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VOL. VII.

HARNACK'S HISTORY OF DOGMA.

VOL. II.

HISTORY OF DOGMA

BY

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*TRANSLATED FROM THE THIRD GERMAN
EDITION*

BY

NEIL BUCHANAN

VOL. II.

BOSTON

ROBERTS BROTHERS

1897

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CHAPTER I.

HISTORICAL SURVEY.

THE second century of the existence of Gentile-Christian communities was characterised by the victorious conflict with Gnosticism and the Marcionite Church, by the gradual development of an ecclesiastical doctrine, and by the decay of the early Christian enthusiasm. The general result was the establishment of a great ecclesiastical association, which, forming at one and the same time a political commonwealth, school and union for worship, was based on the firm foundation of an "apostolic" law of faith, a collection of "apostolic" writings, and finally, an "apostolic" organisation. This institution was *the Catholic Church*.¹ In opposition to Gnosticism and Marcionitism, the main articles forming the estate and possession of orthodox Christianity were raised to the rank of apostolic regulations and laws, and thereby placed beyond all discussion and assault. At first the innovations introduced by this were not of a material, but of a formal, character. Hence they were not noticed by any of those who had never, or only in a vague fashion, been elevated to the feeling and idea of freedom and independence in religion.

¹ Aubé (*Histoire des Persécutions de l'Eglise*, Vol. II. 1878. pp. 1—68) has given a survey of the genesis of ecclesiastical dogma. The disquisitions of Renan in the last volumes of his great historical work are excellent, though not seldom exaggerated in particular points. See especially the concluding observations in Vol. VII. cc. 28—34. Since the appearance of Ritschl's monograph on the genesis of the old Catholic Church, a treatise which, however, forms too narrow a conception of the problem, German science can point to no work of equal rank with the French. Cf. Sohm's *Kirchenrecht*, Vol. I. which, however, in a very one-sided manner, makes the adoption of the legal and constitutional arrangements responsible for all the evil in the Church.

How great the innovations actually were, however, may be measured by the fact that they signified a scholastic tutelage of the faith of the individual Christian, and restricted the immediateness of religious feelings and ideas to the narrowest limits. But the conflict with the so-called Montanism showed that there were still a considerable number of Christians who valued that immediateness and freedom; these were, however, defeated. The fixing of the tradition under the title of apostolic necessarily led to the assumption that whoever held the apostolic doctrine was also essentially a Christian in the apostolic sense. This assumption, quite apart from the innovations which were legitimised by tracing them to the Apostles, meant the separation of doctrine and conduct, the preference of the former to the latter, and the transformation of a fellowship of faith, hope, and discipline into a communion "eiusdem sacramenti", that is, into a union which, like the philosophical schools, rested on a doctrinal law, and which was subject to a legal code of divine institution.¹

The movement which resulted in the Catholic Church owes its right to a place in the history of Christianity to the victory

¹ Sohm (p. 160) declares: "The foundation of Catholicism is the divine Church law to which it lays claim." In many other passages he even seems to express the opinion that the Church law of itself, even when not represented as divine, is the hereditary enemy of the true Church and at the same time denotes the essence of Catholicism. See, e.g., p. 2: "The whole essence of Catholicism consists in its declaring legal institutions to be necessary to the Church." Page 700: "The essence of Church law is incompatible with the essence of the Church." This thesis really characterises Catholicism well and contains a great truth, if expressed in more careful terms, somewhat as follows: The assertion that there is a divine Church law (emanating from Christ, or, in other words, from the Apostles), which is necessary to the spiritual character of the Church and which in fact is a token of this very attribute, is incompatible with the essence of the Gospel and is the mark of a pseudo-Catholicism." But the thesis contains too narrow a view of the case. For the divine Church law is only one feature of the essence of the Catholic Church, though a very important element, which Sohm, as a jurist, was peculiarly capable of recognising. The whole essence of Catholicism, however, consists in the deification of tradition generally. The declaration that the empirical institutions of the Church, created for and necessary to this purpose, are apostolic, a declaration which amalgamates them with the essence and content of the Gospel and places them beyond all criticism, is the peculiarly "Catholic" feature. Now, as a great part of these institutions cannot be inwardly appropriated and cannot really amalgamate with faith and piety, it is self-evident that such portions become

over Gnosticism and to the preservation of an important part of early Christian tradition. If Gnosticism in all its phases was the violent attempt to drag Christianity down to the level of the Greek world, and to rob it of its dearest possession, belief in the Almighty God of creation and redemption, then Catholicism, inasmuch as it secured this belief for the Greeks, preserved the Old Testament, and supplemented it with early Christian writings, thereby saving—as far as documents, at least, were concerned—and proclaiming the authority of an important part of primitive Christianity, must in one respect be acknowledged as a conservative force born from the vigour of Christi-

legal ordinances. to which obedience must be rendered. For no other relation to these ordinances can be conceived. Hence the legal regulations and the corresponding slavish devotion come to have such immense scope in Catholicism, and well-nigh express its essence. But behind this is found the more general conviction that the empirical Church, as it actually exists, is the authentic, pure, and infallible creation: its doctrine, its regulations, its religious ceremonial are apostolic. Whoever doubts that renounces Christ. Now, if, as in the case of the Reformers, this conception be recognised as erroneous and unevangelical, the result must certainly be a strong detestation of “the divine Church law.” Indeed, the inclination to sweep away all Church law is quite intelligible, for when you give the devil your little finger he takes the whole hand. But, on the other hand, it cannot be imagined how communities are to exist on earth, propagate themselves, and train men without regulations; and how regulations are to exist without resulting in the formation of a code of laws. In truth, such regulations have at no time been wanting in Christian communities, and have always possessed the character of a legal code. Sohni’s distinction, that in the oldest period there was no “law”, but only a “regulation”, is artificial, though possessed of a certain degree of truth; for the regulation has one aspect in a circle of like-minded enthusiasts, and a different one in a community where all stages of moral and religious culture are represented, and which has therefore to train its members. Or should it not do so? And, on the other hand, had the oldest Churches not the Old Testament and the *διατάξεις* of the Apostles? Were these no code of laws? Sohni’s proposition: “The essence of Church law is incompatible with the essence of the Church,” does not rise to evangelical clearness and freedom, but has been formed under the shadow and ban of Catholicism. I am inclined to call it an Anabaptist thesis. The Anabaptists were also in the shadow and ban of Catholicism; hence their only course was either the attempt to wreck the Church and Church history and found a new empire, or a return to Catholicism. Hermann Bockelson or the Pope! But the Gospel is above the question of Jew or Greek, and therefore also above the question of a legal code. It is reconcilable with everything that is not sin, even with the philosophy of the Greeks. Why should it not be also compatible with the monarchical bishop, with the legal code of the Romans, and even with the Pope, provided these are not made part of the Gospel.

anity. If we put aside abstract considerations and merely look at the facts of the given situation, we cannot but admire a creation which first broke up the various outside forces assailing Christianity, and in which the highest blessings of this faith have always continued to be accessible. If the founder of the Christian religion had deemed belief in the Gospel and a life in accordance with it to be compatible with membership of the Synagogue and observance of the Jewish law, there could at least be no impossibility of adhering to the Gospel within the Catholic Church.

Still, that is only one side of the case. The older Catholicism never clearly put the question, "What is Christian?" Instead of answering that question it rather laid down rules, the recognition of which was to be the guarantee of Christianity. This solution of the problem seems to be on the one hand too narrow and on the other too broad. Too narrow, because it bound Christianity to rules under which it necessarily languished; too broad, because it did not in any way exclude the introduction of new and foreign conceptions. In throwing a protective covering round the Gospel, Catholicism also obscured it. It preserved Christianity from being hellenised to the most extreme extent, but, as time went on, it was forced to admit into this religion an ever greater measure of secularisation. In the interests of its world-wide mission it did not indeed directly disguise the terrible seriousness of religion, but, by tolerating a less strict ideal of life, it made it possible for those less in earnest to be considered Christians, and to regard themselves as such. It permitted the genesis of a Church, which was no longer a communion of faith, hope, and discipline, but a political commonwealth in which the Gospel merely had a place beside other things.¹ In ever increasing measure it invested all the forms which this secular commonwealth required with apostolic, that is, indirectly, with divine authority. This course disfigured Christianity and made a knowledge of what is Christian an obscure and difficult matter. But, in Catholicism, religion for the first time obtained a formal dogmatic system. Catholic Christi-

¹ In the formation of the Marcionite Church we have, on the other hand, the attempt to create a rigid oecumenical community, held together solely by religion. The Marcionite Church therefore had a founder, the Catholic has none.

anity discovered the formula which reconciled faith and knowledge. This formula satisfied humanity for centuries, and the blessed effects which it accomplished continued to operate even after it had itself already become a fetter.

Catholic Christianity grew out of two converging series of developments. In the one were set up fixed outer standards for determining what is Christian, and these standards were proclaimed to be apostolic institutions. The baptismal confession was exalted to an apostolic rule of faith, that is, to an apostolic law of faith. A collection of apostolic writings was formed from those read in the Churches, and this compilation was placed on an equal footing with the Old Testament. The episcopal and monarchical constitution was declared to be apostolic, and the attribute of successor of the Apostles was conferred on the bishop. Finally, the religious ceremonial developed into a celebration of mysteries, which was in like manner traced back to the Apostles. The result of these institutions was a strictly exclusive Church in the form of a communion of doctrine, ceremonial, and law, a confederation which more and more gathered the various communities within its pale, and brought about the decline of all nonconforming sects. The confederation was primarily based on a common confession, which, however, was not only conceived as "law," but was also very soon supplemented by new standards. One of the most important problems to be investigated in the history of dogma, and one which unfortunately cannot be completely solved, is to show what necessities led to the setting up of a new canon of Scripture, what circumstances required the appearance of living authorities in the communities, and what relation was established between the apostolic rule of faith, the apostolic canon of Scripture, and the apostolic office. The development ended with the formation of a clerical class, at whose head stood the bishop, who united in himself all conceivable powers, as teacher, priest, and judge. He disposed of the powers of Christianity, guaranteed its purity, and therefore in every respect held the Christian laity in tutelage.

But even apart from the content which Christianity here received, this process in itself represents a progressive secularising of the Church. This would be self-evident enough, even if it

were not confirmed by noting the fact that the process had already been to some extent anticipated in the so-called Gnosticism (See vol. I. p. 253 and Tertullian, *de præscr.* 35). But the element which the latter lacked, namely, a firmly welded, suitably regulated constitution, must by no means be regarded as one originally belonging and essential to Christianity. The depotentiation to which Christianity was here subjected appears still more plainly in the facts, that the Christian hopes were deadened, that the secularising of the Christian life was tolerated and even legitimised, and that the manifestations of an unconditional devotion to the heavenly excited suspicion or were compelled to confine themselves to very narrow limits.

But these considerations are scarcely needed as soon as we turn our attention to the second series of developments that make up the history of this period. The Church did not merely set up dykes and walls against Gnosticism in order to ward it off externally, nor was she satisfied with defending against it the facts which were the objects of her belief and hope; but, taking the creed for granted, she began to follow this heresy into its own special territory and to combat it with a scientific theology. That was a necessity which did not first spring from Christianity's own internal struggles. It was already involved in the fact that the Christian Church had been joined by cultured Greeks, who felt the need of justifying their Christianity to themselves and the world, and of presenting it as the desired and certain answer to all the pressing questions which then occupied men's minds.

The beginning of a development which a century later reached its provisional completion in the theology of Origen, that is, in the transformation of the Gospel into a scientific system of ecclesiastical doctrine, appears in the Christian Apologetic, as we already find it before the middle of the second century. As regards its content, this system of doctrine meant the legitimising of Greek philosophy within the sphere of the rule of faith. The theology of Origen bears the same relation to the New Testament as that of Philo does to the Old. What is here presented as Christianity is in fact the idealistic religious philosophy of the age, attested by divine revelation, made accessible to all by the incarnation of the Logos, and purified from any

connection with Greek mythology and gross polytheism.¹ A motley multitude of primitive Christian ideas and hopes, derived from both Testaments, and too brittle to be completely recast, as yet enclosed the kernel. But the majority of these were successfully manipulated by theological art, and the traditional rule of faith was transformed into a system of doctrine, in which, to some extent, the old articles found only a nominal place.²

This hellenising of ecclesiastical Christianity, by which we do not mean the Gospel, was not a gradual process; for the truth rather is that it was already accomplished the moment that the reflective Greek confronted the new religion which he had accepted. The Christianity of men like Justin, Athenagoras, and Minucius is not a whit less Hellenistic than that of Origen. But yet an important distinction obtains here. It is twofold. In the first place, those Apologists did not yet find themselves face to face with a fixed collection of writings having a title to be revered as Christian; they have to do with the Old Testament and the "Teachings of Christ" (*διδάγματα Χριστοῦ*). In the second place, they do not yet regard the scientific presentation of Christianity as the main task and as one which this religion itself demands. As they really never enquired what was meant by "Christian," or at least never put the question clearly to themselves, they never claimed that their scientific presentation of Christianity was the first proper expression of it that had been given. Justin and his contemporaries make it perfectly clear that they consider the traditional faith existing in the churches to be complete and pure and in itself requiring no scientific revision. In a word, the gulf which existed

¹ The historian who wishes to determine the advance made by Græco-Roman humanity in the third and fourth centuries, under the influence of Catholicism and its theology, must above all keep in view the fact that gross polytheism and immoral mythology were swept away, spiritual monotheism brought near to all, and the ideal of a divine life and the hope of an eternal one made certain. Philosophy also aimed at that, but it was not able to establish a community of men on these foundations.

² Luther, as is well known, had a very profound impression of the distinction between Biblical Christianity and the theology of the Fathers, who followed the theories of Origen. See, for example, Werke, Vol. LXII, p. 49, quoting Proles: "When the word of God comes to the Fathers, me thinks it is as if milk were filtered through a coal sack, where the milk must become black and spoiled."

between the religious thought of philosophers and the sum of Christian tradition is still altogether unperceived, because that tradition was not yet fixed in rigid forms, because no religious utterance testifying to monotheism, virtue, and reward was as yet threatened by any control, and finally, because the speech of philosophy was only understood by a small minority in the Church, though its interests and aims were not unknown to most. Christian thinkers were therefore still free to divest of their direct religious value all realistic and historical elements of the tradition, while still retaining them as parts of a huge apparatus of proof, which accomplished what was really the only thing that many sought in Christianity, viz., the assurance that the theory of the world obtained from other sources was the truth. The danger which here threatened Christianity as a religion was scarcely less serious than that which had been caused to it by the Gnostics. These remodelled tradition, the Apologists made it to some extent inoperative without attacking it. The latter were not disowned, but rather laid the foundation of Church theology, and determined the circle of interests within which it was to move in the future.¹

But the problem which the Apologists solved almost offhand, namely, the task of showing that Christianity was the perfect and certain philosophy, because it rested on revelation, and that it was the highest scientific knowledge of God and the world, was to be rendered more difficult. To these difficulties all that primitive Christianity has up to the present transmitted to the Church of succeeding times contributes its share. The conflict with Gnosticism made it necessary to find some sort of solution to the question, "What is Christian?" and to fix this answer. But indeed the Fathers were not able to answer the question confidently and definitely. They therefore made a selection from tradition and contented themselves with making it binding on Christians. Whatever was to lay claim to authority in the

¹ They were not the first to determine this circle of interests. So far as we can demonstrate traces of independent religious knowledge among the so-called Apostolic Fathers of the post-apostolic age, they are in thorough harmony with the theories of the Apologists, which are merely expressed with precision and divested of Old Testament language.

Church had henceforth to be in harmony with the rule of faith and the canon of New Testament Scriptures. That created an entirely new situation for Christian thinkers, that is, for those trying to solve the problem of subordinating Christianity to the Hellenic spirit. That spirit never became quite master of the situation; it was obliged to accommodate itself to it.¹ The work first began with the scientific treatment of individual articles contained in the rule of faith, partly with the view of disproving Gnostic conceptions, partly for the purpose of satisfying the Church's own needs. The framework in which these articles were placed virtually continued to be the apologetic theology, for this maintained a doctrine of God and the world, which seemed to correspond to the earliest tradition as much as it ran counter to the Gnostic theses. (Melito), Irenæus, Tertullian and Hippolytus, aided more or less by tradition on the one hand and by philosophy on the other, opposed to the Gnostic dogmas about Christianity the articles of the baptismal confession interpreted as a rule of faith, these articles being developed into doctrines. Here they undoubtedly learned very much from the Gnostics and Marcion. If we define ecclesiastical dogmas as propositions handed down in the creed of the Church, shown to exist in the Holy Scriptures of both Testaments, and rationally reproduced and formulated, then the men we have just mentioned were the first to set up dogmas²—dogmas but no

¹ It was only after the apostolic tradition, fixed in the form of a comprehensive collection, seemed to guarantee the admissibility of every form of Christianity that revered that collection, that the hellenising of Christianity within the Church began in serious fashion. The fixing of tradition had had a twofold result. On the one hand, it opened the way more than ever before for a free and unhesitating introduction of foreign ideas into Christianity, and, on the other hand, so far as it really also included the documents and convictions of primitive Christianity, it preserved this religion to the future and led to a return to it, either from scientific or religious considerations. That we know anything at all of original Christianity is entirely due to the fixing of the tradition, as found at the basis of Catholicism. On the supposition—which is indeed an academic consideration—that this fixing had not taken place because of the non-appearance of the Gnosticism which occasioned it, and on the further supposition that the original enthusiasm had continued, we would in all probability know next to nothing of original Christianity to-day. How much we would have known may be seen from the Shepherd of Hermas.

² So far as the Catholic Church is concerned, the idea of dogmas as individual theorems characteristic of Christianity, and capable of being scholastically proved,

system of dogmatics. As yet the difficulty of the problem was by no means perceived by these men either. Their peculiar capacity for sympathising with and understanding the traditional and the old still left them in a happy blindness. So far as they had a theology they supposed it to be nothing more than the explanation of the faith of the Christian multitude (yet Tertullian already noted the difference in one point, certainly a very characteristic one, viz., the Logos doctrine). They still lived in the belief that the Christianity which filled their minds required no scientific remodelling in order to be an expression of the highest knowledge, and that it was in all respects identical with the Christianity which even the most uncultivated could grasp. That this was an illusion is proved by many considerations, but most convincingly by the fact that Tertullian and Hippolytus had the main share in introducing into the doctrine of faith a philosophically formulated dogma, viz., that the Son of God is the Logos, and in having it made the *articulus constitutivus ecclesie*. The effects of this undertaking can never be too highly estimated, for the Logos doctrine is Greek philosophy *in nuce*, though primitive Christian views may have been subsequently incorporated with it. Its introduction into the creed of Christendom, which was, strictly speaking, the setting up of the first dogma in the Church, meant the future conversion of the rule of faith into a philosophic system. But in yet another respect Irenæus and Hippolytus denote an immense advance beyond the Apologists, which, paradoxically enough, results both from the progress of Christian Hellenism and from a deeper study of the Pauline theology, that is, emanates from the controversy with Gnosticism. In them a religious and realistic idea takes the place of the moralism of the Apologists, namely, the deifying of the human race through the incarnation of the Son of God. The apotheosis of mortal man through his acquisition of immortality (divine life) is the idea of salvation which was taught in the ancient mysteries. It is here adopted as a Christian one, supported by the Pauline theology (especially as contained in the Epistle to the Ephesians), and brought into the closest originated with the Apologists. Even as early as Justin we find tendencies to amalgamate historical material and natural theology.

connection with the historical Christ, the Son of God and Son of man (*filius dei et filius hominis*). What the heathen faintly hoped for as a possibility was here announced as certain, and indeed as having already taken place. What a message! This conception was to become the central Christian idea of the future. A long time, however, elapsed before it made its way into the dogmatic system of the Church.¹

But meanwhile the huge gulf which existed between both Testaments and the rule of faith on the one hand, and the current ideas of the time on the other, had been recognized in Alexandria. It was not indeed felt as a gulf, for then either the one or the other would have had to be given up, but as a *problem*. If the Church tradition contained the assurance, not to be obtained elsewhere, of all that Greek culture knew, hoped for, and prized, and if for that very reason it was regarded as in every respect inviolable, then the absolutely indissoluble union of Christian tradition with the Greek philosophy of religion was placed beyond all doubt. But an immense number of problems were at the same time raised, especially when, as in the case of the Alexandrians, heathen syncretism in the entire breadth of its development was united with the doctrine of the Church. The task, which had been begun by Philo and carried on by Valentinus and his school, was now undertaken in the Church. Clement led the way in attempting a solution of the problem, but the huge task proved too much for him. Origen took it up under more difficult circumstances, and in a certain fashion brought it to a conclusion. He, the rival of the Neoplatonic philosophers, the Christian Philo, wrote the first Christian dogmatic, which competed with the philosophic systems of the time, and which, founded on the Scriptures of both Testaments, presents a peculiar union of the apologetic theology of a Justin and the Gnostic theology of a Valentinus,

¹ It is almost completely wanting in Tertullian. That is explained by the fact that this remarkable man was in his inmost soul an old-fashioned Christian, to whom the Gospel was *conscientia religionis, disciplina vite* and *spes fidei*, and who found no sort of edification in Neoplatonic notions, but rather dwelt on the ideas "command", "performance", "error", "forgiveness". In Irenæus also, moreover, the ancient idea of salvation, supplemented by elements derived from the Pauline theology, is united with the primitive Christian eschatology.

while keeping steadily in view a simple and highly practical aim. In this dogmatic the rule of faith is recast and that quite consciously. Origen did not conceal his conviction that Christianity finds its correct expression only in scientific knowledge, and that every form of Christianity that lacks theology is but a meagre kind with no clear consciousness of its own content. This conviction plainly shows that Origen was dealing with a different kind of Christianity, though his view that a mere relative distinction existed here may have its justification in the fact, that the untheological Christianity of the age with which he compared his own was already permeated by Hellenic elements and in a very great measure secularised.¹ But Origen, as well as Clement before him, had really a right to the conviction that the true essence of Christianity, or, in other words, the Gospel, is only arrived at by the aid of critical speculation; for was not the Gospel veiled and hidden in the canon of both Testaments, was it not displaced by the rule of faith, was it not crushed down, depotentiated, and disfigured in the Church which identified itself with the people of Christ? Clement and Origen found freedom and independence in what they recognized to be the essence of the matter and what they contrived with masterly skill to determine as its proper aim, after an examination of the huge apparatus of tradition. But was not that the ideal of Greek sages and philosophers? This question can by no means be flatly answered in the negative, and still less decidedly in the affirmative, for a new significance was here given to the ideal by representing it *as assured beyond all doubt, already realised* in the person of Christ and incompatible with polytheism. If, as is manifestly the case, they found joy and peace in their faith and in the theory of the universe connected with it, if they prepared themselves for an eternal life and expected it with certainty, if they felt themselves to be perfect only through dependence on God, then, in spite of their Hellenism, they unquestionably came nearer to the Gospel than Irenæus with his slavish dependence on authority.

The setting up of a scientific system of Christian dogmatics, which

¹ On the significance of Clement and Origen see Overbeck, "Über die Anfänge der patristischen Litteratur" in d. Hist. Ztschr. N. F., Vol. XII. p. 417 ff.

was still something different from the rule of faith, interpreted in an Antignostic sense, philosophically wrought out, and in some parts proved from the Bible, was a private undertaking of Origen, and at first only approved in limited circles. As yet, not only were certain bold changes of interpretation disputed in the Church, but the undertaking itself, as a whole, was disapproved.¹ The circumstances of the several provincial churches in the first half of the third century were still very diverse. Many communities had yet to adopt the basis that made them into Catholic ones; and in most, if not in all, the education of the clergy—not to speak of the laity—was not high enough to enable them to appreciate systematic theology. But the schools in which Origen taught carried on his work, similar ones were established, and these produced a number of the bishops and presbyters of the East in the last half of the third century. They had in their hands the means of culture afforded by the age, and this was all the more a guarantee of victory because the laity no longer took any part in deciding the form of religion. Wherever the Logos Christology had been adopted the future of Christian Hellenism was certain. At the beginning of the fourth century there was no community in Christendom which, apart from the Logos doctrine, possessed a purely philosophical theory that was regarded as an ecclesiastical dogma, to say nothing of an official scientific theology. But the system of Origen was a prophecy of the future. The Logos doctrine started the crystallising process which resulted in further deposits. Symbols of faith were already drawn up which contained a peculiar mixture of Origen's theology with the inflexible Antignostic *regula fidei*. One celebrated theologian, Methodius, endeavoured to unite the theology of Irenæus and Origen, ecclesiastical realism and philosophic spiritualism, under the badge of monastic mysticism. The developments of the following period therefore no longer appear surprising in any respect.

As Catholicism, from every point of view, is the result of

¹ Information on this point may be got not only from the writings of Origen (see especially his work against Celsus), but also and above all from his history. The controversy between Dionysius of Alexandria and the Chiliasts is also instructive on the matter.

the blending of Christianity with the ideas of antiquity,¹ so the Catholic dogmatic, as it was developed after the second or third century on the basis of the Logos doctrine, is Christianity conceived and formulated from the standpoint of the Greek philosophy of religion.² This Christianity conquered the old world, and became the foundation of a new phase of history in the Middle Ages. The union of the Christian religion with a definite historical phase of human knowledge and culture may be lamented in the interest of the Christian religion, which was thereby secularised, and in the interest of the development of culture which was thereby retarded (?). But lamentations become here ill-founded assumptions, as absolutely everything that we have and value is due to the alliance that Christianity and antiquity concluded in such a way that neither was able to prevail over the other. Our inward and spiritual life, which owes the least part of its content to the empiric knowledge which we have acquired, is based up to the present moment on the discords resulting from that union.

These hints are meant among other things to explain and justify³ the arrangement chosen for the following presentation, which embraces the fundamental section of the history of Christian dogma.⁴ A few more remarks are, however, necessary.

¹ The three or (reckoning Methodius) four steps of the development of church doctrine (Apologists, Old Catholic Fathers, Alexandrians) correspond to the progressive religious and philosophical development of heathendom at that period: philosophic moralism, ideas of salvation (theology and practice of mysteries), Neoplatonic philosophy, and complete syncretism.

² "Virtus omnis ex his causam accipit, a quibus provocatur (Tertull., de bapt. 2.)

³ The plan of placing the apologetic theology before everything else would have much to recommend it, but I adhere to the arrangement here chosen, because the advantage of being able to represent and survey the outer ecclesiastical development and the inner theological one, each being viewed as a unity, seems to me to be very great. We must then of course understand the two developments as proceeding on parallel lines. But the placing of the former parallel before the latter in my presentation is justified by the fact that what was gained in the former passed over much more directly and swiftly into the general life of the Church, than what was reached in the latter. Decades elapsed, for instance, before the apologetic theology came to be generally known and accepted in the Church, as is shown by the long continued conflict against Monarchianism.

⁴ The origin of Catholicism can only be very imperfectly described within the framework of the history of dogma, for the political situation of the Christian

1. One special difficulty in ascertaining the genesis of the Catholic rules is that the churches, though on terms of close connection and mutual intercourse, had no real *forum publicum*, though indeed, in a certain sense, each bishop was *in foro publico*. As a rule, therefore, we can only see the advance in the establishment of fixed forms in the shape of results, without being able to state precisely the ways and means which led to them. We do indeed know the factors, and can therefore theoretically construct the development; but the real course of things is frequently hidden from us. The genesis of a harmonious Church, firmly welded together in doctrine and constitution, can no more have been the natural unpremeditated product of the conditions of the time than were the genesis and adoption of the New Testament canon of Scripture. But we have no direct evidence as to what communities had a special share in the development, although we know that the Roman Church played a leading part. Moreover, we can only conjecture that conferences, common measures, and synodical decisions were not wanting. It is certain that, beginning with the last quarter of the second century, there were held in the different provinces, mostly in the East, but later also in the West, Synods in which an understanding was arrived at on all questions of importance to Christianity, including, e.g., the extent of the canon.¹

2. The degree of influence exercised by particular ecclesiastics

communities in the Roman Empire had quite as important an influence on the development of the Catholic Church as its internal conflicts. But inasmuch as that situation and these struggles are ultimately connected in the closest way, the history of dogma cannot even furnish a complete picture of this development within definite limits.

¹ See Tertullian, de pudic. 10: "Sed cederem tibi, si scriptura Pastoris, quæ sola moechos amat, divino instrumento meruisset incidi. si non ab omni concilio ecclesiarum etiam vestrarum inter apocrypha et falsa iudicaretur;" de ieiun. 13: "Aguntur præterea per Græcias illa certis in locis concilia ex universis ecclesiis, per quæ et altiora quæque in commune tractantur, et ipsa representatio totius nominis Christiani magna veneratione celebratur." We must also take into account here the intercourse by letter, in which connection I may specially remind the reader of the correspondence between Dionysius, Bishop of Corinth, Euseb., H.E. IV. 23, and journeys such as those of Polycarp and Abercius to Rome. Cf. generally Zahn, Weltverkehr und Kirche während der drei ersten Jahrhunderte, 1877.

on the development of the Church and its doctrines is also obscure and difficult to determine. As they were compelled to claim the sanction of tradition for every innovation they introduced, and did in fact do so, and as every fresh step they took appeared to themselves necessary only as an explanation, it is in many cases quite impossible to distinguish between what they received from tradition and what they added to it of their own. Yet an investigation from the point of view of the historian of literature shows that Tertullian and Hippolytus were to a great extent dependent on Irenæus. What amount of innovation these men independently contributed can therefore still be ascertained. Both are men of the second generation. Tertullian is related to Irenæus pretty much as Calvin to Luther. This parallel holds good in more than one respect. First, Tertullian drew up a series of plain dogmatic formulæ which are not found in Irenæus and which proved of the greatest importance in succeeding times. Secondly, he did not attain the power, vividness, and unity of religious intuition which distinguish Irenæus. The truth rather is that, just because of his forms, he partly destroyed the unity of the matter and partly led it into a false path of development. Thirdly, he everywhere endeavoured to give a conception of Christianity which represented it as the divine law, whereas in Irenæus this idea is overshadowed by the conception of the Gospel as real redemption. The main problem therefore resolves itself into the question as to the position of Irenæus in the history of the Church. To what extent were his expositions new, to what extent were the standards he formulated already employed in the Churches, and in which of them? We cannot form to ourselves a sufficiently vivid picture of the interchange of Christian writings in the Church after the last quarter of the second century.¹ Every important work speedily found its way into the churches of the chief cities in the Empire. The diffusion was not merely from East to West, though this was the general rule. At the beginning of the fourth century there was in Cæsarea a Greek translation of Tertullian's Apology and a collection

¹ See my studies respecting the tradition of the Greek Apologists of the second century in the early Church in the *Texte und Unters. z. Gesch. der alt christl. Litteratur*, Vol. I. Part I. 2.

of Cyprian's epistles.¹ The influence of the Roman Church extended over the greater part of Christendom. Up till about the year 260 the Churches in East and West had still in some degree a common history.

3. The developments in the history of dogma within the period extending from about 150 to about 300 were by no means brought about in the different communities at the same time and in a completely analogous fashion. This fact is in great measure concealed from us, because our authorities are almost completely derived from those leading Churches that were connected with each other by constant intercourse. Yet the difference can still be clearly proved by the ratio of development in Rome, Lyons, and Carthage on the one hand, and in Alexandria on the other. Besides, we have several valuable accounts showing that in more remote provinces and communities the development was slower, and a primitive and freer condition of things much longer preserved.²

4. From the time that the clergy acquired complete sway over the Churches, that is, from the beginning of the second third of the third century, the development of the history of dogma practically took place within the ranks of that class, and was carried on by its learned men. Every mystery they set up therefore became doubly mysterious to the laity, for these did not even understand the terms, and hence it formed another new fetter.

¹ See Euseb., H.E. II. 2: VI. 43.

² See the accounts of Christianity in Edessa and the far East generally. The *Acta Archelai* and the *Homilies of Aphraates* should also be specially examined. Cf. further Euseb., H. E. VI. 12, and finally the remains of the Latin-Christian literature of the third century—apart from Tertullian, Cyprian and Novatian—as found partly under the name of Cyprian, partly under other titles. Commodian, Arnobius, and Lactantius are also instructive here. This literature has been but little utilised with respect to the history of dogma and of the Church.

I. *FIXING AND GRADUAL SECULARISING OF CHRISTIANITY AS A CHURCH.*

CHAPTER II.

THE SETTING UP OF THE APOSTOLIC STANDARDS FOR ECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH. ¹

We may take as preface to this chapter three celebrated passages from Tertullian's "de præscriptione hæreticorum." In chap. 21 we find: "It is plain that all teaching that agrees with those apostolic Churches which are the wombs and origins of the faith must be set down as truth, it being certain that such doctrine contains that which the Church received from the Apostles, the Apostles from Christ, and Christ from God." In chap. 36 we read: "Let us see what it (the Roman Church) has learned, what it has taught, and what fellowship it has likewise had with the African Churches. It acknowledges one God the

¹ In itself the predicate "Catholic" contains no element that signifies a secularising of the Church. "Catholic" originally means Christianity in its totality as contrasted with single congregations. Hence the concepts "all communities" and the "universal Church" are identical. But from the beginning there was a dogmatic element in the concept of the universal Church, in so far as the latter was conceived to have been spread over the whole earth by the Apostles; an idea which involved the conviction that only that could be true which was found *everywhere* in Christendom. Consequently, "entire or universal Christendom," "the Church spread over the whole earth," and "the true Church" were regarded as identical conceptions. In this way the concept "Catholic" became a pregnant one, and finally received a dogmatic and political content. As this result actually took place, it is not inappropriate to speak of pre-Catholic and Catholic Christianity.

Lord, the creator of the universe, and Jesus Christ, the Son of God the creator, born of the Virgin Mary, as well as the resurrection of the flesh. It unites the Law and the Prophets with the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles. From these it draws its faith, and by their authority it seals this faith with water, clothes it with the Holy Spirit, feeds it with the eucharist, and encourages martyrdom. Hence it receives no one who rejects this institution." In chap. 32 the following challenge is addressed to the heretics: "Let them unfold a series of their bishops proceeding by succession from the beginning in such a way that this first bishop of theirs had as his authority and predecessor some one of the Apostles or one of the apostolic men, who, however, associated with the Apostles." * From the consideration of these three passages it directly follows that three standards are to be kept in view, viz., the apostolic doctrine, the apostolic canon of Scripture, and the guarantee of apostolic authority, afforded by the organisation of the Church, that is, by the episcopate, and traced back to apostolic institution. It will be seen that the Church always adopted these three standards together, that is simultaneously.¹ As a matter of fact they originated in Rome and gradually made their way in the other Churches. That Asia Minor had a share in this is probable, though the question is involved in obscurity. The three Catho-

* *Translator's note.* The following is Tertullian's Latin as given by Professor Harnack: Cap. 21: "Constat omnem doctrinam quæ cum ecclesiis apostolicis matricibus et originalibus fidei conspiret veritati deputandam, id sine dubio tenentem quod ecclesiæ ab apostolis, apostoli a Christo, Christus a deo accepit." Cap. 36: "Videamus quid (ecclesia Romanensis) didicerit, quid docuerit, cum Africanis quoque ecclesiis contesserit. Unum deum dominum novit, creatorem universitatis, et Christum Iesum ex virgine Maria filium dei creatoris, et carnis resurrectionem; legem et prophetas cum evangelicis et apostolicis litteris miscet; inde potat fidem, eam aqua signat, sancto spiritu vestit, eucharistia pascit, martyrium exhortatur, et ita adversus hanc institutionem neminem recipit." Chap. 32: "Evolvant ordinem episcoporum suorum, ita per successionem ab initio decurrentem, ut primus ille episcopus aliquem ex apostolis vel apostolicis viris, qui tamen cum apostolis perseveravit, habuerit auctorem et antecessorem."

¹ None of the three standards, for instance, were in the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions, which belong to the third century and are of Syrian origin; but instead of them the Old Testament and Gospel on the one hand, and the bishop, as the God of the community, on the other, are taken as authorities.

lic standards had their preparatory stages, (1) in short kerygmatic creeds; (2) in the authority of the Lord and the formless apostolic tradition as well as in the writings read in the Churches; (3) in the veneration paid to apostles, prophets, and teachers, or the "elders" and leaders of the individual communities.

A. *The Transformation of the Baptismal Confession into the Apostolic Rule of Faith.*

It has been explained (vol. I. p. 157) that the idea of the complete identity of what the Churches possessed as Christian communities with the doctrine or regulations of the twelve Apostles can already be shown in the earliest Gentile-Christian literature. In the widest sense the expression, *κανὼν τῆς παραδόσεως* (canon of tradition), originally included all that was traced back to Christ himself through the medium of the Apostles and was of value for the faith and life of the Church, together with everything that was or seemed her inalienable possession, as, for instance, the Christian interpretation of the Old Testament. In the narrower sense that canon consisted of the history and words of Jesus. In so far as they formed the content of faith they were the faith itself, that is, the Christian truth; in so far as this faith was to determine the essence of everything Christian, it might be termed *κανὼν τῆς πίστεως*, *κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας* (canon of the faith, canon of the truth).¹ But the very fact that the extent of what was regarded as tradition of the Apostles was quite undetermined ensured the possibility of the highest degree of freedom; it was also still allowable to give expression to

¹ See Zahn, *Glaubensregel und Taufbekenntnis in der alten Kirche in der Zeitschrift f. Kirchl. Wissensch. u. Kirchl. Leben*, 1881, Part 6, p. 302 ff., especially p. 314 ff. In the Epistle of Jude, v. 3, mention is made of the ἄπαιξι παραδοθεῖσα τοῖς ἁγίοις πίστις, and in v. 20 of "building yourselves up in your most holy faith." See Polycarp, ep. III. 2 (also VII. 2; II. 1). In either case the expressions *κανὼν τῆς πίστεως*, *κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας*, or the like, might stand for *πίστις*, for the faith itself is primarily the canon; but it is the canon only in so far as it is comprehensible and plainly defined. Here lies the transition to a new interpretation of the conception of a standard in its relation to the faith. Voigt has published an excellent investigation of the concept ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας cum synonymis (*Eine verschollene Urkunde des antimont. Kampfes*, 1891, pp. 184—205).

Christian inspiration and to the intuition of enthusiasm without any regard to tradition.

We now know that before the violent conflict with Gnosticism short formulated summaries of the faith had already grown out of the missionary practice of the Church (catechising). The shortest formula was that which defined the Christian faith as belief in the Father, Son, and Spirit.¹ It appears to have been universally current in Christendom about the year 150. In the solemn transactions of the Church, therefore especially in baptism, in the great prayer of the Lord's Supper, as well as in the exorcism of demons,² fixed formulæ were used. They embraced also such articles as contained the most important facts in the history of Jesus.³ We know definitely that not later than about the middle of the second century (about 140 A.D.) the Roman Church possessed a fixed creed, which every candidate for baptism had to profess;⁴ and something similar must also have existed

¹ In Hermas, Mand. I., we find a still shorter formula which only contains the confession of the monarchy of God, who created the world, that is the formula *πιστεύω εἰς ἕνα θεόν παντακράτορα*, which did not originate with the baptismal ceremony. But though at first the monarchy may have been the only dogma in the strict sense, the mission of Jesus Christ beyond doubt occupied a place alongside of it from the beginning; and the new religion was inconceivable without this.

² See on this point Justin, index to Otto's edition. It is not surprising that formulæ similar to those used at baptism were employed in the exorcism of demons. However, we cannot immediately infer from the latter what was the wording of the baptismal confession. Though, for example, it is an established fact that in Justin's time demons were exorcised with the words: "In the name of Jesus Christ who was crucified under Pontius Pilate," it does not necessarily follow from this that these words were also found in the baptismal confession. The sign of the cross was made over those possessed by demons; hence nothing was more natural than that these words should be spoken. Hence they are not necessarily borrowed from a baptismal confession.

³ These facts were known to every Christian. They are probably also alluded to in Luke I. 4.

⁴ The most important result of Caspari's extensive and exact studies is the establishment of this fact and the fixing of the wording of the Romish Confession. (Ungedruckte, unbeachtete und wenig beachtete Quellen z. Gesch. des Taufsymbols u. d. Glaubensregels. 3 Vols. 1866—1875. Alte u. neue Quellen zur Gesch. des Taufsymbols u. d. Glaubensregel, 1879). After this Hahn, Bibliothek d. Symbole u. Glaubensregeln der alten Kirche. 2 Aufl. 1877; see also my article "Apostol. Symbol" in Herzog's R.E., 2nd. ed., as well as Book I. of the present work, Chap. III. § 2.

in Smyrna and other Churches of Asia Minor about the year 150, in some cases, even rather earlier. We may suppose that formulæ of similar plan and extent were also found in other provincial Churches about this time.¹ Still it is neither probable that all the then existing communities possessed such creeds, nor that those who used them had formulated them in such a rigid way as the Roman Church had done. The proclamation of the history of Christ predicted in the Old Testament, the *ἡζουζυμζ τῆζ ἀληθείαζ*, also accompanied the short baptismal formula without being expressed in set terms.²

Words of Jesus and, in general, directions for the Christian life were not, as a rule, admitted into the short formulated creed. In the recently discovered "Teaching of the Apostles" (*Διδαχὴ τῶν ἀποστόλων*) we have no doubt a notable attempt to fix the rules of Christian life as traced back to Jesus through the medium of the Apostles, and to elevate them into the foundation of the confederation of Christian Churches; but this undertaking, which could not but have led the development of Christianity into other paths, did not succeed. That the formulated creeds did not express the principles of conduct, but the facts on which Christians based their faith, was an unavoidable necessity. Besides, the universal agreement of all earnest and thoughtful minds on the question of Christian morals was practically assured.³ Objection was not taken to the principles

¹ This supposition is based on observation of the fact that particular statements of the Roman Symbol, in exactly the same form or nearly so, are found in many early Christian writings. See *Patr. App. Opp.* I. 2. ed. 2. pp. 115—42.

² The investigations which lead to this result are of a very complicated nature and cannot therefore be given here. We must content ourselves with remarking that all Western baptismal formulæ (creeds) may be traced back to the Roman, and that there was no universal Eastern creed on parallel lines with the latter. There is no mistaking the importance which, in these circumstances, is to be attributed to the Roman symbol and Church as regards the development of Catholicism.

³ This caused the pronounced tendency of the Church to the formation of dogma, a movement for which Paul had already paved the way. The development of Christianity, as attested, for example, by the *Διδαχὴ*, received an additional factor in the dogmatic tradition, which soon gained the upper hand. The great reaction is then found in monasticism. Here again the rules of morality become

of morality—at least this was not a primary consideration—for there were many Greeks to whom they did not seem foolishness, but to the adoration of Christ as he was represented in tradition and to the Church's worship of a God, who, as creator of the world and as a speaking and visible being, appeared to the Greeks, with their ideas of a purely spiritual deity, to be interwoven with the world, and who, as the God worshipped by the Jews also, seemed clearly distinct from the Supreme Being. This gave rise to the mockery of the heathen, the theological art of the Gnostics, and the radical reconstruction of tradition as attempted by Marcion. With the freedom that still prevailed Christianity was in danger of being resolved into a motley mass of philosophic speculations or of being completely detached from its original conditions. "It was admitted on all sides that Christianity had its starting-point in certain facts and sayings; but if any and every interpretation of those facts and sayings was possible, if any system of philosophy might be taught into which the words that expressed them might be woven, it is clear that there could be but little cohesion between the members of the Christian communities. The problem arose and pressed for an answer: What should be the basis of Christian union? But the problem was for a time insoluble. For there was no standard and no court of appeal." From the very beginning, when the differences in the various Churches began to threaten their unity, appeal was probably made to the Apostles' doctrine, the words of the Lord, tradition, "sound doctrine", definite facts, such as the reality of the human nature (flesh) of Christ, and the reality of his death and resurrection.¹ In instruction, in exhortations, and above all in opposing erroneous doctrines and moral aber-

the prevailing feature, and therefore the old Christian gnomic literature attains in this movement a second period of vigour. In it again dogmatics only form the background for the strict regulation of life. In the instruction given as a preparation for baptism the Christian moral commandments were of course always inculcated, and the obligation to observe these was expressed in the renunciation of Satan and all his works. In consequence of this, there were also fixed formulæ in these cases.

¹ See the Pastoral Epistles, those of John and of Ignatius; also the epistle of Jude, 1 Clem. VII., Polycarp, ad Philipp. VII. II. 1. VI. 3. Justin.

rations, this precept was inculcated from the beginning: ἀπολείπωμεν τὰς κενὰς καὶ ματαιὰς Φροντίδας, καὶ ἔλωμεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐκλεῆ καὶ σεμνὸν τῆς παραδόσεως ἡμῶν κανόνα ("Let us leave off vain and foolish thoughts and betake ourselves to the glorious and august canon of our tradition"). But the very question was: What is sound doctrine? What is the content of tradition? Was the flesh of Christ a reality? etc. There is no doubt that Justin, in opposition to those whom he viewed as pseudo-Christians, insisted on the absolute necessity of acknowledging certain definite traditional facts and made this recognition the standard of orthodoxy. To all appearance it was he who began the great literary struggle for the expulsion of heterodoxy (see his σύνταγμα κατὰ πατρῶν τῶν γεγενημένων ἀρέσεων); but, judging from those writings of his that have been preserved to us, it seems very unlikely that he was already successful in finding a fixed standard for determining orthodox Christianity.¹

The permanence of the communities, however, depended on the discovery of such a standard. They were no longer held together by the *conscientia religionis*, the *unitas disciplinae*, and the *fides spei*. The Gnostics were not solely to blame for that.

¹ In the apologetic writings of Justin the courts of appeal invariably continue to be the Old Testament, the words of the Lord, and the communications of prophets; hence he has hardly insisted on any other in his anti-heretical work. On the other hand we cannot appeal to the observed fact that Tertullian also, in his apologetic writings, did not reveal his standpoint as a churchman and opponent of heresy; for, with one exception, he did not discuss heretics in these tractates at all. On the contrary Justin discussed their position even in his apologetic writings: but nowhere, for instance, wrote anything similar to Theophilus' remarks in "ad Autol.," II. 14. Justin was acquainted with and frequently alluded to fixed formulæ and perhaps a baptismal symbol related to the Roman, if not essentially identical with it. (See Bornemann, Das Taufsymbol Justins in the *Ztschr. f. K. G.* Vol. III. p. 1 ff.), but we cannot prove that he utilised these formulæ in the sense of Irenæus and Tertullian. We find him using the expression ὀρθογνώμονες in Dial. 80. The resurrection of the flesh and the thousand years' kingdom (at Jerusalem) are there reckoned among the beliefs held by the ὀρθογνώμονες κατὰ πάντα Χριστιανοί. But it is very characteristic of the standpoint taken up by Justin that he places between the heretics inspired by demons and the orthodox a class of Christians to whom he gives the general testimony that they are τῆς καθαρῆς καὶ εὐσεβοῦς γνώμης, though they are not fully orthodox in so far as they reject one important doctrine. Such an estimate would have been impossible to Irenæus and Tertullian. They have advanced to the principle that he who violates the law of faith in one point is guilty of breaking it all.

They rather show us merely the excess of a continuous transformation which no community could escape. The gnosis which subjected religion to a critical examination awoke in proportion as religious life from generation to generation lost its warmth and spontaneity. There was a time when the majority of Christians knew themselves to be such, (1) because they had the "Spirit" and found in that an indestructible guarantee of their Christian position, (2) because they observed all the commandments of Jesus (ἐν τῷ λ. καὶ Ἰησοῦ). But when these guarantees died away, and when at the same time the most diverse doctrines that were threatening to break up the Church were preached in the name of Christianity, the fixing of tradition necessarily became the supreme task. Here, as in every other case, the tradition was not fixed till after it had been to some extent departed from. It was just the Gnostics themselves who took the lead in a fixing process, a plain proof that the setting up of dogmatic formulæ has always been the support of new formations. But the example set by the Gnostics was the very thing that rendered the problem difficult. Where was a beginning to be made? "There is a kind of unconscious logic in the minds of masses of men when great questions are abroad, which some one thinker throws into suitable form."¹ There could be no doubt that the needful thing was to fix what was "apostolic", for the one certain thing was that Christianity was based on a divine revelation which had been transmitted through the medium of the Apostles to the Churches of the whole earth. It certainly was not a single individual who hit on the expedient of affirming the fixed forms employed by the Churches in their solemn transactions to be apostolic in the strict sense. It must have come about by a natural process. But the confession of the Father, Son, and Spirit and the *kerygma* of Jesus Christ had the most prominent place among these forms. The special emphasising of these articles, in opposition to the Gnostic and Marcionite undertakings, may also be viewed as the result of the "common sense" of all those who clung to the belief that the Father of Jesus Christ was the creator of the world, and

¹ Hatch, "Organisation of the Church", p. 96.

that the Son of God really appeared in the flesh. But that was not everywhere sufficient, for, even admitting that about the period between 150 and 180 A.D. all the Churches had a fixed creed which they regarded as apostolic in the strict sense—and this cannot be proved,—the most dangerous of all Gnostic schools, viz., those of Valentinus, could recognise this creed, since they already possessed the art of explaining a given text in whatever way they chose. What was needed was an apostolic creed *definitely interpreted*: for it was only by the aid of a definite interpretation that the creed could be used to repel the Gnostic speculations and the Marcionite conception of Christianity.

In this state of matters the Church of Rome, the proceedings of which are known to us through Irenæus and Tertullian, took, with regard to the fixed Roman baptismal confession ascribed to the Apostles, the following step: The Antignostic interpretation required by the necessities of the times was proclaimed as its self-evident content; the confession, thus explained, was designated as the "Catholic faith" ("fides catholica"), that is the rule of truth for the faith; and its acceptance was made the test of adherence to the Roman Church as well as to the general confederation of Christendom. Irenæus was not the author of this proceeding. How far Rome acted with the coöperation or under the influence of the Church of Asia Minor is a matter that is still obscure,¹ and will probably never be determined with certainty. What the Roman community accomplished practically was theoretically established by Irenæus² and Tertullian. The former proclaimed the baptismal confession, definitely interpreted and expressed in an Antignostic form, to be the apostolic rule of truth (*regula veritatis*), and tried

¹ We can only conjecture that some teachers in Asia Minor contemporary with Irenæus, or even of older date, and especially Melito, proceeded in like manner, adhering to Polycarp's exclusive attitude. Dionysius of Corinth (Eusebius, H. E. IV. 23. 2. 4) may perhaps be also mentioned.

² Irenæus set forth his theory in a great work, *adv. haeres.*, especially in the third book. Unfortunately his treatise, "*λογος εἰς ἐπίδειξιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος*", probably the oldest treatise on the rule of faith, has not been preserved (Euseb., H. E. V. 26.)

to prove it so. He based his demonstration on the theory that this series of doctrines embodied the faith of the churches founded by the Apostles, and that these communities had always preserved the apostolic teaching unchanged (see under C).

Viewed historically, this thesis, which preserved Christianity from complete dissolution, is based on two unproved assumptions and on a confusion of ideas. It is not demonstrated that any creed emanated from the Apostles, nor that the Churches they founded always preserved their teaching in its original form; the creed itself, moreover, is confused with its interpretation. Finally, the existence of a *fides catholica*, in the strict sense of the word, cannot be justly inferred from the essential agreement found in the doctrine of a series of communities.¹ But, on the other hand, the course taken by Irenæus was the only one capable of saving what yet remained of primitive Christianity, and that is its historical justification. A *fides apostolica* had to be set up and declared identical with the already existing *fides catholica*. It had to be made the standard for judging all particular doctrinal opinions, that it might be determined whether they were admissible or not.

The persuasive power with which Irenæus set up the principle of the apostolic "rule of truth," or of "tradition" or simply of "faith," was undoubtedly, as far as he himself was concerned, based on the facts that he had already a rigidly formulated creed before him and that he had no doubt as to its interpretation.² The rule

¹ Irenæus indeed asserts in several passages that all Churches—those in Germany, Iberia, among the Celts, in the East, in Egypt, in Lybia and Italy: see I. 10. 2; III. 3. 1; III. 4. 1 sq.—possess the same apostolic *kerygma*; but "qui nimis probat nihil probat." The extravagance of the expressions shows that a dogmatic theory is here at work. Nevertheless this is based on the correct view that the Gnostic speculations are foreign to Christianity and of later date.

² We must further point out here that Irenæus not only knew the tradition of the Churches of Asia Minor and Rome, but that he had sat at the feet of Polycarp and associated in his youth with many of the "elders" in Asia. Of these he knew for certain that they in part did not approve of the Gnostic doctrines and in part would not have done so. The confidence with which he represented his antignostic interpretation of the creed as that of the Church of the Apostles was no doubt owing to this sure historical recollection. See his epistle to Florinus in Euseb., II. E. V. 20 and his numerous references to the "elders" in his great work. (A collection of these may be found in Patr. App. Opp. I. 3. p. 105 sq.)

of truth (also ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας κηρυσσομένη ἀλήθεια "the truth proclaimed by the Church;" and τὸ τῆς ἀληθείας σωματίον, "the body of the truth") is the old baptismal confession well known to the communities for which he immediately writes. (See I. 9. 4; οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὁ τὸν κανόνα τῆς ἀληθείας ἀκλινηῶς ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατέχων ὡν διὰ τοῦ βαπτίσματος εἴληθε, "in like manner he also who retains immovably in his heart the rule of truth which he received through baptism"); because it is this, it is apostolic, firm and immovable.¹

By the fixing of the rule of truth, the formulation of which in the case of Irenæus (I. 10. 1, 2) naturally follows the arrangement of the (Roman) baptismal confession, the most important Gnostic theses were at once set aside and their antitheses established as apostolic. In his apostolic rule of truth Irenæus himself already gave prominence to the following doctrines:²

¹ Caspari's investigations leave no room for doubt as to the relation of the rule of faith to the baptismal confession. The baptismal confession was not a deposit resulting from fluctuating anti-heretical rules of faith; but the latter were the explanations of the baptismal confession. The full authority of the confession itself was transferred to every elucidation that appeared necessary, in so far as the needful explanation was regarded as given with authority. Each momentary formula employed to defend the Church against heresy has therefore the full value of the creed. This explains the fact that, beginning with Irenæus' time, we meet with differently formulated rules of faith, partly in the same writer, and yet each is declared to be *the* rule of faith. Zahn is virtually right when he says, in his essay quoted above, that the rule of faith is the baptismal confession. But, so far as I can judge, he has not discerned the dilemma in which the Old Catholic Fathers were placed, and which they were not able to conceal. This dilemma arose from the fact that the Church needed an apostolic creed, expressed in fixed formulæ and at the same time definitely interpreted in an anti-heretical sense: whereas she only possessed, and this not in all churches, a baptismal confession, contained in fixed formulæ but not interpreted, along with an ecclesiastical tradition which was not formulated, although it no doubt excluded the most offensive Gnostic doctrines. It was not yet possible for the Old Catholic Fathers to frame and formulate that doctrinal confession, and they did not attempt it. The only course therefore was to assert that an elastic collection of doctrines which were ever being formulated anew, was a fixed standard in so far as it was based on a fixed creed. But this dilemma—we do not know how it was viewed by opponents—proved an advantage in the end, for it enabled churchmen to make continual additions to the rule of faith, whilst at the same time continuing to assert its identity with the baptismal confession. We must make the reservation, however, that not only the baptismal confession, but other fixed propositions as well, formed the basis on which particular rules of faith were formulated.

² Besides Irenæus I. 10. 1, 2, cf. 9. 1—5; 22. 1; II. 1. 1; 9. 1; 28. 1; 32. 3,

the unity of God; the identity of the supreme God with the Creator; the identity of the supreme God with the God of the Old Testament; the unity of Jesus Christ as the Son of the God who created the world; the essential divinity of Christ; the incarnation of the Son of God; the prediction of the entire history of Jesus through the Holy Spirit in the Old Testament; the reality of that history; the bodily reception (ἔνσαρκος ἀνάληψις) of Christ into heaven; the visible return of Christ; the resurrection of all flesh (ἀνάστασις πάσης σαρκός, πάσης ἀνθρωπότητος), the universal judgment. These dogmas, the antitheses of the Gnostic regulæ,¹ were consequently, as apostolic and therefore also as Catholic, removed beyond all discussion.

Tertullian followed Irenæus in every particular. He also interpreted the (Romish) baptismal confession, represented it, thus explained, as the *regula fidei*,² and transferred to the latter the attributes of the confession, viz., its apostolic origin (or origin from Christ), as well as its fixedness and completeness.³ Like Irenæus, though still more stringently, he also endeavoured to prove that the formula had descended from Christ, that is, from the Apostles, and was incorrupt. He based his demonstration on the alleged incontestable facts that it contained the faith of those Churches founded by the Apostles, that in these communities a corruption of doctrine was inconceivable, because in them, as could be proved, the Apostles had always had successors, and that the other Churches were in communion with them (see under C). In a more definite way than Irenæus, Tertullian conceives the rule of faith as a rule for the faith,⁴ as the law given

4: III. 1—4; 11. 1; 12. 9; 15. 1; 16. 5 sq.; 18. 3; 24. 1: IV. 1. 2; 9. 2; 20. 6; 33. 7 sq.: V. Præf. 12. 5; 20. 1.

¹ See Iren. I. 31. 3: II. Præf. 19. 8.

² This expression is not found in Irenæus, but is very common in Tertullian.

³ See de præscr. 13: "Hæc regula a Christo instituta nullas habet apud nos quæstiones."

⁴ See l. c. 14: "Ceterum manente forma regulæ in suo ordine quantumlibet quæras et tractes." See de virg. vol. I.

to faith,¹ also as a "regula doctrinæ" or "doctrina regulæ" (here the creed itself is quite plainly the regula), and even simply as "doctrina" or "institutio".² As to the content of the *regula*, it was set forth by Tertullian in three passages.³ It is essentially the same as in Irenæus. But Tertullian already gives prominence within the *regula* to the creation of the universe out of nothing,⁴ the creative instrumentality of the

¹ See I. c. 14: "Fides in regula posita est. habet legem et salutem de observatione legis," and de vir. vol. 1.

² See de præscr. 21: "Si hæc ita sunt, constat perinde omnem doctrinam, quæ cum illis ecclesiis apostolicis matricibus et originalibus fidei conspiret. veritati deputandum... Superest ergo ut demonstremus an hæc nostra doctrina, cujus regulam supra edidimus, de apostolorum traditione censeatur... Communicamus cum ecclesiis catholicis, quod nulla doctrina diversa." De præscr. 32: "Ecclesiæ. quæ licet nullum ex apostolis auctorem suum proferant, ut multo posteriores, tamen in eadem fide conspirantes non minus apostolicæ deputantur pro consanguinitate doctrinæ." That Tertullian regards the baptismal confession as identical with the *regula fidei*, just as Irenæus does, is shown by the fact that in de spectac. 4 ("Cum aquam ingressi Christianam fidem in legis suæ verba profitemur, renuntiassent nos diabolo et pompæ et angelis eius ore nostro contestamur.") the baptismal confession is the *lex*. He also calls it "sacramentum" (military oath) in ad mart. 3; de idolol. 6; de corona 11; Scorp. 4. But he likewise gives the same designation to the interpreted baptismal confession (de præscr. 20. 32; adv. Marc. IV. 5); for we must regard the passages cited as referring to this. Adv. Marc. I. 21: "regula sacramenti"; likewise V. 20, a passage specially instructive as to the fact that there can be only one regula. The baptismal confession itself had a fixed and short form (see de spectac. 4; de corona. 3: "amplius aliquid respondententes quam dominus in evangelio determinavit"; de bapt. 2: "homo in aqua demissus et inter pauca verba tinctus"; de bapt. 6. 11; de orat. 2 etc.). We can still prove that, apart from a subsequent alteration, it was the Roman confession that was used in Carthage in the days of Tertullian. In de præscr. 26 Tertullian admits that the Apostles may have spoken some things "inter domesticos", but declares that they could not be communications "quæ aliam regulam fidei superducerent."

³ De præscr. 13; de virg. vol. 1; adv. Prax. 2. The latter passage is thus worded: "Unicum quidem deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione quam *ἑκονομίαν* dicimus, ut unici dei sit et filius sermo ipsius, qui ex ipso processerit, per quem omnia facta sunt et sine quo factum est nihil, hunc missum a patre in virginem et ex ea natum, hominem et deum, filium hominis et filium dei et cognominatum Iesum Christum, hunc passum, hunc mortuum et sepultum secundum scripturas et resuscitatam a patre et in cœlo resumptum sedere ad dextram patris, venturum iudicare vivos et mortuos; qui exinde miserit secundum promissionem suam a patre spiritum s. paraclætum sanctificatorem fidei eorum qui credunt in patrem et filium et spiritum s. Hanc regulam ab initio evangelii decucurrisse."

⁴ De præscr. 13.

Logos,¹ his origin before all creatures,² a definite theory of the Incarnation,³ the preaching by Christ of a *nova lex* and a *nova promissio regni cælorum*,⁴ and finally also the Trinitarian economy of God.⁵ Materially, therefore, the advance beyond Irenæus is already very significant. Tertullian's *regula* is in point of fact a *doctrina*. In attempting to bind the communities to this he represents them as schools.⁶ The apostolic "lex et doctrina" is to be regarded as inviolable by every Christian. Assent to it decides the Christian character of the individual. Thus the Christian *disposition and life* come to be a matter which is separate from this and subject to particular conditions. In this way the essence of religion was split up—the most fatal turning-point in the history of Christianity.

But we are not of course to suppose that at the beginning of the third century the actual bond of union between all the Churches was a fixed confession developed into a doctrine, that is, definitely interpreted. This much was gained, as is clear from the treatise *de præscriptione* and from other evidence, that in the communities with which Tertullian was acquainted, mutual recognition and brotherly intercourse were made to depend on assent to formulæ which virtually coincided with the Roman baptismal confession. Whoever assented to such a formula was regarded as a Christian brother, and was entitled to the salutation of peace, the name of brother, and hospitality.⁷

¹ L. c.

² L. c.

³ L. c.: "id verbum filium eius appellatum, in nomine dei varie visum a patriarchis, in prophetis semper auditum, postremo delatum ex spiritu patris dei et virtute in virginem Mariam, carnem factum." etc.

⁴ L. c.

⁵ Adv. Prax. 2: "Unicum quidem deum credimus, sub hac tamen dispensatione quam *διονομίαν* dicimus, ut unici dei sit et filius sermo ipsius," etc.

⁶ But Tertullian also knows of a "regula disciplinæ" (according to the New Testament) on which he puts great value, and thereby shows that he has by no means forgotten that Christianity is a matter of conduct. We cannot enter more particularly into this rule here.

⁷ Note here the use of "contesserare" in Tertullian. See de præser. 20: "Itaque tot ac tante ecclesiæ una est illa ab apostolis prima, ex qua omnes. Sic omnes

In so far as Christians confined themselves to a doctrinal formula which they, however, strictly applied, the adoption of this practice betokened an advance. The scattered communities now possessed a "lex" to bind them together, quite as certainly as the philosophic schools possessed a bond of union of a real and practical character¹ in the shape of certain briefly formulated doctrines. In virtue of the common apostolic *lex* of Christians the Catholic Church became a reality, and was at the same time clearly marked off from the heretic sects. But more than this was gained, in so far as the Antignostic interpretation of the formula, and consequently a "doctrine", was indeed in some measure involved in the *lex*. The extent to which this was the case depended, of course, on the individual community or its leaders. All Gnostics could not be excluded by the wording of the confession; and, on the other hand, every formulated faith leads to a formulated doctrine, as soon as it is set up as a critical canon. What we observe in Irenæus and Tertullian must have everywhere taken place in a greater or less degree; that is to say, the authority of the confessional formula must have been extended to statements not found in the formula itself.

We can still prove from the works of Clement of Alexandria that a confession claiming to be an apostolic law of faith, ostensibly comprehending the whole essence of Christianity, was not set up in the different provincial Churches at one and the

prima et omnes apostolicæ, dum una omnes. Probant unitatem communicatio pacis et appellatio fraternitatis et contesseratio hospitalitatis, quæ iura non alia ratio regit quam eiusdem sacramenti una traditio." De præser. 36: "Videamus, quid ecclesia Romanensis cum Africanis ecclesiis contesserit."

¹ We need not here discuss whether and in what way the model of the philosophic schools was taken as a standard. But we may refer to the fact that from the middle of the second century the Apologists, that is the Christian philosophers, had exercised a very great influence on the Old Catholic Fathers. But we cannot say that 2. John 7—11 and Didache XI. 1 f. attest the practice to be a very old one. These passages only show that it had preparatory stages; the main element, namely, the formulated summary of the faith, is there sought for in vain.

² Herein lay the defect, even if the content of the law of faith had coincided completely with the earliest tradition. A man like Tertullian knew how to protect himself in his own way from this defect, but his attitude is not typical.

same time. From this it is clearly manifest that at this period the Alexandrian Church neither possessed a baptismal confession similar to that of Rome, nor understood by "regula fidei" and synonymous expressions a collection of beliefs fixed in some fashion and derived from the apostles.² Clement of Alexandria in his Stromateis appeals to the holy (divine)

¹ Hegesippus, who wrote about the time of Eleutherus, and was in Rome about the middle of the second century (probably somewhat earlier than Irenæus), already set up the apostolic rule of faith as a standard. This is clear from the description of his work in Euseb., H. E. IV. 8. 2 (ἐν πέντε συγγράμμασιν τὴν ἀπλανῆ παράδοσιν τοῦ ἀποστολικοῦ κηρύγματος ὑπομνηματίζαμενος) as well as from the fragments of this work (l.c. IV. 22. 2, 3; ὁ ὁρθὸς λόγος and § 5 ἐμέριταν τὴν ἔνωσιν τῆς ἐκκλησίας φθοριμαίοις λόγοις κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ; see also § 4). Hegesippus already regarded the unity of the Church as dependent on the correct doctrine. Polycrates (Euseb., H. E. V. 24. 6) used the expression ὁ κανὼν τῆς πίστεως in a very wide sense. But we may beyond doubt attribute to him the same conception with regard to the significance of the rule of faith as was held by his opponent Victor the Antimontanist (in Euseb. H. E. V. 16. 22.) will only allow that the martyrs who went to death for the κατὰ ἀλήθειαν πίστις were those belonging to the Church. The *regula fidei* is not here meant, as in this case it was not a subject of dispute. On the other hand, the anonymous writer in Eusebius, H. E. V. 28. 6, 13 understood by τὸ ἐκκλησιαστικὸν φρόνημα or ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀρχαίας πίστεως the interpreted baptismal confession, just as Irenæus and Tertullian did. Hippolytus entirely agrees with these (see Philosoph. Pref., p. 4. v. 50 sq. and X. 32—34). Whether we are to ascribe the theory of Irenæus to Theophilus is uncertain. His idea of the Church is that of Irenæus (ad Autol. II. 14): δέδωκεν ὁ Θεὸς τῷ κόσμῳ κυματινομένῳ καὶ χεημαζομένῳ ὑπὸ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων τὰς συναγωγὰς, λεγομένας δὲ ἐκκλησίας ἁγίας, ἐν αἷς καθάπερ λιμέσιν εὐδρμῖς ἐν νήσοις αἱ διδασκαλῖαι τῆς ἀληθείας εἰσὶν. . . Καὶ ὡς περ αὐτῶν νῆσοι εἰσὶν ἕτεροι πετρώδεις καὶ ἄνυδροι καὶ ἄκαρποι, καὶ θυριώδεις καὶ ζοικητοὶ ἐπὶ βλάβῃ τῶν πλεοντῶν. . . οὕτως εἰσὶν αἱ διδασκαλῖαι τῆς πλάνης, λεγῶ δὲ τῶν αἱρέσεων, αἱ ἐξαπολλύουσιν τοὺς προσόντας αὐταῖς.

² This has been contested by Caspari (Ztschr. f. Kirchl. Wissensch. 1886. Part. 7. p. 352 ff.: "Did the Alexandrian Church in Clement's time possess a baptismal confession or not?"); but his arguments have not convinced me. Caspari correctly shows that in Clement the expression "ecclesiastical canon" denotes the summary of the Catholic faith and of the Catholic rule of conduct; but he goes on to trace the baptismal confession, and that in a fixed form, in the expression ἡ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὁμολογία, Strom. VII. 15. 90 (see remarks on this passage below), and is supported in this view by Voigt, l. c. p. 196 ff. I also regard this as a baptismal confession; but it is questionable if it was definitely formulated, and the passage is not conclusive on the point. But, supposing it to be definitely formulated, who can prove that it went further than the formula in Hermas, Mand. I. with the addition of a mere mention of the Son and Holy Spirit. That a free *kerygma* of Christ and some other matter were added to Hermas, Mand. I. may still be proved by a reference to Orig., Comm. in Joh. XXXII. 9 (see the passage in vol. I. p. 155.).

Scriptures, to the teaching of the Lord,¹ and to the standard tradition which he designates by a great variety of names, though he never gives its content, because he regards the whole of Christianity in its present condition as needing to be reconstructed by gnosis, and therefore as coming under the head of tradition.² In one respect therefore, as compared with Irenæus and Tertullian, he to some extent represents an earlier standpoint; he stands midway between them and Justin. From this author he is chiefly distinguished by the fact that he employs sacred Christian writings as well as the Old Testament, makes the true Gnostic quite as dependent on the former as on the latter and has lost that naive view of tradition, that is, the complete content of Christianity, which Irenæus and Tertullian still had. As is to be expected, Clement too assigns the ultimate authorship of the tradition to the Apostles; but it is characteristic that he neither does this of such set purpose as Irenæus and Tertullian, nor thinks it necessary to prove that the Church had presented the apostolic tradition intact. But as he did not extract from the tradition a fixed complex of fundamental propositions, so also he failed to recognise the importance of its publicity and catholicity, and rather placed an esoteric alongside of an exoteric tradition. Although, like Irenæus and Tertullian, his attitude is throughout determined by opposition to the Gnostics and Marcion, he supposes it possible to refute them by giving to the Holy Scriptures a scientific exposition which must not oppose the *κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας*, that is, the Christian common sense, but receives from it only certain guiding rules. But this attitude of Clement would be simply inconceivable if the Alexandrian Church of his time had already employed the fixed standard applied in those of Rome, Carthage

¹ Ἡ κυριακὴ διδασκαλία, e.g., VI. 15. 124; VI. 18. 165; VII. 10. 57; VII. 15. 90; VII. 18. 165, etc.

² We do not find in Clement the slightest traces of a baptismal confession related to the Roman, unless we reckon the Θεὸς παντοκράτωρ or εἶς Θε. π. as such. But this designation of God is found everywhere and is not characteristic of the baptismal confession. In the lost treatise on the Passover Clement expounded the "παράδοσις τῶν ἀρχαίων πρεσβυτέρων" which had been transmitted to him.

and Lyons.¹ Such a standard did not exist; but Clement made no distinction in the yet unsystematised tradition, even between faith and discipline, because as a theologian he was not able to identify himself with any single article of it without

¹ Considering the importance of the matter it is necessary to quote as copiously as possible from original sources. In Strom. IV. 15. 98, we find the expression *ὁ κανὼν τῆς πίστεως*; but the context shows that it is used here in a quite general sense. With regard to the statement of Paul: "whatever you do, do it to the glory of God," Clement remarks *ὅσα ὑπὸ τὸν κανόνα τῆς πίστεως ποιεῖν ἐπιτέτραπται*. In Strom. I. 19. 96; VI. 15. 125; VI. 18. 165; VII. 7. 41; VII. 15. 90; VII. 16. 105 we find *ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἐκκλησίας* (*ἐκκλησιαστικός*). In the first passage that canon is the rule for the right observance of the Lord's Supper. In the other passages it describes no doubt the correct doctrine, that is, the rule by which the orthodox Gnostic has to be guided in contrast with the heretics who are guided by their own desires (it is therefore parallel to the *διδασκαλία τοῦ κυρίου*); but Clement feels absolutely no need to mention wherein this ecclesiastical canon consists. In Strom IV. 1. 3; VI. 15. 124; VI. 15. 131; VII. 16. 94, we find the expression *ὁ κανὼν τῆς ἀληθείας*. In the first passage it is said: *ἡ γοῦν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας κανόνα γνωστικῆς παραδόσεως φυσιολογία, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐσπτεία, ἐκ τοῦ περὶ κοσμογονίας ἤρτηται λόγου, ἐνθένδε ἀναβραίνουσα ἐπὶ τὸ θεολογικὸν εἶδος*. Here no one can understand by the rule of truth what Tertullian understood by it. Very instructive is the second passage in which Clement is dealing with the right and wrong exposition of Scripture. He says first: *παρακαταβήκη ἀποδοδομένη Θεῷ ἢ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου διδασκαλίαν διὰ τῶν ἀποστόλων αὐτοῦ τῆς θεοσεβοῦς παραδόσεως σύνεσις τε καὶ συνατήκησις*; then he demands that the Scriptures be interpreted *κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀληθείας κανόνα*, or *τ. ἐκκλησ. καν.*; and continues (125): *κανὼν δὲ ἐκκλησιαστικός ἢ συναρδία καὶ ἢ συμφωνία νόμου τε καὶ προφητῶν τῆ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίαν παραδομένη διὰ τῆς κ.* Here then the agreement of the Old Testament with the Testament of Christ is described as the ecclesiastical canon. Apart from the question as to whether Clement is here already referring to a New Testament canon of Scripture, his rule agrees with Tertullian's testimony about the Roman Church: "legem et prophetas cum evangelicis et apostolicis litteris miscet." But at any rate the passage shows the broad sense in which Clement used the term "ecclesiastical canon." The following expressions are also found in Clement: *ἡ ἀληθὴς τῆς μακαρίας διδασκαλίας παράδοσις* (I. 1. 11), *αἱ ἄγιοι παράδοσις* (VII. 18. 110), *ἡ εὐκλεὴς καὶ σεμνὸς τῆς παραδόσεως κανὼν* (all gnosis is to be guided by this, see also *ἡ κατὰ τὴν θείαν παράδοσιν φιλοσοφία*. I. 1. 15. I: 11. 52., also the expression *ἡ θεία παράδοσις* (VII. 16. 103), *ἡ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ παράδοσις* (VII. 16. 95), *αἱ τοῦ Χριστοῦ παράδοσις* (VII. 16. 99), *ἡ τοῦ κυρίου παράδοσις* (VII. 17. 106; VII. 16. 104), *ἡ θεοσεβὴς παράδοσις* (VI. 15. 124). Its content is not more precisely defined, and, as a rule, nothing more can be gathered from the context than what Clement once calls *τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πίστεως* (VII. 16. 97). Where Clement wishes to determine the content more accurately he makes use of supplementary terms. He speaks, e.g., in III. 10. 66 of the *κατὰ ἀληθείαν εὐαγγελικὸς κανὼν*, and means by that the tradition contained in the Gospels recognised by the Church in contradistinction to that found in other gospels (IV. 4. 15: *κατὰ τὸν κανόνα τοῦ εὐαγγελίου* = *κατὰ τ. εὐαγγ.*). In none of these formulæ is

hesitation, and because he ascribed to the true Gnostic the ability to fix and guarantee the truth of Christian doctrine.

Origen, although he also attempted to refute the heretics chiefly by a scientific exegesis of the Holy Scriptures, exhibits

any notice taken of the Apostles. That Clement (like Justin) traced back the public tradition to the Apostles is a matter of course and manifest from I. 1. 11. where he gives an account of his early teachers (*οἱ μὲν τὴν ἀληθῆ τῆς μακαρίας σώζοντες διδασκαλίας παράδοσιν εὐθύς ἀπὸ Πέτρου τε καὶ Ἰακώβου, Ἰωάννου τε καὶ Παύλου τῶν ἁγίων ἀποστόλων, παῖς παρὰ πατρός ἐκδεχόμενος ἦκον δὴ τὸν θεῶ καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὰ προγονικὰ ἐκεῖνα καὶ ἀποστολικὰ καταβησόμενοι σπέρματά*). Clement does not yet appeal to a hierarchical tradition through the bishops, but adheres to the natural one through the teachers, though he indeed admits an esoteric tradition alongside of it. On one occasion he also says that the true Gnostic keeps the *ἀποστολικὴ καὶ ἐκκλησιαστικὴ ὀρθοτομία τῶν δογμάτων* (VII. 16. 104). He has no doubt that: *μία ἢ πάντων γέγονε τῶν ἀποστόλων ὡσπερ διδασκαλία οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἢ παρῶσιν* (VII. 17. 108). But all that might just as well have been written in the first half of the second century. On the tracing back of the Gnosis, the esoteric tradition, to the Apostles see Hypotyp. in Euseb., H. E. II. 1. 4, Strom. VI. 15. 131: *αὐτίκα διδάξαντος τοῦ σωτῆρος τοὺς ἀποστόλους ἢ τῆς ἐγγραφου ἄγραφος ἦδη καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς διαδίδοται παράδοσις*. VI. 7. 61: *ἢ γνωσις δὲ αὐτῆ ἢ κατὰ διαδοχὰς* (this is the only place where I find this expression) *εἰς ὀλίγους ἐκ τῶν ἀποστόλων ἀγράφως παραδοθεῖσα κατελήλυθεν*, *ibid ἢ γνωστικὴ παράδοσις*; VII. 10. 55: *ἢ γνώσις ἐκ παραδόσεως διαδιδόμενη τοῖς ἀξίους σφᾶς αὐτοὺς τῆς διδασκαλίας παρεχομένοις οἷον παρακατήχη ἐγχειρίζεται*. In VII. 17. 106 Clement has briefly recorded the theories of the Gnostic heretics with regard to the apostolic origin of their teaching, and expressed his doubts. That the tradition of the "Old Church", for so Clement designates the orthodox Church as distinguished from the "human congregation" of the heretics of his day, is throughout derived from the Apostles, he regards as so certain and self-evident that, as a rule, he never specially mentions it, or gives prominence to any particular article as apostolic. But the conclusion that he had no knowledge of any apostolic or fixed confession might seem to be disproved by one passage. It is said in Strom. VII. 15. 90: *Μὴ τι οὖν, εἰ καὶ παραβαίη τις συνθήκας καὶ τὴν ὁμολογίαν παρέλθοι τὴν πρὸς ἡμᾶς, διὰ τὸν ψευδόμενον τὴν ὁμολογίαν ἀφεξόμεθα τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ ἡμεῖς, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀψευθεῖν χρὴ τὸν ἐπισεικὴ καὶ μὴδὲν ὦν υπέσχηται ἀκυροῦν ἀν' ἄλλοι τινὲς παραβαίνωσι συνθήκας, οὕτως καὶ ἡμᾶς κατὰ μὴδὲνα τρόπον τὸν ἐκκλησιαστικὸν παραβαίνειν προσήκει κανόνα καὶ μάλιστα τὴν περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ὁμολογίαν ἡμεῖς μὲν φυλάττομεν, οἱ δὲ παραβαίνουσι*. But in the other passages in Clement where *ὁμολογία* appears it nowhere signifies a fixed formula of confession, but always the confession in general which receives its content according to the situation (see Strom. IV. 4. 15; IV. 9. 71; III. 1. 4: *ἐγκράτεια σώματος ὑπεροψία κατὰ τὴν πρὸς θεὸν ὁμολογίαν*). In the passage quoted it means the confession of the main points of the true doctrine. It is possible or probable that Clement was here alluding to a confession at baptism, but that is also not quite certain. At any rate this one passage cannot prove that Clement identified the ecclesiastical canon with a formulated confession similar to or identical with the Roman, or else such identification must have appeared more frequently in his works.

an attitude which is already more akin to that of Irenæus and Tertullian than to that of Clement. In the preface to his great work, "De principiis," he prefixed the Church doctrine as a detailed apostolic rule of faith, and in other instances also he appealed to the apostolic teaching.¹ It may be assumed that in the time of Caracalla and Heliogabalus the Alexandrian Christians had also begun to adopt the principles acted upon in Rome and other communities.² The Syrian Churches, or at least a part of them, followed still later.³ There can be no doubt that, from the last decades of the third century onward, one and the same confession, identical not in its wording, but in its main features, prevailed in the great confederation of Churches extending from Spain to the Euphrates and from Egypt to beyond the Alps.⁴ It was the basis of the confederation, and therefore also a passport, mark of recognition, etc., for the orthodox Chris-

¹ De princip. l. I. præf. § 4—10., IV. 2. 2. Yet we must consider the passage already twice quoted, namely, Com. in John. XXXII. 9, in order to determine the practice of the Alexandrian Church at that time. Was this baptismal confession not perhaps compiled from Herm., Mand. I., and Christological and theological teachings, so that the later confessions of the East with their dogmatic details are already to be found here?

² That may be also shown with regard to the New Testament canon. Very important is the declaration of Eusebius (H. E. VI. 14) that Origen, on his own testimony, paid a brief visit to Rome in the time of Zephyrinus, "because he wished to become acquainted with the ancient Church of the Romans." We learn from Jerome (de vir. inl. 61) that Origen there became acquainted with Hippolytus, who even called attention to his presence in the church in a sermon. That Origen kept up a connection with Rome still later and followed the conflicts there with keen interests may be gathered from his works. (See Döllinger. "Hippolytus und Calixtus" p. 254 ff.) On the other hand, Clement was quite unacquainted with that city. Bigg therefore l.c. rightly remarks: "The West is as unknown to Clement as it was to his favourite Homer." That there was a formulated *πίστις και ὁμολογία* in Alexandria about 250 A.D. is shown by the epistle of Dionysius (Euseb., H. E. VII. 8) He says of Novatian, *ἀνατρέπει τὴν πρὸ λούτρου πίστιν και ὁμολογίαν*. Dionysius would hardly have reproduced this Roman reproach in that way, if the Alexandrian Church had not possessed a similar *πίστις*.

³ The original of the Apostolic Constitutions has as yet no knowledge of the Apostolic rule of faith in the Western sense.

⁴ The close of the first homily of Aphraates shows how simple, antique, and original this confession still was in outlying districts at the beginning of the fourth century. On the other hand, there were oriental communities where it was already heavily weighted with theology.

tians. The interpretation of this confession was fixed in certain ground features, that is, in an Antignostic sense. But a definite theological interpretation was also more and more enforced. By the end of the third century there can no longer have been any considerable number of outlying communities where the doctrines of the pre-existence of Christ and the identity of this pre-existent One with the divine Logos were not recognised as the orthodox belief.¹ They may have first become an "apostolic confession of faith" through the Nicene Creed. But even this creed was not adopted all at once.

B. *The designation of selected writings read in the churches as New Testament Scriptures or, in other words, as a collection of apostolic writings.*²

Every word and every writing which testified of the *κύριος* (Lord) was originally regarded as emanating from him, that is, from his spirit: "Ὅθεν ἡ κυριότης λαλλεῖται ἐκεί Κύριός ἐστιν. (Didache IV. 1 ;

¹ Cf. the epistles of Cyprian, especially ep. 69. 70. When Cyprian speaks (69. 7) of one and the same law which is held by the whole Catholic Church, and of one *symbol* with which she administers baptism (this is the first time we meet with this expression), his words mean far more than the assertion of Irenæus that the confession expounded by him is the guiding rule in all Churches: for in Cyprian's time the intercourse of most Catholic communities with each other was so regulated that the state of things in each was to some extent really known. Cf. also Novatian, "de trinitate seu de regula fidei," as well as the circular letter of the Synod of Antioch referring to the Metropolitan Paul (Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. 6 . . . ἀποστὰς τοῦ κανόνος ἐπὶ κίβδηλα καὶ νόθα διδάγματα μετελήλυθεν), and the homilies of Aphraates. The closer examination of the last phase in the development of the confession of faith during this epoch, when the apostolic confessions received an interpretation in accordance with the theology of Origen, will be more conveniently left over till the close of our description (see chap. 7 fin).

² See the histories of the canon by Credner, Reuss, Westcott, Hilgenfeld, Schmiedel, Holtzmann, and Weiss; the latter two, which to some extent supplement each other, are specially instructive. To Weiss belongs the merit of having kept Gospels and Apostles clearly apart in the preliminary history of the canon (see Th. L. Z. 1886. Nr. 24): Zahn, *Gesch. des N. Tlichen Kanons*, 2 vols. 1888 ff.: Harnack, *Das Neue Test. um d. J. 200*, 1889; Voigt, *Eine verschollene Urkunde des antimontan. Kampfes*, 1891, p. 236 ff.; Weizsäcker, *Rede bei der akad. Preisvertheilung*, 1892. Nov.; Köppel, *Stud. u. Krit.* 1891, p. 102 ff.: Barth, *Nene Jahrb. f. deutsche Theologie*, 1893, p. 56 ff. The following account gives only a few aspects of the case, not a history of the genesis of the canon.

see also 1 Cor. XII. 3). Hence the contents were holy.¹ In this sense the New Testament is a "residuary product," just as the idea of its inspiration is a remnant of a much broader view. But on the other hand, the New Testament is a new creation of the Church,² inasmuch as it takes its place alongside of the Old—which through it has become a complicated book for Christendom,—as a Catholic and apostolic collection of Scriptures containing and attesting the truth.

Marcion had founded his conception of Christianity on a new canon of Scripture,³ which seems to have enjoyed the same authority among his followers as was ascribed to the Old Testament in orthodox Christendom. In the Gnostic schools, which likewise rejected the Old Testament altogether or in part, Evangelic and Pauline writings were, by the middle of the second century, treated as sacred texts and made use of to confirm their theological

¹ "Holy" is not always equivalent to "possessing absolute authority." There are also various stages and degrees of "holy."

² I beg here to lay down the following principles as to criticism of the New Testament. (1) It is not individual writings, but the whole book that has been immediately handed down to us. Hence, in the case of difficulties arising, we must first of all enquire, not whether the title and historical setting of a book are genuine or not, but if they are original, or were only given to the work when it became a component part of the collection. This also gives us the right to assume interpolations in the text belonging to the time when it was included in the canon, though this right must be used with caution. (2) Baur's 'tendency-criticism' has fallen into disrepute; hence we must also free ourselves from the pedantry and hair-splitting which were its after effects. In consequence of the (erroneous) assumptions of the Tübingen school of critics a suspicious examination of the texts was justifiable and obligatory on their part. (3) Individual difficulties about the date of a document ought not to have the result of casting suspicion on it, when other good grounds speak in its favour; for, in dealing with writings which have no, or almost no accompanying literature, such difficulties cannot fail to arise. (4) The condition of the oldest Christianity up to the beginning of the second century did not favour literary forgeries or interpolations in support of a definite tendency. (5) We must remember that, from the death of Nero till the time of Trajan, very little is known of the history of the Church except the fact that, by the end of this time, Christianity had not only spread to an astonishing extent, but also had become vigorously consolidated.

³ The novelty lies first in the idea itself, secondly in the form in which it was worked out, inasmuch as Marcion would only admit the authority of one Gospel to the exclusion of all the rest, and added the Pauline epistles which had originally little to do with the conception of the apostolic doctrinal tradition of the Church.

speculations.¹ On the other hand, about the year 150 the main body of Christendom had still no collection of Gospels and Epistles possessing equal authority with the Old Testament, and, apart from Apocalypses, no new writings at all, which as such, that is, as sacred texts, were regarded as inspired and authoritative.² Here we leave

¹ It is easy to understand that, wherever there was criticism of the Old Testament, the Pauline epistles circulating in the Church would be thrust into the foreground. The same thing was done by the Manichæans in the Byzantine age.

² Four passages may be chiefly appealed to in support of the opposite view, viz., 2 Peter III. 16; Polycarp ep. 12. 1; Barn. IV. 14; 2 Clem. II. 4. But the first is put out of court, as the second Epistle of Peter is quite a late writing. The second is only known from an unreliable Latin translation (see Zahn on the passage: "verba "his scripturis" suspecta sunt, cum interpres in c. II. 3 ex suis inseruerit "quod dictum est"), and even if the latter were faithful here, the quotation from the Psalms prefixed to the quotation from the Epistle to the Ephesians prevents us from treating the passage as certain evidence. As to the third passage (*μήποτε, ὡς γέγραπται, πολλοὶ κλητοὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἐκλεκτοὶ εὐρεθῶμεν*), it should be noted that the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, although he makes abundant use of the evangelic tradition, has nowhere else described evangelic writings as *γραφή*, and must have drawn from more sources than the canonic Gospels. Here, therefore, we have an enigma which may be solved in a variety of ways. It seems worth noting that it is a saying of the Lord which is here in question. But from the very beginning words of the Lord were equally revered with the Old Testament (see the Pauline Epistles). This may perhaps explain how the author—like 2 Clem. II. 4: *ἐτέρω δὲ γραφῇ λέγει: ὅτι οὐκ ἤλθον καλεῖσθαι δικαίους ἀλλὰ ἀμαρτωλοῦς*—has introduced a saying of this kind with the same formula as was used in introducing Old Testament quotations. Passages, such as Clem. XIII. 4: *λέγει ὁ θεός: οὐ χάρις ὑμῖν εἰ ἀγαπήτε κ.τ.λ.* would mark the transition to this mode of expression. The correctness of this explanation is confirmed by observation of the fact that the same formula as was employed in the case of the Old Testament was used in making quotations from early Christian apocalypses, or utterances of early Christian prophets in the earliest period. Thus we already read in Ephesians V. 14: *διὸ λέγει ἔγειρε ὁ καθεύδων καὶ ἀνάστα ἐκ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ἐπιφάσει σοι ὁ Χριστός*. That, certainly, is a saying of a Christian prophet, and yet it is introduced with the usual "λέγει". We also find a saying of a Christian prophet in Clem. XXIII. (the saying is more complete in 2 Clem. XI.) introduced with the words: *ἡ γραφὴ αὕτη, ὅπου λέγει*. These examples may be multiplied still further. From all this we may perhaps assume that the trite formulae of quotation "*γραφή*, *γέγραπται*," etc., were applied wherever reference was made to sayings of the Lord and of prophets that were fixed in writings, even when the documents in question had not yet as a whole obtained canonical authority. Finally, we must also draw attention to the following:—The Epistle of Barnabas belongs to Egypt; and there probably, contrary to my former opinion, we must also look for the author of the second Epistle of Clement. There is much to favour the view that in Egypt Christian writings were treated as sacred texts, without being united into a collection of equal rank with the Old Testament. (See below on this point.)

out of consideration that their content is a testimony of the Spirit. From the works of Justin it is to be inferred that the ultimate authorities were the Old Testament, the words of the Lord, and the communications of Christian prophets.¹ The memoirs of the Apostles (*ἀπομνημονεύματα τῶν ἀποστόλων* = *τὰ εὐαγγέλια*) owed their significance solely to the fact that they recorded the words and history of the Lord and bore witness to the fulfilment of Old Testament predictions. There is no mention whatever of apostolic epistles as holy writings of standard authority.² But we learn further from Justin that the Gospels as well as the Old Testament were read in public worship (Apol. I. 67) and that our first three Gospels were already in use. We can, moreover, gather from other sources that other Christian writings, early and late, were more or less regularly read in Christian meetings.³ Such writings naturally possessed a high degree of authority. As the Holy Spirit and the Church are inseparable, everything that edifies the Church originates with the Holy Spirit,⁴ which in this, as well as every other respect, is inexhaustibly rich. Here, however, two interests were predominant from the beginning, that of immediate spiritual edification and that of attesting and certifying the Christian

¹ See on Justin Bousset. *Die Evv.—Citate Justins.* Gött., 1891. We may also infer from the expression of Hegesippus (Euseb., H. E. IV. 22. 3; Stephanus Gobarus in Photius, *Bibl.* 232. p. 288) that it was not Christian writings, but the Lord himself, who was placed on an equality with Law and Prophets. Very instructive is the formula: "Libri et epistolæ Pauli viri iusti" (*αἱ καὶ ἡμεῖς βιβλοὶ καὶ αἱ προσεπιτούτοις ἐπιστολαὶ Παύλου τοῦ ὀπίου ἀνδρός*), which is found in the *Acta Mart. Scillit.* anno 180 (ed. Robinson. *Texts and Studies.* 1891. I. 2. p. 114 f.), and tempts us to make certain conclusions. In the later recensions of the *Acta* the passage, characteristically enough, is worded: "Libri evangeliorum et epistolæ Pauli viri sanctissimi apostoli" or "Quattuor evv. dom. nostri J. Chr. et epp. S. Pauli ap. et omnis divinitus inspirata scriptura."

² It is worthy of note that the Gnostics also, though they quote the words of the Apostles (John and Paul) as authoritative, place the utterances of the Lord on an unattainable height. See in support of this the epistle of Ptolemy to Flora.

³ Rev. I. 3; Herm. Vis. II. 4; Dionys. Cor. in Euseb., IV. 23. 11.

⁴ Tertullian, this Christian of the primitive type, still reveals the old conception of things in one passage where, reversing 2 Tim. III. 16, he says (*de cultu fem.* I. 3) "Legimus omnem scripturam ædificationi habilem divinitus inspirari."

Kerygma (ἡ ἀσφάλεια τῶν λόγων). The ecclesiastical canon was the result of the latter interest, not indeed in consequence of a process of collection, for individual communities had already made a far larger compilation,¹ but, in the first instance, through selection, and afterwards, but not till then, through addition.

We must not think that the four Gospels now found in the canon had attained full canonical authority by the middle of the second century, for the fact—easily demonstrable—that the texts were still very freely dealt with about this period is in itself a proof of this.² Our first three Gospels contain passages and corrections that could hardly have been fixed before about the year 150. Moreover, Tatian's attempt to create a new Gospel from the four shews that the text of these was not yet fixed.³ We may remark that he was the first in whom we find the Gospel of John⁴ alongside of the Synoptists, and these four the only ones recognised. From the assault of the "Allogi" on the Johannine Gospel we learn that about 160 the whole of our four Gospels had not been definitely recognised even in Asia Minor. Finally, we must refer to the Gospel of the Egyp-

¹ The history of the collection of the Pauline Epistles may be traced back to the first century (1 Clem. XLVII. and like passages). It follows from the Epistle of Polycarp that this native of Asia Minor had in his hands all the Pauline Epistles (quotations are made from nine of the latter; these nine imply the four that are wanting, yet it must remain an open question whether he did not yet possess the Pastoral Epistles in their present form), also 1 Peter, 1 John (though he has not named the authors of these), the first Epistle of Clement and the Gospels. The extent of the writings read in churches which Polycarp is thus seen to have had approaches pretty nearly that of the later recognised canon. Compare, however, the way in which he assumes sayings from those writings to be well known by introducing them with "εἰδότες" (l. 3; IV. 1; V. 1). Ignatius likewise shows himself to be familiar with the writings which were subsequently united to form the New Testament. We see from the works of Clement, that, at the end of the second century, a great mass of Christian writings were collected in Alexandria and were used and honoured.

² It should also be pointed out that Justin most probably used the Gospel of Peter among the ἀπομνημονεύματα; see Texte u. Unters. IX. 2.

³ See my article in the Zeitschr. f. K. Gesch. Vol. IV. p. 471 ff. Zahn (Tatian's Diatessaron. 1881) takes a different view.

⁴ Justin also used the Gospel of John, but it is a disputed matter whether he regarded and used it like the other Gospels.

tians, the use of which was not confined to circles outside the Church.¹

From the middle of the second century the Encratites stood midway between the larger Christendom and the Marcionite Church as well as the Gnostic schools. We hear of some of these using the Gospels as canonical writings side by side with the Old Testament, though they would have nothing to do with the Epistles of Paul and the Acts of the Apostles.² But Tatian, the prominent Apologist, who joined them, gave this sect a more complete canon, an important fact about which was its inclusion of Epistles of Paul. Even this period, however, still supplies us with no testimony as to the existence of a New Testament canon in orthodox Christendom, in fact the rise of the so-called "Montanism" and its extreme antithesis, the "Alogi", in Asia Minor soon after the middle of the second century proves that there was still no New Testament canon there; for, if such an authoritative compilation had existed, these movements could not have arisen. If we gather together all the indications and evidence bearing on the subject, we shall indeed be ready to expect the speedy appearance in the Church of a kind of Gospel canon comprising the four Gospels;³ but we are prepared neither for this being formally placed on an equality with the Old Testament, nor for its containing apostolic writings, which as yet are only found in Marcion and the Gnostics. The canon emerges quite suddenly in an allusion of Melito of Sardis preserved by Eusebius,⁴ the meaning of which is, however, still dubious; in the works of Irenæus and Tertullian; and in the so-called Muratorian Fragment. There is no direct account of its origin

¹ The Sabellians still used it in the third century, which is a proof of the great authority possessed by this Gospel in Christian antiquity. (Epiiph., II. 62. 2.)

² Euseb., H. E. IV. 29. 5.

³ In many regions the Gospel canon alone appeared at first, and in very many others it long occupied a more prominent place than the other canonical writings. Alexander of Alexandria, for instance, still calls God the giver of the Law, the Prophets, and the Gospels (Theodoret, I. 4).

⁴ Euseb., H. E. II. 26. 13. As Melito speaks here of the ἀκριβεια τῶν παλαιῶν βιβλίων, and of τὰ βιβλία τῆς παλαιᾶς διαθήκης, we may assume that he knows τὰ βιβλία τῆς καινῆς διαθήκης.

and scarcely any indirect; yet it already appears as something to all intents and purposes finished and complete.¹ Moreover, it emerges in the same ecclesiastical district where we were first able to show the existence of the apostolic *regula fidei*. We hear nothing of any authority belonging to the compilers, because we learn nothing at all of such persons.² And yet the collection is regarded by Irenæus and Tertullian as completed. A refusal on the part of the heretics to recognise this or that book is already made a severe reproach against them. Their Bibles are tested by the Church compilation as the older one, and the latter itself is already used exactly like the Old Testament. The assumption of the inspiration of the books; the harmonistic interpretation of them; the idea of their absolute sufficiency with regard to every question which can arise and every event which they record; the right of unlimited combination of passages; the assumption that nothing in the Scriptures is without importance; and, finally, the allegorical interpretation: are the immediately observable result of the creation of the canon.³

¹ We may here leave undiscussed the hesitancy with regard to the admissibility of particular books. That the Pastoral Epistles had a fixed place in the canon almost from the very first is of itself a proof that the date of its origin cannot be long before 180. In connection with this, however, it is an important circumstance that Clement makes the general statement that the heretics reject the Epistles to Timothy (Strom. II. 12. 52: *οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἱρέσεων τὰς πρὸς Τιμόθεον ἀνετοῦσιν ἐπιστολάς*). They did not happen to be at the disposal of the Church at all till the middle of the second century.

² Yet see the passage from Tertullian quoted, p. 15, note 1; see also the "receptor", de pudic. 20, the cause of the rejection of Hermas in the Muratorian Fragment and Tertull. de bapt. 17: "Quodsi quæ Pauli perperam scripta sunt exemplum Theclæ ad licentiam mulierum docendi tinguendique defendunt, sciant in Asia presbyterum, qui eam scripturam construxit, quasi titulo Pauli de suo cumulans, convictum atque confessum id se amore Pauli fecisse, loco decessisse." The hypothesis that the Apostles themselves (or the apostle John) compiled the New Testament was definitely set up by no one in antiquity and therefore need not be discussed. Augustine (c. Faustum XXII. 79) speaks frankly of "sancti et docti homines" who produced the New Testament. We can prove by a series of testimonies that the idea of the Church having compiled the New Testament writings was in no way offensive to the Old Catholic Fathers. As a rule, indeed, they are silent on the matter. Irenæus and Tertullian already treat the collection as simply existent.

³ Numerous examples may be found in proof of all these points, especially in the writings of Tertullian, though such are already to be met with in Irenæus also. He is not yet so bold in his allegorical exposition of the Gospels as Ptole-

The probable conditions which brought about the formation of the New Testament canon in the Church, for in this case we are only dealing with probabilities, and the interests which led to and remained associated with it can only be briefly indicated here.¹

The compilation and formation of a canon of Christian writings by a process of selection² was, so to speak, a kind of involuntary undertaking of the Church in her conflict with Marcion and the Gnostics, as is most plainly proved by the

mæus whom he finds fault with in this respect: but he already gives an exegesis of the books of the New Testament not essentially different from that of the Valentinians. One should above all read the treatise of Tertullian "de idololatria" to perceive how the authority of the New Testament was even by that time used for solving all questions.

¹ I cannot here enter into the disputed question as to the position that should be assigned to the Muratorian Fragment in the history of the formation of the canon, nor into its interpretation, etc. See my article "Das Muratorische Fragment und die Entstehung einer Sammlung apostolisch-katholischer Schriften" in the *Ztschr. f. K. Gesch.* III. p. 358 ff. See also Overbeck, *Zur Geschichte des Kanons*, 1880; Hilgenfeld, in the *Zeitschrift f. Wissensch. Theol.* 1881, part 2; Schmiedel, Art. "Kanon" in *Ersch. u. Gruber's Encykl.* 2 Section, Vol. XXXII. p. 309 ff.; Zahn, *Kanongeschichte*, Vol. II. p. 1 ff. I leave the fragment and the conclusions I have drawn from it almost entirely out of account here. The following sketch will show that the objections of Overbeck have not been without influence on me.

² The use of the word "canon" as a designation of the collection is first plainly demonstrable in Athanasius (ep. fest. of the year 365) and in the 59th canon of the synod of Laodicea. It is doubtful whether the term was already used by Origen. Besides, the word "canon" was not applied even to the Old Testament before the fourth century. The name "New Testament" (books of the New Testament) is first found in Melito and Tertullian. For other designations of the latter see Rönsch, *Das N. T. Tertullian's* p. 47 f. The most common name is "Holy Scriptures". In accordance with its main components the collection is designated as τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ ὁ ἀπόστολος (evangelicæ et apostolicæ litteræ); see Tertullian, *de bapt.* 15: "tam ex domini evangelio quam ex apostoli litteris." The name "writings of the Lord" is also found very early. It was already used for the Gospels at a time when there was no such thing as a canon. It was then occasionally transferred to all writings of the collection. Conversely, the entire collection was named, after the authors, a collection of apostolic writings, just as the Old Testament Scriptures were collectively called the writings of the prophets. Prophets and Apostles (= Old and New Testament) were now conceived as the media of God's revelation fixed in writing (see the Muratorian Fragment in its account of Hermas, and the designation of the Gospels as "Apostolic memoirs" already found in Justin.) This grouping became exceedingly important. It occasioned

warnings of the Fathers not to dispute with the heretics about the Holy Scriptures,¹ although the New Testament was already in existence. That conflict necessitated the formation of a new Bible. The exclusion of particular persons on the strength of some apostolic standards, and by reference to the Old Testament, could not be justified by the Church in her own eyes and those of her opponents, so long as she herself recognised that there were apostolic writings, and so long as these heretics appealed to such. She was compelled to claim exclusive possession of *everything* that had a right to the name "apostolic," to deny it to the heretics, and to shew that she held it in the highest honour. Hitherto she had "contented" herself with proving her legal title from the Old Testament, and, passing over her actual origin, had dated herself back to the beginning of all things. Marcion and the Gnostics were the first who energetically pointed out that Christianity began with Christ, and that all Christianity was really to be *tested* by the apostolic preaching, that the assumed identity of Christian common sense with apostolic Christianity did not exist, and (so Marcion said) that the Apostles contradicted themselves. This opposition made it necessary to enter into the questions raised by their opponents. But, in point of content, the problem of proving the contested identity was simply insoluble, because it was endless and subject to question on every particular point. The "unconscious logic," that is the logic of self-preservation, could only prescribe an expedient. The Church had to collect everything apostolic and declare herself to be its only legal possessor. She was obliged, moreover, to amalgamate the apostolic with the canon of the Old Testament in such a way as to fix the exposition

new speculations about the unique dignity of the Apostles and did away with the old collocation of Apostles and Prophets (that is Christian prophets). By this alteration we may measure the revolution of the times. Finally, the new collection was also called "the writings of the Church" as distinguished from the Old Testament and the writings of the heretics. This expression and its amplifications shew that it was the Church which selected these writings.

¹ Here there is a distinction between Irenæus and Tertullian. The former disputed with heretics about the interpretation of the Scriptures, the latter, although he has read Irenæus, forbids such dispute. He cannot therefore have considered Irenæus' efforts as successful.

from the very first. But what writings were apostolic? From the middle of the second century great numbers of writings named after the Apostles had already been in circulation, and there were often different recensions of one and the same writing.¹ Versions which contained docetic elements and exhortations to the most pronounced asceticism had even made their way into the public worship of the Church. Above all, therefore, it was necessary to determine (1) what writings were really apostolic, (2) what form or recension should be regarded as apostolic. The selection was made by the Church, that is, primarily, by the churches of Rome and Asia Minor, which had still an unbroken history up to the days of Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. In making this choice, the Church limited herself to the writings that were used in public worship, and only admitted what the tradition of the elders justified her in regarding as genuinely apostolic. The principle on which she proceeded was to reject as spurious all writings, bearing the names of Apostles, that contained anything contradictory to Christian common sense, that is, to the rule of faith—hence admission was refused to all books in which the God of the Old Testament, his creation, etc., appeared to be depreciated,—and to exclude all recensions of apostolic writings that seemed to endanger the Old Testament and the monarchy of God. She retained, therefore, only those writings which bore the names of Apostles, or anonymous writings to which she considered herself justified in attaching such names,² and whose contents were not at variance with the orthodox

¹ The reader should remember the different recensions of the Gospels and the complaints made by Dionysius of Corinth (in Euseb., II. E. IV. 23. 12).

² That the text of these writings was at the same time revised is more than probable, especially in view of the beginnings and endings of many New Testament writings, as well as, in the case of the Gospels, from a comparison of the canonical text with the quotations dating from the time when there was no canon. But much more important still is the perception of the fact that, in the course of the second century, a series of writings which had originally been circulated anonymously or under the name of an unknown author were ascribed to an Apostle and were also slightly altered in accordance with this. In what circumstances or at what time this happened, whether it took place as early as the beginning of the second century or only immediately before the formation of the canon, is in almost every individual case involved in obscurity; but the fact itself, of which unfortunately the Introductions to the New Testament still know so little, is, in

creed or attested it. This selection resulted in the awkward fact that besides the four Gospels there was almost nothing but Pauline epistles to dispose of, and therefore no writings or almost none which, as emanating from the twelve Apostles, could immediately confirm the truth of the ecclesiastical *Kerygma*. *This perplexity was removed by the introduction of the Acts of the Apostles*¹ and in some cases also the *Epistles of Peter and John*, though that of Peter was not recognised at Rome at first. As a collection this group is the most interesting in the new compilation. It gives it the stamp of Catholicity, unites the Gospels with the Apostle (Paul), and, by subordinating his Epistles to the "Acta omnium apostolorum", makes them witnesses to the particular tradition that was required and divests them of every thing suspicious and insufficient.² The Church, however, found

my opinion. incontestable. I refer the reader to the following examples, without indeed being able to enter on the proof here (see my edition of the "Teaching of the Apostles" p. 106 ff). (1) The Gospel of Luke seems not to have been known to Marcion under this name, and to have been called so only at a later date. (2) The canonical Gospels of Matthew and Mark do not claim, through their content, to originate with these men; they were regarded as apostolic at a later period. (3) The so-called Epistle of Barnabas was first attributed to the Apostle Barnabas by tradition. (4) The Apocalypse of Hermas was first connected with an apostolic Hermas by tradition (Rom. XVI. 14). (5) The same thing took place with regard to the first Epistle of Clement (Philipp. IV. 3). (6) The Epistle to the Hebrews, originally the writing of an unknown author or of Barnabas, was transformed into a writing of the Apostle Paul (Overbeck zur Gesch. des Kanons, 1880), or given out to be such. (7) The Epistle of James, originally the communication of an early Christian prophet, or a collection of ancient holy addresses, first seems to have received the name of James in tradition. (8) The first Epistle of Peter, which originally appears to have been written by an unknown follower of Paul, first received its present name from tradition. The same thing perhaps holds good of the Epistle of Jude. Tradition was similarly at work, even at a later period, as may for example be recognised by the transformation of the epistle "de virginitate" into two writings by Clement. The critics of early Christian literature have created for themselves insoluble problems by misunderstanding the work of tradition. Instead of asking whether the tradition is reliable, they always wrestle with the dilemma "genuine or spurious", and can prove neither.

¹ As regards its aim and contents, this book is furthest removed from the claim to be a portion of a collection of Holy Scriptures. Accordingly, so far as we know, its reception into the canon has no preliminary history.

² People were compelled by internal and external evidence (recognition of their apostolicity; example of the Gnostics) to accept the epistles of Paul. But, from the Catholic point of view, a canon which comprised only the four Gospels and the

the selection facilitated by the fact that the content of the early Christian writings was for the most part unintelligible to the Christendom of the time, whereas the late and spurious additions were betrayed not only by heretical theologoumena, but also and above all by their profane lucidity. Thus arose a collection of apostolic writings, which in extent may not have been strikingly distinguished from the list of writings that for

Pauline Epistles, would have been at best an edifice of two wings without the central structure, and therefore incomplete and uninhabitable. The actual novelty was the bold insertion into its midst of a book, which, if everything is not deceptive, had formerly been only in private use, namely, the Acts of the Apostles, which some associated with an Epistle of Peter and an Epistle of John, others with an Epistle of Jude, two Epistles of John, and the like. There were now (1) writings of the Lord which were at the same time regarded as ἀπομνημονεύματα of definite Apostles; (2) a book which contained the acts and preaching of all the Apostles, which historically legitimised Paul, and at the same time gave hints for the explanation of "difficult" passages in his Epistle; (3) the Pauline Epistles increased by the compilation of the Pastoral ones, documents which "in ordinatione ecclesiasticæ disciplinæ sanctificate erant." The Acts of the Apostles is thus the key to the understanding of the Catholic canon and at the same time shows its novelty. In this book the new collection had its bond of cohesion, its Catholic element (apostolic tradition), and the guide for its exposition. That the Acts of the Apostles found its place in the canon *faute de mieux* is clear from the extravagant terms, not at all suited to the book, in which its appearance there is immediately hailed. It is inserted in place of a book which should have contained the teaching and missionary acts of all the 12 Apostles; but, as it happened, such a record was not in existence. The first evidence regarding it is found in the Muratorian fragment and in Irenæus and Tertullian. There it is called "acta omnium apostolorum sub uno libro scripta sunt. etc." Irenæus says (III. 14. 1): "Lucas non solum prosecutor sed et cooperarius fuit *Apostolorum*, maxime autem Pauli", and makes use of the book to prove the subordination of Paul to the twelve. In the celebrated passages, de præscr. 22, 23; adv. Marc. I. 20; IV. 2—5; V. 1—3, Tertullian made a still more extensive use of the Acts of the Apostles, as the Antimarcionite book in the canon. One can see here why it was admitted into that collection and used against Paul as the Apostle of the heretics. The fundamental thought of Tertullian is that no one who fails to recognise the Acts of the Apostles has any right to recognise Paul, and that to elevate him by himself into a position of authority is unhistorical and absolutely unfounded fanaticism. If the διδαχὴ τῶν δώδεκ ἀποστόλων was needed as an authority in the earlier time, a *book* which contained that authority was required in the later period; and nothing else could be found than the work of the so-called Luke. "Qui Acta Apostolorum non recipiunt, nec spiritus sancti esse possunt, qui necdum spiritum sanctum possunt agnoscere discentibus missum, sed nec ecclesiam se dicant defendere qui quando et quibus incunabulis institutum est hoc corpus probare non habent." But the greater part of the heretics remained obstinate. Neither Marcionites, Severians, nor the later Manicheans recognised the Acts of the Apostles. To some extent they replied by setting up other histories of

more than a generation had formed the chief and favourite reading in the communities.¹ The new collection was already exalted to a high place by the use of other writings being prohibited either for purposes of general edification or for theological ends.² But the causes and motives which led to

Apostles in opposition to it, as was done later by a fraction of the Ebionites and even by the Marcionites. But the Church also was firm. It is perhaps the most striking phenomenon in the history of the formation of the canon that this late book, from the very moment of its appearance, asserts its right to a place in the collection, just as certainly as the four Gospels, though its position varied. In Clement of Alexandria indeed the book is still pretty much in the background, perhaps on a level with the *κῆρυγμα Πέτρου*, but Clement has no New Testament at all in the strict sense of the word; see below. But at the very beginning the book stood where it is to-day, *i.e.*, immediately after the Gospels (see Muratorian Fragment, Irenæus, etc.). The parallel creation, the group of Catholic Epistles, acquired a much more dubious position than the Acts of the Apostles, and its place was never really settled. Its germ is probably to be found in two Epistles of John (*viz.*, 1st and 3rd) which acquired dignity along with the Gospel, as well as in the Epistle of Jude. These may have given the impulse to create a group of narratives about the twelve Apostles from anonymous writings of old Apostles, prophets, and teachers. But the Epistle of Peter is still wanting in the Muratorian Fragment, nor do we yet find the group there associated with the Acts of the Apostles. The Epistle of Jude, two Epistles of John, the Wisdom of Solomon, the Apocalypse of John and that of Peter form the unsymmetrical conclusion of this oldest catalogue of the canon. But, all the same writings, by Jude, John, and Peter are here found side by side; thus we have a preparation for the future arrangement made in different though similar fashion by Irenæus and again altered by Tertullian. The genuine Pauline Epistles appear enclosed on the one hand by the Acts of the Apostles and the Catholic Epistles, and on the other by the Pastoral ones, which in their way are also "Catholic." That is the character of the "Catholic" New Testament which is confirmed by the earliest use of it (in Irenæus and Tertullian). In speaking above of the Acts of the Apostles as a late book, we meant that it was so relatively to the canon. In itself the book is old and for the most part reliable.

¹ There is no doubt that this was the reason why to all appearance the innovation was scarcely felt. Similar causes were at work here as in the case of the apostolic rule of faith. In the one case the writings that had long been read in the Church formed the basis, in the other the baptismal confession. But a great distinction is found in the fact that the baptismal confession, as already settled, afforded an elastic standard which was treated as a fixed one and was therefore extremely practical; whilst, conversely, the undefined group of writings hitherto read in the Church was reduced to a collection which could neither be increased nor diminished.

² At the beginning, that is about 180, it was only in practice, and not in theory, that the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles possessed equal authority. Moreover, the name New Testament is not yet found in Irenæus, nor do we yet find him giving an exact idea of its content. See Werner in the *Text. u. Unters. z. altchristl. Lit. Gesch.* Bd. VI. 2.

its being formed into a canon, that is, being placed on a footing of complete equality with the Old Testament, may be gathered partly from the earlier history, partly from the mode of using the new Bible and partly from the results attending its compilation. First, Words of the Lord and prophetic utterances, including the written records of these, had always possessed standard authority in the Church; there were therefore parts of the collection the absolute authority of which was undoubted from the first.¹ Secondly, what was called "Preaching of the Apostles," "Teaching of the Apostles," etc., was likewise regarded from the earliest times as completely harmonious as well as authoritative. There had, however, been absolutely no motive for fixing this in documents, because Christians supposed they possessed it in a state of purity and reproduced it freely. The moment the Church was called upon to fix this teaching authentically, and this denotes a decisive revolution, she was forced to have recourse to *writings*, whether she would or not. The attributes formerly applied to the testimony of the Apostles, so long as it was not collected and committed to writing, had now to be transferred to the written records they had left. Thirdly, Marcion had already taken the lead in forming Christian writings into a canon in the strict sense of the word. Fourthly, the interpretation was at once fixed by forming the apostolic writings into a canon, and placing them on an equality with the Old Testament, as well as by subordinating troublesome writings to the Acts of the Apostles. Considered by themselves these writings, especially the Pauline Epistles, presented the greatest difficulties. We can see even yet from Irenæus and Tertullian that the duty of accommodating herself to these Epistles was *forced* upon the Church by Marcion and the heretics, and that, but for this constraint, her method of satisfying herself as to her relationship to them would hardly have taken the shape of incorporating them with the canon.²

See above, p. 40. note 2.

² We have ample evidence in the great work of Irenæus as to the difficulties he found in many passages of the Pauline Epistles, which as yet were almost solely utilised as sources of doctrine by such men as Marcion, Tatian, and theologians of the school of Valentinus. The difficulties of course still continued to be felt in the period which followed. (See, e.g., Method, Conviv. Orat. III. 1, 2.)

This shows most clearly that the collection of writings must not be traced to the Church's effort to create for herself a powerful controversial weapon. But the difficulties which the compilation presented so long as it was a mere collection vanished as soon as it was viewed as a *sacred* collection. For now the principle: "as the teaching of the Apostles was one, so also is the tradition" (*μια ἡ πάντων γέγνευ τῶν ἀποστόλων ὡσπερ διδασκαλία οὕτως δὲ καὶ ἡ παράδοσις*)" was to be applied to all contradictory and objectionable details.¹ It was now imperative to explain one writing by another; the Pauline Epistles, for example, were to be interpreted by the Pastoral Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles.² Now was required what Tertullian calls the "mixture" of the Old and New Testaments,³ in consequence of which the full recognition of the knowledge got from the old Bible was regarded as the first law for the interpretation of the new. The formation of the new collection into a canon was therefore an immediate and unavoidable necessity if doubts of all kinds were to be averted. These were abundantly excited by the exegesis of the heretics; they were got rid of by making the writings into a canon. Fifthly, the early Christian enthusiasm more and more decreased in the course of the second century; not only did Apostles, prophets, and teachers die out, but the religious mood of the majority of Christians was changed. A reflective piety took the place of the instinctive religious enthusiasm which made those who felt it believe that they themselves possessed the Spirit.⁴ Such a piety requires rules; at the same time, however, it is characterised by the perception that it has not the active and spontaneous character which it ought to have, but has to prove its

¹ Apollinaris of Hierapolis already regards any contradiction between the (4) Gospels as impossible. (See Routh, *Reliq. Sacr.* I. p. 150.)

² See Overbeck, "Ueber die Auffassung des Streites des Paulus mit Petrus in Antiochien bei den Kirchenvätern." 1877, p. 8.

³ See also Clement Strom. IV. 21. 124; VI. 15. 125. The expression is also frequent in Origen, e.g., *de princip.* præf. 4.

⁴ The Roman Church in her letter to that of Corinth designates her own words as the words of God (1 Clem. LIX. 1) and therefore requires obedience "τοῖς ὑψ' ἡμῶν γεγραμμένοις διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος" (LXIII. 2).

legitimacy in an indirect and "objective" way. The breach with tradition, the deviation from the original state of things is felt and recognised. Men, however, conceal from themselves their own defects, by placing the representatives of the past on an unattainable height, and forming such an estimate of their qualities as makes it unlawful and impossible for those of the present generation, in the interests of their own comfort, to compare themselves with them. When matters reach this point, great suspicion attaches to those who hold fast their religious independence and wish to apply the old standards. Not only do they seem arrogant and proud, but they also appear disturbers of the necessary new arrangement which has its justification in the fact of its being unavoidable. This development of the matter was, moreover, of the greatest significance for the history of the canon. Its creation very speedily resulted in the opinion that the time of divine revelation had gone past and was exhausted in the Apostles, that is, in the records left by them. We cannot prove with certainty that the canon was formed to confirm this opinion, but we can show that it was very soon used to oppose those Christians who professed to be prophets or appealed to the continuance of prophecy. The influence which the canon exercised in this respect is the most decisive and important. That which Tertullian, as a Montanist, asserts of one of his opponents: "Prophetiam expulit, paracletum fugavit" ("he expelled prophecy, he drove away the Paraclete"), can be far more truly said of the New Testament which the same Tertullian as a Catholic recognised. The New Testament, though not all at once, put an end to a situation where it was possible for any Christian under the inspiration of the Spirit to give authoritative disclosures and instructions. It likewise prevented belief in the fanciful creations with which such men enriched the history of the past, and destroyed their pretensions to read the future. As the creation of the canon, though not in a hard and fast way, fixed the period of the production of sacred facts, so it put down all claims of Christian prophecy to public credence. Through the canon it came to be acknowledged that all post-apostolic Christianity is only of a mediate and particular kind, and can therefore never be itself a standard.

The Apostles alone possessed the Spirit of God completely and without measure. They only, therefore, are the media of revelation, and by their word alone, which, as emanating from the Spirit, is of equal authority with the word of Christ, all that is Christian must be tested.¹

The Holy Spirit and the Apostles became correlative conceptions (Tertull., *de pudic.* 21). The Apostles, however, were more and more overshadowed by the New Testament Scriptures; and this was in fact an advance beyond the earlier state of things, for what was known of the Apostles? Accordingly, *as authors of these writings*, they and the Holy Spirit became correlative conceptions. This led to the assumption that the apostolic writings were inspired, that is, in the full and only intelligible sense attached to the word by the ancients.² By this assumption the Apostles, viewed as *prophets*, received a significance quite equal to that of Old Testament writers.³ But, though Irenæus and Tertullian placed both parties on a level, they preserved a distinction between them by basing the whole authority of the New Testament on its apostolic origin, the concept "apostolic" being much more comprehensive than that

¹ Tertull., *de exhort.* 4: "Spiritum quidem dei etiam fideles habent, sed non omnes fideles apostoli... Proprie enim apostoli spiritum sanctum habent, qui plene habent in operibus prophetiæ et efficacia virtutum documentisque linguarum, non ex parte, quod ceteri." Clem. Alex., *Strom.* IV. 21, 135: "Ἐκαστος ἴδιον ἔχει χάρισμα ἀπὸ θεοῦ, ὁ μὲν οὕτως, ὁ δὲ οὕτως, οἱ ἀπόστολοι δὲ ἐν παντί πεπληρωμένοι; Serapion in Euseb., II. E. VI. 12. 3: ἡμεῖς καὶ τὸν Πέτρον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποστόλους ἀποδεχόμεθα ὡς Χριστόν. The success of the canon here referred to was an undoubted blessing, for, as the result of enthusiasm, Christianity was menaced with complete corruption, and things and ideas, no matter how alien to its spirit, were able to obtain a lodgment under its protection. The removal of this danger, which was in some measure averted by the canon, was indeed coupled with great disadvantages, inasmuch as believers were referred in legal fashion to a new book, and the writings contained in it were at first completely obscured by the assumption that they were inspired and by the requirement of an "expositio legitima."

² See Tertull., *de virg.* vol. 4. *de resurr.* 24. *de ieiun.* 15. *de pudic.* 12. Sufficiency is above all included in the concept "inspiration" (see for ex. Tertull., *de monog.* 4: "Negat scriptura quod non notat"), and the same measure of authority belongs to all parts (see Iren., IV. 28, 3. Nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud deum").

³ The direct designation "prophets" was, however, as a rule, avoided. The conflict with Montanism made it expedient to refrain from this name; but see Tertullian, *adv. Marc.* IV. 24: "Tam apostolus Moyses, quam et apostoli prophetae."

of "prophet." These men, being Apostles, that is men chosen by Christ himself and entrusted with the proclamation of the Gospel, have for that reason received the Spirit, and their writings are filled with the Spirit. To the minds of Western Christians the primary feature in the collection is its apostolic authorship.¹ This implies inspiration also, because the Apostles cannot be inferior to the writers of the Old Testament. For that very reason they could, in a much more radical way, rid the new collection of everything that was not apostolic. They even rejected writings which, in their form, plainly claimed the character of inspiration; and this was evidently done because they did not attribute to them the degree of authority which, in their view, only belonged to that which was apostolic.² The new canon of Scripture set up by Irenæus and Tertullian primarily professes to be nothing else than a collection of *apostolic* writings, which, as such, claim absolute authority.³ It takes its place beside the apostolic rule of faith; and by this faithfully preserved

¹ Compare also what the author of the Muratorian Fragment says in the passage about the Shepherd of Hermas.

² This caused the most decisive breach with tradition, and the estimate to be formed of the Apocalypses must at first have remained an open question. Their fate was long undecided in the West: but it was very soon settled that they could have no claim to public recognition in the Church, because their authors had not that fulness of the Spirit which belongs to the Apostles alone.

³ The disputed question as to whether all the acknowledged apostolic writings were regarded as canonical must be answered in the affirmative in reference to Irenæus and Tertullian, who conversely regarded no book as canonical unless written by the Apostles. On the other hand, it appears to me that no certain opinion on this point can be got from the Muratorian Fragment. In the end the Gospel, Acts, Kerygma, and Apocalypse of Peter as well as the Acts of Paul were rejected, a proceeding which was at the same time a declaration that they were spurious. But these three witnesses agree (see also App. Constit. VI. 16) that the apostolic *regula fidei* is practically the final court of appeal, inasmuch as it decides whether a writing is really apostolic or not, and inasmuch as, according to Tertullian, the apostolic writings belong to the Church alone, because she alone possesses the apostolic *regula* (de præscr. 37 ff.). The *regula* of course does not legitimise those writings, but only proves that they are authentic and do not belong to the heretics. These witnesses also agree that a Christian writing has no claim to be received into the canon merely on account of its prophetic form. On looking at the matter more closely, we see that the view of the early Church, as opposed to Montanism, led to the paradox that the Apostles were prophets in the sense of being inspired by the Spirit, but that they were not so in the strict sense of the word.

possession, the Church scattered over the world proves herself to be that of the Apostles.

But we are very far from being able to show that such a rigidly fixed collection of apostolic writings existed everywhere in the Church about the year 200. It is indeed continually asserted that the Antiochian and Alexandrian Churches had at that date a New Testament which, in extent and authority, essentially coincided with that of the Roman Church; but this opinion is not well founded. As far as the Church of Antioch is immediately concerned, the letter of Bishop Serapion (whose episcopate lasted from about 190 to about 209), given in Eusebius (VI. 12), clearly shows that Cilicia and probably also Antioch itself as yet possessed no such thing as a completed New Testament. It is evident that Serapion already holds the Catholic principle that all words of Apostles possess the same value to the Church as words of the Lord; but a completed collection of apostolic writings was not yet at his disposal.¹ Hence it is very improbable that Theophilus, bishop of Antioch, who died as early as the reign of Commodus, presupposed such a collection. Nor, in point of fact, do the statements in the treatise "ad Autolyicum" point to a completed New Testament.² Theophilus makes diligent use of the Epistles of Paul and mentions the evangelist John (C.I.I.) as one of the bearers of the Spirit. But with him the one canonical court of appeal is the Scriptures of the Old Testament, that is, the writings of the Prophets (bearers of the Spirit). These Old Testament Prophets, however, are continued in a further group of "bearers of the Spirit", which we cannot definitely determine, but which at any rate included the authors of the four Gospels and the writer of the Apocalypse. It is remarkable that Theophilus has never mentioned the Apostles. Though he perhaps regards them all, including Paul, as "bearers of the Spirit", yet we have no indication that he looked on their *Epistles* as canonical. The different way he uses the Old

¹ The fragment of Serapion's letter given in Eusebius owes its interest to the fact that it not only shows the progress made at this time with the formation of the canon at Antioch, but also what still remained to be done.

² See my essay "Theophilus v. Antiochien und das N. T." in the *Zschr. f. K. Gesch.* XI. p. 1 ff.

Testament and the Gospels on the one hand and the Pauline Epistles on the other is rather evidence of the contrary. Theophilus was acquainted with the four Gospels (but we have no reference to Mark), the thirteen Epistles of Paul (though he does not mention Thessalonians), most probably also with the Epistle to the Hebrews, as well as 1st Peter and the Revelation of John. It is significant that no single passage of his betrays an acquaintance with the Acts of the Apostles.¹

It might certainly seem venturesome, on the basis of the material found in Theophilus and the original document of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions, to conclude that the formation of a New Testament canon was not everywhere determined by the same interest and therefore did not everywhere take a similar course. It might seem hazardous to assume that the Churches of Asia Minor and Rome began by creating a fixed canon of *apostolic* writings, which was thus necessarily declared to be inspired, whereas other communities applied or did not deny the notion of inspiration to a great number of venerable and ancient writings not rigidly defined, and did not make a selection from a stricter historical point of view, till a later date. But the latter development not only corresponds to the indication found in Justin, but in my opinion may be verified from the copious accounts of Clement of Alexandria.² In the entire literature of Greeks and barbarians Clement distinguishes between profane and sacred, *i. e.*, inspired

¹ The most important passages are Autol. II. 9. 22: ὅθεν διδάσκουσιν ἡμᾶς αἱ ἄγιοι γραφαὶ καὶ πάντες οἱ πνευματοφόροι, ἐξ ὧν Ἰωάννης λέγει κ.τ.λ. (follows John I. 1) III. 12: καὶ περὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἧς ὁ νόμος εἴρηκεν, ἀκόλουθα εὐρίσκεται καὶ τὰ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τῶν εὐαγγελίων ἔχειν, διὰ τὸ τοὺς πάντας πνευματοφόρους ἐνὶ πνεύματι θεοῦ λελαληκέναι; III. 13: ὁ ἄγιος λόγος—ἡ εὐαγγέλιος φωνή.; III. 14: Ἡσαίας—τοὐτο εὐαγγέλιον—ὁ θεὸς λόγος. The latter formula is not a quotation of Epistles of Paul viewed as canonical, but of a divine command found in the Old Testament and given in Pauline form. It is specially worthy of note that the original of the six books of the Apostolic Constitutions, written in Syria and belonging to the second half of the third century, knows yet of no New Testament. In addition to the Old Testament it has no authority but the "Gospel."

² There has as yet been no sufficient investigation of the New Testament of Clement. The information given by Volkmar in Credner's *Gesch. d. N.Tlichen Kanon*, p. 382 ff., is not sufficient. The space at the disposal of this manual prevents me from establishing the results of my studies on this point. Let me at

writings. As he is conscious that all knowledge of truth is based on inspiration, so all writings, that is all parts, paragraphs, or sentences of writings which contain moral and religious truth are in his view inspired.¹ This opinion, however, does not exclude a distinction between these writings, but rather requires it. (2) The Old Testament, a fixed collection of books, is regarded by Clement, as a whole and in all its parts, as the divine, that is, inspired book *par excellence*. (3) As Clement in theory distinguishes a new covenant from the old, so also he distinguishes the books of the new covenant from those of the old. (4) These books to which he applies the formula "Gospel" (τὸ εὐαγγέλιον) and "Apostles" (οἱ ἀποστόλοι) are likewise viewed by him as inspired, but he does not consider them as forming a fixed collection. (5) Unless all appearances are deceptive, it was, strictly speaking, only the four Gospels that he considered and treated as completely on a level with the Old Testament. The formula: ὁ νόμος καὶ οἱ προφῆται καὶ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ("the Law and the Prophets and the Gospel") is frequently found, and everything else, even the apostolic writings, is judged by this group.² He does not consider even the Pauline Epistles to be a court of appeal of equal value with the Gospels, though he occasionally describes them as γραφάι.³

least refer to some important passages which I have collected. Strom. I. §§ 28, 100; II. §§ 22, 28, 29; III. §§ 11, 66, 70, 71, 76, 93, 108; IV. §§ 2, 91, 97, 105, 130, 133, 134, 138, 159; V. §§ 3, 17, 27, 28, 30, 31, 38, 80, 85, 86; VI. §§ 42, 44, 54, 59, 61, 66—68, 88, 91, 106, 107, 119, 124, 125, 127, 128, 133, 161, 164; VII. §§ 1, 14, 34, 76, 82, 84, 88, 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107. As to the estimate of the Epistles of Barnabas and Clement of Rome as well as of the Shepherd, in Clement, see the Prolegg. to my edition of the Opp. Patr. Apost.

¹ According to Strom. V. 14, 138 even the Epicurean Metrodorus uttered certain words ἐνθέως: but on the other hand Homer was a prophet against his will. See Pæd. I. 6, 36, also § 51.

² In the Pæd. the Gospels are regularly called ἡ γραφή, but this is seldom the case with the Epistles. The word "Apostle" is used in quoting these.

³ It is also very interesting to note that Clement almost nowhere illustrates the parabolic character of the Holy Scriptures by quoting the Epistles, but in this connection employs the Old Testament and the Gospels, just as he almost never allegorises passages from other writings. 1 Cor. III, 2 is once quoted thus in Pæd. I. 6, 49: τὸ ἐν τῷ ἀποστόλῳ ἁγίον πνεῦμα τῷ τοῦ κυρίου ἀποχρώμενον φωνῇ λέγει. We can hardly conclude from Pæd. I. 7, 61 that Clement called Paul a "prophet."

A further class of writings stands a stage lower than the Pauline Epistles, viz., the Epistles of Clement and Barnabas, the Shepherd of Hermas, etc. It would be wrong to say that Clement views this group as an appendix to the New Testament, or as in any sense Antilegomena. This would imply that he assumed the existence of a fixed collection whose parts he considered of equal value, an assumption which cannot be proved.¹ (6) As to certain books, such as the "Teaching of the Apostles," the "Kerygma of Peter," etc., it remains quite doubtful what authority Clement attributed to them.² He quotes the $\Delta\iota\delta\alpha\chi\eta$ as $\gamma\rho\alpha\Phi\eta$. (7) In determining and estimating the sacred books of the New Testament Clement is manifestly influenced by an ecclesiastical tradition, for he recognises four Gospels and no more because that was the exact number handed down. This tradition had already applied the name "apostolic" to most Christian writings which were to be considered as $\gamma\rho\alpha\Phi\eta$, but it had given the concept "apostolic" a far wider content than Irenæus and Tertullian,³ although it had not been able to include all the new writings which were regarded as sacred under this idea. (Herms). At the time Clement wrote, the *Alexandrian Church* can neither have held the principle that all writings of the Apostles must be read in the Church and form a decisive court of appeal like the Old Testament, nor have believed that nothing but the Apostolic—using this word also in its wider sense—has any claim to authority among Christians. We willingly admit the great degree of freedom

¹ It is worthy of special note that Clem. Pæd. II. 10. 3; Strom. II. 15. 67 has criticised an interpretation given by the author of the Epistle of Barnabas, although he calls Barnabas an Apostle.

² In this category we may also include the Acts of the Apostles, which is perhaps used like the $\kappa\acute{\eta}\rho\upsilon\gamma\mu\alpha$. It is quoted in Pæd. II. 16. 56; Strom. I. 50. 89, 91. 92. 153. 154; III. 49; IV. 97; V. 75, 82; VI. 63, 101. 124. 165.

³ The "seventy disciples" were also regarded as Apostles, and the authors of writings the names of which did not otherwise offer a guarantee of authority were likewise included in this category. That is to say, writings which were regarded as valuable and which for some reason or other could not be characterised as apostolic in the narrower sense were attributed to authors whom there was no reason for denying to be Apostles in the wider sense. This wider use of the concept "apostolic" is moreover no innovation. See my edition of the Didache, pp. 111—118.

and peculiarity characteristic of Clement, and freely acknowledge the serious difficulties inseparable from the attempt to ascertain from his writings what was regarded as possessing standard authority in the *Church*. Nevertheless it may be assumed with certainty that, at the time this author wrote, the content of the New Testament canon, or, to speak more correctly, its reception in the Church and exact attributes had not yet been finally settled in Alexandria.

The condition of the Alexandrian Church of the time may perhaps be described as follows: Ecclesiastical custom had attributed an authority to a great number of early Christian writings without strictly defining the nature of this authority or making it equal to that of the Old Testament. Whatever professed to be inspired, or apostolic, or ancient, or edifying was regarded as the work of the Spirit and therefore as the Word of God. The prestige of these writings increased in proportion as Christians became more incapable of producing the like themselves. Not long before Clement wrote, however, a systematic arrangement of writings embodying the early Christian tradition had been made in Alexandria also. But, while in the regions represented by Irenæus and Tertullian the canon must have arisen and been adopted all at once, so to speak, it was a slow process that led to this result in Alexandria. Here also the principle of apostolicity seems to have been of great importance for the collectors and editors, but it was otherwise applied than at Rome. A conservative proceeding was adopted, as they wished to insure as far as possible the permanence of ancient Christian writings regarded as inspired. In other words, they sought, wherever practicable, to proclaim all these writings to be apostolic by giving a wider meaning to the designation and ascribing an imaginary apostolic origin to many of them. This explains their judgment as to the Epistle to the Hebrews, and how Barnabas and Clement were described by them as Apostles.¹ Had this undertaking succeeded in the Church, a much more extensive canon would have resulted

¹ The formation of the canon in Alexandria must have had some connection with the same process in Asia Minor and in Rome. This is shown not only by each Church recognising four Gospels, but still more by the admission of

than in the West. But it is more than questionable whether it was really the intention of those first Alexandrian collectors to place the great compilation thus produced, as a New Testament, side by side with the Old, or, whether their undertaking was immediately approved in this sense by the Church. In view of the difference of Clement's attitude to the various groups within this collection of *γραφεῖς*, we may assert that in the Alexandrian Church of that time Gospels and Apostles were indeed ranked with the Law and the Prophets, but that this position of equality with the Old Testament was not assigned to all the writings that were prized either on the score of inspiration or of apostolic authority. The reason of this was that the great collection of early Christian literature that was inspired and declared to be apostolic could hardly have been used so much in public worship as the Old Testament and the Gospels.

Be this as it may, if we understand by the New Testament a fixed collection, equally authoritative throughout, of all the writings that were regarded as genuinely apostolic, that is, those of the original Apostles and Paul, then the Alexandrian Church at the time of Clement did not yet possess such a book; but the process which led to it had begun. She had come much nearer this goal by the time of Origen. At that period the writings included in the New Testament of the West were all regarded in Alexandria as equally authoritative, and also stood in every respect on a level with the Old Testament. The principle of apostolicity was more strictly conceived and more surely applied. Accordingly the extent of "Holy Scripture" was already limited in the days of Origen. Yet we have to thank the Alexandrian Church for giving us the seven Catholic Epistles. But, measured by the canon of the Western Church, which must have had a share in the matter, this sifting process was by no means complete. The inventive minds of scholars thirteen Pauline Epistles. We would see our way more clearly here, if anything certain could be ascertained from the works of Clement, including the Hypotyposes, as to the arrangement of the Holy Scriptures; but the attempt to fix this arrangement is necessarily a dubious one, because Clement's "canon of the New Testament" was not yet finally fixed. It may be compared to a half-finished statue whose bust is already completely chiselled, while the under parts are still embedded in the stone.

designated a group of writings in the Alexandrian canon as "Antilegomena." The historian of dogma can take no great interest in the succeeding development, which first led to the canon being everywhere finally fixed, so far as we can say that this was ever the case. For the still unsettled dispute as to the extent of the canon did not essentially affect its use and authority, and in the following period the continuous efforts to establish a harmonious and strictly fixed canon were solely determined by a regard to tradition. The results are no doubt of great importance to Church history, because they show us the varying influence exerted on Christendom at different periods by the great Churches of the East and West and by their learned men.

Addendum.—The results arising from the formation of a part of early Christian writings into a canon, which was a great and meritorious act of the Church,¹ notwithstanding the fact that it was forced on her by a combination of circumstances, may be summed up in a series of antitheses. (1) The New Testament, or group of "apostolic" writings formed by selection, preserved from destruction one part, and undoubtedly the most valuable one, of primitive Church literature; but it caused all the rest of these writings, as being intrusive, or spurious, or superfluous, to be more and more neglected, so that they ultimately perished.² (2) The New Testament, though not all at once, put an end to the composition of works which claimed an authority binding on Christendom (inspiration); but it first made possible the production of secular Church literature and neutralised the extreme dangers attendant on writings of this kind. By making room for all kinds of writings that did not oppose it, it enabled the Church to utilise all the elements of Greek culture. At the same

¹ No greater creative act can be mentioned in the whole history of the Church than the formation of the apostolic collection and the assigning to it of a position of equal rank with the Old Testament.

² The history of early Christian writings in the Church which were not definitely admitted into the New Testament is instructive on this point. The fate of some of these may be described as tragical. Even when they were not branded as downright forgeries, the writings of the Fathers from the fourth century downwards were far preferred to them.

time, however, it required an ecclesiastical stamp to be placed on all the new Christian productions due to this cause.¹ (3) The New Testament obscured the historical meaning and the historical origin of the writing contained in it, especially the Pauline Epistles, though at the same time it created the conditions for a thorough study of all those documents. Although primarily the new science of theological exegesis in the Church did more than anything else to neutralise the historical value of the New Testament writings, yet, on the other hand, it immediately commenced a critical restoration of their original sense. But, even apart from theological science, the New Testament enabled original Christianity to exercise here and there a quiet and gradual effect on the doctrinal development of the Church, without indeed being able to exert a dominant influence on the natural development of the traditional system. As the standard of interpretation for the Holy Scriptures was the apostolic *regula fidei*, always more and more precisely explained, and as that *regula*, in its Antignostic and philosophico-theological interpretation, was regarded as apostolic, the New Testament was explained in accordance with the conception of Christianity that had become prevalent in the Church. At first therefore the spirit of the New Testament could only assert itself in certain undercurrents and in the recognition of particular truths. But the book did not in the least ward off the danger of a total secularising of Christianity. (4) The New Testament opposed a barrier to the enthusiastic manufacture of "facts." But at the same time its claim to be a collection of *inspired* writings² naturally resulted in principles of interpretation (such as the principle of unanimity, of unlimited combination, of absolute clearness and sufficiency, and of allegorism) which were neces-

¹ See on this point Overbeck "Abhandlung über die Anfänge der patristischen Litteratur, i.e., p. 469." Nevertheless, even after the creation of the New Testament canon, theological authorship was an undertaking which was at first regarded as highly dangerous. See the Antimontanist in Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 3: *δεδιώς καὶ ἐξευλαβούμενος, μή τι δόξω πρὶν ἐπισυγγράφειν ἢ ἐπιδιατάσσεσθαι τῷ τῆς τοῦ εὐαγγελίου καινῆς διαθήκης λόγῳ*. We find similar remarks in other old Catholic Fathers (see Clemen. Alex.).

² But how diverse were the expositions; compare the exegesis of Origen and Tertullian, Scorp. 11.

sarily followed by the manufacture of new facts on the part of theological experts. (5) The New Testament fixed a time within which divine revelation ceased, and prevented any Christian from putting himself into comparison with the disciples of Jesus. By doing so it directly promoted the lowering of Christian ideals and requirements, and in a certain fashion legitimised this weakening of religious power. At the same time, however, it maintained the knowledge of these ideals and requirements, became a spur to the conscience of believers, and averted the danger of Christianity being corrupted by the excesses of enthusiasm. (6) The fact of the New Testament being placed on a level with the Old proved the most effective means of preserving to the latter its canonical authority, which had been so often assailed in the second century. But at the same time it brought about an examination of the relation between the Old and New Testaments, which, however, also involved an enquiry into the connection between Christianity and pre-Christian revelation. The immediate result of this investigation was not only a theological exposition of the Old Testament, but also a theory which ceased to view the two Testaments as of equal authority and *subordinated* the Old to the New. This result, which can be plainly seen in Irenæus, Tertullian, and Origen, led to exceedingly important consequences.¹ It gave some degree of insight into statements, hitherto completely unintelligible, in certain New Testament writings, and it caused the Church to reflect upon a question that had as yet been raised only by heretics, viz., what are the marks which distinguish Christianity from the Old Testament religion? An historical examination imperceptibly arose; but the old notion of the inspiration of the Old Testament confined it to the narrowest limits, and in fact always continued to forbid it; for, as before, appeal was constantly made to the Old Testament as a Christian book which contained all the truths of religion in a perfect form. Nevertheless the conception

¹ On the extent to which the Old Testament had become subordinated to the New and the Prophets to the Apostles, since the end of the second century, see the following passage from Novatian, *de trinit.* 29: "Unus ergo et idem spiritus qui in prophetis et apostolis, nisi quoniam ibi ad momentum, hic semper. Ceterum ibi non ut semper in illis inesset, hic ut in illis semper maneret, et ibi mediocriter distributus, hic totus effusus, ibi parce datus, hic large commodatus."

of the Old Testament was here and there full of contradictions.¹

(7) The fatal identification of words of the Lord and words of the Apostles (apostolical tradition) had existed before the creation of the New Testament, though this proceeding gave it a new range and content and a new significance. But, with the Epistles of Paul included, the New Testament elevated the highest expression of the consciousness of redemption into a guiding principle, and by admitting Paulinism into the canon it introduced a wholesome ferment into the history of the Church.

(8) By creating the New Testament and claiming exclusive possession of it the Church deprived the non-Catholic communions of every apostolic foundation, just as she had divested Judaism of every legal title by taking possession of the Old Testament; but, by raising the New Testament to standard authority, she created the armoury which supplied the succeeding period with the keenest weapons against herself.² The place of the Gospel was taken by a book with exceedingly varied contents, which theoretically acquired the same authority as the Gospel. Still, the Catholic Church never became a religion "of the book", because every inconvenient text could be explained away by the allegoric method, and because the book was not made use of as the immediate authority for the guidance of Christians, this latter function being directly discharged by the rule of faith.³

¹ That may be shown in all the old Catholic Fathers, but most plainly perhaps in the theology of Origen. Moreover, the subordination of the Old Testament revelation to the Christian one is not simply a result of the creation of the New Testament, but may be explained by other causes; see chap. 5. If the New Testament had not been formed, the Church would perhaps have obtained a Christian Old Testament with numerous interpolations—tendencies in this direction were not wanting; see vol. I. p. 114 f.—and increased in extent by the admission of apocalypses. The creation of the New Testament preserved the purity of the Old, for it removed the need of doing violence to the latter in the interests of Christianity.

² The Catholic Church had from the beginning a very clear consciousness of the dangerousness of many New Testament writings, in fact she made a virtue of necessity in so far as she set up a theory to prove the unavoidable nature of this danger. See Tertullian, *de præscr. passim*, and *de resurr.* 63.

³ To a certain extent the New Testament disturbs and prevents the tendency to summarise the faith and reduce it to its most essential content. For it not only puts itself in the place of the unity of a system, but frequently also in the place of

In practice it continued to be the rule for the New Testament to take a secondary place in apologetic writings and disputes with heretics.¹ On the other hand it was regarded (1) as the directly authoritative document for the direction of the Christian life,² and (2) as the final court of appeal in all the conflicts that arose within the sphere of the rule of faith. It was freely applied in the second stage of the Montanist struggle, but still more in the controversies about Christology, that is, in the conflict with the Monarchians. The apostolic writings belong solely to the Church, because she alone has preserved the apostolic doctrine (*regula*). This was declared to the heretics and therewith all controversy about Scripture, or the sense of Scripture passages, was in principle declined. But within the Church herself the Holy Scripture was regarded as the supreme and completely independent tribunal against which not even an old tradition could be appealed to; and the rule *πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον* ("live according to the Gospel") held good in every respect. Moreover, this formula, which is rarely replaced by the other one, viz., *κατὰ τῆν καινὴν διαθήκην* ("according to the New Testament"), shows that the words of the Lord, as in the earlier period, continued to be the chief standard of *life and conduct*.

a harmonious and complete creed. Hence the rule of faith is necessary as a guiding principle, and even an imperfect one is better than a mere haphazard reliance upon the Bible.

¹ We must not, however, ascribe that to conscious mistrust, for Irenæus and Tertullian bear very decided testimony against such an idea, but to the acknowledgment that it was impossible to make any effective use of the New Testament Scriptures in arguments with educated non-Christians and heretics. For these writings could carry no weight with the former, and the latter either did not recognise them or else interpreted them by different rules. Even the offer of several of the Fathers to refute the Marcionites from their own canon must by no means be attributed to an uncertainty on their part with regard to the authority of the ecclesiastical canon of Scripture. We need merely add that the extraordinary difficulty originally felt by Christians in conceiving the Pauline Epistles, for instance, to be analogous and equal in value to Genesis or the prophets occasionally appears in the terminology even in the third century, in so far as the term "divine writings" continues to be more frequently applied to the Old Testament than to certain parts of the New.

² Tertullian, in *de corona* 3, makes his Catholic opponent say: "Etiam in traditionis obtentu exigenda est auctoritas scripta."

C. *The transformation of the episcopal office in the Church into an apostolic office. The history of the remodelling of the conception of the Church.*¹

I. It was not sufficient to prove that the rule of faith was of apostolic origin, *i.e.*, that the Apostles had set up a rule of faith. It had further to be shown that, up to the present, the Church had always maintained it unchanged. This demonstration was all the more necessary because the heretics also claimed an apostolic origin for their *regulæ*. and in different ways tried to adduce proof that they alone possessed a guarantee of inheriting the Apostles' doctrine in all its purity.² An historical demonstration was first attempted by the earliest of the old Catholic Fathers. They pointed to communities of whose apostolic origin there could be no doubt, and thought it could not reasonably be denied that those Churches must have preserved apostolic Christianity in a pure and incorrupt form. The proof that the Church had always held fast by apostolic Christianity depended on the agreement in doctrine between the other communities and these.³ But Irenæus as well as Tertullian felt that a special demonstration was needed to show that the Churches founded by the Apostles had really at all times faithfully preserved their genuine teaching. General considerations, as, for instance, the notion that Christianity would otherwise have temporarily perished, or "that one event among many is as good as none; but when one and the same feature is found among many, it is not an aberration but a tradition" ("Nullus inter multos eventus unus est . . . quod apud multos unum

¹ Hatch, *Organisation of the early Christian Church*. 1883. Harnack, *Die Lehrer der zwölf Apostel*. 1884. Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, Vol. I. 1892.

² Marcion was the only one who did not claim to prove his Christianity from traditions inasmuch as he rather put it in opposition to tradition. This disclaimer of Marcion is in keeping with his renunciation of apologetic proof, whilst, conversely, in the Church the apologetic proof, and the proof from tradition adduced against the heretics, were closely related. In the one case the truth of Christianity was proved by showing that it is the oldest religion, and in the other the truth of ecclesiastical Christianity was established from the thesis that it is the oldest Christianity, *viz.*, that of the Apostles.

³ See Tertullian, *de præser.* 20, 21, 32.

invenitur, non est erratum sed traditum") and similar ones which Tertullian does not fail to mention, were not sufficient. But the dogmatic conception that the *ecclesiæ* (or *ecclesia*) are the abode of the Holy Spirit,¹ was incapable of making any impression on the heretics, as the correct application of this theory was the very point in question. To make their proof more precise Tertullian and Irenæus therefore asserted that the Churches guaranteed the incorruptness of the apostolic inheritance, inasmuch as they could point to a chain of "elders," or, in other words, an "ordo episcoporum per successionem ab initio decurrens," which was a pledge that nothing false had been mixed up with it.² This thesis has quite as many aspects as the conception of the "Elders," *e.g.*, disciples of the Apostles, disciples of the disciples of the Apostles, bishops. It partly

¹ This theory is maintained by Irenæus and Tertullian, and is as old as the association of the *ἀγία ἐκκλησία* and the *πνεῦμα ἅγιον*. Just for that reason the distinction they make between Churches founded by the Apostles and those of later origin is of chief value to themselves in their arguments against heretics. This distinction, it may be remarked, is clearly expressed in Tertullian alone. Here, for example, it is of importance that the Church of Carthage derives its "authority" from that of Rome (de præscr. 36).

² Tertull., de præscr. 32 (see p. 19). Iren., III. 2. 2: "Cum autem ad eam iterum traditionem, quæ est ab apostolis, quæ per successiones presbyterorum in ecclesiis custoditur, provocamus eos, etc." III. 3. 1: "Traditionem itaque apostolorum in toto mundo manifestatam in omni ecclesia adest perspicere omnibus qui vera velint videre, et habemus annumerare eos, qui ab apostolis instituti sunt episcopi in ecclesiis et successiones eorum usque ad nos... valde enim perfectos in omnibus eos volebant esse, quos et successores relinquebant, suum ipsorum locum magisterii tradentes... traditio Romanæ ecclesiæ, quam habet ab apostolis, et annuntiata hominibus fides per successiones episcoporum perveniens usque ad nos." III. 3. 4. 1: "Si de aliqua modica questione disceptatio esset, nonne oporteret in antiquissimas recurrere ecclesias, in quibus apostoli conversati sunt... quid autem si neque apostoli quidem scripturas reliquissent nobis, nonne oportebat ordinem sequi traditionis, quam tradiderunt iis, quibus committebant ecclesias?" IV. 33. 8: "Character corporis Christi secundum successiones episcoporum, quibus apostoli eam quæ in unoquoque loco est ecclesiam tradiderunt, quæ pervenit usque ad nos, etc." V. 20. 1: "Omnes enim ii valde posteriores sunt quam episcopi, quibus apostoli tradiderunt ecclesias." IV. 26. 2: "Quapropter eis, qui in ecclesia sunt, presbyteris obaudire oportet, his qui successionem habent ab apostolis; qui cum episcopatus successione charisma veritatis certum secundum placitum patris acceperunt." IV. 26. 5: "Ubi igitur charismata domini posita sunt, ibi discere oportet veritatem, apud quos est ea quæ est ab apostolis ecclesiæ successio." The declaration in Luke X. 16 was already applied by Irenæus (III. præf.) to the successors of the Apostles.

preserves a historic and partly assumes a dogmatic character. The former aspect appears in the appeal made to the foundation of Churches by Apostles, and in the argument that each series of successors were faithful disciples of those before them and therefore ultimately of the Apostles themselves. But no historical consideration, no appeal to the "Elders" was capable of affording the assurance sought for. Hence even in Irenæus the historical view of the case had clearly changed into a dogmatic one. This, however, by no means resulted merely from the controversy with the heretics, but was quite as much produced by the altered constitution of the Church and the authoritative position that the bishops had actually attained. The idea was that the Elders, *i.e.* the bishops, had received "cum episcopatus successione certum veritatis charisma," that is, their office conferred on them the apostolic heritage of truth, which was therefore objectively attached to this dignity as a *charism*. This notion of the transmissibility of the charism of truth became associated with the episcopal office after it had become a monarchical one, exercising authority over the Church in all its relations;¹ and after the bishops had proved themselves the strongest supports of the communities against the attacks of the secular power and of

¹ For details on this point see my edition of the *Didache*, Proleg., p. 140. As the *regula fidei* has its preparatory stages in the baptismal confession, and the New Testament in the collection of writings read in the Churches, so the theory that the bishops receive and guarantee the apostolic heritage of truth has its preparatory stage in the old idea that God has bestowed on the Church Apostles, prophets, and teachers, who always communicate his word in its full purity. The functions of these persons devolved by historical development upon the bishop; but at the same time it became more and more a settled conviction that no one in this latter period could be compared with the Apostles. The only true Christianity, however, was that which was apostolic and which could prove itself to be so. The natural result of the problem which thus arose was the theory of an objective transference of the *charisma veritatis* from the Apostles to the bishops. This notion preserved the unique personal importance of the Apostles, guaranteed the apostolicity, that is, the truth of the Church's faith, and formed a dogmatic justification for the authority already attained by the bishops. The old idea that God bestows his Spirit on the Church, which is therefore the holy Church, was ever more and more transformed into the new notion that the bishops receive this Spirit, and that it appears in their official authority. The theory of a succession of prophets, which can be proved to have existed in Asia Minor, never got beyond a rudimentary form and speedily disappeared.

heresy.¹ In Irenæus and Tertullian, however, we only find the first traces of this new theory. The old notion, which regarded the *Churches* as possessing the heritage of the Apostles in so far as they possess the Holy Spirit, continued to exercise a powerful influence on these writers, who still united the new dogmatic view with a historical one, at least in controversies with the heretics. Neither Irenæus, nor Tertullian in his earlier writings,² asserted that the transmission of the *charisma veritatis* to the bishops had really invested them with the apostolic office in its full sense. They had indeed, according to Irenæus, received the "locum magisterii apostolorum" ("place of government of the Apostles"), but nothing more. It is only the later writings of Tertullian, dating from the reigns of Caracalla and Heliogabalus, which show that the bishop of Rome, who must have had imitators in this respect, claimed for his office the full authority of the apostolic office. Both Calixtus and his rival Hippolytus described themselves as successors of the Apostles in the full sense of the word, and claimed for themselves in that capacity much more than a mere guaranteeing of the purity of Christianity. Even Tertullian did not question this last mentioned attribute of the bishops.³ Cyprian found the theory already in existence, but was the first to develop it definitely and to eradicate every

¹ This theory must have been current in the Roman Church before the time when Irenæus wrote: for the list of Roman bishops, which we find in Irenæus and which he obtained from Rome, must itself be considered as a result of that dogmatic theory. The first half of the list must have been concocted, as there were no monarchical bishops in the strict sense in the first century (see my treatise: "Die ältesten christlichen Datirungen und die Anfänge einer bischöflichen Chronographie in Rom." in the report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, p. 617 ff). We do not know whether such lists were drawn up so early in the other churches of apostolic origin (Jerusalem?). Not till the beginning of the 3rd century have we proofs of that being done, whereas the Roman community, as early as Soter's time, had a list of bishops giving the duration of each episcopate. Nor is there any evidence before the 3rd century of an attempt to invent such a list for Churches possessing no claim to have been founded by Apostles.

² We do not yet find this assertion in Tertullian's treatise "de præser."

³ Special importance attaches to Tertullian's treatise "de pudicitia," which has not been sufficiently utilised to explain the development of the episcopate and the pretensions at that time set up by the Roman bishop. It shows clearly that Calixtus claimed for himself as bishop the powers and rights of the Apostles in their full extent, and that Tertullian did not deny that the "doctrina apostolorum" was

remnant of the historical argument in its favour. The conception of the Church was thereby subjected to a further transformation.

(2) The transformation of the idea of the Church by Cyprian completed the radical changes that had been gradually taking

inherent in his office, but merely questioned the "potestas apostolorum." It is very significant that Tertullian (c. 21) sneeringly addressed him as "apostolice" and reminded him that "ecclesia spiritus, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum." What rights Calixtus had already claimed as belonging to the apostolic office may be ascertained from Hippol. Philos. IX. 11. 12. But the introduction to the Philosophoumena proves that Hippolytus himself was at one with his opponent in supposing that the bishops, as successors of the Apostles, had received the attributes of the latter: *Τὰς αἰρέσεις ἕτερος οὐκ ἐλέγξει, ἢ τὸ ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ παραδοθὲν ἅγιον πνεῦμα, οὗ τυχόντες πρότεροι οἱ ἀπόστολοι μετέδοσαν τοῖς ὀρθῶς πεπιστευκότιν ὧν ἡμεῖς διάδοχοι τυγχάνοντες τῆς τε αὐτῆς χάριτος μετέχοντες ἀρχιερατείας τε καὶ διδασκαλίας καὶ φρουροὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας λελογισμένοι οὐκ ὀφθαλμῶ νυστάζομεν, οὐδὲ λόγον ὀρθόν σιωπῶμεν, κ.τ.λ.* In these words we have an immense advance beyond the conception of Irenæus. This advance, of course, was first made in practice, and the corresponding theory followed. How greatly the prestige and power of the bishops had increased in the first 3rd part of the 3rd century may be seen by comparing the edict of Maximus Thrax with the earlier ones (Euseb., H. E. VI. 28; see also the genuine Martyr. Jacobi, Mariani, etc., in Numidia c. 10 [Ruinart. Acta mart. p. 272 edit. Ratish.]): "Nam ita inter se nostræ religionis gradus artifex sævitia dividerat, ut laicos clericis separatos tentationibus sæculi et terroribus suis putaret esse cessuros" that is, the heathen authorities also knew that the clergy formed the bond of union in the Churches). But the theory that the bishops were successors of the Apostles, that is, possessed the apostolic office, must be considered a Western one which was very slowly and gradually adopted in the East. Even in the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions, composed about the end of the 3rd century, which represents the bishop as mediator, king, and teacher of the community, the episcopal office is not yet regarded as the apostolic one. It is rather presbyters, as in Ignatius, who are classed with the Apostles. It is very important to note that the whole theory of the significance of the bishop in determining the truth of ecclesiastical Christianity is completely unknown to Clement of Alexandria. As we have not the slightest evidence that his conception of the Church was of a hierarchical and anti-heretical type, so he very rarely mentions the ecclesiastical officials in his works and rarest of all the bishops. These do not at all belong to his conception of the Church, or at least only in so far as they resemble the English orders (cf. Pæd. III. 12. 97, presbyters, bishops, deacons, widows: Strom. VII. 1. 3; III. 12. 90, presbyters, deacons, laity: VI. 13. 106, presbyters, deacons: VI. 13. 107, bishops, presbyters, deacons; Quis dives 42, bishops and presbyters). On the other hand, according to Clement, the true Gnostic has an office like that of the Apostles. See Strom. VI. 13. 106, 107: *ἔξεστιν οὖν καὶ νῦν ταῖς κυριακαῖς ἐνασκήσαντας ἐντολαῖς κατὰ τὸ εὐαγγέλιον τελείως βιώσαντας καὶ γνωστικῶς εἰς τὴν ἐκλογὴν τῶν ἀποστόλων ἐγγραφῆναι. οὗτος πρεσβύτερός ἐστι τῷ ὄντι τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ δίακονος ἀληθῆς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως.* Here we see plainly that the servants of the earthly Church, as such, have nothing to do with the true Church and the heavenly hierarchy). Strom. VII. 9, 52 says: the true Gnostic is the mediator with God. In Strom. VI.

place from the last half of the second century.¹ In order to understand them it is necessary to go back. It was only with slowness and hesitation that the theories of the Church followed the actual changes in her history. It may be said that the idea of the Church always remained a stage behind the condition reached in practice. That may be seen in the whole course of the history of dogma up to the present day.

The essential character of Christendom in its first period was a new holy life and a sure hope, both based on repentance

14. 108; VII. 12. 77 we find the words: ὁ γνωστικός οὗτος συνελόντι εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀποστολικὴν ἀπουσίαν ἀνταναπληροῦ, κ.τ.λ. Clement could not have expressed himself in this way if the office of bishop had at that time been as much esteemed in the Alexandrian Church, of which he was a presbyter, as it was at Rome and in other Churches of the West (see Bigg l.c. 101). According to Clement the Gnostic as a teacher has the same significance as is possessed by the bishop in the West: and according to him we may speak of a natural succession of teachers. Origen in the main still held the same view as his predecessor. But numerous passages in his works and above all his own history shew that in his day the episcopate had become stronger in Alexandria also, and had begun to claim the same attributes and rights as in the West (see besides de princip. praef. 2: "servetur ecclesiastica praedicatione per successionis ordinem ab apostolis tradita et usque ad praesens in ecclesiis permanens; illa sola credenda est veritas, quæ in nullo ab ecclesiastica et apostolica discordat traditione"—so in Rufinus, and in IV. 2. 2: τοῦ κανόνος τῆς Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κατὰ διαδοχὴν τ. ἀποστόλων οὐρανοῦ ἐκκλησίας). The state of things here is therefore exactly the same as in the case of the apostolic *regula fidei* and the apostolic canon of scripture. Clement still represents an earlier stage, whereas by Origen's time the revolution has been completed. Wherever this was so, the theory that the monarchical episcopate was based on apostolic institution was the natural result. This idea led to the assumption—which, however, was not an immediate consequence in all cases—that the apostolic office, and therefore the authority of Jesus Christ himself, was continued in the episcopate: "Manifesta est sententia Iesu Christi apostolos suos mittentis et ipsis solis potestatem a patre sibi datam permittentis, quibus nos successimus eadem potestatem ecclesiam domini gubernantes et credentium fidem baptizantes (Hartel, Opp. Cypr. I. 459).

¹ See Rothe. Die Anfänge der christlichen Kirche und ihrer Verfassung, 1837. Köstlin. Die Katholische Auffassung von der Kirche in ihrer ersten Ausbildung in der Deutsche Zeitschrift für christliche Wissenschaft und christliches Leben, 1855. Ritschl. Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche," 2nd ed., 1857. Ziegler. Des Irenäus Lehre von der Autorität der Schrift, der Tradition und der Kirche, 1868. Hackenschmidt, Die Anfänge des katholischen Kirchenbegriffs, 1874. Hatch—Harnack, Die Gesellschaftsverfassung der christlichen Kirche im Alterthum, 1883. Seeberg, Zur Geschichte des Begriffs der Kirche, Dorpat, 1884. Söder. Der Begriff der Katholicität der Kirche und des Glaubens, 1881. O. Ritschl, Cyprian von Karthago und die Verfassung der Kirche, 1885. (This contains the special literature treating of Cyprian's conception of the Church). Sohm, l.c.

towards God and faith in Jesus Christ and brought about by the Holy Spirit. Christ and the Church, that is, the Holy Spirit and the holy Church, were inseparably connected. The Church, or, in other words, the community of all believers, attains her unity through the Holy Spirit. This unity manifested itself in brotherly love and in the common relation to a common ideal and a common hope.¹ The assembly of all Christians is realised in the Kingdom of God, viz., in heaven; on earth Christians and the Church are dispersed and in a foreign land. Hence, properly speaking, the Church herself is a heavenly community inseparable from the heavenly Christ. Christians believe that they belong to a real super-terrestrial commonwealth, which, from its very nature, cannot be realised on earth. The heavenly goal is not yet separated from the idea of the Church; there is a holy Church on earth in so far as heaven is her destination.² Every individual congregation is to be an image of the heavenly Church.³ Reflections were no doubt made on the contrast between the empirical community and the heavenly Church whose earthly likeness it was to be (Hermas); but these did not affect the theory of the subject. Only the saints of God, whose salvation is certain, belong to her, for the essential thing is not to be called, but to be, a Christian. There was as yet no empirical universal Church possessing an outward legal title that could, so to speak, be detached from the personal Christianity of the individual Christian.⁴ All the lofty

¹ See Hatch, *l.c.* pp. 191, 253.

² See vol. I. p. 150 f. Special note should be given to the teachings in the Shepherd, in the 2nd Epistle of Clement and in the *Διδαχὴ*.

³ This notion lies at the basis of the exhortations of Ignatius. He knows nothing of an empirical union of the different communities into one Church guaranteed by any law or office. The bishop is of importance only for the individual community, and has nothing to do with the essence of the Church; nor does Ignatius view the separate communities as united in any other way than by faith, charity, and hope. Christ, the invisible Bishop, and the Church are inseparably connected (ad Ephes. V. 1: as well as 2nd Clem. XIV.), and that is ultimately the same idea as is expressed in the associating of *πνεῦμα* and *ἐκκλησία*. But every individual community is an image of the heavenly Church, or at least ought to be.

⁴ The expression "Catholic Church" appears first in Ignatius (ad Smyrn. VIII. 2): *ὅπου ἔνι Φανῶ ὁ ἐπίσκοπος, ἐκεῖ τὸ πλῆθος ἕσται ὡσπερ ὅπου ἔνι ἡ Χριστὸς Ἰησοῦς, ἐκεῖ ἡ καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία*. But in this passage these words do not yet express a

designations which Paul, the so-called Apostolic Fathers, and Justin gathered from the Old Testament and applied to the Church, relate to the holy community which originates in heaven and returns thither.¹

But, in consequence of the naturalising of Christianity in the world and the repelling of heresy, a formulated creed was made the basis of the Church. This confession was also recognised as a foundation of her unity and guarantee of her truth, and in certain respects as the main one. Christendom protected itself by this conception, though no doubt at a heavy price. To Irenæus and Tertullian the Church rests entirely on the apostolic, traditional faith which legitimises her.² But this faith itself appeared as a *λατὴ* and aggregate of doctrines, all of which are of equally fundamental importance, so that their practical aim became uncertain and threatened to vanish ("fides in regula posita est, habet legem et salutem de observatione legis").

The Church herself, however, became a union based on the true doctrine and visible in it; and this confederation was at the same time enabled to realise an actual outward unity by means of the apostolic inheritance, the doctrinal confession, and the apostolic writings. The narrower and more external character assumed by the idea of the Church was concealed by the fact that, since the latter half of the second century, Christians in

new conception of the Church, which represents her as an empirical commonwealth. Only the individual earthly communities exist empirically, and the universal, *i.e.*, the whole Church, occupies the same position towards these as the bishops of the individual communities do towards the Lord. The epithet "*καθολικός*" does not of itself imply any secularisation of the idea of the Church.

¹ The expression "invisible Church" is liable to be misunderstood here, because it is apt to impress us as a mere idea, which is certainly not the meaning attached to it in the earliest period.

² It was thus regarded by Hegesippus in whom the expression "*ἡ ἔνωσις τῆς ἐκκλησίας*" is first found. In his view the *ἐκκλησία* is founded on the *ὁρθὸς λόγος* transmitted by the Apostles. The innovation does not consist in the emphasis laid upon faith, for the unity of faith was always supposed to be guaranteed by the possession of the one Spirit and the same hope, but in the setting up of a formulated creed, which resulted in a loosening of the connection between faith and conduct. The transition to the new conception of the Church was therefore a gradual one. The way is very plainly prepared for it in 1 Tim. III. 15: *οἶκος θεοῦ ἐκκλησία, στυλοῦς καὶ ἑδραίωμα τῆς αληθείας.*

all parts of the world had really united in opposition to the state and "heresy", and had found compensation for the incipient decline of the original lofty thoughts and practical obligations in the consciousness of forming an œcumenical and international alliance. The designation "Catholic Church" gave expression to the claim of this world-wide union of the same faith to represent the true Church.¹ This expression corresponds to the powerful position which the "great Church" (Celsus), or the

¹ The oldest predicate which was given to the Church and which was always associated with it, was that of *holiness*. See the New Testament: Barn. XIV. 6; Hermas, Vis. I. 3, 4; I. 6; the Roman symbol; Dial. 119; Ignat. ad Trall. inscr.: Theophil., ad AutoL., II. 14 (here we have even the plural, "holy churches"); Apollon. in Euseb., H. E. V. 18. 5; Tertull., adv. Marc. IV. 13; V. 4; de pudicit. 1; Mart. Polyc. inscr.: Alexander Hieros. in Euseb., H. E. VI. 11. 5; Clemens Alex.: Cornelius in Euseb., VI. 43. 6; Cyprian. But the holiness (purity) of the Church was already referred by Hegesippus (Euseb., H. E. IV. 22. 4) to its pure doctrine: ἐκάλουν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν παρβένον· οὐπω γὰρ ἔφθαρτο ἀκοίης ματαίαις. The unity of the Church according to Hegesippus is specially emphasised in the Muratorian Fragment (line 55); see also Hermas; Justin; Irenæus; Tertullian, de præscr. 20; Clem. Alex., Strom. VII. 17. 107. Even before Irenæus and Tertullian the *universality* of the Church was emphasised for apologetic purposes. In so far as universality is a proof of truth, "universal" is equivalent to "orthodox." This signification is specially clear in expressions like: ἡ ἐν Σμύρνη καθολικὴ ἐκκλησία (Mart. Polyc. XVI. 2). From Irenæus, III. 15. 2, we must conclude that the Valentinians called their ecclesiastical opponents "Catholics." The word itself is not yet found in Irenæus, but the idea is there (see I. 10. 2; II. 9. 1, etc., Serapion in Euseb., H. E. V. 19: πᾶσα ἡ ἐν κόσμῳ ἀδελφότης). Καθολικός is found as a designation of the orthodox, visible Church in Mart. Polyc. inscr.: αἱ κατὰ πάντα τόπον τῆς ἀγίας καὶ καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας παρεικίζου; 19. 2; 16. 2 (in all these passages, however, it is probably an interpolation, as I have shown in the "Expositor" for Dec. 1885, p. 410 f.); in the Muratorian Fragment 61, 66, 69; in the anonymous writer in Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 9, in Tertull. frequently, e.g., de præscr. 26, 30; adv. Marc. III. 22; IV. 4; in Clem. Alex., Strom. VII. 17. 106, 107; in Hippol. Philos. IX. 12; in Mart. Pionii 2. 9, 13, 19; in Cornelius in Cyr., ep. 49. 2; and in Cyprian. The expression "catholica traditio" occurs in Tertull., de monog. 2, "fides catholica" in Cyprian ep. 25. "κανὼν καθολικός" in the Mart. Polyc. rec. Mosq. fin. and Cyr. ep. 70. 1. "catholica fides et religio" in the Mart. Pionii 18. In the earlier Christian literature the word καθολικός occurs in various connections in the following passages: in fragments of the Peratae (Philos. V. 16), and in Herakleon, e.g., in Clement, Strom. IV. 9. 71; in Justin, Dial. 81, 102; Athenag., 27; Theophil., I. 13; Pseudojustin, de monarch. 1. (καθολ. δόξα); Iren., III. 11. 8; Apollon. in Euseb., H. E. IV. 18. 5; Tertull., de fuga 3; adv. Marc. II. 17; IV. 9; Clement, Strom., IV. 15. 97; VI. 6. 47; 7. 57; δ. 67. The addition "catholicam" found its way into the symbols of the West only at a comparatively late period. The earlier expressions for the whole of Christendom are πᾶσαι αἱ ἐκκλησίαι, ἐκκλησίαι κατὰ πᾶσαν πόλιν, ἐκκλησίαι αἰ ἐν κόσμῳ, αἱ ὑφ' οὐράνου, etc.

“old” Church (Clemens Alex.) had attained by the end of the second century, as compared with the Marcionite Church, the school sects, the Christian associations of all kinds, and the independent Christians. This Church, however, was declared to be apostolic, *i. e.*, founded in its present form by Christ through the Apostles. Through this idea, which was supported by the old enthusiastic notion that the Apostles had already proclaimed the Gospel to all the world, it came to be completely forgotten how Christ and his Apostles had exercised their ministry, and an empirical conception of the Church was created in which the idea of a holy life in the Spirit could no longer be the ruling one. It was taught that Christ received from God a law of faith, which, as a new lawgiver, he imparted to the Apostles, and that they, by transmitting the truth of which they were the depositaries, founded the one Catholic Church (Iren. III. 4. 1). The latter, being guardian of the apostolic heritage, has the assurance of possessing the Spirit; whereas all communities other than herself, inasmuch as they have not received that deposit, necessarily lack the Spirit and are therefore separated from Christ and salvation.¹ Hence one must be a member of this Church in order to be a partaker of salvation, because in her alone one can find the creed which must be recognised as the condition of redemption.² Consequently, in proportion as the faith became a doctrine of faith, the Catholic Church interposed herself as an empiric power between the individual and salvation. She became a condition of salvation;

¹ Very significant is Tertullian's expression in *adv. Val.* 4: “Valentinus de ecclesia authenticae regulæ abruptit.” (but probably this still refers specially to the Roman Church).

² Tertullian called the Church *mother* (in *Gal.* IV. 26 the heavenly Jerusalem is called “mother”); see *de orat.* 2: “ne mater quidem ecclesia præteritur”. *de monog.* 7; *adv. Marc.* V. 4 (the author of the letter in *Euseb.* II. E. V. 2. 7. 1. 45. had already done this before him). In the African Church the symbol was thus worded soon after Tertullian's time: “credis in remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam ecclesiam” (see *Hahn. Bibliothek der Symbole*, 2nd ed. p. 29 ff.) On the other hand Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* VI. 16. 146) rejected the designation of the Church, as “mother”: μήτηρ δέ οὐχ, ὡς τινες ἐκδεδώκασιν, ἡ ἐκκλησία, ἀλλ' ἡ θεία γνώσις καὶ ἡ σοφία (there is a different idea in *Paed.* I. 5. 21 and 6. 42: μήτηρ παρθένος ἐκκλησίαν ἔμοι φίλον αὐτὴν καλεῖν). In the *Acta Justiniani* c. 4 the faith is named “mother.”

but the result was that she ceased to be a sure communion of the saved and of saints (see on this point the following chapter). It was quite a logical proceeding when about the year 220 Calixtus, a Roman bishop, started the theory that there *must* be wheat and tares in the Catholic Church and that the Ark of Noah with its clean and unclean beasts was her type.¹ The departure from the old idea of the Church appears completed in this statement. But the following facts must not be overlooked: — First, the new conception of the Church was not yet a hierarchical one. Secondly, the idea of the union and unity of all believers found here magnificent expression. Thirdly, the development of the communities into one solid Church also represents the creative power of the Christian spirit. Fourthly, through the consolidation effected in the Church by the rule of faith the Christian religion was in some measure preserved from enthusiastic extravagancies and arbitrary misinterpretation. Fifthly, in consequence of the regard for a Church founded on the doctrine of faith the specific significance of redemption by Christ, as distinguished from natural religion and that of the Old Testament, could no longer be lost to believers. Sixthly, the independence of each individual community had a wide scope not only at the end of the second but also in the third century.² Consequently, though the revolution which led to the Catholic Church was a result of the situation of the communities in the world in general and of the struggle with the Gnostics and Marcion in particular, and though it was a fatal error to identify the Catholic and apostolic Churches, this change did not take place without an exalting of the Christian spirit and an awakening of its self-consciousness.

But there was never a time in history when the conception of the Church, as nothing else than the visible communion of those holding the correct apostolic doctrine, was clearly grasped or exclusively emphasised. In Irenæus and Tertullian we rather find, on the one hand, that the old theory of the

¹ Hippol. Philos. IX. 12 p. 460.

² The phraseology of Irenæus is very instructive here. As a rule he still speaks of Churches (in the plural) when he means the empirical Church. It is already otherwise with Tertullian, though even with him the old custom still lingers.

Church was still to a great extent preserved and, on the other, that the hierarchical notion was already making its appearance. As to the first point, Irenæus frequently asserts that the Spirit and the Church, that is, the Christian people, are inseparable; that the Spirit in divers ways continually effects whatever she needs; that she is the totality of all true believers, that all the faithful have the rank of priests; that outside the holy Church there is no salvation, etc.; in fact these doctrines form the very essence of his teaching. But, since she was also regarded as the visible institution for objectively preserving and communicating the truth, and since the idea of the Church in contradistinction to heresy was necessarily exhausted in this as far as Irenæus was concerned, the old theories of the matter could not operate correctively, but in the end only served to glorify the earthly Catholic Church.¹ The proposition that truth is only to be found in the Church and that she and the Holy Spirit are inseparable must be understood in Irenæus as already referring to the Catholic Church in contradistinction to every other calling itself Christian.² As to the second point, it cannot be denied that, though Irenæus desires to maintain that the only essential part of the idea of the Church is the fact of her being the depository of the truth, he was no longer able to confine himself to this (see above). The episcopal succession and the transmission to the bishops of the *magisterium* of the Apostles were not indeed of any direct importance to his idea of the Church, but they were of consequence for the preservation of truth and therefore indirectly for the idea of the Church also. To Irenæus, however, that theory was still

¹ The most important passages bearing on this are II. 31. 3: III. 24. 1 (see the whole section, but especially: "in ecclesia posuit deus universam operationem spiritus; cuius non sunt participes omnes qui non concurrunt ad ecclesiam... ubi enim ecclesia, ibi et spiritus dei, et ubi spiritus dei, illic ecclesia et omnis gratia"): III. 11. 8: *στέλος καὶ στήριγμα ἐκκλησίας τὸ εὐαγγέλιον καὶ πνεῦμα ζωῆς*: IV. 8. 1: "semen Abrahæ ecclesia", IV. 8. 3: "omnes iusti sacerdotalem habent ordinem": IV. 36. 2: "ubique præclara est ecclesia: ubique enim sunt qui suscipiunt spiritum": IV. 33. 7: *ἐκκλησία μέγα καὶ ἔνδοξον πᾶμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ*; IV. 26. 1 sq.: V. 20. 1.: V. 32.: V. 34. 3., "Levitæ et sacerdotes sunt discipuli omnes domini."

² Hence the repudiation of all those who separate themselves from the Catholic Church (III. 11. 9; 24. 1: IV. 26. 2; 33. 7).

nothing more than an artificial line; but artificial lines are really supports and must therefore soon attain the value of foundations.¹ Tertullian's conception of the Church was essentially the same as that of Irenæus; but with the former the idea that she is the outward manifestation of the Spirit, and therefore a communion of those who are spiritual, at all times continued to operate more powerfully than with the latter. In the last period of his life Tertullian emphasised this theory so vigorously that the Antignostic idea of the Church being based on the "traditio unius sacramenti" fell into the background. Consequently we find nothing more than traces of the hierarchical conception of the Church in Tertullian. But towards the end of his life he found himself face to face with a *fully developed* theory of this kind. This he most decidedly rejected, and, in doing so, advanced to such a conception of ecclesiastical orders, and therefore also of the episcopate, as clearly involved him in a contradiction of the other theory—which he also never gave up—viz., that the bishops, as the class which transmits the rule of faith, are an apostolic institution and therefore necessary to the Church.²

¹ On IV. 33. 7 see Seeberg, l.c. p. 20, who has correctly punctuated the passage, but has weakened its force. The fact that Irenæus was here able to cite the "antiquus ecclesiæ status in universo mundo et character corporis Christi secundum successiones episcoporum", etc., as a second and independent item alongside of the apostolic doctrine is, however, a proof that the transition from the idea of the Church, as a community united by a common faith, to that of a hierarchical institution was already revealing itself in his writings.

² The Church as a communion of the same faith, that is of the same doctrine, is spoken of in de præscr. 20; de virg. vol. 2. On the other hand we find the ideal spiritual conception in de bapt. 6: "ubi tres, id est pater et filius et spiritus sanctus, ibi ecclesia, quæ trium corpus est"; 8: "columba s. spiritus advolat, pacem dei adferens, emissa de cœlis, ubi ecclesia est arca figurata"; 15: "unus deus et unum baptismum et una ecclesia in cœlis"; de pœnit. 10: "in uno et altero ecclesia est, ecclesia vero Christus"; de orat. 28: "nos sumus veri adoratores et veri sacerdotes, qui spiritu orantes spiritu sacrificamus"; Apolog. 39; de exhort. 7: "differentiam inter ordinem et plebem constituit ecclesiæ auctoritas et honor per ordinis consensum sanctificatus. Adeo ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consensus, et offers et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus. Sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici" (the same idea, only not so definitely expressed, is already found in de bapt. 17); de monog. 7: "nos autem Iesus summus sacerdos sacerdotes deo patri suo fecit... vivit unicus pater noster deus et mater ecclesia... certe sacerdotes sumus a Christo vocati"; 12; de pudic. 21: "nam et ipsa ecclesia proprie et principaliter ipse est spiritus, in

From the disquisitions of Clement of Alexandria we see how vigorous the old conception of the Church, as the heavenly communion of the elect and believing, still continued to be about the year 200. This will not appear strange after what we have already said as to Clement's views about the rule of faith, the New Testament, and the episcopate. It is evident that his philosophy of religion led him to give a new interpretation to the original ideas. Yet the old form of these notions can be more easily made out from his works than from those of Irenæus.¹ Up to the 15th Chapter of the 7th Book of his great work, the *Stromateis*, and in the *Pædagogus*, Clement simply speaks of the Church in the sense of the Epistle to the Ephesians and the Shepherd of Hermas. She is a heavenly formation, continued in that which appears on earth as her image. Instead of distinguishing two Churches Clement sees one, the product of God's will aiming at the salvation of man—a Church which is to be on earth as it is in heaven, and of which faith forms the subjective and the Logos the objective bond of union. But, beginning with *Strom.* VII. 15 (see especially 17), where he is influenced by opposition to the heretics, he suddenly identifies this Church with the single old Catholic one, that is, with the visible "Church" in opposition to the heretic sects. Thus the empirical interpretation of the Church, which makes her the institution in possession of the true doctrine, was also completely adopted by Clement; but as yet he employed it simply in polemics and not in positive teachings. He neither reconciled nor seemingly felt the contradiction in the statement that the Church is to be at one and the same time the assembly of the elect and the empiric universal Church. At any rate he made

quo est trinitas unius divinitatis, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus. Illam ecclesiam congregat quam dominus in tribus posuit. Atque ita exinde etiam numerus omnis qui in hanc fidem conspiraverint ecclesia ab auctore et consecratore censetur. Et ideo ecclesia quidem delicta donabit, sed ecclesia spiritus per spiritalem hominem, non ecclesia numerus episcoporum"; de anima 11, 21. Contradictions in detail need not surprise us in Tertullian, since his whole position as a Catholic and as a Montanist is contradictory.

¹ The notion that the true Gnostic can attain the same position as the Apostles also preserved Clement from thrusting the ideal conception of the Church into the background.

as yet no unconditional acknowledgment of the Catholic Church, because he was still able to attribute independent value to Gnosis, that is, to independent piety as he understood it.¹ Consequently, as regards the conception of the Church, the mystic Gnosis exercised the same effect as the old religious enthusiasm from which in other respects it differs so much.² The hierarchy has still no significance as far as Clement's idea of the Church is concerned.³ At first Origen entirely agrees with Clement in regard to this conception. He also starts with the theory that the Church is essentially a heavenly communion and a holy communion of believers, and keeps this idea constantly before him.⁴ When opposing heretics, he also, like Clement, cannot help identifying her with the Catholic Church, because the latter contains the true doctrine, though he likewise

¹ Some very significant remarks are found in Clement about the Church which is the object of faith. See *Paed.* I. 5. 18, 21; 6. 27: *ὡς γὰρ τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο κόσμος ὀνομάζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὸ βούλημα αὐτοῦ ἀνθρώπων ἐστὶ σωτηρία, καὶ τοῦτο ἐκκλησία κέκληται*—here an idea which Irenaeus had in his mind (see Vol. I., p. 180. note 4) is pregnantly and excellently expressed. *Strom.* II. 12. 55; IV. 8. 66: *εἰκὼν τῆς οὐρανόθεν ἐκκλησίας ἡ ἐπίγειος, διόπερ εὐχόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς γενέσθαι τὸ θέλημα τοῦ Θεοῦ ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ*; IV. 26. 172: *ἡ ἐκκλησία ὑπὸ λόγου ἀπολιόρκητος ἀτυράννητος πόλις ἐπὶ γῆς, βέλημα θεῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, ὡς ἐν οὐρανῷ*; VI. 13. 106, 107; VI. 14. 108: *ἡ ἀνωτάτω ἐκκλησία, καθ' ἣν οἱ φιλόσοφοι συνάγονται τοῦ Θεοῦ*; VII. 5. 29: *πῶς οὐ κυρίως τὴν εἰς τιμὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ κατ' ἐπίγνωσιν ἀγίαν γενομένην ἐκκλησίαν ἱερὸν ἂν ἔποιμεν Θεοῦ τὸ πολλοῦ ἄξιον... οὐ γὰρ νῦν τὸν τόπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄβροισμα τῶν ἐκλεκτῶν ἐκκλησίαν καλῶ*; VII. 6. 32; VII. 11. 68: *ἡ πνευματικὴ ἐκκλησία*. The empirical conception of the Church is most clearly formulated in VII. 17. 107; we may draw special attention to the following sentences: *Φανερόν οἶμαι γεγενῆσθαι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀληθῆ ἐκκλησίαν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἀρχαίαν, εἰς ἣν οἱ κατὰ πρόβησιν δίκαιοι ἐγκαταλέγονται, ἐνὸς γὰρ ὄντος τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ ἐνὸς τοῦ κυρίου... τῆ γούν τοῦ ἐνὸς φύσει συγκληροῦται ἐκκλησία ἡ μία, ἣν εἰς πολλὰς κατατέμνειν βιάζονται αἰρέσεις*.

² It may, however, be noted that the old eschatological aim has fallen into the background in Clement's conception of the Church.

³ A significance of this kind is suggested by the notion that the orders in the earthly Church correspond to those in the heavenly one; but this idea, which afterwards became so important in the East, was turned to no further account by Clement. In his view the "Gnostics" are the highest stage in the Church. See Bigg, *l.c.*, p. 100.

⁴ *De princip.* IV. 2. 2: *ἡ οὐράνιος ἐκκλησία*; Hom. IX. in Exod. c. 3: "ecclesia credentium plebs"; Hom. XI. in Lev. c. 5; Hom. VI. in Lev. c. 5; *ibid.* Hom. IX.: "omni ecclesiae dei et credentium populo sacerdotium datum."; T. XIV. in Mt. c. 17: c. Cels. VI. 48; VI. 79; Hom. VII. in Lk.; and *de orat.* 31 a twofold Church is distinguished

refrains from acknowledging any hierarchy.¹ But Origen is influenced by two further considerations, which are scarcely hinted at in Clement, but which were called forth by the actual course of events and signified a further development in the idea of the Church. For, in the first place, Origen saw himself already compelled to examine closely the distinction between the essence and the outward appearance of the Church, and, in this process, reached results which again called in question the identification of the Holy Church with the empiric Catholic one (see on this point the following chapter). Secondly, in consequence of the extraordinary extension and powerful position attained by the Catholic Church by the time of Philip the Arabian, Origen, giving a new interpretation to a very old Christian notion and making use of a Platonic conception,² arrived at the idea that she was the earthly Kingdom of God, destined to enter the world, to absorb the Roman Empire and indeed all mankind, and to unite and take the place of the various secular states.³ This magnificent idea, which regards the Church as *κόσμος τοῦ κόσμου*,⁴ denoted indeed a complete departure from the original theory of the subject, determined by eschatological considerations; though we must not forget

(ὡστε εἶναι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀγίων συναθροισομένων διπλὴν ἐκκλησίαν τὴν μὲν ἀνθρώπων, τὴν δὲ ἀγγέλων). Nevertheless Origen does not assume two Churches, but, like Clement, holds that there is only one, part of which is already in a state of perfection and part still on earth. But it is worthy of note that the ideas of the heavenly hierarchy are already more developed in Origen (de princip. I. 7). He adopted the old speculation about the origin of the Church (see Papias, fragm. 6; 2 Clem. XIV.). Socrates (H. E. III. 7) reports that Origen, in the 9th vol. of his commentary on Genesis, compared Christ with Adam and Eve with the Church, and remarks that Pamphilus' apology for Origen stated that this allegory was not new: *ὁ ὑπὸ Πρωτοῦ Ὠριγένη ἐπὶ ταύτην τὴν πραγματείαν ἐλθεῖν φασίν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῆς ἐκκλησίας μυστικὴν ἐρμηνεύσαι παράδοσιν*. A great many more of these speculations are to be found in the 3rd century. See, e.g., *the Acts of Peter and Paul* 29.

¹ De princip. IV. 2. 2: Hom. III. in Jesu N. 5: "nemo tibi persuadeat, nemo semetipsum decipiat: extra ecclesiam nemo salvatur." The reference is to the Catholic Church which Origen also calls *τὸ ὅλον σῶμα τῶν συναγωγῶν τῆς ἐκκλησίας*.

² Hermas (Sim. I.) has spoken of the "city of God" (see also pseudo-Cyprian's tractate "de pascha computus"); but for him it lies in Heaven and is the complete contrast of the world. The idea of Plato here referred to is to be found in his *Republic*.

³ See c. Cels. VIII. 68—75.

⁴ Comment. in Joh. VI. 38.

that Origen still demanded a really holy Church and a new polity. Hence, as he also distinguishes the various degrees of connection with the Church,¹ we already find in his theory a combination of all the features that became essential parts of the conception of the Church in subsequent times, with the exception of the clerical element.²

3. The contradictory notions of the Church, for so they appear to us, in Irenæus and Clement and still more in Tertullian and Origen, need not astonish any one who bears in mind that none of these Fathers made the Church the subject of a theological theory.³ Hence no one as yet thought of questioning the old article: "I believe in a holy Church." But, at the same time, actual circumstances, though they did not at first succeed in altering the Church's belief, forced her to *realise* her changed position, for she had in point of fact become an association which was founded on a definite law of doctrine and rejected everything that did not conform to it. The identifying of this association with the ideal Church was a matter of course,⁴ but it was quite as natural to take no immediate *theoretical* notice of the identification except in cases where it was absolutely necessary, that is, in polemics. In the latter case the unity of faith and hope became the unity of the doctrine of faith, and the Church was, in this instance, legitimised by the possession of the apostolic tradition instead of by the realising of that tradition in heart and life. From the principle that had been set

¹ Accordingly he often speaks in a depreciatory way of the ὄχλος τῆς ἐκκλησίας (the ignorant) without accusing them of being unchristian (this is very frequent in the books c. Cels., but is also found elsewhere).

² Origen, who is Augustine's equal in other respects also, and who anticipated many of the problems considered by the latter, anticipated prophetically this Father's view of the City of God—of course as a hope (c. Cels. viii. 68 f.). The Church is also viewed as τὸ κατὰ Θεοῦ πολίτευμα in Euseb., H. E. V. Præf. § 4, and at an earlier period in Clement.

³ This was not done even by Origen, for in his great work "de principiis" we find no section devoted to the Church.

⁴ It is frequently represented in Protestant writers that the mistake consisted in this identification, whereas, if we once admit this criticism, the defect is rather to be found in the development itself which took place in the Church, that is, in its secularisation. No one thought of the desperate idea of an invisible Church; this notion would probably have brought about a lapse from pure Christianity far more rapidly than the idea of the Holy Catholic Church.

up it necessarily followed that the apostolic inheritance on which the truth and legitimacy of the Church was based, could not but remain an imperfect court of appeal until *living* authorities could be pointed to in this court, and until *every* possible cause of strife and separation was settled by reference to it. An empirical community cannot be ruled by a traditional written word, but only by persons; for the written law will always separate and split. If it has such persons, however, it can tolerate within it a great amount of individual differences, provided that the leaders subordinate the interests of the whole to their own ambition. We have seen how Irenæus and Tertullian, though they in all earnestness represented the *fides catholica* and *ecclesia catholica* as inseparably connected,¹ were already compelled to have recourse to bishops in order to ensure the apostolic doctrine. The conflicts within the sphere of the rule of faith, the struggles with the so-called Montanism, but finally and above all, the existing situation of the Church in the third century with regard to the world within her pale, made the question of organisation the vital one for her. Tertullian and Origen already found themselves face to face with episcopal claims of which they highly disapproved and which, in their own way, they endeavoured to oppose. It was again the Roman bishop² who first converted the proposition that the bishops are direct successors of the Apostles and have the same "locus magisterii" ("place of government") into a theory which declares that *all* apostolic powers have devolved on the bishops and that these have therefore peculiar rights and duties in virtue of their office.³ Cyprian added to this the corresponding theory of the Church.

¹ Both repeatedly and very decidedly declared that the unity of faith (the rule of faith) is sufficient for the unity of the Church, and that in other things there must be freedom (see above all Tertull., *de orat.*, *de bapt.*, and the Montanist writings). It is all the more worthy of note that, in the case of a question in which indeed the customs of the different countries were exceedingly productive of confusion, but which was certainly not a matter of faith, it was again a bishop of Rome, and that as far back as the 2nd century, who first made the observance of the Roman practice a condition of the unity of the Church and treated non-conformists as heterodox (Victor; see Euseb., H. E. V. 24). On the other hand Irenæus says: ἡ διαφωνία τῆς υἱστείας τὴν ὁμόνοιαν τῆς πίστεως συνίστησι.

² On Calixtus see Hippolyt., *Philos.* IX. 12. and Tertull., *de pudic.*

³ See on the other hand Tertull., *de monog.*, but also Hippol., *l.c.*

In one decisive point, however, he did not assist the secularising process which had been completed by the Roman bishop, in the interest of Catholicity as well as in that of the Church's existence (see the following chapter). In the second half of the third century there were no longer any Churches, except remote communities, where the only requirement was to preserve the Catholic faith; the bishops had to be obeyed. The idea of the one episcopally organised Church became the main one and overshadowed the significance of the doctrine of faith as a bond of unity. *The Church based on the bishops, the successors of the Apostles, the vicegerents of God, is herself the legacy of the Apostles in virtue of this her foundation.* This idea was never converted into a rigid theory in the East, though the reality to which it corresponded was not the less certain on that account. The fancy that the earthly hierarchy was the image of the heavenly was the only part that began to be taken in real earnest. In the West, on the other hand, circumstances compelled the Carthaginian bishop to set up a finished theory.¹ According to Cyprian, the Catholic Church, to which all the lofty predictions and predicates in the Bible apply (see Hartel's index under "ecclesia"), is the one institution of salvation outside of which there is no redemption

¹ Cyprian's idea of the Church, an imitation of the conception of a political empire, viz., one great aristocratically governed state with an ideal head, is the result of the conflicts through which he passed. It is therefore first found in a complete form in the treatise "de unitate ecclesie" and, above all, in his later epistles (Epp. 43 sq. ed. Hartel). The passages in which Cyprian defines the Church as "constituta in episcopo et in clero et in omnibus credentibus" date from an earlier period, when he himself essentially retained the old idea of the subject. Moreover, he never regarded those elements as similar and of equal value. The limitation of the Church to the community ruled by bishops was the result of the Novatian crisis. The unavoidable necessity of excluding orthodox Christians from the ecclesiastical communion, or, in other words, the fact that such orthodox Christians had separated themselves from the majority guided by the bishops, led to the setting up of a new theory of the Church, which therefore resulted from stress of circumstances just as much as the antagonistic conception of the matter held by Irenæus. Cyprian's notion of the relation between the whole body of the Church and the episcopate may, however, be also understood as a generalisation of the old theory about the connection between the individual community and the bishop. This already contained an œcumenical element, for, in fact, every separate community was regarded as a copy of the one Church, and its bishop therefore as the representative of God (Christ).

(ep. 73. 21). She is this, moreover, not only as the community possessing the true apostolic faith, for this definition does not exhaust her conception, but as a harmoniously organised federation. ¹ This Church therefore rests entirely on the episcopate, which sustains her, ² because it is the continuance of the apostolic office and is equipped with all the power of the Apostles. ³ Accordingly, the union of individuals with the Church, and therefore with Christ, is effected only by obedient dependence on the bishop, *i.e.*, such a connection alone makes one a member of the Church. But the unity of the Church, which is an attribute of equal importance with her truth, because this union is only brought about by love, ⁴ primarily appears in the unity of the episcopate. For, according to Cyprian, the episcopate has been from its beginning undivided and has continued to be

¹ We need only quote one passage here—but see also epp. 69. 3. 7 sq.: 70. 2: 73. 8—ep. 55. 24: “Quod vero ad Novatiani personam pertinet, scias nos primo in loco nec curiosos esse debere quid ille doceat, cum foris doceat: quisquis ille est et qualiscunque est, christianus non est, qui in Christi ecclesia non est.” In the famous sentence (ep. 74. 7; de unit. 6): “habere non potest deum patrem qui ecclesiam non habet matrem.” we must understand the Church held together by the *sacramentum unitatis*, *i.e.*, by her constitution. Cyprian is fond of referring to Korah’s faction, who nevertheless held the same faith as Moses.

² Epp. 4. 4: 33. 1: “ecclesia super episcopos constituta”: 43. 5: 45. 3: “unitatem a domino et per apostolos nobis successoribus traditam”: 46. 1: 66. 8: “scire debes episcopum in ecclesia esse et ecclesiam in episcopo et si qui cum episcopo non sit in ecclesia non esse”: de unit. 4.

³ According to Cyprian the bishops are the *sacerdotes* κατ’ ἐξοχήν and the *iudices vice Christi*. See epp. 59. 5: 66. 3 as well as c. 4: “Christus dicit ad apostolos ac per hoc ad omnes prepositos, qui apostolis vicaria ordinatione succedunt: qui audit vos me audit.” Ep. 3. 3: “dominus apostolos, *i.e.*, episcopos elegit”: ep. 75. 16.

⁴ That is a fundamental idea and in fact the outstanding feature of the treatise “de unitate”. The heretics and schismatics lack love, whereas the unity of the Church is the product of love, this being the main Christian virtue. That is the *ideal* thought on which Cyprian builds his theory (see also epp. 45. 1: 55. 24: 69. 1 and elsewhere), and not quite wrongly, in so far as his purpose was to gather and preserve, and not scatter. The reader may also recall the early Christian notion that Christendom should be a band of brethren ruled by love. But this love ceases to have any application to the case of those who are disobedient to the authority of the bishop and to Christians of the sterner sort. The appeal which Catholicism makes to love, even at the present day, in order to justify its secularised and tyrannical Church, turns in the mouth of hierarchical politicians into hypocrisy, of which one would like to acquit a man of Cyprian’s stamp.

so in the Church, in so far as the bishops are appointed and guided by God, are on terms of brotherly intercourse and exchange, and each bishop represents the whole significance of the episcopate.¹ Hence the individual bishops are no longer to be considered primarily as leaders of their special communities, but as the foundation of the one Church. Each of these prelates, however, provided he keeps within the association of the bishops, preserves the independent right of regulating the circumstances of his own diocese.² But it also follows that

¹ Ep. 43. 5:55. 24: "episcopatus unus episcoporum multorum concordia numerositate diffusus"; de unit. 5: "episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur." Strictly speaking Cyprian did not set up a theory that the bishops were directed by the Holy Spirit, but in identifying Apostles and bishops and asserting the divine appointment of the latter he took for granted their special endowment with the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he himself frequently appealed to special communications he had received from the Spirit as aids in discharging his official duties.

² Cyprian did not yet regard uniformity of Church practice as a matter of moment—or rather he knew that diversities must be tolerated. In so far as the *concordia episcoporum* was consistent with this diversity, he did not interfere with the differences, provided the *regula fidei* was adhered to. Every bishop who adheres to the confederation has the greatest freedom even in questions of Church discipline and practice (as for instance in the baptismal ceremonial); see ep. 59. 14: "Singulis pastoribus portio gregis est adscripta, quam regit unusquisque et gubernat rationem sui actus domino redditurus"; 55. 21: "Et quidem apud antecessores nostros quidam de episcopis istic in provincia nostra dandam pacis mœchis non putaverunt et in totum pœnitentiæ locum contra adulteria cluserunt, non tamen a co-episcoporum suorum collegio recesserunt aut catholicæ ecclesiæ unitatem ruperunt, ut quia apud alios adulteris pax dabatur, qui non dabat de ecclesia separaretur." According to ep. 57. 5 Catholic bishops, who insist on the strict practice of penance, but do not separate themselves from the unity of the Church, are left to the judgment of God. It is different in the case referred to in ep. 68, for Marcion had formally joined Novatian. Even in the disputed question of heretical baptism (ep. 72. 3) Cyprian declares to Stephen (See 69. 17: 73. 26; Sententiæ episc., præfat.): "qua in re nec nos vim cuiquam facimus aut legem damus, quando habeat in ecclesiæ administratione voluntatis suæ arbitrium liberum unusquisque præpositus, rationem actus sui domino redditurus." It is therefore plain wherein the unity of the episcopate and the Church actually consists; we may say that it is found in the *regula*, in the fixed purpose not to give up the unity in spite of all differences, and in the principle of regulating all the affairs of the Church "ad originem dominicam et ad evangelicam adque apostolicam traditionem" (ep. 74. 10). This refers to the New Testament, which Cyprian emphatically insisted on making the standard for the Church. It must be taken as the guide, "si in aliquo in ecclesia nutaverit et vacillaverit veritas"; by it, moreover, all false customs are to be corrected. In the controversy about heretical baptism, the alteration of

the bishops of those communities founded by the Apostles themselves can raise no claim to any special dignity, since the unity of the episcopate as a continuation of the apostolic office involves the equality of all bishops.¹ However, a special importance attaches to the Roman see, because it is the seat of the Apostle to whom Christ first granted apostolic authority in order to show with unmistakable plainness the unity of these powers and the corresponding unity of the Church that rests on them; and further because, from her historical origin, the Church of this see had become the mother and root of the Catholic Church spread over the earth. In a severe crisis which Cyprian had to pass through in his own diocese he appealed to the Roman Church (the Roman bishop) in a manner which made it appear as if communion with that Church was in itself the guarantee of truth. But in the controversy about heretical baptism with the Roman bishop Stephen, he emphatically denied the latter's pretensions to exercise special rights over the Church in consequence of the Petrine succession.² Finally,

Church practice in Carthage and Africa, which was the point in question—for whilst in Asia heretical baptism had for a very long time been declared invalid (see ep. 75. 19) this had only been the case in Carthage for a few years—was justified by Cyprian through an appeal to *veritas* in contrast to *consuetudo sine veritate*. See epp. 71. 2. 3: 73. 13. 23: 74. 2 sq.: 9 (the formula originates with Tertullian; see de virg. vel. 1—3). The *veritas*, however, is to be learned from the Gospel and words of the Apostles: “Lex evangelii”, “præcepta dominica”, and synonymous expressions are very frequent in Cyprian, more frequent than reference to the *regula* or to the symbol. In fact there was still no Church dogmatic, there being only principles of Christian faith and life, which, however, were taken from the Holy Scriptures and the *regula*.

¹ Cyprian no longer makes any distinction between Churches founded by Apostles, and those which arose later (that is, between their bishops).

² The statement that the Church is “super Petrum fundata” is very frequently made by Cyprian (we find it already in Tertullian, de monog.); see de habitu virg. 10; Epp. 59. 7: 66. 8: 71. 3: 74. 11: 73. 7. But on the strength of Matth. XVI, he went still farther; see ep. 43. 5: “deus unus est et Christus unus et una ecclesia et cathedra una super Petrum domini voce fundata”; ep. 48. 3 (ad Cornel.): “communicatio tua, id est catholicæ ecclesiæ unitas pariter et caritas”; de unit. 4: “super unum ædificat ecclesiam, et quamvis apostolis omnibus post resurrectionem suam parem potestatem tribuat, tamen ut unitatem manifestaret, unitatis eiusdem originem ab uno incipientem sua auctoritate disposuit”; ep. 70. 3: “una ecclesia a Christo domino nostro super Petrum origine unitatis et ratione fundata” (“with regard to the origin and constitution of the unity” is the translation of this last passage in the

although Cyprian exalted the unity of the organisation of the Church above the unity of the doctrine of faith, he preserved the Christian element so far as to assume in all his statements that the bishops display a moral and Christian conduct in keeping with their office, and that otherwise they have *ipso facto* forfeited it.¹ Thus, according to Cyprian, the episcopal office does not confer any indelible character, though Calixtus and other bishops of Rome after him presupposed this attribute. (For more details on this point, as well as with regard to the contra-

“Stimmen aus Maria Laach,” 1877, part 8, p. 355; but “ratio” cannot mean that); ep. 73. 7: “Petro primum dominus, super quem ædificavit ecclesiam et unde unitatis originem instituit et ostendit, potestatem istam dedit.” The most emphatic passages are ep. 48. 3, where the Roman Church is called “matrix et radix ecclesiæ catholicæ” (the expression “radix et mater” in ep. 45. 1 no doubt also refers to her), and ep. 59. 14: “navigare audent et ad Petri cathedram atque ad ecclesiam principalem, unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est, ab schismaticis et profanis litteras ferre nec cogitare eos esse Romanos, quorum fides apostolo prædicante laudata est (see epp. 30. 2, 3: 60. 2), ad quos perfidia habere non possit accessum.” We can see most clearly from epp. 67. 5 and 68 what rights were in point of fact exercised by the bishop of Rome. But the same Cyprian says quite naïvely, even at the time when he exalted the Roman cathedra so highly (ep. 52. 2), “quoniam *pro magnitudine sua* debeat Carthaginem Roma præcedere.” In the controversy about heretical baptism Stephen like Calixtus (Tertull., de pudic. 1) designated himself, on the ground of the *successio Petri* and by reference to Matth. XVI., in such a way that one might suppose he wished to be regarded as “episcopus episcoporum” (Sentent. episc. in Hartel I., p. 436). He expressly claimed a primacy and demanded obedience from the “ecclesiæ novellæ et posteræ” (ep. 71. 3). Like Victor he endeavoured to enforce the Roman practice “tyrannico terrore” and insisted that the *unitas ecclesiæ* required the observance of this Church’s practice in all communities. But Cyprian opposed him in the most decided fashion, and maintained the principle that every bishop, as a member of the episcopal confederation based on the *regula* and the Holy Scriptures, is responsible for his practice to God alone. This he did in a way which left no room for any special and actual authority of the Roman see alongside of the others. Besides, he expressly rejected the conclusions drawn by Stephen from the admittedly historical position of the Roman see (ep. 71. 3): “Petrus non sibi vindicavit aliquid insolenter aut adroganter adsumpsit, ut diceret se principatum tenere et obtemperari a novellis et posteris sibi potius oportere.” Firmilian, ep. 75, went much farther still, for he indirectly declares the *successio Petri* claimed by Stephen to be of no importance (c. 17), and flatly denies that the Roman Church has preserved the apostolic tradition in a specially faithful way. See Otto Ritschl, l. c., pp. 92 ff., 110—141. In his conflict with Stephen Cyprian unmistakably took up a position inconsistent with his former views as to the significance of the Roman see for the Church, though no doubt these were ideas he had expressed at a critical time when he stood shoulder to shoulder with the Roman bishop Cornelius.

¹ See specially epp. 65, 67, 68.

dictions that remain unreconciled in Cyprian's conception of the Church, see the following chapter, in which will be shown the ultimate interests that lie at the basis of the new idea of the Church).

ADDENDUM I. The great confederation of Churches which Cyprian presupposes and which he terms *the* Church was in truth not complete, for it cannot be proved that it extended to any regions beyond the confines of the Roman Empire or that it even embraced all orthodox and episcopally organised communities within those bounds. ¹ But, further, the conditions of the confederation, which only began to be realised in the full sense in the days of Constantine, were never definitely formulated—before the fourth century at least. ² Accordingly, the idea of the one exclusive Church, embracing all Christians and founded on the bishops, was always a mere theory. But, in so far as it is not the idea, but its realisation to which Cyprian here attaches sole importance, his dogmatic conception appears to be refuted by actual circumstances. ³

II. The idea of heresy is always decided by the idea of the Church. The designation ἑρέσις implies an adherence to some-

¹ Hatch l.c., p. 189 f.

² The gradual union of the provincial communities into one Church may be studied in a very interesting way in the ecclesiastical Fasti (records, martyrologies, calendars, etc.), though these studies are as yet only in an incipient stage. See De Rossi, Roma Sotter. the Bollandists in the 12th vol. for October; Stevenson, Studi in Italia (1879), pp. 439. 458: the works of Nilles; Egli, Altchristl. Studien 1887 (Theol. Lit. Ztg. 1887, no. 13); Duchesne, Les sources du Martyrol, Hieron. Rome 1885, but above all the latter's study: Mémoire sur l'origine des diocèses épiscopaux dans l'ancienne Gaule, 1890. The history of the unification of liturgies from the 4th century should also be studied.

³ There were communities in the latter half of the 3rd century, which can be proved to have been outside the confederation, although in perfect harmony with it in point of belief (see the interesting case in Euseb., H.E. VII. 24. 6). Conversely, there were Churches in the confederation whose faith did not in all respects correspond with the Catholic *regula* as already expounded. But the fact that it was not the dogmatic system, but the practical constitution and principles of the Church, as based on a still elastic creed, which formed the ultimate determining factor, was undoubtedly a great gain: for a system of dogmatics developed beyond the limits of the Christian *kerigma* can only separate. Here, however, all differences of faith had of course to be glossed over, for the demand of Apelles: μή δεῖν ὕλως ἐξετάζειν τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἕκαστον, ὡς πεπίστευκε, διαμένειν σωθήσεσθαι γὰρ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν ἑσταυρωμένον ἡλικίωτας κ.τ.λ., was naturally regarded as inadmissible.

thing self-chosen in opposition to the acknowledgment of something objectively handed down, and assumes that this is the particular thing in which the apostasy consists. Hence all those who call themselves Christians and yet do not adhere to the traditional apostolic creed, but give themselves up to vain and empty doctrines, are regarded as heretics by Hegesippus, Irenæus, Tertullian, Clement, and Origen. These doctrines are as a rule traced to the devil, that is, to the non-Christian religions and speculations, or to wilful wickedness. Any other interpretation of their origin would at once have been an acknowledgment that the opponents of the Church had a right to their opinions,¹ and such an explanation is not quite foreign to Origen in one of his lines of argument.² Hence the orthodox party were perfectly consistent in attaching no value to any sacrament³ or acts esteemed in their own communion, when these were performed by heretics;⁴ and this was a practical application of the saying that the devil could transform himself into an angel of light.⁵

¹ Hence we need not be surprised to find that the notion of heresy which arose in the Church was immediately coupled with an estimate of it, which for injustice and harshness could not possibly be surpassed in succeeding times. The best definition is in Tertull., *de præscr.* 6: "Nobis nihil ex nostro arbitrio indulgerelicet, sed nec eligere quod aliquis de arbitrio suo induxerit. Apostolos domini habemus auctores, qui nec ipsi quicquam ex suo arbitrio quod inducerent elegerunt, sed acceptam a Christo disciplinam fideliter nationibus assignaverunt."

² See Vol. I., p. 224, note 1.

³ We already find this idea in Tertullian; see *de bapt.* 15: "Hæretici nullum habent consortium nostræ disciplinæ, quos extraneos utique testatur ipsa ademptio communicationis. Non debeo in illis cognoscere, quod mihi est præceptum, quia non idem deus est nobis et illis, nec unus Christus, id est idem, ideoque nec baptismus unus, quia non idem: quem cum rite non habeant, sine dubio non habent, nec capit numerari, quod non habetur; ita nec possunt accipere quia non habent." Cyprian passed the same judgment on all schismatics, even on the Novatians, and like Tertullian maintained the invalidity of heretical baptism. This question agitated the Church as early as the end of the 2nd century, when Tertullian already wrote against it in Greek.

⁴ As far as possible the Christian virtues of the heretics were described as hypocrisy and love of ostentation (see *e.g.*, Rhodon in Euseb., *H. E. V.* 13. 2 and others in the second century). If this view was untenable, then all morality and heroism among heretics were simply declared to be of no value. See the anonymous writer in Eusebius, *H. E. V.* 16. 21, 22; Clem., *Strom.* VII. 16. 95; Orig., *Comm. ad Rom.* I. X., c. 5; Cypr., *de unit.* 14, 15; *ep.* 73. 21 etc.

⁵ Tertull., *de præscr.* 3—6.

But the Fathers we have named did not yet completely identify the Church with a harmoniously organised institution. For that very reason they do not absolutely deny the Christianity of such as take their stand on the rule of faith, even when these for various reasons occupy a position peculiar to themselves. Though we are by no means entitled to say that they acknowledged orthodox schismatics, they did not yet venture to reckon them simply as heretics.¹ If it was desired to get rid of these, an effort was made to impute to them some deviation from the rule of faith; and under this pretext the Church freed herself from the Montanists and the Monarchians.² Cyprian was the first to proclaim the identity of heretics and schismatics, by making a man's Christianity depend on his belonging to the great episcopal Church confederation.³ But, both in East

¹ Irenæus definitely distinguishes between heretics and schismatics (III. 11. 9: IV. 26. 2; 33. 7), but also blames the latter very severely, "qui gloriosum corpus Christi, quantum in ipsis est, interficiunt, non habentes dei dilectionem suamque utilitatem potius considerantes quam unitatem ecclesiæ." Note the parallel with Cyprian. Yet he does not class them with those "qui sunt extra veritatem," i.e., "extra ecclesiam," although he declares the severest penalties await them. Tertullian was completely preserved by his Montanism from identifying heretics and schismatics, though in the last years of his life he also appears to have denied the Christianity of the Catholics (?).

² Read, on the one hand, the Antimontanists in Eusebius and the later opponents of Montanism: and on the other, Tertull., *adv. Prax.*: Hippol., c. Noët; Novatian, *de trinitate*. Even in the case of the Novatian heresies were sought and found (see Dionys. Alex., in Euseb., II. E. VII. 8, where we find distortions and wicked misinterpretations of Novatian doctrines, and many later opponents). Nay, even Cyprian himself did not disdain to join in this proceeding (see *epp.* 69. 7: 70. 2). The Montanists at Rome were placed by Hippolytus in the catalogue of heretics (see the *Syntagma* and *Philosoph.*). Origen was uncertain whether to reckon them among schismatics or heretics (see in Tit. *Opp.* IV., p. 696).

³ Cyprian plainly asserts (*ep.* 3. 3): "hæc sunt initia hæreticorum et ortus adque conatus schismaticorum, ut præpositum superbo tumore contemnant" (as to the early history of this conception, which undoubtedly has a basis of truth, see Clem., *ep. ad Cor.* 1. 44; Ignat.; Hegesippus in Euseb., II. E. IV. 22. 5; Tertull., *adv. Valent.* 4; *de bapt.* 17; Anonymus in Euseb.; II. E. V. 16. 7; Hippolyt. *ad. Epiphan.* II. 42. 1; Anonymus in Eusebius, II. E. V. 28. 12; according to Cyprian it is quite the common one): see further *ep.* 59. 3: "neque enim aliunde hæreses obortæ sunt aut nata sunt schismata, quam quando sacerdoti dei non obtemperatur": *epp.* 66. 5: 69. 1: "item b. apostolus Johannes nec ipse ullam hæresin aut schisma discrevit aut aliquos speciatim separe posuit": 52. 1: 73. 2: 74. 11. Schism and heresy are always identical.

and West, this theory of his became established only by very imperceptible degrees, and indeed, strictly speaking, the process was never completed at all. The distinction between heretics and schismatics was preserved, because it prevented a public denial of the old principles, because it was advisable on political grounds to treat certain schismatic communities with indulgence, and because it was always possible in case of need to prove heresy against the schismatics.¹

III. As soon as the empiric Church ruled by the bishops was proclaimed to be the foundation of the Christian religion, we have the fundamental premises for the conception that everything progressively adopted by the Church, all her functions, institutions, and liturgy, in short, all her continuously changing arrangements were holy and apostolic. But the courage to draw all the conclusions here was restrained by the fact that certain portions of tradition, such as the New Testament canon of Scripture and the apostolic doctrine, had been once for all exalted to an unapproachable height. Hence it was only with slowness and hesitation that Christians accepted the inferences from the idea of the Church in the remaining directions, and these conclusions always continued to be hampered with some degree of uncertainty. The idea of the *παράδοσις ἁγία* (unwritten tradition); *i.e.*, that every custom, however recent, within the sphere of outward regulations, of public worship, discipline, etc., is as holy and apostolic as the Bible and the "faith", never succeeded in gaining complete acceptance. In this case, complicated, uncertain, and indistinct assumptions were the result.

¹ Neither Optatus nor Augustine take Cyprian's theory as the starting-point of their disquisitions, but they adhere in principle to the distinction between heretic and schismatic. Cyprian was compelled by his special circumstances to identify them, but he united this identification with the greatest liberality of view as to the conditions of ecclesiastical unity (as regards individual bishops). Cyprian did not make a single new article an "articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesie". In fact he ultimately declared—and this may have cost him struggle enough—that even the question of the validity of heretical baptism was not a question of faith.

CHAPTER III.

CONTINUATION. THE OLD CHRISTIANITY AND THE NEW CHURCH.

I. THE legal and political forms by which the Church secured herself against the secular power and heresy, and still more the lower moral standard exacted from her members in consequence of the naturalisation of Christianity in the world, called forth a reaction soon after the middle of the second century. This movement, which first began in Asia Minor and then spread into other regions of Christendom, aimed at preserving or restoring the old feelings and conditions, and preventing Christendom from being secularised. This crisis (the so-called Montanist struggle) and the kindred one which succeeded produced the following results: The Church merely regarded herself all the more strictly as a legal community basing the truth of its title on its historic and objective foundations, and gave a correspondingly new interpretation to the attribute of holiness she claimed. She expressly recognised two distinct classes in her midst, a spiritual and a secular, as well as a double standard of morality. Moreover, she renounced her character as the communion of those who were sure of salvation, and substituted the claim to be an educational institution and a necessary condition of redemption. After a keen struggle, in which the New Testament did excellent service to the bishops, the Church expelled the Cataphrygian fanatics and the adherents of the new prophecy (between 180 and 220); and in the same way, during the course of the third century, she caused the secession of all those Christians who made the truth of the Church depend on a stricter administration of moral discipline. Hence, apart from the heretic and Montanist sects, there existed in the Empire, after the middle of the second

century, two great but numerically unequal Church confederations, both based on the same rule of faith and claiming the title "ecclesia catholica", viz., the confederation which Constantine afterwards chose for his support, and the Novatian Catharist one. In Rome, however, the beginning of the great disruption goes back to the time of Hippolytus and Calixtus; yet the schism of Novatian must not be considered as an immediate continuation of that of Hippolytus.

2. The so-called Montanist reaction¹ was itself subjected to a similar change, in accordance with the advancing ecclesiastical development of Christendom. It was originally the violent undertaking of a Christian prophet, Montanus, who, supported by prophetesses, felt called upon to realise the promises held forth in the Fourth Gospel. He explained these by the Apocalypse, and declared that he himself was the Paraclete whom Christ had promised—that Paraclete in whom Jesus Christ himself, nay, even God the Father Almighty, comes to his own to guide them to all truth, to gather those that are dispersed, and to bring them into one flock. His main effort therefore was to make Christians give up the local and civil relations in which they lived, to collect them, and create a new undivided Christian commonwealth, which, separated from the world, should prepare itself for the descent of the Jerusalem from above.²

¹ See Ritschl, l. c.; Schwegler, *Der Montanismus*, 1841; Gottwald, *De Montanismo Tertulliani*, 1862; Réville, *Tertull. et le Montanisme*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 1st Novr. 1864; Stroehlin, *Essai sur le Montanisme*, 1870; De Soyres, *Montanism and the Primitive Church*, 1878; Cunningham, *The Churches of Asia*, 1880; Renan, *Les Crises du Catholicisme Naissant* in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of 15th Febr. 1881; Renan, *Marc Aurèle*, 1882, p. 208 ff.; Bonwetsch, *Geschichte des Montanismus*, 1881; Harnack, *Das Mönchthum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte*, 3rd. ed., 1886; Belck, *Geschichte des Montanismus*, 1883; Voigt, *Eine verschollene Urkunde des antimontanistischen Kampfes*, 1891. Further the articles on Montanism by Möller (*Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie*), Salmon (*Dictionary of Christian Biography*), and Harnack (*Encyclopedia Britannica*). Weizsäcker in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1882, no. 4; Bonwetsch, *Die Prophetie im apostolischen und nach-apostolischen Zeitalter* in the *Zeitschrift für kirchliche Wissenschaft und kirchliches Leben*, 1884, Parts 8, 9; M. von Engelhardt, *Die ersten Versuche zur Aufrichtung des wahren Christenthums in einer Gemeinde von Heiligen*, Riga, 1881.

² In certain vital points the conception of the original nature and history of Montanism, as sketched in the following account, does not correspond with that traditionally current. To establish it in detail would lead us too far. It may be

The natural resistance offered to the new prophets with this extravagant message—especially by the leaders of communities, and the persecutions to which the Church was soon after subjected under Marcus Aurelius, led to an intensifying of the eschatological expectations that beyond doubt had been specially keen in Montanist circles from the beginning. For the New Jerusalem was soon to come down from heaven in visible form, and establish itself in the spot which, by direction of the Spirit, had been chosen for Christendom in Phrygia.¹ Whatever amount of peculiarity the movement lost, in so far as the ideal of an assembly of all Christians proved incapable of being realised or at least only possible within narrow limits, was abundantly restored in the last decades of the second century by the strength and courage that the news of its spread in Christendom gave to the earnest minded to unite and offer resistance to the ever increasing tendency of the Church to assume a secular and political character. Many entire commu-

noted that the mistakes in estimating the original character of this movement arise from a superficial examination of the oracles preserved to us and from the unjustifiable practice of interpreting them in accordance with their later application in the circles of Western Montanists. A completely new organisation of Christendom, beginning with the Church in Asia, to be brought about by its being detached from the bonds of the communities and collected into one region, was the main effort of Montanus. In this way he expected to restore to the Church a spiritual character and fulfil the promises contained in John. That is clear from Euseb., V. 16 ff. as well as from the later history of Montanism in its native land (see Jerome, ep. 41; Epiph., H. 49. 2 etc.). In itself, however, apart from its particular explanation in the case of Montanus, the endeavour to detach Christians from the local Church unions has so little that is striking about it, that one rather wonders at being unable to point to any parallel in the earliest history of the Church. Wherever religious enthusiasm has been strong, it has at all times felt that nothing hinders its effect more than family ties and home connections. But it is just from the absence of similar undertakings in the earliest Christianity that we are justified in concluding that the strength of enthusiastic exaltation is no standard for the strength of *Christian* faith. (Since these words were written, we have read in Hippolytus' Commentary on Daniel [see Georgiades in the journal *Ἐκκλ. ἀληθεία*, 1885, p. 52 sq.] very interesting accounts of such undertakings in the time of Septimius Severus. A Syrian bishop persuaded many brethren with wives and children to go to meet Christ in the wilderness; and another in Pontus induced his people to sell all their possessions, to cease tilling their lands, to conclude no more marriages etc., because the coming of the Lord was nigh at hand).

¹ Oracle of Prisca in Epiph. H. 49. 1.

nities in Phrygia and Asia recognised the divine mission of the prophets. In the Churches of other provinces religious societies were formed in which the predictions of these prophets were circulated and viewed as a Gospel, though at the same time they lost their effect by being so treated. The confessors at Lyons openly expressed their full sympathy with the movement in Asia. The bishop of Rome was on the verge of acknowledging the Montanists to be in full communion with the Church. But among themselves there was no longer, as at the beginning, any question of a new organisation in the strict sense of the word, and of a radical remodelling of Christian society. ¹ Whenever Montanism comes before us in the clear light of history it rather appears as a religious movement already deadened, though still very powerful. Montanus and his prophetesses had set no limits to their enthusiasm; nor were there as yet any fixed barriers in Christendom that could have restrained them. ² The Spirit, the Son, nay, the Father himself had appeared in them and spoke through them. ³ Imagination pic-

¹ Even in its original home Montanism must have accommodated itself to circumstances at a comparatively early date—which is not in the least extraordinary. No doubt the Montanist Churches in Asia and Phrygia, to which the bishop of Rome had already issued *litteræ pacis*, were now very different from the original followers of the prophets (Tertull., adv. Prax. 1). When Tertullian further reports that Praxeas at the last moment prevented them from being recognised by the bishop of Rome, “falsa de ipsis prophetis et ecclesiis eorum adseverando”, the “falsehood about the Churches” may simply have consisted in an account of the original tendencies of the Montanist sect. The whole unique history which, in spite of this, Montanism undoubtedly passed through in its original home is, however, explained by the circumstance that there were districts there, where all Christians belonged to that sect (Epiph., H. 51. 33; cf. also the later history of Novatianism). In their peculiar Church organisation (patriarchs, stewards, bishops), these sects preserved a record of their origin.

² Special weight must be laid on this. The fact that whole communities became followers of the new prophets, who nevertheless adhered to no old regulation, must above all be taken into account.

³ See Oracles 1, 3, 4, 5, 10, 12, 17, 18, 21 in Bonwetsch. l.c., p. 197 f. It can hardly have been customary for Christian prophets to speak like Montanus (Nos. 3—5): ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς ὁ παντοκράτωρ καταγινόμενος ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ ἐγὼ κύριος ὁ θεὸς πατὴρ ἦλθον, ἢ ἐγὼ εἰμὶ ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ὁ υἱὸς καὶ ὁ παράκλητος, though Old Testament prophecy takes an analogous form. Maximilla says on one occasion (No. 11): ἀπέστειλέ με κύριος τούτου τοῦ πόνου καὶ τῆς συνθήκης καὶ τῆς ἐπαγγελίας ἀρετιστῆν: and a second time (No. 12): διώκομαι ὡς λύκος ἐκ προβάτων οὐκ εἰμὶ λύκος· ῥῆμά

tured Christ bodily in female form to the eyes of Prisca.¹ The most extravagant promises were given.² These prophets spoke in a loftier tone than any Apostle ever did, and they were even bold enough to overturn apostolic regulations.³ They set up new commandments for the Christian life, regardless of any tradition,⁴ and they inveighed against the main body of

εἰμὶ καὶ πνεῦμα καὶ δύναμις. The two utterances do not exclude, but include, one another (cf. also No. 10: *ἐμοῦ μὴ ἀκούσγητε ἀλλὰ Χριστοῦ ἀκούσατε*). From James IV. V. and Hermas, and from the Didache, on the other hand, we can see how the prophets of Christian communities may have usually spoken.

¹ L.c., no. 9: *Χριστὸς ἐν ἰδέᾳ γυναικίῳ ἐσχηματισμένος.* How variable must the misbirths of the Christian imagination have been in this respect also! Unfortunately almost everything of that kind has been lost to us because it has been suppressed. The fragments of the once highly esteemed Apocalypse of Peter are instructive, for they still attest that the existing remains of early Christian literature are not able to give a correct picture of the strength of religious imagination in the first and second centuries. The passages where Christophanies are spoken of in the earliest literature would require to be collected. It would be shown what naïve enthusiasm existed. Jesus appears to believers as a child, as a boy, as a youth, as Paul etc. Conversely, glorified men appear in visions with the features of Christ.

² See Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 9. In Oracle No. 2 an evangelical promise is repeated in a heightened form; but see Papias in *Iren.*, V. 33. 3 f.

³ We may unhesitatingly act on the principle that the Montanist elements, as they appear in Tertullian, are, in all cases, found not in a strengthened, but a weakened, form. So, when even Tertullian still asserts that the Paraclete in the new prophets could overturn or change, and actually did change, regulations of the Apostles, there is no doubt that the new prophets themselves did not adhere to apostolic dicta and had no hesitation in deviating from them. Cf., moreover, the direct declarations on this point in Hippolytus (*Syntagma* and *Philos.* VIII. 19) and in Didymus (*de trin.* III. 41. 2).

⁴ The precepts for a Christian life, if we may so speak, given by the new prophets, cannot be determined from the compromises on which the discipline of the later Montanist societies of the Empire were based. Here they sought for a narrow line between the Marcionite and Encratite mode of life and the common church practice, and had no longer the courage and the candour to proclaim the “*e sæculo excedere*”. Sexual purity and the renunciation of the enjoyments of life were the demands of the new prophets. But it is hardly likely that they prescribed precise “laws”, for the primary matter was not asceticism, but the realising of a promise. In later days it was therefore possible to conceive the most extreme demands as regulations referring to none but the prophets themselves, and to tone down the oracles in their application to believers. It is said of Montanus himself (Euseb., H. E. V. 18. 2): *ὁ διδάξας λύσεις γάμων, ὁ νηστείας νομοθετήσας*; Prisca was a *παρθένος* (l.c. § 3); Proculus, the chief of the Roman Montanists, “*virginis senectæ*” (Tert., *adv. Val.* 5). The oracle of Prisca (No. 8) declares that sexual purity is the preliminary condition for the oracles and visions

Christendom.¹ They not only proclaimed themselves as prophets, but as the last prophets, as notable prophets in whom was first fulfilled the promise of the sending of the Paraclete.² These Christians as yet knew nothing of the "absoluteness of

of God; it is presupposed in the case of every "sanctus minister". Finally, Origen tells us (in Titum, Opp. IV. 696) that the (older) Cataphrygians said: "ne accedas ad me, quoniam mundus sum; non enim accepi uxorem, nec est sepulcrum patens guttur meum, sed sum Nazarenus dei non bibens vinum sicut illi". But an express legal direction to abolish marriage cannot have existed in the collection of oracles possessed by Tertullian. But who can guarantee that they were not already corrected? Such an assumption, however, is not necessary.

¹ Euseb., V. 16. 9: V. 18. 5.

² It will not do simply to place Montanus and his two female associates in the same category as the prophets of primitive Christian Churches. The claim that the Spirit had descended upon them in unique fashion must have been put forth by themselves with unmistakable clearness. If we apply the principle laid down on p. 98, note 3, we will find that—apart from the prophets' own utterances—this is still clearly manifest from the works of Tertullian. A consideration of the following facts will remove all doubt as to the claim of the new prophets to the possession of an unique mission. (1) From the beginning both opponents and followers constantly applied the title "New Prophecy" to the phenomenon in question (Euseb., V. 16. 4: V. 19. 2; Clem., Strom. IV. 13. 93; Tertull., monog. 14, ieiun. 1, resurr. 63, Marc. III. 24: IV. 22, Prax. 30; Firmil. ep. 75. 7; alii). (2) Similarly, the divine afflatus was, from the first, constantly designated as the "Paraclete" (Orac. no. 5; Tertull. passim; Hippol. passim; Didymus etc.). (3) Even in the third century the Montanist congregations of the Empire must still have doubted whether the Apostles had possessed this Paraclete or not, or at least whether this had been the case in the full sense. Tertullian identifies the Spirit and the Paraclete and declares that the Apostles possessed the latter in full measure—in fact as a Catholic he could not do otherwise. Nevertheless he calls Montanus etc. "prophete proprii" of the Spirit (pudic. 12; see Acta Perpet. 21). On the contrary we find in Philos. VIII. 19: ὑπὲρ δὲ ἀποστόλους καὶ πᾶν χάρισμα ταῦτα τὰ γύναια δοξάζουσιν, ὡς τοιμᾶν πλεῖον τι Χριστοῦ ἐν τούτοις λέγειν τινὰς αὐτῶν γεγονέναι. Pseudo-Tertullian says: "in apostolis quidem dicunt spiritum sanctum fuisse, paracletum non fuisse, et paracletum plura in Montano dixisse quam Christum in evangelio protulisse." In Didymus, l.c., we read: τοῦ ἀποστόλου γράψαντος κ.τ.λ., ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσιν τὸν Μοντανὸν ἐληλυθέναι καὶ ἐσχηκέναι τὸ τέλειον τὸ τοῦ παρακλήτου, τοῦτ' ἔστιν τὸ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος. (4) Lastly, the Montanists asserted that the prediction contained in John XIV. ff. had been fulfilled in the new prophecy, and that from the beginning, as is denoted by the very expression "Paraclete."

What sort of mission they ascribed to themselves is seen from the last quoted passage, for the promises contained in it must be regarded as the enthusiastic carrying out of Montanus' programme. If we read attentively John XIV. 16—21, 23, 26: XV. 20—26: XVI. 7—15, 25 as well as XVII. and X.; if we compare the oracles of the prophets still preserved to us; if we consider the attempt of Montanus to gather the scattered Christians and really form them into a flock, and also

a historically complete revelation of Christ as the fundamental condition of Christian consciousness;" they only felt a Spirit to which they yielded unconditionally and without reserve. But, after they had quitted the scene, their followers sought and found a kind of compromise. The Montanist congregations that sought for recognition in Rome, whose part was taken by the Gallic confessors, and whose principles gained a footing in North Africa, may have stood in the same relation to the original adherents of the new prophets and to these prophets themselves, as the Mennonite communities did to the primitive Anabaptists and their empire in Münster. The "Montanists" outside of Asia Minor acknowledged to the fullest extent the legal position of the great Church. They declared their adher-

his claim to be the bearer of the greatest and last revelations that lead to all truth; and, finally, if we call to mind that in those Johannine discourses Christ designated the coming of the Paraclete as his own coming in the Paraclete and spoke of an immanence and unity of Father, Son, and Paraclete, which one finds re-echoed in Montanus' Oracle No. V., we cannot avoid concluding that the latter's undertaking is based on the impression made on excited and impatient prophets by the promises contained in the Gospel of John, understood in an apocalyptic and realistic sense, and also by Matt. XXIII. 34 (see Euseb., V. 16. 12 sq.). The correctness of this interpretation is proved by the fact that the first decided opponents of the Montanists in Asia—the so-called "Alogi" (Epiph., H. 51)—rejected both the Gospel and Revelation of John, that is, regarded them as written by some one else. Montanism therefore shows us the first and—up till about 180—really the only impression made by the Gospel of John on non-Gnostic Gentile Christians; and what a remarkable one it was! It has a parallel in Marcion's conception of Paulinism. Here we obtain glimpses of a state of matters which probably explains why these writings were made innocuous in the canon. To the view advanced here it cannot be objected that the later adherents of the new prophets founded their claims on the recognised gift of prophecy in the Church, or on a prophetic succession (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 4; Proculus in the same author, II. 25. 7: III. 31. 4), nor that Tertullian, when it suits him, simply regards the new prophecy as a *restitutio* (e.g., in Monog. 4); for these assumptions merely represent the unsuccessful attempt to legitimise this phenomenon within the Catholic Church. In proof of the fact that Montanus appealed to the Gospel of John see Jerome, Ep. 41 (Migne I. p. 474), which begins with the words: "Testimonia de Johannis evangelio congregata, quæ tibi quidam Montani sectator ingessit, in quibus salvator noster se ad patrem iturum missurumque paracletum pollicetur etc." In opposition to this Jerome argues that the promises about the Paraclete are fulfilled in Acts II., as Peter said in his speech, and then continues as follows: "Quodsi voluerint respondere et Philippi deinceps quattuor filias prophetasse et prophetam Agabum reperiri et in divisionibus spiritus inter apostolos et doctores et prophetas quoque apostolo scribente formatos, etc."

ence to the apostolic "regula" and the New Testament canon.¹ The organisation of the Churches, and, above all, the position of the bishops as successors of the Apostles and guardians of doctrine were no longer disputed. The distinction between them and the main body of Christendom, from which they were unwilling to secede, was their belief in the new prophecy of Montanus, Prisca, and Maximilla, which was contained, in its final form, in written records and in this shape may have produced the same impression as is excited by the fragments of an exploded bomb.²

In this new prophecy they recognised a *subsequent revelation* of God, which for that very reason assumed the existence of a previous one. This after-revelation professed to decide the practical questions which, at the end of the second century, were burning topics throughout all Christendom, and for which no direct divine law could hitherto be adduced, in the form of a strict injunction. Herein lay the importance of the new prophecy for its adherents in the Empire, and for this reason they believed in it.³ The belief in the efficacy of the Para-

¹ We are assured of this not only by Tertullian, but also by the Roman Montanist Proculus, who, like the former, argued against heretics, and by the testimony of the Church Fathers (see, e.g., Philos. VIII. 19). It was chiefly on the ground of their orthodoxy that Tertullian urged the claim of the new prophets to a hearing: and it was, above all, as a Montanist that he felt himself capable of combating the Gnostics, since the Paraclete not only confirmed the *regula*, but also by unequivocal utterances cleared up ambiguous and obscure passages in the Holy Scriptures, and (as was asserted) completely rejected doctrines like the Monarchian (see fuga 1, 14; corona 4; virg. vel. 1; Prax. 2, 13, 30; resurr. 63; pud. 1; monog. 2; ieiun. 10, 11). Besides, we see from Tertullian's writings that the secession of the Montanist conventicles from the Church was forced upon them.

² The question as to whether the new prophecy had or had not to be recognised as such became the decisive one (fuga 1, 14; coron. 1; virg. vel. 1; Prax. 1; pudic. 11; monog. 1). This prophecy was recorded in writing (Euseb., V. 18. 1; Epiph., H. 48. 10; Euseb., VI. 20). The putting of this question, however, denoted a fundamental weakening of conviction, which was accompanied by a corresponding falling off in the application of the prophetic utterances

³ The situation that preceded the acceptance of the new prophecy in a portion of Christendom may be studied in Tertullian's writings "de idolol." and "de spectac." Christianity had already been conceived as a *nova lex* throughout the whole Church, and this *lex* had, moreover, been clearly defined in its bearing on the faith. But, as regards outward conduct, there was no definite *lex*, and arguments in favour both of strictness and of laxity were brought forward from the Holy

plete, who, in order to establish a relatively stricter standard of conduct in Christendom during the latter days, had, a few decades before, for several years given his revelations in a remote corner of the Empire, was the dregs of the original enthusiasm, the real aspect of which had been known only to the fewest. But the diluted form in which this force remained was still a mighty power, because it was just in the generation between 190 and 220 that the secularising of the Church had made the greatest strides. Though the followers of the new prophecy merely insisted on abstinence from second marriage, on stricter regulations with regard to fasts, on a stronger manifestation of the Christian spirit in daily life, in morals and customs, and finally on the full resolve not to avoid suffering and martyrdom for Christ's name's sake, but to bear them willingly and joyfully,¹ yet, under the given circumstances, these requirements, in spite of the express repudiation of everything "Encratite,"² implied a demand that directly endangered the conquests already made by the Church and impeded the progress of the new propaganda.³ The people who put forth these demands, expressly based them on the injunctions of the Paraclete, and really lived in accordance with them, were not permanently capable of maintaining their position in the Church. In fact, the endeavour to found these demands

Scriptures. No divine ordinances about morality could be adduced against the progressive secularising of Christianity; but there was need of statutory commandments by which all the limits were clearly defined. In this state of perplexity the oracles of the new prophets were gladly welcomed; they were utilised in order to justify and invest with divine authority a reaction of a moderate kind. More than that—as may be inferred from Tertullian's unwilling confession—could not be attained; but it is well known that even this result was not reached. Thus the Phrygian movement was employed in support of undertakings, that had no real connection with it. But this was the form in which Montanism first became a factor in the history of the Church. To what extent it had been so before, particularly as regards the creation of a New Testament canon (in Asia Minor and Rome), cannot be made out with certainty.

¹ See Bonwetsch, l.c., p. 82—108.

² This is the point about which Tertullian's difficulties are greatest. Tatian is expressly repudiated in *de icium.* 15.

³ Tertullian (*de monog.*) is not deterred by such a limitation: "qui potest capere capiat, inquit, id est qui non potest discedat."

on the legislation of the Paraclete was an undertaking quite as strange, in form and content, as the possible attempt to represent the wild utterances of determined anarchists as the programme of a constitutional government. It was of no avail that they appealed to the confirmation of the rule of faith by the Paraclete; that they demonstrated the harmlessness of the new prophecy, thereby involving themselves in contradictions;¹ that they showed all honour to the New Testament; and that they did not insist on the oracles of the Paraclete being inserted in it.² As soon as they proved the earnestness of their temper-

¹ It is very instructive, but at the same time very painful, to trace Tertullian's endeavours to reconcile the irreconcilable, in other words, to show that the prophecy is new and yet not so; that it does not impair the full authority of the New Testament and yet supersedes it. He is forced to maintain the theory that the Paraclete stands in the same relation to the Apostles as Christ does to Moses, and that he abrogates the concessions made by the Apostles and even by Christ himself; whilst he is at the same time obliged to reassert the sufficiency of both Testaments. In connection with this he hit upon the peculiar theory of stages in revelation—a theory which, were it not a mere expedient in his case, one might regard as the first faint trace of a historical view of the question. Still, this is another case of a dilemma, furnishing theology with a conception that she has cautiously employed in succeeding times, when brought face to face with certain difficulties; see *virg.* vel. 1; *exhort.* 6; *monog.* 2, 3, 14; *resurr.* 63. For the rest, Tertullian is at bottom a Christian of the old stamp; the theory of any sort of finality in revelation is of no use to him except in its bearing on heresy; for the Spirit continually guides to all truth and works wherever he will. Similarly, his only reason for not being an Encratite is that this mode of life had already been adopted by heretics, and become associated with dualism. But the conviction that all religion must have the character of a fixed *law* and presupposes definite regulations—a belief not emanating from primitive Christianity, but from Rome—bound him to the Catholic Church. Besides, the contradictions with which he struggled were by no means peculiar to him; in so far as the Montanist societies accepted the Catholic regulations, they weighed on them all, and in all probability crushed them out of existence. In Asia Minor, where the breach took place earlier, the sect held its ground longer. In North Africa the residuum was a remarkable propensity to visions, holy dreams, and the like. The feature which forms the peculiar characteristic of the Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas is still found in a similar shape in Cyprian himself, who makes powerful use of visions and dreams; and in the genuine African Acts of the Martyrs, dating from Valerian's time, which are unfortunately little studied. See, above all, the *Acta Jacobi*, *Mariani* etc., and the *Acta Montani*, *Lucii* etc. (*Ruinart, Acta Mart.* edit Ratisb. 1859, p. 268 sq., p. 275 sq.)

² Nothing is known of attempts at a formal incorporation of the Oracles with the New Testament. Besides, the Montanists could dispense with this because they distinguished the commandments of the Paraclete as "*novissima lex*" from the

ate but far-reaching demands, a deep gulf that neither side could ignore opened up between them and their opponents. Though here and there an earnest effort was made to avoid a schism, yet in a short time this became unavoidable; for variations in rules of conduct make fellowship impossible. The lax Christians, who, on the strength of their objective possession, viz., the apostolic doctrine and writings, sought to live comfortably by conforming to the ways of the world, necessarily sought to rid themselves of inconvenient societies and inconvenient monitors;¹ and they could only do so by reproaching the latter with heresy and unchristian assumptions. Moreover, the followers of the new prophets could not permanently recognise the Churches of the "Psychical,"² which rejected the "Spirit" and extended their toleration so far as to retain even whoremongers and adulterers within their pale.

In the East, that is, in Asia Minor, the breach between the Montanists and the Church had in all probability broken out before the question of Church discipline and the right of the bishops had yet been clearly raised. In Rome and Carthage this question completed the rupture that had already taken place between the conventicles and the Church (*de pudic.* 1.21). Here, by a peremptory edict, the bishop of Rome claimed the right of forgiving sins as successor of the Apostles; and declared that he would henceforth exercise this right in favour of repentant adulterers. Among the Montanists this claim was

"*novum testamentum.*" The preface to the Montanist Acts of Perpetua and Felicitas (was Tertullian the author?) showed indeed the high value attached to the visions of martyrs. In so far as these were to be read in the Churches they were meant to be reckoned as an "*instrumentum ecclesiæ*" in the wider sense.

¹ Here the bishops themselves occupy the foreground (there are complaints about their cowardice and serving of two masters in the treatise *de fuga*). But it would be very unjust simply to find fault with them as Tertullian does. Two interests combined to influence their conduct: for if they drew the reins tight they gave over their flock to heresy or heathenism. This situation is already evident in Hermas and dominates the resolutions of the Church leaders in succeeding generations (see below).

² The distinction of "*Spiritales*" and "*Psychici*" on the part of the Montanists is not confined to the West (see Clem., Strom. IV. 13, 93); we find it very frequently in Tertullian. In itself it did not yet lead to the formal breach with the Catholic Church.

violently contested both in an abstract sense and in this application of it. The Spirit the Apostles had received, they said, could not be transmitted; the Spirit is given to the Church; he works in the prophets, but lastly and in the highest measure in the new prophets. The latter, however, expressly refused to readmit gross sinners, though recommending them to the grace of God (see the saying of the Paraclete, *de pud.* 21; "potest ecclesia donare delictum, sed non faciam"). Thus agreement was no longer possible. The bishops were determined to assert the existing claims of the Church, even at the cost of her Christian character, or to represent the constitution of the Catholic Church as the guarantee of that character. At the risk of their own claim to be Catholic, the Montanist sects resisted in order to preserve the minimum legal requirements for a Christian life. Thus the opposition culminated in an attack on the new powers claimed by the bishops, and in consequence awakened old memories as to the original state of things, when the clergy had possessed no importance.¹ But the ultimate motive was the effort to stop the continuous secularising of the Christian life and to preserve the virginity of the Church as a holy community.² In his latest writings Tertullian vigorously

¹ A contrast to the bishops and the regular congregational offices existed in primitive Montanism. This was transmitted in a weakened form to the later adherents of the new prophecy (cf. the Gallic confessors' strange letter of recommendation on behalf of Irenæus in Euseb., *H. E.* V. 4), and finally broke forth with renewed vigour in opposition to the measures of the lax bishops (*de pudic.* 21; *de exhort.* 7; Hippolytus against Calixtus). The *ecclesia*, represented as *numerus episcoporum*, no longer preserved its prestige in the eyes of Tertullian.

² See here particularly, *de pudicitia* 1, where Tertullian sees the virginity of the Church not in pure doctrine, but in strict precepts for a holy life. As will have been seen in this account, the oft debated question as to whether Montanism was an innovation or merely a reaction does not admit of a simple answer. In its original shape it was undoubtedly an innovation; but it existed at the end of a period when one cannot very well speak of innovations, because no bounds had yet been set to subjective religiosity. Montanus decidedly went further than any Christian prophets known to us; Hermas, too, no doubt gave injunctions, as a prophet, which gave rise to innovations in Christendom; but these fell short of Montanus' proceedings. In its later shape, however, Montanism was to all intents and purposes a reaction, which aimed at maintaining or reviving an older state of things. So far, however, as this was to be done by legislation, by a *novissima lex*, we have an evident innovation analogous to the Catholic development. Whereas

defended a position already lost, and carried with him to the grave the old strictness of conduct insisted on by the Church.

Had victory remained with the stricter party, which, though not invariably, appealed to the injunctions of the Paraclete,¹ the Church would have been rent asunder and decimated. The great opportunist party, however, was in a very difficult position, since their opponents merely seemed to be acting up to a conception that, in many respects, could not be theoretically disputed. The problem was how to carry on with caution the work of naturalising Christianity in the world, and at the same time avoid all appearance of innovation which, as such, was opposed to the principle of Catholicism. The bishops therefore assailed the form of the new prophecy on the ground of innovation;² they sought to throw suspicion on its content; in some cases even Chiliasm, as represented by the Montanists, was declared to have a Jewish and fleshly character.³ They tried to show that the moral demands of their opponents were extravagant, that they savoured of the ceremonial law (of the Jews), were opposed to Scripture, and were derived from the worship of Apis, Isis, and the mother of the Gods.⁴ To the

in former times exalted enthusiasm had of itself, as it were, given rise to strict principles of conduct among its other results, these principles, formulated with exactness and detail, were now meant to preserve or produce that original mode of life. Moreover, as soon as the New Testament was recognised, the conception of a subsequent revelation through the Paraclete was a highly questionable and strange innovation. But for those who acknowledged the new prophecy all this was ultimately nothing but a means. Its practical tendency, based as it was on the conviction that the Church abandons her character if she does not resist gross secularisation at least, was no innovation, but a defence of the most elementary requirements of primitive Christianity in opposition to a Church that was always more and more becoming a new thing.

¹ There were of course a great many intermediate stages between the extremes of laxity and rigour, and the new prophecy was by no means recognised by all those who had strict views as to the principles of Christian polity: see the letters of Dionysius of Corinth in Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. Melito, the prophet, eunuch, and bishop, must also be reckoned as one of the stricter party, but not as a Montanist. We must judge similarly of Irenæus.

² Euseb., H. E. V. 16. 17. The life of the prophets themselves was subsequently subjected to sharp criticism.

³ This was first done by the so-called Alogi who, however, had to be repudiated.

⁴ De ieiun. 12, 16.

claim of furnishing the Church with authentic oracles of God, set up by their antagonists, the bishops opposed the newly formed canon; and declared that everything binding on Christians was contained in the utterances of the Old Testament prophets and the Apostles. Finally, they began to distinguish between the standard of morality incumbent on the clergy and a different one applying to the laity,¹ as, for instance, in the question of a single marriage; and they dwelt with increased emphasis on the glory of the heroic Christians, *belonging to the great Church*, who had distinguished themselves by asceticism and joyful submission to martyrdom. By these methods they brought into disrepute that which had once been dear to the whole Church, but was now of no further service. In repudiating supposed abuses they more and more weakened the regard felt for the thing itself, as, for example, in the case of the so-called Chiliasm,² congregational prophecy and the spiritual independence of the laity. But none of these things could be absolutely rejected; hence, for example, Chiliasm remained virtually unweakened (though subject to limitations³) in the West and certain districts of the East; whereas prophecy lost its force so much that it appeared harmless and therefore died away.⁴

¹ Tertullian protested against this in the most energetic manner.

² It is well known that in the 3rd century the Revelation of John itself was viewed with suspicion and removed from the canon in wide circles in the East.

³ In the West the Chiliastic hopes were little or not at all affected by the Montanist struggle. Chiliasm prevailed there in unimpaired strength as late as the 4th century. In the East, on the contrary, the apocalyptic expectations were immediately weakened by the Montanist crisis. But it was philosophical theology that first proved their mortal enemy. In the rural Churches of Egypt Chiliasm was still widely prevalent after the middle of the 3rd century; see the instructive 24th chapter of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History, Book VII. "Some of their teachers," says Dionysius, "look on the Law and the Prophets as nothing, neglect to obey the Gospel, esteem the Epistles of the Apostles as little worth, but, on the contrary, declare the doctrine contained in the Revelation of John to be a great and a hidden mystery." There were even temporary disruptions in the Egyptian Church on account of Chiliasm (see Chap. 24. 6).

⁴ "Lex et prophetæ usque ad Johannem" now became the motto. Churchmen spoke of a "completus numerus prophetarum" (Muratorian Fragment), and formulated the proposition that the prophets corresponded to the pre-Christian stage of revelation, but the Apostles to the Christian; and that in addition to this the apostolic age was also particularly distinguished by gifts of the Spirit. "Prophets and Apostles"

However, the most effective means of legitimising the present state of things in the Church was a circumstance closely connected with the formation of a canon of early Christian writings, viz., the distinction of an *epoch of revelation*, along with a corresponding classical period of Christianity unattainable by later generations. This period was connected with the present by means of the New Testament and the apostolic office of the bishops. This later time was to regard the older period as an ideal, but might not dream of really attaining the same perfection, except at least through the medium of the Holy Scriptures and the apostolic office, that is, the Church. The place of the holy Christendom that had the Spirit in its midst was taken by the ecclesiastic institution possessing the "instrument of divine literature" ("instrumentum divinæ litteraturæ") and the spiritual office. Finally, we must mention another factor that hastened the various changes; this was the theology of the Christian philosophers, which attained importance in the Church as soon as she based her claim on and satisfied her conscience with an objective possession.

3. But there was one rule which specially impeded the naturalisation of the Church in the world and the transformation of a communion of the saved into an institution for obtaining now replaced "Apostles, prophets, and teachers," as the court of appeal. Under such circumstances prophecy might still indeed exist: but it could no longer be of a kind capable of ranking, in the remotest degree, with the authority of the Apostles in point of importance. Hence it was driven into a corner, became extinct, or at most served only to support the measures of the bishops. In order to estimate the great revolution in the spirit of the times let us compare the utterances of Irenæus and Origen about gifts of the Spirit and prophecy. Irenæus still expressed himself exactly like Justin (Dial. 39, 81, 82, 88): he says (II. 32. 4: V. 6. 1): *καθὼς καὶ πολλῶν ἀκούομεν ἀδελφῶν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ προφητικὰ χαρίσματα ἐχόντων κ.τ.λ.* Origen on the contrary (see numerous passages, especially in the treatise c. Cels.), looks back to a period after which the Spirit's gifts in the Church ceased. It is also a very characteristic circumstance that along with the naturalisation of Christianity in the world, the disappearance of charisms, and the struggle against Gnosticism, a strictly ascetic mode of life came to be viewed with suspicion. Euseb., H. E. V. 3 is especially instructive on this point. Here it is revealed to the confessor Attalus that the confessor Alcibiades, who even in captivity continued his ascetic practice of living on nothing but bread and water, was wrong in refraining from that which God had created and thus become a "τύπος σκανδάλου" to others. Alcibiades changed his mode of life. In Africa, however, (see above, p. 103) dreams and visions still retained their authority in the Church as important means of solving perplexities.

salvation, viz., the regulation that excluded gross sinners from Christian membership. Down to the beginning of the third century, in so far as the backslider did not atone for his guilt¹ by public confession before the authorities (see Ep. Lugd. in Euseb., H. E. V. iff.), final exclusion from the Church was still the penalty of relapse into idolatry, adultery, whoredom, and murder; though at the same time the forgiveness of God in the next world was reserved for the fallen provided they remained penitent to the end. In *theory* indeed this rule was not very old. For the oldest period possessed no theories; and in those days Christians frequently broke through what might have been counted as one by appealing to the Spirit, who, by special announcements—particularly by the mouth of martyrs and prophets—commanded or sanctioned the readmission of lapsed members of the community (see Hermas).² Still, the rule corresponded to the ancient notions that Christendom is a communion of saints, that there is no ceremony *invariably* capable of replacing baptism, that is, possessing the same value, and that God alone can forgive sins. The practice must on the whole have agreed with this rule; but in the course of the latter half of the second century it became an established custom, in the case of a first relapse, to allow atonement to be made once for most sins and perhaps indeed for all, on condition of public confession.³ For this, appeal was probably made

¹ Tertullian, adv. Marc. IV. 9, enumerates “septem maculas capitalium delictorum,” namely, “idololatria”, “blasphemia”, “homicidium”, “adulterium”, “stuprum”, “falsum testimonium”, “fraus”. The stricter treatment probably applied to all these seven offences. So far as I know, the lapse into heresy was not placed in the same category in the first centuries; see Iren. III. 4. 2; Tertull., de præser. 30 and, above all, de pudic. 19 init.; the anonymous writer in Euseb., H. E. V. 28. 12, from which passages it is evident that repentant heretics were readmitted.

² Hermas based the admissibility of a second atonement on a definite divine revelation to this effect, and did not expressly discuss the admission of gross sinners into the Church generally, but treated of their reception into that of the last days, which he believed had already arrived. See particulars on this point in my article “Lapsi”, in Herzog’s Real-Encyklopädie, 2 ed. Cf. Preuschen, Tertullian’s Schriften de pœnit. et de pudic. mit Rücksicht auf die Bussdisciplin, 1890; Rolffs, Indulgenz-Edict des Kallistus, 1893.

³ In the work de pœnit. (7 ff.) Tertullian treats this as a fixed Church regulation. K. Müller, Kirchengeschichte I. 1892, p. 114, rightly remarks: “He who desired this expiation continued in the wider circle of the Church, in her “antechamber”

to Hermas, who very likely owed his prestige to the service he here unwittingly rendered. We say "unwittingly," for he could scarcely have intended such an application of his precepts, though at bottom it was not directly opposed to his attitude. In point of fact, however, this practice introduced something closely approximating to a second baptism. Tertullian indeed (*de pœnit.* 12) speaks unhesitatingly of *two* planks of salvation.¹ Moreover, if we consider that in any particular case the decision as to the deadly nature of the sin in question was frequently attended with great difficulty, and certainly, as a rule, was not arrived at with rigorous exactness, we cannot fail to see that, in conceding a second expiation, the Church was beginning to abandon the old idea that Christendom was a community of

indeed, but as her member in the wider sense. This, however, did not exclude the possibility of his being received again, even in this world, into the ranks of those possessing full Christian privileges,—after the performance of penance or *exhomologesis*. But there was no kind of certainty as to that taking place. Meanwhile this *exhomologesis* itself underwent a transformation which in Tertullian includes a whole series of basal religious ideas. It is no longer a mere expression of inward feeling, confession to God and the brethren, but is essentially performance. It is the actual attestation of heartfelt sorrow, the undertaking to satisfy God by works of self-humiliation and abnegation, which he can accept as a voluntarily endured punishment and therefore as a substitute for the penalty that naturally awaits the sinner. It is thus the means of pacifying God, appeasing his anger, and gaining his favour again—with the consequent possibility of readmission into the Church. I say the *possibility*, for readmission does not always follow. Participation in the future kingdom may be hoped for even by him who in this world is shut out from full citizenship and merely remains in the ranks of the penitent. In all probability then it still continued the rule for a person to remain till death in a state of penance or *exhomologesis*. For readmission continued to involve the assumption that the Church had in some way or other become *certain* that God had forgiven the sinner, or in other words that she had power to grant this forgiveness in virtue of the Spirit dwelling in her, and that this readmission therefore involved no violation of her holiness." In such instances it is first prophets and then martyrs that appear as organs of the Spirit, till at last it is no longer the inspired Christian, but the professional medium of the Spirit, viz., the priest, who decides everything.

¹ In the 2nd century even endeavours at a formal repetition of baptism were not wholly lacking. In Marcionite congregations repetition of baptism is said to have taken place (on the Elkesaites see Vol. I. p. 308). One can only wonder that there is not more frequent mention of such attempts. The assertion of Hippolytus (*Philos.* IX. 12 fin.) is enigmatical: Ἐπὶ Καλλίστου πρῶτω τετόλημται δεύτερον αὐτοῖς βάπτισμα.

saints. Nevertheless the fixed practice of refusing whoremongers, adulterers, murderers, and idolaters readmission to the Church, in ordinary cases, prevented men from forgetting that there was a boundary line dividing her from the world.

This state of matters continued till about 220.¹ In reality the rule was first infringed by the peremptory edict of bishop Calixtus, who, in order to avoid breaking up his community, granted readmission to those who had fallen into sins of the flesh. Moreover, he claimed this power of readmission as a right appertaining to the bishops as successors of the Apostles, that is, as possessors of the Spirit and the power of the keys.² At Rome this rescript led to the secession headed by Hippolytus. But, between 220 and 250, the milder practice with regard to the sins of the flesh became prevalent, though it was not yet universally accepted. This, however, resulted in no further schism (Cyp., ep. 55. 21). But up to the year 250 no concessions were allowed in the case of relapse into idolatry.³ These were first occasioned by the Decian persecution, since in many towns those who had abjured Christianity were more numerous than those who adhered to it.⁴ The majority of the bishops, part of them with hesitation, agreed on new principles.⁵

¹ See Tertull., de pudic. 12: "hinc est quod neque idololatriæ neque sanguini pax ab ecclesiis redditur." Orig., de orat. 28 fin; c. Cels. III. 50.

² It is only of whoremongers and idolaters that Tertullian expressly speaks in de pudic. c. I. We must interpret in accordance with this the following statement by Hippolytus in Philos. IX. 12: *Κάλλιστος πρῶτος τὰ πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις συγχωρεῖν ἐπενόησε, λέγων πᾶσιν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀφίεσθαι ἀμαρτίας*. The aim of this measure is still clear from the account of it given by Hippolytus, though this indeed is written in a hostile spirit. Roman Christians were then split into at least five different sects, and Calixtus left nothing undone to break up the unfriendly parties and enlarge his own. In all probability, too, the energetic bishop met with a certain measure of success. From Euseb., H. E. IV. 23. 6, one might be inclined to conclude that, even in Marcus Aurelius' time, Dionysius of Corinth had issued lax injunctions similar to those of Calixtus. But it must not be forgotten that we have nothing but Eusebius' report; and it is just in questions of this kind that his accounts are not reliable.

³ No doubt persecutions were practically unknown in the period between 220 and 260.

⁴ See Cypr., de lapsis.

⁵ What scruples were caused by this innovation is shown by the first 40 letters in Cyprian's collection. He himself had to struggle with painful doubts.

To begin with, permission was given to absolve repentant apostates on their deathbed. Next, a distinction was made between *sacrificati* and *libellatici*, the latter being more mildly treated. Finally, the possibility of readmission was conceded under certain severe conditions to all the lapsed, a casuistic proceeding was adopted in regard to the laity, and strict measures—though this was not the universal rule—were only adopted towards the clergy. In consequence of this innovation, which logically resulted in the gradual cessation of the belief that there can be only one repentance after baptism—an assumption that was untenable in principle—Novatian's schism took place and speedily rent the Church in twain. But, even in cases where unity was maintained, many communities observed the stricter practice down to the fifth century.¹ What made it difficult to introduce this change by regular legislation was the authority to forgive sins in God's stead, ascribed in primitive times to the inspired, and at a later period to the confessors in virtue of their special relation to Christ or the Spirit (see Ep. Lugd. in Euseb., H. E. V. 1ff.; Cypr. epp.; Tertull. de pudic. 22). The confusion occasioned by the confessors after the Decian persecution led to the non-recognition of any rights of "spiritual" persons other than the bishops. These confessors had frequently abetted laxity of conduct, whereas, if we consider the measure of secularisation found among the great mass of Christians, the penitential discipline insisted on by the bishops is remarkable for its comparative severity. The complete adoption of the episcopal constitution coincided with the introduction of the unlimited right to forgive sins.²

¹ Apart from some epistles of Cyprian, Socrates, H. E. V. 22, is our chief source of information on this point. See also Conc. Illib. can. 1, 2, 6—8, 12, 17, 18—47, 70—73, 75.

² See my article "Novatian" in Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie, 2nd ed. One might be tempted to assume that the introduction of the practice of unlimited forgiveness of sins was an "evangelical reaction" against the merciless legalism which, in the case of the Gentile Church indeed, had established itself from the beginning. As a matter of fact the bishops and the laxer party appealed to the New Testament in justification of their practice. This had already been done by the followers of Calixtus and by himself. See Philos. IX. 12: *φάσκοντες Χριστὸν ἀφιέναι τοῖς εὐδοκοῦσι*; Rom. XIV. 4 and Matt. XIII. 29 were also quoted. Before this Tertullian's opponents who favoured laxity had appealed exactly in the same way to

4. The original conception of the relation of the Church to salvation or eternal bliss was altered by this development. According to the older notion the Church was the sure communion of salvation and of saints, which rested on the forgiveness of sins mediated by baptism, and excluded everything unholy. It is not the Church, but God alone, that forgives sins, and, as a rule, indeed, this is only done through baptism, though, in virtue of his unfathomable grace, also now and then by special proclamations, the pardon coming into effect for repentant sinners, after death, in heaven. If Christendom readmitted gross sinners, it would anticipate the judgment of God, as it would thereby assure them of salvation. Hence it can only take back those who have been excluded in cases where their offences have not been committed against God himself, but have consisted in transgressing the commandments of the Church, that is, in venial sins.¹ But in course of time it was just in lay circles that faith in God's grace became weaker and trust in the Church stronger. He whom the Church abandoned was lost to the world; therefore she must not abandon him. This state of things was expressed in the new interpretation of the proposition, "no salvation outside the Church" ("extra ecclesiam nulla salus"), viz., *the Church alone saves from damnation which is otherwise certain*. In this conception the nature of the Church is depotentiated, but her powers are extended. If she is the institution which, according to Cyprian, is the indispensable preliminary condition of salvation, she can no longer be a sure communion of the saved; in other words, she becomes an institution from which proceeds the communion of saints; she includes both saved and unsaved. Thus her religious character consists in her being the indispens-

numerous Bible texts, e.g., Matt. X. 23: XI. 19 etc., see de monog., de pudic., de ieiu. Cyprian is also able to quote many passages from the Gospels. However, as the bishops and their party did not modify their conception of baptism, but rather maintained in principle, as before, that baptism imposes only obligations for the future, the "evangelical reaction" must not be estimated very highly; (see below, p. 117, and my essay in the Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Vol. I., "Die Lehre von der Seligkeit allein durch den Glauben in der alten Kirche.")

¹ The distinction of sins committed against God himself, as we find it in Tertullian, Cyprian, and other Fathers, remains involved in an obscurity that I cannot clear up.

able medium, in so far as she alone guarantees to the individual the *possibility* of redemption. From this, however, it immediately follows that the Church would anticipate the judgment of God if she finally excluded anyone from her membership who did not give her up of his own accord; whereas she could never prejudge the ultimate destiny of a man by readmission.¹ But it also follows that the Church must possess a means of repairing any injury upon earth, a means of equal value with baptism, namely, a sacrament of the forgiveness of sins. With this she acts in God's name and stead, but—and herein lies the inconsistency—she cannot by this means establish any final condition of salvation. In bestowing forgiveness on the sinner she in reality only reconciles him with herself, and thereby, in fact, merely removes the certainty of damnation. In accordance with this theory the holiness of the Church can merely consist in her possession of the means of salvation: *the Church is a holy institution in virtue of the gifts with which she is endowed*. She is the moral seminary that trains for salvation and the institution that exercises divine powers in Christ's room. Both of these conceptions presuppose political forms; both necessarily require priests and more especially an episcopate. (In *de pudic.* 21 Tertullian already defines the position of his adversary by the saying, "ecclesia est numerus episcoporum.") This episcopate by its unity guarantees the unity of the Church and has received the power to forgive sins (*Cyp.*, ep. 69. 11).

The new conception of the Church, which was a necessary outcome of existing circumstances and which, we may remark, was not formulated in contradictory terms by Cyprian, but by Roman bishops,² was the first thing that gave a fundamental

¹ Cyprian never expelled any one from the Church, unless he had attacked the authority of the bishops, and thus in the opinion of this Father placed himself outside her pale by his own act.

² Hippol., *Philos.* IX. 12: Καὶ παραβολὴν τῶν ζιζανίων πρὸς τοῦτο ἔφη ὁ Κάλλιστος λέγεσθαι. Ἄφετε τὰ ζιζάνια συναύξειν τῷ σιτῷ, τουτέστιν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοὺς ἀμαρτάνοντας. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν κιβωτὸν τοῦ Νῶε εἰς ὁμοίωμα ἐκκλησίας ἔφη γεγονέναι, ἐν ᾗ καὶ κύνες καὶ λύκοι καὶ κόρακες καὶ πάντα τὰ κτήνη καὶ ἀκάθαρτα. οὕτω φάσκων δεῖν εἶναι ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ ὁμοίως καὶ ὅσα πρὸς τοῦτο δυνατὸς ἦν συναγεῖν οὕτως ἠρμήνευσεν. From Tertull., *de idolol.* 24, one cannot help assuming that even before the year 200 the laxer sort in Carthage had already appealed to the Ark.

religious significance to the separation of clergy and laity. The powers exercised by bishops and priests were thereby fixed and hallowed. No doubt the old order of things, which gave laymen a share in the administration of moral discipline, still continued in the third century, but it became more and more a mere form. The bishop became the practical vicegerent of Christ; he disposed of the power to bind and to loose. But the recollection of the older form of Christianity continued to exert an influence on the Catholic Church of the third century. It is true that, if we can trust Hippolytus' account, Calixtus had by this time firmly set his face against the older idea, inasmuch as he not only defined the Church as *essentially a mixed body (corpus permixtum)*, but also asserted the unlawfulness of deposing the bishop even in case of mortal sin.¹ But we do not find that definition in Cyprian, and, what is of more importance, he still required a definite degree of active Christianity as a *sine quâ non* in the case of bishops; and assumed it as a self-evident necessity. He who does not give evidence of this forfeits his episcopal office *ipso facto*.² Now if we consider

("Viderimus si secundum arcae typum et corvus et milvus et lupus et canis et serpens in ecclesia erit. Certe idololatries in arcae typo non habetur. Quod in arca non fuit, in ecclesia non sit"). But we do not know what form this took and what inferences they drew. Moreover, we have here a very instructive example of the multitudinous difficulties in which the Fathers were involved by typology: the Ark is the Church, hence the dogs and snakes are men. To solve these problems it required an abnormal degree of acuteness and wit, especially as each solution always started fresh questions. Orig. (Hom. II. in Genes. III.) also viewed the Ark as the type of the Church (the working out of the image in Hom. I. in Ezech., Lomm. XIV. p. 24 sq., is instructive); but apparently in the wild animals he rather sees the simple Christians who are not yet sufficiently trained—at any rate he does not refer to the whoremongers and adulterers who must be tolerated in the Church. The Roman bishop Stephen again, positively insisted on Calixtus' conception of the Church, whereas Cornelius followed Cyprian (see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 10), who never declared sinners to be a necessary part of the Church in the same fashion as Calixtus did. (See the following note and Cyp., epp. 67. 6; 68. 5).

¹ Philo., I. c.: *Κάλλιστος ἐδογμάτισεν ὅπως εἰ ἐπίσκοπος ἀμάρτοι τι, εἰ καὶ πρὸς θάνατον, μὴ δεῖν κατατίθεσθαι*. That Hippolytus is not exaggerating here is evident from Cyp., epp. 67, 68; for these passages make it very probable that Stephen also assumed the irremovability of a bishop on account of gross sins or other failings.

² See Cyp., epp. 65, 66, 68; also 55. 11.

that Cyprian makes the Church, as the body of believers (*plebs credentium*), so dependent on the bishops, that the latter are the only Christians not under tutelage, the demand in question denotes a great deal. It carries out the old idea of the Church in a certain fashion, as far as the bishops are concerned. But for this very reason it endangers the new conception in a point of capital importance; for the spiritual acts of a sinful bishop are invalid;¹ and if the latter, as a notorious sinner, is no longer bishop, the whole certainty of the ecclesiastical system ceases. Moreover, an appeal to the certainty of God's installing the bishops and always appointing the right ones² is of no avail, if false ones manifestly find their way in. Hence Cyprian's idea of the Church—and this is no dishonour to him—still involved an inconsistency which, in the fourth century, was destined to produce a very serious crisis in the Donatist struggle.³ The view, however—which Cyprian never openly expressed, and which was merely the natural inference from his theory—that the Catholic Church, though the "one dove" ("una columba"), is in truth not coincident with the number of the elect, was clearly recognised and frankly expressed by Origen before him. Origen plainly distinguished between spiritual and fleshly members of the Church; and spoke of such as only belong to her outwardly, but are not Christians. As these are finally overpowered by the gates of hell, Origen does not hesitate to class them as merely seeming members of the Church. Conversely, he contemplates the possibility of a person being expelled from her fellowship and yet remaining a member in

¹ This is asserted by Cyprian in epp. 65. 4 and 67. 3; but he even goes on to declare that everyone is polluted that has fellowship with an impure priest, and takes part in the offering celebrated by him.

² On this point the greatest uncertainty prevails in Cyprian. Sometimes he says that God himself installs the bishops, and it is therefore a deadly sin against God to criticise them (*e.g.*, in ep. 66. 1); on other occasions he remembers that the bishops have been ordained by bishops; and again, as in ep. 67. 3, 4, he appears to acknowledge the community's right to choose and control them. Cf. the sections referring to Cyprian in Reuter's "Augustinische Studien" (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. VII., p. 199 ff.).

³ The Donatists were quite justified in appealing to Cyprian, that is, in one of his two aspects.

the eyes of God.¹ Nevertheless he by no means attained to clearness on the point, in which case, moreover, he would have been the first to do so; nor did he give an impulse to further reflection on the problem. Besides, speculations were of no

¹ Origen not only distinguishes between different groups within the Church as judged by their spiritual understanding and moral development (Comm. in Matt. Tom. XI. at Chap. XV. 29; Hom. II. in Genes. Chap. 3; Hom. in Cantic. Tom. I. at Chap. I. 4: "ecclesia una quidem est, cum perfecta est; multæ vero sunt adolescentulæ, cum adhuc instruuntur et proficiunt"; Hom. III. in Levit. Chap. iii.), but also between spiritual and carnal members (Hom. XXVI. in Num. Chap. vii.) *i. e.*, between true Christians and those who only bear that name without heartfelt faith—who outwardly take part in everything, but bring forth fruits neither in belief nor conduct. Such Christians he as little views as belonging to the Church as does Clement of Alexandria (see Strom. VII. 14. 87, 88). To him they are like the Jebusites who were left in Jerusalem: they have no part in the promises of Christ, but are lost (Comm. in Matt. T. XII. c. xii.). It is the Church's task to remove such members, whence we see that Origen was far from sharing Calixtus' view of the Church as a *corpus permixtum*; but to carry out this process so perfectly that only the holy and the saved remain is a work beyond the powers of human sagacity. One must therefore content oneself with expelling notorious sinners; see Hom. XXI. in Jos., c. i.: "sunt qui ignobilem et degenerem vitam ducunt, qui et fide et actibus et omni conversatione sua perversi sunt. Neque enim possibile est, ad liquidum purgari ecclesiam, dum in terris est, ita ut neque impius in ea quisquam, neque peccator residere videatur, sed sint in ea omnes sancti et beati, et in quibus nulla prorsus peccati macula deprehendatur. Sed sicut dicitur de zizaniis: Ne forte eradicantes zizania simul eradicetis et triticum, ita etiam super iis dici potest, in quibus vel dubia vel occulta peccata sunt. . . . Eos saltem eiiciamus quos possumus, quorum peccata manifesta sunt. Ubi enim peccatum non est evidens, eiicere de ecclesia neminem possumus." In this way indeed very many wicked people remain in the Church (Comm. in Matt. T. X. at c. xiii. 47 f.: *μὴ ξενίζώμεθα, ἐὰν ἐρῶμεν ἡμῶν τὰ ἀθροίσματα πεπληρωμένα καὶ πονηρῶν*); but in his work against Celsus Origen already propounded that empiric and relative theory of the Christian Churches which views them as simply "better" than the societies and civic communities existing alongside of them. The 29th and 30th chapters of the 3rd book against Celsus, in which he compares the Christians with the other population of Athens, Corinth, and Alexandria, and the heads of congregations with the councillors and mayors of these cities, are exceedingly instructive and attest the revolution of the times. In conclusion, however, we must point out that Origen expressly asserts that a person unjustly excommunicated remains a member of the Church in God's eyes; see Hom. XIV. in Levit. c. iii.: "ita fit, ut interdum ille qui foras mittitur intus sit, et ille foris, qui intus videtur retineri." Döllinger (Hippolytus and Calixtus, page 254 ff.) has correctly concluded that Origen followed the disputes between Hippolytus and Calixtus in Rome, and took the side of the former. Origen's trenchant remarks about the pride and arrogance of the bishops of large towns (in Matth. XI. 9. 15; XII. 9—14; XVI. 8. 22 and elsewhere, *e.g.*, de orat. 28, Hom. VI. in Isai c. i., in Joh. X. 16), and his denunciation of such of them as, in order to

use here. The Church with her priests, her holy books, and gifts of grace, that is, the moderate secularisation of Christendom corrected by the means of grace, was absolutely needed in order to prevent a complete lapse into immorality. ¹

But a minority struggled against this Church, not with speculations, but by demanding adherence to the old practice with regard to lapsed members. Under the leadership of the Roman presbyter, Novatian, this section formed a coalition in the Empire that opposed the Catholic confederation. ² Their adherence to the old system of Church discipline involved a reaction against the secularising process, which did not seem to be tempered by the spiritual powers of the bishops. Novatian's conception of the Church, of ecclesiastical absolution and the rights of the priests, and in short, his notion of the power of the keys is different from that of his opponents. This is clear from a variety of considerations. For he (with his followers) assigned to the Church the right and duty of expelling gross sinners once for all; ³ he denied her the authority to absolve glorify God, assume a mere distinction of names between Father and Son, are also correctly regarded by Langen as specially referring to the Roman ecclesiastics (*Geschichte der römischen Kirche* I. p. 242). Thus Calixtus was opposed by the three greatest theologians of the age—Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen.

¹ If, in assuming the irremovability of a bishop even in case of mortal sin, the Roman bishops went beyond Cyprian, Cyprian drew from his conception of the Church a conclusion which the former rejected, viz., the invalidity of baptism administered by non-Catholics. Here, in all likelihood, the Roman bishops were only determined by their interest in smoothing the way to a return or admission to the Church in the case of non-Catholics. In this instance they were again induced to adhere to their old practice from a consideration of the catholicity of the Church. It redounds to Cyprian's credit that he drew and firmly maintained the undeniable inferences from his own theory in spite of tradition. The matter never led to a great *dogmatic* controversy.

² As to the events during the vacancy in the Roman see immediately before Novatian's schism, and the part then played by the latter, who was still a member of the Church, see my essay: "Die Briefe des römischen Klerus aus der Zeit der Sedisvacanz im Jahre 250" (*Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker*, 1892).

³ So far as we are able to judge, Novatian himself did not extend the severer treatment to all gross sinners (see ep. 55. 26, 27): but only decreed it in the case of the lapsed. It is, however, very probable that in the later Novatian Churches no mortal sinner was absolved (see, *e.g.*, Socrates, *H. E.* I. 10). The statement of Ambrosius (*de pœnit.* III. 3) that Novatian made no difference between gross and lesser sins and equally refused forgiveness to transgressors of every kind distorts the

idolaters, but left these to the forgiveness of God who alone has the power of pardoning sins committed against himself; and he asserted: "non est pax illi ab episcopo necessaria habituro gloriæ suæ (scil. martyrii) pacem et accepturo maiorem de domini dignatione mercedem."—"the absolution of the bishop is not needed by him who will receive the peace of his glory (*i.e.*, martyrdom) and will obtain a greater reward from the approbation of the Lord" (Cypr. ep. 57. 4), and on the other hand taught: "peccato alterius inquinari alterum et idololatriam delinquentis ad non delinquentem transire."—"the one is defiled by the sin of the other and the idolatry of the transgressor passes over to him who does not transgress." His proposition that none but God can forgive sins does not depotentiate the idea of the Church; but secures both her proper religious significance and the full sense of her dispensations of grace: it limits her powers and *extent* in favour of her *content*. Refusal of her forgiveness under certain circumstances—though this does not exclude the confident hope of God's mercy—can only mean that in Novatian's view this forgiveness is the foundation of salvation and does not merely avert the certainty of perdition. To the Novatians, then, membership of the Church is not the *sine quâ non* of salvation, but it really secures it in some measure. In certain cases nevertheless the Church may not anticipate the judgment of God. Now it is never by exclusion, but by re-admission, that she does so. As the assembly of the baptised, who have received God's forgiveness, the Church must be a real communion of salvation and of saints; hence she cannot endure unholy persons in her midst without losing her essence. Each gross sinner that is tolerated within her calls her legitimacy in question. But, from this point of view, the constitution of the Church, *i.e.*, the distinction of lay and spiritual and the authority of the bishops, likewise retained nothing but the secondary importance it had in earlier times. For, according to those principles, the primary question as regards Church member-

truth as much as did the old reproach laid to his charge, *viz.*, that he as "a Stoic" made no distinction between sins. Moreover, in excluding gross sinners, Novatian's followers did not mean to abandon them, but to leave them under the discipline and intercession of the Church.

ship is not connection with the clergy (the bishop). It is rather connection with the community, fellowship with which secures the salvation that may indeed be found outside its pale, but not with certainty. But other causes contributed to lessen the importance of the bishops: the art of casuistry, so far-reaching in its results, was unable to find a fruitful soil here, and the laity were treated in exactly the same way as the clergy. The ultimate difference between Novatian and Cyprian as to the idea of the Church and the power to bind and loose did not become clear to the latter himself. This was because, in regard to the idea of the Church, he partly overlooked the inferences from his own view and to some extent even directly repudiated them. An attempt to lay down a principle for judging the case is found in ep. 69. 7: "We and the schismatics have neither the same law of the creed nor the same interrogation, for when they say: 'you believe in the remission of sins and eternal life through the holy Church', they speak falsely" ("non est una nobis et schismaticis symboli lex neque eadem interrogatio; nam cum dicunt, credis in remissionem peccatorum et vitam æternam per sanctam ecclesiam, mentiuntur"). Nor did Dionysius of Alexandria, who endeavoured to accumulate reproaches against Novatian, succeed in forming any effective accusation (Euseb., H. E. VII. 8). Pseudo-Cyprian had just as little success (ad Novatianum).

It was not till the subsequent period, when the Catholic Church had resolutely pursued the path she had entered, that the difference in principle manifested itself with unmistakable plainness. The historical estimate of the contrast must vary in proportion as one contemplates the demands of primitive Christianity or the requirements of the time. The Novatian confederation undoubtedly preserved a valuable remnant of the old tradition. The idea that the Church, as a fellowship of salvation, must also be the fellowship of saints (*Καθαρσῶν*) corresponds to the ideas of the earliest period. The followers of Novatian did not entirely identify the political and religious attributes of the Church; they neither transformed the gifts of salvation into means of education, nor confused the reality with the possibility of redemption; and they did not completely lower

the requirements for a holy life. But on the other hand, in view of the minimum insisted upon, the claim *that they were the really evangelical party and that they fulfilled the law of Christ*¹ was a presumption. The one step taken to avert the secularising of the Church, exclusion of the lapsed, was certainly, considering the actual circumstances immediately following a great apostasy, a measure of radical importance; but, estimated by the Gospel and in fact simply by the demands of the Montanists fifty years before, it was remarkably insignificant. These Catharists did indeed go the length of expelling *all* so-called mortal sinners, because it was too crying an injustice to treat *libellatici* more severely than unabashed transgressors;² but, even then, it was still a gross self-deception to style themselves the "pure ones", since the Novatian Churches speedily ceased to be any stricter than the Catholic in their renunciation of the world. At least we do not hear that asceticism and devotion to religious faith were very much more prominent in

¹ The title of the evangelical life (evangelical perfection, imitation of Christ) in contrast to that of ordinary Catholic Christians, a designation which we first find among the Encratites (see Vol. I. p. 237. note 3) and Marcionites (see Tertull., adv. Marc. IV. 14: "Venio nunc ad ordinarias sententias Marcionis, per quas proprietatem doctrinæ suæ inducit ad edictum, ut ita dixerim, Christi, Beati mendici etc."), and then in Tertullian (in his pre-Montanist period, see ad mart., de patient., de pœnit., de idolol.; in his later career, see de coron. 8, 9, 13, 14; de fuga 8, 13; de ieiun. 6, 8, 15; de monog. 3, 5, 11; see Aubé, Les Chrétiens dans l'empire Romain de la fin des Antonins, 1881, p. 237 ff.: "Chrétiens intransigeants et Chrétiens opportunistes") was expressly claimed by Novatian (Cypr., ep. 44. 3: "si Novatiani se adsertores evangelii et Christi esse confitentur"; 46. 2: "nec putetis, sic vos evangelium Christi adserere"). Cornelius in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 43. 11 calls Novatian: ὁ ἐνδικητὴς τοῦ εὐαγγελίου. This is exceedingly instructive, and all the more so when we note that, even as far back as the end of the second century, it was not the "evangelical", but the lax, who declared the claims of the Gospel to be satisfied if they kept God in their hearts, but otherwise lived in entire conformity with the world. See Tertullian, de spec. 1; de pœnit. 5: "Sed aiunt quidam, satis deum habere, si corde et animo suspiciatur, licet actu minus fiat; itaque se salvo metu et fide peccare, hoc est salva castitate matrimonia violare etc."; de ieiun. 2: "Et scimus, quales sint carnalium commodorum suasoriæ, quam facile dicatur: Opus est de totis præcordiis credam, diligam deum et proximum tanquam me. In his enim duobus præceptis tota lex pendet et prophetæ, non in pulmonum et intestinorum meorum inanitate." The Valentinian Heracleon was similarly understood, see above Vol. I. p. 262.

² Tertullian (de pud. 22) had already protested vigorously against such injustice.

the Catharist Church than in the Catholic. On the contrary, judging from the sources that have come down to us, we may confidently say that the picture presented by the two Churches in the subsequent period was practically identical.¹ As Novatian's adherents did not differ from the opposite party in doctrine and constitution, their discipline of penance appears an archaic fragment which it was a doubtful advantage to preserve; and their rejection of the Catholic dispensations of grace (practice of rebaptism) a revolutionary measure, because it had insufficient justification. But the distinction between venial and mortal sins, a theory they held in common with the Catholic Church, could not but prove especially fatal to them; whereas their opponents, through their new regulations as to penance, softened this distinction, and that not to the detriment of morality. For an entirely different treatment of so-called gross and venial transgressions must in every case deaden the conscience towards the latter.

5. If we glance at the Catholic Church and leave the melancholy recriminations out of account, we cannot fail to see the wisdom, foresight, and comparative strictness² with which the bishops carried out the great revolution that so depotentiated the Church as to make her capable of becoming a prop of civic society and of the state, without forcing any great changes upon them.³ In learning to look upon the Church as a training

¹ From Socrates' Ecclesiastical History we can form a good idea of the state of the Novatian communities in Constantinople and Asia Minor. On the later history of the Catharist Church see my article "Novatian", l.c., 667 ff. The most remarkable feature of this history is the amalgamation of Novatian's adherents in Asia Minor with the Montanists and the absence of distinction between their manner of life and that of the Catholics. In the 4th century of course the Novatians were nevertheless very bitterly attacked.

² This indeed was disputed by Hippolytus and Origen.

³ This last conclusion was come to after painful scruples, particularly in the East—as we may learn from the 6th and 7th books of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History. For a time the majority of the Oriental bishops adopted an attitude favourable to Novatian and unfavourable to Cornelius and Cyprian. Then they espoused the cause of the latter, though without adopting the milder discipline in all cases (see the canons of Ancyra and Neocæsarea IV. sæc. init.). Throughout the East the whole question became involved in confusion, and was not decided in accordance with clear principles. In giving up the last remnant of her exclusiveness

school for salvation, provided with penalties and gifts of grace, and in giving up its religious independence in deference to her authority, Christendom as it existed in the latter half of the third century,¹ submitted to an arrangement that was really best adapted to its own interests. In the great Church every distinction between her political and religious conditions necessarily led to fatal disintegrations, to laxities, such as arose in Carthage owing to the enthusiastic behaviour of the confessors; or to the breaking up of communities. The last was a danger

(the canons of Elvira are still very strict while those of Arles are lax), the Church became "Catholic" in quite a special sense, in other words, she became a community where everyone could find his place, provided he submitted to certain regulations and rules. Then, and not till then, was the Church's pre-eminent importance for society and the state assured. It was no longer variance, and no longer the sword (Matt. X. 34, 35), but peace and safety that she brought; she was now capable of becoming an educative or, since there was little more to educate in the older society, a conservative power. At an earlier date the Apologists (Justin, Melito, Tertullian himself) had already extolled her as such, but it was not till now that she really possessed this capacity. Among Christians, first the Encratites and Marcionites, next the adherents of the new prophecy, and lastly the Novatians had by turns opposed the naturalisation of their religion in the world and the transformation of the Church into a political commonwealth. Their demands had progressively become less exacting, whence also their internal vigour had grown ever weaker. But, in view of the continuous secularising of Christendom, the Montanist demands at the beginning of the 3rd century already denoted no less than those of the Encratites about the middle of the second, and no more than those of the Novatians about the middle of the third. The Church resolutely declared war on all these attempts to elevate evangelical perfection to an inflexible law for all, and overthrew her opponents. She pressed on in her world-wide mission and appeased her conscience by allowing a twofold morality within her bounds. Thus she created the conditions which enabled the ideal of evangelical perfection to be realised in her own midst, in the form of monasticism, without threatening her existence. "What is monasticism but an ecclesiastical institution that makes it possible to separate oneself from the world and to remain in the Church, to separate oneself from the outward Church without renouncing her, to set oneself apart for purposes of sanctification and yet to claim the highest rank among her members, to form a brotherhood and yet to further the interests of the Church?" In succeeding times great Church movements, such as the Montanist and Novatian, only succeeded in attaining local or provincial importance. See the movement at Rome at the beginning of the 4th century, of which we unfortunately know so little (Lipsius, *Chronologie der römischen Bischöfe*, pp. 250—255), the Donatist Revolution, and the Audiani in the East.

¹ It is a characteristic circumstance that Tertullian's *de ieiun.* does *not* assume that the great mass of Christians possess an actual knowledge of the Bible.

incurred in all cases where the attempt was made to exercise unsparing severity. A casuistic proceeding was necessary as well as a firm union of the bishops as pillars of the Church. Not the least important result of the crises produced by the great persecutions was the fact that the bishops in West and East were thereby forced into closer connection and at the same time acquired full jurisdiction ("per episcopos solos peccata posse dimitti"). If we consider that the archiepiscopal constitution had not only been simultaneously adopted, but had also attained the chief significance in the ecclesiastical organisation,¹ we may say that the Empire Church was completed the moment that Diocletian undertook the great reorganisation of his dominions.² No doubt the old Christianity had found its place in the new Church, but it was covered over and concealed. In spite of all that, little alteration had been made in the expression of faith, in religious language; people spoke of the universal holy Church, just as they did a hundred years before. Here the development in the history of dogma was in a very special sense a development in the history of the Church. Catholicism was now complete; the Church had suppressed all utterances of individual piety, in the sense of their being binding on

¹ The condition of the constitution of the Church about the middle of the 3rd century (in accordance with Cyprian's epistles) is described by Otto Ritschl, l. c. pp. 142—237. Parallels to the provincial and communal constitution of secular society are to be found throughout.

² To how great an extent the Church in Decius' time was already a state within the state is shown by a piece of information given in Cyprian's 55th epistle (c. 9): "Cornelius sedit intrepidus Romæ in sacerdotali cathedra eo tempore: cum tyrannus infestus sacerdotibus dei fanda adque infanda comminaretur, cum multo patientius et tolerabilius audiret levare adversus se æmulum principem quam constitui Romæ dei sacerdotem." On the other hand the legislation with regard to Christian flamens adopted by the Council of Elvira, which, as Duchesne (*Mélanges Renier: Le Concile d'Elvire et les flamines chrétiens*, 1886) has demonstrated, most probably dates from before the Diocletian persecution of 300, shows how closely the discipline of the Church had already been adapted to the heathen regulations in the Empire. In addition to this there was no lack of syncretist systems within Christianity as early as the 3rd century (see the *Κεστοί* of Julius Africanus, and other examples). Much information on this point is to be derived from Origen's works and also, in many respects, from the attitude of this author himself. We may also refer to relic- and hero-worship, the foundation of which was already laid in the 3rd century, though the "religion of the second order" did not become a recognised power in the Church or force itself into the official religion till the 4th.

Christians, and freed herself from every feature of exclusiveness. In order to be a Christian a man no longer required in any sense to be a saint. "What made the Christian a Christian was no longer the possession of charisms, but obedience to ecclesiastical authority," share in the gifts of the Church, and the performance of penance and good works. The Church by her edicts legitimised average morality, after average morality had created the authority of the Church. ("La médiocrité fonda l'autorité"). The dispensations of grace, that is, absolution and the Lord's Supper, abolished the charismatic gifts. The Holy Scriptures, the apostolic episcopate, the priests, the sacraments, average morality in accordance with which the whole world could live, were mutually conditioned. The consoling words: "Jesus receives sinners", were subjected to an interpretation that threatened to make them detrimental to morality.¹ And with all that the self-righteousness of proud ascetics was not excluded—quite the contrary. Alongside of a code of morals, to which any one in case of need could adapt himself, the Church began to legitimise a morality of self-chosen, refined sanctity, which really required no Redeemer. It was as in possession of this constitution that the great statesman found and admired her, and recognised in her the strongest support of the Empire.²

A comparison of the aims of primitive Christendom with those of ecclesiastical society at the end of the third century—a comparison of the actual state of things at the different periods is hardly possible—will always lead to a disheartening result; but the parallel is in itself unjust. The truth rather is that the correct standpoint from which to judge the matter was al-

¹ See Tertullian's frightful accusations in *de pudic.* (10) and *de iejun.* (fin) against the "Psychici", *i.e.*, the Catholic Christians. He says that with them the saying had really come to signify "peccando promeremur", by which, however, he does not mean the Augustinian: "o felix culpa".

² The relation of this Church to theology, what theology she required and what she rejected, and, moreover, to what extent she rejected the kind that she accepted may be seen by reference to chap. 5 ff. We may here also direct attention to the peculiar position of Origen in the Church as well as to that of Lucian the Martyr, concerning whom Alexander of Alexandria (Theoderet, H.E. 1. 3) remarks that he was a *ἀποσυνάγωγος* in Antioch for a long time, namely, during the rule of three successive bishops.

ready indicated by Origen in the comparison he drew (c. Cels. III. 29. 30) between the Christian society of the third century and the non-Christian, between the Church and the Empire, the clergy and the magistrates. ¹ Amidst the general disorganisation of all relationships, and from amongst the ruins of a shattered fabric, a new structure, founded on the belief in one God, in a sure revelation, and in eternal life, was being laboriously raised. It gathered within it more and more all the elements still capable of continued existence; it readmitted the old world, cleansed of its grossest impurities, and raised holy

¹ We have already referred to the passage above. On account of its importance we may quote it here:

“According to Celsus Apollo required the Metapontines to regard Aristeas as a god; but in their eyes the latter was but a man and perhaps not a virtuous one... They would therefore not obey Apollo, and thus it happened that no one believed in the divinity of Aristeas. But with regard to Jesus we may say that it proved a blessing to the human race to acknowledge him as the Son of God, as God who appeared on earth united with body and soul.” Origen then says that the demons counterworked this belief, and continues: “But God who had sent Jesus on earth brought to nought all the snares and plots of the demons and aided in the victory of the Gospel of Jesus throughout the whole earth in order to promote the conversion and amelioration of men; and everywhere brought about the establishment of Churches which are ruled by other laws than those that regulate the Churches of the superstitious, the dissolute and the unbelieving. For of such people the civil population (πολιτευόμενα ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις τῶν πολέων πλήθῃ) of the towns almost everywhere consists.” Αἱ δὲ τοῦ Θεοῦ Χριστῶ μαθητευθεῦσαι ἐκκλησίαι, συνζηταζόμεναι ταῖς ἄν παροικοῦσι δήμων ἐκκλησίαις, ὡς φωστῆρες εἰσιν ἐν κόσμῳ. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαι, καὶ τοὺς χεῖρους τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐκκλησίας καὶ συγκρίσει βελτιόνων ἐλάττους πολλῶ κρείττους τυγχάνειν τῶν ἐν τοῖς δήμοις ἐκκλησιῶν; ἐκκλησία μὲν γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, φέρ’ εἰπεῖν, ἢ Ἀθήνησι πραεῖά τις καὶ εὐσταθής, ἅτε Θεῶ ἀρέσκειν τῷ ἐπὶ πᾶσι βουλομένη ἢ δ’ Ἀθηναίων ἐκκλησία στασιώδης καὶ οὐδαμῶς παραβαλλομένη τῇ ἐκεῖ ἐκκλησίᾳ τοῦ Θεοῦ· τὸ δ’ αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς, περὶ ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Κορίνθῳ καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας τοῦ δήμου Κορινθίων; καὶ, φέρ’ εἰπεῖν, περὶ ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ τῆς ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ, καὶ ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Ἀλεξανδρέων δήμου. καὶ ἐὰν εὐγνώμων ᾖ ὁ τοῦτου ἀκούων καὶ φιλαλήθως ἐξετάζη τὰ πράγματα, θαυμάσεται τὸν καὶ βουλευσάμενον καὶ ἀνύσαι δυνηέντα πανταχοῦ συστήσασθαι ἐκκλησίας τοῦ Θεοῦ, παροικοῦσας ἐκκλησίαις τῶν καδ’ ἐκάστην πόλιν δήμων οὕτω δὲ καὶ βουλήν ἐκκλησίας Θεοῦ βουλῇ τῇ καδ’ ἐκάστην πόλιν συνζητάζων εὐροῖς ἂν ὅτι τινὲς μὲν τῆς ἐκκλησίας βουλευταὶ ἄξιοί εἰσι—εἴ τις ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ παντὶ πόλις τοῦ Θεοῦ—ἐν ἐκείνῃ πολιτεύεσθαι οἱ δὲ πανταχοῦ βουλευταὶ οὐδὲν ἄξιον τῆς ἐκ κατατάξεως ὑπεροχῆς, ἣν ὑπερέχειν δοκοῦσι τῶν πολιτῶν, φέρουσιν ἐν τοῖς ἑαυτῶν ἡβесιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντα ἐκκλησίας ἐκάστης πόλεως ἄρχοντι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει συγκριτέον ἵνα κατανοήσης, ὅτι καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σφόδρα ἀποτυγχανομένων βουλευτῶν καὶ ἄρχόντων ἐκκλησίας Θεοῦ, καὶ βθυμωτέρων παρὰ τοὺς εὐτονωτέρως βιοῦντας οὐδὲν ἤττόν ἐστιν εὐρεῖν ὡς ἐπίπαν ὑπεροχὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς προκοπῇ παρὰ τὰ ἦθῃ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι βουλευτῶν καὶ ἄρχόντων.

barriers to secure its conquests against all attacks. Within this edifice justice and civic virtue shone with no greater brightness than they did upon the earth generally; but within it burned two mighty flames—the assurance of eternal life, guaranteed by Christ, and the practice of mercy. He who knows history is aware that the influence of epoch-making personages is not to be sought in its direct consequences alone, as these speedily disappear: that structure which prolonged the life of a dying world, and brought strength from the Holy One to another struggling into existence, was also partly founded on the Gospel, and but for this would neither have arisen nor attained solidity. Moreover, a Church had been created within which the pious layman could find a holy place of peace and edification. With priestly strife he had nothing to do, nor had he any concern in the profound and subtle dogmatic system whose foundation was now being laid. We may say that the religion of the laity attained freedom in proportion as it became impossible for them to take part in the establishment and guardianship of the official Church system. It is the professional guardians of this ecclesiastical edifice who are the real martyrs of religion, and it is they who have to bear the consequences of the worldliness and lack of genuineness pertaining to the system. But to the layman who seeks from the Church nothing more than aid in raising himself to God, this worldliness and unverity do not exist. During the Greek period, however, laymen were only able to recognise this advantage to a limited extent. The Church dogmatic and the ecclesiastical system were still too closely connected with their own interests. It was in the Middle Ages, that the Church first became a Holy Mother and her house a house of prayer—for the Germanic peoples; for these races were really the children of the Church, and they themselves had not helped to rear the house in which they worshipped.

ADDENDA.

I. THE PRIESTHOOD. The completion of the old Catholic conception of the Church, as this idea was developed in the latter half of the third century, is perhaps most clearly shown in the attribute of priesthood, with which the clergy were invested and which conferred on them the greatest importance.¹ The development of this conception, whose adoption is a proof that the Church had assumed a heathen complexion, cannot be more particularly treated of here.² What meaning it has

¹ Ritschl, Entstehung der altkatholischen Kirche pp. 362, 368, 394, 461, 555, 560, 576. Otto Ritschl, l.c., pp. 208, 218, 231. Hatch "Organisation of the early Christian Church", Lectures 5 and 6: id., Art. "Ordination", "Priest", in the Dictionary of Christian Antiquities. Hauck, Art. "Priester" in Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie, 2nd ed. Voigt, l.c., p. 175 ff. Sohm, Kirchenrecht I. p. 205 ff. Louw, Het ontstaan van het Priesterschap in de christ. Kerk, Utrecht, 1892.

² Clement of Rome was the first to compare the conductors of public worship in Christian Churches with the priests and Levites, and the author of the *Διδαχὴ* was the first to liken the Christian prophets to the high priests. It cannot, however, be shown that there were any Christian circles where the leaders were directly styled "priests" before the last quarter of the 2nd century. We can by no means fall back on Ignatius, Philad. 9, nor on Iren., IV. 8. 3, which passage is rather to be compared with *Διδ.* 13. 3. It is again different in Gnostic circles, which in this case, too, anticipated the secularising process; read for example the description of Marcus in Iren., I. 13. Here, *mutatis mutandis*, we have the later Catholic bishop, who alone is able to perform a mysterious sacrifice to whose person powers of grace are attached—the formula of bestowal was: *μεταδοῦναί σοι θέλω τῆς ἐμῆς χάριτος . . . λάμβανε ἀπ' ἐμοῦ καὶ δι' ἐμοῦ χάριν*, and through whose instrumentality union with God can alone be attained: the *ἀπολύτρωσις* (I. 21.) is only conferred through the mystagogue. Much of a similar nature is to be found, and we can expressly say that the distinction between priestly mystagogues and laymen was of fundamental importance in many Gnostic societies (see also the writings of the Coptic Gnostics); it was different in the Marcionite Church. Tertullian (de bapt. 17) was the first to call the bishop "summus sacerdos", and the older opinion that he merely "played" with the idea is untenable, and refuted by Pseudo-Cyprian, de aleat. 2 ("sacerdotalis dignitas"). In his Antimontanist writings the former has repeatedly repudiated any distinction in principle of a particular priestly class among Christians, as well as the application of certain injunctions to this order (de exhort. 7: "nonne et laici sacerdotes sumus? . . . adeo ubi ecclesiastici ordinis non est consensus, et offers et tinguis et sacerdos es tibi solus, sed ubi tres, ecclesia est, licet laici."; de monog. 7). We may perhaps infer from his works that before about the year 200, the name "priest" was not yet universally applied to bishop and presbyters in Carthage (but see after this de præscr. 29, 41: sacer-

is shown by its application in Cyprian and the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions (see Book II.). The bishops (and also the presbyters) are priests, in so far as they alone are empowered to present the sacrifice as representatives of the congregation before God¹ and in so far as they dispense or refuse the divine grace as representatives of God in relation to the congregation. In this sense they are also judges in God's stead.² The position here conceded to the

dotalia munera; de pud. 1, 21; de monog. 12: disciplina sacerdot.; de exhort. 7: sacerdotalis ordo; ibid. 11: "et offeres pro duabus uxoribus, et commendabis illas duas per sacerdotem de monogamia ordinatum; de virg. vel. 9: sacerdotale officium; Scorp. 7: sacerdos). The latest writings of Tertullian show us indeed that the name and the conception which it represents were already prevalent. Hippolytus (Philos. præf.: ὧν ἡμεῖς διάδοχοι τυγχάνοντες τῆς τε αὐτῆς χάριτος μετέχοντες ἀρχιερατείας καὶ διδασκαλίας, see also the Arabian canons) expressly claimed high priesthood for the bishops, and Origen thought he was justified in giving the name of "Priests and Levites" to those who conducted public worship among Christians. This he indeed did with reserve (see many passages, e.g., Hom. II. in Num., Vol. II. p. 278; Hom. VI. in Lev., Vol. II. p. 211; Comment. in Joh., Vol. I. 3), but yet to a far greater extent than Clement (see Bigg, l.c., p. 214 f.). In Cyprian and the literature of the Greek Church in the immediately following period we find the designation "priest" as the regular and most customary name for the bishop and presbyters. Novatian (Jerome. de vir. inl. 70) wrote a treatise *de sacerdote* and another *de ordinatione*. The notable and momentous change of conception expressed in the idea can be traced by us through its preparatory stages almost as little as the theory of the apostolic succession of the bishops. Irenæus (IV. 8. 3, 17. 5, 18. 1) and Tertullian, when compared with Cyprian, appear here as representatives of primitive Christianity. They firmly assert the priesthood of the whole congregation. That the laity had as great a share as the leaders of the Churches in the transformation of the latter into Priests is moreover shown by the bitter saying of Tertullian (de monog. 12): "Sed cum extollimur et inflamur adversus clerum, tunc unum omnes sumus, tunc omnes sacerdotes, quia 'sacerdotes nos deo et patri fecit'. Cum ad peræquationem disciplinæ sacerdotalis provocamur, deponimus infulas."

¹ See Sohm, I. p. 207.

² The "deservire altari et sacrificia divina celebrare" (Cypr., ep. 67. 1) is the distinctive function of the *sacerdos dei*. It may further be said, however, that *all* ceremonies of public worship properly belong to him, and Cyprian has moreover contrived to show that this function of the bishop as leader of the Church follows from his priestly attributes; for as priest the bishop is *antistes Christi* (dei); see epp. 59. 18: 61. 2: 63. 14: 66. 5, and this is the basis of his right and duty to preserve the *lex evangelica* and the *traditio dominica* in every respect. As *antistes dei*, however, an attribute bestowed on the bishop by the apostolic succession and the laying on of hands, he has also received the power of the keys, which confers the right to judge in Christ's stead and to grant or refuse the divine grace. In

higher clergy corresponds to that of the mystagogue in heathen religions, and is acknowledged to be borrowed from the latter.¹ Divine grace already appears as a sacramental consecration of an objective nature, the bestowal of which is confined to spiritual personages chosen by God. This fact is no way affected by the perception that an ever increasing reference is made to the Old Testament priests as well as to the whole Jewish ceremonial and ecclesiastical regulations.² It is true that there is no other respect in which Old Testament commandments were incorporated with Christianity to such an extent as they were in this.³ But it can be proved that this formal adoption every-

Cyprian's conception of the episcopal office the *successio apostolica* and the position of vicegerent of Christ (of God) counterbalance each other; he also tried to amalgamate both elements (ep. 55. 8: "cathedra sacerdotalis"). It is evident that as far as the inner life of each church was concerned, the latter and newer necessarily proved the more important feature. In the East, where the thought of the apostolical succession of the bishops never received such pronounced expression as in Rome it was just this latter element that was almost exclusively emphasised from the end of the 3rd century. Iguatius led the way when he compared the bishop, in his position towards the individual community, with God and Christ. He, however, is dealing in images, but at a later period the question is about realities based on a mysterious transference.

¹ Soon after the creation of a professional priesthood, there also arose a class of inferior clergy. This was first the case in Rome. This development was not uninfluenced by the heathen priesthood, and the temple service (see my article in *Texte und Untersuchungen* II. 5). Yet Sohni, l. c. p. 128 ff., has disputed this, and proposed modifications, worth considering, in my view of the origin of the *ordines minores*.

² Along with the sacerdotal laws, strictly so called, which Cyprian already understood to apply in a frightful manner (see his appeal to Deut. XVII. 12; 1 Sam. VIII. 7; Luke X. 16; John XVIII. 22 f.; Acts XXIII. 4—5 in epp. 3. 43-59. 66), other Old Testament commandments could not fail to be introduced. Thus the commandment of tithes, which Irenæus had still asserted to be abolished, was now for the first time established (see Origen; *Constit. Apost.* and *my* remarks on *Δδ.* c. 13); and hence Mosaic regulations as to ceremonial cleanness were adopted (see Hippol. *Canones arab.* 17; Dionys. Alex., ep. canon.). Constantine was the first to base the observance of Sunday on the commandment as to the Sabbath. Besides, the West was always more hesitating in this respect than the East. In Cyprian's time, however, the classification and dignity of the clergy were everywhere upheld by an appeal to Old Testament commandments, though reservations still continued to be made here and there.

³ Tertullian (*de pud. I.*) sneeringly named the bishop of Rome "pontifex maximus", thereby proving that he clearly recognised the heathen colouring given to the episcopal office. With the picture of the bishop drawn by the Apostolic constitutions may be compared the ill-natured descriptions of Paul of Samosata in Euseb., VII. 30.

where took place at a subsequent date, that is, it had practically no influence on the development itself, which was not legitimised by the commandments till a later period, and that often in a somewhat lame fashion. We may perhaps say that the development which made the bishops and elders priests altered the inward form of the Church in a more radical fashion than any other. "Gnosticism", which the Church had repudiated in the second century, became part of her own system in the third. As her integrity had been made dependent on inalienable objective standards, the adoption even of this greatest innovation, which indeed was in complete harmony with the secular element within her, was an elementary necessity. In regard to every sphere of Church life, and hence also in respect to the development of dogma¹ and the interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, the priesthood proved of the highest significance. The clerical exposition of the sacred books, with its frightful ideas, found its earliest advocate in Cyprian and had thus a most skilful champion at the very first.²

II. SACRIFICE. In Book I., chap. III., § 7, we have already shown what a wide field the idea of sacrifice occupied in primitive Christendom, and how it was specially connected with the celebration of the Lord's Supper. The latter was re-

¹ Yet this influence, in a direct form at least, can only be made out at a comparatively late period. But nevertheless, from the middle of the 3rd century the priests alone are possessed of knowledge. As *μύησις* and *μυσταγωγία* are inseparably connected in the mysteries and Gnostic societies, and the mystagogue was at once knowing one and priest, so also in the Catholic Church the priest is accounted the knowing one. Doctrine itself became a mystery to an increasing extent.

² Examples are found in epp. 1, 3, 4, 33, 43, 54, 57, 59, 65, 66. But see Iren., IV. 26. 2, who is little behind Cyprian here, especially when he threatens offenders with the fate of Dathan and Abiram. One of the immediate results of the formation of a priestly and spiritual class was that the independent "teachers" now shared the fate of the old "prophets" and became extinct (see my edition of the *Διδασχί*, prolegg. pp. 131—137). It is an instructive fact that Theoktistus of Cæsarea and Alexander of Jerusalem in order to prove in opposition to Demetrius that independent teachers were still tolerated, *i.e.*, allowed to speak in public meetings of the Church, could only appeal to the practice of Phrygia and Lycaonia, that is, to the habit of outlying provinces where, besides, Montanism had its original seat. Euelpis in Laranda, Paulinus in Iconium, and Theodorus in Synnada, who flourished about 216, are in addition to Origen the last independent teachers (*i.e.*, outside the ranks of the clergy) known to us in Christendom (Euseb., H. E. VI. 19 fin.).

garded as the pure (*i.e.*, to be presented with a pure heart), bloodless thank-offering of which Malachi had prophesied in I. 11. Priesthood and sacrifice, however, are mutually conditioned. The alteration of the concept "priest" necessarily led to a simultaneous and corresponding change in the idea of sacrifice, just as, conversely, the latter reacted on the former.¹ In Irenæus and Tertullian the old conception of sacrifice, *viz.*, that prayers are the Christian sacrifice and that the disposition of the believer hallows his whole life even as it does his offering, and forms a well-pleasing sacrifice to God, remains essentially unchanged. In particular, there is no evidence of any alteration in the notion of sacrifice connected with the Lord's Supper.² But nevertheless we can already trace a certain degree of modification in Tertullian. Not only does he give fasting, voluntary celibacy, martyrdom, etc., special prominence among the sacrificial acts of a Christian life, and extol their religious value—as had already been done before; but he also attributes a God-propitiating significance to these performances, and plainly designates them as "merita" ("promereri deum"). To the best of my belief Tertullian was the first who definitely regarded ascetic performances as propitiatory offerings and ascribed to them the "potestas reconciliandi iratum deum."³ But he himself was far from using

¹ See Döllinger, *Die Lehre von der Eucharistie in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten*, 1826. Höfling, *Die Lehre der ältesten Kirche vom Opfer*, p. 71 ff. Th. Harnack, *Der christliche Gemeindegottesdienst im apostolischen und altkatholischen Zeitalter*, p. 342 ff. Steitz, Art. "Messe" in Herzog's *Real Encyclopädie*, 2nd ed. It is idle to enquire whether the conception of the "sacerdotium" or that of the "sacrificium" was first altered, because they are correlative ideas.

² See the proof passages in Höfling, *l. c.*, who has also treated in detail Clement and Origen's idea of sacrifice, and cf. the beautiful saying of Irenæus IV. 18. 3: "Non sacrificia sanctificant hominem; non enim indiget sacrificio deus; sed conscientia eius qui offert sanctificat sacrificium, pura existens, et præstat acceptare deum quasi ab amico" (on the offering in the Lord's Supper see Iren. IV. 17. 5, 18. 1); Tertull., *Apolog.* 30; *de orat.* 28; *adv. Marc.* III. 22; IV. 1, 35; *adv. Jud.* 5; *de virg. vel.* 13.

³ Cf. specially the Montanist writings; the treatise *de ieiunio* is the most important among them in this case; see cc. 7, 16; *de resurr.* 8. On the use of the word "satisfacere" and the new ideas on the point which arose in the West (cf. also the word "meritum") see below chap. 5. 2 and the 2nd chap. of the 5th Vol. Note that the 2nd Ep. of Clement already contains the sayings: *καλὸν ἐλεημοσύνη ὡς μετάνοια ἀμαρτίας; κρείσσων νηστεία προσευχῆς, ἐλεημοσύνη δὲ ἀμφοτέρων . . . ἐλεη-*

this fatal theory, so often found in his works, to support a lax Church practice that made Christianity consist in outward forms. This result did not come about till the eventful decades, prolific in new developments, that elapsed between the persecutions of Septimius and Decius; and in the West it is again Cyprian who is our earliest witness as to the new view and practice.¹ In the first place, Cyprian was quite familiar with the idea of ascetic propitiations and utilised it in the interest of the Catholicity of the Church; secondly, he propounded a new theory of the offering in the cultus. As far as the first point is concerned, Cyprian's injunctions with regard to it are everywhere based on the understanding that even after baptism no one can be without sin (*de op. et eleemos.* 3); and also on the firm conviction that this sacrament can only have a retrospective virtue. Hence he concludes that we must appease God, whose wrath has been aroused by sin, through performances of our own, that is, through offerings that bear the character of "satisfactions". In other words we must blot out transgressions by specially meritorious deeds in order thus to escape eternal punishment. These deeds

μοσύνη γὰρ κούφισμα ἁμαρτίας γίνεται (16. 4; similar expressions occur in the "Shepherd"). But they only show how far back we find the origin of these injunctions borrowed from Jewish proverbial wisdom. One cannot say that they had no effect at all on Christian life in the 2nd century; but we do not yet find the idea that ascetic performances are a sacrifice offered to a wrathful God. Martyrdom seems to have been earliest viewed as a performance which expiated sins. In Tertullian's time the theory, that it was on a level with baptism (see Melito, 12. Fragment in Otto, Corp. Apol. IX. p. 418: *δύο συνέστη τὰ ἕφεσιν ἁμαρτημάτα παρεχόμενα, πάθος διὰ Χριστὸν καὶ βάπτισμα*), had long been universally diffused and was also exegetically grounded. In fact, men went a step further and asserted that the merits of martyrs could also benefit others. This view had likewise become established long before Tertullian's day, but was opposed by him (*de pudic.* 22), when martyrs abused the powers universally conceded to them. Origen went furthest here; see *exhort. ad mart.* 50: *ὡςπερ τιμῶ ἀίματι τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἠγοράσθημεν... οὕτως τῷ τιμῶ ἀίματι τῶν μαρτύρων ἀγορασθήσονται τινες;* Hom. X. in Num. c. II.: "ne forte, ex quo martyres non fiunt et hostie sanctorum non offeruntur pro peccatis nostris, peccatorum nostrorum remissionem non mereamur." The origin of this thought is, on the one hand, to be sought for in the wide-spread notion that the sufferings of an innocent man benefit others, and, on the other, in the belief that Christ himself suffered in the martyrs (see, e.g., ep. Lugd. in Euseb., H. E. V. 1. 23, 41).

¹ In the East it was Origen who introduced into Christianity the rich treasure of ancient ideas that had become associated with sacrifices. See Bigg's beautiful account in "The Christian Platonists of Alexandria," Lect. IV.—VI.

Cyprian terms "merita", which either possess the character of atonements, or, in case there are no sins to be expiated, entitle the Christian to a special reward (merces).¹ But, along with *lamentationes* and acts of penance, it is principally alms-giving that forms such means of atonement (see de lapsis, 35,36). In Cyprian's eyes this is already the proper satisfaction; mere prayer, that is, devotional exercises unaccompanied by fasting and alms, being regarded as "bare and unfruitful". In the work "de opere et eleemosynis" which, after a fashion highly characteristic of Cyprian, is made dependent on Sirach and Tobias, he has set forth a detailed theory of what we may call alms-giving as a *means of grace* in its relation to baptism and salvation.² However, this practice can only be viewed as a means of grace in Cyprian's sense in so far as God has accepted it, that is, pointed it out. In itself it is a free human act. After the Decian persecution and the rearrangement of ecclesiastical affairs necessitated by it, works and alms (opera et eleemosynæ) made their way into the absolution system of the Church, and were assigned a permanent place in it. Even

¹ Moreover, Tertullian (Scorp. 6) had already said: "Quomodo multæ mansiones apud patrem, si non pro varietate meritorum."

² See c. 1: Nam cum dominus adveniens sanasset illa, quæ Adam portaverit vulnera et venena serpentis antiqua curasset, legem dedit sano et præcepit, ne ultra iam peccaret, ne quid peccanti gravius eveniret; coartati eramus et in angustum innocentiae præscriptione conclusi, nec haberet quid fragilitatis humanæ infirmitas adque imbecillitas faceret, nisi iterum pietas divina subveniens iustitiæ et misericordiæ operibus ostensis viam quandam tuendæ salutis aperiret, ut sordes postmodum quascumque contrahimus eleemosynis abluamus." c. 2: sicut lavacro aquæ salutaris gehennæ ignis extinguitur, ita eleemosynis adque operationibus iustus delictorum flamma sopitur, et quia semel in baptismo remissa peccatorum datur, adsidua et ingnis operatio baptismi instar imitata dei rursus indulgentiam largiatur." 5, 6, 9. In c. 18 Cyprian already established an arithmetical relation between the number of alms-offerings and the blotting out of sins, and in c. 21, in accordance with an ancient idea which Tertullian and Minucius Felix, however, only applied to martyrdom, he describes the giving of alms as a spectacle for God and Christ. In Cyprian's epistles "satisfacere deo" is exceedingly frequent. It is almost still more important to note the frequent use of the expression "promereri deum (iudicem)" in Cyprian. See de unitate 15: "iustitia opus est, ut promereri quis possit deum iudicem: præceptis eius et monitis obtemperandum est, ut accipiant merita nostra mercedem." 18; de lapsis 31; de orat. 8, 32, 36; de mortal. 10; de op. 11, 14, 15, 26; de bono pat. 18; ep. 62, 2: 73. 10. Here it is everywhere assumed that Christians acquire God's favour by their works.

the Christian who has forfeited his Church membership by abjuration may ultimately recover it by deeds of sacrifice, of course under the guidance and intercessory coöperation of the Church. The dogmatic dilemma we find here cannot be more clearly characterised than by simply placing the two doctrines professed by Cyprian side by side. These are:—(1) that the sinfulness common to each individual can only be once extirpated by the power of baptism derived from the work of Christ, and (2) that transgressions committed after baptism, inclusive of mortal sins, can and must be expiated solely by spontaneous acts of sacrifice under the guidance of kind mother Church.¹ A Church capable of being permanently satisfied with such doctrines would very soon have lost the last remains of her Christian character. What was wanted was a means of grace, similar to baptism and granted by God through Christ, to which the *opera et elemosynæ* are merely to bear the relation of *accompanying* acts. But Cyprian was no dogmatist and was not able to form a doctrine of the means of grace. He never got beyond his “propitiate God the judge by sacrifices after baptism” (“*promereri deum judicem post baptismum sacrificiis*”), and merely hinted, in an obscure way, that the absolution of him who has committed a deadly sin after baptism emanates from the same readiness of God to forgive as is expressed in that rite, and that membership in the Church is a condition of absolution. His whole theory as to the legal nature of man’s (the Christian’s) relationship to God, and the practice, inaugurated by Tertullian, of designating this connection by terms derived from Roman law continued to prevail in the West down to Augustine’s time.² But, during this whole interval, no book was written by a Western Churchman which made the salvation of the sinful Christian dependent on ascetic offerings of atonement,

¹ Baptism with blood is not referred to here.

² With modifications, this has still continued to be the case beyond Augustine’s time down to the Catholicism of the present day. Cyprian is the father of the Romish doctrine of good works and sacrifice. Yet is it remarkable that he was not yet familiar with the theory according to which man *must* acquire *merita*. In his mind “merits” and “blessedness” are not yet rigidly correlated ideas; but the rudiments of this view are also found in him: cf. *de unit.* 15 (see p. 134. note 3).

with so little regard to Christ's grace and the divine factor in the case, as Cyprian's work *de opere et eleemosynis*.

No less significant is Cyprian's advance as regards the idea of the sacrifice in public worship, and that in three respects. To begin with, Cyprian was the first to associate the specific offering, *i.e.*, the Lord's Supper¹ with the specific priesthood. Secondly, he was the first to designate the *passio dominis*, nay, the *sanguis Christi* and the *dominica hostia* as the object of the eucharistic offering.² Thirdly, he expressly represented the

¹ "Sacrificare", "sacrificium celebrare", in all passages where they are unaccompanied by any qualifying words, mean to celebrate the Lord's Supper. Cyprian has never called prayer a "sacrifice" without qualifying terms; on the contrary he collocates "preces" and "sacrificium", and sometimes also "oblatio" and "sacrificium". The former is then the offering of the laity and the latter of the priests.

² Cf. the whole 63rd epistle and above all c. 7: "Et quia passionis eius mentionem in sacrificiis omnibus facimus, passio est enim domini sacrificium quod offerimus, nihil aliud quam quod ille fecit facere debemus"; c. 9: "unde apparet sanguinem Christi non offerri, si desit vinum calici." 13; de unit. 17: "dominicæ hostiæ veritatem per falsa sacrificia profanare"; ep. 63. 4: "sacramentum sacrificii dominici". The transference of the sacrificial idea to the consecrated elements, which, in all probability, Cyprian already found in existence, is ultimately based on the effort to include the element of mystery and magic in the specifically sacerdotal ceremony of sacrifice, and to make the Christian offering assume, though not visibly, the form of a bloody sacrifice, such as secularised Christianity desired. This transference, however, was the result of two causes. The first has been already rightly stated by Ernesti (Antimur. p. 94) in the words: "quia eucharistia habet ἀνάμνησιν Christi mortui et sacrificii eius in cruce peracti, propter ea paulatim cepta est tota eucharistia sacrificium dici." In Cyprian's 63rd. epistle it is still observable how the "calicem in commemorationem domini et passionis eius offerre" passes over into the "sanguinem Christi offerre", see also Euseb. demonstr. 1. 13: μνήμην τῆς θυσίας Χριστοῦ προσφέρειν and τὴν ἑνσαρκον τοῦ Χριστοῦ παρουσίαν καὶ τὸ καταρτισθὲν αὐτοῦ σῶμα προσφέρειν. The other cause has been specially pointed out by Theodore Harnack (*l.c.*, p. 409 f.). In ep. 63. 2 and in many other passages Cyprian expresses the thought "that in the Lord's Supper nothing else is done *by us* but what the Lord has first done *for us*." But he says that at the institution of the Supper the Lord first offered himself as a sacrifice to God the Father. Consequently the priest officiating in Christ's stead only presents a true and perfect offering when he imitates what Christ has done (c. 14: "si Christus Jesus dominus et deus noster ipse est summus sacerdos dei patris et sacrificium patri se ipsum obtulit et hoc fieri in sui commemorationem precepit, utique ille sacerdos vice Christi vere fungitur, qui id quod Christus fecit imitatur et sacrificium verum et plenum tunc offert in ecclesia deo patri, si sic incipiat offerre secundum quod ipsum Christum videat obtulisse"). This brings us to the conception of the repetition of Christ's sacrifice by the priest. But in Cyprian's case it was still, so to speak, only a notion verging on that idea, that is, he only leads up to it,

celebration of the Lord's Supper as an incorporation of the congregation and its individual members with Christ, and was the first to bear clear testimony as to the special importance attributed to commemoration of the celebrators ("vivi et defuncti"), though no other can be ascertained than a specially strong intercession.¹ But this is really the essential effect of the sacrifice of the supper as regards the celebrators; for however much the conceptions about this ceremony might be heightened, and whatever additions might be made to its ritual, forgiveness of sins in the strict sense could not be associated with it. Cyprian's statement that every celebration of the Lord's Supper is a repetition or imitation of Christ's sacrifice of himself, and that the ceremony has therefore an expiatory value remains a mere assertion, though the Romish Church still continues to

abstains from formulating it with precision, or drawing any further conclusions from it, and even threatens the idea itself inasmuch as he still appears to conceive the "calicem in commemorationem domini et passionis eius offerre" as identical with it. As far as the East is concerned we find in Origen no trace of the assumption of a repeated sacrifice of Christ. But in the original of the first 6 books of the Apostolic Constitutions this conception is also wanting, although the Supper ceremonial has assumed an exclusively sacerdotal character (see II. 25: αἱ τότε (in the old covenant) θυσίαι, νῦν εὐχαὶ καὶ δεήσεις καὶ εὐχαριστίαι. II. 53). The passage VI. 23: ἀντὶ θυσίας τῆς δι' αἱμάτων τὴν λογικὴν καὶ ἀναίμακτον καὶ τὴν μυστικὴν, ἥτις εἰς τὸν θάνατον τοῦ κυρίου συμβόλων χάριν ἐπιτελεῖται τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἵματος does not belong to the original document, but to the interpolator. With the exception therefore of one passage in the Apostolic Church order (printed in my edition of the Didache prolegg. p. 236) viz.: ἡ προσφορά τοῦ σώματος καὶ τοῦ αἵματος, we possess no proofs that there was any mention in the East before Eusebius' time of a sacrifice of Christ's body in the Lord's Supper. From this, however, we must by no means conclude that the mystic feature in the celebration of the sacrifice had been less emphasised there.

¹ In ep. 63. 13 Cyprian has illustrated the incorporation of the community with Christ by the mixture of wine and water in the Supper, because the special aim of the epistle required this: "Videmus in aqua populum intellegi, in vino vero ostendi sanguinem Christi; quando autem in calice vino aqua miscetur, Christo populus adunatur et credentium plebs ei in quem credidit copulatur et iungitur etc." The special mention of the offerers (see already Tertullian's works: de corona 3, de exhort. cast. II, and de monog. 10) therefore means that the latter commend themselves to Christ as his own people, or are recommended to him as such. On the Praxis see Cyprian ep. I. 2 "... si quis hoc fecisset, non offerretur pro eo nec sacrificium pro dormitione eius celebraretur"; 62. 5: "ut fratres nostros in mente habeatis orationibus vestris et eis vicem boni operis in sacrificiis et precibus representetis, subdidi nomina singulorum."

repeat this doctrine to the present day. For the idea that partaking of the Lord's Supper cleansed from sin like the mysteries of the Great Mother (*magna mater*) and Mithras, though naturally suggested by the ceremonial practice, was counteracted by the Church principles of penance and by the doctrine of baptism. As a sacrificial rite the Supper never became a ceremony equivalent in effect to baptism. But no doubt, as far as the popular conception was concerned, the solemn ritual copied from the ancient mysteries could not but attain an indescribably important significance. It is not possible, within the framework of the history of dogma, to describe the development of religious ceremonial in the third century, and to show what a radical alteration took place in men's conceptions with regard to it (cf. for example, Justin with Cyprian). But, in dealing with the history of dogma within this period, we must clearly keep in view the development of the cultus, the new conceptions of the value of ritual, and the reference of ceremonial usages to apostolic tradition; for there was plainly a remodelling of the ritual in imitation of the ancient mysteries and of the heathen sacrificial system, and this fact is admitted by Protestant scholars of all parties. Ceremonial and doctrine may indeed be at variance, for the latter may lag behind the former and vice versa, but they are never subject to entirely different conditions.

III. MEANS OF GRACE, BAPTISM, and EUCHARIST. That which the Western Church of post-Augustinian times calls sacrament in the specific sense of the word (means of grace) was only possessed by the Church of the third century in the form of baptism.¹ In strict theory she still held that the grace once

¹ Much as the use of the word "sacramentum" in the Western Church from Tertullian to Augustine (Hahn, *Die Lehre von den Sacramenten*, 1864, p. 5 ff.) differs from that in the classic Romish use it is of small interest in the history of dogma to trace its various details. In the old Latin Bible *μυστήριον* was translated "sacramentum" and thus the new signification "mysterious, holy ordinance or thing" was added to the meaning "oath", "sacred obligation". Accordingly Tertullian already used the word to denote sacred facts, mysterious and salutary signs and vehicles, and also holy acts. Everything in any way connected with the Deity and his revelation, and therefore, for example, the content of revelation as doctrine, is designated "sacrament"; and the word is also applied to the symbolical which is always something mysterious and holy. Alongside of this the old meaning

bestowed in this rite could be conferred by no holy ceremony of equal virtue, that is, by no fresh sacrament. The baptised Christian has no means of grace, conferred by Christ, at his disposal, but has his law to fulfil (see, *e.g.*, Iren. IV. 27. 2). But, as soon as the Church began to absolve mortal sinners, she practically possessed in absolution a real means of grace that was equally effective with baptism from the moment that this remission became unlimited in its application.¹ The notions as to this means of grace, however, continued quite uncertain in so far as the thought of God's absolving the sinner through the priest was qualified by the other theory (see above) which asserted that forgiveness was obtained through the penitential acts of transgressors (especially baptism with blood, and next in importance *lamentationes, ieiunia, elemosynæ*). In the third century there were manifold holy dispensations of grace by the hands of priests; but there was still no theory which traced the means of grace to the historical work of Christ in the same way that the grace bestowed in baptism was derived from it. From Cyprian's epistles and the anti-Novatian sections in the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions we indeed see that appeal was not unfrequently made to the power of for-

"sacred obligation" still remains in force. If, because of this comprehensive use, further discussion of the word is unnecessary, the fact that revelation itself as well as everything connected with it was expressly designated as a "mystery" is nevertheless of importance in the history of dogma. This usage of the word is indeed not removed from the original one so long as it was merely meant to denote the supernatural origin and supernatural nature of the objects in question; but more than this was now intended; "sacramentum" (*μυστήριον*) was rather intended to represent the holy thing that was revealed as something relatively concealed. This conception, however, is opposed to the Judæo-Christian idea of revelation, and is thus to be regarded as an introduction of the Greek notion. Probst (*Sacramente und Sacramentalia*, 1872) thinks differently. That which is mysterious and dark appears to be such an essential attribute of the divine, that even the obscurities of the New Testament Scriptures were now justified because these writings were regarded as altogether "spiritual". See Iren. II. 28. 1—3. Tert. de bapt. 2: "deus in stultitia et impossibilitate materias operationis suæ instituit."

¹ We have explained above that the Church already possessed this means of grace, in so far as she had occasionally absolved mortal sinners, even at an earlier period; but this possession was quite uncertain and, strictly speaking, was not a possession at all, for in such cases the early Church merely followed extraordinary directions of the Spirit.

giving sins bestowed on the Apostles and to Christ's declaration that he received sinners; but, as the Church had not made up her mind to repeat baptism, so also she had yet no theory that expressly and clearly supplemented this rite by a *sacramentum absolutionis*. In this respect, as well as in regard to the *sacramentum ordinis*, first instituted by Augustine, theory remained far behind practice. This was by no means an advantage, for, as a matter of fact, the whole religious ceremonial was already regarded as a system of means of grace. The consciousness of a personal, living connection of the individual with God through Christ had already disappeared, and the hesitation in setting up new means of grace had only the doubtful result of increasing the significance of human acts, such as offerings and satisfactions, to a dangerous extent.

Since the middle of the second century the notions of baptism¹ in the Church have not essentially altered (see Vol. I. p. 206 ff.). The result of baptism was universally considered to be forgiveness of sins, and this pardon was supposed to effect an actual sinlessness which now required to be maintained.² We frequently find "deliverance from death", "regeneration of man", "restoration to the image of God", and "obtaining of the Holy Spirit". ("Absolutio mortis", "regeneratio hominis", "restitutio ad similitudinem dei" and "consecutio spiritus sancti") named along with the "remission of sins" and "obtaining of eternal life" ("remissio delictorum" and "consecutio aeternitatis"). Examples are to be found in Tertullian³ adv. Marc. I. 28 and elsewhere; and Cyprian speaks of the "bath of regeneration and sanctification" ("lavacrum regenerationis et sanctificationis"). Moreover, we pretty frequently find rhetorical passages where, on the strength of New Testament texts, all possible blessings are associated with baptism.⁴ The constant additions to the

¹ Höfling, Das Sacrament der Taufe. 2 Vols., 1846. Steitz, Art. "Taufe" in Herzog's Real Encyclopädie. Waleh, Hist. paedobaptismi quattuor priorum sæculorum. 1739.

² In de bono pudic. 2: "renati ex aqua et pudicitia." Pseudo-Cyprian expresses an idea, which, though remarkable, is not confined to himself.

³ But Tertullian says (de bapt. 6): "Non quod in aquis spiritum sanctum consequamur, sed in aqua emundati sub angelo spiritui sancto preparamur."

⁴ The disquisitions of Clement of Alexandria in Pædag. I. 6 (baptism and sonship)

baptismal ritual, a process which had begun at a very early period, are partly due to the intention of symbolising these supposedly manifold virtues of baptism,¹ and partly owe their origin to the endeavour to provide the great mystery with fit accompaniments.² As yet the separate acts can hardly be proved to have an independent signification.³ The water was

are very important, but he did not follow them up. It is deserving of note that the positive effects of baptism were more strongly emphasised in the East than in the West. But, on the other hand, the conception is more uncertain in the former region.

¹ See Tertullian, de bapt. 7 ff.; Cypr., ep. 70. 2 ("ungi quoque necesse est eum qui baptizatus est, ut accepto chrismate, *i.e.*, unctioē esse unctus dei et habere in se gratiam Christi possit"), 74. 5 etc. "Chrism" is already found in Tertullian as well as the laying on of hands. The Roman Catholic bishop Cornelius in the notorious epistle to Fabius (Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 15), already traces the rites which accompany baptism to an ecclesiastical canon (perhaps one from Hippolytus' collection; see can. arab. 19). After relating that Novatian in his illness had only received clinical baptism he writes: οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔτυχε, διαφυγῶν τὴν νότον, ὧν χρῆ μεταλαμβάνειν κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας κανόνα, τοῦ τε σφραγισθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπισκόπου. It is also remarkable that one of the bishops who voted about heretic baptism (Sentent. episcop., Cypr., opp. ed. Hartel I. p. 439) calls the laying on of hands a sacrament like baptism: "neque enim spiritus sine aqua separatim operari potest nec aqua sine spiritu male ergo sibi quidem interpretantur ut dicant. quod per manus impositionem spiritum sanctum accipiant et sic recipiantur, cum manifestum sit *utroque sacramento* debere eos renasci in ecclesia catholica." Among other particulars found in Tertullian's work on baptism (cc. 1. 12 seq.) it may moreover be seen that there were Christians about the year 200, who questioned the indispensability of baptism to salvation (baptismus non est necessarius, quibus fides satis est). The assumption that martyrdom replaces baptism (Tertull., de bapt. 16; Origen), is in itself a sufficient proof that the ideas of the "sacrament" were still uncertain. As to the objection that Jesus himself had not baptised and that the Apostles had not received Christian baptism see Tert., de bapt. 11, 12.

² In itself the performance of this rite seemed too simple to those who sought eagerly for mysteries. See Tertull., de bapt. 2: "Nihil adeo est quod obduret mentes hominum quam simplicitas divinatorum operum, quæ in actu videtur, et magnificentia, quæ in effecta repromittitur, ut hinc quoque, quoniam tanta simplicitate, sine pompa, sine apparatu novo aliquo, denique sine sumptu homo in aqua demissus et inter pauca verba tinctus non multo vel nihilo mundior resurgit, eo incredibilis existimetur consecutio æternitatis. Mentior, si non e contrario idolorum solemnia vel arcana de suggestu et apparatu deque sumptu fidem at auctoritatem sibi exstruunt."

³ But see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 15, who says that only the laying on of hands on the part of the bishop communicates the Holy Spirit, and this ceremony *must* therefore follow baptism. It is probable that confirmation as a specific act did not become detached from baptism in the West till shortly before the middle of the third century. Perhaps we may assume that the Mithras cult. had an influence here.

regarded both as the symbol of the purification of the soul and as an efficacious, holy medium of the Spirit (in accordance with Gen. I. 2; water and Spirit are associated with each other, especially in Cyprian's epistles on baptism). He who asserted the latter did not thereby repudiate the former (see Orig. in Joann. Tom. VI. 17, Opp. IV. p. 133).¹ Complete obscurity prevails as to the Church's adoption of the practice of child baptism, which, though it owes its origin to the idea of this ceremony being indispensable to salvation, is nevertheless a proof that the superstitious view of baptism had increased.² In the time of Irenæus (II. 22. 4) and Tertullian (de bapt. 18) child baptism had already become very general and was founded on Matt. XIX. 14. We have no testimony regarding it from earlier times; Clement of Alexandria does not yet assume it. Tertullian argued against it not only because he regarded conscious faith as a needful preliminary condition, but also because he thought it advisable to delay baptism (*cunctatio baptismi*) on account of the responsibility involved in it (*pondus baptismi*). He says: "It is more advantageous to delay baptism, especially in the case of little children. For why is it necessary for the sponsors (this is the first mention of "godparents") also to be thrust into danger? . . . let the little ones therefore come when they are growing up; let them come when they are learning, when they are taught where they are coming to; let them become Christians when they are able to know Christ. Why does an age of innocence hasten to the remission of sins? People will act more cautiously in worldly affairs, so that one

¹ See Tertullian's superstitious remarks in de bapt. 3—9 to the effect that water is the element of the Holy Spirit and of unclean Spirits etc. Melito also makes a similar statement in the fragment of his treatise on baptism in Pitra. Anal. Sacra II., p. 3 sq. Cyprian, ep. 70. 1, uses the remarkable words: "oportet vero mundari et sanctificari aquam prius a sacerdote (Tertull. still knows nothing of this: c. 17: etiam laicis ius est"), ut possit baptismo suo peccata hominis qui baptizatur abluere." Ep. 74. 5: "peccata purgare et hominem sanctificare aqua sola non potest, nisi habeat et spiritum sanctum." Clem. Alex. Protrept. 10. 99: λάβετε ὕδωρ λογικόν.

² It was easy for Origen to justify child baptism, as he recognised something sinful in corporeal birth itself, and believed in sin which had been committed in a former life. The earliest justification of child baptism may therefore be traced back to a philosophical doctrine.

who is not trusted with earthly things is trusted with divine. Whoever understands the responsibility of baptism will fear its attainment more than its delay." * To all appearance the practice of immediately baptising the children of Christian families was universally adopted in the Church in the course of the third century. (Origen, Comment. in ep. ad Rom. V. 9, Opp. IV. p. 565, declared child baptism to be a custom handed down by the Apostles.) Grown up people, on the other hand, frequently postponed baptism, but this habit was disapproved.¹

The Lord's Supper was not only regarded as a sacrifice, but also as a divine gift.² The effects of this gift were not theoretically fixed, because these were excluded by the strict scheme³

* *Translator's note.* The following is the original Latin, as quoted by Prof. Harnack: "Cunctatio baptismi utilior est, præcipue circa parvulos. Quid enim necesse, sponsos etiam periculo ingeri... veniant ergo parvuli, dum adolescent; veniant dum discunt, dum quo veniant docentur; fiant Christiani, cum Christum nosse potuerint. Quid festinat innocens ætas ad remissionem peccatorum? Cautius agetur in sæcularibus, ut cui substantia terrena non creditur, divina credatur... Si qui pondus intelligant baptismi, magis timebunt consecutionem quam dilationem."

¹ Under such circumstances the recollection of the significance of baptism in the establishment of the Church fell more and more into the background (see Harnack: "the Church rests like the world upon water"; Irenæus III. 17. 2: "Sicut de arido tritico massa una non fieri potest sine humore neque unus panis, ita nec nos multi unum fieri in Christo Iesu poteramus sine aqua quæ de cælo est. Et sicut arida terra, si non percipiat humorem, non fructificat: sic et nos lignum aridum existentes primum, nunquam fructificaremus vitam sine superna voluntaria pluvia. Corpora unim nostra per lavacrum illam quæ est ad incorruptionem unitatem acceperunt, animæ autem per spiritum"). The unbaptised (catechumens) also belong to the Church, when they commit themselves to her guidance and prayers. Accordingly baptism ceased more and more to be regarded as an act of initiation, and only recovered this character in the course of the succeeding centuries. In this connection the 7th (spurious) canon of Constantinople (381) is instructive: *καὶ τὴν πρώτην ἡμέραν ποιοῦμεν αὐτοὺς Χριστιανούς, τὴν δὲ δευτέραν κατηχοιμένους, εἶτα τὴν τρίτην ἐξορκίζομεν αὐτοὺς κ.τ.λ.*

² Döllinger, *Die Lehre von der Eucharistie in dem ersten 3 Jahrhunderten*, 1826. Engelhardt in the *Zeitschrift für die hist. Theologie*, 1842, I, Kahnis, *Lehre vom Abendmahl*, 1851. Rückert, *Das Abendmahl, sein Wesen und seine Geschichte*, 1856. Leimbach, *Beiträge zur Abendmahlslehre Tertullian's*, 1874. Steitz, *Die Abendmahlslehre der griechischen Kirche*, in the *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1864—1868; cf. also the works of Probst. Whilst Eucharist and love feast had already been separated from the middle of the 2nd century in the West, they were still united in Alexandria in Clement's time; see Bigg, l.c., p. 103.

³ The collocation of baptism and the Lord's Supper, which, as the early Christian monuments prove, was a very familiar practice (Tert., adv. Marc. IV. 34: sacra-

of baptismal grace and baptismal obligation. But in practice Christians more and more assumed a real bestowal of heavenly gifts in the holy food, and gave themselves over to superstitious theories. This bestowal was sometimes regarded as a spiritual and sometimes as a bodily self-communication of Christ, that is, as a miraculous implanting of divine life. Here ethical and physical, and again ethical and theoretical features were intermixed with each other. The utterances of the Fathers to which we have access do not allow us to classify these elements here; for to all appearance not a single one clearly distinguished between spiritual and bodily, or ethical and intellectual effects unless he was in principle a spiritualist. But even a writer of this kind had quite as superstitious an idea of the holy elements as the rest. Thus the holy meal was extolled as the communication of incorruption, as a pledge of resurrection, as a medium of the union of the flesh with the Holy Spirit; and again as food of the soul, as the bearer of the Spirit of Christ (the Logos), as the means of strengthening faith and knowledge, as a sanctifying of the whole personality. The thought of the forgiveness of sins fell quite into the background. This ever changing conception, as it seems to us, of the effects of partaking of the Lord's Supper had also a parallel in the notions as to the relation between the visible elements and the body of Christ. So far as we are able to judge no one felt that there was a *problem* here, no one enquired whether this relation was realistic or symbolical. The symbol is the mystery and the mystery was not conceivable without a symbol. What we now-a-days understand by "symbol" is a thing which is not that which it represents; at that time "symbol" denoted a thing which, in some kind of way, really is what it signifies; but, on the other hand, according to the ideas of that period, the really heavenly element lay either in or behind the visible form without being

mentum baptismi et eucharistie"; Hippol., can. arab. 38: "baptizatus et corpore Christi pastus"), was, so far as I know, justified by no Church Father on internal grounds. Considering their conception of the holy ordinances this is not surprising. They were classed together because they were instituted by the Lord, and because the elements (water, wine, bread) afforded much common ground for allegorical interpretation.

identical with it. Accordingly the distinction of a symbolic and realistic conception of the Supper is altogether to be rejected; we could more rightly distinguish between materialistic, dyophysite, and docetic conceptions which, however, are not to be regarded as severally exclusive in the strict sense. In the popular idea the consecrated elements were heavenly fragments of magical virtue (see Cypr., *de laps.* 25; Euseb., *H. E.* VI. 44). With these the rank and file of third-century Christians already connected many superstitious notions which the priests tolerated or shared.¹ The antignostic Fathers acknowledged that the consecrated food consisted of two things, an earthly (the elements) and a heavenly (the real body of Christ). They thus saw in the sacrament a guarantee of the union between spirit and flesh, which the Gnostics denied; and a pledge of the resurrection of the flesh nourished by the blood of the Lord (Justin; *Iren.* IV. 18. 4, 5; V. 2. 2, 3; likewise Tertullian who is erroneously credited with a "symbolical" doctrine²). Clement and Origen "spiritualise", because, like Ignatius, they assign a spiritual significance to the flesh and blood of Christ himself (summary of wisdom). To judge from the exceedingly confused passage in *Pæd.* II. 2, Clement distinguishes a spiritual and a material blood of Christ. Finally, however, he sees in the Eucharist the union of the divine Logos with the human spirit, recognises, like Cyprian at a later period, that the mixture of wine with water in the symbol represents the spiritual process, and lastly does not fail to attribute to the holy food a relationship to the body.³ It is true that Origen, the great

¹ The story related by Dionysius (in Euseb., *l.c.*) is especially characteristic, as the narrator was an extreme spiritualist. How did it stand therefore with the dry tree? Besides, Tertull. (*de corona* 3) says: "Calicis aut panis nostri aliquid decuti in terram anxie patimur". Superstitious reverence for the sacrament *ante et extra usum* is a very old habit of mind in the Gentile Church.

² Leimbach's investigations of Tertullian's use of words have placed this beyond doubt; see *de orat.* 6; *adv. Marc.* I. 14; IV. 40; III. 19; *de resurr.* 8.

³ The chief passages referring to the Supper in Clement are *Protrept.* 12. 120; *Pæd.* I. 6. 43; II. 2. 19 sq.; I. 5. 15; I. 6. 38, 40; *Quis div.* 23; *Strom.* V. 10. 66; I. 10. 46; I. 19. 96; VI. 14. 113; V. 11. 70. Clement thinks as little of forgiveness of sins in connection with the Supper as does the author of the *Didache* or the other Fathers; this feast is rather meant to bestow an initiation into know-

mysteriosophist and theologian of sacrifice, expressed himself in plainly "spiritualistic" fashion; but in his eyes religious mysteries and the whole person of Christ lay in the province of the spirit, and therefore his theory of the Supper is not "symbolical", but conformable to his doctrine of Christ. Besides, Origen was only able to recognise spiritual aids in the sphere of the intellect and the disposition, and in the assistance given to these by man's own free and spontaneous efforts. Eating and drinking and, in general, participation in a ceremonial are from Origen's standpoint completely indifferent matters. The intelligent Christian feeds at all times on the body of Christ, that is, on the Word of God, and thus celebrates a never ending Supper (c. Cels. VIII. 22). Origen, however, was not blind to the fact that his doctrine of the Lord's Supper was just as far removed from the faith of the simple Christian as his doctrinal system generally. Here also, therefore, he accommodated himself to that faith in points where it seemed necessary. This, however, he did not find difficult; for, though with him everything is at bottom "spiritual", he was unwilling to dispense with symbols and mysteries, because he knew that one must be *initiated* into the spiritual, since one cannot learn it as one learns the lower sciences.¹ But, whether we consider simple believers, the antignostic Fathers or Origen, and, moreover, whether we view the Supper as offering or sacrament, we everywhere observe that the holy ordinance had been entirely

ledge and immortality. Ignatius had already said, "the body is faith, the blood is hope". This is also Clement's opinion; he also knows of a transubstantiation, not, however, into the real body of Christ, but into heavenly powers. His teaching was therefore that of Valentinus (see the Exc. ex. Theod. § 82, already given on Vol. i. p. 263) Strom. V. 11. 70: λογικὸν ἡμῖν βρῶμα ἢ γυνῶσις; I. 20. 46: ἵνα δὲ φάγωμεν λογικῶς; V. 10. 66: βρῶσις γὰρ καὶ πόσις τοῦ θείου λόγου ἢ γυνῶσις ἐστὶ τῆς θείας οὐσίας. Adumbrat. in epp. Joh.: "sanguis quod est cognitio"; see Bigg, l.c., p. 106 ff.

¹ Orig. in Matth. Comment. ser. 85: "Panis iste, quem deus verbum corpus suum esse fatetur, verbum est nutritorium animarum, verbum de deo verbo procedens et panis de pane coelesti... Non enim panem illum visibilem, quem tenebat in manibus, corpus suum dicebat deus verbum, sed verbum, in cuius mysterio fuerat panis ille frangendus; nec potum illum visibilem sanguinem suum dicebat, sed verbum in cuius mysterio potus ille fuerat effundendus"; see in Matt. XI. 14: c. Cels. VIII. 33. Hom. XVI. 9 in Num. On Origen's doctrine of the Lord's Supper see Bigg, p. 219 ff.

diverted from its original purpose and pressed into the service of the spirit of antiquity. In no other point perhaps is the hellenisation of the Gospel so evident as in this. To mention only one other example, this is also shown in the practice of child communion, which, though we first hear of it in Cyprian (Testim. III. 25; de laps. 25), can hardly be of later origin than child baptism. Partaking of the Supper seemed quite as indispensable as baptism, and the child had no less claim than the adult to a magical food from heaven.¹

In the course of the third century a crass superstition became developed in respect to the conceptions of the Church and the mysteries connected with her. According to this notion we must subject ourselves to the Church and must have ourselves filled with holy consecrations as we are filled with food. But the following chapters will show that this superstition and mystery magic were counterbalanced by a most lively conception of the freedom and responsibility of the individual. Fettered by the bonds of authority and superstition in the sphere of religion, free and self-dependent in the province of morality, this Christianity is characterised by passive submission in the first respect and by complete activity in the second. It may be that exegetical theology can never advance beyond an alternation between these two aspects of the case, and a recognition of their equal claim to consideration; for the religious phenomenon in which they are combined defies any explanation. But religion is in danger of being destroyed when the insufficiency of the understanding is elevated into a convenient principle of theory and life, and when the real mystery of the faith,

¹ The conception of the Supper as *viaticum mortis* (fixed by the 13th canon of Nicaea: *περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐξοδεούντων ὁ παλαιὸς καὶ κανονικὸς νόμος φυλαχθήσεται καὶ νῦν, ὥστε εἴ τις ἐξοδεύει, τοῦ τελευταίου καὶ ἀναγκαιοτάτου ἐφοδίου μὴ ἀποστερεῖσθαι*, a conception which is genuinely Hellenic and which was strengthened by the idea that the Supper was *φάρμακον ἀθανασίας*), the practice of benediction, and much else in theory and practice connected with the Eucharist reveal the influence of antiquity. See the relative articles in Smith and Cheetham's Dictionary of Christian Antiquities.

viz., how one becomes a new man, must accordingly give place to the injunction that we must obediently accept the religious as a consecration, and add to this the zealous endeavour after ascetic virtue. Such, however, has been the character of Catholicism since the third century, and even after Augustine's time it has still remained the same in its practice.

EXCURSUS TO CHAPTERS II. AND III.

CATHOLIC AND ROMAN. ¹

IN investigating the development of Christianity up till about the year 270 the following facts must be specially kept in mind: In the regions subject to Rome, apart from the Judæo-Christian districts and passing disturbances, Christianity had yet an undivided history in vital questions;² the independence of individual congregations and of the provincial groups of Churches was very great; and every advance in the development of the

¹ The fullest account of the "history of the Romish Church down to the pontificate of Leo I." has been given by Langen, 1881; but I can in no respect agree (see *Theol. Lit. Ztg.* 1891, No. 6) with the hypotheses about the primacy as propounded by him in his treatise on the Clementine romances (1890, see especially p. 163 ff). The collection of passages given by Caspari, "Quellen zur Geschichte des Taufsymbols," Vol. III., deserves special recognition. See also the sections bearing on this subject in Renan's "Origines du Christianisme," Vols. V.—VII., especially VII., chaps. 5, 12, 23. Sohm in his "Kirchenrecht" I. (see especially pp. 164 ff., 350 ff., 377 ff.) has adopted my conception of "Catholic" and "Roman", and made it the basis of further investigations. He estimates the importance of the Roman Church still more highly, in so far as, according to him, she was the exclusive originator of Church law as well as of the Catholic form of Church constitution; and on page 381 he flatly says: "The whole Church constitution with its claim to be founded on divine arrangement was first developed in Rome and then transferred from her to the other communities." I think this is an exaggeration. Tschirn (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, XII. p. 215 ff.) has discussed the origin of the Roman Church in the 2nd century. Much that was the common property of Christendom, or is found in every religion as it becomes older, is regarded by this author as specifically Roman.

² No doubt we must distinguish two halves in Christendom. The first, the ecclesiastical West, includes the west coast of Asia Minor, Greece, and Rome together with their daughter Churches, that is, above all, Gaul and North Africa. The second or eastern portion embraces Palestine, Egypt, Syria, and the east part of Asia Minor. A displacement gradually arose in the course of the 3rd century. In the West the most important centres are Ephesus, Smyrna, Corinth, and Rome, cities with a Greek and Oriental population. Even in Carthage the original speech of the Christian community was probably Greek.

communities at the same time denoted a forward step in their adaptation to the existing conditions of the Empire. The first two facts we have mentioned have their limitations. The further apart the different Churches lay, the more various were the conditions under which they arose and flourished; the looser the relations between the towns in which they had their home the looser also was the connection between them. Still, it is evident that towards the end of the third century the development in the Church had well-nigh attained the same point everywhere—except in outlying communities. Catholicism, essentially as we conceive it now, was what most of the Churches had arrived at. Now it is an *a priori* probability that this transformation of Christianity, which was simply the adaptation of the Gospel to the then existing Empire, came about under the guidance of the metropolitan Church,¹ the Church of Rome; and that “Roman” and “Catholic” had therefore a special relation from the beginning. It might *a limine* be objected to this proposition that there is no direct testimony in support of it, and that, apart from this consideration, it is also improbable, in so far as, in view of the then existing condition of society, Catholicism appears as the *natural and only possible* form in which Christianity could be adapted to the world. But this is not the case; for in the first place very strong proofs can be adduced, and besides, as is shown by the development in the second century, very different kinds of secularisation were possible. In fact, if all appearances are not deceptive, the Alexandrian Church, for example, was up to the time of Septimius Severus pursuing a path of development which, left to itself, would *not* have led to Catholicism, but, in the most favourable circumstances, to a parallel form.²

¹ Rome was the first city in the Empire, Alexandria the second. They were the metropolitan cities of the world (see the inscription in Kaibel, No. 1561, p. 407: *θρέψε μ' Ἀλεξάνδρεια, μέτοικον ἔβαψε δὲ Ῥώμη, αἰ κόσμου καὶ γῆς, ᾧ ξένη, μητροπόλεις*). This is reflected in the history of the Church; first Rome appears, then Alexandria. The significance of the great towns for the history of dogma and of the Church will be treated of in a future volume. Abercius of Hieropolis, according to the common interpretation (inscription V. 7 f.) designates Rome as “queen”. This was a customary appellation; see Eunap., *vita Prohaer.* p. 90: *ἡ βασιλεύουσα Ῥώμη*.

² In this connection we need only keep in mind the following summary of facts. Up to the end of the second century the Alexandrian Church had none of the

It can, however, be proved that it was in the Roman Church, which up to about the year 190 was closely connected with that of Asia Minor, that all the elements on which Catholicism is based first assumed a definite form.¹ (1) We know that the Roman Church possessed a precisely formulated baptismal confession, and that as early as the year 180 she declared this to be the apostolic rule by which everything is to be measured. It is, only in her case that we are really certain of this, for we can merely guess at it as regards the Church of Smyrna, that is, of Asia Minor. It was accordingly admitted that the Roman Church was able to distinguish true from false with special exactness;² and Irenæus and Tertullian appealed to her to decide the practice in Gaul and Africa. This practice, in its precisely developed form, cannot be shown to have existed in Alexandria till a later period; but Origen, who testifies to it, also bears witness to the special reverence for and connection with the Roman Church. (2) The New Testament canon, with its claim to be accounted catholic and apostolic and to possess

Catholic and apostolic standards, and none of the corresponding institutions as found in the Roman Church; but her writer, Clement, was also "as little acquainted with the West as Homer". In the course of the first half of the 3rd century she received those standards and institutions; but her writer, Origen, also travelled to Rome himself in order to see "the very old" church and formed a connection with Hippolytus; and her bishop Dionysius carried on a correspondence with his Roman colleague, who also made common cause with him. Similar particulars may also be ascertained with regard to the Syrian Church.

¹ See the proofs in the two preceding chapters. Note also that these elements have an inward connection. So long as one was lacking, all were, and whenever one was present, all the others immediately made their appearance.

² Ignatius already says that the Roman Christians are ἀποδιυλισμένοι ἀπὸ παντὸς ἀλλοτριῦ χρώματος (Rom. inscr.): he uses this expression of no others. Similar remarks are not quite rare at a later period: see, for instance, the oft-repeated eulogy that no heresy ever arose in Rome. At a time when this city had long employed the standard of the apostolic rule of faith with complete confidence, namely, at the beginning of the 3rd century, we hear that a lady of rank in Alexandria, who was at any rate a Christian, lodged and entertained in her house Origen, then a young man, and a famous heretic. (See Euseb., H. E. VI. 2. 13, 14). The lectures on doctrine delivered by this heretic and the conventicles over which he presided were attended by a μυρίον πλῆθος οὐ μόνον αἰρετικῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμετέρων. That is a very valuable piece of information which shows us a state of things in Alexandria that would have been impossible in Rome at the same period. See, besides, Dionys. Alex. in Euseb., H. E. VII. 7.

exclusive authority is first traceable in her; in the other communities it can only be proved to exist at a later period. In the great Antiochian diocese there was, for instance, a Church some of whose members wished the Gospel of Peter read; in the Pentapolis group of congregations the Gospel of the Egyptians was still used in the 3rd century; Syrian Churches of the same epoch used Tatian's Diatessaron; and the original of the first six books of the Apostolic Constitutions still makes no mention of a New Testament canon. Though Clement of Alexandria no doubt testifies that, in consequence of the common history of Christianity, the group of Scriptures read in the Roman congregations was also the same as that employed in public worship at Alexandria, he had as yet no New Testament canon before him in the sense of Irenæus and Tertullian. It was not till Origen's time that Alexandria reached the stage already attained in Rome about forty years earlier. It must, however, be pointed out that a series of New Testament books, in the form now found in the canon and universally recognised, show marks of revision that can be traced back to the Roman Church.¹ Finally, the later investigations, which show that after the third century the Western readings, that is, the Roman text, of the New Testament were adopted in the Oriental MSS. of the Bible,² are of the utmost value here; for the most natural

¹ I must here refrain from proving the last assertion. The possibility of Asia Minor having had a considerable share, or having led the way, in the formation of the canon must be left an open question (cf. what Melito says, and the use made of New Testament writings in the Epistle of Polycarp). We will, however, be constrained to lay the chief emphasis on Rome, for it must not be forgotten that Irenæus had the closest connection with the Church of that city, as is proved by his great work, and that he lived there before he came to Gaul. Moreover, it is a fact deserving of the greatest attention that the Montanists and their decided opponents in Asia, the so-called Alogi, had no ecclesiastical *canon* before them, though they may all have possessed the universally acknowledged books of the Romish canon, and none other, in the shape of *books read in the churches*.

² See the Prolegg. of Westcott and Hort (these indeed give an opposite judgment), and cf. Harris, *Codex Bezae. A study of the so-called Western text of the New Testament*, 1891. An exhaustive study of the oldest martyrologies has already led to important cases of agreement between Rome and the East, and promises still further revelations. See Duchesne, "Les Sources du Martyrologe Hieron." 1885. Egli, "Altchristliche Studien, Martyrien und Martyrologieen ältester Zeit." 1887; the same writer in the "Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie", 1891, p. 273 ff.

explanation of these facts is that the Eastern Churches then received their New Testament from Rome and used it to correct their copies of books read in public worship.¹ (3) Rome is the first place which we can prove to have constructed a list of bishops reaching back to the Apostles (see Irenæus).² We know that in the time of Heliogabalus such lists also existed in other communities; but it cannot be proved that these had already been drawn up by the time of Marcus Aurelius or Commodus, as was certainly the case at Rome. (4) The notion of the apostolic succession of the episcopate³ was first turned to account by the Roman bishops, and they were the first who definitely formulated the political idea of the Church in connection with this. The utterances and corresponding practical measures of Victor,⁴ Calixtus (Hippolytus), and Stephen are the earliest of their kind; whilst the precision and assurance with which they substituted the political and clerical for the ideal conception of the Church, or amalgamated the two notions, as well as the decided way in which they proclaimed the sovereignty of the bishops, were not surpassed in the third century by Cyprian himself. (5) Rome was the first place, and

¹ On the relations between Edessa and Rome see the end of the Excursus.

² See my treatise "Die ältesten christlichen Datirungen und die Anfänge einer bischöflichen Chronographie in Rom." in the report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, pp. 617—658. I think I have there proved that, in the time of Soter, Rome already possessed a figured list of bishops, in which important events were also entered.

³ That the idea of the apostolic succession of the bishops was first turned to account or appeared in Rome is all the more remarkable, because it was not in that city, but rather in the East, that the monarchical episcopate was first consolidated. (Cf. the Shepherd of Hermas and Ignatius' Epistles to the Romans with his other Epistles). There must therefore have been a very rapid development of the constitution in the time between Hyginus and Victor. Sohm, l.c., tries to show that the monarchical episcopate arose in Rome immediately after the composition of the First Epistle of Clement, and as a result of it; and that this city was the centre from which it spread throughout Christendom.

⁴ See Pseudo-Cyprian's work "de aleat" which, in spite of remarks to the contrary, I am inclined to regard as written by Victor; cf. "Texte und Untersuchungen" V. I: see c. I of this writing: "et quoniam in nobis divina et paterna pietas apostolatus ducatum contulit et vicariam domini sedem cælesti dignatione ordinavit et originem authentici apostolatus, super quem Christus fundavit ecclesiam, in superiore nostro portamus."

that at a very early period, to date occurrences according to her bishops; and, even outside that city, churches reckoned, not according to their own, but according to the Roman episcopate.¹ (6) The Oriental Churches say that two bishops of Rome compiled the chief apostolic regulations for the organisation of the Church; and this is only partially wrong.² (7) The three great theologians of the age, Tertullian, Hippolytus, and Origen, opposed the pretensions of the Roman bishop Calixtus; and this very attitude of theirs testified that the advance in the political organisation of the Church, denoted by the measures of Calixtus, was still an unheard-of novelty, but immediately exercised a very important influence on the attitude of other Churches. We know that the other communities imitated this advance in the succeeding decades. (8) The institution of lower orders of clergy with the corresponding distinction of *clerici maiores* and *minores* first took place in Rome; but we know that this momentous arrangement gradually spread from that city to the rest of Christendom.³ (9) The different Churches communicated with one another through the medium of Rome.⁴

¹ See report of the proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 1892, p. 622 ff. To the material found there must be added a remarkable passage given by Nestle (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1893, p. 437), where the dates are reckoned after Sixtus I.

² Cf. the 8th book of the Apostolic Constitutions with the articles referring to the regulation of the Church, which in Greek MSS. bear the name of Hippolytus. Compare also the Arabian *Canones Hippolyti*, edited by Haneberg (1870) and commented on by Achelis (*Texte und Untersuchungen* VI. 4). Apart from the additions and alterations, which are no doubt very extensive, it is hardly likely that the name of the Roman bishop is wrongly assigned to them. We must further remember the importance assigned by the tradition of the Eastern and Western Churches to one of the earliest Roman "bishops", Clement, as the confidant and secretary of the Apostles and as the composer and arranger of their laws.

³ See my proofs in "*Texte und Untersuchungen*". Vol. II., Part 5. The canons of the Council of Nicea presuppose the distinction of higher and lower clergy for the whole Church.

⁴ We see this from the Easter controversy, but there are proofs of it elsewhere, e.g., in the collection of Cyprian's epistles. The Roman bishop Cornelius informs Fabius, bishop of Antioch, of the resolutions of the Italian, African, and other Churches (Euseb., H. E. VI. 43. 3: ἦλθον εἰς ἡμᾶς ἐπιστολαὶ Κορνηλίου Ῥωμαίων ἐπισκόπου πρὸς . . . Φάβιον, ἀγλαῦσαι τὰ περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων συνόδου. καὶ τὰ δόξαντα πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ Ἀφρικὴν καὶ τὰς αὐτῶν χώρας.. We must not

From these considerations we can scarcely doubt that the fundamental apostolic institutions and laws of Catholicism were framed in the same city that in other respects imposed its authority on the whole earth; and that it was the centre from which they spread, because the world had become accustomed to receive law and justice from Rome.¹ But it may be objected that the parallel development in other provinces and towns was spontaneous, though it everywhere came about at a somewhat later date. Nor do we intend to contest the assumption in this general sense; but, as I think, it can be proved that the Roman community had a direct and important share in the process and that, even in the second century, she was reckoned the first and most influential Church.² We shall give a bird's-eye view of the most important facts bearing on the question, in order to prove this.

No other community made a more brilliant entrance into Church history than did that of Rome by the so-called First Epistle of Clement—Paul having already testified (Rom. i. 8) that the faith of this Church was spoken of throughout the whole world. That letter to the Corinthians proves that, by the end of the first century, the Roman Church had already drawn up fixed rules for her own guidance, that she watched with motherly

forget, however, that there were also bishops elsewhere who conducted a so-called ecumenical correspondence and enjoyed great influence, as, *e.g.*, Dionysius of Corinth and Dionysius of Alexandria. In matters relating to penance the latter wrote to a great many Churches, even as far as Armenia, and sent many letters to Rome (Euseb., H. E. VI. 46). The Catholic theologian, Dittrich—before the Vatican Decree, no doubt—has spoken of him in the following terms (Dionysius von Alexandrien, 1867, p. 26): “As Dionysius participated in the power, so also he shared in the task of the primateship.” “Along with the Roman bishop he was, above all, called upon to guard the interests of the whole Church.”

¹ This conception, as well as the ideas contained in this Excursus generally, is now entirely shared by Weingarten (Zeittafeln, 3rd. ed., 1888, pp. 12, 21): “The Catholic Church is essentially the work of those of Rome and Asia Minor. The Alexandrian Church and theology do not completely adapt themselves to it till the 3rd century. The metropolitan community becomes the ideal centre of the Great Church” . . . “The primacy of the Roman Church is essentially the transference to her of Rome’s central position in the religion of the heathen world during the Empire: *urbs aeterna urbs sacra*.”

² This is also admitted by Langen (l.c., 184 f.), who even declares that this precedence existed from the beginning.

care over outlying communities, and that she then knew how to use language that was at once an expression of duty, love, and authority.¹ As yet she pretends to no legal title of any kind, but she knows the "commandments and ordinances" (*πρὸς τὰ νόμους* and *δικαιώματα*) of God, whereas the conduct of the sister Church evinces her uncertainty on the matter; she is in an orderly condition, whereas the sister community is threatened with dissolution; she adheres to the *κατὰ τῆς παραδόσεως*, whilst the other body stands in need of exhortation;² and in these facts her claim to authority consists. The Shepherd of Hermas also proves that even in the circles of the laity the Roman Church is impressed with the consciousness that she must care for the whole of Christendom. The first testimony of an outsider as to this community is afforded us by Ignatius. Soften as we may all the extravagant expressions in his Epistle to the Romans, it is at least clear that Ignatius conceded to them a precedence in the circle of sister Churches; and that he was well acquainted with the energy and activity displayed by them in aiding and instructing other communities.³ Dionysius of Corinth, in his letter to bishop Soter, affords us a glimpse of the vast activity manifested by the Christian Church of the world's metropolis on behalf of all Christendom and of all brethren far and near; and reveals to us the feelings of filial affection and veneration

¹ Cf. chaps. 59 and 62, but more especially 63.

² At that time the Roman Church did not confine herself to a letter: she sent ambassadors to Corinth, *οἵτινες μάρτυρες ἔσονται μεταξύ ὑμῶν καὶ ἡμῶν*. Note carefully also the position of the Corinthian community with which the Roman one interfered (see on this point Wrede, Untersuchungen zum I Clemensbrief, 1891.)

³ In Ignatius, Rom. inscr., the verb *προκαίνομαι* is twice used about the Roman Church (*προκαίνομαι ἐν* [to be understood in a local sense] *τόπω χωρίου Ῥωμαίων* — *προκαίνομένη τῆς ἀγάπης* = presiding in, or having the guardianship of, love). Ignatius (Magn. 6), uses the same verb to denote the dignity of the bishop or presbyters in relation to the community. See, besides, the important testimony in Rom. II.: *ἄλλους ἐδιδάξατε*. Finally, it must be also noted that Ignatius presupposes an extensive influence on the part of individual members of the Church in the higher spheres of government. Fifty years later we have a memorable proof of this in the Marcia-Victor episode. Lastly, Ignatius is convinced that the Church will interfere quite as energetically on behalf of a foreign brother as on behalf of one of her own number. In the Epistle of Clement to James, c. 2, the Roman bishop is called *ὁ ἀληθείας προκαθεζόμενος*.

with which she was regarded in all Greece as well as in Antioch. This author has specially emphasised the fact that the Roman Christians are *Romans*, that is, are conscious of the particular duties incumbent on them as members of the metropolitan Church.¹ After this evidence we cannot wonder that Irenæus expressly assigned to the Church of Rome the highest rank among those founded by the Apostles.² His famous testimony has been quite as often under- as over-estimated. Doubtless his reference to the Roman Church is introduced in such a way that she is merely mentioned by way of example, just as he also adds the allusion to Smyrna and Ephesus; but there is quite as little doubt that this example was no arbitrary selection. The truth rather is that the Roman community *must* have been named, because its decision was already the most authoritative and impressive in Christendom.³ Whilst giving a

¹ Euseb., II. E. IV. 23. 9—12: cf. above all, the words: Ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑμῖν ἔθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο, πάντας μὲν ἀδελφούς ποικίλως εὐεργετεῖν, ἐκκλησίαις τε πολλαῖς ταῖς κατὰ πᾶσαν πόλιν ἐφόδια πέμπειν... πατροπαράδοτον ἔθος Ῥωμαίων Ῥωμαῖοι διαφυλάττοντες. Note here the emphasis laid on Ῥωμαῖοι.

² According to Irenæus a peculiar significance belongs to the old Jerusalem Church, in so far as all the Christian congregations sprang from her (III. 12. 5: αὐται φωναὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας, ἐξ ἧς πᾶσα ἔσχηκεν ἐκκλησία τῆς ἀρχῆν αὐται φωναὶ τῆς μητροπόλεως τῶν τῆς καινῆς διαβήκης πολιτῶν). For obvious reasons Irenæus did not speak of the Jerusalem Church of his own time. Hence that passage cannot be utilised.

³ Iren. III. 3. 1: "Sed quoniam valde longum est, in hoc tali volumine omnium ecclesiarum enumerare successiones, maximæ et antiquissimæ et omnibus cognite, a gloriosissimis duobus apostolis Paulo et Petro Romæ fundatæ et constitutæ ecclesie, eam quam habet ab apostolis traditionem et annuntiatam hominibus fidem, per successiones episcoporum pervenientem usque ad nos indicantes confundimus omnes eos, qui quocumque modo vel per sibiplacentiam malam vel vanam gloriam vel per cæcitatem et malam sententiam, præterquam oportet, colligunt. Ad hanc enim ecclesiam propter potentiores principalem necesse est omnem convenire ecclesiam, hoc est, eos qui sunt undique fideles, in qua semper ab his, qui sunt undique, conservata est ea quæ est ab apostolis traditio." On this we may remark as follows: (1) The special importance which Irenæus claims for the Roman Church—for he is only referring to her—is not merely based by him on her assumed foundation by Peter and Paul, but on a combination of the four attributes "maxima", "antiquissima" etc. Dionysius of Corinth also made this assumption (Euseb., II. 25. 8), but applied it quite as much to the Corinthian Church. As regards capability of proving the truth of the Church's faith, all the communities founded by the Apostles possess *principalitas* in relation to the others; but the Roman Church has the *potentior principalitas*, in so far as she excels all the rest in her qualities of *ecclesia maxima et omnibus cognita* etc. *Principalitas* = "sovereign

formal scheme of proof that assigned the same theoretical value to each Church founded by the Apostles, Irenæus added a reference to particular circumstance, viz., that in his time many communities turned to Rome in order to testify their orthodoxy.¹ As soon as we cease to obscure our vision with theories and keep in view the actual circumstances, we have no cause for astonishment. Considering the active intercourse between the various Churches and the metropolis, it was of the utmost importance to all, especially so long as they required financial aid, to be in connection with that of Rome, to receive support from her, to know she would entertain travelling brethren, and to have the power of recommending prisoners and those pining in the mines to her influential intervention. The evidence of Ignatius and Dionysius as well as the Marcia-Victor episode place this beyond doubt (see above). The efforts of Marcion and Valentinus in Rome have also a bearing on this question, and the venerable bishop, Polycarp, did not shrink from the toil of a long journey to secure the valuable fellowship of the Roman Church;² it was not Anicetus who came to Polycarp,

authority," *αὐθεντία*, for this was probably the word in the original text (see proceedings of the Royal Prussian Academy of Science, 9th Nov., 1893). In common with most scholars I used to think that the "in qua" refers to "Roman Church"; but I have now convinced myself (see the treatise just cited) that it relates to "omnem ecclesiam", and that the clause introduced by "in qua" merely asserts that every church, *in so far as she is faithful to tradition. i.e., orthodox*, must as a matter of course agree with that of Rome. (2) Irenæus asserts that every Church, *i.e.,* believers in all parts of the world, must agree with this Church ("convenire" is to be understood in a figurative sense; the literal acceptance "every Church must come to that of Rome" is not admissible). However, this "must" is not meant as an imperative, but = *ἀνάγκη* = "it cannot be otherwise." In reference to *principalitas* = *αὐθεντία* (see I. 31. 1: I. 26. 1) it must be remembered that Victor of Rome (l.c.) speaks of the "*origo authenticæ apostolatus*", and Tertullian remarks of Valentinus when he apostatised at Rome, "*ab ecclesiæ authenticæ regulæ abruptit*" (adv. Valent. 4).

¹ Beyond doubt his "convenire necesse est" is founded on actual circumstances.

² On other important journeys of Christian men and bishops to Rome in the 2nd and 3rd centuries see Caspari, l.c. Above all we may call attention to the journey of Abercius of Hierapolis (not Hierapolis on the Meander) about 200 or even earlier. Its historical reality is not to be questioned. See his words in the epitaph composed by himself (V. 7 f.): *εἰς Ῥώμην ὅς ἔπεμψεν ἔμμεν βασιλεῖαν ἀδρήσαι καὶ βασιλίссαν ιδεῖν χρυσοστόλον χρυσοπέδιλον*. However, Ficker raises very serious objections to the Christian origin of the inscription.

but Polycarp to Anicetus. At the time when the controversy with Gnosticism ensued, the Roman Church showed all the rest an example of resolution; it was naturally to be expected that, as a necessary condition of mutual fellowship, she should require other communities to recognise the law by which she had regulated her own circumstances. No community in the Empire could regard with indifference its relationship to the great Roman Church; almost everyone had connections with her; she contained believers from all the rest. As early as 180 this Church could point to a series of bishops reaching in uninterrupted succession from the glorious apostles Paul and Peter¹ down to the present time; and she alone maintained a brief but definitely formulated *lex*, which she entitled the summary of apostolic tradition, and by reference to which she decided all questions of faith with admirable certainty. Theories were incapable of overcoming the elementary differences that could not but appear as soon as Christianity became naturalised in the various provinces and towns of the Empire. Nor was it theories that created the empiric unity of the Churches, but the unity which the Empire possessed in Rome; the extent and composition of the Græco-Latin community there; the security—and this was not the least powerful element—that accompanied the development of this great society, well provided as it was with wealth and possessed of an influence in high quarters already dating from the first century;² as well as the care which it displayed on behalf of all Christendom. *All these causes combined to convert*

¹ We cannot here discuss how this tradition arose; in all likelihood it already expresses the position which the Roman Church very speedily attained in Christendom. See Renan, *Orig.*, Vol. VII., p. 70: "Pierre et Paul (réconciliés), voilà le chef-d'œuvre qui fondait la suprématie ecclésiastique de Rome dans l'avenir. Une nouvelle qualité mythique remplaçait celle de Romulus et Remus." But it is highly probable that Peter was really in Rome like Paul (see 1 Clem. V., Ignatius ad Rom. IV.); both really performed important services to the Church there, and died as martyrs in that city.

² The wealth of the Roman Church is also illustrated by the present of 200,000 sesterces brought her by Marcion (Tertull., *de præsc.* 30). The "Shepherd" also contains instructive particulars with regard to this. As far as her influence is concerned, we possess various testimonies from Philipp. IV. 22 down to the famous account by Hippolytus of the relations of Victor to Marcia. We may call special attention to Ignatius' Epistle to the Romans.

the Christian communities into a real confederation under the primacy of the Roman Church (and subsequently under the leadership of her bishops). This primacy cannot of course be further defined, for it was merely a *de facto* one. But, from the nature of the case, it was immediately shaken, when it was claimed as a *legal* right associated with the person of the Roman bishop.

That this theory is more than a hypothesis is shown by several facts which prove the unique authority as well as the interference of the Roman Church (that is, of her bishop). First, in the Montanist controversy—and that too at the stage when it was still almost exclusively confined to Asia Minor—the already sobered adherents of the new prophecy petitioned Rome (bishop Eleutherus) to recognise their Church, and it was at Rome that the Gallic confessors cautiously interfered in their behalf; after which a native of Asia Minor induced the Roman bishop to withdraw the letters of toleration already issued.¹ In view of the facts that it was not Roman Montanists who were concerned, that Rome was the place where the Asiatic members of this sect sought for recognition, and that it was in Rome that the Gauls interfered in their behalf, the significance of this proceeding cannot be readily minimised. We cannot of course dogmatise on the matter; but the fact can be proved that the decision of the Roman Church must have settled the position of that sect of enthusiasts in Christendom. Secondly, what is reported to us of Victor, the successor of Eleutherus, is still plainer testimony. He ventured to issue an edict, which we may already style a peremptory one, proclaiming the Roman practice with regard to the regulation of ecclesiastical festivals to be the universal rule in the Church, and declaring that every congregation, that failed to adopt the Roman arrangement,²

¹ See Tertullian, *adv. Prax.* 1: Euseb., *II. E. V.* 3, 4. *Dictionary of Christian Biography III.*, p. 937.

² Euseb., *II. E. V.* 24. 9: Ἐπὶ τούτοις ὁ μὲν τῆς Ῥωμαίων προεστῶς Βίκτωρ ἀθρόως τῆς Ἀσίας πάσης ἅμα ταῖς ὁμόροις ἐκκλησίαις τὰς παροικίας ἀποτέμνει ὡσάν ἐτεροδοξούτας, τῆς κοινῆς ἐνώσεως πειρᾶται, καὶ στηλιτεύει γε διὰ γραμμμάτων, ἀκοινωνήτους πάντας ἄρδην τοὺς ἐκεῖσε ἀνακηρύττων ἀδελφούς. Stress should be laid on two points here: (1) Victor proclaimed that the people of Asia Minor were to be excluded from the κοινὴ ἔνωσις, and not merely from the fellowship of the Roman

was excluded from the union of the one Church on the ground of heresy. How would Victor have ventured on such an edict—though indeed he had not the power of enforcing it in every case—unless the special prerogative of Rome to determine the conditions of the “common unity” (*κοινὴ ἔνωσις*) in the vital questions of the faith had been an acknowledged and well-established fact? How could Victor have addressed such a demand to the independent Churches, if he had not been recognised, in his capacity of bishop of Rome, as the special guardian of the *κοινὴ ἔνωσις*?¹ Thirdly, it was Victor who formally excluded Theodotus from Church fellowship. This is the first really well-attested case of a Christian *taking his stand on the rule of faith* being excommunicated because a definite interpretation of it was already insisted on. In this instance the expression *ὕιός μουγενηής* (only begotten Son) was required to be understood in the sense of *Φύσει Θεός* (God by nature). It was in Rome that this first took place. Fourthly, under Zephyrinus, Victor's successor, the Roman ecclesiastics interfered in the Carthaginian veil dispute, making common cause with the local clergy against Tertullian; and both appealed to the authority of predecessors, that is, above all, of the Roman bishops.² Tertullian, Hippolytus, Origen, and Cyprian were

Church: (2) he based the excommunication on the alleged heterodoxy of those Churches. See Heinichen, Melet. VIII., on Euseb., l.c. Victor's action is paralleled by that of Stephen. Firmilian says to the latter: “Dum enim putas, omnes abs te abstinere posse, solum te ab omnibus abstinuisti.” It is a very instructive fact that in the 4th century Rome also made the attempt to have Sabbath fasting established as an *apostolic* custom. See the interesting work confuted by Augustine (ep. 36), a writing which emanates from a Roman author who is unfortunately unknown to us. Cf. also Augustine's 54th and 55th epistles.

¹ Irenæus also (l.c. § 11) does not appear to have questioned Victor's proceeding as such, but as applied to this particular case.

² See Tertull., de orat. 22: “Sed non putet institutionem unusquisque antecessoris commovendam.” De virg. vel. I: “Paracletus solus antecessor, quia solus post Christum”; 2: “Eas ego ecclesias proposui, quas et ipsi apostoli vel apostolici viri condiderunt, et puto ante quosdam”; 3: “Sed nec inter consuetudines dispicere voluerunt illi sanctissimi antecessores”. This is also the question referred to in the important remark in Jerome, de vir. inl. 53: “Tertullianus ad mediam ætatem presbyter fuit ecclesiæ Africanæ, invidia postea et contumeliis clericorum Romanæ ecclesiæ ad Montani dogma delapsus.”

obliged to resist the pretensions of these ecclesiastics to authority outside their own Church, the first having to contend with Calixtus, and the three others with Stephen.¹

It was the Roman *Church* that first displayed this activity and care; the Roman bishop sprang from the community in exactly the same way as the corresponding official did in other places.² In Irenæus' proof from prescription, however, it is already the Roman *bishops* that are specially mentioned.³

¹ Stephen acted like Victor and excluded almost all the East from the fellowship of the Church; see in addition to Cyprian's epistles that of Dionysius of Alexandria in Euseb., II. E. VII. 5. In reference to Hippolytus, see Philosoph. I. IX. In regard to Origen, see the allusions in de orat. 28 fin.; in Matth. XI. 9, 15; XII. 9—14; XVI. 8, 22; XVII. 14; in Joh. X. 16; Rom. VI in Isai. c. 1. With regard to Philosoph. IX. 12, Sohm rightly remarks (p. 389): "It is clear that the responsibility was laid on the Roman bishop not merely in several cases where married men were made presbyters and deacons, but also when they were appointed bishops; and it is also evident that he appears just as responsible when bishops are not deposed in consequence of their marrying. One cannot help concluding that the Roman bishop has the power of appointing and deposing not merely presbyters and deacons, but also bishops. Moreover, the impression is conveyed that this appointment and deposition of bishops takes place in Rome, for the passage contains a description of existent conditions in the Roman Church. Other communities may be deprived of their bishops by an order from Rome, and a bishop (chosen in Rome) may be sent them. The words of the passage are: ἐπὶ Καλλίστου ἤρξαντο ἐπίσκοποι καὶ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ διάκονοι δίγαμοι καὶ τρίγαμοι καθίστασθαι εἰς κλήρους· εἰ δὲ καὶ τις ἐν κλήρῳ ὧν γαμοίη, μένειν τὸν τοιοῦτον ἐν τῷ κλήρῳ ὡς μὴ ἡμαρτηκότα.

² In the treatise "Die Briefe des römischen Klerus aus der Zeit der Sedisvacanz im Jahre 250" (Abhandlungen für Weizsäcker, 1892), I have shown how the Roman clergy kept the revenue of the Church and of the Churches in their hands, though they had no bishop. What language the Romans used in epistles 8, 30, 36 of the Cyprian collection, and how they interfered in the affairs of the Carthaginian Church! Beyond doubt the Roman *Church* possessed an acknowledged primacy in the year 250; it was the primacy of active participation and fulfilled duty. As yet there was no recognised dogmatic or historic foundation assigned for it; in fact it is highly probable that this theory was still shaky and uncertain in Rome herself. The college of presbyters and deacons feels and speaks as if it were the bishop. For it was not on the bishop that the incomparable prestige of Rome was based—at least this claim was not yet made with any confidence.—but on the *city itself*, on the origin and history, the faith and love, the earnestness and zeal of the *whole Roman Church and her clergy*.

³ In Tertullian, de præsc. 36, the bishops are not mentioned. He also, like Irenæus, cites the Roman Church as one amongst others. We have already remarked that in the scheme of proof from prescription no higher rank could be assigned to the Roman Church than to any other of the group founded by the Apostles. Tertullian

Praxeas reminded the bishop of Rome of the authority of his predecessors (“*auctoritates præcessorum eius*”) and it was in the character of *bishop* that Victor acted. The assumption that Paul and Peter laboured in Rome, that is, founded the Church of that city (Dionysius, Irenæus, Tertullian, Caius), must have conferred a high degree of prestige on her bishops, as soon as the latter officials were elevated to the position of more or less sovereign lords of the communities and were regarded as successors of the Apostles. The first who acted up to this idea was Calixtus. The sarcastic titles of “*pontifex maximus*”, “*episcopus episcoporum*”, “*benedictus papa*” and “*apostolicus*”, applied to him by Tertullian in “*de pudicitia*” I. 13, are so many references to the fact that Calixtus already claimed for himself a position of primacy, in other words, that he associated with his own personal position as bishop the primacy possessed by the Roman Church, which pre-eminence, however, must have been gradually vanishing in proportion to the progress of the Catholic form of organisation among the other communities. Moreover, that is evident from the form of the edict he issued (Tert. l. c., I: “I hear that an edict has been issued and that a decisive one”,

continues to maintain this position. but expressly remarks that the Roman Church has special authority for the Carthaginian, because Carthage had received its Christianity from Rome. He expresses the special relationship between Rome and Carthage in the following terms: “*Si autem Italiae adiaces habes Romam, unde nobis quoque auctoritas præsto est.*” With Tertullian, then, the *de facto* position of the Roman Church in Christendom did not lead to the same conclusion in the scheme of proof from prescription as we found in Irenæus. But in his case also that position is indicated by the rhetorical ardour with which he speaks of the Roman Church, whereas he does nothing more than mention Corinth, Philippi, Thessalonica, and Ephesus. Even at that time, moreover, he had ground enough for a more reserved attitude towards Rome, though in the antignostic struggle he could not dispense with the tradition of the Roman community. In the veil dispute (de virg. vel. 2) he opposed the authority of the Greek apostolic Churches to that of Rome. Polycarp had done the same against Anicetus, Polycrates against Victor. Proculus against his Roman opponents. Conversely, Praxeas in his appeal to Eleutherus (c. I.: “*præcessorum auctoritates*”), Caius when contending with Proculus, the Carthaginian clergy when opposing Tertullian (in the veil dispute), and Victor when contending with Polycrates set the authority of Rome against that of the Greek apostolic Churches. These struggles at the transition from the 2nd to the 3rd century are of the utmost importance. Rome was here seeking to overthrow the authority of the only group of Churches able to enter into rivalry with her those of Asia Minor, and succeeded in the attempt.

“audio edictum esse præpositum et quidem peremptorium”), from the grounds it assigned and from the opposition to it on the part of Tertullian. From the form, in so far as Calixtus acted here quite independently and, without previous consultation, issued a *peremptory* edict, that is, one settling the matter and immediately taking effect; from the grounds it assigned, in so far as he appealed in justification of his action to Matt. XVI. 18 ff.¹—the first instance of the kind recorded in history; from Tertullian’s opposition to it, because the latter treats it not as local, Roman, but as pregnant in consequences for all Christendom. But, as soon as the question took the form of enquiring whether the Roman *bishop* was elevated above the rest, a totally new situation arose. Even in the third century, as already shown, the Roman community, led by its bishops, still showed the rest an example in the process of giving a political constitution to the Church. It can also be proved that even far distant congregations were still being bound to the Roman Church through financial support,² and that she was appealed to in questions of faith, just as the law of the city of Rome was invoked as the standard in civil questions.³ It

¹ De pudic. 21: “De tua nunc sententia quero, unde hoc ius ecclesie usurpes. Si quia dixerit Petro dominus: Super hanc petram ædificabo ecclesiam meam. tibi dedi claves regni cælestis, vel. Quæcumque alligaveris vel solveris in terra, erunt alligata vel soluta in cælis, id circo presumis et ad te derivasse solvendi et alligandi potestatem?” Stephen did the same: see Firmilian in Cyprian ep. 75. With this should be compared the description Clement of Rome gives in his epistles to James of his own installation by Peter (c. 2). The following words are put in Peter’s mouth: Κλήμεντα τοῦτον ἐπίσκοπον ὑμῖν χειροτονῶ, ᾧ τὴν ἐμὴν τῶν λόγων πιστεύω καθέδραν... διὸ αὐτῷ μεταδίδομι τὴν ἐξουσίαν τοῦ δεσμεύειν καὶ λύειν, ἵνα περὶ παντός οὗ ἂν χειροτονήσῃ ἐπὶ ἧῆς ἔσται δεδογματισμένον ἐν οὐρανοῖς, δῆσει γὰρ ὅ δεῖ δεθῆναι καὶ λύσει ὅ δεῖ λυθῆναι, ὡς τὸν τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰδῶς κανόνα.

² See Dionysius of Alexandria’s letter to the Roman bishop Stephen (Euseb., H. E. VII. 5. 2): Αἱ μέντοι Συρίαι ὅλαι καὶ ἡ Ἀραβία, οἷς ἐπαρκεῖτε ἐκάστοτε καὶ οἷς νῦν ἐπεστείλατε.

³ In the case of Origen’s condemnation the decision of Rome seems to have been of special importance. Origen sought to defend his orthodoxy in a letter written by his own hand to the Roman bishop Fabian (see Euseb., H. E. VI. 36: Jerome, ep. 84. 10). The Roman bishop Pontian had previously condemned him after summoning a “senate”: see Jerome, ep. 33 (Döllinger, Hippolytus and Calixtus, p. 259 f.). Further, it is an important fact that a deputation of Alexandrian Christians, who did not agree with the Christology of their bishop Dionysius, repaired to Rome

is further manifest from Cyprian's epistles that the Roman Church was regarded as the *ecclesia principalis*, as the guardian *par excellence* of the *unity* of the Church. We may explain from Cyprian's own particular situation all else that he said in praise of the Roman Church (see above p. 88, note 2) and specially of the *cathedra Petri*; but the general view that she is the "matrix et radix ecclesiæ catholicæ" is not peculiar to him, and the statement that the "unitas sacerdotalis" originated in Rome is merely the modified expression, necessitated by the altered circumstances of the Church, for the acknowledged fact that the Roman community was the most distinguished among the sister groups, and as such had had and still possessed the right and duty of watching over the unity of the whole. Cyprian himself no doubt took a further step at the time of his correspondence with Cornelius, and proclaimed the special reference of Matt. XVI. to the *cathedra Petri*; but he confined his theory to the abstractions "ecclesia", "cathedra". In him the importance of this *cathedra* oscillates between the significance of a once existent fact that continues to live on as a symbol, and that of a real and permanent court of appeal. Moreover, he did not go the length of declaring that any special authority within the collective Church attached to the temporary occupant of the *cathedra Petri*. If we remove from Cyprian's abstractions everything to which he himself thinks there is nothing concrete corresponding, then we must above all eliminate every prerogative of the Roman bishop for the time being. What remains behind is the special position of the Roman Church, which indeed is represented by her bishop. Cyprian can say quite

to the *Roman* bishop Dionysius and formally accused the first named prelate. It is also significant that Dionysius received this complaint and brought the matter up at a Roman synod. No objection was taken to this proceeding (Athanas., de synod.). This information is very instructive, for it proves that the Roman Church was ever regarded as specially charged with watching over the observance of the conditions of the general ecclesiastical federation, the *κοινὴ ἐνωσις*. As to the fact that in circular letters, not excepting Eastern ones, the Roman Church was put at the head of the address, see Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. How frequently foreign bishops came to Rome is shown by the 19th canon of Arles (A.D. 314): "De episcopis peregrinis, qui in urbem solent venire, placuit iis locum dari ut offerant." The first canon is also important in deciding the special position of Rome.

frankly: "owing to her magnitude Rome ought to have precedence over Carthage" ("pro magnitudine sua debet Carthaginem Roma præcedere") and his theory: "the episcopate is one, and a part of it is held by each bishop for the whole" ("episcopatus unus est, cuius a singulis in solidum pars tenetur"), virtually excludes any special prerogative belonging to a particular bishop (see also "de unit." 4). Here we have reached the point that has already been briefly referred to above, viz., that the consolidation of the Churches in the Empire after the Roman pattern could not but endanger the prestige and peculiar position of Rome, and did in fact do so. If we consider that each bishop was the acknowledged sovereign of his own diocese—now Catholic, that all bishops, as such, were recognised to be successors of the Apostles, that, moreover, the attribute of priesthood occupied a prominent position in the conception of the episcopal office, and that the metropolitan unions with their presidents and synods had become completely naturalised—in short, that the rigid episcopal and provincial constitution of the Church had become an accomplished fact, so that, ultimately, it was no longer communities, but merely bishops that had dealings with each other, then we shall see that a new situation was thereby created for Rome, that is, for her bishop. In the West it was perhaps chiefly through the coöperation of Cyprian that Rome found herself face to face with a completely organised Church system. His behaviour in the controversy about heretical baptism proves that in cases of dispute he was resolved to elevate his theory of the sovereign authority of each bishop above his theory of the necessary connection with the *cathedra Petri*. But, when that levelling of the episcopate came about, Rome had already acquired rights that could no longer be cancelled.¹ Besides, there was

¹ Peculiar circumstances, which unfortunately we cannot quite explain, are connected with the cases discussed by Cyprian in epp. 67 and 68. The Roman bishop must have had the acknowledged power of dealing with the bishop of Arles, whereas the Gallic prelates had not this right. Sohm, p. 391 ff., assumes that the Roman bishop alone—not Cyprian or the bishops of Gaul—had authority to exclude the bishop of Arles from the general fellowship of the Church, but that, as far as the Gallic Churches were concerned, such an excommunication possessed no legal effect, but only a moral one, because in their case the bishop of Rome had only a

one thing that could not be taken from the Roman Church, nor therefore from her bishop, even if she were denied the special right to Matt. XVI., viz., the possession of Rome. The site of the world's metropolis might be shifted, but Rome could not be removed. In the long run, however, the shifting of the capital proved advantageous to ecclesiastical Rome. At the beginning of the great epoch when the alienation of East from West became pronounced and permanent, an emperor, from political grounds, decided in favour of that party in Antioch "with whom the bishops in Italy and the city of the Romans held intercourse" (οἷς ἂν οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν καὶ τὴν Ῥωμαίων πόλιν ἐπίσκοποι τοῦ δόγματος ἐπιστέλλοιεν¹). In this instance the

spiritual authority and no legal power. Further, two Spanish bishops publicly appealed to the Roman see against their deposition, and Cyprian regarded this appeal as in itself correct. Finally, Cornelius says of himself in a letter (in Euseb., II. E. VI. 43. 10): τῶν λοιπῶν ἐπισκόπων διαδόχους εἰς τοὺς τόπους, ἐν οἷς ἦσαν, χειροτονήσαντες ἀπεστάλακμεν. This quotation refers to Italy, and the passage, which must be read connectedly, makes it plain (see, besides, the quotation in reference to Calixtus given above on p. 162), that, before the middle of the 3rd century, the Roman Church already possessed a legal right of excommunication and the recognised power of making ecclesiastical appointments as far as the communities and bishops in Italy were concerned (see Sohm, p. 389 ff.).

¹ Euseb., H. E. VII. 30. 19. The Church of Antioch sought to enter upon an independent line of development under Paul of Samosata. Paul's fall was the victory of Rome. We may suppose it to be highly probable, though to the best of my belief there is for the present no sure proof, that it was not till then that the Roman standards and sacraments, catholic and apostolic collection of Scriptures (see, on the contrary, the use of Scripture in the Didaskalia), apostolic rule of faith, and apostolic episcopacy attained supremacy in Antioch: [but that they began to be introduced into that city about the time of Serapion's bishopric (that is, during the Easter controversy). The old records of the Church of Edessa have an important bearing on this point: and from these it is evident that her constitution did not begin to assume a Catholic form till the beginning of the 3rd century, and that as the result of connection with Rome. See *the Doctrine of Addai* by Phillips, p. 50: "Palut himself went to Antioch and received the hand of the priesthood from Serapion, bishop of Antioch. Serapion, bishop of Antioch, himself also received the hand from Zephyrinus, bishop of the city of Rome, from the succession of the hand of the priesthood of Simon Cephas, which he received from our Lord, who was there bishop of Rome 25 years, (sic) in the days of the Cæsar, who reigned there 13 years." (See also Tixeront, *Edesse*, pp. 149, 152.) Cf. with this the prominence given in the Acts of Scharbil and Barsamya to the fact that they were contemporaries of Fabian, bishop of Rome. We read there (see Rubens Duval, *Les Actes de Scharbil et les Actes de Barsamya*, Paris, 1889, and *Histoire d'Édesse*, p. 130): "Barsamya (he was bishop of Edessa at the time of Decius) lived at the time of Fabian, bishop of Rome. He had

interest of the Roman Church and the interest of the emperor coincided. But the Churches in the various provinces, being now completely organised and therefore seldom in need of any more help from outside, were henceforth in a position to pursue their own interest. So the bishop of Rome had step by step to fight for the new authority, which, being now based on a purely dogmatic theory and being forced to repudiate any empirical foundation, was inconsistent with the Church system that the Roman community more than any other had helped to build up. The proposition "the Roman Church always had the primacy" ("ecclesia Romana semper habuit primatum") and the statement that "Catholic" virtually means "Roman Catholic" are gross fictions, when devised in honour of the temporary occupant of the Roman see and detached from the significance of the Eternal City in profane history; but, applied to the *Church* of the imperial capital, they contain a truth the denial of which is equivalent to renouncing the attempt to explain the process by which the Church was unified and catholicised.¹

received the laying on of hands from Abschelama, who had received it from Palut. Palut had been consecrated by Serapion, bishop of Antioch, and the latter had been consecrated by Zephyrinus, bishop of Rome." As regards the relation of the State of Rome to the Roman Church, that is, to the Roman bishop, who by the year 250 had already become a sort of *præfectus urbis*, with his district superintendents, the deacons, and in fact a sort of *princeps æmulus*. cf. (1) the recorded comments of Alexander Severus on the Christians, and especially those on their organisation: (2) the edict of Maximinus Thrax and the banishment of the bishops Pontian and Hippolytus: (3) the attitude of Philip the Arabian: (4) the remarks of Decius in Cyp. ep. 55 (see above p. 124) and his proceedings against the Roman bishops, and (5) the attitude of Aurelian in Antioch. On the extent and organisation of the Roman Church about 250 see Euseb., H. E. VI. 43.

¹ The memorable words in the lately discovered appeal by Eusebius of Dorylæum to Leo I. (Neues Archiv., Vol. XI. part 2. p. 364 f.) are no mere flattery, and the fifth century is not the first to which they are applicable: "Curavit desuper et ab exordio consuevit thronus apostolicus iniqua perferentes defensare et eos qui in evitabiles factiones inciderunt, adiuvaré et humi iacentes erigere, secundum possibilitatem, quam habetis; causa autem rei, quod sensum rectum tenetis et inconcussam servatis erga dominum nostrum Iesum Christum fidem, nec non etiam indissimulatam universis fratribus et omnibus in nomine Christi vocatis tribuitis caritatem, etc." See also Theodoret's letters addressed to Rome.

II. *FIXING AND GRADUAL HELLENISING OF CHRISTIANITY AS A SYSTEM OF DOCTRINE.*

CHAPTER IV.

ECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY. THE APOLOGISTS.

1. *Introduction.*¹

THE object of the Christian Apologists, some of whom filled ecclesiastical offices and in various ways promoted spiritual progress,² was, as they themselves explained, to uphold the Christianity professed by the Christian Churches and publicly preached. They were convinced that the Christian faith was founded on revelation and that only a mind enlightened by God could grasp and maintain the faith. They acknowledged the Old Testament to be the authoritative source of God's revelation, maintained that the whole human race was meant to be

¹ Edition by Otto, 9 Vols., 1876 f. New edition of the Apologists (unfinished: only Tatian and Athenagoras by Schwarz have yet appeared) in the *Texte und Untersuchungen zur altchristlichen Litteratur-Geschichte*, Vol. IV. Tzschirner, *Geschichte der Apologetik*, 1st part, 1805; id., *Der Fall des Heidenthums*, 1829. Ehlers, *Vis atque potestas, quam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica in doctrina apologetarum habuerit*, 1859.

² It is intrinsically probable that their works directly addressed to the Christian Church gave a more full exposition of their Christianity than we find in the Apologies. This can moreover be proved with certainty from the fragments of Justin's, Tatian's and Melito's esoteric writings. But, whilst recognising this fact, we must not make the erroneous assumption that the fundamental conceptions and interests of Justin and the rest were in reality other than may be inferred from their Apologies.

reached by Christianity, and adhered to the early Christian eschatology. These views as well as the strong emphasis they laid upon human freedom and responsibility, enabled them to attain a firm standpoint in opposition to "Gnosticism", and to preserve their position within the Christian communities, whose moral purity and strength they regarded as a strong proof of the truth of this faith. In the endeavours of the Apologists to explain Christianity to the cultured world, we have before us the attempts of Greek churchmen to represent the Christian religion as a philosophy, and to convince outsiders that it was the highest wisdom and the absolute truth. These efforts were not rejected by the Churches like those of the so-called Gnostics, but rather became in subsequent times the foundation of the ecclesiastical dogmatic. The Gnostic speculations were repudiated, whereas those of the Apologists were accepted. The manner in which the latter set forth Christianity as a philosophy met with approval. What were the conditions under which ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek philosophy concluded the alliance which has found a place in the history of the world? How did this union attain acceptance and permanence, whilst "Gnosticism" was at first rejected? These are the two great questions the correct answers to which are of fundamental importance for the understanding of the history of Christian dogma.

The answers to these questions appear paradoxical. The theses of the Apologists finally overcame all scruples in ecclesiastical circles and were accepted by the Græco-Roman world, because they made Christianity *rational* without taking from, or adding to, its traditional historic material. The secret of the epoch-making success of the apologetic theology is thus explained: These Christian philosophers formulated the content of the Gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain. In the theology of the Apologists, Christianity, as the religious enlightenment directly emanating from God himself, is most

sharply contrasted with all polytheism, natural religion, and ceremonial. They proclaimed it in the most emphatic manner as the religion of the spirit, of freedom, and of absolute morality. Almost the whole positive material of Christianity is embodied in the story which relates its entrance into the world, its spread, and the proof of its truth. The religion itself, on the other hand, appears as the truth that is surely attested and accords with reason—a truth the content of which is not primarily dependent on historical facts and finally overthrows all polytheism.

Now this was the very thing required. In the second century of our era a great many needs and aspirations were undoubtedly making themselves felt in the sphere of religion and morals. "Gnosticism" and Marcionite Christianity prove the variety and depth of the needs then asserting themselves within the space that the ecclesiastical historian is able to survey. Mightier than all others, however, was the longing men felt to free themselves from the burden of the past, to cast away the rubbish of cults and of unmeaning religious ceremonies, and to be assured that the results of religious philosophy, those great and simple doctrines of virtue and immortality and of the God who is a Spirit, were certain truths. He who brought the message that these ideas were realities, and who, on the strength of these realities, declared polytheism and the worship of idols to be obsolete, had the mightiest forces on his side; for the times were now ripe for this preaching. What formed the strength of the apologetic philosophy was the proclamation that Christianity both contained the highest truth, as men already supposed it to be and as they had discovered it in their own minds, and the absolutely reliable guarantee that was desired for this truth. To the quality which makes it appear meagre to us it owed its impressiveness. The fact of its falling in with the general spiritual current of the time and making no attempt to satisfy special and deeper needs enabled it to plead the cause of spiritual monotheism and to oppose the worship of idols in the manner most easily understood. As it did not require historic and positive material to describe the nature of religion and morality, this philosophy enabled the Apologists

to demonstrate the worthlessness of the traditional religion and worship of the different nations.¹ The same cause, however, made them take up the conservative position with regard to the historical traditions of Christianity. These were not ultimately tested as to their content, for this was taken for granted, no matter how they might be worded; but they were used to give an assurance of the truth, and to prove that the religion of the spirit was not founded on human opinion, but on divine revelation. The only really important consideration in Christianity is that it is *revelation, real revelation*. The Apologists had no doubt as to what it reveals, and therefore any investigation was unnecessary. The result of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of Plato and Zeno, as it had further developed in the empires of Alexander the Great and the Romans, was to attain victory and permanence by the aid of Christianity. Thus we view the progress of this development to-day,² and Christianity really proved to be the force from which that religious philosophy, viewed as a theory of the world and system of morality, first received the courage to free itself from the polytheistic past and descend from the circles of the learned to the common people.

This constitutes the deepest distinction between Christian philosophers like Justin and those of the type of Valentinus. The latter sought for a *religion*: the former, though indeed they were not very clear about their own purpose, sought *assurance* as to a theistic and moral conception of the world which they already possessed. At first the complexus of Christian tradition, which must have possessed many features of attraction for them, was something foreign to both. The latter, however, sought to make this tradition intelligible. For the former it was enough that they had here a revelation before them; that this revelation

¹ That is, so far as these were clearly connected with polytheism. Where this was not the case or seemed not to be so, national traditions, both the true and the spurious, were readily and joyfully admitted into the *catalogus testimoniorum* of revealed truth.

² Though these words were already found in the first edition, Clemen (Justin 1890, p. 56) has misunderstood me so far as to think that I spoke here of conscious intention on the part of the Apologists. Such nonsense of course never occurred to me.

also bore unmistakable testimony to the one God, who was a Spirit, to virtue, and to immortality; and that it was capable of convincing men and of leading them to a virtuous life. Viewed superficially, the Apologists were no doubt the conservatives; but they were so, because they scarcely in any respect meddled with the contents of tradition. The "Gnostics", on the contrary, sought to understand what they read and to investigate the truth of the message of which they heard. The most characteristic feature is the attitude of each to the Old Testament. The Apologists were content to have found in it an ancient source of revelation, and viewed the book as a testimony to the truth, *i.e.* to philosophy and virtue; the Gnostics investigated this document and examined to what extent it agreed with the new impressions they had received from the Gospel. We may sum up as follows: The Gnostics sought to determine what Christianity is as a religion, and, as they were convinced of the absoluteness of Christianity, this process led them to incorporate with it all that they looked on as sublime and holy and to remove everything they recognised to be inferior. The Apologists, again, strove to discover an authority for religious enlightenment and morality and to find the confirmation of a theory of the universe, which, if true, contained for them the certainty of eternal life; and this they found in the Christian tradition.

At bottom this contrast is a picture of the great discord existing in the religious philosophy of the age itself (see p. 129, vol. I.). No one denied the fact that all truth was divine, that is, was founded on revelation. The great question, however, was whether every man possessed this truth as a slumbering capacity that only required to be awakened; whether it was rational, *i.e.*, merely moral truth, or must be above that which is moral, that is, of a religious nature; whether it must carry man beyond himself; and whether a real redemption was necessary. It is ultimately the dispute between morality and religion, which appears as an unsettled problem in the theses of the idealistic philosophers and in the whole spiritual conceptions then current among the educated, and which recurs in the contrast between the Apologetic and the Gnostic theology. And,

as in the former case we meet with the most varied shades and transitions, for no one writer has developed a consistent theory, so also we find a similar state of things in the latter; ¹ for no Apologist quite left out of sight the idea of redemption (deliverance from the dominion of demons can only be effected by the Logos, *i.e.*, God). Wherever the idea of freedom is strongly emphasised, the religious element, in the strict sense of the word, appears in jeopardy. This is the case with the Apologists throughout. Conversely, wherever redemption forms the central thought, need is felt of a suprarational truth, which no longer views morality as the only aim, and which, again, requires particular media, a sacred history and sacred symbols. Stoic rationalism, in its logical development, is menaced wherever we meet the perception that the course of the world must in some way be helped, and wherever the contrast between reason and sensuousness, that the old Stoa had confused, is clearly felt to be an unendurable state of antagonism that man cannot remove by his own unaided efforts. The need of a revelation had its starting-point in philosophy here. The judgment of oneself and of the world to which Platonism led, the self-consciousness which it awakened by the detachment of man from nature, and the contrasts which it revealed led of necessity to that frame of mind which manifested itself in the craving for a revelation. The Apologists felt this. But their rationalism gave a strange turn to the satisfaction of that need. It was not their Christian ideas which first involved them in contradictions. At the time when Christianity appeared on the scene, the Platonic and Stoic systems themselves were already so complicated that philosophers did not find their difficulties seriously increased by a consideration of the Christian doctrines. As *Apologists*, however, they decidedly took the part of Christianity because, according to them, it was the doctrine of reason and freedom.

The Gospel was hellenised in the second century in so far as the Gnostics in various ways transformed it into a Hellenic

¹ Note here particularly the attitude of Tatian, who has already introduced a certain amount of the "Gnostic" element into his "Oratio ad Græcos", although, he adheres in the main to the ordinary apologetic doctrines.

religion for the educated. The Apologists used it—we may almost say inadvertently—to overthrow polytheism by maintaining that Christianity was the realisation of an absolutely moral theism. The Christian religion was not the first to experience this twofold destiny on Græco-Roman soil. A glance at the history of the Jewish religion shows us a parallel development; in fact, both the speculations of the Gnostics and the theories of the Apologists were foreshadowed in the theology of the Jewish Alexandrians, and particularly in that of Philo. Here also the Gospel merely entered upon the heritage of Judaism.¹ Three centuries before the appearance of Christian Apologists, Jews, who had received a Hellenic training, had already set forth the religion of Jehovah to the Greeks in that remarkably summary and spiritualised form which represents it as the absolute and highest philosophy, *i.e.*, the knowledge of God, of virtue, and of recompense in the next world. Here these Jewish philosophers had already transformed all the positive and historic elements of the national religion into parts of a huge system for proving the truth of that theism. The Christian Apologists adopted this method, for they can hardly be said to have invented it anew.² We see from the Jewish Sibylline oracles how wide-spread it was. Philo, however, was not only a Stoic rationalist, but a hyper-Platonic religious philosopher. In like manner, the Christian Apologists did not altogether lack this element, though in some isolated cases among them there are hardly any traces of it. This feature is most fully represented among the Gnostics.

This transformation of religion into a philosophic system would not have been possible had not Greek philosophy itself happened to be in process of development into a religion. Such a transformation was certainly very foreign to the really classical time of Greece and Rome. The pious belief in the efficacy and power of the gods and in their appearances and manifestations, as well as the traditional worship, could have no bond of union

¹ Since the time of Josephus Greek philosophers had ever more and more acknowledged the "philosophical" character of Judaism; see Porphyry, *de abst. anim.* II. 26. about the Jews: ἄτε φιλόσοφοι τὸ γένος ὄντες.

² On the relation of Christian literature to the writings of Philo, cf. Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandrien*, p. 303 f.

with speculations concerning the essence and ultimate cause of things. The idea of a religious dogma which was at once to furnish a correct theory of the world and a principle of conduct was from this standpoint completely unintelligible. But philosophy, particularly in the Stoa, set out in search of this idea, and, after further developments, sought for one special religion with which it could agree or through which it could at least attain certainty. The meagre cults of the Greeks and Romans were unsuited for this. So men turned their eyes towards the barbarians. Nothing more clearly characterises the position of things in the second century than the agreement between two men so radically different as Tatian and Celsus. Tatian emphatically declares that salvation comes from the barbarians, and to Celsus it is also a "truism" that the barbarians have more capacity than the Greeks for discovering valuable doctrines.¹ Everything was in fact prepared, and nothing was wanting.

About the middle of the second century, however, the moral and rationalistic element in the philosophy and spiritual culture of the time was still more powerful than the religious and mystic: for Neoplatonism, which under its outward coverings concealed the aspiration after religion and the living God, was only in its first beginnings. It was not otherwise in Christian circles. The "Gnostics" were in the minority. What the great majority of the Church felt to be intelligible and edifying above everything else was an earnest moralism.² New and strange as the

¹ It is very instructive to find Celsus (Origen, c. Cels. I. 2) proceeding to say that the Greeks understood better how to judge, to investigate, and to perfect the doctrines devised by the barbarians, and to apply them to the practice of virtue. This is quite in accordance with the idea of Origen, who makes the following remarks on this point: "When a man trained in the schools and sciences of the Greeks becomes acquainted with our faith, he will not only recognise and declare it to be true, but also by means of his scientific training and skill reduce it to a system and supplement what seems to him defective in it, when tested by the Greek method of exposition and proof, thus at the same time demonstrating the truth of Christianity."

² See the section "Justin und die apostolischen Väter" in Engelhardt's "Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers", p. 375 ff., and my article on the so-called 2nd Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* I. p. 329 ff.). Engelhardt, who on the whole emphasises the correspondences, has rather under- than over-estimated them. If the reader compares the exposition given in Book I., chap. 3, with the theology of the Apologists (see sub. 3), he will find proof of the intimate relationship that may be traced here.

undertaking to represent Christianity as a philosophy might seem at first, the Apologists, so far as they were understood, appeared to advance nothing inconsistent with Christian common sense. Besides, they did not question authorities, but rather supported them, and introduced no foreign positive materials. For all these reasons, and also because their writings were not at first addressed to the communities, but only to outsiders, the marvellous attempt to present Christianity to the world as the religion which is the true philosophy, and as the philosophy which is the true religion, remained unopposed in the Church. But in what sense was the Christian religion set forth as a philosophy? An exact answer to this question is of the highest interest as regards the history of Christian dogma.

2. *Christianity as Philosophy and as Revelation.*

It was a new undertaking and one of permanent importance to a tradition hitherto so little concerned for its own vindication, when Quadratus and the Athenian philosopher, Aristides, presented treatises in defence of Christianity to the emperor.¹ About a century had elapsed since the Gospel of Christ had begun to be preached. It may be said that the Apology of Aristides was a most significant opening to the second century, whilst we find Origen at its close. Marcianus Aristides expressly designates himself in his pamphlet as a *philosopher of the Athenians*. Since the days when the words were written: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit" (Col. II. 8), it had constantly been repeated (see, as evidence, Celsus, *passim*) that Christian preaching and philosophy were things entirely different, that God had chosen the fools, and that man's duty was not to investigate and seek, but to

¹ See Euseb., H. E. IV. 3. Only one sentence of Quadratus' Apology is preserved: we have now that of Aristides in the Syriac language: moreover, it is proved to have existed in the original language in the *Historia Barlaam et Joasaph*: finally, a considerable fragment of it is found in Armenian. See an English edition by Harris and Robinson in the *Texts and Studies* I. 1891. German translation and commentary by Raabe in the *Texte und Untersuchungen* IX. 1892. Eusebius says that the Apology was handed in to the emperor Hadrian; but the superscription in Syriac is addressed to the emperor Titus Hadrianus Antoninus.

believe and hope. Now a philosopher, as such, pleaded the cause of Christianity. In the summary he gave of the content of Christianity at the beginning of his address, he really spoke as a philosopher and represented this faith as a philosophy. By expounding pure monotheism and giving it the main place in his argument, Aristides gave supreme prominence to the very doctrine which simple Christians also prized as the most important.¹ Moreover, in emphasizing not only the supernatural character of the Christian doctrine revealed by the Son of the Most High God, but also the continuous inspiration of believers—the new *race* (not a new *school*)—he confessed in the most express way the peculiar nature of this philosophy as a divine truth. According to him Christianity is philosophy because its content is in accordance with reason, and because it gives a satisfactory and universally intelligible answer to the questions with which all real philosophers have concerned themselves. But it is no philosophy, in fact it is really the complete opposite of this, in so far as it proceeds from revelation and is propagated by the agency of God, *i.e.*, has a supernatural and divine origin, on which alone the truth and certainty of its doctrines finally depend. This contrast to philosophy is chiefly shown in the unphilosophical form in which Christianity was first preached to the world. That is the thesis maintained by all the Apologists from Justin to Tertullian,² and which Jewish philosophers before them propounded and defended. This proposition may certainly be expressed in a great variety of ways. In the first place, it is important whether the first or second half is emphasised, and secondly, whether that which is “universally intelligible” is to be reckoned as philosophy at all, or is to be separated from it as that which comes by “nature”. Finally, the attitude to be taken up towards the Greek philosophers is left an open question, so that the thesis, taking up this attitude as a starting-point, may again assume various forms. But was the contradiction which it contains not felt? The content of revelation is to be

¹ See Hermas, Mand I.

² With reservations this also holds good of the Alexandrians. See particularly Orig., c. Cels. I. 62.

rational: but does that which is rational require a revelation? How the proposition was understood by the different Apologists requires examination.

Aristides. He first gives an exposition of monotheism and the monotheistic cosmology (God as creator and mover of the universe, as the spiritual, perfect, almighty Being, whom all things need, and who requires nothing). In the second chapter he distinguishes, according to the Greek text, three, and, according to the Syriac, four classes of men (in the Greek text polytheists, Jews, Christians, the polytheists being divided into Chaldeans, Greeks, and Egyptians; in the Syriac barbarians, Greeks, Jews, Christians), and gives their origin. He derives the Christians from Jesus Christ and reproduces the Christian *kerygma* (Son of the Most High God, birth from the Virgin, 12 disciples, death on the cross, burial, resurrection, ascension, missionary labours of the 12 disciples). After this, beginning with the third chapter, follows a criticism of polytheism, that is, the false theology of the barbarians, Greeks, and Egyptians (down to chapter 12). In the 13th chapter the Greek authors and philosophers are criticised, and the Greek myths, as such, are shown to be false. In the 14th chapter the Jews are introduced (they are monotheists and their ethical system is praised; but they are then reproached with worshipping of angels and a false ceremonial). In the 15th chapter follows a description of the Christians, *i.e.*, above all, of their pure, holy life. It is they who have found the truth, because they know the creator of heaven and earth. This description is continued in chapters 16 and 17: "This people is new and there is a divine admixture in it." The Christian writings are recommended to the emperor.

*Justin.*¹ In his treatise addressed to the emperor Justin did not call himself a philosopher as Aristides had done. In es-

¹ Semisch. Justin der Märtyrer, 2 Vols., 1840 f. Aubé. S. Justin. philosophe et martyre, 2nd reprint, 1875. Weizsäcker. Die Theologie des Märtyrers Justin's in the Jahrbuch für deutsche Theologie, 1867. p. 60 ff. Von Engelhardt. Christenthum Justin's, 1878: id. "Justin", in Herzog's Real Encyclopädie. Stählin, Justin der Märtyrer, 1880. Clemen, Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung des stoisch-christlichen Eudämonismus in Justin's Apologie, 1890. Flemming, zur Beurtheilung des Christenthums Justin's des Martyrers, 1893. Duncker. Logoslehre Justin's, 1848. Bosse. Der präexistente Christus des Justinus, 1891.

pousing the cause of the hated and despised Christians he represented himself as a simple member of that sect. But in the very first sentence of his Apology he takes up the ground of piety and philosophy, the very ground taken up by the pious and philosophical emperors themselves, according to the judgment of the time and their own intention. In addressing them he appeals to the *λόγος σώφρων* in a purely Stoic fashion. He opposes the truth—also in the Stoic manner—to the *δόξαις πικραῖς*.¹ It was not to be a mere *captatio benevolentiae*. In that case Justin would not have added: "That ye are pious and wise and guardians of righteousness and friends of culture, ye hear everywhere. Whether ye are so, however, will be shown."² His whole exordium is calculated to prove to the emperors that they are in danger of repeating a hundredfold the crime which the judges of Socrates had committed.³ Like a second Socrates Justin speaks to the emperors in the name of all Christians. They are to hear the convictions of the wisest of the Greeks from the mouth of the Christians. Justin wishes to enlighten the emperor with regard to the life and doctrines (*βίος καὶ μαθήματα*) of the latter. Nothing is to be concealed, for there is nothing to conceal.

Justin kept this promise better than any of his successors. For that very reason also he did not depict the Christian Churches as schools of philosophers (cc. 61—67). Moreover, in the first passage where he speaks of Greek philosophers,⁴ he is merely drawing a parallel. According to him there are bad Christians and seeming Christians, just as there are philosophers who are only so in name and outward show. Such men, too, were in early times called "philosophers" even when they preached atheism. To all appearance, therefore, Justin does *not* desire Christians to be reckoned as philosophers. But it is nevertheless significant that, in the case of the Christians, a

¹ Apol. I. 2. p. 6, ed. Otto.

² Apol. I. 2. p. 6, sq.

³ See the numerous philosophical quotations and allusions in Justin's Apology pointed out by Otto. Above all, he made an extensive use of Plato's Apology of Socrates.

⁴ Apol. I. 4. p. 16, also I. 7. p. 24 sq; I. 26.

phenomenon is being repeated which otherwise is only observed in the case of philosophers; and how were those whom he was addressing to understand him? In the same passage he speaks for the first time of Christ. He introduces him with the plain and intelligible formula: ὁ διδάσκαλος Χριστός ("the teacher Christ").¹ Immediately thereafter he praises Socrates because he had exposed the worthlessness and deceit of the evil demons, and traces his death to the same causes which are now he says bringing about the condemnation of the Christians. Now he can make his final assertion. In virtue of "reason" Socrates exposed superstition; in virtue of the same reason, this was done by the teacher whom the Christians follow. *But this teacher was reason itself; it was visible in him, and indeed it appeared bodily in him.*²

Is this philosophy or is it myth? The greatest paradox the Apologist has to assert is connected by him with the most impressive remembrance possessed by his readers as philosophers. In the same sentence where he represents Christ as the Socrates of the barbarians,³ and consequently makes Christianity out to be a Socratic doctrine, he propounds the unheard of theory *that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason of God.*

Justin nowhere tried to soften the effect of this conviction or explain it in a way adapted to his readers. Nor did he conceal from them that his assertion admits of no speculative demonstration. That philosophy can only deal with things which ever are, because they ever were, since this world began, is a fact about which he himself is perfectly clear. No Stoic could have felt more strongly than Justin how paradoxical is the assertion that a thing is of value which has happened only once. Certain as he is that the "reasonable" emperors will regard it as a rational assumption that "Reason" is the

¹ Apol. I. 4, p. 14.

² Apol. I. 5, p. 18 sq., see also I. 14 fin.: οὐ σοφιστής ὑπῆρχεν ἀλλὰ δύναμις Θεοῦ ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ ἦν.

³ I. c.: οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν Ἑλλησι διὰ Σωκράτους ὑπὸ λόγου ἠλέγχθη ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν βαρβάρους ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου μορφωθέντος καὶ ἀνθρώπου καὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ κληθέντος.

Son of God,¹ he knows equally well that no philosophy will bear him out in that other assertion, and that such a statement is seemingly akin to the contemptible myths of the evil demons.

But there is certainly a proof which, if not speculative, is nevertheless sure. The same ancient documents, which contain the Socratic and super-Socratic wisdom of the Christians, bear witness through prophecies, which, just because they are predictions, admit of no doubt, that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason; for history confirms the word of prophecy even in the minutest details. Moreover, in so far as these writings are in the lawful possession of the Christians, and announced at the very beginning of things that this community would appear on the earth, they testify that the Christians may in a certain fashion date themselves back to the beginning of the world, because their doctrine is as old as the earth itself (this thought is still wanting in Aristides).

The new Socrates who appeared among the barbarians is therefore quite different from the Socrates of the Greeks, and for that reason also his followers are not to be compared with the disciples of the philosophers.² From the very beginning of things a world-historical dispensation of God announced this reasonable doctrine through prophets, and prepared the visible appearance of reason itself. The same reason which created and arranged the world took human form in order to draw the whole of humanity to itself. Every precaution has been taken to make it easy for any one, be he Greek or barbarian, educated or uneducated, to grasp all the doctrines of this reason, to verify their truth, and test their power in life. What further importance can philosophy have side by side with this, how can one think of calling this a philosophy?

And yet the doctrine of the Christians can only be compared with philosophy. For, so far as the latter is genuine, it is also

¹ Celsus also admits this, or rather makes his Jew acknowledge it (Orig. c. Cels. II. 31). In Book VI. 47 he adopts the proposition of the "ancients" that the world is the Son of God.

² See Apol. II. 10 fin.: Σωκράτει οὐδεὶς ἐπέστη ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ δόγματος ἀποβήσκειν. Χριστῷ δὲ τῷ καὶ ὑπὸ Σωκράτους ἀπὸ μέρους γνωσθέντι... οὐ φιλόσοφοι οὐδὲ φιλόλογοι μόνον ἐπέστησαν.

guided by the Logos; and, conversely, what the Christians teach concerning the Father of the world, the destiny of man, the nobility of his nature, freedom and virtue, justice and recompense, has also been attested by the wisest of the Greeks. They indeed only stammered, whereas the Christians speak. These, however, use no unintelligible and unheard-of language, but speak with the words and through the power of reason. The wonderful arrangement, carried out by the Logos himself, through which he ennobled the human race by restoring its consciousness of its own nobility, compels no one henceforth to regard the reasonable as the unreasonable or wisdom as folly. But is the Christian wisdom not of divine origin? How can it in that case be natural, and what connection can exist between it and the wisdom of the Greeks? Justin bestowed the closest attention on this question, but he never for a moment doubted what the answer must be. Wherever the reasonable has revealed itself, it has always been through the operation of the *divine* reason. For man's lofty endowment consists in his having had a portion of the divine reason implanted within him, and in his consequent capacity of attaining a knowledge of divine things, though not a perfect and clear one, by dint of persistent efforts after truth and virtue. When man remembers his real nature and destination, that is, when he comes to himself, the divine reason is already revealing itself in him and through him. As man's possession conferred on him at the creation, it is at once his most peculiar property, and the power which dominates and determines his nature.¹ All that is reasonable

¹ The utterances of Justin do not clearly indicate whether the non-Christian portion of mankind has only a σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου as a natural possession, or whether this σπέρμα has in some cases been enhanced by the inward workings of the whole Logos (inspiration). This ambiguity, however, arises from the fact that he did not further discuss the relation between ὁ λόγος and τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου and we need not therefore attempt to remove it. On the one hand, the excellent discoveries of poets and philosophers are simply traced to τὸ ἔμφυτον παντὶ γένει ἀνθρώπων σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου (Apol. II. 8), the μέρος σπερματικοῦ λόγου (ibid.) which was implanted at the creation, and on which the human εὕρεσις καὶ θεωρία depend (II. 10). In this sense it may be said of them all that they "in human fashion attempted to understand and prove things by means of reason": and Socrates is merely viewed as the πάντων εὐτονώτερος (ibid.), his philosophy also, like all pre-Christian systems, being a φιλοσοφία ἀνθρώπειος (II. 15). But on the other hand

is based on revelation. In order to accomplish his true destiny man requires from the beginning the inward working of that divine reason which has created the world for the sake of man, and therefore wishes to raise man beyond the world to God.¹

Apparently no one could speak in a more stoical fashion. But this train of thought is supplemented by something which limits it. Revelation does retain its peculiar and unique significance. For no one who merely possessed the "seed of the Logos" (*σπέρμα τοῦ λόγου*), though it may have been his exclusive guide to knowledge and conduct, was ever able to grasp the whole truth and impart it in a convincing manner. Though Socrates and Heraclitus may in a way be called Christians, they cannot be so designated in any real sense. Reason is clogged with unreasonableness, and the certainty of truth is doubtful wherever the whole Logos has not been acting; for man's natural endowment with reason is too weak to oppose the powers of evil and of sense that work in the world, namely, the demons. We must

Christ was known by Socrates though only ἀπὸ μέρους; for "Christ was and is the Logos who dwells in every man". Further, according to the Apologist, the *μέρος τοῦ σπερματικοῦ θείου λόγου* bestows the power of recognising whatever is related to the Logos (τὸ συγγενές II. 13). Consequently it may not only be said: ὅσα παρὰ πάντι καλῶς εἴρηται ἡμῶν, τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστὶ (ibid.), but, on the strength of the "participation" in reason conferred on all, it may be asserted that all who have lived with the Logos (*μετὰ λόγου*) — an expression which must have been ambiguous — were Christians. Among the Greeks this specially applies to Socrates and Heraclitus (I. 46). Moreover, the Logos implanted in man does not belong to his nature in such a sense as to prevent us saying ὑπὸ λόγου διὰ Σωκράτους ἡλ-έγχθη κ.τ.λ. (I. 5). Nevertheless αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος did not act in Socrates, for this only appeared in Christ (ibid.). Hence the prevailing aspect of the case in Justin was that to which he gave expression at the close of the 2nd Apology (II. 15: alongside of Christianity there is only *human* philosophy), and which, not without regard for the opposite view, he thus formulated in II. 13 fin.: All non-Christian authors were able to attain a knowledge of true being, though only darkly, by means of the seed of the Logos naturally implanted within them. For the *σπορά* and *μίμημα* of a thing, which are bestowed in proportion to one's receptivity, are quite different from the thing itself, which divine grace bestows on us for our possession and imitation."

¹ "For the sake of man" (Stoic) Apol. I. 10: II. 4, 5: Dial. 41, p. 260A, Apol. I. 8: "Longing for the eternal and pure life, we strive to abide in the fellowship of God, the Father and Creator of all things, and we hasten to make confession, because we are convinced and firmly believe that that happiness is really attainable." It is frequently asserted that it is the Logos which produces such conviction and awakens courage and strength.

therefore believe in the prophets in whom the whole Logos spoke. He who does that must also of necessity believe in Christ; for the prophets clearly pointed to him as the perfect embodiment of the Logos. Measured by the fulness, clearness, and certainty of the knowledge imparted by the Logos-Christ, all knowledge independent of him appears as merely human wisdom, even when it emanates from the seed of the Logos. The Stoic argument is consequently untenable. Men blind and kept in bondage by the demons require to be aided by a special revelation. It is true that this revelation is nothing new, and in so far as it has always existed, and never varied in character, from the beginning of the world, it is in this sense nothing extraordinary. *It is the divine help granted to man, who has fallen under the power of the demons, and enabling him to follow his reason and freedom to do what is good. By the appearance of Christ this help became accessible to all men.* The dominion of demons and revelation are the two correlated ideas. If the former did not exist, the latter would not be necessary. According as we form a lower or higher estimate of the pernicious results of that sovereignty, the value of revelation rises or sinks. This revelation cannot do less than give the necessary assurance of the truth, and it cannot do more than impart the power that develops and matures the inalienable natural endowment of man and frees him from the dominion of the demons.

Accordingly the teaching of the prophets and Christ is related even to the very highest human philosophy as the whole is to the part,¹ or as the certain is to the uncertain; and hence also

¹ Justin has destroyed the force of this argument in two passages (I. 44. 59) by tracing (like the Alexandrian Jews) all true knowledge of the poets and philosophers to borrowing from the books of the Old Testament (Moses). Of what further use then is the *σπέρμα λόγου ἔμφυτον*? Did Justin not really take it seriously? Did he merely wish to suit himself to those whom he was addressing? We are not justified in asserting this. Probably, however, the adoption of that Jewish view of the history of the world is a proof that the results of the demon sovereignty were in Justin's estimation so serious that he no longer expected anything from the *σπέρμα λόγου ἔμφυτον* when left to its own resources; and therefore regarded truth and prophetic revelation as inseparable. But this view is not the essential one in the Apology. That assumption of Justin's is evidently dependent on a tradition, whilst his real opinion was more "liberal".

as the permanent is to the transient. For the final stage has now arrived and Christianity is destined to put an end to natural human philosophy. When the perfect work is there; the fragmentary must cease. Justin gave the clearest expression to this conviction. Christianity, *i.e.*, the prophetic teaching attested by Christ and accessible to all, puts an end to the human systems of philosophy that from their close affinity to it may be called Christian, inasmuch as it effects all and more than all that these systems have done, and inasmuch as the speculations of the philosophers, which are uncertain and mingled with error, are transformed by it into dogmas of indubitable certainty.¹ The practical conclusion drawn in Justin's treatise from this exposition is that the Christians are at least entitled to ask the authorities to treat them as philosophers (Apol. I. 7, 20: II. 15). This demand, he says, is the more justifiable because the freedom of philosophers is enjoyed even by such people as merely bear the name, whereas in reality they set forth immoral and pernicious doctrines.²

¹ Compare with this the following passages: In Apol. I. 20 are enumerated a series of the most important doctrines common to philosophers and Christians. Then follow the words: "If we then in particular respects even teach something similar to the doctrines of the philosophers honoured among you, though in many cases in a divine and more sublime way; and we indeed alone do so in such a way that the matter is proved etc." In Apol. I. 44: II. 10, 13 uncertainty, error, and contradictions are shown to exist in the case of the greatest philosophers. The Christian doctrines are more sublime than all human philosophy (II. 15). "Our doctrines are evidently more sublime than any human teaching, because the Christ who appeared for our sakes was the whole fulness of reason" (*τὸ λογικὸν τοῦ ὅλου*, II. 10). "The principles of Plato are not foreign (*ἀλλότρια*) to the teaching of Christ, but they do not agree in every respect. The same holds good of the Stoics" (II. 13). "We must go forth from the school of Plato" (II. 12). "Socrates convinced no one in such a way that he would have been willing to die for the doctrine proclaimed by him; whereas not only philosophers and philologers, but also artisans and quite common uneducated people have believed in Christ" (II. 10). These are the very people—and that is perhaps the strongest contrast found between Logos and Logos in Justin—among whom it is universally said of Christianity: *δύναμις ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀρρήτου πατρὸς καὶ οὐχὶ ἀνθρώπειου λόγου κατασκευή* (see also I. 14 and elsewhere.)

² In Justin's estimate of the Greek philosophers two other points deserve notice. In the first place, he draws a very sharp distinction between real and nominal philosophers. By the latter he specially means the Epicureans. They are no doubt referred to in I. 4, 7, 26 (I. 14: Atheists). Epicurus and Sardanapalus are classed together in II. 7: Epicurus and the immoral poets in II. 12; and in the conclusion of II. 15 the same philosopher is ranked with the worst society. But according

In the dialogue with the Jew Trypho, which is likewise meant for heathen readers, Justin ceased to employ the idea of the existence of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" (*σπέρμα λόγου ἔμφυτου*) in every man. From this fact we recognise that he did not consider the notion of fundamental importance. He indeed calls the Christian religion a philosophy;¹ but, in so far as this is the case, it is "the only sure and saving philosophy". No doubt the so-called philosophies put the right questions, but they are incapable of giving correct answers. For the Deity, who embraces all true being, and a knowledge of whom alone makes salvation possible, is only known in proportion as he reveals himself. True wisdom is therefore exclusively based on revelation. Hence it is opposed to every human philosophy,

to II. 3 fin. (*ἀδύνατον Κυνικῶν, ἀδιάφορον τὸ τέλος προβεμένω, τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι πλὴν ἀδιαφορίας*) the Cynics also seem to be outside the circle of real philosophers. This is composed principally of Socrates, Plato, the Platonists and Stoics, together with Heraclitus and others. Some of these understood one set of doctrines more correctly, others another series. The Stoics excelled in ethics (II. 7): Plato described the Deity and the world more correctly. It is, however, worthy of note—and this is the second point—that Justin in principle conceived the Greek philosophers as a unity, and that he therefore saw in their very deviations from one another a proof of the imperfection of their teaching. In so far as they are all included under the collective idea "human philosophy", philosophy is characterised by the conflicting opinions found within it. This view was suggested to Justin by the fact that the highest truth, which is at once allied and opposed to human philosophy, was found by him among an exclusive circle of fellow-believers. Justin showed great skill in selecting from the Gospels the passages (I. 15—17), that prove the "philosophical" life of the Christians as described by him in c. 14. Here he cannot be acquitted of colouring the facts (cf. Aristides) nor of exaggeration (see, for instance, the unqualified statement: *ἃ ἔχομεν εἰς κοινὸν φέροντες καὶ παντὶ δοομενῶ κοινω-νοῦντες*). The philosophical emperors were meant here to think of the "*φίλοις πάντα κοινά*". Yet in I. 67 Justin corrected exaggerations in his description. Justin's reference to the invaluable benefits which Christianity confers on the state deserves notice (see particularly I. 12, 17.) The later Apologists make a similar remark.

¹ Dialogue 8. The dialogue takes up a more positive attitude than the Apology, both as a whole and in detail. If we consider that both works are also meant for Christians, and that, on the other hand, the Dialogue as well as the Apology appeals to the cultured heathen public, we may perhaps assume that the two writings were meant to present a graduated system of Christian instruction. (In one passage the Dialogue expressly refers to the Apology). From Justin's time onward the apologetic polemic of the early Church appears to have adhered throughout to the same method. This consisted in giving the polemical writings directed against the Greeks the form of an introduction to Christian knowledge, and in continuing this instruction still further in those directed against the Jews.

because revelation was only given in the prophets and in Christ.¹ The Christian is *the* philosopher,² because the followers of Plato and the Stoics are virtually no philosophers. In applying the title "philosophy" to Christianity he therefore does not mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely together. No doubt, however, he asserts that the Christian doctrine, which is founded on the knowledge of Christ and leads to blessedness,³ is in accordance with reason.

Athenagoras. The petition on behalf of Christians, which Athenagoras, "the Christian philosopher of Athens", presented to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, nowhere expressly designates Christianity as a philosophy, and still less does it style the Christians philosophers.⁴ But, at the very beginning of his writing Athenagoras also claims for the Christian doctrines the toleration granted by the state to all philosophic tenets.⁵ In support of his claim he argues that the state punishes nothing but practical atheism,⁶ and that the "atheism" of the Christians is a doctrine about God such as had been propounded by the most distinguished philosophers—Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics—who, moreover, were permitted to write whatsoever they pleased on the subject of the "Deity".⁷ The Apologist concedes even more: "If philosophers did not also acknowledge the existence of one God, if they did not also conceive the gods in question to be partly demons, partly matter, partly of human birth, then certainly we would be justly expelled as aliens."⁸ He therefore takes up the standpoint that the state is justified in refusing to tolerate people with completely new doctrines. When we add that he everywhere assumes that the wisdom and piety of the emperors are sufficient to test

¹ Dial. 2. sq. That Justin's Christianity is founded on theoretical scepticism is clearly shown by the introduction to the Dialogue.

² Dial. 8: οὕτως δὲ καὶ διὰ ταῦτα φιλόσοφος ἐγώ.

³ Dial., l. c.: παρέστιν σοὶ τὸν Χριστὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐπιγινώσκει καὶ τελείως γενομένην εὐδαιμονεῖν.

⁴ See particularly the closing chapter.

⁵ Suppl. 2.

⁶ Suppl. 4.

⁷ Suppl. 5—7.

⁸ Suppl. 24 (see also Aristides c. 13).

and approve¹ the truth of the Christian teaching, that he merely represents this faith itself as the *reasonable* doctrine,² and that, with the exception of the resurrection of the body, he leaves all the positive and objectionable tenets of Christianity out of account,³ there is ground for thinking that this Apologist differs essentially from Justin in his conception of the relation of Christianity to secular philosophy.

Moreover, it is not to be denied that Athenagoras views the revelation in the prophets and in Christ as completely identical. But in one very essential point he agrees with Justin; and he has even expressed himself still more plainly than the latter, inasmuch as he does not introduce the assumption of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" (*σπέρμα λόγου ἔμφυτου*). The philosophers, he says, were incapable of knowing the full truth, since it was not from God, but rather from themselves, that they wished to learn about God. True wisdom, however, can only be learned from God, that is, from his prophets; it depends solely on revelation.⁴ Here also then we have a repetition of the thought that the truly reasonable is of supernatural origin. Such is the importance attached by Athenagoras to this proposition, that he declares any demonstration of the "reasonable" to be insufficient, no matter how luminous it may appear. Even that which is most evidently true—*e.g.*, monotheism—is not raised from the domain of mere human opinion into the sphere of undoubted certainty till it can be confirmed by revelation.⁵ This can be done by Christians alone. Hence they are very different from the philosophers, just as they are also distinguished from these by their manner of life.⁶ All the praises which Athenagoras from time to time bestows on philosophers, particularly Plato,⁷ are consequently to be understood in a merely

¹ Suppl. 7 fin. and many other places.

² *E. g.*, Suppl. 8. 35 fin.

³ The Crucified Man, the incarnation of the Logos etc. are wanting. Nothing at all is said about Christ.

⁴ Suppl. 7.

⁵ Cf. the arguments in c. 8 with c. 9 init.

⁶ Suppl. 11.

⁷ Suppl. 23.

relative sense. Their ultimate object is only to establish the claim made by the Apologist with regard to the treatment of Christians by the state; but they are not really meant to bring the former into closer relationship to philosophers. Athenagoras also holds the theory that Christians are philosophers, in so far as the "philosophers" are not such in any true sense. It is only the problems they set that connect the two. He exhibits less clearness than Justin in tracing the necessity of revelation to the fact that the demon sovereignty, which, above all, reveals itself in polytheism,¹ can only be overthrown by revelation; he rather emphasises the other thought (cc. 7, 9) that the necessary attestation of the truth can only be given in this way.²

*Tatian's*³ chief aim was not to bring about a juster treatment of the Christians.⁴ He wished to represent their cause as the good contrasted with the bad, wisdom as opposed to error, truth in contradistinction to outward seeming, hypocrisy, and pretentious emptiness. His "Address to the Greeks" be-

¹ Suppl. 18. 23—27. He, however, as well as the others, sets forth the demon theory in detail.

² The Apology which Miltiades addressed to Marcus Aurelius and his fellow-emperor perhaps bore the title: ὑπὲρ τῆς κατὰ Χριστιανούς φιλοσοφίας (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 5). It is certain that Melito in his Apology designated Christianity as ἡ κατ' ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφία (l. c. IV. 26. 7). But, while it is undeniable that this writer attempted, to a hitherto unexampled extent, to represent Christianity as adapted to the Empire, we must nevertheless beware of laying undue weight on the expression "philosophy". What Melito means chiefly to emphasise is the fact that Christianity, which in former times had developed into strength among the barbarians, began to flourish in the provinces of the Empire simultaneously with the rise of the monarchy under Augustus, that, as foster-sister of the monarchy, it increased in strength with the latter, and that this mutual relation of the two institutions had given prosperity and splendour to the state. When in the fragments preserved to us he twice, in this connection, calls Christianity "philosophy", we must note that this expression alternates with the other "ὁ κατ' ἡμᾶς λόγος", and that he uses the formula: "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour along with the other cults" (πρὸς ταῖς ἄλλαις θρησκείαις). This excludes the assumption that Melito in his Apology merely represented Christianity as philosophy (see also IV. 26. 5, where the Christians are called "τὸ τῶν θεοσεβῶν γένος"). He also wrote a treatise περὶ κτίσεως καὶ γενέσεως Χριστοῦ. In it (fragment in the Chron. Pasch.) he called Christ Θεοῦ λόγος πρὸ αἰώνων.

³ See my treatise "Tatian's Rede an die Griechen übers.", 1884 (Giessener Programm). Daniel, Tatianus, 1837. Steuer, Die Gottes- und Logoslehre des Tatian, 1893.

⁴ But see Orat. 4 init., 24 fin., 25 fin., 27 init.

gins with a violent polemic against all Greek philosophers. Tatian merely acted up to a judgment of philosophers and philosophy which in Justin's case is still concealed.¹ Hence it was not possible for him to think of demonstrating analogies between Christians and philosophers. He also no doubt views Christianity as "reasonable"; he who lives virtuously and follows wisdom receives it;² but yet it is too sublime to be grasped by earthly perception.³ It is a heavenly thing which depends on the communication of the "Spirit", and hence can only be known by revelation.⁴ But yet it is a "philosophy" with definite

¹ He not only accentuated the disagreement of philosophers more strongly than Justin, but insisted more energetically than that Apologist on the necessity of viewing the practical fruits of philosophy in life as a criterion: see Orat. 2, 3, 19, 25. Nevertheless Socrates still found grace in his eyes (c. 3). With regard to other philosophers he listened to foolish and slanderous gossip.

² Orat. 13, 15 fin., 20. Tatian also gave credence to it because it imparts such an intelligible picture of the creation of the world (c. 29).

³ Orat. 12: τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας παιδείας ἐστὶν ἀνωτέρω τῆς κοσμικῆς καταλήψεως. Tatian troubled himself very little with giving demonstrations. No other Apologist made such bold assertions.

⁴ See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin., 29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.). The section cc. 12—15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7 ff): for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above his natural endowment: see c. 15: ἄνθρωπον λέγω τὸν πόρρω μὲν ἀνθρωπότητος πρὸς αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Θεὸν κενωρηκότα. But with Tatian this conception is burdened with radical inconsistency: for he assumes that the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom, and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a *donum superadditum et supernaturale*. For if a proper spontaneous use of freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that the decision and conse-

doctrines (δόγματα);¹ it brings nothing new, but only such blessings as we have already received, but could not retain² owing to the power of error, *i.e.*, the dominion of the demons.³ Christianity is therefore the philosophy in which, by virtue of the Logos revelation through the prophets,⁴ the rational knowledge that leads to life⁵ is restored. This knowledge was no less obscured among the Greek philosophers than among the Greeks generally. In so far as revelation took place among the barbarians from the remotest antiquity, Christianity may also be called the barbarian philosophy.⁶ Its truth is proved

quently the realisation of man's destination depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and pernicious art: philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27): whereas of Christians the following holds good (c. 32): *λόγου τοῦ δημοσίου καὶ ἐπιγείου κερωρισμένοι καὶ πειθόμενοι Θεοῦ παραγγέλιμασι καὶ νόμῳ πατρὸς ἀβραάμης ἐπίστομοι, τῶν τὸ ἐν δόξῃ κείμενον ἀνθρώπινῃ παραιτούμεθα.*

¹ C. 31. init.: ἡ ἡμετέρα φιλοσοφία. 32 (p. 128): οἱ βουλόμενοι φιλοσοφεῖν παρ' ἡμῖν ἄνθρωποι. In c. 33 (p. 130) Christian women are designated αἱ παρ' ἡμῖν φιλοσοφούσαι. C. 35: ἡ καθ' ἡμᾶς βάρβαρος φιλοσοφία. 40 (p. 152): οἱ κατὰ Μωυσέα καὶ ὁμοίως αὐτῷ φιλοσοφούντες. 42: ὁ κατὰ βαρβάρους φιλοσοφῶν Τατιανός. The δόγματα of the Christians: c. 1 (p. 2), 12 (p. 58), 19 (p. 86), 24 (p. 102), 27 (p. 108), 35 (p. 138), 40, 42. But Tatian pretty frequently calls Christianity "ἡ ἡμετέρα παιδεία", once also "νομοθεσία" (12; cf. 40: οἱ ἡμέτεροι νόμοι), and often πολιτεία.

² See, *e.g.*, c. 29 fin.: the Christian doctrine gives us οὐχ ὑπὲρ μὴ ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ λαβόντες ὑπὸ τῆς πλάνης ἔχειν ἐκωλύθημεν.

³ Tatian gave still stronger expression than Justin to the opinion that it is the demons who have misled men and rule the world, and that revelation through the prophets is opposed to this demon rule: see c. 7 ff. The demons have fixed the laws of death: see c. 15 fin. and elsewhere.

⁴ Tatian also cannot at bottom distinguish between revelation through the prophets and through Christ. See the description of his conversion in c. 29, where only the Old Testament writings are named, and c. 13 fin., 20 fin., 12 (p. 54) etc.

⁵ Knowledge and life appear in Tatian most closely connected. See, *e.g.*, c. 13 init.: "In itself the soul is not immortal, but mortal; it is also possible, however, that it may not die. If it has not attained a knowledge of that truth it dies and is dissolved with the body; but later, at the end of the world, it will rise again with the body in order to receive death in endless duration as a punishment. On the contrary it does not die, though it is dissolved for a time, if it is equipped with the knowledge of God."

⁶ Barbarian: the Christian doctrines are τὰ τῶν βαρβάρων δόγματα (c. 1): ἡ

by its ancient date¹ as well as by its intelligible form, which enables even the most uneducated person that is initiated in it² to understand it perfectly.³ Finally, Tatian also states (c. 40) that the Greek sophists have read the writings of Moses and the prophets, and reproduced them in a distorted form. He therefore maintains the very opposite of what Celsus took upon him to demonstrate when venturing to derive certain sayings and doctrines of Christ and the Christians from the philosophers. Both credit the plagiarists with intentional misrepresentation or gross misunderstanding. Justin judged more charitably. To Tatian, on the contrary, the mythology of the Greeks did not appear worse than their philosophy; in both cases he saw imitations and intentional corruption of the truth.⁴

καὶ ἡμῶς βάρβαρος Φιλοσοφία (c. 35): ἡ βαρβαρική νομοθεσία (c. 12); γραφαὶ βαρβαρικαί (c. 29): καινοτομεῖν τὰ βαρβαρῶν δόγματα (c. 35): ὁ κατὰ βαρβάρους φιλοσοφῶν Τατιανός (c. 42): Μωυσῆς πάσης βαρβαρίου φιλοσοφίας ἀρχηγός (c. 31): see also c. 30, 32. In Tatian's view barbarians and Greeks are the decisive contrasts in history.

¹ See the proof from antiquity, c. 31 ff.

² C. 30 (p. 114): τούτων οὖν τὴν κατάληψιν μεμυημένος.

³ Tatian's own confession is very important here (c. 26): "Whilst I was reflecting on what was good it happened that there fell into my hands certain writings of the barbarians, too old to be compared with the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared with their errors. And it chanced that they convinced me through the plainness of their expressions, through the unartificial nature of their language, through the intelligible representation of the creation of the world, through the prediction of the future, the excellence of their precepts, and the summing up of all kinds under one head. My soul was instructed by God and I recognised that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition, whereas the others abolish the slavery to which we are subjected in the world, and rescue us from our many lords and tyrants, though they do not give us blessings we had not already received, but rather such as we had indeed obtained, but were not able to retain in consequence of error." Here the whole theology of the Apologists is contained *in nuce*; see Justin, Dial. 7—8. In Chaps. 32, 33 Tatian strongly emphasises the fact that the Christian philosophy is accessible even to the most uneducated; see Justin, Apol. II. 10; Athenag. 11 etc.

⁴ The unknown author of the *Λόγος πρὸς Ἕλληνας* also formed the same judgment as Tatian (Corp. Apolog., T. III., p. 2 sq., ed. Otto; a Syrian translation, greatly amplified, is found in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658. It was published by Cureton, Spic. Syr., p. 38 sq. with an English translation). Christianity is an incomparable heavenly wisdom, the teacher of which is the Logos himself. "It produces neither poets, nor philosophers, nor rhetoricians; but it makes mortals immortal and men gods, and leads them away upwards from the earth into super-Olympian regions." Through Christian knowledge the soul returns to its Creator: δεῖ γὰρ ἀποκατασταθῆναι ὅθεν ἀπέστη.

Theophilus agrees with Tatian, in so far as he everywhere appears to contrast Christianity with philosophy. The religious and moral culture of the Greeks is derived from their poets (historians) and philosophers (ad Auto]. II. 3 fin. and elsewhere). However, not only do poets and philosophers contradict each other (II. 5); but the latter also do not agree (II. 4. 8: III. 7), nay, many contradict themselves (III. 3). Not a single one of the so-called philosophers, however, is to be taken seriously;¹ they have devised myths and follies (II. 8); everything they have set forth is useless and godless (III. 2); vain and worthless fame was their aim (III. 3). But God knew beforehand the "drivellings of these hollow philosophers" and made his preparations (II. 15). He of old proclaimed the truth by the mouth of prophets, and these deposited it in holy writings. This truth refers to the knowledge of God, the origin and history of the world, as well as to a virtuous life. The prophetic testimony in regard to it was continued in the Gospel.² Revelation, however, is necessary because this wisdom of the philosophers and poets is really demon wisdom, for they were inspired by devils.³ Thus the most extreme contrasts appear to exist here. Still, *Theophilus* is constrained to confess that

¹ Nor is Plato "ὁ δοκῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς σεμνότερον πεφιλοσοφηκέναι" any better than Epicurus and the Stoics (III. 6). Correct views which are found in him in a greater measure than in the others (ὁ δοκῶν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτερος γεγενῆσθαι), did not prevent him from giving way to the stupidest babbling (III. 16). Although he knew that the full truth can only be learned from God himself through the law (III. 17), he indulged in the most foolish guesses concerning the beginning of history. But where guesses find a place, truth is not to be found (III. 16: εἰ δὲ εἰκασμῶ, οὐκ ἔρα ἀληθῆ ἐστὶν τὰ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ εἰρημέναι).

² *Theophilus* confesses (I. 14) exactly as Tatian does: καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ἠπίστων τοῦτο ἔσθαι, ἀλλὰ νῦν κατανοήσας αὐτὰ πιστεύω, ἅμα καὶ ἐπιτυχῶν ἱερῆς γραφῆς τῶν ἀγίων προφητῶν, οἱ καὶ προεῖπον διὰ πνεύματος Θεοῦ τὰ προγεγονότα ἢ προτι γέγονεν καὶ τὰ ἐνεστώτα τίνι τρόπῳ γίνεται, καὶ τὰ ἐπερχόμενα ποῖα τάξει ἀκριτοῦσθεται. ³ Ἀποδείξιν οὖν λαβὼν τῶν γινομένων καὶ προαναπεφωνημένων οὐκ ἀπιστῶ; see also II. 8—10, 22, 30, 33—35: III. 10, 11, 17. *Theophilus* merely looks on the Gospel as a continuation of the prophetic revelations and injunctions. Of Christ, however, he did not speak at all, but only of the Logos (Pneuma), which has operated from the beginning. To *Theophilus* the first chapters of Genesis already contain the sum of all Christian knowledge (II. 10—32).

³ See II. 8: ὑτὸ δαίμόνων δὲ ἐμπνευσθέντες καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν ψυσιωθέντες ἔειπον δι' αὐτῶν εἶπον.

truth was not only announced by the Sibyl, to whom his remarks do not apply, for she is (II. 36): ἐν Ἑλλησιν καὶ ἐν τοῖς λοιποῖς ἔθνεσιν γενομένη προφῆτις, but that poets and philosophers, "though against their will", also gave clear utterances regarding the justice, the judgment, and the punishments of God, as well as regarding his providence in respect to the living and the dead, or, in other words, about the most important points (II. 37, 38, 8 fin.). Theophilus gives a double explanation of this fact. On the one hand he ascribes it to the imitation of holy writings (II. 12, 37: I. 14), and on the other he admits that those writers, when the demons abandoned them (τῶ ψυχῶν ἐκνήψαυτες ἐξ αὐτῶν), of themselves displayed a knowledge of the divine sovereignty, the judgment etc., which agrees with the teachings of the prophets (II. 8). This admission need not cause astonishment; for the freedom and control of his own destiny with which man is endowed (II. 27) must infallibly lead him to correct knowledge and obedience to God, as soon as he is no longer under the sway of the demons. Theophilus did not apply the title of philosophy to Christian truth, this title being in his view discredited; but Christianity is to him the "wisdom of God", which by luminous proofs convinces the men who reflect on their own nature.¹

¹ The unknown author of the work *de resurrectione*, which goes under the name of Justin (Corp. Apol., Vol. III.) has given a surprising expression to the thought that it is simply impossible to give a demonstration of truth. (Ὁ μὲν τῆς ἀληθείας λόγος ἐστὶν ἐλεύθερός τε καὶ ἀντεξούσιος, ὑπὸ μηδεμίαν βᾶσανον ἐλέγχου βέλων πίπτειν μηδὲ τὴν παρὰ τοῖς ἀκούουσι δι' ἀποδείξεως ἐξέτασιν ὑπομένειν. Τὸ γὰρ εὐγενὲς αὐτοῦ καὶ πεποιθὸς αὐτῷ τῷ πέμψαντι πιστεῦσθαι βέλει.) He inveighs in the beginning of his treatise against all rationalism, and on the one hand professes a sort of materialistic theory of knowledge, whilst on the other, for that very reason, he believes in inspiration and the authority of revelation: for all truth originates with revelation, since God himself and God alone is the truth. Christ revealed this truth and is for us τῶν ὅλων πίστις καὶ ἀποδείξις. But it is far from probable that the author would really have carried this proposition to its logical conclusion (Justin, Dial. 3 ff. made a similar start). He wishes to meet his adversaries "armed with the arguments of faith which are unconquered" (c. I., p. 214), but the arguments of faith are still the arguments of reason. Among these he regarded it as most important that even according to the theories about the world, that is, about God and matter, held by the "so-called sages", Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, the assumption of a resurrection of the flesh is not irrational (c. 6, p. 228 f.). Some of these, viz., Pythagoras and Plato, also acknowledged the im-

*Tertullian and Minucius Felix.*¹ Whilst, in the case of the Greek Apologists, the acknowledgment of revelation appears conditioned by philosophical scepticism on the one hand, and by the strong impression of the dominion of the demons on the other, the sceptical element is not only wanting in the Latin Apologists, but the Christian truth is even placed in direct opposition to the sceptical philosophy and on the side of philosophical dogmatism, *i.e.*, Stoicism.² Nevertheless the observations of Tertullian and Minucius Felix with regard to the essence of Christianity, viewed as philosophy and as revelation, are at bottom completely identical with the conception of the Greek Apologists, although it is undeniable that in the former case the revealed character of Christianity is placed in the background.³ The recognition of this fact is exceedingly instructive, for it proves

mortality of the soul. But, for that very reason, this view is not sufficient. "for if the Redeemer had only brought the message of the (eternal) life of the soul what new thing would he have proclaimed in addition to what had been made known by Pythagoras, Plato, and the band of their adherents?" (c. 10, p. 246) This remark is very instructive, for it shows what considerations led the Apologists to adhere to the belief in the resurrection of the body. Zahn, (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. VIII., pp. 1 f., 20 f.) has lately reassigned to Justin himself the fragment *de resurr.* His argument, though displaying great plausibility, has nevertheless not fully convinced me. The question is of great importance for fixing the relation of Justin to Paul. I shall not discuss Hermias' "*Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum*", as the period when this Christian disputant flourished is quite uncertain. We still possess an early-Church Apology in Pseudo-Melito's "*Oratio ad Antoninum Cæsarem*" (Otto, *Corp. Apol.* IX., p. 423 sq.). This book is preserved (written?) in the Syrian language and was addressed to Caracalla or Heliogabalus (preserved in the *Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add.* 14658). It is probably dependent on Justin, but it is less polished and more violent than his Apology.

¹ Masebieu (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1887, Vol. XV. No. 3) has convinced me that Minucius wrote at a later period than Tertullian and made use of his works.

² Cf. the plan of the "*Octavius*". The champion of heathenism here opposed to the Christian is a philosopher representing the standpoint of the middle Academy. This presupposes, as a matter of course, that the latter undertakes the defence of the Stoical position. See, besides, the corresponding arguments in the Apology of Tertullian, *e.g.*, c. 17, as well as his tractate: "*de testimonio animæ naturaliter Christianæ*". We need merely mention that the work of Minucius is throughout dependent on Cicero's book, "*de natura deorum*." In this treatise he takes up a position more nearly akin to heathen syncretism than Tertullian.

³ In R. Kühn's investigation ("*Der Octavius des Min. Felix*", Leipzig, 1882) —the best special work we possess on an early Christian Apology from the point

that the conception of Christianity set forth by the Apologists was not an individual one, but the necessary expression of the conviction that Christian truth contains the completion and guarantee of philosophical knowledge. To Minucius Felix (and Tertullian) Christian truth chiefly presents itself as the wisdom implanted by nature in every man (Oct. 16. 5). In so far as man possesses reason and speech and accomplishes the task of the "examination of the universe" ("inquisitio universitatis"), conditioned by this gift, he has the Christian truth, that is, he finds Christianity in his own constitution, and in the rational order of the world. Accordingly, Minucius is also able to demonstrate the Christian doctrines by means of the Stoic principle of knowledge, and arrives at the conclusion that Christianity is a philosophy, *i.e.*, the true philosophy, and that philosophers are to be considered Christians in proportion as they have discovered the truth.¹ Moreover, as he represented Christian ethics to be the expression of the Stoic, and depicted the Christian bond of brotherhood as a cosmopolitan union of philosophers, who have become conscious of their natural similarity,² the revealed character of Christianity appears to be entirely given up. This religion is natural enlightenment, the revelation of a truth contained in the world and in man, the discovery of the one God from the open book of creation. The difference between him and an Apologist like Tatian seems here to be a radical one. But, if we look more closely, we find that Minucius—and not less Tertullian—has abandoned Stoic rationalism in vital points. We may regard his apologetic aim as his excuse for clearly drawing the logical conclusions from these inconsis-

of view of the history of dogma—based on a very careful analysis of the Octavius, more emphasis is laid on the difference than on the agreement between Minucius and the Greek Apologists. The author's exposition requires to be supplemented in the latter respect (see *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1883, No. 6).

¹ C. 20: *Exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum . . . , ut quivis arbitretur, aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos.*"

² See Minucius, 31 ff. A quite similar proceeding is already found in Tertullian, who in his *Apologeticum* has everywhere given a Stoic colouring to Christian ethics and rules of life, and in c. 39 has drawn a complete veil over the peculiarity of the Christian societies.

encies himself. However, these deviations of his from the doctrines of the Stoa are not merely prompted by Christianity, but rather have already become an essential component of his philosophical theory of the world. In the first place, Minucius developed a detailed theory of the pernicious activity of the demons (cc. 26, 27). This was a confession that human nature was not what it ought to be, because an evil element had penetrated it from without. Secondly, he no doubt acknowledged (I. 4 : 16, 5) the natural light of wisdom in humanity, but nevertheless remarked (32, 9) that our thoughts are darkness when measured by the clearness of God. Finally, and this is the most essential point, after appealing to various philosophers when expounding his doctrine of the final conflagration of the world, he suddenly repudiated this tribunal, declaring that the Christians follow the prophets, and that philosophers "have formed this shadowy picture of distorted truth in imitation of the divine predictions of the prophets" (34). Here we have now a union of all the elements already found in the Greek Apologists; only they are, as it were, hid in the case of Minucius. But the final proof that he agreed with them in the main is found in the exceedingly contemptuous judgment which he in conclusion passed on all philosophers and indeed on philosophy generally¹ (34, 5 : 38, 5). This judgment is not to be explained, as in Tertullian's case, by the fact that his Stoic opinions led him to oppose natural perception to all philosophical theory—for this, at most, cannot have been more than a secondary contributing cause,² but by the fact that he is conscious of following *revealed* wisdom.³

¹ Tertullian has done exactly the same thing: see Apolog. 46 (and de præscr. 7.)

² Tertull., de testim. I.: "Sed non eam te (animam) advoco, quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academiis et porticibus Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impolitam et idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent... Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ tuæ nemo credit."

³ Tertull., Apol. 46: "Quid simile philosophus et Christianus? Græciæ discipulus et cæli?" de præscr. 7: "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiæ et ecclesiæ?" Minuc. 38,5: "Philosophorum supercilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et adulteros novimus... nos, qui non habitu sapientiam sed mente præferimus, non eloquimur magna sed vivimus, gloriamur nos consecutos, quod illi summa intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Quid ingrati sumus, quid nobis invidemus, si veritas divinitatis nostri temporis ætate maturuit?"

Revelation is necessary because mankind must be aided from without, *i.e.*, by God. In this idea man's need of redemption is acknowledged, though not to the same extent as by Seneca and Epictetus. But no sooner does Minucius perceive the teachings of the prophets to be divine truth than man's natural endowment and the speculation of philosophers sink for him into darkness. Christianity is the wisdom which philosophers sought, but were not able to find.¹

We may sum up the doctrines of the Apologists as follows: (1) Christianity is revelation, *i.e.*, it is the divine wisdom, proclaimed of old by the prophets and, by reason of its origin, possessing an absolute certainty which can also be recognised in the fulfilment of their predictions. As divine wisdom Christianity is contrasted with, and puts an end to, all natural and philosophical knowledge. (2) Christianity is the enlightenment corresponding to the natural but impaired knowledge of man.² It embraces all the elements of truth in philosophy, whence it is *the* philosophy; and helps man to realise the knowledge with which he is naturally endowed. (3) Revelation of the rational was and is necessary, because man has fallen under the sway of the demons. (4) The efforts of philosophers to ascertain the right knowledge were in vain; and this is, above all, shown by the fact that they neither overthrew polytheism nor brought about a really moral life. Moreover, so far as they discovered the truth, they owed it to the prophets from whom they borrowed

¹ Minucius did not enter closely into the significance of Christ any more than Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus; he merely touched upon it (9. 4 : 29. 2). He also viewed Christianity as the teaching of the Prophets; whoever acknowledges the latter must of necessity adore the crucified Christ. Tertullian was accordingly the first Apologist after Justin who again considered it necessary to give a detailed account of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos (see the 21st chapter of the Apology in its relation to chaps. 17—20).

² Among the Greek Apologists the unknown author of the work "de Monarchia", which bears the name of Justin, has given clearest expression to this conception. He is therefore most akin to Minucius (see chap. I.). Here monotheism is designated as the *καθολικὴ δόξα* which has fallen into oblivion through bad habit; for *τῆς ἀνθρώπινης φύσεως τὸ κατ' ἀρχὴν συζυγίαν συνέσεως καὶ σωτηρίας λαβούσης εἰς ἐπίγνωσιν ἀληθείας θρησκείας τε τῆς εἰς τὸν ἕνα καὶ πάντων δεσπότην*. According to this, then, only an awakening is required,

it; at least it is uncertain whether they even attained a knowledge of fragments of the truth by their own independent efforts.¹ But it is certain that many seeming truths in the writings of the philosophers were imitations of the truth by evil demons. This is the origin of all polytheism, which is, moreover, to some extent an imitation of Christian institutions. (5) The confession of Christ is simply included in the acknowledgment of the wisdom of the prophets; the doctrine of the truth did not receive a new content through Christ; he only made it accessible to the world and strengthened it (victory over the demons; special features acknowledged by Justin and Tertullian). (6) The practical test of Christianity is first contained in the fact that all persons are able to grasp it, for women and uneducated men here become veritable sages; secondly in the fact that it has the power of producing a holy life, and of overthrowing the tyranny of the demons. In the Apologists, therefore, Christianity served itself heir to antiquity, *i.e.*, to the result of the monotheistic knowledge and ethics of the Greeks: "Ὅσα οὖν παρὰ πᾶσι καλῶς εἰρηγῆαι ἡμῶν τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐστὶν" (Justin, Apol. II. 13). It traced its origin back to the beginning of the world. Everything true and good which elevates mankind springs from divine revelation, and is at the same time genuinely human, because it is a clear expression of what man finds within him and of his destination (Justin, Apol. I. 46: *οἱ μετὰ λόγου βιώσαντες Χριστιανοὶ εἰσι, καὶ ἄθεοι ἐνομισθησαν, οἷον ἐν Ἑλληνισμῶν Σωκράτης καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ οἱ ἕμιοι αὐτοῖς, ἐν βαρβάροις δὲ Ἀβραάμ κατ' ἄλλοις*... "those that have lived with reason are Christians, even though they were accounted atheists, such as Socrates and Heraclitus and those similar to them among the Greeks, and Abraham etc. among the barbarians"). But everything true and good is Christian, for Christianity is nothing else than the teaching of revelation. No second formula can be imagined in which the claim of Christianity to be the religion of the world is so powerfully expressed (hence also the endeavour of the Apologists to

¹ But almost all the Apologists acknowledged that heathendom possessed prophets. They recognise these in the Sibyls and the old poets. The author of the work "de Monarchia" expressed the most pronounced views in regard to this. Hermas (Vis. II. 4). however, shows that the Apologists owed this notion also to an idea that was widespread among Christian people.

reconcile Christianity and the Empire), nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of one where the specific content of traditional Christianity is so thoroughly neutralised as it is here. But the really epoch-making feature is the fact that the intellectual culture of mankind now appears reconciled and united with religion. The "dogmas" are the expression of this. Finally, these fundamental presuppositions also result in a quite definite idea of the essence of revelation and of the content of reason. The essence of revelation consists in its form: it is divine communication through a miraculous inward working. All the media of revelation are passive organs of the Holy Spirit (Athenag. Supplic. 7; Pseudo-Justin, Cohort. 8; Justin, Dialogue 115. 7; Apol. I. 31, 33, 36; etc.; see also Hippolytus, de Christo et Antichr. 2). These were not necessarily at all times in a state of ecstasy, when they received the revelations; but they were no doubt in a condition of absolute receptivity. The Apologists had no other idea of revelation. What they therefore viewed as the really decisive proof of the reality of revelation is the prediction of the future, for the human mind does not possess this power. It was only in connection with this proof that the Apologists considered it important to show what Moses, David, Isaiah, etc., had proclaimed in the Old Testament, that is, these names have only a *chronological* significance. This also explains their interest in a history of the world, in so far as this interest originated in the effort to trace the chain of prophets up to the beginning of history, and to prove the higher antiquity of revealed truth as compared with all human knowledge and errors, particularly as found among the Greeks (clear traces in Justin,¹ first detailed argument in Tatian).² If, however, strictly speaking, it is only the form and not the content of revelation that is supernatural in so far as this content coincides with that of reason, it is evident that the Apologists simply took the content of the latter for granted and stated it dogmatically. So, whether they expressed themselves in strictly Stoic fashion or not, they all essentially agree in the assumption that true religion

¹ See Justin. Apol. I. 31. Dial. 7. p. 30 etc.

² See Tatian. c. 31 ff.

and morality are the natural content of reason. Even Tatian forms no exception, though he himself protests against the idea.

3. *The doctrines of Christianity as the revealed and rational religion.*

The Apologists frequently spoke of the doctrines or "dogmas" of Christianity; and the whole content of this religion as philosophy is included in these dogmas.¹ According to what we have already set forth there can be no doubt about the character of

¹ In the New Testament the content of the Christian faith is nowhere designated as dogma. In Clement (I. II.), Hermas, and Polycarp the word is not found at all; yet Clement (I. 20. 4. 27. 5) called the divine order of nature τὰ θεοδογματισμένα ὑπὸ Θεοῦ. In Ignatius (ad Magn. XIII. 1) we read: σπουδάζετε οὖν βεβηιωθῆναι ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν τοῦ κυρίου καὶ τῶν ἀποστόλων, but δόγματα here exclusively mean the rules of life (see Zahn on this passage), and this is also their signification in Διδαχὴ XI. 3. In the Epistle of Barnabas we read in several passages (I. 6 : IX. 7 : X. 1. 9 f.) of "dogmas of the Lord"; but by these he means partly particular mysteries, partly divine dispensations. Hence the Apologists are the first to apply the word to the Christian faith, in accordance with the language of philosophy. They are also the first who employed the ideas θεολογεῖν and θεολογία. The latter word is twice found in Justin (Dial. 56) in the sense of "aliquem nominare deum". In Dial. 113, however, it has the more comprehensive sense of "to make religio-scientific investigations". Tatian (10) also used the word in the first sense: on the contrary he entitled a book of which he was the author "πρὸς τοὺς ἀποφηνιζόμενους τὰ περὶ Θεοῦ" and not "πρὸς τοὺς θεολογοῦντας". In Athenagoras (Suppl. 10) theology is the doctrine of God and of all beings to whom the predicate "Deity" belongs (see also 20. 22). That is the old usage of the word. It was thus employed by Tertullian in ad nat. II. 1 (the threefold division of theology: in II. 2, 3 the expression "theologia physica, mythica" refers to this); Cohort. ad Gr. 3. 22. The anonymous writer in Eusebius (H. E. V. 28. 4. 5) is instructive on the point. Brilliant demonstrations of the ancient use of the word "theology" are found in Natorp, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Philosophische Monatshefte, 1887, Parts 1 and 2, pp. 55—64). The title "theology", as applied to a philosophic discipline, was first used by the Stoics: the old poets were previously called "theologians", and the "theological" stage was the prescientific one which is even earlier than the "childhood" of "physicists" (so Aristotle speaks throughout). To the Fathers of the Church also the old poets are still οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι. But side by side with this we have an adoption of the Stoic view that there is also a philosophical theology, because the teaching of the old poets concerning the gods conceals under the veil of myth a treasure of philosophical truth. In the Stoa arose the "impossible idea of a 'theology' which is to be philosophy, that is, knowledge based on reason, and yet to have positive religion as the foundation of its certainty." The Apologists accepted this, but added to it the distinction of a κοσμικὴ καὶ θεολογικὴ σοφία.

Christian dogmas. *They are the rational truths, revealed by the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and summarised in Christ (Χριστὸς λόγος καὶ νόμος), which in their unity represent the divine wisdom, and the recognition of which leads to virtue and eternal life.* The Apologists considered it their chief task to set forth these doctrines, and hence they can be reproduced with all desirable clearness. The dogmatic scheme of the Apologists may therefore be divided into three component parts. These are: (A) Christianity viewed as monotheistic cosmology (God as the Father of the world); (B) Christianity as the highest morality and righteousness (God as the judge who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness); (C) Christianity regarded as redemption (God as the Good One who assists man and rescues him from the power of the demons).¹ Whilst the first two ideas are expressed in a clear and precise manner, it is equally true that the third is not worked out in a lucid fashion. This, as will afterwards be seen, is, on the one hand, the result of the Apologists' doctrine of freedom, and, on the other, of their inability to discover a specific significance for the *person* of Christ within the sphere of revelation. Both facts again are ultimately to be explained from their moralism.

The essential content of revealed philosophy is viewed by the Apologists (see A, B) as comprised in three doctrines.² First, there is one spiritual and inexpressibly exalted God, who is Lord and Father of the world. Secondly, he requires a holy life. Thirdly, he will at last sit in judgment, and will reward the good with immortality and punish the wicked with death. The teaching concerning God, virtue, and eternal reward is traced to the prophets and Christ; but the bringing about of a virtuous

¹ Christ has a relation to all three parts of the scheme, (1) as *λόγος*: (2) as *νόμος, νομοθέτης, and κριτής*: (3) as *διδάσκαλος and σωτήρ*.

² In the reproduction of the apologetical theology historians of dogma have preferred to follow Justin: but here they have constantly overlooked the fact that Justin was the most Christian among the Apologists, and that the features of his teaching to which particular value is rightly attached, are either not found in the others at all (with the exception of Tertullian), or else in quite rudimentary form. It is therefore proper to put the doctrines common to all the Apologists in the foreground, and to describe what is peculiar to Justin as such, so far as it agrees with New Testament teachings or contains an anticipation of the future tenor of dogma.

life (of righteousness) has been necessarily left by God to men themselves; for God has created man free, and virtue can only be acquired by man's own efforts. The prophets and Christ are therefore a source of righteousness in so far as they are teachers. But as God, that is, the divine Word (which we need not here discuss) has spoken in them, Christianity is to be defined as the Knowledge of God, mediated by the Deity himself, and as a virtuous walk in the longing after eternal and perfect life with God, as well as in the sure hope of this imperishable reward. By knowing what is true and doing what is good man becomes righteous and a partaker of the highest bliss. This knowledge, which has the character of divine instruction,¹ rests on faith in the divine revelation. This revelation has the nature and power of redemption in so far as the fact is undoubted that without it men cannot free themselves from the tyranny of the demons, whilst believers in revelation are enabled by the Spirit of God to put them to flight. Accordingly, the dogmas of Christian philosophy theoretically contain the monotheistic cosmology, and practically the rules for a holy life, which appears as a renunciation of the world and as a new order of society.² The goal is immortal life, which consists in the full knowledge and contemplation of God. The dogmas of revelation lie between the cosmology and ethics; they are indefinitely expressed so far as they contain the idea of salvation; but they are very precisely worded in so far as they guarantee the truth of the cosmology and ethics.

I. The dogmas which express the knowledge of God and the world are dominated by the fundamental idea that the world as the created, conditioned, and transient is contrasted with something

¹ Cicero's proposition (*de nat. deor.* II. 66. 167): "nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit," which was the property of all the idealistic philosophers of the age, is found in the Apologists reproduced in the most various forms (see, e.g., Tatian 29). That all knowledge of the truth, both among the prophets and those who follow their teaching, is derived from inspiration was in their eyes a matter of certainty. But here they were only able to frame a theory in the case of the prophets; for such a theory strictly applied to all would have threatened the spontaneous character of the knowledge of the truth.

² Justin, *Apol.* I. 3: Ἡμετέρον οὖν ἔργον καὶ βίου καὶ μαθημάτων τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν πᾶσι παρέχειν.

self-existing, unchangeable and eternal, which is the first cause of the world. This self-existing Being has none of the attributes which belong to the world; hence he is exalted above every name and has in himself no distinctions. This implies, first, the unity and uniqueness of this eternal Being; secondly, his spiritual nature, for everything bodily is subject to change; and, finally, his perfection, for the self-existent and eternal requires nothing. Since, however, he is the cause of all being, himself being unconditioned, he is the fulness of all being or true being itself (Tatian 5: *καθὸ πάντα δυνάμεις ἑρατῶν τε καὶ ἀράτων αὐτὸς ὑπόστασις ἦν, σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα*). As the living and spiritual Being he reveals himself in free creations, which make known his omnipotence and wisdom, *i. e.*, his operative reason. These creations are, moreover, a proof of the goodness of the Deity, for they can be no result of necessities, in so far as God is in himself perfect. Just because he is perfect, the Eternal Essence is also the Father of all virtues, in so far as he contains no admixture of what is defective. These virtues include both the goodness which manifests itself in his creations, and the righteousness which gives to the creature what belongs to him, in accordance with the position he has received. On the basis of this train of thought the Apologists lay down the dogmas of the monarchy of God (*τῶν ἔλων τὸ μοναρχικόν*); his supramundaneness (*τὸ ἄρηχτον, τὸ ἀνεκφραστον, τὸ ἀχώρητον, τὸ ἀκατάληπτον, τὸ ἀπεριώρητον, τὸ ἀσύγκριτον, τὸ ἀσυμβίβαστον, τὸ ἀνεκδιηγητόν*; see Justin, *Apol.* II. 6; Theoph. I. 3); his unity (*εἷς Θεός*); his having no beginning (*ἀναρχος, ἔτι ἀγένητος*); his eternity and unchangeableness (*ἀναλλοίωτος καθότι ἀθάνατος*); his perfection (*τέλειος*); his need of nothing (*ἀπροσδεής*); his spiritual nature (*πνεῦμα ὁ Θεός*); his absolute causality (*αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τοῦ παντὸς ἢ ὑπόστασις, the motionless mover, see Aristides c. 1*); his creative activity (*κτίστης τῶν πάντων*); his sovereignty (*δεσπότης τῶν ἔλων*); his fatherhood (*πατὴρ διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸν πρὸ τῶν ἔλων*) his reason-power (God as *λόγος, νοῦς, πνεῦμα, σοφία*); his omnipotence (*παντοκράτωρ ὅτι αὐτὸς τὰ πάντα κρατεῖ καὶ ἐμπεριέχει*); his righteousness and goodness (*πατὴρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ παστῶν τῶν ἀρετῶν χρηστέτης*). These dogmas are set forth by one Apologist in a more detailed, and by another in a more concise form,

but three points are emphasised by all. First, God is primarily to be conceived as the First Cause. Secondly, the principle of moral good is also the principle of the world. Thirdly, the principle of the world, that is, the Deity, as being the immortal and eternal, forms the contrast to the world which is the transient. In the cosmology of the Apologists the two fundamental ideas are that God is the Father and Creator of the world, but that, as uncreated and eternal, he is also the complete contrast to it.¹

These dogmas about God were not determined by the Apologists from the standpoint of the Christian Church which is awaiting an introduction into the Kingdom of God; but were deduced from a contemplation of the world on the one hand (see particularly Tatian, 4; Theophilus, I. 5, 6), and of the moral nature of man on the other. But, in so far as the latter itself belongs to the sphere of created things, the cosmos is the starting-point of their speculations. This is everywhere dominated by reason and order;² it bears the impress of the divine Logos, and that in a double sense. On the one hand it appears as the copy of a higher, eternal world, for if we imagine transient and changeable matter removed, it is a wonderful complex of spiritual forces; on the other it presents itself as the finite product of a rational will. Moreover, the matter which lies at its basis is nothing bad, but an indifferent substance created by God,³ though indeed perishable. In its constitution the world is in every respect a structure worthy of God.⁴ Nevertheless, according to the Apologists, the direct author of the world was not God, but the personified power of reason which they per-

¹ See the exposition of the doctrine of God in Aristides with the conclusion found in all the Apologists, that God requires no offerings and presents.

² Even Tatian says in c. 19: *Κόσμου μὲν γὰρ ἡ κατασκευὴ καλή, τὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ πολίτευμα ψαῦλον.*

³ Tatian 5: *Οὔτε ἀναρχος ἡ ὕλη κατὰπερ ὁ Θεός, οὐδὲ διὰ τὸ ἀναρχον καὶ αὐτῆ ἰσοδύναμος τῷ Θεῷ· γεννητὴ δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἄλλου γεγενητῆ μόνον θε ὑπο τοῦ πάντων δημιουργοῦ προβεβλημένη.* 12. Even Justin does not seem to have taught otherwise, though that is not quite certain: see *Apol.* I. 10, 59, 64, 67; II. 6. Theophilus I. 4: II. 4, 10, 13 says very plainly: *ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν. . . . τί δὲ μέγα, εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐποίησεν τὸν κόσμον;*

⁴ Hence the knowledge of God and the right knowledge of the world are most closely connected; see Tatian 27: *ἡ Θεοῦ κατὰλληψις ἢν ἔχω περὶ τῶν ὄλων.*

ceived in the cosmos and represented as the immediate source of the universe. The motive for this dogma and the interest in it would be wrongly determined by alleging that the Apologists purposely introduced the Logos in order to separate God from matter, because they regarded this as something bad. This idea of Philo's cannot at least have been adopted by them as the result of conscious reflection, for it does not agree with their conception of matter; nor is it compatible with their idea of God and their belief in Providence, which is everywhere firmly maintained. Still less indeed can it be shown that they were all impelled to this dogma from their view of Jesus Christ, since in this connection, with the exception of Justin and Tertullian, they manifested no specific interest in the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus. The adoption of the dogma of the Logos is rather to be explained thus: (1) The idea of God, derived by abstraction from the cosmos, did indeed, like that of the idealistic philosophy, involve the element of unity and spirituality, which implied a sort of personality; but the fulness of all spiritual forces, the essence of everything imperishable were quite as essential features of the conception; for in spite of the transcendence inseparable from the notion of God, this idea was nevertheless meant to explain the world.¹ Accordingly, they required a formula capable of expressing the transcendent and unchangeable nature of God on the one hand, and his fulness of creative and spiritual powers on the other. But the latter attributes themselves had again to be comprehended in a unity, because the law of the cosmos bore the appearance of a harmonious one. From this arose the idea of the Logos, and indeed the latter was necessarily distinguished from God as a separate existence, as soon as the realisation of the powers residing in God was represented as beginning. *The Logos is the hypostasis of the operative power of reason, which at once preserves the unity and unchangeableness of God in spite of the exercise of the powers residing in him, and renders this very exercise possible.* (2) Though the Apologists believed in the divine origin of the revelation given to the prophets, on which

¹ The beginning of the fifth chapter of Tatian's Oration is specially instructive here.

all knowledge of truth is based, they could nevertheless not be induced by this idea to represent God himself as a direct actor. For that revelation presupposes a speaker and a spoken word; but it would be an impossible thought to make the fulness of all essence and the first cause of all things speak. The Deity cannot be a speaking and still less a visible person, yet according to the testimony of the prophets, a Divine Person was seen by them. The Divine Being who makes himself known on earth in audible and visible fashion can only be the Divine Word. As, however, according to the fundamental view of the Apologists the principle of religion, *i.e.*, of the knowledge of the truth, is also the principle of the world, so that Divine Word, which imparts the right knowledge of the world, must be identical with the Divine Reason which produced the world itself. In other words, the Logos is not only the creative Reason of God, but also his revealing Word. This explains the motive and aim of the dogma of the Logos. We need not specially point out that nothing more than the precision and certainty of the Apologists' manner of statement is peculiar here; the train of thought itself belongs to Greek philosophy. But that very confidence is the most essential feature of the case; for in fact the firm belief that the principle of the world is also that of revelation represents an important early-Christian idea, though indeed in the form of philosophical reflection. To the majority of the Apologists the theoretical content of the Christian faith is completely exhausted in this proposition. They required no particular Christology, for in every revelation of God by his Word they already recognised a proof of his existence not to be surpassed, and consequently regarded it as Christianity *in nuce*.¹ But the fact that the Apologists made a distinction *in thesi* between the prophetic Spirit of God and the Logos, without being able to make any use of this distinction,

¹ According to what has been set forth in the text it is incorrect to assert that the Apologists adopted the Logos doctrine in order to reconcile monotheism with the divine honours paid to the crucified Christ. The truth rather is that the Logos doctrine was already part of their creed before they gave any consideration to the person of the historical Christ, and *vice versa* Christ's right to divine honours was to them a matter of certainty independently of the Logos doctrine.

is a very clear instance of their dependence on the formulæ of the Church's faith. Indeed their conception of the Logos continually compelled them to identify the Logos and the Spirit, just as they not unfrequently define Christianity as the belief in the true God and in his Son, without mentioning the Spirit.¹ Further their dependence on the Christian tradition is shown in the fact that the most of them expressly designated the Logos as the *Son* of God.²

The Logos doctrine of the Apologists is an essentially unanimous

¹ We find the distinction of Logos (Son) and Spirit in Justin, Apol. I. 5. and in every case where he quotes formulæ (if we are not to assume the existence of interpolation in the text, which seems to me not improbable: see now also Cramer in the Theologische Studien, 1893, pp. 17 ff., 138 ff.). In Tatian 13 fin. the Spirit is represented as *ὁ διάκονος τοῦ πεπονθότος Θεοῦ*. The conception in Justin, Dial. 116. is similar. Father, Word, and prophetic Spirit are spoken of in Athenag. 10. The express designation *τρίων* is first found in Theophilus (but see the Excerpta ex Theodoto); see II. 15: *αἱ τρεῖς ἡμέραι τύποι εἰσὶν τῆς τριάδος, τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς σοφίας αὐτοῦ*; see II. 10, 18. But it is just in Theophilus that the difficulty of deciding between Logos and Wisdom appears with special plainness (II. 10). The interposition of the host of good angels between Son and Spirit found in Justin, Apol. I. 5 (see Athenag.), is exceedingly striking. We have, however, to notice, provided the text is right, (1) that this interposition is only found in a single passage, (2) that Justin wished to refute the reproach of *ἀθεότης*, (3) that the placing of the Spirit after the angels does not necessarily imply a position inferior to theirs, but merely a subordination to the Son and the Father common to the Spirit and the angels, (4) that the good angels were also invoked by the Christians, because they were conceived as mediators of prayer (see my remark on I. Clem. ad Corinth. LVI. 1); they might have found a place here just for this latter reason. On the significance of the Holy Spirit in the theology of Justin, see Zahn's Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 228: "If there be any one theologian of the early Church who might be regarded as depriving the Holy Spirit of all scientific *raison d'être* at least on the ground of having no distinctive(?) activity, and the Father of all share in revelation, it is Justin." We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a doctrine of the Trinity.

² To Justin the name of the Son is the most important; see also Athenag. 10. The Logos had indeed been already called the Son of God by Philo, and Celsus expressly says (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31): "If according to your doctrine the Word is really the Son of God then we agree with you:" but the Apologists are the first to attach the name of Son to the Logos as a proper designation. If, however, the Logos is intrinsically the Son of God, then Christ is the Son of God, not because he is the begotten of God in the flesh (early Christian), but because the spiritual being existing in him is the antemundane reproduction of God (see Justin, Apol. II. 6: *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ Θεοῦ, ὁ μόνος λεγόμενος κυριῶς υἱός*)—a momentous expression.

one. Since God cannot be conceived as without reason, *λόγος*, but as the fulness of all reason,¹ he has always Logos in himself. This Logos is on the one hand the divine consciousness itself, and on the other the power (idea and energy) to which the world is due; he is not separate from God, but is contained in his essence.² For the sake of the creation God produced (sent forth, projected) the Logos from himself, that is, he engendered³ him from his essence by a free and simple act of will (*Θεός ἐκ Θεοῦ πεφυκώς ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ*. Dial. 61). Then for the first time the Logos became a hypostasis separate from God, or, in other words, he first came into existence; and, in virtue of his origin, he possesses the following distinctive features:⁴

¹ Athenag., 10; Tatian, Orat. 5.

² The clearest expression of this is in Tatian 5, which passage is also to be compared with the following: *Θεός ἦν ἐν ἀρχῇ, τὴν δὲ ἀρχὴν λόγου δυνάμιν παρειλύψαμεν. Ὁ γὰρ δεσπότης τῶν ὅλων, αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων τοῦ παντός ἢ ὑπόστασις, κατὰ μὲν τὴν μηδέπω γεγεννημένην ποίησιν μόνος ἦν· καὶ ὅτε πάντα δυνάμεις, ὁρατῶν τε καὶ ἀοράτων αὐτὸς ὑπόστασις ἦν, σὺν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα σὺν αὐτῷ διὰ λογικῆς δυνάμεως αὐτὸς καὶ ὁ λόγος, ὅς ἦν ἐν αὐτῷ, ὑπέστησε. Θελήματι δὲ τῆς ἀπλότητος αὐτοῦ προηῶξ λόγος· ὁ δὲ λόγος, οὐ κατὰ κενοῦ χωρήσας, ἔργον πρωτότοκον τοῦ πατρὸς γίνεταί. Τοῦτον ἴσμεν τοῦ κόσμου τὴν ἀρχήν. Γέγονε δὲ κατὰ μερισμὸν, οὐ κατὰ ἀποκοπήν· τὸ γὰρ ἀποτιμῆν τοῦ πρώτου κενώσεται, τὸ δὲ μερισθὲν οἰκονομίας τὴν αἵρεσιν προσλαβὼν οὐκ ἐνδεῖ τὸν ὅθεν εἰληπταί πεποίηκεν. Ὡσπερ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ὁδοῦ ἀνάπτεται μὲν πυρὰ πολλὰ, τῆς δὲ πρώτης ὁδοῦ διὰ τὴν ἕξαιριν τῶν πολλῶν ὁδῶν οὐκ ἐλαττοῦται τὸ φῶς, οὕτω καὶ ὁ λόγος προελθὼν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς δυνάμεως οὐκ ἄλλογον πεποίηκε τὸν γεγεννηκότα. In the identification of the divine consciousness, that is, the power of God, with the force to which the world is due the naturalistic basis of the apologetic speculations is most clearly shown. Cf. Justin, Dial. 128, 129.*

³ The word "beget" (*γενῆναι*) is used by the Apologists, especially Justin, because the name "Son" was the recognised expression for the Logos. No doubt the words *ἐξερέυσθαι*, *προβάλλεσθαι*, *προέρχεσθαι*, *προπηδῆναι* and the like express the physical process more exactly in the sense of the Apologists. On the other hand, however, *γενῆναι* appears the more appropriate word in so far as the relation of the essence of the Logos to the essence of God is most clearly shown by the name "Son".

⁴ None of the Apologists has precisely defined the Logos idea. Zahn, l.c., p. 233, correctly remarks: "Whilst the distinction drawn between the hitherto unspoken and the spoken word of the Creator makes Christ appear as the thought of the world within the mind of God, yet he is also to be something real which only requires to enter into a new relation to God to become an active force. Then again this Word is not to be the thought that God thinks, but the thought that thinks in God. And again it is to be a something, or an Ego, in

(1) The inner essence of the Logos is identical with the essence of God himself; for it is the product of self-separation in God, willed and brought about by himself. Further, the Logos is not cut off and separated from God, nor is he a mere modality in him. He is rather the independent product of the self-unfolding of God (*οὐκ ἐκνομήθη*), which product, though it is the epitome of divine reason, has nevertheless not stripped the Father of this attribute. The Logos is the revelation of God, and the visible God. Consequently the Logos is really God and Lord, *i.e.*, he possesses the divine nature in virtue of his essence. The Apologists, however, only know of one kind of divine nature and this is that which belongs to the Logos. (2) From the moment when he was begotten the Logos is a being distinct from the Father; he is *ἀριθμῶν ἑτερόν τι, Θεὸς ἕτερος, Θεὸς δευτέρος* ("something different in number, another God, a second God.") But his personality only dates from that moment. "Fuit tempus, cum patri filius non fuit," ("there was a time when the Father had no Son", so Tertullian, *adv. Hermog.* 3). The *λόγος προφασιμῶς* is for the first time a hypostasis distinct from the Father, the *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* is not.¹ (3) The Logos has an origin, the Father has not; hence it follows that in relation to God the Logos is a creature; he is the begotten, that is, the created God, the God who has a beginning. Wherefore in rank he is below God (*ἐν δευτέρῳ ἰσχύει—δευτέρος Θεός*, "in the second place,

God's thinking essence, which enters into reciprocal intercourse with something else in God; occasionally also the reason of God which is in a state of active exercise and without which he would not be rational." Considering this evident uncertainty it appears to me a very dubious proceeding to differentiate the conceptions of the Logos in Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, and Theophilus, as is usually done. If we consider that no Apologist wrote a special treatise on the Logos, that Tatian (c. 5) is really the only one from whom we have any precise statements, and that the elements of the conception are the same in all, it appears inadvisable to lay so great stress on the difference as Zahn, for instance, has done in the book already referred to, p. 232 f. Hardly any real difference can have existed between Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus in the Logos doctrine proper. On the other hand Athenagoras certainly seems to have tried to eliminate the appearance of the Logos in time, and to emphasise the eternal nature of the divine relationships, without, however, reaching the position which Irenæus took up here.

¹ This distinction is only found in Theophilus (II. 10); but the idea exists in Tatian and probably also in Justin, though it is uncertain whether Justin regarded the Logos as having any sort of being before the moment of his begetting.

and a second God"), the messenger and servant of God. The subordination of the Logos is not founded on the content of his essence, but on his origin. In relation to the creatures, however, the Logos is the ἀρχή, i.e., not only the beginning but the principle of the vitality and form of everything that is to receive being. As an emanation (the begotten) he is distinguished from all creatures, for he alone is the Son;¹ but, as having a beginning, he again stands on a level with them. Hence the paradoxical expression, ἔργον πρωτότου του πατρὸς ("first begotten work of the Father"), is here the most appropriate designation. (4) In virtue of his finite origin, it is possible and proper for the Logos to enter into the finite, to act, to speak, and to appear. As he arose for the sake of the creation of the world, he has the capacity of personal and direct revelation which does not belong to the infinite God; nay, his whole essence consists in the very fact that he is thought, word, and deed. Behind this active substitute and vicegerent, the Father stands in the darkness of the incomprehensible, and in the incomprehensible light of perfection as the hidden, unchangeable God.²

With the issuing forth of the Logos from God began the realisation of the idea of the world. The world as κόσμος νοητός is contained in the Logos. But the world is material and manifold, the Logos is spiritual and one. Therefore the

¹ Justin, *Apol.* II. 6., *Dial.* 61. The Logos is not produced out of nothing, like the rest of the creatures. Yet it is evident that the Apologists did not yet sharply and precisely distinguish between begetting and creating, as the later theologians did; though some of them certainly felt the necessity for a distinction.

² All the Apologists tacitly assume that the Logos in virtue of his origin has the capacity of entering the finite. The distinction which here exists between Father and Son is very pregnantly expressed by Tertullian (*adv. Marc.* II. 27): "Igitur quaecumque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quaecumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro." But we ought not to charge the Apologists with the theologoumenon that it was an inward necessity for the Logos to become man. Their Logos hovers, as it were, between God and the world, so that he appears as the highest creature, in so far as he is conceived as the production of God; and again seems to be merged in God, in so far as he is looked upon as the consciousness and spiritual force of God. To Justin, however, the incarnation is irrational, and the rest of the Greek Apologists are silent about it.

Logos is not himself the world, but he is its creator and in a certain fashion its archetype. Justin and Tatian used the expression "beget" (*γεννᾶν*) for the creation of the world, but in connections which do not admit of any importance being attached to this use. The world was created out of nothing after a host of spirits, as is assumed by most Apologists, had been created along with heaven, which is a higher, glorious world. The purpose of the creation of the world was and is the production of men, *i.e.*, beings possessed of soul and body, endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore made in the image of God; beings who are to partake of the blessedness and perfection of God. Everything is created for man's sake, and his own creation is a proof of the goodness of God. As beings possessed of soul and body, men are neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of death or immortality.¹ The condition on which men can attain the latter introduces us to ethics. The doctrines, that God is also the absolute Lord of matter; that evil cannot be a quality of matter, but rather arose in time and from the free decision of the spirits or angels; and finally that the world will have an end, but God can call the destroyed material into existence, just as he once created it out of nothing, appear in principle to reconcile the dualism in the cosmology. We have the less occasion to give the details here, because they are known from the philosophical systems of the period, especially Philo's, and vary in manifold ways. All the Apologists, however, are imbued with the idea that this knowledge of God and the world, the genesis of the Logos and cosmos, are the most essential part of Christianity itself.² This conception is really not peculiar to the Apologists: in the second century the great majority of Christians, in so far as they reflected at all, re-

¹ The most of the Apologists argue against the conception of the natural immortality of the human soul: see Tatian 13; Justin, Dial. 5; Theoph. II. 27.

² The first chapter of Genesis represented to them the sum of all wisdom, and therefore of all Christianity. Perhaps Justin had already written a commentary to the Hexaëmeron (see my *Texte und Untersuchungen* I. 1. 2, p. 169 f.). It is certain that in the second century Rhodon (Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 8), Theophilus (see his 2nd Book ad Autol.), Candidus, and Apion (Euseb., H. E. V. 27) composed such. The Gnostics also occupied themselves a great deal with Gen. I.—III.: see, *e.g.*, Marcus in Iren. I. 18.

garded the monotheistic explanation of the world as a main part of the Christian religion. The theoretical view of the world as a harmonious whole, of its order, regularity and beauty; the certainty that all this had been called into existence by an Almighty Spirit; the sure hope that heaven and earth will pass away, but will give place to a still more glorious structure, were always present, and put an end to the bright and gorgeously coloured, but phantastic and vague, cosmogonies and theogonies of antiquity.

2. Their clear system of morality is in keeping with their relatively simple cosmology. In giving man reason and freedom as an inalienable possession God destined him for incorruptibility (*ἀθνησις, ἀφθαρσις*), by the attainment of which he was to become a being similar to God.¹ To the gift of imperishability God, however, attached the condition of man's preserving τὰ τῆς ἀθνησις ("the things of immortality"), *i.e.*, preserving the knowledge of God and maintaining a holy walk in imitation of the divine perfection. This demand is as natural as it is just; moreover, nobody can fulfil it in man's stead, for an essential feature of virtue is its being free, independent action. Man must therefore determine himself to virtue by the knowledge that he is only in this way obedient to the Father of the world and able to reckon on the gift of immortality. The conception of the content of virtue, however, contains an element which cannot be clearly apprehended from the cosmology; moral goodness consists in letting oneself be influenced in no way by the sensuous, but in living solely, after the Spirit, and imitating the perfection and purity of God. Moral badness is giving way to any affection resulting from the natural basis of man. The Apologists undoubtedly believe that virtue consists negatively in man's renunciation of what his natural constitution of soul and body demands or impels him to. Some express this thought

¹ See Theophilus ad Aut. II. 27: Εἰ γὰρ ὁ Θεὸς ἀθάνατον τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀπ' ἀρχῆς πεποιήκει, Θεὸν αὐτοῦ πεποιήκει πάλιν εἰ βλητὸν αὐτὸν τεποιήκει ἐδόκει ἂν ὁ Θεὸς αἴτιος εἶναι τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ. Οὔτε οὖν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἐποίησεν οὔτε μὴ βλητὸν, ἀλλὰ δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνα, εἰ βέλῃ ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ἀθανασίας τηρήσας τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ, μισθὸν κομισῆται παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ γένηται Θεός, εἰ δ' αὖ τραπήῃ ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ θανάτου πράγματα παρακούσας τοῦ Θεοῦ, αὐτὸς ἐαυτοῦ αἴτιος ᾖ τοῦ θανάτου.

in a more pregnant and unvarnished fashion, others in a milder way. Tatian, for instance, says that we must divest ourselves of the human nature within us; but in truth the idea is the same in all. The moral law of nature of which the Apologists speak, and which they find reproduced in the clearest and most beautiful way in the sayings of Jesus,¹ calls upon man to raise himself above his nature and to enter into a corresponding union with his fellow-man which is something higher than natural connections. It is not so much the law of love that is to rule everything, for love itself is only a phase of a higher law: it is the law governing the perfect and sublime Spirit, who, as being the most exalted existence on this earth, is too noble for the world. Raised already in this knowledge beyond time and space, beyond the partial and the finite, the man of God, even while upon the earth, is to hasten to the Father of Light. By equanimity, absence of desires, purity, and goodness, which are the necessary results of clear knowledge, he is to show that he has already risen above the transient through gazing on the imperishable and through the enjoyment of knowledge, imperfect though the latter still be. If thus, a suffering hero, he has stood the test on earth, if he has become dead to the world,² he may be sure that in the life to come God will bestow on him the gift of immortality, which includes the direct contemplation of God together with the perfect knowledge that flows from it.³ Conversely, the vicious man is given over to eternal death, and in this punishment the righteousness of God is quite as plainly manifested, as in the reward of everlasting life.

3. While it is certain that virtue is a matter of freedom, it

¹ See Justin. *Apol.* I. 14 ff. and the parallel passages in the other Apologists.

² See Tatian. *Orat.* II. and many other passages.

³ Along with this the Apologists emphasise the resurrection of the flesh in the strongest way as the specific article of Christian anticipation, and prove the possibility of realising this irrational hope. Yet to the Apologists the ultimate ground of their trust in this early-Christian idea is their reliance on the unlimited omnipotence of God and this confidence is a proof of the vividness of their idea of him. Nevertheless this conception assumes that in the other world there will be a return of the flesh, which on this side the grave had to be overcome and regarded as non-existent. A clearly chiliastic element is found only in Justin.

is just as sure that no soul is virtuous unless it follows the will of God, *i.e.*, knows and judges of God and all things as they must be known and judged of; and fulfils the commandments of God. This presupposes a revelation of God through the Logos. A revelation of God, complete in itself and mediated by the Logos, is found in the cosmos and in the constitution of man, he being created in his Maker's image.¹ But experience has shown that this revelation is insufficient to enable men to retain clear knowledge. They yielded to the seduction of evil demons, who, by God's sufferance, took possession of the world, and availed themselves of man's sensuous side to draw him away from the contemplation of the divine and lead him to the earthly.² The results of this temptation appeared in the facts that humanity as a whole fell a prey to error, was subjected to the bonds of the sensuous and of the demons, and therefore became doomed to death, which is at once a punishment and the natural consequence of want of knowledge of

¹ No uniform conception of this is found in the Apologists; see Weidt, *Die Christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit* 1882, pp. 8—20. Justin speaks only of a heavenly destination for which man is naturally adapted. With Tatian and Theophilus it is different.

² The idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is absolutely unknown to Justin (see Weidt, l. c., p. 11 f., who has successfully defended the correct view in Engelhardt's "*Das Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers*" pp. 92 f. 151. f. 266 f., against Stählin, "*Justin der Märtyrer und sein neuester Beurtheiler*" 1880, p. 16 f.). Tatian expressed a different opinion, which, however, involved him in evident contradictions (see above, p. 191 ff.). The apologetic theology necessarily adhered to the two following propositions: (1) The freedom to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism. (2) The desires of the flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal *liberum arbitrium* explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons. The Apologists acknowledge the universality of sin and death, but refused to admit the necessity of the former in order not to call its guilty character in question. On the other hand they are deeply imbued with the idea that the sovereignty of death is the most powerful factor in the perpetuation of sin. Their believing conviction of the omnipotence of God, as well as their moral conviction of the responsibility of man, protected them in theory from a strictly dualistic conception of the world. At the same time, like all who separate nature and morality in their ethical system, though in other respects they do not do so, the Apologists were obliged in practice to be dualists.

God.¹ Hence it required fresh efforts of the Logos to free men from a state which is indeed in no instance an unavoidable necessity, though a sad fact in the case of almost all. For very few are now able to recognise the one true God from the order of the universe and from the moral law implanted in themselves; nor can they withstand the power of the demons ruling in the world and use their freedom to imitate the virtues of God. Therefore the Almighty in his goodness employed new means through the Logos to call men back from the error of their ways, to overthrow the sovereignty of the demons upon earth, and to correct the disturbed course of the world before the end has yet come. From the earliest times the Logos (the Spirit) has descended on such men as preserved their souls pure, and bestowed on them, through inspiration, knowledge of the truth (with reference to God, freedom, virtue, the demons, the origin of polytheism, the judgment) to be imparted by them to others. These are his "prophets". Such men are rare among the Greeks (and according to some not found at all), but numerous among the barbarians, *i.e.*, among the Jewish people. Taught by God, they announced the truth about him, and under the promptings of the Logos they also committed the revelations to writings, which therefore, as being inspired, are an authentic record of the whole truth.² To some of the most virtuous among them he himself even appeared in human form and gave directions. He then is a Christian, who receives and follows these prophetic teachings, that have ever been proclaimed afresh from the beginning of the world down to the present time, and are summed up in the Old Testament. Such a one

¹ Death is accounted the worst evil. When Theophilus (II. 26) represents it as a blessing, we must consider that he is arguing against Marcion. Polytheism is traced to the demons: they are accounted the authors of the fables about the gods: the shameful actions of the latter are partly the deeds of demons and partly lies.

² The Old Testament therefore is not primarily viewed as the book of prophecy or of preparation for Christ, but as the book of the full revelation which cannot be surpassed. In point of content the teaching of the prophets and of Christ is completely identical. The prophetic details in the Old Testament serve only to attest the *one* truth. The Apologists confess that they were converted to Christianity by reading the Old Testament. Cf. Justin's and Tatian's confessions. Perhaps Commodian (Instruct. I. 1) is also to be understood thus.

is enabled even now to rescue his soul from the rule of the demons, and may confidently expect the gift of immortality.

With the majority of the Apologists "Christianity" seems to be exhausted in these doctrines; in fact, they do not even consider it necessary to mention *ex professo* the appearance of the Logos in Christ (see above, p. 189 ff.). But, while it is certain that they all recognised that the teachings of the prophets contained the full revelation of the truth, we would be quite wrong in assuming that they view the appearance and history of Christ as of no significance. In their presentations some of them no doubt contented themselves with setting forth the most rational and simple elements, and therefore took almost no notice of the historical; but even in their case certain indications show that they regarded the manifestation of the Logos in Christ as of special moment.¹ For the prophetic utterances, as found from the beginning, require an attestation, the prophetic teaching requires a guarantee, so that misguided humanity may accept them and no longer take error for truth and truth for error. The strongest guarantee imaginable is found in the fulfilment of prophecy. Since no man is able to foretell what is to come, the prediction of the future accompanying a doctrine proves its divine origin. God, in his extraordinary goodness, not only inspired the prophets, through the Logos, with the doctrines of truth, but has from the beginning put numerous predictions in their mouth. These predictions were detailed and manifold; the great majority of them referred to a more prolonged appearance of the Logos in human form at the end of history, and to a future judgment. Now, so long as the predictions had not yet come to pass, the teachings of the prophets were not sufficiently impressive, for the only sure witness of the truth is its outward attestation. In the history of Christ,

¹ The *Oratio* of Tatian is very instructive in this respect. In this book he has nowhere spoken *ex professo* of the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; but in c. 13 fin. he calls the Holy Spirit "the servant of God who has suffered", and in c. 21 init. he says: "we are not fools and do not adduce anything stupid, when we proclaim that God has appeared in human form." Similar expressions are found in Minucius Felix. In no part of Aristides' Apology is there any mention of the pre-Christian appearance of the Logos. The writer merely speaks of the revelation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ.

however, the majority of these prophecies were fulfilled in the most striking fashion, and this not only guarantees the fulfilment of the relatively small remainder not yet come to pass (judgment, resurrection), but also settles beyond all doubt the truth of the prophetic teachings about God, freedom, virtue, immortality, etc. In the scheme of fulfilment and prophecy even the irrational becomes rational; for the fulfilment of a prediction is not a proof of its divine origin unless it refers to something extraordinary. Any one can predict regular occurrences which always take place. Accordingly, a part of what was predicted had to be irrational. Every particular in the history of Christ has therefore a significance, not as regards the future, but as regards the past. Here everything happened "that the word of the prophet might be fulfilled." Because the prophet had said so, it had to happen. Christ's destiny attests the ancient teachings of the prophets. Everything, however, depends on this attestation, for it was no longer the full truth that was wanting, but a convincing proof that the truth was a reality and not a fancy.¹ But prophecy testifies that Christ is the ambassador of God, the Logos that has appeared in human form, and the Son of God. If the future destiny of Jesus is recorded in the Old Testament down to the smallest particular, and the book at the same time declares that this predicted One is the Son of God and will be crucified, then the paying of divine honours to this crucified man, to whom all the features of prophecy apply, is completely justified. The stage marked by Christ in the history of God's revelation, the content of which is always the same, is therefore the highest and last, because in it the "truth along with the proof" has appeared. This circumstance explains why the truth is so much more impressive and convinces more men than formerly, especially since Christ has also made special provision for the spread of the

¹ We seldom receive an answer to the question as to why this or that particular occurrence should have been prophesied. According to the ideas of the Apologists, however, we have hardly a right to put that question: for, since the value of the historical consists in its having been predicted, its content is of no importance. The fact that Jesus finds the she-ass bound to a vine (Justin, *Apol.* 1. 32) is virtually quite as important as his being born of a virgin. Both occurrences attest the prophetic teachings of God, freedom, etc.

truth and is himself an unequalled exemplification of a virtuous life, the principles of which have now become known in the whole world through the spread of his precepts.

These statements exhaust the arguments in most of the Apologies; and they accordingly seem neither to have contemplated a redemption by Christ in the stricter sense of the word, nor to have assumed the unique nature of the appearance of the Logos in Jesus. Christ accomplished salvation as a divine *teacher*, that is to say, his teaching brings about the *ἐπίστασις* and *ἐπιστροφή* of the human race, its restoration to its original destination. This also seems to suffice as regards demon rule. Logically considered, the individual portions of the history of Jesus (of the baptismal confession) have no direct significance in respect to salvation. Hence the teachings of the Christians seem to fall into two groups having no inward connection, *i.e.*, the propositions treating of the rational knowledge of God, and the predicted and fulfilled historical facts which prove those doctrines and the believing hopes they include.

But Justin at least gave token of a manifest effort to combine the historical statements regarding Christ with the philosophical and moral doctrines of salvation and to conceive Jesus as the Redeemer.¹ Accordingly, if the Christian dogmatic of succeeding times is found in the connection of philosophical theology with the baptismal confession, that is, in the "scientific theology of facts", Justin is, in a certain fashion, the first framer of Church dogma, though no doubt in a very tentative way. (1) He tried to distinguish between the appearance of the Logos in pre-Christian times and in Christ; he emphasised the fact that the whole Logos appeared only in Christ, and that the manner of this appearance has no counterpart in the past. (2)

¹ In Justin's polemical works this must have appeared in a still more striking way. Thus we find in a fragment of the treatise *περὶ Μαρτυρίων*, quoted by Irenæus (IV. 6. 2), the sentence "unigenitus filius venit ad nos, sum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans." So the theologoumenon of the *recapitulatio per Christum* already appeared in Justin. (Vide also Dial. c. Tryph. 100.) If we compare Tertullian's *Apologeticum* with his Antignostic writings we easily see how impossible it is to determine from that work the extent of his Christian faith and knowledge. The same is probably the case, though to a less extent, with Justin's apologetic writings.

Justin showed in the Dialogue that, independently of the theologoumenon of the Logos, he was firmly convinced of the divinity of Christ on the ground of predictions and of the impression made by his personality.¹ (3) In addition to the story of the exaltation of Christ, Justin also emphasised other portions of his history, especially the death on the cross (together with baptism and the Lord's Supper) and tried to give them a positive significance.² He adopted the common Christian saying that the blood of Christ cleanses believers and men are healed through his wounds; and he tried to give a mystic significance to the cross. (4) He accordingly spoke of the forgiveness of sins through Christ and confessed that men are changed, through the new birth in baptism, from children of necessity and ignorance into children of purpose and understanding and forgiveness of sins.³ Von Engelhardt has, however, quite rightly noticed that these are mere words which have nothing at all corresponding to them in the general system of thought, because Justin remains convinced that the knowledge of the true God, of his will, and of his promises, or the certainty that God will always grant forgiveness to the repentant and eternal life to the righteous, is sufficient to convert the man who is master of himself. Owing to the fundamental conviction which is expressed in the formulæ, "perfect philosophy", "divine teacher", "new law", "freedom", "repentance", "sinless life", "sure hope", "reward", "immortality". the ideas, "forgiveness of sins", "redemption", "reconciliation", "new birth", "faith" (in the Pauline sense) must remain

¹ Christians do not place a man alongside of God, for Christ is God, though indeed a second God. There is no question of two natures. It is not the divine nature that Justin has insufficiently emphasised—or at least this is only the case in so far as it is a second Godhead—but the human nature; see Schultz, *Gottheit Christi*, p. 39 ff.

² We find allusions in Justin where the various incidents in the history of the incarnate Logos are conceived as a series of arrangements meant to form part of the history of salvation, to paralyse mankind's sinful history, and to regenerate humanity. He is thus a forerunner of Irenæus and Melito.

³ Even the theologoumenon of the definite number of the elect, which must be fulfilled, is found in Justin (*Apol.* I. 28, 45). For that reason the judgment is put off by God (II. 7). The Apology of Aristides contains a short account of the history of Jesus: his conception, birth, preaching, choice of the 12 Apostles, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, sending out of the 12 Apostles are mentioned.

words,¹ or be relegated to the sphere of magic and mystery.² Nevertheless we must not on that account overlook the intention. Justin tried to see the divine revelation not only in the sayings of the prophets, but in unique fashion in the person of Christ, and to conceive Christ not only as the divine teacher, but also as the "Lord and Redeemer". In two points he actually succeeded in this. By the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Justin proved that Christ, the divine teacher, is also the future judge and bestower of reward. Christ himself is able to give what he has promised—a life after death free from sufferings and sins, that is the first point. The other thing, however, which Justin very strongly emphasised is that Jesus is even now reigning in heaven, and shows his future visible sovereignty of the world by giving his own people the power to cast out and vanquish the demons in and by his name. Even at the present time the latter are put to flight by believers in Christ.³ So the redemption is no mere future one; it is even now taking place, and the revelation of the Logos in Jesus Christ is not merely intended to prove the doctrines of the rational religion, but denotes a real redemption, that is, a new beginning, in so far as the power of the demons on earth is overthrown through Christ and in his strength. Jesus Christ, the teacher of the whole

¹ "To Justin faith is only an acknowledgment of the mission and Sonship of Christ and a conviction of the truth of his teaching. Faith does not justify, but is merely a presupposition of the justification which is effected through repentance, change of mind, and sinless life. Only in so far as faith itself is already a free decision to serve God has it the value of a saving act, which is indeed of such significance that one can say, 'Abraham was justified by faith.' In reality, however, this took place through *μετάνοια*." The idea of the new birth is exhausted in the thought: *Θεὸς καλεῖ εἰς μετάνοιαν*, that of the forgiveness of sins in the idea: "God is so good that he overlooks sins committed in a state of ignorance, if man has changed his mind." Accordingly, Christ is the Redeemer in so far as he has brought about all the conditions which make for repentance.

² This is in fact already the case in Justin here and there, but in the main there are as yet mere traces of it: the Apologists are no mystics.

³ If we consider how largely the demons bulked in the ideas of the Apologists, we must rate very highly their conviction of the redeeming power of Christ and of his name, a power continuously shown in the victories over the demons. See Justin Apol. II. 6, 8: Dial. 11. 30, 35, 39, 76, 85, 111, 121: Tertull., Apol. 23, 27, 32, 37 etc. Tatian also (16 fin.) confirms it, and c. 12, p. 56, line 7 ff. (ed. Otto) does not contradict this.

truth and of a new law, which is the rational, the oldest, and the divine, the only being who has understood how to call men from all the different nations and in all stages of culture into a union of holy life, the inspiring One, for whom his disciples go to death, the mighty One, through whose name the demons are cast out, the risen One, who will one day reward and punish as judge, must be identical with the Son of God, who is the divine reason and the divine power. In this belief which accompanies the confession of the one God, creator of heaven and earth, Justin finds the special content of Christianity, which the later Apologists, with the probable exception of Melito, reproduced in a much more imperfect and meagre form. One thing, however, Justin in all probability did not formulate with precision, viz., the proposition that the special result of salvation, *i.e.*, immortality, was involved in the incarnation of the Logos, in so far as that act brought about a real secret transformation of the whole mortal nature of man. With Justin, indeed, as with the other Apologists, the "salvation" (*σωτηρία*) consists essentially in the apportioning of eternal life to the world, which has been created mortal and in consequence of sin has fallen a prey to the natural destiny of "death"; and Christ is regarded as the bestower of incorruptibility who thus brings the creation to its goal; but as a rule Justin does not go beyond this thought. Yet we certainly find hints pointing to the notion of a physical and magical redemption accomplished at the moment of the incarnation. See particularly the fragment in Irenæus (already quoted on page 220), which may be thus interpreted, and Apol. I. 66. This conception, in its most complete shape, would have to be attributed to Justin if the fragment V. (Otto, Corp. Apol. III. p. 256) were genuine.¹ But the precise form of the presentation

¹ Von Engelhardt, *Christenthum Justin's*, p. 432 f., has pronounced against its genuineness; see also my *Texte und Untersuchungen* I. 1. 2. p. 158. In favour of its genuineness see Hilgenfeld, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1883, p. 26 f. The fragment is worded as follows: Πλάσας ὁ Θεὸς κατ' ἀρχῆς τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῆς γνώμης αὐτοῦ τὰ τῆς φύσεως ἀπῆρμησεν ἐντολῇ μιᾶ ποιητάμενος τὴν διάπειραν. Φυλάσσαντα μὲν γὰρ ταύτην τῆς ἀθανάτου λήξεως πεποιήκειν ἔσσεσθαι, παραβάντα δὲ τῆς ἐναντίας. Οὕτω γεγωνῶς ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ πρὸς τὴν παράβασιν εὐθύς ἔλθων τὴν φθορὰν φυσικῶς εἰσεδέξατο. Φύσει δὲ τῆς φθορᾶς προσγενομένης ἀναγκασίον ἦν ὅτι σῶσθαι βουλόμενος ἦν τὴν φθοροποιὸν οὐσίαν ἀφανίσας. Τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἦν ἑτέρως

makes this very improbable. The question as to how, *i.e.*, in what conceivable way, immortality can be imparted to the mortal nature as yet received little attention from Justin and the Apologists: it is the necessary result of knowledge and virtue. Their great object was to assure the belief in immortality. "Religion and morality depend on the belief in immortality or the resurrection from the dead. The fact that the Christian religion, as faith in the incarnate Son of God the creator, leads to the assurance that the maker of all things will reward piety and righteousness with the bestowal of eternal and immortal life, is the essential advantage possessed by the Christian religion over all others. The righteousness of the heathen was imperfect in spite of all their knowledge of good and evil, because they lacked the certain knowledge that the creator makes the just immortal and will consign the unjust to eternal torment." The philosophical doctrines of God, virtue, and immortality became through the Apologists the certain content of a world-wide religion, which is Christian because Christ guarantees its certainty. They made Christianity a deistical religion for the whole world without abandoning in word at least the old "teachings and knowledge" (*διδάγματα καὶ μαθήματα*) of the Christians. They thus marked out the task of "dogmatic" and, so to speak, wrote the prolegomena for every future theological system in the Church (see Von Engelhardt's concluding observations in his "Christenthum Justin's" pp. 447—490, also Overbeck in the *Historische Zeitschrift*, 1880, pp. 499—505.) At the same time, however, they adhered to the early-Christian eschatology (see Justin, Melito, and, with reference to the resurrection of the flesh, the Apologists

γενέσθαι, εἰ μήπερ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ζωὴ προσεπλάκη τῇ τὴν φθορὰν δεξαμένῳ, ἀφανίζουσα μὲν τὴν φθορὰν, ἀθάνατον δὲ τοῦ λοιποῦ τὸ δεξαμένον διατηροῦσα. Διὰ τοῦτο τὸν λόγον ἐδέησεν ἐν σώματι γενέσθαι, ἵνα (τοῦ θανάτου) τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἡμᾶς φθορᾶς ἐλευθερώσῃ. Εἰ γὰρ, ὡς φατε, νεύματι μόνον τὸν θάνατον ἡμῶν ἀπεκάλυπεν, οὐ προσήει μὲν διὰ τὴν βούλησιν ὁ θάνατος, οὐδὲν δὲ ἦττον φθαροὶ τάλιν ἦμεν. Φυσικὴν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς τὴν φθορὰν περιφέροντες.

¹ Schultz (*Gottheit Christi*, p. 41) very rightly points out that all the systems of the post-Socratic schools, so far as they practically spread among the people, invariably assume that knowledge, as such, leads to salvation, so that the bestowal of the ἀφθαρσία need not necessarily be thought so naturalistic and mystic a process as we are apt to imagine.

generally), and thus did not belie their connection with early Christianity.¹

Interpretation and Criticism, especially of Justin's Doctrines.

1. The fundamental assumption of all the Apologists is that there can only be one and the same relation on earth between God and free man, and that it has been conditioned by the creation. This thought, which presupposes the idea of God's unchangeableness, at bottom neutralises every quasi-historical and mythological consideration. According to it grace can be nothing else than the stimulation of the powers of reason existent in man; revelation is supernatural only in respect of its form, and the redemption merely enables us to redeem ourselves, just as this possibility was given at the creation. Sin, which arose through temptation, appears on the one hand as error which must almost of necessity have arisen so long as man only possessed the "germs of the Logos" (σπέρματα τοῦ λόγου), and on the other as the dominion of sensuousness, which was nearly unavoidable since earthly material clothes the soul and mighty demons have possession of the world. The mythological idea of the invading sway of the demons is really the only interruption of the rationalistic scheme. So far as Christianity is something different from morality, it is the antithesis of the service and sovereignty of the demons. Hence the idea that the course of the world and mankind require in some measure to be helped is the narrow foundation of the thought of revelation or redemption. The necessity of revelation and redemption was expressed in a much stronger and more decisive way by many heathen philosophers of the same period. Accordingly, not only did these long for a revelation which would give a fresh attestation to old truth, but they yearned for a force, a real redemption, a *præsens numen*, and some new thing. Still more powerful was this longing in the case of the

¹ Weizsäcker, *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, 1867, p. 119, has with good reason strongly emphasised this element. See also Stählin, *Justin der Märtyrer*, 1880, p. 63 f., whose criticism of Von Engelhardt's book contains much that is worthy of note, though it appears to me inappropriate in the main.

Gnostics and Marcion; compare the latter's idea of revelation with that of the Apologists. It is probable indeed that the thought of redemption would have found stronger expression among them also, had not the task of *proof*, which could be best discharged by the aid of the Stoic philosophy, demanded religious rationalism. But, admitting this, the determination of the highest good itself involved rationalism and moralism. For immortality is the highest good, in so far as it is perfect knowledge—which is, moreover, conceived as being of a rational kind,—that necessarily leads to immortality. We can only find traces of the converse idea, according to which the change into the immortal condition is the *prius* and the knowledge the *posterius*. But, where this conception is the prevailing one, moralistic intellectualism is broken through, and we can now point to a specific, supernatural blessing of salvation, produced by revelation and redemption. Corresponding to the general development of religious philosophy from moralism into mysticism (transition from the second to the third century), a displacement in this direction can also be noticed in the history of Greek apologetics (in the West it was different); but this displacement was never considerable and therefore cannot be clearly traced. Even later on under altered circumstances, apologetic science adhered in every respect to its old method, as being the most suitable (monotheism, morality, proof from prophecy), a circumstance which is evident, for example, from the almost complete disregard of the New Testament canon of Scripture and from other considerations besides.

2. In so far as the possibility of virtue and righteousness has been implanted by God in men, and in so far as—apart from trifling exceptions—they can actually succeed in doing what is good only through prophetic, *i.e.*, divine, revelations and exhortations, some Apologists, following the early Christian tradition, here and there designate the transformation of the sinner into a righteous man as a work of God, and speak of renewal and regeneration. The latter, however, as a real fact, is identical with the repentance which, as a turning from sin and turning to God, is a matter of free will. As in Justin, so also in Tatian, the idea of regeneration is exhausted in the

divine call to repentance. The conception of the forgiveness of sins is also determined in accordance with this. Only those sins can be forgiven, *i.e.*, overlooked, which are really none, *i.e.*, which were committed in a state of error and bondage to the demons, and were well-nigh unavoidable. The blotting out of these sins is effected in baptism, "which is the bath of regeneration in so far as it is the voluntary consecration of one's own person. The cleansing which takes place is God's work in so far as baptism was instituted by him, but it is effected by the man who in his change of mind lays aside his sins. The name of God is pronounced above him who repents of his transgressions, that he may receive freedom, knowledge, and forgiveness of his previous sins, but this effects a change only denoting the new knowledge to which the baptised person has attained." If, as all this seems to show, the thought of a specific grace of God in Christ appears virtually neutralised, the adherence to the language of the cultus (Justin and Tatian) and Justin's conception of the Lord's Supper show that the Apologists strove to get beyond moralism, that is, they tried to supplement it through the mysteries. Augustine's assertion (*de predest. sanct.* 27) that the faith of the old Church in the efficacy of divine grace was not so much expressed in the *opuscula* as in the *prayers*, shows correct insight.

3. All the demands, the fulfilment of which constitutes the virtue and righteousness of men, are summed up under the title of *the new law*. In virtue of its eternally valid content this new law is in reality the oldest; but it is new because Christ and the prophets were preceded by Moses, who inculcated on the Jews in a transient form that which was eternally valid. It is also new because, being proclaimed by the Logos that appeared in Christ, it announced its presence with the utmost impressiveness and undoubted authority, and contains the promise of reward in terms guaranteed by the strongest proof—the proof from prophecy. The old law is consequently a new one because it appears now for the first time as purely spiritual, perfect, and final. The commandment of love to one's neighbour also belongs to the law; but it does not form its essence (still less love to God, the place of which is taken by faith, obedience, and imitation). The content of all moral demands is compre-

hended in the commandment of perfect, active holiness, which is fulfilled by the complete renunciation of all earthly blessings, even of life itself. Tatian preached this renunciation in a specially powerful manner. There is no need to prove that no remains of Judæo-Christianity are to be recognised in these ideas about the new law. It is not Judæo-Christianity that lies behind the Christianity and doctrines of the Apologists, but Greek philosophy (Platonic metaphysics, Logos doctrine of the Stoics, Platonic and Stoic ethics), the Alexandrine-Jewish apologetics, the maxims of Jesus, and the religious speech of the Christian Churches. Justin is distinguished from Philo by the sure conviction of the living power of God, the Creator and Lord of the world, and the steadfast confidence in the reality of all the ideals which is derived from the person of Christ. We ought not, however, to blame the Apologists because to them nearly everything historical was at bottom only a guarantee of thoughts and hopes. As a matter of fact, the assurance is not less important than the content. By dint of thinking one can conceive the highest truth, but one cannot in this way make out the certainty of its reality. No positive religion can do more for its followers than faith in the revelation through Christ and the prophets did for the Apologists. Although it chiefly proved to them the truth of that which we call natural theology and which was the idealistic philosophy of the age, so that the Church appears as the great insurance society for the ideas of Plato and Zeno, we ought not at the same time to forget that their idea of a divine spirit working upon earth was a far more lively and worthy one than in the case of the Greek philosophers.

4. By their intellectualism and exclusive theories the Apologists founded philosophic and dogmatic Christianity (Loofs: "they laid the foundation for the conversion of Christianity into a revealed doctrine."¹ If about the middle of the second century

¹ Loofs continues: "The Apologists, viewing the transference of the concept 'Son' to the preëxistent Christ as a matter of course, enabled the Christological problem of the 4th century to be started. They removed the point of departure of the Christological speculation from the historical Christ back into the preëxistence and depreciated the importance of Jesus' life as compared with the incarnation.

the short confession of the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded as a watchword, passport, and *tessera hospitalitas* (*signum et vinculum*), and if even in lay and uneducated circles it was conceived as "doctrine" in contradistinction to heresy, this transformation must have been accelerated through men, who essentially conceived Christianity as the "divine doctrine", and by whom all its distinctive features were subordinated to this conception or neutralised. As the philosophic schools are held together by their "laws" (*νόμοι*) as the "dogmas" form the real bond between the "friends", and as, in addition to this, they are united by veneration for the founder, so also the Christian Church appeared to the Apologists as a universal league established by a divine founder and resting *on the dogmas of the perfectly known truth*, a league the members of which possess definite laws, viz., the eternal laws of nature for everything moral, and unite in common veneration for the Divine Master. In the "dogmas" of the Apologists, however, we find nothing more than traces of the fusion of the philosophical and historical elements; in the main both exist separately side by side. It was not till long after this that intellectualism gained the victory in a Christianity represented by the clergy. What we here chiefly understand by "intellectualism" is the placing of the scientific conception of the world behind the commandments of Christian morality and behind the hopes and faith of the Christian religion, and the connecting of the two things in such a way that this conception appeared as the foundation of these commandments and hopes. Thus was created the future dogmatic in the form which still prevails in the Churches and which presupposes the Platonic and Stoic conception of the world long ago overthrown by science. The attempt made at the beginning of the Reformation to free the Christian faith from this amalgamation remained at first without success.

They connected the Christology with the cosmology, but were not able to combine it with the scheme of salvation. Their Logos doctrine is not a 'higher' Christology than the prevailing form; it rather lags behind the genuine Christian estimate of Christ. It is not God who reveals himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God, who *as God* is subordinate to the supreme Deity."

CHAPTER V.

THE BEGINNINGS OF AN ECCLESIASTICO-THEOLOGICAL INTER-
PRETATION AND REVISION OF THE RULE OF FAITH IN
OPPOSITION TO GNOSTICISM ON THE BASIS OF THE
NEW TESTAMENT AND THE CHRISTIAN PHILO-
SOPHY OF THE APOLOGISTS:
MELITO, IRENEUS, TERTULLIAN, HIPPOLYTUS, NOVATIAN.¹

I. *The theological position of Irenæus and the later contemporary Church teachers.*

GNOSTICISM and the Marcionite Church had compelled orthodox Christianity to make a selection from tradition and to make this binding on Christians as an apostolical law. Everything that laid claim to validity had henceforth to be legitimised by the faith, *i.e.*, the baptismal confession and the New Testament canon of Scripture (see above, chap. 2, under A and B). However, mere "prescriptions" could no longer suffice here. But the baptismal confession was no "doctrine"; if it was to be transformed into such it required an interpretation. We have shown above that the *interpreted* baptismal confession was instituted as the guide for the faith. This interpretation took its *matter* from the sacred books of *both* Testaments. It owed its guiding lines, however,

¹ Authorities: The works of Irenæus (Stieren's and Harvey's editions), Melito (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX.), Tertullian (Oehler's and Reifferscheid's editions), Hippolytus (Fabricius', Lagarde's, Duncker's and Schneidewin's editions), Cyprian (Hartel's edition), Novatian (Jackson). Biographies of Böhringer, *Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen*, 1873 ff. Werner, *Der Paulinismus des Irenæus*, 1889. Nöldechen, *Tertullian*, 1890. Döllinger, "Hippolytus und Kallistus," 1853. Many monographs on Irenæus and Tertullian.

on the one hand to philosophical theology, as set forth by the Apologists, and on the other to the earnest endeavour to maintain and defend against all attacks the traditional convictions and hopes of believers, as professed in the past generation by the enthusiastic forefathers of the Church. In addition to this, certain interests, which had found expression in the speculations of the the so-called Gnostics, were adopted in an increasing degree among all thinking Christians, and also could not but influence the ecclesiastical teachers.¹ The theological labours, thus initiated, accordingly bear the impress of great uniqueness and complexity. In the first place, the old Catholic Fathers, Melito,² Rhodon,³ Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian were in every case convinced that all their expositions contained the universal Church faith itself and nothing else. Though the faith is identical with the baptismal confession, yet every interpretation of it derived from the New Testament is no less certain than the shortest formula.⁴ The creation of the New Testament furnished all at once a quite

¹ The following exposition will show how much Irenæus and the later old Catholic teachers learned from the Gnostics. As a matter of fact the theology of Irenæus remains a riddle so long as we try to explain it merely from the Apologists and only consider its antithetical relations to Gnosis. Little as we can understand modern orthodox theology from a historical point of view—if the comparison be here allowed—without keeping in mind what it has adopted from Schleiermacher and Hegel, we can just as little understand the theology of Irenæus without taking into account the schools of Valentinus and Marcion.

² That Melito is to be named here follows both from Eusebius, II. E. V. 28. 5, and still more plainly from what we know of the writings of this bishop; see *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Litteratur*, I. 1. 2, p. 240 ff.). The polemic writings of Justin and the Antignostic treatise of that "ancient" quoted by Irenæus (see *Patr. App. Opp.* ed. Gebhardt etc. I. 2, p. 105 sq.) may in a certain sense be viewed as the precursors of Catholic literature. We have no material for judging of them with certainty. The New Testament was not yet at the disposal of their authors, and consequently there is a gap between them and Irenæus.

³ See Eusebius, II. E. V. 13.

⁴ Tertullian does indeed say in *de præscr.* 14: "Ceterum manente forma regule fidei in suo ordine quantumlibet quæras, et tractes, et omnem libidinem curiositatis effundas, si quid tibi videtur vel ambiguitate pendere vel obscuritate obumbrari"; but the preceding exposition of the *regula* shows that scarcely any scope remained for the "curiositas", and the one that follows proves that Tertullian did not mean that freedom seriously.

unlimited multitude of conceptions, the whole of which appeared as "doctrines" and offered themselves for incorporation with the "faith".¹ The limits of the latter therefore seem to be indefinitely extended, whilst on the other hand tradition, and polemics too in many cases, demanded an adherence to the shortest formula. The oscillation between this brief formula, the contents of which, as a rule, did not suffice, and that fullness, which admitted of no bounds at all, is characteristic of the old Catholic Fathers we have mentioned. In the second place, these Fathers felt quite as much need of a rational proof in their arguments with their Christian opponents, as they did while contending with the heathen;² and, being themselves children of their time, they required this proof for their own assurance and that of their fellow-believers. The epoch in which men appealed to charisms, and "knowledge" counted as much as prophecy and vision, because it was still of the same nature, was in the main a thing of the past.³ Tradition and reason had taken the place of charisms as courts of appeal. But this change had neither come to be clearly recognised,⁴ nor was the right and scope of rational theology alongside of tradition felt to be a problem. We can indeed trace the consciousness of the danger in attempting to introduce new *termini* and regulations not prescribed by the Holy Scriptures.⁵ The bishops themselves in fact encouraged this apprehension in order to

¹ The most important point was that the Pauline theology, towards which Gnostics, Marcionites, and Encratites had already taken up a definite attitude, could now no longer be ignored. See Overbeck's Basler Univ.—Programm, 1877. Irenæus immediately shows the influence of Paulinism very clearly.

² See what Rhodon says about the issue of his conversation with Appelles in Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 7: ἐγὼ δὲ ῥηλάσας κατέβην αὐτοῦ, διότι διδάσκαλος εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἔδει τὸ διδασκόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ κρατύνειν.

³ On the old "prophets and teachers" see my remarks on the *Διδασχὴ*, c. II ff., and the section, pp. 93—137, of the prolegomena to my edition of this work. The *διδάσκαλοι ἀποστολικοὶ καὶ προφητικοὶ* (Erb. Smyrn. ap. Euseb., H. E. IV. 15. 30) became lay-teachers who were skilful in the interpretation of the sacred traditions.

⁴ In the case of Irenæus, as is well known, there was absolutely no consciousness of this, as is well remarked by Eusebius in H. E. V. 7. In support of his own writings, however, Irenæus appealed to no charisms.

⁵ See the passage already quoted on p. 63, note 1.

warn people against the Gnostics,¹ and after the deluge of heresy, representatives of Church orthodoxy looked with distrust on every philosophic-theological formula.² Such propositions of rationalistic theology as were absolutely required, were, however, placed by Irenæus and Tertullian on the same level as the hallowed doctrines of tradition, and were not viewed by them as something of a different nature. Irenæus uttered most urgent warnings against subtle speculations;³ but yet, in the naïvest way, associated with the faithfully preserved traditional doctrines and fancies of the faith theories which he likewise regarded as tradition and which, in point of form, did not differ from those of the Apologists or Gnostics.⁴ The

¹ Irenæus and Tertullian scoffed at the Gnostic terminology in the most bitter way.

² Tertullian, adv. Prax. 3: "Simplices enim quique, ne dixerim imprudentes et idiotæ, quæ major semper credentium pars est, quoniam et ipsa regula fidei a pluribus diis sæculi ad unicum et verum deum transfert, non intellegentes unicum quidem, sed cum sua *οικονομίᾳ* esse credendum, expavescunt ad *οικονομίαν*." Similar remarks often occur in Origen. See also Hippol., c. Nöet II.

³ The danger of speculation and of the desire to know everything was impressively emphasised by Irenæus, II. 25—28. As a pronounced ecclesiastical positivist and traditionalist, he seems in these chapters disposed to admit nothing but obedient and acquiescent faith in the words of Holy Scripture, and even to reject speculations like those of Tatian, Orat. 5. Cf. the disquisitions II. 25, 3: "Si autem et aliquis non invenerit causam omnium quæ requiruntur, cogitet, quia homo est in infinitum minor deo et qui ex parte (cf. II. 28.) acceperit gratiam et qui nondum æqualis vel similis sit factori; II. 26. 1: "Ἀμείνον καὶ συμφορώτερον, ἰδιώτας καὶ ὀλιγομαθεῖς ὑπάρχειν, καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀγάπης πλησίον γενέσθαι τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ πολυμαθεῖς καὶ ἑμπείρους δοκοῦντας εἶναι, βλασφήμους εἰς τὸν ἑαυτῶν εὕρισκῆσθαι δεσπότην, and in addition to this the close of the paragraph, II. 27. 1: Concerning the sphere within which we are to search (the Holy Scriptures and "quæ ante oculos nostros occurrunt", much remains dark to us even in the Holy Scriptures II. 28. 3); II. 28. 1 f. on the canon which is to be observed in all investigations, namely, the confident faith in God the creator, as the supreme and only Deity; II. 28. 2—7: specification of the great problems whose solution is hid from us, viz., the elementary natural phenomena, the relation of the Son to the Father, that is, the manner in which the Son was begotten, the way in which matter was created, the cause of evil. In opposition to the claim to absolute knowledge, i.e., to the complete discovery of all the processes of causation, which Irenæus too alone regards as knowledge, he indeed pointed out the limits of our perception, supporting his statement by Bible passages. But the ground of these limits, "ex parte accepimus gratiam", is not an early-Christian one, and it shows at the same time that the bishop also viewed knowledge as the goal, though indeed he thought it could not be attained on earth.

⁴ The same observation applies to Tertullian. Cf. his point blank repudiation

Holy Scriptures of the New Testament were the basis on which Irenæus set forth the most important doctrines of Christianity. Some of these he stated as they had been conceived by the oldest tradition (see the eschatology), others he adapted to the new necessities. The qualitative distinction between the *fides credenda* and theology was noticed neither by Irenæus nor by Hippolytus and Tertullian. According to Irenæus I. 10. 3 this distinction is merely quantitative. Here faith and theological knowledge are still completely intermixed. Whilst stating and establishing the doctrines of tradition with the help of the New Testament, and revising and fixing them by means of intelligent deduction, the Fathers think they are setting forth the faith itself and nothing else. Anything more than this is only curiosity not unattended with danger to Christians. Theology is interpreted faith.¹

Corresponding to the baptismal confession there thus arose at the first a loose system of dogmas which were necessarily devoid of strict style, definite principle, or fixed and harmonious aim. In this form we find them with special plainness in Tertullian.² This writer was still completely incapable of inwardly connecting his rational (Stoic) theology, as developed by him for apologetic purposes, with the Christological doctrines of the *regula fidei*, which, after the example of Irenæus, he constructed and defended from Scripture and tradition in opposition to heresy. Whenever he attempts in any place to prove

of philosophy in de præsc. 7. and the use he himself nevertheless made of it everywhere.

¹ In point of form this standpoint is distinguished from the ordinary Gnostic position by its renunciation of absolute knowledge, and by its corresponding lack of systematic completeness. That, however, is an important distinction in favour of the Catholic Fathers. According to what has been set forth in the text I cannot agree with Zahn's judgment (Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 235 f.): "Irenæus is the first ecclesiastical teacher who has grasped the idea of an independent science of Christianity, of a theology which, in spite of its width and magnitude, is a branch of knowledge distinguished from others: and was also the first to mark out the paths of this science."

² Tertullian seems even to have had no great appreciation for the degree of systematic exactness displayed in the disquisitions of Irenæus. He did not reproduce these arguments at least, but preferred after considering them to fall back on the proof from prescription.

the *intrinsic* necessity of these dogmas, he seldom gets beyond rhetorical statements, holy paradoxes, or juristic forms. As a systematic thinker, a cosmologist, moralist, and jurist rather than a theosophist, as a churchman, a masterly defender of tradition, as a Christian exclusively guided in practical life by the strict precepts and hopes of the Gospel, his theology, if by that we understand his collective theological disquisitions, is completely devoid of unity, and can only be termed a mixture of dissimilar and, not unfrequently, contradictory propositions, which admit of no comparison with the older theology of Valentinus or the later system of Origen.¹ To Tertullian everything lies side by side; problems which chance to turn up are just as quickly solved. The specific faith of Christians is indeed no longer, as it sometimes seems to be in Justin's case, a great apparatus of proof for the doctrines of the only true philosophy; it rather stands, in its own independent value, side by side with these, partly in a crude, partly in a developed form; but inner principles and aims are nearly everywhere sought for in vain.² In spite of this he possesses inestimable importance in the history of dogma; for he developed and created, in a disconnected form and partly in the shape of legal propositions, a series of the most important dogmatic formulæ, which Cyprian, Novatian, Hosius, and the Roman bishops of the fourth century, Ambrosius and Leo I., introduced into the general dogmatic system of the Catholic Church. He founded the terminology both of the trinitarian and of the Christological dogma; and in addition to this was the first to give currency to a series of dogmatic concepts (*satisfacere, meritum, sacramentum, vitium originis etc., etc.*).

¹ The more closely we study the writings of Tertullian, the more frequently we meet with inconsistencies, and that in his treatment both of dogmatic and moral questions. Such inconsistencies could not but make their appearance, because Tertullian's dogmatizing was only incidental. As far as he himself was concerned, he did not feel the slightest necessity for a systematic presentation of Christianity.

² With reference to certain articles of doctrine, however, Tertullian adopted from Irenæus some guiding principles and some points of view arising from the nature of faith; but he almost everywhere changed them for the worse. The fact that he was capable of writing a treatise like the *de præser. hæret.* in which all proof of the intrinsic necessity and of the connection of his dogmas is wanting, shows the limits of his interests and of his understanding.

Finally it was he who at the very outset imparted to the type of dogmatic that arose in the West its momentous bias in the direction of *auctoritas et ratio*, and its corresponding tendency to assume a legal character (*l.c.x.* formal and material), peculiarities which were to become more and more clearly marked as time went on.¹ But, great as is his importance in this respect, it has no connection at all with the fundamental conception of Christianity peculiar to himself, for, as a matter of fact, this was already out of date at the time when he lived. What influenced the history of dogma was not his Christianity, but his masterly power of framing formulæ.

It is different with Irenæus. The Christianity of this man proved a decisive factor in the history of dogma in respect of its content. If Tertullian supplied the future Catholic dogmatic with the most important part of its formulæ, Irenæus clearly sketched for it its fundamental idea, by combining the ancient notion of salvation with New Testament (Pauline) thoughts.² Accordingly, as far as the essence of the matter is concerned, the great work of Irenæus is far superior to the theological writings of Tertullian. This appears already in the task, voluntarily undertaken by Irenæus, of giving a relatively complete exposition of the doctrines of ecclesiastical Christianity on the basis of the New Testament, in opposition to heresy. Tertullian nowhere betrayed a similar systematic necessity, which indeed, in the case of the Gallic bishop too, only made its appearance as the result of polemical motives. But Irenæus to a certain degree succeeded in amalgamating philosophic theology and the statements of ecclesiastical tradition viewed as doctrines. This result followed (1) because he never lost sight of a fundamental idea to which he tried to refer everything, and (2) because he was directed by a confident view of Christianity as a religion.

¹ Further references to Tertullian in a future volume. Tertullian is at the same time the first Christian *individual* after Paul, of whose inward life and peculiarities we can form a picture to ourselves. His writings bring us near himself, but that cannot be said of Irenæus.

² Consequently the *spirit* of Irenæus, though indeed strongly modified by that of Origen, prevails in the later Church dogmatic, whilst that of Tertullian is not to be traced there.

that is, a theory of its purpose. The first fundamental idea, in its all-dominating importance, was suggested to Irenæus by his opposition to Gnosticism. It is the conviction that the Creator of the world and the supreme God are one and the same.¹ The other theory as to the aim of Christianity, however, is shared by Irenæus with Paul, Valentinus, and Marcion. It is the conviction that Christianity is real redemption, and that this redemption was only effected by the appearance of Christ. The working out of these two ideas is the most important feature in Irenæus' book. As yet, indeed, he by no means really succeeded in completely adapting to these two fundamental thoughts all the materials to be taken from Holy Scripture and found in the rule of faith; he only thought with systematic clearness within the scheme of the Apologists. His archaic eschatological disquisitions are of a heterogeneous nature, and a great deal of his material, as, for instance, Pauline formulæ and thoughts, he completely emptied of its content, inasmuch as he merely contrived to turn it into a testimony of the oneness and absolute causality of God the Creator; but the repetition of the same main thoughts to an extent that is wearisome to us, and the attempt to refer everything to these, unmistakably constitute the success of his work.² God the Creator and the one Jesus Christ

¹ The supreme God is the Holy and Redeeming One. Hence the identity of the creator of the world and the supreme God also denotes the unity of nature, morality, and revelation.

² What success the early-Christian writings of the second century had is almost completely unknown to us; but we are justified in saying that the five books "adv. hæreses" of Irenæus were successful, for we can prove the favourable reception of this work and the effects it had in the 3rd and 4th centuries (for instance, on Hippolytus, Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, Victorinus, Marcellus of Ancyra, Epiphanius, and perhaps Alexander of Alexandria and Athanasius). As is well known, we no longer possess a Greek manuscript, although it can be proved that the work was preserved down to middle Byzantine times, and was quoted with respect. The insufficient Christological and especially the eschatological disquisitions spoiled the enjoyment of the work in later times (on the Latin Irenæus cf. the exhaustive examination of Loof: "The Manuscripts of the Latin translation of Irenæus", in the "Studies of Church History" dedicated to Reuter, 1887). The old Catholic works written against heretics by Rhodon, Melito, Miltiades, Proculus, Modestus, Musanus, Theophilus, Philip of Gortyna, Hippolytus, and others have all been just as little preserved to us as the oldest book of this kind, the Syntagma of Justin against heresies, and the Memorabilia of Hegesippus. If we consider the criticism

are really the middle points of his theological system, and in this way he tried to assign an intrinsic significance to the several historical statements of the baptismal confession. Looked at from this point of view, his speculations were almost of an identical nature with the Gnostic.¹ But, while he conceives Christianity as an explanation of the world and as redemption, his Christocentric teaching was opposed to that of the Gnostics. Since the latter started with the conception of an original dualism they saw in the empiric world a faulty combination of opposing elements,² and therefore recognised in the redemption by Christ the separation of what was unnaturally united. Irenæus, on the contrary, who began with the idea of the absolute causality of God the Creator, saw in the empiric world faulty estrangements and separations, and therefore viewed the redemption by Christ as the reunion of things unnaturally separated—the “recapitulatio” (*ἀνακεφαλαιώσις*).³ This speculative

to which Tatian’s Christology was subjected by Arethas in the 10th century (*Oratio* 5 : see my *Texte und Untersuchungen* I. 1. 2 p. 95 ff.), and the depreciatory judgment passed on Chiliasm from the 3rd century downwards, and if we moreover reflect that the older polemical works directed against heretics were supplanted by later detailed ones, we have a summary of the reasons for the loss of that oldest Catholic literature. This loss indeed makes it impossible for us to form an exact estimate of the extent and intensity of the effect produced by any individual writing, even including the great work of Irenæus.

¹ People are fond of speaking of the “Asia Minor” theology of Irenæus, ascribe it already to his teachers, Polycarp and the presbyters, then ascend from these to the Apostle John, and complete, though not without hesitation, the equation : John—Irenæus. By this speculation they win simply everything, in so far as the Catholic doctrine now appears as the property of an “apostolic” circle, and Gnosticism and Antignosticism are thus eliminated. But the following arguments may be urged against this theory: (1) What we know of Polycarp by no means gives countenance to the supposition that Irenæus learned more from him and his fellows than a pious regard for the Church tradition and a collection of historical traditions and principles. (2) The doctrine of Irenæus cannot be separated from the received *canon* of New Testament writings; but in the generation before him there was as yet no such compilation. (3) The presbyter from whom Irenæus adopted important lines of thought in the 4th book did not write till after the middle of the second century. (4) Tertullian owes his Christocentric theology, so far as he has such a thing, to Irenæus (and Melito?).

² Marcion, as is well known, went still further in his depreciatory judgment of the world, and therefore recognised in the redemption through Christ a pure act of grace.

³ See Molwitz, *De Ἀνακεφαλαιώσεως in Irenæi theologia potestate*, Dresden, 1874.

thought, which involved the highest imaginable optimism in contrast to Gnostic pessimism, brought Irenæus into touch with certain Pauline trains of thought,¹ and enabled him to adhere to the theology of the Apologists. At the same time it opened up a view of the person of Christ, which supplemented the great defect of that theology,² surpassed the Christology of the Gnostics,³ and made it possible to utilise the Christological statements contained in certain books of the New Testament.⁴

So far as we know at least, Irenæus is the first ecclesiastical theologian after the time of the Apologists (see Ignatius before that) who assigned a quite specific significance to the person of Christ and in fact regarded it as the vital factor.⁵ That was possible for him because of his realistic view of redemption. Here, however, he did not fall into the abyss of Gnosticism, because, as a disciple of the "elders", he adhered to the early-Christian eschatology, and because, as a follower of the Apologists, he held, along with the realistic conception of salvation, the other dissimilar theory that Christ, as the teacher, imparts

¹ See, e.g., the Epistle to the Ephesians and also the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians.

² But see the remark made above, p. 220, note 1. We might without loss give up the half of the Apologies in return for the preservation of Justin's chief Anti-gnostic work.

³ According to the Gnostic Christology Christ merely restores the *status quo ante*, according to that of Irenæus he first and alone realises the hitherto unaccomplished destination of humanity.

⁴ According to the Gnostic conception the incarnation of the divine, i.e., the fall of *Sophia*, contains, paradoxically expressed, the element of sin; according to Irenæus' idea the element of redemption. Hence we must compare not only the Gnostic Christ, but the Gnostic *Sophia*, with the Christ of the Church. Irenæus himself did so in II. 20. 3.

⁵ After tracing in II. 14 the origin of the Gnostic theologoumena to the Greek philosophers Irenæus continues § 7: "Dicemus autem adversus eos: utramne hi omnes qui prædicti sunt, cum quibus eadem dicentes arguimini (Scil. "ye Gnostics with the philosophers"), cognoverunt veritatem aut non cognoverunt? Et si quidem cognoverunt, superflua est salvatoris in hunc mundum descensio. Ut (lege "ad") quid enim descendebat?" It is characteristic of Irenæus not to ask what is new in the revelations of God (through the prophets and the Logos), but quite definitely: "Cur descendit salvator in hunc mundum?" See also lib. III. præf.: "veritas, hoc est dei filii doctrina", III. 10. 3: "Hæc est salutis agnitio quæ deerat eis, quæ est filii dei agnitio... agnitio salutis erat agnitio filii dei, qui et salus et salvator et salutare vere et dicitur et est." III. 11. 3: III. 12. 7: IV. 24.

to men, who are free and naturally constituted for fellowship with God, the knowledge which enables them to imitate God, and thus by their own act to attain communion with him. Nevertheless to Irenæus the pith of the matter is already found in the idea that Christianity is real redemption, *i.e.*, that the highest blessing bestowed in Christianity is the deification of human nature through the gift of immortality, and that this deification includes the full knowledge and enjoying of God (*visio dei*). This conception suggested to him the question as to the cause of the incarnation as well as the answer to the same. The question "cur deus—homo", which was by no means clearly formulated in the apologetic writings, in so far as in these "homo" only meant *appearance* among men, and the "why" was answered by referring to prophecy and the necessity of divine teaching, was by Irenæus made the central point. The reasons why the answer he gave was so highly satisfactory may be stated as follows: (1) It proved that the Christian blessing of salvation was of a specific kind. (2) It was similar in point of form to the so-called Gnostic conception of Christianity, and even surpassed it as regards the promised extent of the sphere included in the deification. (3) It harmonised with the eschatological tendency of Christendom, and at the same time was fitted to replace the material eschatological expectations that were fading away. (4) It was in keeping with the mystic and Neoplatonic current of the time, and afforded it the highest imaginable satisfaction. (5) For the vanishing trust in the possibility of attaining the highest knowledge by the aid of reason it substituted the sure hope of a supernatural transformation of human nature which would even enable it to appropriate that which is above reason. (6) Lastly, it provided the traditional historical utterances respecting Christ, as well as the whole preceding course of history, with a firm foundation and a definite aim, and made it possible to conceive a history of salvation unfolding itself by degrees (*ἰσχυρομία Θεοῦ*). According to this conception the central point of history was no longer the Logos as such, but Christ as the *incarnate God*, while at the same time the moralistic interest was balanced by a really religious one. An approach was thus made to the Pauline

theology, though indeed in a very peculiar way and to some extent only in appearance. A more exact representation of salvation through Christ has, however, been given by Irenæus as follows: Incorruptibility is a *habitus* which is the opposite of our present one and indeed of man's natural condition. For immortality is at once God's manner of existence and his attribute; as a created being man is only "capable of incorruption and immortality" ("*capax incorruptionis et immortalitatis*");¹ thanks to the divine goodness, however, he is intended for the same, and yet is empirically "subjected to the power of death" ("*sub condicione mortis*"). Now the sole way in which immortality as a physical condition can be obtained is by its possessor uniting himself *realiter* with human nature, in order to deify it "by adoption" ("*per adoptionem*"), such is the technical term of Irenæus. The deity must become what we are in order that we may become what he is. Accordingly, if Christ is to be the Redeemer, he must himself be God, and all the stress must fall upon his birth as man. "By his birth as man the eternal Word of God guarantees the inheritance of life to those who in their natural birth have inherited death."²

¹ See II. 24. 3, 4: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est: sed secundum gratiam dei datur." Cf. what follows. Irenæus has in various places argued that human nature inclusive of the flesh is *capax incorruptibilitatis*, and likewise that immortality is at once a free gift and the realisation of man's destiny.

² Book V. pref.: "Iesus Christus propter immensam suam dilectionem factus est, quod sumus nos, uti nos periceret esse quod et ipse"; III. 6. 1: "Deus stetit in synagoga deorum... de patre et filio et de his, qui adoptionem perceperunt, dicit: hi autem sunt ecclesia. Hæc enim est synagoga dei." etc.; see also what follows III. 16. 3: "Filius dei hominis filius factus, ut per eum adoptionem percipiamus, portante homine et capiente et complectente filium dei." III. 16. 6: "Dei verbum unigenitum, qui semper humano generi adest, unum et conspersus suo plasmate secundum placitum patris et caro factus, ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster... unus Iesus Christus, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semetipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis, et impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans... in semetipsum primatum assumens... universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore." III. 18. 1: "Quando incarnatus est filius homo et homo factus longam hominum expositionem in se ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans, ut quod perdideramus in Adam id est secundum imaginem et similitudinem esse dei, hoc in Christo Iesu reciperemus." Cf. the whole 18th chapter where the deepest thoughts of the Pauline Gnosis of the death on the cross

But this work of Christ can be conceived as *recapitulatio* because God the Redeemer is identical with God the Creator; and Christ consequently brings about a final condition which existed from the beginning in God's plan, but could not be immediately realised in consequence of the entrance of sin. It

are amalgamated with the Gnosis of the incarnation: see especially 18. 6, 7: "Ἦνωσεν οὖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῷ Θεῷ. Εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἄνθρωπος ἐνίκησεν τὴν ἀντίπαλον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, οὐκ ἂν δικαίως ἐνίκηθῃ ὁ ἔχθρος. Πάλιν τε, εἰ μὴ ὁ Θεὸς ἐδωρήσατο τὴν σωτηρίαν, οὐκ ἂν βεβαίως ἔσχομεν αὐτήν. Καὶ εἰ μὴ συνηνώθῃ ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῷ Θεῷ, οὐκ ἂν ἡδυνήθῃ μετασχεῖν τῆς ἀφθαρσίας. "Ἐδει γὰρ τὸν μεσίτην Θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων διὰ τῆς ἰδίας πρὸς ἑκατέρους οἰκειότητος εἰς Φιλίαν καὶ ὁμόνοιαν τοὺς ἀμφοτέρους συναγαγεῖν καὶ Θεῷ μὲν παραστήται τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώποις δὲ γνωρίσαι τὸν Θεόν. Qua enim ratione filiorum adoptionis eius participes esse possemus, nisi per filium eam quæ est ad ipsum recepissemus ab eo communionem, nisi verbum eius communicasset nobis caro factum? Quapropter et per omnem venit ætatem, omnibus restituens eam quæ est ad deum communionem." The Pauline ideas about sin, law, and bondage are incorporated by Irenæus in what follows. The disquisitions in capp. 19—23 are dominated by the same fundamental idea. In cap. 19 Irenæus turns to those who hold Jesus to be a mere man. "perseverantes in servitute pristinae inobedientiae moriuntur, nondum commixti verbo dei patris neque per filium percipientes libertatem... privantur munere eius, quod est vita æterna: non recipientes autem verbum incorruptionis perseverant in carne mortali, et sunt debitores mortis, antidotum vite non accipientes. Ad quos verbum ait, sum munus gratiæ narrans: 'Εγὼ εἶπα, υἱοὶ ὑψίστου ἐστὲ πάντες καὶ θεοὶ ὑμεῖς δὲ ὡς ἄνθρωποι ἀποθνήσκετε. Ταῦτα λέγει πρὸς τοὺς μὴ δεξαμένους τὴν δωρεάν τῆς υἰοθεσίας, ἀλλ' ἀτιμάζοντας τὴν σάρκωσιν τῆς καθάρως γεννήσεως τοῦ λόγου τοῦ Θεοῦ... Εἰς τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ λόγος ἄνθρωπος et qui filius dei est filius hominis factus est. Ἴνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος τὸν λόγον χωρήσας καὶ τὴν υἰοθεσίαν λαβὼν υἱὸς γέννηται Θεοῦ. Non enim poteramus aliter incorruptelam et immortalitatem percipere, nisi adunati fuisset incorruptelæ et immortalitati. Quemadmodum autem adunari possumus incorruptelæ et immortalitati, nisi prius incorruptela et immortalitas facta fuisset id quod et nos, ut absorberetur quod erat corruptibile ab incorruptela et quod erat mortale ab immortalitate, ut filiorum adoptionem perciperemus?" III. 21. 10: Εἰ τοίνυν ὁ πρῶτος Ἀδὰμ ἔσχε πατέρα ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἐκ σπέρματος ἐγεννήθη, εἰκὸς ἦν καὶ τὸν δεῦτερον Ἀδὰμ λέγειν ἐξ Ἰωσήφ γενενηθῆσθαι. Εἰ δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἐκ γῆς ἐλήφθη, πλάστῃς δὲ αὐτοῦ ὁ Θεός, ἔδει καὶ τὸν ἀνακεφαλαιούμενον εἰς αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ πεπλασμένον ἄνθρωπον τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκεῖνῳ τῆς γεννήσεως ἔχειν ὁμοιότητα. Εἰς τὸ οὖν πάλιν οὐκ ἔλαβε χροὺν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλ' ἐκ Μαρίας ἐνήργησε τὴν πλάσιν γενέσθαι: Ἴνα μὴ ἄλλη πλάσις γέννηται μηδὲ ἄλλο τὸ σαζόμενον ἦ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ἐκεῖνος ἀνακεφαλαιωθῆ τηρουμένης τῆς ὁμοιότητος; III. 23. 1: IV. 38: V. 36: IV. 20: V. 16, 19—21, 22. In working out this thought Irenæus verges here and there on soteriological naturalism (see especially the disquisitions regarding the salvation of Adam, opposed to Tatian's views, in III. 23). But he does not fall into this for two reasons. In the first place, as regards the history of Jesus, he has been taught by Paul not to stop at the incarnation, but to view the work of salvation as only completed by the sufferings and death of Christ (See II. 20. 3: "dominus per passionem mortem destruxit et solvit errorem cor-

is perhaps Irenæus' highest merit, from a historical and ecclesiastical point of view, to have worked out this thought in pregnant fashion and with the simplest means, *i.e.*, without the apparatus of the Gnostics, but rather by the aid of simple and essentially Biblical ideas. Moreover, a few decades later, he and Melito, an author unfortunately so little known to us, were already credited with this merit. For the author of the so-called "Little Labyrinth" (Euseb., H. E. V. 28. 5) can indeed boast with regard to the works of Justin, Miltiades, Tatian, Clement, etc., that they declared Christ to be God, but then continues: *Τὰ Εἰρηναίου τε καὶ Μελίτωνος καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν τίς ἀγνοεῖ βιβλία, θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων καταγγέλλοντα τὸν Χριστὸν* ("Who is ignorant of the books of Irenæus, Melito, and the rest, which proclaim Christ to be God and man"). The progress in theological views is very precisely and appropriately expressed in these words. The Apologists also professed their belief in the full revelation of God upon earth, that is, in revelation as the teaching which necessarily leads to immortality;¹ but Irenæus is the first to whom Jesus Christ, God and man, is the centre of history and faith.²

ruptionemque exterminavit. et ignorantiam destruxit. vitam autem manifestavit et ostendit veritatem et incorruptionem donavit": III. 16. 9: III. 18. 1-7 and many other passages), that is, to regard Christ as having performed a *work*. Secondly, alongside of the deification of Adam's children, viewed as a mechanical result of the incarnation, he placed the other (apologetic) thought, *viz.*, that Christ, as the teacher, imparts complete knowledge, that he has restored, *i.e.*, strengthened the freedom of man, and that redemption (by which he means fellowship with God) therefore takes place only in the case of those children of Adam that acknowledge the truth proclaimed by Christ and imitate the Redeemer in a holy life (V. 1. 1.: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quæ sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verbum existens, homo factus fuisset. Neque enim alius poterat enarrare nobis, quæ sunt patris, nisi proprium ipsius verbum... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes et per auditum nostrum vocem eius percipientes, ut imitatores quidem operum, factores autem sermonum eius facti, communionem habeamus cum ipso", and many other passages. We find a combined formula in III. 5. 3: "Christus libertatem hominibus restauravit et attribuit incorrupte hæreditatem."

¹ Theophilus also did not see further, see Wendt, *l.c.*, 17 ff.

² Melito's teaching must have been similar. In a fragment attributed to him (see my *Texte und Untersuchungen* I. 1. 2 p. 255 ff.) we even find the expression *καὶ δύο οὐσίαι Χριστοῦ*. The genuineness of the fragment is indeed disputed, but, as I think, without grounds. It is certainly remarkable that the formula is not found in Irenæus (see details below). The first Syriac fragment (Otto IX. p. 419) shows that Melito also views redemption as reunion through Christ.

Following the method of Valentinus, he succeeded in sketching a history of salvation, the gradual realising of the *σινωσις* *Θεοῦ* culminating in the deification of believing humanity, but here he always managed to keep his language essentially within the limits of the Biblical. The various acting æons of the Gnostics became to him different stages in the saving work of the one Creator and his Logos. His system seemed to have absorbed the rationalism of the Apologists and the intelligible simplicity of their moral theology, just as much as it did the Gnostic dualism with its particoloured mythology. Revelation had become history, the history of salvation; and dogmatics had in a certain fashion become a way of looking at history, the knowledge of God's ways of salvation that lead historically to an appointed goal.¹

But, as this realistic, quasi-historical view of the subject was by no means completely worked out by Irenæus himself, since the theory of human freedom did not admit of its logical development, and since the New Testament also pointed in other directions, it did not yet become the predominating one even in the third century, nor was it consistently carried out by any one teacher. The two conceptions opposed to it, that of the early Christian eschatology and the rationalistic one, were still in vogue. The two latter were closely connected in the third century, especially in the West, whilst the mystic and realistic view was almost completely lacking there. In this respect Tertullian adopted but little from Irenæus. Hippolytus also lagged behind him. Teachers like Commodian, Arnobius, and Lactantius, however, wrote as if there had been no Gnostic movement at all, and as if no Antignostic Church theology existed. The immediate result of the work carried on by Irenæus and the Antignostic teachers in the Church consisted in the fixing of tradition and in the intelligent treatment of individual doctrines, which gradually became established. The most

¹ The conception of the stage by stage development of the economy of God and the corresponding idea of "several covenants" (I. 10. 3; III. 11—15 and elsewhere) denote a very considerable advance, which the Church teachers owe to the controversy with Gnosticism, or to the example of the Gnostics. In this case the origin of the idea is quite plain. For details see below.

important will be set forth in what follows. On the most vital point, the introduction of the philosophical Christology into the Church's rule of faith, see Chapter 7.

The manner in which Irenæus undertook his great task of expounding and defending orthodox Christianity in opposition to the Gnostic form was already a prediction of the future. The oldest Christian motives and hopes; the letter of both Testaments, including even Pauline thoughts; moralistic and philosophical elements, the result of the Apologists' labours; and realistic and mystical features balance each other in his treatment. He glides over from the one to the other; limits the one by the other; plays off Scripture against reason, tradition against the obscurity of the Scriptures; and combats fantastic speculation by an appeal sometimes to reason, sometimes to the limits of human knowledge. Behind all this and dominating everything, we find his firm belief in the bestowal of divine incorruptibility on believers through the work of the God-man. This eclectic method did not arise from shrewd calculation. It was equally the result of a rare capacity for appropriating the feelings and ideas of others, combined with the conservative instincts that guided the great teacher, and the consequence of a happy blindness to the gulf which lay between the Christian tradition and the world of ideas prevailing at that time. Still unconscious of the greatest problem, Irenæus with inward sincerity sketched out that future dogmatic method according to which the theology compiled by an eclectic process is to be nothing else than the simple faith itself, this being merely illustrated and explained, developed and by that very process established, as far as "stands in the Holy Scripture", and—let us add—as far as reason requires. But Irenæus was already obliged to decline answering the question as to how far unexplained faith can be sufficient for most Christians, though nothing but this explanation can solve the great problems, "why more covenants than one were given to mankind, what was the character of each covenant, why God shut up every man unto unbelief, why the Word became flesh and suffered, why the advent of the Son of God only took place in the last times etc." (I. 10. 3). The relation of faith and theological Gnosis was

fixed by Irenæus to the effect that the latter is simply a continuation of the former.¹ At the same time, however, he did not clearly show how the collection of historical statements found in the confession can of itself guarantee a sufficient and tenable knowledge of Christianity. Here the speculative theories are as a matter of fact quite imbedded in the historical propositions of tradition. Will these obscurities remain when once the Church is forced to compete in its theological system with the whole philosophical science of the Greeks, or may it be expected that, instead of this system of eclecticism and compromise, a method will find acceptance which, distinguishing between faith and theology, will interpret in a new and speculative sense the whole complex of tradition? Irenæus' process has at least this one advantage over the other method: according to it everything can be reckoned part of the faith, providing it bears the stamp of truth, without the faith seeming to alter its nature. It is incorporated in the theology of facts which the faith here appears to be.² The latter, however, imperceptibly becomes a revealed system of doctrine and history; and though Irenæus himself always seeks to refer everything again to the "simple faith" (*ψιλή πίστις*), and to believing simplicity, that is, to the belief in the Creator and the Son of God who became man, yet it was not in his power to stop the development destined to transform the faith into knowledge of a theological system. The pronounced hellenising of the Gospel,

¹ It would seem from some passages as if faith and theological knowledge were according to Irenæus simply related as the "is" and the "why". As a matter of fact, he did express himself so without being really able to maintain the relationship thus fixed; for faith itself must also to some extent include a knowledge of the reason and aim of God's ways of salvation. Faith and theological knowledge are therefore, after all, closely interwoven with each other. Irenæus merely sought for a clear distinction, but it was impossible for him to find it in his way. The truth rather is that the same man, who, in opposition to heresy, condemned an exaggerated estimate of theoretical knowledge, contributed a great deal to the transformation of that faith into a monistic speculation.

² See I. 10. 2: Καὶ οὔτε ὁ πάνυ δυνατὸς ἐν λόγῳ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις προεστώτων ἕτερα τούτων (scil. than the *regula fidei*) ἔρεϊ· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὑπὲρ τὸν διδάσκαλον οὔτε ὁ ἀσθενὴς ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἑλαττώσει τὴν παράδοσιν. Μιᾶς γὰρ καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς πίστεως οὔσης οὔτε ὁ πολὺ περὶ αὐτῆς δυνάμενος εἶπεῖν ἐπλεοναυεν, οὔτε ὁ τὸ ὀλίγον ἕλαττόνησε.

brought about by the Gnostic systems, was averted by Irenæus and the later ecclesiastical teachers by preserving a great portion of the early Christian tradition, partly as regards its letter, partly as regards its spirit, and thus rescuing it for the future. But the price of this preservation was the adoption of a series of "Gnostic" formulæ. Churchmen, though with hesitation, adopted the adversary's way of looking at things, and necessarily did so, because as they became ever further and further removed from the early-Christian feelings and thoughts, they had always more and more lost every other point of view. The old Catholic Fathers permanently settled a great part of early tradition for Christendom, but at the same time promoted the gradual hellenising of Christianity.

2. *The Doctrines of the Church.*

In the following section we do not intend to give a presentation of the theology of Irenæus and the other Antignostic Church teachers, but merely to set forth those points of doctrine to which the teachings of these men gave currency in succeeding times.

Against the Gnostic theses¹ Irenæus and his successors, apart from the proof from prescription, adduced the following intrinsic considerations: (1) In the case of the Gnostics and Marcion the Deity lacks absoluteness, because he does not embrace everything, that is, he is bounded by the *kenoma* or by the sphere of a second God; and also because his omnipresence, omniscience, and omnipotence have a corresponding limitation.² (2) The assumption of divine emanations and of a differentiated

¹ See Böhringer's careful reviews of the theology of Irenæus and Tertullian (*Kirchengeschichte in Biographien*, Vol. I. 1st section, 1st half (2nd ed.), pp. 378—612, 2nd half. pp. 484—739).

² To the proof from prescription belong the arguments derived from the novelty and contradictory multiplicity of the Gnostic doctrines as well as the proofs that Greek philosophy is the original source of heresy. See *Iren.* II. 14. 1—6; *Tertull.* *de præscr.* 7; *Apolog.* 47 and other places; the *Philosophoumena* of Hippolytus. On Irenæus' criticism of Gnostic theology see Kunze, *Gotteslehre des Irenæus*, Leipzig, 1891. p. 8 ff.

divine *pleroma* represents the Deity as a composite, *i.e.*,¹ finite being; and, moreover, the personification of the divine qualities is a mythological freak, the folly of which is evident as soon as one also makes the attempt to personify the affections and qualities of man in a similar way.² (3) The attempt to make out conditions existing within the Godhead is in itself absurd and audacious.³ (4) The theory of the passion and ignorance of Sophia introduces sin into the *pleroma* itself, *i.e.*, into the Godhead.⁴ With this the weightiest argument against the Gnostic cosmogony is already mentioned. A further argument against the system is that the world and mankind would have been incapable of improvement, if they had owed their origin to ignorance and sin.⁵ Irenæus and Tertullian employ lengthy arguments to show that a God who has created nothing is in-

¹ See Irenæus II. 1. 2—4; II. 31. 1. Tertull. adv. Marc. I. 2—7. Tertullian proves that there can be neither two morally similar, nor two morally dissimilar Deities; see also I. 15.

² See Irenæus II. 13. Tertullian (ad Valent. 4) very appropriately defined the æons of Ptolemy as "personales substantias extra deum determinatas, quas Valentinus in ipsa summa divinitatis ut sensus et affectus motus incluserat."

³ See Irenæus, *l.c.*, and elsewhere in the 2nd Book. Tertull. adv. Valent. in several passages. Moreover, Irenæus still treated the first 8 Ptolemaic æons with more respect than the 22 following, because here at least there was some appearance of a Biblical foundation. In confuting the doctrine of æons he incidentally raised several questions (II. 17. 2), which Church theologians discussed in later times, with reference to the Son and Spirit. "Quæritur quemadmodum emissi sunt reliqui æones? Utrum uniti ei qui emisit, quemadmodum a sole radii, an efficaciter et partiliter, uti sit unusquisque eorum separatim et suam figurationem habens, quemadmodum ab homine homo... Aut secundum germinationem, quemadmodum ab arbore rami? Et utrum eiusdem substantiæ existebant his qui se emisit, an ex altera quadam substantia substantiam habentes? Et utrum in eodem emissi sunt, ut eiusdem temporis essent sibi?... Et utrum simplices quidam et uniformes et undique sibi æquales et similes, quemadmodum spiritus et lumina emissa sunt, an compositi et differentes?" See also II. 17. 4: "Si autem velut a lumine lumina accensa sunt... velut verbi gratia a facula facule, generatione quidem et magnitudine fortasse distabunt ab invicem: eiusdem autem substantiæ cum sint cum principe emissionis ipsorum, aut omnes impassibiles perseverant aut et pater ipsorum participabit passiones. Neque enim quæ postea accensa est facula, alterum lumen habebit quam illud quod ante eam fuit." Here we have already a statement of the logical reasons, which in later times were urged against the Arian doctrine.

⁴ See Iren. II. 17. 5 and II. 18.

⁵ See Iren. II. 4. 2.

conceivable, and that a Demiurge occupying a position alongside of or below the Supreme Being is self-contradictory, inasmuch as he sometimes appears higher than this Supreme Being, and sometimes so weak and limited that one can no longer look on him as a God.¹ The Fathers everywhere argue on behalf of the Gnostic Demiurge and against the Gnostic supreme God. It never occurs to them to proceed in the opposite way and prove that the supreme God may be the Creator. All their efforts are rather directed to show that the Creator of the world is the only and supreme God, and that there can be no other above this one. This attitude of the Fathers is characteristic; for it proves that the apologetico-philosophical theology was their fundamental assumption. The Gnostic (Marcionite) supreme God is the God of religion, the God of redemption; the Demiurge is the being required to explain the world. The intervention of the Fathers on his behalf, that is, their assuming him as the basis of their arguments, reveals what was fundamental and what was accidental in their religious teaching. At the same time, however, it shows plainly that they did not understand or did not feel the fundamental problem that troubled and perplexed the Gnostics and Marcion, viz., the qualitative distinction between the spheres of creation and redemption. They think they have sufficiently explained this distinction by the doctrine of human freedom and its consequences. Accordingly their whole mode of argument against the Gnostics and Marcion is, in point of content, of an abstract, philosophico-

¹ Tertullian in particular argued in great detail (adv. Marc. I. 9—19) that every God must, above all, have revealed himself as a creator. In opposition to Marcion's rejection of all natural theology, he represents this science as the foundation of all religious belief. In this connection he eulogised the created world (I. 13) and at the same time (see also the 2nd Book) argued in favour of the Demiurge, *i.e.*, of the one true God. Irenæus urged a series of acute and weighty objections to the cosmogony of the Valentinians (see II. 1—5), and showed how untenable was the idea of the Demiurge as an intermediate being. The doctrines that the Supreme Being is unknown (II. 6), that the Demiurge is the blind instrument of higher æons, that the world was created against the will of the Supreme God, and, lastly, that our world is the imperfect copy of a higher one were also opposed by him with rational arguments. His refutation of the last conception is specially remarkable (II. 7). On the idea that God did not create the world from eternal matter see Tertull., adv. Hermog.

rational kind.¹ As a rule they do not here carry on their controversy with the aid of reasons taken from the deeper views of religion. As soon as the rational argument fails, however, there is really an entire end to the refutation from inner grounds, at least in the case of Tertullian; and the contest is shifted into the sphere of the rule of faith and the Holy Scriptures. Hence, for example, they have not succeeded in making much impression on the heretical Christology from dogmatic considerations, though in this respect Irenæus was still very much more successful than Tertullian.² Besides, in adv. Marc. II. 27, the latter betrayed what interest he took in the preëxistent Christ as distinguished from God the Father. It is not expedient to separate the arguments advanced by the Fathers against the Gnostics from their own positive teachings, for these are throughout dependent on their peculiar attitude within the sphere of Scripture and tradition.

Irenæus and Hippolytus have been rightly named Scripture theologians; but it is a strange infatuation to think that this designation characterises them as evangelical. If indeed we here understand "evangelical" in the vulgar sense, the term may be correct, only in this case it means exactly the same as "Catholic". But if "evangelical" signifies "early-Christian", then it must be said that Scripture theology was not the primary means of preserving the ideas of primitive Christianity; for, as the New Testament Scriptures were also regarded as *inspired* documents and were to be interpreted according to the *regula*, their content was just for that reason apt to be obscured. Both Marcion and the chiefs of the Valentinian school had also been Scripture theologians. Irenæus and Hippolytus merely followed them. Now it is true that they very decidedly argued against the arbitrary method of interpreting the Scriptures adopted by Valentinus, and compared it to the process of forming the mosaic pic-

¹ But this very method of argument was without doubt specially impressive in the case of the educated, and it is these alone of whom we are here speaking. On the decay of Gnosticism after the end of the 2nd century, see Renan, *Origines*, Vol. VII., p. 113 ff.

² See his arguments that the Gnostics merely *assert* that they have only one Christ, whereas they actually possess several, III. 16. 1. 8 and elsewhere.

ture of a king into the mosaic picture of a fox, and the poems of Homer into any others one might choose;¹ but they just as decidedly protested against the rejection by Apelles and Marcion of the allegorical method of interpretation,² and therefore were not able to set up a canon really capable of distinguishing their own interpretation from that of the Gnostics.³ The Scripture theology of the old Catholic Fathers has a twofold aspect. The religion of the Scripture is no longer the original form; it is the mediated, scientific one to be constructed by a learned process; it is, on its part, the strongest symptom of the secularisation that has begun. In a word, it is the religion of the school, first the Gnostic then the ecclesiastical. But it may, on the other hand, be a wholesome reaction against enthusiastic excess and moralistic frigidity; and the correct sense of the letter will from the first obtain imperceptible recognition in opposition to the "spirit" arbitrarily read into it, and at length banish this "spirit" completely. Irenæus certainly tried to mark off the Church use of the Scriptures as distinguished from the Gnostic practice. He rejects the accommodation theory of which some Gnostics availed themselves;⁴ he emphasises more strongly than these the absolute sufficiency of the Scriptures by repudiating all esoteric doctrines;⁵ he rejects all distinction between different kinds of inspiration in the sacred books;⁶ he lays down the maxim that the obscure pas-

¹ See Iren., I. 9 and elsewhere: Tertull., *de præscr.* 39. *adv. Valent.* *passim*.

² See Tertull., *adv. Marc.* II. 19. 21. 22: III. 5. 6. 14. 19: V. 1.: *Orig. Comm.* in *Matth.* T. XV. 3. *Opp.* III., p. 655: *Comm.* in *ep. ad Rom.* T. II. 12. *Opp.* IV., p. 494 sq.: *Pseudo-Orig.* *Adamantius.* *De recta in deum fide*: *Orig.* I. pp. 808. 817.

³ For this reason Tertullian altogether forbade exegetic disputes with the Gnostics. see *de præscr.* 16—19: "Ego non ad scripturas provocandum est nec in his constituendum certamen, in quibus aut nulla aut incerta victoria est aut parum certa."

⁴ See Iren., III. 5. 1: III. 12. 6.

⁵ See Iren., III. 14. 2: III. 15. 1: Tertull., *de præscr.* 25: "Scripturæ quidem perfectæ sunt, quippe a verbo dei et spiritu eius dicte, nos autem secundum quod minores sumus et novissimi a verbo dei et spiritu eius, secundum hoc et scientia mysteriorum eius indigemus."

⁶ See Iren. II. 35. 2: IV. 34. 35 and elsewhere. Irenæus also asserted that the translation of the Septuagint (III. 21. 4) was inspired. The repudiation of different kinds of inspiration in the Scriptures likewise involved the rejection of all the critical views of the Gnostics that were concealed behind that assumption. The Alexandrians were the first who again to some extent adopted these critical principles.

sages are to be interpreted from the clear ones, not vice versa;¹ but this principle being in itself ambiguous, it is rendered quite unequivocal by the injunction to interpret everything according to the rule of faith² and, in the case of all objectionable passages, to seek the type.³ Not only did Irenæus explain the Old Testament allegorically, in accordance with traditional usage;⁴ but according to the principle: "with God there is nothing without purpose or due signification" ("nihil vacuum neque sine signo apud deum") (IV. 21. 3), he was also the first to apply the scientific and mystical explanation to the New Testament, and was consequently obliged to adopt the Gnostic exegesis, which was imperative as soon as the apostolic writings were viewed as a New Testament. He regards the fact of Jesus handing round food to those *lying* at table as signifying that Christ also bestows life on the long dead generations;⁵ and, in the parable of the Samaritan, he interprets the host as the Spirit and the two denarii as the Father and Son.⁶ To Irenæus and also to Tertullian and Hippolytus all numbers, incidental circumstances, etc., in the Holy Scriptures are virtually as significant as they are to the Gnostics, and hence the only question is what hidden meaning we are to give to them. "Gnosticism" is therefore here adopted by the ecclesiastical teachers in its full extent, proving that this "Gnosticism" is nothing else than the learned construction of religion with the scientific means of those days. As soon as Churchmen were forced to bring forward their proofs and proceed to put the same questions as the "Gnostics", they were obliged to work by their method. Allegory, however, was required in

¹ See Iren. II. 10. 1; II. 27. 1. 2.

² See Iren. II. 25. 1.

³ Irenæus appropriates the words of an Asia Minor presbyter when he says (IV. 31. 1): De his quidem delictis, de quibus ipsæ scripturæ increpant patriarchas et prophetas, nos non oportere exprobare eis... de quibus autem scripturæ non increpant (scil. delictis), sed simpliciter sunt positæ, nos non debere fieri accusatores, sed tyrum quærere."

⁴ See, *e.g.*, IV. 20. 12 where he declares the three spies whom Rahab entertained to be Father, Son, and Spirit.

⁵ See Iren. IV. 22. 1.

⁶ See Iren. III. 17. 3.

order to establish the continuity of the tradition from Adam down to the present time—not merely down to Christ—against the attacks of the Gnostics and Marcion. By establishing this continuity a historical truth was really also preserved. For the rest, the disquisitions of Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus were to such an extent borrowed from their opponents that there is scarcely a problem that they propounded and discussed as the result of their own thirst for knowledge. This fact not only preserved to their works an early-Christian character as compared with those of the Alexandrians, but also explains why they frequently stop in their positive teachings, when they believe they have confuted their adversaries. Thus we find neither in Irenæus nor Tertullian a discussion of the relation of the Scriptures to the rule of faith. From the way in which they appeal to both we can deduce a series of important problems, which, however, the Fathers themselves did not formulate and consequently did not answer.¹

The doctrine of God was fixed by the old Catholic Fathers for the Christendom of succeeding centuries, and in fact both the methodic directions for forming the idea of God and their results remained unchanged. With respect to the former they occupy a middle position between the renunciation of all knowledge—for God is not abyss and silence—and the attempt to fathom the depths of the Godhead.² Tertullian, influenced by the Stoics, strongly emphasised the possibility of attaining a knowledge of God. Irenæus, following out an idea which seems to anticipate the mysticism of later theologians, made love a preliminary condition of knowledge and plainly acknowledged it as the principle of knowledge.³ God can be known from revel-

¹ Justin had already noted certain peculiarities of the Holy Scriptures as distinguished from profane writings. Tertullian speaks of two *proprietates iudaicæ literaturæ* in adv. Marc. III. 5. 6. But the Alexandrians were the first to propound any kind of complete theories of inspiration.

² See above p. 233, note 2, Kunze, l.c.

³ See Iren., II. 26. I, 13. 4: "Sic et in reliquis omnibus nulli similis erit omnium pater hominum pusillitati: et dicitur quidem secundum hæc propter delectionem. sentitur autem super hæc secundum magnitudinem." Irenæus expressly says that God cannot be known as regards his greatness, *i.e.*, absolutely, but that he can be known as regards his love. IV. 20. 1: "Igitur secundum magnitudinem non est

ation,¹ because he has really revealed himself, that is, both by the creation and the word of revelation. Irenæus also taught that a sufficient knowledge of God, as the creator and guide, can be obtained from the creation, and indeed this knowledge always continues, so that all men are without excuse.² In this case the prophets, the Lord himself, the Apostles, and the Church teach no more and nothing else than what must be already plain to the natural consciousness. Irenæus certainly did not succeed in reconciling this proposition with his former assertion that the knowledge of God springs from love resting on revelation. Irenæus also starts, as Apologist and Antignostic, with the God who is the First Cause. Every God who is not that is a phantom;³ and every sublime religious state of mind which

cognoscere deum, impossibile est enim mensurari patrem: secundum autem dilectionem eius—hæc est enim quæ nos per verbum eius perducit ad deum—obedientes ei semper discimus quoniam est tantus deus etc.”; in IV. 20. 4 the knowledge of God “secundum dilectionem” is more closely defined by the words “per verbum eius Iesum Christum.” The statements in §§ 5 and 6 are, however, specially important: they who are pure in heart will see God. God’s omnipotence and goodness remove the impossibility of man knowing him. Man comes to know him gradually, in proportion as he is revealed and through love, until he beholds him in a state of perfection. He must be in God in order to know God: ὡςπερ οἱ βλέποντες τὸ φῶς ἐντός εἰσι τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τῆς λαμπρότητος αὐτοῦ μετέχουσιν, οὕτως οἱ βλέποντες τὸν Θεὸν ἐντός εἰσι τοῦ Θεοῦ, μετέχοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς λαμπρότητος. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὁ ἀχώρητος καὶ ἀκατάληπτος καὶ ἀόρατος ὁράμενος ἑαυτὸν . . . τοῖς πιστοῖς παρέσχεν, ἵνα ζωοποιήσῃ τοὺς χωροῦντας καὶ βλέποντας αὐτὸν διὰ πίστεως. See also what follows down to the words: μετοχή Θεοῦ ἐστὶ τὸ γινώσκειν Θεὸν καὶ ἀπολαύειν τῆς χρηστότητος αὐτοῦ, et homines igitur videbunt deum, ut vivant, per visionem immortales facti et pertingentes usque in deum. Sentences of this kind where rationalism is neutralised by mysticism we seek for in Tertullian in vain.

¹ See Iren., IV. 6. 4: Ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς ὁ κύριος, ὅτι Θεὸν εἰδέναι οὐδεὶς δύναται, μὴ οὐχὶ Θεοῦ διδάξαντος, τούτέστιν, ἄνευ Θεοῦ μὴ γινώσκουσθαι τὸν Θεόν· αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ γινώσκουσθαι τὸν Θεὸν βέλγημα εἶναι τοῦ πατρὸς. Γινώσκονται γὰρ αὐτὸν οἷς ἂν ἀποκαλύψῃ ὁ υἱός.

² Iren. II. 6. 1, 9. 1, 27. 2: III. 25. 1: “Providentiam habet deus omnium propter hoc et consilium dat: consilium autem dans adest his, qui morum providentiam habent. Necessè est igitur ea quæ providentur et gubernantur cognoscere suum directorem; quæ quidem non sunt irrationalia neque vana, sed habent sensibilitatem perceptam de providentia dei. Et propter hoc ethnicorum quidam, qui minus illecebris ac voluptatibus servierunt, et non in tantum superstitione idolorum coabducti sunt, providentia eius moti licet tenuiter, tamen conversi sunt, ut dicerent fabricatorem huius universitatis patrem omnium providentem et disponentem secundum nos mundum.” Tertull., de testim. animæ; Apolog. 17.

³ See Iren., IV. 6. 2: Tertull., adv. Marc. I. II.

does not include the feeling of dependence upon God as the Creator is a deception. It is the extremest blasphemy to degrade God the Creator, and it is the most frightful machination of the devil that has produced the *blasphemia creatoris*.¹ Like the Apologists, the early Catholic Fathers confess that the doctrine of God the Creator is the first and most important of the main articles of Christian faith;² the belief in his oneness as well as his absoluteness is the main point.³ God is all light, all understanding, all Logos, all active spirit;⁴ everything anthropopathic and anthropomorphic is to be conceived as incompatible with his nature.⁵ The early-Catholic doctrine of God shows an advance beyond that of the Apologists, in so far as God's attributes of goodness and righteousness are expressly discussed, and it is proved in opposition to Marcion that

¹ See Iren., V. 26. 2.

² See Iren., II. 1. 1 and the Hymn II. 30. 9.

³ See Iren., III. 8. 3. Very pregnant are Irenæus' utterances in II. 34. 4 and II. 30. 9: "Principari enim debet in omnibus et dominari voluntas dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et subdita esse et in servitium dedita" . . . "substantia omnium voluntas dei;" see also the fragment V. in Harvey, Iren., Opp. II p. 477 sq. Because everything originates with God and the existence of eternal metaphysical contrasts is therefore impossible the following proposition (IV. 2. 4), which is proved from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, holds good: "ex una substantia esse omnia, id est Abraham et Moysen et prophetas, etiam ipsum dominum."

⁴ See Iren. II. 28. 4, 5; IV. 11. 2.

⁵ Tertullian also makes the same demand (*e.g.*, adv. Marc. II. 27); for his assertion "deum corpus esse" (adv. Prax. 7: "Quis enim negabit, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie") must be compared with his realistic doctrine of the soul (*de anima* 6) as well as with the proposition formulated in *de carne* 11: "omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est." Tertullian here followed a principle of Stoic philosophy, and in this case by no means wished to teach that the Deity has a human form, since he recognised that man's likeness to God consists merely in his spiritual qualities. On the contrary Melito ascribed to God a corporeal existence of a higher type (Eusebius mentions a work of this bishop under the title "*ὁ περὶ ἐνσωμάτου Θεοῦ λόγος*"), and Origen reckoned him among the teachers who recognised that man had also a likeness to God in form (in body); see my *Texte und Untersuchungen* I. 1. 2, pp. 243, 248. In the second century the realistic eschatological ideas no doubt continued to foster in wide circles the popular idea that God had a form and a kind of corporeal existence. A middle position between these ideas and that of Tertullian and the Stoics seems to have been taken up by Lactantius (*Instit. div.* VII. 9, 21; *de ira dei* 2. 18.).

they are not mutually exclusive, but necessarily involve each other.¹

In the case of the *Logos doctrine* also, Tertullian and Hippolytus simply adopted and developed that of the Apologists, whilst Irenæus struck out a path of his own. In the *Apologétique* (c. 21) Tertullian set forth the Logos doctrine as laid down by Tatian, the only noteworthy difference between him and his predecessor consisting in the fact that the appearance of the Logos in Jesus Christ was the uniform aim of his presentation.²

¹ See Iren., III. 25. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 23—28; II. 11 sq. Hippolytus briefly defined his doctrine of God in Phil. X. 32. The advance beyond the Apologists' idea of God consists not only in the thorough discussion of God's attributes of goodness and righteousness, but also in the view, which is now much more vigorously worked out, that the Almighty Creator has no other purpose in his world than the salvation of mankind. See the 10th Greek fragment of Irenæus (Harvey, II. p. 480): Tertull., de orat. 4: "Summa est voluntatis dei salus eorum, quos adoptavit"; de pœnit. 2: "Bonorum dei unus est titulus, salus hominum"; adv. Marc. II. 27: "Nihil tam dignum deo quam salus hominis." They had here undeniably learned from Marcion; see adv. Marc. I. 17. In the first chapters of the work de orat., however, in which Tertullian expounds the Lord's Prayer, he succeeded in unfolding the meaning of the Gospel in a way such as was never possible for him elsewhere. The like remark may be made of Origen's work de orat., and, in general, in the case of most authors who interpreted the Lord's Prayer in the succeeding period. This prayer kept alive the knowledge of the deepest meaning of the Gospel.

² Apol. 21: "Necesse et igitur pauca de Christo ut deo... Jam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum. Apud vestros quoque sapientes λόγος, id est sermonem et rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis." (An appeal to Zeno and Cleanthes follows). "Et nos autem sermonei atque rationi itemque virtuti, per que omnia molitum deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et sermo insit pronuntianti et ratio adsit disponenti et virtus præsit perficienti. Hunc ex deo prolatum didicimus et prolatione generatum et idcirco filium dei et deum dictum ex unitate substantiæ, nam et deus spiritus (that is, the antimundane Logos is the Son of God). Et cum radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius nec separatur substantia sed extenditur (cf. adv. Prax. 8). Ita de spiritu spiritus et deo deus ut lumen de lumine accensum. Manet integra et indefecta materiæ matrix, etsi plures inde traduces qualitatis mutueris; ita et quod de deo profectum est, deus est et dei filius et unus ambo. Ita et de spiritu spiritus et de deo deus modulo alternum numerum, gradu non statu fecit, et a matrice non recessit sed excessit. Iste igitur dei radius, ut retro semper prædicabatur, delapsus in virginem quandam et in utero eius caro figuratus nascitur homo deo mixtus. Caro spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, adfatur, docet, operatur et Christus est." Tertullian adds: "Recipite interim hanc fabulam, similis est vestris." As a matter of fact the heathen must have viewed this statement as a philosophical speculation with a mythological conclusion. It is very instructive

He fully explained his Logos doctrine in his work against the Monarchian Praxeas.¹ Here he created the formulæ of succeeding orthodoxy by introducing the ideas "substance" and "person" and by framing, despite of the most pronounced subordinationism and a purely economical conception of the Trinity, definitions of the relations between the persons which could be fully adopted in the Nicene creed.² Here also the philosophical and cosmological interest prevails; the history of salvation appears only to be the continuation of that of the cosmos. This system is distinguished from Gnosticism by the history of redemption appearing as the natural continuation of the history of creation and not simply as its correction. The thought that the unity of the Godhead is shown in the *una substantia* and the *una dominatio* was worked out by Tertullian with admirable clearness. According to him the unfolding of this one substance into several heavenly embodiments, or the administration of the divine sovereignty by emanated *persons* cannot endanger the

to ascertain that in Hippolytus' book against Noëtus "the setting forth of the truth" (c. 10 ff.) he begins with the proposition: Θεός ἐβουλήθη κόσμον κτίσαι. The Logos whose essence and working are described merely went forth to realise this intention.

¹ See Hagemann, Die römische Kirche (1864), p. 172 ff.

² See my detailed exposition of the *orthodox* side of Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity ("orthodox" in the later sense of the word), in Vol. IV. There it is also shown that these formulæ were due to Tertullian's *juristic* bias. The formulæ, "una *substantia*, tres *personæ*", never alternates in his case with the others, "una *natura*, tres *personæ*"; and so it remained for a long time in the West: they did not speak of "natures" but of "substances" ("nature" in this connection is very rare down to the 5th century). What makes this remarkable is the fact that Tertullian always uses "substance" in the concrete sense "individual substance" and has even expressed himself precisely on the point. He says in de anima 32: "aliud est substantia, aliud natura substantiæ; siquidem substantia propria est rei cuiusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum: substantia est lapis, ferrum: duritia lapidis et ferri natura substantiæ est. Duritia (natura) communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanæ, mollitia plumæ pariant naturalia eorum, substantiva non pariant... Et tunc naturæ similitudo notatur, cum substantiæ dissimilitudo conspicitur. Men and animals are similar *natura*, but not *substantia*." We see that Tertullian in so far as he designated Father, Son, and Spirit as one substance expressed their *unity* as strongly as possible. The only idea intelligible to the majority was a juristic and political notion, viz., that the Father, who is the *tota substantia*, sends forth officials whom he entrusts with the administration of the monarchy. The legal fiction attached to the concept "person" aided in the matter here.

unity; the "arrangement of the unity when the unity evolves the trinity from itself" ("dispositio unitatis, quando unitas ex semetipsa [trinitatem] derivat") does not abolish the unity, and, moreover, the Son will some day subject himself to the Father, so that God will be all in all.¹ Here then the Gnostic doctrine of æons is adopted in its complete form, and in fact Hippolytus, who in this respect agrees with Tertullian, has certified that the Valentinians "acknowledge that the one is the originator of all" ("τὸν ἕνα ἰσομοιοῦσιν ἀπὸν τῶν πάντων"), because with them also, "the whole goes back to one" ("τὸ πᾶν εἰς ἕνα κατατρέχει").² The only difference is that Tertullian and Hippolytus limit the "economy of God" (οἰκονομία τοῦ Θεοῦ) to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, while the Gnostics exceed this number.³ According to Tertullian "a rational conception of the Trinity constitutes truth, an irrational idea of the unity makes heresy" ("trinitas rationaliter expensa veritatem constituit, unitas irrationaliter collecta hæresim facit") is already the watchword of the Christian dogmatic. Now what he considers a rational conception is keeping in view the different stages of God's economy, and distinguishing between *dispositio*, *distinctio*, *numerus* on the one hand and *divisio* on the other. At the beginning God was alone, but *ratio* and *sermo* existed within him. In a certain sense then,

¹ See adv. Prax. 3: "Igitur si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur, sicut scriptum est: Milies centies centena milia adsistebant ei, et milies centena milia apparebant ei, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta milia virtutum procuratur: quale est ut deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in filio et spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sortitis locum, tam consortibus substantiæ patris, quam non patitur in tot angelorum numero?" (!!) c. 4: "Videmus igitur non obesse monarchiæ filium, etsi hodie apud filium est, quia et in suo statu est apud filium, et cum suo statu restituetur patri a filio." L.c.: Monarchia in tot nominibus constituta est, in quot deus voluit."

² See Hippol., c. Noëtum 11. According to these doctrines the unity is sufficiently preserved (1) if the separate persons have one and the same substance, (2) if there is one possessor of the whole substance, *i.e.*, if everything proceeds from him. That this is a remnant of polytheism ought not to be disputed.

³ Adv. Prax. 8: "Hoc si qui putaverit, me προβολὴν aliquam introducere id est prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utatur et veritas vocabulo isto et re ac censu eius, quia et hæresis utitur; immo hæresis potius ex veritate accepit quod ad mendacium suum strueret": cf. also what follows. Thus far then theologians had got already: "The economy is founded on as many names as God willed" (c. 4).

he was never alone, for he thought and spoke inwardly. If even men can carry on conversations with themselves and make themselves objects of reflection, how much more is this possible with God.¹ But as yet he was the only *person*.² The moment, however, that he chose to reveal himself and sent forth from himself the word of creation, the Logos came into existence as a real being, before the world and for the sake of the world. For "that which proceeds from such a great substance and has created such substances cannot itself be devoid of substance." He is therefore to be conceived as permanently separate from God "secundus a deo constitutus, perseverans in sua forma"; but as unity of substance is to be preserved ("*alius pater, alius filius, alius non aliud*"—"ego et pater unum sumus ad substantiæ unitatem, non ad numeri singularitatem dictum est"—"*tres unum sunt, non unus*"—"the Father is one person and the Son is another, different persons not different things", "*I and the Father are one* refers to unity of substance, not to singleness in number"—"the three are one thing not one person"), the Logos must be related to the Father as the ray to the sun, as the stream to the source, as the stem to the root (see also Hippolytus, c. Noëtum 10).³ For that very reason "Son" is the most suitable expression for the Logos that has emanated in this way (κατὰ μερισμόν). Moreover, since he (as well as the Spirit) has the same substance as the Father ("unius substantiæ" = ἑμοῦσιν) he has also the same *potter*⁴ as regards the world. He has all might in heaven and earth, and he has had it *ab initio*, from the very beginning of time.⁵ On the other hand this same Son is only a part and offshoot; the Father is the whole; and in this the mystery of the economy consists. What the Son possesses has been given him by the Father; the Father is therefore greater than the Son; the Son

¹ See adv. Prax. 5.

² Tertull., adv. Hermog. 3: "fuit tempus, cum ei filius non fuit."

³ Novatian (de trin. 23) distinguishes very decidedly between "factum esse" and "procedere".

⁴ Adv. Prax. 2: "Custodiatur οἰκονομίας sacramentum, quæ unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, tres autem non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie, unius autem substantiæ et unius status et potestatis."

⁵ See the discussions adv. Prax. 16 ff.

is subordinate to the Father.¹ "Pater tota substantia est, filius vero derivatio totius et portio".² This paradox is ultimately based on a philosophical axiom of Tertullian: the whole fullness of the Godhead, *i.e.*, the Father, is incapable of entering into the finite, whence also he must always remain invisible, unapproachable, and incomprehensible. The Divine Being that appears and works on earth can never be anything but a part of the transcendent Deity. This Being must be a derived existence, which has already in some fashion a finite element in itself, because it is the hypostatized Word of creation, which has an origin.³ We would assert too much, were we to say that Tertullian meant that the Son was simply the world-thought itself; his insistence on the "unius substantiæ" disproves this. But no doubt he regards the Son as the Deity depotentiated for the sake of self-communication; the Deity adapted to the world, whose sphere coincides with the world-thought, and whose power is identical with that necessary for the world. From the standpoint of humanity this Deity is God himself, *i.e.*, a God whom men can apprehend and who can apprehend them; but from God's standpoint, which speculation can fix but not fathom, this Deity is a subordinate, nay, even a temporary one. Tertullian and Hippolytus know as little of an immanent Trinity

¹ Tertull., adv. Marc. III. 6: "filius portio plenitudinis." In another passage Tertullian has ironically remarked in opposition to Marcion (IV. 39): "Nisi Marcion Christum non subiectum patri infert."

² Adv. Prax. 9.

³ See the whole 14th chap. adv. Prax. especially the words: "Iam ergo alius erit qui videbatur, quia non potest idem invisibilis definiiri qui videbatur, et consequens erit, ut invisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis." One cannot look at the sun itself, but, "toleramus radium eius pro temperatura portionis, que in terram inde porrigitur." The chapter also shows how the Old Testament theophanies must have given an impetus to the distinction between the Deity as transcendent and the Deity as making himself visible. Adv. Marc. II. 27: "Quæcumque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis, deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro, miscente in semetipso hominem et deum in virtutibus deum, in pusillitatibus hominem, ut tantum homini conferat quantum deo detrahit." In adv. Prax. 29 Tertullian showed in very precise terms that the Father is by nature impassible, but the Son is capable of suffering. Hippolytus does not share this opinion: to him the Logos in himself is likewise $\alpha\pi\alpha\lambda\eta\gamma\epsilon$ (see c. Noëtum 15).

as the Apologists; the Trinity only *appears* such, because the unity of the substance is very vigorously emphasised; but in truth the Trinitarian process as in the case of the Gnostics, is simply the background of the process that produces the history of the world and of salvation. This is first of all shown by the fact that in course of the process of the world and of salvation the Son grows in his sonship, that is, goes through a finite process;¹ and secondly by the fact that the Son himself will one day restore the monarchy to the Father.² These words no doubt are again spoken not from the standpoint of man, but from that of God; for so long as history lasts "the Son continues in his form." In its point of departure, its plan, and its details this whole exposition is not distinguished from the teachings of contemporaneous and subsequent Greek philosophers,³ but merely differs in its aim. In itself absolutely unfitted to preserve the primitive Christian belief in God the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ, its importance consists in its identification of the historical Jesus with this Logos. By its aid Tertullian united the scientific, idealistic cosmology with the utterances of early Christian tradition about Jesus in such a way as to make the two, as it were, appear the totally dissimilar wings of one and the same building,⁴ With peculiar versatility he contrived to make himself at home in both wings.

¹ According to Tertullian it is certainly an *essential part of the Son's nature* to appear, teach, and thus come into connection with men; but he neither asserted the necessity of the incarnation apart from the faulty development of mankind, nor can this view be inferred from his premises.

² See adv. Prax. 4. the only passage, however, containing this idea, which is derived from I Cor. XV.

³ Cf. specially the attempts of Plotinus to reconcile the abstract unity which is conceived as the principle of the universe with the manifoldness and fulness of the real and the particular (Ennead. lib. III.—V.). Plotinus employs the subsidiary notion *μερισμός* in the same way as Tertullian; see Hagemann l.c. p. 186 f. Plotinus would have agreed with Tertullian's proposition in adv. Marc. III. 15: "Dei nomen quasi naturale divinitatis potest in omnes communicari quibus divinitas vindicatur." Plotinus' idea of hypostasis is also important, and this notion requires exact examination.

⁴ Following the baptismal confession, Tertullian merely treated the Holy Ghost according to the scheme of the Logos doctrine without any trace of independent interest. In accordance with this, however, the Spirit possesses his own "numerus" — "tertium numen divinitatis et tertium nomen maiestatis", — and he is a person in the same sense as the Son, to whom, however, he is subordinate, for the sub-

It is essentially otherwise with the Logos doctrine of Irenæus.¹ Whereas Tertullian and Hippolytus developed their Logos doctrine without reference to the historical Jesus, the truth rather being that they simply add the incarnation to the already existing theory of the subject, there is no doubt that Irenæus, as a rule, made Jesus Christ, whom he views as God and man, the *starting-point* of his speculation. Here he followed the Fourth Gospel and Ignatius. It is of Jesus that Irenæus almost always thinks when he speaks of the Logos or of the Son of God; and therefore he does not identify the divine element in Christ or Christ himself with the world idea or the creating Word or the Reason of God.² That

ordination is a necessary result of his later origin. See cc. 2. 8: "tertius est spiritus a deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus a flumine et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tamen a matrice alienatur a qua proprietates suas ducit. Ita trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a patre decurrens et monarchiæ nihil obstrepit et *οικονομίας* statum protegit"; de pudic. 21. In de præser. 13 the Spirit in relation to the Son is called "vicaria vis". The element of personality in the Spirit is with Tertullian merely a result arising from logical deduction; see his successor Novatian de trin. 29. Hippolytus did not attribute personality to the Spirit, for he says (adv. Noët. 14): "Ενα Θεὸν ἔρω, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, οἰκονομία δὲ τρίτην τὴν χάριν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος· πατὴρ μὲν ἄρ' εἷς, πρόσωπα δὲ δύο, ὅτι καὶ ὁ υἱός, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα. In his Logos doctrine apart from the express emphasis he lays on the creatureliness of the Logos (see Philos. X. 33: Εἰ ἄρ' Θεὸν σε ἠθέλησε ποιῆσαι ὁ Θεός, ἐδύνατο· ἔχεις τοῦ λόγου τὸ παράδειγμα) he quite agrees with Tertullian. See *ibid.*: here the Logos is called before his coming forth "ἐνδιάβητος τοῦ παντός λογισμός"; he is produced *ἐκ τῶν ὄντων*, *i. e.* from the Father who then alone existed; his essence is "that he bears in himself the will of him who has begotten him" or "that he comprehends in himself the ideas previously conceived by and resting in the Father." Cyprian in no part of his writings took occasion to set forth the Logos doctrine in a didactic way; he simply kept to the formula: "Christus deus et homo", and to the Biblical expressions which were understood in the sense of divinity and preëxistence; see Testim. II. 1—10. Lactantius was still quite confused in his Trinitarian doctrine and, in particular, conceived the Holy Ghost not as a person but as "sanctificatio" proceeding from the Father or from the Son. On the contrary, Novatian, in his work *de trinitate*, reproduced Tertullian's views. For details see Dorner *Entwicklungsgeschichte* I. pp. 563—634. Kahnis, *Lehre vom heiligen Geiste*; Hagemann, *l. c.*, p. 371 ff. It is noteworthy that Tertullian still very frequently called the preëxistent Christ *dei spiritus*: see de orat. 1: "Dei spiritus et dei sermo et dei ratio, sermo rationis et ratio sermonis et spiritus, utrumque Iesus Christus." Apol. 21; adv. Prax. 26; adv. Marc. I. 10; III. 6. 16; IV. 21.

¹ See Zahn, *Marcellus of Ancyra*, pp. 235—244. Duncker, *Des heiligen Irenäus Christologie*, 1843.

² Zahn, *l. c.*, p. 238.

he nevertheless makes Logos (*μονογενής, πρωτότοκος*, "only begotten", "first born") the regular designation of Christ as the preëxistent One can only be explained from the apologetic tradition which in his time was already recognised as authoritative by Christian scholars, and moreover appeared justified and required by John I. 1. Since both Irenæus and Valentinus consider redemption to be the special work of Christ, the cosmological interest in the doctrine of the second God becomes subordinate to the soteriological. As, however, in Irenæus' system (in opposition to Valentinus) this real redemption is to be imagined as *recapitulatio* of the creation, redemption and creation are not opposed to each other as antitheses; and therefore the Redeemer has also his place in the history of creation. In a certain sense then the Christology of Irenæus occupies a middle position between the Christology of the Valentinians and Marcion on the one hand and the Logos doctrine of the Apologists on the other. The Apologists have a cosmological interest, Marcion only a soteriological, whereas Irenæus has both; the Apologists base their speculations on the Old Testament, Marcion on a New Testament, Irenæus on both Old and New.

Irenæus expressly refused to investigate what the divine element in Christ is, and why another deity stands alongside of the Godhead of the Father. He confesses that he here simply keeps to the rule of faith and the Holy Scriptures, and declines speculative disquisitions on principle. He does not admit the distinction of a Word existing in God and one coming forth from him, and opposes not only ideas of emanation in general, but also the opinion that the Logos issued forth at a definite point of time. Nor will Irenæus allow the designation "Logos" to be interpreted in the sense of the Logos being the inward Reason or the spoken Word of God. God is a simple essence and always remains in the same state; besides we ought not to hypostatise qualities.¹ Nevertheless Irenæus, too, calls the preëxistent Christ the Son of God, and strictly maintains the personal distinction between Father and Son. What makes

¹ See Iren., II. 13. 8; II. 28. 4—9; II. 12. 2; II. 13. 2. and also the important passage II. 29. 3 fin.

the opposite appear to be the case is the fact that he does not utilise the distinction in the interest of cosmology.¹ In Irenæus' sense we shall have to say: The Logos is the revelation hypostasis of the Father, "the self-revelation of the self-conscious God", and indeed the eternal self-revelation. For according to him the Son *always* existed with God, *always* revealed the Father, and it was always the *full* Godhead that he revealed in himself. In other words, he is God in his specific nature, *truly* God, and there is no distinction of essence between him and God.² Now we might conclude from the strong

¹ A great many passages clearly show that Irenæus decidedly distinguished the Son from the Father, so that it is absolutely incorrect to attribute modalistic ideas to him. See III. 6. 1 and all the other passages where Irenæus refers to the Old Testament theophanies. Such are III. 6. 2: IV. 5. 2 fin.: IV. 7. 4, where the distinction is particularly plain: IV. 17. 6: II. 28. 6.

² The Logos (Son) is the administrator and bestower of the divine grace as regards humanity, because he is the revealer of this grace, see IV. 6 (§ 7: "agnitio patris filius, agnitio autem filii in patre et per filium revelata"); IV. 5: IV. 16. 7: IV. 20. 7. He has been the revealer of God from the beginning and always remains so, III. 16. 6: IV. 13. 4 etc.: he is the antemundane revealer to the angel world, see II. 30. 9: "semper autem coëxistens filius patri, olim et ab initio semper revelat patrem et angelis et archangelis et potestatibus et virtutibus et omnibus, quibus vult revelari deus: he has always existed with the Father, see II. 30. 9: III. 18. 1: "non tunc cœpit filius dei, existens semper apud patrem": IV. 20. 3, 7, 14. 1: II. 25. 3: "non enim infectus es, o homo, neque semper coëxistebas deo, sicut proprium eius verbum" The Logos is God as God, nay, for us he is God himself, in so far as his work is the work of God. Thus, and not in a modalistic sense, we must understand passages like II. 30. 9: "fabricator qui fecit mundum per semetipsum, hoc est per verbum et per sapientiam suam," or hymnlike statements such as III. 16. 6: "et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo" (see something similar in Ignatius and Melito, Otto, Corp. Apolog. IX, p. 419 sq.). Irenæus also says in III. 6. 2: "filius est in patre et habet in se patrem," III. 6. 1.: utrosque dei appellatione signavit spiritus, et eum qui ungitur filium et eum, qui ungit, id est patrem." He not only says that the Son has revealed the Father, but that the Father has revealed the Son (IV. 6. 3: IV. 7. 7). He applies Old Testament passages sometimes to Christ, sometimes to God, and hence in some cases calls the Father the creator, and in others the Son ("pater generis humani verbum dei", IV. 31. 2). Irenæus (IV. 4. 2) appropriated the expression of an ancient "immensum patrem in filio mensuratum: mensura enim patris filius, quoniam et capit eum." This expression is by no means intended to denote a diminution, but rather to signify the identity of Father and Son. In all this Irenæus adhered to an ancient tradition; but these propositions do not admit of being incorporated with a rational system.

emphasis laid on "always" that Irenæus conceived a relationship of Father and Son in the Godhead, conditioned by the essence of God himself and existing independently of revelation. But the second hypostasis is viewed by him as existing from all eternity, just as much in the quality of Logos as in that of Son, and his very statement that the Logos has revealed the Father from the beginning shows that this relationship is always within the sphere of revelation. The Son then exists because he gives a revelation. Little interested as Irenæus is in saying anything about the Son, apart from his historical mission, naïvely as he extols the Father as the direct Creator of the universe, and anxious as he is to repress all speculations that lead beyond the Holy Scriptures, he could not altogether avoid reflecting on the problems: why there is a second deity alongside of God, and how the two are related to one another. His incidental answers are not essentially different from those of the Apologists and Tertullian; the only distinction is this incidental character. Irenæus too looked on the Son as "the hand of God", the mediator of creation; he also seems in one passage to distinguish Father and Son as the naturally invisible and visible elements of God; he too views the Father as the one who dominates all, the head of Christ, *i.e.*, he who bears the creation and *his* Logos.¹ Irenæus had no opportunity of writing against

¹ Logos and Sophia are the hands of God (III. 21. 10; IV. 20); also IV. 6. 6: "Invisible filii pater, visibile autem patris filius." Judging from this passage, it is always doubtful whether Irenæus, like Tertullian, assumed that transcendency belonged to the Father in a still higher sense than to the Son, and that the nature of the Son was more adapted for entering the finite than that of the Father (on the contrary see IV. 20. 7 and especially IV. 24. 2: "verbum naturaliter quidem invisibile"). But it ought not to have been denied that there are passages, in which Irenæus hints at a subordination of the Son, and deduces this from his origin. See II. 28. 8 (the knowledge of the Father reaches further than that of the Son and the Father is greater than the Son); III. 6. 1 (the Son *receives* from the Father the sovereignty); IV. 17. 6 (a very important passage: the Father owns the name of Jesus Christ as his, first, because it is the name of his Son, and, secondly, because he gave it himself); V. 18. 21. 3 ("pater conditionem simul et verbum suum portans"—"verbum portatum a patre"—"et sic unus deus pater ostenditur, qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus: super omnia pater quidem et ipse est caput Christi"—"verbum universorum potestatem habet a patre"). "This is not a subordination founded on the nature of the second person, but an inequality that has arisen historically," says Zahn (*l.c.*, p. 241); but it is doubtful whether such a distinction can be imputed to Irenæus.

the Monarchians, and unfortunately we possess no apologetic writings of his. It cannot therefore be determined how he would have written, if he had had less occasion to avoid the danger of being himself led into Gnostic speculations about æons. It has been correctly remarked that with Irenæus the Godhead and the divine personality of Christ merely exist beside each other. He did not want to weigh the different problems, because, influenced as he was by the lingering effects of an early-Christian, anti-theological interest, he regarded the results of this reflection as dangerous; but, as a matter of fact, he did not really correct the premises of the problems by rejecting the conclusions. We may evidently assume (with Zahn) that, according to Irenæus, "God placed himself in the relationship of Father to Son, in order to create after his image and in his likeness the man who was to become his Son;"¹ but we ought not to ask if Irenæus understood the incarnation as a definite purpose necessarily involved in the Sonship, as this question falls outside the sphere of Patristic thinking. No doubt the incarnation constantly formed the preëminent interest of Irenæus, and owing to this interest he was able to put aside or throw a veil over the mythological speculations of the Apologists regarding the Logos, and to proceed at once to the soteriological question.²

We have rather simply to recognise the contradiction, which was not felt by Irenæus because, in his religious belief, he places Christ on a level with God, but, as a theologian, merely touched on the problem. So also he shows remarkable unconcern as to the proof of the unity of God in view of the distinction between Father and Son.

¹ Irenæus very frequently emphasises the idea that the whole economy of God refers to mankind, see, e.g. I. 10. 3: ἐκδιηγείσθαι τὴν πραγματείαν καὶ οἰκονομίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ τὴν ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνθρωπότητι γενομένην, IV. 20. 7: Verbum dispensator paternæ gratiæ factus est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones." God became a creator out of goodness and love: see the beautiful expression in IV. 20. 7: "Gloria dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio dei." or III. 20. 2: "Gloria hominis deus, operationes vero dei et omnis sapientiæ eius et virtutis receptaculum homo." V. 29. 1: "Non homo propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem."

² Irenæus speaks about the Holy Spirit in numerous passages. No doubt he firmly believes in the distinction of the Spirit (Holy Spirit, Spirit of God, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, prophetic Spirit, Wisdom) from the Father and Son, and in a particular significance belonging to the Spirit, as these doctrines are found

Nothing is more instructive than an examination of Irenæus' views with regard to the *destination of man*, the *original state*, the *fall*, and *sin*: because the heterogeneous elements of his "theology", the apologetic and moralistic, the realistic, and the

in the *regula*. In general the same attributes as are assigned to the Son are everywhere applicable to him; he was always with the Father before there was any creation (IV. 20. 3: Irenæus applies Prov. III. 19: VIII. 22 to the Spirit and not to the Son); like the Son he was the instrument and hand of the Father (IV. pref. 4. 20. 1: V. 6. 1.). That Logos and Wisdom are to be distinguished is clear from IV. 20. 1—12 and particularly from § 12: IV. 7. 4: III. 17. 3 (the host in the parable of the Good Samaritan is the Spirit). Irenæus also tried by reference to Scripture to distinguish the work of the Spirit from that of the Logos. Thus in the creation, the guidance of the world, the Old Testament history, the incarnation, the baptism of Jesus, the Logos is the energy, the Spirit is wisdom. He also alluded to a specific ministry of the Spirit in the sphere of the new covenant. The Spirit is the principle of the new knowledge in IV. 33. 1. 7. Spirit of fellowship with God in V. 1. 1, pledge of immortality in V. 8. 1, Spirit of life in V. 18. 2. But not only does the function of the Spirit remain very obscure for all that, particularly in the incarnation, where Irenæus was forced by the canon of the New Testament to unite what could not be united (Logos doctrine and descent of the Spirit upon Mary—where, moreover, the whole of the Fathers after Irenæus launched forth into the most wonderful speculations), but even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him. *e.g.* in III. 18. 3: "unguentem patrem et unctum filium et unctionem, qui est spiritus" (on Isaiah LXI. 1); there is also no mention of the Spirit in IV. pref. 4 *fin.*, and IV. 1. 1, though he ought to have been named there. Father, Son, and Spirit, or God, Logos, and Sophia are frequently conjoined by Irenæus, but he never uses the formula *τριὰς*, to say nothing of the abstract formulæ of Tertullian. In two passages (IV. 20. 5: V. 36. 2) Irenæus unfolded a sublime speculation, which is inconsistent with his usual utterances. In the first passage he says that God has shown himself prophetically through the Spirit (in the Old Testament), then adoptively through the Son, and will finally show himself paternally in the kingdom of heaven: the Spirit prepares man for the Son of God, the Son leads him to the Father, but the Father confers on him immortality. In the other passage he adopts the saying of an old presbyter (Papias?) that we ascend gradually through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in the end the Son will deliver up everything to the Father, and God will be all in all. It is remarkable that, as in the case of Tertullian (see above), it is 1 Cor. XV. 23—28 that has produced this speculation. This is another clear proof, that in Irenæus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional and that the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute. Here also we plainly perceive that the several disquisitions in Irenæus were by no means part of a complete system. Thus, in IV. 38. 2, he inverts the relationship and says that we ascend from the Son to the Spirit: *Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο Παῦλος Κορινθίοις φησί: γάλα ὑμᾶς ἐπότισα, οὐ βρώμα, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἠδύνασθε βασιτάζειν· τούτεστι, τὴν μὲν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον παρουσίαν τοῦ κυρίου ἐμαθητεύθητε, οὐδέηπου δὲ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς πνεῦμα ἐπαναπαύεται ἐφ' ὑμᾶς διὰ τὴν ὑμῶν ἀσθενειαν.* Here one of Origen's thoughts appears.

Biblical (Pauline), are specially apparent here, and the inconsistencies into which he was led are very plain. But these very contradictions were never eliminated from the Church doctrinal system of succeeding centuries and did not admit of being removed; hence his attitude on these points is typical.¹ The apologetic and moralistic train of thought is alone developed with systematic clearness. Everything created is imperfect, just from the very fact of its having had a beginning; therefore man also. The Deity is indeed capable of bestowing perfection on man from the beginning, but the latter was incapable of grasping or retaining it from the first. Hence perfection, *i.e.*, incorruptibility, which consists in the contemplation of God and is conditional on voluntary obedience, could only be the *destination* of man, and he must accordingly have been made *capable* of it.² That destination is realised through the guidance of God

¹ The opinions advanced here are, of course, adumbrations of the ideas about redemption. Nöldechen (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1885, p. 462 ff): "Die Lehre vom ersten Menschen bei den christlichen Lehrern des 2. Jahrhunderts."

² Here the whole 38th chapter of the 4th Book is to be examined. The following sentences are perhaps the most important: Εἰ δὲ λέγει τις οὐκ ἠδύνατο ὁ Θεὸς ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τέλειον ἀναδείξει τὸν ἄνθρωπον; Γινώτω, ὅτι τῷ μὲν Θεῷ, καὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντι καὶ ἀγεννήτῳ ὑπάρχοντι, ὡς πρὸς ἑαυτόν, πάντα δυνατὰ· τὰ δὲ γερονότα, καθὸ μετέπειτα γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἰδίαν ἔσχε, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑπερεῖσθαι δεῖ αὐτὰ τοῦ πεποιηκότος· οὐ γὰρ ἠδύνατο ἀγέννητα εἶναι τῶν νεωστὶ γεγεννημένων. Καθὸ δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἀγέννητα, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὑστεροῦνται τοῦ τελείου. Καθὸ δὲ νεώτερα, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ νήπια, κατὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀτυνήβη καὶ ἀγύμναστα πρὸς τὴν τελείαν ἀγωγήν. The mother can no doubt give strong food to the child at the very beginning, but the child cannot stand it: ἄνθρωπος ἀδύνατος λαβεῖν αὐτό· νήπιος γὰρ ἦν, see also § 2—4: "Non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamvis deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis sue hoc fecerit, nequis eum putet invidiosum aut imprestantem. "Ego," inquit, "dixi, dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, nobis autem potestatem divinitatis bailulare non sustinentibus" . . . Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali." Ibid.: ὑποταγὴ Θεοῦ ἀφθαρσία, καὶ παραμονὴ ἀφθαρσίας δόξα ἀγέννητος. . . ὄρασις Θεοῦ περιποιητικὴ ἀφθαρσίας· ἀφθαρσία δὲ ἐγγύς εἶναι ποιεῖ Θεοῦ. In this chapter Irenæus contemplates the manner of appearance of the Logos (as man) from the point of view of a *συννηπιάζειν*. His conception of the capacity and destination of man enabled him to develop his ideas about the progressive training of the human race and about the different covenants (see below). On this point cf. also IV, 20, 5—7. The fact that, according to this way of looking at things, the Good and Divine appeared only as the *destination* of man—which was finally to be reached through divine guidance—but not as his

and the free decision of man, for goodness not arising from free choice has no value. The capacity in question is on the one hand involved in man's possession of the divine image, which, however, is only realised in the body and is therefore at bottom a matter of indifference; and, on the other, in his likeness to God, which consists in the union of the soul with God's Spirit, but only comes about when man is obedient to him. Along with this Irenæus has also the idea that man's likeness consists in freedom. Now, as man became disobedient immediately after the creation, this likeness to God did not become perfect.¹ Through the fall he lost the fellowship with God to

natura, suggested both to Irenæus and Tertullian the distinction between "natura" and "gratia" or between "substantia" and "fides et iustitia". In other words, they were led to propound a problem which had occurred to the Gnostics long before, and had been solved by them in a dualistic sense. See Irenæus II. 29. 1: "Si propter substantiam omnes succedunt animæ in refrigerium, et superfluum est credere, superflua autem et discessio salvatoris; si autem propter iustitiam, iam non propter id, quod sint animæ sed quoniam sunt iustæ... Si enim natura et substantia salvat, omnes salvabuntur animæ; si autem iustitia et fides etc. II. 34. 3: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur." II. 34. 4. Tertullian adv. Marc. III. 15: "Christi nomen non ex natura veniens, sed ex dispositione." In Tertullian these ideas are not unfrequently opposed to each other in this way: but the relationship between them has by no means been made clear.

¹ On the psychology of Irenæus see Böhringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some passages he reckoned the πνεῦμα in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33. 5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The εἰκών is realised in the body, the ὁμοίωσις is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of God realised through obedience (V. 6. 1). The ὁμοίωσις is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the πνοή, not the πνεῦμα, that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenæus appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenæus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom. Alongside of this God's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see § I. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenæus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In § 2 Irenæus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural

which he was destined, *i.e.*, he is forfeit to death. This death was transmitted to Adam's whole posterity.¹ Here Irenæus followed sayings of Paul, but adopted the words rather than the sense; for, in the first place, like the Apologists, he very strongly emphasises the elements that palliate man's fall² and, secondly, he contemplates the fall as having a teleological significance. It is the fall itself and not, as in Paul's case, the

goodness and wickedness: πάντες τῆς αὐτῆς εἰσὶ φύσεως. In § 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil (!): "libere sententiæ ab initio est homo et libere sententiæ est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." § 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suæ potestatis arbitrium hominis *servavit* (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." § 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." § 3: "τὸ ἀτεξούσιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τὸ συμβουλευτικὸν τοῦ Θεοῦ μὴ βιάζομένου. IV. 4. 3: "homo rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."

¹ As a matter of fact this view already belongs to the second train of thought: see particularly III. 21—23. Here in reality this merely applies to the particular individuals who chose disobedience, but Irenæus almost everywhere referred back to the fall of Adam. See, however, V. 27. 2: "Quicumque erga eum custodiunt dilectionem, suam his præstat communionem. Communio autem dei vita et lumen et fructus eorum quæ sunt apud deum honorum. Quicumque autem absint secundum sententiam suam ab eo, his eam quæ electa est ab ipsis separationem inducit. Separatio autem dei mors, et separatio lucis tenebræ, et separatio dei amissio omnium quæ sunt apud eum honorum." V. 19. 1, 1. 3, 1. 1. The subjective moralism is very clearly defined in IV. 15. 2: "Id quod erat semper liberum et suæ potestatis in homine semper servavit deus et sua exhortatio, ut iuste iudicentur qui non obediunt ei quoniam non obediunt, et qui obediunt et crediderunt ei, honorentur incorruptibilitate."

² Man's sin is thoughtlessness; he is merely led astray (IV. 40. 3). The fact that he let himself be seduced under the pretext of immortality is an excuse for him: man was *infans*, (See above: hence it is said, in opposition to the Gnostics, in IV. 38. 4: "superredientes legem humani generis et antequam fiant homines, iam volunt similes esse factori deo et nullam esse differentiam infecti dei et nunc facti hominis." The same idea is once more very clearly expressed in IV. 39. 3: "quemadmodum igitur erit homo deus, qui nondum factus est homo?" *i.e.*, how could newly created man be already perfect as he was not even man, inasmuch as he did not yet know how to distinguish good and evil?). Cf. III. 23. 3, 5: "The fear of Adam was the beginning of wisdom: the sense of transgression led to repentance; but God bestows his grace on the penitent" . . . "eum odivit deus, qui seduxit hominem, ei vero qui seductus est, sensim paullatimque misertus est." The "pondus peccati" in the sense of Augustine was by no means acknowledged by Irenæus, and although he makes use of Pauline sayings, and by preference such as have a quite different sense, he is very far from sharing Paul's view.

consequences of the fall, that he thus views; for he says that disobedience was conducive to man's development. Man had to learn by experience that disobedience entails death, in order that he might acquire wisdom and choose freely to fulfil the commandments of God. Further, man was obliged to learn through the fall that goodness and life do not belong to him by nature as they do to God.¹ Here life and death are always the ultimate question to Irenæus. It is only when he quotes sayings of Paul that he remembers sin in connection with redemption; and ethical consequences of the fall are not mentioned in this connection "The original destination of man was not abrogated by the fall, the truth rather being that the fall was intended as a means of leading men to attain this perfection to which they were destined."² Moreover, the goodness of God immediately showed itself both in the removal of the tree of life and in the sentence of temporal death.³ What significance belongs to Jesus Christ within this conception is clear: he is the man who first realised in his person the destination of humanity; the Spirit of God became united with his soul and accustomed itself to dwell in men. But he is also the teacher who reforms mankind by his preaching, calls upon them to direct their still existing freedom to obedience to the divine commandments, thereby restoring, *i.e.*, strengthening, freedom, so that humanity is thus rendered capable of receiving incorruptibility.⁴ One can plainly see that this is the idea of Tatian

¹ See IV. 37. 7: "Alias autem esset nostrum insensatum bonum, quod esset inexercitatum. Sed et videre non tantum nobis esset desiderabile, nisi cognovissemus quantum esset malum non videre: et bene valere autem male valentis experientia honorabilius efficit, et lucem tenebrarum comparatio et vitam mortis. Sic et cœleste regnum honorabilius est his qui cognoverunt terrenum." The main passage is III. 20. 1, 2, which cannot be here quoted. The fall was necessary in order that man might not believe that he was "naturaliter similis deo". Hence God permitted the great whale to swallow man for a time. In several passages Irenæus has designated the permitting of evil as kind generosity on the part of God, see, *e.g.*, IV. 39. 1, 37. 7.

² See Wendt, *l.c.*, p. 24.

³ See III. 23. 6.

⁴ See V. 1. 1: "Non enim aliter nos discere poteramus quæ sunt dei, nisi magister noster, verbum existens, homo factus fuisset... Neque rursus nos aliter discere poteramus, nisi magistrum nostrum videntes," etc.; III. 23. 2, 5. 3: "libertatem restauravit"; IV. 24. 1: "reformavit humanum genus"; III. 17. 1: "spiritus

and Theophilus, with which Irenæus has incorporated utterances of Paul. Tertullian and Hippolytus taught essentially the same doctrine;¹ only Tertullian beheld the image and likeness of God expressly and exclusively in the fact that man's will and capacity are free, and based on this freedom an argument in justification of God's ways.²

But, in addition to this, Irenæus developed a second train of thought. This was the outcome of his Gnostic and realistic doctrine of recapitulation, and evinces clear traces of the influence of Pauline theology. It is, however, inconsistent with the moralistic teachings unfolded above, and could only be united with them at a few points. To the Apologists the proposition: "it is impossible to learn to know God without the help of God" ("impossibile est sine deo discere deum") was a conviction which, with the exception of Justin, they subordinated to their moralism and to which they did not give a specifically Christological signification. Irenæus understood this proposition in a Christological sense,³ and at the same time conceived the blessing of salvation imparted by Christ not only as the incorruptibility consisting in the beholding of God bestowed on obedience IV. 20. 5—7: IV. 38, but also as the divine sonship which

sanctus in filium dei. filium hominis factum. descendit cum ipso assuescens habitare in genere humano." III. 19. 1: IV. 38. 3: 39. 1. 2. Wendt's summary. I. c. p. 24: "By the Logos becoming man, the type of the perfect man made its appearance." formulates Irenæus' meaning correctly and excludes the erroneous idea that he viewed the Logos himself as the prototype of humanity. A real divine manhood is not necessary within this train of thought: only a *homo inspiratus* is required.

¹ See Hippol. Philos. X. 33 (p. 538 sq.): 'Επὶ τούτοις τὸν πάντων ἀρχοντα δημιουργῶν ἐκ πασῶν συνθέτων οὐσιῶν ἐσκέυασεν, οὐ Θεὸν βέλων ποιεῖν ἐσφηλεν, οὐδὲ ἄγγελον, ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπον. Εἰ γὰρ Θεὸν σε ἠβέλησε ποιῆσαι, ἐδύνατο ἔχεις τοῦ λογίου τὸ παράδειγμα ἄνθρωπον βέλων, ἄνθρωπόν σε ἐποίησεν· εἰ δὲ βέλεις καὶ Θεὸς γενέσθαι, ὑπάκουε τῷ πεποιηότι. The famous concluding chapter of the Philosophoumena with its prospect of deification is to be explained from this (X. 34).

² See Tertull. adv. Marc. II. 4—11: his undiluted moralism appears with particular clearness in chaps. 6 and 8. No weight is to be attached to the phrase in chapter 4 that God by placing man in Paradise really even then put him from Paradise into the Church. This is contrary to Wendt's opinion, I. c. p. 67. ff. where the exposition of Tertullian is *speciosior quam verior*. In adv. Marc. II. 4 ff. Wendt professes to see the first traces of the scholastic and Romish theory, and in de anima 16. 41 the germ of the subsequent Protestant view.

³ See IV. 5. 1, 6. 4.

has been won for us by Christ and which is realised in constant fellowship with God and dependence on him.¹ No doubt he also viewed this divine sonship as consisting in the transformation of human nature; but the point of immediate importance here is that it is no longer human freedom but Christ that he contemplated in this connection. Corresponding to this he has now also a different idea of the original destination of man, of Adam, and of the results of the fall. Here comes in the mystical Adam-Christ speculation, in accordance with the Epistles to the Ephesians and Corinthians. Everything, that is, the "longa hominum expositio", was recapitulated by Christ in himself; in other words he restored humanity *to what it originally was* and again included under one head what was divided.² If humanity is restored, then it must have lost something before and been originally in good condition. In complete contradiction to the other teachings quoted above, Irenæus now says: "What we had lost in Adam, namely, our possession of the image and likeness of God, we recover in Christ."³ Adam, however, is humanity; in other words, as all humanity is united and renewed through Christ so also it was already summarised in Adam. Accordingly "the sin of disobedience and the loss of salvation which Adam consequently suffered may now be viewed as belonging to all mankind summed up in him, in like manner as Christ's obedience and possession of salvation are the property

¹ See IV. 14. 1: "In quantum enim deus nullius indiget, in tantum homo indiget dei communione. Hæc enim gloria hominis, perseverare et permanere in dei servitute." This statement, which, like the numerous others where Irenæus speaks of the adoptio, is opposed to moralism, reminds us of Augustine. In Irenæus' great work, however, we can point out not a few propositions which, so to speak, bear the stamp of Augustine; see IV. 38. 3: ὑποταγή Θεοῦ ἀφίχαρσία.

² See the passages quoted above, p. 241 f.

³ See III. 18. 1. V. 16. 1 is very remarkable: Ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν χρόνοις ἐλεγετο μὲν κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ γεγονέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, οὐκ ἐδείκνυτο δὲ, ἔτι γὰρ ἀράτος ἦν ὁ λόγος, οὗ κατ' εἰκόνα ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐγεγόνει. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τὴν ὁμοίωσιν φθιδίως ἀπέβαλεν; see also what follows. In V. 1. 1 Irenæus even says: "Quoniam iniuste dominabatur nobis apostasia, et cum natura essemus dei omnipotentis, alienavit nos contra naturam diabolus." Compare with this the contradictory passage IV. 38: "oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere" etc. (see above, p. 268), where *natura hominis* is conceived as the opposite of the divine nature.

of all mankind united under him as their head."¹ In the first Adam we offended God by not fulfilling his commandments; in Adam humanity became disobedient, wounded, sinful, bereft of life; through Eve mankind became forfeit to death; through its victory over the first man death descended upon us all, and the devil carried us all away captive etc.² Here Irenæus always means that in Adam, who represents all mankind as their head, the latter became doomed to death. In this instance he did not think of a hereditary transmission, but of a mystic unity³ as in the case of Christ, viewed as the

¹ See Wendt. l.c. p. 29, who first pointed out the two dissimilar trains of thought in Irenæus with regard to man's original state, Duncker having already done so in regard to his Christology. Wendt has rightly shown that we have here a real and not a seeming contradiction; but, as far as the explanation of the fact is concerned, the truth does not seem to me to have been arrived at. The circumstance that Irenæus did not develop the mystic view in such a systematic way as the moralistic by no means justifies us in supposing that he merely adopted it superficially (from the Scriptures): for its nature admits of no systematic treatment, but only of a rhetorical and contemplative one. No further explanation can be given of the contradiction, because, strictly speaking, Irenæus has only given us fragments.

² See V. 16. 3: *ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Ἀδὰμ προτεκόψαμεν, μὴ ποιήσαντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ἐντολήν.* IV. 34. 2: "homo initio in Adam inobediens per mortem percussusest;" III. 18. 7—23: V. 19. 1: V. 21. 1: V. 17. 1 sq.

³ Here also Irenæus keeps sin in the background: death and life are the essential ideas. Böhringer l.c. p. 484 has very rightly remarked: "We cannot say that Irenæus, in making Adam's conduct and suffering apply to the whole human race had started from an inward, immediate experience of human sinfulness and a feeling of the need of salvation founded on this." It is the thoughts of Paul to which Irenæus tried to accommodate himself without having had the same feeling about the flesh and sin as this Apostle. In Tertullian the mystic doctrine of salvation is rudimentary (but see, e.g., *de anima* 40: "ita omnis anima eo usque in Adam censetur donec in Christo recenseatur," and other passages: but he has speculations about Adam (for the most part developments of hints given in Irenæus: see the index in Oehler's edition), and he has a new realistic idea as to a physical taint of sin propagated through procreation. Here we have the first beginning of the doctrine of original sin (*de testim.* 3: "per diabolum homo a primordio circumventus, ut præceptum dei excederet, et propterea in mortem datus exinde totum genus de suo semine infectum suæ etiam damnationis traducem fecit." Compare his teachings in *de anima* 40. 41. 16 about the disease of sin that is propagated "ex originis vitio" and has become a real second nature). But how little he regards this original sin as guilt is shown by *de bapt.* 18: "Quare innocens ætas festinat ad baptismum?" For the rest, Tertullian discussed the relationship of flesh and spirit, sensuousness and intellect, much more thoroughly than Irenæus; he showed that flesh is not the seat of sin (*de anima* 40). In the same book (but see Bk. V. c. 1) he expressly declared that in

second Adam. The teachings in III. 21. 10—23¹ show what an almost naturalistic shape the religious quasi-historical idea assumed in Irenæus' mind. This is, however, more especially evident from the assertion, in opposition to Tatian, that unless Adam himself had been saved by Christ, God would have been overcome by the devil.² It was merely his moralistic train of thought that saved him from the conclusion that there is a restoration of *all* individual men.

This conception of Adam as the representative of humanity corresponds to Irenæus' doctrine of the God-man. The historical importance of this author lies in the development of the Christology. At the present day, ecclesiastical Christianity, so far as it seriously believes in the unity of the divine and human in Jesus Christ and deduces the divine manhood from the work of Christ as his deification, still occupies the same standpoint as Irenæus did. Tertullian by no means matched him here; he too has the formula in a few passages, but he cannot, like Irenæus, account for its content. On the other hand we owe to him the idea of the "two natures", which remain in their integrity—that formula which owes its adoption to the influence

this question also sure results are only to be obtained from revelation. This was an important step in the direction of secularising Christianity through "philosophy" and of emasculating the understanding through "revelation." In regard to the conception of sin Cyprian followed his teacher. De op. et elem. 1 reads indeed like an utterance of Irenæus ("dominus sanavit illa quæ Adam portaverat vulnera"); but the statement in ep. 64. 5: "Recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus contagium mortis antiquæ prima natiuitate contraxit" is quite in the manner of Tertullian, and perhaps the latter could also have agreed with the continuation: "infanti remittuntur non propria sed aliena peccata." Tertullian's proposition that absolutely no one but the Son of God could have remained without sin was repeated by Cyprian (see, e.g., de op. et elem. 3).

¹ III. 22. 4 has quite a Gnostic sound... "eam quæ est a Maria in Evam recirculationem significans: quia non aliter quod colligatum est solveretur, nisi ipsæ compagine alligationis reflectantur retrorsus, ut primæ coniunctiones solvantur per secundas, secundæ rursus liberent primas. Et evenit primam quidem compagine a secunda colligatione solvere, secundam vero colligationem primæ solutionis habere locum. Et propter hoc dominus dicebat primos quidem novissimos futuros et novissimos primos." Irenæus expresses a Gnostic idea when he on one occasion plainly says (V. 12. 3): "Εν τῷ Ἀδάμ πάντες ἀποβήσκαμεν, ὅτι ψυχικοί. But Paul, too, made an approach to this thought.

² See III. 23. 1. 2. a highly characteristic statement.

of Leo I. and at bottom contradicts Irenæus' thought "the Son of God became the Son of man", ("filius dei factus filius hominis"). Finally, the manner in which Irenæus tried to interpret the historical utterances about Jesus Christ from the standpoint of the Divine manhood idea, and to give them a significance in regard to salvation is also an epoch-making fact.

"Filius dei filius hominis factus", "it is one and the same Jesus Christ, not a Jesus and a Christ, nor a mere temporary union of an æon and a man, but one and the same person, who created the world, was born, suffered, and ascended"—this along with the dogma of God the Creator is the cardinal doctrine of Irenæus:¹ "Jesus Christ truly man and truly God" ("Jesus Christus, vere homo, vere deus").² It is only the Church that adheres to this doctrine, for "none of the heretics hold the opinion that the Word of God became flesh" ("secundum nullam sententiam hæreticorum verbum dei caro factum est").³ What therefore has to be shown is (1) that Jesus Christ is really the Word of God, *i.e.*, is God, (2) that this Word really became man and (3) that the incarnate Word is an inseparable unity. Irenæus maintains the first statement as well against the "Ebionites" as against the Valentiniens who thought that Christ's advent was the descent of one of the many æons. In opposition to the Ebionites he emphasises the distinction between natural and adopted Sonship, appeals to the Old Testament testimony in favour of the divinity of Christ,⁴ and moreover argues that we would still be in the bondage of the old disobedience, if Jesus Christ had only been a man.⁵ In this connection he also discussed the birth from the virgin.⁶ He not only proved it from prophecy, but his recapitulation theory also suggested to him a parallel between Adam and Eve on the one hand and Christ

¹ See, *e.g.*, III. 9. 3, 12. 2, 16. 6—9, 17. 4 and repeatedly 8. 2: "verbum dei, per quem facta sunt omnia, qui est dominus noster Jesus Christus."

² See IV. 6. 7.

³ See III. 11. 3.

⁴ See III. 6.

⁵ See III. 19. 1, 2; IV. 33. 4; V. 1. 3; see also *Tertullian against "Ebion" de carne 14, 18, 24; de præscr. 10. 33.

⁶ See III. 21, 22; V. 19—21.

and Mary on the other, which included the birth from the virgin.¹ He argues in opposition to the Valentinians that it was really the eternal Word of God himself, who was always with God and always present to the human race, that descended.² He who became man was not a being foreign to the world—this is said in opposition to Marcion—but the Lord of the world and humanity, the Son of God, and none other. The reality of the body of Christ, *i.e.*, the essential identity of the humanity of Christ with our own, was continually emphasised by Irenæus, and he views the whole work of salvation as dependent on this identity.³ In the latter he also includes the fact that Jesus must

¹ See the arguments. I. c. V. 19, 1: "Quemadmodum adstrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, salvatur per virginem, æqua lance disposita virginalis inobedientia per virginalem obedientiam." and other similar ones. We find the same in Tertull. de carne 17, 20. In this connection we find in both very extravagant expressions with regard to Mary (see, *e.g.*, Tertull., I. c. 20 fin.: "uti virgo esset regenerationis nostra spiritualiter ab omnibus inquinamentis sanctificata per Christum." Iren. III. 21, 7: "Maria cooperans dispositioni (dei)"; III. 22, 4 "Maria obediens et sibi et universo generi humano causa facta est salutis" . . . "quod alligavit virgo Eva per incredulitatem, hoc virgo Maria solvit per fidem"). These, however, have no doctrinal significance: in fact the same Tertullian expressed himself in a depreciatory way about Mary in *de carne* 7. On the other hand it is undeniable that the later Mariolatry has one of its roots in the parallel between Eve and Mary. The Gnostic invention of the *virginitas Mariæ in partu* can hardly be traced in Irenæus III. 21, 4. Tertullian (*de carne* 23) does not seem to know anything about it as yet, and very decidedly assumed the natural character of the process. The popular conception as to the reason of Christ's birth from a virgin, in the form still current to-day, but beneath all criticism, is already found in Tertullian *de carne* 18: "Non competebat ex semine humano dei filium nasci, ne, si totus esset filius hominis, non esset et dei filius, nihilque haberet amplius Salomone, ut de Helbionis opinione credendus erat. Ergo iam dei filius ex patris dei semine, id est spiritu, ut esset et hominis filius, caro ei sola competebat ex hominis carne sumenda sine viri semine. Vacabat enim semen viri apud habentem dei semen." The other theory existing side by side with this, *viz.*, that Christ would have been a sinner if he had been begotten from the semen, whereas he could assume sinless flesh from woman is so far as I know scarcely hinted at by Irenæus and Tertullian. The fact of Christ's birth was frequently referred to by Tertullian in order to prove Christ's kinship to God the Creator, *e.g.*, adv. Marc. III. 11. Hence this article of the *regula fidei* received a significance from this point of view also. An Encratite explanation of the birth from the Virgin is found in the old treatise *de resurr.* bearing Justin's name (Otto, Corp. Apol. III., p. 220).

² See, *e.g.*, III. 18, 1 and many other places. See the passages named in note, p. 276.

³ So also Tertullian. See adv. Marc. III. 8: The whole work of salvation is destroyed by Docetism: cf. the work *de carne Christi*. Tertullian exclaims to the

have passed through and been subjected to all the conditions of a complete human life from birth to old age and death.¹ Jesus Christ is therefore the Son of God who has really become the Son of man; and these are not two Christs but one, in whom the Logos is permanently united with humanity.² Irenæus called this union "union of the Word of God with the creature" ("adunitio verbi dei ad plasma")³ and "blending and communion of God and man" ("commixtio et communio dei et hominis")⁴

Docetist Marcion in c. 5: "Parce unice spei totius orbis." Irenæus and Tertullian mean that Christ's assumption of humanity was complete, but not unfrequently express themselves in such a manner as to convey the impression that the Logos only assumed flesh. This is particularly the case with Tertullian, who, moreover, in his earlier time had probably quite naïve Docetic ideas and really looked upon the humanity of Christ as only flesh. See Apolog. 21: "spiritum Christus cum verbo sponte dimisit, prævento carnificis officio." Yet Irenæus in several passages spoke of Christ's human soul (III. 22. 1: V. 1.1) as also did Melito (τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ ἀφάνταστον τῆς ψυχῆς Χριστοῦ καὶ τοῦ σώματος, τῆς καὶ ἡμῶν ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως Otto, l.c., IX, p. 415) and Tertullian (de carne 10 ff. 13; de resurr. 53) What we possess in virtue of the creation was *assumed* by Christ (Iren., l.c., III. 22. 2.) Moreover, Tertullian already examined how the case stands with sin in relation to the flesh of Christ. In opposition to the opinion of the heretic Alexander, that the Catholics believe Jesus assumed earthly flesh in order to destroy the flesh of sin in himself, he shows that the Saviour's flesh was without sin and that it is not admissible to teach the annihilation of Christ's flesh (de carne 16; see also Irenæus V. 14. 2. 3): "Christ by taking to himself our flesh has made it his own, that is, he has made it sinless." It was again passages from Paul (Rom. VIII. 3 and Ephes II. 15) that gave occasion to this discussion. With respect to the opinion that it may be with the flesh of Christ as it is with the flesh of angels who appear, Tertullian remarks (de carne 6) that no angel came to die; that which dies must be born: the Son of God came to die.

¹ This conception was peculiar to Irenæus, and for good reasons was not repeated in succeeding times: see II. 22: III. 17. 4. From it also Irenæus already inferred the necessity of the death of Christ and his abode in the lower world, V. 31. 1. 2. Here we trace the influence of the recapitulation idea. It has indeed been asserted (very energetically by Schultz, Gotttheit Christi, p. 73 f.) that the Christ of Irenæus was not a personal man, but only possessed humanity. But that is decidedly incorrect, the truth merely being that Irenæus did not draw all the inferences from the personal humanity of Christ.

² See Iren. V. 31. 2: "Surgens in carne sic ascendit ad patrem." Tertullian, de carne 24: "Bene quod idem veniet de caelis qui est passus . . . et agnoscent qui eum confixerunt, utique ipsam carnem in quam sævierunt, sine qua nec ipse esse poterit et agnosci:" see also what follows.

³ See Iren. IV. 33. 11.

⁴ See Iren. IV. 20. 4; see also III. 19. 1.

without thereby describing it any more clearly.¹ He views it as perfect, for, *as a rule*, he will not listen to any separation of what was done by the man Jesus and by God the Word.² The explicit formula of two substances or natures in Christ is not found in Irenæus; but Tertullian already used it. It never

¹ He always posits the unity in the form of a confession without describing it. See III. 16. 6, which passage may here stand for many. "Verbum unigenitus, qui semper humano generi adest, unitus et conspersus suo plasmati secundum placitum patris et caro factus ipse est Iesus Christus dominus noster, qui et passus est pro nobis et resurrexit propter nos . . . Unus igitur deus pater, quemadmodum ostendimus, et unus Christus Iesus dominus noster, veniens per universam dispositionem et omnia in semetipsum recapitulans. In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei, et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est. invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis et verbum homo." V. 18. 1: "Ipsum verbum dei incarnatum suspensum est super lignum."

² Here Irenæus was able to adopt the old formula "God has suffered" and the like; so also Melito, see Otto l.c., IX. p. 416: ὁ Θεὸς πέπονθεν ὑπὸ δειξίᾳ Ἰσραὴλ λιπίδος (p. 422): "Quidam est hoc novum mysterium? iudex iudicatur et quietus est; invisibilis videtur neque erubescit; incomprehensibilis prehenditur neque indignatur, incommensurabilis mensuratur neque repugnat; impassibilis patitur neque ulciscitur; immortalis moritur, neque respondit verbum, cœlestis sepelitur et id fert." But let us note that these are not "doctrines", but testimonies to the faith, as they were always worded from the beginning and such as could, if need were, be adapted to any Christology. Though Melito in a fragment whose genuineness is not universally admitted (Otto, l.c., p. 415 sq.) declared in opposition to Marcion, that Christ proved his humanity to the world in the 30 years before his baptism; but showed the divine nature concealed in his human nature during the 3 years of his ministry, he did not for all that mean to imply that Jesus' divinity and humanity are in any way separated. But, though Irenæus inveighed so violently against the "Gnostic" separation of Jesus and Christ (see particularly III. 16. 2, where most weight is laid on the fact that we do not find in Matth.: "Iesu generatio sic erat" but "Christi generatio sic erat"), there is no doubt that in some passages he himself could not help unfolding a speculation according to which the predicates applying to the human nature of Jesus do not also hold good of his divinity, in fact he actually betrayed a view of Christ inconsistent with the conception of the Saviour's person as a perfect unity. We can indeed only trace this view in his writings in the form of an undercurrent, and what led to it will be discussed further on. Both he and Melito, as a rule adhered to the simple "filius dei filius hominis factus" and did not perceive any problem here, because to them the disunion prevailing in the world and in humanity was the difficult question that appeared to be solved through this very divine manhood. How closely Melito agreed with Irenæus is shown not only by the proposition (p. 419): "Propterea misit pater filium suum e cœlo sine corpore (this is said in opposition to the Valentinian view), ut, postquam incarnatus esset in utero virginis et natus esset homo, vivificaret hominem et colligeret membra eius quæ mors disperserat, quum hominem divideret," but also by the "propter hominem iudicatus est iudex, impassibilis passus est?" (l.c.).

occurred to the former, just because he was not here speaking as a theologian, but expressing his belief.¹ In his utterances about the God-man Tertullian closely imitates Irenæus. Like the latter he uses the expression "man united with God" ("homo deo mixtus")² and like him he applies the predicates of the man to the Son of God.³ But he goes further, or rather, in the interest of formal clearness, he expresses the mystery in a manner which shows that he did not fully realise the religious significance of the proposition, "the Son of God made Son of man" ("filius dei filius hominis factus"). He speaks of a "corporal and spiritual, *i.e.*, divine, substance of the Lord", ("corporalis et spiritalis [*i.e.*, divina] substantia domini")⁴ of "either substance of the flesh and spirit of Christ" ("utraque substantia et carnis et spiritus Christi"), of the "creation of two substances which Christ himself also possesses", ("conditio duarum substantiarum, quas Christus et ipse gestat")⁵ and of

¹ The concepts employed by Irenæus are *deus, verbum, filius dei, homo, filius hominis, plasma dei*. What perhaps hindered the development of that formula in his case was the circumstance of his viewing Christ, though he had assumed the *plasma dei*, humanity, as a personal man who (for the sake of the recapitulation theory) not only had a human nature but was obliged to live through a complete human life. The fragment attributed to Irenæus (Harvey II., p. 493) in which occur the words, τοῦ Θεοῦ λόγου ἐνώσει τῇ κατὰ ὑπόστασιν ψυχικῇ ἐνώθέντος τῇ σαρκί, is by no means genuine. How we are to understand the words: ἵνα ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τὸ περιφανεστῶν φύσεων παραδειχθῆ in fragment VIII. (Harvey II., p. 479), and whether this piece belongs to Irenæus, is uncertain. That Melito (assuming the genuineness of the fragment) has the formula of the two natures need excite no surprise: for (1) Melito was also a philosopher, which Irenæus was not, and (2) it is found in Tertullian, whose doctrines can be shown to be closely connected with those of Melito (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1. 2. p. 249 f.). If that fragment is genuine Melito is the first Church teacher who has spoken of two natures.

² See Apol. 21: "verbum caro figuratus . . . homo deo mixtus; adv. Marc. II. 27: "filius dei miscens in semetipso hominem et deum;" de carne 15: "homo deo mixtus;" 18: "sic homo cum deo, dum caro hominis cum spiritu dei." On the Christology of Tertullian cf. Schulz, Gottheit Christi, p. 74 ff.

³ De carne 5: "Crucifixus est dei filius, non pudet quia judendum est: et mortuus est dei filius, prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est: et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossibile est;" but compare the whole book: c. 5 init.: "deus crucifixus" "nasci se voluit deus". De pat. 3: "nasci se deus in utero patitur." The formula: "ὁ γεννηθείς, ὁ μέγας Θεός is also found in Sibyll. VII. 24.

⁴ De carne 1. cf. ad nat. II. 4: "ut iure consistat collegium nominis communiione substantiæ."

⁵ De carne 18 fin.

the "twofold condition not blended but united in one person—God and man" ("duplex status *non confusus sed conjunctus* in una persona—deus et homo").¹ Here we already have in a complete form the later Chalcedonian formula of the two substances in one person.² At the same time, however, we can clearly see that Tertullian went beyond Irenæus in his exposition.³ He was, moreover, impelled to combat an antagonistic principle. Irenæus had as yet no occasion to explain in detail that the proposition "the Word became flesh" ("verbum caro

¹ Adv. Prax. 27: "Sed enim invenimus illum directo et deum et hominem expositum, ipso hoc psalmo suggerente (Ps. LXXXVII. 5) . . . hic erit homo et filius hominis, qui definitus est filius dei secundum spiritum . . . Videmus duplicem statum, non confusum sed coniunctum in una persona deum et hominem Iesum. De Christo autem differo. Et adeo salva est utriusque proprietatis substantiæ, ut et spiritus res suas egerit in illo, id est virtutes et opera et signa, et caro passiones suas functa sit, esuriens sub diabolo . . . denique et mortua est. Quodsi tertium quid esset, ex utroque confusum, ut electrum, non tam distincta documenta parerent utriusque substantiæ." In what follows the *actus utriusque substantiæ* are sharply demarcated: "ambæ substantiæ in statu suo quæque distincte agebant, ideo illis et opere et exitus sui occurrerunt . . . neque caro spiritus fit neque spiritus caro: in uno plane esse possunt." See also c. 29: "Quamquam cum duæ substantiæ censeantur in Christo Iesu, divina et humana, constet autem immortalem esse divinam" etc.

² Of this in a future volume. Here also two *substances* in Christ are always spoken of (there are virtually three, since, according to *de anima* 35, men have already two substances in themselves). I know only one passage where Tertullian speaks of *notures* in reference to Christ, and this passage in reality proves nothing: *de carne* 5: "Itaque utriusque substantiæ census hominem et deum exhibuit, hinc natum, inde non natum (!), hinc carneum, inde spiritalem" etc. Then: "Quæ proprietatis conditionum, divini et humanæ, æqua utique *natura* cuiusque veritate disjuncta est."

³ In the West up to the time of Leo I, the formula "deus et homo", or, after Tertullian's time "duæ substantiæ", was always a simple expression of the facts acknowledged in the Symbol, and not a speculation derived from the doctrine of redemption. This is shown just from the fact of stress being laid on the unmixedness. With this was associated a theoretic and apologetic interest on the part of theologians, so that they began to dwell a greater length on the unmixedness after the appearance of that Patripassianism, which professed to recognise the *filius dei* in the *caro*, that is in the *deus* so far as he is *incarnatus* or has *changed* himself into flesh. As to Tertullian's opposition to this view see what follows. In contradistinction to this Western formula the monophysite one was calculated to satisfy both the *salvation* interest and the understanding. The Chalcedonian creed, as is admitted by Schulz, l.c., pp. 64 ff., 71 ff., is consequently to be explained from Tertullian's view, not from that of the Alexandrians. Our readers will excuse us for thus anticipating.

factum") denoted no transformation. That he excludes the idea of change, and that he puts stress on the Logos' assumption of flesh from the Virgin is shown by many passages.¹ Tertullian, on the other hand, was in the first place confronted by (Gnostic) opponents who understood John's statement in the sense of the Word's transforming himself into flesh, and therefore argued against the "assumption of flesh from the Virgin" ("assumptio carnis ex virgine");² and, in the second place, he had to do with Catholic Christians who indeed admitted the birth from the Virgin, but likewise assumed a change of God into flesh, and declared the God thus invested with flesh to be the Son.³ In this connection the same Tertullian, who in the Church laid great weight on formulæ like "the crucified God", "God consented to be born" ("deus crucifixus", "nasci se voluit deus") and who, impelled by opposition to Marcion and by his apologetic interest, distinguished the Son as capable of suffering from God the Father who is impassible, and imputed to him human weaknesses—which was already a further step,—sharply emphasised the "distinct function" ("distincte agere") of the two substances in Christ and thus separated the persons. With Tertullian the interest in the Logos doctrine, on the one hand, and in the real humanity, on the other, laid the basis of that conception of Christology in accordance with which the unity of the person is nothing more than an assertion. The "deus factus homo" ("verbum caro factus") presents quite insuperable difficulties, as soon as "theology" can no longer be banished. Tertullian smoothed over these difficulties by juristic distinctions,

¹ "Quare," says Irenæus III. 21. 10—"igitur non iterum sumpsit limum deus, sed ex Maria operatus est plasmationem fieri? Ut non alia plasmatio fieret neque alia esset plasmatio que salvaretur, sed eadem ipsa recapitularetur, servata similitudine?"

² See de carne 18. Oehler has misunderstood the passage and therefore mispointed it. It is as follows: "Vox ista (Joh. I. 14) quid caro factum sit contestatur, nec tamen periclitatur, quasi statim aliud sit (verbum), factum caro, et non verbum. . . . Cum scriptura non dicat nisi quod factum sit, non et unde sit factum, ergo ex alio, non ex semetipso suggerit factum" etc.

³ Adv. Prax. 27 sq. In de carne 3 sq. and elsewhere Tertullian indeed argues against Marcion that God in contradistinction to all creatures can transform himself into anything and yet remain God. Hence we are not to think of a transformation in the strict sense, but of an *adunitio*.

for all his elucidations of "substance" and "person" are of this nature.

A somewhat paradoxical result of the defence of the Logos doctrine in the struggle against the "Patripassians" was the increased emphasis that now began to be laid on the integrity and independence of the human nature in Christ. If the only essential result of the struggle with Gnosticism was to assert the substantial reality of Christ's body, it was Tertullian who distinguished what Christ did as man from what he did as God in order to prove that he was not a *tertium quid*. The discriminating intellect which was forced to receive a doctrine as a problem could not proceed otherwise. But, even before the struggle with Modalism, elements were present which repressed the naïve confidence of the utterances about the God-man. If I judge rightly, there were two features in Irenæus both of which resulted in a splitting up of the conception of the perfect unity of Christ's person. The first was the intellectual contemplation of the perfect humanity of Jesus, the second was found in certain Old and New Testament texts and the tradition connected with these.¹ With regard to the first we may point out that Irenæus indeed regarded the union of the human and divine as possible only because man, fashioned from the beginning by and after the pattern of the Logos, was an image of the latter and destined for union with God. Jesus Christ is the realisation of our possession of God's image;² but this

¹ So I think I ought to express myself. It does not seem to me proper to read a twofold conception into Irenæus' Christological utterances under the pretext that Christ according to him was also the perfect man, with all the modern ideas that are usually associated with this thought (Böhringer, l.c., p. 542 ff., see Thomasius in opposition to him).

² See, e.g., V. I. 3, Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte I. p. 309. Tertullian, in his own peculiar fashion, developed still more clearly the thought transmitted to him by Irenæus. See adv. Prax. 12: "Quibus faciebat deus hominem similem? Filio quidem, qui erat induturus hominem... Erat autem ad cuius imaginem faciebat, ad filii scilicet, qui homo futurus certior et verior imaginem suam fecerat dici hominem, qui tunc de limo formari habebat, imago veri et similitudo." Adv. Marc. V. 8: "Creator Christum, sermonem suum, intuens hominem futurum, Faciamus, inquit, hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram"; the same in de resurr. 6. But with Tertullian, too, this thought was a sudden idea and did not become the basis of further speculation.

thought, if no further developed, may be still united with the Logos doctrine in such a way that it does not interfere with it, but serves to confirm it. The case becomes different when it is not only shown that the Logos was always at work in the human race, but that humanity was gradually more and more accustomed by him (in the patriarchs and prophets) to communion with God,¹ till at last the perfect man appeared in Christ. For in this view it might appear as if the really essential element in Jesus Christ were not the Logos, who has become the new Adam, but the new Adam, who possesses the Logos. That Irenæus, in explaining the life of Jesus as that of Adam according to the recapitulation theory, here and there expresses himself as if he were speaking of the perfect man, is undeniable: If the acts of Christ are really to be what they seem, the man concerned in them must be placed in the foreground. But how little Irenæus thought of simply identifying the Logos with the perfect man is shown by the passage in III. 19. 3 where he writes: “ὡςπερ γὰρ ἦν ἀνθρώπος ἵνα πειρασθῆ, οὕτω καὶ λόγος ἵνα δοξασθῆ. ἡσυχαζόντος μὲν τοῦ λόγου ἐν τῷ πειράζεσθαι καὶ σταυρωθῆναι καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν. συγγνωμένους δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐν τῷ νεκρῷ καὶ ὑπομένειν καὶ χρηστεύεσθαι καὶ ἀνίστασθαι καὶ ἀναγαμβάνεσθαι” (“For as he was man that he might be tempted, so also he was the Logos that he might be glorified. The Logos remained quiescent during the process of temptation, crucifixion and death, but aided the human nature when it conquered, and endured, and performed deeds of kindness, and rose again from the dead, and was received up into heaven”). From these words it is plain that Irenæus preferred to assume that the divine and human natures existed side by side, and consequently to split up the perfect unity, rather than teach a mere ideal manhood which would be at the same time a divine manhood. The “discrete agere” of the two natures proves that to Irenæus the perfect manhood of the incarnate Logos was merely an incidental quality he possessed. In reality the Logos is the perfect man

¹ Iren. IV. 14. 2: for further particulars on the point see below, where Irenæus' views on the preparation of salvation are discussed. The views of Dörner, l.c., 492 f., that the union of the Son of God with humanity was a gradual process, are marred by some exaggerations, but are correct in their main idea.

in so far as his incarnation creates the perfect man and renders him possible, or the Logos always exists behind Christ the perfect man. But nevertheless this very way of viewing the humanity in Christ already compelled Irenæus to limit the "deus crucifixus" and to lay the foundation for Tertullian's formulæ. With regard to the second point we may remark that there were not a few passages in both Testaments where Christ appeared as the man chosen by God and anointed with the Spirit. These as well as the corresponding language of the Church were the greatest difficulties in the way of the Logos Christology. Of what importance is an anointing with the Spirit to him who is God? What is the meaning of Christ being born by the power of the Holy Ghost? Is this formula compatible with the other, that he as the Logos himself assumed flesh from the Virgin etc.? Irenæus no doubt felt these difficulties. He avoided them (III. 9. 3) by referring the bestowal of the Spirit at baptism merely to the *man* Jesus, and thus gave his own approval to that separation which appeared to him so reprehensible in the Gnostics.¹ This separation indeed rescued to future ages the minimum of humanity that was to be retained in the person of Christ, but at the same time it laid the foundation of those differentiating speculations, which in succeeding times became the chief art and subject of dispute among theologians. The fact is that one cannot think in realistic fashion of the "deus homo factus" without thinking oneself out of it. It is exceedingly instructive

¹ "Secundum id quod verbum dei homo erat ex radice Iesse et filius Abrahamæ, secundum hoc requiescebat spiritus dei super eum . . . secundum autem quod deus erat, non secundum gloriam iudicabat." All that Irenæus said of the Spirit in reference to the person of Christ is to be understood merely as an *exegetical* necessity and must not be regarded as a theoretical *principle* (this is also the case with Tertullian). Dorner (l.c. p. 492 f.) has failed to see this, and on the basis of Irenæus' incidental and involuntary utterances has attempted to found a speculation which represents the latter as meaning that the Holy Ghost was the medium which gradually united the Logos, who was exalted above growing and suffering, into one person with the free and growing man in Jesus Christ. In III. 12. 5—7 Irenæus, in conformity with Acts IV. 27: X. 38, used the following other formulæ about Christ: ὁ Θεός, ὁ ποιήσας τὸν οὐρανὸν κ.τ.λ., καὶ ὁ τούτου παῖς, ὃν ἔχρισεν ὁ Θεός— "Petrus Iesum ipsum esse filium dei testificatus est, qui et unctus Spiritu Sancto Iesus dicitur." But Irenæus only expressed himself thus because of these passages, whereas Hippolytus not unfrequently calls Christ παῖς Θεοῦ.

to find that, in some passages, even a man like Irenæus was obliged to advance from the creed of the one God-man to the assumption of two independent existences in Christ, an assumption which in the earlier period has only "Gnostic" testimony in its favour. Before Irenæus' day, in fact, none but these earliest theologians taught that Jesus Christ had two natures, and ascribed to them particular actions and experiences. The Gnostic distinction of the Jesus *patibilis* ("capable of suffering") and the Christ *ἀπρόληψ* ("impassible") is essentially identical with the view set forth by Tertullian *adv. Prax.*, and this proves that the doctrine of the two natures is simply nothing else than the Gnostic, *i.e.*, scientific, adaptation of the formula: "filius dei filius hominis factus". No doubt the old early-Christian interest still makes itself felt in the *assertion* of the one person. Accordingly we can have no historical understanding of Tertullian's Christology or even of that of Irenæus without taking into account, as has not yet been done, the Gnostic distinction of Jesus and Christ, as well as those old traditional formulæ: "deus passus, deus crucifixus est" ("God suffered, God was crucified").¹

But beyond doubt the prevailing conception of Christ in

¹ On Hippolytus' views of the incarnation see Dorner, *l.c.*, I. p. 609 ff.—an account to be used with caution—and Overbeck, *Quæst. Hippol. Specimen* (1864), p. 47 sq. Unfortunately the latter has not carried out his intention to set forth the Christology of Hippolytus in detail. In the work quoted he has, however, shown how closely the latter in many respects has imitated Irenæus in this case also. It is instructive to see what Hippolytus has not adopted from Irenæus or what has become rudimentary with him. As a professional and learned teacher he is at bottom nearer to the Apologists as regards his Christology than Irenæus. As an exegete and theological author he has much in common with the Alexandrians, just as he is in more than one respect a connecting link between Catholic controversialists like Irenæus and Catholic scholars like Origen. With the latter he moreover came into personal contact. See Hieron., *de vir. ill.* 61; Hieron., *ep. ad Damas.* edit. Venet. I., ep. 36 is also instructive. These brief remarks are, however, by no means intended to give countenance to Kimmel's untenable hypothesis (*de Hippol. vita et scriptis*, 1839) that Hippolytus was an Alexandrian. In Hippolytus' treatise *c. Noët.* we find positive teachings that remind us of Tertullian. An important passage is *de Christo et Antichristo* 3 f.: εἰς γὰρ καὶ ὁ τοῦ Θεοῦ παῖς (Iren.), δι' οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς τυχόντες τὴν διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ἀναγέννησιν εἰς ἓνα τέλειον καὶ ἐπουράνιον ἄνθρωπον οἱ πάντες καταντῆσαι ἐπιθυμοῦμεν (see Iren.) Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεοῦ ἄσαρκος ὢν (see Melito, Iren., Tertull.) ἐνεδύσατο τὴν ἁγίαν σάρκα ἐκ τῆς ἁγίας παρθένου ὡς νόμφιος ἡμάτιον ἐξυφάννας ἑαυτῷ ἦν τῷ σταυρικῷ πάθει (Irenæus and Tertullian also make the death on the cross the object of the assumption of

Irenæus is the idea that there was the most complete unity between his divine and human natures; for it is the necessary consequence of his doctrine of redemption, that "*Jesus Christus factus est, quod sumus nos, uti nos perficeret esse quod et ipse*"¹

the flesh), ὅπως συγκεράσας το ἑνὸν τῶν ἡμῶν σώμα τῆ ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμει καὶ μίξας (Iren., Tertull.) τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τῷ φθαρτῶν καὶ τὸ ἀσθενὲς τῷ ἰσχυρῷ σώσῃ τὸν ἀπολλύμενον ἄνθρωπον (Iren.). The succeeding disquisition deserves particular note, because it shows that Hippolytus has also borrowed from Irenæus the idea that the union of the Logos with humanity had already begun in a certain way in the prophets. Overbeck has rightly compared the ἀναπλάσσειν δι' ἑαυτοῦ τὸν Ἀδάμ, i. c., c. 26, with the ἀνακεφαλαιοῦν of Irenæus and i. c., c. 44, with Iren. Π. 22, 4. For Hippolytus' Christology Philosoph. X. 33, p. 542 and c. Noët. 10 ff. are the chief passages of additional importance. In the latter passage it is specially noteworthy that Hippolytus, in addition to many other deviations from Irenæus and Tertullian, insists on applying the full name of Son only to the incarnate Logos. In this we have a remnant of the more ancient idea and at the same time a concession to his opponents who admitted an eternal Logos in God, but not a pre-temporal hypostasis of the Son. See c. 15: ποῖον οὖν υἷον ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Θεὸς διὰ τῆς σαρκὸς κατέπεμψεν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸν λόγον; ὃν υἷον προσηγόρευε διὰ τὸ μέλλειν αὐτὸν γενέσθαι. καὶ τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα τῆς εἰς ἀνθρώπους φιλοστοργίας ἀναλαμβάνει ὁ υἷος (καίτοι τέλειος λόγος ὢν μονογενής). οὐδ' ἡ σαρξ κατ' ἑαυτὴν δίχα τοῦ λόγου ὑποστῆναι ἠδύνατο διὰ τὸ ἐν λόγῳ τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν. οὕτως οὖν εἷς υἷος τέλειος Θεοῦ ἐφανερῶδη. Hippolytus partook to a much greater extent than his teacher Irenæus of the tree of Greek knowledge and he accordingly speaks much more frequently than the latter of the "divine mysteries" of the faith. From the fragments and writings of this author that are preserved to us the existence of very various Christologies can be shown: and this proves that the Christology of his teacher Irenæus had not by any means yet become predominant in the Church, as we might suppose from the latter's confident tone. Hippolytus is an exegete and accordingly still yielded with comparative impartiality to the impressions conveyed by the several passages. For example he recognised the woman of Rev. XII, as the Church and the Logos as her child, and gave the following exegesis of the passage (de Christo et Antichristo 61): οὐ παύσεται ἡ ἐκκλησία γεννώσα ἐκ καρδίας τῶν λόγων τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ ὑπὸ ἀπίστων διωκόμενον. "καὶ ἔτεκε", φησίν, "υἷον ἄρρην, ὃς μέλλει ποιμαίνειν πάντα τὰ ἔθνη", τὸν ἄρρην καὶ τέλειον Χριστόν, παῖδα Θεοῦ, Θεὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καταγγελλόμενον ἀεὶ τίκτουσα ἡ ἐκκλησία διδάσκει πάντα τὰ ἔθνη. If we consider how Irenæus' pupil is led by the text of the Holy Scriptures to the most diverse "doctrines", we see how the "Scripture" theologians were the very ones who threatened the faith with the greatest corruptions. As the exegesis of the Valentinian schools became the mother of numerous self-contradictory Christologies, so the same result was threatened here—"doctrinæ inolescentes in silvas iam exoleverunt Gnosticorum." From this standpoint Origen's undertaking to subject the whole material of Biblical exegesis to a fixed theory appears in its historical greatness and importance.

¹ See other passages on p. 241, note 2. This is also reëchoed in Cyprian. See, for example, ep. 58. 6: "filius dei passus est ut nos filios dei faceret, et filius hominis (scil. the Christians) pati non vult esse dei filius possit."

("Jesus Christ became what we are in order that we might become what he himself is"). But, in accordance with the recapitulation theory, Irenæus developed the "factus est quod sumus nos" in such a way that the individual portions of the life of Christ, as corresponding to what we ought to have done but did not do, receive the value of saving acts culminating in the death on the cross. Thus he not only regards Jesus Christ as "salvation and saviour and saving" ("salus et salvator et salutare"),¹ but he also views his whole life as a work of salvation. All that has taken place between the conception and the ascension is an inner necessity in this work of salvation. This is a highly significant advance beyond the conception of the Apologists. Whilst in their case the history of Jesus seems to derive its importance almost solely from the fulfilment of prophecy, it acquires in Irenæus an independent and fundamental significance. Here also we recognise the influence of "Gnosis", nay, in many places he uses the same expressions as the Gnostics, when he sees salvation accomplished, on the one hand, in the mere appearance of Jesus Christ as the second Adam, and on the other, in the simple acknowledgment of this appearance.² But he is distinguished from them by the fact that he decidedly emphasises the personal acts of Jesus, and that he applies the benefits of Christ's work not to the "pneumatic" *ipso facto*, but in principle to all men, though practically only to those who listen to the Saviour's words and adorn themselves with works of righteousness.³ Irenæus presented this work of Christ from various points of view. He regards it as

¹ See III. 10. 3.

² See the remarkable passage in IV. 36. 7: ἡ γυνῶσις τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἣτις ἦν ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς. Another result of the Gnostic struggle is Irenæus' raising the question as to what new thing the Lord has brought (IV. 34. 1): "Si autem subit vos huiusmodi sensus. ut dicatis: Quid igitur novi dominus attulit veniens? cognoscite. quoniam omnem novitatem attulit semetipsum afferens, qui fuerat annuntiatius." The new thing is then defined thus: "Cum perceperunt eam quæ ab eo est libertatem et participant visionem eius et audierunt sermones eius et fructi sunt muneribus ab eo, non iam requiretur. quid novius attulit rex super eos, qui annuntiaverunt advenum eius... Semetipsum enim attulit et ea quæ prædicta sunt bona"

³ See IV. 36. 6: "Adhuc manifestavit oportere nos cum vocatione (i.e. μετὰ τῆν κλήσιν) et iustitiæ operibus adornari. uti requiescat super nos spiritus dei"—we must provide *ourselves* with the wedding garment.

the realisation of man's original destiny, that is, being in communion with God, contemplating God, being imperishable like God; he moreover views it as the abolition of the consequences of Adam's disobedience, and therefore as the redemption of men from death and the dominion of the devil; and finally he looks upon it as reconciliation with God. In all these conceptions Irenæus fell back upon the *person* of Christ. Here, at the same time, he is everywhere determined by the content of Biblical passages; in fact it is just the New Testament that leads him to these considerations, as was first the case with the Valentinians before him. How uncertain he still is as to their ecclesiastical importance is shown by the fact that he has no hesitation in reckoning the question, as to why the Word of God became flesh and suffered, among the articles that are a matter of consideration for science, but not for the simple faith (I. 10. 3). Here, therefore, he still maintains the archaic standpoint according to which it is sufficient to adhere to the baptismal confession and wait for the second coming of Christ along with the resurrection of the body. On the other hand, Irenæus did not merely confine himself to describing the fact of redemption, its content and its consequences; but he also attempted to explain the peculiar nature of this redemption from the essence of God and the incapacity of man, thus solving the question "cur deus homo" in the highest sense.¹ Finally, he adopted from Paul the thought that Christ's real work of salvation consists in his death on the cross; and so he tried to amalgamate the two propositions, "*filius dei filius hominis factus est propter nos*" ("the Son of God became Son of man for us") and "*filius dei passus est propter nos*" ("the Son of God suffered for us") as the most vital ones. He did not, however, clearly show which

¹ The incapacity of man is referred to in III. 18. 1: III. 21. 10: III. 21—23 shows that the same man that had fallen had to be led to communion with God: V. 21. 3: V. 24. 4 teach that man had to overcome the devil; the intrinsic necessity of God's appearing as Redeemer is treated of in III. 23. 1: "Si Adam iam non reverteretur ad vitam, sed in totum proiectus esset morti, victus esset deus et superasset serpentis nequitia voluntatem dei. Sed quoniam deus invictus et magnanimis est, magnanimum quidem se exhibuit etc." That the accomplishment of salvation must be effected in a righteous manner, and therefore be as much a proof of the righteousness as of the immeasurable love and mercy of God, is shown in V. 1. 1: V. 21.

of these doctrines is the more important. Here the speculation of Irenæus is already involved in the same ambiguity as was destined to be the permanent characteristic of Church speculation as to Christ's work in succeeding times. For on the one hand, Paul led one to lay all the emphasis on the death on the cross, and on the other, the logical result of dogmatic thinking only pointed to the appearance of God in the flesh, but not to a particular work of Christ that had not been already involved in the appearance of the Divine Teacher himself. Still, Irenæus contrived to reconcile the discrepancy better than his successors, because, being in earnest with his idea of Christ as the second Adam, he was able to contemplate the whole life of Jesus as redemption in so far as he conceived it as a recapitulation. We see this at once not only from his conception of the virgin birth as a fact of salvation, but also from his way of describing redemption as deliverance from the devil. For, as the birth of Christ from the Virgin Mary is the recapitulating counterpart of Adam's birth from the virgin earth, and as the obedience of the mother of Jesus is the counterpart of Eve's disobedience, so the story of Jesus' temptation is to him the recapitulating counterpart of the story of Adam's temptation. In the way that Jesus overcame the temptation by the devil (Matt. IV.) Irenæus already sees the redemption of mankind from Satan; even then Jesus bound the strong one. But, whereas the devil seized upon man unlawfully and deceitfully, no injustice, untruthfulness, or violence is displayed in the means by which Jesus resisted Satan's temptation.¹ As yet Irenæus is quite as free from the thought that the devil has real rights upon man, as he is from the immoral idea that God accomplished his work of redemption by an act of deceit. But, on the strength of Pauline passages, many of his teachings rather view redemption from the devil as accomplished by the *death* of Christ, and accordingly represent this death as a ransom paid to the "apostasy" for men who had fallen into captivity. He did not, however, develop this thought any further.²

¹ Irenæus demonstrated the view in V. 21 in great detail. According to his ideas in this chapter we must include the history of the temptation in the *regula fidei*.

² See particularly V. 1. 1: "Verbum potens et homo verus sanguine suo ratio-

His idea of the *reconciliation* of God is just as rudimentary, and merely suggested by Biblical passages. He sometimes saw the means of reconciliation solely in obedience and in the "righteous flesh" as such, at other times in the "wood." Here also the recapitulation theory again appears: through disobedience at the tree Adam became a debtor to God, and through obedience at the tree God is reconciled.¹ But teachings as to vicarious suffering on the part of Christ are not found in Irenæus,

nabiliter redimens nos, redemptionem semetipsum dedit pro his, qui in captivitatem ducti sunt . . . dei verbum non deficiens in sua iustitia, iuste etiam adversus ipsam conversus est apostasiam, ea quæ sunt sua redimens ab ea, non cum vi, quemadmodum illa initio dominabatur nostris, ea quæ non erant sua insatiabiliter rapiens, sed secundum suadelam, quemadmodum decebat deum suadentem et non vim inferentem, accipere quæ vellet, ut neque quod est iustum confringeretur neque antiqua plasmatio dei deperiret." We see that the idea of the blood of Christ as ransom does not possess with Irenæus the value of a fully developed theory, but is suggestive of one. But even in this form it appeared suspicious and, in fact, a Marcionite idea to a Catholic teacher of the 3rd century. Pseudo-Origen (Adamantius) opposed it by the following argument (De recta in deum fide, edid Wetstein 1673, Sectio I, p. 38 sq. See Rufinus' translation in Caspari's Kirchenhistorische Anekdota Vol. I, 1883, p. 34 sq., which in many places has preserved the right sense): Τὸν πρωμενον ἔφησ, εἶναι τὸν Χριστόν; ὁ πεπρακώς τις ἐστίν; ἤλθεν εἰς σὲ ὁ ἀπλοῦς μῦθος; ὅτι ὁ πωλῶν καὶ ὁ ἀγοράζων ἀδελφοί εἰσιν; εἰ κακὸς ὢν ὁ διάβολος τῷ ἀγαθῷ πέπρακεν, οὐκ ἔστι κακὸς ἀλλὰ ἀγαθός; ὁ γὰρ ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φρονήσας τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, νῦν οὐκ ἔτι ὑπὸ φθόνου ἄγεται, τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὴν νομὴν παραδοῦς. ἔσται οὖν δίκαιος ὁ τοῦ φθόνου καὶ παντὸς κακοῦ παυσάμενος. αὐτὸς γοῦν ὁ Θεὸς εὐρίσκειται πωλήσας; μᾶλλον δὲ οἱ ἡμαρτηκότες ἑαυτοὺς ἀπηλλοτριώσαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τῆς ἁμαρτίας αὐτῶν πάλιν δὲ ἐλυτρώθησαν διὰ τὴν εὐσπλαγχνίαν αὐτοῦ. τοῦτο γὰρ φήσιν ὁ προφήτης: Ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις ὑμῶν ἐπράβητε καὶ ταῖς ἀνομίαις ἐξαπέστειλα τὴν μητέρα ὑμῶν. Καὶ ἄλλος πάλιν Δωρεῶν ἐπράβητε, καὶ οὐ μετὰ ἀργυρίου λυτρώθησεθε. το. οὐδὲ μετὰ ἀργυρίου δηλονότι, τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ. τοῦτο γὰρ φάσκει ὁ προφήτης (Isaiah, LIII. 5 follows). Ἐικόσ δὲ ὅτι κατὰ σὲ ἐπρίατο θοὺς ἑαυτοῦ τὸ αἷμα; πῶς οὖν καὶ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἡγείρετο; εἰ γὰρ ὁ λαβῶν τὴν τιμὴν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, τὸ αἷμα, ἀπέδωκεν, οὐκέτι ἐπώλησεν. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀπέδωκε, πῶς ἀνέστη Χριστός; οὐκέτι οὖν τό, Ἐξουσίαν ἔχω θεῖναι καὶ ἐξουσίαν ἔχω λαβεῖν, ἴσταιται; ὁ γοῦν διάβολος κατέχει τὸ αἷμα τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἀντὶ τῆς τιμῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων; πολλὴ βλασφημία ἀνοία! φεῦ τῶν κακῶν! Ἀπέθανεν, ἀνέστη ὡς δυνατὸς; ἔβηκεν ὁ ἔλαβεν αὐτὴ ποίαν πρᾶσις; τοῦ προφήτου λέγοντος: Ἀναστήτω ὁ Θεὸς καὶ διασκορπισθήτωσαν οἱ ἐχθροὶ αὐτοῦ; Ὅπου ἀνάστασις, ἐκεῖ θάνατος! That is an argument as acute as it is true and victorious.

¹ See Iren. V. 2, 3, 16, 3, 17—4. In III. 16. 9 he says: Christus per passionem reconciliavit nos deo." It is moreover very instructive to compare the way in which Irenæus worked out the recapitulation theory with the old proof from prophecy ("this happened that the Scripture might be fulfilled"). Here we certainly have an advance: but at bottom the recapitulation theory may also be conceived as a modification of that proof.

and his death is seldom presented from the point of view of a sacrifice offered to God.¹ According to this author the reconciliation virtually consists in Christ's restoring man to communion and friendship with God and procuring forgiveness of sins; he very seldom speaks of God being offended through Adam's sin (V. 16. 3). But the incidental mention of the forgiveness of sins resulting from the redemption by Christ has not the meaning of an *abolition* of sin. He connects the redemption with this only in the form of Biblical and rhetorical phrases; for the vital point with him is the abolition of the *consequences* of sin, and particularly of the sentence of death.² Here we have the transition to the conception of Christ's work which makes this appear more as a completion than as a restoration. In this connection Irenæus employed the following categories: *restoring of the likeness of God in humanity; abolition of death; connection and union of man with God; adoption of men as sons of God and as gods; imparting of the Spirit who now becomes accustomed to abide with men;*³ *imparting of a knowledge of God culminating in beholding him; bestowal of everlasting life.* All these are only the different aspects of one and the same blessing, which, being of a divine order, could only be brought to us and implanted in our nature by God himself. But inasmuch as this view represents Christ not as performing a reconciling but a perfecting work, his *acts* are

¹ See, e.g., IV. 5. 4: *προθύμως Ἀβραὰμ τὸν ἴδιον μονογενῆ καὶ ἀγαπητὸν παραχωρήσας βυστίαν τῷ Θεῷ, ἵνα καὶ ὁ Θεὸς εὐδοκήσῃ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σπέρματος αὐτοῦ πάντος τὸν ἴδιον μονογενῆ καὶ ἀγαπητὸν υἱὸν βύστιαν παρασχεῖν εἰς λύτρωσιν ἡμετέραν.*

² There are not a few passages where Irenæus said that Christ has annihilated sin, abolished Adam's disobedience, and introduced righteousness through his obedience (III. 18. 6, 7; III. 20. 2; V. 16—21); but he only once tried to explain how that is to be conceived (III. 18. 7), and then merely reproduced Paul's thoughts.

³ Irenæus has no hesitation in calling the Christian who has received the Spirit of God the perfect, the spiritual one, and in representing him, in contrast to the false Gnostic, as he who in truth judges all men, Jews, heathen, Marcionites, and Valentinians, but is himself judged by no one; see the great disquisition in IV. 33 and V. 9. 10. This true Gnostic, however, is only to be found where we meet with right faith in God the Creator, sure conviction with regard to the God-man Jesus Christ, true knowledge as regards the Holy Spirit and the economy of salvation, the apostolic doctrine, the right Church system in accordance with the episcopal succession, the intact Holy Scripture, and its uncorrupted text and interpretation (IV. 33. 7. 8). To him the true believer is the real Gnostic.

thrust more into the background; his work is contained in his constitution as the God-man. Hence this work has a universal significance for all men, not only as regards the present, but as regards the past from Adam downwards, in so far as they "according to their virtue in their generation have not only feared but also loved God, and have behaved justly and piously towards their neighbours, and have longed to see Christ and to hear his voice."¹ Those redeemed by Jesus are immediately joined by him into a unity, into the true humanity, the Church, whose head he himself is.² This Church is the communion of the Sons of God, who have attained to a contemplation of him and have been gifted with everlasting life. In this the work of Christ the God-man is fulfilled.

In Tertullian and Hippolytus, as the result of New Testament exegesis, we again find the same aspects of Christ's work as in Irenæus, only with them the mystical form of redemption recedes into the background.³

¹ See IV. 22. In accordance with the recapitulation theory Christ must also have descended to the lower world. There he announced forgiveness of sins to the righteous, the patriarchs and prophets (IV. 27. 2). For this, however, Irenæus was not able to appeal to Scripture texts, but only to statements of a presbyter. It is nevertheless expressly asserted, on the authority of Rom. III. 23, that these pre-Christian just men also could only receive justification and the light of salvation through the arrival of Christ among them.

² See III. 16. 6: "In omnibus autem est et homo plasmatio dei; et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impassibilis passibilis, et verbum homo, universa in semetipsum recapitulans, uti sicut in supercælestibus et spiritalibus et invisibilibus princeps est verbum dei, sic et in visibilibus et corporalibus principatum habeat. in semetipsum primatum assumens et apponens semetipsum caput ecclesie, universa attrahat ad semetipsum apto in tempore."

³ There are innumerable passages where Tertullian has urged that the whole work of Christ is comprised in the death on the cross, and indeed that this death was the aim of Christ's mission. See, e.g., de pat. 3: "Taceo quod figitur: in hoc enim venerat"; de bapt. II: "Mors nostra dissolvi non potuit, nisi domini passione, nec vita restitui sine resurrectione ipsius"; adv. Marc. III. 8: "Si mendacium deprehenditur Christi caro . . . nec passiones Christi fidem merebuntur. Eversum est igitur totum dei opus. Totum Christiani nominis et pondus et fructus, mors Christi, negatur, quam tam impresse apostolus demendat, utique veram, summum eam fundamentum evangelii constituens et salutis nostre et prædictionis suæ, 1 Cor. XV. 3. 4: he follows Paul here. But on the other hand he has also adopted from Irenæus the mystical conception of redemption—the constitution of

Nevertheless the *eschatology* as set forth by Irenæus in the fifth Book by no means corresponds to this conception of the work of Christ as a restoring and completing one; it rather appears as a remnant of antiquity directly opposed to the

Christ is the redemption—though with a rationalistic explanation. See adv. Marc. II. 27: “*filius miscens in semetipso hominem et deum, ut tantum homini conferat, quantum deo detrahit. Conversabatur deus, ut homo divina agere doceretur. Ex æquo agebat deus cum homine, ut homo ex æquo agere cum deo posset.*” Here therefore the meaning of the divine manhood of the Redeemer virtually amounts to divine teaching. In de resurr. 63 Christ is called “*fidelissimus sequester dei et hominum, qui et homini deum et hominem deo reddet.*” Note the future tense. It is the same with Hippolytus who in Philos. X. 34 represents the deification of men as the aim of redemption, but at the same time merely requires Christ as the lawgiver and teacher: “*Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκφεύξῃ Θεὸν τὸν ὄντα διὰ χεῖρας, ἕξεις δὲ ἀθάνατον τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἅμα ψυχῇ, βασιλείαν ὀυρανῶν ἀπολήψῃ, ὁ ἐν γῆ βιοῦς καὶ ἐπουράνιον βασιλέα ἐπιγινούς, ἔσῃ δὲ ὁμιλητὴς Θεοῦ καὶ συγκληρονόμος Χριστοῦ, οὐκ ἐπιθυμίας ἢ πάθεσι καὶ νότοις δουλούμενος. Γέγονας γὰρ Θεός· ὅσα γὰρ ὑπέμεινας πάθῃ ἄνθρωπος ὢν, ταῦτα ἐδίδου, ὅτι ἄνθρωπος εἶς, ὅσα δὲ παρακολουθεῖ Θεῷ, ταῦτα παρέχειν ἐπήγγελται Θεός, ὅτι ἐθεοποιήθης, ἀθάνατος γεννηθεῖς. Τουτέστι το Ἰνῶβι σεαυτὸν, ἐπιγινούς τὸν πεποιηκότα Θεόν. Τὸ γὰρ ἐπιγινῶναι ἑαυτὸν ἐπιγνωσθῆναι συμβέβηκε τῷ καλουμένῳ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ. Μὴ φιλεχθρήσῃτε τοίνυν ἑαυτοῖς, ἄνθρωποι. μὴδὲ τὸ παλινδρομεῖν διστᾶσῃτε. Χριστὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ κατὰ πάντων Θεός, ὃς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἀποπλύνειν προέταξε, νέον τιν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποτελῶν, εἰκόνα τοῦτον καλέσας ἂπ’ ἀρχῆς, διὰ τύπου τὴν εἰς τὴν ἐπιδεικνύμενος σπορῆν, οὐ προστάγματιν ὑπακούσας σερμοῖς, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος μιμητὴς, ἔσῃ ὅμοιος ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τιμηθεῖς. Οὐ γὰρ πτωχύνει Θεός καὶ σὲ Θεὸν ποιήσας εἰς ὁδὸν αὐτοῦ.*” It is clear that with a conception like this, which became prevalent in the 3rd century, Christ’s death on the cross could have no proper significance: nothing but the Holy Scriptures preserved its importance. We may further remark that Tertullian used the expression “*satisfacere deo*” about men (see, e.g., de bapt. 20: de pud. 9), but, so far as I know, not about the work of Christ. This expression is very frequent in Cyprian (for penances), and he also uses it about Christ. In both writers, moreover, we find “*meritum*” (e.g., Scorp. 6) and “*promereri deum*”. With them and with Novatian the idea of “*culpa*” is also more strongly emphasised than it is by the Eastern theologians. Cf. Novatian de trin. 10: “*quoniam cum caro et sanguis non obtinere regnum dei scribitur, non carnis substantia damnata est, quæ divinis manibus ne periret, exstructa est, sed sola carnis culpa merito reprehensa est.*” Tertullian de bapt. 5 says: “*Exempto reatu eximitur et poena.*” On the other hand he speaks of fasting as “*officia humiliationis*”, through which we can “*inlicere*” God. Among these Western writers the thought that God’s anger must be appeased both by sacrifices and corresponding acts appears in a much more pronounced form than in Irenæus. This is explained by their ideas as practical churchmen and by their actual experiences in communities that were already of a very secular character. We may, moreover, point out in a general way that the views of Hippolytus are everywhere more strictly dependent on Scripture texts than those of Irenæus. That many of the latter’s speculations are not

speculative interpretation of redemption, but protected by the *regula fidei*, the New Testament, especially Revelation, and the material hopes of the great majority of Christians. But it would be a great mistake to assume that Irenæus merely repeated the hopes of an earthly kingdom just because he still found them in tradition, and because they were completely rejected by the Gnostics and guaranteed by the *regula* and the New Testament.¹

found in Hippolytus is simply explained by the fact that they have no clear scriptural basis; see Overbeck, Quæst. Hippol., Specimen p. 75, note 29. On a superficial reading Tertullian seems to have a greater variety of points of view than Irenæus: he has in truth fewer, he contrived to work the grains of gold transmitted to him in such a way as to make the form more valuable than the substance. But one idea of Tertullian, which is not found in Irenæus, and which in after times was to attain great importance in the East (after Origen's day) and in the West (after the time of Ambrosius), may be further referred to. We mean the notion that Christ is the bridegroom and the human soul (and also the human body) the bride. This theologoumenon owes its origin to a combination of two older ones, and subsequently received its Biblical basis from the Song of Solomon. The first of these older theologoumena is the Greek philosophical notion that the divine Spirit is the bridegroom and husband of the human soul. See the Gnostics (e.g., the sublime description in the Excerpta ex Theodoto 27); Clem. ep. ad Jacob. 4. 6: as well as Tatian, Orat. 13; Tertull., de anima 41 fin.: "Sequitur animam nubentem spiritui caro; o beatum connubium"; and the still earlier Sap. Sal. VIII. 2 sq. An offensively realistic form of this image is found in Clem. Hom. III. 27: *νύμφη γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ πᾶς ἄνθρωπος, ὅποτεν τοῦ ἀληθοῦς προφήτου λευκῷ λόγῳ ἀληθείας σπειρόμενος φωτίζηται τὸν νοῦν*. The second is the apostolic notion that the Church is the bride and the body of Christ. In the 2nd Epistle of Clement the latter theologoumenon is already applied in a modified form. Here it is said that humanity as the Church, that is human nature (the flesh), belongs to Christ as his Eve (c. 14: see also Ignat. ad Polyc. V. 2; Tertull. de monog. 11, and my notes on *Διδάχῃ* XI. 11). The conclusion that could be drawn from this, and that seemed to have a basis in certain utterances of Jesus, viz., that the individual human soul together with the flesh is to be designated as the bride of Christ, was, so far as I know, first arrived at by Tertullian de resurr. 63: "Carnem et spiritum iam in semetipso Christus fœderavit, sponsam sponso et sponsum sponsæ comparavit. Nam et si animam quis contenderit sponsam, vel dotis nomine sequetur animam caro . . . Caro est sponsa, quæ in Christo spiritum sponsum per sanguinem pacta est"; see also de virg. vel. 16. Notice, however, that Tertullian continually thinks of all souls together (all flesh together) rather than of the individual soul.

¹ By the *regula* inasmuch as the words "from thence he will come to judge the quick and the dead" had a fixed place in the confessions, and the belief in the *duplex adventus Christi* formed one of the most important articles of Church belief in contradistinction to Judaism and Gnosticism (see the collection of passages in Hesse. "das Muratorische Fragment", p. 112 f.). But the belief in the return of

The truth rather is that he as well as Melito, Hippolytus, Tertullian, Lactantius, Commodian, and Victorinus lived in these hopes no less than did Papias, the Asia Minor Presbyters and Justin.¹ But this is the clearest proof that all these theologians were but half-hearted in their theology, which was forced upon them, in defence of the traditional faith, by the historical situation in which they found themselves. The Christ, who will shortly come to overcome Antichrist, overthrow the Roman empire, establish in Jerusalem a kingdom of glory, and feed believers with the fat of a miraculously fruitful earth, is in fact a quite different being from the Christ who, as the incarnate

Christ to this world necessarily involved the hope of a kingdom of glory under Christ upon earth, and without this hope is merely a rhetorical flourish.

¹ Cf. here the account already given in Book I., chap. 3, Vol. I., p. 167 ff., Book I., chap. 4, Vol. I., p. 261, Book II., chap. 3, Vol. I., p. 105 f. On Melito compare the testimony of Polycrates in Eusebius, H. E. V. 24, 5, and the title of his lost work *περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου καὶ τῆς ἀποκαλύψεως Ἰωάννου*. Chiliasm is also found in the epistle from Lyons in Eusebius, H. E. V. 1 sq. On Hippolytus see his work "de Christo et Antichristo" and Overbeck's careful account (loc. cit. p. 70 sq.) of the agreement here existing between Irenæus and Hippolytus as well as of the latter's chiliasm on which unfounded doubts have been cast. Overbeck has also, in my opinion, shown the probability of chiliasm portions having been removed at a later period both from Hippolytus' book and the great work of Irenæus. The extensive fragments of Hippolytus' commentary on Daniel are also to be compared (and especially the portions full of glowing hatred to Rome lately discovered by Georgiades). With reference to Tertullian compare particularly the writings adv. Marc. III., adv. Jud., de resurrectione carnis, de anima, and the titles of the subsequently suppressed writings de paradiso and de spe fidelium. Further see Commodian, Carmen apolog., Lactantius, Instit. div., I. VII., Victorinus, Commentary on the Apocalypse. It is very remarkable that Cyprian already set chiliasm aside: cf. the conclusion of the second Book of the Testimonia and the few passages in which he quoted the last chapters of Revelation. The Apologists were silent about chiliasm hopes, Justin even denied them in Apol. I. 11. but, as we have remarked, he gives expression to them in the Dialogue and reckons them necessary to complete orthodoxy. The Pauline eschatology, especially several passages in 1 Cor. XV. (see particularly verse 50), caused great difficulties to the Fathers from Justin downwards. See Fragm. Justinii IV. a Methodio supped., in Otto, Corp. Apol. III., p. 254. Iren. V. 9, Tertull. de resurr. 48 sq. According to Irenæus the heretics, who completely abandoned the early-Christian eschatology, appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 50. The idea of a kind of purgatory—a notion which does not originate with the realistic but with the philosophical eschatology—is quite plainly found in Tertullian, e.g., in de anima 57 and 58 ("modicum delictum illuc luendum"). He speaks in several passages of stages and different places of bliss; and this was a universally diffused idea (e.g., Scorp. 6).

God, has already virtually accomplished his work of imparting perfect knowledge and filling mankind with divine life and incorruptibility. The fact that the old Catholic Fathers have both Christs shows more clearly than any other the middle position that they occupy between the acutely hellenised Christianity of the theologians, *i.e.*, the Gnostics, and the old tradition of the Church. We have indeed seen that the twofold conception of Christ and his work dates back to the time of the Apostles, for there is a vast difference between the Christ of Paul and the Christ of the supposedly inspired Jewish Apocalypses; and also that the agency in producing this conjunction may be traced back to the oldest time; but the union of a precise Christological Gnosis, such as we find in Irenæus and Tertullian, with the retention in their integrity of the imaginative series of thoughts about Antichrist, Christ as the warrior hero, the double resurrection, and the kingdom of glory in Jerusalem, is really a historical novelty. There is, however, no doubt that the strength of the old Catholic theology in opposition to the Gnostics lies in the accomplishment of this union, which, on the basis of the New Testament, appeared to the Fathers possible and necessary. For it is not systematic consistency that secures the future of a religious conception within a church, but its elasticity, and its richness in dissimilar trains of thought. But no doubt this must be accompanied by a firm foundation, and this too the old Catholic Fathers possessed—the church system itself.

As regards the details of the eschatological hopes, they were fully set forth by Irenæus himself in Book V. Apart from the belief that the returning Nero would be the Antichrist, an idea spread in the West during the third century by the Sibylline verses and proved from Revelation, the later teachers who preached chiliastic hopes did not seriously differ from the Gallic bishop; hence the interpretation of Revelation is in its main features the same. It is enough therefore to refer to the fifth Book of Irenæus.¹ There is no need to show in detail that

¹ Irenæus begins with the resurrection of the body and the proofs of it (in opposition to Gnosticism). These proofs are taken from the omnipotence and goodness of God, the long life of the patriarchs, the translation of Enoch and

chiliasm leads to a peculiar view of history, which is as much opposed to that resulting from the Gnostic theory of redemption, as this doctrine itself forbids the hope of a bliss to be realised in an earthly kingdom of glory. This is not the proper place to demonstrate to what extent the two have been blended,

Elijah, the preservation of Jonah and of the three men in the fiery furnace, the essential nature of man as a temple of God to which the body also belongs, and the resurrection of Christ (V. 3—7). But Irenæus sees the chief proof in the incarnation of Christ, in the dwelling of the Spirit with its gifts in us (V. 8—16), and in the feeding of our body with the holy eucharist (V. 2. 3). Then he discusses the defeat of Satan by Christ (V. 21—23), shows that the powers that be are set up by God, that the devil therefore manifestly lies in arrogating to himself the lordship of the world (V. 24), but that he acts as a rebel and robber in attempting to make himself master of it. This brings about the transition to Antichrist. The latter is possessed of the whole power of the devil, sums up in himself therefore all sin and wickedness, and pretends to be Lord and God. He is described in accordance with the Apocalypses of Daniel and John as well as according to Matth. XXIV. and 2nd Thessalonians. He is the product of the 4th Kingdom that is, the Roman empire; but at the same time springs from the tribe of Dan (V. 30. 2), and will take up his abode in Jerusalem etc. The returning Christ will destroy him, and the Christ will come back when 6000 years of the world's history have elapsed; for "in as many days as the world was made, in so many thousands of years will it be ended" (V. 28. 3). The seventh day is then the great world Sabbath, during which Christ will reign with the saints of the first resurrection after the destruction of Antichrist. Irenæus expressly argued against such "as pass for orthodox, but disregard the order of the progress of the righteous and know no stages of preparation for incorruptibility" (V. 31). By this he means such as assume that after death souls immediately pass to God. On the contrary he argues that these rather wait in a hidden place for the resurrection which takes place on the return of Christ, after which the souls receive back their bodies and men now restored participate in the Saviour's Kingdom (V. 31. 2). This Kingdom on earth precedes the universal judgment: "for it is just that they should also receive the fruits of their patience in the same creation in which they suffered tribulation"; moreover, the promise made to Abraham that Palestine would be given to him and to his seed, *i.e.* the Christians, must be fulfilled (V. 32). There they will eat and drink with the Lord in the restored body (V. 33. 1), sitting at a table covered with food (V. 33. 2) and consuming the produce of the land, which the earth affords in miraculous fruitfulness. Here Irenæus appeals to alleged utterances of the Lord of which he had been informed by Papias (V. 33. 3. 4). The wheat will be so fat that lions lying peacefully beside the cattle will be able to feed themselves even on the chaff (V. 33. 3. 4). Such and similar promises are everywhere to be understood in a literal sense. Irenæus here expressly argues against any figurative interpretation (*ibid.* and V. 35). He therefore adopted the whole Jewish eschatology, the only difference being that he regards the Church as the seed of Abraham. The earthly Kingdom is then followed by the second resurrection, the general judgment, and the final end.

and how the chiliastic scheme of history has been emptied of its content and utilised in the service of theological apologetics.

But the Gnostics were not the only opponents of chiliasm. Justin, even in his time, knew orthodox Christians who refused to believe in an earthly kingdom of Christ in Jerusalem, and Irenæus (V. 33 ff.), Tertullian, and Hippolytus¹ expressly argued against these. Soon after the middle of the second century, we hear of an ecclesiastical party in Asia Minor, which not only repudiated chiliasm, but also rejected the Revelation of John as an untrustworthy book, and subjected it to sharp criticism. These were the so-called Alogi.² But in the second century such Christians were still in the minority in the Church. It was only in the course of the third century that chiliasm was almost completely ousted in the East. This was the result of the Montanistic controversy and the Alexandrian theology. In the West, however, it was only threatened. In this Church the first literary opponent of chiliasm and of the Apocalypse appears to have been the Roman Presbyter Caius. But his polemic did not prevail. On the other hand the learned bishops of the East in the third century used their utmost efforts to combat and extirpate chiliasm. The information given to us by Eusebius (H. E. VII. 24), from the letters of Dionysius of Alexandria, about that father's struggles with whole communities in Egypt, who would not give up chiliasm, is of the highest interest. This account shews that wherever philosophical theology had not yet made its way the chiliastic hopes were not only cherished and defended against being explained away, but were emphatically regarded as Christianity itself.³ Cultured

¹ Hippolytus in the lost book *ὑπὲρ τοῦ κατὰ Ἰωάννην εὐαγγελίου καὶ ἀποκαλύψεως*. Perhaps we may also reckon Melito among the literary defenders of Chiliasm.

² See Epiph., II. 51, who here falls back on Hippolytus.

³ In the Christian village communities of the district of Arsinoë the people would not part with chiliasm, and matters even went the length of an "apostasy" from the Alexandrian Church. A book by an Egyptian bishop, Nepos, entitled "Refutation of the allegorists" attained the highest repute. "They esteem the law and the prophets as nothing, neglect to follow the Gospels, think little of the Epistles of the Apostles, and on the contrary declare the doctrine set forth in this book to be a really great secret. They do not permit the simpler brethren among us to obtain

theologians were able to achieve the union of chiliasm and religious philosophy; but the "simplices et idiotæ" could only understand the former. As the chiliastic hopes were gradually obliged to recede in exactly the same proportion as philosophic theology became naturalised, so also their subsidence denotes the progressive tutelage of the laity. The religion they understood was taken from them, and they received in return a faith they could not understand; in other words, the old faith and the old hopes decayed of themselves and the *authority* of a mysterious faith took their place. In this sense the extirpation or decay of chiliasm is perhaps the most momentous fact in the history of Christianity in the East. With chiliasm men also lost the living faith in the nearly impending return of Christ, and the consciousness that the prophetic spirit with its gifts is a real possession of Christendom. Such of the old hopes as remained were at most particoloured harmless fancies which, when allowed by theology, were permitted to be added to dogmatics. In the West, on the contrary, the millennial hopes retained their vigour during the whole third century; we know of no bishop there who would have opposed chiliasm. With this, however, was preserved a portion of the earliest Christianity which was to exercise its effects far beyond the time of Augustine.

Finally, we have still to treat of the altered conceptions regarding the Old Testament which the creation of the New produced among the early-Catholic Fathers. In the case of Barnabas and the Apologists we became acquainted with a theory of the Old Testament which represented it as the Chris-

a sublime and grand idea of the glorious and truly divine appearance of our Lord, of our resurrection from the dead as well as of the union and assimilation with him: but they persuade us to hope for things petty, perishable, and similar to the present in the kingdom of God." So Dionysius expressed himself, and these words are highly characteristic of his own position and that of his opponents; for in fact the whole New Testament could not but be thrust into the background in cases where the chiliastic hopes were really adhered to. Dionysius asserts that he convinced these Churches by his lectures; but chiliasm and material religious ideas were still long preserved in the deserts of Egypt. They were cherished by the monks; hence Jewish Apocalypses accepted by Christians are preserved in the Coptic and Ethiopian languages.

tian book of revelation and accordingly subjected it throughout to an allegorical process. Here nothing specifically new could be pointed out as having been brought by Christ. Sharply opposed to this conception was that of Marcion, according to which the whole Old Testament was regarded as the proclamation of a Jewish God hostile to the God of redemption. The views of the majority of the Gnostics occupied a middle position between the two notions. These distinguished different components of the Old Testament, some of which they traced to the supreme God himself and others to intermediate and malevolent beings. In this way they both established a connection between the Old Testament, and the Christian revelation and contrived to show that the latter contained a specific novelty. This historico-critical conception, such as we specially see it in the epistle of Ptolemy to Flora, could not be accepted by the Church because it abolished strict monotheism and endangered the proof from prophecy. No doubt, however, we already find in Justin and others the beginning of a compromise, in so far as a distinction was made between the moral law of nature contained in the Old Testament—the Decalogue—and the ceremonial law; and in so far as the literal interpretation of the latter, for which a pedagogic significance was claimed, was allowed in addition to its typical or Christian sense. With this theory it was possible, on the one hand, to do some sort of justice to the historical position of the Jewish people, and on the other, though indeed in a meagre fashion, to give expression to the novelty of Christianity. The latter now appears as the *new* law or the law of freedom, in so far as the moral law of nature had been restored in its full purity without the burden of ceremonies, and a particular historical relation to God was allowed to the Jewish nation, though indeed more a wrathful than a covenant one. For the ceremonial regulations were conceived partly as tokens of the judgment on Israel, partly as concessions to the stiffneckedness of the people in order to protect them from the worst evil, polytheism.

Now the struggle with the Gnostics and Marcion, and the creation of a New Testament had necessarily a double consequence. On the one hand, the proposition that the "Father of

Jesus Christ is the creator of the world and the God of the Old Testament" required the strictest adherence to the unity of the two Testaments, so that the traditional apologetic view of the older book had to undergo the most rigid development; on the other hand, as soon as the New Testament was created, it was impossible to avoid seeing that this book was superior to the earlier one, and thus the theory of the novelty of the Christian doctrine worked out by the Gnostics and Marcion had in some way or other to be set forth and demonstrated. We now see the old Catholic Fathers engaged in the solution of this twofold problem; and their method of accomplishing it has continued to be the prevailing one in all Churches up to the present time, in so far as the ecclesiastical and dogmatic practice still continues to exhibit the inconsistencies of treating the Old Testament as a Christian book in the strict sense of the word and yet elevating the New above it, of giving a typical interpretation to the ceremonial law and yet acknowledging that the Jewish people had a covenant with God.

With regard to the first point, viz., the maintenance of the unity of the two Testaments, Irenæus and Tertullian gave a most detailed demonstration of it in opposition to Marcion,¹ and primarily indeed with the same means as the older teachers had already used. It is Christ that prophesied and appeared in the Old Testament; he is the householder who produced both Old and New Testaments.² Moreover, as the two have the same origin, their meaning is also the same. Like Barnabas the early-Catholic Fathers contrived to give all passages in the Old Testament a typical Christian sense: it is the same truth which we can learn from the prophets and again from Christ and the Apostles. With regard to the Old Testament the watchword is: "Seek the type" ("Typum quæras").³ But they went

¹ See Irenæus lib. IV. and Tertull. adv. Marc. lib. II. and III.

² It would be superfluous to quote passages here; two may stand for all. Iren. IV. 9. 1: "Utraque testamenta unus et idem paterfamilias produxit. verbum dei, dominus noster Iesus Christus, qui et Abrahæ et Moysi collocutus est." Both Testaments are "unius et eiusdem substantiæ." IV. 2. 3: "Moysis literæ sunt verba Christi."

³ See Iren. IV. 31. 1.

a step further still. In opposition to Marcion's antitheses and his demonstration that the God of the Old Testament is a petty being and has enjoined petty, external observances, they seek to show in syntheses that the same may be said of the New. (See Irenæus IV. 21—36). The effort of the older teachers to exclude everything outward and ceremonial is no longer met with to the same extent in Irenæus and Tertullian, at least when they are arguing and defending their position against the Gnostics. This has to be explained by two causes. In the first place Judaism (and Jewish Christianity) was at bottom no longer an enemy to be feared; they therefore ceased to make such efforts to avoid the "Jewish" conception of the Old Testament. Irenæus, for example, emphasised in the most naïve manner the observance of the Old Testament law by the early Apostles and also by Paul. This is to him a complete proof that they did not separate the Old Testament God from the Christian Deity.¹ In connection with this we observe that the radical antijudaism of the earliest period more and more ceases. Irenæus and Tertullian admitted that the Jewish nation had a covenant with God and that the literal interpretation of the Old Testament was justifiable. Both repeatedly testified that the Jews had the right doctrine and that they only lacked the knowledge of the Son. These thoughts indeed do not attain clear expression with them because their works contain no systematic discussions involving these principles. In the second place the Church itself had become an institution where sacred ceremonial injunctions were necessary; and, in order to find a basis for these, they had to fall back on Old Testament commandments (see Vol. I., chap. 6, p. 291 ff.). In Tertullian we find this only in its most rudimentary form;² but in

¹ Iren. III. 12. 15 (on Gal. II. 11 f.): Sic apostoli, quos universi actus et universæ doctrinæ dominus testes fecit, religiose agebant circa dispositionem legis, quæ est secundum Moysem, ab uno et eodem significantes esse deo"; see Overbeck "Ueber die Auffassung des Streits des Paulus mit Petrus bei den Kirchenvätern," 1877, p. 8 f. Similar remarks are frequent in Irenæus.

² Cf., e.g., de monog. 7: "Certe sacerdotes sumus a Christo vocati, monogamie debitores, ex pristina dei lege, quæ nos tunc in suis sacerdotibus prophetavit." Here also Tertullian's Montanism had an effect. Though conceiving the directions of the Paraclete as *new legislation*, the Montanists would not renounce the view

the course of the third century these needs grew mightily¹ and were satisfied. In this way the Old Testament threatened to become an authentic book of revelation to the Church, and that in a quite different and much more dangerous sense than was formerly the case with the Apostolic Fathers and the Apologists.

With reference to the second point, we may remark that just when the decay of antijudaism, the polemic against Marcion, and the new needs of the ecclesiastical system threatened the Church with an estimate of the Old Testament hitherto unheard of, the latter was nevertheless thrust back by the creation and authority of the New Testament, and this consequently revived the uncertain position in which the sacred book was henceforth to remain. Here also, as in every other case, the development in the Church ends with the *complexus oppositorum*, which nowhere allows all the conclusions to be drawn, but offers the great advantage of removing every perplexity up to a certain point. The early-Catholic Fathers adopted from Justin the distinction between the Decalogue, as the moral law of nature, and the ceremonial law; whilst the oldest theologians (the Gnostics) and the New Testament suggested to them the thought of the (relative) novelty of Christianity and therefore also of the New Testament. Like Marcion they acknowledged the literal sense of the ceremonial law and God's covenant with the Jews; and they sought to sum up and harmonise all these features in the thought of an economy of salvation and of a history of salvation. This economy and history of salvation which contained the conception of a divine *accommodation and pedagogy*, and which accordingly distinguished between constituent parts of different degrees of value (in the Old Testament also), is the great result presented in the main work of Irenæus and accepted by Tertullian. It is to exist beside the proof from prophecy without modifying it;² and thus appears as something inter-

that these laws were in some way already indicated in the written documents of revelation.

¹ Very much may be made out with regard to this from Origen's works and the later literature, particularly from Commodian and the Apostolic Constitutions, lib. I.—VI

² Where Christians needed the proof from prophecy or indulged in a devotional

mediate between the Valentinian conception that destroyed the unity of origin of the Old Testament and the old idea which neither acknowledged various constituents in the book nor recognised the peculiarities of Christianity. We are therefore justified in regarding this history of salvation approved by the Church, as well as the theological propositions of Irenæus and Tertullian generally, as a Gnosis "toned down" and reconciled with Monotheism. This is shown too in the faint gleam of a historical view that still shines forth from this "history of salvation" as a remnant of that bright light which may be recognised in the Gnostic conception of the Old Testament.¹ Still, it is a striking advance that Irenæus has made beyond Justin and especially beyond Barnabas. No doubt it is mythological history that appears in this history of salvation and the recapitulating story of Jesus with its saving facts that is associated with it; and it is a view that is not even logically worked out, but ever and anon crossed by the proof from prophecy; yet for all that it is development and history.

The fundamental features of Irenæus' conception are as follow: The Mosaic law and the New Testament dispensation of grace both emanated from one and the same God, *and were granted for the salvation of the human race in a form appropriate to the times.*² The two are in part different; but the difference must be conceived as due to causes³ that do not affect the unity of the author and of the main points.⁴ We must make the nature of God and the nature of man our point of departure. God is always the same, man is ever advancing towards God; God is always the giver, man always the receiver;⁵

application of the Old Testament, everything indeed remained as before, and every Old Testament passage was taken for a Christian one, as has remained the case even to the present day.

¹ With the chiliastic view of history this newly acquired theory has nothing in common.

² Iren. III. 12. 11.

³ See III. 12. 12.

⁴ No *commutatio agnitionis* takes place, says Irenæus, but only an increased gift (IV. 11. 3); for the knowledge of God the Creator is "*principium evangelii.*" (III. 11. 7).

⁵ See IV. 11. 2 and other passages, *e.g.*, IV. 20. 7 : IV. 26. 1 : IV. 37. 7 : IV. 38. 1—4.

God leads us ever to the highest goal; man, however, is not God from the beginning, but is destined to incorruptibility, which he is to attain step by step, advancing from the childhood stage to perfection (see above, p. 267 f.). This progress, conditioned by the nature and destination of man, is, however, dependent on the revelation of God by his Son, culminating in the incarnation of the latter and closing with the subsequent bestowal of the Spirit on the human race. In Irenæus therefore the place of the many different revelation-hypostases of the Valentinians is occupied by the one God, who stoops to the level of developing humanity, accommodates himself to it, guides it, and bestows on it increasing revelations of grace.¹ The fundamental knowledge of God and the moral law of nature, *i.e.*, natural morality, were already revealed to man and placed in his heart² by the creator. He who preserves these, as for example the patriarchs did, is justified. (In this case Irenæus leaves Adam's sin entirely out of sight). But it was God's will to bring men into a higher union with himself; wherefore his Son descended to men from the beginning and accustomed himself to dwell among them. The patriarchs loved God and refrained from injustice towards their neighbours; hence it was not necessary that they should be exhorted with the strict letter of the law, since they had the righteousness of the law in themselves.³ But, as far as the great majority of men are concerned, they wandered away from God and fell into the sorriest condition. From this moment Irenæus, keeping strictly to the Old Testament, only concerns himself with the Jewish people. These

¹ Several covenants I. 10. 3; four covenants (Adam, Noah, Moses, Christ) III. 11. 8; the two Testaments (Law and New Covenant) are very frequently mentioned.

² This is very frequently mentioned: see *e.g.*, IV. 13. 1: "Et quia dominus naturalia legis, per quæ homo iustificatur, quæ etiam ante legisdationem custodiebant qui fide iustificabantur et placebant deo non dissolvit etc." IV. 15. 1.

³ Irenæus, as a rule, views the patriarchs as perfect saints: see III. 11. 8: "Verbum dei illis quidem qui ante Moysem fuerunt patriarchis secundum divinitatem et gloriam colloquebatur", and especially IV. 16. 3. As to the Son's having descended from the beginning and having thus appeared to the patriarchs also, see IV. 6. 7. Not merely Abraham but all the other exponents of revelation knew both the Father and the Son. Nevertheless Christ was also obliged to descend to the lower world to the righteous, the prophets, and the patriarchs, in order to bring them forgiveness of sins (IV. 27. 2).

are to him the representatives of humanity. It is only at this period that the training of the human race is given to them; but it is really the Jewish *nation* that he keeps in view, and through this he differs very decidedly from such as Barnabas.¹ When righteousness and love to God died out in Egypt, God led his people forth so that man might again become a disciple and imitator of God. He gave him the written law (the Decalogue), which contains nothing else than the moral law of nature that had fallen into oblivion.² But when they made to themselves a golden calf and chose to be slaves rather than free men, then the Word, through the instrumentality of Moses, gave to them, as a particular addition, the commandments of slavery (the ceremonial law) in a form suitable for their training. These were bodily commandments of bondage which did not separate them from God, but held them in the yoke. The ceremonial law was thus a pedagogic means of preserving the people from idolatry; but it was at the same time a type of the future. Each constituent of the ceremonial law has this double signification, and both of these meanings originate with God, *i.e.*, with Christ; for "how is Christ the end of the law, if he be not the beginning of it?" ("quomodo finis legis Christus, si non et initium eius esset") IV. 12. 4. Everything in the law is therefore holy, and moreover we are only entitled to blame such portions of the history of the Jewish nation as Holy Scripture itself condemns. This nation was obliged to circumcise itself, keep Sabbaths, offer up sacrifices, and do whatever is related of it, so far as its action is not censured. All this belonged to the state of bondage in which men had a *covenant* with God and in which they also possessed

¹ On the contrary he agrees with the teachings of a presbyter, whom he frequently quotes in the 4th Book. To Irenæus the heathen are simply idolaters who have even forgotten the law written in the heart; wherefore the Jews stand much higher, for they only lacked the *agnitio filii*. See III. 5. 3 : III. 10. 3 : III. 12. 7 IV. 23, 24. Yet there is still a great want of clearness here. Irenæus cannot get rid of the following contradictions. The pre-Christian righteous know the Son and do not know him: they require the appearance of the Son and do not require it; and the *agnitio filii* seems sometimes a new, and in fact the decisive, *veritas*, and sometimes that involved in the knowledge of God the Creator.

² Irenæus IV. 16. 3. See IV. 15. 1: "Decalogum si quis non fecerit, non habet salutem".

the right faith in the one God and were taught before hand to follow his Son (IV. 12, 5; "lex prædocuit hominem sequi oportere Christum"). In addition to this, Christ continually manifested himself to the people in the prophets, through whom also he indicated the future and prepared men for his appearance. In the prophets the Son of God accustomed men to be instruments of the Spirit of God and to have fellowship with the Father in them; and in them he habituated himself to enter bodily into humanity.¹ Hereupon began the last stage, in which men, being now sufficiently trained, were to receive the "testamentum libertatis" and be adopted as Sons of God. By the union of the Son of God with the flesh the *agnitio filii* first became possible to all; that is the fundamental novelty. The next problem was to restore the law of freedom. Here a threefold process was necessary. In the first place the Law of Moses, the Decalogue, had been disfigured and blunted by the "traditio seniorum". First of all then the pure moral law had to be restored; secondly, it was now necessary to extend and fulfil it by expressly searching out the inclinations of the heart in all cases, thus unveiling the law in its whole severity; and lastly the *particularia legis*, *i.e.*, the law of bondage, had to be abolished. But in the latter

¹ As the Son has manifested the Father from of old, so also the law, and indeed even the ceremonial law, is to be traced back to him. See IV. 6. 7: IV. 12. 4: IV. 14. 2: "his qui inquieti erant in eremo dans aptissimam legem . . . per omnes transiens verbum omni conditioni congruentem et aptam legem conscribens". IV. 4. 2. The law is a law of bondage; it was just in that capacity that it was necessary; see IV. 4. 1: IV. 9. 1: IV. 13. 2. 4: IV. 14. 3: IV. 15: IV. 16: IV. 32: IV. 36. A part of the commandments are concessions on account of hardness of heart (IV. 15. 2). But Irenæus still distinguishes very decidedly between the "people" and the prophets. This is a survival of the old view. The prophets he said knew very well of the coming of the Son of God and the granting of a new covenant (IV. 9. 3: IV. 20. 4, 5: IV. 33. 10): they understood what was typified by the ceremonial law, and to them accordingly the law had only a typical signification. Moreover, Christ himself came to them ever and anon through the prophetic spirit. The preparation for the new covenant is therefore found in the prophets and in the typical character of the old. Abraham has this peculiarity, that both Testaments were prefigured in him: the Testament of faith, because he was justified before his circumcision, and the Testament of the law. The latter occupied "the middle times", and therefore come in between (IV. 25. 1). This is a Pauline thought, though otherwise indeed there is not much in Irenæus to remind us of Paul, because he used the moral categories, *growth* and *training*, instead of the religious ones, *sin* and *grace*.

connection Christ and the Apostles themselves avoided every transgression of the ceremonial law, in order to prove that this also had a divine origin. The non-observance of this law was first permitted to the Gentile Christians, Thus, no doubt, Christ himself is the end of the law, but only in so far as he has abolished the law of bondage and restored the moral law in its whole purity and severity, and given us himself.

The question as to the difference between the New Testament and the Old is therefore answered by Irenæus in the following manner. It consists (1) in the *agnitio filii* and consequent transformation of the slaves into children of God; and (2) in the restoration of the law, which is a law of freedom just because it excludes bodily commandments, and with stricter interpretation lays the whole stress on the inclinations of the heart.¹ But in

¹ The law, *i.e.*, the ceremonial law, reaches down to John. IV. 4. 2. The New Testament is a law of freedom, because through it we are adopted as sons of God. III. 5. 3: III. 10. 5: III. 12. 5: III. 12. 14: III. 15. 3: IV. 9. 1, 2: IV. 11. 1: IV. 13. 2, 4: IV. 15. 1, 2: IV. 16. 5: IV. 18: IV. 32: IV. 34. 1: IV. 36. 2 Christ did not abolish the *naturalia legis*, the Decalogue, but extended and fulfilled them; here the old Gentile-Christian moral conception based on the Sermon on the Mount, prevails. Accordingly Irenæus now shows that in the case of the children of freedom the situation has become much more serious, and that the judgments are now much more threatening. Finally, he proves that the fulfilling, extending, and sharpening of the law form a contrast to the blunting of the natural moral law by the Pharisees and elders; see IV. 12. 1 ff.: "Austero dei præcepto miscent seniores aquatam traditionem", IV. 13. 1. f.: "Christus naturalia legis (which are summed up in the commandment of love) extendit et implevit... plenitudo et extensio... necesse fuit, auferri quidem vincula servitutis, superextendi vero decreta libertatis". That is proved in the next passage from the Sermon on the Mount: we must not only refrain from evil works, but also from evil desire. IV. 16. 5: "Hæc ergo, quæ in servitutem et in signum data sunt illis, circumscripsit novo libertatis testamento. Quæ autem naturalia et liberalia et communia omnium, auxit et dilatavit, sine invidia largiter donans hominibus per adoptionem, patrem scire deum... auxit autem etiam timorem: filios enim plus timere oportet quam servos". IV. 27. 2. The new situation is a more serious one; the Old Testament believers have the death of Christ as an antidote for their sins, "propter eos vero, qui nunc peccant, Christus non iam morietur". IV. 28. 1 f.: under the old covenant God punished "typice et temporaliter et mediocrius", under the new, on the contrary, "vere et semper et austerius"... as under the new covenant "fides aucta est", so also it is true that "diligentia conversationis adaucta est". The imperfections of the law, the "particularia legis", the law of bondage have been abolished by Christ, see specially IV. 16. 17. for the types are now fulfilled: but Christ and the Apostles did not transgress the law; freedom was first granted to the Gentile Christians (III. 12) and circumcision and foreskin united

these two respects he finds a real addition, and hence, in his opinion, the Apostles stand higher than the prophets. He proves this higher position of the Apostles by a surprising interpretation of 1 Cor. XII. 28, conceiving the prophets named in that passage to be those of the Old Testament.¹ He therefore views the two Testaments as of the same nature, but "greater is the legislation which confers liberty than that which brings bondage" ("maior est legisdatio quæ in libertatem, quam quæ data est in servitutem"). Through the two covenants the accomplishment of salvation was to be hastened "for there is one salvation and one God; but the precepts that form man are numerous, and the steps that lead man to God are not a few; ("una est enim salus et unus deus; quæ autem formant hominem, præcepta multa et non pauci gradus, qui adducunt hominem ad deum"). A worldly king can increase his benefits to his subjects; and should it not also be lawful for God, though he is always the same, to honour continually with greater gifts those who are well pleasing to him? (IV. 9. 3). Irenæus makes no direct statement as to the further importance which the Jewish people have, and in any case regards them as of no consequence after the appearance of the covenant of freedom. Nor does this nation appear any further even in the chiliastic train of thought. It furnishes the Antichrist and its holy city becomes the capital of Christ's earthly kingdom; but the nation itself, which, according to this theory, had represented all mankind from Moses to Christ, just as if all men had been Jews, now entirely disappears.²

This conception, in spite of its want of stringency, made an immense impression, and has continued to prevail down to the present time. It has, however, been modified by a combination

(III. 5. 3). But Irenæus also proved how little the old and new covenants contradict each other by showing that the latter also contains concessions that have been granted to the frailty of man: see IV. 15. 2 (1 Cor. VII.).

¹ See III. 11. 4. There too we find it argued that John the Baptist was not merely a prophet, but also an Apostle.

² From Irenæus' statement in IV. 4 about the significance of the city of Jerusalem we can infer what he thought of the Jewish nation. Jerusalem is to him the vine-branch on which the fruit has grown: the latter having reached maturity, the branch is cut off and has no further importance.

with the Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace. It was soon reckoned as Paul's conception, to which in fact it has a distant relationship. Tertullian had already adopted it in its essential features, amplified it in some points, and, in accordance with his Montanist ideas, enriched it by adding a fourth stage (ab initio—Moses—Christ—Paraclete). But this addition was not accepted by the Church.¹

¹ No special treatment of Tertullian is required here, as he only differs from Irenæus in the additions he invented as a Montanist. Yet this is also prefigured in Irenæus' view that the concessions of the Apostles had rendered the execution of the stern new law more easy. A few passages may be quoted here. *De orat.* 1: *Quidquid retro fuerat, aut demutatatum est (per Christum), ut circumcisio, aut suppletum ut reliqua lex, aut impletum ut prophetia, aut perfectum ut fides ipsa. Omnia de carnalibus in spiritalia renovavit nova dei gratia superducto evangelio, expunctore totius retro vetustatis.*" (This differentiation strikingly reminds us of the letter of Ptolemy to Flora. Ptolemy distinguishes those parts of the law that originate with God, Moses, and the elders. As far as the divine law is concerned, he again distinguishes what Christ had to complete, what he had to supersede and what he had to spiritualise, that is, *perficere, solvere, demutare*). In the *regula fidei* (de præscr. 13): "Christus predicavit novam legem et novam promissionem regni celorum": see the discussions in *adv. Marc.* II., III., and *adv. Iud.*: de pat. 6: "amplianda adimplendaque lex." *Scorp.* 3, 8, 9: *ad uxor.* 2: de monog. 7: "Et quoniam quidam interdum nihil sibi dicunt esse cum lege, quam Christus non dissolvit, sed adimplevit, interdum quæ volunt legis arripiunt (he himself did that continually), plane et nos sic dicimus legem, ut onera quidem eius, secundum sententiam apostolorum, quæ nec patres sustinere valuerunt, concesserint, quæ vero ad iustitiam spectant, non tantum reservata permaneant, verum et ampliata." That the new law of the new covenant is the moral law of nature in a stricter form, and that the concessions of the Apostle Paul cease in the age of the Paraclete, is a view we find still more strongly emphasised in the Montanist writings than in Irenæus. In *ad uxor.* 3 Tertullian had already said: "Quod permittitur, bonum non est." and this proposition is the theme of many arguments in the Montanist writings. But the intention of finding a basis for the laws of the Paraclete, by showing that they existed in some fashion even in earlier times, involved Tertullian in many contradictions. It is evident from his writings that Montanists and Catholics in Carthage alternately reproached each other with judaïsing tendencies and an apostasy to heathen discipline and worship. Tertullian, in his enthusiasm for Christianity, came into conflict with all the authorities which he himself had set up. In the questions as to the relationship of the Old Testament to the New, of Christ to the Apostles, of the Apostles to each other, of the Paraclete to Christ and the Apostles, he was also of necessity involved in the greatest contradictions. This was the case not only because he went more into details than Irenæus; but, above all, because the chains into which he had thrown his Christianity were felt to be such by himself. This theologian had no greater opponent than himself, and nowhere perhaps is this so plain as in his attitude to the two Testaments. Here, in every question of

3. *Results to ecclesiastical Christianity.*

As we have shown, Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus had no strictly systematised theology; they formulated theological propositions because their opponents were theologians. Hence the result of their labours, so far as this was accepted by the Western Church of the third century, does not appear in the adoption of a systematic philosophical dogmatic, but in theological fragments, namely, the rule of faith fixed and interpreted in an antignostic sense.¹ As yet the rule of faith and theology nowhere came into collision in the Western Churches of the third century, because Irenæus and his younger contemporaries did not themselves notice any such discrepancies, but rather imagined all their teachings to be expositions of the faith itself, and did not trouble their heads about inconsistencies. If we

detail. Tertullian really repudiated the proposition from which he starts. In reference to one point, namely, that the Law and the prophets extend down to John, see Nöldechen's article in the *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1885, p. 333 f. On the one hand, in order to support certain trains of thought, Tertullian required the proposition that prophecy extended down to John (see also the Muratorian Fragment: *completus numerus prophetarum*"), Sibyll. 1. 386: *καὶ τότε ὃν πάντας ἔσται μετέπειτα προφητῶν*, scil. after Christ), and on the other, as a Montanist, he was obliged to assert the continued existence of prophecy. In like manner he sometimes ascribed to the Apostles a unique possession of the Holy Spirit, and at other times, adhering to a primitive Christian idea, he denied this thesis. Cf. also Barth "Tertullian's Auffassung des Apostels Paulus und seines Verhältnisses zu den Uraposteln" (*Jahrbuch für protestantische Theologie*, Vol. III, p. 706 ff.). Tertullian strove to reconcile the principles of early Christianity with the authority of ecclesiastical tradition and philosophical apologetics. Separated from the general body of the Church, and making ever increasing sacrifices for the early-Christian enthusiasm, as he understood it, he wasted himself in the solution of this insoluble problem.

¹ In addition to this, however, they definitely established within the Church the idea that there is a "Christian" view in all spheres of life and in all questions of knowledge. Christianity appears expanded to an immense, immeasurable breadth. This is also Gnosticism. Thus Tertullian, after expressing various opinions about dreams, opens the 45th chapter of his work "de anima" with the words: "Tene-mur hic de somniis quoque Christianam sententiam exprimere". Alongside of the antignostic rule of faith as the "doctrine" we find the casuistic system of morality and penance (the Church "disciplina") with its media of almsgiving, fasting, and prayer: see Cypr., de op. et elemos., but before that Hippol., Comm. in Daniel (Εκκλ. Ἀληθ. 1886, p. 242): *οἱ εἰς τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ Θεοῦ πιστεύοντες καὶ δι' αὐτὴν ἀφορηταί τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ ἐξιλασκόμενοι*.

wish to form a notion as to what ideas had become universally prevalent in the Church in the middle of the third century let us compare Cyprian's work "Testimonia", written for a layman, with Novatian's work "De Trinitate".

In the "Testimonia" the doctrine of the two Testaments, as developed by Irenæus, forms the framework in which the individual dogmas are set. The doctrine of God, which should have been placed at the beginning, has been left out in this little book probably because the person addressed required no instruction on the point. Some of the dogmas already belong to philosophical theology in the strict sense of the word; in others we have merely a precise assertion of the truth of certain facts. All propositions are, however, supported by passages from the two Testaments and thereby proved.¹ The theological counterpart to this is Novatian's work "De Trinitate". This first great Latin work that appeared in Rome is highly important. In regard to completeness, extent of Biblical proofs, and perhaps also its influence on succeeding times, it may in many respects be compared with Origen's work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*. Otherwise indeed it differs as much from that work, as the sober, meagre theology of the West, devoid of philosophy and speculation, differs in general from that of the East. But it sums up in classic fashion the doctrines of Western orthodoxy, the main features of which were sketched by Tertullian in his antignostic writings and the work against Praxeas. The old Roman symbol forms the basis of the work. In accordance with this the author gives a comprehensive exposition of his doctrine of God in the first eight chapters. Chapters 9—28 form the main portion; they establish the correct Christology in opposition to the heretics who look on Christ as a mere man or as the Father himself; the Holy Scriptures furnish the material for the proofs. Chapter 29 treats of the Holy Spirit. Chapters 30 and 31 contain the recapitulation and conclusion. The whole is based on Tertullian's treatise against Praxeas. No important argument in that work has escaped Novatian; but everything is extended, and made more systematic

¹ In the case of Irenæus, Hippolytus, and Tertullian we already find that they observe a certain order and sequence of books when advancing a detailed proof from Scripture.

and polished. No trace of Platonism is to be found in this dogmatic; on the contrary he employs the Stoic and Aristotelian syllogistic and dialectic method used also by his Monarchian opponents. This plan together with its Biblical attitude gives the work great outward completeness and certainty. We cannot help concluding that this work must have made a deep impression wherever it was read, although the real difficulties of the matter are not at all touched upon, but veiled by distinctions and formulæ. It probably contributed not least to make Tertullian's type of Christology the universal Western one. This type, however, as will be set forth in greater detail hereafter, already approximates closely to the resolutions of Nicæa and Chalcedon.¹ Novatian adopted Tertullian's formulæ "one substance, three persons" ("una substantia, tres personæ"), "from the substance of God" ("ex substantia dei"), "always with the Father" ("semper apud patrem"), "God and man" ("deus et homo"), "two substances" ("duæ substantiæ"), "one person" ("una persona"), as well as his expressions for the union and separation of the two natures adding to them similar ones and giving them a wider extension.² Taking his book in all we may see

¹ It is worthy of note that there was not a single Arian ecclesiastic of note in the Novatian churches of the 4th century, so far as we know. All Novatian's adherents, even those in the West (see Socrates' Ecclesiastical History), were of the orthodox Nicæan type. This furnishes material for reflection.

² Owing to the importance of the matter we shall give several Christological and trinitarian disquisitions from the work "de trinitate". The archaic attitude of this Christology and trinitarian doctrine is evident from the following considerations. (1) Like Tertullian, Novatian asserts that the Logos was indeed always with the Father, but that he only went forth from him at a definite period of time (for the purpose of creating the world). (2) Like Tertullian, he declares that Father, Son, and Spirit have one substance (that is, are *ὁμοούσιος*, the *homoousia* of itself never decides as to equality in dignity): but that the Son is subordinate and obedient to the Father and the Spirit to the Son (cc. 17, 22, 24), since they derive their origin, essence, and function from the Father (the Spirit from the Son). (3) Like Tertullian, Novatian teaches that the Son, after accomplishing his work, will again become intermingled with the Father, that is, will cease to have an independent existence (c. 31): whence we understand why the West continued so long to be favourable to Marcellus of Ancyra: see also the so-called symbol of Sardika). Apart from these points and a few others of less consequence, the work, in its formulæ, exhibits a type which remained pretty constant in the West down to the time of Augustine, or, till the adoption of Johannes Damascenus' dogmatic. The sharp distinction between "deus" and "homo" and the use that

that he thereby created for the West a dogmatic *vademecum*, which, from its copious and well-selected quotations from Scripture, must have been of extraordinary service.

The most important articles which were now fixed and trans- nevertheless made of "permixtio" and synonymous words are also specially characteristic. Cap. 9: "Christus deus dominus deus noster, sed dei filius": c. 11: "non sic de substantia corporis ipsius exprimimus, ut solum tantum hominem illum esse dicamus, sed ut divinitate sermonis in ipsa concretionem permixta etiam deum illum teneamus": c. 11 Christ has *auctoritas divina*, "tam enim scriptura etiam deum aduuntiat Christum, quam etiam ipsum hominem aduuntiat deum, tam hominem descripsit Iesum Christum, quam etiam deum quoque descripsit Christum dominum." In c. 12 the term "Immanuel" is used to designate Christ as God in a way that reminds one of Athanasius: c. 13: "præsertim cum animadvertat, scripturam evangelicam utramque istam substantiam in unam nativitatis Christi foederasse concordiam"; c. 14: "Christus ex verbi et carnis coniunctione concretus"; c. 16: "... ut neque homo Christo subtrahatur, neque divinitas negetur... utrumque in Christo confoederatum est, utrumque coniunctum est et utrumque conexum est... pignerata in illo divinitatis et humilitatis videtur esse concordia... qui mediator dei et hominum effectus exprimitur, in se deum et hominem sociasse reperitur... nos sermonem dei scimus indutum carnis substantiam... lavit substantiam corporis et materiam carnis abluens, ex parte suscepti hominis, passione": c. 17: "... nisi quoniam auctoritas divini verbi ad suscipiendum hominem interim conquiescens nec se suis viribus exercens, deiecit se ad tempus atque deponit, dum hominem fert, quem suscepit": c. 18: "... ut in semetipso concordiam confilularet terrenorum pariter atque cælestium, dum utriusque partis in se connectens pignora et deum homini et hominem deo copularet, ut merito filius dei per assumptionem carnis filius hominis et filius hominis per receptionem dei verbi filius dei effici possit": c. 19: "hic est enim legitimus dei filius qui ex ipso deo est, qui, dum sanctum illud (Luke I. 35) assumit, sibi filium hominis annectit et illum ad se rapit atque transducit, connexionem suam et permixtionem sociatam præstat et filium illum dei facit, quod ille naturaliter non fuit (Novatian's teaching is therefore like that of the Spanish Adoptionists of the 8th century), ut principalitas nominis istius "filius dei" in spiritu sit domini, qui descendit et venit, ut sequela nominis istius in filio dei et hominis sit, et merito consequenter hic filius dei factus sit, dum non principaliter filius dei est, atque ideo dispositionem istam anhelus videns et ordinem istum sacramenti expediens non sic cuncta confundens, ut nullum vestigium distinctionis collocavit, distinctionem posuit dicendo. "Propterea et quod nascetur ex te sanctum vocabitur filius dei". Ne si distributionem istam cum libramentis suis non dispensasset, sed in confuso permixtum reliquisset, vere occasionem hæreticis contulisset, ut hominis filium qua homo est, eundem et dei et hominis filium pronuntiare deberent... Filius dei, dum filium hominis in se suscepit, consequenter illum filium dei fecit, quoniam illum filius sibi dei sociavit et iunxit, ut, dum filius hominis adhæret in nativitate filio dei, ipsa permixtionem feceraturum et mutuatum teneret, quod ex natura propria possidere non posset. Ac si facta est angeli voce, quod nolunt hæretici, inter filium dei hominisque cum sua tamen sociatione distinctio, urgendo illos, ut Christum hominis filium hominem intelligant quoque dei filium et hominem dei filium id est dei verbum deum accipiant, atque ideo

ferred to the general creed along with the necessary proofs, especially in the West, were: (1) the unity of God, (2) the identity of the supreme God and the creator of the world, that is, the identity of the mediators of creation and redemption, (3)

Christum Iesum dominum ex utroque connexum, et utroque contextum atque concretum et in eadem utriusque substantiæ concordia mutui ad invicem federis confibulatione sociatum, hominem et deum, scripturæ hoc ipsum dicentis veritate cognoscant". c. 21: "hæretici nolunt Christum secundam esse personam post patrem, sed ipsum patrem:" c. 22: "Cum Christus 'Ego' dicit (John X. 30), deinde patrem infert dicendo, 'Ego et pater', proprietatem personæ suæ id est filii a paterna auctoritate discernit atque distinguit, non tantummodo de sono nominis, sed etiam de ordine dispositæ potestatis . . . unum enim neutraliter positum, societatis concordiam, non unitatem personæ sonat. . . unum autem quod ait, ad concordiam et eandem sententiam et ad ipsam charitatis societatem pertinet, ut merito unum sit pater et filius per concordiam et per amorem et per dilectionem. Et quoniam ex patre est, quicquid illud est, filius est, manente tamen distinctione. . . denique novit hanc concordie unitatem est apostolus Paulus cum personarum tamen distinctione." (Comparison with the relationship between Paul and Apollos! "Quos personæ ratio invicem dividit, eosdem rursus invicem religionis ratio conducit; et quamvis idem atque ipsi non sint, dum idem sentiunt, ipsum sunt, et cum duo sint, unum sunt"); c. 23: "constat hominem a deo factum esse, non ex deo processisse: ex deo autem homo quomodo non processit, sic dei verbum processit". In c. 24 it is argued that Christ existed before the creation of the world and that not merely "predestinatione", for then he would be subsequent and therefore inferior to Adam, Abel, Enoch etc. "Sublata ergo prædestinatione quæ non est posita, in substantia fuit Christus ante mundi institutionem": c. 31: "Est ergo deus pater omnium institutor et creator, solus originem nesciens(!), invisibilis, immensus, immortalis, æternus, unus deus(!). . . ex quo quando ipse voluit, sermo filius natus est, qui non in sono percussi aëris aut tono coactæ de visceribus vocis accipitur, sed in substantia prolata a deo virtutis agnoscitur, cuius sacræ et divinæ nativitatis arcana nec apostolus didicit. . . , filio soli nota sunt, qui patris secreta cognovit. Ille ergo cum sit genitus a patre, semper est in patre. Semper autem sic dico, ut non innatum, sed natum probem: sed qui ante omne tempus est, semper in patre fuisse descendus est, nec enim tempus illi assignari potest, qui ante tempus est: semper enim in patre, ne pater non semper sit pater: quia et pater illum etiam præcedit, quod necesse est, prior sit qua pater sit. Quoniam antecedit necesse est eum, qui habet originem, ille qui originem nescit. Simul ut hic minor sit, dum in illo esse se scit habens originem quia nascitur, et per patrem quamvis originem habet qua nascitur, vicinus in nativitate, dum ex eo patre, qui solus originem non habet, nascitur. . . , substantia scilicet divina, cuius nomen est verbum. . . , deus utique procedens ex deo secundam personam efficiens, sed non eripiens illud patri quod unus est deus. . . Cuius sic divinitas traditur, ut non aut dissonantia aut inæqualitate divinitatis duos deos reddidisse videatur. . . Dum huic, qui est deus, omnia substrata traduntur et cuncta sibi subiecta filius accepta refert patri, totam divinitatis auctoritatem rursus patri remittit, unus deus ostenditur verus et æternus pater, a quo solo hæc vis divinitatis emissa, etiam in filium tradita et directa rursus per substantiæ communionem ad patrem revolvitur."

the identity of the supreme God with the God of the Old Testament, and the declaration that the Old Testament is God's book of revelation, (4) the creation of the world out of nothing, (5) the unity of the human race, (6) the origin of evil from freedom, and the inalienable nature of freedom, (7) the two Testaments, (8) Christ as God and Man, the unity of his personality, the truth of his divinity, the actuality of his humanity, the reality of his fate. (9) the redemption and conclusion of a covenant through Christ as the new and crowning manifestation of God's grace to all men, (10) the resurrection of man in soul and body. But the transmission and interpretation of these propositions, by means of which the Gnostic theses were overthrown, necessarily involved the transmission of the Logos doctrine; for the doctrine of the revelation of God and of the two Testaments could not have prevailed without this theory. How this hypothesis gained acceptance in the course of the third century, and how it was the means of establishing and legitimising philosophical theology as part of the faith, will be shown in the seventh chapter. We may remark in conclusion that the religious hope which looked forward to an earthly kingdom of Christ was still the more widely diffused among the Churches of the third century;¹ but that the other hope, viz., that of being deified, was gaining adherents more and more. The latter result was due to men's increasing indifference to daily life and growing aspiration after a higher one, a longing that was moreover nourished among the more cultured by the philosophy which was steadily gaining ground. The hope of deification is the expression of the idea that this world and human nature do not correspond to that exalted world which man has built up within his own mind and which he may reasonably demand to be realised, because it is only in it that he can come to himself. The fact that Christian teachers like Theophilus, Irenæus, and Hippolytus expressly declared this to be a legitimate Christian hope and held out a sure prospect of its fulfilment

¹ If I am not mistaken, the production or adaptation of Apocalypses did indeed abate in the third century, but acquired fresh vigour in the 4th, though at the same time allowing greater scope to the influence of heathen literature (including romances as well as hagiographical literature).

through Christ, must have given the greatest impulse to the spread and adoption of this ecclesiastical Christianity. But, when the Christian religion was represented as the belief in the incarnation of God and as the sure hope of the deification of man, a speculation that had originally never got beyond the fringe of religious knowledge was made the central point of the system and the simple content of the Gospel was obscured.¹

¹ I did not care to appeal more frequently to the Sibylline oracles either in this or the preceding chapter, because the literary and historical investigation of these writings has not yet made such progress as to justify one in using it for the history of dogma. It is well known that the oracles contain rich materials in regard to the doctrine of God, Christology, conceptions of the history of Jesus, and eschatology; but, apart from the old Jewish oracles, this material belongs to several centuries and has not yet been reliably sifted.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL TRADITION INTO A PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION, OR THE ORIGIN OF THE SCIENTIFIC THEOL- OGY AND DOGMATIC OF THE CHURCH.

Clement and Origen.

THE Alexandrian school of catechists was of inestimable importance for the transformation of the heathen empire into a Christian one, and of Greek philosophy into ecclesiastical philosophy. In the third century this school overthrew polytheism by scientific means whilst at the same time preserving everything of any value in Greek science and culture. These Alexandrians wrote for the educated people of the whole earth; they made Christianity a part of the civilisation of the world. The saying that the Christian missionary to the Greeks must be a Greek was first completely verified within the Catholic Church in the person of Origen, who at the same time produced the only system of Christian dogma possessed by the Greek Church before John Damascenus.

1. *The Alexandrian Catechetical School. Clement of Alexandria.*¹

“The work of Irenæus still leaves it undecided whether the form of the world’s literature, as found in the Christian Church,

¹ Guericke, *De schola, quæ Alex. floruit catechetica* 1824, 1825. Vacherot, *Hist. crit. de l'école d'Alex.*, 1846—51. Reinkens, *De Clemente Alex.*, 1850. Redepenning, *Origenes Thl. I.* p. 57 ff. Læmmer, *Clem. Al. de Logos doctrina*, 1855. Reuter, *Clem. theolog. moralis*, 1853. Cognat, *Clement d'Alex.* Paris, 1859. Westcott, *Origen*

is destined only to remain a weapon to combat its enemies, or is to become an instrument of peaceful labour within its own territory." With these words Overbeck has introduced his examination of Clement of Alexandria's great masterpiece from the standpoint of the historian of literature. They may be also applied to the history of theology. As we have shown, Irenæus, Tertullian (and Hippolytus) made use of philosophical theology to expel heretical elements; but all the theological expositions that this interest suggested to them as necessary, were in their view part of the faith itself. At least we find in their works absolutely no clear expression of the fact that faith is one thing and theology another, though rudimentary indications of such distinctions are found. Moreover, their adherence to the early-Christian eschatology in its entirety, as well as their rejection of a qualitative distinction between simple believers and 'Gnostics', proved that they themselves were deceived as to the scope of their theological speculations, and that moreover their Christian interest was virtually satisfied with subjection to the authority of tradition, with the early-Christian hopes, and with the rules for a holy life. But since about the time of Commodus, and in some cases even earlier, we can observe, even in ecclesiastical circles, the

and the beginnings of Christian Philosophy (Contemporary Review, May 1879). Winter, *Die Ethik des Clemens von Alex.*, 1882. Merk, *Cl. Alex. in seiner Abhängigkeit von der griech. Philosophie*, Leipzig, 1879 (see besides Overbeck, *Theol. Lit. Ztg.*, 1879, No. 20 and cf. above all his disquisitions in the treatise "Ueber die Anfänge der patristischen Litteratur." *Hist. Ztschr. N. F.*, Vol. XII., pp. 455—472 Zahn, *Forschungen*, Vol. III. Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alexandria*, Oxford, 1886. Kremmer, *De catal. heurematum*, Lips. 1890. Wendland, *Quæst. Musonianæ*, Berol. 1886. Bratke, *Die Stellung des Clem. Alex. z. antiken Mysterienwesen* (*Stud. u. Krit.* 1888, p. 647 ff.). On Alexander of Jerusalem see Routh, *Reliq. Sacr. T.* II. p. 161 sq.; on Julius Africanus see Gelzer, *Sextus Jul. Afr. I. Thl.*, 1880, p. 1 ff. Spitta, *Der Brief des Jul. Afr. an Aristides*, Halle 1877, and my article in the *Real-Encykl.* On Bardesanes see Hilgenfeld, *B., der letzte Gnostiker*, 1864, and Hort's article in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography*. On the labours in scientific theology on the part of the so-called Alogi in Asia Minor and of the Roman Theodotianists see *Epiph. hæ.* 51, Euseb., *H. E.* V. 28 and my article "Monarchianismus" in the *R.-Encykl. f. protest. Theol.* 2nd. ed., Vol. X., pp. 183 ff., 188 ff. On the tendencies even of orthodox Christians to scientific theology see Tertull., *de præser. hæ.* 8 ff. (cf. the first words of c. 8: "Venio itaque ad illum articulum, quem et nostri prætendunt ad incundam curiositatem. Scriptum est, inquit, Quærite et inveniatis" etc.).

growing independence and might of the aspiration for a scientific knowledge and treatment of the Christian religion, that is of Christian tradition.¹ There is a wish to maintain this tradition in its entirety and hence the Gnostic theses are rejected. The selection from tradition, made in opposition to Gnosticism—though indeed in accordance with its methods—and declared to be apostolic, is accepted. But there is a desire to treat the given material in a strictly scientific manner, just as the Gnostics had formerly done, that is, on the one hand to establish it by a critical and historical exegesis, and on the other to give it a philosophical form and bring it into harmony with the spirit of the times. Along with this we also find the wish to incorporate the thoughts of Paul which now possessed divine authority.² Accordingly schools and scholastic unions now make their appearance afresh, the old schools having been expelled from the Church.³ In Asia Minor such efforts had already begun shortly before the time when the canon of holy apostolic tradition was fixed by the ecclesiastical authorities (Alogi). From the history of Clement of Alexandria, the life of bishop Alexander, afterwards bishop of Jerusalem, and subsequently from the history of Origen (we may also mention Firmilian of Cæsarea), we learn that there was in Cappadocia about the year 200 a circle of ecclesiastics who zealously applied themselves to scientific pursuits. Bardesanes, a man of high repute, laboured in the Christian kingdom of Edessa about the same time. He wrote treatises on philosophical theology, which indeed, judged by a Western standard, could not be accounted orthodox, and directed a theological school which maintained its ground in the third

¹ This manner of expression is indeed liable to be misunderstood, because it suggests the idea that something new was taking place. As a matter of fact the scientific labours in the Church were merely a continuation of the Gnostic schools under altered circumstances, that is, under the sway of a tradition which was now more clearly defined and more firmly fenced round as a *noli me tangere*.

² This was begun in the Church by Irenæus and Tertullian and continued by the Alexandrians. They, however, not only adopted theologoumena from Paulinism, but also acquired from Paul a more ardent feeling of religious freedom as well as a deeper reverence for love and knowledge as contrasted with lower morality.

³ We are not able to form a clear idea of the school of Justin. In the year 180 the schools of the Valentinians, Carpocratians, Tatian etc. were all outside the Church.

century and attained great importance.¹ In Palestine, during the time of Heliogabalus and Alexander (Severus), Julius Africanus composed a series of books on scientific theology, which were specifically different from the writings of Irenæus and Tertullian; but which on the other hand show the closest relationship in point of form to the treatises of the so-called Gnostics. His inquiries into the relationship of the genealogies of Jesus and into certain parts of the Greek Apocalypse of Daniel showed that the Church's attention had been drawn to problems of historical criticism. In his chronography the apologetic interest is subordinate to the historical, and in his *Κεττιβί*, dedicated to Alexander Severus (Hippolytus had already dedicated a treatise on the resurrection to the wife of Heliogabalus), we see fewer traces of the Christian than of the Greek scholar. Alexander of Ælia and Theoktistus of Cæsarea, the occupants of the two most important sees in Palestine, were, contemporaneously with him, zealous patrons of an independent science of theology. Even at that early time the former founded an important theological library; and the fragments of his letters preserved to us prove that he had caught not only the language, but also the scientific spirit of the age. In Rome, at the beginning of the third century, there was a scientific school where textual criticism of the Bible was pursued and where the works of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Euclid, and Galen were zealously read and utilised. Finally, the works of Tertullian show us that, even among the Christians of Carthage, there was no lack of such as wished to naturalise the pursuit of science within the Church; and Eusebius (H. E. V. 27) has transmitted to us the titles of a series of scientific works dating as far back as the year 200 and ascribed to ecclesiastics of that period.

Whilst all these phenomena, which collectively belong to the close of the second and beginning of the third century, show

¹ On the school of Edessa see Assemani, *Bibl. orient.*, T. III., P. II., p. 924; Von Lengerke, *De Ephraemi arte hermen.*, p. 86 sq.; Kihn, *Die Bedeutung der antiochenischen Schule* etc., pp. 32 f. 79 f., Zahn, *Tatian's Diatessaron*, p. 54. About the middle of the 3rd century Macarius, of whom Lucian the Martyr was a disciple, taught at this school. Special attention was given to the exegesis of the Holy Scriptures.

that it was indeed possible to suppress heresy in the Church, but not the impulse from which it sprang, the most striking proof of this conclusion is the existence of the so-called school of catechists in Alexandria. We cannot now trace the origin of this school, which first comes under our notice in the year 190,¹ but we know that the struggle of the Church with heresy was concluded in Alexandria at a later period than in the West. We know further that the school of catechists extended its labours to Palestine and Cappadocia as early as the year 200, and, to all appearance, originated or encouraged scientific pursuits there.² Finally, we know that the existence of this school was threatened in the fourth decade of the third century; but Heraclas was shrewd enough to reconcile the ecclesiastical and scientific interests.³ In the Alexandrian school of catechists the whole of Greek science was taught and made to serve the purpose of Christian apologetics. Its first teacher, who is well known to us from the writings he has left, is *Clement of Alexandria*.⁴ His main work is epoch-making. "Clement's intention is nothing

¹ Overbeck, l.c. p. 455, has very rightly remarked: "The origin of the Alexandrian school of catechists is not a portion of the Church history of the 2nd century, that has somehow been left in the dark by a mere accident; but a part of the well-defined dark region on the map of the ecclesiastical historian of this period, which contains the beginnings of all the fundamental institutions of the Church as well as those of the Alexandrian school of catechists, a school which was the first attempt to formulate the relationship of Christianity to secular science." We are, moreover, still in a state of complete uncertainty as to the personality and teaching of Pantænus (with regard to him see Zahn, "Forschungen" Vol. III. pp. 64 ff. 77 ff.). We can form an idea of the school of catechists from the 6th Book of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History and from the works of Clement and Origen.

² On the connection of Julius Africanus with this school see Eusebius, VI. 31. As to his relations with Origen see the correspondence. Julius Africanus had, moreover, relations with Edessa. He mentions Clement in his chronicles. On the connection of Alexander and the Cappadocian circle with Pantænus, Clement, and Origen, see the 6th Book of Eusebius' Ecclesiastical History. Alexander and Origen were disciples of Pantænus.

³ See my article "Heraklas" in the Real-Encyclopädie.

⁴ We have the most complete materials in Zahn, "Forschungen" Vol. III. pp. 17—176. The best estimate of the great tripartite work (Protrepticus, Pædagogus, Stromateis) is found in Overbeck, l.c. The titles of Clement's remaining works, which are lost to us or only preserved in fragments, show how comprehensive his scientific labours were.

less than an introduction to Christianity, or, speaking more correctly and in accordance with the spirit of his work, an initiation into it. The task that Clement sets himself is an introduction to what is inmost and highest in Christianity itself. He aims, so to speak, at first making Christians perfect Christians by means of a work of literature. By means of such a work he wished not merely to repeat to the Christian what life has already done for him as it is, but to elevate him to something still higher than what has been revealed to him by the forms of initiation that the Church has created for herself in the course of a history already dating back a century and a half." To Clement therefore Gnosis, that is, the (Greek) philosophy of religion, is not only a means of refuting heathenism and heresy, but at the same time of ascertaining and setting forth what is highest and inmost in Christianity. He views it as such, however, because, apart from evangelical sayings, the Church tradition, both collectively and in its details, is something foreign to him; he has subjected himself to its authority, but he can only make it intellectually his own after subjecting it to a scientific and philosophical treatment.¹ His great work, which has rightly been called the boldest literary undertaking in the history of the Church,² is consequently the first attempt to use Holy Scripture and the Church tradition together with the assumption that Christ as the Reason of the world is the source of all truth, as the basis of a presentation of Christianity which at once addresses itself to the cultured by satisfying the scientific demand for a philosophical ethic and theory of the world, and at the same time reveals to the believer the rich content of his faith. Here then is found, in form and content, the scientific Christian doctrine of religion which, while not contradicting the faith, does

¹ This applies quite as much to the old principles of Christian morality as to the traditional faith. With respect to the first we may refer to the treatise: "Quis dives salvetur", and to the 2nd and 3rd Books of the *Pædagogus*.

² Clement was also conscious of the novelty of his undertaking: see Overbeck, *loc. cit.*, p. 464 f. The respect enjoyed by Clement as a master is shown by the letters of Alexander of Jerusalem. See Euseb., *H. E.* VI. 11 and specially VI. 14. Here both Pantenus and Clement are called "Father", but whilst the former receives the title. *ὁ μακάριος ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ κύριος*, the latter is called: *ὁ ἱερός Κλήμης, κύριος μου γενόμενος καὶ ὠφελήσας με*.

not merely support or explain it in a few places, but raises it to another and higher intellectual sphere, namely, out of the province of authority and obedience into that of clear knowledge and inward, intellectual assent emanating from love to God.¹ Clement cannot imagine that the Christian faith, as found in tradition, can of itself produce the union of intellectual independence and devotion to God which he regards as moral perfection. He is too much of a Greek philosopher for that, and believes that this aim is only reached through knowledge. But in so far as this is only the deciphering of the secrets revealed in the Holy Scriptures through the Logos, secrets which the believer also gains possession of by subjecting himself to them, all knowledge is a reflection of the divine revelation. The lofty ethical and religious ideal of the man made perfect in fellowship with God, which Greek philosophy had developed since the time of Plato and to which it had subordinated the whole scientific knowledge of the world, was adopted and heightened by Clement, and associated not only with Jesus Christ but also with ecclesiastical Christianity. But, whilst connecting it with the Church tradition, he did not shrink from the boldest remodelling of the latter, because the preservation of its wording was to him a sufficient guarantee of the Christian character of the speculation.²

In Clement, then, ecclesiastical Christianity reached the stage that Judaism had attained in Philo, and no doubt the latter

¹ Strom. VI. 14. 109: πλέον ἐστὶν τοῦ πιστεῦσαι τὸ γινῶναι. Pistis is γινῶσις σύντομος τῶν κατεπειγόντων (VII. 10. 57, see the whole chapter), Gnosis is ἀποδείξις τῶν διὰ πίστεως παρειλημμένων τῇ πίστει ἐποικοδομουμένη (l.c.), τελείωσις ἀνθρώπου (l.c.), πίστις ἐπιστημονική (II. 11. 48).

² We have here more particularly to consider those paragraphs of the Stromateis where Clement describes the perfect Gnostic: the latter elevates himself by dispassionate love to God, is raised above everything earthly, has rid himself of ignorance, the root of all evil, and already lives a life like that of the angels. See Strom. VI. 9. 71, 72: Οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐνδεῖ τι αὐτῷ πρὸς ἐξομοίωσιν τῷ καλῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι· οὐδὲ ἄρα φιλεῖ τινὰ τὴν κοινὴν ταύτην φιλεῖν, ἀλλ' ἀγαπᾷ τὸν κτίστην διὰ τῶν κτισμάτων. Οὐτ' οὖν ἐπιθυμῶ καὶ ὀρέξει τινὶ περιπίπτει οὔτε ἐνδεής ἐστι κατὰ γε τὴν ψυχὴν τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς συνῶν ἢ δὴ δι' ἀγάπης τῷ ἔραστῷ, ᾧ δὴ ἀκείωται κατὰ τὴν αἴρεσιν καὶ τῇ ἐξ ἀσκήσεως ἕξει, τούτῳ προτεχέστερον συνεγγίζων, μακάριος ὢν διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν περιουσίαν, ὥστε ἕνεκά γε τούτων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι βιάζεται τῷ διδασκάλῳ εἰς ἀπαθείαν. Strom. VII. 69—83; VI. 14, 113: οὕτως δύναμιν λαβοῦσα κυριακὴν ἢ ψυχὴ μελετᾷ εἶναι Θεός, κακὸν μὲν οὐδὲν ἄλλο πλὴν ἀγνοίας εἶναι νομίζουσα. The whole 7th Book should be read.

exercised great influence over him.¹ Moreover, Clement stands on the ground that Justin had already trodden, but he has advanced far beyond this Apologist. His superiority to Justin not only consists in the fact that he changed the apologetic task that the latter had in his mind into a systematic and positive one; but above all in the circumstance that he transformed the tradition of the Christian Church, which in his days was far more extensive and more firmly established than in Justin's time, into a real scientific dogmatic; whereas Justin neutralised the greater part of this tradition by including it in the scheme of the proof from prophecy. By elevating the idea of the Logos who is Christ into the highest principle in the religious explanation of the world and in the exposition of Christianity, Clement gave to this idea a much more concrete and copious content than Justin did. Christianity is the doctrine of the creation, training, and redemption of mankind by the Logos, whose work culminates in the perfect Gnostics. The philosophy of the Greeks, in so far as it possessed the Logos, is declared to be a counterpart of the Old Testament law;² and the facts contained in the Church tradition are either subordinated to the philosophical dogmatic or receive a new interpretation expressly suited to it. The idea of the Logos has a content which is on the one hand so wide that he is found wherever man rises above the level of nature, and on the other so concrete that an authentic knowledge of him can only be obtained from historical revelation. The Logos is essentially the rational law of the world and the teacher; but in Christ he is at the same time officiating priest, and the blessings he bestows are a series of holy initiations which

¹ Philo is quoted by Clement several times and still more frequently made use of without acknowledgment. See the copious citations in Siegfried, *Philo von Alexandrien*. pp. 343—351. In addition to this Clement made use of many Greek philosophers or quoted them without acknowledgment. e.g., Musonius.

² Like Philo and Justin, Clement also no doubt at times asserts that the Greek philosophers pilfered from the Old Testament; but see Strom. I, 5. 28 sq.: πάντων μὲν ἄτιτος τῶν καλῶν ὁ Θεός, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατὰ προηγούμενον ὡς τῆς τε διαβήκης τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νεᾶς, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἐπακολουθίαν ὡς τῆς φιλοσοφίας. τάχα δὲ καὶ προηγουμένως τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐδόθη τότε πρὶν ἢ τὸν κύριον καλέσαι καὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας. ἐπαιδαγωγῶν γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἑβραίους εἰς Χριστόν.

alone contain the possibility of man's raising himself to the divine life.¹ While this is already clear evidence of Clement's affinity to Gnostic teachers, especially the Valentinians, the same similarity may also be traced in the whole conception of the task (Christianity as theology), in the determination of the formal principle (inclusive of the recourse to esoteric tradition; see above, p. 35 f.),² and in the solution of the problems. But Clement's great superiority to Valentinus is shown not only in his contriving to preserve in all points his connection with the faith of the main body of Christendom, but still more in his power of mastering so many problems by the aid of a single principle, that is, in the art of giving the most comprehensive presentation with the most insignificant means. Both facts are indeed most closely connected. The rejection of all conceptions that could not be verified from Holy Scripture, or at least easily reconciled with it, as well as his optimism, opposed as this was to Gnostic pessimism, proved perhaps the most effective means of persuading the Church to recognise the Christian character of a dogmatic that was at least half inimical to ecclesiastical Christianity. Through

¹ See Bratke's instructive treatise cited above.

² The fact that Clement appeals in support of the Gnosis to an esoteric tradition (Strom. VI. 7. 61: VI. 8. 68: VII. 10. 55) proves how much this writer, belonging as he did to a sceptical age, underestimated the efficacy of all human thought in determining the ultimate truth of things. The existence of sacred writings containing all truth was not even enough for him; the content of these writings had also to be guaranteed by divine communication. But no doubt the ultimate cause of this, as of all similar cases of scepticism, was the dim perception that ethics and religion do not at all come within the sphere of the intellectual, and that the intellect can produce nothing of religious value. As, however, in consequence of philosophical tradition, neither Philo, nor the Gnostics, nor Clement, nor the Neoplatonists were able to shake themselves free from the intellectual *scheme*, those things which—as they instinctively felt, but did not recognise—could really not be ascertained by knowledge at all received from them the name of *suprational* and were traced to divine revelation. We may say that the extinction or pernicious extravagancies to which Greek philosophy was subjected in Neoplatonism, and the absurdities into which the Christian dogmatic was led, arose from the fact that the tradition of placing the ethical and religious feelings and the development of character within the sphere of knowledge, as had been the case for nearly a thousand years, could not be got rid of, though the incongruity was no doubt felt. Contempt for empiricism, scepticism, the extravagancies of religious metaphysics which finally become mythology, have their origin here. Knowledge still continues to be viewed as the highest possession: it is, however, no longer knowledge, but character and feeling; and it must be nourished by the fancy in order to be able to assert itself as knowledge.

Clement theology became the crowning stage of piety, the highest philosophy of the Greeks was placed under the protection and guarantee of the Church, and the whole Hellenic civilisation was thus at the same time legitimised within Christianity. The Logos is Christ, but the Logos is at the same time the moral and rational in all stages of development. The Logos is the teacher, not only in cases where an intelligent self-restraint, as understood by the ancients, bridles the passions and instincts and wards off excesses of all sorts; but also, and here of course the revelation is of a higher kind, wherever love to God alone determines the whole life and exalts man above everything sensuous and finite.¹ What Gnostic moralists merely regarded as contrasts Clement, the Christian and Greek, was able to view as stages; and thus he succeeded in conceiving the motley society that already represented the Church of his time as a unity, as the humanity trained by one and the same Logos, the Pedagogue. His speculation did not drive him out of the Church; it rather enabled him to understand the multiplicity of forms she contained and to estimate their relative justification; nay, it finally led him to include the history of pre-Christian humanity in the system he regarded as a unity, and to form a theory of universal history satisfactory to his mind.² If we compare this theory with the

¹ Clement was not a Neoplatonic mystic in the strict sense of the word. When he describes the highest ethical ideal, ecstasy is wanting; and the freshness with which he describes Quietism shows that he himself was no Quietist. See on this point Bigg's third lecture, l.c., particularly p. 98 f. "... The silent prayer of the Quietist is in fact ecstasy, of which there is not a trace in Clement. For Clement shrank from his own conclusions. Though the father of all the Mystics he is no Mystic himself. He did not enter the "enchanted garden", which he opened for others. If he talks of "slaying the sacrifice", of leaving sense behind, of *Epopeteia*, this is but the parlance of his school. The instrument to which he looks for growth in knowledge is not trance, but disciplined reason. Hence Gnosis, when once obtained, is indefectible, not like the rapture which Plotinus enjoyed but four times during his acquaintance with Porphyry, which in the experience of Theresa never lasted more than half an hour. The Gnostic is no Visionary, no Theurgist, no Antinomian."

² What a bold and joyous thinker Clement was is shown by the almost audacious remark in *Strom.* IV. 22. 136: *εἰ γοῦν τις κατ' ὑπόθεσιν προβείη τῷ γνωστικῷ πότερον ἐλέσθαι βούλοιο τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἢ τὴν σωτηρίαν τὴν αἰώνιαν, εἴη δὲ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐν ταυτότητε ὄντα, οὐδὲ κατ' ὀτιοῦν διστάτας ἔλοιτ' ἄν τὴν γνῶσιν τοῦ Θεοῦ.*

rudimentary ideas of a similar kind in Irenæus, we see clearly the meagreness and want of freedom, the uncertainty and narrowness, in the case of the latter. In the Christian faith as he understood it and as amalgamated by him with Greek culture, Clement found intellectual freedom and independence, deliverance from all external authority. We need not here directly discuss what apparatus he used for this end. Irenæus again remained entangled in his apparatus, and much as he speaks of the *novum testamentum libertatis*, his great work little conveys the impression that its author has really attained intellectual freedom. Clement was the first to grasp the task of future theology. According to him this task consists in utilising the historical traditions, through which we have become what we are, and the Christian communion, which is imperative upon us as being the only moral and religious one, in order to attain freedom and independence of our own life by the aid of the Gospel; and in showing this Gospel to be the highest revelation by the Logos, who has given evidence of himself whenever man rises above the level of nature and who is consequently to be traced throughout the whole history of humanity.

But does the Christianity of Clement correspond to the Gospel? We can only give a qualified affirmation to this question. For the danger of secularisation is evident, since apostasy from the Gospel would be completely accomplished as soon as the ideal of the self-sufficient Greek sage came to supplant the feeling that man lives by the grace of God. But the danger of secularisation lies in the cramped conception of Irenæus, who sets up authorities which have nothing to do with the Gospel, and creates facts of salvation which have a no less deadening effect though in a different way. If the Gospel is meant to give freedom and peace in God, and to accustom us to an eternal life in union with Christ Clement understood this meaning. He could justly say to his opponents: "If the things we say appear to some people diverse from the Scriptures of the Lord, let them know that they draw inspiration and life therefrom and, making these their starting-point give their meaning only, not their letter" (καὶ ἑτέρωθεν τῶν πολλῶν καταφύνηται τὰ ὑφ' ἡμῶν λεγόμενα τῶν κυριακῶν γραφῶν, ἰστέον ὅτι ἐκείθεν ἀναπνεῖ τε καὶ ζῆ καὶ τὰς

ἀΦορμὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἔχοντα τὸν νοῦν μόνου, οὐ τὴν λέξιν, περιστάξιν ἐπαγγελῆτέα).¹ No doubt Clement conceives the aim of the whole traditionary material to be that of Greek philosophy, but we cannot fail to perceive that this aim is blended with the object which the Gospel puts before us, namely, to be rich in God and to receive strength and life from him. The goodness of God and the responsibility of man are the central ideas of Clement and the Alexandrians; they also occupy the foremost place in the Gospel of Jesus Christ. If this is certain we must avoid that searching of the heart which undertakes to fix how far he was influenced by the Gospel and how far by philosophy.

But, while so judging, we cannot deny that the Church tradition was here completely transformed into a Greek philosophy of religion on a historical basis, nor do we certify the Christian character of Clement's "dogmas" in acknowledging the evangelical spirit of his practical position. What would be left of Christianity, if the practical aim, given by Clement to this religious philosophy, were lost? A depotentiated system which could absolutely no longer be called Christian. On the other hand there were many valuable features in the ecclesiastical *regula* literally interpreted; and the attempts of Irenæus to extract an authoritative religious meaning from the literal sense of Church tradition and of New Testament passages must be regarded as conservative efforts of the most valuable kind. No doubt Irenæus and his theological *confrères* did not themselves find in Christianity that freedom which is its highest aim; but on the other hand they preserved and rescued valuable material for succeeding times. If some day trust in the methods of religious philosophy vanishes, men will revert to history, which will still be recognisable in the preserved tradition, as prized by Irenæus and the rest, whereas it will have almost perished in the artificial interpretations due to the speculations of religious philosophers.

The importance that the Alexandrian school was to attain in

¹ Strom. VII. 1. 1. In several passages of his main work Clement refers to those churchmen who viewed the practical and speculative concentration of Church tradition as dangerous and questioned the use of philosophy at all. See Strom. VI. 10. 80: πολλοὶ καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες τὰ μωρμουκεῖα, οὕτως δεδίασι τὴν ἐλληνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, φοβούμενοι μὴ ἀπαγάγη αὐτούς. VI. 11. 93.

the history of dogma is not associated with Clement, but with his disciple Origen.¹ This was not because Clement was more heterodox than Origen, for that is not the case, so far as the *Stromateis* is concerned at least;² but because the latter exerted an incomparably greater influence than the former; and, with an energy perhaps unexampled in the history of the Church, already mapped out all the provinces of theology by his own unaided efforts. Another reason is that Clement did not possess the Church tradition in its fixed Catholic forms as Origen did (see above, chapter 2), and, as his *Stromateis* shows, he was as yet incapable of forming a theological system. What he offers is portions of a theological Christian dogmatic and speculative ethic. These indeed are no fragments in so far as they are all produced according to a definite method and have the same object in view, but they still want unity. On the other hand Origen succeeded in forming a complete system inasmuch as he not only had a Catholic tradition of fixed limits and definite type to fall back upon as a basis; but was also enabled by the previous efforts of Clement to furnish a methodical treatment of this tradition.³ Now a sharp eye indeed perceives that Origen

¹ Eusebius, *ll. E. VI. 14. 8*, tells us that Origen was a disciple of Clement.

² Clement's authority in the Church continued much longer than that of Origen. See Zahn, "*Forschungen*" III. p. 140 f. The heterodox opinions advanced by Clement in the *Hypotyposes* are for the most part only known to us in an exaggerated form from the report of Photius.

³ In ecclesiastical antiquity all systematising was merely relative and limited, because the complex of sacred writings enjoyed a different authority from that which it possessed in the following period. Here the reference of a theologoumenon to a passage of Scripture was of itself sufficient, and the manifold and incongruous doctrines were felt as a unity in so far as they could all be verified from Holy Scriptures. Thus the fact that the Holy Scriptures were regarded as a series of divine oracles guaranteed, as it were, a transcendental unity of the doctrines, and, in certain circumstances, relieved the framer of the system of a great part of his task. Hitherto little justice has been done to this view of the history of dogma, though it is the only solution of a series of otherwise insoluble problems. We cannot for example understand the theology of Augustine, and necessarily create for ourselves the most difficult problems by our own fault, if we make no use of that theory. In Origen's dogmatic and that of subsequent Church Fathers—so far as we can speak of a dogmatic in their case—the unity lies partly in the canon of Holy Scripture and partly in the ultimate aim; but these two principles interfere with each other. As far as the *Stromateis* of Clement is concerned, Overbeek (l.c.) has furnished the explanation of its striking plan. Moreover, how

personally no longer possessed such a complete and bold religious theory of the world as Clement did, for he was already more tightly fettered by the Church tradition, some details of which here and there led him into compromises that remind us of Irenæus; but it was in connection with his work that the development of the following period took place. It is therefore sufficient, within the framework of the history of dogma, to refer to Clement as the bold forerunner of Origen, and, in setting forth the theology of the latter, to compare it in important points with the doctrines of Clement.

2. *The system of Origen.*¹

Among the theologians of ecclesiastical antiquity Origen was the most important and influential alongside of Augustine. He proved the father of ecclesiastical science in the widest sense of the word, and at the same time became the founder of that theology which reached its complete development in the fourth and fifth centuries, and which in the sixth definitely denied its author, without, however, losing the form he had impressed on it. Origen created the ecclesiastical dogmatic and made the sources of the Jewish and Christian religion the foundation of that science. The Apologists, in their day, had found everything clear in Christianity; the antignostic Fathers had confused the Church's faith and the science that treats of it. Origen recognised the problem and the problems, and elevated the pursuit of Christian theology to the rank of an independent task by freeing it from its polemical aim. He could not have become would it have been conceivable that the riches of Holy Scripture, as presented to the philosophers who allegorised the books, could have been mastered, problems and all, at the first attempt.

¹ See the treatises of Huëtius (1668) reprinted by Lommatzsch. Thomasius, *Origenes* 1837. Redepemning, *Origenes*, 2 Vols. 1841—46. Denis, *de la philosophie d'Origène*, Paris 1884. Lang, *Die Leiblichkeit der Vernunftwesen bei Origenes*, Leipzig, 1892. Mehlhorn, *Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes* (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.). Westcott, *Origenes*, in the *Dictionary of Christian Biography* Vol. IV. Möller in *Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie*, 2nd ed., Vol. XI., pp. 92—109. The special literature is to be found there as well as in Nitzsch, *Dogmengeschichte* I., p. 151, and Ueberweg, *Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie*, 5th ed., p. 62 f.

what he did, if two generations had not preceded him in paving the way to form a mental conception of Christianity and give it a philosophical foundation. Like all epoch-making personalities, he was also favoured by the conditions in which he lived, though he had to endure violent attacks. Born of a Christian family which was faithfully attached to the Church, he lived at a time when the Christian communities enjoyed almost uninterrupted peace and were being naturalised in the world; he was a member of a Christian Church where the right of scientific study was already recognised and where this had attained a fixed position in an organised school.¹ He proclaimed the reconciliation of science with the Christian faith and the compatibility of the highest culture with the Gospel within the bosom of the Church, thus contributing more than any other to convert the ancient world to Christianity. But he made no compromises from shrewd calculation: it was his inmost and holiest conviction that the sacred documents of Christianity contained all the ideals of antiquity, and that the speculative conception of ecclesiastical Christianity was the only true and right one. His character was pure, his life blameless; in his work he was not only unwearied, but also unselfish. There have been few Fathers of the Church whose life-story leaves such an impression of purity behind it as that of Origen. The atmosphere which he breathed as a Christian and as a philosopher was dangerous; but his mind remained sound, and even his feeling for truth scarcely ever forsook him.²

¹ See his letter in Eusebius, H. E. VI. 19, 11 ff.

² In the polemic against Celsus it seems to us in not a few passages as if the feeling for truth had forsaken him. If we consider, however, that in Origen's idea the premises of his speculation were unassailable, and if we further consider into what straits he was driven by Celsus, we will conclude that no proof has been advanced of Origen's having sinned against the current rules of truth. These, however, did not include the commandment to use in disputation only such arguments as could be employed in a positive doctrinal presentation. Basilus (Ep. 210 ad prim. Neocæes) was quite ready to excuse an utterance of Gregory Thaumaturgus, that sounded suspiciously like Sabellianism, by saying that the latter was not speaking *δογματικῶς*, but *ἀγωνιστικῶς*. Jerome also (ad Pammach. ep. 48, c. 13), after defending the right of writing *γυμναστικῶς*, expressly said that all Greek philosophers "have used many words to conceal their thoughts, threaten in one place, and deal the blow in another." In the same way, according to him, Origen, Methodius, Eusebius, and Apollinaris had acted in the dispute with Celsus and

To us his theory of the world, surveyed in its details, presents various changing hues, like that of Philo, and at the present day we can scarcely any longer understand how he was able to unite the different materials; but, considering the solidity of his character and the confidence of his decisions, we cannot doubt that he himself felt the agreement of all essential parts of his system. No doubt he spoke in one way to the perfect and in another to the mass of Christian people. The narrow-minded or the immature will at all times necessarily consider such proceedings hypocrisy, but the outcome of his religious and scientific conception of the world required the twofold language. Orthodox theology of all creeds has never yet advanced beyond the circle first mapped out by his mind. She has suspected and corrected her founder, she has thought she could lop off his heterodox opinions as if they were accidental excrescences, she has incorporated with the simple faith itself the measure of speculation she was obliged to admit, and continued to give the rule of faith a more philosophic form, fragment by fragment, in order that she might thus be able to remove the gap between Faith and Gnosis and to banish free theology through the formula of ecclesiastical dogma. But it may reasonably be questioned whether all this is progress, and it is well worth investigating whether the gap between half theological, clerical Christianity and a lay Christianity held in tutelage is more endurable than that between Gnosis and Pistis, which Origen preserved and bridged over.

The Christian system of Origen¹ is worked out in opposition to the systems of the Greek philosophers and of the Christian Gnostics. It is moreover opposed to the ecclesiastical enemies of science, the Christian Unitarians, and the Jews.² But the Porphyry. "Because they are sometimes compelled to say, not what they themselves think, but what is necessary for their purpose: they do this only in the struggle with the heathen"

¹ See, above all, the systematic main work "*περὶ ἀρχῶν*".

² Many writings of Origen are pervaded by arguments, evincing equal discretion and patience, against the Christians who contest the right of science in the Church. In the work against Celsus, however, he was not unfrequently obliged to abandon the simple Christians. C. Celsus III. 78: V. 14—24 are particularly instructive.

science of the faith, as developed by Origen, being built up with the appliances of Philo's science, bears unmistakable marks of Neoplatonism and Gnosticism. Origen speculated not only in the manner of Justin, but also in that of Valentinus and therefore likewise after the fashion of Plotinus; in fact he is characterised by the adoption of the methods and, in a certain sense, of the axioms current in the schools of Valentinus and traceable in Neoplatonism. But, as this method implied the acknowledgment of a sacred literature, Origen was an exegete who believed in the Holy Scriptures and indeed, at bottom, he viewed all theology as a methodical exegesis of Holy Writ. Finally, however, since Origen, as an ecclesiastical Christian, was convinced that the Church (by which he means only the perfect and pure Church) is the sole possessor of God's holy revelations with whose authority the faith may be justly satisfied, nothing but the two Testaments, as preserved by her, was regarded by him as the absolutely reliable divine revelation.¹ But, in addition to these, every possession of the Church, and, above all, the rule of faith, was authoritative and holy.² By acknowledging not only the relative correctness of the beliefs held by the great mass of simple Christians, as the Valentinians did, but also the indispensableness of their faith as the foundation of speculation, Origen like Clement avoided the dilemma of becoming a heterodox Gnostic or an ecclesiastical traditionalist. He was able to maintain this standpoint, because in the first place his Gnosis required a guaranteed sacred literature which he only found in

¹ In this point Origen is already narrower than Clement. Free judgments, such as were passed by Clement on Greek philosophy, were not, so far as I know, repeated by Origen. (See especially Clement, Strom. I. 5, 28—32: 13, 57, 58 etc.); yet he also acknowledges revelations of God in Greek philosophy (see, *e.g.*, c. Cels. VI. 3), and the Christian doctrine is to him the completion of Greek philosophy (see the remains of Origen's lost Stromateis and Hom. XIV. in Genes. § 3; other passages in Redepenning II., p. 324 ff.).

² We must here content ourselves with merely pointing out that the method of scientific Scriptural exegesis also led to historico-critical investigations, that accordingly Origen and his disciples were also critics of the tradition, and that scientific theology, in addition to the task of remodelling Christianity, thus began at its very origin the solution of another problem, namely, the critical restoration of Christianity from the Scriptures and tradition and the removal of its excrescences: for these efforts, strictly speaking, do not come up for consideration in the history of dogma.

the Church, and because in the second place this same Gnosis had extended its horizon far enough to see that what the heretical Gnosis had regarded as contrasts were different aspects of the same thing. The relative way of looking at things, an inheritance from the best time of antiquity, is familiar to Origen, as it was to Clement; and he contrived never to lose sight of it, in spite of the absolute attitude he had arrived at through the Christian Gnosis and the Holy Scriptures. This relative view taught him and Clement toleration and discretion (Strom. IV. 22. 139: ἡ γνῶσις ἀγαπᾷ καὶ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας διδάσκει τε καὶ παιδεύει τὴν πᾶσιν κτίσιν τοῦ παντοκράτορος Θεοῦ τιμᾶν, "Gnosis loves and instructs the ignorant and teaches us to honour the whole creation of God Almighty"); and enabled them everywhere to discover, hold fast, and further the good in that which was meagre and narrow, in that which was undeveloped and as yet intrinsically obscure.¹ As an orthodox traditionalist and decided opponent of all heresy Origen acknowledged that Christianity embraces a salvation which is offered to all men and attained by faith, that it is the doctrine of historical facts to which we must adhere, that the content of Christianity has been appropriately summarised by the Church in her rule of faith,² and that belief is of itself sufficient for the renewal and salvation of man. But, as an idealistic philosopher, Origen transformed the whole content of ecclesiastical faith into ideas. Here he adhered to no fixed philosophical system, but, like Philo, Clement, and the Neoplatonists, adopted and adapted all that had been effected by the labours of idealistic Greek moralists since the time of Socrates. These, however, had long before transformed the Socratic saying "know thyself" into manifold rules for the right conduct of life, and associated with it a theosophy, in which man was first to attain to his true self.³ These rules made the true "sage"

¹ The theory that justified a twofold morality in the Church is now completely legitimised, but the higher form no longer appears as Encratite and eschatological, but as Encratite and philosophical. See, for example, Clement, Strom. III. 12. 82: VI. 13. 106 etc. Gnosis is the principle of perfection. See Strom. IV. 7. 54: πρόκειται δὲ τοῖς εἰς τελείωσιν σπεύδουσιν ἡ γνῶσις ἡ λογικὴ ἢς θεμέλιος ἡ ἀγία τριῶν πιστῆς, ἀγάπης, ἐλπίς.

² See the preface to the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*.

³ From the conclusion of Hippolytus' *Philosophoumena* it is also evident how

abstain from occupying himself in the service of daily life and "from burdensome appearance in public". They asserted that the mind "can have no more peculiar duty than caring for itself. This is accomplished by its not looking without nor occupying itself with foreign things, but, turning inwardly to itself, restoring its own nature to itself and thus practising righteousness."¹ Here it was taught that the wise man who no longer requires anything is nearest the Deity, because he is a partaker of the highest good through possession of his rich Ego and through his calm contemplation of the world; here moreover it was proclaimed that the mind that has freed itself from the sensuous² and lives in constant contemplation of the eternal is also in the end vouchsafed a view of the invisible and is itself deified. No one can deny that this sort of flight from the world and possession of God involves a specific secularisation of Christianity, and that the isolated and self-sufficient sage is pretty much the opposite of the poor soul that hungers after righteousness.³ Nor, on the other hand, can any one deny that concrete examples of both types are found in infinite multiplicity and might shade off into each other in this multiplicity. This was the case with Clement and Origen. To them the ethical and religious ideal is the state without sorrow, the state of insensibility to all evils, of order and peace—but peace in God. Reconciled to the course of the world, trusting in the divine Logos,⁴ rich in disinterested love to God and the brethen, reproducing the divine thoughts, looking up with longing to heaven its native city,⁵ the created spirit

the Socratic *Ἐνώβη σεαυτόν* was in that age based on a philosophy of religion and was regarded as a watchword in wide circles. See Clem. *Pædag.* III. 11. 1.

¹ See Gregory Thaumaturgus' panegyric on Origen, one of the most instructive writings of the 3rd century, especially cc. 11—18.

² Yet all excesses are repudiated. See Clem. *Strom.* IV. 22. 138: *Ὁὐκ ἐγκρατής οὗτος ἔστι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἕξει γέγονεν ἀπαιθείας σχῆμα βεῖον ἐπενδύσασθαι αναμμένων.* Similar remarks are found in Origen.

³ In many passages of Clement the satisfaction in knowledge appears in a still more pronounced form than in Origen. The boldest expression of it is *Strom.* IV. 22. 136. This passage is quoted above on p. 328.)

⁴ See the beautiful prayer of the Christian Gnostic in *Strom.* IV. 23. 148.

⁵ See *Strom.* IV. 26. 172: Origen's commentaries are continually interrupted by similar outbursts of feeling.

attains its likeness to God and eternal bliss. It reaches this by the victory over sensuousness, by constantly occupying itself with the divine—"Go ye believing thoughts into the wide field of eternity"—by self-knowledge and contemplative isolation, which, however, does not exclude work in the kingdom of God, that is in the Church. This is the divine wisdom: "The soul practises viewing herself as in a mirror: she displays the divine Spirit in herself as in a mirror, if she is to be found worthy of this fellowship; and she thus discovers the traces of a mysterious way to deification."¹ Origen employed the Stoic and Platonic systems of ethics as an instrument for the gradual realisation of this ideal.² With him the mystic and ecstatic as well as the magic and sacramental element is still in the background, though it is not wanting. To Origen's mind, however, the inadequacy of philosophical injunctions was constantly made plain by the following considerations. (1) The philosophers, in spite of their noble thoughts of God, tolerated the existence of polytheism; and this was really the only fault he had to find with Plato. (2) The truth did not become universally accessible through them.³ (3) As the result of these facts they did not possess sufficient power.⁴ In contrast to this the divine revelation had already mastered a whole people through Moses—"Would to God the Jews had not transgressed the law, and had not slain the prophets and Jesus; we would then have had a model of that heavenly commonwealth which Plato has sought to describe"⁵—and the Logos shows his universal

¹ On deification as the ultimate aim see Clem., Strom. IV. 23. 149—155: VII. 10. 56, 13. 82, 16. 95: οὕτως ὁ τῷ κυρίῳ πειθόμενος καὶ τῆ ὁδοῖσιν δι' αὐτοῦ κατακολουθήσας προφητεία τελῶς ἐκτελεῖται κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ διδασκάλου ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολῶν Θεός. But note what a distinction Clement makes between ὁ Θεός and the perfect man in VII. 15. 88 (in contradistinction to the Stoic identification); Origen does this also.

² Gregory (I. c., c. 13) relates that all the works of the poets and philosophers were read in Origen's school, and that every part of these works that would stand the test was admitted. Only the works of atheists were excluded, "because these overpass the limits of human thought." However, Origen did not judge philosophers in such an unprejudiced manner as Clement, or, to speak more correctly, he no longer valued them so highly. See Bigg, I. c., p. 133, Denis I. c. Introd.

³ See, for example, c. Cels. V. 43: VII. 47, 59 sq. He compared Plato and other wise men to those doctors who give their attention only to cultured patients.

⁴ See, for example, c. Cels. VI. 2.

⁵ C. Cels. V. 43.

power in the Church (1) by putting an end to all polytheism, and (2) by improving everyone to the extent that his knowledge and capacity admit, and in proportion as his will is inclined to, and susceptible of, that which is good.¹

¹ One of Origen's main ideas, which we everywhere meet with, particularly in the work against Celsus (see, for example, VI. 2) is the thought that Christ has come to improve all men according to their several capacities, and to lead some to the highest knowledge. This conception appears to fall short of the Christian ideal and perhaps really does so: but as soon as we measure it not by the Gospel but by the aims of Greek philosophy, we see very clearly the progress that has been attained through this same Gospel. What Origen has in his eye is mankind, and he is anxious for the amendment not merely of a few, but of all. The actual state of things in the Church no longer allowed him to repeat the exclamations of the Apologists that all Christians were philosophers and that all were filled with the same wisdom and virtue. These exclamations were naïve and inappropriate even for that time. But he could already estimate the relative progress made by mankind within the Church as compared with those outside her pale, saw no gulf between the growing and the perfect, and traced the whole advance to Christ. He expressly declared, c. Cels. III. 78, that the Christianity which is fitted for the comprehension of the multitude is not the best doctrine in an absolute, but only in a relative, sense; that the "common man", as he expresses himself, must be reformed by the prospect of rewards and punishments; and that the truth can only be communicated to him in veiled forms and images, as to a child. The very fact, however, that the Logos in Jesus Christ has condescended so to act is to Origen a proof of the universality of Christianity. Moreover, many of the wonderful phenomena reported in the Holy Scriptures belong in his opinion to the veiled forms and images. He is very far from doing violence to his reason here; he rather appeals to mysterious powers of the soul, to powers of divination, visionary states etc. His standpoint in this case is wholly that of Celsus (see particularly the instructive disquisition in I. 48), in so far as he is convinced that many unusual things take place between heaven and earth, and that individual names, symbols etc. possess a mysterious power (see, for example, c. Cels. V. 45). The views as to the relationship between knowledge and holy initiation or *sacramentum* are those of the philosophers of the age. He thinks, however, that each individual case requires to be examined, that there can be no miracles not in accordance with nature, but that on the contrary everything must fit into a higher order. As the letter of the precepts in both Testaments frequently contains things contrary to reason (see *περὶ ἀρχῶν* IV. 2. 8-27) in order to lead men to the spiritual interpretation, and as many passages contain no literal sense at all (l.c. § 12), so also, in the historical narratives, we frequently discover a mythical element from which consequently nothing but the idea is to be evolved (l.c. § 16 sq.: "Non solum de his, quæ usque ad adventum Christi scripta sunt, hæc Spiritus sanctus procuravit, sed... eadem similiter etiam in evangelistis et apostolis fecit. Nam ne illas quidem narrationes, quas per eos inspiravit, absque huiusmodi, quam supra exposuimus, sapientiæ suæ arte contexuit. Unde etiam in ipsis non parva promiscuit, quibus historialis narrandi ordo interpolatus, vel intercisus per

Not only, however, did Origen employ the Greek ethic in its varied types, but the Greek cosmological speculation also formed the complicated substructure of his religious system of morals. The Gnosis is formally a philosophy of revelation, that is a Scripture theology,¹ and materially a cosmological speculation. On the basis of a detailed theory of inspiration, which itself, moreover, originates with the philosophers, the Holy Scriptures are so treated that all facts appear as the vehicles of ideas and only attain their highest value in this aspect. Systematic theol-

impossibilitatem sui reflecteret atque revocaret intentionem legentis ad intelligentie interioris examen.") In all such cases Origen makes uniform use of the two points of view, that God wished to present something even to the simple and to incite the more advanced to spiritual investigations. In some passages, however, the former point of view fails, because the content of the text is offensive; in that case it is only the second that applies. Origen therefore was very far from finding the literal content of Scripture edifying in every instance, indeed, in the highest sense, the letter is not edifying at all. He rather adopted, to its widest extent, the critical method employed by the Gnostics particularly when dealing with the Old Testament; but the distinction he made between the different senses of Scripture and between the various legitimate human needs enabled him to preserve both the unity of God and the harmony of revelation. Herein, both in this case and everywhere else, lies the superiority of his theology. Read especially c. Celsus I. 9—12. After appealing to the twofold religion among the Egyptians, Persians, Syrians, and Indians—the mythical religion of the multitude and the mystery-religion of the initiated—he lays down exactly the same distinction within Christianity, and thus repels the reproach of Celsus that the Christians were obliged to accept everything without examination. With regard to the mythical form of Christianity he merely claims that it is the most suitable among religions of this type. Since, as a matter of fact, the great majority of men have neither time nor talent for philosophy, ποία ἂν ἄλλη βελτίων μέθοδος πρὸς τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς βοηθῆσαι εὐρεθείη, τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ τοῖς ἔννεσι παραδόσεως (l.c., 9). This thought is quite in the spirit of antiquity, and neither Celsus nor Porphyry could have any fault to find with these arguments in point of form: all positive religions have a mythical element; the true religion therefore lies behind the religions. But the novelty which neither Celsus nor Porphyry could recognise lies in the acknowledgment that the one religion, even in its mythical form, is unique and divine, and in the demand that all men, so far as they cannot attain the highest knowledge, must subject themselves to this mythical religion and no other. In this claim Origen rejected the ancient contrast between the multitude and the initiated just as he repudiated polytheism; and in this, if I see rightly, his historical greatness consists. He everywhere recognised gradations tending in the same direction and rejected polytheism.

¹ Bigg (l.c., p. 154) has rightly remarked: "Origen in point of method differs most from Clement, who not unfrequently leaves us in doubt as to the precise Scriptural basis of his ideas."

ogy, in undertaking its task, always starts, as Clement and Origen also did, with the conscious or unconscious thought of emancipating itself from the outward revelation and community of cultus that are the characteristic marks of positive religion. The place of these is taken by the results of speculative cosmology, which, though themselves practically conditioned, do not seem to be of this character. This also applies to Origen's Christian Gnosis or scientific dogmatic, which is simply the metaphysics of the age. However, as he was the equal of the foremost minds of his time, this dogmatic was no schoolboy imitation on his part, but was to some extent independently developed and was worked out both in opposition to pantheistic Stoicism and to theoretical dualism. That we are not mistaken in this opinion is shown by a document ranking among the most valuable things preserved to us from the third century; we mean the judgment passed on Origen by Porphyry in Euseb., H. E. VI. 19. Every sentence is instructive,¹ but the culminating point is the judgment contained in § 7: *κατὰ μὲν τὸν βίον Χριστιανῶς ζῶν καὶ παρανόμως, κατὰ δὲ τὰς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξας Ἑλληνίζων καὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων τοῖς θύελοις ὑποβαλλόμενος μύθοις.* ("His outward life was that of a Christian and opposed to the law, but in regard to his views of things and of the Deity, he thought like the Greeks, inasmuch as he introduced their ideas into the myths of other peoples.") We can everywhere verify this observation from Origen's works and particularly from the books written against Celsus, where he is continually obliged to mask his essential agreement in principles and method with the enemy of the Christians.² The Gnosis is in fact the Hellenic one and results in that wonderful picture of the world which, though apparently a drama, is in reality immovable, and only assumes such a complicated form here from its relation to the Holy Scriptures and the history of Christ.³ The

¹ Note, for example, § 8, where it is said that Origen adopted the allegorical method from the Stoic philosophers and applied it to the Jewish writings. On Origen's hermeneutic principles in their relation to those of Philo see Siegfried, l.c., pp. 351—62. Origen has developed them fully and clearly in the 4th Book of *περὶ ἀρχῶν*.

² See Overbeck, *Theologische Literatur-Zeitung*, 1878, Col. 535.

³ A full presentation of Origen's theology would require many hundreds of

Gnosis neutralises everything connected with empiric history; and if this does not everywhere hold good with regard to the actual occurrence of facts, it is at least invariably the case in respect to their significance. The clearest proof of this is (1) that Origen raised the thought of the unchangeability of God to be the norm of his system and (2) that he denied the historical, incarnate Logos any significance for "Gnostics". To these Christ merely appears as the Logos who has been from eternity with the Father and has always acted from the beginning. He alone is the object of the knowledge of the wise man, who merely requires a perfect or, in other words, a divine teacher.¹ The Gospel too only teaches the "shadow of the secrets of Christ:" but the eternal Gospel, which is also the pneumatic one, "clearly places before men's minds all things concerning the Son of God himself, both the mysteries shown by his words, and the things of which his acts were the riddles" (*σφωδρῶς παρίστησι τοῖς νοούσι τὰ πάντα ἐνώπιον περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ, καὶ τὰ παριστάμενα μυστήρια ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ. τὰ τε πράγματα, ἃ ἀνύγματ' ἦσαν καὶ πράξεις αὐτοῦ*)² No doubt the true theology based on revela-

pages, because he introduced everything worth knowing into the sphere of theology, and associated with the Holy Scriptures, verse by verse, philosophical maxims, ethical reflexions, and results of physical science, which would require to be drawn on the widest canvas, because the standpoint selected by Origen allowed the most extensive view and the most varied judgments. The case was similar with Clement before him, and also with Tertullian. This is a necessary result of "Scripture theology" when one takes it up in earnest. Tertullian assumes, for example, that there must be a Christian doctrine of dreams. Why? Because we read of dreams in the Holy Scriptures.

¹ In c. Cels. III. 61 it is said (Lommatsch XVIII. p. 337): *ἐπέμφθη οὖν Θεὸς λόγος καθὼς μὲν ἱατρὸς τοῖς ἀμαρτωλοῖς, καθὼς δὲ διδάσκαλος βέλων μυστηρίων τοῖς ἡδὴ καθάρσις καὶ μηκέτι ἀμαρτάνουσιν.* See also what follows. In Comment. in John I. 20 sq. the crucified Christ, as the Christ of faith, is distinguished from the Christ who takes up his abode in us, as the Christ of the perfect. See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): *καὶ μακάριοι γε ὅσοι θεόμενοι τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ τοιοῦτοι γεγόνασιν, ὡς μηκέτι αὐτοῦ χρῆζειν ἱατροῦ τοὺς κακῶς ἔχοντας θεραπεύοντας, μηδὲ ποιμένους, μηδὲ ἀπολυτρώσεως, ἀλλὰ σοφίας καὶ λόγου καὶ δικαιοσύνης, ἢ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοῖς διὰ τελειότητα χωρεῖν αὐτοῦ τὰ κάλλιστα δυναμένοις.* Read also c. Cels. II. 66. 69; IV. 15. 18; VI. 68. These passages show that the crucified Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too, really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a teacher.

² Comment. in Joh. I. 9. Lomm. I. p. 20. The "mysteries" of Christ is the

tion makes pantheism appear overthrown as well as dualism, and here the influence of the two Testaments cannot be mistaken; but a subtle form of the latter recurs in Origen's system. whilst the manner in which he rejected both made the Greek philosophy of the age feel that there was something akin to it here. In the final utterances of religious metaphysics ecclesiastical Christianity, with the exception of a few compromises, is thrown off as a husk. The objects of religious knowledge have no history or rather, and this is a genuinely Gnostic and Neoplatonic idea, they have only a supramundane one.

This necessarily gave rise to the assumption of an esoteric and exoteric form of the Christian religion, for it is only behind the statutory, positive religion of the Church that religion itself is found. Origen gave the clearest expression to this assumption, which must have been already familiar in the Alexandrian school of catechists, and convinced himself that it was correct, because he saw that the mass of Christians were unable to grasp the deeper sense of Scripture, and because he realised the difficulties of the exegesis. On the other hand, in solving the problem of adapting the different points of his heterodox system of thought to the *regula fidei*, he displayed the most masterly skill. He succeeded in finding an external connection, because, though the construction of his theory proceeded from the top downwards, he could find support for it on the steps of the *regula fidei*, already developed by Irenæus into the history of salvation.¹ The system itself is to be, in principle and in every respect, monistic, but, as the material world, though created by God out of nothing, merely appears as a place of punishment and purification for souls, a strong element of dualism is inherent in the system, as far as its practical application is concerned.² The pre-

technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely, something in itself evident and intelligible.

¹ See Nitzsch, *Dogmengeschichte*, p. 136.

² To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most important: see Book III. of *περὶ ἀρχῶν* and c. Cels. VI. 53—59. He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile God: (2) that virtues and the works arising from

vailing contrast is that between the one transcendent essence and the multiplicity of all created things. The pervading ambiguity lies in the twofold view of the spiritual in so far as, on the one hand, it belongs to God as the unfolding of his essence, and, on the other, as being created, is contrasted with God. This ambiguity, which recurs in all the Neoplatonic systems and has continued to characterise all mysticism down to the present day, originates in the attempt to repel Stoic pantheism

them are alone good in the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these is bad: (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will (see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he admits that they partly originate from God, in which case they are designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this conception is insufficient, both in view of individual passages of Holy Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training. Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with respect to the power of God. There are evils which are a necessary consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53: τὰ κακὰ ἐκ παρακολούθησεως γεγένηται τῆς πρὸς τὰ προηγούμενα): "Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by God; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised: as the carpenter who executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings: (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible. See the Theodicy in *περὶ ἀρχῶν* III. 17—22. (Here, and also in other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz: see Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the great mass it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its origin in God" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really bad. It is sufficient for the multitude to know that that which is bad springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV. 66, see also III. 42: τὸ κυρίως μισρὸν ἀπὸ κακίας τοιούτων ἐστὶ. Φύσις δὲ σώματος οὐ μισρά: οὐ γὰρ ἢ φύσις σώματός ἐστι, τὸ γεννητικὸν τῆς μισρότητος ἔχει τὴν κακίαν); but a closer examination shows that there can be no man without sin (III. 61) because error is inseparable from growth and because the constitution of man in the flesh makes evil unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the necessary *fruits*. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenæus, is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content with proving it, however, but in order to justify God's ways proceeded to the assumption of a Fall before time began (see below).

and yet to preserve the transcendental nature of the human spirit, and to maintain the absolute causality of God without allowing his goodness to be called in question. The assumption that created spirits can freely determine their own course is therefore a necessity of the system; in fact this assumption is one of its main presuppositions¹ and is so boldly developed as to limit the omnipotence and omniscience of God. But, as from the empirical point of view the knot is tied for every man at the very moment he appears on earth, and since the problem is not created by each human being as the result of his own independent will, but lies in his organisation, speculation must retreat behind history. So the system, in accordance with certain hints of Plato, is constructed on the same plan as that of Valentinus, for example, to which it has an extraordinary affinity. It contains three parts: (1) The doctrine of God and his unfoldings or creations, (2) the doctrine of the Fall and its consequences, (3) the doctrine of redemption and restoration.² Like Denis,

¹ See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)

² The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in the fact that the former makes an aeon or, in other words, a part of the divine *pleroma*, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete clearness from the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, because he endeavoured to treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles are God, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part treats of God and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection, punishment in hell, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no "principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted with Origen. If we read the great work *περὶ ἀρχῶν*, or the treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details all possible views down to the most naïve myths, and how he on the one hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views, betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that confronts us in Origen is that presented

however, we may also, in accordance with a premised theory of method, set forth the system in four sections, viz., Theology, Cosmology, Anthropology, Teleology. Origen's fundamental idea is "the original indestructible unity of God and all spiritual essence." From this it necessarily follows that the created spirit after fall, error, and sin must ever return to its origin, to being in God. In this idea we have the key to the religious philosophy of Origen.

The only sources for obtaining a knowledge of the truth are the Holy Scriptures of both Testaments. No doubt the speculations of Greek philosophers also contain truths, but these have only a propædeutic value and, moreover, have no certainty to offer, as have the Holy Scriptures, which are a witness to themselves in the fulfilment of prophecy.¹ On the other hand Origen assumes that there was an esoteric deeper knowledge in addition to the Holy Scriptures, and that Jesus in particular imparted this deeper wisdom to a few;² but, as a correct Church theologian, he scarcely made use of this assumption. The first

by his age. This we realise on reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les théories d'Origène, même les plus imaginaires, représentent l'état intellectuel et moral du siècle où il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who, like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt anticipated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have assurance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions. This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology which was indeed completely heterodox.

¹ The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II. 37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: *πρὸς ταῦτα δ' ἡμεῖς φήσομεν οἱ μελετήσαντες μηδενὶ ἀπεχθάνεσθαι τῶν καλῶς λεγομένων, κἂν οἱ ἕξω τῆς πίστεως λέγωσι καλῶς*. In that same place it is asserted that God in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p. 338, Origen's attitude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved than that of Clement.

² See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII. 59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.

methodical principle of his exegesis is that the faith, as professed in the Church in contradistinction to heresy, must not be tampered with.¹ But it is the carrying out of this rule that really forms the task of the theologian. For the faith itself is fixed and requires no particular presentation; it never occurred to Origen to assume that the fixing of the faith itself could present problems. It is complete, clear, easily teachable, and really leads to victory over sensuality and sin (see c. Cels. VII. 48 and cf. other passages), as well as to fellowship with God, since it rests on the revelation of the Logos. But, as it remains determined by fear and hope of reward so, as "uninformed and irrational faith" (*πίστις ἰδιωτικὴ* and *ἄλογος*), it only leads to a "somatic Christianity" (*χριστιανισμὸς σωματικὸς*). It is the task of theology, however, to decipher "spiritual Christianity" (*χριστιανισμὸς πνευματικὸς*) from the Holy Scriptures, and to elevate faith to knowledge and clear vision. This is effected by the method of Scripture exegesis which ascertains the highest revelations of God.² The Scripture has a threefold sense because, like the cosmos, alongside of which it stands like a second revelation, as it were, it must contain a pneumatic, psychic, and somatic element. The somatic or historical sense is in every case the first that must be ascertained. It corresponds to the stage of mere faith and has consequently the same dignity as the latter. But there are instances where it is to be given up and designated as a Jewish and fleshly sense. This is to be assumed in all cases where it leads to ideas opposed to the nature of God, morality, the law of nature, or reason.³ Here one must judge (see above) that such objectionable passages were meant to incite the searcher to a deeper investigation. The psychic sense is of a moral nature: in the Old Testament more especially most narratives have a moral content, which one can easily find by stripping off the history as a covering; and in certain

¹ Περὶ ἄρχῶν preface.

² On Origen's exegetical method see Kihn, Theodor v. Mopsu. p. 20 ff., Bigg, l.c. p. 131 ff. On the distinction between his application of the allegorical method and that of Clement see specially p. 134 f. of the latter work.

³ Origen noted several such passages in the very first chapter of Genesis. Examples are given in Bigg. p. 137 f.

passages one may content oneself with this meaning. The pneumatic sense, which is the only meaning borne by many passages, an assertion which neither Philo nor Clement ventured to make in plain terms, has with Origen a negatively apologetic and a positively didactic aim. It leads to the ultimate ideas which, once attained, are self-evident, and, so to speak, pass completely over into the mind of the theologian, because they finally obtain for him clear vision and independent possession.¹ When the Gnostic has attained this stage, he may throw away the ladders by which he has reached this height.² He is then inwardly united with God's Logos, and from this union obtains all that he requires. In most passages Origen presupposed the similarity and equal value of all parts of the Holy Scriptures; but in some he showed that even inspiration has its stages and grades, according to the receptivity and worthiness of each prophet, thus applying his relative view of all matters of fact in such cases also. In Christ the full revelation of the Logos was first expressed; his Apostles did not possess the same inspiration as he,³ and among the Apostles and apostolic men differences in the degrees of inspiration are again to be assumed. Here Origen set the example of making a definite distinction between a heroic age of the Apostles and the succeeding period. This laid the foundation for an assumption through which the later Church down to our time has appeased her conscience and freed herself from demands that she could not satisfy.⁴

¹ Bigg, *l.c.*, has very appropriately named Origen's allegorism "Biblical alchemy".

² To ascertain the pneumatic sense, Origen frequently drew analogies between the domain of the cosmic and that of the spiritual. He is thus a forerunner of modern idealistic philosophers, for example, Drummond: "To Origen allegorism is only one manifestation of the sacramental mystery of nature (Bigg, p. 134).

³ See Hom. in Luc. XXIX., Lomm. V., p. 193 sq.

⁴ Since Origen does not, as a rule, dispute the literal meaning of the Scriptures, he has also a much more favourable opinion of the Jewish people and of the observance of the law than the earlier Christian authors (but see Iren. and Tertull.). At bottom he places the observance of the law quite on the same level as the faith of the simple Christians. The Apostles also kept the law for a time, and it was only by degrees that they came to understand its spiritual meaning. They were also right to continue its observance during their mission among the Jews. On the other hand, he considers the New Testament a higher stage than the Old both in its literal and its spiritual sense. See *c. Cels.* II. 1—4, 7, 75; IV. 31 sq.; V. 10, 30, 31, 42 sq., 66; VII. 26.

THE DOCTRINE OF GOD AND HIS SELF-UNFOLDINGS OR CREATIONS.¹ The world points back to an ultimate cause and the created spirit to an eternal, pure, absolutely simple, and unchangeable spirit, who is the original source of all existence and goodness, so that everything that exists only does so in virtue of being caused by that One, and is good in so far as it derives its essence from the One who is perfection and goodness. This fundamental idea is the source of all the conclusions drawn by Origen as to the essence, attributes, and knowableness of God. As the One, God is contrasted with the Manifold; but the order in the Manifold points back to the One. As the real Essence, God is opposed to the essences that appear and seem to vanish, and that therefore have no real existence, because they have not their principle in themselves, but testify: "We have not made ourselves." As the absolutely immaterial Spirit, God is contrasted with the spirit that is clogged with matter, but which strives to get back to him from whom it received its origin. The One is something different from the Manifold; but the order, the dependence, and the longing of that which is created point back to the One, who can therefore be known relatively from the Manifold. In sharpest contrast to the heretical Gnosis, Origen maintained the absolute causality of God, and, in spite of all abstractions in determining the essence of God, he attributed self-consciousness and will to this superessential Essence (in opposition to Valentinus, Basilides, and the later Neoplatonists).² The created is one thing and the Self-existent is another, but both are connected together;

¹ In opposition to the method for obtaining a knowledge of God, recommended by Alcinoüs (c. 12), Maximus Tyr. (XVII, 8), and Celsus (by analysis [apophat.], synthesis [kataphat.], and analogy), Origen, c. Cels. VII. 42, 44, appeals to the fact that the Christian knows God better, namely, in his incarnate Son. But he himself, nevertheless, also follows the synthetic method.

² In defining the superessential nature of the One, Origen did not go so far as the Basilidians (Philosoph. VII. 20, 21) or as Plotinus. No doubt he also regards the Deity as *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* (c. Cels. VII. 42—51; *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 1; Clement made a closer approach to the heretical abstractions of the Gnostics inasmuch as he still more expressly renounced any designation of God; see Strom. V. 12, 13), but he is not *βύθος* and *σιγή*, being rather a self-comprehending Spirit, and therefore does not require a hypostasis (the *νοῦς*) before he can come to himself. Accordingly the human intellect is not incapable of soaring up to God as the later Neoplatonists assert; at least vision is by no means so decidedly opposed

as the created can only be understood from something self-existent, so the self-existent is not without analogy to the created. The Self-existent is in itself a living thing; it is beyond dispute that Origen with all his abstractions represented the Deity, whom he primarily conceived as a constant substance, in a more living, and, so to speak, in a more personal way than the Greek philosophers. Hence it was possible for him to produce a doctrine of the attributes of God. Here he did not even shrink from applying his relative view to the Deity, because, as will be seen, he never thinks of God without revelation, and because all revelation must be something limited. The omnipresence of God indeed suffers from no limitation. God is potentially everywhere; but he is everywhere only potentially; that is, he neither encompasses nor is encompassed. Nor is he diffused through the universe, but, as he is removed from the limits of space, so also he is removed from space itself.¹ But the omniscience and omnipotence of God have a limit, which indeed, according to Origen, lies in the nature of the case itself. In the first place his omnipotence is limited through his essence, for he can only do what he wills;² secondly by logic, for omnipotence cannot produce things containing an inward contradiction: God can do

to thought, that is, elevated above it as something new, as is held by the Neoplatonists and Philo before them. Origen is no mystic. In accordance with this conception Origen and Clement say that the perfect knowledge of God can indeed be derived from the Logos alone (c. Cels. VII. 48. 49: VI. 65—73: Strom. V. 12. 85: VI. 15. 122), but that a relative knowledge may be deduced from creation (c. Cels. VII. 46). Hence they also spoke of an innate knowledge of God (Protrept. VI. 68; Strom. V. 13. 78), and extended the teleological proof of God furnished by Philo (*περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 1. 6: c. Cels. I. 23). The relatively correct predicates of God to be determined from revelation are his unity (c. Cels. I. 23), his absolute spirituality (*πνεῦμα ἀσώματος, ἄυλος, ἀσχημάτιστος*)—this is maintained both in opposition to Stoicism and anthropomorphism: see Orig. *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 1, Origen's polemic against Melito's conception of God, and Clem., Strom. V. 11. 68: V. 12. 82,—his unbegottenness, his immortality (this is eternity conceived as enjoyment; the eternity of God itself, however, is to be conceived, according to Clement, as that which is above time; see Strom. II. 2. 6), and his absolute causality. All these concepts together constitute the conception of perfection. See Fischer, *De Orig. theologia et cosmologia*. 1840.

¹ Orig. *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 1. 3.

² C. Cels. V. 23.

nothing contrary to nature, all miracles being natural in the highest sense¹—thirdly, by the impossibility of that which is in itself unlimited being comprehended, whence it follows that the extent of everything created must be limited²—fourthly, by the impossibility of realising an aim completely and without disturbing elements.³ Omniscience has also its corresponding limits; this is specially proved from the freedom of spirits bestowed by God himself. God has indeed the capacity of foreknowledge, but he knows transactions beforehand because they happen; they do not happen because he knows them.⁴ That the divine purpose should be realised in the end necessarily follows from the nature of the created spirit itself, apart from the supporting activity of God. Like Irenæus and Tertullian Origen very carefully discussed the attributes of goodness and justice in God in opposition to the Marcionites.⁵ But his exposition is different. In his eyes goodness and justice are not two opposite attributes, which can and must exist in God side by side; but as virtues they are to him identical. God rewards in justice and punishes in kindness. That it should go well with all, no matter how they conduct themselves, would be no kindness; but it is kindness when God punishes to improve, deter, and prevent. Passions, anger, and the like do not exist in God, nor any plurality of virtues; but, as the Perfect One, he is all kindness. In other places, however, Origen did not content himself with this presentation. In opposition to the Marcionites, who declared Christ and the Father of Christ to be good, and the creator of the world to be just, he argued that, on the contrary; God (the foundation of the world)

¹ L.c.

² *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 9. 1: "Certum est, quippe quod præfinito aliquo apud se numero creaturas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circumscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit utique nec contineri vel dispensari a deo, quæ facta sunt, poterunt. Naturaliter nempe quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit." In *Matth.*, t. 13., c. 1 fin., Lomm. III., p. 209 sq.

³ See above, p. 343, note 2.

⁴ See c. *Cels.* II. 20.

⁵ Clement also did so; see with respect to Origen *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 5, especially § 3 sq.

is good, but that the Logos-Christ, in so far as he is the pedagogue, is just.¹

From the perfect goodness of God Origen infers that he reveals or communicates himself, from his immutability that he *always* reveals himself. The eternal or never beginning communication of perfection to other beings is a postulate of the concept "God". But, along with the whole fraternity of those professing the same philosophy, Origen assumed that the One, in becoming the Manifold and acting in the interests of the Manifold, can only effect his purpose by divesting himself of absolute apathy and once more assuming a form in which he can act, that is, procuring for himself an adequate organ—the *Logos*. The content of Origen's teaching about this Logos was not essentially different from that of Philo and was therefore quite as contradictory; only in his case everything is more sharply defined and the hypostasis of the Logos (in opposition to the Monarchians) more clearly and precisely stated.² Nevertheless the personal independ-

¹ See Comment. in Johann. I. 40. Lomm. I. p. 77 sq. I cannot agree that this view is a *rapprochement* to the Marcionites (contrary to Nitzsch's opinion. l.c. p. 285). The confused accounts in Epiph. II. 43. 13 are at any rate not to be taken into account.

² Clement's doctrine of the Logos, to judge from the Hypotyposes, was perhaps different from that of Origen. According to Photius (Biblioth. 109) Clement assumed two Logoi (Origen indeed was also reproached with the same; see Pamphili Apol. Routh, Reliq. S., IV., p. 367), and did not even allow the second and weaker one to make a real appearance on earth: but this is a misunderstanding (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 144). *Λέγεται μὲν*—these are said to have been the words of a passage in the Hypotyposes—*καὶ ὁ υἱὸς λόγος ὁμωνύμως τῷ πατρικῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ τὰρξ γενόμενος, οὐδὲ μὲν ὁ πατρῷος λόγος, ἀλλὰ δύναμις τις τοῦ Θεοῦ, οἷον ἀπόρροια τοῦ λόγου αὐτοῦ νοῦς γενόμενος τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων καρδίας διαπεφοίτηκε*. The distinction between an impersonal Logos-God and the Logos-Christ necessarily appeared as soon as the Logos was definitely hypostatized. In the so-called Monarchian struggles of the 3rd century the disputants made use of these two Logoi, who formed excellent material for sophistical discussions. In the Strom. Clement did not reject the distinction between a *λόγος ἐνδιάθετος* and *προφορικὸς* (on Strom. V. 1. 6. see Zahn, l.c. p. 145 against Nitzsch), and in many passages expresses himself in such a way that one can scarcely fail to notice a distinction between the Logos of the Father and that of the Son. "The Son-Logos is an emanation of the Reason of God, which unalterably remains in God and is the Logos proper." If the Adumbrationes are to be regarded as parts of the Hypotyposes, Clement used the expression *ὁμοούσιος* for the Logos, or at least an identical one (See Zahn, Forschungen III., pp. 87—

ence of the Logos is as yet by no means so sharply defined as in the case of the later Arians. He is still the Consciousness of God, the spiritual Activity of God. Hence he is on the one hand the idea of the world existing in God, and on the other the product of divine wisdom originating with the will of God. The following are the most important propositions.¹ The Logos who appeared in Christ, as is specially shown from Joh. I. 1 and Heb. I. 1, is the perfect image² of God. He is the Wisdom

138 f.). This is the more probable because Clement, Strom. 16. 74. expressly remarked that men are not *μέρος θεοῦ καὶ τῷ Θεῷ ὁμοούσιαι*, and because he says in Strom. IV. 13. 91: *εἰ ἐπὶ τὸ καταλύσει θάνατον ἀφικνεῖται τὸ διαφέρον γένος, οὐχ ὁ Χριστὸς τὸν θάνατον κατήργησεν, εἰ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτοῖς ὁμοούσιος λεχθείη.* One must assume from this that the word was really familiar to Clement as a designation of the community of nature, possessed by the Logos, both with God and with men. See Protrept. 10. 110: *ὁ βεῖος λογος, ὁ φανερώτατος ὄντως Θεός, ὁ τῷ δεσπότῃ τῶν ὅλων ἐξισωθείς.* In Strom. V. 1. 1 Clement emphatically declared that the Son was equally eternal with the Father: *οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ ὁ πατὴρ ἄνευ υἱοῦ· ἅμα γὰρ τῷ πατὴρ υἱοῦ πατὴρ* (see also Strom. IV. 7. 58: *ἔν μὲν τὸ ἀγέννητον ὁ παντοκράτωρ, ἔν δὲ καὶ τὸ προγεννηθὲν δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα ἐγένετο*, and Adumbrat. in Zahn. l.c., p. 87. where 1 John I. 1 is explained: "principium generationis separatum ab opificis principio non est. Cum enim dicit "quod erat ab initio" generationem tangit sine principio filii cum patre simul exstantis." See besides the remarkable passage, Quis dives salv. 37: *Θεῷ τὰ τῆς ἀγάπης μυστήρια, καὶ τότε ἐποπτεύσεις τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, ὃν ὁ μονογενὴς υἱὸς Θεός μόνος ἐξηγήσατο· ἔστι δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη καὶ δι' ἀγάπην ἡμῖν ἀνεκράβη καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ πατὴρ, τὸ δὲ ἡμῖν συμπάσης γέγονε μήτηρ· ἀγαπήσας ὁ πατὴρ ἐβήλυνθη, καὶ τούτου μέγα σημεῖον, ὃν αὐτὸς ἐγέννησεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ ὁ τεχθεὶς ἐξ ἀγάπης καρτὸς ἀγάπῃ.* But that does not exclude the fact that he, like Origen, named the Son *κτίσμα* (Phot., l.c.). In the Adumbrat. (p. 88) Son and Spirit are called "primitivæ virtutes ac primo create, immobiles existentes secundum substantiam". That is exactly Origen's doctrine, and Zahn (l.c., p. 99) has rightly compared Strom. V. 14. 89: VI. 7. 58: and Epit. ex Theod. 20. The Son stands at the head of the series of created beings (Strom. VII. 2. 5: see also below), but he is nevertheless specifically different from them by reason of his origin. It may be said in general that the fine distinctions of the Logos doctrine in Clement and Origen are to be traced to the still more abstract conception of God found in the former. A sentence like Strom. IV. 25. 156 (*ὁ μὲν οὖν Θεὸς ἀναπόδεικτος ὢν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστημονικός, ὁ δὲ υἱὸς σοφία τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐπιστήμη*) will hardly be found in Origen I think. Cf. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 45 ff.

¹ See Schultz, l.c., p. 51 ff. and Jahrbuch für protestantische Theologie I. pp. 193 ff. 369 ff.

² It is very remarkable that Origen *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter

of God, the reflection of his perfection and glory, the invisible image of God. For that very reason there is nothing corporeal in him¹ and he is therefore really God, not *ἀπόθεν*, nor *ἰσθῆς*, nor *ἀναρχος ἀρχή* ("beginningless beginning"), but the second God.² But, as such, immutability is one of his attributes, that is, he can never lose his divine essence, he can also in this respect neither increase nor decrease (this immutability, however, is not an independent attribute, but he is perfect as being an image of the Father's perfection).³ Accordingly this deity is not a communicated one in the sense of his having another independent essence in addition to this divine nature; but deity rather constitutes his essence: *ὁ σωτὴρ οὐ κατὰ μετουσίαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' οὐσίαν ἐστὶ Θεός*⁴ ("the Saviour is not God by communication, but in his essence"). From this it follows that he shares in the essence of God, therefore of the Father, and is accordingly *ὁμοούσιος τῷ πατρὶ* ("the same in substance with the Father") or, seeing that, as Son, he has come forth from the Father, is engendered from the essence of the Father.⁵ But having

begins, "Quod aliud est in Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit. Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."

¹ Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 2. 2. 6.

² The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: Καὶ δεύτερον οὖν λέγωμεν Θεὸν ἴστωσαν. ὅτι τὸν δεύτερον Θεὸν οὐκ ἄλλο τι λέγομεν, ἢ τὴν περιεκτικὴν πασῶν ἀρετῶν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸν περιεκτικὸν παντὸς οὐτίσοσῶν λόγου τῶν κατὰ φύσιν καὶ προηγουμένως γεγενημένων.

³ Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by Rufinus. The passage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed *ἀγνάος*, but not, like the Father, *ἀπαρμολάκτως ἀγνάος*.

⁴ Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134: see also Fragm. comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.

⁵ I. c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem corporalis aporrhœe esse dicitur aporrhœa gloriæ omnipotentis pura quædam et sincera. Quæ utræque similitudines (see the beginning of the passage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiæ esse filio cum patre. Aporrhœa enim *ὁμοούσιος* videtur, id est, unius substantiæ cum illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhœa vel vapor." In opposition to Heraclion Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p. 43 sq.) that *we* are not *homousios* with God: *ἐπιστήσωμεν δέ, εἰ μὴ σφόδρα ἐστὶν ἀσεβὲς ὁμοουσίους τῷ ἀγεννήτῳ φύσει καὶ παμμακαρίῳ εἶναι λέγειν τοὺς προσκυνοῦντας ἐν πνεύματι τῷ Θεῷ*. On the meaning of *ὁμοούσιος* see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11—32. The conception decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it having a different essence: but it

proceeded, like the will, from the Spirit, he was always with God; there was not a time when he was not,¹ nay, even this expression is still too weak. It would be an unworthy idea to think of God without his wisdom or to assume a beginning of his begetting. Moreover, this begetting is not an act that has only once taken place, but a process lasting from all eternity; the Son is always being begotten of the Father.² It is the theology of Origen which Gregory Thaumaturgus has thus summed up:³ εἷς κύριος, μόνος ἐκ μόνου, Θεὸς ἐκ Θεοῦ, χαρακτηρὴς καὶ εἰκὼν τῆς θεότητος, λόγος ἑνεργός, σοφία τῆς τῶν ὄλων συστάσεως περιεπιτική καὶ δύναμις τῆς ὄλης κτίσεως ποιητική, οὐκ ἀληθινὸς ἀληθινῶ πατρὸς, ἀόρατος ἀοράτου καὶ ἀφάρτος ἀφάρτου καὶ ἀθάνατος ἀθανάτου καὶ ἀίδιος ἀίδιου. ("One Lord, one from one, God from God, impress and image of Godhead, energetic word, wisdom embracing the entire system of the universe and power producing all creation, true Son of a true Father, the invisible of the invisible and incorruptible of the incorruptible, the immortal of the immortal, the eternal of the eternal"). The begetting is an indescribable act which can only be represented by inadequate images: it is no emanation—the expression *προβολή* is not found, so far as I

says nothing about how they came to have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger, which could only be averted by assertions. In some of Origen's teachings a modalistic aspect is also not quite wanting. See Hom. VIII. in Jerem. no. 2: Τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἓν ἐστὶ, ταῖς δὲ ἐπινοίαις τὰ πολλὰ ὀνόματα ἐπὶ διαφόρων. Conversely, it is also nothing but an appearance when Origen (for ex. in c. Cels. VIII. 12) merely traces the unity of Father and Son to unity in feeling and in will. The charge of Ebionitism made against him is quite unfounded (see Pamphili Apol., Routh IV. p. 367).

¹ Οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτε οὐκ ἦν, de princip. I. 2. 9; in Rom. I. 5.

² Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 2. 2—9. Comm. in ep. ad. Hebr. Lomm. V., p. 296: "Nunquam est, quando filius non fuit. Erat autem non, sicut de æterna luce diximus, innatus, ne duo principia lucis videamur inducere, sed sicut ingenitæ lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa; sed non erat quando non erat." See the comprehensive disquisition in *περὶ ἀρχῶν* IV. 28, where we find the sentence: "hoc autem ipsum, quod dicimus, quia nunquam fuit, quando non fuit, cum venia audiendum est" etc. See further in Jerem. IX. 4. Lomm. XV., p. 212: τὸ ἀπαύρασμα τῆς δόξης οὐχὶ ἄπαξ γεγέννηται, καὶ οὐχὶ γέννηται . . . καὶ ἀεὶ γέννηται ὁ σωτὴρ ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς; see also other passages.

³ See Caspari, Quellen, Vol. IV., p. 10.

know¹—but is rather to be designated as an act of the will arising from an inner necessity, an act which for that very reason is an emanation of the essence. But the Logos thus produced is really a personally existing being; he is not an impersonal force of the Father, though this still appears to be the case in some passages of Clement, but he is the “*sapientia dei substantialiter subsistens*”² (“the wisdom of God substantially existing”) “*figura expressa substantiæ patris*” (express image of the Father’s substance”), “*virtus altera in sua proprietate subsistens*” (a second force existing in its own characteristic fashion”). He is, and here Origen appeals to the old Acts of Paul, an “animal vivens” with an independent existence.³ He is another person,⁴ namely, the second person in number.⁵ But here already begins Origen’s second train of thought which limits the first that we have set forth. As a particular hypostasis, which has its “first cause” (*πρῶτον αἴτιον*) in God, the Son is “that which is caused” (*αἰτιατόν*), moreover as the fulness of ideas, as he who comprehends in himself all the forms that are to have an active existence, the Son is no longer an absolute *simplex* like the Father.⁶ He is already the first stage of the transition from the One to the Manifold, and, as the medium of the world-idea, his essence has an inward relation to the world, which is itself without begin-

¹ In *περὶ ἀρχῶν* IV. 28 the *prolatio* is expressly rejected (see also I. 2. 4) as well as the “*conversio partis alicuius substantiæ dei in filium*” and the “*procreatio ex nullis substantibus*.”

² L.c. I. 2. 2.

³ L.c. I. 2. 3.

⁴ De orat. 15: Ἐτερος κατ’ οὐσίαν καὶ ὑποκείμενον ὁ υἱὸς ἔστι τοῦ πατρὸς. This, however, is not meant to designate a deity of a hybrid nature, but to mark the personal distinction.

⁵ C. Cels. VIII. 12.: δύο τῇ ὑποστάσει πράγματα. This was frequently urged against the Monarchians in Origen’s commentaries: see in Joh. X. 21: II. ὁ etc. The Son exists κατ’ ἴδιαν τῆς οὐσίας περιγραφῆν. Not that Origen has not yet the later terminology οὐσία, ὑπόστασις, ὑποκείμενον, πρόσωπον. We find three hypostases in Joh. II. 6. Lomm. I. p. 109, and this is repeatedly the case in c. Cels.

⁶ In Joh. I. 22. Lomm. I. p. 41 sq.: ὁ Θεὸς μὲν οὖν πάντα ἐν ἑστὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦν ὁ δὲ σωτὴρ ἡμῶν διὰ τὰ πολλὰ. The Son is ἰδέα ἰδεῶν, σύστημα θεωρημάτων ἐν αὐτῷ (Lomm. I. p. 127).

ning.¹ As soon therefore as the category of causality is applied—which moreover dominates the system—and the particular contemplation of the Son in relation to the Father gives way to the general contemplation of his task and destination, the Son is not only called *πῆσις* and *δυνατότης*, but all the utterances about the quality of his essence receive a limitation. We nowhere find the express assertion that this quality is inferior or of a different kind when compared with that of God; but these utterances lose their force when it is asserted that complete similarity between Father and Son only exists in relation to the world. We have to acknowledge the divine being that appeared in Christ to be the manifestation of the Deity; but, from God's standpoint, the Son is the hypostasis appointed by and *subordinated* to him.² The Son stands between the uncreated One and the created Many; in so far as unchangeableness is an attribute of self-existence he does not possess it.³ It is evident why Origen was obliged to conceive the Logos exactly as he did; it was only in this form that the idea answered the purpose for which it was intended. In the description of the essence of the Logos much more heed continues to be given to his creative than to his redeeming significance. Since it was only a teacher that Origen ultimately required for the purpose of redemption, he could unfold the nature and task of the Logos without thinking of Christ, whose name indeed he frequently mentions in his disquisitions, but whose person is really not of the slightest importance there.⁴

In order to comply with the rule of faith, and for this reason alone, for his speculation did not require a Spirit in addition to the Logos, Origen also placed the Spirit alongside of Father and Son. All that is predicated about him by the Church is that he is equal to the other persons in honour and dignity, and it was he that inspired both Prophets and Apostles; but that it is still undecided

¹ See the remarks on the saying: "The Father is greater than I." in Joh. XIII. 25, Lomm. II., p. 45 sq. and other passages. Here Origen shows that he considers the homousia of the Son and the Father just as relative as the unchangeability of the Son.

² Περὶ ἀρχῶν II. 2. 6 has been corrupted by Rufinus; see Jerome ep. ad Avitum.

³ See περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 2. 13 (see above, p. 354, note 3).

⁴ Athanasius supplemented this by determining the essence of the Logos from the redeeming work of Christ.

whether he be created or uncreated, and whether he too is to be considered the Son of God or not.¹ As the third hypostasis, Origen reckoned him part of the constant divine essence and so treated him after the analogy of the Son, without producing an impressive proof of the necessity of this hypostasis. He, however, became the Holy Spirit through the Son, and is related to the latter as the latter is related to the Father; in other words he is subordinate to the Son; he is the first creation of the Father through the Son.² Here Origen was following an old tradition. Considered quantitatively therefore, and this according to Origen is the most important consideration, the Spirit's sphere of action is the smallest. All being has its principle in the Father, the Son has his sphere in the rational, the Holy Spirit in the sanctified, that is in the Church; this he has to rule over and perfect. Father, Son, and Spirit form a *τριάς* ("triad")³ to which nothing may be compared; they are equal in dignity and honour, and the substance they possess is one. If the following is not one of Rufinus' corrections, Origen said⁴: *Nihil in trinitate maius minusve dicendum est cum unius divinitatis fons verbo ac ratione sua teneat universa*⁵ ("nothing in the Trinity is to be called greater or less, since the fountain of one divinity holds all his parts by word and reason"). But, as in Origen's sense the union of these only exists because the Father alone is the "source of deity" (*πηγή τῆς θεότητος*) and principle of the other two hypostases, the Trinity is in truth no homogeneous one, but one which, in accordance with a "subtle emanation idea", has degrees within it. This Trinity, which in the strict sense remains a

¹ See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* pref. and in addition to this Hermas' view of the Spirit.

² *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 3. The Holy Spirit is eternal, is ever being breathed out, but is to be termed a creature. See also in Joh. II. 6. Lomm. I. p. 109 sq.: τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐγένετο, πρεσβυτέρου (logically) παρ' αὐτὸ τοῦ λόγου τυγχάνοντος. Yet Origen is not so confident here as in his Logos doctrine.

³ See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 3. 5—8. Hence Origen says the heathen had known the Father and Son, but not the Holy Spirit (*de princip.* I. 3: II. 7).

⁴ L.c. § 7.

⁵ See Hom. in Num. XII. 1. Lomm. X. p. 127: "Est hæc trium distinctio personarum in patre et filio et spiritu sancto, quæ ad pluralem puteorum numerum revocatur. Sed horum puteorum unum est fons. Una enim substantia est et natura trinitatis."

Trinity of revelation, except that revelation belongs to the essence of God, is with Origen the real secret of the faith, the mystery beyond all mysteries. To deny it shows a Jewish, carnal feeling or at least the greatest narrowness of conception.

The idea of createdness was already more closely associated with the Holy Ghost than with the Logos. He is in a still clearer fashion than the Son himself the transition to the series of ideas and spirits that having been created by the Son, are in truth the unfolding of his fulness. They form the next stage after the Holy Spirit. In assuming the existence of such beings as were required by his philosophical system, Origen appealed to the Biblical doctrine of angels, which he says is expressly acknowledged in the Church.¹ With Clement even the association of the Son and Holy Ghost with the great angelic spirits is as yet not altogether avoided, at least in his expressions.² Origen was more cautious in this respect.³ The world of spirits appears to him as a series of well-arranged, graded energies, as the representative of created reason. Its characteristic is growth, that is, progress (πρροκοπή).⁴ Growth is conditioned by freedom: "*omnis creatura rationalis laudis et culpæ capax: laudis, si secundum rationem, quam in se habet, ad meliora proficiat, culpæ, si rationem recti declinet*"⁵ ("every rational creature is capable of meriting praise or blame—praise, if it advance to better things according to the reason it possesses in itself, blame, if it avoid the right course") As unchangeableness and permanence are

¹ Περὶ ἀρχῶν præf.

² From Hermas, Justin, and Athenagoras we learn how, in the 2nd century, both in the belief of uneducated lay-Christians and of the Apologists, Son, Spirit, Logos, and angels under certain circumstances shaded off into one another. To Clement, no doubt, Logos and Spirit are the only unchangeable beings besides God. But, inasmuch as there is a series which descends from God to men living in the flesh, there cannot fail to be elements of affinity between Logos and Spirit on the one hand and the highest angels on the other, all of whom indeed have the capacity and need of development. Hence they have certain names and predicates in common, and it frequently remains uncertain, especially as regards the theophanies in the Old Testament, whether it was a high angel that spoke, or the Son through the angel. See the full discussion in Zahn, Forschungen, III., p. 98 f.

³ Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 5.

⁴ So also Clement, see Zahn, l.c.

⁵ Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 5. 2.

characteristic of the Deity, so freedom is the mark of the created spirit.¹ In this thesis Origen goes beyond the assumption of the heretical Gnostics just as much as he does in his other proposition that the creaturely spirit is in no sense a portion of the divine (because it is changeable²); but in reality freedom, as he understands it, is only the capacity of created spirits to determine their own destiny *for a time*. In the end, however, they must turn to that which is good, because everything spiritual is indestructible. *Sub specie æternitatis*, then, the mere communication of the divine element to the created spirit³ is *not* a mere communication, and freedom is no freedom; but the absolute necessity of the created spirit's developing itself merely appears as freedom. Yet Origen himself did not draw this conclusion, but rather based everything on his conception that the freedom of *nature rationabiles* consisted in the *possibilitas utriusque*, and sought to understand the cosmos, as it is, from this freedom. To the *nature rationabiles*, which have different *species* and *ordines*, human souls also belong. The whole of them were created from all eternity; for God would not be almighty unless he had always produced everything⁴; in virtue of their origin they are equal, for their original community with

¹ It was of course created before the world, as it determines the course of the world. See Comm. in Matth. XV, 27, Lomm. III., p. 384 sq.

² See Comm. in Joh. XIII. 25. Lomm. II., p. 45; we must not look on the human spirit as *ὁμοούσιος* with the divine one. The same had already been expressly taught by Clement. See Strom. II. 16. 74: ὁ Θεὸς οὐδεμίαν ἔχει πρὸς ἡμᾶς φυσικὴν σχέσιν ὡς οἱ τῶν αἰρέσεων κτίσται βέλουσιν. Adumbr., p. 91 (ed. Zahn). This does not exclude God and souls having *quodammodo* one substance.

³ Such is the teaching of Clement and Origen. They repudiated the possession of any natural, essential goodness in the case of created spirits. If such lay in their essence, these spirits would be unchangeable.

⁴ Περὶ ἀρχῶν I. 2. 10: "Quemadmodum pater non potest esse quis, si filius non sit, neque dominus quis esse potest sine possessione, sine servo, ita ne omnipotens quidem deus dici potest, si non sint, in quos exerceat potentatum, et deo ut omnipotens ostendatur deus, omnia subsistere necesse est." (So the Hermogenes against whom Tertullian wrote had already argued). "Nam si quis est, qui velit vel secula aliqua vel spatia transisse, vel quodcumque aliud nominare vult, cum nondum facta essent, que facta sunt, sine dubio hoc ostendet, quod in illis seculis vel spatiis omnipotens non erat deus et postmodum omnipotens factus est." God would therefore, it is said in what follows, be subjected to a *προκοπή*, and thus be proved to be a finite being. III. 5. 3.

the Logos permits of no diversity¹; but, on the other hand, they have received different tasks and their development is consequently different. In so far as they are spirits subject to change, they are burdened with a kind of bodily nature,² for it is only the Deity that is without a body. The element of materiality is a necessary result of their finite nature, that is, of their being created; and this applies both to angels and human souls.³ Now Origen did not speculate at all as to how the spirit world might have developed in ideal fashion, a fact which it is exceedingly important to recognise; he knows nothing at all about an ideal development for all, and does not even view it as a possibility. The truth rather is that as soon as he mentions the *nature rationabiles*, he immediately proceeds to speak of their fall, their growth, and their diversities. He merely contemplates them in the given circumstances in which they are placed (see the exposition in *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 9. 2).

THE DOCTRINE OF THE FALL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES. All created spirits must develop. When they have done so, they attain perfection and make way for new dispensations and worlds.⁴ In the exercise of their freedom, however, disobedience, laxity, laziness, and failure make their appearance among them in an endless multiplicity of ways.⁵ The disciplining and purifying

¹ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 8.

² Here, however, Origen is already thinking of the temporary wrong development, that is of growth. See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 7. Created spirits are also of themselves immaterial, though indeed not in the sense that this can be said of God who can never attach anything material to himself.

³ Angels, ideas (see Phot. Biblioth. 109), and human souls are most closely connected together, both according to the theory of Clement and Origen and also to that of Pantenus before them (see Clem. eclog. 56. 57); and so it was taught that men become angels (Clem. Strom. VI. 13. 107). But the stars also, which are treated in great detail in *περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 7, belong to the number of the angels. This is a genuinely Greek idea. The doctrine of the preëxistence of human souls was probably set forth by Clement in the Hypotyposes. The theory of the transmigration of souls was probably found there also (Phot. Biblioth. 109). In the Adumbrat., which has been preserved to us, the former doctrine is, however, contested and is not found in the Stromateis VI. 16. 1. sq.

⁴ Phot. Biblioth. 109: *Κλήμης πολλοὺς πρὸ τοῦ Ἄδαμ κόσμους τερατεύεται*. This cannot be verified from the Strom. Orig., *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 3.

⁵ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 5 and the whole 3rd Book. The Fall is something that happened before time began.

of these spirits was the purpose for which the material world was created by God.¹ It is therefore a place of purification, ruled and harmoniously arranged by God's wisdom.² Each member of the world of spirits has received a different kind of material nature in proportion to his degree of removal from the Creator. The highest spirits, who have virtually held fast by that which is good, though they too stand in need of restitution, guide the world, are servants of God (*ἄγγελοι*), and have bodies of an exceedingly subtle kind in the form of a globe (stars). The spirits that have fallen very deeply (the spirits of men) are banished into material bodies. Those that have altogether turned against God have received very dark bodies, indescribably ugly, though not visible. Men therefore are placed between the angels and demons, both of whom try to influence them. The moral struggle that man has to undergo within himself is made harder by the demons, but lightened by the angels,³ for these spiritual powers are at all times and places acting both upon

¹ The assumption of uncreated matter was decidedly rejected by Origen (*περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. I. 2). On the other hand Clement is said to have taught it in the Hypotyposes (Phot., l.c.: *ὕλην ἀχρονον ὁσέξῃσι*): this cannot be noticed in the Strom.: in fact in VI. 16. 147 he vigorously contested the view of the uncreatedness of the world. He emphasised the agreement between Plato and Moses in the doctrine of creation (Strom. II. 16. 74 has nothing to do with this). According to Origen, matter has no qualities and may assume the most diverse peculiarities (see, e.g., c. Cels. III. 41).

² This conception has given occasion to compare Origen's system with Buddhism. Bigg, (p. 193) has very beautifully said: "Creation, as the word is commonly understood, was in Origen's views not the beginning, but an intermediate phase in human history. Æons rolled away before this world was made: æons upon æons, days, weeks, months and years, sabbatical years, jubilee years of æons will run their course, before the end is attained. The one fixed point in this gigantic drama is the end, for this alone has been clearly revealed." "God shall be all in all." Bigg also rightly points out that Rom. VIII. and I Cor. XV. were for Origen the key to the solution of the problems presented by creation.

³ The popular idea of demons and angels was employed by Origen in the most comprehensive way, and dominates his whole view of the present course of the world. See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* III. 2 and numerous passages in the Commentaries and Homilies, in which he approves the kindred views of the Greeks as well as of Hermas and Barnabas. The spirits ascend and descend: each man has his guardian spirit, and the superior spirits support the inferior (*περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 6). Accordingly they are also to be revered (*θεραπεύεσθαι*): yet such reverence as belongs to a Gabriel, a Michael, etc., is far different from the adoration of God (c. Cels. VII. 13).

the physical and the spiritual world. But everything is subject to the permission of the divine goodness and finally also to the guidance of divine providence, though the latter has created for itself a limit in freedom.¹ Evil, however, and it is in this idea that Origen's great optimism consists, cannot conquer in the end. As it is nothing eternal, so also it is at bottom nothing real; it is "nonexistent" (οὐκ ἔν) and "unreal" (ἄνυπόστατον).² For this very reason the estrangement of the spirits from God must finally cease; even the devil, who, as far as his *being* is concerned, resulted from God's will, cannot always remain a devil. The spirits must return to God, and this moment is also the end of the material world, which is merely an intermediate phase.³

According to this conception the doctrine of man, who in Origen's view is no longer the sole aim of creation to the same extent as he is with the other Fathers,⁴ assumes the following form: The essence of man is formed by the reasonable soul, which has fallen from the world above. This is united with the body by means of the animal soul. Origen thus believes in a threefold nature of man. He does so in the first place,

¹ Clement wrote a special work *περὶ προνοίας* (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 39 ff.) and treated at length of *προνοία* in the Strom.: see Orig., *περὶ ἀρχῶν* III. 1: de orat. 6 etc. Evil is also subject to divine guidance: see Clem., Strom. I. 17. 81—87: IV. 12. 86 sq. Orig. Hom. in Num. XIV., Lomm. X., p. 163: "Nihil otiosum, nihil inane est apud deum, quia sive bono proposito hominis utitur ad bona sive malo ad necessaria." Here and there, however, Origen has qualified the belief in Providence, after the genuine fashion of antiquity (see c. Cels. IV. 74).

² *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 9. 2: "Recedere a bono, non aliud est quam effici in malo. Ceterum namque est, malum esse bono carere. Ex quo accidit, ut in quanta mensura quis devolveretur a bono, in tantam mensuram malitiæ deveniret." In the passage in Joham. II. 7. Lomm. I., p. 115, we find a closely reasoned exposition of evil as *ἄνυπόστατον* and an argument to the effect that τὰ πονηρὰ are—*μὴ ὄντα*.

³ *Περὶ ἀρχῶν* I. 5. 3: III. 6. The devil is the chief of the apostate angels (c. Cels. IV. 65). As a reasonable being he is a creature of God (i. e., and in Joh. II. 7. Lomm., l. c.).

⁴ Origen defended the teleology culminating in man against Celsus' attacks on it: but his assumption that the spirits of men are only a part of the universal spirit world is, as a matter of fact, quite akin to Celsus' view. If we consider the plan of the work *περὶ ἀρχῶν* we easily see that to Origen humanity was merely an element in the cosmos.

because Plato holds this theory, and Origen always embraced the most complicated view in matters of tradition, and secondly, because the rational soul can never in itself be the principle of action opposed to God, and yet something relatively spiritual must be cited as the cause of this action. It is true that we also find in Origen the view that the spirit in man has itself been cooled down into a soul, has been, as it were, transformed into a soul; but there is necessarily an ambiguity here, because on the one hand the spirit of man is said to have chosen a course opposed to God, and, on the other, that which is rational and free in man must be shown to be something remaining intact.¹ Man's struggle consists in the endeavour of the two factors forming his constitution to gain control of his sphere of action. If man conquers in this struggle he attains *likeness* to God; the image of God he bears beyond danger of loss in his indestructible, rational, and therefore immortal spirit.² Victory, however, denotes nothing else than the subjugation of the instincts and passions.³ No doubt God affords help in the struggle, for nothing good is without God,⁴ but in such a way as not to interfere with freedom. According to this conception sin is a

¹ The doctrine of man's threefold constitution is also found in Clement. See *Pedag.* III. 1. 1; *Strom.* V. 14. 94; VI. 16. 134. (quite in the manner of Plato). Origen, who has given evidence of it in all his main writings, sometimes calls the rational part spirit, sometimes *ψυχὴ λογικὴ*, and at other times distinguishes two parts in the one soul. Of course he also professes to derive his psychology from the Holy Scriptures. The chief peculiarity of his speculation consists in his assumption that the human spirit, as a fallen one, became as it were a soul, and can develop from that condition partly into a spirit as before and partly into the flesh (see *περὶ ἀρχῶν* III. 4. 1 sq.; II. 8. 1—5). By his doctrine of the preëxistence of souls Origen excluded both the creation and traducian hypotheses of the origin of the soul.

² Clement (see *Strom.* II. 22. 131) gives the following as the opinion of some Christian teachers: *το μὲν κατ' εἰκόνα εὐθέως κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν εἰληφέναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον, τὸ κατ' ὁμοίωσιν δὲ ὕστερον κατὰ τὴν πελειώσιν μέλλειν ἀπολαμβάνειν.* Origen, c. *Cels.* IV. 30: *ἐποίησε δὲ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ κατ' ὁμοίωσιν ἤδη.*

³ This follows from the fundamental psychological view and is frequently emphasised. One must attain the *σωφορσύνη*.

⁴ This is emphasised throughout. The goodness of God is shown first in his having given the creature reason and freedom, and secondly in acts of assistance, which, however, do not endanger freedom. *Clem., Strom.* VI. 12. 96: *ἡμεῖς ἐξ ἡμεῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σώζεσθαι.*

matter of necessity in the case of fallen spirits; all men are met with as sinners and are so, for they were already sinners.¹ Sin is rooted in the whole earthly condition of men; it is the weakness and error of the spirit parted from its origin.² The idea of freedom, indeed, is supposed to be a feature which always preserves the guilty character of sin; but in truth it becomes a mere appearance³ it does not avail against the constitution of man and the sinful habit propagated in human society.⁴ All must be sinners at first,⁵ for that is as much their destiny as is the doom of death which is a necessary consequence of man's material nature.⁶

The Doctrine of Redemption and Restoration.

In the view of Clement and Origen the proposition: "God wishes us to be saved by means of ourselves" (ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σώζεσθαι) is quite as true as the other state-

¹ See above, p. 344. and p. 361. note 5. Origen continually emphasised the universality of sin in the strongest expressions; c. Cels. III. 61—66: VII. 50: Clem. Præd. III. 12. 93: τὸ ἐξαμαρτάνειν πᾶσιν ἔμφυτον.

² See Clem., Strom. VII. 16. 101: μυρίων γούν ὄντων κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἢ πράσσουσιν ἀνθρώποι σχεδὸν δύο εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ πάσης ἀμαρτίας, ἀγνοια καὶ ἀσθένεια, ἅμφω δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, τῶν μῆτε ἐθελόντων μανθάνειν μῆτε αὐτῆς ἐπιθυμίας κρατεῖν. Two remedies correspond to this (102): ἡ γνῶσις τε καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν μαρτυρίας ἐναργῆς ἀπόδειξις and ἡ κατὰ λόγον ἄσκησις ἐκ πίστεώς τε καὶ φόβου παιδαγωγουμένη, or otherwise expressed: ἡ θεωρία ἢ ἐπιστημονική and ἡ πράξις, which lead to perfect love.

³ Freedom is not prejudiced by the idea of election that is found here and there, for this idea is not worked out. In Clem., Strom. VI. 9. 76. it is said of the friend of God, the true Gnostic, that God has destined (προώρισεν) him to sonship before the foundation of the world. See VII. 17. 107.

⁴ C. Cels. III. 69.

⁵ It is both true that men have the same freedom as Adam and that they have the same evil instincts. Moreover, Origen conceived the story of Adam symbolically. See c. Cels. IV. 40; περὶ ἀρχῶν IV. 16: in Levit. hom. VI. 2. In his later writings, after he had met with the practice of child baptism in Cæsarea and prevailed on himself to regard it as apostolic, he also assumed the existence of a sort of hereditary sin originating with Adam, and added it to his idea of the preëxisting Fall. Like Augustine after him, he also supposed that there was an inherent pollution in sexual union; see in Rom. V. 9: VII. 4; in Lev. hom. VIII. 3; in Num. hom. 2 (Bigg, p. 202 f.).

⁶ Nevertheless Origen assumes that some souls are invested with flesh, not for their own sins, but in order to be of use to others. See in Joh. XIII. 43 ad fin: II. 24. 25: in Matth. XII. 30.

ment that no spirit can be saved without entering into fellowship with the Logos and submitting to his instruction.¹ They moreover hold that the Logos, after passing through his various stages of revealing activity (law of nature, Mosaic law), disclosed himself in the Gospel in a manner complete and accessible to all, so that this revelation imparts redemption and eternal happiness to all men, however different their capacities may be. Finally, it is assumed that not only men but all spiritual creatures, from the radiant spirits of heaven down to the dusky demons, have the capacity and need of redemption; while for the highest stage, the "spiritual Church", there is an *eternal Gospel* which is related to the written one as the latter is to the law. This eternal Gospel is the first complete revelation of God's highest intentions, and lies hidden in the Holy Scriptures.² These elements compose Origen's doctrine of revelation in general and of Christ in particular.³ They presuppose the sighing of the creature and the great struggle which is more especially carried on upon earth, within the human breast, by the angels and demons, virtues and vices, knowledge and passion, that dispute the possession of man. Man must conquer and yet he cannot do so without help. But help has never been wanting. The Logos has been revealing himself from the beginning. Origen's teaching concerning the preparatory history of redemption is founded on the doctrines of the Apologists; but with him everything takes a more vivid form, and influences on the part of the heretical Gnosis are also not lacking. Pure spirits, whom no fault of their own had caused to be invested with bodies, namely, the prophets, were sent to men by the Logos in order to support the struggling and to increase knowledge. To prepare the way of salvation the Logos chose for himself a whole people, and he revealed himself among all men. But all these undertakings did not yet lead to the goal. The Logos himself was obliged to appear and

¹ Origen again and again strongly urged the necessity of divine grace.

² See on this point Bigg, pp. 207 ff., 223 f. Origen is the father of Joachim and all spiritualists.

³ See Knittel, *Orig. Lehre von der Menschwerdung* (Tübinger Theologische Quartalschrift, 1872). Ramers, *Orig. Lehre von der Auferstehung des Fleisches*, 1851. Schultz, *Gottheit Christi*, pp. 51—62.

lead men back. But by reason of the diverse nature of the spirits, and especially of men, the redeeming work of the Logos that appeared could not fail to be a complicated one. In the case of some he had really to show them the victory over the demons and sin, a view which beyond dispute is derived from that of Valentinus. He had, as the "Godman," to make a sacrifice which represented the expiation of sin, he had to pay a ransom which put an end to the devil's sovereignty over men's souls, and in short he had to bring a redemption visible and intelligible to all.¹ To the rest, however, as divine teacher and hierophant

¹ With regard to this point we find the same explanation in Origen as in Irenæus and Tertullian, and also among the Valentinians, in so far as the latter describe the redemption necessary for the Psychici. Only, in this instance also, everything is more copious in his case, because he availed himself of the Holy Scriptures still more than these did, and because he left out no popular conception that seemed to have any moral value. Accordingly he propounded views as to the value of salvation and as to the significance of Christ's death on the cross, with a variety and detail rivalled by no theologian before him. He was, as Bigg (p. 209 ff.) has rightly noticed, the first Church theologian after Paul's time that gave a detailed theology of sacrifices. We may mention here the most important of his views. (1) The death on the cross along with the resurrection is to be considered as a real, recognisable victory over the demons, inasmuch as Christ (Col. II. 14) exposed the weakness of his enemies (a very frequent aspect of the matter). (2) The death on the cross is to be considered as an expiation offered to God. Here Origen argued that all sins require expiation, and, conversely, that all innocent blood has a greater or less importance according to the value of him who gives up his life. (3) In accordance with this the death of Christ has also a vicarious signification (see with regard to both these conceptions the treatise *Exhort. ad martyr.*, as well as *c. Cels.* VII. 17: I. 31; in *Rom. t. III.* 7, 8, *Lomm.* VI., pp. 196—216 etc.). (4) The death of Christ is to be considered as a ransom paid to the devil. This view must have been widely diffused in Origen's time: it readily suggested itself to the popular idea and was further supported by Marcionite theses. It was also accepted by Origen who united it with the notion of a deception practised on the devil, a conception first found among the Basilidians. By his successful temptation the devil acquired a right over men. This right cannot be destroyed, but only bought off. God offers the devil Christ's soul in exchange for the souls of men. This proposal of exchange was, however, insincere, as God knew that the devil could not keep hold of Christ's soul, because a sinless soul could not but cause him torture. The devil agreed to the bargain and was duped. Christ did not fall into the power of death and the devil, but overcame both. This theory, which Origen propounded in somewhat different fashion in different places (see *Exhort. ad martyr.* 12; in *Matth.* t. XVI. 8, *Lomm.* IV., p. 27; t. XII. 28, *Lomm.* III., p. 175; t. XIII. 8, 9, *Lomm.* III., pp. 224—229; in *Rom.* II. 13, *Lomm.* VI., p. 139 sq. etc.). shows in a specially clear way the conservative method of this theologian, who would not positively abandon any idea-

he had to reveal the depths of knowledge, and to impart in this very process a new principle of life, so that they might now partake of his life and themselves become divine through being interwoven with the divine essence. Here, as in the former case, restoration to fellowship with God is the goal; but, as in the lower stage, this restoration is effected through faith and sure conviction of the reality of a historical fact—namely, the redeeming death of Christ,—so, in the higher stage, it is accomplished through knowledge and love, which, soaring upward beyond the Crucified One, grasp the eternal essence of the Logos, revealed to us through his teaching in the eternal Gospel.¹ What the Gnostics merely represented as a more or

No doubt it shows at the same time how uncertain Origen was as to the applicability of popular conceptions when he was dealing with the sphere of the Psychici. We must here remember the ancient idea that we are not bound to sincerity towards our enemies. (5) Christ, the God who became flesh, is to be considered as high priest and mediator between God and man (see de Orat. 10. 15). All the above-mentioned conceptions of Christ's work were, moreover, worked out by Origen in such a way that his humanity and divinity are necessary inferences from them. In this case also he is characterised by the same mode of thought as Irenæus. Finally, let us remember that Origen adhered as strongly as ever to the proof from prophecy, and that he also, in not a few instances, regarded the phrase, "it is written", as a sufficient court of appeal (see, for example, c. Cels. II. 37). Yet, on the other hand, behind all this he has a method of viewing things which considerably weakens the significance of miracles and prophecies. In general it must be said that Origen helped to drag into the Church a great many ancient (heathen) ideas about expiation and redemption, inasmuch as he everywhere found some Bible passage or other with which he associated them. While he rejected polytheism and gave little countenance to people who declared: *εὐσεβέστεροί ἐσμεν καὶ Θεοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀγάλματα σέβοντες* (Clemens Rom., Hom. XI. 12), he had for all that a principal share in introducing the apparatus of polytheism into the Church (see also the way in which he strengthened angel and hero worship)

¹ See above, p. 342, note 1, on the idea that Christ, the Crucified One, is of no importance to the perfect. Only the teacher is of account in this case. To Clement and Origen, however, teacher and mystagogue are as closely connected as they are to most Gnostics. Christianity is *μάθησις* and *μυσταγωγία*, and it is the one because it is the other. But in all stages Christianity has ultimately the same object, namely, to effect a reconciliation with God, and deify man. See c. Cels. III. 28: *Ἄλλὰ γὰρ καὶ τὴν καταβᾶσαν εἰς ἀνθρωπίνην φύσιν καὶ εἰς ἀνθρωπίνης περιστάσεως δύναμιν, καὶ ἀναλαβοῦσαν ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα ἀνθρώπινον, ἐώρων ἐκ τοῦ πιστεῦσθαι μετὰ τῶν βειοτέρων συμβαλλομένην εἰς σωτηρίαν τοῖς πιστεύουσιν ὄρωσιν, ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἤρξατο βεῖα καὶ ἀνθρωπίνῃ συμφαίνεσθαι φύσις· ἢ ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη τῆ πρὸς τὸ βειοτερον κοινωνίᾳ γένηται βεῖα οὐκ ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Ἰησοῦ, ἀλλὰ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ πιστεῦειν ἀναλαμβάνουσι βίον, ἐν Ἰησοῦς ἐδιόξαζεν.*

less valuable appearance — namely, the historical work of Christ — was to Origen no appearance but truth. But he did not view it as *the* truth, and in this he agrees with the Gnostics, but as *a* truth, beyond which lies a higher. That historical work of Christ was a reality; it is also indispensable for men of more limited endowments, and not a matter of indifference to the perfect; but the latter no longer require it for their personal life. Here also Origen again contrived to reconcile contradictions and thus acknowledged, outdid, reconciled, and united both the theses of the Gnostics and those of orthodox Christians. The object and goal of redemption are the same for all, namely, the restoration of the created spirit to God and participation in the divine life. In so far as history is a struggle between spirits and demons, the death of Christ on the cross is the turning-point of history, and its effects extend even into heaven and hell.¹

On the basis of this conception of redemption Origen developed his idea of Christ. Inasmuch as he recognised Christ as the Redeemer, this Christ, the God-man, could not but be as many-sided as redemption is. Only through that masterly art of reconciling contradictions, and by the aid of that fantastic idea which conceives one real being as dwelling in another, could there be any apparent success in the attempt to depict a homogeneous person who in truth is no longer a person, but the symbol of the various redemptions. That such an acute thinker, however, did not shrink from the monstrosity his speculation produced is ultimately to be accounted for by the fact that this very speculation afforded him the means of nullifying all the utterances about Christ and falling back on the idea of the divine teacher as being the highest one. The whole “humanity” of the Redeemer together with its history finally disappears from the eyes of the perfect one. What remains is the principle, the divine Reason, which became known and recognisable through Christ. The perfect one, and this remark also applies to Clement’s perfect Gnostic, thus knows no “Christology”, but only an indwelling of the

¹ From this also we can very clearly understand Origen’s aversion to the early Christian eschatology. In his view the demons are already overcome by the work of Christ. We need only point out that this conception must have exercised a most important influence on his frame of mind and on politics.

Logos in Jesus Christ, with which the indwellings of this same Logos in men began. To the Gnostic the question of the divinity of Christ is of as little importance as that of the humanity. The former is no question, because speculation, starting above and proceeding downwards, is already acquainted with the Logos and knows that he has become completely comprehensible in Christ; the latter is no question, because the humanity is a matter of indifference, being the form in which the Logos made himself recognisable. But to the Christian who is not yet perfect the divinity as well as the humanity of Christ is a problem, and it is the duty of the perfect one to solve and explain it, and to guard this solution against errors on all sides. To Origen, however, the errors are already Gnostic Docetism on the one hand, and the "Ebionite" view on the other.¹ His doctrine was accordingly as follows: As a pure unchangeable spirit, the Logos could not unite with matter, because this as *μὴ ἔν* would have depotentiated him. A medium was required. The Logos did not unite with the body, but with a soul, and only through the soul with the body. This soul was a pure one; it was a created spirit that had never fallen from God, but always remained in faithful obedience to him, and that had chosen to become a soul in order to serve the purposes of redemption. This soul then was always devoted to the Logos from the first and had never renounced fellowship with him. It was selected by the Logos for the purpose of incarnation and that because of its moral dignity. The Logos became united with it in the closest way; but this

¹ Clement still advocated docetic views without reservation. Photius (Biblioth. 109) reproached him with these (*μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ δοξῆσαι*), and they may be proved from the Adumbrat., p. 87 (ed Zahn): "fertur in traditionibus—namely, in the Acta of Lucius—quoniam Iohannes ipsum corpus (Christi), quod erat extrinsecus, tangens manum suam in profunda misisse et duritiam carnis nullo modo reluctatam esse, sed locum manni præbuisse discipuli," and likewise from Strom. VI. 9. 71 and III. 7. 59. Clement's repudiation of the Docetists in VII. 17. 108 does not affect the case, and the fact that he here and there plainly called Jesus a man, and spoke of his flesh (Pæd. II. 2. 32; Protept. X. 110) matters just as little. This teacher simply continued to follow the old undisguised Docetism which only admitted the apparent reality of Christ's body. Clement expressly declared that Jesus knew neither pain, nor sorrow, nor emotions, and only took food in order to refute the Docetists (Strom. VI. 9. 71). As compared with this, Docetism in Origen's case appears throughout in a weakened form; see Bigg, p. 191.

connection, though it is to be viewed as a mysteriously real union, continues to remain perfect only because of the unceasing effort of will by which the soul clings to the Logos. Thus, then, no intermixture has taken place. On the contrary the Logos preserves his impassibility, and it is only the soul that hungers and thirsts, struggles and suffers. In this, too, it appears as a real human soul, and in the same way the body is sinless and unpolluted, as being derived from a virgin; but yet it is a human one. This humanity of the body, however, does not exclude its capacity of assuming all possible qualities the Logos wishes to give it; for matter of itself possesses no qualities. The Logos was able at any moment to give his body the form it required, in order to make the proper impression on the various sorts of men. Moreover, he was not enclosed in the soul and body of Christ; on the contrary he acted everywhere as before and united himself, as formerly, with all the souls that opened themselves to him. But with none did the union become so close as with the soul, and consequently also with the body of Jesus. During his earthly life the Logos glorified and deified his soul by degrees and the latter acted in the same way on his body. Origen contrived to arrange the different functions and predicates of the incarnate Logos in such a way that they formed a series of stages which the believer becomes successively acquainted with as he advances in knowledge. But everything is most closely united together in Christ. This union (*κοινωνία, ἕνωσις, ἀνακρίσις*) was so intimate that Holy Writ has named the created man, Jesus, the Son of God; and on the other hand has called the Son of God the Son of Man. After the resurrection and ascension the whole man Jesus appears transformed into a spirit, is completely received into the Godhead, and is thus identical with the Logos.¹

¹ See the full exposition in Thomasius, Origenes, p. 203 ff. The principal passages referring to the soul of Jesus are de princip. II. 6: IV. 31; c. Cels. II. 9. 20—25. Socrates (H. E. III. 7) says that the conviction as to Jesus having a human soul was founded on a *μυστικὴ παράδοσις* of the Church, and was not first broached by Origen. The special problem of conceiving Christ as a real *θεάνθρωπος* in contradistinction to all the men who only possess the presence of the Logos within them in proportion to their merits, was precisely formulated by Origen on many occasions. See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* IV. 29 sq. The full divine nature existed in Christ and yet, as before, the Logos operated wherever he wished (l. c., 30): “non ita

In this conception one may be tempted to point out all possible "heresies":—the conception of Jesus as a heavenly man—but all men are heavenly;—the Adoptianist ("Ebionite") Christology—but the Logos as a person stands behind it;—the conception

sentiendum est, quod omnis divinitatis eius maiestas intra brevissimi corporis claustra conclusa est, ita ut omne verbum dei et sapientia eius ac substantialis veritas ac vita vel a patre divulsa sit vel intra corporis eius coercita et conscripta breviter nec usquam præterea putetur operata: sed inter utrumque cauta pietatis debet esse confessio, ut neque aliquid divinitatis in Christo defuisse credatur et nulla penitus a paterna substantia, quæ ubique est, facta putetur esse divisio." On the perfect ethical union of Jesus' soul with the Logos see *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 6. 3: "anima Iesu ab initio creature et deinceps inseparabiliter ei atque indissociabiliter inhærens et tota totum recipiens atque in eius lucem splendoremque ipsa cedens facta est cum ipso principaliter unus spiritus;" II. 6. 5: "anima Christi ita elegit diligere iustitiam, ut pro immensitate dilectionis inconvertibiliter ei atque inseparabiliter inhæret, ita ut propositi firmitas et affectus immensitas et dilectionis inextinguibilis calor omnem sensum conversionis atque immutationis abscederet, et quod in arbitrio erat positum, longi usus affectu iam verum sit in naturam." The sinlessness of this soul thus became transformed from a fact into a necessity, and the real God-man arose, in whom divinity and humanity are no longer separated. The latter lies in the former as iron in the fire II. 6. 6. As the metal *capax est frigoris et caloris* so the soul is capable of deification. "Omne quod agit, quod sentit, quod intelligit, deus est," "nec convertibilis aut mutabilis dici potest" (l.c.). "Dilectionis merito anima Christi cum verbo dei Christus efficitur." (II. 6. 4). *Τίς μᾶλλον τῆς Ἰησοῦ ψυχῆς ἢ κἄν παραπλησίως κεκόλληται τῷ κυρίῳ; ὅπερ εἰ οὕτως ἔχει οὐκ εἰσὶ δύο ἢ ψυχὴ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ πρὸς τὸν πάσης κτίσεως πρωτότοκου Θεοῦ λόγον* (c. Cels. VI. 47). The metaphysical foundation of the union is set forth in *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 6. 2: "Substantia animæ inter deum carnemque mediante—non enim possibile erat dei naturam corpori sine mediatore miscere—nascitur deus homo, illa substantia media existente, cui utique contra naturam non erat corpus assumere. Sed neque rursus anima illa, utpote substantia rationabilis, contra naturam habuit, capere deum." Even during his historical life the body of Christ was ever more and more glorified, acquired therefore wonderful powers, and appeared differently to men according to their several capacities (that is a Valentinian idea, see Exc. ex Theod. 7): cf. c. Cels. I. 32—38: II. 23, 64: IV. 15 sq.: V. 8, 9, 23. All this is summarised in III. 41: "Ὁν μὲν νομίζομεν καὶ πεπεῖσμεθα ἀρχῆθεν εἶναι Θεὸν καὶ υἴον Θεοῦ, οὗτος ὁ αὐτολόγος ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ αὐτοσοφία καὶ ἡ αὐτοαλήθεια: τὸ δὲ θνητὸν αὐτοῦ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχὴν τῇ πρὸς ἐκεῖνον οὐ μόνον κοινωσάτω, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐνώσει καὶ ἀνακράσει, τὰ μέγιστα φάμεν προσειληφέναι καὶ τῆς ἐκεῖνου θεότητος κεκοινωνηκότα εἰς Θεὸν μεταβεβηκέναι. Origen then continues and appeals to the philosophical doctrine that matter has no qualities and can assume all the qualities which the Creator wishes to give it. Then follows the conclusion: *εἰ ὕγι᾽ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τί θαυμαστόν, τὴν ποιότητα τοῦ θνητοῦ κατὰ τὸν Ἰησοῦν σώματος προνοίᾳ Θεοῦ βουληθέντος μεταβαλεῖν εἰς αἰθέριον καὶ θείαν ποιότητα;* The man is now the same as the Logos. See in Joh. XXXII. 17, Lomm. II., p. 461 sq.: Hom. in Jerem. XV. 6, Lomm. XV., p. 288: *εἰ καὶ ἦν ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλὰ νῦν οὐδαμῶς ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος.*

of two Logoi, a personal and an impersonal; the Gnostic separation of Jesus and Christ; and Docetism. As a matter of fact Origen united all these ideas, but modified the whole of them in such a way that they no longer seem, and to some extent are not, what they turn out to be when subjected to the slightest logical analysis. This structure is so constituted that not a stone of it admits of being a hair's-breadth broader or narrower. There is only one conception that has been absolutely unemployed by Origen, that is, the modalistic view. Origen is the great opponent of Sabellianism, a theory which in its simplicity frequently elicited from him words of pity; otherwise he made use of all the ideas about Christ that had been formed in the course of two hundred years. This becomes more and more manifest the more we penetrate into the details of this Christology. We cannot, however, attribute to Origen a doctrine of two natures, but rather the notion of two subjects that become gradually amalgamated with each other, although the expression "two natures" is not quite foreign to Origen.¹ The Logos retains his human nature eternally,² but only in the same sense in which we preserve our nature after the resurrection.

The significance which this Christological attempt possessed for its time consists first in its complexity, secondly in the energetic endeavour to give an adequate conception of Christ's *humanity*, that is, of the moral freedom pertaining to him as a creature. This effort was indeed obliged to content itself with a meagre result: but we are only justified in measuring Origen's Christology by that of the Valentinians and Basilidians, that is, by the scientific one that had preceded it. The most important advance lies in the fact that Origen set forth a scientific Christology in which he was able to find so much scope for the humanity of Christ. Whilst within the framework of the scientific Christologies this humanity had hitherto been conceived as something

¹ In c. Cels. III. 28, Origen spoke of an intermingling of the divine and human natures, commencing in Christ (see page 368, note 1). See I. 66 fin.: IV. 15, where any ἀλλάττεσθαι καὶ μεταπλάττεσθαι of the Logos is decidedly rejected: for the Logos does not suffer at all. In Origen's case we may speak of a *communicatio idiomatum* (see Bigg, p. 190 f.).

² In opposition to Redepening.

indifferent or merely apparent, Origen made the first attempt to incorporate it with the various speculations without prejudice to the Logos, God in nature and person. No Greek philosopher probably heeded what Irenæus set forth respecting Christ as the second Adam, the *recapitulatur generis humani*; whereas Origen's speculation could not be overlooked. In this case the Gnosis really adopted the idea of the incarnation, and at the same time tried to demonstrate the conception of the God-man from the notions of unity of will and love. In the treatise against Celsus, moreover, Origen went the reverse way to work and undertook to show, and this not merely by help of the proof from prophecy, that the predicate deity applied to the historical Christ.¹ But Origen's conception of Christ's person as a model (for the Gnostic) and his repudiation of all magical theories of redemption ultimately explain why he did not, like Tertullian, set forth a doctrine of two natures, but sought to show that in Christ's case a human subject with his will and feelings became completely merged in the Deity. No doubt he can say that the union of the divine and human natures had its beginning in Christ, but here he virtually means that this beginning is continued in the sense of souls imitating the example of Christ. What is called the real redemption supposed to be given in him is certainly mediated in the Psychic through his *work*, but the *person* of Christ which cannot be known to any but the perfect man is by no means identified with that real redemption, but appears as a free moral personality, inwardly blended with the Deity, a personality which cannot mechanically transfer the content of its essence, though it can indeed exercise the strongest impression on mind and heart. To Origen the highest value of Christ's person lies in the fact that the Deity has here condescended to reveal to us the whole fulness of his essence, in the person of a man, as well as in the fact that a man is given to us who shows that the human spirit is capable of becoming entirely God's. At bottom there is nothing obscure

¹ This idea is found in many passages, especial in Book III., c. 22—43, where Origen, in opposition to the fables about deification, sought to prove that Christ is divine because he realised the aim of founding a holy community in humanity. See, besides, the remarkable statement in III. 38 init.

and mystical here; the whole process takes place in the will and in the feelings through knowledge.¹

This is sufficient to settle the nature of what is called personal attainment of salvation. Freedom precedes and supporting grace follows. As in Christ's case his human soul gradually united itself with the Logos in proportion as it voluntarily subjected its will to God, so also every man receives grace according to his progress. Though Clement and Origen did not yet recommend actual exercises according to definite rules, their description of the gradations by which the soul rises to God already resembles that of the Neoplatonists, except that they decidedly begin with faith as the first stage. Faith is the first step and is our own work.² Then follows the religious contemplation of visible things, and from this the soul advances, as on the steps of a ladder, to the contemplation of the *substantiæ rationabiles*, the Logos, the knowable essence of God, and the whole fulness of the Deity.³ She retraces her steps upwards along the path she formerly passed over as a fallen spirit. But, when left to her own resources, she herself is everywhere weak and powerless; she requires at every stage the divine grace, that is, enlightenment.⁴ Thus a

¹ A very remarkable distinction between the divine and human element in Christ is found in Clement *Pæd.* I. 3. 7: πάντα δύνησιν ὁ κύριος καὶ πάντα ὠφελεῖ καὶ ὡς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὡς Θεός, τὰ μὲν ἀμαρτήματα ὡς Θεός ἀφίεις, εἰς δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐξαμαρτάνειν παιδαγωγῶν ὡς ἄνθρωπος.

² "Fides in nobis: mensura fidei causa accipiendarum gratiarum" is the fundamental idea of Clement and Origen (as of Justin); "voluntas humana præcedit". In *Ezech. hom.* I. c. 11: "In tua potestate positum est, ut sis palea vel frumentum". But all growth in faith must depend on divine help. See Orig. in *Matth.* series 69, Lomm. IV., p. 372: "Fidem habenti, quæ est ex nobis, dabitur gratia fidei quæ est per spiritum fidei, et abundabit; et quidquid habuerit quis ex naturali creatione, cum exercuerit illud, accipit id ipsum et ex gratia dei, ut abundet et firmior sit in eo ipso quod habet"; in *Rom.* IV. 5, Lomm. VI., p. 258 sq.; in *Rom.* IX. 3, Lomm. VII., p. 300 sq. The fundamental idea remains: ὁ Θεός ἡμᾶς ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν βούλεται σώζεσθαι.

³ This is frequent in Clement; see Orig. c. *Cels.* VII. 46.

⁴ See *Clem., Strom.* V. 1. 7: χάριτι σωζόμεθα, οὐκ ἄνευ μέντοι τῶν κλητῶν ἔργων. VII. 7. 48: V. 12. 82, 13. 83: εἴτε τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτεξούσιον εἰς γνῶσιν ἀφικόμενον τὰ γὰρ οὐ σικριτᾶ τε καὶ πηδᾶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα, πλὴν οὐ χάριτος ἄνευ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου πτεροῦται τε καὶ ἀνίσταται καὶ ἄνω τῶν ὑπερκειμένων αἰρεται ἢ ψυχῆ; The amalgamation of freedom and grace. *Quis div. salv.* 21. Orig. *περὶ ἀρχῶν* III. 2. 2: In bonis rebus humanum propositum solum per se ipsum imperfectum est

union of grace and freedom takes place within the sphere of the latter, till the "contemplative life" is reached, that joyous ascetic contemplativeness, in which the Logos is the friend, associate, and bridegroom of the soul, which now, having become a pure spirit, and being herself deified, clings in love to the Deity.¹ In this view the thought of regeneration in the sense of a fundamental renewal of the Ego has no place;² still baptism is designated the bath of regeneration. Moreover, in connection with the consideration of main Biblical thoughts (God as love, God as the Father, Regeneration, Adoption, etc.) we find in both Clement and Origen passages which, free from the trammels of the system, reproduce and set forth the preaching of the Gospel in a surprisingly appropriate way.³ It is evident that in Origen's view there can be no visible means of grace; but it likewise follows from his whole way of thinking that the symbols attending the enlightening operation of grace are not a matter of indifference to the Christian Gnostic, whilst to the common man they are indispensable.⁴ In the same way he brought

ad consummationem boni. adiutorio namque divino ad perfecta quæque perducitur." III. 2. 5. 1. 18: Selecta in Ps. 4. Lomm. XI. p. 450: τὸ τοῦ λογικοῦ ἀγὰθόν μικτόν ἐστιν ἐκ τε τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς συμπνεύσεως θείας δυνάμεως τῆς τὰ κάλλιστα προελομένης. The support of grace is invariably conceived as enlightenment: but this enlightenment enables it to act on the whole life. For a more detailed account see Landerer in the Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie, Vol. II. Part 3. p. 500 ff., and Wörter. *Die christliche Lehre von Gnade und Freiheit bis auf Augustin.* 1860.

¹ This goal was much more clearly described by Clement than by Origen: but it was the latter who, in his commentary on the Song of Solomon, gave currency to the image of the soul as the bride of the Logos. Bigg (p. 188 f.): "Origen, the first pioneer in so many fields of Christian thought, the father in one of his many aspects of the English Latitudinarians, became also the spiritual ancestor of Bernard, the Victorines, and the author of the "De imitatione", of Tauler and Molinos and Madame de Guyon."

² See Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte I. p. 467.

³ See e.g., Clem. Quis dives salv. 37 and especially Pædag. I. 6. 25—32; Orig. de orat. 22 sq.—the interpretation of the Lord's Prayer. This exegesis begins with the words: "It would be worth while to examine more carefully whether the so-called Old Testament anywhere contains a prayer in which God is called Father by anyone: for till now we have found none in spite of all our seeking. . . Constant and unchangeable sonship is first given in the new covenant."

⁴ See above, p. 339 f.

into play the system of numerous mediators and intercessors with God, viz., angels and dead and living saints, and counselled an appeal to them. In this respect he preserved a heathen custom. Moreover, Origen regards Christ as playing an important part in prayer, particularly as mediator and high priest. On prayer to Christ he expressed himself with great reserve.

Origen's eschatology occupies a middle position between that of Irenæus and the theory of the Valentinian Gnostics, but is more akin to the latter view. Whilst, according to Irenæus, Christ reunites and glorifies all that had been severed, though in such a way that there is still a remnant eternally damned; and, according to Valentinus, Christ separates what is illegitimately united and saves the spirits alone, Origen believes that all spirits will be finally rescued and glorified, each in the form of its individual life, in order to serve a new epoch of the world when sensuous matter disappears of itself. Here he rejects all sensuous eschatological expectations.¹ He accepted the formula, "resurrection of the flesh", only because it was contained in the doctrine of the Church; but, on the strength of 1. Cor. XV. 44, he interpreted it as the rising of a "corpus spiritale", which will lack all material attributes and even all the members that have sensuous functions, and which will beam with radiant light like the angels and stars.² Rejecting the doctrine that souls sleep,³ Origen assumed that the souls of the departed immediately enter Paradise,⁴ and that souls not yet purified pass into a state of punishment, a penal fire, which, however, like the whole world, is to be conceived as a place of purification.⁵ In this way also

¹ See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 11.

² See *περὶ ἀρχῶν* II. 10. 1—3. Origen wrote a treatise on the resurrection, which, however, has not come down to us, because it was very soon accounted heretical. We see from c. Cels. V. 14—24 the difficulties he felt about the Church doctrine of the resurrection of the flesh.

³ See Eusebius, H. E. VI. 37.

⁴ Orig., Hom. II. in Reg. I., Lomm. XI., p. 317 sq.

⁵ C. Cels. V. 15; VI. 26; in Lc. Hom. XIV., Lomm. V., p. 136: "Ego puto, quod et post resurrectionem ex mortuis indigemus sacramento eluente nos atque purgante". Clem., Strom. VII. 6. 34: *φαμὲν δ' ἡμεῖς ἀγιάζειν τὸ πῦρ, οὐ τὰ κρέα, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀμαρτωλοὺς ψυχάς, πῦρ οὐ τὸ πικρῶδες καὶ βάνανσον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρόνιμον*

Origen contrived to reconcile his position with the Church doctrines of the judgment and the punishments in hell; but, like Clement, he viewed the purifying fire as a temporary and figurative one; it consists in the torments of conscience.¹ In the end all the spirits in heaven and earth, nay, even the demons, are purified and brought back to God by the Logos-Christ,² after they have ascended from stage to stage through seven heavens.³ Hence Origen treated this doctrine as an esoteric one: "for the common man it is sufficient to know that the sinner is punished."⁴

This system overthrew those of the Gnostics, attracted Greek philosophers, and justified ecclesiastical Christianity. If one undertook to subject it to a new process of sublimation from the standpoint given in the "contemplative life", little else would be left than the unchangeable spirit, the created spirit, and the ethic. But no one is justified in subjecting it to this process.⁵ The method according to which Origen preserved whatever appeared valuable in the content of tradition is no less significant than his system of ethics and the great principle of viewing everything created in a relative sense. Supposing minds of a radical cast, to have existed at the close of the history of ancient civilisation, what would have been left to us? The fact of a strong and undivided religious interest attaching itself to the traditions of the philosophers and of the two Testaments was the condition—to use Origen's own language—that enabled a new world of spirits to arise after the old one had finished its course.

During the following century Origen's theology at first acted in its entirety. But it likewise attained this position of influence, because some important propositions could be detached from

λέγοντες (cf. Heraclitus and the Stoa). τὸ δικνούμενον διὰ ψυχῆς τῆς διερχομένης τὸ πῦρ. For Origen cf. Bigg, p. 229 ff. There is another and intermediate stage between the punishments in hell and *regnum dei*.

¹ See *περὶ ἀρχ.* II. 10. 4—7; c. Cels. I. c.

² See *περὶ ἀρχ.* I. 6. 1—4; III. 6. 1—8; c. Cels. VI. 26.

³ On the seven heavens in Clem. see Strom. V. 11. 77 and other passages. Origen does not mention them, so far as I know.

⁴ c. Cels. I. c.

⁵ We would be more justified in trying this with Clement.

their original connection and fitted into a new one. It is one of the peculiarities of this ecclesiastical philosophy of religion that the most of its formulæ could be interpreted and employed *in utramque partem*. The several propositions could be made to serve very different purposes not only by being halved, but also by being grouped. With this the relative unity that distinguishes the system no doubt vanished; but how many are there who strive after unity and completeness in their theory of the world? Above all, however, there was something else that necessarily vanished, as soon as people meddled with the individual propositions, and enlarged or abridged them. We mean the frame of mind which produced them, that wonderful unity between the relative view of things and the absolute estimate of the highest good attainable by the free spirit that is certain of its God. But a time came, nay, had already come, when a sense of proportion and relation was no longer to be found.

In the East the history of dogma and of the Church during the succeeding centuries is the history of Origen's philosophy. Arians and orthodox, critics and mystics, priests who overcame the world and monks who shunned it but were eager for knowledge¹ could appeal to this system and did not fail to do so. But, in the main problem that Origen set for the Church in this religious philosophy of his, we find a recurrence of that propounded by the so-called Gnosticism two generations earlier. He solved it by producing a system which reconciled the faith of the Church with Greek philosophy; and he dealt Gnosticism its death-blow. This solution, however, was by no means intended as the doctrine of the Church, since indeed it was rather based on the distinction between Church belief and theology, and consequently on the distinction between the common man and the theologian. But such a distinction was not permanently tenable in a Church that had to preserve its strength by the unity and finality of a revealed faith, and no longer tolerated fresh changes in the interpretation of its possession. Hence a further compromise was necessary. The Greek philosophy, or speculation, did not attain real and permanent recognition within

¹ See Bornemann, *In investiganda monachatus origine quibus de causis ratio habenda sit Origenis*. Gottingæ 1885.

the Church till a new accommodation, capable of being accounted both Pistis and Gnosis, was found between what Origen looked on as Church belief and what he regarded as Gnosis. In the endeavours of Irenæus, Tertullian, and Hippolytus were already found hesitating, nay, we may almost say naïve, attempts at such an accommodation; but ecclesiastical traditionalism was unable to attain complete clearness as to its own position till it was confronted with a philosophy of religion that was no longer heathen or Gnostic, but had an ecclesiastical colouring.

But, with this prospect, we have already crossed the border of the third century. At its beginning there were but few theologians in Christendom who were acquainted with speculation, even in its fragmentary form. In the course of the century it became a recognised part of the orthodox faith, in so far as the Logos doctrine triumphed in the Church. This development is the most important that took place in the third century; for it denoted the definite transformation of the rule of faith into the compendium of a Greek philosophical system, and it is the parallel of a contemporaneous transformation of the Church into a holy commonwealth (see above, chapter 3).

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