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PROFESSOR OF APOLOGETICS AND NEW TESTAMENT EXEGESIS FREE
CHURCH COLLEGE, GLASGOW.

VOL. XI.

HARNACK'S HISTORY OF DOGMA.

VOL. VI.

HISTORY OF DOGMA

BY

DR. ADOLPH HARNACK

ORDINARY PROF. OF CHURCH HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY, AND FELLOW OF
THE ROYAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCE, BERLIN

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TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.

AS at several places in this volume Latin quotations are largely introduced, so as to form portions of the text, these have in many cases been simply reproduced in English. Where the meaning is less obvious, and the reader might desire to be made acquainted with the original, the Latin has been inserted within brackets.

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HISTORY OF DOGMA

HISTORY OF DOGMA.

CHAPTER I.

HISTORY OF DOGMA IN THE PERIOD OF CLUGNY, ANSELM,
AND BERNARD, TILL THE CLOSE OF THE TWELFTH
CENTURY.

A TENACIOUSLY maintained tradition relates that in the closing years of the tenth century the Christians of the West looked forward with fear and trembling to the destruction of the world in the year 1000, and that a kind of reformation, expressing itself in the keenest activity in all branches of religion, was the consequence of this expectation. This representation has long since been proved a legend;¹ but there lies at the basis of it, as is the case with so many legends, an accurate historic observation. From the end of the tenth century² we really discern the beginnings of a powerful rise of religious and ecclesiastical life. This revival grew in strength, suffering from no reaction of any consequence, till the beginning of the thirteenth century. During this period it released, and took command of all the forces of mediæval manhood. All institutions of the past, and all the new elements of culture that had been added were subjected to its influence, and even the most hostile powers were ultimately

¹ The eschatological ideas were always strong and vigorous in the Middle Ages, but for a time they certainly asserted themselves with special intensity; see Wadstein, *Die Eschat. Ideengruppe* (Antichrist, world-Sabbath, world-end and world-judgment) in den Hauptmomenten ihrer christlich-mittelalterlichen Gesamtentwicklung, 1896. But Wadstein again thinks that the year 1000 was contemplated with special suspense (p. 16 f.).

² On the tenth century, see Reuter, *l.c.* I., p. 67 ff.

made to yield it service and support. In the thirteenth century the supremacy of the Church and the system of the mediæval view of the world appear in perfected form.¹

This perfecting is the conclusion, not only of Mediæval Church history, but also of that historical development of Christianity, the beginnings of which lie as far back as the history of the primitive Church. Certainly, if Christianity is regarded only as *doctrine*, the Middle Ages appear almost as a supplement to the history of the ancient Church; but if it is regarded as *life*, our judgment must be that it was only in the Western Church of the Middle Ages that the Christianity of the early Church came to its completion. In ancient times the Church was confronted with restrictions in the motives, standards, and ideas of ancient life. These restrictions it was never able to break through, and so it continued to be with the Church of the Eastern Empire: Monachism stood *alongside* the Church; the Church of the world was the old world itself with Christian manners. It was otherwise in the West. Here the Church was able to apply much more effectively its peculiar standards of monastic asceticism and domination of this world by the world beyond,² because it had not to subdue an ancient civilisation, but met with its restrictions simply in the most elementary forces of human life, in the desire to live, hunger, love and cupidity. It was thus able to propagate here through all circles, from the highest to the lowest, a view of the world which would inevitably have driven all into the cloisters, had not these elementary forces been stronger than even the fear of hell.

It is not the task of the History of Dogma to show how the mediæval view of the world was fully constructed and applied from the end of the tenth (for here the beginnings lie) till the thirteenth century. *Substantially* not much that is new would be discovered, for it is still the old well-known body of thought; what is new is merely the application of the material to all provinces of life, the comprehensive control in the hands of the Pope, and the gradual progressive development in its prior

¹ See v. Eicken, *Gesch. und System der mittelalterlichen Weltanschauung*, 1887.

² From this there resulted a new kind of dominion over the world, which certainly became very like the old, for there is only *one* way of exercising dominion.

stages of religious individualism. But before we describe the changes, partly really, and partly apparently slight, which dogma underwent down to the time of the Mendicant Orders, it is necessary to indicate in a few lines the conditions under which these changes came about. We must direct our attention to the fresh rise of *piety*, to the development of *ecclesiastical law*, and to the beginnings of mediæval *science*.

1. *The Fresh Rise of Piety.*

The Monastery of Clugny, founded in the tenth century, became the centre of the great reform which the Church in the West passed through in the eleventh century.¹ Instituted by monks, it was at first supported against the secularised monachism, priesthood (Episcopate),² and papacy by pious and prudent princes and bishops, above all, by the Emperor, the representative of God on earth, until the great Hildebrand laid hold of it, and, as Cardinal and successor of Peter, set it in

¹ The following partly corresponds with my Lecture on Monachism (3rd ed. 1886, p. 43 ff.). Two sources appear in the tenth century from which the religious awakening proceeded, the Monastery of Clugny, and the Saxon dynasty. We cannot attach too much importance to the influence of Matilda (cf. in general the Essay by Lamprecht, *Das deutsche Geistesleben unter den Ottonen in die deutsche Zeitschrift f. Geschichtswissensch.* Vol. VII., part 1, p. i. ff.). It extended to Henry II., and even, indeed, to the third Henry; v. Nitzsch, *Gesch. des deutschen Volkes I.*, p. 318 f. For the history of the world the ecclesiastical sympathies of the dynasty, and the spirit of ascetic piety that emanated from the saintly devotee in the Quedlinburg Convent were of as great importance as the reformed monachism of Clugny. The history of mediæval Germanic piety may be said to have begun with Matilda. Charlemagne is still in many respects a Christian of the type of Constantius and Theodosius.

² From Hauck (*K.-Gesch. Deutschlands III.*, p. 342 ff.) and the work of Sackur, *Die Cluniacenser in ihrer Kirchl. und allgemeinesch. Wirksamkeit bis zur Mitte des 11. Jahrh.* (2 vols., 1892-1894) we learn that the reform of Clugny had for centuries to contend with the same difficulties against the secularised Church and the secularised, but also more independent monachism (see also Hauck, "Zur Erklärung von Ekkeh. Cas. s. Galli" c. 87 in the *Fest-schrift f. Luthardt*, p. 107 ff.) as had the old monachism formerly on its introduction about 400 into Gaul and Spain (and as had the Minorites at a later time). It is instructive to notice the attitude of the laity in connection with these three great reforms of the Church. Towards the first they were substantially indifferent, in the second they took a share from the outset (against the secularised clergy), the third (the Minorite) was simply carried out by them.

opposition to the princes, the secularised clergy, and the Emperor. What the West obtained in it was a monastic reform of the Church, that rested on the idea of a view of the world that made everything alike, and that consequently favoured the universal supremacy of Rome over the Church. What were the aims of this new movement which took hold of the entire Church in the second half of the eleventh century? In the first instance, and chiefly, the restoration *in the monasteries themselves* of the "old" discipline, of the true abnegation of the world, and piety; but then, also, first, *the monastic training of the whole secular clergy*; second, *the supremacy of the monastically trained clergy over the lay world, over princes and nations*; third, *the reduction of national churches, with their pride and secularity, in favour of the uniform supremacy of Rome.*¹

¹ Sackur (II., p. 464 f.) characterises this French monastic reform thus: "The movement of Clugny did not start with announcing a programme: it was the product of a view of the world. It had no other aim than to oppose the coarse materialism of those days by reviving those institutions that admitted of an existence in sympathy with evangelical injunctions, even in the midst of a barbarised society. It was a formation of autonomous associations, such as usually arise in disorganised States under a weak central government, and serve to supplement by self-help the great social unions of, e.g., State and Church. From this there resulted the design of influencing from these institutions those around, and winning them for religion. The restored monasteries increased in number, the task became always greater; but it became in no way different. The winning of souls was, and continued to be, the real end. Connections became extended; we have seen how ready the princes were to support the efforts of the monks. Very soon every family of mark had its family monastery. . . . Monachism found its way to the courts . . . by means of a conspicuous social activity monachism gained hold of the masses. . . . Not a few bishops, especially in the South, were carried away by the current, friends of the movement came to occupy the Episcopal Sees. What followed was a spiritual transformation (but no transformation of any consequence of a literary and scientific kind. See what Sackur has stated, II., p. 327 ff.), giving pain to those who had previously built their house out of the ruins of the Carolingian order of society, giving annoyance especially to a part of the Episcopate. . . . With this the opposition also was given. The ascetic *Romanic* movement issuing from the South mastered in the end the French North, captured the new Capetian dynasty, and here found itself confronted with an Episcopate which defended itself, in some cases, with desperation, against the assaults of a monachism that set out from the idea of a view of the world that made all things alike, from the thought of the universal Romanism, and that had no understanding for the independent pride of national churches. . . . The strict organisation of the German Imperial Church, its close union with the monarchy, the morality of the clergy (of a higher character as compared with the West-Frankian Church), still kept back the movement (at first) from the borders of Germany. It

The attempt to control the life of the whole clergy by monastic rules had already begun in the Carolingian period; but in part it had failed, in part the Chapters had only become thoroughly secularised. Now, however, it was undertaken anew and with greater efficiency. In the Cluniacensian reform Western monachism raised for the first time the decided claim to apply, and find recognition for, itself as the Christian order of life for all Christians of full age—the priests. This Western monachism could not withdraw from the task of serving the Church and urging itself upon it, *i.e.*, upon the clergy of the day, as Christianity. The Christian freedom which it strove for was for it, with all wavering, not only a freedom from the world, but *the freedom of Christendom for unrestricted preparation for the life beyond, and for the service of God in this world.* But no man can serve two masters.

Herewith there was given also its relation to the laity, with the position of the latter. If the mature confessors of Christianity must be trained according to monastic rules, then the immature—and these are the laity—must leave an entirely free course to the former, and must at least pay respect to their majesty, that it may be possible to stand approved in the coming judgment. If Clugny and its great Popes required the strict observance of celibacy, the estrangement of the priests from secular life, and especially the extirpation of all “simony,” then this last demand of itself involved, under the then existing distribution of power and property, the subjection of the laity, inclusive of the civil power, to the Church. But what was the Church’s dominion over the world to mean, side by side with the renunciation of the world exacted of all priests? How does that power over the earth harmonise with exclusive concern for the soul’s salvation in the world beyond? How can the same man who exclaims to his brother who thinks of leaving him all the patrimonial property, “What an unjust division,—for thee, heaven, and for me, the earth,” and who then himself enters a monastery—how

was only the process of ecclesiastical and civil dissolution, which began under Henry IV., that opened the breaches through which the monastic Romanic spirit could penetrate into the organism of the German State.”—On Clugny and Rome, see Sackur II., p. 441 ff.

can this same man bring himself to contend from within the monastery for dominion over the world? Now in a certain sense this dominion is *something substitutionary*, so long as and because the *true, universal* Christianising has not been carried out. As long as all are not genuine Christians, the obstinate world and the half-developed Christendom must be governed and educated, for otherwise the gospel would be captured by the powers hostile to it, and would not be in the position to fulfil its mission. But the dominion is certainly not merely something substitutionary. *Christianity is asceticism and the City of God.* All earthly relations must be moulded by the transcendent and universal idea of God's kingdom, and all national political forms of life must be brought under control in accordance therewith. But the kingdom of God has its existence on this side of things in the Church. The States, therefore, must become subject to the divine ends of the Church; they must merge themselves in the kingdom of righteousness and of the victorious Christ, which is a truly heavenly kingdom, because it has its source in heaven, and is ruled by Christ's representative. Thus out of the programme of renunciation of the world and out of the supra-mundane world that was to permeate this world, out of the Augustinian idea of the city of God and out of the idea of the *one* Roman world-empire, an idea that had never disappeared, but that had reached its glorification in the papal supremacy, there developed itself the claim to world-dominion, though the ruin of many an individual monk might be involved in making it. With sullied consciences and broken courage many monks, whose only desire was to seek after God, yielded to the plans of the great monastic Popes, and became subservient to their aims. And those whom they summoned from the retirement of the cloisters were just those who wished to think least of the world. They knew very well that it was only the monk who fled from the world, and would be rid of it, that could give help in subduing the world. Abandonment of the world in the service of the world-ruling Church, dominion over the world in the service of renunciation of the world,—this was the problem, and the ideal of the Middle Ages! What an innocent simplicity, what a wealth of illusions, was involved in

believing that this ideal could be realised, and in working for it! What a childlike reverence for the Church was necessary for developing that paradoxical "flight from the world," which at one and the same moment could join the fight and pray, utter cursing and blessing, exercise dominion and do penance! What a spirit of romance filled those souls, which at a single view could see in nature and all sensuous life an enchantment of the devil, and could behold in it at the same time, as illumined by the Church, the reflection of the world beyond! What kind of men were they, who abandoned the world and gladsome life, and then took back from the hand of the Church the good things of earth, love-making, combat and victory, speculating and money-making, feasting, and the joys of sense! Of course, with a slight turn of the kaleidoscope, all these things were in ruins; there must be fasting and repentance; but again a slight turn, and everything was back again which the world could afford—but glorified with the light of the Church and of the world beyond.

At the close of this period (about 1200) the Church was victorious. If ever ideals were carried out in the world and gained dominion over souls, it happened then. "It was as if the world had cast aside its old garment and clothed itself in the white robe of the Church."¹ Negation of the world and rule of the world by the Church appeared to men identical. That age bore in its culture "the pained look of world-renunciation on the one hand, and the look of strong character suggesting world-conquest on the other."² But in the period we are reviewing the development, which had to cancel itself when it seemed to have come near its completion, was still in process. Much was still to be done in the way of excavating secularised Christendom

¹ The Cluniacensian monk, Rudolph Glaber, *Ilist. lib. III., 4.*

² v. Eicken, *l.c.*, p. 155 f. If the early Church had had this latter characteristic expressed in its piety, it would inevitably have developed into Islam, or rather would have been crushed by the Roman world-empire. *But the Mediæval Church from its origin* (period of the migration of the nations) *had absorbed into itself the Roman world-empire as an idea and as a force*, and stood face to face with uncivilised nations; hence its aggressive character, which, moreover, it only developed after Charlemagne had shown it how the *vicarius Christi* on earth must rule. Nicolas I. learned from Charles I., the Gregorian popes from Otto I., Henry II., and Henry III., how the *rector ecclesiæ* must administer his office.

from its rough surroundings. And the masses were really changed in temper and set on fire—set on fire to contend against the secularised clergy and against simonistic princes in the whole of Europe. A new enthusiasm of a religious kind stirred the nations of the West, especially the Romanic. The ardour of the Crusades was the direct fruit of the monastic papal reform movement of the eleventh century. In them most vividly the religious revival which had passed over the West revealed itself in its specific character. The supremacy of the Church must be given effect to on earth. It was the ideas of the world-ruling monk of Clugny that guided the Crusaders on their path. The Holy Land and Jerusalem were parts of heaven on earth. They must be conquered. The dreadful and affecting scenes at the taking of the sacred city illustrate the spirit of mediæval piety.

Christianity is ascetism and the City of God—but the Church, which really fired souls for these ideas, lit also thereby the flame of *religious individualism*; it awakened the power which was ultimately strong enough to burst through the strict bonds of system and sever the chain. But it was long before things went so far as this. The Cluniacensian reform, if I see aright, produced as yet no religious individualism at all, in the sense of manifold expressions of piety. The enthusiastic religious spirit of the eleventh century was quite of the same kind in individual cases. Among the numerous founders of orders during this period, there still prevailed the greatest uniformity: spiritual need, flight from the world, contemplation—all of them are expressed in similar forms and by the same means.¹ An appeal must not be made to the Sectaries, already numerous in this century; they stood in scarcely any connection with the *ecclesiastical* revival, and had as yet no influence upon it.²

¹ See Neander, K.-Gesch. V., 1, pp. 449-564.

² Their doctrines were imported from the East—from Bulgaria; that old remnants of sects survived in the West itself (Priscillians) is not impossible. But spontaneous developments also must be recognised, such as have arisen in all ages of the Church's history, from reading Scripture and the Fathers, and from old reminiscences. In the twelfth century, heresy became an organised power, frightfully dangerous to the Church, in some regions—indeed, superior to it; see Reuter I., p. 153 f., and Döllinger's work, *Beiträge zur Sectengesch. des Mittelalters*, 2 Thl., München 1890, in which the Paulicians, Bogomili, Apostolic Brethren and Catharists are described.

Through the Crusades this became changed. The primitive Christian intuitions were restored. The sacred places stirred the imagination, and led it to the Christ of the Gospels. Piety was quickened by the most vivid view of the suffering and dying Redeemer; He must be followed through all the stages of His path of sorrow! Negative asceticism thus obtained a positive form, and a new and more certain aim. The notes of the Christ-Mysticism, which Augustine had struck only singly and with uncertainty,¹ became a ravishing melody. Beside the sacramental Christ the image of the historical took its place²—majesty in humility, innocence in penal suffering, life in death. That dialectic of piety without dialectic, that combined spectacle of suffering and of glory, that living picture of the true *communicatio idiomatum* (communication of attributes) developed itself, before which mankind stood worshipping, adoring with equal reverence the sublimity and the abasement. The sensuous and the spiritual, the earthly and the heavenly, shame and honour, renunciation and fulness of life were no longer tumultuously intermingled: they were united in serene majesty in the “*Ecce homo.*” And so this piety broke forth into the solemn hymn: “*Salve caput cruentatum*” (“O Lamb of God once wounded”). We cannot measure the effects which this newly-tempered piety produced, nor can we calculate the manifold types it assumed, and the multitude of images it drew within its range. We need only recall the picture—new, and certainly only derived from the cross—of the mother and child, the God in the cradle, omnipotence in weakness. Where this piety appears without dogmatic formulæ, without fancifulness, without subtlety, or studied calculation, it is the simple expression, now brought back again, of the Christian religion itself; for in reverence for the suffering Christ, and in the power which proceeds from His image, all the forces of religion are embraced. But even where it does not appear in its purity, where there is intermingled with it the trivial—down even to the heart-of-Jesus-worship³—the

¹ See Vol. V., p. 124 f.

² Bernh., Sermo LXII. 7, in cant. cantic: “quid enim tam efficax ad curanda conscientie vulnera nec non ad purgandam mentis aciem quam Christi vulnere sedula meditatio?”

³ This certainly is also very old, and that, too, in bad forms; it is not otherwise

over-refined and studied, it can still be salutary and worthy of honour, more salutary and worthy of honour, at least, than the strivings of a purely negative asceticism governed by no living conception. Even, indeed, where it manifestly degenerates into paganism, there will still remain some remnant of that liberating message, that the divine is to be found in humility and in patient suffering, and that the innocent suffers that the guilty may have peace.

In the period under review, this newly attuned piety, born of the Crusades, and nurtured on Augustine as now understood, was still in process of growth. But we have already alluded to the man who stood at the beginning, though he was himself no initiator, Saint Bernard.¹ Bernard is the religious genius of the twelfth century, and therefore also the leading spirit of the age. Above all, in him the Augustinian contemplation was revived. Too much is not asserted when it is said that he was *Augustinus redivivus*, that he moulded himself entirely on the pattern of the great African,² and that from him what lay at the foundation of his pious contemplations was derived. So far as Bernard furnishes a system of contemplation, and describes the development of love,³ on to its fourth and highest stage, at which man, rising above self-love, is wholly absorbed in the love of God, and experiences that momentary ecstasy in which he becomes one with God—so far Bernard has simply experienced anew what Augustine experienced before him. Even his language indeed is to a very large extent dependent on the language of the Confessions.⁴ But Bernard has also learned his relation to

with the limb-worship of Mary. In the *Vitt. Fratrum* of Gérard de Frachet (about 1260), published in the *Monum. Ord. Frat. Prædic. Hist. I.* (Louvain, 1896) the following is related of a brother: "Consueverat venerari beatam virginem, cor ejus, quo in Christum credidit et ipsum amavit, uterum, quo eum portavit, ubera, quibus eum lactavit, manus ejus tornatiles, quibus ei servivit, et pectus ejus, in quo recubuit, virtutum omnium apothecam specialiter venerans, ad singula faciens frequenter singulas venias cum totidem Ave Maria, adaptando illi virtutes, quibus meruit fieri mater dei," etc.

¹ See the Monograph by Neander, new edit. (edited by Deutsch, 1889); Hüffer, *Der hl. Bernard von Clairvaux*, vol. I., 1886.

² This is true to a much greater extent than Neander has shown.

³ Caritas and humilitas are the fundamental conceptions in Bernard's Ethics.

⁴ v. the Treatise *De diligendo deo*.

Jesus Christ from the great leader. Like the latter¹ he writes: "Dry is all food of the soul if it is not sprinkled with the oil of Christ. When thou writest, promise me nothing, unless I read Jesus in it. When thou conversest with me on religious themes, promise me nothing if I hear not Jesus' voice. Jesus—honey to the taste, melody to the ear, gladness to the soul."² But here Bernard has taken a step beyond Augustine. "Reverence for what is beneath us" dawned upon him, as it had never dawned upon any Christian of the older world (not even upon Augustine); for these earlier Christians, while revering asceticism as the means of escape from the body, still, as men of the ancient world, were unable to see in suffering and shame, in the cross and death, the form of the divine. The study of the Song of Songs (under the direction of Ambrose), and the spirit enkindled by the Crusades, led him before the image of the crucified Saviour as the bridegroom of the soul. In this picture he became absorbed. From the features of the suffering Christ there shone forth upon him truth and love. In a literal sense He hangs on His lips and gazes on His limbs: "My beloved, saith the Spouse, is white and ruddy: in this we see both the white light of truth and the ruddy glow of love" (*in hoc nobis et candet veritas et rubet caritas*), says Gilbert in the spirit of Bernard.³ The basis for this Christ-contemplation—the wounds of Christ as the clearest token of His love—was laid by Ambrose and Augustine (Christ, mediator as man), and the image of the soul's bridegroom goes back to Origen and Valentinus (*cf.* also Ignatius); but Bernard was the first to give to the pious spirit its historic Christian intuitions; he united the Neoplatonic self-discipline for rising to God with contemplation of the suffer-

¹ *v.* the numerous passages in the Confessions.

² *Jesus mel in ore, in aure melos, in corde jubilus.* In *cantic. cantic.* XV. 6.

³ How the cross of Christ is for Bernard the sum and substance of all reflection and all wisdom, see *Sermo XLIII.*; on loftiness in abasement see *XXVIII.* and *XLII.*; de *osculo pedis, manus et oris domini III.*; de *triplici profectu animæ, qui fit per osculum pedis, manus et oris domini IV.*; de *spiritu, qui est deus, et quomodo misericordia et judicium dicantur pedes domini VI.*; de *uberibus sponsi, i.e., Christi IX.*; de *duplice humilitate, una vid. quam parit veritas et altera quam inflammat caritas XLII., etc. etc.*

ing and dying Redeemer, and released the subjectivity of the Christ-Mysticism and the Christ-Lyricism.¹

But in spite of all quickening of the imagination, and in spite of his most ardent devotion to the *person* of Christ, even Bernard was obliged to pay the heavy tribute that is exacted of

¹ See the Poems of Bernard and the 86 Sermons on the Song of Songs, which determined the character of the piety of the following generations. These sermons became the source of the Catholic Christ-mysticism. Ritschl, however, (*Lesefrüchte aus dem hl. Bernhard*, Stud. u. Krit. 1879, pp. 317-335) has noted (see Neander, l.c. p. 116), that in these sermons true evangelical thoughts also find expression. "The cause of that I was constrained to see in this, that the preacher did not handle his doctrinal material in the historical order which dogmatic theology adheres to among both Catholics and Evangelicals—an order according to which the doctrines treated first are dealt with without regard to those that follow. We can see rather, without difficulty, that the preacher uses the points of doctrine as they present themselves in the *practical* circle of vision." Ritschl points to the following passages (see also Wolff, *Die Entw. d. einen christl. K.* 1889, p. 165 ff.): Sermo LXIX. 3 (the gravity of original sin: the degree of injury is determined by regeneration); Sermo LXXII. 8 (significance of death: among the redeemed "propter quos omnia fiunt," it must be regarded as an expression, not of God's wrath, but of His mercy, as the act of redemption from the conflict between the law in the members and the sanctified will); Sermo XXII. 7-11 (righteousness by faith; it is not equivalent to power given for good works, but "unde vera justitia nisi de Christi misericordia? . . . soli justii qui de ejus misericordia veniam peccatorum consecuti sunt . . . quia non modo justus sed et beatus, cui non imputabit deus peccatum"); Sermo XX. 2; XI. 3; VI. 3 (redemptive work of Christ: the work of love ["non in omni mundi fabrica tantum fatigationis auctor assumpsit"], of which the modus is the exinanitio of God, its fruit nostri de illo repletio, and which is divine, because Christ here kept in view the way of acting which is God's way, who makes His sun to rise on the evil and the good. The *communicatio idiomatum* is not understood here in the Greek sense, but is exhibited in the motives of Christ; VI. 3: "dum in carne et per carnem facit opera, non carnis sed dei . . . manifeste ipsum se esse judicat, per quem eadem et ante fiebant, quando fiebant. In carne, inquam, et per carnem potenter et patienter operatus mira, locutus salubria, passus indigna evidentur ostendit, quia ipse sit, qui potenter sed invisibiliter sæcula condidisset, sapienter regeret, benigne protegeret. Denique dum evangelizat ingratis, signa præbet infidelibus, pro suis crucifixoribus orat, nonne liquido ipsum se esse declarat, qui cum patre suo quotidie oriri facit solem super bonos et malos, pluit super justos et injustos?"): Sermo XXI. 6, 7; LXXXV. 5 (the restored image of God in man); Sermo LXVIII. 4; LXXI. 11 (the founding of the Church as the aim of redemption); LXXVIII. 3 (Church and predestination); Sermo VIII. 2, XII. 11, XLVI. 4, LI. 5 (conception and marks of the historic Church, where the rigidly juristic view is quite absent: in XII. 11, it is said that no individual may declare himself the bride of Christ; the members of the Church only share in the honour which belongs to the Church as bride). Cf. also Ritschl, *Gesch. des Pietismus I.*, p. 46 ff., and *Rechtfert. u. Versöhn.*, I.² p. 109 ff., where it is shown how for Bernard the thought of grace controls everything.

every mystic,—the mood of *abandonment* after the blessed feeling of union, and the exchange of the historic Christ for the dissolving picture of the ideal. With him the latter is specially remarkable. It might have been expected that for one who became so absorbed in the picture of the suffering Christ, it would have been impossible to repeat the direction given by Origen and Augustine, that we must rise from the word of scripture, and from the Incarnate Word, to the "Spirit." And yet this final and most questionable direction of mysticism, which nullifies historical Christianity and leads on to pantheism, was most distinctly repeated by Bernard. No doubt what he has written in ep. 106, on the uselessness of the study of Scripture, as compared with practical devotion to Christ,¹ may still be interpreted in the light of the thought, that Christianity must be *experienced*, not known. But there is no ambiguity in the expositions in the twentieth sermon on the Song of Songs. Here the love to Christ that is stirred by what Christ did or offered in the flesh is described as still to some extent fleshly. It is no doubt a valuable circumstance that Bernard does not regard the distress and anguish awakened by the picture of the man Jesus as the highest thing, that he rather sees in it a portion of the fleshly love. But he then goes on to say, that in true spiritual love we must rise altogether from the picture of the historic Christ to the Christ *κατὰ πνεῦμα* (after the spirit), and for this he appeals to John VI. and 2 Cor. V. 16. All the mysticism of after times retained this feature. It learned from Bernard the Christ-contemplation ;² but, at the same time, it adopted the pan-

¹ "Why dost thou seek in the Word for the Word that already stands before thine eyes as Incarnate? He that hath ears to hear, let him hear Him crying in the temple, If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink. . . . O, if thou only once tastedst of the rich marrow of the grain with which the heavenly Jerusalem is satisfied, how willingly wouldst thou leave the Jewish scribes to gnaw at their bread-crusts. . . . *Experto crede, aliquid amplius invenies in silvis, quam in libris. Ligna et lapides docebunt, quod a magistris audire non possis.*"

² Bernard was revered as an apostle and prophet "among all nations of Gaul and Germany." The lament of Odo of Morimond (see Hüffer, l.c. p. 21 ff.) is very touching, and proves at the same time the incomparable influence of his personality. Since Augustine, no such man had been given to the Church. "Vivit Bernardus et nardus ejus dedit odorem suum etiam in morte." "His life is hid with Christ in God," with this the disciple comforted himself at the grave.

theistic tendency of the Neoplatonists and Augustine.¹ In the second half of the twelfth century the new piety was already a powerful force in the Church.² The subjectivity of pious feeling was unfettered in the monasteries.³ But as the same man who,

“Verba ejus spiritus et vita erant.” The recollection of the days when Bernard wandered as a preacher of the cross through the districts of Germany long survived ; for the Germans had never heard such a preacher. See the *Historia miraculorum in itinere Germanico patratorem in Migne CLXXXV.* ; Hüffer, p. 70 ff. (who certainly is remarkably credulous). The correspondence of Bernard stands alone in the twelfth century as regards importance and extent. Almost 500 letters by himself are extant.

¹ The “*excedere et cum Christo esse*” (S. LXXXV.) was understood even by Bernard as meaning, that the soul loses itself, and in the embraces of the bridegroom ceases to be a proper ego. But where the soul is merged in the Godhead, the Godhead becomes resolved into the All-One.

² Follow Christ became the watchword ; it broke through the restrictions which dogmatic had drawn, and turned to the Lord Himself. For all relations of life, the suffering, humble, and patient Saviour was presented as an example. What a *quickening* was the result ! But from this point it was possible that a familiarity of feeling should develop itself, which conflicts with reverence for the Redeemer, and because the value of Christ was seen, in a one-sided way, in His example, other sides necessarily suffered neglect. With Bernard that was not yet the case ; but already in him it is astonishing how the Greek dogmatic scheme of Christology had to give place in praxi to a scheme quite different. After he has shown in the 16th sermon that the rapid spread of Christianity was due simply to the preaching of the person of Jesus, that the image of Jesus had assuaged wrath, humbled pride, healed the wounds of envy, checked luxury, quenched lust, bridled avarice, and, in short, had driven out all the lower passions of men, he continues : *Siquidem cum nomino Jesum, hominem mihi propono mitem et humilem corde, benignum, sobrium, castum, misericordem et omni denique honestate et sanctitate conspicuum eundemque ipsum deum omnipotentem, qui suo me et exemplo sanet et roborat adjutorio. Hæc omnia simul mihi sonant, cum insonerit Jesus. Sumo itaque mihi exempla de homine et auxilium de potente.*” Thus did one write, while in theory rejecting Adoptianism ! This Bernardine Christology, of which the roots lie in Augustine, requires no two-nature doctrine ; it excludes it. It is fully represented by the formula that Jesus is the sinless man, approved by suffering, to whom the divine grace by which He lives has lent such power that His image takes shape in other men, *i. e.*, incites to counter love and imparts humility. *Caritas* and *humilitas* were practical Christianity, till St. Francis gave as much vividness of form to the latter in his demand for poverty as was to be exhibited by love in imitation of Christ in His course of suffering. All the ascetic treatises of the period speak of humility ; see Petrus Comestor, *Hist. evang.* c. 133 : “*est debita humilitas subdere se majori propter deum, abundans (humilitas) subdere se pari, superabundans subdere se minori.*” Note the distinction also, so important subsequently in the doctrine of the merit of Christ, between debita, abundans, and superabundans.

³ It counterbalanced the legal righteousness and “meritoriousness” that lay close at hand from other sides. Ritschl remarks very correctly (*Rechtf. und Versöhn.*

in the seclusion of his monastery, spoke a new language of adoration, preached flight from the world, and called to the Pope that he sat in Peter's chair to serve and not to rule—as this man at the same time continued fettered by all the hierarchical prejudices of his age, and himself guided the policy of the world-ruling Church, even the pious in the Church in the twelfth century had not yet felt the contrast between Church and Christianity. The attachment of monachism to the Church was still of a naïve kind; the contradiction between the actual form of the world-ruling Church and the gospel which it preached was felt, indeed, but always suppressed again.¹ That great mendicant monk had not yet come on the scene whose appearing was to work the crisis in the fluctuating struggle between renunciation of the world and lordship over it. But already the Church was beset all around by the wrathful curses of the “heretics,” who saw in the Church's powerful exercise of her dominion and in the alienation of her gifts of grace the features of the ancient Babylon.

I. 2, p. 117): “It is an erroneous view that the Latin Catholicism of the Middle Ages was summed up in the cultivation of legal righteousness and meritoriousness.” It has as its correlate the mysticism that sacrifices the personal ego, to which at one time a theologico-acosmistic, at another time a christologico-lyrical character is given. But the simple trust in God, who reveals His grace in Christ, with the confession: “Sufficit mihi ad omnem justitiam solum habere propitium, cui soli peccavi” (Bernh. serm. in cant. xxiii. 15), was certainly not wanting in individual cases. Here and there, but above all in view of death, it triumphed, both over the calculations of legal righteousness and over the vagueness of mysticism. Flacius and Chemnitz were right in seeking and collecting testimonies for the evangelical doctrine of justification from the Middle Ages, and as Augustine in his day could justly assert that his doctrine of grace had its tradition in the *prayers* of the Church, so Chemnitz also was entitled to affirm that the cardinal evangelical doctrine could produce evidence for itself from earlier times, “Non in declamatoriis rhetoricationibus nec in otiosis disputationibus, sed in seriis exercitiis pœnitentiæ et fidei, quando conscientia in tentationibus cum sua indignitate vel coram ipso iudicio dei vel in agone mortis luctatur. Hoc enim solo modo rectissime intelligi potest doctrina de justificatione, sicut in scriptura traditur.”

¹ The “eternal gospel” of Joachim of Fiore belongs to the close of our period, and for a time remained latent; see Reuter, l.c. II., p. 198 ff.

2. *The Development of Ecclesiastical Law.*¹

Let us notice at least in a few words the increased activity in ecclesiastical law in the period under review, which was not without its influence on the mode of conceiving of dogma, and on the history of dogma.

First, it is a fact of importance that from the middle of the second half of the ninth century, Church law was framed more and more on a *Pseudoisidorian* basis. *Second*, the preponderating attention given to law in general, and the growing subjection of all ecclesiastical questions to *legal conceptions* are characteristics of the period. As to the first point, it is well known that the Popes always continued to take more to do with the administration of the dioceses,² that the old metropolitan constitution lost its importance, and that the old constitutional state of things in general—during the first half of our period—fell into decay and ceased to exist. The Episcopal power, it is true, strengthened itself in many places by assuming a civil character, and on the other hand, the Emperors, from Otto I. to Henry III. after having reformed the enfeebled papacy, brought it for a time into dependence on the imperial crown. But as they also deprived all laymen, who were not princes, of all share in the direction of ecclesiastical affairs, and as they suppressed the independence of the local ecclesiastical bodies (the congregations), in the interests of imperialism and of “piety,” only the Emperor (who called himself *rector ecclesiæ* and *vicarius Christi*), the Pope, and the bishops remained as independent powers. It was about the property of the bishops, and on the question as to who was the true ruler of the divine state and the vicar of Christ, that the great battle was really waged between the empire and the reformed papacy. In this struggle the latter, acting on the

¹ For the earliest period see Maassen, *Gesch. der Quellen und Litt. des Kanonischen Rechts* I. vol. (till Pseudoisidore) 1870. For the later period see v. Schulte, *Gesch. der Quellen und Lit. des Kanonischen Rechts von Gratian bis auf Gregor IX.*, 1875. See the introductions to von Friedberg's edition of the *corp. jur. can.*

² Nicholas I., Leo IX., Alexander II., Alexander III. represent the stages prior to Innocent III. But Gregory VII. was the soul of the great movement in the eleventh century.

impulse given by Gregory VII., developed itself into the *autocratic* power in the Church, and accordingly after having freed itself in Rome from the last remnants of older constitutional conditions, framed its legislation by means of numerous decretals. At the "œcumenical" Lateran Synods of 1123 and 1139, the papacy left no doubt as to this new position which it meant to assert.¹ The Popes after-

¹ The numbering of the (Ecumenical Councils, which has now become a *sententia communis* among the curialist theologians, has been established on the authority of Bellarmin (see Döllinger and Reusch, *Die Selbstbiographie des Cardinals Bellarmin*, 1887, p. 226 ff. That previous to him Antonius Augustinus [ob. 1586] counted them in the same way, has been pointed out by Buschball: "Die Professiones fidei der Päpste," separately printed from the *Röm. Quartalschr.* 10 Bd., 1896, p. 62). In the sixteenth century there still prevailed the greatest diversity in the enumeration: indeed the majority did not regard those Councils in which the Greek Church did not take part as œcumenical at all. There was likewise conflict of opinion as to whether the Councils of Bâsle, Florence (and Constance), were to be reckoned in. Antonius Augustinus and Bellarmin (in the Roman edition of the *Concilia generalia* of 1608 f.), included the Lateran Councils of 1123 and 1139 (and left out the Council of Bâsle). "The question, it is true, was of subordinate importance for Bellarmin, in as much as he places on the same level with the decrees of the General Councils those of the 'Particular' Councils held under the presidency of the Pope, or sanctioned by him; but having in view those who held, not that the Pope, but that the General Council was infallible, it was certainly necessary for him to discuss the question as to what Councils are to be regarded as general." But in thus determining the question, he naturally allowed himself to be influenced by his strong curialistic standpoint, that is, he set aside the Council of Constance and Bâsle, and placed among the (Ecumenical Councils that of Florence, the fourth and fifth Lateran Councils, the first of Lyons, and that of Vienna, on the ground that these favoured the papacy. He thus arrived at the number of eighteen *approved* General Councils (eight from the first ten centuries, the Lateran Councils of 1123, 1139, 1179, 1215, those of Lyons in 1245 and 1274, that of Vienna in 1311, that of Florence, the fifth Lateran Council, and that of Trent). But here also, as everywhere in Catholic dogmatics, there are "half" authorities, and half genuine coin, in spite of the Holy Ghost who guides into all truth. That is to say, several Councils are "partly ratified, partly rejected," those of Constance and Bâsle being among them, and the Council of Pisa in 1409 is "neither manifestly ratified nor manifestly rejected." Since the year 1870, the question about the number of the Councils has completely lost all real interest for Catholics. But reactionary Protestantism has every reason to feel interested in it. Buschball (l.c. pp. 60, 74, 79), holds that *in the Middle Ages* a distinction in principle was not made between the view taken of the Councils of the first thousand years and that taken of those that were later. But he adduces no proof that prior to the Council of Constance the later Councils were placed quite on a level with the earlier, and even by what he adduces for the time subsequent uncertainty is suggested. How could the Mediæval Councils be regarded even before the Council of Trent as quite of equal standing with those of the first ten centuries, when, up to the time of this Council, the general

wards, till the time of Innocent III., defended and strengthened their autocratic position in the Church amid severe but victorious struggles. No doubt, they had to hear many an anxious word from their most faithful sons ; but the rise of the papacy to despotic power in the Church, and thereby to dominion over the world, was promoted by the piety and by all the ideal forces of the period. Not in opposition to the spirit of the times—how would that have been possible?—but in union with it, the papacy ascended the throne of the world's history in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its opponents, so far as they possessed religion, were its secret allies, or contended with doubtful consciences, or, at least, were unable to show that the benefits for which they fought (national churchism, etc.) were the highest and the holiest. Under such circumstances the papal decretals obtained an ever-increasing authority.¹ They took their place

opinion was certainly to the effect that *dogma* was contained in fundamental and final form in the twelve articles, and in the interpretation relating to them which they had received from the older Councils ! The process of equalising was probably begun by the Councils of Florence and Bâsle, with their high degree of self-consciousness. That Councils at all could be pointed to in the long period between the ninth and the fifteenth centuries, was necessarily of more importance than the taking account of what was decided at these Councils, of how they were constituted, and of the authority that guided them. We may very well venture to say therefore : in the fifteenth century the equalising had begun with some hesitation, the Council of Trent favoured it by its weight, and it then became established.

¹ On the development of the primacy in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, see Döllinger, Janus, p. 107 ff. (Schwane, Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters, p. 530 ff.). How much stronger was the Gregorian party in the eleventh century than the Pseudoisidorian in the ninth, and how much more revolutionary and aware of his aim was Gregory VII. than Nicolas I. ! “ He was the first who, with full, clear consciousness, was determined to introduce a new condition of things into the Church by new means. He regarded himself not merely as the reformer of the Church, but as the divinely chosen founder of an order of things such as had never before existed.” His chief means were Synods held by the Pope (this was begun by Leo IX.) and new ecclesiastical law-books. The nephew of Pope Alexander II., Anselm of Lucca, became the founder of the new Gregorian Church law, this being effected by him partly by making apt use of that of Pseudoisidore, and partly by a new set of fictions (e.g., that the episcopacy everywhere originated from Peter) and forgeries. He was followed by Deusdedit, Bonizo, and Cardinal Gregorius. Deusdedit formulated the new principle, that contradictions in the traditional Church law must always be harmonised by letting, not the older, but the *greater* authority, that is, the dictum of the Pope cancel the opposite view. In this way the autocracy of the Popes was established. On the series of new fictions and falsifications of the old tradition, see

beside the old canons,¹ nay even beside the decrees of the Œcumenical Councils. Yet, strictly speaking, the measure of their authority remained still quite uncertain, and prior to Innocent III. *dogmatic* questions were not treated in them, or treated only very seldom, while the Popes in general, in the period of 150 years from the Synod of Sutri till 1198, had their hands fully occupied with establishing the Roman autocratic and monastic Church order.²

In developing itself as the supreme court of *jurisdiction*, the papacy could never have obtained in the *Church*, which assuredly is fellowship in *faith* and *worship*, monarchical rule as regards *faith* and *morals*, had not the amalgamation of *dogma* and *law* become perfect in this period. It was not the Popes who brought about this fusion; they merely turned to account a mode of view which prevailed everywhere, and from which scarcely an individual dissented. In what has been represented from the beginning of Book II. of our Second Part, it has been shown that the *legal* view of religion was an old inheritance of the Latin Church; religion is *lex dei*, *lex Christi*. In principle, it is true, this view had been radically corrected by Augustinianism; but Augustine himself allowed the legal schemes to remain in many important particulars. Then there followed the mission of the Western Church among the foreign nations, pagan and Arian. With these it came into contact, not merely as an institution

Janus, p. 112 ff. Specially important is the way in which history was induced to furnish testimony in proof of the infallibility of the papal decretals, and in which even Augustine was pronounced an authority for this new doctrine (p. 119 ff.). A sentence of his was so manipulated that it came to mean that the papal letters stood on a level with canonical Scripture. Since then the defenders of the infallibility of the Pope, to which Gregory VII. already made a distinct claim, and, indeed, treated it as *concessum* (p. 124 ff.), have always appealed to Augustine. Indeed, Gregory VII., following an earlier precedent, claimed for the Popes a complete *personal* holiness—for they have all that Peter had—and the Pope's holiness, in addition to his infallibility, was so boldly taught by the Gregorians (imputation of the merit of Peter) that anything stronger in the way of claim became impossible.

¹ Alexander II. wrote to King Philip of France, requesting him to rank the papal decrees along with the canons; see Jaffé, *Regesta*, 2 Edit., Nr. 4525.

² The Lateran Synods of 1123, 1139, 1179, contain nothing whatever of a dogmatic character (excepting the twenty-seventh canon of the Council of 1179, which urges the extermination of the Cathari, but says nothing of their doctrine); see Mansi XXI., XXII., Hefele V.², pp. 378 ff., 438 ff., 710 ff.

for religious worship, but as the *Roman Christian system of civilisation and law*. Not simply as a system of faith did it wish and venture to assert itself; it could assert itself at all, rather, only by placing its entire equipment, and all its principles, some of which had an extremely profane origin, under the protection of the *divine law*. Thus the Germanic and Romanic nations came to regard all *legal ordinances* of the Church as *ordinances of faith*, and *vice versâ*. Boniface and Charlemagne then set themselves to secure that the two would harmonise. The "must" became identical in the three sentences: "He who will be saved *must* believe as follows"; "the Christian *must* pay tithes"; "adultery *must* be atoned for by this particular penalty." How busily the framing, or the codification, of Church law was carried on from the time when Dionysius Exiguus made his collection till the time of Pseudoisidore, is shown by the numerous collections which were everywhere produced—even in Rome still—by the rich synodical life of the provincial Churches, and which were meant to guard the independence, the rights, and the distinctive life of the Church in the new world of Germanic manners. Everywhere (prior to the ninth century) dogma fell quite into the background; but just on that account the feeling became habitual, of regarding all deliverances of the Church as *legal ordinances*. The Cluniacensian-Gregorian reform of the eleventh century put an end to numerous traditional ordinances pertaining to constitution and law, and replaced them with new ones, in which the independence of the Church in relation to the State, and of Roman universalism in relation to the national Churches, found ever stronger expression. As the result of this, there developed itself in the eleventh century an imposing legislation, which was gathered up and completed in Gratian's collection—though this collection was in so far out of date and behind the facts, as in it the legislation was not yet determined throughout by the thought of the concentration of ecclesiastical power in the hands of the Pope.¹ But besides their adoption of the Gregorian doctrines, this collection, and some older ones that preceded it, show quite a new turn of things, for they are the product of a *study of law*. Here also Gregory VII. was

¹ See v. Schulte, Lehrbuch des Kathol. und evang. Kirchenrechts 4 Aufl., p. 20.

epoch-making. He was the great jurist in the papal chair, *and from his time onward, the treatment of all functions of the Church in accordance with juristic science began to be the main problem.* The study of law, carried on chiefly in Bologna,¹ exercised an immeasurable influence on the intellectual vision of the Church throughout its whole extent; the study of law, indeed, moulded thought in general. Hellenism also at that time exerted an incalculable influence in the way of fostering this study. The Romo-Grecian legislation came into the West, and although, at the first, it began by modifying what was still a "barbarian" form of secular legal life there, and by building up a sovereign State with its laws and officials, it yet gradually exercised also a furthering influence on the construction of the strict monarchical Church system; for what is legal for the Emperor is allowable for the Pope; or rather—he is in truth the Emperor. It cannot be doubted that here also Rome knew how to gather grapes of thorns and figs of thistles. The new rights of its adversary, the Emperor, it applied to itself.

What had formerly developed itself under the force of circumstances—the Church as a legal institution—was now strengthened and built up by thought.² Juristic thought laid its arrest on everything. And yet even here need controlled the situation. For when the impulse to reflect is once awakened, what else can those at first become, who still live in a world of abstractions and are blind to nature and history, but jurists and dialecticians? Thus there settled down upon the whole Church, even upon its faith, the spirit of jurisprudence, now grown conscious of itself. Everything was laid hold of by it. It was a strong force in what is styled "Scholasticism"; it governed the most powerful Popes (Alexander III. as Magister Rolandus), and it began to bring

¹ See Denifle, *Die Univ. des Mittelalters* I. 1885. Kaufmann, *Gesch. der deutschen Univers.* I., p. 157 ff.

² See v. Schulte, *Gesch. der Quellen, etc.*, I., p. 92 ff.; II., p. 512 f. As Gregory VII. held still more strongly than any of his predecessors that the Church is the *kingdom* founded upon Peter, and that everything is to be traced back to the *power* given to it, the *legal organism* was placed in the foreground; see Kahl, *Die Verschiedenheit Kathol. und Evang. Anschauung über das Verhältniss von Staat und Kirche* (1886), p. 7 f.: "The character of the Catholic Church as a legal organism is already involved in the doctrine of its founding, and in the conception of it." The fullest and most reliable historic proofs in Hinschius, *Kath. Kirchenrecht*.

within its sweep the form in which the traditional dogmas were presented. Certainly this was an easy matter for it; for in their practical conclusions these dogmas had already been made to serve quite as legal means in a legal process. What still remained was to submit to juristic exposition even the central tenets of faith themselves, and so to justify and defend them "scientifically." Here too, indeed, the material was not entirely in a raw state; to some extent, rather, the foundation stones had received a juristic shaping from the Latin fathers of dogma themselves (cf. Tertullian); but there was still an immense task presenting itself, to the full accomplishment of which an approach even had never been made; it was to re-think the whole dogmatic tradition in the spirit of jurisprudence, to represent everything under the categories of judge (God), accused, advocate, legal measures, satisfactions, penalties, indulgences, to make out of dogmas as many distinctions as obtain in secular legal order between universally valid, relatively valid, probable, consuetudinary law, positive law, etc., and to convert dogmatics into a chamber of justice, out of which there was afterwards to develop the merchant's hall and the den of thieves.

But in the period we are considering, the Church was certainly the basis and sum of the highest ideals of the mediæval man, and the enormous contradiction on which one proceeded—had proceeded indeed, from the time of Augustine—of regarding the Church as at once the society of the faithful (*societas fidelium*), and as the hierarchically organised assemblage (*coetus*), of recognising the secular power in its divine right and yet suppressing its authority, was by many scarcely felt.¹ Only at the end of the epoch did the inner antagonism become apparent; but the hierarchy had then already become the Church. Just at that time, therefore, the claim of the hierarchy, and specially of the papacy, was proclaimed as dogma, and the struggle of the

¹ In the valuable inquiry of Mirbt, *Die Stellung Augustin's in der Publicistik des gregorianischen Kirchenstreits* (1888)—cf. the same author's work "*Die Publicistik im Zeitalter Gregor's VII.*," 1894—the significance of Augustine for the struggles in Church politics in the eleventh century has for the first time been methodically and thoroughly described. It amounted *directly* to less than one would have expected, and it is noteworthy that the Antigregorians can show a larger heritage of Augustinian thoughts than their opponents (see *Theol. Lit. Ztg.*, 1889, Col. 599).

civil powers against the despotism of the Pope was declared to be as really rebellion against Christ as was the assertion of the sects that the true Church is the opposite of the hierarchy. This will have to be dealt with in the following chapter.

3. *The Revival of Science.*¹

Theologians and philosophers have vied with one another in endeavouring to find a specific definition of Scholasticism, and to differentiate what this term is meant to denote, from the theology and philosophy of the old (Greek) Church on the one hand, and from modern science on the other. These efforts have led to no accepted result; nor could they lead to any such, for Scholasticism is simply nothing but *scientific thought*. That this thought was governed by prejudices,² and that from these it in some respects did not free itself at all, and in some respects freed itself only slowly, is shared by the science of the Middle Ages with the science of every age. Neither dependence on authorities, nor the preponderance of the deductive method, was specially characteristic of Scholasticism; for science in fetters has existed in every period—our descendants will find that present-day science is in many respects not controlled merely by pure experience—and the dialectico-deductive method is the means that must be used by all science that has the courage to emphasise strongly the conviction of the unity of all that is. But it is not even correct to say that within mediæval science that method prevailed alone, or chiefly. The realism that was represented by Albert and Thomas, acting upon impulses re-

¹ See the histories of philosophy by Ueberweg, Erdmann and Stöckl; Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik* Bd. II.-IV.; Bach, l.c., I. and II.; Reuter, *Gesch. der Aufkl.* I. and II.; Löwe, *Der Kampf zwischen dem Nominalismus und Realismus*, 1876; Nitzsch, *Art. Scholastische Theologie in der R.-E.*, XIII.², p. 650 ff., where in p. 674 ff., the literature is noted. Dilthey, *Einl. in die Geisteswissensch.* I. Denifle, l.c.; Kaufmann, l.c., p. 1 ff.; Denifle in the *Archiv f. Litt.-u. Kirchengesch. des Mittelalters*, I. and II.; v. Eicken, l.c., p. 589 ff.

² The fundamental prejudice, which, however, Scholasticism shared with the theology of antiquity, and unfortunately also of modern times, was that theology is cognition of the world, or that it has to verify and complete cognition of the world. If it is said to-day that it has to supplement it, seeing that it steps in where knowledge fails, modesty has extorted the expression, but the same thing is still meant.

ceived from Augustine, made excellent use of experience, and Scotism and Nominalism in particular are partly based on the empiric method, though as compared with the deductive, Duns may have found fault with this method as confused. What is of importance here is only this, that the observation of the *external* world was extremely imperfect, that, in a word, natural science, and the science of history did not exist, the reason being that men knew how to observe spirit, but not how to observe things of sense.¹ But least of all must Scholasticism be reproached with treating "artificial," "fabricated" problems. On its premises they were not artificial, and if they were boldly wrought out, it was only a proof of scientific energy.

The Scholasticism of the Middle Ages, then, was simply *science*, and it is merely perpetuating an unwarranted mistrust when it is thought that this part of the general history of science may be designated by a special name.² As if science in general had not its stages, as if the mediæval stage was distinguished from the rest by its unparalleled and culpable obscurity! On

¹ Yet even this does not apply to the whole of Scholasticism. Especially in its later period, it pointed also to the book of nature.

² Kaufmann remarks correctly, p. 5: "There still attaches to the term Scholasticism something of the hatred and contempt which the Humanists poured upon it." This hostile spirit is, no doubt, intelligible, inasmuch as Scholasticism still threatens our present-day science. Yet in more recent years a complete change of judgment has appeared, which comes to the help of the Pope in his renewed recommendations of St. Thomas. Indeed, in the effort to be just, the once disparaged Scholasticism is beginning to be extravagantly belauded, as is shown by the pronouncement of a very celebrated jurist. With this praise the circumstance may also have some connection, that the Schoolmen are now being read again, and readers find to their surprise that they are not so irrational as had been believed. The strongest contribution to the glorification of Thomas has been furnished by Otto Willmann in the second volume of his "Gesch. des Idealismus" (1896). Here Idealism and Thomism (of the strictest type) are simply placed on a level. Nominalism is the corrupt tree, which can bear no good fruit, and is to be regarded, moreover, merely as an episode, as a nubacula; for since its rising, the sun of the Thomist Realism has been always in the heavens, and has given warmth to every century. The real enemy of Thomas and of Idealism is Kantianism, which has slowly prepared itself, that, on its assuming its perfect form, it may forthwith be assailed and overthrown by the true Idealism. Protestantism is viewed as the continuation of monistic Mysticism (!), because it (v. the strict determinism) does not take account of the cause *secundæ*. So Thomism alone, sans phrase, is the saviour of the holy things of humanity! Augustinianism at the same time still finds recognition here, but yet it is still no completed system; it only represents the way to the right one.

the contrary, it may rather be said that Scholasticism furnishes a unique and luminous example of the fact that thought finds its way even under the most adverse conditions, and that even the gravest prejudices that weigh it down are not heavy enough to quench its life. The science of the Middle Ages gives practical proof of eagerness in thinking, and exhibits an energy in subjecting all that is real and valuable to thought, to which we can find, perhaps, no parallel in any other age.¹

Hence it is useless to direct one's ingenuity to answering the question as to what *kind* of science presents itself in Scholasticism; we have simply rather to inquire into the *conditions* under which scientific thought was placed at that time. Not equally useless, but vaguely treated, is the academic question, much discussed and marked by confusion and wearisomeness, with regard to the relation of Scholasticism to Mysticism.² If by Scholasticism there is understood (though this is arbitrary) "the hand-maid of hierarchism," or, with sudden change of front, the "construction of systems without concern for the needs of the inner life," or the "rationalistic craving for proof," and if Mysticism is then placed alongside as the free pectoral theology, then the most beautiful contrasts can be drawn—Hagar and Sarah, Martha and Mary. But with little trouble Scholasticism and Mysticism can, on the other hand, be resolved into each other, and a daring dialectic performance can be carried on with these terms, which does honour to the acuteness of the author, but which has only the disadvantage that one is as wise after, as before, the definitions have been given. The thing to be dealt with here is simple. Scholasticism is science, applied to religion, and—at least, till the time when it underwent self-disintegration—science setting out from the axiom, that all things are to be understood from *theology*, that all things therefore must be

¹ We may say, indeed, with the poet about that age: "Everything now aims at fathoming man from within and from without; truth, where hast thou an escape from the wild chase?"

² On Mysticism, see the works which Karl Müller has cited in his *krit. Uebersicht* (*Zeitschr. f. K.-Gesch.* VII., p. 102 ff.). Above all the numerous works of Denifle and Preger (*Gesch. der deutschen Mystik* I., II.) have to be consulted; as also Greith, *Die deutsche Mystik im Predigerorden*, 1861. For the earlier Mysticism, cf. the monographs on Anselm, Bernard, and the Victorinians.

traced back to *theology*. This axiom regularly presupposes that the thinker feels himself to be in entire dependence on God, that he seeks to *know* this dependence ever more deeply, and that he uses every means for the strengthening of his own religious life; for only in the measure in which he finds, and knows himself to be, under and in God, is he made capable of understanding all else, since, of course, to *understand* things means nothing else than to know their relation to the One and All, or to the Author (*i.e.*, in both cases, to God). From this it follows at once *that personal piety is the presupposition of science*. But in so far as personal piety at that time was always thought of as *contemplation* of the relation of the ego to God accompanied by asceticism,¹ *Mysticism is the presupposition of Scholasticism*; in other words, mediæval science bases itself on piety, and on piety, too, which is itself *contemplation*, which lives therefore in an *intellectual* element. From this it follows, *that this piety itself prompts to thought*; for the strong impulse to become acquainted with the relation of one's own ego to God necessarily leads to the determination of the relation of the creation, of which one knows himself to be a part, to God. Now, where this knowledge is so pursued that insight into the relation of the world to God is sought for solely or chiefly with the view of understanding the position of one's own soul to God, and of inwardly growing through such understanding, we speak of *Mystic theology*.² But where this reflex aim of the process of knowledge does not present itself so distinctly, where, rather, the knowledge of the world in its relation to God acquires a more independent objective interest,³ the term *Scholastic theology*

¹ Piety is, above all, not the hidden temper of feeling and will, from which spring love to one's neighbour, humility and patience, but it is growing *cognition*, begotten of steadfast reflection on the relation of the soul to God.

² How largely dependent on Scholasticism the later Mystic theology in particular was; or, more correctly, how identical the two were, has been shown especially by the works of Denifle (against Preger in the *histor. polit. Blättern*, 1875, p. 679 ff., and on Master Eckhart in the *Archiv f. Litt.-u. K.-Gesch. des Mittelalters II. Bd.*).

³ It is only a question of difference of degree; very correctly Karl Müller says (*Zeitschr. f. K.-Gesch. VII.*, p. 118): "The character of mediæval piety always expresses itself, more or less, even in the theoretic discussions of Scholasticism, because among the representatives of the latter the entire half of the way of salvation is dominated throughout by the interests and points of view of Mysticism, this circum-

is employed. From this it appears that we have not before us two magnitudes that run parallel, or that, forsooth, collide with each other, but that Mystic theology and Scholastic theology are one and the same phenomenon, which only present themselves in manifold gradations, according as the subjective or objective interest prevails.¹ The former interest was so little lacking even to the most distinguished Schoolmen that their whole theology can be unhesitatingly described as *also* Mystic theology—for Thomas, Mysticism is the starting-point and practical application of Scholasticism—and, on the other hand, there are theologians who are described as Mystics, but who, in the strength of their desire to know the *world*, and to understand in a systematic way the Church doctrine, are not a whit behind the so-called Schoolmen. But in saying this the further position is already stated, that a specific difference between the scientific *means* had likewise no existence. Here also it is simply a question of shade (nuance). The view of the God in whom, and from whom, all things must be understood, was given by the Church tradition. But in this view also subjective piety was

stance having a connection with their monastic training and education. As soon as these men come to deal in their theoretical discussions with the appropriation of salvation, they bring along with them the presuppositions of their practical Mysticism.”

¹ Even in Nitzsch's determination of the relationship (i.e., pp. 651 ff., 655) I cannot find a clearing up, while in Thomasius-Seeberg the distinct vision of the matter is completely obscured by a mass of details. Nitzsch first accentuates strongly the formalistic character of Scholasticism, then, with a view to understanding Mystic theology, points to its origin, the Pseudo-Dionysian doctrine, and now concludes: “It is obvious that this theology of the soul, of feeling, and of *direct* intuition is fundamentally distinct from the Scholastico-dialectic theology.” But the assertion that the Scholastic theology is formalistic is scarcely *cum grano salis* correct, as will appear more clearly below. How can one call a mode of thought formalistic which takes the greatest interest in relating everything to a living unity? And if the means employed cannot secure the proposed end (as *we* think), have we therefore a right to reproach these scholars with a merely formalistic interest in things? But, further, the Pseudo-Dionysian theology is as much the presupposition of Scholasticism as of Mysticism, and that which Nitzsch calls “theology of the soul, of feeling, and of direct intuition” plays in both the same part, as alpha and omega, while the Mystic theology certainly keeps manifestly to its point of departure throughout the whole alphabet, the Scholastic, on the other hand, apparently forsakes it, but in the end (doctrine of the way of salvation) always returns to it, thereby showing that it has never really lost sight of it.

trained. The formal shaping elements were likewise everywhere the same. Inasmuch as the scientific means were derived entirely from the same three sources, the authoritative dogma, inner experience, and the traditional philosophy, any differences that would be more than varieties cannot be made out (a greater or less passing into the background of logical formalism, a preference for inner observation over authoritative tradition¹).

Yet it is said that great inner antagonisms entered into mediæval science. Anselm and his opponents are pointed to, Bernard and Abelard, the German theologians of the fourteenth century and the Churchmen who pronounced them heretics, and from the contrasted positions in these cases the formula is framed, that here Mysticism is in conflict with Scholasticism. Differences certainly there are here; but that stock controversial term throws a very uncertain light on them. Above all, the phenomena here gathered together can by no means be united in *one* group. But before we deal with them, it will be well to answer the main question stated above, under what conditions the scientific thought of the Middle Ages was placed, or, let us say, how it developed itself, and what were the concrete factors which determined it (in the way of advancing or retarding), and thereby gave it its peculiar stamp. From this inquiry the proper light will naturally be thrown upon these "antagonisms" which are erroneously represented when they are described as a struggle of two opposing principles.

The Middle Ages received from the ancient Church not only the substantially completed dogma, but also—as a living force—the philosophy, or say, the theology which had been employed in the shaping of dogma, and together with this also a treasury of classical literature, which had little or no connection with the philosophy and the dogma, but which answered to an element in the antique view of life in Italy and Byzantium that had never quite disappeared. These three things constituted the legacy of the old world to the new. But they already contained in them all the contrasts that came to view in the inner life of the Middle Ages, when consciousness of that inheritance had been awakened.

¹ Scholasticism shares with Mysticism the "finis," and Mysticism uses essentially the same means as Scholasticism.

These "antagonisms" were as actively at work in the Greek Church from the days of Origen and Jerome as they afterwards were in the Mediæval Church. In this sense all scientific developments of the West in the Middle Ages were simply a continuation of what the Greek Church had already partly passed through, and was partly still continuing to pass through in feeble movements. The difference consisted only in this, that in the West everything gradually developed itself to a higher degree of energy; that the Church, as the visible commonwealth of God on earth, impressed its stamp on all secular life, taking even science into closer connection with itself, giving it a higher flight, and at the same time requiring it by its authority to adopt juristic thought; and finally in this, that from Greek science Augustinianism was absent.

We have remarked above that along with the substantially completed dogma the Middle Ages received from antiquity the related philosophy or theology. But this very circumstance introduced strain: for while this theology was certainly "related," yet as certainly also did it contain, as a living force, elements that were hostile to dogma, whether we think of Neoplatonism or Aristotelianism. It is well known that in the Greek Church, from the fifth and sixth centuries, both schools worked upon dogma, and that "heresies" to the right and left were the result (pantheism and tritheism, spiritualistic Mysticism and rationalistic Criticism), and that then, from the Justinian age, the Scholasticism evolved itself which found the *via media* between the Areopagite and John Philoponus.¹

In the theological science of John of Damascus there presents itself the reconciliation of dogma with Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism.² Here the former plays the principal part in the principles, the latter in the working out; for with the help of dialectic distinction one can remove all difficulties and contradictions that emerge. But the *independent* force of the Neoplatonic and Aristotelian philosophies was not broken by the harmonising. The books in which they were contained continued to be read, and thus in Byzantium the strain did not cease. Mystic

¹ v. Vol. IV. p. 232 f. of this work.

² Vol. IV. p. 264 f.; see also p. 331 ff.

theology was further cultivated, Aristotle was studied, and although the acts of aggression always grew feebler, both of them threatened the Church with its dogma, the Church that was meanwhile growing more powerless in the embraces of the State. There were the further circumstances that memories of the theologically unconcerned age of antiquity had never died out, that a certain worldly culture, indifferent to religion, and often indeed degenerating into barbarism, still survived, which was strong enough to hinder the Eastern Church from ever making even an approach to the carrying out of its ideals and aims in *secular* life and *secular* culture. From the days of the Alexandrian Theophilus monks and pious laymen might lament over the godlessness of the ancient literature and wish it in hell, but no one was able either to banish it, or to purify it, and bring it entirely into the service of ecclesiastical science.

If we pass now to the Carolingian period, *i.e.*, to the first epoch of scientific advance in the West, we find exactly the same elements side by side, only with one important addition (Augustinianism). There is an eager endeavour to become acquainted with the traditional dogma and to think it out, and, as the Adoptian controversy shows, there is at the same time a surrender to entire dependence on the Greeks. In the writings of Boethius and Isidore there is possessed a source, rich enough for that period, from which the dialectic science of method may be learned. As the work of John Scotus shows, the Neoplatonic Mysticism had already become known to the West from the writings of Dionysius and Maximus; besides this, however, it was represented in a *theistic* setting, and with incomparable attractiveness, by Augustine. Finally, the ancient literature (poets and historians) was sought out, and through contact with Italy there arose the seductive pictures of a blithesome life that had never altogether vanished.

But the forces which the West had at its command at that time were still too weak to admit of working independently with the capital that had been inherited. To become familiar with Augustine and Gregory I., to understand the christological speculations of the Greeks, and to master the simplest rules of logic and method—that was the real task of the period. What was

attempted beyond this, Scotus excepted, was a feeble renaissance: indeed the union of the antique with the theological at the court of Charles the Great has something childish. This union therefore was soon dissolved again. Not for the first time under Louis the Pious, but as early as the last years of Charles I. himself, the ascetic thought of the ancient Church asserted its influence even in science. And so it continued to be afterwards; we can observe indeed, on till the thirteenth century, a steady increase of aversion to the antique, while, no doubt, some bold spirits sought more than before to learn from it. In theory secular studies were discarded. Ancient literature was regarded as a source of temptations. All science which did not place itself under theology, *i.e.*, which did not refer everything to the knowledge of God, was held to be pernicious, nay, to be a seduction of the devil. But as what is characteristic, in all fields, of the mediæval view of the world consists in this, that it aims at uniting the ununitable, and requires that negation of the world shall be attained in the form of dominion over it, so we observe here also that what is rejected is again adopted. Ancient literature and philosophy were certainly employed as a formal means of culture, and with a view also to the refutation of pagans, Jews, and heretics, and to a fathoming of the divine mysteries. It was to some extent the same persons who rejected them in the end, who on their slow, toilsome journey to the summit made use of them. And where they were different persons, yet there was at bottom between the two an elective affinity; for *all* thinkers who came to be influential, though some of them may appear to us "illuminists" (*Aufklärer*) and others traditionalists, were dominated by the same fundamental thought of tracing back all things to God and understanding them from Him. And when in the end the Church released Aristotle and allowed full use to be made of him, that was not done by way of yielding to outward constraint, but because the Church theology was now strong enough to master this master, and because he could furnish it with the most effectual help against the dangers of a bold idealism which threatened dogma. Though the schools, the universities, might not be ecclesiastical institutions in the strict sense of the term, science

was *ecclesiastical, theological*. There was no lay science. The thought of such science was for that age equivalent to paganism and nihilism.

From the Carolingian period a chain of scientific tradition and schools of learning extends into the eleventh century ;¹ but a *continuous* increase of scientific activity cannot be ascertained, and even the greatest masters (Gerbert of Rheims) did not produce effects that were epoch-making. Not till the middle of the century was the advancement begun that was followed by no further declension, and the thread formed that was not again to break. The inner rise of the Church was unquestionably the determining cause of this upward movement of science, although we are surprised at meeting quite at the beginning with a trained skill in dialectic for which we had not been prepared, and which must have gone on developing in the dark ages (*sæculum obscurum*) in spite of their darkness. But how could the inner revival of the Church have continued without results for science? The Church conceived itself at that time as *spiritual* power, as the power of the supersensuous life over the sensuous ; the subject of science was the supersensuous ; science, therefore, was challenged by this revival ! But even the science which revels in the transcendental, and which readily attaches itself to revelations, cannot deny its character as *science*. Even where it is, and wishes to be, the handmaid of revelation, it will always embrace an element by which it offends the faith which desires rest ; it will exhibit a freshness and joy which to devoutness appears as insolence ; nay, even when it knows itself to be one with the Church in its starting-point and aims, it will never be able to deny a negative tendency, for it will always be justified in finding that the principles of the Church suffer deterioration in the concrete expressions of life, and are disfigured by superstition.

In the dazzling light in which Reuter, the marvellous master of that literature, has presented the conflicts between young mediæval science and the men of the Church (Berengar and Lanfranc, Anselm and his opponents, Abelard and Bernard),

¹ Berengar was a disciple of Fulbert of Chartres (ob. 1028) ; the latter had studied under Gerbert.

the persons engaged appear like spectral caricatures. Because this scholar tries to find "negative illuminism" everywhere in the movements, things are deprived of their proportion, and the common ground on which the combatants stand almost entirely disappears. With wonder and astonishment we see one Herostratus after another cross the stage, surrounded by troops of like-minded disciples; the "primacy of infallible reason" is set up by them, after they have destroyed authority; the antitheses become as abrupt as cliffs, and frightful chasms open up. But the biographer of these heroes, so far as he does not charge them with hypocrisy, must himself regularly acknowledge in some stray turn of thought, that they stood in closest connection with their age and with their opponents, that their enormously magnified performances were of a much more modest kind, and that the great illuminists were obedient sons of the Church. In opposition to this representation we follow out the hints given above, in order to elucidate and understand these struggles.

In the higher rise of science three things were involved: the *penetrating more deeply into the Neoplatonic-Augustinian principles of all theology, the dialectic art of analysis*, and, united with both, *a certain knowledge of the ancient classics and of the Church Fathers*. As regards those principles, it was the spirit of the *so-called Platonic Realism* that prevailed. By means of it, as it had been derived from Augustine and from dogma itself, and from a hundred little sources also, dogma—but the world, too, as well—came to be understood, and all things came to be known from and in God. Till the beginning of the twelfth century this Platonic Realism, with its spiritualistic sublimating tendency and its allegorical method, reigned pretty much unbroken. It reigned all the more securely, the less a conception of it had as yet been consciously formed (as a theory of knowledge).¹ It

¹ Till far on in the twelfth century the scholars were not first philosophers and then theologians; they possessed as yet no philosophic system at all; their philosophy rather was quite essentially dialectic art; see Deutsch, Abelard, p. 96: "The relation of philosophy to theology in the initial period of Scholasticism was essentially different from what it was at its maturity. In the earlier period a proper philosophic system, a view of the world developed on different sides, had as yet no existence. Only logic was known with some completeness . . . but, as a distinct discipline,

was peculiar to it that it set out from faith, and then made itself master of dogma in the way in which dogma had formerly arisen ("credo ut intelligam"—this position of Augustine was not merely reasserted by Anselm, but was willingly assented to by all Church thinkers of the period). But it was, further, peculiar to it *that it took a flight beyond dogma*. This had occurred in Greek Mysticism as well as with Augustine, and it repeated itself, without the danger being observed, from the eleventh century (and just, too, among the "most pious" philosophers). Here lay the first antagonism. As one got to understand dogma by the help of the same means by which it had arisen, that idea of the immanence of God, of all things existing in God, asserted itself, before which the historical, and dogma itself, threatened to vanish, *i.e.*, were viewed as the final stage needing sublimation. So Origen thought, so also had Augustine felt, and had expressed it at the outskirts of his speculation,¹ so was it taught by the Greek Mystics.² From this point, as by a circuit, a complete rehabilitation of reason could take place. After getting its dismissal at the beginning—revelation decides and authority—reason was now the means for removing out of the way whatever hindered the thought of the absoluteness, the *immutability* and immanence of God. It neutralised miracle, in order to give expression to the strict uniformity of the operation

metaphysic did not yet exist for the philosophers of that period. What they had of it consisted in single propositions, partly Platonic, partly Aristotelian. . . . Only when the Aristotelian writings became known in the second half of the twelfth century did the West learn to know a real philosophic system."

¹ See Vol. V., p. 125 ff.

² Hence even in the question about the universals, which was already dealt with at that time on the basis of passages from Porphyry and Boethius, the treatment was almost entirely realistic: general notions exist in and of themselves, or they exist in things as their real essence (though very different turns of thought were possible here in matters of detail; see Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, II., p. 118 ff.). Certainly there were already to be found also in this period representatives of Nominalism, according to which general notions are intellectus, or, say, only voces; indeed, it probably always existed side by side with Realism; but theology still treated it with indifference. When the Nominalist Roscellin, the teacher of Abelard, applied the Nominalist view to the doctrine of the Trinity, he was resisted by Anselm (v. Deutsch, p. 100 f.). The latter had no doubt that those who held the universales substantiæ to be mere voces, must err from the Christian faith, and were heretics. But how did it stand with those who logically applied the substantiality of general notions?

of the All-One ; it neutralised even the history of salvation, and history in general, or transformed it into the circulating course of the operative Being that is, was, and shall be ; it neutralised, finally, the creature. The "illuminist" of the eleventh and twelfth centuries would still have to be found who did not play his "illuminist" part under the influence of this mysticism, who did not likewise take the "credo ut intelligam" as his starting-point. Though, like Berengar, he might compare the literally understood Jewish law with the laws of the Romans, Athenians, and Spartans in order to give the palm to the latter, though like Abelard, he might unite into one the history of salvation and general history in the "philosophy of religion on a historic basis"—this was still done on the understanding that there was to be absolute validity obtained for all that the Church offered of material content, by means of sublimating (allegory) ; it was done in the name of the conception of God and of the theology which prevailed also among the opponents, so far as they thought at all, and these latter started back before conclusions which Justin, Origen, and the great group of Greek and Latin Fathers had long before drawn.¹ So it was not that principle stood opposed to principle, but the amount of application was disputed²—unless we should have to regard as the real principle

¹ The inquiry would be interesting and important that would lead us to determine whether, and through what channels, the older Pre-Jeromic Church literature influenced Scholasticism ; *e.g.*, are the agreements of Abelard with Justin and Origen accidental, or only indirect, or direct ? That the Shepherd of Hermas and the Didache continued to have influence admits of proof. Contradictions within tradition, between the older and the later, and again between tradition (the sacred canons) and Scripture had already been discovered in the Gregorian period, and up to a certain point had been admitted (see Mirbt, Augustine, p. 3 f.) ; but Abelard was the first to emphasise the importance of these contradictions, while on the other hand, certainly, he began to have an inkling of what his contemporaries were far from thinking of, namely, that errors promote the progress of truth.

² It surely does not require to be specially noted, that no teacher of importance in this period drew all the conclusions of Platonic Realism (as little as Augustine did). They lay only on the horizon of their view, and were touched on in passages here and there. Till Abelard taught him better, William of Champeaux, it is true, seems to have asserted the full immanence of the generic notion, conceived of substantially, in every individual, a view which must necessarily have led to the doctrine of the *one* latent substance, and of the negating of all that is individual as mere semblance or mere contingency. This doctrine certainly lay on the outskirts of the view then taken

of mediæval ecclesiastical theology, lack of thought, or blind surrender. But that was not what the Church Fathers taught, nor was it what the Church itself wished when it again conceived of itself as spiritual power in the eleventh century. How slight really is the distinction between Berengar and Anselm as theologians! It often entirely disappears; for how far were those represented as wild destroyers from drawing the conclusions *in their totality*, and from repeating, say, the thoughts of Erigena! They were not innovators, but restorers; not a trace is to be found in them of negative illuminism.

In the Greek Church Aristotelianism had made its appearance when dogma and speculation could no longer be reconciled, and it rendered the Church invaluable service as the Horos which kept the Sophia of the Mystics from plunging into the abyss of the primeval Father. But along with these services it had at the same time brought at first unpleasant gifts in addition. While it checked unrestrained idealism, and at the same time set to work to make paradoxical and burdensome formulæ tolerable by means of distinctions, it also subjected to revision formulæ that collapsed as soon as their basis of Platonic Realism was taken from them. This Aristotelianism, which was so necessary, but of which there had been such bad experiences, as it appeared in John Philoponus and other Greeks, not to speak of the old Antiochian School, was known also to those in the West, through Boethius, and from other sources (in a poor enough form, no doubt, more directly as logical method), and long before had concluded (in the case of Boethius himself, *e.g.*), an irregular marriage with the Neoplatonic doctrine of principles. To the spirit of the West, which had more of understanding than of reason, and, as juristic also, constantly strove after distinctions, this Aristotelianism was congenial. From it there developed "dialectic," at first, too, as scientific art. And as this scientific art always encourages insolence and pride where it is held to be the sum of all wisdom, so was it at the beginning of the Middle Ages. The schooled "dialecticians" of the eleventh

of the world, and made its appearance in Mysticism as the expression of pious contemplation, afterwards even as a theoretic conviction. On Abelard's having the credit of discarding it see below.

century looked proudly down on the obscurantists who did not understand art, while these again became concerned about the traditional Church doctrine, although the operations of the youthful science only seldom touched the kernel of things, unless it was that one here and there ventured too far with his art in regard to dogmas that stood in the centre of vision (doctrines of the Trinity, of the two natures, of the Eucharist), and, anticipating the later Nominalism, or recalling unpleasant facts in the history of tradition, served up a questionable attempt at solving the trinitarian problem (tritheistic, Sabellian), or approached too near the old Adoptianism, or threw doubt on the current opinion about the external miracle in the Eucharist. In this way the first conflicts arose, which were lacking in real sharpness, however, because the dialectic itself stood in league with Platonic Realism, and at bottom did not know very often what it really wanted. At the same time it must not be denied, that wherever the understanding is brought in, it will assert its own rights and will overleap the limits of a purely formal activity. But it is shown, *e.g.*, by the science of Anselm, how peacefully, under certain conditions, dogma, Platonic Realism, and dialectic harmonised.

Yet in the twelfth century that came to be otherwise. In Abelard¹ both the critical tendency of Platonic Realism (cf. his

¹ See the excellent monograph of Deutsch upon him (1883), the best book we possess on the history of the theological science of that period, distinguished pre-eminently by calmness and caution of judgment, as compared with the overstrained biographies to the right and left. In the introduction, p. 11 f., it is denied on good grounds that there was a widely prevailing negative illuminism in this period. What widely prevailed was not negative but ecclesiastical, and what was negative (frivolity of course there has been in every age; "the frivolity and avarice of the jeunesse dorée that vaunted itself in the apostolic chair up to the middle of the eleventh century": Sackur) or expressly heretical had no widespread influence (to what extent at the time of the establishment of Clugny practical and theoretical atheism, frivolous criticism of the Bible, etc., prevailed among the West-Frankian lay circles is shown by Sackur). That to Abelard there belongs a unique position in his time, Deutsch has grounds for asserting, but he is far from characterising him simply as an illuminist. If it were necessary to describe him as such, then it would be peculiar to Catholic religion to be purely acquiescent faith—but at that time at least it certainly had not yet made that claim; then Justin, Origen, and Augustine would be "credless free-thinkers"; then Abelard himself would be a double-tongued hypocrite, for his wish was to be a Church theologian, believing in revelation, and yet at the same time one who could give account of his faith and was capable of showing it to be plain truth. That while this was his aim he became entangled in contradictions, that in under-

view of history) and the critical tendency of dialectic grew stronger, *without his abandoning, however, in the fundamental theses, his relation of dependence on the Church doctrine.* Abelard was the boldest theologian of his time, because he understood how to derive the critical side from *all* elements of tradition, and was really persuaded of the defectiveness just of what was held valid. His opponents of his day thought that the dangers of his science arose quite essentially from his *dialectic*, and, accordingly, discredited this above everything else. In point of fact, boldness in submitting particulars to the treatment of the understanding was an outstanding feature in Abelard; the understanding, too, when once released, asserted its own rights, frequently overleapt the boundaries theoretically recognised, scorned authority, and proclaimed, with the support of a certain knowledge of ancient history, the eternal right of reasonable thought as the highest court of appeal. But that the most dangerous theses of the restless scholar sprang from Platonic (Augustinian) Realism, *i.e.*, from the fundamental view that was adhered to by one's self, was not observed. *In principle Abelard certainly moderated this view by means of his critico-dialectic reflections.* He was no more a representative of thorough-going Realism. He was rather the first to introduce into epistemology a kind of conceptualism,¹ to break through the strict doctrine of immanence, and, by beginning to restore independence to the creature, to begin also to emancipate the conception of God itself from pantheism. For Abelard, the dialectic art ceases to be mere art; it begins to become a material principle, and to correct the traditional (Neoplatonic-Augustinian) doctrines of the first and last things. *The paradox in Abelard's position consists in this, that on the one hand in contemplating history he*

taking to commend religion to the understanding he frequently had more regard to the judge than to the client, was certainly not peculiar to him as a theologian! For ascertaining the theology of Abelard the sentences of his disciple, Magister Roland Alexander III. (see the edition by Gietl, 1891, and Denifle in *Archiv*, Vol. I., pp. 434 ff. 603 ff.) may be consulted.

¹ How his theory of knowledge is to be understood is a disputed point among scholars (v. Deutsch, p. 104 ff.). It is certain that he held a sceptical attitude towards Platonic Realism, that he rejected it indeed, without however passing over to Nominalism.

drew certain conclusions from the Mystic doctrine of God (cf. Justin, Origen, but also Augustine himself) *more confidently than his contemporaries, while, on the other hand, he allowed sober thought to have a material influence on the view taken of ground principles.* His opponents saw in him only the negative theologian. *This negative theologian really laid the foundation for the classical structure of mediæval conservative theology.*¹ For

¹ This seems paradoxical, and certainly other things come more prominently to view in Abelard at first: his genuine, unquenchable scientific ardour, his sense for the natural (sound human understanding), his ambitious striving, not devoid of vanity, his dialectic acuteness, his critical spirit, finally, the conviction animating him that the ratio has its own field of play, and that there are many questions on which it first, and it alone, must be heard (on his learning, which has often been over-rated, see Deutsch, p. 53 ff.). But on the other hand the following factors in his mode of teaching are to be noted, which obtained quite a *positive* importance for the time that followed (while we pass over what is an understood matter, viz., that even by him all knowledge was ultimately traced up to the revelation of God): (1) The man charged with "rationalism" has no great confidence in the capabilities of the human power of knowledge, and openly expressed this, in opposition to the self-assurance of the dialecticians and mystics; he did not possess it, but pointed to revelation, because he (2) did not regard thought and being as identical, but took up a critico-sceptical attitude towards the reigning Realism, such as was just required for the defence of the Church doctrine—as was taught by the time that followed. With this there is connected (3) that, while keeping very much on Augustine's lines in the conception of God, he avoided those conclusions from his conception which led at one time to the assumption of a rigid, unchangeable divine working (a rigid order of nature), at another time to an unlimited arbitrariness on God's part. This he effected by bringing in again (with Origen, partly *against* Augustine) very strongly though not at every point, the thought of the *ethically* determined character of the divine action, and of the limitation of the divine power by the notion of purpose (and so by what actually happens). With this he also drew a sharp distinction between God and the creature, and asserted the independence of the latter, corrected thereby the questionable Mystic conception of God, and prepared the way for the conception of God held by the great Schoolmen. His opponents, on the other hand, such as Hugo (and afterwards also the Lombard) adhered to that conception of God which afterwards proved more convenient in defending any kind of Church doctrine; but there is no question that Abelard was really the *more positive*. If he has nevertheless been classed with Spinoza, that only proves that there has been ignorance of the notion of God which elsewhere prevailed in his time among Church theologians, and that just that side in Abelard's notion of God has been emphasised which was *not* peculiar to him, for he sought to unite the standpoints of immanence and transcendence, while his opponents assailed him from the standpoint of the "Spinozist" notion of God. (4) As with the doctrine of God so is it with all the other doctrines of the faith: here Abelard always set out from Augustine (see Deutsch's account), keeps essentially to his formulations, but, with more courage and confidence than the great master, fettered by his Neoplatonism, strives to free theology and the objects of faith from the embraces of a

the Church dogma could not be held by the thinking mind under the entire domination of the Mystic Neoplatonic theology. Although it was by this theology that it had been chiefly elaborated, yet the *Church* had always reserved to itself the *supra-mundane* God and the independence of the creature, and had formed a set of dogmas which Platonism could only sublimate, but could not justify as the *final* expression of the matter itself. The Church needed, therefore, the

Mysticism which is ultimately philosophy of nature. The *ethical* interest, the assurance that what answers to the moral law is also the holy and good before and for God, dominates Abelard (hence also his special interest in moral philosophy), and so far as this interest corrected the Mystical scheme of Christian doctrine in the thirteenth century, Abelard must be thought of as the pioneer. But if in this sense it may be said that Abelard laid the foundation for the great structures of Scholasticism in the thirteenth century—not only because he was the teacher of the Lombard, nor only because he was the acutest thinker of the period, *but because he was the first to attempt that amalgamation of the immanence and transcendence doctrines*, and taught that lower estimation of the principles of knowledge, which became the presuppositions of *ecclesiastical* systems—yet it cannot be denied that the following age did not attach itself directly to him. What he found independently the following age learned from Aristotle, who became more and more known to it from the second half of the twelfth century; it learned it only indirectly, or not at all, from Abelard. But that cannot diminish his fame. He was the first to show how all Church doctrines can and must be so treated that the *principles of morality* (the moral law) shall have as much justice done to them in the system as the *fundamental thoughts of theological speculation on nature*. That he did not solve this problem no one will make the ground of a reproach, for it is insoluble. But that it must be set down as the task of all ecclesiastical science—so long as this science at all declares that its ideal is that of knowing the world—is quite obvious. The contemporaries of Abelard were not willing to learn enough from him, and that, as a rule, determines the amount of influence that belongs to a teacher. They felt repelled (1) by the still novel form of the science in general; (2) by many propositions of Abelard, which were afterwards found to be tolerable—indeed to be the only correct ones; (3) by many individual negative, or critical judgments, both in regard to history and the validity of opinion prevailing at the time, and in regard to particular ecclesiastical doctrines, of which his defensive presentation was felt to be questionable (Sabellianism in the doctrine of the Trinity, yet see Augustine; strong inner variance in the Christology, which thus approached Nestorianism, yet see likewise Augustine). (4) It must not be denied that Abelard himself injured the influence of his doctrines by many contradictions and by the immaturity of his systematising. But how much could have been learned from him; compare only his admirable discussions of love, reconciliation, and the Church! The Church had no genius between Augustine and Luther; but among the men of second rank, Abelard deserves to be named. Karl Müller (*Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker* 1892, pp. 308 f., 319 f.) has strongly emphasised the importance of Abelard for the ways of stating problems and for the positive views of the following period.

help of dialectics (of sober intelligence, and of juristic acuteness directed to the given formulæ) and of a lowering of the lofty flight of speculation, and this help Aristotelianism alone could afford it, *i.e.*, the Aristotelianism, which was then understood as such, and which was then exercising its influence, as the view of things according to which it is held—not that the phenomenal and creaturely are the form transitorily expressing the divine—but that the supernatural God, as Creator in the proper sense of the word, has created the creature and endowed it with independence. It needed the help of Aristotelianism to defend a set of dogmas in the form in which they were already established.¹ But still more was the “Aristotelianism” to do for it. Reason will never ultimately make a compact with authority, but the understanding will. Whoever has entered into the spirit of the All-One and embraces the doctrine of immanence, will feel himself to be as “God,” and will therefore reject all authority, of whatever kind it be. Whoever, on the other hand, feels his independence, side by side with other forms of independence, will become certain of his dependence also. He will no longer take part in the dialectic performance of exchanging his estimate of himself as the perfect nothing (as an individual) for an estimate of himself as the perfect being (as spirit); but while within certain limits, and perhaps with great

¹ Very correctly v. Eicken l.c. p. 602: “The importance which Plato and Aristotle acquired in mediæval philosophy was really in the inverse relation to the position which the two had taken up in the history of the development of Greek philosophy. The Platonic philosophy had placed the substance of things in the general ideas, and had deduced from this assumption the transcendence of the latter, and especially of the highest idea, that is, the idea of God. But the extreme Realism of the Middle Ages adopted the Platonic doctrine of ideas, not to derive from it the transcendence of the supreme idea, but to derive rather the harmonious co-existence of all things in the supreme idea, and just with this aim before it it arrived at that doctrine of God which bore a pantheistic character, as compared with the strict transcendence of the Church doctrine. On the other hand the Aristotelian philosophy had asserted the reality of the general ideas in the individuals, with the view of refuting Plato’s transcendent doctrine of ideas. The Aristotelian Realism, however, attached itself to the Aristotelian doctrine, in order that, by guarding the substantial character of the individuals, it might prove their extra-divine subsistence, and accordingly also the divine transcendence that harmonised with the Church doctrine. This view, which quite inverted the historical and logical relation of the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies, was maintained till the close of the Middle Ages.”

tenacity, he will embrace a rational mode of view, he will, in that which lies beyond these limits, be ready to recognise authorities.

Yet for the great inaugurator of Mediæval Scholasticism (for Anselm everything is still naïve)—for Abelard, the elements were still vaguely intermingled. He set down already as force all that, in the time following, the period when Scholasticism flourished, was conceived of as mutually limiting potencies, or that then became differentiated as distinct tendencies. His contemporaries had as yet no presentiment, that an element in him which they specially censured would yet become the means of saving the Church doctrine. Orthodoxy and the Platonic Realism were still in closest union. The French Mystics declared the efforts of the “dialecticians” heretical; Aristotle was hated. When the great disciple of Abelard, Petrus Lombardus, published his *Sentences*, and in them fittingly placed the learning of his master at the service of the Church theology—as yet the Middle Ages had not possessed a compendium for the study of theology¹—much would not have been required for even this book to be set aside on suspicion. No doubt, this work, because, from the patristic tradition being uncertain, it still frequently adds opinion to opinion, bears the stamp of a freedom which was afterwards lost. But the mere fact that it became the authoritative compendium of the thirteenth century is a proof that on the part of the Church free inquiry, dialectic investigation, and Aristotelian philosophy were now tolerated, not because inward freedom had increased, but because the faculty had grown for making friends with these forces, and because there began to be observed what the Aristotelian method and mode of thought could do for dogma. In the second half of the twelfth century the turn round of things was already preparing itself. The “pious” theologians (the Mystics), so far as they gave themselves up to the work of expounding and establishing dogma, were forced to see that by means of thorough-

¹ Only since Abelard's times were there somewhat more comprehensive statements of Christian doctrine, which, besides, were still in many respects different. He himself and Hugo of St. Victor took the lead in producing them; see Abelard's “*Introductio*”; faith, love, the sacraments as subjects of dogmatic.

going Realism contemplation might be enriched, but the objective doctrine could not be defended. The coalition of naïve faith on authority with a Mysticism that, in its ultimate ground, was not without danger, came to an end. Church faith, Mysticism, and Aristotelian science formed a close alliance. On the other hand, the dialecticians, in the degree in which they passed from the Aristotelian formalism to Aristotle's doctrine of principles (perhaps the increasing knowledge of this philosophy contributed most to this), lost that audacity which had once given so much offence, and which, certainly, had often been only a sign of playing with empty forms. No doubt in connection with this many a fresh piece of knowledge came to be lost.¹ One who has much to carry gets more anxious, and moves more slowly, than one who marches under an easy burden. To this there came to be added, that from decade to decade the authority of the Church grew stronger. Though there was a growth also of opposition, which forced to anxious reflection (Mohammedans, Jews, heretics, knowledge of the ancient classics),² at the end of the twelfth century the Church outshone all else with its lustre. Its *rights* in respect of life and doctrine became the worthiest subject of investigation and exposition. Into this task blended the other, of referring all things to God and construing the knowledge of the world as theology. *The theology of the ecclesiastical facts pressed itself on the theology of speculation.* Under what other auspices could this great structure be erected than under those of that *Aristotelian Realism*, which was at bottom a *dialectic* between the Platonic Realism and Nominalism, and which was represented as capable of uniting immanence and transcendence, history and miracle, the immutability of God and mutability, Idealism and Realism, reason and authority? Thus it was only

¹ In the writings of the earlier Schoolmen, *i.e.*, of Abelard chiefly, there are not a few thoughts that were *directly* fitted either to enrich or to modify dogma. But at that time the Church accepted nothing from the Schoolmen, and when it was prepared to have the doctrine interpreted to it by them, these men had no longer the freedom and boldness to say anything new to the Church.

² What importance for Abelard the discussion with the Jew and the philosopher had may be learned from the "Dialogue" (v. Deutsch, p. 433 ff., against Reuter I., pp. 198-221.)

in the thirteenth century that there made its appearance the theology adequate to the Church and its dogma, and no longer viewed with suspicion,¹ after a new wave of piety (the Mendicant Orders) had imparted to it the highest measure of power of which the Catholic religion is at all capable. The fear of the Lord was also the beginning of this new wisdom. In form and contents, in its systematic method, and in the exhaustive fulness of its material, it is related to the theology of the twelfth century as, we might say, Origen was related to Clement of Alexandria. This is more than a comparison, for the course of events really repeated itself. Clement, the inaugurator, the *bolder* spirit, the less "enlightened," who does not yet know that the full authority of the Catholic Church is against him; Origen, the man of system, more comprehensive, but at the same time more closely tied to the Church and its doctrine. The same relation obtained between the theologians of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. (Compare, *e.g.*, the "aggregating" character of the Sentences of Robert Pulleyn [Deutsch, p. 6 f.] with the *Stromateis* of Clement, and the great "Sums" of the thirteenth century with Origen's *De principiis*.) In the following chapter we shall take up the thread here again. If we direct no further attention here to the Lombard, and especially to Hugo, the somewhat earlier, and, *in respect of matter*, the most influential theologian of the twelfth century ("a second Augustine"), the fact may serve as an excuse that the importance which the two obtained for the *history of dogma* appeared only at the great Lateran Council, and in the theologians of the thirteenth century. On Hugo's Sentences see Denifle in the *Archiv f. L.-u. K.-Gesch. des Mittelalters* III., p. 634 ff.

¹The diminishing distrust of theology in contra-distinction to the former period is also to be explained from the circumstance that the general average of culture among the higher clergy became higher. The theologians of the thirteenth century were no longer confronted with so much unreason as the "dialecticians" of the eleventh century had to contend with in the wide development of the Church.

4. *Elaboration of Dogma.*

The theological conflicts of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, as they were fought out between the dialecticians and their opponents, do not belong to the history of dogma. This science has to confine itself to showing what position dogma asserted in connection with the revival and the crises of theology, what enrichments it received, and how far the Scholastic activity (or the theological systematising) already influenced it. As to the first of these questions, the statement may be quite brief: dogma, as it was fixed by the Councils, as it had been described by Augustine and Gregory I,¹ was the presupposition of all theological thought, and was held inviolate. Isolated exceptions were without any importance. The dialectic experiments on dogma were always based on the traditional view of it. As regards the third question, an influence on dogma of Scholastic activity and systematic theology can already be pointed to in the twelfth century; but the influence was still so much in its beginnings that it is better to treat it first in connection with the thirteenth century.² And so there remains only the question as to the "enrichments." Strictly speaking, this question also would have to be answered in the negative,³ were it not that in the Berengarian controversy a movement presents itself, in which a dogma that had still always been the subject of dispute, attained a relatively complete form, and had not Anselm set up a doctrine of satisfaction, which, indeed, was a product of purely private work, and found few adherents, too, in the period that followed, but which brought before the Church a dogmatic problem that was hitherto unsolved, nay,

¹So far as there was at all a single authoritative book here, it was Augustine's *Enchiridion*. But it is characteristic that Abelard, in his systematic work, already added the Sacraments to faith and love.

²The doctrine of the sacraments is chiefly thought of here.

³Almost everything that Bach has set forth in the second volume of his work on the history of dogma in the Middle Ages, including the "history of Adoptianism in the twelfth century" and the "systematic polemic against the dialecticians" (p. 390 ff.; Gerhoch against the German Adoptians, p. 475 ff.), belongs simply to the history of theology, and has no significance for the history of dogma.

had scarcely ever been touched as yet, but which was not again to pass out of view. In what follows, therefore, we have to treat of these two movements.

A. *The Berengarian Controversy.*

Besides its dogmatic, this controversy¹ has a philosophic² interest, and an interest also in connection with Church politics.³ The last of these interests may be left quite out of view here; the second is closely connected with the first. From the place which the dogma of the Eucharist held in the theory and practice of the Church, the criticism of it was a criticism of the reigning Church doctrine as a whole. When the youthful science, represented and led by Berengar of Tours, began at this point, charged the accepted view with error, and applied the scientific doctrine of method to the dogma of the Eucharist, expression was given to the thought, that there may not be a resting satisfied with mere Church tradition, with what is held as valid *to-day*. But this thought was not expressed in the name of a negative "illumism,"⁴ but, on the contrary rather, that the *true* tradition of the Church might be delivered from the embraces of a bad routine, that the spirit of the doctrine

¹ Besides Lessing's well-known work and Vischer, *De sacra cœna* adv. Lanfrancum lib. posterior, 1834; also the Acts of the Roman Council (Mansi XIX., p. 761 ff.), see Sudendorf, *Berengarius*, 1850; Schnitzer, *Berengar v. Tours, sein Leben u. s. Lehre*, 1890; Bach I., pp. 364-451; Reuter I., p. 91 ff., Dieckhoff, *Die Abendmahlslehre im Reform.-Zeitalter I.*, p. 44 ff.

² Here, for the first time, the categories "subjectum," "quod in subjecto," "de subjecto," the distinction of "esse" from "secundum quod esse," in short, the dialectic manipulations of the notion of substance (according to Porphyry, Boethius, etc.) were applied to a dogma in the West.

³ The outward political side of the controversy has been thoroughly treated by Schwane (*Studien zur Gesch. des 2. Abendmahlsstreits*, 1887, see Loofs, *Gött. Gel.-Anz.*, 1888, No. 15), who follows Sudendorf. On the antagonism to Berengar, see the accounts of Schnitzer, l.c. p. 246 ff.

⁴ Reuter's judgment is, I., p. 97: "Thus the second controversy on the Eucharist became what the first was not, a struggle as to the supreme criteria of religious truth, a conflict of the tendency of negative 'illumism,' directly with the authoritative ecclesiasticism of the time, indirectly with the Christianity of positive revelation." This is to me utterly unintelligible. Even the most deeply convinced Romish theologian will hesitate to endorse this opinion.

might be protected against a coarse and superstitious realism, that the λογική λατρεία (reasonable service) might be maintained against a barbarian craving for mysteries, and that the mystery of faith might not be profaned. But combined with this interest, which was by no means merely pretended, there was the pleasure in thinking, and the daring reliance on dialectics as on "reason" in general. As theologians, Berengar and his followers were Augustinians, but, at the same time, Berengar had an enjoyment in criticism as such, and a confidence in "science," that were not Augustinian.

Berengar, Director of the Cathedral School in Tours, from about 1040 Archdeacon in Angers (ob. 1088), had instituted studies on the doctrine of the Eucharist, searched through the Church Fathers, occupied himself with the first Eucharist controversy, and rejected¹ the doctrine of Paschasius, long before a controversy developed itself. In the doctrine as it prevailed at the time he saw apostasy from the Church Fathers and unreason; for he saw in it only the view, that after the consecration bread and wine have disappeared, and in place of them there exist the real flesh and blood of Christ in so sensibly palpable a form that they are present as pieces (portions) of His bloody body. He was right; so the widely prevailing superstition taught;² yet

¹ See on this Reuter I., p. 95, "Paschasius ineptus ille monachus Corbeiensis." Berengar is correct in seeing contradictions in Paschasius. The book of Ratramnus was then regarded as a work of John Scotus, and was condemned as such at Vercell in 1050.

² The confession of faith which was forced upon him in 1059 (composed by Cardinal Humbert), also contained the coarse view. Even Bach I., p. 366, n. 4, declares the confession "at least objectionable." In Lanfranc de corp. et sang. dom. 2 (Migne CL.) the words occur: "panem et vinum quæ in altari ponuntur post consecrationem non solum sacramentum sed etiam verum corpus et sanguinem J. Christi esse et sensualiter, non solum in sacramento sed et in veritate, manibus sacerdotum tractari et frangi et fidelium dentibus atteri." The most characteristic thing is that those who were quite logical declared even the word "sacrament" to be unsatisfactory: "The Eucharist is the mystery (sacramentum) in which there is no mystery, but all takes place vere et sensualiter." That is the fundamental thought of Berengar's opponents. That this was a falling away from tradition stands beyond doubt. But the traditional theologians, as is well known, are most fanatical, when to the old beaten track which they call tradition, or to their fancies, which, from their lack of understanding, they surround with the halo of the venerable, there is opposed the truth *that has the protection of the true tradition.*

Paschasius had certainly taken also a more spiritual view of the change, and among the authoritative churchmen of that period such a "conversion" was not taught by all the more prominent.¹ By means of a letter to Lanfranc, Berengar himself opened the controversy.² We have his doctrine fully stated for us for the first time in his work *de sacra cœna. adv. Lanfrancum* (ab. 1073; anything earlier is almost entirely lost). His leading idea was to introduce reason into the Church doctrine, or, more correctly, to bring to light by means of reason the reason that lies in the divine doctrines of the Church. Dialectics, the science which had always differentiated, is nowhere more in its proper place than where there is a question about two objects, which, in one respect, are one, and in another respect are different. Thus the two-nature doctrine is very peculiarly its province; and so also is the doctrine of the Eucharist, with its earthly elements and its heavenly gift.³ Berengar showed that the doctrine of the bodily transmutation was absurd ("ineptia"), and went directly in the face of the old traditions, as well as of reason, which we must make use of as reasonable beings created in the image of God.⁴ He accordingly adopted the standpoint of Scotus (Ratramnus), as he understood it. He taught that the words are to be understood *tropically*; but he held this interpretation

¹ The controversy is also so uninspiring, because, as usual, the opponents exaggerated. Berengar proceeded as if he had only the view against him that parts of the bloody body of Christ are chewed by the teeth, while his adversaries asserted that according to him the elements were empty symbols. He had at any rate more right on his side in his description; yet not only Fulbert (Bach I., p. 365), but some also who were later, did not think of a *spatial* extension of the body of Christ in the converted elements.

² See Mansi T. XIX., p. 768.

³ Of course the chief arguments of Berengar are derived from Scripture and tradition. To them he attaches decisive weight. The distinction that already prejudices everything, between the sensible, the visible, and the sacrament, the invisible—Berengar had made it the basis of his doctrine and the starting-point of his dialectic, as long as he could think—originates with Augustine. With the dialectic there mingle the beginnings of a more independent, a critical view of history. Yet Berengar meddles with no decree of any Council. Only, the decrees connected with his subject are ridiculed by him.

⁴ See Vischer, p. 600: "maximi plane cordis est, per omnia ad dialecticam confugere, quia confugere ad eam ad rationem est confugere, quo qui non confugit, cum secundum rationem sit factus ad imaginem dei, suum honorem reliquit nec potest renovari de die in diem ad imaginem dei."

with much greater firmness than his predecessor, and gave it an exclusiveness of which his predecessor had not thought; Christ is spoken of under many symbols, hence the bread is also a symbol;¹ Scripture teaches that, till His return, Christ remains in heaven;² a piece of bread is not capable of taking into itself the body born of the Virgin, and yet it is a question about the *whole* Christ;³ a destruction of the subject (the elements) involves the destruction of all essential attributes of the elements, for concretely (in concreto) these cannot be distinguished from the subject itself (Nominalist tendency).⁴ Yet the tropical view, as he did not stand by it, was not equivalent for Berengar to the symbolical. This latter view rather he explicitly rejected, in so far as he followed the old tradition, and recognised two things in the Eucharist, sign and sacrament. The elements become sacrament through consecration, and this implies that they now include something objectively holy. A "conversio" takes place; but for Berengar this expression has certainly an unusual sense.⁵ It is meant to suggest that the

¹ Berengar compares the description of Christ as a lion, lamb, corner-stone.

² P. 199: "constabit, eum qui opinetur, Christi corpus cœlo devocatum adesse sensualiter in altari, ipsum se dejicere, quod recordium est, dum confirmat se manu frangere, dente atterere Christi corpus, quod tamen ipsum negare non possit impossibile esse et incorruptibile."

³ The last point was for Berengar of the greatest weight. He always regards his opponents as assuming that there are "particulae" of the body of Christ on the altar, and objects to this, (1) that it is a question of the *whole* body (see pp. 148, 199 f.); (2) that the body of Christ is not something "corruptible," which can be touched, broken, and bitten. Then, again, the bread is not capable of affording room for such a body, and then the "sensualiter" is above all objected to. The incorruptibility and uniqueness of the body of Christ are the presuppositions of his dialectic. A body so constituted cannot become sensible, and it cannot be at the same time in a thousand places. The expedient also of supposing a creating-anew of the body of Christ is effectively refuted by him; this would involve us in the thought of two bodies.

⁴ Here Berengar emphasised the correct logical reflection, "quod in subjecto erat superesse quacunq̄ ratione non potest corrupto subjecto" (p. 93), *i.e.*, when the substance is destroyed, the essential attributes (taste, colour, form) cannot remain behind; or p. 59: "non potest res ulla aliquid esse, si desinat ipsum esse." Even Protestant historians will take no account of such reasons.

⁵ It must be assumed that it rests on accommodation; for although there answers to the sacrament a *res sacramenti*, which is created by the consecration, yet it is certainly not a question of transmutation. Nor did the old tradition furnish this term. In substance Berengar is a correct Augustinian; hence it is unnecessary to quote further passages. The proper expression for what Berengar means would be a

elements remain what they are, but *at the same time* become the body of Christ. They become *in a certain respect* something different, *i.e.*, there is now added to the visible a second element, which is real, but *invisible*. The consecrated elements remain in one respect what they are, but in another respect they become the sacraments, *i.e.*, as the visible, temporal, and mutable subjects, they become the guarantees (*pignora, figuræ, signa*) of the reception of the *whole* heavenly Christ by the believer. While the mouth therefore receives the "sacrament," the truly genuine Christian receives by discernment ("in cognitione"), and into his heart that which the sacramental elements represent, namely, Christ as food, the power of the heavenly Christ. Hence the enjoyment and the effect of the Eucharist are spiritual: the inner man (so it depends on faith, in addition to the consecration) receives the true body of Christ, and appropriates the death of the crucified Christ through believing remembrance.¹

Augustine would have had nothing to object to this doctrine of the Eucharist, even though some dialectic arguments and devices in it had surprised him. But the men of the period were shocked, both at the result, and partly also at the course of thought that led to this result. At Rome and Vercelli (1050), in Berengar's absence, the doctrine was condemned, on the ground of the letter to Lanfranc. Nine years later, after it had become artificially mixed up in France with ecclesiastico-political questions, but had thereby become for the time more tolerable for Rome, and after its author had suffered much from slander and imprisonment, Berengar was compelled to subscribe at Rome, under Nicolas II., a formula of faith, which made it clear that his worst fears with regard to the tyranny of superstition in the Church were not exaggerated.² Having returned to France, he kept in retirement at first; but subsequently he

divine "auctio" in the elements, and so also he has expressed himself, p. 98. On the other hand, it is said, p. 125: "per consecrationem altaris fiunt panis et vinum sacramenta religionis, non ut desinat esse quæ fuerant, sed ut sint quæ erant et in aliud commutentur."

¹ "Christi corpus totum constat accipi ab interiore homine, fidelium corde, non ore" (p. 148). At the same time also a memorial feast: "spiritualis comestio, quæ fit in mente."

² v. above p. 47, note 2.

could have no rest. He came to the front again with his doctrine, for which he had influential supporters in Rome itself, and a new, heated literary controversy was the result. During its course the most important writings on both sides were produced. Gregory VII. treated the controversy in a dilatory way, and with much indulgence towards Berengar, who was personally known to him: in all ages Rome has been clever enough not to be hasty in making heretics, and a Pope who, in ruling the world, must so often wink at things, knows also how to exercise patience and forbearance, especially when personal sympathy is not wanting.¹ But in the end Gregory was compelled, in order not to shake his own authority, to force Berengar, at the Synod of 1079, to recognise the transmutation doctrine.² For a second time Berengar outwardly submitted; the Pope was satisfied with the form; but with this the cause which the broken scholar represented became lost.

The transmutation theory of Paschasius—the term transubstantiation was apparently first used casually by Hildebert of Tours (beginning of twelfth century) in his 93rd Sermon (Migne CLXXI., p. 776), and therefore already existed³—was further developed by the opponents of Berengar.⁴ First, the mystery was conceived of still more sensuously, at least by some (manducatio infidelium);⁵ secondly, there was a beginning,

¹On the interesting relation of Berengar to the Curia and Gregory VII., see Reuter I., p. 116 ff., 120 ff.

²The formula (in Lanfranc, c. 2) was milder than that of 1059, but yet sufficiently plain: “Ego Berengarius corde credo et ore confiteor panem et vinum que *ponuntur in altari* per mysterium sacre orationis et verba nostri redemptoris *substantialiter* converta in veram et propriam et vivatricem carnem et sanguinem J. Christi et post consecrationem esse verum corpus Christi, quod natum est de virgine . . . et quod sedet ad dexteram patris . . . non tantum *per signum et virtutem sacramenti sed in proprietate nature et veritate substantie.*”

³In his two treatises (of date 1157) against the followers of Soterichos, in whose opinion the mass was not offered to the Son, but only to the Father and Spirit, Nicolas of Methone used the expression *μεταστροφείσις*, see Hefele V.², p. 568. These treatises were published by Dimitracopulos in the year 1865 (see Reusch, Theol. Lit.-Blatt, 1866, No. 11).

⁴Yet everything acquired settled form only in the thirteenth century: the questions resulting from the new doctrine are innumerable.

⁵Lanfranc, l.c. c. 20: even sinners and the unworthy receive the true body of Christ. Only in this respect did Lanfranc develop the doctrine beyond Paschasius.

though with caution, to apply to dogma the "science" that was discredited in the opponent. The crude conceptions (which embraced the *total* conversion) were put aside, and an attempt was made to unite the older deliverances of tradition with the new transmutation doctrine, as also to adapt the Augustinian terminology, by means of dialectic distinctions, to the still coarsely realistic view of the object.¹ The struggle of Berengar, therefore, did not continue altogether without fruit; but the fruit consisted essentially in this, that science was left quite free,

¹ There was an aiming above all at recognising the *whole* Christ as present in the host, at reconciling the Augustinian, as well as the older rich and manifold conception of the Eucharist as a whole, with the transmutation doctrine, at rationalising the relation of element to *verum corpus Christi* by dialectic distinctions of accident and substance, at reconciling the presence of Christ in heaven with the sacramental presence, and at not forgetting, too, in these speculations the Church as *corpus Christi*. Note here as specially important the treatise *de corp. et sang. Christi veritate in eucharistia*, by Guitmund of Aversa (Migne CXLIX.), who certainly learned from Berengar. For the theories of other opponents of Berengar (Lanfranc, Adelman of Brixen, Hugo of Langres, Durandus of Troanne, Alger of Lüttich, Abelard [he taught differently from Berengar, see Deutsch, l.c. pp. 401 f., 405 ff.], Walter of St. Victor, Honorius of Autun, etc.), see in Bach I., p. 382 ff. On the German theologians who occupied themselves with the doctrine of the Eucharist, see *ibid.*, p. 399 ff. (the Reichersberg theologians, Gerhoch, Rupert of Deutz; in the last named there is a peculiar, spiritualistic consubstantiation doctrine). Guitmund attributed the whole Christ to every particle, and thereby led on to the new view, first expressed by Anselm, that the whole Christ is contained in *one* form (ep. IV., 107): "in acceptione sanguinis totum Christum deum et hominem et in acceptione corporis similiter totum accipimus." In this the dogmatic basis was laid for withholding the cup, which afterwards became the rule. There is interest connected with the timid attempts that were made to teach also a "certain" incorruptibility of the *accidents* of the converted *substances* (these terms are now used even by the orthodox). Yet appearance witnessed against this assumption, and there was not yet resolution enough to adopt the doctrine that even here the empirical misleads. That Lutheran theologians take sides with Berengar's opponents (Thomasius-Seeberg, p. 48: "really religious position as opposed to the rationalising mis-interpretation of this man," cf. Reuter), although their final argument was the omnipotence of God, belongs to the peculiarities of the Romantic theology of the nineteenth century. Thomasius (p. 49) is specially delighted with the timid anticipations of the doctrine of the ubiquity of the substance of the body of the heavenly Christ in Alger (*de sacram. corp. et sang. domini* I., 11-16), whereby the difficulties which attach to the idea of the creatio of the Eucharistic body are to be set aside (Bach. I., p. 389 ff.): "Christ can be corporeally present wherever he wills." For the rest (see Lanfranc), there was as yet no more declared than that with the body exalted to the right hand of God the Eucharistic body is identical, and yet not identical. How necessary here, therefore, was the so much despised dialectic of Berengar!

because it was gradually seen that in face of the gravity of the problems the simplicity of faith was powerless. At the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) the mediæval doctrine of the Supper was solemnly framed as dogma in the famous confession of faith, which, previous to the Tridentine confession, was the most influential symbol (after the Niceno-Constantinopolitan; see Mansi XXII., p. 982; Hefele V.², p. 878 ff.; and the *Corpus juris canonici*, where the topic finds a place under X. 1: *de summa trinitate* [I. 1]). What is important here is (1) that the doctrine of the Eucharist is immediately attached to the confession of the Trinity and Incarnation. *In this way it is represented even in the symbol as having a most intimate relation to these doctrines, as, indeed, forming with them a unity; i.e.,* the state of things was now created that was disastrous even for the history of the Reformation: the real presence obtained the same value as the Trinity and the two-nature doctrine, so that every one was regarded as an ecclesiastical anarchist who called it in question. This valuation certainly corresponds with the development of the doctrine of the Eucharist, inasmuch as the Eucharist appears as the continuously present, earthly incorporation of the mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, but it robs the Gospel of its spiritual character. (2) Transubstantiation was now expressly taught; the words run: "moreover there is one universal Church of the faithful, outside of which no one whatever can be saved, in which Jesus Christ is at once priest and sacrifice, whose body and blood are truly (*veraciter*) contained in the sacrifice of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine, the bread being *transubstantiated* into the body, and the wine into the blood by divine power, so that for the effecting of the mystery of unity (*ad perficiendum mysterium unitatis*) we receive of His what He received of ours (here the conjunction with the Christology is manifest). And this sacrament especially (*hoc utique sacramentum*) no one can administer but the priest who has been duly ordained according to the Church authority (*secundum claves ecclesiæ*) which Jesus Christ Himself gave to the Apostles and their successors." The symbol then immediately continues: "But the sacrament of baptism, which is consecrated in water on invoking the undivided Trinity, avails for salvation both to

infants and adults, by whomsoever it is duly administered in the forms of the Church (in forma ecclesiæ). And if after receiving baptism any one shall have fallen into sin, he can *always* be restored (reparari) through true penitence." Thus this line of development also is completed, and at the same time the related one (see Vol. V., p. 325), according to which every Christian must make confession of his sins before the parish priest (parochus). It is laid down in the twenty-first chapter: "Every believer, of either sex, after arriving at the years of discretion, must by himself (solus) faithfully confess all his sins, at least once a year, to his own priest, and must study to carry out to the best of his ability the repentance enjoined upon him, receiving reverently, at least at Easter, the sacrament of the Eucharist." The novelty in the symbol—the direct attachment of the Eucharist dogma to the Trinity and Christology—is the most distinctive and boldest act of the Middle Ages. Compared with this immense innovation, the addition of the "filioque" weighs very lightly. But on the other hand, the symbol certainly shows also very plainly how the old dogmatic tradition still dominated everything, for it contains *nothing* of the specific Augustinian-Western propositions about sin, original sin, grace, and justification. "Dogma," in the strict sense of the word, consists of the Trinity, Christology, the doctrine of the Eucharist, the doctrine of Baptism, and of the Sacrament of Penance. All else is at the most dogma of the second order. This state of things also was of the greatest weight for the history of the Reformation; the doctrines of the Trinity, of Christ and of the Sacraments (*i.e.*, the doctrine of the three Sacraments, Baptism, Penance, Eucharist) constitute Catholic Christianity—nothing else.

*B. Anselm's Doctrine of Satisfaction, and the Doctrines of Atonement of the Theologians of the Twelfth Century.*¹

Ever since the days when an attempt was made to punish, without decimating the Church, the great apostasy occasioned by the Decian persecution, the positions were held as valid, that

¹ See Baur, *Lehre von der Versöhnung*; Hasse, *Anselm*, 1853; Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* 2 Aufl. I., p. 31 ff.

God's mercy is unlimited, even as regards the baptised, but that only a *satisfactio*, consisting of legitimate penance (*pœnitentia legitima*), can move the offended God to regard the sinner again with favour. Since that time these ideas had obtained the widest circulation,¹ united themselves at a later period with Germanic ideas, and dominated the whole penitential system of the Church.² Connected with this system stood the conception of "merits," *i.e.*, of such supererogatory acts as establish a claim to reward, when no guilt exists to be expiated. Through this idea a *calculation* of the *value* of particular deeds was introduced, and of these calculations the whole ethical system was full. Whether an act was obligatory, or abundans, or superabundans, whether, under given circumstances, it was compensatory (*satisfactory*), or meritorious, had to be established in each particular case, so that each one might know how his account stood with heaven. The Augustinian conception of prevenient grace freely bestowed (*gratia gratis data præveniens*), which had been generally accepted, wrought no change on this view, but only made it more complicated.

Yet neither by Gregory the Great, nor by any theologian of the Carovingian period, was this view applied to the work of Christ. Frequent reference, it is true, was already made to the "*copiousness of the value of the mystery of the passion*" (*pretii copiositas mysterii passionis*; see the fourth chapter of the Synod of Chiersey); but a theory had not been framed, because there was no reflection at all on the nature, the specific worth, and the effect of the redemption contained in the suffering and death of Christ. The Fathers, Augustine included, had handed down nothing certain on this. The only view taken by the Greeks was that the reign of death was broken by the cross and resurrection of Christ, or that mankind were thereby bought off, or cunningly wrested, from the devil. All that they said of the *sacrifice* in the suffering was quite vague. Only Athanasius spoke with noteworthy clearness of the penal suffering which Christ took from us and laid upon Himself. But, from the days

¹ See the confidence in the unlimited mercy of God on the part of the Carovingian theologians, especially Alcuin (Hauck, K.-Deutschlands II., p. 136 f.).

² See Vol. V., p. 323 ff.

of Paul, all of them testified *that Christ died for us*, and delivered us from the power of the devil. That was felt and proclaimed as the great act of redemption. Ambrose and Augustine had then emphasised the position that Christ is Mediator as *man*, and had given many instructions about particular points; but the question why that Man, who was at the same time God, was obliged to *suffer* and *die*, was dealt with by pointing to His *example*, or by reciting biblical texts about ransom, sacrifice, and such like, without the necessity of the death here coming clearly to view.¹ But Augustine certainly had laid the foundation for a new and vigorous apprehension of the significance of Christ's work, by emphasising so strongly the gravity of sin, and by representing the relation between God and man under the scheme of sin and grace.

At this point Anselm came in. The importance of his *doctrine of satisfaction*, as developed in Book II. of his "*Cur deus homo*,"² composed as a dialogue, lies in this, that he made use of all the factors of the Augustinian theology, so far as they came into consideration here, but that at the same time he was the first of all to frame a *theory*, both of the necessity of the appearing of the God-man, and of the necessity of His death. This he did by *making the principles of the practice of penance the fundamental scheme of religion in general*.³ The "necessity"

¹ The necessity resulted, no doubt, when the sight of the devil over mankind was thought of. Beyond this, it may be said that we have in one respect an anticipation of the Anselmic representation in the sermon composed about 500 by a contemporary of Faustus of Reji: Why Christ redeemed mankind from the power of the devil, not through the use of His divine might, but by becoming man, fulfilling the law, suffering and dying. (Caspari, Briefe, Abhandlungen und Predigten, 1890, pp. 202 ff. 411 ff.). The whole view of redemption, it is true, is still given here under the scheme of redemption from the devil, but the mode of redemption is dominated by the thought that "*deus est rationis atque justitiæ et auctor et exactor*." Something similar is also to be found in some homilies of Faustus (see Caspari, l.c. p. 418 ff.).

² Edit. II., by Fritzsche, 1886.

³ Cremer (die Wurzeln des Anselm'schen Satisfactionsbegriff, in den Stud. und Krit. 1880, p. 7 ff.) has endeavoured to show that the fundamental thesis of Anselm's satisfaction theory (I. 13: "*necesse est, ut aut ablatus honor solvatur aut pœna sequatur*." I. 15: "*necesse est, ut omne peccatum satisfactio aut pœna sequatur*") is of Germanic origin. The correspondence is no doubt easily proved, but the Roman law also knows of this alternative in the case of private offences, and there can be no doubt that the Church, in its ordinances of penance, had acted on

was understood by Anselm in the sense of the strictest *reasonableness*, *i.e.*, his aim is to show that even if we knew nothing of Christ, and such an One had never existed, reason would have

the principle, "aut poenitentia legitima (satisfactio congrua) aut mors aeterna," long ere it learned to know Germanic law. In Tertullian, certainly, there still prevails another idea, when (de pudic. 2) he says: "omne delictum aut venia dispungit aut poena"; but the fatal turn of thought is already anticipated, when he forthwith adds: "*venia ex castigatione, poena ex damnatione.*"—Thus I had written in the first edition; since then, Cremer has again described his standpoint in the Stud. u. Krit., 1893 (pp. 316-345). I must adhere to the position that it is not necessary for understanding Anselm to have recourse to the Germanic notion of satisfaction, since the material in hand, of which we have to take account, is quite sufficiently given in the prevailing practice and theory of penance. These go back in the West to the time of Cyprian, or say of Tertullian (see Wirth, Der Verdienstbegriff bei Tertullian, 1892; see also Tertullian's notion of "compensatio," cf. Apolog. 50: "veniam dei compensatione sanguinis expedire"), and developed themselves everywhere in the same way. It may be enough to point to Sulpitius Severus (Dial. II. 10), who was certainly not affected by Germanic influence: "fornicatio deputatur ad *panam*, nisi *satisfactione* purgatur." That is surely clearly enough the Anselmic scheme. (See other passages in Karl Müller, Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker, 1892, p. 290 f.: God is satisfied with a lesser performance; this appears sometimes as mutatio of, sometimes as compensatio for, the eternal penalty.) Nor is it advisable here, or in Tertullian, to speak of "compensating penalty" ("Ersatzstrafe") as distinct from "compensation for injury" ("Schadenersatz"), for these notions cannot at all be strictly kept apart everywhere. "The sacrifices that are well-pleasing to God are a broken spirit, a broken and contrite heart." From this passage and similar ones, from the consensus gentium also, which may very well be appealed to here, and finally from the rule, well-known even to the Romans, as to every other nation, that private injuries are cancelled by indemnifications which restore to the injured party his honour, it is quite sufficiently explained, how in the gemitus, lamentationes, humiliationes, etc., there should both be recognised mortificationes temporales, and also something seen which changes the feeling of the angry God and makes Him again gracious. That is *compensation* for injury as regards the honour of God (because voluntary self-humiliation), for in the normal relationship one is not obliged in such a way to testify his subjection (therefore it is also a "merit"—*i.e.*, something which God gladly sees and prizes—when in this condition one nevertheless offers those performances, and under certain circumstances a saint can also offer them for a sinner). But it can also be described as *compensating penalty*, for the satisfaction, it is true, and even the Anselmic is no exception, is in no sense endurance of deserved penalty, but it is a performance, which to the performer is painful and arduous. In Roman public law the poena is certainly the satisfactio—that has not been disputed—but, so far as I know, in the penitential discipline of the ancient Church the satisfactio was never thought of purely in the forms of Roman law (against Cremer, p. 316), but was always the *evasion* of penalty by acts which were at once (as castigatio) compensating penalties and (as surplus exercise of lowly submission to God) compensations for injury. It may be that to the man of the ancient world the compensating *penalty* was more distinctly present than the compensation for injury, although all public penal

to confess that men can only be saved if a God-man appears and dies for them.¹ Jews and pagans must be constrained to acknowledge this necessity. They, and unbelieving Christians, must see that it is *unreason* to assert that God could also have redeemed us by another person (whether man or angel), or that He could have redeemed us by a mere determination of His will;² they must *perceive* that the mercy of God does not suffer wrong through the death on the cross, and that it is not unworthy of God that Christ should have stooped to abasement and taken upon Himself the uttermost suffering. No doubt it holds good that we first believe and then see.³ But though the attempt may fail—faith, of course, would remain unshaken—we

procedure has developed itself from compensating *performances*, and the consciousness of this has never disappeared (even “*pœna*” is originally “ransom”). But when Cremer asserts: “The term and conception ‘penance’ (*Busse*), in the penal law and current language of the Romish Church, springs from the *satisfactio* of German law,” that is an error which prejudices all his further exposition (see also Loofs, *Dogmengesch.*², p. 273 f.). At the same time it may be held by way of reservation that the transfusion of the penance discipline of the Church with Germanic ideas strengthened the theory, and gave a casuistic tinge and externality to the practice (*Weregild*, instead of, and in addition to, *cor humiliatum* and *lamentationes*). So also the peculiar expression Anselm gives to the notion “honour” of God is *perhaps* due to Germanic influence, although one must look very closely to discover a shade of difference on this point between Anselm’s God and the injured and wrathful God of Tertullian. Why then (according to Tertullian) is God injured by sins? Because the obedience is withheld which is due to His commands. When Cremer asserts (p. 329) that in the ancient penance discipline, the *satisfactio congrua* (“*congrua*”—that is, determined by the penance regulations; the expression can be pointed out already in the fourth century) was *as much* penalty as the *mors aeterna*, that is certainly a wonderful statement. When, finally (p. 326), he throws on me the burden of proving that the Roman law, in the case of private injuries, recognises the alternative: “*aut pœna aut satisfactio*,” I grant that I expressed myself too strongly, and in a way not incapable of being misunderstood. The law, so far as it was *publicly* administered and codified, may no longer recognise this principle; but a jurist like Tertullian shows that the scheme must have been a familiar one, and how can we think of the settlement of private wrongs at all otherwise than by supposing that a *satisfactio* is rendered to the injured?

¹ Augustine already propounded the question of the absolute necessity of redemption by means of the incarnation and death of the *Logos*, but answered it *in the negative*. He saw in this means not the only, though certainly the worthiest, way.

² I. 1.

³ I. 2: “*Sicut rectus ordo exigit, ut profunda christianæ fidei prius credamus, quam ea presumamus ratione discutere.*”

must advance to the knowledge of what we believe, and in this case a perfect reasonable knowledge is possible.

At the outset Anselm rejects three ideas, one as insufficient, the others as erroneous. It is not sufficient to justify redemption through the death on the cross by emphasising the "conveniens," *i.e.*, the correspondence of the person and work of Christ with the person and fall of Adam; that is an æsthetic view, which is correct, but which proves nothing until the "necessarium" is established.¹ It is erroneous to think that a man could have redeemed us; for we should then become the servants of him who should have delivered us from eternal death. But in that way our original dignity would not be restored, in virtue of which we were like the angels and servants of *God* alone.² It is erroneous, finally, to think that by redemption legal claims of the devil upon us had to be wiped out; for although by reason of our sins we have justly come under the devil's power, yet the devil does not rule justly, but rather unjustly. He has obtained no claim upon us, and over against God he has absolutely no right.³ Before Anselm begins his process of proof, he further endeavours—the arrangement is extremely unskillful—to refute the objection that the suffering and death of a God-man, just because he is man, are without effect, because every man is bound to be obedient unto death. He rejects this view, which is only apparently supported by passages of Scripture that teach that the death of Christ was obligatory, because it was fulfilment of the divine will; a sinless man, rather—and the God-man was such—was only under obligation to observe *justitia* and *veritas* (righteousness and truth), but not to die, for death follows only upon sin.⁴ Having now cleared the path for himself, he goes on to put the question thus: Assuming that we knew nothing whatever of the God-

¹ I. 3, 4: ". . . Multa alia, quæ studiose considerata inenarrabilem quandam nostræ redemptionis hoc modo procuratæ pulchritudinem (see Augustine) ostendunt . . . sed si non est aliquid solidum super quod sedeant, non videntur infidelibus sufficere."

² I. 5.

³ I. 6, 7.

⁴ I. 8-10. In the 2nd Book this decisive point is repeatedly treated very fully in c. 10, 11 and 16, 18.

man and His action, what must take place, if men, who are created for blessedness in the world beyond, but who can attain to this blessedness only as *sinless*, have all become sinners? The most natural answer is (for it has already been said in I. 4, that it would not become God not to carry out His plan): *sins must be forgiven*. But how must that be done? What is forgiveness of sin? What range has it? In order to answer this question, we must first ask, What is sin? With this the development begins.¹

Every rational creature owes to God entire subjection to His will. That is the only honour which God demands. He who pays it is righteous; he who pays it not, sins; sin, indeed, is nothing else than the dishonouring of God by withholding from Him His own.² This robbery God cannot tolerate; He must defend His honour. He must therefore demand that man restore it to Him, and, indeed, "for the insult inflicted, that he restore more than he took away"; otherwise he continues "in culpa" (under guilt).³ Every sinner, therefore, must furnish a satisfaction.⁴ God cannot dispense with this; for that would

¹ In the course of it (I. 16-18) the Augustinian theologoumenon, that the men destined to salvation take the place of the fallen angels, fills a large space. But it is in no way connected with the doctrine of satisfaction. Anselm differs from Augustine in this, that he thinks that the number of saved men is greater than that of the fallen angels; from the beginning God had in view the numerus beatorum as consisting of angels and men. Otherwise the creation of men would be simply a consequence of the fall among the angels, and there would result the inconveniens that we men should have to rejoice over this fall. This correction of the Augustinian doctrine does all honour to Anselm's heart; but as the doctrine has its point in the equally great number of the fallen angels and saved men, it is really cancelled by Anselm. Yet he was himself not quite sure of his case. See I. 18, p. 37.

² I. 11: "non est aliud peccare quam non reddere deo debitum . . . debitum est subjectum esse voluntate deo . . . hæc est justitia sive rectitudo voluntatis, quæ justos facit sive rectos corde, *i. e.*, voluntate, hic est solus et totus honor quem debemus deo . . . hunc honorem debitum qui deo non reddit, aufert deo quod suum est et deum exhonorat, et hoc est peccare."

³ I. 11: "non sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est, sed pro contumelia illata plus debet reddere, quam abstulit, sicut enim qui kedit salutem alterius, non sufficit si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris injuria recompenset aliquid, ita qui honorem alicujus violat, non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonorationis factam molestiam aliquid, quod placeat illi quem exhonoravit, restituit. Hoc quoque attendendum, quod cum aliquis quod injuste abstulit solvit, hoc debet dare, quod ab illo non posset exigi, si alienum non rapuisset."

⁴ I. 11 fin.

be equivalent to the impunity of sin, and would violate the divine honour. But the impunity of sin would be equivalent to God's ceasing to be the controller of sin (*ordinator peccatorum*); He would let something disorderly pass in His kingdom ("aliquid inordinatum in suo regno dimittere.") Right and wrong also would then become the same; the latter, indeed, would have the advantage, because, as unrepented of and unpunished, it would be subject to no law. No doubt we men are enjoined simply to forgive those who sin against us. But that is said to us, that we may not encroach upon the prerogative of God: "for it belongs to no one but Him to take vengeance." Nor may we appeal against this to the omnipotence and goodness of God, and say that all that God does is good, even when He simply forgives sin therefore; for God's power and goodness are determined by His *will* ("it is not to be so understood that if God wills something improper [*inconveniens*], it is right because He wills it; for it does not follow that if God wills to lie, it is right to lie"); hence, as God wills to do nothing wrong or disorderly (*inordinate*), the absolving without penalty of a sinner who does not restore to Him what he has robbed Him of, is not within the scope of the freedom or the goodness or the will of God.¹ The supreme rightness, therefore, which is nothing else than God Himself, requires restitution or—this turn of thought appears first here—penalty.² Even the latter, that is to say, as deprivation of salvation (*damnation*), restores the divine honour, in as much as by it "man unwillingly pays back of his own what he took away . . . as man by sinning seized what is God's, so God by punishing takes away what is man's."³ Even by penalty the beauty and order of the universe are maintained, which must never be shaken (of the honour of God in itself it holds good that it cannot be shaken; "for to Himself He is the incorruptible and in no way mutable honour. . . . No one can honour or dishonour God so far as He is in Himself.")⁴ But it is "extremely

¹ I. 12.

² I. 13, see above, p. 56, note 3.

³ I. 14: "deum impossibile est honorem suum perdere: aut enim peccator sponte solvit quod debet aut deus ab invito accipit."

⁴ I. 15.

alien to God" that He should abandon His costliest work, the rational creature (*creatura rationabilis*), to complete ruin.¹ But as, on the other hand, He cannot associate sinful men with the holy angels, satisfaction must come in ("hold this most firmly, because without satisfaction, *i.e.*, without spontaneous payment of the debt, God cannot allow sin to pass with impunity").² The objection that we are directed to pray to God for forgiveness, which would surely be unmeaning if only satisfaction were of any avail, is met by saying *that the prayer for forgiveness is itself a part of the satisfaction*.³ Now the satisfaction is subject to the twofold rule, that it must be, first, restitution, and secondly, smart-money (*Schmerzengeld*).⁴ But what can man give to God which he was not already required to give Him in any case, since entire surrender is included in obligatory obedience? "If I owe Him myself and all I can do—even when I sin not, that I do not sin (so there is no thought here of supererogatory deeds), I have nothing that I can render back (*reddam*) for my sin." The objection: "if I consider reasons (*rationes*), I do not see how I can be saved, but if I fall back upon my faith, then in Christian faith which worketh by love I hope that my salvation is possible," is repelled; for here it is just a question of reason.⁵ Man can therefore do nothing. And how much he would have to do! "Thou hast not yet considered of what gravity thy sin is." Even the smallest disobedience entails an *infinite* guilt (even to gain the whole world one may not commit

¹ In II. 4, it is said indeed (*cf.* I. 4): "Si nihil pretiosius agnoscitur deus fecisse quam rationalem naturam ad gaudendum de se, valde alienum est ab eo, ut *ullam* rationalem naturam penitus perire sinat." I. 25, p. 52.

² I. 19.

³ I. 19: The Interlocutor says: "Quid est, quod dicimus deo: dimitte nobis debita nostra, et omnis gens orat deum quem credit, ut dimittat sibi peccata? Si enim solvimus quod debemus, cur oramus ut dimittat? Numquid deus injustus est, ut iterum exigat quod solutum est? Si autem non solvimus, cur frustra oramus, ut faciat quod, quia non convenit, facere non potest?" To this Anselm replies: "*Qui non solvit, frustra dicit: dimitte: qui autem solvit, supplicat, quoniam hoc ipsum pertinet ad solutionem ut supplicet*; nam deus nulli quicquam debet, sed omnis creatura illi debet; et ideo non expedit homini, *ut agat cum deo, quemadmodum par cum pari*." Unfortunately Anselm has forgotten this last thought in his exposition elsewhere.

⁴ See above, p. 60, note 3.

⁵ I. 20.

the smallest sin), for the guilt is to be measured by the God who is despised.¹ Man has therefore to furnish an infinitely great satisfaction, since it is already an established rule, that God's honour does not permit of man's receiving salvation, "*if he does not restore to God all he has taken from Him, so that as God has lost by him, He may also recover by him.*"² The incapacity of human nature to furnish satisfaction can make no change on this law, which follows from the honour of God³ So therefore there remains only one solution, if the "convenientia" (the befitting) requires redemption⁴—namely, the *God-man*. There must be someone "who shall pay to God for the sin of man something greater than all that is, apart from God . . . it is necessary, therefore, that he who shall be able to give *of his own* to God something that shall surpass all that is under God, shall be greater than all that is not God . . . but there is nothing above all that is not God, save God. . . . No one, therefore, is able to make this satisfaction save *God*." Again, "nor must that satisfaction be made by anyone save *man*, otherwise man does not satisfy." Conclusion: "If, therefore, as is certain (sicut constat), it is necessary that that heavenly State be made perfect from men, and this cannot be unless there is made the aforesaid satisfaction, which no one can make save God, and no one owes save man, it is necessary that *the God-man* shall make it."⁵

¹ See the exposition in I. 21. Because every sin is committed contra voluntatem dei, it is greater than the value of the world—infinately great. Further (I. 22), because man in paradise preferred the devil to God, it is "contra honorem dei, ut homo reconcilietur illi cum calumnia hujus contumelie deo irrogatae, nisi pius honoraverit deum vincendo diabolum, sicut inhonoravit illum victus a diabolo." But how can he do that?

² I. 23.

³ I. 24.

⁴ I. 4, and the strongest passage, I. 25: "Si deo inconueniens est, hominem cum aliqua macula perducere ad hoc, ad quod illum sine omni macula fecit, ne aut boni incepti pænitere aut propositum implere non posse videatur: *multo magis propter eandem inconuenientiam impossibile est nullum hominem ad hoc procehi, ad quo factus est.*" In II. 4, 5, it is said, indeed, that while God "nihil facit necessitate, quia nullo modo cogitur aut prohibetur facere aliquid," yet an inner self-willed necessity exists for God's carrying out His work: "necesse est, ut bonitas dei propter immutabilitatem suam perficiat de homine quod inceptit, quamvis totum sit gratia bonum quod facit."

⁵ II. 6.

This God-man must possess the two natures unchanged (otherwise he would be either only God or only man), unmingled, too (otherwise he would be neither God nor man), but also unseparated (otherwise no work having unity is effected); therefore he must possess them "entire in one person" (*integras in una persona*).¹ The God must have derived the human nature from Adam and Eve, but from a virgin,² and he must as man have surrendered this nature to death voluntarily. His dying was really free, for he was sinless.³ If the supposed God-man now surrenders his life voluntarily to God, the satisfaction sought for is obtained. It must be his *life*; for only this he is not under obligation to offer to God; all that he could give of his own, it behoved him in some way or other to offer to God. "Let us see if, perhaps, this giving of his life, or parting with his soul, or surrender of himself to death, is for the honour of God. For God will not require it from him as a debt, because, as there shall be no sin in him, he shall not owe it to die . . . if man has had a sweet experience in sinning, is it not fitting that he should have a hard experience in satisfying? And if he has been so easily prevailed upon by the devil to dishonour God by sinning that nothing could be easier, is it not just that, in satisfying for sin, he should overcome the devil to the honour of God with a measure of difficulty that could not be exceeded? Is it not becoming (*dignum*) that as he who by sinning so denied himself to God that he could not deny himself

¹ II. 7.

² II. 8: The former, because the descendants of Adam must make satisfaction; the latter, because of the four ways in which God can create man (from man and woman [the rule], neither from man nor woman [Adam], from man alone [Eve], from woman alone), the fourth had not yet occurred. But that it must be a virgin, if it was to be a woman, "*non opus est disputare.*" Here is a piece of Scholasticism in the strictest sense of the term, and this kind of proof is continued in the following chapter, where it is shown that it had to be the second person of the Trinity who became man, because otherwise the predicates in the Trinity would have been destroyed, and for other equally cogent reasons ("*duo nepotes essent in trinitate, quia, si pater incarnatus esset, esset nepos parentum virginis per hominem assumptum, et verbum cum nihil habeat de homine, nepos tamen esset virginis, quia filii ejus erit filius*" II. 9). Here, besides, there is a working everywhere with "*mundius*," "*honestius*," in short, with relative notions.

³ The prolix demonstration here in II. 10, 11 and 16 ff. shows that Anselm did not understand how to make this point quite "*rational.*"

in a greater degree, should by satisfying so give himself to God that he could not give himself in a greater degree? . . . But there is nothing harder or more difficult that a man can suffer *for the honour of God* spontaneously and not of debt than death, *and in no way can man give himself more fully to God than when he surrenders himself to death for His honour.*" Hence the man sought for must be one who does not die "of necessity," because he is almighty, nor "of debt," because he is sinless, who therefore can die "of free choice because it will be necessary" (*ex libera voluntate quia necessarium erit.*)¹ The worth of such a life as a satisfaction is infinite. Because the smallest violation of this life has an infinitely negative worth, the voluntary surrender of it has an infinitely positive worth. Because sins are as hate-worthy as they are bad, so that life also is as love-worthy as it is good. Hence the acceptance of the death (*acceptio mortis*) of such a God-man is an infinite good for God (!), which far surpasses the loss by sin.² But the giving of life (*datio vitæ*)

¹ II. 11. In II. 12, 13 further allied questions are discussed. The God-man was not "miser," although he took the *incommoda* on himself; he was omniscient, because otherwise he would not have been perfectly good (!).

² II. 14: "Si omne bonum tam bonum est, quam mala est ejus destructio (!), plus est bonum incomparabiliter quam sint ea peccata mala, que sine aestimatione superat ejus interemptio . . . tantum bonum tam amabile potest sufficere ad solvendum quod debetur pro peccatis totius mundi, *inmo plus potest in infinitum* (II. 17 fin. : plus in infinitum. II. 20: "pretium majus omni debito") . . . si ergo dare vitam est *mortem accipere* (!), sicut *datio hujus vitæ prævalet omnibus hominum peccatis, ita et acceptio mortis.*" The question is next discussed, whether the death of Christ can be of advantage even to His enemies who crucified Him (II. 15: the question is answered affirmatively; for they acted in ignorance), then how Christ could be sinless (II. 16), for although He was conceived "absque carnalis delectationis peccato"—the sexual appetite is, after Augustine, original sin—yet Mary was not sinless. This question is discussed with much prolixity. Anselm was apparently at a loss for a rational solution. In the end, though with uncertainty, he offers the explanation, that in prospect of the future effect of the work of Christ, Mary was purified from her sins before her birth, *i.e.*, God purified her. After this the question of the voluntariness of the death of Christ is again discussed; for if Mary was only purified in view of His death, while He needed a purified mother, it was *necessary* that He should die. This question again occupies a very large space, and is only solved by a subtle dialectic, which in the end cannot do without the support of the proposition, "*ad hoc valuit in Christo diversitas naturarum . . . ut quod opus erat fieri ad hominum restaurationem si humana non posset natura, faceret divina, et si divinæ minime conveniret, exhiberet humana*" (II. 17, p. 85).

can only have taken place "to the honour of God;" for another spirit and purpose cannot be discovered. To this there is to be added, no doubt, the further design of setting us an example, so that by no sufferings we might let ourselves be drawn aside from the righteousness which is due to God. Others, it is true, have given us such an example; but his is the most powerful, for he suffered without being obliged to suffer.¹ Once again it is asked, by way of objection, whether he was not really obliged, because the creature "owes all to God, what he is, and what he knows, and what he can do." As the answer, there suddenly appears the doctrine of surplus merit. When God leaves us free to offer Him something smaller or greater, a reward is the result if we give the greater, "because we give spontaneously what is our own." When this is applied to the God-man, the conclusion follows that his dying was necessary, because he willed it, but at the same time was not necessary, because God did not demand it. His death therefore is voluntary.² Now at length can the long-looked-for solution be given.³ It follows in a surprising form, and, above all, with strange brevity: the God-man acts for himself, by no means as the representative of mankind. But the Father must *recompense* him for that.⁴ But nothing, again, can be given to the Son, since he has all. Yet it would be outrageous to assume that the whole action of the Son should remain without effect. Hence it is *necessary* that it should be for the advantage of another, and if that is willed by the Son, the Father cannot object, otherwise He would be unjust. "But to whom *more fittingly* (*convenientius*) shall he impart the fruit and recompence of his death than to those for whose salvation, as true reason (*ratio veritatis*) has taught us, he made himself man, and to whom, as we have said, he gave in dying the example of dying for righteousness' sake? *In vain surely shall they be imitators of him, if they are not to be partakers*

¹ This thought is dropped into the course of the discussion, II. 18.

² II. 18.

³ II. 19: "intueamur nunc prout possumus, quanta inde ratione *sequatur humana salvatio*." The Interlocutor: "ad hoc tendit cor meum."

⁴ II. 19: "eum autem qui tantum donum sponte dat deo, sine retributione debere esse non judicabis . . . alioquin aut injustus (!) videretur esse si nollet, aut impotens si non posset."

of his merit. Or whom shall he more justly make heirs of that which is due to him, but which he does not need, and of the superabundance of his plenitude (*exundatiæ suæ plenitudinis*) than his own *parents* and *brethren*, whom he looks on, burdened in their poverty with so many and so great debts, and languishing in the depths of misery, *that what they owe for their sin may be remitted to them, and what, by reason of their sin, they lack, may be given to them?*"¹ God accordingly now rejects no one who comes to Him in the name of this God-man, on condition that he comes as it befits him, *i.e.*, that he so approaches Him, and so lives, as Holy Scripture directs.² The divine mercy, therefore, has not been made void by the death on the cross—so it would seem when sin and the divine righteousness are contemplated—but it appears rather as inconceivably great, and at the same time as in perfect harmony with righteousness. God's word, indeed, to the sinner is: "Take mine only-begotten Son and give him for thyself," and the Son's word is: "Take me and redeem thyself."³ Only the wicked angels cannot be redeemed. Not as if the "price of His death would not be availing through its magnitude for all sins of men and angels"; but the condition of the angels (they are not descended from *one* angel, and fell without a tempter) excludes redemption.⁴ Anselm concludes with the lofty consciousness that "by the solution of one question" he has shown to be reasonable "all that is contained in the New and Old Testaments."⁵

Because it really is what Anselm, in the last sentence, has asserted, namely, a (new) construction of the *whole* of dogma from the point of view of sin and redemption, and because in this construction the *disjecta membra* of the Augustinian Mediæval view of Christianity were for the first time knit together into a unity, this representation deserves a searching criticism. Standing on the shoulders of Augustine, but eliminating the "patristic," *i.e.*, the Greek elements of his mode of thought, Anselm has, by his book, "Cur deus homo," placed

¹ II. 19, p. 93 sq.

² II. 19.

³ II. 20.

⁴ II. 21.

⁵ II. 22.

himself, as distinctively a dogmatic theologian, side by side with the Fathers of Greek dogma (Irenæus, Athanasius, and Origen). With the outline which John of Damascus had furnished another outline is now associated, which certainly, and not to its advantage, is still dependent on the old, but yet is evidently dominated by another *principle*. Anselm's representation, however, also deserves special consideration because it has given the impulse to permanent treatment of the subject, and because it is still regarded in our own day—and by evangelical theologians, too—as essentially a model.

First of all, as against misunderstandings, it must be stated what Anselm's theory is *not*, and is *not* meant to be. It is (1) no doctrine of reconciliation in the sense of showing how the opposition of will between God and sinful humanity is removed; it is (2) no theory of penal suffering, for Christ does not suffer penalty; the point rather at which penalty is inflicted is never reached, for God declares Himself satisfied with Christ's spontaneous *acceptio mortis*; just for this reason it is (3) no theory of vicarious representation in the strict sense of the term, for Christ does not suffer penalty in our stead, but rather provides a benefit, the value of which is not measured by the greatness of sin and sin's penalty, but by the value of His life, and which God accepts, as it weighs more for Him than the loss which He has suffered through sin (between sin, therefore, and the value of the life of Christ there exists only an external relation; both are infinite, but the latter is more infinite; hence it more than satisfies God);¹ it is, finally (4), not a theory which guarantees to the *individual* that he *really* becomes saved; *it aims rather at only showing for all the possibility of their being saved*; whether they shall be saved depends "on the measure in which men come to partake of so great grace, and on the degree in which they live under it," *i.e.*, on how they fulfil the commandments of holy scripture (II. 19, p. 94).

From this consideration of what the Anselmic theory is *not* and does *not* offer, it already appears how inadequate it is. Above all, its unevangelical character shows itself in the 4th

¹ The theory of a vicarious penal suffering is to be found, along with the theory of ransom of men from the devil, in Athanasius, see Vol. III. p. 308 of this work.

point. The entire ancient world, indeed, and, as Anselm shows, the mediæval world as well, rested satisfied *with the doctrine of redemption, as demonstrating the possibility of the redemption of the individual from sin*; but as this "possibility" can afford no comfort whatever to any distressed conscience, as it only satisfies the understanding, it is a worthless substitute for a real doctrine of redemption—Luther would say it is of the *devil*. If it cannot be shown from the person of Christ that we really *are redeemed*, if the *certainty of salvation* (*certitudo salutis*) is not derived therefrom, nothing is gained; all, rather, is lost, when we rest satisfied with such a doctrine, and append to it, as Anselm does, the conclusion, "If thou fulfillest the commands of Scripture, then the great provision of the God-man has an effect for thee." For Anselm, the question of personal certitude of salvation, the fundamental question of religion, is simply not yet raised at all. He is an old-world, a mediæval, in a word, a *Catholic* Christian, inasmuch as he is satisfied with having made out that in virtue of Christ's provision *some* certainly from the "mass of perdition" *can* be saved, and in fact shall be saved, because they live piously. But a second point is to be noted here. With every effort to express it as strongly as possible, the gravity of sin (*pondus peccati*) is not treated with sufficient earnestness if the thought of penalty, and therefore also of vicarious penal suffering, is entirely eliminated. In the idea that sin can be compensated for by something else than penalty there lies an underestimate of its gravity that is extremely objectionable. A recognition of the deep proposition that the innocent suffers for the guilty, that the *penalty* lies upon him, that we might have peace, is not to be found in the Anselmic *theory*. It does not appear even in the statement, prompted by warm feeling, II. 20: "Accept mine only-begotten and give Him for thyself." "Take Me and redeem thyself," for nothing is said of a penal suffering (just as little in the equally warm line of exposition II. 16, pp. 77 sq.).

But before entering upon the objections to the theory, let us indicate its excellences. These are not small: (1) It must be held as greatly to the credit of Anselm that he laid hold of the problem at all, and made it the centre for a survey of faith; (2)

that he so apprehended it that redemption from *guilt* is the question dealt with (the Greeks had always thought primarily of redemption from the consequences of sin, liability to death); (3) it is to be specially noted that he conceived of guilt exclusively as guilt before *God* (disobedience), and entirely set aside the traditional doctrine (see even Augustine) that in redemption (by means of the crucifixion of the God-man) the question is about satisfying the devil;¹ (4) that he discarded a merely æsthetic, or an externally historical, grounding of the death on the Cross (Christ did not die because it was prophesied, nor because the accomplishment of redemption had to correspond in its particulars with the history of Adam and the fall); (5) it is a point of much importance that Anselm made earnest efforts to prove the *moral* necessity of this precise mode of redemption.² That which he calls "reason" (*ratio*) is, at least in many lines of proof, nothing but the strict moral imperative, and is accordingly entirely admissible here, and he expressly refuses to lay at the basis of his investigation the conception of an unrestricted divine arbitrariness; with deeper insight and more courage than Augustine, he rather assumes everywhere that God's omnipotence is in inner subjection to His holy will. What, in his judgment, makes it possible to reflect rightly on God's arrangements is just our title to feel assured that the supreme righteousness and the supreme mercy, which He is Himself, can be understood by us as righteousness and mercy. Finally (6), according to Anselm, Jesus Christ, in His historic person and through His death, is for us the redemption. The grace of God is nothing but the redeeming work of Christ, *i.e.*, the thought of grace is now for the first time entirely dissociated from that of nature and located in history, *i.e.*, is connected solely with the person of Christ.

But contrasted with these excellences there are so many defects that this theory is entirely untenable. To a great extent these defects lie so much on the surface, and do such

¹ Whether indeed what Anselm offered as a substitute was in every respect better, or was not rather worse, will appear below.

² A noteworthy passage already in Tertullian (*de jejun.* 3): "homo per eandem materiam causæ deo satisfacere debet, per quam offenderat."

violence, equally to reason and to morality (not to speak of the attack on the gospel), that if the present-day theology stood under normal conditions not a word would have to be lost upon them. But as the current theology stands under the dominating influence of traditional faith and Romanticism, and discards all the criteria of gospel, morality, logic, and culture, when it sees the "*necessity of the possibility*" of the traditional objects of its faith in some way justified, some discussion will here be in its right place. Besides what has been already noted above, the following things fall to be observed :

First, the theory contains a series of imperfections, or, say contradictions ; for (1) the *necessarium* is to be strictly carried through, yet at important points Anselm does not get beyond the *conveniens*, above all at the most important point, that it is just to men that the merit of Christ is imparted (II. 19, pp. 93 fin.). Moreover, that God *accepts* the death of the God-man for the wrong done to Him is not based on strict necessity, for the sin of men, and the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, have nothing *inwardly* in common ;¹ (2) the satisfaction theory must be brought to a point in a way that is foreign to it, that it may be proved to have any effect at all. That is to say, the theory itself, strictly taken, only goes so far as to show that God's injured honour is vindicated and men take an example from the death of Christ to adhere steadfastly to righteousness, even under the severest sufferings. *But how can they take an example?* Will the example, then, have the *power* to incite to earnest imitation? Will they not rather go on sinning? Yet the whole provision, according to Anselm, avails only for those who regulate their life according to Holy Scripture. So the provision will be a failure ! Anselm certainly felt this, and therefore passed quite beyond his theory by asserting that God sees occasion for His rewarding the voluntary action of the God-man, and for His conferring this reward on men, *by reckoning to them as the kinsmen of Christ the merit of Christ, without which they shall be quite unable to become imitators of*

¹ The keen criticism which the present-day Catholics apply to Anselm's theory (see Schwane, pp. 296 ff.) rests, on the contrary, on the strong Scotist antipathy to unconditional necessity.

Christ. This turn of thought does all honour to Anselm's piety ; but it destroys his doctrine of satisfaction ; for if Christ's suffering establishes *merit*, it does not contain strict reparation ; but if it contains satisfaction, it establishes no merit. Nor does Anselm speak here of a *surplus* merit, *but he suddenly regards the whole work of Christ as merit* ; but then it is not satisfaction. Further, when men suddenly come to be considered as kinsmen of Jesus, the question arises as to why this standpoint—that Christ is to be regarded as the head of elect humanity—was not asserted at the beginning of the inquiry. (3) The way in which the conceptions of the *righteousness* and *honour* of God are treated is full of contradictions. On the one hand righteousness, it is maintained, finds expression in penalty as much as in the positive attainment of salvation as an end ; on the other hand righteousness *requires* that this end be reached. In keeping with this is the way the conception of honour is dealt with ; indeed, three conceptions are here presupposed. First of all, it must be held entirely impossible for God to receive personal wrong ; His honour can suffer absolutely no injury (I., 15 : “By nothing can the honour of God, so far as it is concerned, be increased or diminished ; since for itself it is the same incorruptible and absolutely immutable honour”). Then it is asserted that His honour, certainly, can be injured, but that it can likewise be restored, either by penalty (damnation of the human race) or by satisfaction. Lastly, it is asserted that the honour of God cannot tolerate the destruction of His world-plan, which culminates in the salvation of the reasonable creature, that, accordingly, God must forego penalty, bring about the salvation of the creature, and therefore choose satisfaction. (4) While in general the idea is always carried through, that on account of His honour God cannot simply pardon men, the turn of thought occurs in c. 19, p. 41, that God cannot do so *on man's account*, because a man polluted by sin, even though he were restored to paradise, would not be as he was before the fall. Yet this important turn of thought is not wrought out to a further issue. (5) It is asserted of God that He stands above all change of human conditions, and supports all things by His holy omnipotence ; hence the rule holds good (l.c.) : “it is not

for man to transact with God as an equal with an equal." Yet this rule is contravened by the *whole* exposition, which proceeds on the principle (I. 23, p. 47): "Man never should, and never can, receive from God what God has proposed to give him, unless he restores to God all that he took from Him, so that as God has lost by him, He shall also recover by him." This principle places God and man entirely on the same footing as injured and injurer. God is wronged as a man is wronged. But if it is said, that in point of fact, as moral beings, they would stand on the same footing, yet this correct observation must not alter the fundamental relationship, that God is the Lord and man His creature. (6) The assumption that Christ's death was voluntary, in the sense that He could also have declined death, cannot be carried through without contradiction, and yet, as Anselm knew very well, everything in his theory depends on this point. First of all, Anselm can only set aside by clumsy sophisms the Bible passages that assert that death was included in the *obedience* of Christ, and that He drank the cup in trembling fulfilment of the will of the *Father*. Secondly, when the subject itself is dealt with, it cannot be proved that the obedience of Christ did not extend to the suffering of death, for as it was—according to Anselm—the *man* Christ that suffered, death is also included in what He owed to God, since man, even apart from sin, owes himself entirely to God. The action, moreover, which Christ offered up when He died "to the honour of God" was not objective; it was personal. But—again according to Anselm—man is under obligation to direct all personal action "to the honour of God."¹

Second, the old ecclesiastical material with which Anselm works is not adapted to the new purposes for which he employs it. From the time of Athanasius, and even earlier, the doctrine of the two natures was so understood as to imply that *the God-Logos is the subject*, and that He takes human nature into the unity of His divine being. This idea alone suits the purpose which the Greeks had in view, namely, to explain the reality of the conquest of death, and the deification of our nature. From this as a starting-point, Athanasius developed in detail a multi-

¹ See Ritschl l.c. I., pp. 44 f.

tude of points of view, this among the rest, that by His dying—which was possible to Him through the human nature—the God-Logos bore the penalty, and expelled death from human nature. But Anselm wished to trace back everything to satisfaction, and he adhered strictly to the correct theory of Ambrose and Augustine, that it was the *man* Jesus who died, and that it is He therefore who is our mediator. At the same time, however, the impossibility of reconciling this view with the doctrine of the two natures now at last found definite expression in him; *for where the subject of the redeeming personality is regarded, not as the God-Logos, but as, with Anselm, the man, there is a cancelling, not, indeed, of the Godhead of Christ, but certainly of the two-nature doctrine. The term, "the Godhead of Christ," occurs in Anselm, within the lines of the strict theory, only as a determination of the value of the human person in his action.*¹ Christ appears as the *man*, whose life has an infinite value. That that is something quite different from the second person of the Godhead is obvious.² When Anselm now continues to use the two-nature doctrine as a hallowed tradition, a quite Nestorian diremption of the person is the result (see I. 9, 10), such as had regularly occurred in the West from the time of Augustine, when there was an attempt to work out one's own Christology as a doctrine of redemption, and yet a refusal to relinquish that doctrine of natures. But further, the two-nature doctrine still appears welcome on this ground also, namely, that by means of it every difficulty whatever which the theory of redemption offers can be got quit of; for as everything conceivable can be distributed between the predicates, "human and divine natures," one finds himself herewith equal to any difficulty, and can suppress every doubt, and excuse all indolence of thought.

¹ See Ritschl I., pp. 43 f.

² Hence also the feeling in relation to Christ is quite different among the Latins from what it is among the Greeks. The latter look for the most part to the God in Christ, the former to the man. Ritschl has (p. 47) pointed out the remarkable, though by no means solitary, passage in Anselm's Meditations (12): "Certe nescio, quia non plene comprehendere valeo, unde hoc est, quod longe dulcior es in corde diligentis *te in eo quod caro es, quam in eo quod verbum*: dulcior in eo, quod humilis, quam in eo quod sublimis . . . Hæc omnia (the human) formant et adaugent magis ac magis exultationem, fiduciam et consolationem, amorem ac desiderium."

Anselm confessed that himself in a naïve way (c. 17, p. 85): "What does not answer to the man in Christ must be transferred to the God, what does not suit the God must be applied to the man." In this way the earnest Greek speculation, which always stood for the unity of the God-man, was discarded; and thus it continued to be in the West. Among those who to-day interject in discussion the "Godhead" of Christ, how many reflect that the term obliges them to *prove the divine-human unity*, and that, if they imagine they may disregard this obligation, an Athanasius and the Fathers of dogma would despise them as empty talkers or as heretics? These men knew full well that the mere term, "the divinity of Christ," affirms simply nothing, is heretical, indeed, because the *God-manhood* must be *proved*. But to those in the West that no longer occurs; for they neither can, nor will, prove it, by employing the means of the Greeks; nay, they follow quite a different scheme in the doctrine of redemption: Christ is the *man* whose action has an infinite value. If, then, the term, "doctrine of two-natures," continues in use, then among those who really reflect on Christ as Redeemer it is deprived of its meaning through the Western conception of it. Hence it is only used still in the service of "conservative interests," or to secure an authorised exemption from all energetic reflection on Christ as Redeemer by means of the convenient formula; this He did as God, and that as man.

Third, besides what has been set forth up to this point, there is still a series of the gravest objections to be urged against the whole character of the Anselmic doctrine. Let us only briefly indicate them: (1) In many passages, and these, too, the most important, Anselm proceeds according to a logic by which already everything can be proved. The gravest malpractices of Scholasticism already betray themselves in him; the self-restraint of the ancient thinkers, modest as was the expression given to it by the Fathers, is wanting to him. (2) Everything is conceived of quite abstractly, very much in the way in which a clever child thinks and speaks of such things. This theory manages to describe the work of redemption by Jesus Christ without adducing *a single* saying of His (what is brought forward does not serve to elucidate, but consists in the *explaining*

away of important passages of Scripture). Anselm holds it as superfluous to accentuate any one personal feature in the picture of Christ; the sinless man with the infinitely valuable life is enough. The death of Christ is entirely severed from His life-work on earth, and isolated. This God-man need not have preached, and founded a kingdom, and gathered disciples; he only required to die. (3) There is no reference to the eternal election of the Christian community, or the reference is only feeble (see I. 16, and in connection with Mary). As the Kingdom of God is not spoken of, so neither is the Church, and its eternal existence in the view of God. The category of the inner moral necessity of the good and holy even for God is consistently confounded with that of reason (*ratio*), by means of which, it is represented, one can constrain even a heathen to believe in the God-man, the result being that the mystery of faith is profaned. (4) Sin is conceived of certainly as guilt before God; but this guilt is not the want of trust (faith) in Him, but is conceived of as a personal injury. How any one pleases to deal with personal injuries is a matter for himself; on the other hand, the guilt which is want of child-like fear and love, and which destroys God's world, must be *wiped out*, whether it be in wrath or in love. Anselm fails to see that. (5) And this brings us to the worst thing in Anselm's theory: the mythological conception of God as the mighty private man, who is incensed at the injury done to His honour and does not forego His wrath till He has received an at least adequately great equivalent; the quite Gnostic antagonism between justice and goodness, the Father being the just one, and the Son the good; the frightful idea (as compared with which the views of the Fathers and the Gnostics are far to be preferred) *that mankind are delivered from the wrathful God*;¹

¹ Very correct statement by Bigg, *The Christian Platonists of Alex.*, p. 290: "It was reserved for Anselm, centuries afterwards, to array the justice against the goodness of God, and thus to complete the resemblance of Christianity to its ancient deadly foe" (namely, Gnosticism). Only, Gnosticism distinguished between the just God (the demiurge) and the good God as two hostile deities. But the old patristic theory was that by His death Christ has redeemed men from the devil. If we isolate the death from the life of Christ, this is in fact the best theory, for it brings no discord into the deity. It was no doubt a step of progress on Anselm's part that he

the illusory performance between Father and Son, while the Son is one with the Father; the illusory performance of the Son with Himself, *for according to Anselm the Son offers Himself to Himself* (II. 18: "filius ad honorem suum seipsum sibi obtulit");¹ the blasphemous idea that the Son's giving of life (*datio vitæ*) is for God, as acceptance of death (*acceptio mortis*), a *benefit*; the dreadful thought that God is superior to man, as having the prerogative of not being able to forgive from love, a payment always being needed by Him (I. 12); the vitiated conception of our prayer to God for forgiveness, that it is a part of our satisfaction, but can never in itself have the effect of forgiveness (I. 19: "qui non solvit, frustra dicit: dimitte"). If it is now added that, as has been shown above, there is proved by all this only the *possibility* of our being saved, that the thought of the penalty of sin is eliminated (and therefore the righteousness of God too laxly conceived of), that here no innocent one suffers *penalty* for the guilty, and that, in the effect upon us, only the feeble thought of example comes clearly to view, then we must say, that in spite of Anselm's good intentions, and in spite of some correct perceptions, no theory so bad had

wished to carry through the thought that God is at the same time holy and merciful. But this thought cannot be carried through by means of the death of Christ as isolated, and thought of as satisfaction, if this is held as satisfaction to God Himself. So it is always better to let the satisfaction be paid to the devil, because even on that assumption the idea of righteousness is satisfied—in a mythological way, no doubt (the right view would be, that justice must be done to evil, namely by penalty)—without Christ the merciful and God the wrathful being brought into conflict, while Christ is nevertheless regarded as Himself God. That the latter is an impracticable thought was clearly seen, moreover, by Augustine, after he had weighed its possibility. Bigg points to *de trinit.* XIII. 11: "Sed quid est justificati in sanguine ipsius? Que vis est sanguinis hujus, obsecro, ut in eo justificentur credentes? Et quid est reconciliati per mortem filii ejus? Itane vero, cum irasceretur nobis deus pater, vidit mortem filii sui pro nobis et placatus est nobis?" This cannot be; "for omnia simul et pater et filius et amborum spiritus pariter et concorditer operantur." He therefore rejects the Anselmic theory in anticipation. This theory can only be explained from the fact that the thought of God as the *Father* who is nigh to us had fallen into the background in the Middle Ages, and the old view of the Trinity as *unity* was no longer held. Here too, therefore, the ancient traditional dogma was discarded, the term Trinity retained.

¹ In Constantinople the Synods from the year 1156 f. decided, that the mass is offered also to the Son, as He is at the same time the offerer and the offered, and the Trinity admits of no diremption. See Hefele V.², p. 567.

ever before his day been given out as *ecclesiastical*. But perhaps no one can frame a better, who isolates the death of Christ from His life, and wishes to see in this death something else than the consummation of the "service" which He rendered throughout His *life*.¹

In its complete form Anselm's theory exercised little influence. The conception, which he only touched on, of the "*meritoriousness*" of the work of Christ, very rapidly came to the front, and made his satisfaction theory—which, moreover, conflicted with the Augustinian tradition—without effect. Added to this was the fact that interest in the proof of *our* reconciliation to God was not satisfied by Him. At this point Abelard intervened, without giving, certainly, a connected and exact development of the doctrine.² After rejecting still more decidedly than Anselm the relation of the death on the Cross to the devil, he sets out from the fundamental thought of the love of God, and at the same time makes it clear to himself that sin has separated men from God, that it is a question therefore of bringing them back to God, and of again imparting to them trust in God. Further, he keeps it before him that the fruit of redemption relates to the chosen, with regard to whom God's disposition did not first need to be changed. Accordingly, the incarnation and death of the Son of God can be conceived of only as an act of love, and even the righteousness of God must be so defined that it is subordinated to love, or, say, is identical with it. It was not required then that Christ should first assuage the wrath of God. It is as easy for God to forgive sin as it was for Him to bring into existence a sinless man, who united himself to Christ. But in order really to win *us* for Himself, Christ has given us the highest proof of love, which kindles our cold hearts and leads us back to the trust and love of God. Further (the reflections do not

¹ That Anselm himself, however, has, in other writings, carried through other thoughts with regard to redemption has been shown by Ritschl, l.c. I., pp. 46 f., 109. He surrendered himself to the certainty of grace even without such calculations, on the other hand emphasised more strongly the conception of merit.

² See Ritschl, l.c. I., pp. 48 ff.; Schwane, pp. 304 ff.; Deutsch, Abälard, pp. 336 ff.; Seeberg in the "Mittheil. u. Nachricht. f. die ev. K. in Russland," 1888, March-April. Also Reuter in his 1st, and especially Bach in his 2nd, vol., pp. 68 f. 77 f., 88 ff.

stand in a strict order) in this deed of Christ in dying on the Cross God beholds us, that is, He forgives us our sins, in so far as He reckons to us the merit of Christ, because Christ stands before God as the head of humanity; He likewise lets the merit of the perfect righteousness of Christ fall to our advantage; for in the *obedience* of Christ God is satisfied. Finally, Christ goes on working continuously for us, for inasmuch as He prays for us unceasingly to the Father, it is in keeping with the righteousness of God to reckon to us this merit. But by Christ's "merit" Abelard never understands "a sum of distinct actions; the fulness of love to God dwelling in Christ is His merit." "Thus it is in will, not in works, which are common to the good and evil, that all merit consists."¹ There is therefore here nothing objective and nothing magical. Even the death on the Cross is not estimated as an objective deed, but belongs entirely—as a chief part—to the evidences of the love of Christ which He exhibited from the beginning. *Christ's merit is His service of love*; but love calls forth responsive love, and he who loves (because Christ has first loved him) has forgiveness of sins granted him, nay, in the interchange of love which springs from Christ there lies the forgiveness of sins itself.²

Abelard has furnished no strict proof for the necessity of the death on the Cross; his propositions, moreover, are inadequate, because he has not clearly perceived that *that love* is the highest, is indeed alone effectual, which, by taking the *penalty* upon itself, reveals at the same time the greatness of the absolution and the greatness of the cancelled guilt. He did not perceive that the sinner cannot be otherwise delivered from guilt than by experiencing and seeing the penalty of guilt. But he had too keen a sense of the love of his God, and of the oneness of God

¹ So a disciple of Abelard, who hit upon his meaning; see Seeberg, p. 7, and Deutsch, p. 378 ff.

² I do not transcribe here the passages, for in their isolation they do not give a true view. There fall to be considered more particularly several passages from the *Exposit. ep. Rom.* (especially on chap. III. 22 ff., V. 12 ff.), from the *Sermons V., X., XII., theolog. christ. IV.,* and the *Dialogue*. How much Abelard's whole Christology and doctrine of redemption are dominated by the thought of love and counter love, how entirely love is "merit," could not be ascertained from separate quotations.

and Christ, to entertain the Gnostic thought that God needs a sacrifice or an equivalent, or that for Him Christ's death is a benefit. And he knew himself so intimately united to Christ in living fellowship that it was he who first introduced again into the doctrine of redemption the apostolic thought of the perpetual intercession of Christ for us, and on the other hand saw also in the earthly life of Christ, not *one* proof of love—the death—but a continuous stream of love, in which the “work” of Christ also, namely His “merit,” *i.e.*, the operation of His loving will, is included.¹

¹ Deutsch says very correctly, p. 382: “Accordingly the ultimate and deepest thought of Abelard is this, that reconciliation rests on personal fellowship with Christ. It is He who, by perfectly fulfilling the will of God as man, realised the divine destination of humanity, *in this sense* satisfied God, and thereby opened again to mankind the closed gates of paradise. He who belongs to Him has through Him the forgiveness of sins, and with Him access to God, but at the same time also the power of the new life, in which he fulfils the commands of God from love; and so far as this fulfilment is still imperfect the righteousness of God comes in to complete it.” On the other hand Reuter (I., p. 243) has given this perverted view of Abelard's doctrine: “For one who wrought reconciliation, there was substituted one who proclaimed that God was already reconciled [but according to Abelard Christ is no “proclaimer,” and God is not reconciled, if we are not]; instead of a passion of the Son, who alone opens again the way to the Father [but that is just Abelard's meaning], a martyrdom with psychological efficacy was held up to view [the word “psychological” is here meant to create an impression of the profane, but we have surely only the choice between this and physico-chemical]; instead of change of disposition on God's part, change of disposition on man's was spoken of.” [Is God love or is He of alienated mood? Is it not the *penalty for man* that as a sinner he *must* think of a God of terror, and can anything greater take place in heaven or earth than when a man's feelings are revolutionised, *i.e.*, when his fear of a God of terror is transformed into trust and love? If it were possible to bring home to the sinner the thought of the loving God, in whom he can have confidence, while he feels himself guilty, then certainly Christ would have died in vain; but that is a *contradictio in adjecto*.] Even Seeberg, in spite of all his efforts to be impartial, has made a rationalistic caricature of Abelard's doctrine, and in keeping with this has much bepraised sayings of Bernard, some of which are to be found also in Abelard, some of which Abelard has happily set aside (the *justa potestas diaboli*). That which we really miss in Abelard—that Christ bore our penalty—is also wanting in Bernard, and the “example” of Christ is much more incautiously emphasised by the latter than by the former, who always thinks of the *power* of love that proceeds from Christ. But Bernard, it is alleged, stands much higher than Abelard, because he can give a more lyrical expression to the impassioned love to Christ, while Abelard thinks only of the doctrine and the example (!), and because, it is asserted, something “objective” is to be found in him which is supposed to be wanting in Abelard. Even according to Seeberg, indeed, this “objective” is quite falsely defined by Bernard, but that is of

The polemic against Abelard directed itself also against his theory of redemption ; but it was contested essentially from the basis of the Augustinian theory of redemption (vanquishment of the claim of the devil), while there was no following of Anselm.¹ At the same time all were increasingly at one in this, that the point of view of merit must be applied, and that Christ must be contemplated as Redeemer in the light of His human quality. With this understanding also the Lombard drew up his connected account of the opinions of the Fathers in his doctrinal compendium. As in the case of Augustine, the "man" (homo) in Christ takes the prominent place, as the moral personality chosen and sustained by God, and the whole life of Christ is understood from this point of view.² At the same time, in order to understand the peculiar nature of redemption, all points of view were combined that were furnished by the past : obedience, redemption from the devil, death and penalty, but, above all, the *merit* of death, then also sacrifice. With Augustine, the strict necessity of this precise means (death on the Cross) is rejected ; with him and the other Fathers, the buying off of the devil (including deception) is asserted. With Abelard, the death is viewed as a proof of love, which awakens counter love ; with him Christ is regarded as the representative of humanity before God ; with Augustine, the necessity for a reconciliation of God through the death of Christ is rejected (God loves even His enemies ; He has loved us beforehand from eternity, and we are reconciled, not with the wrathful, but with the loving God) ; finally, a penal value in the death of Christ is asserted, in the sense that by it the eternal penalty is remitted (see Athanasius), the temporal penalty in future (after death) falls away. On the other hand the Anselmic theory is not mentioned at all.³ The Lombard shows there-

no consequence, if only there is "something" there. When will there be a getting rid in Protestantism of this "something," which at best only establishes the possibility of redemption ; and when will there be a distinguishing between a vicarious penal suffering and a satisfaction demanded by God ?

¹ See Bach II., pp. 88-122. Besides Bernard, William of St. Thierry specially comes into view here.

² Sentent. lib. III., dist. 18, 19.

³ Ritschl I., p. 56 f.

fore that the patristic tradition still continued to be the only subject of doctrine, and that it was only with an effort that what was new asserted itself against it. Yet the whole undertaking to give a combined and connected view was itself new (on which account the Lombard was regarded with much distrust as an Abelardian).¹

Not till the thirteenth century did the new dogmatic impulses of the eleventh and twelfth centuries take their place with equal rights, materially, though not formally, alongside the mass of traditional patristic tenets. By the latter, which were represented partly by a voluminous exegetical tradition, and partly

¹ This was not without ground; for apart from the objective redemption which consists in deliverance from the fetters of the devil (yet even to this a subjective turn is given, see Sentent. III. Dist. 19 A: "si ergo recte fidei intuitu in illum respicimus qui pro nobis pependit in ligno, a vinculis diaboli solvimur, i.e., a peccatis, et ita a diabolo liberamur, ut nec post hanc vitam in nobis inveniat quod puniat. Morte quippe sua, uno verissimo sacrificio, quidquid culparum erat, unde nos diabolus ad luenda supplicia detinebat, Christus exstinxit, ut in hac vita tentando nobis non prævaleat") the Lombard knows only of a *subjective* redemption; i.e. "quo modo a peccatis per Christi mortem soluti sumus? Quia per ejus mortem, ut ait apostolus, commendatur nobis caritas dei, i.e., apparet eximia et commendabilis caritas dei erga nos in hoc, quod filium suum tradidit in mortem pro nobis peccatoribus. Exhibita autem tantæ erga nos dilectionis arrha, et nos movemur accendimurque ad diligendum deum, qui pro nobis tanta fecit, et per hoc justificamur, i.e., soluti a peccatis justi efficimur. Mors ergo Christi nos justificat, dum per eam caritas excitatur in cordibus nostris." Yet along with this the other turn of thought is found: "dicimur quoque et aliter per mortem Christi justificati, quia per fidem mortis ejus a peccatis mundamur." But his thought is not further followed out; on the contrary, it is said again Dist. 19 F: "reconciliati sumus deo, ut ait apostolus, per mortem christi. Quod non sic intelligendum est quasi nos sic reconciliaverit Christus, ut inciperet amare quos oderat, sicut reconciliatur inimicus inimico, ut deinde sint amici qui ante se oderant, sed jam nos diligenti deo reconciliati sumus; non enim ex quo ei reconciliati sumus per sanguinem filii nos coepit diligere, sed ante mundum, priusquam nos aliquid essemus. Quomodo ergo nos diligenti deo sumus reconciliati? Propter peccatum cum eo habebamus inimicitias, qui habebat erga nos caritatem, etiam cum inimicitias exercebamus adversus eum operando iniquitatem. Ita ergo inimici eramus deo, sicut justitiæ sunt inimica peccata et ideo dimissis peccatis tales inimicitie finiuntur, et reconciliamur justo quos ipse justificat. Christus ergo dicitur mediator, eo quod medius inter deum et homines ipsos reconciliat deo." But here again another thought comes in, when the Lombard immediately continues: "reconciliat autem dum offendicula hominum tollit ab oculis dei, id est dum peccata delet quibus deus offendebatur et nos inimici ejus eramus." The prevailing thought of the awakening of counter love, which the Lombard took over from Abelard, is already to be found in Augustine; see e.g., de catech. rud. 4: "Nulla est major ad amorem invitatio, quam prevenire amando, et nimis durus est animus, qui dilectionem si nolebat impendere, nolit rependere."

by theological positions no longer understood in their original connection, the trivial spirit of mediæval theology was fostered, which mingled in a marvellous way with its energy and with its juristic acuteness. The statement of the thesis in scholastic science was invariably lofty and great; "but by its love for details even heaven was dragged down." From the scientific standpoint, and from the standpoint of "juristic thinking," we cannot find fault, certainly, with this spirit; for does not science require that the problems be thought out to their ultimate consequences? The error lay simply in the premises, and in the idea that that thinking was thinking about religion. But even that idea it was necessary then to entertain, for religion was of course contemplation!

CHAPTER II.

HISTORY OF DOGMA IN THE PERIOD OF THE MENDICANT ORDERS, TILL THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

IF in this chapter we again direct our attention in the first instance to the history of ecclesiastical *piety*, of ecclesiastical *law* and of ecclesiastical *science*, it is less with the view of understanding the *changes* which dogma passed through in this period, *than in order to show how the conditions under which it stood served to make it ever more stable and to protect it from all attack*. It must, above all, be shown how it was possible that the enormous revolution of the sixteenth century—keeping out of view the Anabaptist movements—stayed its course before the old dogma. This can only be understood, however, when we consider what *confirmations* dogma received from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. These confirmations were a consequence of the peculiar history of *piety*, of ecclesiastical law and of science in this period. All of these sought, not for an “unmoved mover” in the background—for dogma was simply no longer a “mover”—but for an immovable *basis*. Mysticism, the development of ecclesiastical law, Nominalist theology—all of them could only develop themselves on the basis of an authoritative dogma, or, say, could only protect themselves on that basis against dangerous consequences.

It is only in the second place that there fall to be considered how far the general conditions produced also certain *changes* in dogma, then how far an *individual* *piety* developed itself, how from this *piety* the need for individual certainty of salvation arose, and how this need gathered itself into a mighty force. Of itself the force was strong enough to demand, and to carry out, a revision of the entire ecclesiastical tradition. But it will

appear in the last Book (see below) that it was impeded in its unfolding by the still greater power of a fifteen century long development.

1. *On the History of Piety.*

What was germinating in the twelfth century, the century of the Crusades—namely, the piety of which Bernard was the subject and delineator, which derives its power from *humility* before God and from *love* to the sorely suffering Redeemer—opened into blossom in the holy beggar of Assisi, and “its fragrance filled the world.” In Francis mediæval piety attained its clearest and most forcible expression. In him it uttered itself most simply, and therefore most powerfully and most impressively, because its chord—“humility, love and obedience”—was here struck with the greatest purity, while the quality of tone which Francis lent to it was the most melting.¹

Humility—that is entire *poverty*. The reverence for that which is beneath us, which Bernard and his followers proclaimed, admits of no other robe than that of perfect poverty and humility. Long ago no doubt, nay, on from the beginning, Greek monks had striven after this ideal; but in their hands it became a torch, which consumed, along with the body, the imagination also, the powers of perception, and the wealth of the inner life. It was to be the means of emancipation from the body; but often enough it made a wilderness of the spirit. *Here, on the other hand, it is the imitation of the poor life of Jesus*, and while it thus acquired a personal ideal, it also developed out of itself, in the inexhaustibly fresh imagination of

¹Müller, Die Anfänge des Minoritenordens und der Bussbruderschaften, 1885. Sabatier, Leben des h. Franz v. Assisi, German by M. L., 1895. R. Mariano, Francesco d' Assisi e alcuni dei suoi più recenti biografi. Napoli, 1896. Mariano brings a sharp, and in many respects well-deserved, criticism to bear on the work of Sabatier, which is captivantly written and instructive, but, after the style of Renan, mingles confusedly past and present, religion and poetry. Mariano has made a substantial contribution to the estimation of St. Francis, by correcting the partly rhetorical, partly material, exaggerations of Sabatier. An excellent lecture, taking a survey of all the principal points, has been published recently by Hegler “Franciskus von Assisi und die Gründung des Franciskanerordens” (Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. K. 6 Bd. p. 395 ff.

St. Francis, a wealth of intuitions from which all provinces of the outer and inner life derived profit. A spirited investigator has shown us what effects were produced by St. Francis in the field of art.¹ But in all spheres of human life, even including that of strict science, the new impulse took effect—the godly fear which gives honour to God alone, the living view of Christ, which brought the personal into the foreground, the holy simplicity which shed its light into the heart and over the world. In the sunny soul of the sacred singer of Assisi, the troubadour of God (“*joculator domini*”) and of poverty, the world mirrored itself, not as merely the struggle for existence, or the realm of the devil, but as the paradise of God with our brothers and sisters, the sun, the moon and the stars, the wind and the water, the flowers and the living creatures. In poverty, which is nothing else but sister of the humility by which the soul becomes like the eye, which sees everything save only itself, a new organ was obtained for contemplating God and the world. But poverty is not only imitation of the poor life of Jesus, it is also, nay pre-eminently, imitation of the *apostolic* life, the life without care, of “the pilgrim preacher and herald of love.” The oldest rule of St. Francis presented this ideal with the utmost clearness, and created the joyous, devout Franciscan “family.”²

With the spirit of which poverty and humility are the evidence, *love* must unite itself. Going forth in pairs, the new Apostles must *serve* in lowly love; there is no work for which they must hold themselves too feeble; “for the love of Jesus Christ” they must “expose themselves to enemies, both visible and invisible”; according to the Sermon on the Mount, they must willingly suffer wrong; above all, wherever they come, in house and hall, they must render to men the loving service of preaching repentance, must deliver the message: “fear ye and honour, praise and bless, thank and adore, the Lord God omnipotent in trinity and unity . . . be of penitent heart, bring forth fruits meet for repentance, for know ye that we shall soon die. Give and it shall be given you, forgive and ye shall be forgiven,

¹ Thode, *Franciskus v. Assisi und die Anfänge der Kunst der Renaissance* 1885.

² See Müller, *l.c.* pp. 19 ff., 185 ff.

and if ye forgive not, the Lord will not forgive you your trespasses. Blessed are they who die in penitence, for they shall be in the Kingdom of Heaven," etc.¹ But the power of this love had its source in the example of Christ and of His devoted disciple, St. Francis, who reproduced ever more deeply in his experience the life and suffering of his Master. More and more his feelings became merged in one alone—in love. This feeling, which in him was so strong that it often overpowered him, so that he was forced to retire to lonely churches and forests to give it full vent, was love to Christ; but it wedded itself ever more closely to unlimited devotion to his neighbour, to concern for his spiritual and bodily well-being, to warm compassion and self-abasement in the service of his brethren. So out of humility and love he made of his life a poem—he, the greatest poet who then lived; for, after fiery conflicts, the sensuous element in his ardent nature appeared—not destroyed, but subdued and glorified, nay, transformed into the purest organ of the soul's life.²

A great work of *home missions* was not contemplated by St. Francis, but begun; he was not the first to undertake it, but he was the first through whom the whole Church derived benefit from it: Christendom has certainly the right faith; but it is not what it ought to be. It is subject to priests and sacraments; *but now the individual must be dealt with. He must be laid hold of, and guided to repentance.* The gospel must be brought home to every man: the world must be again shaken, and rescued from its old ways, by a mighty call to repentance: he who has tasted the sweetness of the love of Christ will turn with gladness to repentance and poverty. Yet it is not for the monks and priests alone that there must be concern, but for individual Christians, for the laity; they, likewise, must be won for a penitent and holy life. The "Brothers of Penitence," of whom St. Francis formed visions, and whom he brought into existence, were, in spite of their continuing in family life, really ascetics, who were required to maintain strict separation from the world and from civic life, and, above all, to take no part in

¹ The Rule of 1209. See Müller, p. 187.

² See the beautiful characterisation in Thode, l.c. p. 59 ff.

military service. The great saint had not yet made terms with the world ; the later Tertiaries were as little his creation as the later Franciscans.¹

From the monks to the secular priests, from the secular priests to the laity—this was the course by which Christianity was to be delivered from secularity ; it is at the same time the history of the awakening of religious individualism in the West. And in the measure in which religion became, extensively and intensively, more world-renouncing, it acquired (paradoxical, it may seem, but intelligible enough) a higher social and political importance, penetrated more deeply into the life of the people, and developed itself out of the aristocratic form (in which, as Roman, it had come to the barbarian nations) into a form that was popularly social.² The further the monachising proceeded, the more did the virtuosi in religion see themselves compelled to engage in practical tasks. When the new factor of *apostolic* life was introduced into the ideal of poverty and ascetic self-denial, the ideal acquired an enormous immanent power for *propagandism*, a power such as monachism had never before possessed, and which does not belong—either formerly or now—to its distinctive nature. Where “apostolic life” becomes the watchword, there monachism is at once seen to apply itself to positive work among the people. In the eleventh

¹ See Müller, pp. 117-144. An excellent description of the aim of St. Francis in Werner (Duns Scotus, p. 2): “The original designs of the order founded by St. Francis were the restoring of the original Christian Apostolate, with its poverty and renunciation of the world, that through the force of this restoration there might be restored to the Church itself the apostolic spirit ; the awakening in Christian souls everywhere of a striving after holiness and perfection ; the keeping the example of a direct following of Christ before the eyes of the world as a continuous living spectacle ; the comforting of all the suffering and wretched with the consolation of Christian mercy ; and, by self-sacrificing devotion, the becoming all things to those spiritually abandoned and physically destitute.”

² Cf. Thode, l.c. p. 521 f. : “The beggar of Assisi is the representative of the third estate, the great lower mass of the people, in their combined upward striving towards a position self-sustained and independent ; but at the same time also the representative of each individual out of this mass, as he becomes conscious of himself, and of his rights in relation to God and to the world. With him, and in him, mediæval humanity experiences the full power of the emotional force that dwells in each individual, and this inner experience brings with it a first knowledge of one’s own being which emancipates itself from dogmatic general conceptions.”

and twelfth centuries what engaged attention was the great political problem of releasing Church from State ; the question was, how to break down the great forces, the power of the Princes, the power of purely secular national bishops, in short, the title to exist of all unpliant political factors. At the close of the twelfth, and in the thirteenth centuries, there followed immediately upon this undertaking the *positive* evangelising of, and giving ecclesiastical character to, all relationships, to the whole of civilisation and the individual life, this being done under the dominating idea of the apostolical. Monachism, as *apostolic* life, entered upon this new work as formerly in the days of Clugny it entered upon the work of freeing Church from State. And how powerfully did religious individualism assert itself in Francis, when he ventured to place before himself and his disciples the example of *the Apostles*, and did not hesitate to say to the brothers that they could, and should, be what the Apostles once were, and that to them everything that Christ had said to the Apostles applied !

He was not the first who awakened this "apostolic life." We know of powerful phenomena in the twelfth century in which the new impulse had already found expression.¹ But these older movements, tenaciously as they survived (and to some

¹ See the history of sects in the twelfth century, especially the Waldensian, cf. Müller, *Die Waldenser und ihre einzelnen Gruppen bis zum Anfang des 14. Jahrhunderts* (1886), and the older fundamental work of Dieckhoff. The ground-thought of the Waldensian movement is unquestionably "to imitate the apostles, and therefore to observe literally the instructions which the Lord gave to his wandering disciples in the missionary address, Matth. 10. The undertaking, therefore, displays everywhere the same features as, thirty years later, the similar attempt of Francis in its initial stages : distribution of all property among the poor and renunciation of all further possessions, according to Matth. 19, 21, 29 ; then, the apostolic preaching, in constant itineracy, and the particulars as to apostolic garb and methods of travelling. They go two and two, without shoes, only sandals of wood on their feet, in simple woollen garments, without money. They move from place to place, seek shelter and support among those to whom they preach the gospel—for the workman is worthy of his hire—and despise all settled life and private householding, in imitation of the Son of man, who had not where to lay His head." The Waldensians seem to have exercised an influence on St. Francis ; but as to how, and by what means, nothing is known. On this account it will always be possible to believe in an entire independence, in a resemblance merely in fact ; but this is not probable, especially as relations have been ascertained between St. Francis and Southern France.

extent survived as Catholic, in spite of being condemned), came too early; the clergy were not yet strong and matured enough to tolerate them, and, besides, there was lacking to them the element of unconditional submission to the Church, or more exactly, to the secular clergy, and of renunciation on principle of criticism of the Church.¹

¹The "Poor" were already excommunicated by Lucius III. (1184). On their spread in Northern Italy, where they had precursors in the Order of the Humiliates, but were only brought into existence by Waldes, on the relation of the Lyonnese Poor to those of Lombardy, and on the breach between the latter and Waldes, see Müller, *l.c.* pp. 11-65. The view that the efficacy of the Sacraments depends on the worthiness of the celebrator—a revolutionary principle under then existing conditions—appeared again among the Poor of Lombardy before 1211. Of itself the view was fitted to sever entirely the connection with the ancient Church, and was perhaps one of the causes of the ultimate breach between the Lyonnese and Lombard poor. The former were not so sharply opposed to the Roman Church as the latter. They did not regard it as Antichrist, but included it rather in the great community of the baptised, and recognised its administration of the Sacraments. But they made it a grave reproach against the Roman Church that its hierarchy exercised apostolic powers without adopting the apostolic life of poverty and homelessness (see the demand of the Didache regarding the qualities of apostles and prophets). They did not contest the *full authority* of the duly ordained bishops, who derived their dignity from the apostles; but they looked upon it as a deadly sin that they refused to live as did the apostles. A certain wavering in their attitude towards the Roman Church was the result. The judicial and legislative authority of the hierarchy was certainly disputed, or at least held as needing restriction. But as the "Brothers" did not organise into communities the "Friends" (the "believers") won over by them, but rather left them in the old relationships, the position of the reigning Church towards the Brothers and their adherents was much more definite and decided than was their position towards it. The French kinsmen of the Waldensians were not a new evangelical community, based on the idea of the universal priesthood, but "the sect itself is nothing but a hierarchy, which, founded on the thought of the apostolic life and the demand for a special ethical perfection, places itself alongside the Roman hierarchy, that, in an organisation which partakes at least of the fundamental forms of the latter, it may carry on preaching, dispense sacramental penance, and in its own innermost seclusion celebrate the Eucharist. So little is there the idea of the universal priesthood that the laity do not belong at all to the sect, membership being conferred rather only by consecration to one of the three hierarchical grades." (See Müller, p. 93 ff. and cf., as a parallel, the way in which the Irvingites now carry on their propaganda, and relate themselves to the *communitas baptizatorum*). Nor was the old traditional Church doctrine assailed by the Waldensians. They diverged only in respect of certain doctrines which bore upon practice, and which, besides, had not yet been formulated. Thus they rejected purgatory, and disapproved therefore of the Church practice that was connected with the idea of it (*i.e.*, of all institutions that were meant to extend their influence into the world beyond). The rejection of oaths, of service in war, of civil jurisdiction, of all shedding of blood, seemed to them,

For this is the third element in the piety of St. Francis—childlike confidence in the Church and unconditional obedience to the secular clergy. “Let all the Brethren,” so it runs in the Rule of 1209, “be Catholics, live and speak as Catholics . . .

as to so many mediæval sects, simply to follow from the Sermon on the Mount. On the other hand, the branch in Lombardy (which carried on a propaganda in Germany) took up a much more radical attitude towards the Roman Church (see Müller, p. 100 ff.) Although in what was cardinal it adhered to the standpoint of the French group of the stock (close communion, but only of men and women living *apostolically*: administration of the sacrament of penance; instruction of the “Friends” by preaching), it nevertheless saw in the Roman Church only apostasy, which at a subsequent time it traced to the benefactions of Constantine (cf. the *Spirituales*). This Church appeared to them accordingly as the synagogue of evil-doers and as the whore, its priests and monks as Scribes and Pharisees, its members as the lost. And so all regulations, orders, sacraments, and acts of this Church were to be rejected. Everything without exception, above all, the Pope and the mass, then also all legal regulations for worship fell under the adverse judgment. We can therefore gather testimonies here to the full for the “evangelical” character of these Lombards, who rejected all ecclesiastical differences of rank within the Christian community, all pomp, riches, lights, incense, holy water, processions, pilgrimages, vestments, ceremonies, etc., and in place of these required support of the poor, who would have nothing to do with the worship of Mary and the saints, who disbelieved as much in miracles of saints as in relics, who—at least originally—rejected the entire sacramental system of the Church, and both limited the number of sacraments and only recognised their validity on condition that the priest was free from mortal sin. But from the beginning onwards this attitude towards the reigning Church was really in many respects only “academic,” for the great mass of the “Friends,” *i.e.*, of adherents, by no means actually so judged the Roman Church, but remained within the sacramental bonds. Further, the extremely defective vindication of this radical opposition on the part of the Brethren themselves shows that it was more the result of the breach forced upon them from without, or, say, of the doctrine of poverty, than the product of a religious criticism dealing with what was essential. Finally, this view is confirmed by the circumstance that from the beginning the Brethren left themselves, as can be proved, a convenient alternative, by means of which they might be able to recognise the celebration of the sacraments by one guilty of mortal sin (they said that in that case the worthy Christian receives *directly from the Lord* in the dispensation of sacramental grace). Moreover, in the time following they approached always more closely to the Church and its sacramental celebration, partly on practical grounds (to avoid detection), partly because confidence in their own “apostolic” powers always became feebler, and the Catholic orders were viewed with longing and with greater trust. The whole movement, therefore, was at bottom not dogmatic. It was on the one hand—if we would draw the conclusions without hesitation—too *radical* to play a part in the history of dogma (Christianity is the apostolic life), on the other hand too *conservative*, as it set aside absolutely *nothing* that was Catholic with good conscience and clear insight. It is a phenomenon in the history of Catholic *piety*, though it may be worth considering in connection with the history of dogma that

and let us regard the clergy and all religious persons as masters in those things which relate to the salvation of the soul, and do not deflect from our religion, let us reverence in the Lord both their rank (*ordinem*) and their office and their administration." (See the Rule of 1221, c. 19).¹ That a nature like St Francis felt oppressed by nothing *external*, if only free scope was given him for his ideal,² that he could maintain his inner freedom and

the whole hierarchico-sacramental apparatus of the Church was called in question. Had the movement come a generation later, the Church would no doubt have found means for incorporating it into itself, as it did the Franciscan. Such an attempt was even made with the "Catholic Poor" of the converted Durandus of Huesca, formerly a French Waldensian (acknowledged by Innocent III. a year before St. Francis stood before him), and of the converted Lombard, Bernhard Primus, also one of the "Poor"; but there was no more success in leading the whole movement back to the channel of the Church by means of such approved Poor ones (Müller, p. 16 ff.) Only in the Mendicant Orders did the powerful counter-movement become organised and permanent (cf. Müller's excellent directions for finding the connection between the approvals of the Societies of Durandus, Dominic, and Francis (Waldenser, p. 65 ff.); also the same author's *Anfänge des Minoritenordens* (pp. 43, 69 f.), and the perhaps anti-Waldensian passage on the Rule of 1209 (p. 187): "Nulla penitus mulier ab aliquo fratre recipiatur ad obedientiam"). The Mendicant Orders naturally, particularly that of Dominic, set themselves in opposition, not only to the unsanctioned "Poor," but to sectarianism as a whole. On this latter there is no reason to enter in the history of dogma, for however high its importance may have to be estimated in connection with Church politics and social life, and however clearly it indicates that piety felt itself straightened within the tyrannical structure of the Roman Church and among its priests and ceremonies, it is equally certain that the mediæval sects continued entirely without influence as regards the development of dogma. It cannot even be said that they prepared the way for the Reformation; for the loosening which, to some extent, they brought about, was no prior condition of that movement. In the controversies rather which prevailed between the Roman Church and the dualistic (or pantheistic) sects, the Reformation placed itself entirely on the side of the former. What prepared the way for the Reformation in the domain of theology (keeping out of view the development of the ideas of the State and of natural rights) was always only the revived Augustinianism and the subjectivity of mysticism allied with it. As long, therefore, as it is regarded as expedient that the history of dogma should not be treated as history of culture, or as universal history, attention must be withdrawn from such phenomena as the Cathari, Albigenes, etc.

¹ But in the year 1210, and later, Francis would not be induced to connect himself with an already existing Order, or to conform to the older Monachism, and in this obstinacy towards the Pope and the cardinals he showed that he knew the greatness of his cause.

² This was not done indeed, and it led to sore distress on Francis' part; yet Sabatier seems to me to have exaggerated this strain in relationship (see Mariano, and especially Hegler); the Cardinal to whom the movement was chiefly due also did the most to make it political. The relation of St. Francis to the Curia and to the Church

pure cheerfulness of soul, even under quite other burdens than the Church then imposed, that he must have emptied himself of his very essence if he had undertaken to "abolish" anything, are things that are manifest. For him, obedience to all existing ordinances was as much a need as humility, and never assuredly did the shadow of a sceptical reflection as to whether the hierarchy was as it should be, or as to whether it should exist at all, fall upon the soul of this pure fool. But how could it fail to come about that the ideal of poverty and the ideal of obedience should come into conflict? We cannot here unfold the history of St. Francis and of the Minorite Order. It is well known against what mistrust he had to contend on the part of the secular clergy (even the curia), especially in France (but even on the part of the older Orders), and how the conditions reproduced themselves here which we have observed at the establishment of monachism in the end of the fourth, and beginning of the fifth, centuries, as well as in connection with the Cluniacensian reform in the West. It is well known also that "poverty" was the great theme in the history of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries; that there was as much stubborn and passionate controversy over it as in the fourth and fifth centuries over the natures of Christ, and that in this controversy as artful and clever formulæ made their appearance as at Chalcedon and Constantinople. For thousands, the controversy about poverty was a controversy about the gospel itself. By this conflict the formulæ of the old dogmatic were little or in no way touched; but they, so to speak, sank into the ground. The question about the nature of the gospel was narrowed down to a *practical* question about life-conduct. Even when we keep out of view the pedantic mode of treatment, the way of stating the question appears to us strangely inadequate. Yet "poverty," certainly, was only the final expression for the whole sum of the virtues involved in imitating Christ. What the watchword "poverty" denoted was an immense step of advance from dead faith, and from a barren service of ceremonies and works to spiritual freedom in religion, politicians, or rather the relation of these to him, still needs a thorough investigation. Excellent discussions in Hegler, l.c. 436 ff.

and to an earnest personal Christianity. The new Order soon broke up into different sections. In the one principal section, the last to submit, it certainly wrought invaluable results in the first generations of its existence. Its preaching kindled an earnest Christian life, indeed in many regions it was the first thing that produced an individual Christianity at all among the laity—so was it in Germany. Yet as everything was brought by it into closest connection with the confessional, the sacraments and the Pope, as all greater freedom was repressed as sectarianism, or crushed out—just by the Mendicant Orders—only an inferior kind of existence was allowed to this individual piety of the laity. For what the Minorites were obliged to sacrifice to the hierarchy—it was nothing less than the chief part of their original ideal, only the shadow remaining—they, so to speak, indemnified their conscience by the unparalleled energy with which they served the Church in its plans for ruling the world, and won for it the interest and allegiance of the laity. Here, at this final stage, therefore, the enemy the Church had in her own midst was once more vanquished; the enormous force of world-forsaking Christianity, which threatened the political supremacy of the Church, became visibly her servant; the “exempted” Order became, along with the Order of Preachers, her surest support.

But in other sections the obedience was not powerful enough to control that force.¹ “Poverty” turned itself against the rich and worldly Church, and when there was to be threatening and forced silence, it threw off restraint. It called upon the Church to serve; it united itself with the old apocalyptic ideas, that had already been long exercising their power in secret; it adopted the critical attitude of the “Lombard Poor”; it joined hands readily with the new social, and even the new territorial, ideas, the conceptions that were taking shape of the inherent rights of nations and individuals, of States and Princes.² While

¹ Of course many personal elements entered also, such as we can study in the most interesting of the earlier Franciscans, Elias of Cortona.

² See the writings of Joh. de Oliva and Ubertino de Casale (both were under the influence of the writings of Joachim of Fiore). The view of history friendly to the State as against the Secularised Church appears already in the middle of the thirteenth century (and even among the Dominicans): see Voelter in the *Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch.*

it declared the Church to be Babylon, and hierarchy Anti-Christ, it was not fastidious about its partnership. It left the dogmatic of the Church unassailed; but against the Church itself it declared war, an undertaking so full of contradiction that it was only possible in the Middle Ages, the period of contradictions and illusions; for did not this Church possess in its system of dogma the surest and most definite title for its existence? Only in one branch (the Fraticelli) did the contradiction become so radical that the fences dividing from the heretical sects (Apostolic Brethren, Beghards) became frail.

From these last-mentioned sections nothing permanent developed itself.¹ The importance for universal history of the vast movement of the Mendicant Orders is not to be seen at all in new doctrines or institutions, though these were not entirely wanting, but lies rather in the religious *awakening* that was produced by them during a period of 150 or—if a time of slackened

IV., H. 3. On the "Spirituales," and the "Fraticelli" (the latter are not to be identified with the former), as well as on the conflicts in the time of John XXII. and Louis of Bavaria, see Ehrle in the *Archiv. f. Litt.-u. K.-Gesch. des Mittelalters*, Vol. I. and II., Müller, *Kampf Ludwig's des Bayern 1879 f.*, the same author in the *Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch.* VI., part I, Gudenatz, *Michael von Cesena*, 1876.

¹ At a later time Hussism incorporated and wrought over a great part of the Franciscan and Joachimic-Franciscan elements (see Müller, *Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand der Forschung auf dem Gebiet der vorreformatorischen Zeit*, in den *Vorträgen der theol. Conferenz zu Giessen 1887 S. 44*), and as it spread widely, even beyond Bohemia, among the lower orders it prepared the way for the great Baptist movement and the social revolutions of the sixteenth century. Yet creations of a lasting kind appeared here as little as permanent influences on the Church generally. But from the point of view of Church history and the history of culture, the study of the powerful movement, essentially one throughout, which began with Joachimism and culminated with the Hussites and Baptists, is of the deepest interest. Like the "Illuminism" (*Aufklärung*) in the eighteenth century, and the Romantic ideas in the nineteenth, Joachimism spread over Europe in the thirteenth century, not as a new system of dogma, but as a new mode of viewing history and the highest problems, comforting to the seriously disposed, because it flattered them: cf., e.g., the *Chronicle of Salimbene* (*Michael, Salimbene und seine Chronik*, Innsbruck 1889). Strange that this movement should have begun in the hills of Calabria, the most out-of-the-way district of Southern Europe! It is still too little studied, while it certainly belongs to a period more open to our inspection than any in which prophetism played a part. Where prophets appear and are welcomed, fabrications are the immediate sequel. But the history of Joachimism is the typical history of all prophetism. Of the way in which it succeeds in adjusting itself in the world, Salimbene also furnishes some beautiful examples.

effort on the part of the Orders is overlooked—of 300 years. “The individual began to reflect on the saving truths of the Christian religion, to enter himself into a personal relation to them.” That is the highest significance of the Mendicant Order movement. In this sense the Orders were a prior stage of the Reformation. But when religion passed into the circles of the laity, and independent religious life was awakened there, it was a natural result that redoubled vigilance should be exercised lest the old dogma should be injured. So long as dogma is in the hands of priests and theologians, it can maintain a certain freedom; this is here natural to it, indeed. But as soon as the laity become thoughtfully interested in ecclesiastical Christianity, dogma becomes extraordinarily sensitive. Those who are entrusted with the care of the *religio publica* must—as the Mendicant Orders did—guard it with jealousy, if the result of the general interest is not to be a general running wild of religious speculation. The criterion of what is firmly fixed ecclesiastically must everywhere be applied without hesitation, especially if the Church practice of the present is to be corrected. On the other hand, the ecclesiastically pious laymen themselves demand that the dogma shall continue as a *rocher de bronze*, and they feel every movement or alteration of it to be an injury to their personal Christianity. This was the situation that was always becoming more firmly established in the three centuries before the Reformation. The larger the number grew of those who sought to become really familiar with religion, the larger became also the number of sectaries of all kinds; but the more inviolable also did dogma appear to the ecclesiastically faithful, and the greater were the efforts of the hierarchy to put down all “heresy.” Besides, dogma had come from the beginning, and indeed chiefly, to the mediæval nations, as a series of legal ordinances. This character it must retain, all the more if the spiritual life had a more vigorous and manifold development; otherwise the unity of the Church was lost. There must at least be an imperative demand for *fides implicita*, *i.e.*, for respectful obedience. Thus the awakening, which in Germany seems to have gone on continually increasing from the middle of the thirteenth century, contributed to main-

tain the unalterable character of dogma. Ideally dogma had always been immutable; but now to the reality of this unchangeable thing there attached itself a profoundly practical interest.

The history of piety in the centuries immediately preceding the Reformation consists of a series of sermons on repentance and of *revivals*, of reforms with a view to a deepening of spiritual life that was to extend through the whole of Christendom. Only in its leading points have we to take a survey of it. What comes first under our notice here is the alliance of the Mendicant Orders with Mysticism.

By Mysticism, as has been explained above, there is to be understood nothing but *theological piety* (contemplation), having a reflex aim, modelled on Augustine and the Areopagite, and fertilised (though not thoroughly) by Bernardine devotion to Christ. That this theology should have been found congenial to the temper of the Mendicant Monks, as soon as they at all took to do with theology, is easily understood. Bonaventura, Albertus, and Thomas Aquinas were the greatest Mystics, not although, but because, they were *theologians* and Mendicant Monks.¹ The same is true of David of Augsburg and Theodoric of Freiburg. Widely-extended investigations have been instituted with the view of classifying the Mystics, and it has been thought possible to distinguish between a Scholastic, a Romanic, and a German, a Catholic, an Evangelical, and a Pantheistic Mysticism. But at bottom the distinctions are without importance. *Mysticism is always the same; above all there are no national or confessional distinctions in it.* The differences never have to do with its essence, but only either with the *degree*, the *way* and the *energy* with which it is applied, or with its being predominantly directed upon the *intellect* or upon the *will*. Even as regards this last point it is only a question of difference of degree, and, at the same time, this last-mentioned distinction shows again very plainly the complete alliance of

¹ Herrmann remarks very correctly (Verkehr des Christen mit Gott 1. Aufl., p. 100): "The (present day) lovers of Mysticism present on a diminished scale the same spectacle as the great Schoolmen; they seek repose from the work of their faith in Mystic piety."

Mysticism with objective theology; for it is from this alliance that distinction springs. *Mysticism is Catholic piety in general, so far as this piety is not merely ecclesiastical obedience, that is, fides implicita.* Just for that reason Mysticism is not *one* form among others of pre-reformation piety—perhaps the latent evangelical—but is the Catholic expression of *individual* piety in general. The Reformation element that is ascribed to it lies here simply in this, that Mysticism, *i.e.*, Catholic piety, when developed in a particular direction, is led to the discernment of the inherent *responsibility* of the soul, of which no *authority* can again deprive it; and that it is thereby, at the same time, brought face to face with the question of the certitudo salutis (assurance of salvation), a question which can never again pass out of its view till it is solved in the act of faith. But where that question is determined, *Mysticism points beyond itself; for the entire scheme of thought in which it moves always admits only of a perpetually increasing approach to the Deity, and never allows the constant feeling of a sure possession to arise.* That, as a Christian, one must always be growing, was rightly discerned by the Catholic piety; but it never arrived at a clear and peaceful vision of the truth, that this growth can, and must, have its sure and inalienable basis in firm confidence in the God of grace, that is, in salvation. As for Catholic Christianity to-day, the Evangelical faith, described as “trust-faith” (“Fiduzglaube”), is a stumbling-block and foolishness, so also before the tribunal of Mediæval Mysticism it was a thing of which there was no understanding. For these Mystics, who framed and saw through so many sacred paradoxes, there was *one* paradox that remained hidden, namely, that in the spiritual life one can only *become* what he already is in faith. Only where they arrived at the discernment of this can they be described as precursors of the Reformation.

If Mysticism is withdrawn from the Catholic Church and set down as “Protestant,” then Catholicism is emptied of its character, and evangelical faith becomes deteriorated. Is there then to be no living and individual Catholic piety? But where should we have to seek it, if not in Mysticism? In the three centuries before the Reformation, where can we find even a single

manifestation of truly religious life that had not its source in "Mysticism"? Or is Mysticism to be denied to Catholicism, because the latter requires, above everything else, devotion to the Church and the Sacraments, and because the history of Mysticism is the history of continual conflicts between it and sacramental and authoritative ecclesiasticism? But when did it become permissible to regard such conflicts as showing that one of the two factors is illegitimate? Is there not a conflict also between the unquestionably Catholic ideal of asceticism, and the equally unquestionable Catholic ideal of world supremacy? Are the great Mystics not the great Saints of the Church? Or shall it be held, against all that appears, that this Church cannot produce and tolerate independent piety *within its own lines*? Now, no Evangelical Christian, certainly, would ever think of confounding his delight in the warm spiritual life which Catholic Christianity exhibits in the centuries before the Reformation¹ with full approval of it, if—one must, unfortunately, add it—he had made clear to himself what evangelical faith is. The inability to fight one's way to such faith produces the craving for Mysticism which is *then*, as one is of course a Protestant, claimed for Protestantism. The fondness, it is true, for "German" Mysticism has received a severe check from records that have shown that if one is enthusiastic about Master Eckhart, etc., and derives edification from him, one must be still more enthusiastic about St. Thomas, or about the Arcopagite and Augustine. But still more powerful checks will be needed if a view of history is to be got quit of, which seems the proper one to all fragmentary natures that deal in a dilettante way with religion, theology and philosophy—a Mystic that does not become a Catholic is a dilettante. For one, what is of value in the

¹Herrmann (Verkehr des Christen mit Gott 3 Aufl., p. 21) justly emphasises the following also: "We must confess to ourselves that if we Evangelicals think we have another kind of religion, we are in any case still far from having reached the thoroughness of culture which Catholicism possesses in that Mysticism . . . it is a wonderfully perfect expression of a particular kind of religion. The speculations of Catholic Mysticism are of ancient date. Apart from Neoplatonism, it has little peculiar to it in this respect. But in the capacity to make personal life the subject of observation and delineation, it represents a height of attainment which Protestantism has not yet reached."

Mystics is their "individualism," as if everything were already implied under this form; for another, it is their feeling, no matter what the "feeling" is for; for a third, it is the pantheistic metaphysic, which, without much trouble, can be abstracted from Mysticism; for a fourth, it is their ascetic views and their resolution of Christology into the *Ecce Homo*, or into the endless series of men travailing in birth with the Christ; for a fifth, it is the light of "illumination" (*Aufklärung*) which broke forth from Mysticism. What historian, with clear vision, will be able to pass by these fruits of Mysticism without sympathy, or with amused indifference? What Christian will not draw with heart-felt delight from the spring of fresh intuitions which flows forth here? Who, as an investigator of history, will not readily acknowledge that an Evangelical Reformation was as impossible about the year 1200 as it was prepared for about the year 1500? But if Protestantism is not at some time yet, so far as it means anything at all, to become entirely Mystical, it will never be possible to make Mysticism Protestant without flying in the face of history and Catholicism.¹

¹ The right conception of Mysticism as Catholic piety has been taught—in opposition to Ullmann's "Reformers before the Reformation"—by Ritschl (*Rechtfert. und Versöhn.* vol. I., *Geschichte des Pietismus*, vols. I.-III., *Theologie und Metaphysik*) who has also given hints for further investigation (connection of the Mystics with the Anabaptists, Hussites, etc.). He has been followed by a large number of more recent investigators. Besides the works named above, p. 25, among which those of Denifle are epoch-making, as having shown that Master Eckhart is, in his Latin writings, entirely dependent on Thomas, and even in other respects owes his best to him (*Archiv f. Litt.-und K.-Gesch. des Mittelalters* II., pp. 417-640; preparatory work had already been done here by Bach in his monograph on Eckhart), see Lasson, *Meister Eckhart*, 1866, also the more recent works on Tauler and the Friends of God (Denifle), Pfeiffer's edition of the German Mystics (2 vols., 1845-57), Suso's Works, edited by Denifle (1877), still further, Ritschl in the *Zeitschr. f. K.-Gesch.* IV., p. 337 ff., Strauch, Marg. Ebner und Heinrich v. Nördlingen, 1882. On the earliest German Mystics see Preger, *Vorarbeiten z. einer Gesch. der deutschen Mystik* (*Ztschr. f. die hist. Theol.* 1869, and several essays in the *Abhandl. der hist. Klasse d. bayer. Akad. d. Wissensch.*, which, along with his comprehensive history of Mysticism, are rich sources of material). On Ruysbroek cf. Engelhardt, *Rich. v. St. Victor und R.* 1838; on Thomas à Kempis "*de imitatione Christi*" the literature is voluminous, cf. Hirsche, *Prolegomena z. einer neuen Ausg.* 2 vols. 1873-83, the same author on the Brothers of the Common Life in the *R.-E.*². In general: Denifle, *Das geistliche Leben. Blumenlese aus den deutschen Mystikern und Gottesfreunden.* 3. Aufl. 1880, A very full delineation of Mysticism is also given in Thomasius-Seeburg, *D.-Gesch.* 2 Aufl. II. 1 pp. 261 ff., cf. also Seeburg, *Ein Kampf um jenseitiges Leben. Lebens-*

In the three pre-Reformation centuries, the individual Catholic piety, which we call Mysticism, had in it only the difference represented by varieties. It was rooted in the Neoplatonic-Augustinian view of the first and last things, as this has been described above, Vol. V. p. 106 f.: God and the soul, the soul and its God; the one and the many, God and the creature. The soul that has departed from God must return to Him by *purification*, *illumination*, and essential *unification*; it must be “unformed,” “formed,” and “transfigured” (“entbildet,” “bildet,” “überbildet”). With their more definite and richer vision of the inwardly experienced, Mediæval Saints spoke of the retirement of the soul within itself, of the contemplation of the outer world as a work of God, of the poverty and humility to which the soul must dispose itself, of conversion and return to God, and the school of suffering. But they also described the whole process in the most exact way. It begins with longing; there follows the renunciation of the *creaturely*, but also of all self-righteousness and all self-conceit. That is the purification of the soul for true Christian poverty. What the Church offers in the shape of means—the Sacraments—must be used; but all things must be taken up into the inner life. It is as signs of the

bild eines mittelalterlichen Frommen., 1889. I give no extracts from the writings of the German Mediæval Mystics, because I should like to avoid even seeming to countenance the error that they expressed anything one cannot read in Origen, Plotinus, the Areopagite, Augustine, Erigena, Bernard and Thomas, or that they represented religious progress, while in respect of intrinsic Christian worth, their tractates really stand for the most part lower than the writings of Augustine and Bernard. The importance of those works rests in this, that they were written in *German*, and that they were intended for the *laity*. They are therefore of inestimable value within the history of the *German* church and dogma. But in general history we may, and must, content ourselves with a characterisation. Whether, perhaps, they represent a considerable advance in the history of epistemology and metaphysic, is a question I do not trust myself to answer, nor does it fall to be considered here. As to the idea of regeneration, which is strongly emphasised in many Mystic writings, we must take in connection with it the silence on forgiveness of sins, that we may see how even this idea stood under the ban of intellectualism. The “clarification” which the Mysticism of the fourteenth century underwent in the fifteenth certainly related very specially to that aggressive intellectualism, so that the piety which expresses itself, for example, in the famous book *de imitatione Christi* (Thomas à Kempis) may be described as essentially Bernardine without Neoplatonic admixture, but yet only as Bernardine. A new, powerful element of joy in God, who forgives sin, and bestows faith, is sought for in vain.

love of God that they must be contemplated. And as formerly in Neoplatonism (cf. also Origen, and again the Areopagite) everything sensible on which the lustre of a sacred tradition rested, was highly esteemed as a *sign* of the eternal, and, therefore, as a means of spiritual exaltation, so by this piety also, sacred signs were not discarded, but were multiplied and increased. As the more recent investigations have shown us,¹ in the centuries before the Reformation a growing value was attached, not only to the Sacraments, but to crosses, amulets, relics, holy places, helpers of the needy, saints, etc. As long as what the soul seeks is not the rock of assurance, but means for inciting to piety, it will create for itself a thousand holy things. It is, therefore, an extremely superficial view that regards the most inward Mysticism and the service of idols as contradictory. The opposite view, rather, is correct; such piety seeks for holy signs, and clings to them. It can at the same time hold redemption by Christ as the supreme, all-embracing proof of the love of God;² but the sovereignty of Christ has not dawned upon it, because it really regards the supreme proof of love as the means by which the *possibility* of individual salvation is given, that is, the impulse towards *imitation* is strengthened. Just as little does the inward purification conflict with the sacramental, as mediated by the sacrament of penance. The Mystics rather, with dwindling exceptions, always directed attention, not to contrition merely, but to the whole confessional, and to perfect repentance, that is, to the sacrament of penance. After purification, there follows illumination. Here the Bernardine direction now comes in: there must be a being formed in Christ, and after Christ's image. In one's own experience, Christ's life of poverty and His suffering humanity must be reproduced, with a view to attaining to his Deity. It is well known how, in this direction, the tenderest training of the

¹ See the works of Gothein, Kolde, Kawerau, Haupt, and above all v. Bezold (Gesch. der deutschen Reformation) on the inner state of Catholicism at the close of the fifteenth century. Succinct accounts in Lenz, Martin Luther, 1883 (introduction) and Karl Müller, Bericht über den gegenwärtigen Stand, etc., 1887.

² There are several Mystics of the fourteenth century who, in many passages of their devotional writings, find their sole ground of comfort, as definitely as St. Bernard, in the sufferings of Christ.

soul is combined with a distressingly sensuous presentation of the sufferings of the "man" Jesus. The *following* of Christ that is prompted by compassion, the *imitation* of Him that has its spring in love—these are required to a degree that can be reached only by long practice, and by the most anxious straining of every thought. Not unfrequently, this imitation then becomes changed into the idea that one must become a Christ one's self, must travail anew in birth with Christ. There were nuns, indeed, who fancied that they bore Christ in their womb. The highly-trained *imagination*, and *theory*, had equal parts in the production of this idea. The former—inasmuch as it actually experienced what it passionately contemplated; the latter—inasmuch as in the Neoplatonic-Augustinian tradition there was contained that idea of God and the spiritual creature, according to which the appearance of the Logos in Christ was only a special case in a long series; with Him the indwelling of God in man took its beginning; and, besides this, all love of God is something so sovereign that it does not admit of the intermingling of a third in the relation to which it gives life. But, on the other hand, this view of Christ as the first in a series stood in agreement again with the view of His death as an extraordinary event that is the basis of reconciliation with God; for, as this piety sacrifices no outward visible sign, so it surrenders also no part of the sacred history; only, it allows no weight to it at the highest stage. Yet, at countless times in the case of the most distinguished Mystics, as already in the case of St. Bernard, it is just at the highest stages of religious feeling that confidence in Christ asserts itself; for, as they derived everything from divine grace—especially where the theology of St. Thomas exercised its influence—so this grace is discerned in the Christ who is our righteousness. Further, there was added here the trinitarian speculation, as it was developed from the thought of *love*. Thus the piety shown by Richard of St. Victor in the earlier period, by Bonaventura and others in the later, was able to attach itself most intimately to this intractable dogma of the Trinity, and also to the other dogma of the Incarnation. The infinite love must be contemplated in the Mystery of the Trinity, and the highest point of the spirit's enlightenment is reached

when in prayer, in knowledge, and in vision, man becomes absorbed in the great mystery of the union of deity and humanity, and contemplates the indifference of opposites (*indifferentia oppositorum*), seeing how the Creator and the creature, the lofty and the lowly, the being and the not-being coalesce in one. From all these speculations, in which the old formulas are placed in the light of omnipotent love, in which the boldest and most complex theology is finally led back to the All-One, and converted into *feeling*, there resulted an intense deepening of inner life. This inner life was again discovered, and there was given to it the place of central command. But it found much richer expression still than in the days of Neoplatonism; for, in those centuries before the Reformation, in conjunction with the most frightful self-torturing, nay in the midst of them (think of St. Elizabeth), and in conjunction with whimsical or insane ideas, the elevating power of suffering, and the purifying influence of pain, were proved by experience and preached. What an ennobling of feeling, and what a deepening of the life of the soul issued from this—a Renaissance before and alongside of the Renaissance—cannot be described. One must read the writings in poetry and prose, for example the verses of Jacopone,¹ or the treatises and sermons of the German Mystics, to see how even the language here underwent a regeneration. A lyric poetry that awakens a response in us exists only from the thirteenth century, and what force the Latin and German tongues are capable of developing in describing the inner life we have been taught by the Mendicant Monks. From the discernment that lowliness and poverty, scorn and contempt, shame and misery, suffering and death, are aids to the saint's progress, from the contemplation of the Man Jesus, from compassion, and pain, and humility, there sprang for Western Christianity, in the age of the Mendicant Monks, that inner elevation and that enrichment of feeling and of moral sensibility which was the condition for all that was to grow up in the time that followed. One speaks of the Renaissance and the Reformation, and comprehends in these words, taken together,

¹ See Schlüter u. Storck, *Ausgewählte Gedichte Jacopone's*, 1864. Thode, l.c. pp. 398 ff.

the basis of our present-day culture; but both have a strong common root in the elevation of religious and æsthetic feeling in the period of the Mendicant Monks.

But the Catholic character of this elevation shows itself most plainly in this, that with repentance, faith, and love to Christ, the process is not concluded: man must become entirely nothing; he must pass out of himself, in order, finally, to be merged into the Godhead. There is meant by this, certainly, the highest spiritual freedom also (see, *e.g.*, the "Deutsche Theologie"); but as the freedom is enfolded in the metaphysical thought that God is all and the individual nothing, freedom can only be conceived of as absorption into the deity. He alone can experience this union with God who has followed the way of the Church, and has been an imitator of Christ. But how can the command be given to adhere to the historical, when all the powers of the imagination have been let loose, and it has been declared the organ for coalescing with the Godhead. The Church Mystics made earnest attempts to check the pantheistic, "extravagant," wild-growing piety; but they themselves frequently were at least incautious with their final directions, nay, to these the ardent application was wanting, so long as they had still respect to something that lay outside of God and the soul (even the Trinity here was felt to be something disturbing; the God with whom the soul has to do at this supreme height of exaltation is the solitary One). Thomas himself, "the normal dogmatic theologian," gave the strongest impulse to this restoration of the most extravagant Mysticism. He was followed by Eckhart and others.¹ According to Thomas, the soul can already here on earth so receive God into itself that it enjoys in the fullest sense the vision (*visio*) of His essence. It itself already dwells in

¹ Although, shortly before his death, Eckhart had retracted everything unecclasiastical in his writings, two years after his death a process was instituted against him, *i.e.*, twenty-eight of his propositions were condemned, partly as heretical, and partly as open to suspicion (Bull of John XXII., 1329). On this condemnation, and on the relation of Suso to Eckhart, see Denifle in the *Archiv. f. L.-u. K.-G. des Mittelalters* II. and Seeberg, *Ein Kampf um jenseitiges Leben*. 1889, p. 137 ff. Even Suso could not quite escape the reproach of polluting the land with heretical filth. It was always the Ultra's, who, by making an appeal to them, brought discredit upon the "Church" Mystics.

heaven. The earthly, that still clings to it, is, as it were, as unsubstantial as the earthly in the consecrated elements. But if the soul is capable, through rapture (*per raptum*), of such a flight from its nothingness to God, if God can enter into its innermost depth, then—here is the necessary inversion of view—the soul itself includes, in its innermost being, a deeply hidden divine element. Pantheism is transformed into self-deification. The divine is at bottom the capacity of the soul to abstract and emancipate itself from all that is phenomenal; it is the pure feeling of spiritual freedom and exaltedness above all that is and can be thought. In this feeling, which arises as an act of grace, and is only guarded by this co-efficient in its mood from the pride of self-assertion, the soul has the sense of being one with the divine Being, who, in the Catholic view, is Himself best described by negative definitions. In these negative definitions the Mediæval Mystics went much further than Augustine and the Arcopagite.¹ We must go back to Valentinus and Basilides, to the *Búthos* (abyss), to the *Σιγή* (silence) and the *Οὐκ ὄν θεός* (the God that is not), to find the fitting parallels to the “Abysmal Substance” (“Abgründlichen Substanz”), the “Waste Deity” (“Wüsten Gottheit”), the “Silent Silence” (“Stillen Stillheit”). In this hot forcing-house of thought, religion was not really matured, but the Mediæval man had his sense of self-importance awakened. In the Thomist Mysticism, which, of course, always insists on principle that the essential distinction between God and man must be recognised, both the whole process and the supreme attainment are intellectually conditioned. *Knowledge* is the means of reaching spiritual freedom, and the highest state attained is nothing but the natural result of the *absolute* knowledge given in vision. Here Thomas and his disciples adhere strictly to Augustine, who also admitted no progress in religious life without advancing knowledge, and for whom the highest fellowship with God had also no other content than that of the *visio dei*, *i.e.*, of essential knowledge. The contemplation that rises to intuition suffers thereby no qualitative change; for intuition is simply that form of knowledge in which every medium has fallen away, in which the subject, having become wholly in-

¹ Cf. especially Eckhart and Suso.

tellect, apprehends the purely spiritual object, and so, also, as there is no longer any hindering restriction, coalesces with it. Yet in this conception of the contemplated end there was presupposed the Anselmic conviction, that all objects of faith here below can be made rational, so that the whole ascent to the Supreme end can take place through the intellect. Where this conviction, however, became uncertain, then, if the final end of union to God was to be held as attainable in this world, it could no longer be contemplated as enjoyment of God and eternal life *through the intellect*. But this latter idea was unsatisfactory also for this reason, that the Thomists had to admit that the end thus described could always be reached only per raptum, *i.e.*, intermittently and seldom. Hence we see how, after the appearance of Duns Scotus, and after the development of Nominalism, the end is otherwise described. The confidence in the rationality of the objects of faith threatens to disappear, *on the other hand the religious impulse towards constant supreme fellowship with God grows stronger*—therefore the enjoyment of God and eternal life came to be placed in the *will*, which, in general, indeed, had increased attention directed to it in Nominalist science.¹ *Salvation consists in union of will with God*, in the rest which the creaturely will finds in the will of God, that is, in surrender and repose. That this way of viewing things likewise found an eccentric expression was unavoidable from the monastic character of all Catholic piety. Yet a very marked advance was certainly made here, which directly prepared the way for the Reformation; for, first, piety was now delivered from intermixture with those speculative monstrosities, which really served only to stupefy simple devout feeling (of course the speculative philosophers will always prefer Thomas to Duns); second, a way was indicated by which the soul might attain to the feeling of *constant fellowship with God*. This “Nominalist” Mysticism tended more and more to supplant the Thomist in the 15th century.² *One must give up his own will to the will of God.*

¹ To this distinction between the Thomist and the Quietist (Nominalist) Mysticism Ritschl was the first to point, see *Gesch. des Pietismus I.*, p. 467 ff., and *Zeitschr. f. K.-Gesch. IV.*, p. 337 ff; also already in the first vol. of *Rechtfertig. u. Versöhn.-Lehre*.

² About 1500 it seems to have gained the ascendancy; cf. the attitude of Staupitz

The Nominalists themselves, certainly, failed to see clearly where the divine will is to be sought for, and what it is, and just on that account much wild growth still developed itself even here. But only within Nominalist piety could the question about assurance of salvation (*certitudo salutis*) arise, because there was no longer a building upon the intellect, because the pointing to bare authority was bound, in the course of time, to be felt unsatisfactory, and because the problem was correctly stated, as being the question, namely, about the power that is capable of breaking self-will and leading the will to God.¹

This revival of piety from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth would not be perfectly described were not a fact, at the same time, strongly emphasised, which, on first view, seems very paradoxical

and Thomas M \ddot{u} nzer. Even the "German Theology," of which Luther was so fond, is quietistic.

¹In the section on the history of theology the characteristics and significance of Nominalism will receive a still further illustration. Meanwhile, however, let it be noted here, that by its "positiveness," based on mere authority, Nominalism purchased its truer insight into the nature of religion at a heavy cost. Here Anselm and Thomas undoubtedly hold a higher position; but these men were hindered by their intellectualism from doing justice to the Christian religion as a *historic magnitude and force*. What I have set forth in these pages (p. 97 ff.) has been keenly assailed by Lason and Raffaele Mariano. Plainly enough they put before me the alternative of irreligious criticism or blind faith (*Köhlerglauben*), when on their side they claim for the Thomist Mysticism that it is the only form of religion in which faith and thought, history and religious independence, are reconciled. It must be the endeavour of each of us to find something in his own way. What we have ultimately to do with here is the great problem as to what history and the person of Christ are in religion, and then there is the other problem also as to whether religion is contemplation or something more serious. That the end to which our striving is directed is the same—the seeking, finding, and keeping hold of God—may be confidently granted on both sides. But my opponents have an easier position than I have: they can prove—and I recognise this proof—that the piety that culminates in Mysticism and the old ecclesiastical dogma hang together, *and they can at the same time let the question rest as to what reality of fact answers to the dogma*. That is to say, the dogma renders them the best services, just when they are at liberty to contemplate it as a mobile and elastic magnitude, which hovers between the poles of an inferior actuality and that "highest," which can never have been actual as earthly: out of the darkness there is a pressing forward to the light; *luminous clouds show the path!* But I seek in the dogma itself of the Christian Church for something concrete, namely the Gospel of Jesus Christ as the Lord. The tradition which the dogma represents is treated with more respect when it is criticised and sifted, than when one takes it as it is, in order ultimately to bid it a secret farewell, *i.e.*, to substitute for it something quite different—namely the idea.

cal, namely, *the revival of a life of practical activity in the service of one's neighbour*. We should think that where Catholic piety, *i.e.*, Mysticism, flourished, monastic contemplation and asceticism would repress everything else.¹ In point of fact, there was a weighty problem for that piety here. Yet the way in which it was solved shows again most distinctly that in the Mendicant Order movement we have to do with a reformation of the Church. This movement strengthened, theoretically, the old Catholic position, that the contemplative life is higher than the practical. But as it presents itself in St. Francis as a movement born of love, so also from the first, as "imitation of the poor life of Jesus," and as "Apostolic life," it recognised in *loving activity the highest sphere for its exercise*. In this way the old Monasticism was superseded, which rendered services of love only to the hierarchy, the princes and the papal policy, but otherwise retired within itself, and felt service to a poor brother to be a work of supererogation. It was the Mendicant Orders and their theologians who first gave a conspicuous place again to the command, "Love thy neighbour as thyself." They praised the contemplative life; they still continued always to maintain the distinction between it and the practical; but they drew this distinction in such a way that one living in contemplation (that is, the monk) was, nevertheless, required to serve his neighbour with all his powers, while the Christian occupied with the affairs of life, was never justified in leaving out of account concern for his brother. Thus there came to exist between the contemplative and active lives a wide neutral province, so to speak, which belonged to both, to the former as well as to the latter—the province of self-denying love. The love of God on the part of monk and layman could prove its existence only in the love of one's neighbour. Hence it is to be understood how enthusiastic Mystics used expressions that sound like an exaltation of the active life above the contemplative; what they had in their mind was unfeigned brotherly love, mercy, gentleness, the spirit that returns good for evil, and active

¹ On the relation of Metaphysic to Asceticism, or, say, of Mysticism to Asceticism, see the dissertation of Bender in the *Archiv. f. Gesch. der Philos.* vol. 6, pp. 1 ff., 208 ff., 391 ff.

ministration to need. Neither their "intellectualism" nor their "quietism" hindered them in their powerful preaching of mercy, but rather strengthened them in it; for they would no longer recognise any monachism, or any service of God, that disregarded the service of one's neighbour. The obligation to make one's self every man's servant in love was first plainly asserted again by Francis, and after him it was repeatedly enforced as *the highest attainment of Christian life* by Thomas and Bonaventura, by Eckhart, Suso, Tauler, Thomas à Kempis, and all the hundred active witnesses to Christian piety in the centuries before the Reformation.¹ The simple relation of man to man, sanctified by the Christian command of love and by the peace of God, issued forth from all the traditional corporations and castes of the Middle Ages, and set itself to break them up. Here, also, the advent of a new age, in which, certainly, only a few blossoms developed into fruit, was brought about by the history of *piety*. But this piety, although it always continued to call more loudly for reform in the affairs of the Church, still remained under the ban of the idea that God gives grace in the measure in which a man progresses in love. How this state of things was to be remedied, no one had any inkling.

In what precedes it has already been indicated several times that, while maintaining the line of distinction, the Mendicant Orders brought about inwardly (to some extent even outwardly) a mutual approximation of monks and laity. The activity of the former among the people on the one hand, and the awakening of a strong religious life among the laity on the other, brought them together. But it was in general the characteristic of the period under review, that the laity always came more to the front, and in the fifteenth century they took their place in their free religious associations alongside the monks in theirs, though, no doubt, as a rule, there was dependence on the monastic unions. The period from 1046 to 1200 was the period of the monachising of the priests; that from 1200 to 1500 brought the monachising of the laity (notice, also, the participation of women in the Mystic and charitable movements); but *the latter* process

¹ With Eckhart the direction originated to let even ecstasy go, though it should be as great as that of Paul, if one can help a poor man even with a sop.

was not carried out without a deeply penetrating alteration of Monachism, and it is to be observed that the *charitable* element was here determinative. When, in spite of earnest reforms, the Mendicant Orders were now, nevertheless, unable (from the end of the fourteenth century) fully to recover the position and confidence they had once enjoyed, the free Christian associations came quite into the foreground. But they secured, if I see aright, a large measure of influence only on *German* soil. What they did for the German was done for the Romanic peoples, naturally more mobile, but less susceptible of abiding impressions, by the great *Preachers of Repentance*, of whom there was no lack among them at any period, from the time of Francis to that of Savonarola, and who, along with their preaching of repentance, knew also how to stir national and political feeling. But it was only the Anglo-Saxons and the Czechs, hitherto kept in subjection and poverty by other nations, who understood, at this period, how to derive from the Franciscan doctrine of poverty a politico-national and an ecclesiastical programme, and among whom a great movement took place, in which the rise to independent piety united itself with a national rise and emancipation. In both countries the result, certainly, did not correspond with the first steps. In England, the movement ran its course comparatively quickly, and in Bohemia deeper religious motives were unable to hold their ground alongside the national and political aims imperiously asserting themselves, and at first, at least, were overborne by motives of an ecclesiastical, a social revolutionary, and an anti-hierarchical character, though afterwards the religious element wrought its way to the front again.

Any one, therefore, wishing to describe the stages in the history of piety during this period, must begin, by way of introduction, with a view of the Lyonnese, Lombard and Catholic "Poor." Then follows the establishment of the Mendicant Orders, who, by developing the principle of poverty, the apostolic life and repentance, as well as by preaching love (*caritas*) raise monachism to its highest point, and free it from its restrictions, but at the same time impart to it a most powerful influence upon the lay world. The Church succeeds in taking this movement into its service, in creating by means of it an

interest in Church institutions among the aspiring lay Christianity, and in placing a check upon heresy. The Mendicant Orders made themselves masters of all the forces of the Church; above all, they developed more deeply the individual Mystic piety, by grasping more firmly its old fundamental elements, poverty and obedience, adding to these love, and gave it a powerful force of attraction, which united itself to the aspiring individualism and trained it. By urgent preaching of repentance, which pointed to future judgment, even the widest circles were stirred, and the new movement settled down, in part, into monk-like associations (the third Order). But the principle of "poverty" embraced not only an ascetically religious, but also a social and anti-hierarchical, nay, even a political ideal, for the neutral state could be regarded as the power that had to deprive the Church of her property, or, in the event of her being recalcitrant, to execute judgment upon her. The new movement united itself therefore with the apocalyptic ideas, which, in spite of Augustine, had never died out in the West, and which had received a new development from Joachim and his following.¹ Partly within the Order, and partly beyond it, an apocalyptic socio-political excitement grew up, asserting itself in a hundred different ways. Its relative justification over against the rich worldly hierarchy was furnished by the wide hold which it everywhere secured for itself: it made its appearance in all lands, and it continued to exist, always again gathering new strength, till far on in the period of the Reformation. In the second half of the thirteenth century the Mendicant Orders reached, at least in the Romanic lands, their highest point of influence. From that time they began to decline: after the close of the century the movement as a whole was broken up and distributed among the efforts of individual men. The great struggle about poverty in the age of John XXII. had, so far as it was *religious*, only a limited importance. In Germany, on the other hand, there began, from the end of the

¹ See Wadstein, *Die eschatologische Ideengruppe in den Hauptmomenten ihrer christlich-mittelalterlichen Gesamtentwicklung*, 1896. The details of these ideas scarcely belong to the history of theology, not to speak of the history of dogma; but as was the case with the ideas about the devil, they exercised a very strong influence.

thirteenth century, the "German" Mystic movement, *i.e.*, the introduction of the impassioned individual piety of the monastic theologians into the circles of the laity. For a century and more, the work of bringing about an inward conversion of the laity in Germany was carried on, and it was quite specially by Mendicant monks, chiefly Dominican, that this service was rendered. (David of Augsburg, Theodoric of Freiburg, Master Eckhart, Tauler, Merswin, the "Friends of God," Suso, Henry of Nördlingen, Margaret Ebner, Ruysbroek, etc.)

While in the Romanic lands the Mendicant Orders grew weaker, and in Germany the religious life, still through their influence partly, slowly advanced, the world-ruling Church pursued a course of complete self-abandonment at Avignon, and seemed to have the deliberate wish to subject the ecclesiastical fidelity of the already imperilled piety to the severest test. Nay, how firmly the papacy and the Church as an institution still held together souls and the world is shown by the confusions and complaints which, when the great schism ensued, became still more numerous. Under the impression produced by frightful elemental calamities, the apocalyptic, anti-hierarchical ideas became the real danger, especially as even Mendicant monks were regarded as enemies of the papacy. But only in England did a great movement at that time result. The law of God, poverty, the Augustinian theology—these were the dominant ideas under which Wyclif undertook his Catholic reform and preached to the reigning Church judgment and repentance—a second Francis, of more understanding but less resolute, more cautious but less free. Beyond England at first no similar movement was anywhere to be traced; but it was everywhere apparent that the world had entered upon a religious age, in which the multiplicity of aspirations testified that the dissolution of what existed at the time was felt to be the signal for a new construction—the ridicule and frivolity of some Italian poets and novelists of an inferior order have no claim whatever to be considered. In its greatest representatives, the Renaissance, especially the German, which was much more important in the realm of thought than the Italian, felt that it had outgrown neither the Catholic Church nor the Christian religion.

What was really breaking up was mediæval *society*, mediæval *institutions*, the mediæval *world*.¹ So far as the Church was interwoven with this last, nay, constituted the chief part of it, and in this form had hitherto been held as holy—a state of things on which the Mendicant Orders had been able to work no change—the crisis was already prepared. But there was no proclaiming of separation from the Church; there was a seeking for means for politically reforming it (this almost alone was the question at the Reform Councils), and monachism also took itself seriously to task.² From the end of the fourteenth century till the time of the Reformation there was a continuous succession of efficient reforms in the older Orders and in the younger, of course on the basis already laid. If the signs do not mislead, the Mendicant Orders in particular rose higher again in the course of the fifteenth century and gained an always increasing influence on popular circles, in the Romanic lands through the occasional appearing of preachers of repentance, in Germany through earnest, steady work. But it is certainly unmistakable that all this did not yet give satisfaction and rest. The proof of this lies—apart from other sectarian agitations—in the fact that the Wyclifite movement, which in literary form had crept in among the Czechs, who were already deeply infected with apocalyptic excitement and Franciscan fanaticism, could strike its roots so deeply in Bohemia under Huss, and could occasion so terrible a revolution, a revolution that shook the half of Germany. From the confused intermingling of “religious, social, national, Joachim-apocalyptic, chiliastic, specifically Wyclifite and Waldensian tendencies, thoughts, hopes and dreams,” individuals gathered out what appealed to them. All shades were represented, from the wild

¹ See Lamprecht, *Zum Verständniss der wirthschaftlichen und Socialen Wandlungen in Deutschland vom 14. zum 16. Jahrh.*, in the *Ztschr. f. Social-und Wirthschaftsgesch.* I., 2. 3, pp. 191-263. The significance of the state of the towns is specially to be observed (see the works by Schmoller).

² Höfler, *Die Romanische Welt und ihr Verhältniss zu den Reformideen des Mittelalters*, 1878. Maurenbrecher, *Gesch. d. Kathol. Reformation I.*, 1880. Kolde, *Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation*, 1879. Dittrich, *Beiträge z. Gesch. der Kathol. Reform im 1. Drittel des 16. Jahrh. I. u. II.* (*Görres-gesellsch.-Jahrbuch V.* 1884, p. 319 ff., VII. 1886, p. 1 ff.).

warriors of God, who inflicted judgment with fire and sword on the Church and on all despisers of divine law, to the quiet brothers, who really judged the Church as hardly, and clung to as utopian hopes regarding the adjustment of human relationships, but who were willing to wait in patience and quietness. In the fifteenth century the currents of all foregoing attempts at reform flowed together; they could converge into *one* channel; for *all* of them sprang originally from one source — the doctrine of poverty, wedded to apocalyptic and to certain Augustinian thoughts, that is, Catholicism. “Silent and soft is poverty’s step,” Jacopone had once sung in his wonderful hymn. That was truly no prophecy of the future.

Even after the papacy, by an unparalleled diplomacy, had released itself from the oppressive requirements of the Reform Councils, when the nations were defrauded of the sure prospect of a reform of the Church, when the Popes, with their great undertaking of securing a sovereign state, descended to the lowest depths of degradation and spoke of reform with scorn, piety as a rule did not lose faith in the *Church*, but only in her representation at the time, and in her corrupt order. It is a mistake to conclude from the contempt for priests and for lazy monks to the existence of an evangelical spirit. There can express itself in such contempt the purest and most obedient Catholic piety. This piety displayed in the second half of the fifteenth century a strength of vigorous impulse, in some measure even a power, greater than ever before. And it remained immovably the *old* piety. It attracted the laity more powerfully; it became richer in good works and in the spirit of love; it united clergy and laity in common religious undertakings; it wrought for the deepening and strengthening of the inner life. But just on these grounds it attached higher value to outward signs, sought for them, increased their number, and gave itself up to them. One may detect in this something of unrest, of dissatisfaction; but we must not forget that this is just what belongs to Catholic piety. This piety seeks, not for a basis of rock, but for *means of help*, and even where it is most inward, and seems to have bidden farewell to everything ex-

ternal, it must confess that, openly or secretly, it still uses the narcotics and stimulants.

An enormous revolution, ever again retarded, was preparing in the fifteenth century. *But this revolution threatened institutions, political and ecclesiastical*; threatened the Church, not its gospel, the new dogma-like doctrines, not the old dogma. That a reformation of piety in the sense of *faith* was preparing, is suggested by nothing whatever that is historically apprehensible; for the most radical opponents, and the most faithful supporters, of the dominant Church, were at one in this, that the forces for a reform of the ecclesiastical life were bound up in Augustine and Francis. The Church doctrines that became the subject of controversy were really no Church doctrines as yet;¹ and then again—even the most radical Church programme had its strong roots, and its justifying title, in elements of the vulgar Church doctrine. Thus dogma remained substantially unassailed. How could anyone imagine, in the age of Nominalism, that the salvation by reform must come from *doctrine*, so long as the authority of the dogmatic tradition remained untouched? And yet, certainly, it would be a very childish view that would regard the Reformation as something absolutely new, because no direct preparatory stages of it can be pointed out. Individualism, the force of personal life, the irresistible demands for a reconstruction of civil life and social order, the needs of a piety always growing more restless, the distrust of the hierarchy, the rising consciousness of personal responsibility and craving for personal certainty, the conviction that Christ is in His Church, and yet that He is not in ecclesiasticism—all these things could not have reached the ends contemplated by them without a Reformation, which, to outward view, appeared less radical than the programme of the devastating and burning Hussites, but in reality left that programme far behind it. And the piety, *i.e.*, the ecclesiastical faith itself, had, among the manifold elements it included, the new element implanted within it, in the shape of words of Christ and doctrines

¹ The doctrines of indulgence, of the hierarchy, of free will, etc. Certainly there was opposition also to some old traditional doctrines (eternal damnation, purgatory, etc.), but it was not thorough-going.

of Paul, in the life displayed by every Christian who, through trust in the grace of God in Christ, had found inward deliverance from the law of grace-dispensations and merit, and from the law of the letter.

Under a theology that had degenerated into a tangled brake, from the hundreds of new religious-ecclesiastical institutions, societies, and brotherhoods, from the countless forms in which the sacred was embodied and sought after, from the sermons and the devotional literature of all kinds, there was to be heard *one* call, distinct and ever more distinct—the call to vigorous religious life, to practical Christianity, to the religion that is really religion. “Say unto my soul, I am thy salvation”—this prayer of Augustine was the hidden force of the unrest among the nations, especially the Germanic, in the fifteenth century. Dogmatically expressed: there was a seeking for a sure doctrine of salvation; but one knew not himself what he sought for. The uncertain and hesitating questions got only uncertain and hesitating answers. Even at the present day we cannot escape the charm that clings just to such questions and answers; for they let us see into the living movement of the heart; but he for whom religion has become so serious a matter that he seeks, not for charms, but for nourishment, will not be inclined to exchange Luther’s *Smaller Catechism* and his hymns for all the wealth, beauty, and freshness of the German devotional literature of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.¹

¹ What is here said applies also to Gothic architecture. It is certainly the greatest, most perfect, and most harmonious product of architectural art since the time of the Greek temple; indeed, it is the only style that is all-pervasive, and that embraces all in unity, as the Greek temple style does. In itself it proves that the mediæval period at its highest point of attainment possessed a harmonious culture which of its kind was perfect. But just on that account the Gothic is the style of mediæval Catholic Christianity, the style of Mysticism and Scholasticism. It awakens exactly the feelings, emotions, and sensations of awe which the Catholic piety, of which it is born, seeks to produce; just on that account also it is of *Romanic* origin, and the history of its spread is simply a parallel to the history of the spread of Romanic piety. Perhaps the deepest thing that can be said about the Gothic, about its ineffable charm and its æsthetic impressiveness—though at the same time it suggests the inevitable reaction of Protestant piety against it—has been put into words by Goethe in his *Wahlverwandschaften* (Hempel’s edition, XV., pp. 143, 137, 173): “ . . . She sat down in one of the seats (in a Gothic chapel), and it seemed to her, as she looked up and around, as if she was, and yet was not, as if she realised

2. *On the History of Ecclesiastical Law.—The Doctrine of the Church.*

“ In the fifty years that elapsed between the appearing of the Gratian book of laws (which contains, besides the Isodorian, numerous forgeries of the Gregorian Deusdedit, Anselm and Cardinal Gregorius) and the pontificate of Innocent III., the papal system achieved for itself complete supremacy. In the Roman Courts justice was dispensed according to Gratian’s law, in Bologna the teaching was regulated thereby, even the Emperor Frederick I. already had his son, Henry VI., instructed in the Decretum and in Roman law. The whole decretal legislation from 1159 to 1320 was framed on the basis of Gratian, and presupposes him. The same holds good of the dogmatic of Thomas in the relative material, while the scholastic dogmatic in general was made entirely dependent in questions of Church constitution on the favourite science of the clergy at the time, namely, jurisprudence, as it had been drawn up by Gratian, Raymund, and the other collectors of decretals. The

her identity and yet realised it not, as if all this that was before her was to vanish from her and she from herself, and only when the sun passed from the hitherto very brightly illumined (stained glass) window did she awake.” “ From all figures there looks forth only the purest existence; all must be pronounced, if not noble, at least good. Cheerful collectedness, ready recognition of something above us to be revered, quiet self-devotion in love and expectant waiting, are expressed in all faces, in all attitudes. The aged man with the bald head, the boy with the curly locks, the sprightly youth, the grave-minded man, the glorified saint, the hovering angel, all seem to know the bliss of an innocent satisfaction, of a devout expectancy. The commonest thing that happens has a touch of heavenly life about it, and an act of divine service seems perfectly adapted to every nature. For such a religion most men look as for a vanished golden age, a lost paradise.” But on the other hand: “ As for myself, this mutual approximation and intermingling of the sacred and the sensuous is certainly not to my liking; I am not pleased when people set apart and consecrate and adorn certain special places, that thereby alone they may foster and maintain the feeling of piety. No surroundings, not even the commonest, should disturb the feeling in us of the divine, which can accompany us everywhere, and make every place a consecrated temple. I would like to see an important religious service held in the saloon, where people usually take food, gather for social intercourse, and enjoy themselves with games and dancing. The highest, the most excellent thing, in man is formless, and we must guard against giving it shape in anything save noble deeds.”

theory, as well as the texts and proofs relating thereto, were derived by the theologians from these collections of laws."¹ With regard to the nature of the Church, while the Augustinian definition was firmly retained, that the Church is the community of believers or of the predestinated, the idea was always gaining a fuller acceptance that the hierarchy is the Church, and that the Pope, as successor of Peter, and *episcopus universalis*, unites in himself all the powers of the Church. The German Kings themselves were in great part to blame for this development, for while they, and, above all, the Hohenstaufens, led the struggle for the rights of the State against the papacy, they left the latter to its own irresponsible action in the ecclesiastical domain. Only when it was now too late did Frederick II. point out in his address to the Kings of the Franks and Angles (*ad reges Francorum et Anglorum*) that the hierarchy must be restored by an inner reform to its original poverty and humility.² In its development to autocratic supremacy *within the Church* and the Churches, a check was put upon the papacy from the beginning of the fourteenth century only from France.³

We cannot be required to show here what particular conclusions were drawn by the Popes and their friends from the idea of the Church as a civil organism of law in the thirteenth century and in the first half of the fourteenth, and in what measure these conclusions were practically carried out. The leading thoughts were the following: (1) *The hierarchical organisation is essential to the Church, and in all respects the Christianity of the laity is dependent on the mediation of the priests* ("properly ordained"), *who alone can perform ecclesiastical acts*. When we pass from Cyprian to Gregory I., from the latter to Pseudoisidore and Gregory VII., we might conclude on superficial consideration that the principle just stated had long been determinative. But when we enter into detail, and take into

¹ See Janus, p. 162 f.

² See the passage in Gieseler II., 2, 4 ed. p. 153.

³ The "pragmatic sanction" of Louis the Holy is a forgery of the year 1438 (or about this time), as Scheffer-Boichorst has shown in the *Kleinere Forsch. z. Gesch. des Mittelalters* (Mith. des Instituts f. österreich. Geschichtsforschung VIII., Bd. 3 part; published separately, 1887). In the first edition of this work I had still treated this sanction as genuine, but my attention was immediately directed to the mistake.

account the ecclesiastical legislation from the time of Innocent III., we observe how much was still wanting to a strict application of it in theory and practice till the end of the twelfth century. Only from the time of the fourth Lateran Council was full effect given to it, expressly in opposition to the Catharist and Waldensian parties.¹ (2) *The sacramental and judicial powers of the priests are independent of their personal worthiness.* This also was an old principle; but after having been long latent, it was now strongly emphasised, asserted in opposition to all "heretical" parties, and so turned to account that by it the hierarchy protected themselves against all demand for reform, and, above all, evaded the appeal to resume the apostolic life. Whoever returned from the "heretical" parties to the bosom of the Church was required to declare that he recognised the celebration of Sacraments by sinful priests.² (3) *The Church is a visible community with a constitution given to it by Christ (even as such it is the body of Christ [corpus Christi]); as a visible, constituted community it has a double power, namely, the potestas spiritualis and the potestas temporalis (spiritual and temporal power). Through both is it, as it shall endure till the end of the world, superior to the transitory states, which are subordinate to it. To it, therefore, must all states and all individuals be obedient de necessitate salutis (as a necessary condition of salvation); nay, the power of the Church extends itself even to heretics³ and heathen.⁴ Even these principles⁵ have their root in the Augustinian doctrine of the Church;⁶ but*

¹ See especially the first and third decrees of the Synod; Mansi XXII., p. 982 sq., Hefele V., p. 879 ff. It was not, however, carried out to its full logical issue, as is shown by the admission of the right of the laity to baptise in case of emergency, by the recognition of absolution by a layman in *casu mortis*, and by the treatment of the sacrament of marriage.

² See e.g. the confession of Durandus, Innocent III., ep. XI. 196.

³ On the Inquisition, see Janus, p. 254 ff., and Thomas, *Summa Sec. Sec. quæst.* II art. 3 conclusio: "Hæresis est peccatum, per quod meruerunt per mortem a mundo excludi"; art. 4 concl.

⁴ Augustinus Triumphus (ob. 1328), *Summa de potest. eccl. ad Johannem XXII.*, Quæst. 23 art. 1: "Pagani jure sunt sub papæ obedientia." Yet this continued a controverted question in spite of the Bull "Unam sanctam."

⁵ The hierarchy together with the monks are held as properly the Church.

⁶ There were certainly also passages to be found in Augustine that could be

from the logical expression and thorough-going application which they received between 1050 and 1300, they present the appearance of an unheard-of innovation. They obtained their complete formulation from Boniface VIII.;¹ but long before him the Popes acted according to these principles. The worst consequence was not the undervaluing,² repression and serious deterioration of civic life (here, on the contrary, there can be discerned also many salutary effects in the interests of popular freedom), but the inevitable profanation of religion, inasmuch as all its aims and benefits were perverted and falsified through the light being foreign to them in which they presented themselves from the standpoint of *Church law*; and obedience to an external human institution, that was subject to all errors of human passion and sin, was raised to the first condition of Christian life. "It was this Church on which there fell that heaviest responsibility that has ever been incurred in history: by all violent means it applied as pure truth a doctrine that was vitiated and distorted to serve its omnipotence, and under the feeling of its inviolability abandoned itself to the gravest immorality; in order to maintain itself in such a position, it struck deadly blows at the spirit and conscience of the nations, and drove many of the more highly gifted, who had secretly withdrawn from it, into the arms of unbelief and embitterment."³

(4) *To the Church has been given, by Christ, a strictly monarchical constitution in His representative, the successor of Peter, the Roman Bishop. Not only is all that is valid with regard to the hierarchy valid in the first instance of the Pope, but*

employed against the Gregorian claims of the Church, v. Mirbt. *Die Stellung Augustin's in der Publicistik des Gregor. Kirchenstreits*, 1888.

¹ See note 2 on p. 122.

² Gregory VII. carried to the furthest extreme the opposition to the evangelical doctrine that the powers that be are ordained of God; see epp. VIII. 21: "Quis nesciat, reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pæne sceleribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante, dominari cæca cupiditate et intolerabili præsumptione affectaverunt." But even according to Innocent III., the State arose "per extorsionem humanam." On the other hand, even the strictest papalists, indeed Gregory VII. himself, were not clear as to the limits between civil and ecclesiastical power.

³ Burckhardt, *Kultur der Renaissance*, 3. ed. 2. vol., p. 228.

to him all powers are committed, and the other members of the hierarchy are only chosen in *partem sollicitudinis* (for purposes of oversight). He is the *episcopus universalis* (universal bishop); to him belong, therefore, both swords, and as every Christian can attain salvation only in the Church, as the Church, however, is the hierarchy, and the hierarchy the Pope, it follows that *de necessitate salutis* all the world must be subject to the Pope. In numerous letters these principles had already been maintained by Gregory VII. in a way that could not be out-vied (cf. also the so-called *dictatus Gregorii*). Yet in his case everything appears as the outflow of a powerful dominating personality, which, in a terrible conflict, grasps at the extremest measures. In the period that followed, however, his principles were not only expressed, but were effectively applied, and, at the same time, as the result of a marvellous series of forgeries, were believingly accepted even by those who felt obliged to combat the papacy. At the time when the papacy saw itself confronted with a weak imperial power in the West, and with a still weaker Latin Empire in the East, this view of things established itself (from the time of Innocent III. onward) in the souls and minds of men. So far as I know, Thomas was the first to state the position roundly in the formula: "(ostenditur etiam), quod subesse Romano pontifici sit de necessitate salutis" (it is also shown that to be subject to the Roman pontiff is essential to salvation).¹ Then the whole theory was summed up in a form not to be surpassed in the Bull "Unam sanctam" of Boniface VIII. (1302), after the Popes for a whole century had strictly followed it in hundreds of small and great questions (questions of Church policy, of civil policy, of diocesan administration, etc.), and were in a position for daring to disregard all protests.²

¹ Opusc. c. err. Græc. fol. 9. The Roman law was in general paraded in an extravagant way before the weak Greeks in the thirteenth century, and that had a reflex influence on the West.

² The most important sentences of the Bull ran thus: "Unam sanctam ecclesiam Catholicam et ipsam apostolicam urgente fide credere cogimur et tenere. Nosque hanc firmiter credimus et simpliciter confitemur, extra quam nec salus est nec remissio peccatorum (the Church is now spiritually described with its head, Christ). Igitur ecclesie unius et unice unum corpus, unum caput, non duo capita, quasi monstrum, Christus videlicet et Christi vicarius Petrus Petrique successor (there

The setting up of strict monarchical power and the destruction of the old Church constitution is represented in three stages by Pseudo Isidore, Gratian, and the Mendicant Orders; for the latter, through the special rights which they received, completely broke up the local powers (bishops, presbyteries, parish priests), and were subject entirely to papal direction.¹ All the premises from which there necessarily followed the infallibility of the

follows John XXI., 16; here the *oves universæ* were entrusted to Peter). In hac ejusque potestate duos esse gladios, spiritualem videlicet et temporalem, evangelicis dictis instruimur. Nam dicentibus apostolis: ecce gladii duo hic (Luke XXII. 38) in ecclesia scilicet, cum apostoli loquerentur, non respondit dominus nimis esse, sed satis. Certe qui in potestate Petri temporalem gladium esse negat, male verbum attendit domini proferentis; converte gladium tuum in vaginam (Matt. XXVI. 52). Uterque ergo est in potestate ecclesiæ, spiritualis scilicet gladius et materialis. Sed is quidem pro ecclesia, ille vero ab ecclesia exercendus. Ille sacerdotis, ille manu regum et militum, *sed ad nutum et patientiam sacerdotis*. Oportet autem gladium esse sub gladio et temporalem potestatem spirituali subici potestati, nam cum dicat apostolus (there follows Rom. XIII. 1) . . . non ordinatæ essent, nisi gladius esset sub gladio (the spiritual power transcends in dignity and nobility all earthly power as much as the spiritual the earthly). Nam veritate testante *spiritualis potestas terrenam potestatem instituere*" (is it literally institute? or institute in the sense of religious consecration? or instruct? In view of the immediately following "judicare," and of the sentence of Hugo St. Victor, which is here the source, the first meaning is the most probable; Finke [Röm. Quartalschrift 4. Supplementheft, 1896, p. 40] is inclined to adopt the second) "*habet et judicare, si bona non fuerit* (there follows Jerem. I. 10). Ergo si deviat terrena potestas, judicabitur a potestate spirituali, sed si deviat spiritualis minor, a suo superiori, si vero suprema, a solo deo, non ab homine poterit judicari, testante apostolo (1 Cor. II. 25). Est autem hæc auctoritas, etsi data sit homini et exercentur per hominem, non humana sed potius divina, ore divino Petro data sibi que suisque successoribus in ipso quem confessus fuit petra firmata, dicente domino ipsi Petro (Matt. XVI. 19). Quicumque igitur huic potestati a deo sic ordinatæ resistit, dei ordinationi resistit, nisi duo *sicut Manichæus* fingat esse principia, quod falsum et hæreticum judicamus, quia testante Mose non in principiis sed in principio coelum deus creavit et terram. Porro *subesse Romano pontifici omni humanæ creature declaramus, dicimus, definimus [et pronuntiamus] omnino esse de necessitate salutis*." As can be understood, the Bull at the present day gives trouble to not a few Catholics, and the attempt is made to strip it to some extent of its dogmatic authoritative character, or to find help in interpretation. A collection of the more important papal pronouncements from the time between Gregory VII. and Alexander VI. is given by Mirbt, Quellen z. Gesch. des Papstthums, 1895, p. 47 f.

¹ Janus, p. 166: "Ready everywhere to interpose and take action as agents of the papacy, entirely independent of the bishops, and of higher authority than the secular priests and the local clergy, they really formed churches within the Church, laboured for the honour and aggrandisement of their orders, and for the power of the Pope, on which their privileged position rested."

Pope had been brought together ; they were strictly developed, too, by Thomas, after new forgeries had been added.¹ Nevertheless, though the doctrine had long been recognised, that through a special divine protection the Roman Church could not entirely fall from faith, and was the divinely appointed refuge for doctrinal purity and doctrinal unity, beyond the groups that stood under the influence of the Dominican Order, the doctrine of infallibility did not command acceptance. The history of the Popes was still too well known ; even in the canonical law-book there were contradictory elements, and² Popes as great as Innocent III. admitted the possibility of a Pope falling into sin

¹ There are specially to be considered here the Pseudocyrillian passages ; see the valuable inquiry by Reusch, *Die Fälschungen in dem Tractat des Thomas v. Aquin gegen die Griechen*, Abhandl. d. k. bay. Akad. der Wissensch. III., Cl. 18, Bd. 3 Abth., 1889. On Thomas as the normal theologian for the doctrine of infallibility, see Langen, *Das Vatic. Dogma*, 3 Thl., p. 99 ff. ; Leitner, *Der hl. Thomas über das unfehlbare Lehramt des Papstes*, 1872, Delitzsch, *Lehrsystem der römischen K.*, I., p. 194 ff. Thomas, *Summa Sec. Sec. qu. II art. 2* : " Sic ergo aliqui doctores videntur dissensisse vel circa ea quorum nihil interest ad fidem utrum sic vel aliter teneatur, vel etiam in quibusdam ad fidem pertinentibus, quæ nondum erant per ecclesiam determinata. Postquam autem essent auctoritate universalis ecclesiæ determinata, si quis tali ordinationi pertinaciter repugnaret, hæreticus censeretur. *Quæ quidem auctoritas principaliter residet in summo pontifice.*" *Sec. Sec. qu. I art. 10* (" utrum ad summum pontificem pertineat fidei symbolum ordinare?"). Here, as usual, the thesis is first denied, then follows : " editio symboli facta est in synodo generali, sed hujusmodi synodus auctoritate solius summi pontificis potest congregari. Ergo editio symboli ad auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet." Further : " *Nova editio symboli necessaria est ad vitandum insurgentes errores. Ad illius ergo auctoritatem pertinet editio symboli, ad cuius auctoritatem pertinet finaliter determinare ea que sunt fidei, ut ab omnibus inconcussa fide teneantur.* Hoc autem pertinet ad auctoritatem summi pontificis, ad quem majores et difficiliore ecclesiæ questiones referuntur (there follows a passage from the decretals). Unde et dominus (Luke XXII. 32) Petro dixit, quem summum pontificem constituit : ego pro te rogavi, etc. Et hujus ratio est : quia una fides debet esse totius ecclesiæ secundum illud I Cor. I. 10 : Id ipsum dicatis omnes, et non sint in vobis schismata. *Quod servari non posset nisi questio exorta determinetur per eum, qui toti ecclesiæ præest, ut sic ejus sententia a tota ecclesia firmiter teneatur, et ideo ad solam auctoritatem summi pontificis pertinet nova editio symboli, sicut et omnia alia quæ pertinent ad totam ecclesiam, ut congregare synodum generalem et alia hujusmodi.*" The tenet, that to every Pope there belongs personal holiness (Gregory VII.), was no longer reasserted, because, as Döllinger (Janus, p. 168) supposes, the danger existed of arguing from the defective holiness of a Pope to the illegality of his decisions.

² See the canon in Gratian ascribed to Boniface " Si Papa," dist. 40, 6. On the whole question see Mirbt, *Publicistik im Zeitalter Gregors VII.*, p. 566 ff.

in matters of faith, and, in that case, acknowledged the competency of the judgment of the entire Church.¹ It was thus possible that at the University of Paris a decided opposition should establish itself, which led, *e.g.*, to the Pope being charged with heresy in connection with a doctrine of John XXII. The indefiniteness in which many Church doctrines (and theories of practice, *e.g.*, in regard to ordination) still stood, and the hesitating attitude which the Popes assumed towards them, also prevented the dogmatic authority of the papacy from being taken as absolute.² Although the falsification of history, by the publication of historic accounts that painted over in an incredible way the great conflict between the papacy and the Empire, reached its climax about 1300,³ and the principles of the Thomist policy⁴ always received a fuller adoption, the decisive question of the infallibility remained unsolved. From about the year 1340, indeed, the literature in which the papal system was delineated in the most extravagant way,⁵ ceased entirely to be

¹ See the admission in Eymerici Director. Inquis., p. 295 (cited in Janus, p. 295).

² See the question of reordination in connection with "Simonists."

³ Martin of Troppau and Tolomeo of Lucca.

⁴ Thomas, de regimine principum, continued by Tolomeo.

⁵ The most extreme works are those of Augustinus Triumphus, Summa de ecclesiast. potest. (ob. 1328) and of the Franciscan Alvarus Pelagius, De planctu ecclesie (ob. 1352). From the Summa de potestate eccl. of the former, and from the work de planctu ecclesie of the latter, Gieseler II., 3, 2 Aufl., p. 42 ff. and 101 ff., gives full extracts, which show that the glorification of the Pope could not be carried further in the nineteenth century. Augustinus asserted generally: "Nulla lex populo christiano est danda, nisi ipsius papæ auctoritate;" for only the papal power is immediately from God, and it embraces the *jurisdictio et cura totius mundi*. Alvarus carried the identifying of Christ with the Pope to the point of blasphemy, and at the same time declared the Pope to be the rightful possessor of the *imperium Romanum* from the days of Peter. At bottom, both distinguish the Pope from God only by saying that to the earthly "dominus deus noster papa" (see Finke, l.c., p. 44 ff.; observe that I have placed the word "earthly" before the expression, which indicates the trope here employed, so far as there is one), adoration is due only "ministerialiter." (Finke, l.c., pp. 40-44, has objected to this last sentence, and believes he has refuted it from the source, Augustinus Triumphus. That, according to Augustinus, there belongs to the Pope the *servitus summa* [*i.e.*, the *Latria*, full divine worship] I have not asserted. But certainly Augustinus teaches that the Pope possesses participative and exercises ministerialiter the *summa potestas* [the *dominatio*, the divine power of rule]; in accordance with this therefore must the *dulia* also be defined which belongs to the Pope. Instead of the somewhat short expression "ministerialiter," which it would be better not to use, I should have

produced. Only after 120 years did it re-appear, when it was a question of rescuing and asserting the old claims of the papacy against the Council of Bâsle. It was then that Cardinal Torquemada wrote that defence of the papal system,¹ which, resting on a strict Thomistic foundation, was still regarded at the period of the Reformation as the most important achievement of the papal party. But from the middle of the fifteenth century the papal system, as a whole, was again gathering power, after the storm of the Councils had been happily exorcised by the brilliant but crafty policy of Eugene IV. Only the French nation maintained what ground of freedom was already won in opposition to the Pope (Bourges 1438). The other nations returned, through the Concordats, to their old dependence on the Autocrat in Rome;² indeed, they were, to some extent, betrayed just by their own local rulers, inasmuch as these men saw it to be of advantage in hastening their attainment to full princely power to take shares with the Pope in the Church of the country.³ This fate overtook, in the end, even the French national Church (through the concordat of Dec. 1516), and yet in such a way that the king obtained the chief share of the power over it. While, as the fifteenth century passed into the sixteenth, the Popes were indulging wildly in war, luxury, and the grossest simony, Cajetan and Jacobazzi wrought out the strictest papal theory, the former including in it the doctrine of infallibility.⁴ The hopes of the nations in the Council were

said: "The adoration" belongs in the way in which it is due to him who shares in the divine power of rule, and exercises it as an instrument of God.)

¹ De Pontifice Maximo et generalis concilii auctoritate; see also his *Summa de ecclesia* and the *Apparatus super decreto unionis Græcorum*.

² Rome, however, always understood these concordats as acts of grace, by which only the party admitted to partnership was bound. Even at an earlier time this view was maintained by Roman canonists, and was deduced from the supreme lordship of the Pope over all men.

³ Think of the development of the territorial-prince system in the fifteenth century. Great rulers (Emperor Frederick III.) and small literally vied with each other, till far on in the sixteenth century, in injuring the independence of their national churches. The local princes derived a passing, but the Pope the permanent, advantage.

In the period of conflict between the Popes and the Councils the question about the infallibility of the Pope in matters of faith had retired into the background. At the Union Council at Florence it was not mentioned. Even Torquemada admitted the possibility of a Pope falling into a heresy; from this, however, he did not conclude

quenched, the old tyranny was again set up; it was complained, indeed, that the ecclesiastical despotism was worse than that of the Turks, but, nevertheless, men submitted to the inevitable. About the year 1500 the complaints were perhaps more bitter than at any other time; but the falling away was slight, the taking of steps less frequent. Heresy seemed to have become rarer and tamer than in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, especially after the Hussite movement had exhausted itself. The "heretics" — so it appeared — had really become the "silent in the land," who shunned an open breach with the Church; their piety appeared less aggressive. "It was pretty generally felt that it had happened to the Church with the Reformation, as formerly it had happened to the King of Rome with the Sibylline books; after the seed of corruption sown by the Curia had, for fifty years, borne a much larger harvest, and the Church itself made no more effort to save it, the Reformation had to be purchased at a much heavier price and with still smaller prospect of success."¹ The Lateran Council at the beginning of the sixteenth century, which treated with scorn all wishes of the nations and promulgated the papal theory in the strictest sense,² as if there had never been councils at Constance and Bâsle, was tacitly recognised. But it was the lull before the storm—a storm which the Pope had yet to experience, who had entered upon his office with the words: "Volo, ut pontificatu isto quam maxime perfruamur." (It is my wish that we may enjoy the pontificate in the largest measure possible.)³

Before the time of Thomas *theology* took no part in this im-

that the council was superior to him, for a heretical Pope was ipso facto deposed by God. This impracticable, imbecile assumption was first rejected by Cajetan, who reverted to the doctrine of Thomas, which was based on fictitious passages from the Fathers, while he added himself a new falsification by suppressing the proposition laid down at Constance: "error est, si per Romanam ecclesiam intelligat universalem aut concilium generale." With him also originated the famous proposition, that the Catholic Church is the born hand-maid of the Pope.

¹ Janus, p. 365.

² The Pope, it is said in the Bull "Pastor æternus," has the "auctoritas super omnia concilia"; he alone may convene, transfer, and dissolve them.

³ On the handing down of this saying, see Janus, p. 381, n. 407.

posing development of the papal theory; even after him the share taken by it was small. *The development was directed by jurisprudence*, which founded simply on external, mostly forged, historic testimonies, and drew its conclusions with dialectic art. The meagre share of theology is to be explained on two grounds. First, Rome alone had a real interest in the whole theory; but in Rome theology never flourished, either in antiquity or in the Middle Ages. There was practical concern in Rome neither with Scripture exposition nor with the dogmatic works of the Fathers. Whoever wished to study theology went to France. For the Curia, only the student of law was of any account; from the time of Innocent IV. a school of law existed in Rome; the great majority of the Cardinals were well-equipped jurists, not theologians, and the greatest Popes of the Middle Ages, Alexander III., Innocents III. and IV., Boniface VIII., etc., came to the papal chair as highly-esteemed legal scholars.¹ When it was now much too late, men with clear vision, like Roger Bacon, or pious patriots, like Dante, saw that the ruin of the Church was due to the decretals, which were studied in place of the Church Fathers and Scripture. The former, in particular, demanded very loudly that the Church should be delivered from the secularised Church law which was poisoning it. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries there were complaints constantly made about the papacy, and about the corrupted Church law ("Jurists bad Christians") as being the real source of all evil. It was the spirit of ancient Rome that had settled down on the Mediæval spirit, that Roman spirit of jurisprudence, which had now, however, degenerated into a spirit of tyranny, and used as its means audacious forgeries. But the slight share of theology in the development of the hierarchical conception of the Church is to be explained not merely from the lack of theology, but, second, from the fortunate incapacity of theology (till past the middle of the thirteenth century) to lower itself to this notion of the Church. Anyone who reflected as a *theologian* on the Church, instituted researches into the works of the Church fathers, especi-

¹ See Döllinger, Ueber das Studium der deutschen Geschichte (Akad. Vorträge II., pp. 407 ff., 418 f.

ally Augustine. But here the spiritual conception of the Church (*i.e.*, the Church as *corpus Christi* [body of Christ], as *multitudo fidelium* [multitude of the faithful], as *universitas Christianorum* [entire mass of Christians]) came so clearly to view that for the time it riveted reflection, and there was failure to force one's way with any confidence to the hierarchical, not to speak of the papal, conception, or it was only touched on. This explains how all the great theologians before Thomas, from Anselm onwards, even those of Gregorian tendency, achieved as *theologians* very little in promoting the development of the hierarchical conception of the Church. They taught and wrote like Augustine, indeed they still remained behind him in precise definition of the Church as an external society.¹ *Theology did nothing for the development and establishment of the papal system till far on in the thirteenth century*, and it may here be said at once in its honour, that with a single, and that even not a perfect, exception (Thomas), it did only half work in the time that followed, leaving the most to be done by the Post-Tridentine theology.² So far as I know, there is nothing to be found in the theological writings of the Schoolmen in the shape of rounded off formulæ for, nothing of strictly systematic exposition of, the conception of the Church (as in the case of the doctrine of the Sacraments). On the other hand, both in Hugo St. Victor, and in the later Schoolmen also, not a few fundamental lines of proof with regard to the notion of the Church can be pointed to which were directly and without change taken over by the

¹ See Hugo of St. Victor, *de Sacr.* II., p. II., c. 2 sq. In his *Sentences* the Lombard made no mention whatever of the papacy! So far as others dealt with the Church at all, even the firmness of Cyprian in apprehending the hierarchical notion of the Church was not reached. Numerous proofs in Langen, *Das Vaticanische Dogma*, 2. Theil. If Hugo differs from the other earlier theologians in entering more fully into a description of the Church, this has a connection with his interest in the Sacraments. What he says about the hierarchy and the Pope falls behind the Gregorian ideas, and therefore does nothing to advance them. Even about the relation of the Church (the Pope) to the State he has still evangelical ideas. And yet here, as elsewhere also, he must be held as in many respects the precursor of Thomas.

² It is amazing that in Thomasius-Seeberg (p. 196) the sentence: "As in general, so also with regard to the Church, Scholasticism set itself the task of proving that what exists ought to exist," is followed at once by the other: "It must be emphasised here first of all, that Scholasticism does not know of a dogma of the Church."

“heretical” parties, and by men like Wyclif.¹ What most simply explains this is that the patristic, and especially the Augustinian, expositions still determined theology. Yet it is not to be denied, that from the middle of the thirteenth century theology took a certain share in developing the conception of the Church. It was just the Mendicant Monks—to the shame of St. Francis—who, even as theologians, began to be enthusiastic for the papal theory, after there had been conferred upon them such excessive privileges as could only be held legal if the Pope was really the Lord of the Church. There was added to this, that in the thirteenth century, in the course of the negotiations with the Greeks, theology saw that it had to face the task of ingratiating them into the papal system also. *It was in connection with this task that there was awakened the interest theology took in the hierarchical conception of the Church which formed the presupposition of the papal system,*² and the great thinker, Thomas Aquinas, now developed at once the hierarchical and papal theory, together with a bold theory of the state.³ But he was far

¹ The agreement of the “heretics” with the fundamental Catholic notion of the Church was not unfrequently substantiated by their Catholic opponents. These men were still naïve enough to hold the conception of the Church as *societas unitatis fidei* as their own basis; see correct statement by Gottschick (*Zeitschr. f. K.-Gesch.* VIII., p. 348 f.).

² The Council of Lyons in 1274 was of epoch-making importance here. The vigorous re-awakening of interest in the theoretic statement and proof of the papal system in the middle of the fifteenth century likewise finds an explanation in the transactions with the Greeks. In this way the relation of the Greeks to the West came to be of sinister omen. There was a wish to win them for the papacy, and this became the occasion for developing “scientifically” for the first time—mostly by means of forgeries—the papal theory!

Thomas develops the chief attributes of the Pope (*summus pontifex, caput ecclesie, cura ecclesie universalis, plenitudo potestatis, potestas determinandi novum symbolum*). The discussions on the distribution of hierarchical power may here be left aside (on the development of the notion of the Church as a monarchy Aristotle’s influence was at work). We have only to note how entirely the second conception of the Church, *i.e.*, the hierarchical, is dominated by the doctrine of the Sacraments. The particulars of the Thomist conception of the Church were not dogma in his day, but they afterwards became the norm for dogmatic construction. That Thomas, moreover, does not place the hierarchical notion of the Church side by side with the spiritual without indicating a relation has been shown by Gottschick, *l.c.* pp. 347-357. Yet it must not be forgotten that such tenets as those of Augustine regarding the Church (taken in connection with predestinarian grace) continued to exercise their own influence even when they were subordinated to alien thoughts. Thomas

from surrendering, at the same time, the spiritual conception of the Church, or—as was done in the Post-Tridentine period—from correcting it throughout by means of the hierarchical. With all his logical consistency in the development of the papal system, he certainly did not derive the powers of the bishops and priests entirely from the papal; in his “Summa” he still works to a great extent with the notion of the “Ecclesia” as having the force of a central conception, and in doing so has no thought of monarchy. For him it is no figure of speech that the

(Explanation of the Apostolic Symbol; see also “Summa” III., qu. 8) begins by representing the Church as a religious community (*congregatio fidelium, corpus mysticum*) whose head is Christ. But while so describing it—as the community of those who are united to Christ by the love that proceeds from God—he at the same time accentuates the moral character of the community, as an entire whole ruled by the divine law, which embraces the earth, heaven, and purgatory, and which has its end in the vision and enjoyment of God. In more precisely defining the compass of the Church, Thomas’s process of proof is affected by all the uncertainties which we already observed in Augustine, and which were due to regard on the one hand to predestinarian grace (in accordance with which all particulars are determined), and on the other hand to the empirical circumstances. Even the reprob, according to him, are in the Church *de potentia*, that is to say, so long as they stand under the influence of the *virtus Christi* or still through their free will hold a connection with him. Now, so far as the Church imparts to the individual the love of God, and thereby sanctification, it is an external community like the state, is discernible by external marks, is defined by an external limit (*excommunication*) and requires the hierarchical organisation; for this last is the presupposition of sacramental celebration. If, until felicity is reached, the life of the individual as a believer proceeds by stages of faith (*i.e.*, of holding true upon authority) and is regulated by the several sacraments which contain the saving grace, this implies that it is of the essence of the Church that it is the authority on doctrine and the administrator of the Sacraments. But this it can only be as a community with a strictly legal and hierarchical organisation. In this way the second conception of the Church is brought by Thomas into closest connection with the first, and Gottschick (p. 353) is quite correct in further pointing out that “faith in the objective sense is part of the commands of *the law* by which (see above) the Church must be guided.” The Church as a legal authority on doctrine, and as a priestly sacramental institution, is therefore the “exclusive organ by which the Head of the Church, Christ, forms its members.” One sees then that a very spiritual conception of the Church, nay, even the predestinarian, can be brought into combination with the empirico-hierarchical (Summa III., qu. 64, art. 2: “*per sacramenta dicitur esse fabricata ecclesia Christi.*”) As salvation is a mystery that cannot be experienced, *i.e.*, as a certainty regarding its possession can never be reached, inasmuch as it consists of forces that mysteriously operate in the human sphere that is inaccessible to reflection, nothing remains but simply to surrender one’s self to the sacramental saving institution, which, again, involves the graded priesthood. In this way the authority of the clergy necessarily became absolute, and the spiritual (predestinarian)

individual bishop "is called specially the bridegroom of the Church as also Christ" (specialiter sponsus ecclesiæ dicitur sicut et Christus).¹ But, so far as the influence of Thomas extended, the result was unquestionably a mingling of jurisprudence and theology in this department and the acclimatising of the hierarchico-papal notion of the Church.² Yet his influence must not be over-rated. The Franciscan (Nominalist) dogmatic took little to do, so far as I know, with this development of the conception of the Church. Even at the beginning of the Reformation, the whole hierarchical and papal theory had no sure position in dogmatic—it was *Romish decretal law*. But it had attained more than a place in dogmatic. From about 1450 it was again energetically acted upon from Rome, and the opposition to it appeared no longer so powerful as a century before.³

This opposition we have still to review. Here it is to be observed, above everything else, that the imperfect public development of the conception of the Church was a matter of little importance, because in the *doctrine of the Sacraments* all was already acquired as a sure possession which could be expected from a formulation of the conception of the Church in hierarchical interests. From this, again, it followed still further, that the opposition to the hierarchical papal notion of the Church necessarily continued—in spite of all fostering—without danger,

notion of the Church, so far from correcting, necessarily aided this advance of view. Hence follows the tenet of the infallibility of the Church, which was bound to issue in the infallibility of the Pope; for some kind of rock to build on must be sought for and found. If this does not lie in an overmastering certainty which the subject-matter itself brings with it, inasmuch as it transforms the absoluteness of the moral imperative into the absolute certainty of the grace of God in Christ, it must be given in something external. This external thing, certainly, the infallibility of the priesthood in teaching and administering the Sacraments, can never guarantee to the individual the *possession* of salvation, but only its possibility.

¹ Summa, III. suppl. qu. 40 art. 4 fin.

² The attitude to the State was involved in the position that only the priest is able rightly to teach the law of God, but that even the States have no other task than to care for the salvation of the souls of their subjects by promoting the virtue that corresponds to the law of God.

³ No good Catholic Christian doubted that in *spiritual things* the clergy were the divinely-appointed superiors of the laity, that this power proceeded from the right of the priests to celebrate the Sacraments, that the Pope was the real possessor of this power, and was far superior to all secular authority. The question, however, as to the Pope's power to rule was certainly a subject of controversy.

so long as the doctrine of the Sacraments was not objected to. But the latter again rested on the peculiar view of salvation, as the sanctification that leads to the visio dei, as active holiness (measured by the standard of the law of God). Here we must go back to an earlier point.¹

Augustine combined the old Catholic notion of salvation, as the visio et fruitio dei (vision and enjoyment of God), with the doctrine of predestination on the one hand and with the doctrine of the regnum Christi (kingdom of Christ) and the process of justification on the other. As contrasted with the Greek view, both combinations were new ; but the union of the idea of salvation with the process of justification and sanctification was easily effected, because this process was taken as regulated entirely by the *Sacraments*, while the Sacraments, as the Greek development shows, formed the necessary correlate to the idea of salvation. If in salvation, that is to say, the supramundane *condition* in which one is to find himself is mainly emphasised, then there answer to the production of this condition, means that operate as holy natural forces. When Augustine conceived of these natural forces as forces of love working for righteousness, a very great step of progress was taken ; but no difference was made thereby in the general scheme, since love was regarded as infused. But certainly he made it possible that there should *also* be given to the whole process a very decided tendency towards morality—which had dropped out of the Greek view as held within the lines of dogma. The forces of love, that is to say, bring it about that here on earth the *law* of Christ, which is summed up in the commandment to love, can be fulfilled. In this way there arises from the forces of love, which are transmitted through the Sacraments as channels, the *kingdom* of Christ, in which righteousness reigns according to the

¹ A full understanding of the Catholic conception of the Church can only be reached by starting from the conception of the Sacraments, which, as has been observed, is dependent on the view taken of salvation. But from this point of view it can also be said that the Catholic notion of the Church forms the necessary supplement to the imperfect idea of faith. That which is lacking to faith, taken in the Catholic sense, namely, the certitudo salutis, is supplied by the doctrinal authority of the Church on the one side and by the Sacramental Church institution on the other, and yet in such a way that it is obtained only approximately.

example and law of Christ. The Sacraments have therefore the double effect, that of preparing for, and conducting gradually to the *visio et fructio dei*, and that of producing on earth the Church in which the law of Christ reigns and by which the "bene vivere" (right-living) is produced. By the latter of these two views the position of the State is determined—as the bene vivere is its end, it must submit itself to the sacramental institution. But by the whole idea the priesthood as the teaching and sanctifying corporation is legitimised; for the administration of the Sacraments is tied to a particular order, whom Christ has appointed, and this order, at the same time, is alone empowered to interpret the law of Christ with binding authority. To them, therefore, there must be subjection.

This whole view, which, certainly, had not received a clear and precise expression from Augustine, obtained clearness and precision in the period that followed—less through the labours of the theologians than by the force of the resolute Roman policy. Because this policy aimed, above all, at monarchy in the Church, *it had, as the result of its victorious exercise, brought out clearly for the first time, and at the same time created, the general hierarchial conditions requisite for the existence of such a monarchy.* Yet, in spite of many forgeries, it could not bring it about that the factor of *hierarchial gradation*, comparatively insignificant from a dogmatic point of view, but extremely important from the point of view of practice, should obtain the support of an imposing tradition; for from Augustine and the Fathers in general it was as good as absent. But still further, Augustine, as we have noted above, combined with the dogma of salvation as the *visio dei* the doctrine of predestination, and developed from the latter a doctrine of the Church that held a neutral relation to hierarchy and sacrament. No doubt it can easily be shown that the predestinarian and the sacramental hierarchial notions of the Church are not necessarily mutually exclusive, nay, that in a certain sense they require each other, inasmuch as the individual's uncertainty of his own election, affirmed by Augustine, necessarily forces him to make a diligent use of all the means furnished by the Church, and the explanation very naturally occurs that God effectuates the fulfilment

of the predestinating decree only through the empirical Church with its Sacraments. But Augustine himself did not assert that; and although in the time that came after, this mode of adjusting things came to be very much in favour, yet, as there was no allowing the doctrine of predestination to drop out, there was involved in this doctrine an element that threatened, like an overhanging mass of rock, to destroy the existence of the structure beneath. Finally, Augustine had no doubt carried on a victorious conflict with Donatism; but there was still one point at which it was not easy to deny entirely the correctness of the Donatist thesis, and that was the sacrament of penance. It could certainly be made credible that baptism, the Lord's supper, confirmation, ordination were valid, even when an unworthy priest dispensed them; but how was such a man to be able to sit in judgment upon the holy and the unholy, to apply the law of Christ, to bind and loose, if the load rested on himself of ignorance of sin? It was surely more than paradoxical, it was an inconceivable thought, that the blind should be able to judge aright as to light and darkness. Was excommunication by such a man to be held valid before God? Was his absolution to have force? There was no doubt an escape sought for here, also, by saying that it is Christ who binds and looses, not the priest, who is only a minister; but when flagrant unrighteousness was practised by the priest, when such cases increased in number, what was then to be done?¹

¹ Let it be distinctly noted here that it was just the strict papal system that had widely given rise in the period of the great conflicts (eleventh and twelfth centuries) to the greatest uncertainty about ordinations, seeing that the Popes cancelled without hesitation "simonistic" orders, and likewise orders of the imperial bishops, nay, even ordinations at which a single simonist had been present. Innocent II., indeed, at the second Lateran Council, pronounced invalid all ordinations of the schismatics, *i.e.*, of the bishops who adhered to Pope Anacleto II. ("From him whom he hath ordained we take away the orders" [evacuamus et irritas esse consemus]; the curialist theologians are disposed to see in this only a suspension of the exercise of office; Hefele, *Concil. Gesch.* V.², p. 438 f., leaves the passage unexplained; Friedrich [in his edition of *Janus*, 2 Aufl., pp. 143, 456] holds to the cancelling of the orders.) Thus it was the Popes who were the instructors of those sects that spread the greatest uncertainty as to the most important Catholic question, the question regarding the validity of orders. At the time of the Schism it was laid down by the papal Secretary, Coluccio Salutato, that as all Church power emanates from the Pope, and as a wrongly elected Pope has himself no power, such an one can

In a way indicating the greatest acuteness, Thomas combined the predestinarian (spiritual) and the hierarchical conceptions of the Church, and tried to eliminate the points from which a "heretical" conception could develop itself; but it is apparent from what has been stated *that one could accept substantially the Augustinian-Thomist notion of the Church with its premises (doctrines of salvation and the Sacraments), and yet, when tested by the claims which the Mediæval Church set up at the time of its greatest power, could become "heretical," in the event, namely, of his either (1) contesting the hierarchical gradation of the priestly order; or (2) giving to the religious idea of the Church implied in the thought of predestination a place superior to the conception of the empirical Church; or (3) applying to the priests, and thereby to the authorities of the Church, the test of the law of God, before admitting their right to exercise, as holding the keys, the power of binding and loosing.*

Certainly during the whole of the Middle Ages there were sects who attacked the Catholic notion of the Church at the root; but however important they may be for the history of culture, they play no part in the history of dogma; for as their opposition, as a rule, developed itself from dualistic or pantheistic premises (surviving effects of old Gnostic or Manichæan views), they stood outside of ordinary Christendom, and, while no doubt affecting many individual members within it, had no influence on Church doctrine.¹ On the other hand, it may be asserted that *all* the movements which are described as "reformations anticipating the Reformation," and which for a time resisted not unsuccessfully the introduction of the Romish

give none; consequently the bishops and priests ordained since the death of Gregory XI. were incompetent to dispense the Sacraments. If, accordingly, says Coluccio, a believer adores the Eucharist that has been consecrated by a bishop ordained in the Schism, he worships an idol (in a letter to Jost of Moravia in Martene, Thes. Anecd. II., p. 1159, quoted by Janus, p. 318).

¹There are referred to here sects like the Catharists and Albigenses, "Patarenese," "Bulgarians," as also the adherents of Amalrich of Bena, the Ortliebists (allied to the Waldensians), the sect of the New Spirit, the sect of the Free Spirit, and many similar movements; see Hahn, *Gesch. der Ketzler im Mittelalter*, 3 Bdd., Reuter, *Aufklärung* Bd. II., the different works of Ch. Schmidt, Jundt, Preger, Haupt; Staude, *Urspr. d. Katharer* (*Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch.* V. 1); Döllinger, *Beiträge z. Sectengesch. des Mittelalters*, 1890.

conception of the Church, set out from the Augustinian conception of the Church, but took exception to the development of this conception, from the three points that have been defined above. Now whether we look at the Waldensian, the Lombard, the Apocalyptic-Joachimic, the Franciscan opposition to the new conception of the Church, whether at that of the Empire or the Councils, of Wyclif or Huss, or even, indeed, at the humanist, we have always the same spectacle. On the first view the opposition seems radical, nay, expressly antagonistic. Angry curses—Anti-Christ, Babylon, Church of the devil, priests of the devil, etc.—catch the ear everywhere. But if we look a little more closely, the opposition is really much tamer. That fundamental Catholic conception of the Church, as a sacramental institution, is not objected to, because the fundamental conception of salvation and of blessedness remains unassailed. Although all hierarchical gradation may be rejected, the conception of the hierarchical priesthood is allowed to stand; although the Church may be conceived of as the community of the predestinated, every Christian must place himself under the influence of the Sacraments dispensed by the Church, and must use them most diligently, for by means of these his election is effected; although the sacramental acts of unworthy priests may be invalid, still priests are needed, but they must live according to the law of Christ; although the Church as the community of the predestinated may be known only to God, yet the empirical Church is the true Church, if the apostolic life prevails in it, and a true empirical Church of the kind is absolutely necessary, and can be restored by reforms; although, finally, all secular rights may have to be denied to the Pope and the priesthood, yet secular right in general is something that has gradually to disappear. The criticism of the Romish conception of the Church is therefore entirely a criticism *from within*.

The criticism must not on that account be under-estimated; it certainly accomplished great things; in it the spiritual and moral gained supremacy over the legal and empirical, and Luther was fortunate when he came to know Huss's doctrine of the Church. Yet we must not be deceived by this as to the

fact that the conception of the Church held by all the opposing parties was only a form of the Augustinian conception of the Church, modified by the Waldensian-Franciscan ideal of the apostolic life (according to the law of Christ). The ways in which the elements were mingled in the programmes of the opposition parties were very different; at one time the predestinarian element preponderated, at another time an apocalyptic-legal, at another the Franciscan, at another the biblical (the *lex Christi*), at another they were all present in equipoise. Especially on the ground that these opposition parties, starting from the doctrine of predestination, enforced the conception of the "invisible Church," and applied the standard of *Scripture* to everything, they are praised as evangelical. But attention has very rightly been drawn of late to the fact¹ that they by no means renounced the conception of an empirical, true Church, a conception to which they were driven by individual uncertainty about election, and that their standpoint on the ground of Scripture is the Catholic-legal, as it had been adopted by Augustine, Bernard, and Francis.

Under such circumstances it is enough to delineate in a few of their features the conceptions of the Church held by the several parties. The Waldensians contested neither the Catholic cultus nor the Sacraments and the hierarchical constitution in themselves, but they protested (1) as against a mortal sin, against the Catholic clergy exercising the rights of the successors of the Apostles without adopting the apostolic life; and (2) against the comprehensive power of government on the part of the Pope and the bishops, hence against the Romish hierarchy with its graded ranks. But the French Waldensians did not, nevertheless, contest the validity of the Sacraments dispensed by unworthy priests, though this certainly was done by those of Lombardy.² Among the Waldensians, then, the conception of the *law of Christ*, as set forth in Scripture and as prescribing to the priests the apostolic life, rises above all other marks of the Church (among those in Italy the Donatist

¹ See Gottschick in the dissertation cited above and K. Müller, Bericht, etc., p. 37 f.

² See above, p. 90, and Müller, Waldesier, p. 93 ff. and passim.

element developed itself from this). The same applies to a part of the Franciscans, who passed over to the opposition. In the sharp polemic against Rome on the part of the Joachimites, the apocalyptic element takes its place side by side with the legal: clergy and hierarchy are judged from the standpoint of emancipated monachism and of the approaching end of time.¹ No wonder that just this view gained favour with not a few Franciscans, that it extended itself to far in the North among all sections of the people,² and that it came to take up a friendly (Ghibelline) attitude towards the State. As thus modified it freed itself up to a certain point from the wild apocalyptic elements, and passed over to be merged in the imperialist opposition. Here also they were again Franciscans who passed over also, and to some extent, indeed, conducted the resistance to the papal power (Occam). In this opposition the dispute was by no means about the Church as a sacramental institution and as a priesthood, but simply about the legitimacy of the hierarchical gradation of rank (including the Pope, whose divine appointment Occam contested), and about the governing powers of the hierarchy, which were denied. But these powers were denied on the ground of the Franciscan view, that the Church admits of no secular constitution, and that the hierarchy *must* be poor and without rights. The assigning of the entire legal sphere to the State was at bottom an expression of contempt for that sphere, not indeed on the part of all literary opponents of the papacy in the fourteenth century, but yet on the part of not a few of them.³ The imperialist opposition was

¹ See Reuter., l.c. II., p. 191 ff., and Archiv. f. Litt.-und K.-Gesch. des Mittelalters I., p. 105 ff.

² In greater numbers than before protocols of processes against heretics have been published in recent years; see Wattenbach in the Sitzungsberichten der Berliner Academie, 1886, IV., and Döllinger, l.c., Bd. 2. We can very easily understand how, above all, the charge was brought against the heretics that they did away with the Sacraments.

³ Besides Occam, Marsilius of Padua and John of Jandun are specially to be named here; cf. Riezler, Die lit. Widersacher der Päpste z. Z. Ludwig's des Bayern, 1874, K. Müller, der Kampf Ludwig's d. B. mit der röm. Curie, 2 Bdd., 1879 f., Friedberg, Die Grenzen zwischen Staat und Kirche, 1882, the same author, Die mittelalterlichen Lehren über d. Verh. v. St. u. K., 1874; Dorner, Das Verhältniss von

dissolved by that of the Councils. Reform of the Church in its head and members was the watchword—but the professors of Paris, who, like the German professors in the fifth and sixth decades of the present century, gave themselves up to the illusion that they sat at the loom of history, understood by this reform merely a national-liberal reform of the ecclesiastical constitution (after the pattern of the constitution of the University of Paris), the restriction of the tyrannical and speculative papal rights, the giving to the Council supremacy over the papacy,¹ and the liberating of the national Churches from papal oppression, with a view to their possessing independence, either perfect or relative. The importance of these ideas from the point of view of ecclesiastical policy, and the sympathy we must extend to the idealism of these professors, must not lead to our being deceived as to the futility of their efforts for reform, which were supported by the approval of peoples and princes. They attacked at the root the Gregorian (Pseudo-Isidorian) development of the ecclesiastical constitution and of the papacy; but they did not say to themselves, that this development must always again repeat itself if the root, the doctrines of the Sacraments and of the priesthood, be left untouched. But how could these doctrines be assailed when there was agreement with the Curialists in the view taken of salvation and of the law of Christ? In face of the actual condition of

K. u. St. nach Occam (Stud. u. Krit. 1885, IV.). How powerfully the idea of the State asserted itself in the fourteenth century (cf. even Dante earlier) is well known.

¹ Cf. the famous decrees of the fourth and fifth Sessions of the Council of Constance: "Every legally-convened (Ecumenical) Council representing the Church has its authority directly from Christ, and in matters of faith, in the settlement of disputes and the reformation of the Church in its head and members, every one, even the Pope, is subject to it." Even the cardinals did not venture to refuse their assent. The Thomist conception of the Church was as yet no dogma; by the decisions of Constance it was tacitly—unfortunately only tacitly—described as error; but at the Council, so far as is known, no voice was raised on its behalf, and though Martin V. took his stand at the beginning on the newly acquired ground, it was only for a minute. That the Council of Basle, on an understanding with the Pope, gave a fresh declaration of the decrees of Constance, is well known. But thereafter Eugene IV. himself, and wisely, brought about the breach. On the Council of Constance we shall shortly be able to judge much better than before, when the great publication of Finke, *Acta concilii Constanciensis* will be before us, of which the first volume (*Acten z. Vorgeschichte*) has already appeared (1896).

things, which had developed throughout many centuries in the Church, the idea that the Church's disorders could be healed by paralysing the papal system of finance, and declaring the Council the divinely instituted court of appeal in the Church, was a Utopia, the realisation of which during a few decades was only apparent. It is somewhat touching to observe with what tenacity in the fifteenth, and beginning of the sixteenth, centuries, men clung to the hope that a Council could heal the hurt of Israel, and deliver the Church from the tyranny of the Pope. The healing indeed came, but in a way in which it was not expected, while it was certainly the only healing which a Council could permanently bestow—it came at the Councils of Trent and the Vatican.¹

Even before the beginning of the great opposition movement of the Councils against the papal system, the most important mediæval effort towards reform had been initiated—the *Wyclifite*, which continued itself in the *Hussite*. In spite of wild extravagances, the movement under Wyclif and Huss, in which many of the earlier lines of effort converged, must be regarded as the *ripest* development of mediæval reform-agitation. Yet it will

¹ On the conception of the Church held by the Paris theologians and their friends—they thought of themselves, not without reason, as restoring the old Catholic view, yet under quite changed circumstances the old thing became a new—see Schwab, Gerson, 1858, Tschackert, d'Ailly, 1877, Hartwig, Henricus de Langenstein, 1858, Brockhaus, Nicolai Cusani de concilii univ. potest. sentent., 1867. Also the works on Clemange and the Italian and Spanish Episcopalists. In particular matters the representatives of the conciliar ideas, at that time and later, widely diverged from each other, and more especially, each one defined differently the relation of the Pope to the Council and to the Church: there were some who held the papacy to be entirely superfluous, and some who only wished for it, so to speak, a slight letting of blood. The great majority interfered in no way with its existence, but aimed merely at purifying and restricting it; see the good review of the Episcopal system in Delitzsch, Lehrsystem der röm. K., p. 165 ff. Janus, p. 314 ff. No doubt it only needs to be recalled here that the Episcopal system arose from the frightful trouble created by the Schism, when the Italians wished to wrest back the papacy from the French. The termination of the Schism was a real, but it was also the only permanent, result of the Councils. Yet it must not be overlooked that in the definitions of the Church which the Episcopalists had furnished, Reformation elements were included, though these certainly were derived almost entirely from Augustine; for Augustine reiterated the position that the keys are given, not to an individual, but to the Church, and in his dogmatic expositions he always subordinated the constitutional to the spiritual unity of the Church.

appear, that while doing much in the way of loosening and preparing, it gave expression to no *Reformation* thought ; it, too, confined itself to the ground that was Augustinian-Franciscan, with which there was associated only a powerful national element. Yet to Wyclif's theory, which Huss simply transcribed,¹ a high value is to be attached, as being the only coherent *theological* theory which the Middle Ages opposed to the Thomist. All the other mediæval opponents of the Romish Church system work with mere measuring-lines or with fragments.

When we look at what Wyclif and Huss challenged or rejected, we might suppose that here a radical criticism of the Catholic conception of the Church was carried through, and a new idea of the Church presented. Everything must be determined by Holy Scripture ; the practice in regard to worship and the Sacraments is everywhere represented as perverted and as encumbered by the traditions of men ; the doctrine of indulgence, the practice of auricular confession, the doctrine of transubstantiation (Wyclif), the *manducatio infidelium* (communicating of unbelievers), the priests' absolute power of the keys, are as zealously opposed as the worship of saints, images, and relics, private masses, and the many sacramentalia. For the worship of God there are demanded plainness, simplicity, and *intelligibility* ; the people must receive what will be inwardly and spiritually edifying (hence the preference for the vernacular).² With the thorough reform of worship and of sacrament celebra-

¹ Wyclif's works are only now being made fully accessible ; cf. the *Dialogues* edited by Lechler, the controversial writings published by Buddensieg, and especially the treatise *de ecclesia* edited by Loserth (Wyclif Society from 1882). Monographs by Lechler, 2 vols., 1872 (and in Herzog's R.-E.) and by Buddensieg, 1885. The discovery that Huss simply, and to a large extent verbally, adopted the Wyclifite doctrine, we owe to Loserth (Hus und Wiclif, 1884), see also the same author's Introduction to the treatise *de ecclesia*. The results of Gottschick's discussion of Huss's doctrine of the Church (*Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch.* VIII., p. 345 ff.) apply therefore throughout to Wyclif. I do not venture an opinion as to how far Wesel and Wessel were influenced by Huss. Savonarola continued the opposition of the Mendicant Monks in the old style.

² The translation of the Bible was a great achievement of Wyclif ; but it must not be forgotten that the Church also of the fifteenth century concerned itself with Bible translation, as more recent investigations have shown.

tion there must be a corresponding reform of the hierarchy. Here also there must be a reverting to the original simplicity. The papacy, as it existed, was regarded as a part of Anti-Christ, and this was not less true of the secularised Mendicant Monk system (as Lechler has shown, it was only towards the end of his life that Wyclif entered upon a vigorous conflict with both; his original attitude towards the Mendicant Monks was more friendly). The Pope, who contravenes the law of Christ, is the Anti-Christ, and in the controversial treatise "de Christo et suo adversario Anti-Christo," it is proved that in twelve matters the Pope has apostatised from the law and doctrine of Christ. The head of the Church is Christ, not the Pope; only through Constantine has the latter, as the bishop of Rome, become great. Therefore the Roman bishop must return to a life of apostolic service. He is not the direct and proximate vicar of Christ, but is a servant of Christ, as are the other bishops as well. The entire priestly order exists to serve in humility and love; the State alone has to rule. The indispensable condition of priestly service is imitation of the suffering man Jesus. If a priest disregards this and serves sin, he is no priest, and all his sacred acts are in vain.

But behind all these positions, which were for the most part already made familiar by older reform parties, there lies a distinctly defined conception of the Church, which is not new, however, but is rather only a variety of the Thomist. Wyclif's conception of the Church can be wholly derived from the Augustinian (influence on Wyclif of Thomas of Bradwardine, the Augustinian), when the peculiar national and political conditions are kept in view under which he stood,¹ and also the impression which the Franciscan ideal—even to the length of communism indeed—made upon him. Huss stood under quite similar conditions, and could therefore simply adopt Wyclifism.

Wyclif sets out from the Augustinian definition of the Church

¹ This has been observed especially by Buddensieg, l.c. In dealing with Wyclif, as with all the opposition movements from the thirteenth century to the fifteenth, the great national economical revolution in Europe must be remembered. At the same time the Anglo-Saxon type in Wyclif, as contrasted with the Romanic, must not be overlooked.

as the entire sum of the predestinated in heaven and on earth. To this Church the merely præsciti (foreknown) do not belong; they do not belong to it even at the time when they are righteous; while, on the other hand, every predestinated one is a member of it, even if at the time he is still not under grace, or, say, is a heathen or Jew. No one can say of himself without special revelation (*revelatio specialis*) that he belongs to this Church. This momentous proposition, which dominates the whole of the further discussion, is a clear proof that Wyclif and Huss stood on Catholic ground, *i.e.*, that the significance of *faith* was entirely ignored. As a fact, the definition of the Church as *congregatio fidelium* was a mere title; for, as we shall immediately see, faith was not what is decisive; it comes to view rather within the conception of the Church as merely an empirical mark (equivalent to community of the baptized). Further, as it is an established fact that no one can be certain of his election—for how can one surrender himself here on earth to the *constant* feeling of felicity which springs from the vision and enjoyment of God after all other feelings have been quenched? how is it possible to attain to this state of heart even now?—then there is either no mark at all by which the existence of the Church may be determined, or we may rest assured that the Church of Christ exists where the legacy of Christ is in force—the *Sacraments* and the *law of Christ*. The latter, not the former, is the opinion of Wyclif and Huss. *The true Church of Christ is where the law of Christ reigns,*¹ *i.e.*, the law of love, humility, and poverty, which means the apostolic life in imitation of Christ, and where, accordingly, the Sacraments also, which prepare for the life beyond, are administered in the Spirit of Christ. *The predestination doctrine is not brought into service therefore with the view of making room for faith over against the Sacraments, or in order to construct a purely invisible Church*—what interest would Wyclif and Huss have then had in the reform of the empirical Church?²—but it is brought into

¹ “*Lex Christi*” and “*lex evangelica*” were the terms constantly applied to the contents of the New Testament even by the Reformers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, see Otto Clemen, Pupper von Goch (Leipzig, 1896), p. 120 ff.; but at the same time it is in some way to hold good that that law is a “*lex perfectæ libertatis*.”

² See Gottschick, *l.c.*, p. 360 ff.

service that it may be possible to oppose the claims of the hierarchy as godless pretensions and to set up the law of Christ as the true *nota ecclesie catholice*. For from what has been shown it follows that there can be no rights in the Church which do not originate from the acknowledged supremacy of the law of Christ. The question is entirely one of establishing this law. A leap is taken over faith. The important matter is *fides caritate formata* (faith deriving form from love), *i.e.*, *caritas*, *i.e.*, the law of the Sermon on the Mount (consilia).¹ What is contested is not only the hierarchical gradation, but the alleged *independent* right of the clergy to represent the Church and administer the means of grace without observing the law of Christ.² How can such a right exist, if the Church is nothing but the community of the predestinated, and as such can have no other mark save the law of Christ? How, again, can acts of priests be valid, when the presupposition of all action in the Church, and for the Church, is lacking to them—obedience to the law of Christ? But this law has its quintessence in the Sermon on the Mount and in the example of the poor life of Jesus; nevertheless (this feature is genuinely Augustinian) the whole of Scripture is at the same time the law of Christ. This standard then must be applied to all ecclesiastical practice. And yet in its application, which of course must become entirely arbitrary as soon as the attempt is really made to follow the thousand directions literally, everything is to be subordinated to the law of love that ministers in poverty and—to the reigning dogma. With the exception of the transubstantiation doctrine, which Wyclif alone objected to, both Reformers left dogma entirely untouched, nay, they strengthened it. What they aimed at reforming, and did reform, were the ordinances relating to worship and Sacraments, which had originated in the immediately preceding centuries, and were justly felt by them to be restrictions on the

¹ See Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 2 ed. I., p. 134.

² Huss adhered firmly to the Catholic distinction between clergy and laity. Wyclif regarded laymen called directly by Christ as capable of priestly acts. But that a direct appointment by Christ is valid could scarcely be contested even by a Romish opponent of Wyclif. The only question, therefore, must be as to whether such an appointment can be established. Hence the assertion that Wyclif and Huss opposed the universal priesthood to the priestly order is incorrect.

full and direct efficacy of word and Sacrament. At the same time they did not renounce the view that the numerus predestinatorum (number of the predestinated) may find its earthly embodiment in a true, empirical Church. It certainly could not but come about, that in the Hussite movement, when once the watchword had again been emphatically given forth that everything must be reformed according to the law of holy Scripture, there should be introduced into the Church the disorder and terror connected with Old Testament socialist and apocalyptic ideas; but such things seldom last beyond the third generation, nor did they last longer then. There was a falling back upon patience, and the once aggressive enthusiasm became changed into silent mistrust and reserve.

How this Wyclifite conception of the Church, which really came into conflict with the Romish only about the Pope and the sacrament of penance, and arose from an over-straining of the good Catholic principle of the *lex Christi* (law of Christ), can be called evangelical, is difficult to understand. Equally with Thomas's conception of the Church it leaves *faith* aside, as Luther understood it; and it has as its presuppositions, in addition to the predestinarian doctrine, the Catholic conception of salvation, the Catholic conception of the Sacraments, and the Catholic ideal of poverty. It puts an end to the priests who govern the world; but it does not put an end to the priests who dispense the Sacraments, who expound the law of God, and who alone—by the apostolic life—perfectly fulfil it. Will these world-ruling priests not return, if it must really be the highest interest of man to prepare himself for the life beyond by means of the Sacraments, seeing that that life is not attainable by faith alone, and a clear, certain and perfect faith does not fall to the lot of every man? ¹ But however certain it is that this question

¹ See Gottschick, l.c., p. 364 f.: "Huss has no other view of salvation than the ordinary Catholic one. Man's goal is union with God through *visio dei* and the love dependent thereon. There is preparation on earth for this by means of faith and the meritorious fulfilment of the law of love. By faith is understood throughout the theoretic assent to a quantum of doctrines; there suffices for a good part of this quantum the *fides implicita*. Faith having value only as *fides caritate formata*, it follows that the chief matter is fulfilment of the law. But the qualification for this is dependent on the infusion of grace on the ground of the merit of Christ, a grace

can only be answered in the affirmative (as long as the Sacraments play the chief part in the Church, the priest will be a man of power on earth, and as long as the letter of scripture is regarded as the law of Christ, the official interpreters will be the ruling authorities in the Church) it is equally certain that the Wyclifite conception of the Church represented a great advance. The attempt was here made to separate the religious from the secular; moreover, the value of the law of Christ, as something spiritual, was placed on a level with the value of the Sacraments, nay, the efficacy of all ecclesiastical acts was derived from inward Christian disposition; the whole "objective" right of a hierarchy in the Church was shaken;¹ Christians were most urgently reminded that the gospel has to do with life. And this did not take place outside theology, as if these were personally-formed notions, but on the ground and in the name of the truly ecclesiastical theology.

About the year 1500 Hussitism, as a great movement, had run its course. But it exerted an incalculable influence: it loosened the hold of the hierarchical papal conception of the Church on the hearts and minds of men, and helped to prepare the way for the great revolution. No doubt at the beginning of the Reformation the greatest vagueness of view prevailed among the really pious in the land: there was no wish to part with the Pope, but episcopalist (conciliar) and

whereby sin is abolished. And Huss never mentions any other way in which this takes place than by preaching and the Sacraments, more particularly baptism and the Eucharist or the sacrifice of the mass." Cf. the passages quoted by Gottschick, l.c., from the treatise *de ecclesia*, among which those upon *fides implicita* are specially instructive. I. 38: "Christianus debet fidem *aliqua* cognoscere." 62: "Quantum oporteat *fidelem* de necessitate salutis *explicita* credere, non est meum pro nunc discutere, cum deus omnipotens suos electos secundum gradum fidei *multiplicem* ad se trahit." 259: "Quicumque habuerit fidem caritate formatam . . . in communi sufficit cum virtute perseverantiae ad salutem. . . . Non exigit deus, ut omnes filii sui sint continue pro viatione sua in actu cogitanti particulari de *qualibet fidei particula* (so always quantitatively estimated), sed satis est, quod post posita desidia habeant fidem in habitu formatam." Wyclif had a similar opinion ("omnia sacramenta sensibilia rite administrata [but for this there is requisite also, and above all, the priest who lives like the apostles] habent efficaciam salutarem").

¹ The Council of Constance contested the Wyclifite-Hussite propositions that were adverse to the Pope, as also the exclusive definition of the Church as *universitas predestinatorum*.

Waldensian-Hussite ideas were widely disseminated.¹ A distinct settlement was necessary: either the establishment of the papal system, or a new view of the Church that should be able to furnish a firm basis for the numerous and heavy assaults upon that system. The *empirico-monarchical* conception of the Church was challenged by the Episcopalists, the *juristic* by Wyclif and Huss—in this lies the chief importance of these men. But for the juristic conception they substituted a *moralistic*. From the latter the former will always develop itself again. What was lacking was the conception of a Church to which one belongs through living faith. The mere criticising of the hierarchy, however much courage that might imply, was not all that was needed. Nor was it enough that the legal ordinances of the Church should be traced back to their moral conditions. For having done this Wyclif and Huss cannot be too highly praised. But it must not be forgotten that the Church of Christ has to take the criteria for judging what she is from Romans V.-VIII. One thing, however, and for our purposes the most important, will be made apparent from this whole review, namely, that the manifold development of the conception of the Church in this period, so far from threatening the old dogma, gave it an always firmer lodgment—not, indeed, as a living authority, but as a basis and boundary line. Where would the Waldensians and the Hussites, with their appeals to the *lex Christi*, to Scripture and the Apocalypse, have arrived at, if they had not been held fast by the quiet but powerful force of the ancient dogma?

But at this point we may extend our observations still a step further. Is it the case, then, that the so-called “Reformers before the Reformation” were the only reformers before the Reformation, or is it not apparent rather that this designation has only a proper meaning when it is applied, not to any *one* phenomenon in the Mediæval Church, but to the Mediæval Church as a whole? For the highest level of observation, there lies between the Christianity of the Ancient Church and the

¹ Besides the works on the history of the spread of Hussitism (especially von Bezold, *Zur Gesch. des Husitentums* 1874, and the *Studies of Haupt*), see the works of Keller, which, however, must be used with caution.

Christianity of the Reformation, the Christianity of the Middle Ages as the intermediate stage, *i.e.*, as the Pre-Reformation. None of its leading tendencies can be dispensed with in the picture, not even the hierarchical. The very conception of the Church shows that. For those opposing the "Pre-Reformers" represented with their Church ideal the certainty that Christ has left behind Him on earth a *kingdom*, in which He, as the exalted One, is present, and the holiness of which does not depend on the moral goodness of its members, but on the grace which God gives them. This thought they no doubt disfigured and secularised, yet it must not be said that it had value for them only in its disfigured form. No, even it was for many really an expression of Christian piety. They thought of the living and reigning Christ when they thought of the Pope and his power, of the bishops and the Church, who reduced the whole world to their rule. In this form their faith was a necessary complement to the individualistic Christianity of the Mystics, and the Reformation with its thesis of the holy community and the kingdom of God, which have Christ in their midst, connected itself directly with the Catholic thoughts of Augustine and the Middle Ages, after it had learned from Paul and Augustine to judge spiritual things spiritually.

3. *On the History of Ecclesiastical Science.*

In connection with the history of piety we have been already obliged to enter upon the history of theology; for piety and theology are most intimately related in the Middle Ages. In the former chapter also (p. 23 ff.) a sketch of the history of science till the close of the twelfth century has been given. From the immense amount of material in the thirteenth to the fifteenth century only some cardinal points shall be brought more prominently to view.¹

¹ See the histories of philosophy by Erdmann, Ueberweg-Heinze (where are the fullest lists of literary works), Stöckl and Werner (Monograph on Thomas v. Aqu., various dissertations on Duns Scotus, *Die Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters* in 3 vols., 1881 f. : (1) Johannes Duns Scotus. (2) Die Nachscotistische Scholastik. (3) Der Augustinismus des späteren Mittelalters). Baur, *Vorles. über die christl. Dog-*

The great advancement of mediæval science from the beginning of the thirteenth century was occasioned (1) by the immense triumph of the Church and the papacy under Innocent III. and his successors; (2) by the intensification of piety in consequence of the Mendicant Orders movement;¹ (3) by the enrichment and extension of general culture, which was partly a consequence of inner developments, and partly arose from contact with the East, in Palestine, Constantinople, and Spain.² Here the acquaintance, now obtained for the first time, with the *true* Aristotle, the teacher of logic, physics, ethics, and politics, became of supreme importance. His philosophy, understood as dogmatism,³ was hailed as a gospel, or at least as

mengesch. 2 Bd., p. 199 ff. We owe to Bach a beautiful dissertation on Albertus M., distinguished by thorough knowledge and abundant points of view.

¹ On the entrance of the Minorite Order into the scientific movement, see Werner, Duns Scotus, p. 4 ff.

² Cf. Books 6-8 of the History of the Aufklärung by Reuter, especially the sections on the Averrhoistic Aufklärung, as well as on the importance of the Arabic and Jewish middle-men, also on the influence of the Natural Sciences and on the University of Paris in the thirteenth century. The Arabs Avicenna (ob. 1037) and Averrhoes (ob. 1198), the former supranaturalistic, the latter pantheistic, in his tendency, were the most important commentators on Aristotle, whose works became known to the West by means of Spanish Jews. But by Averrhoes, who exercised a powerful attraction, Aristotle was in the first instance discredited, so that several Church interdicts were issued against him. But it was soon observed that Aristotle, so far from favouring pantheism, really refuted it. Scotus Erigena and Averrhoes—his system meant for the Church of the thirteenth century what Gnosticism in the second century, Manichæanism in the fourth, Socinianism in the seventeenth, meant for Church Christianity, see Renan, Averroes et l'Averroisme—were now regarded as the real enemies of Church dogma. Naturalistic pantheism in general now became the chief object of persecution; to oppose it, the supranaturalistic elements were derived from Aristotelianism, and this Aristotelianism had the widest scope given to it (see Schwane, Dogmengesch. des Mittelalters, p. 33 ff.). Among the Jewish scholars it was chiefly Maimonides who influenced the Schoolmen of the thirteenth century. Thomas owed very much to him, and in part transcribed him (see Merx, Prophetie des Joel, 1879). In this way the juristic-casuistic element in Scholasticism was still further strengthened, and pharisaic-talmudic theologoumena crept into mediæval theology, which are partly traceable to the Persian age of Judaism. But besides this, Neoplatonic and Aristotelian material found its way to the schoolmen from the translations of the Jews, who had rendered the Arabic versions of the Greek philosophical writings into Latin; see Bardenhewer, Die Schrift de causis, 1882.

³ In the sense in which Kant exposed and refuted dogmatism. It was only Roger Bacon who stoutly fought his way out of these fetters in the thirteenth century; see Reuter, II., p. 67 ff.

the necessary introduction to one ("præcursor Christi in naturalibus") and through him the science of the thirteenth century received an almost incalculable amount of material, and, above all, impulses to master the material.

The two new forces of commanding importance in the period, the Mendicant Orders¹ and Aristotle, had first to achieve a position for themselves. At the beginning they met with hostility from the old Orders, and from the teachers and universities that were in alliance with them. An attitude of self-defence was assumed towards both. The new Aristotelianism, indeed, came under ecclesiastical proscription, and there was a wish to exclude theologians of the Mendicant Orders from university chairs. There were always some, too, who still were influenced by the attacks in general on the scientific-dialectic theology, which had been made by such men as John of Salisbury and Walter of St. Victor.² But the new movement asserted itself with an irresistible energy, and the opposition was silenced.

Yet this was only possible because the new factors really furnished nothing new, but completed the triumph of the *Church* over everything spiritual. The new Aristotle, as he was understood, taught the theory of knowledge, metaphysics and politics, which admitted of a surer vindication of dogma against such opposition as had formerly appeared, *e.g.*, in William of Champeaux and Roscellin, and offered a defence against the

¹ Among all the Orders the Dominican was the first to adopt into its rules directions as to study (see Denifle, *Archiv. fur Litt.-u. Kirchengesch. des Mittelalters* I., p. 165 ff.

² Cf. *e.g.*, for the period about 1250 the *Chronicle of Salimbene and Michael l.c.*, p. 39 f. That in the Dominican Order itself a tendency had at first to be checked, which, after the style of the older Orders, emphasised asceticism so strongly that no room was left for study, which indeed described science (including theology) as dangerous and pernicious, has been convincingly proved by Wehofer O. P. from the book of the Dominican Gérard de Frachet, "*Vitas Patrum*" (published not long after 1256, issued in the *Monum. Ord. Frat. Prædic. Historica*. Löwen, 1896), and from the attitude of Humbert of Romans (General of the Order from 1254 to 1263; *Görres-Jahrbuch f. Philos.* Bd. IX., 1896, p. 17 ff.) That "propter philosophiam" one goes to hell or at least—after a great example—receives here already on earth a sound cudgelling from angels, was never forgotten in the Catholic Church. The founder of the Trappist Order simply attempted to bring into force again an old monastic tradition: "study, *i.e.*, philosophy is sin."

dangers both of an eccentric realism and of an empirical mode of thought. If it is permissible, nay necessary, to conceive of the universals on the one hand, as the archetypes that express the cosmos of ideas in the thought of God, then they exist *ante rem* (before the thing); if on the other hand they must be regarded as simply realised in things (categories and forms) then they are *in re* (in the thing); if, finally, it is undeniable that it is only by the observation of things that they are obtained, that accordingly the intellect derives them from experience, then they are *post rem* (after the thing). In this way it was possible to apply to every dogma the epistemological mode of view which seemed best fitted to defend it. The "qualified" realism, which could assume the most different forms, and which had been already represented by Abelard, certainly more in a spirit of sceptical reserve than with a view to speculative construction, became dominant in the thirteenth century. But what was of most importance was that the great theologians who developed it showed even greater energy than their predecessors in subordinating the whole structure of thought to the principle that all things are to be understood by tracing them back to God.

But the tracing back to God was equivalent to subjecting all knowledge to the authority of the Church. The same science which displayed an astonishing energy of thought, and through such scholars as Thomas made a really important advance upon antiquity in the ethical and political sciences, appeared in many respects still more fettered than the science of the eleventh and twelfth centuries; *for in its view, not only the old dogma ("articuli fidei"), but the entire department of ecclesiastical practice, the principles of which were traced back to the articuli fidei, was absolutely authoritative, and it proceeded much more frankly than before on the principle that in particular questions every instance of authority had as much weight as a deliberate reflection of the understanding.*

It was only in the thirteenth century—and by the theologians of the Mendicant Orders—that the whole existing structure of ecclesiasticism was theologically vindicated, and its newest and most questionable parts, as well as the oldest and

most important, declared inviolate by "science"; it was only in the thirteenth century that there was introduced that complete inter-blending of faith on authority and of science which means that at one and the same level there is a working at one time with the "credo," at another time with the "intelligo"; such interblending is not yet found in Anselm, for example. Certainly it was still theoretically held that theology, resting on revelation, is a (speculative) science.¹ But it was not held as required, nor even as possible, to rear on the basis of faith a purely rational structure: there was rather an alternating between authority and reason; they were regarded as parallel methods which one employed. The object in view indeed continued to be the knowledge that culminates in the visio dei; but there was no longer the wish always to eliminate more fully as knowledge advanced the element of faith (authority) in order to retain at the last pure knowledge; at all stages, rather, the element of authority was held as justifiable and necessary. Nay, there was now the conviction that there are two provinces, that of natural theology, and that of specific (revealed). The two, certainly, are thought of as being in closest harmony; but yet the conviction has been obtained that there are things known, and these, too, the most important, which belong simply to revealed theology, and which can be inter-related certainly, but not identified with natural theology. Natural theology, moreover, must subordinate itself to revealed, for theology has its foundation in revelation. In point of fact, however, the dogmatic theologian alternated between

¹See the first question in Part I. of the Summa of Thomas; Art. I.: "Utrum sit necessarium præter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam haberi." Art. II.: "Utrum sacra doctrina sit scientia." Answer: "Sacram doctrinam esse scientiam. Sed sciendum est quod duplex est scientiarum genus. Quædam enim sunt, quæ procedunt ex principiis notis lumine naturali intellectus sicut Arithmetica; quædam vero sunt quæ procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiæ, sicut Perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per Geometriam. . . . Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiæ, quæ scilicet est scientia dei et beatorum. Unde sicut Musicus credit principia revelata sibi ab Arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a deo." Art. III.: "Utrum sacra doctrina sit una scientia?" Conclusio: "Cum omnia considerata in sacra doctrina sub una formali ratione divinæ revelationis considerentur, eam unam scientiam esse sentiendum est." Art. IV.: "Utrum s. doctrina sit scientia practica?" Conclusio: "Tametsi s. theologia altioris ordinis sit practica et speculativa, eminenter utramque continens, speculativa tamen magis est quam practica," etc.

reason and revelation, and his structure derived its style from the former ; for in particular questions the content of revelation is not derived solely from the thought of redemption—however truly this, as the *visio dei*, may be the contemplated end—but is set forth also in a thousand isolated portions, which are nothing else than heterogeneous fragments of a real or supposed knowledge of the world. It was the effect of holding that very conception of the goal of redemption as *visio dei* that the view of the content of revelation threatened to become broken up into an incalculable number of *things known*, and, in spite of the still retained title, acquired the character of a natural knowledge of supernatural things. Accordingly there was now introduced also the idea of *articuli mixti*, *i.e.*, of such elements of knowledge as are given both in a natural way and by revelation, only in the latter way, however, in perfection. What appeared outlined already in Tertullian (see Vol. V. c. ii.) as the distinctive character of Western theology, now came to its fullest development.

From the newly-discovered Aristotle the scholars derived courage to advance from the compilation of mere “sentences” to the rearing of entire doctrinal systems. The imposing form of the Church also, with the unfolding of its uniform power, may have been a co-operating influence here ; for the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century presents the same spectacle in the sphere of knowledge, which the Church of which it is the servant presents in the sphere of human life generally. In the one sphere as in the other everything is to be reduced to subjection ; in the one as in the other everything is to be brought into a harmonious system ; in the one as in the other the position is held, tacitly or expressly, that the Church is Christ, and Christ is the Church. Thus the theological science of the thirteenth century can be described as *the submitting to dialectic-systematic revision of ecclesiastical dogma and ecclesiastical practice, with the view of unfolding them in a system having unity and comprehending all that in the highest sense is worthy of being known, with the view of proving them, and so of reducing to the service of the Church all the forces of the understanding and the whole product of science.* But most intimately connected with this end is the other, namely, the theologian’s attaining in this way

to the *visio (fruitio) dei*; these two ends, indeed, are *mutually involved*; for all knowledge of Church doctrine and of Church practice is knowledge of God—this was taught by the Church itself. Now, if the gradual knowledge of God is the only means whereby the individual can attain to salvation (*visio dei*), then in theology the objective and subjective aims simply coincide; one serves the Church in serving himself, and the converse is equally true. The great Schoolmen by no means felt that they wrought as slaves, labouring under compulsion for their masters. The only end indeed that was clearly before them was their own advancement in the knowledge of God; but, standing as faithful sons within the Church, to which all power was given in heaven and on earth, their speculations necessarily served, with more or less of intention on their part, to glorify the Church's power and give a divine character to all that it did. And yet how many things did they come to know, the truth of which is entirely independent of the truth of Church theory and practice; how necessary and how helpful was even this period in the general history of science and theology; and how many seeds were sown broadcast by the great Schoolmen, of the development of which they did not allow themselves to dream! Never yet in the world's history was any science quite fruitless which served God with true devotion. Theology has at any time become a hindrance, only when it has lost faith in itself or become vacillating. We shall see that this was verified also in mediæval theology.

For all that has been stated up to this point applies only to the pre-Scotist Scholasticism; it applies above all to Thomas. He exercised, moreover, an enduring influence on the period that followed, and his influence is still at work at the present day. His predecessors and contemporaries have passed out of view in him. The Thomist science, as embodied above all in the "Summa," is characterised by the following things: (1) by the conviction that religion and theology are essentially of a speculative (not practical) nature, that they must therefore be imparted and appropriated spiritually, that it is possible so to appropriate them, and that ultimately no conflict can arise between reason and revelation; (2) by strict adherence to

Augustinianism, and in particular to the Augustinian doctrines of God, predestination, sin and grace,¹ but on the other hand by contesting on principle Averrhoism; (3) by a thoroughly minute acquaintance with Aristotle, and by a comprehensive and strenuous application of the Aristotelian philosophy, so far as Augustinianism admitted in any way of this (under the conception of God the Areopagitic-Augustinian view is only slightly limited); (4) by a bold vindication of the highest ecclesiastical claims by means of an ingenious theory of the State, and a wonderfully observant study of the empirical tendencies of the papal ecclesiastical and sacramental system. Aristotle the politician and Augustine the theologian, two enemies, became allies in Thomas; in that consists the importance of Thomas in the world's history. While he is a

¹ Thomas shows himself an Augustinian by his estimation also of Holy Scripture. *Scripture alone was for him absolutely certain revelation.* All other authorities he held as only relative. Very many passages can be quoted from Thomas to prove that the "formal principle of the reformation" had a representative in the great Schoolman. Cf. Holzhey, *Die Inspiration d. hl. Schrift in der Anschauung des Mittelalters*, 1895. This book, which did not necessarily require to be written, gives an account of the estimation of Holy Scripture on the part of the mediæval theologians and sectaries from the period of Charles the Great till the Council of Trent. The author remarks very correctly (p. 164 f.) that the view of Holy Scripture, or the mode of apprehending the notion of inspiration, does not pass beyond what is furnished by the Church Fathers, and that even among the theologians from the time of Alcuin till the beginning of the sixteenth century the greatest agreement regarding Holy Scripture prevailed. But when the author says further, that the doctrine of the absolute perspicuity and sufficiency of the Bible finds no confirmation in the mediæval Church—for even if expressions of the kind were to be met with among the mediæval theologians, yet the living union with the Church and tradition is at the same time presupposed—then that is in *one* respect a platitude. It is such also (but only in *one* respect) when the author remarks that the Middle Ages always recognised the exposition of Holy Scripture as an attribute of the Church. But on the really interesting problem Holzhey has scarcely touched, namely whether even in the Middle Ages a unique importance does not belong to Scripture as rule for the *vita Christiana* and whether it was not held by very many in this respect as absolutely clear and sufficient. That this question is to be answered affirmatively is to me beyond doubt. To the sentence of Duns Scotus: "Sacra scriptura sufficienter continet doctrinam necessariam *viatori*," many parallels may be adduced. Besides, there is still another question on which Holzhey has scarcely entered: since when was the decision of the Church in matters of faith placed as *another kind of authority* alongside Scripture as of equal weight? Certainly not yet since Thomas, scarcely only since Duns, but, as Ritschl likewise (*Fides implicita*, p. 31 f.) remarks, only since Occam, and even since his time not yet generally.

theologian and an Augustinian, he is still always an absolute thinker full of confidence; and yet it must not be overlooked that in him there are already recognisable the seeds of the destruction of the absolute theology. Although hidden, arbitrary and relative elements have already found a place for themselves in him. It is still his aim to express all things in the firm and sure categories of the majesty of the deity whose pervasive power controls all things, and to prove the strict necessity of all theological deliverances: the Christian religion is believed in and demonstrated from principles; but yet at not a few points the strength failed, and the thinker was obliged to fall back upon the authority which supports the probable, although he understood how to maintain for the whole the impression of absolute validity.¹

¹ Anselm proves in part the *articuli fidei*; in principle Thomas refuses to do so (Pars. I., Quæst. I., Art. 8); yet the *ratio* bases itself on the *articuli fidei* in order to prove something else. We shall see how, as the development proceeded, Scholasticism always relied less on *ratio* in divine things. This may be an appropriate place for a short description of the "Summa" (see Portman, *Das System der theol. Summe des hl. Thomas*, Luzern 1885). The 1. Part (119 Quæst.) treats of God and the issue of things from God, the 2. Part (1. Sect.) of general morality (114 Quæst.), the 2. Part (2. Sect.) of special morality (189 Quæst.) from the point of view of the return of the rational creature to God, the 3. Part of Christ and the Sacraments (90 Quæst.) As a supplement there has been added, from the commentary on the Lombard, the concluding part of the doctrine of the Sacraments, and the eschatology (102 Quæst.) Every Quæstio contains a number of *articuli*, and every *articulus* is divided into three parts. First the difficulties are brought forward, which seem to answer in the negative the question propounded, then the authorities (one or more, among them here and there also Aristotle), then follows the speculative discussion, dealing with principles, and thereafter the solution of the particular difficulties (the conclusions are not formulated by Thomas himself, but by his commentators). The scheme corresponds with the Pauline-Augustinian thought: "From God to God." The introduction (Quæst. 1) comprises the questions on theology as a science, on the subject (object) of theology—God and all else *sub ratione dei*,—on the methods (*auctoritas* and *ratio*, theology as *doctrina argumentativa*, sed "*hæc doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quæ sunt articuli fidei, sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid aliud probandum . . . nam licet locus ab auctoritate quæ fundatur super ratione humana sit infimissimus, locus tamen ab auctoritate quæ fundatur super revelatione divina est efficacissimus. Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandam fidem [quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei], sed ad manifestandum aliqua alia, quæ traduntur in hac doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tollat naturam, sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio voluntatis obsequitur caritati. . . . Sacra doctrina utitur philosophorum auctoritatibus quasi extraneis argumentis et probabilibus, auctoritatibus*

But was this strict necessity of any service at all to the Church? Should the Church not rather have been gratified, when the understanding perceived its incapacity to follow up the decisions of authority, and therefore abandoned further

autem canonice scripturæ utitur proprie et ex necessitate arguendo, auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum ecclesie quasi argumentando ex propriis sed probabiliter. *Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi apostolis et prophetis factæ, qui canonicos libros scripserunt, non autem revelationi, si qua fuit aliis doctoribus facta*"), on the exposition of Holy Scripture, etc. Quest. 2-27 of the I. Part treat of God's existence (five proofs for God), the nature of God (primum movens, ens a se, perfectissimum, actus purus), His attributes, His unity and uniqueness, His knowableness, the name of God, further of the inner life-activity in God (of His knowledge, His world of ideas, His relation to truth, His life, His will, the expressions of His will, providence and predestination); lastly, of the outer activity of God or the divine omnipotence, and of the divine blessedness. Then follows in Q. 27-44 the investigation de processione divinarum personarum (Trinity): lastly, Q. 44-119, the doctrine of creation, and here (1) the origination of things (creation out of nothing, temporality of the world): (2) division of creation (doctrine of angels, doctrine of the world of bodies, doctrine of man, here minute investigations into the substance of the soul, the union of body and soul, the powers of the soul, human knowledge; then concerning the creation of man, the divine image in man, paradise and the original state); (3) the doctrine of the divine government of the world (on angels as means of providence, etc.). The II. Part (1 sect.) is grounded entirely on the Aristotelian Ethics. It begins with an introduction on man's end (the bonum = beatitudo = deus ipse = visio dei), and proceeds to treat of freedom, the nature of free acts of the will, the goodness and badness of acts of the will (to the goodness belongs the rationality of the act of the will), merit and guilt (Q. 6-21). Thereon follow investigations into the emotional life of man (passiones), which is minutely analysed (Q. 22-48). Now only comes the account of the principles of moral action, of "habitus" or of the qualities of the soul. After an introduction (Q. 49 sq.) the doctrine of virtue is discussed (divided according to the object into intellectual, moral, and theological virtues), the cause of the virtues, their peculiarities (virtue as moderation or the "middle" course between two extremes) and the culmination of the virtues in the gifts of the Holy Ghost (the eight beatitudes and the fruits of the Spirit). This is followed by the doctrines of the nature of sin (contrary to reason and nature), of the division of sins, of the relation of sins to one another, of the subject (the will), the causes (inner and outer) of sin, of original sin and its effects (the deterioration of nature, darkening = macula, the reatus pœnæ, mortal sins and venial sins). All this belongs to the inner principles of moral conduct. This part concludes with the discussion of the outer principles, namely, the law and grace. The "law" is discussed on all sides, as eternal law (that is, the law according to which God Himself acts, and whose reflected rays are all laws valid for the creatures), as natural law, as human law, as Old Testament and New Testament law, and as law of "counsels" for special perfection. But the New Testament law, as it is inward, and infused by grace, is the law of grace, and thus the way is prepared for passing to the second outer principle of moral acts—to grace which gives man aid for the good. Grace is the outer principle of the supernatural good; in the intellectual sphere it is not

effort? To this question the reply must not be absolutely affirmative, but still less must it be negative. The Church, as it then already was, and as it still is to-day, needs both things ; it

necessary for the knowledge of natural truths, but it is so for the knowledge of the supernatural : it is likewise requisite for ability to do the supernatural good. Here there is a keen polemic against Pelagianism : man cannot by naturally good acts even prepare himself sufficiently for grace ; he can neither convert himself, nor continue always steadfast in goodness. An inquiry into the nature, division, causes, and effects of grace (doctrine of justification, doctrine of the meritoriousness of good works), forms the conclusion. The II. Part, 2. section now contains special ethics, namely, first, the precise statement of the theological virtues (faith, hope, and love), the commands corresponding to these virtues, and the sins against them, then the discussion of the cardinal virtues, wisdom, righteousness (here in Q. 57-123 the most exhaustive account is given, inasmuch as religiousness as a whole is placed under this term), courage, and moderation ; lastly, the discussion of the special virtues, *i.e.*, of the gifts of grace and duties of station (Q. 171-189). Under this last title there are dealt with (*a*) the charisms, (*b*) the two forms of life (the contemplative and the active), (*c*) the stations of perfection (namely, the station of the bishops as the virtuosi in neighbourly love, and the station of the monks, with special reference to the Mendicant monks). The III. Part now aims at showing by what provision and means the return of the rational creature to God has become possible by way of faith, hope, and love, namely, through Christ and the Sacraments. To this there is the intention to add eschatology. Hence there is a treatment here (1) of Christ, in particular of His incarnation and His natures. After a discussion of the necessity of the incarnation (on account of sin, and since a *satisfactio de condigno* was requisite) for the removal of original sin, the personal unity, the divine person, of Christ, and His human nature are set forth (in which connection, Q. 8, there is reference to the Church as the mystic body of Christ, and the thought of "Christus" as the head of mankind is strongly accentuated) ; then the consequences of the personal union (*communicatio idiomatum*) and all bearings of the constitution of the Godman are explained. On this follows (2) a section on the work of Christ, which, however, contains almost no speculation whatever, but illustrates in an edifying way the history of Christ from his entrance into the world (Q. 27-31, the doctrine of Mary). In connection with the suffering and death of Christ, the point of view of the "conveniens" as distinguished from the "necessarium" has special prominence given to it. Immediately after the work of Christ the doctrine of the Sacraments is added (Q. 60 sq.) ; for redemption is imparted to individuals only through the Sacraments, which have their efficacy from Christ, and through which men are incorporated into Christ. The statement begins with the general doctrine of the Sacraments (nature, necessity, effect, cause, number, connection) ; then follows the discussion of Baptism, confirmation, the eucharist, and penance. Here Thomas was obliged to lay down his pen. It was not granted to him to complete his "Summa." What was still wanting, as has been remarked, was supplied from his other works ; but in this supplement we miss somewhat of the strictness marking the expositions given by himself in the Summa, since it was mainly constructed out of notes and excursus on the text of the Lombard. Observe lastly, that in the Summa repetitions are not only not avoided, but occur to an incalculable extent.

is indispensable to it that its *articuli fidei* and modes of practice be *also* proved, and their rationality brought to view ; but it is still more needful to it that there be a blind surrender to its authority.

In this respect there was still obviously too little done by Thomas. In him, the determination of the relation of ratio to *auctoritas* is, indeed, marked by a quite special amount of confusion, the claims of faith (as faith on authority) and of knowledge receive no elucidation whatever, not to speak of reconciliation, and he stated not a few propositions in which there was a complete surrender to authority, that "faith" might not be deprived of its "merit" (see the sentence quoted above : "Sacred doctrine, however, uses human reason also, not indeed for proving faith, for through this the merit of faith would be lost" [*Utitur tamen sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandam fidem, quia per hoc tolleretur meritum fidei*]). Yet his real interest in theology is still the same as that of Augustine. Theology is cognition of God in the strict sense ; the necessity, which is accentuated in God, must also pervade the whole cognition of Him. The *articuli fidei*, and all results of world-knowledge, must be merged in the unity of this knowledge which truly liberates the soul and leads it back to God. At bottom the imposing and complicated system is extremely simple. Just as the perfect Gothic Cathedral, from its exhibiting what is really an organic style, expresses a single architectural thought, and subordinates all to this, even making all practical needs of worship serviceable to it, so this structure of thought, although all ecclesiastical doctrines are submissively and faithfully taken account of, still proclaims the *one* thought, that the soul has had its origin in God, and returns to Him through Christ, and even the Augustinian-Areopagite turn given to this thought, that God *is* all in all, is not denied by Thomas.

But this attitude is dangerous. There will always be a fresh development from it of the "Spurious Mysticism," as the Catholics call it, in which the subject is eager to go his own way, and avoids *complete* dependence upon the Church. Nevertheless, the course of scientific development came to be helpful

to the Church, and we may almost say that the Church here gathered figs of thistles. The assiduous study of Aristotle, and the keener perception gained through philosophy and observation, weakened the confidence of the theologians regarding the rationality and strict necessity of the revealed articles of faith. They began to forego revising them by means of reason, and subordinating them as component parts of a system to a uniform thought. Their scientific sense was strengthened, and when they now turned to the revealed tenets, they found in them, not necessity, but arbitrariness. Moreover, the further they advanced in psychology and secular science and discovered what cognition really is, the more sceptical they became towards the "general": "latet dolus in generalibus" (deception lurks under general conceptions). They began to part with their inward interest in the general, and their faith in it. The "idea," which is to be regarded as "substance," and the "necessity" of the general, disappeared for them; they lost confidence in the knowledge that knows everything. The particular, in its concrete expression, acquired interest for them: will rules the world, the will of God and the will of the individual, not an incomprehensible substance, or a universal intellect that is the product of construction. This immense revolution is represented in mediæval science by Duns Scotus, the acutest scholastic thinker;¹ but only with Occam did it attain completion.

We should expect that the result of this revolution would have been either a protest against the Church doctrine, or an attempt to test it by its foundations, and to subject it to critical

¹ See Baur, l.c. II., p. 235: "The thorough reasonableness of the ecclesiastical faith, or the conviction that for all doctrines of the ecclesiastical system some kind of rationes can be discovered, by which they are established even for the thinking reason, was the fundamental presupposition of Scholasticism. But after Scholasticism had risen to its highest point in Thomas and Bonaventura, it became itself doubtful again of this presupposition. This very important turning-point in the history of Scholasticism, after which it tended increasingly to fall to pieces, is represented by Duns Scotus." (Doctrine of double truth as consequence of the Fall!) Besides Duns Scotus, and after him, it was chiefly the doctor resolutissimus Durandus who, at first a Thomist, passed over to Nominalism and obtained currency for its mode of thought (see his commentary on the Lombard). He worked in the first third of the fourteenth century; on him see Werner in the 2. vol. of the "Scholastik des späteren Mittelalters."

reconstruction. But it was 200 years before these results followed, in Socinianism on the one hand, and in the Reformation theology on the other. What happened at first was quite different: *there was a strengthening of the authority of the Church, and, along with full submission to it, a laying to its account of responsibility for the articles of faith and for the principles of its practice.*¹ What was once supported by reason in league with authority must now be supported by the latter alone. Yet this conversion of things was felt to be by no means an act of despair, but to be an obviously required act of obedience to the Church, so complete was the supremacy of the latter over the souls of men, even though at the time it might be in the deepest debasement.

When Nominalism obtained supremacy in theology and in the Church, the ground was prepared for the threefold development of doctrine in the future: Post-Tridentine Catholicism, Protestantism and Socinianism are to be understood from this point of view.²

Nominalism exhibits on one side a number of outstanding excellences: it had come to see that religion is something different from knowledge and philosophy; it had also discovered the importance of the concrete as compared with hollow abstrac-

¹ Even the sufficiency of the Bible was doubted by Duns (against Thomas).

² Nominalism only achieved its position in the Church after a hard struggle. From the days of Roscellin it was viewed with suspicion, and the appearing of Occam in its support could not be in its favour (Occam's writings prohibited in 1389 by the University of Paris). But from the middle of the fourteenth century it established itself, and even Dominicans — although the controversy between Thomists and Scotists continued — became advocates of it. Indeed, when Wyclif and other Reformers (Augustinians) again adopted realism, a new chapter began. Realism now, from the close of the fourteenth century, became ecclesiastically suspected (on account of the spiritualism, the determinism, and the intellectualistic mysticism, which seemed to endanger ecclesiasticism). The most important representatives of Post-Scotisti: Scholasticism are Petrus Aureolus, John of Baconthorp, Durandus, and Occam. On the "theological mode of thought and the general mental habit" of these scholars, see Werner, *Nachscotist. Scholastik*, p. 21 ff. On the Thomist scrutiny applied by Capreolus to Post-Scotistic Scholasticism, see *ibid.*, p. 438 ff. That Nominalism, in spite of its dogmatic probabilism, did not, at least at the beginning, weaken dogma, is best illustrated by the fanatical attack on the peculiar doctrine of Pope John XXII.

tions, and to its perception of this it gave brilliant expression,¹ e.g., in psychology; through recognising the importance of will, and giving prominence to this factor even in God, it strongly accentuated the personality of God, and so prepared the way for the suppression of that Areopagite theology, from which the danger always arose of its causing the world and the reasonable creature to disappear in God;² finally, by placing restrictions on speculation it brought out more clearly the positiveness of historic religion. But this progress in discernment was dearly purchased by two heavy sacrifices: first, with the surrender of the assurance that an absolute accordant knowledge could be attained, there was also surrendered the assurance of the categorical imperative, of the strict necessity of the moral in God, and of the moral law; and secondly, among the historic magnitudes to which it submitted itself, it included the Church with its entire apparatus—*the commands of the religious and moral are arbitrary, but the commands of the Church are absolute*. The haven of rest amidst the doubts and uncertainties of the understanding and of the soul *is the authority of the Church*.

Neither the latter nor the former was, strictly speaking, an innovation.³ Through the institution of penance an uncertainty about the moral had for long become widely diffused: it was only a question of expressing in theory what had for centuries been the fundamental thought in practice—*the sovereign right of casuistry*.⁴ Moreover, the contradictory mode of procedure,

¹ See Siebeck, *Die Anfänge der neueren Psychologie in der Scholastik*, in der *Zeitschr. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik*, 1888, 1889.

² Duns also rejected the Thomist idea that in created things the absolute divine original form is pictured forth, and, under the direction of Aristotle, passed over to a naturalistic doctrine of the world.

³ Still less, as frequently happens, is the Jesuit Order, with its casuistic dogmatic and ethic, to be made accountable here, as if it was the first to introduce the innovation. This Order simply entered into the inheritance of mediæval Nominalism.

⁴ For the speculative Scholasticism there was substituted the empirico-casuistic. The Nominalists sought to show, with an immense expenditure of acuteness and speculation, that there could not be a speculative Scholasticism. When they had furnished this "proof," there remained over purely hollow forms, which were bound to collapse, or could be maintained only through the compulsory force of a powerful institution. What was *not* brought within the view of Nominalism, in spite of all its progress, was *the idea of personality* (see for the first time the Renaissance), and consequently the *person of Christ* (see the Reformation), and above all, *history* (see

which the great Schoolmen (Thomas at the head of them), in obedience to the spirit of jurisprudence, applied to each particular dogma and each ethical position, necessarily had the effect of shaking the conviction that there is something absolutely valid. If, as any page of Thomas will suggest, from two to twelve grounds can be adduced for every heresy and for many immoral assertions—if, *e.g.*, there are a dozen grounds on which it may be alleged that simplex fornicatio is *no* mortal sin (Thomas), how can the belief be firmly maintained in face of this that it must nevertheless be regarded as such?

From the conflict between yes and no will there always result certainty on behalf of the answer which the dogmatic theologian prefers? How can certainty be reckoned on at all, so long as there is still *one* ground only for the counter position, and so long as the *one* ground cannot be shown which alone is valid? Nominalism only continued here what Realism had begun; it merely did still more in the way of differentiating and distinguishing; it extended the recognised method of the acute advocate to ever new fields, to the doctrine of God, to the doctrines of creation and providence, to the holiness and the honour of God, to sin and reconciliation, and it always came to the conclusions, (1) that all is relative and arbitrary—but even in Thomas's dogmatic already much that is very important in the doctrine of religion is only "*conveniens*"; (2) that the doctrines of revealed religion conflict with natural theology, with the thought of the understanding about God and the world (doctrine of double truth). Finally, when Nominalism taught that, since belief (*credere*) and understanding (*intelligere*) cannot be reconciled, there must be a blind surrender to the authority of the Church, and that it is just in this blind obedience that both the nature, and also the *merit*, of faith consist, here also it only wrought out fully a general Catholic theorem; for Tertullian had as little doubt as Thomas that all faith begins with sub-

the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). For it the place of history was still occupied always by the *rigid Church*. It is not otherwise still to-day with the science of the Jesuits. They consistently trifle with history, and can treat it, in the tone of a man of the world, with a certain amusement and easy scorn, when once they have established the things which the conception of the Church requires to be established.

mission. Though afterwards—from the time of Augustine—many considerations had been adduced for modifying the original theorem and changing faith into inward assent and love, nevertheless the old position remained the same, that faith is originally obedience, and that in this it has its initial merit. But if it is obedience, then it is *fides implicita*, *i.e.*, submission is enough. *When the later Nominalism declared with increasing distinctness the sufficiency of fides implicita, or laid it at the foundation of its theological reflections*, because many truths of faith, taken in general, or as dealt with by individuals, do not admit of being accepted in any other way, *it only gave to an old Catholic thought a thoroughly logical expression*;¹ for the danger of transforming

¹ The juristic Popes from Gregory VII. onwards, especially the Popes of the thirteenth century, anticipated the Nominalist doctrine of *fides implicita*: “In his commentary on the Decretals (in lib. I., c. 1 de summa trinitate et fide Catholica) Innocent IV. laid down two momentous rules. First, that it is enough for the laity to believe in a God who recompenses, but with regard to everything else, of dogma or moral doctrine, merely to believe implicitly, that is to think, and to say, I believe what the Church believes. Second, that a cleric must obey even a Pope who issues an unrighteous command” (Döllinger, Akad. Vorträge II., p. 419). The latter position does not interest us here; there is interest, however, in the more precise definition of the former given by Innocent, (1) that the lower clergy, who cannot carry on the study of theology, are to be regarded as laymen; only they must believe in transubstantiation; (2) that an error with regard to Christian doctrine (the doctrine of the Trinity even) does not do harm to a layman, if he at the same time believes (believes erroneously) that he holds to the doctrine of the Church. Ritschl (*Fides implicita*, 1890) has dealt more minutely with this important doctrine. He shows that it originated from a passage of the Lombard (l. III., dist. 25). But the terminology, the range and the validity of the *fides implicita* remained uncertain among the theologians and Popes till the end of the thirteenth century. The great teachers of the thirteenth century (above all Thomas) confined it within narrow limits, and in this contradicted the Popes (even Innocent III. comes under consideration; see Ritschl, p. 5 f.). Even Duns differs little from Thomas (p. 20 ff.). But Occam reverted to the exposition of Innocent IV. (p. 30 f.); nay, although he is a doctor, he claims *fides implicita* for himself (with regard to the doctrine of the Eucharist): “quidquid Romana ecclesia credit, hoc solum et non aliud vel explicitè vel implicitè credo.” Occam wishes to get free play for his doctrine of the Eucharist, which diverges from the traditional view; he saves himself therefore by roundly acknowledging the Church doctrine, that he may then make his divergence appear as a theological experiment. Here therefore the *fides implicita* is turned to account for another purpose. It is remarkable that in its original purpose it was rejected (no doubt on account of Thomas) by Gregory XI. (against Raymund Lullus); but by Biel it is again accepted, and treated apparently with reserve, but in the end there is seen just in it the proof of *fides* as *infusa* (as the work of God). Neither Occam nor Biel wishes by this to treat dogma ironically, on the contrary they show their want

religion into an ecclesiastical regime was at no time absent from Western Catholicism.¹

What has already been briefly hinted at above may be distinctly stated here—the problem was *the elimination of Augustinianism from the ecclesiastical doctrine*. The whole turning from Realism to Nominalism can be represented *theologically* under this heading. Augustine falls and Aristotle rises—ostensibly not in theology indeed, but only in the field of world-knowledge, yet as a fact in theology as well; for no one can keep

of inner freedom in relation to dogma; but when Laurentius Valla winds up his critical supplementings with the assertion that he believes as mother Church does, the irony is manifest. In what way the *fides implicita* extended into the period of the Reformation has been shown by Ritschl, p. 40 ff., who also traces out the doctrine among later Catholic teachers. That there is an element of truth in the recognition of the *fides implicita* is easily seen; but it is not easy to define theologically what is right in it. Where value is attached to the mere act of obedience, or where, for that part, there is also something of merit attributed to it, the limit of what is correct is transgressed.

¹ Into the philosophy of Duns Scotus (see Werner, l.c., and the summary in the article by Dorner in Herzog's R.-E., 2 ed.) and of Occam (see Wagemann in the R.-E.) I cannot here enter further. Important theological doctrines of both will fall to be spoken of in the following section. It is well known that Duns Scotus himself was not yet a Nominalist, but prepared the way for applying this theory of knowledge to dogmatics. He already emphasised the independence of the secular sciences (even of metaphysics) as over against theology, while in general he brought out much more clearly the independence of the world (in continual discussions with Thomas) as over against God. To balance this he gives wide scope to the arbitrary will of God as over against the world. Yet that this opinion may not lead to everything being plunged in uncertainty, the knowledge of God derived from revelation (as distinguished from rational knowledge) is strongly accentuated. In Duns we still observe the struggle of the principle of reason with the principle of arbitrariness tempered by revelation and made conceivable; in Occam the latter has triumphed. To the understanding, which Occam brings into court against dogma, the task is assigned of showing that logic and physics cannot be applied to the articles of faith, and to the supernatural objects that answer to them. All doctrines of faith are full of contradictions; but so also it must be, according to Occam; for only in this way do they show themselves to be declarations about a super-sensible world, which to the understanding is a miracle. This theologian has been misunderstood, when his criticism of dogma has been taken as suggesting the irony of the doubter. If, after proving the doctrine of transubstantiation impossible, he finally holds it as more probable than any other doctrine, because the Church has fixed it, and because the omnipotence of God appears in it most unlimitedly, *i.e.*, because it is the most irrational doctrine that can be thought of, in this he is severely in earnest, however much he might like to maintain his own dialectic doctrine on this point. And what holds good of the doctrine of the Supper holds good also of all other cardinal

metaphysics and theology entirely asunder, and the theological doctrines of the Nominalists prove that, while they have reverently called a halt before the old dogmas, after having shown them irrational, on the other hand they have revised in a new-fashioned way the circle of the new, and really living, doctrines (Sacraments, appropriation of salvation). This work directed itself against Augustine, in its directing itself against Thomas.

We have frequently pointed out already, that the history of Church doctrine in the West was a much disguised history of struggle against Augustine. His spirit and his piety undoubtedly rose far above the average of ecclesiasticism, and the new discoveries which he made were in many ways inconvenient to the Church as an ecclesiastical institution, and did not harmonise with its tendencies. No doubt the Church had accepted Augustinianism, but with the secret reservation that it was to be moulded by its own mode of thought. We have seen to what extent there was success in that in the period that ends, and in the period that begins, with Gregory the Great. Gottschalk already experienced what it costs in Catholicism to represent Augustinianism. In the time that followed there was developed in the sacramental and penance systems a practice and mode of thought that was always the more plainly in conflict with Augustinianism; all the more important was the fact that the Dominican Order, and especially Thomas, sought to rejuvenate the theology of Augustine. Duns Scotus and the Nominalist theology directed themselves in the first instance against Augustine's philosophy of religion, against those doctrines of the first and last things, which gravitated so strongly to pantheism. But in controverting these doctrines, and shaking confidence in the doctrine of God as the All-One, they also

doctrines of the Church. Unreasonableness and authority are in a certain sense the stamp of truth. That is also a positivism, but it is the positivism whose sins have fully developed. Here, too, it applies, that one abyss calls up another. The Pre-Nominalist theology had loaded reason with a burden of speculative monstrosities, and at the same time required it to bear the whole weight of religion; the sobered ratio abandoned entirely the thought of a *λογική λατρεία*, became always more prepared to recognise the faith of ignorant submission as religion, and fell back on knowledge of the world. On Biel, see Linsenmaun in the Tüb. Quartalschr., 1865.

shook confidence, for themselves and others, in the Augustinian doctrines of grace and sin, which certainly had the closest connection with his doctrine of God. These Nominalists, who (following Duns Scotus) always insisted that reason relates to the realm of the worldly, and that in spiritual things there must simply be a following the traditional authority of revelation, that the understanding, therefore, must be left out of play, really wrought in a most vigorous way, and with the utmost use of the "understanding," within the lines of the Church doctrine. Under certain circumstances "not to speculate" leads also to a metaphysic, or at least does not hinder a traditional speculation from being corrected and transformed in many of its details, and so also in its entire cast. At any rate this principle did not prevent the Nominalist theologians from revising the existing dogma under the protection of authority. But not only did this work now acquire an entirely external, formalistic character, but there were also introduced into everything the principles of an arbitrary morality, of the "conveniens" too, the expedient and the relative. One might say, that the principles of a cosmopolitan diplomacy in matters of religion and morals were applied to objective religion and to subjective religious life. God is not quite so strict, and not quite so holy, as He might be imagined to be; sin is not quite so bad as it appears to be to the very tender conscience; guilt is not immeasurably great; redemption by Christ, taken as a whole, and in its parts, is very serviceable, but not really necessary; faith does not require to be full surrender, and even of love a certain amount is really enough. That is the "Aristotelianism" of the Nominalistic Schoolmen, which Luther declared to be the root of all mischief in the Church; but that is also the "Aristotelianism" which must be most welcome to the hierarchy; for here they hold the key of the position, seeing that they determine how strict God is, how heinous sin is, etc. That at the same time they neither can nor will part entirely with Augustinianism (Thomism) was remarked above. But they determine where it is to come in, and they showed that they watched jealously the extent to which it was applied.

In the Pelagianism and Probabilism of Nominalism there lies

the express apostasy from Augustinianism.¹ But just because the apostasy was so manifest, there could not fail to be a certain reaction—though certainly no longer a strong one—in the Church. Not only did the Dominican Order, in their defending the theology of their great teacher, Thomas, persistently defend Augustine also (though not, as a rule, in the most important points), but men also appeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries who observed the *Pelagian* tendency of Nominalism, and strenuously resisted it in the spirit of Augustine.² Here Bradwardine must first be mentioned (ob. 1349) who placed the *entire* Augustine, together with the predestination doctrine, in strong opposition to the Pelagian tendency of the period.³ On

¹ Also from the ancient Church and from dogma in its original sense as a whole. Whoever transforms all dogmatic and ethic into casuistry, thereby proves that he is no more inwardly, but only outwardly, bound.

² Werner has the credit of having described the reaction of Augustinianism in the third vol. of his "Scholastik des Späteren Mittelalters." Yet his account is by no means complete. In pp. 1-232 he treats of "the representation of the Scholastic Augustinianism given by the mediæval Augustinian-Hermit School," *i.e.*, almost exclusively of the doctrines of Ægidius (ob. 1315), the great defender of Thomas, and of Gregory of Rimini; then, in pp. 234-306, of Bradwardine's doctrine. Stöckl also goes into the Augustinianism of the fifteenth century, but in his own way. Moreover, Werner will not admit a rejuvenated Augustinianism. "The earlier and later attempts to obtain a specific Augustinianism fall under different points of view, according as they signify a reaction against the enfeebling and externalising of the Christian ecclesiastical thought of salvation, or the opposition, supported by the name of Augustine, of a resuscitated one-sided Platonism to Aristotelianism, or, finally, as they arose from a vague fusion of the respect for Augustine in the Church generally, with the authority of the head and leader of a particular school. It was to such a vague fusion that the Mediæval Order-theology of the Augustinian Hermits (?) owed its origin, which came into existence as schola Ægidiana, and, under many changes, continued to exist till last century" (p. 8 f.).

³ See Lechler, *Wiclif I. Bd.*, and the same author's monograph on Bradwardine, 1863. Bradwardine made a further endeavour to create a philosophy adequate to the Christian conception of God, and on that account went back on the Augustinian Anselmic speculation as regards an absolutely necessary and perfect being, from which all that is and can be is to be deduced. But yet he shows himself to be dependent on Duns in this, that he represents God and the world exclusively under the contrast of the necessary and the contingent (see his book *de causa dei adv. Pelag.*, Werner pp. 255 ff. 299), while in other respects also very strong influences of Nominalism are discernible in him. Yet these influences disappear behind the main tendency, which is directed to showing the "immediate unity and coincidence of theological and philosophical thought," and to restoring Augustine's doctrine of grace together with Determinism. ("All willing in God is absolute substance.") Werner will have it

him Wyclif was dependent as a theologian, and as Huss took all his theological thoughts from Wyclif, and introduced them into Bohemia and Germany, Bradwardine is really to be signalized as the theologian who gave the impulse to the Augustinian reactions that accompanied the history of the Church till the time of Staupitz and Luther, and that prepared the way for the Reformation. In the fifteenth century the men were numerous, and some of them influential too, who, standing on the shoulders of Augustine, set themselves in opposition to Pelagianism. But they neither overthrew, nor wished to overthrow, the strong basis of the Nominalist doctrine, the authority of the Church. Moreover, Augustinianism exercised an influence in many ways on the reform parties and sects; but as no new theology resulted, so also all these efforts led to no Reformation. The Augustinians still allowed a wide scope to the *fides implicita* and the Sacraments, because even they believed in the idol of Church authority. The reigning theology remained unshaken so long as it was not assailed at the root. Even attacks so energetic as those of Wesel and Wessel passed without general effect.¹ But the fact is unmistakable, that in the course of the fifteenth century the Nominalist Scholasticism fell steadily into disrepute. While the period revelled in new, fresh impressions and perceptions, that theological art became always more formalistic, and its barren industry was always the more keenly felt. While the rediscovered Platonism was being absorbed with delight, that art still lived under the impulses of the Aristotle who had arisen 250 years before. The spirit of the Renaissance and of Humanism was in its innermost nature alien to the old Scholasticism; for it had no wish for formulæ,

that he has proved that Bradwardine is no Thomist, but that he reverts to the pre-Thomist Scholasticism. That is right in so far as Bradwardine is a logical Augustinian. But Werner has an interest in emphasising as strongly as possible the peripatetic elements in Thomas; for only when these are emphasised in a one-sided way can Thomas continue to be the normal theologian. "According to the 'universal feeling' the Aristotelian basis was indispensable for the ends of a methodically conducted theological scholastic science, and as a rational restraint upon giving a false internal character to the Christian ecclesiastical religious consciousness" (p. 305).

¹ Even the rejection of all philosophy and of the whole of Scholasticism, of which we have an instance in Pupper of Goch (O. Clemen, l.c. p. 135 ff.)—whom Luther described as "Vere Germanus et gnosis theologus"—changed nothing.

sylogisms, and authorities; it wished neither the darkness nor the illumination of the "Aristotelian" Scholasticism, but was eager for *life*, that can be *reproduced in feeling*, and for perceptions that elevate above the common world and the common art of living.¹ For the poets and humanists—though not for all, yet certainly for the most of them—the ecclesiastical theology, as represented in the Scholastic labours of the Schoolmen, was like stagnant, filthy water. But still there was always the endeavour to find the redeemers in antiquity. *Plato*, at length the true *Plato*, was discovered, revered and deified. It was not by chance that the Platonic reaction coincided with the Augustinian in the fifteenth century; for the two great spirits of ancient times had an elective affinity—*Plato's Dialogues* and *Augustine's Confessions* are not incapable of being united. The influence of *Plato* and *Augustine* guided all the movements in the fields of science and theology in the fifteenth century that rose against a Scholasticism which, in spite of its rich perceptions, had become fossilised and hollow, and had lost touch with the needs of the inner life and of the present time. The reflection of the Germans was more serious than that of the Italians and French. In the last third of the fifteenth century Germany took the lead in thought and scholarship. The Romanic nations did not produce in the fifteenth century a man like *Nicolas of Cusa*.² *Nicolas* was the precursor and leader of all the distinguished men who, in the following century, starting from the Platonic view of the world, brought so strong and fresh a current of real illuminism into the world. Though fantastical in many ways and even greatly interested in magic and ghosts, some of them at once discoverers and charlatans, these men laid, nevertheless, the basis for the scientific (even experimental) observation of nature, and were the restorers of scientific thought. Assurance of the unity of all things and the bold flight of imagination—both of which had been lost by scholastic wisdom—made the new

¹ Burckhardt, *Die Cultur der Renaissance in Italien*. 4. Aufl., 1885. Voigt, *Wiederbelebung des class. Alterthums*. 2 Aufl. 2 Bde., 1880 f.

² See Stöckl, l.c., Janssen, *Gesch. des deutschen Volkes* Bd. I., Clemens, *Giordano Bruno* u. N. v. K., 1847. Storz, *Die specul. Gotteslehre des N. v. K. in the theol. Quartalschr.*, 1873, I. *Laurentius Valla* is superior to *Nicolas* as a critic, but otherwise not on a level with him.

science possible. This science by no means arose because Nominalism, or the philosophy of the great student of nature, Aristotle, as it was then treated, was always growing more empirical, and gradually developed itself into exact science, but a new spirit passed over the withered leaves of Scholasticism, scattered them boldly to the four winds, and derived confidence and power for gathering out of nature and history their secrets, from the living speculations of Plato that grasp the whole man, from the original historic sources now discovered, and from converse with the living reality.

By theology little advantage, certainly, was derived from this in the fifteenth century. The Italian Humanists, the fathers of this European movement, practically took nothing to do with it—at the most they instituted some historical investigations, with the view of annoying the priests and monks (Laurentius Valla : favours from Constantine, origin of the Apostolic Symbol, writings of the Areopagite)—and even the Germans made no real contributions to progress.¹ One could help all other sciences by going back upon antiquity, but not theology. What it could learn from Plato and the Neoplatonists it had learned long before. When men like Nicolas of Cusa sought to release it from the embraces of the Schoolmen, they themselves knew of no better form for it than that which had been given to it by Augustine and Mystics like Eckhart. But trial had been made of this form of long time. Just because it appeared unsatisfactory, and there was an unwillingness any longer to breathe in this fine fog, there had been, in course of time, a passing over to Nominalism. Now, there must be a reverting to the beginning—though it might be better understood. Another prescription was not offered. Theology seemed doomed to move helplessly in a circle; fundamentally it remained as it was; for the iron ecclesiastical authority remained. Then came the help, not from Aristotle, nor even from Plato and Augustine, but from the conscience of a Mendicant Monk.

But what the Renaissance and Humanism did *indirectly* for theology² must not be ignored. While it was not really

¹ Yet, "German patriotism effected a union in many ways of the anti-Romish traditions with Humanistic Illuminism" (Loofs).

² Drews, *Humanismus und Reformation*, 1887.

demolished by them, and still much less re-shaped, yet for the future re-shaping they certainly rendered most valuable services. The sources of history were gradually disclosed for it also, and the Humanist Erasmus not only laid the foundation of textual criticism of the New Testament and scientific patrology, but carried them at once to a high state of perfection. From a taste for the original, criticism grew up. What had died out in the Church with Origen, nay, in some measure even before Origen, or what—keeping out of view a few Antiochians—had never really developed themselves strongly, namely, historic sense and historic exegesis, developed themselves now. The Reformation was to reap the benefit of them; but by the Reformation also they were soon to be swallowed up again. For the history of theology, and of dogmas, in the strictest sense of the term, Humanism was otherwise quite unfruitful. Theology was put aside by it with a respectful recognition, or with an air of cool superiority, or with saucy ridicule. Scarcely anyone approached it with serious criticism. Erasmus aimed at giving it a humanistic ennoblement and freeing it from restrictions. When the Reformation dawned, he pronounced, among other things, the controversy about indulgences to be a monks' quarrel, or a delightful dilemma for causing stir among the parsons. When things then grew serious and a decision had to be made, it became apparent that the Franciscan ideal, in peculiar combination with antique reserve and humanistic worldliness, with silent hatred of dogma and Church, and external submission, had a stronger hold on many aspiring souls than a liking for the gospel.¹ The scholar, besides, would not let himself be disturbed by the din of the "Lutheran rogues." Theological doctrine was held to be something indifferent: "*Quieta non movere*"—(let things that are at rest not be stirred)—or, at least, only in the form of a learned passage of arms. The avenger was at the door; the following 150 years showed the terrified scholars to a frightful extent that theology will not be mocked.

¹ Dilthey (*Archiv. f. Gesch. d. Philos.* 5 Bd., p. 381 ff.), in a way that seems to me substantially correct, but somewhat forced, has described Erasmus as the founder of theological Rationalism with accommodation to the Church. Erasmus was too many-sided, and too uncertain of principles, to found anything beyond methods.

4. *The Moulding of Dogma in Scholasticism.*

In the Scholasticism of the thirteenth century the Latin Church attained what the Greek Church attained in the eighth century—a uniform systematic exhibition of its faith. This exhibition had as its presuppositions, *first*, Holy Scripture and the articuli fidei, as these had been formulated at the Councils; *second*, Augustinianism; *third*, the ecclesiastical (papal) decisions and the whole development of ecclesiasticism from the ninth century; *fourth*, the Aristotelian philosophy.

We have shown in the third and fourth chapters of Vol. V. how the old scheme of Christian doctrine had undergone a trenchant modification at the hands of Augustine, but how, in its ultimate basis—as regards the final aim of religion and theology—it did not lose its recognised validity, its form, rather, having only become more complicated. While Augustine described the influences of grace that operate in the Sacraments as the influences of *love*, he allowed the old view of the Sacraments to remain, namely, that they prepare for, and help to secure, the enjoyment of God. But he at the same time gave the most powerful impetus to a dual development of piety and ecclesiastical doctrine; for the forces of love that operate in the Sacraments establish also the “kingdom of righteousness” on earth, produce in this way the life in love that corresponds with the “law of Christ,” and qualify the individual for those good works which establish merit before God and create a claim for salvation.

In this last turn of thought Augustine had subordinated (by means of the intermediate idea, “*nostra merita dei munera*” [our merits gifts of God]), his new view of divine grace as a *gratia gratis data* (grace freely given) to the old, chiefly Western, view of religion, as a combination of law, performance, and reward, and in the period that followed this subordinating process always continued to be carried further. *Grace (in the form of the Sacraments) and merit (law and performance) are the two centres of the curve in the mediæval conception of Christianity.* But this curve is entirely embedded in faith in the Church; for

since to the Church (as was not doubted) the Sacraments, and the power of the keys dependent on them, were entrusted, the Church was not merely the authority for the whole combination, but was in a very real sense the continued working of Christ Himself, and the body of Christ, which is enhypostatically united to Him. In this sense mediæval theology is *science of the Church* (Ecclesiastik), although it had not much to say about the Church. But on the other hand, at least till Nominalism triumphed, this theology never lost sight of the fundamental Augustinian aim: "Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino" (I desire to know God and the soul. Nothing more? No, nothing whatever), *i.e.*, it never discarded the view that in all theology what is aimed at ultimately is *exclusively* the cognition of God and of the relation of the individual soul to Him.¹ It was the intermingling of theology as ecclesiasticism with theology as nourishment for the soul that produced within mediæval theology its internal discords, and lent to it its charm. From this intermingling also there is to be explained the twofold end here set before the Christian religion, although to the theologians only one of the ends was consciously present: religion and theology must on the one hand lead the individual to salvation (*visio dei* or surrender of the will), but it must on the other hand build up on earth the kingdom of virtue and righteousness, which is the empirical Church, and bring all powers into subjection to this kingdom.²

¹ In Nominalism this became otherwise. The exhibition of the ecclesiastical doctrine became more and more an end in itself, and was detached from the philosophy of religion. That on this account the originality and independence of the Christian religion as a historic phenomenon came to view again more plainly, is not to be denied.

² In their definition of salvation or of the *finis* theologice, the Schoolmen exhibit a Mystic, *i.e.*, an Augustinian, *i.e.*, an old Catholic tendency. The *fruitio dei* is held to be the final end, whether it is realised in the intellect or in quiescence of the will in God. For this individualistic mode of viewing salvation, which is indifferent to the moral destiny of man, the Church is either not taken into account at all, or is taken into account simply as a means, and as an auxiliary institution. Only in so far as man conceives of himself as a being that is *earthly*, bound to time, and must train himself, are all his ideals, and the forces that render him aid, included for him in the Church (salvation in time is salvation in the Church), and he must reverence the Church, as it is, as the mother of faith, as the saving institution, nay, as the *regnum Christi*. But this *regnum* has in the world beyond a form totally different from its present form.

Augustine utilised in quite a new way the *articuli fidei*; for him they are no longer faith itself, but, re-shaping them in many ways, he builds up faith by means of them. Yet their authority was not thereby shaken, but in a certain way was still further increased, inasmuch as the *external* authority became greater in the degree in which the internal—that faith identified itself *exclusively* with them—became less. This was exactly how things continued to move on in the Middle Ages. It was solely the articles of faith of ecclesiastical antiquity that were, in the strict sense, dogmas. Only the doctrine of transubstantiation succeeded in winning for itself equal dignity with the old dogmas,¹ by the *quid pro quo* that it is implied in the doctrine of the incarnation. When in this way the doctrine of transubstantiation took its place side by side with the old dogmas, everything really was gained; for by this link of attachment the whole sacramental system might be drawn up to the higher level of absolute Christian doctrine. This, too, afterwards took place, although, prior to the Council of Trent, the distinction was never made in detail between what belongs to dogma and what is simply a portion of theology, and even after the Council of Trent the Church wisely avoided the distinction. It is thus explained how, about the year 1500, no one except the most decided papists could affirm how far the province of necessary faith in the Church really extended.

The task of Scholasticism, so far as it was dogmatic theology, was a threefold one. Following Augustine, it had to shape the

In this whole view Scholasticism nowhere passed beyond Augustine. The relation is not drawn between the aim to be realised in the earthly, and the aim to be realised in the heavenly Church. *In the last resort* Roman Catholicism was then, and is also to-day, no phenomenon with but one meaning, as the Greek Church is, and as Protestantism might be. At one time it points its members to a contemplation that moves in the line of knowledge, love, and asceticism, a contemplation that is as neutral to the Church as to every association among men, and to everything earthly; at another time it directs men to recognise in the earthly Church their highest goods and their proper aim. These directions can only be followed alternately, not together. In consequence of this, Roman Catholics maintain two notions of the Church, which are neutral towards each other, the invisible communion of the elect and the papal Church.

¹ See the Symbol of 1215.

old *articuli fidei* so that they would adjust themselves to the elliptic line drawn round the sacrament and merit; it had to revise the doctrine of the Sacraments, which had come to it from Augustine in an extremely imperfect form;¹ and it had to gather from observation the principles of present-day Church practice, and to bring these into accord, on the one hand with the *articuli fidei*, raised to the level of theology, and with the doctrine of the Sacraments, and on the other hand with Augustinianism. This task became more complicated from the fact that the Schoolmen—at least the earlier—uniformly combined dogmatics with philosophy of religion, and thus introduced into the former all the questions of metaphysics, as rising out of the general state of knowledge at the time. But *this great task was really faithfully carried out by mediæval theology*. That theology fulfilled the claims that were made upon it; indeed, there has probably never been a period in history when, after hard labour, theology stood so securely in command of the situation, *i.e.*, of its age, as then. At the same time it knew how to maintain for itself until the fifteenth century the impression of a certain roundedness and unity, and yet left room, as the contrast between the Franciscan and Dominican dogmatists shows, for different modes of development. Yet on the other hand it must not be denied that the opinion here expressed by no means applies when we deal with the relation between piety and theology. In the case of Thomas, it is true, the claims of the latter and former still coincide, although not so perfectly as in the Greek Church at the time of the Cappadocians and of Cyril. But from the close of the thirteenth century piety and theology manifestly held an increasingly strained relation to each other. The former recognised itself always less clearly in the latter. They were one, it is true, in their ultimate ground (*finis religionis*, authority of the Church); even the most devoted piety was not really able to free itself from these bonds. But starting from the common basis, theology unfolded a tendency to treat the holy as something authoritative, external and made easy by the Church, and this tendency piety viewed with growing suspicion and annoy-

¹ In this lies the greatest importance of Scholasticism within the history of dogma.

ance. In the doctrines of the Sacraments and of grace, as Scholasticism gave fuller shape to them—developing germs which were not wanting even in Thomas—the strain between theology and piety reached clearest expression. The Augustinian reactions from the middle of the fourteenth century, at one time noisy in their course, at another time moving on silently and steadily, were the result of this strain. *The official theology of the fifteenth century must be recognised only in a relative way as the expression of the true Catholic piety of the period.* This applies even to Tridentine Catholicism, and holds true to the present day. The doctrine, as it is, is not the sphere in which vital Catholic faith lives. But because its foundations are also the foundations of this faith, the faith lets itself in the end be satisfied with this doctrine.

As we have not to do with the philosophy of religion, we must confine ourselves in what follows to describing the scholastic revision of the old *articuli fidei*, the scholastic doctrine of the Sacraments, and the scholastic discussion of Augustinianism as related to the new Church principles, which led finally to an entire dissolution of the Pauline Augustinian doctrine. With regard to the first of these points the statement can be quite brief, seeing that in the revision of the old *articuli fidei* theological doctrines were dealt with which, as scientifically unfolded, never acquired a universal dogmatic importance, and seeing that this revision leads over at many points into the philosophy of religion.

A. The Revision of the Traditional Articuli Fidei.

I. The article “de deo” (on God) was the fundamental and cardinal article.¹ In the strictly realistic Scholasticism the Areopagitic Augustinian conception of God was held as valid: God as the absolute substance. Where this conception was adhered to, its absolute necessity for thought was also asserted (Anselm’s ontological proof,²) and a high value was ascribed to

¹ See the excellent selection of passages from the sources in Münscher-Coelln II., I, § 118, 119. Schwane, l.c., p. 122 ff.

² Anselm’s discussions of the conception of God, in which there is the first step of

the proofs for God. Through the acquaintance with Aristotle, however, the Areopagite conception of God was restricted, which had developed itself in Scotus Erigena, Amalrich of Bena and David of Dinanto, as well as among the adherents of the Averrhoistic Aristotelianism, into pantheism. The cosmological proofs, to which preference was more and more given,¹ led also to a stricter distinguishing between God and the creature, and Thomas himself, although the Areopagite Augustinian conception of God is still for him fundamental, stoutly combated pantheism.² Following Anselm, Thomas also linked the conception of God as the absolute substance with that of self-conscious thought, adopted, still further, from Aristotle the definition of God as *actus purus*, and thus gave the conception a more living and personal shape. But he had at the same time the very deepest interest in emphasising absolute sufficiency and necessity in God; for only the necessary can be known with certainty; but it is on certain knowledge that salvation, *i.e.*, the *visio dei*, depends. Thomas accordingly now conceived of God, not only as necessary being, but also as an end for Himself, so that the world, which He creates in goodness, is entirely subordinated to His own purpose, a purpose which could realise itself indeed even without the world.³ Yet Duns already combated (against Richard of St. Victor, see also Anselm, *Monolog.*) the notion of a *necessary existence due to itself*, and thereby really abandoned all proofs of God:⁴ the infinite is not cognisable by demonstration, and hence can only be

advance beyond the Areopagite conception, are not taken note of at all by the Lombard, who adhered simply to the patristic tradition. Thomas is the first to adopt Anselm's speculations.

¹ See Thomas, P. I., Q. 2, Art. 3, where the cosmological argument appears in a threefold form.

² Ritschl, *Gesch. Studien z. christl. L. v. Gott*, Jahrb. f. deutsche Theol., 1865, p. 277 ff., Joh. Delitzsch, *Die Gotteslehre des Thomas*, 1870. Ritschl has shown (see also *Rechtfert. u. Versöhnungslehre*, Bd. I., 2 Aufl., p. 58 ff.,) that the Aristotelian conception had already a strong influence on Thomas.

³ *Summa*, P. I., Q. 19, Art. 1, 2.

⁴ In *Sentent. Lomb.*, I. Dist. 2, Q. 2, Art. I. On Duns' doctrine of knowledge and of science, see Werner, *Duns Scotus*, p. 180 ff.; *ibid.*, p. 331 ff., on his doctrine of God, which only admits of an a posteriori ascertainment of the qualities of the divine Being.

believed in on authority. Occam made as energetic an attack on the "primum movens immobile" (prime immovable mover) and likewise fell back on authority. But with the impossibility of demonstrating the infinite, and of giving life by speculation to the notion of the "necessarium ex se ipso," there disappeared also for Nominalism the conception of the necessity of the inner determinedness of the infinite Being, of whom authority taught. God is not summum esse (supreme being) and summa intelligentia (supreme intelligence) in the sense in which intelligence belongs to the creature, but He is, as measured by the understanding of the creature, the unlimited almighty will, the cause of the world, a cause, however, which could operate quite otherwise from the way in which it does. God is thus the absolutely free will, who simply wills because He wills to, *i.e.*, a cognisable ground of the will does not exist. From this point of view the doctrine of God becomes as uncertain as, above all, the doctrine of grace. Occam went so far as to declare monotheism to be only more probable than polytheism; for what can be strictly proved is either only the notion of a single supreme Being, but not His existence, or the existence of relatively supreme beings, but not the one-ness. Accordingly the attributes of God were quite differently treated in the Thomist and in the Scotist schools. In the former they were strictly derived from a necessary principle, but only to be cancelled again in the end, as identical in the one substance, in the latter they were relatively determined; in the former—in accordance with the thesis of the summum esse—a virtual existence of God in the world was assumed, and in the last analysis there was no distinguishing between the existence of God for Himself and His existence for the world, in the latter—as the world is a free product of God's will, entirely disjoined from God—only an ideal presence of God is taught. As can easily be seen, the contrast is ultimately determined by different ideas of the position of man and of religion. For the Thomists, the idea is that of dependence on *God Himself*, who comprehends and sustains all things, for the Scotists the idea is that of independence in relation to God. It certainly meant an important advance upon Thomas when God was strictly con-

ceived of by Duns as will and person, and was distinguished from the world; but this advance becomes at once a serious disadvantage when we can no longer depend upon this God, because we are not permitted to think of Him as acting according to the highest categories of moral necessity,¹ and when, accordingly, the rule holds, that the goodness of the creature consists in surrender to the will of God, of which the motives are inscrutable, while its content is clearly given in revelation (so Duns).² The view that contemplates God as also arbitrariness, because He is will, becomes ultimately involved in the same difficulties as the view that contemplates Him as the all-determining substance, for in both cases His essence is shrouded in darkness. But the narrow way that leads to a sure and comforting knowledge of God, the way of faith in God as the Father of Jesus Christ, the Schoolmen would not follow. Therefore their whole doctrine of God, whether it be of a Thomist or of a Scotist cast, cannot be used in dogmatic. For on this point dogmatic must keep to its own field of knowledge, namely, the historic Christ, and must not fear the reproach of "blind faith" ("Köhlerglaubens," collier's faith,) if it is blind faith that God can be felt and known only from personal life—and, in a way that awakens conviction, only from the personal life of Christ. This does not exclude the truth that Thomistic Mysticism can warmly stir the fancy, and gently delude the understanding as to the baselessness of speculation. How far, as regards the conception of God, mediæval thought in Nominalism had drifted from the thought which had once given theological fixity in the Church to the articulus de deo, can best be seen when we compare the doctrine of God of Origen,

¹ Werner, l. c., p. 408: "It is a genuinely Scotist thought that the absolute divine will cannot be subjected to the standard of our ethical habits of thought (!)"

² In contrast with this, Thomas had taught (P. I., Q. 12, Art. 12) that indeed "ex sensibilibus cognitione non potest tota dei virtus cognosci et per consequens nec ejus essentia videri," but that both the existence of God and "*ea quæ necesse est ei convenire*" can be known. Duns and his disciples denied this; but, on the other hand, they asserted that God is more cognisable than the Thomists were willing to grant. The latter denied an adequate (essential) knowledge of God (cognitio quidditativa); the Scotists affirmed it, because it was not a question at all about the knowledge of an infinite intelligence, but about the knowledge of the God who is will, and who has manifested His will.

Gregory of Nyssa, or John of Damascus with that of Duns or Occam.¹ But the whole of dogmatic is dependent on the conception of God; for that conception determines both the view of salvation and the view of reconciliation.² Finally, it must be pointed out, that mediæval theology strongly emphasises the conception of God as *judge*, though this conception was not introduced by it into speculations as to the nature of God.

2. Stormy debates on the right way of understanding, and the right way of mentally representing the doctrine of the Trinity,³ had already run their course, when the Mendicant Orders made their appearance in science. The bold attempts to make the mystery more intelligible, whether by approximating to tritheism (Roscellin),⁴ or by passing over to Modalism (Abelard), were rejected in the period of Anselm and Bernard (against Gilbert).⁵ Where Augustine's treatise *De trinitate* was studied and followed, a fine Modalism introduced itself everywhere,⁶ and it was easy for any one who wished to convict another of heresy to bring the reproach of Sabellianism against his opponent who was influenced by Augustine. Even the Lombard was charged with giving too much independence to the *divina essentia*, and with thus teaching a quaternity, or a species of Sabellianism.⁷ The lesson derived in the thirteenth

¹ On this, and the acute criticism of the Aristotelian doctrine of God, see Werner, *Nachscotistische Scholastik*, p. 216 ff.

² It is a special merit of Ritschl that in his great work in the department of the history of dogma he has shown everywhere the fundamental importance of the conception of God.

³ See Münscher, § 120, Schwane, l.c. p. 152 ff., Bach, *Dogmengesch.* Bd. II., Baur, *L. v. d. Dreieinigkeit*, Bd. II.

⁴ Application of the Nominalist mode of thought; against him Anselm; see Reuter I., p. 134 f.; Deutsch, Abelard, p. 256 f.

⁵ There was a disposition to detect even tritheism in Abelard; on his doctrine of the Trinity, see Deutsch, p. 259 ff. Abelard's wish was to reject both the Roscellin conception and strict Sabellianism, yet he does not get beyond a fine Modalism (see Deutsch, p. 280 ff.). It is noteworthy that, like Luther at Worms, he stated in the prologue to his *Introductio in theol.*, that he was ready to be corrected, "*cum quis me fidelium vel virtute rationis vel auctoritate scripture correxerit*" (see Münscher, p. 52).

⁶ Thus it was with Anselm and the Victorinians, especially Richard, who reproduced and expounded the Augustinian analogies of the Trinity (the powers of the human spirit).

⁷ Joachim of Fiore made it a reproach that the 4th Lateran Council, c. 2, took

century from these experiences was to guard the trinitarian dogma by a still greater mustering of terminological distinctions than Augustine had recourse to. The exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity continued to be the high school of logic and dialectic. In Thomism the doctrine still had a relation to the idea of the world, in so far as the hypostasis of the Son was not sharply marked off from the world-idea in God. Thomism was also necessarily obliged to retain its leaning to Modalism, as the conception of God did not at bottom admit of the assumption of distinctions in God, but reduced the distinctions to relations, which themselves again had to be neutralised. The Scotist School, on the other hand, kept the persons sharply asunder. But this school, especially in its later period, could equally well have defended, or yielded submission to, the quaternity, or any other doctrine of God whatever. But before this the whole doctrine had already come to be a mere problem of the schools, having no relation to living faith. The respect that was paid to it as the fundamental dogma of the Church was in flagrant contrast with the incapacity to raise it in theological discussion above the level of a logical mystery. Like Augustine in his day, the mediæval theologians let it be seen that they would not have set up this dogma if it had not come to them by tradition, and the decree of the Lateran Council (see page 182, note 7,) which places behind the persons a "*res non generans neque genita nec procedens*" (*a thing not begetting nor begotten nor proceeding*) really transforms the persons into mere modalities *κατ' ἐπινοίαν* (existing for thought), or into inner processes in God. Or is it still a doctrine of the Trinity, when the immanent thinking and the immanent willing

the Lombard under its protection and decreed: "Nos (*i.e.*, the Pope) sacro et universali concilio approbante credimus et confitemur cum Petro (scil. Lombardo), quod una quædam summa res est, incomprehensibilis quidem et ineffabilis, quæ veraciter est pater et filius et spiritus, tres simul personæ, ac singulatim quælibet earundem. Et ideo in deo trinitas est solummodo, non quaternitas, quia quælibet trium personarum est illa res, videlicet substantia, essentia sive natura divina, quæ sola est universorum principium, præter quod aliud inveniri non potest. Et illa res non est generans neque genita nec procedens, sed est pater qui generat, filius qui gignitur, et spiritus sanctus qui procedit, ut distinctiones sint in personis et unitas in natura."

in God are defined and objectified as *generare* and *spirare* (begetting and breathing)? But in Nominalism the treatment of this dogma grew no better. The Thomist School was certainly still regulated by a concrete thought, when it sought to make the Trinity more intelligible by means of analogies; for according to these the finite world, and especially the rational creature, show traces of the divine nature and the divine attributes. But this idea Scotism had set aside, emphasising the threefold personality as revealed fact. Its "subtle investigations," even Schwane confesses,¹ "went astray too much into a region of formalism, and came to be a playing with notions."

3. The doctrine of the eternity of the world² was universally combated, and the creation from nothing adhered to as an article of faith. But only the Post-Thomist Schoolmen expressed the temporality of the world, and creation out of nothing, in strict formulæ. Although Thomas rejected the pantheism of the Neoplatonic-Erigenistic mode of thought, there are still to be found in him traces of the idea that creation is the actualising of the divine ideas, that is, their passing into the creaturely form of subsistence. Further, he holds, on the basis of the Areopagite conception of God, that all that is has its existence "by participating in him who alone exists through himself" (*participatione ejus, qui solum per se ipsum est*). But both thoughts obscure the conception of creation.³ Hence it is characteristic of Thomas, who elsewhere, as a rule, finds strict necessity, that he refrains from showing that the world's having a beginning is a doctrine necessary for thought; *Summa*, P. I., Q. 46, Art. 2: "It is to be asserted that the world's not having always existed is held by faith alone, and cannot be proved demonstratively: as was asserted also above regarding the mystery of the Trinity . . . that the world had a beginning is

¹ L.c., p. 179.

² See Münscher, § 121, 122, Schwane, pp. 179-226.

³ For a pantheistic view of creation in Thomas an appeal, however, can scarcely be made to the expression frequently employed by him, "*emanatio*" (*processio creaturarum a deo*); for he certainly does not employ the expression in a pantheistic sense. If he says, P. I., Q. 45, Art. 1: "*emanationem totius entis a causa universali, quæ est deus, designamus nomine creationis*," just for that reason he shows in what follows, that "*creatio, quæ est emanatio totius esse, est ex non ente, quod est nihil*."

credible, but not demonstrable or knowable. And it is useful to consider this, in case perhaps some one, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should adduce reasons that are not necessary, thus giving occasion for ridicule to infidels, who might think that on the ground of such reasons we believe what is of faith." If only Thomas had always taken to heart these splendid words, which, moreover, were directed against Bonaventura and Albertus Magnus, who undertook to prove the beginning of the world in time a doctrine of reason! Duns Scotus and his school naturally followed Thomas here, in so far as they held the temporality of the world as guaranteed simply by the authority of faith.¹ Yet the view of Albertus certainly survived at the same time in the Church. The purpose of the creation of the world was taken by all the Schoolmen to be the exhibition of the love (*bonitas*) of God, which seeks to communicate itself to other beings. Even Thomas, correcting the Areopagite conception of God, declared the creation of the world no longer a necessary, but only a contingent, means, whereby God fulfils His personal end. Yet he certainly represented the personal end of God, which is freely realised in creation, as the supreme thought: "*divina bonitas est finis rerum omnium*"² (the divine love is the end of all things), *i.e.*, God's willing His own blessedness embraces all movements whatever of that which exists, His willing it by means of creation of the world is His free will; but as He has so willed to create, the end of the creature is entirely included in the divine end; the creature has no end of its own, but realises the divine end, which is itself nothing but the actualising of the love (*bonitas*). In this way the pantheistic acosmism is certainly not quite banished, while on the other hand, in the thesis of Thomas, that God necessarily conceived from eternity the *idea* of the world, because this idea coincides with His knowledge and so also with His being, the pancosmistic conception of God is not definitely excluded. In the Scotist school, the personal

¹ Scotus holds the possibility of a divine creation from eternity as not unthinkable, but disputes the arguments by which Thomas sought to corroborate the position that a beginning of creation in time cannot be proved; see Werner, Duns Scotus, p. 380 ff.

² P. I., Q. 44, Art. 4; see also Q. 14, 19, 46, 104.

end of God and the end of the creature are sharply disconnected.¹ As regards divine providence, from the time of Anselm and Abelard onwards, all the questions were again treated which were formerly dealt with by Origen ; but from the time of Thomas they were added to in an extraordinary degree, so that quite new terminology was here created.² To the question whether this world is the best, Thomas gave a negative answer, after Anselm had answered it in the affirmative ; yet even Thomas thinks this universe cannot be better ; God, however, could have created other things, which would have been still better.³ As a consequence of his fundamental view, Thomas assumes that God directs all things immediately ; yet the greater the independence was that was attributed to the world, the stronger became the opposition to this thesis. In the theodicy, moreover, which was

¹ Here would be the place to deal with the doctrine of angels held by the Schoolmen ; but as the material relating to this subject—the fencing and wrestling ground of the theologians, who had here more freedom than elsewhere—is very loosely connected with dogma, and is at the same time unworthy of serious consideration, it may be passed over ; see Thomas, P. I., Q. 50-65 ; Schwane, pp. 194-217.

² See Summa, P. I., Q. 103-117 : de gubernatione rerum, divided according to the points of view of finis gubernationis, conservatio and mutatio rerum. Under the first point of view it is established speculatively that the finis rerum must be “quoddam bonum extrinsecum,” because the finis universalis rerum as the ultimate goal must be the “bonum universale,” but this latter cannot be included in the world, since the world, in virtue of its created quality, can never include more than a participative bonum ; hence God Himself is the finis gubernationis (see above). Further, in the general doctrine of government the questions are treated, whether there is a gubernatio at all, whether it proceeds from *one*, whether its effect is uniform or manifold, whether *everything* is under it, whether it is everywhere *direct*, whether anything can happen *præter ordinem gubernationis*, and whether anything “reniti possit contra ordinem gubernationis dei.” The “conservatio” is defined (q. 104, art. 1) as only a continued creating, and so it is said at the close of the article (ad. 4) : “conservatio rerum a deo non est per aliquam novam actionem, sed per continuationem actionis quæ dat *esse*, quæ quidem actio est sine motu et tempore, sicut etiam conservatio luminis in aëre est per continuatum influxum a sole.” This not unobjectionable definition is applied in many different ways. Thus miracle is declared impossible, in so far as the *ordo rerum* depends on a *prima causa*, while on the other hand it is admitted in view of the *causæ secundæ* (art. 6). But according to Thomas the real miracles, although they are not so designated, are the creation of the world and of souls, and also the *justificatio impiorum* ; for they are *præter ordinem naturalem*. The miracle of all miracles is God, quod habet causam simpliciter et omnibus occultam.

³ P. I., Q. 25, Art. 6.

vigorously revised in the thirteenth century in opposition to the dualistic sects, Thomas attached himself more closely to Augustine. He did not shrink from the thought that God produces "quasi per accidens" (as it were accidentally) the *corruptiones rerum* (corruption in things); for the "perfection of things in the universe requires that there shall be not only incorruptible, but also corruptible entities" ("perfectio rerum universitatis requirit, ut non solum sint entia incorruptibilia, sed etiam corruptibilia"); but from this it follows that the *perfectio univarsi* requires beings that *can* fall from the good, "ex quo sequitur ea interdum deficere" (from which it follows that they are sometimes defective).¹ In these doctrines, too, greater caution came to be exercised, as the distinction came to be more sharply drawn between God, and the creature as endowed with its own volitional movement.²

4. The history of Christology was similar to that of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the twelfth century there was still much keen discussion with regard to the former, as the satisfaction was not general with the Greek scheme that had been framed in opposition to Adoptianism (Abelard's Nestorian Christology was a protest against the doctrine of John of Damascus and of Alcuin, and continued to extend its influence).³ Even the Lombard, although, with Alcuin, he denies that the *Logos* assumed a human *person*,⁴ still gravitated—certainly in a very peculiar way—to a Nestorian thought, in so far as he denied, in the interest of the *immutability* of God, that by the incarnation God "became" something, the humanity rather being for him only like a garment.⁵ But against this doctrine,

¹ P. I., Q. 48, Art. 2.

² Very worthy of notice is Duns' criticism of Augustine's and Anselm's doctrines of *malum*; see Werner, l.c., p. 402 ff.

³ See Deutsch, l.c., pp. 289-318. Abelard's doctrine is a very vigorous attempt to give full justice to the humanity of Christ within the lines of the traditional dogma. But there was the feeling that this attempt was heretical, and it is, in fact, questionable, if we consider that it threatens the unity of the person of Christ, on which all depends, but which, of course, at that time could only be expressed in the impracticable categories of the natures.

⁴ Sentent. III., dist. 5 C.

⁵ Sentent. III., dist. 6. Yet it was only the disciples that utilised the thought thrown out by the Master. Besides, the doctrine asserts nothing else than what

described as Nihilianism, and adopted by the dialecticians (Christ was, as man, *non aliquid* [not something]), a strong opposition was raised in the period of Alexander III., especially by German scholars (Gerhoch); there was asserted, in opposition to it, the most complete and real interpenetration of deity and humanity in Christ (see Alcuin), and the Lombard's doctrine was even publicly described as dangerous.¹ With this "nota" against "Nihilianism," the doctrine of the two natures came to the great Schoolmen, and the problem of the "hypostatic union" now became as much the field of contest for the acutest thought as the problem of the Trinity.² At the same time the view all took of the *communicatio idiomatum* implied that the thought must be excluded of a human person as existing for himself in Christ. But here, also, there resulted important differences between the Thomists and Scotists; for Thomas made the greatest effort to give such predominance to the divine factor that the human became merely something passive and accidental; as he was influenced by the Areopagite, he continued also, in a very real way, the Greek Monophysite Christology; nor was there wanting to him the Areopagite background, that the Logos entered into just the same relation to human nature as a whole, into which he entered with the human nature of Jesus. Against this Scotus made an effort, in a very modest way, and with a profusion of confusingly complicated terminology, to save something more of the humanity of Christ. But in return for this, he has to hear the verdict of modern Catholic theologians of dogma, that "he won for himself no laurels; that what he did, rather, in this field, with his critical censures (of the Angelic Doctor) was mostly a fiasco."³ His effort to attribute existence even to the human individual nature

Cyril had expressed regarding the incarnation of the Logos with the *μεμνήσκων ὅπερ ἦν*.

¹ See Bach, l.c., Bd. II., Hefele, Conciliengesch. V.2, p. 616 ff. (Synod of Tours, 1163), and p. 719 f. (3rd Lateran Synod, 1179).

² See Schwane, pp. 251-296.

³ Schwane, p. 288; compare the full account in Werner, l.c., p. 427 ff. Duns taught a double filiation, and in the Report. Paris. expressly professed belief also in the probability of Adoptionism; see p. 439 f. On the similar Christology of Post-Scotist Scholasticism, see Werner II., p. 330 f.

of Christ was disapproved. His mild attempts, likewise, were repudiated to fix certain limits to the human knowledge of Christ, and to deduce the sinlessness of the human will of Jesus, not from the hypostatic union, but from the "plenissima fruitio quam habuit Christus" (fullest enjoyment that Christ had), *i.e.*, from his perfect surrender of will.¹ On this field Thomism continued victorious. The Scotists did not succeed in securing the recognition of a special mode of being for the individual human nature of Christ.²

The victory of the Monophysite doctrine of Christ concealed under the Chalcedonian formulæ,³ was all the more surprising from no practical religious use whatever being made of it, the real interest in Christ finding expression rather, on the one hand, in the idea of the poor life of Jesus and the *Ecce homo*, on the

¹ See Werner, p. 440 ff.

² The doctrine of the Holy Spirit did not receive a further development in Scholasticism. From the days, certainly, of the Latin Empire in the East till the Synod of Florence there was controversy and negotiation with the Greeks in numberless treatises about the procession of the Holy Spirit. The negotiations for union lasted, with interruptions, for almost 250 years, and for a time they furnished a certain prospect of success, because from the thirteenth century there was a small Latin party in the East, which, however, in the end was disowned by the whole Eastern Church. At Lyons in 1274 (can. 1) Greeks made admission that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son ("non tamquam ex duobus principiis, sed tamquam ex uno principio, unica spiratione"), and at Florence (Mansi XXXI., p. 1027 sq.) there was a coming to terms in a complicated formula, which, however, expressly justified the "filioque." But as early as 1443 the Florentine Council was condemned at a Jerusalem Synod by the Patriarchs of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem. The Greeks with Latin sympathies either confessed penitently their "betrayal of the faith," or preferred to remain in Italy and become Roman dignitaries.

³ This victory, it is true, came about not in Scholasticism but in the Church. Scholasticism was led on rather by Occam to a complete dissolution of the God-Manhood of Christ, so that for Socinianism there remained nothing more to do (see Werner II., p. 353 ff.). In Certilog., concl. 6, Occam writes: "Est articulus fidei, quod deus assumpsit naturam humanam. Non includit contradictionem *deum assumere naturam asininam*; pari ratione potest assumere lapidem vel lignum." Also (l.c. concl. 62): "To Christ the predicate Son of God can only be attributed in so far as in Him the Verbum divinum appears united with *the human nature*; of a filiation relation of the Verbum divinum in itself the reason of man knows nothing"; so also the doctrine of the Trinity is contrary to reason (I., Dist. 9, Q. 1). If as over against this there is a pointing to fides, it is simply submission to authority that is meant. If, now, from any cause, this authority fell away, Socinianism was ripe.

other hand, in the doctrines of reconciliation and of the Sacraments.¹ But it is only apparently that the doctrine of reconciliation has the Greek Christology, together with the doctrine of the two natures, as its presupposition. This has been shown already above in connection with the reconciliation doctrine of Anselm, Abelard, and the Lombard.² It still remains to us here to specify concisely the thoughts of the later Schoolmen on the work of Christ.³

The Lombard had brought the *merit* of Christ into the foreground, and at the same time had given expression to all possible thoughts about redemption by Christ—the Anselmic theory excepted—and had attached himself closely to Augustine and Abelard (“reconciliati sumus deo *diligenti nos*” [we are reconciled to God, *who loves us*]). The modification in the thirteenth century consisted now in this, that, in opposition to Abelard, and with a certain adherence to Anselm, objective redemption (in its bearing upon God) was brought into the foreground, but at the same time, the point of view of *merit*, which Anselm had only suggested, was strongly emphasised. This turn of things appears already in Alexander of Hales and Albertus; but Thomas was the first to furnish a full, strictly-thought-out doctrine of redemption. Certainly even he alternates between the points of view, which is always a sign that *the* point of view is not firmly got hold of; for, where the sufficient reason is wanting, reasons tend to accumulate. But the sufficient reason was really wanting to Thomas; for P. III., Q. 46, Art. 1-3, the

¹ There was repeated here what we have already observed in connection with the doctrine of the Trinity. In regard to both dogmas theoretical speculation strikes out paths which are scarcely any longer united with the paths along which faith moves. There can scarcely be conceived of a greater contrariety than is implied, when in the doctrine of the person of Christ the “homo” is almost entirely eliminated, and then in the doctrine of the work of Christ this “homo” takes the commanding place. No doubt by means of words and terminologies all chasms can be bridged over; but they are still only words.

² See p. 54 ff.

³ See Ritschl, Vol. I., p. 55 ff.; Münscher, § 135; Schwane, pp. 296-333. The *passio Christi* dominates the whole Western theology. If John of Damascus (see Vol. III., p. 288) calls the incarnation the only new thing under the sun, Walter v.d. Vogelweide expresses the general conviction of the West, when in one of his best-known poems he exalts the suffering of Christ as the miracle of all miracles.

necessity of the death of Christ is explicitly rejected—God could also have simply remitted sin in the exercise of His free will,—the chosen way of deliverance by the death of Christ (*liberatio per mortem Christi*) is only the most fitting, because, by it, more and greater things are imparted to us than if we were redeemed solely by the will of God (*sola voluntate dei*).

There were three points of view especially which Thomas applied. First, he stated (Q. 46) a large number of arguments that were intended to prove that the death of Christ, with all the circumstances of His suffering, was the most fitting means of redemption. Within the lines of this idea many points of view are already suggested that deal with the facts. But above all the infinite pain which He endured is taken into account. His suffering (during His whole life and in death) is represented as being the sum of all conceivable suffering, in the sense too of its being His own pain and the pain of sympathy on account of our sin. Here justice is done to the Abelardian-Augustinian tradition, *vis.*, that the suffering of Christ, the *Mediatorial Man*, is redemptive, inasmuch as it brings God's love home to our hearts, becomes an example to us, recalls us from sin, and stirs as a motive responsive love. But on the other hand, the *convenientius* (more fitting) in an objective sense is also already brought out here, inasmuch as the death of Christ was the most fitting means for winning for men the *gratia justificans* (justifying grace) and the *gloria beatitudinis* (glory of beatitude).¹

¹ Q. 46, Art. 3: "Tanto aliquis modus convenientior est ad assequendum finem, quanto per ipsum plura concurrunt, quæ sunt expedientia fini. Per hoc autem quod homo per Christi passionem liberatus, multa concurrerunt ad salutem hominis pertinentia *preter liberationem a peccato*: Primo enim per hoc homo cognoscit, quantum hominem deus diligit, et per hoc provocatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanæ salutis consistit. Unde Apostolus dicit: '*Commendat suam caritatem deus,*' etc. Secundo quia per hoc nobis dedit exemplum obedientiæ et humilitatis et constantiæ, justitiæ et ceterarum virtutum in passione Christi ostensarum, quæ sunt necessaria ad humanam salutem. Unde dicitur, I., Pet. 2: 'Christus passus pro nobis, nobis relinquens exemplum, etc.' Tertio quia Christus per passionem suam non solum hominem a peccato liberavit, *sed etiam gratiam justificantem et gloriam beatitudinis ei promeruit*, ut infra dicitur (Q. 48). Quarto, quia per hoc est homini inducta major necessitas, se immunem a peccato conservandi, qui se sanguine Christi redemptum cogitat a peccato, secundum illud I., Cor. 6: 'Empti estis pretio,' etc. Quinto quia hoc ad majorem dignitatem hominis cessit, ut sicut homo victus fuerat et deceptus a diabolo, *ita etiam homo esset qui diabolum*

In Q. 408, new points of view are now introduced under the heading "de modo passionis Christi quantum ad effectum" (on the mode of Christ's suffering as regards its effect). The hypothetical character here passes into the rear behind the necessary result of the suffering. But the whole inquiry is dominated by the fundamental thought: "Christus non est passus secundum divinitatem, sed secundum carnem," (Christ did not suffer as to His divinity, but as to His flesh), with which the divinity associated itself. Here the death of Christ is placed under the points of view of merit (Art. 1), satisfaction (Art. 2), sacrifice (Art. 3), redemption (Arts. 4 and 5), and "efficientia" (Art. 6). This is succeeded, in Quest. 49, by an inquiry as to how far the death of Christ has freed us from sin (Art. 1), from the power of the devil (Art. 2), and from liability to penalty (a reatu pœnæ) (Art. 3), and again, as to whether by it we are reconciled to God (Art. 4), whether by it entrance to heaven is secured for us (Art. 5), and whether by it Christ was exalted (Art. 6). Among these points of view there stand out prominently (secondly) that of satisfaction and (thirdly) that of merit as specially important.

The conception of satisfaction is obtained by taking (against Anselm) in the strictest sense the voluntariness of Christ's sufferings, and then defining this voluntary suffering according to the particular rule, that satisfaction always consists in a gift for which the party injured has more love than he has hatred for the injury. This is shown in the suffering of Christ, which is described (see above) as not only suffering in death but suffering in life,¹ and which has its value in the divine-human life of the Mediator. Just on that account the satisfactio is not only sufficient but superabundans;² i.e., it is not only æqualis omni-

vinceret, et sicut homo mortem meruit, ita homo moriendo mortem superaret. Et ideo convenientius fuit quod per passionem Christi liberaremur, quam per solam dei voluntatem." In Q. 47 the treatment of redemption from the point of view of the convenientissimum is continued.

¹ It is a step in advance on the part of Thomas that he does not confine himself to the death of Christ, but embraces in his view His whole life as suffering.

² Q. 48, Art. 2: "Respondeo dicendum, quod ille proprio satisfacit pro offensa, qui exhibet offenso id quod æque vel magis diligit, quam oderit offensam. Christus autem ex caritate et obedientia patiendo *majus* aliquid deo exhibuit, quam exigeret

bus peccatis humani generis (equal to all the sins of the human race), but positively in excess of them. In this way an idea is obtained which, though apparently unobjectionable and worthy, was to give occasion to the most unhappy speculations. A vicarious penal suffering, in the strict sense of the terms, is not recognised even by Thomas, because on the whole question he allowed only a limited range to the *justitia dei*.¹ Still, some lines of exposition in Quest. 49 touch on that thought.²

recompensatio totius offense humani generis ; primo quidem propter magnitudinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur, secundo propter dignitatem vite suæ quam pro satisfactione ponebat, quæ erat vita dei et hominis ; tertio propter *generalitatem* passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti, ut supra dictum est (Q. 46, Art. 6). Et ideo passio Christi non solum sufficiens, sed etiam *superabundans satisfactio* fuit pro peccatis humani generis."

¹ To this satisfactio superabundans Thomas returns in the 4 Art. [redemptio : "respondeo dicendum, quod per peccatum dupliciter homo obligatus erat, primo quidem servitute peccati, quia qui facit peccatum, servus est peccati. . . . Quia igitur diabolus hominem superaverat, inducendo ad peccatum, homo servituti diaboli addictus erat. Secundo, quantum ad reatum pœnæ, quo homo erat obligatus secundum dei justitiam. Et hoc etiam est servitus quedam ; ad servitatem enim pertinet quod aliquis patiatur, quod non vult, cum liberi hominis sit uti se ipso ut vult. Quia igitur passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superabundans satisfactio pro peccato et reatu pœnæ generis humani, ejus passio fuit *quasi quoddam pretium* per quod liberati sumus ab utraque obligatione. Nam ipsa satisfactio qua quis satisfacit, sive pro se sive pro alio, *pretium quoddam dicitur*, quo seipsum vel alium redimit a peccato et a pœna. . . . Christus autem satisfacit non quidem pecuniam dando aut aliquid hujusmodi, sed dando id quod fuit maximum, seipsum scil. pro nobis. Et ideo passio Christi dicitur esse nostra redemptio." There is a not unimportant turn of thought (Q. 47, 2 ; 48, 3), where the suffering of Christ is looked at from the point of view of sacrifice. Here it is not merely love in general that is described as that which has efficacy in the voluntary sacrifice, but still more precisely *obedience* : "Convenientissimum fuit, quod Christus ex obedientia pateretur . . . obedientia vero omnibus sacrificiis antefertur . . . miles vincere non potest nisi duci obediat, et ita homo Christus victoriam obtinuit per hoc quod deo fuit obediens. . . . Quia in morte Christi lex vetus consummata est, potest intelligi quod patiendo omnia veteris legis præcepta implevit : moralia quidam, quæ in præceptis caritatis fundantur, implevit in quantum passus est et ex dilectione patris et etiam ex dilectione proximi, caeremonialia vero præcepta legis, quæ ad sacrificia et oblationes præcipue ordinantur, implevit Christus sua passione, in quantum omnia antiqua sacrificia fuerunt figuræ illius veri sacrificii, quod Christus obtulit moriendo pro nobis. . . . Præcepta vero judicialia legis, quæ præcipue ordinantur ad satisfaciendam injuriam passis, implevit Christus sua passione, permittens se ligno affigi pro pomo quod de ligno homo rapuerat contra dei mandatum."

² See Art. 3 and 4 : "Respondeo dicendum, quod per passionem Christi liberati sumus a reatu pœnæ dupliciter. Uno modo directe, in quantum scil. passio Christi fuit sufficiens et superabundans satisfactio pro peccatis totius humani generis ; *exhibita*

With regard to *merit*, a distinct idea is to be got under this term as to how far Christ's suffering really profits individuals. It is a circumstance of value that Thomas sets aside, and ceases to employ, the Greek thought which dominates his doctrine of the *person* of Christ, namely, that the humanity of Christ is in itself human nature in general. With this mechanical idea of the matter he was not satisfied. Here also we see that between his doctrine of the person of Christ, and his doctrine of His work, there is quite a chasm. Only once ¹ does he touch on

autem satisfactione sufficienti tollitur reatus pœnæ (this is, of course, no taking over of penalty). *Alio modo indirecte, in quantum scil. passio Christi est causa remissionis peccati, in quo fundatur reatus pœnæ.*" To the objection that on the liberati pœnæ satisfactoriæ are still imposed by the Church, he replies thus: "Ad hoc quod consequemur effectum passionis Christi, oportet nos ei configurari. Configuramur autem ei in baptismo sacramentaliter, secundum Rom. 6, 4: 'Consepulti sumus ei per baptismum in mortem.' Unde baptisatis nulla pœna satisfactoria imponitur, quia sunt totaliter liberati per satisfactionem Christi. Quia vero Christus semel tantum pro peccatis nostris mortuus est, ut dicitur I. Pet. 3, 18. ideo non potest homo secundario configurari morti Christi per sacramentum baptismi. Unde oportet quod illi, qui post baptismum peccant, configurentur Christo patienti per aliquid pœnalitatis vel passionis quam in se ipsis sustineant (!) Quæ tamen multo minor sufficit, quam esset congligna peccato, cooperante satisfactione Christi." A wonderful illustration of satisfactio superabundans! Even in the 4 Art. the reconciliatio dei is traced, not to the endurance of the penal suffering, but to the "sacrificium acceptissimum." God is reconciled (1) because the passio Christi peccatum removat, (2) because it is sacrifice; "est enim hoc proprie sacrificii effectus, ut per ipsum placetur deus"; for as man propter aliquod obsequium acceptum forgives the injury, "similiter tantum bonum fuit, quod Christus voluntarie passus est, quod propter hoc bonum *in natura humana inventum* deus placatus est super omni offensa generis humani, quantum ad eos qui Christo passo conjunguntur." With a change of disposition on God's part Thomas will have nothing to do, although he expresses himself more cautiously than the Lombard. "Deus diligit omnes homines quantum ad naturam quam ipse fecit, odit tamen eos quantum ad culpam . . . , non dicendum, quod passio Christi dicitur quantum ad hoc, deo nos reconciliasse, quod de novo nos amare inciperet, sed quia per passionem Christi sublata est odii causa, tum per ablationem peccati tum per recompensationem *acceptabilioris beneficii.*" In the 5 Art. the passio Christi is expressly related both to the peccatum commune totius humanæ naturæ (et quantum ad culpam et quantum ad reatum pœnæ), and to the peccata propria singulorum, qui communicant ejus passioni per fidem et caritatem et fidei sacramenta. Yet in connection with the latter the removal of the reatus pœnæ is not expressly emphasised. The clearest passage on the penal worth of the death of Christ is in Q. 47, Art. 3: "in quo ostenditur et dei severitas, qui peccatum sine pœna dimittere noluit." But a connected view is not outlined from this as a starting-point, while such a view can be shown in Bernard.

¹ See the foregoing note.

the thought that God is reconciled because He has now found the good in human *nature*. Elsewhere he has quite a different view, with which indeed he crowns his discussion (Q. 48, 1), and of which as his discussion proceeds he never loses sight. It is the view hinted at by Anselm, that by His voluntary suffering Christ *merited* exaltation (Q. 49, 6), that the exaltation, however, cannot be conferred upon Him, but passes over from Him to the Church of which He is the Head.¹ The fulness with which Thomas stated and repeated this thought is a guarantee that for him it was an extremely valuable one. It has also been expressed by him thus (Q. 48, Art. 2): "The head and the members are, as it were, one mystical person, and thus the satisfaction of Christ belongs to all *believers*, just as to His own members" (caput et membra sunt quasi una persona mystica, et ideo satisfactio Christi ad omnes *fideles* pertinet, sicut ad sua membra). Here, finally, the conception of the *faithful* (fideles) also (as the ecclesia) is introduced into the question about the effect and bearings of redemption; but only in the 1st Art. of Quest. 49 has Thomas come to deal more closely with *faith*—simply however to pass over at once to love: "It must be affirmed that by faith also there is applied to us the passion of Christ, with a view to its fruit being seen, according to the passage Rom. 3: 'Whom God hath set forth as a propitiator through faith, etc.' But the faith by which we are cleansed from sin is not fides informis, (unformed faith), which can exist even along with sin, but is fides formata per caritatem (faith deriving form from love), so that in this way the passion of Christ is applied to us, not intellectually merely,

¹ Q. 48, Art. 1: "Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari personæ, sed in quantum est caput ecclesiæ, ut scilicet ab ipso redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera Christi hoc modo se habent tam ad se quam ad sua membra sicut se habent opera alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum. . . ." Q. 49, Art. 1: "Passio Christi causat remissionem peccatorum per modum redemptionis, quia enim ipse est caput nostrum, per passionem suam quam ex caritate et obedientia sustinuit, liberavit nos tam quam membra sua a peccatis, quasi per pretium suæ passionis, sicut si homo per aliquod opus meritorium, quod manu exerceret, redimeret se a peccato quod pedibus commisisset. Sicut enim naturale corpus est unum ex membrorum diversitate constans, ita tota ecclesia, quæ est mysticum corpus Christi, computatur quasi una persona cum suo capite, quod est Christus," and other passages, especially P. III., Q. 8.

but also effectually." ("Dicendum quod etiam per fidem applicatur nobis passio Christi ad percipiendum fructum ipsius, secundum illud Rom. 3: 'Quem proposuit deus propitiatorem per fidem, etc.' Fides autem per quam a peccato mundamur non est fides informis, quæ potest esse etiam cum peccato, sed est fides formata per caritatem, ut sic passio Christi nobis applicetur, non solum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad effectum.")

When we review the exposition given by Thomas, we cannot escape the impression created by confusion (*multa, non multum*, [many things, not much]). The wavering between the hypothetical and the necessary modes of view, between objective and subjective redemption, further, between the different points of view of redemption, and finally, between a *satisfactio superabundans* and the assertion that for the sins after baptism we have to supplement the work of Christ, prevents any distinct impression arising. It was only a natural course of development when Duns Scotus went on to reduce everything entirely to the relative. It is what always happens when an attempt is made to find a surer hold for the actual in what is assumed to be the metaphysically necessary; this actual presents itself in the end only as the *possible*, and so, very soon also, as the irrational. No one thought of the moral necessity of penalty.

Duns Scotus draws the true logical conclusion from the theory of satisfaction (as distinguished from the idea of vicarious penal suffering), by tracing everything to the "acceptatio" of God. All satisfaction and all merit obtain their worth from the arbitrary estimation of the receiver. Hence the value of Christ's death was as high as God chose to rate it. But in the strict sense of the term infinity cannot at all be spoken of here; for (1) sin itself is not infinite, seeing that it is committed by finite beings (it is, at the most, quasi infinite, when it is measured, that is to say, though this is not necessary, by the injury done to the infinite God); (2) the merit of Christ is not infinite, for He suffered in His human (finite) nature¹; (3) in no sense is

¹ In Sent. III., Dist. 19, n. 7: "Meritum Christi fuit finitum, quia a principio finito essentialiter dependens, etiam accipiendo ipsum cum omnibus respectibus, sive cum respectu ad suppositum Verbi, sive cum respectu ad finem, quia omnes respectus isti erant finiti."

an infinite merit needed, because God can estimate any merit as highly as He pleases; for nothing is meritorious in itself, because nothing is good in itself, but the sovereign divine will declares what it wills to be good and meritorious. And so Duns has not hesitated to assert that an angel, or even a *purus homo* who should have remained free from original sin and been endowed with grace, could have redeemed us. It is a question merely of receiving the first impulse; the rest every man must acquire for himself together with grace. Grace must only raise him, so to speak, above the point at which he is dead. Of course, Duns made the further effort to show the *conveniens* of the death of the God-man, and here he works out essentially the same thoughts as Thomas. But this no more belongs, strictly speaking, to dogmatic. For dogmatic, it is enough if it is proved that in virtue of His arbitrary will God has destined a particular number to salvation; that in virtue of the same arbitrary will He already determined before the creation of the world, that the election should be carried out through the suffering of the God-man; and that He now completes this plan by accepting the merit of the God-man, imparting the *gratia prima* to the elect, and then expecting the rest from their personal efforts. Here the reason at bottom for Christ's having died is its having been prophesied (see Justin), and it was prophesied because God so decreed it. Everything "infinite"—which is surely the expression for what is divine and alone of its kind—is here cleared away; as a fact, human action would have been enough here, for nothing is necessary in the moral sense, and nowhere does there appear more than a quasi-infinity.¹ This

¹ See Ritschl, I., pp. 73-82; Werner, p. 454 ff. In Sentent. III., Dist. 19, Q. 1. The 20 Dist. is entirely devoted to the refutation of Anselm. Let us quote some leading sentences here: "*Sicut omne aliud a deo ideo est bonum, quia a deo volitum, et non e converso, sic meritum illud tantum bonum erat, pro quanto acceptabatur et ideo meritum, quia acceptatum, non autem e converso quia meritum est et bonum, ideo acceptatum.*" . . . "*Christi passio electis solum primam gratiam disponentem ad gloriam consummatam efficaciter meruit. Quantum vero adtinet ad meriti sufficientiam, fuit profecto illud finitum, quia causa ejus finita fuit, vid. voluntas nature assumptæ et summa gloria illi collata. Non enim Christus quatenus deus meruit, sed in quantum homo. Proinde si exquiras, quantum valuerit Christi meritum secundum sufficientiam, valuit procul dubio quantum fuit a deo acceptatum, si quidem divina acceptatio est potissima causa et ratio omnis meriti. Omne enim*

theory, the product of thought on the uncontrollable, predestinating arbitrariness of God (and on legal righteousness), stands side by side with an explicit doctrine of two natures!¹ But it is quite distinctly irreligious in this respect, that it confines the work of Christ to the procuring of that "*gratia prima*" (primary grace), which is nothing but the creating of a kind of *possibility*, in order that man may himself take concern for the *reality* of his redemption.²

By Scotus it was brought about that this doctrine also became severed from faith, and was entirely transformed into a dialectic problem. In this lies the disintegration of dogma through Scotism. The doctrine of the Trinity, Christology, and the doctrine of redemption, were now happily withdrawn from the domain of the *inwardly* necessary, comforting faith that saves. Thus it continued to be in the Nominalist school. Only in the one particular, which, however, was constantly brought under the category of the *conveniens*—namely, that the love of God shown in the death of Christ becomes a motive to reciprocal love—did there survive a meagre remnant of an inspiring thought. While in the fourteenth century the Scotist theory of *satisfactio secundum acceptationem* (satisfaction on the ground of acceptance) gained always more adherents, was here and

aliud a deo ideo est bonum quia a deo dilectum, et non e contrario . . . deus non acceptat opus ideo quod sit meritorium aut bonum. Tantum ergo valuit Christi meritum sufficienter, quantum potuit et voluit ipsum trinitas acceptare. Verum tamen ex sua ratione formali et *de condigno* non potuit in infinitum seu pro infinitis acceptari, quia nec illud in se fuit formaliter infinitum. Nihilominus si spectes suppositi merentis circumstantiam et dignitatem, habebat *quandam* extrinsecam rationem, propter quam *de congruo* in infinitum extensive, id est pro infinitis, potuit acceptari. Sed quid meruit Christus? Meruit sane *primam gratiam* omnibus qui eam recipiunt, quæ et absque nostro merito confertur. Nam licet in adultis qui baptizantur non desideretur aliqua dispositio, nihilominus non merentur illam gratiam per suam dispositionem . . . nullus actu ingreditur regnum cœleste, nisi cooperetur, si habuerit facultatem, et utatur prima gratia, quam sibi Christus promeruit."

¹ Certainly this doctrine of two natures, from its Nestorianism, has already the tendency in it to do away with the deity of Christ.

² The redemption theory of Scotus, which, dialectically considered, is superior to the Thomist through its completeness, is very severely criticised even by Schwane, who, however, does not bring out its Pelagian feature (p. 327 ff.). He speaks of "shallow apprehension of the incarnation, and a weakening of the conceptions of righteousness and merit."

there carried even to the point of blasphemy by the formalism of dialectic, and had an influence even on the Thomists, traces are not wanting in the fifteenth century that more serious reflection, dealing with the essence of the matter, had begun to return. This had undoubtedly a connection with the revival of *Augustinianism*, perhaps also with a renewed study of *St. Bernard*, and it is to be met with more in the practical religious, than in the systematic expositions; indeed, in the former the thought of Christ's having borne the penalty of guilt in the interests of the righteousness of God seems never to have entirely disappeared. Ritschl points to Gerson.¹ "Gerson declares sin to be the crime of high treason, and finds God's righteousness so great that in mercy He surrenders His innocent Son to penalty, evidences, in this way, the harmony between His righteousness and His mercy, and removes sin on condition that the sinner unites himself to Christ by faith, *i.e.*, by obedience and imitation.² In the Nominalist school the same view is still to be met with in Gabriel Biel.³ In the end, even John Wessel comes back to it." But Ritschl is inclined to think that the idea of the penal value of Christ's death, which, from the time of Athanasius, had ever again appeared sporadically in the Church, did not pass from Biel and Wessel to the Reformers.⁴

¹ L.c. I., p. 85.

² Expos. in pass. dom. (Opp. ed. du Pin III. pp. 1157, 1187, 1188): "Per læsæ majestatis crimen morti est obnoxius. Rex tamen adeo justus fuerit, quod nec ullo pacto crimen tuum dimittere velit impunitum, altera vero ex parte tam benignus et misericors, quod proprium filium suum innocentem doloribus committat et morti, et quidem sponte sua, ut justitiam concordet cum misericordia fiatque criminis emendatio. . . . Nunquam deus malum impunitum permetteret, eapropter omnia peccata et delicta nostra Jesu Christo supposuit. Ideo ipse est justitia et redemptio nostra, modo nos junxerimus ei et per fidem gratiamque ei adhæserimus."

³ See Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, III., I, p. 249 ff. Seeberg, l.c., p. 147.

⁴ In dealing with the history of dogma, we are not required to enter on the history of the doctrine of Scripture, for that doctrine underwent no change, even the uncertainties about the Canon were not removed, and the slight differences in the way of understanding the notion of inspiration have no weight attaching to them. The history of Bible prohibition, or of the restriction of the use of the Bible among the laity, does not fall to be considered here (see above, p. 156).

*B. The Scholastic Doctrine of the Sacraments.*¹

The uncertainty of the Schoolmen regarding the doctrine of redemption, and the fact that the treatment of it could be as easily relegated by them to the School as the doctrines of the Trinity and of the natures in Christ, are explained from the circumstance, that in the doctrine of the Sacraments it was definitely set forth what *faith* in the divine *grace in Christ* needed. In the Sacraments this grace is exhibited, and in the Sacrament of the Eucharist particularly it is clearly and intelligibly traced back—through the doctrine of transubstantiation—to the incarnation and death of Christ. That was enough. Those facts now form merely the *presuppositions*; *faith lives* in the contemplation and enjoyment of the Sacraments. But the Sacraments are committed to the Church, and are administered by the *hierarchy* (as servants, priests, and as judges). Thus the connection with Christ, which is effected only through the Sacraments, is at the same time mediated by the *Church*. Christ and the Church indeed are really made one, in so far as the same Church which administers the Sacraments is also, as the mystical body of Christ, so to speak, *one* mystical person with Him. This is the fundamental thought of Mediæval Catholicism, which was adhered to even by the majority of those who opposed themselves to the ruling hierarchy.

The Schoolmen's doctrine of the Sacraments has its root in that of Augustine; but it goes far beyond it (formally and materially). Above all, there was not merely a passing out of view in the Middle Ages of the connection between *verbum* and *sacramentum*, on which Augustine had laid such stress, but the *verbum* disappeared entirely behind the sacramental sign. The conception became still more magical, and consequently more objectionable. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that in its seven Sacraments Catholicism created a very efficient and impressive institution of an educational kind, the service of

¹ Münscher, § 138-152. Hahn, *Lehre v. d. Sacramenten*, 1864: same author, *Doctr. romanæ de num. sacram. septennario rationes hist.* 1859. Schwane, l.c., pp. 579-693.

which, however, for the individual, did not consist in giving him certainty of salvation, but in training him as a member of the Church. And yet the mediæval doctrine of the Sacraments must be regarded, at least in its Thomist form, as the *logical* development of the Old Catholic fundamental view ; for the definition of grace given by Thomas (P. III., Q. 62, Art. 1) : "*grace is nothing else than the communicated likeness of the divine nature*, according to the passage II Pet. 1 : he hath given to us great and precious promises, that we may be partakers of the divine nature" (*gratia nihil est aliud quam participata similitudo divinæ naturæ secundum illud, II Pet. 1 : Magna nobis et pretiosa promissa donavit, ut divina simus consortes natura*), allows of no other form of grace than the magical sacramental. Augustine's view, which, however, does not at bottom contradict the one just stated, is here thrust aside, and only comes under consideration so far as a link with it is found in the "*participata similitudo divinæ naturæ*" (communicated likeness of the divine nature). Hence the further suppression of the *verbum*, to which even Augustine, though he has the merit of having taken account of it, had not done full justice.

A strictly developed doctrine of the Sacraments could not exist, so long as the *number* of the Sacraments was not definitely fixed. But on this point, as antiquity had handed down nothing certain, the greatest vacillation prevailed for centuries, so difficult was it to determine anything which had not already been determined by the tradition of ancient times. The doctrine of the Sacraments was accordingly developed under the disadvantage of not knowing for certain to what sacred acts the general conceptions were to be applied. Still, theology had already wrought for long with the number seven, before the number was officially recognised by the Church.

The number seven developed itself in the following way : As sacred acts in a pre-eminent sense, there had been handed down from ecclesiastical antiquity only baptism and the Eucharist, but baptism included the Chrisma (anointing). This last could be counted separately or not. At the same time, there was an indefinite group of sacred acts which were enumerated quite variously (the reckoning of the Areopagite was not determina-

tive). Bernard, *e.g.*, speaks of many Sacraments, and himself mentions ten.¹ Even Hugo of St. Victor gives quite a special place to baptism and the Eucharist. Yet it was just he who contributed to a widening of the conception. By him,² as well as by Abelard,³ there are reckoned as the sacramenta majora or spiritualia baptism, the Eucharist, confirmation, unction⁴ and marriage.⁵ How this combination arose is unknown. It continued to exist, however, in the school of Abelard, *i.e.*, there was no reduction again made, only additions followed. Robert Pullus may have exercised an influence here,⁶ who in his Sentences counts along with the other three Sacraments, not unction and marriage, but confession⁷ and ordination.⁸ From the combination of these reckonings the number seven as applied to the Sacraments may have arisen.⁹ No doubt the sacred number also gave fixity to this particular enumeration.¹⁰ It is first found in the Sentence Book of Alexander III., when he was still Master Roland,¹¹ and then in the Lombard.¹² The latter however represents it, not as a recognised tenet, but as his own view, without

¹ See Hahn, p. 103 f., and in general the copious proofs, pp. 79-133.

² Summa sentent. tract., 5-7.

³ See Deutsch, Abälard, p. 401 ff.

⁴ Extreme unction cannot be traced back under the term "Sacrament" further than to Innocent I. (ep. ad Decent).

⁵ Marriage of course is very often named a sacrament from the earliest times, on the ground of the Epistle to the Ephesians.

⁶ Sentent. V. 22-24; VII. 14.

⁷ How gradually the "sacrament of penance" arose our whole account in the foregoing chapters has shown; see Steitz, Das Römische Buss-sacrament, 1854. Gregory I. called the reconciliatio of the sinner a sacrament. From the time of Petrus Damiani (69. orat.) confession was often so described, *e.g.*, even by Bernard.

⁸ Since Augustine's time ordination had very frequently been styled a "sacrament"; but even the anointing of princes, and the consecration of bishops and of churches, etc., were regarded as Sacraments.

⁹ In a passing way the number six also occurs. In the twelfth century, moreover, the considerations connected with the Sacraments have a very close connection with the struggle against the heretics (Catharists). It may be that subsequent investigation will succeed in showing that the fixing of the number seven was the direct consequence of this struggle.

¹⁰ See Hahn, p. 113 f.

¹¹ Denifle in Archiv. f. Litt.-u. K.-Gesch. d. Mittelalters, vol. I., pp. 437, 460, 467.

¹² Sentent. IV., dist. 2 A. The former view, that Otto of Bamberg already has the number seven, is disproved; see Hahn, p. 107.

specially emphasising it. The vacillation continued to exist even in the period that followed. The decrees of the great Councils of 1179 and 1215 imply that there was still nothing fixed as to the number of the Sacraments. But the great Schoolmen of the thirteenth century, who followed the Lombard, all accepted seven as the number of the Sacraments, and although special stress was laid by them on baptism and particularly the Eucharist, which was described, *e.g.*, by Thomas as the most potent of all the Sacraments ("potissimum inter alia sacramenta sacramentum,")¹ they already made some attempt to vindicate the number on internal grounds.² For the first

¹ P. III., Q. 65, Art. 4: "Sacramentum eucharistiæ est potissimum inter alia sacramenta. Reasons: (1) because in it there is contained Christus substantialiter, not merely a virtus instrumentalis participata a Christo: (2) because all other Sacraments look to this Sacrament sicut ad finem (this is then proved in the case of each separately); (3) because almost all Sacraments in eucharistia consummantur."

² In l.c. the Sacraments are graded according to their value: "Aliorum sacramentorum (*i.e.*, the Eucharist is previously assumed to be the chief Sacrament) comparatio ad invicem potest esse multiplex. Nam in via necessitatis baptismus est potissimum sacramentorum, in via autem perfectionis sacramentum ordinis; medio autem modo se habet sacramentum confirmationis. Sacramentum vero pœnitentiæ et extremæ unctionis sunt inferioris gradus a prædictis sacramentis, quia, sicut dictum est, ordinantur ad viam Christianam non per se, sed quasi per accidens, scil. in remedium supervenientis defectus. Inter quæ extrema unctio comparatur ad pœnitentiam, sicut confirmatio ad baptismum; ita scil. quod pœnitentia est majoris necessitatis, sed extrema unctio est majoris perfectionis." But in Q. 65, Art. 1, the number seven is justified at length. The Sacraments are instituted "ad perficiendum hominem in his quæ pertinent ad cultum dei secundum religionem Christianæ vitæ et in remedium contra defectum peccati. Utroque modo convenienter ponuntur VII. sacramenta. Vita enim spiritualis conformitatem aliquam habet ad vitam corporalem." In the bodily life of the individual there is taken into consideration his individual weal and his weal as a social being. This is then set forth scholastically in several sub-sections, and it is then shown that in the spiritual life baptism means birth (regeneration), confirmation the augmentum (robur), the eucharist, nourishment; penance, healing of the maladies that have supervened; extreme unction, the taking away of the "reliquiæ peccatorum." These five Sacraments relate to the individual. To man as animal sociale there relate also in spiritual things ordo and marriage. Proof: the potestas regendi multitudinem et exercendi actus publicos is necessary in the spiritual life, and marriage provides for the propagatio tam in corporali quam in spirituali vita. In the same way it is now shown that each separate Sacrament has also its meaning contra defectum peccati, and that the number seven is conveniens (*e.g.*, ordo contra dissolutionem multitudinis and marriage in remedium contra concupiscentiam personalem et contra defectum multitudinis, qui per mortem accidit). Thomas also mentions another view, which he had found entertained by others: "fidei respondet baptismus et ordinatur c.

time at Florence (1439) was there a definite ecclesiastical declaration made as to seven being the number of the Sacraments.¹

The technical revision of the conception of the sacrament begins with Hugo of St. Victor. He sets out from the Augustinian definition: "sign of a sacred thing" ("visible form of invisible grace"), but it appears to him unsatisfactory, because too wide. He adds to it two things: first, that the sacrament must have a natural resemblance to the sacred thing which it represents; second, that it is also the vehicle of this sacred thing, and communicates it to the receiver of the sign. Hence (de sacram, Christ. fid. I. 9, 2): "A sacrament is a corporeal or material element set forth sensibly to view, representing by resemblance, signifying by institution, *and containing by consecration some invisible and spiritual grace*" (sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibilibus propositum ex similitudine repræsentans, ex institutione significans et ex sanctificatione continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam), or (Summa tract. IV. 1): "a sacrament is a visible form of invisible grace conveyed in it, *i.e., which the sacrament itself conveys*, for it is not only the sign of a sacred thing, but also its efficacious operation" (sacramentum est visibilis forma invisibilis gratiæ in eo collatæ, quam scil. confert ipsum sacramentum, non enim est solummodo sacræ rei signum sed etiam

culpam originalem, spei extrema unctio et ordinatur c. culpam venialem, caritati eucharistia et ordinatur c. pœnalitatem malitiæ, prudentiæ ordo et ordinatur c. ignorantiam, justitiæ pœnitentia et ordinatur c. peccatum mortale, temperantiæ matrimonium et ordinatur c. concupiscentiam, fortitudini confirmatio et ordinatur c. infirmitatem." We may smile at these attempts; but yet we shall not be able to deny the serviceableness of this combination of the seven Sacraments which accompany life. The inclusion particularly of orders on the one hand, and of marriage on the other, was a master-stroke of a perhaps unconscious policy.

¹ Eugene IV. in Bull "Exultate deo" (Mansi XXXI., p. 1054): "(sacramentorum septem novæ legis) quinque prima ad spiritalem uniuscujusque hominis in se ipso perfectionem, duo ultima ad totius ecclesiæ regimen multiplicationemque ordinata sunt (quite according to Thomas, see above); per baptismum enim spiritualiter renascimur, per confirmationem augeamur in gratia et roboramur in fide, renati autem et roborati nutrimur divina eucharistiæ alimonia. Quod si per peccatum ægritudinem incurrimus animæ, per pœnitentiam spiritualiter sanamur, spiritualiter etiam et corporaliter, prout animæ expedit, per extremam unctionem; per ordinem vero ecclesiæ gubernatur et multiplicatur spiritualiter, per matrimonium corporaliter augetur."

efficacia). The sacrament has, further, the similitudo from nature, the significatio from institution, the efficacia through the consecrating word of the priest, or the first from the Creator, the second from Christ,¹ and the third from the dispenser (!). This German "Mystic" was therefore the first to give fixed form to the mischievous definition which so sadly externalised the sacrament and eliminated the word. The Augustinian distinction between the sacrament and the saving benefit in the sacrament (*res sacramenti* or *res cujus sacramentum est*) Hugo retained.

Hugo's definition passed over to the Lombard, and was never again set aside in the Church. By it the Sacraments, in the stricter sense of the term, were raised above the field of the "sacramentalia": the Sacraments are not merely signs; they are vehicles and "causes" of sanctification. The Lombard defines thus (Sent. IV., Dist. 1 B): "That is properly called a sacrament which is a sign of the grace of God, and a form of invisible grace in such a way that it bears the image thereof, and exists as a cause (*et causa existat*). Sacraments, therefore, are instituted for the purpose, not merely of signifying, but also of sanctifying. For things that are merely instituted for the sake of signifying are only signs and not sacraments, as were the carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances of the old law." But, further, Sacraments are "signa data" (signs given, not "natural" signs), in the sense, namely, that they rest on free divine institution. The Lombard differs, accordingly, from Hugo in his regarding as necessary, not a corporeal or material element, but only some kind of sign, which may therefore consist also in an *act*; and also in his not saying that the Sacraments *contain* grace, but only—with greater caution—that they effect it *causally*.

In general, this definition of the Lombard lies at the foundation of the later definitions. But the more firmly it came to be held that the number of the Sacraments was seven, the more distinctly was the difficulty felt of applying the definition given to all the Sacraments individually. Hence it is not to be wondered at that the Nominalist theologians abstained more and

¹ But Hugo still refrained from tracing all Sacraments to institution by Christ.

more from giving a general definition that dealt with the essence.¹

Thomas begins (III., Q. 60) his statement of the doctrine of the Sacraments with the words: "After consideration of those things which relate to the mysteries of the incarnate Word, there are to be considered the Sacraments of *the Church*, which have *efficacy* from the incarnate Word Himself."² By these terms, the unguarded definition of Hugo is set aside. He then proceeds, down to Quest. 65, to state the general doctrine of the Sacraments. Here it is worthy of note that Thomas, going still further than the Lombard, modifies the cruder conception of Hugo ("continent"). Indeed, he will not accept, without guarding clauses, the "*causa existit*" of the Lombard. He rejects, certainly, the opinion of Bernard and others, that God only works "*adhibitis sacramentis*" (with employment of sacraments). This would not lead beyond an interpretation of them as signs; but he then shows that it can be said of the Sacraments that "in some way" (*per aliquem modum*) they "cause grace." The "*causa principalis*" of grace, rather, is God, who works as the fire does by its warmth, that is, *communicates in grace His own nature*. The Sacraments are the "*causa instrumentalis*"; but this latter cause "does not act by virtue of its own form, but only through the impulse it receives from the principal agent" (*non agit per virtutem suæ formæ, sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente*). "Hence the effect does not derive its character from the instrument, but from the principal agent; as a couch does not derive its character from

¹ Biel, Sentent. IV., Dist. I., Q. I, dub. I (see Hahn, l.c., p. 18 f.): "Sciendum quod duplex est definitio. — Una est oratio exprimens quid rei, alia est oratio exprimens quid nominis. Primo modo nihil definitur, nisi sit res una h. e. terminus significans unam rem (that is logical Nominalism). Definitione quid nominis potest omnis terminus categorematicus definiri, quicquid significet in recto vel in obliquo. Nam pro omni nomine possunt poni plura nomina distincte significantia illa, quæ significantur per illud unum nomen tam in recto quam in obliquo. Ad propositum dicitur, quod sacramentum non potest definiiri primo modo h. e., definitione quid rei quia sacramentum non res una, sed *aggregatum ex pluribus* . . . sed tantum definitur definitione quid nominis."

More exactly, Q. 62, Art. 5: "Sacramenta novæ legis habent virtutem ex passione Christi." Hence also the incorporatio in Christo is the effect (Q. 62, Art. 1).

the axe, but from the design which is in the mind of the artificer (unde effectus non assimilatur instrumento sed principali agenti; sicut lectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti, quæ est in mente artificis). And in this way the Sacraments of the new law cause grace, for they are applied to men by divine appointment (ex divina ordinatione) for the purpose of causing grace in them (ad gratiam in eis causandam). . . . It is to be asserted that the *causa principalis* cannot properly be called the sign of an effect that may be hidden (effectus licet occulti), though the cause itself is sensible and manifest; but the *causa instrumentalis*, if it be manifest, can be called the sign of a hidden effect, because (eo quod) it is not only cause, but also *in a certain way* (quodammodo) effect, in so far as it is set in motion (movetur) by the principal agent. And according to this, the Sacraments of the new law are at the same time causes and signs, and hence it is that it is commonly said of them, that they *effect what they symbolise* (efficiunt quod figurant).” The “*causæ et signa*” is in the style of Old Catholic thought; but the opposition of a spiritual to a coarse Mysticism is quite specially apparent here. In the period that followed, the loosening of grace from sacrament, in the sense of regarding the latter as merely associated with the former, was carried still further, but not because a more spiritual view was advocated (as by Thomas), or because weight was laid on the “word,”¹ but because the conception of God, which indeed exercised its influence even upon Thomas, only in another way, allowed only of a conjunction by virtue of divine arbitrariness.² Bonaventura already had denied, both that the Sacraments contain grace substantially (substantialiter), and

¹ This laying of weight on the word would, on the other hand, have necessarily led to the recognition of a closer union of sacrament and grace: for the word, as the word of forgiveness of sin, is itself the grace. The mistake therefore of Thomas and the Lombard does not lie in their uniting the Sacraments too closely with grace by calling them *causæ* (indeed the position, rather, of Hugo is correct—“continent gratiam”); their mistake lies in their defining grace as “*participata similitudo divinæ naturæ*”; for to describe a grace so conceived of as the content or the effect of the Sacraments amounts to changing the Sacrament into a magical means. We can understand the relative title which the Nominalists had as over against this, to regard the grace so conceived of as merely *accompanying* the Sacrament; but by this again the certainty and comforting power of God’s offer of grace were imperilled.

² Brevilog., p. VI., c. I.

that they effect it causally (causaliter); God has not bound His grace to the Sacraments, but has appointed by decree ("ex decreto") that it shall be derived "per sacramenta" from the supreme physician, Christ. In this direction Scotus went further. He defines the Sacrament¹ as "a sensible sign, which efficaciously signifies, by divine appointment, the grace of God, or the gracious effect of God, and is ordained for the salvation of man the pilgrim" (signum sensibile, gratiam dei vel effectum dei gratuitum ex institutione divina efficaciter significans, ordinatum ad salutem hominis viatoris). But the ambiguous formula, which he employs elsewhere also, "significans efficaciter effectum dei gratuitum" (signifying efficaciously the gracious effect of God), really means that God's grace works *side by side* with the Sacraments; for the cause of grace is exclusively the divine will, while this cause is represented by the Sacrament, in the Sacrament's accompanying it (concomitatur). There does not lie in the Sacraments an "intrinsic supernatural virtue,"² but (in Sentent. IV., Dist. 1, Q. 5) "the receiving of the Sacrament is an appointment binding in order to the effect which the Sacrament signifies (dispositio necessitans ad effectum signatum per sacramentum), not, indeed, through some intrinsic form, . . . but only per *assistentiam dei* (through the aid of God), who causes that effect, not of absolute necessity, but by a necessity that has regard to the power ordained (necessitate respiciente ad potentiam ordinatam). For God has *made the appointment universal* (disposuit universaliter), and has *certified* to the Church (but how?)³ that on him who receives such a Sacrament, He will confer the signified effect." The same doctrine was taught by Occam and Biel.⁴ But this view is directly counter to that of Thomas, who had asserted that in the Sacrament itself there is

¹ In Sentent. IV., Dist. 2, Q. 2.

² In this there is a gratifying protest expressed against the magical.

³ Scotus speaks even directly of a "pactum dei initum cum ecclesia," that He will always be present at the Sacraments with His influence.

⁴ Yet Biel endeavours, by means of ingenious distinctions, to get beyond the idea of mere concomitance, and to conceive in such a way of the "pactum cum ecclesia" that God is thought of as in virtue of it making the Sacraments causæ secundæ of grace, just as all that happens in the world is caused by causæ secundæ, which have their efficiency from the causa prima; see Dieckhoff, *Ev. Abendmahlslehre*, p. 219.

inwardly present "a virtue for producing the sacramental effect" (*virtus ad inducendum sacramentalem effectum*). The Nominalist thesis wanted inward stability; for it is quite formalistic, and leaves the *concrete* nature of the gracious effect out of account. This point being reached, a threefold development was possible; either that there should be a turning back to the Old Catholic realism of Thomas (Biel already entered upon this course, and later Catholicism followed him), or that the Sacraments should be conceived of strictly as signs (thus many mediæval sects and Zwingli), or that the content of the gracious will of God should be defined anew, namely, as the word of the gospel, and it should be shown that this word forms also the content of the Sacrament, that the two therefore coincide. Of one thing, at any rate, there can be no doubt, *viz.*, that the motive of the so-called "evangelical" opposition on the part of many sects and "Earlier Reformers" to the reigning view of the Sacraments, is to be sought for in logical Nominalism, that at bottom the opposition directed itself therefore against the Thomist practice. The "word," so far as my knowledge goes, was not seen to be the content of the Sacrament and of the divine will.

Now there was still an almost countless number of questions of detail regarding the Sacraments,¹ in answering which the Thomists and Scotists were, as usual, of different opinions. First of all, Thomas (following Augustine) distinguished sharply between the Sacraments of the old and new Covenants. The former only prefigured grace, the latter cause it. But already Bonaventura, and after him Scotus, were of opinion that certain Old Testament institutions (circumcision) were real Sacraments. Yet Bonaventura also made the distinction, that only the New Testament Sacraments are efficacious *per se* (the Old Testa-

¹ Hahn has distinguished the following leading points of inquiry: the conception of the Sacraments, their necessity, their serviceableness, their difference at different periods of human history, the conception of New Testament Sacraments, their parts, their institution, the administrators of the several Sacraments, the conditions under which the Sacraments come to exist, their effect (their character *indelebilis*, their gracious effect (*a*) in its nature, (*b*) relation of the different Sacraments in respect of their gracious effect, (*c*) more precise definition of the gracious effect of the Sacraments severally) origin and conditions of the sacramental efficacy.

ment only "per accidens," that is, by means of the added faith !),¹ while Scotus declared circumcision to be a Sacrament efficacious ex opere operato ("by effect of Christ's passion"). But at the Council of Florence Thomas's view was approved:² "the Sacraments of the new law differ much from the Sacraments of the old law. For the earlier did *not* cause grace, but only *prefigured* a grace to be given through the passion of Christ, while those which we have both *contain* grace, and *convey* it to those who worthily receive" (complete return to the position of Hugo and Thomas).

In what follows the chief points of the Thomist doctrine are stated, since that doctrine finally became dominant :

Generically (in genere) the Sacraments as a whole are necessary to salvation, but specifically (in specie) this applies, in the strictest sense, only to baptism. The other Sacraments partly come under the rule "non defectus sed contemptus damnat" (not omission but contempt condemns), and they are partly necessary only under particular circumstances (orders, marriage, extreme unction, even the Sacrament of Penance). But the perplexity

¹ Even Thomas makes this distinction in Sentent. IV., Dist. 2, Q. 1, Art. 4, and, moreover, we find here the expression "ex opere operato," which we look for in vain in parallel passages of the Summa, although he has the thing it denotes (Q. 61, Art. IV., and elsewhere). In the commentary on the Lombard the words occur: "Sacramenta veteris legis non habebant aliquam efficaciam ex opere operato sed solum ex fide; non autem ita est de sacramentis novæ legis, quæ ex opere operato gratiam conferunt." On the expression "ex opere operato" see R.-Encycl.² XIII., p. 277 f. It was already used in the twelfth century (not by the Lombard), before it was applied to the Sacraments. As distinguished from the expression "ex opere operantis or operante," it denotes that the *act as such* is meant, not the *actor*. An effect ex opere operato therefore is an effect that is produced simply by the act itself as performed, independently of all co-operation of him who performs it, or of him who derives benefit from it. Peter of Poitiers is supposed to have been the first to use the term in connection with the doctrine of the Sacraments (he adds further "ut liceat uti.") William of Auxerre says: "Opus operans est ipsa actio (oblatio) vituli, opus operatum est ipsa caro vituli sc. ipsum oblatum, ipsa caro Christi." Also Albertus M. on John 6, 29: "Dixerunt antiqui dicentes, quod est opus operans et opus operatum. Opus operans est, quod est in operante virtutis opus vel a virtute elicited vel quod est essentialis actus virtutis, et sine illo nihil valet virtus ad salutem. Opus autem operatum est extrinsecum factum quod apothelasma vocant sancti, sicut operatum legis est sacrificium factum vel circumcisio facta vel tale aliquid."

² Mansi XXXI., p. 1054.

showing itself here appears still greater when the Sacraments are considered in their effects. It is here seen, that is to say, that according to the Augustinian distinction of *sacramentum* and *res sacramenti* *all* would require to have a threefold effect, namely, first, a significative (*sacramentum*); second, a neutral (as compared with the real saving benefit of grace) or preparatory (*sacramentum et res*)—Augustine called this character, and compared it with the *corporalis nota militiæ* (corporal mark of military service); and, third, a saving effect (*res sacramenti*). Now, this distinction Thomas also followed. He shows that those who are set apart to the service of God must, first of all, have a certain *stamp impressed* on them, as in the case of soldiers. Through this process of stamping a certain *capacity* is imparted, *i.e.*, for *receptio et traditio cultus dei* (receiving and administering the worship of God); hence the character is the “character Christi.” This character is not implanted in the *essentia* (essence), but in the *potentia* (powers) of the soul, and as *participatio sacerdotii Christi* (participation in the priesthood of Christ) is engraven on the soul “indelibly,” and hence cannot be repeated. Yet all Sacraments do not impart such a character, but only those which qualify the man “*ad recipiendum vel tradendum ea quæ sunt divini cultus*” (for receiving and dispensing those things which pertain to divine worship), and this holds good of baptism, confirmation, and orders. The objection, that surely all Sacraments make man a “partaker of the priesthood of Christ,” and so, must impart a character, is obviated by the ingenious distinction between that formula and the other: “*deputari ad agendum aliquid vel recipiendum quod pertineat ad cultum sacerdotii Christi*” (deputed to *do* something or *receive* something that pertains to the worship connected with the priesthood of Christ) (baptism, orders, confirmation).¹ So

¹ P. III., Q. 63, Art. 2-6; cf. 1: “*sacramenta novæ legis ad duo ordinantur, vid. ad remedium c. peccata et ad perficiendam animam in his quæ pertinent ad cultum dei secundum ritum Christianæ vite. Quicumque autem ad aliquid certum deputatur, consuevit ad illud consignari, sicut milites qui adscribebantur ad militiam antiquitus solebant quibusdam characteribus corporalibus insigniri, eo quod deputabantur ad aliquid corporale.*” This is then applied to the spiritual, see Art. 2: “*Sacramenta novæ legis characterem imprimunt, in quantum per ea deputantur homines ad cultum dei secundum ritum Christianæ religionis.*” Also Art. 3: “*Totus ritus*

also if the serious objection is urged that "in any Sacrament of the new law there is something that is only *res*, and something that is only *sacramentum*, and something that is *res* and *sacramentum*," and that therefore in every Sacrament a character is to be assumed, since this character is just *res* and *sacramentum*, the objection is got quit of by saying that that which is at the same time *res* and *sacramentum* does not require always to be a character.¹ This whole theory was sanctioned at Florence (l. c.): "Among the Sacraments there are three which indelibly impress on the soul character, that is, a certain spiritual sign distinct from the rest (*a cæteris*); hence they are not repeated in the same person. But the remaining four do not impress character and admit of repetition."

The question, "What is a Sacrament?"² is answered as follows: it is (1) a sign; (2) not any sign whatever of a sacred thing (*quodvis rei sacræ signum*), but such a sign of a sacred thing as makes man *holy*; (3) this "making holy" (*sanctificare*) is to be looked at under three aspects: "the *cause* of our sanctification is the passion of Christ, the *form* of sanctification consists in grace and virtues, the ultimate *end* (*finis*) is life eternal." Hence now the complete definition: "A sacrament is a sign commemorative of what went before (*rememorativum ejus quod præcessit*), *viz.*, the passion of Christ, and representative (*demonstrativum*) of what is effected in us by the passion of Christ, *viz.*, grace, and anticipatory, that is, predictive (*prognosticum, i.e., prænuntiativum*) of future glory"; (4) the sacrament must always be a "*res sensibilis*," for it corresponds with the nature of man that he should attain to the knowledge of intelligible, through sensible, things; (5) these sensible signs must be "*res determinatæ*," that is, God must have selected and appointed these things: "in the use of Sacraments two things can be considered, *viz.*, divine worship and the sanctification of

christianæ religionis derivatur a sacerdotio Christi, et ideo manifestum est, quod character sacramentalis specialiter est character Christi, cujus sacerdotio configurantur fideles secundum sacramentales characteres, qui nihil aliud sunt quam quædam participationes sacerdotii Christi."

¹ The real, at least the original, motive here, is to save the objectivity of the sacrament in view of unbelieving reception.

² Q. 60.

man, of which the first pertains to men viewed in their relation to God (*pertinet ad homines per comparationem ad deum*), the second, on the other hand, pertains to God viewed in His relation to man; but it does not belong to anyone to determine what is in the power of another, but only what is in his own power"; hence "in the Sacraments of the new law, by which men are sanctified, it is necessary to use things appointed by *divine institution* (*ex divina institutione determinatis*)"; (6) it is very fitting that "words" also are used in connection with the Sacraments, because the Sacraments are thereby in a certain way conformed (*quodammodo conformantur*) to the incarnate Word, and can thus symbolise the sacred things more plainly; ¹ and, moreover (7) "*verba determinata*" are necessary, just as "*res sensibiles determinatæ*" are necessary, nay, they are necessary even in a higher degree; hence he who utters sacramental words in a corrupt form, if *this is done designedly* (*qui corrupte profert verba sacramentalia, si hoc ex industria facit*), does not show that he intends to do what the Church does, and thus the sacrament is not seen to be perfectly celebrated (*non videtur perfici sacramentum*); nay, even an unintentional *lapsus linguæ*, which destroys the sense of the words (*c.g.*, if one says, "in nomine matris") hinders the Sacrament from becoming perfect; likewise (8) every addition or subtraction annuls the Sacrament, if made with the intention of introducing another rite than that of the Church. Further, the *res sensibiles* are described as being the *materia*, the words as the *forma* (Aristotelian) of the Sacrament.²

To the question as to the necessity of the Sacraments,³ it is replied (1) that they are necessary on three grounds, (*a*) from the constitution of human nature (*ex conditione humanæ naturæ*; man must be led through the corporeal to the intelligible); (*b*) from the state of man (*ex statu hominis*; "medicinal remedy

¹ So it is only for this reason that the word is necessary in connection with the Sacrament.

² Hugo and the Lombard had already described the "words" as the *form*. This view likewise was fixed ecclesiastically by the Bull of Eugene IV.: "*Hæc omnia Sacramenta tribus perficiuntur, vid. rebus tamquam materia, verbis tamquam forma, et persona ministri conferentis sacramentum cum intentione faciendi quod facit ecclesia.*"

³ Q. 61.

against the disease of sin"); (c) from a tendency in human action (ex studio actionis humanæ; man clings to the sensible, and it would be too hard to sever him entirely from it). To the objection, again, that the passion of Christ is surely sufficient in itself for salvation, the answer is given, that the Sacraments are not useless, "*because they work in the power of Christ's suffering, and the passion of Christ is somehow¹ applied to men by the Sacraments*" (quia operantur in virtute passionis Christi, et passio Christi quodammodo applicatur hominibus per sacramenta); (2) in the state of innocence man neither required the Sacraments as a remedy for sin (pro remedio peccati), nor for perfecting the soul (pro perfectione animæ); (3) in the state of sin before Christ certain Sacraments were necessary "by which man might confess his faith concerning the future advent of the Saviour" (quibus homo fidem suam protestaretur de futuro salvatoris adventu); (4) in the Christian state Sacraments are necessary, "which represent those things which took place before in Christ" (quæ significant ea quæ præcesserunt in Christo). By this change in the Sacraments the unchangeableness of God is not affected, who, like a good father in a home, "gives different precepts to His family to suit different times" ("pro temporum varietate diversa præcepta familiæ suæ proponit"). The fathers were redeemed "by faith in the Christ who was to come," we are redeemed "by faith in the Christ who has now been born and has suffered"; what they had to do with were Sacraments "that corresponded with grace that had to be foreshadowed" (quæ fuerunt congrua gratiæ præfigurandæ), what we have to do with are "*Sacraments that correspond with grace that has to be shown as present*" (sacramenta congrua gratiæ præsentialiter demonstrandæ).²

To the question as to the effect of the Sacraments³ it is replied,

¹ Observe this word; Thomas is a Mystic.

² Cf. on this also Q. 62, Art. 6: "Sacramenta veteris legis non contulerunt gratiam justificantem per se ipsa, i.e., propria virtute, quia sic non fuisset necessaria passio Christi. . . . Manifestum est, quod a passione Christi, quæ est causa humanæ justificationis *convenienter derivatur virtus justificativa ad sacramenta novæ legis*, non autem ad sacramenta veteris legis. . . . Patet, quod sacramenta veteris legis non habebant in se aliquam virtutem qua operarentur ad conferendam gratiam justificantem, sed solum significabant fidem, per quam justificabantur."

³ Q. 62.

that we must distinguish between "grace" and "character." The latter has already been treated above; we have also learned to know the view of Thomas (p. 206) on the Sacraments as "instrumental causes" in addition to the "principal cause" (God). But Thomas has given more precise definitions as to the effect. First, it is laid down (Art. 2) that sacramental grace adds something beyond the "grace of virtues and gifts," namely, "a certain divine help for securing the end of the Sacrament" (quoddam divinum auxilium ad consequendum sacramenti finem).¹ Second, the proposition "sacramenta signant et continent (causant) gratiam" (the Sacraments signify and contain [cause] grace) is more exactly explained (Art. 3). Third, it is shown that, as there is contained in the Sacraments (Art. 4), and that, too, "in verbis et rebus" (in words and things), "a certain instrumental virtue for conveying grace (which is the effect of the Sacrament) that is proportioned to the instruments" (quædam instrumentalis virtus ad inducendam gratiam, quæ est sacramenti effectus, proportionata instrumento), this virtue originates "from the benediction of Christ and the application of it by the minister to sacramental use," and is to be traced back to the "principal agent." Fourth, the relation of sacramental grace to the passion of Christ is more precisely defined

¹ "Gratia virtutem et donorum sufficienter perficit essentiam et potentias animæ, quantum ad generalem ordinationem actuum animæ, sed quantum ad quosdam effectus speciales, qui requiruntur in vita Christiana, requiritur sacramentalis gratia.—Per virtutes et dona excluduntur sufficienter vitia et peccata, quantum ad præsens et futurum, in quantum scil. impeditur homo per virtutes et dona a peccando; sed quantum ad præterita peccata, quæ transeunt actu et permanent reatu, adhibetur homini remedium specialiter per sacramenta.—Ratio sacramentalis gratiæ se habet ad gratiam communiter dictam, sicut ratio speciei ad genus, unde sicut non æquivoce dicitur animal communiter dictum et pro homine sumptum, ita non æquivoce dicitur gratia communiter sumpta et gratia sacramentalis." The Protestant polemic had to come in here and show that the gratia virtutum et donorum as gratia fidei is the only grace, and that the sacramental grace in every sense is nothing but the manifestation of the gratia virtutum et donorum, or, say, of the general and only grace. Of this latter it is said (l.c.), "gratia secundum se considerata perficit essentiam animæ in quantum participat quandam similitudinem divini 'esse'; et sicut ab essentia animæ fluunt ejus potentiæ, ita a gratia fluunt quedam perfectiones ad potentias animæ, quæ dicuntur virtutes et dona, quibus potentiæ perficiuntur in ordine ad suos actus." But also: "Ordinantur autem sacramenta ad quosdam speciales effectus necessarios in vita Christiana."

(Art. 5): "The principal cause of grace is God Himself, in relation to whom the humanity of Christ is, so to speak, a conjoined instrument (*ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi sicut instrumentum conjunctum*) (as *e.g.*, the hand is a conjoined instrument), while the Sacrament is, as it were, a separate instrument (*e.g.*, like a stick). And thus it is necessary that saving virtue be derived for the Sacraments from the divinity of Christ through His humanity (*et ideo oportet, quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi per ejus humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta derivetur*). But sacramental grace appears to be appointed (*ordinari*) for two things especially, *viz.*, for the removal of the defects of past sins, in so far as they pass away as acts (*transeunt actu*) and remain as guilt (*remanent reatu*), and again for the perfecting of the soul in those things which pertain to the worship of God according to the religion of the Christian life. But it is manifest from what has been said above, that Christ has wrought for us, chiefly by His passion, a deliverance from our sins that is not only meritorious and sufficient but also satisfactory (*quod Christus liberavit nos a peccatis nostris, præcipue per suam passionem non solum sufficienter et meritorie sed etiam satisfactorie*). In like manner also He initiated by His passion the ritual (*ritum*) of the Christian religion, yielding Himself up as an offering and sacrifice to God (*offerens se ipsum oblationem et hostiam deo*), as it is declared in Ephes. V. Whence it is manifest that the Sacraments of the Church have their efficacy principally from the passion of Christ, of which the virtue is in some way united (*copulatur*) to us through receiving the Sacraments, as a sign of which (*in cujus signum*) there flowed from Christ as He hung upon the Cross water and blood, of which the one relates to baptism, the other to the eucharist, which are the most potent (*potissima*) Sacraments."¹

¹ I have quoted the whole passage, because it shows more clearly than any other that the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments is at bottom nothing but a reduplication of the redemption by Christ, or, to put it otherwise, a second structure above the first, by which the first is crushed to the ground. *As grace was conceived of physically, but this physical grace could not be directly connected with the death of Christ or derived from it, it was necessary to associate with God the Redeemer, besides the instrumentum conjunctum (the God-man Jesus), still another instrumentum separatum (the Sacraments)*. If on the other hand the life and death of Christ can be so under-

To the question as to the “*causa sacramentorum*” (whether *per auctoritatem* or *per ministerium*) the reply is as follows: ¹ (1) as the “inner effect” of the Sacraments is justification, it appears as if this effect could be produced only by God; but by way of administering (“*per modum ministri*”) man also (the priest) can be the “instrumental cause” of the effect. Whether he is more or less good does not come into account here; the effect of the Sacrament remains always the same, nay, even as regards the “*annexa*,” the priest’s prayers, it makes no difference what the character of the priest is; for they are offered “*ex parte ecclesiæ*” (on the part of the Church), not on the part of an individual person. (2) God alone is the “*institutor sacramentorum*,” from whom alone also their “*virtus*” proceeds. Hence it follows: “those things which are done in the Sacraments by appointment of men (*per homines instituta*) are not necessary to the sacrament (*de necessitate sac.*), but have to do with a certain solemn observance of it (*pertinent ad quandam solemnitatem*) . . . but those things which are necessary to the Sacraments *are instituted by Christ Himself*, who is God and man. And although all things are not handed down in Scripture, yet the Church has these things from a well-known (*familiari*) tradition of the Apostles, as the Apostle says, 1. Cor. XI.: The rest will I set in order when I come.”² To the objection that the Apostles acted as God’s representatives (“*vicem dei*”) on earth, and therefore might also be institutors of Sacraments, it is replied, that they were certainly not allowed to set up another Church, and so also “it was not lawful for them to institute other Sacraments, (for) it is by Sacraments that the Church of Christ is declared to stand *that these themselves are seen to be the grace and the Sacrament*, the reduplication is useless. This is the evangelical Protestant point of view; at least it ought to be. Of course it is then no longer possible to conceive of grace *physically*; for in that case the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments must again return, which is, however, a pure invention of men, and has nothing to support it in the gospel history. This holds true notwithstanding the institution of the Supper by Jesus; for where is it found written that the consecrated elements “*causant et continent gratiam ex opere operato*”?

¹ Q. 64.

² If the *necessaria* in sacramentis are all to be traced to Christ the institutor, then the Bible is not enough; *tradition* must be appealed to; but where is then the limit?

be formed (*fabricata*)." (3) It is laid down that the authority in the Sacraments belongs to Christ as God, but that He as man "had the power of the chief *ministry* or pre-eminence and works meritoriously and effectually (*potestatem ministerii principalis habuit seu excellentiæ et operatur meritorie et efficienter*)." (4) It is shown that Christ could convey this "power of ministering" (not the "authority") to other servants, *viz.*, "by giving them such fulness of grace that their merit would operate for rendering the Sacraments effectual (*operaretur ad sacramentorum effectus*), that the Sacraments would be consecrated on the invocation of their names (*ut ad invocationem nominorum ipsorum sanctificarentur sacramenta*), and that they would themselves be able to institute Sacraments and, without the ritual of the Sacraments, be able to convey by their power alone the effect of the Sacraments (*ut ipsi possent sacramenta instituere et sine ritu sacramentorum effectum sacramentorum conferre solo imperio*)." But this "*potestas excellentiæ*" He has not conveyed to the servants, in order to avoid the "inconveniens," that is, that there might not be many heads in the Church; "if He had nevertheless communicated it, He would Himself have been the head in the principal sense, and they only in a secondary (*ipse esset caput principaliter, alii vero secundario*)." (5) It is shown that the Sacraments can be validly celebrated even by bad servants, as these act only instrumentally, and "the instrument does not work by its own form or virtue, but by the virtue of him by whom it is moved (*non agit secundum propriam formam aut virtutem sed secundum virtutem ejus a quo movetur*);" but of course (6) bad servants commit a mortal sin when they celebrate the Sacraments, though the sin does not extend to the receiver, "who does not communicate with the sin of the bad minister, but with the Church." (7) The "intention" and "faith" of the minister are treated (in Art. 8 and 9). The former he must necessarily have,¹ but not the latter: "as it is not required for

¹ More precisely: "Quando aliquid se habet ad multa, oportet quod per aliquid determinetur ad unum, si illud effici debeat. Ea vero quæ in sacramentis aguntur possunt diversimode agi, sicut ablutio aquæ quæ fit in baptismo potest ordinari ad munditiam corporalem et ad ludum et ad multa alia hujusmodi. *Et ideo oportet ut determinetur ad unum, i.e., ad sacramentalem effectum per intentionem abluentis. Et hæc intentio exprimitur per verba quæ in sacramentis dicuntur, puta cum dicit: Ego.*

the perfection of the Sacrament that the minister have love (sit in caritate), but sinners also can dispense Sacraments, so his faith is not required for the perfection of the Sacrament, but an unbeliever can dispense the true Sacrament, provided other things are present which are necessary to a Sacrament." Thus even heretics can dispense the Sacraments, that is, "sacramentum," not "res sacramenti"; for the "power of administering sacraments pertains to spiritual character, which is indelible (he confers, but sins in conferring)."

These doctrines of Thomas, from which a regard to faith (*fides*) is obviously lacking,¹ and which altogether pass very rapidly over the question as to the conditions of *saving* reception of the Sacraments, underwent afterwards great modification from the time of Scotus onwards.² In many points, moreover, the Thomist theses were novelties, and hence were not forthwith received. Thus Thomas was the first to assert the origination of all Sacraments by Christ. Hugo³ and the Lombard were frank enough to trace several Sacraments, not to Him, but to the Apostles, or to the pre-Christian Era (marriage), and were satisfied with saying that all Sacraments are now administered in the power of Christ (in potestate Christi). Only with Alexander of Hales begins a more exact investigation of the origin of the Sacraments. But till the time of Thomas we still find much uncertainty. It had been usual to fall back on the general assertion of their divine origin, or a "certain" institution by Christ was taught,⁴ while in the case of the different Sacraments

te baptizo in nomine," etc. An instrumentum inanimatum receives "loco intentionis motum a quo movetur," but an instrumentum animatum must have the intentio, scil. "faciendi quod facit Christus et ecclesia." But Thomas now places himself more decidedly on the side of the lax, *i.e.*, he disputes the position that a *mentalis* intentio is necessary. What is enough, rather, as the minister acts in loco totius ecclesie, is the intention of the Church as *actually* expressed in the sacramental words which he speaks, "nisi contrarium exterius exprimatur ex parte ministri vel recipientis sacramentum."

¹ Hence the 13th Art. of the Augustana; "Damnant illos, qui docent, quod sacramenta ex opere operato justificent, nec docent fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum, que credit remitti peccata."

² Yet Scotus himself stands very near Thomas in the doctrine of the Sacraments.

³ On his want of logical thoroughness, see Hahn, p. 155.

⁴ See Hahn, p. 158 ff.

very different hypotheses, attributable to embarrassment, were adopted. But there always continued to be some (on to the sixteenth century) who traced back individual Sacraments simply to *apostolic* institution.¹

In addition to the problem as to how far the effect is *bound* to the Sacrament (see above), the chief questions in the period that followed were those as to the "minister sacramenti" and as to the conditions of saving reception. There was certainly agreement on the points, that there are Sacraments whose minister is not designated in the institution by Christ, and that we must distinguish between Sacraments which only a baptised Christian, a priest, or a bishop can duly celebrate; yet in making the application to each separate Sacrament, and in defining the relations of the minister and the receiver to the Sacrament, great controversies prevailed (is the priest who blesses the marriage, or are the parties to be married, the minister of the Sacrament of Marriage? In regard to the Eucharist, also, and other Sacraments, old ideas still continued to exercise their influence, and that not always in the case of declared heretics merely; further, as to confirmation there was doubt whether the exclusive power of the bishops rested on divine or on ecclesiastical appointment, while in connection with this there arose again the whole of the old dispute as to whether presbyters and bishops were originally identical, etc., etc.).

The controversy as to the conditions of saving reception penetrated more deeply; for here it was necessary to show in what relation the two poles of the Romish view of Christianity were to be placed, *whether the factor of merit was to have predominance over the factor of sacrament or vice-versa*. The development in Nominalist theology was such that *merit* always asserted its superiority more decidedly, and the conditions accordingly were always more laxly conceived of, while at the same time the view taken of the depreciated effects of the Sacraments became always more magical. From this as a starting-point (namely, the conditions), which Thomas had merely touched on, the whole doctrine of the Sacraments really

¹ See Hahn, p. 163 f. By conveying the potestas excellentiæ to the apostles, Christ empowered them to institute Sacraments.

became a subject of controversy again, or received a fresh revision.¹ The chief points are the following :

1. Alexander of Hales and Thomas had not indeed derived from all Sacraments a character, but they had asserted of all that they exercise an influence that is independent of the subjective condition of the receiver. But Scotus and those coming later denied this in the case of penance and extreme unction, teaching that these Sacraments remain without any effect if they are received without the requisite disposition.

2. In the earlier period it was held that for the unworthy recipient the virtue of the Sacraments becomes deleterious in its effect. This the Nominalists denied. In the worthy disposition and in the character, they saw on the contrary, as already existing, a positive *dispositio ad gratiam*, and declared accordingly that in the case of the unworthy the saving effect *ex opere operato* is not realised,² while the "wrath-effect" is not produced by the Sacrament, but arises from the sin of the receiver, and hence is not *ex opere operato*, but *ex opere operante*.

3. That a "disposition" belongs to the saving reception was therefore the general opinion; but as to *why* it was necessary there was difference of view. Some saw in the disposition, not the positive condition of sacramental grace, but only the *conditio sine qua non*, *i.e.*, *the disposition is not considered as worthiness*; the Sacraments, rather, of the new covenant, as distinguished from those of the old, in which the *fides* was requisite (hence *opus operans*), work *ex opere operato*.³ This

¹ See Hahn, p. 392 ff.

² What takes place, therefore, is only that the Sacrament is observed as an external adorning of the soul (the unbeliever receives a character, enjoys the body of the Lord, stands in an indissoluble marriage bond, etc.), while the gracious *effect* is not wrought. But this last at once follows subsequently, if the "indisposition" gives way.

³ In its application to the Sacrament the expression "*ex opere operato*" itself passed through a history which is too extensive to follow out here; see Schätzler, *Die L. v. d. Wirks. d. Sac. ex opere operato*, 1860. The assertion is certainly false that the expression only denotes that the Sacraments are effectual on account of the work accomplished by Christ, or that Christ works in them, that is, it is an apologetic novelty of Möhler, or, say, of some theologians already in the sixteenth century. The leading thought of Scholasticism was rather this, that the Sacrament itself is the *opus operatum*, and starting from this point it proceeded to call the *outer* act *opus operatum*, the inner disposition *opus operans*.

implied the exclusion, not of the necessity of the dispositio, but certainly of its causal significance. In entire contrast with this view stands the other, which, however, was represented only by a few, that the Sacraments can only mediate grace when inner contrition and faith are present, so that all saving grace is solely the result of penitent disposition and of faith; but these as inner motives (*interiores motus*) are wrought by God, so that on that ground we must not assume a justification *ex opere operante*; the Sacraments now declare this inner act of God, make man sure as to the reception of grace, and strengthen the belief that the reception transmits the effectual grace to the whole man and makes him the possessor of it. This view comes very near the evangelical one of the sixteenth century; but it differs from it in this, that the idea of grace is still always the Catholic, as participation in the divine nature, and that accordingly faith is really held as only something preliminary, that is, it is not yet seen that the "*motus fiduciæ in deum*" (trustful impulse God-wards) is the form and the essence of grace itself. Further, it is to be observed that this view has been expressed clearly and plainly by no Schoolman.¹

¹ Hahn (p. 401 f.) names as representatives of this view Robert Pulleyn, William of Auxerre, and John Wessel, and, as holding this view as regards at least the Sacrament of Penance, a large number of theologians, among whom the Lombard, Alexander of Hales, Bonaventura, and Henry of Ghent are mentioned. These men really taught that where there is true contritio, absolution comes directly from God, not through the Sacrament of Penance only, which in this case only declares. Karl Müller (*Der Umschwung in der Lehre von der Busse während des 12. Jahrh.* in the *Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker*, 1892, p. 287 ff.) has shown that this view runs back to Abelard. He regards it as something new, and if applied to the common reigning practice, it would certainly have been something new. But there was no kind of change in this practice contemplated by it, and it was only a sign that *theology* again grappled with the question, and felt itself unable simply to justify theoretically the conception that prevailed in practice of sacrament and priest. It went back, therefore, at this point to ideas of the early Church, or to ideas that were Augustinian and more spiritual (Müller seems to me to overlook this, see further details below). Alexander of Hales (*Summa IV.*, Q. 14, M. 2, Art. 1, § 3) writes: "*Duplex est pœnitentia; quædam quæ solummodo consistit in contritione, quædam quæ consistit in contritione, confessione, satisfactione; utraque est sacramentum. Sed primo modo sumpta non est sacramentum ecclesiæ, sed secundo modo. Sacramentum pœnitentiæ est signum et causa et quantum ad deletionem culpæ et quantum ad deletionem pœnæ. Contritio enim est signum et causa remissionis peccati et quantum ad culpam et quantum ad penam*" (the adding of the remission of temporal penalties for sin

According to the third view, which constantly gained more adherents, and always came to be more laxly expressed, the saving grace is a product of the Sacrament and of contrite faith, so that the Sacrament in itself merely raises the soul above the point at which it is dead and plants a seed which develops to saving effect only by the co-operation of contrition and faith. Here first the question now came to be of importance as to what the nature was of this contrition and this faith, or as to what the state of soul must be which puts the receiver into the position for letting the sacramental grace attain to its full effect. To begin with it was generally answered here, with Augustine, that the receiver must not "obicem contrariæ cogitationis opponere" (oppose a barrier of adverse thought.) But what is this "obex"¹ or this "impedimentum"? It was replied that the receiver must not receive the Sacrament "cum fictione" (insincerely). But when is he a hypocrite? The earlier theologians required a "bonus motus interior," that is, a really pious spirit that longs for grace, contrition, and faith, and so, since every "bonus motus" is in a certain way meritorious,

takes place, however, only through the priestly sacrament). With this view of repentance, as is well known, the Reformation formed a connection. That fides and sacramentum are exclusively essential to each other in the case of all Sacraments was emphasised by Robert Pulleyn and Wessel (the former, Sentent. I., octo P. V., c. 13: "quod fides facit, baptismus ostendit; fides peccata delet, baptismus deleta docet, unde sacramentum dicitur." VI. 61: "Absolutio, quæ peracta confessione super penitentem a sacerdote fit, sacramentum est, quoniam rei sacræ signum est. Et cuius sacræ rei est signum, nisi remissionis et absolutionis? Nimirum confitentibus a sacerdote facta a peccatis absolutio remissionem peccatorum, quam antea peperit cordis contritio, designat. A peccatis ergo presbyter solvit, non utique quod peccata dimittat, sed quod dimissa sacramento pandat." The latter, de commun. sanct. [edit. Groning, 1614], p. 817: "Effectus sacramentorum sunt secundum dispositionem suscipientis et secundum requisitam illi intentioni dispositionem. . . . Dispositio vero requisita huic sacramento, ut efficax fiat, est fames et sitis hujus vivifici cibi et potus. Unde quanto minus eum esurit et sitit, pro tanto minore etiam effectum consequitur." 818: "Semper sacramenta fidei sunt instrumenta, tanto semper efficacia, quanto est fides negotiosa"). But in view of these valuable sentences, we must remember, as has been remarked above, that to closer inspection a mysterious gratia is placed behind and above the fides, which lowers the fides to a means.

¹ The Greek Scholasticism also knows of the obex. Antonius Melissa quotes in the *Loci Comm.* (Migne, Bl. 136, col. 823), sermo 16, the saying of a certain Theotimus: εἰκεν ἡ ἁμαρτία παρακωλύματι. κωλύοντι τὴν εὐνοίαν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν ἡμῖν γενέσθαι.

certain merits. The "barrier" is here therefore the lack of such a positive good disposition. So it was taught by the Lombard, Alexander, Thomas,¹ and a large number of theologians, and they further laid it down that, as all merit is rewarded, the reception of the Sacrament results in a twofold grace, namely (1) *ex opere operato*, (2) but also *ex opere operante*; the latter is different from the sacramental grace, but is always added to it (*ex merito*, on account of the disposition, and greater or less, according to the measure of the disposition). Here already, then, merit is introduced in a hazardous way. Yet the later theologians (among the earlier, Albertus) required only the absence of an undevout disposition; what is held by them as a barrier is simply the presence of a "*motus contrarius malus*," *i.e.*, contempt of the Sacrament, positive unbelief, or an unforgiven mortal sin.² They said that the dignity of the New Testament Sacraments consists just in this, that they presuppose *no* positive disposition, while such disposition is to be presupposed in the case of all other grace. Hence Scotus defines: "for the first reception of grace (the non-sacramental) there is required some kind of merit (*aliquis modus meritorius*) *de congruo*; but for the second (the sacramental) nothing is required save a reception of baptism that is voluntary and without insincerity (*sine fictione*), *i.e.*, with the intention of receiving what the Church confers, and without mortal sin in act or will (*sine actu vel voluntate peccati mortalis*), so that in the first there is required some intrinsic work in some way accepted as *meritum de congruo*, in the second there is only required an external work (*opus exterius*), with putting away of inner hindrance (*cum amotione interioris impedimenti*)." One sees that here the doctrine of the Sacraments is already quite drawn into the (Pelagian) doctrine of justification, and subordinated to it, while apparently the power of the Sacrament is increased, seeing that it is to be held as effectual even where a *tabula rasa* exists.

¹ In Sentent. IV., Dist. 4, Q. 3, Art. 2: "Indispositus reputatur et qui non credit et qui indevotus accedit . . . in sacramentis præcipue fides operatur . . . ideo defectus fidei specialius pertinet ad fictionem."

² Scotus, in Sent. IV., Dist. 1, Q. 6: "Sacramentum ex virtute operis operati confert gratiam, ita quod non requiritur ibi bonus motus interior qui mereatur gratiam, sed sufficit quod suscipiens non ponat obicem."

Yet with the increased power there contrasts the really small saving effect, which passes, rather, into the "acceptance of the merits of man." Between these two views there was still a third, which certainly stands quite near the last mentioned, frequently coalesced with it, and was afterwards to become the predominant one; it is neither satisfied with the absence of the "malus motus," nor does it require the "bonus motus," but it demands that a "certain" sorrow shall precede the reception of the Sacrament, which does not require to spring from the highest motives, but may arise from lower, *e.g.*, from fear of punishment or something similar. This "sorrow" is described as *attritio*,¹ and it is said of it that, if there is earnest striving, the Sacrament can raise it to *contritio*. But others now went still further and taught *that the Sacrament changes attritio into contritio ex opere operato*. According to this extremely widely diffused view, the man can be saved *who lets himself stand in dread of hell*, even though otherwise all inner connection with the Christian religion is wanting to him; he must only assiduously use the Sacrament of Penance, in the opinion that it can protect him against hell. Yet even this "opinion" does not need to be a sure faith; he may only hold the effect of the Sacrament as not impossible; "attrition, when the Sacrament is added, is made sufficient by the power of the keys" (*attritio superveniente sacramento virtute clavium efficitur sufficiens*).²

A quite magical view of the Sacraments here competes in a pernicious way with that doctrine of "merit," according to

¹ Scotus was the first to direct his attention to this very correctly observed character of the commoner type of humanity, and began to use it in the way indicated for the doctrine of salvation; see Hahn, p. 413 f.

² Or: "Attritus accedit ad confessionem, ex quo ibi fit contritus, *unde fugatur fictio*. Et sic non habet dubium, quia et sacramentum suscipit et effectum ejus scilicet remissionem peccatorum." Numerous passages in Hahn, *l.c.* From this point of view, indeed, the mere purpose to partake of the Sacrament, or the partaking per se, might come to be regarded as something initially meritorious, and this step was really already taken from the time of the Lombard, the view becoming quite widely prevalent. Nay, as if the conscience and the plain understanding reacted against the sacramental magic, the Lombard declares that the humiliatio before the sensible materials in the Sacrament establishes merit (Sentent. IV., Dist. 1 C.): "propter humiliationem quidem, ut dum homo sensibilibus rebus, quæ natura infra ipsum sunt, ex præcepto creatoris se reverendo subicit, ex hac humilitate et obedientia deo magis placeat et apud eum mereatur."

which God of His good pleasure (*per acceptationem*) takes as complete what is only a beginning, and indeed is not even a beginning, since the motives of those "meritorious" acts may be religiously neutral. In connection with the doctrine of justification we shall return to this worst point, which dominated the whole practical and theoretical system of Catholicism at the beginning of the Reformation period.¹ But certainly it is clear here already, that to hush up rather than to give comfort was the effect of a doctrine of the Sacraments having this form and issue. This doctrine was originally framed on the exalted idea of the "*participatio divinæ naturæ*," and it still continues to betray its basis in the first stages of its construction. But it ends in confirming the man of common spirit in his low-type morality and feeble piety. The earnest Catholic may not apply these final conclusions to himself; he may confine himself to the original thesis, which is not forbidden to him, but for the careless, the Church has prepared a broad road and opened a wide gate. In a *relative* way it may work much good with this; for its system is derived from listening to life; it gives pedagogic direction on the question as to how one who is not quite thoughtless, who is not perfectly stolid, who is not entirely sunk in earthly enjoyment, can be aided, and introduced into a better society, with better modes of life. But as soon as we consider that it is the *Christian religion* we have to do with here, that religion of earnest spirit and comforting power, this structure of *opus operatum*, *attritio* and *meritum* is seen to be a mockery of all that is sacred.²

¹ Apol. Confess. Aug. 13: "Hic damnamus totum populum scholasticorum doctorum, qui docent, quod sacramenta non ponenti obicem conferant gratiam ex opere operato sine bono motu utentis. Hæc simpliciter judaica opinio est sentire quod per ceremoniam justificemur, sine bono motu cordis, hoc est, sine fide. Et tamen hæc impia et perniciosa opinio magna auctoritate docetur in toto regno pontificio."

² On Duns Scotus' doctrine of the Sacraments see Werner, Scotus (1881), pp. 462-496; on the doctrine of Post-Scotist Scholasticism see the same author, Die Nachscotistische Scholastik (1883), p. 380 ff. As specially important characteristics of the Scotist doctrine of the Sacraments note the following: (1) the rejection of the *inner* necessity of the Sacraments, since God can grant the saving grace even without the employment of these outward signs (all the more firmly is the *outer* necessity maintained, on the ground of the positive divine appointment); (2) the rejection of

The individual Sacraments. (1) *Baptism.*¹ This Sacrament² is the medicine for the consequences of the Fall, and lays the basis of the new life ; it has therefore a negative and a positive effect.³ The former, in which the "grace" already appears as "most perfect,"⁴ relates to original sin. In so far as this consists in guilt, penalty, and concupiscence, baptism abolishes all these with the entire sin ; *i.e.*, the guilt (guilt of original sin and of the previously committed sinful deeds without exception)⁵ is an influence of a naturally necessary kind in the media of sacramental grace ; (3) the strong emphasising of the Sacraments as *notæ ecclesiæ* ; (4) the assertion that since the Fall there have been Sacraments effectual *ex opere operato* ; (5) the rejection of the *virtus supernaturalis* in the Sacraments ; (6) the rejection of the position, that the intellect is the vehicle of the sacramental character ; (7) the assertion that only from the positive appointment of God is it to be concluded that baptism cannot be repeated ; (8) the assertion, that the *reatus culpæ* after the act of sin is no *reatio realis*, *i.e.*, that there remains nothing in the *soul* of the effect of sin, which would again be sin ; for the *habitus vitiosus* is not sin, seeing that it remains even in the justified ; hence there stands nothing that is a link between the sinful act and the *obligatio ad penam* ; the latter, therefore, is only a *relatio rationis* of the divine intellect or will, which has its ground in the "ordering will" of God ; in accordance with this the view of the Sacrament of Penance is formed. Occam emptied the Sacraments of every kind of inner and speculative import ; they have simply an importance because God has so *ordained* them ; but we do not know why. Here also the position of things was such that as soon as the authority of the Church disappeared, there was necessarily a falling away, not only of the doctrine of the Sacraments in every sense—that was no misfortune—but also of every doctrine of grace ; for no one had taken the precaution to secure that the latter should be able to exist independently of the Sacraments.

¹ See the detailed exposition in Thomas, P. III., Q. 66-71. Schwane, pp. 605-622.

² According to the general view (something similar already in Ignatius of Antioch) Christ, at His own baptism, imparted to the water consecration and power. Hence the water needs no special consecration, as the material does in the other Sacraments.

³ According to the Scholastic view, which, however, was not shared by all, an abolition of sin is in itself possible without infusion of saving grace (so Thomas).

⁴ Gabriel Biel (according to Hahn, p. 334) : "Licet gratia baptismalis sit incipientium et ita *imperfecta* quantum ad habilitandum ad bonum, tamen quantum ad liberandum a malo habet vim gratiæ perfectissimæ . . . restituit perfectam innocentiam."

⁵ On the other hand : "baptismus non est institutus ad delendum omnia peccata futura, sed tamen præterita et præsentia." Hence the rule : "baptismus delet quidquid invenit." This reluctance to relate the sin-cancelling grace of baptism to the future, had originally sprung from regard for the interests of human freedom and for the serious nature of Christian morality. But in the Scholastic period what is aimed at mainly is to protect the Church Sacrament of Penance.

blotted out, the penalty remitted (and that means the eternal penalty totally, the temporal penalty likewise, so far as it consists in *pœnæ determinatæ*; but so far as it finds expression in the penal evils of the earthly life, it remains), and the concupiscence is controlled. The last point is new, as only in Scholasticism is a clear distinction drawn between sinful and innocent concupiscence. The meaning is this, that through sin sinful concupiscence has come into existence as disorder of the lower impulses, or as dominion of these over the higher impulses and over the province of human action, whereby a *fomes peccati* (slumbering fire of sin), ever continuing, and working with a certain necessity, has developed itself. Baptism, now, has the effect of so rectifying the disorder of the passions, and moderating the "*fomes peccati*," that man is now in a position for resisting, or for keeping within appointed limits, the concupiscence, which is involved in his earthly nature, and is therefore in itself innocent. This view of the natural life, which is not a religious one, will occupy us again in the next section (under C). Here it is enough to note that, in order to give expression to the absoluteness of the negative baptismal influence as an effectual one, the conception of an innocent concupiscence was admitted.¹ The positive effect of baptism is summed up under the term, "*sacramentum regenerationis*." But while here

¹ Lombard, *Sentent. II.*, Dist. 32, A. B.: "*Licet remaneat concupiscentia post baptismum, non tamen dominatur et regnat sicut ante, immo per gratiam baptismi mitigatur et minuitur, ut post dominari non valeat, nisi quis reddat vires hosti eundo post concupiscentias. Nec post baptismum remanet ad reatum, quia non imputatur in peccatum, sed tantum pœna peccati est, ante baptismum vero pœna est et culpa. . . . Per gratiam baptismi vitium concupiscentiæ debilitatur atque extenuatur, ita ut jam non regnet, nisi consensu reddantur ei vires, et quia reatus ipsius solvitur.*" Thomas defines the *fomes* (after the Fall) in the 27 Q., P. III., as "*rebellio inferiorum virium ad rationem*," or as "*inordinata concupiscentia sensibilis appetitus*"; but by grace it is weakened and loses the reatus. What was still thought of even then (see Augustine) was almost exclusively the sexual impulse and generation. Therefore there can be no thought of removing the concupiscence, and Thomas asserts: "*baptismus non aufert actu infectionem, prout afficit personam, quod patet ex hoc, quod baptizatus per actum naturæ originale transmittit in prolem.*" He says also, P. II., I, Q. 74, Art. 3: "*Transit peccatum originale reatu et remanet actu (this is not so strongly expressed afterwards). Sed talis corruptio fomitis non impedit, quin homo rationabili voluntate possit reprimere singulos motus inordinatos sensualitatis, si præsentiat, puta divertendo cogitationem ad alia.*"

there was in general no occasion to pass beyond the old ecclesiastical conception (even the special connection of baptism with faith is still always emphasised), yet misgivings arose on two points. Is the positive grace in baptism "perfectissima," and do the children receive this grace as perfectly as baptised adults? Although in general it was declared that baptism is the sacrament of justification, and that through it the baptised person receives the *gratia operans* and *cooperans*, provided he does not already possess it (in which case there is only an increasing), yet, from the time of Nominalism especially, baptism was in point of fact held to be only the sacrament of initiation for justification.¹ Hence there was an increased willingness to assume in the case of children the perfect application of baptismal grace,² while it was held at an earlier period, that to children there is perfectly communicated only purification from original sin, the positive grace being only infused into them afterwards at successive times.³ As regards the faith of children, there was no fixed opinion; the majority seem to have held that the faith of the Church (or of the sponsors) intervenes here vicariously, and that thereby the saving effect is made possible.⁴ Thus baptism only lays the foundation for the process of justification, or it implants it "in habitu," but not "in actu" (that Mary was thought of as an exception to this was a matter of course on the Catholic view; for to her nothing could

¹ See note 4 on p. 227.

² As a rule, no doubt, with the addition, that the *habitus ligatus est propter pueritiam*, but that as truly is it perfectly imparted as the sleeping man is a living man. So already Thomas. At the Council of Vienna in 1311, the view was declared the *sententia probabilior* and sanctioned, that baptism is the cause in the case of *parvuli*, both of the *remissio culpæ* and of the *collatio gratiæ* (quoad habitum, etsi non pro illo tempore quoad usum), *i.e.*, that it communicates the *gratia informans* et *virtutes* (Mansi XXV., p. 411).

³ Lombardus, IV., Dist. 4 H.: "de adultis, qui digne recipiunt sacramentum, non ambigitur quin gratiam operantem et cooperantem perceperint . . . de parvulis vero, qui nondum ratione utuntur, quæstio est, an in baptismo receperint gratiam qua ad majorem venientes ætatem possent velle et operari bonum? Videtur, quod non receperint, quia gratia illa caritas est et fides, quæ voluntatem preparat et adjuvat. Sed quis dixerit, eos accepisse fidem et caritatem!"

⁴ Following Augustine, Thomas III., Q. 68, Art. 9: the *parvuli sunt in utero matris ecclesiæ* and are thus nourished.

be given by baptism which she had not already possessed before baptism).¹

Baptism is absolutely necessary (baptism with blood a substitute), conveys a character, cannot be repeated, is valid when it is performed with water (*materia*) and with the words of institution (*forma*),² and is regularly dispensed by the priest. Yet in an emergency a deacon, and even a layman, can baptise. The considerations regarding the sacramentalia which accompanied baptism do not belong to the history of dogma ;³ just as little do the secondary consequences of baptism, as, *e.g.*, spiritual affinity, etc.

As the Church had to contend, especially from the thirteenth century onwards, against sects and schools who, on different grounds (as a rule out of opposition to the prevailing sacramental system, here and there also from opposition to the sacramental system in general), disputed the rightfulness of infant baptism, or who denied the necessity of baptism altogether, an apologetic, polemical discussion of the Sacrament of Baptism was necessary. Yet there was never nearly so much fulness of statement here as in the account given of the Sacrament of the Eucharist.⁴

2. *Confirmation*.⁵ This Sacrament obtained its independent existence simply through Western practice, inasmuch as only the bishop⁶ could administer it. Hence it naturally resulted, that it became dissociated from baptism, which, however, forms its presupposition,⁷ and with which it shares the quality, that it conveys a character, and therefore cannot be repeated. The

¹ Here there were great controversies, which will be briefly dealt with afterwards.

² Thomas, P. III., Q. 66, Art. 6, declares (against Hugo) that baptism in the name of Christ alone is invalid ; yet the Apostles allowed themselves such baptism.

³ See Schanz, *Die Wirksamkeit der Sacramentalien*, Tüb, Theol. Quartalschr. 1886, Part. 4.

⁴ See the polemic against the Catharists (Moneta), Petrobrusiani, etc.

⁵ Thomas, P. III., Q. 72, Schwane, pp. 622-627.

⁶ Because only the Apostles had the power to impart the Holy Spirit by laying on of hands.

⁷ Not only its presupposition, "sed est majoris necessitatis," Thomas, l.c., Art. 12. With regard to the presupposition it is said in Art. 6: "si aliquis non baptizatus confirmaretur, nihil reciperet."

material is the Chrisma consecrated by the bishop, the form the sacramental words: "consigno te, etc." The effect, which, of course, as additional to that of baptism, either cannot be definitely expressed, or restricts the importance of the baptismal communication of grace, is *power* (robur) for growth, strength for conflict with enemies of the faith (military), the gifts of the Holy Spirit, or even—as a portion of the process of justification—the *gratia gratum faciens* (grace that renders well-pleasing).¹ Doubts about this Sacrament, which, according to Thomas,

¹ "Robur," or "potestas ad pugnam spiritalem," is the chief conception; baptism distinguishes believers from unbelievers, confirmation the newly-born from the mature. At the same time Thomas (Art. 7) sought to introduce confirmation into the process of justification, in which, certainly, he had poor enough success: "datur baptisato spiritus sanctus ad robur . . . missio seu datio spiritus s. non est nisi cum gratia gratum faciente. Unde manifestum est, quod gratia gratum faciens confertur in hoc sacramento . . . gratiæ gratum facientis primus effectus est remissio culpæ, habet tamen et alios effectus quia sufficit ad hoc quod promoveat hominem per omnes gradus usque in vitam æternam . . . et ideo gratia gratum faciens non solum datur ad remissionem culpæ, sed etiam ad augmentum et firmamentum justitiæ, et sic confertur in hoc sacramento." But any number of Sacraments might then be forced in! See the summing up of the chief deliverances on the Sacrament by Eugene IV. (l.c., p. 1055), where it is said of the effect: "datur S. S. ad robur, ut vid. Christianus audacter Christi confiteatur nomen." The Pope will have it, besides, that per apostolicæ sedis dispensationem even ordinary priests have celebrated the Sacrament, yet only with oil which a bishop had consecrated. This continued afterwards to be the Catholic view, or, say, practice. This special linking of confirmation to the power of the Pope goes back to Thomas. He framed the theory, fraught with large consequences, that the Sacraments of the Eucharist and of ordination relate to the true body of Christ, the others to the mystical (the Church). Hence in the celebration of the latter five Sacraments there is to be taken into account, besides the potestas ministerii in general, the power of jurisdiction (in the case of one in a higher, in the case of another in a lower degree) belonging to the Church, that is, the Pope. In consequence of this he has the right, in the case of confirmation, to depute ordinary priests; in Sentent. IV., Dist. 7, Q. 3, A. 1: "Sciendum est, quod cum episcopatus non addat aliquid supra sacerdotium per relationem ad corpus domini verum, sed solum per relationem ad corpus mysticum, papa per hoc quod est episcoporum summus non dicitur habere plenitudinem potestatis per relationem ad corpus domini verum, sed per relationem ad corpus mysticum. Et quia gratia sacramentalis descendit in corpus mysticum a capite, ideo omnis operatio in corpus mysticum sacramentalis, per quam gratia datur, dependet ab operatione sacramentali super corpus domini verum, et ideo solus sacerdos potest absolvere in loco penitentiali et baptizare ex officio. Et ideo dicendum, quod promovere ad illas perfectiones, quæ non respiciunt corpus domini verum, sed solum corpus mysticum, potest a papa qui habet plenitudinem pontificalis potestatis committi sacerdoti."

“etiam a non jejunis dari vel accipi potest”¹ (can be given or received even by those not fasting), never disappeared; Wyclif again gave emphatic expression to them; for a reliable proof from tradition could not be obtained.² In the last resort Thomas is unable otherwise to defend the “conveniens” in the ritual than by the sentence:³ “it must be firmly held that the ordinances of the Church are directed according to the wisdom of Christ. And for this reason it ought to be certain that the ritual which the Church observes in this and in other Sacraments is fitting” (firmiter tenendum est, quod ordinationes ecclesiæ dirigantur secundum sapientiam Christi. Et propter hoc certum esse debet, ritus quod ecclesia observat in hoc et in aliis sacramentis esse convenientes). If we assume, not the dogmatic, but the practical pedagogic point of view, we cannot deny the serviceableness of this observance, especially when taken along with infant baptism, both as regards the plebs Christiana, and as regards the bishop, who in this way comes close to every member of his diocese.⁴

3. *The Eucharist.*⁵ At the beginning of the thirteenth century, after the conflicts in the eleventh, and many uncertainties in the twelfth, the doctrine of transubstantiation, together with what was derived from it, or coheres with it, was substantially settled. The Lateran Council (see above, p. 53) of the year 1215 had brought the development to a conclusion, and had given to the Sacrament the highest conceivable place, as was shown by the deliverance regarding it being introduced into the Symbol.⁶ But the “heretical” opposition had made the deliverance necessary. This opposition never

¹ Thomas, l.c., Art. 12.

² A passage from Pseudo-Isidore (ep. episc. Melchiadis) played an important part, as also the Pseudo-Dionysius.

³ Thomas, l.c.

⁴ Its institution by Christ, first asserted by Albertus, even Thomas has only “proved” by declaring that Christ instituted the Sacrament, John XVI. 7, “promittendo.”

⁵ Thomas, P. III., Q. 73-83; Schwane, pp. 628-661; Article, “Transubstantiation,” by Steitz-Hauck, Real-Encyclopädie, vol. 15², pp. 803 ff., 815 ff. (a very thorough-going account).

⁶ Baur points out very correctly (Vorles, II., p. 475) that Thomas tries to prove that Christianity without transubstantiation is not the absolute religion.

became silent ; nay, in the circles of the Church theology itself, there were set forth in later times views of transubstantiation, that, strictly speaking, had the effect of cancelling it.

Here, also, it was Thomas whose view of the Sacrament became classic in Catholicism. The modifications which Nominalism allowed itself to adopt disappeared ; the doctrine of Thomas remained. Thomas put an end to the uncertainties still betrayed by the Lombard at some points,¹ and he applied in perfected form to the Sacrament the dialectic mode of treatment which had once occasioned so much offence. He could dispose of the Sacrament with confidence, for he was a Realist, and Duns Scotus could do so likewise (in some respects in a still more perfect form), because he also readily adopted a realistic theory of knowledge. But this confidence thereafter received a check ; for it is only in a forced way, if at all, that the Nominalist mode of thought can come to terms with transubstantiation. It must either let it drop, or declare it an intensified miracle, by which two impossible things become actual.

In the Sacrament of the Supper and the doctrine regarding it, the Church gave expression to everything that it highly prized—its dogma, its mystical relation to Christ, the fellowship of believers, the priest, the sacrifice, the miraculous power which God had given to His Church, the satisfaction of the sensuous

¹ Only the fact of the conversio was a certainty for the Lombard, not the modus ; see Sentent. IV., Dist. 11 A. : “ Si quæritur, qualis sit ista conversio, an formalis an substantialis vel alterius generis, definire non sufficio ; formalem tamen non esse cognosco, quia species rerum quæ ante fuerant, remanent, et sapor et pondus. *Quibusdam* videtur esse substantialis, dicentibus sic substantiam converti in substantiam, ut hæc essentialiter fiat illa.” Yet that is at bottom the opinion of the Lombard also, for he unequivocally teaches (Dist. 12 A.) that after the transformation the accidents are “ sine subjecto.” In the doctrine of the Mass the Lombard had not yet reached the height of Realism ; ideas of the ancient Church still exercised their influence on him ; see Sentent. IV., Dist. 12 F. : “ Quæritur, si quod gerit sacerdos proprie dicatur sacrificium vel immolatio, et si Christus quotidie immolatur vel semel tantum immolatus sit ? Ad hoc breviter dici potest, illud quod offertur et consecratur a sacerdote vocari sacrificium et oblationem, quia memoria est et representatio sacrificii veri et sancte immolationis factæ in ara crucis. Et semel Christus mortuus est in cruce, ibique inmolatus est in semetipso, quotidie autem immolatur in sacramento, quia in sacramento *recordatio*, fit illius quod factum est semel.”

impulse in piety, etc., *only not the faith which seeks for certainty and to which certainty is given.* This appears very plainly from the description of the effects of the Eucharist as a Sacrament and as a sacrifice. The Sacrament was universally revered as the chiefest Sacrament, the sun among the Sacraments, etc., because here *res* and *sacramentum* coincide (the matter becomes itself Christ), because the incarnation and the death on the Cross are represented as operative in it, or are repeated in it, and because it embraces the past, the present, and the future. Yet the effects, which are summed up under the term *nourishment* of the spiritual life of the soul, and are detailed as incorporation into Christ, incorporation into the Church, communion of the members with each other, forgiveness of venial sins, perseverance in faith, strengthening of human weakness, refreshment, foretaste and fore-celebration of the heavenly blessedness, anticipation of eternal fellowship with God, etc., do not attain to the effect of the Sacrament of Penance. Just as little is specific importance attached to the Eucharist as a sacrifice; under this term, indeed, personal merit rather is strongly asserted. In the sacrifice of the Mass one testifies his obedience to God; like every sacrifice it is a performance which can claim a reward. Thus all effects here are at the same time dependent on the receiver. These effects *appear* to be estimated most highly; the sacrifice of the Mass, indeed, is a constant repetition of the death on the Cross; but this constant repetition has respect only to daily sins, to penal evils and bodily need. It extends, no doubt, in its effect, beyond the earthly life—in practice, the bearing of the sacrifice of the Mass on the penalties in purgatory was almost its most important bearing—yet there are also other means, which are really not less effectual than the Masses.¹

¹ On the effect of the Eucharist, see Thomas, Q. 79. In the first Art. he shows that it conveys grace; in the second that it gives aid for eternal life; in the third that it does not blot out mortal sins, seeing that it is given to the spiritually alive, though under certain circumstances it removes an unconscious mortal sin; in the fourth that it blots out the *peccata venalia*; in the fifth that it does not cancel the penalty of sin entirely, but only “*secundum quantitatem devotionis sumentium*”; in the sixth that it guards men against future transgressions; in the seventh that as a Sacrament it profits only the receivers, but as a sacrifice the spectators also: “*In quantum in hoc sacramento representatur passio Christi, qua Christus obtulit se hostiam deo,*

The materia of the Sacrament is wheaten¹ bread and wine.² The appropriateness of these, and, in particular, of this *double* form, is dealt with very minutely. The very ancient symbolic idea of the many grains which become *one* bread also reappears in the Schoolmen.³ The forma is the words of consecration, which are spoken in the name of Christ (not in the name of the minister).⁴ In connection therewith, Bonaventura explains the "hoc" as denoting the bread, Thomas as denoting the accidents of the bread ("hoc sub his specibus contentum," *i.e.*, that which is here presented is not bread, but my body). But the forma is not only an appeal to God (Bonaventura, Duns) that He will accomplish the transubstantiation, but an effectual power, as soon as the priest has the intention to work the mystery.⁵

But the difficult question was now this, How is the transubstantiation to be thought of?⁶ Here there was, first, a rejection already by the Lombard of the idea of a new-creation of the body of Christ, for Christ's body already exists; but, second, the opinion was also rejected by him that Christ makes the bread and wine into His body, so that they become the Sacrament, whether by *assumptio* or by *consubstantiality*; there must be believed in rather a *conversio* of such a kind that the substances

habet rationem sacrificii, in quantum vero in hoc sacramento traditur invisibilis gratia sub visibili specie, habet rationem sacramenti . . . hoc sacrificium, quod est memoriale dominicæ passionis, non habet effectum nisi in illis qui junguntur huic sacramento per fidem et caritatem. Unde et in Canone Missæ non oratur pro his qui sunt extra ecclesiam; illis tamen prodest plus vel minus secundum modum devotionis eorum." So the Mass profits only those who already have fides and caritas, as securing for them an augmentum fidei, or a remission of penalty, and always according to the measure of their desert. The Eucharist is the Sacrament and sacrifice which accompanies the process of justification, so far as that process has already begun and is disturbed by no mortal sin, and which carries the process to its higher stages.

¹ Controversy with the Greeks about leavened bread.

² Mixing with water is the rule.

³ Thomas, Q. 74, Art. 1.

⁴ Q. 78, Art. 1.

⁵ Thomas, in Sentent. IV., Dist. 8, Q. 2, Art. 3: "In verbis prædictis sicut et in aliis formis sacramentorum est aliqua virtus a deo, sed hæc virtus non est qualitas habens esse completum in natura . . . sed habet esse incompletum, sicut virtus quæ est in instrumento ex intentione principalis agentis."

⁶ There was in possession no traditional doctrine whatever on this point; indeed, a proof for the fact itself of transubstantiation could not be derived from earlier times. Special appeal was made to Pseudo-Ambrosius.

of the elements pass into the substances of the body of Christ, while the accidents remain behind without a subject.¹ What happens to the substance of the elements, whether it breaks up and is destroyed, the Lombard declared that he did not know. Alexander of Hales distinctly rejects consubstantiality and destruction, and speaks of a "passing over." But he at once adds, that after the change, the *whole* Christ is present, inasmuch as the human soul and the deity of Christ always are concomitantly (*per concomitantiam*) where His flesh is. The continuance of the accidents without a subject he pronounced a miracle.² Bonaventura attached weight to the *conversio* taking place both as regards the *materia* and the *forma* of the bread (it would otherwise be imperfect); yet we must not understand by the former the *materia prima* (matter as the potency [*potentia*] of all material substances).³ With regard to the first Eucharist celebration—the treatment of which is the hardest crux of the whole theory—it was universally held, indeed, that Christ partook of Himself in eating (as an example, and with a view to the enjoyment of love, not with a view to being perfected), but while Hales thought that Christ partook then already of His glorified body, Bonaventura taught (Thomas following him) that Christ partook of His mortal body, which, however, as Eucharistic was already present "impassibiliter" (in impassible form). All of them thought of the parallels in creation and incarnation, and sought to explain the mystery from these. Thomas now submitted to a final treatment the accidents, which, as the subject is wanting to them after the *conversio*, are maintained in existence by God as the first cause (*causa prima*).⁴ But at the

¹ Sentent. IV., Dist. 12 A.: "Si vero quaeritur de accidentibus, quae remanent, scilicet de speciebus et de sapore et pondere, in quo subjecto fundantur, potius mihi videtur fatendum existere sine subjecto, quam esse in subjecto, quia ibi non est substantia nisi corporis et sanguinis dominici, quae non afficitur illis accidentibus. Non enim corpus Christi talem in se habet formam, sed qualis in iudicio apparebit. Remanent ergo illa accidentia per se subsistentia ad mysterii ritum, ad gustus fideique suffragium, quibus corpus Christi habens formam et naturam suam tegitur."

² Summa IV., Q. 38, 40.

³ It is an opinion peculiar to Bonaventura, that the substance of the bread would return if the accidents were destroyed.

⁴ Thomas III., Q. 77. In the first Article the question is discussed: "Utrum accidentia quae remanent, sint sine subjecto"; it is answered in the affirmative, since

same time, following Bonaventura, he laid the foundation for an extremely complicated doctrine of the form of all matter, which was afterwards spun out by Duns and the Nominalists. As the bread, that is to say, is changed as regards the material *and the form*, both changes must be demonstrated in the transubstantiated result. But as the soul of Christ (form) only appears present concomitantly (*per concomitantiam*), the body of Christ must have a form for itself.¹ Thus Thomas is led to the idea of a "form of corporeity" (*forma corporeitatis*), which is identical neither with the soul nor with the outer shape, but appears as the ground of the qualities of the body. Further, in accordance with this, Thomas conceives of the *conversio* as a *passing over* in the strict sense of the term (*no destruction = annihilatio* of the elements).² The miracle is identical with a miracle of creation in so far as in the case of both the two states are not united by a common subject (substance); for the continued existence of the accidents is no real bond. Duns pursued this line further, and came to the adoption of a plurality of forms in matter. He required this assumption, as he assailed St. Thomas with reflections arising from the hypothesis, that the Eucharist was conceivably celebrated during the time when Christ lay in the grave. The Thomist doctrine was not framed to meet this case, as it assumed a *forma substantialis* for the *living* body. Hence, according to Thomas, only an imperfect transubstantiation would then have taken place—that is, a transubstantiation only into the material of the dead body. Duns himself appealed more confidently to the divine omnipotence, placed in the foreground the general possibility that God can transform everything (even the material into the spiritual, and vice versa), affirmed the existence of a matter without quality which is capable of everything, and came very close to the view, that in transubstantiation one sub-

they cannot become accidents of the body of Christ. In the second Article it is asked: "utrum quantitas dimensiva sit subjectum aliorum accidentum," etc., etc. Here already the logical investigations into space begin.

¹ Summa P. III., Q. 75, Art. 6: "Forma substantialis panis *non* remanet" (which is elaborately proved). Yet the breaking relates, not to the body of Christ, but to the species sacramentalis ("corpus Christi non frangitur"); see Q. 77, Art. 7.

² Even animals, according to Thomas, enjoy the body of the Lord (Q. 80, Art. 3). Bonaventura is in favour of the *opinio honestior* that this does not happen.

stance is annihilated and another is introduced. Above all, however, his thesis, that God Himself, as if on the ground of a contract, always works the *conversio*, so that the words of consecration only form the *occasion*, influenced all the Nominalists afterwards. But by a logical process there then followed also upon this view a modification of the way of understanding transubstantiation, in the direction of impanation and consubstantiality. For it became natural to assume, that if the divine working only *accompanies* the words of the priest (that is, the *forma sacramenti*), it only *accompanies*, also, the elements (the *materia*; a "moral" conjunction by the free will of Christ). This doctrine was first suggested as possible, and then asserted as possible. But when once the idea of the *conversio* was separated by a logical distinction into two acts—into annihilation, and entrance of the body of Christ into the place of the annihilated subject—the first act could also drop out. The miracle only becomes the greater when substance stands side by side with substance. At the same time the signal was now given for investigations into *space* in its relation to *substance*, investigations which, from the time of Scotus onwards, did not continue without fruit for the doctrine of space. Human thought does not advance without receiving a determining impulse from the practical sphere: from the doctrine of God there grew up the doctrines of thought and of will; from the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of the Kosmos; from the doctrine of the Lord's Supper, the doctrine of space. If the question as to the relation of the body of Christ to the elements already led to inquiries into space, still greater was the impulse in that direction as soon as the question arose as to how the eucharistic body is related to the glorified body of Christ in heaven. The thorny discussions on this subject do not belong to dogma strictly speaking. As new-creation was excluded, the question was as to the presence in the Sacrament of the body that is already in heaven. And again, as the body *as a whole* appears at the same time in each of the independent particles of the consecrated bread, a space-less presence had necessarily to be taught. This Thomas began to do;¹ but it was only the

¹ Q. 76, Art. 3-6.

Nominalists who treated the question as *virtuosi* (especially Occam), though they did not come definitely to the doctrine of the ubiquity of the body of Christ. On the other hand, it was they, especially John of Paris and Occam, who anticipated the Lutheran doctrine of the real presence in the bread.¹ An energetic opponent of the doctrine of transubstantiation was Wyclif (but even he did not get clearly beyond impanation, and if he was incensed by the idolatry that was practised with the host, yet it was by grounds of reason [the absurdity of accidents without substance] that he was moved to opposition.)² By him not a few (but not Huss)³ were constrained to renounce the

¹ John of Paris (*de modo existendi corpus Christi*, etc., printed in London, 1686) declared that the interpretation of the real presence as *conversio* did not come within his faith, but that he was prepared to retract, if it was proved to him that the Church (the Pope) had defined it. After then rejecting the Berengarian doctrine, as not leading to *communicatio idiomatum* of bread and of body, he holds the following view as free from objection (p. 86): “*ut substantia panis maneat sub accidentibus suis non in proprie supposito, sed tracta ad esse et suppositum Christi, ut sic sit unum suppositum in duabus naturis.*” As Münscher (p. 257) has correctly explained, the idea here is this, that the bread and the body of Christ become united into *one substance*, in virtue of a common likeness of their qualities, similar to that which it was believed must be assumed in the conjoining of the two natures in Christ in the unity of one person. It may be said, therefore, that the orthodox Catholic view of the Supper is Monophysite; the Berengarian, Nestorian; and that of John of Paris, Chalcedonian. Even Occam declared that there is nothing in Scripture on the question that the substance of the bread does not remain (*de sacram. alt.* 5), and with regard to the view of the real presence, according to which “*corpus Christi in eodem loco cum substantia panis et vini manet,*” he says that it is “*multum rationalis, nisi esset determinatio ecclesie in contrarium, quia illa salvat et vitat omnes difficultates quæ sequuntur ex separatione accidentium a subjecto*” (for this contradicts the Nominalist theory of knowledge). But he falls back ultimately on the wish that the doctrine of the *conversio* may be revealed to the Church.

² Trial. IV. 2: “*Inter omnes hæreses, quæ unquam in ecclesia pullularunt, nunquam considero aliquam plus callide per hypocritas introductam et multiplicius populum defraudantem, nam spoliat populum, facit ipsum committere idololatriam, negat fidem scripturæ et per consequens ex infidelitate multipliciter ad iacundiam provocat veritatem.*” In c. 4 he then works out the view that panis and body of Christ are at the same time present. Yet he scouts the idea that any kind of priest—even a sinful one therefore—can produce Christ. The doctrine of impanation receives from him a spiritual turn, though this has not the effect of entirely cancelling it. Against the coarse form of this doctrine he waged war, and came close to Berengar.

³ In his treatise *de corpore Christi*, written during imprisonment, Huss assents to transubstantiation. But from his other writings we must assume that he was not of

monstrous doctrine, and in the fifteenth century the opposition to it is met with not infrequently.¹ Yet it remained the reigning view; the hostility of declared heretics could only be in its favour.²

The consequences of the transubstantiation doctrine were manifold, and of radical importance; the following may be mentioned:—

(1) The discontinuance of child communion.³

(2) The augmentation of the dignity of the priests, by whom daily Christ was magically produced and offered up.

(3) The withholding of the cup. From the time of the Lombard it was a settled belief that the whole Christ is contained in each species, and that meant, too (according to the doctrine developed especially by Thomas),⁴ Christ concomitantly (*per concomitantiam*) in His body and soul as well as in His divinity. But that being so, it was permissible, safer indeed (that the wine might not be spilt, and the Sacrament thereby profaned), and, with a view to increasing the dignity of the priest, “conveniens,” that the layman should receive only in the form

the opinion that a sinful priest can effect it (see above his conception of the Church, p. 143).

¹ Wesel was an adherent of the impanation doctrine.

² The decree as to the Lord's Supper in the Bull of Eugene IV. “*Exultate deo*” runs: “*Tertium est eucharistiæ sacramentum, cuius materia est panis triticeus et vinum de vite, cui ante consecrationem aqua modicissima admisceri debet* (there follows an elaborate justification of this mixing in opposition to the Armenian practice). *Forma hujus sacramenti sunt verba salvatoris, quibus hoc conficit sacramentum. Nam ipsorum verborum virtute substantia panis in corpus Christi et substantia vini in sanguinem convertuntur, ita tamen, quod totus Christus continetur sub specie panis et totus sub specie vini. Sub qualibet quoque parte hostiæ consecrate et vini consecrati, separatione facta, totus est Christus. Hujus sacramenti effectus, quem in anima operatur digne sumentis, est adunatio hominis ad Christum. Et quia per gratiam homo Christo incorporatur et membris ejus unitur, consequens est, quod per hoc sacramentum in sumentibus digne gratia augeatur, omnemque effectum, quem materialis cibus et potus quoad vitam agunt corporalem sustentando, augendo, reparando et delectando, sacramentum hoc quoad vitam operatur spiritualem, in quo, ut inquit Urbanus Papa, gratiam salvatoris nostri recensemus memoriam, a malo retrahimur, confortamur in bono et ad virtutum et gratiarum proficimus incrementum.*”

³ This certainly had also other grounds; but one ground lay in the extravagant ideas of the content of the Sacrament.

⁴ P. III., Q. 76, Arts. 1 and 2.

of the bread (*sub specie panis*), while the priest drank the cup in the name of all.¹ At Constance this became fixed.

(4) The adoration of the elevated host (elevation is represented as having been already adopted in opposition to Berengar), the procession of the host, and the feast of Corpus Christi (1264, 1311): for the body of Christ is, of course, not present merely at the moment of enjoyment, but, when once produced by consecration, remains until the accidents are dissolved.² Against this idolatry there arose in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries much opposition, which, however, continued to be lacking in vigour.

It was already pointed out above that as regards the idea of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, the Lombard was still influenced by the old ecclesiastical motive of *recordatio* (remembrance). But from ecclesiastical antiquity there was certainly taken over also the idea of the *repetition* of the sacrificial death of Christ (Gregory I.), and on the basis of the doctrine of transubstantiation this idea now necessarily became firmly established. The Roman Canon of the Mass, which did not originally contain the idea of the bloodless repetition of the death of Christ, and still bears traces to-day of not having contained it, has in its most recent portions the new idea. At the Lateran Council in 1215 the idea is presupposed, and brief note is taken of it,³ and the Schoolmen, although they do not here give elaborated doctrines, have no other thought than that the priest offers the body of the Lord.⁴ The Eucharist as a sacrifice, as it formed the central

¹ Thomas, P. III., Q. 80, Art. 12: The priest *must* enjoy the sacramentum perfectum, since he celebrates it; the custom of some Churches is to be approved (Thomas still expresses himself cautiously) of withholding the cup from incautious laymen. Thereafter there was a rapid advance made in practice; the history of this process, and of the opposition to it, is not relevant here, as a dogma was not involved.

² Q. 76, Art. 6: "Corpus Christi manet, quousque species sacramentales manent."

³ Chap. I.

⁴ For the Eucharist as a repetition of the sacrificial death of Christ, there could be produced from tradition only a bad, and, to some extent, a forged proof. Thomas treats the question in Q. 83, Art. 1. According to his custom he raises at the outset three objections, and they are very telling, against the position that Christ is offered in this Sacrament. He appeals, first, to the passage in Hebrews about the being once offered; secondly, to the circumstance that in the Mass Christ is not crucified; thirdly, to the Augustinian position, that in the sacrifice of Christ "idem est sacerdos

part of divine service, was for the people much more important than the Sacrament. Although, in strict theory, there were connected with it only slender results (see above), yet misdirected piety made this observance entirely its own, and saw in it its real defence in life and in death. The mischief of low masses and masses for souls was as much the consequence of violent importunity on the part of the laity for as many masses as possible, as

et hostia," which does not apply in the case of the Mass. But he then explains that (1) the *one* sacrifice is not touched by the repetition, for in the repetition it remains always the same; (2) that the altar is *representativum crucis*; and (3) that the priest "gerit imaginem Christi," and hence it holds good even for the sacrifice of the mass, that "*quodammodo idem est sacerdos et hostia.*" The positive exposition is extremely weak, even when we adopt Thomas's standpoint, and shows plainly that at bottom the repetition of the sacrificial death of Christ could not in any way be theoretically justified. But it stands here as it does with the doctrine of the Church. The practice justifies itself by its existence! What Thomas has submitted is as follows:—
 "Duplici ratione celebratio hujus sacramenti dicitur immolatio Christi. Primo quidem quia, sicut dicit Augustinus ad Simplic. solent imagines earum rerum nominibus appellari, quarum imagines sunt . . . celebratio autem hujus sacramenti, sicut supra dictum est (Q. 79, Art. 1. 3), imago quædam est representativa passionis Christi quæ est vera ejus immolatio. Et ideo celebratio hujus sacramenti dicitur Christi immolatio (here, therefore, there is an expression only of symbol and remembrance). Alio modo quantum ad effectum passionis Christi, quia scilicet per hoc sacramentum participes efficimur fructus dominicæ passionis, unde in quadam dominicali oratione secreta dicitur: Quoties hujus hostiæ commemoratio celebratur, opus nostræ redemptionis exercetur. Quantum igitur ad primum modum poterat dici Christus immolari etiam in figuris Veteris Testamenti . . . sed quantum ad secundum modum proprium est huic sacramento, quod in ejus celebratione Christus immolatur." One easily sees that there is not the smallest degree of proof given for the repetition of the sacrificial death of Christ. Even in other passages in which Thomas speaks of the Eucharist as a sacrifice, I have found nothing more than bare assertions, and sometimes an entire uncertainty as to the relation of the Eucharistic to the true sacrifice. How weak the position is, too, with regard to the effect of this sacrifice, is shown by Q. 79, Art. 5: "Sacramentum effectum sacrificii in eo qui offert habet vel in his, pro quibus offertur." It is really instituted as a sacrament; for "non est institutum ad satisfaciendum, sed ad spiritualiter nutriendum per unionem ad Christum," but "per concomitantiam" a certain remission of penalty also is effected. "In quantum est sacrificium, habet vim satisfactivam, sed in satisfactione magis attenditur affectus offerentis quam quantitas oblationis. Quamvis ergo hæc oblatio ex sui quantitate sufficiat ad satisfaciendum pro omni pœna, tamen sit satisfactoria illis, pro quibus offertur vel etiam offerentibus, secundum quantitatem suæ devotionis et non pro tota pœna." It must by no means be regarded as an accident that Thomas has not repeated the audacious propositions of Hugo and Albertus (the Father first offered the Son for us, we then offer Him for the Father). Thomas has only allowed the term *vera immolatio* to stand, because he held that the "Church" taught it. In the Bull of Eugene IV., moreover (see above), there is no mention of a repetition.

of priestly self-importance; for in the Mass the priest, who is here not a minister but an originator (autor), appears in a very real sense as the mediator between God and men, and, as priest of the body of Christ (sacerdos corporis Christi), his dignity comes most distinctly to view. The Mass was assailed as unbiblical by Wyclif. On the part of others also opposition arose in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries against the low masses and masses for souls, which, however, was directed, as a rule, only against the abuse (abusus).

4. *Penance*.¹ Although in theory baptism and the Eucharist were placed together and emphasised as the two principal Sacraments, yet, as a fact, the two chief closely connected Sacraments were baptism and penance ("second plank after shipwreck" [secunda tabula post naufragium]—so first Tertullian, after him many teachers). But inasmuch as baptism is only administered once, while the Sacrament of Penance is administered repeatedly, and as almost every baptised person comes to be in a position for requiring this latter Sacrament, for which no other can be substituted, this Sacrament became practically the *most important means of grace*. Now, as the Church had completely saturated this Sacrament with its hierarchical spirit, and at the same time attached to it its enfeebled doctrines of sin, grace, and merit, the most important means of grace thus became subordinated to the meaner ecclesiastical tendencies.²

The hierarchical practice, which the laity themselves demanded as a security for grace, preceded the theory by many centuries. In respect of theory there was a special shyness on this point, and an adhering to the evangelical line of thought, that the genuine contrition of the Christian is in itself "sacramental" (see above).³ In spite of the attempts

¹ Thomas, Summa, P. III. Q. 84-90, Suppl. Q. 1-28. Schwane, p. 661, ff. Steitz das römische Buss sacrament, 1854.

² Herrmann remarks correctly (Ztschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche I vol., p. 30): "In the Romish institution of penance the question is not about the way in which the Christian attains to renewal of mind, but about providing security for the Christian as he is."

³ Karl Müller, in the dissertation referred to above (p. 222), sees in this rather something new. Certainly this thought was for a long time not expressed, because there was entirely wanting a "theologian of penance"; but neither had the prevailing sacramental priestly practice any normal theologian. In my opinion it was a novelty in

of Hugo to define the Sacrament of Penance in a stricter ecclesiastical sense (the priest *effects* forgiveness; but Hugo still demands, on the other side, the perfect contritio),¹ the Lombard as the disciple of Abelard, and Master Roland, too,² adhered to the old ecclesiastical theory.³ Gratian placed

theology, when Hugo of St. Victor (see Müller, p. 218 f.) declared that man can only be freed from the sentence of eternal damnation by priestly absolution, that this absolution is perfectly real, and that “sententiam Petri non præcedit, sed subsequitur sententia cæli.” In opposition to this, Abelard, and all those who, following in his steps (see Müller, p. 308 ff.), emphasised the contritio, and regarded God as the iudex, the priest as the declarator, appear to me to have reproduced an old ecclesiastical thought, which is parallel to the Augustinian “Crede et manducasti,” and coincides with the very early idea that sins against God are only forgiven by God. That—as the practice of penance, as regards the satisfactions, had become quite different from what it was in the ancient Church—the distinctions of Abelard and his disciples with respect to this were new, is certain.

¹ De sacram. II. i. 14. Moreover, Hugo certainly then makes other conditions still as regards the certainty and sovereignty of the priestly forgiveness of sin with respect to the forgiveness of God. That at bottom the Sacraments, as a whole, effect only the *possibility* of salvation—the cardinal thought that lies concealed under the Catholic doctrine of the Sacraments—is acknowledged by Hugo in the following very noteworthy sentence (c. 8): “Ubique magis virtus sacramentorum exprimitur, nec quod per ea quilibet participantis salvandi sint, sed quod salvari possint, significatur.” A pernicious influence on the shaping of the new theory and practice of penance was exercised by the Pseudo-Augustinian treatise de vera et falsa pœnitentia (Migne T. 40, col. 1113 sq.), which seems to have appeared in the tenth or in the beginning of the eleventh century (see Karl Müller, Abhandl. f. Weizsäcker, 1892, p. 292. ff.). Luther had already recognised its spuriousness before 1517.

² It has been effectively shown by Müller, that the spiritual view of penance goes back to Abelard. He says, “the great innovation”; I would say “restoration.”

On this account, therefore, he is in disfavour among modern Catholic theologians. Credit is given to him, indeed, for placing together the three things, contritio (compunctio) cordis, confessio oris, satisfactio operis, but his demanding a *perfect* contritio (caritate perfecta), and his not regarding the priestly absolution as absolutely necessary, are held to be grave defects. As a fact, he declared the contritio, conjoined with the *votum* confitendi, to be sufficient; this is followed by the divine forgiveness of sins, the infusion of grace and the remission of the eternal penalty “ante oris confessionem et satisfactionem” (Sentent. IV., 17 A). Hence the consequent reckoning of the priestly absolution as a forgiveness merely *declarative*, or as a forgiveness merely *ecclesiastical*, as distinguished from the divine forgiveness, 18 E: “Ecce quam varia a doctoribus super his traduntur, et in hac tanta varietate quid tenendum sit? Hoc sane dicere ac sentire possumus, quod solus deus peccata dimittit et retinet, et tamen ecclesie contulit potestatem ligandi et solvendi. Sed aliter ipse solvit vel ligat, aliter ecclesia. Ipse enim per se tantum ita dimittit peccatum, quia et animam mundat ab interiori macula et a debito æternæ mortis solvit.” 18 F: “Non autem hoc sacerdotibus concessit, quibus tamen tribuit potestatem ligandi et solvendi *i.e.*, ostendendi

the old and new views side by side, without coming to a decision himself.¹

The Lateran Council of 1215 laid here also the basis of a fixed doctrine. This doctrine appears in perfected form, not yet in Alexander of Hales, but certainly in Thomas. Thomas shows first (in Q. 84) that penance is a Sacrament. In the 1st Art. he starts the objections that there are no corporeal things (*corporales res*) present, that penance is not dispensed "by ministers of Christ," but is inwardly wrought by God, and, finally, that we cannot distinguish between *sacramentum, res,* and *res and sacramentum*. But he sets aside these objections by pointing to the visible acts of the penitent and of the absolving priest, and by recognising in the former, which are completed by the latter, the *materia sacramenti*. In the 2nd Art. he shows that these acts are the *materia proxima* (proximate material), while the sins "to be detested and destroyed" (*peccata detestanda et destruenda*) are the *materia remota* (remote material). In the 3rd Art. there follows the fatal proof that the words, "I absolve thee" (*ego te absolvo*) are the form (*forma*) of the Sacrament, for "this Sacrament receives its full effect from those things which are spoken by the priest" (*hoc sacramentum perficitur per ea quæ sunt ex parte sacerdotis*); but these words of the priest are by appointment of Christ (*Matt. 16*). Since the Sacraments "effect what they represent" (*efficiunt quod figurant*), it is not enough in the sacramental absolution to say, "May God have mercy on thee" (*misereatur tui deus*); "yet such language is also premised in the sacramental absolution, that the effect of the Sacrament may not be hindered on the side of the penitent" (*præmittitur tamen etiam in sacramentali absolutione talis oratio, ne impediatur effectus sacramenti ex parte homines ligatos et solutos . . . Quia etsi aliquis apud deum sit solutus, non tamen in facie ecclesiæ solutus habetur nisi per iudicium sacerdotis. In solvendis ergo culpis et retinendis ita operatur sacerdos evangelicus et iudicat, sicut olim legalis in illis qui contaminati erant lepra quæ peccatum significat.*" In addition to the declaration of forgiveness as an ecclesiastical act (for the congregation), the binding and loosing on the part of the priests consists, according to the Lombard, simply in this, that they impose the works connected with penance, or, abate and remit them. Here, therefore, there still exists a complete understanding of the distinction between inward forgiveness and ecclesiastical reconciliation.

¹ De pœnit. P. II., c. 33, q. 3, dist. 1.

pænitentis). The general rule that God alone forgives sin is not violated by the priest's absolution, for the priests are "authorised ministers" (this is a makeshift). In Art. 4 the laying on of the hand at confession is dealt with (it is not necessary, as what is contemplated is forgiveness of sins, not the obtaining of positive grace). In Art. 5 the necessity of sacramental penance for anyone guilty of mortal sin is shown: "the salvation of the sinner—that is, that his sin be removed from him—is not possible without the Sacrament of Penance, in which there operates the virtue of Christ's passion, through absolution of the priest together with the work of the penitent, who co-operates with grace for the destruction of sin." To this there is further added: "When once anyone has fallen into sin (*ex quo aliquis peccatum incurrit*), *love, faith, and mercy do not deliver the man from sin without penitence* (as if they could exist at all without penitence!); for love requires that a man grieve for the offence committed against his friend, and that a man be anxious to satisfy his friend; faith also requires that he seek to be justified from his sins through the virtue of the passion of Christ, which operates in the Sacraments of the Church; rightly directed mercy (*miseriordia ordinata*) also requires that a man find a remedy in his repenting for the misery into which his sin has plunged him (*ut homo subveniat pænitendo suæ miseriæ, quam per peccatum incurrit*)" (but the necessity of *sacramental* penance has not thus been proved). In Art. 6 it is shown that penance is "the second plank after shipwreck." In Art. 8 it is explained that the "pænitentia" does not need to last till the end of life, but only "for a time determined by the measure of the sin" (*ad determinatum tempus pro mensura peccati*); yet "penitence is twofold, *vis.*, internal and external. That is internal penitence in which one grieves over sin committed, and such penitence ought to last till the close of life. . . . That is external penitence in which one shows external signs of grief, and verbally (*verbo tenus*) confesses his sins to the priest who absolves him, and makes satisfaction according to the priest's judgment (*juxta ejus arbitrium satisfacit*); and such penitence does not need to continue till the end of life, but only for a time determined by the measure of the sin." In Art. 9 it is shown

that a penitence continuous in act (*continua secundum actum*) is impossible, but that a penitence continuous in habit (*secundum habitum*) is obligatory. In Art. 10 it is proved that sacramental penance can be repeated; love can be lost through free will; but God's mercy seeks always to restore it. In Q. 85 there now follows a minute inquiry into penance as "virtue," and in Q. 86 the effect of penance is dealt with "as regards the remission of mortal sins" (*quoad mortalium peccatorum remissionem*). Here it is explained in Art. 4 that with the forgiveness of guilt and the cancelling of eternal penalty all the "penal liability" (*reatus pœnæ*) is not blotted out ("*potest remanere*"). If sin, that is to say, is departure from God as the supreme good, and "a perverse turning to mutable good" (*conversio inordinata ad commutabile bonum*), then there follows from the former eternal, from the latter temporal guilt and penalty. Now, although penance takes the eternal guilt and penalty, as well as the temporal guilt, entirely away, yet the temporal penalty *may* remain; for "in baptism a man attains to (consequitur) a remission of his whole penal guilt (*reatus totius pœnæ*), but in penance he attains to the virtue of the passion of Christ *according to the measure of his own acts* (*secundum modum propriorum actuum*) (this, then, is the ultimate ground of the strange and objectionable view) which are the material of penance (*qui sunt materia pœnitentiæ*); *and so it is not always by the first act of penance, by which blame (culpa) is remitted, that liability to the whole penalty is cancelled, but by all the acts of penance when completed*" (*et ideo non statim per primum actum pœnitentiæ quo remittitur culpa, solvitur reatus totius pœnæ, sed completis omnibus pœnitentiæ actibus*).¹ In Q. 87, in which the forgiveness of venial sins through penance is treated, it is shown that to one guilty of

¹ Hence, also, in the 5th Article the following exposition: "Peccatum mortale ex parte conversionis inordinate ad bonum commutabile quandam dispositionem causat in anima vel etiam habitum, *si actus frequenter iteretur*. Sicut autem dictum est, culpa peccati mortalis remittitur, in quantum tollitur per gratiam aversio mentis a deo. Sublato autem eo, quod est ex parte aversionis, nihilominus remanere potest id quod est ex parte conversionis inordinate, cum hanc contingat esse sine illa (!), sicut prius dictum est; et ideo nihil prohibet, quin remissa culpa remaneant dispositiones ex præcedentibus actibus causatæ, quæ dicuntur *peccati reliquiæ* . . . sicut etiam remanet fomes post baptismum."

mortal sin no venial sins are forgiven, so long as the mortal sin is not blotted out (Art. 4). With Q. 90 begins the inquiry into the "parts of penance."

As all these thoughts of Thomas were no doubt already common property in his day, so they continued also to be among the Schoolmen. The necessity of priestly absolution, hence also confession before the priest, and, still further, the idea of the effectual action of the priest in the Sacrament, were settled matters.¹ The inner contrition was certainly regarded as *res* and *sacramentum* (the *res sacramenti* is the forgiveness of sins, the Sacrament is the external acts of the penitent and the priests, see Thomas III., Q. 84, Art. 1); but it is not enough, and just because it is not yet enough, the perverse opinion could easily creep in *ex contrario*, that perfect contrition is, indeed, essential to non-sacramental penitence, but that in the case of sacramental penitence the addition of the Sacrament completes the imperfect contrition. This opinion not merely crept in, it became actually dominant. But in the definition of the particular parts of penance (*partes pœnitentiæ*) a general perversion of the worst kind made its appearance, of which the seeds, indeed, are to be found already in Thomas.²

With respect to *contrition*, no other thought was entertained till the thirteenth century (see above, p. 221 ff.) than that what is alone of account before God is a perfect penitent disposition, *i.e.*, a disposition prompted by love.³ Contrition as an inner spirit and habit was magnified as an essential Christian virtue, and as "virtue"

¹ Yet there still continued certainly to be a want of logical consistency, in so far as many Schoolmen maintained that perfect contrition conjoined with the *votum sacramenti* is immediately followed by the forgiveness of sins—a position which even to-day is still valid in the Catholic Church.

² How seriously even the *fundamental* theory was threatened (though that of Thomas continued to be held valid) is shown by the proposals of Duns Scotus and Durandus (see Schwane, p. 665) to call the sacrament not so much "penance" as "confession." Durandus would only have *confession* and *absolution* described as material and form of the sacrament; for *contrition* and satisfaction are not parts of the Sacrament, but the *preparation* for the forgiveness of sin (Durandus, in Sent. IV., Dist. 16, Q. 1). This proposal is quite logical, but it shows very plainly how penitence had become externalised in having become a sacrament. It was inevitable that this process of externalising should continue.

³ See Stückert, Die Katholische Lehre v. d. Reue, 1896.

received elaborate treatment.¹ But it was already pointed out by Alexander of Hales that God has made entrance into the Church easier for man,² and he distinguishes attritio (timor servilis [servile fear]) from contritio. This distinction Thomas adopted. He explains, however: "attritio, as is declared by all, is not a virtuous activity" (attritio, ut ab omnibus dicitur, non est actus virtutis). Yet he then defines it in the same article as "in spiritual matters a certain displeasure over sins committed, which, however, is not perfect, but is an *approach* to perfect contrition" (in spiritualibus quædam displicentia de peccatis commissis, sed non perfecta, [quæ est] *accessus* ad perfectam contritionem).³ Prior to him Bonaventura had already

¹ Thomas, Summa III., Suppl. Q. 1: contritio in opposition to superbia, which is initium omnis peccati. An extremely artificial and empty distinction between contritio as virtue and contritio as sacramental in Q. 5, Art. 1: "Contritio potest dupliciter considerari, vel in quantum est pars sacramenti vel in quantum est actus virtutis, et utroque modo est causa remissionis peccati, sed diversimode: quia in quantum est pars sacramenti primo operatur ad remissionem peccati instrumentaliter, sicut et de aliis sacramentis patet: in quantum autem est actus virtutis sic est quasi causa materialis remissionis peccati, eo quod dispositio est quasi necessitas ad justificationem, dispositio autem reducit ad causam materialem." To the question, why then the sacrament is necessary if the contritio is enough, Thomas replies (l.c. Art. 1): "Quamvis possit tota poena per contritionem dimitti, tamen adhuc necessaria est confessio et satisfactio, tum quia homo non potest esse certus de sua contritione, quod fuerit ad totum tollendum sufficiens, tum etiam quia confessio et satisfactio sunt in precepto."

² Summa IV., Q. 59, M. 2, A. 4: "*expeditius* et melius liberatur peccator per *sacramentum penitentiae* quam per *penitentiae virtutem*."

³ P. III., Suppl. Q. 1, Art. 2. Without using the word "attritio," he gives already the thing in P. III., Q. 85, Art. 5, where an exceedingly important statement of the *stages* of penance is given, which clearly shows the divergence of the Catholic from the evangelical view: "De penitentia loqui possumus dupliciter. Uno modo quantum ad habitum. Et sic immediate a deo infunditur sine nobis principaliter operantibus . . . alio modo possumus loqui de penitentia quantum ad actus quibus deo operanti in penitentia cooperamur. Quorum actuum primum principium est dei operatio convertentis cor, secundus actus est motus fidei, tertius est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur" (take also: "peccatum prius incipit homini displicere [maxime peccatori] propter supplicia, quæ respicit timor servilis, quam propter dei offensam vel peccati turpitudinem, quod pertinet ad caritatem . . . ipse etiam motus timoris procedit ex actu dei convertentis cor"). "Quartus actus est motus spei, quo quis sub spe veniæ consequendæ assumit propositum emendandi. Quintus actus est motus caritatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum se ipsum et non jam propter supplicia" (that is the contritio). "Sextus est motus timoris filialis, quo propter reverentiam dei aliquis emendam deo voluntarius offert."

said :¹ " For the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary that he who comes to it has love, or an inclination to love that is sufficient when judged by the standard of truth, provided it be sufficient when judged by the standard of probability ; but this disposition is attritio, which, by reason of superadded confession and absolution of the priest, frequently so receives form from grace (*formatur per gratiam*), that it becomes contritio, or that contritio follows upon it." This thought Thomas did *not* adopt; he tacitly rejected it rather, and expressed himself altogether with strictness and earnestness regarding contritio and its necessity in Q. 1-5. Yet the considerations suggested by Alexander of Hales² and Bonaventura continued to have their influence. It was especially Scotus who secured currency for the view, that attrition, in itself inadequate, is sufficient for the reception of the Sacrament of Penance, since the Sacrament itself makes the sorrow perfect by " infusion of grace."³ On this point the decrees of Trent adopted—though, indeed, only conditionally—the side of the Scotists.⁴

¹ In Sentent. IV., Dist. 17, p. 2, a. 1, q. 4.

² Summa IV., Q. 60, A. 3: " si autem pœnitens pœparatus quantum in se est accedat ad confessionem attritus, non contritus . . . confessio cum subiectione arbitrio sacerdotis et satisfactio pœnitentię injunctę a sacerdote est signum et causa deletionis culpę et pœnę, quia sic subjiciendo se et satisfaciendo gratiam acquirit."

³ See Report IV., Dist. 14, Q. 4, schol. 2 (quoted in Schwane, p. 666): " Dico, quod bonus motus pœcedens sacramentum pœnitentię tantum est attritio et dispositio de congruo ad deletionem culpę et infusionem gratię, quę remissio culpę et collatio gratię sunt in virtute sacramenti pœnitentię et non in virtute attritionis tantum, nisi dispositive. Sed hæc attritio post collationem gratię, quę confertur in susceptione sacramenti, fit contritio formata."

⁴ Sess. XIV. de pœnit., c. 4: " attritio peccatorum ad dei gratiam in sacramento pœnitentię impetrandam disponit." In recent times, following Lämmer (Vortrident. Theologie), Bratke (Luther's 95 Thesen und ihre dogmenhistor. Voraussetzung, 1884) and Dieckhoff (Der Ablassstreit, dogmengesch. dargestellt, 1886) have very fully treated the scholastic doctrine of penance in connection with the doctrine of indulgences, after a controversy on the doctrine of indulgences had broken out, occasioned by the great work of Janssen (see Kolde, Die deutsche Augustiner-Congregation u. Johann v. Staupitz, 1879, the same author in the ThLZ. 1882, No. 23, and also dissertations by Kawerau, Köstlin, Schweitzer and Janssen " An meine Kritiker"). Bratke already placed the doctrine of indulgences in a clearer light in opposition to Köstlin. But Dieckhoff has especially the credit of having traced back the theory to the lax view of penance, and of having shown that here the seat of the evil must be sought for. There can be no doubt that the doctrine of attritio more and more threatened to become the Church's chief *means of producing ease of mind*,

The theologian on *confession* (before the priest) is Thomas, the Lombard having previously, as Catholic scholars express it, thrown obscurity over the connection between confession and

and that it actually became such subsequently in wide circles (especially through the influence of the Jesuit Father Confessors; but also, prior to them, through the influence of the preachers of indulgences). Opposition certainly was not wanting, and it grew stronger in many circles in the fifteenth century (Augustinian-Thomist reaction, see Bratke, p. 59 ff. and elsewhere); but when one reads, e.g., the discussions of John of Paltz, the senior contemporary and Augustinian brother of Luther (Kolde l.c.), one is shocked to see what a withering up of religion and of the simplest morality resulted from the "atritio" ("gallows-repentance"). The priest is here extravagantly dignified (in the book "Cœlifodina"); for he is the most necessary person, because only very few men are really contrite; on the other hand, everyone can bring himself in the end to an imperfect contrition; and now he, the priest, through the sacrament of penance, transforms this imperfect into a perfect sorrow ("paucissimi sunt vere contriti, ergo paucissimi salventur sine sacerdotibus; possunt autem omnes aliquo modo fieri atriti, et tales possunt sacerdotes juvare et eorum ministerio facere contritos et per consequens possunt eos salvare"). Or—everything depends on an experienced priest; there is nothing lacking to anyone who finds such ("non potest esse peccator adeo desperatus, quia posset consequi indulgentias, si habuerit intelligentem et fidelem informatorem et voverit facere, quod potest, et habeat *atritionem aliqualem*, quæ tunc in sacramentis sibi succurritur et imperfectum ejus tollitur, et informis atritio, i.e., caritate carens formatur per gratiam sacramentalem"); see Kolde, pp. 187, 191; Dieckhoff, p. 14; Bratke, pp. 53 ff., 111 ff., 128 ff. The last-mentioned gives abundant material, from which it appears that Paltz by no means stood alone. Everywhere the assertion is made that it is *easier*, under the new covenant, to attain salvation on account of the wonderful efficacy of the cross of Christ. At the same time it did not fail to be clearly seen that atritio is something else than contritio, not merely quantitatively, but also *qualitatively*. Gabriel Biel, who certainly thinks more earnestly about contrition than Paltz, knows very well that under some circumstances atritio springs from *immoral* motives, hence is by no means a pars contritionis, and is besides, as a rule, a passing mood (Bratke, p. 46 f.). Others knew that also, and nevertheless calmly built up on this atritio their theories that were to lead to heaven. Indeed some actually gave instructions for deluding God in heaven and His holy law; entrance into heaven was to be secured by merely guarding against mortal sin for one day in the year or for one hour, and showing for this space of time aliquam atritionem (see Petrus de Palude in Bratke, p. 84 ff., especially p. 87, note 1). Thus the doctrine of atritio, *which dominates the whole Christian life*, is really the radical source of mischief in the Catholic system of doctrine; for in it both things are at work, the magical, and therefore godless, conception of the efficacy of the Sacrament, and the idea, which is no longer Pelagian, but is pressed to the point of denial of all that is moral, of a "merit" recognised in any kind of motus that is only a turning away from sin. In the fourth extra number of the Röm. Quartalschr. (1896), p. 122 ff., Finke has attempted to combat the exposition given here. One proposition of the first edition I have now shaped more precisely. The sentence about the "withering up of religion and the simplest morality" I could not change. I would not have written it, if it said in a general way (so Finke seems to have misunderstood me),

the Sacrament, and over the necessity of the former, an obscurity not yet entirely removed even by Halesius.¹ In Q. 6 that at the end of the fifteenth century religion and the simplest morality had become a desolate waste. That was not my thought; I only said that where attritionism reigns, as in the case of John of Paltz and others, withering up is a necessary result. To deal now with the subject itself, Finke asserts (1) that an attritio which has only the timor servilis, in which the fixed purpose of thorough repentance is not present, was *never* held to be adequate sorrow. If the "was held" is not to have the sense of "was established as an authoritative dogma," or if the notion "adequate sorrow" is not equivocal (attritio is of course in itself never "adequate sorrow," but it becomes such through the sacrament), then the position is false; cf. Döllinger and Reusch, *Moralstreitigkeiten* (1889), I., p. 69 ff., and many other passages. Liguori himself was an attritionist (p. 458 f.); what he requires over and above the timor servilis, does not, from the way in which he has presented it, possess much weight. Finke asserts (2): "In the practice of penance, confession, and preaching, that is, in dealing with the Christian people, it was *always taught* from the seventh century to the sixteenth, that *contritio is requisite for confession*; the conception of contritio, which an Isidore presented in the seventh century and a Rabanus in the ninth, coincides with that which we meet with in the sermons at the close of the Middle Ages." This thesis the author seeks to prove by furnishing (we are thankful to him for it) on pages 128-135 of his dissertation, extracts from sermons at the end of the mediæval period, which are intended to show that sorrow springing from fear was not regarded as adequate. Certainly, we reply, how often must the words have been spoken from the pulpit at that time: "*contritio non potest esse sine caritate*"! But how little is proved by that! We must question the preachers of indulgences, and observe the real spirit that was awakened by the confessional and by indulgences. What the Reformers relate to us in this regard, what we can ourselves discern from the decrees of Trent as to the practice disapproved by the Fathers of the Council, what breaks out again afterwards as attritionism in spite of the Tridentinum, is certainly more important than what was said in sermons and *general* directions as to repentance, which of course urged to the utmost endeavour. In sermons it was also said that all good works are gifts from God; but did Luther simply misunderstand the temper of his Church, when, in looking back to his works as a monk, he speaks of his "own works" with a view to sanctification, which he had wished to practise in the spirit of the Church? Besides the assertion which Finke makes without qualifications, which he has printed in italics, and which relates to a thousand years, is itself very considerably restricted when he says (p. 123): "The question is as to whether attritio was the form of sorrow in the circles of our people, and not as to the doctrinal opinions of a Duns Scotus, etc., which remained unknown to the people." As developed doctrines of course they remained unknown to the people; but were these doctrines really without consequences in practice? And why should one make so light of the doctrines of the theologians? In view of the worthlessness of attritio as timor servilis asserted by Finke, observe what Bellarmin (*de pœnit.* II. c. 17) says as to its value. Perrone (*de pœnit.* c. 2, § 91 f.) has certainly been somewhat more cautious, inasmuch as he introduces the distinction between the timor simpliciter servilis and the worthless timor serviliter servilis.

¹ As the priest, according to Halesius, could still only remit temporal penalties and could not forgive sins, even on that account the necessity of confession could not be

(P. III. Suppl.) Thomas has dealt at length with the necessity of confession. In Art. 1 its absolute necessity is proved from the nature of the case; ¹ in Art. 2 it is shown that confession is divinely enjoined (*juris divini*); in 3 it is pointed out that though, according to divine law, only those guilty of mortal sin are obliged to confess, yet according to *positive* law all Christians must confess at least once a year; ² in Art. 4 it is laid down that one may not confess sins of which he does not know himself to be guilty; in 5 it is declared that it is not necessary to salvation (*de necessitate salutis*) to confess sins *at once*, but that delay is not without danger, and that a regard to Church regulations (times of confession) is advisable; finally in 6 it is proved that a dispensation exempting from confession (for ever) can on no account whatever be given; even the Pope can as little be exempted from confession as he can declare that a man can be saved without baptism.³

Q. 7 treats of the "quidditas confessionis," *i.e.*, of its nature, as "disclosure of the latent disease in the hope of pardon" (*aperitio latentis morbi spe veniæ*); and also as an "exercise of virtue" (*actus virtutis*)⁴ and as an "exercise of the virtue of penitence" (*actus virtutis pænitentiae*). Q. 8 is specially important, for it develops the doctrine as to the administrator ("minister") of confession. Here it is at once said in Art. 1: "The grace that is conferred in the Sacraments descends from the head to the members, and so he only is the minister of the Sacraments in which grace is given, who has a ministry in con-

confidently proved yet. Even Bonaventura did not trust himself to represent the order to confess as originating in the institution and command of Christ.

¹ "Sicut aliquis per hoc quod baptismum petit se ministris ecclesiæ subicit, ad quos pertinet dispensatio sacramenti, ita etiam per hoc quod confitetur peccatum suum se ministro ecclesiæ subicit, ut per sacramentum pænitentiae ab eo dispensatum remissionem consequatur, qui congruum remedium adhibere non potest, nisi peccatum cognoscat, quod fit per confessionem peccantis. Et ideo confessio est de necessitate salutis ejus, qui in peccatum actuale mortale cecidit."

²The "positive" law is the decree of the Council of 1215; further, every one of course must know himself to be a sinner; still further, one must confess in order to come with greater reverence to the Eucharist; finally, in order that the shepherd may be able to superintend his flock and protect it from the wolf.

³"Sicut non potest dispensari in jure naturali, ita nec in jure positivo divino."

⁴Art. 2: "ad virtutem pertinet, ut aliquis ore confiteatur, quod corde tenet."

nection with the true body of Christ (*qui habet ministerium super corpus Christi verum*), which belongs only to the priest who is able to consecrate the Eucharist, and therefore as in the Sacrament of Penance grace is conferred, the priest only is minister of this Sacrament, and therefore to him only must be made the sacramental confession (*sacramentalis confessio*) which ought to be made to the minister of the Church." But in Art. 2 it is conceded, that "in case of necessity a layman supplies the place of the priest, so that it is possible to make confession to him" (*in necessitate etiam laicus vicem sacerdotis supplet, ut ei confessio fieri possit*).¹ The necessity of confessing venial sins to the priest is denied (Art. 3), and this view continued to be held, as even Duns assented to it. Confession must take place before the *Parochus* (priest of the parish); only by authority of one of higher rank (*ex superioris privilegio*) and in case of death (*in casu mortis*) (Art. 4-6) may this be departed from. In Q. 9, on the "quality of confession," Art. 2, which treats of the "integrity of the confession,"² and Art. 3, which forbids confession "through another or in writing," are specially important.³ Q. 10 deals with the effect of confession, and 11 with the reticence of the minister, which is very strongly accentuated (*God covers the sin of him who surrenders himself in penitence; hence this also should be indicated in the Sacrament of Penance (hoc oportet in sacramento pœnitentiæ significari)*, and thus it is of *the essence of the Sacrament* (*de necessitate sacramenti*), that one conceal confession, and he sins as a violator of

¹ Yet such confession is not sacramental in the strict sense.

² As one must disclose to the physician the whole disease, and this is the presupposition of being healed, so is it also with confession. "*Ideo de necessitate confessionis est, quod homo omnia peccata confiteatur quæ in memoria habet, quod si non faciat, non est confessio, sed confessionis simulatio.*" Mortal sins that have been forgotten must be confessed in the confession that follows. A voluminous work on the history of auricular confession has been written by Lea, 2 vols. (English), Philadelphia, 1896. I have not yet been able to look into it.

³ To describe the qualities of confession the scholastic stanza was framed (see Art. 4):

"Sit simplex, humilis confessio, pura, fidelis,
Atque frequens, nudo, discreta, libens, verecunda,
Integra, secreta, lacrimabilis, accelerata,
Fortis et accusans et sit parere parata."

the Sacraments who reveals confession" (et tanquam violator sacramenti peccat, qui confessionem revelat).

These definitions of Thomas underwent, indeed, many modifications in the Scotist School, but *in substance* they became permanent.

Confession is made before the priest; it is followed by *absolution*. We have already pointed out how much time elapsed before the new ideas became currently accepted, (1) that confession must be made to the priest,¹ (2) that the priest confers absolution as proceeding from himself (in the exercise of divine authority)² and as effectual (Matth. 16, John 20). The power of absolution, which is given to every priest, appears complicated because it is connected with the power of jurisdiction (in its application), which, as is well known, was graded. Here also Thomas was the first to furnish the theory; for even for Halesius and Bonaventura there are still points of uncertainty, which were due to the continued influence of the older view. In the *Summa P. III., Suppl. Q. 17-24*, Thomas has developed the doctrine of the power of the keys (*potestas clavium*), and has shown that the priest's absolution is the "*causa instrumentalis*" (in a physical sense) of the forgiveness of sin. But in the Scotist School, which in general relaxed the connection between the Sacrament and the *res sacramenti*, only a moral communication, through absolution, of forgiveness of sin was assumed, the priest being held as moving God by means of his absolution to fulfil his "covenant." The priests' power of jurisdiction has also been dealt with by Thomas, and from his time it was always treated in connection with the theory of absolution, although it leads in a quite different direction, is really calculated indeed to weaken confidence in the power of every priest to absolve. It was asserted, that is to say, by the majority, though not by all, that the power of jurisdiction is also *ex jure divino* (by divine authority), and that the restrictions therefore on the permissible conferring of absolution were not merely ecclesiastical regulations, but had divine right. But in the Middle Ages there had by this time developed itself an immense system of special per-

¹ On the exception, see above.

² Not *ex potestate auctoritatis* or *excellentię*, but *ministerii*.

missions, reservations, etc., which had their basis in arbitrary decisions of the Popes. The position, though vigorously contested, continued to be held as valid, that ecclesiastical superiors "in conveying judicial power *in foro interno* can by reservation make any kind of restrictions in respect of duration, place, and object." Was it not inevitable that by such procedure, in dealing with which it was impossible for the layman to find his way, confusion and uncertainty should arise about the Sacrament? ¹

¹ The most important propositions of Thomas regarding absolution are the following: Suppl. Q. 17, Art. 1: "In corporalibus clavis dicitur instrumentum, quo ostium aperitur, regni autem ostium nobis per peccatum clauditur et quantum ad maculam et quantum ad reatum poenae, et ideo potestas qua tale obstaculum removetur, dicitur *clavis*. Hæc autem potestas est in divina trinitate per auctoritatem, et ideo dicitur a quibusdam, quod habeat clavem auctoritatis, sed *in Christo homine* fuit hæc potestas ad removendum prædictum obstaculum per meritum passionis quæ etiam dicitur januam aperire. Et ideo dicitur secundum quosdam habere clavem excellentiæ. Et quia ex latere Christi dormientis in cruce sacramenta fluxerunt, ex quibus ecclesia fabricatur, ideo in sacramentis ecclesiæ efficacia passionis manet, et *propter hoc etiam ministris ecclesiæ, qui sunt dispensatores sacramentorum, potestas aliqua ad prædictum obstaculum removendum est collata*, non propria, sed virtute divina et passionis Christi, et hæc potestas metaphorice clavis ecclesiæ dicitur, quæ est *clavis ministerii*." Especially important is Q. 18, Art. 1: "Sacramenta continent ex sanctificatione invisibilem gratiam. Sed hujusmodi sanctificatio quandoque ad necessitatem sacramenti requiritur tam in materia quam in ministro, sicut patet in confirmatione. Quandoque autem de necessitate sacramenti non requiritur nisi sanctificatio materiæ, sicut in baptismo, quia non habet ministrum determinatum quantum ad sui necessitatem et tunc tota vis sacramentalis consistit in materia. Quandoque vero de necessitate sacramenti requiritur consecratio vel sanctificatio ministri sine aliqua sanctificatione materiæ, et tunc *tota vis sacramentalis consistit in ministro, sicut est in penitentia* . . . Per penitentiae sacramentum nunquam datur gratia, nisi preparatio adsit vel prius fuerit. Unde virtus clavium operatur ad culpæ remissionem, vel in voto existens, vel in actu se exercens . . . sed non agit sicut principale agens, sed sicut instrumentum, non quidem pertingens ad ipsam gratiæ susceptionem causandam etiam instrumentaliter, sed disponens ad gratiam, per quam fit remissio culpæ. Unde solus deus remittit per se culpam et in virtute ejus agit . . . sacerdos *ut instrumentum animatum* . . . ut minister. Et sic patet, quod potestas clavium ordinatur aliquo modo ad remissionem culpæ non sicut causans, sed sicut disponens ad eam; unde si ante absolutionem aliquis non fuisset perfecte dispositus ad gratiam suscipiendam, *in ipsa confessione et absolutione sacramentali gratiam consequeretur*, si obicem non poneret." In what follows it is now proved that the priestly clavis cannot possibly relate only to the remission of penalty ("ut quidam dicunt"). In Art. 2 it is then shown that "ex vi clavium non tota pœna remittitur, sed aliquid de pœna temporali, cujus reatus post absolutionem a pœna æterna remanere potuit, nec solum de pœna illa, quam penitens habet in confitendo, quia sic confessio et sacramentalis absolutio non esset nisi in onus, quod non competit sacramentis novæ legis, sed etiam de illa pœna, quæ in purgatorio debetur, aliquid remittitur." With regard to the efficacy of the absolution a

Absolution is preceded by the appointment of *satisfactio*, if such has not already been made. Here the priest acts as a skilled physician (*medicus peritus*) and impartial judge (*judex æquus*). The practice of satisfactions (Church-penances) is very old (see vol. v., p. 268 f., 324 ff.), the giving it a mechanical form and the over-estimation of it—by putting it alongside contritio as a part of penance—are in theory comparatively new. The idea is now this, that *satisfactio*, as a portion of the Sacrament of Penance, is the necessary manifestation of sorrow through works that are fitted to furnish a certain satisfaction to the injured God (and thereby become the occasion also for limiting the temporal penalties). In baptism there is forgiveness of the

distinction also of this kind was drawn: God cancels the *reatus culpæ*, Christ the *reatus pœnæ æternæ*; both are effectually wrought by the minister *sacramenti* in the exercise of plenary divine power, and he has at the same time the right belonging to him to give abatement in his absolving of the *reatus pœnæ temporalis*. In Q. 19, Art. 3, Thomas shows that the *clavis ordinis* is given only to the priest, while the *clavis jurisdictionis*—*quæ non clavis cœli est, sed quedam dispositio ad eam!*—may be granted also to others. In Q. 19, Art. 5, it is explained that even the bad priest retains the keys; on the other hand, it is said in Art. 6 of the heretical and schismatic priests that in them “*manet clavium potestas quantum ad essentiam, sed usus impeditur ex defectu materiæ. Cum enim usus clavium in utente prælationem requirat respectu ejus in quem utitur, propria materia in quam exercetur usus clavium est homo subditus. Et quia per ordinationem ecclesiæ unus subditur alteri, ideo etiam per ecclesiæ prelatos potest subtrahi alicui ille, qui erat ei subjectus. Unde cum ecclesia hæreticos et schismaticos et alios hujusmodi privet subtrahendo subditos vel simpliciter vel quantum ad aliquid, quantum ad hoc quod privati sunt, non possunt usum clavium habere.*” In Q. 20, Art. 1, it is explained that only to the Pope, as he possesses the indistincta potestas super omnes, does there fall the application of the power of the keys with respect to all, while it is said of the others that “*non in quolibet uti (potestatem clavium) possunt, sed in eos tantum, qui eis in sortem venerunt, nisi in necessitatis articulo.*” But the priest cannot always absolve even his subditus; for aliqua peccata—if the power is not conferred upon him—fall to be dealt with by his superior (Art. 2). A priest can absolve even a bishop; for “*potestas clavium, quantum est de se, se extendit ad omnes*” (Art. 3). Questions 21-24 treat of excommunication, with which the power of jurisdiction has specially to do (Q. 21, Art. 4: “*Even an unjust excommunication habet effectum suum; in the case of a mortal sin it must be respected; sed si quis pro falso crimine in judicio probato excommunicatus est, tunc, si humiliter sustinet, humilitatis meritum recompensat excommunicationis damnum.*” Q. 22, Art. 1: “*Of the priests only bishops and majores prelati can excommunicate, qui habent jurisdictionem in foro judiciali, ad quod spectat causa, quæ obligat hominem in comparatione ad alios homines*”: but even those who are not priests can excommunicate [because it is not a question of gratia], if they have the *jurisdictio in foro contentioso*).

sin, along with the penalty, without any satisfaction; but God requires from the baptised person a certain satisfaction—although both before and now the merit of Christ is the decisive thing—partly because the man can render a certain satisfaction, partly because it serves to make him better, and is fitted to protect him against further sins. But this satisfaction is only of real value when it is rendered in a state of grace (*caritas*). Hence the man guilty of mortal sin must first be absolved, that he may then furnish the satisfaction which is required of him, and which he has promised to render prior to absolution. But there is a certain value also in works that are not performed in a state of grace (*caritas*); even they are not without their weight as satisfactions, and can abridge the temporal penalties of sin. The satisfying works are especially prayer, fasting, and alms; for they deliver man from his natural disposition. But the Schoolmen also justified the practice that originated in the wilder times of the Germanic Church, according to which satisfaction can, under certain circumstances, be rendered by others, because Christians are united to one another as members of one body. And this leads us to the subject of indulgences.¹

¹ Thomas treats *satisfactio* in *Suppl. Q. 12-15*. In *Q. 12, Arts. 1 and 2*, *satisfactio* is shown to be *actus virtutis et justitiæ*; in *Art. 3* the old definition is justified, that *satisfacere* is both “*honorem debitum deo impendere*” and “*preservare culpam futuram*.” In *Q. 13* it is shown that man is not in a position to satisfy God *quoad æqualitatem quantitatis*, but certainly *quoad æqualitatem proportionis* (“*ex hoc quod per liberum arbitrium agit, deo satisfacere potest, quia quamvis dei sit prout a deo sibi concessum, tamen libere ei traditum est, ut ejus dominus sit*”); in *Art. 2* there follows the proof that one can render *satisfactio* for another; yet the thesis has its guarding clauses (“*Pœna satisfactoria est ad duo ordinata, scil. ad solutionem debiti et ad medicinam pro peccato vitando*.” In the latter regard one can help another only *per accidens*, in so far as by good works he can procure for the other an *augmentum gratiæ*: “*sed hoc est per modum meriti magis quam per modum satisfactionis. Sed quantum ad solutionem debiti, unus potest pro alio satisfacere, dummodo sit in caritate, ut opera ejus satisfactoria esse possint*”). In *Q. 14* the quality of the *satisfactio* is treated; here the questions as to the necessity for the man's being in a state of *caritas* are discussed and answered with still greater strictness (“*Quidem dixerunt*”—*Art. 2*—“*quod postquam omnia peccata per præcedentem contritionem remissa sunt, si aliquis ante satisfactionem peractam in peccatum decidat et in peccato existens satisfaciatur, satisfactio talis ei valet, ita quod si in peccato illo moretur, in inferno de illis peccatis non puniretur. Sed hoc non potest esse, quia in satisfactione oportet quod amicitia restituta etiam justitiæ æqualitas restituitur cujus contrarium amicitiam tollit. Æqualitas autem in satisfactione ad deum non est*

Indulgences. The doctrine of indulgence stands inwardly in closest relation to the doctrine of attritio; outwardly it appears as a consequence of the doctrine of satisfactio.¹ Theoretically it has nothing to do with the reatus culpæ (moral culpability) and the reatus pænæ æternæ (liability to eternal death); in practice there not only arose, in the Middle Ages, serious irregularities, which the Catholics (see the Council of

secundum æquivalentiam, sed magis secundum acceptationem ipsius. Et ideo oportet, etiamsi jam offensa sit dimissa per præcedentem contritionem, quod opera satisfactoria sint deo accepta, quod dat eis caritas, et ideo sine caritate opera facta non sunt satisfactoria," but in Art. 5 it is conceded that bona opera extra caritatem facta diminuunt pœnam inferni, i. e., as Augustine says, moderate damnation and limit the temporal penalties. Q. 15 treats of the means of satisfactio ("satisfactio sive referatur ad præteritam offensam sive ad futuram culpam per pœnalia opera fieri asseritur"). Here the following shocking justification of the three penal means of satisfaction is given (Art. 3): "satisfactio debet esse talis, per quam aliquid nobis subtrahamus ad honorem dei, nos autem non habemus nisi tria bona, scil. bona anime, bona corporis et bona fortune, scil. exteriora. Ex bonis quidem fortune subtrahimus nobis aliquid per elemosynam, sed ex bonis corporis per jejuniûm. Ex bonis autem anime non oportet quod aliquid subtrahamus nobis quantum ad essentiam vel quantum ad diminutionem ipsorum, quia per ea efficimur deo accepti, sed per hoc quod ea submittimus deo totaliter, et hoc fit per orationem. . . . Secundum quosdam duplex est oratio: quedam que est contemplativorum, quorum conversatio in caelis est, et talis quia totaliter est delectabilis non est satisfactoria. Alia est, que pro peccatis gemitus fundit et talis habet pœnam et est satisfactionis pars. Vel dicendum et melius, quod quelibet oratio habet rationem satisfactionis, quia quamvis habet suavitatem spiritus, habet tamen afflictionem carnis." The importance in respect of theory of satisfaction as expiation of temporal penalties of sins that are not remitted does not, for the rest, come specially into view for Thomas, in addition to the other ends which satisfactions contemplate. Indeed, it is even granted in abstracto that contritio can be so perfect that all penalty is condoned by God. Yet as a fact satisfactions were regarded almost exclusively from the point of view of expiation of the penalties of sin (and these were chiefly the future penalties of purgatory). It was here that indulgences came in, and it was here that there entered the very pardonable misunderstanding of the laity that satisfactions in themselves deliver from all penalties for sin—and it was only with this deliverance that the majority took to do.

¹ For the literature see above (p. 250, note 4). Add also Schneider, Die Ablässe, 7 ed., 1881. Thomas, Suppl., Qs. 25-27. Götz, Studien z. Gesch. d. Buss-sacraments in the Ztschr. f. K.-Gesch., Vol. 15, p. 321 ff., Vol. 16, p. 541 ff. These investigations, which start from an examination of a series of forged Bulls on indulgences, illustrate the history of the development of indulgences, give important disclosures as to the Bulls connected with the Crusades, and treat also the papal easements of reservation in the penance discipline (cf. Hausmann, Gesch. der päpstl. Reservatfälle, 1868). The importance which belonged in the course of the development of indulgences to the peregrinations to the sacred places, or to Rome (imposed as penance works), comes prominently to view in these studies.

Trent) admit, but these irregularities still continue, and nothing is done to check the over-estimation of indulgences.¹

Scholasticism found indulgences already in existence, a great increase of them having taken place especially in the period of the Crusades. It simply framed its theory according to the practice. If the doctrine of satisfaction was already an extremely arbitrary one, which, in spite of all saving clauses, necessarily endangered the importance of repentance, the doctrine of indulgence became arbitrariness intensified, and exercised an extremely ruinous influence on religion and morality. The practice and theory of indulgences can, no doubt, be idealised, nay, it is possible indeed to justify, in a certain way, the idealised practice.² Were that not possible it would be incredible that so many earnest Christians have defended indulgences. But the scholastic theology by no means idealised them.

The practice of indulgences has its root in the *commutations*. The exchange of more arduous for easier penitential acts was called indulgence.³ The penance performances were here taken into consideration in their significance for the expiation of the temporal penalties of sin. The heaviest temporal penalties for sin were those of purgatory: for the earthly penalties for sin were, on the one hand, as experience taught, unavoidable, and on the other hand, even though one thought of year-long

¹ That even in *theory* there were defects in the Middle Ages is acknowledged by Catholic witnesses themselves (see Schneider, p. 10, note 2): "Certain letters of indulgence are found which speak at the same time of forgiveness of guilt and of penalty (a culpa et a pœna); but, according to the opinion of Benedict XIV., these indulgences are spurious, and must be ascribed to those collectors of alms who proclaimed indulgences and at the same time collected alms previous to the Synod of Trent." Of course on the Catholic side an appeal is readily made to the circumstance that "peccatum" was also used for "penalty for sin," "atonement for sin." This meaning can really be proved; but whether it suits all cases in which indulgences and sin are brought into conjunction is more than questionable.

² To defend at the same time both the satisfactions and the indulgences is certainly difficult. If the former are due to the glad eagerness of the heart, delivered from guilt, to exercise the love bestowed on it, the thought of the indulgence will not arise. On the other hand, if indulgences are the remission of the temporal penalties of sin, they must not be brought into relation with the idealised satisfactions.

³ Such exchanges were also necessarily introduced, because the old penitential demands were in part exorbitantly high.

penances, they were of no weight as compared with the long and painful penalties in purgatory. It was a refined practice of the Church, which had gradually developed itself, to comfort men in an easy way about hell by means of grace (Sacrament of Penance), and, on the other hand, to terrify them by means of purgatory. Was this purgatory, then, not also a hell? But how skilfully was the whole idea derived from studying the moral feelings of the *homines attriti* (men practising attrition)!¹ They did not really believe in hell, because the gravity of sin had not been disclosed to them, and because, accordingly, they were not to be constrained to a life in God. *Hence the Church shut up hell by means of the Sacrament of Penance.* But that at some period in the future it would, for a long time, go very badly with them, and that one day they must expiate all their sins,—that they believed. Therefore the Church opened purgatory.² That this purgatory could be made less severe or briefer, these *homines attriti* were also very ready to believe; for they lived, all of them, in the thought that good performances simply compensate for delinquencies, and even the “gallows contrition” is not so enduring as to constrain men to practise serious repentance—even in the sense of steady self-denial and heroic action. *Hence the Church discloses indulgences.* In them she shows to the man of lower type her real power; for the magic of the Sacrament of Penance has certainly not yet given him complete rest. He has a remnant of the moral feeling that something must be done on his part in order that forgiveness may become credible and sure. “Faith” and “con-

¹ The indulgences were most truly the refuge of the Christians of lower type, although the most pious also made use of them. It is related of Tetzl that when, in the small town of Belitz, near Berlin, no one would buy indulgences from him, he said indignantly, that those in the town must either be “right *pious people* or desperate villains.” This is told by Creusing in his “*Märkische Fürstengeschichte*,” edited by Holtze, p. 159, the informant being the Miller of Belitz, Meister Jacob (see Heidemann, *Die Reform. in der Mark Brandenburg*, p. 77).

² After these words were long written down, I came across Rousseau’s description in his *Confessions* of the demonic Madame de Warens. It is here said (German edition by Denhard, I., p. 291): “. . . although she did not believe in a hell, she strangely refused to let her faith in purgatory be taken from her.” Rousseau regards it as strange, because, in spite of his change of faith, he was never able to free himself entirely from the Protestant influences of his youth.

trition" he neither can nor will practise, but something he will willingly do. Here the Church now intervenes, and says to him that his poor performance can be converted and transformed by the power of the Church into something so lofty that by means of it the penalties of sin in purgatory are abolished. The man wishes to know no more. What has still to happen can cause him little concern, and the Church itself says to him that if he is well provided with the Sacrament of Penance, what follows will not affect him.¹ *Attritio, sacramentum pœnitentiæ, indulgentia*,—these form the Catholic triad. What was to be done for the indulgence was the only burdensome thing here; but even this was made very easy. Thus the indulgence became a

¹ The doctrine of purgatory (*purgatorium*) was a settled matter for the Schoolmen, and was energetically maintained against the Greeks from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. This purgatory, which is for departed souls who are absolved but have not made satisfaction for all sins, exists, according to the Latin view, till the judgment of the world (the Greeks, so far as they recognised it at all, put it after the judgment), or for a shorter time. The souls of the righteous, who need no further purification, attain at once to the vision of God (the counter doctrine of John XXII. was rejected). More particularly, the Schoolmen taught that there are five dwelling-places of departed souls: (1) hell, to which those guilty of mortal sin at once pass; (2) the *limbus infantium, i.e.*, of children who have died unbaptised; (3) the *limbus patrum, i.e.*, of the Old Testament saints; (4) *purgatorium*; (5) heaven; see the detailed statement in Thomas, *Suppl.*, Q. 69. That the souls of the pious have knowledge of what takes place on earth, and intercede for their earthly brethren, has been shown by the Lombard (*Sent. IV.*, *Dist. 45 G*): "*Cur non credamus et animas sanctorum dei faciem contemplantium in ejus veritate intelligere preces hominum, que et implende sunt vel non? . . . Intercedunt ergo pro nobis ad deum sancti, et merito, dum illorum merita suffragantur nobis, et affectu, dum vota nostra cupiunt impleri. . . . Oramus ergo, ut intercedant pro nobis, i.e.*, ut merita eorum suffragentur nobis, et ut ipsi velint bonum nostrum, quia eis volentibus deus vult et ita fiet"; similarly Thomas (*Suppl.*, Q. 73 or 74, *Art. 1*). The existence of purgatory is thus established by Thomas (*l.c.*, Q. 69, *Art. 7*): "*Satis potest constare purgatorium esse post hanc vitam; si enim per contritionem deleta culpa non tollitur ex toto reatus pœnæ nec etiam semper venialia dimissis mortalibus tolluntur, et justitia hoc exigit, ut peccatum per pœnam debitam ordinetur, oportet quod ille, qui post contritionem de peccato et absolutionem decedit ante satisfactionem debitam post hanc vitam puniatur. Et ideo illi qui purgatorium negant, contra divinam justitiam loquuntur, et propter hoc erroneum est et a fide alienum (there follows a forged passage from Gregory of Nyssa's Works, representing that the whole Church so teaches). Quod non potest nisi de illis, qui sunt in purgatorio, intelligi; ecclesiæ autem autoritati quicumque resistit, hæresim incurrit.*" Yet opposition to this doctrine never ceased, and it became very active in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Wyclif and Wessel strenuously adopted the hostile attitude of the Mediæval sects.

caricature (persiflage) of Christianity as the religion of redemption through Christ.

The theory of the Schoolmen is as follows: After there had been uncertainty till far on in the thirteenth century as to whether the indulgences did not relate merely to the ecclesiastical penalties imposed by the priest, Thomas laid it down that they apply in general to the liability to temporal penalty (*reatus temporalis pœnæ*) ("on earth and in purgatory"). The righteousness of God demands that no sin shall remain "inordinate" (*inordinata*), and that man shall also perform what he can perform. He is obliged, accordingly, even as absolved, to discharge the temporal penalties of sin. But what the merit of Christ does not do of itself and directly, inasmuch as in the Sacrament it cancels only the *reatus culpæ et pœnæ*, *it does out-with the Sacrament as merit*. Christ, that is to say, has done more by His suffering than was required for redemption, and even many saints have acquired for themselves merit which God's grace rewards. This surplus merit (*thesaurus operum supererogatoriorum* [treasury of supererogatory works]) must necessarily fall to the benefit of the Church as the body of Christ, since neither Christ nor the saints can derive further advantage from it. But alongside the Sacrament of Penance it cannot have another effect than to moderate, abridge, or cancel the temporal penalties of sin. It can be applied only to those who, in penitent spirit, have been absolved after making confession, and it is administered in the first instance by the Pope as the head of the Church. Yet by him a partial power of administration can be conveyed to others. The regular mode of making the application is by requiring for the indulgence a comparatively very small performance ("eleemosynæ," *i.e.*, penance money.)¹

¹ A *thesaurus meritorum* which the Church administers was first adopted by Halesius (see the passages in Münscher, l.c., p. 290 ff.). The theory received a fixed construction from Albertus and Thomas. In *Suppl. Q. 25, Art. 1*, the latter gives the following exposition: "*Ab omnibus conceditur indulgentias aliquid valere, quia impium esset dicere, quod ecclesia aliquid vane faceret. Sed quidam dicunt, quod non valent ad absolvendum a reatu pœnæ, quam quis in purgatorio secundum iudicium dei meretur, sed valent ad absolvendum ab obligatione qua sacerdos obligavit penitentem ad pœnam aliquam vel ad quam etiam obligatur ex canonum statutis. Sed hæc opinio*

Now this theory—keeping practice quite out of view—still admitted in detail of very different modifications (nuances). It

non videtur vera. Primo quia est expresse contra privilegium Petro datum cui dictum est, ut quod in terra remitteret, in cœlo remitteretur. Unde remissio, quæ fit quantum ad forum ecclesiæ valet, valet etiam quantum ad forum dei. Et præterea ecclesia hujusmodi indulgentias faciens magis damnificaret, quam adjuvaret, quia remitteret ad graviores pœnas, scil. purgatorii, absolvendo a pœnitentiis injunctis. Et ideo aliter dicendum, *quod valent et quantum ad forum ecclesiæ et quantum ad iudicium dei, ad remissionem pœnæ residuæ post contritionem et confessionem et absolutionem*, sive sit injuncta, sive non. Ratio autem, quare valere possint, est unitas corporis mystici, in qua multi in operibus pœnitentiæ supererogaverunt ad mensuram debitorum suorum . . . quorum meritorum tanta est copia, quod omnem pœnam debitam nunc viventibus excedunt *et præcipue propter meritum Christi, quod etsi in sacramentis operatur, non tamen efficacia ejus in sacramentis includitur, sed sua infinitate excedit efficaciam sacramentorum*. Dictum est autem supra, quod unus pro alio satisfacere potest; sancti autem, in quibus superabundantia operum sanctificationis invenitur, non determinate pro isto qui remissione indiget, hujusmodi opera fecerunt, alias absque omni indulgentia remissionem consequerentur, sed communiter pro tota ecclesia, sicut apostolus ait (Coloss. I.), et sic prædicta merita sunt communia totius ecclesiæ. Ea autem quæ sunt alicujus multitudinis communia, distribuuntur singulis de multitudine *secundum arbitrium ejus qui multitudini præest*." Note also the cautious remarks: "Remissio quæ per indulgentias fit, non tollit quantitatem pœnæ ad culpam, quia pro culpa unus alius sponte pœnam sustinuit."—"Ille qui indulgentias suscipit, non absolvitur, simpliciter loquendo, a debito pœnæ, sed datur ei, unde debitum solvat."—"Non est in destructionem indulgentias dare, nisi inordinate dentur. Tamen consulendum est eis qui indulgentias consequuntur, ne propter hoc ab operibus pœnitentiæ injunctis abstineant, ut etiam ex his remedium consequentur, quamvis a debito pœnæ esse immunes, *et præcipue quia quandoque sunt plurimum debitores quam credant*." In Art. 2 those are confuted who assert that the indulgences "non tantum valent, quantum pronuntiantur," only so far avail for the individual "quantum fides et devotio sua exigit." It is proved, "indulgentiæ simpliciter tantum valent quantum prædicantur, dummodo ex parte dantis sit auctoritas et ex parte recipientis caritas et ex parte causæ pietas." Also: "quæcunque causa adsit, quæ in utilitatem ecclesiæ et honorem dei vergat, sufficiens est ratio indulgentias faciendi . . . (nam) merita ecclesiæ semper superabundant." It is further shown that indulgences belong to the clavis jurisdictionis (are not sacramental), and therefore "effectus ejus arbitrio hominis subjacet" (also authorised legati non sacerdotes can dispense indulgences). To the question whether indulgences can be dispensed pro temporali subsidio, it is answered in Art. 3 that this is not possible simpliciter, "sed pro temporalibus ordinatis ad spiritualia, sicut est repressio inimicorum ecclesiæ, qui pacem ecclesiæ perturbant, sicut constructio ecclesiarum et pontium et aliarum elemosynarum largitio." Q. 26 treats of those who can dispense indulgences ("papa potest facere prout vult"), Q. 27 of the receivers of indulgences. Here in Art. 1 the thesis is contested of those who assert that to those guilty of mortal sin indulgences are of benefit, not for forgiveness of sins, but yet ad acquirendum gratiam: "in omnibus indulgentiis fit mentio de vere contritio et confessis." In Art. 3 it is shown that the indulgence does not avail for one who has not done what the

could also be conceived of more strictly or more laxly. In particular, the demand that one must be in a contrite frame of mind could be lowered to an extraordinary degree.¹ But not

indulgence is given for. Compare with this also Q. 74, where in Art. 10 the question is answered whether indulgences are of use for the dead. The answer is that they are of no direct use, as the dead cannot do what the indulgences are given for. On the other hand they are of indirect use, that is, if the indulgence formula runs thus: "Quicumque fecerit hoc vel illud, ipse et pater ejus vel quicumque alius ei adjunctus in purgatorio detentus, tantum de indulgentia habebit." "Talis indulgentia non solum vivo sed etiam mortuo proderit. Non enim est aliqua ratio quare ecclesia transferre possit communia merita quibus indulgentiæ innotuntur in vivos et non in mortuos." The indulgences, moreover, do not work simply per modum suffragii; they are effectual. Yet arbitrariness on the part of the Pope in rescuing souls from purgatory must be limited by this, that there must always be a *causa conveniens indulgentias faciendi*; but such is always to be found. It is furthermore probable that the recognition of a *thesaurus meritorum* had a long course of historic preparation in the history of religion: see Siegfried in Hilgenfeld's *Ztschr.*, 1884, Part 3, p. 356 (also *Gött. Gel. Anz.*, 1881, St. 12 and 13): "The doctrine of a treasury of good works from which indemnifications can be derived for the sins of others came originally into Judaism under Iranian influences, as is known to have been the case with so much else in the later Jewish dogmatics. If we compare what appears regarding this in Spiegel's "*Eranische Alterthumskunde*" with what is to be found in Weber's *System der altsynagogalen paläst. Theol.*, 1880, p. 280 ff., that this is a fact we shall not be able to doubt. Now as this doctrine, after being first brought forward by Alexander of Hales, owed its recognition within the Catholic Church chiefly to Thomas Aquinas, of whom it is also well known that he transcribed Maimonides (Merx, *Die Prophetie des Joel*, 1879, pp. 354-367), the suspicion at once arises that this doctrine also was derived from Jewish sources. The more exact proof that this was actually so we reserve, as it would lead us too far afield here." Against this conjecture Güdemann (*Jüd. Lit.-Blatt.*, 21 Jahrg., 29 Oct., 1890) has raised objections, and has tried to show that the "*merit of the Fathers*" ("*Sechus Owaus*") is something else and much more harmless. Yet identity no one has asserted, but only a historical connection. The *thesaurus meritorum* has been developed in directions, and has found applications, of which certainly Judaism did not think. But my conviction that a historical connection exists has not been shaken by Güdemann's objections. For the rest I do not presume to be a judge in this matter, but I would like to point out something akin. In the "*History of Joseph*" preserved in the *Syriac*, which is said to have been composed by Basil of Cæsarea, and yet contains only Jewish Haggada, and, so far as I can see, nothing Christian (and so apparently is of Jewish origin), one reads (see Weinberg, *Gesch. Josefs, angeblich verfasst v. Basilus d. Gr.* Berlin, 1893, p. 53): "Potipher's wife said: But if thou art afraid of sin, as thou hast asserted, then take gold and silver, as much as thou wilt, and give to the poor; and God will forgive thee thy guilt." It is a woman under the devil's influence whom the narrator represents as speaking, and he certainly disapproved of the woman's speech; but it shows undoubtedly that such reflexions were not far off. The *abusus*—and that is condemned also by a pious Catholic—is disapproved.

¹A large amount of material on the lax and strict theories in Bratke, l.c. One

only did that happen; the practice, as has already been indicated, struck out on quite different paths. With more or less of design, it left the question in obscurity as to what really was cancelled by the indulgence (see the ambiguous expression "for the salvation of the soul," and others similar); it substituted for the demand for true sorrow and honest resolution to reform a reference to the Sacrament of Penance, or it was quite silent upon the demand; it gave to the indulgence an interpretation in which the power of the Church and the priest thrust aside the theoretic basis of the merit of Christ, and, finally, it encouraged the shocking folly of believing that, by the means of religion, man can provide himself with temporal advantages, and that beyond this, the spirit and power of religion are summed up in warding off just punishments. With all this there is still unmentioned the ruinous effect that must have been produced by the frequently shameful use of the indulgence money, and by the whole speculative system of the Curia. The Sacrament of Penance culminated unfortunately in these indulgences, and without incurring the charge of deriding, one may state concisely the final word of this system thus: *Every man who surrenders himself to the Catholic Church, and who, for some reason, is not quite satisfied with the inner state of his heart, can secure salvation and deliverance from all eternal and temporal penalties—if he acts with shrewdness and finds a skilful priest.*¹

thing that made a principal difference was the question as to whether indulgences were not of use even for those guilty of mortal sin ad acquirendam gratiam, or, whether they could not be given beforehand to such persons, to be used by them when they felt disposed. Of course the differences of Scotists and Thomists as to attritio and contritio are important here also. The explanations of the Jubilee indulgence in Bratke, pp. 201 ff., 240 ff., appear to me to be partly based on misunderstanding and partly exaggerated. The account of the indulgence theory of the ecclesiastical reform party, p. 234 ff. (Cajetan) is instructive, both as helping us to understand the earliest position of Luther, and as enabling us to see how poorly armed this reform party was.

¹The theory of indulgence is summed up in the Extravagante Unigenitus of Clement VI. of the year 1349: "Unigenitus dei filius . . . sanguine nos redemit quam in ara crucis innocens immolatus, non guttam sanguinis modicam (que tamen propter unionem ad verbum pro redemptione totius humani generis suffecisset), sed copiose velut quoddam profluvium noscitur effudisse. . . . Quantum ergo exinde, ut nec supervacua, inanis aut superflua tantæ effusionis

Against this theory there not only was a reaction on the part of the re-invigorated or Augustinian Thomism, in the shape of a strong insistence on the moral and religious requirements for the reception of indulgences, but—keeping the sects out of view—there also arose in the fourteenth century a radical opposition, which had likewise an Augustinian (and biblical) basis. Against no other ecclesiastical practice and theory did Wyclif assume so determined an attitude as against indulgences. He saw in them nothing but arbitrariness, which had only forced its way in of recent times; the Bible knew nothing of indulgences, which encroached upon the prerogative of God, and were therefore positively blasphemous. He also saw clearly the mischief of indulgences in hindering obedience to the law of Christ; still he did not frame a satisfactory theory as to how a *distressed* conscience can be comforted. For him, and for his scholar Huss, the perniciousness of indulgences lies simply in their unbiblical character, in the pretensions of the hierarchy (the Pope), and in the corruption of morals. But indulgences cannot be rooted out by merely quickening conscience and contending against priestly power.¹

miseratio redderetur, the-aurum militanti ecclesie acquisivit, volens suis thesaurizare filiis pius pater, ut sic sit infinitus thesaurus hominibus, quo qui usi sunt dei amicitie participes sunt effecti. Quem quidem thesaurum non in sudario repositum, non in agro absconditum, sed per beatum Petrum . . . ejusque successores suos in terris vicarios commisit fidelibus salubriter dispensandum, et propriis et rationabilibus causis: nunc pro totali, nunc pro partiali remissione pœne temporalis pro peccatis delitæ, tam generaliter quam specialiter (prout cum deo expedire cognoscerent) *vere pœnitentibus et confessis* misericorditer applicandum. Ad cujus quidem thesauri cumulum b. dei genetricis omniumque electorum a primo justo usque ad ultimum merita adminiculum præstare noscuntur, de cujus consumptione seu minutione non est aliquatenus formidandum (!), tam propter infinita Christi merita quam pro eo quod, quanto plures ex ejus applicatione trahuntur ad justitiam, tanto magis accrescit ipsorum cumulus meritum."

See Buddensieg, Wyclif, p. 201 ff., Trialogus IV., 32: "Fateor quod indulgentiæ papales, si ita se habeant ut dicuntur, sapiunt manifestam blasphemiam. Dicitur enim, quod papa prætendit, se habere potentiam ad salvandum singulos viatores, et quantumcunque viantes deliquerint, nedum ad mitigandum pœnas ad suffragandum eis cum absolutionibus et indulgentiis, ne unquam veniant ad purgatorium, sed ad præcipiendum sanctis angelis, ut anima separata a corpore indilate ipsam deferant in requiem sempiternam. . . . Contra istam rudem blasphemiam invexi alias, primo sic: nec papa nec etiam dominus Jesus Christus potest dispensare cum aliquo nec dare indulgentias, nisi ut æternaliter deitas justo consilio definivit.

Not less strenuous than the opposition of Wyclif and Huss to the indulgences were the attacks of Wesel and Wessel. Both likewise wrote from the standpoint of Augustine against the indulgences. They too described the theory as unbiblical and as unsupported by any tradition, and used as weapons for overthrowing it the sole efficiency of God, the majesty of the divine penal righteousness and the *gratia gratis data* (*caritas infusa*). The punishments which God decrees man cannot avert; only the penalties of positive law, or the ecclesiastical penalties, can the Pope remit. God infuses His grace without merit (*sine merito*), but only in the case of those who are perfectly disposed for it. At the same time Wesel relaxes the connection between sacrament and communication of grace (nominalistically: "*propter pactum institutum cum sacerdotibus*" [on account of an agreement instituted with the priests]). At bottom there is no distinction between his doctrine of the Sacrament and the vulgar one. He is merely unable, from feeling more decidedly the majesty of God, to draw the conclusions from the indulgences, which, along with others, he calls "*piæ fraudes*."¹

Sed non docetur, quod papa vel homo aliquis potest habere colorem justitiæ (on this falls the greatest weight) taliter faciendi; igitur non docetur, quod papa talem habeat potestatem. . . . Item videtur quod illa opinio multipliciter blasphematur in Christum, cum extollitur supra ejus humanitatem atque deitatem et sic super omne quod dicitur deus. . . . Sed eia, milites Christi, abicite prudenter hæc opera atque fictitias principis tenebrarum et induimini dominum Jesum Christum, in armis suis fideliter confidentes, et excutite ab ecclesia tales versutias antichristi, docentes populum, quod in ipso solo cum lege sua et membris debet confidere et operando illis conformiter ex suo opere bono salvari, specialiter si antichristi versutias fideliter detestetur."

¹ A series of passages from the Disput. adv. indulgentias of Wesel has been reprinted by Hauck, p. 303 f. Everything in Wesel is really only apparently radical. He lets the vulgar doctrine of the Sacraments stand, up to the point at which the Sacrament of Penance does not cancel the temporal penalties of sin. But at this point he will stop short; for these penalties cannot at all be cancelled (1) because God decrees them and means to carry them out; (2) because there is no one who could remove them—the priests are in everything only *ministri dei* in remittendis *culpis*—(3) because it is in keeping with piety to endure them; (4) because there could be no purgatory at all, if the theory of indulgences were correct; for the treasury of indulgences would be enough to compensate for all temporal penalties. If there mingles already in the polemic of Wesel a Wyclifite-Hussite (Donatist) element, in so far as it is required that the objective importance of the priests (the hierarchy) be diminished (by no means abolished), this element is much more recognisable in Wessel. To the *pius* alone are the keys given. Now as the Popes and priests are

The Church, in spite of these forms of opposition, went on its way.¹

5. *Extreme unction.*² Only from Thomas's time was it asserted that Christ Himself instituted this Sacrament, while the Apostle James (5, 14) only proclaimed it. The Materia is oil blessed by the bishop, while the episcopal consecration was declared "conveniens" by Thomas on the same ground as in the case of confirmation (expression of the higher power of the bishop with respect to the "mystical body of Christ," see above, p. 231, note; hence the Pope can also give power to ordinary priests to consecrate). The "form" is a deprecatory prayer (the indicative form can at the most be added). The administrator is any priest. The Sacrament can be repeated.³ The receivers are those under fatal illness and the dying. The purpose (*res sacramenti*) is the remission of sins (*remissio peccatorum*). In many cases not pious, these carnal men have power at all only in externis, *i.e.*, what they undertake has to do, not with the true Church and grace and sin, but with the empirical Church; see *de sacram. penit.* f. 51: "Carnalis homo non sapit, quæ sancti amoris sunt, igitur iudicare non potest. Unde iudicium ecclesiæ et eorum qui in ecclesia president, quia sæpe carnales, animales, mundiales aut diabolici sunt et tamen suum officium vere administrant sicut viri spirituales est deo pleni, liquet excommunicationes et indulgentias non ad ea quæ caritatis et amoris sunt se extendere sed tantum ad exteriorem pacem et tranquillitatem ecclesiæ. Unde indulgentiæ sunt remissiones de his peccatis quas prelatus injunxit aut injungere potuit." But further, the keys that are given to Peter are not handed over to arbitrary use; true repentance and *divine* forgiveness go together. Everything rests on grace, and only pious priests are ministers of the grace which God alone is able to infuse. But Wessel took still another important step. He asked himself whether the temporal *penalties* of sin really remain after forgiveness, and he is inclined to see discipline rather in the penalties of the absolved. (f. 60.) From this point he also assailed the conception of *satisfactio operum*, and drew a conclusion from Augustinianism which scarcely anyone before him had ventured to draw: satisfaction cannot take place at all, where God has infused His love; it leads of necessity to a limitation of the *gratia gratis data*, and detracts from the work of Christ. The plenitudo gratiæ excludes the *satisfactio* (fol. 61, 62), how much more the indulgences, which he defines thus (*l.c.*): "indulgentiarum materia est abusus quæstorum et sæpe illorum falsum crimen, nonnumquam impura et corrupta intentio papæ."

¹ At Constance (Mansi XXVII., p. 634, No. 42) the proposition was condemned: "Fatuum est credere indulgentiis papæ et episcoporum."

² Thomas, P. III., Suppl. Q. 29-33. Schwane, p. 675-677.

³ In the earlier period, Ivo and others expressed themselves against repetition. From the Lombard's time repetition is approved, but not in one and the same illness.

catorum), but only of venial sins, or the cleansing away of the remains of sin, or occasionally (per accidens), that is, if no hindrance exists, the full forgiveness of sins.¹ Therefore the Sacrament is also defined as "completion" of the Sacrament of Penance, though it remains quite dark why and how far this Sacrament needs completion. Here also, as in the case of confirmation, we have to do, not with a Sacrament that is the product of a dogmatic *theory*, but with an observance, the value of which is raised so high on grounds of expediency,² while theoretically it is rated very low. Even bodily healing is expected, if it please God, from this Sacrament.

6. *Priestly ordination.*³ In connection with this Sacrament the general sacramental theory can be maintained, if at all, only by artifice, because the hierarchical interest created it, and introduced it into the sacramental system of grace simply with a view to self-glorification. The "form" is the words "accipe potestatem offerendi" (receive the power of offering); the "material" cannot be pointed out to the senses with certainty; but Thomas here made a virtue of necessity, and the others followed him; from the very uncertainty the hierarchical nature of the Sacrament is proved.⁴ One thought of the vessels or

¹ Thomas, l.c., Q. 30, Art. 1: "Principalis effectus hujus sacramenti est remissio peccatorum, quoad reliquias peccati (what does that mean?), et ex consequenti etiam quoad culpam, si eam inveniat." Art. 2: "Ex hoc sacramento non semper sequitur corporalis sanatio, sed quando expedit ad spiritualem sanationem. Et tunc semper eam inducit, dummodo non sit impedimentum ex parte recipientes"; cf. the comprehensive description of the Sacrament in the Bull of Eugene IV. (Mansi XXXI., p. 1058).

² In itself it was, no doubt, very expedient to introduce a Sacrament in connection with death, and thereby to increase confidence in dying. This was strengthened by the rite of anointing the several members, and thereby showing in an impressive way to the sick, that the members with which he had sinned had been cleansed. Here, also, as in the case of confirmation, the Church gave heed to men's need of something "objective," instead of leading them without any ceremonies to Christ.

³ Thomas, P. III., Suppl. Q. 34-40. Schwane, pp. 677-685.

⁴ Q. 34, Art. 3: "Sacramentum nihil est aliud quam quaedam sanctificatio homini exhibita cum aliquo signo visibili. Unde cum in susceptione ordinis quaedam consecratio homini exhibetur per visibilia signa, constat ordinem esse sacramentum." Art. 5: "Materia in sacramentis exterius adhibita significat virtutem in sacramentis agentem ex intrinseco omnino advenire. Unde cum effectus prius hujus sacramenti, scil. character, non percipiatur ex aliqua operatione ipsius qui ad sacramentum accedit sicut erat in penitentia sed omnino ex intrinseco adveniat, competit ei materiam

symbols by which the hierarchical functions were represented (Thomas), another of the laying on of hands. The former was asserted by Eugene IV. in the Bull "Exultate" (l.c.). The dispenser is solely the bishop. Here there arose, however, many questions, in some respects entering deep into ecclesiastical law and ecclesiastical practice, indirectly also into dogmatic, which will only be noted here; (1) on the seven orders (ordines), and their relation (the Pope can empower even an ordinary priest to ordain to the lower orders); (2) on the relation of the priestly to the episcopal consecration (in how far is the bishop superior to the priest? in respect of divine right? (jure divino); (3)—and this was the most important question—on the validity of orders that have been conferred by schismatic or heretical bishops. From as far back as the Donatist conflict there prevailed a controversy on this point, which was decided in the Church, as a rule, in a liberal spirit, to the effect, namely, that such ordinations are indeed unpermitted, *i.e.*, are null and void as to their practical effects, but yet are not invalid. On the other hand the Lombard asserted that no heretic can duly celebrate confirmation, the Eucharist and ordination to the priesthood. Thereafter there prevailed among the Scholastic theologians great uncertainty; yet there was a growing leaning to the liberal view, the Sacrament of Penance alone being excepted. But in the Middle Ages the Popes very often declared entirely invalid the ordinations of bishops who were under disfavour and of rival Popes. As regards the effect of this Sacrament, the *character* was here the chief matter.¹ It

habere, tamen diversimode ab aliis sacramentis quæ materiam habent. *Quia hoc quod confertur in aliis sacramentis, derivatur tantum a deo, non a ministro qui sacramentum dispensat, sed illud quod in hoc sacramento traditur, scil. spiritualis potestas, derivatur etiam ab eo qui sacramentum dat sicut potestas imperfecta a perfecta. Et ideo efficacia aliorum sacramentorum principaliter consistit in materia, quæ virtutem divinam et significat et continet, ex sanctificatione per ministrum adhibita. Sed efficacia hujus sacramenti principaliter residet penes eum, qui sacramentum dispensat, materia autem adhibet magis ad demonstrandum potestatem, quæ traditur particulariter ab habente eam complete, quam ad potestatem causandam, quod patet ex hoc quod materia competit usui potestatis."*

¹ Not a saving benefit, therefore, given to an individual; for the ordo serves the Church (Thomas, Q. 35, A. 1). Here, also, the doctrine of sacramental grace (participatio divinæ naturæ) has breaches made in it; nay, Thomas says plainly, Q. 34,

consists in the conveyance of the right to dispense the Sacraments,¹ to forgive sins, to officiate as judge, and to be mediator between God and men.² But on the other hand, again, all the seven orders were called Sacraments by some (in the case of others they are regarded only as sacramentalia), although it was added, that only the diaconate and the presbyterate have institution by Christ as their basis. The episcopate could not be reckoned as a special ordo, because tradition forbade it; but efforts were made to assign to it a special position, higher than the ordinary priesthood, and given to it by Christ, and a basis was found for it, not in sacramental, but in judicial power. Duns Scotus, moreover, laid down the lines of the doctrine, that the episcopal consecration is a special Sacrament.

7. *Marriage.*³ Like the former Sacrament, this one also encroaches, in the particular questions connected with it, on the field of ecclesiastical law, only that these questions are tenfold more numerous than in the case of the other. The expediency of declaring marriage a Sacrament, and thereby bringing this foundation of society under ecclesiastical jurisdiction is obvious. Just on that account it was overlooked also that the declaring of marriage a Sacrament implied that breaches had previously been made in the general conception of a Sacrament. Marriage was already instituted by God in Paradise for the propagation of the human race (and therefore as an obligation [ad officium]), and to be indissoluble too; but according to Thomas it was only raised to the position of a Sacrament by Christ, inasmuch as He made it the picture of His union with the Church, thereby established anew its indissoluble character, and also united with

Art. 2: "unde relinquitur, quod ipse character interior sit essentialiter et principaliter ipsum sacramentum ordinis!"

¹ At the same time the celebration of the Mass is the chief matter; it alone is mentioned in the formula of consecration.

² The Lombard, Sent. IV., Dist. 24 I.: "Sacerdos nomen habet compositum ex Græco et Latino, quod est sacrum dans sive sacer dux. Sicut enim rex a regendo ita sacerdos a sacrando dictus est, consecrat enim et sanctificat." At the same time being empowered to teach was also no doubt mentioned, and for the person of the priest an undefinable "amplius gratiæ munus, per quod ad majora redduntur idonei" (Thomas, Q. 35, Art. 1). In the Bull "Exultate" (Mansi, l.c., p. 1058) it is said: "Effectus augmentum gratiæ, ut quis sit idoneus minister."

³ Thomas, P. III., Suppl. Q. 41-68. Schwane, pp. 685-693.

marriage a saving gift.¹ So far as it also provides for propagation within the *Church*, its sacramental character is already justified ;² but besides its sacramental effect, marriage, since the Fall, has also the character of an indulgence, as “remedium” against the insurgent passions of the flesh.³ It is further admitted, that among all the Sacraments marriage has the “minimum de spiritualitate,”⁴ hence it stands in the last place, and the unmarried life is to be preferred. The examination of the question, whether the “copula carnalis,” or, the right to demand the “debitum conjugale,” belongs to the essence of marriage, was necessarily treated with Joseph’s marriage in view. As there was no wish to exclude that right from the essence of marriage (the *assertion* of the right does not belong to its essence), one was led to the interesting question whether Mary, when she concluded marriage with Joseph, was not obliged to agree *conditionally* to a *possible* assertion of the right of marriage on the part of Joseph. The Lombard still answered this question in the affirmative ;⁵ but Bonaventura already found another way of solving it.⁶ As to “material” and “form,” there prevailed the greatest uncertainty. Yet in the Middle Ages it was not doubted that the decisive external sign is the expressed “consensus” of the parties to the marriage,⁷ the

¹ Thomas, l.c., Q. 41, A. 1 ; 42, A. 2, 3. In the way in which the Lombard describes the marriage bond as sacramental, a beautiful proof is presented of the ultimate interest of Western Post-Augustinian Catholicism, in so far as it is determined at the same time by the thought of *conformitas nature divine* and by that of *caritas*, Sentent. IV., Dist. 26 F. : “Ut inter conjuges conjunctio est secundum consensum animorum et secundum permixtionem corporum, sic ecclesia Christo copulatur voluntate et natura, qua idem vult cum eo, et ip-a formam sump-it de natura hominis. Copulata est ergo sponsa sponso spiritualiter et corporaliter, i.e., caritate et conformitate nature. Hujus utriusque copule figura est in conjugio. Consensus enim conjugum copulam spiritualem Christi et ecclesia, que fit per caritatem, significat ; commixtio vero sexuum illam significat, que fit per nature conformitatem.”

² Thomas, P. III., Q. 65, A. 4.

³ Thomas, Q. 42, A. 2.

⁴ Thomas, P. III., Q. 65, A. 2.

Sentent. IV., Dist. 30 B.

⁶ See Schwane, p. 688.

⁷ Thomas, Q. 42, Art. 1 : “Verba quibus consensus matrimonialis exprimitur sunt forma hujus sacramenti.” Also : “Sacramentum matrimonii perficitur per actum ejus, qui sacramento illo utitur, sicut pœnitentia. Et ideo sicut pœnitentia non habet

priest's blessing was held to be only "a sacramental," not the Sacrament.¹ Many Schoolmen, it is true, sought to extract an *effectual* spiritual character, but the majority recognised only a quite undefined saving grace.² On the other hand Durandus denied entirely the *opus operatum* (the saving grace), saying that marriage only *signifies* something sacred (union of the Church with Christ).³ That excessive recognition of saving grace stands in flagrant opposition to the view that was derived from Augustine, that the "copula carnalis" in marriage, because it is not materially different from the "copula carnalis fornicatoria," is so deeply infected with sin, that sin is committed, not indeed by the partner who consents, but by the partner who demands, even when it is done for the purpose of avoiding adultery.⁴ While therefore the Sacrament consists in the expressed "consensus" to enter into marriage with a person of the other sex, and thereby the right of the "debitum conjugale" is implicitly laid down, the assertion of this sacramental right is to be held a sin!⁵ In the Bull of Eugene IV. (l.c.) there is to be found, again, a short serviceable summing up.⁶

aliam materiam nisi ipsos actus sensui subjectos, qui sunt loco materialis elementi, ita est de matrimonio."

¹ Thomas, Q. 42, Art. 1: "benedictio sacerdotis est quoddam sacramentale."

² Thomas, Q. 42, Art. 3.

³ See Schwane, p. 689.

⁴ So Bonaventura and Thomas, Q. 49, Art. 4-6, especially Art. 5: "utrum actus matrimonialis excusari possit sine bonis matrimoniis." Here, among other things, it is said: "si aliquis per actum matrimonii intendat vitare fornicationem in conjugate, non est aliquod peccatum: . . . sed si intendat vitare fornicationem in se . . . hoc est peccatum veniale."

⁵ The contradictions on Thomas's part are here very great; for on the other hand it is said, l.c., Art. 4, that proles, fides, and sacramentum not only excuse, but sanctify, the act of marriage. See also in Sentent. Dist. 26, Q. 2, Art. 3: "Cum in matrimonio datur homini ex divina institutione facultas utendi sua uxore ad procreationem proles, datur etiam gratia, sine qua id convenienter facere non posset."

⁶ "Septimum est sacramentum matrimonii, quod est signum conjunctionis Christi et ecclesie secundum apostolum. Causa efficiens matrimonii regulariter est mutus consensus per verba de presenti expressus. Adsignatur autem triplex bonum matrimonii. Primum est proles suscipienda et educanda ad cultum dei. Secundum est fides quam unus conjugum alteri servare debet. Tertium indivisibilitas matrimonii, propter hoc quod significat indivisibilem conjunctionem Christi et ecclesie. Quamvis autem ex causa fornicationis liceat tori separationem facere, non tamen aliud matrimonium contrahere fas est, cum matrimonii vinculum legitime contracti perpetuum sit." How strong still in the fourteenth century was the disinclination of the Scotist

In the doctrine of the Sacraments Thomas was the teacher of determining influence in the Middle Ages, and he has remained such to the present day in the Catholic Church. But, so far as the new ecclesiasticism admitted of it at all, Thomas went back to Augustine. Yet how strongly even in him the doctrine of the *gratia gratis data* (grace graciously bestowed) is affected by a regard to the doctrine, that God treats with us according to our merits; how this latter view, which Augustine had not entirely eradicated, still exercised its influence, Thomas's doctrine of the Sacraments shows already very plainly. The earnest, truly religious spirit which distinguished him was increasingly weakened and led astray by regard for what was held valid. Yet that, certainly, is not the only weakness. An influence, at least equally pernicious, was exercised by the logical apprehension of grace as a physical, mysterious act, and a communication of objective benefits. That also originated with Augustine, and that also, logically carried out, broke up Augustinianism; *the breaking up of Augustinianism was really not occasioned from without; it was in great part the result of an inner development.* The three elements which Augustine left standing in and along with his doctrine of grace, *the element of merit, the element of gratia infusa and the hierarchical priestly element*, continued to work, till they completely transformed the Augustinian mode of thought. But as we have seen, that was already foreshadowed in Gregory the Great, and on the other hand the process did not reach its termination yet in the Middle Ages. The Augustinian reaction of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries which partly embodied itself in the decrees of Trent, was only fully checked again, after a struggle for three hundred years, in the nineteenth century.

C. *The Revision of Augustinianism in the Direction of the Doctrine of Merit.*

That the *grace* springing from the *passio Christi* is the foundation of the Christian religion, and therefore must be the Alpha theologians to regard marriage as a full sacrament, may be seen from Werner, II., p. 424 ff. (against Durandus Aureolus).

and Omega of Christian Theology—this fundamental Pauline and Augustinian thought was directly denied by no ecclesiastical teacher of the West.¹ But as in itself it may mean many things, and, without definite interpretation, by no means guarantees the purity of the Christian religion—for what is grace? God Himself in Christ, or divine forces? and what does grace effect? faith, or a mysterious quality?—so also, if the effect of grace is to be held as only “improvement,” for this very reason it is capable of being wrought over in a way that ultimately cancels it.

The Lombard—in accordance with his intention to reproduce tradition—confined himself to repeating with precision the Augustinian propositions about *grace*, predestination and justification (faith and love).² But as soon as he brings forward pro-

¹ The proposition of Irenæus (III., 18, 6): “Si non vere passus est, nulla gratia ei, cum nulla fuerit passio,” is the firmly adhered to basis of the whole of the Christianity and of the whole of the theology of the West.

² Sentent. II., Dist. 25 P.: “Libertas a peccato et a miseria per gratiam est; libertas vero a necessitate per naturam. Utramque libertatem, nature scilicet et gratiæ, notat apostolus cum ex persona hominis non redempti ait: ‘velle adjacet mihi, etc.,’ acsi diceret, habeo libertatem nature, sed non habeo libertatem gratiæ, ideo non est apud me perfectio boni. Nam voluntas hominis, quam naturaliter habet, non valet erigi ad bonum efficaciter volendum, vel opere implendum, nisi per gratiam liberetur et adjuvetur: liberetur quidem, ut velit, et adjuvetur, ut perficiat. . . . dei gratiam non advocat hominis voluntas vel operatio, sed ipsa gratia voluntatem prævenit præparando ut velit bonum et præparatam adjuvat ut perficiat.” He repeats also correctly the Augustinian doctrine of predestination (I. Dist. 40 D.): God does not elect on the basis of prescience, but it is only the election that produces the merits. He rejects præscientia iniquitatis quorundam: “reprobatio dei, qua ab æterno non eligendo quosdam reprobavit, secundum duo consideratur, quorum alterum præscit et non præparat, *i.e.*, iniquitatem, alterum præscit et præparat, scilicet æternam pœnam.” Reprobation rests on the mysterious but just decision *not* to show mercy to some; its result is hardening. The chief propositions of the Lombard on faith, love, and works are: III. Dist. 23 D.: “Credere deo est credere vera esse quæ loquitur, quod et mali faciunt. . . . credere deum est credere quod ipse sit deus, quod etiam mali faciunt; credere in deum est *credendo amare*, credendum in eum ire, credendo ei adhærere et ejus membris incorporari: *per hanc fidem justificatur impius*” (word for word after Augustine). So also he distinguishes in faith, after Augustine, id quod and id quo creditur (*i.e.* sub. C.). The latter, subjective faith, is to be distinguished according as it is virtue and according as it is not virtue. Faith, so far as love is still wanting to it, is *fides informis* (not virtue). All deeds without faith are devoid of goodness, II. Dist. 41 A.: “cum intentio bonum opus faciat et fides intentionem dirigat, non immerito queri potest, utrum omnis intentio omneque opus illorum malum sit, qui fidem non habent? . . . Quod a quibusdam non irrationabiliter astruitur, qui dicunt omnes actiones et voluntates hominis sine fide malas esse. . . . Quæ ergo sine fide

positions about free will, these have by no means an Augustinian, but rather a Semipelagian ring ; for they are already dominated by a regard to *merit*.¹ Where this view is taken, that is to say, a point must always be ultimately found, which makes it possible to attribute a value to the *independent* action of man over against God. But the contradiction which plainly comes out in the Lombard, when his doctrine of grace is compared with his doctrine of freedom, is equally prevalent among the theologians before him, nay, in them it comes out more strongly, most strongly in Abelard.² There is still to be observed as

fiunt, bona non sunt, quia omne bonum deo placet." II. Dist. 26 A. : "Operans gratia est, quæ prævenit voluntatem bonam : ea enim liberatur et præparatur hominis voluntas, ut sit bona bonumque efficaciter velit ; cooperans vero gratia voluntatem jam bonam sequitur adjuvando . . . Voluntas hominis gratia dei prævenitur atque præparatur, ut fiat bona, non ut fiat voluntas, quia et ante gratiam voluntas erat, sed non erat bona et recta voluntas." It is repeatedly said that grace consists in the infusion of fides cum caritate (*i.e.*, the Holy Spirit), and that only with this the merits of man begin ; accordingly justitia as bona qualitas mentis (virtus, qua recte vivitur) is entirely a work of God.

¹ Sentent. II., Dist. 24 C. : "Liberum arbitrium est facultas rationis et voluntatis, qua bonum eligitur gratia assistente vel malum eadem desistente." II. Dist. 27 G. : "Cum ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere . . . gratia gratis data intelligitur, ex qua bona merita incipiunt. Quæ cum ex sola gratia esse dicantur, non excluditur liberum arbitrium, quia nullum meritum est in homine, quod non fit per liberum arbitrium." II. Dist. 26 G. : "Ante gratiam prævenientem et operantem, qua voluntas bona præparatum in homine, præcedere quædam bona ex dei gratia et libero arbitrio, quædam etiam ex solo libero arbitrio, quibus tamen vita non meretur, nec gratia, qua justificatur." II. Dist. 27 J. : "Cum dicitur fides mereri justificationem et vitam æternam, ex ea ratione dictum accipitur, quia per actum fidei meretur illa. Similiter de caritate et justitia et de aliis accipitur. Si enim fides ipsa virtus præveniens diceretur esse mentis actus qui est meritum, jam ipsa ex libero arbitrio originem haberet, quod quia non est, sic dicitur esse meritum, quia actus ejus est meritum, si tamen adsit caritas, sine qua nec credere nec sperare meritum vitæ est. Unde apparet vere quia caritas est spiritus s., qui animæ qualitates informat et sanctificat, ut eis anima informetur et sanctificetur, sine qua animæ qualitas non dicitur virtus, quia non valet sanare animam." II. Dist. 41 C. : "Nullus dei gratiam mereri potest, per quam justificatur, potest tamen mereri, ut penitus abiciatur. Et quidem aliqui in tantum profundum iniquitatis devenerunt, ut hoc mereantur, ut hoc digni sint ; alii vero ita vivunt, ut etsi non mereantur gratiam justificationis, non tamen mereantur omnino repellì et gratiam sibi subtrahi."

²In Anselm (*Dialog. de lib. arb.*), Bernard (*de gratia et lib. arb.*), and Hugo the Augustinian propositions regarding grace are repeated, but the explanations of free will are in part still more uncertain than in the Lombard. According to Anselm the rectitudo liberi arbitrii has disappeared indeed, but the potestas servandi rectitudinem remains ; see c. 3 : "liberum arbitrium non est aliud, quam arbitrium potens servare

noteworthy the specific view taken by the Lombard of saving grace, who simply identifies it with the Holy Spirit. His meaning is, that while all other virtues become man's own by means of an infused habit (*habitus*), love arises directly in the soul through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, since it is the indwelling Holy Spirit Himself. In this noteworthy view there lies the approach to a more evangelical position; for "*habitus*" there is substituted the direct activity of the Holy Ghost. Just on that account this view¹ seldom found followers; ² quite as few did the other, that in grace the *gratia gratis dans* (God Himself) and the *gratia gratis data* ought to be distinguished.³ The desire was to have, not God, but divine forces that can become human virtues.

rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam rectitudinem." The ratio and the will power remain, and so, after the Fall, men are like those who have eyes and can see, but for whom the object has disappeared (c. 4). The *libertas arbitrii* is accordingly defined by him (1) formally (*ratio et voluntas tenendi*), but also (2) materially, in as much as the *voluntas tenendi* remains. According to Bernard (c. 8) there belongs to free will, not the *posse vel sapere*, but only the *velle*; but the latter remains: "*manet igitur post peccatum liberum arbitrium, etsi miserum, tamen integrum . . . non ergo si creatura potens aut sapiens, sed tantum si volens esse desierit, liberum arbitrium amisisse putanda erit.*" In this formal description of free will Hugo diverges still further from Augustine; for what is characteristic of this fatal development is this, that for Augustine's religious mode of view, for which freedom is *beata necessitas*, there is substituted an empirico-psychological mode of view, which is of no concern for religion, and which nevertheless now influences religious contemplation. "*Voluntas semper a necessitate libera est*": this proposition is again made a foundation in the doctrine of religion. On Abelard's doctrine see Deutsch, l.c., p. 319 ff., who illustrates in particular the dangerous side in the conception of *intentio* on which Abelard lays stress, and shows how the intellectualism of the theologian is in conflict with the traditional doctrine of original sin.

¹ See II. Dist., 27 J. (see above, p. 277, note 1); I. Dist., 17 B.: "*Ipse idem spiritus sanctus est amor sive caritas, qua nos diligimus deum et proximum, que caritas cum ita est in nobis, ut nos faciet diligere deum et proximum, tunc spiritus sanctus dicitur mitti ac dari nobis.*" I. Dist., 17 Q.: "*Alios actus atque motus virtutum operatur caritas, i.e., spiritus s., mediantibus virtutibus quarum actus sunt, utpote actum fidei, i.e., credere fide media, et actum spei, i.e., sperare media spe. Per fidem enim et spem predictos operatur actus. Diligendi vero actum per se tantum sine alicujus virtutis medio operatur. Aliter ergo hunc actum operatur quam alios virtutum actus.*"

² Duns contested it; on the other hand, Pupper of Goch and Staupitz defended it; see Otto Clemen, J. Pupper von Goch (Leipzig, 1896), p. 249.

³ Sentent. II., Dist. 27 G.: "*Cum ex gratia dicuntur esse bona merita et incipere, aut intelligitur gratia gratis dans, i.e., deus, vel potius gratia gratis data, quæ voluntatem hominis prævenit.*"

Here lies the fundamental error. In its ultimate basis the mode of view is not a religious but a moral one. That comes out distinctly in the case of the Schoolman who may be styled par excellence the theologian of grace, namely Thomas. It would seem as if one could not value grace more highly than he has done; *from God to God through grace*—that is the theme of his entire dogmatic. And yet ultimately it is habitual virtue on which all depends. The decisive mistake was already made by Augustine. It lies in the *gratia cooperans*, which is distinguished from the *gratia operans* (*præveniens*). The latter does not procure justification and salvation, but the former. But the former is only cooperative, for it runs parallel with the liberated will, and the two together produce merit, which is the matter of importance. But why is merit the matter of importance? Because the theologian cannot conceive of anything else availing before God than *improvement* that exhibits itself in a habitus. That thought, however, is not framed from the standpoint of religion, but from the standpoint of morality, or is a distressed conscience to be comforted by saying that there will gradually be formed a habit of love? Look at it as we will, faith appears important here only in so far as it opens the way for the procuring of virtues; the *gratia præveniens* becomes the bridge that leads over to morality. But in the last analysis the cause that led to this scheme of doctrine lies still deeper; for we must necessarily ask, why is the grace, which is, of course, to dominate the whole process, so narrowly conceived of in respect of its power, that it is unable to effect, alone and perfectly, what it contemplates? The answer to this question must not simply run: in order to set aside the thought of an arbitrary procedure on God's part, for in other connections there was a falling back on the hidden will of God. Nor is it enough to say that the moral principle, that each one shall receive according to his deeds, furnishes the solution here; this had an influence, but was not the only thing that was at work. *At bottom, rather, it was because the conception itself of God and of grace admitted of no other conclusion.* There was no recognition of *personality*, neither of the personality of God, nor of man as a *person*. If even in earthly relations man cannot be otherwise raised to a

higher stage, than by passing into a person who is superior, more mature, and greater, that is, by entering into spiritual fellowship with such an one, and attaching one's self to him by reverence, love, and trust, then the same holds good, but in a way that transcends comparison, of the rising of man from the sphere of sin and guilt into the sphere of God. Here no communications of things avail, but only fellowship of person with person; the disclosure to the soul, that the holy God who rules heaven and earth is its Father, with whom it can, and may, live as a child in its father's house—that is grace, nay, that *alone* is grace, the trustful confidence in God, namely, which rests on the certainty that the separating guilt has been swept away. That was seen by Augustine as little as by Thomas, and it was not discerned even by the mediæval Mystics, who aspired to having intercourse with Christ as with a friend; for it was the *man* Jesus of whom they thought in seeking this. But all of them, when they think of God, look, not to the heart of God, but to an inscrutable Being, who, as He has created the world out of nothing, so is also the productive source of inexhaustible forces that yield *knowledge* and *transformation of essence*. And when they think of themselves, they think, not of the centre of the human ego, the spirit, which is so free and so lofty that it cannot be influenced by benefits that are objective, even though they be the greatest perceptions and the most glorious investiture, and at the same time is so feeble in itself that it can find support only in another *person*. Therefore they constructed the thesis: *God and gratia* (i.e., knowledge and participation in the divine nature), in place of the personal fellowship with God, *which is the gratia*. That *gratia*, only a little separated from God in the thesis, became in course of time always further removed from Him. It appears deposited in the merit of Christ, and then in the Sacraments. But in the measure in which it becomes more impersonal, more objective, and more external, confidence in it is also impaired, till at last it becomes a magical means, which stirs to activity the latent good agency of man, and sets in motion the standing machine, that it may then do *its* work, and that *its* work may be of account before God. One sees plainly that everythings depends ultimately on the con-

ception of God. In the *gratia cooperans* that conception of God comes to view which represents God, not as the holy Lord in relation to guilty man, and as the Father of Jesus Christ in relation to His child, but as the unfathomable power that comes to help man with knowledge and with secret influences of a natural kind, in order that, by love and virtue, man may be able to win independent worth before Him. In Thomas it is the Augustinian intellectualism, closely conjoined with the doctrine of deification, which ultimately determines the view of God and of grace. In the later Schoolmen the intellectualism is surmounted, and a beautiful beginning is made to reflect upon will, and thereby upon personality. But as it is no more than a beginning, grace appears finally in Nominalism simply as emptied of its contents and reduced to a magical force. Where the simplest and the hardest thing is not taken account of—childship and faith in contrast with the guilt of sin—piety and speculation are condemned to treat *physics* and *morality* (the *natura divina* and the *bonum esse* [the divine nature and the being good]) in endless speculations, to see grace in the conjunction of these two elements, with the result that, when the understanding has awakened and discovered its limits, there is an ending up with a bare aliquid (something) and with a morality that underbids itself. This conclusion is in keeping with the God who is inscrutable self-will, and who, just on that account, has set up an inscrutably arbitrary institution of grace as an establishment for the insurance of life.

The fundamental features of Thomas's doctrine of grace are the following: ¹ the *external* principles of moral action are the law and grace (*Summa* II. 1, Q. 90): "The exterior principle moving to goodness is God, who both instructs us by the law and aids us by grace." In Qs. 90-108 the law is treated, and in Q. 107, Art. 4, it is asserted, that although the new law is easier as respects the external commands, it is more difficult as respects the "repression of the inner impulses" (*cohibitio inter-*

¹ On the general scheme in which Thomas has inserted his doctrine of grace, and especially on the significance of the Church as correlate of redemption, see Ritschl. *Rechtfertigung*, I. vol., 2 ed., p. 86 ff. The most wonderful thing in Thomas is that in the whole account no notice is taken of the specific nature of grace as *gratia Christi*.

iorum motuum).¹ In Qs. 109-114 there follows the doctrine of grace. Thomas treats first (Q. 109) of the necessity of grace. In Art. 1 it is laid down that it is impossible without grace to know any *truth*. The exposition is extremely noteworthy because it is very strongly determined by Aristotelian influences.² At the same time the intellectualism of Thomas comes out here most distinctly: grace is the communication of supernatural *knowledge*; but the "light of grace" (*lumen gratiæ*) is, moreover, "*superadded* to nature" (*naturæ superadditum*). In both these views a disastrous step forward is taken; for what is "*superadded*" is not necessary to the accomplishment of man's end, but reaches beyond it, may therefore be wanting, or establishes, if it is present, a superhuman worth, and hence a merit. Only now in Art. 2 is the relation of grace to moral goodness spoken of. Here appears at once the consequence of the "*superadditum*." To man in his state of integrity the capacity is ascribed to do in his own strength "the good proportionate to his nature" (*bonum suæ naturæ proportion-*

¹ "Quantum ad opera virtutum in interioribus actibus præcepta novæ legis sunt graviora præceptis veteris legis." The later Schoolmen did not indeed directly contest this position, but they asserted that through the Sacraments the defective fulfilment of the commands of the new law is supplemented.

² "Cognoscere veritatem est usus quidam vel actus intellectualis luminis ('omne quod manifestatur lumen est'), usus autem quilibet quendam *motum* importat . . . videmus autem in corporalibus, quod ad motum non solum requiritur ipsa forma, quæ est principium motus vel actionis, sed etiam requiritur motio primi moventis. Primum autem movens in ordine corporalium est corpus cæleste." This is now applied to the motus spirituales, whose ultimate author must therefore be God, "ideo quantumcunque natura aliqua corporalis vel spiritualis ponatur perfecta, non potest in suum actum procedere nisi moveatur a deo, quæ quidem motio est secundum suæ providentiæ rationem, non secundum necessitatem naturæ, sicut motio corporis cælestis. Non solum autem a deo est omnis motio, sicut a primo movente, sed etiam ab ipso est omnis formalis perfectio, sicut a primo actu. Sic igitur actio intellectus et cujuscunque entis creati dependet et a deo quantum ad duo. Uno modo in quantum ab ipso habet perfectionem sive formam per quam agit, alio modo in quantum ab ipso movetur ad agendum. Intellectus humanus habet aliquam formam, scil. ipsum intelligibile lumen, quod est de se sufficiens ad quaedam intelligibilia cognoscenda . . . altiora vero intelligibilia intellectus humanus cognoscere non potest, nisi fortiori lumine perficiatur . . . quod dicitur lumen gratiæ, in quantum est naturæ superadditum. Sic igitur dicendum est, quod ad cognitionem cujuscunque veri homo indiget auxilio divino, ut intellectus a deo moveatur ad suum actum, non autem indiget ad cognoscendam veritatem in omnibus nova illustratione superaddita naturali illustrationi, sed in quibusdam quæ excedunt naturalem cognitionem."

atum)—God only comes into view here, as everywhere else, as “*primus movens*” (the primary mover); yet divine help was needed in order to obtain a meritorious “*bonum superexcedens*” (surplus goodness). But after the Fall there is need in order to both these ends of grace, which must first restore man’s nature. Accordingly a twofold grace is required by him here. In this way the distinction is already drawn between *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans*, and at the same time *there is contemplated as man’s goal a supernatural state, which can only be reached by help of the second grace, which produces merits.*¹ In Art. 3 the question as to whether man can love God above all things without grace is dealt with in the same way: Nature before the Fall is certainly capable of that; for it is “*quiddam connaturale homini*” (something congenial to man); but after the Fall nature is incapable of it. “Man in the state of unfallen nature did not need the gift of grace superadded to natural goodness (*naturalibus bonis*) for loving God naturally above all things, though he needed the aid of God moving him to this, but in the state of corrupt nature man needs also for this the help of grace that heals nature.”² In Art. 5 it is said regarding the question as to whether without grace man can merit eternal life, that every nature can, by its action, only bring about an effect which is proportionate to its strength. “*But eternal life is an end exceeding the proportions (proportionem) of human nature; hence man cannot in his own strength produce meritorious works which are proportionate to eternal life. Therefore without grace*

¹ “*In statu naturæ integræ quantum ad sufficientiam operativæ virtutis poterat homo per sua naturalia velle et operari bonum suæ naturæ proportionatum, quale est bonum virtutis acquisite, non autem bonum superexcedens, quale est bonum virtutis infusæ; sed in statu naturæ corruptæ etiam deficit homo ab hoc, quod secundum suam naturam potest, ut non possit totum hujusmodi bonum implere per sua naturalia. Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scil. tanto bono naturæ privetur, potest quidem etiam in statu naturæ corruptæ per virtutem suæ naturæ aliquod bonum particulare agere, non tamen totum bonum sibi connaturale.*” He must be healed *auxilio medicinæ*. “*Sic igitur virtute gratuita superaddita virtuti naturæ indiget homo in statu naturæ integræ, quantum ad unum scil. ad operandum et volendum bonum supernaturale, sed in statu naturæ corruptæ quantum ad duo, scil. ut sanetur et ulterius ut bonum supernaturalis virtutis operetur, quod est meritorium.*”

² In Art. 4 the fulfilling of the law of God is treated in the same way.

man cannot merit eternal life." Nothing is said here of merits de congruo, nay, in Art. 6 it is denied that by natural good deeds man can prepare for this grace; ¹ no doubt conversion to God comes about in free will, but the will cannot turn to God unless God converts it; for man cannot raise himself independently from the state of sin without grace, ² cannot even in this state avoid with certainty mortal sins (Art. 8), nay even the redeemed man needs grace in order not to fall into sin; ³ hence perseverance is also a special gift of grace.⁴

After this, in Q. 110, the *essence* of grace is described. The inquiry begins very characteristically with the question "whether grace places anything in the soul" (*utrum gratia ponat aliquid*

¹ "Quod homo convertatur ad deum, hoc non potest esse nisi deo ipsum convertente, hoc autem est præparare se ad gratiam, quasi ad deum converti . . . homo non potest se præparare ad lumen gratiæ suscipiendum, nisi per auxilium gratuitum dei interioris moventis."

² Art. 7: "Cum enim peccatum transiens actu, remaneat reatu, non est idem resurgere a peccato, quod cessare ab actu peccati, sed resurgere a peccato est reparari hominem ad ea quæ peccando amisit." Sin has three evils as its consequences, macula, corruptio naturalis boni, reatus culpæ. None of these results can be removed otherwise than by God.

³ Art. 9: "homo ad recte vivendum dupliciter auxilio dei indiget. Uno quidem modo quantum ad aliquod habituale donum, per quod natura humana corrupta sanetur et etiam sanata elevetur ad operanda opera meritoria vitæ æternæ, quæ excedunt proportionem naturæ. Alio modo indiget homo auxilio gratiæ, ut a deo moveatur ad agendum. Quantum igitur ad primum auxilii modum, homo in gratia existens non indiget alio auxilio gratiæ quasi aliquo alio habitu infuso, indiget tamen auxilio gratiæ secundum alium modum, ut scil. a deo moveatur ad recte agendum, et hoc propter duo. First generally (nulla res creata potest in quemcunque actum prodire nisi virtute motionis divinæ), second specially, propter conditionem status humanæ naturæ, quæ quidem licet per gratiam sanetur quantum ad mentem, remanet tamen in ea corruptio et infectio quantum ad carnem per quam servit legi peccati; remanet etiam quedam ignorantie obscuritas in intellectu; propter varios enim rerum eventus *et quia etiam nos ipsos non perfecte cognoscimus*, non possumus ad plenum scire quid nobis expediat, et ideo necesse est nobis, ut a deo dirigamur et protegatur qui omnia novit et omnia potest. Et propter hoc etiam renatis in filios dei per gratiam convenit dicere: Et ne nos inducas in tentationem, et fiat voluntas tua, etc."

⁴ Art. 10 (strictly Augustinian, against Pelagius): "Ad perseverantiam habendam homo in gratia constitutus non quidem indiget aliqua alia habituali gratia, sed divino auxilio ipsum dirigente et protegente contra tentationum impulsus . . . et ideo postquam aliquis est justificatus per gratiam, necesse habet a deo petere prædictum perseverantiæ donum, ut scil. custodiatur a malo usque ad finem vitæ: *multis enim datur gratia, quibus non datur perseverare in gratia.*"

in anima). Here it is laid down that *gratia* has a threefold meaning = benevolent disposition, free gift without equivalent, and thanks. Divine grace is not only benevolent disposition, but also gift, and therefore "it is manifest that grace places something in him who receives grace." Now the definition: "Thus, therefore, by man's being said to have the grace of God, there is signified something supernatural in man proceeding from God. Sometimes, however, the grace of God is a designation for God's eternal love itself, as it is also called the grace of predestination, in so far as God has predestinated or chosen some gratuitously, and not on the ground of merit" (*sic igitur per hoc, quod dicitur homo gratiam dei habere, significatur quiddam supernaturale in homine a deo proveniens. Quandoque tamen gratia dei dicitur ipsa æterna dei dilectio, secundum quod dicitur etiam gratia prædestinationis, in quantum deus gratuito et non ex meritis aliquos prædestinavit sive elegit*).¹ But as grace "places something in the soul," *it is also a quality of the soul, i.e.,* in addition to the help by which God in general moves the soul to good action, He *infuses into it a supernatural quality*.² In the two following articles (3 and 4) it is now proved that grace is not only the being filled with this or that quality (not only with love even), but that it is related to the infused virtues as the natural light of reason (*lumen rationis*) to the acquired virtues (*virtutes acquisitæ*), and that it is to be regarded therefore as participation in the divine nature by means of an illumination penetrating the whole being, whereby the true sonship to God comes to exist.³

¹ Art. 1.

² Art. 2: ". . . multo magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale æternum, *infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moventur ad bonum æternum consequendum.*"

³ Art. 3: "Sicut lumen naturale rationis est aliquid præter virtutes acquisitas, quæ dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale, ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiæ, *quod est participatio divinæ nature*, est aliquid præter virtutes infusas, quæ a lumine illo derivantur et ad illud lumen ordinantur." Hence because grace is not a mere virtue, but aliquid virtute prius, it is not placed in aliqua potentiarum animæ, but in the essence of the soul itself. "Sicut enim per potentiam *intellectivam* homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem *fidei*, et secundum potentiam *voluntatis* amorem divinum per virtutem *caritatis*, ita etiam per naturam animæ *participat secundum quandam similitudinem naturam divinam, per quandam regenerationem*" (Art. 4).

From this point, in Q. III, the division of grace is sketched. And, first, a distinction is drawn between *gratia gratum faciens* (by which man is united to God [qua ipse homo deo conjungitur]), and *gratia gratis data* (the priestly official grace, by which the man himself is not justified, but the justification of another is contemplated [qua non homo ipse justificatur, sed justificatio alterius comparatur]). It is worthy of note that Thomas begins with this distinction (Art. 1). Then follows the separation of grace into *gratia operans* and *gratia co-operans* (that by which He moves us to good volition and action—gift of habit divinely imparted to us [illa, qua nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum—habituale donum nobis divinitus inditum]); it is justified by the proposition: “the operation of any *effect* is not attributed to that which moves, but to the mover” (*operatio alicujus effectus non attribuitur mobili, sed moventi*). In the effect, so far as our soul is *mota non movens* (the moved, not moving) the *gratia operans* appears; in the effect, so far as it is *mota movens* (the moved, moving) the *gratia cooperans* appears (Art. 2).¹ Parallel with this is the division into *gratia præveniens* and *gratia subse-*

¹ Note also: “Est autem in nobis duplex actus; primus quidem interior voluntatis; et quantum ad istum actum, voluntas se habet ut mota, deus autem ut movens, et præsertim cum voluntas incipit bonum velle, quæ prius malum volebat. Et ideo secundum quod deus movet humanam mentem ad hunc actum, dicitur *gratia operans*. Alius autem actus est exterior qui cum a voluntate imperetur consequens est quod ad hunc actum operatio attribuitur voluntati. Et quia etiam ad hunc actum deus nos adjuvat et interius confirmando voluntatem, ut ad actum perveniat, et exterius facultatem operandi præbendo, respectu hujusmodi actus dicitur *gratia cooperans*. (There follows a proof-passage from Augustine). Si igitur gratia accipiatur pro gratuita dei motione, quia movet nos ad bonum meritorium convenienter dividitur gratia per operantem, et cooperantem. Si vero accipiatur gratia pro habituali dono, sic est duplex gratiæ effectus, sicut et cujuslibet alterius formæ, quorum primus est *esse*, secundus est *operatio*. . . . Sic igitur habitualis gratia, in quantum animam sanat vel justificat sive gratam deo facit, dicitur *gratia operans*, in quantum vero est principium operis meritorii, quod ex libero arbitrio procedit, dicitur *cooperans*.” At an earlier point Thomas had already made an analogous distinction with regard to righteousness (*justitia*); see II., I Q. 100, Art. 12: “Si loquamur de justificatione proprie dicta sic considerandum est, quod *justitia* potest accipi prout est in *habitu* vel prout est in *actu*, et secundum hoc justificatio dupliciter dicitur. Uno quidem modo secundum quod homo fit justus adipiscens *habitum justitiæ*. Alio vero modo, secundum quod *opera justitiæ* operatur, ut secundum hoc justificatio nihil aliud sit quam *justitiæ executio*. *Justitia* autem, sicut aliæ virtutes, potest accipi et *acquisita et infusa*. *Acquisita* quidem causatur ex operibus, sed *infusa* causatur ab ipso deo per ejus gratiam, et hæc est *vera justitia*, secundum quam aliquis dicitur justus apud deum.”

quens (Art. 3).¹ In Art. 4 the *gratia gratis data*, *i.e.*, the grace with which one helps others (for the edification of the community, official grace), is subjected to a further division according to 1 Cor. xi., and in Art. 5 it is shown that the *gratia gratum faciens* is to be valued much more highly than the *gratia gratis data*.

In Q. 112 the *causæ gratiæ* (causes of grace) are now considered. That God alone can be the cause is deduced in a genuinely Old Catholic way from the conception of grace as *deifica* (making divine).² Hence man cannot even prepare himself for this grace, the preparation rather, *which is necessary*, must be effected by grace itself,³ therefore the act of preparation for *gratia infusa* is not meritorious, for although every *forma* presupposes a *materia disposita* (prepared), yet it holds good even in the things of nature that "the preparedness of the material does not necessarily secure form save by virtue of the agent who causes the preparedness" (*dispositio materiæ non ex necessitate consequitur formam nisi per virtutem agentis, qui dispositionem causat*).⁴ This *gratia gratum faciens* can be smaller in the one, greater in the other, just because it is a free

¹ "Sicut *gratia* dividitur in operantem et cooperantem secundum diversos affectus, ita etiam in prævenientem et subsequentem, qualitercumque *gratia* accipiat. Sunt autem quinque effectus *gratiæ* in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur, secundus est, ut bonum velit, tertius est, ut bonum quod vult efficaciter operetur, quartus est, ut in bono perseveret, quintus est, ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo *gratia* secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, vocatur præveniens, respectu secundi effectus et prout causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi effectus."

² "Cum donum *gratiæ* nihil aliud sit quam quædam participatio divinæ naturæ, quæ excedit omnem aliam naturam, ideo impossibile est quod aliqua creatura *gratiam* causet. Sic enim necesse est, quod solus deus deficiet, communicando consortium divinæ naturæ per quandam similitudinis participationem, sicut impossibile est, quod aliquid igniat nisi solus ignis" (Art. 1).

³ The thought is this, that *gratia* as *habituali* donum dei requires a preparation, because (Aristotelian) "nulla *forma* potest esse nisi in materia disposita; sed si loquamur de *gratia* secundum quod significat auxilium dei *moventis ad bonum* (that is, the *gratia* prima), nulla preparatio requiritur ex parte hominis, quasi præveniens divinum auxilium." With this momentous distinction the dissolution of Augustinianism took its beginning.

⁴ Art. 3: "Præparatio hominis ad *gratiam* est a deo sicut a movente, a libero autem arbitrio sicut a moto . . . Secundum quod est a libero arbitrio, nullam necessitatem habet ad *gratiæ* consecutionem."

gift;¹ but because it is something supernatural, no one here below to whom it is not specially revealed can know for certain whether he possess it.²

There follows in Qs. 113 and 114 the inquiry into the effects of grace. In correspondence with the distinction between *gratia operans* and *gratia cooperans* the effect of grace is twofold—justification and meritorious good works; but even in justification the will must co-operate. Only the very first point is distinguished by the sole efficiency of grace. This comes out at

¹ This also is a momentous, as it is also an Augustinian, proposition, due likewise to thinking of grace as *gratia infusa* (*habitus*). No doubt Thomas further explains, that *ex parte finis* the greatness of grace always remains the same (“*conjungens hominem summo bono, quod est deus*”). But “*ex parte subjecti gratia potest suscipere magis vel minus, prout scilicet perfectius illustratur a lumine gratiæ quam alius. Cujus diversitatis ratio quidem est aliqua ex parte preparantis se ad gratiam, qui enim magis se ad gratiam preparat plenioram gratiam accipit.*” This position was the main source of disaster for the period that followed: there was naturally the growing tendency to think more of the *preparatio* than of the *causa*, and to overlook the addition which Thomas had appended: “*sed hac ex parte non potest accipi prima ratio hujus diversitatis, quia preparatio ad gratiam non est hominis, nisi in quantum liberum arbitrium ejus preparatur a deo. Unde prima causa hujus diversitatis accipienda est ex parte ipsius dei, qui diversimode suæ gratiæ dona dispensat ad hoc quod ex diversis gradibus pulchritudo et perfectio ecclesiæ consurgat, sicut etiam diversos gradus rerum instituit, ut esset universum perfectum.*” This explanation manifestly leads in quite a different direction from the one mentioned first, with which it is associated; for in the case of the former it is really a question about a more or less, in the case of the latter, on the other hand, it is a question about *varieties*, which are necessary to the perfectness of the beautiful whole. But Thomas could unite the two explanations in accordance with his ontology, because, like Augustine, he regarded ultimately even the less good as necessary in the cosmic system, since it is just in this way that the *beauty* of the whole comes out in the manifoldness of its parts. Of course this reflection simply cancels the ethical mode of contemplation and transforms it into the aesthetic. Thus, so far as Thomas does not derive the existence of more or less grace from the *dispositio* (*preparatio*) *hominis*, but traces it rather to God, *he knows only of æsthetic ways of justifying it* (Art. 4).

² This is the third momentous position (Art. 5): “*Nullus potest scire, se habere gratiam, certitudinaliter; certitudo enim non potest haberi de aliquo, nisi possit dijudicari per proprium principium.*” No one is sure of a conclusion, who does not know the major premiss. “*Principium autem gratiæ et objectum ejus est ipse deus, qui propter sui excellentiam est nobis ignotus.*” One can only ascertain the possession of grace conjecturaliter (per aliqua signa). But one can very well *be sure of possessing scientia and fides*, “*non est autem similis ratio de gratia et caritate.*” We see here what ruin was wrought by the thought of *gratia infusa* as a mysterious *habitus* which is applied to the soul! But this *habitus*, of which one cannot be certain, corresponds with the *deus ignotus*!

once in Art. 1 (Q. 113). Thomas raises the question whether the justification of the sinner is the remission of sins (*utrum justificatio impii sit remissio peccatorum?*), and in an extremely round-about explanation he answers at bottom with no, although he apparently replies to the question in the affirmative. He lays it down, that is to say, that "justification, passively received, introduces an *impulse towards righteousness*" (*justificatio passive accepta importat motum ad justitiam*), but that it comes into view here "as a certain change (*transmutatio*) from a state of unrighteousness to a state of righteousness." "And because movement is described rather from the *terminus ad quem* than from the *terminus a quo*, so a change (*transmutatio*) of this kind, by which one is changed (*transmutatur*) from a state of unrighteousness into a state of righteousness, derives its name from the *terminus ad quem*, and is called the justification of the sinner"; in other words: the actual justification does not yet take place through the "remission of sins," but only on account of the *contemplated end* can it be said that forgiveness of sins is already justification; in reality, however, justification—as a translation into a new state—only takes place later. This becomes still plainer, when it is affirmed in Art. 2 that even for the forgiveness of sins the *gratia infusa* is necessary. This has the effect, certainly, of introducing a bad confusion; for if the position: "remission of guilt cannot be understood where there is no infusion of grace" (*non potest intelligi remissio culpæ, si non adest infusio gratiæ*) is correct (it is proved by the reflection that forgiveness of sins *presupposes* "the effect of divine love" in us, *i.e.*, presupposes that we love God in return), then forgiveness of sins, instead of being the first thing, is the last, and one must ask himself, what then is really the effect of the *gratia præveniens* (in the strictest sense)? Is it mere *vocatio* (calling), or something undefinable? Thomas here got astray with his own distinctions, or—in a highly characteristic way—he left in darkness what man owes to prevenient grace. In accordance with this it is pointed out in Arts. 3-5, that for justification there must already co-operate a movement of free will (*motus liberi arbitrii*), a movement of faith (*motus fidei*) and a hatred of sin (*odium peccati*), *i.e.*, we are at once led on to contemplate the

intermingling of grace and self-activity.¹ Only now does justification take place (Art. 6); for "four things are to be reckoned (enumerantur) which are required for the justification of the sinner, *viz.*, the infusion of grace, the movement of free will in relation to God (in deum) by faith, and the movement of free will in relation to sin (in peccatum), and the remission of guilt (this last *follows*, then, from the three other things); the reason of which is that, as has been said, justification is a certain movement by which the soul is moved by God from a state of guilt into a state of righteousness; but in any movement by which anything is moved by another, three things are required. First, the moving (motio) of the mover himself; second, the movement as in motion (motus mobilis); third, the consummation of the movement, or the arrival at the goal. From the side (ex parte), therefore, of the divine moving there is received the infusion of grace, from the side of free will the retirement and advance (recessus et accessus) of movement, while the consummation or arrival at the goal of this movement is brought about (importatur) by the remission of guilt. *For in this justification is consummated.*"² But although justification culminates in the forgiveness of sins, yet, as will appear, the whole process does not yet culminate in justification. Of this justification of the sinner it is further taught (Art. 7), that it is effected "originaliter" at the moment of *infusion*, and that "*it is realised instantaneously and without succession*" (in instanti fit absque successione). The difficulty, that the giving of *form* (infusion) can only take place in *materia disposita* (in prepared matter) is set aside by saying, that "for the infusion of grace into the soul God does

¹ Art. 3: "In eo, qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a deo ad justitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii, sed ita infundit donum gratiæ justificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiæ acceptandum in his, que sunt hujus motionis capaces." 4: "deus movet animam hominis convertendo eam ad se ipsum . . . prima conversio ad deum fit per fidem . . . ideo motus fidei requiritur ad justificationem impii." 5: "recessus et accessus in motu liberi arbitrii accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium . . . oportet igitur quod in justificatione impii sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex, unus quo per desiderium tendat in dei justitiam, et alius, quo detestetur peccatum."

² It may be remarked, by the way, that here and there in the Middle Ages it is related that those specially endowed with grace *detected* (sensibiliter) the infusion of grace, felt with the sense of taste a sweetness, etc.

not require any disposition save that which He Himself creates. But He creates a disposition of this kind sufficient for the reception of grace, sometimes indeed suddenly, but sometimes gradually and in stages" (*ad hoc quod gratiam infundat animæ, non requirit aliquam dispositionem, nisi quam ipse facit. Facit autem hujusmodi dispositionem sufficientem ad susceptionem gratiæ quandoque quidem subito quandoque autem paulatim et successive*).¹ In what follows, the order of the process is now inverted in a bold way (Art. 8): from the point of view of time the four things named above coincide, but causally they follow each other thus—(1) the infusion of grace; (2) the movement towards God in love; (3) the turning from sin; (4) the forgiveness of guilt. The legitimacy of this inversion is not proved by Thomas; the aim in view is manifest; grace must stand at the beginning. But because he is averse to distinguishing a grace which is not infused, but is simply the awakening of trust (*fiducia*), he cannot allow validity to the scheme which would really correspond with his mode of thought, namely, (1) a grace that is merely *movens*; (2) faith (*fides*); (3) detestation of sin; (4) remission of guilt; (5) infused grace (*gratia infusa*). He, therefore, places infused grace first "causally" (*causaliter*) (from the correct reflection that at all events the precedence belongs to this), but it is a mere assertion, which he himself cannot effectively prove, that this *gratia* is *infusa*; for its effects do not correspond with this. The confusion which, on closer inspection, we at once see to have been introduced by him here,² was not without its influence in the period that followed. In the concluding view taken of justification (Arts. 9 and 10), it is laid down that it is not only a great work (*opus magnum*) of God,

¹The exposition is again cosmological (Aristotelian): "Quod enim agens naturale non subito possit disponere materiam, contingit ex hoc, quod est aliqua proportio ejus quod in materia resistit ad virtutem agentis et propter hoc videmus, quod quanto virtus agentis fuerit fortior, tanto materia citius disponitur. Cum igitur virtus divina sit infinita, potest quæcumque materiam creatam subito disponere, etc. etc."

²It shews itself, *e.g.*, in the contradiction Art. 8 ad Primum, where he says: "Quia infusio gratiæ et remissio culpæ dicuntur ex parte dei justificantis, ideo ordine nature *prior* est gratiæ infusio quam culpæ remissio. Sed si sumantur ea quæ ex parte hominis justificati, *est ex converso*; nam prius est ordine nature liberatio a culpa, quam consecutio gratiæ justificantis." But only the one thing or the other holds good. It is the worst scholasticism to assert that the two views can be held together.

but is really even a miraculous work (*opus miraculosum*); but at bottom the latter holds good only of sudden conversions: "certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the sinner, so far as the good that comes into existence is concerned, are, nevertheless, beyond the usual order of such effects, and therefore have more of the nature of miracle" ("quædam miraculosa opera, esti sunt minora quam justificatio impii quantum ad bonum quod fit, sunt tamen præter consuetum ordinem talium effectuum et ideo plus habent de ratione miraculi"). This exhausts justification, yet not the whole process; only now, rather, are the effects first considered which are imparted through grace in an increasing measure to *him who is already justified*. They are all placed under the head of merit (Q. 114). First, the question is raised whether man can acquire merit at all before God (Art. 1). The answer runs: not in the absolute sense of strict righteousness, but certainly in virtue of a benevolent arrangement of God.¹ Then in accordance with this it is declared impossible that any one should merit for himself eternal life, even if he lives in the state of unfallen nature (in statu

¹ This is the religious robe that is thrown over the irreligious "merit." Thomas says that merit and merces are the same = retributio as pretium of a deed. *Justitia* in the strict sense exists only inter eos, quorum est simpliciter æqualitas. Where therefore there is simpliciter justum, there is also simpliciter meritum vel merces. In other cases there exists at the most a meritum secundum quid (not justum). But between God and men there is the greatest inequality, and all goodness which man has springs from God; hence there is here, not a meritum simpliciter, but certainly a meritum "in quantum uterque operatur secundum modum suum." But the modus humanæ virtutis is appointed by God; "ideo meritum hominis apud deum esse non potest nisi secundum persuppositionem divinæ ordinationis, ita scil. ut id homo consequatur a deo per operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit." Still it is to be noted here, that Thomas does not determine merit purely according to the arbitrary will of God; it is estimated rather by the faculty and end of man. Yet in the period that followed, there was an adhering always more closely, because it was more convenient, and because the conception of God admitted of it to pure arbitrariness as respects meritoriousness, and a relying on the Church's being initiated into the purposes of this arbitrariness. But in this article Thomas has a still further addition that is not without its significance; he continues: "Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a deo sunt ordinate, differenter tamen, quia creatura rationalis se ipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium. Unde sua actio habet rationem meriti, quod non est in aliis creaturis." It is implied therefore in the *nature* of free will that it acquires merits; in Art. 4, *e.g.*, in addition to the thesis that the meritorious originates ex ordinatione divina, Thomas has made an independent use of this thesis.

naturæ integræ) (Art. 2); for "eternal life is something good that exceeds the proportions of created nature" (*vita æterna est quoddam bonum excedens proportionem naturæ creatæ*).¹ On the other hand, to the question, whether the man who is in a state of grace can merit eternal life "ex condigno," no explicit answer is given.² The decision rather runs (Art. 3), "meritorious work of man can be looked at in two ways; on the one hand in so far as it proceeds from free will, on the other hand in so far as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it is looked at with respect to the substance of work and in so far as it proceeds from free will, there cannot here be condignity on account of the very great inequality of proportions. For it appears *congruous*, that man working according to his virtue should be rewarded by God according to the excellence of his virtue. But if we speak of meritorious work with respect to what proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, it is in this case meritorious of eternal life *ex condigno*. For here the value of the merit is estimated according to the power of the Holy Spirit who moves us to eternal life. The reward also of the work is estimated by the dignity of the grace by which man, made a participant of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom inheritance is due in virtue of the very right of adoption" (*opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest; uno modo, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, alio modo, secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio, sic non potest ibi esse condignitas propter maximam inæqualitatem proportionis. Videtur enim congruum, ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem deus recompenset secundum excellentiam suæ virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio secundum quod procedit ex gratia spiritus sancti, sic est meritorium vitæ æternæ ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem spiritus sancti moventis nos in vitam æternam. Attenditur etiam*

¹ "Nulla natura creata est sufficiens principium actus meritorii vitæ æternæ, nisi superaddatur aliquod supernaturale donum, quod gratia dicitur."

² "Ex condigno" = in a truly meritorious way, as contrasted with "ex congruo" = in the way of a performance, to which, when a benevolent view is taken of it, a certain worth and therefore also a certain merit can be attributed.

pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiæ, per quam homo consors factus divini naturæ adoptatur in filium dei, cui debetur hæreditas ex ipso jure adoptionis). The same thing, then, is in one respect ex condigno, in another respect ex congruo! The period that followed was not satisfied with this, but attributed to human merit a higher worth; but to this Thomas himself gave the impulse. In Art. 4 it is shown that the meritorious principle is love, whether we look at merit ex ordinatione divina (by divine arrangement), or at merit "in so far as man has, beyond other creatures, the power of acting for himself as a voluntary agent" (in quantum homo habet præ ceteris creaturis ut per se agat voluntarie agens). In both cases it can easily be shown, that in love and in no other virtue merit consists.¹ In view of the principle "any act of love merits absolutely eternal life"

¹ Here in Arts. 5-7, as if by way of giving extra measure, Thomas introduces three chapters, in which he again expressly shows that one cannot merit the first grace, that one cannot merit it for another, and that one cannot merit even the reparatio post lapsum. But the sections are important, for the reason that the decided negative which Thomas here adopts everywhere was cancelled, or at least modified, in the period that followed. With regard to the first point, he explains most distinctly that "omne meritum repugnat gratiæ," hence: "*nullus sibi mereri potest gratiam primam.*" But Thomas did not see that what holds good of the gratia prima holds good of all grace. Indeed the gratia prima, just because it has nothing to do with merit, is at bottom an extremely dark phenomenon for him, and this explains his passing over it so rapidly. He was himself accountable for it therefore, that in the period that followed even the communication of the gratia prima was attached to certain merits. The second point is important, because Thomas, in distinction from the later Schoolmen, here gives Christ the honour, and still keeps Mary and the saints in the background. He recalls first of all his expositions in Arts. 1 and 3, to the effect that in the meritorious works of the justified that which free will does is only a meritum de congruo, and then proceeds: "Ex quo patet, quod merito condigni nullus potest mereri alteri primam gratiam nisi solus Christus, quia unusquisque nostrum movetur a deo per donum gratiæ, ut ipsa ad vitam æternam perveniat, et ideo meritum condigni ultra hanc motionem non se extendit. Sed anima Christi mota est a deo per gratiam, non solum ut ipse perveniret ad gloriam vitæ æternæ, sed etiam ut alios in eam adduceret, *in quantum est caput ecclesiæ.* . . . Sed merito congrui potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet dei voluntatem congruum est secundum amicitie proportionem, ut deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius." Thus the saints are certainly admitted by the back-door of meritum de congruo. Regarding the third point it is said: "Nullus potest sibi mereri reparationem post lapsum futurum, neque merito condigni, neque merito congrui"; for the former is excluded, because the grace that might be the ground of merit is lost by the Fall ("motione prioris gratiæ usque ad hæc [viz., the Fall or the mortal sin] non se extendente"); the latter becomes in still higher degree an impossibility through the impedimentum peccati.

(quilibet actus caritatis meretur absolute vitam æternam), it is now asked in Art. 8, whether man can merit the increase (augmentum) of grace or love, and this question is answered roundly in the affirmative; for "that to which the motion of grace extends falls under merito *condigni*, but the motion of any thing moving extends not only to the ultimate goal of the movement, but also to the whole progress in movement; but the goal of the movement of grace is eternal life, while the progress in this movement is according to the increase of love. Thus therefore the increase of grace falls under merito *condigni*" (illud cadit sub merito *condigni*, ad quod motio gratiæ se extendit, motio autem alicujus moventis non solum se extendit ad ultimum terminum motus, sed etiam ad totum progressum in motu; terminus autem motus gratiæ est vita æterna, progressus autem in hoc motu est secundum augmentum caritatis. Sic igitur augmentum gratiæ cadit sub merito *condigni*). On the other hand, the question whether man can also merit *perseverance* in grace is denied in the following article, and thus the ultimate worth of "merit" is cancelled, and a way of return sought for to pure Augustinianism.¹

In order to form a correct historic estimate of this grace doctrine of Thomas, we must keep in view, in addition to the interest of Christian piety by which he was really guided, and in addition to the practice of the Church, which for him was authoritative, that in the philosophy of religion he was determined by Augustine's doctrines of God and of predestination, and in ethics by Aristotle's doctrines of God and of virtue. Because both were certainties for him, and he therefore made it his business to unite the two, he framed that complicated system of doctrine in which the dexterous, often paradoxical, subtleties of Augustine, the believing sceptic, became as much fundamental tenets as the most direct and confident deliverances of his piety. These fundamental tenets are then placed in connection with the entirely contrasted thoughts of Aristotle, while with wearisome reiteration the definition of God as *primum movens* is made to

¹ "Perseverantia vitæ non cadit sub merito, quia dependet solum ex motione divina, quæ est principium omnis meriti, sed deus gratis perseverantiæ bonum largitur *cuiunque illud largitur.*"

serve as the bridge. How entirely dependent Thomas is upon Augustine is shown by the doctrine of predestination, which he has taken over in all its strictness;¹ how largely dependent he

¹ See Summa I., Q. 23: Predestination is the providence of God in relation to creaturæ rationales; He alone can give them the *ultimus finis*, *i.e.*, can "appoint their order." In virtue of His decree, God determines the *numerus electorum*, and in so far as it belongs to divine providence "*aliquos permittere a vita æterna deficere*," so also it belongs to it that God should reprobate some. "*Sicut enim prædestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam et inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpa*" (Art. 3), nay, *i.e.*, Thomas asserts with chilling sternness that the reprobatio is also a bonum: "*Deus omnes homines diligit et etiam omnes creaturas, in quantum omnibus vult aliquod bonum; non tamen quodcumque bonum vult omnibus. In quantum igitur quibusdam non vult hoc bonum, quod est vita æterna, dicitur eos habere odio vel reprobare.*" According to this, therefore, there is also a bonum which is no bonum (for the receiver), and so nothing but the divine will itself: *God loves these men in hell!* But on the other hand it is also said with Augustine: "*Aliter se habet reprobatio in causando quam prædestinatio. Nam prædestinatio est causa et ejus quod expectatur in futura vita a prædestinatis, scil. gloriæ, et ejus quod percipitur in præ-senti, scil. gratiæ; reprobatio vero non est causa ejus quod est in præ-senti, scil. culpæ, sed est causa derelictionis a deo (this has not its source in prescience); est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in futuro, scil. pœnæ æternæ. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio ejus, qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur.*" But how shall he not sin if God has forsaken him? What does it avail to add: "*reprobatio dei non subtrahit aliquid de potentia reprobati; unde cum dicitur quod reprobatur non potest gratiam adipisci, non est hoc intelligendum secundum impossibilitatem absolutam, sed secundum impossibilitatem conditionatam*"? It was not easy for Thomas to construe the doctrine of free will, since in the doctrine of God he had applied throughout the thought of the sole divine causality; and in the doctrine of the gubernatio (I., Q. 103) had shown that, just like the principium mundi, so also the finis mundi is aliquid extra mundum (Art. 2). But if the world has no independent end, it follows that the gubernatio must be conceived of as implying that by Him alone all things are moved, *i.e.*, brought to their goal; for they themselves cannot move forward to that, *quod est extrinsecum a toto universo*. But by distinguishing the *esse* and *operari*, as also the *primum movens* in things and the *movens ex se*, and finally the gubernatio *diversa* in quantum ad creaturas irracionales and in quantum ad creaturas *per se agentes*, Thomas still succeeds in maintaining free will, which indeed he necessarily requires also, in order to get merit; see the discussion of freedom of will, I., 83 (Art. 1: "*Homo est liberi arbitrii, alioquin frustra essent consilia, exhortationes, præcepta, prohibitiones, præmia et pœnæ. . . . Liberum arbitrium est causa sui motus, quia homo per liberum arbitrium seipsum movet ad agendum. Non tamen hoc est de necessitate libertatis, quod sit prima causa sui id quod liberum est, sicut nec ad hoc quod aliquid sit causa alterius, requiritur quod sit prima causa ejus. Deus igitur est prima causa movens et naturales causas et voluntarias. Et sicut naturalibus causis movendo eas non aufert, quin actus earum sint naturales, ita movendo causas voluntarias non aufert, quin actiones earum sint voluntariæ, sed potius hoc in eis facit; operatur in unoquoque secundum ejus proprietatem*"). In accordance with this it is constantly emphasised in the determin-

is upon Aristotle is shown both by his doctrine of God and above all by the *Pars Secunda Secundæ*, the special doctrine of morals, in which it is demonstrated that virtue consists in the right government of the appetencies and impulses by reason, and is then perfected supernaturally by the gifts of grace. Finally, in order to get a complete view of Thomas's doctrine of grace, we must add his doctrines of the constitution of man, of the primitive state, of the Fall, of original sin and of sin, as they are developed in Parts I, Q. 90-102, and II., I Q. 71-89. But we may refrain from presenting these here in fuller detail, partly because Thomas attaches himself closely to Augustine, partly because the chief points have already been specified in the discussion of his doctrine of grace.¹ Yet his doctrine of the consilia

ing paragraphs on justification that the process of grace realises itself with the *consent* of free will, which consent, however, is at the same time an effect of grace: when God infuses grace, He moves us according to our own proper nature, *i.e.*, in such a way that He moves the free will to the willing acceptance of the gift of grace. The same thing is said of the virtues; on the one hand they are likewise infused; but on the other hand God never acts *sine nobis*, but always only with the assent of our free will; for the rational creature is so constituted that in its being impelled by God towards the goal, it must always be impelled *consentiente voluntate*.

¹Let us adduce here only a few of the determining positions. As had been the case already with Augustine, the "primitive state" created a special difficulty for Thomas, inasmuch as on the one hand eternal life was to be regarded as a gift of grace, while on the other hand it was held as certain that it could only be acquired through merit. It necessarily followed from this that the view taken of the primitive state was indeterminate; it was not quite conceived of as mere *possibilitas boni* (in the sense of the highest goodness, *quod superexcedit naturam*), but neither was it quite thought of as *habitus boni*. So Thomas, introducing the idea that the *vita æterna* is a *bonum superexcedens naturam*, described the natural equipment of Adam as insufficient for the obtaining of this good, and accordingly assumed that in creation there was given to him over and above the natural equipment a special *gratia superaddita*, by the help of which his free will should acquire for itself the merit which fits for eternal life; see I., Q. 95, Art. 1: Adam received grace at once at creation (not only afterwards)—he was in *gratia conditus*—for only grace could secure for him the *rectitudo*, which consists in the subordination of the ratio to God, of the *inferiores virtutes* to the ratio, of the body to the soul. But this subordination was not "rationalis"; for otherwise it would have continued after the Fall; so it was *secundum supernaturale donum gratiæ*. Note also Art. 4: "*Homo etiam ante peccatum indigebat gratia ad vitam æternam consequendam, quæ est principalis necessitas gratiæ.*" But this view, still a religious one, had already many breaches made in it before Thomas' time, and these always increased in number; see below. A further result of this view was that Thomas was not able to identify the *justitia originalis* with the image of God, so far as this image is incapable of being lost, or

evangelica deserves still a special consideration. This doctrine forms the conclusion of his discussion of the doctrine of the new law. But on the other hand the doctrine of grace also culminates in the "evangelical counsels," so that in a very real sense these represent the summit of the whole course of thought. Thomas (II., 1 Q. 108, Art. 4) first of all gives the following definition: "This is the difference between counsel and precept, that precept introduces (importat) necessity, while counsel is made dependent on the *option* (in *optione* ponitur) of him to whom it is given, and so counsels are fittingly (convenienter) added to precepts in the new law, which is the law of liberty, but not in the old law, which was the law of servitude (servitutis)." Thereupon it is remarked that the "precepts of the new law" are necessary to (but also sufficient for) eternal life, "but there ought to be counsels regarding those things by which man can attain the appointed end better

say, to unite it with the innate end of human nature, but viewed it as a supernatural gift, which leads beyond the bonum naturale and the finis naturalis. The grounds for this view are easily discovered. They lie both in the purpose entertained that the coming into existence of merit shall be proved possible, and in the conceiving of merit as something supernatural; in short, in the regarding of asceticism as a state, or say opus, which is supernatural, meritorious, and which also conducts therefore to eternal life. If the supreme good cannot be so described that even the present life as an end is included in it, then nothing remains but to erect two stories, residence in the lower story simply serving the purpose of gathering merit for entering the higher. The sin which originated with Adam (inherited sin) is loss of the justitia originalis, and accordingly, as this latter alone effected the ordinatio partium, disorder, *i.e.*, rebellion of the lower parts against the higher. On the other hand, the principia naturæ humanæ continue unaffected by the inherited sin, which is both a habitus and a culpa, and even the natural capacity of ratio to know and to will the good is only weakened but not eradicated. The chief sentences are (II., 1, Q. 82-89): ". . . alio modo est habitus dispositio alicujus nature ex multis compositæ secundum quam bene se habet vel male ad aliud . . . hoc modo peccatum originale est habitus; est enim quædam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniæ, in qua consistebat ratio originalis justitiæ, sicut ægritudo corporalis . . . unde peccatum originale *languor nature* dicitur" (this view is partly aesthetic partly, pathological, 82, 1). "Peccatum originale materialiter quidem est concupiscentia, formaliter vero est defectus originalis justitiæ;" the former is original sin, because the "inordinatio virium animæ præcipue in hoc attenditur, quod inordinate convertuntur ad bonum commutabile, quæ quidem inordinatio communi nomine potest dici concupiscentia" (82, 3). "Peccatum originale non magis in uno quam in alio esse potest" (82, 4). "Anima est subjectum peccati originalis, non autem caro . . . cum anima possit esse subjectum culpe, caro autem de se non habeat quod sit subjectum culpæ, quidquid pervenit de corruptione primi peccati ad animam, habet rationem culpæ, quod autem pervenit ad carnem, non habet rationem culpæ, sed pænæ" (83, 1).

and more readily" (*consilia vero oportet esse de illis, per quæ melius et expeditius potest homo consequi finem prædictum*). Then it is explained that here on earth man is placed between the things of this world and spiritual benefits, and that entire devotion to the former is removed by the præcepta. Yet on the other hand man does not require to surrender the things of this world entirely in order to attain to the goal of eternal life (!), "but he attains more expeditiously by abandoning (*abdicando*) totally the good things of this world, and therefore the evangelical counsels are given regarding this." But the benefits of this world consist in the possession of outward goods, in sexual pleasures, and in the possession of honours, which relate to the lust of the eye, the lust of the flesh, and the pride of life. To relinquish these entirely, so far as it is possible—in this consists the evangelical counsels, and in the adoption of them consists "*omnis religio, quæ statum perfectionis profitetur*" (all religion which professes a state of perfection). The adoption of even one of these counsels has a corresponding worth, as, *e.g.*, when one gives alms to a poor man beyond what is obligatory, abstains from marriage for a long time for the sake of prayer, or does good to his enemies in excess of what is due, etc. The following of these counsels is a ground of merit in a still higher degree than the "*Peccatum originale per prius respicit voluntatem*" (83, 3). "*Cupiditas est radix omnium peccatorum*" (84, 1); but, on the other hand, it holds good: "*quoniam inordinate se homo ad temporalia convertens semper singularem quandam perfectionem et excellentiam tamquam finem desiderat, recte ex hac parte superbia, quæ inordinatus est propriæ excellentiæ appetitus, initium omnis peccati ponitur*" (84, 2). With regard to the consequences of sin: "*Principia naturæ (primum bonum naturæ) nec tolluntur nec diminuuntur per peccatum (empirico-psychological observation, to which, however, a certain worth also is given for the religious mode of apprehension), inclinatio ad virtutem a natura insita (secundum bonum naturale) diminuitur per peccatum (ethical observation, but important for religion), donum originalis justitiæ (tertium bonum naturæ) totaliter est ablatum*" (religious view, v. 85, 1). That sin can ever remove totally the *inclinatio* of the *ratio ad bonum* is described as unthinkable, since, according to Augustine, "*malum non est nisi in bono*" (85, 2). "*Omnes vires animæ remanent quodammodo destitutæ proprio ordine, quo naturaliter ordinantur ad virtutem, et ipsa destitutæ dicitur vulneratio naturæ (vulnus ignorantie, malitiæ, infirmitatis, concupiscentiæ)*" v. 85, 3). "*Mors et omnes defectus corporales consequentes sunt quædam pænæ originalis peccati, quamvis non sint intenti a peccanti*" (85, 5). Death is natural to man *secundum naturam universalem, non quidem a parte formæ, sed materiæ* (85, 6). Q. 86 treats de *macula peccati*; Q. 87 de *reatu pænæ*; P. 88 and 89 de *peccato veniali et mortali*.

following of the commands, so that here in a pre-eminent way it holds good, that God gives eternal life to man, not merely in grace, but also by virtue of His righteousness.¹

Thomas's doctrine of grace, when judged of from the standpoint of religion, presents two faces. On the one hand it looks back to Augustine,² on the other hand it looks forward to the dissolution which Augustinianism was to undergo in the fourteenth century. Whoever examines Thomism carefully, will find that its author makes an earnest endeavour, by means of a strictly religious mode of view, to assert the sole efficacy of divine grace; but on the other hand he will be compelled to note, that *at almost all decisive points the line of statement takes ultimately a different direction*, the reason being that the effect of grace itself is seen in a contemplated end that has a character partly hyperphysical, partly moral ("participation in the divine nature," and "love," conjoined by the thought that love merits eternal life).³ But as compared with what was presented by Halesius, Bonaventura and others, or, with what was taught at the time, Thomism was already a *religious reaction*; for those theologians yielded to a much more decided tendency to render

¹ See the voluminous exposition in S. II., 2 Q. 184-189, "de statu perfectionis" (bishops and monks), where in Q. 184, Art. 2, the triplex perfectio is described, and it is said of that which is possible here on earth, that it is not indeed attainable that one "in actu semper feratur in deum," but it is attainable that "ab affectu hominis excluditur non solum illud quod est caritati contrarium, sed etiam omne illud quod impedit ne affectus mentis totaliter dirigatur ad deum"; the whole idea of the consilia in particular of virginitas already in Pseudo-Cyprian (=Novatian) de bono pud. 7: "Virginitas quid aliud est quam future vitæ gloriosa meditatio?"

² It may also be traced back to Augustine that from Thomas, as has been already remarked, the specific nature of grace propter Christum and per Christum never receives clear expression in the whole doctrine of grace. The connection is simply now and again asserted, but is not distinctly demonstrated, *while the whole doctrine of grace is treated completely prior to the doctrine of the person of Christ*. Is that accidental? No, certainly not! It comes out here again, that in the West, because the Mystic-Cyrrillian theory was not maintained (Soterology and Soteriology as identical), there had come to be—in spite of Anselm—entire uncertainty as to how really Christology was to be dogmatically utilised. The only possible solution was not found, namely in adhering, without theoretic speculation, to the impression produced by the person who awakens spirit and life, certainty and blessedness.

³ Therefore *faith* also, and forgiveness of sins play, in spite of all that is said of them, an insignificant part. Faith is either fides informis, that is, *not yet faith*, or fides formata, that is, *no longer faith*. Faith as inward fiducia is a transitional stage.

the doctrine of grace less effectual by means of the doctrine of merit. By the appearing of Thomas, a development was *checked*, which, apart from him, would have asserted itself much more rapidly, but which in the end, nevertheless (from the middle of the fourteenth century), gained, through the victorious conflicts of the Scotists against the Thomists, the ascendancy in the Church, thereby calling forth a new reaction, which seems to have slowly gathered force from the close of the fourteenth century.¹

At all points, from the doctrines as to the nature of man and as to the primitive state, on to the doctrine of final perfection, there are apparent the dissolving tendencies of the later scholasticism, led by Halesius, Bonaventura and Scotus.

1. Halesius, who was also the first to introduce into dogmatics the expression "supernatural good" as having a technical sense, taught that the *justitia originalis* belongs to the nature of man itself as its completion, but that there is to be distinguished from this the *gratia gratum faciens*, which man already possessed in the primitive state as a supernatural good, though this was imparted to him, not *in* creation, but only *after* creation, *while Adam moreover earned it for himself meritoriously by good works ex congruo*.² So merit was to begin so early! Thomas knows nothing of this; but Bonaventura repeated this doctrine;³ it is also to be found in Albertus,⁴ and the Scotists adhered to it.⁵ The advantage which this doctrine offered, namely the possibility of reckoning to the perfection of human nature itself the *justitia originalis*, which was distinguished from the *gratia gratum faciens*, was greatly counterbalanced by the

¹ Just in the doctrines of grace and sin did the Scotists gain more and more the upper hand; as regards the other doctrines, their dialectico-sceptical investigations were crowned with a smaller measure of success.

² Schwane, l.c., p. 379 f., S. II., Q. 96, membr. 1: "Alii ponunt, ipsum (Adam) fuisse conditum solummodo in naturalibus, non in gratuitis gratum facientibus et hoc magis sustinendum est et magis est rationi consonum . . . Sic noluit deus gratiam dare nisi præambulo merito congrui per bonum usum nature."

³ See Schwane, p. 383.

⁴ See Schwane, p. 384.

⁵ L.c., p. 391. Werner, Scotus, p. 410 ff. Scotus himself says: "Adam conditus fuit sine omni peccato et sine gratia gratum faciente" (Report, Par. III. D. 13, Q. 2, n. 3).

injury involved in introducing the *meritum de congruo* into paradise itself, and thus placing merit from the beginning side by side with the "sole efficacy" of grace. The *meritum de congruo* is thus earlier than the *meritum de condigno*; for the latter could only be implanted, and was meant only to be implanted, in Adam after reception of the *gratia gratum faciens*, in order that he might merit for himself eternal life.

2. There already appear in Thomas (see above p. 297) approaches towards the breaking up of the Augustinian doctrines of sin and original sin, in so far as he no longer broadly grants the proposition, "*naturalia bona corrupta sunt*" (natural goodness is corrupt), in so far as he defines concupiscence, which is in itself not evil, as only "*languor et fomes*" (tinder), emphasizes the negative side of sin more strongly than Augustine, and assumes, on the ground of the ratio remaining, an abiding inclination towards goodness (*inclinatio ad bonum*). Yet he certainly taught a stricter doctrine than Anselm, who really only accentuated the negative side, and began to waver even in regard to its character as guilt.¹ To him Duns attached himself, in so far as he at bottom separated the question about concupiscence from the question about original sin; the former is for him no more the formal in the latter, but simply the material. Thus there remains for original sin merely the being deprived of the supernatural good, from which there then resulted certainly a disturbing effect upon the nature of man, while however nothing was really lost of the natural goodness.²

¹ De conceptu virg. 27: "Hoc peccatum, quod originale dico, aliud intellegere nequeo in infantibus nisi ipsam, factam per inobedientiam Adæ, justitiæ debitæ nuditatem, per quam omnes filii sunt iræ: quoniam et naturam accusat spontanea quam fecit in Adam justitiæ desertio, nec personas excusat recuperandi impotentia. Quam comitatur beatitudinis quoque nuditas, ut sicut sunt sine omni justitia, ita sint absque omni beatitudine." C. 22: "Peccatum Adæ ita in infantes descendere, ut sic puniri pro eo debeant ac si ipsi singuli illud fecissent personaliter sicut Adam, *non puto*." Hence also the idea of the limbus infantium now came always more prominently in view. But the rejection of the damnation of infants overturns the whole of Augustinianism.

² Comm. in Sent. II., Dist. 30 Q. 2: Original sin cannot be concupiscence; for the latter is (1) natural, (2) ". . . tum quia non est actualis, quia tunc illa concupiscentia esset actualis, non habitualis, *quia habitus derelictus in anima ex peccato mortali non est peccatum mortale*, manet enim talis habitus dimisso peccato per pœnitentiam; *nec etiam ignorantia est*, quia parvulus baptizatus ita ignorat sicut non

3. According to Thomas the magnitude of the first sin (and therefore also of inherited sin) is infinite, according to Scotus it is finite.

4. The Lombard had already taught that inherited sin is propagated simply through the flesh, and that the soul created baptizatus." One is now eager to hear what original sin then is, and the answer is received (D. 32, with an appeal to Anselm): "*carentia justitiæ debita.*" "Et si obicitur, quod aliqui sancti videntur dicere concupiscentiam esse peccatum originale, respondeo: concupiscentia potest accipi vel prout est actus vel habitus vel pronitas in appetitu sensitivo et nullum istorum est formaliter peccatum, quia non est peccatum in parte sensitiva secundum Anselmum. Vel potest accipi, prout est pronitas in appetitu rationali, *i.e.*, in voluntate ad concupiscendum delectabilia immoderate, quæ nata est condelectari appetitui sensitivo, cui conjungitur. *Et hoc modo concupiscentia est materiale peccati originalis, quia per carentiam justitiæ originalis, quæ erat sicut frenum cohibens ipsam ab immoderata delectatione, ipsa non positive, sed per privationem, fit prona ad concupiscendum immoderate delectabilia.*" Very loose also is Dun's conception of the first sin of man (of Adam) as distinguished from the sin of the angels; it did not arise from uncontrolled self-love, but had its root in uncontrolled love for the partner associated with him (Werner, p. 412); this uncontrolled conjugal love, however, was (1) not libidinous, for in the primitive state there was no bad libido; (2) the act to which Adam allowed himself to be led was not in its nature an immoral act, but only transgression of a command imposed for the purpose of testing. Adam accordingly sinned only *indirectly* against the command to love God, and at the same time transgressed the law of neighbourly love by overpassing, through his piancy, the proper limit. That is a comparatively slight fault, and is not equal in its gravity to the smallest violation of a *natural* rule of morality. Compare with this empiristic view Augustine's or Anselm's description of the greatness of the first sin! In order to see clearly the Pelagianism of Scotus, it must still be added that he disputed the doctrine of Thomas, that in the state of *justitia originalis* even the smallest venial sin was unthinkable. According to him only mortal sins were impossible; on the other hand, as man in his original state was just man, such sins were quite well possible as do not entail directly the loss of righteousness, but only occasion a *delay* in arriving at the final goal. How small according to this view, in spite of all assertions to the contrary, is the significance of the first sin and of original sin! In a disguised way Duns taught, as did Julian of Eklunum, that on the one hand there belongs to the natural will the quality that leads it to turn to the good without effort, while on the other hand, because it is the will of *man*, the possibility of "small sins" was given even in the original state! Occam draws here again the ultimate conclusions (v. Werner II., pp. 318 f.). As everything is arbitrary, he asserts on the one hand that we must not dispute that it is in God's power to remit to the sinner the guilt of sin, and bestow upon him saving grace without repentance and contrition; on the other hand, he denies all inner ideal necessary connection between moral guilt and penalty or expiation. "In this way," Werner justly remarks, "theological Scholasticism arrived at the opposite extreme to the idea expressed in the Anselmic theory of satisfaction of the *inviolability of a holy order*, whose absolute law of righteousness implies, that God can only remit the reatus pœnæ æternæ at the cost of a supreme atonement, the making of which transcends all the powers of a mere creature." But

for the latter is thereby defiled.¹ He held, therefore, as many others did, that inherited sin is inherited sin, in so far as it must propagate itself as a contagion (*contagium*) from Adam onwards. At the same time he also touches, on the other hand, on the thought of Augustine: "all these had been the one man, *i.e.*, were in him *materially*" (*omnes illi unus homo fuerant, i.e., in eo materialiter erant*), though the emphasis lies on the *materialiter*, so that the matter is to be understood, not mystically but realistically.² Now, although Thomas, with the view of giving expression to *guilt*, and at the same time placing the accent on the will (not merely on the flesh), affirmed, in opposition to this, an imputation on a mystical basis,³ yet the former idea continued to be the ruling one. Now, if in spite of this the guilt of the inherited sin is greatly reduced even in Thomas, it appears in

it was not from laxity that Occam destroyed the principles of Augustinianism; there met in combination in him rather two clearly recognisable factors, "the absolute lack of an ideal understanding of the world" (or let us say more correctly, his philosophic empiricism), and the greatest interest in determining the necessity of the saving grace of Christ simply from revelation itself. But—*vestigia terrent*; we can learn by studying the historical consequences of Occamism, that thinking humanity will not continue to be satisfied, if religion is set before it simply as revelation, and all links are severed which bind this revelation with an understanding of the world. From Occam it either goes back again to Thomas (Bradwardine and his spiritual descendants, cf. also the Platonism of the fifteenth century) or passes on to Socinianism. But should it not be possible that the *history* of religion should henceforward render to thoughtful reflection the service that has hitherto been rendered to it by Plato's and Augustine's and Thomas's understanding of the world? We shall not be able certainly to dispense with an absolute, but it will be grasped as an experience. The Nominalism that sought to deliver the Christian religion from the "science" that perverted it made a disastrous failure in carrying on this rightly chosen task, because it understood by religion subjection to an enormous mass of material, which, having arisen in history, admits of no isolation.

¹ Sent. II., Dist. 31, A. B.: "*caro sola ex traduce est.*" With Augustine the propagation of inherited sin is derived from the pleasure in the act of generation "*unde caro ipsa, quæ concipitur in vitiosa concupiscentia polluitur et corrumpitur: ex cujus contactu anima, cum infunditur, maculam trahit, qua polluitur et fit rea, i.e., vitium concupiscentiæ, quod est originale peccatum.*"

² So, I think, must Anselm also be understood, *de conc. virg.* 23.

³ Adam's sinful will (as the will of the *primus movens* in humanity) is the expression of the universal will; see II., I, Q. 81, Art. 1: "*Inordinatio quæ est in isto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex ejus origine derivantur.*" Hence inherited sin is not personal sin, but *peccatum naturæ*, the effect of which really is that its significance and gravity are greatly lessened.

Duns quite insignificant, notwithstanding all that is said regarding it. Nay, even the consequences of sin are presented by him in another light ; for, as inherited sin is simply nothing but loss of the supernatural gift (*donum*), it has not attacked the nature of man. This remains, even after the Fall, uninjured. Duns really carried on a polemic against the Thomist definition of inherited sin as *vulneratio naturæ* (wounding of nature).¹ Now, if we add to this, that by hair-splitting over defilement, corruption of nature, moral culpability, and penalty (*macula, corruptio naturæ, reatus culpæ, pœna*), the subject was quite brought down to the level of casuistry, we must come to be of the opinion that Scholasticism ultimately lost sight entirely of the Augustinian starting-point.

The *religious* view of sin, which even Augustine, indeed, had not strictly wrought out, entirely disappeared. Inherited sin was an external negative character, which is cancelled by the positive character of magical grace. Thus there remained only the wretched dregs of a view that had once been full of life, and had deeply stirred the soul.

5. It is obvious that free will also was now bound to have a higher value attached to it than the Augustinian-Thomist tradition admitted of. When once the fundamental thesis was abandoned, that moral goodness only exists in connection with God (by dependence on Him), when, consequently, the view again prevailed that man can make a parade before God with his independent works, the process of emptying Augustinianism of its contents (for the formulæ durst not be surrendered) necessarily became inevitable. Thomas himself, indeed, had begun, though at first timidly, to assign to free will a special range of action as apart from grace. His mode of procedure, in giving with the one hand and taking with the other, could not continue to be maintained. Bonaventura made predestination dependent on prescience, and limited God as cause in His relation to rational creatures. He is not entire cause (*tota causa*), but cause along with another contingent cause, *i.e.*, with free will (*causa cum alia causa contingente, scil. cum libero*

¹ In Sentent. II., Dist. 29. See at the same place the passage showing that the "voluntas in puris naturalibus habet justitiam originalem."

arbitrio). For Duns, and likewise for the leading theologians till the Council of Constance (and later), the will of the creature is the second great power next to God,¹ and to what they correctly lay down in the sphere of empirical psychology, *they also give a material and positive religious significance*. But in this way they separate themselves both from Augustine and from religion; for, as a dogmatic theologian, Augustine knows of free will only as a formal principal or as the cause of sin. It was the

¹ Bonaventura (in Sentent. I., Dist. 40, Art. 2, Q. 1) asks: "an prædestinatio inferat salutis necessitatem?" He answers: "prædestinatio non infert necessitatem saluti nec infert necessitatem libero arbitrio. *Quoniam prædestinatio non est causa salutis nisi includendo merita* (complete apostasy from Augustine), et ita salvando liberum arbitrium (that is ambiguous). Ad intelligentiam autem objectorum notandum, quod prædestinatio duo importat, et rationem præscientiæ et rationem causæ. In quantum dicit rationem causæ, *non necessario ponit effectum, quia non est causa per necessitatem*, sed per voluntatem, et iterum non est tota causa, sed cum alia causa contingente, scil. cum libero arbitrio. Et regula est, quod quotiescumque effectus pendet ex causa necessaria et variabili—a necessaria tamquam ab universali, a variabili tamquam a particulari—denominatur a variabili (in this way predestination is set aside), quia denominatio est a causa particulari, *et effectus, quia dependet a causa contingente, est contingens*. Et præter rationem causæ importat rationem præscientiæ et præscientia quidem totum includit in cognitione liberum arbitrium et ejus cooperationem et vertibilitatem et totum. Et præterea non est nisi veri, et etiam de vero contingente est infallibilis." Duns' doctrine of predestination is very complicated. It is dependent on his conception of God, which includes a determinism of arbitrariness (see Ritschl, l.c., I., pp. 58 f., 64). But just because the all-working God is always the contingently working will, the possibility of there being contingency in the world is disclosed. God embraces this contingency only with His prescience, and this prescience embraces the possible equally with the actual. The effect of this is, not only that predestination, as having unity, and as being inwardly motivated, is cancelled, but that God appears no longer as the absolute Being who wills and can do *one thing*, but as the relative Being who, in an unfathomable way, wills and can do everything possible. Over against such a conception of God the will of man can assert itself not only as *free*, but also as relatively good, and so predestination and the grace that is the alone cause vanish, or rather predestination remains, in so far as absolute contingency and absolute arbitrariness coincide; see in Sent. I., Dist. 40, in resol: "Prædestinatio bifariam accipitur. Primo et proprie pro actu divini voluntatis, quo rationalem creaturam ad æternam eligit vitam seu decernit ac determinat se daturum in presenti gratiam et gloriam in futuro. *Secundo accipitur fusius pro actu etiam intellectus divini, pro præcognitione vid. quam habet deus salutis electorum, que quidem præcognitio concomitatur et consequitur electionem*. Divina autem voluntas circa ipsas creaturas libere et contingenter se habet. Quocirca contingenter salvandos prædestinat, et posset eosdem non prædestinare. . . . Ex quo consequitur, quod is qui damnatus est damnari possit, quandoquidem ob ejus prædestinationem non est ejus voluntas in bonum confirmata, ut peccare nequeat."

hereditary fate of mediæval dogmatic, that through the mixing up of knowledge of the world with religion, a relatively more correct knowledge of the world became as dangerous, nay, still more dangerous to faith, than a knowledge that was false; for every piece of knowledge, in whatever way it was found, was at once introduced into the calculation as having religious worth. Against the Pelagianism, which, with ever decreasing hesitation, made use of Augustinianism simply as "an artistic form of speech," Bradwardine was the first to take again a strong stand, and after his time, the reaction never again disappeared, but slowly gathered strength in the fifteenth century, till the time of Wesel and Wessel, Cajetan and Contarini, till the time of Luther and the Decrees of Trent.¹

¹ From Bradwardine's preface to his treatise *de causa dei c. Pelagium* Münscher quotes the following passage: "In hac causa, quot, domine, hodie cum Pelagio pro libero arbitrio contra gratuitam gratiam tuam pugnant, et contra Paulum pugilem gratiæ spiritualem! Quot etiam hodie gratuitam gratiam tuam fastidiunt solumque liberum arbitrium ad salutem sufficere stomachantur! aut si gratia utantur, vel perfunctorie necessariam eam simulant ipsamque se jactant liberi sui arbitrii viribus promereri, ut sic saltem nequaquam gratuita, sed vendita videatur! Quot etiam, deus omnipotens, impotentes de sui potestate arbitrii præsumentes tuæ cooperationis auxilium in operationibus suis recusant, dicendo cum impiis 'recede a nobis' . . . Quin immo et voluntati suæ in contingenter futuris omnimodam tribuunt libertatem, in tantum ut etiam contra vocem propheticam a tua subjectione exemptionem prætentant . . . Et quot et quam innumerabiles eis favent! *Totus etenim pæne mundus post Pelagium abiit in errorem.* Exsurge igitur, domine, judica causam tuam et sustinentem te sustine, protege, roboram, consolare! Scis enim quod nusquam virtute mea, sed tua confisus, tantillus adgredior tantam causam." It is easily seen that here, as in the case of Gottschalk, the spirit and style of Augustine have exercised an influence. But Bradwardine and all the Reformers after him and previous to Luther simply went back upon Augustine (Wyclif, Huss, Wesel, Wessel, Staupitz, etc.). Just on that account this movement issued, not in the Evangelical Reformation, but in the Articles of Trent, or, in Bajus and Jansen; see Ritschl, *Rechtfertigung*, 1 vol., 2. ed., pp. 105-140. Ritschl begins these discussions with the not quite accurate words: "The effort will be fruitless to point out in any theologian of the Middle Ages the Reformation conception of the doctrine of justification, that is to say, the deliberate distinguishing between *justificatio* and *regeneratio*." Bradwardine's doctrine of free will has been treated in detail by Werner (III., p. 270 ff.). Conscious in the highest degree that it was a question about the *articulus stantis et cadentis ecclesiæ*, Bradwardine revived Augustine's doctrine of the incapacity of free will. Whether he really contracted the horizon of the Augustinian theology by tracing back its contents to the doctrines of the immutability of the divine thought and will as being its ultimate fundamental import (Werner, p. 282 ff.), is a question I leave undiscussed. Certainly to me also the determinism seems to come out more strongly in Bradwardine than in

6. Most distinct, and fraught with the gravest practical results, was the further development of Scholasticism as regards the doctrine of justification and the meritorious acquirement of eternal life. But how many germs tending to develop into the Pelagian deterioration of these doctrines had already been deposited in his system by Thomas himself? I will not repeat here what must have already come clearly to view above in the account of the Thomist doctrine of grace. The most manifest outcome of the further development in Scotism consists in these things: (1) that the decisive effect of "prevenient grace" became more and more a mere assertion, or, say, a form of speech—"co-operating grace" is the only intelligible grace—(2) that what, for Thomas, was "meritum ex congruo" became "meritum ex condigno," while the "merita ex congruo" were seen in impulses and acts which Thomas had not placed under the point of view of merit at all, and (3) that, as a parallel to the meritoriousness of attritio, the meritoriousness of "fides informis," of the mere obedience of faith, became more highly estimated. *In this point the corruption was perhaps greatest*; for the fides implicita, the mere self-surrender, now became in a sense a fundamental dogmatic principle.¹

According to Scotus, the man who does not possess the habit of grace (*habitus gratiæ*), who therefore is not in union with God, and hence can do nothing really meritorious to earn eternal life, must not be held as having no power to conform his conduct to the divine commands. He *can* still always fulfil these commands (otherwise God would require of him something impossible, and would be partial were He not to save all), and He must fulfil them; *for he must prepare himself for the first grace*. As it is a natural duty to love God beyond every Augustine; but Werner has an interest in separating Bradwardine as far as possible from Augustine, Anselm, and Thomas, because his doctrine led to Wyclif, and to that Augustinianism which Catholic theology no longer tolerates, though, as a fact, it is the genuine Augustinianism. Yet neither can these theologians, on the other hand, make use of the pure Nominalism of Occam. Hence Bradwardine is recognised, so far as he became "an involuntary witness (?) as it were, for the necessity of a restoration of the ecclesiastical Scholasticism on a Thomist basis."

¹ In germ the fides implicita was contained from the beginning in the Western system as a factor to which religious value was attributed. But only in Nominalism did this germ open into blossom.

thing, it is also a duty that can be fulfilled; accordingly, even the natural righteousness of heathen and sinners is not without connection with the supernatural virtues; indeed, it cannot at all be *proved* that a habit of love produced by supernatural grace is always necessary in order to love God above all; this rather is simply an ecclesiastical tenet. Before the Fall at least all this held good, and it can be proved, indeed, from Aristotle (!) that it holds good also after the Fall. It is with this in view that Scotus' doctrines of grace and of merit must be understood. In point of fact, merit always precedes grace with him, that is to say, first the merit *de congruo*, then the merit *de condigno*; ¹ the former entirely neutralises the thought of

¹ See Werner I., p. 418 ff. In Sentent. II., Dist. 28, Q. 1, Question: "How can God forgive guilt without giving grace? *videretur enim esse mutatio in deo, si non ponatur in ipso justificato. Potest illa opinio confirmari per hoc, quod illud præceptum 'Diliges dominum deum, etc.'* est primum, a quo tota lex pendet et prophetæ. Ad actum igitur hujus præcepti aliquando eliciendum (actus elicitus dilectionis, rationis) tenetur voluntas; ita quod non potest esse semper omissio actus hujus præcepti sine peccato mortali. Quodcumque autem voluntas actum hujus præcepti exsequitur, licet informis, et disponit se de congruo ad gratiam gratificantem sibi oblatam, vel resistet et peccabit mortaliter, vel consentiet et justificabitur." In the following way the Augustinian position that meritum is the munus dei is justified (Dist. 17, Q. 1 in Resol.): "in actu meritorio duo sunt consideranda. Primum illud quod præcedit rationem meritorii, in quo includitur substantia et intentio actus ac rectitudo moralis. Secundum est ratio meritorii, quod est esse acceptum a divina voluntate, aut acceptabile, sive dignum acceptari ad præmium æternum. Quantum ad primum, potentia est causa prima et principalis, et habitus causa secunda, cum potentia utatur habitu, non e converso; alias habens semel gratiam nunquam posset peccare, cum causa secunda semper sequatur motionem causæ primæ, nec possit movere ad oppositum illius, ad quod causa prima inclinat. *Sed accipiendo actum in quantum est meritorius talis conditio ei convenit principaliter ab habitu et minus principaliter a voluntate.* Magis siquidem actus acceptatur ut dignus præmio, quia est elicitus a caritate, quam quia est a voluntate libere elicitus, *quantvis utrumque necessario requiratur . . . Actus meritorius est in potestate hominis* supposita generali influenza, si habuerit liberi arbitrii usum et gratiam, *sed completio in ratione meriti non est in potestate hominis nisi dispositive*, sic tamen dispositive quod ex dispositione divina nobis revelata"; observe here the yes and no which comes out in these distinctions. Consequently Bradwardine was right in fixing down the following errors in the reigning Scholasticism: (1) While denying that the meritum is causa principalis doni gratiæ, it asserts that it is causa sine qua non; (2) while denying that man can of himself merit saving grace, it asserts that he can prepare himself for it in a way required of him, and that God then gives His grace, because even in naturalibus the forma is at once given to the materia disposita; (3) while denying that man can, strictly speaking, initiate the saving process, it asserts that he consents

prevenient grace, the latter cancels the decisive significance of co-operating grace. Everywhere in words, by means of extremely forced distinctions, Augustinianism is defended, but in reality it is discarded. The position that was not disputed even by Thomas and Augustine, that we are not justified unwillingly (*inviti*), receives from Nominalism a Pelagian interpretation, and the other position, that eternal life is the reward for the merits one acquires on the basis of infused grace, is so understood that the accent falls on the will, and not on the merit of Christ. The divine factor really appears only in the "acceptance" (*acceptatio*), which, as it dominates the whole relation between God and man and is arbitrary, does not allow merits in the strictest (necessary) sense to be spoken of. *The Nominalist doctrine is not simple moralism, only in so far as the doctrine of God does not admit in any case of a strict moralism.* This comes out most plainly in Occam, who, indeed, taken altogether, presents the paradoxical spectacle of a strongly pronounced religious nature finding refuge simply in the arbitrary will of God. It is reliance on this arbitrary will alone that frees him from Nihilism, and the same applies to the greatest theologians of the period of the Reform Councils, till Nicolas of Cusa brought about a change. Faith, in order to maintain itself, found no other means of deliverance from the intruding floods of world-knowledge than the plank of the divine arbitrariness, to which it clung with intense eagerness. These theologians were still no moralists—they merely appear such to

and follows *ex propriis viribus*; (4) it asserts that man merits divine grace *ex congruo* (c. Pelag. 39), "et quia iste error est famosior ceteris his diebus, et nimis multi per ipsum in Pelagianum precipitium dilabuntur, necessarium videtur ipsum diligentiori examine perscrutari." The situation at the beginning of the sixteenth century is excellently described by Ritschl thus (I., p. 138): "The state of things in respect of public doctrine which the Reformation found existing was not apprehended and represented by the two sides with historical precision and justice. The theological opponents of the Reformation, who were exclusively Realists, entirely ignore the fact, that for a century and a half the Nominalist School had maintained the Pelagian doctrine with regard to *merita de congruo*, and had over-rated the *merita de condigno* as compared with the merit of Christ, that as a School they had won equal public rights with the Realists, and even in respect of science and practice had exercised a far-reaching influence on the latter. The Reformers on the other hand directed their reproaches and charges of Pelagianism, which should have applied only to the Nominalist tradition, against Scholasticism in general."

us ;—it was only the Socinians who became that. “ According to Occam the necessity of supernatural habits (*habitus*) for the obtaining of eternal life cannot be proved on grounds of reason. What alone could support the proof would be, that the acts of faith, love, and hope corresponding to these habits are not possible without their supernatural habits ; this, however, cannot be proved. A heathen living among Christians can come to hold the articles of the Christian faith as true, on grounds of purely natural conviction ; a philosophically trained heathen can live according to the conviction, acquired in a natural way, that God, who is more excellent than all else, must be loved above all else. The acts of faith, hope, and love performed by such men originate, not from infused, but from acquired habits, while these latter can exist even among Christians, and really do exist where there is a certain height of moral and intellectual development. The necessity of supernatural habits is established solely by the authority of traditional Church doctrine. Thus then as regards the necessity of supernatural habits, we see Occam arriving at the most extreme opposition to the necessity of supernatural habits that is possible within the limits of Church faith.” (? !) So Werner.¹ That here there is still always a keeping within the limits of ecclesiastical faith is an instructive assertion of the modern Catholic theologian. The truth is, that the displacement of “ merits ” is here carried so far, that the distinction between *merita ex congruo* and *merita ex condigno* is entirely neutralised ; man can acquire for himself in the state of nature *merita de condigno* ; but God has *willed*, nevertheless, the necessity of a supernatural *habitus* and has appointed the corresponding institutions.² Now although many theologians, such as Occam himself, might feel their religious conscience quieted by the reflection that God’s arbitrary will is for us His mercy, yet the only general effect possible from this kind of theology—especially when we recall the *attritio* and the

¹ II., p. 339 f.

² The Catholic precautionary position lies simply in this, that God need give the *vita æterna* to no one at all, but that that life is in every case an arbitrary gift, the source of which is an ordained arrangement. This precautionary position, however, has nothing to do with the question about sin and guilt, but originates in the general doctrine of God.

indulgences, was that there should be recognised in good works the instrumental causes (*causæ instrumentales*) for the reception of eternal life, that these good works, moreover, should be judged to be meritorious even in their minimised form, and that, finally, self-subjection to the revelation taught by the Church should be held to be a sufficient good motive (*bonus motus*), which is so completed by the Sacraments that it imparts worthiness. In this way Nominalism was understood even by the earnest Augustinians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. They saw in it a denial of the grace of God in Christ, and they did not let themselves be led astray from this judgment by the most acute distinctions of the Nominalists: "In vain is much said in the way of repudiation; what the other hears in everything is only a No."

Perhaps the plainest evidence of the decline of an inwardly grounded doctrine of salvation and of the growing attachment of value to creaturely goodness in the last centuries of the Middle Ages, is *the doctrine of Mary*, as embracing both the doctrine of her immaculate conception and the doctrine of her co-operation in the work of redemption.¹

1. We have seen above (Vol. V., p. 235) that even Augustine had doubts as to whether Mary was subject to the general law of sin, and Paschasius Radbertus already knows that Mary was sanctified in the womb. Anselm, certainly, who on this point was more Augustinian than Augustine, had distinctly rejected the immaculate conception (*Cur deus homo* II. 16); but a few years after his death we meet with a *festival* in Lyons (1140) in honour of the immaculate conception of Mary, which proves how

¹ The Pelagian motives underlying the doctrine of Mary are pretty much concealed in Scholasticism, but they are clearly apparent on closer inspection. The treatment, moreover, of the doctrine of the human soul of Christ by Scotus and the Scotists is also a beautiful demonstration of their Pelagianism, but the description here of this complicated line of doctrinal development would take us too far; see Werner I., p. 427 ff.; II., p. 330 ff. What alone reconciles us in the mariology is the observing that pious faith allows itself utterances about the relationship of Mary to God and Christ which it does not venture to make about its own relationship. In this sense—though it appears paradoxical—there is much that is *evangelical* in the doctrine of Mary. It would be an interesting task to prove this from the doctrine of Mary as taught by the Schoolmen individually.

widely current the superstition had already become in the lower strata of the Church.¹

Bernard (ep. 174 ad canonicos Lugd.) spoke against the new festival, but used feeble weapons in opposing the idea that was expressed in it: that Mary was already sanctified in the womb, and continued also to be protected against all sin; but that her conception was not sinless, otherwise that of her parents must also have been so (*i.e.*, if in this way the proof is to be got of the sinless birth of Christ); that the sinless conception was a prerogative of Christ. But if general opinion already held as certain what Bernard had laid down as to the sinlessness of Mary,² and if, besides this, the act of birth was surrounded with the halo of the miraculous, how could the logic in these fancies be hindered from pressing on to the ultimate extreme? The Pre-Scotist Schoolmen still denied, it is true, the immaculate conception (even Bonaventura); but if Thomas adheres to sanctification in the womb, and accordingly assumes, immediately after the conception, a special influence of grace upon Mary, why shall she not be declared exempt from original sin itself? Thomas answers, because Christ is the redeemer of all men; but that he would no longer be if Mary had remained free from original sin (S. III., Q. 27). Still—everything is possible, of course, for Scholasticism—why can it not be assumed that Christ's death had a reflex power for Mary? Then, again, original sin is a mere *privatio*, is it not? Why cannot God,

¹The history of the worship of Mary is throughout a history in which the superstitious religion of the congregations and the monks worked upwards from its dark foundations, and determined theology, which reluctantly submitted; but, on closer view, this is seen to hold good of almost all specifically Western Catholic practices and doctrines. The *παράδοσις ἀγραφος*, the tradition, which is now claimed as the papal, that has existed *semper, ubique et apud omnes*, is *the common superstition, which everywhere and always expressed itself in analogous forms*. In this sense the Catholic position cannot be disputed, that the Romish Church is the Church of stable, and yet at the same time living, tradition. This tradition is stable, because the lower religious instincts, which are compounded of fear and sensuousness, are stable; it is living, because theology by its devices *gradually* legitimised these instincts. This does not of course imply the denial, that apart from this there was another and higher content in the Catholic tradition. For the literature on the worship of Mary see Vol. IV., p. 314, and Reusch, *Theol. Lit. Ztg.* 1887, No. 7.

²A monk relates that Bernard, who appeared to him in a dream, regretted and retracted his doubts about the immaculate conception (see Werner II., p. 349, f.)

who can do everything, fill Mary from the beginning with grace? And is this being filled with grace not necessary if she is afterwards to act, not merely a passive, but an active part in the work of redemption (see sub. 2)? So Scotus then held it as "probable" that Mary was conceived without sin, and therefore never possessed the *concupiscentia carnis* (in Sent. III., Dist. 3., Q. 1). From that time the Franciscans strenuously maintained this view against the Dominicans (Thomists). The "reflex power of redemption" was the fig-leaf to cover the apostasy from Christ, and—to adopt the artistic form of speech—"her preservation from contracting original sin was due to its being fitting that the Mediator, Christ, *should prove Himself in the most perfect way to be Mediator* by means of some human creature that was above all others adapted for this (that is, *meritum de congruo* on Mary's part, seen *ex præscientia* [in the exercise of prescience]). The most perfect kind of mediation is that by which the injured is anticipated in such a way that he never at all begins to be angry about the injury done to him, *and therefore lets forgiveness drop as superfluous.*"¹

This proof is extraordinarily instructive, for it contains implicitly the admission that Christ is not the perfect Redeemer of all men, but that He only establishes for them the *possibility* of redemption. That is correctly thought from a Catholic point of view; but it is not usually plainly expressed in that quarter—nay, for good reasons there is a very grave reluctance to express it. Thomists and Scotists rivalled each other in glorifying Mary; but the former magnified in her the power and splendour of the grace which cleanses and purifies, the latter magnified the grace itself which originally (*ab origine*) imparts innocence. But if grace is able to do that, why does it not do it always? It seems, then, as if it were not really the glorifying of grace that is aimed at. Certainly not. "Only with the existence of a perfect innocence wrought by redeeming grace is a complete representation afforded of *all orders of rank in human beatification*. The highest stage is represented by the blessedness of the soul of Christ, which was absolutely blessed even on earth without foregoing merit; then follows the holy virgin, *whose beatifying merit*

¹ III. Dist. 3., Q. 1., n. 4 sq. Werner I., p. 460.

was her perfect innocence wrought by the grace of redemption ; in the third rank stand those whose souls were never stained by actual sins ; lastly come those who, from being great sinners, have become saints."¹

In this graduated choir it is manifestly not grace that is of effect, but merit. Here again there was a connecting of the idea of *consilia evangelica* with salvation. As is well known, the great controversy about the immaculate conception was not fought out in the Middle Ages. But the University of Paris condemned the rejection of the new doctrine (1387) ; at Bâsle the " Reform Council " gave its voice for it (36. Sess. 1439), and Sixtus IV. (Extravag. III., 12, 1) prepared the way for its adoption as dogma by forbidding, under the penalty of excommunication, the pronouncing it heresy, though at the same time he declared to the world that the apostolic chair had not yet decided, *i.e.*, could not yet overlook the opposition of the Dominicans at the time. Not without ground these latter could point out that they themselves encouraged the deepest conceivable veneration of Mary, for their great teacher had taught that there should be paid to the holy virgin, not, indeed, *latreia* as to God, nor yet *doubleia*, as to the saints,² but *hyperdoubleia*.³

2. From as early as the time of Irenæus occasion was furnished, through the fatal parallel drawn between Eve and Mary, for attributing to Mary a certain share in the work of redemption ; from the idea of the graded hierarchy of angels and saints in

¹ III. Dist. 3, Q. 1, n. 7, 12. Werner I., p. 462. On the attitude of the later Scotists, *l.c.* II., p. 347 f. Two sanctifications of Mary were assumed, the first at the moment of her being conceived (extinction of original sin, *i.e.*, of the *fomes peccati*), the second at the moment of her conceiving (*impossibilitas peccandi*). Occam adopted this double sanctification also, but made less of its effects, because he did not rate very highly the *peccatum originis* itself.

² Special proofs of the worship of saints and relics are not necessary, as Scholasticism added nothing of importance to the practice and theory that prevailed even from early times. The doctrine of the saints was attached in the closest way to the doctrine of the *consilia*. The intercession of the saints was proved from the idea of the connection of the earthly Church with the heavenly; on their *merita*, see the doctrine of indulgences. Thomas was here also the ruling authority as a teacher, and by his doctrine of the merits of the saints he prepared the way for the Pelagianism of the Scotists.

³ Thomas, S. III., Q. 25, Art. 5. Thomas claimed *latreia* for the cross and the image of Christ, III., Q. 25, Arts. 3 and 4; see also II., I Q. 103, Art. 4.

heaven the impulse was received to worship Mary along with Christ as the Queen of Heaven ("in the midst between the Son, who is holiest of the holy, and all the saints, royal virgin, gate of heaven, way, the ladder from sins" [*media inter filium, qui est sanctus sanctorum, et alios sanctos, virgo regia, janua cœli, via, peccatorum scala*]); the most extravagant veneration even on the part of Bernard in the Sermones II. in adv. dom.: "let us also strive to ascend *by her* to Him who *by her* descended to us; by her to come into the grace of Him who by her came into our misery; by thee may we have access to the Son, O blessed *contriver* of grace, author of life, mother of salvation, that through thee He may receive us, who through thee was given to us. Thy innocence excuses before Him the guilt of our corruption . . . let thy abundant love cover the magnitude of our sins, and thy glorious fecundity confer on us fecundity of merits; our lady, our *mediatrix*, our advocate, reconcile us to thy Son, commend us to thy Son, represent us before thy Son! Grant, O blessed one, by the grace which thou hast found . . . that He who through thy mediation deigned to partake of our infirmity and misery, may, through thy intercession also, make us partakers of His glory and blessedness" [*studeamus et nos ad ipsum per eam ascendere, qui per ipsam ad nos descendit; per eam venire in gratiam ipsius, qui per eam in nostram miseriam venit; per te accessum habeamus ad filium, O benedicta inventrix gratiæ, genetrix vitæ, mater salutis, ut per te nos suscipiat, qui per te datus est nobis. Excusat apud ipsum integritas tua culpam nostræ corruptionis . . . copiosa caritas tua nostrorum cooperiat magnitudinem peccatorum, et fœcunditas gloriosa fœcunditatem nobis conferat meritorum; domina nostra, mediatrix nostra, advocata nostra, tuo filio nos reconcilia, tuo filio nos commenda, tuo filio nos repræsenta! fac, O benedicta, per gratiam quam invenisti . . . ut qui te mediante fieri dignatus est particeps infirmitatis et miseriæ nostræ, te quoque intercedente participes faciat nos gloriæ et beatitudinis suæ¹]). From here it was only*

¹ Bernard is also fond of variations on the thought that the Son will hear the mother, the Father the Son. "Hæc peccatorum scala, hæc mea maxima fiducia est, hæc tota ratio spei meæ." The Son cannot refuse to hear the mother; for the "invenisti

a step to the doctrine of Scotus and the Scotists, that Mary cooperated, not only passively, but *actively*, in the incarnation.

gratiam apud deum" is still in force. These thoughts passed over in succum et sanguinem of Catholicism ; they were disseminated especially by the Franciscans.

¹On the proof, see Werner I., pp. 433 f., 435 ff.; II. 352 ff. In Duns the idea coheres with his general zoological ideas ; yet for him it has also independent significance.



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