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HISTORY OF GREECE;

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE CLOSE OF THE GENERATION
CONTEMPORARY WITH ALEXANDER THE GREAT.

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HISTORY OF GREECE.

PART II.

CONTINUATION OF HISTORICAL GREECE.

CHAPTER XLII.

BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE.—FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.

THOUGH the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos; in the latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of Samos under Persian protection.¹ Early in the spring they were reassembled—to the number of 400 sail, but without the Phœnicians—at the naval station of Samos, intending however only to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.²

The Persian fleet, after retiring from Greece, winters at Kymê, and collects in the spring at Samos.

For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify such belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to the number of 110 ships, under the Spartan

¹ Herodot. viii. 85.

² Herodot. viii. 130; Diodor. xi. 27.

king Leotychildês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward: nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys, despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should appear, prevail upon Leotychildês to hazard any aggressive enterprise. Ionia and the eastern waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared especially to the maritime inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of Heraklês:¹ not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared, fifty-two years afterwards, to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas, when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the Athenian empire.

Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been anticipated. Alexander king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,² and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty co-operation with Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phokians, whose fidelity to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the Isthmus of Pallênê, as well as the neighbouring towns in the long

¹ Herodot. viii. 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii. 29-32.

Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in inducing Leotichidês to proceed even as far as Delos—τό γὰρ προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινόν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὐτε τῶν χώρων εἶδσι ἐμπείρουσι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλεῖα εἶδουσε εἶναι τῆν δὲ Σάμου ἐπιστάτο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.

This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously interpreted by some of the commentators as if it were a measure of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or of those whom he is describing. In my judgement,

no inferences of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an enemy's country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and where they could not calculate the risk beforehand—rather than any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea, we might say—"A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as distant as a voyage to the Indies,"—by which we should merely affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their geographical knowledge.

² Herodot. ix. 1, 2, 67: viii. 136.

tongue of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighbouring town of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on the point of following their example. The Persian general Artabazus, on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks under Kritobulus of Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic. But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa, the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallænæan peninsula to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius in Thessaly.¹

General adherence of the medising Greeks to Mardonius —revolt of Potidæa— which is besieged in vain by Artabazus.

Mardonius, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign, thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially those within the limits of Bœotia and Phokis. He sent a Karian named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language, to consult Trophônus at Lebadeia, Amphiaras and the Ismenian Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at Mount Ptôon near Akraphiæ, and Apollo at the Phokian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon whom he was now very much dependent. But neither the questions put, nor the answers given, were made public. The only remarkable fact which Herodotus had heard, was, that the priests of the Ptôian Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.² It appears however that at this period, when

Mardonius, after wintering in Thessaly, resumes operations in the spring in Bœotia. He consults the Bœotian oracles.

¹ Herodot. viii. 128, 129.

² Herodot. viii. 134, 135; Pausanias, ix. 24, 3

Mardonius was seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions, that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.¹ The way was thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens—

Mardonius sends Alexander of Macedon to Athens, to offer the most honourable terms of peace. Alexander king of Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers—to promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the active future friendship of the Great King—and to hold out to the Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.² The Macedonian

prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the welfare of the Athenians, recommending them as a sincere friend to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honourable: especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies, without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was protected by its Isthmus.³

This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians re-established wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes from Thermopylæ the year be-

¹ Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ, . . . ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λογίων, ὡς σφραγισθέν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, &c.

Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the *medising* party in Greece at this particular moment: there is no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted—no other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus, by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamt of. The Lacedæmonians are indeed said

here “to call to mind the prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old collection like that of Bakis or Musaus. And Herodotus doubtless himself believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”

² Herodot. ix. 7.

³ Herodot. viii. 142.

fore, might perhaps have gone far to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared, there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would ensure to the Persian general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing a winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances, even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war, of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover the Athenians were at this time suffering privations of the severest character; for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer together with the seed of the past autumn.¹ The prudential view of the case being thus favourable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening to him, as well as to tender succour during the existing poverty of the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: "Cast not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater than ours: we too know *that*, as well as thou: but we nevertheless love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can. Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him. Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods and heroes

Temptation to Athens to accept this offer—fear of the Lacedæmonians that she would accept it—Lacedæmonian envoys sent to Athens to prevent it.

¹ Herodot. viii. 142. Πιεζουμένοιτι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα (say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν ἐστὲρρήθητε δι᾽ ὧν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοδομήσθε χρόνον ἤδη πώλων. Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius, the loss of *two crops* must include

the seed of the preceding autumn: and the advice of Themistoklēs to his countrymen—καὶ τις οἰκίη τε ἀναπλοσάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐγέτω (viii. 109)—must have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.

to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses and statues he has burnt. Come thou not to us again with similar propositions, nor persuade us even in the spirit of good-will, into unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands."¹

To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive tenor; protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they reminded them that Mardonius, when apprised that his propositions were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to assist in the defence of Attica.² The Spartan envoys, promising fulfilment of this request,³ and satisfied to have ascertained the sentiments of Athens, departed.

Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering combined with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of their descendants and the frequent theme of applause by their orators.⁴ But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous

Resolute reply of the Athenians, and determination to carry on the war, in spite of great present suffering.

Selfish indifference displayed by Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens.

¹ Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as having been "on the point of stoning Alexander"—μικροῦ δεῖν κατέλειπον (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 186)—one among many specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with past history.

² Herodot. viii. 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 10. According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidēs who proposed and prepared the reply

to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavourably with the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.

³ Herodot. ix. 7. συνέθεντο δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσῃ ἀντιώσασθαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίαν, &c.

Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some erroneous motives (xi. 28).

⁴ Herodot. ix. 7. ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ

neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside of their own isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing and on which they had relied for protection against the land-force of Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired: but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was anticipated. It was however still unfinished at the time of the embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm lest the Athenians should accept terms proposed. That danger being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate state of defence and the battlements along the summit were in course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark, they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in Bœotia and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius. Indeed their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus, was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.¹ Besides these two reasons—indifference and unfavourable omens—which restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third: they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia, and it was their paramount object (says the historian)² to fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the

ἔτι κερδαλειώτερον ἔστι ἁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμέειν, &c.

The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratēs, Or. iv. Panegyric. c. 27, p. 61.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10.

² Herodot. ix. 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Ἰσθαζὸν τε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον καὶ σφι ἦν Ἵακινθια· περὶ πλείστου δ' ἤγγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχος σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἴσθμῳ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλλεαις ἐλάμβανε.

Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen

Olympia and the Karneia in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.

Meanwhile Mardonius, informed of the unfavourable reception which his proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia,

The Spartans having fortified the Isthmus, leave Attica undefended: Mardonius occupies Athens a second time.

the Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavoured to dissuade him from farther military operations against the united force of his enemies—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded not their advice. About ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he entered the

country without resistance, and again established the Persian head quarters in Athens (May or June—479 B.C.).¹

Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed

Second migration of the Athenians to Salamis—their bitter disappointment and anger against Sparta for deserting them.

to Salamis, under feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise that a Peloponnesian army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier; at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they found themselves compelled to transport their families across to Salamis.² The migration was far less terrible than that of the preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them. But it was more gratuitous, and might

have been obviated had the Spartans executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of Plataea two months earlier than it actually was fought.

Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to repeat the offers made

to be employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 5, 11).

¹ Diodor. xi. 28; Herodot. ix. 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες παραίχον

στρατιγὴν καὶ συνεπέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περὲν ἔμειζον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτης οἰκημένων, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 4.

through Alexander of Macedon. He thought that they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a Hellenistic Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal, not less resolute than what had been returned to Alexander of Macedon, and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an exception to this unanimity, venturing to recommend acceptance of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to death; while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed, went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor; unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their feelings.¹ Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was dismissed without injury.

Second offer of Mardonius to the Athenians—again refused—intense resolution which they display.

While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their stedfast attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent envoys, conjointly with Megara and Plataea, to remonstrate with the Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in Attica; not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted, it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their will, to make terms with the enemy.

Remonstrance sent by the Athenians to Sparta—ungenerous slackness of the Spartans.

¹ Herodot. ix. 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas (see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors recount the same incident as having happened to a person named Kyrtilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296. c. 59; and Cicero de Officiis, iii. 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the Athenians is noway probable: and if we are to choose

between the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrtilus might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover Xerxes held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation: while the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded citizen deserving of attention.

So careless, however, were the Spartan Ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of the Isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with a negative answer—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the Isthmus—had not a Tegean named Chileos, whom they much esteemed and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus laid the peninsula open by sea.

The strong opinion of this respected Tegean, proved to the Ephors that their selfish policy would not be seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies; and brought to their attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; so that they despatched forthwith in the night 5000 Spartan citizens to the Isthmus—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy, came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take measures for her own security and separate pacification—the Ephors affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march, and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.¹ Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and reluctant,

Isokratēs (Or. iv. Panegyric. s. 184. e. 42) states that the Athenians condemned many persons to death for *medism* (in allusion doubtless to Themistoklēs as one), but he adds—"even now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable negotiation with the Persians"—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἄρας ποιῶνται, εἴτις ἐπιχρηροῦέεται Πέρσαισι τῶν πολιτῶν. This must have been an ancient custom, continued after it had ceased to be pertinent or appropriate.

¹ Herodot. ix. 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidēs, c. 10. Plutarch had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidēs, in which Kimon, Xanthippus, and Myrōnidēs, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy, seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.

Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and march-

for foregoing desertion and breach of promise—the Ephors may probably have thought that the mystery of the night march, and the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys, in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of the latter; who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at all approaching to 5000 being put on foreign service at the same time. But this was not all: 5000 Lacedæmonian Pericæki, each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed the example, and a large army was thus collected under the Spartan Pausanias.

Large Spartan force collected under Pausanias at the Isthmus.

It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans beyond their own borders.¹ If they ever made such a promise, the suddenness of the march, as well as the greatness of the force, prevented them from fulfilling it, and may perhaps have been so intended by the Ephors, under the apprehension that resistance might possibly be offered by the Argeians. At any rate, the latter were forced to content themselves with apprising Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest courier. It determined that general to evacuate

Mardonius, after ravaging Attica, retires into Bœotia.

ed off in one night, no preparations having been made beforehand.

Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi. p. 366) suspects the correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all, the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all depended on the five Ephors:

there was no public discussion or criticism. Now the conduct of these Ephors is consistent and intelligible—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think (with Dr. Thirlwall) that the manner of communication ultimately adopted is of the nature of a jest.

¹ Herodot. ix. 12.

Attica, and to carry on the war in Bœotia—a country in every way more favourable to him. He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a body of 1000 Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the protection of Megara,¹ he withdrew all his army into Bœotia, not taking either the straight road to Plataea, through Eleutheræ, or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the north-easterly direction to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself after a route longer but easier, in Bœotia on the plain of the Asôpus; along which river he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of Thebes seemingly near to that of Plataea.² He then took up a position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus: his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiaë, and his right in the territory of Plataea: and he employed his army in constructing a fortified camp³ of ten furlongs square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the Theban territory.

¹ There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis (Pausan. i. 40, 2).

² Herodot. ix. 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendale or Sphendaleis seems not certainly known (Ross, Ueber die Deme von Attika, p. 138): but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that it stood "near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass leading from Dekelia through the ridges of Parnes into the extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa." (Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii. sect. iv. p. 123.)

Mr. Finlay (Oropus and Diakria, p. 38) says that "Malakasa is the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry could conveniently halt."

It appears that the Bœotians from the neighbourhood of the Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by the Athenians.

The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to take place most frequently in this south-eastern region of Bœotia,—Tanagra, Cenophyta, Delium, &c.

³ Herodot. ix. 15.

Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain favourable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the fortified city of Thebes¹ in his rear,—and a considerable stock of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the cause or confident of success:² even the native Persians had been disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were full of melancholy auguries.

Discouragement in the army of Mardonius generally: Thersander of Orchomenus at the banquet: jealousies between Mardonius and Artabazus the second in command—zeal and eagerness of the Thebans.

A splendid banquet to which the Theban leader Attagînus invited Mardonius along with fifty Persian and fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by one of the guests present—an Orchomenian citizen of note named Thersander. The banquet being so arranged that each couch was occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted in Greek by his Persian neighbour, who inquired to what city he belonged; and upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,³ continued thus: “Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup, I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions; the rather in order that thou mayest be thyself forewarned so as to take the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river? Yet a little while, and out of all these, thou shalt behold but few surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment, spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and replied—“Surely thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to his confidential advisers:” but the Persian rejoined—

¹ The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him (Thucyd. i. 90).

² Herodot. ix. 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.

³ Herodot. ix. 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes as a Theban—Ἠέρσταν τὴ καὶ Θηβαιοῦ ἐν κλιῖνι ἐλάσσονα—a proof of the intimate connexion between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time, which

is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i. 51 (compare the Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the Thebau family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be found to grow up in later times between these two towns.

"My friend, man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity. And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings—to be full of knowledge and at the same time to have no power over any result."¹—"This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned the fact to several persons about him even before the battle of Plataea." It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as to the general events of the campaign—but also as it discloses to us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause, much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command, was not merely slack, but jealous of his superior.² Under such circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.

Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phokians even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of 1000 hoplites, under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phokians even remained

¹ Herodot. ix. 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is striking and emphatic—ἐγθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι αὐτῇ, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατεῖν. It will have to be more carefully considered at a later period of this history, when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks, and upon

the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics as to the superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικός or life of scientific observation and reflection.

² Herodot. ix. 66.

behind in the neighbourhood of Parnassus, prosecuting manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place before him in an unfavourable point of view, Mardonius determined to impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form in a separate body on the plain, he brought up his numerous cavalry all around them; while the Phê mê, or sudden simultaneous impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phokians themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.¹ The general Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks, addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly, and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins—when the cavalry rode up apparently to the charge, and advanced close to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string, some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phokians maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment the Phokians on their courage, and to assure them by means of a herald that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them. He at the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service for the future, and promised that all good behaviour should be amply recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first to massacre the Phokians in the field, and desisted from the intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish. However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality, and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and suspicious fidelity of the army.²

¹ Herodot. ix. 17. διεξήγηθε φύμη, ὡς κατακοντισὶ σφέας. Respecting φύμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of Mykalê, in this same chapter.

Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατακόντισε (Thucyd. viii. 108).

² Οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ γέλοιον μὲν ἀπολέοντες τοὺς Φωκέας, δεχθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, &c. (Herodot. ix. 18).

This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans, distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is describing, is not without importance as strengthening our confidence in the historian.


Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of Marathon already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows: from Tegea, 1500; from Corinth, 5000, besides a small body of 300 from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa; from the Arcadian Orchomenus, 600; from Sikyon, 3000; from Epidaurus, 800; from Trœzen, 1000; from Lepreon, 200; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, 400; from Phlius, 1000; from Hermionê, 300; from Eretria and Styra, 600; from Chalkis, 400; from Ambrakia, 500; from Leukas and Anaktorium, 800; from Palê in Kephallenia, 200; from Ægina, 500. On marching from the Isthmus to Megara, they took up 3000 Megarian hoplites; and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress, the army was completed by the junction of 8000 Athenian hoplites, and 600 Plataean, under Aristeidês, who passed over from Salamis.¹ The total force of hoplites

¹ Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Plataea (Pausan. v. 23, 1).

Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by Herodotus, except the Palês of Kephallenia; and he found in addition the Eleians, Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians and Mèlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean: their contingents sent to Plataea must at all events have been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent any—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they should join themselves in preference to land-service.

With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of Brøndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied that he read *FAAEIOI* when it was really written *ΠΑΛΕΙΣ*, in an inscription at that time about 600 years old. The place in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians strengthens this suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês. The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the superintendents and eurers at Olympia.

Plutarch seems to have read the



BATTLE OF PLATEA

B.C. 479.

- a Persians
- b Athenians.
- c Lacedaemonians
- d Various Greek Allies

I. First position occupied by the opposing armies
 II. Second position
 III. Third position.

or heavy-armed troops was thus 38,700 men. There were no cavalry, and but very few bowmen—but if we add those who are called light-armed or unarmed generally, some perhaps with javelins or swords, but none with any defensive armour—the grand total was not less than 110,000 men. Of these light-armed or unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus, 35,000 in attendance on the 5000 Spartan citizens, and 34,500 in attendance on the other hoplites; together with 1800 Thespians who were properly hoplites, yet so badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.¹

Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat against the Persians at Plataea, which took place some little time afterwards. But it seemed that the contingents were not at first completely full, and that new additions² continued to arrive until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the Athenians from Salamis. At Eleusis as well as at the Isthmus, the sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius, the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach; but the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large

March of Pausanias over Kithæron into Bœotia.

He is attacked by the Persian cavalry under Masistius, and much harassed—superior efficiency of the Athenians against cavalry—Masistius is slain.

same inscription as Pausanias (De Herodoti Malignit. p. 873). ² Herodot. ix. 28. οἱ ἐπιρωσσῶν- τές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχῆι ἐλθόντες Ἑλλή- νων.

¹ Herodot. ix. 19, 28, 29.

bows and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood, charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts and arrows—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for keeping back from the plain.¹ So general was then the fear of the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks, except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially 300 chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen, immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful: at length the general Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty in stature, clad in conspicuous armour, and mounted on a Nisæan horse with golden trappings—charging at the head of his troops, had his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of his helmet and breastplate² however, that they had considerable difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass, to recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their possession.³

The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief was violent and un-

¹ About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see Herodot. i. 136; Xenophon, *Anab.* iii. 4, 17.

Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the javelin (*Xenoph. Anab.* i. 8,

26; i. 9, 5: compare *Cyropæd.* i. 2, 4).

² See Quintus Curtius, iii. 11, 15; and the note of Müttel.

³ Herodot. ix. 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 14.

bounded, manifested by wailing so loud as to echo over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses and cattle, was abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand, overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart and paraded it round the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring its stature and proportions.¹

The Greeks quit the protection of the mountain-grounds and take up a position near to Platæa, along the Asôpus.

So much was their confidence increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water, and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiaë, the Greeks occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called Gargaphia,² and their left

¹ Herodot. ix. 24, 25, οἰμωγῆ τε γροῦμαι ἀπλέτω· ἄπασαν γὰρ τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἡχώ, &c.

The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and Atossa in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the manners of Orientals of that day.

² Herodot. ix. 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρώων ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ πυκνῶν δένδρων περιχώμενον.

The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by Pausanias, Οὔτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο, as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἑλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῆσι, παρήσαν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν αὐτῆ ῥέοντα—show plainly that the Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the ground on the opposite or Theban side of the river.

Whichever army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c. 36-59).

For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole's Turkey, p. 338; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii. ch. vi. p. 9 seq., and ch. viii. p. 592 seq.: and the still more copious and accurate information of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert's maps. I cannot but think that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating that the fountain of Gargaphia was *near* the river towards the right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês also *near* the river towards the left of that position,

wing near to the chapel, surrounded by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero Androkratês. In this position they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of the Greek name—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans and Corinthians immediately joining them—and the Athenians on the left wing; a post, which as second in point of dignity, was at first claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits, to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.¹ In the field even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the argument and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.

Mardonius, apprised of this change of position, marched his army also a little further to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of the Thebans, he himself with his Persians and Medes, the picked men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians: Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled the centre; and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia, the right—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates them conjecturally at

where the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii. 24), who merely mentions that chapel as being on the right-hand of the first mile of road from Platæa to Thebes.

Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia were no longer recognisable. At any rate, neither the fountain pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutian which had been supposed by

Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear to be suitable for Gargaphia.

The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies the Voyage d'Anacharsis, are now well understood.

¹ Herodot. ix. 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.C. 396) and Mantinea (B.C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 2, 19).

50,000:¹ nor can we place any confidence in the total of 300,000 which he gives as belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot have been much less.

In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius, and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic families in Elis—the latter invited one from Leukas.² All received large pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honoured with a recompense above all pay—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets on both sides delivered the same report of their respective sacrifices: favourable for resistance if attacked—unfavourable for beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Plataea³ had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement, though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians, and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger

Unwillingness of both armies to begin the attack—the prophets on both sides discourage first aggression.

¹ Herodot. ix. 31, 32.

² Herodot. ix. 36, 38. μεμισθω- μένος οὐκ ὀλίγου.

These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may be seen by the details which He-

rodotus gives respecting their adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix. 93.

³ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi.; Thueyd. ii. 74.

at such a moment, though fortunately repressed¹ by Aristeidês, with a hand at once gentle and decisive.

The annoyance inflicted by the Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant. Their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using the river for supplies of water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,² near the Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover the Theban leader Timegenidas, remarking the Mardonius annoys the Greeks with his cavalry, and cuts off their supplies in the rear. convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron in the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak Heads, was eminently successful. A train of 500 beasts of burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the Persian camp; so that it became unsafe for any further convoys to approach the Greeks.³ Eight days had already been passed in inaction before Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed this manœuvre; which it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier, and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his impatience became uncon-

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.

² Herodot. ix. 40, 49, 50. τὴν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ' ἧς ὕδρευετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τῇ κρήνῃ ἐποίησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γὰρ σφί οὐκ ἐπὶ ὕδαρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπὸ τε τῶν ἰσπέων καὶ τοῦ ξυμμάτων.

Diodorus (xi. 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his superior numbers. It is evident from the ac-

count of Herodotus that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once diffuse and un instructive, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi. 30-36) forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.

³ Herodot. ix. 38, 39.

trollable, and he determined on a general battle forthwith.¹ In vain did Artabazus endeavour to dissuade him from the step; taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite them. He recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes, well fortified and amply provisioned: so as to allow time of distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.²

But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the objections of all around him, Persians as well as Greek, he could not but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected to arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies, of unfavourable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek as well as Persian, and put the question to them whether they knew any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but others (Herodotus intimates) knew them full well, though they did not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, "Since ye either do not know, or will not tell, I who know well will myself speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground therefore we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye therefore, ye who are well-affected to the Persians—we shall get the better of the Greeks." With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general attack and battle on the morrow.³

It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part of the whole, as illustrating the

Impatience of Mardonius—in spite of the reluctance of Artabazus and other officers he determines on a general attack: he tries to show that the prophecies are favourable to him.

¹ Herodot. ix. 40, 41.

² Herodot. ix. 42.

³ Herodot. ix. 42.

manner in which these prophecies sunk into men's minds, and determined their judgements. Herodotus knew (though he does not cite it) the particular prophecy to which Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative tone,¹ that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis. But both Bakis (from whom he quotes four lines) and Musæus had prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.

The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from Alexander king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name and proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit—he apprised them that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by any effort obtain favourable sacrifices, but was nevertheless, even in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning. “Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he), remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke; I too am a Greek by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see Greece enslaved.”²

The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal

¹ Herodot. ix. 43. Τοῦτον δ' ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυριοὺς τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγγελέων στρατὸν οἶδα πεποιημένον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἄλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, &c.

² Her. ix. 44-45 The language

about the sacrifices is remarkable—λέγω δὲ ὡς ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ δύναται τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι· πάλσι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, &c.

Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better sacrifices: it could not be done.

not a little surprising as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. "We Lacedæmonians (said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes against whom we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing against the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are familiar." The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change of order was accordingly directed. It was not yet quite completed, when day broke and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more over against the Lacedæmonians; upon which Pausanias, seeing that his manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing, while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies in the order originally observed.¹

Pausanias changes places in the line between the Spartans and Athenians.

No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops in the enemy's line, and to depart for this purpose from their privileged post on the right wing, was a step well-calculated to lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to produce that effect, if the intention had been realized. It is at the same time no mean compliment to the formidable reputation of the native Persian troops—a reputation recognised by Herodotus, and well-sustained at least by their personal bravery.² Nor can we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in Homeric style,³ casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a "single combat with champions of equal numbers, Lace-

¹ Herodot. ix. 47; Plutarch, Aristidès, c. 16. Here, as on many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the narrative of Herodotus.

² Herodot. ix. 71.

³ Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomèdes (Iliad, viii. 161).

dæmonians against Persians." This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment, was followed by something very real and terrible—a vigorous attack on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more than ever. The latter (as has been before stated) had no cavalry whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous, appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been of late the only watering-place; and without it the position which they then occupied became untenable—while their provisions also were exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry, could not descend from Kithæron to join them.¹

In this dilemma Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent. After an anxious debate, the resolution was taken, in case Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the day, to change their position during the night, when there would be no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the Island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and seemingly north of the town of Plataea, which was itself about twenty furlongs distant. This island, improperly so denominated, included the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê;² both of which flow from Kithæron, and after flowing for a certain time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run in a north-westerly

¹ Her. ix. 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Plataeans restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ ἀνεστρώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as

if he had himself seen it (ix. 4, 2).

² See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi. vol. ii. p. 358.

In consequence of the annoyance of the Persian cavalry, Pausanias determines to move in the night into the Island.

direction towards one of the recesses of the Gulf of Corinth—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa. When encamped in this so-called Island, the army would be secure of water from the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them only by the Asôpus.¹ It was farther resolved, that so soon as the army should once be in occupation of the Island, half of the troops should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march was to be commenced at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy's cavalry would have completely withdrawn.

In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed the whole day without any general attack. But his cavalry, probably elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that day more daring and indefatigable than ever; and inflicted much loss as well as severe suffering;² insomuch that the centre of the Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, &c., between the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when the hour arrived for retiring to the Island, commenced their march indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the orders of Pausanias in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the Island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the town of Plataea, and took up a position in front of the Heræum or temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings, partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about

Confusion
of the
Grecian
army in
executing
this night
movement.

¹ Herodot. ix. 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χώρον ἐβουλεύσαντο μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόγῳ, καὶ οἱ ἱππέες σφέας μὴ σινοῖατο, ὡς περ κατ' ἰθὺ ἐόντων.

The last words have reference

to the position of the two hostile armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.

² Herodot. ix. 52. ξεινήν μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης τῆς ἱπποῦ, εἶχον πόλον ἀπρῦτον.

to leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (*i. e.*, between the course of Asôpus and that of the Oeroë), there appear to have been a range of low hills. The Lacedæmonians, starting from the right wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians, from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other side.¹ Pausanias, apprised that the divisions of the centre had commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they would proceed to the Island according to orders, allowed a certain interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from the enemy, and not consistent with the military honour of a Spartan: nevertheless most of the taxiarchs or leaders of companies obeyed without murmuring, but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,² obstinately refused. Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment and disdain, declaring "that he for one would never so far disgrace Sparta as to run away from the foreigner."³ Pausanias, with the second in command Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his reluctance. But they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed alone to the enemy.⁴

Refusal of the Spartan lochage Amompharetus to obey the order for the night march.

¹ Herodot. ix. 56. Παισανίης—σημύνας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἶποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ταχθέντες ἤσαν τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε ὄχθων ἀντίχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπὸ τῆς Κιθαιρώνας. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.

With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind the hills, which prevented Mar-donius from seeing them, though they were marching along the

plain:—Μαρδόνιος—ἐπέσχε ἐπὶ Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεῆτας μόνους. Ἀθηναῖους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.

² There is on this point a difference between Thueydidēs and Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan lochus so called (Thueyd. i. 21).

We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be certain that Thueydidēs is right in his negative comprehending all past time—ὅς οὐδ' ἐγένετο πρότετα.

³ Herodot. ix. 53, 54.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 52, 53.

Amidst the darkness of night, and in this scene of indecision and dispute, an Athenian messenger on horseback reached Pausanias, instructed to ascertain what was passing, and to ask for the last directions. For in spite of the resolution taken after formal debate, the Athenian generals still mistrusted the Lacedæmonians, and doubted whether, after all, they would act as they had promised. The movement of the central division having become known to them, they sent at the last moment before they commenced their own march, to assure themselves that the Spartans were about to move also. A profound, and even an exaggerated mistrust, but too well justified by the previous behaviour of the Spartans towards Athens, is visible in this proceeding;¹ yet it proved fortunate in its results—for if the Athenians, satisfied with executing their part in the preconcerted plan, had marched at once to the Island, the Grecian army would have been severed without the possibility of reuniting, and the issue of the battle might have proved altogether different. The Athenian herald found the Lacedæmonians still stationary in their position, and the generals in hot dispute with Amompharetus, who despised the threat of being left alone to make head against the Persians, and when reminded that the resolution had been taken by general vote of the officers, took up with both hands a vast rock fit for the hands of Ajax or Hektor, and cast it at the feet of Pausanias, saying—"This is *my* pebble, wherewith I give my vote not to run away from the strangers." Pausanias denounced him as a madman—desiring the herald to report the scene of embarrassment which he had just come to witness, and to entreat the Athenian generals not to commence their retreat until the Lacedæmonians should also be in march. In the meantime the dispute continued, and was even prolonged by the perverseness of Amompharetus until the morning began to dawn; when Pausanias, afraid to remain longer, gave the signal for retreat—calculating that the refractory captain, when he saw his lochus really left alone, would probably make up his mind to follow. Having marched about ten furlongs, across the hilly ground

Mistrust of Pausanias and the Spartans exhibited by the Athenians.

¹ Herodot. ix. 54. Ἀθηναῖοι—εἶχον νόημα, ὡς ἄλλα φρονούντων καὶ ἄλλα ἀτρέμας σφέας αὐτοὺς ἕνα ἐτάχθησαν, λεγόντων. ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρο-

which divided him from the Island, he commanded a halt; either to await Amompharetus if he chose to follow, or to be near enough to render aid and save him, if he were rash enough to stand his ground single-handed. Happily the latter, seeing that his general had really departed, overcame his scruples, and followed him; overtaking and joining the main body in its first halt near the river Moloëis and the temple of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr.¹ The Athenians, commencing their movement at the same time with Pausanias, got round the hills to the plain on the other side and proceeded on their march towards the Island.

When the day broke, the Persian cavalry were astonished to find the Grecian position deserted. They immediately set themselves to the pursuit of the Spartans, whose march lay along the higher and more conspicuous ground, and whose progress had moreover been retarded by the long delay of Amompharetus: the Athenians on the contrary, marching without halt, and being already behind the hills, were not open to view. To Mardonius, this retreat of his enemy inspired an extravagant and contemptuous confidence which he vented in full measure to the Thessalian Aleuadæ—"These are your boasted Spartans, who changed their place just now in the line, rather than fight the Persians, and have here shown by a barefaced flight what they are really worth!" With that he immediately directed his whole army to pursue and attack with the utmost expedition. The Persians crossed the Asôpus, and ran after the Greeks at their best speed, pell-mell, without any thought of order or preparations for overcoming resistance: the army already rang with shouts of victory, in full confidence of swallowing up the fugitives as soon as they were overtaken.

The Asiatic allies all followed the example of this disorderly rush forward:² but the Thebans and the other

¹ Herodot. ix. 56, 57.

² Herodot. ix. 59. ἐδίωκον ὡς ποδῶν ἕκαστος εἶχον, οὔτε κόσμον οὔδενι κοσμηθέντες, οὔτε τάξι. Καὶ οὔτοι μὲν βροῦ τε καὶ ὀμίλῳ ἐπήϊσαν, ὡς ἀναρπασόμενοι τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

Herodotus dwells especially on

the reckless and disorderly manner in which the Persians advanced: Plutarch, on the contrary, says of Mardonius—ἔχων συντεταγμένην τὴν δύναμιν ἐπεφύετο τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις, &c. (Plutarch, Aristeid. c. 17).

Plutarch also says that Pausanias

Grecian allies on the right wing of Mardonius, appear to have maintained somewhat better order.

Pausanias had not been able to retreat farther than the neighbourhood of the Demetrium or temple ^{Battle of} of Eleusinian Dêmêtêr, where he had halted to ^{Platæa.} take up Amompharetus. Overtaken first by the Persian horse and next by Mardonius with the main body, he sent a horseman forthwith to apprise the Athenians, and to entreat their aid. The Athenians were prompt in complying with his request: but they speedily found themselves engaged in conflict against the Theban allies of the enemy, and therefore unable to reach him.¹ Accordingly the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans had to encounter the Persians single-handed without any assistance from the other Greeks. The Persians, on arriving within bowshot of their enemies, planted in the ground the spiked extremities of their gerrha (or long wicker shields), forming a continuous breastwork, from behind which they poured upon the Greeks a shower of arrows:² their bows were of the largest size, and drawn with no less power than skill. In spite of the wounds and distress thus inflicted, Pausanias persisted in the indispensable duty of offering the battle-sacrifice, and the victims were for some time unfavourable, so that he did not venture to give orders for advance and close combat. Many were here wounded or slain in the ranks,³ among them the brave Kallikratês, the handsomest and strongest man in the army: until Pausanias, wearied out with this compulsory and painful delay, at length raised his eyes to the conspicuous Heræum of the Platæans, and invoked the merciful intervention of Hêrê to remove that obstacle which confined him to the spot. Hardly had he pronounced the words, when the victims changed and became favourable:⁴ but the Tegeans, while he was yet praying,

ἤγε τὴν ἄλλην δύναμιν πρὸς τὰς Πλαταιάς, &c.; which is quite contrary to the real narrative of Herodotus. Pausanias intended to march to the Island, not to Platæa: he did not reach either the one or the other.

¹ Herodot. ix. 60, 61.

² About the Persian bow, see Xenoph. Anab. iii. 4, 17.

³ Herodot. ix. 72.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 62. Καὶ τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι ἀτύχια μετὰ τὴν εὐχὴν τὴν Πausανίω ἐγένετο θυομένοισι τὰ σφάγια χρηστά. Plutarch exaggerates the long-suffering of Pausanias (Aristot. c. 17, ad finem).

The lofty and conspicuous site of the Heræon, visible to Pausanias at the distance where he was, is plainly marked in Herodotus (ix. 61).

anticipated the effect and hastened forward against the enemy, followed by the Lacedæmonians as soon as Pausanias gave the word. The wicker breastwork before the Persians was soon overthrown by the Grecian charge: nevertheless the Persians, though thus deprived of their tutelary hedge and having no defensive armour, maintained the fight with individual courage, the more remarkable because it was totally unassisted by discipline or trained collective movement, against the drilled array, the regulated step, the well-defended persons, and the long spears, of the Greeks.¹ They threw themselves upon the Lacedæmonians, seizing hold of their spears, and breaking them: many of them devoted themselves in small parties of ten to force by their bodies a way into the lines, and to get to individual close combat with the short spear and the dagger.² Mardonius himself, conspicuous upon a white horse, was among the foremost warriors, and the thousand select troops who formed his body-guard distinguished

Great personal bravery of the Persians—they are totally defeated and Mardonius slain.

For incidents illustrating the hardships which a Grecian army endured from its reluctance to move without favourable sacrifices, see Xenophon, *Anabasis*, vi. 4, 10-25; *Hellenic*. iii. 2, 17.

¹ Herodot. ix. 62, 63. His words about the courage of the Persians are remarkable: *λήματι μὲν ὄντι καὶ ῥώμῃ οὐκ ἔσσαντες ἦσαν οἱ Πέρσαι· ἀνοπλοὶ δὲ εἶόντες, καὶ πρὸς, ἀνεπιτήμονες ἦσαν, καὶ οὐκ ὁμοῖοι τοῖσι ἐναντίοισι σοφίην . . . πλείστον γὰρ σφραγίσθησαν ἢ ἐσθῆς ἐρῆμος εὐόσα βίβλων, πρὸς γὰρ ὀπλίτας εἶόντες γυμνήτες ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο. Compare the striking conversation between Xerxes and Demaratus (Herodot. vii. 104).*

The description given by Herodotus of the gallant rush made by these badly-armed Persians, upon the presented line of spears in the Lacedæmonian ranks, may be compared with Livy (xxxii. 17), a description of the Romans attacking the Macedonian phalanx,—and with the battle of Sempach (June, 1386),

in which 1400 half-armed Swiss overcame a large body of fully-armed Austrians, with an impenetrable front of projecting spears; which for some time they were unable to break in upon, until at length one of their warriors, Arnold von Winkelried, grasped an armful of spears, and precipitated himself upon them, making a way for his countrymen over his dead body. See Vogelien, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft*, ch. vi. p. 240, or indeed any history of Switzerland, for a description of this memorable incident.

² For the arms of the Persians, see Herodot. vii. 61.

Herodotus states in another place that the Persian troops adopted the Egyptian breastplates (*θώρακας*): probably this may have been after the battle of Plataea. Even at this battle, the Persian leaders on horseback had strong defensive armour, as we may see by the case of Masistius above narrated: by the time of the battle of Kunaxa,

themselves beyond all the rest. At length he was slain by the hand of a distinguished Spartan named Aeimnêstus; his thousand guards mostly perished around him, and the courage of the remaining Persians, already worn out by the superior troops against which they had been long contending, was at last thoroughly broken by the death of their general. They turned their backs and fled, not resting until they got into the wooden fortified camp, constructed by Mardonius behind the Asôpus. The Asiatic allies also, as soon as they saw the Persians defeated, took to flight without striking a blow.¹

The Athenians on the left, meanwhile, had been engaged in a serious conflict with the Bœotians; especially the Theban leaders with the hoplites immediately around them, who fought with great bravery, but were at length driven back, after the loss of 300 of their best troops. The Athenians on the left wing defeated the Thebans. The Theban cavalry however still maintained a good front, protecting the retreat of the infantry and checking the Athenian pursuit, so that the fugitives were enabled to reach Thebes in safety; a better refuge than the Persian fortified camp.² With the exception of the Thebans and Bœotians, none of the other *medising* Greeks rendered any real service. Instead of sustaining or reinforcing the Thebans, they never once advanced to the charge, but merely followed in the first movement of flight. So that in point of fact the only troops in this numerous Perso-Grecian army who really fought, were, the native Persians and Sakæ on the left, and the Bœotians on the right; the former against the Lacedæmonians, the latter against the Athenians.³

Nor did even all the native Persians take part in the combat. A body of 40,000 men under Artabazus, of whom some must doubtless have been native Persians, left the field without fighting and without loss. That general, seemingly the ablest man in the Persian army, had been from the first disgusted with the nomination of Mardonius as commander-in-chief, and had farther incurred his

the habit had become more widely diffused (Xenoph. Anabas. i. 8, 6; Brisson, De Regno Persarum, lib. iii. p. 361), for the cavalry at least.

¹ Herodot. ix. 64, 65.

² Herodot. ix. 67, 68.

³ Herodot. ix. 67, 68. Τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων τῶν μετὰ βασιλέως ἐθελοχακούντων . . . καὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμμάχων ὁ πᾶς ἕμιλος οὔτε διαπραχσάμενος οὔδενι οὔτε τι ἀποδείξάμενος ἔφυγεν.

displeasure by deprecating any general action. Apprised that Mardonius was hastening forward to attack the retreating Greeks, he marshalled his division and led them out towards the scene of action, though despairing of success and perhaps not very anxious that his own prophecies should be proved false. And such had been the headlong impetuosity of Mardonius in his first forward movement,—so complete his confidence of overwhelming the Greeks when he discovered their retreat,—that he took no pains to ensure the concerted action of his whole army. Accordingly before Artabazus arrived at the scene of action, he saw the Persian troops, who had been engaged under the commander-in-chief, already defeated and in flight. Without making the least attempt either to save them or to retrieve the battle, he immediately gave orders to his own division to retreat; not repairing, however, either to the fortified camp or to Thebes, but abandoning at once the whole campaign, and taking the direct road through Phokis to Thessaly, Macedonia, and the Hellespont.¹

As the native Persians, the Sakæ, and the Bœotians were the only real combatants on the one side, so also were the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians, on the other. It has already been mentioned that the central troops of the Grecian army, disobeying the general order of march, had gone during the night to the town of Platæa instead of to the Island. They were thus completely severed from Pausanias, and the first thing which they heard about the battle was, that the Lacedæmonians were gaining the victory. Elate with this news, and anxious to come in for some share of the honour, they rushed to the scene of action, without any heed of military order: the Corinthians taking the direct track across the hills, while the Megarians, Phliasians and others, marched by the longer route along the plain, so as to turn the hills, and arrive at the Athenian position. The Theban horse under Asôpodôrus, employed in checking the pursuit of the victorious Athenian hoplites, seeing these fresh troops coming up in thorough disorder, charged them vigorously

Artabazus, with a large Persian corps, abandons the contest and retires out of Greece—the rest of the Persian army take up their position in the fortified camp.

Small proportion of the armies on each side which really fought.

¹ Herodot. ix. 66.

and drove them back, to take refuge in the high ground, with the loss of 600 men.¹ But this partial success had no effect in mitigating the general defeat.

Following up their pursuit, the Lacedæmonians proceeded to attack the wooden redoubt wherein the Persians had taken refuge. But though they were here aided by all or most of the central Grecian divisions, who had taken no part in the battle, they were yet so ignorant of the mode of assailing walls, that they made no progress, and were completely baffled, until the Athenians arrived to their assistance. The redoubt was then stormed, not without a gallant and prolonged resistance on the part of its defenders. The Tegeans, being the first to penetrate into the interior, plundered the rich tent of Mardonius, whose manger for his horses, made of brass, remained long afterwards exhibited in their temple of Athênê Alea—while his silver-footed throne, and scimitar,² were preserved in the acropolis of Athens, along with the breastplate of Masistius. Once within the wall, effective resistance ceased, and the Greeks slaughtered without mercy as well as without limit; so that if we are to credit Herodotus, there survived only 3000 men out of the 300,000 which had composed the army of Mardonius—save and except the 40,000 men who accompanied Artabazus in his retreat.³

Respecting these numbers, the historian had probably little to give except some vague reports, without any pretence of computation: about the Grecian loss his statement deserves more attention, when he tells us that there perished ninety-one Spartans, sixteen Tegeans, and fifty-two Athenians. Herein however is not included the loss of the Megarians when attacked by the Theban cavalry,

¹ Herodot. ix. 69.

² Herodot. ix. 70; Demosthenês cont. Timokrat. p. 741. c. 33. Pausanias (i. 27, 2) doubts whether this was really the scimitar of Mardonius, contending that the Lacedæmonians would never have permitted the Athenians to take it.

³ Herodot. ix. 70: compare Æschyl. Pers. 805-824. He singles out "the Dorian spear" as the great weapon of destruction to the

Persians at Plataea—very justly. Dr. Blomfield is surprised at this compliment; but it is to be recollected that all the earlier part of the tragedy had been employed in setting forth the glory of Athens at Salamis, and he might well afford to give the Peloponnesians the credit which they deserved at Plataea. Pindar distributes the honour between Sparta and Athens in like manner (Pyth. i. 70).

nor is the number of slain Lacedæmonians, not Spartans, specified: while even the other numbers actually stated are decidedly smaller than the probable truth, considering the multitude of Persian arrows and the unshielded right side of the Grecian hoplite. On the whole, the affirmation of Plutarch, that not less than 1360 Greeks were slain in the action appears probable: all doubtless hoplites—for little account was then made of the light-armed, nor indeed are we told that they took any active part in the battle.¹ Whatever may have been the numerical loss of the Persians, this defeat proved the total ruin of their army: but we may fairly presume that many were spared and sold into slavery,² while many of the fugitives probably found means to join the retreating division of Artabazus. That general made a rapid march across Thessaly and Macedonia, keeping strict silence about the recent battle, and pretending to be sent on a special enterprise by Mardonius, whom he reported to be himself approaching. If Herodotus is correct (though it may well be doubted whether the change of sentiment in Thessaly and the other *medising* Grecian states was so rapid as he implies), Artabazus succeeded in traversing these countries before the news of the battle became generally known, and then retreated by the straightest and shortest route through the interior of Thrace to Byzantium, from whence he passed into Asia. The interior tribes, unconquered and predatory, harassed his retreat considerably; but we shall find long afterwards Persian garrisons in possession of many principal places on the Thracian coast.³ It will be seen that Artabazus subsequently rose higher than ever in the estimation of Xerxes.

¹ Plutarch, *Aristeidês*, c. 19. Kleidemus, quoted by Plutarch, stated that all the fifty-two Athenians who perished belonged to the tribe *Æantis*, which distinguished itself in the Athenian ranks. But it seems impossible to believe that no citizens belonging to the other nine tribes were killed.

² Diodorus indeed states that Pausanias was so apprehensive of the numbers of the Persians, that he forbade his soldiers to give

quarter or take any prisoners (xi. 32); but this is hardly to be believed, in spite of his assertion. His statement that the Greeks lost 10,000 men is still less admissible.

³ Herodot. ix. 89. The allusions of Demosthenês to Perdikkas king of Macedonia, who is said to have attacked the Persians on their flight from Plataea, and to have rendered their ruin complete, are too loose to deserve attention;

Ten days did the Greeks employ after their victory, first in burying the slain, next in collecting and apportioning the booty. The Lacedæmonians, the Athenians, the Tegeans, the Megarians and the Phliasians each buried their dead apart, erecting a separate tomb in commemoration. The Lacedæmonians, indeed, distributed their dead into three fractions, in three several burial-places: one for those champions who enjoyed individual renown at Sparta, and among whom were included the most distinguished men slain in the recent battle, such as Poseidonius, Amompharetus the refractory captain, Philokyon, and Kallikratês—a second for the other Spartans and Lacedæmonians¹—and a third for the Helots. Besides these sepulchral monuments, erected in the neighbourhood of Plataea by those cities whose citizens had really fought and fallen, there were several similar monuments to be seen in the days of Herodotus, raised by other cities which falsely pretended to the same honour, with the connivance and aid of the Platæans.² The body of Mardonius was discovered among the slain, and treated with respect by Pausanias, who is even said to have indignantly repudiated advice offered to him by an Æginetan, that he should retaliate upon it the ignominious treatment inflicted by Xerxes upon the dead Leonidas.³ On the morrow the

Funeral obsequies by the Greeks—monuments—dead body of Mardonius—distribution of booty.

more especially as Perdikkas was not then king of Macedonia (Demosthenês cont. Aristokrat. p. 687. c. 51; and περί Συντάξεως, p. 173. c. 9).

¹ Herodot. ix. 84. Herodotus indeed assigns this second burial-place only to the other Spartans, apart from the Select. He takes no notice of the Lacedæmonians not Spartans, either in the battle or in reference to burial, though he had informed us that 5000 of them were included in the army. Some of them must have been slain, and we may fairly presume that they were buried along with the Spartan citizens generally. As to the word ἱρέας, or εἰρένας, or ὑπέας (the two last being both conjectural readings), it seems im-

possible to arrive at any certainty: we do not know by what name these select warriors were called.

² Herodot. ix. 85. Τῶν δ' ἄλλων ὄσοι καὶ φθίνοναι ἐν Πλαταιῆσι ἐόντες τάφοι, τούτους δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ἐπεισχνομένους τῇ ἀπεστοί τῆς μάχης, ἐκάστους χωμάτα χῶσαι κεινά, τῶν ἐπιγινόμενων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων ἐπεὶ καὶ Αἰγινητέων ἐστὶ αὐτόθι καλεόμενος τάφος, τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω καὶ δεῖκα ἔτεσι ὕστερον μετὰ ταῦτα, δεξιθέντων τῶν Αἰγινητέων, χῶσαι Κλεάδην τὸν Αὐτοδίκου, ἄνδρα Πλαταιέα, πρόξενον ἐόντα αὐτῶν.

This is a curious statement, derived by Herodotus doubtless from personal inquiries made at Plataea.

³ Her. ix. 78, 79. This suggestion

body was stolen away and buried; by whom was never certainly known, for there were many different pretenders who obtained reward on this plea from Artyntês, the son of Mardonius. The funereal monument was yet to be seen in the time of Pausanias.¹

The spoil was rich and multifarious—gold and silver in Darics as well as in implements and ornaments, carpets, splendid arms and clothing, horses, camels, &c., even the magnificent tent of Xerxes, left on his retreat with Mardonius, was included.² By order of the general Pausanias, the Helots collected all the valuable articles into one spot for division; not without stealing many of the golden ornaments, which, in ignorance of the value, they were persuaded by the Æginetans to sell as brass. After reserving a tithe for the Delphian Apollo, together with ample offerings for the Olympic Zeus and the Isthmian Poseidon, as well as for Pausanias as general—the remaining booty was distributed among the different contingents of the army in proportion to their respective numbers.³ The concubines of the Persian chiefs were among the prizes distributed: there were probably however among them

so abhorrent to Grecian feeling, is put by the historian into the mouth of the Æginetan Lampôn. In my preceding note I have alluded to another statement made by Herodotus, not very creditable to the Æginetans: there is moreover a third (ix. 80), in which he represents them as having cheated the Helots in their purchases of the booty. We may presume him to have heard all these anecdotes at Platœa: at the time when he probably visited that place, not long before the Peloponnesian war, the inhabitants were united in the most intimate manner with Athens, and doubtless sympathised in the hatred of the Athenians against Ægina. It does not from hence follow that the stories are all untrue. I disbelieve, indeed, the advice said to have been given by Lampôn to crucify the body of Mardonius

—which has more the air of a poetical contrivance for bringing out an honourable sentiment, than of a real incident. But there seems no reason to doubt the truth of the other two stories. Herodotus does but too rarely specify his informants: it is interesting to scent out the track in which his inquiries have been prosecuted.

After the battle of Kunaxa, and the death of Cyrus the younger, his dead body had the head and hands cut off, by order of Artaxerxes, and nailed to a cross (Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 1; iii. 1, 17).

¹ Herodot. ix. 84; Pausanias, ix. 2, 2.

² Herodot. ix. 80, 81: compare vii. 41-83.

³ Diodorus (xi. 33) states this proportional distribution. Herodotus only says—ἐλαβον ἕκαστοι τῶν ἀξίωι ἤσαν (ix. 81).

many of Grecian birth, restored to their families; and one especially, overtaken in her chariot amidst the flying Persians, with rich jewels and a numerous suite, threw herself at the feet of Pausanias himself, imploring his protection. She proved to be the daughter of his personal friend Hegetoridês of Kos, carried off by the Persian Pharandatês; and he had the satisfaction of restoring her to her father.¹ Large as the booty collected was, there yet remained many valuable treasures buried in the ground, which the Platæan inhabitants afterwards discovered and appropriated.

The real victors in the battle of Platæa were the Lacedæmonians, Athenians and Tegeans. The Corinthians and others, forming part of the army opposed to Mardonius, did not reach the field until the battle was ended, though they doubtless aided both in the assault of the fortified camp and in the subsequent operations against Thebes, and were universally recognised, in inscriptions and panegyrics, among the champions who had contributed to the liberation of Greece.² It was not till after the taking of the Persian camp that the contingents of Elis and Mantinea, who may perhaps have been among the convoys prevented by the Persian cavalry from descending the passes of Kithæron, first reached the scene of action. Mortified at having

¹ Herodot. ix. 76, 80, 81, 82. The fate of these female companions of the Persian grandees, on the taking of the camp by an enemy, forms a melancholy picture here as well as at Issus, and even at Kunaxa: see Diodor. xvii. 35; Quintus Curtius, iii. xi. 21; Xenoph. Anab. i. 10, 2.

² Plutarch animadverts severely (De Malign. Herodot. p. 873; compare Plut. Aristeid. e. 19) upon Herodotus, because he states that none of the Greeks had any share in the battle of Platæa except the Lacedæmonians, Tegeans, and Athenians: the orator Lysias repeats the same statement (Oratio Funebr. e. 9). If this were the fact (Plutarch asks) how comes it that the inscriptions and poems of the time recognise the exploit as performed by the whole Grecian army,

Corinthians and others included? But these inscriptions do not really contradict what is affirmed by Herodotus. The actual battle was fought only by a part of the collective Grecian army; but this happened in a great measure by accident; the rest were little more than a mile off, and until within a few hours had been occupying part of the same continuous line of position: moreover, if the battle had lasted a little longer, they would have come up in time to render actual help. They would naturally be considered, therefore, as entitled to partake in the glory of the entire result.

When however in after-times a stranger visited Platæa, and saw Lacedæmonian, Tegean, and Athenian tombs, but no Corinthian nor Æginetan, &c., he would naturally

missed their share in the glorious exploit, the new-comers were at first eager to set off in pursuit of Artabazus: but the Lacedæmonian commander forbade them, and they returned home without any other consolation than that of banishing their generals for not having led them forth more promptly.¹

There yet remained the most efficient ally of Mardonius —the city of Thebes; which Pausanias summoned on the eleventh day after the battle, requiring that the *medising* leaders should be delivered up, especially Timêgenidas and Attagînus. On receiving a refusal, he began to batter their walls, and to adopt the still more effective measure of laying waste their territory; giving notice that the work of destruction would be continued until these chiefs were given up. After twenty days of endurance, the chiefs at length proposed, if it should prove that Pausanias peremptorily required their persons and refused to accept a sum of money in commutation, to surrender themselves voluntarily as the price of liberation for their country. A negotiation was accordingly entered into with Pausanias, and the persons demanded were surrendered to him, excepting Attagînus, who found means to escape at the last moment. His sons, whom he left behind, were delivered up as substitutes, but Pausanias refused to touch them, with the just remark, which in those times was even generous,² that they were nowise implicated in the *medism* of their father. Timêgenidas and the remaining prisoners were carried off to Corinth and immediately put to death, without the smallest discussion or form of trial: Pausanias was apprehensive that if any delay or consultation were granted, their wealth and that of their friends would effectually purchase voices for their acquittal,—indeed the prisoners themselves had been induced to give themselves up partly in that expectation.² It is remarkable

enquire how it happened that none of these latter had fallen in the battle, and would then be informed that they were not really present at it. Hence the motive for these cities to erect empty sepulchral monuments on the spot, as Herodotus informs us that they afterwards did or caused to be done by

individual Platæans.

¹ Herodot. ix. 77.

² See, a little above in this chapter, the treatment of the wife and children of the Athenian senator Lykidas (Herodot. ix. 5). Compare also Herodot. iii. 116; ix. 120.

³ Herodot. ix. 87, 88.

that Pausanias himself only a few years afterwards, when attainted of treason, returned and surrendered himself at Sparta under similar hopes of being able to buy himself off by money.¹ In this hope indeed he found himself deceived, as Timêgenidas had been deceived before: but the fact is not the less to be noted as indicating the general impression that the leading men in a Grecian city were usually open to bribes in judicial matters, and that individuals superior to this temptation were rare exceptions. I shall have occasion to dwell upon this recognised untrustworthiness of the leading Greeks when I come to explain the extremely popular cast of the Athenian judicature.

Whether there was any positive vote taken among the Greeks respecting the prize of valour at the battle of Platæa may well be doubted: and the silence of Herodotus goes far to negative an important statement of Plutarch, that the Athenians and Lacedæmonians were on the point of coming to an open rupture, each thinking themselves entitled to the prize—that Aristeidês appeased the Athenians, and prevailed upon them to submit to the general decision of the allies—and that Megarian and Corinthian leaders contrived to elude the dangerous rock by bestowing the prize on the Platæans, to which proposition both Aristeidês and Pausanias acceded.² But it seems that the general opinion recognised the Lacedæmonians and Pausanias as bravest among the brave, seeing that they had overcome the best troops of the enemy and slain the general. In burying their dead warriors, the Lacedæmonians singled out for peculiar distinction Philokyon, Poseidonius, and Amompharetus the lochage, whose conduct in the fight atoned for his disobedience to orders. There was one Spartan however who had surpassed them all—Aristodêmus, the single survivor of the troop of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Having ever since experienced nothing but disgrace and

Honours
and distinc-
tions
among the
Greek war-
riors.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. καὶ πιστεύων γρήγορα διαλύσει τῆς διαβολῆς. Compare Thucyd. viii. 45, where he states that the trierarchs and generals of the Lacedæmonian and allied fleet (all except Hermokratês of Syracuse) received bribes from Tissaphernes to betray the interests both of their seamen and of

their country: also c. 49 of the same book about the Lacedæmonian general Astyochous. The bribes received by the Spartan kings Leotyichidês and Pleistoanax are recorded (Herodot. vi. 72; Thucyd. ii. 21).

² Plutarch. Aristeidês, c. 20; De Herodot. Malign. p. 873.

insult from his fellow-citizens, this unfortunate man had become reckless of life, and at Plataea he stepped forth single-handed from his place in the ranks, performing deeds of the most heroic valour and determined to regain by his death the esteem of his countrymen. But the Spartans refused to assign to him the same funereal honours as were paid to the other distinguished warriors, who had manifested exemplary forwardness and skill, yet without any desperate rashness, and without any previous taint such as to render life a burthen to them. Subsequent valour might be held to efface this taint, but could not suffice to exalt Aristodemus to a level with the most honoured citizens.¹

But though we cannot believe the statement of Plutarch that the Plataeans received by general vote the prize of valour, it is certain that they were largely honoured and recompensed, as the proprietors of that ground on which the liberation of Greece had been achieved. The market-place and centre of their town was selected as the scene for the solemn sacrifice of thanksgiving, offered up by Pausanias after the battle, to Zeus Eleutherius, in the name and presence of all the assembled allies. The local gods and heroes of the Plataean territory, who had been invoked in prayer before the battle, and who had granted their soil as a propitious field for the Greek arms, were made partakers of the ceremony, and witnesses as well as guarantees of the engagements with which it was accompanied.² The Plataeans, now re-entering their city, which the Persian invasion had compelled them to desert, were invested with the honourable duty of celebrating the periodical sacrifice in commemoration of this great victory, as well as of rendering care and religious service at the tombs of the fallen warriors. As an aid to enable them to discharge this obligation, which probably might have pressed hard upon them at a time when their city was half-ruined and their fields unsown, they received out of the prize-money the large allotment of eighty talents, which was partly employed in building and adorning a handsome

¹ Herodot. ix. 71, 72.

² Thucyd. ii. 71, 72. So the Roman Emperor Vitellius, on visiting the field of Bebricum where

his troops had recently been victorious, "instaurabat sacrum Diis loci" (Tacitus, *Histor.* ii. 70).

temple of Athênê—the symbol probably of renewed connexion with Athens. They undertook to render religious honours every year to the tombs of the warriors, and to celebrate in every fifth year the grand public solemnity of the Eleutheria with gymnastic matches analogous to the other great festival games of Greece.¹ In consideration of the discharge of these duties, together with the sanctity of the ground, Pausanias and the whole body of allies bound themselves by oath to guarantee the autonomy of Platæa, and the inviolability of her territory. This was an emancipation of the town from the bond of the Bœotian federation, and from the enforcing supremacy of Thebes as its chief.

But the engagement of the allies appears to have had other objects also, larger than that of protecting Platæa, or establishing commemorative ceremonies. The defensive league against the Persians was again sworn to by all of them, and rendered permanent. An aggregate force of 10,000 hoplites, 1000 cavalry, and 100 triremes, for the purpose of carrying on the war, was agreed to and promised, the contingent of each ally being specified. Moreover the town of Platæa was fixed on as the annual place of meeting, where deputies from all of them were annually to assemble.²

Permanent Grecian confederacy decreed by the victors to hold meetings at Platæa.

This resolution is said to have been adopted on the proposition of Aristeidês, whose motives it is not difficult to trace. Though the Persian army had sustained a signal defeat, no one knew how soon it might re-assemble, or be reinforced. Indeed, even later, after the battle of Mykalê had become known, a fresh invasion of the Persians was still regarded as not improbable;³ nor did any one then anticipate that extraordinary fortune and activity whereby the Athenians afterwards organized an alliance such as to throw Persia on the defensive. Moreover, the northern

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 19-21; Strabo, ix. p. 412; Pausanias, ix. 2, 4.

The Eleutheria were celebrated on the fourth of the Attic month Boëdromion, which was the day on which the battle itself was fought; while the annual decoration of the tombs, and ceremonies in

honour of the deceased, took place on the sixteenth of the Attic month Mæmaktêrion. K. F. Hermann. (Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen, ch. 63, note 9) has treated these two celebrations as if they were one.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 21.

³ Thucyd. i. 90.

half of Greece was still *medising*, either in reality or in appearance, and new efforts on the part of Xerxes might probably keep up his ascendancy in those parts. Now assuming the war to be renewed, Aristeidês and the Athenians had the strongest interest in providing a line of defence which should cover Attica as well as Peloponnesus; and in preventing the Peloponnesians from confining themselves to their Isthmus, as they had done before. To take advantage for this purpose of the new-born reverence and gratitude which now bound the Lacedæmonians to Plataea, was an idea eminently suitable to the moment; though the unforeseen subsequent start of Athens, combined with other events, prevented both the extensive alliance and the inviolability of Plataea, projected by Aristeidês, from taking effect.¹

On the same day that Pausanias and the Grecian land army conquered at Plataea, the naval armament under Leotychildês and Xanthippus was engaged in operations hardly less important at Mykalê on the Asiatic coast. The Grecian commanders of the fleet (which numbered 110 triremes), having advanced as far as Delos, were afraid to proceed farther eastward, or to undertake any

Proceedings of the Grecian fleet: it moves to the rescue of Samos from the Persians.

¹ It is to this general and solemn meeting, held at Plataea after the victory, that we might probably refer another vow noticed by the historians and orators of the subsequent century, if that vow were not of suspicious authenticity. The Greeks, while promising faithful attachment, and continued peaceful dealing among themselves, and engaging at the same time to amerce in a tithe of their property all who had *medised*—are said to have vowed that they would not repair or rebuild the temples which the Persian invader had burnt; but would leave them in their half-ruined condition as a monument of his sacrilege. Some of the injured temples near Athens were seen in their half-burnt state even by the traveller Pausanias (x. 35, 2), in his time. Periklês,

forty years after the battle, tried to convoke a Pan-Hellenic assembly at Athens, for the purpose of deliberating what should be done with these temples (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17). Yet Theopompus pronounced this alleged oath to be a fabrication, though both the orator Lykurgus and Diodorus profess to report it verbatim. We may safely assert that the oath, *as they give it*, is not genuine; but perhaps the vow of tithing those who had voluntarily joined Xerxes, which Herodotus refers to an earlier period, when success was doubtful, may not have been renewed in the moment of victory: see Diodor. ix. 29; Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 19, p. 193; Polybius, ix. 33; Isokratês, Or. iv.; Panegyri. c. 41, p. 74; Theopompus, Fragm. 167, ed. Didot; Suidas, v. Δεκετῶθεν,

offensive operations against the Persians at Samos, for the rescue of Æonia—although Ionian envoys, especially from Chios and Samos, had urgently solicited aid both at Sparta and at Delos. Three Samians, one of them named Hegesistratus, came to assure Leotychildês, that their countrymen were ready to revolt from the despot Theomêstor, whom the Persians had installed there, so soon as the Greek fleet should appear off the island. In spite of emphatic appeals to the community of religion and race, Leotychildês was long deaf to the entreaty; but his reluctance gradually gave way before the persevering earnestness of the orator. While yet not thoroughly determined, he happened to ask the Samian speaker what was his name. To which the latter replied, "Hegesistratus, *i. e.* army-leader." "I accept Hegesistratus as an omen (replied Leotychildês, struck with the significance of this name), pledge thou thy faith to accompany us—let thy companions prepare the Samians to receive us, and we will go forthwith." Engagements were at once exchanged, and while the other two envoys were sent forward to prepare matters in the island, Hegesistratus remained to conduct the fleet, which was farther encouraged by favourable sacrifices, and by the assurances of the prophet Deïphonus, hired from the Corinthian colony of Apollonia.¹

When they reached the Heræum near Kalami in Samos,² and had prepared themselves for a naval engagement, they discovered that the enemy's fleet had already been withdrawn from the island to the neighbouring continent. For the Persian commanders had been so disheartened with the

The Persian fleet abandons Samos and retires to Mykalê in Æonia.

Cicero de Republicâ, iii. 9, and the beginning of the chapter last but one preceding, of this History.

¹ Herodot. ix. 91, 92, 95; viii. 132, 133. The prophet of Mardonius at Platæa bore the name—Hegesistratus: and was probably the more highly esteemed for it (Herodot. ix. 37).

Diodorus states the fleet as comprising 250 triremes (xi. 34).

The anecdotes respecting the Apolloniate Euenius, the father of Deïphonus, will be found curious

and interesting (Herodot. ix. 93, 94). Euenius, as a recompense for having been unjustly blinded by his countrymen, had received from the gods the grant of prophecy transmissible to his descendants: a new prophetic family was thus created, alongside of the Iamids, Telliads, Klytiads, &c.

² Herodot. ix. 96. ἐπει δὲ ἐγένοντο τῆς Σαμῆος πρὸς Καλάμισσι, οἱ μὲν αὐτοῦ ὀρμισάμενοι κατὰ τὸ Ἡραῖον τὸ ταύτην, παρεσκευάζοντο ἐς νουμαχίην.

It is by no means certain that

defeat of Salamis that they were not disposed to fight again at sea: we do not know the numbers of their fleet, but perhaps a considerable proportion of it may have consisted of Ionic Greeks, whose fidelity was now very doubtful. Having abandoned the idea of a sea-fight, they permitted their Phœnician squadron to depart, and sailed with their remaining fleet to the promontory of Mykalê near Miletus.¹ Here they were under the protection of a land-force of 60,000 men, under the command of Tigranês—the main reliance of Xerxes for the defence of Ionia. The ships were dragged ashore, and a rampart of stones and stakes was erected to protect them, while the defending army lined the shore, and seemed amply sufficient to repel attack from seaward.²

It was not long before the Greek fleet arrived. Disappointed of their intention of fighting, by the flight of the enemy from Samos, they had at first proposed either to return home, or to turn aside to the Hellespont: but they were at last persuaded by the Ionian envoys to pursue the enemy's fleet and again offer battle at Mykalê. On reaching that point, they discovered that the Persians had abandoned the sea, intending to fight only on land. So much had the Greeks now become emboldened, that they ventured to disembark and attack the united land-force and sea-force before them. But since much of their chance of success depended on the desertion of the Ionians, the first proceeding of Leotychidês was, to copy the previous manœuvre of Themistoklês, when retreating from Artemisium, at the watering-places of Eubœa. Sailing along

the Heræum here indicated is the celebrated temple which stood near the city of Samos (iii. 80): the words of Herodotus rather seem to indicate that another temple of Hêrê, in some other part of the island, is intended.

¹ Herodotus describes the Persian position by topographical indications known to his readers, but not open to be determined by us—Gæson, Skolopoeis, the chapel of Dêmêtêr, built by Philistus one of the primitive colonists of Miletus, &c. (ix. 96): from the lan-

guage of Herodotus, we may suppose that Gæson was the name of a town as well as of a river (Euphorus ap. Athenæ. vi. p. 311).

The eastern promontory (Cape Poscidiou) of Samos was separated only by seven stadia from Mykalê (Strabo, xiv. p. 637), near to the place where Glaukê was situated (Thucyd. viii. 79)—modern observers make the distance rather more than a mile (Poppo, Prolegg. ap. Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 465).

² Herodot. ix. 96, 97.

close to the coast, he addressed, through a herald of loud voice, earnest appeals to the Ionians among the enemy to revolt; calculating, even if they did not listen to him, that he should at least render them mistrusted by the Persians. He then disembarked his troops, and marshalled them for the purpose of attacking the Persian camp on land: while the Persian generals, surprised by this daring manifestation and suspecting, either from his manœuvre, or from previous evidences, that the Ionians were in secret collusion with him, ordered the Samian contingent to be disarmed, and the Milesians to retire to the rear of the army, for the purpose of occupying the various mountain roads up to the summit of Mykalê—with which the latter were familiar as a part of their own territory.¹

Serving as these Greeks in the fleet were, at a distance from their own homes, and having left a powerful army of Persians and Greeks under Mardonius in Bœotia, they were of course full of anxiety lest his arms might prove victorious and extinguish the freedom of their country. It was under these feelings of solicitude for their absent brethren that they disembarked, and were made ready for attack by the afternoon. But it was the afternoon of an ever-memorable day—the fourth of the month Boëdromion (about September), 479 B. C. By a remarkable coincidence, the victory of Plataea in Bœotia had been gained by Pausanias that very morning. At the moment when the Greeks were advancing to the charge, a divine Phê mê or message flew into the camp. Whilst a herald's staff was seen floated to the shore by the western wave, the symbol of electric transmission across the Ægean—the revelation, sudden, simultaneous, irresistible, struck at once upon the minds of all, as if the multitude had one common soul and sense, acquainting them that on that very morning their countrymen in Bœotia had gained a complete victory over Mardonius. At once the previous anxiety was dissipated, and the whole army, full of joy and confidence, charged with redoubled energy. Such is the account given by Herodotus,² and doubtless

The Greeks land to attack the Persians ashore—revelation of the victory of Plataea, gained by their countrymen on the same morning, is communicated to them before the battle.

¹ Herodot. ix. 98, 99, 104.

² Herodot. ix. 100, 101. ἰοῦσι δὲ σφι (Ἕλλησι) φήμη τε ἐσέπειτατο

ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον πᾶν, καὶ κηρυκίον ἐφάνη ἐπὶ τῆς κορυφῆς κείμενον. ἡ δὲ φήμη εἰρήληθῆσφι

universally accepted in his time, when the combatants of Mykalê were alive to tell their own story. He moreover

ὥδε, ὡς οἱ Ἕλληνες τὴν Μαρδονίου στρατιὴν νικῶεν ἐν Βοιωτίῃ μαχόμενοι. Δηλα δὴ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοις ἐστὶ τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμαμάτων· εἰ καὶ τότε τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης συμπιπτούσης τοῦ τε ἐν Πλαταιῶσι καὶ τοῦ ἐν Μυκάλλῃ μέλλοντος ἔσθαι τρώματος, φήμη τοῖσι Ἕλλησι τοῖσι ταύτῃ ἐσπίκετο, ὥστε θαρσῆσαι τε τὴν στρατιὴν πολλῇ μᾶλλον, καὶ ἐθέλειν προθυμότερον κινδυνεύειν. . . γεγονέναι δὲ νίκην τῶν μετὰ Πausanias Ἕλληγνων ὀρθῶς σφι ἢ φήμη συνέβαινε ἐλθούσα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐν Πλαταιῶσι πρῶτ' ἔτι τῆς ἡμέρης ἐγένετο· τὸ δὲ ἐν Μυκάλλῃ, περὶ δεῖλην. . . ἦν δὲ ἀρρωδίη σφι πρὶν τὴν φήμην ἐσπικέσθαι, οὗτι περὶ σφίων αὐτῶν οὔτω, ὡς τῶν Ἕλληγων, μὴ περὶ Μαρδονίῳ πταίσῃ ἢ Ἑλλάδι. ὡς μέντοι ἢ κληθῶν αὐτῇ σφι ἐσέπειτατο, μᾶλλον τι καὶ ταχύτερον τὴν πρόσοδον ἐποιεῦντο: compare Plutarch, Paul. Emilius, c. 24, 25, about the battle of Pydna.—The φήμη which circulated through the assembled army of Mardonius in Bœotia, respecting his intention to kill the Phokians, turned out incorrect (Herodot. ix. 17).

Two passages in Æschines (cont. Timarchum, c. 27, p. 57, and De Fals. Legat. c. 45, p. 290) are peculiarly valuable as illustrating the ancient idea of Φήμη—a divine voice or vocal goddess, generally considered as informing a crowd of persons at once, or moving them all by one and the same unanimous feeling—the Vox Dei passing into the Vox Populi. There was an altar to Φήμη at Athens (Pausan. i. 17, 1); compare Hesiod. Opp. Di. 761, and the Ὅσσα of Homer, which is essentially the same idea as Φήμη; Iliad, ii. 93. μετὰ δὲ σφισιν Ὅσσα δεδῶκε Ὀτρύνουσα ἱέται, Διὸς ἄγγελος; also Odyssey, i. 282—opposed to the idea of a distinct

human speaker or informant—ἦν τις τοι εἴπῃσι βροτῶν, ἢ Ὅσσα ἀκούσῃ; Ἐκ Διὸς, ἧτε μάλιστα φέροι κλέος ἀνθρώποισι; and Odys. xxiv. 412. Ὅσσα δ' ἄρ' ἄγγελος ὦκα κατὰ πόλιν ὄψετο πάντη, Μνηστήρων στυγερόν θάνατον καὶ κῆρ' ἐνέπουσα. The word κληθῶν is used in the same meaning by Sophoklès, Philoktet. 255: Κληθῶν at Smyrna had altars as a goddess, Aristeidès, Orat. xl. p. 507. ed. Dindorf, p. 724 (see Andokidès de Mysteriis, c. 22, p. 64): Herodotus in the passage now before us considers the two as identical—compare also Herodot. v. 72. Both words are used also to signify an omen conveyed by some undesigned human word or speech, which in that particular case is considered as determined by the special intervention of the gods, for the information of some person who hears it: see Homer, Odys. xx. 100: compare also Aristophan. Aves, 719: Sophoklès, Œdip. Tyr. 43-472; Xenophon, Symposion, c. 14. s. 48.

The descriptions of *Fama* by Virgil, Æneid, iv. 176 seq., and Ovid, Metamorph. xii. 40 seq., are more diffuse and overcharged, departing from the simplicity of the Greek conception.

We may notice, as partial illustrations of what is here intended, those sudden, unaccountable impressions of panic terror which occasionally ran through the ancient armies or assembled multitudes, and which were supposed to be produced by Pan or by Nymphs—indeed sudden, violent and contagious impressions of every kind, not merely of fear. Livy, x. 28. "Victorem equitatum velut *lymphaticus* pavor dissipat." ix. 27. "Milites, incertum ob quam causam, *lymphatis* similes ad arma

mentions another of those coincidences which the Greek mind always seized upon with so much avidity: there

discurrunt"—in Greek *συμρόλητοι*: compare Polyæn. iv. 3, 26, and an instructive note of Müttel, ad Quint. Curt. iv. 46, 1 (iv. 12, 14).

But I cannot better illustrate that idea which the Greeks invested with divinity under the name of *Φύμη* than by transcribing a striking passage from M. Michelet's *Histoire de la Révolution Française*. The illustration is the more instructive, because the religious point of view, which in Herodotus is predominant,—and which, to the believing mind, furnishes an explanation pre-eminently satisfactory—has passed away in the historian of the nineteenth century, and gives place to a graphic description of the real phenomenon, of high importance in human affairs; the common susceptibilities, common inspiration, and common spontaneous impulse, of a multitude, effacing for the time each man's separate individuality.

M. Michelet is about to describe that ever-memorable event—the capture of the Bastille, on the 14th of July, 1789 (ch. vii. vol. i. p. 105).

“Versailles, avec un gouvernement organisé, un roi, des ministres, un général, une armée, n'étoit qu'hésitation, doute, incertitude, dans la plus complète anarchie morale.

“Paris, bouleversé, délaissé de toute autorité légale, dans un désordre apparent, atteignit, le 14 Juillet, ce qui moralement est l'ordre le plus profond, l'unanimité des esprits.

“Le 13 Juillet, Paris ne songeait qu'à se défendre. Le 14, il attaqua.

“Le 13, au soir, il y avoit encore des doutes, il n'y en eut plus le

matin. Le soir étoit plein de troubles, de fureur désordonnée. Le matin fut lumineux et d'une sérénité terrible.

“*Une idée se leva sur Paris avec le jour, et tous virent la même lumière. Une lumière dans les esprits, et dans chaque cœur une voix: Va, et tu prendras la Bastille!*

“Cela étoit impossible, insensé, étrange à dire; . . . Et tous le crurent néanmoins. Et cela se fit.

“La Bastille, pour être une vieille forteresse, n'en étoit pas moins imprenable, à moins d'y mettre plusieurs jours, et beaucoup d'artillerie. Le peuple n'avoit en cette crise ni le temps ni les moyens de faire un siège régulier. L'eût-il fait, la Bastille n'avoit pas à craindre, ayant assez de vivres pour attendre un secours si proche, et d'immenses munitions de guerre. Ses murs de dix pieds d'épaisseur au sommet des tours, de trente et quarante à la base, pouvaient rire longtemps des boulets: et ses batteries, à elle, dont le feu plongeait sur Paris, auroient pu en attendant démolir tout le Marais, tout le Faubourg St. Antoine.

“L'attaque de la Bastille ne fut un acte nullement raisonnable. Ce fut un acte de foi.

“*Personne ne proposa. Mais tous crurent et tous agirent.* Le long des rucs, des quais, des ponts, des boulevards, la foule criait à la foule—A la Bastille—à la Bastille. Et dans le tocsin qui sonnoit, tous entendoient: A la Bastille.

“*Personne, je le répète, ne donna l'impulsion.* Les parleurs du Palais Royal passèrent le temps à dresser une liste de proscription, à juger à mort la Reine, le Polignac, Artois, le prévôt Flesselles, d'au-

was a chapel of the Eleusinian Dêmêtêr close to the field of battle at Mykalê, as well as at Plataea. Diodorus and other later writers,¹ who wrote when the impressions of the time had vanished, and when divine interventions were less easily and literally admitted, treat the whole proceeding as if it were a report designedly circulated by the generals, for the purpose of encouraging their army.

The Lacedæmonians on the right wing, and the portion of the army near them, had a difficult path before them, over hilly ground and ravine; while the Athenians, Corinthians, Sikyonians and Trœzenians, and the left half of the army, marching only along the beach, came much sooner into conflict with the enemy. The Persians, as at Plataea, employed their *gerrha*, or wicker bucklers planted by spikes in the ground, as a breastwork, from behind which they discharged their arrows; and they made a strenuous resistance to prevent this defence from being overthrown. Ultimately, the Greeks succeeded in demolishing it; driving the enemy into the interior of the fortification, where they in vain tried to maintain themselves against the ardour of their pursuers, who forced their way into it almost along with the defenders. Even when this last rampart was carried, and when the Persian allies had fled, the native Persians still continued to prolong the struggle with undiminished bravery. Unpractised in line and drill, and acting only in small knots,² with

Battle of Mykalê—revolt of the Ionians in the Persian camp—complete defeat of the Persians.

tres encore. Les noms des vainqueurs de la Bastille n'offrent pas un seul des faiseurs de motions. Le Palais Royal ne fut pas le point de départ, et ce n'est pas non plus au Palais Royal que les vainqueurs ramenèrent les dépouilles et les prisonniers.

"Encore moins les électeurs qui siégeaient à l'Hotel de ville eurent-ils l'idée de l'attaque. Loin de là, pour l'empêcher, pour prévenir le carnage que la Bastille pouvoit faire si aisément, ils allèrent jusqu'à promettre au gouverneur, que s'il retirait ses canons, on ne

l'attaqueroit pas. Les électeurs ne trahissoient pas comme ils en furent accusés; mais ils n'avoient pas la foi.

"Qui l'ent? Celui qui eut aussi le dévouement, la force, pour accomplir sa foi. Qui? Le peuple, tout le monde."

¹ Diodor. xi. 35; Polyæn. i. 33. Justin (ii. 14) is astonished in relating "tantam famæ velocitatem."

² Herodot. ix. 102, 103. Οὔτοι δὲ (Πέρσαι), κατ' ὀλίγους γινόμενοι, ἐμπαχοντο τοῖσι αἰεὶ ἐς τὸ ταῖχος ἐστιπύουσι Ἑλλήνων.

disadvantages of armour such as had been felt severely at Plataea, they still maintained an unequal conflict with the Greek hoplites; nor was it until the Lacedæmonians with their half of the army arrived to join in the attack that the defence was abandoned as hopeless. The revolt of the Ionians in the camp put the finishing stroke to this ruinous defeat. First, the disarmed Samians—next, other Ionians and Æolians—lastly, the Milesians, who had been posted to guard the passes in the rear—not only deserted, but took an active part in the attack. The Milesians especially, to whom the Persians had trusted for guidance up to the summits of Mykalê, led them by wrong roads, threw them into the hands of their pursuers, and at last set upon them with their own hands. A large number of the native Persians, together with both the generals of the land-force, Tigranês and Mardontês, perished in this disastrous battle: the two Persian admirals, Artayntês and Ithamithrês, escaped, but the army was irretrievably dispersed, while all the ships which had been dragged up on the shore fell into the hands of the assailants, and were burnt. But the victory of the Greeks was by no means bloodless. Among the left wing, upon which the brunt of the action had fallen, a considerable number of men were slain, especially Sikyonians, with their commander Perilaus.¹ The honours of the battle were awarded, first to the Athenians, next to the Corinthians, Sikyonians, and Trœzenians; the Lacedæmonians having done comparatively little. Hermolykus the Athenian, a celebrated pankratiast, was the warrior most distinguished for individual feats of arms.²

The dispersed Persian army, so much of it at least as had at first found protection on the heights of Mykalê, was withdrawn from the coast forthwith to Sardis under the command of Artayntês, whom Masistês, the brother of Xerxes, bitterly reproached on the score of cowardice in the recent defeat. The general was at length so maddened by a repetition of

Retirement of the defeated Persian army to Sardis.

¹ Herodot. ix. 104, 105. Diodorus (xi. 36) seems to follow different authorities from Herodotus: his statement varies in many particulars, but is less probable.

Herodotus does not specify the

loss on either side, nor Diodorus that of the Greeks; but the latter says that 10,000 Persians and allies were slain.

² Herodot. ix. 105.

these insults, that he drew his scimitar and would have slain Masistês, had he not been prevented by a Greek of Halikarnassus named Xenagoras,¹ who was rewarded by Xerxes with the government of Kilikia. Xerxes was still at Sardis, where he had remained ever since his return, and where he conceived a passion for the wife of his brother Masistês. The consequences of his passion entailed upon that unfortunate woman sufferings too tragical to be described, by the orders of his own queen, the jealous and savage Amêstris.² But he had no fresh army ready to send down to the coast; so that the Greek cities, even on the continent, were for the time practically liberated from Persian supremacy, while the insular Greeks were in a position of still greater safety.

The commanders of the victorious Grecian fleet, having full confidence in their power of defending the islands, willingly admitted the Chians, Samians, Lesbians, and the other islanders hitherto subjects of Persia, to the protection and reciprocal engagements of their alliance. We may presume that the despots Strattis and Theomêstor were expelled from Chios and Samos.³ But the Peloponnesian commanders hesitated in guaranteeing the same secure autonomy to the continental cities, which could not

Reluctance of the Spartans to adopt the continental Ionians into their alliance—proposition to transport them across the Ægean into Western Greece—rejected by the Athenians.

be upheld against the great inland power without efforts incessant as well as exhausting. Nevertheless not enduring to abandon these continental Ionians to the mercy of Xerxes, they made the offer to transplant them into European Greece, and to make room for them by expelling the *medising* Greeks from their sea-port towns. But this proposition was at once repudiated by the Athenians, who would not permit that colonies originally planted by themselves should be abandoned, thus impairing the metropolitan dignity of Athens.⁴ The Lacedæmonians readily acquiesced in this objection, and were glad, in all probability, to find honour-

¹ Herodot. ix. 107. I do not know whether we may suppose Herodotus to have heard this from his fellow-citizen Xenagoras.

² Herodot. ix. 108-113. He gives the story at considerable length: it illustrates forcibly and painfully

the interior of the Persian regal palace.

³ Herodot. viii. 132.

⁴ Herodot. ix. 106; Diodor. xi. 37. The latter represents the Ionians and Æolians as having actually consented to remove into European

able grounds for renouncing a scheme of wholesale dis-possession eminently difficult to execute¹—yet at the same time to be absolved from onerous obligations towards the Ionians, and to throw upon Athens either the burden of defending or the shame of abandoning them. The first step was thus taken, which we shall quickly see followed by others, for giving to Athens a separate ascendancy and separate duties in regard to the Asiatic Greeks, and for introducing first, the confederacy of Delos—next, Athenian maritime empire.

From the coast of Ionia the Greek fleet sailed northward to the Hellespont, chiefly at the instance of the Athenians, and for the purpose of breaking down the Xerxeian bridge. For so imperfect was their information, that they believed this bridge to be still firm and in passable condition in September 479 B.C., though it had been broken and useless at the time when Xerxes crossed the strait in his retreat, ten months before (about November 480 B.C.).² Having ascertained on their arrival at Abydos the destruction of the bridge, Leotychidês and the Peloponnesians returned home forthwith; but Xanthippus with the Athenian squadron resolved to remain and expel the Persians from the Thracian Chersonese. This peninsula had been in great part an Athenian possession, for the space of more than forty years, from the first settlement of the elder Miltiadês³ down to the suppression of the Ionic revolt, although during part of that time tributary to Persia. From the flight of the second Miltiadês to the expulsion of Xerxes from Greece (493-480 B.C.), a period during which the Persian monarch was irresistible and full of hatred to Athens, no

The Grecian fleet sails to the Hellespont: the Spartans return home, but the Athenians remain to attack the Chersonese.

Greece, and indeed the Athenians themselves as having at first consented to it, though the latter afterwards repented and opposed the scheme.

¹ Such wholesale transportations of population from one continent to another have always been more or less in the habits of Oriental despots, the Persians in ancient times and the Turks in more modern times: to a conjunction of free states like the Greeks they must

have been impracticable.

See Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reichs*, vol. i. book vi. p. 251, for the forced migrations of people from Asia into Europe directed by the Turkish Sultan Bajazet (A.D. 1390-1400).

² Herodot. viii. 115, 117; ix. 106, 114.

³ See the preceding volume of this History, ch. xxx., ch. xxxiv., ch. xxxv.

Athenian citizen would find it safe to live there. But the Athenian squadron from Mykalê were now naturally eager both to re-establish the ascendancy of Athens, and to regain the properties of Athenian citizens in the Chersonese. Probably many of the leading men, especially Kimon son of Miltiadês, had extensive possessions there to recover, as Alkibiadês had in after days, with private forts of his own.¹ To this motive for attacking the Chersonese may be added another—the importance of its corn-produce, as well as of a clear passage through the Hellespont for the corn ships out of the Propontis to Athens and Ægina.² Such were the reasons which induced Xanthippus and the leading Athenians, even without the cooperation of the Peloponnesians, to undertake the siege of Sestus—the strongest place in the peninsula, the key of the strait, and the centre in which all the neighbouring Persian garrisons, from Kardia and elsewhere, had got together under Eobazus and Artayktês.³

The Grecian inhabitants of the Chersonese readily joined the Athenians in expelling the Persians, who, taken altogether by surprise, had been constrained to throw themselves into Sestus, without stores of provisions or means of making a long defence. But of all the Chersonesites the most forward and exasperated were the inhabitants of Elæus—the southernmost town of the peninsula, celebrated for its tomb, temple, and sacred grove of the hero Protesilaus, who figured in the Trojan legend as the foremost warrior in the host of Agamemnon to leap ashore, and as the first victim to the spear of Hektor. The temple of Protesilaus, conspicuously placed on the seashore,⁴ was a scene of worship and pilgrimage not merely for the inhabitants of Elæus, but also for the neighbouring Greeks generally, insomuch that it had been enriched with ample votive offerings and probably deposits for security—money, gold and silver saucers, brazen implements, robes, and various other presents. The story ran that when Xerxes

¹ Xenoph. Hellen. i. 5, 17. τὰ ἐλευπόῦ τείχη.

² Herodot. vii. 147. Schol. ad Aristophan. Equites, 262.

In illustration of the value set by Athens upon the command of Hellespont, see Demosthenês, De

Fals. Legat. c. 59.

³ Herodot. ix. 114, 115. Σηστόν—φρούριον καὶ φυλακὴν τοῦ παντός Ἑλλησπόντου—Thucyd. viii. 62: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. 1, 25.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 102.

was on his march across the Hellespont into Greece, Artayktês, greedy of all this wealth, and aware that the monarch would not knowingly permit the sanctuary to be despoiled, preferred a wily request to him—"Master, here is the house of a Greek, who in invading thy territory met his just reward and perished: I pray thee give his house to me, in order that people may learn for the future not to invade *thy* land"—the whole soil of Asia being regarded by the Persian monarchs as their rightful possession, and Protesilaus having been in this sense an aggressor against them. Xerxes, interpreting the request literally, and not troubling himself to ask who the invader was, consented: upon which, Artayktês, while the army were engaged in their forward march into Greece, stripped the sacred grove of Protesilaus, carrying all the treasures to Sestus. He was not content without still farther outraging Grecian sentiment: he turned cattle into the grove, ploughed and sowed it, and was even said to have profaned the sanctuary by visiting it with his concubines.¹ Such proceedings were more than enough to raise the strongest antipathy against him among the Chersonesite Greeks, who now crowded to reinforce the Athenians and blocked him up in Sestus. After a certain length of siege, the stock of provisions in the town failed, and famine began to make itself felt among the garrison; which nevertheless still held out, by painful shifts and endurance, until a late period in the autumn, when the patience even of the Athenian besiegers was well nigh exhausted. It was with difficulty that the leaders repressed the clamorous desire manifested in their own camp to return to Athens.

Impatience having been appeased, and the seamen kept together, the siege was pressed without relaxation, and presently the privations of the garrison became intolerable; so that Artayktês and Gobazus were at last reduced to the necessity of escaping by stealth, letting themselves down with a few followers from the wall at a point where it was imperfectly blockaded. Gobazus found his way into Thrace, where however he was taken captive by the Abyssinian

Capture of Sestus — crucifixing of Artayktês.

¹ Herodot. ix. 116: compare i. 4. Ἀρταύκτης, ἀνὴρ Πέρσης, θεινός δὲ καὶ ἀτάσθαλος· ὅς καὶ βασιλέα ἐλαύνοντα ἐπ' Ἀθήνας ἐξηπάτησε, τὰ

Πρωτεσίλω τοῦ Ἰφικλοῦ χρήματα ἐξ Ἐλαιῶντος ὑπελόμενος. Compare Herodot. ii. 64.

natives and offered up as a sacrifice to their god Pleistôrus: Artayktês fled northward along the shores of the Hellespont, but was pursued by the Greeks, and made prisoner near Ægospotami, after a strenuous resistance. He was brought with his son in chains to Sestus, which immediately after his departure had been cheerfully surrendered by its inhabitants to the Athenians. It was in vain that he offered a sum of 100 talents as compensation to the treasury of Protesilaus, and a farther sum of 200 talents to the Athenians as personal ransom for himself and his son. So deep was the wrath inspired by his insults to the sacred ground, that both the Athenian commander Xanthippus, and the citizens of Elæus, disdained everything less than a severe and even cruel personal atonement for the outraged Protesilaus. Artayktês, after having first seen his son stoned to death before his eyes, was hung up to a lofty board fixed for the purpose, and left to perish, on the spot where the Xerxeian bridge had been fixed.¹ There is something in this proceeding more Oriental than Grecian: it is not in the Grecian character to aggravate death by artificial and lingering preliminaries.

After the capture of Sestus the Athenian fleets returned home with their plunder, towards the commencement of winter, not omitting to carry with them the vast cables of the Xerxeian bridge, which had been taken in the town, as a trophy to adorn the acropolis of Athens.²

¹ Herodot. ix. 118, 119, 120. Οἱ γὰρ Ἐλαίουσιαι τιμωρόντες τῷ Πρωτεσίλαφ ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτη ὁ νόσος ἔφερε.

² Herodot. ix. 121. It must be either to the joint Grecian armament of this year, or to that of the former year, that Plutarch must intend his celebrated story respecting the proposition advanced by Themistoklès and condemned by Aristeidès, to apply (Plutarch, Themistoklès, c. 20; Aristeidès, c. 22). He tells us that the Greek fleet was all assembled to pass the winter in the Thessa-

lian harbour of Pagasæ, when Themistoklès formed the project of burning all the other Grecian ships except the Athenian, in order that no city except Athens might have a naval force. Themistoklès (he tells us) intimated to the people, that he had a proposition, very advantageous to the state, to communicate; but that it could not be publicly proclaimed and discussed: upon which they desired him to mention it privately to Aristeidès. Themistoklès did so; and Aristeidès told the people, that the project was at once eminently ad-

vantageous and not less eminently unjust. Upon which the people renounced it forthwith, without asking what it was.

Considering the great celebrity which this story has obtained, some allusion to it was necessary, though it has long ceased to be received as matter of history. It is quite inconsistent with the narrative of Herodotus, as well as with all the conditions of the time: Pagasæ was *Thessalian*, and as such, hostile to the Greek fleet rather than otherwise: the fleet seems to have never been there: moreover we may add, that taking matters as they then stood, when

the fear from Persia was not at all terminated, the Athenians would have lost more than they gained by burning the ships of the other Greeks, so that Themistoklès was not very likely to conceive the scheme, nor Aristeidès to describe it in the language put into his mouth.

The story is probably the invention of some Greek of the Platonic age, who wished to contrast justice with expediency and Aristeidès with Themistoklès—as well as to bestow at the same time panegyric upon Athens in the days of her glory.

CHAPTER XLIII.

EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE EXPULSION OF THE GELONIAN DYNASTY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND.

I HAVE already mentioned, in the preceding volume of this History, the foundation of the Greek colonies in Italy and Sicily, together with the general fact, that in the sixth century before the Christian æra, they were among the most powerful and flourishing cities that bore the Hellenic name. Beyond this general fact, we obtain little insight into their history.

Though Syracuse, after it fell into the hands of Gelo, about 485 B.C., became the most powerful city in Sicily, yet in the preceding century Gela and Agrigentum, on the south side of the island, had been its superiors. The latter, within a few years of its foundation, fell under the dominion of one of its own citizens named Phalaris; a despot energetic, warlike, and cruel. An exile from Astypalæa near Rhodes, but a rich man, and an early settler at Agrigentum, he contrived to make himself despot seemingly about the year 570 B.C. He had been named to one of the chief posts in the city, and having undertaken at his own cost the erection of a temple to Zeus Polieus in the acropolis (as the Athenian Alkmæônids rebuilt the burnt temple of Delphi), he was allowed on this pretence to assemble therein a considerable number of men; whom he armed, and availed himself of the opportunity of a festival of Dêmêtêr to turn them against the people. He is said to have made many conquests over the petty Sikan communities in the neighbourhood; but exaction and cruelties towards his own subjects are noticed as his most prominent characteristic, and his brazen bull passed into imperishable memory. This piece of mechanism was hollow, and sufficiently capacious to

Agrigentum and Gela superior to Syracuse before 500 B.C.—Phalaris despot of Agrigentum.

contain one or more victims enclosed within it, to perish in tortures when the metal was heated: the cries of these suffering prisoners passed for the roarings of the animal. The artist was named Perillus, and is said to have been himself the first person burnt in it by order of the despot. In spite of the odium thus incurred, Phalaris maintained himself as despot for sixteen years; at the end of which period, a general rising of the people, headed by a leading man named Telemachus, terminated both his reign and his life.¹ Whether Telemachus became despot or not, we have no information: sixty years afterwards, we shall find his descendant Thêro established in that position.

It was about the period of the death of Phalaris that the Syracusans reconquered their revolted colony of Kamarina (in the south-east of the island between Syracuse and Gela), expelled or dispossessed the inhabitants, and resumed the territory.² With the exception of this accidental circumstance, we are without information about the Sicilian cities until a time rather before 500 B.C., just when the war between Kroton and Sybaris had extinguished the power of the latter, and when the despotism of the Peisistratids at Athens had been exchanged for the democratical constitution of Kleisthenês.

Syracuse
in 500 B.C.
—oligarchical
government under
the Gamori
or privi-
leged des-
cendants
of the ori-
ginal pro-
prietary
colonists—
the Demos
—the
Kyllyrii
or Serfs.

¹ Everything which has ever been said about Phalaris is noticed and discussed in the learned and acute Dissertation of Bentley on the Letters of Phalaris: compare also Seyffert, Akragas und sein Gebiet, p. 57-61, who however treats the pretended letters of Phalaris with more consideration than the readers of Dr. Bentley will generally be disposed to sanction.

The story of the brazen bull of Phalaris seems to rest on sufficient evidence: it is expressly mentioned by Pindar, and the bull itself, after having been carried away to Carthage when the Carthaginians took Agrigentum, was restored to the Agrigentines by Scipio when he took Carthage. See Aristot. Polit. v. 8, 4; Pindar, Pyth. i. 185;

Polyb. xii. 25; Diodor. xiii. 90; Cicero in Verr. iv. 33.

It does not appear that Timæus really called in question the historical reality of the bull of Phalaris, though he has been erroneously supposed to have done so. Timæus affirmed that the bull which was shown in his own time at Agrigentum was not the identical machine: which was correct, for it must have been *then* at Carthage, from whence it was not restored to Agrigentum until after 146 B.C. See a note of Boeckh on the Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. i. 185.

² Thucyd. vi. 5; Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. v. 19: compare Wesseling ad Diodor. xi. 76.

The first forms of government among the Sicilian Greeks, as among the cities of Greece Proper in the early historical age, appear to have been all oligarchical. We do not know under what particular modifications they were kept up, but probably all more or less resembled that of Syracuse, where the Gamori (or wealthy proprietors descended from the original colonising chiefs), possessing large landed properties tilled by a numerous Sikel serf population called Killyrii, formed the qualified citizens—out of whom, as well as by whom, magistrates and generals were chosen; while the Demos, or non-privileged freemen, comprised, first, the small proprietary cultivators who maintained themselves, by manual labour and without slaves, from their own lands or gardens—next, the artisans and tradesmen. In the course of two or three generations, many individuals of the privileged class would have fallen into poverty, and would find themselves more nearly on a par with the non-privileged; while such members of the latter as might rise to opulence were not for that reason admitted into the privileged body. Here were ample materials for discontent. Ambitious leaders, often themselves members of the privileged body, put themselves at the head of the popular opposition, overthrew the oligarchy, and made themselves despots; democracy being at that time hardly known anywhere in Greece. The general fact of this change, preceded by occasional violent dissensions among the privileged class themselves,¹ is all that we are permitted to know, without those modifying circumstances by which it must have been accompanied in every separate city. Towards or near the year 500 B.C., we find Anaxilaus despot at Rhegium, Skythês at Zanklê, Têrillus at Himera, Peithagoras at Selinus, Kleander at Gela, and Panætius at Leontini.² It was about the year 509 B.C. that the Spartan prince Dorieus conducted a body of emigrants to the territories of Eryx and Eggesta, near the north-western corner of the island,

Early governments of the Greek cities in Sicily—original oligarchies subverted in many places by despots—attempted colony of the Spartan prince Dorieus.

¹ At Gela, Herodot. vii. 153; at Syracuse, Aristot. Politic. v. 3, 1.

² Aristot. Politic. v. 8, 4; v. 10, 4. Καὶ εἰς τυραννίδα μεταβάλλει ἐξ ὀλιγαρχίας, ὥσπερ ἐν Σικελίᾳ σχε-

δὸν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν ἀρχαίων ἐν Λεοντίνοις εἰς τὴν Παναϊτίου τυραννίδα, καὶ ἐν Γέλα, εἰς τὴν Κλεάνδρου, καὶ ἐν ἄλλαις πολλαῖς πόλεσιν ὡσαύτως

in hopes of expelling the non-Hellenic inhabitants and found a new Grecian colony. But the Carthaginians, whose Sicilian possessions were close adjoining and who had already aided in driving Dorieus from a previous establishment at Kinyps in Libya,—now lent such vigorous assistance to the Egestæan inhabitants, that the Spartan prince, after a short period of prosperity, was defeated and slain with most of his companions. Such of them as escaped, under the orders of Euryleon, took possession of Minoa, which bore from henceforward the name of Herakleia¹—a colony and dependency of the neighbouring town of Selinus, of which Peithagoras was then despot. Euryleon joined the malcontents at Selinus, overthrew Peithagoras, and established himself as despot, until, after a short possession of power, he was slain in a popular mutiny.²

We are here introduced to the first known instance of that series of contests between the Phœnicians and Greeks in Sicily, which, like the struggles between the Saracens and the Normans in the eleventh and twelfth centuries after the Christian æra, were destined to determine whether the island should be a part of Africa or a part of Europe—and which were only terminated, after the lapse of three centuries, by the absorption of both into the vast bosom of Rome. It seems that the Carthaginians and Egestæans not only overwhelmed Dorieus, but also made some conquests of the neighbouring Grecian possessions, which were subsequently recovered by Gelo of Syracuse.³

Not long after the death of Dorieus, Kleander despot of Gela began to raise his city to ascendancy over the other Sicilian Greeks, who had hitherto been, if not all equal, at least all independent. His powerful mercenary force, levied in part among the Sikel tribes,⁴ did not

¹ Diodorus ascribes the foundation of Herakleia to Dorieus: this seems not consistent with the account of Herodotus, unless we are to assume that the town of Herakleia which Dorieus founded was destroyed by the Carthaginians, and that the name Herakleia was afterwards given by Euryleon or his successors to that which had before been called Minoa (Diodor. iv. 23).

A funereal monument in honour of Athenæus, one of the settlers who perished with Dorieus, was seen by Pausanias at Sparta (Pausanias, iii. 16, 4).

² Herodot. v. 43, 46.

³ Herodot. vii. 15². The extreme brevity of his allusion is perplexing, as we have no collateral knowledge to illustrate it.

⁴ Polyænus, v. 6.

preserve him from the sword of a Geloan citizen named Sabyllus, who slew him after a reign of seven years: but it enabled his brother and successor Hippokratês to extend his dominion over nearly half of the island. In that mercenary force two officers, Gelo and Ænesidêmus (the latter a citizen of Agrigentum, of the conspicuous family of the Emmenidæ, and descended from Telemachus the deposer of Phalaris), particularly distinguished themselves. Gelo was descended from a native of Têlos near the Triopian Cape, one of the original settlers who accompanied the Rhodian Antiphêmus to Sicily. His immediate ancestor, named Têlinês, had first raised the family to distinction by valuable aid to a defeated political party, who had been worsted in a struggle and forced to seek shelter in the neighbouring town of Maktorium. Têlinês was possessed of certain peculiar sacred rites (or visible and portable holy symbols, with a privileged knowledge of the ceremonial acts and formalities of divine service under which they were to be shown) for propitiating the Subterranean Goddesses, Dêmêtêr and Persephonê: "from whom he obtained them, or how he got at them himself (says Herodotus), I cannot say;" but such was the imposing effect of his presence and manner of exhibiting them, that he ventured to march into Gela at the head of the exiles from Maktorium, and was enabled to reinstate them in power—detering the people from resistance in the same manner as the Athenians had been overawed by the spectacle of Phyê-Athênê in the chariot along with Peisistratus. The extraordinary boldness of this proceeding excites the admiration of Herodotus, especially as he had been informed that Têlinês was of an unwarlike temperament. The restored exiles rewarded it by granting to him, and to his descendants after him, the hereditary dignity of hierophants of the two goddesses¹—a function certainly honourable, and probably lucrative, connected with the adminis-

¹ See about Têlinês and this hereditary priesthood, Herodot. vii. 153. τούτους ὦν ὁ Τηλίνης κατήγαγε ἐς Γέλην, ἔχων οὐδεμίαν ἀνδρῶν δύναμιν, ἀλλ' ἰρὰ τούτων τῶν θεῶν. ἔθεν δὲ αὐτὰ ἔλαβε, ἣ αὐτός ἐκτίσατο, τούτο οὐκ ἔχω εἶπαι. τούτοιαι δὲ ὦν

πίσυνος ἑὼν, κατήγαγε, ἐπ' ᾧ τε οἱ ἀπόγονοι αὐτοῦ ἱεροφάνται τῶν θεῶν ἔσσονται: compare a previous passage of this History, vol. i. chap. i.

It appears from Pindar that Hiero exercised this hereditary priesthood (Olymp. v. 160 (95), with the Scholia

tration of consecrated property and with the enjoyment of a large portion of its fruits.

ad loc. and Scholia ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 27).

About the story of Phylé personifying Athênê at Athens, see above, ch. xxx. of this History.

The ancient religious worship addressed itself more to the eye than to the ear; the words spoken were of less importance than the things exhibited, the persons performing, and the actions done. The vague sense of the Greek and Latin neuter, *ἱερά* or *sacra*, includes the entire ceremony, and is difficult to translate into a modern language: but the verbs connected with it, *ἔχειν*, *κακτῆσθαι*, *κομίζειν*, *φάνειν*, *ἱερά*—*ἱεροφάντης*, &c., relate to exhibition and action. This was particularly the case with the mysteries (or solemnities not thrown open to the general public, but accessible only to those who went through certain preliminary forms, and under certain restrictions) in honour of Dêmêtêr and Persephonê, as well as of other deities in different parts of Greece. The *λεγόμενα*, or things *said* on these occasions, were of less importance than the *δεικνόμενα* and *δρώμενα*, or *matters shown and things done* (see Pausanias, ii. 37, 3). Herodotus says about the lake of Sais in Egypt, 'Ἐν δὲ τῇ λίμνῃ ταύτῃ τὰ δεικνύμενα τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ (of Osiris) *νοκτὶς ποιέσσι*, τὰ καλέουσι *μυστήρια Αἰγύπτου*: he proceeds to state that the Thesmophoria celebrated in honour of Dêmêtêr in Greece were of the same nature, and gives his opinion that they were imported into Greece from Egypt. Homer (Hymn. Cerer. 476); compare Pausan. ii. 14, 2.

Δεῖξεν Τριπολέμφ τε, Διόκλει τε
πληξίπῳ

Δρημοσούνην ἱερῶν καὶ ἐπέ-
φραδεν ἔργια παισὶ

Πρεσβυτέρης Κελείου....

Ὅλβιος, ὅς τὰ δ' ἔπωπεν ἐπι-
χθολίων ἀνθρώπων, &c.

Compare Eurip. Hippolyt. 25; Pindar, Fragm. xevi.; Sophokl. Frag. lviii. ed. Brunck; Plutarch, De Profect. in Virtute, c. 10, p. 81: De Isid. et Osir. p. 353, c. 3. ὡς γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐν θορόβῳ καὶ βοῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι συνίασι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν, προσέχουσι ἤδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς: and Isokratês, Panegyric, c. 6, about Eleusis, τὰ ἱερά καὶ νῦν δεικνυμεν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐνιαυτόν. These mysteries consisted thus chiefly of exhibition and action addressed to the eyes of the communicants, and Clemens Alexandrinus calls them a mystic drama—Δρῶ καὶ Κόρη δράμα ἐγενέσθαι μυστικόν, καὶ τῆν πλάνην καὶ τῆν ἀρμαγῆν καὶ τὸ πένθος ἢ Ἐλευσίς δαδούχει. The word *ἔργια* is originally nothing more than a consecrated expression for *ἔργα*—*ἱερά ἔργα* (see Pausanias, iv. 1, 4, 5), though it comes afterwards to designate the whole ceremony, matters shown as well as matters done—τὰ ἔργια κομίζων—*ἔργιων παντοίων συνθέτης*, &c.: compare Plutarch, Alkibiad. 22-34.

The sacred objects exhibited formed an essential part of the ceremony, together with the chest in which such of them as were moveable were brought out—*τελετῆς ἐχόμενα μυστιδὰ χίστην* (Nonnus, ix. 127). Æschines, in assisting the religious lustrations performed by his mother, was bearer of the chest—*χιστοφόρος καὶ λιανοφόρος* (Demosthen. de Coronâ, c. 79. p. 313). Clemens Alexandrinus (Cohort. ad Gent. p. 14) describes

Gelo thus belonged to an ancient and distinguished hierophantic family at Gela, being the eldest of four brothers, sons of Deinomenes—Gelo, Hiero, Polyzelus and Thrasybulus: and he further ennobled himself by such personal exploits, in the army of the despot Hippokratês, as to be promoted to the supreme command of the cavalry. It was greatly to the activity of Gelo that the despot owed a succession of victories and conquests, in which the Ionic or Chalkidic cities of Kallipolis, Naxos,

the objects which were contained in these mystic chests of the Eleusinian mysteries—cakes of particular shape, pomegranates, salt, ferules, ivy, &c. The communicant was permitted, as a part of the ceremony, to take these out of the chest and put them into a basket, afterwards putting them back again—“Jejunavi et ebibi cyceonem: ex cistâ sumpsi et in calathum misi: accipi rursus, in cistulam transtuli” (Arnobius ad Gent. v. p. 175, ed. Elmenhorst), while the uninitiated were excluded from seeing it, and forbidden from looking at it “even from the house-top.”

Τὸν κάλαθον κατιόντα χαμαὶ θασεῖσθε
βέβαλοι

Μήδ' ἀπὸ τῶ τέγροσ.

(Kallimachus, Hymn. in Cererem, 4.)

Lobeck, in his learned and excellent treatise, *Aglaophamus* (i. p. 51), says, “Sacrorum nomine tam Græci, quam Romani, præcipuè signa et imagines Deorum, omnemque sacram supellectilem dignari solent. Quæ res animum illuc potius inclinât, ut putem Hierophantæ ejusmodi ἱερά in conspectum hominum protulisse, sive deorum simulacra, sive vasa sacra et instrumenta aliave prisæ religionis monumenta; qualia in sacrario Eleusinio asservata fuisse, etsi nullo testimonio affirmare possumus, tamen probabilitatis speciem habet testimonio similem.

Namque non solum in templis ferè omnibus cimelia venerandæ antiquitatis condita erant, sed in mysteriis ipsis talium rerum mentio occurrit, quas initiati summâ cum veneratione aspicerent, non initiatis ne aspicere quidem liceret. . . . Ex his testimoniis efficitur (p. 61) sacra quæ Hierophanta ostendit, illa ipse fuisse ἄγρια φάσματα sive simulacra Deorum, eorumque aspectum qui præbeant δεῖξαι τὰ ἱερά vel πρῆξαι vel φαῖναι dici, et ab hoc quasi primario Hierophantæ actu tum Eleusiniorum sacerdotum principem nomen accepisse, tum totum negotium esse nuncupatum.”

Compare also K. F. Hermann, *Gottesdienstliche Alterthümer der Griechen*, part ii. ch. ii. sect. 32.

A passage in Cicero de *Haruspicum Responsis* (c. 11), which is transcribed almost entirely by Arnobius adv. Gentes, iv. p. 148, demonstrates the minute precision required at Rome in the performance of the festival of the Megalesia: the smallest omission or alteration was supposed to render the festival unsatisfactory to the gods.

The memorable history of the Holy Tunic at Treves in 1845, shows what immense and wide-spread effect upon the human mind may be produced, even in the nineteenth century, by ἱερά δεικνύμενα.

Leontini and Zanklê, were successively reduced to dependence.¹

The fate of Zanklê—seemingly held by its despot Skythês in a state of dependent alliance under Hippokratês, and in standing feud with Anaxilaus of Rhegium on the opposite side of the strait of Messina—was remarkable. At the time when the Ionic revolt in Asia was suppressed, and Milêtus reconquered by the Persians (B.C. 494, 493), a natural sympathy was manifested by the Ionic Greeks in Sicily towards the sufferers of the same race on the east of the Ægean sea. Projects were devised for assisting the Asiatic refugees to a new abode; and the Zanklæans, especially, invited them to form a new Pan-Ionic colony upon the territory of the Sikels, called Kalê Aktê, on the north coast of Sicily; a coast presenting fertile and attractive situations, and along the whole line of which there was only one Grecian colony—Himera. This invitation was accepted by the refugees from Samos and Milêtus, who accordingly put themselves on shipboard for Zanklê; steering, as was usual, along the coast of Akarnania to Korkyra, from thence across to Tarentum, and along the Italian coast to the strait of Messina. It happened that when they reached the town of Epizephyrian Lokri, Skythês, the despot of Zanklê, was absent from his city, together with the larger portion of his military force, on an expedition against the Sikels—perhaps undertaken to facilitate the contemplated colony at Kalê Aktê. His enemy the Rhegian prince Anaxilaus, taking advantage of this accident, proposed to the refugees at Lokri that they should seize for themselves, and retain, the unguarded city of Zanklê. They followed his suggestion, and possessed themselves of the city, together with the families and property of the absent Zanklæans; who speedily returned to repair their loss, while their prince Skythês farther invoked the powerful aid of his ally and superior, Hippokratês. The latter, however, provoked at the loss of one of his dependent cities, seized and imprisoned Skythês, whom he considered as the cause of it,² at Inykus, in the interior of

Fate of the Ionic town of Zanklê, afterwards Messina—it is seized by the Samians—conduct of Hippokratês.

¹ Herodot. vii. 151.

² Herodot. vi. 22, 23. Σκόθητι μὲν τῶν μούσων τῶν Ζαγκλαίων, ὡς ἀποβλήντα τῆν πόλιν, ὁ Ἴπποκράτης

πεδύρας, καὶ τὸν ἀδελφεὸν αὐτοῦ Πυθογένεα, ἐς Ἴνυκον πόλιν ἀπέπεμψε.

The words ὡς ἀποβλήντα seem to imply the relation pre-existing

the island. But he found it at the same time advantageous to accept a proposition made to him by the Samians, captors of the city, and to betray the Zanklæans whom he had come to aid. By a convention ratified with an oath, it was agreed that Hippokratês should receive for himself all the extra-mural, and half the intra-mural, property and slaves belonging to the Zanklæans, leaving the other half to the Samians. Among the property without the walls, not the least valuable part consisted in the persons of those Zanklæans whom Hippokratês had come to assist, but whom he now carried away as slaves: excepting however from this lot, three hundred of the principal citizens, whom he delivered over to the Samians to be slaughtered—probably lest they might find friends to procure their ransom, and afterwards disturb the Samian possession of the town. Their lives were however spared by the Samians, though we are not told what became of them. This transaction, alike perfidious on the part of the Samians and of Hippokratês, secured to the former a flourishing city, and to the latter an abundant booty. We are glad to learn that the imprisoned Skythês found means to escape to Darius, king of Persia, from whom he received a generous shelter: imperfect compensation for the iniquity of his fellow Greeks.¹ The Samians however did not long retain possession of their conquest, but were expelled by the very person who had instigated them to seize it—Anaxilaus of Rhegium. He planted in it new inhabitants, of Dorian and Messenian race, recolonizing it under the name of Messênê—a name which it ever afterwards bore;² and it appears to have been governed either by himself or by his son Kleophon, until his death about B.C. 476.

Besides the conquests above-mentioned, Hippokratês of Gela was on the point of making the still more important acquisition of Syracuse, and was only prevented from doing so, after defeating the Syracusans at the river Helôrus, and capturing many prisoners, by the mediation of

between Hippokratês and Skythês, as superior and subject; and punishment inflicted by the former upon the latter for having lost an important post.

¹ Herodot. vi. 23, 24. Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 2, 11) represents the Samians as having been first actu-

ally received into Zanklê, and afterwards expelling the prior inhabitants: his brief notice is not to be set against the perspicuous narrative of Herodotus.

² Thucyd. vi. 4; Schol. ad Pindar. *Pyth.* ii. 84; Diodor. xi. 43.

the Corinthians and Korkyræans, who prevailed on him to be satisfied with the cession of Kamarina and its territory as a ransom. Having re-peopled this territory, which became thus annexed to Gela, he was prosecuting his conquests farther among the Sikels, when he died or was killed at Hybla. His death caused a mutiny among the Geloans, who refused to acknowledge his sons, and strove to regain their freedom; but Gelo, the general of horse in the army, espousing the cause of the sons with energy, put down by force the resistance of the people. As soon as this was done, he threw off the mask, deposed the sons of Hippokratês, and seized the sceptre himself.¹

Hippokratês is victorious over the Syracusans—takes Kamarina—dies—Gelo becomes in his place despot of Gela.

Thus master of Gela, and succeeding probably to the ascendancy enjoyed by his predecessor over the Ionic cities, Gelo became the most powerful man in the island;

B. C. 491.

but an incident which occurred a few years afterwards (B. C. 485), while it aggrandised him still farther, transferred the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse. The Syracusan Gamori, or oligarchical order of proprietary families, probably humbled by their ruinous defeat at the Helôrus, were dispossessed of the government by a combination between their serf-cultivators called the Killyrii, and the smaller freemen called the Demos; they were forced to retire to Kasmenæ, where they invoked the aid of Gelo to restore them. That ambitious prince undertook the task, and accomplished it with facility; for the Syracusan people, probably unable to resist their political opponents when backed by such powerful foreign aid, surrendered to him without striking a blow.² But instead of restoring the

Greatness of Gelo—he gets possession of Syracuse—and transfers the seat of his power from Gela to Syracuse.

¹ Herodot. vii. 155; Thucyd. vi. 5. The ninth Nemean Ode of Pindar (v. 40), addressed to Chromius the friend of Hiero of Syracuse, commemorates, among other exploits, his conduct at the battle of the Helôrus.

² Herodot. vii. 155. Ὁ γὰρ ὀῆμος ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων ἐπιόντι Γέλωνι παραδίδοι τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἐωυτόν.

Aristotle (Politie. v. 2, 6) alludes

to the Syracusan democracy prior to the despotism of Gelo as a case of democracy ruined by its own lawlessness and disorder. But such can hardly have been the fact, if the narrative of Herodotus is to be trusted. The expulsion of the Gamori was not an act of lawless democracy, but the rising of free subjects and slaves against a governing oligarchy. After the

place to the previous oligarchy, Gelo appropriated it to himself, leaving Gela to be governed by his brother Hiero. He greatly enlarged the city of Syracuse, and strengthened its fortifications: probably it was he who first carried it beyond the islet of Ortygia, so as to include a larger space of the adjacent mainland (or rather island of Sicily) which bore the name of Achradina. To people this enlarged space he brought all the residents in Kamarina, which town he dismantled—and more than half of those in Gela; which was thus reduced in importance, while Syracuse became the first city in Sicily, and even received fresh addition of inhabitants from the neighbouring towns of Megara and Eubœa.

Both these towns, Megara and Eubœa, like Syracuse, were governed by oligarchies, with serf-cultivators dependent upon them, and a Demos or body of smaller freemen excluded from the political franchise: both were involved in war with Gelo, probably to resist his encroachments: both were besieged and taken. The oligarchy who ruled these cities, and who were the authors as well as leaders of the war, anticipated nothing but ruin at the hands of the conqueror; while the Demos, who had not been con-

Gamori were expelled, there was no time for the democracy to constitute itself, or to show in what degree it possessed capacity for government, since the narrative of Herodotus indicates that the restoration by Gelo followed closely upon the expulsion. And the superior force which Gelo brought to the aid of the expelled Gamori, is quite sufficient to explain the submission of the Syracusan people, had they been ever so well administered. Perhaps Aristotle may have had before him reports different from those of Herodotus: unless indeed we might venture to suspect that the name of *Gelo* appears in Aristotle by lapse of memory in place of that of *Dionysius*. It is highly probable that the partial disorder into which the Syracusan democracy had fallen immediately before the despotism of Dionysius, was one of the main

circumstances which enabled him to acquire the supreme power; but a similar assertion can hardly be made applicable to the early times preceding Gelo, in which indeed democracy was only just beginning in Greece.

The confusion often made by hasty historians between the names of Gelo and Dionysius, is severely commented on by Dionysius of Halikarnassus (*Antiq. Roman.* vii. 1. p. 1314): the latter however, in his own statement respecting Gelo, is not altogether free from error, since he describes Hippokratês as *brother* of Gelo. We must accept the supposition of Larcher, that Pausanias (vi. 9, 2), while professing to give the date of Gelo's occupation of *Syracuse*, has really given the date of Gelo's occupation of *Gela* (see Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fast. Hellen.* ad ann. 491 B.C.)

sulted and had taken no part in the war (which we must presume to have been carried on by the oligarchy and their serfs alone), felt assured that no harm would be done to them. His behaviour disappointed the expectations of both. After transporting both of them to Syracuse, he established the oligarchs in that town as citizens, and sold the Demos as slaves under covenant that they should be exported from Sicily. "His conduct (says Herodotus¹) was dictated by the conviction, that a Demos was a most troublesome companion to live with." It appears that the state of society which he wished to establish was that of Patricians and clients, without any Plebs; something like that of Thessaly, where there was a proprietary oligarchy living in the cities, with Penestæ or dependent cultivators occupying and tilling the land on their account—but no small self-working proprietors or tradesmen in sufficient number to form a recognised class. And since Gelo was removing the free population from these conquered towns, leaving in or around the towns no one except the serf-cultivators, we may presume that the oligarchical proprietors when removed might still continue, even as residents at Syracuse, to receive the produce raised for them by others: but the small self-working proprietors, if removed in like manner, would be deprived of subsistence, because their land would be too distant for personal tillage, and they had no serfs. While therefore we fully believe, with Herodotus, that Gelo considered the small free proprietors as "troublesome yoke-fellows"—a sentiment perfectly natural to a Grecian despot, unless where he found them useful aids to his own ambition against a hostile oligarchy—we must add that they would become peculiarly troublesome in his scheme of concentrating the free population of Syracuse, seeing that he would have to give them land in the

Conquest of various Sicilian towns by Gelo—he transports the oligarchy to Syracuse, and sells the Demos for slaves.

¹ Herodot. vii. 156. Μεγαρέας τε τούτους ἐν Σικελίῃ, ὡς πολιορκούμενοι ἐς ὁμολογίην προσεχώρησαν, τούτους μὲν αὐτῶν παγέας, ἀειραμένους τε πόλεμον αὐτῶν καὶ προσδοκούντας ἀπολέσθαι διὰ τοῦτο, ἄγων ἐς Συρακούσας πολιήτας ἐποίησε: τὸν δὲ δῆμον τῶν Μεγαρέων, οὐκ ἔοντα μεταίτιον τοῦ πολέμου τούτου, οὐδὲ προσδεκό-

μενον κακὸν οὐδὲν πείσσεσθαι, ἀγαθῶν καὶ τούτους ἐς τὰς Συρακούσας, ἀπέδοτο ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ ἐκ Σικελίης. Τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ τούτου καὶ Εὐβοέας τούτους ἐν Σικελίῃ ἐποίησε διακρίνας. Ἐποίησε δὲ τὰυτὰ τούτους ἀμροτέρους, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτωτάτον.

neighbourhood or to provide in some other way for their maintenance.

So large an accession of size, walls, and population, rendered Syracuse the first Greek city in Sicily. And the power of Gelo, embracing as it did not merely Syracuse, but so considerable a portion of the rest of the island, Greek as well as Sikel, was the greatest Hellenic force then existing. It appears to have comprised the Grecian cities on the east and south-east of the island from the borders of Agrigentum to those of Zanklê or Messênê, together with no small proportion of the Sikel tribes. Messênê was under the rule of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, Agrigentum under that of Thêro son of Ænesidêmus, Himera under that of Terillus; while Selinus, close on the borders of Egesta and the Carthaginian possession, had its own government free or despotic, but appears to have been allied with or dependent upon Carthage.¹ A dominion thus extensive doubtless furnished ample tribute, besides which Gelo, having conquered and dispossessed many landed proprietors and having recolonised Syracuse, could easily provide both lands and citizenship to recompense adherents. Hence he was enabled to enlarge materially the military force transmitted to him by Hippokratês, and to form a naval force besides. Phormis² the Mænalian, who took service under him and became citizen of Syracuse, with fortune enough to send donatives to Olympia—and Agêsias the Iamid prophet from Stymphâlus³—are doubtless not the only examples of emigrants joining him from Arcadia. For the Arcadian population

¹ Diodor. xi. 21.

² Pausan. v. 27, 1, 2. We find the elder Dionysius, about a century afterwards, transferring the entire free population of conquered towns (Kaulonia and Hipponium in Italy, &c.) to Syracuse (Diodor. xiv. 106, 107).

³ See the sixth Olympic Ode of Pindar, addressed to the Syracusan Agêsias. The Scholiast on v. 5 of that ode—who says that not Agêsias himself, but some of his progenitors migrated from Stymphâlus to Syracuse—is contradicted not

only by the Scholiast on v. 167, where Agêsias is rightly termed both Ἀρχάς and Συρακοσσιός; but also by the better evidence of Pindar's own expressions—συνουχιστήρ τε τᾶν κλεινῶν Συρακοσσᾶν—εὐχόμεν εὐχαδε, with reference to Stymphâlus and Syracuse—δὲ ἄρχόρου (v. 6, 99, 101=169-174).

Ergotelês; an exile from Knóssus in Krete, must have migrated somewhere about this time to Himera in Sicily. See the twelfth Olympic Ode of Pindar.

were poor, brave, and ready for mercenary soldiery; while the service of a Greek despot in Sicily must have been more attractive to them than that of Xerxes.¹ Moreover during the ten years between the battles of Marathon and Salamis, when not only so large a portion of the Greek cities had become subject to Persia, but the prospect of Persian invasion hung like a cloud over Greece Proper—the increased feeling of insecurity throughout the latter probably rendered emigration to Sicily unusually inviting.

These circumstances in part explain the immense power and position which Herodotus represents Gelo to have enjoyed, towards the autumn of 481 B.C., when the Greeks from the Isthmus of Corinth, confederated to resist Xerxes, sent to solicit his aid. He was then imperial leader of Sicily: he could offer to the Greeks (so the historian tells us) 20,000 hoplites, 200 triremes, 2000 cavalry, 2000 archers, 2000 slingers, 2000 light-armed horse, besides furnishing provisions for the entire Grecian force as long as the war might last.² If this numerical statement could be at all trusted (which I do not believe), Herodotus would be much within the truth in saying, that there was no other Hellenic power which would bear the least comparison with that of Gelo:³ and we may well assume such general superiority to be substantially true, though the numbers above-mentioned may be an empty boast rather than a reality.

Power of Gelo when the envoys from Sparta and Athens came to entreat his aid—
B.C. 481.

Owing to the great power of Gelo, we now for the first time trace an incipient tendency in Sicily to combined and central operations. It appears that Gelo had formed the plan of uniting the Greek forces in Sicily for the purpose of expelling the Carthaginians and Egestæans, either wholly or partially, from their maritime possessions in the western corner of the island, and of avenging the death of the Spartan prince Dorieus—that

Plans of Gelo for strengthening Sicilian Hellenism against the barbaric interests in the islands.

¹ Herodot. viii. 26.

² Herodot. vii. 157. σὺ δὲ δυνάμεις τε ἤξεις μεγάλης, καὶ μοῖρά τοι τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐκ ἐλαχίστη μετέα, ἄρχοντι γε Σικελίας; and even still stronger, c. 163. ἐὼν Σικελίης τύραννος.

The word ἄρχων; corresponds with

ἀρχή, such as that of the Athenians, and is less strong than τύραννος. The numerical statement is contained in the speech composed by Herodotus for Gelo (vii. 158).

³ Herodot. vii. 145. τὰ δὲ Γελωνος

he even attempted, though in vain, to induce the Spartans and other central Greeks to cooperate in this plan—and that upon their refusal, he had in part executed it with the Sicilian forces alone.¹ We have nothing but a brief and vague allusion to this exploit, wherein Gelo appears as the chief and champion of Hellenic against barbaric interests in Sicily—the forerunner of Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathoklês. But he had already begun to conceive himself, and had already been recognised by others, in this commanding position, when the envoys of Sparta, Athens, Corinth, &c., reached him from the Isthmus of Corinth, in 481 B.C., to entreat his aid for the repulse of the vast host of invaders about to cross the Hellespont. Gelo, after reminding them that they had refused a similar application for aid from him, said that, far from requiting them at the hour of need in the like ungenerous spirit, he would bring to them an overwhelming reinforcement (the numbers as given by Herodotus have been already stated), but upon one condition only—that he should be recognised as generalissimo of the entire Grecian force against the Persians. His offer was repudiated, with indignant scorn, by the

Spartan
and Athe-
nian en-
voys apply
to Gelo—
his answer.

πρήγματα μεγάλα ἐλέγετο εἶναι· οὐδα-
αῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τῶν οὐ πολλῶν μέζω.

¹ Herodot. vii. 158. Gelo says to the envoys from Peloponnesus—
Ἄνδρες Ἕλληνας, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην, ἐτολμήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέοντες ἔλθεῖν. Αὐτοὶ δὲ, ἐμεῦ πρότερον δεηθέντος βρββαρικοῦ στρατοῦ συνεπάψασθαι, ὅτε μοι πρὸς Καρχηδονίους νεῖκος συνῆπτο, ἐπισχήπτο, τὸς τε τὸν Δωριέος τοῦ Ἀναξανδρίδω πρὸς Ἐγεσταιῶν φόνον ἐκπρήξασθαι, ὑποτεινοντός τε τὰ ἐμπόρια συνελευθεροῦν, ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν μεγάλα ὠφελία τε καὶ ἐπαυρέσεις γέγονασιν· οὐτε ἐμεῦ εἶνεκα ἦλθετε βοηθήσοντες, οὐτε τὸν Δωριέος φόνον ἐκπρήξόμενοι· τὸ δὲ κατ' ὑμέας, τὰδε ἅπαντα ὑπὸ βρββάροις νέμεται. Ἄλλὰ εὐ γάρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη· νῦν δὲ, ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπίκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνηστis γέγονε.

It is much to be regretted that

we have no farther information respecting the events which these words glance at. They seem to indicate that the Carthaginians and Eggestæans had made some encroachments and threatened to make more: that Gelo had repelled them by actual and successful war. I think it strange however that he should be made to say—"You (the Peloponnesians) have derived great and signal advantages from these sea-ports"—the profit derived from the latter by *the Peloponnesians* can never have been so great as to be singled out in this pointed manner. I should rather have expected—ἀπ' ὧν ἡμῖν (and not ἀπ' ὧν ὑμῖν)—which must have been true ir point of fact, and will be found to read quite consistently with the general purport of Gelo's speech.

Spartan envoy: and Gelo then so far abated in his demand, as to be content with the command either of the land force or the naval force, whichever might be judged preferable. But here the Athenian envoy interposed his protest—"We are sent here (said he) to ask for an army, and not for a general; and thou givest us the army, only in order to make thyself general. Know, that even if the Spartans would allow thee to command at sea, *we* would not. The naval command is ours, if they decline it: we Athenians, the oldest nation in Greece—the only Greeks who have never migrated from home—whose leader before Troy stands proclaimed by Homer as the best of all the Greeks for marshalling and keeping order in an army—we, who moreover furnish the largest naval contingent in the fleet—we will never submit to be commanded by a Syracusan."

"Athenian stranger (replied Gelo), ye seem to be provided with commanders, but ye are not likely to have soldiers to be commanded. Ye may return as soon as you please, and tell the Greeks that their year is deprived of its spring."¹

That envoys were sent from Peloponnesus to solicit assistance from Gelo against Xerxes, and that they solicited in vain, is an incident not to be disputed: but the reason assigned for refusal—conflicting pretensions about the supreme command—may be suspected to have arisen less from historical transmission, than from the conceptions of the historian, or of his informants, respecting the relations between the parties. In his time, Sparta, Athens, and Syracuse were the three great imperial cities of Greece; and his Sicilian witnesses, proud of the great past power of Gelo, might well ascribe to him that competition for pre-eminence and command which Herodotus has dramatised. The immense total of forces which Gelo is made to promise becomes the more incredible, when we reflect that he had another and a better reason for refusing aid altogether. He was attacked at home, and was fully employed in defending himself.

¹ Herodot. vii. 161, 162. Polybius (xii. 26) does not seem to have read this embassy as related by Herodotus—or at least he must have preferred some other account of it. He gives a different account

of the answer which they made to Gelo: an answer (not insolent, but) business-like and evasive—πραγματικωτατον ἀπόκριμα, &c. See Timæus, Fragm. 87, ed. Didot.

The same spring which brought Xerxes across the Hellespont into Greece, also witnessed a formidable Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Gelo had already been engaged in war against them (as has been above stated) and had obtained successes, which they would naturally seek the first opportunity of retrieving. The vast Persian invasion of Greece, organised for three years before, and drawing contingents not only from the whole eastern world, but especially from their own metropolitan brethren at Tyre and Sidon, was well calculated to encourage them: and there seems good reason for believing that the simultaneous attack on the Greeks both in Peloponnesus and in Sicily, was concerted between the Carthaginians and Xerxes¹—probably by the Phœnicians on behalf of Xerxes. Nevertheless this alliance does not exclude other concurrent circumstances in the interior of the island, which supplied the Carthaginians both with invitation and with help. Agrigentum, though not under the dominion of Gelo, was ruled by his friend and relative Thêro; while Rhegium and Messênê under the government of Anaxilaus,—Himera under that of his father-in-law Terillus—and Selinus,—seem to have formed an imposing minority among the Sicilian Greeks; at variance with Gelo and Thêro, but in amity and correspondence with Carthage.² It was seemingly about the year 481 B.C., that Thêro, perhaps invited by an Himeræan party, expelled from Himera the despot Terillus, and became possessed of the town. Terillus applied for aid to Carthage; backed by his son-in-law Anaxilaus, who espoused the quarrel so warmly, as even to tender his own children as hostages to Hamilkar the Carthaginian Suffet or general, the personal friend or guest of Terillus. The application was favourably entertained, and Hamilkar, arriving at Panormus in the eventful year 480 B.C., with a fleet of 3000 ships of war and a still larger number of store ships, disembarked a land-force of 300,000 men: which would even have been larger, had

¹ Ephorus, Fragment 111, ed. Didot; Diodor. xi. 1, 20. Mitford and Dahlmann (Forschungen, *Herodotus*, &c., sect. 35, p. 186) call in question this alliance or understanding between Xerxes and the Carthaginians; but on no sufficient

grounds, in my judgment.

² Herodot. vii. 165; Diodor. xi. 23: compare also xiii. 55, 59. In like manner Rhegium and Messênê formed the opposing interest to Syracuse, under Dionysius the elder (Diodor. xiv. 44).

not the vessels carrying the cavalry and the chariots happened to be dispersed by storms.¹ These numbers we can only repeat as we find them, without trusting them any farther than as proof that the armament was on the most extensive scale. But the different nations of whom Herodotus reports the land-force to have consisted are trustworthy and curious: it included Phœnicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Helisyki, Sardinians, and Corsicans.² This is the first example known to us of those numerous mercenary armies which it was the policy of Carthage to compose of nations different in race and language,³ in order to obviate conspiracy or mutiny against the general.

The Carthaginian army under Hamilkar besiege Himera—battle of Himera—complete victory gained over them by Gelo.

Having landed at Panormus, Hamilkar marched to Himera, dragged his vessels on shore under the shelter of a rampart, and then laid siege to the town; while the Himerians, reinforced by Thêro and the army of Agrigentum, determined on an obstinate defence, and even bricked up the gates. Pressing messages were despatched to solicit aid from Gelo, who collected his whole force, said to have amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and marched to Himera. His arrival restored the courage of the inhabitants, and after some partial fighting, which turned out to the advantage of the Greeks, a general battle ensued. It was obstinate and bloody, lasting from sunrise until late in the afternoon; and its success was mainly determined by an intercepted letter which fell into the hands of Gelo—a communication from the Selinuntines to Hamilkar, promising to send a body of horse to his aid, and intimating the time at which they would arrive. A party of Gelo's horse, instructed to personate this reinforcement from Selinus, were received into the camp of Hamilkar, where they spread consternation and disorder, and are even said to have slain the general and set fire to the ships; while the Greek army,

¹ Herodot. (vii. 165) and Diodor, (xi. 20) both give the number of the land-force: the latter alone gives that of the fleet.

² Herodot. vii. 165. The Ligyes came from the southern junction of Italy and France; the Gulfs of Lyons and Genoa. The Helisyki cannot be satisfactorily verified;

Niebuhr considers them to have been the *Volsci*: an ingenious conjecture.

³ Polyb. i. 67. His description of the mutiny of the Carthaginian mercenaries, after the conclusion of the first Punic war, is highly instructive.

brought to action at this opportune moment, at length succeeded in triumphing over both superior numbers and a determined resistance. If we are to believe Diodorus, 150,000 men were slain on the side of the Carthaginians; the rest fled—partly to the Sikanian mountains where they became prisoners of the Agrigentines—partly to a hilly ground, where, from want of water, they were obliged to surrender at discretion. Twenty ships alone escaped with a few fugitives, and these twenty were destroyed by a storm on the passage, so that only one small boat arrived at Carthage with the disastrous tidings.¹ Dismissing such unreasonable exaggerations, we can only venture to assert that the battle was strenuously disputed, the victory complete, and the slain as well as the prisoners numerous. The body of Hamilkar was never discovered, in spite of careful search ordered by Gelo: the Carthaginians affirmed, that as soon as the defeat of his army became irreparable, he had cast himself into the great sacrificial fire wherein he had been offering entire victims (the usual sacrifice consisting only of a small part of the beast²) to propitiate the gods, and had there been consumed. The Carthaginians erected funereal monuments to him, graced with periodical sacrifices, both in Carthage and in their principal colonies:³ on the field of battle itself also, a monument was raised to him by the Greeks. On that monument, seventy years

¹ Diodor. xi. 21-24.

² Herodotus, vii. 167. εἴματα ἕλα κτεγγίζων. This passage of Herodotus receives illustration from the learned comment of Movers on the Phœnician inscription recently discovered at Marseilles. It was the usual custom of the Jews, and it had been in old times the custom with the Phœnicians (Porphyr. de Abstin. iv. 15), to burn the victim entire: the Phœnicians departed from this practice, but the departure seems to have been considered as not strictly correct, and in times of great misfortune or anxiety the old habit was resumed (Movers, Das Opferwesen der Karthager. Breslau, 1847, p. 71-118).

³ Herodot. vii. 166, 167. Hamil-

kar was son of a Syracusan mother: a curious proof of *connubium* between Carthage and Syracuse. At the moment when the elder Dionysius declared war against Carthage, in 398 B.C., there were many Carthaginian merchants dwelling both in Syracuse and in other Greco-Sicilian cities, together with ships and other property. Dionysius gave licence to the Syracusans, at the first instant when he had determined on declaring war, to plunder all this property (Diodor. xiv. 46). This speedy multiplication of Carthaginians with merchandise in the Grecian cities so soon after a bloody war had been concluded, is a strong proof of the spontaneous tendencies of trade.

afterwards, his victorious grandson, fresh from the plunder of this same city of Himera, offered the bloody sacrifice of 3000 Grecian prisoners.¹

We may presume that Anaxilaus with the forces of Rhegium shared in the defeat of the foreign invader whom he had called in, and probably other Greeks besides. All of them were now compelled to sue for peace from Gelo, and to solicit the privilege of being enrolled as his dependent allies, which was granted to them without any harder imposition than the tribute probably involved in that relation.² Even the Carthaginians themselves were so intimidated by the defeat, that they sent envoys to ask for peace at Syracuse, which they are said to have obtained mainly by the solicitation of Damaretê wife of Gelo, on condition of paying 2000 talents to defray the costs of the war, and of erecting two temples in which the terms of the treaty were to be permanently recorded.³ If we could believe the assertion of Theophrastus, Gelo exacted from the Carthaginians a stipulation that they would for the future abstain from human sacrifices in their religious worship.⁴ But such an interference with foreign religious rites would be unexampled in that age, and we know moreover that the practice was not permanently discontinued at Carthage.⁵ Indeed we may considerably suspect that Diodorus, copying from writers like Ephorus and Timæus, long after the events, has exaggerated considerably the defeat, the humiliation, and the amercement of the Carthaginians. For the words of the poet Pindar, a very few years after the battle of Himera, represent a fresh Carthaginian

Supremacy of Gelo in Sicily—he grants peace to the Carthaginians.

¹ Diodor. xiii. 62. According to Herodotus, the battle of Himera took place on the same day as that of Salamis; according to Diodorus, on the same day as that of Thermopylæ. If we are forced to choose between the two witnesses, there can be no hesitation in preferring the former: but it seems more probable that neither is correct.

As far as we can judge from the brief allusions of Herodotus, he must have conceived the battle of Himera in a manner totally differ-

ent from Diodorus. Under such circumstances, I cannot venture to trust the details given by the latter.

² I presume this treatment of Anaxilaus by Gelo must be alluded to in Diodorus, xi. 66: at least it is difficult to understand what other "great benefit" Gelo had conferred on Anaxilaus.

³ Diodor. xi. 26.

⁴ Schol. ad Pindar. Pyth. ii. 3; Plutarch, De Serâ Numinis Vindictâ, p. 552, c. 6.

⁵ Diodor. xx. 14.

invasion as matter of present uneasiness and alarm:¹ and the Carthaginian fleet is found engaged in aggressive warfare on the coast of Italy, requiring to be coerced by the brother and successor of Gelo.

The victory of Himera procured for the Sicilian cities immunity from foreign war, together with a large plunder. Splendid offerings of thanksgiving to the gods were dedicated in the temples of Himera, Syracuse, and Delphi; while the epigram of Simonidès,² composed for the tripod offered in the latter temple, described Gelo with his three brothers Hiero, Polyzêlus, and Thrasybulus, as the joint liberators of Greece from the Barbarian, along with the victors of Salamis and Plataea. And the Sicilians alleged that he was on the point of actually sending reinforcements to the Greeks against Xerxes, in spite of the necessity of submitting to Spartan command, when the intelligence of the defeat and retreat of that prince reached him. But we find another statement decidedly more probable—that he sent a confidential envoy named Kadmus to Delphi with orders to watch the turn of the Xerxeian invasion, and in case it should prove successful (as he thought that it probably would be) to tender presents and submission to the victorious invader on behalf of Syracuse.³ When we consider that until the very morning of the battle of Salamis, the cause of Grecian independence must have appeared to an impartial spectator almost desperate, we cannot wonder that Gelo should take precautions for preventing the onward progress of the Persians towards Sicily, which was already sufficiently imperilled by its formidable enemies in Africa. The defeat of the Persians at Salamis and of the Carthaginians at Himera cleared away suddenly and unexpectedly the terrific cloud from Greece as well as from Sicily, and left a sky comparatively brilliant with prosperous hopes.

To the victorious army of Gelo, there was abundant plunder for recompense as well as distribution. Among the most valuable part of the plunder were the numerous prisoners taken, who were divided among the cities in

¹ Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 67 (=28B.) with the Scholia.

² Herodot. vii. 163-165: compare Diodor. xi. 26; Ephorus, *Fragm.*

³ Simonidès, *Epigr.* 141, ed. Bergk. 111, ed. Didot.

proportion to the number of troops furnished by each. Of course the largest shares must have fallen to Syracuse and Agrigentum; while the number acquired by the latter was still farther increased by the separate capture of those prisoners who had dispersed throughout the mountains in and near the Agrigentine territory. All the Sicilian cities allied with or dependent on Gelo, but especially the two last-mentioned, were thus put in possession of a number of slaves as public property, who were kept in chains to work,¹ and were either employed on public undertakings for defence, ornament, and religious solemnity—or let out to private masters so as to afford a revenue to the state. So great was the total of these public slaves at Agrigentum, that though many were employed on state-works, which elevated the city to signal grandeur during the flourishing period of seventy years which intervened between the recent battle and its subsequent capture by the Carthaginians—there nevertheless remained great numbers to be let out to private individuals, some of whom had no less than five hundred slaves respectively in their employment.²

Number of prisoners taken at the battle of Himera and distributed among the Carthaginian cities—their prosperity, especially that of Agrigentum.

The peace which now ensued left Gelo master of Syracuse and Gela, with the Chalkidic Greek towns on the east of the island; while Thêro governed in Agrigentum, and his son Thrasydæus in Himera. In power as well as in reputation, Gelo was unquestionably the chief person in the island; moreover he was connected by marriage, and lived on terms of uninterrupted friendship, with Thêro. His conduct, both at Syracuse and towards the cities dependent upon him, was mild and conciliating. But his subsequent career was very short: he died of a dropsical complaint not much more than a year after the battle of Himera, while the

Death and obsequies of Gelo.

¹ Diodor. xi. 25. αἱ δὲ πόλεις εἰς πέδας κατέστησαν τοῖς διακριθέντας σιγμαλώτους, καὶ τὰ δημόσια τῶν ἔργων διὰ τούτων ἐπεσκεύαζον.

rodot. i. 66; iii. 39.

For analogous instances of captives taken in war being employed in public works by the captors, and labouring in chains, see the cases of Tegea and Samos in He-

² Diodor. xi. 25. Respecting slaves belonging to the public, and let out for hire to individual employers, compare the large financial project conceived by Xenophon, De Vectigalibus, capp. 3 and 4.

glories of that day were fresh in every one's recollection. As the Syracusan law rigorously interdicted expensive funerals, Gelo had commanded that his own obsequies should be conducted in strict conformity to the law: nevertheless the zeal of his successor as well as the attachment of the people disobeyed these commands. The great mass of citizens followed his funeral procession from the city to the estate of his wife, fifteen miles distant: nine massive towers were erected to distinguish the spot; and the solemnities of heroic worship were rendered to him. The respectful recollections of the conqueror of Himera never afterwards died out among the Syracusan people, though his tomb was defaced first by the Carthaginians, and afterwards by the despot of Agathoklês.¹ And when we recollect the destructive effects caused by the subsequent Carthaginian invasions, we shall be sensible how great was the debt of gratitude owing to Gelo by his contemporaries.

It was not merely as conqueror of Himera, but as a sort of second founder of Syracuse,² that Gelo was thus solemnly worshipped. The size, the strength, and the population, of the town were all greatly increased under him. Besides the number of the new inhabitants which he brought from Gela, the Hyblæan Megara, and the Sicilian Eubœa, we are informed that he also inscribed on the roll of citizens no less than 10,000 mercenary soldiers. It will moreover appear that these new-made citizens were in possession of the islet of Ortygia³—the interior stronghold of Syracuse. It has already been stated that Ortygia was the original settlement, and that the city did not overstep the boundaries of the islet before the enlargements of Gelo. We do not know by what arrangements Gelo provided new lands for so large a number of new-comers: but when we come to notice the antipathy with which these latter were regarded by the remaining citizens, we shall be inclined to believe that the old citizens had been dispossessed and degraded.

Gelo left a son in tender years, but his power passed, by his own direction, to two of his brothers, Polyzêlus

¹ Diodor. xi. 38, 67: Plutarch, Timoleon, c. 29; Aristotle Γελώων Πολιτεία: Fragm. p. 106, ed. Neu-

mann.

² Diodor. xi. 49.

³ Diodor. xi. 72, 73.

and Hiero; the former of whom married the widow of the deceased prince, and was named, according to his testamentary directions, commander of the military force—while Hiero was intended to govern the city. Whatever may have been the wishes of Gelo, however, the real power fell to Hiero; a man of energy and determination, and munificent as a patron of contemporary poets, Pindar, Simonidês, Bacchylidês, Epicharmus, Æschylus, and others; but the victim of a painful internal complaint—jealous in his temper—cruel, and rapacious in his government¹—and noted as an organizer of that systematic espionage which broke up all freedom of speech among his subjects. Especially jealous of his brother Polyzêlus, who was very popular in the city, he despatched him on a military expedition against the Krotoniates, with a view of indirectly accomplishing his destruction. But Polyzêlus, aware of the snare, fled to Agrigentum, and sought protection from his brother-in-law the despot Thêro; from whom Hiero redemanded him, and on receiving a refusal, prepared to enforce the demand by arms. He had already advanced on his march as far as the river Gela, but no actual battle appears to have taken place. It is interesting to hear that Simonidês the poet, esteemed and rewarded by both these princes, was the mediator of peace between them.²

B.C. 478.

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Hiero, brother and successor of Gelo at Syracuse—jealous of his brother Polyzêlus—harsh as a ruler—quarrel between Hiero of Syracuse and Thêro of Agrigentum—appeased by the poet Simonidês.

Severe treatment of the inhabitants of Himera by Thêro.

The temporary breach, and sudden reconciliation, between these two powerful despots, proved the cause of sorrow and ruin at Himera. That city, under the dominion of the Agrigentine Thêro, was administered by his son Thrasydæus—a youth whose oppressive conduct speedily excited the strongest antipathy. The Himeraëans, knowing that they had little chance of redress from Thêro against his son, took advantage of the quarrel between him and

¹ Diodor. xi. 67; Aristotel. Politic. v. 9, 3. In spite of the compliments directly paid by Pindar to Hiero (πραῦς ἀστὸς, οὐ φρονέων ἀγαθῶς, ξείνοισι δὲ θαυμαστός πατήρ, Pyth. iii. 71=125), his indirect ad-

monitions and hints sufficiently attest the real character (see Dissen ad Pindar. Pyth. i. and ii. p. 161-182).

² Diodor. xi. 43; Schol. Pindar, Olymp. ii. 29.

Hiero to make propositions to the latter, and to entreat his aid for the expulsion of Thrasydæus, tendering themselves as subjects of Syracuse. It appears that Kapys and Hippokratês, cousins of Thêro, but at variance with him, and also candidates for the protection of Hiero, were concerned in this scheme for detaching Himera from the dominion of Thêro. But so soon as peace had been concluded, Hiero betrayed to Thêro both the schemes and the malcontents at Himera. We seem to make out that Kapys and Hippokratês collected some forces to resist Thêro, but were defeated by him at the river Himera:¹ his victory was followed up by seizing and putting to death a large number of Himeræan citizens. So great was the number slain, coupled with the loss of others who fled for fear of being slain, that the population of the city was sensibly and inconveniently diminished. Thêro invited and enrolled a large addition of new citizens, chiefly of Dorian blood.²

The power of Hiero, now reconciled both with Thêro and with his brother Polyzêlus, is marked by several circumstances as noway inferior to that of Gelo, and probably the greatest, not merely in Sicily, but throughout the Grecian world. The citizens of the distant city of Cumæ, on the coast of Italy, harassed by Carthaginian and Tyrrhenian fleets, entreated his aid, and received from him a squadron which defeated and drove off their enemies:³ he even settled a Syracusan colony in the neighbouring island of Pithekusa. Anaxilaus, despot of Rhegium and Messênê, had attacked, and might probably have overpowered, his neighbours the Epizephyrian Lokrians; but the menaces of Hiero, invoked by the Lokrians, and conveyed by the envoy Chromius, compelled him to

¹ Schol. ad Pindar. Olymp. ii. 173. For the few facts which can be made out respecting the family and genealogy of Thêro, see Gôller, *De Situ et Origine Syracusarum*, ch. vii. p. 19-22. The Scholiasts of Pindar are occasionally useful in explaining the brief historical allusions of the poet; but they seem to have had very few trustworthy materials before them for so doing.

² Diodor. xi. 48, 49.

³ The brazen helmet, discovered near the site of Olympia with the name of Hiero and the victory at Cumæ inscribed on it, yet remains as an interesting relic to commemorate this event: it was among the offerings presented by Hiero to the Olympic Zeus: see Boeckh, *Corp. Inscriptt. Græc. No. 16, part i. p. 34.*

desist.¹ Those heroic honours, which in Greece belonged to the *Ækist* of a new city, were yet wanting to him. He procured them by the foundation of the new city of *Ætna*,² on the site and in the place of *Katana*, the inhabitants of which he expelled, as well as those of *Naxos*. While these *Naxians* and *Katanæans* were directed to take up their abode at *Leontini* along with the existing inhabitants, *Hiero* planted 10,000 new inhabitants in his adopted city of *Ætna*; 5000 of them from *Syracuse* and *Gela*—with an equal number from *Peloponnesus*. They served as an auxiliary force, ready to be called forth in the event of discontents at *Syracuse*, as we shall see by the history of his successor: he gave them not only the territory which had before belonged to *Katana*, but also a large addition besides, chiefly at the expense of the neighbouring *Sikel* tribes. His son *Deinomenês*, and his friend and confidant *Chromius*, enrolled as an *Ætnæan*, became joint administrators of the city, whose religious and social customs were assimilated to the *Dorian* model.³ *Pindar* dreams of future relations between the despot and citizens of *Ætna*, analogous to those between king and citizens at *Sparta*. Both *Hiero* and *Chromius* were proclaimed as *Ætnæans* at the *Pythian* and *Nemean* games, when their chariots gained victories; on which occasion the assembled crowd heard for the first time of the new Hellenic city of *Ætna*. We see, by the compliments of *Pindar*,⁴ that *Hiero* was vain of his new title of founder. But we must

¹ *Diodor.* xi. 51; *Pindar*, i. 74 (=140); ii. 17 (=35) with the *Schol.* *Epicarmus*, Fragment, p. 19, ed. *Krusemann*; *Schol.* *Pindar.* *Pyth.* i. 90; *Strabo*, v. p. 247.

² Ἰέρων οἰκιστὴς ἀντὶ τυράννου βουλόμενος εἶναι, Κατάνην ἐξελὼν Αἴτην μετωνόμασε τὴν πόλιν, κατόνοἰκιστὴν προσαγορεύσας (*Schol.* ad *Pindar.* *Nem.* i. 1).

Compare the subsequent case of the foundation of *Thurii*, among the citizens of which violent disputes arose, in determining who should be recognised as *Ækist* of the place. On referring to the oracle, *Apollo* directed them to commemorate *himself* as *Ækist* (*Diodor.* xii. 35).

³ *Chromius* ἐπιτροπος τῆς Αἴτης (*Schol.* *Pind.* *Nem.* ix. 1). About the *Dorian* institutions of *Ætna*, &c., *Pindar*, *Pyth.* i. 60-71.

Deinomenês survived his father, and commemorated the Olympic victories of the latter by costly offerings at *Olympia* (*Pausan.* vi. 12, 1).

⁴ *Pindar.* *Pyth.* i. 60 (=117); iii. 69 (=121). *Pindar.* ap. *Strabo*. vi. p. 269. Compare *Nemea*, ix. 1-30, addressed to *Chromius*. *Hiero* is proclaimed in some odes as a *Syracusan*: but *Syracuse* and the newly-founded *Ætna* are intimately joined together: see *Nemea*, i. *init.*

remark that it was procured, not, as in most cases, by planting Greeks on a spot previously barbarous, but by the dispossession and impoverishment of other Grecian citizens, who seem to have given no ground of offence. Both in Gelo and Hiero we see the first exhibition of that propensity to violent and wholesale transplantation of inhabitants from one seat to another, which was not uncommon among Assyrian and Persian despots, and which was exhibited on a still larger scale by the successors of Alexander the Great in their numerous new-built cities.

Anaxilaus of Rhegium died shortly after that message of Hiero which had compelled him to spare the Lokrians. Such was the esteem entertained for his memory, and so efficient the government of Mikythus, a manumitted slave whom he constituted regent, that Rhegium and Messênê were preserved for his children, yet minors.¹ But a still more important change in Sicily was caused by the death of the Agrigentine Thêro, which took place seemingly about 472 B.C. This prince, a partner with Gelo in the great victory over the Carthaginians, left a reputation of good government as well as ability among the Agrigentines, which we find perpetuated in the laureat strains of Pindar: and his memory doubtless became still farther endeared from comparison with his son and successor. Thrasydæus, now master both of Himera and Agrigentum, displayed on a larger scale the same oppressive and sanguinary dispositions which had before provoked rebellion at the former city. Feeling himself detested by his subjects, he enlarged the military force which had been left by his father, and engaged so many new mercenaries, that he became master of a force of 20,000 men, horse and foot. And in his own territory, perhaps he might long have trodden with impunity in the footsteps of Phalaris, had he not imprudently provoked his more powerful neighbour Hiero. In an obstinate and murderous battle between these two princes, 2000 men were slain on the side of the Syracusans, and 4000 on that of the Agrigentines: an immense slaughter, considering that it mostly fell upon the Greeks in the two armies, and not upon the non-Hellenic mercenaries.² But the defeat

Death of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, and of Thêro of Agrigentum. Thrasydæus, son of Thêro, rules Agrigentum and Himera. His cruel government—he is defeated by Hiero and expelled.

¹ Justin. iv. 2.

² So I conceive the words of

of Thrasydæus was so complete, that he was compelled to flee not only from Agrigentum, but from Sicily: he retired to Megara in Greece Proper, where he was condemned to death and perished.¹ The Agrigentines, thus happily released from their oppressor, sued for and obtained peace from Hiero. They are said to have established a democratical government, but we learn that Hiero sent many citizens into banishment from Agrigentum and Himera, as well as from Gela,² nor can we doubt that all the three were numbered among his subject cities. The moment of freedom only commenced for them when the Gelonian dynasty shared the fate of the Theronian.

The victory over Thrasydæus rendered Hiero more completely master of Sicily than his brother Gelo had been before him. The last act which we hear of him is, his interference on behalf of his brothers-in-law,³ the sons of Anaxilaus of Rhegium, who were now of age to govern. He encouraged them to prefer, and probably showed himself ready to enforce, their claim against Mikythus, who had administered Rhegium since the death of Anaxilaus, for the property as well as the sceptre. Mikythus complied readily with the demand, rendering an account so exact and faithful, that the sons of Anaxilaus themselves entreated him to remain and govern—or more probably to lend his aid to their government. This request he was wise enough to refuse: he removed his own property and retired to Tegea in Arcadia. Hiero died shortly after-

Great power of Hiero, after the defeat of Thrasydæus—his death.

Diodorus are to be understood—
 πλειστοι τῶν παραταξαμένων Ἑλλήνων πρὸς Ἑλλάδας ἔπεσον (Diodor. xi. 53).

¹ Diodor. xi. 53. ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεῖς ἐτελεύτησεν. This is a remarkable specimen of the feeling in a foreign city towards an oppressive tyrant. The Megarians of Greece Proper were much connected with Sicily, through the Hyblæan Megara, as well as Selinus.

² Diodor. xi. 76. Οἱ κατὰ τὴν Ἱέρωνος δυναστείαν ἐκπεπωχότες ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων πόλεων—τούτων, δ' ἦσαν Γελῶσι καὶ Ἀκραγαντῖνοι καὶ Ἰμε-

ραῖοι.

³ Hiero had married the daughter of Anaxilaus, but he seems also to have had two other wives—the sister or cousin of Thêro, and the daughter of a Syracusan named Nikoklès: this last was the mother of his son Deinomenès (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. i. 112).

We read of Kleophon son of Anaxilaus, governing Messênê during his father's lifetime: probably this young man must have died, otherwise Mikythus would not have succeeded (Schol. Pindar. Pyth. ii. 34).

wards, of the complaint under which he had so long suffered, after a reign of ten years.¹

On the death of Hiero, the succession was disputed between his brother Thrasybulus, and his nephew the youthful son of Gelo, so that the partisans of the family became thus divided. Thrasybulus, surrounding his nephew with temptations to luxurious pleasure, contrived to put him indirectly aside, and thus to seize the government for himself.² This family division—a curse often resting upon the blood-relations of Grecian despots, and leading to the greatest atrocities³—coupled with the conduct of Thrasybulus himself, caused the downfall of the mighty Gelonian dynasty. The bad qualities of Hiero were now seen greatly exaggerated, but without his accompanying energy, in Thrasybulus; who put to death many citizens, and banished still more, for the purpose of seizing

their property, until at length he provoked among the Syracusans intense and universal hatred, shared even by many of the old Gelonian partisans. Though he tried to strengthen himself by increasing his mercenary force, he could not prevent a general revolt from breaking out among the Syracusan population. By summoning those cities which Hiero had planted in his new city of Ætna, as well as various troops from his dependent allies, he found himself at the head of 15,000 men, and master of the inner city; that is, the islet of Ortygia, which was the

¹ Diodor. xi. 66.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 19. Diodorus does not mention the son of Gelo.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenici*, App. chap. 10, p. 264 *seq.*) has discussed all the main points connected with Syracusan and Sicilian chronology.

³ Xenophon, Hiero, iii. 8. *Εἰ τοίνυν ἐθέλεις κατανοεῖν, εὐρήσεις μὲν τοὺς ἰδιώτας ὑπὸ τούτων μάλιστα φιλουμένους, τοὺς δὲ τυράννους πολλοὺς μὲν παῖδας ἑαυτῶν ὑπεκτονηκότας, πολλοὺς δ' ὑπὸ παιδῶν αὐτοῦ ἀπολωλότας, πολλοὺς δὲ ἀδελφοὺς ἐν*

τυραννίαι ἀλληλοφόνους γεγεννημένους, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ γυναικῶν τῶν ἑαυτῶν τυράννους διεφθαρμένους, καὶ ὑπὸ ἐταίρων γε τῶν μάλιστα δοκούντων φίλων εἶναι: compare Isokratēs, De Pace, Orat. viii. p. 162, § 138.

So also Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 9) respecting the native kings of Judæa, after the expulsion of the Syrian dynasty—"Sibi ipsi reges imposuere: qui, mobilitate vulgi expulsi, resumptâ per arma dominatione, fugas civium, urbium eversiones,—*fratrum, conjugum, parentum, necesse—aliaque solita regibus ausi,*" &c.

primitive settlement of Syracuse, and was not only distinct and defensible in itself, but also contained the docks, the shipping, and command of the harbour. The revolted people on their side were masters of the outer city, better known under its latter name of Achradina, which lay on the adjacent mainland of Sicily, was surrounded by a separate wall of its own, and was divided from Ortygia by an intervening space of low ground used for burials.¹ Though

¹ Respecting the topography of Syracuse at the time of these disturbances, immediately preceding and following the fall of the Gelonian dynasty—my statements in the present edition will be found somewhat modified as compared with the first. In describing the siege of the city by the Athenian army under Nikias, I found it necessary to study the local details of Thucydides with great minuteness, besides consulting fuller modern authorities. The conclusion which I have formed will be found stated, —partly in the early part of chapter lix.—but chiefly in a separate dissertation annexed as an Appendix to that chapter, and illustrated by two plans. To the latter Dissertation with its Plans, I request the reader to refer.

Diodorus here states (xi. 67, 68) that Thrasybulus was master both of the Island (Ortygia) and Achradina, while the revolted Syracusans held the rest of the city, of which Itykê or Tychê was a part. He evidently conceives Syracuse as having comprised, in 463 B. C., substantially the same great space and the same number of four quarters or portions, as it afterwards came to contain from the time of the despot Dionysius down to the Roman empire, and as it is set forth in the description of Cicero (Orat. in Verr. iv. 53, 118—120) enumerating the four quarters Ortygia, Achradina, Tychê, and Neapolis. I believe this to be a mistake. I take

the general conception of the topography of Syracuse given by Thucydides in 415 B. C., as representing in the main what it had been fifty years before. Thucydides (vi. 3) mentions only the Inner City, which was in the Islet of Ortygia (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἐντός)—and the Outer City (ἡ πόλις ἡ ἔξω). This latter was afterwards known by the name of Achradina, though that name does not occur in Thucydides. Diodorus expressly mentions that both Ortygia and Achradina had each separate fortifications (xi. 73).

In these disputes connected with the fall of the Gelonian dynasty, I conceive Thrasybulus to have held possession of Ortygia, which was at all times the inner stronghold and the most valuable portion of Syracuse; inasmuch that under the Roman dominion, Marcellus prohibited any native Syracusan from dwelling in it. (Cicero cont. Verr. v. 32-84. 38, 98.) The enemies of Thrasybulus, on the contrary, I conceive to have occupied Achradina.

There is no doubt that this bisection of Syracuse into two separate fortifications must have afforded great additional facility for civil dispute, if there were any causes abroad tending to foment it; conformably to a remark of Aristotle (Polit. v. 2, 12.), which the philosopher illustrates by reference to Kolophôn and Notium.

superior in number, yet being no match in military efficiency for the forces of Thrasybulus, they were obliged to invoke aid from the other cities in Sicily, as well as from the Sikel tribes—proclaiming the Gelonian dynasty as the common enemy of freedom in the island, and holding out universal independence as the reward of victory. It was fortunate for them that there was no brother-despot like the powerful Thêro to espouse the cause of Thrasybulus. Gela, Agrigentum, Selinus, Himera, and even the Sikel tribes, all responded to the call with alacrity, so that a large force, both military and naval, came to reinforce the Syracusans; and Thrasybulus, being totally defeated, first in naval action, next on land, was obliged to shut himself up in Ortygia, where he soon found his situation hopeless. He accordingly opened a negotiation with his opponents, which ended in his abdication and retirement to Lokri, while the mercenary troops whom he had brought together were also permitted to depart unmolested.¹ The expelled Thrasybulus afterwards lived and died as a private citizen at Lokri—a very different fate from that which had befallen Thrasidæus (son of Thêro) at Megara, though both seem to have given the same provocation.

Thus fell the powerful Gelonian dynasty at Syracuse, after a continuance of eighteen years.² Its fall was nothing less than an extensive revolution throughout Sicily. Among the various cities of the island there had grown up many petty despots, each with his separate mercenary force; acting as the instruments, and relying on the protection, of the great despot at Syracuse. All these were now expelled, and governments more or less democratical were established everywhere.³ The sons of Anaxilaus maintained themselves a little longer at Rhegium and Messênê, but the citizens of these two towns at length followed the general example, compelled them to retire,⁴ and began their æra of freedom.

But though the Sicilian despots had thus been expelled, the free governments established in their place

as well as to the insular and continental portions of Klazomenæ.

¹ Diodor. ix. 67. 68.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 8, 23.

³ Diodor. xi. 68.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 76.

B.C. 465.
Expulsion
of Thrasy-
bulus, and
extinction
of the Ge-
lonian dy-
nasty.

were exposed at first to much difficulty and collision. It has been already mentioned that Gelo, Hiero, Thêro, Thrasidæus, Thrasybulus, &c., had all condemned many citizens to exile with confiscation of property; and had planted on the soil new citizens and mercenaries, in numbers no less considerable. To what race these mercenaries belonged, we are not told: it is probable that they were only in part Greeks. Such violent mutations, both of persons and property, could not occur without raising bitter conflicts, of interest as well as of feeling, between the old, the new, and the dispossessed proprietors, as soon as the iron hand of compression was removed. This source of angry dissension was common to all the Sicilian cities, but in none did it flow more profusely than in Syracuse. In that city, the new mercenaries last introduced by Thrasybulus, had retired at the same time with him, many of them to the Hieronian city of Ætna, from whence they had been brought. But there yet remained the more numerous body introduced principally by Gelo, partly also by Hiero; the former alone having enrolled 10,000, of whom more than 7000 yet remained. What part these Gelonian citizens had taken in the late revolution, we do not find distinctly stated: they seem not to have supported Thrasybulus as a body, and probably many of them took part against him.

Popular governments established in all the Sicilian cities—confusion and disputes arising out of the number of new citizens and mercenaries domiciliated by the Gelonian princes.

After the revolution had been accomplished, a public assembly of the Syracusans was convened, in which the first resolution was, to provide for the religious commemoration of the event, by erecting a colossal statue of Zeus Eleutherius, and by celebrating an annual festival to be called the Eleutheria, with solemn matches and sacrifices. They next proceeded to determine the political constitution, and such was the predominant reaction, doubtless aggravated by the returned exiles, of hatred and fear against the expelled dynasty—that the whole body of new citizens, who had been domiciliated under Gelo and Hiero, were declared ineligible to magistracy or honour. This harsh and sweeping disqualification, falling at once upon a numerous minority, naturally provoked renewed irritation and civil war. The Gelonian citizens, the most warlike individuals in the state, and occupying, as favoured

partisans of the previous dynasty, the inner section of Syracuse¹—Ortygia—placed themselves in open revolt; while the general mass of citizens, masters of the outer city, were not strong enough to assail with success this defensible position.² But they contrived to block it up nearly altogether, and to intercept both its supplies and its communication with the country, by means of a new fortification carried out from the outer city towards the Great Harbour, and stretching between Ortygia and Epipolæ. The garrison within could thus only obtain supplies at the cost of perpetual conflicts. This disastrous internal war continued for some months, with many partial engagements both by land and sea: whereby the general body of citizens became accustomed to arms, while a chosen regiment of 600 trained volunteers acquired especial efficiency. Unable to maintain themselves longer, the Gelonians were forced to

¹ Aristotle (*Politic.* v. 2, 11) mentions, as one of his illustrations of the mischief of receiving new citizens, that the Syracusans, after the Gelonian dynasty, admitted the foreign mercenaries to citizenship, and from hence came to sedition and armed conflict. But the incident cannot fairly be quoted in illustration of that principle which he brings it to support. The mercenaries, so long as the dynasty lasted, had been the first citizens in the community: after its overthrow, they became the inferior, and were rendered inadmissible to honours. It is hardly matter of surprise that so great a change of position excited them to rebel: but this is not a case properly adducible to prove the difficulty of adjusting matters with new-coming citizens.

After the expulsion of Agathoklês from Syracuse, nearly two centuries after these events, the same quarrel and sedition was renewed, by the exclusion of his mercenaries from magistracy and posts of honour (*Diodor.* xxi. *Fragm.*

p. 282).

² *Diodor.* xi. 73. Οἱ δὲ Συρακοῦσιοι πάλιν ἐμπεσόντες εἰς ταραχὴν, τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς πόλεως κάτεσχον, καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰς Ἐπιπολάς τετραμμένον αὐτῆς ἐπετείχισαν, καὶ πολλὴν ἀσφάλειαν ἑαυτοῖς κατεσκεύασαν· εὐθὺ γὰρ τῆς ἐπὶ τῆν χώραν ἐξόδου τοὺς ἀφεστηχότας εὐχερῶς εἶργον καὶ ταχὺ τῶν ἐπιτηδεῶν ἐποίησαν ἀπορεῖν.

Diodorus here repeats the same misconception as I have noticed in a previous note. He supposes that the Gelonians were in possession both of Ortygia and of Achradina, whereas they were only in possession of the former, as Thrasylbulus had been in the former contest.

The opposing party were in possession of the outer city or Achradina: and it would be easy for them, by throwing out a fortification between Epipolæ and the Great Harbour, to straiten the communication of Ortygia with the country around; as may be seen by referring to the Plans of Syracuse annexed to chap. lix. of this History.

hazard a general battle, which, after an obstinate struggle, terminated in their complete defeat. The chosen band of 600, who had eminently contributed to this victory, received from their fellow-citizens a crown of honour, and a reward of one mina per head.¹

The meagre annals, wherein these interesting events are indicated rather than described, tell us scarcely anything of the political arrangements which resulted from so important a victory. Probably many of the Gelonians were expelled: but we may assume as certain, that they were deprived of the dangerous privilege of a separate residence in the inner stronghold or islet Ortygia.²

Meanwhile the rest of Sicily had experienced disorders analogous in character to those of Syracuse. At Gela, at Agrigentum, at Himera, the reaction against the Gelonian dynasty had brought back in crowds the dispossessed exiles; who, claiming restitution of their properties and influence, found their demands sustained by the population generally. The Katanæans, whom Hiero had driven from their own city to Leontini, in order that he might convert Katana into his own settlement Ætna, assembled in arms and allied themselves with the Sikel prince Duketius, to reconquer their former home and to restore to the Sikels that which Hiero had taken from them for enlargement of the Ætnæan territory. They were aided by the Syracusans, to whom the neighbourhood of these Hieronian partisans was dangerous: but they did not accomplish their object until after a long contest and several battles with the Ætnæans. A convention was at length concluded, by which the latter evacuated Katana and were allowed to occupy the town and territory (seemingly Sikel) of Ennesia or Inessa, upon which they bestowed the name of Ætna,³ with monuments commemorating Hiero as the founder—while the tomb of the latter at Katana was demolished by the restored inhabitants.

Defeat of the Gelonians—Syracuse made into one popular government.

Disorders in other Sicilian cities, arising from the return of exiles who had been dispossessed under the Gelonian dynasty. Katana and Ætna.

¹ Diodor. xi. 72, 73, 76.

² Diodorus, xiv. 7.

³ Diodorus, xi. 76; Strabo, vi. 268. Compare, as an analogous event, the destruction of the edi-

fices erected in the market-place of Amphipolis, in honour of the Athenian Agnon the Ækist, after the revolt of that city from Athens (Thucyd. v. 11).

These conflicts, disturbing the peace of all Sicily, came to be so intolerable, that a general congress was held between the various cities to adjust them. It was determined by joint resolution to re-admit the exiles and to extrude the Gelonian settlers everywhere: but an establishment was provided for these latter in the territory of Messênê. It appears that the exiles received back their property, or at least an assignment of other lands in compensation for it. The inhabitants of Gela were enabled to provide for their own exiles by re-establishing the city of Kamarina,¹ which had been conquered from Syracuse by Hippokratês despot of Gelo, but which Gelo, on transferring his abode to Syracuse, had made a portion of the Syracusan territory, conveying its inhabitants to the city of Syracuse. The Syracusans now renounced the possession of it—a cession to be explained probably by the fact, that among the new-comers transferred by Gelo to Syracuse, there were included not only the previous Kamarinæans, but also many who had before been citizens of Gela.² For these men, now obliged to quit Syracuse, it would be convenient to provide an abode at Kamarina, as well as for the other restored Geloan exiles; and we may farther presume that this new city served as a receptacle for other homeless citizens from all parts of the island. It was consecrated by the Geloans as an independent city, with Dorian rites and customs: its lands were distributed anew, and among its settlers were men rich enough to send prize chariots to Peloponnesus, as well as to pay for odes of Pindar. The Olympic victories of the Kamarinæan Psaumis secured for his new city an Hellenic celebrity, at a moment when it had hardly yet emerged from the hardships of an initiatory settlement.³

¹ Diodor. xi. 76. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα
Καμαρίναν μὲν Γελῶσι κατοικίσαντες
εἰς ἀρχῆς κατακληρούχησαν.

See the note of Wesseling upon this passage. There can be little doubt that in Thucydides (vi. 5) the correction of κατωκίσθη ὑπὸ Γελῶων (in place of ὑπὸ Γέλωνος) is correct.

² Herodot. vii. 155.

³ See the fourth and fifth Olympic odes of Pindar, referred to Olympiad 82, or 452 B.C., about nine years after the Geloans had re-established Kamarina. Τὸν νέον ἔδραν (Olymp. v. 9); ἀπ' ἀμαχανίας ἄγων εἰς φάος τόνδε δᾶμον ἀστῶν (Olymp. v. 14).

Such was the great reactionary movement in Sicily against the high-handed violences of the previous despots. We are only enabled to follow it generally, but we see that all their transplantations and expulsions of inhabitants were reversed, and all their arrangements overthrown. In the correction of the past injustice, we cannot doubt that new injustice was in many cases committed, nor are we surprised to hear that at Syracuse many new enrolments of citizens took place without any rightful claim,¹ probably accompanied by grants of land. The reigning feeling at Syracuse would now be quite opposite to that of the days of Gelo, when the Demos or aggregate of small self-working proprietors was considered as "a troublesome yoke-fellow," fit only to be sold into slavery for exportation. It is highly probable that the new table of citizens now prepared included that class of men in larger number than ever, on principles analogous to the liberal enrolments of Kleisthenês at Athens. In spite of all the confusion however with which this period of popular government opens, lasting for more than fifty years until the despotism of the elder Dionysius, we shall find it far the best and most prosperous portion of Sicilian history. We shall arrive at it in a subsequent chapter.

Reactionary feelings against the previous despotism, and in favour of popular government, at Syracuse and in the other cities.

Respecting the Grecian cities along the coast of Italy, during the period of the Gelonian dynasty, a few words will exhaust the whole of our knowledge. Rhegium, with its despots Anaxilaus and Mikythus, figures chiefly as a Sicilian city, and has been noticed as such in the stream of Sicilian politics. But it is also involved in the only event which has been preserved to us respecting this portion of the history of the Italian Greeks. It was about the year B.C. 473, that the Tarentines undertook an expedition against their non-Hellenic neighbours the Iapygians, in hopes of conquering Hyria and the other towns belonging to them. Mikythus, despot of Rhegium, against the will of his citizens, despatched 3000 of them by constraint as auxiliaries to the Tarentines. But the expedition proved signally disastrous to both. The Iapygians, to the number of 20,000 men, encountered

Italian Greeks—destructive defeat of the inhabitants of Tarentum and of Rhegium.

¹ Diodor. xi. 86. πολλῶν εἰζῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχε πεπολιτογραφημένων.

the united Grecian forces in the field, and completely defeated them. The battle having taken place in a hostile country, it seems that the larger portion both of Rhegians and Tarentines perished, insomuch that Herodotus pronounces it to have been the greatest Hellenic slaughter within his knowledge.¹ Of the Tarentines slain a great proportion were opulent and substantial citizens, the loss of whom sensibly affected the government of the city; strengthening the Demos, and rendering the constitution more democratical. In what particulars the change consisted we do not know: the expression of Aristotle gives reason to suppose that even before this event the constitution had been popular.²

¹ Herodot. vii. 170; Diodor. xi. 52. The latter asserts that the Iapygian victors divided their forces, part of them pursuing the Rhegian fugitives, the rest pursuing the Tarentines. Those who followed the former were so rapid in their movements, that they entered (he says) along with the fugitives into the town of Rhegium, and even became masters of it.

To say nothing of the fact, that Rhegium continues afterwards, as before, under the rule of Mikythus—we may remark that Diodorus must have formed to himself a strange idea of the geography of

southern Italy, to talk of pursuit and flight *from Iapygia to Rhegium*.

² Aristotel. Polit. v. 2, 8. Aristotle has another passage (vi. 3, 5) in which he comments on the government of Tarentum: and O. Müller applies this second passage to illustrate the particular constitutional changes which were made after the Iapygian disaster. I think this juxtaposition of the two passages unauthorized: there is nothing at all to connect them together. See *History of the Dorians*, iii. 9, 14.

CHAPTER XLIV.

FROM THE BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE DOWN TO THE DEATHS OF THEMISTOKLES AND ARISTEIDES.

AFTER having in the last chapter followed the repulse of the Carthaginians by the Sicilian Greeks, we now return to the central Greeks and the Persians—a case in which the triumph was yet more interesting to the cause of human improvement generally.

The disproportion between the immense host assembled by Xerxes, and the little which he accomplished, naturally provokes both a contempt for Persian force and an admiration for the comparative handful of men by whom they were so ignominiously beaten. Both these sentiments are just, but both are often exaggerated beyond the point which attentive contemplation of the facts will justify. The Persian mode of making war (which we may liken to that of the modern Turks,¹ now that the period of their energetic fanaticism has passed away) was in a high degree disorderly and inefficient. The men indeed, individually taken, especially the native Persians, were not deficient in the qualities of soldiers, but their arms and their organisation were wretched—and their leaders yet worse. On the other hand, the Greeks, equal, if not superior, in individual bravery, were incomparably superior in soldier-like order as well as in arms: but here too the leadership was defective, and the disunion a constant source of peril. Those who, like Plutarch (or rather the Pseudo-Plutarch) in his treatise on the Maliginity of Herodotus, insist on acknowledging nothing but magnanimity and heroism in the proceedings of the Greeks

Causes of the disgraceful repulse of Xerxes from Greece—his own defects—inferior quality and slackness of most of his army.—Tendency to exaggerate the heroism of the Greeks.

¹ Mr. Waddington's Letters from Greece, describing the Greek revolution of 1821, will convey a good idea of the stupidity of Tur-

kish warfare: compare also the second volume of the Memoirs of Baron de Tott, part. iii.

throughout these critical years, are forced to deal harshly with the inestimable witness on whom our knowledge of the facts depends. That witness intimates plainly that, in spite of the devoted courage displayed not less by the vanquished at Thermopylæ, than by the victors at Salamis, Greece owed her salvation chiefly to the imbecility, cowardice, and credulous rashness, of Xerxes.¹ Had he indeed possessed either the personal energy of Cyrus, or the judgement of Artemisia, it may be doubted whether any excellence of management, or any intimacy of union, could have preserved the Greeks against so great a superiority of force. But it is certain that all their courage as soldiers in line would have been unavailing for that purpose, without a higher degree of generalship, and a more hearty spirit of cooperation, than that which they actually manifested.

Comparison of the invasion of Greece by Xerxes with the invasion of Persia afterwards by Alexander the Great.—No improvement in warfare among the Persians during that interval of 150 years—great improvement among the Greeks.

One hundred and fifty years after this eventful period, we shall see the tables turned, and the united forces of Greece under Alexander of Macedon becoming invaders of Persia. We shall find that in Persia no improvement has taken place during this long interval—that the scheme of defence under Darius Codomannus labours under the same defects as that of attack under Xerxes—that there is the same blind and exclusive confidence in pitched battles with superior numbers²—that the advice of Mentor the Rhodian, and of Charidemus, is despised like that of Demaratus and Artemisia—that Darius Codomannus, essentially of the same stamp as Xerxes, is hurried into the battle of Issus by the same ruinous temerity as that which threw away the Persian fleet at Salamis—and that the Persian native infantry (not the cavalry) even appear to have lost that individual gallantry which they displayed so conspicuously at Platæa. But on the Grecian side, the improvement in every way is very great: the orderly courage of the soldier has been sustained and even augmented, while the generalship and power of military combination has reached a point unexampled in the previous history of mankind. Military

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ cyd. vi. 33.

τὸν βάρβαρον αὐτὸν περὶ αὐτῶ τὰ ² Thucyd. i. 142. πλήθει τὴν ἀμα-
πλείω στρατέντα, &c.: compare Thu- θίαν θρασυόνοντας, &c.

science may be esteemed a sort of creation during this interval, and will be found to go through various stages—Demosthenês and Brasidas—the Cyreian army and Xenophon—Agésilauis—Iphikratês—Epaminondas—Philip of Macedon—Alexander:¹ for the Macedonian princes are borrowers of Greek tactics, though extending and applying them with a personal energy peculiar to themselves, and with advantages of position such as no Athenian or Spartan ever enjoyed. In this comparison between the invasion of Xerxes and that of Alexander, we contrast the progressive spirit of Greece, serving as herald and stimulus to the like spirit in Europe—with the stationary mind of Asia, occasionally roused by some splendid individual, but never appropriating to itself new social ideas or powers, either for a war or for peace.

It is out of the invasion of Xerxes that those new powers of combination, political as well as military, which lighten up Grecian history during the next century and more, take their rise. They are brought into agency through the altered position and character of the Athenians—improvers, to a certain extent, of military operations on land, but the great creators of marine tactics and manœuvring in Greece—and the earliest of all Greeks who showed themselves capable of organising and directing the joint action of numerous allies and dependents: thus uniting the two distinctive qualities of the Homeric Agamemnon²—ability in command, with vigour in execution.

Progressive spirit in Greece—operating through Athenian initiative.

In the general Hellenic confederacy, which had acted against Persia under the presidency of Sparta, Athens could hardly be said to occupy any ostensible rank above that of an ordinary member. The post of second dignity in the line at Plataea had indeed been adjudged to her, yet only after a contending claim from Tegea. But without any difference in ostensible rank, she was in the eye and feeling of Greece no longer the same power as before. She had suffered more, and at sea had certainly done more, than all the other allies put

Conduct of Athens in the repulse of the Persians—her position, temper, and influence, after that event.

¹ See a remarkable passage in the third Philippic of Demosthenês, c. 10, p. 123.

² Ἀμφότερον, βασιλεὺς τ' ἀγαθός, κρατερός τ' ἀίχμητής.
Homer, *Iliad*, iii. 179.

together. Even on land at Platæa, her hoplites had manifested a combination of bravery, discipline, and efficiency against the formidable Persian cavalry, superior even to the Spartans. No Athenian officer had committed so perilous an act of disobedience as the Spartan Amompharetus. After the victory of Mykalê, when the Peloponnesians all hastened home to enjoy their triumph, the Athenian forces did not shrink from prolonged service for the important object of clearing the Hellespont, thus standing forth as the willing and forward champions of the Asiatic Greeks against Persia. Besides these exploits of Athens collectively, the only two individuals, gifted with any talents for command, whom this momentous contest had thrown up, were both of them Athenians: first, Themistoklês; next, Aristeidês. From the beginning to the end of the struggle, Athens had displayed an unreserved Pan-Hellenic patriotism which had been most ungenerously requited by the Peloponnesians; who had kept within their Isthmian walls, and betrayed Attica twice to hostile ravage; the first time, perhaps, unavoidably—but the second time by a culpable neglect in postponing their outward march against Mardonius. And the Peloponnesians could not but feel, that while they had left Attica unprotected, they owed their own salvation at Salamis altogether to the dexterity of Themistoklês and to the imposing Athenian naval force.

Considering that the Peloponnesians had sustained little or no mischief by the invasion, while the Athenians had lost for the time even their city and country, with a large proportion of their moveable property irrecoverably destroyed—we might naturally expect to find the former, if not lending their grateful and active aid to repair the damage in Attica, at least cordially welcoming the restoration of the ruined city by its former inhabitants. Instead of this, we find the selfishness again prevalent among them. Ill-will and mistrust for the future, aggravated by an admiration which they could not help feeling, overlays all their gratitude and sympathy.

The Athenians, on returning from Salamis after the battle of Platæa, found a desolate home to harbour them. Their country was laid waste,—their city burnt or de-

Proceedings of the Athenians to restore their city—jealous obstructions caused by the Peloponnesians.

stroyed, so that there remained but a few houses standing, wherein the Persian officers had taken up their quarters—and their fortifications for the most part razed or overthrown. It was their first task to bring home their families and effects from the temporary places of shelter at Trœzen, Ægina, and Salamis. After providing what was indispensably necessary for immediate wants, they began to rebuild their city and its fortifications on a scale of enlarged size in every direction.¹ But as soon as they were seen to be employed on this indispensable work, without which neither political existence nor personal safety was practicable, the allies took the alarm, preferred complaints to Sparta, and urged her to arrest the work. In the front of these complainants probably stood the Æginetans, as the old enemies of Athens, and as having most to apprehend from her might at sea. The Spartans, perfectly sympathising with the jealousy and uneasiness of their allies, were even disposed, from old association, to carry their dislike of fortifications still farther, so that they would have been pleased to see all the other Grecian cities systematically defenceless like Sparta itself.² But while sending an embassy to Athens, to offer a friendly remonstrance against the project of re-fortifying the city, they could not openly and peremptorily forbid the exercise of a right common to every autonomous community. Nor did they even venture, at a moment when the events of the past months were fresh in every one's remembrance, to divulge their real jealousies as to the future. They affected to offer prudential reasons against the scheme, founded on the chance of a future Persian invasion; in which case it would be a dangerous advantage for the invader to find any fortified city outside of Peloponnesus to further his operations, as Thebes had recently seconded Mardonius. They proposed to the Athenians therefore, not merely to desist from their own fortifications, but also to assist them in demolishing all fortifications of other cities beyond the limits of Peloponnesus—promising shelter within the Isthmus, in case of need to all exposed parties.

¹ Thucyd. i. 89.

² Thucyd. i. 90. τὰ μὲν καὶ αὐτοὶ ἴδιον ἂν ὀρώμετες μήτε ἐκαίνομεν μήτ' ἄλλον μὴδένα τείχος ἔχοντα, τὸ δὲ

πλέον, τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐξοτρυνόντων καὶ φοβουμένων τοῦ τεναυτικῆς αὐτῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὃ πρὶν οὐκ ὑπῆρχε, καὶ

Stratagem
of The-
mistoklês
to procure
for the
Athenians
the oppor-
tunity of
fortifying
their city.

A statesman like Themistoklês was not likely to be imposed upon by this diplomacy: but he saw that the Spartans had the power of preventing the work if they chose, and that it could only be executed by the help of successful deceit. By his advice the Athenians dismissed the Spartan envoys, saying that they would themselves send to Sparta and explain their views. Accordingly Themistoklês himself was presently despatched thither, as one among three envoys instructed to enter into explanations with the Spartan authorities. But his two colleagues, Aristeidês and Abronichus, by previous concert, were tardy in arriving—and he remained inactive at Sparta, making use of their absence as an excuse for not even demanding an audience, yet affecting surprise that their coming was so long delayed. But while Aristeidês and Abronichus, the other two envoys, were thus studiously kept back, the whole population of Athens laboured unremittingly at the walls. Men, women, and children, all tasked their strength to the utmost during this precious interval. Neither private houses, nor sacred edifices, were spared to furnish materials; and such was their ardour in the enterprise, that before the three envoys were united at Sparta, the wall had already attained a height sufficient at least to attempt defence. Yet the interval had been long enough to provoke suspicion, even in the slow mind of the Spartans; while the more watchful Æginetans sent them positive intelligence that the wall was rapidly advancing.

Themistoklês, on hearing this allegation, peremptorily denied the truth of it; and the personal esteem entertained towards him was at that time so great, that his assurance¹ obtained for some time unqualified credit, until fresh messengers again raised suspicions in the minds of the Spartans. In reply to these, Themistoklês urged the Ephors to send envoys of their own to Athens, and thus convince themselves of the state of the facts. They unsuspectingly acted upon his recommendation, while he at the same time transmitted a private communication to Athens, desiring that the envoys might not be suffered to depart until the safe return of himself and his colleagues,

τῆν ἐς τὸν Μηδικὸν πόλεμον πόλιν
γενομένην.

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. τῷ μὲν Θεμισ-
τοκλεῖ ἐπαίθοντο διὰ φίλιν αὐτοῦ.

which he feared might be denied them when his trick came to be divulged. Aristeidês and Abronichus had now arrived—the wall was announced to be of a height at least above contempt—and Themistoklês at once threw off the mask. He avowed the stratagem practised—told the Spartans that Athens was already fortified sufficiently to ensure the safety and free will of its inhabitants—and warned them that the hour of constraint was now past, the Athenians being in a condition to define and vindicate for themselves their own rights and duties in reference to Sparta and the allies. He reminded them that the Athenians had always been found competent to judge for themselves, whether in joint consultation, or in any separate affair such as the momentous crisis of abandoning their city and taking to their ships. They had now, in the exercise of this self-judgement, resolved on fortifying their city, as a step indispensable to themselves and advantageous even to the allies generally. No equal or fair interchange of opinion could subsist, unless all the allies had equal means of defence: either all must be unfortified, or Athens must be fortified as well as the rest.¹

Mortified as the Spartans were by a revelation which showed that they had not only been detected in a dishonest purpose, but completely outwitted—they were at the same time overawed by the decisive tone of Themistoklês, whom they never afterwards forgave. To arrest beforehand erection of the walls, would have been practicable, though not perhaps without difficulty; to deal by force with the fact accomplished, was perilous in a high degree. Moreover the inestimable services just rendered by Athens became again predominant in their minds, so that sentiment and prudence for the time coincided. They affected therefore to accept the communication without manifesting any offence, nor had they indeed put forward any pretence which required to be formally retracted. The envoys on both sides returned home, and the Athenians completed their fortifications, without obstruction²—yet not without murmurs on the

Athens fortified—
confusion of the Spartans—
disappointment of the allies.

¹ Thucyd. i. 91. Οὐ γὰρ οἶόν τε εἶναι μὴ ἀπὸ ἀντιπάλου παρασκευῆς ὁμοῖόν τι ἢ ἴσον ἐς τὸ κοινὸν βουλευέσθαι. Ἡ πάντας οὖν ἀπειχίστους

ἔφη χρῆναι συμμαχεῖν, ἧ καὶ τάδε νομίζεν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν.

² We are fortunate enough to possess this narrative, respecting

part of the allies, who bitterly reproached Sparta afterwards for having let slip this golden opportunity of arresting the growth of the giant.¹

If the allies were apprehensive of Athens before, the mixture of audacity, invention, and deceit, whereby she had just eluded the hindrance opposed to her fortifications, was well calculated to aggravate their uneasiness. On the other hand, to the Athenians, the mere hint of intervention to debar them from that common right of self-defence which was exercised by every autonomous city except Sparta, must have appeared outrageous injustice—aggravated by the fact that it was brought upon them by their peculiar sufferings in the common cause, and by the very allies who without their devoted forwardness would now have been slaves of the Great King. And the intention of the allies to obstruct the fortifications must have been known to every soul in Athens, from the universal press of hands required to hurry the work and escape interference; just as it was proclaimed to after-generations by the shapeless fragments and irregular structure of the wall, in which even sepulchral stones and inscribed columns were seen imbedded.² Assuredly the sentiment connected with this work—performed as it was alike by rich and poor, strong and weak—men, women, and children—must have been intense as well as equalising. All had endured the common miseries of exile, all had contributed to the victory, all were now sharing the same fatigue for the defence of their recovered city, in order to counterwork the ungenerous hindrance of their Peloponnesian allies.

the rebuilding of the walls of Athens, as recounted by Thucydides. It is the first incident which he relates, in that general sketch of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian war, which precedes his professed history (i. 89-92). Diodorus (xi. 39, 40), Plutarch (Themistoklēs, c. 19), and Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 6, 7) seem all to have followed Thucydides, though Plutarch also notices a statement of Theopompus, to the effect that Themistoklēs accomplished his object by bribing the Ephors. This

would not be improbable in itself—nor is it inconsistent with the narrative of Thucydides; but the latter either had not heard or did not believe it.

¹ Thucyd. i. 69. Καὶ τῶνδε ὁμοίως αἴτιοι (says the Corinthian envoy addressing the Lacedæmonians), τὸ τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς (the Athenians) τῆν πόλιν μετα τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῶναι, καὶ ὕστερον τὰ μακρὰ στήσαι τεύχη, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 93. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 7) exaggerates this into a foolish conceit.

Effect of this intended, but baffled intervention upon Athenian feelings.

We must take notice of these stirring circumstances, peculiar to the Athenians and acting upon a generation which had now been nursed in democracy for a quarter of a century and had achieved unaided the victory of Marathon—if we would understand that still stronger burst of aggressive activity, persevering self-confidence, and aptitude as well as thirst for command—together with that still wider spread of democratical organisation—which marks their character during the age immediately following.

The plan of the new fortification was projected on a scale not unworthy of the future grandeur of the city. Its circuit was sixty stadia or about seven miles, with the acropolis nearly in the centre: but the circuit of the previous walls is unknown, so that we are unable to measure the extent of that enlargement which Thucydidês testifies to have been carried out on every side. It included within the town the three hills of the Areopagus, Pnyx, and the Museum; while on the south of the town it was carried for a space even on the southern bank of the Ilissus, thus also comprising the fountain Kallirhoê.¹ In spite of the excessive hurry in which it was raised, the structure was thoroughly solid and sufficient against every external enemy: but there is reason to believe that its very large inner area was never filled with buildings. Empty spaces, for the temporary shelter of inhabitants driven in from the country with their property, were eminently useful to a Grecian city-community; to none more useful than to the Athenians, whose principal strength lay in their fleet, and whose citizens habitually resided in large proportion in their separate demes throughout Attica.

The first indispensable step in the renovation of Athens after her temporary extinction, was now happily accomplished: the city was made secure against external enemies. But Themistoklês, to whom the Athenians owed the late successful stratagem, and whose influence must

¹ For the dimensions and direction of the Themistoklean walls of Athens, see especially the excellent Treatise of Forchhammer—*Topographie von Athen*—published in the *Kieler Philologische Studien*, Kiel, 1841.

The plan of Athens, prepared by Kiepert after his own researches and published among his recent maps, adopts for the most part the ideas of Forchhammer as to the course of the walls.

Enlarge-
ment of
the walls
of Athens.

have been much strengthened by its success, had conceived plans of a wider and more ambitious range. He had been the original adviser of the great maritime start taken by his countrymen, as well as of the powerful naval force which they had created during the last few years, and which had so recently proved their salvation. He saw in that force both the only chance of salvation for the future, in case the Persians should renew their attack by sea—a contingency at that time seemingly probable—and boundless prospects of future ascendancy over the Grecian coasts and islands. It was the great engine of defence, of offence, and of ambition. To continue

this movement required much less foresight and genius than to begin it. Themistoklès, the moment that the walls of the city had been finished, brought back the attention of his countrymen to those wooden walls which had served them as a refuge against the Persian monarch. He prevailed upon them to provide harbour-room at once safe and adequate, by the enlargement and fortification of the Peiræus. This again was only the prosecution of an enterprise previously begun; for he had already, while in office two or three years before,¹ made his countrymen sensible

¹ Thucyd. i. 93. ἐπέσειε δὲ καὶ τοῦ Πειραιέως τὰ λοιπὰ ὁ Θεμιστοκλῆς οἰκοδομεῖν (ὑπέρχτο δ' αὐτοῦ πρότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ἐκείνου ἀρχῆς, ἧς κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν Ἀθηναίους ἤρξε.)

Upon which words the Scholiast observes (Κατ' ἐνιαυτὸν)—κατὰ τινα ἐνιαυτὸν ἡ γερμῶν ἐγένετο, πρὸ δὲ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα.

It seems hardly possible, having no fuller evidence to proceed upon, to determine to which of the preceding years Thucydides means to refer this ἀρχή of Themistoklès. Mr. Fynes Clinton, after discussing the opinions of Dodwell and Corsini (sec Fasti Hellenici, ad ann. 481 B.C. and Preface, p. xv.), inserts Themistoklès as Archon Eponymus in 481 B.C., the year before the invasion of Xerxes, and sup-

poses the Peiræus to have been commenced in that year. This is not in itself improbable: but he cites the Scholiast as having asserted the same thing before him (πρὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἤρξε Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα), in which I apprehend that he is not borne out by the analogy of the language: ἐνιαυτὸν ἕνα in the accusative case denotes only the duration of ἀρχή, not the position of the year (compare Thucyd. iii. 68).

I do not feel certain that Thucydides meant to designate Themistoklès as having been Archon Eponymus, or even as having been one of the nine Archons. He may have meant “during the year when Themistoklès was Stratégus (or general),” and the explanation of the Scholiast, who

that the open roadstead of Phalêrum was thoroughly insecure, and had prevailed upon them to improve and employ in part the more spacious harbours of Peiræus and Munychia—three natural basins, all capable of being closed and defended. Something had then been done towards the enlargement of this port, though it had probably been subsequently ruined by the Persian invaders. But Themistoklês now resumed the scheme on a scale far grander than he could then have ventured to propose—a scale which demonstrates the vast auguries present to his mind respecting the destinies of Athens.

Peiræus and Munychia, in his new plan, constituted a fortified space as large as the enlarged Athens, and with a wall far more elaborate and unassailable. The wall which surrounded them, sixty stadia in circuit,¹ was intended by him to be so stupendous, both in height and thickness, as to render assault hopeless, and to enable the whole military population to act on shipboard, leaving only old men and boys as a garrison.² We may judge how vast his project was, when we learn that the wall, though in practice always found sufficient, was only carried up to half the height which he had contemplated.³ In respect to thickness however his ideas were exactly followed: two carts meeting one another brought stones which were laid together right and left on the outer side of each, and thus formed two primary parallel walls, between which the interior space (of course at least as broad as the joint breadth of the two carts) was filled up, “not with rubble, in the usual manner of the Greeks, but constructed, throughout the whole thickness, of squared stones, cramped together with metal.”⁴

employs the word ἡγεμών, rather implies that he so understood it. The Stratêgi were annual as well as the Archons. Now we know that Themistoklês was one of the generals in 480 B.C., and that he commanded in Thessaly, at Artemisium, and at Salamis. The Peiræus may have been begun in the early part of 480 B.C., when Xerxes was already on his march, or at least at Sardis.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13.

² Thucyd. i. 93.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 93. Τὸ δὲ ὕψος ἤμισυ

μάλιστα ἐτελέσθη οὗ διανοεῖτο· ἐβούλετο γὰρ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῷ πάχει ἀφιστάναί τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιβουλάς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐνόμιζεν ὀλίγων καὶ τῶν ἀγχειροτάτων ἀρχέσειν τὴν φυλακὴν, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐσβήσεσθαι.

³ Thucyd. i. 93. The expressions are those of Colonel Leake, derived from inspection of the scanty remnant of these famous walls still to be seen—Topography of Athens, ch. ix. p. 411: see edit. p. 293, Germ. transl. Compare Aris-tophan. Aves, 1127, about the

The result was a solid wall, probably not less than fourteen or fifteen feet thick, since it was intended to carry so very unusual a height. In the exhortations whereby he animated the people to this fatiguing and costly work, he laboured to impress upon them that Peiræus was of more value to them than Athens itself, and that it afforded a shelter into which, if their territory should be again overwhelmed by a superior land-force, they might securely retire, with full liberty of that maritime action in which they were a match for all the world.¹ We may even suspect that if Themistoklês could have followed his own feelings, he would have altered the site of the city from Athens to Peiræus: the attachment of the people to their ancient and holy rock doubtless prevented any such proposition. Nor did he at that time, probably, contemplate the possibility of those long walls which in a few years afterwards consolidated the two cities into one.

Forty-five years afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall hear from Periklês, who espoused and carried out the large ideas of Themistoklês, this same language about the capacity of Athens to sustain a great power exclusively or chiefly upon maritime action. But the Athenian empire was then an established reality, whereas in the time of Themistoklês it was yet a dream, and his bold predictions, surpassed as they were by the future reality, mark that extraordinary power of practical divination which Thucydidês so emphatically extols in him. And it proves the exuberant hope which had now passed into the temper of the Athenian people, when we find them, on the faith of these predictions, undertaking a new enterprise of so much toil and expense; and that too when just returned from exile into a desolated country, at a moment of private distress and public impoverishment.

However, Peiræus served other purposes besides its direct use as a dockyard for military marine. Its secure fortifications and the protection of the Athenian navy were well-calculated to call back those metics or resident foreigners, who had been driven away by the invasion of

breadth of the wall of Nephelokokygia.

¹ Thucyd. i. 93 (compare Cornel.

Nepos, Themistok. c. 6). ταῖς ναυσὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας ἀνθίστασθαι.

Xerxes, and who might feel themselves insecure in returning unless some new and conspicuous means of protection were exhibited. To invite them back, and to attract new residents of a similar description, Themistoklês proposed to exempt them from the *Metokion* or non-freeman's annual tax:¹ but this exemption can only have lasted for a time, and the great temptation for them to return must have consisted in the new securities and facilities for trade, which Athens, with her fortified ports and navy, now afforded. The presence of numerous metics was profitable to the Athenians, both privately and publicly. Much of the trading, professional and handicraft business, was in their hands: and the Athenian legislation, while it excluded them from the political franchise, was in other respects equitable and protective to them. In regard to trading pursuits, the metics had this advantage over the citizens—that they were less frequently carried away for foreign military service. The great increase of their numbers, from this period forward, while it tended materially to increase the value of property all throughout Attica, but especially in Peiræus and Athens, where they mostly resided, helps us to explain the extraordinary prosperity, together with the excellent cultivation, prevalent throughout the country before the Peloponnesian war. The barley, vegetables, figs, and oil, produced in most parts of the territory—the charcoal prepared in the flourishing deme of Acharnæ²—and the fish obtained in abundance near the coast—all found opulent buyers and a constant demand from the augmenting town population.

We are farther told that Themistoklês³ prevailed on the Athenians to build every year twenty new ships of the line—so we may designate the trireme. Whether this number was always strictly adhered to, it is impossible to say: but to repair the ships, as well as to keep up their numbers, was always regarded among the most indispensable obligations of the executive government.

¹ Diodor. xi. 43.

² See the lively picture of the Acharnian demots in the comedy of Aristophanes so entitled.

Respecting the advantages derived from the residence of metics and from foreign visitors, compare

the observations of Isokratês, more than a century after this period, *Orat. iv. De Pace*, p. 163, and Xenophon, *De Vectigalibus*, c. iv.

³ Diodor. xi. 43.

It does not appear that the Spartans offered any opposition to the fortification of the Peiræus, though it was an enterprise greater, more novel, and more menacing, than that of Athens. But Diodorus tells us, probably enough, that Themistoklês thought it necessary to send an embassy to Sparta,¹ intimating that his scheme was to provide a safe harbour for the collective navy of Greece, in the event of future Persian attack.

Works on so vast a scale must have taken a considerable time, and absorbed much of the Athenian force: yet they did not prevent Athens from lending active aid towards the expedition which, in the year after the battle of Plataea (B.C. 478), set sail for Asia under the Spartan Pausanias. Twenty ships from the various cities of Peloponnesus² were under his command: the Athenians alone furnished thirty, under the orders of Aristeidês and Kimon: other triremes also came from the Ionian and insular allies. They first sailed to Cyprus, in which island they liberated most of the Grecian cities from the Persian government. Next they turned to the Bosphorus of Thrace, and undertook the siege of Byzantium, which, like Sestus in the Chersonese, was a post of great moment as well as of great strength—occupied by a considerable Persian force, with several leading Persians and even kinsmen of the monarch. The place was captured,³ seemingly after a prolonged siege: it might probably hold out even longer than Sestus, as being taken less unprepared. The line of communication between the Euxine sea and Greece was thus cleared of obstruction.

¹ Diodor. xi. 41, 42, 43. I mean, that the fact of such an embassy being sent to Sparta is probable enough—separating that fact from the preliminary discussions which Diodorus describes as having preceded it in the assembly of Athens, and which seem unmeaning as well as incredible. His story—that Themistoklês told the assembly that he had conceived a scheme of great moment to the state, but that it did not admit of being made public beforehand, upon which the assembly named Aristeidês and Xanthippus to hear it

confidentially and judge of it—seems to indicate that Diodorus had read the well-known tale of the project of Themistoklês to burn the Grecian fleet in the harbour of Pagasæ, and that he jumbled it in his memory with this other project for enlarging and fortifying the Peiræus.

² Thucyd. i. 94; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23. Diodorus (xi. 44) says that the Peloponnesian ships were fifty in number: his statement is not to be accepted, in opposition to Thucydides.

³ Thucyd. i. 94.

The capture of Byzantium proved the signal for a capital and unexpected change in the relations of the various Grecian cities; a change, of which the proximate cause lay in the misconduct of Pausanias, but towards which other causes, deep-seated as well as various, also tended. In recounting the history of Miltiadês,¹ I noticed the deplorable liability of the Grecian leading men to be spoiled by success. This distemper worked with singular rapidity on Pausanias. As conqueror of Plataea, he had acquired a renown unparalleled in Grecian experience, together with a prodigious share of the plunder. The concubines, horses,² camels, and gold plate, which had thus passed into his possession, were well calculated to make the sobriety and discipline of Spartan life irksome, while his power also, though great on foreign command, became subordinate to that of the Ephors when he returned home. His newly-acquired insolence was manifested immediately after the battle, in the commemorative tripod dedicated by his order at Delphi, which proclaimed himself by name and singly, as commander of the Greeks and destroyer of the Persians: an unseemly boast, of which the Lacedæmonians themselves were the first to mark their disapprobation, by causing the inscription to be erased, and the names of the cities who had taken part in the combat to be all enumerated on the tripod.³ Nevertheless he was still sent on the command against Cyprus and Byzantium, and it was on the capture of this latter place that his ambition and discontent first ripened into distinct treason. He entered into correspondence with Gongylus the Eretrian exile (now a subject of Persia, and invested with the property and government of a district in Mysia), to whom he entrusted his new acquisition of Byzantium, and the care of the valuable prisoners taken in it.

Misconduct of Pausanias—refusal of the allies to obey him—his reasonable correspondence with Xerxes.

¹ See the volume of this History immediately preceding, ch. xxxvi.

² Herodot. ix. 81.

³ In the Athenian inscriptions on the votive offerings dedicated after the capture of Eion, as well as after the great victories near the river Eurymedon, the name of Kimon the commander is not even

mentioned (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 7; Diodor. xi. 62).

A strong protest, apparently familiar to Grecian feeling, against singling out the general particularly, to receive the honours of victory, appears in Euripid. *Andromach.* 691:—striking verses, which are said (truly or falsely)

These prisoners were presently suffered to escape, or rather sent away underhand to Xerxes; together with a letter from the hand of Pausanias himself, to the following effect:—"Pausanias the Spartan commander having taken these captives, sends them back in his anxiety to oblige thee. I am minded, if it so please thee, to marry thy daughter, and to bring under thy dominion both Sparta and the rest of Greece: with thy aid I think myself competent to achieve this. If my proposition be acceptable, send some confidential person down to the seaboard, through whom we may hereafter correspond." Xerxes, highly pleased with the opening thus held out, immediately sent down Artabazus (the same who had been second in command in Bœotia), to supersede Megabatês in the satrapy of Daskylium. The new satrap, furnished with a letter of reply bearing the regal seal, was instructed to promote actively the projects of Pausanias. The letter was to this purport:—"Thus saith King Xerxes to Pausanias. Thy name stands for ever recorded in my house as a well-doer, on account of the men whom thou hast saved for me beyond sea at Byzantium; and thy propositions now received are acceptable to me. Relax not either night or day in accomplishing that which thou promisest, nor let thyself be held back by cost, either gold or silver, or numbers of men, if thou standest in need of them; but transact in confidence thy business and mine jointly with Artabazus, the good man whom I have now sent, in such manner as may be best for both of us."¹

Throughout the whole of this expedition, Pausanias had been insolent and domineering; degrading the allies at quarters and watering-places in the most offensive manner as compared with the Spartans, and treating the whole armament in a manner which Greek warriors could not tolerate, even in a Spartan Herakleid and a victorious general. But when he received the letter from Xerxes, and found himself in immediate communication with Artabazus, as well as supplied

Pausanias, having assurances of aid from Xerxes, becomes more intolerable in his behaviour. He is recalled to Sparta.

to have been indignantly repeated by Kleitus, during the intoxication of the banquet wherein he was slain by Alexander (Quint. Curtius, viii. 4, 29 (viii. 4); Plutarch, Alexand. c. 51).

¹ These letters are given by Thucydides verbatim (i. 128, 129): he had seen them or obtained copies (*ὡς ἕστειρον ἀνευρέθη*)—they were doubtless communicated along with the final revelations of the confi-

with funds for corruption,¹ his insane hopes knew no bounds, and he already fancied himself son-in-law of the Great King as well as despot of Hellas. Fortunately for Greece, his treasonable plans were neither deliberately laid, nor veiled until ripe for execution, but manifested with childish impatience. He clothed himself in Persian attire (a proceeding which the Macedonian army, a century and a half afterwards, could not tolerate² even in Alexander the Great)—he traversed Thrace with a body of Median and Egyptian guards—he copied the Persian chiefs both in the luxury of his table and in his conduct towards the free women of Byzantium. Kleonikê, a Byzantine maiden of conspicuous family, having been ravished from her parents by his order, was brought to his chamber at night: he happened to be asleep, and being suddenly awakened, knew not at first who was the person approaching his bed, but seized his sword and slew her.³ Moreover his haughty reserve, with uncontrolled bursts of wrath, rendered him unapproachable; and the allies at length came to regard him as a despot rather than a general. The news of such outrageous behaviour, and the manifest evidences of his alliance with the Persians, were soon transmitted to the Spartans, who recalled him to answer for his conduct, and seemingly the Spartan vessels along with him.⁴

In spite of the flagrant conduct of Pausanias, the Lacedæmonians acquitted him on the allegations of positive and individual wrong; yet mistrusting his conduct in reference to collusion with the enemy, they sent out Dorkis to supersede him as commander. But a revolution, of immense importance for Greece, had taken place in the minds of the allies. The headship, or hege-

dential Argilian slave. As they are autographs, I have translated them literally, retaining that abrupt transition from the third person to the first, which is one of their peculiarities. Cornelius Nepos, who translates the letter of Pausanias, has effaced this peculiarity. He carries the third person from the beginning to the end (Cornel. Nep. Pausan. e. 2).

¹ Diodor. xi. 44.

² Arrian. Exp. Alex. iv. 7, 7;

vii. 8, 4; Quint. Curt. vi. 6, 10 (vi. 21, 11).

³ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 6; also Plutarch, De Ser. Numin. Vind. c. 10, p. 555. Pausanias, iii. 17, 8. It is remarkable that the latter heard the story of the death of Kleonikê from the lips of a Byzantine citizen of his own day, and seems to think that it had never found place in any written work.

⁴ Thueyd. i. 95-131: compare Duris and Nymphis apud Athenæum, xii. p. 535.

mony, was in the hands of Athens, and Dorkis the Spartan found the allies not disposed to recognize his authority.

Even before the battle of Salamis, the question had been raised,¹ whether Athens was not entitled to the command at sea, in consequence of the preponderance of her naval contingent. The repugnance of the allies to any command except that of Sparta, either on land or water, had induced the Athenians to waive their pretensions at that critical moment. But the subsequent victories had materially exalted the latter in the eyes of Greece: while the armament now serving, differently composed from that which had fought at Salamis, contained a large proportion of the newly-enfranchised Ionic Greeks, who not only had no preference for Spartan command, but were attached to the Athenians on every ground—as well from kindred race, as from the certainty that Athens with her superior fleet was the only protector upon whom they could rely against the Persians. Moreover, it happened that the Athenian generals on this expedition, Aristeidês and Kimon, were personally just and conciliating, forming a striking contrast with Pausanias. Hence the Ionic Greeks in the fleet, when they found that the behaviour of the latter was not only oppressive towards themselves but also revolting to Grecian sentiment generally—addressed themselves to the Athenian commanders for protection and redress, on the plausible ground of kindred race;² entreating to be allowed to serve under Athens, as leader instead of Sparta.

Plutarch tells us that Aristeidês not only tried to remonstrate with Pausanias, who repelled him with arrogance—which is exceedingly probable—but that he also required, as a condition of his compliance with the request of the Ionic allies, that they should personally insult Pausanias, so as to make reconciliation impracticable: upon which a Samian and a Chian captain deliberately attacked and damaged the Spartan admiral-ship in the harbour of Byzantium.³ The historians from whom Plutarch copied this latter statement must have presumed in the Athenians

¹ Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Compare the language of the Athenian envoy, as it stands in Herodotus (vii. 155), addressed to Gelo.

ἡγεμόνας τοῦ ἅπαντος γένους κατὰ τὸ ξυγγένες καὶ Πρωσποντικῆ μὴ ἐπιτρέψαι ἡμῶν ἀνάγκη.

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 23.

³ Thucyd. i. 95. ἡξίουν αὐτοῦς

a disposition to provoke that quarrel with Sparta which afterwards sprung up as it were spontaneously: but the Athenians had no interest in doing so, nor can we credit the story—which is moreover unnoticed by Thucydidēs. To give the Spartans a just ground of indignation, would have been glaring imprudence on the part of Aristeidēs. Yet having every motive to entertain the request of the allies, he began to take his measures for acting as their protector and chief. And his proceedings were much facilitated by the circumstance that the Spartan government about this time recalled Pausanias to undergo an examination, in consequence of the universal complaints against him which had reached them. He seems to have left no Spartan authority behind him—even the small Spartan squadron accompanied him home: so that the Athenian generals had the best opportunity for ensuring to themselves and exercising that command which the allies besought them to undertake. So effectually did they improve the moment, that when Dorkis arrived to replace Pausanias, they were already in full supremacy; while Dorkis, having only a small force and being in no condition to employ constraint, found himself obliged to return home.¹

This incident, though not a declaration of war against Sparta, was the first open renunciation of her authority as presiding state among the Greeks; the first avowed manifestation of a competitor for that dignity, with numerous and willing followers; the first separation of Greece (considered in herself alone and apart from foreign solicitations such as the Persian invasion) into two distinct organized camps, each with collective interests and projects of its own. In spite of mortified pride, Sparta was constrained, and even in some points of view not indisposed, to patient acquiescence. She had no means of forcing the dispositions of the Ionic allies, while the war with Persia altogether—having now become no longer strictly defensive, and being withal maritime as well as distant from her own territory—had ceased to be in harmony with her home-routine and strict discipline. Her grave senators, especially an ancient Herakleid named Hetœmaridas, reproved the impatience of the younger citizens, and

Importance of this change in the relations of the Grecian states.

¹ Thucyd. i. 95; Diodorus, xi. 44-47.

discountenanced the idea of permanent maritime command as a dangerous innovation. They even treated it as an advantage, that Athens should take the lead in carrying on the Persian war, since it could not be altogether dropped; nor had the Athenians as yet manifested any sentiments positively hostile to excite their alarm.¹ Nay, the Spartans actually took credit in the eyes of Athens, about a century afterwards, for having themselves advised this separation of command at sea from command on land.² Moreover, if the war continued under Spartan guidance, there would be a continued necessity for sending out their kings or chief men to command: and the example of Pausanias showed them the depraving effect of such military power, remote as well as unchecked.

The example of their king Leotychidês, too, near about this time, was a second illustration of the same tendency. At the same time, apparently, that Pausanias embarked for Asia to carry on the war against the Persians, Leotychidês was sent with an army into Thessaly to put down the Aleuadæ and those Thessalian parties who had sided with Xerxes and Mardonius. Successful in this expedition, he suffered himself to be bribed, and was even detected with a large sum of money actually on his person; in consequence of which the Lacedæmonians condemned him to banishment and razed his house to the ground. He died afterwards in

Tendency of the Spartan kings to become corrupted on foreign service—Leotychidês.

¹ Thucyd. i. 95. Following Thucydidês in his conception of these events, I have embodied in the narrative as much as seems consistent with it in Diodorus (xi. 50), who evidently did not here copy Thucydidês, but probably had Ephorus for his guide. The name of Hetœmaridas, as an influential Spartan statesman on this occasion, is probable enough; but his alleged speech on the mischiefs of maritime empire, which Diodorus seems to have had before him composed by Ephorus, would probably have represented the views and feelings of the year 350 B.C., and not those of 476 B.C. The subject would have been treated in the same manner

as Isokratês, the master of Ephorus, treats it in his Orat. viii. De Pace, p. 179, 180.

² Xenophon. Hellen. vi. 5, 34. It was at the moment when the Spartans were soliciting Athenian aid, after their defeat at Leuktra. ὑπομινθήσκοντες μὲν, ὡς τὸν βάρβαρον κοινῇ ἀπεμαχέσαντο—ἀναμιμνήσκοντες δὲ, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι τε ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἤγερθησαν ἡγεμόνες τοῦ ναυτικοῦ, καὶ τῶν κοινῶν χρημάτων φύλακες, τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ταῦτα συμβουλευομένων· αὐτοὶ τε κατὰ γῆν ὁμολογουμένως ὑπ' ἀπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμόνες προκρίθεισαν, συμβουλευομένων αὐ τὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

exile at Tegea.¹ Two such instances were well calculated to make the Lacedæmonians distrust the conduct of their Herakleid leaders when on foreign service, and this feeling weighed much in inducing them to abandon the Asiatic headship in favour of Athens. It appears that their Peloponnesian allies retired from this contest at the same time as they did, so that the prosecution of the war was thus left to Athens as chief of the newly-emancipated Greeks.²

It was from these considerations that the Spartans were induced to submit to that loss of command which the misconduct of Pausanias had brought upon them. Their acquiescence facilitated the immense change about to take place in Grecian politics.

According to the tendencies in progress prior to the Persian invasion, Sparta had become gradually more and

¹ Herodot. vi. 72; Diodor. xi. 48; Pausanias, iii. 7, 8: compare Plutarch, De Herodoti Malign. c. 21, p. 859.

Leotychidês died, according to Diodorus, in 476 B.C.: he had commanded at Mykalê in 479 B.C. The expedition into Thessaly must therefore have been in one of the two intermediate years, if the chronology of Diodorus were in this case thoroughly trustworthy. But Mr. Clinton (Fasti Hellenici, Appendix, ch. iii. p. 210) has shown that Diodorus is contradicted by Plutarch, about the date of the accession of Archidamus — and by others, about the date of the revolt at Sparta. Mr. Clinton places the accession of Archidamus and the banishment of Leotychidês (of course therefore the expedition into Thessaly) in 469 B.C. I incline rather to believe that the expedition of Leotychidês against the Thessalian Aleuadae took place in the year or in the second year following the battle of Plataeæ, because they had been the ardent and hearty allies of Mardonius in Bœotia, and because the war would seem not to have been completed without

putting them down and making the opposite party in Thessaly predominant.

Considering how imperfectly we know the Lacedæmonian chronology of this date, it is very possible that some confusion may have arisen in the case of Leotychidês from the difference between the date of his *banishment* and that of his *death*. King Pleistoanax afterwards, having been banished for the same offence as that committed by Leotychidês, and having lived many years in banishment, was afterwards restored: and the years which he had passed in banishment were counted as a part of his reign (Fast. Hellen. l. c. p. 211). The date of Archidamus may perhaps have been reckoned in one account from the *banishment* of Leotychidês—in another from his *death*, the rather, as Archidamus must have been very young, since he reigned forty-two years even after 469 B.C. And the date which Diodorus has given as that of the death of Leotychidês, may really be only the date of his banishment, in which he lived until 469 B.C.

² Thueyd. i. 18.

more the president of something like a Pan-hellenic union, comprising the greater part of the Grecian states. Such at least was the point towards which things seemed to be tending; and if many separate states stood aloof from this union, none of them at least sought to form any counter-union, if we except the obsolete and important pretensions of Argos.

Momentary Pan-hellenic union under Sparta, immediately after the repulse of Xerxes—now broken up and passing into a schism with two distinct parties and chiefs, Sparta and Athens.

The preceding volumes of this history have shown that Sparta had risen to such ascendancy, not from her superior competence on the management of collective interests, nor even, in the main, from ambitious efforts on her own part to acquire it—but from the converging tendencies of Grecian feeling which required some such presiding state—and from the commanding military power, rigid discipline, and ancient undisturbed constitution, which attracted that feeling towards Sparta. The necessities of common defence against Persia greatly strengthened these tendencies; and the success of the defence, whereby so many Greeks were emancipated who required protection against their former master, seemed destined to have the like effect still more. For an instant, after the battles of Plataea and Mykalê—when the town of Plataea was set apart as a consecrated neutral spot for an armed confederacy against the Persian, with periodical solemnities and meetings of deputies—Sparta was exalted to be the chief of a full Pan-hellenic union, Athens being only one of the principal members. And had Sparta been capable either of comprehensive policy, of self-directed and persevering efforts, or of the requisite flexibility of dealing, embracing distant Greeks as well as near,—her position was now such, that her own ascendancy, together with undivided Pan-hellenic union, might long have been maintained. But she was lamentably deficient in all the requisite qualities, and the larger the union became, the more her deficiency stood manifest. On the other hand, Athens, now entering into rivalry as a sort of leader of opposition, possessed all those qualities in a remarkable degree, over and above that actual maritime force which was the want of the day; so that the opening made by Spartan incompetence and crime (so far as Pausanias was concerned) found her in every respect prepared.

But the sympathies of the Peloponnesians still clung to Sparta, while those of the Ionian Greeks had turned to Athens: and thus not only the short-lived symptoms of an established Pan-hellenic union, but even all tendencies towards it, from this time disappear. There now stands out a manifest schism, with two pronounced parties, towards one of which nearly all the constituent atoms of the Grecian world gravitate: the maritime states, newly enfranchised from Persia, towards Athens—the land-states, which had formed most part of the confederate army at Plataea, towards Sparta.¹ Along with this national schism, and called

¹ Thucyd. i. 18. Καὶ μεγάλου κινδύνου ἐπεκρεμασθέντος οἱ τε Λακεδαιμόνιοι τῶν ξυμπολεμησάντων Ἑλλήνων ἤγησαντο δυνάμει προὔχοντες, καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ ἀνασκευασμένοι, ἐς τὰς ναῦς ἐμβάντες ναυτικοὶ ἐγένοντο. Κοινῇ δὲ ἀπωσάμενοι τὸν βάρβαρον, ὕστερον οὐ πολλῶ διακρίθησαν πρὸς τε Ἀθηναίους καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιους, οἱ τε ἀποστάντες βασιλείως Ἑλλήνες καὶ οἱ ξυμπολεμήσαντες. Δυνάμει γὰρ ταῦτα μέγιστα διεφάνη ἰσχυρον γὰρ οἱ μὲν κατὰ γῆν, οἱ δὲ ναυσί. Καὶ ὀλίγον ἔμει χρόνον συνέμεινεν ἡ ὁμαιχμία, ἔπειτα δὲ δινεχθέντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπολέμησαν μετὰ τῶν ξυμάχων πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων εἰτινές που διασταίεν, πρὸς τούτους ἦδη ἐχώρουν. Ὅστε ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰεὶ τὸν πόλεμον, &c.

This is a clear and concise statement of the great revolution in Grecian affairs, comparing the period before and after the Persian war. Thucydides goes on to trace briefly the consequences of this bisection of the Grecian world into two great leagues—the growing improvement in military skill, and the increasing stretch of military effort on both sides from the Persian invasion down to the Peloponnesian war. He remarks also upon the difference between

Sparta and Athens in their way of dealing with their allies respectively. He then states the striking fact, that the military force put forth separately by Athens and her allies on the one side, and by Sparta and her allies on the other, during the Peloponnesian war, were each of them greater than the entire force which had been employed by both together in the most powerful juncture of their confederacy against the Persian invaders—Καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδίᾳ παρασκευῇ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραίφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίας ἦθησαν (i. 19).

I notice this last passage especially (construing it as the Scholiast seems to do), not less because it conveys an interesting comparison, than because it has been understood by Dr. Arnold, Götter, and other commentators in a sense which seems to me erroneous. They interpret thus—αὐτοῖς to mean the Athenians only, and not the Lacedæmonians—ἡ ἰδίᾳ παρασκευῇ to denote the forces equipped by Athens herself, apart from her allies—and ἀκραίφνοῦς ξυμμαχίας to refer “to the Athenian alliance only, at a period a little before the conclusion of the thirty years’ treaty, when the Athenians were masters not only of the islands, and the Asiatic

into action by it, appears the internal political schism in each separate city between oligarchy and democracy. Of course the germ of these parties had already previously existed in the separate states. But the energetic democracy of Athens, and the pronounced tendency of Sparta to rest upon the native oligarchies in each separate city as her chief support, now began to bestow, on the conflict of internal political parties, an Hellenic importance, and an aggravated bitterness, which had never before belonged to it.

The departure of the Spartan Dorkis left the Athenian generals at liberty; and their situation imposed upon them the duty of organising the new confederacy which they had been chosen to conduct. The Ionic allies were at this time not merely willing and unanimous, but acted as the forward movers in the enterprise; for they stood in obvious need of protection against the attacks of Persia, and had no farther kindness to expect from Sparta or the Peloponnesians. But even had they been less under the pressure of necessity, the conduct of Athens, and of Aristeidês as the representative of Athens, might have sufficed to bring them into harmonious cooperation. The new leader was no less equitable towards the confederates

Greek colonies, but had also united to their confederacy Bœotia and Achaia on the continent of Greece itself" (Dr. Arnold's note). Now so far as the words go, the meaning assigned by Dr. Arnold might be admissible; but if we trace the thread of ideas in Thucydides, we shall see that the comparison, as these commentators conceive it, between Athens alone and Athens aided by her allies—between the Athenian empire as it stood during the Peloponnesian war, and the same empire as it *had* stood before the thirty years' truce—is quite foreign to his thoughts. Nor had Thucydides said one word to inform the reader, that the Athenian empire at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war had di-

minished in magnitude, and thus was no longer ἀρχαίωνης: without which previous notification, the comparison supposed by Dr. Arnold could not be clearly understood. I conceive that there are two periods, and two sets of circumstances, which throughout all this passage Thucydides means to contrast: first, confederate Greece at the time of the Persian war; next, bisected Greece in a state of war, under the double headship of Sparta and Athens.—Αὐτοῖς refers as much to Sparta as to Athens—ἀρχαίους τῆς ἑσσυμαχίας means what had been before expressed by ἑμιχμαίς—and ποτε set against τόνδε τον πόλεμον, is equivalent to the expression which had before been used—ἀπὸ τῶν Μηδικῶν ἐς τόνδε αἰὶ τον πόλεμον.

than energetic against the common enemy. The general conditions of the confederacy were regulated in a common synod of the members, appointed to meet periodically for deliberative purposes, in the temple of Apollo and Artemis at Delos—of old the venerated spot for the religious festivals of the Ionic cities, and at the same time a convenient centre for the members. A definite obligation, either in equipped ships of war or in money, was imposed upon every separate city, and the Athenians, as leaders, determined in which form contribution should be made by each. Their assessment must of course have been reviewed by the synod. They had no power at this time to enforce any regulation not approved by that body.

Formation of the confederacy of Delos, under Athens as president—general meetings of allies held in that island.

It had been the good fortune of Athens to profit by the genius of Themistoklês on two recent critical occasions (the battle of Salamis and the rebuilding of her walls), where sagacity, craft, and decision were required in extraordinary measure, and where pecuniary probity was of less necessity. It was no less her good fortune now,—in the delicate business of assessing a new tax and determining how much each state should bear, when unimpeachable honesty in the assessor was the first of all qualities—not to have Themistoklês; but to employ in his stead the well-known, we might almost say the ostentatious, probity of Aristeidês. This must be accounted good fortune, since at the moment when Aristeidês was sent out, the Athenians could not have anticipated that any such duty would devolve upon him. His assessment not only found favour at the time of its original proposition, when it must have been freely canvassed by the assembled allies—but also maintained its place in general esteem, as equitable and moderate, after the once responsible headship of Athens had degenerated into an unpopular empire.¹

¹ Thucyd. v. 18; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 24. Plutarch states that the allies expressly asked the Athenians to send Aristeidês for the purpose of assessing the tribute. This is not at all probable: Aristeidês, as commander of the Athenian contingent under Pausanias, was at Byzantium when the mutiny

of the Ionians against Pausanias occurred, and was the person to whom they applied for protection. As such, he was the natural person to undertake such duties as devolved upon Athens, without any necessity of supposing that he was specially asked for to perform it.

Plutarch farther states that a

Respecting this first assessment we scarcely know more than one single fact—the aggregate in money was 460 talents (=about 106,000*l.* sterling). Of the items composing such aggregate—of the individual cities which paid it—of the distribution of obligations to furnish ships and to

Assessment of the confederacy and all its members, made by Aristeidês—definite obligation in ships and money—total—Hellênôtamiâ.

furnish money—we are entirely ignorant. The little information which we possess on these points relates to a period considerably later, shortly before the Peloponnesian war, under the uncontrolled empire then exercised by Athens. Thucydidês in his brief sketch makes us clearly understand the difference between *presiding* Athens with her autonomous and regularly assembled allies in 476 B.C., and *imperial* Athens with her subject allies in 432 B.C. The Greek word equivalent to *ally* left either of these

epithets to be understood, by an ambiguity exceedingly convenient to the powerful states. From the same author, too, we learn the general causes of the change: but he gives us few particulars as to the modifying circumstances, and none at all as to the first start. He tells us only that the Athenians appointed a peculiar board of officers called the Hellênôtamiâ, to receive and administer the common fund—that Delos was constituted the general treasury, where the money was to be kept—and that the payment thus levied was called the *phorus*;¹ a name which appears then to have been first put into circulation, though afterwards usual—and to have conveyed at first no degrading import, though it afterwards became so odious as to be exchanged for a more innocent synonym.

Endeavouring as well as we can to conceive the Athenian alliance in its infancy, we are first struck with the

certain contribution had been levied from the Greeks towards the war, even during the headship of Sparta. This statement also is highly improbable. The headship of Sparta covers only one single campaign, in which Pausanias had the command: the Ionic Greeks sent their ships to the fleet, which would be held sufficient, and there was no time for measuring commutations into money.

Pausanias states, but I think quite erroneously, that the name of Aristeidês was robbed of its due honour because he was the first person who ἐταξέ φόρους τοῖς Ἑλλησι (Pausan. viii. 52, 2). Neither the assessment nor the name of Aristeidês was otherwise than popular.

Aristotle employs the name of Aristeidês as a symbol of unrivalled probity (Rhetoric. ii. 24, 2).

¹ Thucyd. i. 95, 96.

magnitude of the total sum contributed; which will appear the more remarkable when we reflect that many of the contributing cities furnished ships besides. We may be certain that all which was done at first was done by general consent, and by a freely determining majority. For Athens, at the time when the Ionic allies besought her protection against arrogance, could have had no power of constraining parties, especially when the loss of supremacy, though quietly borne, was yet fresh and rankling among the countrymen of Pausanias. So large a total implies, from the very first, a great number of contributing states, and we learn from hence to appreciate the powerful, wide-spread, and voluntary movement which then brought together the maritime and insular Greeks distributed throughout the Ægean sea and the Hellespont.

Rapid growth, early magnitude, of the confederacy of Delos: willing adhesion of the members.

The Phœnician fleet, and the Persian land-force, might at any moment re-appear, and there was no hope of resisting either except by confederacy: so that confederacy under such circumstances became with these exposed Greeks not merely a genuine feeling, but at that time the first of all their feelings. It was their common fear, rather than Athenian ambition, which gave birth to the alliance; and they were grateful to Athens for organising it. The public import of the name *Hellênotamiæ*, coined for the occasion—the selection of Delos as a centre—and the provision for regular meetings of the members—demonstrate the patriotic and fraternal purpose which the league was destined to serve. In truth the protection of the Ægean sea against foreign maritime force and lawless piracy, as well as that of the Hellespont and Bosphorus against the transit of a Persian force, was a purpose essentially public, for which all the parties interested were bound in equity to provide by way of common contribution. Any island, or seaport which might refrain from contributing, was a gainer at the cost of others. The general feeling of this common danger, as well as equitable obligation, at a moment when the fear of Persia was yet serious, was the real cause which brought together so many contributing members, and enabled the forward parties to shame into concurrence such as were more backward. How the confederacy came to be turned afterwards to the purposes

of Athenian ambition, we shall see at the proper time: but in its origin it was an equal alliance, in so far as alliance between the strong and the weak can ever be equal—not an Athenian empire. Nay, it was an alliance in which every individual member was more exposed, more defenceless, and more essentially benefited in the way of protection than Athens. We have here in truth one of the few moments in Grecian history wherein a purpose at once common, equal, useful, and innocent, brought together spontaneously many fragments of this disunited race, and overlaid for a time that exclusive bent towards petty and isolated autonomy which ultimately made slaves of them all. It was a proceeding equitable and prudent, in principle as well as in detail; promising at the time the most beneficent consequences—not merely protection against the Persians, but a standing police of the Ægean sea, regulated by a common superintending authority. And if such promise was not realised, we shall find that the inherent defects of the allies, indisposing them to the hearty appreciation and steady performance of their duties as equal confederates, are at least as much chargeable with the failure as the ambition of Athens. We may add, that in selecting Delos as a centre, the Ionic allies were conciliated by a renovation of the solemnities which their fathers, in the days of former freedom, had crowded to witness in that sacred island.

At the time when this alliance was formed, the Persians still held not only the important posts of Eion on the Strymon and Doriskus in Thrace, but also several other posts in that country¹ which are not specified to us. We may thus understand why the Greek cities on and near the Chalkidic peninsula—Argilus, Stageirus, Akanthus, Skôlus, Olynthus, &c.—which we know to have joined under the first assessment of Aristeidês, were not less anxious² to seek protection in the bosom of the new confederacy, than the Dorian islands of Rhodes and Kos, the Ionic islands of Samos and Chios,

State and power of Persia at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed.

¹ Herodot. vii. 106. Ἐπαρχίαι ἐν τῇ Θρηάκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλάδασι πᾶνταχῆ. Οὐτοῦν πάντες, οἳ τε ἐκ Θρηάκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλάδασι, πῶς, τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπο Ἑλλήνων ὑπεῖρον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλατίας

ἐγγρέθησαν, &c.

² Thucyd. v. 18. Τὰς δὲ πόλεις, φερόμενας τὸν φόρον τὸν ἐπ' Ἀριστείδου, αὐτονομίαις εἶναι. . . εἰσὶ δὲ, Ἀργίλος, Στάγειρος, Ἀκανθός, Σκώλος, Ὀλύθιος, Σάμωτιος.

the Æolic Lesbos and Tenedos, or continental towns such as Milêtus and Byzantium: by all of whom adhesion to this alliance must have been contemplated, in 477 or 476 B.C., as the sole condition of emancipation from Persia. Nothing more was required, for the success of a foreign enemy against Greece generally, than complete autonomy of every Grecian city, small as well as great—such as the Persian monarch prescribed and tried to enforce ninety years afterwards, through the Lacedæmonian Antalkidas, in the pacification which bears the name of the latter. Some sort of union, organised and obligatory upon each city, was indispensable to the safety of all. Indeed even with that aid, at the time when the confederacy of Delos was first formed, it was by no means certain the Asiatic enemy would be effectually kept out; especially as the Persians were strong not merely from their own force, but also from the aid of internal parties in many of the Grecian states—traitors within, as well as exiles without.

Among these traitors, the first in rank as well as the most formidable, was the Spartan Pausanias. Summoned home from Byzantium to Sparta, in order that the loud complaints against him might be examined, he had been acquitted¹ of the charges of wrong and oppression against individuals. Yet the presumptions of *medism* (or treacherous correspondence with the Persians) appeared so strong, that, though not found guilty, he was still not reappointed to the command. Such treatment seems to have only emboldened him in the prosecution of his designs against Greece; for which purpose he came out to Byzantium in a trireme belonging to Hermionê, under pretence of aiding as a volunteer without any formal authority in the war. He there resumed his negotiations with Artabazus. His great station and celebrity still gave him so strong a hold on men's opinions, that he appears to have established a sort of mastery in Byzantium, from whence the Athenians, already recognised heads of the confederacy, were constrained to expel him by force.²

Conduct of Pausanias after being removed from the command—he prosecutes his treasonable designs in conjunction with Persia.

¹ Cornelius Nepos states that he was fined (Pausanias, c. 2), which is neither noticed by Thucydides, nor at all probable, looking at the

subsequent circumstances connected with him.

² Thucyd. i. 130, 131. Καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Βυζαντίου βία ὑπο τῶν Ἀθηναίων

And we may be sure that the terror excited by his presence, as well as by his known designs, tended materially to accelerate the organisation of the confederacy under Athens. He then retired to Kolônæ in the Troad, where he continued for some time in the farther prosecution of his schemes, trying to form a Persian party, despatching emissaries to distribute Persian gold among various cities of Greece, and probably employing the name of Sparta to impede the formation of the new confederacy:¹ until at length the Spartan authorities, apprised of his proceedings, sent a herald out to him with peremptory orders that he should come home immediately along with the herald: if he disobeyed, "the Spartans would declare war against him," or constitute him a public enemy.

ἐκπολιτορχηθεὶς, &c.: these words seem to imply that he had acquired a strong position in the town.

¹ It is to this time that I refer the mission of Arthmius of Zeleia (an Asiatic town, between Mount Ida and the southern coast of the Propontis) to gain over such Greeks as he could by means of Persian gold. In the course of his visit to Greece, Arthmius went to Athens: his purpose was discovered, and he was compelled to flee: while the Athenians, at the instance of Themistoklès, passed an indignant decree, declaring him and his race enemies of Athens, and of all the allies of Athens—and proclaiming that whoever should slay him would be guiltless; because he had brought in Persian gold to bribe the Greeks. This decree was engraven on a brazen column, and placed on record in the acropolis, where it stood near the great statue of Athênê Promachos, even in the time of Demosthenès and his contemporary orators. See Demosthen. Philippic. iii. c. 9. p. 122, and De Fals. Legat. c. 76, p. 428; Æschin. cont. Ktesiphont. ad fin. Harpokrat. v. Ἀτιμωτός—Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton. sect. 25, 26.

Plutarch (Themistoklès, c. 6, and Aristeidès, tom. ii. p. 218) tells us that Themistoklès proposed this decree against Arthmius and caused it to be passed. But Plutarch refers it to the time when Xerxes was on the point of invading Greece. Now it appears to me that the incident cannot well belong to that point of time. Xerxes did not rely upon bribes, but upon other and different means, for conquering Greece: besides, the very tenor of the decree shows that it must have been passed after the formation of the confederacy of Delos—for it pronounces Arthmius to be an enemy of Athens and of all the allies of Athens. To a native of Zeleia it might be a serious penalty to be excluded and proscribed from all the cities in alliance with Athens; many of them being on the coast of Asia. I know no point of time to which the mission of Arthmius can be so conveniently referred as this—when Pausanias and Artabazus were engaged in this very part of Asia, in contriving plots to get up a party in Greece. Pausanias was thus engaged for some years—before the banishment of Themistoklès.

As the execution of this threat would have frustrated all the ulterior schemes of Pausanias, he thought it prudent to obey; the rather, as he felt entire confidence of escaping all the charges against him at Sparta by the employment of bribes,¹ the means for which were doubtless abundantly furnished to him through Artabazus. He accordingly returned along with the herald, and was, in the first moments of indignation, imprisoned by order of the Ephors—who, it seems, were legally competent to imprison him, even had he been king instead of regent. But he was soon let out, on his own requisition and under a private arrangement with friends and partisans, to take his trial against all accusers.² Even to stand forth as accuser against so powerful a man was a serious peril: to undertake the proof of specific matter of treason against him was yet more serious: nor does it appear that any Spartan ventured to do either. It was known that nothing short of the most manifest and invincible proof would be held to justify his condemnation, and amidst a long chain of acts carrying conviction when taken in the aggregate, there was no single treason sufficiently demonstrable for the purpose. Accordingly Pausanias remained not only at large but unaccused, still audaciously persisting both in his intrigues at home and his correspondence abroad with Artabazus. He ventured to assail the unshielded side of Sparta by opening negotiations with the Helots, and instigating them to revolt; promising them both liberation and admission to political privilege;³ with a view, first to destroy the board of

He is recalled to Sparta—imprisoned—put on his trial—tries to provoke the Helots to revolt.

¹ Thucyd. i. 131. Ὁ δὲ βουλομένος ὡς ἥμισυτα ὑποπτος εἶναι καὶ πιστευῶν χρήμασι διαλύσειν τὴν διαβολήν, ἀνεχωρεῖ τὸ δευτέρου ἐς Σπάρτην.

² Thucyd. i. 131. Καὶ ἐς μὲν τὴν εἰρκτὴν ἐσπίπτει τὸ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐφόρων ἔπειτα διαπραξάμενος ὑστερον ἐξῆλθε, καὶ καθίστησιν ἑαυτὸν ἐς κρίσιν τοῖς βουλομένοις περὶ αὐτὸν ἐλέγχειν.

The word διαπραξάμενος indicates first, that Pausanias himself originated the efforts to get free, —next that he came to an under-

hand arrangement: very probably by a bribe, though the word does not necessarily imply it. The Scholiast says so distinctly—χρήμασι καὶ λόγοις διαπραξάμενος δηλονότι διακρουσάμενος τὴν κατηγορίαν. Dr. Arnold translates διαπραξάμενος "having settled the business."

³ Aristotel. Politic. iv. 13, 13; v. 1, 5; v. 6, 2; Herodot. v. 32. Aristotle calls Pausanias *king*, though he was only *regent*: the truth is, that he had all the power of a Spartan king, and seemingly more, if we compare his treatment

Ephors and render himself despot in his own country—next, to acquire through Persian help the supremacy of Greece. Some of those Helots to whom he addressed himself revealed the plot to the Ephors, who nevertheless, in spite of such grave peril, did not choose to take measures against Pausanias upon no better information—so imposing was still his name and position. But though some few Helots might inform, probably many others both gladly heard the proposition and faithfully kept the secret: we shall find, by what happened a few years afterwards, that there were a large number of them who had their spears in readiness for revolt. Suspected as Pausanias was, yet by the fears of some and the connivance of others, he was allowed to bring his plans to the very brink of consummation; and his last letters to Artabazus,¹ intimating that he was ready for action, and bespeaking immediate performance of the engagements concerted between them, were actually in the hands of the messenger. Sparta was saved from an outbreak of the most formidable kind, not by the prudence of her authorities, but by a mere accident—or rather by the fact that Pausanias was not only a traitor to his country, but also base and cruel in his private relations.

The messenger to whom these last letters were entrusted was a native of Argilus in Thrace, a favourite and faithful slave of Pausanias; once connected with him by that intimate relation which Grecian manners tolerated—and admitted even to the full confidence of his treasonable projects. It was by no means the intention of this Argilian to betray his master. But on receiving the letter to carry, he recollected with some uneasiness that none of the previous messengers had ever come back. Accordingly he broke the seal and read it, with the full view of carrying it forward to its destination if he found nothing inconsistent with his own personal safety: he had farther taken the precaution to counterfeit his master's seal, so that he could easily re-close the letter. On reading it, he found his suspicions confirmed by an express injunction that the bearer was to be put to death—a dis-

with that of the Prokleid king
Leotychildes.

¹ Thucyd. i. 132. ὁ μέλλων τὰς

τελευταίας βασιλεῖ ἐπιστολάς πρὸς
'Αρτάβαζον κομιεῖν, ἀνὴρ Ἀργίλιος,
&c.

covery which left him no alternative except to deliver it to the Ephors. But those magistrates, who had before disbelieved the Helot informers, still refused to believe even the confidential slave with his master's autograph and seal, and with the full account besides, which doubtless he would communicate at the same time, of all that had previously passed in the Persian correspondence, not omitting copies of those letters between Pausanias and Xerxes which I have already cited from Thucydidês—for in no other way can they have become public. Partly from the suspicion which in antiquity always attached to the testimony of slaves, except when it was obtained under the pretended guarantee of torture—partly from the peril of dealing with so exalted a criminal—the Ephors would not be satisfied with any evidence less than his own speech and their own ears. They directed the Argilian slave to plant himself as a suppliant in the sacred precinct of Poseidon, near Cape Tænarus, under the shelter of a double tent or hut, behind which two of them concealed themselves. Apprised of this unexpected mark of alarm, Pausanias hastened to the temple, and demanded the reason: upon which the slave disclosed his knowledge of the contents of the letter, and complained bitterly that after long and faithful service,—with a secrecy never once betrayed, throughout this dangerous correspondence,—he was at length rewarded with nothing better than the same miserable fate which had befallen the previous messengers. Pausanias, admitting all these facts, tried to appease the slave's disquietude, and gave him a solemn assurance of safety if he would quit the sanctuary; urging him at the same time to proceed on the journey forthwith, in order that the schemes in progress might not be retarded.

All this passed within the hearing of the concealed Ephors; who at length, thoroughly satisfied, determined to arrest Pausanias immediately on his return to Sparta. They met him in the public street not far from the temple of Athênê Chalkiœkus (or of the Brazen House). But as they came near, either their menacing looks, or a significant nod from one of them, revealed to this guilty man their purpose. He fled for refuge to the temple, which was so near that he reached it before they could overtake him. He planted himself as a suppliant, far more hopeless

His arrest and death—atonement made for offended sanctuary.

than the Argilian slave whom he had so recently talked over at Tænarus, in a narrow roofed chamber belonging to the sacred building; where the Ephors, not warranted in touching him, took off the roof, built up the doors, and kept watch until he was on the point of death by starvation. According to a current story¹—not recognised by Thucydides, yet consistent with Spartan manners—his own mother was the person who placed the first stone to build up the door, in deep abhorrence of his treason. His last moments being carefully observed, he was brought away just in time to expire without, and thus to avoid the desecration of the temple. The first impulse of the Ephors was to cast his body into the ravine or hollow called the Kæadas, the usual place of punishment for criminals: probably his powerful friends averted this disgrace, and he was buried not far off, until some time afterwards, under the mandate of the Delphian oracle, his body was exhumed and transported to the exact spot where he had died. However, the oracle, not satisfied even with this reinterment, pronounced the whole proceeding to be a profanation of the sanctity of Athênê, enjoining that two bodies should be presented to her as an atonement for the one carried away. In the very early days of Greece—or among the Carthaginians, even at this period—such an injunction would probably have produced the slaughter of two human victims: on the present occasion, Athênê, or Hikesius the tutelary god of suppliants, was supposed to be satisfied by two brazen statues; not however without some attempts to make out that the expiation was inadequate.²

Thus perished a Greek who reached the pinnacle of
 About B.C. 467. renown simply from the accidents of his lofty descent and of his being general at Plataea, where it does not appear that he displayed any superior qualities. His treasonable projects implicated and brought to disgrace a man far greater than himself—the Athenian Themistoklês.

The chronology of this important period is not so
 Themistoklês is compromised in the detected treason of Pausanias. fully known as to enable us to make out the precise dates of particular events. But we are obliged (in consequence of the subsequent incidents connected with Themistoklês, whose flight to Persia is tolerably well-marked as to date) to

¹ Diodor. xi. 45; Cornel. Nepos, Pausan. c. 5; Polyæn. viii. 51. ² Thucyd. i. 133, 134; Pausanias, iii. 17, 9.

admit an interval of about nine years between the retirement of Pausanias from his command at Byzantium, and his death. To suppose so long an interval engaged in treasonable correspondence, is perplexing; and we can only explain it to ourselves very imperfectly by considering that the Spartans were habitually slow in their movements, and that the suspected regent may perhaps have communicated with partisans, real or expected, in many parts of Greece. Among those whom he sought to enlist as accomplices was Themistoklês, still in great power—though, as it would seem, in declining power—at Athens. The charge of collusion with the Persians connects itself with the previous movement of political parties in that city.

The rivalry of Themistoklês and Aristeidês had been greatly appeased by the invasion of Xerxes, which had imposed upon both the peremptory necessity of cooperation against a common enemy. And apparently it was not resumed during the times which immediately succeeded the return of the Athenians to their country: at least we hear of both, in effective service and in prominent posts. Themistoklês stands forward as the contriver of the city walls and architect of Peiræus: Aristeidês is commander of the fleet, and first organiser of the confederacy of Delos. Moreover we seem to detect a change in the character of the latter. He had ceased to be the champion of Athenian old-fashioned landed interest, against Themistoklês as the originator of the maritime innovations. Those innovations had now, since the battle of Salamis, become an established fact; a fact of overwhelming influence on the destinies and character, public as well as private, of the Athenians. During the expatriation at Salamis, every man, rich or poor, landed proprietor or artisan, had been for the time a seaman: and the anecdote of Kimon, who dedicated the bridle of his horse in the acropolis as a token that he was about to pass from the cavalry to service on shipboard,¹ is a type of that change of feeling which must have been impressed more or less upon every rich man in Athens. From henceforward the fleet is endeared to every man as the grand force, offensive and defensive, of the state, in which character all the political leaders agree in accepting it. We ought to add, at the same time, that this change

Position of Themistoklês at Athens—tendency of Athenian parties and politics.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 8.

was attended with no detriment either to the land-force or to the landed cultivation of Attica, both of which will be found to acquire extraordinary development during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Still the triremes, and the men who manned them, taken collectively, were now the determining element in the state. Moreover the men who manned them had just returned from Salamis, fresh from a scene of trial and danger, and from a harvest of victory, which had equalized for the moment all Athenians as sufferers, as combatants, and as patriots. Such predominance of the maritime impulse having become pronounced immediately after the return from Salamis, was farther greatly strengthened by the construction and fortification of the Peiræus—a new maritime Athens as large as the old inland city—as well as by the unexpected formation of the confederacy at Delos, with all its untried prospects and stimulating duties.

The political change arising from hence in Athens was not less important than the military. “The maritime multitude, authors of the victory of Salamis,”¹ and instruments of the new vocation of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, appear now ascendant in the political constitution also; not in any way as a separate or privileged class, but as leavening the whole mass, strengthening the democratical sentiment, and protesting against all recognised political inequalities. In fact, during the struggle at Salamis, the whole city of Athens had been nothing else than “a maritime multitude,” among which the proprietors and chief men had been confounded, until, by the efforts of all, the common country had been reconquered. Nor was it likely that this multitude, after a trying period of forced equality, during which political privilege had been effaced, would patiently acquiesce in the full restoration of such privilege at home. We see by the active political sentiment of the German people, after the great struggles of 1813 and 1814, how much an energetic and successful military effort of the people at large, blended with endurance of serious hard-

Effect of the events of the Persian war upon Athenian political sentiment—stimulus to democracy.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. v. 3, 5. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος, γενόμενος αἴτιος τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης, καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ

διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλασσαν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέρην ἐποίησεν.

² Ὁ ναυτικὸς ὄχλος (Thucyd. viii. 72 and *passim*).

ship, tends to stimulate the sense of political dignity and the demand for developed citizenship: and if this be the tendency even among a people habitually passive on such subjects, much more was it to be expected in the Athenian population, who had gone through a previous training of near thirty years under the democracy of Kleisthenês. At the time when that constitution was first established,¹ it was perhaps the most democratical in Greece. It had worked extremely well, and had diffused among the people a sentiment favourable to equal citizenship and unfriendly to avowed privilege: so that the impressions made by the struggle at Salamis found the popular mind prepared to receive them.

Early after the return to Attica, the Kleisthenean constitution was enlarged as respects eligibility to the magistracy. According to that constitution, the fourth or last class on the Solonian census, including the considerable majority of the freemen, were not admissible to offices of state, though they possessed votes in common with the rest: no person was eligible to be a magistrate unless he belonged to one of the three higher classes. This restriction was now annulled, and eligibility extended to all the citizens. We may appreciate the strength of feeling with which such reform was demanded, when we find that it was proposed by Aristeidês; a man the reverse of what is called a demagogue, and a strenuous friend of the Kleisthenean constitution. No political system would work, after the Persian war, which formally excluded "the maritime multitude" from holding magistracy. I rather imagine (as has been stated in my preceding volume) that election of magistrates was still retained, and not exchanged for drawing lots until a certain time, though not a long time afterwards. That which the public sentiment first demanded was the recognition of the equal and open principle; after a certain length of experience it was found that poor men, though legally qualified to be chosen, were in point of fact rarely chosen: then came the lot, to give them an equal chance with the rich. The principle of sortition or choice by lot, was never applied (as I have

Alteration of the Kleisthenean constitution—all citizens without exception are rendered politically admissible to office: first, universal eligibility and election of magistrates—next, sortition or drawing by lot.

¹ For the constitution of Kleisthenês, see ch. xxxi. of this History.

before remarked) to all offices at Athens—never for example to the Stratêgi or Generals, whose functions were more grave and responsible than those of any other person in the service of the state, and who always continued to be elected by show of hands.

In the new position into which Athens was now thrown, with so great an extension of what may be termed her foreign relations, and with a confederacy which imposed the necessity of distant military service, the functions of the Stratêgi naturally tended to become both more absorbing and complicated; while the civil administration became more troublesome if not more difficult, from the enlargement of the city and the still greater enlargement of Peiræus—leading to an increase of town population, and especially to an increase of the metics or resident non-freemen. And it was probably about this period, during the years immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis—when the force of old habit and tradition had been partially enfeebled by so many stirring novelties,—that the Archons were withdrawn altogether from political and military duties, and confined to civil or judicial administration. At the battle of Marathon, the Polemarch is a military commander, president of the ten Stratêgi:¹ we know him afterwards only as a civil magistrate, administering justice to the metics or non-freemen, while the Stratêgi perform military duties without him: a change not unlike that which took place at Rome, when the Prætor was created to undertake the judicial branch of the large original duties of the Consul. I conceive that this alteration, indicating as it does a change in the character of the Archons generally, must have taken place at the time which we have now reached²—a time when the Athenian establishments on all sides required a more elaborate distribution of functionaries. The distribution of so many Athenian boards of functionaries, part to do duty in the city, and part in the Peiræus, cannot have commenced until after this period, when Peiræus had been raised by Themistoklês to the dignity of town, fortress, and state-harbour. Such

¹ Herodot. vi. 109.

² Aristotel. Πολιτικῶν Fragm. xlvii. ed. Neumann, Harpokration,

v. Πολέμαρχος; Pollux, viii. 91: compare Meier und Schömann, *Der Attische Prozess*, ch. ii. p. 50 seqq.

boards were the Astynomi and Agoranomi, who maintained the police of streets and markets—the Metronomi, who watched over weights and measures—the Sitophylakes, who carried into effect various state regulations respecting the custody and sale of corn—with various others who acted not less in Peiræus than in the city.¹ We may presume that each of these boards was originally created as the exigency appeared to call for it, at a period later than that which we have now reached; most of these duties of detail having been at first discharged by the Archons, and afterwards (when these latter became too full of occupation) confided to separate administrators. The special and important change which characterised the period immediately succeeding the battle of Salamis, was, the more accurate line drawn between the Archons and the Stratêgi; assigning the foreign and military department entirely to the Stratêgi, and rendering the Archons purely civil magistrates,—administrative as well as judicial: while the first creation of the separate boards above-named was probably an ulterior enlargement, arising out of increase of population, power, and trade, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. It was by some such steps that the Athenian administration gradually attained that complete development which it exhibits in practice during the century from the Peloponnesian war downward, to which nearly all our positive and direct information relates.

Adminis-
tration of
Athens en-
larged—
new func-
tionaries
appointed
—distribu-
tion be-
tween
Athens and
Peiræus.

With this expansion both of democratical feeling and of military activity at Athens, Aristeidês appears to have sympathized. And the popularity thus ensured to him, probably heightened by some regret for his previous ostracism, was calculated to acquire permanence from his straightforward and incorruptible character, now brought into strong relief by his function as assessor to the new Delian confederacy.

Political
career and
precarious
tenure of
Themisto-
klês—
bitter ri-
vals against
him—
Kimon,
Alkmæon,
&c.—his
liability to
charges of
corruption.

On the other hand, the ascendancy of Themistoklês, though so often exalted by his unrivalled political genius and daring, as well as by the signal value of his public recommendations, was as

¹ See Aristotel. Πολιτικῶν Fragm. Schömann, Antiqq. Jur. 1.ubl. i. v. xxiii. xxxviii. l. ed Neumann; Græc. c. xli. xlii. xliii.

often overthrown by his duplicity of means and unprincipled thirst for money. New political opponents sprung up against him, men sympathising with Aristeidês and far more violent in their antipathy than Aristeidês himself. Of these the chief were Kimon (son of Miltiadês) and Alkmæon: moreover it seems that the Lacedæmonians, though full of esteem for Themistoklês immediately after the battle of Salamis, had now become extremely hostile to him—a change which may be sufficiently explained from his stratagem respecting the fortifications of Athens, and his subsequent ambitious projects in reference to the Peiræus. The Lacedæmonian influence, then not inconsiderable in Athens, was employed to second the political combinations against him.¹ He is said to have given offence by manifestations of personal vanity—by continual boasting of his great services to the state, and by the erection of a private chapel, close to his own house, in honour of Artemis Aristobulê, or Artemis of admirable counsel; just as Pausanias had irritated the Lacedæmonians by inscribing his own single name on the Delphian tripod, and as the friends of Aristeidês had displeased the Athenians by endless encomiums upon his justice.²

But the main cause of his discredit was, the prostitution of his great influence for arbitrary and corrupt purposes. In the unsettled condition of so many different Grecian communities, recently emancipated from Persia, when there was past misrule to avenge, wrong-doers to be deposed and perhaps punished, exiles to be restored, and all the disturbance and suspicions accompanying so great a change of political condition as well as of foreign policy—the influence of the leading men at Athens must have been great in determining the treatment of particular individuals. Themistoklês, placed at the head of an Athenian squadron and sailing among the islands, partly for the purposes of war against Persia, partly for organising the new confederacy—is affirmed to have accepted bribes without scruple, for executing sentences just and unjust—restoring some citizens, expelling others, and even putting some to death. We learn this from a friend and guest of Themistoklês—the poet Timokreon of Ialysus in Rhodes,

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Scho- Kimon, c. 5-8; Aristeidês, c. 25);
Lion 2, ad Aristophan. Equit. 84. Diodorus, xi. 54.

² Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 22;

who had expected his own restoration from the Athenian commander, but found that it was thwarted by a bribe of three talents from his opponents; so that he was still kept in exile on the charge of *medism*. The assertions of Timokreon, personally incensed on this ground against Themistoklês, are doubtless to be considered as passionate and exaggerated: nevertheless they are a valuable memorial of the feelings of the time, and are far too much in harmony with the general character of this eminent man to allow of our disbelieving them entirely. Timokreon is as emphatic in his admiration of Aristeidês as in his censure of Themistoklês, whom he denounces as "a lying and unjust traitor."¹

Such conduct as that described by this new Archilochus, even making every allowance for exaggeration, must have caused Themistoklês to be both hated and feared among the insular allies, whose opinion was now of considerable importance to the Athenians. A similar sentiment grew up partially against him in Athens itself, and appears to have been connected with suspicions of treasonable inclinations towards the Persians. As the Persians could offer the highest bribes, a man open to corruption might naturally be suspected of inclinations towards their cause; and if Themistoklês had rendered pre-eminent service against them, so also had Pausanias, whose conduct had undergone so fatal a change for the worse. It was the treason of Pausanias—suspected and believed against him by the Athenians even when he was in command at Byzantium, though not proved against him at Sparta until long afterwards—which first seems to have raised the presumption of *medism* against Themistoklês also, when combined with the corrupt proceedings which stained his public conduct. We must recollect also, that Themistoklês had given some colour to these presumptions even by the stratagems in reference to Xerxes, which wore a double-faced aspect, capable of being construed either in a Persian or in a Grecian sense. The Lacedæmonians, hostile to Themistoklês since the time when he had outwitted them respecting the walls of Athens,—and fearing him also as a supposed accomplice of the suspected Pausanias—procured the charge of *medism* to be preferred against

Themistoklês is charged with accepting bribes from Persia—acquitted at Athens.

¹ Plutarch. Themist. c. 21.

him at Athens; by secret instigations, and as it is said, by bribes to his political opponents.¹ But no satisfactory proof could be furnished of the accusation, which Themistoklês himself strenuously denied, not without emphatic appeals to his illustrious services. In spite of violent invectives against him from Alkmæon and Kimon, tempered indeed by a generous moderation on the part of Aristeidês,² his defence was successful. He carried the people with him and was acquitted of the charge. Nor was he merely acquitted, but as might naturally be expected, a reaction took place in his favour. His splendid qualities and exploits were brought impressively before the public mind, and he seemed for the time to acquire greater ascendancy than ever.³

Such a charge, and such a failure, must have exasperated to the utmost the animosity between him and his chief opponents—Aristeidês, Kimon, Alkmæon, and others; and we can hardly wonder that they were anxious to get

¹ This accusation of treason brought against Themistoklês at Athens, *prior to his ostracism*, and at the instigation of the Lacedæmonians—is mentioned by Diodorus (xi. 54). Thucydides and Plutarch take notice only of the second accusation, *after his ostracism*. But Diodorus has made his narrative confused, by supposing the first accusation preferred at Athens to have come after the full detection of Pausanias and exposure of his correspondence; whereas these latter events, coming after the first accusation, supplied new proofs before unknown, and thus brought on the second, after Themistoklês had been ostracised. But Diodorus has preserved to us the important notice of this first accusation at Athens, followed by trial, acquittal, and temporary glorification of Themistoklês—and preceding his ostracism.

The indictment stated by Plutarch to have been preferred against Themistoklês by Leôbotas son of Alkmæon, at the instance of the Spar-

tans, probably relates to the first accusation at which Themistoklês was acquitted. For when Themistoklês was arraigned after the discovery of Pausanias, he did not choose to stay, nor was there any actual trial: it is not therefore likely that the name of the accuser would be preserved—Ὁ δὲ γραψάμενος αὐτὸν προδοσίας Λεωβότας ἦν Ἀλκμαίωνος, ἅμα συνεπαίτιωμένων τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν (Plutarch, Themist. c. 23).

Compare the second Scholion on Aristophan. Equit. 84, and Aristeidês, Orat. xlvi. Ἐπὲρ τῶν Τεττάρων (vol. ii. p. 318, ed. Dindorf, p. 243, Jebb).

² Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

³ Diodor. xi. 54. τότε μὲν ἀπέφυγε τὴν τῆς προδοσίας κρίσιν· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον μετὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν μέγας ἦν παρὰ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡγάπων γὰρ αὐτὸν διαφερόντως οἱ πολῖται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα, οἱ μὲν φοβηθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν, οἱ δὲ, φθονήσαντες τῆ δόξῃ, τῶν μὲν εὐεργεσιῶν ἐπελάθοντο, τῆ δὲ ἰσχῦν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα ταπεινοῦν ἐσπεύδον.

rid of him by ostracism. In explaining this peculiar process, I have already stated, that it could never be raised against any one individual separately and ostensibly; and that it could never be brought into operation at all, unless its necessity were made clear, not merely to violent party men, but also to the assembled senate and people, including of course a considerable proportion of the more moderate citizens. We may reasonably conceive that the conjuncture was deemed by many dispassionate Athenians well-suited for the tutelary intervention of ostracism, the express benefit of which consisted in its separating political opponents when the antipathy between them threatened to push one or the other into extra-constitutional proceedings—especially when one of those parties was Themistoklês, a man alike vast in his abilities and unscrupulous in his morality. Probably also there were not a few who wished to revenge the previous ostracism of Aristeidês: and lastly, the friends of Themistoklês himself, elate with his acquittal and his seeming augmented popularity, might indulge hopes that the vote of ostracism would turn out in his favour, and remove one or other of his chief political opponents. From all these circumstances we learn without astonishment, that a vote of ostracism was soon after resorted to. It ended in the temporary banishment of Themistoklês.

Increased bitterness of feud between him and his political rivals, after this acquittal. He is ostracised.

He retired into exile, and was residing at Argos, whither he carried a considerable property, yet occasionally visiting other parts of Peloponnesus¹—when the exposure and death of Pausanias, together with the discovery of his correspondence, took place at Sparta. Among this correspondence were found proofs, which Thucydidês seems to have considered as real and sufficient, of the privity of Themistoklês. By Ephorus and others, he is admitted to have been

B.C. 471. While in banishment under ostracism, the Lacedæmonians prefer a charge of treason against him.

¹ Thucyd. i. 137. ἤλθε γὰρ αὐτῷ ὕστερον ἔκ τε Ἀθηνῶν παρὰ τῶν φίλων, καὶ ἐξ Ἀργους ἃ ὑπεξείκειτο, &c.

I follow Mr. Fynes Clinton in considering the year 471 B.C. to be the date of the ostracism of Themistoklês. It may probably be so;

there is no evidence positively to contradict it: but I think Mr. Clinton states it too confidently, as he admits that Diodorus includes, in the chapters which he devotes to one archon, events which must have happened in several different years (see Fast. Hellen. B.C. 471).

solicited by Pausanias, and to have known his plans—but to have kept them secret while refusing to cooperate in them.¹ Probably after his exile he took a more decided share in them than before; being well-placed for that purpose at Argos, a city not only unfriendly to Sparta, but strongly believed to have been in collusion with Xerxes at his invasion of Greece. On this occasion the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens publicly to prefer a formal charge of treason against him, and to urge the necessity of trying him as a Pan-hellenic criminal before the synod of the allies assembled at Sparta.²

Whether this latter request would have been granted or whether Themistoklês would have been tried at Athens, we cannot tell: for no sooner was he apprised that joint envoys from Sparta and Athens had been despatched to arrest him, than he fled forthwith from Argos to Korkyra. The inhabitants of that island, though owing gratitude to him and favourably disposed, could not venture to protect him against the two most powerful states in Greece, but sent him to the neighbouring continent. Here however, being still tracked and followed by the envoys, he was obliged to seek protection from a man whom he had formerly thwarted in a demand at Athens, and who had become his personal enemy—Admêtus king of the Molossians. Fortunately for him, at the moment when he arrived, Admêtus was not at home; and Themistoklês, becoming a suppliant to his wife, conciliated her sympathy so entirely, that she placed her child in his arms and planted him at the hearth in the full solemnity of supplication to soften her husband. As soon as Admêtus returned, Themistoklês revealed his name, his pursuers, and his danger—entreatng protection as a helpless suppliant in the last extremity.

After the expedition under the command of Pausanias in 478 B.C., we have no one date at once certain and accurate, until we come to the death of Xerxes, where Diodorus is confirmed by the Canon of the Persiau kings, B.C. 465. This last event determines by close approximation and inference, the flight of Themistoklês, the siege of Naxos, and the death of Pau-

sanias: for the other events of this period, we are reduced to a more vague approximation, and can ascertain little beyond their order of succession.

¹ Thucyd. i. 135; Ephorus ap. Plutarch. de Malign. Herodoti, c. 5, p. 855; Diodor. xi. 54; Plutarch. Themist. c. 23.

² Diodor. xi. 55.

B.C. 466.
Flight and adventures of Themistoklês.

He appealed to the generosity of the Epirotic prince not to take revenge on a man now defenceless, for offence given under such very different circumstances; and for an offence too, after all, not of capital moment, while the protection now entreated was to the suppliant a matter of life or death. Admêtus raised him up from the hearth with the child in his arms—an evidence that he accepted the appeal and engaged to protect him; refusing to give him up to the envoys, and at last only sending him away on the expression of his own wish to visit the King of Persia. Two Macedonian guides conducted him across the mountains to Pydna in the Thermaic gulf, where he found a merchant-ship about to set sail for the coast of Asia Minor, and took a passage on board; neither the master nor the crew knowing his name. An untoward storm drove the vessel to the island of Naxos, at that moment besieged by an Athenian armament. Had he been forced to land there, he would of course have been recognised and seized, but his wonted subtlety did not desert him. Having communicated both his name and the peril which awaited him, he conjured the master of the ship to assist in saving him, and not to suffer any one of the crew to land; menacing that if by any accident he were discovered, he would bring the master to ruin along with himself, by representing him as an accomplice induced by money to facilitate the escape of Themistoklês: on the other hand, in case of safety, he promised a large reward. Such promises and threats weighed with the master, who controlled his crew, and forced them to beat about during a day and a night off the coast without seeking to land. After that dangerous interval, the storm abated and the ship reached Ephesus in safety.¹

Thus did Themistoklês, after a series of perils, find himself safe on the Persian side of the Ægean. At Athens he was proclaimed a traitor, and his property confiscated; nevertheless (as it frequently happened in cases of confiscation), his friends secreted a considerable sum, and sent it over to him in Asia, together with the money which he

Themistoklês gets over to Asia, and seeks refuge with the Persian king.

¹ Thueyd. i. 137. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 8) for the most part follows Thueydidês, and professes to do so; yet he is not very accurate, especially about the re-

lations between Themistoklês and Admêtus. Diodorus (xi. 56) seems to follow chiefly other guides, as Plutarch does also to a great extent (Themist. c. 24-26). There

had left at Argos; so that he was thus enabled liberally to reward the ship-captain who had preserved him. With all this deduction, the property which he possessed of a character not susceptible of concealment, and which was therefore actually seized, was found to amount to eighty talents, according to Theophrastus—to 100 talents, according to Theopompus. In contrast with this large sum, it is melancholy to learn that he had begun his political career with a property not greater than three talents.¹ The poverty of Aristeidês at the end of his life presents an impressive contrast to the enrichment of his rival.

The escape of Themistoklês, and his adventures in Persia, appear to have formed a favourite theme for the fancy and exaggeration of authors a century afterwards. We have thus many anecdotes which contradict either directly or by implication the simple narrative of Thucydidês. Thus we are told that at the moment when he was running away from the Greeks, the Persian king also had proclaimed a reward of 200 talents for his head, and that some Greeks on the coast of Asia were watching to take him for this reward: that he was forced to conceal himself strictly near the coast, until means were found to send him up to Susa, in a closed litter, under pretence that it was a woman for the king's harem: that Mandanê, sister of Xerxes, insisted upon having him delivered up to her as an expiation for the loss of her son at the battle of Salamis: that he learnt Persian so well, and discoursed in it so eloquently, as to procure for himself an acquittal from the Persian judges, when put upon his trial through the importunity of Mandanê: that the officers of the king's household at Susa, and the satraps in his way back, threatened him with still farther perils: that he was admitted to see the king in person, after having received a lecture from the chamberlain on the indispensable duty of falling down before him to do homage, &c., with several other uncertified details,² which make us value more highly the narrative of Thucydidês. Indeed Ephorus, Deinô, Kleitarchus, and Herakleidês, from

were evidently different accounts of his voyage, which represented him as reaching, not Ephesus, but the Æolic Kymê. Diodorus does not notice his voyage by sea.

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 25; also Kritias ap. Ælian. V. H. x. 17: compare Herodot. viii. 12.

² Diodor. xi. 56; Plutarch, Themist. c. 24-30.

whom these anecdotes appear mostly to be derived, even affirmed that Themistoklès had found Xerxes himself alive and seen him; whereas Thucydidès and Charon, the two contemporary authors (for the former is *nearly* contemporary), asserted that he had found Xerxes recently dead, and his son Artaxerxes on the throne.

According to Thucydidès, the eminent exile does not seem to have been exposed to the least danger in Persia. He presented himself as a deserter from Greece, and was accepted as such: moreover —what is more strange, though it seems true— he was received as an actual benefactor of the Persian king, and a sufferer from the Greeks on account of such dispositions—in consequence of his communications made to Xerxes respecting the intended retreat of the Greeks from Salamis, and respecting the contemplated destruction of the Hellespontine bridge. He was conducted by some Persians on the coast up to Susa, where he addressed a letter to the king couched in the following terms, such as probably no modern European king would tolerate except from a quaker:—"I, Themistoklès, am come to thee, having done to thy house more mischief than any other Greek, as long as I was compelled in my own defence to resist the attack of thy father—but having also done him yet greater good, when I could do so with safety to myself, and when his retreat was endangered. Reward is yet owing to me for my past service: moreover, I am now here, chased away by the Greeks in consequence of my attachment to thee,¹ but able still to serve thee with great effect. I wish to wait a year, and then to come before thee in person to explain my views."

Real treatment of Themistoklès in Persia.

Whether the Persian interpreters, who read this letter to Artaxerxes Longimanus, exactly rendered its brief and direct expression, we cannot say. But it made a strong impression upon him, combined with the previous reputation of the writer—and he willingly granted the prayer for delay: though

Influence which he acquires with the Persian king.

¹ "Proditionen *ultra* imputabant (says Tacitus, Hist. ii. 60, respecting Paullinus and Proculus, the generals of the army of Otho, when they surrendered to Vitellius after the defeat at Bebriciaum),

spatium longi ante prælium itineris, fatigationem Othonianorum, permixtum vehiculis agmen, ac pleraque fortuita fraudi suæ assiguanτες.—Et Vitellius credidit de perfidiâ, et fraudem absolvit."

we shall not readily believe that he was so transported as to show his joy by immediate sacrifice to the gods, by an unusual measure of convivial indulgence, and by crying out thrice in his sleep, "I have got Themistoklês the Athenian"—as some of Plutarch's authors informed him.¹ In the course of the year granted, Themistoklês had learned so much of the Persian language and customs as to be able to communicate personally with the king, and acquire his confidence. No Greek (says Thucydidês) had ever before attained such a commanding influence and position at the Persian court. His ingenuity was now displayed in laying out schemes for the subjugation of Greece to Persia, which were evidently captivating to the monarch, who rewarded him with a Persian wife and large presents, sending him down to Magnesia on the Mæander, not far from the coast of Ionia. The revenues of the district round that town, amounting to the large sum of fifty talents yearly, were assigned to him for bread: those of the neighbouring seaport of Myus, for articles of condiment to his bread, which was always accounted the main nourishment: those of Lampsakus on the Hellespont, for wine.² Not knowing the amount of these two latter items, we cannot determine how much revenue Themistoklês received altogether; but there can be no doubt, judging from the revenues of Magnesia alone, that he was a great pecuniary gainer by his change of country. After having visited various parts of Asia,³ he lived for a certain time at Magnesia, in which place his family joined him from Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Themist. c. 23.

² Thucyd. i. 138; Diodor. xi. 57. Besides the three above-named places, Neanthês and Phantias describe the grant as being still fuller and more specific: they state that Perkôtê was granted to Themistoklês for bedding, and Palæskêpsis for clothing (Plutarch, Themist. c. 29, Athenæus, i. p. 29).

This seems to have been a frequent form of grants from the Persian and Egyptian kings, to their queens, relatives, or friends—a grant nominally to supply some particular want or taste: see Dr. Arnold's note on the passage of

Thucydidês. I doubt his statement however about the land-tax or rent; I do not think that it was a tenth or a fifth of the produce of the soil in these districts which was granted to Themistoklês, but the portion of regal revenue or tribute levied in them. The Persian kings did not take the trouble to assess and collect the tribute: they probably left that to the inhabitants themselves, provided the sum total were duly paid.

³ Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 31. *πλανώμενος περί τῆς Ἀσίας*: this statement seems probable enough, though Plutarch rejects it.

How long his residence at Magnesia lasted, we do not know, but seemingly long enough to acquire local estimation and leave mementos behind him. He at length died of sickness, when sixty-five years old, without having taken any step towards the accomplishment of those victorious campaigns which he had promised to Artaxerxes. That sickness was the real cause of his death, we may believe on the distinct statement of Thucydidês;¹ who at the same time notices a rumour partially current in his own time, of poison voluntarily taken, from painful consciousness on the part of Themistoklês himself that the promises made could never be performed—a farther proof of the general tendency to surround the last years of this distinguished man with impressive adventures, and to dignify his last moments with a revived feeling not unworthy of his earlier patriotism. The report may possibly have been designedly circulated by his friends and relatives, in order to conciliate some tenderness towards his memory; since his sons still continued citizens at Athens, and his daughters were married there. These friends farther stated that they had brought back his bones to Attica at his own express command, and buried them privately without the knowledge of the Athenians; no condemned traitor being permitted to be buried in Attic soil. If however we even suppose that this statement was true, no one could point out with certainty the spot wherein such interment had taken place. Nor does it seem, when we mark the cautious expressions

Large reward which he receives—His death at Magnesia.

¹ Thueyd. i. 138. Νοσήσας δὲ τελευτᾷ τὸν βίον· λέγουσι δὲ τινες, καὶ ἐκούσιον φαρμάκῳ ἀποθανεῖν αὐτὸν, ἀδύνατον νομίσαντα εἶναι ἐπιτελέσαι βασιλεῖ ἃ ὑπέσχετο.

This current story, as old as Aristophanês (Equit. 83, compare the Scholia), alleged that Themistoklês had poisoned himself by drinking bull's blood (see Diodor. xi. 58). Diodorus assigns to this act of taking poison a still more sublime and patriotic character, by connecting it with a design on the part of Themistoklês to restrain the Persian king from warring against Greece.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 31, and Kimon, c. 18) and Diodorus both state as an unquestionable fact, that Themistoklês died by poisoning himself; omitting even to notice the statement of Thucydidês that he died of disease. Cornelius Nepos (Themist. c. 10) follows Thucydidês. Cicero (Brutus, c. 11) refers the story of the suicide by poison to Clitarchus and Stratoklês, recognising it as contrary to Thucydidês. He puts into the mouth of his fellow dialogist Atticus a just rebuke of the facility with which historical truth was sacrificed to rhetorical purpose.

of Thucydidês,¹ that he himself was satisfied of the fact. Moreover we may affirm with confidence that the inhabitants of Magnesia, when they showed the splendid sepulchral monument erected in honour of Themistoklês in their own market-place, were persuaded that his bones were really enclosed within it.

Aristeidês died about three or four years after the ostracism of Themistoklês;² but respecting the place and manner of his death, there were several contradictions among the authors whom Plutarch had before him. Some affirmed that he perished on foreign service in the Euxine sea; others, that he died at home, amidst the universal esteem and grief of his fellow-citizens. A third story, confined to the single statement of Kraterus, and strenuously rejected by Plutarch, represents Aristeidês as having been falsely accused before the Athenian judicature and condemned to a fine of fifty minæ, on the allegation of having taken bribes during the assessment of the tribute upon the allies—which fine he was unable to pay, and was therefore obliged to retire to Ionia, where he died. Dismissing this last story, we find nothing certain about his death except one fact—but that fact at the same time the most honourable of all—that he died very poor. It is even asserted that he did not leave enough to pay funeral expenses—that a sepulchre was provided for him at Phalêrum at the public cost, besides a handsome donation to his son Lysimachus and a dowry to each of his two daughters. In the two or three ensuing generations, however, his descendants still continued poor,

¹ Thucyd. i. 138. τὰ δὲ ὀστᾶ φασὶ κομισθῆναι αὐτοῦ οἱ προσήκοντες οὐκ ἄδε κελεύσαντος ἐκείνου, καὶ τεθῆναι κρύφα Ἀθηναίων ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ· οὐ γὰρ ἐξῆν θάπτειν, ὡς ἐπὶ προδοσίᾳ φερόμεντος.

Cornelius Nepos, who here copies Thucydides, gives this statement by mistake, as if Thucydides had himself affirmed it: "Idem (sc. Thucydides) ossa ejus clam in Atticâ ab amicis sepulta, quoniam legibus non concederetur, quod proditionis esset damnatus, memoriæ prodidit." This shows the haste or inaccuracy with which these secondary authors

so often cite: Thucydides is certainly not a witness for the fact: if anything, he may be said to count somewhat against it.

Plutarch (Themist. c. 32) shows that the burial-place of Themistoklês, supposed to be in Attica, was yet never verified before his time: the guides of Pausanias, however, in the succeeding century, had become more confident (Pausanias, i. 1, 3).

² Respecting the probity of Aristeidês, see an interesting fragment of Eupolis the comic writer (Δῆμοι, Fragm. iv. p. 457, ed. Meineke).

and even at that remote day some of them received aid out of the public purse, from the recollection of their incorruptible ancestor. Near a century and a half afterwards, a poor man named Lysimachus, descendant of the Just Aristeidês, was to be seen at Athens near the chapel of Iacchus, carrying a mysterious tablet, and obtaining his scanty fee of two oboli for interpreting the dreams of the passers-by: Demetrius the Phalerean procured from the people, for the mother and aunt of this poor man, a small daily allowance.¹ On all these points the contrast is marked when we compare Aristeidês with Themistoklês. The latter, having distinguished himself by ostentatious cost at Olympia, and by a choregic victory at Athens, with little scruple as to the means of acquisition—ended his life at Magnesia in dishonourable affluence greater than ever, and left an enriched posterity both at that place and at Athens. More than five centuries afterwards, his descendant the Athenian Themistoklês attended the lectures of the philosopher Ammonius at Athens, as the comrade and friend of Plutarch himself.²

¹ Plutarch, *Arist.* c. 26, 27; *Cornelius Nepos*, *Arist.* c. 3: compare *Aristophan. Vesp.* 53.
² Plutarch, *Themist.* c. 5—32.

CHAPTER XLV.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFEDERACY UNDER ATHENS AS HEAD.—FIRST FORMATION AND RAPID EXPANSION OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE.

I HAVE already recounted, in the preceding chapter, how the Asiatic Greeks, breaking loose from the Spartan Pausanias, entreated Athens to organise a new confederacy, and to act as presiding city (Vorort)—and how this confederacy, framed not only for common and pressing objects, but also on principles of equal rights and constant control on the part of the members, attracted soon the spontaneous adhesion of a large proportion of Greeks, insular or maritime, near the Ægean sea. I also noticed this event as giving commencement to a new æra in Grecian politics. For whereas there had been before a tendency, not very powerful, yet on the whole steady and increasing, towards something like one Pan-hellenic league under Sparta as president—from henceforward that tendency disappears, and a bifurcation begins: Athens and Sparta divide the Grecian world between them, and bring a much larger number of its members into cooperation, either with one or the other, than had ever been so arranged before.

Thucydidês marks precisely, as far as general words can go, the character of the new confederacy during the first years after its commencement. But unhappily he gives us scarcely any particular facts; and in the absence of such controlling evidence, a habit has grown up of describing loosely the entire period between 477 B.C. and 405 B.C. (the latter date is that of the battle of Ægos-potami) as constituting “the Athenian empire.” This word denotes correctly enough the last part, perhaps the last forty years, of the seventy-two years indicated; but it is misleading when applied to

Consequence of the formation of the Confederacy of Delos.—Bifurcation of Grecian politics between Sparta and Athens.

Distinction between the Confederacy of Delos, with Athens as president—and the Athenian empire which grew out of it.

the first part: nor indeed can any single word be found which faithfully characterizes as well the one part as the other. A great and serious change had taken place, and we disguise the fact of that change if we talk of the Athenian hegemony or headship as a portion of the Athenian empire. Thucydidēs carefully distinguishes the two, speaking of the Spartans as having lost, and of the Athenians as having acquired, not empire, but headship or hegemony.¹

¹ Thueyd. i. 94. ἐξεπολιόρχησαν (Βυζάντιον) ἐν τῇ δε τῇ ἡγεμονίᾳ, i. e. under the Spartan hegemony, before the Athenians were invited to assume the hegemony: compare ἡγησάμενοι, i. 77, and Herodot. viii. 2, 3. Next we have (i. 95) φοιτῶν-τές τε (the Ionians, &c.) πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἤξιον αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνας σφῶν γενέσθαι κατὰ τὸ ζυγγενές. Again, when the Spartans send out Dorkis in place of Pausanias, the allies οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν. Then, as to the ensuing proceedings of the Athenians (i. 96) — παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτῳ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐκόντων τῶν ζυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Πausανίου μίσος, &c.: compare i. 75.—ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ζυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δετηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστή- ναι, and vi. 76.

Then the transition from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή (i. 97)—ἡγού- μενοι δὲ αὐτονόμων τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ζυμμάχων καὶ ἀπὸ κοινῶν ξυνοδῶν βουλευόντων, τόσα δὲ ἐπέηλον πολέμου τε καὶ διαχειρίζει πραγμάτων μεταξύ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ.

Thucydidēs then goes on to say that he shall notice these “many strides in advance”—which Athens made, starting from her original hegemony, so as to show in what manner the Athenian empire or ἀρχή was originally formed—ἀμα δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀποδείξειν ἔχει τῆς τῶν Ἀθηναίων, ἐν αἷψ τρόπῳ κατέστη. The same transition

from the ἡγεμονία to the ἀρχή is described in the oration of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, shortly before the Peloponnesian war (i. 75): but as it was rather the interest of the Athenian orator to confound the difference between ἡγεμονία and ἀρχή, so after he has clearly stated what the relation of Athens to her allies had been at first, and how it afterwards became totally changed, Thucydidēs makes him slur over the distinction, and say—οὕτως οὐδ’ ἡμεῖς θαυμαστόν οὐδὲν πεποιήκαμεν. . . εἰ ἀρχὴν τε διδομεν ἡν ἐδεξάμεθα καὶ ταύτην μὴ ἀνέμεν, &c.; and he then proceeds to defend the title of Athens to command on the ground of superior force and worth: which last plea is advanced a few years afterwards still more nakedly and offensively by the Athenian speakers. Read also the language of the Athenian Euphemus at Kamarina (vi. 82), where a similar confusion appears, as being suitable to the argument.

It is to be recollected that the word *hegemony* or headship is extremely general, denoting any case of following a leader, and of obedience, however temporary, qualified, or indeed little more than honorary. Thus it is used by the Thebans to express their relation towards the Bœotian confederated towns (ἡγεμονεύεσθαι ὑπ’ ἡμῶν, Thue. iii. 61, where Dr. Arnold draws attention to the distinction

The transition from the Athenian hegemony to the Athenian empire was doubtless gradual, so that no one could determine precisely where the former ends and the latter begins: but it had been consummated before the thirty years' truce, which was concluded fourteen years before the Peloponnesian war—and it was in fact the substantial cause of that war. Empire then came to be held by Athens—partly as a fact established, resting on acquiescence rather than attachment or consent on the minds of the subjects—partly as a corollary from necessity of union combined with her superior force: while this latter point, superiority of force as a legitimate title, stood more and more forward both in the language of her speakers and in the conceptions of her citizens. Nay, the Athenian orators of the middle of the Peloponnesian war venture to affirm that their empire had been of this same character ever since the repulse of the Persians: an inaccuracy so manifest, that if we could suppose the speech made by the Athenian Euphêmus at Kamarina in 415 B.C. to have been heard by Themistoklês or Aristeidês fifty years before, it would have been alike offensive to the prudence of the one and to the justice of the other.

The imperial condition of Athens, that which she held at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, when her allies (except Chios and Lesbos) were tributary subjects, and when the Ægean sea was an Athenian lake,—was of course the period of her greatest splendour and greatest action upon the Grecian world. It was also the period

between that verb and ἄρχειν, and holds language respecting the Athenian ἀρχή, more precise than his language in the note ad Thucyd. i. 94), and by the Corinthians to express their claims as metropolis of Korkyra, which were really little more than honorary—ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγεμόνεσσι τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι (Thucyd. i. 38): compare vii. 55. Indeed it sometimes means simply a guide (iii. 98; vii. 50).

But the words ἀρχή, ἄρχειν, ἄρχεισθαι, voc. pass., are more specific in their application, and imply both superior dignity and coercive

authority to a greater or less extent: compare Thucyd. v. 69; ii. 8, &c. The πόλις ἀρχὴν ἔχουσα is analogous to ἀνὴρ τύραννος (vi. 85).

Herodotus is less careful in distinguishing the meanings of these words than Thucydidês: see the discussion of the Lacedæmonian and Athenian envoys with Gelo (vii. 155-162). But it is to be observed that he makes Gelo ask for the ἡγεμονία and not for the ἀρχή—putting the claim in the least offensive form: compare also the claim of the Argeians for ἡγεμονία (vii. 148).

most impressive to historians, orators, and philosophers—suggesting the idea of some one state exercising dominion over the Ægean, as the natural condition of Greece, so that if Athens lost such dominion, it would be transferred to Sparta—holding out the dispersed maritime Greeks as a tempting prize for the aggressive schemes of some new conqueror—and even bringing up by association into men’s fancies the mythical Minos of Krete, and others, as having been rulers of the Ægean in times anterior to Athens.

Even those who lived under the full-grown Athenian empire had before them no good accounts of the incidents between 479-450 B.C. For we may gather from the intimation of Thucydidês, as well as from his barrenness of facts, that while there were chroniclers both for the Persian invasion and for the times before it, no one cared for the time immediately succeeding.¹ Hence, the little light which has fallen upon this blank has all been borrowed (if we except the careful Thucydidês) from a subsequent age; and the Athenian hegemony has been treated as a mere commencement of the Athenian empire. Credit has been given to Athens for a long-sighted ambition, aiming from the Persian war downwards at results, which perhaps Themistoklês² may have partially divined, but which only time and successive accidents opened even to distant view. But such systematic

Tendency to confuse these two, and to impute to Athens long-sighted plans of ambition.

¹ Thueyd. i. 97. τοῖς πρό ἐμοῦ ἅπασιν ἐκλιπέες ἦν τοῦτο τό χωρίον, καί ἦ τὰ πρό τῶν Μηδικῶν ξυγετίθεσαν ἢ αὐτὰ τὰ Μηδικά τούτων δὲ ὅσπερ καί ἠψατο ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ συγγραφῇ Ἑλλάνικος, βραχέως τε καί τοῖς χρόνοις οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἐπεμνήσθη.

Hellanicus therefore had done no more than touch upon the events of this period: and he found so little good information within his reach, as to fall into chronological blunders.

² Thucyd. i. 93. τῆς γὰρ δὴ θαλάσσης πρῶτος ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀνθεκτέα ἐστί, καί τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθύς ξυγκατεσκευάζε.

Dr. Arnold says in his note “εὐθύς signifies probably immediately after the retreat of the Persians.” I

think it refers to an earlier period—that point of time when Themistoklês first counselled the building of the fleet, or at least when he counselled them to abandon their city and repose all their hopes in their fleet. It is only by this supposition that we get a reasonable meaning for the words ἐτόλμησε εἰπεῖν, “he was the first who dared to say”—which implies a counsel of extraordinary boldness. “For he was the first who dared to advise them to grasp at the sea, and from that moment forward he helped to establish their empire.” The word ξυγκατεσκευάζε seems to denote a collateral consequence, not directly contemplated, though divined, by Themistoklês.

anticipation of subsequent results is fatal to any correct understanding, either of the real agents or of the real period; both of which are to be explained from the circumstances preceding and actually present, with some help, though cautious and sparing, from our acquaintance with that which was then an unknown future. When Aristeidês and Kimon dismissed the Lacedæmonian admiral Dorkis, and drove Pausanias away from Byzantium on his second arrival, they had to deal with the problem immediately before them. They had to complete the defeat of the Persian power, still formidable—and to create and organize a confederacy as yet only inchoate. This was quite enough to occupy their attention, without ascribing to them distant views of Athenian maritime empire.

In that brief sketch of incidents preceding the Peloponnesian war, which Thucydidês introduces as “the digression from this narrative,”¹ he neither gives, nor professes to give, a complete enumeration of all which actually occurred. During the interval between the first desertion of the Asiatic allies from Pausanias to Athens, in 477 B.C.—and the revolt of Naxos in 466 B.C.—he recites three incidents only: first, the siege and capture of Eion on the Strymon with its Persian garrison—next, the capture of Skyros, and appropriation of the island to Athenian kleruchs or out-citizens,—thirdly, the war with Karystus in Eubœa, and reduction of the place by capitulation. It has been too much the practice to reason as if these three events were the full history of ten or eleven years. Considering what Thucydidês states respecting the darkness of this period, we might perhaps suspect that they were all which he could learn about it on good authority: and they are all, in truth, events having a near and special bearing on the subsequent history of Athens herself—for Eion was the first stepping-stone to the important settlement of Amphipolis, and Skyros in the time of Thucydidês was the property of outlying Athenian citizens or kleruchs. Still, we are left in almost entire ignorance of the proceedings of Athens, as conducting the newly-established confederate force: for it is certain that

¹ Thucyd. i. 97. ἔγραψα δὲ αὐτά καὶ τὴν ἐκβολὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐποίησά μιν διὰ τὸδε, &c.

the first ten years of the Athenian hegemony must have been years of most active warfare against the Persians. One positive testimony to this effect has been accidentally preserved to us by Herodotus, who mentions that "before the invasion of Xerxes, there were Persian commanders and garrisons everywhere in Thrace and the Hellespont,¹ all of whom were conquered by the Greeks after that invasion, with the single exception of Maskamês governor of Doriskus, who could never be taken, though many different Grecian attempts were made upon the fortress."

Of those who were captured by the Greeks, not one made any defence sufficient to attract the admiration of Xerxes, except Bogês governor of Eion. Bogês, after bravely defending himself, and refusing offers of capitulation, found his provisions exhausted, and farther resistance impracticable. He then kindled a vast funeral pile—slew his wives, children, concubines, and family, and cast them into it—threw his precious effects over the wall into the Strymon—and lastly, precipitated himself into the flames.² His brave despair was the theme of warm encomium among the Persians, and his relatives in Persia were liberally rewarded by Xerxes. This capture of Eion, effected by Kimon, has been mentioned (as already stated) by Thucydidês; but Herodotus here gives us to understand that it was only one of a string of enterprises, all unnoticed

¹ Herodot. vii. 106, 107. Κατέστασαν γὰρ ἔτι πρότερον ταύτης τῆς ἐλάσιος ὑπάρχοντες ἐν τῇ Θρηάκῃ καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου πανταχῇ. Οὗτοι ὡν πάντες, οἱ τε ἐκ Θρηάκης καὶ τοῦ Ἑλλησπόντου, πλὴν τοῦ ἐν Δορίσκῳ, ὑπὸ Ἑλλητῶν ὕστερον ταύτης τῆς στρατηλατίας ἐξηρέθησαν· τὸν δὲ ἐν Δορίσκῳ Μασκάμηρ σὸθάμῳ κω ἐδυνάσθησαν ἐξελεῖν, πολλῶν πειρησαμένων.

The loose chronology of Plutarch is little to be trusted; but he, too, acknowledges the continuance of Persian occupations in Thrace, by aid of the natives, until a period later than the battle of the Eurymedon (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14).

It is a mistake to suppose, with Dr. Arnold in his note on Thucyd. viii. 62, "that Sestus was almost

the last place held by the Persians in Europe."

Weissenborn (Hellen, oder Beiträge zur genaueren Erforschung der alt-griechischen Geschichte. Jena, 1844, p. 144, note 31) has taken notice of this important passage of Herodotus, as well as of that in Plutarch; but he does not see how much it embarrasses all attempts to frame a certain chronology for those two or three events which Thucydidês gives us between 476-466 B.C.

² Kutzen (De Atheniensium Imperio Cimonis atque Periclis tempore constituto. Grimæ, 1837. Commentatio, i. p. 8) has good reason to call in question the stratagem ascribed to Kimon by Pausanias (viii. 8, 2) for the capture of Eion.

by Thucydidês, against the Persians. Nay, it would seem from his language that Maskamês maintained himself in Doriskus during the whole reign of Xerxes, and perhaps longer, repelling successive Grecian assaults.

The valuable indication here cited from Herodotus would be itself a sufficient proof that the first years of the Athenian hegemony were full of busy and successful hostility against the Persians. And in truth this is what we should expect. The battles of Salamis, Plataea, and Mykalê, drove the Persians out of Greece and overpowered their main armaments, but did not remove them at once from all the various posts which they occupied throughout the Ægean and Thrace. Without doubt the Athenians had to clear the coasts and the islands of a great number of different Persian detachments; an operation neither short nor easy, with the then imperfect means of siege, as we may see by the cases of Sestus and Eion; nor indeed always practicable, as the case of Doriskus teaches us. The fear of these Persians, yet remaining in the neighbourhood,¹ and even the chance of a renewed Persian invading armament, formed one pressing motive for Grecian cities to join the new confederacy; while the expulsion of the enemy added to it those places which he had occupied. It was by these years of active operations at sea against the common enemy, that the Athenians first established² that constant, systematic, and laborious training, among their own ships' crews, which transmitted itself

¹ To these "remaining operations against the Persians" the Athenian envoy at Lacedæmon alludes, in his speech prior to the Peloponnesian war—*ὁμῶν μὲν* (you Spartans) *οὐκ ἐβελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν εὐμαχῶν καὶ αὐτῶν δεσθόντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι, &c.* (Thucyd. i. 75): and again, iii. 11. *τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τῶν ἔργων.*

Compare also Plato, Menexen. c. 11. *αὐτός δὲ ἡγγέλλετο βασιλεὺς*

διανοεῖσθαι ὡς ἐπιχειρήσων πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας, &c.

² The Athenian nautical training begins directly after the repulse of the Persians. *Τὸ δὲ τῆς θαλάσσης ἐπιστήμονας γενέσθαι* (says Periklês respecting the Peloponnesians, just at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war) *οὐ βραδίως αὐτοῖς προσγενήσεται οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς, μελετῶντες αὐτὸ εὐθύς ἀπο τῶν Μηδικῶν, ἐξείργασθέ πω* (Thucyd. i. 142).

with continual improvements down to the Peloponnesian war. It was by these, combined with present fear, that they were enabled to organise the largest and most efficient confederacy ever known among Greeks—to bring together deliberative deputies—to plant their own ascendancy as enforcers of the collective resolutions—and to raise a prodigious tax from universal contribution. Lastly, it was by the same operations, prosecuted so successfully as to remove present alarm, that they at length fatigued the more lukewarm and passive members of the confederacy, and created in them a wish either to commute personal service for pecuniary contribution, or to escape from the obligation of service in any way. The Athenian nautical training would never have been acquired—the confederacy would never have become a working reality—the fatigue and discontents among its members would never have arisen—unless there had been a real fear of the Persians, and a pressing necessity for vigorous and organised operations against them, during the ten years between 477 and 466 B.C.

As to these ten years, then, we are by no means to assume that the particular incidents mentioned by Thucydidês about Eion, Skyros, Karystus, and Naxos, constitute the sum total of events. To contradict this assumption, I have suggested proof sufficient, though indirect, that they are only part of the stock of a very busy period—the remaining details of which, indicated in outline by the large general language of Thucydidês, we are condemned not to know. Nor are we admitted to be present at the synod of Delos, which during all this time continued its periodical meetings: though it would have been highly interesting to trace the steps whereby an institution which at first promised to protect not less the separate rights of the members than the security of the whole, so lamentably failed in its object. We must recollect that this confederacy, formed for objects common to all, limited to a certain extent the autonomy of each member; both conferring definite rights, and imposing definite obligations. Solemnly sworn to by all, and by Aristeidês on behalf of Athens, it was intended to bind the members in perpetuity—marked even in the form of the oath, which was performed by casting heavy lumps of

Confederacy of Delos—sworn to by all the members—perpetual and peremptory—not allowing retirement nor evasion.

iron into the sea never again to be seen.¹ As this confederacy was thus both perpetual and peremptory, binding each member to the rest and not allowing either retirement or evasion, so it was essential that it should be sustained by some determining authority and enforcing sanction. The determining authority was provided by the synod at Delos: the enforcing sanction was exercised by Athens as president. And there is every reason to presume that

Enforcing sanctions of Athens, strictly exercised, in harmony with the general synod.

Athens, for a long time, performed this duty in a legitimate and honourable manner, acting in execution of the resolves of the synod, or at least in full harmony with its general purposes. She exacted from every member the regulated quota of men or money, employing coercion against recusants, and visiting neglect of military duty with penalties. In all these requirements she only discharged her appropriate functions as chosen leader of the confederacy. There can be no reasonable doubt that the general synod went cordially along with her² in strictness of dealing towards those defaulters who obtained protection without bearing their share of the burthen.

Gradual alteration in the relations of the allies—substitution of money-payment for personal service, demanded by the allies themselves, suitable to the interests and feelings of Athens.

But after a few years, several of the confederates, becoming weary of personal military service, prevailed upon the Athenians to provide ships and men in their place, and imposed upon themselves in exchange a money-payment of suitable amount. This commutation, at first probably introduced to meet some special case of inconvenience, was found so suitable to the taste of all parties, that it gradually spread through the larger portion of the confederacy. To unwarlike allies, hating labour and privation, it was a welcome relief: while to the Athenians, full of ardour, and patient of labour as well as discipline for the aggrandisement of their country, it afforded constant pay for a fleet more numerous than they

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidès, c. 24.

² Such concurrence of the general synod is in fact implied in the speech put by Thucydides into the mouth of the Mitylenæan envoys at Olympia, in the third year of the Peloponnesian war: a speech

pronounced by parties altogether hostile to Athens (Thucyd. iii. 11) — ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυροῦν ἐχρῶντο (the Athenians) μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψήζουσας ἄχοντασ, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίχουσι οἷσ ἐπήεσαν, ξυστρατεύειν.

could otherwise have kept afloat. It is plain from the statement of Thucydides that this altered practice was introduced from the petition of the confederates themselves, not from any pressure or stratagem on the part of Athens.¹ But though such was its real source, it did not the less fatally degrade the allies in reference to Athens, and extinguish the original feeling of equal rights and partnership in the confederacy, with communion of danger as well as of glory, which had once bound them together. The Athenians came to consider themselves as military chiefs and soldiers, with a body of tribute-paying subjects, whom they were entitled to hold in dominion, and restrict, both as to foreign policy and internal government, to such extent as they thought expedient—but whom they were also bound to protect against foreign enemies. The military force of these subject-states was thus in a great degree transferred to Athens by their own act, just as that of so many of the native princes in India has been made over to the English. But the military efficiency of the confederacy against the Persians was much increased, in proportion as the vigorous resolves of Athens² were less and less paralysed by the contentions and irregularity of a synod: so that the war was prosecuted with greater success than ever, while those motives of alarm, which had served as the first pressing stimulus to the formation of the confederacy, became every year farther and farther removed.

Under such circumstances, several of the confederate states grew tired even of paying their tribute—and averse to continuance as members. They made successive attempts to secede: but Athens, acting seemingly in conjunction with the synod, repressed their attempts one after the other—

Change in the position, as well as in the feelings of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 97-99.—Αἰτίαι δὲ ἄλλαι ἦσαν τῶν ἀποστάσεων, καὶ μέγιστα, αἱ τῶν φόρων καὶ νεῶν ἐκθεταί, καὶ λειποστράτιον, εἴ τῳ ἐγένετο· οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον, καὶ λυπηροὶ ἦσαν, οὐκ εὐθρόσιν οὐδὲ βουλομένοις ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. Ἦσαν δὲ πῶς καὶ ἄλλως οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκέτι ὁμοίως ἐν ἡδονῇ ἄρχοντες, καὶ οὕτε ξυνοστράτευον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου, ῥαδίον τε προσάγεσθαι ἢ αὐτοῖς τοὺς ἀρισταμέλους ὧν αὐτοὶ αἰτίαι ἐγένοντο οἱ ξύμμαχοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀπόκ-

νησιν ταύτην τῶν στρατειῶν, οἱ πλείους αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ἀπ' οἴκου ὦσι, χρήματα ἐτάξαντο ἀντὶ τῶν νεῶν τὸ ἰκνούμενον ἀνάλωμα φέρειν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν Ἀθηναῖοις ἤυξεν το ναυτικὸν ἀπὸ τῆς δαπάνης ἣν ἐκείνοι συμφέρουεν, αὐτοὶ δὲ ὅποτε ἀποσταίεν, ἀπαράσκευοι καὶ ἄπειροι ἐς τὸν πόλεμον καθίστατο.

² See the contemptuous remarks of Periklēs upon the debates of the Lacedæmonian allies at Sparta (Thucyd. i. 141).

conquering, fining, and disarming the revolters; which was the more easily done, since in most cases their naval force had been in great part handed over to her. As these events took place, not all at once, but successively in different years—the number of mere tribute-paying allies as well as of subdued revolters continually increasing—so there was never any one moment of conspicuous change in the character of the confederacy. The allies slid unconsciously into subjects, while Athens, without any predetermined plan, passed from a chief into a despot. By strictly enforcing the obligations of the pact upon unwilling members, and by employing coercion against revolters, she had become unpopular in the same proportion as she acquired new power—and that too without any guilt of her own. In this position, even if she had been inclined to relax her hold upon the tributary subjects, considerations of her own safety would have deterred her from doing so; for there was reason to apprehend that they might place their strength at the disposal of her enemies. It is very certain that she never was so inclined. It would have required a more self-denying public morality than has ever been practised by any state, either ancient or modern, even to conceive the idea of relinquishing voluntarily an immense ascendancy as well as a lucrative revenue: least of all was such an idea likely to be conceived by Athenian citizens, whose ambition increased with their power, and among whom the love of Athenian ascendancy was both passion and patriotism. But though the Athenians were both disposed, and qualified, to push all the advantages offered and even to look out for new—we must not forget that the foundations of their empire were laid in the most honourable causes: voluntary invitation—efforts both unwearied and successful against a common enemy—unpopularity incurred in discharge of an imperative duty—and inability to break up the confederacy, without endangering themselves as well as laying open the Ægean sea to the Persians.¹

¹ The speech of the Athenian envoy at Sparta, a little before the Peloponnesian war, sets forth the growth of the Athenian empire, in the main, with perfect justice (Thucyd. i. 75, 76). He admits and even exaggerates its unpopularity, but shows that such unpopularity was,

to a great extent and certainly as to its first origin, unavoidable as well as undeserved. He of course, as might be supposed, omits those other proceedings by which Athens had herself aggravated it.

Καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε (τὴν ἀρχήν) ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι . . . ἐξ αὐτοῦ

There were two other causes, besides that which has been just adverted to, for the unpopularity of imperial Athens. First, the existence of the confederacy, imposing permanent obligations, was in conflict with the general instinct of the Greek mind, tending towards separate political autonomy of each city—as well as with the particular turn of the Ionic mind, incapable of that steady personal effort which was requisite for maintaining the synod of Delos on its first large and equal basis. Next—and this is the great cause of all—Athens, having defeated the Persians and thrust them to a distance, began to employ the force and the tribute of her subject-allies in warfare against Greeks, wherein these allies had nothing to gain from success—everything to apprehend from defeat—and a banner to fight for, offensive to Hellenic sympathies. On this head the subject-allies had great reason to complain, throughout the prolonged wars of Greek against Greek for the purpose of sustaining Athenian predominance. But on the point of practical grievances or oppressions, they had little ground for discontent, and little feeling of actual discontent, as I shall show more fully hereafter. Among the general body of citizens in the subject-allied cities, the feeling towards Athens was rather indifference than hatred. The movement of revolt against her proceeded from small parties of leading men, acting apart from the citizens, and generally with collateral views of ambition for themselves. The positive hatred towards her was felt chiefly by those who were not her subjects.

It is probable that the same indisposition to personal effort, which prompted the confederates of Delos to tender money-payment as a substitute for military service, also induced them to neglect attendance at the synod. But we do not know the steps whereby this assembly, at first an effective reality, gradually dwindled into a mere form, and

δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηραγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τὸδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας. Καὶ οὐκ ἀσφαλές ἔτι ἔδοκεῖ εἶναι, τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀπηχθημένους, καὶ τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων χειρωμένων, ὁμῶν τε ἡμῖν οὐκέτι ὁμοίως φίλων ἀλλ' ὑπόπτων καὶ διαφόρων ὄντων, ἀνέν-

τας κινδυνεύειν· καὶ γὰρ ἂν αἱ ἀποστάσεις πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐγίγοντο· πᾶσι δὲ ἀνεπίφθονον τὰ συμφέροντα τῶν μεγίστων περὶ κινδύων εὐτίθεσθαι.

The whole speech well merits attentive study: compare also the speech of Periklēs at Athens, in the second year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 63).

Growing unpopularity of Athens throughout Greece—causes of it.

vanished. Nothing however can more forcibly illustrate the difference of character between the maritime allies of Athens and the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta, than the fact—that while the former shrank from personal service and thought it an advantage to tax themselves in place of it—the latter were “ready enough with their bodies,” but uncomplying and impracticable as to contributions.¹ The contempt felt by these Dorian landsmen for the military efficiency of the Ionians recurs frequently, and appears even to exceed what the reality justified. But when we turn to the conduct of the latter twenty years earlier, at the battle of Ladê, in the very crisis of the Ionic revolt from Persia²—we detect the same want of energy, the same incapacity of personal effort and labour, as that which broke up the Confederacy of Delos with all its beneficial promise. To appreciate fully the indefatigable activity and daring, together with the patient endurance of laborious maritime training, which characterised the Athenians of that day—we have only to contrast them with these confederates, so remarkably destitute of both. Amidst such glaring inequalities of merit, capacity, and power, to maintain a confederacy of equal members was impossible. It was in the nature of things that the confederacy should either break up, or be transmuted into an Athenian empire.

I have already mentioned that the first aggregate assessment of tribute, proposed by Aristeidês and adopted by the synod at Delos, was four hundred and sixty talents in money. At that time many of the confederates paid their quota, not in money, but in ships. But this practice gradually diminished, as the commutations above alluded to, of money in place of ships, were multiplied, while the aggregate tribute of course became larger. It was no more than six hundred talents³ at the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, forty-six years after the first formation of the confederacy; from whence we may infer that it

Tribute first raised by the synod of Delos—assessment of Aristeidês.

¹ Thucyd. i. 141. σῶμασι δὲ ἐπιμότεροι οἱ αὐτουργοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἢ χρήμασι πολεμεῖν, &c.

² See Herodot. vi. 12, and the

preceding volume of this History, chap. xxxv.

³ Thucyd. ii. 13.

was never at all increased upon individual members during the interval. For the difference between four hundred and sixty talents and six hundred, admits of being fully explained by the numerous commutations of service for money as well as by the acquisitions of new members, which doubtless Athens had more or less the opportunity of making. It is not to be imagined that the confederacy had attained its maximum number at the date of the first assessment of tribute: there must have been various cities, like Sinopê and Ægina, subsequently added.¹

Without some such preliminary statements as those just given, respecting the new state of Greece between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, beginning with the Athenian hegemony or headship, and ending with the Athenian empire—the reader would hardly understand the bearing of those particular events which our authorities enable us to recount; events unhappily few in number, though the period must have been full of action—and not well-authenticated as to dates. The first known enterprise of the Athenians in their new capacity (whether the first absolutely or not we cannot determine) between 476 B.C. and 466 B.C., was the conquest of the important post of Eion on the Strymon, where the Persian governor Bogês, starved out after a desperate resistance, destroyed himself rather than capitulate, together with his family and precious effects—as has already been stated. The next events named are their enterprises against the Dolopes and Pelasgi in the island of Skyros (seemingly about 470 B.C.) and the Dryopes in the town and district of Karystus in Eubœa. To the latter, who were of a different kindred from the inhabitants of Chalkis and Eretria, and received no aid from them, they granted a capitulation: the former were more rigorously dealt with and expelled from their island. Skyros was barren, and had little to recommend it except a good maritime position and an excellent harbour; while its inhabitants, seemingly akin to the Pelasgian residents in Lemnos prior to the Athenian occupation of that spot, were alike piratical and cruel. Some Thessalian traders, recently plundered and imprisoned by them, had raised a complaint against them before the Amphictyonic synod, which condemned the island to make restitution. The mass of the islanders

Events between B.C. 476-466. Eion—Skyros—Karystos.

¹ Thucyd. i. 108; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

threw the burden upon those who had committed the crime: and these men, in order to evade payment, invoked Kimon with the Athenian armament. He conquered the island, expelled the inhabitants, and peopled it with Athenian settlers.

Such clearance was a beneficial act, suitable to the new character of Athens as guardian of the *Ægean* sea against piracy: but it seems also connected with Athenian plans. The island lay very convenient for the communication with Lemnos (which the Athenians had doubtless reoccupied after the expulsion of the Persians¹), and became, as well as Lemnos, a recognized adjunct or outlying portion of Attica. Moreover there were old legends which connected the Athenians with it, as the tomb of their hero Theseus; whose name, as the mythical champion of democracy, was in peculiar favour at the period immediately following the return from Salamis. It was in the year 476 B.C., that the oracle had directed them to bring home the bones of Theseus from Skyros, and to prepare for that hero a splendid entombment and edifice in their new city. They had tried to effect this, but the unsocial manners of the Dolopians had prevented a search, and it was only after Kimon had taken the island that he found, or pretended to find, the body. It was brought to Athens in the year 469 B.C.,² and after being welcomed by the people in solemn

¹ Xenophon, *Hellenic*. v. 1, 31.

² Mr. Fynes Clinton (*Fasti Hellenic*. ad ann. 476 B.C.) places the conquest of Skyros by Kimon in the year 476 B.C. He says, after citing a passage from Thucyd. i. 98, and from Plutarch, *Theseus*, c. 36, as well as a proposed correction of Bentley, which he justly rejects—"The island was actually conquered in the year of the archon Phædon, B.C. 476. This we know from Thucyd. i. 98, and Diodor. xi. 41-48 combined. Plutarch named the archon Phædon with reference to the conquest of the island: then, by a negligence not unusual with him, connected the oracle with that fact, as a contemporary transaction: although in truth the oracle

was not procured till six or seven years afterwards."

Plutarch has many sins to answer for against chronological exactness; but the charge here made against him is undeserved. He states that the oracle was given in (476 B.C.) the year of the archon Phædon; and that the body of Theseus was brought back to Athens in (469 B.C.) the year of the archon Aphepsion. There is nothing to contradict either statement; nor do the passages of Thucydidēs and Diodorus, which Mr. Clinton adduces, prove that which he asserts. The two passages of Diodorus have indeed no bearing upon the event: and insofar as Diodorus is in this case

and joyous procession, as if the hero himself had come back, was deposited in the interior of the city. On the spot was

an authority at all, he goes against Mr. Clinton, for he states Skyros to have been conquered in 470 B.C. (Diodor. xi. 60). Thucydides only tells us that the operations against Eion, Skyros, and Karystus, took place in the order here indicated, and at some periods between 476 and 466 B.C.: but he does not enable us to determine positively the date of either. Upon what authority Mr. Clinton states that "the oracle was not procured till six or seven years afterwards" (*i. e.* after the conquest), I do not know: the account of Plutarch goes rather to show that it was procured six or seven years *before* the conquest: and this may stand good until some better testimony is produced to contradict it. As our information now stands, we have no testimony as to the year of the conquest except that of Diodorus, who assigns it to 470 B.C., but as he assigns both the conquest of Eion, and the expeditions of Kimon against Karia and Pamphylia with the victories of Eurymedon, all to the same year, we cannot much trust his authority. Nevertheless I incline to believe him as to the date of the conquest of Skyros: because it seems to me very probable that this conquest took place in the year immediately before that in which the body of Theseus was brought to Athens, which latter event may be referred with great confidence to 469 B.C. in consequence of the interesting anecdote related by Plutarch about the first prize gained by the poet Sophoklés.

Mr. Clinton has given in his Appendix (No. vi.-viii. p. 248-253) two Dissertations respecting the chronology of the period from the

Persian war down to the close of the Peloponnesian war. He has rendered much service by correcting the mistake of Dodwell, Wes-seling and Mitford (founded upon an inaccurate construction of a passage in Isokratés) in supposing, after the Persian invasion of Greece, a Spartan hegemony, lasting ten years, prior to the commencement of the Athenian hegemony. He has shown that the latter must be reckoned as commencing in 477, or 476 B.C., immediately after the mutiny of the allies against Pausanias—whose command, however, need not be peremptorily restricted to one year, as Mr. Clinton (p. 252) and Dodwell maintain: for the words of Thucydides, ἐν τῷ ὄρει τῆ ἡγεμονίᾳ, imply nothing as to annual duration, and designate merely "the hegemony which preceded that of Athens."

But the refutation of this mistake does not enable us to establish any good positive chronology for the period between 477 and 466 B.C. It will not do to construe Πρῶτον μὲν (Thuc. i. 98) in reference to the Athenian conquest of Eion, as if it must necessarily mean "*the year after*" 477 B.C. If we could imagine that Thucydides had told us all the military operations between 477-466 B.C., we should be compelled to admit plenty of that "interval of inaction" against which Mr. Clinton so strongly protests (p. 252). Unhappily Thucydides has told us but a small portion of the events which really happened.

Mr. Clinton compares the various periods of duration assigned by ancient authors to that which is improperly called the Athenian "empire"—between 477-405 B.C. (p. 1.

built the monument called the Theseium with its sacred precinct, invested with the privilege of a sanctuary for men of poor condition who might feel ground for dreading the oppressions of the powerful, as well as for slaves in case of cruel usage.¹ Such were the protective functions of the mythical hero of democracy, whose installation is interesting as marking the growing intensity of democratical feeling in Athens since the Persian war.

It was about two years or more after this incident that the first breach of union in the Confederacy of Delos took place. The important island of Naxos, the largest of the Cyclades—an island which thirty years before had boasted a large marine force and 8000 hoplites—revolted; on what special ground we do not know: but probably the greater islands fancied themselves better able to dispense with the protection of the confederacy than the smaller—at the same time that they were more jealous of Athens.

248, 249). I confess that I rather agree with Dr. Gillies, who admits the discrepancy between these authors broadly and undisguisedly, than with Mr. Clinton, who seeks to bring them into comparative agreement. His explanation is only successful in regard to one of them—Demosthenês; whose two statements (forty-five years in one place and seventy-three years in another) are shown to be consistent with each other as well as chronologically just. But surely it is not reasonable to correct the text of the orator Lykurgus from ἐνενηήκοντα to ἐβδομήκοντα, and then to say that “Lykurgus may be added to the number of those who describe the period as seventy years” (p. 250). Neither are we to bring Andokidês into harmony with others, by supposing that “his calculation ascends to the battle of Marathon, from the date of which (B.C. 490) to the battle of Ægospotami, are just eighty-

five years” (Ibid.). Nor ought we to justify a computation by Demosthenês of sixty-five years, by saying “that it terminates at the Athenian defeat in Sicily” (p. 249).

The truth is, that there is more or less chronological inaccuracy in all these passages, except those of Demosthenês—and historical inaccuracy in all of them, not even excepting those. It is not true that the Athenians ἤρξαν τῆς θαλάσσης—ἤρξαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—προστάται ἦσαν τῶν Ἑλλήνων—for seventy-three years. The historical language of Demosthenês, Plato, Lysias, Isokratês, Andokidês, Lykurgus, requires to be carefully examined before we rely upon it.

¹ Plutarch (Kimon, c. 8; Theseus, c. 36). ἐστὶ δὲ φύσιον οἰκέταις καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ταπειντέροις καὶ δεδιόσι κρείττονας, ὡς καὶ τοῦ Θησέως προστατικοῦ τινός καὶ βοηθητικοῦ γενομένου καὶ προσδεχομένου φίλων θρώπως τὰς τῶν ταπεινοτέρων δεήσεις.

About 467-466 B.C.
First revolt among the members of the Confederacy of Delos—
—Naxos revolts and is reconquered.

federate force, it was forced to surrender, and reduced to the condition of a tributary subject;¹ its armed ships being doubtless taken away, and its fortifications razed. Whether any fine or ulterior penalty was levied, we have no information.

We cannot doubt that the reduction of this powerful island, however untoward in its effects upon the equal and self-maintained character of the confederacy, strengthened its military force by placing the whole Naxian fleet with new pecuniary contributions in the hands of the chief. Nor is it surprising to hear that Athens sought both to employ this new force, and to obliterate the late act of severity, by increased exertions against the common enemy. Though we know no particulars respecting operations against Persia, since the attack on Eion, such operations must have been going on; but the expedition under Kimon, undertaken not long after the Naxian revolt, was attended with memorable results. That commander, having under him 200 triremes from Athens, and 100 from the various confederates, was despatched to attack the Persians on the south-western and southern coast of Asia Minor. He attacked and drove out several of their garrisons from various Grecian settlements, both in Karia and Lykia: among others, the important trading city of Phasêlis, though at first resisting and even standing a siege, was prevailed upon by the friendly suggestions of the Chians in Kimon's armament to pay a contribution of ten talents and join in the expedition. From the length of time occupied in these various undertakings, the Persian satraps had been enabled to assemble a powerful force, both fleet and army, near the mouth of the river Eurymedon in Pamphylia, under the command of Tithraustês and Pherendatês, both of the regal blood. The fleet, chiefly Phœnician, seems to have consisted of 200 ships, but a farther reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships was expected, and was actually near at hand, so that the commanders were unwilling to hazard a battle before its arrival. Kimon, anxious for the same reason to hasten on the combat, attacked them

B.C. 466-465.
Operations
of Athens
and the con-
federacy
against
Persia.—
Defeat of
the Per-
sians by
Kimon at
the river
Eurymedon.

¹ Thucyd. i. 98. It has already been stated in the preceding chapter, that Themistokiês, as a fugitive, passed close to Naxos while it was under siege, and incurred great danger of being taken.

vigorously. Partly from their inferiority of numbers, partly from discouragement at the absence of the reinforcement, they seem to have made no strenuous resistance. They were put to flight and driven ashore; so speedily, and with so little loss to the Greeks, that Kimon was enabled to disembark his men forthwith, and attack the land-force which was drawn up on shore to protect them. The battle on land was long and gallantly contested, but Kimon at length gained a complete victory, dispersed the army with the capture of many prisoners, and either took or destroyed the entire fleet. As soon as his victory and his prisoners were secured, he sailed to Cyprus for the purpose of intercepting the reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships in their way, and was fortunate enough to attack them while yet they were ignorant of the victories of the Eurymedon. These ships too were all destroyed, though most of the crews appear to have escaped ashore on the island. Two great victories, one at sea and the other on land, gained on the same day by the same armament, counted with reason among the most glorious of all Grecian exploits, and were extolled as such in the inscription on the commemorative offering to Apollo, set up out of the tithe of the spoils.¹ The number of prisoners, as well as the booty taken by the victors, was immense.

¹ For the battles of the Eurymedon, see Thucyd. i. 100; Diodor. xi. 60-62; Plutarch, Kimon, 12, 13.

The accounts of the two latter appear chiefly derived from Ephorus and Kallisthenés, authors of the following century; and from Phanodemus, an author later still. I borrow sparingly from them, and only so far as consists with the brief statement of Thucydidés. The narrative of Diodorus is exceedingly confused, indeed hardly intelligible.

Phanodemus stated the number of the Persian fleet at six hundred ships; Ephorus, at three hundred and fifty. Diodorus (following the latter) gives three hundred and forty. Plutarch mentions the expected reinforcement of eighty Phœnician ships; which appears

to me a very credible circumstance, explaining the easy nautical victory of Kimon at the Eurymedon. From Thucydidés we know that the vanquished fleet at the Eurymedon consisted of no more than two hundred ships. For so I venture to construe the words of Thucydidés, in spite of the authority of Dr. Arnold—Καὶ εἶλον (Ἀθηναῖοι) τριήρεις Φοινίκων καὶ διέσθθειραν τὰς πάσας ἐς (τὰς) διακοσίας. Upon which Dr. Arnold observes,—“Amounting in all to two hundred; that is, that the whole number of ships taken or destroyed was two hundred—not that the whole fleet consisted of no more.” Admitting the correctness of this construction (which may be defended by viii. 21), we may remark that the defeated Phœnician fleet, according to the

A victory thus remarkable, which thrust back the Persians to the region eastward of Phasêlis, doubtless fortified materially the position of the Athenian confederacy against them. But it tended not less to exalt the reputation of Athens, and even to popularize her with the confederates generally, from the large amount of plunder divisible among them. Probably this increased power and popularity stood her in stead throughout her approaching contest with Thasos, at the same time that it explains the increasing fear and dislike of the Peloponnesians.

Thasos was a member of the confederacy of Delos; but her quarrel with Athens seems to have arisen out of causes quite distinct from confederate relations. It has been already stated that the Athenians had within the last few years expelled the Persians from the important post of Eion on the Strymon, the most convenient post for the neighbouring region of Thrace, which was not less distinguished for its fertility than for its mining wealth. In the occupation of this post, the Athenians had had time to become acquainted with the productive character of the adjoining region, chiefly occupied by the Edonian Thracians; and it is extremely probable that many private settlers arrived from Athens, with the view of procuring grants, or making their fortunes by partnership with powerful Thracians in working the gold-mines round Mount Pangæus. In so doing, they speedily found themselves in collision with the Greeks of the opposite island of Mount Thasos, who possessed a considerable strip of land with

Revolt of Thasos from the confederacy of Delos.— Siege of Thasos by the Athenians under Kimon.— Mines in Thrace.

universal practice of antiquity, ran ashore to seek protection from its accompanying land-force. When therefore this land-force was itself defeated and dispersed, the ships would all naturally fall into the power of the victors; or if any escaped, it would be merely by accident. Moreover, the smaller number is in this case more likely to be the truth, as we must suppose an easy naval victory, in order to leave strength for a strenuous

land battle on the same day.

It is remarkable that the inscription on the commemorative offering only specifies "one hundred Phœnician ships with their crews" as having been captured (Diodor. xi. 62). The other hundred ships were probably destroyed. Diodorus represents Kimon as having captured three hundred and forty ships, though he himself cites the inscription which mentions only one hundred.

various dependent towns on the continent of Thrace, and derived a large revenue from the mines of Skaptê Hylê, as well as from others in the neighbourhood.¹ The condition of Thasos at this time (about 465 B.C.) indicates to us the progress which the Grecian states in the Ægean had made since their liberation from Persia. It had been deprived both of its fortifications and of its maritime force, by order of Darius, about 491 B.C., and must have remained in this condition until after the repulse of Xerxes; but we now find it well-fortified and possessing a powerful maritime force.

In what precise manner the quarrel between the Thasians and the Athenians of Eion manifested itself, respecting the trade and the mines in Thrace, we are not informed. But it reached such a height that the Athenians were induced to send a powerful armament against the island, under the command of Kimon.² Having vanquished the Thasian force at sea, they disembarked, gained various battles, and blocked up the city by land as well as by sea. And at the same time they undertook—what seems to have been part and parcel of the same scheme—the establishment of a larger and more powerful colony on Thracian ground not far from Eion. On the attempt of Athens to found a city at Ennea Hodoi on the Strymon above Eion. The attempt fails and the settlers are slain.

the two Milesian despots, had been tempted by the advantages of this place to commence a settlement there: both of them had failed, and a third failure on a still grander scale was now about to be added. The

¹ About Thasos, see Herodot. vi. 46-48; vii. 118. The position of Ragusa in the Adriatic, in reference to the despots of Servia and Bosnia in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, was very similar to that of Athens and Thasos in regard to the Thracian princes of the interior. In Engel's History of Ragusa we

find an account of the large gains made in that city by its contracts to work the gold and silver mines belonging to these princes (Engel, Geschichte des Freystaates Ragusa, sect. 36, p. 163. Wien, 1807).

² Thucyd. i. 100, 101; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Diodor. xi. 70.

Athenians sent thither a large body of colonists, ten thousand in number, partly from their own citizens, partly collected from their allies; the temptations of the site probably rendering volunteers numerous. As far as Ennea Hodoi was concerned, they were successful in conquering it and driving away the Edonian possessors. But on trying to extend themselves farther to the eastward, to a spot called Drabêkus convenient for the mining region, they encountered a more formidable resistance from a powerful alliance of Thracian tribes, who had come to aid the Edonians in decisive hostility against the new colony—probably not without instigation from the inhabitants of Thasos. All or most of the ten thousand colonists were slain in this warfare, and the new colony was for the time completely abandoned. We shall find it resumed hereafter.¹

Disappointed as the Athenians were in this enterprise, they did not abandon the blockade of Thasos, which held out more than two years, and only surrendered in the third year. Its fortifications were razed; its ships of war, thirty-three in number, were taken away:² its possessions and mining establishments on the opposite continent were relinquished. Moreover an immediate contribution in money was demanded from the inhabitants, over and above the annual payment assessed upon them for the future. The subjugation of this powerful island was another step in the growing dominion of Athens over her confederates.

464-463 B.C.
Reduction
of Thasos
after a
blockade
of two
years—it
is disarm-
ed and
dismantled.

The year before the Thasians surrendered, however, they had taken a step which deserves particular notice, as indicating the newly-gathering clouds in the Grecian political horizon. They had made secret application to the

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. Philip of Mædon, in his dispute more than a century after this period with the Athenians respecting the possession of Amphipolis, pretended that his ancestor Alexander had been the first to acquire possession of the spot after the expulsion of the Persians from Thrace (see Philippi Epistola ap. Demosthen. p. 164, R.). If this pretence had been true,

Ennea Hodoi would have been in possession of the Mædonians at this time, when the first Athenian attempt was made upon it: but the statement of Thueydidês shows that it was then an Edonian township.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14. Galêpus and Cēsýmê were among the Thasian settlements on the mainland of Thrace (Thucyd. iv. 108).

Lacedæmonians for aid, entreating them to draw off the attention of Athens by invading Attica; and the Lacedæmonians, without the knowledge of Athens, having actually engaged to comply with this request, were only prevented from performing their promise by a grave and terrible misfortune at home.¹ Though accidentally unperformed, this hostile promise is a most significant event. It marks the growing fear and hatred on the part of Sparta and the Peloponnesians towards Athens, merely on general grounds of the magnitude of her power, and without any special provocation. Nay, not only had Athens given no provocation, but she was still actually included as a member of the Lacedæmonian alliance, and we shall find her presently both appealed to and acting as such. We shall hear so much of Athens, and that too with truth, as pushing and aggressive—and of Sparta as home-keeping and defensive—that the incident just mentioned becomes important to remark. The first intent of unprovoked and even treacherous hostility—the germ of the future Peloponnesian war—is conceived and reduced to an engagement by Sparta.

We are told by Plutarch, that the Athenians, after the surrender of Thasos and the liberation of the armament, had expected from Kimon some farther conquests in Macedonia—and even that he had actually entered upon that project with such promise of success, that its farther consummation was certain as well as easy. Having under these circumstances relinquished it and returned to Athens, he was accused by Periklês and others of having been bought off by bribes from the Macedonian king Alexander; but was acquitted after a public trial.²

During the period which had elapsed between the first formation of the confederacy of Delos and the capture of Thasos (about thirteen or fourteen years, B.C. 477-463), the Athenians seem to have been occupied almost entirely in their maritime operations, chiefly against the Persians—having been free

¹ Thucyd. i. 101. *οἱ δὲ ὑπέσχεοντο μένου σισμοῦ. μὲν κρῦφα τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ ἐμελλόν, διεκωλύθησαν δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ γειτο-*

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

from embarrassments immediately round Attica. But this freedom was not destined to last much longer. During the ensuing ten years, their foreign relations near home become both active and complicated; while their strength expands so wonderfully, that they are found competent at once to obligations on both sides of the Ægean sea, the distant as well as the near.

Of the incidents which had taken place in Central Greece during the twelve or fifteen years immediately succeeding the battle of Plataea, we have scarcely any information. The feelings of the time, between those Greeks who had supported and those who had resisted the Persian invader, must have remained unfriendly even after the war was at an end; while the mere occupation of the Persian numerous host must have inflicted severe damage both upon Thessaly and Bœotia. At the meeting of the Amphiktyonic synod which succeeded the expulsion of the invaders, a reward was proclaimed for the life of the Melian Ephialtês, who had betrayed to Xerxes the mountain-path over Ceta, and thus caused the ruin of Leonidas at Thermopylæ. Moreover, if we may trust Plutarch, it was even proposed by Lacedæmon that all the *medising* Greeks should be expelled from the synod¹—a proposition which the more long-sighted views of Themistoklês successfully resisted. Even the stronger measure of razing the fortifications of all the extra-Peloponnesian cities, from fear that they might be used to aid some future invasion, had suggested itself to the Lacedæmonians—as we see from their language on the occasion of rebuilding the walls of Athens. In regard to Bœotia, it appears that the headship of Thebes as well as the coherence of the federation was for the time almost suspended. The destroyed towns of Plataea and Thespiæ were restored, and the latter in part re-peopled,² under Athenian influence. The general sentiment of Peloponnesus as well as of Athens would have sustained these towns against Thebes, if the latter had tried at that time

Proceedings in Central Greece between 470-464 B.C. Thebes and the Bœotian towns. Discredit of Thebes.

¹ Plutarch, Themistokl. c. 20.

² See the case of Sikinnus, the person through whom Themistoklês communicated with Xerxes before the battle of Salamis, and for

whom he afterwards procured admission among the batch of newly-introduced citizens at Thespiæ (Herodot. viii. 75).

to enforce her supremacy over them in the name of "ancient Bœotian right and usage."¹ The Theban government was then in discredit for its previous *medism*—even in the eyes of Thebans themselves;² while the party opposed to Thebes in the other towns was so powerful, that many of them would probably have been severed from the federation to become allies of Athens like Plataea, if the interference of Lacedæmon had not arrested such a tendency. Lacedæmon was in every other part of Greece an enemy

Sparta restores and upholds the supremacy of Thebes over the lesser Bœotian towns.

to organized aggregation of cities, either equal or unequal, and was constantly bent on keeping the little autonomous communities separate:³ whence she sometimes became by accident the protector of the weaker cities against compulsory alliance imposed upon them by the stronger. The interest of her own ascendancy

was in this respect analogous to that of the Persians when they dictated the peace of Antalkidas—of the Romans in administering their extensive conquests—and of the kings of Mediæval Europe in breaking the authority of the barons over their vassals. But though such was the policy of Sparta elsewhere, her fear of Athens, which grew up during the ensuing twenty years, made her act differently in regard to Bœotia. She had no other means of maintaining that country as her own ally and as the enemy of Athens, except by organising the federation effectively, and strengthening the authority of Thebes. It is to this revolution in Spartan politics that Thebes owed the recovery of her ascendancy⁴—a revolution so conspicuously marked, that the Spartans even aided in enlarging her circuit and improving her fortifications. It was not without difficulty that she maintained this position even when recovered, against the dangerous neighbourhood of Athens—a circumstance which made her not only a vehement partisan of Sparta, but even more furiously anti-Athenian than Sparta, down to the close of the Peloponnesian war.

The revolution, just noticed, in Spartan politics

¹ Τὰ τῶν Βοιωτῶν πάτρια—τὰ κρινά τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν πάτρια (Thucyd. iii. 61-65).

² Thucyd. iii. 62.

³ See among many other evi-

dences, the remarkable case of the Olynthian confederacy (Xenophon. Hellen. v. 2, 16).

⁴ Diodor. xi. 81; Justin, iii. 6.

towards Bœotia, did not manifest itself until about twenty years after the commencement of the Athenian maritime confederacy. During the course of those twenty years, we know that Sparta had had more than one battle to sustain in Arcadia, against the towns and villages of that country, in which she came forth victorious: but we have no particulars respecting these incidents. We also know that a few years after the Persian invasion, the inhabitants of Elis concentrated themselves from many dispersed townships into the one main city of Elis:¹ and it seems probable that Lepreum in Triphylia, and one or two of the towns of Achaia, were either formed or enlarged by a similar process near about the same time.² Such aggregation of towns out of pre-existing separate villages was not conformable to the views, nor favourable to the ascendancy of Lacedæmon. But there can be little doubt that her foreign policy after the Persian invasion was both embarrassed and discredited by the misconduct of her two contemporary kings, Pausanias (who though only regent was practically equivalent to a king) and Leotychildês—not to mention the rapid development of Athens and Peiræus.

Moreover, in the year B. C. 464 (the year preceding the surrender of Thasos to the Athenian armament), a misfortune of yet more terrific moment befel Sparta. A violent earthquake took place in the immediate neighbourhood of Sparta itself, destroying a large portion of the town, and a vast number of lives, many of them Spartan citizens. It was the judgement of the earth-shaking god Poseidon (according to the view of the Lacedæmonians themselves) for a recent violation of his sanctuary at Tænarus, from whence certain suppliant Helots had been dragged away not long before for punishment:³ not improbably some of those Helots whom Pausanias had instigated to revolt. The sentiment of the Helots, at all times one of enmity towards their masters, appears at this moment to have been unusually inflammable: so that an earthquake at Sparta, especially an earthquake construed as divine vengeance for Helot blood recently spilt, was sufficient to rouse many of them

Events in Peloponnesus—Arcadia—Elis, &c.

Terrible earthquake at Sparta—464 B.C. Revolt of the Helots.

¹ Diodor. xi. 54; Strabo, viii. p. 337. ² Thucyd. i. 101-123; Diodor. xi. 62.

³ Strabo, viii. pp. 337, 348, 356.

at once into revolt, together with some even of the Pericœki. The insurgents took arms and marched directly upon Sparta, which they were on the point of mastering during the first moments of consternation, had not the bravery and presence of mind of the young king Archidamus re-animated the surviving citizens and repelled the attack. But though repelled, the insurgents were not subdued. They maintained the field against the Spartan force, sometimes with considerable advantage, since *Æimnêstus* (the warrior by whose hand *Mardonius* had fallen at *Platœa*) was defeated and slain with 300 followers in the plain of *Stenyklêrus*, overpowered by superior numbers.¹ When at length defeated, they occupied and fortified the memorable hill of *Ithômê*, the ancient citadel of their Messenian forefathers. Here they made a long and obstinate defence, supporting themselves doubtless by incursions throughout *Laconia*. Defence indeed was not difficult, seeing that the *Lacedæmonians* were at that time confessedly incapable of assailing even the most imperfect species of fortification. After the siege had lasted some two or three years, without any prospect of success, the *Lacedæmonians*, beginning to despair of their own sufficiency for the undertaking, invoked the aid of their various allies, among whom we find specified the *Æginetans*, the *Athenians*, and the *Platæans*.² The *Athenian* troops are said to have consisted of 4000 men, under the command of *Kimôn*; *Athens* being still included in the list of *Lacedæmonian* allies.

So imperfect were the means of attacking walls at that day, even for the most intelligent Greeks, that this increased force made no immediate impression on the fortified hill of *Ithômê*. And when the *Lacedæmonians* saw that their *Athenian* allies were not more successful than they had been themselves, they soon passed from surprise into doubt, mistrust, and apprehension. The troops had given no ground for such a feeling, while *Kimôn* their general was notorious for his attachment to *Sparta*. Yet the *Lacedæmonians* could not help suspecting the ever-wakeful energy and ambition of these *Ionic* strangers whom they introduced into the interior of *Laconia*. Calling to mind their own promise—though doubtless a secret

The *Lacedæmonians* invoke the aid of their allies against the revolted *Helots*.—*March of the Athenians* under *Kimôn* into *Laconia* to aid them.

¹ Herodot. ix. 64

² Thucyd. i. 102; iii. 54; iv. 57.

promise—to invade Attica not long before, for the benefit of the Thasians—they even began to fear that the Athenians might turn against them, and listen to solicitations for espousing the cause of the besieged. Under the influence of such apprehensions, they dismissed the Athenian contingent forthwith, on pretence of having no farther occasion for them; while all the other allies were retained, and the siege or blockade went on as before.¹

¹ Thucyd. i. 102. τὴν μὲν ὑποψίαν οὐ δηλοῦντες, εἰπόντες δὲ ὅτι οὐδὲν προσδέονται αὐτῶν ἔτι.

Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fast. Hellen. ann. 464-461 B.C.) following Plutarch, recognizes two Lacedæmonian requests to Athens, and two Athenian expeditions to the aid of the Spartans, both under Kimon; the first in 464 B.C., immediately on the happening of the earthquake and consequent revolt—the second in 461 B.C., after the war had lasted some time.

In my judgement, there is no ground for supposing more than one application made to Athens, and one expedition. The duplication has arisen from Plutarch, who has construed too much as historical reality the comic exaggeration of Aristophanês (Aristoph. Lysistrat. 1138; Plutarch, Kimon, 16). The heroine of the latter, Lysistrata, wishing to make peace between the Laedæmonians and Athenians, and reminding each of the services which they had received from the other, might permit herself to say to the Lacedæmonians—"Your envoy Perikleidas came to Athens, pale with terror, and put himself as a suppliant at the altar to entreat our help as a matter of life and death, while Poseidon was still shaking the earth and the Messenians were pressing you hard: then Kimon with 4000 hoplites went and achieved your complete salvation."

This is all very telling and forcible, as a portion of the Aristophanic play, but there is no historical truth in it except the fact of an application made and an expedition sent in consequence.

We know that the earthquake took place at the time when the siege of Thasos was yet going on, because it was the reason which prevented the Lacedæmonians from aiding the besieged by an invasion of Attica. But Kimon commanded at the siege of Thasos (Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14), accordingly he could not have gone as commander to Laconia at the time when this first expedition is alleged to have been undertaken.

Next, Thucydides acknowledges no more than one expedition; nor indeed does Diodorus (xi. 64), though this is of minor consequence. Now mere silence on the part of Thucydides, in reference to the events of a period which he only professes to survey briefly, is not always a very forcible negative argument. But in this case, his account of the expedition of 461 B.C., with its very important consequences, is such as to exclude the supposition that he knew of any prior expedition, two or three years earlier. Had he known of any such, he could not have written the account which now stands in his text. He dwells especially on the prolongation of the war, and on the incapacity of

This dismissal, ungracious in the extreme and probably rendered even more offensive by the habitual roughness of Spartan dealing, excited the strongest exasperation both among the Athenian soldiers and the Athenian people—an exasperation heightened by circumstances immediately preceding. For the resolution to send

Mistrust conceived by the Lacedæmonians of their Athenian auxiliaries, who are dismissed from Laconia. Displeasure and change of policy at Athens.

auxiliaries into Laconia, when the Lacedæmonians first applied for them, had not been taken without considerable debate at Athens. The party of Periklês and Ephialtês, habitually in opposition to Kimon, and partisans of the forward democratical movement, had strongly discountenanced it, and conjured their countrymen not to assist in renovating and strengthening their most formidable rival. Perhaps the previous engagement of the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica on behalf of the Thasians may have become known to them,

though not so formally as to exclude denial. And even supposing this engagement to have remained unknown at that time to every one, there were not wanting other grounds to render the policy of refusal plausible. But Kimon—with an earnestness which even the philo-Laconian Kritias afterwards characterised as a sacrifice of the grandeur of Athens to the advantage of Lacedæmon¹—employed all his credit and influence in seconding the application. The maintenance of alliance with Sparta on equal footing—peace among the great powers of Greece and common war against Persia—together with the prevention of all farther democratical changes in Athens—were the leading points of his political creed.

the Lacedæmonians for attacking walls, as the reasons why they invoked the Athenians as well as their other allies: he implies that the presence of the latter in Laconia was a new and threatening incident: moreover, when he tells us how much the Athenians were incensed by their abrupt and mistrustful dismissal, he could not have omitted to notice as an aggravation of this feeling, that only two or three years before, they had rescued Lacedæmon from the

brink of ruin. Let us add, that the supposition of Sparta, the first military power in Greece, and distinguished for her unintermitting discipline, being reduced all at once to a condition of such utter helplessness as to owe her safety to foreign intervention—is highly improbable in itself; inadmissible except on very good evidence.

For the reasons here stated, I reject the first expedition into Laconia mentioned in Plutarch.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

As yet, both his personal and political ascendancy were predominant over his opponents. As yet, there was no manifest conflict, which had only just begun to show itself in the case of Thasos, between the maritime power of Athens and the union of land-force under Sparta: and Kimon could still treat both of these phenomena as coexisting necessities of Hellenic well-being. Though noway distinguished as a speaker, he carried with him the Athenian assembly by appealing to a large and generous patriotism, which forbade them to permit the humiliation of Sparta. "Consent not to see Hellas lamed of one leg and Athens drawing without her yoke-fellow;"¹—such was his language, as we learn from his friend and companion the Chian poet Ion: and in the lips of Kimon it proved effective. It is a speech of almost melancholy interest, since ninety years passed over before such an appeal was ever again addressed to an Athenian assembly.² The despatch of the auxiliaries was thus dictated by a generous sentiment, to the disregard of what might seem political prudence. And we may imagine the violent reaction which took place in Athenian feeling, when the Lacedæmonians repaid them by singling out their troops from all the other allies as objects of insulting suspicion. We may imagine the triumph of Periklês and Ephialtês, who had opposed the mission—and the vast loss of influence to Kimon, who had brought it about—when Athens received again into her public assembly the hoplites sent back from Ithômê.

Both in the internal constitution, indeed (of which more presently), and in the external policy, of Athens, the dismissal of these soldiers was pregnant with results. The Athenians immediately passed a formal resolution to renounce the alliance between themselves and Lacedæmon against the Persians. They did more: they looked out for land-enemies of Lacedæmon, with whom to ally themselves.

The Athenians renounce the alliance of Sparta, and contract alliance with Argos. Position of Argos —her conquest of Mykênæ and other towns.

Of these by far the first, both in Hellenic rank and in real power, was Argos. That city, neutral during the Persian invasion, had now

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16. 'Ο δ' Ἴων ἀπομνημονεύει καὶ τὸν λόγον, μῆτε τὴν πόλιν ἑτεροζυγα, περιδεῖν γεγενημένην.
² See Xenophon, Hellenic, vi. πρὸς μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐκίνησε, παρακαλῶν μῆτε τῆς Ἑλλάδος χωλῆν,

recovered the effects of the destructive defeat suffered about thirty years before from the Spartan king Kleomenês. The sons of the ancient citizens had grown to manhood, and the temporary predominance of the Pericæi, acquired in consequence of the ruinous loss of citizens in that defeat, had been again put down. In the neighbourhood of Argos, and dependent upon it, were situated Mykenæ, Tiryns, and Midea—small in power and importance, but rich in mythical renown. Disdaining the inglorious example of Argos at the period of danger, these towns had furnished contingents both to Thermopylæ and Plataea, which their powerful neighbour had been unable either to prevent at the time or to avenge afterwards, from fear of the intervention of Lacedæmon. But so soon as the latter was seen to be endangered and occupied at home, with a formidable Messenian revolt, the Argeians availed themselves of the opportunity to attack not only Mykenæ and Tiryns, but also Orneæ, Midea, and other semi-dependent towns around them. Several of these were reduced; and the inhabitants, robbed of their autonomy, were incorporated with the domain of Argos: but the Mykenæans, partly from the superior gallantry of their resistance, partly from jealousy of their mythical renown, were either sold as slaves or driven into banishment.¹ Through these victories Argos was now more powerful than ever, and the propositions of alliance made to her by Athens, while strengthening both the two against Lacedæmon, opened to her a new chance of recovering her lost headship in Peloponnesus. The Thessalians became members of this new alliance, which was a defensive alliance against Lacedæmon: and hopes were doubtless entertained of drawing in some of the habitual allies of the latter.

The new character which Athens had thus assumed, as a competitor for landed alliances not less than for maritime ascendancy, came opportunely for the protection of the neighbouring town of Megara. It appears that Corinth, perhaps instigated like Argos by the helplessness of the Lacedæmonians, had been making border encroach-

—about 372 B.C.—a little before the battle of Leuktra.

¹ Diodor. xi. 65; Strabo, viii. p. 372; Pausan. ii. 16, 17, 25. Diodorus places this incident in 468 B.C.:

but as it undoubtedly comes after the earthquake at Sparta, we must suppose it to have happened about 463 B.C. See Mr. Fynes Clinton, *Fasti Hellenici*, Appendix. 8.

ments on the one side upon Kleônæ—on the other side upon Megara:¹ on which ground the latter, probably despairing of protection from Lacedæmon, renounced the Lacedæmonian connexion, and obtained permission to enrol herself as an ally of Athens.² This was an acquisition of signal value to the Athenians, since it both opened to them the whole range of territory across the outer Isthmus of Corinth to the interior of the Krissæan Gulf, on which the Megarian port of Pêgæ was situated—and placed them in possession of the passes of Mount Geraneia, so that they could arrest the march of a Peloponnesian army over the Isthmus, and protect Attica from invasion. It was moreover of great importance in its effects on Grecian politics: for it was counted as a wrong by Lacedæmon, gave deadly offence to the Corinthians, and lighted up the flames of war between them and Athens; their allies the Epidaurians and Æginetans taking their part. Though Athens had not yet been guilty of unjust encroachment against any Peloponnesian state, her ambition and energy had inspired universal awe; while the maritime states in the neighbourhood, such as Corinth, Epidaurus, and Ægina, saw these terror-striking qualities threatening them at their own doors, through her alliance with Argos and Megara. Moreover, it is probable that the ancient feud between the Athenians and Æginetans, though dormant since a little before the Persian invasion, had never been appeased or forgotten: so that the Æginetans, dwelling withir sight of Peiræus, were at once best able to appreciate, and most likely to dread, the enormous maritime power now possessed by Athens. Periklès was wont to call Ægina the eyesore of Peiræus:³ but we may be sure that Peiræus, grown into a vast fortified port within the existing generation, was in a much stronger degree the eyesore of Ægina.

About
461-460 B.C.
Megara be-
comes
allied with
Athens.
Growing
hatred of
Corinth
and the
neighbour-
ing Pello-
ponnesian
states
towards
Athens.

The Athenians were at this time actively engaged in prosecuting the war against Persia, having a fleet of no less than two hundred sail, equipped by or from the confederacy collectively, now serving in Cyprus and on the Phœnician coast. Moreover the revolt of the Egyptians

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17.

² Thucyd. i. 103.

³ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 8.

under Inaros (about 460 B.C.) opened to them new means of action against the Great King. Their fleet, by invitation of the revolted, sailed up the Nile to Memphis, where there seemed at first a good prospect of throwing off the Persian dominion. Yet in spite of so great an abstraction from their disposable force, their military operations near home were conducted with unabated vigour: and the inscription which remains—a commemoration of their citizens of the Erechtheid tribe who were slain in one and the same year in Cyprus, Egypt, Phœnicia, the Halieis, Ægina, and Megara—brings forcibly before us that energy which astonished and even alarmed their contemporaries.

Their first proceedings at Megara were of a nature altogether novel, in the existing condition of Greece. It was necessary for the Athenians to protect their new ally against the superiority of Peloponnesian land-force, and to ensure a constant communication with it by sea. But the city (like most of the ancient Hellenic towns) was situated on a hill at some distance from the sea, separated from its port Nisæa by a space of nearly one mile. One of the earliest proceedings of the Athenians was to build two lines of wall, near and parallel to each other, connecting the city with Nisæa; so that the two thus formed one continuous fortress, wherein a standing Athenian garrison was maintained, with the constant means of succour from Athens in case of need. These "Long Walls," though afterwards copied in other places and on a larger scale, were at that juncture an ingenious invention, for the purpose of extending the maritime arm of Athens to an inland city.

The first operations of Corinth however were not directed against Megara. The Athenians, having undertaken a landing in the territory of the Halieis (the population of the southern Argolic peninsula, bordering on Trœzen and Hermionê), were defeated on land by the Corinthian and Epidaurian forces: possibly it may have been in this expedition that they acquired possession of Trœzen, which we find afterwards in their dependance, without knowing when it became so. But in a sea-fight which took place off the island of Kekryphaleia (between Ægina and the Argolic peninsula) the Athenians gained the victory. After this victory and defeat,—neither

Energetic simultaneous action of the Athenians—in Cyprus, Phœnicia, Egypt, and Greece.—They build the first "Long Wall" from Megara to Nisæa.

459-458 B.C.
War of Athens against Corinth, Ægina, &c. Total defeat of the Æginetans at sea.

of them apparently very decisive,—the Æginetans began to take a more energetic part in the war, and brought out their full naval force together with that of their allies—Corinthians, Epidaurians, and other Peloponnesians: while Athens equipped a fleet of corresponding magnitude, summoning her allies also; though we do not know the actual numbers on either side. In the great naval battle which ensued off the island of Ægina, the superiority of the new nautical tactics acquired by twenty years' practice of the Athenians since the Persian war—over the old Hellenic ships and seamen, as shown in those states where at the time of the battle of Marathon the maritime strength of Greece had resided—was demonstrated by a victory most complete and decisive. The Peloponnesian and Dorian seamen had as yet had no experience of the improved seacraft of Athens, and when we find how much they were disconcerted with it even twenty-eight years afterwards at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we shall not wonder at its destructive effect upon them in this early battle. The maritime power of Ægina was irrecoverably ruined. The Athenians captured seventy ships of war, landed a large force upon the island, and commenced the siege of the city by land as well as by sea.¹

If the Lacedæmonians had not been occupied at home by the blockade of Ithômê, they would have been probably induced to invade Attica as a diversion to the Æginetans; especially as the Persian Megabazus came to Sparta at this time on the part of Artaxerxes to prevail upon them to do so, in order that the Athenians might be constrained to retire from Egypt. This Persian brought with him a large sum of money, but was nevertheless obliged to return without effecting his mission.² The Corinthians and Epidaurians however, while they carried to Ægina a reinforcement of 300 hoplites, did their best to aid her farther by an attack upon Megara; which place, it was supposed, the Athenians could not possibly relieve without withdrawing their forces from Ægina, inasmuch as so many of their men were at the same time serving in Egypt. But the Athenians showed themselves equal to all these three

The Athenians besiege Ægina. The Corinthians, Epidaurians, &c. attack—are defeated by the Athenians under Myronidès.

¹ Thucyd. i. 105; Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10; Diodor. xi. 78.

² Thucyd. i. 109.

exigencies at one and the same time—to the great disappointment of their enemies. Myrônidês marched from Athens to Megara at the head of the citizens in the two extremes of military age, old and young; these being the only troops at home. He fought the Corinthians near the town, gaining a slight, but debateable, advantage, which he commemorated by a trophy, as soon as the Corinthians had returned home. But the latter, when they arrived at home, were so much reproached by their own old citizens, for not having vanquished the refuse of the Athenian military force,¹ that they returned back at the end of twelve days and erected a trophy on their side, laying claim to a victory in the past battle. The Athenians, marching out of Megara, attacked them a second time, and gained on this occasion a decisive victory. The defeated Corinthians were still more unfortunate in their retreat; for a body of them, missing their road, became entangled in a space of private ground enclosed on every side by a deep ditch, and having only one narrow entrance. Myrônidês, detecting this fatal mistake, planted his hoplites at the entrance to prevent their escape, and then surrounded the enclosure with his light-armed troops, who with their missile weapons slew all the Corinthian hoplites, without possibility either of flight or resistance. The bulk of the Corinthian army effected their retreat, but the destruction of this detachment was a sad blow to the city.²

Splendid as the success of the Athenians had been during this year, both on land and at sea, it was easy for them to foresee that the power of their enemies would presently be augmented by the Lacedæmonians taking the field. Partly on this account—partly also from the more energetic phase of democracy, and the long-sighted views of Periklês, which were now becoming ascendent in the city—the Athenians began the stupendous undertaking of connecting Athens with the sea by means of long walls. The idea of this measure had doubtless been first suggested by the recent erection of long walls, though for so much smaller

458-457 B.C.
The Long Walls between Athens and Peiræus are projected—espoused by Periklês, opposed by Kimon—political contentions at Athens—importance of the Long Walls.

¹ Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 10. ἐνίκων μαχόμενοι ἄπασαν τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐκείνων τοῖς ἤδη ἀπειρηχόσι καὶ τοῖς οὕτω δυναμένοις, &c.

The incident mentioned by Thucydides about the Corinthians, that

the old men of their own city were so indignant against them on their return, is highly characteristic of Grecian manners—*χαλιζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει πρεσβυτέρων*, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 106. πάθος μέγα τοῦτο

a distance, between Megara and Nisæa: for without such an intermediate stepping-stone, the project of a wall forty stadia (=about 4½ Engl. miles) to join Athens with Peiræus, and another wall of thirty-five stadia (=nearly 4 Engl. miles) to join it with Phalêrum, would have appeared extravagant even to the sanguine temper of Athenians—as it certainly would have seemed a few years earlier to Themistoklês himself. Coming as an immediate sequel of great recent victories, and while Ægina, the great Dorian naval power, was prostrate and under blockade, it excited the utmost alarm among the Peloponnesians—being regarded as the second great stride,¹ at once conspicuous and of lasting effect, in Athenian ambition, next to the fortification of Peiræus.

But besides this feeling in the bosom of enemies, the measure was also interwoven with the formidable contention of political parties then going on at Athens. Kimon had been recently ostracised; and the democratical movement pressed by Periklês and Ephialtês (of which more presently) was in its full tide of success; yet not without a violent and unprincipled opposition on the part of those who supported the existing constitution. Now the long walls formed a part of the foreign policy of Periklês, continuing on a gigantic scale the plans of Themistoklês when he first schemed the Peiræus. They were framed to render Athens capable of carrying on war against any superiority of landed attack, and of bidding defiance to the united force of Peloponnesus. But though thus calculated for contingencies which a long-sighted man might see gathering in the distance, the new walls were, almost on the same grounds, obnoxious to a considerable number of Athenians: to the party recently headed by Kimon, who were attached to the Lacedæmonian connexion, and desired above all things to maintain peace at home, reserving the energies of the state for anti-Persian enterprise: to many landed proprietors in Attica, whom they seemed to threaten with approaching invasion and destruction of their territorial possessions: to

Κορινθίοις ἐγένετο. Compare Diodor. xi. 78, 79—whose chronology however is very misleading.

¹ Καὶ τῶνδε ὑμεῖς αἴτιοι, τὸ τε πρῶτον ἐάσαντες αὐτοὺς τὴν πόλιν μετὰ τὰ Μηδικὰ κρατῦναι, καὶ ὕστε-

ρον τὰ μακρὰ στῆσαι τείχη—is the language addressed by the Corinthians to the Spartans, in reference to Athens, a little before the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. i. 69).

the rich men and aristocrats of Athens, averse to a still closer contact and amalgamation with the maritime multitude in Peiræus: lastly, perhaps, to a certain vein of old Attic feeling, which might look upon the junction of Athens with the separate demes of Peiræus and Phalêrum as effacing the special associations connected with the holy rock of Athênê. When to all these grounds of opposition, we add, the expense and trouble of the undertaking itself, the interference with private property, the peculiar violence of party which happened then to be raging, and the absence of a large proportion of military citizens in Egypt—we shall hardly be surprised to find that the projected long walls brought on a risk of the most serious character both for Athens and her democracy. If any farther proof were wanting of the vast importance of these long walls, in the eyes both of friends and of enemies, we might find it in the fact that their destruction was the prominent mark of Athenian humiliation after the battle of Ægospotami, and their restoration the immediate boon of Pharnabazus and Konon after the victory of Knidus.

Under the influence of the alarm now spread by the proceedings of Athens, the Lacedæmonians were prevailed upon to undertake an expedition out of Peloponnesus, although the Helots in Ithômê were not yet reduced to surrender. Their force consisted of 1500 troops of their own, and 10,000 of their various allies, under the regent Nikomédês. The ostensible motive, or the pretence, for this march, was the protection of the little territory of Doris against the Phokians, who had recently invaded it and taken one of its three towns. The mere approach of so large a force immediately compelled the Phokians to relinquish their conquest, but it was soon seen that this was only a small part of the objects of Sparta, and that her main purpose, under instigation of the Corinthians, was, to arrest the aggrandisement of Athens. It could not escape the penetration of Corinth, that the Athenians might presently either enlist or constrain the towns of Bœotia into their alliance, as they had recently acquired Megara, in addition to their previous ally Platæa: for the Bœotian federation was at this time much disorganised, and Thebes, its chief, had never recovered her ascendancy since the discredit of her support lent to the Persian invasion. To

Expedition
of the
Lacedæmo-
nians into
Bœotia
—they re-
store the
ascendency
of Thebes.

strengthen Thebes and to render her ascendancy effective over the Bœotian cities, was the best way of providing a neighbour at once powerful and hostile to the Athenians, so as to prevent their farther aggrandisement by land: it was the same policy as Epaminondas pursued eighty years afterwards, in organising Arcadia and Messenê against Sparta. Accordingly the Peloponnesian force was now employed partly in enlarging and strengthening the fortifications of Thebes herself, partly in constraining the other Bœotian cities into effective obedience to her supremacy; probably by placing their governments in the hands of citizens of known oligarchical politics,¹ and perhaps banishing suspected opponents. To this scheme the Thebans lent themselves with earnestness; promising to keep down for the future their border neighbours, so as to spare the necessity of armies coming from Sparta.²

But there was also a farther design, yet more important, in contemplation by the Spartans and Corinthians. The oligarchical opposition at Athens were so bitterly hostile to the Long Walls, to Periklês, and to the democratical movement, that several of them opened a secret negotiation with the Peloponnesian leaders; inviting them into Attica, and entreating their aid in an internal rising for the purpose not only of putting a stop to the Long Walls, but also of subverting the democracy. The Peloponnesian army, while prosecuting its operations in Bœotia, waited in hopes of seeing the Athenian malcontents in arms, and encamped at Tanagra on the very borders of Attica for the purpose of immediate cooperation with them. The juncture was undoubtedly one of much hazard for Athens, especially as the ostracised Kimon and his remaining friends in the city were suspected of being implicated in the conspiracy. But the Athenian leaders, aware of the Lacedæmonian operations in Bœotia, knew also what was meant by the presence of the army on their immediate borders—and

Intention of the Spartan army in Bœotia to threaten Athens, and sustain the Athenian oligarchical party, opposed to the Long Walls.

¹ Diodor. xii. 81; Justin, iii. 6. Τῆς μὲν τῶν Θηβαίων πόλεως μείζονα του περιβολου κατεσκευασαν, τὰς δ' εν Βοιωτιᾷ πόλεις ἠγάγκασαν ὑποτάττεσθαι τοῖς Θηβαίοις.

² Diodor. l. c. It must probably be to the internal affairs of Bœo-

tia, somewhere about this time, full as they were of internal dissension, that the dictum and simile of Periklês allude—which Aristotle notices in his Rhetoric. iii. 4, 2.

took decisive measures to avert the danger. Having obtained a reinforcement of 1000 Argeians and some Thessalian horse, they marched out to Tanagra, with the full Athenian force then at home; which must of course have consisted chiefly of the old and the young, the same who had fought under Myrônidês at Megara; for the blockade of Ægina was still going on. Nor was it possible for the Lacedæmonian army to return into Peloponnesus without fighting; for the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in possession of the difficult high lands of Geraneia, the road of march along the isthmus; while the Athenian fleet, by means of the harbour of Pêgæ, was prepared to intercept them if they tried to come by sea across the Krissæan Gulf, by which way it would appear that they had come out. Near Tanagra a bloody battle took place between the two armies, wherein the Lacedæmonians were victorious, chiefly from the desertion of the Thessalian horse who passed over to them in the very heat of the engagement.¹ But though the advantage was on their side, it was not sufficiently decisive to favour the contemplated rising in Attica. Nor did the Peloponnesians gain anything by it except an undisturbed retreat over the high lands of Geraneia, after having partially ravaged the Megarid.

Though the battle of Tanagra was a defeat, yet there were circumstances connected with it which rendered its effects highly beneficial to Athens. The ostracised Kimon presented himself on the field, as soon as the army had passed over the boundaries of Attica, requesting to be allowed to occupy his station as a hoplite and fight in the ranks of his tribe—the Cênês. But such was the belief, entertained by the members of the senate and by his political enemies present, that he was an accomplice in the conspiracy known to be on foot, that permission was refused and he was forced to retire. In departing he conjured his personal friends, Euthippus (of the deme Anaphlystus) and others, to behave in such a manner as might wipe away the stain resting upon his fidelity, and in part also upon theirs. His friends retained his panoply and assigned to it the station in the ranks which he would himself have occupied: they then entered the engagement with

Effects of the battle—generous behaviour of Kimon—he is recalled from ostracism.

¹ Thucyd. i. 107.

desperate resolution and one hundred of them fell side by side in their ranks. Periklês, on his part, who was present among the hoplites of his own tribe the Akamantis, aware of this application and repulse of Kimon, thought it incumbent upon him to display not merely his ordinary personal courage, but an unusual recklessness of life and safety, though it happened that he escaped unwounded. All these incidents brought about a generous sympathy and spirit of compromise among the contending parties at Athens; while the unshaken patriotism of Kimon and his friends discountenanced and disarmed those conspirators who had entered into correspondence with the enemy, at the same time that it roused a repentant admiration towards the ostracised leader himself. Such was the happy working of this new sentiment that a decree was shortly proposed and carried—proposed too by Periklês himself—to abridge the ten years of Kimon’s ostracism, and permit his immediate return.¹ We may recollect that under circumstances partly analogous, Themistoklês had himself proposed the restoration of his rival Aristeidês from ostracism, a little before the battle of Salamis:² and in both cases, the suspension of enmity between the two leaders was partly the sign, partly also the auxiliary cause, of reconciliation and renewed fraternity among the general body of citizens. It was a moment analogous to that salutary impulse of compromise, and harmony of parties, which followed the extinction of the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, forty-six years afterwards, and on which Thucydidês dwells emphatically as the salvation of Athens in her distress—a moment rare in free communities generally, not less than among the jealous competitors for political ascendancy at Athens.³

Compromise and reconciliation between the rival leaders and parties at Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14; Periklês, e. 10. Plutarch represents the Athenians as having recalled Kimon from fear of the Lacedæmonians who had just beaten them at Tanagra, and for the purpose of procuring peace. He adds that Kimon obtained peace for them forthwith. Both these assertions are incorrect. The extraordinary successes in Bœotia, which followed so quickly after the defeat at Tanagra, show that the Athenians were under no impressions

of fear at that juncture, and that the recall of Kimon proceeded from quite different feelings. Moreover the peace with Sparta was not made till some years afterwards.

² Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10.

³ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17; Periklês, c. 10; Thucyd. viii. 97. Plutarch observes, respecting this reconciliation of parties after the battle of Tanagra, after having mentioned that Periklês himself proposed the restoration of Kimon—

So powerful was this burst of fresh patriotism and unanimity after the battle of Tanagra, which produced the recall of Kimon and appears to have overlaid the pre-existing conspiracy, that the Athenians were quickly in a condition to wipe off the stain of their defeat. It was on the sixty-second day after the battle that they undertook an aggressive march under Myrônidês into Bœotia: the

B.C. 456.

Victory of
Cænophyta
gained by
the Athe-
nians—they
acquire as-
cendency
over all
Bœotia,
Phokis, and
Lokris.

extreme precision of this date—being the single case throughout the summary of events between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars wherein Thucydidês is thus precise—marks how strong an impression it made upon the memory of the Athenians. At the battle of Cænophyta, engaged against the aggregate Theban and Bœotian forces—or, if Diodorus is to be trusted, in two battles, of which that of Cænophyta was the last

—Myrônidês was completely victorious. The Athenians

Οὕτω τότε πολιτικά μὲν ἦσαν αἱ διαφοραὶ, μέτριοι δὲ οἱ θυμοὶ καὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν εὐανάκλητοι σύμφερον, ἡ δὲ φιλοτιμία πάντων ἐπικρατοῦσα τῶν παθῶν τοῖς τῆς πατρίδος ὑπεχώρει κείροις.

Which remarks are very analogous to those of Thucydidês in recounting the memorable proceedings of the year 411 B.C., after the deposition of the oligarchy of Four Hundred (Thucyd. viii. 97).

Καὶ οὐχ ἥμισυ δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπὶ γε ἐμοῦ Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὐ πολιτεύσαντες· μετρία γὰρ ἦ τε ἐς τοὺς ὀλίγους καὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐύχρασις ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐκ πονηρῶν τῶν πραγμάτων γενομένων τοῦτο πρῶτον ἀνήνεγκε τὴν πόλιν. Dr. Arnold says in his note—"It appears that the constitution as now fixed was *at first*, in the opinion of Thucydidês, the best that Athens had ever enjoyed within his memory; that is, the best since the complete ascendancy of the democracy effected under Periklês. But how long a period is meant to be included by the words τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον, and when and how did the implied

change take place? Τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον can hardly apply to the whole remaining term of the war, as if this improved constitution had been first subverted by the triumph of the oligarchy under the Thirty, and then superseded by the restoration of the old democracy after their overthrow. Yet Xenophon mentions no intermediate change in the government between the beginning of his history and the end of the war," &c.

I think that the words εὐ πολιτεύσαντες are understood by Dr. Arnold in a sense too special and limited—as denoting merely the new constitution, or positive organic enactments, which the Athenians now introduced. It appears to me that the words are of wider import; meaning the general temper of political parties both reciprocally towards each other and towards the commonwealth; their inclination to relinquish antipathies, to accommodate points of difference, and to cooperate with each other heartily against the enemy, suspending those *ἰδίας φι-*

became masters of Thebes as well as of the remaining Bœotian towns: reversing all the arrangements recently made by Sparta—establishing democratical governments—and forcing the aristocratical leaders, favourable to Theban ascendancy and Lacedæmonian connexion, to become exiles. Nor was it only Bœotia which the Athenians thus acquired: Phokis and Lokris were both successively added to the list of their dependent allies—the former being in the main friendly to Athens and not disinclined to the change, while the latter were so decidedly hostile that one hundred of their chiefs were detained and sent to Athens as hostages. The Athenians thus extended their influence—maintained through internal party-management, backed by the dread of interference from without in case of need—from the borders of the Corinthian territory, including both Megara and Pêgæ, to the strait of Thermopylæ.¹

These important acquisitions were soon crowned by the completion of the Long Walls and the conquest of Ægina. That island, doubtless starved out by its protracted blockade, was forced to capitulate on condition of destroying its fortifications, surrendering all its ships of war, and submitting to annual tribute as a dependent ally of Athens. The reduction of this once powerful maritime city marked Athens as mistress of the sea on the Peloponnesian coast not less than on the Ægean. Her admiral Tolmidês displayed her strength by sailing round Peloponnesus, and even by the insult of burning the Lacedæmonian ports of Methônê and of Gythium. He took Chalkis, a possession of the Corinthians, and Naupaktus belonging to the Ozolian Lokrians, near the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf—disembarked troops near Sikyon, with some advantage in a battle against opponents from that town—and either gained or forced into the Athenian alliance not only

B.C. 455.
Completion of the Long Walls—conquest of Ægina, which is disarmed, dismantled, and rendered tributary.

The Athenians first sail round Peloponnesus—their operations in the Gulf of Corinth.

λοσιμίας, ἰδίαις διαβολαῖς περὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄγκου προστασίας (ii. 65) noticed as having been so mischievous before. Of course any constitutional arrangements introduced at such a period would partake of the moderate and harmonious spirit then prevalent, and would therefore

form a part of what is commended by Thucydides: but his commendation is not confined to them specially. Compare the phrase ii. 38. ἐλευθέρως δὲ τὰ τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, &c.

¹ Thucyd. i. 108; Diodor. xi. 81, 82.

Zakynthus and Kephallênia, but also some of the towns of Achaia; for we afterwards find these latter attached to Athens without knowing when the connexion began.¹ During the ensuing year the Athenians renewed their attack upon Sikyon, with a force of 1000 hoplites under Periklês himself, sailing from the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ in the Krissæan Gulf. This eminent man, however, gained no greater advantage than Tolmidês—defeating the Sikyonian forces in the field and driving them within their walls. He afterwards made an expedition into Akarnania, taking the Achæan allies in addition to his own forces, but miscarried in his attack on Æniadæ and accomplished nothing. Nor were the Athenians more successful in a march undertaken this same year against Thessaly, for the purpose of restoring Orestes, one of the exiled princes or nobles of Pharsalus. Though they took with them an imposing force, including their Bœotian and Phokian allies, the powerful Thessalian cavalry forced them to keep in a compact body and confined them to the ground actually occupied by their hoplites: while all their attempts against the city failed, and their hopes of internal rising were disappointed.²

Had the Athenians succeeded in Thessaly, they would have acquired to their alliance nearly the whole of extra-Peloponnesian Greece. But even without Thessaly their power was prodigious, and had now attained a maximum height from which it never varied except to decline. As a counterbalancing loss against so many successes, we have to reckon their ruinous defeat in Egypt, after a war of six years against the Persians (b.c. 460-455). At first they had gained brilliant advantages, in conjunction with the insurgent prince Inarôs; expelling the Persians from all Memphis except the strongest part called the White Fortress. And such was the alarm of the Persian king Artaxerxes at the presence of the Athenians in Egypt, that he sent Megabazus with a large sum of money to Sparta, in order to induce the Lacedæmonians to invade Attica. This envoy however failed, and an augmented Persian force, being sent to Egypt under Megabyzus, son of Zopyrus,³ drove the Athenians and their allies, after

¹ Thucyd. i. 108-115; Diodor. xi. 84. ² Thucyd. i. 111; Diodor. xi. 85.

³ Herodot. iii. 160.

an obstinate struggle, out of Memphis into the island of the Nile called Prosôpîtis. Here they were blocked up for eighteen months, until at length Megabyzus turned the arm of the river, laid the channel dry, and stormed the island by land. A very few Athenians escaped by land to Kyrênê: the rest were either slain or made captive, and Inarôs himself was crucified. And the calamity of Athens was farther aggravated by the arrival of fifty fresh Athenian ships, which, coming after the defeat, but without being aware of it, sailed into the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and thus fell unawares into the power of the Persians and Phœnicians; very few either of the ships or men escaping. The whole of Egypt became again subject to the Persians, except Amyrtæus, who contrived by retiring into the inaccessible fens still to maintain his independence. One of the largest armaments ever sent forth by Athens and her confederacy was thus utterly ruined.¹

It was about the time of the destruction of the Athenian army in Egypt, and of the circumnavigation of Peloponnesus by Tolmidês, that the internal war, carried on by the Lacedæmonians against the Helots or Messenians at Ithômê, ended. These besieged men, no longer able to stand out against a protracted blockade, were forced to abandon this last fortress of ancient Messenian independence, stipulating for a safe retreat from Peloponnesus with their wives and families; with the proviso that if any one of them ever returned to Peloponnesus, he should become the slave of the first person who seized him. They were established by Tolmidês at Naupaktus (recently taken by the Athenians from the Ozolian Lokrians),² where they will be found rendering good service to Athens in the following wars.

After the victory of Tanagra, the Lacedæmonians made no farther expeditions out of Peloponnesus for several succeeding years, not even to prevent Bœotia and Phokis

¹ Thucyd. i. 104, 109, 110; Diodor. xi. 77; xii. 3. The story of Diodorus in the first of these two passages—that most of the Athenian forces were allowed to come back under a favourable capitulation

granted by the Persian generals—is contradicted by the total ruin which he himself states to have befallen them in the latter passages, as well as by Thucydîdês.

² Thucyd. i. 103; Diodor. xi. 84.

n.c. 455.
The re-
volted He-
lots in La-
conia capi-
tulate and
leave the
country.

from being absorbed into the Athenian alliance. The reason of this remissness lay, partly, in their general character; partly, in the continuance of the siege of Ithômê, which occupied them at home; but still more, perhaps, in the fact that the Athenians, masters of the Megarid, were in occupation of the road over the high lands of Geraneaia, and could therefore obstruct the march of any army out from Peloponnesus. Even after the surrender of Ithômê, the Lacedæmonians remained inactive for three years, after which time a formal truce was concluded with Athens by the Peloponnesians generally, for five years longer.¹ This truce was concluded in a great degree through the influence of Kimon,² who was eager to resume effective operations against the Persians; while it was not less suitable to the political interest of Periklês that his most distinguished rival should be absent on foreign service,³ so as not to interfere with his

Truce for five years concluded between Athens and the Lacedæmonians, through the influence of Kimon. Fresh expeditions of Kimon against Persia.

B.C. 455-452.

B.C. 452-447.

¹ Thucyd. i. 112.

² Theopompus, Fragm. 92, ed. Didot; Plutarch, Kimon, c. 18; Diodor. xi. 86.

It is to be presumed that this is the peace which Æschinês (De Fals. Legat. c. 54. p. 300) and Andokidês (De Pacc. c. 1) state to have been made by Miltiadês son of Kimon, proxenus of the Lacedæmonians; assuming that Miltiadês son of Kimon is put by them, through lapse of memory, for Kimon son of Miltiadês. But the passages of these orators involve so much both of historical and chronological inaccuracy, that it is unsafe to cite them, and impossible to amend them except by conjecture. Mr. Fynes Clinton (Fasti Hellen. Appendix, 8. p. 257) has pointed out some of these inaccuracies; and there are others besides, not less grave, especially in the oration ascribed to Andokidês. It is remarkable that both of them seem to recognise only *two* long walls, the northern and the southern wall;

whereas in the time of Thucydidês there were *three* long walls: the two near and parallel, connecting Athens with Peiræus, and a third connecting it with Phalêrum. This last was never renewed, after all of them had been partially destroyed at the disastrous close of the Peloponnesian war: and it appears to have passed out of the recollection of Æschinês, who speaks of the two walls as they existed in his time.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10, and Reipublic. Gerend. Præcep. p. 812.

An understanding to this effect between the two rivals is so natural that we need not resort to the supposition of a secret agreement concluded between them through the mediation of Elpinikê sister of Kimon, which Plutarch had read in some authors. The charms as well as the intrigues of Elpinikê appear to have figured conspicuously in the memoirs of Athenian biographers: they were employed by one party as a means of calum-

influence at home. Accordingly Kimon, having equipped a fleet of 200 triremes from Athens and her confederates, set sail for Cyprus, from whence he despatched sixty ships to Egypt, at the request of the insurgent prince Amyrtæus, who was still maintaining himself against the Persians amidst the fens—while with the remaining armament he laid siege to Kitium. In the prosecution of this siege, he died either of disease or of a wound. The armament, under his successor Anaxikratês, became so embarrassed for want of provisions, that they abandoned the undertaking altogether, and went to fight the Phœnician and Kilikian fleet near Salamis in Cyprus. They were here victorious, first on sea and afterwards on land, though probably not on the same day, as at the Eurymedon; after which they returned home, followed by the sixty ships which had gone to Egypt for the purpose of aiding Amyrtæus.¹

Death of Kimon at Cyprus—victories of the Athenian fleet—it returns home.

From this time forward no farther operations were undertaken by Athens and her confederacy against the Persians. And it appears that a convention was concluded between them, whereby the Great King on his part promised two things: To leave free, undisturbed, and untaxed, the Asiatic maritime Greeks, not sending troops within a given distance of the coast: To refrain from sending any ships of war either westward of Phasêlis (others place the boundary at the Chelidonean islands, rather more to the westward) or within the Kyanean rocks at the confluence of the Thracian Bosphorus with the Euxine. On their side the Athenians agreed to leave him in undisturbed possession of Cyprus and Egypt. Kallias, an Athenian of distinguished family, with some others of his countrymen, went up to Susa to negotiate this convention: and certain envoys from Argos, then in alliance with Athens, took the opportunity of going thither at the same time, to renew the friendly understanding

No farther expeditions of the Athenians against Persia—convention concluded between them.

niating Kimon, by the other for discrediting Periklês.

¹ Thueyd. i. 112; Diodorus, xii. 13. Diodorus mentions the name of the general Anaxikratês. He affirms farther that Kimon lived not only to take Kitium and Mallus, but

also to gain these two victories. But the authority of Thucydidês, superior on every ground to Diodorus, is more particularly superior as to the death of Kimon, with whom he was connected by relationship.

which their city had established with Xerxes at the period of his invasion of Greece.¹

As is generally the case with treaties after hostility—
 Mistakes and exaggerations respecting this convention—doubts raised as to its historical reality. Discussion of those doubts—confirmatory hints of Thucydids.

this convention did little more than recognise the existing state of things, without introducing any new advantage or disadvantage on either side, or calling for any measures to be taken in consequence of it. We may hence assign a reasonable ground for the silence of Thucydids, who does not even notice the convention as having been made: we are to recollect always that in the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, he does not profess to do more than glance briefly at the main events. But the boastful and inaccurate authors of the ensuing century, orators, rhetors, and historians, indulged in so much exaggeration and untruth respecting this convention, both as to date and as to details—and extolled as something so glorious the fact of having imposed such hard conditions on the Great King—that they have raised a suspicion against themselves. Especially, they have occasioned critics to ask the very natural question, how this splendid achievement of Athens came to be left unnoticed by Thucydids? Now the answer to such question is, that the treaty itself was really of no great moment: it is the state of facts and relations implied in the treaty, and existing substantially before it was concluded, which constitutes the real glory of Athens. But to the later writers,

¹ Herodot. vii. 151; Diodor. xii. 3, 4; Demosthenès (De Falsa Legat. c. 77, p. 428 R.: compare De Rhodior. Libert. c. 13, p. 199) speaks of this peace as τῆν ὑπὸ πάντων θρολλουμένην εἰρήνην. Compare Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 187; Isokratès (Panegy. c. 33, 34, p. 244; Areopagitic. c. 37, pp. 150, 229; Panathenaic. c. 20, p. 360).

The loose language of these orators makes it impossible to determine what was the precise limit in respect of vicinity to the coast. Isokratès is careless enough to talk of the river Halys as the boundary; Demosthenès states it

as "a day's course for a horse."

The two houndaries marked by sea, on the other hand, are both clear and natural, in reference to the Athenian empire—the Kyanean rocks at one end—Phaselis or the Chelidonean islands (there is no material distance between these two last-mentioned places) on the other.

Dahlmann, at the end of his Dissertation on the reality of this Kimonian peace, collects the various passages of authors wherein it is mentioned: among them are several out of the rhetor Aristeidès (Forschungen, p. 140-148).

the treaty stood forth as the legible evidence of facts which in their time were past and gone: while Thucydidês and his contemporaries, living in the actual fulness of the Athenian empire, would certainly not appeal to the treaty as an evidence, and might well pass it over even as an event, when studying to condense the narrative. Though Thucydidês has not mentioned the treaty, he says nothing which disproves its reality, and much which is in full harmony with it. For we may show even from him,—1. That all open and direct hostilities between Athens and Persia ceased, after the last mentioned victories of the Athenians near Cyprus: that this island is renounced by Athens, not being included by Thucydidês in his catalogue of Athenian allies prior to the Peloponnesian war;¹ and that no farther aid is given by Athens to the revolted Amyrtæus in Egypt. 2. That down to the time when the Athenian power was prostrated by the ruinous failure at Syracuse, no tribute was collected by the Persian satraps in Asia Minor from the Greek cities on the coast, nor were Persian ships of war allowed to appear in the waters of the Ægean,² nor was the Persian king admitted to be sovereign

¹ Thucyd. ii. 14.

² Thucyd. viii. 5, 6, 56. As this is a point on which very erroneous representations have been made by some learned critics, especially by Dahlmann and Manso (see the treatises cited in the subsequent note, p. 196), I transcribe the passage of Thucydidês. He is speaking of the winter of B.C. 412, immediately succeeding the ruin of the Athenian army at Syracuse, and after redoubled exertions had been making (even some months before that ruin actually took place) to excite active hostile proceedings against Athens from every quarter (Thucyd. vii. 25): it being seen that there was a promising opportunity for striking a heavy blow at the Athenian power. The satrap Tissaphernes encouraged the Chians and Erythreans to revolt, sending an envoy along with them to Sparta with persuasions and

promises of aid—ἐπέτατο καὶ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης τοὺς Πελοποννησίους καὶ ὑπισχεῖτο τροφήν παρεῖναι. Ὑπὸ βασιλείῳς γὰρ νεωστὶ ἐτύχχανε πεπραγμένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῆς φόρους, οὗς δι' Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλληίδων πόλεων οὐ δυνάμενος πράττειν ἐπωφείλησε. Τοὺς τε οὖν φόρους μᾶλλον ἐνόμιζε κομίσσῃναι, κακώτας τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, καὶ ἅμα βασιλεὶ ζυμμάχους Λακεδαιμονίους ποιῆσαι, &c. In the next chapter, Thucydidês tells us that the satrap Pharnabazus wanted to obtain Lacedæmonian aid in the same manner as Tissaphernes for his satrapy also, in order that he might detach the Greek cities from Athens and be able to levy the tribute upon them. Two Greeks go to Sparta, sent by Pharnabazus, ζῶντι ναῦς κομίσσῃναι ἐς τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον, καὶ αὐτόν, εἰ δόνατο ἄπερ ὁ Τισσαφέρνης προθύμαίτο, τὰς τε ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἀρχῇ πόλεις Ἀθηναίων

of the country down to the coast. Granting, therefore, that we were even bound, from the silence of Thucydidês, to

ἀποστήσειε διὰ τοὺς φόρους, καὶ ἀπ' ἑαυτοῦ βασιλεῖ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ποιήσειε.

These passages (strange to say) are considered by Manso and Dahlmann as showing that the Grecian cities on the Asiatic coast, though subject to the Athenian empire, continued nevertheless to pay their tribute regularly to Susa. To me the passages appear to disprove this very supposition; they show that it was essential for the satrap to detach these cities from the Athenian empire, as a means of procuring tribute from them to Persia: that the Athenian empire, while it lasted, prevented him from getting any tribute from the cities subject to it. Manso and Dahlmann have overlooked the important meaning of the adverb of time νεωστὶ—"lately." By that word Thucydidês expressly intimates that the court of Susa *had only recently* demanded from Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, tribute from the maritime Greeks within their satrapies: and he implies that *until recently no such demand* had been made upon them. The court of Susa, apprised doubtless by Grecian exiles and agents of the embarrassments into which Athens had fallen, conceived this a suitable moment for exacting tributes, to which doubtless it always considered itself entitled, though the power of Athens had compelled it to forego them. Accordingly the demand was now for the first time sent down to Tissaphernes, and he "became a debtor for them" to the court (ἐπιωφελήσῃ), until he could collect them: which he could not at first do, even then, embarrassed as Athens was—and which, *à fortiori*, he could not have done before,

when Athens was in full power.

We learn from these passages two valuable facts. 1. That the maritime Asiatic cities belonging to the Athenian empire paid no tribute to Susa, from the date of the full organization of the Athenian confederacy down to a period after the Athenian defeat in Sicily. 2. That nevertheless these cities always continued, throughout this period, to stand rated in the Persian king's books each for its appropriate tribute; the court of Susa waiting for a convenient moment to occur, when it should be able to enforce its demands, from misfortune accruing to Athens.

This state of relations, between the Asiatic Greeks and the Persian court under the Athenian empire, authenticated by Thucydidês, enables us to explain a passage of Herodotus, on which also both Manso and Dahlmann have dwelt (p. 91) with rather more apparent plausibility, as proving their view of the case. Herodotus, after describing the re-arrangement and re-measurement of the territories of the Ionic cities by the satrap Artaphernes (about 493 B.C. after the suppression of the Ionic revolt), proceeds to state that he assessed the tribute of each with reference to this new measurement, and that the assessment remained unchanged until his own (Herodotus's) time—καὶ τὰς χώρας σφέων μετρήσας κατὰ παρασάγγας . . . φόρους ἔταξε ἑκάστοισι, οἳ κατὰ χώραν διατελοῦσι ἔχοντες ἐκ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου αἰεὶ ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ, ὡς ἐτάχθησαν ἐξ Ἀρταφέρνηος ἐτάχθησαν δὲ σχεδὸν κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ τὰ καὶ πρότερον εἶγον (vi. 42). Now Dahlmann and Manso contend that Herodotus here affirms the tribute of the Ionic cities to

infer that no treaty was concluded, we should still be obliged also to infer, from his positive averments, that a state of historical fact, such as the treaty acknowledged and prescribed, became actually realized. But when we reflect farther, that Herodotus¹ certifies the visit of Kallias and other Athenian envoys to the court of Susa, we can assign no other explanation of such visit so probable as the reality of this treaty. Certainly no envoys would have gone thither during a state of recognized war; and though it may be advanced as possible that they may have gone with the view to conclude a treaty, and yet not have succeeded—this would be straining the limits of possibility beyond what is reasonable.²

Persia to have been continuously and regularly paid down to his own time. But in my judgement this is a mistake; Herodotus speaks not about the *payment*, but about the *assessment*: and these were two very different things, as Thucydidēs clearly intimates in the passage which I have cited above. The *assessment* of all the Ionic cities in the Persian king's books remained unaltered all through the Athenian empire; but the *payment* was not enforced until immediately before 412 B.C., when the Athenians were supposed to be too weak to hinder it. It is evident by the account of the general Persian revenues, throughout all the satrapies, which we find in the third book of Herodotus, that he had access to official accounts of the Persian finances, or at least to Greek secretaries who knew those accounts. He would be told that these assessments remained unchanged from the time of Artaphernes downward: whether they were *realised* or not was another question, which the "books" would probably not answer, and which he might or might not know.

The passages above cited from Thucydidēs appear to me to afford positive proof that the Greek cities

on the Asiatic coast paid no tribute to Persia during the continuance of the Athenian empire. But if there were no such positive proof, I should still maintain the same opinion. For if these Greeks went on paying tribute, what is meant by the phrases, of their having "*revolted* from Persia," of their "*having been liberated* from the king" (οἱ ἀποστάνας βασιλείῳς Ἕλληνας—οἱ ἀπὸ Ἰωνίας καὶ Ἑλλησπόντου ἤδη ἀφεστηκότες ἀπὸ βασιλείῳς—ἔσοι ἀπὸ βασιλείῳς νεωστὶ ἡλευθέρωντο. Thucyd. i. 18, 89, 95)?

So much respecting the payment of tribute. As to the other point—that between 477 and 412 B.C., no Persian ships were tolerated along the coast of Ionia, which coast, though claimed by the Persian king, was not recognised by the Greeks as belonging to him—proof will be found in Thucyd. viii. 56: compare Diodor. iv. 26.

¹ Herodot. viii. 151. Diodorus also states that this peace was concluded by Kallias the Athenian (xii. 4).

² I conclude, on the whole, in favour of this treaty as an historical fact—though sensible that some of the arguments urged against it are not without force. Mr. Mitford and Dr. Thirlwall (ch. xvii. p. 474),

We may therefore believe in the reality of this treaty between Athens and Persia, improperly called the Kimonian treaty: improperly, since not only was it concluded after the death of Kimon, but the Athenian victories by which it was immediately brought on, were gained after his death. Nay more—the probability is, that if Kimon had lived, it would not have been concluded at all. For his interest as well as his glory led him to prosecute

Thucydides, son of Melésias, succeeds Kimon as leading opponent of Periklès.

as well as Manso and Dahlmann, not to mention others, have impugned the reality of the treaty: and the last-mentioned author particularly has examined the case at length and set forth all the grounds of objection; urging, among some which are really serious, others which appear to me weak and untenable (Manso, Sparta, vol. ii. Beylage, x. p. 471; Dahlmann, Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der Geschichte, vol. i. Ueber den Kimonischen Frieden, p. 1-148). Boeckh admits the treaty as an historical fact.

If we deny altogether the historical reality of the treaty, we must adopt some such hypothesis as that of Dahlmann (p. 40):—"The distinct mention and averment of such a peace as having been formally concluded, appears to have first arisen among the schools of the rhetors at Athens, shortly after the peace of Antalkidas, and as an oratorical antithesis to oppose to that peace."

To which we must add the supposition, that some persons must have taken the trouble to cause this fabricated peace to be engraved on a pillar, and placed either in the Metrôn or somewhere else in Athens among the records of Athenian glories. For that it was so engraved on a column is certain (Theopompus ap. Harpokration. Ἀττικαῖς γράμματα). The suspicion started by Theopompus (and found-

ed on the fact that the peace was engraved, not in ancient Attic, but in Ionic letters—the latter sort having been only legalized in Athens after the archonship of Eukleidès), that this treaty was a subsequent invention and not an historical reality, does not weigh with me very much. Assuming the peace to be real, it would naturally be drawn up and engraved in the character habitually used among the Ionic cities of Asia Minor, since they were the parties most specially interested in it: or it might even have been re-engraved, seeing that nearly a century must have elapsed between the conclusion of the treaty and the time when Theopompus saw the pillar. I confess that the hypothesis of Dahlmann appears to me more improbable than the historical reality of the treaty. I think it more likely that there *was* a treaty, and that the orators talked exaggerated and false matters respecting it—rather than that they fabricated the treaty from the beginning with a deliberate purpose, and with the false name of an envoy conjoined.

Dahlmann exposes justly and forcibly (an easy task indeed) the loose, inconsistent and vain-glorious statements of the orators respecting this treaty. The chronological error by which it was asserted to have been made shortly after the victories of the Eurymedou (and was thus connected with

the war against Persia, since he was no match for his rival Periklês either as a statesman or as an orator, and could only maintain his popularity by the same means whereby he had earned it—victories and plunder at the cost of the Persians. His death ensured more complete ascendancy to Periklês, whose policy and character were of a cast altogether opposite:¹ while even Thucydidês, son of Melêsias, who succeeded Kimon his relation as leader of the anti-Perikleian party, was also a man of the senate and public assembly rather than of campaigns and conquests. Averse to distant enterprises and precarious acquisitions, Periklês was only anxious to maintain unimpaired the Hellenic ascendancy of Athens, now at its very maximum. He was well aware that the undivided force and vigilance of Athens would not be too much for this object—nor did they in fact prove sufficient, as we shall presently see. With such dispositions he was naturally glad to conclude a peace, which excluded the Persians from all the coasts of Asia Minor westward of the Chelidoneans, as well as from all the waters of the Ægean, under the simple condition of renouncing on the part of Athens farther aggressions against Cyprus, Phœnicia, Kilikia, and Egypt. The Great King on his side had had sufficient experience of Athenian energy to fear the consequences of such aggressions, if prosecuted. He did not lose much by relinquishing formally a tribute which at the time he could have little hope of realizing, and which of course he intended to resume on the first favourable opportunity. Weighing all these circumstances, we shall find that the peace,

the name of Kimon), is one of the circumstances which have most tended to discredit the attesting witnesses: but we must not forget that Ephorus (assuming that Diodorus in this case copies Ephorus, which is highly probable—xii. 3, 4) did not fall into this mistake, but placed the treaty in its right chronological place, after the Athenian expedition under Kimon against Cyprus and Egypt in 450-449 B.C. Kimon died before the great results of this expedition were consummated, as we know

from Thucydidês: on this point Diodorus speaks equivocally, but rather giving it to be understood that Kimon lived to complete the whole, and then died of sickness.

The absurd exaggeration of Isokratês, that the treaty bound the Persian kings not to come westward of the river Halys, has also been very properly censured. He makes this statement in two different orations (Areopagitic. p. 150: Panathenaic. p. 462).

¹ Plutarch, Perikles, c. 21-25.

improperly called Kimonian, results naturally from the position and feelings of the contracting parties.

Athens was now at peace both abroad and at home, under the administration of Periklês, with a great empire, a great fleet, and a great accumulated treasure. The common fund collected from the contributions of the confederates, and originally deposited at Delos, had before this time been transferred to the acropolis at Athens. At what precise time such transfer took place, we cannot state. Nor are we enabled to assign the successive stages whereby the confederacy, chiefly with the freewill of its own members, became transformed from a body of armed and active warriors under the guidance of Athens, into disarmed and passive tribute-payers defended by the military force of Athens: from allies free, meeting at Delos, and self-determining—into subjects isolated, sending their annual tribute, and awaiting Athenian orders. But it would appear that the change had been made before this time. Some of the more resolute of the allies had tried to secede, but Athens had coerced them by force, and reduced them to the condition of tribute-payers without ships or defence. Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were now the only allies free and armed on the original footing. Every successive change of an armed ally into a tributary—every subjugation of a seceder—tended of course to cut down the numbers, and enfeeble the authority, of the Delian synod. And what was still worse, it altered the reciprocal relation and feelings both of Athens and her allies—exalting the former into something like a despot, and degrading the latter into mere passive subjects.

Of course the palpable manifestation of the change must have been the transfer of the confederate fund from Delos to Athens. The only circumstance which we know respecting this transfer is, that it was proposed by the Samians¹—the second power in the confederacy, inferior only to Athens, and least of all likely to favour any job or sinister purpose of the Athenians. It is farther said that when the Samians proposed it, Aristeidês characterised it as a motion unjust, but useful: we may reasonably doubt,

B.C. 449.
Transfer of
the com-
mon fund
of the
confede-
racy from
Delos to
Athens.—
Gradual
passage of
the con-
federacy
into an
Athenian
empire.

Transfer
of the
fund was
proposed
by the
Samians.

¹ Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 25.

however, whether it was made during his lifetime. When the synod at Delos ceased to be so fully attended as to command respect—when war was lighted up not only with Persia, but with Ægina and Peloponnesus—the Samians might not unnaturally feel that the large accumulated fund, with its constant annual accessions, would be safer at Athens than at Delos, which latter island would require a permanent garrison and squadron to ensure it against attack. But whatever may have been the grounds on which the Samians proceeded, when we find them coming forward to propose the transfer, we may fairly infer that it was not displeasing, and did not appear unjust, to the larger members of the confederacy; and that it was no high-handed and arbitrary exercise of power, as it is often called, on the part of Athens.

After the conclusion of the war with Ægina, and the consequences of the battle of Cœnophyta, the position of Athens became altered more and more. She acquired a large catalogue of new allies, partly tributary, like Ægina—partly in the same relation as Chios, Lesbos, and Samos; that is, obliged only to a conformity of foreign policy and to military service. In this last category were Megara, the Bœotian cities, the Phokians, Lokrians, &c. All these, though allies of Athens, were strangers to Delos and the confederacy against Persia; and accordingly that confederacy passed insensibly into a matter of history, giving place to the new conception of imperial Athens with her extensive list of allies, partly free, partly subject. Such transition, arising spontaneously out of the character and circumstances of the confederates themselves, was thus materially forwarded by the acquisitions of Athens extraneous to the confederacy. She was now not merely the first maritime state in Greece, but perhaps equal to Sparta even in land-power—possessing in her alliance Megara, Bœotia, Phokis, Lokris, together with Achæa and Trœzen in Peloponnesus. Large as this aggregate already was, both at sea and on land, yet the magnitude of the annual tribute, and still more the character of the Athenians themselves, superior to all Greeks in that combination of energy and discipline which is the grand cause of progress, threatened still farther increase. Occupying the Megarian harbour of Pêgæ, the Athenians

Position of Athens with a numerous alliance both of inland and maritime states.

had full means of naval action on both sides of the Corinthian Isthmus: but what was of still greater importance to them, by their possession of the Megarid and of the high lands of Geraneia, they could restrain any land-force from marching out of Peloponnesus, and were thus (considering besides their mastery at sea) completely unassailable in Attica.

Ever since the repulse of Xerxes, Athens had been advancing in an uninterrupted course of power and prosperity at home, as well as of victory and ascendancy abroad—to which there was no exception except the ruinous enterprise in Egypt. Looking at the position of Greece therefore about 488 B.C.,—after the conclusion of the five years' truce between the Peloponnesians and Athens, and of the so-called Kimonian peace between Persia and Athens,—a discerning Greek might well calculate upon farther aggrandisement of this imperial state as the tendency of the age. And accustomed as every Greek was to the conception of separate town-autonomy as essential to a freeman and a citizen, such prospect could not but inspire terror and aversion. The sympathy of the Peloponnesians for the islanders and ultra-maritime states, who constituted the original confederacy of Athens, was not considerable. But when the Dorian island of Ægina was subjugated also, and passed into the condition of a defenceless tributary, they felt the blow sorely on every ground. The ancient celebrity, and eminent service rendered at the battle of Salamis, of this memorable island, had not been able to protect it; while those great Æginetan families, whose victories at the sacred festival-games Pindar celebrates in a large proportion of his odes, would spread the language of complaint and indignation throughout their numerous "guests" in every Hellenic city. Of course, the same anti-Athenian feeling would pervade those Peloponnesian states who had been engaged in actual hostility with Athens—Corinth, Sikyon, Epidaurus, &c., as well as Sparta, the once-recognised head of Hellas, but now tacitly degraded from her preeminence, baffled in her projects respecting Bœotia, and exposed to the burning of her port at Gythium without being able even to retaliate upon Attica. Putting all those circumstances together, we may comprehend the powerful feeling of dislike and apprehension now diffused so widely over Greece against the

upstart despot-city; whose ascendancy, newly acquired, maintained by superior force, and not recognised as legitimate—threatened nevertheless still farther increase. Sixteen years hence, this same sentiment will be found exploding into the Peloponnesian war. But it became rooted in the Greek mind during the period which we have now reached, when Athens was much more formidable than she had come to be at the commencement of that war. We can hardly explain or appreciate the ideas of that later period, unless we take them as handed down from the earlier date of the five years' truce (about 451-446 B.C.).

Formidable as the Athenian empire both really was and appeared to be, however, this wide-spread feeling of antipathy proved still stronger, so that instead of the threatened increase, the empire underwent a most material diminution. This did not arise from the attack of open enemies; for during the five years' truce, Sparta undertook only one movement, and that not against Attica: she sent troops to Delphi, in an expedition dignified with the name of the Sacred War—expelled the Phokians, who had assumed to themselves the management of the temple—and restored it to the native Delphians. To this the Athenians made no direct opposition: but as soon as the Lacedæmonians were gone, they themselves marched thither and placed the temple again in the hands of the Phokians, who were then their allies.¹ The Delphians were members of the Phokian league, and there was a dispute of old standing as to the administration of the temple—whether it belonged to them separately or to the Phokians collectively. The favour of those who administered it counted as an element of considerable moment in Grecian politics; the sympathies of the leading Delphians led them to embrace the side of Sparta, but the Athenians now hoped to counteract this tendency by means of their preponderance in Phokis. We are not told that the Lacedæmonians took any ulterior step in consequence of their views being frustrated by Athens—a significant evidence of the politics of that day.

Commencement of reverses and decline of power to Athens.

The blow which brought down the Athenian empire from this its greatest exaltation was struck by the subjects themselves. The Athenian ascendancy over Bœotia, Phokis,

¹ Thucyd. i. 112: compare Philochor. Fragm. 88, ed. Didot.

Lokris, and Eubœa, was maintained, not by means of gar-
 risons, but through domestic parties favourable
 to Athens, and a suitable form of government—
 just in the same way as Sparta maintained her
 influence over her Peloponnesian allies.¹ After
 the victory of Œnophyta, the Athenians had bro-
 ken up the governments in the Bœotian cities
 established by Sparta before the battle of Ta-
 nagra, and converted them into democracies at
 Thebes and elsewhere. Many of the previous leading men
 had thus been sent into exile: and as the same process had
 taken place in Phokis and Lokris, there was at this time a
 considerable aggregate body of exiles, Bœotian, Phokian,
 Lokrian, Eubœan, Æginetan, &c., all bitterly hostile to
 Athens, and ready to join in any attack upon her power.
 We learn farther that the democracy² established at Thebes
 after the battle of Œnophyta was ill-conducted and dis-
 orderly: which circumstance laid open Bœotia still farther
 to the schemes of assailants on the watch for every weak
 point.

These various exiles, all joining their forces and con-
 certing measures with their partisans in the interior, suc-
 ceeded in mastering Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some
 other less important places in Bœotia. The Athenian
 general Tolmidês marched to expel them, with 1000 Athe-
 nian hoplites and an auxiliary body of allies. It appears
 that this march was undertaken in haste and rashness.
 The hoplites of Tolmidês, principally youthful volunteers
 and belonging to the best families of Athens, disdained the
 enemy too much to await a larger and more commanding
 force: nor would the people listen even to Periklês, when
 he admonished them that the march would be full of hazard.
 and adjured them not to attempt it without greater numbers
 as well as greater caution.³ Fatally indeed were his pre-

¹ Thucyd. i. 19. Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐχ ὑποταλείς ἔχοντες φόβου τοὺς ἐυμάχους, κατ' ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ σφρίσιν αὐτοῖς μόνον ἐπιτηδείως ὅπως πολιτεύσουσι θεραπεύοντες—the same also i. 76-144.

² Aristotel. Politic. v. 2, 6. Καὶ ἐν Θήβαις μετὰ τὴν ἐν Οἰνοφύτοις μάχην, κακῶς πολιτευομένων, ἡ δημοκρατία διεφάρη.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 18; also his comparison between Periklês and Fabius Maximus, c. 3.

Kleinias, father of the celebrated Alkibiadês, was slain in this battle: he had served thirty-three years before at the sea-fight of Artemisium: he cannot therefore be numbered among the youthful warriors, though a person of the

dictions justified. Though Tolmidês was successful in his first enterprise—the recapture of Chæroneia, wherein he placed a garrison—yet in his march, probably incautious and disorderly, when departing from that place, he was surprised and attacked unawares, near Korôneia, by the united body of exiles and their partisans. No defeat in Grecian history was ever more complete or ruinous. Tolmidês himself was slain, together with many of the Athenian hoplites, while a large number of them were taken prisoners. In order to recover these prisoners, who belonged to the best families in the city, the Athenians submitted to a convention whereby they agreed to evacuate Bœotia altogether. In all the cities of that country the exiles were restored, the democratical government overthrown, and Bœotia was transformed from an ally of Athens into her bitter enemy.¹ Long indeed did the fatal issue of this action dwell in the memory of the Athenians,² and inspire them with an apprehension of Bœotian superiority in heavy armour on land. But if the hoplites under Tolmidês had been all slain on the field, their death would probably have been avenged and Bœotia would not have been lost—whereas in the case of living citizens, the Athenians deemed no sacrifice too great to redeem them. We shall discover hereafter in the Lacedæmonians a feeling very similar, respecting their brethren captured at Sphakteria.

The calamitous consequences of this defeat came upon Athens in thick and rapid succession. The united exiles, having carried their point in Bœotia, proceeded to expel the philo-Athenian government both from Phokis and Lokris, and to carry the flame of revolt into Eubœa. To this important island Periklês himself proceeded forthwith, at the head of a powerful force; but before he had time to complete the reconquest, he was summoned home by news of a still more formidable character. The Megarians had revolted from Athens. By a conspiracy previously planned, a division of hoplites from Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidaurus, was already admitted as garrison into their

b.c. 445.
Revolt of Phokis, Lokris, Eubœa, and Megara: invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians under the Lacedæmonian king Pleistoanax.

first rank (Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 1).

¹ Thucyd. i. 113; Diodor. xii. 6. Plataea appears to have been considered as quite dissevered from

Bœotia: it remained in connexion with Athens as intimately as before.

² Xenophon, Memorabil. iii. 5, 4.

city: the Athenian soldiers who kept watch over the long walls had been overpowered and slain, except a few who escaped into the fortified port of Nisæa. As if to make the Athenians at once sensible how seriously this disaster affected them, by throwing open the road over Geraneia—Pleistoanax king of Sparta was announced as already on his march for an invasion of Attica. He did in truth conduct an army, of mixed Lacedæmonians and Peloponnesian allies, into Attica, as far as the neighbourhood of Eleusis and the Thriasian plain. He was a very young man, so that a Spartan of mature years, Kleandridês, had been attached to him by the Ephors as adjutant and counsellor. Periklês (it is said) persuaded both the one and the other, by means of large bribes, to evacuate Attica without advancing to Athens. We may fairly doubt whether they had force enough to adventure so far into the interior, and we shall hereafter observe the great precautions with which Archidamus thought it necessary to conduct his invasion, during the first year of the Peloponnesian war, though at the head of a more commanding force. Nevertheless, on their return, the Lacedæmonians, believing that they might have achieved it, found both of them guilty of corruption. Both were banished: Kleandridês never came back, and Pleistoanax himself lived for a long time in sanctuary near the temple of Athênê at Tegea, until at length he procured his restoration by tampering with the Pythian priestess, and by bringing her bought admonitions to act upon the authorities at Sparta.¹

So soon as the Lacedæmonians had retired from Attica, Periklês returned with his forces to Eubœa re-conquered Eubœa, and reconquered the island completely. With that caution which always distinguished him as a military man, so opposite to the fatal rashness of Tolmidês, he took with him an overwhelming force of fifty triremes and 5000 hoplites. He admitted most of the Eubœan towns to surrender, altering the government of Chalkis by the expulsion of the wealthy oligarchy called the Hippobotæ. But the inhabitants of Histiaea at the north of the island, who had taken an Athenian merchantman and massacred all the crew, were more severely dealt with—the free population being all or in great part ex-

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; v. 16; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

pelled, and the land distributed among Athenian kleruchs or out-settled citizens.¹

Yet the reconquest of Eubœa was far from restoring Athens to the position which she had occupied before the fatal engagement of Korôneia. Her land-empire was irretrievably gone, together with her recently acquired influence over the Delphian oracle; and she reverted to her former condition of an exclusively maritime potentate. For though she still continued to hold Nisæa and Pêgæ, yet her communication with the latter harbour was now cut off by the loss of Megara and its appertaining territory, so that she thus lost her means of acting in the Corinthian Gulf, and of protecting as well as of constraining her allies in Achaia. Nor was the port of Nisæa of much value to her, disconnected from the city to which it belonged, except as a post for annoying that city.

Humiliation and despondency of Athens.—Conclusion of the thirty years' truce.—Diminution of Athenian power.

Moreover, the precarious hold which she possessed over unwilling allies had been demonstrated in a manner likely to encourage similar attempts among her maritime subjects; attempts which would now be seconded by Peloponnesian armies invading Attica. The fear of such a combination of embarrassments, and especially of an irresistible enemy carrying ruin over the flourishing territory round Eleusis and Athens, was at this moment predominant in the Athenian mind. We shall find Periklês, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war fourteen years afterwards, exhausting all his persuasive force, and not succeeding without great difficulty, in prevailing upon his countrymen to endure the hardship of invasion—even in defence of their maritime empire, and when events had been gradually so ripening as to render the prospect of war familiar, if not inevitable. But the late series of misfortunes had burst upon them so rapidly and unexpectedly, as to discourage even Athenian confidence, and to render the prospect of continued war full of gloom and danger. The prudence of Periklês would doubtless counsel the surrender of their remaining landed possessions or alliances, which had now become unprofitable, in order to purchase peace. But we may be sure that nothing short of extreme temporary despondency could have induced the Athenian

¹ Thucyd. i. 114; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 23; Diodor. xii. 7.

assembly to listen to such advice, and to accept the inglorious peace which followed. A truce for thirty years was concluded with Sparta and her allies, in the beginning of 445 B.C., whereby Athens surrendered Nisæa, Pêgæ, Achaia, and Trœzen—thus abandoning Peloponnesus altogether,¹ and leaving the Megarians (with their full territory and their two ports) to be included among the Peloponnesian allies of Sparta.

It was to the Megarians, especially, that the altered position of Athens after this truce was owing: it was their secession from Attica and junction with the Peloponnesians, which laid open Attica to invasion. Hence arose the deadly hatred on the part of the Athenians towards Megara, manifested during the ensuing years—a sentiment the more natural, as Megara had spontaneously sought the alliance of Athens

Feud between Athens and Megara.

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115; ii. 21; Diodor. xii. 5. I do not at all doubt that the word Achaia here used means the country in the north part of Peloponnesus, usually known by that name. The suspicions of Gœller and others, that it means, not this territory, but some unknown town, appear to me quite unfounded. Thucydidês had never noticed the exact time when the Athenians acquired Achaia as a dependent ally, though he notices the Achæans (i. 111) in that capacity. This is one argument, among many, to show that we must be cautious in reasoning from the silence of Thucydidês against the reality of an event—in reference to this period between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars, where his whole summary is so brief.

In regard to the chronology of these events, Mr. Fynes Clinton remarks, "The disasters in Bœotia produced the revolt of Eubœa and Megara about eighteen months after, in Anthestêrion 445 B.C; and the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica, on the expiration of the five years' truce" (ad ann. 447 B.C.).

Mr. Clinton seems to me to allow a longer interval than is probable: I incline to think that the revolt of Eubœa and Megara followed more closely upon the disasters in Bœotia, in spite of the statement of archons given by Diodorus: οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον, the expression of Thucydidês, means probably no more than three or four months; and the whole series of events were evidently the product of one impulse. The truce having been concluded in the beginning of 445 B.C., it seems reasonable to place the revolt of Eubœa and Megara, as well as the invasion of Attica by Pleistoanax, in 446 B.C.—and the disasters in Bœotia either in the beginning of 446 B.C., or the close of 447 B.C.

It is hardly safe to assume, moreover (as Mr. Clinton does ad ann. 450, as well as Dr. Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. ch. xvii. p. 478), that the five years' truce must have been actually expired before Pleistoanax and the Lacedæmonians invaded Attica: the thirty years' truce, afterwards concluded, did not run out its full time.

a few years before as a protection against the Corinthians, and had then afterwards, without any known ill-usage on the part of Athens, broken off from the alliance and become her enemy, with the fatal consequence of rendering her vulnerable on the land-side. Under such circumstances we shall not be surprised to find the antipathy of the Athenians against Megara strongly pronounced, insomuch that the system of exclusion which they adopted against her was among the most prominent causes of the Peloponnesian war.

Having traced what we may call the foreign relations of Athens down to this thirty years' truce, we must notice the important internal and constitutional changes which she had experienced during the same interval.

CHAPTER XLVI.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND JUDICIAL CHANGES AT ATHENS UNDER PERIKLES.

THE period which we have now passed over appears to have been that in which the democratical cast of Athenian public life was first brought into its fullest play and development, as to judicature, legislation, and administration.

The great judicial change was made by the methodical distribution of a large proportion of the citizens into distinct judicial divisions, by the great extension of their direct agency in that department, and by the assignment of a constant pay to every citizen so engaged. It has been already mentioned, that even under the democracy of

First establishment of the democratical judicial system at Athens.

Kleisthenês, and until the time succeeding the battle of Plataea, large powers still remained vested both in the individual archons and in the senate of Areopagus (which latter was composed exclusively of the past archons after their year of office, sitting in it for life); though the check

exercised by the general body of citizens, assembled for law-making in the Ekklesia and for judging in the Heliaea, was at the same time materially increased. We must farther recollect, that the distinction between powers administrative and judicial, so highly valued among the more elaborate governments of modern Europe, since the political speculations of the last century, was in the early history of Athens almost unknown. Like the Roman kings, and the Roman consuls before the appointment of the Prætor, the Athenian archons not only administered, but also exercised jurisdiction, voluntary as well as contentious

Union in the same hands, of functions both administrative and judicial in early Athens—great powers of the magistrates, as well as of the senate of Areopagus.

1 See K. F. Hermann, Griechische Staatsalterthümer, sect. 53-107, and his treatise De Jure et Auctoritate Magistratum ap. Athen. p. 53 (Heidelb. 1829); also Rein, Römi-

sches Privatrecht, pp. 26, 408. Leipz. 1836. M. Laboulaye also insists particularly upon the confusion of administrative and judiciary functions among the Romans (Essai

—decided disputes, inquired into crimes, and inflicted punishment. Of the same mixed nature were the functions of the senate of Areopagus, and even of the annual senate of Five Hundred, the creation of Kleisthenês. The Stratêgi, too, as well as the archons, had doubtless the double competence, in reference to military, naval, and foreign affairs, of issuing orders and of punishing by their own authority disobedient parties: the *imperium* of the magistrates, generally, enabled them to enforce their own mandates as well as to decide in cases of doubt whether any private citizen had or had not been guilty of infringement. Nor was there any appeal from these magisterial judgements: though the magistrates were subject, under the Kleisthenean constitution, to personal responsibility for their general behaviour, before the people judicially assembled, at the expiration of their year of office—and to the farther animadversion of the Ekklesia (or public deliberative assembly) meeting periodically during the course of that year: in some of which assemblies, the question might formally be raised for deposing any magistrate even before his year was expired.¹ Still, in spite of such partial checks.

sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains, pp. 23, 79, 107, &c.). Compare Sir G. C. Lewis, Essay on the Government of Dependencies, p. 42, with his citation from Hugo, Geschichte des Römischen Rechts, p. 42. Sir G. Lewis has given just and valuable remarks upon the goodness of the received classification of powers as a theory, and upon the extent to which the separation of them either has been, or can be, carried in practice: see also Note E. in the same work, p. 347.

The separation of administrative from judicial functions appears unknown in early societies. M. Meyer observes, respecting the judicial institutions of modern Europe, "Anciennement les fonctions administratives et judiciaires n'étoient pas distinctes. Du temps de la liberté des Germaines et même long temps après, les plaids de la nation ou ceux du comté reudoient

la justice et administroient les intérêts nationaux ou locaux dans une seule et même assemblée: sous le régime féodal, le roi ou l'empereur dans son conseil, sa cour, son parlement composé des hauts barons ecclésiastiques et laïcs, exerçoit tous les droits de souveraineté comme de justice: dans la commune, le bailli, mayeur, ou autre fonctionnaire nommé par le prince, administroient les intérêts communaux et jugeoient les bourgeois de l'avis de la communauté entière, des corporations qui la composoient, ou des autorités et conseils qui la représentoient: on n'avoit pas encore soupçonné que le jugement d'une cause entre particuliers pût être étranger à la cause commune."—Meyer, Esprit des Institutions Judiciaires, book v. chap. 11, vol. iii. p. 339; also chap. 18. p. 383.

¹ A case of such deposition of an archon by vote of the public

the accumulation, in the same hand, of powers to administer, judge, punish, and decide civil disputes, without any other canon than the few laws then existing, and without any appeal—must have been painfully felt, and must have often led to corrupt, arbitrary, and oppressive dealing. And if this be true of individual magistrates, exposed to annual accountability, it is not likely to have been less true of the senate of Areopagus, which, acting collectively, could hardly be rendered accountable, and in which the members sat for life.¹

I have already mentioned that shortly after the return of the expatriated Athenians from Salamis, Aristeidês had been impelled by the strong democratical sentiment which he found among his countrymen to propose the abolition

Magistrates generally wealthy men—oligarchical tendencies of the senate of Areopagus—increase of democratical sentiment among the bulk of the citizens.

of all pecuniary qualification for magistracies, so as to render every citizen legally eligible. This innovation, however, was chiefly valuable as a victory and as an index of the predominant sentiment. Notwithstanding the enlarged promise of eligibility, little change probably took place in the fact, and rich men were still most commonly chosen. Hence the magistrates, possessing the large powers administrative and judicial above described—and still more the senate of Areopagus, which sat for life—still belonging almost entirely to the wealthier class,

remained animated more or less with the same oligarchical interests and sympathies, which manifested themselves in the abuse of authority. At the same time the democratical sentiment among the mass of Athenians went on steadily increasing from the time of Aristeidês to that of Periklês: Athens became more and more maritime, the population of Peiræus augmented in number as well as in importance, and the spirit even of the poorest citizen was stimulated

assembly, even before the year of office was expired, occurs in Demosthenês cont. Theokrin. c. 7: another, the deposition of a stratêgus, in Demosthen. cont. Timoth. c. 3.

¹ Æschinês (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9. p. 373) speaks of the senate of Areopagus as ὑπεύθυνος, and so it was doubtless understood to be: but it is difficult to see how ac-

countability could be practically enforced against such a body. They could only be responsible in this sense—that if any one of their number could be proved to have received a bribe, he would be individually punished. But in this sense the dikasteries themselves would also be responsible: though it is always affirmed of them that they were not responsible.

by that collective aggrandisement of his city to which he himself individually contributed. Before twenty years had elapsed, reckoning from the battle of Plataea, this new fervour of democratical sentiment made itself felt in the political contests of Athens, and found able champions in Periklès and Ephialtès, rivals of what may be called the conservative party headed by Kimon.

We have no positive information that it was Periklès who introduced the lot, in place of election, for the choice of archons and various other magistrates. But the change must have been introduced nearly at this time, and with a view of equalizing the chances of office to every candidate, poor as well as rich, who chose to give in his name and who fulfilled certain personal and family conditions ascertained in the dokimasy or preliminary examination. But it was certainly to Periklès and Ephialtès that Athens owed the elaborate constitution of her popular Dikasteries or Jury-courts regularly paid, which exercised so important an influence upon the character of the citizens. These two eminent men deprived both the magistrates, and the senate of Areopagus, of all the judicial and penal competence which they had hitherto possessed, save and except the power of imposing a small fine. This judicial power, civil as well as criminal, was transferred to numerous dikasts, or panels of jurors selected from the citizens; 6000 of whom were annually drawn by lot, sworn, and then distributed into ten panels of 500 each; the remainder forming a supplement in case of vacancies. The magistrate, instead of deciding causes or inflicting punishment by his own authority, was now constrained to impanel a jury—that is, to submit each particular case, which might call for a penalty greater than the small fine to which he was competent, to the judgement of one or other among these numerous popular dikasteries. Which of the ten he should take, was determined by lot, so that no one knew beforehand what dikastery would try any particular cause. The magistrate himself presided over it during the trial and submitted to it the question at issue, together with the results of his own preliminary examination; after which came the speeches of accuser and accused with the

Political parties in Athens. Periklès, and Ephialtès, democratical: Kimon, oligarchical or conservative.

Democratical Dikasteries or Jury-courts, constituted by Periklès and Ephialtès. How these Dikasteries were arranged.

statements of their witnesses. So also the civil judicature, which had before been exercised in controversies between man and man by the archons, was withdrawn from them and transferred to these dikasteries under the presidency of an archon. It is to be remarked, that the system of reference to arbitration, for private causes,¹ was extensively applied at Athens. A certain number of public arbitrators were annually appointed, to one of whom (or to some other citizen adopted by mutual consent of the parties), all private disputes were submitted in the first instance. If dissatisfied with the decision, either party might afterwards carry the matter before the dikastery; but it appears that in many cases the decision of the arbitrator was acquiesced in without this ultimate resort.

I do not here mean to affirm that there never was any trial by the people before the time of Periklês and Ephialtês. I doubt not that before their time the numerous judicial assembly, called *Heliaëa*, pronounced upon charges against accountable magistrates as well as upon various other accusations of public importance; and perhaps in some cases separate bodies of them may have been drawn

¹ Respecting the procedure of arbitration at Athens, and the public as well as private arbitrators, see the instructive treatise of Hudtwalcker, *Ueber die öffentlichen und Privat-Schiedsrichter (Diaeteten)* zu Athen: Jena, 1812.

Each arbitrator seems to have sat alone to inquire into and decide disputes: he received a small fee of one drachma from both parties; also an additional fee when application was made for delay (p. 16). Parties might by mutual consent fix upon any citizen to act as arbitrator: but there were a certain number of public arbitrators, elected or drawn by lot from the citizens every year: and a plaintiff might bring his cause before any one of these. They were liable to be punished under $\epsilon\tilde{\nu}\theta\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\alpha\iota$, at the end of their year of office, if accused and convicted of corruption or unfair dealing.

The number of these public Di-

ætetæ or arbitrators was unknown when Hudtwalcker's book was published. An inscription since discovered by Professor Ross and published in his work, *Ueber die Demen von Attika*, p. 22, records the names of all the *Diaetetæ* for the year of the archon Antiklês, B.C. 325, with the name of the tribe to which each belonged.

The total number is 104: the number in each tribe is unequal: the largest number is in *Kekropis*, which furnishes sixteen: the smallest in *Candionis*, which sends only three. They must have been either elected or drawn by lot from the general body of citizens, without any reference to tribes. The inscription records the names of the *Diaetetæ* for this year B.C. 325, in consequence of their being crowned or receiving a vote of thanks from the people. The fragment of a like inscription for the year B.C. 337, also exists.

by lot for particular trials. But it is not the less true, that the systematic distribution and constant employment of the numerous dikasts of Athens cannot have begun before the age of these two statesmen, since it was only then that the practice of paying them began. For so large a sacrifice of time on the part of poor men, wherein M. Boeckh states¹ (in somewhat exaggerated language) that "nearly one third of the citizens sat as judges every day," cannot be conceived without an assured remuneration. From and after the time of Periklês, these dikasteries were the exclusive assemblies for trial of all causes civil as well as criminal, with some special exceptions, such as cases of homicide and a few others: but before his time, the greater number of such causes had been adjudged either by individual magistrates or by the senate of Areopagus. We may therefore conceive how great and important was the revolution wrought by that statesman, when he first organized these dikastic assemblies into systematic action, and transferred to them nearly all the judicial power which had before been exercised by magistrates and senate. The position and influence of these latter became radically altered. The most commanding functions of the archon were abrogated, so that he retained only the power of receiving complaints, inquiring into them, exercising some small preliminary interference with the parties for the furtherance of the cause or accusation, fixing the day for trial, and presiding over the dikastic assembly by whom peremptory verdict was pronounced. His administrative functions remained unaltered, but his powers, inquisitorial and determining, as a judge, passed away.²

Pay to the dikasts introduced and made regular.

The magistrates are deprived of their judicial, and confined to administrative functions.

¹ Public Economy of the Athenians, book ii. chap. xiv. p. 227, Engl. transl.

M. Boeckh must mean that the whole 600, or nearly the whole, were employed every day. It appears to me that this supposition greatly overstates both the number of days, and the number of men, actually employed. For the inference in the text, however, a much smaller number is sufficient.

See the more accurate remark of Sehömaun, Antiquit. Juris Public. Græcor., sect. lxxi. p. 310.

² Aristotel. Politic. ii. 9, 3. Καὶ τῆν μὲν ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ βουλῆν Ἐφιάλτης ἐκόλουσε καὶ Περικλῆς· τὰ δὲ δικαστήρια μισθοφόρα κατέστησε Περικλῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἕκαστος τῶν δημοκρατῶν προήγαγεν, αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν οὖν δημοκρατίαν. Φθίνεται δ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν Σόλωνος γενεσθαι τοῦτο προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον

In reference to the senate of Areopagus also, the changes introduced were not less considerable. That senate, anterior to the democracy in point of date, and standing alone in the enjoyment of a life-tenure, appears to have exercised an undefined and extensive control which long continuance had gradually consecrated. It was invested with a kind of religious respect, and believed to possess mysterious traditions emanating from a divine source.¹ Especially, the cognizance which it took of intentional homicide was a part of old Attic religion not less than of judicature. Though put in the background for a time after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, it had gradually recovered itself when recruited by the new archons under the Kleisthenean constitution; and during the calamitous sufferings of the Persian invasion, its forwardness and patriotism had been so highly appreciated as to procure for it an increased sphere of ascendancy. Trials for homicide were only a small part of its attributions. It exercised judicial competence in many other cases besides: and what was of still greater moment, it maintained a sort of censorial police over the lives and habits of the citizens—it professed to enforce a tutelary and paternal discipline beyond that which the strict letter of the law could mark out, over the indolent, the prodigal, the undutiful, and the deserters from old rite and custom. To crown all, the senate of Areopagus also exercised a supervision over the public assembly, taking

ἀπὸ συμπτώματος. Τῆς ναυαρχίας γὰρ ἐν τοῖς Μηδικαῖς ὁ δῆμος αἴτιος γενόμενος ἐφρονηματίσθη, καὶ δημαγωγούς ἔλαβε φαύλους, ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῶν ἐπεικῶν ἐπεὶ Σόλων γ' ἔοικε τὴν ἀναγκαιστάτην ἀποδιδόναι τῷ δῆμῳ δύναμιν, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν μηδὲ γὰρ τοῦτου κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος, δούλος ἂν εἴη καὶ πολέμιος.

¹ Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. Or. i. p. 91. φυλάττει τὰς ἀπορήτους διαθήκας, ἐν αἷς τὰ τῆς πόλεως σωτήρια κεῖται, &c. So also Æschines calls this senate τὴν σκυθρωπὸν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων κυρίαν βουλήν (cont. Ktesiphont. c. 9, p. 373:

compare also cont. Timarehum, c. 16, p. 41; Demosth. cont. Aristokrat. c. 65, p. 641). Plutarch, Solon, c. 19. τὴν ἄνω βουλήν ἐπίσκοπον πάντων καὶ φύλακα τῶν νόμων &c.

Ἐδίκαζον οὖν οἱ Ἀρεοπαῖται περὶ πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν σφαλμάτων καὶ παρανομιῶν, ὡς ἀπαντὰ φησὶν Ἀνδροτίων ἐν πρώτῃ καὶ Φιλόχορος ἐν δευτέρᾳ καὶ τρίτῃ τῶν Ἀτθίδων (Philochorus, Fr. 17-58, ed. Didot, p. 19, ed. Siebelis).

See about the Areopagus, Schömann, Antiq. Jur. Att. sect. lxvi.; K. F. Hermann. Griech. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 109.

care that none of the proceedings of those meetings should be such as to infringe the established laws of the country. These were powers immense as well as undefined, not derived from any formal grant of the people, but having their source in immemorial antiquity and sustained by general awe and reverence. When we read the serious expressions of this sentiment in the mouths of the later orators—Demosthenês, Æchinês, or Deinarchus—we shall comprehend how strong it must have been a century and a half before them, at the period of the Persian invasion. Isokratês, in his Discourse usually called *Areopagiticus*, written a century and a quarter after that invasion, draws a picture of what the senate of Areopagus had been while its competence was yet undiminished, and ascribes to it a power of interference little short of paternal despotism, which he asserts to have been most salutary and improving in its effect. That the picture of this rhetor is inaccurate—and to a great degree indeed ideal, insinuating his own recommendations under the colour of past realities—is sufficiently obvious. But it enables us to presume generally the extensive regulating power of the senate of Areopagus, in affairs both public and private, at the time which we are now describing.

Such powers were pretty sure to be abused. When we learn that the Spartan senate¹ was lamentably open to bribery, we can hardly presume much better of the life-sitting elders at Athens. But even if their powers had been guided by all that beneficence of intention which Isokratês affirms, they were in their nature such as could only be exercised over a passive and stationary people: while the course of events at Athens, at that time peculiarly, presented conditions altogether the reverse. During the pressure of the Persian invasion, indeed, the senate of Areopagus had been armed with more than ordinary authority, which it had employed so creditably as to strengthen its influence and tighten its supervision during the period immediately following. But that same trial had also called forth in the general body of the citizens a fresh burst of democratical sentiment, and an augmented consciousness of force, both individual and

Large powers of the senate of Areopagus, in part abused, became inconsistent with the feelings of the people after the Persian invasion. New interest and tendencies then growing up at Athens.

¹ Aristotel. Politic. ii. 6, 18.

national. Here then were two forces, not only distinct but opposite and conflicting, both put into increased action at the same time.¹ Nor was this all: a novel cast was just then given to Athenian life and public habits by many different circumstances—the enlargement of the city, the creation of the fortified port and new town of Peiræus, the introduction of an increased nautical population, the active duties of Athens as head of the Delian confederacy, &c. All these circumstances tended to open new veins of hope and feeling, and new lines of action, in the Athenians between 480-460 B.C., and by consequence to render the interference of the senate of Areopagus, essentially old-fashioned and conservative as it was, more and more difficult. But at the very time when prudence would have counselled that it should have been relaxed or modified, the senate appear to have rendered it stricter, or at least to have tried to do so; which could not fail to raise against them a considerable body of enemies. Not merely the democratical innovators, but also the representatives of new interests generally at Athens, became opposed to the senate as an organ of vexatious repression, employed for oligarchical purposes.²

From the character of the senate of Areopagus and the ancient reverence with which it was surrounded, it served naturally as a centre of action to the oligarchical or conservative party: that party which desired to preserve the Kleisthenean constitution unaltered—with undiminished authority, administrative as well as judicial, both

Senate of Areopagus—a centre of action for the conservative party and Kimon.

¹ Aristotle particularly indicates these two conflicting tendencies in Athens, the one immediately following the other, in a remarkable passage of his Politics (v. 3, 5):—

Μεταβάλλουσι δὲ καὶ εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν καὶ εἰς δῆμον καὶ εἰς πολιτείαν ἐκ τοῦ εὐδοκίμησά τι ἢ ἀβέλγηθαι ἢ ἀρχεῖον ἢ μόριον τῆς πόλεως οἶον, ἢ ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῃ βουλή εὐδοκίμησασα ἐν τοῖς Μηδικοῖς ἔδοξε συντονωτέραν ποιῆσαι τῆς πολιτείας. Καὶ πάλιν ὁ ναυτικός ὄγκος γενομένου αἰτίας τῆς περὶ Σαλαμίνα νίκης καὶ διὰ ταύτης τῆς ἡγεμονίας καὶ

διὰ τὴν κατὰ θάλατταν δύναμιν, τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἰσχυροτέραν ἐποίησεν.

The word συντονωτέραν ("stricter, more rigid") stands opposed in another passage to ἀνεμείνας (iv. 3, 5).

² Plutarch, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805. Οὐκ ἀγνώω δέ, ἔτι βουλῆς τινας ἐπαχθῆ καὶ ὀλιγαρχικῆς κολούσοντας, ὡς περ' Ἐφιάλτης Ἀβελγησι καὶ Φορμίων, περ' ἠλείσιος, δύναμιν ἅμα καὶ δοῦσα ἔσχατο.

About the oligarchical character of the Areopagites, see Deinarchus cont. Demosthen. pp. 40, 95.

to individual magistrates and to the collective Areopagus. Of this sentiment, at the time of which we are now speaking, Kimon was the most conspicuous leader. His brilliant victories at the Eurymedon, as well as his exploits in other warlike enterprises, doubtless strengthened very much his political influence at home. The same party also probably included the large majority of rich and old families at Athens; who, so long as the magistracies were elected and not chosen by lot, usually got themselves chosen, and had every interest in keeping the power of such offices as high as they could. Moreover the party was farther strengthened by the pronounced support of Sparta, imparted chiefly through Kimon, proxenus of Sparta at Athens. Of course such aid could only have been indirect, yet it appears to have been of no inconsiderable moment—for when we consider that Ægina had been in ancient feud with Athens, and Corinth in a temper more hostile than friendly, the good feeling of the Lacedæmonians might well appear to Athenian citizens eminently desirable to preserve: and the philo-Laconian character of the leading men at Athens contributed to disarm the jealousy of Sparta during that critical period while the Athenian maritime ascendancy was in progress.¹

The political opposition between Periklès and Kimon was hereditary, since Xanthippus the father of the former had been the accuser of Miltiadès the father of the latter. Both were of the first families in the city, and this, combined with the military talents of Kimon and the great statesmanlike superiority of Periklès, placed both the one and the other at the head of the two political parties which divided Athens. Periklès must have begun his political career very young, since he maintained a position first of great influence, and afterwards of unparalleled moral and political ascendancy, for the long period of forty years, against distinguished rivals, bitter assailants, and unscrupulous libellers (about 467-428 B.C.). His public life began about the time when Themistoklès was ostracised, and when Aristeidès was passing off the stage, and he soon displayed a character which combined the pecuniary probity of the one with the resource and large views of the other; superadding to both,

Opposition between Kimon and Periklès—inherited from their fathers—character and working of Periklès.

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16; Themistoklès, c. 20.

a discretion and mastery of temper never disturbed—an excellent musical and lettered education received from Pythokleidês—an eloquence such as no one before had either heard or conceived—and the best philosophy which the age afforded. His military duties as a youthful citizen were faithfully and strenuously performed, but he was timid in his first political approaches to the people—a fact perfectly in unison with the caution of his temperament, but which some of his biographers¹ explained by saying that he was afraid of being ostracised, and that his countenance resembled that of the despot Peisistratus. We may be pretty sure however that this personal resemblance (like the wonderful dream ascribed to his mother² when pregnant of him) was an after-thought of enemies when his ascendancy was already established—and that young beginners were in little danger of ostracism. The complexion of political parties in Athens had greatly changed since the days of Themistoklês and Aristeidês. For the Kleisthenean constitution, though enlarged by the latter after the return from Salamis to the extent of making all citizens without exception eligible for magistracy, had become unpopular with the poorer citizens and to the keener democratical feeling which now ran through Athens and Peiræus.

It was to this democratical party—the party of movement against that of resistance, or of reformers against conservatives, if we are to employ modern phraseology—that Periklês devoted his great rank, character, and abilities. From the low arts, which it is common to ascribe to one who espouses the political interests of the poor against the rich, he was remarkably exempt. He was indefatigable in his attention to public business, but he went little into society, and disregarded almost to excess the airs of popularity. His eloquence was irresistibly impressive; yet he was by no means prodigal of it, taking care to reserve himself, like the Salaminian trireme, for solemn occasions, and preferring for the most part to employ the agency of friends and partisans.³ Moreover he imbibed from his friend and teacher Anaxagoras a tinge of physical

Reserved, philosophical, and business-like habits of Periklês—his little pains to court popularity—less of the demagogue than Kimon.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4-7 *seq.*

² Herodot. vi. 131.

³ Plutarch. Reipub. Gerend. Præcept. p. 812; Periklês, c. 5, 6, 7.

philosophy which greatly strengthened his mind¹ and armed him against many of the reigning superstitions—but which at the same time tended to rob him of the sympathy of the vulgar, rich as well as poor. The arts of demagogy were in fact much more cultivated by the oligarchical Kimon; whose open-hearted familiarity of manner was extolled, by his personal friend the poet Ion, in contrast with the reserved and stately demeanour of his rival Periklês. Kimon employed the rich plunder, procured by his maritime expeditions, in public decorations as well as in largesses to the poorer citizens; throwing open his fields and fruits to all the inhabitants of his deme, and causing himself to be attended in public by well-dressed slaves, directed to tender their warm tunics in exchange for the threadbare garments of those who seemed in want. But the property of Periklês was administered with a strict, though benevolent economy, by his ancient steward Evangelus—the produce of his lands being all sold, and the consumption of his house supplied by purchase in the market.² It was by such regularity that his perfect and manifest independence of all pecuniary seduction was sustained. In taste, in talent, and in character, Kimon was the very opposite of Periklês: a brave and efficient commander, a lavish distributor, a man of convivial and amorous habits—but incapable of sustained attention to business, untaught in music or letters, and endued with Laconian aversion to rhetoric and philosophy; while the ascendancy of Periklês was founded on his admirable combination of civil qualities—probity, firmness, diligence, judgement, eloquence, and power of guiding partisans. As a military commander, though noway deficient in personal courage, he rarely courted distinction and was principally famous for his care of the lives of the citizens, discountenancing all rash or distant enterprises. His private habits were sober and recluse: his chief conversation was with Anaxagoras, Protagoras,³ Zeno, the musician Damon, and other philosophers—while the tenderest domestic attachment bound him to the engaging and cultivated Aspasia.

¹ Plato, *Phædrus*, c. 54, p. 270; Kimon, c. 10; *Reipubl. Gerend.* Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 8; Xenoph. *Precept.* p. 818.
Memor. i. 2, 46.

² Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 9, 16; ³ The personal intercourse between Periklês and Protagoras is

Such were the two men who stood forward at this time as most conspicuous in Athenian party-contest—the expanding democracy against the stationary democracy of the past generation, which now passed by the name of oligarchy—the ambitious and talkative energy, spread even among the poor population, which was now forming more and more the characteristic of Athens, against the unlettered and uninquiring valour of the conquerors of Marathon.¹ Ephialtês, son of Sophônidês, was at this time the leading auxiliary, seemingly indeed the equal of Periklês, and noway inferior to him in personal probity, though he was a poor man.² As to aggressive political warfare, he was even more active than Periklês, who appears throughout his long public life to have manifested but little bitterness against political enemies. Unfortunately our scanty knowledge of the history of Athens brings before us only some general causes and a few marked facts. The details and the particular persons concerned are not within our sight: yet the actual course of political events depends everywhere mainly upon these details, as well as upon the general causes. Before Ephialtês advanced his main proposition for abridging the competence of the senate of Areopagus, he appears to have been strenuous in repressing the practical abuse of magisterial authority, by accusations brought against the magistrates at the period of their regular accountability. After repeated efforts to check the practical abuse of these magisterial powers,³ Ephialtês and Periklês were at last conducted to the proposition of cutting them down permanently, and introducing an altered system.

Such proceedings naturally provoked extreme bitterness of partyfeeling. It is probable that this temper may have partly dictated the accusation preferred against Kimon (about 463 B.C.) after the surrender of Thasos, for

attested by the interesting fragment of the latter which we find in Plutarch, *Consolat. ad Apollonium*, c. 33, p. 119.

¹ Aristophan. *Nubes*, 972, 1000 *seq.* and *Ranæ*, 1071.

² Plutarch, *Kimon*, c. 10; *Ælian*, *V. H.* ii. 43; xi. 9.

³ Plutarch, *Periklês*, c. 10: compare *Valer. Maxim.* iii. 8, 4. Ἐπιόλητην μὲν οὖν, φοβερόν ὄντα τοῖς ὀλιγαρχικοῖς καὶ περὶ τὰς εὐθύνων καὶ διώξεων τῶν τῶν δῆμον ἀδικούντων ἀπαραίτητον, ἐπιβουλευσάντες οἱ ἔχθροὶ δὲ Ἀριστοδήκου τοῦ Ταναρχικοῦ χρυσάϊως ἀνεῖλον, &c.

alleged reception of bribes from the Macedonian prince Alexander—an accusation of which he was acquitted. At this time the oligarchical or Kimonian party was decidedly the most powerful: and when the question was proposed for sending troops to aid the Lacedæmonians in reducing the revolted Helots on Ithômê, Kimon carried the people along with him to comply, by an appeal to their generous feelings, in spite of the strenuous opposition of Ephialtês.¹ But when Kimon and the Athenian hoplites returned home, having been dismissed by Sparta under circumstances of insulting suspicion (as has been mentioned in the preceding chapter), the indignation of the citizens was extreme. They renounced their alliance with Sparta, and entered into amity with Argos. Of course the influence of Kimon, and the position of the oligarchical party, was materially changed by this incident. And in the existing bitterness of political parties, it is not surprising that his opponents should take the opportunity for proposing soon afterwards a vote of ostracism²—a challenge, indeed, which may perhaps have been accepted not unwillingly by Kimon and his party, since they might still fancy themselves the strongest, and suppose that the sentence of banishment would fall upon Ephialtês or Periklês. However, the vote ended in the expulsion of Kimon, a sure proof that his opponents were now in the ascendent. On this occasion, as on the preceding, we see the ostracism invoked to meet a period of intense political conflict, the violence of which it would at least abate, by removing for the time one of the contending leaders.

Kimon and his party, more powerful than Ephialtês and Periklês, until the time when the Athenian troops were dismissed from Læconia. Ostracism of Kimon.

It was now that Periklês and Ephialtês carried their important scheme of judicial reform. The senate of Areopagus was deprived of its discretionary censorial power, as well as of all its judicial competence, except that which

¹ Plutarch, Kimon, c. 16.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 17. Οἱ δὲ πρὸς ὀργήν ἀπελθόντες ἤδη τοῖς λακωνίζουσι φανερώς ἐχάλεπαντο, καὶ τοῦ Κίμωνος μικρὰς ἐπιλαβόμενοι προσφάσεως ἐξωστράνησαν εἰς ἔτη δέκα.

I transcribe this passage as a specimen of the inaccurate manner

in which the ostracism is so often described. Plutarch says—"The Athenians took advantage of a slight pretence to ostracise Kimon:" but it was a peculiar characteristic of ostracism that it had no pretence: it was a judgement passed without specific or assigned cause.

related to homicide. The individual magistrates, as well as the senate of Five Hundred, were also stripped of their judicial attributes (except the power of imposing a small fine¹), which were transferred to the newly-created panels of salaried dikasts, lotted off in ten divisions from the aggregate Heliaea. Ephialtês² first brought down the laws of Solon from the acropolis to the neighbourhood of the market place, where the dikasteries sat—a visible proof that the judicature was now popularised.

In the representations of many authors, the full bearing of this great constitutional change is very inadequately conceived. What we are commonly told is, that Periklês was the first to assign a salary to these numerous dikasteries at Athens. He bribed the people with the public money (says Plutarch), in order to make head against Kimon, who bribed them out of his own private purse: as if the pay were the main feature in the case, and as if all which Periklês did was, to make himself popular by paying the dikasts for judicial service which they had before rendered gratuitously. The truth is, that this numerous army of dikasts, distributed into ten regiments, and summoned to act systematically throughout the year, was now for the first time organised: the commencement of their pay is also the commencement of their regular judicial action. What Periklês really effected was, to sever for the first time from the administrative competence of the magistrates that judicial authority which had originally gone along with it. The great men who had been accustomed to hold these offices were lowered both in influence and authority:³ while on the other hand

Measures carried by Ephialtês and Periklês to abridge the power of the senate of Areopagus as well as of individual magistrates. Institution of the paid dikasteries.

Separation of judicial from administrative functions.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. c. 12.

² Harpokration—'Ο κάτωθεν νόμος—Pollux, xiii. 128.

³ Aristot. Polit. iv. 5, 6. ἔτι δ' οἱ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἐγκαλοῦντες τὸν δῆμόν φασι δεῖν κρίνειν ὁ δ' ἀσμένως δέχεται τὴν πρόκλησιν ὥστε καταλύονται πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρχαί, &c.: compare vi. 1, 8.

The remark of Aristotle is not

justly applicable to the change effected by Periklês, which transferred the power taken from the magistrates, not to the people, but to certain specially constituted, though numerous and popular dikasteries, sworn to decide in conformity with known and written laws. Nor is the separation of judicial competence from administrative, to be characterised as

a new life, habit, and sense of power, sprung up among the poorer citizens. A plaintiff having cause of civil action, or an accuser invoking punishment against citizens guilty of injury either to himself or to the state, had still to address himself to one or other of the archons, but it was only with a view of ultimately arriving before the dikastery by whom the cause was to be tried. While the magistrates acting individually were thus restricted to simple administration and preliminary police, they experienced a still more serious loss of power in their capacity of members of the Areopagus, after the year of archonship was expired. Instead of their previous unmeasured range of supervision and interference, they were now deprived of all judicial sanction beyond that small power of fining which was still left both to individual magistrates, and to the senate of Five Hundred. But the cognizance of homicide was still expressly reserved to them—for the procedure, in this latter case religious not less than judicial, was so thoroughly consecrated by ancient feeling, that no reformer could venture to disturb or remove it.¹

"dissolving or extinguishing magisterial authority." On the contrary, it is conformable to the best modern notions. Periklès cannot be censured for having effected this separation, however persons may think that the judicature which he constituted was objectionable.

Plato seems also to have conceived administrative power as essentially accompanied by judicial (Legg. vi. p. 767)—πάντα ἄρχοντα ἀναρχαίων καὶ δικαστῆν εἶναι τοῦτων—an opinion doubtless perfectly just, up to a certain narrow limit: the separation between the two sorts of powers cannot be rendered *absolutely* complete.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Nær. p. 1372; cont. Aristokrat. p. 642.

Meier (Attischer Prozess, p. 143) thinks that the senate of Areopagus was also deprived of its cognizance of homicide as well as of its other functions, and that this was only restored after the expulsion of the Thirty. He pro-

duces as evidence a passage of Lysias (De Cade Eratosthenis, p. 31-33).

M. Boeckh and O. Müller adopt the same opinion as Meier, and seemingly on the authority of the same passage (see the Dissertation of O. Müller on the Eumenides of Æschylus, p. 113, Eng. transl.). But in the first place, this opinion is contradicted by an express statement in the anonymous biographer of Thucydides, who mentions the trial of Pylilampès for murder before the Areopagus; and contradicted also, seemingly, by Xenophon (Memorab. iii. 5, 20); in the next place, the passage of Lysias appears to me to bear a different meaning. He says, ὅ καὶ πατρῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἐφ' ἑμῶν ἀποδέδοται τοῦ φόνου τὰς δίκας δικάζειν: now (even if we admit the conjectural reading ἐφ' ἑμῶν in place of ἐφ' ἑμῖν to be correct) still this restoration of functions to the Areopagus refers naturally to the

It was upon this same ground probably that the stationary party defended *all* the prerogatives of the senate

restored democracy after the violent interruption occasioned by the oligarchy of the Thirty. Considering how many persons the Thirty caused to be violently put to death, and the complete subversion of all the laws which they introduced, it seems impossible to suppose that the Areopagus could have continued to hold its sittings and try accusations for intentional homicide, under their government. On the return of the democracy after the Thirty were expelled, the functions of the senate of Areopagus would return also.

If the supposition of the eminent authors mentioned above were correct—if it were true that the Areopagus was deprived not only of its supervising function generally, but also of its cognizance of homicide, during the fifty-five years which elapsed between the motion of Ephialtès and the expulsion of the Thirty—this senate must have been without any functions at all during that long interval; it must have been for all practical purposes non-existent. But during so long a period of total suspension, the citizens would have lost all their respect for it; it could not have retained so much influence as we know that it actually possessed immediately before the Thirty (Lysias c. Erastoth. c. 11. p. 126); and it would hardly have been revived after the expulsion of the Thirty. Whereas by preserving during that period its jurisdiction in cases of homicide, apart from those more extended privileges which had formerly rendered it obnoxious, the ancient traditional respect for it was kept alive, and it was revived after the fall of the Thirty as a

venerable part of the old democracy; even apparently with some extension of privileges.

The inferences which O. Müller wishes to draw, as to the facts of these times, from the Eumenides of Æschylus, appear to me ill-supported. In order to sustain his view that by virtue of the proposition of Ephialtès "the Areopagus almost entirely ceased to be a high Court of Judicature" (sect. 36, p. 109), he is forced to alter the chronology of the events, and to affirm that the motion of Ephialtès must have been carried subsequently to the representation of the Eumenides, though Diodorus mentions it in the year next but one before, and there is nothing to contradict him. All that we can safely infer from the very indistinct allusions in Æschylus, is, that he himself was full of reverence for the Areopagus, and that the season was one in which party bitterness ran so high as to render something like civil war (*ἐμφύλιον ἄρτι*, v. 864) within the scope of reasonable apprehension. Probably he may have been averse to the diminution of the privileges of the Areopagus by Ephialtès: yet even thus much is not altogether certain, inasmuch as he puts it forward prominently and specially as a tribunal for homicide, exercising this jurisdiction by inherent prescription, and confirmed in it by the Eumenides themselves. Now when we consider that such jurisdiction was precisely the thing confirmed and left by Ephialtès to the Areopagus, we might plausibly argue that Æschylus, by enhancing the solemnity and predicting the perpetuity of the remaining privilege, intended to conciliate those who resented the

of Areopagus—denouncing the curtailments proposed by Ephialtês as impious and guilty innovations.¹ How extreme their resentment became, when these reforms were carried—and how fierce was the collision of political parties at this moment—we may judge by the result. The enemies of Ephialtês caused him to be privately assassinated, by the hand of a Bœotian of Tanagra named Aristodikus. Such a crime—rare in the political annals of Athens, for we come to no known instance of it afterwards until the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411 B.C.—marks at once the gravity of the change now introduced, the fierceness of the opposition offered, and the unscrupulous character of the conservative party. Kimon was in exile and had no share in the deed. Doubtless the assassination of Ephialtês produced an effect unfavourable in every way to the party who procured it. The popular party in their resentment must have become still more attached to the judicial reforms just assured to them, while the hands of Periklês, the superior leader left behind and now acting singly, must have been materially strengthened.

Assassination of Ephialtês by the conservative party.

It is from this point that the administration of that great man may be said to date: he was now the leading adviser (we might almost say Prime Minister) of the Athenian people. His first years were marked by a series of brilliant successes—already mentioned—the acquisition of Megara as an ally, and the victorious war against Corinth and Ægina. But when he proposed the great and valuable improvement of the Long Walls, thus making one city of Athens and Peiræus, the same oligarchical party, which had opposed his judicial changes and assassinated Ephialtês, again stood forward in vehement resistance. Finding direct opposition unavailing, they did not scruple to enter into treasonable

Commencement of the great ascendancy of Periklês, after the death of Ephialtês. Compromise between him and Kimon. Brilliant successes of Athens, and era of the maximum of her power.

recent innovations, and to soften the hatred between the two opposing parties.

The opinion of Boeckh, O. Müller, and Meier,—respecting the withdrawal from the senate of Areopagus of the judgements on homicide, by the proposition of

Ephialtês—has been discussed and (in my judgement) refuted by Forchhammer—in a valuable Dissertation—*De Areopago non privato per Ephialten Homicidii Judiciis*. Kiel, 1828.

¹ This is the language of those authors whom Diodorus copied

correspondence with Sparta—invoking the aid of a foreign force for the overthrow of the democracy: so odious had it become in their eyes, since the recent innovations. How serious was the hazard incurred by Athens, near the time of the battle of Tanagra, has been already recounted; together with the rapid and unexpected reconciliation of parties after that battle, principally owing to the generous patriotism of Kimon and his immediate friends. Kimon was restored from ostracism on this occasion, before his full time had expired; while the rivalry between him and Periklês henceforward becomes mitigated, or even converted into a compromise,¹ whereby the internal affairs of the city were left to the one, and the conduct of foreign expeditions to the other. The successes of Athens during the ensuing ten years were more brilliant than ever, and she attained the maximum of her power: which doubtless had a material effect in imparting stability to the democracy, as well as to the administration of Periklês—and enabled both the one and the other to stand the shock of those great public reverses, which deprived the Athenians of their dependent landed alliances, during the interval between the defeat of Korôneia and the thirty years' truce.

Along with the important judicial revolution brought about by Periklês, were introduced other changes belonging to the same scheme and system.

Thus a general power of supervision, both over the magistrates and over the public assembly, was vested in seven magistrates, now named for the first time, called Nomophylakes, or Law-Guardians, and doubtless changed every year. These

Other constitutional changes.—The Nomophylakes.

(Diodor. xi. 77)—οὐ μὲν ἀθρόως γε διεφύγετε τηλικούτοις ἀνομήμασιν ἐπιβαλλόμενος (Ephialtês), ἀλλὰ τῆς νυκτός ἀνατρέψεις, ἀδύλον ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτήν. Compare Pausanias, i. 29, 15.

Plutarch (Periklês, c. 10) cites Aristotle as having mentioned the assassin of Ephialtês. Antipho, however, states that the assassin was never formally known or convicted (De Cæde Hero. c. 68).

The enemies of Periklês circulated a report (mentioned by Idomeneus), that it was he who had

procured the assassination of Ephialtês, from jealousy of the superiority of the latter (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10). We may infer from this report how great the eminence of Ephialtês was.

¹ The intervention of Elpinikê, the sister of Kimon, in bringing about this compromise between her brother and Periklês, is probable enough (Plutarch; Periklês, c. 10, and Kimon, c. 14). Clever and engaging, she seems to have played an active part in the political intrigues of the day: but we

Nomophylakes sat alongside of the Proëdri or presidents both in the senate and in the public assembly, and were charged with the duty of interposing whenever any step was taken or any proposition made contrary to the existing laws. They were also empowered to constrain the magistrates to act according to law.¹ We do not know whether they possessed the presidency of a dikastery—that is, whether they could themselves cause one of the panels of jurors to be summoned, and put an alleged delinquent on his trial before it, under their presidency—or whether they were restricted to entering a formal protest, laying the alleged illegality before the public assembly. To appoint magistrates however, invested with this special trust of watching and informing, was not an unimportant step; for it would probably enable Ephialtês to satisfy many objectors who feared to abolish the superintending power of the Areopagus without introducing any substitute. The Nomophylakes were honoured with a distinguished place at the public processions and festivals, and were even allowed (like the Archons) to enter the senate of Areopagus after their year of office had expired: but they never acquired any considerable power such as that senate had itself exercised. Their interference must have been greatly superseded by the introduction, and increasing application of the Graphê Paranomôn, presently to be explained. They are not even noticed in the description of that misguided assembly which condemned the six generals, after the battle of Arginusæ, to be tried by a novel process which violated legal form

are not at all called upon to credit the scandals insinuated by Eupolis and Stesimbrotus.

¹ We hear about these Nomophylakes in a distinct statement cited from Philochorus, by Photius, Lexic. p. 674, Porson. Νομοφύλακες ἑτεροὶ εἰσι τῶν θεσμοθετῶν, ὡς Φιλόχορος ἐν ζ'. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχοντες ἀνέβαινον εἰς Ἄρειον πάγον ἐστεφανωμένοι, οἱ δὲ νομοφύλακες χρύσια στέφρα ἄγοντες· καὶ ταῖς θεαῖς ἐναντίον ἄρχόντων ἐκαθέζοντο· καὶ τῆν πομπήν, ἔπεμπον τῇ Παλλάδι· τὰς δὲ ἄρχαίς ἡνάγκαζον τοῖς νόμοις χρῆσθαι· καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ καὶ ἐν τῇ βουλῇ μετὰ τῶν προέδρων ἐκά-

θηντο, κωλύοντες τὰ ἀσύμφορα τῇ πόλει πράττειν· ἕπτα δὲ ἦσαν καὶ κατέστησαν, ὡς Φιλόχορος, ὅτε Ἐφιάλτης μόνῃ κατέλιπε τῇ ἐξ Ἄρειου πάγου βουλῇ τὰ ὑπὲρ τοῦ σώματος.

Harpokration, Pollux, and Suidas, give substantially the same account of these magistrates, though none except Photius mentions the exact date of their appointment. There is no adequate ground for the doubt which M. Boeckh expresses about the accuracy of this statement: see Schömann, Ant. Jur. Pub. Græc. sec. lxxv. ; and Cicero, Legg. iii. 20.

not less than substantial justice.¹ After the expulsion of the Thirty, the senate of Areopagus was again invested with a supervision over magistrates, though without anything like its ancient ascendancy.

Another important change, which we may with probability refer to Periklês, is, the institution of the Nomothetæ. These men were in point of fact dikasts, members of the 6000 citizens annually sworn in that capacity. But they were not, like the dikasts for trying causes, distributed into panels or regiments known by a particular letter and acting together throughout the entire year: they were lotted off to sit together only on special occasion and as the necessity arose.

According to the reform now introduced, the Ekklesia or public assembly, even with the sanction of the senate of Five Hundred, became incompetent either to pass a new law or to repeal a law already in existence; it could only enact a *psephism*—that is, properly speaking, a decree applicable only to a particular case; though the word was used at Athens in a very large sense, sometimes comprehending decrees of general as well as permanent application. In reference to laws, a peculiar judicial procedure was established. The Thesmothetæ were directed annually to examine the existing laws, noting any contradictions or double laws on the same matter; and in the first prytany (tenth part) of the Attic year, on the eleventh day, an Ekklesia was held, in which the first business was to go through the laws *seriatim*, and submit them for approval or rejection; first beginning with the laws relating to the senate, next coming to those of more general import, especially such as determined the functions and competence of the magistrates. If any law was condemned by the vote of the public assembly, or if any citizen had a new law to propose, the third assembly of the Prytany was employed, previous to any other business, in the appointment of Nomothetæ and in the provision of means to pay their salary. Previous notice was required to be given publicly by every citizen who had new propositions of the sort to make, in order that the time necessary for the sitting of the Nomothetæ might be measured according to the number of matters to be submitted to their cognizance. Public

¹ See Xenophon, *Hellenic*. i. 7; Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, p. 40.

advocates were farther named to undertake the formal defence of all the laws attacked, and the citizen who proposed to repeal them had to make out his case against this defence, to the satisfaction of the assembled Nomothetæ. These latter were taken from the 6000 sworn dikasts, and were of different numbers according to circumstances: sometimes we hear of them as 500, sometimes as 1000—and we may be certain that the number was always considerable.

The effect of this institution was, to place the making or repealing of laws under the same solemnities and guarantees as the trying of causes or accusations in judicature. We must recollect that the citizens who attended the Ekklesia or public assembly were not sworn like the dikasts; nor had they the same solemnity of procedure, nor the same certainty of hearing both sides of the question set forth, nor the same full preliminary notice. How much the oath sworn was brought to act upon the minds of the dikasts, we may see by the frequent appeals to it in the orators, who contrast them with the unsworn public assembly.¹ And there can be no doubt that the

Procedure in making or repealing of laws assimilated to the procedure in judicial trials.

¹ Demosthen. cont. Timokrat. c. 20, pp. 725, 726. Ἄρ' οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν δοξαῖν συμφέρειν τῇ πόλει τοιοῦτος νόμος, ὃς δικαστηρίου γῶσσεως οὗτος κυριώτερος ἔσται, καὶ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄνωμοκτόνων γῶσσεως τοῖς ἀνωμοτοῖς προστάξει λῦσιν;—Εὐβουλίδης, ἀπὸ τοῦ δικαστηρίου καὶ τῆς κατοργώσεως οὗ διεπρόβησεν (Timokratēs) ἐπὶ τῶν δήμων, ἐκτὸς ἑστῶν τῶν ἄνωμοκτόνων compare Demosthen. cont. Eubulid. c. 15.

See, about the Nomothetæ, Schömann, De Comititiis, ch. vii. p. 248 seqq., and Platner, Prozess und Klagen bey den Attikern, Abschn. ii. 3, 3, p. 33 seqq.

Both of them maintain, in my opinion erroneously, that the Nomothetæ are an institution of Solon. Demosthenēs indeed a-eribes it to Solon (Schömann, p. 268): but this counts in my view for nothing, when I see that all the laws which

he cites for governing the proceedings of the Nomothetæ, bear unequivocal evidence of a time much later. Schömann admits this to a certain extent, and in reference to the style of these laws—"Illorum quidem fragmentorum, quæ in Timokrateâ extant, recentiore Solonis ætate formam atque orationem apertum est." But it is not merely the style which proves them to be of post-Solonian date: it is the mention of post-Solonian institutions, such as the ten prytanies into which the year was divided, the ten statues of the Eponymii—all derived from the creation of the ten tribes by Klei-thenēs. On the careless employment of the name of Solon by the orators whenever they desire to make a strong impression on the dikasts, I have already remarked.

Nomothetæ afforded much greater security than the public assembly, for a proper decision. That security depended upon the same principle as we see to pervade all the constitutional arrangements of Athens; upon a fraction of the people casually taken, but sufficiently numerous to have the same interest with the whole,—not permanent but delegated for the occasion,—assembled under a solemn sanction,—and furnished with a full exposition of both sides of the case. The power of passing psephism, or special decrees, still remained with the public assembly, which was doubtless much more liable to be surprised into hasty or inconsiderate decision than either the Dikastery or the Nomothetæ—in spite of the necessity of previous authority from the senate of Five Hundred, before any proposition could be submitted to it.

As an additional security both to the public assembly and the Nomothetæ against being entrapped into decisions contrary to existing law, another remarkable provision has yet to be mentioned—a provision probably introduced by Periklês at the same time as the formalities of law-making by means of specially delegated Nomothetæ. This was the *Graphê Paranomôn*—indictment for informality or illegality—which might be brought on certain grounds against the proposer of any law or any psephism, and rendered him liable to punishment by the dikastery. He was required in bringing forward his new measure to take care that it should not be in contradiction with any pre-existing law—or if there were any such contradiction, to give formal notice of it, to propose the repeal of that which existed, and to write up publicly beforehand what his proposition was—in order that there might never be two contradictory laws at the same time in operation, nor any illegal decree passed either by the senate or by the public assembly. If he neglected this precaution, he was liable to prosecution under the *Graphê Paranomôn*, which any Athenian citizen might bring against him before the dikastery, through the intervention and under the presidency of the *Thesmothetæ*.

Judging from the title of this indictment, it was originally confined to the special ground of formal contradiction between the new and the old. But it had a natural tendency to extend itself: the citizen accusing

Graphê Paranomôn—indictment against the mover of illegal or unconstitutional propositions.

would strengthen his case by showing that the measure which he attacked contradicted not merely the letter, but the spirit and purpose of existing laws—and he would proceed from hence to denounce it as generally mischievous and disgraceful to the state. In this unmeasured latitude we find the Graphê Paranomôn at the time of Demosthenês. The mover of a new law or psephism, even after it had been regularly discussed and passed, was liable to be indicted, and had to defend himself not only against alleged informalities in his procedure, but also against alleged mischiefs in the substance of his measure. If found guilty by the dikastery, the punishment inflicted upon him by them was not fixed, but variable according to circumstances. For the indictment belonged to that class wherein, after the verdict of guilty, first a given amount of punishment was proposed by the accuser, next another and lighter amount was named by the accused party against himself—the dikastery being bound to make their option between one and the other, without admitting any third modification—so that it was the interest even of the accused party to name against himself a measure of punishment sufficient to satisfy the sentiment of the dikasts, in order that they might not prefer the more severe proposition of the accuser. At the same time, the accuser himself (as in other public indictments) was fined in the sum of 1000 drachms, unless the verdict of guilty obtained at least one-fifth of the suffrages of the dikastery. The personal responsibility of the mover, however, continued only one year after the introduction of his new law. If the accusation was brought at a greater distance of time than one year, the accuser could invoke no punishment against the mover, and the sentence of the dikasts neither absolved nor condemned anything but the law. Their condemnation of the law with or without the author, amounted *ipso facto* to a repeal of it.

Such indictment against the author of a law or of a decree might be preferred either at some stage prior to its final enactment—as after its acceptance simply by the senate, if it was a decree, or after its approval by the public assembly, and prior to its going before the Nomothetæ, if it was a law—or after it had reached full completion by the verdict of the Nomothetæ. In the former case the indictment staid its farther progress until sentence had been pronounced by the dikasts.

This regulation is framed in a thoroughly conservative spirit, to guard the existing laws against being wholly or partially nullified by a new proposition. As, in the procedure of the *Nomothetæ*, whenever any proposition was made for distinctly repealing any existing law, it was thought unsafe to entrust the defence of the law so assailed to the chance of some orator gratuitously undertaking it. Paid advocates were appointed for the purpose. So also, when any citizen made a new positive proposition, sufficient security was not supposed to be afforded by the chance of opponents rising up at the time. Accordingly, a farther guarantee was provided in the personal responsibility of the mover. That the latter, before he proposed a new decree or a new law, should take care that there was nothing in it inconsistent with existing laws—or, if there were, that he should first formally bring forward a direct proposition for the repeal of such preexistent law—was in no way unreasonable. It imposed upon him an obligation such as he might perfectly well fulfil. It served as a check upon the use of that right, of free speech and initiative in the public assembly, which belonged to every Athenian without exception,¹ and which was cherished by the democracy as much as it was condemned by oligarchical thinkers. It was a security to the *dikasts*, who were called upon to apply the law to particular cases, against the perplexity of having conflicting laws quoted before them, and being obliged in their verdict to set aside either one or the other. In modern European governments, even the most free and constitutional, laws have been both made and applied either by select persons or select assemblies, under an organization so different as to put out of sight the idea of personal responsibility on the proposer of a new law. Moreover, even in such assemblies, private initiative has either not existed at all, or has been of comparatively little effect, in law-making; while in the

¹ The privation of this right of public speech (*παρρησία*) followed on the condemnation of any citizen to the punishment called *ἀτιμία*, disfranchisement, entire or partial

(*Demosthen. cont. Ncar. p. 1352, c. 9; cont. Meidiam, p. 545, c. 27*). Compare for the oligarchical sentiment, *Xenophon, Republ. Athen. i. 9.*

application of laws when made, there has always been a permanent judicial body exercising an action of its own, more or less independent of the legislature, and generally interpreting away the text of contradictory laws so as to keep up a tolerably consistent course of forensic tradition. But at Athens, the fact that the proposer of a new decree, or of a new law, had induced the senate or the public assembly to pass it, was by no means supposed to cancel his personal responsibility, if the proposition was illegal. He had deceived the senate or the people, in deliberately keeping back from them a fact which he knew, or at least might and ought to have known.

But though a full justification may thus be urged on behalf of the *Graphê Paranomôn* as originally conceived and intended, it will hardly apply to that indictment as applied afterwards in its plenary and abusive latitude. Thus *Æschinês* indicts *Ktesiphon* under it for having under certain circumstances proposed a crown to *Demosthenês*. He begins by showing that the proposition was illegal—for this was the essential foundation of the indictment: he then goes on farther to demonstrate, in a splendid harangue, that *Demosthenês* was a vile man and a mischievous politician: accordingly (assuming the argument to be just) *Ktesiphon* had deceived the people in an aggravated way—first by proposing a reward under circumstances contrary to law, next by proposing it in favour of an unworthy man. The first part of the argument only is of the essence of the *Graphê Paranomôn*: the second part is in the nature of an abuse growing out of it,—springing from that venom of personal and party enmity which is inseparable, in a greater or less degree, from free political action, and which manifested itself with virulence at Athens, though within the limits of legality. That this indictment, as one of the most direct vents for such enmity, was largely applied and abused at Athens, is certain. But though it probably deterred unpractised citizens from originating new propositions, it did not produce the same effect upon those orators who made politics a regular business, and who could therefore both calculate the temper of the people, and reckon upon support from a certain knot of friends. *Aristophon*, towards the close of his political life, made it a boast that

Abusive extension of the *Graphê Paranomôn* afterwards.

he had been thus indicted and acquitted seventy-five times. Probably the worst effect which it produced was that of encouraging the vein of personality and bitterness which pervades so large a proportion of Attic oratory, even in its most illustrious manifestations; turning deliberative into judicial eloquence, and interweaving the discussion of a law or decree along with a declamatory harangue against the character of its mover. We may at the same time add that the *Graphê Paranomôn* was often the most convenient way of getting a law or a psephism repealed, so that it was used even when the annual period had passed over, and when the mover was therefore out of danger—the indictment being then brought only against the law or decree, as in the case which forms the subject of the harangue of Demosthenês against Leptinês. If the speaker of this harangue obtained a verdict, he procured at once the repeal of the law or decree, without proposing any new provision in its place; which he would be required to do—if not peremptorily, at least by common usage,—if he carried the law for repeal before the *Nomothetæ*.

It was often used as a simple way of procuring the repeal of an existing law—without personal aim against the author of the law.

The *dikasteries* provided under the system of *Periklês* varied in number of members: we never hear of less than 200 members—most generally of 500—and sometimes also of 1000, 1500, 2000 members, on important trials.¹ Each man received pay from the treasurers called *Kolakretæ*, after his day's business was over, of three oboli or half a drachm: at least this was the amount paid during the early part of the Peloponnesian war. M. Boeckh supposes that the original pay proposed by *Periklês* was one obolus, after-

Numbers and pay of the *dikasts*, as provided by *Periklês*.

¹ See Meier, *Attisch. Prozess*, p. 139. *Andokidês* mentions a trial under the indictment of *γραφῆ παρανομῶν*, brought by his father *Leogoras* against a senator named *Speusippus*, wherein 6000 *dikasts* sat—that is the entire body of *Heliasts*. However, the loose speech so habitual with *Andokidês* renders this statement very uncertain (*Andokidês de Mysteriis*, p. 3, § 29).

See *Matthiæ*, *De Judiciis Atheniensium*, in his *Miscellanea Philologica*, vol. i. p. 252. *Matthiæ* questions the reading of that passage in *Demosthenês* (cont. *Meidiam*, p. 5⁶⁵), wherein 200 *dikasts* are spoken of as sitting in judgement; he thinks it ought to be *πεντακσίδους* instead of *δικοκσίδους*—but this alteration would be rash.

wards tripled by Kleon; but his opinion is open to much doubt. It was indispensable to propose a measure of pay sufficient to induce citizens to come, and come frequently, if not regularly. Now one obolus seems to have proved afterwards an inadequate temptation even to the ekklesiasts (or citizens who attended the public assembly), who were less frequently wanted, and must have had easier sittings, than the dikasts: much less therefore would it be sufficient in the case of the latter. I incline to the belief that the pay originally awarded was three oboli:¹ the rather, as these new institutions seem to have nearly coincided in point of time with the transportation of the confederate treasure from Delos to Athens—so that the Exchequer would then appear abundantly provided. As to the number of dikasts actually present on each day of sitting, or the minimum number requisite to form a sitting, we are very imperfectly informed. Though each of the ten panels or divisions of dikasts included 500 individuals, seldom probably did all of them attend. But it also seldom happened, probably, that all the ten divisions sat on the same day: there was therefore an opportunity of making up deficiencies in division A—when its lot was called and when its dikasts did not appear in sufficient numbers—from those who belonged to division B or Δ, besides the supplementary dikasts who were not comprised in any of the ten divisions: though on all these points we cannot go beyond conjecture. Certain it is, however, that the dikasteries were always numerous, and that none of the dikasts could know in what causes they would be employed, so that it was impossible to tamper with them beforehand.²

¹ See on this question, Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, ch. xv. p. 233; K. F. Hermann, Griech. Staatsalt. § 134.

The proof which M. Boeckh brings to show, first, that the original pay was one obolus—next that Kleon was the first to introduce the tri-obolus—is in both cases very inconclusive.

Certain passages from the Scholiast, stating that the pay of the dikasts fluctuated (ὄχι ἕστηκεν—ἀλλοτε ἄλλως ἐβιβόητο) do not so naturally indicate a rise from one

obolus to three, as a change backwards and forwards according to circumstances. Now it seems that there were some occasions when the treasury was so very poor that it was doubtful whether the dikasts could be paid: see Lysias, cont. Epikrat. c. 1; cont. Nikomach. c. 22; and Aristophan. Equit. 1370. The amount of pay may therefore have been sometimes affected by this cause.

² There is a remarkable passage on this point in the treatise of

Such were the great constitutional innovations of Periklēs and Ephialtēs—changes full of practical results—the transformation, as well as the complement, of that democratical system which Kleisthenēs had begun and to which the tide of Athenian feeling had been gradually mounting up during the preceding twenty years. The entire force of these changes is generally not perceived, because the popular dikasteries and the *Nomothetæ* are so often represented as institutions of Solon, and as merely supplied with pay by Periklēs. This erroneous supposition prevents all clear view of the growth of the Athenian democracy by throwing back its last elaborations to the period of its early and imperfect start. To strip the magistrates of all their judicial power, except that of imposing a small fine, and the Areopagus of all its jurisdiction except in cases of homicide—providing popular, numerous, and salaried dikasts to decide all the judicial business at Athens as well as to repeal and enact laws—this was the consummation of the Athenian democracy. No serious constitutional alteration (I except the temporary interruptions of the Four Hundred and the Thirty) was afterwards made until the days of Macedonian interference. As Periklēs made it, so it remained in the days of Demosthenēs—though with a sensible change in the character, and abatement in the energies, of the people, rich as well as poor.

Xenophon, *De Republic. Athen.* iii. 6. He says,—

Φέρε δὲ, ἀλλὰ φησὶ τις χρῆναι δικάζειν μὲν, ἐλάττους δὲ δικάζειν. Ἀνάγκη ποίουν, ἐάν μὲν πολλὰ (both Weiske and Schneider substitute πολλὰ here in place of ὀλίγα, which latter makes no sense) ποιῶνται διασκαστῆρια, ὀλίγοι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσονται τῷ δικαστηρίῳ· ὥστε καὶ διασκευάσασθαι βῆδιν ἔσται πρὸς ὀλίγους δικαστὰς, καὶ συνδεκάσαι (so Schneider and Matthiæ in place of συνδικάσαι) πολὺ ἤττον δικαίως δικάζειν.

That there was a good deal of bribery at Athens, where individuals could be approached and

dealt with, is very probable (see *Xenoph. de Repub. Ath.* iii. 3): and we may well believe that there were also particular occasions on which money was given to the dikasts, some of whom were punished with death for such corrupt receipt (*Æschinēs cont. Timarch.* c. 17-22, p. 12-15). But the passage above quoted from Xenophon, an unfriendly witness, shows that the precautions taken to prevent corruption of the dikasteries were well-devised and successful, though these precautions might sometimes be eluded.

In appreciating the practical working of these numerous dikasteries at Athens, in comparison with such justice as might have been expected from individual magistrates, we have to consider, first — That personal and pecuniary corruption seems to have been a common vice among the leading men of Athens and Sparta, when acting individually or in boards of a few members, and not uncommon even with the kings of Sparta,— next, That in the Grecian cities generally, as we know even from the oligarchical Xenophon (he particularly excepts Sparta), the rich and great men were not only insubordinate to the magistrates, but made a parade of showing that they cared nothing about them.¹ We know also from the same unsuspected source,² that while the poorer Athenian citizens who served on shipboard were distinguished for the strictest discipline, the hoplites or middling burghers who formed the infantry were less obedient, and the rich citizens who served on horseback the most disobedient of all. To make rich and powerful criminals effectively amenable to justice has indeed been found so difficult everywhere, until a recent period of history, that we should be surprised if it were otherwise in Greece. When we follow the reckless demeanour of rich men like Kritias, Alkibiadês,³ and Meidias, even under

Working of the numerous dikasteries — their large numbers essential to exclude corruption or intimidation — liability of individual magistrates to corruption.

¹ Xenophon, De Republ. Laced. c. 8. 2. Τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ταῦτα, ἕτι εἰ μὲν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν οἱ δυνατωτέρω οὔτε βούλονται δοκεῖν τὰς ἀρχὰς φοβεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ νομίζουσι τοῦτο ἀνελεύθερον εἶναι· ἐν δὲ τῇ Σπάρτῃ οἱ κράτιστοι καὶ ὑπέρχονται μάλιστα τὰς ἀρχὰς, &c.

Respecting the violent proceedings committed by powerful men at Thebes, whereby it became almost impossible to procure justico against them for fear of being put to death, see Dikæarchus, Vit. Græc. Fragm. ed. Fabr. p. 143, and Polybius, xx. 4, 6; xxiii. 2.

² Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 18. Μηδραμῶς, ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, ὡ Περικλείας, οὕτως ἤγου ἀνηχέστῃ πονη-

ρία νοσεῖν Ἀθηναίους· Οὐχ ὄρης, ὡς εὐτάχτοι μὲν εἰσιν ἐν τοῖς ναυτικοῖς, εὐτάχτως δ' ἐν τοῖς γυμνακοῖς ἀγῶσι πείθονται τοῖς ἐπιστάταις, οὐδέων δὲ καταδέεστρον ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς ὑπηρετοῦσι τοῖς διδασκάλοις; Τοῦτο γάρ τοι, ἔφη, καὶ θυμαστόν ἐστὶ τὸ τοὺς μὲν τοιοῦτους πειθαρχεῖν τοῖς ἐφεστώσι, τοὺς δὲ ὀπλίτας, καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς, οἱ δοκοῦσι καλοκαγαθία προκεκρίσθαι τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀπειθεσάτους εἶναι πάντων.

³ See Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 12-25; Thucyd. vi. 15, and the speech which he gives as spoken by Alkibiadês in the assembly, vi. 17; Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7-8-16, and the Oration of Demosthenês against Meidias throughout: also Fragm.

the full-grown democracy of Athens, we may be sure that their predecessors under the Kleisthenean constitution would have been often too formidable to be punished or kept down by an individual archon of ordinary firmness,¹

V. of the Πέλαργοι of Aristophanés, Meineke, ii. p. 1128.

¹ Sir Thomas Smith, in his Treatise on the Commonwealth of England, explains the Court of Star-Chamber as originally constituted in order "to deal with offenders too stout for the ordinary course of justice." The abundant compounds of the Greek language furnish a single word exactly describing this same class of offenders—Υβριστόδικοι—the title of one of the lost comedies of Eupolis; see Meineke, *Historia Critica Comædiorum Græcorum*, vol. i. p. 145.

Dean Tucker observes, in his Treatise on Civil Government, "There was hardly a session of parliament from the time of Henry III. to Henry VIII., but laws were enacted for restraining the feuds, robberies and oppressions of the barons and their dependents on the one side—and to moderate and check the excesses and extortions of the royal purveyors on the other; these being the two capital evils then felt. Respecting the tyranny of the ancient baronage, even squires as well as others were not ashamed to wear the liveries of their leaders, and to glory in every badge of distinction, whereby they might be known to be retained as the bullies of such or such great men, and to engage in their quarrels, just or unjust, right or wrong. The histories of those times, together with the statutes of the realm, inform us that they associated (or as they called it, *confederated* together) in great bodies, parading on horseback in fairs and markets, and clad in armour, to the great terror of peaceable sub-

jects: nay, that they attended their lords to parliament, equipped in the same military dress, and even dared sometimes to present themselves before the judge of assize, and to enter the courts of justice in a hostile manner—while their principals sat with the judges on the bench, intimidating the witnesses, and influencing the juries by looks, nods, signs and signals." (Treatise concerning Civil Government, p. 337, by Josiah Tucker, D.D. London, 1781.)

The whole chapter (pp. 301-355) contains many statutes and much other matter, illustrating the intimidation exercised by powerful men in those days over the course of justice.

A passage among the *Fragmenta* of Sallust, gives a striking picture of the conduct of powerful citizens under the Roman Republic. (*Fragm. lib. i. p. 158, ed. Delph.*)

"At discordia, et avaritia, et ambitio, et cætera secundis rebus oriri sueta mala, post Carthaginis excidium maximè aucta sunt. Nam injuriæ validiorum, et ob eas discessio plebis à Patribus, aliæque dissensiones domi fuere jam inde à principio: neque amplius, quam regibus exactis, dum metus à Tarquinio et bellum grave cum Etruriâ positum est, æquo et modesto jure agitarum: dein, servili imperio patres plebem exercere: de vitâ atque tergo, regio more consulere: agro pellere, et à cæteris expertibus, soli in imperio agere. Quibus servitiis, et maximè fœnoris onere, oppressa plebes, cum assiduus bellis tributum simul et militiam toleraret,

even assuming him to be upright and well-intentioned. Now the dikasteries established by Periklēs were inaccessible both to corruption and intimidation: their number, their secret suffrage, and the impossibility of knowing beforehand what individuals would sit in any particular

armata Montem Sacrum et Aveninum insedit. Tumque tribunos plebis, et alia sibi jura paravit. Discordiarum et certaminis utrimque finis fuit secundum bellum Punicum."

Compare the exposition of the condition of the cities throughout Europe in the thirteenth, and fifteenth centuries, in Hüllmann's *Städte-Wesen des Mittelalters*, especially vol. iii. pp. 196-199 *seqq.*

The memorable institution which spread through nearly all the Italian cities during these centuries, of naming as Podesta or supreme magistrate a person not belonging to the city itself, to hold office for a short time—was the expedient which they resorted to for escaping the extreme perversion of judicial and administrative power, arising out of powerful family connexions. The restrictions which were thought necessary to guard against either favour or antipathies on the part of the Podesta, are extremely singular (Hüllmann, vol. iii. pp. 252-261 *seqq.*).

"The proceeding of the patrician families in these cities (observes Hüllmann) in respect to the debts which they owed, was among the worst of the many oppressions to which the trading classes were exposed at their hands—one of the greatest abuses which they practised by means of their superior position. How often did they even maltreat their creditors, who came to demand merely what was due to them!" (*Städte-Wesen*, vol. ii. p. 229.)

Machiavel's History of Florence

illustrates, throughout, the inveterate habit of the powerful families to set themselves above the laws and judicial authority. Indeed he seems to regard this as an incorrigible chronic malady in society, necessitating ever-recurring disputes between powerful men and the body of the people. "The people (he says) desire to live according to the laws; the great men desire to overrule the laws: it is therefore impossible that the two should march in harmony." "Volendo il popolo vivere secondo le leggi, e i potenti comandare a quelle, non è possibile che capino insieme" (*Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine*, liv. ii. p. 79, ad ann. 1282).

The first book of the interesting tale, called the *Promessi Sposi*, of Manzoni,—itself full of historical matter, and since published with illustrative notes by the historian Cantù—exhibits a state of judicial administration, very similar to that above described, in the Milanese, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; demonstrated by repeated edicts, all ineffectual, to bring powerful men under the real control of the laws.

Because men of wealth and power, in the principal governments of modern Europe, are now completely under the control of the laws, the modern reader is apt to suppose that this is the natural state of things. It is therefore not unimportant to produce some references (which might be indefinitely multiplied) reminding him of the very different phenomena which past history exhibits almost everywhere.

cause, prevented both the one and the other. And besides that, the magnitude of their number, extravagant according to our ideas of judicial business, was essential to this tutelary effect¹—it served farther to render the trial solemn and the verdict imposing on the minds of parties and spectators, as we may see by the fact, that in important causes the dikastery was doubled or tripled. Nor was it possible by any other means than numbers² to give dignity

¹ The number of Roman judices employed to try a criminal cause under the *questiones perpetuæ* in the last century and a half of the Republic, seems to have varied between 100, 75, 70, 56, 51, 52, 32, &c. (Laboulaye, *Essai sur les Loix Criminelles des Romains*, p. 336. Paris, 1845.)

In the time of Augustus, there was a total of 4000 judices at Rome, distributed into four decuries (Pliny, *H. N.* xxxiii. 1, 11).

The venality as well as the party corruption of these Roman judices or jurors, taken from the senatorial and equestrian orders, the two highest and richest orders in the state,—was well known and flagrant (Appian, *Bell. Civ.* i. 22, 35, 37; Laboulaye, *ibid.* p. 217-227; Walter, *Geschichte des Römischen Rechts*, ch. xxviii. sect. 237, 238; Asconius in *Cicero. Ver. rin.* pp. 141-145, ed. Orell.; and Cicero himself, in the remarkable letter to Atticus, *Ep. ad Attic.* i. 16).

² Numerous dikasteries taken by lot seem to have been established in later times in Rhodes and other Grecian cities (though Rhodes was not democratically constituted) and to have worked satisfactorily. Sallust says (in his *Oratio II. ad Cæsarem de Republicâ ordinandâ*, p. 561, ed. Cort.), “Judices à paucis probari, regnum est; ex pecuniâ legi, inhonestum. Quare omnes primæ classis judicare placent; sed numero plures quam ju-

dicant. Neque Rhodios, neque alias civitates unquam suorum judiciorum pœnituit; ubi promiscuè dives et pauper, ut cuique sors tulit, de maximis rebus juxtâ ac de minimis disceptat.”

The necessity of a numerous judicature, in a republic where there is no standing army or official force professionally constituted, as the only means of enforcing public-minded justice against powerful criminals, is insisted upon by Machiavel, *Discorsi sopra Tito Livio*, lib. i. c. 7.

“Potrebbe si ancora allegare, a fortificazione della soprascritta conclusione, l' accidente seguito pur in Firenze contra Piero Soderui: il quale al tutto segui per non essere in quella republica alcuno modo di accuse contro alla ambizione dei potenti cittadini: perchè lo accusare un potente a otto giudici in una republica, non basta: bisogna che i giudici siano assai, perchè pochi sempre fanno a modo de' pochi,” &c.: compare the whole of the same chapter.

I add another remarkable passage of Machiavel—*Discorso sulla Riforma* (of Florence, addressed to Pope Leo X.), pp. 119, 120. vol. iv. of the complete edition of his works. 1813.

“E necessarissimo in una republica questo ricorso, perchè i pochi cittadini non hanno ardire di punire gli uomini grandi, e però bisogna che a tale effetto concorrano assai cittadini, acciochè

to an assembly of citizens, of whom many were poor, some old, and all were despised individually by rich accused persons who were brought before them—as Aristophanês and Xenophon give us plainly to understand.¹ If we except the strict and peculiar educational discipline of Sparta, these numerous dikasteries afforded the only organ which

Il giudizio si nasconda, e nascondendosi, ciascuno si possa scusare.”

¹ Aristophan. *Vesp.* 570; Xenophon, *Rep. Ath.* i. 18. We are not to suppose that *all* the dikasts who tried a cause were very poor: Demosthenês would not talk to very poor men as to “the slave whom each of them might have left at home” (*Demosthenês cont. Stephan. A. c.* 26. p. 1127).

It was criminal by law in the dikasts to receive bribes in the exercise of their functions, as well as in every citizen to give money to them (*Demosth. cont. Steph. B. c.* 13. p. 1137). And it seems perfectly safe to affirm that in practice the dikasts were never tampered with beforehand: had the fact been otherwise, we must have seen copious allusions to it in the many free-spoken pleadings which remain to us (just as there are in the Roman orators): whereas in point of fact there are hardly any such allusions. The word *δευάζω* (in *Isokratês de Pac. Or.* viii. p. 169. sect. 63) does not allude to obtaining by corrupt means verdicts of dikasts in the dikastery, but to obtaining by such means votes for offices in the public assembly, where the election took place by show of hands. *Isocrates* says that this was often done in his time, and so perhaps it may have been; but in the case of the dikasteries, much better security was taken against it.

The statement of Aristotle (from his *Πολιτικά*, *Fragm.* xi. p. 69, ed. Neumann: compare *Harpokrat*

v. *Δευάζειν*; *Plutarch*, *Coriolan.* c. 14; and *Pollux*, viii. 121) intimates that Anytus was the first person who taught the art τοῦ δευάζειν τὰ δικαστήρια, a short time before the battle of *Ægospotami*. But besides that the information on this point is to the last degree vague, we may remark that between the defeat of the oligarchy of Four Hundred, and the battle of *Ægospotami*, the financial and political condition of Athens was so exceedingly embarrassed, that it may well be doubted whether she could maintain the paid dikasteries on the ordinary footing. Both all the personal service of the citizens, and all the public money, must have been put in requisition at that time for defence against the enemy, without leaving any surplus for other purposes; there was not enough even to afford constant pay to the soldiers and sailors (compare *Thucyd.* vi. 91; viii. 69, 71, 76, 86). If therefore in this time of distress, the dikasteries were rarely convoked, and without any certainty of pay, a powerful accused person might find it more easy to tamper with them beforehand, than it had been before, or than it came to be afterwards, when the system was regularly in operation. We can hardly reason with safety therefore, from the period shortly preceding the battle of *Ægospotami*, either to that which preceded the Sicilian expedition, or to that which followed the subversion of the Thirty.

Grecian politics could devise, for getting redress against powerful criminals, public as well as private, and for obtaining a sincere and uncorrupt verdict.

Taking the general working of the dikasteries, we shall find that they are nothing but Jury-trial applied on a scale broad, systematic, unaided, and uncontrolled, beyond all other historical experience—and that they therefore exhibit in exaggerated proportions both the excellences and the defects characteristic of the jury-system, as compared with decision by trained and professional judges. All the encomiums, which it is customary to pronounce upon jury-trial, will be found predicable of the Athenian dikasteries in a still greater degree; all the reproaches, which can be addressed on good ground to the dikasteries, will apply to modern juries also, though in a less degree. Such parallel is not less just, though the dikasteries, as the most democratical feature of democracy itself, have been usually criticised with marked disfavour—every censure or sneer or joke against them which can be found in ancient authors, comic as well as serious, being accepted as true almost to the letter; while juries are so popular an institution, that their merits have been overstated (in England at least) and their defects kept out of sight. The theory of the Athenian dikastery, and the theory of jury-trial as it has prevailed in England since the Revolution of 1688, are one and the same: recourse to a certain number of private citizens, taken by chance or without possibility of knowing beforehand who they will be, sworn to hear fairly and impartially plaintiff and defendant, accuser and accused, and to find a true verdict according to their consciences upon a distinct issue before them. But in Athens this theory was worked out to its natural consequences; while English practice, in this respect as in so many others, is at variance with English theory. The jury, though an ancient and a constant portion of the judicial system, has never been more than a portion—kept in subordination, trammels, and pupilage, by a powerful crown and by judges presiding over an artificial system of law. In the English state trials, down to a period not long before the Revolution of 1688, any jurors who found a verdict contrary to the dictation of the judge

The Athenian dikasteries are Jury-trial applied on the broadest scale—exhibiting both its excellences and its defects in an exaggerated form.

were liable to fine; and at an earlier period (if a second jury on being summoned found an opposite verdict) even to the terrible punishment of attain^t.¹ And though, for the last century and a half, the verdict of the jury has been free as to matters of fact, new trials having taken the place of the old attain^t—yet the ascendancy of the presiding judge over their minds, and his influence over the procedure as the authority on matters of law, has always been such as to overrule the natural play of their feelings and judgement as men and citizens²—sometimes to the detriment, much

¹ Mr. Jardine, in his interesting and valuable publication, *Criminal Trials*, vol. i. p. 115, after giving an account of the trial of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton in 1553, for high treason, and his acquittal, observes—“There is one circumstance in this trial, which ought not to be passed over without an observation. It appears that after the trial was over, the jury were required to give recognizances to answer for their verdict, and were afterwards imprisoned for nearly eight months and heavily fined by a sentence of the Star-chamber. Such was the security which the trial by jury afforded to the subject in those times: and such were the perils to which jurors were then exposed, who ventured to act upon their conscientious opinions in state prosecutions! But even these proceedings against the jury, monstrous as they appear to our improved notions of the administration of justice, must not be considered as a wanton exercise of unlawful power on this particular occasion. The fact is that the judges of England had for centuries before exercised a similar authority, though not without some murmuring against it; and it was not until more than a century after it, in the reign of Charles II., that a solemn decision was pronounced against its legality.”

.... “In the reign of James I.

it was held by the Lord Chancellor Egerton, together with the two Chief Justices and the Chief Baron, that when a party indicted is *found guilty on the trial*, the jury shall not be questioned; but on the other side, when the jury hath *acquitted* a felon or a traitor against manifest proof, they may be charged in the Star-chamber for their partiality in finding a manifest offender not guilty. After the abolition of the Star-chamber, there were several instances in the reign of Charles II., in which it was resolved that both grand and petit juries might be fined for giving verdicts against plain evidence and the directions of the court.” Compare Mr. Amos’s *Notes on Fortescue, De Laudibus Legum Angliæ*, c. 27.

² Respecting the French juries. M. Cottu (*Réflexions sur la Justice criminelle*, p. 79) remarks,—

“Le désir ardent de bien faire dont les jurés sont généralement animés, et la crainte de s’égayer, les jette dans une obéissance passive à l’impulsion qui leur est donnée par le président de la Cour d’Assise, et si ce magistrat sait s’emparer de leur estime, alors leur confiance en lui ne connoît plus de bornes. Ils le considèrent comme l’étoile qui doit les guider dans l’obscurité qui les environne, et pleins d’un respect aveugle pour son opinion, ils n’attendent que la manifestation

oftener to the benefit (always excepting political trials), of substantial justice. But in Athens the dikasts judged of the law as well as of the fact. The laws were not numerous, and were couched in few, for the most part familiar, words. To determine how the facts stood, and whether, if the facts were undisputed, the law invoked was properly applicable to them, were parts of the integral question submitted to them, and comprehended in their verdict. Moreover, each dikastery construed the law for itself without being bound to follow the decisions of those which had preceded it, except in so far as such analogy might really influence the convictions of the members. They were free, self-judging persons—unassisted by the schooling, but at the same time untrammelled by the awe-striking ascendancy, of a professional judge—obeying the spontaneous inspirations of their own consciences, and recognising no authority except the laws of the city, with which they were familiar.

Trial by jury, as practised in England since 1688, has been politically most valuable, as a security against the encroachments of an anti-popular executive. Partly for this reason, partly for others not necessary to state here, it has had greater credit as an instrument of judicature generally, and has been supposed to produce much more of what is good in English administration of justice, than really belongs to it. Amidst the unqualified encomiums so frequently bestowed upon the honesty, the unprejudiced

The encomiums usually pronounced upon the jury-trial would apply yet more strongly to the Athenian dikasteries.

qu'il leur en fait pour la sanctionner par leur déclaration. Ains i au lieu de deux juges que l'accusé devoit avoir, il n'en a bien souvent qu'un seul, qui est le président de la Cour d'Assise."

Anselm Feuerbach (in the second part of his work, *Ueber die Oeffentlichkeit und Mündlichkeit der Gerechtkeitspflege*, which contains his review of the French judicial system, *Ueber die Gerichtsverfassung Frankreichs*. Abth. iii. H. v. p. 477) confirms this statement from a large observation of the French courts of justice.

The habit of the French juries, in so many doubtful cases, to pronounce a verdict of guilty by a majority of seven against five (in which case the law threw the burden of actual condemnation upon the judges present in court, directing their votes to be counted along with those of the jury) is a remarkable proof of this aversion of the jury to the responsibility of decision: see Feuerbach, *ibid.* p. 481 *seq.* Compare also the treatise of the same author, *Betrachtungen über das Geschwornen-Gericht*. p. 186-198.

rectitude of appreciation, the practical instinct for detecting falsehood and resisting sophistry, in twelve citizens taken by hazard and put into a jury-box—comparatively little account is taken either of the aids, or of the restrictions, or of the corrections in the shape of new trials, under which they act, or of the artificial forensic medium into which they are plunged for the time of their service: so that the theory of the case presumes them to be more of spontaneous agents, and more analogous to the Athenian dikasts, than the practice confirms. Accordingly, when we read these encomiums in modern authors, we shall find that both the direct benefits ascribed to jury-trial in ensuring pure and even-handed justice, and still more its indirect benefits in improving and educating the citizens generally—might have been set forth yet more emphatically in a laudatory harangue of Periklês about the Athenian dikasteries. If it be true that an Englishman or an American counts more certainly on an impartial and uncorrupt verdict from a jury of his country than from a permanent professional judge, much more would this be the feeling of an ordinary Athenian, when he compared the dikasteries with the archon. The juror hears and judges under full persuasion that he himself individually stands in need of the same protection or redress invoked by others: so also did the dikast. As to the effects of jury-trial in diffusing respect to the laws and constitution—in giving to every citizen a personal interest in enforcing the former and maintaining the latter—in imparting a sentiment of dignity to small and poor men, through the discharge of a function exalted as well as useful—in calling forth the patriotic sympathies, and exercising the mental capacities of every individual—all these effects were produced in a still higher degree by the dikasteries at Athens; from their greater frequency, numbers, and spontaneity of mental action, without any professional judge, upon whom they could throw the responsibility of deciding for them.¹

¹ I transcribe from an eminent lawyer of the United States—Mr. Livingston, author of a Penal Code for the State of Louisiana (Preface, p. 12-16), an eloquent panegyric on Trial by Jury. It contains little more than the topics commonly insisted on, but it is expressed with

peculiar warmth, and with the greater fulness, inasmuch as the people of Louisiana, for whom the author was writing, had no familiarity with the institution and its working. The reader will observe that almost everything here said, in recommendation of the

On the other hand, the imperfections inherent in jury-trial were likewise disclosed in an exaggerated form under the Athenian system. Both juror and dikast represent the average man of the time and of the neighbourhood, exempt indeed from pecuniary corruption or personal fear,—deciding according to what he thinks justice or to some genuine feeling of equity, mercy, religion, or patriotism,

Imperfections of jury-trial—exaggerated in the procedure of the dikasteries.

jury, might have been urged by Periklēs with much truer and wider application, in enforcing his transfer of judicial power from individual magistrates to the dikasteries.

“By our constitution (*i. e.* in Louisiana), the right of a trial by jury is secured to the accused, but it is not exclusively established. This however may be done by law, and there are so many strong reasons in its favour, that it has been thought proper to insert in the code a precise declaration that in all criminal prosecutions, the trial by jury is a privilege which cannot be renounced. Were it left entirely at the option of the accused, a desire to propitiate the favour of the judge, ignorance of his interest, or the confusion incident to his situation, might induce him to waive the advantage of a trial by his country, and thus by degrees accustom the people to a spectacle which they ought never to behold—a single man determining the fact, applying the law, and disposing at his will of the life, liberty, and reputation of a citizen . . . Those who advocate the present disposition of our laws say—admitting the trial by jury to be an advantage, the law does enough when it gives the accused the option to avail himself of its benefits: he is the best judge whether it will be useful to him: and it would be unjust to direct him in so important a choice. This argument is specious, but not

solid. There are reasons, and some have already been stated, to show that this choice cannot be freely exercised. There is moreover another interest besides that of the culprit to be considered. If he be guilty, the state has an interest in his conviction: and whether guilty or innocent, it has a higher interest,—that the fact should be fairly canvassed before judges inaccessible to influence, and unbiassed by any false views of official duty. It has an interest in the character of its administration of justice, and a paramount duty to perform in rendering it free from suspicion. It is not true therefore to say, that the laws do enough when they give the choice between a fair and impartial trial, and one that is liable to the greatest objections. They must do more—they must restrict that choice, so as not to suffer an ill-advised individual to degrade them into instruments of ruin, though it should be voluntarily inflicted; or of death, though that death should be suicide.”

“Another advantage of rendering this mode of trial obligatory is, that it diffuses the most valuable information among every rank of citizens: it is a school, of which every jury that is impanelled is a separate class, where the dictates of the laws and the consequence of disobedience to them are practically taught. The frequent exercise of these important functions moreover gives a sense of dignity and

which in reference to the case before him he thinks as good as justice—but not exempt from sympathies, antipathies,

self-respect, not only becoming to the character of a free citizen, but which adds to his private happiness. Neither party-spirit, nor intrigue, nor power, can deprive him of his share in the administration of justice, though they can humble the pride of every other office and vacate every other place. Every time he is called upon to act in this capacity, he must feel *that though placed in perhaps the humblest station, he is yet the guardian of the life, the liberty, and the reputation of his fellow-citizens against injustice and oppression; and that while his plain understanding has been found the best refuge for innocence, his incorruptible integrity is pronounced a sure pledge that guilt will not escape.* A state whose *most obscure citizens* are thus individually elevated to perform these august functions; who are alternately the defenders of the injured, the dread of the guilty, the vigilant guardians of the constitution; without whose consent no punishment can be inflicted, no disgrace incurred; who can by their voice arrest the blow of oppression, and direct the hand of justice where to strike—such a state can never sink into slavery, or easily submit to oppression. Corrupt rulers may pervert the constitution: ambitious demagogues may violate its precepts: foreign influence may control its operations: but while the people enjoy the trial by jury, taken by lot from among themselves, they cannot cease to be free. The information it spreads, the sense of dignity and independence it inspires, the courage it creates—will always give them an energy of resistance that can grapple with

encroachments, and a renovating spirit that will make arbitrary power despair. The enemies of freedom know this: they know how admirable a vehicle it is, to convey the contagion of those liberal principles which attack the vitals of their power, and they therefore guard against its introduction with more care than they would take to avoid pestilential disease. In countries where it already exists, they insidiously endeavour to innovate, because they dare not openly destroy: changes inconsistent with the spirit of the institution are introduced, under the plausible pretext of improvement: *the common class of citizens are too ill-informed to perform the functions of jurors—a selection is necessary.* This choice must be confided to an agent of executive power, and must be made among the most eminent for education, wealth, and respectability: so that after several successive operations of political chemistry, a shining result may be obtained, freed indeed from all republican dross, but without any of the intrinsic value that is found in the rugged, but inflexible integrity, and incorruptible worth, of the original composition. Men impanelled by this process bear no resemblance but in name to the *sturdy, honest, unlettered jurors who derive no dignity but from the performance of their duties; and the momentary exercise of whose functions gives no time for the work of corruption or the influence of fear.* By innovations such as these the institution is so changed as to leave nothing to attach the affections or awaken the interest of the people, and it is neglected as an

and prejudices, all of which act the more powerfully because there is often no consciousness of their presence, and because they even appear essential to his idea of plain and straightforward good sense. According as a jury is composed of Catholics or Protestants, Irishmen or Englishmen, tradesmen, farmers, or inhabitants of a frontier on which smuggling prevails,—there is apt to prevail among them a corresponding bias. At the time of any great national delusion, such as the Popish Plot—or of any powerful local excitement, such as that of the Church and King mobs at Birmingham in 1791 against Dr. Priestley and the Dissenters—juries are found to perpetrate what a calmer age recognises to have been gross injustice. A jury, who disapprove of the infliction of capital punishment for a particular crime, will acquit prisoners in spite of the

useless, or abandoned as a mischievous contrivance.”

Consistently with this earnest admiration of jury-trial, Mr. Livingston, by the provisions of his code, limits very materially the interference of the presiding judge, thus bringing back the jurors more nearly to a similarity with the Athenian dikasts (p. 85): “I restrict the charge of the judge to an opinion of the law and to the repetition of the evidence, *only when required by any one of the jury*. The practice of repeating all the testimony from notes,—always (from the nature of things) imperfectly, not seldom inaccurately, and sometimes carelessly taken,—has a double disadvantage: it makes the jurors, who rely more on the judge’s notes than on their own memory, inattentive to the evidence; and it gives them an imperfect copy of that which the nature of the trial by jury requires that they should record in their own minds. Forced to rely upon themselves, the necessity will quicken their attention, and it will be only when they disagree in their recollection that recourse will be had to the notes of the

judge.” Mr. Livingston goes on to add, that the judges, from their old habits acquired as practising advocates, are scarcely ever neutral—always take a side—and generally against the prisoners on trial.

The same considerations as those which Mr. Livingston here sets forth to demonstrate the value of jury-trial, are also insisted upon by M. Charles Comte, in his translation of Sir Richard Phillips’s *Treatise on Juries*, enlarged with many valuable reflections on the different shape which the jury-system has assumed in England and France (*Des Pouvoirs et des Obligations des Jury*, traduit de l’Anglois, par Charles Comte, 2d ed. Paris, 1828, with preliminary *Considérations sur le Pouvoir Judiciaire*, pp. 100 *seqq.*).

The length of this note forbids my citing anything farther either from the eulogistic observations of Sir Richard Phillips or from those of M. Comte: but they would be found (like those of Mr. Livingston) even more applicable to the dikasteries of Athens than to the juries of England and America.

clearest evidence of guilt. It is probable that a delinquent, indicted for any state offence before the dikastery at Athens, —having only a private accuser to contend against, with equal power of speaking in his own defence, of summoning witnesses and of procuring friends to speak for him—would have better chance of a fair trial than he would now have anywhere except in England and the United States of America; and better than he would have had in England down to the seventeenth century.¹ Juries bring the common

¹ Mr. Jardine (Criminal Trials, Introd. p. 8) observes, that the "proceedings against persons accused of state offences in the earlier periods of our history, do not deserve the name of trials: they were a mere mockery of justice," &c.

Respecting what English juries have been, it is curious to peruse the following remarks of Mr. Daines Barrington, Observations on the Statutes, p. 409. In remarking on a statute of Henry VII. A.D. 1494, he says—

"The 21st chapter recites—'That perjury is much and customarily used within the city of Loudon, among such persons as passen and been impelled in issue, joined between party and party.'

"This offence hath been before this statute complained of in preambles to several laws, being always the perjury of a *juror*, who finds a verdict contrary to his oath, and not that which we hear too much of at present, in the witnesses produced at a trial.

"In the Dance of Death, written originally in French by Macharel, and translated by John Lydgate in this reign, with some additions to adapt it to English characters—a juryman is mentioned, who had often been bribed for giving a false verdict, which shows the offence to have been very common. The sheriff, who summoned the jury, was likewise greatly accessory to this crime, by summoning those

who were most partial and prejudiced. Carew, in his account of Cornwall, informs us that it was a common article in an attorney's bill to charge *pro amicitia vicecomitis*.

"It is likewise remarkable, that partiality and perjury in jurors of the city of London is more particularly complained of than in other parts of England, by the preamble of this and other statutes. Stow informs us that in 1468, many jurors of this city were punished by having papers fixed on their heads, stating their offence of having been tampered with by the parties to the suit. He likewise complains that this crying offence continued in the time of Queen Elizabeth, when he wrote his account of London: and Fuller, in his English Worthies, mentions it as a proverbial saying, that London juries hang half and save half. Grafton also, in his Chronicle, informs us that the Chancellor of the diocese of London was indicted for a murder, and that the bishop wrote a letter to Cardinal Wolsey, in behalf of his officer, to stop the prosecution, 'because London juries were so prejudiced, that they would find Abel guilty for the murder of Cain.'

"The punishment for a false verdict by the petty jury is by writ of attain: and the statute directs, that half of the grand jury, when the trial is *per medietatem linguæ*,

feeling as well as the common reason of the public—or often indeed only the separate feeling of particular fractions of the public—to dictate the application of the law to particular cases. They are a protection against anything worse—especially against such corruption or servility as are liable to taint permanent official persons—but they cannot possibly reach anything better. Now the dikast trial at Athens effected the same object, and had in it only the same ingredients of error and misdecision, as the English jury: but it had them in stronger dose,¹ without the counter-

shall be strangers, not Londoners.

‘And there ’s no London jury,
but are led

In evidence as far by common
fame,

As they are by present deposition.
’

(Ben Jonson’s *Magnetic Lady*, Act
III. Sc. 3.)

“It appears by 15 Henry VI. c. 5 (which likewise recites the great increase of perjury in jurors and in the strongest terms), that in every attaint there were thirteen defendants—the twelve jurors who gave the verdict and the plaintiff or defendant who had obtained it, who therefore was supposed to have used corrupt means to procure it. For this reason, if the verdict was given in favour of the crown, no attaint could be brought, because the king could not be joined as a defendant with the jury who were prosecuted.”

Compare also the same work, p. 394-457, and Mr. Amos’s *Notes on Fortescue de Laudib. Leg. Angliæ*, c. 27.

¹ In France, jury-trial was only introduced for the first time by the Constituent Assembly in 1790; and then only for Criminal procedure: I transcribe the following remarks on the working of it from the instructive article in Merlin’s ‘*Répertoire de Jurisprudence*,’ article *Juré*. Though written in a spirit very favourable to the jury, it pro-

claims the reflections of an observing lawyer on the temper and competence of the jurymen whom he had seen in action, and on their disposition to pronounce the verdict according to the *feeling* which the case before them inspired.

“Pourquoi faut-il qu’une institution qui rassure les citoyens contre l’endurcissement et la prévention si funeste à l’innocence, que peut produire l’habitude de juger les crimes . . . qu’une institution qui donne pour juges à un accusé, des citoyens indépendans de toute espèce d’influence, ses pairs, ses égaux . . . pourquoi faut-il que cette institution, dont les formes sont simples, touchantes, patriarcales, dont la théorie flatte et entraîne l’esprit par une séduction irrésistible, ait été si souvent méconnue, trompée par l’ignorance et la pusillanimité, prostituée peut-être par une vile et coupable corruption?”

“Rendons pourtant justice aux erreurs, même à la prévarication, des jurés: ils ont trop de fois acquitté les coupables, mais il n’a pas encore été prouvé qu’ils eussent jamais fait couler une goutte de sang innocent: et si l’on pouvoit supposer qu’ils eussent vu quelquefois le crime là où il n’y en avoit qu’une apparence trompeuse et fausse, ce ne seroit pas leur conscience qu’il faudroit accuser: ce seroit la fatalité malheureuse

acting authority of a judge, and without the benefit of a procedure such as has now been obtained in England.

des circonstances qui auroient accompagné l'accusation, et qui auroit trompé de même les juges les plus pénétrants et les plus exercés à rechercher la vérité et à la démêler du mensonge.

“Mais les reproches qu'ont souvent mérités les jurés, c'est d'avoir cédé à une fausse commisération, ou à l'intérêt qu'étoient parvenus à leur inspirer les familles d'accusés qui avoient un rang dans la société: c'est souvent d'être sortis de leurs attributions, qui se bornent à apprécier les faits, et les juger d'une manière différente de la loi. *J'ai vu cent exemples de ces usurpations de pouvoir et de ce despotisme des jurés.* Trop souvent ils ont voulu voir une action innocente, là où la loi avoit dit qu'il y avoit un crime, et alors ils n'ont pas craint de se jouer de la vérité pour tromper et éluder la loi.”
 “Sera-t-il possible d'améliorer l'institution des jurés, et d'en prévenir les écarts souvent trop scandaleux? Gardons-nous d'en douter. Que l'on commence par composer le jury de propriétaires intéressés à punir le crime pour le rendre plus rare: que surtout on en éloigne les artisans, les petits cultivateurs, hommes chez qui sans doute la probité est heureusement forte commune, mais dont l'esprit est peu exercé, et qui accoutumés aux déférences, aux égards, cèdent toujours à l'opinion de ceux de leurs collègues dont le rang est plus distingué: ou qui, familiarisés seulement avec les idées relatives à leur profession, n'ont jamais eu, dans tout le reste, que des idées d'emprunt ou d'inspiration. On sait qu'aujourd'hui ce sont ces hommes qui dans presque toute la France forment toujours

la majorité des jurés: mettez au milieu d'eux un homme d'un état plus élevé, d'un esprit délié, d'une élocution facile, il entraînera ses collègues, il décidera la délibération: et si cet homme a le jugement faux ou le cœur corrompu, cette délibération sera nécessairement mauvaise.

“Mais pourra-t-on parvenir à vaincre l'insouciance des propriétaires riches et éclairés, à leur faire abandonner leurs affaires, leurs familles, leurs habitudes, pour les entraîner dans les villes, et leur y faire remplir des fonctions qui tourmentent quelquefois la probité, et donnent des inquiétudes d'autant plus vives que la conscience est plus délicate? Pourquoi non? Pourquoi les mêmes classes de citoyens qui dans les huit ou dix premiers mois de 1792, se portaient avec tant de zèle à l'exercice de ces fonctions, les fuioient-elles aujourd'hui? surtout si, pour les y rappeler, la loi fait mouvoir les deux grands ressorts qui sont dans sa main, si elle s'engage à récompenser l'exactitude, et à punir la négligence?” (Merlin, Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 97.)

In these passages it deserves notice, that what is particularly remarked about juries, both English and French, is, their reluctance to convict accused persons brought before them. Now the character of the Athenian dikasts, as described by Mr. Mitford and by many other authors, is the precise reverse of this: an extreme severity and cruelty, and a disposition to convict all accused persons brought before them, upon little or no evidence—especially rich accused persons. I venture

The feelings of the dikasts counted for more, and their reason for less: not merely because of their greater numbers, which naturally heightened the pitch of feeling in each individual—but also because the addresses of orators or parties formed the prominent part of the procedure, and the depositions of witnesses only a very subordinate part. The dikast¹ therefore heard little of the naked facts, the

to affirm that to ascribe to them such a temper generally, is not less improbable in itself, than unsupported by any good evidence. In the speeches remaining to us from defendants, we do indeed find complaints made of the severity of the dikasteries: but in those speeches which come from accusers, there are abundance of complaints to the contrary—of over-indulgence on the part of the dikasteries, and consequent impunity of criminals. Nor does Aristophanês—by whom most modern authors are guided even when they do not quote him—when fairly studied, bear out the temper ascribed by Mr. Mitford to the dikasts; even if we admitted Aristophanês to be a faithful and trustworthy witness, which no man who knows his picture of Sokratês will be disposed to do. Aristophanês takes hold of every quality which will raise a laugh against the dikasts, and his portrait of them as Wasps was well-calculated for this purpose—to describe them as boiling over with acrimony, irritation, impatience to find some one whom they could convict and punish. But even he, when he comes to describe these dikasts in action, represents them as obeying the appeals to their pity, as well as those to their anger—as being yielding and impressionable when their feelings are approached on either side, and unable, when they hear the exculpatory appeal of the accused,

to maintain the anger which had been raised by the speech of the accuser. (See Aristophan. *Vesp.* 574, 713, 727, 974.) Moreover, if from the *Vespæ* we turn to the *Nubes*, where the poet attacks the sophists and not the dikasts, we are there told that the sophists could arm any man with fallacies and subterfuges which would enable him to procure acquittal from the dikasts, whatever might be the crime committed.

I believe that this open-mindedness, and impressibility of the feelings on all sides, by art, eloquence, prayers, tears, invectives, &c., is the true character of the Athenian dikasts. And I also believe that they were, as a general rule, more open to commiseration than to any other feeling—liko what is above said respecting the French jurymen: εὐκίνητος πρὸς ὀργήν (ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος), εὐμετάθετος πρὸς ἔλεον—this expression of Plutarch about the Athenian demos is no less true about the dikasts: compare also the description given by Pliny (*H. N.* xxxv.10) of the memorable picture of the Athenian demos by the painter Parrhasius.

¹ That the difference between the dikast and the jurymen, in this respect, is only one of degree, I need hardly remark. M. Merlin observes, “Je ne pense pas, comme bien des gens, que pour être propre aux fonctions de juré, il suffit d’avoir une intelligence ordinaire et de la probité. Si l’accusé paroissoit seul aux débats avec

appropriate subjects for his reason—but he was abundantly supplied with the plausible falsehoods, calumnies, irrelevant statements and suggestions, &c., of the parties, and that too in a manner skilfully adapted to his temper. To keep the facts of the case before the jury, apart from the falsehood and colouring of parties, is the most useful function of the modern judge, whose influence is also considerable as a restraint upon the pleader. The helps to the reason

les témoins, il ne faudroit sans doute que du bon sens pour reconnoître la vérité dans des déclarations faites avec simplicité et dégagées de tout raisonnement: mais il y paroît assisté presque toujours d'un ou de plusieurs défenseurs qui par des interpellations captieuses, embarrassent ou égarent les témoins: et par une discussion subtile, souvent sophistique, quelquefois éloquente, enveloppent la vérité des nuages, et rendent l'évidence même problématique. Certes, il faut plus que de bonnes intentions, il faut plus que du bon sens, pour ne pas se laisser entraîner à ces fausses lueurs, pour se garantir des écarts de la sensibilité, et pour se maintenir immuablement dans la ligne du vrai, au milieu de ces impulsions données en même temps à l'esprit et au cœur" (Merlin. Répertoire de Jurisprudence, art. Jurés, p. 98).

At Athens, there were no professional advocates: the accuser and the accused (or the plaintiff and defendant, if the cause was civil), each appeared in person with their witnesses, or sometimes with depositions which the witnesses had sworn to before the archon: each might come with a speech prepared by Antipho (Thucyd. viii. 6) or some other rhetor: each might have one or more *ἑταίρους* to speak on his behalf after himself, but seemingly only out of the space of time allotted to

him by the clepsydra. In civil causes, the defendant must have been perfectly acquainted with the plaintiff's case, since besides the *Anakrisis* or preliminary examination before the archon, the cause had been for the most part already before an arbitrator. In a criminal case the accused party had only the *Anakrisis* to guide him, as to the matter of which he was to be accused: but it appears from the prepared speeches of accused parties which we now possess, that this *Anakrisis* must have been sufficiently copious to give him a good idea of that which he had to rebut. The accuser was condemned to a fine of 1000 drachms, if he did not obtain on the verdict one-fifth of the votes of the *dikasts* engaged.

Antipho not only composed speeches for pleaders before the *dikastery*, but also gave them valuable advice generally as to the manner of conducting their case, &c., though he did not himself speak before the *dikasts*: so also *Ktesiklēs* the *λογογράφος* (Demosthenēs cont. Theokrin. c. 5) acted as general adviser or attorney. Xenophon (Memor. i. 2, 51) notices the persons "who knew how to furnish advice and aid to those engaged in a suit at law" (*οἱ συνδικαίων ἐπιστάμενοι*) as analogous to the surgeon when a man was sick; though they bore no current professional name.

of the dikast were thus materially diminished, while the action upon his feelings, of anger as well as of compassion, was sharpened, as compared with the modern juror.¹ We see in the remaining productions of the Attic orators how much there is of plausible deception, departure from the true issue, and appeals to sympathies, antipathies, and prejudices of every kind, addressed to the dikasteries.² Of

¹ Aristotle in the first and second chapters of his Treatise de Rhetoricâ, complains that the teachers and writers on rhetoric who preceded him, treated almost entirely of the different means of working on the feelings of the dikasts, and of matters "extraneous to the real question which the dikasts ought to try" (περὶ τῶν ἕξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλείστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργή, οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν, &c., i. 1, 1: compare, i. 2, 3 and iii. 1, 2).

This is sufficient to show how prominent such appeals to the feelings of the dikasts were, in actual fact and practice, even if we did not know it from the perusal of the orations themselves.

Respecting the habit of accused persons to bring their wives and children before the dikasts as suppliants for them to obtain mercy or acquittal, see Aristophan. Vesp. 567-976; Andokidês de Mysteriis (ad finem), and Lysias Orat. iv. de Vulnere (ad finem).

² To a person accustomed to the judicature of modern Europe, conducted throughout all its stages by the instrumentality of professional men (judges, advocates, attorneys, &c.), and viewed by the general public as a matter in which no private citizen either could act or ought to act for himself—nothing is more remarkable in reading the Attic judicial orations (to a certain extent also the Roman) than the entire absence of this professional

feeling, and the exhibition of justice both invoked and administered by private citizens exclusively. The nearest analogy to this, which modern justice presents, is to be found in the Courts of Requests and other courts for trying causes limited to small sums of property—too small to be worth the notice of judges and lawyers.

These Courts, in spite of their direct and important bearing on the welfare and security of the poorer classes, have received little elucidation. The History of the Birmingham Court of Requests, by Mr. William Hutton (lately published by Messrs. Chambers), forms an exception to this remark, and is full of instruction in respect to the habits, the conduct, and the sufferings of poor persons. It furnishes, besides, the closest approach that I know to the feelings of Athenian dikasts and pleaders, though of course with many important differences. Mr. Hutton was for many years unremitting in his attendance as a Commissioner, and took warm interest in the honourable working of the Court. His remarks upon the position, the duties, and the difficulties of the Commissioners, illustrated by numerous cases given in detail, are extremely interesting, and represent thoughts which must have often suggested themselves to intelligent dikasts at Athens.

"Law and equity (he says, p. 34) often vary. If the Commissioners cannot decide *against* law, they

course such artifices were resorted to by opposite speakers in each particular trial. We have no means of knowing to what extent they actually perverted the judgement of the hearers.¹ Probably the frequent habit of sitting in dikastery gave them a penetration in detecting sophistry not often possessed by non-professional citizens. Nevertheless it cannot be doubted that in a considerable proportion of cases, success depended less upon the intrinsic merits of a case, than upon apparent airs of innocence and truth-telling, dexterity of statement, and good general character, in the parties, their witnesses, and the friends who addressed the court on their behalf. The accusatory speeches in Attic oratory, wherein punishment is invoked upon an alleged delinquent, are expressed with a bitterness which is now banished from English criminal judicature, though it was common in the state trials of two centuries ago. Against them may be set the impassioned and emphatic appeals made by defendants and their friends to the commiseration of the dikasts; appeals the more often successful,

can decide *without* it. Their oath binds them to proceed according to *good conscience* (περὶ ὅτου ὄρκισι νόμοι, γνώμη τῆ δικαιοσύνη—was the oath of the Athenian dikast). A man only needs information to be able to decide."

A few words from p. 36, about the sources of misjudgement. "Misinformation is another source of evil: both parties equally treat the Commissioners with deceit. The only people who can throw light upon the subject will not.

"It is difficult not to be won by the first speaker, if he carries the air of mildness and is master of his tale; or not to be biased in favour of infirmity or infancy. Those who cannot assist themselves, we are much inclined to assist.

"Nothing dissolves like tears. Though they arise from weakness, they are powerful advocates, which instantly disarm, particularly those which the afflicted wish to hide. They come from the heart and will

reach it, if the judge has a heart to reach. Distress and pity are inseparable.

"Perhaps there never was a judge, from seventeen to seventy, who could look with indifference upon beauty in distress; if he could, he was unfit to be a judge. He should be a stranger to decision who is a stranger to compassion. All these matters influence the man, and warp his judgement."

This is a description, given by a perfectly honest and unprofessional judge, of his own feelings when on the bench. It will be found illustrated by frequent passages in the Attic pleaders, where they address themselves to the feelings here described in the bosom of the dikasts.

¹ Demosthenês (cont. Phormio. p. 913, o. 2) emphatically remarks how much more cautious witnesses were of giving false testimony before the numerous dikastery, than before the arbitrator.

because they came last, immediately before decision was pronounced. This is true of Rome as well as of Athens.¹

As an organ for judicial purposes, the Athenian dikasteries were thus a simple and plenary manifestation of jury-trial, with its inherent excellences and defects both brought out in exaggerated relief. They ensured a decision at once uncorrupt, public-minded, and imposing—together with the best security which the case admitted against illegal violences on the part of the rich and great.² Their extreme publicity—as well as their simple and oral procedure, divested of that verbal and ceremonial technicality which marked the law of Rome even at its outset, was no small benefit. And as the verdicts of the dikasts, even when wrong, depended upon causes of misjudgement common to them with the general body of the citizens, so they never appeared to pronounce unjustly, nor lost the confidence of their fellow-citizens generally. But whatever may have been their defects as judicial instruments, as a stimulus both to thought and speech, their efficacy was unparalleled, in the circumstances of Athenian society. Doubtless they would not have produced the same effect if established at Thebes or Argos. The susceptibilities of the Athenian mind, as well as the previous practice and expansive tendencies of democratical citizenship, were

¹ Asconius gives an account of the begging off and supplication to the judges at Rome, when sentence was about to be pronounced upon Scaurus, whom Cicero defended (*Cic. Orat. pro Scauro*, p. 28. ed. Orell.): "Laudaverunt Scaurum consulares novem—Horum magna pars per tabellas laudaverunt, qui aberant: inter quos Pompeius quoque. Unus præterea adolescens laudavit, frater ejus, Faustus Cornelius, Syllæ filius. Is in laudatione multa humiliter et cum lacrimis locus non minus audientes permovit, quam Scaurus ipse permoverat. Ad genua judicum, cum sententiæ ferrentur, bifariam se diviserunt qui pro eo rogabant: ab uno latere

Scaurus ipse et M. Glabrio, sororifilius, et Paulus, et P. Lentulus, et L. Æmilius Buca, et C. Memmius, supplicaverunt: ex alterâ parte Syllæ Faustus, frater Scauri, et T. Annius Milo, et T. Peducæus, et C. Cato, et M. Octavius Lænas."

Compare also Cicero, *Brutus*, c. 23, about the defence of Sergius Galba: *Quintilian*, I. O. ii. 15.

² Plato, in his *Treatise de Legibus* (vi. p. 768), adopts all the distinguishing principles of the Athenian dikasteries. He particularly insists, that the citizen who does not take his share in the exercise of this function, conceives himself to have no concern or interest in the commonwealth—*το παράπαν τῆς πόλεως οὐ μέτοχος εἶναι*.

also essential conditions—and that genuine taste for sitting in judgement and hearing both sides fairly, which, however Aristophanês may caricature and deride it, was alike honourable and useful to the people. The first establishment of the dikasteries is nearly coincident with the great improvement of Attic tragedy in passing from Æschylus to Sophoklês. The same development of the national genius, now preparing splendid manifestations both in tragic and comic poetry, was called with redoubled force into the path of oratory, by the new judicial system. A certain power of speech now became necessary, not merely for those who intended to take a prominent part in politics, but also for private citizens to vindicate their rights or repel accusations, in a court of justice. It was an accomplishment of the greatest practical utility, even apart from ambitious purposes; hardly less so than the use of arms or the practice of the gymnasium. Accordingly, the teachers of grammar and rhetoric, and the composers of written speeches to be delivered by others, now began to multiply and to acquire an unprecedented importance—as well at Athens as under the contemporary democracy of Syracuse,¹ in which also some form of popular judicature was established. Style and speech began to be reduced to a system, and so communicated; not always happily, for several of the early rhetors² adopted an artificial, ornate, and conceited manner, from which Attic good taste afterwards liberated itself. But the very character of a teacher of rhetoric as an art,—a man giving precepts and putting himself forward in show-lectures as a model for others, is a feature first belonging to the Perikleian age, and indicates a new demand in the minds of the citizens.

We begin to hear, in the generation now growing up, of the rhetor and the sophist, as persons of influence and

¹ Aristot. ap. Cicero. Brut. c. 12. "Itaque cum sublatis in Sicilia tyrannis res privata longo intervallo judiciis repeterentur, tum primum quod esset acuta ea gens et controversa naturâ, artem et præcepta Siculos Coracem et Tisiam conscripsisse," &c. Compare Diodor. xi. 87; Pausan. vi. 17, 8.

² Especially Gorgias; see Aristotel. Rhetor. iii. 1, 26; Timæus, Fr.; Dionys. Halicarn. De Lysiâ Judicium, c. 3: also Foss, Dissertatio de Gorgiâ Leontino, p. 20 (Halle, 1828); and Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Græchenland und Rom, sect. 30, 31.

Necessity of learning to speak—growth of professional teachers of rhetoric—professional composers of speeches for others.

celebrity. These two names denoted persons of similar Rhetors and moral and intellectual endowments, or often in- sophists. deed the same person, considered in different points of view;¹ either as professing to improve the moral character—or as communicating power and facility of expression—or as suggesting premises for persuasion, illustrations on the common-places of morals and politics, argumentative abundance on matters of ordinary experience, dialectical subtlety in confuting an opponent, &c.² Antipho of the deme Rhamnus in Attica, Thrasymachus of Chalkêdon, Tisias of Syracuse, Gorgias of Leontini, Protagoras of Abdêra, Prodikus of Keôs, Theodôrus of Byzantium, Hippias of Elis, Zeno of Elea, were among the first who distinguished themselves in these departments of teaching. Antipho was the author of the earliest composed speech really spoken in a dikastery and preserved down to the later critics.³ These men were

¹ Plato (Gorgias, c. 20-75; Protagoras, c. 9). Lysias is sometimes designated as a sophist (Demosth. cont. Neær. c. 7. p. 1351; Athenæ. xiii. p. 592). There is no sufficient reason for supposing with Taylor (Vit. Lysiæ, p. 56, ed. Dobson) that there were two persons named Lysias, and that the person here named is a different man from the author of the speeches which remain to us: see Mr. Fynes Clinton, Fast. H. p. 360, Appendix, c. 20.

² See the first book of Aristotle's Rhetoric (alluded to in a former note) for his remarks on the technical teachers of rhetoric before his time. He remarks (and Plato had remarked before him) (i. 1 and 2) that their teaching was for the most part thoroughly narrow and practical, bearing exclusively on what was required for the practice of the dikastery (περὶ τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες περιώνται τεχνολογῆν): compare also a remarkable passage in his Treatise de Sophisticis Elenchis, c. 32 ad finem. And though he himself lays down a far more profound and comprehensive theory of rhetoric and all matters

appertaining to it (in a treatise which has rarely been surpassed in power of philosophical analysis), yet when he is recommending his speculation to notice, he appeals to the great practical value of rhetorical teaching, as enabling a man to "help himself" and fight his own battles in case of need—Ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἐπουτῶ, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν (i. 1, 3: compare iii. 1, 2; Plato, Gorgias, c. 41-55; Protagoras, c. 9; Phædrus, c. 43-50; Euthydem. c. 1-31; and Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 12, 2, 3).

See also the character of Proxenus in the Anabasis of Xenophon, ii. 6, 16; Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 307; Aristoph. Nubes, 1108; Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 48; Plato, Alkibiadês, i. c. 31, p. 119; and a striking passage in Plutarch's life of Cato the elder, c. 1.

³ Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 832; Quintilian, iii. 1, 10. Compare Van Spaan (or Ruhnken), Dissertatio de Antiphonte Oratore Attico, pp. 8, 9, prefixed to Dobson's edition of Antipho and Andokidês. Antipho is said to have been the teacher

mostly not citizens of Athens, though many of them belonged to towns comprehended in the Athenian empire, at a time when important judicial causes belonging to these towns were often carried up to be tried at Athens—while all of them looked to that city as a central point of action and distinction. The term *Sophist*, which Herodotus¹ applies with sincere respect to men of distinguished wisdom such as Solon, Anacharsis, Pythagoras, &c., now came to be applied to these teachers of virtue, rhetoric, conversation, and disputation; many of whom professed acquaintance with the whole circle of human science, physical as well as moral (then narrow enough), so far as was necessary to talk about any portion of it plausibly and effectively, and to answer any question which might be proposed to them. Though they passed from one Grecian town to another, partly in the capacity of envoys from their fellow-citizens, partly as exhibiting their talents to numerous hearers, with much renown and large gain,²—they appear to have been viewed with jealousy and dislike by a large portion of the public.³ For at a time when every citizen pleaded his own cause before the dikastery, they imparted, to those who were rich enough to purchase it, a peculiar skill in the common weapons, which made them like fencing-masters or professional swordsmen amidst a society of untrained duellists.⁴ Moreover Sokratês,

of the historian Thucydidês. The statement of Plutarch that the father of Antipho was also a *sophist*, can hardly be true.

¹ Herodot. i. 29; iv. 95.

² Plato (Hippias Major, c. 1, 2; Menon, p. 95; and Gorgias, c. 1, with Stallbaum's note); Diodor. xii. 53; Pausan. vi. 17, 8.

³ Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 31. To teach or learn the art of speech was the common reproach made by the vulgar against philosophers and lettered men—τὸ κοινῇ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμωμένον (Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31). Compare Æschinês cont. Timar. about Demosthenês, c. 25, 27, which illustrates the curious fragment of Sophoklês, 865. Οἱ γὰρ γυῖανδροι καὶ λέγειν ἤσκηχόταες.

⁴ Such is probably the meaning of that remarkable passage in which Thucydidês describes the Athenian rhetor Antipho (viii. 68): Ἀντιφῶν, ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναίων ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς ὕστερος, καὶ κράτιστος ἐνθουμαχῆσαι γενόμενος καὶ ἃ ἂν γνοίη εἰπεῖν καὶ ἐς μὲν δῆμον οὐ παριῶν οὐδ' ἐς ἄλλον ἀγῶνα ἐκούσιος οὐδένα, ἀλλ' ὑπόπτως τῶν πλήθει διὰ δόξαν δεινότητος διακείμενος, τοῦς μένοι ἀγωνιζομένους καὶ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ καὶ ἐν δήμῳ, πλεῖστα εἰς ἀνὴρ, ἥστις συμβουλεύσατό τι, δυνάμενος ὡφελεῖν. "Inde illa circa occultandam eloquentiam simulatio," observes Quintilian, Inst. Or. iv. 1, 8.

Compare Plato (Protagoras, c. 8; Phædrus, c. 86), Isokratês cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 295, where he complains of the teachers—οὔτι-

—himself a product of the same age, a disputant on the same subjects, and bearing the same name of a *Sophist*¹—but despising political and judicial practice, and looking to the production of intellectual stimulus and moral impressions upon his hearers—Sokratês—or rather, Plato speaking through the person of Sokratês—carried on throughout his life a constant polemical warfare against the sophists and rhetors, in that negative vein in which he was unrivalled. And as the works of these latter have not remained, it is chiefly from the observations of their opponents that we know them; so that they are in a situation such as that in which Sokratês himself would have been, if we had been compelled to judge of him only from the Clouds of Aristophanês, or from those unfavourable impressions respecting his character which we know, even from the Apologies of Plato and Xenophon, to have been generally prevalent at Athens.

This is not the opportunity however for trying to distinguish the good from the evil in the working of the sophists and rhetors. At present it is enough that they were the natural product of the age; supplying those wants, and answering to that stimulus, which arose partly from the deliberations of the Ekklesia, but still more from the contentions before the dikastery,—in which latter a far greater number of citizens took active part, with or without their own consent. The public and frequent dikasteries constituted by Periklês opened to the Athenian mind precisely that career of improvement which was best suited to its natural aptitude. They were essential to the development of that demand out of which grew not only Grecian oratory, but also, as secondary

Sophists and rhetors were the natural product of the age and of the democracy.

νες ὑπέσχοντο, διχάζεσθαι διδάσκειν, ἐκλεξάμενοι τὸ δυσχερέστατον τῶν ὀνομάτων, ὃ τῶν φοβουμένων ἔργον εἶη λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὐ τῶν προσεστωτων τῆς τοιαύτης παιδείσεως, Demosthen. De Fals. Legat. c. 70, 71, p. 417-420; and Æschin. cont. Ktesiphon, c. 9, p. 371—κακούργον σοφιστήν, αἰόμενον ῥήμασι τοὺς νόμους ἀνατρέσειν.

¹ Æschinês cont. Timarch. c. 34,

p. 74. Ὑμεῖς μὲν, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, Σωκράτην μὲν τὸν σοφιστὴν ἀπεκτείνετε, ἔτι Κριτίαν ἐφάνη παιδευκῶς, ἕνα τῶν τριάκοντα τῶν τὸν δῆμον καταλυσάντων.

Among the sophists whom Isokratê severely criticises, he evidently seems to include Plato, as may be seen by the contrast between δόξα and ἐπιστήμη, which he particularly notes, and which is so

products, the speculative moral and political philosophy, and the didactic analysis of rhetoric and grammar, which long survived after Grecian creative genius had passed away.¹ And it was one of the first measures of the oligarchy of Thirty, to forbid, by an express law, any teaching of the art of speaking. Aristophanês derides the Athenians for their love of talk and controversy, as if it had enfeebled their military energy; but in his time most undoubtedly, that reproach was not true—nor did it become true, even in part, until the crushing misfortunes which marked the close of the Peloponnesian war. During the course of that war, restless and energetic action was the characteristic of Athens even in a greater degree than oratory or political discussion, though before the time of Demosthenês a material alteration had taken place.

The establishment of these paid dikasteries at Athens was thus one of the most important and prolific events in all Grecian history. The pay helped to furnish a maintenance for old citizens, past the age of military service. Elderly men were the best persons for such a service, and were preferred for judicial purposes both at Sparta, and as it seems, in heroic Greece. Nevertheless, we need not suppose that *all* the dikasts were either old or poor, though a considerable proportion of them were so, and though Aristophanês selects these qualities as among the most suitable subjects for his

The dikasteries were composed, not exclusively of poor men, but of middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately.

conspicuously set forth in the Platonic writings (Isokratês cont. Sophistas, Or. xiii. p. 293: also p. 295). We know also that Lysias called both Plato and Æschinês the disciple of Sokratês, by the name of *Sophists* (Aristeidês, Orat. Platonic. xlvii. Ἐπὶ τῶν τετραρῶν, p. 407, vol. ii. ed. Dindorf). Aristeidês remarks justly that the name Sophist was a general name, including all the philosophers, teachers, and lettered men.

The general name *Sophists*, in fact, included good, bad, and indifferent, like "the philosophers, the political economists, the metaphysicians," &c. I shall take a future opportunity of examining

the indiscriminate censures against them as a class, which most modern writers have copied implicitly from the polemics of ancient times. This examination will be found in ch. 67 of the present history.

¹ Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν. Xenophon ascribes the passing of this law to a personal hatred of Kritias against Sokratês, and connects it with an anecdote exceedingly puerile, when considered as the alleged cause of that hatred, as well as of the consequent law. But it is evident that the law had a far deeper meaning, and was aimed directly at one of the prominent democratical habits.

ridicule. Periklês has been often censured for this institution, as if he had been the first to ensure pay to dikasts who before served for nothing, and had thus introduced poor citizens into courts previously composed of citizens above poverty. But in the first place, this supposition is not correct in point of fact, inasmuch as there were no such constant dikasteries previously acting without pay; next, if it had been true, the habitual exclusion of the poor citizens would have nullified the popular working of these bodies, and would have prevented them from answering any longer to the reigning sentiment at Athens. Nor could it be deemed unreasonable to assign a regular pay to those who thus rendered regular service. It was indeed an essential item in the whole scheme¹ and purpose, so that the suppression of the pay of itself seems to have suspended the dikasteries, while the oligarchy of Four Hundred was established—and it can only be discussed in that light. As the fact stands, we may suppose that the 6000 Heliasts who filled the dikasteries were composed of the middling and poorer citizens indiscriminately; though there was nothing to exclude the richer, if they chose to serve.

¹ Thucyd. viii. 67. Compare a curious passage, even in reference to the time of Demosthenês, in the speech of that orator contra Βεο-

tum de Nomine, c. 5. καὶ εἰ μισθὸς ἐπορίσθη τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, εἰσῆγγον ἄν με δῆλον ἔτι, &c.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM THE THIRTY YEARS' TRUCE, FOURTEEN YEARS BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR, DOWN TO THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA, IN THE YEAR BEFORE THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

THE judicial alterations effected at Athens by Periklês and Ephialtês, described in the preceding chapter, gave to a large proportion of the citizens direct jury functions and an active interest in the constitution, such as they had never before enjoyed; the change being at once a mark of previous growth of democratical sentiment during the past, and a cause of its farther development during the future. The Athenian people were at this time ready for personal exertion in all directions. Military service on land or sea was not less conformable to their dispositions than attendance in the ekklesia or in the dikastery at home. The naval service especially was prosecuted with a degree of assiduity which brought about continual improvement in skill and efficiency; while the poorer citizens, of whom it chiefly consisted, were more exact in obedience and discipline than any of the more opulent persons from whom the infantry or the cavalry were drawn.¹ The maritime multitude, in addition to self-confidence and courage, acquired by this laborious training an increased skill, which placed the Athenian navy every year more and more above the rest of Greece. And the perfection of this force became the more indispensable as the Athenian empire was now again confined to the sea and seaport towns; the reverses immediately preceding the thirty years' truce having broken up all Athenian land ascendancy over Megara, Bœotia, and the other continental territories adjoining to Attica.

Personal activity now prevalent among the Athenian citizens—empire of Athens exclusively maritime, after the thirty years' truce.

The maritime confederacy—originally commenced at Delos under the headship of Athens, but with a common

¹ Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 5, 18.

synod and deliberative voice on the part of each member—had now become transformed into a confirmed empire on the part of Athens, over the remaining states as foreign dependencies; all of them rendering tribute except Chios, Samos, and Lesbos. These three still remained on their

Chios, Samos, and Lesbos were now the only free allies of Athens, on the same footing as the original confederates of Delos—the rest were subject and tributary.

original footing of autonomous allies, retaining their armed force, ships, and fortifications, with the obligation of furnishing military and naval aid when required, but not of paying tribute. The discontinuance of the deliberative synod, however, had deprived them of their original security against the encroachments of Athens. I have already stated generally the steps (we do not know them in detail) whereby this important change was brought about, gradually and without any violent revolution—for even the transfer of the common treasure from Delos to Athens, which was the most palpable symbol

and evidence of the change, was not an act of Athenian violence, since it was adopted on the proposition of the Samians. The change resulted in fact almost inevitably from the circumstances of the case, and from the eager activity of the Athenians contrasted with the backwardness and aversion to personal service on the part of the allies. We must recollect that the confederacy, even in its original structure, was contracted for permanent objects, and was permanently binding by the vote of its majority, like the Spartan confederacy, upon every individual member.¹ It was destined to keep out the Persian fleet, and to maintain the police of the Ægean. Consistently with these objects, no individual member could be allowed to secede from the confederacy, and thus to acquire the benefit of protection at the cost of the remainder: so that when Naxos and other members actually did secede, the step was taken as a revolt, and Athens only performed her duty as president of the confederacy in reducing them. By every such reduction, as well as by that exchange of personal service for money-payment, which most of the allies voluntarily sought, the power of Athens increased, until at length she found herself with an irresistible navy in the midst of disarmed

¹ Thucyd. v. 30: about the Spartan confederacy—*εἰρημένον, κύριον εἶναι, ὅ,τι ἂν τὸ πλεῖστον τῶν ζυμ-*

μάχων ὑπείσθηται, ἥν μὴ τι θεῶν ἢ ἡρώων κωλύμα ᾖ.

tributaries, none of whom could escape from her constraining power,—and mistress of the sea, the use of which was indispensable to them. The synod of Delos, even if it had not before become partially deserted, must have ceased at the time when the treasure was removed to Athens—probably about 460 B.C., or shortly afterwards.

The relations between Athens and her allies were thus materially changed, by proceedings which gradually evolved themselves and followed one upon the other without any preconcerted plan. She became an imperial or despot city, governing an aggregate of dependent subjects all without their own active concurrence, and in many cases doubtless contrary to their own sense of political right. It was not likely that they should conspire unanimously to break up the confederacy, and discontinue the collection of contribution from each of the members; nor would it have been at all desirable that they should do so: for while Greece generally would have been a great loser by such a proceeding, the allies themselves would have been the greatest losers of all, inasmuch as they would have been exposed without defence to the Persian and Phœnician fleets. But the Athenians committed the capital fault of taking the whole alliance into their own hands, and treating the allies purely as subjects, without seeking to attach them by any form of political incorporation or collective meeting and discussion—without taking any pains to maintain community of feeling or idea of a joint interest—without admitting any control, real or even pretended, over themselves as managers. Had they attempted to do this, it might have proved difficult to accomplish,—so powerful was the force of geographical dissemination, the tendency to isolated civic life, and the repugnance to any permanent extramural obligations, in every Grecian community. But they do not appear to have ever made the attempt. Finding Athens exalted by circumstances to empire, and the allies degraded into subjects, the Athenian statesmen grasped at the exaltation as a matter of pride as well as profit.¹ Even Periklês, the

Athens took no pains to inspire her allies with the idea of a common interest—nevertheless the allies were gainers by the continuance of her empire.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 63. τῆς δὲ πόλεως βολῆσει, καὶ μὴ φύξει τοὺς πολέους, ἡμᾶς εἰκόσ τῷ τιμωμένῳ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἢ μῆδε τὰς τιμὰς δῶκεται, &c. ἀρχεῖν, ὡσπερ ἄπικτας ἀγῶνισθεῖς,

most prudent and far-sighted of them, betrayed no consciousness that an empire without the cement of some all-pervading interest or attachment, although not practically oppressive, must nevertheless have a natural tendency to become more and more unpopular, and ultimately to crumble in pieces. Such was the course of events which, if the judicious counsels of Periklès had been followed, might have been postponed, though it could not have been averted.

Instead of trying to cherish or restore the feelings of equal alliance, Periklès formally disclaimed it. He maintained that Athens owed to her subject allies no account of the money received from them, so long as she performed her contract by keeping away the Persian enemy and maintaining the safety of the Ægean waters.¹ This was, as he represented, the obligation which Athens had under-

Conception of Periklès—Athens, an imperial city, owing protection to the subject allies; who, on their part, owed obedience and tribute.

taken; and provided it were faithfully discharged, the allies had no right to ask questions or exercise control. That it was faithfully discharged no one could deny. No ship of war except from Athens and her allies was ever seen between the eastern and western shores of the Ægean. An Athenian fleet of sixty triremes was kept on duty in these waters, chiefly manned by Athenian citizens, and beneficial as well from the protection afforded to commerce as for keeping the seamen in constant pay and training.² And such was the effective superintendence maintained, that in the disastrous period preceding the thirty years' truce, when Athens lost Megara and Bœotia, and with difficulty recovered Eubœa, none of her numerous maritime subjects took the opportunity to revolt.

The total of these distinct tributary cities is said to have amounted to 1000, according to a verse of Aristophanês³ which cannot be under the truth, though it may well be, and probably is, greatly above the truth. The total annual tribute collected at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, and probably also for the years preceding it, is given by Thucydidès at about 600 talents. Of the sums paid by particular states, however, we have little or

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 12.

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 11.

³ Aristophan. Vesp. 707.

no information.¹ It was placed under the superintendence of the *Hellenotamiæ*; originally officers of the confederacy

¹ The island of Kythêra was conquered by the Athenians from Sparta in 425 B.C., and the annual tribute then imposed upon it was four talents (Thucyd. iv. 57). In the Inscription No. 143, ap. Boeckh Corp. Inscr., we find some names enumerated of tributary towns with the amount of tribute opposite to each, but the stone is too much damaged to give us much information. Tyrodiza in Thrace paid 1000 drachms: some other towns, or junctions of towns, not clearly discernible, are rated at 1000, 2000, 3000 drachms, one talent, and even ten talents. This inscription must be anterior to 413 B.C., when the tribute was converted into a five per cent. duty upon imports and exports: see Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, and his notes upon the above-mentioned Inscription.

It was the practice of Athens not always to rate each tributary city separately, but sometimes to join several in one collective rating; probably each responsible for the rest. This seems to have provoked occasional remonstrances from the allies, in some of which the rhetor Antipho was employed to furnish the speech which the complainants pronounced before the dikastery: see Antipho ap. Harpokration, v. Ἀντιφῶν—Συνταξιῶν. It is greatly to be lamented that the orations composed by Antipho for the Samo- thrakians and Lindians (the latter inhabiting one of the three separate towns in the island of Rhodes) have not been preserved.

Since my first edition, M. Boeckh has published a second edition of his Public Economy of the Athenians, with valuable additions and enlargements. Among the latter

are included several Inscriptions (published also for the most part in Rangabé's *Antiquités Helléniques*) recently found at Athens, and illustrating the tribute raised by ancient Athens from her subject-allies. M. Boeckh has devoted more than half his second volume (from p. 369 to p. 747) to an elaborate commentary for the elucidation of these documents.

Had it been our good fortune to recover these Inscriptions complete, we should have acquired important and authentic information respecting the Athenian Tribute-system. But they are very imperfectly legible, and require at every step conjectural restoration as well as conjectural interpretation. To extract from them a consistent idea of the entire system, M. Boeckh has recourse to several hypotheses, which appear to me more ingenious than convincing.

The stones (or at least several among them) form a series of records, belonging to successive years or other periods, inscribed by the Thirty Logistæ or Auditors (Boeckh, p. 584). The point of time from which they begin is not positively determinable. Rangabé supposes it to be Olymp. 82. 1. (452 B.C.), while Boeckh puts it later—Olymp. 83. 2. B.C. 447 (p. 594-596). They reach down, in his opinion, to B.C. 406.

As to the amount of tribute demanded from or paid by the allies, collectively or individually, nothing certain appears to me obtainable from these Inscriptions; which vary surprisingly (as Boeckh observes p. 615, 626, 628, 646) in the sums placed opposite to the same name. We learn how-

but now removed from Delos to Athens, and acting altogether as an Athenian treasury-board. The sum total of the Athenian revenue¹ from all sources, including this tribute, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war is stated by Xenophon at 1000 talents. Customs, harbour and market-dues, receipt from the silver-mines at Laurium,

ever something about the classification of the subject allies. They were distributed under five general heads,—1. Karian Tribute. 2. Ionic Tribute. 3. Insular Tribute. 4. Hellespontine Tribute. 5. Thracian Tribute. Under the first head, Karian, we find specified 62 names of cities; under the second, Ionic, 42 names; under the third, Insular, 41; under the fourth Hellespontine, 50; under the fifth, Thracian, 68. The total of these (with the addition of four undecypherable names not aggregated to either class) makes 267 names of tributary cities (Boeckh, p. 619). Undoubtedly all the names of tributaries are not here included. Boeckh supposes that an approximation to the actual total may be made, by adding one-fifth more, making in all 334 tributaries (p. 663). This shows a probable minimum, but little more.

Allusion is made in the Inscriptions to certain differences in the mode of assessment. Some are self-assessed cities, πόλεις αὐτὰι φόρον τὰζήμεναι—others are cities inscribed by private individuals on the tribute roll, πόλεις ἃς οἱ ἰδιώται ἐνέγραψαν φόρον φέρειν (p. 613-616). These two heads (occurring in three different Inscriptions) seem to point to a date not long after the first establishment of the tribute. It appears that the Athenian kleruchs or outlying citizens were numbered among the tributaries, and were assessed (as far as can be made out) at the highest rate (p. 631).

There are a few Inscriptions in

which the sum placed opposite to the name of each city is extremely high; but in general the sum recorded is so small, that Boeckh affirms it not to represent the whole tribute assessed, but only that small fraction of it (according to him $\frac{1}{120}$) which was paid over as a compliment of perquisite to the goddess Athênê. His hypothesis on this subject rests, in my judgement, upon no good proof, nor can I think that these Inscriptions at all help us to discover the actual aggregate of tribute raised. He speaks too emphatically about the heavy pressure of it upon the allies. Nothing in Thucydides warrants this belief; moreover, we know distinctly from him that until the year 413 B.C., the total tribute was something not so much as 5 per cent. upon imports and exports (Thucyd. vii. 2^s). How much less it was we do not know; but it certainly did not reach that point. Mitford seems struck with the lightness of the tax (see a note in this History, ch. lxi.). It is possible that the very high assessments, which appear on a few of the stones appended to some names of insular tributaries, may refer to a date later than 413 B.C. during the closing years of the war, when Athens was struggling under the most severe pressure and peril (Boeckh, p. 547 seq.).

¹ Xenophon. Anab. vii. 1. 27. οὐ μείον χιλίων τετράκων: compare Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, b. iii. ch. 7, 15, 19.

rents of public property, fines from judicial sentences, a tax per head upon slaves, the annual payment made by each metic, &c., may have made up a larger sum than 400 talents: which sum, added to the 600 talents from tribute, would make the total named by Xenophon. But a verse of Aristophanês¹ during the ninth year of the Peloponnesian war (B. c. 422) gives the general total of that time as "nearly 2000 talents:" this is in all probability much above the truth, though we may reasonably imagine that the amount of tribute-money levied upon the allies had been augmented during the interval. I think that the alleged duplication of the tribute by Alkibiadês, which Thucydidês nowhere notices, is not borne out by any good evidence, nor can I believe that it ever reached the sum of 1200 talents.² Whatever may have been the actual magnitude

¹ Aristophan. Vesp. 660. τάλαντ' ἑγγὺς δισχιλία.

² Very excellent writers on Athenian antiquity (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, c. 15, 19, b. iii.; Schömann, Antiq. J. P. Att. sect. lxxiv.; K. F. Hermann, Gr. Staatsalterthümer, sect. 157: compare however a passage in Boeckh, ch. 17, p. 421, Eng. transl., where he seems to be of an opposite opinion) accept this statement, that the tribute levied by Athens upon her allies was doubled some years after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war (at which time it was 600 talents), and that it came to amount to 1200 talents. Nevertheless, I cannot follow them, upon evidence no stronger than Æschinês (Fals. Leg. c. 54. p. 301), Andokidês (De Paec, c. 1, s. 9), and Pseudo-Andokidês, cont. Alkib. s. 11.

Both Andokidês, and Æschinês who seems to copy him, profess to furnish a general but brief sketch of Athenian history for the century succeeding the Persian invasion. But both are so full of historical and chronological inaccuracies, that we can hardly accept their authority, when opposed by any

negative probabilities, as sufficient for an important matter of fact. In a note on the chapter immediately preceding I have already touched upon their extraordinary looseness of statement—pointed out by various commentators, among them particularly by Mr. Fynes Clinton: see above, chap. xlv.

The assertion that the tribute from the Athenian allies was raised to a sum of 1200 talents annually, comes to us only from these orators as original witnesses; and in them it forms part of a tissue of statements alike confused and incorrect. But against it we have a powerful negative argument—the perfect silence of Thucydidês. Is it possible that that historian would have omitted all notice of a step so very important in its effects, if Athens had really adopted it? He mentions to us the commutation by Athens of the tribute from her allies into a duty of 5 per cent. payable by them on their exports and imports (vii. 28)—this was in the nineteenth year of the war—413 B.C. But anything like the duplication of the tribute all at once, would have altered much

of the Athenian budget, however, prior to the Peloponnesian war, we know that during the larger part of the ad-

more materially the relations between Athens and her allies, and would have constituted in the minds of the latter a substantive grievance such as to aggravate the motive for revolt in a manner which Thucydides could hardly fail to notice. The orator Æschinês refers the augmentation of the tribute, up to 1200 talents, to the time succeeding the peace of Nikias: M. Boeckh (*Public Econ. of Athens*, b. iii. ch. 15-19, p. 400-434) supposes it to have taken place earlier than the representation of the *Vespæ* of Aristophanês, that is, about three years before that peace, or 423 B.C. But this would have been just before the time of the expedition of Brasidas into Thrace, and his success in exciting revolt among the dependencies of Athens. Now if Athens had doubled her tribute upon all the allies, just before that expedition, Thucydides could not have omitted to mention it, as increasing the chances of success to Brasidas, and helping to determine the resolutions of the Akanthians and others, which were by no means adopted unanimously or without hesitation, to revolt.

In reference to the Oration to which I here refer as that of Pseudo-Andokidês against Alkibiadês, I made some remarks in chap. xxxi. of this History, tending to show it to be spurious and of a time considerably later than that to which it purports to belong. I will here add one other remark, which appears to me decisive, tending to the same conclusion.

The oration professes to be delivered in a contest of ostracism between Nikias, Alkibiadês, and the speaker. One of the three (he says) must necessarily be ostra-

cised, and the question is to determine which of the three: accordingly the speaker dwells upon many topics calculated to raise a bad impression of Alkibiadês, and a favourable impression of himself.

Among the accusations against Alkibiadês, one is, that after having recommended in the assembly of the people that the inhabitants of Melos should be sold as slaves, he had himself purchased a Melian woman among the captives, and had had a son by her: it was criminal (argues the speaker) to beget offspring by a woman whose relations he had contributed to cause to be put to death, and whose city he had contributed to ruin (c. 8).

Upon this argument I do not here touch, any farther than to bring out the point of chronology. The speech, if delivered at all, must have been delivered, at the earliest, nearly a year after the capture of Melos by the Athenians: it may be of later date, but it *cannot possibly be earlier*.

Now Melos surrendered in the winter immediately preceding the great expedition of the Athenians to Sicily in 415 B.C., which expedition sailed about midsummer (Thucyd. v. 116; vi. 30). Nikias and Alkibiadês both went as commanders of that expedition: the latter was recalled to Athens for trial on the charge of impiety about three months afterwards, but escaped in the way home, was condemned and sentenced to banishment in his absence, and did not return to Athens until 407 B.C., long after the death of Nikias, who continued in command of the Athenian armament in Sicily, enjoying the full esteem of his countrymen, until its complete failure and ruin before

ministration of Periklês, the revenue including tribute was so managed as to leave a large annual surplus; inso-
 much that a treasure of coined money was accumulated in
 the Acropolis during the years preceding the
 Peloponnesian war—which treasure when at
 its maximum reached the great sum of 9700
 talents (=2,230,000*l.*), and was still at 6000
 talents, after a serious drain for various pur-
 poses, at the moment when that war began.¹
 This system of public economy, constantly lay-
 ing by a considerable sum year after year—in
 which Athens stood alone, since none of the
 Peloponnesian states had any public reserve
 whatever,² goes far of itself to vindicate Periklês from the
 charge of having wasted the public money in mischievous
 distributions for the purpose of obtaining popularity; and
 also to exonerate the Athenian Demos from that reproach
 of a greedy appetite for living by the public purse which
 it is common to advance against them. After the death of
 Kimon, no farther expeditions were undertaken against
 the Persians. Even for some years before his death, not

Large amount of revenue laid by and accumulated by Athens, during the years preceding the Peloponnesian war.

Syracuse—and who perished him-
 self afterwards as a Syracusan
 prisoner.

Taking these circumstances to-
 gether, it will at once be seen that
 there never can have been any
 time, ten months or more after the
 capture of Melos, when Nikias and
 Alkibiadês *could* have been exposed
 to a vote of ostracism at Athens.
 The thing is absolutely impossible:
 and the oration in which such his-
 torical and chronological incom-
 patibilities are embodied, must be
 spurious; furthermore it must have
 been composed long after the pre-
 tended time of delivery, when the
 chronological series of events had
 been forgotten.

I may add that the story of this
 duplication of the tribute by Alki-
 biadês is virtually contrary to the
 statement of Plutarch, probably
 borrowed from Æschinês, who
 states that the demagogues *gradu-*
ally increased (κατὰ μίτρον) the tri-

bute to 1300 talents (Plutarch,
 Aristeid. c. 24).

¹ Thueyd. ii. 13.

² Thueyd. i. 80. The foresight of
 the Athenian people, in abstaining
 from immediate use of public
 money and laying it up for future
 wants, would be still more con-
 spicuously demonstrated, if the
 statement of Æschinês the orator
 were true, that they got together
 7000 talents between the peace of
 Nikias and the Sicilian expedition.
 M. Boeckh believes this statement,
 and says, "It is not impossible
 that 1000 talents might have been
 laid by every year, as the amount
 of tribute received was so consider-
 able" (Public Economy of Athens,
 ch. xx. p. 446, Eng. Trans.). I do
 not believe the statement: but M.
 Boeckh and others, who do, ought
 in fairness to set it against the
 many remarks which they pass in
 condemnation of the demoeatrical
 prodigality.

much appears to have been done. The tribute money thus remained unexpended, and kept in reserve, as the presidential duties of Athens prescribed, against future attack, which might at any time be renewed.

Though we do not know the exact amount of the other sources of Athenian revenue, however, we know that tribute received from allies was the largest item in it.¹ And altogether the exercise of empire abroad became a prominent feature in Athenian life, and a necessity to Athenian sentiment, not less than democracy at home. Athens was no longer, as she had been once, a single city, with Attica for her territory. She was a capital or imperial city—a despot-city, was the expression used by her enemies, and even sometimes by her own citizens²—with many dependencies attached to her, and bound to follow her orders. Such was the manner in which not merely Periklês and the other leading statesmen, but even the humblest Athenian citizen, conceived the dignity of Athens. The sentiment was one which carried with it both personal pride and stimulus to active patriotism. To establish Athenian interests among the dependent territories was one important object in the eyes of Periklês. While

¹ Thucyd. i. 122-143; ii. 13. The *πεντηχοστή*, or duty of two per cent. upon imports and exports at the Peiræus, produced to the state a revenue of thirty-six talents in the year in which it was farmed by Andokidês, somewhere about 400 B.C., after the restoration of the democracy at Athens from its defeat and subversion at the close of the Peloponnesian war (Andokidês de *Mysteriis*, c. 23, p. 65). This was at a period of depression in Athenian affairs, and when trade was doubtless not near so good as it had been during the earlier part of the Peloponnesian war.

It seems probable that this must have been the most considerable permanent source of Athenian revenue next to the tribute; though we do not know what rate of

customs-duty was imposed at the Peiræus during the Peloponnesian war. Comparing together the two passages of Xenophon (*Republ. Ath.* i, 17, and *Aristophan. Vesp.* 657), we may suppose that the regular and usual rate of duty was one per cent. or one *ἐκατοστή*—while in case of need this may have been doubled or tripled—*τάς πωλλὰς ἐκατοστάς* (see Boeckh, b. iii. ch. 1-4, p. 298-318, Eng. Trans.). The amount of revenue derived even from this source, however, can have borne no comparison to the tribute.

² By Periklês, Thucyd. ii. 63. By Kleon, Thucyd. iii. 37. By the envoys at Mélos, v. 89. By Euphemus, vi. 85. By the hostile Corinthians, i. 124, as a matter of course.

discouraging all distant¹ and rash enterprises, such as invasion of Egypt or Cyprus, he planted out many kleruchies, and colonies of Athenian citizens intermingled with allies, on islands and parts of the coast. He conducted 1000 citizens to the Thracian Chersonese, 500 to Naxos, and 250 to Andros. In the Chersonese, he farther repelled the barbarous Thracian invaders from without, and even undertook the labour of carrying a wall of defence across the isthmus which connected the peninsula with Thrace; since the barbarous Thracian tribes, though expelled some time before by Kimon,² had still continued to renew their incursions from time to time. Ever since the occupation of the elder Miltiadês about eighty years before, there had been in this peninsula many Athenian proprietors, apparently intermingled with half-civilized Thracians: the settlers now acquired both greater numerical strength and better protection, though it does not appear that the cross-wall was permanently maintained. The maritime expeditions of Periklês even extended into the Euxine sea, as far as the important Greek city of Sinôpê, then governed by a despot named Timesilaus, against whom a large proportion of the citizens were in active discontent. Lamachus was left with thirteen Athenian triremes to assist in expelling the despot, who was driven into exile along with his friends and party. The properties of these exiles were confiscated, and assigned to the maintenance of six hundred Athenian citizens, admitted to equal fellowship and residence with the Sinôpians. We may presume that on this occasion Sinôpê became a member of the Athenian tributary alliance, if it had not been so before: but we do not know whether Kotyôra and Trapezus, dependencies of Sinôpê farther eastward, which the 10,000 Greeks found on their retreat fifty years afterwards, existed in the time of Periklês or not. Moreover the numerous and well-equipped Athenian fleet under the command of Periklês produced an imposing effect upon the barbarous princes and tribes along the coast,³ contributing certainly to the security of Grecian trade, and probably to the acquisition of new dependent allies.

Numerous Athenian citizens planted out as kleruchs by Periklês. Chersonesus of Thrace. Sinôpê.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 20.

² Plutarch, Kimon, c. 14.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 19, 20.

It was by successive proceedings of this sort that many detachments of Athenian citizens became settled in various portions of the maritime empire of the city—some rich, investing their property in the islands as more secure (from the incontestable superiority of Athens at sea) even than Attica, which since the loss of the Megarid could not be guarded against a Peloponnesian land invasion¹—others poor, and hiring themselves out as labourers.² The islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros, as well as the territory of Estiæa, on the north of Eubœa, were completely occupied by Athenian proprietors and citizens: other places were partially so occupied. And it was doubtless advantageous to the islanders to associate themselves with Athenians in trading enterprises, since they thereby obtained a better chance of the protection of the Athenian fleet. It seems that Athens passed regulations occasionally for the commerce of her dependent allies, as we see by the fact that shortly before the Peloponnesian war she excluded the Megarians from all their ports. The commercial relations between Peiræus and the Ægean reached their maximum during the interval immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. These relations were not confined to the country east and north of Attica: they reached also the western regions. The most important settlements founded by Athens during this period were, Amphipolis in Thrace and Thurii in Italy.

Amphipolis was planted by a colony of Athenians and other Greeks, under the conduct of the Athenian Agnon, in 437 B.C. It was situated near the river Strymon in Thrace, on the eastern bank, and at the spot where the Strymon resumes its river-course after emerging from the lake above. It was originally a township or settlement of the Edonian Thracians, called Ennea Hodoi or Nine Ways—in a situation doubly valuable, both as being close upon the

¹ Xenophon, Rep. Ath. ii. 16. τὴν μὲν οὐσίαν τοῖς νήσοις παρατίθενται, πιστεύοντες τῇ ἀρχῇ τῆ κατὰ θάλασσαν τὴν δὲ Ἀττικὴν γῆν περιουρῶσι τεμνομένην, γινώσκοντες ἕτι εἰ αὐτῶν ἐλεήσουσιν, ἐτέρων ἀγαθῶν μειζόνων στεργήσουσιν.

Compare also Xenophon (Memorabil. ii. 8, 1, and Symposium, iv. 31).

² See the case of the free labourer and the husbandman at Naxos, Plato, Euthyphro. c. 3.

bridge over the Strymon, and as a convenient centre for the ship-timber and gold and silver mines of the neighbouring region. It was distant about three English miles from the Athenian settlement of Eion at the mouth of the river. The previous unsuccessful attempts to form establishments at Ennea Hodoi have already been noticed—first that of Histiaëus the Milesian, followed up by his brother Aristagoras (about 497-496 B.C.), next that of the Athenians about 465 B.C. under Leagrus and others—on both which occasions the intruding settlers had been defeated and expelled by the native Thracian tribes, though on the second occasion the number sent by Athens was not less than 10,000.¹ So serious a loss deterred the Athenians for a long time from any repetition of the attempt. But it is highly probable that individual Athenian citizens, from Eion and from Thasus, connected themselves with powerful Thracian families, and became in this manner actively engaged in mining—to their own great profit, as well as to the profit of the city collectively, since the property of the kleruchs, or Athenian citizens occupying colonial lands, bore its share in case of direct taxes being imposed on property generally. Among such fortunate adventurers we may number the historian Thucydidês himself; seemingly descended from Athenian parents intermarrying with Thracians, and himself married to a wife either Thracian or belonging to a family of Athenian colonists in that region, through whom he became possessed of a large property in the mines, as well as of great influence in the districts around.² This was one of the various ways in which the collective power of Athens enabled her chief citizens to enrich themselves individually.

The colony under Agnon, despatched from Athens in the year 437 B.C., appears to have been both numerous and well-sustained, inasmuch as it conquered and maintained the valuable position of Ennea Hodoi in spite of those formidable

Situation and importance of Amphipolis.

¹ Thucyd. i. 100.

² Thucyd. iv. 105; Marcellinus, Vit. Thucyd. c. 19. See Roscher, *Leben des Thucydides*, ch. i. 4. p. 96, who gives a genealogy of Thucydidês, as far as it can be made out with any probability. The historian was connected by blood

with Miltiadês and Kimon, as well as with Olorus king of one of the Thracian tribes, whose daughter Hegesipylê was wife of Miltiadês the conqueror of Marathon. In this manner therefore he belonged to one of the ancient heroic families of Athens and even of Greece,

Edonian neighbours who had baffled the two preceding attempts. Its name of Ennea Hodoi was exchanged for that of Amphipolis—the hill on which the new town was situated being bounded on three sides by the river. The settlers seem to have been of mixed extraction, comprising no large proportion of Athenians. Some were of Chalkidic race, others came from Argilus, a Grecian city colonised from Andros, which possessed the territory on the western bank of the Strymon immediately opposite to Amphipolis,¹ and which was included among the subject allies of Athens. Amphipolis, connected with the sea by the Strymon and the port of Eion, became the most important of all the Athenian dependencies in reference to Thrace and Macedonia.

The colony of Thurii on the coast of the Gulf of Tarentum in Italy, near the site and on the territory of the ancient Sybaris, was founded by Athens about seven years earlier than Amphipolis, not long after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce with Sparta, B.C. 443. Since the destruction of the old Sybaris by the Krotoniates, in 509 B.C., its territory had for the most part remained unappropriated. The descendants of the former inhabitants, dispersed at Laüs and in other portions of the territory, were not strong enough to establish any new city: nor did it suit the views of the Krotoniates themselves to do so. After an interval of more than sixty years, however, during which one unsuccessful attempt at occupation had been made by some Thessalian settlers, these Sybarites at length prevailed upon the Athenians to undertake and protect the re-colonization; the proposition having been made in vain to the Spartans. Lampon and Xenokritus, the former a prophet and interpreter of oracles, were sent by Periklês with ten ships as chiefs of the new colony of Thurii, founded under the auspices of Athens. The settlers, collected from all parts of Greece, included Dorians, Ionians, islanders, Bœotians, as well as Athenians. But the descendants of the ancient Sybarites procured themselves to be treated as privileged citizens,

being an Æakid through Ajax and Philæus (Marcellin. c. 2).

¹ Thucyd. iv. 102; v. 6.

Founda-
tion by the
Athenians,
of Thurii,
on the
southern
coast of
Italy.

Conduct of
the refugee
inhabitants
of the
ruined Sy-
baris—their
encroach-
ments in
the founda-
tion of
Thurii:
they are
expelled,
and Thurii
recon-
stituted.

monopolising for themselves the possession of political powers as well as the most valuable lands in the immediate vicinity of the walls; while their wives also assumed an offensive pre-eminence over the other women of the city in the public religious processions. Such spirit of privilege and monopoly appears to have been a frequent manifestation among the ancient colonies, and often fatal either to their tranquillity or to their growth; sometimes to both. In the case of Thurii, founded under the auspices of the democratical Athens, it was not likely to have any lasting success. And we find that after no very long period, the majority of the colonists rose in insurrection against the privileged Sybarites, either slew or expelled them, and divided the entire territory of the city upon equal principles among the colonists of every different race. This revolution enabled them to make peace with the Krotoniates, who had probably been unfriendly so long as their ancient enemies the Sybarites were masters of the city and likely to turn its powers to the purpose of avenging their conquered ancestors. And the city from this time forward, democratically governed, appears to have flourished steadily and without internal dissension for thirty years, until the ruinous disasters of the Athenians before Syracuse occasioned the overthrow of the Athenian party at Thurii. How miscellaneous the population of Thurii was, we may judge from the denominations of the ten tribes—such was the number of tribes established, after the model of Athens—Arkas, Achaïs, Eleia, Bœotia, Amphiktyonis, Doris, Ias, Athenaïs, Euboïs, Nesiôtis. From this mixture of race they could not agree in recognizing or honouring an Athenian Ækist, or indeed any Ækist except Apollo.¹ The Spartan general Kleandridas, banished a few years before for having suffered himself to be bribed by Athens along with king Pleistoanax, removed to Thurii and was appointed general of the citizens in their war against Tarentum. That war was ultimately adjusted by the joint foundation of the new city of Herakleia half-way between the two—in the fertile territory called Siritis.²

The most interesting circumstance respecting Thurii is, that the rhetor Lysias, and the historian Herodotus, were both domiciliated there as citizens. The city was connected with Athens, yet seemingly only by a feeble tie;

¹ Diodor. xii. 35.

² Diodor. xii. 11, 12; Strabo, vi. 264; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 22.

it was not numbered among the tributary subject allies.¹ From the circumstance, that so small a proportion of the settlers at Thurii were native Athenians, we may infer that not many of the latter at that time were willing to put themselves so far out of connexion with Athens—even though tempted by the prospect of lots of land in a fertile and promising territory. And Periklês was probably anxious that those poor citizens, for whom emigration was desirable, should rather become kleruchs in some of the islands or ports of the Ægean, where they would serve (like the colonies of Rome) as a sort of garrison for the maintenance of the Athenian empire.²

The fourteen years between the Thirty years' truce and the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war, are a period of full maritime empire on the part of Athens—partially indeed resisted, but never with success. They are a period of peace with all cities extraneous to her own empire; and of splendid decorations to the city itself, emanating from the genius of Pheidias and others, in sculpture as well as in architecture.

Since the death of Kimon, Periklês had become, gradually but entirely, the first citizen in the commonwealth. His qualities told for more, the longer they were known, and even the disastrous reverses which preceded the Thirty years' truce had not overthrown him, since he had protested against that expedition of Tolmidês into Bœotia out of which they first arose. But if the personal influence of Periklês had increased, the party opposed to him seems also to have become stronger and better organised than before: and to have acquired a leader in many respects more effective than Kimon—Thucydidês son of Melêsias. The new chief was a near relative of Kimon, but of a character and talents more analogous to that of Periklês; a statesman and orator rather than a general, though competent

Period from 445-431 B.C. Athens at peace. Her political condition. Rivalry of Periklês with Thucydidês son of Melêsias.

¹ The Athenians pretended to no subject allies beyond the Ionian Gulf, Thucyd. vi. 14: compare vi. 45, 104; vii. 34. Thucydidês does not even mention Thurii, in his

catalogue of the allies of Athens at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii. 15).

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11.

to both functions if occasion demanded, as every leading man in those days was required to be. Under Thucydîdês, the political and parliamentary opposition against Periklês assumed a constant character and organisation, such as Kimon with his exclusively military aptitudes had never been able to establish. The aristocratical party in the commonwealth—the “honourable and respectable” citizens, as we find them styled, adopting their own nomenclature—now imposed upon themselves the obligation of undeviating regularity in their attendance on the public assembly, sitting together in a particular section so as to be conspicuously parted from the Demos. In this manner their applause and dissent, their mutual encouragement to each other, their distribution of parts to different speakers, was made more conducive to the party purposes than it had been before when these distinguished persons were intermingled with the mass of citizens.¹ Thucydîdês himself was eminent as a speaker, inferior only to Periklês—perhaps hardly inferior even to him. We are told that in reply to a question put to him by Archidamus, whether Periklês or he were the better wrestler, Thucydîdês replied—“Even when I throw him, he denies that he has fallen, gains his point, and talks over those who actually saw him fall.”²

Such an opposition, made to Periklês in all the full licence which a democratical constitution permitted, must have been both efficient and embarrassing. But the pointed severance of the aristocratical chiefs, which Thucydîdês son of Melêsias introduced, contributed probably at once to rally the democratical majority round Periklês, and to exasperate the bitterness of party conflict.³ As far as we can make out the grounds of the opposition, it turned partly upon the pacific policy of Periklês towards the

Points of contention between the two parties.
1. Peace with Persia.
2. Expenditure of money for the decoration of Athens.

¹ Compare the speech of Nîkias, in reference to the younger citizens and partisans of Alkibiadês sitting together near the latter in the assembly—ὄς ἐγὼ ὁρῶν νῦν ἐνθάδε τῶ αὐτῶ ἀνδρὶ παρακλειυστοῦς καθημένους φοβούμαι, καὶ τοῖς πρῶτον ἀντιπαρακλειούμαι μὴ κατασχολῆται, εἴ τῳ τις παρακλήσ-

ται τῶνδε, &c. (Thueyd. vi. 13.) See also Aristophanês, Ekklesiâz. 298 seq., about partisans sitting near together.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8. Ὅταν ἐγὼ καταβάλω παλαιῶν, ἐκεῖνος ἀντιλέγων ὡς οὐ πέπτωκε, νικᾷ, καὶ μεταπειθεὶ τοὺς ὁρῶντας.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. ἡ δ'

Persians, partly upon his expenditure for home ornament. Thucydidês contended that Athens was disgraced in the eyes of the Greeks by having drawn the confederate treasure from Delos to her own acropolis, under pretence of greater security—and then employing it, not in prosecuting war against the Persians,¹ but in beautifying Athens by new temples and costly statues. To this Periklês replied that Athens had undertaken the obligation, in consideration of the tribute money, to protect her allies and keep off from them every foreign enemy—that she had accomplished this object completely at the present, and retained a reserve sufficient to guarantee the like security for the future—that under such circumstances, she owed no account to her allies of the expenditure of the surplus, but was at liberty to employ it for purposes useful and honourable to the city. In this point of view it was an object of great public importance to render Athens imposing in the eyes both of the allies and of Hellas generally, by improved fortifications,—by accumulated embellishment, sculptural and architectural,—and by religious festivals, frequent, splendid, musical and poetical.

Such was the answer made by Periklês in defence of his policy against the opposition headed by Thucydidês. And considering the grounds of the debate on both sides, the answer was perfectly satisfactory. For when we look

Defence of
Periklês
perfectly
good
against his
political
rivals.

at the very large sum which Periklês continually kept in reserve in the treasury, no one could reasonably complain that his expenditure for ornamental purposes was carried so far as to encroach upon the exigencies of defence.

What Thucydidês and his partisans appear to have urged, was that this common fund should still continue

ἐκείνων ἀμιλλα καὶ φιλοτιμία τῶν ἀνδρῶν βαθυτάτην τομὴν τεμοῦσα τῆς πόλεως, τὸ μὲν δῆμον, τὸ δ' ὀλίγους ἐποίησε καλεῖσθαι.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 12. διέβαλλον ἐν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις βοῶντες, ὡς ὁ μὲν δῆμος ἀδοξεῖ καὶ κακῶς ἀκούει τὰ κοινὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων χρήματα πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ Δήλου μεταγαγῶν, ἢ δ' ἐνεστὶν αὐτῷ πρὸς τοὺς ἐγκαλοῦντας εὐπρεπεστάτη τῶν προφάσεων, δεῖσαστα τοὺς βαρβάρους ἐκεῖθεν ἀνελεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττειν ἐν

ὄχυρῳ τὰ κοινὰ, ταύτην ἀνῆρχκε Περικλῆς, &c.

Compare the speech of the Lesbians, and their complaints against Athens, at the moment of their revolt in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. iii. 10); where a similar accusation is brought forward—ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑώρων μὲν αὐτούς (the Athenians) τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μηροῦ ἐχθρὰν ἀνιέντας, τῆν δὲ τῶν ἑυμμάχων δοῦλῶσιν ἐπαγομένους, &c.

to be spent in aggressive warfare against the Persian king, in Egypt and elsewhere—conformably to the projects pursued by Kimon during his life.¹ But Periklēs was right in contending that such outlay would have been simply wasteful; of no use either to Athens or her allies, though risking all the chances of distant defeat, such as had been experienced a few years before in Egypt. The Persian force was already kept away both from the waters of the Ægean and the coast of Asia, either by the stipulations of the treaty of Kallias, or (if that treaty be supposed apocryphal) by a conduct practically the same as those stipulations would have enforced. The *allies* indeed might have had some ground of complaint against Periklēs, either for not reducing the amount of tribute required from them, seeing that it was more than sufficient for the legitimate purposes of the confederacy,—or for not having collected their positive sentiment as to the disposal of it. But we do not find that this was the argument adopted by Thucydidēs and his party; nor was it calculated to find favour either with aristocrats, or democrats, in the Athenian assembly.

Admitting the injustice of Athens—an injustice common to both the parties in that city, not less to Kimon than to Periklēs—in acting as despot instead of chief, and in discontinuing all appeal to the active and hearty concurrence of her numerous allies; we shall find that the schemes of Periklēs were nevertheless eminently Pan-Hellenic. In strengthening and ornamenting Athens, in developing the full activity of her citizens, in providing temples, religious offerings, works of art, solemn festivals, all of surpassing attraction,—he intended to exalt her into something greater than an imperial city with numerous dependent allies. He wished to make her the centre of Grecian feeling, the stimulus of Grecian intellect, and the type of strong democratical patriotism combined with full liberty of individual taste and aspiration. He wished not merely to retain the adherence of the subject states, but to attract the admiration and spontaneous deference of independent neighbours, so as to procure for Athens a moral ascendancy much beyond the range of her direct power. And he succeeded in elevating the city to a visible

Pan-Hellenic schemes and sentiment of Periklēs.

¹ Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 20.

grandeur,¹ which made her appear even much stronger than she really was—and which had the farther effect of softening to the minds of her subjects the humiliating sense of obedience; while it served as a normal school, open to strangers from all quarters, of energetic action even under full licence of criticism—of elegant pursuits economically followed—and of a love for knowledge without enervation of character. Such were the views of Periklēs in regard to his country, during the years which preceded the Peloponnesian war. We find them recorded in his celebrated Funeral Oration pronounced in the first year of that war—an exposition for ever memorable of the sentiment and purpose of Athenian democracy, as conceived by its ablest president.

So bitter however was the opposition made by Thucydidēs and his party to this projected expenditure—so violent and pointed did the scission of aristocrats and democrats become—that the dispute came after no long time to that ultimate appeal which the Athenian constitution provided for the case of two opposite and nearly equal party-leaders—a vote of ostracism. Of the particular details which preceded this ostracism, we are not informed; but we see clearly that the general position was such as the ostracism was intended to meet. Probably the vote was proposed by the party of Thucydidēs, in order to procure the banishment of Periklēs, the more powerful person of the two and the most likely to excite popular jealousy. The challenge was accepted by Periklēs and his friends, and the result of the voting was such that an adequate legal majority condemned Thucydidēs to ostracism.² And it seems that the majority must have been very decisive, for the party of Thucydidēs was completely broken by it. We hear of no other single individual equally formidable, as a leader of opposition, throughout all the remaining life of Periklēs.

¹ Thucyd. i. 10.

² Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 11-14. Τέλος δὲ πρὸς τὸν Θουκυδίδην εἰς ἀγῶνα περὶ τοῦ ὀστράκου καταστάς καὶ διακινδυνεύσας, ἐκέλευον μὲν ἐξέρχασθαι, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν ἀντιπαταγμῆν ἐπιταγίζου. See, in reference

to the principle of the ostracism, a remarkable incident at Magnesia, between two political rivals, Krētínēs and Hermeias: also the just reflections of Montesquieu, *Esprit des Loix*, xxvi. c. 17; xxix. c. 7.

The ostracism of Thucydidês apparently took place about two years¹ after the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce (443-442 B.C.), and it is to the period immediately following, that the great Perikleian works belong. The southern wall of the acropolis had been built out of the spoils brought by Kimon from his Persian expeditions; but the third of the long walls connecting Athens with the harbour was the proposition of Periklês, at what precise time we do not know. The long walls originally completed (not long after the battle of Tanagra, as has already been stated) were two, one from Athens to Peiræus, another from Athens to Phalêrum: the space between them was broad, and if in the hands of an enemy, the communication with Peiræus would be interrupted. Accordingly Periklês now induced the people to construct a third or intermediate wall, running parallel with the first wall to Peiræus, and within a short distance² (seemingly near one furlong) from it: so that the communication between the city and the port was placed beyond all possible interruption, even assuming an enemy to have got within the Phalêric wall. It was seemingly about this time, too, that the splendid docks and arsenal in Peiræus, alleged by Isokratês to have cost 1000 talents, were constructed;³ while the town itself of Peiræus was laid out anew with straight streets intersecting at right angles. Apparently this was something new in Greece—the towns generally, and Athens itself in particular, having been built without any symmetry, or width, or continuity of streets.⁴ Hippodamus the Milesian, a man of considerable attainments in the physical

New works undertaken at Athens. Third Long Wall. Docks in Peiræus—which is newly laid out as a town, by the architect Hippodamus.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16: the indication of time however is vague.

² Plato, Gorgias, p. 455, with *Selolia*; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13; Forchhammer, *Topographie von Athen*, in *Kieler Philologische Studien*, p. 279-282. See the map of Athens and its environs ch. xlv.

³ Isokratês, *Orat. vii.*; *Areopagit.* p. 153, c. 27.

⁴ See Dikæarchus, *Vit. Græciæ*, *Fragm. ed. Fuhr.* p. 140: compare the description of *Platæa* in *Thucydidês*, ii. 3.

All the older towns now existing in the Grecian islands are put together in this same manner—narrow, muddy, crooked ways—few regular continuous lines of houses—see *Ross, Reisen in den Griechischen Inseln*, *Letter xxvii.* vol. ii. p. 20.

philosophy of the age, derived much renown as the earliest town architect, for having laid out the Peiræus on a regular plan. The market-place, or one of them at least, permanently bore his name—the Hippodamian agora.¹ At a time when so many great architects were displaying their genius in the construction of temples, we are not surprised to hear that the structure of towns began to be regularised also. Moreover we are told that the new colonial town of Thurii, to which Hippodamus went as a settler, was also constructed in the same systematic form as to straight and wide streets.²

The new scheme upon which the Peiræus was laid out was not without its value as one visible proof of the naval grandeur of Athens. But the buildings in Athens and on the acropolis formed the real glory of the Perikleian age. A new theatre, termed the Odeon, was constructed for musical and poetical representations at the great Panathenaic solemnity. Next, the splendid temple of Athênê, called the Parthenon, with all its masterpieces of decorative sculpture, friezes, and reliefs: lastly, the costly portals erected to adorn the entrance of the acropolis, on the western side of the hill, through which the solemn processions on festival days were conducted. It appears that the Odeon and the Parthenon were both finished between 445 and 437 B.C.: the Propylæa somewhat later, between 437 and 431 B.C., in which latter year the Peloponnesian war began.³ Progress was also made in restoring or re-constructing the Erechtheion, or ancient temple of Athênê Polias, the patron goddess of the city—which had been burnt in the invasion of Xerxes. But the breaking out of the Peloponnesian war seems to have prevented the completion of this, as well as of the great temple of Dêmêtêr at Eleusis, for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries—that of Athênê at Sunium—and that of Nemesis at Rhamnus. Nor was the sculpture less memorable than the architecture. Three statues of Athênê, all by the hand of Pheidias, decorated the acropolis—one colossal, 47 feet high, of ivory, in the Parthenon⁴—a second

¹ Aristotle, *Politic.* ii. 5, 1; Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 4, 1; Harpocration, v. Ἰπποδάμειος.

² Diodor. xii. 9.

³ Leake, *Topography of Athens*, Append. ii. and iii. p. 328-336, 2nd edit.

⁴ See Leake, *Topography of*

of bronze, called the Lemnian Athênê—a third of colossal magnitude, also in bronze, called Athênê Promachos, placed between the Propylæa, and the Parthenon, and visible from afar off, even to the navigator approaching Peiræus by sea.

It is not of course to Periklês that the renown of these splendid productions of art belongs. But the great sculptors and architects, by whom they were conceived and executed, belonged to that same period of expanding and stimulating Athenian democracy, which likewise called forth creative genius in oratory, in dramatic poetry, and in philosophical speculation. One man especially, of immortal name,—Pheidias,—born a little before the battle of Marathon, was the original mind in whom the sublime ideal conceptions of genuine art appear to have disengaged themselves from that stiffness of execution, and adherence to a consecrated type, which marked the efforts of his predecessors.¹ He was the great director and superintendent of all those decorative additions, whereby Periklês imparted to Athens a majesty such as had never before belonged to any Grecian city. The architects of the Parthenon and the other buildings—Iktinus, Kallikratês, Korœbus, Mnesiklês, and others—worked under his instructions: and he had besides a school of pupils and subordinates to whom the mechanical part of his labours was confided. With all the great contributions which Pheidias made to the grandeur of Athens, his last and greatest achievement was far away from Athens—the colossal statue of Zeus, in the great temple of Olympia, executed in the years immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war. This stupendous work was sixty feet high, of ivory and gold, embodying in visible majesty some of the grandest conceptions of Grecian poetry and religion. Its effect upon the minds of all beholders, for many centuries successively, was such as never has been, and probably never will be, equalled in the annals of art, sacred or profane.

Illustrious
artists and
architects
— Pheidias,
Iktinus,
Kallikra-
tês.

Athens, 2nd ed. p. 111, Germ. Transl. O. Müller (De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 18) mentions no less than eight celebrated statues of Athênê, by the hand of Pheidias—four in the acro-

polis of Athens.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-15: O. Müller, De Phidiæ Vitâ, p. 34-60; also his work, Archæologie der Kunst, sect. 103-113.

Considering these prodigious achievements in the field of art only as they bear upon Athenians and Grecian history, they are phænomena of extraordinary importance. When we learn the profound impression which they produced upon Grecian spectators of a later age, we may judge how immense was the effect upon that generation which saw them both begun and finished. In the year 480 B.C., Athens had been ruined by the occupation of Xerxes. Since that period, the Greeks had seen, first the rebuilding and fortifying of the city on an enlarged scale—next, the addition of Peiræus with its docks and magazines—thirdly, the junction of the two by the long walls, thus including the most numerous concentrated population, wealth, arms, ships, &c. in Greece¹—lastly the rapid creation of so many new miracles of art—the sculptures of Pheidias as well as the paintings of the Thasian painter Polygnôtus, in the temple of Theseus, and in the portico called Pœkilê. Plutarch observes² that the celerity with which the works were completed was the most remarkable circumstance connected with them; and so it probably might be, in respect to the effect upon the contemporary Greeks. The gigantic strides by which Athens had reached her maritime empire were now immediately succeeded by a series of works which stamped her as the imperial city of Greece, gave to her an appearance of power even greater than the reality, and especially put to shame the old-fashioned simplicity of Sparta.³ The cost was doubtless prodigious, and could only have been borne at a time when there was a large treasure in the acropolis, as well as a considerable tribute annually coming in. If we may trust a computation which seems to rest on plausible grounds, it cannot have been much less than 3000 talents in the aggregate (about 690,000*l.*)⁴ The expenditure of

¹ Thucyd. i. 80. καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄσασιν ἄριστα ἐξήρτυνται, πλοῦτον τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυσί καὶ ἔμπορι καὶ ἔπλοις, καὶ ὄχλῳ ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνὶ γῆ χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν, &c.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13.

³ Thucyd. i. 10.

⁴ See Leake, Topography of Athens, Append. iii. p. 329, 2nd

ed. Germ. transl. Colonel Leake, with much justice, contends that the amount of 2012 talents, stated by Harpokration out of Philochorus as the cost of the Propylæa alone, must be greatly exaggerated. Mr. Wilkins (*Atheniensiâ*, p. 84) expresses the same opinion; remarking that the transport of marble from Pentelikus to Athens

so large a sum was of course a source of great private gain to contractors, tradesmen, merchants, artizans of various descriptions, &c., concerned in it. In one way or another, it distributed itself over a large portion of the whole city. And it appears that the materials employed for much of the work were designedly of the most costly description, as being most consistent with the reverence due to the gods. Marble was rejected as too common for the statue of Athênê, and ivory employed in its place.¹ Even the gold with which it was surrounded weighed not less than forty talents.² A large expenditure for such purposes, considered as pious towards the gods, was at the same time imposing in reference to Grecian feeling, which regarded with admiration every variety of public show and magnificence, and repaid with grateful deference the rich men who indulged in it. Periklês knew well that the visible splendour of the city, so new to all his contemporaries, would cause her great power to appear greater still, and would thus procure for her a real, though unacknowledged influence—perhaps even an ascendancy—over all cities of the Grecian name. And it is certain that even among those who most hated and feared her, at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, there prevailed a powerful sentiment of involuntary deference.

A step taken by Periklês, apparently not long after the commencement of the Thirty years' truce, evinces how much this ascendancy was in his direct aim, and how much he connected it with views both of harmony and usefulness for Greece generally. He prevailed upon the people to send envoys to every city of the Greek name, great and small, inviting each to appoint deputies for a congress to be held at Athens. Three points were to be discussed in this intended congress. 1. The restitution of those temples which had been burnt by the Persian invaders. 2. The fulfilment of such vows, as on that occasion had been made to the gods. 3. The safety of the sea and of maritime commerce for all.

Attempt of Periklês to convene a general congress at Athens, of deputies from all the Grecian states.

is easy, and on a descending road. Demetrius Phalereus (ap. Cicer. de Officiis, ii. 17) blamed Periklês for the large sum expended upon the Propylæa. It is not wonderful

that he uttered this censure, if he had been led to rate the cost of them at 2012 talents.

¹ Valer. Maxim. i. 7, 2.

² Thucyd. ii. 13.

Twenty elderly Athenians were sent round to obtain the convocation of this congress at Athens—a Pan-hellenic congress for Pan-hellenic purposes. But those who were sent to Bœotia and Peloponnesus completely failed in their object, from the jealousy, noway astonishing, of Sparta and her allies. Of the rest we hear nothing, for this refusal was quite sufficient to frustrate the whole scheme.¹ It is to be remarked that the dependent allies of Athens appear to have been summoned just as much as the cities perfectly autonomous; so that their tributary relation to Athens was not understood to degrade them. We may sincerely regret that such congress did not take effect, as it might have opened some new possibilities of converging tendency and alliance for the dispersed fractions of the Greek name—a comprehensive benefit not likely to be entertained at Sparta even as a project, but which might perhaps have been realised under Athens, and seems in this case to have been sincerely aimed at by Periklês. The events of the Peloponnesian war, however, extinguished all hopes of any such union.

The interval of fourteen years, between the beginning of the Thirty years' truce and that of the Peloponnesian war, was by no means one of undisturbed peace to Athens. In the sixth year of that period occurred the formidable revolt of Samos.

That island appears to have been the most powerful of all the allies of Athens.² It surpassed even Chios or Lesbos, standing on the same footing as these two: that is, paying no tribute-money—a privilege when compared with the body of the allies,—but furnishing ships and men when called upon, and retaining, subject to this condition, its complete autonomy, its oligarchical government, its fortifications,

B.C. 440.
Revolt of
Samos from
the Athe-
nian.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 17. Plutarch gives no precise date, and O. Müller (*De Phidjæ Vitâ*, p. 9) places these steps, for convocation of a congress, before the first war between Sparta and Athens and the battle of Tanagra—i. e. before 460 B.C. But this date seems to me improbable: Thebes was not yet renovated in power, nor had Bœotia as yet recovered from the

fruits of her alliance with the Persians; moreover, neither Athens nor Periklês himself seems to have been at that time in a situation to conceive so large a project; which suits in every respect much better for the later period, after the Thirty year's truce, but before the Peloponnesian war.

² Thucyd. i. 115; viii. 76; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28.

and its military force. Like most of the other islands near the coast, Samos possessed a portion of territory on the Asiatic mainland, between which and the territory of Milêtus lay the small town of Priênê, one of the twelve original members contributing to the Pan-Ionic solemnity. Respecting the possession of this town of Priênê, a war broke out between the Samians and Milesians, in the sixth year of the 'Thirty years' truce (B.C. 440-439). Whether the town had before been independent, we do not know, but in this war the Milesians were worsted, and it fell into the hands of the Samians. The defeated Milesians, enrolled as they were among the tributary allies of Athens, complained to her of the conduct of the Samians, and their complaint was seconded by a party in Samos itself, opposed to the oligarchy and its proceedings. The Athenians required the two disputing cities to bring the matter before discussion and award at Athens. But the Samians refused to comply:¹ whereupon an armament of forty ships was despatched from Athens to the island, and established in it a democratical government; leaving in it a garrison and carrying away to Lemnos fifty men and as many boys from the principal oligarchical families, to serve as hostages. Of these families, however, a certain number retired to the mainland, where they entered into negotiations with Pissuthnes the satrap of Sardes, to procure aid and restoration. Obtaining from him seven hundred mercenary troops, and passing over in the night to the island, by previous concert with the oligarchical party, they overcame the Samian democracy as well as the Athenian garrison, who were sent over as prisoners to Pissuthnes. They were farther lucky enough to succeed in stealing away from Lemnos their own recently deposited hostages, and they

¹ Thucyd. i. 115; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 25. Most of the statements which appear in this chapter of Plutarch (over and above the concise narrative of Thueydidês) appear to be borrowed from exaggerated party stories of the day. We need make no remark upon the story, that Periklês was induced to take the side of Milêtus against Samos by the fact that Aspasia was a native of Milêtus. Nor is it at all more credible, that

the satrap Pissuthnes, from goodwill towards Samos, offered Periklês 10,000 golden staters as an inducement to spare the island. It may perhaps be true, however, that the Samian oligarchy, and those wealthy men whose children were likely to be taken as hostages, tried the effect of large bribes upon the mind of Periklês to prevail upon him not to alter the government.

then proclaimed open revolt against Athens, in which Byzantium also joined. It seems remarkable, that though by such a proceeding they would of course draw upon themselves the full strength of Athens, yet their first step was to resume aggressive hostilities against Milêtus,¹ whither they sailed with a powerful force of seventy ships, twenty of them carrying troops.

Immediately on the receipt of this grave intelligence, a fleet of sixty triremes—probably all that were in complete readiness—was despatched to Samos under ten generals, two of whom were Periklês himself and the poet Sophoklês,² both seemingly included among the ten ordinary Stratêgi of the year. But it was necessary to employ sixteen of these ships, partly in summoning contingents from Chios and Lesbos, to which islands Sophoklês went in person;³ partly in keeping watch off the coast of Karia for the arrival of the Phœnician fleet, which report stated to be approaching; so that Periklês had only forty-four ships remaining in his squadron. Yet he did not hesitate to attack the Samian fleet of seventy ships on his way back from Milêtus, near the island of Tragia, and was victorious in the action. Presently he was reinforced by forty ships from Athens and by twenty-five from Chios and Lesbos, so as to be able to disembark at Samos, where he overcame the Samian land-force and blocked up the harbour with a portion of his fleet, surrounding the city on the land-side with a triple wall. Meanwhile the Samians had sent Stesagoras with five ships to press the coming of the Phœnician fleet, and the report of their approach became again so prevalent that Periklês felt obliged to take sixty ships (out of the total 125) to watch for them off the coast of Kaunus and Karia, where he cruised for about fourteen days. The Phœnician fleet⁴ never came in sight, though Diodorus

¹ Thucyd. i. 114, 115.

² Strabo, xiv. p. 638; Schol. Aristeidês, t. iii. p. 485, Dindorf.

³ See the interesting particulars recounted respecting Sophoklês by the Chian poet Ion, who met and conversed with him during the course of this expedition (Atheneus, xiii. p. 603). He represents the poet as uncommonly pleasing

and graceful in society, but noway distinguished for active capacity. Sophoklês was at this time in peculiar favour, from the success of his tragedy *Antigonê* the year before. See the chronology of these events discussed and elucidated in Boeckh's preliminary Dissertation to the *Antigonê*, c. 6-9.

⁴ Diodor. xi. 27.

affirms that it was actually on its voyage. Pissuthnes certainly seems to have promised, and the Samians to have expected it. Yet I incline to believe that, though willing to hold out hopes and encourage revolt among the Athenian allies, the satrap did not choose openly to violate the convention of Kallias, whereby the Persians were forbidden to send a fleet westward of the Chelidonian promontory. The departure of Periklês, however, so much weakened the Athenian fleet off Samos, that the Samians, suddenly sailing out of their harbour in an opportune moment, at the instigation and under the command of one of their most eminent citizens, the philosopher Melissus—surprised and disabled the blockading squadron, and even gained a victory over the remaining fleet before the ships could be fairly got clear of the land.¹ For fourteen days they remained masters of the sea, carrying in and out all that they thought proper.

It was not until the return of Periklês that they were again blockaded. Reinforcements however were now multiplied to the investing squadron—from Athens, forty ships under Thucydidês,² Agnon, and Phormion, and

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 26. Plutarch seems to have had before him accounts respecting this Samian campaign not only from Ephorus, Stesimbrotus, and Duris, but also from Aristotle: and the statements of the latter must have differed thus far from Thucydidês, that he affirmed Melissus the Samian general to have been victorious over Periklês himself, which is not to be reconciled with the narrative of Thucydidês.

The Samian historian Duris, living about a century after this siege, seems to have introduced many falsehoods respecting the cruelties of Athens; see Plutarch, l. c.

² It appears very improbable that this Thucydidês can be the historian himself. If it be Thucydidês son of Melêsias, we must suppose him to have been restored

from ostracism before the regular time—a supposition indeed noway inadmissible in itself, but which there is nothing else to countenance. The author of the Life of Sophoklês, as well as most of the recent critics, adopt this opinion.

On the other hand, it may have been a third person named Thucydidês; for the name seems to have been common, as we might guess from the two words of which it is compounded. We find a third Thucydidês mentioned viii. 92—a native of Pharsalus: and the biographer Marcellinus seems to have read of many persons so called (Θουκυδίδου πολλοί, p. xvi. ed. Arnold). The subsequent history of Thucydidês son of Melêsias is involved in complete obscurity. We do not know the incident to which the remarkable passage in

twenty under Tlepolemus and Antiklès, besides thirty from Chios and Lesbos—making altogether near two hundred sail. Against this overwhelming force Melissus and the Samians made an unavailing attempt at resistance, but were presently quite blocked up, and remained so for nearly nine months until they could hold out no longer. They then capitulated, being compelled to rase their fortifications, to surrender all their ships of war, to give hostages for their future conduct, and to make good by stated instalments the whole expense of the enterprise, said to have reached 1000 talents. The Byzantines too made their submission at the same time.¹

Two or three circumstances deserve notice respecting this revolt, as illustrating the existing condition of the Athenian empire. First, that the whole force of Athens, together with the contingents from Chios and Lesbos, was necessary in order to crush it, so that Byzantium, which joined in the revolt, seems to have been left unassailed. Now it is remarkable that none of the dependent allies near Byzantium or anywhere else, availed themselves of so favourable an opportunity to revolt also: a fact which seems plainly to imply that there was little positive discontent then prevalent among them. Had the revolt spread to other cities, probably Pissuthnes might have realised his promise of bringing up the Phœnician fleet, which would have been a serious calamity for the Ægean Greeks, and was only kept off by the unbroken maintenance of the Athenian empire.

Next, the revolted Samians applied for aid, not only to Pissuthnes, but also to Sparta and her allies; among whom

Aristophanès (Acharn. 703) alludes—compare Vespæ, 946: nor can we confirm the statement which the Scholiast cites from Idomeneus, to the effect that Thucydidès was banished and fled to Artaxerxes: see Bergk. Reliq. Com. Att. p. 61.

¹ Thucyd. i. 117; Diodor. xii. 27, 28; Isokratès, De Permutat. Or. xv. sect. 118; Corn. Nep., Vit. Timoth. c. 1.

The assertion of Ephorus (see Diodorus, xii. 28, and Ephori Fragm.

117, ed. Marx, with the note of Marx) that Periklès employed battering machines against the town, under the management of the Klazomenian Artemon, was called in question by Herakleidès Ponticus, on the ground that Artemon was a contemporary of Anakreon, near a century before: and Thucydidès represents Periklès to have captured the town altogether by blockade.

at a special meeting the question of compliance or refusal was formally debated. Notwithstanding the Thirty years' truce then subsisting, of which only six years had elapsed, and which had been noway violated by Athens—many of the allies of Sparta voted for assisting the Samians. What part Sparta herself took, we do not know—but the Corinthians were the main and decided advocates for the negative. They not only contended that the truce distinctly forbade compliance with the Samian request, but also recognised the right of each confederacy to punish its own recusant members. And this was the decision ultimately adopted, for which the Corinthians afterwards took credit in the eyes of Athens, as its chief authors.¹ Certainly, if the contrary policy had been pursued, the Athenian empire might have been in great danger—the Phœnician fleet would probably have been brought in also—and the future course of events greatly altered.

Application of the Samians to Sparta for aid against Athens—it is refused chiefly through the Corinthians.

Again, after the reconquest of Samos, we should assume it almost as a matter of certainty that the Athenians would renew the democratical government which they had set up just before the revolt. Yet if they did so, it must have been again overthrown, without any attempt to uphold it on the part of Athens. For we hardly hear of Samos again, until twenty-seven years afterwards, the latter division of the Peloponnesian war, in 412 B. C., and it then appears with an established oligarchical government of Geomori or landed proprietors, against which the people make a successful rising during the course of that year.² As Samos remained, during the interval between 439 B. C. and 412 B. C., unfortified, deprived of its fleet, and enrolled among the tribute-paying allies of Athens—and as it nevertheless either retained, or acquired, its oligarchical government; so we may conclude that Athens cannot have systematically interfered to democratise by violence the subject-allies, in cases where the natural tendency of parties ran towards oligarchy. The condition of Lesbos at the time of its revolt (hereafter to be related) will be found to confirm this conclusion.³

Government of Samos after the reconquest—doubtful whether the Athenians renewed the democracy which they had recently established.

¹ Thucyd. i. 40, 41. ² Thucyd. viii. 21. ³ Compare Wachsmuth, *Hellenische Alterthumskunde*, sect. 58, vol. ii. p. 82.

On returning to Athens after the reconquest of Samos, Periklès was chosen to pronounce the funeral oration over the citizens slain in the war, to whom, according to custom, solemn and public obsequies were celebrated in the suburb called Kerameikus. This custom appears to have been introduced shortly after the Persian war,¹ and would doubtless contribute to stimulate the patriotism of the citizens, especially when the speaker elected to deliver it was possessed of the personal dignity as well as the oratorical powers of Periklès. He was twice public funeral orator by the choice of the citizens; once after the Samian success, and a second time in the first year of the Peloponnesian war. His discourse on the first occasion has not reached us,² but the second has been fortunately preserved (in substance at least) by Thucydidès, who also briefly describes the funeral ceremony—doubtless the same on all occasions. The bones of the deceased warriors were exposed in tents three days before the ceremony, in order that the relatives of each might have the opportunity of bringing offerings. They were then placed in coffins of cypress and carried forth on carts to the public burial-place at the Kerameikus; one coffin for each of the ten tribes, and one empty couch, formally laid out, to represent those warriors whose bones had not been discovered or collected. The female relatives of each followed the carts, with loud wailings, and after them a numerous procession both of citizens and strangers. So soon as the bones had been consigned to the grave, some

¹ See Westermann, *Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom*; Diodor. xi. 33; Dionys. Hal. A. R. v. 17.

Periklès, in the funeral oration preserved by Thucydidès (ii. 35-40), begins by saying—Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν ἐνθάδε εἰρηκότων ἤδη ἐπεινοῦσι τὸν προσθέντα τῷ νόμῳ τὸν λόγον τόδε, &c.

The Scholiast, and other commentators (K. F. Weber and Westermann among the number), make various guesses as to *what* celebrated man is here designated as the introducer of the custom of a

funeral harangue. The Scholiast says, Solon; Weber fixes on Kimon; Westermann, on Aristeidès; another commentator on Themistoklès. But we may reasonably doubt whether *any* one very celebrated man is specially indicated by the words τὸν προσθέντα. To commend the introducer of the practice, is nothing more than a phrase for commending the practice itself.

² Some fragments of it seem to have been preserved, in the time of Aristotle: see his treatise de Rhetoricâ, i. 7; iii. 10, 3.

distinguished citizen, specially chosen for the purpose, mounted on an elevated stage and addressed to the multitude an appropriate discourse. Such was the effect produced by that of Periklês after the Samian expedition, that when he had concluded, the audience present testified their emotion in the liveliest manner, and the women especially crowned him with garlands like a victorious athlete.¹ Only Elpinikê, sister of the deceased Kimon, reminded him that the victories of her brother had been more felicitous, as gained over Persians and Phœnicians, and not over Greeks and kinsmen. And the contemporary poet Ion, the friend of Kimon, reported what he thought an unseemly boast of Periklês—to the effect that Agamemnon had spent ten years in taking a foreign city, while *he* in nine months had reduced the first and most powerful of all the Ionic communities.² But if we possessed the actual speech pronounced, we should probably find that he assigned all the honour of the exploit to Athens and her citizens generally, placing their achievement in favourable comparison with that of Agamemnon and his host—not himself with Agamemnon.

Whatever may be thought of this boast, there can be no doubt that the result of the Samian war not only rescued the Athenian empire from great peril,³ but rendered it stronger than ever: while the foundation of Amphipolis, which was effected two years afterwards, strengthened it still farther. Nor do we hear, during the ensuing few years, of any farther tendencies to disaffection among its members, until the period immediately before the Peloponnesian war. The feeling common among them towards Athens, seems to have been neither attachment nor hatred, but simple indifference and acquiescence in her supremacy. Such amount of positive discontent as really existed among them, arose, not from actual hardships suffered, but from the general political instinct of the Greek mind—desire of separate autonomy: which manifested itself in each city, through the oligarchical party, whose power was kept down by Athens—and was stimulated by the sentiment communicated from

Position of the Athenian empire—relation of Athens to her subject-allies—their feelings towards her generally were those of indifference and acquiescence, not of hatred.

¹ Compare the enthusiastic demonstrations which welcomed Brasidas at Skiônê (Thucyd. iv. 121).

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 28; Thucyd. ii. 34.

³ A short fragment remaining

the Grecian communities without the Athenian empire. According to that sentiment, the condition of a subjectally of Athens was treated as one of degradation and servitude. In proportion as fear and hatred of Athens became predominant among the allies of Sparta, these latter gave utterance to the sentiment more and more emphatically, so as to encourage discontent artificially among the subject-allies of the Athenian empire. Possessing complete mastery of the sea, and every sort of superiority requisite for holding empire over islands, Athens had yet no sentiment to appeal to in her subjects, calculated to render her empire popular, except that of common democracy, which seems at first to have acted without any care on her part to encourage it, until the progress of the Peloponnesian war made such encouragement a part of her policy. And even had she tried to keep up in the allies the feeling of a common interest and the attachment to a permanent confederacy, the instinct of political separation would probably have baffled all her efforts. But she took no such pains. With the usual morality that grows up in the minds of the actual possessors of power, she conceived herself entitled to exact obedience as her right. Some of the Athenian speakers in Thucydidês go so far as to disdain all pretence of legitimate power, even such as might fairly be set up; resting the supremacy of Athens on the naked plea of superior force.¹ As the allied cities were mostly under democracies—through the indirect influence rather than the systematic dictation of Athens—yet each having its own internal aristocracy in a state of opposition; so the movements for revolt against Athens originated with the aristocracy or with some few citizens apart; while the people, though sharing more or less in the desire for autonomy, had yet either a fear of their own aristocracy or a sympathy with Athens, which made them always backward in revolting, sometimes decidedly opposed to it. Neither Periklês nor Kleon indeed lays stress on the attachment

from the comic poet Eupolis (Κόλακας, Fr. xvi. p. 493, ed. Meineke), attests the anxiety at Athens about the Samian war, and the great joy when the island was reconquered: compare Aristophan. Vesp. 283.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 37; ii. 63. See the conference, at the island of Melos

in the sixteenth year of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. v. 89 seq.), between the Athenian commissioners and the Melians. I think however that this conference is less to be trusted as based in reality, than the speeches in Thucydidês generally—of which more hereafter.

of the people as distinguished from that of the Few, in these dependent cities. But the argument is strongly insisted on by Diodotus¹ in the discussion respecting Mitylênê after its surrender: and as the war advanced, the question of alliance with Athens or Sparta became more and more identified with the internal preponderance of democracy or oligarchy in each.²

We shall find that in most of those cases of actual revolt where we are informed of the preceding circumstances, the step is adopted or contrived by a small number of oligarchical malcontents, without consulting the general voice; while in those cases where the general assembly is consulted beforehand, there is manifested indeed a preference for autonomy, but nothing like a hatred of Athens or decided inclination to break with her. In the case of Mitylênê,³ in the fourth year of the war, it was the aristocratical government which revolted, while the people, as soon as they obtained arms, actually declared in favour of Athens. And the secession of Chios, the greatest of all the allies, in the twentieth year of the Peloponnesian war—even after all the hardships which the allies had been called upon to bear in that war, and after the ruinous disasters which Athens had sustained before Syracuse—was both prepared beforehand and accomplished by secret negotiations of the Chian oligarchy, not only without the concurrence, but against the inclination, of their own people.⁴ In like manner, the revolt of Thasos would not have occurred, had not the Thasian democracy been previously subverted by the Athenian Peisander and his oligarchical confederates. So in Akanthus, in Amphipolis, in Mendê, and those other Athenian dependencies which were wrested from Athens by Brasidas—we find the latter secretly introduced by a

¹ Thucyd. iii. 47. Νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὑμῖν ὁ δῆμος ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς πόλεσιν εὖλους ἐστὶ, καὶ ἡ οὐ συναρξίσταται τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἢ ἐὰν βιασθῆ, ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀποστήσασιν πολέμιος εὐθὺς, &c.

² See the striking observations of Thucydides, iii. 82, 83; Aristotel. Politic. v. 6, 9.

³ Thucyd. iii. 27.

⁴ Thucyd. viii. 9-14. He observes also, respecting the Thasian oligar-

chy just set up in lieu of the previous democracy by the Athenian oligarchical conspirators who were then organising the revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens—that they immediately made preparations for revolting from Athens—ξυνέβη οὖν αὐτοῖς μάλιστα ἃ ἐβούλοντο, τῆν πόλιν τε ἀκιδῶως ὀρθοῦσθαι, καὶ τὸν ἐναντιωσομένον δῆμον καταλελεῖσθαι (viii. 64).

few conspirators. The bulk of the citizens do not hail him at once as a deliverer, like men sick of Athenian supremacy: they acquiesce, not without debate, when Brasidas is already in the town, and his demeanour, just as well as conciliating, soon gains their esteem. But neither in Akanthus nor in Amphipolis would he have been admitted by the free decision of the citizens, if they had not been alarmed for the safety of their friends, their properties, and their harvest, still exposed in the lands without the walls.¹ These particular examples warrant us in affirming, that though the oligarchy in the various allied cities desired eagerly to shake off the supremacy of Athens, the people were always backward in following them, sometimes even opposed, and hardly ever willing to make sacrifices for the object. They shared the universal Grecian desire for separate autonomy,² and felt the Athenian empire as an extraneous pressure which they would have been glad to shake off, whenever the change could be made with safety. But their condition was not one of positive hardship, nor did they overlook the hazardous side of such a change—partly from the coercive hand of Athens—partly from new enemies against whom Athens had hitherto protected them—and not least from their own oligarchy. Of course the different allied cities were not all animated by the same feelings, some being more averse to Athens than others.

The particular modes, in which Athenian supremacy pressed upon the allies and excited complaints, appear to have been chiefly three. 1. The annual tribute. 2. The encroachments or other misdeeds committed by individual Athenians, taking advantage of their superior position: citizens either planted out by the city as Kleruchs (out-settlers), on the lands of those allies who had been subdued—or serving in the naval armaments—or sent round as inspectors—or placed in occasional garrison—or carrying on some private speculation. 3. The obligation under which the allies were laid of bringing a large proportion of their judicial trials to be settled before the dikasteries at Athens.

As to the tribute, I have before remarked that its amount had been but little raised from its first settlement

¹ Thucyd. iv. 86, 88, 106, 123.

² See the important passage, Thucyd. viii. 43.

down to the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, at which time it was 600 talents yearly.¹ It appears to have been reviewed, and the apportionment corrected, in every fifth year, at which period the collecting officers may probably have been changed. Afterwards, probably, it became more burdensome, though when, or in what degree, we do not know: but the alleged duplication of it (as I have already remarked) is both uncertified and improbable. The same gradual increase may probably be affirmed respecting the second head of inconvenience—vexation caused to the allies by individual Athenians, chiefly officers of armaments or powerful citizens.² Doubtless this was always more or less a real grievance, from the moment when the Athenians became despots in place of chiefs. But it was probably not very serious in extent until after the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, when revolt on the part of the allies became more apprehended, and when garrisons, inspectors, and tribute-gathering ships became more essential in the working of the Athenian empire.

Annual tribute—changes made in its amount. Athenian officers and inspectors throughout the empire.

But the third circumstance above-noticed—the subjection of the allied cities to the Athenian dikasteries—has been more dwelt upon as a grievance than the second, and seems to have been unduly exaggerated. We can hardly doubt that the beginning of this jurisdiction exercised by the Athenian dikasteries dates with the synod of Delos, at the time of the first formation of the confederacy. It was an indispensable element

Disputes and offences in and among the subject-allies, were brought for trial before the dikasteries at Athens.

¹ Xenophon, *Repub. Athen.* iii. 5. πλὴν αἱ τάξεις τοῦ φόρου τοῦτο δὲ γίνεσθαι ὡς τὰ πολλὰ δι' ἔτους πέμπτου.

² Xenophon, *Repub. Athen.* i. 14. Περὶ δὲ τῶν συμμάχων, αἱ ἐκπλέοντες συκοφαντοῦσιν, ὡς δοκοῦσι, καὶ μισοῦσι τὸς χρηστὸς, &c.

Who are the persons designated by the expression αἱ ἐκπλέοντες, appears to be specified more particularly a little farther on (i. 18); it means the generals, the officers, the envoys, &c., sent forth by Athens.

In respect to the Kleruchies, or out-settlements of Athenian citizens on the lands of allies revolted and reconquered—we may remark that they are not noticed as a grievance in this treatise of Xenophon, nor in any of the anti-Athenian orations of Thucydides. They appear, however, as matters of crimination after the extinction of the empire, and at the moment when Athens was again rising into a position such as to inspire the hope of reviving it. For at the close of the Peloponnesian war,

of that confederacy, that the members should forego their right of private war among each other, and submit their differences to peaceable arbitration—a covenant introduced even into alliances much less intimate than this was, and absolutely essential to the efficient maintenance of any common action against Persia.¹ Of course many causes of dispute, public as well as private, must have arisen among these wide-spread islands and seaports of the Ægean, connected with each other by relations of fellow-feeling, of trade, and of common apprehensions. The synod of Delos, composed of the deputies of all, was the natural board of arbitration for such disputes. A habit must thus have been formed, of recognising a sort of federal tribunal,—to decide peaceably how far each ally had faithfully discharged its duties, both towards the confederacy collectively, and towards other allies with their individual citizens separately,—as well as to enforce its decisions and punish refractory members, pursuant to the right which Sparta and her confederacy also claimed and exercised.² Now from the

which was also the destruction of the empire, all the Kleruchs were driven home again, and deprived of their outlying property, which reverted to various insular proprietors. These latter were terrified at the idea that Athens might afterwards try to resume these lost rights: hence the subsequent outcry against the Kleruchies.

¹ See the expression in Thucydides (v. 27), describing the conditions required when Argos was about to extend her alliances in Peloponnesus. The conditions were two. 1. That the city should be autonomous. 2. Next, that it should be willing to submit its quarrels to equitable arbitrations—ἤ τις αὐτόνομός τε ἔστι, καὶ δικασίας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι.

In the orations against the Athenians, delivered by the Syracusan Hermokratês at Kamarina, Athens is accused of having enslaved her allies partly on the ground that they neglected to perform their military obligations, partly be-

cause they made war upon each other (Thucyd. vi. 76), partly also on other specious pretences. How far this charge against Athens is borne out by the fact, we can hardly say; in all those particular examples which Thucydides mentions of subjugation of allies by Athens, there is a cause perfectly definite and sufficient—not a mere pretence devised by Athenian ambition.

² According to the principle laid down by the Corinthians shortly before the Peloponnesian war—τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμαχούς αὐτῶν τινα κολάζειν (Thucyd. i. 40-43).

The Lacedæmonians, on preferring their accusation of treason against Themistoklês, demanded that he should be tried at Sparta, before the common Hellenic synod which held its sitting there, and of which Athens was then a member; that is, the Spartan confederacy or alliance—ἐπὶ τοῦ κοινοῦ συνεδρίου τῶν Ἑλλήνων (Diodor. xi. 55).

beginning the Athenians were the guiding and enforcing presidents of this synod. When it gradually died away, they were found occupying its place as well as clothed with its functions. It was in this manner that their judicial authority over the allies appears first to have begun, as the confederacy became changed into an Athenian empire,—the judicial functions of the synod being transferred along with the common treasure to Athens, and doubtless much extended. And on the whole, these functions must have been productive of more good than evil to the allies themselves, especially to the weakest and most defenceless among them.

Among the thousand towns which paid tribute to Athens (taking this numerical statement of Aristophanês not in its exact meaning, but simply as a great number), if a small town, or one of its citizens, had cause of complaint against a larger, there was no channel except the synod of Delos, or the Athenian tribunal, through which it could have any reasonable assurance of fair trial or justice. It is not to be supposed that *all* the private complaints and suits between citizen and citizen, in each respective subject town, were carried up for trial to Athens: yet we do not know distinctly how the line was drawn, between matters carried up thither, and matters tried at home. The subject cities appear to have been interdicted from the power of capital punishment, which could only be inflicted after previous trial and condemnation at Athens:¹ so that the latter reserved to herself the cognizance of most of the grave crimes—or what may be called “the higher justice” generally. And the political accusations preferred by citizen against citizen, in any subject city, for alleged treason, corruption, non-fulfilment of public duty, &c., were doubtless carried to Athens for trial—perhaps the most important part of her jurisdiction.

But the maintenance of this judicial supremacy was not intended by Athens for the substantive object of amending the administration of justice in each separate allied city. It went rather to regulate the relations between city and city—between citizens of different cities—between Athenian citizens or officers, and any of these allied cities

Productive of some disadvantage, but of preponderance of advantage to the subject-allies themselves.

¹ Antipho, De Ciede Herôdis, c. Ἀθηναίων, οὐδένα θανάτω τιμῶν-7. p. 135. ὁ οὐδέ πολεῖ εἴσεσται, ἀνευ σπι.

with which they had relations—between each city itself, as a dependent government with contending political parties, and the imperial head Athens. All these being problems which imperial Athens was called on to solve, the best way of solving them would have been through some common synod emanating from all the allies. Putting this aside, we shall find that the solution provided by Athens was perhaps the next best, and we shall be the more induced to think so when we compare it with the proceedings afterwards adopted by Sparta, when she had put down the Athenian empire. Under Sparta, the general rule was, to place each of the dependent cities under the government of a Dekarchy (or oligarchical council of ten) among its chief citizens, together with a Spartan harmost or governor having a small garrison under his orders. It will be found when we come to describe the Spartan maritime empire that the arrangements exposed each dependent city to very great violence and extortion, while, after all, they solved only a part of the problem. They served only to maintain each separate city under the dominion of Sparta without contributing to regulate the dealings between the citizens of one and those of another, or to bind together the empire as a whole. Now the Athenians did not, as a system, place in their dependent cities governors analogous to the harmosts, though they did so occasionally under special need. But their fleets and their officers were in frequent relation with these cities; and as the principal officers were noways indisposed to abuse their position, so the facility of complaint, constantly open, to the Athenian popular dikastery, served both as redress and guarantee against misrule of this description. It was a guarantee which the allies themselves sensibly felt and valued, as we know from Thucydidês. The chief source from whence they had to apprehend evil was, the misconduct of the Athenian officials and principal citizens, who could misemploy the power of Athens for their own private purposes—but they looked up to the “Athenian Demos as a chastener of such evil-doers and as a harbour of refuge to themselves.”¹ If the popular dikasteries at

¹ Thucyd. viii. 48. Τοὺς τε καλοὺς καὶ κακοὺς ὀνομαζομένους οὐκ ἐλάττω αὐτούς (that is, the subject-allies) νομίζουσιν σφισὶ πράγματα παρ-

ἔξαιν τοῦ δήμου, ποριστὰς ὄντας καὶ ἐσχηγτὰς τῶν κακῶν τῷ δήμῳ, εἰς ὧν τὰ πλείω αὐτούς ἀπελευθεῖται· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' ἑκείνοις εἶναι, καὶ ἄκριτοι

Athens had not been thus open, the allied cities would have suffered much more severely from the captains and officials of Athens in their individual capacity. And the maintenance of political harmony, between the imperial city and the subject ally, was ensured by Athens through the jurisdiction of her dikasteries with much less cost of injustice and violence than by Sparta. For though oligarchical leaders in these allied cities might sometimes be unjustly condemned at Athens, yet such accidental wrong was immensely overpassed by the enormities of the Spartan harmosts and Dekarchies, who put numbers to death without any trial at all.

So again, it is to be recollected that Athenian private citizens, not officially employed, were spread over the whole range of the empire as kleruchs, proprietors, or traders. Of course therefore disputes would arise between them and the natives of the subject cities, as well as among these latter themselves, in cases where both parties did not belong to the same city. Now in such cases the Spartan imperial authority was so exercised as to afford little or no remedy, since the action of the harmost or the Dekarchy was confined to one separate city; while the Athenian dikasteries, with universal competence and public trial, afforded the best redress which the contingency admitted. If a Thasian citizen believed himself aggrieved by the historian Thucydidês, either as commander of the Athenian fleet on that station, or as proprietor of gold mines in Thrace,—he had his

Numerous Athenian citizens spread over the Ægean—the allies had no redress against them, except through the Athenian dikasteries.

ἄ, καὶ βιαιότερον ἀποθνήσκειν, τὸν τε ὄλμον σφῶν τε καταργήν εἶναι καὶ ἐκείνων σωφροναστῆν. Καὶ ταῦτα παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων ἐπισταμένως τὰς πόλεις σφῶν ἀπὸς εἰδέναι, ὅτι οὕτω νομιζοῦσι. This is introduced as the deliberate judgement of the Athenian commander, the oligarch Phrynichus, whom Thucydidês greatly commends for his sagacity, and with whom he seems in this case to have concurred.

Xenophon (Rep. Ath. i. 14, 15) affirms that the Athenian officers on service passed many unjust sentences upon the oligarchical party

in the allied cities—fines, sentences of banishment, capital punishments, and that the Athenian people, though they had a strong public interest in the prosperity of the allies in order that their tribute might be larger, nevertheless thought it better that any individual citizen of Athens should pocket what he could out of the plunder of the allies, and leave to the latter nothing more than was absolutely necessary for them to live and work, without any superfluity such as might tempt them to revolt.

remedy against the latter by accusation before the Athenian dikasteries, to which the most powerful Athenian was amenable not less than the meanest Thasian. To a citizen of any allied city it might be an occasional hardship to be sued before the courts at Athens; but it was also often a valuable privilege to him to be able to sue, before those courts, others whom else he could not have reached. He had his share of the benefit as well as of the hardship. Athens, if she robbed her subject-allies of their independence, at least gave them in exchange the advantage of a central and common judiciary authority; thus enabling each of them to enforce claims of justice against the rest, in a way which would not have been practicable (to the weaker at least) even in a state of general independence.

Now Sparta seems not even to have attempted anything of the kind with regard to her subject-allies, being content to keep them under the rule of a harmost and a partisan oligarchy. And we read anecdotes which show that no justice could be obtained at Sparta even for the grossest outrages committed by the harmost, or by private Spartans out of Laconia. The two daughters of a Bœotian named Skedasmus (of Leuktra in Bœotia) had been first violated and then murdered by two Spartan citizens: the son of a citizen of Oreus in Eubœa had been also outraged and killed by the harmost Aristodêmus:¹ in both cases the fathers went to Sparta to lay the enormity before the ephors and other authorities, and in both cases a deaf ear was turned to their complaints. But such crimes, if committed by Athenian citizens or officers, might have been brought to a formal exposure before the public sitting of the dikastery, and there can be no doubt that both would have been severely punished. We shall see hereafter that an enormity of this description, committed by the Athenian general Pachês at Mitylênê, cost him his life before the Athenian dikasts.² Xenophon,

The dikasteries afforded protection against misconduct both of Athenian citizens and Athenian officers.

That the Athenian officers on service may have succeeded too often in unjust peculation at the cost of allies, is probable enough: but that the Athenian people were pleased to see their own individual citizens so enriching themselves, is certainly not true. The large jurisdiction of the dikasteries was

intended, among other effects, to open to the allies a legal redress against such misconduct on the part of the Athenian officers: and the passage above cited from Thucydides proves that it really produced such an effect.

¹ Plut., Pelop., c. 20; Plut., Am. Nar. c. 3, p. 773. ² See infra, chap. 49.

in the dark and one-sided representation which he gives of the Athenian democracy, remarks, that if the subject-allies had not been made amenable to justice at Athens, they would have cared little for the people of Athens, and would have paid court only to those individual Athenians, generals, trierarchs, or envoys, who visited the islands on service; but under the existing system, the subjects were compelled to visit Athens either as plaintiffs or defendants, and were thus under the necessity of paying court to the bulk of the people also—that is, to those humbler citizens out of whom the dikasteries were formed; they supplicated the dikasts in court for favour or lenient dealing.¹ But this is only an invidious manner of discrediting what was really a protection to the allies, both in purpose and in reality. For it was a lighter lot to be brought for trial before the dikastery, than to be condemned without redress by the general on service, or to be forced to buy off his condemnation by a bribe. Moreover the dikastery was open not merely to receive accusations against citizens of the allied cities, but also to entertain complaints which they preferred against others.

Assuming the dikasteries at Athens to be ever so defective as tribunals for administering justice, we must recollect that they were the same tribunals under which every Athenian citizen held his own fortune or reputation, and that the native of any subject city was admitted to the same chance of justice as the native of Athens. Accordingly we find the Athenian envoy at Sparta, immediately before the Peloponnesian war, taking peculiar credit to the imperial city on this ground, for equal dealing with her subject-allies. “If our power (he says) were to pass into other hands, the comparison would presently show how moderate we are in the use of it: but as regards us, our very moderation is

The dikasteries, defective or not, were the same tribunals under which every Athenian held his own security.

¹ Xenophon, Rep. Athen. i. 18. Πρὸς δὲ τοῦτοις, εἰ μὲν μὴ ἐπὶ δίκας ἤσαν οἱ σύμμαχοι, τοὺς ἐκπλέοντας Ἀθηναίων ἐτίμων ἂν μόνους, τοὺς τε στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχους καὶ πρέσβεις· νῦν δ' ἡνάγκασται τὸν δῆμον νολακεύειν τῶν Ἀθηναίων εἰς ἕκαστος τῶν συμμάχων, γινώσκων ὅτι δεῖ μὲν ἀφικόμενον Ἀθήνας εἰς δίκα,

δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὐκ ἐν ἄλλοις τῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ δήμῳ, ὅς ἐστι δὴ νόμος Ἀθηναίων. Καὶ ἀντιβολήσεται ἀναγκάζεται ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, καὶ εἰσιόντος του, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῆς χειρὸς. Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν οἱ σύμμαχοι δοῦλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίων καθεστᾶσι μᾶλλον.

unfairly turned to our disparagement rather than to our praise. For even though we put ourselves at disadvantage in matters litigated with our allies, and though we have appointed such matters to be judged among ourselves, and under laws equal to both parties, we are represented as animated by nothing better than a love of litigation.”¹

¹ Thucyd. i. 76, 77. Ἄλλους γ' ἂν οὖν οἰόμεθα τὰ ἡμέτερα λαβόντας δεῖξαι ἂν μάλιστα εἶ τι μετριάζομεν ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπεικοῦς ἀδοξία τὸ πλέον ἢ ἔπαινος οὐκ εἰκότως περιέσθη. Καὶ ἐλασσοῦμενος γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ξυμβολαίαις πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαις, καὶ παρ' ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐν τοῖς ὁμοίοις νόμοις ποιήσαντες τὰς κρίσεις, φιλοδικεῖν δοκοῦμεν, &c.

I construe ξυμβολαίαις δίκαις as connected in meaning with ξυμβόλαια and not with ξύμβολα—following Duker and Bloomfield in preference to Poppo and Göller: see the elaborate notes of the two latter editors. Δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων indicated the arrangements concluded by special convention between two different cities, by consent of both, for the purpose of determining controversies between their respective citizens; they were something essentially apart from the ordinary judicial arrangements of either state. Now what the Athenian orator here insists upon is exactly the contrary of this idea: he says that the allies were admitted to the benefit of Athenian trial and Athenian laws, in like manner with the citizens themselves. The judicial arrangements by which the Athenian allies were brought before the Athenian dikasteries cannot with propriety be said to be δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων; unless the act of original incorporation into the confederacy of Delos is to be regarded as a ξύμβολον or agreement—which in a large sense it might be, though not in the proper sense in which δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων are commonly mentioned.

Moreover I think that the passage of Antipho (De Cæde Herodis, p. 745) proves that it was the citizens of places *not in alliance with Athens* who litigated with Athenians according to δίκαι ἀπὸ ξυμβόλων—not the allies of Athens while they resided in their own native cities; for I agree with the interpretation which Boeckh puts upon this passage, in opposition to Platner and Schömann (Boeckh, Public Econ. of Athens, book iii. ch. xvi. p. 403, Eng. transl.; Schömann, Der Attisch. Prozess, p. 778; Platner, Prozess und Klagen bei den Attikern, ch. iv. 2, p. 110-112, where the latter discusses both the passages of Antipho and Thucydides).

The passages in Demosthenés, Orat. de Halones. c. 3, pp. 98, 99; and Andokidés cont. Alkibiad. c. 7, p. 121 (I quote this latter oration, though it is undoubtedly spurious, because we may well suppose the author of it to be conversant with the nature and contents of ξύμβολα), give us a sufficient idea of these judicial conventions, or ξύμβολα—special and liable to differ in each particular case. They seem to me essentially distinct from that systematic scheme of proceeding whereby the dikasteries of Athens were made cognizant of all, or most, important controversies among or between the allied cities, as well as of political accusations.

M. Boeckh draws a distinction between the *autonomous* allies (Chios and Lesbos, at the time immediately before the Peloponnesian war) and the *subject*-allies;

“Our allies (he adds) would complain less if we made open use of our superior force with regard to them; but we dis-

“the former class (he says) retained possession of unlimited jurisdiction, whereas the latter were compelled to try all their disputes in the courts of Athens.” Doubtless this distinction would prevail to a certain degree, but how far it was pushed we can hardly say. Suppose that a dispute took place between Chios and one of the subject-islands—or between an individual Chian and an individual Thasian—would not the Chian plaintiff sue, or the Chian defendant be sued before the Athenian dikastery? Suppose that an Athenian citizen or officer became involved in dispute with a Chian, would not the Athenian dikastery be the competent court, whichever of the two were plaintiff or defendant? Suppose a Chian citizen or magistrate to be suspected of fomenting revolt, would it not be competent to any accuser, either Chian or Athenian, to indict him before the dikastery at Athens? Abuse of power, or peculation, committed by Athenian officers at Chios, must of course be brought before the Athenian dikasteries, just as much as if the crime had been committed at Thasos or Naxos. We have no evidence to help us in regard to these questions; but I incline to believe that the difference in respect to judicial arrangement, between the autonomous and the subject-allies, was less in degree than M. Boeckh believes. We must recollect that the arrangement was not all pure hardship to the allies—the liability to be prosecuted was accompanied with the privilege of prosecuting for injuries received.

There is one remark however which appears to me of importance for understanding the testimonies

on this subject. The Athenian empire, properly so called, which began by the confederacy of Delos after the Persian invasion, was completely destroyed at the close of the Peloponnesian war, when Athens was conquered and taken. But after some years had elapsed, towards the year 377 B.C., Athens again began to make maritime conquests, to acquire allies, to receive tribute, to assemble a synod, and to resume her footing of something like an imperial city. Now her power over her allies during this second period of empire was not near so great as it had been during the first, between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars: nor can we be at all sure that what is true of the second is also true of the first. And I think it probable, that those statements of the grammarians, which represent the allies as carrying on *εἰσας ἀπὸ συμβόλων* in ordinary practice with the Athenians, may really be true about the second empire or alliance. Bekker, *Anecdota*, p. 436. Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ συμβόλων ἐδίκαζον τοῖς ὑπηκόοις οὕτως Ἀριστοτέλης. Pol-lux, viii. 68. Ἀπὸ συμβόλων δὲ δίκη ἦν, ὅτε οἱ σύμμαχοι ἐδικάζοντο. Also Hesychius, i. 489. The statement here ascribed to Aristotle may very probably be true about the second alliance, though it cannot be held true for the first. In the second, the Athenians may really have had *σύμβολα*, or special conventions for judicial business, with many of their principal allies, instead of making Athens the authoritative centre, and heir to the Delian synod, as they did during the first. It is to be remarked however that Harpokration, in the explanation which he gives of *σύμβολα*, treats them

card such maxims, and deal with them upon an equal footing: and they are so accustomed to this that they think themselves entitled to complain at every trifling disappointment of their expectations.¹ They suffered worse hardship under the Persians before our empire began, and they would suffer worse under you (the Spartans) if you were to succeed in conquering us and making our empire yours."

History bears out the boast of the Athenian orator, both as to the time preceding and following the empire of Athens.² And an Athenian citizen indeed might well regard it not as a hardship, but as a privilege to the subject-allies, that they should be allowed to sue him before the dikastery, and to defend themselves before the same tribunal either in case of wrong done to him, or in case of alleged treason to the imperial authority of Athens: they were thereby put upon a level with himself. Still more would he find reason to eulogise the universal competence of these dikasteries in providing a common legal authority for all disputes of the numerous distinct communities of the empire one with another, and for the safe navigation and general commerce of the Ægean. That complaints were raised against it among the subject-allies is noway surprising. For the empire of Athens generally was inconsistent with that separate autonomy to which every town thought itself entitled; and this central judicature was one of its prominent and constantly operative institutions, as well as a striking mark of dependence to the subordinate communities. Yet we may safely affirm that if empire was to be maintained at all, no way of maintaining it could be found at once less oppressive and more beneficial than the superintending competence of the dikasteries—a system not taking its rise in the mere "love of litigation" (if indeed we are to reckon this a real feature in the Athenian character, which I shall take another opportunity of examining), much less in those petty collateral interests indi-

in a perfectly general way, as conventions for settlement of judicial controversy between city and city, without any particular allusion to Athens and her allies. Compare Heffter, *Athenäische Gerichtsverfassung*, iii. 1, 3, p. 91.

¹ Thucyd. i. 77. Οἱ δὲ (the allies)

εἰθισμένοι πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου ὁμιλεῖν, &c.

² Compare Isokratēs, Or. iv. Panegyric. p. 62, 66. sect. 116-138; and Or. xii. Panathenaic. p. 247-254. sect. 72-111; Or. viii. De Pace, p. 178. sect. 119 *seqq.*; Plutarch, *Lysand. c.* 13; *Cornel. Nepos, Lysand. c.* 2, 3.

cated by Xenophon,¹ such as the increased customs duty, rent of houses, and hire of slaves at Peiræus, and the larger profits of the heralds, arising from the influx of suitors. It was nothing but the power, originally inherent in the confederacy of Delos, of arbitration between members and enforcement of duties towards the whole—a power inherited by Athens from that synod, and enlarged to meet the political wants of her empire; to which end it was essential, even in the view of Xenophon himself.² It may be that the dikastery was not always impartial between Athenian citizens privately, or the Athenian commonwealth collectively, and the subject-allies,—and insofar the latter had good reason to complain. But on the other hand we have no ground for suspecting it of deliberative or standing unfairness, or of any other defects than such as were inseparable from its constitution and procedure, whoever might be the parties under trial.

We are now considering the Athenian empire as it stood before the Peloponnesian war; before the increased exactions and the multiplied revolts, to which that war gave rise—before the cruelties which accompanied the suppression of those revolts, and which so deeply stained the character of Athens—before that aggravated fierceness, mistrust, contempt of obligation, and rapacious violence, which Thucydidês so emphatically indicates as having been infused into the Greek bosom by the fever of an all-pervading contest.³ There had been before this time many revolts of the Athenian dependencies, from the earliest at Naxos down to the latest at Samos. All had been successfully suppressed, but in no case had Athens displayed

Athenian empire was affected for the worse by the circumstances of the Peloponnesian war: more violence was introduced into it by that war, than had prevailed before.

¹ Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i. 17.

² Xenophon, *Repub. Ath.* i. 16. He states it as one of the advantageous consequences, which induced the Athenians to bring the suits and complaints of the allies to Athens for trial—that the *prytaneia*, or fees paid upon entering a cause for trial, became sufficiently large to furnish all the pay for the dikasts throughout the year.

But in another part of his treatise

(iii. 2. 3) he represents the Athenian dikasteries as overloaded with judicial business, much more than they could possibly get through; insomuch that there were long delays before causes could be brought on for trial. It could hardly be any great object therefore to multiply complaints artificially, in order to make fees for the dikasts.

³ See his well-known comments

the same unrelenting rigour as we shall find hereafter manifested towards Mitylênê, Skiônê, and Mêlos. The policy of Periklês, now in the plenitude of his power at Athens, was cautious and conservative, averse to forced extension of empire as well as to those increased burdens on the dependent allies which such schemes would have entailed, and tending to maintain that assured commerce in the Ægean by which all of them must have been gainers—not without a conviction that the contest must arise sooner or later between Athens and Sparta, and that the resources as well as the temper of the allies must be husbanded against that contingency. If we read in Thucydidês the speech of the envoy from Mitylênê¹ at Olympia, delivered to the Lacedæmonians and their allies in the fourth year of the Peloponnesian war, on occasion of the revolt of the city from Athens—a speech imploring aid and setting forth the strongest impeachment against Athens which the facts could be made to furnish—we shall be surprised how weak the case is and how much the speaker is conscious of its weakness. He has nothing like practical grievances and oppressions to urge against the imperial city. He does not dwell upon enormity of tribute, unpunished misconduct of Athenian officers, hardship of bringing causes for trial to Athens, or other sufferings of the subjects generally. He has nothing to say except that they were defenceless and degraded subjects, and that Athens held authority over them without and against their own consent: and in the case of Mitylênê, not so much as this could be said, since she was on the footing of an equal, armed, and autonomous ally. Of course this state of forced dependence was one which the allies, or such of them as could stand alone, would naturally and reasonably shake off whenever they had an opportunity.² But the negative evidence, derived from the speech of the Mitylênæan orator, goes far to make out the point contended for by the Athenian speaker at Sparta immediately before the war—that, beyond

The subject-allies of Athens had few practical grievances to complain of.

on the seditions at Korkyra, iii. 82, 83.

¹ Thucyd. iii. 11-14.

² So the Athenian orator Diodotus puts it in his speech deprecating the extreme punishment

about to be inflicted on Mitylênê—
ἤν τινα ἐλεύθερον καὶ βίᾳ ἀρχόμενον
εἰκότως πρὸς αὐτονομίαν
ἀποστάντα χειρωσώμεθα, &c.
(Thucyd. iii. 46).

the fact of such forced dependence, the allies had little practically to complain of. A city like Mitylênê might be strong enough to protect itself and its own commerce without the help of Athens. But to the weaker allies, the breaking up of the Athenian empire would have greatly lessened the security both of individuals and of commerce, in the waters of the Ægean, and their freedom would thus have been purchased at the cost of considerable positive disadvantages.¹

¹ It is to be recollected that the Athenian empire was essentially a *government of dependencies*; Athens as an imperial state exercising authority over subordinate governments. To maintain beneficial relation between two governments,—one supreme—the other subordinate—and to make the system work to the satisfaction of the people in the one as well as of the people in the other—has always been found a problem of great difficulty. Whoever reads the instructive volume of Sir G. C. Lewis (*Essay on the Government of Dependencies*), and the number of instances of practical misgovernment in this matter which are set forth therein—will be inclined to think that the empire of Athens over her allies makes comparatively a creditable figure. It will most certainly stand full comparison with the government of England over dependencies in the last century; as illustrated by the history of Ireland, with the penal laws against the Catholics—by the declaration of independence published in 1776 by the American colonies, setting forth the grounds of their separation—and by the pleadings of Mr. Burke against Warren Hastings.

A statement and legal trial alluded to by Sir George Lewis (p. 367) elucidates farther two points not unimportant on the present occasion: 1. The illiberal and hu-

miliating vein of sentiment which is apt to arise in citizens of the supreme government towards those of the subordinate. 2. The protection which English Jury-trial, nevertheless, afforded to the citizens of the dependency against oppression by English officers.

“An action was brought in the Court of Common Pleas, in 1773, by Mr. Anthony Fabrigas, a native of Minorca, against General Mostyn the governor of the island. The facts proved at the trial were, that Governor Mostyn had arrested the plaintiff, imprisoned him, and transported him to Spain without any form of trial, on the ground that the plaintiff had presented to him a petition for redress of grievances in a manner which he deemed improper. Mr. Justice Gould left it to the jury to say, whether the plaintiff's behaviour was such as to afford a just conclusion that he was about to stir up sedition and mutiny in the garrison, or whether he meant no more than earnestly to press his suit and obtain a redress of grievances. If they thought the latter, the plaintiff was entitled to recover in the action. The jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff *with £3000 damages*. In the following term an application was made for a new trial, which was refused by the whole court.

“The following remarks of the counsel for Governor Mostyn on this trial contain a plain and naïve

Nearly the whole of the Grecian world (putting aside Italian, Sicilian, and African Greek) was at this time included either in the alliance of Lacedæmon or in that of Athens, so that the truce of thirty years ensured a suspension of hostilities everywhere. Moreover the Lacedæmonian confederates had determined by a majority of votes to refuse the request of Samos for aid in her revolt against Athens: whereby it seemed established, as practical international law, that neither of these two great aggregate bodies should intermeddle with

statement of the doctrine, that a dependency is to be governed not for its own interest, but for that of the dominant state. 'Gentlemen of the jury (said the counsel), it will be time for me now to take notice of another circumstance, notorious to all the gentlemen who have been settled in the island, that the natives of Minorca are but ill-affected to the English and to the English government. It is not much to be wondered at. They are the descendants of Spaniards; and they consider Spain as the country to which they ought naturally to belong: it is not at all to be wondered at that they are indisposed to the English whom they consider as their conquerors.—Of all the Minorquins in the island, the plaintiff perhaps stands singularly and eminently the most seditious, turbulent, and dissatisfied subject to the crown of Great Britain that is to be found in Minorca. Gentlemen, he is, or chooses to be, called the patriot of Minorca. Now patriotism is a very pretty thing among ourselves, and we owe much to it: we owe our liberties to it; but we should have but little to value, and perhaps we should have but little of what we now enjoy, were it not for our trade. And for the sake of our trade, it is not fit that we should encourage

patriotism in Minorca: for it is there destructive of our trade, and there is an end to our trade in the Mediterranean, if it goes there. But here it is very well: for the body of the people in this country will have it: they have demanded it—and in consequence of their demands, they have enjoyed liberties which they will transmit to their posterity—and it is not in the power of this government to deprive them of it. But they will take care of all our conquests abroad. If that spirit prevailed in Minorca, the consequence would be the loss of that country, and of course of our Mediterranean trade. We should be sorry to set all our slaves free in our plantations.'"

The prodigious sum of damages awarded by the jury shows the strength of their sympathy with this Minorquin plaintiff against the English officer. I doubt not that the feeling of the dikastery at Athens was much of the same kind, and often quite as strong; sincerely disposed to protect the subject-allies against misconduct of Athenian trierarchs or inspectors.

The feelings expressed in the speech above-cited would also often find utterance from Athenian orators in the assembly: and it

the other, and that each should restrain or punish its own disobedient members.¹

Of this refusal, which materially affected the course of events, the main advisers had been the Corinthians, in spite of that fear and dislike of Athens which prompted many of the allies to vote for war.² The position of the Corinthians was peculiar; for while Sparta and her other allies were chiefly land-powers, Corinth had been from early times maritime, commercial, and colonising. She had indeed once possessed the largest navy in Greece, along with Ægina; but either she had not increased it at all during the last forty years, or if she had, her comparative naval importance had been sunk by the gigantic expansion of Athens. The Corinthians had both commerce and colonies—Leukas, Anaktorium, Ambrakia, Korkyra, &c., along or near the coast of Epirus: they had also their colony Potidæa, situated on the isthmus of Pallênê in Thrace, and intimately connected with them: and the interest of their commerce made them averse to collision with the superior navy of the Athenians. It was this consideration which had induced them to resist the impulse of the Lacedæmonian allies towards war on behalf of Samos. For though their feelings both of jealousy and hatred against Athens were even now strong,³ arising greatly out of the struggle a few years before the acquisition of Megara to the Athenian alliance—prudence indicated that in a war against the first naval power in Greece, they were sure to be the greatest losers.

Policy of Corinth, from being pacific, becomes warlike.

So long as the policy of Corinth pointed towards peace, there was every probability that war would be avoided,

would not be difficult to produce parallel passages, in which these orators imply discontent on the part of the allies to be the natural state of things, such as Athens could not hope to escape. The speech here given shows that such feelings arise, almost inevitably, out of the uncomfortable relation of two governments, one supreme, and the other subordinate. They are not the product of peculiar cruelty and oppression on the part of the Athenian democracy, as Mr.

Mitford and so many others have sought to prove.

¹ See the important passage already adverted to in a prior note.

Thucyd. i. 40. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡμεῖς Σαμίων ἀποστάντων, ψήφου προσεθέμεθα ἐναντίον ὑμῖν, τῶν ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων διχα ἐψηφισμένων εἰ χρεὴ αὐτοῖς ἀμύνειν, φανερώως δὲ ἀντεῖπομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ἔυμαχούς αὐτῶν τινα κολλάειν.

² Thucyd. i. 33.

³ Thucyd. i. 42.

or at least accepted only in a case of grave necessity, by the Lacedæmonian alliance. But a contingency, distant as well as unexpected, which occurred about five years after the revolt of Samos, reversed all these chances, and not only extinguished the dispositions of Corinth towards peace, but even transformed her into the forward instigator of war.

Amidst the various colonies planted from Corinth along the coast of Epirus, the greater number acknowledged on her part an hegemony or supremacy.¹ What extent of real power and interference this acknowledgement implied, in addition to the honorary dignity, we are not in a condition to say. But the Corinthians were popular, and had not carried their interference beyond the point which the colonists themselves found acceptable. To these amicable relations, however, the powerful Korkyra formed a glaring exception—having been generally at variance, sometimes in the most aggravated hostility, with its mother-city, and withholding from her even the accustomed tributes of honorary and filial respect. It was amidst such relations of habitual ill-will between Corinth and Korkyra that a dispute grew up respecting the city of Epidamnus (known afterwards in the Roman times as Dyrrhachium, hard by the modern Durazzo)—a colony founded by the Korkyræans on the coast of Illyria in the Ionic Gulf, considerably to the north of their own island. So strong was the sanctity of Grecian custom in respect to the foundation of colonies, that the Korkyræans, in spite of their enmity to Corinth, had been obliged to select the *Ækist* (or Founder-in-Chief) of Epidamnus from that city—a citizen of Herakleid descent named Phalius—along with whom there had also come some Corinthian settlers. And thus Epidamnus, though a Korkyræan colony, was nevertheless a recognised grand-daughter (if the expression may be allowed) of Corinth, the recollection of which was perpetuated by the solemnities periodically celebrated in honour of the *Ækist*.²

Founded on the isthmus of an outlying peninsula on the seacoast of the Illyrian Taulantii, Epidamnus was at first prosperous, and acquired a considerable territory as

¹ Thucyd. i. 38. ἡγεμόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θεωρεῖσθαι.

² Thucyd. i. 24, 25.

well as a numerous population. But during the years immediately preceding the period which we have now reached, it had been exposed to great reverses. Internal sedition between the oligarchy and the people, aggravated by attacks from the neighbouring Illyrians, had crippled its power; and a recent revolution, in which the people put down the oligarchy, had reduced it still farther—since the oligarchical exiles, collecting a force and allying themselves with the Illyrians, harassed the city grievously both by sea and land. The Epidamnian democracy was in such straits as to be forced to send to Korkyra for aid. Their envoys sat down as suppliants at the temple of Hêrê, cast themselves on the mercy of the Korkyræans, and besought them to act both as mediators with the exiled oligarchy, and as auxiliaries against the Illyrians. Though the Korkyræans, themselves democratically governed, might have been expected to sympathise with these suppliants and their prayers, yet their feeling was decidedly opposite. For it was the Epidamnian oligarchy who were principally connected with Korkyra, from whence their forefathers had emigrated, and where their family burial-places as well as their kinsmen were still to be found:¹ while the Demos, or small proprietors and tradesmen of Epidamnus, may perhaps have been of miscellaneous origin, and at any rate had no visible memorials of ancient lineage in the mother-island. Having been refused aid from Korkyra, and finding their distressed condition insupportable, the Epidamnians next thought of applying to Corinth. But as this was a step of questionable propriety, their envoys were directed first to take the opinion of the Delphian god. His oracle having given an unqualified sanction, they proceeded to Corinth with their mission; describing their distress as well as their unavailing application at Korkyra—tendering Epidamnus to the Corinthians as to its Ækists and chiefs, with the most urgent entreaties for immediate aid to preserve it from ruin—and not omitting to insist on the divine sanction just obtained. It was found easy to persuade the Corinthians, who, looking upon Epidamnus as a joint colony

The Epidamnians apply for aid in their distress to Korkyra—they are refused—the Corinthians send aid to the place.

¹ Thucyd. i. 26. ἤλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπίδαμνιων συγγάτες, τάρους τε ἀποδείκνυντες καὶ συγγένειαν ἢ προϊσχυόμενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατὰ γένειν.

from Corinth and Korkyra, thought themselves not only authorised, but bound, to undertake its defence—a resolution much prompted by their ancient feud against Korkyra. They speedily organized an expedition, consisting partly of intended new settlers, partly of a protecting military force—Corinthian, Leukadian, and Ambrakiôtic: which combined body, in order to avoid opposition from the powerful Korkyræan navy, was marched by land as far as Apollônia, and transported from thence by sea to Epidamnus.¹

The arrival of such a reinforcement rescued the city for the moment, but drew upon it a formidable increase of peril from the Korkyræans; who looked upon the interference of Corinth as an infringement of their rights, and resented it in the strongest manner. Their feelings were farther inflamed by the Epidamnian oligarchical exiles, who, coming to the island with petitions for succour and appeals to the tombs of their Korkyræan ancestors, found a ready sympathy. They were placed on board a fleet of twenty-five triremes, afterwards strengthened by a farther reinforcement, which was sent to Epidamnus with the insulting requisition that they should be forthwith restored and the new-comers from Corinth dismissed. No attention being paid to such demands, the Korkyræans commenced the blockade of the city with forty ships and with an auxiliary land-force of Illyrians—making proclamation that any person within, citizen or not, might depart safely if he chose, but would be dealt with as an enemy if he remained. How many persons profited by this permission we do not know; but at least enough to convey to Corinth the news that their troops in Epidamnus were closely besieged. The Corinthians immediately hastened the equipment of a second expedition—sufficient not only for the rescue of the place, but to surmount that resistance which the Korkyræans were sure to offer. In addition to thirty triremes, and three thousand hoplites, of their own, they solicited aid both in ships and money from many of their allies. Eight ships fully manned were furnished by Megara, four by Palês in the island of Kephallenia, five by Epidaurus, two by Trœzen, one by Hermionê, ten by Leukas, and eight by Ambrakia—together with

The Korkyræans attack Epidamnus—armament sent thither by Corinth.

¹ Thucyd. i. 26.

pecuniary contributions from Thebes, Phlius, and Elis. They farther proclaimed a public invitation for new settlers to Epidamnus, promising equal political rights to all; an option being allowed to any one, who wished to become a settler without being ready to depart at once, to ensure future admission by depositing the sum of fifty Corinthian drachmas. Though it might seem that the prospects of these new settlers were full of doubt and danger, yet such was the confidence entertained in the metropolitan protection of Corinth, that many were found as well to join the fleet, as to pay down the deposit for liberty of future junction.

All these proceedings on the part of Corinth, though undertaken with intentional hostility towards Korkyra, had not been preceded by any formal proposition such as was customary among Grecian states—a harshness of dealing arising not merely from her hatred towards Korkyra, but also from the peculiar political position of that island, which stood alone and isolated, not enrolled either in the Athenian or in the Lacedæmonian alliance. The Korkyræans, well aware of the serious preparation now going on at Corinth and of the union among so many cities against them, felt themselves hardly a match for it alone, in spite of their wealth and their formidable naval force of 120 triremes, inferior only to that of Athens. They made an effort to avert the storm by peaceable means, prevailing upon some mediators from Sparta and Sikyon to accompany them to Corinth; where, while they required that the forces and settlers recently despatched to Epidamnus should be withdrawn, denying all right on the part of Corinth to interfere in that colony—they at the same time offered, if the point were disputed, to refer it for arbitration either to some impartial Peloponnesian city, or to the Delphian oracle; such arbiter to determine to which of the two cities Epidamnus as a colony really belonged—and the decision to be obeyed by both. They solemnly deprecated recourse to arms, which, if persisted in, would drive them as a matter of necessity to seek new allies such as they would not willingly apply to. To this the Corinthians answered that they could entertain no proposition until the Korkyræan besieging force was withdrawn from Epidamnus. Whereupon the Korkyræans

Remonstrance of the Korkyræans with Corinth and the Peloponnesians.

rejoined that they would withdraw it at once, provided the new settlers and the troops sent by Corinth were removed at the same time. Either there ought to be this reciprocal retirement, or the Korkyræans would acquiesce in the *statu quo* on both sides, until the arbiters should have decided.¹

Although the Korkyræans had been unwarrantably harsh in rejecting the first supplication from Epidamnus, yet in their propositions made at Corinth, right and equity were on their side. But the Corinthians had gone too far, and assumed an attitude too decidedly aggressive, to admit of listening to arbitration. Accordingly, so soon as their armament was equipped, they set sail for Epidamnus, despatching a herald to declare war formally against the Korkyræans. When the armament, consisting of seventy-five triremes under Aristeus, Kallikratês, and Timanor, with 2000 hoplites under Archetimus and Isarchidas, had reached Cape Aktium at the mouth of the Ambrakian Gulf, it was met by a Korkyræan herald in a little boat forbidding all farther advance—a summons of course unavailing, and quickly followed by the appearance of the Korkyræan fleet. Out of the 120 triremes which constituted the naval establishment of the island, forty were engaged in the siege of Epidamnus, but all the remaining eighty were now brought into service; the older ships being specially repaired for the occasion. In the action which ensued, they gained a complete victory, destroying fifteen Corinthian ships, and taking a considerable number of prisoners. And on the very day of the victory, Epidamnus surrendered to their besieging fleet, under covenant that the Corinthians within it should be held as prisoners, and that the other new-comers should be sold as slaves. The Corinthians and their allies did not long keep the sea after their defeat, but retired home, while the Korkyræans remained undisputed masters of the neighbouring sea. Having erected a trophy on Leukimmê, the adjoining promontory of their island, they proceeded, according to the melancholy practice of Grecian warfare, to kill all their prisoners²—except the Corinthians, who were carried

¹ Thucyd. i. 28.

Greeks, I transcribe an incident

² To illustrate this treatment of prisoners of war among the ancient Europe. It is contained in Bas-

home and detained as prizes of great value for purposes of negotiation. They next began to take vengeance on those allies of Corinth who had lent assistance to the recent expedition: they ravaged the territory of Leukas, burnt Kyllênê the seaport of Elis, and inflicted so much damage that the Corinthians were compelled towards the end of the summer to send a second armament to Cape Aktium, for the defence of Leukas, Anaktorium, and Ambrakia. The Korkyræan fleet was again assembled near Cape Leukimmê, but no farther action took place, and at the approach of winter both armaments were disbanded.¹

Deeply were the Corinthians humiliated by their defeat at sea, together with the dispersion of the settlers whom they had brought together: and though their original project was frustrated by the loss of Epidamnus, they were only the more bent on complete revenge against their old enemy Korkyra. They employed themselves for two entire years after the battle in building new ships and providing an armament adequate to their purposes: and in particular, they sent round not only to the Peloponnesian seaports, but also to the islands under the empire of Athens, in order to take into their pay the best class of seamen. By such prolonged efforts, ninety well-manned Corinthian ships were ready to set sail in the third year after the battle. The entire fleet, when reinforced by the allies, amounted to not less than 150 sail; twenty-seven triremes from Ambrakia, twelve from Megara, ten from Elias, as many from Leukas, and one from Anaktorium. Each of these allied squadrons had officers of its own, while the Corinthian Xenokleidês and four others were commanders-in-chief.²

B.C. 434-433.
Large preparations made by Corinth for renewing the war.

But the elaborate preparations going on at Corinth were no secret to the Korkyræans, who well knew, besides, the numerous allies which that city could command,

sompierre's description of his campaign in Hungary in 1693, with the German and Hungarian army under Count de Rossworm, against the Turks:—

“Après cette victoire, nous repassâmes toute l'armée de l'autre côté du Danube en notre camp. Le général commanda que l'on tuât

tous les prisonniers du jour précédent, parcequ'ils embarrassoient l'armée: qui fut une chose bien cruelle, de voir tuer de sang-froid plus de huit cents hommes rendus.”

—Mémoires de Bassompierre, p. 308: collect. Pétitot.

¹ Thucyd. i. 29, 30.

² Thucyd. i. 31-46.

and her extensive influence throughout Greece. So formidable an attack was more than they could venture to brave, alone and unaided. They had never yet enrolled themselves among the allies either of Athens or of Lacedæmon. It had been their pride and policy to maintain a separate line of action, which, by means of their wealth, their power, and their very peculiar position, they had hitherto been enabled to do with safety. That they had been able so to proceed with safety, however, was considered both by friends and enemies as a peculiarity belonging to their island; from whence we may draw an inference how little the islands in the Ægean, now under the Athenian empire, would have been able to maintain any real independence, if that empire had been broken up. But though Korkyra had been secure in this policy of isolation up to the present moment, such had been the increase and consolidation of forces elsewhere throughout Greece, that even she could pursue it no longer. To apply for admission into the Lacedæmonian confederacy, wherein her immediate enemy exercised paramount influence, being out of the question, she had no choice except to seek alliance with Athens. That city had as yet no dependencies in the Ionic Gulf; she was not of kindred lineage, nor had she had any previous amicable relations with the Dorian Korkyra. But if there was thus no previous fact or feeling to lay the foundation of alliance, neither was there anything to forbid it; for in the truce between Athens and Sparta, it had been expressly stipulated, that any city, not actually enrolled in the alliance of either, might join the one or the other at pleasure.¹ While the proposition of alliance was thus formally open either for acceptance or refusal, the time and circumstances under which it was to be made rendered it full of grave contingencies to all parties. The Korkyræan envoys, who now for the first time visited Athens for the purpose of making it, came thither with doubtful hopes of success, though to their island the question was one of life or death.

According to the modern theories of government, to declare war, to make peace, and to contract alliances, are functions proper to be entrusted to the executive government apart from the representative assembly. Accord-

¹ Thucyd. i. 35-40.

ing to ancient ideas, these were precisely the topics most essential to submit for the decision of the full assembly of the people: and in point of fact they were so submitted, even under governments only partially democratical; much more, of course, under the complete democracy of Athens. The Korkyræan envoys on reaching that city would first open their business to the Stratêgi or generals of the state, who would appoint a day for them to be heard before the public assembly, with full notice beforehand to the citizens. The mission was no secret, for the Korkyræans had themselves intimated their intention at Corinth, at the time when they proposed reference of the quarrel to arbitration. Even without such notice, the political necessity of the step was obvious enough to make the Corinthians anticipate it. Lastly, their *proxeni* at Athens (Athenian citizens who watched over Corinthian interests public and private, in confidential correspondence with that government—and who, sometimes by appointment, sometimes as volunteers, discharged partly the functions of ambassadors in modern times) would communicate to them the arrival of the Korkyræan envoys. So that, on the day appointed for the latter to be heard before the public assembly, Corinthian envoys were also present to answer them and to oppose the granting of their prayer.

Address of the Korkyræan envoys to the Athenian public assembly.

Thucydidês has given in his history the speeches of both; that is, speeches of his own composition, but representing in all probability the substance of what was actually said, and of what he perhaps himself heard. Though pervaded throughout by the peculiar style and harsh structure of the historian, these speeches are yet among the plainest and most business-like in his whole work; bringing before us thoroughly the existing situation; which was one of doubt and difficulty, presenting reasons of considerable force on each of the opposite sides.

Principal topics upon which it insists, as given in Thucydidês.

The Korkyræans, after lamenting their previous improvidence which had induced them to defer seeking alliance until the hour of need arrived, presented themselves as claimants for the friendship of Athens on the strongest grounds of common interest and reciprocal usefulness. Though their existing danger and need of Athenian support was now urgent, it had not been brought upon them in an

unjust quarrel or by disgraceful conduct. They had proposed to Corinth a fair arbitration respecting Epidamnus, and their application had been refused—which showed where the right of the case lay: moreover they were now exposed single-handed, not to Corinth alone, whom they had already vanquished, but to a formidable confederacy organised under her auspices, including choice mariners hired even from the allies of Athens. In granting their prayer, Athens would in the first place neutralize this mis-employment of her own mariners, and would at the same time confer an indelible obligation, protect the cause of right, and secure to herself an important reinforcement. For next to her own, the Korkyræan naval force was the most powerful in Greece, and this was now placed within her reach. If by declining the present offer, she permitted Korkyra to be overcome, that naval force would pass to the side of her enemies: for such were Corinth and the Peloponnesian alliance—and such they would soon be openly declared. In the existing state of Greece, a collision between that alliance and Athens could not long be postponed. It was with a view to this contingency that the Corinthians were now seeking to seize Korkyra along with her naval force.¹ The policy of Athens therefore imperiously called upon her to frustrate such a design, by now assisting the Korkyræans. She was permitted to do this by the terms of the Thirty years' truce. And although some might contend that in the present critical conjuncture, acceptance of Korkyra was tantamount to a declaration of war with Corinth, yet the fact would falsify such predictions; for Athens would so strengthen herself that her enemies would be more than ever unwilling to attack her. She would not only render her naval force irresistibly powerful, but would become mistress of the communication between Sicily and Peloponnesus, and thus prevent the Sicilian Dorians from sending reinforcements to the Peloponnesians.²

To these representations on the part of the Korkyræans, the Corinthian speakers made reply. They denounced the

¹ Thucyd. i. 33. Τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιους φόβω τῶν ὑμετέρων πολεμησείοντες, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους δυναμένους παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ ὑμῖν ἐχθροὺς ὄντας καὶ προκαταλαμβάνοντας ἡμᾶς νῦν ἐς

τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν, ἵνα μὴ τῷ κοινῷ ἔγῃ κατ' αὐτῶν μετ' ἀλλήλων στῶμεν, &c.

² Thucyd. i. 32-36.

selfish and iniquitous policy pursued by Korkyra, not less in the matter of Epidamnus than in all former time¹—which was the real reason why she had ever been ashamed of honest allies. Above all things, she had always acted undutifully and wickedly towards Corinth her mother city, to whom she was bound by those ties of colonial allegiance which Grecian morality recognised, and which the other Corinthian colonies cheerfully obeyed.² Epidamnus was not a Korkyræan, but a Corinthian colony. The Korkyræans, having committed wrong in besieging it, had proposed arbitration without being willing to withdraw their troops while arbitration was pending: they now impudently came to ask Athens to become accessory after the fact, in such injustice. The provision of the Thirty years' truce might seem indeed to allow Athens to receive them as allies: but that provision was not intended to permit the reception of cities already under the tie of colonial allegiance elsewhere—still less the reception of cities engaged in an active and pending quarrel, where any countenance to one party in the quarrel was necessarily a declaration of war against the opposite. If either party had a right to invoke the aid of Athens on this occasion, Corinth had a better right than Korkyra. For the latter had never had any transactions with the Athenians, while Corinth was not only still under covenant of amity with them, through

Envoys from Corinth address the Athenian assembly in reply.

¹ The description given by Herodotus (vii. 168: compare Diodor. xi. 15) of the duplicity of the Korkyræans when solicited to aid the Grecian cause at the time of the invasion of Xerxes, seems to imply that the unfavourable character of them given by the Corinthians coincided with the general impression throughout Greece.

Respecting the prosperity and insolence of the Korkyræans, see Aristotle apud Zenob. Proverb. iv. 49.

² Thucyd. i. 38. ἄποικοι δὲ ὄντες ἀφροστασί τε διὰ παντός καὶ οὖν πολέμοισι, λέγοντες ὡς οὐκ ἐπὶ τῷ κακῶς πάσχειν ἐκπεμφθειῶσαν. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐδ' αὐτοὶ φραμεν ἐπὶ τῷ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑβρίζεσθαι κατοικίσι, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ ἡγε-

μόνες τε εἶναι καὶ τὰ εἰκότα θαυμάζεσθαι· αἱ γοῶν ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι τιμῶσιν ἡμᾶς, καὶ μάλιστα ὑπὸ ἀποίκων στεργόμεθα.

This is a remarkable passage in illustration of the position of a metropolis in regard to her colony. The relation was such as to be comprised under the general word *hegemony*: superiority and right to command on the one side, inferiority with duty of reverence and obedience on the other—limited in point of extent, though we do not know where the limit was placed, and varying probably in each individual case. The Corinthians sent annual magistrates to Potidæa, called Epidemiurgi (Thucyd. i. 56).

the Thirty years' truce—but had also rendered material service to them by dissuading the Peloponnesian allies from assisting the revolted Samos. By such dissuasion, the Corinthians had upheld the principle of Grecian international law, that each alliance was entitled to punish its own refractory members. They now called upon Athens to respect this principle by not interfering between Corinth and her colonial allies,¹ especially as the violation of it would recoil inconveniently upon Athens herself with her numerous dependencies. As for the fear of an impending war between the Peloponnesian alliance and Athens, such a contingency was as yet uncertain—and might possibly never occur at all, if Athens dealt justly, and consented to conciliate Corinth on this critical occasion. But it would assuredly occur if she refused such conciliation, and the dangers thus entailed upon Athens would be far greater than the promised naval cooperation of Korkyra would compensate.²

Such was the substance of the arguments urged by the contending envoys before the Athenian public assembly, in this momentous debate. For two days did the debate continue, the assembly being adjourned over to the morrow; so considerable was the number of speakers, and probably also the divergence of their views. Unluckily Thucydidês does not give us any of these Athenian discourses—not even that of Periklês, who determined the ultimate result.

Epidamnus with its disputed question of metropolitan right occupied little the attention of the Athenian assembly. But the Korkyræan naval force was indeed an immense item, since the question was whether it should stand on their side or against them—an item which nothing could counterbalance except the dangers of a Peloponnesian war. "Let us avoid this last calamity (was the opinion of many) even at the sacrifice of seeing Korkyra conquered, and all her ships and seamen in the service of the Peloponnesian league." "You will not really avoid it, even by that great sacrifice (was the reply of others). The generating causes of war are at work—and it will infallibly come whatever you may determine re-

¹ Thucyd. i. 40. φανερώς δὲ ἀντι-
κομεν τοὺς προσήκοντας ξυμμά-

χοὺς αὐτὸν τινα κολάσειν.

² Thucyd. i. 37-43.

specting Korkyra: avail yourselves of the present opening, instead of being driven ultimately to undertake the war at great comparative disadvantage." Of these two views, the former was at first decidedly preponderant in the assembly;¹ but they gradually came round to the latter, which was conformably to the steady conviction of Periklês. It was however resolved to take a sort of middle course, so as to save Korkyra, and yet, if possible, to escape violation of the existing truce and the consequent Peloponnesian war. To comply with the request of the Korkyræans, by adopting them unreservedly as allies, would have laid the Athenians under the necessity of accompanying them in an attack of Corinth, if required—which would have been a manifest infringement of the truce. Accordingly nothing more was concluded than an alliance for purposes strictly defensive, to preserve Korkyra and her possessions in case they were attacked: nor was any greater force equipped to back this resolve than a squadron of ten triremes, under Lacedæmonius son of Kimon. The smallness of this force would satisfy the Corinthians that no aggression was contemplated against their city, while it would save Korkyra from ruin, and would in fact feed the war so as to weaken and cripple the naval force of both parties²—which was the best result that Athens could hope for. The instructions to Lacedæmonius and his two colleagues were express: not to engage in fight with the Corinthians unless they were actually approaching Korkyra or some Korkyræan possession with a view to attack; but in that case to do his best on the defensive.

The great Corinthian armament of 150 sail soon took its departure from the Gulf, and reached a harbour on the coast of Epirus at the Cape called Cheimerium, nearly opposite to the southern extremity of Korkyra. They there established a naval station and camp, summoning to their aid a considerable force from the friendly Epirotic tribes in the neighbourhood. The Korkyræan

Naval combat between the Corinthians and Korkyræans: rude tactics on both sides.

¹ Thucyd. i. 44. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ ἀκούσαντες ἀμφοτέρων, γενομένης καὶ δις ἐκκλησίαις, τῇ μὲν προτέρᾳ οὐχ ἤσσαν τῶν Κορινθίων ἀπεδείξαντο τοῦς λόγους, ἐν δὲ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ μετέγνωσαν, &c.

Οὐχ ἤσσαν in the language of Thucydides usually has the positive meaning of *more*.

² Thucyd. i. 44. Plutarch (Periklês, c. 29) ascribes the smallness of the squadron despatched under

fleet of 110 sail, under Meikiadês and two others, together with the ten Athenian ships, took station at one of the adjoining islands called Sybotha, while the land force and 1000 Zakynthian hoplites were posted on the Korkyræan Cape Leukimmê. Both sides prepared for battle: the Corinthians, taking on board three days' provisions, sailed by night from Cheimerium, and encountered in the morning the Korkyræan fleet advancing towards them, distributed into three squadrons, one under each of the three generals, and having the ten Athenian ships at the extreme right. Opposed to them were ranged the choice vessels of the Corinthians, occupying the left of their aggregate fleet: next came the various allies, with Megarians and Ambrakiots on the extreme right. Never before had two such numerous fleets, both Grecian, engaged in battle. But the tactics and manœuvring were not commensurate to the numbers. The decks were crowded with hoplites and bowmen, while the rowers below, on the Korkyræan side at least, were in great part slaves. The ships on both sides, being rowed forward so as to drive in direct impact prow against prow, were grappled together, and a fierce hand-combat was then commenced between the troops on board of each, as if they were on land—or rather, like boarding-parties: all upon the old-fashioned system of Grecian sea-fight, without any of those improvements introduced into the Athenian navy during the last generation. In Athenian naval attack, the ship, the rowers, and the steersman, were of much greater importance than the armed soldiers on deck. By strength and exactness of rowing, by rapid and sudden change of direction, by feints calculated to deceive, the Athenian captain sought to drive the sharp beak of his vessel, not against the prow, but against the weaker and more vulnerable parts of his enemy—side, oars, or stern. The ship thus became in the hands of her crew the real weapon of attack, which was intended first to disable the enemy and leave him unmanageable on the water; and not until this was done did the armed men on deck begin their operations.¹

Lacedæmonius to a petty spite of Periklês against that commander, as the son of his old political antagonist Kimon. From whomsoever he copied this statement, the motive assigned seems quite unworthy of credit.

¹ Πεζομαχητῶν ἀπὸ νεῶν—to turn the naval battle into a land-battle on shipboard—was a practice altogether repugnant to Athenian feeling—as we see remarked also in Thucyd. iv. 14: compare also vii. 61.

Lacedæmonius with his ten Athenian ships, though forbidden by his instructions to share in the battle, lent as much aid as he could by taking position at the extremity of the line and by making motions as if about to attack; while his seamen had full leisure to contemplate what they would despise as lubberly handling of the ships on both sides. All was confusion after the battle had been joined. The ships on both sides became entangled, the oars broken and unmanageable,—orders could neither be heard nor obeyed—and the individual valour of the hoplites and bowmen on deck became the decisive point on which victory turned.

On the right wing of the Corinthians, the left of the Korkyræans was victorious. Their twenty ships drove back the Ambrakiot allies of Corinth, and not only pursued them to the shore, but also landed and plundered the tents. Their rashness in thus keeping so long out of the battle proved incalculably mischievous, the rather as their total number was inferior; for their right wing, opposed to the best ships of Corinth, was after a hard struggle thoroughly beaten. Many of the ships were disabled, and the rest obliged to retreat as they could—a retreat which the victorious ships on the other wing might have protected, had there been any effective discipline in the fleet, but which now was only imperfectly aided by the ten Athenian ships under Lacedæmonius. Though at first they obeyed the instructions from home in abstaining from actual blows, yet—when the battle became doubtful, and still more, when the Corinthians were pressing their victory—the Athenians could no longer keep aloof, but attacked the pursuers in good earnest, and did much to save the defeated Korkyræans. As soon as the latter had been pursued as far as their own island, the victorious Corinthians returned to the scene of action, which was covered with crippled and waterlogged ships, of their own and their enemies, as well as with seamen, soldiers, and wounded men, either helpless aboard the wrecks or keeping above water as well as they could—among the number, many of their own citizens and allies, especially on their

The Korkyræans are defeated.

The Corinthian and Syracusan ships ultimately came to counteract the Athenian manœuvring by constructing their prows with increased solidity and strength, and forcing the Athenian vessel to a direct shock which its weaker prow was unable to bear (Thucyd. vii. 36).

defeated right wing. Through these disabled vessels they sailed, not attempting to tow them off, but looking only to the crews aboard, and making some of them prisoners, but putting the greater number to death. Some even of their own allies were thus slain, not being easily distinguishable. The Corinthians, having picked up their own dead bodies as well as they could, transported them to Sybota, the nearest point of the coast of Epirus; after which they again mustered their fleet, and returned to resume the attack against the Korkyræans on their own coast. The latter got together as many of their ships as were seaworthy, together with the small reserve which had remained in harbour, in order to prevent at any rate a landing on the coast: and the Athenian ships, now within the strict letter of their instructions, prepared to cooperate with full energy in the defence. It was already late in the afternoon: but the Corinthian fleet, though their pæan had already been shouted for attack, were suddenly seen to back water instead of advancing; presently they pulled round, and steered direct for the Epirotic coast. The Korkyræans did not comprehend the cause of this sudden retreat, until at length it was proclaimed that an unexpected relief of twenty fresh Athenian ships was approaching, under Glaukon and Andokidês; which the Corinthians had been the first to descry, and had even believed to be the forerunners of a larger fleet. It was already dark when these fresh ships reached Cape Leukimmê, having traversed the waters covered with wrecks and dead bodies.¹ At first the Korkyræans even mistook them for enemies. The reinforcement had been sent from Athens, probably after more accurate information of the comparative force of Corinth and Korkyra, under the impression that the original ten ships would prove inadequate for the purpose of defence—an impression more than verified by the reality.

Though the twenty Athenian ships were not, as the Corinthians had imagined, the precursors of a larger fleet, they were found sufficient to change completely the face of affairs. In the preceding action the Korkyræans had had seventy ships sunk or disabled—the Corinthians only thirty—so that the superiority of numbers was still on the side

¹ Thucyd. i. 51. διὰ τῶν νεκρῶν καὶ ναυαγίων προσκομισθεῖσαι κατέπλεον ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.

of the latter, who were however encumbered with the care of 1000 prisoners (800 of them slaves) captured, not easy either to lodge or to guard in the narrow accommodations of an ancient trireme. Even apart from this embarrassment, the Corinthians were in no temper to hazard a second battle against thirty Athenian ships in addition to the remaining Korkyræan. And when their enemies sailed across to offer them battle on the Epirotic coast, they not only refused it, but thought of nothing but immediate retreat—with serious alarm lest the Athenians should now act aggressively, treating all amicable relations between Athens and Corinth as practically extinguished by the events of the day before. Having ranged their fleet in line not far from shore, they tested the dispositions of the Athenian commanders by sending forward a little boat with a few men to address to them the following remonstrance. The men carried no herald's staff (*we* should say, no flag of truce), and were therefore completely without protection against an enemy. “Ye act wrongfully, Athenians (they exclaimed), in beginning the war and violating the truce; for ye are using arms to oppose us in punishing our enemies. If it be really your intention to hinder us from sailing against Korkyra or anywhere else that we choose, in breach of the truce, take first of all us who now address you, and deal with us as enemies.” It was not the fault of the Korkyræans that this last idea was not instantly realised: for such of them as were near enough to hear, instigated the Athenians by violent shouts to kill the men in the boat. But the latter, far from listening to such an appeal, dismissed them with the answer: “We neither begin the war nor break the truce, Peloponnesians: we have come simply to aid these Korkyræans our allies. If ye wish to sail anywhere else, we make no opposition: but if ye are about to sail against Korkyra or any of her possessions, we shall use our best means to prevent you.” Both the answer, and the treatment of the men in the boat, satisfied the Corinthians that their retreat would be unopposed, and they accordingly commenced it as soon as they could get ready, staying however to erect a trophy at Sybota on the Epirotic coast, in commemoration of their advantage on

Arrival of a reinforcement from Athens—the Corinthian fleet retires, carrying off numerous Korkyræan prisoners.

Hostilities not yet professedly begun between Athens and Corinth.

the preceding day. In their voyage homeward they surprised Anaktorium at the mouth of the Ambrakiotic Gulf, which they had hitherto possessed jointly with the Korkyræans, planting in it a reinforcement of Corinthian settlers as guarantee for future fidelity. On reaching Corinth, the armament was dismissed, and the great majority of the prisoners taken, 800 slaves, were sold; but the remainder, 250 in number, were detained, and treated with peculiar kindness. Many of them were of the first and richest families in Korkyra, and the Corinthians designed to gain them over, so as to make them instruments for effecting a revolution in the island. The calamitous incidents arising from their subsequent return will appear in another chapter.

Relieved now from all danger, the Korkyræans picked up the dead bodies and the wrecks which had floated during the night on to their island, and even found sufficient pretence to erect a trophy, chiefly in consequence of their partial success on the left wing. In truth, they had been only rescued from ruin by the unexpected coming of the last Athenian ships: but the last result was as triumphant to them, as it was disastrous and humiliating to the Corinthians, who had incurred an immense cost, and taxed all their willing allies, only to leave their enemy stronger than she was before. From this time forward they considered the Thirty years' truce as broken, and conceived a hatred, alike deadly and undisguised, against Athens; so that the latter gained nothing by the moderation of her admirals in sparing the Corinthian fleet off the coast of Epirus. An opportunity was not long wanting for the Corinthians to strike a blow at their enemy through one of her wide-spread dependencies.

On the isthmus of that lesser peninsula called Pallênê, (which forms the westernmost of the three prongs of the greater Thracian peninsula called Chalkidikê, between the Thermaic and the Strymonic Gulfs,) was situated the Dorian town of Potidæa, one of the tributary allies of Athens, but originally colonised from Corinth and still maintaining a certain metropolitan allegiance towards the latter: insomuch that every year certain Corinthians were sent thither as magistrates under the title of Epidemiurgi. On various points of the neigh-

Hatred
conceived
by the Co-
rinthians
towards
Athens.

They begin
to stir up
revolt
among the
Athenian
allies—
Potidæa, a
colony of
Corinth,
but ally of
Athens.

bouring coast also there were several small towns belonging to the Chalkidians and Bottiæans, enrolled in like manner in the list of Athenian tributaries. The neighbouring inland territory, Mygdonia and Chalkidikê,¹ was held by the Macedonian king Perdikkas, son of that Alexander who had taken part fifty years before in the expedition of Xerxes. These two princes appear gradually to have extended their dominions, after the ruin of Persian power in Thrace by the exertions of Athens, until at length they acquired all the territory between the rivers Axios and Strymon. Now Perdikkas had been for some time the friend and ally of Athens; but there were other Macedonian princes, his brother Philip, and Derdas, holding independent principalities in the upper country² (apparently on the higher course of the Axios near the Pæonian tribes), with whom he was in a state of dispute. These princes having been accepted as the allies of Athens, Perdikkas from that time became her active enemy, and it was from his intrigues that all the difficulties of Athens on that coast took their first origin. The Athenian empire was much less complete and secure over the seaports on the mainland than over the islands.³ For the former were always more or less dependent on any powerful land neighbour, sometimes more dependent on him than upon the mistress of the sea; and we shall find Athens herself cultivating assiduously the favour of Sitalkes and other strong Thracian potentates, as an aid to her dominion over the seaports.⁴ Perdikkas immediately

Relations of Athens with Perdikkas king of Macedonia, his intrigues along with Corinth against her—he induces the Chalkidians to revolt from her—
increase of Olynthus.

¹ See the geographical Commentary of Gatterer upon Thrace, embodied in Poppo, Prolegg. ad Thucyd. vol. ii. ch. 29.

The words τὰ ἐπὶ Θρόακῆς—τὰ ἐπὶ Θρόακῆς χωρία (Thucyd. ii. 29) denote generally the towns in Chalkidikê—places in the direction or in the skirts of Thrace, rather than parts of Thrace itself.

² Thucyd. i. 57; ii. 100.

³ See two remarkable passages illustrating this difference, Thucyd. iv. 120-122.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 29-38. Isokratês has

a remarkable passage on this subject in the beginning of Or. v. ad Philippum, sect. 5-7. After pointing out the imprudence of founding a colony on the skirts of the territory of a powerful potentate, and the excellent site which had been chosen for Kyrênê, as being near only to feeble tribes—he goes so far as to say that the possession of Amphipolis would be injurious rather than beneficial to Athens, because it would render her dependent upon Philip, through his power of annoying her colonists

began to incite and aid the Chalkidians and Bottiæans to revolt from Athens; and the violent enmity against the latter, kindled in the bosoms of the Corinthians by the recent events at Korkyra, enabled him to extend the same projects to Potidæa. Not only did he send envoys to Corinth in order to concert measures for provoking the revolt of Potidæa, but also to Sparta, instigating the Peloponnesian league to a general declaration of war against Athens.¹ And he farther prevailed on many of the Chalkidian inhabitants to abandon their separate small town on the sea-coast, for the purpose of joint residence at Olynthus, which was several stadia from the sea. Thus that town, as well as the Chalkidian interest, became much strengthened, while Perdikkas farther assigned some territory near Lake Bolbê to contribute to the temporary maintenance of the concentrated population.

The Athenians were not ignorant both of his hostile preparations and of the dangers which awaited them from Corinth. Immediately after the Korkyræan sea-fight they sent to take precautions against the revolt of Potidæa; requiring the inhabitants to take down their wall on the side of Pallênê, so as to leave the town open on the side of the peninsula, or on what may be called the sea-side, and fortified only towards the mainland—requiring them farther both to deliver hostages and to dismiss the annual magistrates who came to them from Corinth. An Athenian armament of thirty triremes and 1000 hoplites, under Arcestratus and ten others, despatched to act against Perdikkas in the Thermaic Gulf, was directed at the same time to enforce these requisitions against Potidæa, and to repress any dispositions to revolt among the neighbouring Chalkidians. Immediately on receiving the requisitions, the Potidæans sent envoys both to Athens, for the purpose of evading and gaining time—and to Sparta, in conjunction with Corinth, in order to determine a Lacedæmonian invasion of Attica, in the event of Potidæa

—just as she had been dependent before upon Medokus the Thracian king in consequence of her colonists in the Chersonese—
ἀναγκασθῆσόμεθα τῆν αὐτὴν εὐνοίαν ἔχειν τοῖς σοῖς πράγμασι διὰ τοὺς

ἐνταῦθα (at Amphipolis) κατοικοῦντας οἷαν περ εἶχομεν Μηδῶν τῷ παλαιῷ διὰ τοὺς ἐν Χερρόνῃσιν γεωργούοντας.

¹ Thucyd. i. 56, 57.

being attacked by Athens. From the Spartan authorities they obtained a distinct affirmative promise, in spite of the Thirty years' truce still subsisting. At Athens they had no success, and they accordingly openly revolted (seemingly about Midsummer 432 B.C.), at the same time that the armament under Archestratus sailed. The Chalkidians and Bottiæans revolted also, at the express instigation of Corinth, accompanied by solemn oaths and promises of assistance.¹ Archestratus with his fleet, on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, found them all in proclaimed enmity, but was obliged to confine himself to the attack of Perdikkas in Macedonia, not having numbers enough to admit of a division of his force. He accordingly laid siege to Therma, in cooperation with the Macedonian troops from the upper country under Philip and the brothers of Derdas; after taking that place, he next proceeded to besiege Pydna. But it would probably have been wiser had he turned his whole force instantly to the blockade of Potidæa; for during the period of more than six weeks that he spent in the operations against Therma, the Corinthians conveyed to Potidæa a reinforcement of 1600 hoplites and 400 light-armed, partly their own citizens, partly Peloponnesians hired for the occasion—under Aristeus son of Adeimantus, a man of such eminent popularity, both at Corinth and at Potidæa, that most of the soldiers volunteered on his personal account. Potidæa was thus put in a state of complete defence shortly after the news of its revolt reached Athens, and long before any second armament could be sent to attack it. A second armament however was speedily sent forth—forty triremes and 2000 Athenian hoplites under Kallias son of Kalliades,² with four other commanders—who on reaching the Thermaic Gulf, joined the former body at the siege of Pydna. After prosecuting the siege in vain for a short time, they found themselves obliged to patch up an accommodation on the best terms they could with Perdikkas, from the necessity of commencing immediate operations against Aristeus and Potidæa. They then quitted Macedonia, first crossing by sea from Pydna to the eastern coast of the Thermaic Gulf—next

¹ Thucyd. v. 30.

² Kallias was a young Athenian of noble family, who had paid the large sum of 100 minæ to Zeno of

Elea the philosopher, for rhetorical, philosophical, and sophistical instruction (Plato, *Alkibiadès*, i. c. 31, p. 119).

attacking, though without effect, the town of Berœa—and then marching by land along the eastern coast of the Gulf, in the direction of Potidæa. On the third day of easy march, they reached the seaport called Gigônus, near which they encamped.¹

¹ Thucyd. i. 61. The statement of Thucydidês presents some geographical difficulties which the critics have not adequately estimated. Are we to assume as certain, that the *Berœa* here mentioned must be the Macedonian town of that name, afterwards so well known, distant from the sea westward 160 stadia, or nearly twenty English miles (see Tafel, *Historia Thessaloniciæ*, p. 58), on a river which flows into the *Haliakmon*, and upon one of the lower ridges of Mount *Bermius*?

The words of Thucydidês here are—Ἐπειτα δὲ ξύμβασιν ποιησάμενοι καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκάσασθαι πρὸς τὸν Περδίκκην, ὡς αὐτοὺς κατήπειγεν ἡ Ποτιδαία καὶ ὁ Ἄριστος παρεληλυθώς, ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέρροιαν ἀκείθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ περάσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς τὴν Ποτιδαίαν—ἄμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἐβδόμηχοντα.

"The natural route from *Pydna* to *Potidæa* (observes Dr. Arnold in his note) lay along the coast; and *Berœa* was quite out of the way, at some distance to the westward, near the fort of the *Bermian* mountains. But the hope of surprising *Berœa* induced the Athenians to deviate from their direct line of march; then after the failure of this treacherous attempt, they returned again to the seacoast, and continued to follow it till they arrived at *Gigônus*."

I would remark upon this—1. The words of Thucydidês imply that *Berœa* was not in Macedonia, but out of it (see Poppo, *Proleg.*

ad Thucyd. vol. ii. p. 408-418).

2. He uses no expression which in the least implies that the attempt on *Berœa* on the part of the Athenians was treacherous, that is, contrary to the convention just concluded; though had the fact been so, he would naturally have been led to notice it, seeing that the deliberate breach of the convention was the very first step which took place after it was concluded. 3. What can have induced the Athenians to leave their fleet and march near twenty miles inland to Mount *Bermius* and *Berœa*, to attack a Macedonian town which they could not possibly hold—when they cannot even stay to continue the attack on *Pydna*, a position maritime, useful, and tenable—in consequence of the pressing necessity of taking immediate measures against *Potidæa*? 4. If they were compelled by this latter necessity to patch up a peace on any terms with *Perdikkas*, would they immediately endanger this peace by going out of their way to attack one of his forts? Again, Thucydidês says "that, proceeding by slow land-marches, they reached *Gigônus*, and encamped on the third day"—κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προϊόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The computation of time must here be made either from *Pydna*, or from *Berœa*; and the reader who examines the map will see that neither from the one nor the other (assuming the *Berœa* on Mount *Bermius*) would it be possible for an army to arrive at *Gigônus* on the third day, marching round the head of the Gulf with

In spite of the convention concluded at Pydna, Perdikkas, whose character for faithlessness we shall have more than one occasion to notice, was now again on the side of the Chalkidians, and sent 200 horse to join them under the command of Iolaus. Aristeus posted his Corinthians and Potidæans on the isthmus near Potidæa, providing a market without the walls in order that they might not stray in quest of provisions. His position was on the side towards Olynthus—which was about seven miles off, but within sight, and in a lofty and conspicuous situation.

Combat near Potidæa between the Athenian force, and the allied Corinthians, Potidæans, and Chalkidians. Victory of the Athenians.

easy days' marches; the more so as they would have to cross the rivers Lydias, Axius, and Echeidōrus, all not far from their mouths—or if these rivers could not be crossed, to get on board the fleet and re-land on the other side.

This clear mark of time laid down by Thucydidēs (even apart from the objections which I have just urged in reference to Berœa on Mount Bermius) made me doubt whether Dr. Arnold and the other commentators have correctly conceived the operations of the Athenian troops between Pydna and Gigōnus. The *Berœa* which Thucydidēs means cannot be more distant from Gigōnus, at any rate, than a third day's easy march, and therefore cannot be the Berœa on Mount Bermius. But there was another town named Berœa either in Thrace or in Emathia, though we do not know its exact site (see Wasse ad Thueyd. i. 61; Steph. Byz. v. Βέρρης: Tafel, Thessalonica, Index). This other Berœa, situated somewhere between Gigōnus and Therma, and out of the limits of that Macedonia which Perdikkas governed, may probably be the place which Thucydidēs here indicates. The Athenians, raising the siege of Pydna, crossed the Gulf *on shipboard* to Berœa, and after vainly trying to surprise that town,

marched along *by land* to Gigōnus. Whoever inspects the map will see that the Athenians would naturally employ their large fleet to transport the army by the short transit across the Gulf from Pydna (see Livy, xlv. 10), and thus avoid the fatiguing land-march round the head of the Gulf. Moreover the language of Thucydidēs would seem to make the land-march *begin at Berœa*, and not at Pydna—ἀπανίστανται ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας, καὶ ἀφικόμενοι ἐς Βέρροισιν κάκειθεν ἐπιστρέψαντες, καὶ πειράσαντες πρῶτον τοῦ χωρίου καὶ οὐχ ἔλόντες, ἐπορεύοντο κατὰ γῆν πρὸς Ποτιδαίαν—ἄμα δὲ νῆες παρέπλεον ἐβδομήκοντα. Κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ προΐόντες τριταῖοι ἀφίκοντο ἐς Γίγωνον καὶ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο. The change of tense between ἀπανίστανται and ἐπορεύοντο—and the connexion of the participle ἀφικόμενοι with the latter verb,—seems to divide the whole proceeding into two distinct parts; first, departure from Macedonia to Berœa, as it would seem, by sea—next, a land-march from Berœa to Gigōnus, of three short days.

This is the best account, as it strikes me, of a passage, the real difficulties of which are imperfectly noticed by the commentators.

The site of Gigōnus cannot be exactly determined, since all that

He here awaited the approach of the Athenians, calculating that the Chalkidians from Olynthus would, upon the hoisting of a given signal, assail them in the rear when they attacked him. But Kallias was strong enough to place in reserve his Macedonian cavalry and other allies as a check against Olynthus; while with his Athenians and the main force he marched to the isthmus and took position in front of Aristeus. In the battle which ensued, Aristeus and the chosen band of Corinthians immediately about him were completely successful, breaking the troops opposed to them, and pursuing for a considerable distance. But the remaining Potidæans and Peloponnesians were routed by the Athenians and driven within the walls. On returning from pursuit, Aristeus found the victorious Athenians between him and Potidæa, and was reduced to the alternative either of cutting his way through them into the latter

we know of the towns on the coast between Potidæa and Æneia, is derived from their enumerated names in Herodotus (vii. 123); nor can we be absolutely certain that he has enumerated them all in the exact order in which they were placed. But I think that both Colonel Leake and Kiepert's map place Gigónus too far from Potidæa; for we see, from this passage of Thucydidês, that it formed the camp from which the Athenian general went forth immediately to give battle to an enemy posted between Olynthus and Potidæa; and the Scholiast says of Gigónus—*ὄ πολὺ ἀπέχον Ποτιδαίας*: and Stephan. Byz. *Γίγωνος, πόλις Θράκης προσεγγής τῆ Παλλήνης*.

See Colonel Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece*, vol. iii. ch. xxxi. p. 452. That excellent observer calculates the march from Beroæ on Mount Bermius to Potidæa, as being one of four days, about twenty miles each day. Judging by the map, this seems lower than the reality; but admitting it to be correct, Thucydidês would never describe such a march as *κατ' ὀλίγον δὲ πρόόντες τριταῖοι ἀψί-*

χοντο ἐς Γίγωνον: it would be a march rather rapid and fatiguing, especially as it would include the passage of the rivers. Nor is it likely, from the description of this battle in Thucydidês (i. 62), that Gigónus could be anything like a full day's march from Potidæa. According to his description, the Athenian army advance by three very easy marches; then arriving at Gigónus, they encamp, being now near the enemy, who on their side are already encamped expecting them—*προσδεχόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο πρὸς Ὀλύβουθον ἐν τῷ ἰσθμῷ*: the imperfect tense indicates that they were already there at the time when the Athenians took camp at Gigónus; which would hardly be the case if the Athenians had come by three successive marches from Beroæ on Mount Bermius.

I would add, that it is no more wonderful that there should be one Beroæ in Thrace and another in Macedonia—than that there should be one Methone in Thrace and another in Macedonia (Steph. B. *Μέθωνη*).

town, or of making a retreating march to Olynthus. He chose the former as the least of two hazards, and forced his way through the flank of the Athenians, wading into the sea in order to turn the extremity of the Potidæan wall, which reached entirely across the isthmus with a mole running out at each end into the water. He effected this daring enterprise and saved his detachment, though not without considerable difficulty and some loss. Meanwhile the auxiliaries from Olynthus, though they had begun their march on seeing the concerted signal, had been kept in check by the Macedonian horse, so that the Potidæans had been beaten and the signal again withdrawn, before they could make any effective diversion: nor did the cavalry on either side come into action. The defeated Potidæans and Corinthians, having the town immediately in their rear, lost only 300 men, while the Athenians lost 150, together with the general Kallias.¹

The victory was however quite complete, and the Athenians, after having erected their trophy and given up the enemy's dead for burial, immediately built their blockading wall across the isthmus on the side of the mainland, so as to cut off Potidæa from all communication with Olynthus and the Chalkidians. To make the blockade complete, a second wall across the isthmus was necessary, on the other side towards Pallênê: but they had not force enough to detach a completely separate body for this purpose, until after some time they were joined by Phormio with 1600 fresh hoplites from Athens. That general, landing at Aphytis in the peninsula of Pallênê, marched slowly up to Potidæa, ravaging the territory in order to draw out the citizens to battle. But the challenge not being accepted, he undertook and finished without obstruction the blockading wall on the side of Pallênê, so that the town was now completely enclosed and the harbour watched by the Athenian fleet. The wall once finished, a portion of the force sufficed to guard it, leaving Phormio at liberty to undertake aggressive operations against the Chalkidic and Bottiæan townships. The capture of Potidæa being now only a question of more or less time, Aristeus, in order that the provisions might last longer, proposed to the citizens to choose a favourable wind, get on shipboard,

Potidæa placed in blockade by the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. i. 62, 63.

and break out suddenly from the harbour, taking their chance of eluding the Athenian fleet, and leaving only 500 defenders behind. Though he offered himself to be among those left, he could not determine the citizens to so bold an enterprise, and therefore sallied forth, in the way proposed, with a small detachment, in order to try and procure relief from without—especially some aid or diversion from Peloponnesus. But he was able to accomplish nothing beyond some partial warlike operations among the Chalkidians,¹ and a successful ambuscade against the citizens of Sermylus, which did nothing for the relief of the blockaded town. It had however been so well-provisioned that it held out for two whole years—a period full of important events elsewhere.

From these two contests between Athens and Corinth, first indirectly at Korkyra, next distinctly and avowedly at Potidæa, sprang those important movements in the Lacedæmonian alliance which will be recounted in the next chapter.

¹ Thucyd. i. 65.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM THE BLOCKADE OF POTIDÆA DOWN TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR.

EVEN before the recent hostilities at Korkyra and Potidæa, it had been evident to reflecting Greeks that prolonged observance of the Thirty years' truce was becoming uncertain, and that the mingled hatred, fear, and admiration, which Athens inspired throughout Greece would prompt Sparta and the Spartan confederacy to seize any favourable opening for breaking down the Athenian power. That such was the disposition of Sparta, was well understood among the Athenian allies, however considerations of prudence, and general slowness in resolving, might postpone the moment of carrying it into effect. Accordingly not only the Samians when they revolted had applied to the Spartan confederacy for aid, which they appear to have been prevented from obtaining chiefly by the pacific interests then animating the Corinthians—but also the Lesbians had endeavoured to open negotiations with Sparta for a similar purpose, though the authorities to whom alone the proposition could have been communicated, since it long remained secret and was never executed—had given them no encouragement.¹

State of feeling in Greece between the Thirty years' truce and the Peloponnesian war—recognised probability of war—Athens at that time not encroaching—decree interdicting trade with the Megarians.

The affairs of Athens had been administered, under the ascendancy of Periklês, without any view to extension of empire or encroachment upon others, though with constant reference to the probabilities of war, and with anxiety to keep the city in a condition to meet it. But even the splendid internal ornaments, which Athens at that time acquired, were probably not without their effect in provoking

¹ Thucyd. iii. 2-13. This proposition of the Lesbians at Sparta must have been made before the collision between Athens and Corinth at Korkyra.

jealousy on the part of other Greeks as to her ultimate views.

The only known incident, wherein Athens had been brought into collision with a member of the Spartan confederacy prior to the Korkyræan dispute, was, her decree passed in regard to Megara—prohibiting the Megarians, on pain of death, from all trade or intercourse as well with Athens as with all ports within the Athenian empire. This prohibition was grounded on the alleged fact, that the Megarians had harboured runaway slaves from Athens, and had appropriated and cultivated portions of land upon her border; partly land, the property of the goddesses of Eleusis—partly a strip of territory disputed between the two states, and therefore left by mutual understanding in common pasture without any permanent enclosure.¹ In reference to this latter point, the Athenian herald Anthemokritus had been sent to Megara to remonstrate, but had been so rudely dealt with, that his death shortly afterwards was imputed to the Megarians.² We may reasonably suppose

¹ Thucyd. i. 139. ἐπικαλοῦντες ἐπεργασίαν Μεγαρεῦσι τῆς γῆς τῆς ἱερᾶς καὶ τῆς ἀορίστου, &c. Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30; Schol. ad Aristophan. Pac. 609.

I agree with Göller that two distinct violations of right are here imputed to the Megarians: one, that they had cultivated land the property of the goddesses at Eleusis—the other, that they had appropriated and cultivated the unsettled pasture land on the border. Dr. Arnold's note takes a different view, less correct in my opinion: "The land on the frontier was consecrated to prevent it from being inclosed: in which case the boundaries might have been a subject of perpetual dispute between the two countries," &c. Compare Thucyd. v. 42. about the border territory round Panaktum.

² Thucydides (i. 139), in assigning the reasons of this sentence of exclusion passed by Athens against the Megarians, mentions only the two allegations here no-

ticed—wrongful cultivation of territory, and reception of runaway slaves. He does not allude to the herald Anthemokritus: still less does he notice that gossip of the day which Aristophanēs and other comedians of this period turn to account in fastening the Peloponnesian war upon the personal sympathies of Periklēs, viz. that first, some young men of Athens stole away the courtesan Simætha from Megara: next, the Megarian youth revenged themselves by carrying off from Athens "two engaging courtezans," one of whom was the mistress of Periklēs; upon which the latter was so enraged that he proposed the sentence of exclusion against the Megarians (Aristoph. Acharn. 501-516; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 30).

Such stories are chiefly valuable as they make us acquainted with the political scandal of the time. But the story of the herald Anthemokritus and his death cannot be altogether rejected. Though Thu-

that ever since the revolt of Megara fourteen years before—which caused to Athens an irreparable mischief—the feeling prevalent between the two cities had been one of bitter enmity, manifesting itself in many ways, but so much exasperated by recent events as to provoke Athens to a signal revenge.¹ Exclusion from Athens and all the ports in her empire, comprising nearly every island and seaport in the Ægean, was so ruinous to the Megarians, that they loudly complained of it at Sparta, representing it as an infraction of the Thirty years' truce; though it was undoubtedly within the legitimate right of Athens to enforce—and was even less harsh than the systematic expulsion of foreigners by Sparta, with which Periklēs compared it.

These complaints found increased attention after the war of Korkyra and the blockade of Potidæa by the Athenians. The sentiments of the Corinthians towards Athens had now become angry and warlike in the highest degree. It was not simply resentment for the past which animated them, but also the anxiety farther to bring upon Athens so strong a hostile pressure as should preserve Potidæa and its garrison from capture. Accordingly they lost no time in endeavouring to rouse the feelings of the Spartans against Athens, and in inducing them to invite to Sparta all such of the confederates as had any grievances against that city. Not merely the Megarians, but several other confederates, came thither as accusers; while the Æginetans, though their insular position made it perilous for them to appear, made

Zealous importunity of the Corinthians in bringing about a general war, for the purpose of preserving Potidæa.

cydidēs, not mentioning the fact, did not believe that the herald's death had really been occasioned by the Megarians; yet there probably was a popular belief at Athens to that effect, under the influence of which the deceased herald received a public burial near the Thriasian gate of Athens, leading to Eleusis: see Philippi Epistol. ad Athen. ap. Demosthen. p. 159 R.; Pausan. i. 36, 3; iii. 4, 2. The language of Plutarch (Periklēs, c. 30) is probably literally correct—"the herald's death appeared to have been caused by the Mega-

rians"—αἰτία τῶν Μεγαρέων ἀποθανεῖν ἕδοξε. That neither Thucydides, nor Periklēs himself, believed that the Megarians had really caused his death, is pretty certain: otherwise the fact would have been urged when the Lacedæmonians sent to complain of the sentence of exclusion—being a deed so notoriously repugnant to all Grecian feeling.

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. Μεγαρέων, δηλοῦντες μὲν καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα διάφορα, μάλιστα δὲ, λιμένων τε εἴργεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ Ἀθηνάων ἀρχῇ, &c.

themselves vehemently heard through the mouths of others, complaining that Athens withheld from them the autonomy to which they were entitled under the truce.¹

According to the Lacedæmonian practice, it was necessary first that the Spartans themselves, apart from their allies, should decide whether there existed a sufficient case of wrong done by Athens against themselves or against Peloponnesus—either in violation of the Thirty years' truce, or in any other way. If the determination of Sparta herself were in the negative, the case would never even be submitted to the vote of the allies. But if it were in the affirmative, then the latter would be convoked to deliver their opinion also: and assuming that the majority of votes coincided with the previous decision of Sparta, the entire confederacy stood then pledged to the given line of policy—if the majority was contrary, the Spartans would stand alone, or with such only of the confederates as concurred. Each allied city, great or small, had an equal right of suffrage. It thus appears that Sparta herself did not vote as a member of the confederacy, but separately and individually as leader—and that the only question ever submitted to the allies was, whether they would or would not go along with her previous decision. Such was the course of proceeding now followed. The Corinthians, together with such other of the

Relations of Sparta with her allies—they had a vote thus far—whether they would, or would not, approve of a course of policy which had been previously resolved by Sparta separately.

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. λέγοντες οὐκ εἶναι αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς. O. Müller (Æginet. p. 180) and Götter in his note, think that the *truce* (or *covenant* generally) here alluded to is, not the Thirty years' truce concluded fourteen years before the period actually present, but the ancient alliance against the Persians, solemnly ratified and continued after the victory of Platæa. Dr. Arnold on the contrary thinks that the Thirty years' truce is alluded to, which the Æginetans interpreted (rightly or not) as entitling them to independence.

The former opinion might seem to be countenanced by the allusion to Ægina in the speech of the

Thebans (iii. 64): but on the other hand, if we consult i. 115, it will appear possible that the wording of the Thirty years' truce may have been general, as—Ἀποδοῦναι δὲ Ἀθηναίους ἕσα ἔχουσι Πελοποννησίων: at any rate, the Æginetans may have pretended, that by the same rule as Athens gave up Nisæa, Pægæ, &c., she ought also to renounce Ægina.

However, we must recollect that the one plea does not exclude the other: the Æginetans may have taken advantage of both in enforcing their prayer for interference. This seems to have been the idea of the Scholiast, when he says—κατὰ τὴν συμφωνίαν τῶν σπονδῶν.

confederates as felt either aggrieved or alarmed by Athens, presented themselves before the public assembly of Spartan citizens, prepared to prove that the Athenians had broken the truce and were going on in a course of wrong towards Peloponnesus.¹ Even in the oligarchy of Sparta, such a question as this could only be decided by a general assembly of Spartan citizens, qualified both by age, by regular contribution to the public mess, and by obedience to Spartan discipline. To the assembly so constituted the deputies of the various allied cities addressed themselves, each setting forth his case against Athens. The Corinthians chose to reserve themselves to the last, after the assembly had been inflamed by the previous speakers.

Of this important assembly, on which so much of the future fate of Greece turned, Thucydidês has preserved an account unusually copious. First, the speech delivered by the Corinthian envoys. Next, that of some Athenian envoys, who happening to be at the same time in Sparta on some other matters, and being present in the assembly so as to have heard the speeches both of the Corinthians and of the other complainants, obtained permission from the magistrates to address the assembly in their turn. Thirdly, the address of the Spartan king Archidamus, on the course of policy proper to be adopted by Sparta. Lastly, the brief, but eminently characteristic, address of the Æphor Sthenelaidas, on putting the question for decision. These speeches, the composition of Thucydidês himself, contain substantially the sentiments of the parties to whom they are ascribed. Neither of them is distinctly a reply to that which has preceded, but each presents the situation of affairs from a different point of view.

The Corinthians knew well that the audience whom they were about to address had been favourably prepared for them—for the Lacedæmonian authorities had already given an actual promise, to them and to the Potidæans at the moment before Potidæa revolted, that they would invade Attica. Great was the revolution in sentiment of the Spartans, since they had declined lending aid to the much more powerful island of Lesbos when it proposed to revolt—a revolution occasioned

Assembly of the Spartans separately addressed by envoys of the allied powers, complaining that Athens had violated the truce.

The Corinthian envoys address the assembly last, after the envoys of the other allies have inflamed it against Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 67. κατεβέβωτο ἰθὺς ὁ πῶν Ἀθηναίων ὅτι σπονδὰς τε λελού-

by the altered interests and sentiments of Corinth. Nevertheless, the Corinthians also knew that their positive grounds of complaint against Athens, in respect of wrong or violation of the existing truce, were both few and feeble. Neither in the dispute about Potidæa nor about Korkyra, had Athens infringed the truce or wronged the Peloponnesian alliance. In both she had come into collision with Corinth, singly and apart from the confederacy. She had a right, both according to the truce and according to the received maxims of international law, to lend defensive aid

International customs of the time, as bearing upon the points in dispute between Athens and Corinth—Athens in the right.

to the Korkyræans, at their own request: she had a right also, according to the principles laid down by the Corinthians themselves on occasion of the revolt of Samos, to restrain the Potidæans from revolting. She had committed nothing which could fairly be called an aggression. Indeed the aggression both in the case of Potidæa and in that of Korkyra, was decidedly on the side of the Corinthians: and the Peloponnesian

confederacy could only be so far implicated as it was understood to be bound to espouse the separate quarrels, right or wrong, of Corinth. All this was well known to the Corinthian envoys; and accordingly we find that in their speech at Sparta, they touch but lightly and in vague terms on positive or recent wrongs. Even that which they do say completely justifies the proceedings of Athens about the affair of Korkyra, since they confess without hesitation the design of seizing the large Korkyræan navy for the use of the Peloponnesian alliance: while in respect of Potidæa, if we had only the speech of the Corinthian envoy before us without any other knowledge, we should have supposed it to be an independent state, not connected by any permanent bonds with Athens—we should have supposed that the siege of Potidæa by Athens was an unprovoked aggression upon an autonomous ally of Corinth¹—we should never have imagined that Corinth had deliberately instigated and aided the revolt of the Chalkidians as well as of the Potidæans against Athens. It might be pretended that

κότες εἶεν καὶ ἀδικοῖεν τὴν Πελοπόννησον. The change of tense in these two verbs is to be noticed.

¹ Thucyd. i. 68. οὐ γὰρ ἂν Κέρκυραν τε ὑπολαβόντες βία ἡμῶν εἶχον,

καὶ Ποτιδαίαν ἐπολιόρχουν, ὧν τὸ μὲν ἐπιχειρότατον χωρίον πρὸς τὰ ἐπὶ Θράκης ἀποχρῆσθαι, ἡ δὲ ναυτικὸν ἂν μένιστον παρέσχε Πελοποννησίοις.

she had a right to do this, by virtue of her undefined metropolitan relations with Potidæa. But at any rate the incident was not such as to afford any decent pretext for charge against the Athenians either of outrage towards Corinth,¹ or of wrongful aggression against the Peloponnesian confederacy.

To dwell much upon specific allegations of wrong, would not have suited the purpose of the Corinthian envoy; for against such, the Thirty years' truce expressly provided that recourse should be had to amicable arbitration—to which recourse he never once alludes. He knew, that as between Corinth and Athens, war had already begun at Potidæa; and his business, throughout nearly all of a very emphatic speech, is, to show that the Peloponnesian confederacy, and especially Sparta, is bound to take instant part in it, not less by prudence than by duty. He employs the most animated language to depict the ambition, the unwearied activity, the personal effort abroad as well as at home, the quick resolves, the sanguine hopes never dashed by failure—of Athens: as contrasted with the cautious, home-keeping, indolent, scrupulous routine of Sparta. He reproaches the Spartans with their backwardness and timidity, in not having repressed the growth of Athens before she reached this formidable height: especially in having allowed her to fortify her city after the retreat of Xerxes and afterwards to build the long walls from the city to the sea.² The Spartans (he observes) stood alone among all Greeks in the notable system of keeping down an enemy not by acting, but by delaying to act—not arresting his growth, but putting him down when his force was doubled. Falsely indeed had they acquired the reputation of being sure, when they were in reality merely slow.³ In resisting Xerxes, as in resisting Athens, they had always been behindhand, disappointing and leaving their friends to ruin; while both

Tenor of the Corinthian address—little allusion to recent wrong—strong efforts to raise hatred and alarm against Athens.

¹ Thucyd. i. 68. ἐν οἷς προσήκει ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἥμισυ εἰπεῖν, ὅσῳ καὶ μέγιστα ἐγκλήματα ἔχομεν, ὑπὸ μὲν Ἀθηναίων ὑβριζόμενοι, ὑπὸ δὲ ὑμῶν ἀμελοῦμενοι.

² Thucyd. i. 69.

³ Thucyd. i. 69. ἡσυχάζετε γὰρ μόνοι Ἑλλήνων, ὡ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, οὐ

τῇ δυνάμει τινα ἀλλά τῇ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, καὶ μόνοι οὐκ ἀρρομένη τῇ αὐτῆσιν τῶν ἐχθρῶν, διπλασιούμεην δὲ, καταλύοντες. Καίτοι ἐλέγεσθε ἀσφαλεῖς εἶναι, ὧν ἄρα ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἔργου ἐκράτει τὸν τε γὰρ Μῆδον, &c.

these enemies had only failed of complete success through their own mistakes.

After half apologising for the tartness of these re-proofs—which however, as the Spartans were now well disposed to go to war forthwith, would be well-timed and even agreeable—the Corinthian orator vindicates the necessity of plain-speaking by the urgent peril of the emergency, and the formidable character of the enemy who threatened them. “You do not reflect (he says) how thoroughly different the Athenians are from yourselves. *They* are innovators by nature, sharp both in devising, and in executing what they have determined: *you* are sharp only in keeping what you have got, in determining on nothing beyond, and in doing even less than absolute necessity requires.¹ *They* again dare beyond their means, run risks beyond their own judgement, and keep alive their hopes in desperate circumstances: *your* peculiarity is, that your performance comes short of your power—you have no faith even in what your judgement guarantees—when in difficulties, you despair of all escape. *They* never hang back—you are habitual laggards: *they* love foreign service—you cannot stir from home: for *they* are always under the belief that their movements will lead to some farther gain, while *you* fancy that new products will endanger what you already have. When successful, they make the greatest forward march; when defeated, they fall back the least. Moreover they task their bodies on behalf of their city as if they were the bodies of others—while their minds are most of all their own, for exertion in her service.² When their plans for acquisition do not come successfully

¹ Thucyd. i. 70. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ γεω-
τροποιοὶ, καὶ ἐπιχειρῆσαι ὀξείας καὶ
ἐπιτελέσαι ἔργω ὃ ἂν γνώσιν· ὑμεῖς
δὲ τὰ ὑπάρχοντά τε σώζειν, καὶ ἐπι-
γῶνα μηδὲν, καὶ ἔργω οὐδὲ ταναγ-
χαῖα ἐξικέσθαι.

The meaning of the word ὀξείας
—*sharp*—when applied to the latter
half of the sentence, is in the na-
ture of a sarcasm. But this is
suitable to the character of the
speech. Göller supposes some such
word as ἰκανοί, instead of ὀξείας,

to be understood: but we should
thereby both depart from the more
obvious syntax, and weaken the
general meaning.

² Thucyd. i. 70. ἐπι δὲ τοῖς μὲν
σώμασιν ἀλλοτριωτάτους ὑπὲρ τῆς
πόλεως χρώνται, τῇ γνώμῃ δὲ οἰκειο-
τάτῃ ἐς τὸ πράσσειν τι ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς.

It is difficult to convey in trans-
lation the antithesis between ἀλ-
λοτριωτάτους and οἰκειοτάτῃ — not
without a certain conceit, which
Thucydides is occasionally fond of.

out, they feel like men robbed of what belongs to them: yet the acquisitions when realised appear like trifles compared with what remains to be acquired. If they sometimes fail in an attempt, new hopes arise in some other direction to supply the want: for with them alone the possession and the hope of what they aim at is almost simultaneous, from their habit of quickly executing all that they have once resolved. And in this manner do they toil throughout all their lives amidst hardship and peril, disregarding present enjoyment in the continual thirst for increase—knowing no other festival recreation except the performance of active duty—and deeming inactive repose a worse condition than fatiguing occupation. To speak the truth in two words, such is their inborn temper, that they will neither remain at rest themselves, nor allow rest to others.¹

“Such is the city which stands opposed to you, Lacedæmonians—yet ye still hang back from action. . . . Your continual scruples and apathy would hardly be safe, even if ye had neighbours like yourselves in character: but as to dealings with Athens, your system is antiquated and out of date. In politics as in art, it is the modern improvements which are sure to come out victorious: and though unchanged institutions are best, if a city be not called upon to act—yet multiplicity of active obligations requires multiplicity and novelty of contrivance.² It is through these numerous trials that the means of Athens have acquired so much more new development than yours.”

The Corinthians concluded by saying, that if, after so many previous warnings, now repeated for the last time, Sparta still refused to protect her allies against Athens—if she delayed to perform her promise made to the Potidæans of immediately invading Attica—they (the Corinthians)

¹ Thucyd. l. c. καὶ ταῦτα μετὰ πόνων πάντα καὶ κινδύνων δι' ἔλλου τοῦ αἰῶνος μοχλοῦσι, καὶ ἀπολαύουσιν ἐλάχιστα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων, διὰ τὸ αἰεὶ κτᾶσθαι καὶ μήτε ἐορτήν ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τὰ θέοντα πράξει, ξυμπορᾶν δὲ οὐχ ἤσσον ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα ἢ ἀσχυλίαν ἐπίπονον ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνηλῶν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῷ μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν

μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὁρθῶς ἂν εἶποι.

² Thucyd. i. 71. ἀρχαῖστραπα ὁμῶν τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἔστιν. Ἀνάγκη δ', ὡσπερ τέχνης, αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνώμενα κρατεῖν καὶ ἡσυχάζουση μὲν πόλει τὰ ἀκίνητα νόμιμα ἄριστα, πρὸς πολλὰ δὲ ἀναγκασμένοις ἵεναι, πολλῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ.

would forthwith look for safety in some new alliance, which they felt themselves fully justified in doing. They admonished her to look well to the case, and to carry forward Peloponnesus, with undiminished dignity, as it had been transmitted to her from her predecessors.¹

Such was the memorable picture of Athens and her citizens, as exhibited by her fiercest enemy before the public assembly at Sparta. It was calculated to impress the assembly, not by appeal to recent or particular misdeeds, but by the general system of unprincipled and endless aggression which was imputed to Athens during the past—and by the certainty held out that the same system, unless put down by measures of decisive hostility, would be pushed still farther in future to the utter ruin of Peloponnesus. And to this point did the Athenian envoy (staying in Sparta about some other negotiation and now present in the assembly) address himself in reply, after having asked and obtained permission from the magistrates. The empire of Athens was now of such standing that the younger men present had no personal knowledge of the circumstances under which it had grown up: and what was needed as information for them would be impressive as a reminder even to their seniors.²

He began by disclaiming all intention of defending his native city against the charges of specific wrong or alleged infractions of the existing truce. This was no part of his mission; nor did he recognise Sparta as a competent judge in dispute between Athens and Corinth. But he nevertheless thought it his duty to vindicate Athens against the general character of injustice and aggression imputed to her, as well as to offer a solemn warning to the Spartans against the policy towards which they were obviously tending. He then proceeded to show that the empire of Athens had been honourably earned and amply deserved—that it had been voluntarily ceded, and even pressed upon her—and that she could not abdicate it without imperilling her own separate existence and security. Far from thinking that the circumstances under which it was acquired needed apology, he appealed to them with pride, as a testimony of the genuine Hellenic patriotism of

Reply made by an Athenian envoy, accidentally present in Sparta.

His account of the empire of Athens—how it had been acquired, and how it was maintained.

¹ Thucyd. i. 71.

² Thucyd. i. 72.

that city which the Spartan congress now seemed disposed to run down as an enemy.¹ Hethendwelt upon the circumstances attending the Persian invasion, setting forth the superior forwardness and the unflinching endurance of Athens, in spite of ungenerous neglect from the Spartans and other Greeks—the preponderance of her naval force in the entire armament—the directing genius of her general Themistoklēs, complimented even by Sparta herself—and the title of Athens to rank on that memorable occasion as the principal saviour of Greece. This alone ought to save her empire from reproach; but this was not all—for that empire had been tendered to her by the pressing instance of the allies, at a time when Sparta had proved herself both incompetent and unwilling to prosecute the war against Persia.² By simple exercise of the constraining force inseparable from her presidential obligations, and by the reduction of various allies who revolted, Athens had gradually become unpopular, while Sparta too had become her enemy instead of her friend. To relax her hold upon her allies would have been to make them the allies of Sparta against her; and thus the motive of fear was added to those of ambition and revenue, in inducing Athens to maintain her imperial dominion by force. In her position, no Grecian power either would or could have acted otherwise:—no Grecian power, certainly not Sparta, would have acted with so much equity and moderation, or given so little ground of complaint to her subjects. Worse they *had* suffered, while under Persia; worse they *would* suffer, if they came under Sparta, who held her own allies under the thralldom of an oligarchical party in each city; and if they hated Athens, this was only because subjects always hated the *present* dominion, whatever that might be.³

¹ Thucyd. i. 73. ῥηθήσεται δὲ οὐ παραιτήσεως μᾶλλον ἔνεκα ἢ μαρτυρίου, καὶ δηλώσεως πρὸς οἷαν ὑμῖν πόλιν μὴ εὖ βουλευομένοις ὁ ἀγὼν καταστήσεται.

² Thucyd. i. 75. Ἄρ' ἀξιοὶ ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἔνεκα τῆς τότε καὶ γνώμης συνέσεως, ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακείσθαι; καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν τήνδε ἐλάβομεν οὐ

βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐβλησάντων παραμείναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν συμμαχῶν, καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστήναι· ἐξ αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἔργου κατηναγκάσθημεν τὸ πρῶτον προαγαγεῖν αὐτὴν ἐς τὸδε, μάλιστα μὲν ὑπὸ δέους, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τιμῆς, ὕστερον καὶ ὠφελείας.

³ Thucyd. i. 77.

Having justified both the origin and the working of the Athenian empire, the envoy concluded by warning Sparta to consider calmly, without being hurried away by the passions and invectives of others, before she took a step from which there was no retreat, and which exposed the future to chances such as no man on either side could foresee. He called on her not to break the truce mutually sworn to, but to adjust all differences, as Athens was prepared to do, by the amicable arbitration which that truce provided. Should she begin war, the Athenians would follow her lead and resist her, calling to witness those gods under whose sanction the oaths were taken.¹

The facts recounted in the preceding chapters will have shown, that the account given by the Athenian envoy at Sparta of the origin and character of the empire exercised by his city (though doubtless the account of a partisan) is in substance correct and equitable. The envoys of Athens had not yet learned to take the tone which they assumed in the sixteenth and seventeenth years of the coming war, at Melos and Kamarina. At any time previous to the affair of Korkyra, the topics insisted upon by the Athenian would probably have been profoundly listened to at Sparta. But now the mind of the Spartans was made up. Having cleared the assembly of all "strangers," and even all allies, they proceeded to discuss and determine the question among themselves. Most of their speakers held but one language²—expatiating on the wrongs already done by Athens, and urging the necessity of instant war. There was however one voice, and that a commanding voice, raised against this conclusion; the ancient and respected king Archidamus opposed it.

The speech of Archidamus is that of a deliberate Spartan, who, setting aside both hatred to Athens and blind

¹ Thucyd. i. 78. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐν οὐδεμιά πω τοιαύτη ἀμαρτία ὄντες, οὗτ' αὐτοὶ οὕτε ὑμᾶς ὁρῶντες, λέγομεν ὑμῖν, ἕως ἐπι αὐθαίρετος ἀμφοτέροις ἢ εὐβουλία, σπονδὰς μὴ λύειν μηδὲ παραβαίνειν τοὺς ὄρκους, τὰ δὲ διάφορα δίκῃ λύεσθαι κατὰ τῆν ἐνομήχην ἢ

θεοὺς τοὺς ὄρκιους μάρτυρας ποιούμενοι, πειρασόμεθα ἀμύνεσθαι πολέμου ἄρχοντας ταύτῃ ἢ ἂν ὑψηλῆσθε.

² Thucyd. i. 79. καὶ τῶν μὲν πλειόνων ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ αἰ γινώμην ἔφερον, ἀδικεῖν τε Ἀθηναίους ᾗδῃ, καὶ πολέμητρά εἶναι ἐν τάχει.

partiality to allies, looks at the question with a view to the interests and honour of Sparta only—not however omitting her imperial as well as her separate character. The preceding native speakers, indignant against Athens, had probably appealed to Spartan pride, treating it as an intolerable disgrace that almost the entire land-force of Dorian Peloponnesus should be thus bullied by one single Ionic city, and should hesitate to commence a war which one invasion of Attica would probably terminate. As the Corinthians had tried to excite the Spartans by well-timed taunts and reproaches, so the subsequent speakers had aimed at the same objects by panegyric upon the well-known valour and discipline of the city. To all these arguments Archidamus set himself to reply. Invoking the experience of the elders his contemporaries around him, he impressed upon the assembly the grave responsibility, the uncertainties, difficulties, and perils, of the war into which they were hurrying without preparation.¹ He reminded them of the wealth, the population (greater than that of any other Grecian city), the naval force, the cavalry, the hoplites, the large foreign dominion of Athens,—and then asked by what means they proposed to put her down?² Ships, they had few; trained seamen, yet fewer; wealth, next to none. They could indeed invade and ravage Attica, by their superior numbers and land-force. But the Athenians had possessions abroad sufficient to enable them to dispense with the produce of Attica, while their great navy would retaliate the like ravages upon Peloponnesus. To suppose that one or two devastating expeditions into Attica would bring the war to an end, would be a deplorable error: such proceedings would merely enrage the Athenians, without impairing their real strength, and the war would thus be prolonged, perhaps for a whole generation.³ Before they determined upon war, it was absolutely necessary to provide more

Most Spartan speakers are in favour of war. King Archidamus opposes war. His speech.

¹ Thucyd. i. 80.

² Thucyd. i. 80. πρὸς δὲ ἄνδρας, οἳ γῆν τε ἐκίς ἔχουσι καὶ προσέτι πολέμου ἐμπειροτάτοι εἰσι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπανι ἄριστα ἐξήρτωνται, πλοῦτω τε ἰδίῳ καὶ δημοσίῳ καὶ ναυτῶν καὶ ἵπποις καὶ θπλοῖς, καὶ ὄχλῳ, ὅσος οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ εἰ μὴ γε χωρίῳ Ἑλληνικῷ ἐστίν,

ἔτι δὲ καὶ συμμαχοῦς πολλοὺς φόρου ὑποτελεῖς ἔχουσι, πῶς χρὴ πρὸς τοὺς βαδίζωα πόλεμον ἄρασθαι, καὶ τίνι πιστεύσαντας ἀπαρασκευάτους ἐπειθῆναι.

³ Thucyd. i. 81. δέδοικα δὲ μᾶλλον μὴ καὶ τοῖς παισὶν αὐτὸν ὑπολίπωμεν, &c.

efficient means for carrying it on; and to multiply their allies not merely among the Greeks, but among foreigners also. While this was in process, envoys ought to be sent to Athens to remonstrate and obtain redress for the grievances of the allies. If the Athenians granted this—which they very probably would do, when they saw the preparations going forward, and when the ruin of the highly-cultivated soil of Attica was held over them *in terrorem* without being actually consummated—so much the better: if they refused, in the course of two or three years war might be commenced with some hopes of success. Archidamus reminded his countrymen that their allies would hold *them* responsible for the good or bad issue of what was now determined;¹ admonishing them, in the true spirit of a conservative Spartan, to cling to that cautious policy which had been ever the characteristic of the state, despising both taunts on their tardiness and panegyric on their valour. “We Spartans owe both our bravery and our prudence to our admirable public discipline: it makes us warlike, because the sense of shame is most closely connected with discipline, as valour is with the sense of shame: it makes us prudent, because our training keeps us too ignorant to set ourselves above our own institutions, and holds us under sharp restraint so as not to disobey them.”²

¹ Thucyd. i. 82, 83.

² Thucyd. i. 84. Πολεμικοί τε καὶ εὐβουλοὶ διὰ τὸ εὐκοσμον γιγνόμεθα, τὸ μὲν, ὅτι αἰδῶς σωφροσύνης πλείστον μετέχει, αἰσχύνῃς δὲ εὐφυχία· εὐβουλοὶ δὲ, ἀμαθέστερον τῶν νόμων τῆς ὑπεροψίας παιδευόμενοι, καὶ ἔν χαλεπότητι σωφρονέστερον ἢ ὥστε αὐτῶν ἀνηκουστῆν· καὶ μὴ, τὰ ἀχρεῖα ξυνετοὶ ἄγαν ὄντες, τὰς τῶν πολεμίων παρασκευὰς λόγῳ καλῶς μεμψόμενοι, ἀνομοίως ἔργῳ ἐπέξειέναι, νομίζειν δὲ τὰς τε διανοίας τῶν πέλας παραπλησίους εἶναι, καὶ τὰς προσπιπτούσας τύχας οὐ λόγῳ διαιρετάς.

In the construction of the last sentence, I follow Haack and Poppo, in preference to Gøller and Dr. Arnold.

The wording of this part of the speech of Archidamus is awkward and obscure, though we make out

pretty well the general sense. It deserves peculiar attention, as coming from a king of Sparta, personally too a man of superior judgement. The great points of the Spartan character are all brought out. 1. A narrow, strictly-defined, and uniform range of ideas. 2. Compression of all other impulses and desires, but an increased sensibility to their own public opinion. 3. Great habits of endurance as well as of submission.

The way in which the features of Spartan character are deduced from Spartan institutions, as well as the pride which Archidamus expresses in the ignorance and narrow mental range of his countrymen, are here remarkable. A similar championship of ignorance and narrow-mindedness is not only

And thus, not being otherwise in unprofitable accomplishments, we Spartans are not given to disparage our enemy's strength in clever speech, and then meet him with shortcomings in reality. We think that the capacity of neighbouring states is much on a par, and that the chances in reserve for both parties are too uncertain to be discriminated beforehand by speech. We always make real preparations against our enemies, as if they were proceeding wisely on their side: we must count upon security through our own precautions, not upon the chance of their errors. Indeed there is no great superiority in one man as compared with another: he is the stoutest who is trained in the severest trials. Let us for our parts not renounce this discipline, which we have received from our fathers and which we still continue, to our very great profit: let us not hurry on in one short hour a resolution upon which depend so many lives, so much property, so many cities, and our own reputation besides. Let us take time to consider, since our strength puts it fully in our power to do so. Send envoys to the Athenians on the subject of Potidæa and of the other grievances alleged by our allies—and that too the rather as they are ready to give us satisfaction: against one who offers satisfaction, custom forbids you to proceed, without some previous application, as if he were a proclaimed wrong-doer. But at the same time make preparation for war; such will be the course of policy at once the best for your own power and the most terror-striking to your enemies.”¹

The speech of Archidamus was not only in itself full of plain reason and good sense, but delivered altogether from the point of view of a Spartan; appealing greatly to Spartan conservative feeling and even prejudice. But in spite of all this, and in spite of the personal esteem entertained for the speaker, the tide of feeling in the opposite direction was at that moment irresistible. Sthenelaidas—one of the five Ephors, to whom it fell to put the question for voting—closed the debate. His few words mark at once the character of the man—the

The speech of Archidamus is ineffectual. Short, but warlike appeal of the Ephor Sthenelaidas.

to be found among those who deride the literary and oratorical tastes of the Athenian democracy (see Aristophanês, *Ran.* 1070: com-

pare Xenophon, *Memorab.* i. 2. 9-49), but also in the speech of Kleon (*Thucyd.* iii. 37).

¹ *Thucyd.* i. 84, 85.

temper of the assembly—and the simplicity of speech, though without the wisdom of judgement, for which Archidamus had taken credit to his countrymen.

“I don’t understand (he said) these long speeches of the Athenians. They have praised themselves abundantly, but they have never rebutted what is laid to their charge—that they are guilty of wrong against our allies and against Peloponnesus. Now if in former days they were good men against the Persians, and are now evil-doers against us, they deserve double punishment as having become evil-doers instead of good.¹ But *we* are the same now as we were then: we know better than to sit still while our allies are suffering wrong: we shall not adjourn our aid, while they cannot adjourn their sufferings.² Others have in abundance wealth, ships and horses—but *we* have good allies, whom we are not to abandon to the mercy of the Athenians: nor are we to trust our redress to arbitration and to words, when our wrongs are not confined to words. We must help them speedily and with all our strength. Let no one tell us that we can with honour deliberate when we are actually suffering wrong: it is rather for those who intend to do the wrong, to deliberate well beforehand. Resolve upon war then, Lacedæmonians, in a manner worthy of Sparta. Suffer not the Athenians to become greater than they are: let us not betray our allies to ruin, but march with the aid of the gods against the wrong-doers.”

With these few words, so well calculated to defeat the prudential admonitions of Archidamus, Sthenelaidas put the question for the decision of the assembly—which at Sparta was usually taken neither by show of hands, nor by deposit of balls in an urn, but by cries analogous to the Ay or No of the English House of Commons—the presiding Ephor declaring which of the cries predominated. On this occasion the cry for war was manifestly the stronger.³ Yet Sthenelaidas

Vote of the Spartan assembly in favour of war.

¹ Compare a similar sentiment in the speech of the Thebans against the Plataeans (Thucyd. iii. (7).

² Thucyd. i. 86. ἡμεῖς δὲ ὁμοῖοι καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἐσμέν, καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους, ἦν σωφρονώμεν, οὐ περιψόμεθα ἀδικουμένους, οὐδὲ μελλήσομεν

τιμωρεῖν οἱ δὲ οὐκέτι μέλλουσι κακῶν πάσχειν.

There is here a play upon the word μέλλειν which it is not easy to preserve in a translation.

³ Thucyd. i. 87. βουλόμενος αὐτοὺς φανερώς ἀποδεικνυμένους τῆν γνομην ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν μᾶλλον ὁρμηται, &c.

affected inability to determine which of the two was the louder, in order that he might have an excuse for bringing about a more impressive manifestation of sentiment and a stronger apparent majority—since a portion of the minority would probably be afraid to show their real opinions as individuals openly. He therefore directed a division—like the Speaker of the English House of Commons when his decision in favour of Ay or No is questioned by any member—“Such of you as think that the truce has been violated and that the Athenians are doing us wrong, go to *that* side; such as think the contrary, to the other side.” The assembly accordingly divided, and the majority was very great on the warlike side of the question.

The first step of the Lacedæmonians, after coming to this important decision, was to send to Delphi and inquire of the oracle whether it would be beneficial to them to undertake the war. The answer brought back (Thucydidês seems hardly certain that it was really given¹) was—that if they did their best they would be victorious, and that the god would help them, invoked or uninvoked. They at the same time convened a general congress of their allies to Sparta, for the purpose of submitting their recent resolution to the vote of all.

To the Corinthians, in their anxiety for the relief of Potidæa, the decision to be given by this congress was not less important than that which the Spartans had just taken separately. They sent round envoys to each of the allies, entreating them to authorise war without reserve. Through such instigations, acting upon the general impulse then prevalent, the congress came together in a temper decidedly warlike. Most of the speakers were full of invective against Athens and impatient for action, while the Corinthians, waiting as before to speak the last, wound up the discussion by a speech well calculated to ensure a hearty vote. Their former speech had been directed to shame, exasperate, and alarm the Lacedæmonians; this point having now been carried, they had to enforce, upon the allies, generally, the dishonour as well as the impolicy of receding from a willing leader. The cause was one in which all were interested,

The Spartans send to Delphi—obtain an encouraging reply.

General congress of allies at Sparta. Second speech of the Corinthian envoy, enforcing the necessity and propriety of war.

¹ Thucyd. i. 118. ὁ δὲ ἀνεῖλεν ἀποτοῖς, ὡς λέγεταί, &c.

the inland states not less than the maritime, for both would find themselves ultimately victims of the encroaching despot-city. Whatever efforts were necessary for the war, ought cheerfully to be made, since it was only through war that they could arrive at a secure and honourable peace. There were good hopes that this might soon be attained, and that the war would not last long—so decided was the superiority of the confederacy, in numbers, in military skill, and in the equal heart and obedience of all its members.¹ The naval superiority of Athens depended chiefly upon hired seamen—so that the confederacy, by borrowing from the treasuries of Delphi and Olympia, would soon be able to overbid her, take into pay her best mariners, and equal her equipment at sea. They would excite revolt among her allies and establish a permanent fortified post for the ruin of Attica. To make up a common fund for this purpose, was indispensably necessary; for Athens was far more than a match for each of them single-handed. Nothing less than hearty union could save them all from successive enslavement—the very supposition of which was intolerable to Peloponnesian freemen, whose fathers had liberated Greece from the Persian. Let them not shrink from endurance and sacrifice in such a cause—it was their hereditary pride to purchase success by laborious effort. The Delphian god had promised them his cooperation; and the whole of Greece would sympathise in the cause, either from fear of the despotism of Athens, or from hopes of profit. They would not be the first to break the truce, for the Athenians had

¹ Thucyd. i. 120, 121. Κατὰ πολλὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς εἰκὸς ἐπικρατῆσαι, πρῶτον μὲν πλήθει προὔχοντας καὶ ἐμπειρίᾳ πολεμικῇ, ἔπειτα ὁμοίως πάντας ἐς τὰ παραγγελλόμενα ἴοντας.

I conceive that the word ὁμοίως here alludes to the equal interest of all the confederates in the quarrel, as opposed to the Athenian power, which was composed partly of constrained subjects, partly of hired mercenaries—to both of which points, as weaknesses in the enemy, the Corinthian orator goes on to allude. The word ὁμοίως here designates the same fact as Periklēs in his speech at Athens (i. 141),

mentions under the words πάντες ἰσόψηφοι: the Corinthian orator treats it as an advantage to have all confederates equal and hearty in the cause: Periklēs, on the contrary, looking at the same fact from the Athenian point of view, considers it as a disadvantage, since it prevented unity of command and determination.

Poppo's view of this passage seems to me erroneous.

The same idea is reproduced, c. 124. εἴπερ βεβαιότατον τὸ ταῦτα ξυμφέροντα καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ἰδιώταις εἶναι, &c.

already broken it, as the declaration of the Delphian god distinctly implied. Let them lose no time in sending aid to the Potidæans, a Dorian population now besieged by Ionians, as well as to those other Greeks whom Athens had enslaved. Every day the necessity for effort was becoming stronger, and the longer it was delayed, the more painful it would be when it came. "Be ye persuaded then (concluded the orator), that this city, which has constituted herself despot of Greece, had her means of attack prepared against all of us alike, some for present rule, others for future conquest. Let us assail and subdue her, that we may dwell securely ourselves hereafter, and may emancipate those Greeks who are now in slavery."¹

If there were any speeches delivered at this congress in opposition to the war, they were not likely to be successful in a cause wherein even Archidamus had failed. After the Corinthian had concluded, the question was put to the deputies of every city, great and small indiscriminately: and the majority decided for war.² This important resolution was adopted about the end of 432 B.C., or the beginning of January 431 B.C.: the previous decision of the Spartans separately, may have been taken about two months earlier, in the preceding October or November 432 B.C.

Reviewing the conduct of the two great Grecian parties at this momentous juncture, with reference to existing treaties and positive grounds of complaint, it seems clear that Athens was in the right. She had done nothing which could fairly be called a violation of the Thirty years' truce: while for such of her acts as were alleged to be such, she offered to submit them to that amicable arbitration which the truce itself prescribed. The Peloponnesian confederates were manifestly the aggressors in the contest. If Sparta, usually so backward, now came forward in a spirit so decidedly opposite, we are to ascribe it partly to her standing fear and jealousy of Athens, partly to the pressure of her allies, especially of the Corinthians.

Thucydidês, recognising these two as the grand determining motives, and indicating the alleged infractions of

Vote of the majority of the allies in favour of war—B.C. 432.

Views and motives of the opposing powers.

¹ Thucyd. i. 123, 124.

the decision was not absolutely unanimous.

² Thucyd. i. 125. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἐψηφίσαντο πολεμεῖν. It seems that

truce as simple occasions or pretexts, seems to consider the fear and hatred of Athens as having contributed more to determine Sparta than the urgency of her allies.¹ That the extraordinary aggrandisement of Athens, during the period immediately succeeding the Persian invasion, was well-calculated to excite alarm and jealousy in Peloponnesus, is indisputable. But if we take Athens as she stood in 432 B. C., it deserves notice that she had neither made, nor (so far as we know) tried to make, a single new acquisition during the whole fourteen years which had elapsed since the conclusion of the 'Thirty years' truce,²—and moreover that that truce marked an epoch of signal humiliation and reduction of her power. The triumph which Sparta and the Peloponnesians then gained, though not sufficiently complete to remove all fear of Athens, was yet great enough to inspire them with the hope that a second combined effort would subdue her. This mixture of fear and hope was exactly the state of feeling out of which war was

¹ Thucyd. i. 88. Ἐψηφίσαντο δὲ οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τὰς σπονδὰς λελύσθαι καὶ πολεμητέα εἶναι, οὐ τοσοῦτον τῶν ξυμμάχων πεισθέντες τοῖς λόγοις, ἕσσον φοβούμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, μὴ ἔτι μείζον δυνηθῶσιν, ὀρῶντες αὐτοῖς τὰ πολλὰ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ὑποχείρια ἦδη ὄντα: compare also c. 23 and 118.

² Plutarch's biography of Periklēs is very misleading from its inattention to 'chronology, ascribing to an earlier time feelings and tendencies which really belong to a later. Thus he represents (c. 20) the desire for acquiring possession of Sicily, and even of Carthage and the Tyrrhenian coast, as having become very popular at Athens even before the revolt of Megara and Eubœa, and before those other circumstances which preceded the Thirty years' truce: and he gives much credit to Periklēs for having repressed such unmeasured aspirations. But ambitious hopes directed towards Sicily could not have sprung up in

the Athenian mind until after the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. It was impossible that they could make any step in that direction until they had established their alliance with Korkyra, and this was only done in the year before the Peloponnesian war—done too, even then, in a qualified manner and with much reserve. At the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war, the Athenians had nothing but fears, while the Peloponnesians had large hopes of aid, from the side of Sicily. While it is very true, therefore, that Periklēs was eminently useful in discouraging rash and distant enterprises of ambition generally, we cannot give him the credit of keeping down Athenian desires of acquisition in Sicily, or towards Carthage (if indeed this latter ever was included in the catalogue of Athenian hopes)—for such desires were hardly known until after his death—in spite of the assertion again repeated by Plutarch, Alkiabiadēs, c. 17.

likely to grow. We see that even before the quarrel between Corinth and Korkyra, sagacious Greeks everywhere anticipated war as not far distant.¹ It was near breaking out even on occasion of the revolt of Samos;² peace being then preserved partly by the commercial and nautical interests of Corinth, partly by the quiescence of Athens. But the quarrel of Corinth and Korkyra, which Sparta might have appeased beforehand had she thought it her interest to do so,—and the junction of Korkyra with Athens—exhibited the latter as again in a career of aggrandisement, and thus again brought into play the warlike feelings of Sparta; while they converted Corinth from the advocate of peace into a clamorous organ of war. The revolt of Potidæa—fomented by Corinth and encouraged by Sparta in the form of a positive promise to invade Attica—was in point of fact the first distinct violation of the truce, and the initiatory measure of the Peloponnesian war. The Spartan meeting, and the subsequent congress of allies at Sparta, served no other purpose than to provide such formalities as were requisite to ensure the concurrent and hearty action of numbers, and to clothe with imposing sanction a state of war already existing in reality, though yet unproclaimed.

The sentiment in Peloponnesus at this moment was not the fear of Athens, but the hatred of Athens,—and the confident hope of subduing her. And indeed such confidence was justified by plausible grounds. Men might well think that the Athenians could never endure the entire devastation of their highly cultivated soil,—or at least that they would certainly come forth to fight for it in the field, which was all that the Peloponnesians desired. Nothing except the unparalleled ascendancy and unshaken resolution of Periklês induced the Athenians to persevere in a scheme of patient defence, and to trust to that naval superiority which the enemies of Athens, save and except the judicious Archidamus, had not yet learned fully to appreciate. Moreover the confident hopes of the Peloponnesians were materially strengthened by the widespread sympathy in favour of their cause, proclaiming as it did the intended liberation of Greece from a despot city.³

¹ Thucyd. i. 33-36.

² Thucyd. i. 40, 41.

³ Thucyd. ii. 8.

To Athens, on the other hand, the coming war presented itself in a very different aspect; holding out nothing less than the certainty of prodigious loss and privation—even granting that at this heavy cost, her independence and union at home, and her empire abroad, could be upheld. By Periklês, and by the more long-sighted Athenians, the chance of unavoidable war was foreseen even before the Korkyræan dispute.¹ But Periklês was only the first citizen in a democracy, esteemed, trusted, and listened to, more than any one else, by the body of citizens, but warmly opposed in most of his measures, under the free speech and latitude of individual action which reigned at Athens,—and even bitterly hated by many active political opponents. The formal determination of the Lacedæmonians, to declare war, must of course have been made known at Athens, by those Athenian envoys who had entered an unavailing protest against it in the Spartan assembly. No steps were taken by Sparta to carry this determination into effect until after the congress of allies and their pronounced confirmatory vote. Nor did the Spartans even then send any herald, or make any formal declaration. They despatched various propositions to Athens, not at all with a view of trying to obtain satisfaction, or of providing some escape from the probability of war; but with the contrary purpose—of multiplying demands, and enlarging the grounds of quarrel.² Meanwhile the deputies, retiring home from the congress to their respective cities, carried with them the general resolution for immediate warlike preparations to be made with as little delay as possible.³

The first requisition addressed by the Lacedæmonians to Athens was a political manœuvre aimed at Periklês, their chief opponent in that city. His mother Agaristê belonged to the great family of the Alkmæônids, who were supposed to be under an inexpiable hereditary taint, in consequence of the sacrilege committed by their ancestor

¹ Thucyd. i. 45; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 8.

² Thucyd. i. 126. ἐν τούτῳ δὲ ἀπεσβεθόντο τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐγκλήματα ποιούμε-

νοι, ὅπως σφίσις ᾖτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἴη ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν, ἢ μὴ τι ἐσακρούωσι.

³ Thucyd. i. 125.

Megaklês nearly two centuries before, in the slaughter of the Kylonian suppliants near the altar of the Venerable Goddesses.¹ Ancient as this transaction was, it still had sufficient hold on the mind of the Athenians to serve as the basis of a political manœuvre. About seventy-seven years before, shortly after the expulsion of Hippias from Athens, it had been so employed by the Spartan king Kleomenês, who at that time exacted from the Athenians a clearance of the ancient sacrilege, to be effected by the banishment of Kleisthenês (the founder of the democracy) and his chief partisans. This demand, addressed by Kleomenês to the Athenians at the instance of Isagoras the rival of Kleisthenês,² had been then obeyed, and had served well the purposes of those who sent it. A similar blow was now aimed by the Lacedæmonians at Periklês (the grand-nephew of Kleisthenês), and doubtless at the instance of his political enemies. Religion required, it was pretended, that "the abomination of the goddess should be driven out."³ If the Athenians complied with this demand, they would deprive themselves, at this critical moment, of their ablest leader. But the Lacedæmonians, not expecting compliance, reckoned at all events upon discrediting Periklês with the people, as being partly the cause of the war through family taint of impiety⁴—and this impression would doubtless be loudly proclaimed by his political opponents in the assembly.

The influence of Periklês with the Athenian public had become greater and greater as their political experience of him was prolonged. But the bitterness of his enemies appears to have increased along with it. Not long before this period, he had been indirectly assailed through the medium of accusations against three different persons, all more or less intimate with him—his mistress Aspasia, the philosopher Anaxagoras, and the sculptor Pheidias.

We cannot make out either the exact date, or the exact facts of either of these accusations. Aspasia, daughter of Axiochus, was a native of

Requisitions addressed by Sparta to Athens—demand for the expulsion of the Alkmeonidæ as impious—aimed at Periklês.

Position of Periklês at Athens: bitter hostility of his political opponents: attacks made upon him. Prosecution of Aspasia. Her character and accomplishments.

¹ See the account of the Kylonian troubles, and the sacrilege which followed, in this History, ch. x.

² See Herodot. v. 70: compare

xi. 131; Thucyd. i. 126; and ch. xxxi. of this History.

³ Thucyd. i. 126. ἐπέλεσον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους τὸ ἄγος ἐλάττωσαι τῆς θεοῦ.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 127.

Miletus, beautiful, well-educated, and aspiring. She resided at Athens, and is affirmed (though upon very doubtful evidence) to have kept slave-girls to be let out as courtesans. Whatever may be the case with this report, which is most probably one of the scandals engendered by political animosity against Periklès,¹ it is certain that so remark-

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 24. Respecting Aspasia, see Plato, Menexenus, c. 3, 4; Xenophon, Memorab. ii. 6, 36; Harpokration, v. Ἀσπασία. Aspasia was doubtless no uncommon name among Grecian women: we know of one Phokæan girl who bore it, the mistress of Cyrus the younger (Plutarch, Artaxer. c. 26). The story about Aspasia having kept slave-girls for hire, is stated by both Plutarch and Athenæus (xiii. p. 570): but we may reasonably doubt whether there is any better evidence for it than that which is actually cited by the latter—the passage in Aristophanès, Acharn. 497-505:—

Κάθ' οἱ Μεγαρήϊς ὀδύνας πεφουσιγ-
γυμένοι

Ἄντεξέκλησαν Ἀσπασίας πόρνας
δύο ἢ πόρνας δύο.

Athenæus reads πόρνας, but the reading πόρνα δύο appears in the received text of Aristophanès. Critics differ whether Ἀσπασίας is the genitive case singular of Ἀσπασία, or the accusative plural of the adjective ἀσπίσιος. I believe that it is the latter; but intended as a play on the word, capable of being understood either as a substantive or as an adjective—ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο ἢ Ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο. There is a similar play on the word, in a line of Kratinus, quoted by Plutarch, Periklès, c. 24.

At the time, if ever, when this theft of the Megarian youth took place, Aspasia must have been the beloved mistress and companion of Periklès; and it is inconceivable that she should have kept

slave-girls for hire *then*, whatever she may have done before.

That reading and construction of the verse above cited, which I think the less probable of the two, has been applied by the commentators of Thucydidès to explain a line of his history, and applied in a manner which I am persuaded is erroneous. When the Lacedæmonians desired the Athenians to repeal the decree excluding the Megarians from their ports, the Athenians refused, alleging that the Megarians had appropriated some lands which were disputed between the two countries, and some which were even sacred property—and also that “*they had received runaway slaves from Athens*”—καὶ ἀνδραπόδων ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἀφισταμένων (i. 139). The Scholiast gives a perfectly just explanation of these last words—ὡς ἔτι δούλους αὐτῶν ἀποφεύγοντας ἐδέχοντο. But Wasse puts a note to the passage to this effect—“*Aspasia servos*, v. Athenæum. p. 570; Aristoph. Acharn. 525, et Schol.” This note of Wasse is adopted and transcribed by the three best and most recent commentators on Thucydidès—Poppo, Gøller, and Dr. Arnold. Yet with all respect to their united authority, the supposition is neither natural as applied to the words, nor admissible as regards the matter of fact. Ἀνδράποδα ἀφιστάμενα mean naturally (not *Aspasia servos*, or more properly *servas*, for the very gender ought to have made Wasse suspect the correctness of his interpretation—but) the runaway slaves of proprietors gen-

able were her own fascinations, her accomplishments, and her powers not merely of conversation, but even of oratory and criticism,—that the most distinguished Athenians of all ages and characters, Sokratês among the number, visited her, and several of them took their wives along with them to hear her also. The free citizen women of Athens lived in strict and almost oriental recluseness, as well after being married as when single. Everything which concerned their lives, their happiness, or their rights, was determined or managed for them by male relatives: and they seem to have been destitute of all mental culture and accomplishments. Their society presented no charm nor interest, which men accordingly sought for in the company of a class of women called Hetæræ or Courtezans, literally Female Companions, who lived a free life, managed their own affairs, and supported themselves by their powers of pleasing. These women were numerous, and were doubtless of every variety of personal character. The most distinguished and superior among them, such as Aspasia and Theodotê,¹ appear to have been the only women in Greece,

erally in Attica; of whom the Athenians lost so prodigious a number after the Lacedæmonian garrison was established at Dekeleia (Thucyd. vii. 28: compare i. 142; and iv. 118, about the ἀπρόμοτοι). Periklês might fairly set forth the reception of such runaway slaves as matter of complaint against the Megarians, and the Athenian public assembly would feel it so likewise: moreover the Megarians are charged not with having *stolen away* the slaves, but with *harbouring* them (ὑποδοχίζειν). But to suppose that Periklês, in defending the decree of exclusion against the Megarians, would rest the defence on the ground that some Megarian youth had run away with two girls of the *cortège* of Aspasia, argues a strange conception both of him and of the people. If such an incident ever really happened, or was even supposed to have happened, we may be sure

that it would be cited by his opponents, as a means of bringing contempt upon the real accusation against the Megarians—the purpose for which Aristophanês produces it. This is one of the many errors in respect to Grecian history arising from the practice of construing passages of comedy as if they were serious and literal facts.

¹ The visit of Sokratês with some of his friends to Theodotê, his dialogue with her, and the description of her manner of living, are among the most curious remnants of Grecian antiquity, or a side very imperfectly known to us (Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 11).

Compare the citations from Eubulus and Antiphanês, the comic writers, apud Athenæum, xiii. p. 571, illustrating the differences of character and behaviour between some of these Hetæræ and others—and Athenæ. xiii. p. 589.

except the Spartan, who either inspired strong passion or exercised mental ascendancy.

Periklês had been determined in his choice of a wife by those family considerations which were held almost obligatory at Athens, and had married a woman very nearly related to him, by whom he had two sons, Xanthippus and Paralus. But the marriage having never been comfortable, was afterwards dissolved by mutual consent, according to that full liberty of divorce which the Attic law permitted. Periklês concurred with his wife's male relations (who formed her legal guardians) in giving her away to another husband.¹ He then took Aspasia to live with him, had a son by her who bore his name, and continued ever afterwards on terms of the greatest intimacy and affection with her. Without adopting those exaggerations which represent Aspasia as having communicated to Periklês his distinguished eloquence, or even as having herself composed orations for public delivery, we may reasonably believe her to have been qualified to take interest and share in that literary and philosophical society which frequented the house of Periklês, and which his unprincipled son Xanthippus,—disgusted with his father's regular expenditure, as withholding from him the means of supporting an extravagant establishment—reported abroad with exaggerated calumnies, and turned into derision. It was from that worthless young man, who died of the Athenian epidemic during the lifetime of Periklês, that his political enemies and the comic writers of the day obtained the pretended revelations, which served them as matter for scandalous libel on the privacy of this distinguished man.²

While the comic writers attacked Periklês himself for alleged intrigues with different women, they treated the name of Aspasia as public property without any mercy or reserve: she was the Omphalê, the Deianeira, or the Hêrê, to this great Hêraklês or Zeus of Athens. At length one of these comic writers, Hermippus, not contented with scenic attacks, indicted her before the dikastery for impiety, as participant in the philosophical discussions held,

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 24. Εἶτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὕτως αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην μὲν ἐτέρῳ βουλευμέ-

νην συνεξέδωκεν, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀσπασίαν λαβῶν ἑσπερῆς διαφερόντως.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 13-36.

and the opinions professed, among the society of Periklês, by Anaxagoras and others. Against Anaxagoras himself, too, a similar indictment is said to have been preferred, either by Kleon or by Thucydidês son of Melesias, under a general resolution recently passed in the public assembly at the instance of Diopeithês. And such was the sensitive antipathy of the Athenian public, shown afterwards fatally in the case of Sokratês, and embittered in this instance by all the artifices of political faction, against philosophers whose opinions conflicted with the received religious dogmas—that Periklês did not dare to place Anaxagoras on his trial. The latter retired from Athens, and a sentence of banishment was passed against him in his absence.¹ But Periklês himself defended Aspasia before the dikastery. In fact the indictment was as much against him as against her: one thing alleged against her (and also against Pheidias) was, the reception of free women to facilitate the intrigues of Periklês. He defended her successfully and procured a verdict of acquittal: but we are not surprised to hear that his speech was marked by the strongest personal emotions and even by tears.² The dikasts were accustomed to such appeals to their sympathies, sometimes even to extravagant excess, from ordinary accused persons. In Periklês, however, so manifest an outburst of emotion stands out as something quite unparalleled: for constant selfmastery was one of the most prominent features in his character.³ And we shall find him, near the close of his political life, when he had become for the moment unpopular with the Athenian people, distracted as they were at the moment with the terrible sufferings of the pestilence,—bearing up against their unmerited anger not merely with dignity, but with a pride of conscious innocence and desert which rises almost into defiance; insomuch that the rhetor Dionysius, who criticises the speech of Periklês as if it were simply the composition of Thucydidês,

Prosecution of Anaxagoras the philosopher as well as of Aspasia—Anaxagoras retires from Athens—Periklês defends Aspasia before the dikastery, and obtains her acquittal.

¹ This seems the more probable story; but there are differences of statement, and uncertainties upon many points: compare Plutarch, Periklês, c. 16-32; Plutarch, Ni-

kias, c. 23; Diogen. Laërt. ii. 12, 13. See also Schaubach, Fragment. Anaxagoræ, p. 47-52.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32.

³ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 7, 36-39.

censures that historian for having violated dramatic propriety by a display of insolence where humility would have been becoming.¹

It appears also, as far as we can judge amidst very imperfect data, that the trial of the great sculptor Pheidias, for alleged embezzlement in the contract for his celebrated gold and ivory statue of Athênê,² took place nearly at this period. That statue had been finished and dedicated in the Parthenon in 437 B.C., since which period Pheidias had been engaged at Olympia in his last and great masterpiece, the colossal statue of the Olympian Zeus. On his return to Athens from the execution of this work, about 433 or 432 B.C., the accusation of embezzlement was instituted against him by the political enemies of Periklês.³ A slave of Pheidias, named Menon, planted himself as a suppliant at the altar, professing to be cognizant of certain facts which proved that his master had committed peculation. Motion was made to receive his depositions and to ensure to his person the protection of the people; upon which he revealed various statements so greatly impeaching the pecuniary probity of Pheidias, that the latter was put in prison, awaiting the day for his trial before the dikastery. The gold employed and charged for in the statue, however, was all capable of being taken off and weighed, so as to verify its accuracy, which Periklês dared the accusers to do. Besides the charge of embezzlement, there were other circumstances which rendered Pheidias unpopular. It had been discovered that, in the reliefs on the frieze of the Parthenon, he had introduced the portraits of himself and Periklês in conspicuous positions. It seems that Pheidias died in prison before the day of trial; and some even said that he had been poisoned by the enemies of Periklês, in order that the suspi-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 60, 61: compare also his striking expressions, c. 65; Dionys. Halikarn. De Thucydid. Judic. c. 44, p. 924.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31. Φειδίας—ἐργόλαβος τοῦ ἀγάλματος.

This tale, about protecting Pheidias under the charge of embezzlement, was the story most widely

in circulation against Periklês—ἡ χειρίστη αἰτία πασῶν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας (Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31).

³ See the Dissertation of O. Müller (De Phidie Vitâ, c. 17, p. 35), who lays out the facts in the order in which I have given them.

cions against the latter, who was the real object of attack, might be aggravated. It is said also that Drakontidês proposed and carried a decree in the public assembly, that Periklês should be called on to give an account of the money which he had expended, and that the dikasts, before whom the account was rendered, should give their suffrage in the most solemn manner from the altar. This latter provision was modified by Agnon, who, while proposing that the dikasts should be 1500 in number, retained the vote by pebbles in the urn according to ordinary custom.¹

If Periklês was ever tried on such a charge, there can be no doubt that he was honourably acquitted: for the language of Thucydidês respecting his pecuniary probity is such as could not have been employed if a verdict of guilty on a charge of speculation had been publicly pronounced. But we cannot be certain that he ever was tried. Indeed another accusation urged by his enemies, and even by Aristophanês in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, implies that no trial took place: for it was alleged that Periklês, in order to escape this danger, "blew up the Peloponnesian war," and involved his country in such confusion and peril as made his own aid and guidance indispensably necessary to her; especially, that he passed the decree against the Megarians by which the war was really brought on.² We know enough, however,

Probability that Periklês was never even tried for speculation, certainly that he was never found guilty of it.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, e. 13-32.

² Aristophan. Pac. 587-603: compare Acharn. 512; Ephorus ap. Diodor. xii. 38-40; and the Scholia on the two passages of Aristophanês; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 32.

Diodorus (as well as Plutarch, Alkibiad. c. 7) relates another tale, that Alkibiadês once approached Periklês when he was in evident low spirits and embarrassment, and asked him the reason: Periklês told him that the time was near at hand for rendering his accounts, and that he was considering how this could be done: upon which Alkibiadês advised him to consider rather, how he could evade doing it. The result of this advice was that Periklês plunged Athens

into the Peloponnesian war: compare Aristophan. Nub. 855, with the Scholia—and Ephorus, Fragn. 118, 119, ed. Marx, with the notes of Marx.

It is probable enough that Ephorus copied the story which ascribes the Peloponnesian war to the accusations against Pheidias and Periklês, from Aristophanês or other comic writers of the time. But it deserves remark that even Aristophanês is not to be considered as certifying it. For if we consult the passage above referred to in his comedy *Pax*, we shall find that, first, Hermês tells the story about Pheidias, Periklês, and the Peloponnesian war; upon which both Trygæus, and the Chorus, remark

to be certain that such a supposition is altogether inadmissible. The enemies of Periklēs were far too eager, and too expert in Athenian political warfare, to have let him escape by such a stratagem. Moreover, we learn from the assurance of Thucydidēs that the war depended upon far deeper causes—that the Megarian decree was in no way the real cause of it—that it was not Periklēs, but the Peloponnesians, who brought it on, by the blow struck at Potidæa.

All that we can make out, amidst these uncertified allegations, is, that in the year or two immediately preceding the Peloponnesian war, Periklēs was hard-pressed by the accusations of political enemies—perhaps even in his own person, but certainly in the persons of those who were most in his confidence and affection.¹ And it was in this turn of his political position, that the Lacedæmonians sent to Athens the above-mentioned requisition, that the ancient Kylonian sacrilege might be at length cleared out; in other words, that Periklēs and his family might be banished. Doubtless his enemies, as well as the partisans of Lacedæmon at Athens, would strenuously support this proposition. And the party of Lacedæmon at Athens was always strong, even during the middle of the war:—to act as proxenus to the Lacedæmonians was accounted an honour even by the greatest Athenian families.² On this occasion, however,

that *they never heard a word of it before*: that it is quite *new* to them.

Tryg. Ταῦτα τοίνυν, μὰ τὸν Ἀπόλλω,
 ἴώ 'πεπύσμη οὐδενός,
 Οὐδ' ἔσπας αὐτῆ (Εἰρήνη)
 προσήκοι Φειδίτας ἄκηχότη.
 Chorus. Οὐδ' ἔγωγε, πλὴν γε νοῦι.

If Aristophanēs had stated the story ever so plainly, his authority could only have been taken as proving that it was a part of the talk of the time: but the lines just cited make him as much a contradicting as an affirming witness.

¹ It would appear that not only Aspasia and Anaxagoras, but also the musician and philosopher Da-

mon, the personal friend and instructor of Periklēs, must have been banished at a time when Periklēs was old—perhaps somewhere near about this time. The passage in Plato, Alkipladēs, i. c. 30, p. 118, proves that Damon was in Athens and intimate with Periklēs when the latter was of considerable age—καὶ νῦν ἔτι τηλικούτος ὢν Δάμωνι σύνεστιν αὐτοῦ τούτου ἕνεκα.

Damon is said to have been ostracised—perhaps he was tried and condemned to banishment: for the two are sometimes confounded.

² See Thucyd. v. 43; vi. 50.

the manœuvre did not succeed, nor did the Athenians listen to the requisition for banishing the sacrilegious Alkmæônids. On the contrary, they replied that the Spartans too had an account of sacrilege to clear off; for they had violated the sanctuary of Poseidon at Cape Tænarus, in dragging from it some helot suppliants to be put to death—and the sanctuary of Athênê Chalkiœkus at Sparta, in blocking up and starving to death the guilty regent Pausanias. To require that Laconia might be cleared of these two acts of sacrilege—was the only answer which the Athenians made to the demand sent for the banishment of Periklês.¹ Probably the actual effect of that demand was, to strengthen him in the public esteem:² very different from the effect of the same manœuvre when practised before by Kleomenês against Kleisthenês.

Counter-requisition sent by the Athenians to Sparta for expiation of sacrilege.

Other Spartan envoys shortly afterwards arrived with fresh demands. The Athenians were now required—1. To withdraw their troops from Potidæa. 2. To replace Ægina in its autonomy. 3. To repeal the decree of exclusion against the Megarians.

Fresh requisitions sent from Sparta to Athens—to withdraw the troops from Potidæa—to leave Ægina free—to re-admit the Megarians to Athenian harbours.

It was upon the latter that the greatest stress was laid; an intimation being held out that war might be avoided if such repeal were granted. We see plainly from this proceeding that the Lacedæmonians acted in concert with the anti-Periklêan leaders at Athens. To Sparta and her confederacy the decree against the Megarians was of less importance than the rescue of the Corinthian troops now blocked up in Potidæa. But on the other hand, the party opposed to Periklês would have much better chance of getting a vote of the assembly against him on the subject of the Megarians: and his advantage, if gained, would serve to enfeeble his influence generally. No concession was obtained however on either of the three points: even in respect to Megara, the decree of exclusion was vindicated and upheld against all the force of opposition. At length the Lacedæmonians—who had already resolved upon war and had sent these envoys in mere compliance with the exigences of ordinary practice, not with any idea of bringing about an accommodation—sent a third

¹ Thucyd. i. 128, 135, 139.

² Plutarch, Perikles. c. 33.

batch of envoys with a proposition which at least had the merit of disclosing their real purpose without disguise. Rhamphias and two other Spartans announced to the Athenians the simple injunction: "The Lacedæmonians wish the peace to stand; and it *may* stand, if you will leave the Greeks autonomous." Upon this demand, so very different from the preceding, the Athenians resolved to hold a fresh assembly on the subject of war or peace, to open the whole question anew for discussion, and to determine once for all on a peremptory answer.¹

The last demands presented on the part of Sparta, which went to nothing less than the entire extinction of the Athenian empire—combined with the character, alike wavering and insincere, of the demands previously made, and with the knowledge that the Spartan confederacy had pronounced peremptorily in favour of war—seemed likely to produce unanimity at Athens, and to bring together this important assembly under the universal conviction that war was inevitable. Such however was not the fact. The reluctance to go to war was sincere amidst the large majority of the assembly: while among a considerable portion of them it was so preponderant, that they even now reverted to the opening which the Lacedæmonians had before held out about the anti-Megarian decree, as if that were the chief cause of war. There was much difference of opinion among the speakers, several of whom insisted upon the repeal of this decree, treating it as a matter far too insignificant to go to war about, and denouncing the obstinacy of Periklês for refusing to concede such a trifle.² Against this opinion Periklês entered his protest, in an harangue decisive and encouraging, which Dionysius of Halikarnassus ranks among the best speeches in Thucydidês. The latter historian may probably himself have heard the original speech.

¹ Thucyd. i. 139. It rather appears, from the words of Thucydidês, that these various demands of the Lacedæmonians were made by one embassy, joined by new members arriving with fresh instructions, but remaining during a

month or six weeks between January and March 431 B.C. installed in the house of the proxenus of Sparta at Athens: compare Xenophon; Hellenic. v. 4, 22.

² Thucyd. i. 139; Plutarch Periklês, c. 31.

“I continue, Athenians, to adhere to the same conviction, that we must not yield to the Peloponnesians—though I know that men are in one mood, when they sanction the resolution to go to war, and in another, when actually in the contest—their judgements then depending upon the turn of events. I have only to repeat now what I have said on former occasions—and I adjure you who follow my views to adhere to what we jointly resolve, though the result should be partially unfavourable; or else not to take credit for wisdom in the event of success.¹ For it is very possible that the contingencies of events may depart more from all reasonable track than the counsels of man: such are the unexpected turns which we familiarly impute to Fortune. The Lacedæmonians have before now manifested their hostile aims against us, but on this last occasion more than ever. While the truce prescribes that we are to give and receive amicable satisfaction for our differences, and each to retain what we possess—they not only have not asked for such satisfaction, but repudiate it when tendered. They choose to settle complaints by war and not by discussion: they have got beyond the tone of complaint, and are here already with that of command. For they enjoin us to withdraw from Potidæa, to leave Ægina free, and to rescind the decree against the Megarians: nay, these last envoys are even come to proclaim to us, that we must leave all the Greeks free. Now let none of you believe, that we shall be going to war about a trifle, if we refuse to rescind the Megarian decree—which they chiefly put forward, as if its repeal would avert the war. Let none of you take blame to yourselves as if we had gone to war about a small matter. For this small matter contains in itself the whole test and trial of your mettle: if ye yield it, ye will presently have some other

Periklēs strenuously urges the Athenians not to yield.

¹ Thucyd. i. 140. ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς συμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἤσσοι, ἀμολῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διαβολὰς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, διόπερ καὶ τῆι τόχῃ, ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον, συμβῆι, εἰσώχμεν αἰτιᾶσθαι. I could have wished in the translation to preserve the play upon the words ἀμολῶς χωρῆσαι which Thucydides introduces into this sentence, and

which seems to have been agreeable to his taste. Ἀμολῶς when referred to συμφορὰς is used in a passive sense by no means common—“in a manner which cannot be learned, departing from all reasonable calculation.” Ἀμολῶς when referred to διαβολὰς bears its usual meaning—“ignorant, deficient in learning or in reason.”

greater exaction put upon you, like men who have already truckled on one point from fear: whereas if ye hold out stoutly, ye will make it clear to them that they must deal with you more upon a footing of equality."¹

Periklēs then examined the relative strength of parties and the chances of war. The Peloponnesians were a self-working population, with few slaves, and without wealth, either private or public: they had no means of carrying on distant or long-continued war. They were ready to expose their persons, but not at all ready to contribute from their very narrow means.² In a border-war, or a single land-battle, they were invincible, but for systematic warfare against a power like Athens, they had neither competent headship, nor habits of concert and punctuality, nor money to profit by opportunities, always rare and accidental, for successful attack. They might perhaps establish a fortified post in Attica, but it would do little serious mischief; while at sea, their inferiority and helplessness would be complete, and the irresistible Athenian navy would take care to keep it so. Nor would they be able to reckon on tempting away the able foreign seamen from Athenian ships by means of funds borrowed from Olympia or Delphi.³ For besides that the mariners of the dependent islands would find themselves losers even by accepting a higher pay, with the certainty of Athenian vengeance afterwards—Athens herself would suffice to man her fleet in case of need, with her own citizens and metics: she had within her own walls steersmen and mariners better, as well as more numerous, than all Greece besides. There was but one side on which Athens

¹ Thucyd. i. 140.

² Thucyd. i. 141. αὐτοῦργοί τε γάρ εἰσι Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ οὔτε ἰδίᾳ οὔτε ἐν κοινῷ χρήματά ἐστιν αὐτοῖς· ἔπειτα χρόνιων πολέμων καὶ διαπονητῶν ἄπειροι, διὰ τὸ βραχέως αὐτοὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλους ὑπὸ πείνης ἐπιφέρειν.

³ Thucyd. i. 143. εἴτε καὶ κινήσαντες τῶν Ὀλυμπιάσιν ἢ Δελφοῖς χρημάτων μίσθῳ μείζονι περιῶντο ἡμῶν ὑπολαβεῖν τοὺς ξέλους τῶν ναυτῶν, μὴ ὄντων μὲν ἡμῶν ἀντιπάλων, ἐσβάντων αὐτῶν τε καὶ τῶν μετοίκων, δεινό, ἂν ἦν· νῦν δὲ τοῦδε τε ὑπάρχει,

καὶ, ὅπερ κράτιστον, κυβερνήτας ἔχομεν πολίτας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ὑπηρεσίαν πλείους καὶ ἀμείνους ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ἄλλη Ἑλλάς.

This is in reply to those hopes which we know to have been conceived by the Peloponnesian leaders, and upon which the Corinthian speaker in the Peloponnesian congress had dwelt (i. 121). Doubtless Periklēs would be informed of the tenor of all these public demonstrations at Sparta.

was vulnerable: Attica unfortunately was not an island—it was exposed to invasion and ravage. To this the Athenians must submit, without committing the imprudence of engaging a land-battle to avert it. They had abundant lands out of Attica, insular as well as continental, to supply their wants, while they could in their turn, by means of their navy, ravage the Peloponnesian territories, whose inhabitants had no subsidiary lands to recur to.¹

“Mourn not for the loss of land and houses (continued the orator). Reserve your mourning for men: houses and land acquire not men, but men acquire them.² Nay, if I thought I could prevail upon you, I would exhort you to march out and ravage them yourselves, and thus show to the Peloponnesians that for them at least ye will not truckle. And I could exhibit many farther grounds for confidently anticipating success, if ye will only be willing not to aim at increased dominion when we are in the midst of war, and not to take upon yourselves new self-imposed risks; for I have ever been more afraid of our own blunders than of the plans of our enemy.³ But these are matters for future discussion, when we come to actual operations: for the present, let us dismiss these envoys with the answer:—That we will permit the Megarians to use our markets and harbours, if the Lacedæmonians on their side will discontinue their (xenêlasy or) summary expulsions of ourselves and our allies from their own territory—for there is nothing in the truce to prevent either one or the other: That we will leave the Grecian cities autonomous, if we *had* them as autonomous at the time when the truce was made,—and as soon as the Lacedæmonians shall grant to *their* allied cities autonomy such as each of them shall freely choose, not such as is convenient to Sparta: That while we are ready to give satisfaction according to the truce, we will not begin war, but will repel those who do begin it. Such is the reply at once just and suitable to the dignity of this city. We ought

¹ Thucyd. i. 141, 142, 143.

² Thucyd. i. 143. τὴν τε δόρυρ-
σιν, μὴ οἰκιῶν καὶ γῆς ποιεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ
τῶν σωμάτων· οὐ γὰρ τὰδε τοὺς ἀν-
θρώπους, ἀλλ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι ταῦτα κτῶνται.

³ Thucyd. i. 144. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ
ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιεῖσεσθαι,

ἢν ἐθέλοιτε ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπικτᾶσθαι
ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καὶ κινδύλους οὐ-
χαιρέτους μὴ προστιθεσθαι· μᾶλλον
γὰρ πεφοβίμαι τὰς οἰκίας ἡμῶν
ἄμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντιῶν δια-
νοίας.

to make up our minds that war is inevitable: the more cheerfully we accept it, the less vehement shall we find our enemies in their attack: and where the danger is greatest, there also is the final honour greatest, both for a state and for a private citizen. Assuredly our fathers, when they bore up against the Persians—having no such means as we possess to start from, and even compelled to abandon all that they did possess—both repelled the invader and brought matters forward to our actual pitch, more by advised operation than by good fortune, and by a daring courage greater than their real power. We ought not to fall short of them: we must keep off our enemies in every way, and leave an unimpaired power to our successors.”¹

These animating encouragements of Periklēs carried with them the majority of the assembly, so that answer was made to the envoys, such as he recommended, on each of the particular points in debate. It was announced to them, moreover, on the general question of peace or war, that the Athenians were prepared to discuss all the grounds of complaint against them, pursuant to the truce, by equal and amicable arbitration—but that they would do nothing under authoritative demand.² With this answer the envoys returned to Sparta, and an end was put to negotiation.

It seems evident, from the account of Thucydidēs, that the Athenian public was not brought to this resolution without much reluctance, and great fear of the consequences, especially destruction of property in Attica; and that a considerable minority took opposition on the Megarian decree—the ground skilfully laid by Sparta for breaking the unanimity of her enemy, and strengthening the party opposed to Periklēs. But we may also decidedly infer from the same historian—especially from the proceedings of Corinth and Sparta as he sets them forth—that Athens could not have avoided the war without such an abnegation both of dignity and power as no nation under any government will

¹ Thucyd. i. 143, 144.

² Thucyd. i. 145. καὶ τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀπεχρίναντο τῇ ἐκείνου γνώμῃ, καθ’ ἕκαστά τε ὡς ἔφρασε,

καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν οὐδὲν κελυεύμενοι ποιήσων, δίκῃ δὲ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἐτοιμοὶ εἶναι διαλύεσθαι περὶ τῶν ἐγκλημάτων ἐπὶ ἴσῃ καὶ ὁμοίᾳ.

ever submit to, and as would even have left her without decent security for her individual rights. To accept the war tendered to her was a matter not merely of prudence but of necessity: the tone of exaction assumed by the Spartan envoys would have rendered concession a mere evidence of weakness and fear. As the account of Thucydidês bears out the judgement of Periklês on this important point,¹ so it also shows us that Athens was not less in the right upon the received principles of international dealing. It was not Athens, (as the Spartans² themselves afterwards came to feel,) but her enemies, who broke the provisions of the truce, by encouraging the revolt of Potidæa, and by promising invasion of Attica: it was not Athens, but her enemies, who after thus breaking the truce, made a string of exorbitant demands, in order to get up as good a case as possible for war.³ The case made out by Periklês, justifying the war on grounds both of right and prudence, is in all its main points borne out by the impartial voice of Thucydidês. And though it is perfectly true, that the ambition of Athens had been great, and the increase of her power marvellous, during the thirty-five years between the repulse of Xerxes and the Thirty years' truce—it is not less true that by that truce she lost very largely, and that she acquired nothing to compensate such loss during the fourteen years between the truce and the Korkyræan alliance. The policy of Periklês had not been one of foreign aggrandisement, or of increasing vexation and encroachment towards other Grecian powers. Even the Korkyræan alliance was noway courted by him, and was in truth accepted with paramount regard to the obligations of the existing truce; while the circumstances, out of

¹ In spite of the contrary view taken by Plutarch, Periklês, c. 31: and in his comparison of Periklês and Fab. Max. c. 3.

² Thucyd. iv. 21. Οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἀθηναῖοι τσαυτὰ εἶπον, νομίζοντες τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐς τὴν πρὶν χρόνον σπονδῶν ἐπιθυμεῖν, σφῶν δὲ ἐναντιουμένῳ κωλύεσθαι, διδομένης δὲ εἰρήνης ἀσμένως δεξιέσθαι τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀποδωσείν.

See also an important passage (vii. 18) about the feelings of the Spartans. The Spartans thought,

says Thucydidês, ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ πολέμῳ (the beginning of the Peloponnesian war) σφίτερον τὸ παρανόμημα μᾶλλον γενέσθαι, ὅτι τε ἐς Πλάταιαν ἦλθον Θηβαῖοι ἐν σπονδαῖς, καὶ εἰρημένῳ ἐν ταῖς πρότερον συνθήκαις ἔπλα μὴ ἐπιφέρειν ἢν δίκας θέλωσι διδόναι, αὐτοὶ οὐχ ὑπάρχουσιν ἐς δίκας προκλιουμένῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εἰκότως δυστυχεῖν τε ἐνόμιζον, &c.

³ Thucyd. i. 126. ὅπως σφίσις ὅτι μεγίστη πρόφασις εἶη τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

which that alliance grew, testify a more forward ambition on the part of Corinth than on that of Athens, to appropriate to herself the Korkyræan naval force. It is common to ascribe the Peloponnesian war to the ambition of Athens, but this is a partial view of the case. The aggressive sentiment, partly fear, partly hatred, was on the side of the Peloponnesians, who were not ignorant that Athens desired the continuance of peace, but were resolved not to let her stand as she was at the conclusion of the Thirty years' truce. It was their purpose to attack her and break down her empire, as dangerous, wrongful, and anti-Hellenic. The war was thus partly a contest of principle, involving the popular proclamation of the right of every Grecian state to autonomy, against Athens: partly a contest of power, wherein Spartan and Corinthian ambition was not less conspicuous, and far more aggressive in the beginning, than Athenian.

Conformably to what is here said, the first blow of the war was struck, not by Athens, but against her. Equivocal period—war not yet proclaimed—first blow struck, not by Athens, but by her enemies. After the decisive answer given to the Spartan envoys, taken in conjunction with the previous proceedings, and the preparations actually going on, among the Peloponnesian confederacy—the truce could hardly be said to be still in force, though there was no formal proclamation of rupture. A few weeks passed in restricted and mistrustful intercourse;¹ though individuals who passed the borders did not yet think it necessary to take a herald with them, as in time of actual war. Had the excess of ambition been on the side of Athens compared with her enemies, this was the time for her to strike the first blow, carrying with it of course great probability of success, before their preparations were completed. But she remained strictly within the limits of the truce, while the disastrous series of mutual aggressions, destined to tear in pieces the entrails of Hellas, was opened by her enemy and her neighbour.

The little town of Plateæ, still hallowed by the memorable victory over the Persians as well as by the tutelary consecration received from Pausanias, was the scene of this unforeseen enterprise. It stood in Bœotia, immediately north of Kithærôn; with the borders of Attica on one side, and the Theban territory (from which it was separ-

Open violation of the truce by the Thebans—they surprise Plateæ in the night.

¹ Thucyd. i. 146. ἐπεμύχουοντο δ' ἕμῳ ἐν αὐταῖς καὶ πρὸ ἀλλήλων:

ated by the river Asôpus) on the other: the distance between Plataea and Thebes being about seventy stadia, or eight miles. Though Bœotian by descent, the Plataeans were completely separated from the Bœotian league, and in hearty alliance (as well as qualified communion of civil rights) with the Athenians, who had protected them against the bitter enmity of Thebes, for a period of now nearly three generations. But in spite of this long prescription, the Thebans, as chiefs of the Bœotian league, still felt themselves wronged by the separation of Plataea. An oligarchical faction of wealthy Plataeans espoused their cause,¹ with a view of subverting the democratical government of the town—of destroying its leaders, their political rivals—and of establishing an oligarchy with themselves as the chiefs. Naukleidês, and others of this faction, entered into a secret conspiracy with Eurymachus and the oligarchy of Thebes. To both it appeared a tempting prize, since war was close at hand, to take advantage of this ambiguous interval, before watches had been placed and the precautions of a state of war commenced. They resolved to surprise the town of Plataea in the night, during a period of religious festival, in order that the population might be most completely off their guard.² Accordingly on a rainy

n.c. 431. night towards the close of March 431 B.C.,³ a
 March. body of rather more than 300 Theban hoplites, commanded by two of the Bœotarchs, Pythangelus and Diemporus, and including Eurymachus in the ranks, presented themselves at the gate of Plataea during the first sleep of the citizens. Naukleidês and his partisans opened the gate and conducted them to the agora, which they reached and occupied in military order without the least resistance. The best part of the Theban military force was

ἐφοίτων, ἀκηρύκτως μὲν, ἀνυπόπτως δ' οὖν σπονδῶν γὰρ εὐχχυσαι τὰ γιγνόμενα ἦν, καὶ πρόφρασις τοῦ πολεμεῖν.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 2. βουλόμενοι ἰδίας ἕνεκα δυνάμεως ἄνδρας τε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς σφίσιν ὑπεναντίους διασφθεῖραι, καὶ τὴν πόλιν τοῖς Θηβαίοις προσπειλῆσαι: also iii. 65. ἄνδρες οἱ πρώτοι καὶ χροῖμασι καὶ γένει, &c.

² Thucyd. iii. 56.

³ Thucyd. ii. 2. ἅμα ἔρι ἀρχομέ-
 νων—seems to indicate a period

rather before than after the first of April: we may consider the bisection of the Thucydidean year into θέρος and χειμῶν as marked by the equinoxes. His summer and winter are each a half of the year (Thucyd. v. 20), though Poppo erroneously treats the Thucydidean winter as only four months (Poppo, Proleg. i. c. v. p. 72, and ad Thucyd. ii. 2: see F. W. Ullrich, Beiträge zur Erklärung des Thucydides, p. 32, Hamburg, 1846).

intended to arrive at Platæa by break of day, in order to support them.¹

Naukleidês and his friends, following the instincts of political antipathy, were eager to conduct the Thebans to the houses of their opponents the democratical leaders, in order that the latter might be seized or despatched. But to this the Thebans would not consent. Believing themselves now masters of the town, and certain of a large reinforcement at daylight, they thought they could overawe the citizens into an apparently willing acquiescence in their terms, without any actual violence. They wished moreover rather to soften and justify, than to aggravate, the gross public wrong already committed. Accordingly their herald was directed to invite by public proclamation all Platæans who were

The gates of Platæa are opened by an oligarchical party within—a Theban detachment are admitted into the agora at night—at first apparently successful, afterwards overpowered and captured.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 2-5. θέμενοι δὲ ἐς τὴν ἀγορὰν τὰ ἔπλα. . . καὶ ἀνείπεν ὁ κήρυξ, εἴτις βούλεται κατὰ τὰ πάτρια τῶν πάντων Βοιωτῶν ξυμμάχεϊν, τίθεσθαι παρ' αὐτοῦς τὰ ἔπλα.

Dr. Arnold has a note upon this passage, explaining τίθεσθαι or θέσθαι τὰ ἔπλα to mean, "piling the arms," or getting rid of their spears and shields by piling them all in one or more heaps. He says—"The Thebans, therefore, as usual on a halt, proceeded to pile their arms, and by inviting the Platæans to come and pile theirs with them, they meant that they should come in arms from their several houses to join them, and thus naturally pile their spears and shields with those of their friends, to be taken up together with theirs, whenever there should be occasion either to march or to fight." The same explanation of the phrase had before been given by Wesseling and Larcher, ad Herodot. ix. 52; though Bähr on the passage is more satisfactory.

Both Poppe and Gøller also sanc-

tion Dr. Arnold's explanation: yet I cannot but think that it is unsuitable to the passage before us, as well as to several other passages in which τίθεσθαι τὰ ἔπλα occurs: there may be other passages in which it will suit, but as a general explanation it appears to me inadmissible. In most cases the words mean "*armati consistere*"—to ground arms—to maintain rank, resting the spear and shield (see Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 12) upon the ground. In the incident now before us, the Theban hoplites enter Platæa, a strange town, with the population decidedly hostile and likely to be provoked more than ever by this surprise; add to which, that it is pitch dark and a rainy night. Is it likely that the first thing which they do will be to pile their arms? The darkness alone would render it a slow and uncertain operation to resume the arms: so that when the Platæans attacked them, as they did quite suddenly and unexpectedly, and while it was yet dark, the Thebans would have been (upon Dr. Arnold's

willing to return to their ancient sympathies of race and to the Bœotian confederacy, that they should come forth and take station as brethren in the armed ranks of the Thebans. And the Plataeans, suddenly roused from sleep by the astounding news that their great enemy was master of the town, supposed amidst the darkness that the number of assailants was far greater than the reality: so that in spite of their strong attachment to Athens, they thought their case hopeless, and began to open negotiations. But finding out soon, in spite of the darkness, as the discussion proceeded, that the real numbers of the Thebans were not greater than could be dealt with—they speedily took courage and determined to attack them; establishing communication with each other by breaking through the walls of their private houses, in order that they might not be detected in moving about in the streets or ways¹—and

supposition) altogether defenceless and unarmed (see ii. 3. προσέβαλόν τε εὐθύς (οἱ Πλαταιῆς) καὶ ἐς χεῖρας ἤσαν κατὰ τὰχος)—which certainly they were not. Dr. Arnold's explanation may suit the case of the soldier in camp, but certainly not that of the soldier in presence of an enemy, or under circumstances of danger: the difference of the two will be found illustrated in Xenophon, Hellenic. ii. 4, 5, 6.

Nor do the passages referred to by Dr. Arnold himself bear out his interpretation of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ ἔπλα. That interpretation is moreover not conveniently applicable either to Thucyd. vii. 3, or viii. 25—decidedly inapplicable to iv. 68 (ἠγασμένον τὰ ἔπλα), in the description of the night attack on Megara, very analogous to this upon Plataea—and not less decidedly inapplicable to two passages of Xenophon's Anabasis, i. 5, 14; iv. 3, 7.

Schneider, in the Lexicon appended to his edition of Xenophon's Anabasis, has a long but not very distinct article upon τίθεσθαι τὰ ἔπλα.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 3. ἐδόκει οὖν ἐπιχειρητέα εἶναι, καὶ ξυνελέγοντο διορύσσοντες τοὺς κοινούς τοίχους παρ' ἀλλήλους, ἕπως μὴ διὰ τῶν ὁδῶν φανεροὶ ὦσιν ἴοντες, ἀμάξια δὲ ἀνευ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ἐς τὰς ὁδοὺς καθίστασαν, ἔν' ἀντὶ τοίχους ἦ, καὶ τᾶλλα ἐξήρτων, &c.

I may illustrate this by a short extract from the letter of M. Mar-rast, mayor of Paris, to the National Assembly, written during the formidable insurrection of June 25, 1848, in that city, and describing the proceedings of the insurgents: "Dans la plupart des rues longues, étroites, et couvertes de barricades qui vont de l'Hôtel de Ville à la Rue St. Antoine, la garde nationale mobile, et la troupe de ligne, ont dû faire le siège de chaque maison; et ce qui rendait l'œuvre plus périlleuse, c'est que les insurgés avaient établi, de chaque maison à chaque maison, des communications intérieures qui reliaient les maisons entre elles, en sorte qu'ils pouvaient se rendre, comme par une allée couverte, d'un point éloigné jusqu'au centre d'une suite de barricades qui les protégeaient."

forming barricades with waggons across such of these ways as were suitable.

A little before daybreak, when their preparations were fully completed, they sallied forth from their houses to the attack, and immediately came to close quarters with the Thebans. The latter, still fancying themselves masters of the town and relying upon a satisfactory close to the discussions when daylight should arrive, now found themselves surprised in their turn, and under great disadvantages. Having been out all night under a heavy rain—they were enclosed in a town which they did not know, with narrow, crooked, and muddy ways, such as they would have had difficulty in tracking out even by daylight. Nevertheless, on finding themselves suddenly assailed they got as well as they could into close order, and repelled the Plataëans two or three times. The attack was repeated with loud shouts, while the women also screamed, howled, and threw tiles from the flat-roofed houses, until at length the Thebans became dismayed and broken. But flight was not less difficult than resistance; for they could not find their way out of the city, and even the gate by which they entered, the only one open, had been closed by a Plataean citizen who thrust into it the point of a javelin in place of the peg whereby the bar was commonly held fast. Dispersed about the city and pursued by men who knew every inch of the ground, some ran to the top of the wall, and jumped down on the outside, most of them perishing in the attempt—a few others escaped through an unguarded gate, by cutting through the bar with a hatchet which a woman gave to them—while the greater number ran into the open doors of a large barn or building in conjunction with the wall, mistaking these doors for an approach to the town-gate. They were here blocked up without a chance of escape, and the Plataëans at first thought of setting fire to the building. But at length a convention was concluded, whereby they, as well as the other Thebans in the city, agreed to surrender at discretion.¹

(Lettre publiée dans le journal, *Le National*, June 26, 1848.)

A similar establishment of internal communication between adjoining houses in the street, was

one of the most memorable features of the heroic defence of Saragossa against the French, in the Peninsular War.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 3, 4.

Had the reinforcements from Thebes arrived at the expected hour, this disaster would have been averted. But the heavy rain and dark night retarded their whole march, while the river Asôpus was so much swollen as to be with difficulty fordable: so that before they reached the gates of Plataea, their comrades within were either slain or captured. Which fate had befallen them, the Thebans without could not tell: but they immediately resolved to seize what they could find, persons as well as property, in the Plataean territory (no precautions having been taken as yet to guard against the perils of war by keeping within the walls), in order that they might have something to exchange for such Thebans as were prisoners. Before this step could be executed, however, a herald came forth from the town to remonstrate with them upon their unholy proceeding in having so flagrantly violated the truce, and especially to warn them not to do any wrong without the walls. If they retired without inflicting farther mischief, their prisoners within should be given up to them; if otherwise, these prisoners would be slain immediately. A convention having been concluded and sworn to on this basis, the Thebans retired without any active measures.

Large force intended to arrive from Thebes to support the assailants early in the morning—they are delayed by the rain and the swelling of the Asôpus—they commence hostilities against the Plataean persons and property without the walls.

Such at least was the Theban account of what preceded their retirement. But the Plataeans gave a different statement; denying that they had made any categorical promise or sworn any oath—and affirming that they had engaged for nothing except to suspend any decisive step with regard to the prisoners, until discussion had been entered into to see if a satisfactory agreement could be concluded.

As Thucydidês records both of these statements, without intimating to which of the two he himself gave the preference, we may presume that both of them found credence with respectable persons. The Theban story is undoubtedly the most probable: but the Plataeans appear to have violated the understanding, even upon their own construction of it. For no sooner had the Thebans retired, than they (the Plataeans) hastily brought in their citizens and the best of their moveable property within the walls, and then slew all their prisoners forthwith, without even entering

Parley between the Plataeans and the Theban force without—the latter evacuate the territory—the Theban prisoners in Plataea are slain.

into the formalities of negotiation. The prisoners thus put to death, among whom was Eurymachus himself, were 180 in number.¹

On the first entrance of the Theban assailants at night, a messenger had started from Plataea to carry the news to Athens: a second messenger followed him to report the victory and capture of the prisoners, as soon as it had been achieved. The Athenians sent back a herald without delay, enjoining the Plataeans to take no step respecting the prisoners until consultation should be had with Athens. Periklès doubtless feared what turned out to be the fact; for the prisoners had been slain before his messenger could arrive. Apart from the terms of the convention, and looking only to the received practice of ancient warfare, their destruction could not be denounced as unusually cruel, though the Thebans afterwards, when fortune was in their favour, chose to designate it as such.² But impartial contemporaries would notice, and the Athenians in particular would deeply lament, the glaring impolicy of the act. For Thebes, the best thing of all would of course be to get back her captured citizens forthwith: but next to that, the least evil would be, to hear that they had been put to death. In the hands of the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 5, 6; Herodot. vii. 233. Demosthenès (cont. Neæram, c. 25, p. 1379) agrees with Thucydides in the statement that the Plataeans slew their prisoners. From whom Diodorus borrowed his inadmissible story, that the Plataeans gave up their prisoners to the Thebans, I cannot tell (Diodor, xii. 41, 42).

The passage in this Oration against Neæra is also curious, both as it agrees with Thucydides on many points and as it differs from him on several others: in some sentences, even the words agree with Thucydides (ὁ γὰρ Ἀσωπὸς ποταμὸς μέγας ἐρρόη, καὶ διαβῆναι οὐ ῥᾶδιον ἦν, &c.: compare Thucyd. ii. 2); while on other points there is discrepancy. Demosthenès (or the Pseudo-Demosthenès) states that Archidamus king of Sparta

planned the surprise of Plataea—that the Plataeans only discovered, when morning dawned, the small real number of the Thebans in the town—that the larger body of Thebans, when they at last did arrive near Plataea after the great delay in their march, were forced to retire by the numerous force arriving from Athens, and that the Plataeans then destroyed their prisoners in the town. Demosthenès mentions nothing about any convention between the Plataeans and the Thebans without the town, respecting the Theban prisoners within.

On every point on which the narrative of Thucydides differs from that of Demosthenès, the former stands out as the most coherent and credible.

² Thucyd. iii. 66.

Athenians and Plataeans, they would have been the means of obtaining from her much more valuable sacrifices than their lives, considered as a portion of Theban power, were worth: so strong was the feeling of sympathy for imprisoned citizens, several of them men of rank and importance,—as may be seen by the past conduct of Athens after the battle of Korôneia, and by that of Sparta (hereafter to be recounted) after the taking of Sphaktêria. The Plataeans, obeying the simple instinct of wrath and vengeance, threw away this great political advantage, which the more long-sighted Periklês would gladly have turned to account.

At the time when the Athenians sent their herald to Plataea, they also issued orders for seizing all Bœotians who might be found in Attica; while they lost no time in sending forces to provision Plataea and placing it on the footing of a garrison town, removing to Athens the old men and sick, with the women and children. No complaint or discussion respecting the recent surprise, was thought of by either party. It was evident to both that the war was now actually begun—that nothing was to be thought of except the means of carrying it on—and that there could be no farther personal intercourse except under the protection of heralds.¹ The incident at Plataea, striking in all its points, wound up all parties to the full pitch of warlike excitement. A spirit of resolution and enterprise was abroad everywhere, especially among those younger citizens, yet unacquainted with the actual bitterness of war, whom the long truce but just broken had raised up. And the contagion of high-strung feeling spread from the leading combatants into every corner of Greece, manifesting itself partly in multiplied oracles, prophecies, and religious legends adapted to the moment.² A recent earthquake at Delos, too, as well as various other extraordinary physical phenomena, were construed as prognostics of the awful struggle impending—a period fatally marked not less by eclipses, earthquakes, drought, famine, and pestilence, than by the direct calamities of war.³

Grecian feeling, already pre-disposed to the war, was wound up to the highest pitch by the striking incident at Plataea.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 1-6.

² Thucyd. ii. 7, 8. ἡ τε ἀλλήγη Ἑλλὰς πᾶσα μετέωρος ἦν, ἕνυσον-

σῶν τῶν πρώτων πόλεων,

³ Thucyd. i. 23.

An aggression so unwarrantable as the assault on Plataea tended doubtless to strengthen the unanimity of the Athenian assembly, to silence the opponents of Periklês, and to lend additional weight to those frequent exhortations¹ whereby the great statesman was wont to sustain the courage of his countrymen. Intelligence was sent round to forewarn and hearten up the numerous allies of Athens, tributary as well as free. The latter, with the exception of the Thessalians, Akarnanians, and Messenians at Naupaktus, were all insular—Chians, Lesbians, Korkyræans, and Zakynthians. To the island of Kephallenia, the Athenians sent envoys, but it was not actually acquired to their alliance until a few months afterwards.² With the Akarnanians, too, their connection had only been commenced a short time before, seemingly during the preceding summer, arising out of the circumstances of the town of Argos in Amphilochia.

That town, situated on the southern coast of the Ambrakian Gulf, was originally occupied by a portion of the Amphilochi, a non-Hellenic tribe, whose lineage apparently was something intermediate between Akarnanians and Epirots. Some colonists from Ambrakia, having been admitted as co-residents with the Amphilochian inhabitants of this town, presently expelled them, and retained the town with its territory exclusively for themselves. The expelled inhabitants, fraternising with their fellow tribes around as well as with the Akarnanians, looked out for the means of restoration; and in order to obtain it, invited the assistance of Athens. Accordingly the Athenians sent an expedition of thirty triremes under Phormio, who, joining the Amphilochians and Akarnanians, attacked and carried Argos, reduced the Ambrakiots to slavery, and restored the town to the Amphilochians and Akarnanians. It was on this occasion that the alliance of the Akarnanians with Athens was first concluded, and that their personal attachment to the Athenian admiral Phormio commenced.³

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13. ἄπερ καὶ πρότερον, &c. ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ ἄλλα, οἷα περ εἰώθει, Περικλῆς ἐς ἀποδείξιν τοῦ περιέσεσθαι τῷ πολέμῳ.

² Thucyd. ii. 7, 22, 30.

³ Thucyd. ii. 68. The time at which this expedition of Phormio and the capture of Argos happened, is not precisely marked by Thucydides. But his words seem to imply

The numerous subjects of Athens, whose contributions stood embodied in the annual tribute, were distributed all over and around the Ægean, including all the islands north of Krete, with the exception of Melos and Thera.¹ Moreover the elements of force collected in Athens itself were fully worthy of the metropolis of so great an empire. Periklês could make a report to his countrymen of 300 triremes fit for active service; 1200 horsemen and horse-bowmen; 1600 bowmen; and the great force of all, not less than 29,000 hoplites—mostly citizens, but in part also metics. The chosen portion of these hoplites, both as to age and as to equipment, were 13,000 in number; while the remaining 16,000, including the elder and younger citizens and the metics, did garrison duty on the walls of Athens and Peiræus—on the long line of wall which connected Athens both with Peiræus and Phalêrum—and in the various fortified posts both in and out of Attica. In addition to these large military and naval forces, the city possessed in the acropolis an accumulated treasure of coined silver amounting to not less than 6000 talents, or about 1,400,000*l.*, derived from annual laying by of tribute from the allies and perhaps of other revenues besides. The treasure had at one time been as large as 9700 talents, or about 2,230,000*l.*, but the cost of the recent religious and architectural decorations at Athens, as well as the siege of Potidæa, had reduced it to 6000. Moreover the acropolis and the temples throughout the city were rich in votive offerings, deposits, sacred plate, and silver implements for the processions and festivals, &c., to an amount estimated at more than 500 talents, while the great statue of the goddess recently set up by Pheidias in the Parthenon, composed of ivory and gold, included a quantity of the latter metal not less than 40 talents in weight—equal in value to more than 400 talents of silver—and all of it so arranged that it could be taken off from the statue at pleasure. In alluding to these sacred valuables among the resources of

Strength and resources of Athens and her allies—military and naval means—treasure.

that it was before the commencement of the war, as Poppo observes. Phormio was sent to Chalkidikê about October or November 432 B.C. (i. 64): and the expedition against Argos probably occurred between that event and the naval

conflict of Korkyraëans and Athenians against Corinthians with their allies, Ambrakiots included—which conflict had happened in the preceding spring.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 9.

the state, Periklēs spoke of them only as open to be so applied in case of need, with the firm resolution of replacing them during the first season of prosperity, just as the Corinthians had proposed to borrow from Delphi and Olympia. Besides the hoard thus actually in hand, there came in a large annual revenue, amounting under the single head of tribute from the subject allies, to 600 talents, equal to about 138,000*l.*; besides all other items,¹ making up a general total of at least 1000 talents, or about 230,000*l.*

To this formidable catalogue of means for war, were to be added other items not less important, but which did not admit of being weighed and numbered; the unrivalled maritime skill and discipline of the seamen—the democratical sentiment, alike fervent and unanimous, of the general mass of citizens—and the superior development of directing intelligence. And when we consider that the enemy had indeed on his side an irresistible land-force, but scarcely anything else—few ships, no trained seamen, no funds, no powers of combination or headship—we may be satisfied that there were ample materials for an orator like Periklēs to draw an encouraging picture of the future. He could depict Athens as holding Peloponnesus under siege by means of her navy and a chain of insular posts;² and he could guarantee success³ as the sure reward of persevering, orderly, and well-considered exertion, combined with firm endurance under a period of temporary, but unavoidable suffering: and combined too with another condition hardly less difficult for Athenian temper to comply with—abstinence from seductive speculations of distant enterprise, while their force was required by the necessities of war near home.⁴ But such prospects were founded upon a long-sighted calculation, looking beyond immediate loss and therefore ill-calculated to take hold of the mind of an ordinary citizen—or at any rate likely to be overwhelmed for the moment by the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13; Xenophon Anab. vii. 4.

² Thucyd. ii. 7. ὡς βεβαίως περίετην Πελοπόννησον καταπολεμήσοιτες. vi. 40. περίε τήν Πελοπόννησον πολιορκήσοιτες.

³ Thucyd. ii. 45. τοσοῦτον τῷ Περικλείϊ ἐπαρίσσευε τότε ἀπ' ὧν αὐτός

πρόεργον, καί πάντο ἄν βεβαίως περιγενέσθαι τῶν Πελοποννησίων αὐτῶν τῷ πολέμῳ.

⁴ Thucyd. i. 144. ἤν ἐθέλητε ἀρχήν τε μή ἐπιπυλάσθαι ἅμα πολεμοῦντες, καί κινδύνους ἀναιρέτους μή προστίθεσθαι.

pressure of actual hardship. Moreover, the best which Periklês could promise was a successful resistance—the unimpaired maintenance of that great empire to which Athens had become accustomed; a policy purely conservative, without any stimulus from the hope of positive acquisition—and not only without the sympathy of other states, but with feelings of simple acquiescence on the part of most of her allies—of strong hostility everywhere else.

On all these latter points the position of the Peloponnesian alliance was far more encouraging. So powerful a body of confederates had never been got together—not even to resist Xerxes. Not only the entire strength of Peloponnesus (except Argeians and Achæans, both of whom were neutral at first, though the Achæan town of Pellênê joined even at the beginning, and all the rest subsequently) was brought together, but also the Megarians, Bœotians, Phokians, Opuntian Lokrians, Ambrakiots, Leukadians and Anaktorians. Among these, Corinth, Megara, Sikyon, Pellênê, Elis, Ambrakia, and Leukas furnished maritime force, while the Bœotians, Phokians, and Lokrians supplied cavalry. Many of these cities however supplied hoplites besides; but the remainder of the confederates furnished hoplites only. It was upon this latter force, not omitting the powerful Bœotian cavalry, that the main reliance was placed; especially for the first and most important operation of the war—the devastation of Attica. Bound together by the strongest common feeling of active antipathy to Athens, the whole confederacy was full of hope and confidence for this immediate forward march—gratifying at once both to their hatred and to their love of plunder, by the hand of destruction laid upon the richest country in Greece—and presenting a chance even of terminating the war at once, if the pride of the Athenians should be so intolerably stung as to provoke them to come out and fight. Certainty of immediate success, at the first outset—a common purpose to be accomplished and a common enemy to be put down, with favourable sympathies throughout Greece—all these circumstances filled the Peloponnesians with sanguine hopes at the beginning of the war. And the general persuasion was, that Athens,

Position and power of Sparta and the Peloponnesian allies—they are full of hope and confidence of putting down Athens speedily.

even if not reduced to submission by the first invasion, could not possibly hold out more than two or three summers against the repetition of this destructive process.¹ Strongly did this confidence contrast with the proud and resolute submission to necessity, not without desponding anticipations of the result, which reigned among the auditors of Periklês.²

But though the Peloponnesians entertained confident belief of carrying their point by simple land-campaign, they did not neglect auxiliary preparations for naval and prolonged war. The Lacedæmonians resolved to make up the naval force already existing among themselves and their allies to an aggregate of 500 triremes; chiefly by the aid of the friendly Dorian cities on the Italian and Sicilian coast. Upon each of them a specific contribution was imposed, together with a given contingent; orders being transmitted to them to make such preparations silently without any immediate declaration of hostility against Athens, and even without refusing for the present to admit any single Athenian ship into their harbours.³ Besides this, the Lacedæmonians laid their schemes for sending envoys to the Persian king and to other barbaric powers—a remarkable evidence of melancholy revolution in Grecian affairs, when that potentate, whom the common arm of Greece had so hardly repulsed a few years before, was now invoked to bring the Phœnician fleet again into the Ægean for the purpose of crushing Athens.

The invasion of Attica however without delay was the primary object to be accomplished; and for that the Lacedæmonians issued circular orders immediately after

¹ Thucyd. vii. 28. ὄσον κατ' ἀρχάς τοῦ πολέμου, οἱ μὲν ἐνιαυτὸν, οἱ δὲ δύο, οἱ δὲ τριῶν γε ἐτῶν, οὐδεὶς πλείω χρόνον, ἐνόμιζον περιτοίσειν αὐτούς (the Athenians), εἰ οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι ἐσβάλοισιν ἐς τὴν χώραν: compare v. 14.

² Thucyd. vi. 11. διὰ τὸ παράγνωμην αὐτῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἐφοβείσθη τὸ πρῶτον, περιγεγενησθαι, καταφρονήσαντες ἤδη καὶ

τῆς Σικελίας ἐπίσθη. It is Nicias, who, in dissuading the expedition against Syracuse, reminds the Athenians of their past despondency at the beginning of the war.

³ Thucyd. ii. 7. Diodorus says that the Italian and Sicilian allies were required to furnish 200 triremes (xii. 41). Nothing of the kind seems to have been actually furnished.

the attempted surprise of Plataea. Though the vote of the allies was requisite to sanction any war, yet when that vote had once been passed, the Lacedæmonians took upon themselves to direct all the measures of execution. Two-thirds of the hoplites of each confederate city—apparently two-thirds of a certain assumed rating for which the city was held liable in the books of the confederacy, so that the Bœotians and others who furnished cavalry, were not constrained to send two-thirds of their entire force of hoplites—were summoned to be present on a certain day at the isthmus of Corinth, with provisions and equipment for an expedition of some length.¹ On the day named, the entire force was found duly assembled. The Spartan king Archidamus, on taking the command, addressed to the commanders and principal officers from each city a discourse of solemn warning as well as encouragement. His remarks were directed chiefly to abate the tone of sanguine over-confidence which reigned in the army. After adverting to the magnitude of the occasion, the mighty impulse agitating all Greece, and the general good wishes which accompanied them against an enemy so much hated—he admonished them not to let their great superiority of numbers and bravery seduce them into a spirit of rash disorder. “We are about to attack (he said) an enemy admirably equipped in every way, so that we may expect certainly that they will come out and fight,² even if they be not now actually on the march to meet us at the border, at least when they see us in their territory ravaging and destroying their property. All men exposed to any unusual indignity become incensed, and act more under passion than under calculation, when it is actually brought under their eyes: much more will the Athenians do so, accustomed as they are to empire, and to ravage the territory of others rather than to see their own so treated.”

Muster of the combined Peloponnesian force at the isthmus of Corinth under Archidamus, to invade Attica.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 10-12.

² Thucyd. ii. 11. ὥστε γρη῏ καὶ πᾶν ἐλπίζειν διὰ μάχης ἵεναι αὐτούς, εἰ μὴ καὶ νῦν ὤρμηγνται, ἐν ᾧ οὐπω πάρεσμεν, ἀλλ' ὅταν ἐν τῇ γῆ ὀρώσιν ἡμᾶς θηούνας τε καὶ τάξειων φθειρόνας.

These reports of speeches are of great value as preserving a record of the feelings and expectations of actors, apart from the result of events. What Archidamus so confidently anticipated did not come to pass.

Immediately on the army being assembled, Archidamus sent Melêsippus as envoy to Athens to announce the coming invasion, being still in hopes that the Athenians would yield. But a resolution had been already adopted, at the instance of Periklês, to receive neither herald nor envoy from the Lacedæmonians when once their army was on its march: so that Melêsippus was sent back without even being permitted to enter the city. He was ordered to quit the territory before sunset, with guides to accompany him and prevent him from addressing a word to any one. On parting from his guides at the border, Melêsippus exclaimed,¹ with a solemnity but too accurately justified by the event—"This day will be the beginning of many calamities to the Greeks."

Archidamus, as soon as the reception of his last envoy was made known to him, continued his march from the isthmus into Attica—which territory he entered by the road of Œnoê, the frontier Athenian fortress of Attica towards Bœotia. His march was slow, and he thought it necessary to make a regular attack on the fort of Œnoê, which had been put into so good a state of defence, that after all the various modes of assault, in which the Lacedæmonians were not skilful, had been tried in vain²—and after a delay of several days before the place,—he was compelled to renounce the attempt.

The want of enthusiasm on the part of the Spartan king—his multiplied delays, first at the isthmus, next in the march, and lastly before Œnoê—were all offensive to the fiery impatience of the army, who were loud in their murmurs against him. He acted upon the calculation already laid down in his discourse at Sparta³—that the highly cultivated soil of Attica was to be looked upon as a hostage for the pacific dispositions of the Athenians, who would be more likely to yield when devastation, though not yet

¹ Thucyd. ii. 12.

² Thucyd. ii. 18. πᾶσαν ἰδέαν παρ᾽ αὐτοῦ οὐκ ἐδόξαντο εἶναι. The situation of Œnoê is not exactly agreed upon by topographical inquirers: it was near Eleuthera, and on one of the roads from Attica into Bœotia (Harpokraton, v.

Οἰνῆ; Herodot. v. 74). Archidamus marched probably from the Isthmus over Geraneia, and fell into this road in order to receive the junction of the Bœotian contingent after it had crossed Kithæron.

³ Thucyd. i. 82; ii. 18.

inflicted, was nevertheless impending and at their doors. In this point of view, a little delay at the border was no disadvantage; and perhaps the partisans of peace at Athens may have encouraged him to hope that it would enable them to prevail.

Nor can we doubt that it was a moment full of difficulty to Periklès at Athens. He had to proclaim to all the proprietors in Attica the painful truth, that they must prepare to see their lands and houses overrun and ruined; and that their persons, families, and moveable property must be brought in for safety either to Athens, or to one of the forts in the territory—or carried across to one of the neighbouring islands. It would indeed make a favourable impression when he told them that Archidamus was his own family friend, yet only within such limits as consisted with duty to the city: in case therefore the invaders, while ravaging Attica, should receive instruction to spare his own lands, he would forthwith make them over to the state as public property. Such a case was likely enough to arise, if not from the personal feeling of Archidamus, at least from the deliberate manœuvre of the Spartans, who would seek thus to set the Athenian public against Periklès, as they had tried to do before by demanding the banishment of the sacrilegious Alkmæônid race.¹ But though this declaration from Periklès would doubtless provoke a hearty cheer, yet the lesson which he had to inculcate—not simply for admission as prudent policy, but for actual practice—was one revolting alike to the immediate interest, the dignity, and the sympathies of his countrymen. To see their lands all ravaged, without raising an arm to defend them—to carry away their wives and families, and to desert and dismantle their country residences, as they had done during the Persian invasion—all in the confidence of compensation in other ways and of remote ultimate success—were recommendations which probably no one but Periklès could have hoped to enforce. They were moreover the

Expectation of Archidamus that Athens would yield at the last moment—Difficulty of Periklès in persuading the Athenians to abandon their territory and see it all ravaged.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 13: compare Tacitus, *Histor.* v. 23. "Cerealis, insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus, agros Civili's notâ arte ducum, intactos suberat." Also Livy, ii. 39.

Justin affirms that the Lacedæ-

monian invaders actually did leave the lands of Periklès uninjured, and that he made them over to the people (iii. 7). Thucydidès does not say whether the case really occurred: see also Polyænus, i. 36.

more painful to execute, inasmuch as the Athenian citizens had very generally retained the habits of residing permanently, not in Athens, but in the various demes of Attica; many of which still preserved their temples, their festivals, their local customs, and their limited municipal autonomy, handed down from the day when they had once been independent of Athens.¹ It was but recently that the farming, the comforts, and the ornaments, thus distributed over Attica, had been restored from the ruin of the Persian invasion, and brought to a higher pitch of improvement than ever. Yet the fruits of this labour, and the scenes of these local affections, were now to be again deliberately abandoned to a new aggressor, and exchanged for the utmost privation and discomfort. Archidamus might well doubt whether the Athenians would nerve themselves up to the pitch of resolution necessary for this distressing step, when it came to the actual crisis; and whether they would not constrain Periklês against his will to make propositions for peace. His delay on the border, and postponement of actual devastation, gave the best chance for such propositions to be made; though, as this calculation was not realised, the army raised plausible complaints against him for having allowed the Athenians time to save so much of their property.

From all parts of Attica the residents flocked within the spacious walls of Athens, which now served as shelter for the houseless, like Salamis forty-nine years before—entire families with all their moveable property, and even with the woodwork of their houses. The sheep and cattle were conveyed to Eubœa and the other adjoining islands.² Though a few among the fugitives obtained dwellings or reception from friends, the greater number were compelled to encamp in the vacant spaces of the city and Peiræus, or in and around the numerous temples of the city—always excepting the acropolis and the Eleusinion, which were at all times strictly closed to profane occupants. But even the ground called *the Pelasgikon* immediately under the acropolis, which by an ancient and ominous tradition was interdicted to human abode,³ was

Attica deserted—the population flock within the walls of Athens. Hardships, privations, and distress endured.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 15, 16.

² Thucyd. ii. 14.

³ Thucyd. ii. 17. καὶ τὸ Πελασγι-

κὸν καλοῦμενον τὸ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀκρόπολις,
ὃ καὶ ἐπάρματο, τα ἔτι μὴ οἰκίειν καὶ
τε καὶ Πυθικῶς μαντείου ἀχρετέλει-

made use of under the present necessity. Many too placed their families in the towers and recesses of the city walls¹, or in sheds, cabins, tents, or even tubs, disposed along the course of the long walls to Peiræus. In spite of so serious an accumulation of losses and hardships, the glorious endurance of their fathers in the time of Xerxes was faithfully copied, and copied too under more honourable circumstances, since at that time there had been no option possible; whereas the march of Archidamus might perhaps now have been arrested by submissions, ruinous indeed to Athenian dignity, yet not inconsistent with the security of Athens, divested of her rank and power. Such submissions, if suggested as they probably may have been by the party opposed to Periklês, found no echo among the suffering population.

After having spent several days before Cœnoê without either taking the fort or receiving any message from the Athenians, Archidamus marched onward to Eleusis and the Thriasian plain—about the middle of June, eighty days after the surprise of Plataea. His army was of irresistible force, not less than 60,000 hoplites, according to the statement of Plutarch,² or of 100,000 according to others. Considering the number of constituent allies, the strong feeling by which they were prompted, and the shortness of the expedition combined with the chance of plunder—even the largest of these two numbers is not incredibly great, if we take it to include not hoplites only, but cavalry and light-armed also. But since Thucydidês, though comparatively full in his account of this march, has stated no general total, we may presume that he had heard none upon which he could rely.

March of Archidamus into Attica.

τιον τοιόνδε διεκώλυε, λέγων ὡς τὸ Πελασγικὸν ἀργὸν ἄμεινον, ὅμως ὑπὸ τῆς παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκης ἐξοικήθη.

Thucydidês then proceeds to give an explanation of his own for this ancient prophecy, intended to save its credit, as well as to show that his countrymen had not, as some persons alleged, violated any divine mandate by admitting residents into the Pelasgikon. When the oracle said,—“The Pelasgikon is better unoccupied”—these words were not meant to interdict the

occupation of the spot, but to foretel that it would never be occupied until a time of severe calamity arrived. The necessity of occupying it grew only out of national suffering. Such is the explanation suggested by Thucydidês.

¹ Aristophanès, Equites, 789. οἰκοῦντ' ἐν ταῖς πηθάκλαισι Κἄν γυπαρίοις καὶ πυργίτοις. The philosopher Diogenès, in taking up his abode in a tub, had thus examples in history to follow.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33.

As the Athenians had made no movement towards peace, Archidamus anticipated that they would come forth to meet him in the fertile plain of Eleusis and Thria, which was the first portion of territory that he sat down to ravage. Yet no Athenian force appeared to oppose him, except a detachment of cavalry, who were repulsed in a skirmish near the small lakes called Rheiti. Having laid waste this plain without any serious opposition, Archidamus did not think fit to pursue the straight road which from Thria conducted directly to Athens across the ridge of Mount Ægaleos, but turned off to the eastward, leaving that mountain on his right-hand until he came to Krôpeia, where he crossed a portion of the line of Ægaleos over to Acharnæ.

Archidamus advances to Acharnæ, within seven miles of Athens. He was here about seven miles from Athens, on a declivity sloping down into the plain which stretches westerly and north-westerly from Athens, and visible from the city walls. Here he encamped, keeping his army in perfect order for battle, but at the same time intending to damage and ruin the place and its neighbourhood. Acharnæ was the largest and most populous of all the demes in Attica, furnishing no less than 3000 hoplites to the national line, and flourishing as well by its corn, vines, and olives, as by its peculiar abundance of charcoal-burning from the forests of ilex on the neighbouring hills. Moreover, if we are to believe Aristophanês, the Acharnian proprietors were not merely sturdy "hearts of oak," but peculiarly vehement and irritable.¹ It illustrates the condition of a Grecian territory under invasion, when we find this great deme—which could not have contained less than 12,000 free inhabitants of both sexes and all ages, with at least an equal number of slaves—completely deserted. Archidamus calculated that when the Athenians actually saw his troops so close to their city, carrying fire and sword over their wealthiest canton, their indignation would become uncontrollable, and they would march out forthwith to battle. The Acharnian proprietors especially (he thought) would be foremost in inflaming this temper and insisting upon protection to their own properties—or if the remaining citizens refused

¹ See the *Acharneis* of Aristophanês, represented in the sixth year of the Peloponnesian war, v. 34, 180, 254, &c.

πρεσβυτάτους
Ἄχαρνικοί, στιπτοὶ γέροντες, πρίννοι,
ἀπεράμους, Μαραθωνομάχαι, σφεν-
δάμννοι, &c.

to march out along with them, they would, after having been thus left undefended to ruin, become discontented and indifferent to the general weal.¹

Though his calculation was not realised, it was nevertheless founded upon most rational grounds. What Archidamus anticipated was on the point of happening, and nothing prevented it except the personal ascendancy of Periklês, strained to its very utmost. So long as the invading army was engaged in the Thriasian plain, the Athenians had some faint hope that it might (like Pleistoanax fourteen years before) advance no farther into the interior. But when it came to Acharnæ within sight of the city walls—when the ravagers were actually seen destroying buildings, fruit-trees, and crops, in the plain of Athens, a sight strange to every Athenian eye except to those very old men who recollected the Persian invasion—the exasperation of the general body of citizens rose to a pitch never before known. The Acharnians first of all—next the youthful citizens generally—became madly clamorous for arming and going forth to fight. Knowing well their own great strength, but less correctly informed of the superior strength of the enemy, they felt confident that victory was within their reach. Groups of citizens were everywhere gathered together,² angrily debating the critical question of the moment; while the usual concomitants of excited feeling—oracles and prophecies of diverse tenor, many of them doubtless promising success against the enemy at Acharnæ—were eagerly caught up and circulated.

Intense clamour within the walls of Athens—eagerness to go forth and fight.

In this inflamed temper of the Athenian mind, Periklês was naturally the great object of complaint and wrath. He was denounced as the cause of all the existing suffering. He was reviled as a coward for not leading out the citizens to fight, in his capacity of general. The rational convictions as to the necessity of the war and the only practicable means of carrying it on, which his repeated speeches had implanted, seemed to be altogether forgotten.³ This burst of spontaneous discontent

Trying position, firmness, and sustained ascendancy of Periklês, in dissuading them from going forth.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 20.

compare Euripidês, Herakleida, 416; and Andromachê, 1077.

² Thucyd. ii. 21. κατὰ συστάσεις ἐπιγυρομενοι ἐν πολλῇ ἔριδι ἄραν:

³ Thucyd. ii. 21. παντὶ τε πρόπῳ

was of course fomented by the numerous political enemies of Periklês, and particularly by Kleon,¹ now rising into importance as an opposition speaker; whose talent for invective was thus first exercised under the auspices of the high aristocratical party, as well as of an excited public. But no manifestations, however violent, could disturb either the judgement or the firmness of Periklês. He listened unmoved to all the declarations made against him, resolutely refusing to convene any public assembly, or any meeting invested with an authorised character, under the present irritated temper of the citizens.² It appears that he as general, or rather the Board of the Generals among whom he was one, must have been invested constitutionally with the power not only of calling the Ekklesia when they thought fit, but also of preventing it from meeting,³ and of postponing even those regular meetings which commonly took place at fixed times, four times in the prytany. No assembly accordingly took place, and the violent exasperation of the people was thus prevented from realising itself in any rash public resolution. That Periklês should have held firm against this raging force, is but one among the many honourable points in his political character; but it is far less wonderful than the fact, that his refusal to call the Ekklesia was efficacious to prevent the Ekklesia from being held. The entire body of Athenians were now assembled within the walls, and if he refused to convoke the Ekklesia, they might easily have met in the Pnyx without him; for which it would not have been difficult at such a juncture to provide plausible justification. The inviolable respect which the Athenian people manifested on this occasion for the forms of their democratical constitution—assisted doubtless by their long-established esteem for Periklês, yet opposed to an excitement alike intense

ἀνθρώπιστο ἢ πόλις καὶ τὸν Περικλέα ἐν ἄργῃ εἶχον, καὶ ὧν παρήγεσε πρότερον ἐμέμνητο οὐδὲν, ἀλλ' ἐκάκιζον ἕτι στρατηγὸς ὧν οὐκ ἐπεξάγοι, αἰτιὸν το σφίσι ἐνόμιζον πάντων ὧν ἔπασχον.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 33.

² Thucyd. ii. 22.

³ See Schömann, De Comitiiis, c. iv. p. 62. The Prytanēs (i. e. the Fifty Senators belonging to that

tribe whose turn it was to preside at the time), as well as the Stratēgi, had the right of convoking the Ekklesia; see Thucyd. iv. 118, in which passage however they are represented as convoking it in conjunction with the Stratēgi: probably a discretion on the point came gradually to be understood as vested in the latter.

and pervading, and to a demand apparently reasonable, in so far as regarded the calling of an assembly for discussion—is one of the most memorable incidents in their history.

While Periklès thus decidedly forbade any general march out for battle, he sought to provide as much employment as possible for the compressed eagerness of the citizens. The cavalry were sent forth, together with the Thessalian cavalry their allies, for the purpose of restraining the excursions of the enemy's light troops, and protecting the lands near the city from plunder.¹ At the same time he fitted out a powerful expedition, which sailed forth to ravage Peloponnesus, even while the invaders were yet in Attica.² Archidamus, after having remained engaged in the devastation of Acharnæ long enough to satisfy himself that the Athenians would not hazard a battle, turned away from Athens in a north-westerly direction towards the demes between Mount Brilèssus and Mount Parnês, on the road passing through Dekeleia. The army continued ravaging these districts until their provisions were exhausted, and then quitted Attica by the north-western road near Orôpus, which brought them into Bœotia. As the Oropians, though not Athenians, were yet dependent upon Athens—the district of Græa, a portion of their territory, was laid waste; after which the army dispersed and retired back to their respective homes.³ It would seem that they quitted Attica towards the end of July, having remained in the country between thirty and forty days.

The Athenians remain within their walls: partial skirmishes only, no general action.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 22. The funeral monument of these slain Thessalians was among those seen by Pausanias near Athens, on the side of the Academy (Pausan. i. 29, 5).

² Diodorus (xii. 42) would have us believe, that the expedition sent out by Periklès, ravaging the Peloponnesian coast, induced the Lacedæmonians to hurry away their troops out of Attica. Thucydides gives no countenance to this—nor is it at all credible.

³ Thucyd. ii. 23. The reading Γραῖα, belonging to Γραῖα, seems

preferable to Παρὰχῆν. Poppo and Gøller adopt the former, Dr. Arnold the latter. Græa was a small maritime place in the vicinity of Orôpus (Aristotel. ap. Stephan. Byz. v. Τάινγγρα)—known also now as an Attic Deme belonging to the tribe Pandionis: this has been discovered for the first time by an inscription published in Professor Ross's work (Ueber die Deme von Attika, p. 3-5). Orôpus was not an Attic Deme: the Athenian citizens residing in it were probably enrolled as Γραῖα.

Meanwhile the Athenian expedition, under Karkinus, Prôteas, and Sokratês, joined by fifty Korkyræan ships and by some other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, landing in various parts to inflict damage, and among other places at Methônê (Modon), on the south-western peninsula of the Lacedæmonian territory.¹ The place, neither strong nor well-garrisoned, would have been carried with little difficulty, had not Brasidas the son of Tellis—a gallant Spartan now mentioned for the first time, but destined to great celebrity afterwards—who happened to be on guard at a neighbouring post, thrown himself into it with 100 men by a rapid movement, before the dispersed Athenian troops could be brought together to prevent him. He infused such courage into the defenders of the place that every attack was repelled, and the Athenians were forced to re-embark—an act of prowess which procured for him the first public honours bestowed by the Spartans during this war. Sailing northward along the western coast of Peloponnesus, the Athenians landed again on the coast of Elis, a little south of the promontory called Cape Ichthys: they ravaged the territory for two days, defeating both the troops in the neighbourhood and 300 chosen men from the central Eleian territory. Strong winds on a harbourless coast now induced the captains to sail with most of the troops round Cape Ichthys, in order to reach the harbour of Pheia on the northern side of it; while the Messenian hoplites, marching by land across the promontory, attacked Pheia and carried it by assault. When the fleet arrived, all were re-embarked—the full force of Elis being under march to attack them. They then sailed northward, landing on various other spots to commit devastation, until they reached Sollium, a Corinthian settlement on the coast of Akarnania. They captured this place, which they handed over to the inhabitants of the neighbouring Akarnanian town of Palærus—as well as Astakus, from whence they expelled the despot Euarchus, and enrolled the town as a member of the Athenian alliance. From hence they passed over to Kephallênia, which they were fortunate enough also to acquire as an ally of Athens without any compulsion—with its four distinct

Athenian fleet is despatched to ravage the coasts of Peloponnesus—first notice of the Spartan Brasidas—operations of the Athenians in Akarnania, Kephallênia, &c.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25; Plutarch, Periklês, c. 34; Justin, iii. 7, 5.

towns or districts, Palês, Kranii, Samê, and Pronê. These various operations took up near three months from about the beginning of July, so that they returned to Athens towards the close of September¹—the beginning of the winter half of the year, according to the distribution of Thucydidês.

This was not the only maritime expedition of the summer. Thirty more triremes, under Kleopompus, were sent through the Euripus to the Lokrian coast opposite to the northern part of Eubœa. Some disembarkations were made, whereby the Lokrian towns of Thronium and Alopê were sacked, and farther devastation inflicted; while a permanent garrison was planted, and a fortified post erected, in the uninhabited island of Atalanta opposite to the Lokrian coast, in order to restrain privateers from Opus and the other Lokrian towns in their excursions against Eubœa.² It was farther determined to expel the Æginetan inhabitants from Ægina, and to occupy the island with Athenian colonists. This step was partly rendered prudent by the important position of the island midway between Attica and Peloponnesus. But a concurrent motive, and probably the stronger motive, was the gratification of ancient antipathy, and revenge against a people who had been among the foremost in provoking the war and in inflicting upon Athens so much suffering. The Æginetans with their wives and children were all put on shipboard and landed in Peloponnesus—where the Spartans permitted them to occupy the maritime district and town of Thyrea, their last frontier towards Argos: some of them however found shelter in other parts of Greece. The island was made over to a detachment of Athenian kleruchs, or citizen proprietors sent thither by lot.³

To the sufferings of the Æginetans, which we shall hereafter find still more deplorably aggravated, we have to add those of the Megarians. Both had been most zealous in kindling the war, but upon none did the distress of war fall so heavily. Both probably shared the premature confidence felt among the Peloponnesian confederacy, that

The Athenians expel the Æginetans from Ægina, and people the island with Athenian kleruchs. The Æginetans settle at Thyrea in Peloponnesus.

The Athenians invade and ravage the Megarid: sufferings of the Megarians.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 25-30; Diodor. xii.

² Thucyd. ii. 26-32; Diodor. xii. 44.

E, 41.

³ Thucyd. ii. 27.

Athens could never hold out more than a year or two—and were thus induced to overlook their own undefended position against her. Towards the close of September, the full force of Athens, citizens and metics, marched into the Megarid, under Periklès, and laid waste the greater part of the territory: while they were in it, the hundred ships which had been circumnavigating Peloponnesus, having arrived at Ægina on their return, went and joined their fellow-citizens in the Megara, instead of going straight home. The junction of the two formed the largest Athenian force that had ever yet been seen together: there were 10,000 citizen hoplites, (independent of 3000 others who were engaged in the siege of Potidæa,) and 3000 metic hoplites—besides a large number of light troops.¹—Against so large a force the Megarians could of course make no head, so that their territory was all laid waste, even to the city walls. For several years of the war, the Athenians inflicted this destruction once, and often twice in the same year. A decree was proposed in the Athenian Ekklesia by Charinus, though perhaps not carried, to the effect that the Stratêgi every year should swear, as a portion of their oath of office,² that they would twice invade and ravage the Megarid. As the Athenians at the same time kept the port of Nisæa blocked up, by means of their superior naval force and of the neighbouring coast of Salamis, the privations imposed on the Megarians became extreme and intolerable.³ Not merely their corn and fruits, but even their garden vegetables near the city, were rooted up and destroyed and their situation seems often to have been that of a besieged city hard pressed by famine. Even in the time of Pausanias, five centuries afterwards, the miseries of the town during these years were remembered and communicated to him, being assigned as the reason why one of their most memorable statues had never been completed.⁴

To the various military operations of Athens during the course of this summer, some other measures of moment

¹ Thucyd. ii. 31; Diodor. xii. 41.

² Plutarch, Periklès, c. 30.

³ See the striking picture in the *Acharneis* of Aristophanès (685-781) of the distressed Megarian selling his hungry children into slavery with their own consent: also Aristoph. *Pac.* 482.

The position of Megara, as the

ally of Sparta and enemy of Athens, was uncomfortable in the same manner (though not to the same intense pitch of suffering) in the war which preceded the battle of Leuktra—near fifty years after this (Demosthen. *cont. Neer.*, p. 1357, c. 12).

⁴ Pausan. i. 40. 3.

are to be added. Moreover Thucydidês notices an eclipse of the sun, which modern astronomical calculations refer to the third of August: had this eclipse happened three months earlier, immediately before the entrance of the Peloponnesians into Attica, it might probably have been construed as an unfavourable omen, and caused the postponement of the scheme.

Expecting a prolonged struggle, the Athenians now made arrangements for placing Attica in a permanent state of defence, both by sea and land. What these arrangements were, we are not told in detail, but one of them was sufficiently remarkable to be named particularly. They set apart one thousand talents out of the treasure in the acropolis as an inviolable reserve, not to be touched except on the single contingency—of a hostile naval force about to assail the city, with no other means at hand to defend it. They further enacted that if any citizen should propose, or any magistrate put the question, in the public assembly, to make a different application of this reserve, he should be punishable with death. Moreover they resolved every year to keep back one hundred of their best triremes, and trierarchs to command and equip them, for the same special necessity.¹

Measures taken by Athens for permanent defence. — Sum put by in the acropolis, against urgent need, not to be touched unless under certain defined dangers.— Capital punishment against any one who should propose otherwise.

It may be doubted whether this latter provision was placed under the same stringent sanction, or observed with the same rigour, as that concerning the money; which latter was not departed from until the twentieth year of the war, after all the disasters of the Sicilian expedition, and on the terrible news of the revolt of Chios. It was on that occasion that the Athenians, having first repealed the sentence of capital punishment against any proposer of the forbidden change, appropriated the money to meet the then imminent peril of the commonwealth.²

The resolution here taken about this sacred reserve, and the rigorous sentence interdicting contrary propositions, is pronounced by Mr. Mitford to be an evidence of the indelible barbarism of democratical government.³ But we must recollect, first, that the

Remarks on this decree.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 24.

² Thucyd. viii. 15.

³ Mitford Hist. of Greece, ch. xiv.

sect. 1, vol. iii. p. 160. "Another measure followed, which taking place at the time when Thucydidês

sentence of capital punishment was one which could hardly by possibility come into execution; for no citizen would be so mad as to make the forbidden proposition, while this law was in force. Whoever desired to make it, would first begin by proposing to repeal the prohibitory law, whereby he would incur no danger, whether the assembly decided in the affirmative or negative. If he obtained an affirmative decision, he would then, and then only, proceed to move the re-appropriation of the fund. To speak the language of English parliamentary procedure, he would first move the suspension or abrogation of the standing order whereby the proposition was forbidden—next, he would move the proposition itself. In fact such was the mode actually pursued, when the thing at last came to be done.¹ But though the capital sentence could hardly come into effect, the proclamation of it *in terrorem* had a very distinct meaning. It expressed the deep and solemn conviction which the people entertained of the importance of their own resolution about the reserve—it forewarned all assemblies and all citizens to come, of the danger of diverting it to any other purpose—it surrounded the reserve with an artificial sanctity, which forced every man who aimed at the re-appropriation to begin with a preliminary proposition formidable on the very face of it, as removing a guarantee which previous assemblies had deemed of immense value, and opening the door to a contingency which they had looked upon as treasonable. The proclamation of a lighter punishment, or a simple prohibition without any definite sanction whatever, would neither have announced the same emphatic conviction, nor produced the same deterring effect. The assembly of 431 B.C. could not in any

wrote and Periklēs spoke, and while Periklēs held the principal influence in the administration, strongly marks both the inherent weakness and the indelible barbarism, of democratical government. A decree of the people directed But so little confidence was placed in a decree so important, sanctioned only by the present will of that giddy tyrant the multitude of Athens, against whose caprices, since the depression of the court of Areopagus,

no balancing power remained—that the denunciation of capital punishment was proposed against whosoever should propose, and whosoever should *concur in* (?) any decree for the disposal of that money to any other purpose, or in any other circumstances.”

¹ Thucyd. viii. 15. τὰ δὲ γίλια τάλαντα, ὧν διὰ παντός τοῦ πολέμου ἐγλίχοντο μὴ ἄψεσθαι, εὐθὺς ἔλυσαν τὰς ἐπικειμένους ζήμιας τῷ εἰπόντι ἢ ἐπιψηφισάντι, ὑπὸ τῆς παρούσης ἐκπλήξεως, καὶ ἐψηφίσαντο κινεῖν.

way enact laws which subsequent assemblies could not reverse; but it could so frame its enactments, in cases of peculiar solemnity, as to make its authority strongly felt upon the judgement of its successors, and to prevent them from entertaining motions for repeal except under necessity at once urgent and obvious.

Far from thinking that the law now passed at Athens displayed barbarism, either in the end or in the means, I consider it principally remarkable for its cautious and long-sighted view of the future—qualities the exact reverse of barbarism—and worthy of the general character of Periklès, who probably suggested it. Athens was just entering into a war which threatened to be of indefinite length, and was certain to be very costly. To prevent the people from exhausting all their accumulated fund, and to place them under a necessity of reserving something against extreme casualties, was an object of immense importance. Now the particular casualty, which Periklès (assuming him to be the proposer) named as the sole condition of touching this one thousand talents, might be considered as of all others the most improbable, in the year 431 B.C. So immense was then the superiority of the Athenian naval force, that to suppose it defeated, and a Peloponnesian fleet in full sail for Peiræus, was a possibility which it required a statesman of extraordinary caution to look forward to, and which it is wonderful that the people generally could have been induced to contemplate. Once tied up to this purpose, however, the fund lay ready for any other terrible emergency. We shall find the actual employment of it incalculably beneficial to Athens, at a moment of the gravest peril, when she could hardly have protected herself without some such special resource. The people would scarcely have sanctioned so rigorous an economy, had it not been proposed to them at a period so early in the war that their available reserve was still much larger. But it will be for ever to the credit of their foresight as well as constancy, that they should first have adopted such a precautionary measure, and afterwards adhered to it for nineteen years, under severe pressure for money, until at length a case arose which rendered farther abstinence really, and not constructively, impossible.

To display their force and take revenge by disem-

Blockade
of Potidæa
—Sitalkês
king of the
Odryisian
Thracians
—alliance
made be-
tween him
and Athens.

barking and ravaging parts of Peloponnesus, was doubtless of much importance to Athens during this first summer of the war: though it might seem that the force so employed was quite as much needed in the conquest of Potidæa, which still remained under blockade—and of the neighbouring Chalkidians in Thrace, still in revolt. It was during the course of this summer that a prospect opened to Athens of subduing these towns, through the assistance of Sitalkês king of the Odryisian Thracians. That prince had married the sister of Nymphodôrus, a citizen of Abdêra, who engaged to render him and his son Sadokus, allies of Athens. Sent for to Athens and appointed proxenus of Athens at Abdêra, which was one of the Athenian subject allies, Nymphodôrus made this alliance, and promised in the name of Sitalkês that a sufficient Thracian force should be sent to aid Athens in the reconquest of her revolted towns: the honour of Athenian citizenship was at the same time conferred upon Sadokus.¹ Nymphodôrus farther established a good understanding between Perdikkas of Macedonia and the Athenians, who were persuaded to restore to him Therma, which they had before taken from him. The Athenians had thus the promise of powerful aid against the Chalkidians and Potidæans: yet the latter still held out, with little prospect of immediate surrender. Moreover the town of Astakus in Akarnania, which the Athenians had captured during the summer in the course of their expedition round Peloponnesus, was recovered during the autumn by the deposed despot Euarchus, assisted by forty Corinthian triremes and 1000 hoplites. This Corinthian armament, after restoring Euarchus, made some unsuccessful descents both upon other parts of Akarnania and upon the island of Kephallênia. In the latter they were entrapped into an ambushade and obliged to return home with considerable loss.²

It was towards the close of autumn also that Periklês, chosen by the people for the purpose, delivered the funeral oration at the public interment of those warriors who had fallen during the campaign. The ceremonies of this public token of respect have already been described in a former chapter, on occasion of the conquest of Samos. But that which imparted to the present scene an imperishable

¹ Thucyd. ii. 29.

² Thucyd. ii. 33.

interest, was the discourse of the chosen statesman and orator; probably heard by Thucydidês himself, and in substance reproduced. A large crowd of citizens and foreigners, of both sexes and all ages, accompanied the funeral procession from Athens to the suburb called the outer Kerameikus, where Periklês, mounted upon a lofty stage prepared for the occasion, closed the ceremony with his address. The law of Athens not only provided this public funeral and commemorative discourse, but also assigned maintenance at the public expense to the children of the slain warriors until they attained military age: a practice which was acted on throughout the whole war, though we have only the description and discourse belonging to this single occasion.¹

Periklês is chosen orator to deliver the funeral discourse over the citizens slain during the year.

The eleven chapters of Thucydidês which comprise this funeral speech are among the most memorable relics of antiquity; considering that under the language and arrangement of the historian —always impressive, though sometimes harsh and peculiar, like the workmanship of a powerful mind misled by a bad or an unattainable model—we possess the substance and thoughts of the illustrious statesman. A portion of it, of course, is and must be commonplace, belonging to all discourses composed for a similar occasion. Yet this is true only of a comparatively small portion. Much of it is peculiar, and every way worthy of Periklês—comprehensive, rational, and full not less of sense and substance than of earnest patriotism. It thus forms a strong contrast with the jejune, though elegant, rhetoric of other harangues, mostly² not composed for actual delivery. And it deserves,

Funeral oration of Periklês.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 34-45. Sometimes also the allies of Athens, who had fallen along with her citizens in battle, had a part in the honours of the public burial (Lysias, Orat. Funebr. c. 13).

² The critics, from Dionysius of Halikarnassus downward, agree for the most part in pronouncing the feeble *Λυγρός Ἐπιτάφιος*, ascribed to Demosthenês, to be not really his. Of those ascribed to Plato and Lysias also, the genuineness has been suspected, though

upon far less grounds. The *Menexenus*, if it be really the work of Plato, however, does not add to his fame: but the harangue of Lysias, a very fine composition, may well be his, and may perhaps have been really delivered — though probably not delivered by him, as he was not a qualified citizen.

See the general instructions, in Dionys. Hal. *Ars Rhetoric.* c. 6, p. 258-268, Reisk., on the contents and composition of a funeral discourse —Lysias is said to have composed

in comparison with the funeral discourses remaining to us from Plato, and the pseudo-Demosthenês, and even Lysias, the honourable distinction which Thucydidês claims for his own history—an ever-living possession, not a mere show-piece for the moment.

In the outset of his speech Periklês distinguishes himself from those who had preceded him in the same function of public orator, by dissenting from the encomiums which it had been customary to bestow on the law enjoining these funeral harangues. He thinks that the publicity of the funeral itself, and the general demonstrations of respect and grief by the great body of citizens, tell more emphatically in token of gratitude to the brave dead, when the scene passes in silence—than when it is translated into the words of a speaker, who may easily offend either by incompetency or by apparent febleness, or perhaps even by unseasonable exaggeration. Nevertheless, the custom having been embodied in law, and elected as he has been by the citizens, he comes forward to discharge the duty imposed upon him in the best manner he can.¹

One of the remarkable features in this discourse is, its businesslike, impersonal character. It is Athens herself who undertakes to commend and decorate her departed sons, as well as to hearten up and admonish the living.

After a few words on the magnitude of the empire and on the glorious efforts as well as endurance whereby

several—Plutarch, Vit. X. Orator. p. 836.

Compare respecting the funeral discourse of Periklês, K. F. Weber, Ueber die Stand-Rede des Periklês (Darmstadt, 1827); Westermann, Geschichte der Beredsamkeit in Griechenland und Rom. sect. 35, 63, 64; Kutzen, Perikles als Staatsmann, p. 158, sect. 12 (Grimma, 1834).

Dahlmann (Historische Forschungen, vol. i. p. 23) seems to think that the original oration of Periklês contained a large sprinkling of mythical allusions and stories out of the antiquities of Athens, such as we now find in the other funeral orations above

alluded to; but that Thucydidês himself deliberately left them out in his report. There seems no foundation for this suspicion. It is much more consonant to the superior tone of dignity which reigns throughout all this oration, to suppose that the mythical narratives and even the previous historical glories of Athens never found any special notice in the speech of Periklês—nothing more than a general recognition, with an intimation that he does not dwell upon them at length because they were well-known to his audience—μακρολογεῖν ἐν εἰδόσιν οὐ βουλόμενος ἕως (ii. 36).

¹ Thucyd. ii. 35.

their forefathers and they had acquired it—Periklēs proceeds to sketch the plan of life, the constitution, and the manners, under which such achievements were brought about.¹

“We live under a constitution such as noway to envy the laws of our neighbours,—ourselves an example to others, rather than mere imitators. It is called a democracy, since its permanent aim tends towards the Many and not towards the Few. As to private matters and disputes, the laws deal equally with every man: while in regard to public affairs and to claims of individual influence, every man’s chance of advancement is determined not by party favour but by real worth, according as his reputation stands in his own particular department. Neither poverty, nor obscure station, keep him back,² if he really has the means of benefiting the city. Moreover our social march is free, not merely in regard to public affairs, but also in regard to intolerance of each other’s diversity of daily pursuits. For we are not angry with our neighbour for what he may do to please himself, nor do we ever put on those sour looks,³ which, though they do no positive damage, are not the less sure to offend. Thus conducting our private social intercourse with reciprocal indulgence, we are restrained from wrong on public matters by fear and reverence of our magistrates for the time being and of our laws—especially such laws as are instituted for the protection of wrongful sufferers, and even such others as, though not written, are enforced by a common sense of shame. Besides this, we have provided

Sketch of Athenian political constitution, and social life, as conceived by Periklēs.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 36. Ἀπὸ δὲ οἷας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ’ αὐτά, καὶ μεθ’ οἷας πολιτείας, καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἷων μεγάλα ἐγένετο, ταῦτα ἀγλῶσας πρῶτον εἶμι, &c.

In the Demosthenic or pseudo-Demosthenic Orat. Funerbris, c. 8, p. 1397—χρηστῶν ἐπιτηδεύματων συνήθεια, τῆς βίης πολιτείας ὑποθέσεις, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 37. οὐδ’ αὖ κατὰ πέναν, ἔχω, δὲ τι ἀγαθὸν δρᾶσαι τὴν πόλιν, αἰσώματος ἀφραγεία κευκλυται: compare Plato, Menexenus, c. 8.

³ Thucyd. ii. 37. εὐκταρῶς δὲ τὰ

τε πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύομεν, καὶ ἐς τὴν πρὸς ἀλλήλους τῶν καθ’ ἡμέραν ἐπιτηδεύματων ὑποψίαν, οὐ δὲ ὀργῆς τον πέλας, εἰ καθ’ ἡδονὴν τι δρᾶ, ἔχοντες, οὐδὲ ἀζημίους μὲν, λυπηράς δὲ, τῇ ὀψει ἀχθιδόνας προστιθέμενοι. Ἀνεπαχθῶς δὲ τὰ ἴδια προσμιλοῦντες τὰ δημόσια διὰ δέους μάλιστα οὐ παρανομοῦμεν, τῶν τε αἰεὶ ἐν ἀρχῇ ὄντων ἀκροάσει καὶ τῶν νομῶν, καὶ μάλιστα αὐτῶν ἔσσι τε ἐπ’ ὠφελείᾳ τῶν ἀδικουμένων κείνται, καὶ ἔσσι ἄγραστοὶ δυνεὶ αἰσχρῶν ὁμολογουμένην φέρουσι.

for our minds numerous recreations from toil, partly by our customary solemnities of sacrifice and festival throughout the year, partly by the elegance of our private establishments,—the daily charm of which banishes the sense of discomfort. From the magnitude of our city, the products of the whole earth are brought to us, so that our enjoyment of foreign luxuries is as much our own and assured as those which we grow at home. In respect to training for war, we differ from our opponents (the Lacedæmonians) on several material points. First, we lay open our city as a common resort: we apply no *xenêlasy* to exclude even an enemy either from any lesson or any spectacle, the full view of which he may think advantageous to him. For military efficiency, we trust less to manœuvres and quackery than to our own native bravery. Next, in regard to education, while the Lacedæmonians even from their earliest youth subject themselves to an irksome exercise for the attainment of courage, we with our easy habits of life are not less prepared than they, to encounter all perils within the measure of our strength. The proof of this is, that the Peloponnesian confederates do not attack us one by one, but with their whole united force; while we, when we attack them at home, overpower for the most part all of them who try to defend their own territory. None of our enemies has ever met and contended with our entire force; partly in consequence of our large navy—partly from our dispersion in different simultaneous land-expeditions. But when they chance to be engaged with any part of it, if victorious, they pretend to have vanquished us all—if defeated, they pretend to have been vanquished by all.

“Now, if we are willing to brave danger, just as much under an indulgent system as under constant toil, and by spontaneous courage as much as under force of law—we are gainers in the end by not vexing ourselves beforehand with sufferings to come, yet still appearing in the hour of trial not less daring than those who toil without ceasing.

“In other matters, too, as well as in these, our city deserves admiration. For we combine elegance of taste with simplicity of life, and we pursue knowledge without being enervated: we employ wealth not for talking and ostentation, but as a real help in the proper season: nor is it dis-

Eulogy
upon
Athens and
the Athe-
nian cha-
racter.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 40. φιλοκαλοῦμεν γὰρ μετ' εὐτελείας, καὶ φιλοσοφοῦμεν

graceful to any one who is poor to confess his poverty, though he *may* rather incur reproach for not actually keeping himself out of poverty. The magistrates who discharge public trusts fulfil their domestic duties also—the private citizen, while engaged in professional business, has competent knowledge on public affairs: for we stand alone in regarding the man who keeps aloof from these latter not as harmless, but as useless. Moreover, we always hear and pronounce on public matters, when discussed by our leaders—or perhaps strike out for ourselves correct reasoning about them: far from accounting discussion an impediment to action, we complain only if we are not told what is to be done before it becomes our duty to do it. For in truth we combine in the most remarkable manner these two qualities—extreme boldness in execution with full debate beforehand on that which we are going about: whereas with others, ignorance alone imparts boldness—debate introduces hesitation. Assuredly those men are properly to be regarded as the stoutest of heart, who, knowing most precisely both the terrors of war and the sweets of peace, are still not the less willing to encounter peril.

“In fine, I affirm that our city, considered as a whole, is the schoolmistress of Greece;¹ while viewed individually, we enable the same man to furnish himself out and suffice to himself in the greatest variety of ways and with the most complete grace and refinement. This is no empty boast of the moment, but genuine reality: and the power of the city, acquired through the dispositions just indicated, exists to prove it. Athens alone of all cities stands forth in actual trial greater than her reputation: her enemy when he attacks her will not have his pride wounded

ἀνευ μαλαχίας πλοῦτῳ τε ἔργου μᾶλλον καιρῷ ἢ λόγου κόμπῳ χρώμεθα, καὶ τὸ πένεσθαι οὐχ ὁμολογεῖν τιμῇ αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ μὴ διαφεύγειν ἔργῳ αἰσχρῶν.

The first strophe of the Chorus in Euripid. *Medea*, 824-841, may be compared with the tenor of this discourse of Periklēs: the praises of Attica are there dwelt upon, as a country too good to receive the guilty *Medea*.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 41. ξυνομένων τε λέγω, τὴν τε πᾶσαν πόλιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος παιδεύειν εἶναι, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δοκεῖν ἂν μοι τὸν αὐτὸν ἄνδρα παρ' ἡμῶν ἐπὶ πλείστ' ἂν εἶδῃ καὶ μετὰ χαρίτων μάλιστα ἂν εὐτραπέλως τὸ σῶμα αὐταρχεῖς παρέχεσθαι.

The abstract word παιδεύειν, in place of the concrete παιδευτήριον, seems to soften the arrogance of the affirmation.

by suffering defeat from feeble hands—her subjects will not think themselves degraded as if their obedience were paid to an unworthy superior.¹ Having thus put forth our power, not uncertified, but backed by the most evident proofs, we shall be admired not less by posterity than by our contemporaries. Nor do we stand in need either of Homer or of any other panegyrist, whose words may for the moment please, though the truth if known would confute their intended meaning. We have compelled all land and sea to become accessible to our courage, and have planted everywhere imperishable monuments of our kindness as well as of our hostility.

“Such is the city on behalf of which these citizens, resolved that it should not be wrested from them, have nobly fought and died²—and on behalf of which all of us here left behind must willingly toil. It is for this reason that I have spoken at length concerning the city, at once to draw from it the lesson that the conflict is not for equal motives between us and enemies who possess nothing of the like excellence—and to demonstrate by proofs the truth of my encomium pronounced upon her.”

Periklēs pursues, at considerable additional length, the same tenor of mixed exhortation to the living and eulogy of the dead; with many special and emphatic observations addressed to the relatives of the latter, who were assembled around and doubtless very near him. But the extract which I have already made is so long, that no farther addition would be admissible: yet it was impossible to pass over lightly the picture of the Athenian commonwealth in its glory, as delivered by the ablest citizen of the age. The effect of the democratical constitution, with its diffused and equal citizenship, in calling forth not merely strong attachment, but painful self-sacrifice, on the part of all Athenians—is nowhere more forcibly insisted upon than in the words above cited of Periklēs, as well as in others afterwards—“Contemplating as you do daily before you the actual power of the state, and becoming passionately attached to it, when you conceive its full

¹ Thucyd. ii. 41. μόνη γὰρ τῶν
νῦν ἀκοῆς κρείστων ἐς πείραν ἔρχε-
ται, καὶ μόνη οὔτε τῷ πολέμῳ ἐπέλ-
θόντι ἀγανάκτησιν ἔχει ὑφ’ οἷων κα-
κοπαθεῖ, οὔτε τῷ ὑπὲρ ἧς κατὰ μεμψιν

ὡς οὐχ ὑπ’ ἀξίων ἄρχεται.

² Thucyd. ii. 41. περὶ τοιαύτης
οὖν πόλεως οἶδε τε γενναίως, δικαι-
οῦντες μὴ ἀφαιρεθῆναι αὐτήν, μαχό-
μενοι ἐτελεύτησαν, &c.

greatness, reflect that it was all acquired by men daring, acquainted with their duty, and full of an honourable sense of shame in their actions"¹—such is the association which he presents between the greatness of the state as an object of common passion, and the courage, intelligence, and mutual esteem, of individual citizens, as its creating and preserving causes; poor as well as rich being alike interested in the partnership.

But the claims of patriotism, though put forward as essentially and deservedly paramount, are by no means understood to reign exclusively, or to absorb the whole of the democratical activity. Subject to these, and to those laws and sanctions which protect both the public and individuals against wrong, it is the pride of Athens to exhibit a rich and varied fund of human impulse—an unrestrained play of fancy and diversity of private pursuit, coupled with a reciprocity of cheerful indulgence between one individual and another—and an absence even of those "black looks" which so much embitter life, even if they never pass into enmity of fact. This portion of the speech of Periklēs deserves peculiar attention, because it serves to correct an assertion, often far too indiscriminately made, respecting antiquity as contrasted with modern societies—an assertion that the ancient societies sacrificed the individual to the state, and that only in modern times has individual agency been left free to the proper extent. This is pre-eminently true of Sparta:—it is also true in a great degree of the ideal societies depicted by Plato and Aristotle: but it is pointedly untrue of the Athenian democracy, nor can we with any confidence predicate it of the major part of the Grecian cities.

I shall hereafter return to this point when I reach the times of the great speculative philosophers: at present, I merely bespeak attention to the speech of Periklēs as negating the supposition, that exorbitant interference of

Mutual tolerance of diversity of tastes and pursuits in Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 43. τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναμιν καθ' ἡμέραν ἔργῳ θεωρούμενους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνομένους αὐτῆς, καὶ ὅταν ὑμῖν μεγάλη δύστη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμούμενους ὅτι τοῖσ' αὐτοῖς καὶ γιγνώσκοντες τὰ δέοντα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις

ἀσχυρόμενοι, ἄνδρες αὐτὰ ἐκτήσαντο, &c.

Αἰσχυρόμενοι: compare Demosthen. Orat. Funerbris, c. 7, p. 1396. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τῶν ὀλίγων δυναστεῖαι θεός μὲν ἐνεργάζονται τοῖς πολίταις, αἰσχυρόν δ' οὐ παριστάσιν.

the state with individual liberty was universal among the ancient Greek republics. There is no doubt that he has

It is only true partial-ly and in some mem-orable in-stances that the state interfered to an exor-bitant degree with individual liberty in Greece.

present to his mind a comparison with the ex-treme narrowness and rigour of Sparta, and that therefore his assertions of the extent of positive liberty at Athens must be understood as partially qualified by such contrast. But even making allowance for this, the stress which he lays upon the liberty of thought and action at Athens, not merely from excessive restraint of law, but also from practical intolerance between man and man, and tyranny of the majority over individual

dissenters in taste and pursuit—deserves serious notice, and brings out one of those points in the national character upon which the intellectual development of the time mainly depended. The national temper was indulgent in a high degree to all the varieties of positive impulse. The peculiar promptings in every individual bosom were allowed to manifest themselves and bear fruit, without being suppressed by external opinion or trained into forced conformity with some assumed standard: antipathies against any of them formed no part of the habitual morality of the citizen. While much of the generating causes of human hatred was thus rendered inoperative, and while society was rendered more comfortable, more instructive, and more stimulating—all its germs of productive fruitful genius, so rare every-where, found in such an atmosphere the maximum of en-couragement. Within the limits of the law, assuredly as faithfully observed at Athens as anywhere in Greece, indi-vidual impulse, taste, and even eccentricity, were accepted with indulgence, instead of being a mark as elsewhere for the intolerance of neighbours or of the public. This re-

Free play of indi-vidual taste and im-pulse in Athens—importance of this pheno-menon in society.

markable feature in Athenian life will help us in a future chapter to explain the striking career of Sokratês, and it farther presents to us, under another face, a great part of that which the censors of Athens denounced under the name of “democratical licence.” The liberty and diver-sity of individual life in that city were offensive to Xenophon,¹ Plato, and Aristotle—attached

¹ Compare the sentiment of Xe-nophon, the precise reverse of that which is here laid down by Peri-

klês, extolling the rigid discipline of Sparta, and denouncing the lax-ity of Athenian life (Xenophon,

either to the monotonous drill of Sparta, or to some other ideal standard, which, though much better than the Spartan in itself, they were disposed to impress upon society with a heavy-handed uniformity. That liberty of individual action, not merely from the over-restraints of law, but from the tyranny of jealous opinion, such as Periklês depicts in Athens, belongs more naturally to a democracy, where there is no select One or Few to receive worship and set the fashion, than to any other form of government. But it is very rare even in democracies. None of the governments of modern times, democratical, aristocratical or monarchical, presents anything like the picture of generous tolerance towards social dissent, and spontaneity of individual taste, which we read in the speech of the Athenian statesman. In all of them, the intolerance of the national opinion cuts down individual character to one out of a few set types, to which every person, or every family, is constrained to adjust itself, and beyond which all exceptions meet either with hatred or with derision. To impose upon men such restraints either of law or of opinion as are requisite for the security and comfort of society, but to encourage rather than repress the free play of individual impulse subject to those limits—is an ideal, which if it was ever approached at Athens, has certainly never been attained, and has indeed comparatively been little studied or cared for, in any modern society.

Connected with this reciprocal indulgence of individual diversity, was not only the hospitable reception of all strangers at Athens, which Periklês contrasts with the xenêlasy or jealous expulsion practised at Sparta—but also the many-sided activity, bodily and mental, visible in the former, so opposite to that narrow range of thought, exclusive discipline of the body, and never-ending preparation for war, which formed the system of the latter. His assertion that Athens was equal to Sparta even in her own solitary excellence—efficiency on the field of battle—is doubtless untenable. But not the less impressive is his sketch of that multitude of concurrent impulses which at this same time agitated

Extraordi-
nary and
many-sided
activity of
Athens.

Memorab. iii. 5, 15; iii. 12, 5). It is curious that the sentiment appears in this dialogue as put in the mouth of the younger Periklês (illegitimate son of the great Periklês) in a dialogue with Sokratês.

and impelled the Athenian mind—the strength of one not implying the weakness of the remainder: the relish for all pleasures of art and elegance, and the appetite for intellectual expansion, coinciding in the same bosom with energetic promptitude as well as endurance: abundance of recreative spectacles, yet noway abating the cheerfulness of obedience even to the hardest calls of patriotic duty: that combination of reason and courage which encountered danger the more willingly from having discussed and calculated it beforehand: lastly an anxious interest, as well as a competence of judgement, in public discussion and public action, common to every citizen rich and poor, and combined with every man's own private industry. So comprehensive an ideal of many-sided social development, bringing out the capacities for action and endurance, as well as those for enjoyment, would be sufficiently remarkable, even if we supposed it only existing in the imagination of a philosopher: but it becomes still more so when we recollect that the main features of it at least were drawn from the fellow-citizens of the speaker. It must be taken however as belonging peculiarly to the Athens of Periklês and his contemporaries. It would not have suited either the period of the Persian war fifty years before, or that of Demosthenês seventy years afterwards. At the former period, the art, the letters, and the philosophy, adverted to with pride by Periklês, were as yet backward, while even the active energy and democratical stimulus, though very powerful, had not been worked up to the pitch which they afterwards reached: at the latter period, although the intellectual manifestations of Athens subsist in full or even increased vigour, we shall find the personal enterprise and energetic spirit of her citizens materially abated. As the circumstances, which I have already recounted, go far to explain the previous upward movement, so those which fill the coming chapters, containing the disasters of the Peloponnesian war, will be found to explain still more completely the declining tendency shortly about to commence. Athens was brought to the brink of entire ruin, from which it is surprising that she recovered at all—but noway surprising that she recovered at the expense of a considerable loss of personal energy in the character of her citizens.

And thus the season at which Periklês delivered his

discourse lends to it an additional and peculiar pathos. It was at a time when Athens was as yet erect and at her maximum. For though her real power was doubtless much diminished compared with the period before the Thirty years' truce, yet the great edifices and works of art, achieved since then, tended to compensate that loss, insofar as the sense of greatness was concerned: and no one, either citizen or enemy, considered Athens as having at all declined. It was at the commencement of the great struggle with the Peloponnesian confederacy, the coming hardships of which Periklēs never disguised either to himself or to his fellow-citizens, though he fully counted upon eventual success. Attica had been already invaded; it was no longer "the unwasted territory," as Euripidēs had designated it in his tragedy *Medea*,¹ represented three or four months before the march of Archidamus. A picture of Athens in her social glory was well-calculated both to rouse the pride and nerve the courage of those individual citizens, who had been compelled once, and would be compelled again and again, to abandon their country-residence and fields for a thin tent or confined hole in the city.² Such calamities might indeed be fore-

Peculiar and interesting moment at which the discourse of Periklēs was delivered. Athens now at the maximum of her power—declining tendency commences soon afterwards.

¹ Euripidēs, *Medea*, 824. ἐρᾶς ἕρως ἀποβήσου τ', κc.

² The remarks of Dionysius Halikarnassus, tending to show that the number of dead buried on this occasion was so small, and the actions in which they had been slain so insignificant, as to be unworthy of so elaborate an harangue as this of Periklēs—and finding fault with Thucydidēs on that ground—are by no means well-founded or justifiable. He treats Thucydidēs like a dramatic writer putting a speech into the mouth of one of his characters, and he considers that the occasion chosen for this speech was unworthy. But though this assumption would be correct with regard to many ancient historians, and to Dionysius himself in his Roman history—it is not

correct with reference to Thucydidēs. The speech of Periklēs was a real speech, heard, reproduced, and doubtless drest up, by Thucydidēs: if therefore more is said than the number of the dead or the magnitude of the occasion warranted, this is the fault of Periklēs, and not of Thucydidēs. Dionysius says that there were many other occasions throughout the war much more worthy of an elaborate funeral harangue—especially the disastrous loss of the Sicilian army. But Thucydidēs could not have heard any of them, after his exile in the eighth year of the war: and we may well presume that none of them would bear any comparison with this of Periklēs. Nor does Dionysius at all appreciate the full circumstances of this first year of the war—which,

seen: but there was one still greater calamity, which though actually then impending, could not be foreseen: the terrific pestilence which will be recounted in the coming chapter. The bright colours and tone of cheerful confidence, which pervade the discourse of Periklês, appear the more striking from being in immediate antecedence to the awful description of this distemper: a contrast, to which Thucydidês was doubtless not insensible, and which is another circumstance enhancing the interest of the composition.

when completely felt, will be found eminently seasonable. See Dionys.
to render the splendid and copious H. de Thucyd. Judic. p. 849-851.
harangue of the great statesman

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND YEAR DOWN TO THE END OF THE THIRD YEAR OF THE PELO- PONNESIAN WAR.

AT the close of one year after the attempted surprise of Plataea by the Thebans, the belligerent parties in Greece remained in an unaltered position as to relative strength. Nothing decisive had been accomplished on either side, either by the invasion of Attica, or by the flying descents round the coast of Peloponnesus. In spite of mutual damage inflicted—doubtless in the greatest measure upon Attica—no progress was yet made towards the fulfilment of those objects which had induced the Peloponnesians to go to war. Especially the most pressing among all their wishes—the relief of Potidæa—was noway advanced; for the Athenians had not found it necessary to relax the blockade of that city. The result of the first year's operations had thus been to disappoint the hopes of the Corinthians and the other ardent instigators of war, while it justified the anticipations both of Periklês and of Archidamus.

430 B.C.
Barren re-
sults of the
operations
during the
first year
of war.

A second devastation of Attica was resolved upon for the commencement of spring; and measures were taken for carrying it all over that territory, since the settled policy of Athens not to hazard a battle with the invaders was now ascertained. About the end of March or beginning of April, the entire Peloponnesian force (two-thirds from each confederate city as before) was assembled under the command of Archidamus and marched into Attica. This time they carried the work of systematic destruction not merely over the Thriasian plain and the plain immediately near to Athens, as before; but also to the more southerly portions of Attica, down even as far as the mines of Laurium. They traversed and ravaged both

Second in-
vasion of
Attica by
the Pelo-
ponnesians
—more
spreading
and ruinous
than the
first.

the eastern and the western coast, remaining not less than forty days in the country. They found the territory deserted as before, all the population having retired within the walls.¹

In regard to this second invasion, Periklēs recommended the same defensive policy as he had applied to the first; and apparently the citizens had now come to acquiesce in it, if not willingly, at least with a full conviction of its necessity. But a new visitation had now occurred, diverting their attention from the invader, though enormously aggravating their sufferings. A few days after Archidamus entered Attica, a pestilence or epidemic sickness broke out unexpectedly at Athens.

It appears that this terrific disorder had been raging for some time throughout the regions round the Mediterranean; having begun, as was believed, in Ethiopia—thence passing into Egypt and Libya, and overrunning a considerable portion of Asia under the Persian government. About sixteen years before, too, there had been a similar calamity in Rome and in various parts of Italy. Recently, it had been felt in Lemnos and some other islands of the Ægean, yet seemingly not with such intensity as to excite much notice generally in the Grecian world: at length it passed to Athens, and first showed itself in the Peiræus. The progress of the disease was as rapid and destructive as its appearance had been sudden; whilst the extraordinary accumulation of people within the city and long walls, in consequence of the presence of the invaders in the country, was but too favourable to every form of contagion. Families crowded together in close cabins and places of temporary shelter²—throughout a city constructed (like most of those in Greece) with little regard to the conditions of

Commencement of the pestilence or epidemic at Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 47-55.

² Thucyd. ii. 52; Diodor. xii. 45; Plutarch, Periklēs, c. 34. It is to be remarked, that the Athenians, though their persons and moveable property were crowded within the walls, had not driven in their sheep and cattle also, but had transported them over to Eubœa and the neighbouring islands (Thucyd. ii. 14). Hence they escaped a

serious aggravation of their epidemic: for in the accounts of the epidemics which desolated Rome under similar circumstances, we find the accumulation of great numbers of cattle, along with human beings, specified as a terrible addition to the calamity (see Livy, iii. 66; Dionys. Hal. Ant. Rom. x. 53: compare Niebuhr, Römisch. Gesch. vol. ii. p. 90).

salubrity—and in a state of mental chagrin from the forced abandonment and sacrifice of their properties in the country, transmitted the disorder with fatal facility from one to the other. Beginning as it did about the middle of April, the increasing heat of summer farther aided the disorder, the symptoms of which, alike violent and sudden, made themselves the more remarked because the year was particularly exempt from maladies of every other description.¹

Of this plague—or (more properly) eruptive typhoid fever,² distinct from, yet analogous to, the small-pox—a description no less clear than impressive has been left by the historian Thucydidès, himself not only a spectator but a sufferer. It is not one of the least of his merits, that his notice of the symptoms, given at so early a stage of medical science and observation, is such as to instruct the medical reader of the present age, and to enable the malady to be understood and identified. The observations with which that notice is ushered in,

Descrip-
tion of the
epidemic
by Thucy-
didès—his
conception
of the duty
of exactly
observing
and record-
ing.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 49. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔτος, ὡς ωμολογεῖτο, ἐκ πάντων μάλιστα δὴ κείνου ἄνοσον ἐς τὰς ἄλλας ἀσθεναίας ἐτόχηνεν ὄν. Hippokratès, in his description of the epidemic fever at Thasos, makes a similar remark on the absence of all other disorders at the time (Epidem. i. 8. vol. ii. p. 640, ed. Littré).

² "La description de Thucydide (observe M. Littré, in his introduction to the works of Hippokratès, tom. i. p. 122) est tellement bonne qu'elle suffit pleinement pour nous faire comprendre ce que cette ancienne maladie a été: et il est fort à regretter que des médecins tels qu'Hippocrate et Galien n'aient rien écrit sur les grandes épidémies, dont ils ont été les spectateurs. Hippocrate a été témoin de cette peste racontée par Thucydide, et il ne nous en a pas laissé la description. Galien vit également la fièvre éruptive qui désola le monde sous Marc Aurèle, et qu'il appelle lui-même la longue peste. Cependant excepté

quelques mots épars dans ses volumineux ouvrages, excepté quelques indications fugitives, il ne nous a rien transmis sur un événement médical aussi important; à tel point que si nous n'avions pas le récit de Thucydide, il nous seroit fort difficile de nous faire une idée de celle qu'a vue Galien, et qui est la même (comme M. Hecker s'est attaché à le démontrer) que la maladie connue sous le nom de Peste d'Athènes. C'était une fièvre éruptive, différente de la variole, et éteinte aujourd'hui. On a cru en voir les traces dans les charbons (ἀνθρακες) des livres Hippocratiques."

Both Krauss (Disquisitio de naturâ morbi Atheniensium. Stuttgart, 1831, p. 38) and Häuser (Historisch-Patholog. Untersuchungen. Dresden, 1839, p. 50) assimilate the pathological phenomena specified by Thucydides to different portions of the Ἐπιδημία of Hippokratès. M. Littré thinks that the resemblance is not close or precise,

deserve particular attention. "In respect to this distemper (he says), let every man, physician or not, say what he thinks respecting the source from whence it may probably have arisen, and respecting the causes which he deems sufficiently powerful to have produced so great a revolution. But I, having myself had the distemper, and having seen others suffering under it, will state *what it actually was*, and will indicate in addition such other matters, as will furnish any man, who lays them to heart, with knowledge and the means of calculation beforehand, in case the same misfortune should ever again occur."¹ To record past facts, as a basis for rational prevision in regard to the future—the same sentiment which Thucydides mentions in his preface,² as having animated him to the composition of his history—was at that time a duty so little understood, that we have reason to admire not less the manner in which he performs it in practice, than the distinctness with which he conceives it in theory. We may infer from his language that speculation in his day was active respecting the causes of this plague, according to the vague and fanciful physics, and scanty stock of ascertained facts, which was all that could

so as to admit of the one being identified with the other. "Le tableau si frappant qu'en a tracé ce grand historien ne se reproduit pas certainement avec une netteté suffisante dans les brefs détails donnés par Hippocrate. La maladie d'Athènes avoit un type si tranché, que tous ceux qui en ont parlé ont du le reproduire dans ses parties essentielles." (Argument aux 2me Livre des Epidémies, Œuvres d'Hippocrate, tom. v. p. 64.) There appears good reason to believe that the great epidemic which prevailed in the Roman world under Marcus Aurelius (the Pestis Antoniniana) was a renewal of what is called the Plague of Athens.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 48. λεγέτω μὲν οὖν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὡς ἕκαστος γιγνώσκει, καὶ ἰατρός καὶ ἰδιώτης, ἀφ' ὅτου εἰκὸς ἦν γενέσθαι αὐτό, καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔστινας νομίζει τοσαύτης μεταβολῆς ἰκανὰς εἶναι δύναμιν ἐς τὸ με-

ταστῆραι σχεῖν ἐγὼ δὲ οἶόν τε ἐρίγνετο λέξω, καὶ ἀπ' ὧν ἂν τις σκοπῶν, εἴ ποτε καὶ αὐθις ἐπιπέσοι, μάλιστα' ἂν ἔχοι τι προειδῶς μὴ ἄγνοεῖν, ταῦτα δηλώσω, αὐτὸς τε νοσήσας καὶ αὐτὸς ἰδὼν ἄλλους πάσχοντας.

Demokritus, among others, connected the generation of these epidemics with his general system of atoms, atmospheric effluvia, and εἰδῶλα: see Plutarch, Symposiac. viii. 9, p. 733; Demokriti Fragment., ed. Mullach. lib. iv. p. 409.

The causes of the Athenian epidemic as given by Diodorus (xii. 58)—unusual rains, watery quality of grain, absence of the Etesian winds, &c., may perhaps be true of the revival of the epidemic in the fifth year of the war, but can hardly be true of its first appearance; since Thucydides states that the year in other respects was unusually healthy, and the epidemic was evidently brought from foreign parts to Peiræus.

² Thucyd. i. 22.

then be consulted. By resisting the itch of theorising from one of those loose hypotheses which then appeared plausibly to explain everything, he probably renounced the point of view from which most credit and interest would be derivable at the time. But his simple and precise summary of observed facts carries with it an imperishable value, and even affords grounds for imagining that he was no stranger to the habits and training of his contemporary Hippokratês, and the other Asklepiads of Kos.¹

¹ See the words of Thucydides, ii. 49. καὶ ἀποκαθάρσεις χολῆς πᾶσαι ἔσονται ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν ὀνομασμέναι εἰσὶν, ἐπήρσαν—which would seem to indicate a familiarity with the medical terminology:—compare also his allusion to the speculations of the physicians, cited in the previous note; and c. 51—τὰ πάσῃ διαίτη θεραπευόμενα, &c.

In proof how rare the conception was in ancient times, of the importance of collecting and registering particular medical facts, I transcribe the following observations from M. Littré (*Œuvres d'Hippocrate*, tom. iv. p. 446, *Remarques Retrospectives*).

“Toutefois ce qu'il importe ici de constater, ce n'est pas qu'Hippocrate a observé de telle ou telle manière, mais c'est qu'il a eu l'idée de recueillir et de consigner des faits particuliers. En effet, rien, dans l'antiquité, n'a été plus rare que ce soin: outre Hippocrate, je ne connois qu'Erasistrate qui se soit occupé de relater sous cette forme les résultats de son expérience clinique. Ni Galien lui-même, ni Arétée, ni Soranus, ni les autres qui sont arrivés jusqu'à nous, n'ont suivi un aussi louable exemple. Les observations consignées dans la collection Hippocratique constituent la plus grande partie, à beaucoup près, de ce que l'antiquité a possédé en ce genre: et si, en commentant le travail d'Hippocrate, on l'avait un peu imité,

nous aurions des matériaux à l'aide desquels nous prendrions une idée bien plus précise de la pathologie de ces siècles reculés. . . . Mais tout en exprimant ce regret et en reconnaissant cette utilité relative à nous autres modernes et véritablement considérable, il faut ajouter que l'antiquité avoit dans les faits et la doctrine Hippocratiques un aliment qui lui a suffi—et qu'une collection, même étendue, d'histoires particulières n'auroit pas alors modifié la médecine, du moins la médecine scientifique, essentiellement et au delà de la limite que comportoit la physiologie. Je pourrai montrer ailleurs que la doctrine d'Hippocrate et de l'école de Cos a été la seule solide, la seule fondée sur un aperçu vrai de la nature organisée; et que les sectes postérieures, méthodisme et pneumatisme, n'ont bâti leurs théories que sur des hypothèses sans consistance. Mais ici je me contente de remarquer, que la pathologie, en tant que science, ne peut marcher qu'à la suite de la physiologie, dont elle n'est qu'une des faces: et d'Hippocrate à Galien inclusivement, la physiologie ne fit pas assez de progrès pour rendre insuffisante la conception Hippocratique. Il en résulte, nécessairement, que la pathologie, toujours considérée comme science, n'auroit pu, par quelque procédé que ce fût, gagner que des corrections et des augmentations de détail.”

It is hardly within the province of an historian of Greece to repeat after Thucydidès the painful enumeration of symptoms, violent in the extreme and pervading every portion of the bodily system, which marked this fearful disorder. Beginning in Peiræus, it quickly passed into the city, and both the one and the other was speedily filled with sickness and suffering, the like of which had never before been known. The seizures were sudden, and a large proportion of the sufferers perished after deplorable agonies on the seventh or on the ninth day. Others, whose strength of constitution carried them over this period, found themselves the victims of exhausting and incurable diarrhœa afterwards: with others again, after traversing both these stages, the distemper fixed itself in some particular member, the eyes, the genitals, the hands, or the feet, which were rendered permanently useless, or in some cases amputated, even where the patient himself recovered. There were also some whose recovery was attended with a total loss of memory, so that they no more knew themselves or recognised their friends. No treatment or remedy appearing, except in accidental cases, to produce any beneficial effect, the physicians or surgeons whose aid was invoked became completely at fault. While trying their accustomed means without avail, they soon ended by catching the malady themselves and perishing. The charms and incantations,¹ to which the unhappy patient resorted, were not likely to be more efficacious. While some asserted that the Peloponnesians had poisoned the cisterns of water, others referred the visitation to the wrath of the Gods, and especially to Apollo, known by hearers of the Iliad as author

¹ Compare the story of Thalêtas appeasing an epidemic at Sparta by his music and song (Plutarch, *De Musicâ*, p. 1146).

Some of the ancient physicians were firm believers in the efficacy of these charms and incantations. Alexander of Tralles says that having originally treated them with contempt, he had convinced himself of their value by personal observation, and altered his opinion (ix. 4)—ἐπιτοὶ γοῦν οἴονται τοῖς τῶν

γραῶν μύθοις ἐοικέναι τὰς ἐπιφθὰς, ὡς περ καὶ γὰρ μέγρι πολλοῦ τῷ χρόνῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων ἐπιστήην εἶναι δόναμιν ἐς αὐτάς. See an interesting and valuable dissertation, *Origines Contagii*, by Dr. C. F. Marx (Stuttgart, 1824, p. 129).

The suffering Hêraklès, in his agony under the poisoned tunic, invokes the αἰεὶδὸς along with the χειροτέχνης ἱατρορίας (Sophoklès, *Trachin.* 1005).

of pestilence in the Greek host before Troy. It was remembered that this Delphian god had promised the Lacedæmonians, in reply to their application immediately before the war, that he would assist them whether invoked or uninvoked—and the disorder now raging was ascribed to the intervention of their irresistible ally; while the elderly men farther called to mind an oracular verse sung in the time of their youth—"The Dorian war will come, and pestilence along with it."¹ Under the distress which suggested, and was reciprocally aggravated by, these gloomy ideas, prophets were consulted, and supplications with solemn procession were held at the temples, to appease the divine wrath.

When it was found that neither the priest nor the physician could retard the spread, or mitigate the intensity, of the disorder, the Athenians abandoned themselves to despair, and the space within the walls became a scene of desolating misery. Every man attacked with the malady at once lost his courage—a state of depression, itself among the worst features of the case, which made him lie down and die, without any attempt to seek for preservatives. And though at first friends and relatives lent their aid to tend the sick with the usual family sympathies, yet so terrible was the number of these attendants who perished, "like sheep," from such contact, that at length no man would thus expose himself; while the most

Inefficacy of remedies—despair and demoralisation of the Athenians.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 54.

Φάσκοντες οἱ πρεσβύτεροι πάλαι ᾄδεσθαι—

"Ἦξει Δωριακὸς πόλεμος, καὶ λοιμὸς ἄμ' αὐτῶν.

See also the first among the epistles ascribed to the orator Æschinês respecting a λοιμὸς in Delos.

It appears that there was a debate whether, in this Hexameter verse, λιμός (famine) or λοιμός (pestilence) was the correct reading: and the probability is, that it had been originally composed with the word λοιμός—for men might well fancy beforehand that *famine* would be a sequel of the Dorian war, but they would not be likely

to imagine *pestilence* as accompanying it. Yet (says Thucydides) the reading λοιμός was held decidedly preferable, as best fitting to the actual circumstances (οἱ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς ἃ ἔπασχον τὴν μνήμην ἐποιούνητο). And "if (he goes on to say) there should ever hereafter come another Dorian war, and famine along with it, the oracle will probably be reproduced with the word λιμός as part of it."

This deserves notice, as illustrating the sort of admitted licence with which men twisted the oracles or prophecies, so as to hit the feelings of the actual moment.

generous spirits, who persisted longest in the discharge of their duty, were carried off in the greatest numbers.¹ The patient was thus left to die alone and unheeded. Sometimes all the inmates of a house were swept away one after the other, no man being willing to go near it: desertion on the one hand, attendance on the other, both tended to aggravate the calamity. There remained only those who, having had the disorder and recovered, were willing to tend the sufferers. These men formed the single exception to the all-pervading misery of the time—for the disorder seldom attacked any one twice, and when it did, the second attack was never fatal. Elate with their own escape, they deemed themselves out of the reach of all disease, and were full of compassionate kindness for others whose sufferings were just beginning. It was from them too that the principal attention to the bodies of deceased victims proceeded: for such was the state of dismay and sorrow, that even the nearest relatives neglected the sepulchral duties, sacred beyond all others in the eyes of a Greek. Nor is there any circumstance which conveys to us so vivid an idea of the prevalent agony and despair, as when we read in the words of an eye-witness, that the deaths took place among this close-packed crowd without the smallest decencies of attention²—that the dead and the dying lay piled one upon another not merely in the public roads, but even in the temples, in spite of the understood defilement of the sacred building—that half-dead sufferers were seen lying round all the springs, from insupportable thirst—that the numerous corpses thus unburied and exposed, were in such a condition, that the dogs which meddled with them died in consequence, while no vultures or other birds of the like habits ever came

¹ Compare Diodor. xiv. 70, who mentions similar distresses in the Carthaginian army besieging Syracuse, during the terrible epidemic with which it was attacked in 395 B.C.; and Livy, xxv. 26, respecting the epidemic at Syracuse when it was besieged by Marcellus and the Romans.

² Thucyd. ii. 52. Οἰκίῳν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπαρχουσῶν, ἀλλ' ἐν καλύβαις πινηγραιῖς ὥρα ἔτους διαιωμένων, ὁ φύλο-

ρος ἐγίγνετο οὐδενὶ κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ νεκροὶ ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισ ἀποθησσκοντες ἔκειντο, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἐκαλυδοῦντο καὶ περὶ τὰς κρήνας ἀπάσας ἡμιθνήτες, τοῦ ὕδατος ἐπιθυμίᾳ. Τὰ τε ἱερά ἐν οἷς ἐσκήνηντο, νεκρῶν πλέα ἦν, αὐτοῦ ἐναποθησσκόντων ὑπερβιζομένου γὰρ τοῦ κακοῦ οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὐκ ἔχοντες ὅ,τι γένωνται, ἐς ὀλιγωρίας ἐτρέποντο καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὁσίων ὁμοίως.

near. Those bodies which escaped entire neglect were burnt or buried¹ without the customary mourning, and with unseemly carelessness. In some cases, the bearers of a body, passing by a funeral pile on which another body was burning, would put their own there to be burnt also;² or perhaps, if the pile was prepared ready for a body not yet arrived, would deposit their own upon it, set fire to the pile, and then depart. Such indecent confusion would have been intolerable to the feelings of the Athenians, in any ordinary times.

To all these scenes of physical suffering, death, and reckless despair—was superadded another evil, which affected those who were fortunate enough to escape the rest. The bonds both of law and morality became relaxed, amidst such total uncertainty of every man both for his own life, and that of others. Men cared not to abstain from wrong, under circumstances in which punishment was not likely to overtake them—nor to put a check upon their passions, and endure privations, in obedience even to their strongest conviction, when the chance was so small of their living to reap reward or enjoy any future esteem. An interval, short and sweet, before their doom was realised—before they became plunged in the wide-spread misery which they witnessed around, and which affected indiscriminately the virtuous and the profligate—was all that they looked to enjoy; embracing with avidity the immediate pleasures of sense, as well as such positive gains, however ill-gotten, as could be made the means of procuring them, and throwing aside all thought both of honour or of long-sighted advantage. Life and property being alike ephemeral, there was no hope left but to snatch a moment of enjoyment, before the outstretched hand of destiny should fall upon its victims.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 50: compare Livy, xli. 21, describing the epidemic at Rome in 174 B.C. "Cadavera, intacta à canibus et vulturibus, tabes absumebat: satisque constabat, nec illo, nec priore anno in tantâ strage boum hominumque vulturium usquam visum."

² Thucyd. ii. 52. From the language of Thucydides, we see that this was regarded at Athens as highly unbecoming. Yet a passage of Plutarch seems to show that it was very common, in his time, to burn several bodies on the same funeral pile (Plutarch, Symposiac. ii. 3, p. 651).

The picture of society under the pressure of a murderous epidemic, with its train of physical torments, wretchedness, and demoralisation, has been drawn by more than one eminent author, but by none with more impressive fidelity and conciseness than by Thucydides,¹ who had no predecessor, nor anything but the reality, to copy from. We may remark that amidst all the melancholy accompaniments of the time, there are no human sacrifices, such as those offered up at Carthage during pestilence to appease the anger of the gods—there are no cruel persecutions against imaginary authors of the disease, such as those against the Untori (anointers of doors) in the plague of Milan in 1630.²

Three years altogether did this calamity desolate Athens: continuously, during the entire second and third years of the war—after which followed a period of marked abatement for a year and a half: but it then revived again, and lasted for another year, with the same fury as at first. The public loss, over and above the private misery, which this unexpected enemy inflicted upon Athens, was incalculable. Out of 1200 horsemen, all among the rich men of the state, 300 died of the epidemic; besides 4400 hoplites out of the roll formally kept, and a number of the poorer population, so great as to defy computation.³ No efforts of the Peloponnesians could have done so much to ruin Athens, or to bring the war to a termination such as they desired: and the distemper told the more in their favour, as it never spread at all into Peloponnesus, though it passed from Athens to some of the more populous islands.⁴

¹ The description in the sixth book of Lucretius, translated and expanded from Thucydides—that of the plague at Florence in 1348, with which the Decameron of Boccaccio opens—and that of Defoe in his History of the Plague in London—are all well-known.

² "Carthaginienses, cum inter cetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruentâ sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio, usi sunt: quippe homines ut victimas immobilabant; pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum

vita Dii rogari maximè solent" (Justin, xviii. 6).

For the facts respecting the plague of Milan and the Untori, see the interesting novel of Manzoni—Promessi Sposi—and the historical work of the same author—Storia della Colonna Infame.

³ Thucyd. iii. 87. τοῦ δὲ ἄλλου ὄχλου ἀνεξέστρατος ἀριθμός. Diodorus makes them above 10,000 (xii. 58) freemen and slaves together, which must be greatly beneath the reality.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 54. τῶν ἄλλων χωρίων τὰ πολυανθρωπώτατα. He does

The Lacedæmonian army was withdrawn from Attica somewhat earlier than it would otherwise have been, for fear of taking the contagion.¹

But it was while the Lacedæmonians were yet in Attica, and during the first freshness of the terrible malady, that Periklês equipped and conducted from Peiræus an armament of 100 triremes and 4000 hoplites to attack the coasts of Peloponnesus: 300 horsemen were also carried in some horse-transport, prepared for the occasion out of old triremes. To diminish the crowd accumulated in the city, was doubtless of beneficial tendency, and perhaps those who went aboard might consider it as a chance of escape to quit an infected home. But unhappily they carried the infection along with them, which desolated the fleet not less than the city, and crippled all its efforts.

Reinforced by fifty ships of war from Chios and Lesbos, the Athenians first landed near Epidaurus in Peloponnesus, ravaging the territory and making an unavailing attempt upon the city: next they made like incursions on the more southerly portions of the Argolic peninsula—Trœzen, Halieis, and Hermionê; and lastly attacked and captured Prasiæ, on the eastern coast of Laconia. On returning to Athens, the same armament was immediately conducted under Agnon and Kleopompus, to press the siege of Potidæa, the blockade of which still continued without any visible progress. On arriving there, an attack was made on the walls by battering engines and by the other aggressive methods then practised; but nothing whatever was achieved. In fact, the armament became incompetent for all serious effort, from the aggravated character which the distemper here assumed, communicated by the soldiers fresh from Athens even to those who had before been free from it at Potidæa. So frightful was the mortality, that out of the 4000 hoplites under Agnon, no less than 1050 died in the short space of forty days. The armament was brought back in this distressed condition to Athens, while the reduction of Potidæa was left as before to the slow course of blockade.²

Athenian armament sent first against Peloponnesus, next against Potidæa—it is attacked and ruined by the epidemic.

not specify what places these were: that island occurs.

—perhaps Chios, but hardly Lesbos, otherwise the fact would have been noticed when the revolt of

¹ Thueyd. ii. 57.

² Thueyd. ii. 56-58.

On returning from the expedition against Peloponnesus, Periklēs found his countrymen almost distracted¹ with their manifold sufferings. Over and above the raging epidemic, they had just gone over Attica and ascertained the devastations committed by the invaders throughout all the territory (except the Marathonian² Tetrapolis and Dekeleia—districts spared, as we are told, through indulgence founded on an ancient legendary sympathy) during their long stay of forty days. The rich had found their comfortable mansions and farms, the poor their modest cottages, in the various demes, torn down and ruined. Death,³ sickness, loss of property, and despair of the future, now rendered the Athenians angry and intractable to the last degree. They vented their feelings against Periklēs as the cause not merely of the war, but also of all that they were now enduring. Either with or without his consent, they sent envoys to Sparta to open negotiations for peace, but the Spartans turned a deaf ear to the proposition. This new disappointment rendered them still more furious against Periklēs, whose long-standing political enemies now doubtless found strong sympathy in their denunciations of his character and policy. That unshaken and majestic firmness, which ranked first among his many eminent qualities, was never more imperiously required and never more effectively manifested.

In his capacity of Stratêgus or General, Periklēs convoked a formal assembly of the people, for the purpose of vindicating himself publicly against the prevailing sentiment, and recommending perseverance in his line of policy. The speeches made by his opponents, assuredly very bitter, are not given by Thucydidēs; but that of Periklēs himself is set down at considerable length, and a memorable discourse it is. It strikingly brings into relief both the character of the man and the impress of actual circumstances—an impregnable mind conscious not only of right pur-

¹ Thucyd. ii. 59. ἡλλοίωοντο τὰς γνώμας.

² Diodor. xii. 45; Ister ap. Schol. ad Soph. Œdip. Colon. 689; Herodot. ix.

³ Thucyd. ii. 65. Ὁ μὲν δῆμος, ἕτι

ἀπ' ἐλασσόνων ὀρμώμενος, ἐστέρητο καὶ τούτων οἱ δὲ δυνατοί, κατὰ κτήματα κατὰ τὴν χώραν οἰκοδομίας τε καὶ πολυτελεῖς κατασκευαῖς ἀπολωλεχότες.

poses but of just and reasonable anticipations, and bearing up with manliness, or even defiance, against the natural difficulty of the case, heightened by an extreme of incalculable misfortune. He had foreseen,¹ while advising the war originally, the probable impatience of his countrymen under its first hardships, but he could not foresee the epidemic by which that impatience had been exasperated into madness: and he now addressed them not merely with unabated adherence to his own deliberate convictions, but also in a tone of reproachful remonstrance against their unmerited change of sentiment towards him—seeking at the same time to combat that uncontrolled despair which for the moment overlaid both their pride and their patriotism. Far from humbling himself before the present sentiment, it is at this time that he sets forth his titles to their esteem in the most direct and unqualified manner, and claims the continuance of that which they had so long accorded, as something belonging to him by acquired right.

His main object, through this discourse, is to fill the minds of his audience with patriotic sympathy for the weal of the entire city, so as to counterbalance the absorbing sense of private woe. If the collective city flourishes (he argues), private misfortunes may at least be borne: but no amount of private prosperity will avail, if the collective city falls (a proposition literally true in ancient times and under the circumstances of ancient warfare—though less true at present). “Distracted by domestic calamity, ye are now angry both with me who advised you to go to war, and with yourselves who followed the advice. Ye listened to me, considering me superior to others in judgment, in speech, in patriotism, and in incorruptible probity²—nor ought I now to be treated as culpable for giving such advice, when in point of fact the war was unavoidable and there would have been still greater danger in shrinking from it. I am the same man, still unchanged—but ye in your misfortunes cannot stand to the convictions which ye adopted when yet unhurt. Extreme and unforeseen, indeed, are the sorrows which have fallen upon you: yet inhabiting as ye do a

Athenian public assembly—last speech of Periklēs—his high tone of self-esteem against the public discontent.

¹ Thucyd. i. 140.

² Thucyd. ii. 60. καίτοι ἐμοί ποιοῦσιν ἀνδρὶ ὀργίσσθε, ὅς οὐδενός

οἶμαι ἤσσαν εἶναι γυνῶνά τε τὰ θεῶν τε καὶ ἐρμηνεύσαι τούτῳ φιλόπολις τε καὶ χρημάτων κρείστων.

great city, and brought up in dispositions suitable to it, ye must also resolve to bear up against the utmost pressure of adversity, and never to surrender your dignity. I have often explained to you that ye have no reason to doubt of eventual success in the war, but I will now remind you, more emphatically than before, and even with a degree of ostentation suitable as a stimulus to your present unnatural depression—that your naval force makes you masters not only of your allies, but of the entire sea¹—one half of the visible field for action and employment. Compared with so vast a power as this, the temporary use of your houses and territory is a mere trifle—an ornamental accessory not worth considering: and this too, if ye preserve your freedom, ye will quickly recover. It was your fathers who first gained this empire, without any of the advantages which ye now enjoy; ye must not disgrace yourselves by losing what they acquired. Delighting as ye all do in the honour and empire enjoyed by the city, ye must not shrink from the toils whereby alone that honour is sustained: moreover ye now fight, not merely for freedom instead of slavery, but for empire against loss of empire, with all the perils arising out of imperial unpopularity. It is not safe for you now to abdicate, even if ye chose to do so; for ye hold your empire like a despotism—unjust perhaps in the original acquisition, but ruinous to part with when once acquired. Be not angry with me, whose advice ye followed in going to war, because the enemy have done such damage as might be expected from them: still less on account of this unforeseen distemper: I know that this makes me an object of your special present hatred, though very unjustly, unless ye will consent to give me credit also for any unexpected good luck which may occur. Our city derives its particular glory from unshaken bearing up against misfortune: her power, her name, her empire of Greeks over Greeks, are such as have never before been seen: and if we choose to be great, we must take the consequence of that temporary envy and hatred which is

¹ Thucyd. ii. 62. δηλώσω δὲ καὶ τοῦδε, ὃ μοι δοκεῖτε οὐτ' αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους περὶ ἐς τὴν ἀρχήν, οὐτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις· οὐδ' ἂν νῦν ἐχρησάμην κομπώδεστέραν ἔχοντι τὴν προσηγορίαν, εἰ μὴ καταπεπληγμένους

ὑμᾶς παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἐώρων. Οἴεσθε μὲν γάρ τῶν συμμαχῶν μόνον ἄρχειν—ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποφαίνω δύο μερῶν τῶν ἐς χρῆσιν φανερῶν, γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, τοῦ ἑτέρου ὑμᾶς παντός κυριωτάτους ὄντας, ἐφ' ὅσον τε νῦν νέμεσθε, καὶ ἦν ἐπιπλέον βουληθῆτε.

the necessary price of permanent renown. Behave ye now in a manner worthy of that glory: display that courage which is essential to protect you against disgrace at present, as well as to guarantee your honour for the future. Send no farther embassy to Sparta, and bear your misfortunes without showing symptoms of distress.”¹

The irresistible reason, as well as the proud and resolute bearing of this discourse, set forth with an eloquence which it was not possible for Thucydîs to reproduce—together with the age and character of Periklês—carried the assent of the assembled people; who when in the Pnyx and engaged according to habit on public matters, would for a moment forget their private sufferings in considerations of the safety and grandeur of Athens. Possibly indeed, those sufferings, though still continuing, might become somewhat alleviated when the invaders quitted Attica, and when it was no longer indispensable for all the population to confine itself within the walls. Accordingly, the assembly resolved that no farther propositions should be made for peace, and that the war should be prosecuted with vigour.

But though the public resolution thus adopted showed the ancient habit of deference to the authority of Periklês, the sentiments of individuals taken separately were still those of anger against him as the author of that system which had brought them into so much distress. His political opponents—Kleon, Simmias, or Lakratidas, perhaps all three in conjunction—took care to provide an opportunity for this prevalent irritation to manifest itself in act, by bringing an accusation against him before the dikastery. The accusation is said to have been preferred on the ground of pecuniary malversation, and ended by his being sentenced to pay a considerable fine, the amount of which is differently reported—fifteen, fifty, or eighty talents, by different authors.² The accusing party thus appeared to have carried their

Powerful effect of his address—new resolution shown for continuing the war—nevertheless, the discontent against Periklês still continues.

He is accused and condemned in a fine.

¹ Thueyd. ii. 60-64. I give a general summary of this memorable speech, without setting forth its full contents, still less the exact words.

² Thueyd. ii. 65; Plato, Gorgias,

p. 515, c. 71; Plutareh, Periklês, e. 35; Diodor. xii. e. 38-45. About Simmias, as the vehement enemy of Periklês, see Plutareh, Reipub. Ger. Præcept. p. 805.

Plutareh and Diodorus both state

point, and to have disgraced, as well as excluded from re-election, the veteran statesman. The event however disappointed their expectations. The imposition of the fine not only satiated all the irritation of the people against him, but even occasioned a serious reaction in his favour, and brought back as strongly as ever the ancient sentiment of esteem and admiration. It was quickly found that those who had succeeded Periklēs as generals neither possessed nor deserved in an equal degree the public confidence. He was accordingly soon re-elected, with as much power and influence as he had ever in his life enjoyed.¹

But that life, long, honourable, and useful, had already been prolonged considerably beyond the sixtieth year, and there were but too many circumstances, besides the recent fine, which tended to hasten as well as to embitter its close. At the very moment when Periklēs was preaching to his

Old age of Periklēs—his family misfortunes—and suffering.

that Periklēs was not only fined, but also removed from his office of Stratēgus. Thucydidēs mentions the fine, but not the removal; and his silence leads me to doubt the reality of the latter event altogether. For with such a man as Periklēs, a vote of removal would have been a penalty more marked and cutting than the fine: moreover, removal from office, though capable of being pronounced by vote of the public assembly, would hardly be inflicted as penalty by the dikastery.

I imagine the events to have passed as follows: The Stratēgi, with most other officers of the Commonwealth, were changed or re-elected at the beginning of Hekatombæon, the first month of the Attic year; that is, somewhere about Midsummer. Now the Peloponnesian army, invading Attica about the end of March or beginning of April, and remaining forty days, would leave the country about the first week in May. Periklēs returned from his expedition against Peloponnesus shortly after they left Attica; that is, about the middle of May (Thucyd. ii. 57):

there still remained therefore a month or six weeks before his office of Stratēgus naturally expired, and required renewal. It was during this interval (which Thucydidēs expresses by the words ἐτι δ' ἔστρατήγει, ii. 59) that he convoked the assembly and delivered the harangue recently mentioned.

But when the time for a new election of Stratēgi arrived, the enemies of Periklēs opposed his re-election, and brought a charge against him in that trial of accountability to which every magistrate at Athens was exposed, after his period of office. They alleged against him some official misconduct in reference to the public money—and the dikastery visited him with a fine. His re-election was thus prevented, and with a man who had been so often re-elected, this might be loosely called "taking away the office of general"—so that the language of Plutarch and Diodorus, as well as the silence of Thucydidēs, would on this supposition be justified.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65.

countrymen, in a tone almost reproachful, the necessity of manful and unabated devotion to the common country, in the midst of private suffering—he was himself among the greatest of sufferers, and most hardly pressed to set the example of observing his own precepts. The epidemic carried off not merely his two sons (the only two legitimate, Xanthippus and Paralus), but also his sister, several other relatives, and his best and most useful political friends. Amidst this train of domestic calamities, and in the funeral obsequies of so many of his dearest friends, he remained master of his grief, and maintained his habitual self-command, until the last misfortune—the death of his favourite son Paralus, which left his house without any legitimate representative to maintain the family and the hereditary sacred rites. On this final blow, though he strove to command himself as before, yet at the obsequies of the young man, when it became his duty to place a wreath on the dead body, his grief became uncontrollable, and he burst out, for the first time in his life, into profuse tears and sobbing.¹

In the midst of these several personal trials he received the intimation, through Alkibiadês and some other friends, of the restored confidence of the people towards him, and of his re-election to the office of Stratêgus. But it was not without difficulty that he was persuaded to present himself again at the public assembly, and resume the direction of affairs. The regret of the people was formally expressed to him for the recent sentence—perhaps indeed the fine may have been repaid to him, or some evasion of it permitted, saving the forms of law²—in the present temper of the city; which was farther displayed towards him by the grant of a remarkable exemption from a law of his own original proposition. He had himself, some years before, been the author of that law, whereby the citizenship of Athens was restricted to persons born both of Athenian fathers and Athenian mothers, under which restriction several thousand persons, illegitimate on the mother's side, are said to have been deprived of the

He is re-elected Stratêgus—restored to power and to the confidence of the people.

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 36.

² See Plutarch, Demosthen. c. 27, about the manner of bringing about such an evasion of a fine:

compare also the letter of M. Boeckh, in Meineke, Fragment. Comie. Græcor. ad Fragm. Eupolid., ii. 527.

citizenship, on occasion of a public distribution of corn. Invidious as it appeared to grant, to Periklès singly, an exemption from a law which had been strictly enforced against so many others, the people were now moved not less by compassion than by anxiety to redress their own previous severity. Without a legitimate heir, the house of Periklès, one branch of the great Alkmæonid Gens by his mother's side, would be left deserted, and the continuity of the family sacred rites would be broken—a misfortune painfully felt by every Athenian family, as calculated to wrong all the deceased members, and provoke their posthumous displeasure towards the city. Accordingly, permission was granted to Periklès to legitimise, and to inscribe in his own gens and phratry, his natural son by Aspasia, who bore his own name.¹

It was thus that Periklès was reinstated in his post of Stratêgus as well as in his ascendancy over the public counsels—seemingly about August or September—430 B.C. He lived about one year longer, and seems to have maintained his influence as long as his health permitted. Yet we hear nothing of him after this moment, and he fell a victim, not to the violent symptoms of the epidemic, but to a slow and wearing fever,² which undermined his strength as well as his capacity. To a friend who came to ask after him when in this disease, Periklès replied by showing a charm or amulet which his female relations had hung about his neck—a proof how low he was reduced, and how completely he had become a passive subject in the hands of others. And according to another anecdote which we read, yet more interesting and equally illustrative of his character—it was during his last moments, when he was lying apparently unconscious and insensible, that the friends around his bed were passing in review the acts of his life, and the nine trophies which he had erected at different times for so many victories. He heard what they said, though they fancied that he was past hearing, and interrupted them by remarking—“What you praise in my life, belongs partly to good fortune—and is, at best, common to me with many

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 37.

² Plutarch, (Perik. c. 38) treats the slow disorder under which he suffered as one of the forms of the

epidemic: but this can hardly be correct, when we read the very marked character of the latter, as described by Thucydides.

other generals. But the peculiarity of which I am most proud, you have not noticed—no Athenian has ever put on mourning through any action of mine.”¹

Such a cause of self-gratulation, doubtless more satisfactory to recall at such a moment than any other, illustrates that long-sighted calculation, ^{His life and character.} aversion to distant or hazardous enterprise, and economy of the public force, which marked his entire political career; a career long, beyond all parallel in the history of Athens—since he maintained a great influence, gradually swelling into a decisive personal ascendancy, for between thirty and forty years. His character has been presented in very different lights by different authors both ancient and modern, and our materials for striking the balance are not so good as we could wish. But his immense and long-continued supremacy, as well as his unparalleled eloquence, are facts attested not less by his enemies than by his friends—nay, even more forcibly by the former than by the latter. The comic writers, who hated him, and whose trade it was to deride and hunt down every leading political character, exhaust their powers of illustration in setting forth both the one and the other:² Telekleidês, Kratinus, Eupolis, Aristophanês, all hearers and all enemies, speak of him like Olympian Zeus hurling thunder and lightning—like Heraklês and Achilles—as the only speaker on whose lips persuasion sat and who left his sting in the minds of his audience: while Plato the philosopher,³ who disapproved of his political working and of the moral effects which he produced upon Athens, nevertheless extols his intellectual and oratorical ascendancy—“his majestic intelligence”—in language not less decisive than Thucydidês. There is another point of eulogy, not less valuable, on which the testimony appears uncontradicted: throughout his long career, amidst the hottest political animosities, the conduct of Periklês towards opponents was always mild and liberal.⁴ The conscious self-esteem and arrogance of manner, with

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 38.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 4, 8, 13, 16; Eupolis. Δῆμοι, Fragm. vi. p. 459, ed. Meineke. Cicero (De Orator. iii. 34; Brutus, 9-11) and Quintilian (ii. 16, 19; x. 1, 82) count

only as witnesses at second-hand.

³ Plato, Gorgias, c. 71, p. 516; Phædrus, c. 54, p. 270. Περικλῆς, τὸν οὕτω μεγαλοσχεπῶς σφῶν ἄνδρα. Plato, Meno. p. 94 B.

⁴ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 10-39.

which the contemporary poet Ion reproached him,¹ contrasting it with the unpretending simplicity of his own patron Kimon—though probably invidiously exaggerated, is doubtless in substance well-founded, and those who read the last speech given above out of Thucydidês will at once recognise in it this attribute. His natural taste, his love of philosophical research, and his unwearied application to public affairs, all contributed to alienate him from ordinary familiarity, and to make him careless, perhaps improperly careless, of the lesser means of conciliating public favour.

But admitting this latter reproach to be well-founded, as it seems to be, it helps to negative that greater and graver political crime which has been imputed to him, of sacrificing the permanent well-being and morality of the state to the maintenance of his own political power—of corrupting the people by distributions of the public money. “He gave the reins to the people (in Plutarch’s words²) and shaped his administration for their immediate favour, by always providing at home some public spectacle or festival or procession, thus nursing up the city in elegant pleasures—and by sending out every year sixty triremes manned by citizen-seamen on full pay, who were thus kept in practice and acquired nautical skill.”

Now the charge here made against Periklês, and supported by allegations in themselves honourable rather than otherwise—of a vicious appetite for immediate popularity, and of improper concessions to the immediate feelings of the people against their permanent interests—is precisely that which Thucydidês in the most pointed manner denies; and not merely denies, but contrasts Periklês with his successors in the express circumstance that *they* did so, while

¹ Plutarch, Periklês, c. 5.

² Plutarch, Periklês, c. 11. Διὸ καὶ τότε μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ τὰς ἡνίας ἀνεῖς ὁ Περικλῆς ἐπολιτεύετο πρὸς χάριν—ἀεὶ μὲν τινα θέαν πανηγυρικὴν ἢ ἐστίασιν ἢ πομπῇν εἶναι μηχανώμενος ἐν ἄσται, καὶ διαπαιδαγωγῶν οὐκ ἀμούσοις ἤδοναῖς τῆς πόλεως—ἐξήχοντα δὲ τριήρεις καθ’ ἕκαστον ἐναυτῶν ἐκπέμπων, ἐν αἷς πολλοῖ τῶν πολιτῶν ἔπλεον ὕκτω μῆνας ἔμισθοί, μελετῶτες ἄμα καὶ μαθήνον-

τες τὴν ναυτικὴν ἐμπειρίαν.

Compare c. 9, where Plutarch says that Perikles, having no other means of contending against the abundant private largesses of his rival Kimon, resorted to the expedient of distributing the public money among the citizens, in order to gain influence; acting in this matter upon the advice of his friend Demonidês, according to the statement of Aristotle.

he did not. The language of the contemporary historian¹ well deserves to be cited—"Periklês, powerful from dignity of character as well as from wisdom, and conspicuously above the least tinge of corruption, held back the people with a free hand, and was their real leader instead of being led by them. For not being a seeker of power from unworthy sources, he did not speak with any view to present favour, but had sufficient sense of dignity to contradict them on occasion, even braving their displeasure. Thus whenever he perceived them insolently and unseasonably confident, he shaped his speeches in such manner as to alarm and beat them down: when again he saw them unduly frightened, he tried to counteract it and restore their confidence: so that the government was in name a democracy, but in reality an empire exercised by the first citizen in the state. But those who succeeded after his death, being more equal one with another, and each of them desiring pre-eminence over the rest, adopted the different course of courting the favour of the people and sacrificing to that object even important state-interests. From whence arose many other bad measures, as might be expected in a great and imperial city, and especially the Sicilian expedition," &c.

It will be seen that the judgement here quoted from Thucydidês contradicts, in an unqualified manner, the reproaches commonly made against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian people—by distributions of the public money, and by giving way to their unwise caprices—for the purpose of acquiring and maintaining his own political power. Nay, the historian particularly notes

Earlier and later political life of Periklês—how far the one differed from the other.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. Ἐκείνος μὲν (Περικλῆς) δυνατός ὦν τῷ τε ἀξίωματι καὶ τῇ γῶμῃ, χρημάτων τε διαφανῶς ἀδωροστατος γενόμενος, κατεῖχε τὸ πλῆθος ἐλευθέρως, καὶ οὐκ ἤγετο μᾶλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ αὐτὸς ἄγε, διὰ τὸ μη κτωμένος εἶσὺ προσηχοῖται τῇ δυνάμει πρὸς ἡδονήν τι λέγειν, ἀλλ' ἔχων ἐπ' ἀξίωσει καὶ πρὸς ἀρχῆν τι ἀντιπεῖναι. Ὅποτε γὰρ αἰσθαιτό τι αὐτοῖς παρὰ καιρὸν ὄρειν θρασυδύνας, λέγωνι κατέπλησσαν ἐπὶ τὸ φροσῖθαι καὶ δεδιότας αὐ ἀλλοίως ἀπικαθίστη πάλιν, ἐπὶ τὸ θαρ-

σεῖν. Ἐγίγνωτο δὲ λόγῳ μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργῳ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρός ἀρχή. Οἱ δὲ ὕστερον ἴσοι αὐτοῖ μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὄντες, καὶ ἀρεγόμενοι τοῦ πρώτου, ἕκαστος γίγνεσθαι, ἐστράπτουτο καθ' ἡδονάς τῷ δήμῳ καὶ τὰ πράγματα ἐνδιδοῖναι. Ἐξ ὧν, ἄλλα τε πολλά, ὡς ἐν μεγάλῃ πόλει καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ, ἡμαρτήθη, καὶ ὁ εἰς Σικελίαν πλοῦς, ὃς οὐ τοσοῦτου γῶμῃς ἀμάρτημα ἦν, &c. Compare Plutarch, Nicias, c. 3.

Ἀξίωσις and ἀξίωμα, as used by Thucydidês, seem to differ in this

the opposite qualities—self-judgement, conscious dignity, indifference to immediate popular applause or wrath when set against what was permanently right and useful—as the special characteristic of that great statesman. A distinction might indeed be possible, and Plutarch professes to note such distinction, between the earlier and the later part of his long political career. Periklês began (so that biographer says) by corrupting the people in order to acquire power; but having acquired it, he employed it in an independent and patriotic manner, so that the judgement of Thucydidês, true respecting the later part of his life, would not be applicable to the earlier. This distinction may be to a certain degree well-founded, inasmuch as the power of opposing a bold and successful resistance to temporary aberrations of the public mind necessarily implies an established influence, and can hardly ever be exercised even by the firmest politician during his years of commencement. He is at that time necessarily the adjunct of some party or tendency which he finds already in operation, and has to stand forward actively and assiduously before he can create for himself a separate personal influence. But while we admit the distinction to this extent, there is nothing to warrant us in restricting the encomium of Thucydidês exclusively to the later life of Periklês, or in representing the earlier life as something in pointed contrast with that encomium. Construing fairly what the historian says, he evidently did not so conceive the earlier life of Periklês. Either those political changes which are held by Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and others, to demonstrate the corrupting effect of Periklês and his political ascendancy—such as the limitation of the functions of the Areopagus, as well as of the power of the magistrates, the establishment of the numerous and frequent popular dikasteries with regular pay, and perhaps also the assignment of pay to those who attended the Ekklesia, the expenditure for public works, religious edifices and ornaments, the Diobely (or distribution of two oboli per head to the poorer citizens at various festivals, in order that they might be able to pay for their places in the theatre), taking

respect: Ἀξιώσει signifies, a man's dignity, or pretensions to esteem and influence, as felt and measured by himself; *his sense of dignity*;

Ἀξίωμα means his *dignity*, properly so called; as felt and appreciated by others. See i. 37, 41, 69.

it as it then stood, &c.—did not appear to Thucydidês mischievous and corrupting, as these other writers thought them; or else he did not particularly refer them to Periklês.

Both are true, probably, to some extent. The internal political changes at Athens, respecting the Areopagus and the dikasteries, took place when Periklês was a young man, and when he cannot be supposed to have yet acquired the immense personal weight which afterwards belonged to him (Ephialtês in fact seems in those early days to have been a greater man than Periklês, if we may judge by the fact that he was selected by his political adversaries for assassination)—so that they might with greater propriety be ascribed to the party with which Periklês was connected, rather than to that statesman himself. But next, we have no reason to presume that Thucydidês considered these changes as

Accusation against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian people—untrue, and not believed by Thucydidês.

injurious, or as having deteriorated the Athenian character. All that he does say as to the working of Periklês on the sentiment and actions of his countrymen is eminently favourable. He represents the presidency of that statesman as moderate, cautious, conservative, and successful; he describes him as uniformly keeping back the people from rash enterprises, and from attempts to extend their empire—as looking forward to the necessity of a war, and maintaining the naval, military, and financial forces of the state in constant condition to stand it—as calculating, with long-sighted wisdom, the conditions on which ultimate success depended. If we follow the elaborate funeral harangue of Periklês (which Thucydidês, since he produces it at length, probably considered as faithfully illustrating the political point of view of that statesman), we shall discover a conception of democratical equality no less rational than generous; an anxious care for the recreation and comfort of the citizens, but no disposition to emancipate them from active obligation, either public or private—and least of all, any idea of dispensing with such activity by abusive largesses out of the general revenue. The whole picture, drawn by Periklês, of Athens “as the schoolmistress of Greece,” implies a prominent development of private industry and commerce not less than of public citizenship and soldiership,—of letters, arts, and recreative varieties of taste.

Though Thucydidês does not directly canvass the constitutional changes effected in Athens under Periklês, yet everything which he does say leads us to believe that he accounted the working of that statesman, upon the whole, on Athenian power as well as on Athenian character, eminently valuable, and his death as an irreparable loss. And we may thus appeal to the judgement of an historian who is our best witness in every conceivable respect, as a valid reply to the charge against Periklês of having corrupted the Athenian habits, character, and government. If he spent a large amount of the public treasure upon religious edifices and ornaments, and upon stately works for the city,—yet the sum which he left untouched, ready for use at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, was such as to appear more than sufficient for all purposes of defence, or public safety, or military honour. It cannot be shown of Periklês that he ever sacrificed the greater object to the less—the permanent and substantially valuable, to the transitory and showy—assured present possessions, to the lust of new, distant, or uncertain conquests. If his advice had been listened to, the rashness which brought on the defeat of the Athenian Tolmidês at Korôneia in Bœotia would have been avoided, and Athens might probably have maintained her ascendancy over Megara and Bœotia, which would have protected her territory from invasion, and given a new turn to the subsequent history. Periklês is not to be treated as the author of the Athenian character: he found it with its very marked positive characteristics and susceptibilities, among which those which he chiefly brought out and improved were the best. The lust of expeditions against the Persians, which Kimon would have pushed into Egypt and Cyprus, he repressed, after it had accomplished all which could be usefully aimed at. The ambition of Athens he moderated rather than encouraged: the democratical movement of Athens he regularised, and worked out into judicial institutions which ranked among the prominent features of Athenian life, and worked, in my judgement, with a very large balance of benefit to the national mind as well as to individual security, in spite of the many defects in their direct character as tribunals. But that point in which there was the greatest difference between Athens, as Periklês found it and as he left it, is un-

Great progress and improvement of the Athenians under Periklês.

questionably, the pacific and intellectual development—rhetoric, poetry, arts, philosophical research, and recreative variety. To which if we add, great improvement in the cultivation of the Attic soil,—extension of Athenian trade—attainment and laborious maintenance of the maximum of maritime skill (attested by the battles of Phormio)—enlargement of the area of complete security by construction of the Long Walls—lastly, the clothing of Athens in her imperial mantle, by ornaments architectural and sculptural,—we shall make out a case of genuine progress realized during the political life of Periklês, such as the evils imputed to him, far more imaginary than real, will go but a little way to alloy. How little, comparatively speaking, of the picture drawn by Periklês in his funeral harangue of 431 B.C. would have been correct, if the harangue had been delivered over those warriors who fell at Tanagra twenty-seven years before!

It has been remarked by M. Boeckh,¹ that Periklês sacrificed the landed proprietors of Attica to the maritime interests and empire of Athens. This is of course founded on the destructive invasions of the country during the Peloponnesian war; for down to the commencement of that war the position of Attic cultivators and proprietors was particularly enviable: and the censure of M. Boeckh therefore depends upon the question, how far Periklês contributed to produce, or had it in his power to avert, this melancholy war, in its results so fatal not merely to Athens, but to the entire Grecian race. Now here again, if we follow attentively the narrative of Thucydidês, we shall see that, in the judgement of that historian, not only Periklês did not bring on the war, but he could not have averted it without such concessions as Athenian prudence as well as Athenian patriotism peremptorily forbade. Moreover we shall see, that the calculations on which Periklês grounded his hopes of success if driven to war.

Periklês is not to blame for the Peloponnesian war.

¹ Boeckh, *Public Economy of Athens*, b. iii. ch. xv. p. 399, Eng. Trans.

Kutzen, in the second Beilage to his treatise, *Periklês als Staatsmann* (p. 169-200), has collected and inserted a list of various characters of Periklês, from twenty

different authors, English, French, and German. That of Wachsmuth is the best of the collection—though even he appears to think that Periklês is to blame for having introduced a set of institutions which none but himself could work well.

were (in the opinion of the historian) perfectly sound and safe. We may even go farther, and affirm, that the administration of Periklês during the fourteen years preceding the war, exhibits a "moderation" (to use the words of Thucydidês¹) dictated chiefly by anxiety to avoid raising causes of war. If in the months immediately preceding the breaking out of the war, after the conduct of the Corinthians at Potidæa, and the resolutions of the congress at Sparta, he resisted strenuously all compliance with special demands from Sparta—we must recollect that these were demands essentially insincere, in which partial compliance would have lowered the dignity of Athens without ensuring peace. The stories about Pheidias, Aspasia, and the Megarians, even if we should grant that there is some truth at the bottom of them, must, according to Thucydidês, be looked upon at worst as concomitants and pretexts, rather than as real causes, of the war: though modern authors in speaking of Periklês are but too apt to use expressions which tacitly assume these stories to be well-founded.

Seeing then that Periklês did not bring on, and could not have averted, the Peloponnesian war—that he steered his course in reference to that event with the long-sighted prudence of one who knew that the safety and the dignity of imperial Athens were essentially interwoven—we have no right to throw upon him the blame of sacrificing the landed proprietors of Attica. These proprietors might indeed be excused for complaining, where they suffered so ruinously. But the impartial historian, looking at the whole of the case, cannot admit their complaints as a ground for censuring the Athenian statesman.

The relation of Athens to her allies, the weak point of her position, it was beyond the power of Periklês seriously to amend; probably also beyond his will, since the idea of political incorporation, as well as that of providing a common and equal confederate bond sustained by effective federal authority, between different cities, was rarely entertained even by the best Greek minds.² We hear that

¹ Thucyd. ii. 65. μετρίως ἐξήγαγε τὸν πόλεμον. i. 144. δίχως δὲ ὅτι ἐβλήθησαν δοῦναι κατὰ τὰς ξυνηθήκας, πόλεμου δὲ οὐκ ἄρξασθαι, ἀρχομένους δὲ ἀποσώμεθα.

² Herodotus (i. 170) mentions that previous to the conquest of the twelve Ionic cities in Asia by Cræsus, Thalês had advised them to consolidate themselves all into

he tried to summon at Athens a congress of deputies from all cities of Greece, the allies of Athens included;¹ but the scheme could not be brought to bear, in consequence of the reluctance, noway surprising, of the Peloponnesians. Practically, the allies were not badly treated during his administration: and if among the other bad consequences of the prolonged war, they as well as Athens and all other Greeks come to suffer more and more, this depends upon causes with which he is not chargeable, and upon proceedings which departed altogether from his wise and sober calculations. Taking him altogether, with his powers of thought, speech, and action—his competence civil and military, in the council as well as in the field—his vigorous and cultivated intellect, and his comprehensive ideas of a community in pacific and many-sided development—his incorruptible public morality, caution, and firmness, in a country where all those qualities were rare, and the union of them in the same individual of course much rarer—we shall find him without a parallel throughout the whole course of Grecian history.

Under the great mortality and pressure of sickness at Athens, operations of war naturally languished; while the enemies also, though more active, had but little success. A fleet of 100 triremes with 1000 hoplites on board, was sent by the Lacedæmonians under Knêmus to attack Zakynthus, but accomplished nothing beyond devastation of the open parts of the island: and then returned home. And it was shortly after this, towards the month of September, that the Ambrakiots made an attack upon the Amphilocheian town called Argos, situated on the southern coast of the Gulf of Ambrakia; which town, as has been recounted in the preceding chapter, had been wrested from them two years before by the Athenians under Phormio and restored to the Amphilocheians and Akarnanians. The Ambrakiots, as colonists and allies of Corinth, were at the same time animated by active enmity to the Athenian influence in Akarnania, and by

Operations of war languid under the pressure of the epidemic. Attack of the Ambrakiots on the Amphilocheian Argos: the Athenian Phormio is sent with a squadron to Naupaktus.

one single city-government at Teos, and to reduce the existing cities to mere demes or constituent, fractional, municipalities—τὰς δὲ ἄλλας πόλεις οὐκ ἐπιμένονας μὲν ἔτι ἴσον

νομιζέσθαι ὑπάπερ εἰ ὄμοιοι εἴεν. It is remarkable to observe that Herodotus himself bestows his unqualified commendation on this idea.

¹ Plutarch, Periklès, c. 17.

desire to regain the lost town of Argos. Procuring aid from the Chaonians and some other Epirotic tribes, they marched against Argos, and after laying waste the territory, endeavoured to take the town by assault, but were repulsed and obliged to retire.¹ This expedition appears to have impressed the Athenians with the necessity of a standing force to protect their interest in those parts; so that in the autumn Phormio was sent with a squadron of twenty triremes to occupy Naupaktus (now inhabited by the Messenians) as a permanent naval station, and to watch the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf.² We shall find in the events of the succeeding year ample confirmation of this necessity.

Though the Peloponnesians were too inferior in maritime force to undertake formal war at sea against Athens, their single privateers, especially the Megarian privateers from the harbour of Nisæa, were active in injuring her commerce³—and not merely the commerce of Athens, but also that of other neutral Greeks, without scruple or discrimination. Several merchantmen and fishing-vessels, with a considerable number of prisoners, were thus captured.⁴ Such prisoners as fell into the hands of the Lacedæmonians,—even neutral Greeks as well as Athenians,—were all put to death, and their bodies cast into clefts of the mountains. In regard to the neutrals, this capture was piratical, and the slaughter unwarrantably cruel, judged even by the received practice of the Greeks, deficient as that was on the score of humanity. But to dismiss these neutral prisoners, or to sell them as slaves, would have given publicity to a piratical capture and provoked the neutral towns; so that the prisoners were probably slain as the best way of getting rid of them and thus suppressing evidence.⁵

¹ Thucyd. ii. 68.

² Thucyd. ii. 69.

³ Thucyd. iii. 51.

⁴ Thucyd. ii. 67-69; Herodot. vii. 137. Respecting the Lacedæmonian privateering during the Peloponnesian war, compare Thucyd. v. 115: compare also Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1. 29.

⁵ Thucyd. ii. 67. Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὑπερῆσαν, τοὺς ἐμπόρους οὓς ἔλαβον Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμαχῶν ἐν ὀλίγῳ περὶ Πελοπόννησον πλείοντας ἀποκτείναντες καὶ ἐς φάραγγας ἐσβαλόντες. Πάντας γὰρ ὅῃ κατ' ἀρχάς τοῦ πολέμου οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ἕσους λάβουσι ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ, ὡς πολεμίους διέρηειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων

Some of these Peloponnesian privateers ranged as far as the south-western coast of Asia Minor, where they found temporary shelter, and interrupted the trading-vessels from Phasêlis and Phœnicia to Athens; to protect which the Athenians despatched in the course of the autumn a squadron of six triremes under Melêsander. He was farther directed to ensure the collection of the ordinary tribute from Athenian subject-allies, and probably to raise such contributions as he could elsewhere. In the prosecution of this latter duty, he undertook an expedition from the sea-coast against one of the Lykian towns in the interior, but his attack was repelled with loss, and he himself slain.¹

An opportunity soon afforded itself to the Athenians of retaliating on Sparta for this cruel treatment of the maritime prisoners. In execution of the idea projected at the commencement of the war, the Lacedæmonians sent Anêristus and two others as envoys to Persia, for the purpose of soliciting from the Great King aids of money and troops against Athens; the dissensions among the Greeks thus gradually paving the way for him to regain his ascendancy in the Ægean. Timagoras of Tegea, together with an Argeian named Pollis without any formal mission from his city, and the Corinthian Aristeus, accompanied them. As the sea was in the power of Athens, they travelled overland through Thrace to the Hellespont. Aristeus, eager to leave nothing untried for the relief of Potidæa, prevailed upon them to make application to Sitalkês, king of the Odrysian Thracians. That prince was then in alliance with Athens, and his son Sadokus had even received the grant of Athenian citizenship. Yet the envoys thought it possible not only to detach him from the Athenian alliance, but even to obtain from him an army to act against the Athenians and raise the blockade of Potidæa. On being refused, they lastly applied to him

Lacedæmonian envoys seized in their way to Persia and put to death by the Athenians.

ἐξυποδείξαμένους καὶ τοὺς μὴδὲ μὲν ἐπέβωον.

The Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas slew all the prisoners taken on board merchantmen, off the coast of Ionia, in the ensuing year (Thucyd. iii. 32). Even this was considered extremely rigorous, and

excited strong remonstrance; yet the mariners slain were not neutrals, but belonged to the subject-allies of Athens: moreover Alkidas was in his flight, and obliged to make choice between killing his prisoners, or setting them free.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 69.

for a safe escort to the banks of the Hellespont, in their way towards Persia. But Learchus and Ameiniadês, then Athenian residents near the person of Sitalkês, had influence enough not only to cause rejection of these requests, but also to induce Sadokus, as a testimony of zeal in his new character of Athenian citizen, to assist them in seizing the persons of Aristeus and his companions in their journey through Thrace. Accordingly the whole party were seized and conducted as prisoners to Athens, where they were forthwith put to death, without trial or permission to speak—and their bodies cast into rocky chasms, as a reprisal for the captured seamen slain by the Lacedæmonians.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 67. Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Greece, vol. iii. ch. 20. p. 129) says that "the envoys were sacrificed chiefly to give a decent colour to the baseness" of killing Aristeus, from whom the Athenians feared subsequent evil, in consequence of his ability and active spirit. I do not think this is fairly contained in the words of Thucydidês. He puts in the foreground of Athenian motive, doubtless, fear from the future energy of Aristeus; but if that had been the only motive, the Athenians would probably have slain him singly without the rest: they would hardly think it necessary to provide themselves with "any decent colour" in the way that Dr. Thirlwall suggests. Thucydidês names the special feeling of the Athenians against Aristeus (in my judgement), chiefly in order to explain the extreme haste of the Athenian sentence of execution—*αὐθιγμερον—ἀκριτους*, &c.: they were under the influence of combined motives—fear, revenge, retaliation.

The envoys here slain were sons of Sperthiês and Bulis, former Spartan heralds who had gone up to Xerxes at Susa to offer their heads as atonement for the pre-

vious conduct of the Spartans in killing the heralds of Darius. Xerxes dismissed them unhurt,—so that the anger of Talthybius (the heroic progenitor of the family of heralds at Sparta) remained still unsatisfied: it was only satisfied by the death of their two sons now slain by the Athenians. The fact that the two persons now slain were sons of those two (Sperthiês and Bulis) who had previously gone to Susa to tender their lives,—is spoken of as a "romantic and tragical coincidence." But there surely is very little to wonder at. The functions of herald at Sparta were the privilege of a particular gens or family: every herald therefore was *ex officio* the son of a herald. Now when the Lacedæmonians, at the beginning of this Pcloponnesian war, were looking out for two members of the Heraldic Gens to send up to Susa, upon whom would they so naturally fix as upon the sons of those two men who had been to Susa before? These sons had doubtless heard their fathers talk a great deal about it—probably with interest and satisfaction, since they derived great glory from the unaccepted offer of their lives in atonement. There was

Such revenge against Aristeus, the instigator of the revolt of Potidæa, relieved the Athenians from a dangerous enemy; and that blockaded city was now left to its fate. About midwinter it capitulated, after a blockade of two years, and after going through the extreme of suffering from famine to such a degree, that some of those who died were even eaten by the survivors. In spite of such intolerable distress, the Athenian generals, Xenophon son of Euripidês and his two colleagues, admitted them to favourable terms of capitulation—allowing the whole population and the Corinthian allies to retire freely, with a specified sum of money per head, as well as with one garment for each man and two for each woman—so that they found shelter among the Chalkidic townships in the neighbourhood. These terms were singularly favourable, considering the desperate state of the city, which must very soon have surrendered at discretion. But the hardships, even of the army without, in the cold of winter, were very severe, and they had become thoroughly tired both of the duration and the expense of the siege. The cost to Athens had been not less than 2000 talents; since the assailant force had never been lower than 3000 hoplites, during the entire two years of the siege, and for a portion of the time considerably greater—each hoplite receiving two drachmas *per diem*. The Athenians at home, when they learnt the terms of the capitulation, were displeased with the generals for the indulgence shown,—since a little additional patience would have constrained the city to surrender at discretion; in which case the expense would have been partly made good

B.C. 429,
January.
Surrender
of Potidæa
—indulgent
capitulation
granted by the
Athenian
generals.

a particular reason why these two men should be taken, in preference to any other heralds, to fulfil this dangerous mission: and doubtless when they perished in it, the religious imagination of the Lacedæmonians would group all the series of events as consummation of the judgement inflicted by Talthybius in his anger (Herodot. vii. 135—ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι).

It appears that Anæristus, the herald here slain, had distinguished

himself personally in that capture of fishermen on the coast of Peloponnesus by the Lacedæmonians, for which the Athenians were now retaliating (Herodot. vii. 137). Though this passage of Herodotus is not clear, yet the sense here put upon it is the natural one—and clearer (in my judgement) than that which O. Müller would propose instead of it (Dorians, ii. p. 437).

by selling the prisoners as slaves—and Athenian vengeance probably gratified by putting the warriors to death.¹ A body of 1000 colonists were sent from Athens to occupy Potidæa and its vacant territory.²

Two full years had now elapsed since the actual commencement of war by the attack of the Thebans on Plataea. Yet the Peloponnesians had accomplished no part of what they expected. They had not rescued Potidæa, nor had their twice-repeated invasion, although assisted by the unexpected disasters arising from the epidemic, as yet brought Athens to any sufficient humiliation—though perhaps the envoys which she had sent during the foregoing summer with propositions for peace (contrary to the advice of Periklês) may have produced an impression that she could not hold out long. At the same time the Peloponnesian allies had on their side suffered little damage, since the ravages inflicted by the Athenian fleet on their coast may have been nearly compensated by the booty which their invading troops gained in Attica. Probably by this time the public opinion in Greece had contracted an unhappy familiarity with the state of war, so that nothing but some decisive loss and humiliation on one side at least, if not on both, would suffice to terminate it. In this third spring, the Peloponnesians did not repeat their annual march into Attica—deterred, partly, we may suppose, by fear of the epidemic yet raging there—but still more, by the strong desire of the Thebans to take their revenge on Plataea.

To this ill-fated city, Archidamus marched forthwith at the head of the confederate army. No sooner had he entered and begun to lay waste the territory, than the Plataean heralds came forth to arrest his hand, and accosted him in the following terms:—“Archidamus, and ye men of Lacedæmon, ye act wrong and in a manner neither worthy of yourselves nor of your fathers, in thus invading the territory of Plataea. For the Lacedæmonian Pausanias son of Kleombrotus, after he had liberated Greece from the Persians, in conjunction with those Greeks

Third year
of the war—
king Archi-
damus
marches to
the invasion
of Attica.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 70; iii. 17. However, the displeasure of the Athenians against the commanders cannot have been very serious,

since Xenophon was appointed to command against the Chalkidians in the ensuing year.

² Diodor. xii. 46

who stood forward to bear their share of the danger, offered sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherius in the marketplace of Platæa; and there, in presence of all the allies, assigned to the Plateans their own city and territory to hold in full autonomy, so that none should invade them wrongfully or with a view to enslave them: should such invasion occur, the allies present pledged themselves to stand forward with all their force as protectors. While your fathers made to us this grant in consideration of our valour and forwardness in that perilous emergency, ye are now doing the precise contrary: ye are come along with our worst enemies the Thebans to enslave us. And we on our side now adjure you, calling to witness the gods who sanctioned that oath, as well as your paternal and our local gods, not to violate the oath by doing wrong to the Platean territory, but to let us live on in that autonomy which Pausanias guaranteed.”¹

Remonstrance of the Plateans to Archidamus—his reply—he summons Platæa in vain.

Whereunto Archidamus replied—“Ye speak fairly, men of Platæa, if your conduct shall be in harmony with your words. Remain autonomous yourselves, as Pausanias granted, and help us to liberate those other Greeks, who, after having shared in the same dangers and sworn the same oath along with you, have now been enslaved by the Athenians. It is for their liberation and that of the other Greeks that this formidable outfit of war has been brought forth. Pursuant to your oaths, ye ought by rights, and we now invite you, to take active part in this object. But if ye cannot act thus, at least remain quiet, conformably to the summons which we have already sent to you. Enjoy your own territory, and remain neutral—receiving both parties as friends, but neither party for warlike purposes. With this we shall be satisfied.”

The reply of Archidamus discloses by allusion a circumstance which the historian had not before directly mentioned; that the Lacedæmonians had sent a formal summons to the Plateans to renounce their alliance with Athens and remain neutral. At what time this took place,² we know not, but it marks the peculiar sentiment

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71, 72.

² This previous summons is again alluded to afterwards, on occasion

of the slaughter of the Platean prisoners (iii. 68): *ἀπὸ τῶν τε ἀλλήλων χρονοῦν ἤξιον ἐβήσαν, &c.*

attaching to the town. But the Platæans did not comply with the invitation thus repeated. The heralds, having returned for instructions into the city, brought back for answer, that compliance was impossible, without the consent of the Athenians, since their wives and families were now harboured at Athens: besides, if they should profess neutrality, and admit both parties as friends, the Thebans might again make an attempt to surprise their city. In reply to their scruples, Archidamus again addressed them—"Well then—hand over your city and houses to us Lacedæmonians: mark out the boundaries of your territory: specify the number of your fruit-trees, and all your other property which admits of being numbered; and then retire whithersoever ye choose, as long as the war continues. As soon as it is over, we will restore to you all that we have received—in the interim we will hold it in trust, and keep it in cultivation, and pay you such an allowance as shall suffice for your wants."¹

The proposition now made was so fair and tempting, that the general body of the Platæans were at first inclined to accept it, provided the Athenians would acquiesce. They obtained from Archidamus a truce long enough to enable them to send envoys to Athens. After communication with the Athenian assembly, the envoys returned to Plataea bearing the following answer—"Men of Plataea, the Athenians say they have never yet permitted you to be wronged since the alliance first began,—nor will they now betray you, but will help you to the best of their power. And they adjure you, by the oaths which your fathers swore to them, not to depart in any way from the alliance."

This message awakened in the bosoms of the Platæans the full force of ancient and tenacious sentiment. They resolved to maintain, at all cost, and even to the extreme of ruin, if necessity should require it, their union with Athens. It was indeed impossible that they could do otherwise (considering the position of their wives and families) without the consent of the Athenians. Though we cannot wonder that the latter refused consent, we may yet remark, that, in their situation, a perfectly generous ally might well have granted it. For the forces of Plataea counted for little as a portion of the aggregate strength

The Platæans resolve to stand out and defy the Lacedæmonian force.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 73, 74.

of Athens; nor could the Athenians possibly protect it against the superior land-force of enemies. In fact, so hopeless was the attempt, that they never even tried, throughout the whole course of the long subsequent blockade.

The final refusal of the Plataeans was proclaimed to Archidamus by word of mouth from the walls, since it was not thought safe to send out any messenger. As soon as the Spartan prince heard the answer, he prepared for hostile operations, —apparently with very sincere reluctance, attested in the following invocation emphatically pronounced:—

Invocation and excuse of Archidamus on hearing the refusal of the Plataeans.

“Ye Gods and Heroes, who hold the Plataean territory, be ye my witnesses, that we have not in the first instance wrongfully — not until these Plataeans have first renounced the oaths binding on all of us—invaded this territory, in which our fathers defeated the Persians after prayers to you, and which ye granted as propitious for Greeks to fight in: nor shall we commit wrong in what we may do farther, for we have taken pains to tender reasonable terms, but without success. Be ye now consenting parties: may those who are beginning the wrong receive punishment for it—may those who are aiming to inflict penalty righteously, obtain their object.”

It was thus that Archidamus, in language delivered probably under the walls, and within hearing of the citizens who manned them, endeavoured to conciliate the gods and heroes of that town which he was about to ruin and depopulate. The whole of this preliminary debate,¹ so strikingly and dramatically set forth by Thucydides, illustrates the respectful reluctance with which the Lacedæmonians first brought themselves to assail this scene of the glories of their fathers. What deserves remark is, their direct sentiment attaches itself, not at all to the Plataean people, but only to the Plataean territory. It is purely local, though it becomes partially transferred to the people, as tenants of this spot, by secondary association. We see, indeed, that nothing but the long-standing antipathy of the Thebans induced Archidamus to undertake the enterprise: for the conquest of Plataea was of no avail towards the main objects of the war, though the exposed situation of the town caused it to be crushed between the two great contending forces in Greece.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 71-75.

Archidamus now commenced the siege forthwith, in full hopes that his numerous army, the entire strength of the Peloponnesian confederacy, would soon capture a place, of no great size, and probably not very well fortified—yet defended by a resolute garrison of 400 native citizens, with eighty Athenians.¹ There was no one else in the town, except 110 female slaves for cooking. The fruit-trees, cut down in laying waste the cultivated land, sufficed to form a strong palisade all round the town, so as completely to enclose the inhabitants. Next, Archidamus, having abundance of timber near at hand in the forests of Kithæron, began to erect a mound against a portion of the town wall, so as to be able to scale it by an inclined plane, and thus take the place by assault. Wood, stones, and earth were piled up in a vast heap—cross palings of wood being carried on each side of it, in parallel lines at right angles to the town wall, for the purpose of keeping the loose mass of materials between them together. For seventy days and as many nights did the army labour at this work, without any intermission, taking turns for food and repose; and through such unremitting assiduity, the mound approached near to the height of the town wall. But as it gradually mounted up, the Platæans were not idle on their side: they constructed an additional wall of wood, which they planted on the top of their own town wall so as to heighten the part in contact with the enemy's mound; sustaining it by brickwork behind, for which the neighbouring houses furnished materials. Hides, raw as well as dressed, were suspended in front of it, in order to protect the workmen against missiles, and the wood-work against fire-carrying arrows.² And as the besiegers still continued heaping up materials, to raise their mound to the height even of this recent addition, the Platæans met them by breaking a hole in the lower part of their town wall, and pulling in the earth from the lower portion of the mound; which then fell in at the top, and left a vacant space near the wall. This the besiegers filled up by letting down quantities of stiff clay rolled up in wattled reeds, which could not be pulled away in the same manner. Again, the Platæans dug a subterranean passage from the interior of their town to the ground immediately under the mound, and

¹ Thucyd. iii. 68.² Thucyd. ii. 75.

thus carried away unseen its earthly foundation; so that the besiegers saw their mound continually sinking down, in spite of fresh additions at the top—yet without knowing the reason. Nevertheless it was plain that these stratagems would be in the end ineffectual, and the Plataeans accordingly built a new portion of town wall in the interior, in the shape of a crescent, taking its start from the old town wall on each side of the mound. The besiegers were thus deprived of all benefit from the mound, assuming it to be successfully completed; since when they had marched over it, there stood in front of them a new town wall requiring to be carried in like manner.

Nor was this the only method of attack employed. Archidamus farther brought up battering engines, one of which greatly shook and endangered the additional height of wall built by the Plataeans against the mound; while others were brought to bear on different portions of the circuit of the town wall. Against these new assailants, various means of defence were used. The defenders on the walls let down ropes, got hold of the head of the approaching engine, and pulled it by main force out of the right line, either upwards or sideways; or they prepared heavy wooden beams on the wall, each attached at both ends by long iron chains to two poles projecting at right angles from the wall, by means of which poles it was raised and held aloft: so that at the proper moment when the battering machine approached the wall, the chain was suddenly let go, and the beam fell down with great violence directly upon the engine, breaking off its projecting beak.¹ However rude these defensive processes may seem, they were found effective against the besiegers, who saw themselves, at the close of three months' unavailing efforts, obliged to renounce the idea of taking the town in any other way than by the process of blockade and famine—a process alike tedious and costly.²

Before they would incur so much inconvenience, however, they had recourse to one farther stratagem—that of trying to set the town on fire. From the height of

¹ The various expedients, such as those here described, employed both for offence and defence in the ancient sieges, are noticed and

discussed in the *Aeneas Poliorketic*, c. 33. *seq.*

² Thucyd. ii. 76.

Operations of attack and defence—the besiegers make no progress, and are obliged to resort to blockade.

their mound, they threw down large quantities of fagots, partly into the space between the mound and the newly-built crescent wall—partly, as far as they could reach, into other parts of the city: pitch and other combustibles were next added, and the whole mass set on fire. The conflagration was tremendous, such as had never been before seen: a large portion of the town became unapproachable, and the whole of it narrowly escaped destruction. Nothing could have preserved it, had the wind been rather more favourable. There was indeed a further story of an opportune thunder-storm coming to extinguish the flames, which Thucydidês does not seem to credit.¹ In spite of much partial damage, the town remained still defensible, and the spirit of the inhabitants unsubdued.

There now remained no other resource except to build a wall of circumvallation round Platæa, and trust to the slow process of famine. The task was distributed in suitable fractions among the various confederate cities, and completed about the middle of September, a little before the autumnal equinox.² Two distinct walls were constructed, with sixteen feet of intermediate space all covered in, so as to look like one very thick wall. There were moreover two ditches, out of which the bricks for the wall had been taken—one on the inside towards Platæa, and the other on the outside against any foreign relieving force. The interior covered space between the walls was intended to serve as permanent quarters for the troops left on guard, consisting half of Bœotians and half of Peloponnesians.³

Wall of circumvallation built round Platæa—the place completely beleaguered and a force left to maintain the blockade.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 77.

² Thucyd. ii. 78. καὶ ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἐξείργαστο περὶ Ἀρκτούρου ἐπιτολάς, &c., at the period of the year when the star Arcturus rises immediately before sunrise—that is, some time between the 12th and 17th of September: see Gôller's note on the passage. Thucydidês does not often give any fixed marks to discriminate the various periods of the year, as we find here done. The Greek months were all lunar months, or nominally so: the names of months, as well as the prac-

tice of intercalation to rectify the calendar, varied from city to city; so that if Thucydidês had specified the day of the Attic month Boëdromion (instead of specifying the rising of Arcturus) on which this work was finished, many of his readers would not have distinctly understood him. Hippokratês also, in indications of time for medical purposes, employs the appearance of Arcturus and other stars.

³ Thucyd. ii. 78; iii. 21. From this description of the double wall and covered quarters provided for

At the same time that Archidamus began the siege of Plataea, the Athenians on their side despatched a force of 2000 hoplites and 200 horsemen to the Chalkidic peninsula, under Xenophon son of Euripidês (with two colleagues), the same who had granted so recently the capitulation of Potidæa. It was necessary doubtless to convey and establish the new colonists who were about to occupy the deserted site of Potidæa. Moreover, the general had acquired some knowledge of the position and parties of the Chalkidic towns, and hoped to be able to act against them with effect. He first invaded the territory belonging to the Bottiæan town of Spartôlus, not without hopes that the city itself would be betrayed to him by intelligences within. But this was prevented by the arrival of an additional force from Olynthus, partly hoplites, partly peltasts. Such peltasts, a species of troops between heavy-armed and light-armed, furnished with a pelta (or light shield) and short spear or javelin, appear to have taken their rise among these Chalkidic Greeks, being equipped in a manner half Greek and half Thracian: we shall find them hereafter much improved and turned to account by some of the ablest Grecian generals. The Chalkidic hoplites are generally of inferior merit: on the other hand, their cavalry and their peltasts are very good. In the action which now took place under the walls of Spartôlus, the Athenian hoplites defeated those of the enemy, but their cavalry and their light troops were completely worsted by the Chalkidic. These latter, still farther strengthened by the arrival of fresh peltasts from Olynthus, ventured even to attack the Athenian hoplites, who thought it prudent to fall back upon the two companies left in reserve to guard the baggage. During this retreat they were harassed by the Chalkidic horse and light-armed, who retired when the Athenians turned upon them, but attacked them on all sides when on their march, and employed missiles so effectively that the retreating hoplites could no longer maintain a steady order, but took to flight and sought refuge at Potidæa. Four hundred and thirty hoplites, near one-fourth of the whole force,

Athenian
armament
sent to
Potidæa
and Chal-
kidic
Thrace—it
is defeated
and returns.

what was foreknown as a long blockade, we may understand the sufferings of the Athenian troops (who probably had no double wall) in the two years' blockade of Potidæa—and their readiness to grant an easy capitulation to the besieged: see a few pages above.

together with all three generals, perished in this defeat, while the expedition returned in dishonour to Athens.¹

In the western parts of Greece, the arms of Athens and her allies were more successful. The Ambrakiots, exasperated by their repulse from the Amphilocheian Argos, during the preceding year, had been induced to conceive new and larger plans of aggression against both the Akarnanians and Athenians. In concert with their mother-city Corinth, where they obtained warm support, they prevailed upon the Lacedæmonians to take part in a simultaneous attack of Akarnania, by land as well as by sea, which would prevent the Akarnanians from concentrating their forces in any one point, and would put each of their townships upon an isolated self-defence: so that all of them might be overpowered in succession, and detached, together with Kephallenia and Zakynthus (Zante), from the Athenian alliance. The fleet of Phormio at Naupaktus, consisting only of twenty triremes, was accounted incompetent to cope with a Peloponnesian fleet such as might be fitted out at Corinth. There was even some hope that the important station at Naupaktus might itself be taken, so as to expel the Athenians completely from those parts.

The scheme of operations now projected was far more comprehensive than anything which the war had yet afforded. The land-force of the Ambrakiots, together with their neighbours and fellow-colonists the Leukadians and Anaktorians, assembled near their own city; while their maritime force was collected at Leukas, on the Akarnanian coast. The force at Ambrakia was joined, not only by Knêmus, the Lacedæmonian admiral, with 1000 Peloponnesian hoplites, who found means to cross over from Peloponnesus, eluding the vigilance of Phormio—but also by a numerous body of Epirotic and Macedonian auxiliaries, collected even from the distant and northernmost tribes. A thousand Chaonians were present, under the command of Photyus and Nikanor, two annual chiefs chosen from the regal gens. Neither this tribe, nor the Thesprotians who came along with them, acknowledged any hereditary king. The Molossians and

Operations on the coast of Akarnania.— Joint attack upon Akarnania, by land and sea, concerted between the Ambrakiots and Peloponnesians.

Assemblage of the Ambrakiots, Peloponnesians, and Epirotic allies—divisions of Epirots.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 73.

Atintânes, who also joined the force, were under Sabylinthus, regent on behalf of the young prince Tharypas. There came, besides, the Parauæi, from the banks of the river Aôus, under their king Orædus, together with 1000 Orestæ, a tribe rather Macedonian than Epirot, sent by their king Antiochus. Even king Perdikkas, though then nominally in alliance with Athens, sent 1000 of his Macedonian subjects, who however arrived too late to be of any use.¹ This large and diverse body of Epirotic invaders, a new phænomenon in Grecian history, and got together doubtless by the hopes of plunder, proves the extensive relations of the tribes of the interior with the city of Ambrakia—a city destined to become in later days the capital of the Epirotic king Pyrrhus.

It had been concerted that the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth should join that already assembled at Leukas, and act upon the coast of Akarnania at the same time that the land-force marched into that territory. But Knêmus, finding the land-force united and ready near Ambrakia, deemed it unnecessary to await the fleet from Corinth, and marched straight into Akarnania, through Linnæa, a frontier village territory belonging to the Amphilochian Argos. He directed his march upon Stratus—an interior town, the chief place in Akarnania—the capture of which would be likely to carry with it the surrender of the rest; especially as the Akarnanians, distracted by the presence of the ships at Leukas, and alarmed by the large body of invaders on their frontier, did not dare to leave their own separate homes, so that Stratus was left altogether to its own citizens. Nor was Phormio, though they sent an urgent message to him, in any condition to help them; since he could not leave Naupaktus unguarded, when the large fleet from Corinth was known to be approaching. Under such circumstances, Knêmus and his army indulged confident hopes of overpowering Stratus without difficulty. They marched in three divisions: the Epirots in the centre—the Leukadians and Anaktorians on the right—the Peloponnesians and Ambrakiots, together with Knêmus himself, on the left. So little expectation was entertained of resistance, that these three divisions took no pains to keep near, or even in sight of each other. Both the Greek divisions, indeed, maintained a good order of march, and kept

They march to attack the Akarnanian town of Stratus.

¹ Thueyd. ii. 80.

proper scouts on the look out; but the Epirots advanced without any care or order; especially the Chaonians, who formed the van. These men, accounted the most warlike of all the Epirotic tribes, were so full of conceit and rashness, that when they approached near to Stratus, they would not halt to encamp and assail the place conjointly with the Greeks; but marched along with the other Epirots right forward to the town, intending to attack it single-handed, and confident that they should carry it at the first assault before the Greeks came up, so that the entire glory would be theirs. The Stratians watched and profited by this imprudence. Planting ambuscades in convenient places, and suffering the Epirots to approach without suspicion near to the gates, they then suddenly sallied out and attacked them, while the troops in ambuscade rose up and assailed them at the same time. The Chaonians who formed the van, thus completely surprised, were routed with great slaughter; while the other Epirots fled, after but little resistance. So much had they hurried forward in advance of their Greek allies, that neither the right nor the left division were aware of the battle, until the flying barbarians, hotly pursued by the Akarnanians, made it known to them. The two divisions then joined, protected the fugitives, and restrained farther pursuit—the Stratians declining to come to hand-combat with them until the other Akarnanians should arrive. They seriously annoyed the forces of Knêmus, however, by distant slinging, in which the Akarnanians were pre-eminently skilful. Knêmus did not choose to persist in his attack under such discouraging circumstances. As soon as night arrived, so that there was no longer any fear of slingers, he retreated to the river Anapus, a distance of between nine and ten miles. Well-aware that the news of the victory would attract other Akarnanian forces immediately to the aid of Stratus, he took advantage of the arrival of his own Akarnanian allies from Œniadæ (the only town in the country which was attached to the Lacedæmonian interest) and sought shelter near their city. From thence his troops dispersed, and returned to their respective homes.¹

Meanwhile the Peloponnesian fleet from Corinth, which had been destined to cooperate with Knêmus off the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 83; Diodor. xii. 48.

coast of Akarnania, had found difficulties in its passage alike unexpected and insuperable. Mustering forty-seven triremes of Corinth, Sikyon, and other places, with a body of soldiers on board and with accompanying store-vessels—it departed from the harbour of Corinth and made its way along the northern coast of Achaia. Its commanders, not intending to meddle with Phormio and his twenty ships at Naupaktus, never imagined that he would venture to attack a number so greatly superior. The triremes were accordingly fitted out more as transports for numerous soldiers than with any view to naval combat—and with little attention to the choice of skilful rowers.¹

The Peloponnesian fleet comes from Corinth to Akarnania—movements of the Athenian Phormio to oppose it.

Except in the combat near Korkyra, and there only partially—the Peloponnesians had never yet made actual trial of Athenian maritime efficiency, at the point of excellence which it had now reached. Themselves retaining the old unimproved mode of fighting and of working ships at sea, they had no practical idea of the degree to which it had been superseded by Athenian training. Among the Athenians, on the contrary, not only the seamen generally had a confirmed feeling of their own superiority—but Phormio especially, the ablest of all their captains, always familiarised his men with the conviction, that no Peloponnesian fleet, be its number ever so great, could possibly contend against them with success.² Accordingly the Corinthian admirals, Machaon and his two colleagues, were surprised to observe that Phormio with his small Athenian squadron, instead of keeping safe in Naupaktus, was moving in parallel line with them and watching their

¹ Thucyd. ii. 83. οὐχ ὡς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαις, ἀλλὰ στρατιωτικώτερον παρεσκευασμένοι: compare the speech of Ktésimus, c. 87. The unskilfulness of the rowers is noticed (c. 84).

² Thucyd. ii. 88. πρότερον μὲν γὰρ ἀεὶ αὐτοῖς ἔλεγε (Phormio) καὶ προσπαρεσκεύαζε τὰς γνώμας, ὡς οὐδὲν αὐτοῖς πλῆθος νεῶν τοσούτου, ἦν ἐπιπέσει, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπομενετέον αὐτοῖς ἐστὶ καὶ οἱ στρατιώται ἐκ πολλοῦ ἐν σφαιρῶν αὐτοῖς τῆν ἀξίωσιν τάσθησι κτήρεσται, μηδὲνα ὄχλον Ἀθη-

ναῖοι ὄντες Πελοποννησίων νεῶν ὑποχωρεῖν.

This passage is not only remarkable as it conveys the striking persuasion entertained by the Athenians of their own naval superiority, but also as it discloses the frank and intimate communication between the Athenian captain and his seamen—so strongly pervading and determining the feelings of the latter. Compare what is told respecting the Syracusan Hermokratés, Xenoph. Hellen. i. 1, 30.

progress until they should get out of the Corinthian Gulf into the more open sea. Having advanced along the northern coast of Peloponnesus as far as Patræ in Achaia, they then altered their course, and bore to the north-west in order to cross over towards the Ætolian coast, in their way to Akarnania. In doing this, however, they perceived that Phormio was bearing down upon them from Chalkis and the mouth of the river Euenus; and they now discovered for the first time that he was going to attack them. Disconcerted by the incident, and not inclined for a naval combat in the wide and open sea, they altered their plan of passage, returned to the coast of Peloponnesus, and brought to for the night at some point near to Rhium, the narrowest breadth of the strait. Their bringing to was a mere feint intended to deceive Phormio and induce him to go back for the night to his own coast: for during the course of the night, they left their station, and tried to get across the breadth of the Gulf, where it was near the strait and comparatively narrow, before Phormio could come down upon them. And if the Athenian captain had really gone back to take night-station on his own coast, they would probably have got across to the Ætolian or northern coast without any molestation in the wide sea. But he watched their movements closely, kept the sea all night, and was thus enabled to attack them in midchannel, even during the shorter passage near the strait, at the first dawn of morning.¹ On seeing his approach, the

¹ Thucyd. ii. 83. Ἐπειδὴ μέντοι ἀντιπαραπλέοντας τε ἑώρων αὐτούς (that is, when the Corinthians saw the Athenian ships) παρά γῆν σφῶν κομισζομένων, καὶ ἐκ Πατρῶν τῆς Ἀχαιῆς πρὸς τὴν ἀντιπέραν ἤπειρον διαβαλλόντων ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίας κατεῖδον τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς Χάλκιδος καὶ τοῦ Εὐήνου ποταμοῦ προσπίπτοντας σφίσι, καὶ οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι, οὗ τω δὴ ἀναγκάζονται ναυμαχεῖν κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν.

There is considerable difficulty in clearly understanding what was here done, especially what is meant by the words οὐκ ἔλαθον νυκτὸς ὑφορμισάμενοι, which words the Scholiast construed as if the nominative

case to ἔλαθον were οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι, whereas the natural structure of the sentence, as well as the probabilities of fact, lead the best commentators to consider οἱ Πελοποννήσιοι as the nominative case to that verb. The remark of the Scholiast, however, shows us, that the difficulty of understanding the sentence dates from ancient times.

Dr. Arnold (whose explanation is adopted by Poppo and Götter) says, "The two fleets were moving parallel to one another along the opposite shores of the Corinthian Gulf. But even when they had sailed out of the strait at Rhium, the opposite shores were still so

Corinthian admirals ranged their triremes in a circle with the prows outward—like the spokes of a wheel. The

near, that the Peloponnesians hoped to cross over without opposition, if they could so far deceive the Athenians as to the spot where they brought to for the night, as to induce them either to stop too soon, or to advance too far, that they might not be exactly opposite to them to intercept the passage. If they could lead the Athenians to think that they meant to advance in the night beyond Patræ, the Athenian fleet was likely to continue its own course along the northern shore, to be ready to intercept them when they should endeavour to run across to Acarnania. But the Athenians, aware that they had stopped at Patræ, stopped themselves at Chalkis, instead of proceeding farther to the westward; and thus were so nearly opposite to them, that the Peloponnesians had not time to get more than half way across, before they found themselves encountered by their watchful enemy."

This explanation seems to me not satisfactory, nor does it take account of all the facts of the case. The first belief of the Peloponnesians was, that Phormio would not dare to attack them at all: accordingly, having arrived at Patræ, they stretched from thence across the Gulf to the mouth of the Euenus—the natural way of proceeding according to ancient navigation—going in the direction of Akarnania (ἐπὶ Ἀκαρνανίᾳ). While they were thus stretching across, they perceived Phormio bearing down upon them from the Euenus: this was a surprise to them; and as they wished to avoid a battle in the mid-channel, they desisted from proceeding farther that day, in hopes to be able to deceive Phor-

mio in respect of their night-station. They made a feint of taking night-station on the shore between Patræ and Rhium, near the narrow part of the strait; but, in reality, they "slipped anchor and put to sea during the night" (as Mr. Bloomfield says), in hopes of getting across the shorter passage under favour of darkness, before Phormio could come upon them. That they must have done this is proved by the fact, that the subsequent battle was fought on the morrow in the mid-channel *very little after day-break* (we learn this from what Thucydidês says about the gulf-breeze, for which Phormio waited before he would commence his attack—*ὅπερ ἀναμένων τε περιέπλει, καὶ εὐθὺς γίνεσθαι ἐπὶ τῆν ἕλω*). If Phormio had returned to Chalkis, they would probably have succeeded; but he must have kept the sea all night, which would be the natural proceeding of a vigilant captain determined not to let the Peloponnesians get across without fighting: so that he was upon them in the mid-channel immediately after day broke.

Putting all the statements of Thucydidês together, we may be convinced that this is the way in which the facts occurred. But of the precise sense of *ὕφορμισάμενοι*, I confess I do not feel certain: Haack says it means "clam appellere ad litus," but here, I think, that sense will not do: for the Peloponnesians did not wish, and could indeed hardly hope, to conceal from Phormio the spot where they brought to for the night, and to make him suppose that they brought to at some point of the shore west of Patræ, when in reality they passed the night in

circle was made as large as it could be without leaving opportunity to the Athenian assailing ships to practise the manœuvre of the *diekplus*,¹ and the interior space was sufficient not merely for the store-vessels, but also for five chosen

Patræ—which is what Dr. Arnold supposes. The shore west of Patræ makes a bend to the south-west (forming the Gulf of Patras), so that the distance from the northern (or Ætolian and Akarnanian) side of the Gulf becomes for a considerable time longer and longer, and the Peloponnesians would thus impose upon themselves a longer crossing, increasing the difficulty of getting over without a battle. But ὑφορμισάμενοι may reasonably be supposed to mean (especially in conjunction with οὐκ ἔλαθον) “taking up a simulated or imperfect night-station,” in which they did not really intend to stay all night, and which could be quitted at short notice and with ease. The preposition ὑπό in composition would thus have the sense not of *secrecy* (*clam*), but of *sham-performance*, or of mere going through the forms of an act for the purpose of making a false impression (like ὑποφέρειν, Xenoph. Hell. iv. 72). Mr. Bloomfield proposes conjecturally ἀφορμισάμενοι, meaning “that the Peloponnesians slipped their anchors in the night:” I place no faith in the conjecture, but I believe him to be quite right in supposing, that the Peloponnesians *did actually* slip their anchors in the night.

Another point remains to be adverted to. The battle took place κατὰ μέσον τὸν πορθμόν. Now we need not understand this expression to allude to the narrowest part of the sea, or the strait, strictly and precisely; that is the line of seven stadia between Rhium and Antirrhium. But I think we must understand it to mean a portion

of sea not far westward of the strait, where the breadth, though greater than that of the strait itself, is yet not so great as it becomes in the line drawn northward from Patræ. We cannot understand πορθμός (as Mr. Bloomfield and Poppo do—see the note of the latter on the Scholia) to mean *trajectus* simply—that is to say, the passage across even the widest portion of the Gulf of Patras: nor does the passage cited out of c. 86 require us so to understand it. Πορθμός in Thucydides means a strait, or narrow crossing of sea, and Poppo himself admits that Thucydides always uses it so: nor would it be reasonable to believe that he would call the line of sea across the Gulf, from Patræ to the mouth of the Euenus, a πορθμός. See the note of Gøller on this point.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 86. μὴ διδόντες διέκπλουν. The great object of the fast-sailing Athenian trireme was, to drive its beak against some weak part of the adversary's ship; the stern, the side, or the oars—not against the beak, which was strongly constructed as well for defence as for offence. The Athenian therefore, rowing through the intervals of the adversary's line, and thus getting in their rear, turned rapidly, and got the opportunity, before the ship of the adversary could change its position, of striking it either in the stern or some weak part. Such a manœuvre was called the *diekplus*. The success of it of course depended upon the extreme rapidity and precision of the movements of the Athenian vessel, so superior in this respect to its adversary,

PLAN ILLUSTRATING THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE ATH

(1850 B.C.)



- A. First station of the Peloponnesian army.
- B. First station of the Athenian fleet.
- C. Position of the Athenian fleet's course.
- D. Position of the Peloponnesian army's camp.

triremes, who were kept as a reserve to dart out when required through the intervals between the outer triremes.

In this position they were found and attacked shortly after daybreak by Phormio, who bore down upon them with his ships in single file, all admirable sailers, and his own ship leading; all being strictly forbidden to attack until he should give the signal. He rowed swiftly round the Peloponnesian circle, nearing the prows of their ships as closely as he could, and making constant semblance of being about to come to blows.

Naval battle between Phormio and the Peloponnesian fleet—his complete victory.

Partly from the intimidating effect of this manœuvre, altogether novel to the Peloponnesians—partly from the natural difficulty, well-known to Phormio, of keeping every ship in its exact stationary position—the order of the circle, both within and without, presently became disturbed. It was not long before a new ally came to his aid, on which he calculated, postponing his actual attack until this favourable incident occurred. The strong land-breeze out of the Gulf of Corinth, always wont to begin shortly after daybreak, came down upon the Peloponnesian fleet with its usual vehemence, at a moment when the steadiness of their order was already somewhat giving way; and forced their ships more than ever out of proper relation one to the other. The triremes began to run foul of each other, or became entangled with the store-vessels: so that in every ship the men on board were obliged to keep pushing off their neighbours on each side with poles—not without loud clamour and mutual reproaches, which prevented both the orders of the captain, and the cheering sound or song whereby the keleustês animated the rowers and kept them to time, from being audible. Moreover, the fresh breeze had occasioned such a swell, that these rowers, unskilful under all circumstances, could not get their oars clear of the water, and the pilots thus lost command over their vessels.¹ The critical moment was now

not only in the better construction of the ship, but the excellence of rowers and steersmen.

¹ See Dr. Arnold's note upon this passage of Thucydîdês, respecting the Keleustês and his functions: to the passages which he indicates as reference, I will

add two more of Plautus, *Mercat.* iv. 2, 5, and *Asinaria*, iii. 1, 15.

When we conceive the structure of an ancient trirem, we shall at once see, first, how essential the keleustês was, to keep the rowers in harmonious action—next, how immense the difference must have

come, and Phormio gave the signal for attack. He first drove against and disabled one of the admiral's ships—his

been between practised and unpractised rowers. The trireme had, in all, 170 rowers, distributed into three tiers. The upper tier, called *Thranitæ*, were sixty-two in number, or thirty-one on each side: the middle tier, or *Zygitæ*, as well as the lowest tier, or *Thalamitæ*, were each fifty-four in number, or twenty-seven on each side. Besides these, there were belonging to each trireme a certain number, seemingly about thirty, of supplementary oars (*ῥώπαι περιπέτω*), to be used by the *epibatæ*, or soldiers serving on board, in case of rowers being killed, or oars broken. Each tier of rowers was distributed along the whole length of the vessel, from head to stern, or at least along the greater part of it; but the seats of the higher tiers were not placed in the exact perpendicular line above the lower. Of course the oars of the *thranitæ*, or uppermost tier, were the longest: those of the *thalamitæ*, or lowest tier, the shortest: those of the *zygitæ*, of a length between the two. Each oar was rowed only by one man. The *thranitæ*, as having the longest oars, were most hardly worked and most highly paid. What the length of the oars was, belonging to either tier, we do not know; but some of the supplementary oars appear to have been about fifteen feet in length.

What is here stated, appears to be pretty well ascertained, chiefly from the inscriptions discovered at Athens a few years ago, so full of information respecting the Athenian marine,—and from the instructive commentary appended to these inscriptions by M. Boeckh, *Scewesen der Athener*, ch. ix. p. 94, 104, 115. But there is a great

deal still respecting the equipment of an ancient trireme unascertained and disputed.

Now there was nothing but the voice of the *keleustês* to keep these 170 rowers all to good time with their strokes. With oars of different length, and so many rowers, this must have been no easy matter; and apparently quite impossible, unless the rowers were trained to act together. The difference between those who were so trained and those who were not, must have been immense. (Compare Xenophon, *Æconomic*. viii. 8.) We may imagine the difference between the ships of Phormio and those of his enemies, and the difficulty of the latter in contending with the swell of the sea—when we read this description of the ancient trireme.

About 200 men, that is to say, 170 rowers and thirty supernumeraries, mostly *epibatæ* or hoplites serving on board, besides the pilot, the man at the ship's bow, the *keleustês*, &c., probably some half-dozen officers—formed the crew of a trireme: compare Herodot. viii. 17; vii. 184—where he calculates the thirty *epibatæ* over and above the 200. Dr. Arnold thinks that at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, the *epibatæ* on board an Athenian trireme were no more than ten; but this seems not quite made out: see his note on Thucyd. iii. 95.

The Venetian galleys in the thirteenth century were manned by about the same number of men. "Les galères Vénitienues du convoi de Flandre devaient être montées par deux cent hommes libres, dont 180 rameurs, et 12 archers. Les arcs ou balistes furent

comrades next assailed others with equal success—so that the Peloponnesians, confounded and terrified, attempted hardly any resistance, but broke their order and sought safety in flight. They fled partly to Patræ, partly to Dymê, in Achaia, pursued by the Athenians; who with scarcely the loss of a man, captured twelve triremes—carried away almost the entire crews,—and sailed off with them to Molykreium or Antirrhium, the northern cape at the narrow mouth of the Corinthian Gulf, opposite to the corresponding cape called Rhium in Achaia. Having erected at Antirrhium a trophy for the victory, dedicating one of the captive triremes to Poseidon, they returned to Naupaktus; while the Peloponnesian ships sailed along the shore from Patræ to Kyllênê, the principal port in the territory of Elis. They were here soon afterwards joined by Knêmus, who passed over with his squadron from Leukas.¹

These two incidents, just recounted, with their details—the repulse of Knêmus and his army from Stratus, and the defeat of the Peloponnesian fleet by Phormio—afford ground for some interesting remarks. The first of the two displays the great inferiority of the Epirots to the Greeks—and even to the less advanced portion of the Greeks—in the qualities of order, discipline, steadiness, and power of cooperation for a joint purpose. Confidence of success with them is exaggerated into childish rashness, so that they despise even the commonest precautions either in march or attack; while the Greek divisions on their right and on their left are never so elate as to omit either. If, on land, we thus discover the inherent superiority of Greeks over Epirots involuntarily breaking out—so in the sea-fight we are no less impressed with the astonishing superiority of the Athenians over their opponents; a superiority, indeed, noway inherent, such as that of Greeks over Epirots, but depending in this case on previous toil, training, and inventive talent, on the one side, compared with neglect and old-fashioned routine on the other. Nowhere does the extraordinary value of that seamanship, which the Athenians had been gaining by years of improved practice, stand

Reflections upon these two defeats of the Peloponnesians.

prescrits en 1333 pour toutes les galères de commerce armées" (Dep- ping, Histoire du Commerce entre le Levant et l'Europe, vol. i. p. 163).

¹ Thucyd. ii. 84.

so clearly marked as in these first battles of Phormio. It gradually becomes less conspicuous as we advance in the war, since the Peloponnesians improve, learning seamanship as the Russians under Peter the Great learnt the art of war from the Swedes under Charles XII.—while the Athenian triremes and their crews seem to become less choice and effective, even before the terrible disaster at Syracuse; and are irreparably deteriorated after that misfortune.

To none did the circumstances of this memorable sea-fight seem so incomprehensible as to the Lacedæmonians. They had heard indeed of the seamanship of Athens, but had never felt it, and could not understand what it meant; so that they imputed the defeat to nothing but disgraceful cowardice, and sent indignant orders to Knêmus at Kylênê, to take the command, equip a larger and better fleet, and repair the dishonour. Three Spartan commissioners—Brasidas, Timokratês, and Lykophron—were sent down to assist him with their advice and exertions in calling together naval contingents from the different allied cities. By this means, under the general resentment occasioned by the recent defeat, a large fleet of seventy-seven triremes was speedily mustered at Panormus,—a harbour of Achaia near to the promontory of Rhium and immediately within the interior gulf. A land-force was also collected at the same place ashore, to aid the operations of the fleet.

Such preparations did not escape the vigilance of Phormio, who transmitted to Athens news of his victory, at the same time urgently soliciting reinforcements to contend with the increasing strength of the enemy. The Athenians immediately sent twenty fresh ships to join him. Yet they were induced by the instances of a Kretan named Nikias, their proxenus at Gortyn, to allow him to take the ships first to Krete, on the faith of his promise to reduce the hostile town of Kydonia. He had made this promise as a private favour to the inhabitants of Polichna, border enemies of Kydonia; but when the fleet arrived he was unable to fulfil it: nothing was effected except ravage of the Kydonian lands, and the fleet was long prevented by adverse winds and weather from getting away.¹ This ill-advised diversion of the fleet from its straight course to

¹ Thucyd. ii. 85.

join Phormio is a proof how much the counsels of Athens were beginning to suffer from the loss of Periklês, who was just now in his last illness and died shortly afterwards. That liability to be seduced by novel enterprises and projects of acquisition, against which he so emphatically warned his countrymen,¹ was even now beginning to manifest its disastrous consequences.

Through the loss of this precious interval, Phormio found himself, with no more than his original twenty triremes, opposed to the vastly increased forces of the enemy—seventy-seven triremes with a large force on land to back them: the latter no mean help in ancient warfare. He took up his station near the Cape Antirrhium, or the Molykric Rhium as it was called—the northern headland, opposite to the other headland also called Rhium, on the coast of Achaia. The line between these two capes, seemingly about an English mile in breadth, forms the entrance of the Corinthian Gulf. The Messenian force from Naupaktus attended him, and served on land. But he kept on the outside of the Gulf, anxious to fight in a large and open breadth of sea, which was essential to Athenian manœuvring; while his adversaries on their side remained on the inside of the Achaic cape, from the corresponding reason—feeling that to them the narrow sea was advantageous, as making the naval battle like to a land battle, effacing all superiority of nautical skill.² If we revert back to the occasion of the battle of Salamis, we find that narrowness of space was at that time accounted the best of all protection for a smaller fleet against a larger. But such had been the complete change of feeling, occasioned by the system of manœuvring introduced since that period in the Athenian navy, that amplitude of sea-room is now not less coveted by Phormio than dreaded by his enemies. The improved practice of Athens had introduced a revolution in naval warfare.

For six or seven days successively, the two fleets were drawn out against each other—Phormio trying to entice

¹ Thucyd. i. 144. Πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γὰρ πεφόβημαι τὰς οὐκίας ἡμῶν ἄλλα ἔχω ἐς ἐλπίδα τοῦ περιέσεσθαι, ἀμαρτίας ἢ τὰς τῶν ἐναντίων δια- γινεῖσθαι ἀρχὴν τε μὴ ἐπιτεῖσθαι νοίας.

² Thucyd. ii. 86-89: compare vii. 36-49.

the Peloponnesians to the outside of the Gulf, while they on their side did what they could to bring him within it.¹ To him, every day's postponement was gain, since it gave him a new chance of his reinforcements arriving: for that very reason, the Peloponnesian commanders were eager to accelerate an action, and at length resorted to a well-laid plan for forcing it on. But in spite of immense numerical superiority, such was the discouragement and reluctance prevailing among their seamen—many of whom had been actual sufferers in the recent defeat—that Knêmus and Brasidas had to employ emphatic exhortations. They insisted on the favourable prospect before them—pointing out that the late battle had been lost only by mismanagement and imprudence, which would be for the future corrected—and appealing to the inherent bravery of the Peloponnesian warrior. They concluded by a hint, that while those who behaved well in the coming battle would receive due honour, the laggards would assuredly be punished:² a topic rarely touched upon by ancient generals in their harangues on the eve of battle, and demonstrating conspicuously the reluctance of many of the Peloponnesian seamen, who had been brought to this second engagement chiefly by the ascendancy and strenuous commands of Sparta. To such reluctance Phormio pointedly alluded, in the encouraging exhortations which he on his side addressed to his men: for they too, in spite of their habitual confidence at sea, strengthened by the recent victory, were dispirited by the smallness of their numbers. He reminded them of their long practice and rational conviction of superiority at sea, such as no augmentation of numbers, especially with an enemy conscious of his own weakness, could overbalance. He called upon them to show their habitual discipline and quick apprehension of orders, and above all to perform their regular movements in perfect silence during the actual battle³—useful in all matters of

¹ Thucyd. ii. 86.

² Thucyd. ii. 87. Τῶν δὲ πρότερον ἡγεμόνων οὐ χεῖρον τὴν ἐπιχειρήσιν ἡμεῖς παρασκευάσομεν, καὶ οὐκ ἐνδύσομεν πρόφασιν οὐδὲνὶ κακῶ γε- νέσθαι· ἢ, ὅτι τις ἄρα καὶ βουλήσιν,

κολασθήσεται τῇ προπούσῃ ζήμει, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ τιμῶσονται τοῖς προσήκου- σιν ἀθλοῖς τῆς ἀρετῆς.

³ Thucyd. ii. 89. Καὶ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ κόσμον καὶ σιγὴν περὶ πλείστου ἡγεῖσθε, ὅτι ἐς τε τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πο-

war, and essential to the proper conduct of a sea-fight. The idea of entire silence on board the Athenian ships while a sea-fight was going on, is not only striking as a feature in the picture, but is also one of the most powerful evidences of the force of self-control and military habits among these citizen-seamen.

The habitual position of the Peloponnesian fleet off Panormus was within the strait, but nearly ^{Battle near} fronting the breadth of it—opposite to Phormio, ^{Naupaktus.} who lay on the outer side of the strait, as well as off the opposite cape: in the Peloponnesian line, therefore, the right wing occupied the north or north-east side towards Naupaktus. Knêmus and Brasidas now resolved to make a forward movement up the Gulf, as if against that town, which was the main Athenian station. Knowing that Phormio would be under the necessity of coming to the defence of the place, they hoped to pin him up and force him to action close under the land, where Athenian manœuvring would be unavailing. Accordingly they commenced this movement early in the morning, sailing in line of four abreast towards the northern coast of the Inner Gulf. The right squadron, under the Lacedæmonian Timokratês, was in the van, according to its natural position,¹ and care had been taken to place in it twenty of the best-sailing ships, since the success of the plan of action was known beforehand to depend upon their celerity. As they had foreseen, Phormio, the moment he saw their movement, put his men on shipboard, and rowed into the interior of the strait, though with the greatest reluctance; for the Messenians were on land alongside of him, and he knew that Naupaktus, with their wives and families, and a long circuit of wall,² was utterly undefended. He ranged his ships in line of battle ahead, probably his own the leading ship; and sailed close along the land toward Naupaktus, while the Messenians marching ashore kept near to him.

λεικῶν ἑυμῆρει, καὶ ναυμαχίᾳ οὐχ ἡμισυ, &c.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 90. ἐπὶ τεσσάρων πατάμενοι τὰς ναῦς. Matthiæ in his Grammar (sect. 534) states that ἐπὶ τεσσάρων means "four deep," and cites this passage of Thucydides

as an instance of it. But the words certainly mean here *four abreast*; though it is to be recollected that a column fourabreast, when formed into line, becomes four deep.

² Thucyd. iii. 102.

Both fleets were thus moving in the same direction, and towards the same point—the Athenian close along shore—the Peloponnesian somewhat farther off.¹ The latter had now got Phormio into the position which they wished, pinned up against the land, with no room for tactics. On a sudden the signal was given, and the whole Peloponnesian fleet, facing to the left, changed from column into line, and instead of continuing to move along the coast, rowed rapidly with their prows shoreward to come to close quarters with the Athenians. The right squadron of the Peloponnesians, occupying the side towards Naupaktus, was especially charged with the duty of cutting off the Athenians from all possibility of escaping thither; the best ships having been placed on the right for that important object. As far as the commanders were concerned, the plan of action completely succeeded: the Athenians were caught in a situation where resistance was impossible, and had no chance of escape except in flight. But so superior were they in rapid movement even to the best Peloponnesians, that eleven ships, the headmost out of the twenty, just found means to run by,² before the right wing of the enemy closed in upon the shore; and made the best of their way to Naupaktus. The remaining nine ships were caught and driven ashore with serious damage—their crews being partly slain, partly escaping by swimming. The Peloponnesians towed off one trireme with its entire crew, and some others empty. But more than one of them was rescued by the bravery of the Messenian hoplites, who, in spite of their heavy panoply, rushed into the water and got aboard them, fighting from the decks and driving off the enemy even after the rope had been actually made fast, and the process of towing off had begun.³

¹ In reference to the description of this movement, see the Appendix to the present chapter, with the Plan annexed.

² Thucyd. ii. 90. How narrow the escape was, is marked in the words of the historian—τῶν δὲ ἕνδεκα μὲν αἴπειρ ἤγρουντο ὑπεκφεύγουσι τὸ κέραιτῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ τὴν ἐπιστροφὴν, ἐς τὴν εὐρυχωρίαν.

The proceedings of the Syracusan fleet against that of the Athenians in the harbour of Syracuse, and the reflections of the historian upon them, illustrate this attack of the Peloponnesians upon the fleet of Phormio (Thucyd. vii. 36).

³ Compare the like bravery on the part of the Lacedæmonian hoplites at Pylus (Thucyd. iv. 14).

The victory of the Peloponnesians seemed assured. While their left and centre were thus occupied, the twenty ships of their right wing parted company with the rest, in order to pursue the eleven fugitive Athenian ships which they had failed in cutting off. Ten of these got clear away into the harbour of Naupaktus, and there posted themselves in an attitude of defence near the temple of Apollo, before any of the pursuers could come near; while the eleventh, somewhat less swift, was neared by the Lacedæmonian admiral, who on board a Leukadian trireme, pushed greatly ahead of his comrades, in hopes of overtaking at least this one prey. There happened to lie moored a merchant-vessel, at the entrance of the harbour of Naupaktus. The Athenian captain in his flight observing that the Leukadian pursuer was for the moment alone, seized the opportunity for a bold and rapid manœuvre. He pulled swiftly round the trader-vessel, directed his trireme so as to meet the advancing Leukadian, and drove his beak against her, amidships, with an impact so violent as to disable her at once. Her commander, the Lacedæmonian admiral Timokratês, was so stung with anguish at this unexpected catastrophe, that he slew himself forthwith, and fell overboard into the harbour. The pursuing vessels coming up behind, too, were so astounded and dismayed by it, that the men, dropping their oars, held water, and ceased to advance; while some even found themselves half aground, from ignorance of the coast. On the other hand, the ten Athenian triremes in the harbour were beyond measure elated by the incident, so that a single word from Phormio sufficed to put them in active forward motion, and to make them strenuously attack the embarrassed enemy; whose ships, disordered by the heat of pursuit, and having been just suddenly stopped, could not be speedily got again under way, and expected nothing less than renewed attack. First, the Athenians broke the twenty pursuing ships on the right wing, next they pursued their advantage against the left and centre, who had probably neared to the right; so that after a short resistance, the whole were completely routed, and fled across the Gulf to their original station at Panormus.¹ Not only did the eleven Athenian ships thus break,

The Peloponnesian fleet at first successful, but afterwards defeated.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 92. It is sufficiently evident that the Athenians defeated and drove off not only the twenty Peloponnesian ships of the

terrify, and drive away the entire fleet of the enemy, with the capture of six of the nearest Peloponnesian triremes—but they also rescued those ships of their own which had been driven ashore and taken in the early part of the action. Moreover the Peloponnesian crews sustained a considerable loss both in killed and in prisoners.

Thus in spite not only of the prodigious disparity of numbers, but also of the disastrous blow which the Athenians had sustained at first, Phormio ended by gaining a complete victory; a victory, to which even the Lacedæmonians were forced to bear testimony, since they were obliged to ask a truce for burying and collecting their dead, while the Athenians on their part picked up the bodies of their own warriors. The defeated party, however, still thought themselves entitled, in token of their success in the early part of the action, to erect a trophy on the Rhium of Achaia, where they also dedicated the single Athenian trireme which they had been able to carry off. Yet they were so completely discomfited—and farther so much in fear of the expected reinforcement from Athens—that they took advantage of the night to retire, and sail into the Gulf to Corinth; all except the Leukadians, who returned to their own home.

Presently the reinforcement arrived, after that untoward detention which had well nigh exposed Phormio and his whole fleet to ruin. It confirmed his mastery of the entrance of the Gulf and of the coast of Akarnania, where the Peloponnesians had now no naval force at all. To establish more fully the Athenian influence in Akarnania, he undertook during the course of the autumn an expedition, landing at Astakus, and marching into the Akarnanian inland country with 400 Athenian hoplites and 400

right or pursuing wing—but also the left and centre. Otherwise they would not have been able to recapture those Athenian ships which had been lost at the beginning of the battle. Thucydides indeed does not expressly mention the Peloponnesian left and centre as following the right in their pursuit towards Naupaktus. But we may presume that

they partially did so, probably careless of much order, as being at first under the impression that the victory was gained. They were probably therefore thrown into confusion without much difficulty, when the twenty ships of the right were beaten and driven back upon them—even though the victorious Athenian triremes were no more than eleven in number.

Retirement of the defeated Peloponnesian fleet. Phormio is reinforced—his operations in Akarnania—he returns to Athens.

Messenians. Some of the leading men of Stratus and Koronta, who were attached to the Peloponnesian interest, he caused to be sent into exile, while a chief named Kynês, of Koronta, who seems to have been hitherto in exile, was re-established in his native town. The great object was, to besiege and take the powerful town of Œniadæ, near the mouth of the Achelôus; a town at variance with the other Akarnanians, and attached to the Peloponnesians. But as the great spread of the waters of the Achelôus rendered this siege impracticable during the winter, Phormio returned to the station at Naupaktus. From hence he departed to Athens towards the end of the winter, carrying home both his prize-ships and such of his prisoners as were freemen. The latter were exchanged man for man against Athenian prisoners in the hands of Sparta.¹

After abandoning the naval contest at Rhium, and retiring to Corinth, Knêmus and Brasidas were prevailed upon by the Megarians, before the fleet dispersed, to try the bold experiment of a sudden inroad upon Peiræus. Such was the confessed superiority of the Athenians at sea, that while they guarded amply the coasts of Attica against privateers, they never imagined the possibility of an attack upon their own main harbour. Accordingly, Peiræus was not only unprotected by any chain across the entrance, but destitute even of any regular guard-ships manned and ready. The seamen of the retiring Peloponnesian armament, on reaching Corinth, were immediately disembarked and marched, first across the isthmus, next to Megara—each man carrying his seat-cloth,² and his oar,

Attempt of Knêmus and Brasidas to surprise Peiræus, starting from Corinth.

¹ Thueyd. ii. 102, 103.

² Thueyd. ii. 93. ἐδόκει δὲ λαβόντα τῶν ναυτῶν ἕκαστον τῆν κώπην, καὶ τὸ ὑπηρέσιον, καὶ τὸν προπωτήρα, &c. On these words there is an interesting letter of Dr. Bishop's published in the Appendix to Dr. Arnold's Thueydidês, vol. i. His remarks upon ὑπηρέσιον are more satisfactory than those upon προπωτήρ. Whether the fulcrum of the oar was formed by a thowell, or a notch on the gunwale, or by a perforation in

the ship's side, there must in both cases have been required (since it seems to have had nothing like what Dr. Bishop calls a *nut*) a thong to prevent it from slipping down towards the water; especially with the oars of the Thranitæ or upper tier of rowers, who pulled at so great an elevation (comparatively speaking) above the water. Dr. Arnold's explanation of προπωτήρ is suited to the case of a boat, but not to that of a trireme. Dr. Bishop shows that

together with the loop whereby the oar was fastened to the oar-hole in the side and thus prevented from slipping.

There lay forty triremes in Nisæa the harbour of Megara, which, though old and out of condition, were sufficient for so short a trip; and the seamen, immediately on arriving, launched these and got aboard. Yet such was the awe entertained of Athens and her power, that when the scheme came really to be executed, the courage of the Peloponnesians failed, though there was nothing to hinder them from actually reaching Peiræus. Pretending that the wind was adverse, they contented themselves with passing across to the station of Budorum, in the opposite Athenian island of Salamis, where they surprised and seized the three guard-ships which habitually blockaded the harbour of Megara, and then landed upon the island. They spread themselves over a large part of Salamis, ravaged the properties, and seized men as well as goods. Fire-signals immediately made known this unforeseen aggression both at Peiræus and at Athens, occasioning in both the extreme of astonishment and alarm; for the citizens in Athens, not conceiving distinctly the meaning of the signals, fancied that Peiræus itself had fallen into the hands of the enemy. The whole population rushed down to the Peiræus at break of day, and put to sea with all the triremes that were ready. But the Peloponnesians, aware of the danger which menaced them, made haste to quit Salamis with their booty and the three captured guard-ships. The lesson was salutary to the Athenians: from henceforward Peiræus was furnished with a chain across the mouth, and a regular guard, down to the end of the war.¹ Forty years afterwards, however, we shall find it just as negligently watched, and surprised with much more boldness and dexterity by the Lacedæmonian captain Teletias.²

As, during the summer of this year, the Ambrakiots had brought down a numerous host of Epirotic tribes to the invasion of Akarnania, in conjunction with the Peloponnesians—so during the autumn the Athenians obtained aid against the Chalkidians of Thrace from the powerful bar-

Alliance of the Athenians with the Odrysian king Sitalkês.

the explanation of the purpose of the ὑπερέστος, given by the Scholiast, is not the true one.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 94.

² Xenophon, Hellen. v. 1, 19.

baric prince before mentioned, Sitalkês king of the Odrysian Thracians.

Amidst the numerous tribes, between the Danube and the Ægean sea—who all bore the generic name of Thracians, though each had a special name besides—the Odrysians were at this time the most warlike and powerful. The Odrysian king Têrês, father of Sitalkês, had made use of this power to subdue¹ and render tributary a great number of these different tribes, especially those whose residence was in the plain rather than in the mountains. His dominion, the largest existing between the Ionian sea and the Euxine, extended from Abdêra or the mouth of the Nestus in the Ægean sea, to the mouth of the Danube in the Euxine; though it seems that this must be understood with deductions, since many intervening tribes, especially mountain tribes, did not acknowledge his authority. Sitalkês himself had invaded and conquered some of the Pæonian tribes who joined the Thracians on the west, between the Axios and the Strymon.² Dominion, in the sense of the Odrysian king, meant tribute, presents, and military force when required. With the two former, at least, we may conclude that he was amply supplied, since his nephew and successor Seuthes (under whom the revenue increased and attained its maximum) received 400 talents annually in gold and silver as tribute, and the like sum in various presents, over and above many other presents of manufactured articles and ornaments. These latter came from the Grecian colonies on the coast, which contributed moreover largely to the tribute, though in what proportions we are not informed. Even Grecian cities, not in Thrace, sent presents to forward their trading objects, as purchasers for the produce, the plunder, and the slaves, acquired by Thracian chiefs or tribes.³ The residence of the Odrysians properly so called, and of the princes of that tribe now ruling over so many of the remaining tribes, appears to have been about twelve days'

¹ Thueyd. ii. 29, 95, 96.

² Thueyd. ii. 99.

³ See Xenophon, *Anabasis* vii. 3, 10; 4, 2. Diodorus (xii. 50) gives the revenue of Sitalkês as more than 1000 talents annually. This sum is not materially different from that which Thucydides states to be the annual receipt of Seu-

thês successor of Sitalkês—revenue properly so called, and presents, both taken together.

Traders from Parium, on the Asiatic coast of the Propontis, are among those who come with presents to the Odrysian king Mëdokus (Xenophon, *ut supra*).

journey inland from Byzantium,¹ in the upper regions of the Hebrus and Strymon, south of Mount Hæmus, and north-east of Rhodopê. The Odrysian chiefs were connected by relationship more or less distant with those of the subordinate tribes, and by marriage even with the Scythian princes north of the Danube: the Scythian prince Ariapeithês² had married the daughter of the Odrysian Têrês, the first who extended the dominion of his tribe over any considerable portion of Thrace.

The natural state of the Thracian tribes—in the judgement of Herodotus, permanent and incorrigible—was that of disunion and incapacity of political association; were such association possible (he says), they would be strong enough to vanquish every other nation—though Thucydidês considers them as far inferior to the Scythians. The Odrysian dominion had probably not reached, at the period when Herodotus

made his inquiries, the same development which Thucydidês describes in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, and which imparted to these tribes a union, partial indeed, and temporary, but such as they never reached either before or afterwards. It has been already mentioned that the Odrysian prince Sitalkês had taken for his wife (or rather for one of his wives) the sister of Nymphodôrus, a Greek of Abdêra; by whose mediation he had been made the ally, and his son Sadokus even a citizen, of Athens. He had farther been induced to promise that he would reconquer the Chalkidians of Thrace for the benefit of the Athenians,³—his ancient kinsmen, according to the mythe of Tereus as interpreted by both parties. At the same time, Perdikkas king of Macedonia had offended him by refusing to perform a promise made of giving him his

Sitalkês, at the instigation of Athens, undertakes to attack Perdikkas and the Chalkidians of Thrace.

sister in marriage—a promise made as consideration for the interference of Sitalkês and Nymphodôrus in procuring for Perdikkas peace with Athens, at a moment when he was much embarrassed by civil dissensions with his brother Philip. The latter prince, ruling in his own name (and seemingly independent of Perdikkas) over a portion of the Macedonians along the

¹ Xenoph. Anabas. l. c.

² Herodot. iv. 80.

³ Xenophon, Anabas. vii. 2, 31; Thucyd. ii. 29; Aristophan. Aves,

upper course of the Axius, had been expelled by his more powerful brother, and taken refuge with Sitalkês. He was now apparently dead, but his son Amyntas received from the Odrysian prince the promise of restoration. The Athenians, though they had ambassadors resident with Sitalkês, nevertheless sent Agnon as special envoy to concert arrangements, for his march against the Chalkidians, with which an Athenian armament was destined to cooperate. In treating with Sitalkês, it was necessary to be liberal in presents both to himself and to the subordinate chieftains who held power dependent upon him. Nothing could be accomplished among the Thracians except by the aid of bribes,¹ and the Athenians were more competent to supply this exigency than any other people in Greece. The joint expedition against the Chalkidians was finally resolved.

366. Thucydidês goes out of his way to refute this current belief—a curious exemplification of ancient legend applied to the convenience of present politics.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 97. Φόρος δὲ ἐκ πάσης τῆς βαρβάρου καὶ τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων, ἕσον προσῆξαν ἐπὶ Σεύθου, ὃς ὑπερὸν Σιτάλκου βασιλεύσας πλείστον δὴ ἐποίησε, τετρακοσίων ταλάντων μάλιστα δύναμις, ἃ χρυσός καὶ ἄργυρος εἶη καὶ δῶρα οὐκ ἐλάσσω τούτῳ χρυσοῦ τε καὶ ἀργύρου προσεφέρετο, χωρὶς δὲ ἕσα ὑραντά τε καὶ λεῖτα, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη κατασκευή, καὶ οὐ μόνον αὐτῷ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς παραδυναστεύουσι καὶ γενναίοις Ὀδρυσῶν κατεστήσαντο γὰρ τοῦναντίον τῆς Περσῶν βασιλείας τὸν νόμον, ὅσα μὲν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑρᾶσι, λαμβάνειν μᾶλλον ἢ διδόναι, καὶ αἴσχιον ἦν αἰτηθέντα μὴ δοῦναι ἢ αἰτήσαντα μὴ τυχεῖν ἕμως θεῖ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι ἐπὶ πλέον αὐτῷ ἐγγίξασθαι· οὐ γὰρ ἦν πράξει οὐδὲν μὴ διδόντα δῶρα· ὥστε ἐπὶ μέγα ἡ βασιλεία ἤλθεν ἰσχύος.

This universal necessity of presents and bribes may be seen illustrated in the dealings of Xenophon and the Cyreian army

with the Thracian prince Seuthes, described in the Anabasis, vii. chapters 1 and 2. It appears that even at that time (B.C. 401) the Odrysian dominion, though it had passed through disturbances and had been practically enfeebled, still extended down to the neighbourhood of Byzantium. In commenting upon the venality of the Thracians, the Scholiast has a curious comparison with his own time—καὶ οὐκ ἦν τι πράξει παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸν μὴ διδόντα χρήματα ἕπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν Ῥωμαίοις. The Scholiast here tells us that the venality in his time as to public affairs, in the Roman empire, was not less universal: of what century of the Roman empire he speaks, we do not know: perhaps about 500-600 A.D.

The contrast which Thucydidês here draws between the Thracians and the Persians is illustrated by what Xenophon says respecting the habits of the younger Cyrus (Anabas. i. 9, 22): compare also the romance of the Cyropædia, viii. 14, 31, 32.

But the forces of Sitalkês, collected from many different portions of Thrace, were tardy in coming together. He summoned all the tribes under his dominion between Hæmus, Rhodopê, and the two seas: the Getæ between Mount Hæmus and the Danube, equipped like the Scythians (their neighbours on the other side of the river) with bow and arrow on horseback, also joined him, as well as the Agrianes, the Lææi, and the other Pæonian tribes subject to his dominion. Lastly, several of the Thracian tribes called Dii, distinguished by their peculiar short swords, and maintaining a fierce independence on the heights of Rhodopê, were tempted by the chance of plunder, or the offer of pay, to flock to his standard. Altogether his army amounted, or was supposed to amount, to 150,000 men—one-third of it cavalry, who were for the most part Getæ and Odrysians proper. The most formidable warriors in his camp were the independent tribes of Rhodopê. The whole host, alike numerous, warlike, predatory, and cruel, spread terror amidst all those who were within even the remote possibilities of its march.

Starting from the central Odrysian territory, and bringing with him Agnon and the other Athenian envoys, he first crossed the uninhabited mountain called Kerkinê, which divided the Pæonians on the west from the Thracian tribes called Sinti and Mædi on the east, until he reached the Pæonian town or district called Dobêrus;¹ it was here that many troops and additional volunteers reached him, making up his full total. From Dobêrus, probably marching down along one of the tributary streams of the Axius, he entered into that portion of Upper Macedonia which lies along the higher Axius, and which had constituted the separate principality of Philip. The presence in his army of Amyntas, son of Philip, induced some of the fortified

¹ See Gatterer (*De Herodoti et Thucydidis Thraciâ*), sect. 44-57; Poppo (*Prolegom. ad Thucydidem*), vol. ii. ch. 31, about the geography of this region, which is very imperfectly known, even in modern times. We can hardly pretend to assign a locality for these ancient names.

Thucydidês, in his brief statements respecting this march of Sitalkês, speaks like one who had good information about the inland regions; as he was likely to have from his familiarity with the coasts, and resident proprietorship in Thrace (*Thucyd. ii. 100*; *Herodot. v. 16*).

places, Gortynia, Atalantê, and others, to open their gates without resistance, while Eidomenê was taken by storm, and Eurôpus in vain attacked. From hence he passed still farther southward into Lower Macedonia, the kingdom of Perdikkas; ravaging the territory on both sides of the Axios even to the neighbourhood of the towns Pella and Kyrrhus; and apparently down as far south as the mouth of the river and the head of the Thermaic Gulf. Farther south than this he did not go, but spread his force over the districts between the left bank of the Axios and the head of the Strymonic Gulf,—Mygdonia, Krestônia, and Anthemus—while a portion of his army was detached to overrun the territory of the Chalkidians and Bottiæans. The Macedonians under Perdikkas, renouncing all idea of contending on foot against so overwhelming a host, either fled or shut themselves up in the small number of fortified places which the country presented. The cavalry from Upper Macedonia, indeed, well-armed and excellent, made some orderly and successful charges against the Thracians, lightly armed with javelins, short swords, and the pelta or small shield,—but it was presently shut in, harassed on all sides by superior numbers, and compelled to think only of retreat and extrication.¹

Luckily for the enemies of the Odrysian king, his march was not made until the beginning of winter—seemingly about November or December. We may be sure that the Athenians, when they concerted with him the joint attack upon the Chalkidians, intended that it should be in a better time of the year. Having probably waited to hear that his army was in motion, and waited long in vain, they began to despair of his coming at all, and thought it not worth while to despatch any force of their own to the spot.² Some envoys and presents only were sent as compliments, instead of the cooperating armament. And this disappointment, coupled with the severity of the weather, the nakedness of the country, and the privations of his army at that season, induced Sitalkês soon to enter into negotiations with Perdikkas; who moreover gained over Seuthes, nephew of the Odrysian prince, by

He is forced to retire by the severity of the season and want of Athenian cooperation.

¹ Thucyd. ii. 100; Xenophon, Memorab. iii. 9, 2.

ναῖσι οὐ παρεῖσαν ταῖς ναυσίν, ἀπιστοῦντες αὐτόν, μὴ ῥῆξεν, &c.

² Thucyd. ii. 101. ἐπειδὴ οἱ Ἄθη-

promising his sister Stratonikê in marriage, together with a sum of money, on condition that the Thracian host should be speedily withdrawn. This was accordingly done, after it had been distributed for thirty days over Macedonia; during eight of which days his detachment had ravaged the Chalkidic lands. But the interval had been quite long enough to diffuse terror all around. Such a host of fierce barbarians had never before been brought together, and no one knew in what direction they might be disposed to carry their incursions. The independent Thracian tribes (Panæi, Odomantes, Drôi and Dersæi) in the plains on the north-east of the Strymon, and near Mount Pangærus, not far from Amphipolis, were the first to feel alarm lest Sitalkês should take the opportunity of trying to conquer them. On the other side, the Thessalians, Magnêtes, and other Greeks north of Thermopylæ, apprehensive that he would carry his invasion farther south, began to organise means for resisting him. Even the general Peloponnesian confederacy heard with uneasiness of this new ally whom Athens was bringing into the field, perhaps against them. All such alarms were dissipated, when Sitalkês, after remaining thirty days, returned by the way he came, and the formidable avalanche was thus seen to melt away. The faithless Perdikkas, on this occasion, performed his promise to Seuthes, having drawn upon himself much mischief by violating his previous similar promise to Sitalkês.¹

¹ Thucyd. ii. 101.

APPENDIX.

Thucyd. ii. 90. Οἱ δὲ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐπειδὴ αὐτοῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐκ ἐπέπλεον ἐς τὸν κόλπον καὶ τὰ στενά, βουλόμενοι ἄκοντες ἔσω προαγαγεῖν αὐτούς, ἀναγόμενοι ὅμα ἔψ ἐπλεον, ἐπὶ τεσσάρων ταξάμενοι τὰς ναῦς, ἐπὶ τὴν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῶν κέρα ἡγουμένῳ, ὡσπερ καὶ ὤρμουν ἐπὶ δ' αὐτῷ εἰκοσι νῆας ἔταξαν τὰς ἀριστα πλεούσας, ὅπως, εἰ ἄρα γαμίσας ἐπὶ τὴν Ναύπακτον πλεῖν ὁ Φορμίων καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιβοηθῶν ταύτῃ παραπλέσι, μὴ διασφύσειεν πλείοντα τοῖς ἐπιπλέον σφῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἔξω τοῦ ἑαυτῶν κέρως, ἀλλ' αὐταὶ αἱ νῆες περικλήσειαν.

The above passage forms the main authority for my description (given above of the movement of the Peloponnesian fleet, previous to the

second battle against Phormio. The annexed plan will enable my reasoning to be understood.

The main question for consideration here is, What is the meaning of τῆν ἐξουτῶν γῆν? Does it mean the land of the Peloponnesians, south of the Gulf—or the land of the Athenians, north of the Gulf? The commentators affirm that it must mean the former. I thought that it might mean the latter: and in my previous editions, I adduced several examples of the use of the pronoun ἐξουτού, tending to justify that opinion.

Finding that on this question of criticism, my opinion is opposed to the best authorities, I no longer insist upon it, nor do I now reprint the illustrative passages. As to the facts, however, my conviction remains unchanged. The land here designated by Thucydides must be “the land of the Athenians north of the Strait:” it cannot be “the land of the Peloponnesians south of the Strait.” The pronoun ἐξουτῶν must therefore be wrong, and ought to be altered into αὐτῶν, as Mr. Bloomfield proposes, or ἐξαιῶν.

The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ τῆν γῆν is here equivalent to παρὰ τῆν γῆν. Dr. Arnold, thoroughly approving the description of Mitford, who states that the Peloponnesian fleet were “moving eastward along the Achaic coast,” says, “The Scholiast says that ἐπὶ is here used for παρὰ. It would be better to say that it has a mixed signification of motion towards a place and neighbourhood to it: expressing that the Peloponnesians sailed towards their own land (i. e. towards Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellênè, to which places the greater number of the ships belonged), instead of standing over to the opposite coast belonging to their enemies; and at the same time kept close upon their own land, in the sense of ἐπὶ with a dative case.”

To discuss this interpretation first with reference to the verbal construction. Surely the meaning which the Scholiast puts upon ἐπὶ τῆν γῆν is one which cannot be admitted without examples to justify it. No two propositions can be more distinct than the two, πλεῖν ἐπὶ τῆν γῆν—and πλεῖν παρὰ τῆν γῆν. The Peloponnesian fleet, before it made any movement, was already moored close upon its own land—at the headland Rhium near Panormus where its land-force stood (Thucyd. ii. 86). In this position, if it moved at all, it must either sail away from the Peloponnesian coast, or along the Peloponnesian coast: and neither of these movements would be expressed by Thucydides under the word πλεῖν ἐπὶ τῆν ἐξουτῶν γῆν.

To obviate this difficulty, while the Scholiast changes the meaning of ἐπὶ, Dr. Arnold changes that of τῆν ἐξουτῶν γῆν; which words, according to him, denote, not the Peloponnesian coast as opposed to the northern shore occupied by Phormio, but Corinth, Sicyon, and Pellênè: to which places (he says) the greater number of the ships belonged. But I submit that this is a sense altogether unnatural. Corinth and Sicyon are so far off, that any allusion to them here is most improbable. Thucydides is describing the operations of two hostile fleets, one occupying the coast northward, the other the coast southward, of the Strait. The *own land* of the Peloponnesians was that southern line of coast which they occupied and on which their land-force was encamped. it is distinguished from the *enemies' land*, on the opposite side of the

Strait. If Thucydides had wished to intimate that the Peloponnesian fleet sailed in the direction of Corinth and Sicyon, he would hardly have used such words as ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆν ἑαυτῶν γῆν.

Professor Dunbar (in an article among the Critical Remarks annexed to the third edition of his Greek and English Lexicon) has contested my interpretation of this passage of Thucydides. He says, "The Peloponnesian fleet must have *proceeded along their own coast*—ἐπὶ τῆν ἑαυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου. In this passage we find ἐπὶ with two cases: the first with the accusative, the other with the genitive. The first appears to me to indicate *the locality to which* they were sailing: and that evidently was, the headland on the Achaean coast, nearly opposite Naupactus."

The headland, to which Mr. Dunbar alludes, will be seen on the annexed plan, marked Drepanum. It is sufficiently near, not to be open to the objection which I have urged against Dr. Arnold's hypothesis of Corinth and Sicyon. But still I contend that it cannot be indicated by the words as they stand in Thucydides. On Mr. Dunbar's interpretation, the Peloponnesians must have moved from one point of their own land to another point of their own land. Now if Thucydides had meant to affirm this, he surely would not have used such words as ἔπλεον ἐπὶ τῆν ἑαυτῶν γῆν. He would either have specified by name the particular point of land (as in c. 86 παρέπλευσεν ἐπὶ τὸ 'Ρίον)—or if he had desired to bring to our view that "they proceeded *along* their own coast," he would have said παρά instead of ἐπὶ.

Thus far I have been discussing simply the verbal interpretation of ἐπὶ τῆν ἑαυτῶν γῆν, for the purpose of showing, that though these words be admitted to mean the land of the Peloponnesians,—still, in order to reconcile such meaning with the facts, the commentators are obliged to advance suppositions highly improbable, and even to identify ἐπὶ with παρά. I now turn from the verbal construction to the facts, in order to show that the real movement of the Peloponnesian fleet *must have been* towards the Athenian coast and towards Naupaktus. Therefore, since ἑαυτῶν cannot have that meaning, ἑαυτῶν must be an error of the text.

The purpose of the Peloponnesians in effecting the movement, was to make Phormio believe that they were going to attack Naupaktus; to constrain him to come within the Gulf with a view of protecting that place; and at the same time, if Phormio did come within the Gulf, to attack him in a narrow space where his ships would have no room for manœuvring. This was what the Peloponnesians not only intended, but actually accomplished.

Now I ask, how this purpose could be accomplished by a movement along the coast of Peloponnesus from the headland of Rhium to the headland of Drepanum,—which last point the reader will see on the plan annexed? How could such movement induce Phormio to think that the Peloponnesians were going to attack Naupaktus, or throw him into alarm for the safety of that place? When arrived at Drepanum, they would hardly be nearer to Naupaktus than they were at Rhim: they would still have the whole breadth of the Gulf to cross. Let us however suppose that their movement towards Drepanum did really induce Phormio to come into the Gulf for the protection of Naupaktus.

If they attempted to cross the breadth of the Gulf from Drepanum towards Naupaktus, they would expose themselves to be attacked by Phormio midway in the open sea; the very contingency which he desired, and which they were manœuvring to avoid.

Again, let us approach the question from another point of view. It is certain, from the description of Thucydidès, that the actual attack of the Peloponnesians upon Phormio, in which they cut off nine out of his twenty ships, took place on the *northern coast of the Gulf*, at some spot between the headland Antirrhium and Naupaktus; somewhere near the spot which I have indicated on the annexed plan. The presence of the Messenian soldiers (who had come out from Naupaktus to assist Phormio, and who waded into the water to save the captured ships) would of itself place this beyond a doubt—if indeed any doubt could arise. It is farther certain, that when the Peloponnesian fleet wheeled from column into line to attack Phormio, they were so near to this northern land, that Phormio was in the greatest danger of having his whole squadron driven ashore: only eleven out of his twenty ships could escape. The plan will illustrate what is here said.

Now I ask, how these facts are to be reconciled with the supposition that the Peloponnesian fleet, on quitting their moorings at Rhium, coasted along their own land towards Drepanum? If they did so, how did they afterwards get across the Gulf, to the place where the battle was fought? Every yard that they moved in the direction of Drepanum, only tended to widen the breadth of open gulf to be crossed afterwards. With the purpose which they had in view, to move from Rhium along their own coast in the direction of Drepanum would have been absurd. Supposing however that they did so, it could only have been preliminary to a second movement, in another direction, across the Gulf. But of this second movement, Thucydidès says not one word. All that he tells us about the course of the Peloponnesians is contained in this phrase—*ἐπὶ τῆν ἐξυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου, δεξιῶν κέρκῃ ἤγου- κέτω, ὡς περ καὶ ὤρμουσι*. If these words really designate a movement along the southern coast, we must assume, first that the historian has left unnoticed the second movement across the Gulf, which nevertheless must have followed—next, that the Peloponnesians made a first move for no purpose except to increase the distance and difficulty of the second.

Considering therefore the facts of the case, the localities and the purpose of the Peloponnesians, all of which are here clear—I contend that *ἐπὶ τῆν ἐξυτῶν γῆν ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου* must denote a movement of the Peloponnesian fleet towards the land of the Athenians, or the northern shore of the Gulf; and that as *ἐξυτῶν* will not bear that sense, it must be altered to *πύτων* or *ἐξείων*.

It remains to explain *ἔσω ἐπὶ τοῦ κόλπου*, which bear a very distinct and important meaning. The land of the Athenians, on the northern side of the Strait, comprises the headland of Antirrhium with both the lines of coast which there terminate and make an angle; that is, one line of coast *fronting inside towards the Corinthian Gulf*—the other, *fronting outside towards the Gulf of Patras*. The reader who looks at the annexed plan will see this at a glance. Now when Thucydidès says that the Peloponnesians sailed *upon the land of the Athenians*

inwards fronting the Gulf,"—these last words are essential to make us understand towards which of the two Athenian lines of coast the movement was turned. We learn from the words that the Peloponnesians did not sail towards that outer side of the headland where Phormio was moored, but towards the inner side of it, on the line which conducted to Naupaktus.

END OF VOL. V.

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