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A HISTORY
OF THE MAHRATTAS

A HISTORY OF THE MAHRATTAS

BY

JAMES CUNINGHAME GRANT DUFF

CAPTAIN IN THE FIRST, OR GRENADIER, REGIMENT OF BOMBAY NATIVE
INFANTRY AND LATE POLITICAL RESIDENT AT SATARA

REVISED ANNOTATED EDITION
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

S. M. EDWARDES, C.S.I., C.V.O.

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A HISTORY OF THE MAHRATTAS

VOL. II

CHAPTER XXIV.

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A.D. 1772.—CONSIDERABLE relaxation in the confinement of Rugonath Rao had taken place for some time prior to Mahdoo Rao's death. As the health of his nephew declined, Rugonath Rao began intrigues with Hyder Ally and the Nizam, in order to obtain complete enlargement, and secure his succession as Peishwa.

The correspondence was intercepted by the ministers during the Peishwa's extreme illness; nineteen persons implicated were sent into hill-forts, and the confinement of Rugonath Rao would have become more rigid than ever, but Mahdoo Rao, perceiving his death was near, interposed, and observed that it was natural for his uncle to desire his liberty. With his usual sound discrimination, he foresaw that his brother would not be able to conduct the administration if Rugonath Rao were not effectually restrained or conciliated; judging on the whole, therefore, that the latter course was the more advisable, and that in case of dissension the government must fall to pieces, he, in the first place, sent for Sukaram Bappoo and reinstated him as Dewan. It should be premised that Sukaram was more favourably disposed towards Rugonath Rao than any of the other ministers: he had acted as his Dewan in different campaigns; he respected Rugonath Rao as a good soldier, and had hitherto retained his confidence. Nana Furnuwees had as yet only acted in a secondary situation under Mahdoo Rao, his abilities had not fully developed themselves, and Sukaram Bappoo was accounted the most capable man in the empire. It had been previously settled, before Mahdoo Rao's present arrangements were contemplated, that Nana was to act

as Furnuwees in the civil, and Moroba, his cousin, in the military department.

Rugonath Rao was sent for to Theur, a reconciliation took place, and Mahdoo Rao, in the presence of Sukaram Bappoo, recommended his brother in an impressive manner to the care and protection of his uncle. He also, on several occasions before his final dissolution, in conversation with his brother and uncle, calmly entered upon the discussion of their state affairs, and represented the necessity of concord for their mutual safety and the preservation of the government.

After the usual time spent in the performance of his brother's funeral obsequies, Narrain Rao¹ early in December repaired to Satara, where he was invested as Peishwa by the Raja. Sukaram Bappoo received the clothes of prime minister, under the name of Karbaree, whilst Bujaba Poorundhuree was appointed Dewan, and Nana Furnuwees was recognized in the hereditary situation of his family.

A.D. 1773.—The first object of the new administration was the reduction of Raigurh, the Havildar of which had been in rebellion against the Peishwa for some months before Mahdoo Rao's death. It was apprehended that he had designs of giving it up to the Seedee, and when required to surrender, he replied that he held the fort for the Raja of Satara and would maintain it against the Peishwa until the Raja was released; but on an order from Ram Raja and the payment of forty thousand rupees, Narrain Rao, in the month of March, obtained possession of the ancient capital of Sivajee.

The new Peishwa and Rugonath Rao continued for some time in apparent amity: but the mother of the one, the wife of the other, and the jealousy of the Bramin ministers, would probably have created discord between men of better temper and stronger judgment. Rugonath Rao, with the consent of all except Sukaram Bappoo, who objected to the violence of the measure, was again made prisoner on the 11th of April and con-

April 11. fined in an apartment of the same palace in which Narrain Rao, when at Poona, usually resided.²

¹ Narrain Rao was the youngest of the three sons of Ballajee Bajee Rao. Wiswas Rao, the eldest, fell, as may be remembered, at Panniput.

² Mahratta MSS. and Bombay Records.

Nana Furnuwees stood high in the young Peishwa's estimation, but Bujaba Poorundhuree and Hurry Punt Phurkay were his chief confidants. The principal state affairs continued ostensibly to be transacted by Sukaram Bappoo, but the favourites were inimical to his administration. Narrain Rao was particularly ambitious of military fame, and looked forward with eagerness to the ensuing season, when he proposed to make a campaign in the Carnatic. For this purpose troops were directed to be in readiness, and orders were dispatched to recall the armies from Hindoostan. But circumstances occurred which occasioned the probability of employment in the Mahratta territories.

Janojee Bhonslay was at Theur at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death; but prior to that event, he had obtained his sanction to adopt Rughoojee, the eldest son of Moodajee, who was the only one of all the brothers that had issue; and Janojee not only made the adoption, but was said to have appointed Moodajee the guardian of his heir. Janojee died in the month of May near Tooljapoor: Moodajee and Sabajee each claimed the right of guardianship; but Durya Bye, the widow of Janojee, resisted the pretensions of both, assumed the government, and appointed Sabajee her general and Dewan. Moodajee, unfortunately for himself and his son, had hitherto maintained a connexion with Rugonath Rao, and his pretensions not being supported by Narrain Rao¹ or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his cause by force of arms. The Peishwa in vain interposed his advice: Moodajee's party were much discouraged by the defection of a considerable number of the choice troops, who carried with them the Juree Putka of the Sena Sahib Soobeh; but notwithstanding the evil presage which this created amongst his men, he attacked his brother at Koombaree near Ankolah, where he was defeated with severe loss and compelled to flee with precipitation. The Peishwa's agent at last procured a cessation of hostilities, but the brothers had scarcely met, when Durya Bye, quitting Sabajee,² joined Moodajee. The latter again took the field, obtained the

¹ The Peishwa's government acknowledged Sabajee as Sena Sahib Soobeh, as he is so styled in an original agreement of four articles, by which he becomes bound to fulfil the conditions of the agreement entered into by Janojee.

² Durya Bye was probably actuated by Sabajee's having been acknowledged as Sena Sahib Soobeh, which, if admitted, at once set aside her pretensions as guardian.

aid of Ismael Khan Patan, Governor of Elichpoor, and renewed hostilities. Sabajee applied to the Nizam and solicited the Peishwa's assistance; Rugonath Rao exhorted Moodajee to persevere; the Nizam joined Sabajee¹; but the attention of all India was arrested, and there was a momentary pause in the bustle of political affairs, by reports, which proved correct, of the murder of Narrain Rao Peishwa on the 30th of August.²

It appeared that on the morning of that day there had been considerable commotion amongst the regular infantry in the Peishwa's service, and it increased so much towards noon, that after an interview with Rughoojee Angria, who had just arrived from Kolabah to pay his respects, Narrain Rao, before he went to dinner, told Hurry Punt Phurkay to take some precautions in case of disturbance, meaning that he should secure the palace. Hurry Punt, however, thoughtlessly neglected these orders and went to dine with a friend in the neighbourhood.³ The Peishwa in the afternoon had retired to repose in his private apartments, when he was awoke by a great tumult in the palace, caused by a large body of infantry, who, having continued their clamours for pay throughout the day, were at last, about two o'clock, led to the palace by Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof on pretence of demanding their arrears. Khurruk Sing, one of their number, who commanded at the palace guard, joined them; but instead of entering at the large gate on the north side, to which there was no impediment, they made their way by an unfinished doorway on the east side, which, together with the wall surrounding the palace, had been pulled down a short time before, to make an entrance distinct from that of the quarter inhabited by Rugonath Rao. Narrain Rao, on starting from sleep, neither resolved on concealment nor defence, but ran to his uncle's apartments, and being closely pursued by Somer Sing he threw himself into his uncle's arms, and called on him to save him. Rugonath Rao did interfere and begged of them to spare him. 'I have not gone thus far to ensure my own destruction,' replied Somer Sing: 'let him go or you shall die with him.' Rugonath Rao disengaged himself and got out upon the terrace; Narrain Rao attempted

¹ Mahratta MSS.

² Mr. Mostyn's Report.

³ In consequence probably of this neglect, Hurry Punt, it would seem, was accused of being one of the partisans of Rugoba, which decidedly was not the case.

to follow him, but Truleea Powar, one of the Mahratta domestics of Rugonath Rao, who was armed, seized him by the legs and pulled him down, at which instant another domestic named Chapajee Teleekur in the service of Narrain Rao, entered the apartment, and, although unarmed, ran forward to his master, who clasped his arms about his neck, when Somer Sing and Truleea Powar dispatched them both with their swords. Whilst this was passing in the interior, the whole of the outer wall of the palace was secured by the conspirators; the people in the city heard of a tumult, armed men thronged in the streets, the shops were shut, and the inhabitants ran to and fro in consternation, asking what had happened. Sukaram Bappoo repaired to the Kotwal's Chowree, or office of the police magistrate, where word being brought to him that Rugonath Rao was not only alive, but had sent out assurances to the people that all was quiet, and had even invited some of them to go inside, Sukaram directed Hurry Punt Phurkay to write a note to Rugonath Rao in his name, which Rugonath Rao answered in his own hand-writing, informing him of the murder of his nephew by some of the Gardees (regular infantry). Hurry Punt Phurkay then declared that suspicions which he had entertained of Rugonath Rao were confirmed; and alarmed for his personal safety, he instantly fled to Baramuttee. Sukaram Bappoo tranquillized the minds of the people, by recommending them to go to their homes and to remain quiet, when nothing should molest them. Bujaba Poorundhuree and Mallojee Ghorepuray had an interview with Rugonath Rao that night; and Trimbuck Rao Mama, repairing to the palace, bore off the body of the unfortunate Peishwa and performed the funeral obsequies.

Visitors were admitted to the palace; Mr. Mostyn, the English envoy, and the different wukeels paid their respects, but Rugonath Rao remained in confinement, detained, as was pretended by the conspirators, as a security for the payment of their arrears. Rugonath Rao was suspected, but there was no proof of his being the author of the outrage. It was well known that he had an affection for his nephew, and the ministers, considering the extreme jealousy with which many of them viewed each other, are entitled to some praise for having adopted a resolution on the occasion equally sound and politic. They were generally of opinion that, whilst there remained a shadow of doubt, it was on every account

advisable to support Rugoba's right to the succession ; to this Ram Shastree, who was consulted, made no objections, but diligently instituted a search into the whole transaction. About six weeks after the event, having obtained proofs against Rugonath Rao, the Shastree waited upon him and accused him of having given an authority to Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof to commit the deed. Rugonath Rao is said to have acknowledged to Ram Shastree that he had written an order to those men, authorizing them to seize Narrain Rao, but that he had never given the order to kill him. This admission is generally supposed to have been literally true ; for by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ram Shastree, it was found that the word *dhurawè*, to seize, was altered to *marawè*, to kill. It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye ; and although Rugonath Rao's own conduct, in subsequently withholding protection even at the hazard of his life, sufficiently justifies the suspicion of his being fully aware of it, the moderate and general opinion in the Mahratta country is that he did not intend to murder his nephew ; that he was exasperated by his confinement, and excited by the desperate counsels of his wife, to whom is also attributed the activity of the domestic, Truleea Powar,¹ who was set on by the vindictive malice of that bad woman.

After Rugonath Rao had avowed his having so far participated in the fall of his nephew, he asked Ram Shastree what atonement he could make. 'The sacrifice of your own life,' replied the undaunted and virtuous Shastree, 'for your future life cannot be passed in amendment ; neither you nor your government can prosper ; and for my own part I will neither accept of employment nor enter Poona, whilst you preside in the administration.' He kept his word, and retired to a sequestered village near Waee.

In the meantime the arrears were discharged, Rugonath Rao was released, and his adopted son, Amrut Rao, attended by Bujaba Poorundhuree, was dispatched to Satara for the clothes of investiture, which were brought back accordingly, and Rugonath Rao

¹ It was given out that this domestic was actuated by motives of personal revenge, in consequence of having been publicly flogged by Narrain Rao's orders. He was executed for the murder of Narrain Rao several years afterwards by Nana Furnuwees.

was proclaimed Peishwa. Sukaram Bappoo was confirmed as Karbaree; but Chintoo Wittul and Sewdasheo Ramchundur, the son of Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, were the most confidential of the new Peishwa's ministers.¹

Of Narrain Rao little need be said except to contradict unjust calumny. He was murdered in the eighteenth year of his age; his follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interest of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations,² kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him.³

There is a well-known Poona anecdote which, though oftener told of Mahdoo Rao, was one from which the latter used to say his brother would become an enterprising officer. While spectators of an elephant fight at the Gooltekree, a small hill in the environs of the city, one of the animals, when enraged, came full speed towards the spot where they sat. Most of the attendants and all the principal people, whose fears overcame their politeness for the Peishwa, hurried off, and Narrain Rao jumped up to run with the rest. Mahdoo Rao caught his arm; 'Brother,' said he, 'what will the Ukhbars⁴ say of you.' He instantly sat down with composure, and the danger, which became imminent, was averted by the extraordinary bravery of a Mahratta Sillidar named Appajee Rao Pahtunkur, who, drawing his dagger, sprang in front of the Peishwa and turned the animal aside by wounding him in the trunk.

The Peishwa's army under Visajee Kishen returned from Hindoostan, after the accession of Rugonath Rao. We left the Emperor preparing to resist their usurpation of his authority. As Mahadajee Sindia could not disguise his enmity to Zabita Khan, and disapproved of the Mahratta alliance with the Rohillas, he was employed to the westward, collecting tribute from the Jhats and Rājpoote states; but Visajee Kishen and Tookajee Holkar continued in the Rohilla country with upwards of thirty thousand horse. Their absence from the capital gave the Emperor

¹ Mahratta MSS. Mr. Mostyn's dispatches.

² A few of his original letters, generally written to Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, found amongst the Poona Records, bear testimony to that trait.

³ [But see the remarks of W. Taylor in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i, pt. ii, p. 251.]

⁴ 'Native newspapers.' Narrain Rao had indeed 'a gazette to himself,' but far different from his brother's anticipation.

full time to prepare for resisting them, and his preparations were much more formidable than the Mahrattas had anticipated. Visajee therefore endeavoured by every means to soothe or intimidate him into terms, and would probably have succeeded but for the more firm counsel of Nujeef Khan. A battle took place in the environs of Delhi on the 19th December, 1772, in which the Mahrattas were victorious after an obstinate conflict. The Moghul horse, although bravely led by Nujeef Khan, behaved ill; but the Emperor's regular infantry acted with spirit; particularly two battalions of Sepoys, originally disciplined by the English, which fought under the command of a Frenchman named Madoc,¹ and retired in order. The terms required by the Mahrattas on this occasion from the Emperor were far from immoderate; they obliged him to nominate the Peishwa his Bukhshee, or commander-in-chief, and to appoint Zabita Khan the Peishwa's deputy; to confirm all the promises he had first made to them; to cede Serampore, lately taken from the Jhats, and to give them a grant of Korah and Kurrah,² two provinces east of the Jumna, adjoining their frontier in Bundelcund, which the English Government of Bengal had obliged Shujah-ud-Dowlah to cede for the Emperor's support, as long as he chose to continue under the British protection; but as he had voluntarily relinquished all the benefits of their alliance, they claimed the right

¹ Madoc was one of the earliest of those European adventurers who rose to consequence in the immediate service of the native states. He was considered by the natives a brave soldier but an indifferent officer; incapable of acting as a chief in command; and of a faithless character. [His name is also spelt Madec. Keene calls him Médoc (*Mughal Empire*, p. 96). Described as ignorant and illiterate, he is supposed to have deserted from the French army in Southern India in 1774, and to have joined Najf Khān at Delhi. Malleson states that he commenced his career in 1757, and was one of Sombre's (Samrū) officers. Leaving Najf Khān, he joined the Rāna of Gohad in 1776. After his defeat by the Rohillas in Mewatti district Madec fled to Agra, where he raised another corps. This he sold to the Rāna of Gohad in 1782. He then retired to Europe, and was killed there in a duel. (Compton, *Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, p. 371.)]

² [Korā (Korah) is a town in Fatehpur District, about one hundred miles north-west of Allahābād. It was the capital of a *Sarkār* in Akbar's time. Karā (Kurrah), about forty miles north-west of Allahābād, is a small town in that district, which played a considerable part in earlier ages. Some of the early English documents speak of 'Corah' only, but the territory is often described as 'Corah and Kurrah' (Strachey, *Rohilla War*, p. 37 n.). *O.H.I.*, p. 503 n.]

of disposing of the reversion, and determined to repel any attempt the Mahrattas might make for their occupation. They resolved, however, to act strictly on the defensive and to assist their ally, Shujah-ud-dowlah, in resisting an invasion of the province of Oude, which it was supposed the Mahrattas meditated ; but after an inactive campaign they quitted Hindoostan in the end of May,¹ in consequence of a positive recall by Narrain Rao for the purpose to which we have alluded. Visajee Kishen, however, did not reach Poona till the rains were nearly over.

As Hyder Ally had most reason to apprehend the approach of the Mahrattas, so was he most ready to take advantage of the confusion likely to ensue from the late violent change in the state. A strong detachment was sent under his son Tippoo for the recovery of the districts conquered by the Mahrattas in the late war ; and Nizam Ally was likewise preparing, with the hope of profiting by Bramin dissensions in the same manner that they had encroached during the intestine broils of his own family.

Moodajee Bhonslay, with his son, and the widow of Janojee, joined Rugonath Rao, and on that occasion Rughoojee Bhonslay, as the adopted son of Janojee, was invested as Sena Sahib Soobeh. Sabajee continuing the stronger party, Moodajee remained with the Peishwa ; but Rughoojee and Durya Bye returned towards Berar. Rugonath Rao resolved in the first instance to oppose Nizam Ally, and to endeavour to cripple his power ; otherwise, by crossing the Kistná, he must have left his own territory exposed to the ravages of the Nizam and Sabajee Bhonslay.

At this critical period, when the army had marched and Rugonath Rao was on the eve of departure from Poona, Ram Shastree waited upon him in the manner which has been mentioned. The other ministers were less sincere, but as Rugonath Rao showed himself suspicious and distrustful of all the experienced men who were capable of supporting his government, they soon became entirely estranged from his councils. Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Chintoo Wittul, Abbajee Mahdeo, and Sukaram Hurry, the persons of whom he made choice, were ill-qualified to supply their place. In the month of November, the Peishwa's army

¹ Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy. Bombay Records, and Mahratta MSS. The Seyr Mutuakhereen gives a very confused account of these transactions at Delhi, which does not agree with any of the authorities above quoted.

approached that of Nizam Ally, before the latter was prepared, and he was compelled to seek shelter under the walls of Beder. For three weeks there were daily skirmishes, in which the Mahrattas were generally successful; the Moghuls, when pressed, retired under cover of the cannon on the works, and the Mahrattas, although they occasionally brought up guns to cannonade,¹ were obliged to retire daily to their camp on the bank of the Manjera, as most of the wells² in the immediate vicinity of Beder were within gun-shot of the walls of the fort.

From the reports of these partial actions, the unpopularity of Rugoba might be read in repeated accounts of his being defeated, wounded, or at the point of death.³ The Moghul army, however,

¹ Rugonath Rao used a large brass gun on this occasion called *Maha Kalee* (the goddess of destruction), which is now at Poona, and which throws a ball *a long way*, as I fancy some of my readers could testify.

² Besides, all Hindoos are very particular in regard to water and always prefer drinking from a running stream.

³ The following extract from one of Mr. Mostyn's dispatches is a specimen of the invention of the day. Since closing my address to the Committee (the select committee of the Bombay Government is meant), 'I have learnt that a party of the Nizam's foot approached quite to Rugoba's tent, undiscovered, and were taken for his own guard, who by some means were absent that night. On their endeavouring to enter the tent, some of the servants found them out and alarmed the camp. They were then obliged to fly as fast as possible; however, one cut through the tent walls and made a blow at Rugoba, which took just below his right shoulder, cut four inches down the arm, and half through the bone. Afterwards a firing commenced, when a musket ball grazed along his left arm, so that he is now lame of both arms, has a fever, and several ulcers about his knee. The elephant with the gold standard' (my readers will recognize the Juree Putka) 'the Moghuls carried off; this is looked upon with these people as a most unlucky omen.' Mr. Mostyn, who had not then much experience in Mahratta politics, writes all the above as intelligence which he fully credited; he might have stopped his evidence when he came to such particulars as *the four inches*, which a good member of a Punchayet would have done, and extracted valuable evidence, not from the falsehoods spoken, but from what his judgment could clearly interpret as the object of the speaker. Strange as it may appear, it was upon the receipt of the dispatch of which the above is an extract, that the Bombay Government came to the resolution, in case of the death or deposition of Rugoba, to take possession of Salsette, &c., by force of arms; and I may remark that Mr. Taylor's able letter to the Bengal Government, 9th October, 1775, founded on Mr. Mostyn's intelligence, is incorrect. Col. Wilks and Mr. Mill have been led into error from the same circumstance. Rugonath Rao was not defeated.

soon became straitened ; and Nizam Ally could only bring on his supplies and reinforcements by risking an action with the Mahrattas at a great disadvantage. He therefore proposed (Dec. 9.) to treat, and it was agreed on the 9th December that he should give up territory yielding an annual sum of twenty lacks of rupees. This cession, if judiciously distributed amongst the Mahratta chiefs, would probably have enabled Rugonath Rao to maintain an ascendancy in the state ; but after all was settled Nizam Ally, with a show of the greatest frankness, paid him a visit, brought to his recollection their former alliance, and being well acquainted with the circumstances in which Rugonath Rao stood, assured him of his perpetual friendship on all future occasions ; he praised the wisdom of his administration, affected even to be proud of his submission to the great Rugonath Rao, and manifested entire confidence in his generosity, by placing before him his seal of state and desiring him to add as much more to the cession as he thought fit.

Rugonath Rao, to the great joy of his domestic enemies, in an effusion of misplaced generosity immediately restored the whole ; and although little can be said in excuse for his being thus openly cajoled by the well-known Nizam Ally, it is one of many proofs that he was still more weak than wicked.

Rugonath Rao, after peace was concluded with the Moghuls, encamped for some time at Kulburga, and detached Trimbuck Rao Mama to watch the motions of Sabajee Bhonslay, who occupied a threatening position in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. This arrangement was precisely that which Rugoba's enemies desired, and they perceived with secret pleasure that his mind was completely occupied in planning an expedition into the Carnatic, where he projected not only the expulsion of Hyder from the Mahratta districts, of which he had possessed himself, but the punishment of Mohummud Ally and the English for having reduced Tanjore.¹ In prosecution of these designs he proceeded towards the Kistna, but in the meantime a cabal was forming against him, which soon obstructed his progress.

Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees had, on different pretences, withdrawn themselves from the army and returned to Poona. They were soon followed by Gunput Rao Rastia,

¹ It was carried by storm 17th September, 1773. (Madras Records.)

Babajee Naik¹ Baramutteekur, and several other persons of consequence. Moraba Furnuwees was the last of his old ministers that quitted his camp, except Bujaba Poorundhuree.

It was evident to all but Rugoba and his immediate dependants that there was some scheme in agitation. The principal persons of the Poona ministry at this time, of whom so much has been written, were Sukaram Bappoo, Trimbeck Rao Mama, the two Furnuwees, Nana and Moraba, Bujaba Poorundhuree, Anund Rao Jewajee² and Hurry Punt Phurkay³;—all men raised by the present family of Peishwas, and totally, as the reader will perceive, distinct from the eight Purdhans of Sivajee and Shao.

There were a variety of conjectures in the Mahratta country as to the revolution meditated; some said the ministers intended to release the Raja; others, that a person assuming the name of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and now a prisoner in the fort of Ahmednugur, was to be set up as Peishwa in the room of Rugonath Rao. This Sewdasheo Rao, or Suddaba, according to the familiar name by which the person alluded to was known, was a Kanoja Bramin from Hindoostan, who personated the Bhow, and raised an insurrection, which had been suppressed by his capture and the dispersion of his followers. But impostors of this description obtain surprising credence in the Deccan; and it was still a popular belief that the real Bhow Sahib, confined for state reasons, was about to be released and opposed to the unpopular Dada Sahib.⁴

A.D. 1774.—The development, however, of their real plans soon put an end to surmises. It having been discovered that

¹ The nephew or grandson of Bappoojee Naik Baramutteekur, who was married to the aunt of Ballajee Bajee Rao, and who endeavoured, with the support of Rughoojee Bhonslay, to purchase the office of Peishwa in 1740.

² Anund Rao Jewajee, commonly called the *Khasgeewala*, from having the charge of all the Peishwa's personal affairs. He was the son of Govind Sew Ram, already repeatedly mentioned.

³ Hurry Punt Phurkay was of very low origin, having been a common domestic in the family of Trimbeck Rao Dixit, a banker in Poona.

⁴ Rugoba and Dada Sahib were familiar or domestic names for Rugonath Rao, as Suddaba and Bhow Sahib were for Sewdasheo Rao Chimmajee. Mr. Mostyn mentions that the impostor was confined in Doulutabad, which is a mistake; he was afterwards removed from Ahmednugur to Rutnaguiry, which I shall have occasion to notice presently.

Gunga Bye, the widow of Narrain Rao, was pregnant, it was resolved, on pretence of carrying her to a place of safety, to convey her to the fort of Poorundhur. But it is generally believed that the real motive was to disguise an intention they had formed of eventually exchanging the infant of Gunga Bye in case of its proving a female, by substituting a male child. For this purpose several Bramin women in a state of pregnancy are said to have been conveyed into the fort at the same time. Gunga Bye herself was carried off from Poona by Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay on the morning of the 30th January, but the reason of her removal was publicly announced. Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, a lady very much respected, accompanied her. The ministers forming themselves into a sort of regency under Gunga Bye began to govern the country in her name. All the adherents of Rugonath Rao were thrown into confinement. Negotiations were opened with Nizam Ally and Sabajee Bhonslay, both of whom agreed to support the widow's pretensions, and intrigues, managed by Krist Rao Bulwunt in the camp of Rugonath Rao, were ready to burst forth in general revolt the moment that a signal was received from the confederates at Poona.¹

In the meantime Rugonath Rao had advanced beyond Bellary, and had admitted an arrangement with Hyder Ally. His pecuniary distress was so urgent that, upon Hyder's paying a few lacks of rupees and promising to make up the sum to twenty-five lacks, Rugoba relinquished all claim to three of the Mahratta districts, and Hyder probably then foresaw that the rest must in the course of a very short time fall into his hands. In a few days, on hearing of the events that had happened at Poona, Rugonath Rao was compelled to abandon his designs of levying a tribute from the province of Arcot, and concluded a treaty at Calliandroog, by which Hyder recognized his right of succession as Peishwa and agreed to pay him, and only to him, an annual tribute of six lacks of rupees.²

Rugonath Rao had information of the revolution before any person in his camp, and was warned to be on his guard against

¹ Mahratta MSS. and Mr. Mostyn's dispatches.

² Wilks. I follow the Mahratta MSS. and what can be gathered from Mr. Mostyn's dispatches, in stating the payment by Hyder to have been prior to receiving the news of the revolution.

several of his Surdars, but especially Bhowan Rao Pritee Needhee. Uncertain what to do, where wisdom would probably have done nothing, he called upon Bhowan Rao to account for his being at the head of four thousand horse, when three hundred was the complement required to be furnished by the tenure of his Jagheer lands. The Pritee Needhee would not condescend to answer an inquiry so abrupt. Rugonath Rao threatened to attack him, and ordered Moorar Rao Ghorepuray Senaputtee 'to plunder his troops.' Ghorepuray replied that he was ready to fight any enemy of the state, but this being a domestic quarrel he begged to be excused. A similar answer was returned by Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdhun and several other commanders. He then ordered out his household troops, and guns were brought ready to open, in case he should still refuse an explanation : but finding the Pritee Needhee resolute, and his followers, mostly all from the banks of the Maun and the Yairla, declaring to a man that they would die with him, Rugonath Rao went himself to Bhowan Rao and demanded an interview. He was received respectfully ; but when sitting down the latter laid his sword between them, and on being asked by the Peishwa why he took such a precaution, ' It is,' said Bhowan Rao, ' lest the Punt Purdhan should forget that he is about to confer with the Pritee Needhee.' After some general assurances on both sides, the visit terminated by Rugonath Rao agreeing to advance him a sum of money ; and all resort to coercion ceased.¹

The Pritee Needhee and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray continued with Rugonath Rao, who now commenced his march towards Poona. Wamun Rao, with all who openly declared for the ministerial party, separated from his army, but they always encamped a march on his left flank, with every precaution to prevent surprise, reserving attack until the approach of some of the three divisions which were moving to co-operate with them. Trimbeck Rao Mama and Sabajee Bhonslay were advancing from Purinda ; Hurry Punt Phurkay was on his route at the head of a division from Poona ; whilst Nizam Ally was marching across the country from Kulburga, to co-operate with either of these armies that might first appear, still however pretending to be the friend of Rugonath Rao. Trimbeck Rao Mama, jealous

¹ I have this anecdote from Appajee Gonedeo, who was present.

of Rugonath Rao's reputation as a soldier¹ and ambitious of the honour of reducing him, finding that Sabajee, who had views of his own to answer, was very tardy in his advance, pushed on in front of his division, crossed the Beema at Punderpoor on the 4th March, when Rugonath Rao, who was close in his neighbourhood, made a sudden attack upon him on a fine plain between Kasseegaom and Punderpoor, where in less than twenty minutes, with a force considerably inferior to that of his opponent, Rugonath Rao obtained a complete victory, mortally wounded Trimbeck Rao Mama, and took him prisoner.

Rugonath Rao was one of the foremost in a charge which he made, supported only by his own division, amounting to about ten thousand horse. Gungadhur Rao Rastia, second in command of Trimbeck Rao's army, was wounded, but escaped.² Neither the Pritee Needhee nor Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, although both in Rugonath Rao's army, was engaged; the former withdrew and after a short time joined Hurry Punt Phurkay, and the latter took the opportunity of the confusion to retire towards his principality at Gootee and never more recrossed the Kistna. Hurry Punt Phurkay immediately effected a junction with Sabajee Bhonslay and the Nizam, but neither of them was in haste to bring the war to a conclusion.

The success thus obtained by Rugoba gave momentary life to his drooping cause. He was enabled to raise a large sum of money in Punderpoor, partly by contribution and partly by pawning a portion of some prize jewels which were brought back by Visajee Kishen from Hindoostan, and on his return, agreeably to old Mahratta usage, presented to Rugonath Rao as the head of the government.

(April.)—The greatest consternation prevailed in Poona, and according to the invariable practice of the inhabitants on such occasions, dreading alike their friends and foes, all began to pack

¹ Trimbeck Rao Mama was, as will be recollected, the officer who defeated Hyder three years before.

² Mr. Mostyn's dispatches describe a stratagem practised by Rugoba on this occasion, but it is not mentioned in any Mahratta account, and besides, from the nature of the ground where it happened, which is a very extensive, bare plain, not apparently favourable to the growth of jungle, I doubt the possibility of an ambuscade such as Rugoba is said to have contrived.

up their property and fly to forts or retired villages, where they esteemed themselves secure. Troops flocked to Rugoba's standard and he advanced for a few days towards the capital ; but having no funds to support his army, which soon amounted to thirty or forty thousand men, becoming suspicious of their fidelity, and indulging hopes of more effectual support from Sindia, Holkar, or eventually the English, with all of whom he was negotiating, he suddenly shaped his course towards Burhanpoor. This resolution he adopted at a time when the ministers, jealous of each other, dreading the resentment of Rugoba, and doubting the intentions of Sabajee Bhonslay as well as of the Nizam, were on the point of releasing the Raja of Satara, as a measure calculated to have ensured them the aid of many of the Mahratta soldiery, who were discontented or neutral. But the retreat of Rugoba at once turned the scale of opinion in their favour, and the design was abandoned. He was followed by the combined armies of Hurry Punt Phurkay, the Nizam, and Sabajee Bhonslay, which together amounted to fifty thousand men ; but the pursuit was purposely retarded by Nizam Ally in order to obtain possession of some territory, promised by the ministers for his treachery to Rugoba ; and thus the fugitive Peishwa had leisure to levy contributions from the country as he went along. The crisis,

however, was passed, he had lost an opportunity of **April 18.** retrieving his affairs, and the birth of Mahdoo Rao Narrain, on the 18th April, gave a finishing blow to his ever being recognized as Peishwa. Notwithstanding the suspicions created by the scheme which was adopted for eventually imposing upon the country, there is very little doubt but that the child was the son of the murdered Narrain Rao.

Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were deputed by Gunga Bye to receive the clothes of investiture for her son, which were sent from Satara by the Raja, in charge of Mahdoo Rao Neelkunt Poorundhuree, and the infant was formally installed as Peishwa when he was forty days old. One of the first acts of the ministers under his government was to remove Rughoojee, the adopted son of Janojee Bhonslay, from the office of Sena Sahib Soobeh, by conferring that dignity on Sabajee, their ally.

Rugonath Rao remained a short time at Burhanpoor, in hopes of being joined by Holkar and Sindia ; but at last, contrary to the advice of his friends, he crossed the Nerbuddah, when Mooda-

jee Bhonslay and all his followers, except about seven thousand horse, deserted him. On his arrival at Indore he was met by Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, received with the greatest respect, and it was generally reported that these two chiefs would espouse his cause ; it was also stated that the two brothers, Govind Rao and Futih Sing Gaekwar, then contending for the possession of Guzerat, as will be hereafter explained, had agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitration of Holkar and Sindia, and to unite with them in supporting Rugonath Rao. Nizam Ally, staggered by these rumours, disappointed at not having received the promised cessions, and willing to sell his aid to either party the more likely to have the power of granting his demands, cantoned for the rains at Basum ; Hurry Punt Phurkay occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Burhanpoor.

The ministers very soon became jealous of each other : Nana Furnuwees was too cautious to take the lead in an infant government ; but, like the generality of men who have risen by revolution and who seldom appear in the foreground, he supported Sukaram Bappoo as the person likely to have most weight and consideration with the public. This conduct in him proceeded as much from timidity as design. Sukaram was an old, cautious, time-serving courtier, but he was a man of much more courage than Nana Furnuwees, and in the humble and assiduous attention of his colleague and adherent he did not foresee a future rival and a powerful foe. Such, indeed, was the influence of Sukaram Bappoo that his secession from the cause of the ministers, which Nana often apprehended, would have ruined them. One circumstance not generally known, which was used by Nana as an instrument of ambition, was the power he had acquired over the mind of the regent Gunga Bye ; for, although a profound secret at the time, the young widow was deeply enamoured of Nana Furnuwees, and was taught by him the best means of governing the old minister.

Moraba, the cousin of Nana, who had been the ostensible prime minister of Mahdoo Rao, was dissatisfied on finding little deference paid to his counsel, and would readily have returned to Rugonath Rao, if he could have effected it with safety and ensured his future power. Such of the other ministers as would not submit to Sukaram and Nana were soon united in common discontent. The cabal, in short, divided into two parties, and

their disagreement became generally known by the discovery of a correspondence on the part of Moraba, Bujaba, and Babajee Naik, with the ex-Peishwa. It appeared, from letters intercepted by Hurry Punt, that these three had formed a plan for securing the persons of Sukaram Bappoo, Nana Furnuwees, Gunga Bye, and her son ; all of whom, on account of the chilling cold frequently experienced in hill-forts during the rains, had come down from Poorundhur to reside in the neighbouring village of Sassoor ; but receiving intelligence on the 30th June of this conspiracy, they instantly, with undissembled panic, betook themselves to the fort.

Hurry Punt Phurkay, leaving a detachment at Burhanpoor, countermarched on Poorundhur ; and Krist Rao Bulwunt, the ministerial agent with Nizam Ally, by stipulating for the immediate cession of upwards of thirteen lacks ¹ of Jagheer territory and promising more, induced him to move to Aurungabad to give countenance to their cause ; but the discovery of their conspiracy at once defeated the designs of the feeble triumvirate, and Hurry Punt was directed to halt at the Ajunta Ghaut.

Hyder Ally, immediately on perceiving these commotions, seized the opportunity in order to complete his conquests of the whole of the Mahratta districts south of the Toongbuddra. He attacked Sera in person, whilst his son Tippoo besieged Gurumcondah.² At the same time Busalut Jung, from Adonee, entered the Mahratta country and levied contributions as far as Hutnee and Merich. No effort could be made to save Sera and Gurumcondah ; they therefore soon fell ; but Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdhun and Anund Rao Rastia were detached for the protection of their own districts, and soon compelled Busalut Jung to retire. These chiefs received instructions to return to the capital as soon as possible ; and Bhew Rao Yeswunt Pansia, Ramchundur Gunnesh, Visajee Kishen, and Bhowan Rao Pritee Needhee were employed in raising men in the districts, who were all to be at Poona on the Dussera. Agents were employed throughout the country to blacken the crimes of Rugoba and hold forth the justice of their cause. The ministers at the same

¹ The amount actually ceded, as appears by the state accounts, was rupees 13,23,339-6-1, of which Rookun-ud-dowlah, the minister, received rupees 1,38,269-10-1.

² Mr. Mostyn's dispatch 17th April, 1774.

time breathed nothing but a spirit of union and concord : they determined on obtaining the absolute submission of Rugoba ; and their active and judicious preparations for hostility showed that they understood the best means of ensuring pacification.

Rugonath Rao, in the meantime, with a force of about thirty thousand men, chiefly composed of the troops of Sindia and Holkar, advanced from Indore to the banks of the Taptee, where he expected to be joined by Moodajee Bhonslay and Govind Rao Gaekwar. In this situation he renewed his negotiations with the English Government at Bombay.

CHAPTER XXV.

FROM A.D. 1772 TO A.D. 1775.

A.D. 1772.—THE Court of Directors, in a dispatch to the Presidency of Bombay, of the 1st of April, 1772, directed that a resident envoy should be appointed to the Peishwa's court ; and Mr. Thomas Mostyn, of the Bombay Civil Service, who had formerly been at Poona, in the situation of assistant to Mr. Price's mission, was selected by the Court of Directors for this important duty.

The declared intention of the East India Company in appointing an envoy was for the purpose of acquiring from time to time, upon safe and honourable terms, such privileges and rights as might be beneficial to their commerce and of security to their possessions, by maintaining a friendly intercourse with all the native powers ; but carefully abstaining from active alliance with any. The Resident was instructed to communicate to Madras and Bengal direct all intelligence he could procure relative to the designs of the Mahrattas of a nature likely to affect those Presidencies ; but the principal objects of the mission were to obtain possession of the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, and the small islands of Kenery, Hog island, Elephanta, and Caranja. The advantage of these islands was justly considered of great importance, in order to preclude other nations from having access to the spacious and excellent harbour of Bombay ; by far the most commodious port in India. It was already celebrated for its dockyard,¹ and was well adapted to become the mart, not

¹ [The first regular dock was opened in Bombay in 1750, two more docks being constructed during the next fifteen years under the supervision of Lāvji Nasarvānjī Wādia, the master-builder. These docks were mentioned by Grose (1750), Ives (1757), Niebuhr (1763), and Parsons (1775), and were described as 'the pride of Bombay and the astonishment of travellers.' They are now included in the Government Dockyard, and are built on the site of an old bay or inlet, which

only for the supply of the interior of western India, but the emporium of the trade with China, the coasts of Persia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. The occupation of Salsette likewise secured the principal inlet to the Mahratta country for woollens and other staples of England, which are said to have been at that time supplied to the amount of fourteen lacks of rupees annually. The expenses of the Bombay establishment far exceeded the receipts, and it was hoped that by the possession of those places and the Mahratta share of the revenue of Surat the balance would be nearly equal.

Permission for the envoy to reside at Poona was granted by Mahdoo Rao ; and Mr. Mostyn arrived there a few days prior to that Peishwa's death ; otherwise, it was Mr. Mostyn's opinion, the succeeding administration would not have allowed him to remain.

Some time elapsed before any event favourable to the views of the Company occurred. The Bombay Presidency, in consequence of certain claims on the Nabob of Baroach, due by right of sovereignty to the government of Surat, sent a force, just before the rains of the year 1771, to enforce their demands, but as the expedition failed, preparations were made for the renewal of hostilities after the monsoon. This armament was countermanded in consequence of the arrival of the Nabob at Bombay, whose object appears to have been merely to obtain a cessation of arms by trusting to the generosity of the English, in hopes that the confidence he had shown might operate in his favour, either by inducing the Bombay Government to relinquish their claims or by affording him time to cement an alliance with the family of Gaekwar. A treaty was concluded on the 30th November at Bombay ; but as the terms did not come up to the full extent of the Nabob's hopes, the English chief at the Baroach factory was in a short time treated with great disrespect ; on which he was desired to retire to Surat. The expedition, as before projected, was carried into effect ; and Baroach, with the loss of the gallant

in early days formed the only secure anchorage for small vessels. Two more docks were constructed on the same site in 1807 and 1810, during the governorship of Jonathan Duncan. The Wādia family, as master-builders of the dockyard, built 170 war vessels for the Company, 34 war vessels for the Royal Navy, and 87 vessels for private firms between 1736 and 1863. Most of them were built of teak, and were so strong and seaworthy that many of them lasted for sixty years. (For a full description see *B.C.G.*, 1909, iii. 266-78.)]

and accomplished General David Wedderburn,¹ was taken by storm on the 18th November, 1772, the same day on which Mahdoo Rao died.

When the Resident at Poona was first sent for on business by the new Peishwa, the exchange, or an equivalent for Baroach, was one of the few things discussed, but no offer was made which could lead to the subject most important to his mission.

A.D. 1773.—After the murder of Narrain Rao, during the progress of Rugonath Rao's warfare with the Nizam in the neighbourhood of Beder, the reports circulated by his enemies of his probable death or deposition induced the Bombay Government to deliberate on what would then be the state of their relations with the Mahrattas. They concluded that the family of the Peishwa, with whom only they had existing treaties, must become extinct by the demise of Rugoba; and they conceived that their engagements with the Poona government only existed whilst that family continued at the head of the administration. Accordingly, without further scruple they determined that should either of the events alluded to take place, they would possess themselves of Salsette by force of arms.² The ready credit given to those unfavourable rumours at Bombay, and a subsequent hasty belief in the rising fortunes of Rugoba, are attributable to the same bias; a desire of the President and Council to fulfil the object of their employers, and court their favour by possessing themselves, and that too at all events, of the long coveted islands.

A.D. 1774.—When Rugonath Rao, instead of marching with bold confidence to Poona, shaped his course to the northward, he clearly exposed his situation to men less under the influence of interested hopes than the members of the Bombay Government, and betrayed his alarm to the Resident at Poona by sending an agent, with hurried and indefinite applications, for a great deal of money and a great many troops³; which only showed that he stood in much need of aid, but had a very confused idea of what plan he should follow to obtain it, or how to extricate himself from difficulty.

¹ [General Wedderburn's tomb lies in the north-west corner of Broach fort, about 200 yards from the bastion. He was killed on November 14, 1772. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 319.)]

² Bombay Secret Consultations.

³ Mr. Mostyn's Letters. (Bombay Records.)

The Bombay Government were willing to assist him with some men, conditionally ; but further negotiation through Mr. Mostyn at Poona could not be prosecuted owing to the distant retreat of Rugoba, who continued his march as far as Malwa. There, after he had recruited his forces, he determined to recross the Nerbuddah, and accordingly advanced to a position on the Taptee, where, as already alluded to, he renewed his overtures to the English through Mr. Robert Gambier, the acting chief or civil governor of Surat. His agent informed Mr. Gambier that Rugoba was desirous of entering on a treaty for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force ' to carry him to Poona, and establish him in the government ; for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the Company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the President and Council at Bombay might choose.'¹ This

acceptable proposal was received at Bombay on the (Sept. 6.) 6th September, when the President and Council agreed to assist Rugoba with all the troops they could spare, which, including a portion of artillery, amounted to about two thousand five hundred men, on condition that he should advance fifteen or twenty lacks of rupees ; and, on being established in the government at Poona, cede to the Honourable Company in perpetuity Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay, and Bassein with its dependencies. The Mahratta share of revenue in Surat and Baroach was, if possible, to be obtained ; and also protection from Mahratta inroads into the Bengal provinces and the possessions of the Nabob of the Carnatic.

The original of the above resolution is signed by Mr. William Hornby,² Governor and President, Mr. Daniel Draper, Mr. William

¹ Mr. Gambier's Letters. (Bombay Records.)

² [William Hornby became Governor of Bombay on February 26, 1771, and held office until January 1, 1784. His name has been given to the well-known Vellard (Portuguese *Vallado*, 'a fence'), which was constructed during his governorship on the west side of Bombay Island between Mahālakshmi and Varli, to shut out the sea which at high tide rendered the central portion of the Island a swamp. Hornby is stated to have built this embankment without the sanction of the Directors of the Company, who were disinclined to face the expenditure (Rs. 100,000). Hearing that he had completed the work in defiance of their orders, the Directors sent a dispatch ordering his suspension from office ; but Hornby, whose term had nearly expired when the dispatch was received, kept it in his custody until after he had handed over charge to his successor. The Directors were irate,

Taylor of the Civil Service, and Mr. John Watson, Commodore of the Bombay Marine, who were the counsellors present on that memorable occasion. In the course of the consultation, a doubt arose whether the president and members had a legal right to enter on any treaty without the concurrence of the Governor-General in Council, as the operation of the Act of Parliament of 1773, which rendered the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay subordinate to Bengal, was to have effect in India from the first of August ; but as intimation had not been received of the arrival of the members appointed from Europe, without whom the supreme parliamentary council could not be constituted, their proceeding, on mature deliberation, was deemed unobjectionable.

The offers of Rugoba, however, in answer to the proposals of the Bombay Government fell very far short of what was expected. He positively refused to cede Salsette, a condition so indispensable that Mr. Gambier without delay replied to his proposals in such terms as he conceived himself authorized to offer, without wasting the time necessary for a reference to Bombay ; of which the President and Council approved. Rugoba adhered to his original declaration of not relinquishing Bassein and Salsette ; he also stated his inability to raise the large advance of cash, but offered to cede districts and claims of much greater value in Guzerat, amounting in all to eleven lacks annually ; to pay six lacks of rupees in advance, and one lack and a half monthly, for the expense of one thousand Europeans, two thousand Sepoys, and fifteen guns. The Government agreed to part of these propositions ; and, on condition of his making the cession up to eighteen and a half lacks, they even consented to waive the grand acquisition of Salsette ; but at this stage of the negotiation they were alarmed by the receipt of intelligence from their envoy at Goa that the Portuguese government had sent a formidable armament from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions, including Salsette and Bassein.¹

and issued orders that the Governor himself should never open dispatches in future, and that they should be first read and registered by one of the Secretaries to Government. (Maclean, *Guide to Bombay*, 1875.)]

¹ [The Bombay Government wrote to the Governor-General and Council saying that if the seizure of Salsette by the Portuguese had taken place, 'it would not only have effectually prevented us from

Offers to surrender the fort of Tannah, by the Mahratta officer in charge, for the sum of two lacks and sixty thousand rupees, had been made to Mr. Hornby as early as the preceding month of February or March, at a time when the greatest confusion prevailed at Poona, and with the consent of his Council Mr. Hornby offered one lack. The Mahratta authorities were disposed to betray their trust for one lack and twenty thousand rupees, which would have been complied with, but, on considering the state of the Mahratta government and the probability of obtaining possession by other means, the negotiation with the Killidar was suspended. On receipt, however, of the intelligence from Goa the scheme was renewed, and Mr. Mostyn was instructed, in case of their obtaining possession, to use every possible endeavour to reconcile it to the ministerial party, as a measure of precaution to prevent the island from falling into the hands of the Portuguese ; and to Rugoba similar assurances were to be given. In the meantime information of the preparations at Goa had been received at Poona, and had induced the ministers to reinforce the garrison of Tannah with five hundred men ; which circumstance, and the strict watch kept up, effectually obstructed the designs of the Mahratta party disposed to make it over.

In consequence of this disappointment, and the additional obstacles with which they should have to contend in attempting to reduce it by force, the matter was again deliberated

Dec. 9. on the 9th December, when the President in Council determined at all events that they ought to anticipate the Portuguese. An expedition, consisting of six hundred and twenty Europeans, including artillery, one thousand Sepoys, and two hundred gun Lascars, was accordingly prepared under the command of Brigadier-General Robert Gordon ; and although the situation of Tannah was such as to preclude the employment of the larger vessels of the Company's Marine, as the Governor

ever acquiring Salsette for the Honourable Company, but the Portuguese would then again have had it in their power to obstruct our trade by being in possession of the principal passes to the inland country, and to lay whatever imposition they pleased upon it, which in former times on every occasion they were so prone to do, which of course would have been of infinite prejudice to the trade, revenue and interests of the Company in these parts, insomuch that we should in great measure have been subject to the caprice of the Portuguese.' (See Danvers, *Report on Portuguese Records*, pp. 108-10 ; *B.C.G.*, ii. 115 f.)]

expressed a wish that Commodore Watson should superintend the naval part of the enterprise, and have joint authority with General Gordon, the Commodore, on the General's acquiescence in the arrangement, cheerfully complied. The troops **Dec. 12.** proceeded on the 12th of December, and on the ensuing day a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay and formally protested against their proceedings. The President and Council used many arguments¹ in justification of their measures; they declared they would **(Dec. 20.)** issue no countermand, and batteries were opened against Tannah on the 20th December. On the eighth day the breach was considered practicable, but it was necessary to fill up the ditch before they could advance to the assault. They attempted this operation on the night of the 27th **(Dec. 27.)** December, when they were forced to retire with the loss of one hundred Europeans, including officers killed and wounded, but next evening the fort was carried by assault, when the soldiers, exasperated by their loss, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword. Among the sufferers at Tannah was Commodore John Watson, a brave and experienced officer, who was mortally wounded² on the third day of the siege.

A separate detachment under the command of Lieutenant-

¹ [The main argument of the Bombay Council was that the Marāthās had seized Salsette from the Portuguese thirty-seven years before, and that the Portuguese had never made any attempt during that period to retake 'the countries situated between Chaul and Damān.' (*B.C.G.*, 1909, ii. 116.)]

² His wounds were most painful, but rather singular to occasion death. A cannon shot struck the sand close to him, and drove the particles into his body. [The diary of the Bombay Government of December 28, 1774, records that 'the body of the late John Watson, Esquire, was interred this morning in the burying-ground without the town (i.e. Sonāpur cemetery on the modern Queen's Road), being attended by the principal inhabitants.' The Bombay cathedral contains a tablet to the memory of Watson with the following inscription: 'To the memory of John Watson, Esq., Superintendent of the Marine at the Presidency, and Commander-in-Chief of the naval force employed in the reduction of Salsette in the year 1774. An officer who manifested an unremitting zeal for the interest of the East India Company and the honour of his country at the siege of Thana. He was mortally wounded the 21st December 1774, and died in this town the 27th following, in the 52nd year of his age. As a testimony of his distinguished merit and eminent services, the United East India Company erected this monument.' (Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i, p. 201.)]

Colonel Keating was sent to take possession of the fort of Versovah on the northern extremity of Salsette. The island of Caranja¹ (or Oorun according to the Mahrattas) was also occupied, and the whole of Salsette reduced before New Year's Day.²

In the meantime the negotiations with Rugoba were continued, but the ministers having secretly engaged Sindia and Holkar in their interests and collected an army of about thirty thousand men, quitted Poorundhur on the 27th November, and advanced towards the Taptee. Rugonath Rao was apprised of the secession of Holkar and Sindia in sufficient time to escape from being surrounded, and having thrown a strong garrison into Talneir, he retired towards Guzerat; but in consequence of the advanced state of the pregnancy of his wife Anundee Bye, he left her in the fort of Dhar, where she was shortly after delivered of Bajee Rao Rugonath,³ destined to become the last of the Peishwas.

A.D. 1775.—Rugoba continued his retreat towards Baroda, at which place he arrived on the 3d January, with about ten thousand horse and four hundred infantry. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after reducing Talneir, was sent in pursuit of him, but Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees returned to the fort of Poorundhur, where all affairs continued to be transacted.

Rugoba's design in retiring to Guzerat was obviously to conclude his negotiation with the English, and to obtain the aid of Govind Rao Gaekwar. The latter, at the period of Rugoba's arrival, was besieging his brother Futih Sing in Baroda, assisted by his uncle Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Jagheerदार of Neriad.

The reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar was sent by his father Dummajee to support Rugonath Rao against Mahdoo Rao in the rebellion of 1768. Shortly after its suppression Dummajee died, leaving four sons, Syajee, Govind Rao, Manikjee, and Futih Sing. The two last were the youngest, and full brothers by the third wife. Syajee was the eldest son, but by Dummajee's second wife. Govind Rao was his second son, but by the first married wife. Such a claim to succession as that of Syajee and

¹ [The town of Uran (Oorun), which lies in the north of Karanja (Caranja) island in 18° 52' N. and 72° 56' E., about eight miles south-east of Bombay, is now included in the Panvél *tāluka*, Kolāba District, and is chiefly remarkable for its nineteen distilleries which supply country liquor to the surrounding districts. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 143.)]

² Bombay Records.

³ Mr. Mostyn's letters, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

Govind Rao always occasions disputes among the Mahrattas, as there are precedents for the superiority of either party. Govind Rao was at Poona at the time of his father's death, a prisoner at large, in consequence of having supported Rugonath Rao. His claim to the succession, and to his father's rank of Sena Khas Kheyl, does not in the first instance appear to have been disputed. Upon his paying a fine of upwards of twenty-three lacks of rupees for his late delinquency, a nuzur of twenty-one lacks, and other exactions amounting in all to upwards of fifty lacks and a half,¹ and having also agreed to pay a tribute of seven lacks and seventy-nine thousand rupees annually, to keep three thousand horse constantly in the service at Poona, and four thousand when the Peishwa was at war, the title and possessions of his father were conferred upon Govind Rao.

Syajee Gaekwar, the eldest son, was an idiot, but his youngest brother Futih Sing urged the claim of Syajee to the succession; and in the year 1771 Futih Sing came to the Peishwa's court, where he prosecuted Syajee's pretensions, and at last succeeded. Ram Shastree is said to have decided the suit in favour of Syajee, and as Mahdoo Rao's policy was directed to circumscribe the power of the Gaekwar family, he could not have taken a more effectual means, short of absolute reduction, than that which he adopted, by acceding to the views of Futih Sing in appointing him Mootaliq to his brother Syajee, now Sena Khas Kheyl, which of course occasioned an irreconcilable difference between

¹ The following is the exact account, as extracted from the Poona State Papers.

Tribute of last year	5,25,000	
Fine for <i>non-attendance</i> in 1768	23,25,000	
Nuzur, for confirmation in the title of Sena Khas Kheyl, with the districts and Jagheer, according to ancient custom	21,00,000	
Babey babut*	1,00,000	
On account of the amount levied, in addition to the assignment given to Mokhund Kasse	2,630	
		50,52,630 0
On account of gold received in part		3,715 2
		50,48,914 14
		Rupees

* Probably on account of the districts conquered from Juwan Murd Khan Babey by Dummajee, of which Rugonath Rao promised to exact no share.

Futih Sing and Govind Rao. On representations, probably of the necessity of keeping his whole force in Guzerat to enable him to resist any insurrection caused by the partisans of his brother Govind Rao, Futih Sing was permitted to withdraw the contingent of horse, on agreeing to pay at the rate of rupees 6,75,000 a year during their non-attendance. But Futih Sing had other views. In his own schemes for supporting Syajee he did not overlook the motives which induced Mahdoo Rao to give him the preference as Mootaliq, and he returned to Baroda determined to strengthen himself against any designs the Peishwa might meditate. For this purpose he made overtures to the Bombay Government early in the year 1772, offering to enter on an offensive and defensive alliance on terms advantageous to the Company; but his proposal was rejected as at variance with the orders of the Court of Directors. Except a short contract, concluded with Futih Sing by Mr. Price on the 12th January, 1773, respecting the Gaekwar's dividend of the revenues of Baroach, which was to continue on the same footing as when under the government of the Nabob, no other agreement of any sort existed between him and the East India Company.

After Narrain Rao's murder and Rugoba's accession to the office of Peishwa, Govind Rao's claim was again recognized, and prior to Rugoba's departure for the Carnatic, whilst his army was encamped at Kulburga, Govind Rao was invested as Sena Khas Kheyl, and immediately set off for Guzerat, in order to endeavour to wrest the government from Futih Sing. From that time the two brothers had been in a state of constant warfare until Rugonath Rao's arrival, who, as already noticed, found Govind Rao engaged in the siege of Baroda.

As soon as Rugoba came into Guzerat he renewed the negotiation with Mr. Gambier, but it was temporarily impeded, owing to a misfortune which befel his accredited agent, Nowruttundass, who was taken prisoner by Futih Sing's troops, when employed with a party of Govind Rao's horse in raising revenues from the districts south of Surat. Various drafts for a treaty had been tendered on both sides, and much time lost by the dilatory (Mar. 6.) preciseness, rather than the indecision, of the Bombay Government. The treaty when finally concluded on the 6th March¹ consisted of sixteen articles, by which

¹ [The treaty was signed on March 7. (*B.C.G.*, 1909, ii. 117.)]

all former treaties between the two governments were confirmed, and neither party was to assist the enemies of the other. The Bombay Government engaged to send immediately five hundred Europeans and one thousand Sepoys, with a due proportion of artillery, to assist Rugoba, and pledged themselves to make up the number to seven or eight hundred Europeans and seventeen hundred Sepoys, with gun-Lascars, artificers and pioneers, the whole amounting to three thousand men. Rugoba engaged to pay, on account of two thousand five hundred men, one lack and a half of rupees monthly, with a proportionate increase or decrease according to the number of men; and as a security for the payment, he made over temporarily the districts of Amod, Hansot, Versaul, and a part of Oklaseer. He ceded in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and the other islands, the districts of Jumbooseer, Oolpar, and an assignment of seventy-five thousand rupees annually upon Oklaseer, the whole amounting to nineteen lacks and twenty-five thousand rupees. He engaged to procure the cession of the Gaekwar's share of the Baroach revenue, and to pay all expenses the Company might incur in obtaining possession of the specified cessions, which were to be considered as belonging to them from the date of the treaty. As Rugonath Rao was destitute of other funds, he deposited jewels, valued at upwards of six lacks,¹ as a security for the promised advance, pledging himself to redeem them. The protection of the Company's possessions in Bengal, and those of their ally the Nabob of Arcot, as long as the latter adhered to the existing engagement with the Mahrattas, was also provided for; and all British ships or vessels sailing under the protection of the British flag, which might have the misfortune to be wrecked on the Mahratta coast, were, as far as practicable, to be restored to the owners, together with such cargoes and stores as might be saved.

Such was the substance of a treaty between the Bombay Government and Rugoba, which occasioned infinite discussions amongst the English in India and in Europe, and led to what is generally termed the First Mahratta War.

¹ About twenty-eight years afterwards, on Bajee Rao's restoration in 1803, these jewels were delivered to him as a free gift from the Honourable Company.

CHAPTER XXVI.

A.D. 1775.

A.D. 1775.—THE Bombay government, before the treaty was finally settled, had prepared a force of eighty European artillery, three hundred and fifty European infantry, eight hundred Sepoys, and one hundred and sixty gun-Lascars, which, with their complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, made up the fifteen hundred men for immediate service. A reinforcement was to follow on the arrival of the troops expected from Madras.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Keating, Commandant of the Artillery and Engineers under the Bombay Presidency, was selected for the command in preference to Colonel Egerton, who was the next senior officer to General Gordon, but whose health was supposed to disqualify him for active service.

(Feb.)—Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment sailed from Bombay in the end of February, but in the meantime the army under Hurry Punt Phurkay, accompanied by a part of the troops of Holkar and Sindia, amounting in all to about thirty thousand men, had entered Guzerat in pursuit of Rugonath Rao, which obliged him and Govind Rao to raise the siege of Baroda and retire beyond the Myhie, near to which, at the village of Wassud, **(17th.)** he was encamped, when on the 17th February the ministerial army arrived in his neighbourhood.

According to a plan suggested by the local knowledge of Futih Sing, the ministerial army, on the afternoon of the same day, suddenly crossed the river in three divisions at separate fords; and whilst Rugonath Rao's army was preparing to repel the centre attack, before Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, who were encamped on the plain at a short distance in the rear, could come to his assistance, the other divisions took him in both flanks;

a body of Arabs, whom he had lately entertained, refused to fight without pay, Mannajee Phakray¹ and Sukaram Hurry, two of his best officers, were wounded in the commencement, the ground was confined, the confusion universal, and Rugoba, fancying that he was about to be seized by his own troops, suddenly set off from the field of battle and fled with about one thousand horse to Cambay. The Nabob of that place, who had before intended to unite with him, was now apprehensive of the consequences of affording protection to a fugitive. Rugoba, therefore, applied to Mr. Charles Malet,² at that time chief of the English factory, who had only heard by common report of the pending negotiation between Rugonath Rao and the Bombay Government, but readily assisted to get him conveyed to Bownuggur, whence he embarked for Surat, and had been four days at that place, when the vessels, on board of which were Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment, anchored at Surat bar on the (Feb. 27.) 27th February. In the meantime the defeated army of Rugoba, under Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Mannajee Phakray and Sukaram Hurry, retired to Kupperwunj, and thence to Pulhanpoor. For the purpose of forming a junction with those chiefs it was proposed to disembark the British troops at Cambay. The members of the Bombay Government approved of that plan, with the

¹ Mannajee Phakray was one of the legitimate Sindias of Kunneir Kheir, and in consequence was more respected among the old Mahratta families than the great Mahadajee Sindia. We shall have frequent occasion to mention Mannajee Sindia, surnamed Phakray or the heroic.

² [Charles Warre Malet was born in Somerset about 1753, and at an early age entered the East India Company's service. After filling various appointments, including the charge of a mission to the Mughal Emperor, he was appointed Resident at Poona in 1785. While there in 1790 he negotiated a treaty between the Company, the Pēshwā and the Nizām against Tipū, and for these services he was created a baronet on February 24, 1791. He subsequently acted for some time as Governor of Bombay, relinquishing the appointment in 1798, when he retired from the service and returned to England. He died in 1815. His wife was the eldest daughter of James Wales of Aberdeen, who painted the well-known picture of Nānā Farnavis, the Pēshwā Mādhu Rāo Narāyan, and Māhādajī Sindia, which now hangs in the hall of Government House (Ganeshkhind), Poona. Of his eight sons the eldest was Sir A. Malet, a distinguished diplomatist, while two of the others did good service in India. See footnote on page 164, *post*.]

exception of Mr. Daniel Draper, one of the members of council, who, at a consultation on the 7th March, dissented (**Mar. 7.**) because, as no formal change or ratification of the treaty had taken place, he conceived the circumstances to be so much altered, and their means so inadequate to the end proposed, that delay was both justifiable and advisable, at least until it could be ascertained what number of Rugoba's party was likely to reassemble, and what resources of money and of troops could be afforded from the other presidencies. Mr. Draper recommended that the detachment should remain with Rugoba at Surat, to protect that place and Baroach, to give confidence to his cause, and, with Rugoba's concurrence, to secure the revenues of the districts to be ceded.

It so happened that the treaty was signed at Surat by Rugoba on the 6th March, the day before this dissent was made, but the President and the other members at once decided that it was more advisable to proceed; in short, that inaction would be tantamount to desertion of the cause, and equally impolitic and spiritless. Governor Hornby seems to have had an idea that his fifteen hundred men might overcome the whole Mahratta army; nor is the confidence and inexperience of Colonel Keating less apparent, for on meeting the forlorn Rugoba at Surat, he congratulates the Bombay Government on their good fortune at finding the ex-Peishwa so entirely dependent on them for his future success. The British detachment, accompanied by Rugoba, proceeded to Cambay, where they landed on the 17th (**17th.**) March; Colonel Keating, however, before he quitted Surat, probably in order to show his new ally his alacrity, for it could be attended with no other advantage, commenced the war by attacking a party of horse belonging to the ministerial army, which appeared in the neighbourhood. The Mahrattas withdrew and awaited his embarkation, when they took ample revenge by plundering all within their reach who acknowledged the English authority.

Colonel Keating's instructions were far from precise, but almost exclusively of a military nature. The object of the expedition which he was appointed to command was briefly stated; he was sent, according to the words, 'for the assistance of Rugoba against all his enemies, the ministerial party and their adherents; to move with his army, and to do everything for bringing the

war to a speedy and happy issue, that he (Rugoba) may desire, and which he (Colonel Keating) may think the force under his command able to effect.' Strict discipline among his troops, and particular attention to the prejudices of the natives ; regular and constant information both of his own proceedings, and of the views, expectations, and designs of their ally, were the leading points particularly enjoined by Government.

Colonel Keating was not authorized to act in any political capacity beyond the tenor of these orders ; but from an injudicious and excessive zeal, often as prejudicial to the public service as its opposite defect, he was ambitious of distinguishing himself as a politician, and entered into a correspondence with Futih Sing shortly after he landed at Cambay, for the purpose of detaching him from the ministerial party by persuading him that it was for his benefit. But those who do not perceive their real interest before it is pointed out by an enemy, are not likely to be convinced by mere reasoning. Colonel Keating had no personal knowledge of Futih Sing, no direct overtures had been made, and the British detachment had as yet gained neither advantage nor reputation. Nothing under these circumstances was to be expected from negotiating, especially with a Mahratta, but humiliation and disappointment. Before quitting Cambay Colonel Keating's detachment was reinforced by the arrival of two companies of European grenadiers and one battalion of Sepoys from Madras, which made up the stipulated complement of two thousand five hundred men. On the 19th of April the detachment formed a junction with the fugitive army of Rugoba at the village of Durmuj, eleven miles north-east from Cambay, where Rugoba's late followers assembled, principally, it would appear, in hopes of receiving their arrears. Mannajee Phakray and Sukaram Hurry were officers of reputation and faithful to Rugoba's cause, but their own followers, amounting to six or eight thousand, were without pay ; mutinous and clamorous : the whole multitude which assembled in their camp, estimated at upwards of twenty thousand men, were worse than useless. Colonel Keating, pleased with the formidable spectacle which the tents, and flags, and crowd of a Mahratta camp present, congratulated himself and the Presidency on their prospects, but in the same dispatch earnestly solicits a supply of treasure, and informs the Government of his having advanced what he could

from his military chest, that the spirit of *such* an army might not be damped.

The ministerial party had succeeded in detaching Khundee Rao Gaekwar from the cause of Rugoba, but were considerably weakened by the return of Holkar and Sindia, with about twelve thousand horse, to Malwa, for reasons which are nowhere satisfactorily shown. Rugoba's party interpreted their departure as a secession in his favour, and it probably did proceed, on the part of Sindia, from his being called upon by Sukaram Bappoo to account for arrears due to the Peishwa; a circumstance to which may be attributed the enmity which subsisted between Mahadajee Sindia and Sukaram ever after this period, but could have occasioned no material alteration in Sindia's policy, as both Sindia and Holkar were at Poona a few months afterwards.

It was, however, confidently asserted by Rugoba's party that Sindia intended to join them, and that Holkar would never act against Mahadajee Sindia. The whole army under Hurry Punt, when joined by Futih Sing, amounted to about twenty-five thousand men, of whom five thousand were infantry. Hurry Punt, in permitting the crowd to assemble about Rugoba at such a distance from the capital, after the season when the revenues were collected and when the rains might be expected in the course of six weeks, acted more judiciously than if he had harassed his own troops to prevent the junction of his enemies.

(April 23.)—On the 23d of April the army of Rugoba, the strength of which lay in the British detachment, moved from Durmuj to Wursura, and thence to the Saburmattee. They then moved northward towards Kaira, but did not (May 3.) reach Mahtur,¹ a village thirty miles north of Cambay, until the 3d of May. This inactivity in the first instance was unavoidable; the reinforcements had not arrived, and the commissariat of the Bombay troops was extremely defective; the delay in advancing was attributed to the numerous carts, baggage, and bazar; but no doubt was partly owing to the want of arrangement on the part of the commanding officer; and above all to the indecision of Rugoba, who was inclined to proceed to Ahmedabad and remain in Guzerat during the monsoon, but the

¹ [Mātar (Mahtur) is now the headquarters of the *tāluka* of the same name in Kaira District.]

Bombay Government disapproved of this intention, and strongly recommended him to push on to Poona at once.

Before the army arrived at Mahtur they had two partial actions with Hurry Punt ; the first took place on the 28th April at the village of Ussaumlee, and was entirely maintained by the English detachment with very trifling loss ; the second was four days afterwards, when fifty or sixty of Rugoba's army were killed or wounded, a loss which dispirited them ever after ; but the enemy experienced a much greater, having made an attempt on the left of the English line, where they met with a severe repulse.

Colonel Keating at length, by positive orders from Bombay, prevailed on Rugoba to change the direction of his route (May 5-8.) and proceed towards Poona. They accordingly moved on the 5th, and before they reached Neriad¹ on the 8th, were again twice opposed ; once in the mode usual for Mahratta horse, and a second time in the same manner, but supported by some pieces of cannon. As Neriad was a considerable town in possession of Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Rugoba, to punish his defection and administer to his own necessities, imposed a contribution of sixty thousand rupees ; but, after wasting one week, he could only collect forty thousand. On the 14th the army crept forward three miles further to the westward, and expected to have a decisive action at the Myhie ; as it was known in the Mahratta camp that Hurry Punt Phurkay had received orders from Poona to attack Rugoba, in case he should attempt to pass that river.

Colonel Keating, in the meantime, had continued his correspondence with Futih Sing Gaekwar, and although aware that it had been discovered by Hurry Punt Phurkay from the first, he still persuaded himself that he should be able to bring over Futih Sing. He even entered into a treaty on the 22d April, secret as he supposed and as Futih Sing pretended ; and Colonel Keating was so credulous as to send an agent, Lieutenant George Lovibond, to the camp of Futih Sing, for the purpose of having it ratified. The agent was very grossly insulted, and the mission must have

¹ [Nadiād (Neriad), situated in 22° 42' N. and 75° 52' E., is now a thriving town on the Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway. In 1775 it was one of the prettiest cities in Gujarāt, flanked by nine strong gates and a dry moat. It was ceded by the Gaekwār to the British Government in 1803, together with Kaira, Mātar and Mahudha. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 285-6.)]

furnished a subject for ridicule in every Mahratta Kutha and Ukhbar¹ of the day. But Colonel Keating knew so little of the people as to be insensible of the derision to which his notable diplomacy exposed him. The circumstances of the mission are too characteristic to be passed over. The agent, attended by the wukeel of Futih Sing, was carried to the camp of Hurry Punt; and on expressing his surprise at being brought there was merely told by the wukeel that his master had joined. During the evening some inferior people about Hurry Punt and Futih Sing were sent to visit the British envoy. Early next morning the wukeel told Mr. Lovibond that a tent was pitched for his reception, where he must meet Futih Sing and his Dewan to execute the treaty. In this tent he was kept the whole day; not without expressing his impatience, but Mr. Lovibond, by not bursting into a passion, which would be expected in a European, probably disappointed them of half their mirth. At last, at five o'clock in the evening, a single horseman rode up to the door of the tent and desired the gentleman to follow the army to Dubhaun. On his complying, the palanquin in which he travelled was surrounded by a party of Hurry Punt's horse, and he was thus exposed as a prisoner to their whole army. At this time, the wukeel coming up with much seeming concern confirmed the truth of his being a prisoner, and earnestly begged of him to save his master by destroying the treaty and his other credentials. The good-natured Englishman contrived to do this most effectually, and after the horsemen had brought him to the middle of Futih Sing's camp-bazar, they rode off and there left him. The wukeel immediately urged him not to lose an opportunity so favourable, but to follow him. He was then carried to the tent of the Dewan, where after one hour came Futih Sing himself. He expressed great gratitude for the precaution Mr. Lovibond had taken in his favour by destroying the treaty, which he begged to excuse himself from renewing at that time, owing to the vigilance of Hurry Punt and the other great officers, but that he would soon be able to elude their jealousy, and make his escape to Baroda.² The envoy of Colonel Keating, after having thus furnished subject for what would, if well told, occasion as much laughter to Mahrattas as the

¹ Ukhbars are native newspapers; for an explanation of Kuthas the reader may refer to vol. i, p. 19.

² Mr. Lovibond's letter to Colonel Keating is on the Bombay Records.

story of the sleeper awakened among Arabs, was escorted back to the British camp. There are certain kinds of ridicule which are peculiarly national, and the full force of this imposture, practised by two personages in such high authority as Futih Sing and Hurry Punt Phurkay, would probably, from its seeming puerility, be at that time little understood, except by Mahrattas ; but the Bombay Government in their judgment disapproved of Colonel Keating's proceedings, and ordered Mr. Mostyn to join his army for the purpose of transacting its political affairs. The troops, however, had advanced too far from Cambay through a hostile country, to enable Mr. Mostyn to overtake them.

(**May 17.**)—The army, after passing Neriad, continued their march towards the Myhie, and arrived at Nappar¹ on the 17th. From Neriad their route lay through a highly cultivated country, along a narrow, deep, sandy road, which only admits one cart abreast, being enclosed on both sides by high milk-bush hedges. Numerous topes, or groves, appear in every direction ; the country on both sides is generally a succession of enclosed fields, the borders of which are lined by stately trees, such as the mountain neem, the tamarind, the moura, and the mango. Guzerat, from Barreah and Godra to Kattywar, is in general a perfect flat ; between Neriad and the Myhie there are a few undulations, which add considerably to the beauty of the country, but tend to obstruct the progress of an army, by confining the line of wheeled carriage to the narrow road just described. After passing Nappar about a mile and a half the country opens on a fine plain, interspersed with trees, extending from Arass² to near the banks of the river, which are full of extensive and deep ravines.

Rugoba's horse, after their first skirmish on leaving Cambay,

¹ [Nāpād (Nappar) is now a village in the Anand *tāluka*, Kaira District. With other villages in the neighbourhood it came into possession of the British under the terms of the treaty of Bassein (December 31, 1802). (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 286.)]

² [The plain of Adas (Arass), lying between Anand and the Mahī river, was the scene of three battles in the eighteenth century. In the first (1723) the Mughal governor of Surat was, through the treachery of Pilājī Gaekwār, defeated and slain by the deputy of Nizām-ul-Mulk. At the second (1775) Raghunāth Rāo was defeated by the Marāthā confederation. The third, which took place a few months later, is that described by the author. James Forbes (1749–1819), author of *Oriental Memoirs*, was an eye-witness of the third battle, of which he has left an account. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 281–2.)]

instead of acting on the flanks and guarding the baggage, used constantly to intermix with it, and with the characteristic feeling of Mahrattas, depressed by previous discomfiture, on occasions of the smallest danger crowded for safety towards the British detachment. Colonel Keating, at Rugoba's request, in order to give them a little confidence, had formed two guards consisting each of two hundred rank and file, one hundred Europeans and one hundred native infantry, supported by two guns. One of these guards was posted in the rear, and one on the reverse flank of the whole army; the front and rear of the British detachment were composed of European grenadiers; and the orders were that, in case of an attack on the flank, the rear-guard should move to its support, whilst the division of grenadiers occupied their place; but in case the attack should be made on the rearguard, the division of grenadiers should fall back and join it.

(May 18.)—On the morning of the 18th May, when marching in this order towards the Myhie, about a mile and a half from Nappar, a smart cannonade from six guns suddenly opened on their rear from behind a grove on the left side of the road, where a large body of the enemy were advancing. Colonel Keating immediately halted the line, rode back, found Captain Myers, who commanded a division of grenadiers, moving according to the instructions, and having ordered down another gun and a howitzer, soon silenced the artillery of the enemy and drove back the advancing body. Two of the enemy's cannon were not withdrawn with the rest, and Captain Myers, with some of the other officers, proposed 'having a dash at their guns'; to which Colonel Keating assented, and sent for the other company of grenadiers. The object of attack was in an enclosed field, the road to which was of the same kind as that already described, between two high milk-bush hedges. As soon as both companies of grenadiers were formed with the rearguard, they were directed to advance with order and regularity, an injunction which Colonel Keating found it necessary to repeat; Captain Myers, however, again quickened his pace until he got near the guns. He then halted, and had just formed for the attack when a body of the enemy's horse charged him; but being supported by the artillery which Colonel Keating directed in person, they were driven back with great slaughter. The division had reformed to prosecute

their object when another charge, more desperate than the first, was again made and repulsed, though many of the grenadiers were cut down, and among the rest, the gallant Captains Myers and Serle. This was certainly the crisis which generally gains or loses an action ; Colonel Keating performed the duty of a good captain of artillery, but as a commander he neglected to support his exhausted men with fresh troops. The Mahrattas took advantage of the oversight, placed two elephants to block up the narrow road, and being encouraged by a treacherous Carcoon in Rugoba's army, charged the rear of the division, thus completely cut off from the main body. But the troops, as yet undismayed, facing about, attacked and routed them. By this time a body of Arabs and Sindians in Rugoba's army were advancing in their irregular manner, and Rugoba's horse, by careering about between the advanced body and the British line, occasioned infinite confusion, and could scarcely be distinguished from the enemy, who for a moment seemed to have relinquished the attack ; when suddenly one of the companies of European grenadiers, without any apparent reason, went to the right about and retreated at a quick pace ; this retrograde movement, as was afterwards discovered by a court of inquiry, was partly the fault of their officer, whose word of command to face to the right, for the purpose of retiring, was mistaken for 'right about face.' Without orders from Colonel Keating the retreat was at all events inexcusable ; and, as might have been expected, was attended with disastrous consequences. The Sepoys immediately fancied themselves defeated, they also turned, and the rest of the Europeans followed their example. Some order was preserved until they gained the milk-bush hedges, when, in spite of all the exertions of their officers, they broke their ranks and ran towards the line in the greatest confusion, whilst the enemy came amongst them, sword in hand, and made a great slaughter. Colonel Keating in vain attempted to rally the grenadiers : those men, who had a few minutes before fought with all the ardour and constancy of British troops, now fled disgracefully ; but the support of the line and the fire of the whole artillery, within forty yards, again drove back the Mahrattas, who finally sustained a severe defeat. Such was the battle of Arass ; and notwithstanding the circumstances attending it, which are related principally from the candid narrative of Colonel Keating, it is a victory recorded by the best

of testimony, the enemy, in terms highly creditable.¹ But it was dearly purchased. The loss on the part of Colonel Keating's detachment amounted to two hundred and twenty-two men; of whom eighty-six were Europeans, and eleven of them officers.²

(May 29.)—Colonel Keating arrived at Baroach on the 29th May, where he deposited his wounded. On the 8th June he

(June 8.) again marched, intending to cross the Nerbuddah; but as the proposed ford was found impracticable, the army on the 10th moved up the river towards Bowpeer.

(June 10.) After a march of about twenty miles, at five o'clock in the evening, Colonel Keating received intelligence that Hurry Punt was still on the north side of the river, about eight or ten miles further on. Having now less respect for his enemy, and having found the simple secret in Mahratta warfare, of always being the first to attack, Colonel Keating resolved on moving forward as soon as he had allowed his men some refreshment. Accordingly, he was again in motion before one o'clock in the morning; but the troops of Rugoba, like their ill-omened master, whose presence seemed to blight the fairest prospect in every affair in which he was engaged, on this occasion, for the first time since their former slight check, stimulated by the hope of plunder, and elated by having received a little pay, part of a lack of rupees advanced to Rugoba by the Baroach factory, showed an inclination to advance, crowded the road, broke through Colonel Keating's line of march in several places, and at last obliged him to halt till daylight. The enemy, therefore, saw him long before he could get near, struck their camp in the greatest confusion, threw their guns into the river, sent their heavy baggage across the Nerbuddah, and retreated along the north bank with the loss of an elephant and a few camels, which were plundered by Rugoba's horse.

Colonel Keating's intention of proceeding to the southward, according to repeated orders from Bombay, was now set aside

¹ Mahratta MSS.

² The officers killed were Captains Myers and Serle; Lieutenants Morris, Henry, Prosser, Anderson, and Young.

The officers wounded were Captain Frith, Lieutenant Dawson, Ensigns Denon and Torin. Rugoba's Arabs were also severe sufferers, but they wreaked their vengeance on the treacherous Carcoon, whom they seized, and, contrary to Rugoba's express orders, put him to instant death by literally cutting him in pieces with their swords.

for many judicious military reasons, urged by Rugoba, of which the Presidency afterwards approved; and it was therefore determined to retire to Dubhoy, nineteen miles south-east of Baroda, whilst Rugoba's troops were encamped at Bheelapoor, a village on the Dadhur between these places.

Colonel Keating then proposed to the Bombay Government, at the repeated solicitation of Govind Rao Gaekwar, to reduce Baroda as soon as the violence of the monsoon abated, to which they assented. In the meantime, preparations were in progress at the Presidency for the purpose of reinforcing Colonel Keating's detachment, replenishing their ammunition, and completing their stores.

Futih Sing was now in earnest in his desire to enter into a treaty; and Colonel Keating, foreseeing more advantage to the cause by admitting his overtures than by reducing him, recommended to Rugoba the conclusion of such an agreement as might reconcile Govind Rao to the measure, secure the alliance of Futih Sing, and ensure relief to Rugoba's urgent necessities, by a supply of treasure.

Futih Sing agreed to furnish three thousand horse, to be at all times kept at Rugoba's service; but if required, two thousand more were to be provided, for which pay was to be allowed: a Jagheer of three lacks, which Futih Sing, by his agreement with Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was bound to reserve in Guzerat for his brother, Govind Rao, was no longer to be required; but in lieu of it Rugonath Rao agreed to bestow a Jagheer of ten lacks on Govind Rao Gaekwar in the Deccan. Twenty-six lacks of rupees were to be paid to Rugoba in sixty-one days; and the East India Company, as guarantees and negotiators between the parties, were to receive the Gaekwar's share of the revenue in Baroach and several villages in perpetuity, estimated at (2,13,000) two lacks and thirteen thousand rupees.

This pacification, effected through Colonel Keating's management, was, as circumstances then stood, politic; for, although Govind Rao afterwards seceded from the agreement, he declared himself satisfied at the time.¹

¹ From Colonel Keating's reports to the Bombay government, which are my chief authority for the above, it is evident that there must have been considerable modifications in the treaty, of which the following production is the only copy that I have found either in English or Mahratta. It is, however, from very high authority,

The war, thus waged in Guzerat, was also prosecuted by sea.

The Mahratta navy in the ministerial interest, at the commencement of the war, consisted of six ships, one of forty-six guns, one of thirty-eight, one of thirty-two, and two of twenty-six guns, with ten armed vessels, mounting each from two to nine guns, besides swivels. This fleet was met at sea by Commodore John Moor¹ in the *Revenge*, frigate, and the *Bombay*, grab. Though

being an enclosure of a letter of 30th January, 1802, from Mr. Jonathan Duncan, when Governor of Bombay, to Sir Barry Close, resident at Poona.

‘Translate of the copy of the treaty between Rugonath Bajerao Pundit Purdan on one part, and Futtu Sing and Seajee Rao Shumshere Buhadur on the other part.

That Seajee and Futtu Sing Shumsher Buhadur had disobeyed and joined with the rebels, but now by the means of Colonel Thomas Keating, for and in behalf of the united English East India Company, have, by promising presents, accommodated matters with Pundit Perdan, the following are the articles of the Gaekwar’s proposals.

Article I.—Thât Seajee, and Futtu Sing Gaekwar Shumshere Buhadur, do hereby agree to pay the sum of eight lacks of rupees every year to the Sircar.

II. That they are to attend as usual with a troop of 3000 good horse and men, which number is not to be lessened.

III. In the late Madoo Rao’s time they used to pay every year three lacks of rupees to Govind Rao Gaekwar Sena Kaskel Shumshere Buhadur, which sum is settled not to be paid him in future, about which Govind Rao is to make no claim against Seajee and Futtu Sing.

IV. Conde Rao Gaekwar Hemut Buhadur is to be continued on the same footing, and agreeable to the agreement made in the time of the late Damajee deceased.

V. That the government and revenue of the Pergunnahs of Baroach have been wholly ceded to the Company agreeable to the agreement made between them and Sreemunt Pundit Predan, about which Seajee and Futtu Sing are not to make any dispute.

VI. The Pergunnahs Chickaly Veriow, near Surat, and Coral, near the Nerbuddah river, and about 15 coss distant from Baroach, which together make three Pergunnahs, the Gaekwar has ceded to the Honourable Company for ever, on account of the peace they have made between the Gaekwar and Sreemunt Punt Purdan.

VII. That in the court of Sreemunt Punt Purdan, the Gaekwar must pay a due attention to everything that is reasonable, without having any communication with its enemies.

VIII. That for the confirmation and compliance of the above articles, the Honourable Company stand security; and should the Gaekwars appear any way false, the Honourable Company is not to protect them. Rugoba is also to fulfil the above articles without any difference.

¹ [See Low, *History of the Indian Navy*, i. 156 f., where the Commodore’s name is spelt Moore. References to the engagement in *Bombay in 1781*, pp. 84, 85, and Parson’s *Travels*, p. 217, are given in *B.G.*, xiii, pt. ii. 502. Note that another *Revenge*, a small man-of-war, had

the Mahrattas were formidable in appearance, the Commodore stood down to attack them, when they bore away with all sail set, but having singled out their largest ship, the *Shumsher Jung* of 46 guns, both the English vessels gave her chase, and at last the grab, being an excellent sailor, brought her to action. The *Revenge* came up to the assistance of the *Bombay*, and after an engagement of three hours the *Shumsher Jung* blew up, her commander, with most of the crew, perished, and the ship was totally destroyed.

On the side of Rugoba everything seemed favourable; elated by the successful exertions of his allies, he presented the Company with the permanent cession of the valuable districts of Hansot and Amod, then estimated at 2,77,000 rupees of annual revenue. The whole amount acquired by the war, including cessions by Futih Sing, was valued at rupees 24,15,000, of all which the Bombay Government had obtained possession, excepting Bassein and its dependencies.

The state of the young Peishwa's affairs wore an aspect proportionally unpromising. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the surprise at Bowpeer, left Gunness Punt Beeray in command of a detachment for the protection of Ahmedabad, and returned to the Deccan by a ford about one hundred miles above where his heavy baggage had crossed. Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were much disheartened in consequence of his defeat, and dreaded the consequences which generally follow disaster in India, by the defection of allies. Moodajee Bhonslay had a few months before prevailed over his brother Sabajee; and although, whilst Rugonath Rao was a fugitive in Guzerat, the former had solicited and obtained through Nana Furnuwees from the young Peishwa a confirmation of the rights and honours of Sena Sahib Soobeh for his son Rughoojee, together with such privileges for himself as pertained to the guardianship, yet the ministers were apprehensive that the rising fortunes of Rugoba would ensure him the support of the Raja of Berar. Several men of consequence already began to turn their eyes on Rugoba; and Nizam

covered herself with glory in an engagement with the Marāthā fleet off Kenery Island in the early years of the Company's rule in Bombay. On that occasion the *Revenge* was commanded by Captain Minchin; with him was the gallant Captain Keigwin, who was Commodore for the occasion. (Fryer's *Travels* (Hakluyt), vol. iii, p. 164.)]

Ally, in hopes of being able to exact something additional from the one party or the other, or at least to retain what he had already recovered, opened a negotiation with Rugoba, which greatly alarmed the ministers, especially as the death of Rookun-ud-dowlah, happening about this period, obstructed their former correct intelligence of his master's real designs. Nizam Ally augmented their uncertainty by pretending to disbelieve the truth of Mahdoo Rao Narrain's legitimacy, and by proposing, as a conciliatory measure to all parties, that Amrut Rao, the adopted son of Rugonath Rao, should be made Peishwa. By this means Nizam Ally exacted a further cession from the ministers of nearly eighteen lacks of rupees¹ of annual revenue. Great promises were also made to Sindia and Holkar; nor did any sacrifice, that could ensure the exclusion of Rugoba, appear too great to the ruling Bramins at Poona. The cause of Rugoba was extremely unpopular; of the generality of the Bramins in Poona, even those who were disposed to acquit him of the atrocity of having conspired against the life of his nephew, remembered with indignation the criminal opposition he had always shown to the wise and virtuous Mahdoo Rao; they reflected with regret on his losses to the state, and on the unfortunate issue of all his measures; the weakness and folly of his whole conduct they viewed with contempt; and his present connexion with the usurping and impure Europeans they regarded with jealousy and detestation. Others, and such were probably the majority of the Mahratta nation, true to no party and guided by no principle, hitherto considered Rugoba as an unfortunate person with whom it was unwise to be connected; but the defeat of Hurry Punt, the subsequent discomfiture of his deputy Gunnessh Punt by Ameen Khan, an officer of Rugoba's, the siege of Ahmedabad carried on by the same officer, the preparations of the English, the doubts of the young Peishwa's legitimacy, and the desire of many of the Mahratta chiefs to become independent of the Bramin ministry, occasioned a revolution in the opinions of many, and an anxiety in the minds of all. In short, such was at this period the state of the Mahratta country, that it is generally believed that any success of equal importance to that at Arass, on the opening of

¹ He obtained rupees 17,84,576 8 0. State Accounts, Poona Records.)

the expected campaign, would have brought the ministry into the terms of Rugonath Rao ; and as the fact of Mahdoo Rao Narrain's legitimacy would have been proved to the satisfaction of the English, Rugoba appeared certain of being established as regent. But fortune was preparing a change, far different from such a prospect.

CHAPTER XXVII.

FROM A.D. 1774 TO A.D. 1778.

(1774.)—THE Supreme Council in Bengal assumed the powers of general administration in the affairs of British India on the 20th October, 1774¹; and during the ensuing month addressed a letter to the Bombay Government, requiring an account of the state of that Presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December, but as the President and members were then in the midst of preparations for the expedition to Salsette, they deferred the consideration of the Bengal letter until after the troops had proceeded on their destination, and sent no reply until the last day of the year.

Three months afterwards, or on the 31st March, the Bombay Government further reported to Bengal their proceedings up to that date. But early in February intelligence of the siege of Tannah reached the Governor-General in Council, by the way of Tellicherry and Madras, before they received the reply from Bombay of the 31st December. The delay on the part of the Bombay Government certainly, to say the least, wore the semblance of a premeditated evasion, and, as new authority is generally tenacious, the Governor-General and Council addressed

(1775.) another letter on the 3d February, censuring the Bombay Presidency for having gone to war with the Mahrattas, and peremptorily requiring immediate and special information of the causes and motives of their conduct. On the 21st May the Bombay Government received the reply to their first letter,

¹ [Three members of the Council, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, arrived in Calcutta on October 19, 1774, and met the following day to hear the instructions of the Directors. The fourth member, Mr. Richard Barwell, who had been in the Company's service since 1758, took his seat a few days later.]

of the 31st December, wherein the Supreme Government offered no opinion respecting the capture of Salsette, but disapproved of the intention of joining Rugoba, not because Rugoba was making war against his lawful prince and was generally obnoxious in the Mahratta country, or because the Bombay Government had unjustly espoused the cause of a man branded with the crime of murder; circumstances of which the Bombay Government, it is justice to them to say, were never well informed, and of which the Supreme Government were ignorant; but they disapproved because, to use their own words, 'it was inconsistent with your negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this government.' They also expressed apprehensions that the measure might involve them in hostilities with Sabajee Bhonslay, the enemy of Rugoba and their neighbour. To which the Bombay Government replied that they neither have, nor ever had any negotiations with the ministry at Poona, and that they need be under no apprehension in regard to Sabajee Bhonslay, as he had been killed in action by Moodajee, the friend of Rugoba, who was now the acknowledged guardian of Rughoojee and the ruler of Berar; all of which was perfectly true—victory had declared for Sabajee; Moodajee was surrounded by his brother's troops; and on the point of being made prisoner, when Sabajee, in the exultation of the moment, drove his elephant up to that on which Moodajee was riding, and called out to him to submit. Moodajee replied by the discharge of a pistol, which laid his brother dead and left him undisputed regent and guardian of the young Rughoojee, who, it will be remembered, was his son.¹

To the report of their proceedings up to the 31st March, the Bombay Government, on the 12th August, received a reply from Bengal, dated on the 31st May. Long before that time the minds of the President and members of the Supreme Government were in a state of strong excitement, caused by those well-known controversies between Warren Hastings and his council, which afterwards occupied so much of the time and attention of the British Parliament.² But on the present occasion President

¹ Mahratta MSS. Where I do not expressly acknowledge my authorities from A.D. 1774 to 1783, I beg the reader to understand that I write from the Records of the Bombay Government.

² [The difficulties which Warren Hastings had to face in consequence of the open hostility of Clavering, Monson and Francis, con-

and members united in a violent condemnation of the Bombay measures; they declared the treaty with Rugoba invalid, and the Mahratta war 'impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust'; they protested against the Bombay Government for all consequences, and peremptorily required them 'to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat.' The Governor-General and Council also intimated their intention of sending an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Mahratta state, and desired the Bombay Government to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without their previous sanction.

The Bombay Government stated in reply that the negotiations which led to the measures thus hastily condemned had been begun before the controlling administration was formed; they defended their conduct on the grounds of the necessity of determining with promptitude, and recapitulated their reasons for deciding and acting in the manner they had done; pointed out the evils prevented by the capture of Salsette, and the fair and honourable advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rugonath Rao. They dwelt on the shame and degradation which must be the consequence of retracting a solemn treaty in support of an object equally just and practicable, and pledged themselves, on their own responsibility, to fulfil their engagements. They sent Mr. William Tayler, a member of their council, to Bengal, who advocated their cause with much ability; and his report on Bombay affairs, dated 9th October, 1775, displays, at that early period, a very considerable knowledge of the history and character of the Mahrattas.

The Supreme Government, however, adhered to their opinion of the expediency of the orders which they had transmitted. Lieutenant-Colonel John Upton, of the Bengal establishment, was selected by Mr. Hastings as envoy plenipotentiary, and instructed to repair to Poona and conclude a treaty between the Mahratta state and the Bombay Government. The President and Council of that establishment, being excluded from all

tinued until the death of Monson in September 1776, when Hastings was enabled with his own casting vote, and with Barwell as his ally, to defeat further opposition.]

participation, strongly remonstrated against this proceeding as a wanton degradation of their authority, and their representations were supported with energy by their deputy at Bengal. 'I trust,' says Mr. Tayler, 'that it will appear to your Honours, &c. that at the time it pleased the wisdom of Parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the Presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded, and so contemptible in the eyes of the native government as the Presidency of Bombay must be, unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management.

'Our honourable employers and the whole British nation may be naturally led to suppose that, in your opinion, the members of that government are devoid in every degree of integrity and abilities; which would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations; for I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefited by their engagements.'

Such was the language then held by the Bombay Government, with apparent sincerity as well as spirit, and, as far as we have yet detailed of their conduct and prospects, certainly with no inconsiderable degree of reason. It must be recollected that the President and members, throughout the whole of the rise and progress of their connexion with Rugoba, were strongly impressed with the belief of his being innocent of the murder of his nephew. Many of our countrymen, who by long residence in the Deccan have become acquainted with the notoriety of the fact, although perhaps represented with exaggeration, have from this circumstance alone entertained strong doubts of the integrity of Mr. Hornby and his Council; and some inveigh, with a feeling far from reprehensible, against Englishmen who could seek by such an instrument to attain their ends and gratify their ambition. But to account for this belief on the part of the Bombay Government it is necessary to state that Sukaram Bappoo was originally concerned in Rugoba's conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life, of Narrain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed by the ministers generally a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao's participation, of course Sukaram Bappoo had stronger reasons than any of them

for professing that opinion. It was this impression, from the reports first circulated at Poona, which the members of the Bombay Government received from their envoy, Mr. Mostyn ; and before it was possible for them to ascertain the real circumstances they were engaged as a party hostile to the ministers, when it was as much the interest of the one to uphold Rugoba's innocence as it was of the other to aggravate his guilt. Parties so influenced diverge from the truth in all countries, more especially in India, where a witness is so apt to suit the word to the wish of his auditor. The same reasons operated in creating a belief that the child named Mahdoo Rao Narrain was supposititious.

The Bengal Presidency, where they had Mahratta connexions, received their first information through the government of Sabajee Bhonslay, a partisan of the ministers. They were also, no doubt, irritated at the neglect of their orders and the apparent contempt of their authority ; and as we find men, in all situations, too often influenced by their feelings when they should be guided only by their judgment, we may suppose that they saw in their full force the evils of inordinate ambition and the wisdom of that Parliament, which had so opportunely vested them with power to control such an unjustifiable enterprise, by interposing in behalf of justice and moderation. The clause in the Act of Parliament was not sufficiently specific¹ ; the intention of establishing a uniform plan of action with respect to peace and war required, at a distance so remote as India from England, the strongest authority in the Supreme Council ; but, as their powers were not clearly defined, the members of government should have perceived that a firm but calm exercise of power for a long period was the best way of establishing an efficient control, unless they could obtain an amendment of the statute. But they violently stretched their power in support of what they deemed propriety, and issued mandates characteristic of an inexperienced and arbitrary government, which, to gratify temporary resentments or forward its impatient selfish will, weakens much more than it strengthens the efficiency of distant authority.

Mr. Hornby and his Council were not blameless even in what has

¹ [For a brief analysis of the Regulating Act and an exposition of its major defects, based upon Sir C. Ilbert's *The Government of India*, see *O.H.I.*, pp. 520-2.]

already been mentioned, and their subsequent conduct accelerated rather than averted the misfortunes which ensued. But the precipitate interference of the Governor-General and Council was attended by effects pernicious to the interests of their country; effects which, but for the weak government of France, might, together with the loss of the American colonies, have proved a fatal blow to Great Britain. Confining reflections, however, to the boundary of Maharashtra, suffice it to say that it depressed the Bombay Presidency, lowered its political importance, and obstructed that advancement and prosperity which, from its situation and maritime advantages, it would otherwise naturally have attained; it immediately tended to strengthen the hands of the ministers at Poorundhur, and it ultimately cemented the tottering confederacy of the Mahrattas under the administration of Nana Furnuwees.

The President and Council of Bombay, on receiving the Bengal order of the 31st May, directed an immediate cessation of hostilities; and as soon as the roads permitted, Colonel Keating, accompanied by Rugoba, returned towards Surat. But instead of strictly retiring within the Company's districts, Colonel Keating, on the earnest recommendation of Rugoba, was permitted by the Bombay Government to encamp at Karòd, a village about twenty-five miles east of Surat, which, although a deviation from the orders of the Supreme Government, was afterwards acknowledged as a useful support in facilitating their (Dec. 28.) negotiations at Poorundhur; at which place Colonel Upton arrived on the 28th December.

Mr. Hastings was sensible that the condemnation of the Bombay measures was unnecessarily violent, but he had been one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, which in that remote empire, considered of itself, was an object in the highest degree important. The mandate issued was now irrevocable; Sukaram Bappoo had been informed by a letter from the Governor-General that the conduct of the Bombay Government was contrary to the Company's order, 'because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the King of England,' says the Governor-General, 'has directed that all the Company's Governors in India should obtain mine and my Council's permission, as King's Governor and Council of Bengal, either to make war or peace.'

In short, that he had therefore issued orders to desist from hostilities, requested of the ministers to do the same, and intimated his intention of sending an envoy to negotiate a peace. If the Governor-General of British India had then said 'to dictate a peace,' and shown a determination to maintain that ground, however bold the words may sound, he would probably at that moment have succeeded with Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees.

After the dispatch of the first letters, the Supreme Government, even for the sake of consistency, would have been obliged to regulate their future measures by the tenor of those orders. Advices having been received of the successes in Guzerat, it seemed not improbable that a revolution might have taken place before Colonel Upton's arrival at Poona. Adopting, therefore, the same equitable principle with which they had professed to set out, that a substantive state has a right to make any change in its internal government which only affects itself, the envoy was instructed to negotiate a peace with either party whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire. But the Governor-General and Council had in effect already become parties; and the members of the Bombay Government, who felt and wrote as if the Supreme Government had ranged themselves on the side of their enemies, remark with some justice in one of their dispatches to the Court of Directors, 'they have acknowledged the legitimacy of the government of the ministers, before they could have any competent knowledge of the justice of their pretensions.'

A.D. 1776.—The ministers soon perceived the advantages thus placed in their hands; and as Bramins in politics misconstrue moderation and attribute concession solely to fear, they assumed a high tone of demand and menace which Colonel Upton, judging by himself, believed to be firm and sincere. The Supreme Government were under a mistake in imagining that Bassein as well as Salsette was in possession of the Bombay Presidency. The envoy was enjoined to require the cession both of these and of the islands in Bombay harbour, and also of the Mahratta shares of revenue in the city of Baroach, with such other advantages for the Company as circumstances might enable him to obtain.

Colonel Upton's correspondence bears ample testimony of sincerity and moderation; but he was ill-qualified to conduct

a negotiation with Mahratta Bramins. The ministers greatly extolled the just and honourable motives which 'had determined the great Governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded.' But when Colonel Upton proposed retaining Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein, and the revenues of Baroach, they affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorized, and pertinently asked the envoy, 'how the Bengal Government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages.' The only reply to this was that Salsette had been taken possession of as a precautionary measure, long deemed necessary to the safety of Bombay and the prosperity of its commerce; but the ministers persisted in their language, and expressed a wish 'that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the Governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they should otherwise long since have settled the business.' They demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay Government since the commencement of the war, on which they would, as a favour to the Governor-General, agree to pay twelve lacks of rupees, in order to reimburse the East India Company for the expenses incurred by the Bombay Government. They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton, conceiving the negotiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the Governor-General and Council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bombay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally, and Hyder; and endeavoured in the same manner to induce Moodajee Bhonslay, Mahadajee Sindia, and Tookajee Holkar to embrace their cause, or at all events to engage their neutrality.

The favourable change in the sentiments of the Bengal Government towards himself reached Rugoba almost as soon as it got to Bombay, and raised his spirits and expectations; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part

of Colonel Upton's original demands ; and before accounts had time to reach Calcutta that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, and consisted of nineteen articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton on the part of the Company's Government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees on that of the Peishwa's ; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the Peishwa having been omitted.

The substance of the articles was a general peace between the English East India Company and the Mahrattas. Salsette to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the Governor-General and Council ; if restored the Peishwa's government agreed to relinquish territory worth three lacks of rupees of annual revenue as an equivalent. To this exchange the Supreme Government could not be expected to accede, although Nana Furnuwees afterwards pretended that it had been preferred with perfect confidence as a question of equity, from a reliance upon the justice of Mr. Hastings. All claims on the revenue of the city of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lacks of rupees, were ceded, as the treaty states, ' by way of friendship to the English Company.' Twelve lacks of rupees were also yielded in payment of the expenses incurred by the Bombay Government. The cessions made by Futih Sing Gaekwar were to be restored to him, provided it could be proved that he had no authority to make such alienations without the consent of the Peishwa's government. The treaty between the Bombay Government and Rugoba was formally annulled. The English troops to return to their garrisons, and the army of Rugoba to be disbanded within a month. A general amnesty to be proclaimed to all the followers of Rugoba, four only excepted, whom the ministers knew to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narrain Rao. If Rugonath Rao should refuse to disband his army, the English agreed not to assist him. On condition of his assenting to the prescribed terms, the Peishwa and his ministers consented to afford him an establishment of one thousand horse, to allow him two hundred domestics, to be chosen by himself, and to pay him twenty-five thousand rupees monthly for his other expenses, but his residence was fixed at

Kopergaom on the Godavery. It was particularly specified that no assistance should be afforded to Rugonath Rao, or to any subject or servant of the Peishwa who should excite disturbance or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions. The treaties of 1739 and 1756, and all other agreements not suspended or dissolved by the present articles, were confirmed. It was mutually agreed to assist the crews and restore the wrecks and cargoes of vessels of the respective nations thrown on each other's coasts.

Nothing could exceed the disappointment of the Bombay Government when they learnt the terms of the treaty. They seemed to consider their own interest and dignity sacrificed to a jealous assumption of authority. They had no power to protest, and could therefore only vent their indignation by entering dissents on their own records against almost every article, with the view of ultimately submitting their objections to the Court of Directors. They certainly had cause for irritation in the manner in which their conduct had been condemned and their power in a great degree suspended ; but they seem to have been determined to find objections, and even petulantly hinted that Colonel Upton must have been in bodily fear, or he never would have consented to terms so derogatory to the English nation : they, however, ' with more propriety ask, Who is this Rao Pundit Purdhan ? why is his name omitted ? if Colonel Upton has had proof of the legitimacy of the child, said to be the son of Narrain Rao, why is that circumstance left in doubt ? or if not proved, why is Rugonath Rao, the rightful Peishwa, wholly excluded ? ' ¹

Rugoba could never entirely comprehend the nature of the interference on the part of the Governor-General and Council ; but under a supposition that it arose from their deeming the advantages he had granted inadequate, he proposed not only to confirm the treaty of Surat by a new agreement with the Bengal Government, but with the single exception of Viziadroog (Gheriah) to cede the whole Concan, to put the Company's troops in possession of one of the passes in the Ghauts, to purchase annually ten lacks of rupees' worth of their woollens and metals, at an advance of fifteen per cent. on the prime cost including all

¹ Although the circumstance is nowhere explained by the Mahrattas, the omission, on the part of the ministers, of the name of Mahdoo Rao Narrain was most likely a precaution, as in case of the child's death it probably was their intention to get Gunga Bye to adopt a son.

charges ; he also proposed that they should unite to subdue Nizam Ally ; and made several other offers of which, as none could be accepted, a further enumeration is unnecessary ; but one inducement was too remarkable to be passed over, as, with his Mahratta ideas, it must have appeared irresistible. Rugoba offered to cede ten per cent. of all the Jagheers in the Mahratta empire ; including, of course, the Mahratta possessions in the Deccan, and those of Holkar, Sindia, and Gaekwar in Hindoostan and Guzerat ; which would have placed the East India Company, with respect to those Jagheers, precisely on the footing of Surdeshmookh.

Rugoba, on hearing of the terms stipulated for him by the treaty, declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them. He pretended to have received overtures from Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, and Dhonsa,¹ one of the officers of Nizam Ally. Mahadajee Sindia had always sent the most friendly assurances to Rugoba, to which he was induced partly from enmity to Sukaram Bappoo, but principally in order to preserve his own consequence and place himself as umpire between the Bramin factions ; a situation to which Mahadajee Sindia with remarkable political sagacity early aspired. After the terms of the treaty were promulgated he continued an intercourse with Rugoba, not avowed, but sufficiently known to alarm the ministers ; Rugoba, however, whatever he might pretend, was not deceived by these professions ; none of his Indian allies afforded him any substantial aid, excepting Hyder, who sent him eighty thousand rupees as a present.²

The Bombay Government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them ;—instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the Supreme Government, and to a solemn engagement under the

¹ The bye-name by which Ibrahim Beg, Zufur-ud-dowlah Sabit Jung was best known. *Dhonsa* is the Hindoostanee name for one of the drums usually carried by parties of horse.

² Large sums are said to have been sent by Hyder Ally to Rugoba, but except the 80,000 rupees above mentioned, no other money appears by the Bombay Records to have been received, and it could hardly have escaped the vigilance of that Government at a time when they had the greatest difficulty in supplying even a pittance to Rugoba.

constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur, was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal.

An impostor, already mentioned, who had assumed the name of Sewdasheo Chimnajee, eight or nine years after the battle of Panniput, was made prisoner during the lifetime of Mahdoo Rao, and after being confined in different places, was finally delivered over to the custody of Ramchundur Naik Paranspey, Soobehdar of Rutnaguiry in the Concan. Paranspey, perceiving the distracted state of affairs at Poona, the dissensions among the heads of the state, and the probability of attaining a sovereignty for himself, released his prisoner and proclaimed him as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, unjustly imprisoned by the traitorous ministers. The impostor is known to have been a Kanoja Bramin from Hindoostan, a man of some abilities, and of the same cast as the famous Kuvée Kulus of Sumbhaje. His story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay Government, to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of *Suddaba*, as they called him, with complacency, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour.

Rugoba, from the date of the treaty, was allowed the space of one month to disband his army, a period which was afterwards prolonged, but perceiving that there was no immediate chance of inducing the Governor-General to assist him, he asked and obtained an asylum from the Bombay Government in Surat, where he was admitted with merely his baggage and two hundred domestics. From Surat he appealed to the Court of Directors, and following the example of his brother Ballajee Rao, addressed a letter to the King of England. Colonel Upton remonstrated against the breach of treaty occasioned by the protection afforded to Rugoba. The Bombay Government declared it no breach of the treaty: they justified their conduct on a former letter from Bengal, dated in the preceding October, which permitted them to afford an asylum to Rugoba in case his personal safety should be endangered; and they declared that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give up the unfortunate man to his persecutors; that Colonel Upton must know little of Asiatics in the situation of the ministers, if he was not aware

that until they had rid themselves of so just an object of dread they would never consider themselves safe, and that common humanity, as well as the law of nations and good policy, dictated the propriety of what they had done, even if unsupported by authority from Bengal.

The army of Rugoba, before it disbanded, encamped, for a short time after the final period allowed had expired, close to Surat, waiting, as they said, for the payment of their arrears. Hurry Punt Phurkay in a letter to Poona intimated his intention of attacking them; but from the position in which they were allowed to remain he could not but apprehend that the English intended to support them. The Bombay Government, on the plea of apprehending danger from the contiguity of the contending Mahratta armies, but in reality to await events, threw their field army into Surat and Baroach.

It was in vain that Colonel Upton complained, or the ministers threatened, in consequence of these proceedings; the Bombay Government paid little attention to the one, and they treated the other with scorn; they expressed their astonishment and surprise that the envoy of the British nation should suffer the Mahratta ministers to declare that they should be induced to follow the example of Hyder, who had secured a peace on terms very honourable to himself, and that, in case of a renewal of the war, they would carry fire and sword to every part of the Company's possessions in India. Such a menace was indeed derogatory to the British character and highly discreditable, not to Colonel Upton, but to those of his nation who by a perverse conduct provoked the threat, and compelled their envoy to admit that the measures they pursued were not regulated in that spirit of good faith which should certainly have actuated them from the moment a treaty was concluded.

The language used in vindication of the protection afforded to Rugoba was specious. The measure had its supporters in the Council at Bengal, but the majority condemned it, as well as the pernicious nature of the opposition which was practised by the Bombay Government.

Mr. Hastings, although he ratified the act of his envoy, did not approve of the treaty of Poorundhur, as terms more suitable might have been obtained. Several of the articles were certainly far from specific, and the ministers afterwards took every

opportunity, not merely of putting the most constrained interpretations on doubtful passages, but of contravening what they must have known was really intended in the articles to which they had subscribed. The consequence was, that though hostilities had ceased, peace could not be considered as established.

Whilst affairs were in this unsettled state a dispatch was received at Bombay, on the 20th August, from the Court of Directors, dated 5th April, 1776, in which they approved, 'under every circumstance,' of the treaty of Surat; and recommended that the Bombay Government should retain possession of the districts ceded. It being likewise known that prior to the date of that dispatch the Court of Directors had received information of Colonel Upton's being deputed to treat with the ministers, the President and Council of Bombay at first came to a resolution of keeping possession of all such districts as were not given up. This determination was tantamount to a renewal of the war, and several of the members, stating their belief that very great commotions were about to take place, in which their own safety would require them to bear an active part, expressed their satisfaction at having obtained this sanction to their measures, and recommended a vigorous prosecution of their former intentions. But Mr. Draper, who was not present at the first consultation, entered a dissent, which gave a different interpretation to the Court's dispatch and induced the Government to alter their resolution. Mr. Draper was of opinion that the Court of Directors only meant that they should retain possession whilst the negotiation by Colonel Upton was pending, but that after a treaty was concluded under the sanction of the Governor-General and Council, it could never be intended that the terms should not be exactly fulfilled.

The Court of Directors could not be insensible to the advantage of a supreme authority in India; but the control over themselves, established by the new Act of Parliament, had not perhaps quite ceased its operation on their minds; their feelings were enlisted against the innovation, and the natural bias, occasioned by a prospect of great advantages on the West of India from the treaty with Rugonath Rao, prevented their fully perceiving the dangerous tendency of supporting men in the situation of the Bombay Government. They might have withdrawn censure from them, and condemned the precipitancy of the Governor-General

and Council, but they should have supported constituted authority and insisted on an adherence to one plan and one interest. The Court, by their approval of the first measures of the Bombay Government, encouraged the members to persevere in their covert opposition, when the circumstances, by the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundhur, were entirely changed.

Before the opening of the season the pretended Suddaba was at the head of twenty thousand men and had got possession of upwards of twenty forts in the Concan. A very great proportion of the vulgar among the Mahratta population, with whom impostors of that description are always dangerous, believed that he was the real Sewdasheo Chimnaje, and the Bombay Government were equally convinced of the reality. They countenanced his cause in various ways; and, although they did not actually join in the insurrection, they permitted one of their surgeons to attend and accompany this Suddaba, and Mr. Dick, the commercial resident at Fort Victoria, waited upon him to pay his respects. After the impostor had possessed himself of the greater part of the Concan, he ascended the Ghauts in the month of October. He was opposed at the Bhore Ghaut, and his troops were temporarily checked, when he headed them himself with spirit and speedily carried the pass.¹ The fort of Rajmachee shortly after sent him offers of submission. Pretended overtures of accommodation were made to him by the ministers, by which he was for a short time amused, until Ramjee Patell, one of Sindia's officers, and Bhow Rao Phansay came suddenly upon him in the neighbourhood of Rajmachee, when his whole force fled precipitately into the Concan, closely pursued by Sindia's troops. Some of the insurgents were sheltered under the walls of Tannah, and the impostor having embarked at Bellapoor fled to Bombay, where he would have been allowed to land, but as Mr. Hornby was absent on Salsette at the time, the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, who probably judged it better to make another effort before finally abandoning his party, excused himself from landing, promised to come back on the return of Mr. Hornby, and repaired to Kolabah. On his arrival at that place he was seized and confined by Rughoojee Angria, to whom the Bombay Government made an unsuccessful application

¹ Letter from Dr. Blakeman who saw the action.

for his release; but Angria conveyed him as a prisoner to Poona, where he was bound to the foot of an elephant and trampled to death.¹

The countenance shown to the impostor naturally occasioned complaints from the ministers,² but their remonstrances became still more strong when they received information that Rugonath Rao had on the 11th November repaired to Bombay,³ where he had been received, and an allowance settled upon him of ten thousand rupees a month. Rugonath Rao had in the

¹ The Bramins of Poona have two stories respecting the fate of this criminal, both intended as apologies for the execution of a Bramin under a Bramin government. One is, that the impostor was not a Bramin, but a goldsmith; and the other is, that he was secretly removed and immured in a dungeon at Ahmednugur, where he was starved to death, and a condemned criminal, by trade a goldsmith, substituted to deceive the populace. Starvation, insufficient, unwholesome food, and a damp dungeon was really the dreadful execution frequently reserved for Bramins, and practised by the Bramin government by way of evading the inexpiable sin of depriving one of that sacred class of life. Amongst other stories, raised by the Peishwas to prejudice the vulgar against the race of Sivajee, it was pretended that the boon of the goddess Bhowanee, the truth of which no one could deny, which granted the Mahratta sovereignty to his lineal descendants for twenty-seven generations, had been taken away because Sivajee killed two Bramin spies with his own hand, having shot them with arrows, by means of that unerring aim which was one of the gifts of the goddess, and impiously hit them in the forehead, right through the distinguishing mark of their cast.

² [A letter from the Pēshwā to Colonel Upton, received on November 19, 1776, began as follows: 'I have just now heard that Raghunāth Rāo arrived at the port of Bombay on the 28th of Ramzān, and the Governor of that place gave him an asylum in the said port. He, also, before gave protection in the above port and Salsette to the followers of the seditious Sadāshivrāo with elephants, horses, and baggage belonging to the Sarkār. These actions are very foreign to the meaning of the treaty under the Company's seal, concluded by you between the Sarkār and all the English.' (Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, 1885, i. 286.)]

³ [Raghunāth Rāo, during his sojourn in Bombay, 'fixed his residence on Malabar Hill, where he built a lofty, habitable tower, since removed. He was in the habit occasionally of passing through the cleft (i.e. the *Yoni* at Malabar Point); and being a Brahman of considerable piety, was doubtless much benefited by such regeneration.' (Moor, *Hindu Pantheon* (1810), p. 397.) Possibly Raghunāth Rāo sought, by passing through the sacred orifice, to cleanse himself from the stain of implication in the murder of the Pēshwā Narāyan Rāo. The ruins of the tower in which he resided are mentioned by Maria Graham in her *Journal of a Residence in India* (1811).]

month of August refused a fresh offer of five lacks of rupees annually, with permission to reside at Bénares, which was made through Colonel Upton; and it appeared that he had quitted Surat as if he had intended to join the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, but having been obliged to seek shelter in the fort of Tarrapoor, he requested the commander of one of the Company's cruisers to give him a passage to Bombay, which the officer did not consider it proper to refuse.

At last, Colonel Upton having received an order of recall from Bengal, and the Bombay Government having been directed to send a resident envoy to Poona, Mr. Mostyn was selected by them for this purpose. The ministers objected to that gentleman's appointment, as they conceived that he was the person who suggested the capture of Salsette and that he was their enemy, but this objection was overruled.

A.D. 1777.—Mr. Mostyn was of opinion that the Poona ministers were able to maintain themselves in power, that the object of the British Government should therefore be directed to keep well with them whilst they could support an efficient authority. He appears to have had a sincere desire to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and to settle every point in an equitable manner, but the ministers were prejudiced against him, and he was determined to uphold the dignity of his situation. He repaired to Poona about the middle of March, and immediately entered upon the adjustment of the articles, which remained nearly in the same unsettled state as when the treaty was signed.

It was evident that 'a country of three complete lacks of rupees,' as expressed in the treaty, meant territory producing annually a revenue amounting to three lacks of rupees complete; but the Persian word *Kumal*, or *Kamil*,¹ which was employed to

¹ [*Jama Kamil*, or *Kamal*, means complete or standard assessment. In Bengal the term usually denotes the settlement made by Akbar's minister, Todar Mall. In Madras it was applied to the assessment of the revenue of the Northern Circars made about A.D. 1512-70; also to one subsequently framed about 1684-7 for the whole of the Deccan on the principles of Todar Mall's assessment. In Khândesh accordingly it denotes the highest rate which any village had been made to pay, although this not infrequently fell short of the estimated rental calculated at an earlier date. (Wilson's *Glossary*, p. 229.) See also *B.G.* xiii. pt. ii. 559.]

express complete, is also a revenue term which, though variously explained, may be said to signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed; and to this interpretation the ministry adhered, although the Bombay government offered to accept the cession at an average of a certain number of years.

The article in regard to Futih Sing Gaekwar was artfully designed on the part of the ministers to induce the Gaekwar to declare, not only his dependence on the Peishwa, but his having no right to make any alienation, or to conclude any treaty without the express approbation of the Mookh Purdhan. Futih Sing readily acknowledged his dependence¹; but, as he perceived the design of the ministers, he evaded the other concessions, and claimed restitution from the Bombay Government, not as the ministers wished, but because Rugonath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cessions were made; these and some other points continued in dispute; the ministers offered to settle five lacks of rupees to be paid annually to Rugoba through the Governor-General and Council, provided he would retire to Benares. But a new impediment soon presented itself.

The mere suspicion of a French intrigue always awakened the most active vigilance of the English Government in India, and an ostensible agent of France, received with distinction by the ministers at Poona, a distinction more pointedly marked by studied neglect towards the British envoy, aroused the attention of the Governor-General; and as a war with France was expected the circumstance naturally excited very considerable anxiety.

A French merchant ship arrived at Choule in the middle of March with a cargo consisting of military and marine stores, cloth, and other staples of European exportation. From that ship several Frenchmen landed and proceeded towards Poona. One of the strangers had announced himself as ambassador from the Court of France, and in that character he was received by the Mahratta court in the beginning of May.² But before entering on the object or proceedings of this mission, which are interwoven

¹ This acknowledgement on the part of Futih Sing was not an admission that he had no right to alienate the districts; one of the agreements produced by the ministers rather inferred that the Gaekwar's share of Guzerat was at his own disposal.

² Bombay Records, and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, from which last, for the ensuing five years, there is very complete information as far as the British government was concerned.

with the progress of the British nation in India, and are reserved for a future chapter, it is requisite to mention a few circumstances relative to Mahratta history, both to account for what may immediately follow, and to preserve a link in the chain of other events which will be explained at a future period.

(A.D. 1776.)—The peace of Poorundhur was of the greatest consequence to the ministers, and the suppression of the insurrection under the pretended Sewdasheo Rao added materially to the stability of their government; they detached Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay into the Concan, who speedily reduced the forts garrisoned by the forces of the late insurgent; but their affairs to the southward were in a less prosperous state. Hyder had occupied the whole of the Peishwa's districts south of the Toongbuddra; Bellary, in possession of a chief originally under the authority of Busalut Jung, had been taken by treachery; Gootee, after a respectable defence, was also acquired in a dishonourable manner, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was shamefully immured in the noxious atmosphere of an unhealthy hill-fort, where he perished. Under a pretended authority from Rugonath Rao,¹ Hyder advanced for the purpose of taking possession of the whole Mahratta country to the southward of the Kistna; and before the rains of 1776 he had pushed his conquests as far as the territory of the Nabob of Savanoor, but withdrew the greater part of his army to the south of the Toongbuddra during the monsoon. The ministers sent a small force under Koneir Punt Putwurdhun to drive Hyder's garrison from Savanoor; but his troops were defeated, and Pandoorung Punt Putwurdhun,² the second in command, was taken prisoner by Mohurnmud Ally and Bajee Punt Burway³; the former, one of Hyder's officers, the latter, the agent of Rugoba in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas,⁴ who acted in concert with Hyder's troops. In the ensuing season the troops of Nizam Ally, under Ibrahim Beg

¹ Colonel Wilks mentions that Hyder sent Rugonath Rao sixteen lacks of rupees at different periods. I can only find 24,000 pagodas, and, as before remarked, I scarcely think that such receipts could have escaped the notice of the Bombay Government.

² Father of the present Chintamun Rao.

³ He was a near connexion of Rugonath Rao by his first wife, whose surname was Burway [Barvē]. Anundee Bye, his second wife, was of the family of Oak [Oke].

⁴ Mahratta MSS. Wilks.

(Dhonsa), and those of the Mahratta ministers under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, took the field for the purpose of co-operating against Hyder; but the former was bribed, and the latter recrossed the Kistna without risking an action. Hurry (1777.) Punt Phurkay, after the rains of 1777, was detached into the Carnatic with the greater part of the disposable force, but met with no success. Mannajee Phakray, who had joined the army of the Poona ministry after the troops of his master Rugoba were disbanded at Surat, was induced by Bajee Punt Burway to unite with Hyder, and many of the Mahratta Mankurees had engaged to accompany him¹; but Hurry Punt defeated a part of the scheme for corrupting his army by an able retreat,² and shortly after extinguished the treacherous intrigues of his officers by seizing Yeswunt Rao Manay, the Deshmookh of Muswar, a powerful chief, and blowing him from a gun.³ But, besides the war with Hyder, other disturbances to the southward demanded the attention of the ministers.

Sumbhajee, Raja of Kolapoor, the last of the lineal descendants of the great Sivajee, died in December, 1760, without issue. About two years afterwards his widow, Jeejee Bye, adopted as her husband's heir a boy named Sivajee, the son of Shahjee Bhonslay, Patell of the village of Kanwut in the district of Indapoor, and having placed him on the musnud, conducted the affairs of the principality in his name. Great irregularities took place during the minority of Sivajee, both by sea and land. Piracy prevailed to an extent before unknown on the coast, which induced the English to send an expedition in 1765, and reduce both Malwan and Rairee, the former belonging to Kolapoor and the latter to Sawuntwaree. The reigning Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was exasperated against Kolapoor, both on account of plundering incursions into his territories and the hereditary connexion which the Kolapoor state maintained with the Nizam. In order to circumscribe its power and punish its aggressions, Mahdoo Rao

¹ Mahratta MSS.

² Wilks. Hyder himself, in a letter to the Bombay Government, the known friends of Rugoba, gives Hurry Punt no credit for his retreat, but takes abundance to himself, by representing it as a victory he had gained. [The letter from Haidar Ali to the President of the Council, dated January 9, 1778, will be found in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 308.]

³ Mahratta MSS.

dispossessed the Raja of several districts, and added them to the Jagheer of his own relations, the family of Putwurdhun ; but during the late disturbances the Kolapoor state, having embraced the cause of Rugonath Rao, recovered the districts, and one of the ministerial officers named Ramchundur Hurry, in attempting to re-occupy them, was defeated by Yessajee Sindia, an officer of the Raja. Mahadajee Sindia was therefore sent to support Ramchundur Hurry, and succeeded in restoring order.

A.D. 1778.—In the meantime Hyder reduced Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and in the end of April formed the siege of Dharwar. Hurry Punt proceeded to Merich, apparently with the design of forming a junction with Mahadajee Sindia at Kolapoor, and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions ; but the report was credited by every person, excepting Hurry Punt, Mahadajee Sindia, and Nana Furnuwees. Hyder fully believed it ; and as Hurry Punt's army was now more to be depended upon, the former foresaw that he should be compelled to recross the Toongbuddra as soon as the Mahratta generals advanced. He therefore used every endeavour to bring about an armistice ; but Hurry Punt pretended to be inflexible until Hyder paid him a large sum of money,¹ and purchased the return of the Mahrattas to their capital, a measure which on their part had become absolutely necessary ; and on this occasion Hyder was outwitted.

This artifice on the part of Hurry Punt is connected with a stroke of policy which ranks high in Bramin estimation, and which will appear in the course of our narrative ; but in the meantime, that we may not lose sight of the other Mahratta authorities in following more interesting events, it may be mentioned that the pageant prince, Ram Raja, worn out with years and infirmities, died at Satara on the 12th December, 1777. Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, also died about the same time, and was succeeded by his son, Pureshram Sree Newass, the present Pritee Needhee, born on the day of his father's death.

In regard to affairs in Berar it has been already shown that Moodajee, after the fall of Sabajee in 1775, was acknowledged regent. But Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), the intimate friend of Sabajee, was sent by Nizam Ally, as was pretended, to avenge

¹ Mahratta MSS. I could not discover the amount in the state accounts, nor is the sum specified in the Mahratta manuscripts.

his fate, but in fact to take advantage of a strong party against Moodajee, who, conscious of inability to oppose the force sent against him, surrendered the forts of Gawelgurh, Nurnalla, Manikdroog, and Chunderpoor, as the price of peace. Nizam Ally, however, restored those forts shortly afterwards, on the occasion of his coming to Elichpoor, when Moodajee, accompanied by his son Rughoojee, Sena Sahib Soobeh, manifested the humblest submission, entered into an agreement of faithful co-operation, and bound himself to suppress the depredations of the Goonds,¹ who were at that time troublesome in the districts of Nizam Ally. A like submissive demeanour towards the Poona Durbar, and a bond for the payment of ten lacks of rupees, obtained a confirmation of the regency, through the favour of Nana Furnuwees. Sabajee had always kept a wukeel at Calcutta; and the same custom was observed by Moodajee, as it was convenient on account of his possessions in Kuttack. The Governor-

¹ A savage race inhabiting the wilds of Gondwanah. [The Gōnds (Goonds) are the most important non-Aryan or Dravidian forest-tribe of India. In 1911 they numbered three millions, of whom more than two millions inhabit the Sātpurā plateau in the Chhindwāra, Betūl, Seonī, and Mandla Districts, and the inaccessible hill-ranges in the Chhattisgarh and Chanda Districts of the Central Provinces. The name of the tribe is probably a Telūgū corruption of Khōnd—another large forest-tribe which may originally have formed one tribe with the Gōnds, and have obtained a separate name and language after the tribe migrated north into the Central Provinces and Orissa from its original home in South India. By the fourteenth century Gōnd kingdoms had been established in parts of the Central Provinces, the Gōnds having probably subverted the former Rājput dynasties between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, when Muhammadan invasions had weakened the central power of the Hindus. The Gōnd States were governed tolerantly and beneficently, but could not combine for defence, so that in the eighteenth century the plain country fell an easy prey to the invading Marāthās. Under Marāthā treatment the Gōnds lost their civilization and became cruel and treacherous savages; but after the introduction of British rule they settled down and became timid and inoffensive labourers. The Gōnds proper have two aristocratic sub-divisions, the Rāj-Gōnds, or landholding class, and the Khatolas; but a number of separate functional castes have developed out of the tribe. The tribe is organized on a totemistic basis, and supplies evidence of survivals of the Matriarchate, of marriage by capture, and of service for a wife (cf. the case of Jacob and Rachel). The Gōnds worship village godlings presiding over crops and disease, their ancestors, and the weapons and creatures of the chase. (For a full account, see Russell, *T. and C.C.P.* (1916), vol. iii; also Sleeman, *Rambles, &c.*, ed. V. A. Smith (1915), pp. xxiii, 68, 102, *et passim.*)]

General, however, both misunderstood the relative situation of Moodajee in the Mahratta empire, and over-estimated his power.

Futih Sing Gaekwar in February, 1778, after having paid up arrears, ten and a half lacks of rupees of tribute, one lack as a present to Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees, besides an offering to the state of five lacks of rupees,¹ was appointed Sena Khas Kheyl.

Ram Raja, a short time before his death, had adopted the son of Trimbukjee Raja Bhonslay, a Patell of the village of Wawee and a descendant of Witoojee, the brother of Mallojee and uncle of Shahjee, the father of the great Sivajee. Trimbukjee Raja commanded a body of two hundred horse, with which his son served as a Sillidar, when selected as heir to a throne and tenant of a prison. He was styled Shao Maharaj. During the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao it had been artfully contrived that there were only a few families, old but of no power, with whom the Raja of the Mahrattas could intermarry. To this day the Raja of Satara would think himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkur and of Jadow, although from them Sivajee was descended in the maternal line. This artifice, which may have been managed by bribing the Oopadheeas and Shastrees, explains the reason why it is scarcely known that Shao was married in Aurungzebe's camp to a daughter of Sindia of Kunneirkheir.

Records of facts, except receipts and accounts in their own favour, would often have proved inconvenient to faithless, shifting, time-serving Bramins; but it is not improbable that their prejudice against all other historical record may originate in causes of very remote date, connected with the foundation of their religious institutions.

¹ Poona State Accounts.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

FROM A.D. 1777 TO A.D. 1779.

A.D. 1777.—ON the 10th of October, 1777, Mr. Hornby, in a minute of Council, entered on a review of the Mahratta affairs, and remarks, 'that they were fast verging to a period which must compel the English nation either to take some active and decisive part in them, or relinquish for ever all hopes of bettering their own situation on the West of India.' He laments the control by which the Bombay Presidency was fettered, remarks the secret divisions among the Mahratta ministers, the views of Sindia and Holkar to their own aggrandizement, the successes of Hyder, the defection of the Mahratta chiefs, and the demise of Gunga Bye, the young Peishwa's mother, who had been the cause of her own death.¹

The French ambassador was discovered to be an adventurer named St. Lubin,² who, after imposing on the English Government at Madras, went home to France, where he so far succeeded in deceiving the French ministry as to obtain authority to proceed to Poona and ascertain what advantages could be gained by an alliance with the Mahrattas. St. Lubin endeavoured to obtain

¹ This event, on which the President expresses some doubt, was really true; Gunga Bye was the cause of her own death, by having taken medicine for the purpose of concealing the consequence of her illicit intercourse with Nana Furnuwees.

² [The exploits of St. Lubin are revealed in detail in letters from J. Madgett and W. Farmer, a servant of the Company, dated November 9 and 11, 1777, respectively (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 291, 296). His main object was to establish a factory, supported by a military force, at Poona, and to obtain a sea-port near Bombay. Had he succeeded, the French might have regained their former importance in India, which had disappeared after the capture of Pondicherry in 1761, while the Marāthās aided by a European force and with European officers to drill their troops, would have proved a menace to peace both in the Deccan and Hindustan. The

the cession of the port of Choule, with the fort of Rewadunda ; and, in order to induce Nana Furnuwees to enter upon an offensive and defensive alliance, he offered to bring two thousand five hundred Europeans to support the ministry, to raise and discipline ten thousand Sepoys, and to furnish abundance of military and marine stores. He affected the utmost horror at the conduct of the English in supporting Rugoba ; a painting had been executed under his direction in France, to represent the cruel and barbarous murder of Narrain Rao ; and this picture he exhibited himself before the Durbar in a burst of grief, which drew tears from some of the spectators, whilst in others it excited ridicule or contempt. A cheat in the character of a European gentleman was new to the Mahrattas, but the discernment of Nana Furnuwees could not have been even temporarily obscured by such superficial artifice. It is probable that, in the great encouragement he affected to give St. Lubin and in various petty indignities offered to the British envoy, he had no other object than to excite the jealousy of the English, without being aware of the dangerous nature of the experiment on which he ventured. Nana Furnuwees was inimical to all Europeans ; but the despicable conduct of St. Lubin must have tended to lower the French nation both in his estimation and that of the Mahrattas in general. Mr. Bolts, originally in the Company's service in Bengal, who was in Poona at the same time as an avowed agent of the house of Austria, received no such civilities. Nana probably perceived that St. Lubin was a fitter tool ; and Mr. Bolts, who was early dismissed, might have viewed that circumstance as complimentary to his character. The credulity which prevailed on the continent of Europe respecting India, and an uncommon plausibility of address, had enabled St. Lubin to impose on several young men, one of them an Englishman and some of them of good family in France, whom he persuaded to embark in his enterprise. But unprincipled men, however superior they may fancy themselves, have generally foibles which speedily discover their true character ; and those of St. Lubin seem to have been egregious vanity and excessive irritability of temper.

Bombay Government had no intention of permitting ' a repetition of the scene of wars and intrigues formerly acted on the coast of Coromandel, which will certainly be fatal to the influence of the English on this coast and may end in our total subversion.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i, p. xvii.)]

Most of his companions were estranged from him ; suspicion soon brought on altercation, and St. Lubin would have murdered them¹ to prevent exposure in India and obstruction to his hopes from France, but they sought and obtained protection from Mr. Mostyn's assistant, Mr. Lewis, during the absence of the former at Bombay.²

¹ The attempt in one instance is clearly proved ; he fired a brace of pistols, one after the other, at M. de Corcelle, within a few yards ; one ball penetrated his clothes, but missed him.

² Mr. William Gamul Farmer, of the Bombay Civil Service, happened to be at Poona for the benefit of his health, and took that opportunity of ascertaining the views of the French, which he communicated to the Governor, probably for his private information, but as it contained useful intelligence, it was put upon record ; the letter was dated Poona, 11th November, 1777. 'This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the ministry of France in this business. He introduced himself to the confidence of Monsieur de Sartine, as to Indian matters, by a memorial he presented relative to this country, which Monsieur de Corcelle assures me he has frequently seen. In this memorial he has not forgot himself. He has made himself the generalissimo at one time of Hyder's army, the very man who framed the treaty between him and the Mahrattas, for which he the next day received two lacks of rupees : but what chiefly introduced him to this business was his particular intimacy with the Raja of the Mahrattas. He was the constant companion of his children, used to learn them to ride, in short he had not in the world a better friend than the Raja. There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to send out to sound the ground here to form an alliance with the Mahratta state, if circumstances should prove favourable. You may perfectly judge from this of what the character is capable in the way of representation.

'Drunk and sober, jointly and separately, I have examined all the Frenchmen with whom we have yet had connection, that is, Madjett, Monsieur de Corcelle, who was to have been made engineer by St. Lubin ; and Monsieur de Coronet, the captain of the ship, whom I found means to get to eat soup with us. They are all in such a situation with respect to Monsieur St. Lubin, that it is the first wish of their lives that he may prove totally a counterfeit, and not be supported by the ministry of France ; for in fact their lives may perhaps depend on Lubin's reality, and the justifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to persuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fish out their arguments to the contrary ; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts mentioned in Madjett's letter. The captain of the ship confirmed to me repeatedly what Madjett had often mentioned, that his owner had given him his orders relative to St. Lubin, in consequence of recommendations from Monsieur de Sartine. They all agree perfectly with regard to the ideas entertained of him at Bourdeaux ; that it was first talked of sending out a body of men under Monsieur Dumas. The fact of the intelligence the captain and supercargo received at Cochin, of Lubin's destination, the captain

The encouragement given to St. Lubin by Nana Furnuwees might have had the effect of alarming the Bombay Government, and inducing them, in the subordinate situation they had been taught to consider themselves, to accept the stipulations of the treaty of Poorundhur, under the disadvantages which the ministers would have imposed, had they not been uniformly supported by the Court of Directors. In a letter from that body of the 16th April, 1777, which was received exactly seven months afterwards, and was a counterpart of a dispatch previously sent to the Bengal Government, a repetition of the approval of their conduct, and of regret at the great and unnecessary sacrifice made by the treaty of Poorundhur, was still more clearly expressed than in the preceding year. The Court, to be sure, repeat their determination to adhere to that treaty ; but should its conditions

confirmed to me. Picot and Briancourt acknowledged him, and Briancourt has gone so far as to request the consulship of Choul. The Count de Mendave, a man of good family in France, who has been seeking his fortunes in this country, and is now with Busalut Jung, heard of him, has offered to join him, and makes interest for a good employment under him ; you will observe, Sir, that although it seems de Belcombe disavows him as an ambassador from the king, yet he takes no effectual measures to remove him ; and it is a known fact that St. Lubin sent by a Frenchman a dispatch to Belcombe in the month of July or August last. They all perfectly agree in the circumstance of the summons given to attend at the Nanah's to witness the treaty. Nanah was sworn by his Bramin, and St. Lubin by his Padre, and Nanah kept the book. The dispatch of Monsieur Pascal du Santy to Surat, in order to carry from thence his dispatches for France, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman, lately arrived here, that he has been seen at Briancourt's ; his destination via Suez. This Frenchman says that he wanted to take his passage in an English Snow, I suppose Barrington, but that it was refused, and he is now to go in a vessel belonging to a black man.

'You see, Sir, how much Lubin has at stake by the total defeat of all his schemes, perhaps the loss of life, or imprisonment, if these fellows find that he is an impostor ; everything, therefore, with him depends on his being able to persuade the minister to hurry out a body of men instantly on the receipt of his dispatches, or order them from the islands. I leave you, Sir, further to judge what he is capable of, when he has wrote that they are in perfect possession of the port and harbour of Choul ; and to make the possession more valuable, he wanted the gentleman who took the draft of it for him, to put seven fathom water where there were only three and a half. The flourishing state of this country, the power of Nanah, the certain destruction of the English, the great advantage to France, all these he has dwelt on, as I am well assured, in a manner that cannot fail to make great impressions in France.'

not be fulfilled by the ministers they authorize an alliance with Rugoba, on the terms of the treaty of Surat, which they considered more for the honour as well as the advantage of the Company than that which was concluded by Colonel Upton.

A.D. 1778.—In the meantime dissensions among the parties at Poona continued to increase. Nana Furnuwees despised the abilities of his cousin, but with a Bramin's caution he was at more pains to conceal his contempt than his enmity. Moraba was supported by all the partisans of Rugoba, particularly Buchaba Poorundhuree, Sukaram Hurry, Chintoo Wittul, and Wishnoo Nerhur. This faction gained Tookajee Holkar, whose defection from the cause of the ministers became avowed by his excusing himself when ordered to support Hurry Punt Phurkay in the Carnatic. The English envoy attributed the confidence he could perceive in Nana to an assurance of support from France. Immediately after the death of Gunga Bye, Sukaram Bappoo began to be jealous of his hitherto humble colleague, and now united, but cautiously and with no decision, in a plan for the restoration of Rugoba. Moraba made the proposal to Bombay, and requested that the Government would immediately bring Rugoba to Poona. Preparations were accordingly begun, and the President and Council determined to afford their assistance without delay. Their resolve was approved by the Supreme Government; and it was determined at Bengal, in consequence of the war in which they were about to engage on the west of India, as well as the apprehended schemes of the French in the same quarter, to support the Bombay Presidency with six battalions of Sepoys and a proportionate artillery from the Bengal establishment, to which some cavalry were afterwards added.¹ This force was directed to assemble on the Jumna opposite to Kalpee; the command was given to Colonel Leslie, and he was directed to march across India towards Bombay, and place himself under the orders of that Presidency.

¹ [The approbation and support of the Supreme Government were gained, after a stormy debate, only by the casting vote of Hastings. Messrs. Francis and Wheler condemned the resolutions as illegal, unjust, and impolitic. Hastings and Barwell argued that the emergency justified the illegality, that it was not contrary to the Treaty of Purandhar, because the principal person with whom the treaty had been made had proposed it, and that it was not impolitic, because it would give the English permanent influence in the Marāthā Empire. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i, pp. xvii, xviii.)]

But although the Bombay Government agreed to aid the scheme of Moraba, it was with a proviso that Sukaram Bappoo, the principal authority in signing the treaty of Poorundhur, should state in writing that the invitation was made at his desire. This decided declaration Sukaram, unfortunately for himself, refused, and the plan was in consequence suspended, but it was the deliberate opinion of the Bombay Government that their own safety depended on their effecting a change in the Poona administration. The complex political machine which Nana Furnuwees managed on this emergency with consummate artifice, was at first a little deranged by a premature attempt to apprehend Moraba, who made his escape from Poona. This exposure would have disconcerted most men; but Nana, through Sukaram Bappoo, persuaded his cousin to return, and it was agreed that a new ministry should be formed, including Moraba and Bujaba Poorundhuree; but Bujaba was not so easily persuaded, and Sukaram Hurry nobly declared that nothing should ever induce him to abjure the cause of a generous master who had been his protector from youth to manhood; that Rugonath Rao was a soldier; and Nana a cunning, cowardly courtier.

Moraba's party, by the aid of Holkar's troops, obtained the complete ascendancy; and Nana, who was obliged to retire to Poorundhur, pretended to acquiesce in the plan for conducting Rugoba to Poona, on condition of obtaining security for himself and property. The Bombay Government again received notice to prepare; but the weak Moraba imagined that he had attained his object, and fancied himself at the head of the administration. Nana affected his usual deference for Sukaram's opinion, and was scrupulously respectful to his cousin. Consultations took place respecting the restoration of Rugonath Rao, and Moraba began to perceive the force of Nana's objections. He could not but recollect that when *he* was minister under Mahdoo Rao, the conduct of Rugonath Rao had invariably tended to dissension, loss, or dishonour. He therefore, though still pretending to be desirous of reinstating Rugoba, began to evade the question when pressed by his English friends.

A majority of the Council in Bombay, seeing that their hopes from Moraba's party had vanished, soothing themselves with the hope of a continuance of peace with France, and with an idea of being able through Moraba to destroy the influence of the

French at Poona, came to a resolution on the 22d April of countermanding Colonel Leslie's detachment; but on the 3d of the ensuing month they reversed this resolution, for reasons which will be explained, and directed Colonel Leslie to advance.

Moraba had given Mr. Mostyn assurances that St. Lubin should be dismissed; but his departure was delayed from day to day; and it was soon discovered that St. Lubin, by Nana's contrivance, had been able to persuade Moraba to enter into his views. But in effect, notwithstanding appearances, Nana Furnuwees, unless when under the immediate influence of fear, would have been the greatest obstacle to the French views had they ever attempted an establishment in the Mahratta country. His jealousy of Europeans would never have admitted a French force sufficiently strong even for the expulsion of the English from the small settlement of Bombay, unless he could have been certain of crushing them afterwards. Nana Furnuwees never entirely believed that St. Lubin could bring troops; and one deception, which the impostor adopted to obtain credit, by writing to Goa and Damaun for permission to pass two French regiments through the Portuguese territories, seems only to have succeeded where he least wished it—with the English, by whom his letters were intercepted.

All the events that have just been detailed had occurred by the time Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt united at Merich. Both these officers were in Nana's interests; and the well-concerted plan of threatening Hyder, during Nana's danger, deceived both Hyder¹ and Moraba; nor did Moraba awake from his dream of security until Hurry Punt and Mahadajee Sindia, arriving by different routes, united at Poorundhur on the 8th June. Nana reassumed his former power, occupied the principal passes in the country with his troops; and through Sindia's influence, seconded by a bribe of nine lacks of rupees, detached Holkar from the confederacy. Moraba once more resorted to negotiation with the English (the detail of which will require more particular notice), but the opportunity was lost. On the 11th July Moraba (**July 11**) was seized by a party of horse belonging to Mahadajee Sindia, and shortly after made over to Nana, by whom he was thrown into confinement in the fortress of Ahmednugur.

¹ This circumstance, already noticed, is well known in the Mahratta country, but is not mentioned in any English record, and has escaped the notice of Colonel Wilks.

The whole of his party were arrested except Sukaram Bappoo, whose confinement was only reserved because his being ostensibly at liberty was essential in regard to the treaty with the English. Bujaba Poorundhuree was thrown into the fort of Wundun, and the others into different hill-forts in the Ghauts. The unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry to his master Rugoba deserved a better fate. He was chained in irons so heavy, that although a very powerful man he could scarcely lift them ; his food and water were insufficient to allay his hunger or to quench his thirst ; but he survived fourteen months : and when so emaciated that he could not rise, ' My strength is gone, and my life is going,' said the dying enthusiast ; ' but when voice and breath fail my fleshless bones shall still shout Rugonath Rao ! Rugonath Rao ! ' ¹

The deep artifice of Nana Furnuwees had succeeded in baffling the designs of his own countrymen, but he had still to encounter the intellect and vigour of Englishmen. The national jealousy he had ventured to awake rose with an aspect which terrified him. The application of the Resident at Poona to the ministers, and to Sindia and Holkar, for passports to facilitate the march of a body of British troops from the east to the west of India, for the declared purpose of counteracting the designs of the French, seems at first to have been viewed by the Mahrattas as a threat. They probably considered that if it had been intended to send troops to Bombay, they would have been embarked from the coast of Malabar or Coromandel, and replaced from Bengal ; an opinion in which many competent judges among our own countrymen coincided ; but the unfavourable season of the year, the ill-treatment to which the Bengal Sepoys had been invariably exposed on board ship ; and perhaps, though never avowed, the grandeur of the enterprise, together with some idea entertained by Mr. Hastings from the first of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, were the motives which influenced the Governor-General in choosing the overland route.

Although the choice was more than questionable in regard to the mere military aid they could afford, yet the political effect

¹ Sukaram Hurry was a Purvoe, and is not a singular instance of the unshaken fidelity of that class in the history of Maharashtra. His daughter is alive in Satara. [*Vide* note on the Prabhūs on pp. 108-9, vol. i.]

was very considerable ; and had the Deccan become, as the Coromandel coast had been, the theatre of war with France, this enterprising march would have proved of much importance in raising friends to the English, and in spreading opinions of their power essential to their preservation. In England, however, in the language of the day, it was considered one of ‘ the frantic military exploits ’ of Mr. Hastings¹ ; but had the English Councils in India not been at various periods guided by men whose views and genius went far beyond the ordinary opinions of their contemporaries; the British Empire in India might never have existed ;— nor is it too much to suppose that we should at this moment have lamented our errors in the overgrown prosperity of our European rival, the exhaustion of our resources, or perhaps the annihilation of our power.

When the President and Council at Bombay accepted the first invitation of Moraba’s party, the Supreme Government approved of their having done so, because the principal person who had signed the treaty of Poorundhur, the articles of which still remained unfulfilled, was one of those who had joined in the application ; and the other party, Nana Furnuwees, not only obstructed the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty, but was supposed to be negotiating, if he had not actually concluded, a secret agreement with the French, which threatened the existence of the Company’s possessions on the west of India. Under these circumstances, in a dispatch dated the 23d March, the Governor-General and Council authorized the Bombay Government ‘ to assist in tranquillizing the dissensions of the Mahratta state ’ ; they directed, that in whatever manner the ruling party should choose to conduct the administration, personal security should be demanded for Rugoba, and the expenses of any military expedition that might be required should be borne by the Mahratta government. Bassein, and some territory in its neighbourhood, were to be demanded in exchange for Baroach, whilst, in order to defeat the designs of the French, it was ordered that there should be an express stipulation, preventing all European settlements within the Mahratta territories, unless sanctioned by the supreme British Government in India ; and they announced that, lest the French should obstruct these objects, Colonel Leslie’s detachment would take the field for the support of the Presidency of Bombay.

¹ Mr. Dundas’s Speech, 1782.

The first plan, however, having been defeated, as we have seen, by the apparent reconciliation of the ministers, the Bombay Government, for the reasons already enumerated, had dropped their intentions ; but, upon receiving the orders of the 23d March, they deemed themselves authorized to call upon the new administration, to know whether or not they held the Mahratta state bound by the treaty of Poorundhur, and to demand explicit answers on the points still in dispute. Instructions to their envoy were addressed to that effect, and they directed him to remonstrate on St. Lubin's being still kept at Poona. Nana Furnuwees perceived that in regard to the English he had committed himself farther than he had intended or might be enabled to retract, and his enmity had been too actively exercised against Rugoba ever to hope for reconciliation with him or his friends. St. Lubin was dismissed early in the month of July, before Moraba was placed in confinement ; but Nana, on St. Lubin's taking leave, although he entered on no absolute agreement, was at that moment sincere in his assurances, when he declared that, if the envoy could bring a French corps to his aid, he would grant his nation an establishment in the Mahratta territories.

Sindia and Holkar, as Mr. Hastings had foretold, granted passports for Colonel Leslie's detachment, because, as their territories were exposed during their absence, it was their object that the British troops, if they came by that route, should pass as friends. The ministers, however, observed to Mr. Mostyn that as the detachment was sent on account of the French, by the dismissal of the envoy, both their advance and their passports were no longer necessary ; Nana at the same time sent secret orders to the Mahratta officers and to the Rajas in Bundelcund to oppose Leslie's progress.

It was at this conjuncture that Moraba's party made a specific application to Mr. Mostyn, which that gentleman intended to carry to Bombay himself, but postponed doing so in hopes of receiving answers to the demands which had been formally made on the Mahratta government, agreeably to the authority from Bengal. A part of Moraba's proposals contained satisfactory assurances on every point referred ; but Nana, who was fully apprised of all that was going forward, in order to create delay, kept back the replies of the acknowledged and executive authority of the state until Mr. Mostyn at last set out on the 6th July,

when Nana sent them to his assistant, Mr. Lewis, who transmitted them to Bombay.

These replies positively denied having entered on any treaty with the French, but in general they were merely a brief summary of the arguments they had before used in their interpretation of the articles of the treaty of Poorundhur. In regard to the important question of whether or not the new ministry held themselves bound by that treaty, they observed, 'the English should keep that treaty faithfully, when they should do the same.'

About the time that these evasive answers were received in Bombay, intelligence arrived of the war with France, and the President and Council after deliberating upon the replies and the proposals from Moraba's party, were of opinion that the former were a violation of the treaty of Poorundhur; and that they in consequence, under the authority granted by the Supreme Government in their dispatch of the 23d March, were at liberty to pursue such measures as might be expedient for the subversion of a party in the Mahratta state decidedly hostile to the English nation; and extremely dangerous to their interest, in the event of any attempt on the part of France against their possessions on the west of India.

They therefore resolved to make equitable stipulations for placing Rugoba in the regency, but with an express proviso that the government should be conducted in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narrain, and that the entire powers should be surrendered to him on the expiration of his minority.¹ The whole was to be kept secret until the opening of the season, when it was intended to carry their plans into effect with the utmost vigour; and in the meantime they directed Colonel Leslie, who had been before instructed to proceed to Surat, to alter his route and march on Joonere.

But they had scarcely signed their resolution when they received accounts of the seizure of Moraba and his friends and the defection of Holkar; circumstances which destroyed the party of Rugoba, but made no alteration in their plan, which they determined to prosecute at all hazards.

Nana Furnuwees perceived the gathering storm, and his preparations to meet it were in progress, whilst those of the Bombay

¹ By Hindoo law the age is sixteen; with the Mahrattas the usage is from sixteen to twenty years of age.

Government were only resolved. To prevent obstruction from Sukaram Bappoo, he was, on the plea of great age, removed from the administration and guarded by a body of Sindia's troops, who were placed over his person and house, though Nana Furnuwees and Sindia still occasionally pretended to be guided by his advice. Sillidars were recruited all over the country and directed to assemble at the Dussera. Vessels in the different ports were refitted, the forts were provisioned and repaired, fresh instructions were dispatched to harass Leslie's march, but positive orders were also sent not to avow that the opposition was made by authority from Poona. An agent was sent to Bombay to amuse the Government by making overtures to Rugoba, but the vigilance of Mr. Lewis had apprised them of the intention.

In the end of August the Bombay Government, for the first time, received some general information from the Governor-General and Council of their intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, and they were directed to enter on no engagement hostile to the government at Poona, excepting such as was absolutely defensive. But on this the President and the majority of the Members of Council observed that Moodajee was so wholly unconnected with their design of establishing Rugoba in the regency, that this intimation ought not to be allowed to interrupt their proceedings. However, up to the 12th of October no preparations had been begun at Bombay, and Mr. John Carnac, one of the Members of Council, and the declared successor of Governor Hornby, in consequence of the delay submitted a minute, urging the necessity of vigorous preparation and representing all the evils of procrastination. Mr. Carnac, though best known on the west of India in his civil capacity, was originally a military officer on the Bengal establishment, where he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general and been distinguished by his services. Mr. Draper, with his usual deliberation and in this instance with the clearest judgement, dissented from Mr. Carnac's proposal, because it was impossible for them to judge what might be the object of the Governor-General and Council in treating with Moodajee Bhonslay; he perfectly agreed in the propriety and expediency of removing Nana Furnuwees when it could be effected with certainty, but circumstances had materially altered at Poona since their first resolutions. Their own force, particularly in Europeans, was very weak, and Colonel Leslie's strong reinforcement was still

at a great distance ; he was therefore of opinion that a delay of about two months ought to be their object. All these suggestions were sound, and apparently too evident to be disputed ; but the majority of the members of the Bombay Government, in regard to Rugoba, were precisely as described by Mr. Hastings, ' their passions were enlisted in his cause, it was in effect their own.' Mr. Carnac, whose peculiar situation in having superseded Mr. Draper, ought, on every view, to have ensured delicacy and forbearance, scarcely concealed his contempt of Mr. Draper's caution and strenuously supported the proposals of Governor Hornby. It was the opinion of the majority that no time should be lost ; the French might probably arrive, an incident the truth of which Mr. Draper admitted, and that too, he observed, ' with their garrison drained of troops and Bombay at their mercy,' but his voice was overruled, and Mr. Carnac's zeal was rewarded, in the first instance, by his being appointed president of a committee to settle the preliminaries with Rugoba.

The Bombay Government had lost a respectable counsellor in the death of General Robert Gordon, the commanding officer of their forces. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Egerton, an officer who had been brought up in the army at home and had served on the continent of Europe ; but a man extremely weak and totally unacquainted with India, its natives, or its warfare. His health was so infirm as to render him unfit for active service, but as he had been before set aside in favour of Colonel Keating, Mr. Hornby on the present occasion assented to his being appointed to the command. In a regular service, however, it sometimes happens that men whose rank is their only recommendation may be convenient commanders, but if their intended directors prove deficient in ability, or should they happen to fall under an influence contrary to what has been designed, the misfortune and disgrace that may result from such selections ought in justice to be attributed to those on whom the choice depends.

Many officers of rank, who at that time entered the Company's service at an advanced period of life, came to India, less with an idea of attaining rank or honour than of making fortunes by any means. Their pay was inadequate, and as the manner of regulating the supplies, carriage, and equipment of an army, was without system, the shameless corruption and embezzlement which frequently prevailed excited the jealousy of the govern-

ments, without either suggesting efficient checks or engaging by high confidence those better feelings which, with the ideas common to their profession, they would perhaps in most instances have retained.

This jealousy was, on the present occasion, one cause of the appointment of two Members of Council, who, together with the Commanding Officer, formed a committee, in whom was not only vested the political authority, but every other arrangement for conducting Rugonath Rao to Poona ; leaving the mere detail of duty and of march as the sole occupation, separately entrusted, to the senior military officer of their army.

On the first proposal of a committee Colonel Egerton assented to the measure, conceiving, as he afterwards explained, that it was intended solely for the purpose of settling the preliminary arrangements with Rugoba, but he afterwards made repeated objections and protested against the measure, as contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors and derogatory to his situation as Commanding Officer.

The basis of the new agreement¹ with Rugonath Rao differed little from the treaty of Surat, as far as the Company was concerned ; but in regard to Rugoba it was most expressly stated that the English were to place him at Poona as regent, and in other respects the articles were nearly in conformity with the instructions from Bengal. As the Bombay Government had decided contrary to the advice of Mr. Draper, it might have been expected that they would have used dispatch in sending off their troops, but their preparations were extremely dilatory. At last an advanced party, consisting of six companies of native grenadiers from different corps, with a small detail of light artillery, embarked from Bombay on the evening of the 22d (Nov. 22.) November, landed at Apte, and moved forward under Captain James Stewart, who took possession of the Bhore Ghaut without opposition and encamped at the village of Kundalla.² The advance had embarked before the treaty was

¹ [The new treaty was dated November 24, 1778, and contained seventeen articles. For details, see Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 334-8.]

² [Khandāla (Kundalla), which is now a station on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, lies about forty-one miles north-west of Poona, and is a favourite hot-weather retreat of Bombay residents. The

signed ; and at this moment an unexpected cause of delay arose from the perverse conduct of Rugoba, who perceiving that the Bombay Government had gone too far to retract, and that his concurrence was indispensable, started objections and pertinaciously adhered to them until a part of his demands were granted. This disposition to take every possible advantage of those friends who had done so much to uphold his cause occasioned considerable vexation ; but for the present this disappointment was forgotten in the animating bustle of expected service, and the brilliant hopes entertained of the result.

The troops embarked at Bombay for Panwell¹ on the 23d ; took possession of the small fort of Bellapoor, and disembarked at Panwell on the 25th of November. Including the advance under Captain Stewart, and a detachment of sixty rank and file left at Bellapoor, the army was composed of five hundred and ninety-one Europeans, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight native infantry, and five hundred gun Lascars ; the whole, officers included, amounted to three thousand nine hundred men. Preparations sufficient to have enabled the commanding officer to move from Panwell were not completed for several days ; but the delay which afterwards took place in making roads, and in the observance of various formalities, was equally unnecessary and inexcusable.

A proclamation declaring the objects of the expedition was issued in Rugoba's name, and probably intended to be disseminated by means of his people. When the troops first entered the village of Panwell, the Carcoon in charge of it, on the part of the ministers, retired. Colonel Egerton immediately occupied his house ; and as he had received two copies of the proclamation, he assembled the inhabitants, whom he describes as well satisfied with the change of government when he had read the proclamation ; and he was therefore not a little surprised on finding intelligence had reached Bombay that the inhabitants were retiring from the village, and that a complaint had been made against him for

neighbourhood affords fine views of the Ghâts, which run north and south in lines of great natural beauty. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 518.)]

¹ [Panvel (Panwell), lying in 18° 59' N. and 75° 7' E. on the high road from Bombay to Poona, is now the headquarters of the Panvel *tāluka*, Kolāba District. It has a considerable coasting-trade, and is locally well known for the manufacture of wheels for bullock-carts. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 139, 140.)]

occupying, and of course defiling, a Bramin's house. This accusation Colonel Egerton repelled by declaring that he was actually living in the government-house, it never appearing to enter his mind that the government agent was a Bramin. It may seem frivolous to record such absurdities, or the petty disputes of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, which commenced regarding the military honours to be paid to the former. Unfortunately Mr. Mostyn, the person best qualified to direct the expedition, was taken ill, and without once attending the committee returned to Bombay, where he died on the 1st of January.¹ Mr. Carnac was fully sensible of his loss; and at an early period expressed apprehensions of the great discouragement his illness might prove to the Mahratta party still inclined to the cause of Rugoba.

Colonel Egerton, on Mr. Mostyn's being taken ill, declared that the powers of the committee were suspended; but his objections were overruled by an order from Bombay, although by this decision, there being only two members, Mr. Carnac, as president with a casting vote, became virtually commander of the army.

(Dec. 23.)—The whole force accompanied by Rugoba, Amrut Rao, his adopted son, and a few straggling horse that had joined them, ascended the Ghauts by the 23d of December; by that time some partial skirmishing had taken place between Captain Stewart and small parties of the enemy, in which the Sepoys showed great zeal. Colonel Egerton, at the top of the Ghauts, divided his force into two brigades; the one commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, still reserving the advance as a separate corps under Captain Stewart. These three divisions advanced alternately at the rate of about three-quarters of a mile daily, the march rarely exceeding two miles, and the one division always occupying the ground which the other had quitted. In this manner, in

¹ [St. Thomas's Cathedral, Bombay, contains a tablet to the memory of Thomas Mostyn with the following inscription:

'Sacred to the memory of Thomas Mostyn, Esq., who died January 1st, 1779, aged 48 years. Skilful in the politics of Hindustan, He resided several years in a public character at the Mahratta Court. Of a cool, discerning mind He discharged his duty with Diligence, Firmness and Integrity. A faithful Servant of the East India Company. In private life he was blessed with mildness and gentleness of manners. A cheerful Companion. A benevolent Master. A steady, sincere Friend.']

eleven days they reached Karlee,¹ a village eight miles from the ground which Captain Stewart had first occupied. This extraordinary mode of warfare, which the Commanding Officer afterwards declared was owing to want of provisions and carriage in the commissariat, and which Mr. Carnac describes as what Colonel Egerton might have seen in Germany, encouraged the enemy, who brought down infantry, rockets, and guns to harass them; but they were attacked and driven back on every occasion with the greatest spirit. During the march from Kundalla

the army lost Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, an excellent
Dec. 31. officer, who was mortally wounded by a rocket on the
 1779. 31st of December; but at the village of Karlee, on the

Jan. 4. 4th of January, Captain Stewart, who on the present
 and several other occasions had distinguished himself,
 was killed by a cannon ball, to the general regret of the army.

‘He was,’ says the Bombay Government, ‘a most active, gallant, and judicious officer, and possessed of the true military spirit.’ It is a remarkable fact that his name is to this day familiar in the Mahratta country by the appellation of *Stewart Phakray*,² which expresses something more than the gallant Stewart, a circumstance that marks the strong impression made by his conduct; and what soldier, wherever he may fall, could desire a nobler epitaph than that such a tradition should be preserved by his enemies?

The dilatory preparations at Bombay afforded Nana Furnuwees and Mahadajee Sindia ample time to assemble the army. Sukaram Bappoo’s restraint was at this crisis deemed impolitic, probably from the same cause as before, on account of the situation in which he stood with the British Government, as one of the two ministers who concluded the treaty of Poorundhur; a reconciliation had therefore been brought about, and he ostensibly resumed his office as minister. The principal part of the military operations were entrusted to Mahadajee Sindia, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and Tookajee Holkar. But they took care to place

¹ [Kārli (Karlee), a village in the Māval tāluka, Poona District, is now a station on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. It is chiefly remarkable for the famous rock-cut Buddhist caves, which lie two and a half miles from the station. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 515-18; Ferguson, *History of Eastern and Indian Architecture*.)]

² [See *Ishtur Phakde* (i.e. Stewart Phakray) by C. A. Kincaid, Bennett, Coleman & Co., Bombay, and note on p. 456, vol. i.]

Holkar, of whom Nana was justly suspicious, in a situation from which he would have found it extremely hazardous to effect a junction with Rugoba. The whole Mahratta army, on the approach of the English, advanced to Tullygaom.¹ Bhow Rao Yeswunt Phansay, with seven guns, four thousand infantry and five thousand horse, had been sent on some time before to oppose the Bombay troops ; and it was with Phansay's party that the skirmishes had hitherto been maintained.

(Jan. 6.) On the 6th of January Colonel Egerton, in consequence of sickness, was obliged to resign the command of the army, which devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn ; but Colonel Egerton continued a member of the committee, as a party of the enemy's horse had cut off the communication with Bombay.

On the 9th of January the army reached Tullygaom, where the Mahrattas made a show of resistance ; but when the line advanced in order of battle they retired. The village had been destroyed by order of Nana Furnuwees, and the committee heard that similar orders had been given for burning Chinchore² and Poona. On receiving this intelligence, instead of pushing forward eighteen miles, the distance between Tullygaom and the capital, the apparent determination of the enemy alarmed them ; and Rugoba's assurance that no person of consequence would declare for him until some advantage had been obtained had quite a contrary effect from what he had intended, and instead of being animated to exertion the committee sank into despondency. With eighteen days' provisions for their troops, they in the same breath came to a resolution, first of negotiating with some of the chiefs, and then of retreating. Mr. Lewis, who had remained at

¹ [Talegāon (Tullygaom), properly Talegāon-Dābhādē, is twenty miles north-west of Poona, and is now a station on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway. The Dābhādē family, whose ancestor Khandē Rāo was appointed *Senāpatī* in 1716, are hereditary *pātel*s of the town. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 533-4.)]

² [Chinchvad (Chinchore) lies ten miles north-west of Poona, and is famous for a shrine of the god Ganpatī, who is said to have become incarnate in the person of a boy, Moroba, about the middle of the seventeenth century. Moroba was succeeded by a line of incarnations, known as the Devs of Chinchvad, which died out in 1810. The family, which now controls the properties and temples of the Devs, lives in a mansion built partly by Nāna Farnavis and partly by Hari Pant Phadkē. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 512-13.) See also Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed., vol. i ; *The Magic Art*, pp. 405 f., for a reference to the Chinchvad Devs.]

Poona till the last moment and had made good his way to Bombay, was with the army, and at this moment assured the committee that a party of horse in the interests of Moraba were in the Concan, and might soon be expected to join their army; but this circumstance was disregarded. When Mr. Carnac proposed a retreat to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley and Mr. Holmes of the civil service were present, and both these gentlemen ventured to suggest that it would be better to await the result of the negotiation where they then were. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn on being called upon for his opinion, said he had no doubt that he could carry the army to Poona, but apprehended the impossibility of protecting the baggage, provisions, and cattle; of which last, of bullocks alone, there were 19,000. The committee, however, determined to adhere to their resolution of retreating.¹ Rugonath Rao, whose advice at such a moment was of great importance, earnestly begged of them to defer their resolution; but the man who had led fifty thousand horse from the Nerbuddah to the Attock was equally odious to his countrymen and despicable among his allies; not one day would the committee delay in deference to his opinion, and at eleven o'clock on the night of the 11th of January, the heavy guns having been thrown into a large tank and a quantity of stores burnt, an army of two thousand six hundred British troops began its retreat, secretly as was supposed, before fifty thousand Mahrattas.²

It was vainly imagined that they could make one march before being discovered; and when the advanced guard, under Captain Gordon, was fired upon by a party of horse at two o'clock in the morning, Colonel Cockburn conceived that the enemy must have obtained the intelligence from Rugonath Rao. The army, as

¹ [The Committee's letter, ordering the retreat, ran as follows: 'To Lieutenant-Colonel William Cockburn, commanding the English forces now at Talegāon.

'Sir,—Having maturely deliberated upon the necessity of the measure, you are hereby directed to march back the army under your command towards the pass at Khandala as expeditiously as possible.' J. Carnac. Charles Egerton.' (Printed on p. 366 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, 1885, i.)

² Mr. Lewis seems to have estimated them at about ten thousand infantry and twenty-five thousand horse. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn declares there were above one hundred and twenty thousand men. The Mahrattas themselves say at least a lack, and I believe there may have been above one half of that number.

already noticed, was divided into two brigades, besides six companies of grenadier Sepoys, which were kept distinct as a reserve. On the present occasion the two brigades were united under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, having a strong advanced guard at some distance in front, with the six companies of grenadier Sepoys and two guns considerably in the rear.

On the death of Captain Stewart, Captain James Hartley was selected to command the reserve. Captain Hartley was a young man, who had been in the Company's service fourteen years; he was well known to the Sepoys, who have much discernment in the character of their officers, and are very different under different men; but in the hour of need, where they have experienced kindness and seen their commanders worthy of confidence, there probably never was an instance of misconduct. An officer, even in a subordinate rank, has often a charge not only difficult in itself, but of higher national importance when leading the natives of India than is likely to fall to the lot of a junior officer in any other branch of the British service. He has not merely to do duty, not his only to animate, or, what is often more difficult, to restrain, but to support the minds of his men and infuse his own spirit when he may perceive them despondent or discontented.

As soon as Colonel Cockburn heard the firing in front, he ordered Major Frederick, with two companies of Europeans, to support Captain Gordon; but the Mahrattas had succeeded in plundering a part of the baggage, and in a very short time the rear was also attacked. The army, however, continued to move on till daylight, when they found themselves completely surrounded, and large bodies of horse coming on as if to charge the main body; the troops were immediately halted and the line formed; but the strength of the attack, as had been the practice in Deccan warfare since the days of Shah Jehan, was made upon the rear. Hartley's Sepoys received them with the greatest animation and steadiness, drove them back, and were with difficulty restrained from pursuing them. Shortly after sunrise the attack on the rear was renewed by the main body of the Mahratta army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry; and their guns, having been brought up, opened on the line, but the heaviest fire and the brunt of the onset were still in the rear. The gallant band of Sepoys, though now sore pressed, had excellent European

officers, and not only stood their ground with spirit, but fought with perfect enthusiasm.

Captain Hartley sent an officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, requesting him to bring up the main body to his support ; to this Colonel Cockburn objected, as a large body of horse threatened to charge his left in case he quitted his position ; but he directed five companies of Europeans and two companies of Sepoys to support Captain Hartley. With this reinforcement Hartley, holding possession of a rising ground, sustained the whole weight of a persevering attack with the steadiest intrepidity. About ten o'clock Colonel Cockburn had sent him peremptory orders to retreat, but fortunately Lieutenant Dawson, who was charged with this message, met by the way Lieutenant Rattray, an officer¹ in Captain Hartley's confidence, to whom he communicated his errand, when both concurring in the fatal consequence that must attend such an order, Rattray took the risk of stopping the messenger, of explaining to Colonel Cockburn, as if from Captain Hartley, the effects of retiring under such circumstances, and of begging that he would allow Captain Hartley to await a more favourable opportunity. To this proposal Colonel Cockburn consented ; before noon, however, he sent Major Frederick from the advance to the rear, desiring him to take the command, but not to depart from the disposition previously made by Captain Hartley.

During the whole of this time the main body was partially engaged : principally occupied in returning the fire of the Mahratta artillery, or cannonading such of their horse as ventured within range of the guns. The loss hitherto, except at the position occupied by Hartley, was very inconsiderable, and the fire from the enemy had slackened, when, about one o'clock in the afternoon, Major Frederick was ordered to retire to the main body, which he effected in a creditable manner ; and the whole moved towards the advanced guard, which had halted at the village of Wurgaom.²

The baggage, bazar, and camp-equipage, so useful to the comfort of an Indian army when successful, becomes quite the

¹ Lieutenant Rattray, of the Bengal establishment, served as a volunteer with one of Hartley's companies.

² [Wadgāon (Wurgaom) is now the headquarter town of the Māwal *tāluka*, Poona, and is situated on the Great Indian Peninsula Railway, twenty-three miles north-west of Poona. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 533-4.)]

contrary in adversity; and on the present occasion the proportion was immoderately great. The followers had quitted the flank and crowded in between the divisions of the troops, so as greatly to impede the retreat; about three o'clock in the afternoon, when they got sufficiently near the village, the followers ran forward and pressed towards it, to seek shelter from the enemy's rockets, which were now showered upon them. This press created the greatest confusion, the enemy's horse took advantage of the circumstance, charged through the baggage and the ranks, and when entering the village of Wurgaom, considerable loss was sustained. The troops however soon extricated themselves, the horse were driven off, the guns placed in commanding situations, and by four o'clock in the afternoon the army had (13th.) some respite. Early on the ensuing morning the enemy's guns opened on the village, and a body of infantry advanced to attack it. They were repulsed, but the troops were supposed by some of the officers to be dispirited; doubts of their being able to retreat began to be expressed—the Commanding Officer, instead of crushing such dangerous despondency, if whispered in his presence, was himself infected by the spreading contagion. Some desertions had taken place, and alarming reports of many more were circulated. It is under such circumstances that a good officer of Sepoys is proved. Captain Hartley addressed his men collectively and individually; there are times to assume the officer, and moments where the officer must be the acquaintance and friend. Hartley was both respected and beloved; he spoke to his men; his officers seconded him; and the desertions from his corps ceased. On the thirteenth the total loss of fighting men in the preceding day was found to amount to three hundred and fifty-two, of which fifty-six were killed, one hundred and fifty-one were wounded, and one hundred and fifty-five were missing; many of the last were supposed to have deserted. Among the killed and wounded fifteen were European officers, whose presence, even on occasions of success, is of great consequence, but at such a time it is invaluable to native troops.

A further retreat was deemed impracticable, and Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee, was sent to negotiate with the ministers. They at first demanded the surrender of Rugonath Rao, which the committee would have complied with, but they were saved from this disgrace by his having entered into a separate

agreement with Mahadajee Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up. Sindia was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana Furnuwees was studiously endeavouring to prevent; yet each was so necessary to the other in the Mahratta empire, that although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union.

The ruling party, of which Nana and Sindia were now the real authorities, insisted on the committee's entering on a treaty for the surrender of the whole of the territory the Bombay Government had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bulla, together with the revenue possessed by the Company in Baroach and Surat, which the Mahrattas never had possessed. Mr. Farmer, who was compelled to write mysteriously, as his letters to the committee passed through the hands of Nana and Sindia, expressed himself by saying, 'they seem to me to feel themselves in that situation with respect to us which the Turkish vizier felt himself in regard to Peter the first, at the time the Empress Catherine sent her jewels to the vizier.'¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn was then called upon for his opinion in writing, when he declared that a retreat was impracticable, and that he could not charge himself with such a responsibility. Captain Hartley, who was present when the declaration was made, not only differed from Colonel Cockburn's opinion, but showed him a plan by which it might be ensured; Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, however, adhered to what he had stated. Mr. Carnac, as he afterwards proved, expressed an opinion at the time that he thought the retreat might be accomplished, and that it ought to be attempted rather than submit to the humiliating terms insisted upon; but he did not choose to press it. As such was Mr. Carnac's opinion, the plea of delicacy or deference towards the military authorities, unfortunately for him, can little avail; for, as he ordered the retreat from Tullygaom, he ought to have adhered to that order, which, however injudicious or disastrous, could not have proved disgraceful. The committee replied to Mr. Farmer's communication by desiring him to inform the ministers that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the Supreme Government. 'Show us then,' said Mahadajee Sindia, when this message was delivered,

¹ [The letter in which these words occur is dated January 14, 1779, and may be read in full at pp. 369-70 of Forrest's *Selections (Marātha Series)*, i.]

‘ the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton.’

But immediately after the committee had dispatched the reply alluded to, which was at least dictated in the language of fair dealing, they sent Mr. Holmes to Mahadajee Sindia, invested with full power to conclude a treaty. Mr. Carnac reconciled himself to this measure by the former message through Mr. Farmer, from which he argued that, if the ministers submitted to be duped, it must be their own fault ; and so far from intending the good faith which he pledged, he afterwards declared that he granted the powers to Mr. Holmes under a *mental reservation* that they were of no validity.

The separate negotiation thus opened with Sindia flattered him exceedingly and accorded most fully with his plans of policy ; but no ebullition of joy prevented his taking every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he now had and was determined to preserve over Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Holmes settled that everything was to be restored to the Mahrattas as held in 1773. The committee were obliged on the spot to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops, and Sindia’s favour was purchased by a private promise to bestow on him the English share of Baroach, besides a sum of forty-one thousand rupees in presents to his servants. The committee were so completely humbled that they viewed with gratitude the kindness of Sindia in suffering the army to depart ; they were obliged to give two hostages, Mr. William Gamul Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, as a security for the performance of their engagement ; but their first act on descending the Ghauts was to suspend the countermand they had addressed to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

On the return of the troops to Bombay, the immediate object of attention was the measure of reward and punishment throughout the army. Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn were suspended from the service by the Government ; no opinion as to the personal conduct of Mr. Carnac was then passed, but in anticipation of the order of events, as the characters are in future quite undistinguished, it is merely necessary to observe that, when the whole of the proceedings came before the Court of Directors, after a deliberate investigation, they addressed a dispatch to Bombay, in which they enumerated the particular demerits of

the parties blamed, passed a just censure on the behaviour of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, and dismissed them from the Company's service. They also dismissed Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, the justice of whose sentence was certainly not questionable, and the occasion called for example ; but we may lament the errors of an officer whose reputation was deservedly considerable until chance raised him to a station above his abilities. Four years before, Colonel Cockburn's character had been recorded by General Gordon in the following words : ' Cool, clear, steady, and determined as an officer ; he has twice within these two years led our troops to assault,¹ which have been attended with glory and success to him and the troops, and much advantage to our employers. I do not know a better regimental officer.'

But, although some were thus punished by the judgement of the Directors in England, others were dismissed at Bombay, and many were applauded and promoted for their conduct on the 12th January. The gallant and judicious behaviour of Hartley was represented in its true colours, and his merit was at first universally acknowledged ; but the Governor and Council having raised him at once to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, although he might have merited the distinction, such promotion being unprecedented in the Company's service, was deemed so improper and injurious, that every officer, before senior to Colonel Hartley, represented the injustice and degradation to which he was personally subjected. Some time after, when an answer arrived from the Court of Directors, it proved a source of mortification to Hartley, as although he was not deprived of his rank, his further promotion and his pay as Lieutenant-Colonel in the Company's service were suspended until the whole of those, formerly his seniors, should in the usual routine be promoted over him.

The Bombay Government were reduced to a situation of great distress ; their measures had been obviously imprudent and impolitic, ill-concerted, and badly executed. Success, that grand apology for statesmen's blunders, had not attended the schemes which they had been labouring to be permitted to attempt. From the time the Supreme Council exercised their first authority by a precipitate interference, the majority of the members of the Bombay Government endeavoured by argument and artifice to

¹ General Gordon alluded to Baroach and Tannah.

bring about their own designs, and instead of taking an enlarged and dignified view of the national interests and government in India, which would have been an honour to themselves and a reproach to their opponents, they lost the commanding ground on which they stood by following a course that brought about its own undoing. The character of their proceedings bears strong marks of personal interest and personal resentment.

In Bengal, whatever their practical errors, the views of men accustomed to think as great statesmen are always apparent in their consultations and transactions ; but in Bombay the spirit of commercial adventurers still lurked at the council table. Their contracted policy was directed merely to carry their point in favour of Rugoba, and to aggrandize their own Presidency. In sending off their expedition it would seem as if they had been actuated by the puerile desire of showing the Bengal Government what *Bombay* could do without their assistance. The excuse, subsequently made on this point, of expected assistance from the Bengal detachment cannot be admitted, as it would appear in their replies to Mr. Draper's dissent, and in the means taken to ascertain the progress of the Bengal detachment ; but the importance of its co-operation seems scarcely to have been considered until some time after their own army had taken the field. In short, the Bombay Government neglected opportunity, they overlooked changes of circumstance, they desperately sent a handful of men against the strength of the Mahratta empire, and committed the conduct of an enterprise, practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution, to men totally unfit for such a charge. Their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant, and their reputation sullied. But under these discouraging circumstances the merit of fortitude, ability, and vigour is justly due to Governor Hornby. There was no consolation in a retrospect, the present misfortunes were chiefly to be attributed to misconduct ; and in anticipation there was censure for what was passed, and danger in what was to come. Mr. Hornby, in the first place, judiciously recommended to the members of his Government to abstain from all recrimination, to allow their motives and their measures as recorded to await the judgement of their superiors, and that everyone should bend his mind to the consideration of the future, for the purpose of preventing and, if they did come, surmounting

the impending perils they had so much reason to apprehend. He took an unreserved and full view of their situation, and although evidently humbled he displayed the strong mind of an English chief, and convinced his Council that, whilst they acted with the unanimity and firmness which became their country, they were not only above contempt, but might soon overcome their difficulties and retrieve their affairs. He disavowed the validity of the disgraceful articles of the Wurgaom convention ; for although Mr. Carnac had ostentatiously intimated to Nana Furnuwees, probably to enhance his own consequence, that he was entrusted with the Company's seal and with full powers, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, nor could the Bombay Government have delegated such a commission. Mr. Hornby determined at all hazards to resist the cessions made by the committee ; but as every point was indispensably referred to Bengal, there appeared no necessity for publishing a defiance to the Mahrattas. The intentions of the Bombay Council were, however, sufficiently declared by their preparations, and every effort was made to recruit and improve their army.

(Feb. 19.)—On the 19th February Mr. Hornby laid an elaborate minute before his Council, in which he took a view of Mahratta politics, and the line of conduct which he thought the most expedient for the British authorities to pursue. The end he proposed to attain was that of securing a peace, so as to exclude the French from the Mahratta dominions, and to retain the territory then in possession of the English. He assumed, as matter of certainty, that Sindia had indicated, by several parts of his conduct, an aversion to the French and a desire to form an alliance with the English against Nana Furnuwees. In the supposition thus adopted Mr. Hornby was not wholly wrong ; for had Nana by any means, foreign or domestic, become too powerful, Mahadajee Sindia might have sought assistance from the English ; but whilst Nana Furnuwees held the reins, principally by the support of Sindia's power, it was completely the interest of the latter to uphold Nana's administration. The President was of opinion that the sum of forty-one thousand rupees, promised to Sindia's servants, ought to be paid ; and that Baroach, or an equivalent, should be given to him for the act of kindness, humiliating as it was, in permitting their army to return. All these suggestions were submitted to the Supreme Government ; but in the meantime, the

principal hope of retrieving their affairs was in the near approach of the Bengal army, to the progress of which a retrospect is now necessary.

(1778.)—Colonel Leslie crossed the Jumna in May, 1778, and, notwithstanding professions of friendship made by the Mahratta officers, they manifested an opposition which induced him to take possession of the fort of Kalpee. It was expected by the Bengal Government that the army would have crossed the Nerbuddah before the rains; but some of the Rajpoot chiefs in Bundelcund, instigated by the Mahrattas, attempted to cut off the supplies, murdered an officer, and frequently killed foragers and followers. Colonel Leslie, however, instead of steadily pursuing his route, entered on a war with those chiefs, took part in their feuds, and thus engaged in a task equally endless and unavailing. He attacked and carried with little difficulty their principal post at Mhow, three *kos* west of Chatterpore; he drove a large body of men from a strong position on the banks of the Kaine, and notwithstanding repeated orders to proceed, he wasted the whole monsoon in this unaccountable manner. In five months he had not advanced more than one hundred and twenty miles; and in the fourth month the estimated expense of his army amounted to twelve lacks of rupees.

Mr. Hastings did not hastily withdraw his confidence from Colonel Leslie, but he was at length compelled to admit that his conduct was indefensible. He was therefore recalled, and Lieutenant-Colonel Goddard¹ was appointed to succeed to the command of the army, but prior to the date of the order of recall, Colonel Leslie had died of a fever on the 3d October, 1778.

Colonel Goddard immediately assumed command of the troops, and a few days afterwards commenced his march from Rajegurh in Bundelcund towards the Nerbuddah. His route lay by Mooltan, Khemlassa, Beilsah, Bhopaul, and Hoossingabad; at the last-mentioned place he forded the Nerbuddah on the 2d December. Before Colonel Goddard had quitted the Bundelcund territory, Ballajee Punt, the Mahratta officer stationed at Sagur, by whose machinations Leslie's progress was at first arrested, after many

¹ [Warren Hastings wrote, 'I have every reason to be satisfied with Colonel Goddard. He is one of the best executive officers in the service, remarkably lively and enterprising.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. xx.)]

professions of friendship, made a perfidious attack on the baggage of the army, in which he was completely foiled. The conduct of the Nabob of Bhopaul was precisely the reverse of that of the Mahratta officer; he treated the English with the greatest confidence and hospitality, furnished them with every supply and every possible assistance, at the risk of incurring future enmity from the Mahrattas, without the support of his new friends. This generous behaviour on the part of the Nabob was never forgotten; and it laid the foundation of a friendship which in modern times has been laudably extended to his descendants by the British Government.

After Colonel Goddard had crossed the Nerbuddah, he halted on the south bank of the river, to await some communications from Moodajee Bhonslay particularly connected with his future operations.

The views of the Supreme Government, in contracting an alliance with the ruler of Berar, were intimated to Bombay in the month of August, but merely in a general manner. The execution of the plan was entrusted to Mr. Elliot, a gentleman eminently qualified for any embassy, but the design was formed on defective information. It had for its object an alliance with Moodajee against the Poona ministers, for the purpose of attaining permanent peace and complete security to the Company's possessions against the attempts of France, by establishing and upholding Moodajee Bhonslay as Raja of all the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings in this plan was precisely adopting the scheme originally suggested by Wittul Sondoor, the minister of Nizam Ally.¹ He was not aware that Moodajee had no claim to the Mahratta sovereignty; but even had such been the case, as the British Government so long acknowledged the Peishwa's supremacy, as the Bombay Presidency had concluded an authorized treaty with Rugonath Rao, declaring him regent during the minority of the young Peishwa, the measure was in the one view unjust, in the other inconsistent, and on the whole complicated and injudicious. Had Moodajee really been heir to the throne of Sivajee it would have been very impolitic to have afforded the

¹ It seems to have been first suggested to Mr. Hastings by Beneeram, the wukeel of Sabajee. See letter from the Bengal Government to the Court of Directors, 19th December, 1774. App. 5. Report from the Committee of Secrecy.

means of uniting an empire, hostile to all the world, which was of itself falling to pieces. The scheme was first interrupted by the death of Mr. Elliot, which happened on the 12th September, when on his route towards Nagpoor. The Governor-General, in consequence of that event, directed the secret instructions, addressed to Mr. Elliot, to be made over to Colonel Goddard, whom Mr. Hastings empowered to treat according to their purport; and about the same time, as the new plan required that they should retain the means of carrying it into effect, the Governor-General and Council suspended the power of the Bombay Government over Colonel Goddard's army, on the plea of a failure in the original plan for which the power had been granted. It was also resolved to strengthen Colonel Goddard by a reinforcement of two additional battalions of native infantry, which were directed to assemble on the western frontier of the province of Bengal, under Major Jacob Camac.

Moodajee in the first instance would have acceded to the Governor-General's views, but before any explanation had taken place, he had received intelligence of the designs at Bombay in favour of Rugoba, and of the vigorous preparations of his own countrymen at Poona; both of which, for obvious reasons, tended to deter him from entering on any immediate alliance. The favourite ambition of his family was however roused, and in a conversation with Lieutenant Watherstone, the agent deputed by Colonel Goddard, Moodajee admitted the great desire he entertained of embracing the proposal at a fit time; but whilst he wished to prolong the negotiation, he declined embarking in any enterprise at that period. Moodajee's plan, which was not disclosed till some time after, differed from that of Mr. Hastings; it was similar to what Rughoojee seems to have intended on the death of Bajee Rao in 1740, and was more practicable than the one proposed.¹ Moodajee foresaw that opposition would be made to pretensions in his own person, but he knew there would be much less difficulty, and a powerful party against the Bramin administration, by his assuming the character of protector at Satara (his authority in Berar was nothing more), and declaring

¹ 'Let,' says Moodajee, in his own proposals to Mr. Hastings, 'a lineal descendant of Maha Raja Chutter Puttee Sivajee Bhonslay continue on the *musnud* of the Satara Raja; but, till the power and authority of the Raje (sovereignty) is established, nothing is done.' (See Appendix, No. 191, 5th Report, Committee of Secrecy.)

that his sole design was the restoration of the imprisoned Raja's authority.

About the same time that Moodajee declined Colonel Goddard's overtures through Lieutenant Watherstone, urgent applications were received from Bombay, dated 6th and 19th December, requesting Goddard to advance with all expedition, in order to support their army which had taken the field in the cause of Rugoba.

Although Colonel Goddard, prior to the receipt of this requisition, was in possession of the order which withdrew him from the authority of the Bombay Government, he considered the interest of his country so much at stake, that without hesitation he resolved to march straight to the west coast. This decision was extremely creditable, as Colonel Goddard had not merely to fight his way through the Mahratta army, but he incurred the serious responsibility of acting on his own judgement, where failure might be ruin in every sense of the word, and where he personally risked nothing by waiting for orders at Hoossingabad.¹ He commenced his march about the 26th January, and arrived at Burhanpoor on the 30th of that month. The contradictory letters, written by the field committee, during and subsequent to the convention, though they afforded no information of the state of affairs and might have perplexed most men, only induced Goddard to quicken his progress. After refreshing his men at Burhanpoor, he resumed his march on the 6th February, and in twenty days reached Surat, a distance of three hundred miles, and by the expedition thus used avoided a body of twenty thousand horse, which were dispatched from Poona to intercept him.

The Bombay Government expressed the liveliest gratitude for the honourable and generous motives which had induced him to hasten to their relief; and they showed their sense of it by immediately offering him a seat on the Council, and recommending that he should be appointed their Commander-in-Chief. Colonel Goddard had gained on their esteem by his repairing to Bombay in person, and communicating with all the respect due to them and to his own situation, joined with the becoming courtesy and frankness of a soldier.

(**Mar. 17.**)—On the 17th March the Bombay Government first received a copy of the instructions intended for Mr. Elliot; the

¹ [i.e. Hoshangābād.]

first copy had been sent from Bengal in November, but had unfortunately miscarried. The state of the negotiation with Moodajee Bhonslay they now learnt from Colonel Goddard, who seemed still to be of opinion that an alliance would take place. The Bombay Government were not sanguine on this subject, and as Mahadajee Sindia had shown none of those favourable intentions towards the English imputed to him in Mr. Hornby's minute of the 19th February, they now perceived that they were on the eve of being compelled to engage as principals in a war, to maintain which their absolute want of funds was the first and most alarming consideration.

In this exigency, making allowance for defects in the original information on which some of his calculations were made, Mr. Hornby submitted a very judicious plan of operations in a minute laid before his Council on the 30th March; he there (**Mar. 30.**) pointed out a method of at once obtaining resources and distressing their enemies, by entering into a treaty with the Gaekwar family on the terms solicited by Futih Sing in 1772; reconciling the brothers, releasing them from tribute and dependence on the Poona state, and conquering the Peishwa's share of Guzerat for the Company. But in all their schemes they soon found themselves more dependent, and more than ever controlled by the Governor-General and Council.

The Bengal Government, before they received intelligence of the disgraceful proceedings at Wurgaom, upon hearing that the Bombay Presidency had sent an army into the field, had decided on sending Colonel Goddard to their support, but they would not again relinquish authority over his army. Even before they heard of the convention they vested Colonel Goddard both with the separate charge of their army, and with distinct powers as their envoy plenipotentiary at the court of Poona. The Governor-General, upon receipt of further intelligence, without waiting to learn the result of Goddard's bold and judicious march, sanctioned the proceedings, however it might turn out, by recording his approbation and applause. The whole conduct of the majority of the Bengal Government was on this occasion admirable. Their first determination on hearing of the disastrous news was to place their military power, offensive and defensive, in the best possible state, without betraying either a weakness or alarm that might have encouraged other native states to rise against them. A

brigade was ordered to the banks of the Jumna, and Sir Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-Chief, proceeded to inspect and prepare their military resources on the north-western frontier, the quarter most likely to be invaded. Mr. Hastings, whose after conduct made amends for his earlier errors, and whose difficulties had tended to improve and exalt his mind, showed at this trying period all the great qualities of which he was possessed, and prudence and ingenuity, vigour and moderation, are alike conspicuous in the measures which he suggested. Superior to the inveteracy of Mr. Francis, and entirely exempt from the impatience of Sir Eyre Coote, which were displayed in a particular manner in regard to the measures of the Bombay Government, Mr. Hastings applied his knowledge of mankind to the art of good government; and fortunately, by the support of Mr. Barwell and his own casting vote as President, he commanded the majority in council. Become wiser by the past, though his present words were a severe censure on the hasty exercise of authority he had formerly supported, Mr. Hastings observes, 'To mark our want of confidence in them (alluding of course to the Bombay Council), by any public act, would weaken theirs in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effects; and to bind their deliberations by absolute and indiscretional orders might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages which the confusion of the Mahratta government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men, whom we are not to regard as exempt from the ordinary infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it. Let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end; restricting their powers where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions.'

Colonel Goddard was appointed a brigadier-general by the Bengal Government, during the service on which he was employed;

and a recommendation to the Court of Directors, in support of an application for his being appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Presidency, was forwarded to England. But the Bombay Government, although they highly approved of the distinction conferred on General Goddard, remonstrated against bestowing the rank except through them, or on his being separately appointed to conduct the negotiation with the Poona state. They also objected to having any military force stationed within the limits of the Bombay Presidency, independent of their authority, as they deemed such a circumstance an invasion of their rights and highly unconstitutional; yet, soothed by the respectful consideration shown to them by Mr. Hastings, and the judicious behaviour of General Goddard, they determined that their disapproval in those particulars should not prevent the utmost exertions of their ability and means to forward the views of the Supreme Government.

(April.)—On the 15th of April General Goddard was directed to endeavour to negotiate a peace with the Poona state, on the terms of the treaty of Poorundhur, but with an additional article expressly excluding the French from any establishment within the Mahratta dominions. In the end of May, (May.) when the Supreme Government had received and taken into consideration Mr. Hornby's minutes of February and March, they sent more detailed instructions for their envoy's guidance, and if peace on the terms proposed could not be obtained, he was then, if he thought proper, to adopt Mr. Hornby's plan of an alliance with the Gaekwar, in which case alone the authority of General Goddard, as the Governor-General's agent, was to be blended with and guided by the instructions of the Bombay Government. The only alteration in the authorized, from the proposed, plan was a restriction preventing the British authority from being engaged as a party between the brothers, Futih Sing and Govind Rao Gaekwar. The alliance was, therefore, to be formed with Futih Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state, and no pledge given for reconciling their domestic differences.

This mode of operations would not have materially interfered with the projected alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, as the political connexion between his father Rughoojee and Dummajee Gaekwar might have paved a way to a union of the sons; but after the convention of Wurgaom, Mr. Hastings immediately

perceived, and the result was a proof of his penetration, that Moodajee could no longer be accounted an ally; though, if judiciously managed, he might safely be reckoned neutral. It was desirable, however, that the British authority should be left unfettered, in case Moodajee persisted in procrastinating; and therefore General Goddard was instructed to tender explicit conditions, by a rejection of which he would have it in his power to declare the negotiation at an end.

In regard to an alliance with Sindia, the Governor-General was disposed to concur in opinion with Mr. Hornby, in supposing that Sindia had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. Mr. Hastings also concurred in the propriety of giving up Baroach, as had been privately promised; but Sindia's conduct had been such as to preclude their deigning to bestow this mark of acknowledgement. General Goddard, however, was instructed to treat separately with Sindia, in case he should at any time find him disposed to espouse the interests of the Company; but the dependence of Nana Furnuwees on Mahadajee Sindia was at this time best secured by war, and whilst his wukeel at Bombay was professing his master's regard, an attack, instigated by Sindia, was made on Bancoote, with no other design than to blow the flame and excite the English to hostilities.

As a further hold on Nana Furnuwees, whom Sindia governed by his fears, he caused the settlement of a Jagheer in Bundelcund to be made on Rugonath Rao, of twelve lacks of rupees, of which he became the guarantee in behalf of Rugoba, and at the same time security to Nana for Rugoba's never molesting the government. He had thus got the latter into his power; but the unpopularity of Rugoba made the custody of his person of little consequence as an instrument of aggrandizement: Nana Furnuwees was perhaps secretly pleased to observe Sindia connecting himself with a man more likely to be shunned than followed, and only dangerous as a political instrument in foreign hands. Soon after the arrangement was made, Rugoba was sent off towards his Jagheer in Bundelcund, for the purpose, as Nana believed, of being confined in the fort of Jhansee, until Sindia might find it convenient to release him; but Rugoba's usual escort and even his guns were suffered to accompany him, whilst the troops which were sent as his guard scarcely exceeded the number of his own followers. Just before Rugoba reached the

Nerbuddah in the latter end of the month of May, he was secretly warned of Sindia's intention to confine him in Jhansee, on which, having watched an opportunity, which presented itself at the ford of Cholee Mheyswur, he attacked and dispersed his guard, mortally wounded the commander, and fled towards Baroach with all speed, to throw himself at the feet of his friends the English, for he could scarcely expect that they would open their arms to receive him.¹

Although no explanation took place between Sindia and Rugoba, there is little doubt but the whole was Mahadajee's contrivance. It widened the breach between Nana and the English, but with either party it gave Sindia an advantage, it roused the fear and jealousy of the one, and made him more dependent; whilst broken, inexplicable hints² of friendship, which he occasionally dropped to the English, might be interpreted hereafter as alluding to some scheme of co-operation connected with this design of releasing their mutual friend.

When Nana Furnuwees required and obtained the sacrifice of his rival Sukaram Bappoo and of Chintoo Wittul, once the minister of Rugoba, it was no test of Sindia's fidelity to him; on the contrary, his having given them up to satisfy Nana at that time is perhaps, from the artifice of his character, rather in evidence of his having been accessory to Rugoba's flight. Sukaram Bappoo was hurried to Singurh, and thence he was removed and thrown into the fort of Pertabgurh; a circumstance which leads to the remarkable reflection—that this venerable old man, after sharing every vicissitude of privation and of grandeur, of toil and of triumph, which a leader in the camps and courts of a

¹ [The details of Raghunāth Rāo's escape are contained in a letter from General Goddard, dated Surat, June 15, 1779, to the Bombay Council. In that letter General Goddard states that Raghunāth Rāo had asked permission to place himself and his family under the protection of General Goddard's camp, and that, pending orders from Bengal, the General had agreed to his request. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 387.)]

² As one of several instances of these hints, just after the convention at Wurgaom, when Mr. Farmer, Mr. Holmes, and Mr. Sibbald were present, Sindia was loudly extolling the conduct of their rear-guard, which he compared to a red wall, 'and no sooner beat down than it was instantly built up again ("each stepping where his comrade stood, the instant that he fell"). I hope,' said Mahadajee, whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, 'to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops by-and-by.'

great empire must experience, now looked down on a scene far more awful to a mind in his situation than the tremendous abyss of four thousand feet of black rugged rock, which formed the western wall of his prison: for from Pertabgurh, on the eastern side, he saw the spot where, one hundred and twenty years before, his ancestor, Puntojee Gopinat Bhokeel, pledged to Sivajee the treacherous oath which betrayed his master Afzool Khan to the stab of the murderer. But Sukaram's death scene was not closed in Pertabgurh; the cautious jealousy of Nana Furnuwees removed him secretly from one place to another to prevent rescue or insurrection; and the once great Sukaram Bappoo perished miserably in Raigurh. Chintoo Wittul's life was also shortened; he died in some hill-fort from the effects of unwholesome food and harsh treatment.

CHAPTER XXIX.

FROM A.D. 1779 TO A.D. 1782.

A.D. 1779.—HYDER ALLY, though mulcted and duped by Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay, was amply compensated by the opportunity afforded when they were called away in the end of May, 1778. Dharwar was taken, and the whole tract, as far north as the Gutpurba and Kistna, submitted to his arms. He also took Chittledroog, and extended his territories to the eastward by the reduction of Kurpa. During his stay in that neighbourhood, he was joined by Monsieur Lally, a military adventurer, who had been for some time in the service of Busalut Jung at Adonee, and afterwards with Nizam Ally, but he now came over to Hyder with his corps.

Prior to this event, Hyder had become thoroughly jealous of the English ; and had he not been deterred by fears of a Mahratta invasion, he would probably at an early period have gone to war with them, and declared himself an ally of the French.¹ He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of Mauritius. The capture of (A.D. 1778.) Pondicherry on the 18th October, 1778, could not fail of occasioning regret to Hyder ; and when the Governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement, which, being situated in his territory, was, he pretended, under his protection. The expedition however went forward ; Hyder, during

¹ [War between England and France was declared in 1778, in consequence of the latter supporting the revolted American Colonies. Early news of this declaration of war had reached Hastings by the temporary overland service via Suez, which he was himself largely instrumental in organizing.]

the siege, hoisted his colours on the works by the side of the French ; but the fort fell to a detachment of Madras troops under **1779.** Colonel Braithwaite in the month of March. The Governor-General and Council, in consequence of having received intelligence that the French meditated an attack on the English settlements on the west coast, made an application to Madras for the assistance of some troops to reinforce Bombay, including Colonel Braithwaite's detachment; and accordingly, after demolishing the works of Mahé, these troops were held at the disposal of the Bombay Government, and intended, if necessary, to join General Goddard after the monsoon.

(**June 12.**)—The fugitive Rugoba was received, though at first scarcely welcomed, by the English; and on the 12th June, accompanied by his sons, Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General Goddard in his camp, from whom he received an allowance of fifty thousand rupees a month, which the Governor-General and Council totally disapproved and condemned as a lavish and unnecessary expenditure. General Goddard had been sufficiently prudent to avoid entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba: it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahratta government to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English, in support of their national honour, could do no less than engage in the war as principals.

The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana Furnuwees continued for several months; but towards the end of the monsoon Goddard communicated to the Bombay Government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattas, Hyder and Nizam Ally, against the English, on whom it was said they meditated an attack at all the three Presidencies. General Goddard, prior to the receipt of this information, had sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, which were obtained sooner than was expected, by his declaring that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Rugoba were preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to (**Oct.**) conclude with the Mahratta state. An immediate requisition was made for Colonel Braithwaite's detachment, on the first intelligence of a confederacy; but, in consequence of

an attack of the Nairs,¹ secretly instigated by Hyder against both Mahé and Tellicherry, the services of the detachment could not be immediately spared; the Madras Government therefore, who then foresaw no impending danger to their own Presidency, prepared another detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, of one hundred artillery, a regiment of five hundred Europeans, and a battalion of Sepoys; but, before they joined Goddard, the campaign of the ensuing season was nearly at an end.

When General Goddard obtained the answer from Nana Furnuwees, he evaded giving an immediate reply, embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, and immediately consulted with the Government respecting the plan of operations, particularly in regard to the proposed alliance with Futih Sing. His principal motive, however, for repairing thus promptly to Bombay, was to urge dispatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Accordingly, although the Bombay Government recommended delay, they acceded to his desire, and a detachment, under Colonel Hartley, of one hundred European artillery, two hundred European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier Sepoys, volunteer drafts from different corps, principally those who had before served under Hartley on the rearguard at Tullygaom, were speedily embarked for Guzerat.²

On the side of Bengal a detachment of two thousand Sepoys was in readiness to follow General Goddard's route, but, on hearing that the war was inevitable and might have broken out before they could have reached their destination, their march to Surat was countermanded. Mr. Hastings, desirous it would seem of embracing any proposal for effecting a diversion, and perhaps of giving the country a rallying point of insurrection against the Mahrattas, entered into an alliance with their turbulent tributary, the Rana of Gohud.

Meanwhile General Goddard, on his return to Surat, dismissed the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees, put his army in a state

¹ There were two chiefs in Malabar known by the appellations of prince of Cherika and king of Cartinadee, who were leaders in the hostilities alluded to.

² [The orders to Colonel Hartley, giving the details of his detachment, are contained in a letter dated Bombay, December 2, 1779, signed, 'Your loving friends, William Hornby and Committee. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 390.)]

of readiness, and opened the negotiation with Futih Sing. A treacherous correspondence was about this period intercepted by General Goddard, between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and Mr. Vandegraaf, the Dutch chief and director at Surat, from which it appeared that the Dutch had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattas to surprise Surat castle ; but Mr. Boddam, the English chief, took effectual precautions to prevent the perfidious design.

Futih Sing, on the receipt of the proposals, attempted to procrastinate, and showed every disposition to evade a definite engagement with the English. General Goddard therefore put

A.D. his army in motion, crossed the Taptee on the 1st
1780. January, but advanced very slowly to the northward,
until his battering train and stores had joined him from

Baroach, when he marched to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was in possession of the Peishwa and garrisoned by about two thousand men. Whilst General Goddard moved forward, Mr. Boddam occupied the Peishwa's districts near Surat. Mr. Robert Gambier and the gentlemen of the Civil Service at Baroach, having enlisted irregulars, also took advantage of General Goddard's being in their neighbourhood, drove out the Peishwa's *thannas*, and took possession of Oklaseer, Hansot, Desborah, and Amod. Jumbooseer had not been restored by the Bombay Government.

(Jan. 18.)—The army arrived before Dubhoy on the 18th January. The Bramin commandant, on being summoned to surrender, answered by a vaunting discharge of matchlocks, and kept up a continued fire during the ensuing day, which did no other mischief than that of wounding one subaltern of the Bombay army, Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, the same person who was afterwards Surveyor-General.

(Jan. 20.)—By daybreak of the 20th, a battery of three eighteen pounders was ready to open within two hundred yards ; but the garrison had evacuated the place in the night, and Mr. James Forbes¹ of the Civil Service, with a company of Sepoys and a few irregulars, was placed in charge of the new acquisition. Futih Sing now began to negotiate in earnest ; met General Goddard, seemingly with as much cordiality as alacrity, and

¹ The author of the *Oriental Memoirs*.

concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed on the 26th, on the terms proposed (**Jan. 26.**) by Governor Hornby and approved by the Supreme Government.¹

The Peishwa's share of territory north of the Myhie was to be given up to Futih Sing, in lieu of which he agreed to cede his share of revenue south of the Taptee, or those districts known by the appellation of Uthaweas Mahal (or Attaweese), his share of the revenues of Baroach, the district of Sinnore on the Nerbuddah, and his villages in the Baroach district. The usual tribute to the Peishwa was to be remitted, at all events during the war, but three thousand horse were to join Goddard's army. The Company were to be put in possession of the districts ceded from the day that Futih Sing's troops were put in possession of Ahmedabad. For that place General Goddard marched with expedition, and arrived before it on the 10th February.

(Feb. 10.) The walls of Ahmedabad are of immense extent, and, for so vast a city, were remarkably strong. Though this ancient capital was considered in a comparatively deserted condition, even at this period it was supposed to contain upwards of one hundred thousand inhabitants. The Bramin in charge on the part of the Poona government, being summoned to surrender, expressed his willingness to give up the place, but desired a little time to persuade his garrison, composed of six thousand Arab and Sindee infantry and two thousand Mahratta horse, to comply with the general's desire. This is the ordinary language of Mahrattas when they intend a firm resistance; but General Goddard had afterwards reason to believe there was truth in what the Bramin asserted.

(Feb. 11.)—Next day, some of the troops having ventured too near the wall suffered for their temerity, and amongst the rest, an officer, the second in command, Lieutenant-**(12.)** Colonel Parker, was wounded. On the 12th, however, General Goddard opened a battery, by which a breach **(13.)** was effected, and reported practicable by the evening of the 13th. From motives of humanity, and the fear of

¹ [The treaty was signed near the village of Candeela in the Dubhoi (Dubhoy) District. It contained twelve articles, which are printed in full in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 394-6. Dubhoi is now the Dubhoi *tāluka* of Baroda State, with an area of 190 square miles.]

excesses in the city, the assault was next day delayed, in hopes that the garrison might be induced to surrender; but the endeavour was unavailing, and the storming party was formed (15.) on the morning of the 15th February, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley. The advance was composed of volunteers from the Bombay division. Two unfortunate individuals,¹ of those who had been dismissed for misbehaviour in the preceding campaign, came forward to General Goddard and earnestly solicited permission to accompany the forlorn hope, which was humanely granted, and both survived, after proving themselves worthy of being restored to the service. The command of the party, however, was entrusted to Serjeant Fridge of the Bombay European regiment, a corps always celebrated for gallant volunteers on such occasions. The grenadiers of the Bombay division followed the forlorn hope, with a strong reserve of chosen men from the army. On the preconcerted signal the whole moved off at a brisk pace, rushed up the breach, where the garrison stood ready to receive them and for a short time made a very determined stand, until three hundred of them lay dead, when resistance ceased. The most honourable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants, not composing the garrison, lost their lives. Of the British troops one hundred and six were killed and wounded, among the latter were ten European officers and four gentlemen volunteers, three of whom died of their wounds.²

¹ Their names were Fraser and Clancey. Fraser was dismissed for abandoning his post at the Bhore Ghaut, on hearing of the defeat at Wurgaom. But the infamy was rendered particularly striking and ridiculous, as it was from him that the first intelligence was received in Bombay of the disaster; and, writing from recollection, his note is on the Bombay records, in these words: 'Dear Sir—Our army is cut to pieces; I can effect my retreat, but I scorn it, at the risk of my honour. This is the last you shall hear from, yours truly, W. Fraser.' Fraser, however, lived not only to retrieve his honour, but to distinguish himself on several occasions, and to be much esteemed throughout the army. This last, I mention on the authority of Major-General Baillie, who knew him intimately.

² Major Spaith, Bombay Engineers; Captain Gough, Bengal Native Infantry, and volunteer Wright. [According to a return supplied by General Goddard the total numbers of British troops killed and wounded at the siege of Ahmadābād were respectively 17 and 64, or 81 in all. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 400.) General Goddard reported on February 15, 1780, that the troops had captured a number

The capital of Guzerat was scarcely reduced, when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, with a body of fifteen thousand horse, to which were to be united seven thousand horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.

After the escape of Rugoba there was some coolness between Sindia and the minister, but they were speedily reconciled ; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet as he had Nana under command by causing him to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat ; and it is necessary to apprise the reader that Nana Furnuwees was without reserve informed of all the subsequent proceedings of Sindia : a report, however, was spread of Sindia's being on the eve of a rupture with Nana, which was speedily followed by another report of his intention to make a desperate effort to recover possession of Rugoba's person by assaulting Surat.

Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in that city when the army took the field, a circumstance which Mahadajee, from not exactly comprehending that the English were at war as principals, did not expect, and which may have disconcerted the scheme he was hatching. The momentary alarm, however, occasioned by this threat was dissipated on the arrival of the European part of the Madras detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, which had disembarked at Surat before the Mahratta army had passed Candeish.

(Feb. 29.)—Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah on the 29th February, with upwards of twenty thousand horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda, where they (Mar. 6.) halted. Goddard crossed the Myhie on the 6th March at Fazilpoor, to give them battle ; but on his advancing towards Baroda they retired in the direction of Pawungurh. Sindia, so far from evincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and joined General Goddard on the evening of the 9th.

of standards from the enemy which he proposed to send to Bombay to be hung as trophies in the church (now the Cathedral), or in the Company's armoury at Bombay. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 399.)]

This act of kindness was followed by the appearance of a wukeel, Abajee Shabajee, who gave assurances of his (Mar. 9.) master's friendship for the English and enmity to Nana Furnuwees, declaring that his master had experienced from the latter the greatest ingratitude and treachery. But Goddard, without being drawn in to make proposals for an alliance, which, allowing Sindia to have been sincere, would have afforded him a great advantage, made suitable answers, by assurances of reciprocal regard on the part of the English ; but with respect to the terms of a treaty, he left Sindia to be the judge of what would prove mutually advantageous, as the British Governments in India had no other view than a permanent peace, which they were determined to obtain on terms honourable, defined, and secure.

Sindia's object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season ; but Indian chicane is no match for European honesty. General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British camp, to offer his (Mar. 16.) proposals. Accordingly, on the 16th March the wukeel returned and submitted the following terms from his master :—‘ That, formerly when Rugoba was at Tullygaom, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of twelve lacks of rupees per annum ; that the sicca should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narrain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, should be appointed the Peishwa's Dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Rugoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona.’

Such were his proposals, without declaring himself further respecting the English, whose part he still reserved for Goddard to propose ; but General Goddard merely objected to what was

wrong, declared that no force should be put on Rugoba's inclination, that he had sought the protection of the English, and that his quitting it should be voluntary; that even allowing the English did assist Sindia to acquire the entire powers of the state, for the sum of his proposals amounted to nothing less, Sindia, on his part, in the name of the Peishwa, should previously consent to certain conditions favourable to the British interests, as well in consideration of the benefits he was to derive, as in compensation for the wars of the Mahratta state in which they had been compelled to engage. The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Sindia probably intended to have spun out into as many months; when it would have been his study to balance Bramin fears and jealousy against the policy of the English and that sanguine temperament of Europeans which is usually accompanied by credulity.

Mahadajee Sindia continued to profess his friendly regard, but perceiving that Goddard was not to be duped, he opened a negotiation with Govind Rao Gaekwar, for putting him in possession of Guzerat; and Goddard had now no other desire than to bring an action, which the Mahrattas as carefully avoided. Sindia apprehending a surprise, sent his heavy baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawungurh, which was in his own possession, and threw out a number of small parties of horse to retire on the first alarm, and enable him to avoid any sudden attack that might be meditated.

(**Mar. 27.**)—In this manner, fancying himself secure, he allowed the British army to encamp on the 27th March within six miles of his main body, in which situation they lay watching each other

(**April 2.**) for a week; but Goddard, on the night of the 2d April, prepared a detachment of ten companies of grenadier Sepoys, headed by the two European grenadier companies of the Bombay regiment, two battalions of Bengal, and one of Bombay native infantry, with the regiment of Bengal cavalry, and a small body of horse belonging to the Nabob of Oude, the whole being supported by twelve pieces of artillery. This force he disposed in two lines; the first line was commanded

by Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Baillie, the second by Major

(**3d.**) Hopkins, and at two o'clock on the morning of the 3d, the time when the guards of irregulars begin to be overpowered by drowsiness, they moved off silently under General

Goddard's personal command: Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley remained in camp, in command of the rest of the army. The detachment passed the Mahratta out-parties without being discovered—came upon their grand guard of several thousand men, —pushed on for their camp, still a mile and a half in front, without firing a shot; but the day dawned, the alarm had been communicated, and the main body were ready mounted. They stood for a short time, and even advanced as if to charge, but they were received with a heavy fire, on which they turned their horses until they were beyond reach of the guns; a spirited charge by the body of cavalry belonging to the Nabob of Oude, distinguished from the regiment of Bengal cavalry by the name of *Candahar Horse*, on a body of the Mahrattas, completed the rout and drove them beyond the reach of pursuit.

Of the regular troops not a man was touched, but fifteen of the *Candahar Horse* fell in the charge. The loss of the Mahrattas was supposed to be considerable; and General Goddard imagined he had gained a victory; but as soon as he had encamped, Sindia took up the same distance as before, observing a greater vigilance in guarding against surprise. On the 14th Colonel (**Apr. 14.**) Browne, with the Madras troops, joined, and General Goddard on the 19th made another attempt on Sindia's camp, but the Mahrattas only waited until he came within sufficient distance, when they let off a flight of rockets and retired as before.

The Bombay Government expressed some impatience at General Goddard's allowing himself to be thus amused, as they imagined that his army might have been better employed in reducing the fort of Bassein, which they considered of value as a permanent acquisition¹; but General Goddard was constrained to this mode

¹ [In a letter to General Goddard of April 30, 1780, President Hornby and Council wrote: 'The possession of Bassein, considered in every point of view, is an object of so much importance to the Company, that we cannot help expressing our anxiety at the probability there appears of this season elapsing and Bassein still unsubdued. The danger of such a fortification, so contiguous to our possessions, remaining in the hands of the enemy at this time of a European war, and the advantage and security the acquisition of it would give to this Presidency, makes us very earnest in our wishes not to leave the reduction of this place to the hazard of future accident or circumstances; nor can we think that any other object can claim a preference to your attention or bring this campaign to a more honourable and

of operations ; the time would not have admitted of his forming a regular siege, and to quit Guzerat at that period was to leave their ally Futih Sing at the mercy of the enemy. It was evident that Sindia wished to draw him into a long pursuit ; and although no decisive advantage was gained, the mere circumstance of forcing Sindia and Holkar to decline a battle and retire before his army, was of importance in the neighbourhood of the new acquisitions. At the request of the Presidency, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was ordered down to Bombay, and (May 8.) quitted the army near Baroda on 8th May. The presence of this reinforcement in the Concan was very necessary.

The greater part of the provisions for the consumption of the inhabitants of Bombay being drawn from the neighbouring continent, in order to prevent the Mahrattas from cutting off the supplies, in which they had partly succeeded, detachments were sent from Salsette and Bombay, which had seized and occupied several posts, and one party, consisting of two companies of Sepoys headed by four European subalterns, pushed on to the Ghauts, occupied one of the passes where they established a post, got up three pieces of cannon, and were reinforced by a small detail of European artillery. But the principal acquisition was the town of Kallian, where a captain's post was established under Captain Richard Campbell. Nana Furnuwees, who set a high value upon that place, assembled a large force for the purpose of recovering it, and driving the English from the continent : the post at the Ghauts was attacked before it could be withdrawn ; the party was cut off or dispersed, and the guns were taken. Three of the officers were killed, and one of them was made prisoner. The Mahrattas, elated with this success, advanced towards Kallian, threatened to exterminate the garrison if they dared to resist, and forced their prisoner, Ensign Fyfe, to write ¹ advantageous conclusion.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 410.)]

¹ The following is a copy of the letter :—

‘ Dear Sir,

‘ I am now a prisoner in the Mahratta camp, with seven European artillerymen, one Subedar, two Jimmadars, and fifteen Sepoys. They are encamped within a very little distance of Callian, and are about sixteen or eighteen thousand fighting men. They have eight guns, and one howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write

to the commanding officer, Captain Richard Campbell, to demand the surrender of the town. To all which Campbell replied, 'that they were welcome to it if they could take it,' and made a most spirited defence. Colonel Hartley fortunately arrived from Guzerat just in time to prevent the assault which was to have taken place on the morning of the 25th May; but on the night of the 24th Hartley surprised the Mahratta camp, followed them up for several miles, killed a great number, but could not succeed in taking the guns. They retired, however, from the Concan, and left the British troops unmolested during the remainder of the fair season.

General Goddard in the meantime being incommoded for want of forage, was obliged to send to a distance to procure it; a covering party was briskly attacked, but repulsed the enemy, and shortly after this event Goddard moved to the Nerbuddah in order to place his troops in convenient stations during the approaching rains.

He received a pressing application from the Bombay Government to endeavour to seize Parneira, a hill fifteen miles north of Damaun, fortified by Moro Punt Pingley in the time of Sivajee; but their wishes had been anticipated. Gunnesh Punt, a Mahratta officer, who had been stationed in the Concan, quitted that quarter, plundered such parts of the Attaveesy as did not acknowledge the ministerial party, and advanced close to Surat,

this at their desire, to demand that you will immediately deliver up Callian and Ballapore, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, to storm both those places, and put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer, as I have pledged my head you will not hurt the messenger; so be sure to return an answer soon. Our situation is none of the most agreeable. I should be obliged to M'Lean for a few clothes, as I have none.

'I am, Dear Sir,

Camp, near Callian,
12th May, 1780.

'Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) 'THOMAS FYFE.'

'To Captain Campbell.'

P.S.—'This does not please Mr. Bappoojee, the Bura Surdar; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty (rice) that has been taken, and a tribute for the expense of his army. He also says, that General Goddard, with the grand army, is at present surrounded in Guzerat, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms, he will get the grand army released, and further threatens us on refusal

where he had committed great devastations. Lieutenant Welsh, an officer of the Bengal cavalry, having been sent forward by Goddard at the requisition of the civil authorities in Surat, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar Horse, and a body of infantry, surprised the camp of Gunnesh Punt at four o'clock on the morning of the 23d April, killed upwards of a hundred of the Mahrattas, mortally wounded Gunnesh Punt the commander, took his guns, three in number, and the whole of his baggage.¹ Lieutenant Welsh went on to the southward, and greatly distinguished himself by reducing Parneira, Bugwara, and Indergurh, three forts in the neighbourhood of Damaun, of which the Bombay Government were very anxious to obtain possession. A detachment of the Bengal Sepoys under Major Forbes also distinguished themselves by attacking and routing one of Sindia's detachments near Sinnore, on the banks of the Nerbuddah, which ensured tranquillity to the newly acquired districts in Guzerat during the approaching monsoon.

In the Concan, after the rain fell, the Mahrattas in small parties returned to molest the different posts; but Major Hopkins and Captain Abington, who were stationed with the eighth² and ninth battalions at Kallian, prevented any attempt upon that place.

¹ Lieutenant Welsh's dispatch to the chief of Surat. Mahratta Letters.

Lieutenant W. does not seem to have been aware that Gunnesh Punt was mortally wounded, which the Mahratta letters mention. The following is a copy of the dispatch:

'Dear Sir,

'I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I rode on at the head of the regiment and Candahars, and reached Gunnesh Punt's camp at four o'clock this morning, when I took his camp standing, bazar, and three guns, killed ninety, and wounded fifteen. I have only lost one Duffedar, and two troopers wounded, one Candahar killed. In short, there was nothing wanting to complete this matter, but sending you in Gunnesh Punt's head. I don't think he has much to brag of now. The inhabitants of the villages seem exceeding happy, and are coming in from all quarters.

'I am, Dear Sir,

'Your very obedient humble servant,
(Signed) 'THOMAS WELSH.'

² The grenadier Sepoys, who accompanied Hartley to Ahmedabad, were formed into a separate corps, but on their return lost their name of the grenadier battalion, and were called the eighth battalion; a circumstance which nearly created a mutiny in the corps. To restore the name to men who remonstrated in a manner so unsoldier-like,

In regard to the affairs of Bengal, the treaty on the part of Mr. Hastings with the Rana of Gohud was opposed by some of the members of the Bengal Government with more reason than is always to be found in their objections; such an insignificant ally, without troops, resources, or extensive popularity, was more likely to embarrass than to aid a regular army, unless in regard to supplies whilst actually within the Gohud territory. A diversion, by attacking the Mahrattas on the north-east part of Malwa, by passing through Gohud, was strongly recommended by Goddard and supported by Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, however, disapproved of sending a small force; and when at the requisition of the Rana, Captain Popham was ordered to cross the Jumna, Sir Eyre Coote deemed the measure extremely injudicious.

The detachment under Captain William Popham was composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard, but in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had been originally ordered, and were now selected for this service. The whole amounted to two thousand four hundred men; they were formed into three battalions of equal strength: a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces accompanied them. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in the month of February; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud, drove them from the country, and at the request of was deemed improper; but they afterwards behaved with such extraordinary valour that their name of grenadier battalion was restored in 1783. They distinguished themselves during the arduous campaign in the Concan, which will be presently detailed. For their conduct in the battle of Paniany, by the side of the 42d regiment, they received the highest compliment ever paid to a Sepoy regiment. 'The Royal Highlanders,' says Colonel M'Leod, in his dispatch of the 29th of November, 1782, evinced the ardour which always inspires their countrymen in battle. The eighth battalion of Sepoys showed themselves equal to any troops in courage, coolness, and discipline.' They then petitioned through Colonel M'Leod to have their name restored; but it was refused. In the following year, however, the eighth battalion formed part of the garrison which maintained the heroic defence of Mangalore, and their name was restored, as the only reward, which the sickly, famished men, on their return to Bombay, solicited. They were long fortunate in a succession of excellent commanding officers; and on every occasion of service the spirit of Stewart and of Hartley has lived in their ranks.

the Rana marched against Lahar, a fortified place fifty miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. Having summoned the fort, which refused to surrender, he was obliged to commence an attack, although he found it much stronger than had been represented, and that battering guns were necessary to ensure its capture. But the determined bravery of the troops overcame every difficulty ; long before the breach was, in the ordinary sense of the word, practicable, Captain Popham, foreseeing that field-pieces might never effect the purpose, determined to storm. Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner led on the advance ; both fell in the breach ; but Mr. O'Dell, a volunteer, rushed forward to supply their place, mounted the works, gallantly followed by the party, and, after a persevering assault, the place was carried, although with the heavy loss of one hundred and twenty-five men of the storming party. This success was entirely unexpected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, on hearing of the attack without battering cannon, only anticipated disaster ; and in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumna, under Major Jacob Camac. But if the successful assault of Lahar was unexpected, the capture of the strong hill-fort of Gwalior, without the loss of a man, excited the utmost admiration. Captain Popham, after his return from Lahar, was encamped during the rains within five *kos* of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior, expecting to be relieved as soon as the season permitted. Gwalior was in possession of Mahadajee Sindia, and in Hindoostan, where the stupendous fastnesses of the west of India were little known, it was accounted one of the strongest forts in Asia.

Captain Popham, with equal enterprise and prudence, was employed for about two months in laying his scheme ; and at last, assisted by spies furnished through the Rana of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. Every preparation had been made with the utmost secrecy, and on the night of the 3d August he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce, who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahratta horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance on this occasion consisted of two companies of Sepoys, chosen grenadiers and light infantry. They were led by four lieutenants, Wilson, Scott, Allen, and Paterson ; and as the

surprise of natives was intended, twenty Europeans followed the Sepoys ; a judicious disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery ; two battalions of Sepoys followed : scaling ladders applied to the foot of the scarpd rock, which was sixteen feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about forty yards to the foot of the second wall, which was thirty feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of ropes, by which the Sepoys mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the Sepoys with Captain Bruce had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm ; but the Sepoys stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on the 4th August, when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.

On that very night a similar attempt was made with different success on the western side of India. Captain Abington, afterwards so well known from his gallant defence of Tellicherry, made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh, or as it is frequently termed Bhow Mullun,¹ one of the most conspicuous objects of the beautiful view to the eastward of the island of Bombay. Captain Abington succeeded in possessing himself of the lower hill ; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm and made good their retreat to the upper fort : an enormous mass of perpendicular rock that defied all attempts at an assault.

During the rains the Bombay Government had full leisure to contemplate the state of their affairs. Their greatest distress was their total want of funds. They looked to Bengal for a supply of treasure ; but the hostility of Hyder, which the Supreme Government had doubted, and which the majority of the Madras rulers disbelieved, burst with appalling certainty on the province of Arcot, which was invaded in the month of July with the most formidable army that had ever opposed the British power in India. This new difficulty, superadded to their own distress,

¹ [i.e. Bāwa Malang, known familiarly as the Cathedral Rock, ten miles south of Kalyān, Thāna District.]

induced the Supreme Government to declare that they could afford no assistance to the Bombay presidency.¹ 'We have no resource,' says Governor Hornby in his admirable minute of the 1st August, 'but such as we may find in our own efforts'; and in this strait his measures showed much judgment and vigour. To raise funds was the subject of immediate deliberation, and the difficulties are best expressed in the means taken to obviate them. A quantity of copper in the Company's warehouses, valued at ten or twelve lacks of rupees, was disposed of to the highest bidder; loans in Bengal, on the credit of the Bombay Government, were proposed to be negotiated, and a plan laid of seizing as much as possible of the enemy's resources, by anticipating them in the collection of their revenue.

General Goddard was to besiege Bassein as soon as the season permitted: the European part of his army was sent down to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared in Bombay, and the Sepoys were to march by land. Early in October the whole of the disposable force at Bombay and in the neighbourhood, consisting of five battalions, was placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, who was instructed to drive out the enemy's posts and cover as much of the Concan as possible, so as to enable the agents of the Bombay Government to collect a part of the revenues and secure the rice harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. There is perhaps no part of Mr. Hornby's minute more expressive of the distress under which that government laboured, than that where, alluding to the field force they were preparing, he observes, 'Our troops will better bear running in arrears when employed on active service, and subsisting in the enemy's country,' for it is a principle with the British Government and its officers in India, than which nothing has more tended to the national success, always to consider the peasantry under their strictest protection. As General Goddard advanced to invest

¹ [As early as May 15, 1780, the Bengal Government had written to Bombay that 'our distress for money is such that we shall be unable to make adequate remittances for the support of your Presidency, and the pay of the large army under command of Brigadier-General Goddard. We must therefore desire that every accession of revenue which may immediately arise to the Company from the operations and successes of General Goddard's army be set aside and appropriated exclusively to that expense.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 420.)]

Bassein, it was intended that Colonel Hartley should then take up a position a little to the east of that fortress, and prevent the Mahratta army from attempting to raise the siege.

Hartley, however, in the first place was required to march to the relief of Captain Abington, who still occupied the lower part of the fort of Mullungurh ; but a large body of upwards of three thousand of the enemy, principally infantry, had cut off his communication with Kallian, so that he was attacked by the garrison from the works above him, and surrounded by the body (Oct. 1.) in question. This service Colonel Hartley effected on the first of October, without loss ; and another corps under Captain Jameson joined the party at Mullungurh, which now consisted of the 2d and 8th battalions under Major Hopkins. The enemy, however, were also reinforced and pitched their camp next day on the south-east side of the hill, where they began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley immediately prepared to attack them, and for this purpose marched from Kallian with the Bombay European regiment and the 1st battalion of Sepoys, directing Major Hopkins to send down the 8th battalion under Captain Jameson to assist in the attack. The Mahrattas were apprised of Colonel Hartley's advance, and met him at the foot of the hill. Thence they gradually retired towards their camp, which was left standing in the confidence of perfect security, and maintained a running fight, as if they had intended to draw the troops into an ambuscade ; but all at once, Captain Jameson's corps, advancing from the hill, came upon the whole body, and without waiting for the rest of the troops instantly attacked them ; to use the words of Colonel Hartley, ' with the utmost eagerness and spirit, pursued them to their camp (of which they took possession), and were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the troops.' This spirited success, which was effected with the loss of only a few men of the 8th battalion, put the troops into high spirits, of which Hartley took immediate advantage, followed up the enemy's parties with alacrity, drove them out of the Concan, occupied a position not far from the Bhoze Ghaut, and thus for a short time enabled the Bombay Government to carry their plan of collecting the revenue into effect.

General Goddard having before sent down the Europeans by sea, commenced his march from Surat on the 16th of October. For the protection of Guzerat, six companies from the Bengal and

two of the Bombay detachment had been left with Futih Sing Gaekwar to strengthen his garrison at Ahmedabad ; that party was accordingly directed to remain there for the present. In Baroda Futih Sing had a considerable force of his own, and Dubhoy was guarded against all but a regular siege. Two Bengal battalions were stationed on the Nerbuddah at Sinnore ; two battalions of Bombay Sepoys, one of which was held ready at Surat and the other at Baroach, to act conjointly or separately, were placed under the orders of Major Forbes, a Bengal officer of approved merit, to whom the charge of the general defence of the Guzerat province was assigned, and Futih Sing Gaekwar's quota of three thousand horse were to join Major Forbes if necessary.

General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November, and having carefully reconnoitred it, he found the north face the only side on which it could be attacked by regular approaches, a mode which, owing to the great strength of the place, although it might require more time, he determined to adopt.

He accordingly opened trenches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November, at the distance of nine hundred yards ; other batteries were opened at the distance of eight and five hundred yards successively. He had a very powerful artillery, principally twenty-four pounders, and one battery of twenty mortars, at the distance of five hundred yards, which did great execution.

In the meantime Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay were making every preparation to recover the Concan and raise the siege of Bassein. The horse did not arrive until the Dussera, and the guns and equipments which had been before furnished, principally by Mahadajee Sindia, were not in sufficient readiness to enable them to take the field. Ramchundur Gunnesh, Pureshram Bhow, Anund Rao Rastia, and several other officers were sent forward, and as fast as the Mahratta troops were assembled, they were sent down to join them in the Concan.

The division under Colonel Hartley were for upwards of a month engaged in daily skirmishes ; a great deal of their ammunition was expended, and the sick, many of whom were wounded, amounted to six hundred, which, with his detachments, reduced his number to little more than two thousand effective men. Having heard that the enemy intended to throw succours

into Bassein and cut off his communication with that place, it being no longer possible to cover the country, Colonel (Dec. 8.) Hartley judiciously moved to Titwalla on the 8th of December, from thence he continued his march towards Doogaur, nine miles east of Bassein. The Bombay Government, over-anxious to recover the revenue, disapproved of his quitting the neighbourhood of the Bhoré Ghaut, but they were not fully aware of the strength of the Mahratta army, or the experience and enterprize of the principal commander, Ramchundur Gunnesh. Finding that the precautions of Goddard had effectually prevented an attempt to succour Bassein, the Mahrattas had determined to make amends for its loss by the destruction of the covering army. On the 10th December, their united force, amounting in horse and foot to upwards of twenty thousand men, thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but were each time steadily repulsed. Five thousand of their horse made a spirited charge on the left of Hartley's line, but they were so well received that no impression was made, and the troops sustained but little loss, having only eighteen killed or wounded; two, however, were officers, Lieutenants Drew and Cooper. On the ensuing day the attack was renewed, the horse (Dec. 11.) did not charge, but the Mahratta guns did considerable execution, and the division lost Lieutenants Cowan and Peirson, with upwards of one hundred men; the troops, however, though weakened and harassed during a period of nearly six weeks' constant fighting, behaved most gallantly, and 'their conduct,' says Colonel Hartley, in his spirited but modest dispatches, 'only confirms me in the high opinion I shall ever have of them.'

On the right and left of Colonel Hartley's line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley having observed that the enemy's skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay Sepoys so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the field engineer to throw up a small breast-work, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night, both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunnesh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these points, and next day intended to

direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchundur in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and a thousand regular infantry under Signior Noronha,¹ a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa's service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchundur was determined to carry this post or perish. Taking advantage of a (Dec. 12.) thick fog, by nine o'clock in the morning they had approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away, the sun shone forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment—when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered—when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy loss. In the action of the 12th, the Bombay troops suffered very little,² and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government³; the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known, even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.

¹ I find this Portuguese officer mentioned in very high terms by Captain Bonnevaux, of the Madras establishment, in a letter dated, Prison in Poona, 25th February, 1781. Captain Bonnevaux, entrusted with an overland dispatch from the Court of Directors, was taken near the coast of India, carried into Viziadroog, and thrown into the fort Russalghurh. After enduring great hardship he was conveyed to Poona, where his sufferings were humanely relieved by Signior Noronha.

² [According to a letter from Colonel Hartley to the Bombay Government of December 12, 1780, his losses were 16 killed and 80 wounded. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 434.)]

³ Mahratta MSS., and letters. The Mahrattas never mention Colonel Hartley's name, and always attribute the defeat of their army and the capture of Bassein to the same person, Goddard.

Bassein surrendered on the 11th December,¹ and General Goddard, hearing that the whole army had attacked the Bombay division, set off in person at the head of the cavalry and the assembled grenadiers of the Bengal and Madras troops, with whom he reached Colonel Hartley's camp on the 13th. He expressed his admiration of the judicious position which had been chosen, and of the fortitude shown by the troops on that and on every occasion where harassing service and great privation, from want of their pay, had been borne not only without a murmur, but with the greatest cheerfulness. The whole army was now united under General Goddard; and it unfortunately happened that the orders from the Court of Directors, before alluded to, which made Hartley the junior Lieutenant-Colonel on the Bombay establishment until all those formerly his seniors should be promoted, was at this time promulgated. Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the Madras establishment, though just promoted to that rank, immediately claimed his right, and of course superseded him. Hartley represented the peculiar mortification to which he was subjected; but the order was irrevocable. He quitted the army, repaired to England, and laid his case before the Court of Directors, who, sensible of his merit, although they could not alter the constitution of their service, recommended him to His Majesty, by whom he was appointed Lieutenant-Colonel of the 73d regiment. Although no longer engaged in Mahratta warfare, he was afterwards distinguished on many occasions in India²; and though hitherto best known as Major-General Hartley, his real merit is not less conspicuous in the military annals of our country, when holding the rank of Captain of Sepoys.

The reduction of Bassein, and the defeat of the army in the Concan, were severely felt by Nana Furnuwees.³ The judicious operations of Goddard had secured that important fortress, with an inconsiderable loss of thirteen men, of whom was one officer, Lieutenant Sir John Gordon, who died of his wounds. On the same day that General Goddard joined Colonel Hartley,

¹ [A full account of the surrender is given in General Goddard's dispatch of December 12, 1780, to the Bombay Council, which is printed at pp. 430-2 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.]

² Bombay Records.

³ Mahratta MSS., and letters.

the Bombay government received a letter from Bengal, dated 9th October, informing them of their intention to make peace with the Mahrattas : ordering that, upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had commanded a cessation of hostilities, they were immediately to desist in like manner ; but, until such an intimation was received, they were urged to prosecute the war with vigour.¹ Similar instructions were transmitted to General Goddard.

To account for these orders it is necessary to explain that the Supreme Government had received information that all the Mahrattas, except Futih Sing Gaekwar (whose communication was in a manner cut off from his countrymen by the British troops, and whose interests strongly bound him to the Company), were combined with Hyder and the Nizam against the English, and that Nizam Ally, although he had not commenced hostilities, was the contriver of the whole confederacy. The immediate cause of the enmity of Nizam Ally towards the English originated in a treaty concluded by the Madras Government, in April, 1779, with his brother, Busalut Jung, Jagheerदार of Adonee, by which they received him under their protection, on condition of their being allowed to rent the district of Guntoor, which was at all events to come into their possession after the death of Busalut Jung. The alliance alarmed Nizam Ally, whose jealousy of Busalut Jung was extreme² ; and Hyder, some of whose late acquisitions would have been cut off from the rest of his territory, would not suffer the British troops to take possession of Guntoor, and opposed their march even before the war broke out. The treaty of the Madras Government with Busalut Jung was illegal, because it never received the sanction or ratification of the Governor-General and Council, who therefore, when it came to their knowledge, in February, 1780, disavowed and annulled it, a measure which tended considerably to appease the resentment of Nizam Ally ; but, from the time of the Wurgaom convention,

¹ Bombay Records, Sixth Report.

² [The Nizam's resentment at the annexation of the Guntūr District was certainly a factor in his policy of forming a confederacy against the English. But 'the Rumbold papers show that his displeasure had been aroused at an earlier date by the support given to his enemy Ragoba (Raghunāth Rāo) by the Bombay Government, and by a project which Hastings had planned for an alliance with the Marāthā Rājā of Nāgpur.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 540, and footnote.)]

he had adopted a tone of overbearing insolence, which, towards the British authorities, he had not before ventured to assume. Hyder, in addition to those motives of jealousy already described, had a very strong inducement for engaging in the confederacy. The conquests he had made as far north as the Kistna had been ceded to him by Rugonath Rao, whom he affected to consider the legitimate Peishwa ; and the confirmation of this cession on the part of the Poona ministers was preliminary to his becoming a party in the alliance ; his right to the Mahratta territories south of the Kistna was admitted, and the future tribute for the whole of his possessions was fixed at the inconsiderable sum of eleven lacks of rupees.

Mr. Hastings, although Moodajee Bhonslay had acquiesced in the scheme of a general confederacy against the English, perceived that he might still ultimately indulge the hope of an alliance with them at some favourable period ; but, from the crisis to which events were hastening, he began to doubt whether the neutrality privately professed by Moodajee could be lasting. The Governor-General was sensible of an influence which Nizam Ally, although in reality an enemy, possessed over the ruler of Berar, through his, Moodajee's, dewan, Dewakur Punt, without whose counsel Moodajee decided on no political measure. The power of Hyder Ally was such that peace with the Mahrattas seemed necessary to the safety of the British in India ; but, in the adversity which threatened them, it seemed less difficult to engage Moodajee as a mediator than as an ally. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hastings offered peace to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee early in the month of October, on the following terms :—Ahmedabad to be retained for Futih Sing ; Gwalior for the Rana of Gohud ; and Bassein, if in possession of the Company at the time, to be kept by them ; but the whole of the other acquisitions made since the 1st January, 1779, to be restored ; a provision to be made for Rugonath Rao during his life, and a place of residence fixed wherever he might desire, except in the neighbourhood of Bombay ; at all events, no assistance to be afforded by the British Government in reasserting his pretensions. Such were the conditions offered, provided the Peishwa's government agreed to enter on an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Company against Hyder Ally and the French nation ; but, if the alliance thus tendered should not be accepted, a peace was

proposed, by each party retaining its respective conquests. Moodajee Bhonslay was to be the declared mediator and guarantee ; the subordinate Governments in India, and all officers commanding divisions of British troops were to desist from hostilities upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had sent like orders to the commanders of his armies. But before these proposals reached Nagpoor, news had arrived of the disastrous affair where Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed by Hyder Ally near Conjevaram on the 10th September,¹ on which Moodajee, concluding that the Company's affairs were desperate, hesitated in becoming mediator, unless on terms to which the Governor-General and Council would not accede.

Moodajee did not send answers to the proposals from Bengal for upwards of two months, but the offers made to him account for the orders already mentioned, which were received on the west of India in December. Although the wants of the Bombay Presidency had been partially relieved by an unexpected supply of money from Bengal, the prospect of peace, notwithstanding the sacrifices they must make, was hailed by the members of that government with satisfaction ; but as no intimation from the Peishwa arrived, they proposed to secure the Concan, reduce the forts, and then act only on the defensive.

A.D. 1781.—General Goddard was detained for some time by the fort of Arnaul,² situated on a small island ten miles north of Bassein, the Killidar of which refused to give it up until a force appeared before it ;—he then surrendered on the 18th January.

It appeared to General Goddard that an advanced (**Jan. 18.**) movement, so as to threaten Poona, was more likely to facilitate the negotiations of the Governor-General with the Peishwa than wasting time in attempting to reduce hill-forts, the greater part of which seemed totally impregnable. Although General Goddard, by order from the Court of Directors, was now Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay army, he was still entrusted with his former powers from Bengal, and at liberty in a great degree to follow his own plans. The orders from Bengal, although they desired that the war should be vigorously

¹ See Wilks, vol. ii.

² [The fort of Arnāla (Arnaul) still exists in a good state of preservation. The garrison which surrendered to Goddard comprised about 500 men. (Forrest, *Selecitons (Marāthā Series)*, i. 435.)]

prosecuted in the event of receiving no intimation from the Peishwa, were yet of a nature to unsettle any steady plan of the authorities acting in subordinate co-operation ; and from Madras, where all their evils were attributed, with some justice, ' to *Rugoba Dada and the Mahratta war,*' every dispatch to Bombay, teeming with regrets on this subject, pressed the necessity of peace with the Mahrattas and an attack on Hyder's possessions on the Malabar coast.

Under these circumstances Goddard adopted the half measure of threatening, without being prepared to carry his threat into execution ; and this excellent officer committed his first error by a departure from a rule which common observation inculcates, even in ordinary life. He advanced towards the passes of the mountains : Hurry Punt, then in the Concan, retired to Poona, but left the Bhore Ghaut guarded. It was gallantly attacked by Colonel Parker at the head of the advanced party of Bengal troops on the night of the 8th of February. He forced the pass with ease, and the troops were encamped at Kundalla, on the same spot which Captain Stewart had occupied about three years before, where they were soon joined by the greater part of the force ; although Goddard,¹ with the headquarters, remained at the village of Campoly at the bottom of the Ghauts.

Their appearance gave Nana Furnuwees no alarm, for his political boldness was contrasted in an extraordinary, but amongst Bramins by no means a singular, manner with his

¹ Nana Furnuwees, as appears by his letters, had very exact intelligence of everything ; but in stating Goddard's force at ten thousand fighting men, he greatly over-estimates it.

The following is the exact number, exclusive of European officers :—

<i>Present for duty.</i>		
Madras Artillery	67
Bombay Artillery	57
Bombay Regiment	170
Madras Regiment	346
Bengal Golundaze, or Native Artillery	97
Bengal Sepoys	2,542
Bombay Sepoys	1,446
Madras Sepoys	527
Cavalry	700
Lascars and Pioneers	200
Total	6,152

} *Europeans.*

} *Natives.*

personal timidity, and the only effects produced on him by the advance to the Ghauts were additional efforts to increase the army, and the most vigorous preparations for rendering the country a desert and Poona a ruin. He, however, tried to amuse General Goddard by sending an unauthorized agent to treat with him, which induced Goddard to make overtures on the terms proposed through Moodajee Bhonslay. Of these Nana affected ignorance; Goddard sent him a copy of the terms, and thus subjected them to positive rejection; for Nana Furnuwees observed that proposals had been tendered by the Governor-General, but that Moodajee had refused to forward them; that these now sent could not be listened to, nor at that time would any terms whatever be admitted in which Hyder, the ally of the Mahratta state, was not included.¹ It is probable that General Goddard's own judgement disapproved of such unavailing concession, but he was urged to it by letters from Sir Eyre Coote,² at Madras, who, in the month of October, 1780, had been solicited by the Governor-General to repair to the coast and retrieve the fortunes and honour of his country; a call which was as gratifying to the feelings of the general as to the army of Fort St. George.

¹ The reply which I have expressed, as above, is couched in the following smooth terms, after explaining that Moodajee had refused to forward the terms. Nana observes, 'the copy of the proposals which you have sent has been read from beginning to end by your friend; and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of this government. If you be sincere in your desire of friendship, it is incumbent on you to make proposals, which shall include those persons who at this time are allied to and connected with the councils of this state.' (Extract of a letter from Nana Furnuwees to General Goddard, 5th March, 1781.)

² [In a letter of March 1, 1781, Sir Eyre Coote wrote as follows to General Goddard: 'Although I ever consider the policy of warring against the Marāthā State a most ruinous one in the interests both of the Company and the English nation; still, on the eve of your late success if we had no other power to combat against, I might have subscribed to the plan you advise me as laid down for the operations of your campaign, as the most likely to procure us honourable terms of accommodation; but, engaged as we are in a scene of contention, I may say, with every power of any consideration in India, all steps, the event of which could not be clearly ascertained as an unfailling remedy, must be exceptionable. . . . I must therefore impose it upon you as a duty you owe your King, your country, and your employers, to leave no means, which may depend upon you, untried to effect a peace with the Marāthās,' &c. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 446.)]

Nana Furnuwees had sent the Peishwa, now in his seventh year, to Poorundhur; Hurry Punt Phurkay and Tookajee Holkar commanded the main body of his army, with which Nana himself advanced towards the Ghauts, and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun was sent down into the Concan with a force of twelve thousand men, to harass Goddard's detachments and obstruct the communication with Bombay.¹ An opportunity soon presented itself; a detachment of two corps, the 1st Bombay and 5th Bengal battalions under Captain Mackay, when returning from Panwell

(Mar. 15.) as an escort to a convoy of grain for the army, were very briskly attacked by Pureshram Bhow. On the night of the 15th March Captain Mackay had brought up his convoy a distance of twelve miles to the village of

(16.) Chouke,² when early on the morning of the 16th March he was suddenly assailed by the whole force of Pureshram

Bhow, which he repulsed though not without difficulty; but Pureshram Bhow's loss was comparatively very severe. Both battalions behaved well, and the Bengal Sepoys, who had never before been so closely engaged, showed very great spirit. One company, however, in charging a body of horse with the bayonet, after having routed them, were drawn forward in the eagerness of pursuit, when the Mahrattas, than whom, if no troops sooner fly, none are so speedily rallied, wheeled about, charged and overpowered them, but the contiguity of the line saved them from total destruction. Captain Mackay had still twelve long miles to march before he could reach the bottom of the Ghaut: the face of the country in the Concan has already been described, and although the road was the best in the country, it was a mere

¹ Letter from Nana Furnuwees to the Peishwa at Poorundhur. The letters which I shall from this time have occasion to refer to, both from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, are all translated from originals in their own handwriting. They were found amongst the records in the Peishwa's palace, recovered by Captain Henry Robertson, Collector of Poona, and the late Lieutenant John M'Leod, Resident at Bushire, when assistant to Mr. Chaplin, Commissioner, and by those gentlemen they were made over to me, by special authority, from the Honourable M. Elphinstone.

² [The village of Chauk lies immediately below the well-known hill-sanitarium, Mātherān, in the Karjat *tāluka*, Kolāba District. It has given its name to the southernmost bluff of Mātherān known as Chauk Point. It is situated on the main road to Kampoli (Campoly) which is now overlooked by the Bhor Ghāt reversing-station of the G.I.P. Railway. (Mātherān, by Mrs. A. K. Oliver, Bombay, 1905.)]

pathway through a tract exceedingly rugged, full of deep ravines and dells, strong jungles on his right and left, and frequently high rocks and precipices within musket shot on both sides. Captain Mackay renewed his march as soon as it was dark, and advanced before morning to within a few miles of Campoly, whence General Goddard sent out a reinforcement with carriage for his wounded, and enabled him to bring in his men and the whole convoy without further molestation.

The movement towards the Ghauts, from which Goddard calculated advantageous political results, had completely failed, and the Bombay Government, in the prospect of keeping Guzerat and the Concan, did not regret that an end was put to the negotiation; even Mr. Hastings, in that view, considered the rejection of his proposals as a circumstance by no means unfortunate. The opinion of the Bombay Government, in regard to a system of defence and sending back the Madras troops to the assistance of their own Presidency, was now adopted by Goddard; but as the season for taking forts was nearly at an end, he proposed raising a work and establishing a strong garrison at the Bhoze Ghaut, of which Mr. Hornby disapproved and judiciously observed that a large garrison left at the Bhoze Ghaut, a pass which experience had shown they could at any time carry with ease, would be but a waste of money and of men. The capture, as Mr. Hornby observed, of Rajmachee, a fort a little to the north of the Bhoze Ghaut, which might have been easily reduced, would, with a very small garrison, have served both to form a depôt and to distress the enemy.

After some deliberation it was resolved in Council that the army should return to canton for the rains at Bombay and Kallian; that the Madras troops should be sent back to their own Presidency, and two of their own battalions sent down to assist in the defence of Tellicherry, which they had intended to abandon until they received some treasure from Bengal; but this ancient possession they now determined to defend. After all had been thus settled, General Goddard found it impracticable to march without sacrificing a great part of his stores and equipments. About the 1st of April he had sent down to (April 1.) Panwell a strong escort of three battalions of Sepoys, ten guns, and the whole of the cavalry, for the purpose of bringing on another convoy of grain and stores. On the road

to Panwell this escort, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, was attacked by Pureshram Bhow, and although every exertion was made to save the cattle, the Mahrattas, whose dexterity in driving off unloaded bullocks is remarkable,¹ carried away a considerable number of them. The escort would have been sufficient to bring on the convoy through the whole force of Pureshram Bhow, but Holkar was sent down the Ghauts by Nana Furnuwees to strengthen him; when Colonel Browne, on hearing of the great army which lay in his route, deemed it impracticable to advance without a reinforcement, in which opinion General Goddard coincided. Unfortunately the greater part of the cattle of the army had been sent down to assist in transporting the supplies, so that Goddard could not march with his own force without sacrificing a great deal of public property, and with a part he was sure of being cut off by the enemy; he therefore represented his situation to Bombay, and entreated the Government to send every disposable man of their garrison to reinforce Colonel Browne, a request with which they instantly complied, and the escort advanced without delay. The Mahratta force amounted to upwards of twenty-five² thousand horse, besides several bodies of rocket men and infantry; they attacked the escort during their march for three days, but were constantly baffled and repulsed by the skill of Colonel Browne, whose conduct was the theme of very great praise.

He brought in his convoy safe,³ but with the loss of one hundred and six men killed⁴ and wounded during the three days on which he marched.

¹ The usual way is for two or three horsemen to steal forward quietly, get the bullocks' heads turned to a flank, when a few, on each side, gallop at them with their spears; two or three goad them from behind, and off they go at full speed, guided in any direction with great facility. The Madras followers, who are by far the most active of all camp people (though the practice is not confined to them), tie the bullock's load to his head, so that when the animal throws his load in any way, he is, as it were, anchored; and whilst the rope holds, he cannot get away; but when unloaded, or let loose to graze, they are very apt to be carried off, even from within the camp guards.

² Letter from Nana Furnuwees. Colonel Browne reported them only twenty thousand.

³ Nana Furnuwees states that they took from one hundred to a hundred and fifty bullocks, chiefly laden with sugar.

⁴ Of this number there were five officers, namely Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall, of the Bombay Infantry, Ensigns

(Apr. 15.)—The junction of this detachment on the 15th April enabled General Goddard to prepare for his retreat.

By the 19th he had sent down his guns and baggage (19.) to the bottom of the Ghauts, unobserved, as he supposed, by the enemy; but the Mahrattas had correct information of the least stir in his camp, and were silently but anxiously watching the result. Tookajee Holkar, with fifteen thousand men, without any baggage, was at the bottom of the Kussoor Ghaut, and Pureshram Bhow, with twelve thousand, was also below the Ghauts near Bheema Shunkur. Hurry Punt Phurkay was above the Ghauts, between Kundalla and Karlee, with above twenty-five thousand horse, four thousand foot, and several light field-pieces. General Goddard's information

represented Holkar and Pureshram Bhow as about to ascend the Ghauts, but on the 20th, the moment that (Apr. 20.) Goddard marched, Hurry Punt's force poured down into the Concan,¹ took a considerable quantity of baggage, consisting of tents, boxes of musket ammunition, and two thousand cannon-shot.² On the 20th Goddard halted at Kalapoor, and

renewed his march on the 21st. His rear had scarcely cleared the ground of encampment, when the first (Apr. 21.) shot from Hurry Punt's guns struck a tumbril full of ammunition, which instantly exploded, and although it did very little mischief, the Mahrattas were greatly encouraged by the circumstance and harassed the troops during the whole of their march to Chouke. The nature of the ground gave their irregular infantry every advantage, as they were enabled from the cover of rocks, bushes, and ravines to take deliberate aim, and Holkar and Pureshram Bhow made their appearance in front about nine o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock in the afternoon, when Goddard pitched his camp, the enemy retired, Hurry Punt to Kalapoor, and the others to some distance in the rear of the right flank of the British army. The loss on the 21st, which was severe, fell principally upon the Bengal Sepoys, who were stationed in the rear and behaved with much gallantry. On the 22d

Gibbings and Richardson, the former of the Madras and the latter of the Bengal establishment.

¹ General Goddard's and Hurry Punt's dispatches.

² Hurry Punt.

General Goddard halted, and again marched on the 23d, when the attack was renewed, but the baggage having been sent forward at two o'clock in the morning, he was thus enabled to get on a considerable distance before the enemy came up. The attack on the rear was at one time very determined, and the 6th Bengal and 13th¹ Bombay battalions particularly distinguished themselves under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Parker of the Bengal establishment, an excellent officer, who fell whilst bravely exerting himself at the head of the rearguard. General Goddard observing that the enemy always retired when they saw him established in his camp, made a show of pitching his tents; the

(Apr.
23.)

manœuvre succeeded, and being the last march was judicious. The army arrived at Panwell on the evening of the 23d of April without further molestation. On this retreat, which the Mahrattas consider one of their most signal victories, General Goddard's army sustained a heavy loss of four hundred and sixty-six in killed and wounded, of whom eighteen were European officers.²

Although the Mahratta troops, particularly the infantry and that part of the horse under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, behaved well, it may be here remarked as a symptom of the decline of military spirit, that the dispatches of Hurry Punt are written in a style of the most vaunting gasconade, in which Bramin commanders, before this period, were less apt to indulge than

¹ The present 6th regiment, and lately the 2d battalion, 3d regiment, was formerly the 13th battalion.

²

Killed.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Neville Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.
Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.
Lieutenant Gibson and Surgeon Penny, Madras Artillery.

Wounded.

Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.
Lieutenant F. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.
Lieutenant Duncan, Major of Brigade, Madras Native Infantry.
Lieutenants Hall, Taylor, More and Smith, Bengal Native Infantry.
Captain Bannatyne, Lieutenants Taylor, Mills and Reynolds, Ensigns Read and King of the Bombay Native Infantry, and Mr. Fleming, Surgeon-General of the army.

[For a full account of the retreat see General Goddard's dispatches of April 22 and 24, 1781, printed on pp. 451-3 of Forrest's *Selections Marāṭhā Series*, vol i.]

either Mahratta or Mahomedan officers. The loss of the English was estimated by the Mahrattas at fifteen hundred men, one gun, several tumbrils, and a great part of their baggage ; both Hurry Punt and Nana Furnuwees acknowledged that they too had sustained a heavy loss, both in men and horses.¹

The reinforcement for Tellicherry and the Madras troops were embarked and sent off as predetermined ; but the European privates were drafted into the Bombay regiment, a measure against which the Madras Government bitterly inveighed. The remainder of the army, after they had remained encamped for some weeks at Panwell, marched to Kallian, where they were cantoned for the monsoon under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.² Ten thousand Mahrattas were sent towards Guzerat under Mahdoo Rao Ramchundur, the garrisons in the Concan were strengthened, and the main body of the Peishwa's army returned as usual to their homes.³

Whilst these events were passing on the west of India, the Governor-General and Council in Bengal, having disapproved of the Bombay defensive system, were endeavouring to create a powerful diversion, by carrying hostilities into the heart of Sindia's territory ; that he, the principal promoter, should become the greatest sufferer by the war ; and Mr. Hastings was at the same time engaged in an intricate negotiation, for the purpose of detaching Moodajee Bhonslay from the confederacy.

It has been already mentioned that a division of troops under Major, now by regular promotion, Lieutenant-Colonel Camac had been prepared to assist the Rana of Gohud ; and as the brilliant successes of Captain Popham, who was appointed a major for his gallant enterprise on Gwalior, had cleared the Gohud territory of the enemy, Colonel Camac invaded Malwa, reduced Sippree, and advanced to Seronje, where he arrived on the 16th of February. Mahadajee Sindia, who was marching from the westward to oppose him, came up with his division at the latter place, and Colonel Camac, having taken post, allowed himself to be surrounded. The want of provisions and forage soon reduced him to great distress. Perceiving the mistake he had made, and the great danger to be incurred by retiring, he sent off the most pressing letters to Colonel Morgan, commanding in the Oude

¹ Original letters.

² Bombay Records.

³ Original letters.

territory, to send on a reinforcement to his relief. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir was detached accordingly, with three battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery. But in the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Camac was attacked by Sindia, and cannonaded in his camp for seven days successively, when he determined to attempt a retreat at all (Mar. 7.) hazards. At midnight on the 7th March, with great skill he commenced his march and was not discovered (8.) till daybreak, but on the 8th and 9th he was constantly harassed, until his arrival at the town of Mahautpoor, where he forced the inhabitants to supply him with provisions, and then turned and fronted his pursuers. Sindia encamped every night at the distance of five or six miles from the British troops, in a state of instant readiness, having his heavy baggage at an equal distance in his rear. This disposition to guard against surprise continued for several nights, until Colonel Camac by his seeming want of enterprise had thrown the wily Mahratta off his guard; when, on the night of the 24th of March, he entered Sindia's camp, attacked and routed his force, killed numbers of his men, took thirteen of his guns, three elephants, his principal standard, twenty-one camels, and many horses. This achievement, which deservedly ranks very high and marks a military genius, was suggested by Captain Bruce, the same officer who led the escalade at Gwalior. It was of the utmost importance, not only in raising the fame of the British arms, but in particularly affecting Sindia, whose reputation had suffered, whilst that of the Bramin party supported by Holkar was greatly increased by the supposed victory over General Goddard. Colonel Muir's detachment did not join that of Colonel Camac until the 4th of April, when the former assumed the command; but although their united forces kept the field and encamped during the rains within the territory of Sindia, they obtained no further advantage, and were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sindia's camp, which continued in the neighbourhood of their own. Endeavours were ineffectually used by the English to excite active co-operation on the part of the Rajpoot princes in the neighbourhood against the Mahrattas; and Gwalior was restored to the Rana of Gohud, in hopes by this act of good faith to wean him from a disposition he had evinced of making terms for himself

with Mahadajee Sindia ; but the Rana was not inclined to bring forward the slender resources which he possessed ; and matters remained in this situation until the commencement of a negotiation on the part of Sindia with Colonel Muir in the month of August. But although the Governor-General's scheme of stirring up those petty princes against their Mahratta superiors failed, his negotiations with the Raja of Berar were productive of more beneficial consequences.

Moodajee, to support appearances with the confederates, had sent forward an army of thirty thousand horse towards Kuttack in the month of October, 1779, under his second son, Chimnajee ; but in order to convince Mr. Hastings that his real design was not hostile to the English, they were seven months in reaching their destination ; this favourable symptom, however, did not induce the Bengal Government to relax in their vigilance or to circumscribe their efforts. It had been determined at Calcutta, on the news of Hyder's invasion of Arcot, to send a division of six battalions of Sepoys to assist in the war against him, as soon as the season permitted of their marching along the coast towards the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut. This force was to have been assembled in the month of October, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse, and it was hoped that Moodajee might be induced to aid them with a body of cavalry, but as Chimnajee's army lay in the route, it was deemed advisable to suspend Colonel Pearse's march until Moodajee's answer was received.

When the replies did arrive on the 9th January, it was determined to send on the detachment, and Colonel Pearse, on entering the territory of Moodajee, was instructed to observe an exact discipline, to protect the country, and to consider the Raja of Berar as a friend, until any attempt was made to obstruct his march, when he was commanded to force his way against all opposition. To reconcile Moodajee, however, to this measure, the Governor-General deputed an agent, Mr. David Anderson, to Kuttack, for the purpose of explaining the reasons and obtaining, if possible, a body of two thousand horse to co-operate with Colonel Pearse. Before Mr. Anderson reached Ballasore, Chimnajee had proceeded with his army to attack the fort of Dhikanall, the Raja of which had neglected to remit the tribute and refused to pay the arrears. Mr. Anderson, however, proceeded to Kuttack,

and thence returned to Calcutta. Chimnajee, in the meantime, had quitted the hills and come down with his army to the open country. Colonel Pearse had not only been allowed to pass without molestation, but assistance was afforded in procuring supplies through the province of Orissa ; and the most friendly assurances were continued on the part of Chimnajee. The position of this Mahratta army was threatening : the government of Berar had behaved liberally to General Goddard, and civilly to Colonel Pearse : Moodajee had been so situated as to be compelled to join the confederacy, or at once declare his alliance with the English ;—the last a daring, a doubtful, and a generous policy, too great for any Mahratta to adventure. The Governor-General secretly promised to advance Moodajee the sum of sixteen lacks of rupees, in order to engage his aid, either in the alliance or mediation proposed ; for it is not very clear how this bribe was originally tendered. Twelve lacks were now offered to Chimnajee if he would withdraw his troops and return to Nagpoor ; at the same time it was carefully expressed that the money was not given in a manner to enable them hereafter to demand it as a right or to expect it in future, but merely to bespeak their friendship and engage them against Hyder, who was represented to have at this period received sunnuds from the Emperor for the whole Deccan ; at the subjugation of which, including the complete peninsula of India, he was said to be aiming. The son of Moodajee observed that on payment of fifty lacks he would be happy to afford the British Government a proof of his friendship, by retiring to Nagpoor and uniting against Hyder, especially if it should appear that he had procured sunnuds for the Deccan. This fictitious report obtained credence, especially with Nizam Ally, and it tended greatly once more to turn his versatile and treacherous mind against Hyder, whom as a rival Mussulman, and an upstart eclipsing him, he hated and feared.

After some discussion, conducted with much ability on the part of Mr. Anderson, Chimnajee at last observed that of the sixteen lacks originally promised, three lacks had been paid ; but if the balance of thirteen lacks were now tendered, he would withdraw ; that two thousand horse, at fifty thousand rupees a month, should be sent to join Colonel Pearse against Hyder, provided the Governor-General and Council would assist the Berar state in raising a loan of ten lacks of rupees, and aid Moodajee in reducing

Gurrah and Mundelah : districts which, the reader may recollect, had been taken by Ballajee Bajee Rao during his first campaign in 1742, before the return of Rughoojee from the Carnatic, and which, from their vicinity to their northern frontier, had ever since been an object of the greatest jealousy to the Bhonslays of Berar. The tenders were accepted, and thus by an objectionable policy, justifiable only by the peculiarity of the circumstances, Mr. Hastings temporarily detached the eastern Mahrattas from the confederacy, and turned them against both Hyder and the Peishwa, at a moment when, with thirty thousand horse, it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras. But in this negotiation no credentials from Moodajee were given or demanded ; and shortly afterwards copies of letters from Nana Furnuwees to Moodajee were transmitted to Bengal, representing the retreat of General Goddard as a great victory, and threatening Moodajee with the utmost vengeance of the Peishwa's government for seceding from the confederacy and his allegiance to his prince. In consequence of these letters it was not altogether convenient for Moodajee to avow the agreement to its full extent ; he wished, however, to mediate a peace, and to engage with the English in a general confederacy against Hyder. For this purpose he intended sending Dewakur Punt to Poona ; but many circumstances rendered it desirable that this minister should first meet Mr. Hastings. An interview was to take place at Benares ; but in the meantime orders by the Supreme Government were dispatched to General Goddard, to negotiate a peace nearly on the terms formerly proposed ; retaining the fort of Bassein if possible, but if not, to give it up if he could thereby ensure an honourable pacification, which was now the sole end in view.

These instructions were not received by General Goddard until the month of August ; various plans were in the meantime proposed at Bombay : that, by General Goddard, of making an increase of eight battalions of native infantry, drawing out the old, and leaving the new levies in garrison ; calling on Futih Sing Gaekwar, the Nabobs of Surat and Cambay, to assist with their utmost means ; permitting Rugonath Rao to assemble horse ; bringing down Colonel Muir's force from Malwa ; forming a junction with his (Goddard's) army ; and carrying the war, first into the heart of the Deccan and then into Mysore, was very

extensive, and with funds it would have been practicable ; but the lowest estimate of the required monthly disbursement was seven lacks of rupees, an expense which to the members of the Bombay Government was quite appalling at this season of unprecedented distress. Goddard, however, in hopes of aid from Bengal, proceeded to Guzerat for the purpose of conferring with Futih Sing and Rugoba. Several schemes were proposed for the ensuing season ; but one, which was suggested to the Bombay Government, is too remarkable to be omitted:—Certain dispossessed Mahratta Deshmookhs,¹ and men whose ancestors had held Jagheer lands under the Mahomedan governments, came forward and offered, on certain conditions, to put the English in possession of the Concan and of the whole of the forts in the Syhadree range ; provided the British Government would, on obtaining possession of the country, recognize their ancient rights ; grant them on the delivery of each fort fifty thousand rupees for each of the larger fortresses, and ten thousand for the smaller ; allowing them to retain whatever plunder in money, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and mares they might acquire ; but everything else, of whatever description, they agreed to relinquish. Their proposals were fully considered,² but finally rejected.

On the opening of the season Goddard returned from Guzerat, after some satisfactory explanations with Futih Sing and obtaining a positive promise of being assisted by five thousand good horse. If recovering the revenue had been the only object, General Goddard observed that the defence of Guzerat should have rather been secured than that of the Concan ; but until it could be ascertained whether the force in Malwa would be sent to join him, it was agreed to maintain defensive operations in the Concan, preserving as much as possible an appearance of action. Early in November accounts reached Bombay of a separate treaty between Mahadajee Sindia and Colonel (Oct. 13.) Muir, concluded 13th October, 1781, by which Sindia agreed to return to Oojein, and Colonel Muir to recross the Jumna ; and that Sindia had further agreed to negotiate a

¹ Arjoonjee and Jeewajee Bamlay, and Suntajee Naik Surkunday seem to have been three of the chiefs who came forward ; but their native villages are not recorded.

² Bombay Consultations, 29th June, 1781.

treaty between the other belligerents and the British Government, but he, at all events, bound himself to stand neutral. His territory west of the Jumna was restored ; but the Rana of Gohud was not to be molested in the possession of Gwalior, as long as he conducted himself properly. The first overtures, as already mentioned, were made by Mahadajee Sindia, who, after his defeat by Colonel Camac, perceived that he had everything to lose by maintaining a contest in the heart of his own dominions, which would probably end in his being driven a fugitive across the Nerbuddah, without lands or friends, and probably to the secret satisfaction of his rivals at Poona.

Mr. Hastings was particularly pleased at the opening of this channel to a general pacification, as the plan of a mediation through Moodajee was obstructed by the death of Dewakur Punt, who did not live to meet the Governor-General at Benares, as had been agreed upon ; Moodajee, however, afterwards wrote to General Goddard, assuring him of his readiness to interpose his best endeavours for the attainment of peace, and even to repair in person to Poona for that purpose. About the same time, on the arrival of Mr. John Macpherson at Madras, a letter was addressed to the Peishwa, dated 11th September, 1781, in the joint names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes and Mr. Macpherson, forwarded to the wukeel of Mohummud Ally at Poona, stating their wish for peace, the moderation of the Company's views, the desire of the British nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty, which no servant of the Company should have power to break ; and assuring the Peishwa, upon their own honour and that of the King, the Company, and the nation, that just satisfaction should be given in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

Amid all these authorized pacificators, General Goddard, who as yet considered himself the accredited agent on the part of the Supreme Government, also opened a negotiation, and assumed, what was privately agreed, though not expressed in the treaty between Colonel Muir and Sindia, that the latter should use his endeavour to obtain a cessation of hostilities between the Peishwa and the English, until the terms of a general peace could be adjusted.

A.D. 1782.—Captain Watherstone was deputed to Poona in January, but shortly after his arrival there, official intelligence

was received of the appointment of Mr. David Anderson, as Agent of the Governor-General, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas ; for which purpose Mr. Anderson was deputed to the camp of Mahadajee Sindia. Upon this news Captain Watherstone was recalled, a circumstance which both Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt regretted, for although they were not fully prepared to treat, they could have wished to conclude the pacification without the mediation of Sindia.¹ The terms to which Mr. Anderson was authorized to accede differed little from the conditions before tendered, except that as the Rana of Gohud had by his conduct forfeited all claims to the benefits of the alliance, and had besides secretly endeavoured to conclude separate terms for himself with Sindia, it was deemed unnecessary to include him as a party in Mr. Anderson's negotiation. A principal obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty was the restoration of the Peishwa's share of Ahmedabad which had been apportioned to Futih Sing. This point, however, was at last conceded, and a treaty was concluded at Salbye on the 17th May by Mr. David Anderson on the part of the East India Company, and by Mahadajee Sindia on that of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees, and the whole of the chiefs of the Mahratta nations ; Mahadajee Sindia being at the same time plenipotentiary of the Peishwa and the mutual guarantee of both parties for the due performance of the conditions. The treaty consisted of seventeen articles : the whole of the territory conquered since the treaty of Poorundhur was restored, together with the three lacks promised near Baroach. The territory of the Gaekwar and the whole of Guzerat were to remain precisely on the same footing as they had been prior to the war of 1775 ; so that the Baroda state was thus secured from dismemberment, and no claim of tribute was to be preferred by the Peishwa against Futih Sing during the period of the late hostilities. Rugonath Rao was to be allowed twenty-five thousand rupees a month, and to be permitted to choose a place of residence.²

¹ [Details of these transactions will be found in letters from Captain Watherston to General Goddard, dated February 13 and 24, and March 9, 1782, at pp. 468-72 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i. See also letter from Warren Hastings to Captain Watherston of February 25, 1782, at pp. 475-6 of the same compilation.]

² [Article VI of the Treaty dealt with Raghunāth Rāo, and ran as follows : 'The English engage that having allowed Raghunāthrāo

It was settled that Hyder should be obliged to relinquish the territories lately conquered from the English and the Nabob of Arcot; and the Peishwa on the one part, and the English on the other, agreed that their allies respectively should maintain peace towards each other. A free trade, the restoration of wrecks, and the exclusion of all European establishments, except those of the Portuguese within the Mahratta dominions, also form part of the substance of the treaty of Salbye, which was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June following; but the adjustment on the part of the Peishwa was delayed by Nana Furnuwees, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, until the 20th December, nor was it finally exchanged until the 24th February, 1783.

During the period when the ratification was in suspense, the Governor-General in Council agreed to fulfil the former intention in regard to the cession of Baroach; and that valuable district was bestowed on Mahadajee Sindia, in testimony of the sense entertained of the conduct manifested by him to the Bombay army at Wurgaom, and of his humane treatment and release of the English gentlemen who had been delivered as hostages on that occasion.

a period of four months from the time when this treaty shall become complete to fix on a place of residence, they will not, after the expiration of the said period, afford him any support, protection, or assistance, nor supply him with money for his expenses; and the Pēshwā on his part engages that, if Raghunāthrāo will voluntarily and of his own accord repair to Mahārāja Mādharāv Sindia, and quietly reside with him, the sum of Rs. 25,000 per month shall be paid him for his maintenance, and no injury whatever shall be offered to him by the Pēshwā or any of his people.'

The Treaty of Sālbāi, remarks Dr. V. A. Smith, 'should be remembered as one of the landmarks in the history of India, because it assured peace with the formidable power of the Marāthās for twenty years, and marked the ascendancy of the English as the controlling, although not yet the paramount, government in India.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 535.)]

CHAPTER XXX.

FROM A.D. 1773 TO A.D. 1784.

A.D. 1782.—FOR some years, whilst the Mahrattas were engaged in domestic dissensions or in war with the English, the imperial court was not subjected to their busy and rapacious intrusion ; but, as the affairs of Delhi soon resume a considerable influence on their politics, we must not lose sight of the principal events that had occurred in that quarter.

(1773.)—On the retreat of the Mahrattas in 1773, Nujeef Khan regained his lost authority at the imperial court, and immediately directed his arms against their garrisons. Husham-ud-dowlah, the rival of Nujeef Khan, who had been secretly subservient to the Mahrattas, was removed from the administration. Shujah-ud-dowlah likewise took advantage of the retreat of the Mahratta army to expel their garrisons from his neighbourhood ; and, after possessing himself of Etaweh, advanced towards Agra for the purpose of assisting Nujeef Khan, who was besieging it ; but the fortress having surrendered, Nujeef Khan placed Mohummud Beg Humadane, one of his own dependants, in command of the garrison. The Nabob Vizier, to conciliate Nujeef Khan, appointed him his deputy at the imperial court ; and these two might have become formidable enemies to the Mahrattas north of the Nerbuddah, had not the Vizier's attention been for a time fully engaged in prosecuting the Rohilla war ; and shortly after its termination, death put an end to all his schemes.

(1775.) His demise occurred in January, 1775, and his son, Asoph-ud-dowlah, after some delay on the part of the Emperor, was confirmed in his father's title and possessions.¹

Nujeef Khan carried on various military expeditions with success. Although the Emperor did not sanction the measure by

¹ Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

remaining in the field himself, Nujeef Khan took part with the English and Shujah-ud-dowlah in the war against the Rohillas; he was afterwards successful against the Jhats; the imperial arms were again respected, and his own authority acknowledged throughout the province of Agra. But whilst thus employed at a distance, he found a domestic enemy in the person of one from whom he had a right to expect fidelity and friendship. As his own deputy in the imperial presence, he had chosen Abdool Ahud Khan, to whom he confided the care of the court and capital, together with the general administration of (1776.) civil affairs. The new Dewan was shortly afterwards honoured with the title of Mujd-ud-dowlah; but the first use he made of his power was to establish his own influence over the imbecile mind of the Emperor, to the prejudice of his patron. Nujeef Khan did not remain ignorant of the progress of the intrigues against him, but he continued in the field and vigorously prosecuted the measures he had undertaken.¹ Much of his success, it may be observed, was owing to some regular infantry, the better part of which were originally disciplined by the English, when the Emperor resided under their protection; but there were now two distinct bodies in the service of Nujeef Khan: the one under Sumroo, a German,² and the other commanded by Madoc, a Frenchman.

Mujd-ud-dowlah was unsuccessful in military expeditions. Foiled by Zabita Khan and harassed by plundering irruptions of the Seiks, who laid waste the country, but still more alarmed

¹ Scott's History, and Bengal Records.

² The history and character of the infamous Walter Reingard, generally known by the name of Sumroo, the instrument of the barbarous massacre at Patna in 1763, is sufficiently public. He entered the imperial service after that event, having in the interval served principally with the Jhats. [Reinhardt was a native of Trèves, in the Duchy of Luxemburg, and came to India as a sailor in the French Navy. Having deserted, he joined the first European battalion raised in Bengal. Thence deserting once more he entered the French garrison at Chandernagore, and after the capture of Law he entered the service of Mir Kāsim (Kāsim Alī Khān). His name Samrū, or Sumroo, was a corruption of 'Sombre,' which was his nickname among his French comrades. For further details of him and his more famous Bēgam see Sleeman's *Rambles*, ch. lxxv, revised annotated edition (1915), by V. A. Smith. His tomb at Agra is described at pp. 124 and 271 of Keene's *Mughal Empire*. His name is spelt Reinhard on the tomb, and elsewhere Renard. Sleeman calls him a native of Salzburg.]

at the rapid power which his rival's successes had gained him in the provinces, he sought to crush him by involving the Emperor in a war with the Rajpoots, which he hoped might prove fatal to his progress; but the result was contrary to his anticipations; for, although the war was brought on, and Nujeef Khan actively employed, it terminated advantageously for the Emperor and creditably for his general.¹ In this situation Mujd-ud-dowlah began a negotiation with Mahadajee Sindia, from which he hoped to free himself from all difficulties, and attain the entire control in the state, by the ruin of Nujeef Khan; after which, in hopes of freeing himself from the Mahrattas, he intended to accede to a scheme, proposed by Sindia, for invading the English provinces in Bengal; and promised, as soon as they could be spared, to lend both the authority and the army of the Emperor in aid of Sindia's design.² But these schemes were at once overturned by his removal from the administration, which Nujeef Khan, with the Emperor's concurrence, at last effected. No obstacle now interfered with that paramount authority which Nujeef Khan established. He became Umeer Ool Oomrah, with the title of Zoolfikar Khan, and continued, till his death, which happened 22d April, 1782, to rule both the Emperor and his territory with judgement and firmness.³

A.D.
1782.

His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, was at first acknowledged his successor, but he was for a time obliged to relinquish his new dignity in favour of his relation, Mirza Shuffee, who was himself opposed by a powerful faction, headed by Mohummud Beg Humadane, the governor of the province of Agra.

An opportunity seemed thus afforded to the Emperor for ridding himself of all parties by a vigorous effort, which he at first seemed disposed to make; but he suffered the opportunity to pass, and his friends became the victims of his imbecility. A scene of contention and treachery soon took place amongst the competitors; Mirza Shuffee was assassinated by Ismael, the

¹ Scott's History. Letters of Nujeef Khan. English Records.

² Original Mahratta letters from Sindia's camp, written by Ramajee Anunt, the Peishwa's Dewan with Mahadajee Sindia. His letters and papers were brought to me by his great-grandson, who now resides at Poona. Conjoined with other materials, those letters throw considerable light on the Mahratta views and transactions of the period.

³ Scott, Francklin, and English Records.

nephew of Mohummud Beg Humadane, so that Afrasiab Khan only remained to contest the supremacy.¹

Such was the state of affairs at Delhi when the treaty of Salbye was pending; and now, to account for the long period which elapsed between its conclusion by Sindia and its ratification by the Peishwa, it is necessary to unfold the motives which then actuated the leading parties in the Mahratta state.

Notwithstanding the increasing jealousy between Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees, though the former sought to establish a kingdom virtually independent, and though each was desirous of extending his control over the whole Mahratta nation, both continued sensible of the necessity of preserving the strength of the empire undivided. By the progress of the war with the British Government, Nana's influence and reputation had increased whilst those of Sindia had diminished. Yet, by the treaty of Salbye Sindia, whilst his fortunes seemed on the decline, had attained one main object of his policy, a sovereignty virtually independent, without any apparent break in the great link of interest which bound the Mahratta confederacy. Although both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees were desirous of a general peace, yet each of them had secret intentions of soon breaking it in such partial instances as suited their respective schemes of aggrandizement. Nana aspired to the recovery of all the territories south of the Nerbuddah that had ever belonged to the Mahrattas, whilst Sindia projected the re-establishment of their power in the provinces of Hindoostan. Although the terms of the treaty of Salbye were so much more favourable to the Mahrattas than any that could have been anticipated before the war between the English and Hyder broke out, yet Nana, being jealous of the prominent part which Sindia acted in the negotiation, and hoping that he might, by temporizing, recover Salsette from the English, maintained in all communications with the British authorities an appearance of steadfast alliance with Hyder,² whilst to the envoys of the latter he affected to be satisfied with the treaty of Salbye, and declared that its immediate ratification by the Peishwa could only be prevented

¹ Francklin's *Life of Shah Alum*. [For a fuller narrative of the events recorded by the author on pp. 148-51, consult Keene's *Mughal Empire*, ch. iii and iv.]

² Original letters, Records, Oral information, and Mahratta MSS.

by Hyder's restoring the Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna, which would ensure their co-operation ; but if not restored, the Mahrattas would unite with the English against him.¹ Nana's ulterior views, in case the pending treaty should be ratified, were hostile towards Hyder, as he in that event projected an offensive alliance with Nizam Ally against the usurper of Mysore, from which the English were to be carefully excluded.²

With regard to Sindia's particular views of aggrandizement, in order fully to understand the reasons which operated in inducing the British Government passively to view the growth of such a power as he acquired in Hindoostan, it may be requisite to explain that Mahadajee Sindia, even before his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, had suggested a plan of attacking the English in Bengal, and when his own territory was invaded, he renewed the proposal to the Peishwa, requesting that Tookajee Holkar might be sent to support the design.³ To the whole of this scheme Nana Furnuwees at first objected, until he saw a probability of its recalling Goddard, but he was afraid to detach Holkar from the Peishwa, not only from being apprehensive that Goddard might not be withdrawn, but lest Sindia should allay the existing jealousy on the part of Holkar towards himself ; which Nana, for his own security, was solicitous to foment. In giving, therefore, a tardy acquiescence to Sindia's plan, he proposed, instead of Holkar's quitting Poona, that Sindia should augment his army by a body of Sillidars from the Mahratta country, whom he offered to assist in raising. Sindia gave various reasons for declining this suggestion ; but the most important one was the removal just at that period of Mujdud-dowlah from the administration, and that Nujeef Khan would not lend his support.⁴ Hyder Ally, who had been apprised that such a design was at one time in agitation, endeavoured, when he broke with the English, to engage Sindia to prosecute the enterprise⁵ ; but the negotiations which Sindia was carrying on with Mr. Hastings, the death of Nujeef Khan, and the subsequent contentions amongst the Mahomedan factions at Delhi, opened

¹ Wilks.

² Mahratta MSS., and letters.

³ Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia.

⁴ Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa's Dewan with Sindia, to Nana Furnuwees.

⁵ Original letters from Sindia's camp.

a prospect to Sindia of realizing those schemes which he had long cherished, and made it of more consequence to him to court the favour of the English than to excite their hostility. Mr. Hastings, if supported by his Council, would probably, on the death of Nujeef Khan, have anticipated Sindia by interposing the British influence at the imperial court ; but instead of that course, the policy of which might certainly have been questionable at such a crisis, Mr. Hastings turned the circumstance to advantage, by giving Sindia to understand that he would not interfere with his views at Delhi,¹ and thus not only engaged his interest in obtaining the ratification of the treaty, but secured him against the gold of Hyder, which was liberally proffered in support of the scheme for invading Bengal.² After the treaty of Salbye was signed, an envoy from Hyder was permitted by the court of Poona to proceed to Sindia's camp ; and Nana Furnuwees, in prosecution of his own views on Salsette, which he hoped the British Government might be induced to cede, in order to propitiate his favour, gave out that the Peishwa had engaged in a new treaty with Hyder, to which the French were parties. But the death of Hyder, which happened on the 7th of December, 1782, had a speedy effect in deciding the measures of the Mahratta minister, and the ratification of the treaty of Salbye was the immediate result. As already noticed, the treaty was ratified by the Peishwa on the 20th December, 1782, formally (1783.) exchanged on the 24th February, 1783, and the term for restoring the districts on the Bombay side limited to the 24th April. Before that date an outrage was committed, which, had it happened at a time when peace was less essential to the British Government, might have occasioned a renewal of the war. The *Ranger*, a small ship of the Bombay Marine, on her voyage from Bombay to Calicut with several military officers

¹ English Records.

² Mahratta MSS., and letters. I am not certain if it be twenty lacks of rupees, or pagodas, that are mentioned in an original Mahratta letter from Sindia's camp, which is my principal authority for this fact. ['Hastings has been criticized,' writes Dr. V. A. Smith, 'for his indifference to the aggrandizement of Sindia, but the fact was that he could not afford to quarrel with the Marāthā chief.' On the other hand Māhādājī Sindia was convinced by the military ability of the English during the operations of 1780 and 1781 that it was safer to be their ally than their enemy. (*O.H.I.*, pp. 535-6.)]

of distinction as passengers on board, was unexpectedly attacked by the fleet of Anund Rao Dhoolup, the Peishwa's (Apr. 8.) admiral, consisting of two ships, one ketch, and eight gallivats; and after a very gallant defence, in which most of the crew and passengers were killed or wounded, she was at last overpowered and carried as a prize into Viziadroog. Colonel Humberston and Major Shaw were killed, and besides Lieutenant Pruen, the commander of the vessel, three of the passengers were desperately wounded. Of this number was Colonel Norman M'Leod, who being disabled in one arm continued to fight on hand to hand with the other, until shot through the body, when he fell, as was supposed, mortally wounded; but though carried into confinement at Viziadroog, where the prisoners had neither medical attendance nor ordinary necessaries, all the wounded officers recovered. This violation of the treaty produced a strong remonstrance from the British Government, and the surrender of the Peishwa's districts was suspended; but upon an apology for the outrage, and the restoration of the vessel, the terms of the pacification were carried into effect.¹

The war, however, was not at an end with the successor of Hyder Ally. Tippoo, although to the Mahrattas he professed his acquiescence in the terms of the treaty of Salbye, continued hostilities against the English.² Mahadajee Sindia called upon him to desist, threatening him, in case of refusal, with an immediate attack from the united armies of the English and the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, persisted; and in consequence, Sindia on the 28th October concluded a new treaty with the English, for the purpose of enforcing compliance. It was as much the wish of Nana Furnuwees as of Sindia to oblige Tippoo to conform to the terms of the treaty of Salbye, in order that he might appear to the other powers of India a Mahratta dependent as well as a tributary; but Nana's jealousy of Sindia's assumption

¹ [A graphic account of the fight between the *Ranger* and the Marāthā fleet is given in a letter from Lieutenant Pruen to the Bombay Council, dated 'Gheria River, April 11, 1783,' which appears on pp. xxiii-xxvi of the introduction of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.]

² [The news of the Treaty of Versailles reached India in June 1783, and put an end to hostilities in India, including the operations in the Carnatic. Tipū Sultan, however, not being a party to the Treaty, continued the war against the English in Malabar, whither he had been dispatched by Haidar Alī after the monsoon season of 1782.]

of authority and his own projected alliance with Nizam Ally impeded the scheme of this league, in which Sindia and the English would have borne parts so prominent. In the

A.D.
1784.

meantime, a separate treaty was concluded by Tippoo and the English Presidency at Fort St. George. Mr. Hastings had authorized the Madras Government to negotiate a treaty, of which that of Salbye was to be the basis. But instead of following their instructions, from an over anxiety to terminate the troubles and distresses in which they found themselves involved, they were led into a train of most injudicious proceedings; in the course of which they were systematically insulted by Tippoo, their representatives treated with indignity, the

British nation held up as supplicants for peace, and **(Mar. 11.)** finally, on the 11th March, the treaty of Mangalore was signed, in which even allusion to the treaty of Salbye was omitted; a circumstance than which nothing could have been more gratifying to Tippoo or more offensive to the Mahrattas.¹ The strongest disapprobation of this omission, and of many other points of that humiliating pacification, was expressed by the Governor-General, and he was only prevented from disavowing and annulling it by the confusion which must have resulted to the Company's affairs, in consequence of the fulfilment of a part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification. The Poona government affected to disbelieve that any treaty could be settled without their concurrence, and declared that such an agreement would be a violation of the treaty of Salbye. But Mr. Hastings had previously apprised Mahadajee Sindia, through Mr. Anderson, of the instructions sent to the Madras Government, and he now explained the departure from his orders of which that Government had been guilty, stating likewise some part of the motives which had operated to induce him to ratify their proceedings; in consequence of which, as the leading parties in the Mahratta state were anxious to prosecute their respective views, there was little difficulty in reconciling them to a measure which had

¹ [The Governor of Madras, who submitted to this abject humiliation at the hands of Tipū, was Lord Macartney. 'What a man is this Lord Macartney,' exclaimed Warren Hastings, 'I yet believe that in spite of the peace, he will effect the loss of the Carnatic.' (Gleig, iii. 186, quoted in *O.H.I.*, p. 546.)]

become irrevocable.¹ The first proceeding of Nana Furnuwees, in his designs on Tippoo, was a formal demand on that prince for arrears of tribute ; Tippoo admitted the justice of the demand, but offered various excuses for not immediately complying with it. At the same time that the demand was made on Tippoo, a like formal application was preferred to Nizam Ally for the outstanding Mahratta claims to Chouth and Surdeshmookhee within his territory. But a secret understanding existed between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. They were on the best terms, insomuch that a short time previous to making this demand Nana Furnuwees had assisted the latter state to suppress a formidable rebellion which was headed by Ihtisham Jung, the Jagheerdar of Neermul. Nizam Ally, in reply to the application, proposed, as had been secretly agreed in order to cover their designs on Tippoo, to hold a conference with the Poona minister on the frontier. Accordingly each of the parties, attended by a large army,² set out from their capitals, and in the month of June had a meeting at Eedgeer near the junction of the Beema and Kistna. Many points of importance regarding their mutual claims were discussed, some of which had existed for a long period, but it was agreed that such of the Mahratta *thannas* as had been displaced by Nizam Ally since 1774, should be re-established in the Moghul territory ; and that the claims for Chouth and Surdeshmookhee of the two past seasons should be put into an immediate train of payment, adopting as a rule in all cases the practice usual in the time of Mahdoo Rao Bullal. Where any considerable doubt existed, the demands were to lie over until a general settlement could be made upon the admitted claims in the time of Nizam Ool Moolk ; according to which Nizam Ally bound himself to pay up all arrears. Thus far the result of this conference was publicly known, but the principal object, as already alluded to, was an offensive alliance against Tippoo for the recovery of the districts which both states had lost by the encroachments of Mysore. Nizam Ally, who over-estimated the value of his own alliance, demanded as a pre-

¹ English Records, Mahratta MSS., and letters.

² Nizam Ally had sixteen thousand horse, twenty thousand infantry, and seventy-five guns. The Mahrattas, eight thousand infantry, fifty thousand horse, and forty guns. (Official reports from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt to the Peishwa.)

liminary article of the agreement the restoration of Ahmednugur and Beejapoor. Nana Furnuwees promised to give up Beejapoor, after they should recover the territory north of the Toongbuddra, but after a prolonged discussion, neither party being very well satisfied nor as yet by any means prepared to prosecute their scheme, the conference terminated in a general treaty of alliance, the particulars of which were to be specified as soon as they found themselves prepared to enter upon its execution.¹ After levying the tribute due by the Naik of Sorapoor,² both parties returned to their respective capitals in July, and Nana Furnuwees took this opportunity of endeavouring to possess himself of the ever coveted island of Jinjeera, but the mediation of the British Government prevented the attack, until events of greater moment diverted all immediate designs from the Seedee.³

Nizam Ally had scarcely reached his capital, when Tippoo, probably apprised of what had taken place, with premeditated insult set up some absurd pretensions to the sovereignty of Beejapoor, and called on Nizam Ally in consequence to adopt his standard of weights and measures.⁴ Nizam Ally took little pains to obtain an explanation, until in the month of October Tippoo was said to have taken the field for the purpose of invading that part of the Moghul territory which lay south of the Kistna. An envoy from Hyderabad was immediately dispatched to Tippoo's camp for the purpose of temporizing, and another to Poona, in order to hasten the projected operations of the alliance. Nana Furnuwees, however, was not only unprepared, but various affairs of internal government prevented him at that moment from supporting his ally. Nizam Ally, therefore, was glad to prevent hostilities through his envoy at Seringapatam, which he effected, not so much by any forbearance of Tippoo, as by his want of preparation for war.

The principal reason which induced Nana Furnuwees to

¹ Poona Records.

² Official letter from Nana Furnuwees. The Naik of Sorapoor is the descendant of the Berud Naik of Wakinkerah.

³ Bombay Records.

⁴ Bombay Records. Tareekh-dil-Ufroz, &c.

It is scarcely worth inquiry how Tippoo arrogated to himself this right; but as Hyder, it was once reported, had obtained from the Emperor the sovereignty of that portion of the Deccan comprised in the space allotted by Aurungzebe to his son Kaum Bakhsh, the insult may have been suggested by that circumstance.

suspend the design he had so long contemplated, was the reported progress of a conspiracy, said to have for its object the deposition of Mahdoo Rao Narrain and the elevation of Bajee Rao, the son of the late Rugonath Rao, to the Peishwa's musnud. Rugonath Rao, after the treaty of Salbye was ratified, seeing no other alternative, accepted the terms there specified, and fixed on Kopergaom, on the banks of the Godavery, as his place of residence. He only survived this last humiliation a few months. His widow Anundee Bye was pregnant at the time, and shortly after, in April, 1784, gave birth to a son, Chimnajeel Appa. Bajee Rao, at the period of his father's death, had scarcely completed his ninth year; but the partisans of Rugonath Rao, and many who were dissatisfied with the existing government, began to stir up a faction in his favour. It is creditable to Nana Furnuwees that in adopting measures for smothering these indications, which were soon accomplished, he placed no additional restraint on the family at Kopergaom, but they naturally became objects of his suspicion; mutual distrust was the consequence, and hatred grew up between Nana Furnuwees and the sons of Rugonath Rao.¹ Mahadajee Sindia was said to have been the secret fomentor of the intrigues to which we have alluded; and from his usual policy of keeping Nana in perpetual alarm, there is ground to suspect his connivance; but he could have had no design of supporting such a faction, as he was at this time fully occupied in the accomplishment of those views on the imperial territory we have before seen him projecting; and events took place which suddenly elevated him to the pinnacle of his ambition.

¹ Mahratta Letters, and MS.

CHAPTER XXXI.

FROM A.D. 1784 TO A.D. 1785.

A.D. 1784.—AT the imperial court we left Afrasiab Khan and Mohummud Beg Humadaneë struggling for the superiority. The former at first obtained the advantage, owing principally to his having the control of the Emperor's person, but foreseeing no probability of reducing his rival with the means at his disposal, he contemplated an alliance with some of the neighbouring states, and cast his eyes successively towards the Nabob Vizier, the English, and the Mahrattas. Whilst hesitating in his choice, the Emperor's son Prince Mirza Jewan Bukht made his escape from Delhi, fled to Lucknow, where the Governor-General then was, and threw himself on his protection and that of the Nabob Vizier. He was promised an asylum; but although he entreated assistance in his father's name, Mr. Hastings declined affording it. The prince's flight, however, alarmed Afrasiab Khan, and he voluntarily offered to make any arrangement for the Emperor which the Governor-General and the Nabob Vizier might suggest, provided they would support him with a sufficient force to suppress the rebellion of Mohummud Beg. But these overtures being also rejected, Afrasiab Khan had recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.¹

Since the ratification of the treaty of Salbye, Sindia had obtained considerable advantages. Several of the minor Rajpoot chieftains, contiguous to Malwa, had returned to their former allegiance as Mahratta tributaries. The fortress of Gwalior, after a protracted siege, was restored by the Rana of Gohud, who was constrained to surrender himself a prisoner on a verbal promise of maintenance and protection.² A body of troops was

¹ Scott.

² Scott.

sent into Bundelcund for the purpose of endeavouring to reduce that province. These troops were under the command of Appa Khunde Rao, who was attended by a body of regulars, raised by a European gentleman named Benoit de Boigne.¹ But Sindia,

¹ As M. de Boigne's progress in the Mahratta service will be found conspicuous, his previous history becomes interesting. M. de Boigne was born at Chamberri, in Savoy, in the territory of the king of Sardinia. He began his career as an ensign, in the regiment of Clare, in the Irish brigade in the service of France, a corps then famous for its discipline. Seeing little prospect of advancement, and hearing that Russia, then at war with Turkey, was much in want of officers in the Grecian Archipelago, he resigned his commission and repaired to Turin, where having obtained letters of recommendation from the Sardinian minister, he proceeded to Greece. Soon after his arrival, he was promoted to the rank of captain in a Greek regiment, in the Russian service. Being employed on an injudicious descent made upon the island of Tenedos, he was taken prisoner by a sally from the Turkish garrison and conveyed to Scio, where he was kept until the peace which was soon after concluded. On being released, he embarked for Smyrna, at which place, happening to meet some Englishmen from India, he was so struck with their account of the country, that he resolved on trying his fortune there. He proceeded to Constantinople, and thence to Aleppo, where he joined a caravan for Bagdad; but in consequence of the successes of the Persians against the Turks, the caravan, after they had arrived near Bagdad, being under an apprehension of falling into the hands of the victors, retraced their steps to Aleppo. De Boigne, balked in his endeavours of getting to India by that route, repaired to Grand Cairo, where he became acquainted with Mr. Baldwin, the British consul-general, and through his influence and kindness, not only obtained a passage to India, but by a letter from that gentleman to Major Sydenham, town-major of Fort St. George, M. de Boigne, soon after his arrival at Madras, was recommended to Mr. Rumbold, the Governor, and appointed an ensign in the 6th Native Battalion under that Presidency. M. de Boigne's corps was with Baillie's detachment destroyed by Tippoo; but De B. being at the time detached on escort duty, to convey grain from Madras, escaped. A short time after this event, in consequence of an act of injustice, which he conceived he had experienced from the Governor, Lord Macartney, respecting the adjutancy of a detachment, he resigned his commission in the Company's service, with an intention of proceeding to Calcutta, and thence overland to Russia. Lord Macartney, when he became sensible of the injustice, would have repaired it, but M. de Boigne appearing determined in his purpose, Lord M. gave him letters of recommendation to the Governor-General, Mr. Hastings, by whom, on his arrival at Calcutta, he was kindly received, and by him furnished with letters, not only to the British authorities in the upper provinces, but to the native princes in alliance with the English Government, which, owing to the presents an individual so recommended would have thus received, ensured civility, together with considerable pecuniary advantage. De Boigne experienced this advantage in a peculiar degree on his arrival at Lucknow, where the Nabob made him

whilst prosecuting those objects, was anxiously watching the confusion and contentions in the imperial territory. He had been invited to take a part both by Mohummud Beg and Afrasiab Khan, but as the invitation sent by the latter was ostensibly

rich presents, and furnished him with letters of credit on Cabul and Candahar for 12,000 rupees. He set forward on his journey in company with Major Brown, at that time deputed on a mission to the Emperor; but Major Brown's progress having been interrupted by the jealousy of the Emperor's ministers, M. de Boigne, in consequence of being supposed one of his suite, was also detained, and took this opportunity of inaction to visit Sindia's camp, on the invitation of Mr. Anderson, the Resident. Sindia being suspicious of De Boigne, and desirous of ascertaining his real character which he expected to discover from the letters in his possession, caused all his baggage to be stolen by some dexterous thieves, whom he employed for the purpose; and although, on Mr. Anderson's application, the greater part of the baggage was restored, the letters and credits were not given up, a circumstance, as M. de Boigne conceived, equally ruinous to his fortune and his journey. It was then he first thought of endeavouring to get employed in the service of some native prince; and Gwalior being at this period besieged by Sindia, De Boigne formed a scheme for its relief, which he communicated to the Rana of Gohud through an officer named Sangster, a Scotchman, who commanded one thousand well-disciplined Sepoys, and a very respectable train of artillery, in the Rana's service. De Boigne proposed, on receiving an advance of 100,000 rupees, to raise two battalions within the Emperor's territory, east of the Jumna, in such a manner as to prevent suspicion, and in conjunction with Sangster from Gohud to fall on Sindia's camp by surprise. There was little doubt but the plan would have succeeded, had not the Rana been afraid to trust De Boigne with the requisite advance of money; but in order to intimidate Sindia, he published the proposed scheme, in all his ukhbars, as about to take place. The knowledge of the circumstance excited the enmity of Sindia towards De Boigne, although he saw the merit of the suggestion.

De Boigne next made overtures to the Raja of Jeypoor, and was commissioned by him to raise two battalions; but having inadvertently communicated this circumstance to the Governor-General, in an official form, Mr. Hastings, who had no objections to tolerate, although he could not sanction, his being so employed, ordered him to Calcutta—a summons with which M. de Boigne immediately complied. Mr. Hastings was so pleased by the prompt obedience shown to his commands that he permitted him to return; but before he could reach the upper provinces, events had occurred which induced the Raja of Jeypoor to alter his intentions. This change was a severe disappointment to De Boigne; but the Raja made him a present of 10,000 rupees. At this juncture De Boigne heard of Sindia's intended expedition to Bundelcund, and proposed to raise two battalions, of eight hundred and fifty men each, for that service, to which after some negotiation Sindia agreed. No advance of money was granted, but De Boigne was allowed for himself one thousand rupees, and for each man indis-

from the Emperor, Sindia preferred accepting it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. A meeting took place on the 22d October, but immediately afterwards Afrasiab Khan was assassinated by the brother of the late Mirza Shuffee, in whose murder Afrasiab Khan secretly participated.¹ As Sindia derived most advantage from the death of Afrasiab Khan, and as the assassin sought and found asylum in his camp, he did not escape suspicion of being accessory to the murder; but those who knew Mahadajee best never accused him of a deed so atrocious. The event, however, vested Sindia with complete authority at Delhi and placed him in a situation which he had only hoped to attain at some remote period. He refused the office of Umeer Ool Oomrah, but with his usual sagacity obtained for the Peishwa that of Wukeel-i-Mootluq, or supreme deputy, a dignity first conferred on the great Nizam Ool Moolk by Mohummud Shah; and Sindia, reversing the domestic policy of the Bramins, who always endeavour to be first in power but second in name, secured for himself the appointment of deputy to the Peishwa, so that he thus held by authority the executive power in Hindoostan, and a rank, which if he ever should be able and desirous of asserting it, would supersede that of all other ministers in the court of the Peishwa. The Emperor also conferred on him the command of his army, and gave up the provinces of Delhi and Agra to his management. For all which Sindia engaged to pay sixty-five thousand rupees monthly,

criminally eight rupees a month. To the privates M. de Boigne gave five and a half rupees monthly, and paid the officers proportionally from the balance. The battalions were formed as nearly as possible on the plan of those in the English service, and armed, disciplined, and clothed after that manner; the labour which this imposed on an individual may be easily conceived by any person acquainted with military affairs. De Boigne gradually got European officers of all nations into his corps. Sangster from the service of the Rana of Gohud joined him, and became superintendent of his cannon foundry.

The continuation of his memoirs will appear in the progress of the Mahratta history. What I have here stated is on the authority of General Count De Boigne himself, from notes taken in his presence.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my acknowledgements to General Count de Boigne for the obliging manner in which he communicated various points of information, during my visit to his hospitable mansion at Chamberri.

¹ Francklin's Life of Shah Alum. [See Keene's *Mughal Empire*, p. 136.]

in order to defray the expenses of the imperial household, and to that sum additions were gradually to be made, according to the increasing prosperity of the provinces.¹

A.D. 1785.—As Sindia appeared at the head of a powerful army, many of the officers serving with Mohummud Beg Humadnee withdrew from his party, and paid their respects to the Emperor. Mohummud Beg^f likewise acknowledged Sindia's authority, accepted a command, and was sent to reduce Raghooorh in the province of Kichwara, which he effected, and remained in that country for a considerable period. The imperial districts in the Dooab were speedily taken possession of, and Ryajee Patell was sent by Sindia to besiege Agra, the governor of which at first refused to give it up, but on the 27th (**Mar. 27.**) March it surrendered, when the Emperor's second son, Akber, was appointed nominal governor of the province, and Ryajee² Patell real governor of the fortress. The widow and brother of Afrasiab Khan resided in the fort of Aligurh,³ but refused to admit Sindia's garrison and sustained a siege until the middle of November, when they also surrendered.

The news of Sindia's success was received by the people at Poona with surprise and joy: a small body of the Peishwa's troops was sent off to join him as a measure of state policy, to preserve the appearance of the Peishwa's co-operation and supremacy; but Holkar and Nana Furnuwees were jealous of his elevation, and Sindia at no period of his life was so little on his guard to prevent that jealousy from being turned against him. In the first intoxication of success he so far lost sight of his usual prudence as to make a demand, under the Emperor's authority, for the Chouth of the British provinces in Bengal.

¹ Bengal Records.

² Ryajee's surname was Sindia. He was a favourite commander of Mahadajee Sindia, and a Patell of Panoura, a village near Assee Oomra. Ryajee Patell must not be confounded with another eminent person, Ramjee Patell, whose surname was Jadow. Ramjee commenced his career in the humble capacity of Bargeer in the service of Ryajee.

³ [The Governor of Aligarh (Aligurh) was persuaded by the entreaties of the ladies in the fort, including the widow of Afrasiab Khān, to surrender, in order to avert the horrors of a siege and capture. As a result of the capitulation the eldest son of Afrasiab Khān received an estate yielding annually Rs. 1,50,000, while the rest of the property, valued at a crore of rupees, was seized by Sindia. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 139.)]

To this arrogance he was probably encouraged by the departure of Mr. Hastings on the 8th February for England; but Mr. Macpherson, who had succeeded to the temporary charge of the Supreme Government, not only denied the existence of such a claim, but insisted on its being disavowed; and Sindia, perceiving that the acting Governor-General would not submit even to temporize with encroachment, acknowledged its impropriety. Mr. Macpherson conceived that the ambitious nature of Sindia's policy was very dangerous, and endeavoured to raise some counterpoise to his progress by exciting the jealousy and rivalry already entertained towards him among the other Mahratta chiefs. Moodajee Bhonslay being at Poona when the demand for the Chouth of Bengal was made, the Bombay Government, by Mr. Macpherson's desire, paid him extraordinary attention, which had the effect of gratifying Moodajee and alarming Sindia. Nana Furnuwees was encouraged in a desire he had frequently expressed of having a British Resident at the Peishwa's court, and Mr. Charles Malet was chosen for that important mission. Although no part of the treaty of Salbye precluded the British Government from sending an envoy to Poona, yet as considerable delicacy was due towards Sindia, it was desirable that he should give his assent to the appointment; and it was supposed that this could be best obtained by Mr. Malet's proceeding in person to Sindia's camp; but the latter was too sagacious not to perceive the loss of influence which Mr. Malet's mission would occasion him.¹ He observed that, after having been entrusted for three years with the management of the English affairs at

¹ [Mr. Charles Warre Malet was dispatched to Sindia's camp to gain his consent to the appointment of a permanent Resident at Poona by orders issued in January 1785. The embassy started from Surat on March 15 of that year, marched through the heart of Central India to Ujjain, reached Gwalior on May 2, visited Agra, where quarters were allotted to Mr. Malet in the Tāj Mahāl, and thence proceeded to Mathurā (Muttra), where Mr. Malet had an interview with Māhādājī Sindia and also visited Shāh Ālam, the Mughal Emperor. After obtaining Sindia's consent to the appointment of a Resident at Poona, Malet proceeded via Cawnpore to Calcutta, which he reached on October 18, 1785. On November 13 he received 'the instructions and credentials of the Honourable the Governor-General and Council to act as their Minister at the Pēshwā's Durbār, under date the 7th instant, with orders to proceed immediately to Bombay on my way to Poona.' (See Malet's Diary of his journey, 1785-6, pp. 485-526 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.)]

the court of Poona, the appointment of a Political Agent of their own would naturally impress the chiefs of the Deccan with an idea that the British Government was dissatisfied with his conduct, and had revoked the confidence it had previously reposed. But these objections, however plausible, were not of sufficient weight to dissuade Mr. Macpherson from the measure which he deemed it necessary to adopt. It was determined that Mr. Malet should proceed as envoy to the court of Poona; but before the arrangement was finally settled, events had taken place to the southward which rendered the appointment still more essential to the interests of the British Government.

CHAPTER XXXII.

FROM A.D. 1784 TO A.D. 1787.

A.D. 1784.—TIPPOO, in assuming a right to the province of Beejapoor and in threatening to attack the territory of Nizam Ally, had probably no other intention than to show the members of the confederacy, which he suspected was formed against him, that he was as well prepared to resist as they to prosecute the hostility meditated. At the subsequent accommodation with Nizam Ally, both parties understood that the adjustment was merely temporary. Tippoo continued to discipline his army and to

A.D. 1785. prepare his forts with increased exertion ; and as the crisis approached, the security of the frontier garrisons became a principal object of his attention.

The fort and district of Nurgoond,¹ situated about twelve miles south of the Malpurba, belonged to a Bramin Dessaye, and had fallen under Hyder with the other Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna in 1778. This district had only been subject to the payment of a moderate tribute, and Hyder, satisfied with the Dessaye's submission, exacted nothing more than what had been usually paid to the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, soon after his father's death had increased the demand, with which the Dessaye

¹ [Nargund (Nurgoond), now a town in Navalgund *tāluka*, Dhārwar District, situated thirty-two miles north-east of Dhārwar town, was one of the earliest possessions wrested by Sivāji from the Sultāns of Bijāpur. Together with some surrounding villages it was subsequently granted to the Bhāve family, to which the Brahman Desāi, mentioned by the author, probably belonged. After the defeat of the Pēshwā Bāji Rāo and the conquest of his territory, Nargund was handed over by the British to one Dādāji Rāo, who was at that time in possession of the town. In 1857 the chief revolted and murdered the British Commissioner and Political Agent, and Nargund was in consequence seized and incorporated in British territory. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 77, 78.)]

refused compliance; but concluding it would eventually be enforced, he secretly claimed protection from the Peishwa, whose subject he declared himself; and as secretly, through the agency of an Englishman in his service named Yoon, applied to the Bombay Government for the aid of some regular troops, representing that he was an independent Raja willing to cooperate in the invasion of Tippoo's dominions. This application to Bombay was made before the treaty of Mangalore; but as no notice was taken of his overtures, the Dessaye continued to court the protection of the minister at Poona and the friendship of the powerful Bramin family of Putwurdhun, with whom he is said to have been connected. When Tippoo, therefore, pressed his demand, Nana Furnuwees interposed and declared that he had no right to exact more than the ordinary tribute—'that Jagheerdars, on the transfer of districts, were liable to no additional payments: and that the rights of Suwusthanees,¹ who had been guilty of no treason against the state to which they owed allegiance, had been invariably respected.'² Tippoo replied that he had a right to levy what he chose from his own subjects; and soon after detached two separate bodies of his troops to enforce demands beyond the Dessaye's ability to pay, which was in other words an order to reduce his fort. The siege commenced in the month of March; and a body of Mahrattas, under Gunnessh Punt Behree and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, advanced to its relief. Tippoo's wukeels still remained at Poona, and Nana Furnuwees had sent orders to the Mahratta commanders not to precipitate hostilities; but by the time they arrived in the neighbourhood of Nurgoond, Tippoo's officers had been compelled from want of water to raise the siege and encamp at some distance. They however sent in derision a message to the Bramin commanders, intimating that they had withdrawn their troops from respect

¹ Bramins who possess old hereditary Jagheers are so styled. [*Savasthānīs* (*Suwusthanees*) were, strictly speaking, holders of *Savasthāns*, which were grants made to religious teachers by Marāthā chiefs, by thē Pēshwās, and by village officers. The most notable of such grants were those made to Bhārgavrām, Bājī Rāo's teacher, and to Rāmdās Swāmi, Sivājī's *guru*. Hindu religious grants in the Deccan comprised: (a) Marāthā *devasthāns* made by rulers or village officers, including grants to temples for lights (*dīp*), worship (*pūja*) and food (*naivēdya*); (b) *gāon devta* to meet the expenses of village shrines; (c) *savasthāns*. (*B.G.*, xix. 327.)]

² Mahratta MS.

to their master the Peishwa. Fired at the insult, the Mahrattas rode on to their camp, drove in their outposts, and pressed forward, until repulsed by two of Tippoo's regular battalions supported by the cavalry; when they retired with the loss of twenty men and an elephant. This premature attack was contrary to the orders of Nana Furnuwees; but as it had been made, he immediately directed Tookajee Holkar with a considerable force to support Gunnesh Punt and Pureshram Bhow; though he at the same time intimated to Tippoo his concern for the quarrel and his desire for an accommodation. Tippoo, whose motives will become apparent, expressed an equal readiness to meet his wishes, and even offered to pay two years' tribute, provided his right of sovereignty was recognized in regard to Nurgoond. Nana Furnuwees, by the advice of Nizam Ally and on assurance that submission only was required from the Dessaye, acceded to what Tippoo proposed, and everything appeared to be settled except the mode of payment, for which a period of twenty-seven days was allowed, and the Mahratta army recrossed the Kistna.¹ But Tippoo had practised a gross deception:—Nurgoond left to its fate submitted; and the terms promised to the unfortunate Dessaye were not observed. After evacuating the fort, he and his family were treacherously seized; his daughter was reserved for the Sultan's seraglio, and the rest were immured in Cabuldroog, where they perished. The fort of Kittoor,² which also belonged to a tributary Dessaye, had likewise

¹ [An account of this engagement at Nargund appears in Malet's diary under date June 30, 1785. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 517-8).]

² [Kittūr (Kittoor) is now included in Sampgaon *tāluka*, Belgaum District, and lies about twenty-six miles south-east of Belgaum town. The Desāis of Kittūr were descended from two brothers who acted as *shroffs* or bankers with the Bijāpur army towards the close of the sixteenth century. In return for their services they obtained a grant of Hubli (Dhārwar), and their fifth successor established himself at Kittūr. In 1818, when Munro was besieging Belgaum, the Desāi of Kittūr rendered much assistance and was allowed by the British to retain possession of the fort and village, which he held till his death in 1824. As he left no heir, an attempt was made by interested parties to secure the *ḷāgīr* by a forged deed of adoption, which led to an outbreak resulting in the death of Mr. Thackeray, the Political Agent and Collector. The fort was consequently seized, and the village included in British territory. A second rising in 1829 was not suppressed without difficulty. A temple at Kittūr contains a stone record of a trial by ordeal in 1188. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 23.)]

been seized, and both that place and Nurgoond, before the opening of the fair season, were occupied by strong garrisons of the Sultan's troops.

To crown these acts, as if he designed to render himself as odious as possible to the Mahrattas, Tippoo forcibly circumcised many of the Hindoo inhabitants of the territory south of the Kistna, and two thousand Bramins, disciples of Shunkeracharya,¹ destroyed themselves to avoid the detested violation.²

Nana Furnuwees very soon found that he had been duped by Tippoo, and he even began to doubt how far he might rely upon the co-operation of Nizam Ally: the inefficient state of the Moghul army had not escaped his observation when they met at Edgeer, and he was alarmed by accounts of the excellent state of discipline to which Tippoo's battalions had attained. These circumstances, combined with a report of Tippoo having entered into a new and closer alliance with the French, had the effect of overcoming his reluctance to calling in the aid of British troops.

¹ A famous Gooroo of the southern Mahratta country. [Shankarāchārya, whose birth is traditionally dated in A.D. 788, was the protagonist of the great reaction against Buddhism in the Deccan. Like Valmīkī and Vyāsa, he was not, it is alleged, a pure Brahman; but the Vedānta school and system which he founded became the exponent of orthodox Brahmanism, teaching that a Sūdra has no right to the Vedas, and is therefore incapable of effecting his own salvation. Whether Shankarāchārya contributed ideas of his own to his presentation of the old teaching, or whether he was merely a brilliant interpreter, it is certain that he possessed enormous intellectual power and audacity of speculation. In his famous commentary on the Upanishads, from which he sought to formulate a theory of the universe, he introduced the doctrine of *Māya*, or illusion, with the object of solving their logical antinomies and building them into a consistent system. (Macnicol, *Indian Theism*, 98, 199.) He is claimed as teacher by both Saivas and Vaishnavas, though he himself appears to have been a follower of Vishnu. The Smārta Brahmins of the South Deccan and Madras claim to be his descendants, and the Swāmi of Sringeri in Mysore is regarded as his modern representative. (See Sir R. G. Bhandarkar's *Vaisnavism, Saivism and Minor Religious Systems in Encyclopædia of Indo-Aryan Research* (Strassburg); Monier-Williams, *Brahmanism and Hinduism*.)]

² [Forcible circumcision was a method adopted on many occasions by Tipū. When Mangalore reverted to Tipū, many thousands of native Christians were thus treated and deported to Seringapatam. A revolt in Coorg resulted in the same treatment of the bulk of the inhabitants. See Wilks's *Sketches*, &c., ii. 100, for an account of the circumcision of the Kanara Christians; L. Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*, ii. 399; Thurston, *E.N.S.I.*, pp. 385 ff.]

But as Nana imagined the English would join in an offensive alliance against Tippoo on almost any terms, and being solicitous not to pledge himself so far as to prevent his eventually receding, the overtures to Mr. Boddam,¹ Governor of Bombay, were made with much caution. In the month of July he sent an agent to that Presidency, offering, on the part of the Peishwa, to give up to the Company any two of Tippoo's seaports on the Malabar coast, on condition of being assisted with a body of troops to co-operate in the reduction of his territory. Mr. Boddam received the proposal without expressing the least surprise at the inadequacy of the terms, and referred Nana Furnuwees to the Supreme Government with an unfeigned indifference, which did not escape the quick-sighted envoy, and from which Nana began to change his opinion of the English policy. Although Nana Furnuwees sent a private agent of his own to Calcutta, it was necessary to prosecute the negotiation through Mahadajee Sindia, whilst there was no British Resident at the Peishwa's court. Sindia immediately applied to the Governor-General, through Lieutenant James Anderson, then resident envoy in his camp, informed him of the probability of a rupture between the Peishwa and Tippoo, and artfully assumed as a matter of course that the English would afford every assistance 'as by the treaty of Salbye the friends and enemies of the Mahrattas and English were mutual.' He added that the Peishwa was sure of the co-operation of Nizam Ally, that the terms of their alliance were that each state should recover its lost territory, and of any new acquisitions there should be an equal participation. Mr. Macpherson² in reply observed that the treaty of Salbye did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two states should be mutual, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, and that by the treaty of Mangalore

¹ [Mr. Rawson Hart Boddam was appointed Governor of Bombay on September 3, 1784, and assumed charge of the office on January 6, 1785.]

² [Mr. (Sir John) Macpherson took the place of Warren Hastings as acting Governor-General in 1785, and held office until the appointment of Lord Cornwallis in 1786. Macpherson was originally a ship's purser, had been employed as agent for the Nawāb of the Carnatic, entered the service of the Company by backstairs influence, was dismissed by the Governor of Madras, but, having been reinstated by the Directors, was sent out to replace Barwell on the Bengal Council. (See *O.H.I.*, pp. 553-4.)]

the English were bound not to assist the enemies of Tippoo. Mr. Macpherson, in declining the alliance, made strong general professions of friendship towards the Mahrattas, hinted at some reasons for dissatisfaction with Tippoo on the part of the British Government, in consequence of his not having fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty of Mangalore, and concluded by assuring Sindia that, in case of any reverse, the British Government would not suffer the Mahrattas to be overpowered.

Nana Furnuwees, the less solicitous the Governor-General appeared, became the more anxious to obtain the co-operation of the English, and he urged it the more, in consequence of a new treaty supposed to have been concluded between Tippoo and the French. At last, either in despair of obtaining the aid of the English or in order to quicken their decision, he made overtures to the Portuguese by whom he was promised assistance. It is certain that Nana believed in the existence of this new treaty between Tippoo and the French, as the Mahratta envoy at Pondicherry publicly remonstrated with the French governor, and accused him of having thereby violated the promises of the King of France to the Peishwa. The French governor denied the existence of such a treaty, and, as a proof of what he alleged, proposed a closer connexion with the Peishwa, a circumstance which is said to have greatly offended Tippoo, who was already jealous of the high and independent tone assumed by his French friends. The French envoy at Poona was treated with much attention, and it was believed that the Peishwa's government had agreed to cede Rewadunda to that nation, on condition of their not assisting Tippoo.

These negotiations showed, more than ever, the necessity of appointing a British Resident at the Poona court, and Mr. Malet, then in Calcutta, was instructed to repair to Bombay and there await an invitation from the Peishwa to proceed to his capital.¹

¹ [In a letter to the Governor of Bombay, dated October 31, 1785, Malet quoted parts of a letter from the Pēshwā's government to the Rājā of Berār concerning the reception of Lubin at Poona, and added, 'Permit me, gentlemen, to repeat that after an avowal of such general principles, after their particular assent to my appointment, after setting us the example by sending agents both to Calcutta and Bombay, and above all, while they are at this moment entertaining a French envoy at Poona, no objection can rest with the Ministry (i.e. the Pēshwā's) to the promotion of the Company's orders in the completion of my appointment as signified both to your Government and

In the meantime the army was assembling at Poona for the purpose of invading Tippoo's territory, and Mr. Macpherson offered to send three battalions to assist in the defence of the Mahratta country, provided they were not employed within Tippoo's boundary; but as Nana's views extended to conquest he did not contemplate defence, and therefore rejected the proposal.¹

The periodical rains were this year of unusual duration, and the Mahratta army under Hurry Punt Phurkay did not quit Poona until about the 1st December. The troops advanced towards the eastern frontier for the purpose of forming a junction with Moodajee Bhonslay and Nizam Ally.

Moodajee, as we have had occasion to observe, had visited Poona during the preceding season; he showed a sincere desire to connect himself with the head of the state, and in the name of his son Rughoojee entered on a new agreement, promising to adhere strictly to that which had been framed by Mahdoo Rao and Janojee in 1769. He pledged himself particularly never to assist the English against the Peishwa's government, and promised to co-operate in the expected war with Tippoo, for which purpose he was now advancing.

A.D. 1786.—Nana Furnuwees followed the army for the purpose of conferring with Nizam Ally, and overtook Hurry Punt at Punderpoor, whence they moved down the right bank of the Beema, and were joined by the Moghul troops near the spot where the interview took place during the preceding season. It was now resolved to reduce the whole of Tippoo's territories and to divide the conquests into six equal parts, of which Nizam Ally should receive two shares, the Peishwa two, and Sindia and Holkar two shares between them, or one sixth each. It was further agreed that their first efforts should be directed to the recovery of the Mahratta districts between the Kistna and Toongbuddra. Tookajee Holkar and Gunnesh Punt Behree were detached with twenty-five thousand troops, chiefly horse, to attack a body of Tippoo's under Burhan-ud-deen near Kittoor, and to expel his garrisons from that district; whilst the main army of the confederates advanced towards Badamee. As they

this (Bengal) by the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors.' Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 525.)]

¹ Bengal and Bombay Records.

approached that place, reports were received of Tippoo's having marched with his whole army; and it was agreed, in case this intelligence should prove correct, to postpone the siege, but to encamp in the neighbourhood of Badamee until the rains had fallen, when the swelling of the rivers would in all probability secure them from interruption.

The prospect of a monsoon campaign was so little relished by Nizam Ally, that, in giving his assent to this plan of operations, he intimated his desire of returning to Hyderabad, and of leaving his general Tuhuwur Jung with 25,000 men under the orders of Hurry Punt; a measure entirely conformable to the wishes of the Mahrattas, who felt themselves encumbered by the form and ceremony necessarily observed to the Soobeh of the Deccan.

Soon after the departure of Nizam Ally, it was ascertained that Tippoo had sent forward some troops from Bangalore; but had himself returned to Seringapatam, on which it was immediately resolved to commence the projected siege. Operations began on the 1st May.¹ The fortified town of Badamee is built on the plain, with a small gurhee or citadel in the body of the place; but it is further protected by two hill-forts, one on each flank.² After battering the walls of the town for three weeks, they were very little injured; but it was determined to try the effect of an escalade. On the morning of the 20th May, twenty thousand infantry of the confederate armies were drawn up for that service. The garrison, consisting of upwards of three thousand five hundred troops, manned the works to oppose them; and when the assailants advanced, which they did with great resolution, they found the ditch and covert way full of small mines, constructed by digging pits, and placing in them large dubbars³ filled with gunpowder; these were fired, and

¹ Poona Records. Mahratta MS.

² Sir C. Malet's dispatches. [The two forts, which were both dismantled about 1845, are named *Bāvanbande* ('fifty-two rocks') and *Rānmandal* ('battle-field'). *Bādāmi* is now a village in the Bijāpur District, and a station on the Southern Marāthā Railway. It was captured by General Munro in 1818. In 1840 a band of 125 Arabs from the Nizām's territory, headed by a blind Brahman, seized the village, plundered the Government treasury and market, and carried the booty into the Nizām's territory. The Brahman and his followers were caught, tried and sentenced to transportation. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 44.)]

³ Dubbers are large vessels, which in appearance resemble immense blown bladders; they are extremely useful for many purposes, but

proved exceedingly destructive ; but the Mahrattas and Moghuls, vying with each other, rushed forward in a most impetuous, though tumultuous manner, applied ladders, mounted the walls in various places, and except a slight check, sustained at the gurhee, carried all before them within the town. The garrison fled to the forts above, closely followed by the assailants ; but the pursuers did not succeed in entering with the fugitives. They, however, continued to crowd up the face of the hills, though huge stones were rolled down, and a heavy fire of musketry opened upon them. Their casualties were numerous ; but the garrison becoming intimidated at their furious and persevering attack, offered to surrender, if their lives were spared ; a condition which was immediately granted.¹

After the fall of Badamee, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona, and Hurry Punt was left to prosecute the war. Moodajee Bhonslay went back to Nagpoor, but left the greater part of his troops with Hurry Punt, under his second son Khundoojee, promising to return with a reinforcement after the Dussera.

While these operations were prosecuted by the grand army, the detachment which proceeded to the westward, under Holkar, had expelled Tippoo's troops from every part of the Kittoor district, except the fort of the same name, which they invested but could not hope to reduce.

Hurry Punt's first care was to send back all his wounded from Badamee ; he then moved towards Gudjendergurh,² but as the small fort of Seertee lay in his route,³ he breached and stormed it ;

principally for preserving oil and ghee. They are made of hides, which are first beaten into a pulp, and then spread in thin coats over shapes composed of clay, and as each coat dries, a new one is added, until the requisite thickness has been attained. When the whole of the coats become solid and dry, the clay is broken to dust and shaken out. Dubbers are sometimes made larger than a wine pipe, and will last upwards of a century. [See Yule's *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. Crooke (1903), p. 328, which gives the derivation of the word from Hind-Persian *dabbah*, and quotations from various authors elucidating the meaning.]

¹ Poona Records and Malet's dispatches.

² [Gajendragarh (Gudjendergurh) is now a town in the Ron *tāluka*, Dhārwar District, fifty-one miles south-east of Kalādgi.]

³ Hurry Punt's official report to the Peishwa. I do not know the exact situation of Seertee ; the Hindoo names frequently differ from the Mahomedan. The propagators of the Koran have always been prone to bestowing new, and the Hindoos to retaining old, appellations.

but scarcely had he accomplished that object, when he was informed that Tippoo was marching to give him battle; and such was the vigilance of a corps of Beruds¹ in Tippoo's service, consisting of both horse and foot, that the address and dexterity of Mahratta spies, famous only where their own language is spoken, could obtain no correct intelligence of his notions, and the first certain accounts which Hurry Punt received assured him that Tippoo was in full march to attack Adonee. That fortress was then held by Mohubbut Jung, son of the late Busalut Jung and nephew of Nizam Ally, who was totally unprepared for a siege. The families and seraglio of the late Busalut Jung, as well as those of his sons, were then in the fort, and Mohubbut Jung's first application was to Nizam Ally, calling upon him to save the honour of his house. A pressing requisition was also sent to Hurry Punt, who immediately sent forward Tuhuwur Jung with the whole of the Moghul troops and twenty thousand Mahrattas under Krist Rao Bulwunt and Rugonath Rao Neelkunt. These troops were on the march towards Adonee, when they received intelligence of the advance towards Raichore of the whole of the disposable force from Hyderabad under Moghul Ally. A junction was formed at Bunnoor, when they moved towards Adonee with an army of nearly sixty thousand men. Tippoo endeavoured to carry the place before the arrival of the approaching succour; his desperate but premature attempts were most gallantly repulsed by Mohubbut Jung, and as the allies drew near, he was compelled to raise the siege and retire some miles to the southward. The confederates had forded the Toongbuddra with difficulty; and as the country to the southward of that river was entirely at Tippoo's command, whilst they could place no dependence on the resources of the tract between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, much of which still remained to be reduced, they prudently resolved to withdraw the garrison from Adonee and recross the latter river. The retreat was judiciously executed; but the

¹ The class of people already described, resembling the Ramoosees of Maharashtra, and improperly called Beders. [See footnote to page 264, vol. i. Bēdar is generally accepted now as the correct name of the tribe, though the term Berad is still in common use in the Southern Marāthā country. The Marāthā spies were handicapped by the fact that Kanarese was, as it is still, the common vernacular of the Belgaum and Dhārwar Districts. The Bēdars are fully described by Thurston, *C. and T.S.I.*, i. 180 ff.]

unpardonable oversight of leaving the fort, guns, ammunition, and stores, without an attempt to render them unserviceable to their enemy, cancelled any merit the commanders might otherwise have claimed.¹

The troops from Hyderabad returned to that capital, and the main body rejoined Hurry Punt at Gudjendergurh, of which place he had obtained possession by bribing the Killidar.

Holkar still lay before Kittoor, apparently in careless inactivity ; when decamping suddenly, he made one march of upwards of sixty miles to Savanoor, with the Nabob of which he had been some time in correspondence. The immediate object of Holkar's movement was an attempt to seize the person of Raghavendra Naik, one of Tippoo's principal bankers, but he had just time to escape across the Toongbuddra, and only two or three inferior Soucars fell into Holkar's hands, from whom he exacted a ransom of two lacks of rupees. Burhan-ud-deen, with a body of Tippoo's troops, attacked Holkar : but the Mahrattas, joined by the Nabob of Savanoor, repulsed them ; and on the ensuing night Burhan-ud-deen retired to Jereeanwutty on the Wurdah, thirty miles above Savanoor.

About the year 1779, the Nabob of Savanoor had married the sister of Tippoo, and on that occasion Hyder restored the whole of the twelve districts originally dependent on his principality, on condition that he should keep up two thousand Patan horse for the service of the state. Tippoo entertained a personal enmity against the Nabob, and on his accession to power found a pretext for indulging it, owing to the Nabob's having omitted to keep up the stipulated number of horse. Following a systematic plan, Tippoo mulcted and plundered both the Nabob and his subjects : so that it was not surprising the Nabob should seek the first opportunity of throwing off his allegiance and declaring, as he now did, for the Mahrattas.

Hurry Punt's operations, after obtaining possession of Gudjendergurgh, were directed against Buhadur Benda and Kopaul ; the former had been delivered up and he was in treaty for the latter, when he was astonished by information of Tippoo's having actually crossed the Toongbuddra at Gurhghaut,² with the greater

¹ Hurry Punt's dispatches. Bombay Records. Wilks.

² Col. Wilks calls this place Kurrucknaut. It is not marked in any map that I have seen, nor do I know its precise situation.

part of his army in basket boats. Hurry Punt advanced towards him : but finding the ground very unfavourable for the operations of his cavalry, he encamped at the distance of ten miles, where Tippoo made two unsuccessful attempts to surprise him. Grain and forage being extremely scarce, in order to procure supplies as well as to draw Tippoo into the plain, Hurry Punt proceeded to Savanoor. Tippoo, marching along the bank of the Kistna, followed him, and encamped in a strong position within six miles of the confederates, keeping the town of Savanoor between the camps. In this situation both parties continued for fifteen days, until on the 1st of October, two hours before dawn, the Mahratta camp was alarmed by a sudden firing, which was speedily answered by the Mahratta artillery. Tippoo, who had headed the attack in person, on discovering where their guns were posted, directed his principal effort to that spot, which induced Hurry Punt to draw them off until daylight, when they again opened on the assailants. The position occupied by the Mahrattas was still very unfavourable ; their horse were prevented from charging by the steep banks of a rivulet, which Tippoo cautiously refrained from crossing, and after cannonading for several hours he withdrew to his encampment.

There was a scarcity of forage in the Mahratta camp, and their own situation, and that of their enemy, precluded all hope of being able to gain any advantage by continuing at Savanoor. Hurry Punt, therefore, deemed it necessary to retire, although he thereby sacrificed the capital of his new ally. The Nabob of Savanoor reluctantly fell back with him ten miles, where the confederates took up a new position. Tippoo possessed himself of the town, but declined advancing upon them : he lay inactive at Savanoor until the Mohurrum, when he retired to celebrate that festival at Benkapoor, leaving Hurry Punt to breach, storm, and take Seerhutty, a fortified town twenty miles north-east of Savanoor, without interruption. Tippoo, having deposited his heavy baggage in Benkapoor, moved from that place ; but aware of his enemy's superiority in cavalry, he did not quit the broken ground on the banks of the Wurdah and Toongbuddra. Proceeding down the left bank, he encamped between Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and again obtained possession of the latter place. The confederates followed him and endeavoured to cut off his supplies ; but their own forage being brought from a great distance, whilst

Tippoo drew his with facility from the south bank of the Toongbuddra, they soon abandoned the attempt. Tippoo renewed his endeavours to surprise the camp of the confederates, and on one occasion took some baggage belonging to the Moghuls.¹

(A.D. 1787.)—In these feeble operations neither party could boast of much advantage, and the confederates were at a loss to account for Tippoo's motives in suddenly tendering proposals of peace. Even after the arrival of two envoys of high rank, Budrul-Zeman Khan and Ali Reza Khan, who negotiated through Tookajee Holkar and Gungadhur Rastia, Hurry Punt for a time imagined that Tippoo's professions were only a prelude to some stratagem. His suspicions contributed to prolong the negotiation, for although an armistice took place on the 10th February, the peace was not concluded till April. The Mahrattas obtained the cession of Badamee, Kittoor, and Nurgoond; the other towns and districts reduced by them were restored to Tippoo. Tippoo also agreed to pay forty-five lacks of tribute, thirty of which were immediately produced, and the remainder promised at the expiration of the year. Adonee was restored to the nephew of Nizam Ally; but Tippoo had destroyed the works and carried off the guns. The Nabob of Savanoor obtained a promise of the restoration of that portion of his territory which he possessed prior to his marriage with Hyder's daughter, but dreading Tippoo's treachery, he did not venture to return to Savanoor at this period, but continued with his Mahratta friends at Poona.²

Tippoo's motives for acceding to a pacification so disadvantageous have been imputed,³ it would appear justly, to his apprehending that the English were about to take part against him. Mr. Malet had not only been invited to Poona as Resident, but at the request of Nana Furnuwees he had joined him at Badamee, a circumstance which Tippoo conceived bespoke a very intimate connexion; but the acting Governor-General was studious to allay any alarm it might create, and had partly succeeded.

¹ Just at this period, the following letter appears in the official correspondence of Hurry Punt, and in his own handwriting:—'The loss sustained by the army, in consequence of the cholera morbus, is very great; medicines are liberally supplied; some do recover, but by far the greater part die.'

² Poona Records. Mr. Chaplin's report.

³ Wilks.

Shortly afterwards however, in September, 1786, Lord Cornwallis, having assumed charge of the Supreme Government, addressed letters to the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, in which although he expressly intimated his determination to take no part in the war between the confederates and Tippoo Sultan, yet the state of military efficiency in which it became the immediate care of the new Governor-General to place all the Presidencies, occasioned a bustle and apparent preparation which seem to have convinced Tippoo that the designs of the English were decidedly hostile ; and may not merely account for his earnestness to terminate the war with the confederates, but afford some reason for that rancorous hostility which led him to persevere in schemes for annihilating the power of the British nation in India.

The appointment of a Resident at the Peishwa's court was not more a cause of alarm to Tippoo than of jealousy to Mahadajee Sindia. A tardy acquiescence was obtained from Sindia to the measure, and in order to reconcile him to it as much as possible, Mr. Malet was instructed to send his dispatches to the Supreme Government through the Resident, for the purpose of being submitted for Sindia's information and obtaining his opinions. But Sindia was at this period, and for several years afterwards, too much occupied by his own vast projects in Hindoostan, to be able either to prevent the English from establishing their influence at Poona, or to direct much of his attention to the affairs of the Deccan. The history of his progress will be found in the ensuing chapter.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

FROM A.D. 1785 TO A.D. 1790.

A.D. 1785.—THE resources of the provinces which Sindia had acquired in Hindoostan were from their exhausted state totally inadequate to meet the great additional disbursements which his late success, more brilliant than lucrative, had entailed. Pressed by pecuniary embarrassments, he was driven to acts equally impolitic and unjust. Against foreign adversaries he might have prevailed, but domestic enemies soon became too strong for his newly established power. The principal cause of discontent arose from his sequestering the Jagheers of many of the Mahomedan chiefs,¹ and from being suspected of entertaining like designs towards all of them. The most considerable of these chiefs, whom he had not yet dispossessed, was Mohummud Beg Humadane, whom Sindia had recalled from Raghoogurh to Delhi, and endeavoured, without success, to prevail upon him to disband a portion of his troops. Mohummud Beg, suspecting that Sindia intended to enforce compliance, ever after harboured a secret enmity against him, which the course of events soon afforded an opportunity of declaring.

A.D. 1786.—Under the sanction of the Emperor's name, Sindia had not only preferred a claim for tribute on the Rajpoots, but at the head of his army at the gates of Jeypoor had fixed the first payment at sixty lacks of rupees, of which a part was received and the balance promised in a given time. When the period expired, Sindia sent Ryajee Patell to recover the remainder; but the Rajpoots having prepared for resistance, and being secretly

¹ [The sequestration of the *jāgīrs* was a necessary result of Sindia's determination to organize a regular standing army, for the *jāgīrs* were fiefs bestowed for military service, and their maintenance was incompatible with the new system. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 145.)]

assured of support from Mohummud Beg and the disaffected Mahomedan nobles, refused to pay the amount, derided the authority of Ryajee Patell, attacked his troops and routed them. The faction at Delhi opposed to Sindia was much strengthened by this revolt ; even the imbecile monarch, whose stipend was irregularly paid, and who readily became the tool of any new party, joined in the increasing murmurs : complained of the invaded rights of imperial dignity, and of the arbitrary acts and uncourteous manner of the Mahratta chiefs. Sindia, though sensible of these discontents, though his funds were exhausted, his own and the imperial troops in arrears, and his fortunes depending on the issue of a very doubtful campaign, was obliged to take the field against the Rajpoots. He ordered his troops under Appa Khunde Rao, with the two battalions of De Boigne lately returned from Bundelcund, to join him ; but, to add to his difficulties, he was obliged to detach two separate bodies of troops to the northward of Delhi, under two of his own officers, Hybut Rao Phalkay and Ambajee Inglija, to repel an incursion of the Seiks.

A.D. 1787.—On approaching Jeypoor, Sindia endeavoured to negotiate, but his overtures were disregarded. The Raja of Joudpoor, with several Rajpoot chiefs of less note, united with Pertaub Sing, the Raja of Jeypoor, who had succeeded his father Jey Sing, and their army was already very formidable.¹ The greater part of Sindia's troops being very different from those of an army wholly Mahratta, the Rajpoots by acting on the supplies, and cutting off the foragers, soon rendered their situation critical. Both Mahrattas and Moghuls, irritated by privation, became dissatisfied ; and Mohummud Beg Humadane, together with his nephew, Ismael Beg, chose this moment for deserting Sindia and joining the Rajpoots. Lest the disaffection should spread to the whole of the Emperor's troops, Sindia took the earliest opportunity of leading them into action. An obstinate battle took place—Mohummud Beg fell by a cannon shot, and his troops were on the point of flying, when they were rallied by Ismael Beg, who retrieved the day and forced the Mahrattas to retire. Sindia was preparing to renew the contest, when, on the third day after

¹ [The Rājput forces comprised 100,000 horse and foot, and 400 pieces of artillery. The battle was fought about forty-three miles east of Jaipur (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 146). For the campaigns in Northern India, Tod should be consulted.]

the battle, the whole of the Emperor's regular infantry, with eighty pieces of cannon, went off in a body to join Ismael Beg.¹

At no period of his life did Sindia evince greater fortitude and conduct than at this alarming crisis.² He immediately sent off his heavy baggage and many of his followers to Gwalior, by the route of Kooshalghurh; he then made a rapid retreat to Deeg, recalled his detachments, and restored Deeg, with several other places, to the Jhats, in order to preserve an interest with that people. He also deposited his heavy guns in their fort of Bhurt-poor, and strengthened his garrisons in Aligurh and Agra.³

To effect these and other contingent arrangements required some time, and had the Rajpoots pressed the war with vigour, they might probably have confined the Mahrattas to the southern bank of the Chumbul; but they only sought to suppress the ambitious pretensions of Sindia, not to annihilate the Mahratta ascendancy in Hindoostan. They therefore returned to their respective capitals when Sindia retreated, and left Ismael Beg to recover the imperial districts.⁴ Ismael first proceeded towards Agra; in the neighbourhood of which Sindia was still hovering, but he was determined to avoid another general action. At that time, however, skirmishes took place for eight successive days, and one village was repeatedly taken and retaken; but it being reported that Gholam Kawdir,⁵ the son of Zabita Khan Rohilla, was on his march to assist Ismael Beg, Sindia made a rapid retreat towards Gwalior, on which occasion many of his men perished,

¹ Mahratta MS. and letters. Bengal Records, &c. [About 14,000 infantry thus deserted, after sending a message to the Rājā of Jaipur that they would join him if he paid them two lakhs of rupees. The Rājā accepted these terms. It should be noted that the author, writing from Marāthā sources, places Ismail Beg's defection prior to the battle. In the Musalmān accounts this action of Ismail Beg is slurred over. 'Perhaps,' writes Keene, 'we shall not be far wrong in supposing that Ismail Beg went off after his uncle's death, when the mutinous corps deserted.' (*Mughal Empire*, p. 149.)]

² From the oral information of General De Boigne.

³ Sindia's letters to the Peishwa, confirmed by General De Boigne.

⁴ Scott's History. Mahratta MS.; original letters, and English Records.

⁵ [Ghulām Kādir's object was probably to renew his father's claims upon the Mughal Emperor and to obtain for himself the dignity of Amīr-ul-Umrā, or Premier Noble. He is supposed to have been acting under the direction of Mansūr Ali Khān (Safdar Jang), Controller of the Imperial Household, who hoped to secure valuable support for Islam by introducing the young Pathān chief into the administration.]

by losing themselves in the ravines contiguous to the Jumna.¹ Sindia had made repeated applications to the Peishwa for troops, and now wrote to Nana Furnuwees, representing that although he by no means considered his own affairs desperate, yet as he had reason to believe the English were about to form an alliance with the Emperor and the Rajpoots, he submitted to his consideration the danger that must ensue to the whole Mahratta empire, by allowing the English to establish their sway over the provinces of Hindoostan and to gain such an influence as they must acquire, if assisted by the weight of the imperial name. He strongly disavowed every feeling of jealousy, and called on Nana, if such did exist towards himself, to erase it from his mind; to ask Holkar, Hurry Punt, and Pureshram Bhow, if he (Sindia) had ever interfered with their views, and if they had not seen that all his endeavours tended to the aggrandizement of the empire: 'we serve,' continued Sindia, 'a common master; let our exertions be directed to the common cause: if you personally entertain jealousy of me, ask yourself who supported you against the faction of Moraba, and put your rival Sukaram Bappoo into your power; who suppressed the insurrection of the pretended Sewdasheo Rao Bhow; beat the English at Tullygaom, maintained a great share of the war against them, and concluded an advantageous peace?—Think of these services, banish suspicion, and silence calumniators, who are our mutual enemies—let the cause of the Mahratta nation be upheld in Hindoostan, and prevent our empire from being disunited and overthrown.'²

These observations, though incorrect with regard to any alliance then meditated by the English, carried much of truth in them; but the grand aim of Nana Furnuwees was to cement the Mahratta confederacy under the authority of the Peishwa, and the whole conduct of Sindia had so fully proved that his views were directed to independence if not to supremacy in the empire, that Nana, however unwilling to relinquish Mahratta claims in Hindoostan, hesitated as to the extent and mode of reinforcing Sindia's army.

A body of troops had been held in readiness under Ali Buhadur,³

¹ General De Boigne.

² Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia to Nana Furnuwees.

³ The son of Shumsher Buhadur and grandson of the great Bajee Rao.

even prior to Sindia's retreat ; but Nana wished to employ them in making a distinct settlement with the Rajpoot states in the name of the Peishwa, for the purpose of extending the Mahratta influence, without confirming the power of a rival of such inordinate ambition. It is supposed by some of his countrymen that Nana had some communications with the Raja of Jeypoor for the purpose of preserving the Hindoo power, but with a view also of controlling Sindia ; the moderation shown by the Rajpoots in not molesting Sindia's retreat is adduced as a proof of this conjecture, but without an absolute rupture with Sindia, which was justly considered ruinous to the empire, Nana saw no means of attaining the ascendancy he desired. Besides the difficulties arising from these considerations, some fresh acts of hostility on the part of Tippoo rendered him averse to detach troops from the Deccan. Sindia, however, whilst he urged these applications at Poona, was using every exertion to retrieve his affairs by his own resources. His most active enemy was Ismael Beg, who, after the retreat of the Mahratta army, invested Agra, which was vigorously defended by Luckwa Dada, a Mahratta Bramin of the Shenwee tribe. At this time appeared Gholam Kawdir, who on the death of his father, Zabita Khan, which happened in January, 1785, succeeded to the Jagheer. His disposition, equally cruel and turbulent, was kept in check whilst the power of Sindia, his hereditary enemy, was predominant ; but no sooner did he see a field open to his view, by the reverses which befell that chief, than he collected troops and rushed on a scene which promised ample gratification to his inclinations. Instead of proceeding to join Ismael Beg, as was reported to be his intention, he in the first instance drove the Mahratta garrison from the city of Delhi, where he placed his own troops, but left the Emperor unmolested in the citadel. He next besieged Aligurh which he reduced, and then proceeded to assist Ismael Beg, who was still engaged in the siege of Agra. The Jhats, whom Ismael Beg might have conciliated by confirming the cessions made to them by Sindia, took every opportunity of obstructing his operations and encouraging the besieged in the fort, till at last Sindia determined to support them. For this purpose he sent forward Rannay Khan ¹ and Appa Khunde Rao

A.D.
1788.

¹ Rannay Khan, says Sir John Malcolm, was originally a Bihishtee, or water-carrier, who saved Mahadajee Sindia's life by carrying him

with a body of horse supported by the two regular battalions of De Boigne, and some other infantry. As the junction of Gholam Kawdir with Ismael Beg was known at Gwalior before the march of these troops, it was deemed an imprudent measure on the part of Sindia. Rannay Khan, however, united his forces with those of the Jhats at Bhurtpoor, when the whole marched towards Agra ; but they had only proceeded sixteen miles, when they met Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, who had raised the siege in order to give them battle.

The cavalry of the Jhats was commanded by Sew Sing Foujdar, their infantry, chiefly regulars, was under M. Listeneaux, a Frenchman, and two Mahomedan officers, each commanding separate bodies ; but one of these Mahomedan officers, named Jehangeer Khan, with his three battalions, deserted to Ismael Beg without firing a shot. The action commenced by a cannonade
 (April 24th.) from the guns of Ismael Beg. The Jhats were on the right, the Mahrattas on the left : Gholam Kawdir made a furious attack upon the infantry of the right wing, which soon put them all to rout, excepting those under M. Listeneaux,¹ who for some time maintained his ground. Ismael Beg, opposed to the infantry on the left, advanced with all the energy of his character, but found himself received with remarkable steadiness and intrepidity by the infantry of De Boigne. All parties admitted that had De Boigne and Listeneaux been properly supported by

off when wounded at Panniput, and in gratitude for this service Sindia raised him to high command.—Whatever may have been Rannay Khan's origin, his conduct proved that he was worthy of his master's confidence. The escape of Mahadajee Sindia, however, is generally attributed with more probability to Trimbukjee Ingliā, one of his Sillidars, who is said to have carried him off behind him on his horse.

¹ [Keene thinks this may be 'a mistake for some such word as Lestonneaux.' Compton (*Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, pp. 368-9) spells the name Lestineau, and states that he commanded a corps in the service of Ranjīt Singh, Rājā of Bharatpur, about 1788. After the battle of Lālsot in 1787, Sindia was allied with Ranjīt Singh, and Lestineau's corps acted in conjunction with the Marāthās at Chaksāna and Agra. It is stated that when Ghulām Kādir Rohilla fled from Meerut, his jewels, which he carried with him in his saddle-bags, fell into Lestineau's hands, and that with these and the stolen pay of his own battalions Lestineau absconded, and found his way to Europe. John Hessing (see *infra*, p. 219) was also in this campaign, as may be gathered from the epitaph on his tomb at Agra (Keene, p. 157). The battle described by the author took place near Fathpur Sīkrī on the Bharatpur (Bhurtpoor) road.]

the cavalry, the issue of the day might have been very different ; but, after a heavy loss, the regular troops at last gave way, and the whole, favoured by the night, effected their retreat to Bhurt-poor. Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir called upon Runjeet Sing, the Jhat chief, to renounce his connexion with the Mahrattas, otherwise they would, after the reduction of Agra, besiege him in his capital. But their triumph was of short duration ; Luckwa Dada, the Killidar of the fort of Agra, persevered in his gallant and successful defence ; the Mahomedan chiefs soon evinced a distrust of each other, and Rannay Khan, hearing of an incursion of the Seiks, sent a body of Mahrattas and Jhats to join and encourage them to fall on the Jagheer of Gholam Kawdir. This diversion had the desired effect : Gholam Kawdir immediately set off to repel the invaders, and Sindia, having reinforced the division of Rannay Khan, the Mahrattas and Jhats once more advanced towards Agra, at which place an obstinate battle was fought, in which De Boigne and his battalions greatly signalized themselves. The army of Ismael Beg was defeated and dispersed ; that chief himself, after receiving two severe wounds, escaped from the field by the swiftness of his horse, plunged into the Jumna, gained the opposite bank, and with a few followers reached the camp of Gholam Kawdir, by whom he was courteously received. His dispersed army flocked to Delhi, whither, in hopes of again collecting them, he immediately repaired. Gholam Kawdir followed him to the capital. The Emperor refused to admit either the one or the other into the citadel ; but Gholam Kawdir, having corrupted one of the confidential servants, not only gained admittance, but seized the gates, occupied every part of the palace and citadel with his own troops, and commenced a systematic train of violence, rapine, and barbarity, almost without example in the annals of the world. These enormities continued for two months ; at the end of that time, when the unhappy monarch had been plundered, insulted, and dethroned, his eyes destroyed in their sockets, by the point of a dagger in the hand of the merciless Gholam Kawdir ; when his wives, daughters, sons, and relatives had been exposed, dishonoured, degraded, and some of them starved to death, the Mahratta army at last marched to his relief. Ismael Beg, who at first had so far concurred in the views of Gholam Kawdir as to agree to plunder the imperial palace, for the purpose of procuring the means of

(June
18th.)

subsistence to their troops, turned with abhorrence from the commission of the cruelties exercised by his colleague ; and, on the promise of a Jagheer from Sindia, joined with the Mahrattas against him. Gholam Kawdir retired from Delhi upon their approach, carrying with him Bedar Bukht, the son of Ahmed Shah, whom, on the dethronement of Shah Alum, he had proclaimed Emperor of the Moghuls.

Mahadajee Sindia was severely censured for not immediately proceeding to the capital, but he probably foresaw that Gholam Kawdir and Ismael Beg, if left for a time to themselves, could not remain united, and, as the result proved, that he should soon be able to secure one party in his interests.¹ Besides these reasons, he was assured that reinforcements under Ali Buhadur, followed by Tookajee Holkar, were on their march from Poona to join him. These troops were granted by Nana Furnuwees, on condition that all territory acquired north of the Chumbul should be equally shared by the Peishwa, Sindia, and Holkar.

The Mahratta army which advanced from Agra was under three principal officers, Rannay Khan, Ali Buhadur, and Appa Khunde Rao, accompanied by the two battalions of De Boigne. Rannay Khan, who was chief in command, on taking possession of Delhi, did everything which humanity dictated for the relief of the unfortunate Emperor. The arrival of the Mahrattas in the Moghul capital was, on this occasion, hailed with the greatest joy. A large body immediately pursued Gholam Kawdir, and forced him to take shelter in the fort of Meerut, where he defended himself vigorously ; but the place being destitute of provisions, and his capture, if he continued, inevitable, he mounted a swift horse and fled alone. But after he had proceeded some distance, the horse fell, and his rider being completely stunned lay senseless on the ground. In this situation he was at daylight discovered and recognized by some of the peasantry, and by them carried to the Mahratta camp, where he was closely guarded, and shortly after, by Sindia's orders, he suffered a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive.² The prince Bedar Bukht was retaken at

¹ [Sindia, however, did urge the Bēgam Samru to hasten to the Emperor's assistance, and also dispatched a messenger to his relative Rāyāji (Ryajee), who arrived at Delhi in the middle of July with a force of 2,000 horse. The Jāts also furnished a small contingent. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 167.)]

² [Keene describes his punishment as follows : ' On his arrival at

Meerut ; and at first, without any harshness, was remanded into confinement, but he was afterwards put to death by order of Shah Alum.¹

A.D. 1789.—Mahadajee Sindia arrived in Delhi a short time after the success of Rannay Khan. Shah Alum was reseated on his throne with much pomp, and the honours of Wukeel-i-Mootluq, formerly conferred on the Peishwa, and those of his deputy on Sindia, were renewed with formal solemnity.²

Meanwhile the Jagheer of Gholam Kawdir was reduced, and the greater part of the Dooab, with the provinces of Delhi and Agra, was annexed to the Mahratta dominions. The situation of Sindia, however, was by no means secure ; he for some time dreaded an invasion of the Abdallee, who under their King, Timoor Shah, were in the field in great force, and he well knew, although the Moghul faction was broken and Ismael Beg had received his stipulated Jagheer in the province of Meywat, that in the event of the appearance of the Afghans, the Mahomedans would unite against him. He had also powerful enemies in the Rajpoots ; and his coadjutors, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, were more solicitous to share his acquisitions and obstruct his measures than to unite in upholding his cause. He at the same time experienced some inquietude from the escape of one of the sons of the Emperor, who

Muttra, Sindeea inflicted upon him the punishment of *Tushheer*, sending him round the bazaar on a jackass, with his face to the tail, and a guard instructed to stop at every considerable shop and beg a cowree, in the name of the Nuwab of the Bawunee. The wretched man becoming abusive under this contemptuous treatment, his tongue was torn out of his mouth. Gradually he was mutilated further ; being first blinded, as a retribution for his treatment of the Emperor, and subsequently deprived of his nose, ears, hands and feet, and sent to Delhi. Death came to his relief upon the road, it is believed by his being hanged upon a tree, March 3, 1789 ; and the mangled trunk was sent to Delhi where it was laid before the sightless monarch, the most ghastly *Nuzzur* that ever was presented in the *Deewan Khas.* (*Mughal Empire*, p. 184.)

¹ Bengal Records. Francklin, Scott, and Mahratta MS.

² [An annual allowance of nine lakhs of rupees was assigned for the support of the Emperor's family and court ; but the amount was not regularly paid, and during Sindia's frequent absences the royal family was often reduced to absolute indigence. All that Shāh Ālam had in his old age for the support of his thirty children and numerous retainers was a monthly allowance of Rs. 2,000, together with the fees paid by persons desirous of being presented. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 186.) The full narrative of the events at Agra and Delhi will be found in Keene, bk. ii, chs. v and vi.]

fled to the court of Nizam Ally at Hyderabad. Little notice being taken of him, he repaired to Poona where he was received with attention, but more to excite Sindia's jealousy than with any intention of affording to the fugitive assistance or relief.

These obstacles did not deter Mahadajee Sindia from pursuing his plans of independence. In detailing his political schemes and the progress of his conquests, we must not omit to notice the changes which he introduced in the constitution of his army. Amongst the minor innovations of Sindia may be enumerated the great proportion of Rajpoots and Mahomedans whom he enlisted; the alteration of the dress of his horsemen, who, from the short breeches worn by the Mahrattas, adopted the long trowsers covering the heel,¹ and lastly, the large bodies of Gosaeens, whom he entertained, and who, until introduced by Sindia, had rarely appeared as soldiers in the Mahratta armies.² The Gosaeens were kept distinct by Sindia from his other troops, and were attached to the division of Ambajee Ingliā, principally under a leader named Himmut Buhadur, who was both their military commander and their spiritual director, and whose history merits some digression.

Himmut Buhadur accompanied Sindia on his first advance to

¹ This to the mere European reader may appear unimportant, but though now quite common among all Mahrattas, it tended at that time to make a difference between Sindia's horse and those of the Deccan; and, as the act of a Hindoo prince, was an important innovation.

² For some account of the Gosaeens the reader may revert to Preliminary Observations, vol. i. [Keene describes the Gosāins as 'a kind of fighting friars who were then beginning to be found useful as mercenaries.' The name is strictly, he adds, 'the denomination of the lay brother or apprentice, who is allowed to hold property and to mingle in the world' (*Mughal Empire*, p. 162). Yule, *Hobson-Jobson*, states succinctly that the name is 'applied in various parts of India to different kinds of persons, not necessarily celibates, but professing a life of religious mendicancy, and including some who dwell together in convents under a superior, and others who engage in trade and hardly pretend to lead a religious life' (see footnote to page 16, vol. i). The most famous of these fighting priests were the Nāga Gosāins of Jaipur, Rājputanā, who are said to have been under an obligation from their *guru*, or spiritual chief, to fight for the Rājā of Jaipur, whenever required. For this service they received rent-free lands and pay of two pice ($\frac{1}{2}d.$) a day, the latter being put into a common treasury and spent, as occasion required, on the purchase of arms. The 7,000 Nāga Gosāins, armed with bow, arrow, shield, spear and discus, were placed in the vanguard of the Jaipur army in battle. (Russell, *T. and C.C.P.*, iii. 156-7.)]

Delhi in 1784: he was left in charge of Muttra when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, and by means of a secret understanding, which he contrived to establish with Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, he continued unmolested. Sindia, who knew that the sole object of Himmud Buhadur was to obtain a Jagheer for himself from either of the contending parties, had, on a former occasion, in consequence of the Gosaeen's misconduct, resumed, and afterwards on promised amendment restored, the lands granted for the support of his followers; and although he pretended, on his return, to be highly satisfied with the Gosaeen for retaining possession of the Jagheer, he determined to deprive him of it on the first opportunity. Sindia's chief causes of displeasure arose from finding that he was engaged in secret intrigues with Holkar and Ali Buhadur, the partisans of Nana Furnuwees; and that he persisted in an intercourse he had long kept up with the Nabob Vizier, in whose dominions he had at a former period sought refuge, when apprehensive of Sindia's enmity. At length, on pretence that the Gosaeen was employed in magical arts to take away his life, Sindia sent a party of troops who seized Himmud Buhadur at Muttra, and were conveying him to their master; but the camp of Ali Buhadur being contiguous to the road by which the prisoner was brought, he contrived to elude his guards and gain the tent of Ali Buhadur, before they could secure him. It was in vain that Sindia remonstrated; Ali Buhadur declared he could not surrender the person of Himmud Buhadur without an order from the Peishwa; and in the meantime, before any answer could be obtained from Poona, he connived at his escape to Lucknow.

The departure of the leader did not affect the great body of Gosaeens, as might have been the case at an earlier period; they remained with Sindia, and, being attached to his service by habit, became intermingled with the rest of his irregular infantry.

But the most important of all the changes introduced by Sindia was the well-organized, regular force, which he about this time raised, by augmenting the two battalions of De Boigne into a brigade, which was subsequently at different periods increased to three brigades. A brigade consisted of eight battalions of seven hundred men each. Attached to every brigade there were five hundred horse; and to each battalion five pieces of artillery, two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and a howitzer. To provide for the regular payment of these troops,

he made over assignments of land to the charge and management of De Boigne ; to whom he allowed two per cent. upon the net revenue, independent of his regular pay, which was ten thousand rupees a month. A select body of irregular infantry was attached to De Boigne's force, to whose efficiency that officer greatly contributed by adding a bayonet to their matchlocks. The augmentation of De Boigne's army was gradual, as was his train of artillery, which consisted at last of upwards of two hundred pieces of cannon of different calibres. Sixty of his best guns were cast by Mr. Sangster, the officer already mentioned, who quitted the service of the Rana of Gohud, and entered that of Sindia under De Boigne. His officers were Europeans of all nations ; many of them British, and men very respectable by birth, education, and character.¹

A.D. 1790.—At the present conjuncture, in the commencement of the year 1790, Sindia had only raised one regular brigade. His immediate views were directed to conciliate Holkar and Ali Buhadur, with the hope of obtaining their assistance in checking the incursions of the Seiks ; in humbling the Rajpoots, who continued in opposition to his authority ; and in securing the dependence of Ismael Beg, who, it was apprehended, had serious intentions of joining the Rajpoots. His reason for contemplating this fresh desertion are partly ascribable to the artifice of Holkar, who, in order to occasion a rupture between him and Sindia, plundered some of the villages in his new Jagheer, which, though expressly contrary to Sindia's wishes and injunctions, was attributed by Ismael Beg to some inimical design on the part of that chief.² We shall, for the present however, leave Mahratta affairs in Hindoostan, and return to those of the Deccan.

¹ Palmer's dispatches. General De Boigne.

² Sindia's letters.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

FROM A.D. 1787 TO A.D. 1792.

A.D. 1787.—AT the period when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, we have observed that one reason which prevented Nana Furnuwees from supporting him with troops from the Deccan proceeded from fresh aggressions on the part of Tippoo ; in fact, the latter scarcely permitted Hurry Punt to recross the Kistna, when he retook Kittoor ; and an army assembled at Bednore threatened a descent on the Mahratta territories in the Concan. As often happens with respect to the capricious conduct of the native princes of India, it is difficult to reconcile this procedure with the reasons which had so recently induced Tippoo to tender hasty proposals of peace. Some of the English, from the various rumours in circulation, concluded that it was a deception, contrived with the consent of Nana Furnuwees, preparatory to a general confederacy against the British ; in which the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally, Tippoo, and the French had become parties. In regard to the Mahrattas, there was no foundation for this supposition, but there was reason to believe that Tippoo had renewed his engagements with the French, and that his designs were more hostile to the British than to the Mahrattas ; but he wished to conceal his real object until he could prepare his army and obtain effectual assistance from France. Nana Furnuwees believed that the invasion of the Mahratta territories was his chief object ; and in the end of the year 1787 proposed to the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, through Mr. Malet, to form on the part of the Peishwa a defensive alliance with the English, in order to control the overbearing and ambitious spirit of Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis, though impressed with a belief of the great importance of this offer, as essential to the safety of British India, was prohibited by Act of Parliament from accepting it, until Tippoo should break

through his engagements by some unequivocal act or declaration of hostility. In declining it, therefore, he instructed Mr. Malet to offer general assurances of the sincere desire of the Governor-General to cultivate the friendship of the Peishwa's government.

A.D. 1788.—The reports of Tippoo's hostile intentions became less prevalent during the early part of 1788 ; and this apparent tranquillity afforded a favourable opportunity of carrying into effect the intentions of the Governor-General respecting the district of Guntoor, which, by the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally in 1768, ought to have been ceded to the English upon the death of Busalut Jung in 1782. Captain Kennaway was the agent deputed for the purpose of obtaining its surrender ; but the motive of his mission was kept secret until he could reach Hyderabad, and preparations be completed at Madras for supporting the demand. Soon after Captain Kennaway's departure from Calcutta, it was again confidently reported that Tippoo was engaged in hostile machinations ; that an attack made upon Tillicherry by the Raja of Cherika was at his instigation ; and that he meditated the subjugation of the territories of the Raja of Travancore, the ally of the English, which formed an important preliminary to the conquest of the British settlements in the south of India. Captain Kennaway, in consequence of these reports, was instructed to confine his immediate communications to general expressions of the great desire of the Governor-General to maintain the most amicable understanding with the Soobeh of the Deccan in all affairs that might arise requiring adjustment. But soon after, as appearances bespoke no immediate hostility on the part of Tippoo, and Nizam Ally seemed disposed to settle everything with the British Government in an equitable manner, the demand for Guntoor was made and the district given over without impediment, and almost without hesitation, in September, 1788. Notwithstanding his apparent readiness, Nizam Ally was greatly mortified at finding himself compelled to surrender Guntoor ; but he was by this time sensible that, of the four great powers in India, his own was the weakest ; and that without a steadfast alliance with some one of the other three, his sovereignty must be swallowed up. The Mahrattas, from contiguity and from their claims and peculiar policy, he most dreaded ; personally, he was inclined to form an alliance with the Mahomedan ruler of Mysore ; but some of his ministers, particularly Meer Abdool

Kassim, in whom he had great confidence, strongly advised him to prefer a connexion with the English, and endeavoured to show by what means the late concession might be made instrumental in effecting the desired object. He proposed that as the English had obtained possession of Guntoor, they should be called upon to fulfil those articles of the treaty of 1768, by which they had agreed to furnish the Hyderabad state with two battalions and six pieces of cannon ; to reduce the territories of Tippoo, and to pay the Soobeh of the Deccan a certain annual tribute. Nizam Ally, acceding to these suggestions, dispatched Meer Abdool Kassim to Calcutta, for the purpose of obtaining the concurrence of the Governor-General. With his habitual duplicity, however, Nizam Ally at the same time sent another envoy¹ to Tippoo, proposing a strict and indissoluble union between the Mahomedan states ; to which Tippoo declared his readiness to subscribe, on condition of an intermarriage in their families ; but the Moghul haughtily rejected such a connexion, and the negotiation terminated.

A.D. 1789.—When the envoy deputed to Calcutta submitted his proposals, the Governor-General found himself under considerable embarrassment. No specific revisal of the political relations between the English and Nizam Ally had taken place since the treaty of 1768 ; but the treaty of Madras, between the English and Hyder in 1769, and that of Mangalore with Tippoo in 1784, had each recognized both father and son as lawful sovereigns of that territory ; of which, by the treaty with Nizam Ally in 1768, Hyder was declared usurper ; and of which the English had then arrogated to themselves the certainty of a speedy reduction. The Governor-General was, as already mentioned, prohibited by Act of Parliament from entering on any new treaty, without express authority from the Court of Directors ; but he was particularly desirous of securing the alliance both of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, in consequence of his belief in Tippoo's hostile proceedings, already commencing by an attempt to subjugate Travancore, without appearing as a party in the aggression. The proposed alliance of the Mahrattas Lord Cornwallis had been constrained to decline ; but the danger which now more distinctly threatened, and the covert nature of Tippoo's operations, which

¹ His name was Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen Khan.

precluded proofs wholly sufficient for legal justification, induced Lord Cornwallis to adopt a line of conduct more objectionable than an avowed defensive alliance. In reply to Meer Abdool Kassim's application, Lord Cornwallis explained the reason of his inability to perform that part of the treaty of 1768 which related to the conquest of the Carnatic Balaghaut ; but by a letter which he now wrote to Nizam Ally, which letter he declared equally binding as a treaty, he promised that should the English at any future period obtain possession of the territory in question, they would then perform their engagements to him and to the Mahrattas. This promise certainly implied at least an eventual intention of subduing Tippoo, and that inference was strengthened by an explanation of a part of the treaty, relative to the two battalions, which was before equivocal. Instead of being furnished with these battalions, as before expressed, when they could be spared, they were now to be sent, when required, and to be paid for at the same rate as they cost the Company ; merely on condition that they were never to be employed against the allies of the British Government. These allies were at the same time expressly named ; the Mahrattas were included, but Tippoo was omitted.

Tippoo considered this letter as a treaty of offensive alliance against him. He was now at less pains to conceal his intended invasion of Travancore, and his unsuccessful attack on the lines,¹

(Dec. 29th.) which he headed in person, was of course considered to be a declaration of war. Nana Furnuwees no sooner heard of it than he made specific proposals to the Governor-General, through Mr. Malet, in name both of his own master and of Nizam Ally ; which with slight modifications were accepted. A preliminary agreement was settled on the 29th March, and a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded at Poona on the 1st June, between Mr.

A.D. 1790. Malet on the part of the Company and Nana Furnuwees on the part both of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally ; by which, these native powers stipulated that an army of 25,000 horse should attack Tippoo's northern possessions before

¹ [The lines of Travancore consisted of a rampart covering thirty miles of the northern frontier of the State. Travancore was in alliance with, and under the protection of, the Company, and Lord Cornwallis treated Tipū's attack as an act of war against the Company. (*O.H.I.*, p. 559.) See also *Travancore State Manual* (1906), i. 394.]

and during the rains, and reduce as much as possible of his territory. That after the rains, they should act against Tippoo with their utmost means, and in case the Governor-General should require the aid of 10,000 horse to co-operate with the English army, that number was also to be furnished within one month from the time of their being demanded, but maintained at the expense of the Company's Government. Both states were to be allowed two battalions, and their expense was to be defrayed by the Peishwa and Nizam Ally respectively, at the same rate as they cost the Company. All conquests were to be equally shared, unless the English, by being first in the field, had reduced any part of the enemy's territory before the allied forces entered on the campaign, in which case the allies were to have no claim to any part of such acquisition. The Polygars and Zumeendars, formerly dependent on the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or those who had been unjustly deprived of their lands by Hyder and Tippoo, were to be re-instated in their territory on paying a *nuzur* at the time of their re-establishment, which should be equally divided among the confederates, but afterwards they were to be tributary to Nizam Ally and the Peishwa, respectively. It was also stipulated that, if after the conclusion of peace Tippoo should attack any of the contracting parties, the others became bound to unite against him.¹

The treaty was not finally concluded by Nizam Ally until 4th July, as he hoped by procrastination to obtain the guarantee of the British Government, not simply, as he pretended, to ensure protection to his territories from the Mahrattas during the absence of his troops on service, but to procure the interposition of the English in the settlement of the Mahratta claims, which, even where just, he had neither disposition nor ability to pay; and he foresaw that a day of reckoning was at no great distance. Lord Cornwallis, viewing the proposal simply as stated, could not accede to it without giving umbrage to the Mahrattas; but he assured Nizam Ally of his disposition to strengthen the connexion between the two governments, when it could be effected

¹ [The treaty, which contains fourteen articles, will be found at pp. 530-2 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i. Excluding the Chief of Savanūr, the Polygārs and Zamindārs, whose names are mentioned in Article 10, were nine in number, among them being the chiefs of Chitaldrug, Bellary and Kittūr.]

consistently with good faith and a due regard to subsisting engagements with other allies.

The first campaign of the English against Tippoo in this war was conducted by General Medows. It commenced on the 26th May, 1790, and terminated by the return of the army to Madras on the 27th January, 1791. The advantages obtained were by no means inconsiderable, but not so great as had been anticipated. General Medows, with the Madras army, invaded Tippoo's territory from the south, and reduced Caroor, Dindigul, Coimbatore, and Palghaut; whilst Colonel Hartley,¹ with a detachment of the Bombay army, assailed it from the west, gallantly attacked and routed a strong corps in the neighbourhood of Calicut, and a reinforcement being brought from Bombay by General Sir Robert Abercromby, who assumed the command, the province of Malabar was soon cleared of Tippoo's troops.²

The Mahratta and Moghul armies had been declared ready to take the field before the march of General Medows in May; but Nizam Ally, as we have seen, did not finally sign the treaty till July, and Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, the officer appointed to command the Mahratta army, did not receive his commission to raise and equip his troops until 5th May; on which (May 5.) day he had his audience of leave from the Peishwa and immediately set out for his own Jagheer at Tasgaom,³ to make the necessary arrangements. The two battalions with their artillery,⁴ which by the treaty the English had engaged to (20th.) furnish, sailed from Bombay about the 20th May, disembarked on the 29th at Sungumeshwur (the same place (29th.) where Sumbhajee was made prisoner by the Moghuls (June upwards of a century before), and ascended the Ambah 10.) Ghaut by the 10th June, although the natural difficulties

¹ This is the same officer with whom the reader is already well acquainted.

² Bombay and Bengal Records. Col. Wilks, &c.

³ [Tāsgaon is now the headquarters of a *tāluka* of Sātāra District, on the Southern Marāthā Railway. The walls, which once surrounded the town and were pierced by four gates, are now ruined. Within stands the family mansion of the Patvardhans, also enclosed by walls and three fortified gates, of which the northernmost was blocked up on the death of Parasurām Bhāu (Pureshram Bhow) in 1799. (*I. G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 563.)]

⁴ The 8th and 11th battalions of native infantry, one company of European artillery, and two companies of gun Lascars, with six field-pieces.

of that stupendous pass were much increased by the setting-in of the monsoon. On the 18th the detachment arrived at Koompta, a village within a few miles of Tasgaom, when the (18th.) commander, Captain Little, found that not above two thousand horse had as yet assembled. Two Carcoons had been sent to meet and accompany the British detachment on its march from the coast, and the many artificial delays and difficulties raised by these Bramin conductors, to prolong the march and conceal their want of preparation, were now explained. The dilatoriness of the Mahrattas appeared ambiguous to the English, especially as it was found that Tippoo's wukeels were still at Poona, where they were allowed to remain, as subsequently avowed by that court, in the vain hope that Tippoo would endeavour to purchase their neutrality; for, although the Mahrattas had really no intention of breaking their engagements with the English, this mode of obtaining a supply of money from a tributary who owed so much was by them considered wholly justifiable. On the 5th of August, however, the wukeels (Aug. 5.) were finally dismissed, but Pureshram Bhow did not cross the Kistna until the 11th; at which time, in (11th.) addition to the British detachment, he had only five thousand horse and about one-third of that number of infantry. In the course of a few days he was joined by a body of horse belonging to the Pritee Needhee; and a separate body of one thousand horse, whom it was at first proposed to attach exclusively to the British detachment, also joined under the partisan officer named Dhondoo Punt Gokla, originally an agent superintending a part of the marine establishment at Viziadroog. His horse were not continued with the detachment as proposed; but the intention of thus employing them was the commencement of a connexion between Gokla's family and the English; by whose influence Bappoo Gokla, the nephew of Dhondoo Punt, was raised to high rank at the Peishwa's court, where we shall ultimately see him, by no uncommon revolution, an active enemy of the British government.

(Aug. 25.)—Hostilities on the part of the Mahrattas against Tippoo commenced on the 25th August by an attack upon a fortified village, from which the Mahrattas expelled the garrison with trifling loss. As they advanced, the country was rapidly occupied. The inhabitants assisted to expel Tippoo's Sebundeas,

but the latter were easily reconciled to a change of masters, enlisted with Pureshram Bhow, and aided him in collecting the outstanding revenue. The Mahratta force, daily joined by small parties, soon amounted to ten thousand horse and three thousand infantry, exclusive of Captain Little's detachment. With this
 (Sept. 18.) army Pureshram Bhow arrived before Dharwar on the 18th September, and after much unnecessary exposure and considerable loss in reconnoitring, commenced the siege by firing cannon from a great distance during the day and withdrawing them at night; an absurd practice not unusual with Mahrattas.

In the Carnatic, south of the Toongbuddra, Tippoo had stationed two officers, Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and Kootub-ud-deen, at the head of about five thousand men, a few of whom were cavalry, but the greater part regular infantry. The Moghuls, as the Mahrattas were proceeding towards Dharwar, moved from Pangul to cross the Kistna in order to besiege Kopaul and Buhadur Benda; on which Kootub-ud-deen, with the whole of the horse and a part of the infantry, advanced to observe their motions, whilst Budr-ul-Zeman threw himself into Dharwar. The defences of this fortress are principally of mud, and though irregular, and now greatly decayed, were then very strong. It is situated in a plain, having an outer and an inner ditch from twenty-five to thirty feet wide and nearly as many feet deep. Adjoining to the fort on the south side and outflanking it to the eastward is a town or Pettah, defended by a low mud wall and a ditch of no strength. The garrison, on being reinforced, consisted of seven thousand regular and three thousand irregular infantry.
 (Oct. 30.) The first operation of any consequence was an attack on a party of the enemy who had advanced outside the town, but were driven back with the loss of three guns and a considerable proportion of killed and wounded, principally from the fire of the British troops. By their exertions also the Pettah was stormed and taken; Captain Little, the commander, and Lieutenant Forster were the first who mounted the wall, and both were wounded, the former severely, the latter mortally. This acquisition, which cost the British detachment sixty-two men in killed and wounded, was made over to a body of Mahrattas under Appa Sahib the son of Pureshram Bhow; but no sooner had the British returned to their camp than the garrison sallied, and

a very severe conflict ensued in the Pettah ; five hundred Mahrattas were killed, and a still greater number of the garrison. Although the advantage was rather on the side of the Mahrattas, Appa Sahib withdrew his troops to camp and permitted the garrison to re-occupy the town. After a truce, in order to allow each party to burn and bury their dead, the Mahrattas, who were ashamed again to call in the aid of the British detachment (**Dec. 18.**) attacked and retook the Pettah themselves. The feeble and absurd operations, however, which generally distinguish Mahratta sieges, were never more conspicuous than on the present occasion. It must ever be a reflection upon those under whose orders the auxiliary force from Bombay was equipped, that there was no efficient battering train to assist the operations of the Mahrattas : whose aid, if so supplied, might have contributed much more to the success of the war. In the first instance it was excusable, because it might have been expected that the Mahrattas, if unprepared with battering cannon, would not employ themselves in sieges ; but Captain Little had early represented how necessary it became to send some heavy guns, ammunition and stores, not merely to save the credit of the British arms, but to ensure some useful co-operation on the part of their Mahratta allies. No battering train was sent, but a battalion of Europeans and another native corps were dispatched under Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick, who arrived in camp before Dharwar on the 28th December, and assumed command of the British force.

A.D. 1790.—Every possible exertion was made by Colonel Frederick. Pureshram Bhow's artillery was manned by Europeans : but the guns were old, clumsy, and nearly unserviceable ; so scanty was the supply of ammunition that they were frequently silent for days together, and the garrison on these occasions never failed to make a complete repair in the intended breach. A considerable quantity of powder was at length obtained, but a prospect of its being again wholly expended (**Feb. 7.**) induced Colonel Frederick to attempt the assault before the breach was entirely practicable. He would probably have succeeded ; but at the moment when the troops were to pass the ditch, the fascines, which they had thrown into it, were set on fire and so rapidly consumed, that it became necessary to retire to the trenches. In this attempt the British detachment

lost eighty-five men. The chagrin occasioned by failure, followed by a series of harassing delays, operating on an ardent mind and a debilitated constitution, proved fatal to Colonel Frederick, who died on the 13th March, and was succeeded in the command of the detachment by Major Sartorius. **(March 13th.)** Materials were furnished so sparingly that little impression was made by the batteries; but the Mahrattas carried on the approaches after their own manner, by running trenches and digging mines under the glacis. Frequent sallies, with various success, were made by the garrison; at length, after a protracted siege of twenty-nine weeks, a lodgement having been effected by the Mahrattas and the English on the crest of the glacis, the brave veteran Budr-ul-Zeman Khan capitulated. The troops, with all the honours of war, were allowed to march out of the fortress, **(April 4.)** which was taken possession of by the confederates on the 4th of April. But the late garrison had only moved a short distance when they were attacked by the Mahrattas, the greater part of them dispersed, and their commandant wounded, overpowered, and with several others made prisoner. It appears that Budr-ul-Zeman Khan had stipulated to surrender the fort, ammunition, and stores, in their actual condition, but the Mahrattas, having discovered that he had destroyed them after the capitulation was made, upbraided him with his want of faith; and accused Hyder, Tippoo, and himself, of habitual violation of their engagements, particularly in regard to Gootee and Nurgoond. Their accusations were just; but Budr-ul-Zeman Khan, enraged at the insult, drew his sword, and his troops followed his example; the result of the fray proved as above related. Though the circumstances may induce us to believe that there was no premeditated treachery, the subsequent confinement of Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and several other prisoners reflects discredit on the conduct of Pureshram Bhow.¹

Before the fall of Dharwar the British army had been some time in the field. Its first campaign against Tippoo in this war terminated, as we have already briefly mentioned, on the 27th January. On the 29th of the same month Lord Cornwallis assumed the command of the army and marched on the 5th February towards Vellore, where he concentrated his forces and

¹ Narrative of Capt. Little's detachment. Wilks, Moor, Bombay Records, Mahratta MSS. and Letters.

advanced to Bangalore, which he invested on the 5th March, and carried it by assault on the night of the 21st of that month. This success tended to discourage the enemy and stimulate the allies to exertion. The fall of Bangalore had some share in influencing the surrender of Dharwar and also of Kopaul, besieged by the Moghuls, which was shortly afterwards given up, as was Buhadur Benda. The Moghuls, according to the treaty, were supported by two battalions of Madras native infantry, in the same manner as the Mahrattas were aided from Bombay. An army of thirty thousand Mahrattas, of which 25,000 were horse,

A.D.
1791.

marched from Poona on the 1st January, under the command of Hurry Punt Phurkay ; advanced by Punderpoor and Sorapoor, forded the Kistna, where it is joined by the Beema, and proceeded to Geddawal, whence Hurry Punt directed the main body of his army to continue its route to Kurnoul, whilst he proceeded to Paungul with an escort of two thousand cavalry, for the purpose of conferring personally with Nizam Ally, whose court was then held at that frontier position, whence he affected to direct the operations of his field army. At this conference it was agreed by Nizam Ally and by Hurry Punt, on the part of his master the Peishwa, that they should abide by the terms of the treaty with the English, but only so far as might humble Tippoo, without absolutely annihilating his power. After the interview Hurry Punt joined his army at Kurnoul, where he remained some time, until hearing of the capture of Bangalore he sent forward 10,000 horse with orders to endeavour to join Lord Cornwallis, in which he had been anticipated by the Moghuls ; a body of that strength having effected a junction with the English army on the 13th of April, after routing the party of Kootub-ud-deen, which we had occasion to mention, before the siege of Dharwar. But the Mahrattas, on arriving some days afterwards at Anuntpoor, found that Lord Cornwallis had advanced towards Seringapatam. They therefore halted until joined by Hurry Punt with the main army, when the whole moved on to Sera. It having occurred to the Mahratta commander to try the effect of summoning the place, Sera was most unexpectedly surrendered, and found full of stores and in high order. This success induced Hurry Punt to detach a party under Bulwunt Soob Rao to besiege Mudgeery, situated twenty miles to the east of Sera ; after which, leaving a strong garrison in his

new acquisition, he proceeded to join the army at Seringapatam.¹ The other Mahratta army, acting on the north-western quarter of Tippoo's territory, whose operations before Dharwar have been detailed, was now also advancing by orders from Hurry Punt towards Seringapatam. After the termination of the siege of Dharwar, a part of the British detachment was recalled to Bombay, and Captain Little with three native battalions, the two with which he entered on the campaign having been much weakened by casualties, continued with Pureshram Bhow: The possession of Dharwar and the forts taken by the Moghuls gave the allies a strong hold on the country situated between the Kistna and Toongbuddra; Kooshgul and several other places of less note surrendered to Pureshram Bhow at the first summons; and the occupation of the country, with the consequent realization of revenue, became so inviting to the Mahratta general that he soon evinced a greater care of his own interests, than those of the confederacy. It was recommended that he should join the Bombay army under General Abercromby, then on its march from Malabar towards the capital of Mysore, through the territory of a friendly chieftain, the Raja of Koorg. The Mahratta army under Pureshram Bhow had been greatly increased during the siege of Dharwar; he crossed the Toongbuddra on the 22d April, and arrived within twenty-four miles of Chittledroog on the 29th of that month. Several fortified towns surrendered without resistance, and Mycondah was besieged by a detachment from his army; but when urged by Captain Little to advance in the direction by which General Abercromby was expected, or send on a part of his troops, he objected to it as unsafe and continued his system of collecting from the surrounding country, until summoned by Hurry Punt to accompany him to Seringapatam.² Whilst Hurry Punt marched south-west, Pureshram Bhow moved south-east. Their armies were united at Nagmungulum on the 24th of May, and on the ensuing day they advanced to Mailgotta. But although thus near the capital, where they knew their allies were encamped, they had not been able to convey any intimation of their approach to Lord Cornwallis, as every letter was intercepted by the admirable activity of Tippoo's mounted Beruds. This circumstance is considered very discreditable to Hurry Punt and

¹ Hurry Punt's dispatches.

² Mahratta MS. and Letters. Captain Little's dispatches, &c.

Pureshram Bhow by their own countrymen ; and it was matter of most serious regret to Lord Cornwallis that he had remained ignorant of their approach.

After the Moghul cavalry joined him, as already noticed, Lord Cornwallis resolved to undertake the siege of Seringapatam, and directed General Abercromby to move forward from the westward, for the purpose of joining him at that capital. As the grand army advanced from the northward, Tippoo burnt the villages, destroyed the forage, and drove off both the inhabitants and their cattle, so that the space on which the army moved was a desert, and the condition of its cattle and horses soon proved the efficacy of this mode of defence. On the 15th, Tippoo made a stand at Arikera, but was defeated ; and on the 19th, Lord (May.) Cornwallis encamped at Caniambaddy, to the west of Seringapatam. But the battle he had gained on the 15th, and his position at the gates of the capital, were advantages more than counterbalanced by the state of his cattle, and the alarming scarcity which prevailed in his camp.¹ The want of forage and provisions, aggravated by the presence of the useless and wasteful Moghul horse, soon became so much felt that, combined with the lateness of the season, Lord Cornwallis abandoned all hope of being able to reduce Seringapatam before the monsoon ; he therefore sent orders to General Abercromby to return to Malabar ; destroyed his own battering guns and heavy stores, raised the siege, and on the 26th May marched towards Mailgotta, from which place the Mahrattas had also moved that morning. Great was the surprise of the English army, when large bodies of horse were seen advancing, of whose approach they had no intimation. Conceiving them to be enemies, preparations were at first made to treat them as such ; but their real character was soon discovered, and though not unclouded with regret and

¹ [Wilks (*Historical Sketches of the South of India*, &c.) gives full details of the sufferings of Lord Cornwallis's troops. V. A. Smith (*O.H.I.*, p. 560) remarks that if the Marāthās with their supplies had only arrived a few days earlier, the war might have been ended triumphantly. 'Lord Cornwallis bought the further aid or neutrality of the mercenary Marāthās with funds provided by seizing the Company's silver on its way to China. In those days modern financial facilities did not exist. There was no paper money, no funded debt, and no machinery of extensive credit. Each campaign had to be financed by chests full of coin, and the amazingly cumbrous arrangements for transport and supply were of a mediæval character.']

disappointment, their arrival was hailed with great joy, as the ample supplies of the Mahratta Bazars afforded immediate relief to the famished camp. That we may not unjustly detract from the merit of the Mahratta commanders, as they have been accused of self-interested motives in the readiness with which they permitted their Bazar followers to sell to all comers : it is proper to mention that, though their followers took advantage of the period to raise the price of grain, their own troops suffered by the scarcity which for a few days ensued. Hurry Punt's dispatches evince a very humane and laudable anxiety to alleviate the distress of his allies. The junction of the Mahrattas near the spot where Trimbuck Rao Mama had gained the victory over Hyder in 1771, was considered by them an omen particularly propitious.

The confederate armies remained for ten days in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, in order to allow time for the convoys of grain, expected by the Mahrattas, to join the camp : after which, the whole moved to Nagmungulum. Hurry Punt proposed that they should proceed to Sera and take possession of the whole country between that place and the Kistna. Lord Cornwallis, however, considered it of prior importance to reduce the Baramahal and the country in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, in order to facilitate the approach of the necessary supplies from Madras. Hurry Punt urged similar reasons in support of his own proposal, and was naturally seconded by the Moghuls ; but as both depended on the English artillery and military stores, they yielded to the wishes of the Governor-General. The army moved forward by very slow marches, necessary to the English from the exhausted state of their cattle, and the motions of the confederates were regulated accordingly. The fort of Oosoor was evacuated on the approach of the grand army. Pureshram Bhow, accompanied by Captain Little's battalions, was detached towards Sera for the purpose of keeping open the northern communication and overawing the country which had already submitted. Nidjigul surrendered to Pureshram Bhow, and the Killidar of Davaraydroog promised to give it up, provided a part of the British detachment was sent to take possession ; but on approaching the fort they were fired upon, and as Pureshram Bhow had not the means of reducing it, he burnt the Pettah in revenge, and proceeded to Sera. Being desirous of returning to the north-west, he assigned want of forage as a reason for hastily

withdrawing to Chittledroog, where he surprised and cut off three hundred of its garrison, who happened to be outside and neglected to seek timely protection in the fort. Pureshram Bhow long indulged hopes of obtaining possession of this stronghold by seducing the garrison ; but all his attempts proved abortive ; he however took several fortified places in its vicinity.

With regard to the operations of the other troops at a distance from the grand army, Bulwunt Soob Rao, the officer sent by Hurry Punt to besiege Mudgeery, did not succeed in gaining possession of it, but he left a detachment in the Pettah and went on to Makleedroog, Bhusmag, and Ruttengerry, of all which he took possession.¹ The army of Nizam Ally, with the two Madras battalions which continued to the northward, took Gandicottah on the Pennar and laid siege to Gurrumcondah.

The operations of Lord Cornwallis, after his retreat from Seringapatam, until the season should admit of his renewing the siege, were chiefly in the Baramahal, the whole of which he reduced, except the strong hill-fort of Kistnagheery, which he intended to blockade ; but previous to this arrangement one of Tippoo's detachments, under Kummur-ud-deen, having surprised and cut off the party of Mahrattas left by Bulwunt Soob Rao at Mudgeery, the report of this circumstance was magnified into the total defeat and dispersion of Pureshram Bhow's army, and induced Lord Cornwallis to proceed to Bangalore without forming the intended blockade. After hearing the true state of the case, he resolved on reducing the forts between Bangalore and Gurrumcondah, in the siege of which last the Moghul troops were still occupied. The whole tract soon fell ; and amongst other places of strength the hill-fort of Nundidroog, when a part of the battering train used in its reduction was sent off to assist the Moghuls at Gurrumcondah, whither also most of their horse repaired.

By the beginning of December, Lord Cornwallis's army had assembled at Bangalore and might have advanced to Seringapatam, but the Bombay troops had a difficult march to perform before they could join ; and Pureshram Bhow, though directed to be prepared to support their advance, remained on pretence of sickness near Chittledroog. The Moghuls loitered with the camp at Gurrumcondah ; and although Hurry Punt continued with

¹ Hurry Punt's dispatches.

Lord Cornwallis, the greater part of his troops were dispersed on various pretexts, but in reality to occupy the districts and to collect as much money as they could. As circumstances thus detained Lord Cornwallis from the main object of reducing the capital, he in the meantime laid siege to the forts in his route. Savendroog¹ and Ootradroog were taken; Ramgheery, Shevingheery and Hooliandroog surrendered.

The Moghul army, after months spent before Gurrumcondah in a series of operations still more feeble than those of the Mahrattas before Dharwar, were at length put in possession of the lower fort by the exertions of Captain Read, the officer who had succeeded to the command of the English detachment.² The Moghuls having resigned all hope of reducing the upper fort, being anxious to join in the siege of Seringapatam, determined to mask it, and for that purpose a considerable body of troops was left under Hafiz Fureed-u-deen Khan, a part of whom, under his personal command, he kept in the lower fort, and a small body was encamped at a little distance on the south side, under the orders of Azim Khan, the son of the Nabob of Kurnoul, and a Frenchman who had assumed the name of Smith. These arrangements being completed, the main body moved on with the intention of joining Lord Cornwallis, but they were speedily recalled in consequence of an unexpected attack on the blockading party, many of whom were killed, and Hafiz Fureed-u-deen, having been made prisoner, was basely murdered from motives of revenge; he having been the envoy through whom the offer of marriage on the part of Tippoo was sent, which was indignantly refused by Nizam Ally. The Frenchman Smith was also taken and put to death. On the return of the main body of the Moghuls, Tippoo's troops, who were headed by his eldest son Futih Hyder, retired and left the

¹ [Savandrug (Savendroog) was the most famous of the hill-fortresses of Mysore, and commanded the communication between Bangalore and Seringapatam. Tipū rejoiced when he heard of Lord Cornwallis's resolve to take it, declaring that one-half of the English army would perish by sickness, the other half by the sword. On December 10, 1791, the troops appeared before the fortress, and eleven days later carried it by assault. Lord Cornwallis, 'sitting in one of the batteries, was a witness of the courage of his troops.' (Extract from a private letter of December 23, 1791, forwarded by Sir Charles Malet, printed on pp. 533, 534, Forrest's *Selections*.)]

² Bombay Records. Col. Wilks.

Moghuls to strengthen their party in the lower fort.¹ This arrangement being again completed, the Moghul army moved on and joined Lord Cornwallis at Otradroog on the 25th January, 1792.

We have noticed the delay of the Mahratta commanders in collecting their detachments, and in engaging actively with the English in the operations against the capital. The object of Hurry Punt was obviously plunder, but that of Pureshram Bhow extended to the long-meditated Mahratta scheme of obtaining possession of the district of Bednore. Pureshram Bhow conceived that the present opportunity, whilst aided by a body of British troops at his absolute disposal, was too favourable to be omitted. Though fully informed by Lord Cornwallis of the general plan of operations, in which he was requested to co-operate, he no sooner saw the English army engaged in besieging the fortresses already mentioned, on its route towards Seringapatam, than he directed his march straight towards Bednore. Hooly Onore

having been assaulted and taken by the British de-
(Dec.21.)tachment, the Mahratta general continued his advance along the left bank of the Toong, intending to reduce the fort of Simoga. But at that place, besides the regular garrison, there was a force consisting of seven thousand infantry, eight hundred horse, and ten guns, under the command of Reza Sahib, one of Tippoo's relations, who, on the approach of the Mahrattas, either from not deeming his position advantageous or with a view to attack Pureshram Bhow when engaged in the siege, quitted his entrenchments close to the walls of the fort and took post in a thick jungle a few miles to the south-west of it. His position was uncommonly strong, having the river Toong on his right, a steep hill covered with impenetrable underwood on his left, and his front protected and concealed, both by underwood and a deep ravine, full of tall and close bamboos, than which no trees form a stronger defence. One road only ran through this position,

but it was more clear and open to the rear. Pureshram
(Dec.29.)Bhow came in sight of the fort on the morning of the 29th December; but instead of attacking, made a considerable circuit to avoid it, and continued his route towards the position occupied by Reza Sahib. Having arrived in its

¹ Letter from Lieut. Stewart, 1st assistant to the Resident at Hyderabad.

neighbourhood, the main army took up its ground of encampment ; but Appa Sahib advanced towards the enemy with a body of cavalry. Pureshram Bhow requested of Captain Little to leave eight companies for the protection of the camp, and move on with the rest of the battalions to support his son, which he immediately did. The closeness of the country rendered the attack of cavalry impracticable ; and Captain Little's three battalions on this memorable occasion mustered about eight hundred bayonets ! Notwithstanding the comparative insignificance of his numbers, he did not hesitate in moving down on the enemy's position : the irregular infantry of the Mahrattas following in his rear. Captain Little, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which the enemy was posted, and aware of the advantage of keeping his strength in reserve in such a situation, went forward with one battalion ; and as the fire opened, he directed two companies to advance on the enemy's right and two other companies to attack their left, whilst the rest were engaged with the centre. Every attempt to penetrate into the jungle was warmly opposed, but the enemy's right seemed the point most assailable, though defended with obstinacy. Two companies were sent to reinforce the two engaged on the right ; but Lieutenants Doolan and Bethune, who led them, were wounded successively. The grenadier company under Lieutenant Moor¹ was sent to their

¹ Author of the interesting narrative of the operations of Captain Little's detachment. [Lieutenant Moor was born in 1771, and appointed a cadet in the East India Company's service in 1782, arriving in Madras in April 1783. He was promoted lieutenant in September 1788, and three months later was adjutant and quartermaster of the 9th Battalion N.I. He was of the storming-party in the assault of Dhārwar on February 7, 1791, and on June 13 was shot in the shoulder whilst heading an assault on a hill-fort near Bangalore. He rejoined his corps four months later, and was again wounded in the action described by Grant Duff. During sick-leave he wrote 'A narrative of the operations of Captain Little's detachment, &c.' (London, 1794, 4to). In 1796 he re-embarked for Bombay with the brevet rank of captain, and in July 1799 was appointed garrison-storekeeper at Bombay, a post which he held till his departure from India in February 1805. Moor retired from the Company's service in 1806, receiving a special pension in addition to his half-pay, and died on February 26, 1848. In 1810 he published his well-known *Hindu Pantheon*. His other works were *Hindu Infanticide, an Account of the Measures Adopted for Suppressing the Practice* (London, 1811), and *Oriental Fragments* (1834). He was a member of the Royal Society and of the Society of Antiquaries.]

support; that officer also fell disabled. Six companies of the 11th battalion were then brought forward, and Brigadier-Major Ross, who directed them, was killed. The Sepoys repeatedly penetrated a short distance into the jungle; but most of their European officers being wounded, they could not keep their ground. The Mahratta infantry on every advance rushed forward tumultuously, but were driven back in disorderly flight, which only added to the general slaughter and contributed to the confusion of the regular infantry; but Captain Little, watching the opportunities when his men's minds required support, with that admirable judgement and gallantry which have on so many occasions distinguished the officers of British Sepoys, rallied, cheered, and reanimated them; sent on parts of the reserve, and continued the apparently unequal struggle with steady resolution. At last the whole reserve was ordered up; the action continued with fresh spirit, and a small party got through the jungle into the enemy's camp. Captain Little, who immediately perceived the importance of this advantage, skilfully prepared a strong body to support them. This reinforcement he headed in person, and arrived in time to secure the retreat of the small advanced party which had given way on their officer being wounded, and were completely overpowered and flying; rallying, however, at Captain Little's word, and seeing themselves seconded they turned on their pursuers with fresh energy. The enemy began to waver. The whole detachment was ordered to press forward. Captain Thomson of the artillery and the few European officers that remained, imitating the example of their gallant commander, led on with the greatest animation, drove the enemy from every point, and thus gained this well-fought battle. The Mahrattas rushed forward with their usual avidity to share the plunder, and were useful in the pursuit, which Captain Little continued in the most persevering manner until he had taken every one of the guns and rendered his victory as dispiriting and injurious to the enemy as it was creditable and cheering to his own party.

The whole conduct of Captain Little on this occasion was most exemplary: it reminds us of the generalship of Lawrence or of Clive, and of itself entitles him to a very respectable rank in the military annals of British India. Of the small number of British troops engaged, sixty were killed and wounded, and the loss

would have been much greater, but for the judicious conduct of their commander, who exposed them as little as possible until he knew where their strength could be exerted with effect. The Mahrattas, though they contributed but little to the success of the day, lost about five hundred men. The fort of Simoga did not long hold out after the defeat of the covering army :

A.D.
1792. it surrendered to Captain Little on the 2d of January,¹ and it was to him a very humiliating circumstance that he was compelled to place the principal officers at the disposal of Pureshram Bhow, who, contrary to the terms of capitulation, detained them in the same manner as he had kept Budr-ul-Zeman Khan.

Some time was spent in making arrangements for the occupation of the country about Simoga ; but towards the middle of January, Pureshram Bhow, to complete his design, advanced through the woods in the direction of Bednore, which he reached on the 28th, and was preparing to invest it when, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, he suddenly retreated and, after returning to Simoga, took the straight route towards Seringapatam.² Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Hurry Punt and the son of Nizam Ally, Sikundur Jah, arrived with the combined army before Tippoo's capital on the 5th February. On the following day, the well-concerted and brilliant attack made by the English on his camp within the bound hedge, put the allies in possession of the whole of the outworks, and immediate preparations were made for commencing the siege. General Abercromby's division joined on the 16th, and materially contributed to forward the operations, particularly by the gallant repulse of Tippoo's attack on their advanced position on the 22d of February.

Tippoo repeatedly endeavoured to open negotiations ; but his first overtures were for various reasons considered inadmissible ; at last, in consequence of the more becoming form and tone of his proposals, together with the intercession of the allies,

¹ [Captain John Little's reports to the Governor-General describing the capture of Shimoga (Simoga) and the preceding action, dated respectively January 6, 1792 and December 31, 1791, will be found on pp. 534-7 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i. A reference to the achievement in a letter from Lord Cornwallis to the Directors, which lays stress on the gallantry of the three Bombay battalions under Little, appears on page 536 of the same work.]

² Moor, Wilks, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

particularly of Hurry Punt, two wukeels, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, were admitted to an audience on the 14th February, whilst in the meantime the attack and defence were going forward as if no peace had been meditated. The wukeels were met by three agents, appointed by the allies respectively : Sir John Kennaway, on the part of Lord Cornwallis ; Buchajee Rugonath, on that of Hurry Punt ; and Meer Abdool Kassim, now distinguished by his title of Meer Alum, on behalf of Sikundur Jah. After considerable discussion and many references by the wukeels to their master, Tippoo on the 23d February, the day after his unsuccessful attack on General Abercromby's division, consented to cede half the territory which he possessed before the war ; to pay three crores and thirty thousand rupees, one half immediately and the rest by three equal instalments within a year ; to release all persons made prisoners from the time of Hyder Ally ; and to deliver two of his sons as hostages for the due performance of the conditions. An armistice had taken place for two days, the hostages had already arrived in the English camp, upwards of one crore of rupees of the money had been paid, and the definitive treaty on the point of being concluded, when Tippoo, who appears to have at first overlooked the circumstance, finding that the principality of Koorg was included in the list of cessions, loudly remonstrated against yielding what he termed equivalent to the surrender of one of the gates of Seringapatam. Appearances indicated his determination to break the truce, but the prompt measures adopted by Lord Cornwallis for renewing the siege and his declared resolution to give up none of the advantages already secured, induced Tippoo to reflect on the consequences, and finally to sign the treaty.¹

Without reference to the condition of the former dependants of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or to that clause which secured a greater advantage to the party first in the field, the allies received an equal share of the districts ceded by Tippoo, amounting annually to about forty lacks of rupees to each.

The share of the Mahrattas lay principally between the Wurdah

¹ [The intentions of Lord Cornwallis were embodied in the preliminary terms in language that lacked precision. The terms were not sufficiently definite on the subject of the cession of Coorg, the point at issue being the meaning of the word ' adjacent ' used in the preliminary articles.]

and Kistna ; it also included the valley of Sondoor near Bellary, which was still in possession of the Ghorepuray family. The portion allotted to Nizam Ally included Gootee and Kurpa, with the districts between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, of which Moodgul, Kannikgeeree and Kopaul may be considered the western boundary, with the exception of a small district about Anagoondy, which Tippoo retained. Dindigul, Baramahal,¹ Koorg and Malabar were assigned to the English.

We now return to explain the cause of Pureshram Bhow's sudden retreat from Bednore, which was occasioned by his learning that Kummur-ud-deen had marched from Seringapatam with a strong force of infantry, for the purpose of entrapping him in the woods, and although success would have more than excused his proceedings at the Poona court, his failure, should he be afterwards hemmed in, would have ruined both himself and his army ; for Nana Furnuwees, though he at first took little notice of the Bhow's intention, no sooner found that it was generally understood, than he ordered him to desist and proceed to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis, after he laid siege to that fortress, had pressingly written to Pureshram Bhow, describing the manner in which he had invested it, and pointing out the essential service that might be rendered by his cavalry if posted on the south face of the fortress ; but Pureshram Bhow disregarded the application until he received the information already mentioned. By the time, however, that he reached Seringapatam, the armistice was signed, and although Lord Cornwallis scarcely noticed his faithless conduct, it has been a theme of just censure ; nor can Nana Furnuwees be exempted from a share of blame, for when urged by Mr. Malet to expedite the Bhow's advance to the capital, he started difficulties as to the scarcity which his junction would occasion in the grand army, and would no doubt have been well pleased to effect a conquest which had been a favourite object with his great master, the first Mahdoo Rao.

By the end of March, after the usual interchange of civilities, the commanders of the allied armies had put their troops in motion

¹ [Dindigul is now in the northern portion of the Madura District, while Baramahal is the north-east portion of the Salem District. Coorg remained a protected State under its Rājā until 1834, when the misconduct of its ruler made annexation necessary. The districts left to Tipū were of little value compared with those taken from him under the treaty. (*O.H.I.*, pp. 560-1.)]

towards their respective frontiers. Hurry Punt returned by the eastern route to Poona, where he arrived on the 25th May; but Pureshram Bhow remained with the heavy baggage and stores, which together with his own artillery and seventeen battering guns, presented by Lord Cornwallis to the Peishwa, greatly retarded his progress. The devastation committed by his own troops on their advance rendered grain and forage extremely scarce, and the heat and drought of the season, together with the active annoyance which, notwithstanding the peace, he continued to experience from Tippoo's Beruds and Pindharees, combined to render Pureshram Bhow's march from Seringapatam to the Toongbuddra one of the most distressing the Mahrattas ever experienced. Captain Little's detachment fortunately escaped the severe privations to which Pureshram Bhow's army was subjected, by having been directed to join General Abercromby's army, which marched to Malabar and embarked at Cannauore for Bombay.¹

Mahratta and English Records Wilks, Moor, &c., &c.

CHAPTER XXXV.

FROM A.D. 1792 TO A.D. 1794.

AN inquiry into the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to refrain from the entire subjugation of Tippoo's territory is foreign to the object of this work ; it is only necessary to observe that even Nana Furnuwees and Pureshram Bhow, the parties in the Mahratta state most inimical to Tippoo, were averse to the total overthrow of the Mysore state, and Mahadajee Sindia was decidedly hostile to that course of policy. The Mahrattas, who are not sensible of the effect which may operate on British authorities from the influence of public opinion in England, attribute the moderation shown by the Governor-General to the representations of Hurry Punt Phurkay.¹

At the period when Lord Cornwallis was negotiating the alliance against Tippoo, he instructed Major Palmer, the Resident with Sindia, to request both of Sindia and Holkar to use their influence at Poona in effecting the desired connexion between the Peishwa and the British Government. Sindia offered to unite in the confederacy against Tippoo, provided two battalions similar to those granted to Nizam Ally were sent to join the army, with which he proposed to march to the southward ; and that the British

¹ Mahratta MSS. Hurry Punt's letters. [V. A. Smith sums up the matter succinctly in the following words : 'Subsequent events proved that the complete overthrow of Tippoo in 1792 would have saved another war ; but at the time the Governor-General believed that he had done enough to secure a lasting peace. Annexation of the whole of Mysore would have displeased both the Nizām and the Marāthās, offended public and official opinion at home, and contravened the policy of the Act of 1784. The partial annexation effected was approved by the ministry, and the Governor-General was promoted to the rank of Marquis. Tippoo compelled his subjects to pay most of the indemnity, and at once began preparations for the next war,' (*O.H.I.*, p. 561 and footnotes.)]

Government should become bound to protect his territory in Hindoostan during his absence. These proposals being considered inadmissible, he refused to become a party to the treaty of Poona.¹

We left Mahadajee Sindia in the early part of 1790, endeavouring to conciliate his coadjutors, intent on humbling the Rajpoots, securing the dependency of Ismael Beg, and preventing the incursions of the Seiks. A temporary adjustment with Holkar and Ali Buhadur enabled him to prepare for opposing Ismael Beg, whose hostile intentions soon became unequivocal, and the Rajpoot Rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were pouring succours into his camp. Sindia, before risking a battle, endeavoured with some success to corrupt the regular troops with Ismael Beg, and at last ordered Gopaul Rao Bhow, Luckwa (June 20.) Dada, and De Boigne to attack his camp near Patun, at a point which was left undefended by a body of troops whom Sindia had secured in his interest; but, notwithstanding this advantage, Sindia's officers being disappointed in the promised aid of Holkar, who stood aloof during the engagement, the utmost exertion was necessary to ensure success. Ismael Beg fought with his usual bravery, and a body of his Patans thrice charged through the regular infantry of the Mahrattas, cutting down the artillery-men at their guns. De Boigne displayed great personal energy on this occasion, and to his gallantry and the discipline of his battalions was justly attributed the great victory which ensued. Numbers fell on both sides,² but the army of Ismael Beg was completely routed, and that chieftain fled with a small retinue from the field of battle to the gates of Jeypoor. All his guns were taken, and ten battalions of infantry grounded their arms and surrendered.³

A.D. 1791.—The Rajpoots, however, still maintained the

¹ Bengal Records.

² One translation of a native newspaper in the Bengal Records says 11 or 12,000 of the Mahrattas were killed.

³ [De Boigne wrote an account of the battle in the *Calcutta Gazette* of July 22, 1790, in which he estimated Ismail Beg's cavalry at 5,000 sabres. Apparently Ismail Beg confined his assaults to the Marāthā horse, having learnt by experience the difficulty of breaking De Boigne's squares. Seeing this, De Boigne brought up his men, numbering 10,000, under the protection of his own guns, and stormed the Rājput camp. He estimated his own losses at 120 killed and 472 wounded—the enemy's infantry, being entrenched, did not suffer greatly; but they lost 'a vast number of cavalry.' (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 196.)]

war and a second battle took place at Mairta, in the Joudpoor territory, where they allowed themselves to be surprised (Sept. 12.) by De Boigne at dawn of day on the 12th September ; and although four hundred Rhatore cavalry made desperate efforts to reanimate their friends, and allow them to recover themselves, the general confusion was irretrievable.¹ It was supposed that Sindia would have completely subjugated the Rajpoots, but the opposition and dissensions to which he was exposed from his colleagues, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, (A.D. 1792.) induced him to grant them peace on their promising to pay a moderate tribute annually.²

The force of De Boigne was now gradually augmented to 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, Nujeebs and Rohillas, 2,000 irregular horse, and 600 Persian cavalry. This last body was mounted, clothed, armed, and disciplined by De Boigne, to whom all the horses of it belonged. Districts in the Dooab yielding twenty-two lacks of rupees of net revenue were assigned for the support of this force, and the fortress of Agra was given up as a depôt of small arms and cannon ; of the latter De Boigne had upwards of two hundred serviceable pieces.³ Sindia affected to consider this force as part of the Emperor's establishment, and denominated them the imperial army ; but such a flimsy veil was not calculated to deceive the watchful eye of his rivals, and Holkar in particular saw the growth of this power with rancorous jealousy. He retired across the Chumbul, and entertained in his service the Chevalier Dudrenee,⁴ a Frenchman, who raised and

¹ [De Boigne's own description of the battle shows that ' his battalions were only enabled to resist the furious charge of the Rathod horse by forming into hollow squares—the formation to be rendered so famous in after years at Quatre Bras and Mont St. Jean. After the defeat, the battalions ' resumed their positions, and advancing with their own artillery, made a general attack on the Rājput line. At three in the afternoon the town was taken by assault.' (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 200 n.) For accourts of the campaign from the Rājput side see Tod, *Personal Narrative*, chs. xxviii, xxix. (popular ed., vol. i.)]

² Mahratta letters and MS. Palmer's dispatches. Indian newspaper and General De Boigne.

³ General De Boigne.

⁴ [Keene (*Mughal Empire*, p. 201) states that the name of this Frenchman is variously spelt Dudrenee, Doderneque, Dudernaig, and suggests that the form du Dernek may be correct and is reconcilable with a Breton origin. Dudrenee was the son of an officer in the French navy, and arrived in India about 1773. He joined the

disciplined four battalions, the first troops of that description which the family of Holkar had ever used.

Ali Buhadur, at the suggestion of Himmud Buhadur, undertook the conquest of Bundelcund, in which province, after a long struggle, they succeeded in establishing themselves, but found infinite difficulty in reducing the country, and were perpetually involved in warfare and insurrection.

Whilst Sindia was engaged in contentions with his colleagues, he frequently declared his intention of repairing to Poona for the purpose of obtaining their recall ; but Nana's policy in supporting Holkar was well known, and Sindia's situation was deemed too insecure to admit of his venturing on an excursion so distant. When he therefore moved towards Oojein and actually commenced his march for Poona, various were the conjectures which ensued. Some considered that, jealous of the increasing power of the British and their influence at Poona and Hyderabad, his views were directed to the establishment of his own authority at Poona, for the purpose of preventing the ascendancy which it seemed probable they would obtain, especially if Tippoo's dominions were conquered and partitioned. Others supposed that he had views on the territory of Nizam Ally, and some believed that his sole object was to prevent the interference of Holkar in his late acquisitions in Hindoostan.

It is probable there was some foundation for all these surmises ; certain it is that he had in view the control of the Bramins, and the establishment of his own authority at the Peishwa's capital. After the battle of Patun in June, 1790, he obtained from the Emperor, for the third time, patents constituting the Peishwa Wukeeli-Mootluq, but which was now to descend to him as a hereditary office in unalienable *enam*, on condition, however, of appointing

forces of Bēgam Samrū about 1782, and remained in her service until 1791, when Tukājī Holkar offered him a large salary to raise and discipline four battalions of infantry. In 1798 the intervention of Amīr Khān, the Pindārī leader, saved him from being assassinated by Jasvant Rāo Holkar, by whom he was subsequently reinstated in his command. He and his troops submitted to Colonel Vandeleur at Mathurā on November 30, 1803. Opinions differ as to Dudrenec's character. Some (*vide* Keene) have described him as a gallant and courteous gentleman ; others describe him as unfortunate as a military commander and possessed of very questionable ideas of loyalty and fidelity. (Compton, *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, pp. 347-51.)]

Sindia and his posterity his perpetual deputies. In order therefore to exhibit to his countrymen his absolute power over the imperial house of Timour, for which the Mahrattas in the Deccan had long a habitual respect, and to gratify the feelings of all Hindoos, the Emperor invested Sindia with the right of selecting his heir from among his sons, and issued an edict forbidding the slaughter of bullocks and cows throughout the Moghul dominions.

Sindia's march to the southward was very slow ; and he often appeared as if deliberating whether he might venture so far from his own territory. He gave out that he was proceeding to Poona by the Emperor's orders, as bearer of the sunnuds and insignia of the office of Wukeel-i-Mootluq for the Peishwa. On his arrival at Bheer near the Godavery, charged with such commissions from the Emperor, he made some demands on Nizam Ally, the nature of which is not ascertained ; but he endeavoured to induce him to make him a present of the fertile district of Bheer, and bestow Aurungabad on the Peishwa. On being refused, he pretended to be much hurt at his want of courtesy.

Nana Furnuwees long doubted whether Sindia would actually come into the Deccan ; but on being assured that he was on his route from Burhanpoor, he applied to Lord Cornwallis, through Hurry Punt Phurkay, for the permanent services of Captain Little's detachment, which, in the name of the Peishwa, he offered to subsidize ; but the Governor-General for various reasons declined assenting to the proposal.

Sindia was very apprehensive of a connexion of that kind ; and, to allay Nana's well-founded jealousy of his regular infantry, he only brought with him a small party under an Englishman of respectable character, named Hessing,¹ and one complete battalion commanded by Michael Filoze, by birth a Neapolitan,

¹ [Hessing was not an Englishman, but a Dutchman, born in 1740 in Utrecht. This is shown by the inscription on his tomb at Agra, which also records that he died Commandant of Agra in his sixty-third year, July 21, 1803, just before Lake's successful siege of the place. He is described as 'a good, benevolent man, and a brave soldier.' Moreover, his son, George Hessing (see page 286 and footnote *infra*) was not the child of 'a native mother.' John Hessing's wife was formerly Mademoiselle Anne Derridon, sister of Major Louis Derridon of Sindia's service and of Madame Perron. She may perhaps have been of mixed descent, but was not a pure native of India. (Compton, *European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, pp. 364-5 ; and article in *Calcutta Review*, January 1912.)]

a low, illiterate man of worthless character, but of considerable address and cunning. Sindia arrived at Poona on the 11th June, and pitched his camp near the *Sungum*, or junction of the Moota and Moola rivers, the place assigned by the Peishwa for the residence of the British envoy and his suite; and hence the *Sungum* and the Residency, a spot for many reasons interesting and well known to most of our countrymen who have visited that quarter, became synonymous.¹

Nana Furnuwees did everything in his power to prevent the Peishwa's acceptance of the titles and insignia brought from the Emperor; he represented the impropriety of adopting some of the titles, especially that of Maharaj Adeeraj (the greatest of great Rajas) which was inconsistent with the constitution of the existing government of the Mahratta empire. But Sindia persisted; and permission for the Peishwa's acceptance of all the honours was formally obtained from the Raja of Satara. Nine days after his arrival, Nana Furnuwees visited Sindia, who received him in the most cordial manner, refused to sit on his musnud in the minister's presence, and treated him with the greatest respect. On the ensuing day Sindia paid his respects to the Peishwa, carrying with him numberless rare productions and curiosities of Hindoostan for the young Prince. The following morning was appointed for the grand ceremony of investing the Peishwa with the title and dignity of Wukeel-i-Mootluq, and Sindia spared no pains to render it as imposing as possible. A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from his own camp. The Peishwa proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant

¹ [For many years past the spot where the Residency stood has been occupied by the official residence of the District and Sessions Judge of Poona, who is also Agent for the Sardars of the Deccan. The grounds of the old Residency included the site of the present Science College and the English burial-ground close to the present Sangam Lodge. The Resident's quarters contained five houses, besides outer buildings for the guard and escort-parties. The entire block was destroyed on November 5, 1817, immediately after the departure of Mountstuart Elphinstone to join the British forces arrayed for the battle of Kirkee. Reporting the event to Sir Evan Nepean, Governor of Bombay, Mountstuart Elphinstone wrote, 'I beg you will excuse this scrawl, but all my writing implements, with everything I have except the clothes on my back, form part of the blaze of the Residency, which is now smoking in sight.' (Colebrooke, *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884), vol. i, p. 376.)]

to represent that of the Emperor of the Moghuls, was erected, on which was displayed the imperial *firman*s, the *khillut*, or dresses of investiture, and all the principal insignia. The Peishwa on approaching the throne made his obeisance thrice, placed 101 gold mohurs upon it as a *nuzur* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Sindia's Persian secretary then read the imperial *firman*s, and amongst others the edict which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The Peishwa then received the *khillut*, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pencease, a seal and inkstand, and two royal *morchuls*, or fans of peacocks' tails, accompanied by a *nalkee*,¹ a *palkee*,² a horse and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the Orders of the Fish and of the Sun.³ The Peishwa retired to an adjoining tent and returned clothed in the imperial

¹ A *nalkee* is a sort of sedan chair without a top, having four poles, two behind and two before, never used but by the Emperor or persons of the very highest rank.

² A *palkee* is totally different from the more useful and convenient, though less splendid conveyance, commonly used by Europeans, and termed by them palanquin. The natives, who call them *meynas*, also use the same conveyance, but the *palkee* is a sort of short bedstead, over which a pole very much curved in the middle is fastened, and above all, a scarlet cloth stretched on bamboos as an awning, and sometimes very highly ornamented, is placed. When used by ladies there are screens affixed to the upper cloth.

³ [Sleeman describes the *nālkī* as 'one of the three great insignia which the Mogul Emperors of Delhi conferred upon independent princes of the first class, and could never be used by any persons upon whom, or upon whose ancestors, they had not been conferred.' The other two were the order of the Fish and the fan of peacock's feathers. The Order of the Fish (*mahī maratīb*) is said to have been instituted by Khusrū Parvīz, King of Persia (A.D. 591-628), and thence passed to the Nawābs of Oudh and the Mughal Emperors of Delhi.

The Order of the Sun was likewise borrowed from Persia; the Mughal Emperors assuming the right to confer it upon the great ruling princes of India, irrespective of creed. According to Malcolm, the figure of the Sun in Leo was adopted centuries ago as the arms of Persia, and consequently became the insignia of an order of knighthood. Dr. V. A. Smith suggests that the symbol may have been borrowed by Hulākū the Tartar (A.D. 1258), as a trophy of his victory over a Seljukian prince of Iconium, who used the emblem on his coins, and adds that the symbol of Sol in Leo was perhaps adopted first by Ghiās-ud-din Kai Khusrū bin Kaikobād (A.D. 1236-44), the emblem having reference either to his own horoscope or to that of his queen. (Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections*, ed. V. A. Smith (1915), pp. 135, 137-8.)]

khillut, when he resumed his seat ; and Sindia, followed by Nana Furnuwees and such of the Peishwa's officers as were present, offered *nuzurs* of congratulation. When the Peishwa arose to return to his palace he was followed by Sindia and Hurry Punt carrying the *morchuls* and fanning him. He entered Poona seated in the *nalkee* ; the concourse of people assembled to witness the procession was exceedingly great ; the pomp and grandeur displayed was beyond anything that the inhabitants of Poona had ever seen, whilst the clang of thousands of musical instruments, the shouts of the populace, volleys of musketry, and salvos of cannon, seemed to give all the effect that the projector of this state ceremony could possibly desire.

The investiture of Sindia by the Peishwa, as deputy to the Wukeel-i-Mootluq, immediately followed on their arrival at the Peishwa's palace ; but on this occasion, and on several others, the pretended humility of Sindia gave disgust when he insisted on being considered as the hereditary servant of the Peishwa, entitled only to carry his slippers, and addressed by no higher title than that of *Patell*. Though this affectation was meant to be in conformity with Mahratta taste, it failed in its effect. No Bramin of education was pleased or deceived by such coarse self-disparagement, and the old Mahrattas, though Mahadajee Sindia had purchased some hereditary privileges in the Deccan, would much more readily have acknowledged his new imperial titles¹ than have assigned to him the appellation of *Patell*, a distinction which they considered due only to the legitimate Sindia, *Patell* of *Kunneirkheir*. The Mankurees, and those cavaliers who considered themselves the old officers of the Rajas of Satara, though some among them could scarcely term the horse he rode his own, refused to enter the imperial tents with the Peishwa, nor would they present *nuzurs* to him as Wukeel-i-Mootluq. *Nuzurs* were presented to Sindia by his officers on returning to his own camp, but the feeling among his countrymen, which was too strong to escape his notice, proved to him the necessity of much caution in the prosecution of his designs.

A principal object was to gain the confidence of the young Peishwa, to which the rarities he had brought from Hindoostan, and the splendid spectacle with which he had been gratified, paved

¹ These were Raja, Maharaj, Mahdoo Rao Sindia, Mudar Ool Muham, Ali Jah Buhadur.

the way. The frank, unreserved manners of Sindia, who talked to the young prince of hunting and hawking, and carried him out on frequent excursions to see those field sports, were things so very different, and so much more agreeable than the sedate and grave observance of decorum habitual to Nana Furnuwees, that Sindia soon became his constant companion. Parties to the country in the neighbourhood of Poona constantly took place, to which the young prince was invited, and Nana thought it advisable to give his assent, although he clearly saw the design of Sindia, and watched his proceedings so vigilantly that it was difficult for him to find opportunities of conversing with Mahdoo Rao unobserved. When they did occur, Sindia never failed to comment on the manner in which he was treated, and to assure him that he had both the power and the inclination to render him independent of such tutelage. But although Mahdoo Rao readily entered into every scheme of pleasure suggested by Sindia, his natural good disposition and judgement rendered it by no means easy to shake his confidence in Nana Furnuwees; and at first he combated Sindia's arguments with warmth; but the customary restraints before unfelt began to be irksome, and Sindia's society proportionally more desirable.

Sindia's public affairs at the Durbar seemed principally to refer to Hindoostan; he represented the large sums he had spent in extending the empire, and procuring such honours and dignity for the Peishwa; he petitioned for the payment of his expenses, the entire management of affairs in Hindoostan, and finally for the recall of Holkar and Ali Buhadur. In reply to these, the minister always demanded in the first instance an account of the revenue of those districts which he had subdued so easily, and had enjoyed so long. Many discussions on these subjects took place, and many circumstances occurred, tending to strengthen the mutual jealousy of Sindia and Nana; but they for some time maintained every form of civility and respect, whilst their respective parties in Hindoostan, though engaged in service together in the Rajpoot country, were almost in a state of open rupture.

The restless spirit of Ismael Beg, and his enmity to Sindia, rendered him a fit instrument for disturbing the tranquillity of Hindoostan; to which, after Sindia's departure, he was secretly prompted by the intrigues of Tookajee Holkar; but, after

assembling a considerable force, his career was stopped sooner than was anticipated.

The widow of Nujeef Khan refused to surrender the fort of Canoond¹ to Sindia's officers. A force marched against her under M. Perron, the officer second in command to De Boigne. Ismael Beg advanced to her assistance, gave Perron battle outside the walls, and being defeated entered the fort. He there assisted in the defence, which was well maintained, until the widow, having been killed by a stone shell, the garrison became dispirited by the accident, and began to think of betraying Ismael Beg to ensure themselves favourable terms. This treachery, however, the latter prevented by giving himself up to M. Perron, who promised, on the faith of his commanding officer, De Boigne, that he should not be put to death. The terms were observed, but he was ever after confined in the fort of Agra, where he died in 1799.

Subsequent to the surrender of Canoond, which happened before Sindia reached Poona, Holkar's and Sindia's armies were levying tribute together in the Rajpoot territory; they had also taken two forts, when, quarrelling about the spoils, their jealousy burst forth into open hostilities, which brought on the battle of Lukhairee,² near Ajimere, on which occasion Gopaul Rao Bhow, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne, with twenty thousand horse and nine thousand regular infantry, defeated Holkar's army, consisting of thirty thousand horse and the four battalions of Dudrenec. The attack was planned by De Boigne, and the conflict the most obstinate ever witnessed by that officer. By the explosion of twelve tumbrils of ammunition his brigades were thrown into great confusion, but, being posted in a wood, Holkar's cavalry could not take advantage of the disaster. Dudrenec's battalions fought until they were nearly annihilated. Their guns, thirty-eight in number, were all taken; the shattered remains of the corps retreated precipitately into Malwa, where Holkar, in impotent rage, sacked Oojein, the capital of his rival.

When accounts of these proceedings reached Poona, the

¹ [Kānund (Canoond) lies to the south of Delhi and Hansi, roughly equidistant from both cities. The proper name of the place is Kānund Mohendargarh (*I.G.* xiv. 369). The fort was a stronghold of earth, faced with stone, on the borders of the Bikanēr desert. Najf Khān's widow was a sister of Ghulām Kādir, the Rohilla.]

² [The battle of Lakherī (Lukhairee) was fought in September 1792. Lakherī is in Kotah State.]

ostensible cordiality of Sindia and the court was for a time obstructed, and precautions were adopted by both parties, as if apprehensive of personal violence. Nana Furnuwees called

A.D.
1793. in the aid of Pureshram Bhow, who arrived with two thousand horse. This imprudent reinforcement furnished Sindia with a pretext for greatly increasing the parties of Hessian and Filoze who accompanied him, and for bringing down one of his infantry brigades, the command of which was confided by De Boigne to M. Perron. But as neither party was desirous of attaining its end by prosecuting the war, positive instructions were dispatched to their respective officers to refrain from hostilities, and to await the pacific settlement of their disputes by orders from the Peishwa.

The result rendered Sindia all powerful in Hindoostan, but he was conscious of his unpopularity in the Deccan and strove to overcome it. With this view he had, on his arrival at Poona, espoused the cause of Govind Rao Gaekwar in a manner which will be hereafter explained, and upon one occasion when Nana Furnuwees, during the minority of the Punt Suchew, assumed charge of his lands, Sindia, who knew that the proceeding met with general disapprobation, interposed, conveyed the Suchew to Poona in opposition to the orders of the minister, re-established him in his possessions, and dismissed Bajee Rao Moreishwur, the agent whom Nana had placed in charge of the Suchew's territory. This daring interference gave rise to a quarrel which was with difficulty appeased by the mediation of Hurry Punt Phurkay ; but fresh disputes arose in consequence of Sindia's more undisguised attempts to induce the Peishwa to seek his protection. On one occasion in particular a conversation took place in a boat at Lohgaom, which being overheard and repeated caused an immediate alarm in the mind of Nana, and he took the first opportunity of coming to an explanation with the Peishwa. He addressed himself both to his judgement and feelings, enumerated the services he had performed for him and for the state, described the views of aggrandizement entertained by Sindia, pointed out his foreign troops, his departure from ancient usage, and his want of connexion with the Mahratta people, over whom and the Bramin sovereignty he was bent on establishing an absolute power. With these observations he contrasted his own situation, his inability to preserve order or to resist the encroachments of

Sindia, if unsupported by his prince ; and finally, lamenting in tears the probable effects of the evil counsels by which he had been misled, he tendered his resignation and declared his resolution to proceed to Benares. Mahdoo Rao was greatly affected. In a transport of grief he begged his forgiveness, entreated his stay, and promised to be for ever guarded in his conduct. But notwithstanding this re-establishment of influence,¹ Sindia by his great power would probably have ultimately prevailed over his rival, although the unqualified support of Hurry Punt to all the measures of the minister, the friendship of the powerful Bramin families of Rastia and Putwurdhun, together with that of the old Mankurees, some of them great Jagheerdars, formed a strong opposition to the views of Mahadajee Sindia. But in the midst of his ambitious schemes he was suddenly seized with a violent fever which in a few days terminated his existence. He breathed his last at Wunowlee,² in the environs of Poona, on the 12th February, 1794.

¹ [Keene refers to an uncorroborated rumour, recorded in the *Tārīkh-i-Musāfirī*, that the Pēshwā about this date sent assassins to waylay Māhādajī Sindia at a little distance from the city, and that Sindia, while defending himself with success, was severely wounded. The story lacks foundation. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 210.)]

² [Wanowri (Wunowlee), the Anglo-Indian form of Vanāvdi, is now a portion of the Poona military cantonment. The Wanowri cavalry lines lie to the south-east of the open central belt of the cantonment. (*B.G.*, xviii. iii. 350, 400.) See diary of meeting of Bombay Council held on February 15, 1794 (Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 537) for record of Māhādajī Sindia's death.]

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A.D. 1794.

A.D. 1794.—THE death of Mahadajee Sindia was an event of great political importance, both as it affected the Mahratta empire and the other states of India. His views and his character are perhaps sufficiently elucidated in the history of the thirty-five years antecedent to the period at which we have arrived; but, that we may hold in mind the state of the different Mahratta powers and explain the proceedings of the petty princes on the coast of Maharashtra, formerly of so much importance when our establishments in India were in their infancy, we shall devote this chapter to a brief recapitulation of Sindia's policy, a summary of his character, a review of the affairs of some of the other chieftains, and an explanation of minor transactions between the English and the petty princes to whom allusion is made. We shall then be free to enter on the causes which led to a war between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls in the Deccan.

The designs of Sindia, as we have already observed, were early directed to independence, but he was at the same time desirous of preserving a coalition, such as would unite the chieftains of the empire against all foreign enemies. He was inimical to the overgrown ascendancy of the Bramins. In his progress he first assisted the one Bramin against the other, and then attempted to overawe and control him whom he had raised. His absence from Poona, his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, the necessity of his returning to his own Jagheer in Malwa, his defeat by Camac, and the successful result of the campaign directed by the Bramins against Goddard, gave an apparant superiority to his rivals, which seemed to foretell the fall of his fortunes. But the treaty of Salbye, the recognition of his independence by the British Government, and the commanding

station in which he was placed as the mediator and guarantee of a peace honourable to the Mahrattas, raised him at once from decline to aggrandizement. In his first attempts to extend his power in Hindoostan, his contemporaries supposed him unequal to such a task, and that he must be ruined by the consequences of his own ambition. When he surmounted his difficulties, and not only rendered himself independent, but held in his hands a force which might control the Mahratta empire, he was very much alarmed lest Nana Furnuwees should call in the aid of a subsidiary, both as it interfered with his own views and sacrificed so much to the English. The power of that nation, at a time when they were supposed to be weak and their resources exhausted, had appeared in the late war greater than at any former period, and had attained a height which, in Sindia's opinion, threatened the subjugation of all India. He was declaredly averse to the entire conquest of Tippoo's territory, as he conceived that measure dangerous to the Mahratta state; but whilst the war continued, he does not seem to have seriously meditated hostilities against the English; neither did he take any secondary steps to undermine the influence the latter had acquired with the Bramin ministers at the Poona court, because the revolution he contemplated would confine or enlarge the intercourse as he might desire.

But although nothing decidedly inimical appears on the part of Sindia towards the British Government, his power and ambition, his march to Poona, and, above all, the general opinion of the country, led the English to suspect him; and we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy. The Bombay Government, in consequence of a slight alteration in the style of address from that which was used in the time of Governor Hornby, attributed the change to studied disrespect, and an attempt to mediate between that Government and his relation, the Dessaye of Sawuntwaree, was deemed a very improper interference; but in the one case the style of address was discovered to be the same as permitted by the Governor-General, and in the other the proposed mediation was perfectly justified. There appeared, however, soon after Sindia's arrival in the Deccan, in an ukhbar or native newspaper from Delhi, a paragraph which stated that the Emperor had written to the Peishwa and Mahadajee Sindia, expressing a hope that by the

exertions of the Wukeel-i-Mootluq and his deputy he should obtain some tribute from Bengal. As such paragraphs are frequently written for the purpose of ascertaining the effects of the reports which they promulgate, it was properly noticed by Lord Cornwallis, whose spirited remonstrance prevented its repetition.

As to a summary of the character of Mahadajee Sindia; though much of his success is attributable to a combination of circumstances, he was a man of great political sagacity and of considerable genius; of deep artifice, of restless ambition, and of implacable revenge. With a high opinion of his personal address, he generally failed where he attempted to exercise it; and in ebullitions of anger, to which he was prone, he frequently exposed what he most wished to conceal. His countenance was expressive of good sense and good humour; but his complexion was dark, his person inclining to corpulency, and he limped from the effects of his wound at Panniput. His habits were simple, his manners kind and frank, but sometimes blustering and coarse. He was beloved by his dependants, liberal to his troops in assignments of land or orders on villages, but quite the reverse in payments from his treasury or in personal donatives; a characteristic not only of Mahadajee Sindia, but of Mahrattas generally. His disposition was not cruel, although his punishments were severe. He could not only write, but what is rare among the Mahrattas, he was a good accountant and understood revenue affairs. His districts in Malwa were well managed, a circumstance, however, which must be ascribed to a judicious selection of agents; for Sindia, like most Mahratta chieftains, was too much engaged in politics or war to bestow the time and attention necessary to a good civil government.¹ He died without male issue.

Tookajee Sindia, Mahadajee Sindia's full brother, was slain in the fatal field of Panniput: but he left three sons, Kedarjee, Rowlajee, and Anund Rao, all of whom became officers in their uncle's service. Kedarjee died without issue; Rowlajee had two sons; but Mahadajee Sindia had resolved to adopt Doulut Rao, the son of his youngest nephew Anund Rao. The ceremony of adoption had not actually taken place, but Mahadajee had repeatedly declared Doulut Rao his heir; and although Luximee

¹ Mahratta MSS. and letters; Bombay records. The living testimony of many respectable natives. A good portrait in my possession. General Count De Boigne; Sir John Malcolm, &c.

Bye, the widow of Mahadajee, opposed Doulut Rao's succession, her objections were overruled, as even Nana Furnuwees acceded to it. Tookajee Holkar was one of the first to acknowledge Doulut Rao. All the dependants of Sindia's family and the other Mahratta authorities sent their congratulations; so that this youth, who had scarcely attained his fifteenth year,¹ became undisputed heir to the extensive realms of Mahadajee Sindia.

The great success of Sindia's regular infantry, rendered efficient by the talents and energy of De Boigne, led most of the Mahratta states to introduce regular battalions as a part of their armies. Many Mahrattas, however, were of opinion that this departure from usage would prove their ruin; infantry and guns, as they had once too bitterly experienced, compelled them to fight when flight was more judicious, and some of them predicted that, if they ever attempted to combat Europeans with their own weapons, they would one day experience a defeat still more fatal than that of Panniput.² Tookajee Holkar long resisted the introduction of regular infantry, but he saw that Sindia could have made no progress in reducing the strong forts in Rajpootana without such aid; and although he might have been convinced that it would have been much better for his army to have wanted the four battalions of Dudrenec at Lukhairee, he was so well satisfied with their conduct, that he immediately afterwards ordered Dudrenec to raise a like number.

Rughoojee Bhonslay, the Raja of Nagpoor, did not, in this respect, follow the example of the generality of the Mahratta chieftains. His father Moodajee died in 1788, and besides Rughoojee, the eldest, he left two other sons, Khundoojee and

¹ [In the Marāthā genealogies, published in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i, Daulat Rāo Sindia's age at this date is given as twenty-two (p. 695). The *Imperial Gazetteer* (1908), vol. xii, p. 423, accepts Grant Duff's view that he was scarcely fifteen. Marshman (1869), vol. ii, p. 47, speaks of him as 'a lad of thirteen'; and Malcolm, *Central India*, 3rd ed., 1832, vol. i, p. 13, describes him as only 'thirteen years of age.' The statement on p. 572, *O.H.I.*, that he was 'a boy of thirteen' when he succeeded to Māhādajī's possessions is correct. Daulat Rāo's mother, Mainabāi, was a daughter of Yesuji Angria. Her brother, Bāburāo Angria, is described by Colonel Broughton in *Letters from a Mahratta Camp* (Constable's Oriental Miscellany IV (1892), pp. 30, 31).]

² Mahratta MSS. This was the opinion of Nana Furnuwees, and many Mahrattas of the present day attribute the overthrow of their power solely to the introduction of regular infantry and artillery.

Venkajee or Munnya Bappoo. Khundoojee had charge of the northern, and Venkajee of the southern districts, but Rughoojee, as heir of his uncle Janojee, was Sena Sahib Soobeh of the Mahratta empire, although until his father's death he was not considered as ruler of Berar. At the time when the confederacy was formed against Tippoo, Rughoojee, in consequence of a peremptory summons from the Peishwa, was constrained to repair to Poona, where he objected to being ordered upon an expedition where the Peishwa was not to command in person, and offered many other ineffectual excuses, until he at length privately explained to Nana Furnuwees his grounds for apprehending that his brother Khundoojee would usurp the sovereignty in his absence, upon which his presence was dispensed with, on promising to contribute ten lacks of rupees to assist in defraying the expenses of the war. Soon after his return to Nagpoor, his brother Khundoojee died, which relieved him from all apprehension of rivalry, and he soon after conferred on his brother Venkajee the districts of Chandah and Chuteesgurh in Jagheer. These were the only changes of importance amongst the eastern Mahrattas up to the period of Mahadajee Sindia's death. In the west, several events in regard to the Gaekwar, or Baroda state, require a summary notice.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, the regent at Baroda, died on the 21st December, 1789, in consequence of a fall from an upper story in his house. His younger brother, Mannajee Rao, who was then at Baroda, immediately assumed charge of the person and government of his brother Syajee. Govind Rao, the elder brother next to Syajee, with whose history the reader is already acquainted, was then residing in obscurity at a village in the neighbourhood of Poona, and presented a petition to the minister, praying to be acknowledged by the Peishwa as regent of the Gaekwar possessions. His claim was just, but Mannajee Rao, by paying a *nuzur* of rupees thirty-three lacks, thirteen thousand and one, and agreeing to pay up arrears due by Futih Sing, amounting to upwards of thirty-six lacks, was confirmed in his usurpation. Mahadajee Sindia however, as already alluded to, espoused the cause of Govind Rao, and procured a repeal of Mannajee's appointment; upon which Mannajee applied to the Bombay Government, claiming its protection on the terms of the treaty concluded with General Goddard by Futih Sing. As the

treaty in question was superseded by that of Salbye, the English declined all interference on that ground ; but by the talent of Mannajee's agent, Goolab Raee, and the supposed imbecility of Govind Rao, they were induced to recommend, through Mr. Malet, that some friendly compromise should be adopted, as being for the benefit of the country and of all parties concerned. Nana Furnuwees concurred in this opinion, but Mahadajee Sindia and the partisans of Govind Rao objected to any compromise. The question, however, was at once set at rest by the death of Mannajee about 1st August, 1793. Still, Govind Rao found it difficult to obtain permission to quit the Peishwa's capital. The ministers, without any regard to the exorbitant exactions already imposed on himself and his family, obliged Govind Rao to sign an agreement confirming the former stipulations, and ceding to the Peishwa the Gaekwar's share of the districts south of the Taptee, formerly included in the cessions to the Company in 1780, together with his proportion of the customs of Surat ; but, there being no service performed by the Peishwa towards the Gaekwar, beyond the mere confirmation of his rights as regent, the British Government objected to the cession, as a dismemberment of the Baroda territory contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of Salbye. The validity of this objection was immediately admitted by Nana Furnuwees, the instrument of cession was restored, and Govind Rao at last set out to assume his office, as undisputed regent at Baroda, on the 19th December, 1793.

Affairs on the coast of Maharashtra demand notice, chiefly from the system of piracy which continued to prevail between Goa and Bombay.

In 1756, piracy received a considerable check by the subjugation of Toolajee Angria, and had the Peishwa then united his endeavours with those of the English, it might have been exterminated. But like predatory incursions on shore, it was profitable ; and so far from being suppressed, it was encouraged by the Poona court. The Peishwa had two fleets, the one under his Sursoobehdar at Bassein, the other commanded by Anund Rao Dhoolup his admiral, who was stationed at Viziadroog. The Peishwa's fleets did not molest vessels under English colours until the war of 1775. After that period, even in times of peace, we find that occasional depredations were committed, and unless

speedy detection followed, which was not always the case, the vessels were not restored: when the capture, however, was clearly ascertained, they were released, and the apology offered for their detention was that they had been mistaken for ships of some other nation.¹

Mannajee Angria of Kolabah continued in obedience to the Peishwa's authority until his death, which happened in 1759. His son Rughoojee professed equal submission, but only obeyed when it suited his convenience. His piracies on the trading ships of the English were conducted in the same manner as the aggressions of the Peishwa. In November, 1793, Rughoojee died, when, without reference to the Poona court, the sovereignty was assumed in the name of his infant son Mannajee under the guardianship of Jey Sing Angria. By this usurpation, as it was termed, in those who had not power to support their pretensions, Mannajee and Jey Sing incurred the enmity of the Poona minister, of which Sindia's successor, Doulut Rao, at a subsequent period took advantage, and raised a member of the family of Angria who was nearly allied to himself to the chiefship of that principality, a change which gave no umbrage to the English, because the reigning party, so far from courting their friendship, had most unjustifiably made prize of some of their ships.²

The Seedees of Jinjeera plundered all nations, except the English, nor did they always escape. Several revolutions had taken place in this small principality. In 1762, Seedee Yakoot, by the will of the regent Seedee Ibrahim, succeeded to the government in prejudice to Seedee Abdool Rahim, who was considered the nearest heir. Abdool Rahim endeavoured to obtain possession by force, and was secretly reinforced by the Mahrattas. The English took part with the reigning chief, and having failed in an attempt to arbitrate the difference, they assisted to repel Abdool Rahim, who being defeated fled to Poona. Seedee Yakoot apprehending that the Peishwa might openly espouse Abdool Rahim's cause offered a compromise, promising him Dhunda Rajepoor and the succession to Jinjeera at his death; a proposal which was accepted, and Abdool Rahim succeeded accordingly. But Seedee Yakoot had made a will bequeathing the principality to the second son of Abdool Rahim at

¹ Bombay Records and Mahratta letters.

² Mahratta MSS. and letters. Bombay Records.

his father's death, under the guardianship, in case of a minority, of his own friend Seedee Johur, who was commandant of Jinjeera. Abdool Rahim died shortly after in 1784 ; but, without paying any regard to the will of Seedee Yakoot, he had bequeathed the principality to his eldest son, Abdool Khureem Khan, commonly called Balloo Meah.¹ Seedee Johur, however, defended his pretensions, founded on the will of Seedee Yakoot, and endeavoured to arrest Balloo Meah ; but he, being apprised of the scheme, fled to Poona, carrying with him his younger brother, whom Seedee Johur wished to set up. Nana Furnuwees, in hopes that it was reserved for him to annex the unconquerable island to the Mahratta possessions, prepared to support the cause of Abdool Khureem Khan ; Seedee Johur, however, called on the English for protection, expressed his readiness to comply with any reasonable arbitration satisfactory to the inhabitants, but declaring his determination to resist the Mahrattas and the obnoxious Balloo Meah, 'whilst the rock of Jinjeera remained and a man to stand by him.' Nana Furnuwees, at the request of the Bombay Government, agreed to suspend operations, until a reference could be made to Lord Cornwallis on the subject. It being at that time a great object of the Governor-General's policy to gain the friendship of the Poona court, and it being generally believed that Seedee Johur was only striving to get the younger brother into his power as a cloak to meditated usurpation, Lord Cornwallis directed the Bombay Government not to support him. He also intimated to the Peishwa that, if he would make an adequate provision for the sons of the late Abdool Khureem Khan in some other part of the country, he might then take possession of the Seedee's territory. The Mahrattas, however, without making the provision stipulated, attempted clandestinely to possess themselves of Jinjeera, which no sooner came to the knowledge of the Governor-General, than he suspended the permission he had given. At length, when the treaty of alliance against Tippoo was concluded, the Peishwa having granted to Balloo Meah and his brother a tract of land near Surat,² guaranteed by the English and yielding

¹ Mahratta MS. and letters.

² [This land now constitutes the modern Sachin State in the Surat Agency, Bombay, the present Nawab being a direct descendant of Balu Mia. Sachin has an area of forty-one square miles, and a revenue

annually 75,000 rupees ; having also given them 40,000 rupees in ready money, the heirs to the Jinjeera principality relinquished their right and title in favour of the Peishwa. The agreement was signed on the 6th June, 1791 ;—but the castle may fall whilst the cottage stands ; the little island was never reduced, and the principality of Jinjeera has survived the empire of the Peishwas.

The most active, however, of all the corsairs on the coast, and the most destructive to the English trade, were the pirates of Malwan and Sawuntwaree. We have already cursorily alluded to the expedition sent against them in 1765. It was under the joint command of Major Gordon¹ and Captain John Watson of the Bombay Marine.² They speedily reduced the fort of Malwan,³ a much valued possession of the Raja of Kolapoor, and took Yeswuntgurh or Rairee from the Dessaye of Waree. To the former the Bombay Government gave the name of Fort Augustus, intending to have kept it, but the acquisition being unprofitable, they proposed to destroy the works ; that alternative, however, was also abandoned on account of the expense, and they at last determined to restore it to the Raja, on condition of his promising not to molest their ships or trade, to give security for his future good conduct, and to indemnify them for losses and expenses to the amount of Rs. 382,896 ; the whole of which, except Rs. 50,000, was received before Malwan was evacuated in May, 1776. This expedition took place during the minority of Sivajee, Raja of Kolapoor. Kem Sawunt, Dessaye of Waree, was then also a minor ; and a confusion, greater even than usual, prevailed amongst his turbulent relations. To this confusion may be ascribed the difficulty which was experienced in effecting a settlement with the Dessaye of Waree. The Bombay Government

of a little more than 2,000,000 rupees a year. The villages composing the State are much scattered, some being surrounded by British territory and others by portions of the Baroda State.]

¹ I am not sure if this name be correct, it is written Gowan and Goreham, as well as Gordon, in the records of the period.

² The same who, as Commodore Watson, was killed at the siege of Tannah.

³ [See note on page 147, vol. i, *ante*. Besides the fort of Sindhudrug, Mālwan contains the Rāj-kot fort, built on rising ground and surrounded on three sides by the sea. Mālwan was ceded to the British by the Rājā of Kolhāpur by the treaty of Kārvīr in 1812]

do not appear to have been aware that there was a distinction between the pirates of Waree and Malwan until 1765, when, on the 7th April of that year, they concluded a treaty of nineteen articles with the Dessaye, whom they distinguished by his ancient family name of Bhonslay, or, as written in their records, the Bouncello.¹ Of this treaty not one article was observed by the Mahrattas. Mr. Mostyn was therefore deputed in 1766 to conclude some settlement, and obtained an obligation for two lacks of rupees, with a promise on the part of the Dessaye to refrain from further aggressions, on condition that the Bombay Government should restore Rairee. The money could only be raised by a mortgage on the revenues of the district of Vingorla² for thirteen years, and to induce the mortgagee, Wittoojee Koomptee, to advance the stipulated sum, Mr. Mostyn, in addition to two hostages procured from Waree, was obliged to promise that a small factory should be established, and the English flag hoisted under the protection of a few Sepoys, to be left in the fort of Vingorla. This arrangement being concluded, Rairee was restored in the end of 1766. A very short time, however, had elapsed, when the hostages made their escape, and the agents of Wittoojee Koomptee were driven from the stations where they were collecting the revenue. Much remonstrance and negotiation followed, but nothing specific was effected. At last, when the thirteen years expired, the Sawunts, although they had prevented the mortgagee from recovering the revenue, demanded restitution of the district, which being refused, they attacked and took Vingorla on the 4th June, 1780, with a considerable quantity of private and some public property belonging to the English. The piracies of the Sawunts of Waree were henceforth renewed, and the marriage of

¹ [Fryer (1675) was one of the earliest writers to use this form of the name Bhōslē. He refers to Sivājī as 'derived from an ancient line of Rajahs, of the cast of the Bounceloes' (original ed., p. 171). Other forms of the name given by early writers are Bhoslah (*Khāfi Khān* in *Elliot*, vii. 257), Bhosselah (*Seir Mutaqherin*, iii. 204), and Bonzolo (*Sonnerat*, i. 60). The Desāi of Wādī in question was Khem Sāvant the Great, who ruled from 1775 to 1803.]

² [Vengurla (Vingorla) is now included in the Ratnāgiri District, and has a flourishing import and export trade. It was ceded to the British by the Rānī of Sāvantvādi in 1812. Its port lighthouses, erected on the mainland in 1869, and the Rock Lighthouse built in 1870 on an isolated rock nine miles north-west of the town, are well known to mariners. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 169; *B.G.*, x. 2, 374 ff.)]

Kem Sawunt to Luximee Bye,¹ the niece of Mahadajee Sindia, although a connexion more splendid than honourable, increased their arrogance, especially whilst the English were too much occupied to send a force against them. The Raja of Kolapoor, seeing the depredations of the Sawunts escape with impunity, returned to his former habits; and thus piracy became as prevalent as ever. Complaints on the subject were made by the English to Mahadajee Sindia, who promised to oblige his relations to restore their captures; and the Raja of Kolapoor was also induced to promise a liquidation of all balances, and to abstain from further aggressions on the English. The conditions were not enforced, and of course such temporizing measures only encouraged a repetition of robbery and insult. In the end of the year 1789 the English had resolved to adopt more active measures, and had determined to crush those depredators; but in their extreme anxiety at that time to avoid giving offence to the Poona court, a doubt suddenly arose as to the propriety of attacking the Raja of Kolapoor: for so ignorant were they at this late period of the existing relations in the Mahratta state, that they supposed him a dependant of the Peishwa. When the question was referred to Nana Furnuwees, he foresaw, as he conceived, an opportunity of drawing in the Kolapoor state to seek the Peishwa's protection, and ultimately to yield obedience to the Poona government. Accordingly, by Nana's address, the Raja was at first induced to accept the Peishwa's mediation; but afterwards suspecting the design and hearing of the hostilities in which the English were about to be engaged with Tippoo, he suddenly revoked his consent, and piracy was never more frequent on the coast of Malabar than during the war with Mysore. It was an attempt to mediate between the Bombay Government and the Sawunts of Waree, that led the former to accuse Sindia of the improper interference to which we have alluded. However, some compromise through Sindia was agreed on with respect to the Sawunts, and an armament was prepared against the Kolapoor Raja in 1792. But the expedition never took place, as in

¹ Luximee Bye was the daughter of Tookajee Sindia. [Lakshmībāi (Luximee Bye) was the daughter of Jayappa or Jayajī Sindia, who was murdered in 1759 at the instance of Bijay Sing of Jodhpur. (See vol. i, p. 514.) In consequence of this marriage which took place in 1763, the Mughal Emperor conferred the title of Rājā Bahādur upon Khem Sāvant. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 496.)]

consequence of his offering indemnification to individuals, promising to pay the balance due to the Company on or before January, 1795, granting permission to establish factories at Malwan and Kolapoor, and tendering the humblest apologies for his misconduct, the numerous aggressions he had committed were once more overlooked, and a treaty was concluded with him on the terms he thus proposed. But no benefit resulted from it; on the contrary, in the ensuing year there were complaints not only against the Raja of Kolapoor, but against the Sawunts, Angria, and Dhoolup, for the capture or plunder of British ships; and it is no slight stigma on the British Indian administration that this system of piracy was not finally suppressed until the year 1812.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

FROM A.D. 1794 TO A.D. 1795.

A.D. 1794.—THE details in the last chapter, together with much of the preceding narrative, may tax the patience of the reader, but are for the most part absolutely necessary to elucidate our subject, and to afford a just view of the numerous authorities and interests which existed at this period among the Mahrattas. The empire founded by Sivajee now covered a vast space ; and had it been possible to combine its powers, to direct advantageously the peculiar genius of its people, and to render its various parts subservient to its general strength, the Mahrattas might still have extended their conquests, and a persevering predatory warfare would probably have arrested the rapid rise of the British nation in India. But the causes which drove the Mahrattas to predatory habits, and the circumstances which allured them to conquest, no longer existed, nor had they any chief whose authority was sufficient to unite them. They now lived under governments of their own, which were generally mild ; the executive authorities, even if administered by persons tyrannically disposed, were not so powerful as to become arbitrarily oppressive, but they were at the same time too feeble to call forth all the resources which smaller states, better organized, could have commanded. The Mahrattas were still a military people ; some member of every peasant's family, and sometimes the fourth or fifth of a whole village had carried arms. Persons, once employed, were generally ready to return to the service when required, but pitched battles and regular warfare were unsuited to their genius¹ ; the Mahratta cavalry when accustomed to depend

¹ [This statement, however true it may have been of the Marāthā troops of the eighteenth century, would not pass unchallenged nowadays. It is the British officer of the Indian Army who has wrought the change, and has taught the Marāthā regiments of the Bombay

on regular infantry and cannon, lost their former surprising activity and confidence on distant enterprises ; even their courage, which as a national virtue was never very conspicuous, had fallen below its ordinary level, and whilst some among them admired the wisdom of Mahadajee Sindia and extolled the advantages to be attained by disciplined armies and artillery, others, as we have already mentioned, more justly predicted from the same cause the certain overthrow of the Hindoo power.

The great object, however, of preserving the supremacy of the Peishwa and of giving to the Mahratta nation that common excitement to action, founded on the immediate gratification of self-interest, became, for a short period, a point of much less difficulty than might have been anticipated. This tendency to union proceeded from the existing claims on Nizam Ally ; in the settlement of which all the Mahratta chiefs were taught to expect a part ; the death of Sindia left the entire management to Nana Furnuwees, and the English adopted a neutral policy on the occasion.

We have before noticed the nature of the claims on Nizam Ally. They were outstanding balances for a series of years, on account of Chouth and Surdeshmookhee. Discussions on the subject had been occasionally agitated by the Mahrattas for upwards of ten years ; but the alliance in which they had been associated against Tippoo had enabled Nizam Ally to procrastinate, and prevented the Mahrattas from insisting on a settlement of their affairs.

(1791.) In 1791 Govind Rao Kallay and Govind Rao Pingley, the Peishwa's envoys at the court of Hyderabad, formally requested that Nizam Ally would appoint commissioners for investigating and adjusting the claims of their master. After considerable discussion Nizam Ally delivered to these envoys a set of demands, under thirty-four separate heads, chiefly regarding contributions unjustly exacted and the revenues of different places improperly taken or withheld by the Mahrattas. He also demanded reparation on account of damage sustained by the inroads of Pindharees residing within the Peishwa's boundary. To all which, full and satisfactory replies, drawn up with remarkable clearness and ability by Nana Furnuwees, were promptly returned,

Presidency to fight under modern conditions with the same courage and persistence as the martial races of Upper India. See footnote on p. 354f, *post.*]

followed by a set of articles, twenty-eight in number, demanding the adjustment of the Mahratta claims, some of which Nana proved to have existed since 1774. Nizam Ally was compelled to acknowledge some of these demands ; others he evaded : but he promised in general terms to appoint some persons to settle the whole, as soon as the war with Tippoo had terminated ; hoping by that time to obtain the interposition of the English.¹

(1792.)—At the conclusion of the war, Lord Cornwallis did endeavour to effect a treaty of guarantee, founded on that article of the alliance which regarded the assistance to be offered by the contracting parties, in case of an attack upon any one of them by Tippoo, believing that by such a treaty he should render a general benefit to all parties and secure the peace of India. But it was hardly to be supposed that any Indian statesman could appreciate such a design ; and accordingly each of the native courts interpreted the proposal as it appeared to affect their own interests. The Nizam saw in it a disposition to assist him, and hoped to realize his meditated scheme of raising a barrier between himself and the Mahrattas, so that he might not only resist their future encroachments, but evade their present demands ; at all events he had no doubt of obtaining a settlement, such as Hyder had effected with the Mahrattas, by paying a fixed tribute ; and from which Tippoo, by the late treaty, was entirely absolved. The Mahrattas on the other hand viewed the proposal as an arrogant assumption of authority on the part of the British Government, and it excited their jealousy, both as affecting their political consequence and interrupting the settlement of their established dues. On the propriety of resisting this interposition both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees concurred ; but they differed in their opinions with regard to the supposed designs of the English. Sindia conjectured that they projected an alliance with Nizam Ally for the purpose of obtaining the command of the Nizam's resources and turning them against the Mahrattas ; in consequence of which, for a short time previous to his death, he carried on a friendly correspondence with Tippoo Sultan. Nana Furnuwees, although he did not perceive the benevolent purpose by which Lord Cornwallis was actuated, took a more correct view of the subject, in supposing that the English, though desirous of becoming umpires, would not risk a war unless to

¹ Mahratta MS. and original papers.

save the Hyderabad state from being subverted ; such a conquest, however, even in subsequent success, Nana Furnuwees never ventured to contemplate. When the treaty of guarantee was submitted to the court of Poona, Mahadajee Sindia would have rejected it at once, but Nana, being anxious to keep well with the English as a check on Sindia, without giving a direct refusal, prolonged the discussion, although with no intention of assenting to what was proposed.

(1793).—Sir John Shore succeeded to the charge of the Government of British India, on the departure of the Marquis Cornwallis in August, 1793. Nizam Ally had supposed the latter so intent on effecting the treaty of general guarantee, that he concealed the deep interest he felt in the success of the negotiation of Poona, until he saw the prospect of its failure. He then used every argument, and held forth every inducement in his power, to obtain a separate treaty of guarantee for himself. Sir John Shore, however, did not think it advisable to compel the Mahrattas to accept the mediation of the British nation, and adhered to a system of neutrality, for a variety of reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon. We need only remark that, whatever might have been the apparant advantage of the Governor-General's interference, if it had enabled Nizam Ally to effect his evasive purposes, it must have been recorded as an injustice to the Mahrattas.¹

From the period when the demands of the Mahrattas were formally renewed, whilst negotiations for the treaty of guarantee were in progress, Nizam Ally, probably without imagining that actual hostilities would take place, had been increasing his military force. A body of regular infantry which, during the war with Tippoo, had consisted of two battalions under a respectable French officer named Raymond,² were increased to twenty-three battalions.

¹ [The Government of India was not definitely bound by the treaty to assist the Nizām with troops ; but 'the Nizam had been led to expect protection and had earned it by his cession of Guntur' in 1788. Dr. V. A. Smith (*O.H.I.*, p. 574) describes Sir John Shore as 'paralysed by a slavish obedience to the words of the Act of Parliament of 1784 and by unworthy fear of the Marāthās.']

² [François de Raymond, whom Malleson calls Michael Joachim Marie Raymond, was born in Gascony in 1755. In 1775 he was a sub-lieutenant in the service of Haidar Ali of Mysore. In 1783 he was given a commission in the French army, and acted as aide-de-camp to Bussy. Three years later he entered the Nizām's service and raised

His army was much augmented after Mahadajee Sindia's death, and he hoped, in consequence of that event, the Mahrattas might be easily satisfied, or successfully resisted, even if he should not be able to obtain the interposition of the English.¹ When the envoy, Govind Rao Kallay,² renewed his master's demands, he produced a detailed statement, showing a balance in his favour of nearly two crores and sixty lacks, or twenty-six millions of rupees. Warm discussions took place between the envoy and Musheer Ool Moolk, when at last the former was told, in public *darbar*, that Nana Furnuwees must himself attend at the court of Hyderabad, in order to afford an explanation of the different items of their intricate claims. The envoy replied, 'Nana Furnuwees is much engaged, how can he come?' 'How can he come?' re-echoed Musheer Ool Moolk, 'I will soon show how he shall be *brought* to the presence.' This menace was considered a sufficient declaration, and although negotiations continued till the last, both parties prepared to decide their differences by the sword.

The war, whilst still at a distance, was extremely popular amongst the Moghuls; the grand army under Nizam Ally's personal command was assembled at Beder, and the camp exhibited much bustle and animation. The most vaunting threats were constantly heard from the ill-appointed, disorderly soldiery. Poona was to be pillaged and burned, the dancing girls already sang the triumphs of their army, and even the prime minister declared in a public assembly that 'the Moghuls should now be freed from Mahratta encroachments; that they should recover Beejapoor and Candeish, or they would never grant peace, until they had dispatched the Peishwa to Benares, with a cloth about his loins and a pot of water in his hand, to mutter incantations on the banks of the Ganges.'³

The minister at Poona was soon enabled to collect a very great a corps of 300, which was increased soon afterwards to 700 men. His distinguished service in the war against Tipū resulted in a further increase of his force to 5,000. At the battle of Kharda he commanded a force of more than 10,000. Raymond was granted a large *jāgīr*, drew a very high salary, and lived in princely style. He died in March 1798, at the age of forty-three. For opinions as to his character see quotations in Compton, *Military Adventurers, &c.*, pp. 382-6.]

¹ Mahratta MSS. and English Records.

² He was still alive when I left India in January, 1823.

³ Persian and Mahratta MSS.

army. No events had taken place since Sindia's death, except such as appeared favourable to Nana's power, and the prospect of sharing in the expected advantages brought to his standard all the chiefs whose attendance was important. Doulut Rao Sindia and Tookajee Holkar were already at Poona, and the Raja of Berar had set out to join. Govind Rao Gaekwar sent a detachment of his troops; the great southern Jagheerdars, composing the Bramin families of Putwurdhun and Rastia, the Bramin Jagheerdars of Mallygaom and Vinchoor, the Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the Mahratta Mankurees, Nimbalkur, Ghatgay, Chowan, Dufloy, Powar, Thorat, and Pahtunkur, with many others less conspicuous, attended the summons.¹ But this was the last time the chiefs of the Mahratta nation assembled under the authority of their Peishwa.

(December.)—Nizam Ally was first in the field, and slowly advanced from Beder along the banks of the Manjera towards the Mahratta frontier. The Peishwa quitted Poona in January, and his army marched at the same

A.D.
1795.

¹ [The Rāste (Rāstia) family were descended from the hereditary Kulkarnis of a village in Anjanvel, and first came into prominence through the marriage of Gopikabāi Rāste with the Pēshwā Bālājī Bājirāo. She was the mother of Mādhu Rāo Pēshwā and Narāyan Rāo Pēshwā. The Jāgirdār of Mālegāon (Mallygaom) was descended from a Rigvedi Brahman, named Naro Shankar Dāni, who was appointed by the Pēshwā Bālājī Bājirāo to collect the revenues of Jhānsī, and eventually attained a high military position with the title of Rājā Bahādur. The family estates were originally situated in Bundēlkhand, Khāndesh and Nāsik, but the portion in Bundēlkhand was transferred to the British Government by the treaty of Bassein. The Thorāt family was descended from one Yeshvantrāo, the Pātel of a village in Karād, who became a cavalry officer in the service of the Rājā of Kolhāpur. When he died without issue his corps was transferred to his uncle, Sīdojī Thorāt, by the Rājā, and his estates, valued at 75,000 rupees a year, were reduced to 35,000, exclusive of hereditary *inām* lands yielding annually 10,000 rupees. The estates lay chiefly in what is now the Vālva *tāluka*, Sātāra District. The Thorāt family, whose family mansion still stands in Vālva village, continued in charge of the estates until the British annexation in 1818. The Pātankar (Pahtunkur) family was descended from one Hanmantrāo, Deshmukh of Pātan, who distinguished himself under Sivājī and accompanied Vyankojī to the conquest of Tanjore. In 1692 Rāja Rām, son of Sivājī, conferred the district of Pātan, now represented by the Pātan *tāluka*, Sātāra District, upon Hanmantrāo, whose descendants served the Pēshwā's Government as mercenary soldiers. The granddaughter of Hanmantrāo married Sakharām Ghatge, and in 1798 their daughter Bāijabāi was married to Daulat Rāo Sindia.]

time, but by different routes, for the convenience of forage. There were upwards of one hundred and thirty thousand horse and foot in the Mahratta army, exclusive of ten thousand Pindharees. Of this force upwards of one half were either paid from the Peishwa's treasury, or were troops of Jagheerdars under his direct control. Doulut Rao Sindia's force was more numerous and more efficient than that of any other chieftain, although the greater part of his army remained in Hindoostan and Malwa. Jooba Bukhshee commanded immediately under Doulut Rao, and had lately joined him with a reinforcement ;—the whole consisted of twenty-five thousand men, of whom ten thousand were regular infantry under De Boigne's second in command, Monsieur Perron. Rug-hoojee Bhonslay mustered 15,000 horse and foot ; Tookajee Holkar had only ten thousand, but of these, two thousand were regulars under Dudrenec, and most of the Pindharees were followers of Holkar. Pureshram Bhow had seven thousand men.

Nana Furnuwees consulted the chief officers separately.¹ He appointed Pureshram Bhow to act as commander-in-chief. The Pindharees and some other horse were ordered on to plunder in the neighbourhood of the Moghul camp and destroy their forage ; the heavy baggage, properly protected, remained one march in the rear, and the best of the horse with the regular infantry, supported by upwards of one hundred and fifty pieces of cannon, were sent forward to attack Nizam Ally, who with an army amounting in all to one hundred and ten thousand men advanced towards Kurdla² and descended the Mohree Ghaut ; a body of the Peishwa's household troops under Baba Rao, son of the deceased Hurry Punt Phurkay, attacked the Moghuls when descending the Ghaut and being driven off with some loss, Nizam Ally

¹ The memoranda in his own handwriting of the different opinions were found in the Poona Records. He seems to have adopted the plans of Jooba Bukhshee and Tookajee Holkar.

² [The proper name of this place is Kharda, and is so spelt in a report from Malet, the Resident at Poona, to the Governor-General, dated March 12, 1795. Kharda, now a town in Jāmkhed *tāluka*, Ahmadnagar District, situated fifty-six miles south-east of Ahmadnagar, belonged originally to the Nimbālkar family, whose mansion in the middle of the town is now in ruins. The fort to the south-east of the town was built by the Nimbālkar in 1745, and is still in good repair. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 412 ; *B.G.*, xvii. 721 f.)]

on the same evening sat in durbar and received *nuzurs* of congratulation on his victory. On the ensuing day, when
 (March 11.) the Moghuls were on their march from Kurdla to Purinda, the Mahrattas appeared on their right, and were soon perceived to be in great force. Nizam Ally halted his own elephant, sent off his baggage to the left, and directed Assud Alee Khan with the cavalry, supported by seventeen thousand regular infantry under Raymond, to attack the Mahratta army. Pureshram Bhow prepared to receive them; he took his own station in the centre with the Peishwa's and Holkar's troops; Rughoojee Bhonslay commanded the right wing and Doulut Rao's army formed the left. Pureshram Bhow rode forward to reconnoitre, supported by Baba Rao Phurkay and Khassee Rao, the son of Tookajee Holkar. He had only advanced a short distance when he was suddenly charged by a body of Patans under Lal Khan, a native of Baloochistan, who displayed great personal energy, cut down several men, and with his own hand unhorsed and wounded Pureshram Bhow. But Hurry Punt Putwurdhun, the Bhow's eldest son, seeing his father fall, instantly attacked the aggressor and killed him on the spot. The Patans, however, did not desist on the loss of their leader: being well supported by Alif Khan, the son of the Nabob of Kurnoul, and Sulabut Khan, the son of Ismael Khan, Nabob of Elichpoor, they persevered until the advanced party of the Mahrattas gave way, and were driven back in such confusion that they communicated a panic to a great portion of their army, and thousands fled precipitately from the field. Baba Rao Phurkay, though in charge of the Juree Putka, seemed about to follow the fugitives, but was prevented by Jooba Bukhshee, who rode up, reproached him as a coward, and told him if he sought a place of safety he would find it behind Sindia's troops.

By this time the regular battalions on both sides had approached within musket-shot of each other, and the Moghul cavalry were advancing to the support of their infantry with apparent steadiness, when Rughoojee Bhonslay assailed them with a shower of rockets, at the same moment that they received the fire of thirty-five pieces of cannon, judiciously placed on an eminence by Perron. In the course of a very few minutes the whole of the cavalry were put to the rout; but Raymond's infantry stood their ground, and had even obtained some advantage over Perron's battalions,

when Raymond, by repeated and peremptory orders, was compelled to follow Nizam Ally, who had already retreated towards Kurdla. By the time the detached portions of the Moghul army had been made acquainted with their leader's intention, the sun had set, and darkness soon augmented the general confusion of the troops. Shots still continued to be exchanged in different directions after the night fell, and few men, except those of the half-disciplined battalions of Raymond, could find their own particular division. At last the multitude, worn out by fatigue and vociferation, gradually sank to rest, or lay down to await the return of day. But in the stillness of night a small patrol of Mahrattas, in search of water for their horses, came by chance to a rivulet, where lay a party of Moghuls, who, discovering what they were, instantly fired upon them. Raymond's sentries, being in the neighbourhood, also fired, when their whole line, who lay on their arms, with their muskets loaded as they had retreated, started from their sleep and instantly fired a sort of irregular volley. The alarm which such a discharge of musketry occasioned in the state of the Moghul army at that moment may be conceived. The uproar suddenly became greater than ever, and many of Raymond's Sepoys, seized with the general panic, quitted their ranks and mingled in the confusion. At last the moon rose, and Nizam Ally, in perfect consternation, sought refuge within the walls of Kurdla, a very small fort surrounded by hills. Most of his troops fled, plundering the baggage of their own army as they went off: but they were not allowed to carry away this ill-gotten spoil unmolested: the Mahratta Pindharees overtook them the next day, and, without experiencing the slightest opposition, stripped the panic-struck fugitives of everything.

The Mahrattas, advancing in the morning, found guns, stores, and baggage, and all the usual wreck of an army, strewing the ground; but their surprise was still greater on perceiving Nizam Ally shut up in Kurdla, and about one tenth of the original number of his troops lying round the fort. No people are more active and vigilant than Mahrattas on such occasions; their most distant parties soon heard of this joyful intelligence, and came swarming 'to plunder the Moghuls,' whom in a short time they had completely enclosed, and on the ensuing day opened batteries, which commanded the fort as well as the position of the troops.

Nizam Ally endured this hopeless exposure for two days, but on the morning of the 15th March he solicited and obtained a cessation of arms. The preliminary demand made by the Mahrattas was the surrender of the minister, Musheer Ool Moolk, that amends might thus be made for the insult offered to the Peishwa, in threatening to seize Nana Furnuwees. They next exacted territorial cessions, extending along the frontier from the district of Purinda on the south to the Taptee river on the north, comprehending the fort of Doulutabad and such part of those districts, formerly conquered by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow in 1760, as had been restored to Nizam Ally. Three crores of rupees were promised on account of arrears of revenue and expenses of the war : besides which, by a separate agreement, Nizam Ally ceded territory yielding three lacks and eighteen thousand rupees, in lieu of Rughoojee Bhonslay's claims for Ghasdana in Gungthuree, estimated at three and a half lacks annually. Nizam Ally likewise promised to pay up the arrears due to Rughoojee Bhonslay, amounting to twenty-nine lacks, and to collect their respective shares of revenue in Berar according to ancient usage, for all which the Peishwa afterwards became Rughoojee's guarantee.

It was with extreme reluctance that Nizam Ally agreed to surrender the person of his minister. Musheer Ool Moolk urged him to the measure, especially as, under the circumstances in which they found themselves, they did not consider the other conditions so immoderate as might have been expected. The minister was delivered over to a party of two hundred Mahrattas, by whom he was escorted to their camp. The Peishwa met him at the outskirts and received him with distinction, but his person was carefully guarded. The Mahrattas were rejoiced to excess by this triumph, and a remark of the young Peishwa, when rallied by Nana Furnuwees on the melancholy which his countenance betrayed at the time of Musheer Ool Moolk's arrival, was as just as from him it was interesting. 'I grieve,' said he, 'to observe such degeneracy as there must be on both sides, when such a disgraceful submission has been made by the Moghuls, and our soldiers are vaunting of a victory obtained without an effort.' There were scarcely two hundred men lost by both those two great armies in the battle, though a considerable number of the Moghuls were killed in the subsequent confusion and during the

time they were surrounded ; but to this day it is one of the great boasts of the old Sillidars in the Mahratta villages, that they were present in the glorious field of Kurdla.

During the action, the British envoys at the respective courts of Nizam Ally and the Peishwa were in the neighbourhood. Nizam Ally was much incensed against the English for their neutrality, which he considered an abandonment of promised friendship. On his return to Hyderabad, he dismissed their two battalions, and ordered a great increase to the corps of Monsieur Raymond, assigning districts for their maintenance in the same manner as Sindia had done. The influence of the English was further diminished by the captivity of Musheer Ool Moolk, a great friend to their nation, and it was likely to be wholly superseded by the growing power of the French party, when an event occurred which induced Nizam Ally to recall their battalions, and the intercourse formerly subsisting was gradually renewed. The event alluded to was nothing less than the rebellion of Nizam Ally's eldest son, Ali Jah, who, from the time of the convention at Kurdla, had been actively engaged in a conspiracy, the ring-leaders of which were all of the party most inimical to Musheer Ool Moolk and the English interests.

On the night of the 28th June, Ali Jah quitted Hyderabad, pretending to be forcibly carried off by a Mahratta, named Sewdasheo Riddey, for the purpose of obtaining the authority of his name in raising an insurrection. He was soon joined by many of his partisans and took the route of Beder, of which fortress, and several other places of less consequence, he obtained possession. The season of the year was unfavourable to his success ; but the vast body of unemployed horsemen in the country (fifty thousand of the Kurdla fugitives having been discharged by Nizam Ally in one day) rendered the insurrection extremely alarming, especially as several officers of rank joined the prince, and Tippoo, as was given out, had promised to support him.

M. Raymond undertook to suppress this rebellion. He followed the prince to Beder, pursued him to Aurungabad, took him prisoner, and was bringing him to Hyderabad ; but Ali Jah, unable to face his father, put an end to his existence by poison, before they reached the capital.

On the return of the Peishwa to Poona, Nana Furnuwees was

employed in distributing the late acquisitions,¹ and in settling various affairs with the different chiefs. Pureshram Bhow and Rughoojee Bhonslay remained in the neighbourhood of the capital, but Holkar and Sindia encamped at some distance, the former at Jejoory and the latter at Jamgaom, until news arrived of Ali Jah's rebellion, when they repaired to Poona, with what view is not ascertained, nor is there any proof that the Mahrattas were instrumental to the rebellion, although it was suspected by Nizam Ally and has been affirmed by Moghul historians.

By the middle of September, Doulut Rao had obtained his audience of leave, and proceeded to Jamgaom on his route to Hindoostan;—Pureshram Bhow had returned to the family Jagheer at Tasgaom;—Holkar continued at Poona, where Rughoojee Bhonslay also remained until the middle of October, when he was dismissed with great honour, receiving new sunnuds for a portion of territory lying on the south side of the Nerbuddah, which had been originally assigned to his grandfather by Ballajee Bajee Rao in 1750, but twelve of the districts² had not yet been conquered from the chiefs who, in the confusion that followed the decline of the Moghul empire, had become independent.³

Nana Furnuwees was now at the summit of prosperity; without the intervention of a foreign power, he had obtained every object of his ambition. Doulut Rao Sindia was favourably disposed towards him, and his ministers and officers were more intent on forwarding their own particular views in the government of their young master, than in schemes for controlling the Poona court. Tookajee Holkar had become imbecile, both in mind and body, and his officers were subservient to Nana. Rughoojee Bhonslay was completely secured in his interests, and the Bramin Jagheerdars were of his party. The Peishwa's

¹ The whole of the particulars of this distribution were found amongst the Poona records; but much confusion having subsequently arisen, the intended arrangements were never entirely completed.

² These were 1st. Bachaee. 2d. Beechea. 3d. Burgee. 4th. Bhowangurh. 5th. Sypoor Choureeagurh. 6th. Khooreybharee. 7th. Kuthooteea. 8th. Pullahoo. 9th. Dujwurdha. 10th. Mookundpoor. 11th. Surnalpoor. And 12th. Ramgurh.

³ This chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta papers, Persian and Mahratta MSS., and English records.

government had thus every prospect of regaining the tone and vigour it had possessed under the great Mahdoo Rao, but Nana's fondness of power, and his anxiety to preserve it, brought on a catastrophe which speedily undermined his authority, overturned the labours of his life, and terminated his days in trouble and in misery.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

FROM A.D. 1795 TO A.D. 1796.

A.D. 1795.—ALTHOUGH the young Peishwa was now in his twenty-first year, Nana Furnuwees relaxed nothing of the rigid tutelage in which he had reared him ; and the old minister became more than ever watchful of all the state prisoners, whose liberty might endanger his own power. He was apprehensive that Mahadajee Sindia had intended to use the Raja of Satara as an instrument in overthrowing the Bramin government, and he now treated the object of his dread with more than ordinary severity, by diminishing his allowances and prohibiting his relations from visiting him in the fort.

The family of Rugonath Rao was kept at Kopergaom until the year 1793, when they were removed to Anundwelee near Nassuck, as a place more agreeable to the widow Anundee Bye, whose health was on the decline. In the month of April of the succeeding year she died. The sons, Bajee Rao and Chimnajee Appa, with the adopted son of Rugoba, Amrut Rao, remained at Anundwelee ; until, upon the prospect of hostilities with Nizam Ally, they were conveyed to the hill-fort of Sewnerree, where once secured, Nana Furnuwees at the termination of the war retained them in close custody under two officers in whom he confided, Rughoo Punt Ghorebulay and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath.

The condition of these young men excited strong feelings of commiseration, even in the minds of those who judged it necessary ; and others, swayed chiefly by their feelings, generally the larger portion of any community, execrated the conduct of the minister as cruel, vindictive, and unjustifiable. Distinct from either of these classes was the old faction of Rugoba, and other persons, wholly discontented, who endeavoured by every means to exalt the character of the prisoners and lower the reputation of Nana Furnuwees. But these indications of the public mind only

increased the wary circumspection of the minister, to whom the elder of the legitimate sons of Rugonath Rao early became an object of jealousy. Graceful in his person, with a handsome and youthful countenance which ensured favourable impressions, Bajee Rao had the mildest manner, and an address so insinuating that he gained the good-will of all who approached him. His bodily and mental accomplishments were equally extolled; at the age of nineteen he was an excellent horseman, skilled in the use of the sword and bow and allowed to be the most expert spearsman in Gungthuree. He was deeply read in the Shasters, particularly in such parts as regard the observance of cast; and of his age no Pundit so learned had been known in Maharashtra.

The young Peishwa, so far from being jealous of the superior accomplishments of his cousin, was pleased at hearing him commended, and frequently expressed a strong desire to procure his enlargement and cultivate his friendship. In vain did the cautious Nana Furnuwees advise him to beware of the sapling, however comely, which sprung from the weakness of Rugonath Rao and the wickedness of Anundee Bye: the greater the restraint, the stronger the inclination; but Mahdoo Rao was watched, and Bajee Rao was a close prisoner. The latter, however, having discovered the favourable disposition of the Peishwa towards him, and having at last gained Bulwunt Rao Nagonath, he conveyed a message with assurances of respect and attachment, adding that 'he was in confinement at Sewneree and the Peishwa under the control of his minister;—that their condition as prisoners was nearly similar, but that their minds and affections were free, and should be devoted to each other;—that their ancestors had distinguished themselves, and that the time would arrive, when his cousin and himself might hope to emulate their deeds, and raise themselves a lasting and honourable name.' This message was the commencement of a correspondence, which began shortly after the return of the army to Poona and continued for some time, till at length it came to the knowledge of Nana, who betrayed a rage altogether unusual at the discovery. He immediately threw Bulwunt Rao Nagonath into a hill-fort loaded with irons, severely reproached Mahdoo Rao, and rendered the strictness of Bajee Rao's confinement far more rigid than before. Mahdoo Rao already galled by restraint and irritated by the insidious messages of his cousin, was overwhelmed with anger,

disappointment, and grief; he refused absolutely to quit his apartment, and his absence from his usual place at the Durbar was imputed to fever. At the Dussera, which happened on the 22d October and was conducted with great splendour, he appeared amongst his troops, and in the evening received his chiefs and the ambassadors at his court in his accustomed manner; but his spirit was wounded to desperation, a fixed melancholy seized on his mind, and on the morning of the 25th (Oct. 25.) October he deliberately threw himself from a terrace in his palace, fractured two of his limbs, and was much wounded by the tube of a fountain on which he fell.¹ He survived for two days, and having particularly desired that Bajee Rao should be placed on the musnud, he expired in the arms of Baba Rao Phurkar, for whom he had entertained a strong affection.²

¹ [The Archaeological Survey Department has recently (1919) cleared away the débris in the Shanīwār Wāda, the ancient palace of the Pēshwās in Poona, which was burnt down in 1840. The work of clearance has disclosed an elaborately laid-out garden, surrounding the plinth of the ruined palace, one side of which consists of three terraces provided with fountains and minute reservoirs on the pattern of the famous Shalimār gardens of Lahore and Kashmīr. On the top of the plinth was found an enormous circular fountain, in the shape of a lotus, containing more than 200 jets. The whole system of fountains and reservoirs is connected by pipes and ducts of pure copper. It may have been one of the pipes of the large lotus-shaped fountain which caused fatal injury to Mādhū Rāo Narāyan.]

A modern building, utilised till recently as a court, was erected on the plinth of the actual palace about forty years after its destruction by fire in 1840.]

² [In a letter to the Governor-General, dated October 27, 1795, the Assistant Resident at Poona reported, from information received from Bahiru Pandit, that 'on the morning of the 25th instant while sitting in an inner room with Durgabāi (his maternal grandmother) and some Brahmans, he (the Pēshwā) complained of the heat, got up suddenly and went to an adjoining terrace, from which he fell into a fountain below; that the thigh-bone is broken and one arm and the face much bruised, and that he is now in pain and weak.' The Pēshwā died about 6 p.m. on the 27th, and his corpse was burnt the same night on the bank of the river. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 539-43.)

This Mādhū Rāo Pēshwā was known as 'Savāi Mādhū Rāo' to distinguish him from the great Mādhū Rāo, who died in 1772. 'Savāi Mādhū Rāo' is a term of flattery, meaning literally 'a Mādhū Rāo and a quarter,' in the same way that we say in English 'There's a horse and a half for you,' meaning a very good horse (cf. Savāi Jai Singh of Jaipur). The word *Savāi* is frequently used in this sense in naming vessels and country craft on the coast of Western India, e.g. *Lābh Savāi* ('gain and a quarter'). See Wilson, *Native Craft of Bombay Harbour*, 1909, Bombay Port Trust Records.]

The death of Mahdoo Rao was an event of such awful importance to the political existence of Nana Furnuwees, that the consideration of its consequences withdrew his mind from the deep affliction which the untimely end of that amiable young prince would have disposed him to indulge. He carefully suppressed the request of Mahdoo Rao in his cousin's favour, dreading that by such an arrangement he should not only be deprived of power, but perhaps of liberty and of life. His first care, on ascertaining the nature of the accident, was to send off notice to Pureshram Bhow, requiring his immediate attendance at Poona with every man he could collect ; and the day after the Peishwa's death, Rughoo-
(Oct. 28.) jee Bhonslay and Doulut Rao Sindia were recalled for the purpose of deliberating on the succession to the musnud. Tookajee Holkar, being in Poona, immediately visited the minister, who not only made use of all the popular prejudice existing against the name of Rugonath Rao, but described the enmity which, from the first dawning of reason, had been instilled into Bajee Rao by his mother, against the whole of those officers who had now any experience in the affairs of the state ; he showed the danger to be apprehended from the connexion between his family and the English,¹ dwelt upon the happy state of prosperity and union which then prevailed in the Mahratta empire, and enlarged on the increasing benefits to be expected, if the existing course of policy were carefully preserved. In these sentiments Holkar concurred, and the disposition of the other chiefs being sounded, Nana ventured to disclose his plan ; by suggesting that Yessooda Bye, the widow of the deceased prince, who had not yet attained the age of womanhood, should adopt a son, in whose name he proposed to conduct the government as heretofore. Some objections were raised by Balloba Tattya, one of the principal ministers of Sindia, but they were overruled by his colleague in office Jooba Bukhshee, who observed that their master was too

¹ [‘ There seems great reason to suppose,’ wrote the Assistant Resident, Poona, to the Governor-General on October 29, 1795, ‘ that Nānā's principal arguments against Bājirāo's succession, particularly with the great Marāthā chieftains at the Grand National Council, will be drawn from the connexion between that branch of the family and us. My messages since the accident of the morning of the 25th instant will probably, if he submits them to the Council, tend in some degree to baffle those arguments ; and if he withholds them from their knowledge, I shall perhaps take some means of bringing them forward again.’ (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 543.)]

young to be able to judge for himself, but he thought his safest course was to be guided by the experience of the elder chiefs and to follow the example of Tookajee Holkar. At length, after some discussion, the consent of the principal chiefs was obtained in writing, and in the month of January they again retired from Poona.

A.D.
1796.

In the preceding November, Mr. Malet, the Resident on the part of the British Government, had made a formal application to the minister for the purpose of ascertaining on what footing the Mahratta government was to be conducted. Nana Furnuwees replied that the widow of the late Peishwa was to be considered head of the empire, until the great officers of the nation had deliberated upon the succession, when the result should be communicated. He now therefore intimated their resolution that the widow should adopt a son, to which no objection on the part of Mr. Malet could be offered, and nothing was now apparently wanting except the selection of a child and the performance of the ceremony. But Bajee Rao, who had obtained information of the whole proceeding, by which he was thus unjustly to be deprived of his right, gave a further specimen of his talent for intrigue, by immediately taking advantage of the favourable disposition evinced towards him by Balloba Tattya, opening a correspondence with him, and in a few months gaining him to his cause. This union was the more important to Bajee Rao, as the death of Jooba Bukhshee had taken place a short time before, and on his death-bed he sent for Doulut Rao and expressed his regret for having advised him to accede to the plan of adoption, whilst a lineal descendant of Ballajee Wishwanath remained. Having secured the prime minister, Bajee Rao next addressed himself to Sindia, offering him four lacks of rupees of territory and whatever might be the expenses of his troops during the time he should require their aid in asserting his lawful succession to the Musnud. This offer was accepted, a formal agreement was drawn up, but it was scarcely concluded, when the whole was divulged to Nana Furnuwees. In the greatest alarm that minister instantly summoned Pureshram Bhow, who marched from Tasgaom to Poona with a body of horse in forty-eight hours, a distance of upwards of 120 English miles. After some deliberation, it was resolved to anticipate Sindia's design, to release Bajee Rao, and to declare him Peishwa. Pureshram Bhow accordingly proceeded to the

fort of Sewneree,¹ and made his proposals. Amrut Rao advised his brother not to accept them, observing that these offers were but certain indications of Sindia's sincerity. Bajee Rao did not rely on the good-will of either party, beyond the dictates of their interests, and, if assured of attaining his object, he would not have hesitated ; he, however, urged many objections, though only for the purpose of obtaining satisfactory assurances. With this view, amongst other solemn asseverations, he obliged Pureshram Bhow to hold the tail of a cow, and swear by the holy Godavery that no deception was intended ; after which he descended from the fort, and, accompanied by his brother Chimnaje Appa, set out for his future capital. Amrut Rao by Pureshram Bhow's orders was detained in custody at Sewneree.

Immediately on Bajee Rao's arrival at Poona, he had an interview with Nana Furnuwees, when they mutually promised to bury all traces of former enmity in oblivion ; and Bajee Rao, on being assured of the succession, promised to retain Nana at the head of his administration. To this agreement both parties exchanged formal declarations² in writing.

Balloba Tattya, on hearing of the step which Bajee Rao had taken, was incensed at his conduct, but determined to counteract the schemes of Nana Furnuwees. He therefore persuaded Sindia, then on the banks of the Godavery, to march on Poona with his whole force. Nana Furnuwees was dismayed ; Pureshram Bhow advised him to stand firm, to collect the troops, and to give battle ; but Nana, deficient in personal courage, was also sensible of the superiority of Sindia's army ; he could not trust

¹ [i.e. the great hill-fort of Shivnēr, at Junnar, in which Sivājī was born. See vol. i, p. 75, *ante*. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii, 153 ff.)]

² The following is a translation of that which was given by Bajee Rao to Nana Furnuwees :

'In the presence of my God, and from the inmost recesses of my heart, have I rooted out every vestige of any former act ; let all your future conduct be guided by the principles of good faith. I will never injure you or yours, by word or deed ; by any inward thought or outward act ; neither will I allow any other person to do so ; on this point I will be inflexible, and will pay no attention to the suggestions of others. I will not allow your reputation to be sullied, and should anyone attempt to instil anything of the kind into my breast, I will point him out to you. I will never release anyone from confinement without your advice ; all state affairs will be managed by our conjunct counsel. From this day all your acts are mine : suspicion is wholly eradicated from my heart.'

Bajee Rao, and he was terrified lest he should fall a prisoner into the hands of Balloba Tattya, by whom he believed he should be put to death. Having therefore left Pureshram Bhow with Bajee Rao at Poona, he told the latter that, as Sindia was advancing with intentions hostile only towards himself, he thought the best means of averting ruinous civil dissensions was for him to retire from business and withdraw from the capital. He accordingly repaired first to Poorundhur, and afterwards to Satara. Sindia arrived in the neighbourhood of Poona, and had a friendly interview with Bajee Rao; but Balloba Tattya, although he affected to meet him with cordiality, could not forget his behaviour, especially after he had seen Amrut Rao, whom he removed from Sewneree to Jamgaom, but did not restore him to liberty.¹ After considering various plans, Balloba Tattya at last resolved to set aside Bajee Rao, and to raise both a minister and a Peishwa of his own; for which purpose he proposed to Pureshram Bhow, through Byhroo Punt Mendlee, that Mahdoo Rao's widow should adopt Chimnajee Appa as her son; that Bajee Rao should be placed in confinement, and that Pureshram Bhow should conduct the administration. Pureshram Bhow had begun to despise Nana Furnuwees for his pusillanimous conduct, but he still so far respected his wisdom as to ask his opinion. Nana advised him to accept what was proposed, but to take care that Bajee Rao came into his own custody. To this last essential part of the advice no attention was paid by Pureshram Bhow. Balloba Tattya pretended to be partly influenced in the measure he now pursued, by the hope of rendering it in some degree acceptable to Nana Furnuwees, lest the latter, in the present state of Doulut Rao's inexperience, should form some confederacy by means of the other chiefs against the house of Sindia. Balloba accordingly as soon as Nana's assent had been obtained made overtures for a reconciliation, to which the latter made no objection.

Nana's own proceedings in the meantime deserve notice. When he quitted Poorundhur and repaired to Satara, he entertained some design of emancipating the Raja and restoring the old form of the government of Sivajee, as a plan calculated to avert the dissensions that had arisen, and which were likely to increase in the state; but a very few days convinced him of the

¹ There is no reason assigned for his not having done so.

futility of this scheme. The Raja, in consequence of the treatment he had experienced, had no confidence in him. The Raja's name was sufficiently popular to have brought many of the most warlike Mahratta families to his standard and to have awakened a powerful interest amongst the descendants of the first followers of Sivajee, residing in the wilds of the Mawuls and Khoras. The Raja, though incapable of conducting state affairs himself, was a man of courage, and several of his relations were fit leaders for any desperate enterprise. But Nana's object was to devise some means of establishing a controlling authority over the chiefs of the empire, not to stir up a power subversive of all order. After a few conferences he desisted and retired to Wae, a town in the neighbourhood ; but his having entertained such a scheme was so far fortunate for the Raja, that he indulged in a little more liberty and was treated with greater kindness and consideration.

When Nana Furnuwees consented to the proposal of Balloba Tattya for adopting Chimnajee Appa, it became necessary to obtain the Raja's *khillut* of investiture for the new Peishwa: on which occasion Nana came from Wae to Satara, and on receiving the *khillut*, promised that, if he ever had an opportunity, he would endeavour to fulfil the agreement made with Ram Raja in the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao, by putting the present Raja Shao in possession of the territory promised by the treaty of Sangola.

Nana would have proceeded to Poona, but on finding that Pureshram Bhow had allowed Sindia's minister to retain the person of Bajee Rao, he suspected, and with good reason, that the whole was a scheme to entice him into the power of Balloba Tattya ; and, therefore, although he forwarded the *khillut*, he himself remained at Wae.

Bajee Rao was still ignorant of the plot which had been formed against him, and the manner of disclosing it is too characteristic, not only of the period but of the future ways of the Poona court, to be omitted. Some demands for money on account of Sindia's expenses were made on Bajee Rao, and upon his expressing inability to comply with them, they were urged in a tone which produced altercation, and Sindia, pretending to take offence at the manner of Bajee Rao's refusal, begged permission to return to Hindoostan. Bajee Rao, as had been foreseen, immediately repaired to Sindia's camp for the purpose of privately expostu-

lating ; he was there detained in argument until late in the evening, when the conference was suddenly interrupted by intelligence of Pureshram Bhow's having carried off Chimnajee Appa ; no one, it was pretended, knew whither, but it was supposed, to Satara. Bajee Rao, alarmed and astonished, begged of Sindia to pursue him ; but the uncertainty of their route, the strength of their party, and the darkness of the night were urged against this proposal. A request, however, to be allowed to continue under Sindia's protection during the night, was readily granted, and next day he discovered the snare, upon being advised to remain, as any place beyond the precincts of Sindia's camp was unsafe for His Highness.

In the meantime Pureshram Bhow and Baba Rao Phurkay had merely conveyed Chimnajee Appa into the city of Poona ; but Chimnajee positively refused to become a party in the unjust usurpation of his brother's rights, and compulsion only induced him to bear his share in it. He was adopted by the name of Chimnajee Mahdoo Rao, and formally invested as Peishwa on the 26th May.

The pecuniary difficulties of Sindia, and the distress of his army, were not fictitious. Pureshram Bhow, on being appointed minister, had promised to raise money, and for this purpose offered to restore the minister of Nizam Ally, Musheer Ool Moolk, to liberty, on condition of receiving a portion of the balance of three crores of rupees, due by the treaty of Kurlda. Musheer Ool Moolk said he could only use his endeavours ; but upon this promise he was released from confinement, permitted to encamp in the environs of the city, and in a short time was surrounded by a considerable retinue.

The day after the installation of the new Peishwa, Pureshram Bhow proposed that Nana Furnuwees should come to Poona, meet and be reconciled to Balloba Tattya, and afterwards assume the civil administration in the new Peishwa's government ; whilst the command of the troops and all military arrangements should remain with himself. In reply to this proposal, Nana Furnuwees requested that Pureshram Bhow's eldest son, Hurry Punt, might be sent to Wae for the purpose of clearly settling some preliminaries ; but, instead of coming as an envoy, Hurry Punt crossed the Neera at the head of four or five thousand chosen horse, a circumstance that in itself naturally excited suspicions,

which were strengthened by a secret letter from Baba Rao Phurkay, advising him to seek his own safety without a moment's delay.

The fortunes of Nana Furnuwees were now in the general opinion, and perhaps in his own, desperate; but on being forced to abandon half measures, into which he was misled by a timid disposition, the vigour of his judgement, the fertility of his expedients, the extent of his influence, and the combination of instruments which he called into action, surprised all India, and from his European contemporaries procured for him the name of 'the Mahratta Machiavel.'

When he saw the danger imminent, he immediately fled from Waee towards the Concan, blocked up the passes in his rear, threw a strong garrison into Pertabgurh, and, on arriving at the village of Mhar,¹ his first care was to put the fort of Raigurh in the best state of defence. Balloba Tattya proposed that he should be followed up without delay, and offered some of Sindia's regular infantry for the purpose; but Pureshram Bhow, influenced by secret well-wishers of Nana, objected to the employment of coercive measures, although his hostility to Nana Furnuwees was soon after avowed by his giving up Nana's Jagheer lands to Sindia and sequestrating his houses and property in Poona for his own use. The ostensible property, however, of Nana Furnuwees bore but an insignificant proportion to the extent of his concealed wealth. It is a common report that he carried with him, when he quitted Poona, hoards of gold, the accumulated treasures of the Peishwas; but, as already stated on the authority of their accounts, the Peishwas, up to the time of the first Mahdoo Rao, were in debt and were always embarrassed, so that the riches of Nana Furnuwees, which were without doubt considerable, must have been saved during his own administration. His funds were secretly deposited in different places, or lodged in the hands of agents in various parts of India, so that he could command them with promptitude in case of emergency; but the secret of their deposit and of his management remains a mystery, a subject

¹ [Mahād (Mhar) is now the headquarters of a *tāluka* in Kolāba District, with a large sea-borne trade. The Buddhist caves of Pāle (A.D. 100) are two miles from the town, and Raigarh fort is within easy reach of it. The Pēshwā took refuge in Mahād when Holkar seized Poona in 1802. In 1818 a force under Colonel Prother occupied Mahād without opposition. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 136-7.)]

of some curiosity, and the theme of many wonders and impositions amongst the Mahratta vulgar.

The revolution which had taken place naturally tended to unite Bajee Rao and Nana Furnuwees; and a secret intercourse was carried on between them through the medium of an individual who afterwards became conspicuous. In the service of Nana Poorundhuree there was a Mahratta Sillidar, the natural son of the Patell of the village of Wangapoor near Poorundhur, who had contrived to attract the notice of Bajee Rao when he was taken from confinement at Sewnerree, and who was afterwards permitted by Nana Poorundhuree to enter Bajee Rao's service. Ballajee Koonjur,¹ for such was the name of the Sillidar, perceiving the situation of affairs, although he had little opportunity of consulting his master, visited Nana Furnuwees at Mhar, and conveyed the most friendly declarations and assurances on the part of Bajee Rao, begging of Nana to exert himself in their mutual behalf. No excitement to exertion was necessary: Nana Furnuwees had every engine at work. Baba Rao Phurkay, in command of the Peishwa's household troops, had engaged to bring them over to him. Tookajee Holkar's whole power and influence were ready at his signal, and he had opened a negotiation with Sindia, through Ryajee Patell, whom he knew to be inimical to Balloba Tattya, offering to Sindia the Jagheer of Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, the fort of Ahmednugur with territory yielding ten lacks of rupees, on condition that he would place Balloba Tattya in confinement, establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and return with his army to Hindoostan. Thus far of his plans Nana Furnuwees communicated to Ballajee Koonjur, for Bajee Rao's information.

This period of the revolution brought many persons into notice, although none so obscure as the individual just mentioned. Of these, one of the most conspicuous was the person employed

¹ [Bālājī Kūnjar (Ballajee Koonjur) had been employed by Purandhare in collecting revenue in Khāndesh, and became a kind of orderly officer to Bājīrāo, to whom on one occasion he lent 8,000 rupees. Bājīrāo subsequently appointed him minister with a salary of 30,000 rupees a year. On the defeat of Bājīrāo at Poona in 1802, Bālājī Kūnjar urged the Pēshwā to form an alliance with Sindia rather than with the British. He remained with Sindia till a short time prior to his death at Pandharpur in 1816. His family was granted a pension by the British Government, in addition to the rights and allowances of Sar Pātelkī or head patelship of Poona. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 682.)]

by Nana Furnuwees to negotiate with Ryajee Patell in order to bring over Sindia; the name of this man was Sukaram Ghatgay of the Kagul family, whose ancient title, as already mentioned, was Shirzee Rao.¹ Sukaram, having had a quarrel with his relation Yeswunt Rao Ghatgay, the brother-in-law of the Raja of Kolapoor, concerning the hereditary rights in their native village, they took up arms to assert them. Sukaram being defeated was obliged to fly from the Kolapoor territory, and seek shelter with Pureshram Bhow, into whose service he entered, and afterwards exchanged it for that of Nana Furnuwees, who gave him the command of one hundred horse. When Nana quitted Poona, Sukaram Ghatgay entered Sindia's service, where he obtained a similar command. He was of an active, bold, intriguing disposition; and by his address had gained the good-will of Ryajee Patell. He was also at this time much courted by Sindia, by reason of the reputed beauty of his daughter, whom Sindia wished to espouse; and Sukaram, who regarded his own aggrandizement more than the dignity of his house, which would be tarnished by his giving a genuine daughter of the Kagulkur Ghatgay to the spurious offspring of the Patells of Kunneirkheir,

¹ [According to the history of the family published in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, Sakharām (Sukaram) and his brother Vishvāsrao Ghātḡē (Ghatgay) were originally *Silāhdārs*, providing ten horse each, under Parasurām Bhau Patvardhan. Vishvāsrao married the daughter of the Rājā of Kolhāpur, who gave her the village of Kāgal in dowry. On this occasion both brothers, who had inherited the title of Sarjī Rāo (Shirzee Rāo) conferred upon their father by the Kolhāpur Rājā, left the service of Parasurām Bhau and entered that of Kolhāpur. On the death of Vishvāsrao and his wife, Kāgal fell into the possession of Sakharām, who eventually quitted Kolhāpur and entered Daulat Rāo Sindia's service. When, as a result of Parasurām Bhau's death in action against Kolhāpur, Sindia's forces were about to besiege Kolhāpur, Sakharām Ghātḡē procured the withdrawal of the troops and received in return from the Kolhāpur Rājā the district of Kāgal in perpetuity. (Forrest, *ibid.*, i. 676.)]

Broughton, who met Sakharām Ghātḡē in Sindia's camp in 1809, describes him as 'a stout, square-built man not more than five feet high; his features coarse and large, especially his eyes, which are grey and uncommonly penetrating. His countenance is just what his character would lead one to expect; strongly marked and expressing, in legible characters, cunning, cruelty and daring ferocity; yet there is a certain quickness in his address and manner of speaking that indicates talents and genius. His complexion is fair, and what little hair he has is quite grey.' (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, p. 50.)]

was pleased with the prospect of the alliance ; though, to enhance the favour of ultimate compliance, he raised numerous objections to the match.

By the aid of such an agent, Nana Furnuwees was successful in gaining over Sindia to his cause ; and this secret having been communicated to Baba Rao Phurkay and others of the party, they became less circumspect in their preparations. Bajee Rao, in the midst of Sindia's camp, assisted by his father's friend, the veteran Mannajee Phakray,¹ used supplies of money furnished by Nana Furnuwees in levying troops in that situation. These imprudent proceedings were discovered by Balloba Tattya. Baba Rao Phurkay was seized and imprisoned in the fort of Chakun, but his Carcoon, Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, a very active officer, escaped by concealing himself in the camp of Musheer Ool Moolk. Neelkunt Rao Purbhoo and Mallojee Ghorepuray, two chiefs of their party, had a few minutes to prepare for defence ; they repulsed the troops sent to apprehend them, and at the head of a few followers made good their retreat from Poona to the strong range of hills south of the Neera.

Bajee Rao's place of encampment, within Sindia's lines, was surrounded, and water was cut off. The troops he had assembled were permitted to disperse, but Mannajee Phakray enjoined them to meet him in the neighbourhood of Wae, where they assembled accordingly, and were promptly joined by Neelkunt Rao and Mallojee Ghorepuray. Nana Furnuwees supplied them with

¹ Mr. Tone, who was at Poona during the progress of these intrigues, published three letters from the 18th June to the 19th December, giving an account of the extraordinary affairs by which he was surrounded. I depend on better materials, but I have examined attentively all which that intelligent gentleman wrote respecting the Mahrattas. What he saw may be relied upon ;—as to what he heard, I am less surprised that he should have fallen into error, than that he should have obtained information so nearly correct. He describes Mannajee Phakray, as 'an officer of high military reputation, and so disfigured with wounds, as to have scarcely the appearance of a human creature.' 'Mannajee,' say the old Sillidars of the present day, 'was the last of the Mahrattas, and was worthy to wear a bangle on his horse's leg, for he never showed his back to a foe.'

Mr. Tone's description of Bajee Rao at this period, except that Bajee Rao was not so old as he supposes, coincides with that of his own countrymen. 'Bajee Rao,' says Mr. Tone, 'is about twenty-five years of age, light complexioned, and rather above the middle size, his person is graceful, and his manner strongly impressive ; his countenance is manly, sensible, and majestic.'

money, directed them to take up a position at the Salpee Ghaut, where, being assisted by Nana's friend Bujaba Seroolkur in raising troops, they soon collected ten thousand men, upon which they declared for Bajee Rao.

Balloba Tattya, unconscious of the inextricable and extensive toils which Nana was weaving around him, attributed the whole plot to Bajee Rao, and therefore determined to send him off a prisoner to Hindoostan. He was dispatched accordingly under the care of Sukharam Ghatgay, to whom the command of his escort was entrusted. But Bajee Rao, aware of the most likely means of gaining Sindia, employed all his eloquence to induce Ghatgay to give his daughter¹ to Sindia in marriage, on condition of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud; and of preventing his being carried out of the Deccan, lest Nana Furnuwees, even if successful, should take advantage of his absence to exclude him from the succession. Ghatgay at first declared it to be impossible, but at last, pretending to be won over, he agreed to give his daughter on the following conditions;—that Bajee Rao should authorize him to promise Sindia two crores of rupees in ready money on his becoming Peishwa; that, when Peishwa, he should get him (Ghatgay) appointed Sindia's prime minister; and that he should also endeavour to obtain for him the village of Kagul in Enam. Having assented to these conditions, Bajee Rao feigned sickness, and Ghatgay remained with him on the banks of the Paira.

At Poona great preparations were going forward. Musheer Ool Moolk was permitted by Pureshram Bhow to raise troops, for the purpose, as the former pretended, of assisting to reduce Nana Furnuwees and the force which had declared for Bajee Rao. Holkar's and Sindia's troops were held in readiness apparently for the same purpose, and after the Dussera, which happened

¹ [Ghātge's daughter was known as the Bāiza Bāi. When Daulat Rāo Sindia died on March 21, 1827, she was allowed by the Government of India to adopt a boy as his successor; but she tried to keep all power in her own hands. The young Mahārājā fled from her and took refuge in the Residency in October 1832. He was obliged to do so again in the following year. The troops then revolted against the Bāiza Bāi, and compelled her to retire to Dholpur. This put an end to her political activity. Ultimately she was allowed to return to Gwalior, and died there in 1862. (Malleon, *The Native States of India*, pp. 160–4.) See Sleeman's *Rambles*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, p. 303 n.; and footnote on p. 244, *ante*.]

on the 11th October, the regular battalions in the Peishwa's service under Mr. Boyd,¹ marched to the Neera bridge, and a brigade of Sindia's regulars proceeded towards Raigurh. These movements were made by Pureshram Bhow himself, or artfully suggested by some conspirators, in order to veil the deception about to be practised on him and Balloba Tattyā.

The schemes of Nana Furnuwees were now matured. In addition to what has been explained, he had incited the Raja of Kolapoor to attack the districts of Pureshram Bhow; he had obtained Nizam Ally's approbation of the draft of a treaty, afterwards settled on the 8th October with Musheer Ool Moolk, the basis of which was to be the establishment of Bajee Rao on the musnud and his own re-establishment as minister; for which, the territory ceded to the Peishwa by the convention of Kurdla was to be restored, and the balance of the stipulated money-payment remitted. The entire remission of the Chouth of Beder was also demanded by Nizam Ally, but Nana Furnuwees replied that he could not yield that point without the previous sanction of Bajee Rao, to whose approval indeed the whole was declaredly subject.²

¹ [Mr., i.e. Colonel, J. P. Boyd was an American, who was first engaged by the Nizām at the instance of the British Government, as a counterpoise to the influence of the Frenchman Raymond. He commanded a corps of 1,800, which took part in the battle of Kharda in 1795. In 1796, when Raymond was at the height of his power and was supposed to be about to attack the British Resident's camp, Boyd and another adventurer, Finglass, paraded their troops and declared for the Company. A few months later disputes arose, and Boyd left the Nizām's service, taking his troops with him. He then entered the Pēshwā's service on a salary of Rs. 3,000 a month, and in 1796 took part in the operations which resulted in the enthronement as Pēshwā of Bājirāo II. In 1797 he was in command of the Pēshwā's regular brigade, but disappears from history after the disturbances which took place that year in Poona. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 340-1.)]

² As this is the treaty of Mhar mentioned in the treaty of Bassein, the stipulations of which were perhaps not fully understood by the Marquis Wellesley, when, in subsequent negotiations with Bajee Rao, he insisted so particularly on their being recognized, I shall here detail them more particularly.

The preliminary of the treaty sets forth that, confusion having arisen in the affairs of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees has removed to Mhar, and for the purpose of restoring order, he, as chief director of the affairs of the Peishwa, calls for the interposition of Nizam Ally, through his prime minister Azim Ool Oomrah (Musheer Ool Moolk) with whom he concludes the following agreement. Nizam Ally is to

A negotiation with Rughoojee Bhonslay had been equally successful. To him Nana promised fifteen lacks of rupees for his immediate expenses; the district of Mundelah, and the fort of Chooreeagurh with its dependencies. Three thousand horse, which by treaty he was bound to furnish when required, were now only to be called for on emergencies. Some other advantages were also held out, and Rughoojee had solemnly promised his support.¹

(Oct. 27.)—The principal powers having been thus secured, the English having also expressed their approbation of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud, Sindia, on the 27th October, arrested Balloba Tattya, and sent a body of his troops, accompanied by some of those of Musheer Ool Moolk, both parties under the direction of Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, for the purpose of seizing Pureshram Bhow. Naroo Punt, however, being desirous of aprising one of his associates, named Pureshram Punt Wydh, wrote him a note, which was carried by mistake to Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun; the latter on reading it instantly got ready a body of horse, and having taken with him Chimnajee Appa, fled with precipitation to Sewneree; but he was quickly pursued and compelled to surrender. Anund Rao Rastia having become security for his safe custody, he was delivered over to his charge.

Bajee Rao was now brought back, and encamped at Korygaom,²

send an army of 15,000 men, with a train of artillery, to unite with those of Nana and Rughoojee Bhonslay, in restoring Bajee Rao. In this alliance, Nana engages for the neutrality, and even for the probable co-operation of the English. The territory and the bills for the money-payment exacted from Nizam Ally at Kurdla, to be restored. Nizam Ally's right to certain districts near Delhi was confirmed. All contested points to be mutually relinquished, and the Mahratta claims settled annually. The Chouth of the Soobeh of Beder being considered as the *wutun* or private hereditary property of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees can only recommend its being ceded to Nizam Ally by Bajee Rao. Two lacks of rupees to be advanced to Nizam Ally for expenses. The English to be engaged by Nana Furnuwees to interpose, in case Tippoo should attack the possessions of Nizam Ally, whilst the army of the latter is employed in the Mahratta territories. Fugitives from the dominions of Nizam Ally to be given up, and Bajee Rao's signature to these articles to be obtained.

¹ Copy of the original treaty.

² [Koregāon (Korygaom), now in the Sirur *tāluka*, lies sixteen miles north-east of Poona. It subsequently became famous as the scene of the battle in which Captain Staunton with 500 native infantry,

on the Beema, eighteen miles from Poona. Amrut Rao and Baba Rao Phurkay were released, and Nana Furnuwees having joined his army at the Salpee Ghaut, the infantry under Mr. Boyd having likewise placed themselves under his orders, he commenced his march for the capital. But on the route, having received a note from Bajee Rao which hinted at the tardiness of his proceedings, he immediately took the alarm and, before he would advance, insisted upon receiving a written declaration from Bajee Rao that he intended no treachery towards him; and that in case of desiring to resign his situation as minister, he might be permitted to retire where his person and property would be secure. A treaty of guarantee was at the same time entered into by Nizam Ally and Sindia, agreeing to establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and to reinstate Nana Furnuwees as prime minister; but they also, with a view of securing themselves, agreed to oblige the latter to fulfil the articles of the *respective* treaties which he had made with them; an extraordinary oversight on the part of Sindia, who does not appear to have known the particulars of the agreement with Nizam Ally, or at all events to have considered how much he should become a loser by the relinquishment of the territory and arrears of tribute obtained by the treaty of Kurdla.

(Nov. 25.) These preliminaries being adjusted, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona and resumed the duties of prime minister on the 25th November. The insignia of investiture having been procured from Satara, Bajee Rao was at last seated on the musnud 4th December, 1796.¹ It was declared by a council of Shastrees that the relationship between the late Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narrain, and the sons of Rugonath Rao prevented the widow of the former from adopting the second cousin of his father; the adoption was therefore declared illegal and annulled. The Shastrees who had performed the ceremony were expelled. Chimnaje Appa, though he had acted on com-

300 irregular native horse and 24 Madras artillerymen, defeated the Pēshwā's army of 20,000 on January 1, 1818. A stone obelisk commemorates the gallant fight. (*B.G.*, xviii. pt. iii, 244 ff.; *I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 519, 520.)]

¹ [The ceremony of investiture took place about midnight on December 4, Abbā Selukar (Aba Shelookur) having arrived from Sātāra in the afternoon with the insignia of the Pēshwāship. Raghuji Bhoslē, Daulat Rāo Sindia, Holkar and the Mānkāris were not present at the ceremony. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 545.)]

pulsion, was obliged to undergo some penance to atone for the deed, but he was shortly after appointed by his brother to the government of Guzerat, which was however merely nominal, and the active duties of it were performed by his deputy Aba Shelookur.¹

¹ When not particularly specified, the whole of the foregoing chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta letters and papers ; Bombay records ; Mahratta MSS. ; and from many conversations with actors in the scenes.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

FROM A.D. 1797 TO A.D. 1798.

A.D. 1797.—NANA FURNUWEES was assisted in the ministry by Trimbeck Rao Pursooree. Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo had chief command of the army, which, from the late dissensions, was in a very disorderly state ; and one desperate affray took place in the streets of Poona between a body of Arabs and a party of Mr. Boyd's Sepoys, in which upwards of a hundred persons were killed, and a great part of the shops and warehouses in the bazaar plundered during the tumult.

The fort of Ahmednugur and the dependent districts were made over to Sindia as promised, and he was left at liberty to reduce the Jagheer of Pureshram Bhow as he might find opportunity. The articles of agreement with Rughoojee Bhonslay were also fulfilled and he departed for Nagpoor ; but Bajee Rao refused to ratify the treaty of Mhar concluded with Nizam Ally, unless greatly modified ; in consequence of which, Musheer Ool Moolk quitted Poona, without taking leave of the Peishwa, and returned highly incensed to Hyderabad. There was at that time no envoy at the Nizam's court, Govind Rao Pingley being at Poona ; but his agent named Sewdasheo Mankesir,¹ a person whom we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to notice, and whom Pingley kept at the court of Nizam Ally in the humble capacity of a news-writer, was

¹ Generally so written by the English ; properly, however, it is Mankeshwur. [Sadāshiv Pant Mānkēshvar (Sewdasheo Mankesir), commonly called Bhāu Mānkēshvar, was a Deshasth Brahman, whose family for many generations had filled the office of Deshpānde of Temburni, near Pandharpur. After Bājīrāo's restoration in 1803, Sadāshiv Pant became chief minister with a *Saranjām* amounting annually to 1,25,000 rupees. He died in 1817, and his possessions passed to a distant relative, Lakshmanrāo, who was adopted by his widow.]

recommended by Pingley to Nana Furnuwees as a fit agent to soothe Musheer Ool Moolk, and prevent the interruption of the amicable intercourse, which it was so important for Nana to preserve.

The difference, however, which thus arose, Bajee Rao was at no pains to adjust; it weakened the confederacy which Nana Furnuwees had formed, and the great power he so lately combined was still more shaken by the death of Tookajee Holkar. (August 15th.) Holkar left two legitimate sons, Khassee Rao and Mulhar Rao; and two by a concubine, Jeswunt Rao and Wittoojee. Khassee Rao was imbecile both in mind and body, but Mulhar Rao was in every respect qualified to support the fortunes of the house. Disputes soon arose between the brothers, in which the illegitimate sons took the part of Mulhar Rao, who in a few days removed from his late father's camp with a small body of troops and took up his abode at Bambooree,¹ a village in the suburbs of Poona, where he was secretly favoured by Nana Furnuwees. Sindia, who only watched for such an opportunity, on being solicited by Khassee Rao, readily afforded the aid of a body of troops for the purpose of apprehending Mulhar Rao, who refusing to surrender was attacked, and maintained a desperate defence until he was killed. His half-brothers made their escape, Jeswunt Rao to Nagpoor and Wittoojee to Kolapoor; but most of his handful of associates fell with him, and amongst others Sindia, Ruwee Rao of Lonee, a gallant soldier, whose fate was rendered more memorable from the fatal effects which the communication of the news had on his widow, who, on being told, dropped dead on the instant.

The assistance thus afforded by Doulut Rao to a person of such a character as Khassee Rao rendered the house of Holkar for a time subservient to that of Sindia, and was a death blow to the power of Nana Furnuwees. Sindia further secured his advantage by having Khundee Rao, the infant son of the deceased Mulhar Rao, kept in safe custody.

The interference of Sindia in the state affairs of Poona, which

¹ [Bhāmburda (Bambooree) is a quarter of a mile north of Poona, with which it is linked by the Lakdi bridge and a causeway. In 1801 Vithuji Holkar was captured in a house in Bhāmburda, and under Bāji Rāo's orders was dragged to death by an elephant in the streets of Poona. The village contains a rock-cut Saiva temple and caves, which are the oldest remains in Poona. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii. 361.)]

Bajee Rao, with a great want of foresight, secretly encouraged, soon extended to acts of sovereignty, some of which were of a nature more arbitrary than had ever been practised by the Peishwa's government. The circumstances particularly alluded to were the capture of the fort of Kolabah, the imprisonment of Mannajee Angria, and the transfer of that principality to Baboo Rao Angria, Sindia's near relation.

The obloquy of such a violent and partial proceeding did not attach to Bajee Rao ; his appearance and misfortunes continued to attract sympathy, and the control by which the supposed goodness of his natural disposition was repressed became a theme of general regret. Mr. Uhtoff, however, the acting Resident at Poona, seems at this early period to have discovered much of his real character ; and it soon appeared that the opinion entertained of Bajee Rao's goodness and wisdom was in fact but a proof of his dissimulation and cunning. To trust none, and to deceive all, was the game he invariably played, and like all who have ever done so, he never failed to lose. His attention was naturally directed to become independent of Sindia and of Nana Furnuwees ; he imagined he should soon be able to induce or compel the former to return to Hindoostan, but he concluded that the thralldom of the minister would be perpetual. His first object therefore was to endeavour to effect the ruin of Nana Furnuwees. Amrut Rao, Govind Rao Kallay, and some others were privy to the design ; but Bajee Rao's chief instrument was Ghatgay, now distinguished by his family title of Shirzee Rao, whose daughter, though promised, was not yet given in marriage to Doulut Rao Sindia. No person had more influence with that chieftain, and Bajee Rao persuaded Shirzee Rao that his views of becoming minister to his future son-in-law would always be obstructed whilst Nana Furnuwees had a vestige of power. It was therefore determined to place him in confinement.

(Dec. 31.) On the 31st December, Nana Furnuwees, after some precaution, was induced to return a formal visit of ceremony, which Sindia had paid him a few days before, when he was seized by Michel Filoze, the Neapolitan, who accompanied Mahadajee Sindia to the Deccan in 1792, and who now commanded eight battalions in the service of Doulut Rao. Filoze had on his word of honour guaranteed the safe return of the old minister to his home, and his perfidious conduct excited just indignation,

particularly amongst the European officers in the service of the native states ; a set of men, who, though mere soldiers of fortune, had become as distinguished for good faith as daring enterprise, and their general character had induced Nana to accept Filoze's word in preference to any other pledge he might have obtained.¹ Aba Shelookur, Bujaba Seroolkur, Naroo Punt Wydh, and several other persons of distinction, who accompanied Nana Furnuwees, were seized at the same time ; the rest of his retinue, amounting to about a thousand persons, were stripped, maimed, some of them killed, and the whole dispersed. Parties of soldiers were immediately sent by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay² to plunder, not only the house of Nana, but the houses of all his adherents ; many of whom barricaded their doors and defended themselves from the tops and windows. The city of Poona was like a town taken by storm ; the firing continued the whole of the night and the ensuing day. The roads in every direction were stopped, all was uproar, plunder, and bloodshed ; the alarm was universal, and in the words of a spectator, ' friends marched together in groups, with their shields on their arms, and their swords in their hands.'³

At the time Nana was seized in Sindia's camp, Bajee Rao, on pretence of business, sent for the other ministers of that party and confined them. The principal persons among them were Baba Rao Phurkay, Appa Bulwunt, Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, Naroo Neelkunt Muzzimdar, and Govind Rao Pingley. Nana Furnuwees was sent into close confinement in the fort of Ahmednugur ;

¹ The Mahrattas excuse Filoze's treachery, by saying that he was entirely ignorant of Sindia's intention to seize Nana ; that there was no premeditated deception on his part, and that he was compelled to the act by a sudden order, accompanied by threats and promises, from Shirzee Rao, through a person named Meer-Assud-Alee Wahid. The mere circumstance of their wishing to defend Filoze is honourable to the European character ; had it regarded any of their own countrymen, the story would have been received without investigation, as a matter of course.

Mahrattas wishing to be polite always disparage themselves, and, in addressing a European, nothing is more common than to speak of themselves as a treacherous, deceitful race of marauders, on whom no dependence should be placed. One unacquainted with their manners, or who has superficially observed them, would not readily suppose that they merely intend an indirect compliment, knowing how highly truth and plain dealing are estimated among us.

² Ghatgay, Shirzee Rao, is the proper way of writing the name and title, but he is best known to Europeans as Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

³ Mahratta MS. Mr. Uhtoff's dispatches. Oral information.

and Bajee Rao appointed his brother Amrut Rao prime minister, with Govind Rao Kallay and Sewram Narrain Thuthay as his colleagues, whilst Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, a man of no experience, was raised to the command of the army.

A.D. 1798.—Having thus effected, as he supposed, the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, Bajee Rao began to devise schemes for ridding himself of Sindia, but in the first instance he found himself compelled to perform his engagements with Sindia and Ghatgay, though he hoped that in the progress of their fulfilment he might find the means of completing his schemes.

Sindia espoused the daughter of Ghatgay in March; the marriage expenses were great; and the monthly pay of Sindia's army at Poona was upwards of twenty lacks of rupees. His pecuniary distress soon became urgent; he pressed Bajee Rao for the payment of the two crores of rupees which he had secretly promised, and was answered that he had not the means of raising it himself, but if Sindia would create Ghatgay his Dewan, the latter might, assisted by information from Ballajee Koonjur, levy it upon the rich inhabitants of Poona. To this Sindia agreed; and such was the secret means by which Shirzee Rao Ghatgay became minister to his son-in-law, and by which Bajee Rao Rugonath let loose upon his subjects the violence and extortion of a monster, whose name will be remembered, whilst Poona exists, with horror and execration. To obtain the object of his mission, Ghatgay first proceeded to the palace of Bajee Rao, where the ex-ministers, late of the party of Nana Furnuwees, were confined. Those respectable persons were dragged forth and scourged, until they gave up their property. Merchants, bankers, and all persons in the city supposed to possess wealth, were next seized and tortured. Several of them died of the consequences, and Gungadhur Punt Bhanoo, one of the relations of Nana Furnuwees, expired whilst tied on a heated gun: one of the many modes of torture invented by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

It was not supposed at the time, nor is it generally known, that Bajee Rao was the original cause of those excesses; he certainly never contemplated the commission of such barbarous enormities. He was shocked at the cruelties of Ghatgay, and remonstrated with Sindia on the subject; but the latter lent a deaf ear to complaints, which he considered mere hypocrisy or excuses to the world. Amrut Rao, who knew nothing of the

existing compact, or that his brother had devised this mode of raising money, being irritated at the conduct of Ghatgay, and encouraged by the universal cry of abhorrence against Sindia, proposed to his brother the bold scheme of seizing Sindia when on a visit ; in which Bajee Rao immediately acquiesced, and was soon eager to carry it into effect. Previous to this suggestion, Bajee Rao had concerted with Amrut Rao a plan for raising a body of regular infantry, which in that respect might place him more on an equality with Sindia and Nizam Ally : in cavalry he could soon become superior to both. Amrut Rao, from his early intercourse with the British troops, during the campaigns of his father Rugoba, had a decided predilection for that nation over all other Europeans. He selected Mr. W. H. Tone¹ to command the first brigade, of which the whole of the officers were to have been British subjects. To obtain a pretext with Sindia for this meditated augmentation, he referred to the state of their relations with the court of Hyderabad, and proposed that they should undertake a conjunct expedition against Nizam Ally for the recovery of the balance of the arrears of tribute fixed and of the districts ceded by the treaty of Kurdla ; which had been restored by Nana Furnuwees without the Peishwa's authority or Sindia's knowledge. Sindia having readily acquiesced, the

¹ [William Henry Tone, brother of the Irish rebel, Theobald Wolfe Tone, was born in August 1764, near Naas in Kildare. He was the son of a ruined coachmaker, and ran away at the age of sixteen to join the East India Company's service as a volunteer. He spent six years at St. Helena and then left the service ; but rejoined it in 1792, and was sent to Madras the same year. Obtaining his discharge he went to Calcutta, and there was given an appointment in the Nizām's service by Marigny, the second-in-command of the Nizām's army. Owing to the quarrel between Raymond and Marigny and seeing no chance of promotion, Tone left Hyderābād and returned to Calcutta, where his good looks, manners and address obtained for him a letter of recommendation to the Pēshwā's Court. He reached Poona in 1796, in company with Colonel Palmer, the newly-appointed Resident, and obtained a post in Boyd's corps. In 1801 he commanded 200 native troops in support of Lakwa Dādā and the Bāis at the defence of Sounda, and was forced by Perron to surrender. The latter permitted him to retire to Holkar's capital, Mahēshwar, and there Holkar provided him with ample funds for his expenses and the restoration of his health. He was killed in 1802 in an action near Choli Māhēshwar, while serving with Holkar. Tone was an enterprising and valorous soldier and was the author of a pamphlet styled *Some Institutions of the Mahratta People*, which was described as 'both elegant and accurate.' (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c. pp. 416-19.)

intention of the Poona court was formally announced to the British Government on the 9th February; but the brigade of infantry was never raised, and the rest of the Peishwa's army, owing to his secret jealousy of Amrut Rao, his own ignorance of military affairs, and his unfit selection of a commander, became daily less efficient. Bajee Rao's total want of preparation did not, however, deter him from carrying on the scheme against Sindia; strong factions began to prevail in the camp of the latter, which encouraged Bajee Rao to hope that, by fomenting the rising disorders, the ministers and army of Sindia might be brought over to his views, or soon be reconciled to the deposal of their master.

In this state of affairs, Sindia's unpopularity having become extreme, Amrut Rao, with Bajee Rao's cognizance, prepared Abba Kally, the commander of one of the Peishwa's regular battalions, to be ready to rush in upon an appointed signal and seize Sindia. Doulut Rao was invited on business to the Peishwa's palace; but the invitation being declined, a positive order was sent by Bajee Rao desiring his attendance. He obeyed the summons; and soon after he sat down, Bajee Rao told him he had sent for him to desire an explanation of his conduct; and suddenly assuming a tone of authority and decision, for which the other was quite unprepared, he required of him to declare whether he was master or servant. Sindia having answered with respect and humility that he was the Peishwa's servant, and ready to show his dependence by his obedience, Bajee Rao reminded him of the insolence, violence, and cruelty which he and his servants had used in numberless instances towards the servants and subjects of his government in the city and even in his own palace; he declared that 'the contempt and disrespect thus shown towards his person and authority he could bear no longer,' and therefore ordered Sindia to remove to Jamgaom. Doulut Rao's reply was couched in the mildest terms; but whilst he expressed his willingness to obey, he declared his inability to move from want of funds to pay his troops; 'that he had large debts incurred by placing His Highness on the musnud, which it was incumbent on His Highness to discharge: when that was effected, he would immediately quit Poona.' At this moment Amrut Rao asked his brother if he should give the signal; but Bajee Rao's heart failed him; he had not courage to proceed in the design, and thus gave his friends the first decided proof

of that imbecility which swayed most of the actions of his life. Sindia withdrew from the presence in a manner the most respectful, but with a mind filled with suspicion and distrust ; and Bajee Rao had afterwards the baseness, as well as the weakness, to tell him what Amrut Rao had intended and to advise him to be upon his guard.¹

The Peishwa's troops were as much in arrears as the army of Sindia. The state of affairs at Satara, which we shall presently explain, demanded the presence of a military force ; but on their services being required, the men demanded their pay, and a tumult arose, which the commander, Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, could not appease. Ballajee Koonjur, with the presumption of a favourite, made an attempt to restore order ; but the soldiery ridiculed his interference, and on his persevering, they grossly insulted him by knocking off his turban and kicking it in the streets. Govind Rao Pingley, who was still in confinement, sent a confidential message to the Peishwa, advising him to release Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, as the only person capable of preventing most serious disturbance ; a suggestion to which, in the moment of alarm, Bajee Rao readily acceded. He also restored Pingley to liberty, the more readily as that person, though one of the late ministry, was no real friend to Nana Furnuwees.

Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, with that facility which any officer who has gained the confidence of the natives of India is sure to experience, calmed the tumult in a day ; but Bajee Rao could neither spare troops from Poona, nor trust the new commander at a distance ; circumstances which led to the enlargement of another state prisoner of consequence, Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun.

When Bajee Rao laid his plans for the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, he engaged the Raja of Satara in the plot, and advised him to confine Baboo Rao Kishen, Nana's agent, and to seize the fort ; assuring him that it was his determination to re-establish the old form of government, and to serve the head of the state as faithfully as the first Bajee Rao had done. The Raja promptly complied with this request, confined Baboo Rao and seized the fort. But after Nana Furnuwees was imprisoned, when Sewram Narrain Thuthay arrived on the part of the Peishwa

¹ The dispatches of Colonel Palmer detail what publicly took place at the interview, the rest is from living authority.

to receive charge, the Raja told him he would take care of the fort himself, and expressed a hope that his servant, the Peishwa, would soon fulfil his intentions. Bajee Rao, alarmed at the consequences of his own intrigues, ordered Mahdoo Rao Rastia to proceed to Satara, and endeavour to prevail on the Raja to admit his troops into the fort. A respectable force accompanied Rastia; but the Raja, having his relations about him, would neither yield to promises nor threats. These proceedings at last attracted the notice of Sindia, who, suspecting that Bajee Rao's intrigue with the Raja was some scheme for enlarging his own power, secretly advised the Raja to maintain the fort and to raise troops, promising that he would assist him to throw off the Bramin yoke, for which purpose he solemnly engaged to send him five battalions with their guns.¹

The Raja soon began to collect troops; and Mahdoo Rao Rastia, having interfered to prevent it, was attacked and obliged to retire from Satara to Malgaom. This event became the more alarming to the Peishwa from the disposition and state of his army at Poona, already described.

It so happened that Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, hitherto confined by Anund Rao, the brother of Mahdoo Rao Rastia, at Mandoogaom, was at the moment removed to Wae, and confident in his own influence he offered his services in suppressing the disturbances and recovering the fort, on condition that he should be permitted to raise troops for the purpose. Accordingly having obtained the Peishwa's sanction, and being assisted by Rastia, Pureshram Bhow soon assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Wae.

The town of Satara lies immediately under the fort in a deep hollow, nearly surrounded on three sides by hills; cut off from the west by the Syhadree mountains, and from every other quarter by the Yena, Kistna, and Oormooree rivers.² The Raja's troops

¹ Bappoo Kanhoo's history of his own times. This promise was actually made through Bappoo Kanhoo, the secret agent of the Raja of Satara. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur, the present Jagheerदार of Nepanee, were present at the time. [Nipāni (Nepanee) is now included in the Chikodi *tāluka*, Belgaum District, the estate having lapsed to the British Government in 1839, on the demise of its owner.]

² [The Vena (Yena) and the Urmodi (Oormooree) are two of the six feeder-rivers on the right bank of the Kistna.]

The town of Sātāra consisted at this date of one long street of tiled

lay encamped in the town, and it being then the height of the rains, when the Yena was supposed unfordable, they considered themselves so perfectly secure, that they had not even the precaution to send out patrols. Pureshram Bhow discovered a ford,¹ and crossed with nearly ten thousand men before intelligence was received of his approach. The force collected by the Raja scarcely amounted to two thousand five hundred men and was quite unprepared. The Raja had barely time to escape into the fort, and his troops were flying, until rallied by his relations Yellojee and Senajee Mohitey, Kooshaba Raja, and Doorgajee Raja Mahareek: these persons were gallantly seconded by the Raja's brother, Chitoor Sing, who was the mainspring of the party. As soon as they had collected a small band, they advanced to the environs of the town to oppose the approaching army; resistance was hopeless, but they pressed forward for a few minutes with impetuosity, until Yellojee Mohitey was killed, and both the Mahareeks wounded, when the party, by Chitoor Sing's advice, retreated. Senajee Mohitey, however, refused to turn his back, and though alone, having tried to single out Mahdoo Rao Rastia, he charged at him in the midst of his followers, by whom he was soon cut in pieces.

The plunder of the town of Satara occupied the troops of the victors; and though a party pursued him, Chitoor Sing was enabled with a small band of faithful followers to join the Raja of Kolapoor, who, ever since he had been excited by Nana Furnuwees to attack Pureshram Bhow, had spread fire and sword over the whole of the southern Mahratta country.

The fort of Satara being destitute of provisions, the Raja surrendered,² and the service being thus accomplished, Pureshram

houses, built partly of stone and partly of brick. The fort of Sātāra, perched on the summit of a small, steep, rocky hill, is said to take its name from the seventeen (*sātāra*) walls, towers and gates which it is supposed to have possessed. A description of the fort and the dwelling of the Rāja of Sātāra in 1818, when Sātāra was finally captured by the British, will be found in Mountstuart Elphinstone's diary under date February 11, 1818, on pp. 26, 27, .vol. ii, Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884).]

¹ The ford was known to very few persons, and the Bramins, desirous of improving any circumstance in their own favour, gave out, what is still generally believed, that on this occasion the waters divided to allow Pureshram Bhow to pass.

² [From this date the Rāja, Shāhu II, became a close prisoner in the fort of Sātāra until his death on May 4, 1808. Pratāp Sing, the

Bhow was desired to disband his troops, but he excused himself, declaring his inability to pay their arrears and protesting his fidelity to the Peishwa's government. Bajee Rao was therefore recommended to grant him a pardon, on his agreeing to pay a fine of ten lacks of rupees.¹

eldest of these three sons, was placed upon the *gādi* (throne) by the British Government in February 1818.]

¹ My authority for the foregoing chapter is the same as the last.

CHAPTER XL.

FROM A.D. 1798 TO A.D. 1800.

IN the meantime disorders increased at Poona, and Sindia's situation was rendered extremely critical. The danger proceeded from a quarter whence he least expected it.

A.D. 1798.—Mahadajee Sindia at his death left three widows, one of whom, named Bhagirthee Bye, was young and beautiful.¹ Doulut Rao, at the time of his being acknowledged the adopted son and heir of his uncle, promised to make an ample provision for these ladies. They accordingly continued to reside in his camp ; but no steps were taken to ensure them a permanent establishment, and in a short time some of their ordinary comforts were circumscribed. No complaint appears to have escaped them ; but of a sudden it was discovered, or at all events alleged by the elder widows, that Sindia carried on a criminal intercourse with the youngest, at which they openly expressed their abhorrence, and declared they could no longer consider as a son the incestuous defiler of his father's bed. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay interposed ; the ladies denied him admittance to their presence ; but this miscreant, having forced the enclosure of their tents, seized, flogged, and barbarously degraded them. The Shenwee

¹ [Māhādajī Sindia left four, not three, widows. The fourth, Bhagīrthī Bāi, was originally a servant in a celebrated temple at Tūljāpur (presumably the temple of Bhavānī), 'remarkable for Mahrattas only officiating at the sacrifices instead of Brahmans.' She was a Bhopī by caste, and was only twelve years old when Māhādajī saw her and married her, after settling a *jāgīr* worth 10,000 rupees upon her uncles, whom she supported out of her earnings at the temple. Māhādajī Sindia died about two years after his marriage with Bhagīrthī Bāi. Some years later she died at Dātia from poison, administered by herself in order 'to conceal the too apparent effects of a subsequent and illicit attachment.' (Broughton, *Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable (1892), pp. 141, 142 ; *Gazetteer of Gwalior State* (1908), p. 28.)]

Bramins, who had held the principal offices under the government of Mahadajee Sindia, and many of whom were connected by relationship as well as by cast, being already much disgusted by the elevation of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and the confinement of Balloba Tattya, whom they regarded as their chief, espoused the cause of the two Byes. Much dissension and discussion ensued ; but it was at last settled that the ladies should proceed to Burhanpoor, where they were to take up their abode, provided with a suitable establishment and funds for its support.

(**May 14.**)—They accordingly departed from Poona, but, instead of carrying them to Burhanpoor, their escort was directed to place them in confinement at Ahmednugur. This treachery being immediately discovered by their adherents in camp, they had scarcely reached Korygaom on the Beema, when Muzuffir Khan, a Patan officer in the interest of the Shenwee Bramins, who commanded a choice body of Hindoostan horse in Sindia's service, suddenly assailed the escort, rescued the ladies, and brought them back to the neighbourhood of Sindia's camp. This daring act would have been punished immediately, but Sindia had reason to believe that many chief persons in his army were concerned, and he also hesitated in attacking a party of desperate men, lest either of the females, standing in such relationship to himself, should be killed in the tumult, an accident which would have entailed upon him the greatest disgrace and odium throughout the Mahratta country. Ghatgay, however, strenuously urged him to crush the conspiracy in the outset, and was at last permitted to act against them ; but Muzuffir Khan, who had correct intelligence of their proceedings, withdrew the ladies to the camp of the Peishwa's brother, Amrut Rao, who happened to be near the Beema on his route to Joonere, and who instantly afforded them protection. Ghatgay had in person pursued Muzuffir Khan, and the latter no sooner deposited his charge than he sallied forth, attacked his pursuers, routed them, and returned in triumph to the camp of Amrut Rao.

It is alleged that Bajee Rao was the instigator of this revolt, and it is certain that he encouraged the partisans of the Byes to persevere. He said with apparent sincerity that he considered the protection which his brother had afforded as humane and proper ; but apprehensive lest it should provoke Sindia and Ghatgay to deeds of violence, he solicited the friendly inter-

position of Colonel Palmer, the British Resident at his court, who tendered his mediation to Sindia, by whom it was declined.

(**June 7.**)—On the night of the 7th June, five battalions of regular infantry were sent by Sindia, under a Frenchman named Du Prat,¹ to endeavour to surprise the camp of Amrut Rao and seize the Byes; but he failed in the attempt, and being briskly attacked, was compelled to retreat with some loss. Negotiations ensued; a suitable provision and a place of residence of their own selection were again promised to the Byes, and Amrut Rao, not doubting Sindia's sincerity, approached his camp in the neighbourhood of Poona, and took up his ground at the Khirkee bridge. When Amrut Rao had been thrown entirely off his guard, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay taking advantage of the Mahomedan festival, which commemorates the death of the sons of Ali and Fatima,² came to the river side on the 11th of Mohurrum, when

¹ [Duprat was an officer in Perron's army, and succeeded Drugeon in command of the 1st brigade of Sindia's army in 1798 at Poona. He held this appointment for a year. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., p. 351.)]

² This festival, termed the Hoossein Hosyn, should only commemorate the death of Hosyn, whose fall is nowhere so well related as by Gibbon, volume 9th. [The festival is known as the Muharram from the name of the first month of the Muhammadan year, and takes place during the first ten days of the month. 'Ali, the cousin of Muhammad, was married to the Prophet's daughter Fātima, and, according to the Shia sect, must be regarded as the lawful successor of Muhammad, who died in June, A.D. 632. But, as a matter of fact, Omar, Abu Bakr and Othmān (Usmān) in turn succeeded to the Khalifate, and Ali did not take possession of the office till A.D. 655. After five and a half years' reign he was assassinated in January, A.D. 661, and his son Hasan, who for a few months had held the vacant office, was poisoned in A.D. 670. Husein, the younger son of Ali, strove to assert his rights by force of arms, but was slain on the tenth day of the month Muharram (October 10, A.D. 680), in a great battle fought at Karbalā, near the Euphrates. These events are commemorated yearly by noisy funeral processions. Properly, the proceedings ought to be altogether mournful, and confined to the Shia sect, but in practice, Sunni Muhammadans, and even Hindus, take part in the ceremonies, which are regarded by many of the populace as no more solemn than a Lord Mayor's Show.' (Sleeman's *Rambles*, ed. V. A. Smith (1915), footnote, pp. 482-3.) See also Meer Hassan Ali's *Observations on Mussulmans*, ed. Crooke (1917), chs. ii, iii.

In Poona the mimic tombs of Husein, which are carried in the final procession, are still thrown into the river at the Sangam, close to the site of the old Residency. In Bombay (see Edwardes, *Byways of Bombay*, ch. vi) the disorder attending the processions grew so great and ended so frequently in serious rioting, that the proces-

the bier is thrown into the water ; he was attended by M. Dugeon,¹ a Frenchman, at the head of two brigades of infantry, on pretence of preserving order and protecting this concluding ceremony ; but they suddenly opened a fire from twenty-five guns upon the unsuspecting troops of Amrut Rao, advanced, charged, and dispersed them with this powerful body of infantry, and afterwards totally pillaged their camp. The Byes were at the time residing in the hamlet of Wittulwaree, so that this outrage was a direct attack on the Peishwa's brother, and open war between the Peishwa and Sindia was supposed to be declared. Khassee Rao Holkar joined Amrut Rao, the Mankurees repaired to his standard, and the Peishwa negotiated an offensive and defensive alliance with Nizam Ally through his resident envoys, then at Poona. The articles agreed to between Nizam Ally and Nana Furnuwees, by the treaty of Mhar, were to be confirmed by the Peishwa, the Chouth of Beder was to be remitted, and an additional tract of territory, yielding eight lacks of rupees, was to be ceded to Nizam Ally in perpetuity, as the price of his assistance against Sindia. Nizam Ally also agreed to support the Peishwa against any future encroachment of the ex-minister, Nana Furnuwees ; but in case of his being liberated by Sindia, it was stipulated that Bajee Rao should allow him an annual pension of one lack of rupees. Rughoojee Bhonslay, if he chose to accede to it, was to be considered a party to this treaty and was to receive the whole of Gurrah Mundelah from Bajee Rao.

Sindia, now alarmed, became very desirous of obtaining that mediation which he had before refused from the British Government. Colonel Palmer recommended the dismissal of his present

sional part of the celebration was stopped by me, during my tenure of the office of Commissioner of Police (1908-16). For the Anglo-Indian corruption of the cry Hasan Husein (Hoosein Hosyn) see Yule's *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. 1903, p. 419.]

¹ [Dugeon was a Savoyard, born near Chambéri, and came to India in the French service. In 1794 he was one of De Boigne's brigade-majors. He accompanied Perron to the Deccan and succeeded to his command in 1797, when Perron was promoted to De Boigne's post. In 1800 he was appointed commandant of Delhi fort, and ten months later was placed in charge of the Mughal Emperor, on a salary of Rs. 800 a month. In 1803 when Bourquien revolted against Perron, Dugeon turned him out of the fort. After the capture of Delhi by the British, Dugeon was deported to Calcutta, whence he eventually reached Europe. He died at Nice in 1824. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 346-7.)]

ministers, the settlement of a Jagheer upon the Byes, and reparation to the Peishwa, by submitting to his authority. Sindia appeared much disposed to follow this advice ; but the Byes became so extravagant in their demands, that it was impossible to accede to them ; and although he was now really desirous of returning to Hindoostan, he had no means of discharging any part of the great arrears due to his army.

In order to intimidate Bajee Rao, and to establish an alliance as a counterpoise to that which was just formed between the Nizam and the Peishwa, Sindia sent envoys to Tippoo ; but Bajee Rao, by the advice of Govind Rao Kallay, did the same. A more efficacious mode of alarming Bajee Rao was the release of Nana Furnuwees, by which Sindia also hoped to obtain a sufficient sum to free him from the most urgent of his embarrassments.

Nana Furnuwees was accordingly brought from Ahmednugur, and two crores of rupees demanded as the price of his liberty. After some delay, during which Nana attempted to throw himself on the protection of the British Government, he at last agreed to pay Sindia ten lacks of rupees, provided he were previously set at liberty ; as otherwise, whilst under restraint, his agents would comply with no order, even if furnished with a private token from himself. He accordingly obtained his liberty, and the money was promptly paid.

The enlargement of Nana, though a source of great concern to Bajee Rao, was not unlooked for ; but when it was almost immediately followed by the revocation of the treaty with Nizam Ally, from causes not sufficiently explained, but chiefly owing to the unsteady and fluctuating policy of the minister Musheer Ool Moolk, the Peishwa lost no time in commencing negotiations with Nana Furnuwees and with Sindia. The latter, not yet apprised of the revocation of the treaty, apprehensive of an attack from the confederated Mahrattas and Moghuls, and alarmed by reports of disaffection among his troops in Hindoostan, received these overtures with complacency, but insisted on the reinstatement of Nana Furnuwees as preliminary to an accommodation. Ghatgay in the meantime assisted by an agent worthy of himself, a Mahratta named Fukeerjee Garway, continued to commit every species of extortion and excess : he even disregarded the remonstrances of Sindia, and his cruelty, increased by indulgence, was almost unparalleled. He seized four officers in Sindia's army,

on mere suspicion of their being concerned in the Byes' insurrection ; he blew three of them from guns, and the fourth, Yeswunt Rao Sivajee, had a tent-peg driven into his brain by a mallet.

Sindia, aroused at length by the contempt shown to his authority, and the universal cry of execration excited by such conduct, listened to the representations of Ramjee Patell and Aba Chitnees, and directed two young men, the sons of Filoze and Hessing¹ by native mothers, to arrest Ghatgay and Garway, which they effected with great dexterity.

The confinement of these persons was a further step to a reconciliation between Sindia and Bajee Rao, and the new course of policy adopted about this period by the English tended to a species of union between them.

The system of neutrality followed by the British Government in India during the administration of Sir John Shore was entirely reversed soon after the arrival of Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, in India on the 26th April, 1798. The revisal of the political relations of the English with the courts of Hyderabad and Poona was the first object to which the Residents were instructed to direct their attention, for the purpose of securing the alliance of those states, so as, at all events, to prevent their resources from being employed against the British Government, in the same manner as appeared to be meditated by the Sultan of Mysore in his recent connexions with the French.²

The principal danger to the English, in a war with Tippoo

¹ Hessing, the father, was an Englishman, and held the rank of Colonel in Sindia's service. He bore an excellent character. [See note on page 219, *ante*, in regard to George Hessing's parentage. George Hessing eventually took command of his father's brigade on the latter's retirement in 1800. In 1801 he accompanied Sindia to Mālwa. He died in Calcutta on January 6, 1826. His comrade in the arrest of Ghātḡē was Fidèle Filose, who after the flight of his father, Michael, divided with his brother, Jean Baptiste, the battalions commanded by Filose. Fidèle Filose was the son of a native mother. Of the eight battalions which he commanded, two were defeated at Ujjain and Nuri respectively, see page 308, *infra*, while the other six took part in the battle of Indore in October 1801. Soon after, Fidèle was charged with a foul act of treachery in firing on Sutherland's troops, which were in the service of his master Sindia, and was placed in confinement. He then committed suicide. (Compton, *Military Adventurers, &c.*, p. 352.)]

² [When Lord Mornington assumed office, the existence of the British power in India was exposed to grave danger. Tipū, the Nizām and Sindia were all under French influence ; a Jacobin Club had been

supported by their European rival, was the fear of his being joined by the other native powers, whose governments were not only becoming gradually weaker, and therefore more likely to be guided by petty intrigue than by sound policy ; but a great change had taken place in their military strength, especially that of Sindia and Nizam Ally, which now in a great measure lay in their numerous corps of regular infantry, and these chiefly commanded by French officers.

It was, therefore, of importance to the British Government to secure the alliance of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, and it became a primary object to induce Sindia to return to Hindoostan, both from the central situation his brigades occupied in the Deccan, and from his known desire to obstruct the influence of the British with the Peishwa, over whom it was his policy to perpetuate his own ascendancy.¹

The reported designs of Zuman Shah, King of Cabul and grandson of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, a name terrible to Mahrattas, were strongly set forth by the British agents, in order to induce Sindia to return for the protection of his dominions in Hindoostan ; whilst to the Peishwa was offered a body of the Company's troops, for the protection of his person and authority and the revival of the energies of his government.² Bajee Rao had shortly before made an application to the British of a nature similar to this arrangement, but at that period both their policy and the operation of the Act of Parliament prevented their complying with this request. The sudden desire now evinced by the English to grant him a subsidiary force, their frequent recommendations to reinstate Nana Furnuwees in the ministry and to remove Sindia from Poona, led Bajee Rao, whose views and information were bounded by very narrow limits, to suppose that the whole was a

organized at Seringapatam. Lord Mornington determined to destroy the chance of a federation of the native governments, acting under the advice of their French military officers. For a succinct survey of the Governor-General's policy and achievements see *O.H.I.*, ch. vi. Letters of Lord Mornington, dealing with these matters, will be found at pp. 611-43 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i. See also B. L. Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*, ii. 410 ff.]

¹ [See Lord Mornington's letter to Daulat Rāo Sindia of January 22, 1799, at p. 619 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.]

² [See letter of July 13, 1798, from Lord Mornington to the Hon. Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, pp. 611-12 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.]

scheme of the detested Nana, the object most dreaded and therefore uppermost in his mind.

Accordingly, although Sindia had declared his intention of endeavouring to return to Hindoostan, and a public visit of ceremony announced the reconciliation which had taken place between Sindia and Nana Furnuwees on the one part and Bajee Rao on the other, the Peishwa shortly afterwards, in a secret conference with Sindia, urged his stay at Poona for the purpose of preventing the introduction of the English by Nana Furnuwees ; but he was at the same moment doing all in his power to conciliate Nana, and was pressing him to quit Sindia's camp for the purpose of resuming the duties of administration. Nana accordingly returned once more to the city of Poona, but declined interfering with the Peishwa's affairs, until the safety of his person and property should be guaranteed by the British Government and Nizam Ally, and until he could effect a reconciliation in Sindia's family to enable him to return to Hindoostan. To forward the latter object he laboured to bring about an accommodation, and in hopes of expediting Sindia's march advanced him fifteen lacks of rupees from his private treasury, in addition to the ten lacks before paid at the time of his liberation.

Perceiving that Sindia was really serious in his proposal of returning to Hindoostan, Bajee Rao intimated his intention of paying Nana Furnuwees a secret visit, and in disguise, so that it might not come to Sindia's knowledge. In the middle of the night, attended by a single domestic, he repaired to Nana's house, and for the time succeeded in deceiving the old minister into a belief of his being wholly unconcerned in his seizure and disgrace, and that he confined the other ministers in the vain hope of affording them protection from the violence and rapacity of Sindia's agents. Colonel Palmer, the British Resident, was of opinion that Nana Furnuwees was never deceived by him, but the fact is proved by the result ; and, indeed, the eloquence and manner of Bajee Rao are so powerful and insinuating that he has deceived most men even when on their guard against him. On this occasion, perceiving the effect his language produced, he laid his head at the feet of Nana Furnuwees, swore by those feet¹ to consider him as his father, to abide by his counsel in all

¹ To swear by the feet of a Bramin is one of the most sacred and solemn of Hindoo oaths.

his future measures, and finally, in a burst of tears, conjured and entreated that he would not abandon the Bramin sovereignty, assailed as it then was by the factions of the Mahrattas and the ambition of the English.

(Oct. 15th.)—In consequence of this appeal Nana Furnuwees resumed the duties of minister, without those securities for which

A.D.
1799.

he had at first so prudently stipulated ; but scarcely had he begun the transaction of public business, when he was informed by Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray¹ that Bajee

Rao was again endeavouring to persuade Sindia to confine him—intelligence which was confirmed by Sindia himself. Nana instantly repaired to the palace ; taxed the Peishwa with his unparalleled duplicity ; begged that he would no longer plot against the life and freedom of an old man, borne down by years, infirmity and misfortune, but permit him to retire to some spot, far from courts and camps, where his being suffered to exist could never interfere with any plans His Highness might form. He abjured the desire of now possessing power on his own account, and declared that he had only accepted it in hopes of being still useful. Bajee Rao positively denied having been accessory to a proceeding so treacherous, and begged that those who had used his name might be apprehended. Sindia immediately seized the Peishwa's minister Govind Rao Kallay and Sewram Narrain Thuthay, the agents employed, but as it is a point of honour amongst Mahrattas never to divulge the name of their principal on such occasions, they bore the loss of their liberty and property without impeaching the veracity of their master, and Sewram Narrain Thuthay soon after died.

Satisfaction being thus afforded, Nana Furnuwees resumed the office of prime minister ; but his suspicions were not removed, and he avoided all interference in business not absolutely necessary.

The period, however, was extremely important ; Nizam Ally had concluded a new treaty with the English on the 1st September, 1798, by which he agreed to receive no Frenchman into his service, to dismiss his French officers, and disband the whole

¹ This person, who came into Sindia's confidence, whose name has already appeared, and whom we shall have occasion to notice repeatedly, was of the family of the great Suntajee Ghorepuray, so conspicuous in the days of Aurungzebe, and a descendant of Moorar Rao Ghorepuray of Gootee, so often mentioned by Orme.

of the infantry lately commanded by Raymond,¹ receiving in their stead six battalions of English Sepoys, each battalion one thousand strong, with a proportion of European artillery, for which he agreed to pay an annual subsidy of twenty-four lacks seventeen thousand and one hundred rupees. The English Government also became bound, by an article cautiously expressed, to mediate between Nizam Ally and the Peishwa, and in case of differences arising between them to use every endeavour to induce the Peishwa to accede to a friendly arbitration.

The Mahrattas naturally viewed this treaty with much jealousy, and the Peishwa, on being urged by the British agent to conclude a similar one, evaded the subject, by an assurance that he would faithfully execute the conditions of subsisting engagements; and on the prospect of a war with Tippoo promised to afford his aid. In these replies Bajee Rao had followed the opinion and advice of Nana Furnuwees, but had neither sincerity nor steadiness to fulfil the engagements alluded to, though assured by Nana that any departure from good faith must equally affect the honour and security of his government. Nana Furnuwees recommended that Appa Sahib, the son of Pureshram Bhow, should be appointed to command the contingent intended to co-operate with the English; and in the present exigency proposed to assemble it, by collecting the force under Dhondoo Punt Gokla, Sur-Soobehdar of the Carnatic, the troops of Rastia and the Vinchorkur, and all the horse which the Bramin Jagheerders could raise. The necessities of the state, and the presence of Sindia, precluded the Peishwa from recruiting his own army or detaching any part of it from Poona.

Appa Sahib refused the command, but the offer having led to a reconciliation between Pureshram Bhow and Nana, the Bhow agreed to head the contingent himself, on condition of having his fine remitted and receiving Dharwar, with several places in the Carnatic, in Jagheer. An English detachment,

¹ Raymond died March 25th, 1798. [Lord Mornington in a letter of November 29, 1798, to Captain Kirkpatrick, Resident at Hyderābād, wrote: 'You will take particular care that none of the men of the late French corps, denominated "Pondicherry Sepoys," be entertained by Colonel Roberts for the Company's service. Indeed, although it might not be proper to require it, it would be satisfactory to me to learn that Azīm-ul-Umrah had included the whole of this description in the number of the French party proposed to be completely disbanded.']

similar to that formerly employed and under the command of the same officer, was held in readiness to join Pureshram Bhow ; but these endeavours on the part of Nana Furnuwees were frustrated by Bajee Rao, who acted under the influence of Doulut Rao Sindia. After the English had commenced hostilities against Tippoo,¹ his envoys were publicly received at Poona, although repeated remonstrances were made on the subject by the British Resident. Even after their formal dismissal was intimated to Colonel Palmer on the 19th March, they only retired to Kikwee, a village twenty-five miles south of Poona. Colonel Palmer at first supposed that the detention of the wukeels was a mere repetition of the former plan of obtaining a sum of money, on a false pretence of neutrality or aid. The British Resident knew that Bajee Rao had received thirteen lacks of rupees from Tippoo to which Sindia was privy, but it was not known at that time to Nana Furnuwees ; and when the Governor-General noticed the conduct of the court of Poona, by simply countermanding the detachment which had been prepared to accompany Pureshram Bhow, Nana Furnuwees could not comprehend the reason.

Bajee Rao imagined that, by the concessions made to Pureshram Bhow on the one hand and the encouragement given to Tippoo on the other, he should deceive both parties and postpone his ultimate decision, until circumstances enabled him to judge on which side it would be most advantageous to range himself. As far, however, as he was capable of following any plan, his resolution was taken in favour of Tippoo. In concert with Sindia, a scheme was laid to attack Nizam Ally, in which they hoped to engage Rughoojee Bhonslay, and as the English would, as a matter of course, defend the Moghul territory, in consequence of their late treaty, the Peishwa was then to declare the Mahrattas the allies of Tippoo Sultan. The Marquis Wellesley, apprised of those views, was on the other hand endeavouring to engage

¹ [On February 3, 1799, Lord Mornington wrote to Colonel Palmer, Resident at Poona, desiring him 'to apprise the Pēshwā and Nānā Fadnavīs ; that the obstinate silence of the Sultān (Tipū) compels me to treat him as an enemy ; and that, considering the Honourable Company to be in a state of war with him from this day, I shall accordingly direct our armies to enter his territories without further delay.' Lord Mornington in the same letter expressed a hope that the Pēshwā had dismissed Tipū's Vakīls and had 'actually ordered the march of the Marāthā contingent into Bednore.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 620-3.)]

Rughoojee Bhonslay as a party to the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally.¹

But before the Peishwa or Sindia had the slightest conception that Tippoo's downfall was so near, they were astonished by intelligence of the capture of Seringapatam, the death of Tippoo, and the subversion of his government.²

Bajee Rao affected the utmost joy, and soon after endeavoured to persuade Colonel Palmer that the failure of his engagement was entirely attributable to Nana Furnuwees. Immediate orders were sent to Dhondoo Punt Gokla, Sur-Soobehdar of the Carnatic, to advance into Tippoo's country with what force he could collect. The consequence was that many villages were plundered after the country had submitted to the British Government³; and the only merit which Dhondoo Punt's party could claim was that of intercepting Dhoondia Waug,⁴ a marauding fugitive from Seringapatam, whom Dhondoo Punt attacked by surprise, and dispersed his followers; after which, Dhoondia entered the service of the

¹ [See Lord Mornington's letter of April 25, 1799, to H. Colebrooke, Resident of Nāgpur, and a letter of April 26, 1799, to Captain Kirkpatrick, at pp. 626-7 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, vol. i.]

² [On March 6, 1799, a Bombay force defeated a large body of the enemy on the Coorg frontier. The Carnatic army under General Harris crossed the frontier on March 5, defeated Tipū at Malavelli on March 27, and stormed Seringapatam on May 4. (*O.H.I.*, p. 583.) On May 14 Lord Mornington wrote to the Pēshwā, announcing the victory and the death of Tipū (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, p. 629).]

³ [Lord Mornington wrote to the Pēshwā on May 27, 1799, informing him that it was unnecessary for him to proceed with warlike preparations, as all hostilities had ceased, and requesting him to recall at once any force that might have set out for Mysore. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 629).]

⁴ [Dhōndia Wāgh aspired to found a new dynasty (see pp. 304-6, *post*). After the fall of Seringapatam, where he was a prisoner, he signalized his release by ravaging the Shimōga District in Mysore, pillaging and destroying the town of Shimōga. After a long pursuit General Wellesley eventually brought him to bay and defeated him at Manoli, on the banks of the Mālprabha river in Belgaum District. He was killed in a cavalry charge led by General Wellesley in person. 'The campaign against Dhōndia was the first occasion on which the Duke of Wellington held an independent command in the field. The conquest of Mysore threw out of employment many of Tipū Sultān's soldiers, and Dhōndia gathered round him a considerable force on the confines of Mysore and in the adjoining provinces. Our troops were engaged for nearly three months hunting him down.' (Colebrooke, *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884), i. 30 n.) See also *Mysore Gazetteer*, by B. L. Rice, ii. 438.]

Raja of Kolapoor who was actively engaged in hostilities against the Peishwa, and who readily received him into his army.

Sindia, on the news of Tippoo's overthrow, dispatched emissaries to Seringapatam for the purpose of encouraging resistance among the partisans of the late Sultan who might yet remain; but he also sent abundant congratulations to the English Resident at Poona, expressive of his happiness at the glorious termination of the war.

The judgement and energy by which the power of Tippoo was so speedily reduced may be considered one of the first examples of that energetic policy, by which Great Britain, in her subsequent mighty struggles in Europe, has been distinguished.

The resources of Nizam Ally's government had been placed at the disposal of the Marquis Wellesley, and the services of his contingent had been directed with far greater efficiency than in the former war; an improvement justly ascribed to the ability and exertion of the Governor-General's Political Agent, Captain Malcolm.¹

The mode of dividing the conquered provinces was dictated by a wise and liberal spirit. Nizam Ally, with judicious confidence, had left the arrangements to the Marquis Wellesley who effected them in the following manner.

As it was deemed incompatible with the future tranquillity of the country, and the security of the Company's possessions, to establish a son of Tippoo in sovereignty, the descendant of those Rajas of Mysore, from whom Hyder Ally usurped the government, was released from captivity and raised to the

(June 22.) musnud of his ancestors.² A partition treaty was then concluded by the British Government, Nizam Ally, and the restored Raja.

The whole of Tippoo's revenue being estimated at 30,40,000 pagodas, to the Raja was assigned, pagodas	13,60,000
To Nizam Ally	5,30,000

¹ Now Sir John Malcolm.

² [The Rājā selected was a child of five years of age, and the administration of the territory reserved to him, which is represented by the modern Mysore State, was entrusted to the Brahman minister, Pūrnīa or Pūrnaiya, who had so faithfully served Tipū. The arrangements were embodied in a supplementary treaty of Seringapatam. Pūrnīa was in executive charge of the administration until December 1811, when the young Rājā was permitted to take over the duties. (O.H.I., pp. 586-7.)]

To the Company.. .. .	5,37,000
For the maintenance of the families of Hyder and Tippoo, in charge of the British Government	2,40,000
For the maintenance of Kummur-ud- deen Khan and his family, in charge of Nizam Ally	70,000
	Pagodas 27,37,000

Notwithstanding the Peishwa's total failure in his engagements, the Governor-General deemed it politic to allow him some share in the conquered territory, provided he could be brought to accede to an alliance corresponding to that formed with Nizam Ally. With this view, the balance in the territory adjoining the Peishwa's southern boundary, yielding an annual revenue of pagodas 2,63,000 was reserved, and was offered on the above conditions to the Peishwa.

Much discussion took place in consequence: the court of Poona was unwilling by a distinct refusal to afford the allies a pretext for at once appropriating the territory reserved; in which case, two-thirds of it were to be given to Nizam Ally and the rest retained by the Company.

In a great part of the negotiation which took place, it is easy to perceive the ability of Nana Furnuwees. In extenuation of the circumstances which had caused the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the allies, the Peishwa represented the unfortunate distractions of the empire which had prevented him from assembling an army, and the usage of native states in permitting wukeels to reside in their courts in time of war. To the preliminary conditions requiring the Mahrattas to abstain from all aggressions on the territory of the Raja of Mysore; the Peishwa replied, that upon obtaining the proposed cession, it should be considered an equivalent for the Chouth, to which the Mahrattas were entitled from the whole of the territories of the late Sultan. In case the French invaded India, the Peishwa engaged to unite with the English in repelling them; but he would not agree to exclude individuals of that nation from his service. He offered to subsidize two battalions, provided they might be employed to assist in reducing refractory tributaries and the Seedee of Jinjeera; but he absolutely refused the Company's mediation in the existing

differences between the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally respecting the Chouth. To an application for exchanging the Chouth of Surat for an equivalent revenue, a measure in itself calculated to obviate vexatious disputes and loss, a like peremptory refusal was given; and a proposal for including Rughoojee Bhonslay as a principal in the intended alliance, the Peishwa treated as absurd.¹ Finally, after protracted discussion, the reserved territory was shared by Nizam Ally and the British Government, as stipulated in the treaty; and on the 12th of October, 1800, a new treaty was concluded between them, by which the British Government engaged to protect the territories of Nizam Ally from unprovoked aggression; two battalions of native infantry were added to the former six battalions, together with a regiment of native cavalry; and for the payment of the whole force, the territories acquired by Nizam Ally, on the partition of the provinces of Mysore, both in 1792 and 1799, were ceded in perpetuity to the British Government.²

The affairs of Sindia during this period continued in a very distracted state. After the treacherous attack made by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay on Amrut Rao's camp, the Byes fled to the Raja of Kolapoor, who was still at war with the Peishwa. The Byes were soon joined by Narrain Rao Bukhshee and the principal Shenwee Bramins from Sindia's camp. Large bodies of horse flocked to their standard, and when sufficiently strong they returned to the northward, plundering every village from the Kistna to the Godavery which acknowledged the authority (Feb.) of Doulut Rao Sindia,³ and not only insulted Sindia in his lines, but stopped the roads in the vicinity of Poona. Sindia's horse at first attempted to oppose them, but their

¹ [See letters of July 8 and 20, 1799, from Lord Mornington to the Resident at Poona, on pp. 630-6 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*. Lord Mornington flatly refused the Pēshwā's proposal to use the subsidiary force in reducing Janjirā, 'not only upon political grounds but upon those of law.']

² [The Company thus obtained the whole of Kanara and some other territory, and the control of Seringapatam. Malabar having already been annexed, it was thus master of the south-western coast. The territory assigned to the Nizām lay to the north-east. (*O.H.I.*, p. 586.)]

³ Numerous villages belonging to one chief are frequently found intermixed with those of another in the Mahratta country, the reason of which has been already explained and accounted for.

numbers were so inferior, that after a few skirmishes, in which they suffered severely, they would not advance unsupported by the regular battalions, before which the troops of the Byes retired, but as soon as the battalions returned towards their own camp, the insurgents also faced about and followed them. There is, perhaps, no parallel example of such an extraordinary state of affairs as that which the Peishwa's territory presented at this period, where a rebellion against one prince was maintained within the territory of another, whom both parties acknowledged as their sovereign. The anarchy which it engendered may be conceived ; the whole country suddenly swarmed with horsemen, and although plunder was not indiscriminate, great devastations were committed. The flame spread in Hindoostan ; Lukwa Dada, a Shenwee Bramin already mentioned, second in importance to the confined minister Balloba Tattya, by whom Lukwa Dada had been first raised, having been suspected of disaffection in consequence of his attachment to Balloba, was deprived of power and dismissed from his employments. Being thus driven into the ranks of the insurgents, he soon raised a powerful army, repeatedly defeated the troops sent against him, and reduced the country from Oojein to Seronje.

To add to these troubles, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who, after his brother fell at Poona, had fled to Nagpoor and was there confined through the influence of Sindia, having effected his escape, repaired to Malwa, collected followers, and plundered the country. M. Perron¹ had succeeded to the command of Sindia's regular infantry on the departure of M. de Boigne, who was compelled from ill-health to return to Europe in 1796 ; but Perron, at the period we have arrived, was so fully occupied in the siege of Agra, held by the adherents of Lukwa Dada, and in which he was assisted by Ambajee Inglija, that he found it impossible to stop the disorders in Malwa without additional troops, for which he sent repeated and earnest applications to his master in the Deccan.

Under these circumstances Sindia had again recourse to negotiation ; but the demands of the Byes extended to nothing less than

¹ [Perron succeeded to De Boigne's command on February 1, 1797. He had originally come to India in a humble capacity on board a man-of-war, and thence joined the native service, under Sangster, as a non-commissioned officer. When Lestineaux absconded in 1788, Perron obtained command of a battalion, and after the success of the army against Ismail Beg, rose to command of a brigade.]

complete sovereignty, which they required Sindia to hold under their authority ; and before even these conditions could be admitted, they insisted on the release of Balloba Tattya.

Sindia's new ministers, Abba Chitnees and Ryajee Patell, with a judgement and a disinterestedness which do them honour, recommended their master to reinstate Balloba as prime minister, to which Sindia agreed ; and no sooner was the arrangement accomplished, than it produced an immediate effect in detaching the principal leaders from the insurrection. The Byes agreed to an adjustment through Balloba's mediation and the fort of Asseegurh with the city of Burhanpoor and a Jagheer of eleven lacks of rupees were to be assigned to them. Lukwa Dada, in consequence of the restoration of Balloba, had an interview with the brother of Ambajee Ingliia, who had been opposed to him in Malwa, and agreed to a cessation of arms. Every difference was on the point of being settled ; the Byes had received their clothes, jewels, and other private property from Sindia's camp, and had come as far as Rajawaree, near Jejoory, on their way to Poona, when one of their partisans, having been attacked and cut off, they immediately returned towards Punderpoor and recommenced their system of depredation.

The whole of the southern Mahratta country was in great disorder. The Raja of Kolapoor still waged war with the Peishwa, and the reinforcement brought by Chittoor Sing, after the defeat of the Raja of Satara, gave a new spirit to his efforts. Chittoor Sing had been closely pursued into the territory of the Raja of Kolapoor by a body of Rastia's troops, joined by some others on the part of the Pritee Needhee, the whole of whom encamped near the Warna river. Five hundred horse of the troops who had been dispersed at Satara, having got together, apprised Chittoor Sing of their situation, and by his direction concealed themselves for some days in the hills, until he had got a reinforcement from Kolapoor ; when by a well-concerted attack upon the troops who had pursued him, he cut them off almost to a man. A body of Pureshram Bhow's troops were shortly afterwards in a like manner surprised and routed ; and Chittoor Sing having learnt that after Pureshram Bhow's departure from Satara, two or three thousand of Rastia's troops with some guns were encamped in the neighbourhood of the fort, he vowed to avenge the disgrace sustained by the first defeat. Accordingly he led six hundred

infantry through the hills and valleys until opposite to the village of Pal,¹ where he remained concealed until night, when, repairing to a celebrated temple in the village, he performed the usual worship, and the whole party, having solemnly invoked the deity, stained their clothes with yellow dye, rubbed their hands and faces with turmeric, and issued forth, thus fortified with the implied vow of conquest or death, to attack their enemy. They did not find Rastia's troops unprepared; but the latter had only time to fire a few rounds, when they were furiously charged sword in hand, their guns taken and destroyed, and the whole body dispersed in a few minutes. A rapid march to the banks of the Warna, before his retreat could be intercepted, marked a prudence as well as enterprise, which gained Chitoor Sing considerable credit with the Mahratta soldiery, and his numbers were in a few months considerably increased. At the head of a very inferior force, and with no funds to support it, he kept seven thousand of Rastia's troops in perpetual motion between the Neera and Warna. He was, however, frequently defeated; and on one occasion, when accompanied by only five hundred men,² he was surrounded by five thousand of Rastia's troops, but cut his way through them, although with the loss of more than half his party. His enterprise, his remarkable escapes, his conciliatory manners, the popularity of his cause amongst Mahrattas, and his confidence in the peasantry, rendered him everywhere a favourite, notwithstanding his having repeatedly laid the whole of the villages under contribution.

Chitoor Sing's insurrection was considered at Poona as a part of the Kolapoor war, and both the Peishwa and Nana Furnuwees had their share of blame in exciting it.

During the insurrection of Satara and afterwards, whilst

¹ [Pāl (originally called Rājāpur) is a village in Sātāra District, lying on both banks of the Tārli, about twenty miles north-west of Karād. The celebrated temple, mentioned by the author, is that of Khandoba, which was built in the fifteenth century on the site of a legendary appearance by the god to a milkmaid named Pālai. Many families prominent in the history of the Deccan have bestowed gifts on the temple, at which a great fair, in celebration of the marriage of the god Khandoba, is held annually in the Hindu month Paush (December-January). As at the Jejuri Temple, many *Murlis*, or sacred harlots, are attached to the temple at Pāl. The priests are Brahmans and Guravs. (*B.G.*, xix. 529 ff.) See remarks on Khandoba in Introduction, vol. i, pp. lv-lvii, *ante*.]

² It is not mentioned whether horse or foot.

Chitoor Sing kept Rastia in check to the north of the Warna, the Raja of Kolapoor was actively employed against the Putwurdhuns and Dhondoo Punt Gokla. Tasgaom, the capital of Pureshram Bhow's Jagheer, was pillaged, and his palace, which had been erected at great expense, was burnt to the ground. The Carnatic was laid under contribution, and Dhondoo Punt Gokla, though a brave and active officer, was repeatedly defeated. Such was the state of the Kolapoor warfare up to the period at which we have arrived.

In the month of August after Balloba Tattya's release, a reconciliation having taken place between him and Nana Furnuwees, they deliberated, with the knowledge and approbation of their superiors, on the course of policy necessary to be pursued with regard to Nizam Ally and the English; but both concurred in the necessity of suppressing the formidable disturbance to the southward, as a preliminary to any other arrangement. It was accordingly resolved that the force, previously intended by Nana Furnuwees to have co-operated with the allies against Tippoo, should be sent under Pureshram Bhow, considerably reinforced, for the present service. The whole, to be furnished in proportions by the Peishwa, and by Sindia and other Jagheerdars, was to consist of thirty thousand horse and six thousand infantry; but, as it was impracticable to prepare this force until the Dussera, Pureshram Bhow was directed to watch the Raja of Kolapoor and restrain him as much as possible. Pureshram Bhow, whose military spirit was on this occasion excited by personal injury and personal pique, although his health was in a declining state, kept the field all the rains, and recovered the garrisons between the rivers Gutpurba and Malpurba. In the month of September he advanced from Gokauk¹ towards Kolapoor, not without hopes

¹ [Gokāk is now a thriving town in Belgaum District, situated eight miles from the Gokāk Road station of the Southern Marāthā Railway. The town is mentioned under the name Gokāge in an inscription of 1047. During the first half of the eighteenth century it belonged to the Nawābs of Savanūr, and thereafter passed to the Patvardhan family. It lapsed to the British in 1836. About three and a half miles north-west of the town are the Gokāk Falls, where the Ghāt-prabha takes a leap of 170 feet over a sandstone cliff into a picturesque gorge. A cotton-mill was established in 1887 close to the falls; and the Gokāk storage works were constructed in 1889-1902 for the supply of motive power and for purposes of irrigation. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, 20, 21.)]

of finishing the war himself, but near the village of Putunkoondée he encountered the Raja of Kolapoor and Chitoor Sing, when he experienced a total defeat, and was himself mortally wounded and made prisoner.¹ Nana Furnuwees and Balloba sent the troops of the Vinchorkur, the Pritee Needhee, and five of Sindia's regular battalions under Major Brownrigg, to support Appa Sahib, Pureshram Bhow's son, and reduce the Raja to submission.

This accession of force was too great for the Raja of Kolapoor to withstand, and he therefore retired under protection of the fort of Panalla. But in that situation his troops were surprised by Appa Sahib, who drove some of them into the fort, whilst the greater part sought refuge in Kolapoor, which the Peishwa's troops

invested, and after a siege of considerable duration had nearly reduced it, when events and revolutions at Poona interfered to save the Kolapoor state, which would otherwise in all probability have been subverted, or at least held in future as a dependency of the Peishwa's government.

A.D.
1800.

¹ Wiswas Rao, the brother of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, took up the dying man, and laying him across his horse, threw him down before the Raja of Kolapoor, who ordered him, it is said, when in this state, to be cut in pieces. Dajeeba Limmay, who was in the action, states this circumstance; and Bajee Rao in a particular conversation with Mr. Elphinstone at Punderpoor in 1812, mentioned it as a well-known fact, but it is not generally believed at Kolapoor; nor at Satara, where the Raja of Kolapoor had many enemies.

Dajeeba Limmay, whose name I have mentioned above, was a confidential agent of Pureshram Bhow; he was employed in several high situations during the administration of Nana Furnuwees, and was a sharer in many of the revolutions and events which I am now recording. At my request, he had the goodness to write the history of his own times, and I take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgements.

CHAPTER XLI.

FROM A.D. 1800 TO A.D. 1802.

A.D. 1800.—THE first of the events alluded to, in point of time and importance, was the death of Nana Furnuwees. His health had long been in a declining state; but he continued to transact business almost to the last with his accustomed order and punctuality. He died on the 13th March, 'and with him,' says Colonel Palmer, 'has departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government.' Nana Furnuwees was certainly a great statesman.¹ His principal defects originated in the want of personal courage, and in an ambition not always restrained by principle. In the later unhappy years of his life, on the testimony of English as well as Mahratta authority, he is entitled to the high praise of having acted with the feelings and sincerity of a patriot. He honourably advised Bajee Rao to such measures as he believed advantageous, unmindful of any consequences. He was decidedly averse to the admission of a body of foreign troops, in the manner proposed by the Marquis

¹ [The Marquess Wellesley wrote to the Pēshwā on May 28, 1800: 'The loss of persons distinguished for their talents, great qualities and abilities, is at all times a subject of regret. The melancholy news, therefore, of the death of Bālājī Pandit, the able minister of your State, whose upright principles and honourable views, and whose zeal for the welfare and prosperity both of the dominions of his own immediate superiors and of other powers, were so justly celebrated, occasions extreme grief and concern.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, p. 641.) Moor (*Hindu Pantheon*, 1st ed., p. 431) records that unlike other Hindus of his time Nānā Furnavīs was something of a *virtuoso*, and had made a collection of valuable pictures which he carefully preserved in books and portfolios, wrapped in cloth. During the disturbances at Poona, they were sent for safety to Lohogarh Fort, and at the date Moor wrote (1810) were in the possession of Dhondo Pandit, its late commandant, who resided at Thāna under English protection.]

Wellesley, if the energies of the government could possibly be restored without their aid. He respected the English, admired their sincerity and the vigour of their government ; but, as political enemies, no one regarded them with more jealousy and alarm. The life of Nana may be said to have been entirely public ; and its events have been so fully recorded, as well as the motives for his conduct, that it is unnecessary to enlarge on his character. In private life he was a man of strict veracity, humane, frugal, and charitable. His whole time was regulated with the strictest order, and the business personally transacted by him almost exceeds credibility.

In regard to civil government, whilst he continued in power he endeavoured to preserve the system of Mahdoo Rao Bullal ; but overwhelming business, and the frequent distractions that prevailed, produced great laxity in the superintendence.

No instance of greater neglect on the part of an administration, or of more extraordinary criminality in a subordinate officer, is recorded in the annals of any state than the case of Gasee Ram, Kotwal, or police superintendent, of the city of Poona. This man, a Bramin native of Hindoostan, employed the power with which he was vested in perpetrating the most dreadful murders. People disappeared, and no trace of them could be found. Gasee Ram was suspected, but Nana Furnuwees refused to listen to complaints, apparently absurd from their unexampled atrocity. At last, it being suspected that Gasee Ram was starving a respectable Bramin to death, Mannajee Phakray headed a party of the people, broke open the prison, and rescued the unfortunate Bramin, which led to the detection of the monster's crimes ; and he fell a victim to the vengeance of the exasperated populace, by whom he was stoned to death.¹

In his person Nana was tall and thin, his complexion was rather dark and his demeanour grave ; but his look intelligent, quick, and penetrating² ; he left a young widow, and died without issue.

¹ [Moor states that Ghāsīrām or Gahunsa Rām Kotwāl was a native of Aurangābād, that his chief assailants were Telinga, or Telugu-speaking, Brahmans, whose caste-fellows had died while in police-custody, and that he was stoned to death on August 31, 1791, close to a temple and tank of handsome design which he himself had built. His fate was actually witnessed by Dr. Findlay, 'Surgeon to our Legation at Poona.' (*Hindu Pantheon*, ed. 1810, London, p. 373.)]

² [Nānā Farnavis is one of the three figures in an interesting oil-painting, which hangs in the entrance-hall of Ganeshkhind, the Poona

The death of Nana Furnuwees was the origin of a new dispute between the Peishwa and Sindia, each being desirous to obtain the treasures of which he was supposed to have died possessed.¹

Sindia immediately seized Nana's Jagheer, on pretext of his having owed him a crore of rupees ; he also supported his widow in her desire to adopt a son ; both because it was in opposition to Bajee Rao's wish, and because it afforded the easiest means of getting the family treasures into his own power. But these disputes did not prevent their plotting against others ; and Sindia, whose re-establishment of Balloba Tattya to power had disarmed the insurrection of Lukwa Dada, now determined on Balloba's destruction. To this measure he was advised by his father-in-law, who had been set at liberty in the month of January at the recommendation of Balloba, and had regained entire influence over Sindia's mind, of which the first use he made was to stir up a faction against the minister, and then to excite Sindia to his destruction and that of his immediate adherents. He was accordingly seized and imprisoned at Ahmednugur, where a natural death interposed to save him from a cruel execution. But his

residence of the Governor of Bombay. The other two portraits are those of the Pēshwā Mādhu Rāo Narāyan and Māhādājī Sindia. The artist was Mr. James Wales of Aberdeen, who died in 1795. His eldest daughter married Sir Charles Malet, Resident at Poona (see footnote, p. 32, *ante*). The picture is supposed to have been painted in Poona between June 1792 and February 1794. The names of the figures are given as follows below the picture : (left) Nana Furnavese, Minister, 1763-1800 ; (centre) Mhadow Rao Narain Peshwa (1774-95) ; (right) Mhadji Sindia, General, 1769-1794.]

¹ [Lieutenant-Colonel Jervis in his MS. studies of the Marāthā people states that Nāna Farnavis had expended most of his huge fortune in an attempt to regain his power after the death of the Pēshwā Mādhu Rāo Narāyan in 1795. His widow, ' Jeoo Bai ' (Jīva Bāi), enjoyed the following income about 1820 :

	Rs.
Pension from British Government	12,000
Deshmukhi of Verval (Ellora)	500
Inām village of Manoli, near Wai	1,000
' Mahojunky ' (i.e. Mahājanki) and ' Koteky ' (i.e. Khōtki) of the family village in Bankot	200
	13,700

Besides this income, Nānā's widow managed the revenues of the religious establishment of the Bele Bāgh at Poona. (*J.B.B.R.A.S.*, xxii. 66. The article on ' Lieut.-Colonel J. B. Jervis (1796-1857) and his MS. Studies,' is by R. P. Karkaria.)]

brother Dhondeba and Narrain Rao Bukhshee, confined at the same time, were both condemned to suffer; the former, in a manner comparatively humane, was blown from a cannon; but the latter was barbarously destroyed, by being tied round with rockets, which being fired, carried him along, mangling his body dreadfully—the invention and sport of the execrable Ghatgay.

One of the ruling passions of the Peishwa was implacable revenge; and he having connived at the destruction of the Shenwee Bramins, Sindia in return agreed to assist him in the ruin of the friends and adherents of Nana, and the family of the late Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun. To accomplish the former object, the Peishwa, pretending to renounce the objection to the adoption of a son by the widow of Nana, indirectly encouraged the proceeding; and at last, in order to ensnare Nana's friends, invited them to a meeting at his palace for the express purpose of deliberating on the subject. When assembled, he suddenly accused them of treasonable practices, of plotting against him, and of intending to place the adopted son of Nana's widow on the musnud. He concluded by seizing and sending them off prisoners to hill-forts. In regard to the latter object of crushing the Putwurdhun family, Sindia the more readily acquiesced in it, as he had long wished to possess himself of their extensive and fertile Jagheer. It was this plot which prevented the capture of Kolapoor; as Appa Sahib, having received timely intelligence of their plan, quitted the siege, and with his own followers, accompanied by Dhondoo Punt Gokla, retired into the Carnatic. The Raja of Kolapoor, through the influence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, to whom he was reconciled, became the immediate ally of Sindia, whose battalions, under the orders of Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur, the Dessaye of Nepanee, proceeded to attack the Jagheer of the late Pureshram Bhow; Major Brownrigg, with the battalions, was soon recalled: but Seedojee Rao, at the head of a body of horse, plundered and devastated the country from Merich to Beejapoor.

Disorders were everywhere prevalent. Dhoondia Waug, whom we have already mentioned as having entered the service of the Raja of Kolapoor, separated from him, returned into the Carnatic, and plundered in the Company's lately acquired districts; taking advantage also of the absence of Gokla's troops, he laid the Peishwa's districts in the Carnatic under contribution, and committed great ravages. The British Government made appli-

cation to the Peishwa, and obtained permission to pursue and destroy the marauder ; but in the meantime, on the return of Dhondoo Punt Gokla to the Carnatic, Dhoondia Waug, who burned with revenge, vowed with singular ferocity to sacrifice his life, or dye his mustachios in the heart's-blood of Dhondoo Punt. On hearing therefore of his approach, he laid an ambush in a wood, and watching an opportunity, when Dhondoo Punt was separated from the main body of his followers, attacked and killed him, when he literally fulfilled his vow. Several persons fell with Dhondoo Punt ; among whom was his elder nephew : his younger nephew, Bappoo Gokla, whom we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to mention, lost an eye ; Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun¹ was also wounded, and the whole of their party were driven to seek refuge at Hullyhal,² where they were kindly welcomed and protected by a British detachment then in that garrison.³

The British troops sent in pursuit of Dhoondia Waug were under the command of Major-General the Honourable Arthur Wellesley, who, on entering the Carnatic, was joined by Gunput Rao Phansay, Bappoo Gokla, and the Putwurdhuns. These Mahratta auxiliaries were of little service ; but the British detachment, after a persevering pursuit, had at last the satisfaction of

10th Sep. coming up with Dhoondia at the village of Kondagul.

His party, consisting of about 5,000 horse, was immediately attacked, routed, and dispersed. Dhoondia exerted himself

¹ [Chintāman Rāo Patvardhan (Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun) was the only one of the Pēshwā's feudatories who, after the defeat of Bājī Rāo and the annexation of his territories, refused to serve the British Government or to accept the liberal terms offered to the great *Jāgirdārs*. He was soon brought to his senses by Mountstuart Elphinstone, and had to submit to the common destiny of these feudal potentates. His character is summed up, in the dispatch dealing with these matters, in the following words : ' Though otherwise rather respectable and well-intentioned, he has a narrow and crooked understanding, a litigious spirit, and a capricious temper.' One of his claims at the time of the settlement was the right to wage private war with his relations. (Colebrooke, *Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone* (1884), ii. 59, 60.)]

² [Haliyāl (Hullyhal) is now the headquarters of the Supasub-division, Kanara District, twenty-five miles north of Yellapur. The town was taken by the English in 1799. It is mentioned in several of Wellesley's dispatches as an important frontier station and source of supplies. Two of his dispatches, Nos. 218, 219 of October 1, 1799, are dated from Haliyāl. (*B.G.*, xv, pt. ii. 304.)]

³ Mahratta MSS.

with spirit, at the head of such men as stood by him, until he was cut down in a charge by the 19th Dragoons.

Sindia was much dissatisfied at the permission granted to the British Government of sending troops into the Mahratta territory. His control over the Peishwa was now complete, and fearing that Bajee Rao intended to fly, he for some time kept a guard over his palace. The Peishwa found that his condition was by no means improved by the death of Nana Furnuwees, and from the situation in which he was so long placed, we cannot be surprised that his natural disposition to intrigue should have become incurably habitual. He had much confidence, even at this period, in his own wisdom for extricating himself from the thralldom of Sindia. To that chieftain, even when experiencing indignity from him, Bajee Rao was profuse in his acknowledgements, and pretended to entertain for him the most unbounded gratitude and affection. When it appeared probable that Sindia would be compelled to retire to Hindoostan for the protection of his dominions, the Peishwa entreated his stay, and even threw obstacles in the way of his departure; but he saw with secret joy the increasing predatory power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as affording a prospect by which he hoped to be enabled to establish his own authority, without the interposition of a foreign power. He was, however, conscious of his own unpopularity as a son of Rugoba; he was anxious to keep well with the British Government, and really had a partiality for the English, though he rather chose to depend on Sindia than to adopt, by calling in their aid, a course which he could not retrace. The establishment of an English subsidiary force was, it is true, in many respects consonant to his disposition: protection and support against his own subjects, could such have been obtained unfettered by control, being the end at which he aimed; and, if the proposal had been met in the first instance, or afterwards allowed to come from himself, he would have had recourse to that plan at an earlier period. But the haste with which the Marquis Wellesley expected his agents to push on his system, evinced an anxiety which retarded his object at Poona, where the Resident prognosticated that it would never be accomplished until Bajee Rao had found that all his own schemes were fallacious.

Sindia's affairs in Malwa at length became in the highest degree critical. Jeswunt Rao Holkar's energy and success threatened the entire subjugation of that province, a great part of which

he had already pillaged and laid waste. The rise of this predatory chieftain was singularly rapid. After his escape from Nagpoor, he fled to Dhar, where he was kindly received by Anund Rao Powar: but as soon as Sindia heard of his retreat, Anund Rao being unable to shelter him from the power of that chief, he furnished him with a few horses and a little money; with which slender commencement, by enterprise and pillage he soon collected a band of marauders, and united to his fortunes Umeer Khan,¹ a Patan adventurer at the head of a well-mounted body of his countrymen, who, by his abilities and predatory habits, was a fit auxiliary for the schemes which Holkar meditated.

Khassee Rao Holkar, according to the first declaration of the party who opposed him, was set aside from incapacity. Jeswunt Rao being illegitimate gave himself out as the subordinate agent of his nephew Khundee Rao, in custody at Poona, and invited all adherents of the house of Holkar to unite with him in upholding the name and rescuing the territories and family from the power of Doulut Rao Sindia. Proceeding to the banks of the Nerbuddah he levied contributions and plundered Sindia's villages. A detachment of Khassee Rao's regular infantry, sent against him by the Chevalier Dudrenec, was defeated, which greatly raised Jeswunt Rao's reputation, and brought on a negotiation which ended in Dudrenec's joining him with his battalions and guns, and in Jeswunt Rao's being recognized and obeyed as the representative of his nephew, which shortly after enabled him to commence regular payments to his troops. But the predatory system being the mode of warfare he followed, the work of pillage and destruction went forward, and Sindia's territory in Malwa was half ruined, before he had taken any steps to stop the formidable progress of Jeswunt Rao.²

The cause of this military imbecility on the part of Sindia was

¹ [Amīr Khān (Umeer Khan) was the famous leader of banditti who on the annihilation of the Pindārīs in 1817, during the Governor-Generalship of Lord Hastings, was granted the principality of Tonk in return for surrendering his artillery to the British Government and disbanding his followers, who for several years had been the scourge of Mālwa and Rājputāna. He has been justly described as 'one of the most atrocious villains that India ever produced.' He opposed Lord Lake at Bharatpur in 1805. His name occurs in Sir A. Lyall's poem, 'The Old Pindaree,' in *Verses Written in India*, 1889 (Sleman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith (1915), p. 130 n.)]

² Sir John Malcolm.

the state of parties at his Durbar. To impede Holkar's career, threats and conciliation were successively resorted to by Doulut Rao's ministers, and Jeswunt Rao, on promise of being supported by Sindia against Khassee Rao, agreed to seize the Byes, to whom he had before proffered friendship. He accordingly attacked their troops, forced the ladies into Burhanpoor, where he besieged them, but they were so fortunate as to escape towards Meywar through the aid of Juggoo Bappoo, the colleague of Lukwa Dada. Sindia supposed that, in permitting them to get off, Holkar had acted with double treachery, so that, whether the supposition was well or ill-founded, this action was deservedly of no advantage to Jeswunt Rao. Sindia now became convinced that his presence was absolutely necessary to the northward, and in the end of November quitted the Peishwa's territory, where he left five battalions of regular infantry and 10,000 horse under Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having, before he set out, exacted from the Peishwa bills to the amount of forty-seven lacks of rupees.¹

A.D. 1801.—Sindia's progress was tardy, and Jeswunt Rao continued to plunder and levy contributions throughout Malwa. Hearing of Sindia's great army, Holkar called in his detachments and concentrated his force in the neighbourhood of Oojein, with an intention of plundering it. During this period there was a pause in their hostilities, and Sindia, in hopes of ensuring the protection of his capital, detached for that purpose four battalions from his own camp at Burhanpoor under Colonel John Hessing. Two battalions and six companies, under Captain M'Intyre, were ordered on to support Hessing; but Holkar, who saw that it was impossible to avoid extremities and of the highest importance to strike a successful blow at the outset, first made a show of opposing Hessing and drew him under the walls of Oojein, where, leaving some troops to amuse him, he pushed on to cut off the detachment under M'Intyre, in which he succeeded, having compelled them to lay down their arms at Newree. With his troops thus (**June.**) encouraged, he returned to the more arduous attack of Hessing, and a most obstinate contest was maintained by that officer, until his men were completely overpowered. Of eleven European officers in Hessing's four battalions, most of whom

¹ Twenty-five by bills on Poona bankers; ten by a bill on the Gaekwar, and twelve by an assignment on Bundelcund. Mahratta MS. Colonel Palmer's dispatches.

were British, seven were killed and three were made prisoners. Hessing alone escaped, and four-fifths of his corps are said to have been killed and wounded.¹

Having exacted a very heavy contribution from Oojein, Holkar next proceeded to attack Sindia's grand park of artillery, which had passed the Nerbuddah, and under the protection of (July.) the four battalions of Major Brownrigg,² and a body of horse, was awaiting the junction of the army from Burhanpoor. Brownrigg, on hearing of Holkar's approach, chose a very strong position, which he defended with such judgement and intrepidity, that Holkar's utmost efforts were unavailing.³

This defence, as it checked Holkar's career, was of the greatest importance to Sindia, who had all this time remained inactive at Burhanpoor; but he now used every exertion to get his army sent across the Nerbuddah, in which he was much assisted by Rughoojee Bhonslay.⁴

Events were in the meantime occurring at Poona which require notice, as some of them were a good deal influenced by news from the northward. Bajee Rao, on Sindia's departure, instead of endeavouring to conciliate parties, evinced a malignant spirit of revenge towards all the great families whom he suspected of ever having been the political opponents of himself or his father. To distress and pillage all such of them as fell into his power, was, from first to last, a favourite object of his policy. The respectable family of Rastia was among the earliest who experienced his malevolence. Mahdoo Rao Rastia was invited on a friendly visit to the Peishwa's palace, seized, and hurried off as a prisoner to

¹ Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

² [Brownrigg was an Irishman, who raised an independent corps for Daulat Rāo Sindia and stormed Kolhāpur in 1799. In 1800 he was operating against Parasurām Bhau. Three months after his successful defence against Jasvant Rāo Holkar, near the Nerbādā, he assisted Sutherland to win the battle of Indore. Perron, becoming jealous of him, brought about his disgrace in 1802, on a charge of intriguing against him. After the fall of Agra he entered the British service, and was in command of irregular levies operating against Jasvant Rāo. He was killed in action before Sirsa, Hariāna District, on February 19, 1804. He is described as 'an amiable man and a fine soldier.' (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 343-4.)]

³ In this action, Dewajee Gokla, an officer of rank, Lieut. Rowbotham, and three hundred men were killed, on the part of Sindia; Holkar's loss was three times that number.

⁴ Ferdinand Lewis Smith; Bombay Records, and Sir John Malcolm.

Raigurh. The unpopularity of this deed was proportionate to its treachery and injustice; many instances, though of a less conspicuous nature, occurred; the minds of his subjects were alienated, and distrust and disaffection towards Bajee Rao's power and government became almost universal. Anarchy was spreading in the country. Bodies of insurgent horse were plundering in various directions. One party under Bal Kishen Gungadhur was defeated by Gunput Rao Phansay; and Wittoojee Holkar, the brother of Jeswunt Rao, who was concerned with him and taken prisoner, was barbarously and ignominiously executed at Poona. That the Peishwa had a right to inflict (April 1.) the punishment of death, on subjects so taken in arms, cannot be doubted, but insurrection and plundering are not rigidly viewed among Mahrattas, and in public opinion a more lenient sentence than loss of life ought to have been passed upon the son of Tookajee Holkar; that circumstance, however, operated differently on the mind of the Peishwa, who could not forget that he was the son of the friend of Nana Furnuwees. Having seated himself with his favourite, Ballajee Koonjur, at a window which overlooked the exterior court of his palace, Wittoojee Holkar was brought before the Peishwa and there tied to the foot of an elephant; in vain did he offer up the humblest supplications for life and mercy; the execution went forward; Bajee Rao sat a composed spectator and heard the yells of the unhappy malefactor as the animal dragged him forth from the palace yard to a lingering death, as in his case it happened to be, in the public street.¹

Bajee Rao by this cruel proceeding at once glutted his revenge, and performed an acceptable piece of courtesy to Sindia; but Jeswunt Rao, who loved his brother, vowed vengeance on those whom he considered his murderers; and his threats, being soon followed by news of his success against Hessing, communicated an alarm to the conscious and cowardly mind of the Peishwa, which towards Holkar he could never afterwards conquer. He now, however, opened a negotiation with him, offering to recognize him as the heir of Tookajee Holkar, on condition of his giving up the territories of the family in the Deccan, estimated at twenty-five lacks of rupees of annual revenue. He was also encouraged,

¹ Mahratta MSS. Oral information; and Palmer's dispatches.

by the prospect of Sindia's being long occupied in the north, to devise means of ridding his country of the presence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, who only increased the trouble and disorders, to prevent which was the pretext for his being left in the Deccan. After plundering to the southward, he repaired to Poona with a small party, where he became importunate in his demands for money, sat in *dhurna* on the favourite Ballajee Koonjur, and insulted the whole of the Peishwa's court. At last Koonjur, on pretence of giving him some orders on bankers, invited him to his house, received him graciously, and shortly after got up as if to bring the bills agreed upon. His quitting the room was to be, in reality, the signal for seizing or murdering Ghatgay, but the latter guessing his intention, instantly grasped his throat with one hand, drew his sword with the other, and in this manner dragged him to the street, where springing on his horse he galloped off to join his party, pursued his route to his army, brought the whole to Poona, and encamped within a mile of the city, which he threatened to plunder and burn. Messages full of conciliatory explanation were sent by Bajee Rao, but the mediation of the British Resident became necessary to prevent extremities. The accounts, however, of Sindia's reverses in Malwa, and his express desire that Shirzee Rao should join him immediately to assume command of the army against Holkar, effectually rid the Peishwa of this turbulent and audacious man.

Having joined the army after it had crossed the Nerbuddah, Shirzee Rao was sent forward with ten thousand horse and fourteen battalions under Colonel Sutherland,¹ to avenge the plunder of Oojein by retaliating on Indore, the capital of Holkar. Jeswunt

¹ [Robert Sutherland, a Scotchman, was originally an officer in the 73rd Regiment, from which he was cashiered. In 1790 he entered De Boigne's 1st brigade, and four years later obtained command of the 3rd brigade, being transferred to the 2nd on the death of Colonel Frémont in 1795. In 1796 he reduced some revolted districts in Bundélkhand, then served against Lakwa Dādā at Chitūrgarh, and in 1801 defeated Jasvant Rāo Holkar at Indore. In 1802, in consequence of Perron's action, he was disgraced and transferred to the 2nd brigade, and consequently resigned the service in disgust. He remained in Agra until war broke out with the English, and was associated with George Hessing in arranging the terms of capitulation of that city in 1803. Sutherland, who was a son-in-law of John Hessing and nephew by marriage to Perron, received a pension from the British on his retirement from Sindia's service, and died some years later at Mathurā, (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 410-16.)]

Rao advanced to its protection with some regular battalions, but without European officers, five thousand irregular infantry and about 25,000 horse. Skirmishes of some days' duration (Oct. 14.) terminated in a well concerted but ill-executed attack on the part of Holkar, and a signal defeat was the consequence. He lost ninety-eight pieces of cannon, and his capital was completely plundered. The remorseless Ghatgay had here a full opportunity of indulging his disposition to violence, which he fully gratified in dreadful acts of wanton and barbarous cruelty.

Had Sindia followed up the blow, the power of Jeswunt Rao was by this victory annihilated; but supposing him to be completely humbled, and being advised to recognize him as guardian to the head of the Holkar family, Sindia made proposals to that effect, and even sent Khassee Rao from his camp, who was thus compelled to seek an asylum in that of his half-brother. But Jeswunt Rao, whether suspicious of Sindia, encouraged by the Peishwa, or led on by an enterprising confidence in his own fortune, was immoderate in his demands; and although become, since his defeat, dependent entirely on plunder, his adventurous spirit was attractive to the soldiery, amongst whom he had a very high reputation, and many of Sindia's troops deserted him, even at this stage of his career.

A.D. 1802.—But Dudrenec, conceiving it prudent to withdraw from a falling cause, listened to overtures from Sindia, which his battalions, more faithful than their commander, having discovered, went off in a body and joined Jeswunt Rao at Jowud. Holkar now adopted a new plan, and determined on carrying the war into the Deccan. With this view Futih Sing Manay was detached with a body of horse to ravage the Peishwa's districts; the regular infantry took up a position at Mohesir, whilst Jeswunt Rao in person, in order to veil his intentions, went off to the northward with the remainder of his followers, to plunder in Malwa and Rajpootana, in hopes of drawing Sindia's forces after him and thus facilitating his future design. He acquired very considerable booty, but Sindia did not pursue him as he expected, a detachment only having been sent after him. Holkar might therefore have been induced to reap a larger harvest in pillage, but, the Peishwa having seized his districts in Candeish, he was hurried into the Deccan for their recovery. Previous, however, to his arrival, an advanced body of his troops attacked the Peishwa's general,

Dhondoo Punt Ghorebulay, defeated him, and retook the districts.

As soon as Jeswunt Rao was joined by his infantry from Mohesir, he assailed Sindia's possessions in Candeish, which he plundered and devastated without mercy, declaring at the same time that he was about to proceed to Poona, to claim the interference of the Peishwa in protecting him, as the agent of the head of the Holkar family, against the tyrannical usurpation of Doulut Rao.

Notwithstanding this appeal to the Peishwa, Futih Sing Manay showed no respect to his territory, but swept the villages on the banks of the Godavery by contribution and plunder; whilst Shah Ahmed Khan, another officer detached by Jeswunt Rao, carried his ravages still nearer the Peishwa's capital, and being opposed by Nursing Khundee Rao, the Jagheerdar of Vinchoor, at the head of fifteen hundred horse, the latter were cut off almost to a man.

The consternation at Poona was great in consequence, and Bajee Rao renewed his negotiations with the British Government, desiring the aid of a force, but objecting to its being stationed within his own territory; neither would he consent to the articles of the treaty of Mhar, nor the arbitration of the British Government in the Mahratta claims on Nizam Ally.

Sindia, supported by Rughoojee Bhonslay, exerted his utmost influence to obstruct the conclusion of any arrangement with the British Government, with which he was himself negotiating, not with any intention of becoming a party to the defensive alliance, against which both the Raja of Berar and Sindia always maintained a strenuous opposition, but merely to gain a certain degree of consequence, which the presence of the British envoy in his camp was at that time likely to create in the mind of the Peishwa.

It is difficult to account for the inactivity of Sindia in the prosecution of the war against Holkar. Doulut Rao became about this period suspicious of Perron, but the death of Lukwa Dada, and a final arrangement concluded with the Byes by Ambajee Ingliā,¹ one of Sindia's principal officers, left him nothing to

¹ [Broughton met Ambājī Ingliā in February 1809, and described him then as 'a tall, hale-looking man for his age, which is said to be upwards of eighty; his complexion is dark; and there is much good humour and intelligence in his countenance. His dress was remarkably plain, almost amounting to meanness; consisting of a common

apprehend in Hindoostan, which should have prevented his following up Holkar. After much delay he at last ordered Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to march against Jeswunt Rao with a large body of cavalry and ten battalions of infantry under Captain Dawes.¹ This force forded the Nerbuddah without impediment; but on their arrival at Burhanpoor the troops refused to advance without payment of all their arrears, and before these could be settled, the Taptee was so swollen that they could not cross. Jeswunt Rao at first moved as if to give them battle on the southern bank; but if such was his intention, he soon abandoned it and again moved towards Poona. The Peishwa tried by every means to prevent his advance, desired him to state his demands, and promised to arbitrate all differences if he would remain to the northward of the Godavery. 'My brother Wittoojee,' replied Jeswunt Rao, 'is dead—he cannot be restored to me; but let Khundee Rao, my nephew, be released, and let the family possessions be given up.' To these conditions Bajee Rao appeared to assent, and assured Holkar he had sent an order for the release of Khundee Rao; but instead of which, he begged of Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to take advantage of the negotiation and advance with all speed, while Khundee Rao was thrown into prison in the fort of Asseergurh.

Shortly afterwards, a body of the Peishwa's troops under Pandoojee Koonjur attempted to oppose Futih Sing Manay at Gardoon, but were defeated with loss; Manay followed up his victory by attacking the Peishwa's camp at Baramuttee,² where he routed Nana Poorundhuree and Gunput Rao Phansay, taking the whole of the artillery. The southern Jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, who had evinced considerable discontent towards the Peishwa since the treacherous seizure of Rastia,

chintz jacket, quilted with cotton, a coarse red shawl, and a white turban.' (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, p. 51.) Ambāji died on May 5, 1809.]

¹ [Dawes was in Perron's 1st brigade under Sutherland. In 1802 he was detached to pursue Holkar after his defeat at Indore and carried on a desultory campaign in Khāndesh. When Holkar advanced against Poona, Dawes was sent to oppose him with an inadequate army, and was defeated and slain in the battle which followed. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 344-5.)]

² [Bārāmāti (Baramuttee), now included in the Bhimthadi *tāluka*, Poona District, lies fifty miles south-east of Poona City. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii. 105.)]

might have prevented or avenged this loss, but except Chintāman Rao none of the Putwurdhuns joined the Peishwa's standard at this period, and that chief took the first opportunity of quitting it.¹

Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur at the head of Sindia's forces, having passed Holkar's army, advanced by Jaulna and Bheer² towards Poona, and having formed a junction with the Peishwa's troops, the united armies prepared to oppose Holkar at the Ally Beylah pass, on which he was marching; but Holkar, aware of the strength of their position, made a circuit to the eastward, passed Ahmednugur, proceeded towards Jejoory, formed a junction with Futih Sing Manay,³ descended the Rajwaree pass, and on the 23d October encamped in the neighbourhood of Poona, between Lonee⁴ and Harupseer.

(Oct.
23.)

The opposing army had returned from Ally Beylah about eight days before, and occupied a position nearer the city, and in the vicinity of the present cantonment of the British troops. Two days were spent in negotiation. The Peishwa demanded Holkar's reason for thus advancing in a hostile manner to his capital, and ordered him to retire. The latter professed his readiness to obey every order from the Peishwa when he was not under the control of Sindia, but that Sindia had disobeyed the Peishwa's orders,

¹ [The Resident at Poona reported to the Bombay Government on October 18, 1802, that Holkar was likely to be joined by the Rāstē and Bhāu (Patvardhan) families, 'who have long been on enmity with the Pēshwā, and are now in some strength.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 549.)]

² [Jalna (Jaulna) lies on the Kundlika river in Aurangābād District, Hyderābād State. Abul Fazl, Akbar's minister, once resided here. Since 1903 the cantonment, formerly occupied by the Hyderābād contingent, has been abandoned. The fort built in 1725 is in ruins. (*I.G.* (1907), xiv. 29.)]

Bhīr (Bheer) is the headquarters of the *tāluka* of the same name in Hyderābād State. Possessed originally by the Chālukyās and then by the Yādavas, it was taken by Muhammad bin Tughlak and became the headquarters of one of his Deccan provinces. (*I.G.* (1907), viii. 112, 113, 117.)]

³ [The point of junction was described by the Resident at Poona as 'about 15 *kos* (i.e. thirty miles) from hence (i.e. Poona) near to the Hyderābād road.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 549.)]

⁴ [There are two villages named Lonī in Poona District, one known as Lonī Kalbhār, ten miles south-east of Poona, which is now a station on the G.I.P. Railway, and the other Lonī Kand, which is on the Poona-Ahmadnagar road, about ten miles north-east of Poona. It is to the latter that the author refers. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii.)]

had rendered the confinement of Khundee Rao doubly severe, and had sent his army to prevent that mediation which the Peishwa had promised ; that Sindia therefore was the real rebel, and he would soon oblige him to submit to the sovereign authority of the Peishwa.

(Oct. 25.)—The armies drew out for battle on the morning of the 25th October. Holkar had fourteen battalions ; six under Colonel Vickers,¹ four under Major Harding,² and four under Major Armstrong³: 5,000 irregular infantry, and 25,000 horse. Although Sindia's infantry was in every respect much inferior to that of Holkar, Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur did not decline the contest, to which he was strongly urged by Captain Dawes. His cavalry and irregular infantry, including those belonging to the Peishwa, were, in point of numbers at least, equal to those of Holkar. The action began at half-past nine o'clock by a brisk cannonade, which continued with little interruption for two hours and a half. A body of Holkar's Patan cavalry made a successful charge on the horse of the Jagheerदार of Vinchoor, but Futih Sing Manay, in a like attempt on the Peishwa's Hoojrat Pagah (or horse on the personal establishment), was repulsed with very

¹ [Vickers was a half-caste, who entered Perron's 2nd brigade as lieutenant under Major Pohlman, and displayed great bravery at the siege of Jhājgarh. When Dudreneo deserted from Holkar's service, Vickers succeeded him and fought gallantly at the battle of Poona in October 1802. In 1804 when war broke out between Holkar and the British, the chief sent for Vickers and asked him if he would fight against his countrymen. He and two others, Dodd and Ryan, refused positively to do so, whereupon Jasvant Rāo Holkar had them all three beheaded at Nahar Maghāna (Tiger's Hill) in May 1804. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., p. 419.)]

² [Harding was a gallant Englishman, who raised four battalions for Jasvant Rāo. He was killed at the battle of Poona, while charging Dawes's guns side by side with Holkar. His dying request to Holkar, who was himself wounded in three places, was that he might be buried by the side of his fellow-countrymen in the cemetery of the British Residency at Poona. The request was scrupulously carried out. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., p. 362.)]

³ [Armstrong succeeded Plumet in command of Holkar's 2nd brigade of infantry in 1802, and distinguished himself at the battle of Poona. When war broke out with the English in 1803, Armstrong decided to quit Holkar's service and did so after great difficulty, at the risk of his life and with the loss of his arrears and effects. He lived to enjoy a pension of Rs. 1,200 a month paid by the British Government as compensation for loss of employ. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., p. 338.)]

considerable loss. Sindia's cavalry followed up the advantage, and those of Holkar were on the point of discomfiture, when Holkar himself, who had taken his station in the rear, sprang on his horse, and calling to those near him 'now or never to follow Jeswunt Rao' rallied the fugitives, and collected a compact body of his best horse, with which he met and repulsed those of Sindia.

In the meantime, six of Sindia's battalions, which were without European officers and opposed to those of Holkar under Vickers, had given way. The remaining four, however, being of the old battalions of De Boigne, though with only four European officers to head them, behaved with great intrepidity. They stood their ground with remarkable firmness and discipline; but Holkar, having driven off the cavalry, charged the infantry, cut down the artillerymen at their guns, killed three of the European officers of the battalions, and took the fourth prisoner: still these battalions fought on, till they were completely overpowered by the persevering and desperate efforts of Holkar, who headed his cavalry in charge after charge and at length bore all before him. A complete victory was the reward of the uncommon energy displayed by Jeswunt Rao on this memorable occasion. The whole of Sindia's guns, baggage, and stores, fell into his hands, and the army of his rival was driven off the field.¹ Holkar's troops were ordered to fall back and not to enter the town, but many of them showing no inclination to obey, he compelled them to desist by turning his own guns upon them.

The Peishwa, not doubting of success, had quitted his palace, with an idea of joining in the action; but the noise of the firing frightened him, and he turned off to the southward of the town, to await the result. On ascertaining the fate of the battle, he fled with about seven thousand followers to the fort of Singurh, and dispatched to Colonel Close, the British Resident, a preliminary engagement, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of Sepoys and to cede twenty-five lacks of rupees of annual revenue for their support. In the course of the previous negotiation he had conceded

¹ ['Sadāshiv Bhāu Bhāskar' (Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur), wrote the Resident at Poona on October 26, 1802, 'is supposed to have escaped with a part of his horse, but what direction he has taken is not known. Bālājī Kūnjar, Nimbājī Bhāskar, Sindia's Vakīl, and a few other Sardārs who were in the action, have joined the Pēshwā.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 550.)]

that point which regarded their being stationed within his own dominions.

Towards the close of the action, the cavalry of the contending armies were very near the British Residency. Colonel Close had taken the precaution of hoisting the British flag in the most conspicuous parts about the Sungum, which had the effect of ensuring the respect of both parties.

Holkar sent an invitation to the Resident to come and see him on the following day, which Colonel Close did not think it prudent to decline. He found the conqueror in a small tent, ankle deep in mud, wounded by a spear, and with a sabre-cut in the head, which last he received from an artillery-man in one of the charges. In his conversation he was polite and frank, spoke lightly of his wounds, and expressed himself in the most friendly manner towards the Resident and the British Government. He seemed extremely desirous of obtaining the mediation of the Resident in settling with Sindia and the Peishwa, and solicited Colonel Close, whom he detained about a month at Poona, to arbitrate in the existing differences.

For a short time after his victory Holkar assumed an appearance of great moderation ; he placed guards for the protection of the city, treated all the dependants of the Peishwa with kindness, and used many vain endeavours to induce him to return to his palace. Bajee Rao remained for three days at Singurh, and then hastily retired to Raigurh, where he released Mahdoo Rao Rastia, till then confined in that fortress, restored his Jagheer, and gave him a commission to raise men for his service.

Quitting Raigurh the Peishwa proceeded to Mhar, whence he dispatched letters to the Bombay Government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that island.¹ Before a reply was sent to that communication, Khundee Rao Rastia, the Sur-Soobehdar of Bassein, had joined Bajee Rao at Mhar ; but on hearing of the approach of Holkar's troops, who

¹ [The Pēshwā asked for 'large armed vessels, well equipped with warlike stores, &c., together with an English gentleman of a courteous disposition, courageous in his nature, and who will act conformably to my pleasure.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 551-2.) The policy adopted towards the Pēshwā by the Bombay Government at this juncture was based upon advice given by Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, Private Secretary to the Marquess Wellesley. (Forrest, *ibid.*, 553-7.)]

were sent in pursuit of him, the Peishwa repaired to Severndroog, where he resided for some time under protection of that fort, until again alarmed by accounts of Umeer Khan's being in the neighbourhood, he crossed over to Rewadunda, and thence embarking in an English ship, provided for his reception, he proceeded, accompanied by Khundee Rao Rastia, to Bassein, where he landed 6th December.

Previous to entering on the events at Poona, and the articles of provision of the treaty of Bassein, or its important consequences, it is necessary to explain the state of affairs in Guzerat, and the immediate causes which led to the connexion, still subsisting, between the Gaekwar and the English; leaving their definitive treaty of 1805, and all subsequent settlements, to be explained in their natural order.

CHAPTER XLII.

FROM A.D. 1793 TO A.D. 1803.

(A.D. 1793.)—THE reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar assumed charge of the Baroda government in December 1793, and also that Aba Shelookur, the deputy-governor of the Peishwa's share of Guzerat, was one of the principal persons who accompanied Nana Furnuwees to Sindia's camp, the day on which that minister was treacherously seized by Michael Filoze.

(A.D. 1798.) Aba Shelookur gave Doulut Rao Sindia a bond for ten lacks of rupees as the price of his liberty, and for permission to return to Guzerat, where on his arrival he immediately assumed charge of the government at Ahmedabad. Being one of the partisans of Nana, Govind Rao Gaekwar was secretly incited against him by Bajee Rao, and Shelookur, being pressed for the payment of his ransom, levied more than his own proportion of revenue, and exacted money from some of Gaekwar's villages. Hostilities soon followed, and for a time Aba Shelookur was successful in the war of plunder and extortion which he pursued against the subjects of Govind Rao.

(A.D. 1799.)—In 1799 the Nabob of Surat died, and the year following, during the prevalence of the disturbances to which we have now alluded, Mr. Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, proceeded to Surat, commissioned by the Governor-General to assume charge of the government of that city, granting to the Nabob's brother, who was the heir apparent to the naib-ship, an annual pension, on condition of his resigning all pretensions to the exercise of authority.¹ Mr. Duncan was at the same time directed

¹ [Up to May 14, 1800, political affairs in Surat had been in charge of an officer styled 'Chief for the affairs of the British nation, and Governor of the Mughal Castle and Fleet of Surat,' and subsequently of a lieutenant-governor. The last of these was Mr. Daniel Seton, whose monument is in the Cathedral at Bombay. By the proclama-

to endeavour to obtain the Gaekwar's share of the Chouth of Surat without reference to the negotiations with the Peishwa for his portion of it. Two wukeels having been sent by Govind Rao to congratulate Mr. Duncan on his arrival, the latter conceived the opportunity favourable for making the application in question, to which he added a request that Chourassy, the district immediately surrounding Surat, might be added to the grant. Govind Rao readily promised to bestow both the one and the other on the East India Company, without requiring any condition on their part, merely observing that it was incumbent on the Company to obtain the Peishwa's sanction to the measure, which, had the Peishwa been able to maintain his authority independent of the English, would have been tantamount to a refusal; both because the Poona court was particularly anxious to perpetuate the Mahratta claims on Surat, owing to an extravagant idea of its consequence which they derived from the Moghuls; and because, in regard to the cession of Chourassy, the same objections urged by the British Government, and admitted by Nana Furnuwees at the time of Govind Rao's accession, were precisely applicable on this occasion.¹ The reason of Govind Rao's

tion of Jonathan Duncan, dated May 15, 1800, Surat District was placed under a Collector and a Judge and Magistrate, one of whom, generally the Judge, was also in political charge of the titular Nawāb and the small chiefs in the neighbourhood as Agent to the Governor of Bombay. These arrangements placed the English in possession of Surat and Rānder. Subsequent cessions under the treaties of Bassein (1802) and Poona (1817), together with the lapse of the Māndvi State in 1839, brought the District into its present shape. The title of Nawāb became extinct in 1842. Surat and Rānder are the two chief towns of the modern Chorāsi (Chourassy) *tāluka*. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 332.)]

¹ On this transaction of the Governor of Bombay, the Court of Directors make the following observation:—'How desirable soever it might have been to obtain a territory contiguous to Surat, in consequence of the late arrangement with the Nabob of that city, it ought not to have been accepted at the risk of incurring the imputation of a breach of faith, and the consequent resentment of the Peishwa, with whom we were reciprocally bound to preserve the integrity of the Brodera principality, and with whom our interference has, at a former period, been successful in preventing the execution of a similar design on his part. We have, however, the satisfaction to observe by the 14th article of the treaty of Bassein, that the Peishwa has formally recognized the treaty with the Raja Anund Rao Gaekwar, otherwise we should have thought it incumbent on us to desire that the before-mentioned cessions be restored to the Gaekwar government.'

extreme complaisance was soon apparent, by his making an application for aid against Shelookur, which was evaded; but shortly afterwards Ahmedabad was taken, Shelookur was made prisoner, and the Peishwa granted his share of the revenue of Guzerat, in farm to the Baroda government, for a period of five years at five lacks of rupees annually. This agreement was concluded in October, 1800; but the death of Govind Rao, which happened during the preceding month, occasioned fresh disturbances in the province.

Govind Rao Gaekwar left a large family; four legitimate and seven illegitimate sons, besides daughters. His eldest son Anund Rao was acknowledged by the principal officers as successor; but being a prince of weak intellect, different parties attempted to take the lead in the administration. Kanhojee Rao, the eldest illegitimate son of Govind Rao, a bold ambitious young man, was, in consequence of his turbulent behaviour, placed in confinement previous to his father's death, but having afterwards contrived to effect his release by professions of attachment to his brother, and his influence with some of the soldiery, he soon usurped not only

(A.D. 1801.) the office of minister, but the entire powers of the state, and continued to rule for some months. At the end of that time, he was deposed by a party headed by Rowjee

Appajee, a Purvoe, who had been the principal minister of the late Govind Rao; and both these persons, Rowjee the minister in power and Kanhojee the deposed authority, made offers to the Bombay Government, in order to engage its support. Rowjee promised to confirm the cessions of the late Govind Rao, and Kanhojee offered to add the district of Chickly to the grant. Rowjee was supported by his brother Babajee, who commanded the cavalry of the state, and by the greater part of a large body of Arab mercenaries, who composed the garrison of the town. The Arabs, whose numbers amounted to about seven thousand, though in some respects bound by unity of interests, were with their chiefs divided among themselves into parties under the influence of two Soucars or Bankers,¹ the one named Mungul Parikh, the other Samul Becher, both men of great wealth acquired by exorbitant

¹ The soldiery in the service of native states in India, owing to the irregular manner in which they are paid, have generally a shroff, or money changer, the agent of some soucar, attached to each division, who advances them money at a high interest, and recovers it as he best can.

interest on loans, and who were the means by which the needy government of the Gaekwar was at once supplied and impoverished. Both these persons had acceded to the deposition of Kanhojee, so that Rowjee's party was the strongest at Baroda ; but the cause of Kanhojee was espoused by Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, the first cousin of the late Govind Rao and son and successor to Khundee Rao, the Jagheerदार of Kurree, a man of considerable talent and enterprise. On promise of a remission of arrears and exemption from future tribute on the part of Kanhojee, Mulhar Rao, although he had at first acquiesced in the propriety of deposing and confining him, took the field at the head of a considerable army in aid of his cause, and began to reduce the garrisons held for Anund Rao under the administration of Rowjee. The minister immediately proposed to the Bombay Government to subsidize five battalions, on condition of being supported against Mulhar Rao, an offer too tempting to be resisted ; but the Governor-General having sent no reply to Mr. Duncan's numerous applications for instructions, it was determined, with that injudicious caution which characterizes half-measures, to send a small auxiliary force of about 1,600 men to Rowjee's support. Major Alexander Walker, the officer in command of the detachment, was instructed to settle the disturbance by amicable mediation, if possible ; otherwise, he was to act with Babajee, the brother of Rowjee, in suppressing the rebellion of Mulhar Rao. Major Walker's detachment joined the Gaekwar's army in the end of February, 1802, and advanced with it towards Kurree. Mulhar Rao, affecting regret for what he had done, offered to restore the places he had taken, and seemed sincerely desirous of making his peace : it was, however, soon discovered that he was insincere in his professions : the army advanced, Mulhar Rao continued to negotiate, but suddenly and in a most treacherous manner attacked the troops, and was repulsed by the British detachment, though they lost on the occasion about fifty men. It being, however, afterwards discovered that Mulhar Rao had seduced many of the Gaekwar's troops, Major Walker's situation became critical, and all the disposable troops at Bombay and Goa were immediately embarked under the command of Colonel Sir William Clarke, who landed at Cambay on the 12th of April, marched on the 14th, and joined Major Walker at Kurree, who had acted chiefly on the

(March
17.)

defensive since the action of the 17th of March. Colonel Clarke found Mulhar Rao's army strongly entrenched under the walls of the town, and it was determined to storm their position without delay. The attack was made at break of day on the morning of the 30th of April, and the entrenchments carried in the most gallant style, with the loss on the part of the British of a hundred and sixty-three men killed and wounded.¹ Mulhar Rao shortly afterwards surrendered at discretion; Kurree was evacuated and made over to the Gaekwar's government, but two companies of Sepoys remained under a British officer to garrison the citadel. A small part of the army returned with Sir William Clarke to Bombay; the rest remained under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, subject to the requisitions of Major Walker, who was appointed Political Resident at the Gaekwar Court.

(April
30.)

A place of residence was assigned to Mulhar Rao in the town of Neriad and 1,25,000 rupees of the revenue of that district were set aside for his support, with a promise, in the event of his conducting himself peaceably, to enlarge his income as the necessities of the state were diminished.

The finances of the Baroda government were in such a deplorable state of confusion and embarrassment that, without foreign aid, it would have been quite impossible to extricate it from total ruin. The prudence and ability of the British Resident were a powerful means of introducing reform; for although Rowjee Appajee was anxious for power and jealous of authority, he gladly solicited support when insurrections were to be suppressed, the government to be strengthened, its expenses to be reduced, money to be raised, and debt to be redeemed.

The object requiring immediate attention was Gunput Rao, a relation of the Gaekwar family, and Mamlitdar of Sunkhera near Baroda, who had declared for Mulhar Rao, and held the fort of

¹ An extraordinary anecdote is related of Lieut. M'Cole of the 75th regt. in this attack, which deserves to be recorded. Just as Lieut. M. at the head of the grenadiers had got into the entrenchment, he observed a Patan in the act of levelling his matchlock at him, when snatching up a cannon shot which happened to be at his foot, he threw it with such instantaneous effect as to prevent his purpose by killing him on the spot. Lieut. M.'s strength and agility, as may be conceived from this fact, were very remarkable; but shortly afterwards, having caught the Guzerat fever, he died at Baroda after a few hours' illness.

Sunkhera in his name : he had also been joined by Moorar Rao, one of the illegitimate sons of the late Gaekwar. A detachment of the subsidiary force was sent to reduce Sunkhera, and soon succeeded in obtaining its surrender ; but Gunput Rao and Moorar Rao made their escape and found a refuge with the Powars of Dhar.

A.D. 1802.—The next difficulty originated in the first essential reform, the reduction of the military force. The Arab mercenaries, who had for some time ruled at Baroda, became alarmed at the prospect of a diminution in their body, and after some discussion, in the course of which they advanced extravagant demands for arrears, taking advantage of their situation in the town, they confined the Gaekwar and refused to release him until their claims were satisfied. They also permitted Kanhojee to escape. Mulhar Rao disappeared about the same time from Neriad, and from the number of men already discharged, the late dispersion of Mulhar Rao's army, and the unemployed soldiery at all times numerous in Guzerat, great apprehensions of serious disorders were naturally entertained. Major Walker anxiously endeavoured to bring them to terms and to restore order without the necessity of resorting to force ; but finding every reasonable inducement ineffectual, he called in the aid of a European regiment from Bombay, which having joined the subsidiary force, Colonel Woodington (**Dec.18.**) invested the town of Baroda, and after a siege of ten days, during which the Arabs from the cover of the walls and houses killed a number of the assailants and picked off a large proportion of officers, the breach being practicable, the garrison surrendered. The terms of capitulation were, the payment of such arrears as might be found justly their due, and a promise on their part to quit the country. The arrears amounted to seventeen and a half lacks, and were duly discharged. Most of the Arab chiefs honourably adhered to the conditions, but some of them, especially Abood Jemadar, forfeited the pledge he had given, went off at the head of a large party in a contrary direction to that which had been prescribed, and with a view to join Kanhojee. Colonel Woodington having been sent in pursuit of them, surprised their camp and dispersed them, but the fugitives prosecuted their route and ultimately most of them joined Kanhojee. That person, after his escape from Baroda, fled to

Rajpeeplee,¹ a hilly tract on the northern boundary of Maharashtra, where having collected a body of men, he returned to Guzerat during the siege of Baroda, attacked and routed a body of Babajee's troops, and prosecuted his march to the vicinity of the town.

1803. Jan. 1st.—Five days after its surrender, a detachment consisting of His Majesty's seventy-fifth regiment and a battalion of Sepoys was sent under Major Holmes in pursuit of Kanhojee, who continued moving about, collecting troops, levying contributions, and endeavouring to stir up a party in his favour at Baroda. After a vain pursuit of one month, it was thought advisable to reinforce Major Holmes with 250 Europeans and 300

(Feb.
6th.)

Sepoys, and at length Kanhojee took post in a strong ravine within four or five miles of the village of Sauree, where his troops concealing themselves allowed the advanced guard to enter before they gave their fire. It fell with such effect that the troops were thrown into some disorder. The Arabs immediately charged sword in hand, overpowered the advanced guard, and pressed forward in a most animated and daring manner. Major Holmes instantly dismounted, and placing himself at the head of the grenadiers of the 75th, followed by those of the second battalion, 1st regiment, he rushed forward supported by his whole line, and soon drove the enemy from the field. The loss of the British in this affair was considerable, upwards of one hundred men having been killed and wounded, of whom five were officers. Major Holmes displayed great energy on the occasion, particularly in a personal encounter with an Arab of great size, whom he laid dead at his feet, having by one cut nearly severed the body of his antagonist.²

¹ [Rājpipla (Rajpeeplee) is now a State in the Rewā Kāntha Agency, Bombay, bounded on the north by the Narbadā and the Mehvās estates of Rewā Kāntha; on the east by the Mehvās estates of Khāndesh District; on the south by Baroda State and Surat District; and on the west by Broach District. The greater portion of Rājpipla is occupied by a continuation of the Sātpura hill-range. The Mahārānā of Rājpipla belongs to the Gohel Rājpiṭ tribe. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 457-60.)]

² I give this anecdote on the authority of my friend and brother officer, the late Major Edward Tandy, who saw the combat between them. The late Major-General Sir George Holmes, K.C.B., Major at the time the above affair took place, was a man of great stature and strength. He is said to have been frequently engaged hand to hand, and to have been always equally successful. He carried a stout

Kanhojee continued in Guzerat for about a month after this defeat, till having near Kupperwunj made a last attempt to stand, his camp was stormed by Major Holmes, and his force dispersed. He himself fled to Oojein.¹

stick in action, which, when he condescended to draw his sword, he used as a shield.

¹ Major Tandy's private journal. Bombay records. Oral information.

CHAPTER XLIII.

FROM A.D. 1802 TO A.D. 1803.

A.D. 1802.—THE natural order of events now carries us back to affairs at Poona, before entering on the history of the important transactions which succeeded the Peishwa's arrival at Bassein.

The moderation at first shown by Holkar after his victory was a mere cloak to allure Bajee Rao to return to his capital. Being in distress for funds to pay his troops, Holkar, in order to satisfy the most urgent of their demands, was obliged to levy a contribution from the city of Poona, but for that purpose he employed two of Bajee Rao's ministers, Chintoo Punt Deshmookh and Wyjunath Punt Mama, who, without being apprised of their master's intention, had been sent by him to negotiate with Holkar, a few hours previous to his retreat from Singurh to the Concan. Such was their influence with the inhabitants that a very considerable cess was promptly raised, in the vain hope of buying exemption from future pillage by their readiness to comply with a measure which, sanctioned by these men, had something of the character of regular authority.

When Holkar found that the Peishwa had no intention of returning, he sent a body of his troops to Amrut Rao at Joonere, inviting him to take charge of the government at Poona; but Amrut Rao on various pretences declined the invitation for several days. At last he arrived on the 12th November,¹ and was prevailed upon to assume the government, in which he was assisted by Moraba Furnuwees, Baba Rao Phurkay, and several others of the adherents of Nana Furnuwees. He held his court in tents pitched at the village of Bambooree

¹ [The Resident at Poona reported to the Governor-General on November 9, 1802, that Amrat Rao arrived at Poona on November 7, and took up his residence at 'the Toph Khānah (i.e. *Top-Khāna* 'Ordnance Department') on the skirt of the city.' (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 561.)]

on the outskirts of the city. He refused to ascend the musnud himself, and for some time opposed a plan of elevating his son, Winaek Rao, to that dignity, as desired by Holkar ; but when Bajee Rao quitted Mhar and threw himself entirely on the protection of the English, Amrut Rao pretended to consider it an abdication of the Peishwa-ship, and assented to the proposal of Holkar. The Raja of Satara at first obstinately refused to grant the usual form of investiture till prevailed upon by his brother Chitoor Sing, who had been for some time of Holkar's party, serving with the division of Futih Sing Manay.

Holkar now laid aside the mask of moderation, and began to extort and to plunder with all the violence of his habits and character. Chintoo Punt and Wyjunath Punt, who by their exertions in levying the contribution might have been at least entitled to his forbearance, were delivered over as prisoners to Huree Punt Bhawey and Hureenath, two Bramins, equally cruel and more systematically wicked than Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. They tortured both the persons thus made over to them, in order to extort money ; and every respectable householder of Poona, possessed of property, was seized and forced by any means to give up his wealth. Several men died under the tortures they underwent. Amrut Rao was not less blameable than Holkar in the enormities thus inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants of Poona, whose sufferings at this time were particularly severe, owing to Bajee Rao's having stationed guards to prevent their flight previous to the battle of the 25th October ; and Holkar, though with a different motive, took care to observe a similar precaution, as soon as the issue of the contest had established his control.

These excesses were begun even before Colonel Close quitted Poona. Both Amrut Rao and Holkar were very desirous of prolonging his stay, in the hopes of his being prevailed upon to mediate in their differences with Sindia and the Peishwa, and of gaining by his presence the apparent sanction of the British Government to their usurpation ; but finding that no persuasion could alter his purpose, he was at last permitted to depart on the 20th November,¹ and he arrived at Bombay on the 3d of the following

¹ [From a letter of Colonel Close to the Marquess Wellesley, dated November 28, 1802, it appears that he finally left Poona early on that date, not on the 20th as stated by the author. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 576.) Colonel (afterwards Sir Barry) Close is

month. Colonel Close met Bajee Rao on the evening of the day on which the latter landed at Bassein ; and the preliminary of the proposed treaty, already tendered by an agent on the day of his flight from his capital, was immediately alluded to and acknowledged by the Peishwa himself. The 18th December was the day appointed for the discussion of the various articles of this treaty, and on the 31st it was finally completed. It was declaredly for the purpose of general defensive alliance, and the reciprocal protection of the territories of the Peishwa and the English East India Company and their allies respectively.¹ For this purpose a subsidiary force of not less than six thousand regular infantry, with the usual proportion of field-artillery and European artillery-men, were to be permanently stationed in the Peishwa's dominions. In the event of war, two battalions of the infantry, not less than one thousand each, were to remain near the Peishwa's person : the rest, joined by six thousand infantry and ten thousand horse of the Peishwa's own troops, were to act as circumstances might require. No European, of a nation hostile to the English, was to be entertained by the Peishwa. Districts yielding twenty-six lacks of rupees were assigned for the payment of the subsidiary force ; and all articles intended for the consumption of these troops were to be allowed to pass duty free. The Peishwa relinquished his claims on Surat, and submitted to the British arbitration in the adjustment of his differences and claims on the Nizam and the Gaekwar : with respect to the former, he bound himself to conform to the treaty of Mhar ; and in regard to the latter, he recognized the engagement lately concluded between Anund Rao Gaekwar and the British. The Peishwa likewise bound himself to engage in no hostilities with other states, neither to commence nor pursue in future any negotiations with any

thus described by Mountstuart Elphinstone in his diary : ' A strong and hardy frame, a clear head, and vigorous understanding, fixed principles, unshaken courage, contempt for pomp and pleasure, entire devotion to the public service, joined to the utmost modesty and simplicity, formed the character of Sir Barry Close—a character such as one would rather think imagined in ancient Rome than met with in our own age and nation.' (Colebrooke, *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884), vol. i, p. 270.)

¹ [A full statement of the Governor-General's policy towards the Pēshwā and other Marāthā chiefs will be found in a letter from his Secretary to Colonel Close, dated November 29, 1802. (See Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 579–82.)]

power whatever, without previous consultation with the British Government.¹

Such was the substance of the important treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa sacrificed his independence as the price of protection, but it was the only course he could pursue to save himself from becoming, more than ever, a pageant in the hands of one or other of the contending chiefs. He had scarcely ratified the treaty when he began to waver in his plans, and to regret the decided line of policy, so contrary to his disposition, into which he had been hurried by the exigency of his circumstances. Motives of policy probably dictated the expression of his regret that Sindia had not been consulted, but there was no insincerity in his strenuous objections to those articles which tended to control his political freedom and influence, nor to the arbitration of his claims on the Gaekwar and the Nizam: a sacrifice on his part greater than the English authorities seem ever to have fully understood, or at all events appreciated. He dispatched Ballajee

A.D. Koonjur to Sindia, and Narrain Rao Wydh to Rughoojee
1803. Bhonslay, ostensibly with the view of explaining the nature of the alliance into which he had entered, but in fact, as he knew they were both averse to it, rather to excuse his conduct in having been obliged, owing to their absence, to flee from Holkar and seek safety with Europeans. He sent no copy of the treaty, and in his letter invites Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay to march to Poona with all speed; not expressly to act against the English, of whom he takes no notice, but to punish the rebel Holkar.² He seems to have expected that Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay would unite to oppose the objects of the treaty; to have been doubtful of the issue of the contest that might ensue between them and the English; and to have been anxious as usual to deceive all parties, whilst he at the same time endeavoured to keep on terms with them.

The Governor-General hoped that Sindia might be deterred from any hostile attempts to obstruct the operation of the treaty.³

¹ [The Treaty of Bassein contained nineteen articles, and will be found on pp. 584-9 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series.)*]

² Copies of his secret letters found in his palace at Poona.

³ [Secret intelligence received from Poona by the Bombay Government shows that on January 2, 1803, Jasvant Rāo Holkar interviewed Amrat Rāo and declared 'Bājirāo has destroyed the Marāthā power. He has taken money from the English and given them territory. In

After the battle of Poona, an effort was made to induce him to enter upon the defensive alliance, and upon the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein he was again invited, in the manner hereafter detailed, to enter on similar engagements ; but Sindia, though he would have been pleased in the first moment of alarm after the defeat of his army by Holkar, to have seen a British force co-operating with his own for the temporary purpose of re-establishing the Peishwa in his capital and suppressing the power of his rival, was mortified and incensed on finding that his own and his uncle's plans for controlling the Peishwa's government were at once frustrated and overturned. Nor were these the only evils resulting from the Peishwa's engagements. He saw his own independence might be soon affected by the support which the Peishwa derived from a foreign nation, whose power, by a novel system of encroachment, threatened the subversion of the Mahrattas ; as effectually as their establishment of Chouth and Sur-deshmookee had overwhelmed the empire of the Moghuls.

The aversion with which Rughoojee Bhonslay had always regarded the Peishwa's connecting himself with the English was well known, and his sentiments on the present occasion were in entire unison with those of Sindia. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's prime minister, was deputed by his master to consult with Rughoojee on the best means of cementing a general confederacy of the Mahrattas against the common enemy ; and Sindia, who had been preparing troops to oppose Holkar, crossed the Nerbuddah on the 4th February with a large army, with which he encamped at Burhanpoor on the 23d of that month. It was a few days after this period when Colonel Collins,¹ an envoy on the part of the Governor-General, arrived for the purpose of again inviting him

due time they will seize the whole as they have done in Mysore. We must write to Sindia to ascertain whether he has done all this with his consent. Do you think this is the case ?' He and Amrat Rāo agreed that each should write to Sindia and suggest that in the event of British troops marching in support of Bājirāo to Poona they should join forces and oppose them. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 583.)

¹ [Colonel John Collins was appointed by Sir John Shore in 1795 to be Resident at the court of Daulat Rāo Sindia, where he remained until 1803. In 1804 he was appointed Resident at Lucknow, where he died on June 11, 1807. The principal tomb in the old Christian cemetery near the Amīnābād Bazar is his ; hence the vernacular name of the place 'Kallan-ka-lāt.' (Broughton, *Letters, &c.*, Constable, 1892, p. 30 n.)]

to enter upon an alliance, and engaging his co-operation in the arrangements required by the treaty with the Peishwa. To gain time, Sindia at first evaded discussion; but when pressed by Colonel Collins, he declined becoming a party to the defensive alliance, declaring that he had no intention of obstructing the treaty; he added that as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye he expected to have been consulted before these new engagements were made, but that his intentions were in every respect friendly to the British Government. These professions were from the first deceitful; both Rughoojee Bhonslay and himself were actively preparing for war, and Bajee Rao continued in constant correspondence with them, secretly encouraging their views.¹

The Governor-General, in the meantime, had taken his measures for the re-establishment of Bajee Rao on his musnud at Poona. For this purpose the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, consisting of six battalions of infantry, each upwards of one thousand strong, with two regiments of native cavalry under Colonel (March 25th.) Stevenson, took up a position at Purinda near the Peishwa's eastern frontier, accompanied by fifteen thousand of the Nizam's troops. The Honourable Major-General Wellesley was detached from the main army of Madras, assembled on the northern frontier of Mysore, with eight thousand infantry and one thousand seven hundred cavalry; being directed to march towards Poona for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Stevenson in the Peishwa's restoration. General Wellesley was joined on the banks of the Kistna by the Southern Mahratta Jagheerdars: Appa Sahib and Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun, Bappoo Gunnesh Gokla, Appa Dessaye Nepankur, and the family of the Patunkurs. The Jagheerdar of Vinchoor, grandson of Wittul Sewdeo, likewise attended the British army. The southern Jagheerdars had orders from the Peishwa to co-operate with the English; and all of them on this occasion, especially the family of Putwurdhun, evinced a very friendly disposition to the British Government. Straggling bodies of Holkar's horse, belonging to the division of Umeer Khan and Futih Sing Manay, were plundering the country between the Beema and Kistna; but on being called upon to desist they retired. They had scarcely crossed

¹ Copies of secret letters found in the palace at Poona.

the Beema, when Umeer Khan suspecting that Manay intended to join the Peishwa, contrived to seize him and disperse his troops.

General Wellesley, on approaching Poona, made a march of sixty miles in thirty-two hours, and reached that city with his cavalry on the 20th April. Colonel Stevenson in the meantime arrived from Purinda at Gardoon on the Beema. General Wellesley's object in advancing so rapidly was to save the city of Poona, which it was supposed Amrut Rao intended to burn; but he had retired many hours before the arrival of the British troops. Holkar was already on his retreat towards Malwa; but intelligence having reached Colonel Stevenson that he had levied a contribution on Aurungabad, and plundered some of the Nizam's villages, that officer advanced towards the Godavery for the protection of the country.

Amrut Rao, accompanied by Huree Punt Bhawee, after leaving Poona, marched to Sungunnere, plundering the towns and villages on his route; then turning on Nassuck, he attacked and defeated a body of troops in the interests of Bajee Rao, commanded by Raja Buhadur, and pillaged the town in the same barbarous manner as had been already done at Poona. Amrut Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Nassuck for some time; and as we shall have little occasion to introduce his name in the subsequent pages of this history, we may here briefly mention that, all overtures of reconciliation between him and Bajee Rao having been obstinately rejected by the latter, he entered into an engagement with General Wellesley, and during the progress of the war which followed joined the British troops with a body of horse. His services were on no occasion conspicuous, but a most liberal pension of eight lacks of rupees was assigned to him by the British Government, on which he retired to Benares, where he still resides.¹

The Peishwa, escorted by a body of 2,300 infantry, of whom 1,200 were Europeans, arrived from Bassein, and resumed his seat on the musnud the 13th May.² Sindia still occupied his

¹ [Amrat Rāo died in September 1824. His lineal descendants are still resident at Karwi or Chitrakut in Banda District, United Provinces. At Puri in Orissa a copper-plate record of his in Marāthī has lately been discovered, appointing one Gauranga Pānde, a priest at Jagannāthpuri, as the *Tirthopādhyāya* (ministering priest at a place of pilgrimage) of his family. See *J.B. and O. Res. Soc.*, vol. v, pt. ii (1919), pp. 216-7.]

² [The Pēshwā ascended the Bhor Ghāt on May 5, arriving at Talegāon on the evening of the 6th. On the 7th he paid a formal

position at Burhanpoor, and Rughoojee Bhonslay was preparing to join him. Every endeavour was used to induce Holkar to take a part in the confederacy. Rughoojee Bhonslay was employed as mediator between him and Sindia ; and Holkar, who was at the same time carrying on a negotiation with the Peishwa through Colonel Close, listened and appeared to favour the overtures of the confederates, from whom he obtained the release of his nephew Khundee Rao, the restoration of his family territory in Malwa, and a promise that all his rights in Hindoostan should be recognized.

It was the interest of the British Government to conciliate Holkar ; and, in order to prevent his joining the confederacy, they wished to overlook any cause of complaint they had against him ; but the Peishwa could not be prevailed upon to listen to any mediation in his favour. The confederates wished Holkar to unite his army with theirs in the Deccan, but he excused himself by asking who was to take care of Hindoostan ; and immediately retired to Malwa, with the real design of being guided by the issue of events.

Although the plans of the confederates were conducted with considerable secrecy, rumours of their hostile designs were universally prevalent.¹ The Governor-General deemed it expedient to call upon Sindia for an explicit declaration of his intentions, and to make efficient preparations in every part of British India to repel the hostilities apparently meditated. In reply to the demands for explanation, sent by the Resident, Sindia declared that it was impossible to afford any satisfaction until he had met the Raja of Berar, after which the Resident should be informed whether it would be peace or war.

Their armies advanced to the frontier of the Nizam's boundary, and encamped in the neighbourhood of each other. The force under Colonel Stevenson crossed to the northward of the Godavery, and General Wellesley occupied a position in the visit to General Wellesley, while on his way to Chinchvād (see note on page 87, *ante*). On receipt of the news that the Pēshwā would make his entry into Poona on May 13, the Bombay Government issued orders for a salute of nineteen guns to be fired on that day at Bombay, Thāna, Surat, Fort Victoria (Bankot) and Baroda. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 596-7.)

¹ [See letter of July 15, 1803, from Colonel Close to Colonel Collins, which clearly exposes the policy of Sindia and the Rājā of Berār. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 601-2.)]

neighbourhood of Ahmednugur. A long train of evasion and delay followed the meeting between the chieftains. They declared they had no designs hostile to the British Government, nor any intention of obstructing the articles of the treaty of Bassein ; but they alluded to their having received no official copy of it from the Peishwa, and mentioned that there were many points of it to be discussed, which the Peishwa was bound to have consulted them upon, before he signed its stipulations. Their professions of friendly intentions were only made with the view of gaining time, in the hope of Holkar's being induced to embrace their cause. Their whole conduct, in other respects, indicated their hostile determination ; and the menacing position which they occupied justified the warlike preparations of the British Government. General Wellesley having been vested with full powers, as Political Agent of the Governor-General, as well as military commander of the British troops in the Deccan, proposed, as the test of the friendly declarations of the chiefs, that they should withdraw their armies, Sindia to Hindoostan and Rughoojee Bhonslay to Berar, whilst he should also direct the British troops to retire within their own territories. This plain and distinct proposal, so characteristic of its author, perplexed the Mahratta chiefs, as there was no evading compliance except by a subterfuge too palpable to be overlooked or justified ; after much discussion, it was finally rejected ; the Resident withdrew from their camp on the 3d August, which was considered a declaration of war.¹

¹ [General Wellesley wrote to the Resident at Poona to inform Sindia and the Rājā of Berār ' that, consistently with the principles and uniform practice of the British Government, I am perfectly ready to attend to their interests and to enter into negotiation with them upon objects by which they may suppose their interests to be affected. But they must first withdraw their troops from the position which they have taken up on the Nizam's frontier and return to their usual stations in Hindustān and Berār respectively, and on my part I will withdraw the Company's troops to their usual stations.' Sindia and the Berār Rājā replied that ' the armies now assembled here, and those of the English Government and of the Nizam shall commence their return upon the same date, and that each of the armies shall arrive at their usual stations on a date previously settled ; that is, that the army of the English and of the Nizam now encamped near Aurangābād, the army of the English encamped near the Kistna, and you also with your army, shall all march towards their stations on the same date that the armies move from this encampment ; and on the same date that all those different armies reach their respective stations at Madras, Seringapatam and Bombay, Sindia and myself

The Governor-General, when he saw that war was inevitable, had resolved to strike a decisive blow, and by a grand effort to attack the territories of the confederates in every quarter at once. For this purpose the preparations of the British Government were necessarily very extensive. Its resources were called forth on a scale of magnitude and efficiency before unknown, and the Governor-General by his liberality, his judicious selection of agents and commanders, and his confidence in the whole service, roused that ardour and spirit of enterprise which have been handed down in the Indian army from the first struggles of the British nation in the East.

The British forces assembled in different quarters of India amounted to nearly fifty thousand men.

The army in the Deccan and Guzerat amounted to 35,596 men, of whom 3,595 were left for the protection of Hyderabad and Poona, and 7,826 formed the covering army under General Stuart, between the Kistna and Toongbuddra.¹ The advanced force with General Wellesley consisted of 8,930 men under his personal command, and 7,920 under Colonel Stevenson. There were 7,352 men in Guzerat, of whom, after providing for the garrisons, 4,281 were available for field service and placed under the orders of Colonel Murray, subject to the control of General Wellesley.

In Hindoostan 10,500 men were collected under General Lake. Three thousand five hundred men were assembled at Allahabad, to act on the side of Bundelcund, and 5,216 men were destined for the invasion of Rughoojee Bhonslay's districts in Kuttack.

The armies of Doulut Rao Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay were estimated at about one hundred thousand men, of whom about 50,000 were horse, and upwards of 30,000 were regular infantry and artillery, commanded by Europeans; of the rest, some were half-disciplined corps under the command of natives

will reach Burhānpur.' The absurdity of this proposal is apparent on a consideration of the distances dividing Ahmādnagar from the several bases of the troops above-mentioned, as compared with the distance of Burhānpur from the Nizām's frontier. General Wellesley in a very firm reply treated the proposal as tantamount to a choice of war on the part of Sindia and the Bhoslē, and commenced hostilities on August 8. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. xxxiii-iv.)]

¹ In this part of the force there was subsequently some alteration made, of no importance to the Mahratta history.

belonging to Rughoojee Bhonslay, some were matchlockmen and rocketmen ; they had many hundred pieces of cannon, and Sindia's train of field artillery was excellent. Of the regular infantry, ten or twelve thousand were with Sindia in the Deccan, and four or five thousand were on their march from the Deccan, conducted by the Chevalier Dudrenec, for the purpose of reinforcing the army in Hindoostan. Sindia's army in the latter quarter was commanded by Monsieur Perron, the successor of De Boigne. His whole force, including those not yet joined, under Dudrenec, amounted to sixteen or seventeen thousand regular infantry and from fifteen to twenty thousand horse, of which four or five thousand were regular cavalry. This estimate does not include the forces of Shumsher Buhadur in Bundelcund, who was a party in the confederacy. Shumsher Buhadur was the son of Ali Buhadur, who, as the reader may remember, attempted, in conjunction with the Gosaeen Himmud Buhadur, to conquer Bundelcund. They so far succeeded as to possess themselves of several districts, all of which they held in the Peishwa's name ; partly as belonging to him from a remote period, and the rest as their own Jagheer. But being constantly engaged in warfare with the petty chiefs of the country, it furnished an excuse for remitting no part of the revenue to the Peishwa, although they acknowledged his authority. Ali Buhadur died in 1802, and his Jagheer was formally resumed by the Peishwa ; but, as the latter had no means of enforcing the resumption, Shumsher, the son of the deceased, retained charge of the territory, took part against the English on the present occasion, and mustered, of all descriptions, about ten or twelve thousand men.

General Wellesley received accounts of the unsuccessful termination of the Resident's negotiations with the confederates on the (Aug. 6.) 6th August, the same day on which Nizam Ally died at Hyderabad, an event long expected, and which was attended by no commotion or change, except the accession of his son Mirza Secundur Jah to the Soobehship of the Deccan.

General Wellesley, who was encamped at the village of Walkee, eight miles south of Ahmednugur, was prevented by heavy rain from marching against that fortress until the 8th, when (Aug. 8.) he commenced hostilities by detaching three divisions from his line of march to attack the Pettah by escalade. The Pettah is surrounded by a mud wall, and was obstinately

defended by a body of Arabs and one of Sindia's regular battalions, supported by a party of horse stationed between the Pettah and the fort; but the perseverance and spirit of the assailants surmounted every obstacle; and this prompt manner of proceeding gave a character to the commander and troops, in the opinion of the enemy, which made amends for the loss sustained in the attack. Of the British detachments, twenty-eight were killed and twenty-two wounded; of which number six were European officers. A

(Aug. 12.) battery was opened upon the fortress on the 10th, and on the 12th this important garrison, once the capital of the Nizam Shahee kingdom, which, ever since the days of Chaund Beebee, had the reputation in the Deccan of being almost impregnable, was surrendered by its Killidar, who marched out with private property and arms, at the head of his garrison fifteen hundred strong; a conduct for which he was much censured by the confederates.¹

The acquisition of Ahmednugur, as a point of support to all future operations to the northward, was of great consequence to the British army. A respectable garrison was left in the fort, and the revenues of the district were temporarily collected by an agent of the British Government, and appropriated to assist in the expenses of the war. General Wellesley moved forward, crossed the Godavery, and arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th August. The Mahrattas had ascended the Ajunta Ghaut on the 24th, with a large body of horse, and, avoiding Colonel Stevenson, who was some miles to the eastward, they encamped at Jaulna. On hearing of General Wellesley's arrival at Aurungabad, they moved off in a south-easterly direction, intending, it was said, to proceed to Hyderabad. General Wellesley immediately moved down to the left bank of the Godavery, to check their probable design of plundering the country, and to protect his own convoys

¹ [The fort of Ahmadnagar lies half a mile to the east of the city, and is said to have been built in 1559 by Husain Nizām Shāh on the site of an old fortress of earth, constructed in 1488. The breach made by the British guns in 1803 is still visible. To the north-east of the flag-staff bastion stands a large tamarind tree, known as 'Wellington's tree,' from the tradition that General Wellesley halted beneath it while his troops were besieging the fort. The tree is worshipped by many of the lower classes at Ahmadnagar. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 409.) See Wellesley's letter of August 12 to the Governor-General, describing the capture of Ahmadnagar, in Forrest's *Selections (Marāthū Series)*, i. 605-7.]

of grain, which were forwarded by General Stuart from the covering army south of the Kistna. Neither Rughoojee Bhonslay nor Sindia was possessed of military enterprise or experience, and they were quite undecided as to their plan of operations; sometimes Sindia proposed to depend on his battalions and artillery, at other times Rughoojee persuaded him to act on the predatory plan; their operations were of course feeble in the extreme. When General Wellesley moved down the Godavery, they counter-marched in a northerly direction; and whilst the General awaited the junction of his convoys, Colonel Stevenson made several unavailing attempts to bring them to action, but only succeeded in partially surprising their camp on the night of the 9th September. He had also made himself master of the fort of Jaulna. On the 21st September, the whole of the Mahratta army, joined by their infantry, of which there were sixteen battalions of regulars, was encamped about the village of Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffeirabad. On the same day, General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson met at Budnapoor, when it was agreed that the two divisions, then in the neighbourhood of each other, should move separately and attack the enemy on the morning of the 24th. They accordingly marched on the 22d; Colonel Stevenson by the western, and General Wellesley by the eastern route. On the 23d, on reaching the village of Naulnye, where he was about to encamp, General Wellesley learnt from his spies that the confederate armies were encamped on the Kailna river, within six miles of him. With great prudence and decision, founded on a remarkable discernment of the character of his enemy,¹ he instantly resolved on attacking them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. Had General Wellesley hesitated, the enemy's infantry would have moved off, their horse would probably have been encouraged to attack his baggage and annoy his camp,

¹ I have had occasion to observe how well the Duke of Wellington must have known the Mahrattas, from having read his private letters to Sir Barry Close during the war of 1803. Without being acquainted with their language, and one would have supposed, with little opportunity of knowing the people or their history, his correct views of the Mahratta character and policy are very remarkable. As the letters in question were shown to me confidentially in 1817, in the course of my official duties, I may be only authorized to mention, that in some instances, his opinion of individuals, particularly of Bajee Rao, was correctly prophetic.

the service must have been prolonged, and by one day's delay or hesitation a new character might have been given to the war.

Having directed his deputy adjutant-general, Captain Barclay, to place the baggage in the village of Naulnye under the protection of a battalion and some details from the native corps, and to bring on the rest of the line with all convenient dispatch, General Wellesley moved out in person at the head of the picquets to reconnoitre, and in a short time, on ascending a rising ground, the host of the confederates was seen extending in a vast line along the opposite bank of the Kailna river, near its junction with the Juah. Their army amounted to upwards of 50,000 men, of whom more than 30,000 were horse, and 10,500 were regular infantry supported by upwards of one hundred guns. The handful of British troops, which now moved straight down upon this formidable array, did not exceed four thousand five hundred men,¹ but the general sentiment was that of their commander, 'they cannot escape us.' As General Wellesley drew nearer the enemy's line, he found their right composed entirely of cavalry, and that their cannon and infantry, which it was his object to take and destroy, were on their left, near the village of Assaye. He therefore moved round and passed the Kailna river at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, forming his infantry into two lines and his cavalry as a reserve in a third, with his right towards the Juah, and his left on the Kailna. The horse belonging to the Peishwa and Raja of Mysore, accompanying General Wellesley, formed at a distance across the Kailna but had little or no share in the conflict.² The position thus occupied by the British, between the two rivers and near their junction, not only brought them upon their object, but was of importance in diminishing the front of the enemy, who changed their position as the British turned the flank of their old ground, and were now drawn up in two lines, one of them fronting the British troops, the other

¹ The corps which had the honour to serve on this occasion, were the 19th light dragoons, the 4th, 5th, and 7th Madras Native cavalry, a detachment of Madras, and a small detail of Bombay artillery, the 74th and 78th Highlanders, 1 batt. 2d, 1 batt. 4th, 1 batt. 8th, 1 batt. 10th, and 2 batt. 12th regiments of Madras Sepoys.

² Just before the battle of Assaye commenced, intelligence was brought to General Wellesley that the Peishwa's troops intended to join Sindia in attacking him. That they would have done so, in the event of a reverse, is not improbable, but I have not met with any confirmation of the circumstance.

running at a right angle to their first line, with the left of both resting on the fortified village of Assaye. In this situation as the British lines were forming, the Mahrattas opened a heavy cannonade, the execution of which is described as terrible. The picquets of the infantry and the 74th regiment which were on the right suffered particularly; the picquets were for a time halted, and the officer in command of them when urged to advance sent word that the guns were disabled and the bullocks killed. General Wellesley received the message with the utmost composure and coolly replied, 'Well, tell him to get on without them.' The whole line without artillery was exposed to a dreadful fire of round and grape; the ranks of the 74th were completely thinned, and a large body of the Mahratta horse charged them: the order was given for the advance of the British cavalry:—the 19th light dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the intimation with one loud huzza! Accompanied by the 4th native cavalry who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day,¹ the 19th passed through the broken but invincible 74th, whose very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. Never did cavalry perform better service or contribute more to the success

¹ Nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry, particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought as if on his arm depended the victory. As instances may be mentioned Lieut. Nathan Wilson, who, with his arm shattered by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the head of his troop. Lieut. Alex. Grant of the Madras Native infantry, major of brigade to Colonel Maxwell, observing a gun pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons, the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and with such force, that his horse stuck between the cannon and its wheel; in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act of endeavouring to prevent it, by cutting down the artillery-man. Captain George Sale was attacking a man who defended himself with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all Sindia's artillery-men were armed; the man's comrade standing on a gun, made a thrust from above at Captain Sale, but it was turned by the breast bone, and glanced off diagonally across his chest; his covering serjeant, named Strange, laid the man dead who wounded his officer, but in the act, was himself speared through the lungs by another man from below the gun. Captain Sale went on, but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear; this, however, he gallantly refused, and rode out the day. Captain Sale and others afterwards saw him, when in hospital, blow out a candle from his lungs—the reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant serjeant recovered.

of a battle. The British infantry likewise pressed forward, the enemy's first line gave way, fell back on their second, and the whole were forced into the Juah at the point of the bayonet ; the fugitives on gaining the opposite bank were followed, charged and broken by the cavalry ; but some of their corps formed again and went off in good order. One large body of this description was pursued and routed by the British cavalry, on which occasion Colonel Maxwell who commanded them was killed. As the British line advanced they passed many individuals of the enemy who either appeared to have submitted, or lay apparently dead. These persons rising up turned their guns on the rear of the British line, and after the more important points of the victory were secured, it was some time before the firing thus occasioned could be silenced. The enemy's horse hovered round for some time, but when the last body of infantry was broken, the battle was completely decided, and ninety-eight pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors. The loss was severe ; upwards of one-third of the British troops lay dead or wounded, but they had, considering the circumstances, achieved a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history.¹

Of the enemy, twelve hundred were killed, and the whole neighbourhood was covered with their wounded. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's minister, was amongst the slain. Rughoojee Bhonslay fled from the field in the commencement of the action, and Sindia soon followed his example. The whole of the horse behaved in the most dastardly manner ; Sindia's infantry, although defeated by such a disparity of troops, did not altogether sully their high reputation. The artillery-men stood to the last, and eight of the old battalions of De Boigne fought with ardour and firmness. Most of Sindia's battalions laboured under disadvantages by the secession of the British part of their European officers, who, in consequence of a proclamation by the British Government, quitted the Mahrattas at the breaking out of the war. This proclamation was addressed to all British subjects, native as well as European, offering them the same pay which they enjoyed with Sindia. It was judiciously extended to all

¹ [A facsimile of General Wellesley's letter to Mr. Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay, announcing the victory of Assaye will be found at p. 609 of Forrest's *Selections (Marāthā Series)*. The letter is dated September 25, and was probably received in Bombay on October 2 or 3, 1803.]

Europeans, and in regard to the British officers was equally humane and politic.

Colonel Stevenson, owing to various impediments, did not join General Wellesley until the evening of the 24th, when he was immediately detached in pursuit of the enemy, whose regular infantry retired before him and crossed the Nerbuddah, towards which Colonel Stevenson followed them. But the main army of the confederates moved to the westward, with an intention, as was supposed, of marching by the Kassarbharee Ghaut towards Poona. Under this supposition General Wellesley remained on the south side of the Ajunta Ghaut, and directed Colonel Stevenson to take possession of the city of Burhanpoor, and to reduce the strong fort of Asseergurh,¹ both of which objects he had accomplished by the 21st of October, with inconsiderable (Oct. 21.) loss. The dependent districts in Candeish, which fell in consequence to the British disposal, were placed under the temporary management of revenue officers of the Hyderabad state.

In regard to the operations of the Guzerat troops under the orders of General Wellesley, a detachment of the field force was sent by Colonel Murray, under Lieutenant-Colonel (August 29th.) Woodington, for the purpose of reducing Sindia's possessions in that quarter. The fortified town of Baroach² was stormed and taken on the 29th August. Colonel Woodington

¹ [Asīrgarh (Asseergurh) fort, situated in 21° 28' N. and 76° 18' E. and now included in the Nīmār District of the Central Provinces, is mentioned in the Mahābhārata. Its possession lent importance to the Fārūkī dynasty of Khāndesh which was established in 1388, with its seat of government at Burhānpur. The dynasty and independence of the State ended with the surrender of Asīrgarh to Akbar in January 1601. In 1625 Shāh Jahān, who had revolted against his father, the Emperor Jahāngīr, surrendered it as one of his pledges of peace. During the operations against the Pindārīs, organized by the Marquess of Hastings, it finally capitulated to the British after a short siege in April 1819. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries it was reckoned to be one of the wonders of the world, so that it was 'impossible to conceive a stronger fortress.' (*O.H.I.*, vi. *et passim*.)]

² [Broach (Baroach) is now the head quarters of the District of the same name in Gujarāt, and is situated in 21° 42' N. and 72° 59' E., on the right bank of the Narbadā, and is a station on the B.B. and C.I. Railway. Broach has a long history, reaching back to the first century of the Christian era; it flourished as a seaport equally under the Rājput dynasties of Anhilvāda (A.D. 750-1300) and under the Musalman dynasty of Ahmadābād (A.D. 1391-1572). A British factory

next marched against the strong hill-fort of Pawungurh,¹ took by assault the town of Champaneer² which is attached to it, and the fort surrendered on the 17th September.³

(Sept. 17th.) Whilst those successes attended the British arms on the west, affairs of not less consequence were passing in the north and east of India. The important possessions which had been acquired by Mahadajee Sindia in Hindoostan were a primary object of attention with the British Government. These provinces, independent of their value and their situation, were the nursery of the regular infantry of Sindia, which, although in itself less formidable to the British power than other descriptions of the Mahratta force, was in one respect dangerous, from its introduction of French officers, whose patriotism might induce them to encourage and

was established there in 1616. Colonel Woodington, in reporting his capture to General Wellesley, stated that the Arab forces in Broach showed considerable resistance and suffered heavy loss. Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 607-8; *I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 318-22.)]

¹ [Pāvāgarh (Pawungurh) fort is now in the Pānch Mahāls District, Bombay, about twenty-eight miles east of Baroda. The hill on which it stands rises abruptly from the plain to a height of 2,500 feet. The fortifications include the lower fort, a massive stone structure with strong bastions stretching across the less precipitous parts of the eastern spur of the hill, and seven massive gates which are connected by strong walls sweeping up to the fortifications on the crest of the hill. The hill, which is named Pāvakgarh, or 'fire-hill,' in old inscriptions, is first referred to in the writings of a twelfth century bard. About A.D. 1300 it was seized by Chauhān Rājput̄s; in 1484 Sultān Mahmūd Begara reduced it after a siege of nearly two years; in 1573 it fell into the hands of Akbar; in 1727 it was surprised by Krishnāji, who made it his headquarters; and Sindia took it about 1761. It was restored to Sindia in 1804 and came finally into British hands in 1853. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 304.)]

² [Chāmpāner, now ruined, lies at the north-east base of Pāvāgarh. It was built by Mahmud Begara after he had defeated the Rājput̄ possessors of Pāvāgarh in 1484, and quickly developed a flourishing trade, being specially famous for the manufacture of sword-blades. In 1535 the Emperor Humāyūn pillaged it, and on the death of Sultān Bahādur Shāh the court, which had been established in Chāmpāner by Mahmūd Begara, was re-transferred to Ahmadābād. By the commencement of the seventeenth century it was falling into ruins, and when Colonel Woodington took it, only 500 inhabitants were found. At present its only occupants are a few Kolis and the *pujāris* of a temple on Pāvāgarh; but the ruins, many of which are of beautiful workmanship, render it a spot of more than ordinary interest. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 300-1; *Trans. Bom. Lit. Soc.*, i. 151; *Ind. Ant.*, lxii. 5, and xliii. 7.)]

³ Public Records. Mahratta MSS. Ferdinand Lewis Smith, and Oral information.

support their countrymen in a favourite scheme of conquest in the East.

General DeBoigne¹ having been compelled, as already mentioned, to return to Europe in 1796 from bad health, was succeeded by M. Perron,² who had particularly recommended himself to Sindia by his conduct at the battle of Kurdla, and who had been sent from the Deccan to Hindoostan to assume the command of the army, the charge of the Emperor's person, and the management of the Jagheer from whence his brigades were paid. De Boigne with much of military enterprise and enthusiasm, was at the same time a man of sense and prudence; a decided enemy to French revolutionary principles, and though friendly and kind to Frenchmen who sought his service, the ideas of conquest in India, entertained by many of his nation, he regarded, even at that period, as chimerical. He knew the power and the watchful jealousy of the English, and he foresaw that any object which might be attempted by the states of India, through a connexion with France, would certainly be anticipated by their subjugation. His last counsel to Sindia, 'never to excite the jealousy of the British Government by increasing his battalions, and rather to discharge them than risk a war,' was a sound advice; but his supposed partiality for the English, and the sentiments of his successor, Perron,³ which were precisely the reverse, was one cause which drove Sindia, more confident and ignorant than Perron himself, to attempt projects, which brought on ruin and disaster, before he and his coadjutors had fixed the mode of warfare they intended to pursue. Perron is said to have laid down a

¹ [See note, pp. 160-62, *ante*. De Boigne retired to his native place, Chambéry, where he spent much of the immense wealth which he had honourably accumulated on charitable institutions and municipal improvements. He died in 1830 at the age of eighty. 'Count de Boigne was the worthiest of the many European freelances or military adventurers who swarmed at Indian courts in the latter half of the eighteenth and the earlier years of the nineteenth century.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 536.)]

² [See footnote, p. 296, *ante*. Perron, whose real name was Pierre Cuillier, died at his chateau of Fresnes in 1834, aged seventy-nine. His career is described at great length on pp. 219-335 of Compton's *Military Adventurers*, &c.]

³ He appears to have imbibed some of his opinions after the departure of De Boigne, who represented him to me as a man of plain sense, of no talent, but a brave soldier.

scheme of operations,¹ but jealousy and distrust on the part of Sindia, the neutrality of Holkar, and the intrigues of Sindia's officers, for the purpose of superseding Perron in the government in Hindoostan, seem to have combined in preventing its adoption.

The main body of the British force in Hindoostan, already mentioned in the general preparations of the Governor-General, was assembled at Cawnpore ; and General Lake, the commander-in-chief, was vested with the same powers, civil and military, which had been delegated by the Supreme Government to General Wellesley in the Deccan. As soon as General Lake understood that the confederates had refused to withdraw their armies on the terms proposed by General Wellesley, he considered them in a state of war with the British Government, and immediately put his troops in motion.

On the 29th August General Lake's army first came in sight of Perron's cavalry, fifteen thousand of whom were encamped at Coel, near the fort of Aligurh. After a trifling skirmish they retired as the British troops advanced ; the town of Coel was taken possession of, and Aligurh was summoned ; but every endeavour on the part of General Lake failed in inducing M. Pedron,² its governor, to surrender. Much dependence was placed on this fortress. It is very strong, situated on a plain surrounded by swamps, having a good glacis, with a ditch thirty-two feet deep and two hundred feet wide. It was well garrisoned, fully provided with cannon, ammunition, and provisions ; and the Mahrattas

¹ Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

² [Pedron was a native of Hennebon, near L'Orient. In 1760 he was serving in M. Law's corps at Lucknow, but subsequently deserting, he took service with the Nawāb Vazīr of Oudh. On the expulsion of all French subjects from Oudh, at the instance of the British Government, he obtained employment under the Rājā of Berār. In 1790 he joined De Boigne's 1st Brigade, and was promoted to the command of it in 1795. Four years later he was engaged in the siege of Delhi, which was surrendered by bribery. In 1800 Pedron raised a 4th Brigade, fought against Lakwa Dādā in 1801, and shortly after took Bourquien's place as commandant in the operations against George Thomas, after whose defeat and flight he made over the command again to Bourquien and then retired to Aligarh to recruit his brigade. He was entrusted with the defence of Aligarh in 1803, but was deposed and confined by his own troops, and after the capture of Aligarh in September was handed over to the British as a prisoner of war. His subsequent history is unknown. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 378-9.)]

expected, as they had a right to expect, that it would sustain a long siege. The only passage into the fort was by a narrow causeway across the ditch, for which the French commandant, by gross neglect, had omitted to substitute a drawbridge. General Lake, apprised of this circumstance, determined to hazard an attack by the gateway ; and Mr. Lucan, a British subject, one of the officers who had come over from Sindia's service, offered to conduct the storming party. Break of day, on the morning of the 4th September, was the time appointed for the enterprise. On the firing of the morning gun, the party, who had been lying for some time within four hundred yards of the gate, waiting for this signal, immediately advanced ; and Colonel Monson pushed forward at the head of the flank companies of the 76th, in hopes of being able to enter the fort with a party of the enemy, supposed to have been stationed outside behind a breast-work. The work in question, however, was found abandoned, and the gate closed. Scaling ladders were applied, but such a formidable row of pikemen presented themselves above, that it was impossible to mount. A six-pounder was brought up to blow open the gate, but it had no effect. Much time and many lives were lost before a twelve-pounder could be substituted ; and when it did come, four or five discharges were necessary to force an entrance. Advancing round a bastion, the party came upon the second gate, which was easily forced, and the third was taken by entering it with the fugitives : but the fourth and last gate, which led to the body of the place, could not be blown open, even by the application of the twelve-pounder, though great delay was experienced before the gun could be brought in. Thus disappointed, in a most trying situation, Major M'Leod of the 76th regiment attempted the wicket, and most fortunately gained an entrance. He was followed by the grenadiers ; the rampart was mounted, opposition soon ceased, and the British troops, by extraordinary bravery and good fortune, found themselves masters of the fortress of Aligurh with the loss of two hundred and seventy-eight men killed and wounded, of whom seventeen were European officers. M. Pedron, the commandant, was taken prisoner, and two thousand of his garrison are said to have perished, including those who were drowned in the ditch.

In the meantime five thousand of the Mahratta cavalry, which retired from Coel, prosecuted a successful enterprise under the

direction of a Frenchman named Fleury,¹ by attacking the cantonment of Shekoabad, where there was a detachment of five companies of Sepoys and one gun. The assailants were repulsed on the first attempt, but having renewed the attack after (Sept. 2.) the intervention of a day, the detachment, when nearly (Sept. 4.) destitute of ammunition, capitulated, and were permitted to retire with their arms, on a promise of not serving against Sindia during the war. This attack obliged General Lake to send off a strong detachment, which arrived too late to save the cantonment, but was of importance to the security of an expected convoy.

Perron, who had for some time been conscious of a decline in Sindia's favour, and had even made some overtures to General Lake before the commencement of the war, proceeded, after the affair at Coel, to Muttra, where he received certain accounts of his being superseded in the government of Sindia's districts, and that his successor and personal enemy Ambajee Inglia was intriguing with the French officers under him, to deprive him of his Jagheer, and of course of his command. Under these circumstances, to secure his private fortune and avoid a crisis in which he had nothing to gain, he addressed a letter to General Lake on the 5th September, requesting permission to pass with his effects, his family, and the officers of his suite, through the Company's territories to Lucknow; with which General Lake, under instructions from the Governor-General, yielded a ready compliance.

(Sep. 7.)—On the 7th September, General Lake's army marched from Aligarh towards Delhi, and on the 11th encamped within six miles of that city; but scarcely were the tents pitched, (Sep. 11.) when the enemy unexpectedly appeared in front. The picquets immediately turned out and General Lake with the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre.²

M. Louis Bourquin,³ the officer next in rank to Perron, hearing

¹ [Fleurea or Fleury was a French cavalry-officer in Perron's army. When Perron fled to Agra after the battle of Koil in 1803, Fleury was dispatched to harry the Company's district of Cawnpore. After the fall of Aligarh he returned to Agra, whence he escaped with great difficulty, rejoining Perron at Lucknow and accompanying him to Calcutta. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., p. 356.)]

² [The village of Patparganj, nearly due east from Humāyūn's Tomb, marks the site of the battle of Delhi. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, p. 566 n.)]

³ [Bourquien (also styled Bourquienne, Bourquoin and Bourkin) was

of the advance of the British force towards Delhi, and that a part of the army was detached in pursuit of Fleury, crossed the Jumna with twelve battalions of regular infantry, amounting to eight or nine thousand men, besides five thousand cavalry and seventy pieces of cannon, for the purpose of attacking General Lake ; whose force, after providing for the safety of his baggage, amounted to about four thousand five hundred men. Bourquin took up a strong position with his guns concealed by high grass, and General Lake, in advancing to reconnoitre, became exposed to a very heavy and destructive fire. The line of British infantry were ordered on, but it was a considerable time before they came up, and General Lake in the interim practised a successful feint, by retiring with the cavalry, which the enemy mistaking for a retreat, followed them shouting as if secure of victory. The cavalry, however, opening from the centre, permitted the British infantry, advancing in perfect order, to pass to the front. The fire of grape, round, and cannister from the Mahratta guns, was for some minutes tremendous, but the British troops moved on steadily, without returning a shot, until they were within one hundred yards. They were then ordered to fire a volley and charge bayonets. Sindia's infantry could not withstand the fury of their onset, but abandoning their guns, fled with precipitation. The line of infantry then broke into open columns of companies, and the cavalry which formed the second line, charging through the intervals, committed great slaughter among the fugitives, many of whom escaped from the sabre but to perish in the Jumna.

a Frenchman, whose real name was Louis Bernard. He came to India first in Admiral Suffrein's fleet, and made his way from Pondicherry to Calcutta, where he enlisted in a mercenary regiment of foreigners in the Company's service, known as 'Doxat's Chasseurs.' On the reduction of that force he became in turn a cook and manufacturer of fireworks in Calcutta. He next entered Bēgam Samrū's service and about 1794 joined De Boigne as a lieutenant on Rs. 200 a month. In 1800 he joined the Rājā of Jaipur, with one of Perron's battalions, for the operations against Lakva Dādā ; in May 1801 he secured the surrender of Ajmere by bribery ; and was shortly after entrusted with the conduct of the war against George Thomas, whom, after much difficulty, he finally defeated at Hansi. He was next detached with his brigade to collect tribute in the Sutlej States, remaining in the Sikh country till 1803. After his surrender to Lake, he was deported to Calcutta, and thence reached France via Hamburg, taking with him an immense fortune. He was described by one who knew him as 'not only a coward but a fool.' (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp 341-2.)]

The total loss of the Mahrattas was estimated at three thousand, that of the British army was five hundred and eighty-five, of whom fifteen were European officers. Louis Bourquin, the commander of the Mahratta infantry, and five other French officers surrendered themselves prisoners three days afterwards. The other results of the victory were the possession of the capital of the Moghul empire, and of the family and person of the descendant of Timour. Though the change was but change of masters, it was a happy event for the aged and unfortunate Shah Alum, to find himself once more under the protection of the British nation, of whose honour and liberality he had experienced many proofs.¹

General Lake next marched against Agra, which he summoned, but no answer was returned. This garrison had been under the command of English officers, who, on the breaking out of the war, were confined by their own troops; this circumstance, combined with other causes, occasioned the greatest anarchy and confusion in the fort. Seven battalions of Sindia's regular infantry were encamped on the glacis; but the garrison were afraid to admit them, lest they should plunder a rich treasury which they wished to reserve for themselves. General Lake resolved to beat up the quarters of the seven battalions (Oct. 10.) outside, in the first instance, in which he completely succeeded, taking twenty-six of their guns. Three days afterwards, two thousand five hundred of those who remained, came over in a body and were admitted into the British service. A few days after this event, the progress of the siege being considerable, the garrison applied to their European officers, whom they had kept prisoners, to make terms for them; on the (Oct. 18.) 18th October they evacuated the fort with their private property; but the treasury and arsenal, with one hundred and sixty two-pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors.²

¹ [Shāh Ālam did all he could to show his gratitude by conferring on his deliverer honours and titles, among them being the '*Mahī Maratib*' (the Order of the Fish). (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, p. 137.) Shāh Ālam was restored to the throne as sovereign of Delhi and the small surrounding district, under the control of a British Resident, who was to pay to the Emperor the net income of that territory besides a monthly stipend of 90,000 rupees. (Keene, *Mughal Empire*, p. 252.)]

² ['A wonderful piece of ordnance, known as the 'great gun of Agra' was taken. It was a casting in brass or some similar alloy, 14 feet 2 inches long, with a calibre or bore 23 inches in diameter.]

General Lake's next object was the infantry which had been sent under Dudrenec, by Sindia, to reinforce his army in Hindoo-stan. It consisted of seven battalions, and arrived from the Deccan about the beginning of October. This body had been joined by three of Bourquin's battalions, not engaged at the battle of Delhi, and by some of the fugitives from Delhi and Agra, who were formed into two battalions; the whole consisting of twelve strong battalions, and amounting to about nine thousand men. They had a very superior equipment of artillery; were accompanied by twelve or fifteen hundred good horse, and during the siege of Agra had occupied a position about thirty miles distant from the British army. The commander was a Mahratta officer,¹ Dudrenec having surrendered to the English on the 30th October.

It was understood that they intended to march on Delhi, for the recovery of the capital. General Lake with a strong force (Oct. 27.) proceeded in quest of them on the 27th of October, but as he advanced, they retired towards the hills of Mewat.

(Oct. 31.) On the 31st of October General Lake, on arriving at the ground which they had occupied the preceding day, determined, in order to prevent their escape, to pursue them with his cavalry, now consisting of eight regiments, three of which were European dragoons. He accordingly moved off at eleven o'clock that night, directing the infantry to follow at three o'clock next morning. After a march of twenty-five miles he came up with them at sunrise of the 1st Nov. On descrying the (Nov. 1.) Mahratta infantry, they appeared in motion, and supposing them to be in full retreat, Lake ordered on the cavalry to impede them by an immediate attack. The Mahrattas however had time to form, and instead of being found on the retreat, they had taken up a strong position, their right on the village of Laswaree,² partially protected by a deep ravine, and their left,

It weighed 96,600 pounds and could fire a shot weighing 1,500 pounds. When General Lake tried to remove it to Calcutta, it sank in the Jamna. Subsequently, Lord William Bentinck caused it to be blown up and sold as old metal.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 600 n.)]

¹ I have not ascertained who this officer was; he is called Abajee by Major Thorn, but I regret not having obtained more satisfactory information respecting him. It was perhaps one of Ambajee Ingliā's Carcoons.

² [Laswārī (Laswaree) is a village in the Alwar State, 128 miles south of Delhi. (*I.G.*, xvi. 153.)]

resting on the village of Mohaulpore. To their rear was a deep rivulet, and their front was lined with seventy-five pieces of cannon chained together, the more effectually to resist the charge of horse. The whole were concealed by very high grass. The different brigades of cavalry, particularly that under Colonel Macan, executed the orders they had received in the most spirited manner ; but the opposition with which they had to contend was formidable in the extreme, and their loss was very great ; inso-much that General Lake was compelled to desist from this hazardous attack, and await the arrival of the infantry. The Mahratta troops, in the meantime, changed their position and drew up in two lines, the one in front, the other in rear of the village of Mohaulpore. Their commander, on seeing the approach of the British infantry, offered to surrender his guns on certain conditions, which were accepted, and one hour was allowed to fulfil the terms ; but at the end of that time, General Lake prepared to renew the attack. The British infantry consisted of the 76th regiment and six battalions of Bengal Sepoys. Of three brigades of cavalry, one was directed to support the infantry ; another was detached to the right to watch the enemy, and take advantage of any confusion that might appear among them ; and a third brigade formed the reserve. The whole of the artillery was thrown into four batteries to support the attack of the infantry. General Lake's object was to turn the right of the enemy's position, for which purpose he moved off with the infantry in open column of companies, along the bank of the rivulet which was nearly at right angles to the enemy's new position. For a time the march of the British troops was concealed by the high grass, but the Mahrattas no sooner discerned them than they perceived the general's intention, which they immediately frustrated by throwing back their left wing, covering the movement with a heavy cannonade, which did severe execution on the front of the British column. The British artillery returned the fire with good effect ; but the enemy's cannon were far superior in number and weight of metal, and equally well served. The ground was much broken, the advance greatly impeded by that circumstance, and the ranks of the 76th were so much thinned that General Lake, who now, as on every occasion, was foremost in the battle, deemed it advisable to hasten on the attack with that regiment and one battalion and five companies of Sepoys who had closed to the front.

When they arrived within reach of the canister shot, the fire and the execution became so extremely severe that it prevented a regular advance, and the Mahratta horse were encouraged to charge. They came on, but were repulsed most heroically; again they rallied, and assumed so menacing a position that General Lake ordered the British cavalry to charge in turn. This service was gallantly performed by the 29th dragoons¹ who dashed through both lines of the enemy's infantry, wheeled round upon their cavalry, killed many of the latter, drove them from the field, and turning round, fell upon the rear of their second line. That line was by this time hotly engaged with the British infantry, which having taken advantage of the gallant charge of their cavalry had rushed forward on the guns, taken possession of them, and driven the first line back on the second. The whole of the British troops had now come up and joined in the attack; but the hardy veterans of De Boigne, determined to die where they could not conquer, fought on with brave though unavailing obstinacy; and excepting about two thousand who were broken, surrounded and made prisoners, they fell with their arms in their hands! Few if any of those men were natives of Maharashtra; they were chiefly from Oude, Rohilcund and the Dooab, for except Sivajee's Mawulees, and men trained in the ranks of the Bombay Sepoys,² the native Mahrattas have never made good infantry.³

¹ When forming for the charge on the flank of the infantry, the 76th, with the same spirit which distinguished the 74th at the battle of Assaye, gave them three cheers.

² The men of this description are remarkably quiet and sober, patient under privation, and good soldiers; they used to be more apt to desert than any other men, but that was probably owing to circumstances no longer in existence.

³ [This assertion requires qualification in the light of the record of the Marāthā regiments during the Great War (1914-18). When war broke out, recruiting for the Bombay regiments was confined to the Deccan and Konkani Marāthās, who are members of the great agricultural Kunbī class, and to the Deccan Muhammadans. Though the Deccan Marāthā came forward in smaller numbers to join the army and showed towards recruiting a much less martial spirit than the Konkani Marāthā from Kolāba, Ratnāgiri and Sāvantvādi Districts, still he fought with as much courage and credit as the Konkani Marāthā in East Africa, Mesopotamia, Palestine and France. The Konkani Marāthā on the other hand came forward freely to enlist for the sake of the Marāthā name, and the honour of the regiments with which his ancestors were associated. British officers who commanded them have borne testimony to the unvarying steadiness and courage with which the Marāthās proper from the Deccan and Konkan

The victory of Laswaree cost the English army 824 men in killed and wounded, but it completed the overthrow of the brigades of De Boigne and Perron, and placed Agra and Delhi, with all Sindia's districts north of the Chumbul, in the power of the British Government.¹

While success thus attended the British arms in Maharashtra fought and faced the hardships of campaigning. The fact that Deccan Marāthās were disposed to join the forces less eagerly than their Konkani caste-fellows is probably due partly to economic causes and partly to the fact that for many years prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, some Bombay regiments were recruited almost entirely outside the Bombay Presidency. Yet, though there had been no warfare affecting the Marāthās for over a century, and the small numbers of them in the regular army had been very seldom employed on active service, the Marāthā regiments served with credit on every occasion, and many of their young recruits fought as gallantly at the end of the Mesopotamian campaign as the older soldiers had done at the battles of Śhaiba and Kut.

In Sivāji's time the Marāthās, as a fighting class, included many who were not Marāthās by race, but who were bound together by the bond of country and language. The Hetkaris, for example, were Bandhārīs; many of the Māvalīs (Mawulees) were Kolīs; the Mhārs claim to have fought in his armies; the Māngs frequently garrisoned his forts; the part played by Prabhus and Brahmans is well known. As the Marāthā power spread, its army tended to become more professional and less national, and the Marāthās themselves became almost wholly cavalrymen. Later still the Marāthā infantry was composed chiefly of men from Hindustān. When the British Government in Bombay began to raise regular regiments, they recruited various classes such as Pardeshis (i.e. men from Hindustān), Deccani and Konkani Marāthās, Deccani Musalmāns, Mhārs, Bandhārīs, Chambhārs and even Bene-Israel (the Jews of the north Konkan). But later on, the preference of the military authorities for men from northern India and the growing caste feeling of the Marāthās proper led to the exclusion of these miscellaneous classes; and although during the Great War a fresh effort was made to recruit castes like the Rājputīs of Gujarāt, Kolīs, Mhārs, Berads and Bandhārīs, which met with no little success, yet the bulk of the regiments were filled with recruits from the Marāthās proper, both of the Deccan and Konkan, who can certainly claim to be 'native Mahrattas,' and who proved themselves to be very good infantry.

(Address by P. R. Cadell, C.S.I., C.I.E. (Indian Civil Service), at the Annual Meeting of the Anthropological Society, Bombay, February 1919, on 'The military instincts of the castes of the Bombay Presidency, as indicated by their share in fighting and recruitment during the war.')

¹ [Sindia's troops, who were known as the 'Deccan Invincibles,' lost about 7,000 killed and 2,000 prisoners. A medal to commemorate the victory was struck in London in 1851, and presented to the survivors. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith (1915), p. 166 n.)]

and in Hindoostan, a force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt invaded Kuttack.¹ Manikpatam was taken possession of without resistance on the 14th September. The Bramins of the temple of Jaggernaut placed it under the protection of the British Government, and the town of Kuttack was surrendered on the 10th October. A detachment under Captain Morgan occupied Ballasore on the 21st September, and took Soorrung on the 3d October. The storm of the fort of Barabuttee on the 14th October, by the troops under Colonel Harcourt, completed the conquest of the province of Kuttack.

The conquest of Bundelcund was effected with equal celerity. In regard to this province, a new arrangement had been made with the Peishwa in the month of August, by which the greater part of his rights in it was ceded to the English Company in lieu of Savanoor and Benkapoor, in the southern Mahratta country, and Oolpar² in the neighbourhood of Surat; all of which were included in the cessions made by the treaty of Bassein, and yielded an annual revenue of rupees 19 lacks and 16 thousand. The nominal revenue of Bundelcund was 36,16,000 rupees, but the state of the country rendered the first-mentioned cessions of much greater value to the Peishwa; whilst to the British, Bundelcund from its situation in the neighbourhood of the position on the Jumna, and their means of rendering its revenues available, was extremely important. The British Government, in consideration of the advantages thus derived, agreed to maintain a body of 5,000 Mahratta horse during the continuance of the war, and to keep a regiment of cavalry in addition to the 6,000 infantry, on the permanent establishment of the Poona subsidiary force; whilst from the Peishwa, instead of 6,000 infantry and 10,000 horse, only half of that number was to be required. This arrangement was afterwards regularly recognised, and the treaty drawn up in consequence of it, under date 16th December, 1803, was termed supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.

¹ [The annexation of Katak (Kuttack or Cuttack) joined the territories of Bengal and Madras. Full particulars of the campaign will be found in Major W. Thorn's *Memoir of the War in India conducted by General Lord Lake and Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, &c.*, London, 1818. The cession of Cuttack was included in the articles of the Treaty of Deogāon (December 30, 1803.)]

² [Olpād (Oolpar) is now the headquarters of the Olpād *tāluka*, occupying the north-western portion of the Surat District. (*B.G.*, ii, 267 f.; *I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 340.)]

The Gosaeen Himmud Buhadur had tendered his services to the British Government, to assist them in the conquest of Bundelcund; and his offer being now accepted, he joined the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, on the 16th September, with a large body of troops. Colonel Powell had crossed the Jumna ten days before. The united forces, after reducing various forts, crossed the river Cane on the 10th October. On the 13th they found the army of Shumsher Buhadur drawn up to oppose them; but after a feeble resistance they gave way, fled across the river Betwah, and evacuated the province.

We now return to the contending armies in the Deccan.

As soon as the confederates found that General Wellesley had not passed the Ghaut, but was moving south towards Aurungabad, and that Colonel Stevenson had marched against Burhanpoor, they made preparations for following and interrupting

him in that object. General Wellesley learning their (Oct. 19.) design immediately returned north, and descended the Ajunta Ghaut. Sindia, on finding that General Wellesley had returned, halted, but Rughoojee Bhonslay, who had separated from his confederate, marched to the southward by the Unkye Tunkye pass. General Wellesley, therefore, in order to protect the territory of the Nizam, reascended the Ajunta, and continued his route beyond Aurungabad, until he arrived in the neighbourhood of the camp of Rughoojee, who was so apprehensive of a night attack that he moved his camp five

(Oct. 31.) times in less than forty-eight hours. On the 31st, Rughoojee detached 5,000 horse to cut off a convoy of 14,000 bullock loads of grain, escorted by three companies of Sepoys and a party of Mysore horse under Captain Baynes, who made a judicious and spirited defence at the village of Amber, and brought in the whole of his convoy safe with the exception of about two hundred bullocks. After this event, General Wellesley, finding that Rughoojee was moving towards his own territories, once more returned to the northward, and descended the Ghauts at Rajoora, for the purpose of supporting and covering Colonel Stevenson, whom he had ordered to form the siege of Gawelgurh.

Previously to this period, several propositions for peace had been made to General Wellesley in Sindia's name. Ballajee Koonjur, the Peishwa's most confidential agent, who, notwith-

standing the war, continued in Sindia's camp, sent a letter fifteen days after the battle of Assaye, requesting that one of the British and one of the Nizam's officers should be sent to Sindia's camp to settle terms of pacification ; but as he was not an accredited agent, and as the appearance of a British officer in Sindia's camp would have enabled the Mahrattas to represent the British nation as supplicants for peace, General Wellesley refused compliance, but expressed his readiness to receive any envoy the confederates might depute. Another communication was opened through Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was serving with the Peishwa's contingent, and the result was that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, accompanied by a Bramin named Naroo Punt, arrived in General Wellesley's camp, on the part of Sindia, for the purpose of negotiating, but as they also were unprovided with credentials, General Wellesley refused to treat until they should obtain them from Sindia. That chief, in the meantime, sent a letter, disavowing Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray's mission ; but, notwithstanding this disavowal, General Wellesley^a was convinced, from a letter addressed by Sindia to Appa Dessaye, that Ghorepuray had been deputed, and therefore permitted him to remain in his camp until a reply to his first reference should be received. A few hours after the interview in question, powers arrived for constituting Ghorepuray and his companion the envoys of Sindia, but they were essentially defective, as they did not enable the envoys to cede any portion of territory as compensation to the British Government and its allies, which was required as the basis of the pacification. Until this authority could be obtained, Ghorepuray solicited a cessation of arms for both the confederates. It was granted to Sindia on the 23d November, on condition that he should occupy a position twenty kos east of Elichpoor, and forage still further to the eastward ; but it was refused to Rughoojee Bhonslay, because he had sent no envoy nor expressed any desire for peace.

The conditions, however, on which General Wellesley agreed to a suspension of hostilities, were not observed by Sindia ; Rughoojee Bhonslay's army was encamped at Argaoim,¹ near Gawelgurh, under his brother Venkajee Munya Bappoo, and Sindia's cavalry were at Sersowly, within about five miles of him.

¹ [Argāon (Argaoim) is in the Akola District of Berār. (*I.G.*, vi. 1.)]

Venkajee, besides cavalry, had the whole of his brother's infantry and a considerable number of guns. The wukeels of Sindia urgently dissuaded the British commander from attacking Venkajee. General Wellesley told them repeatedly that there was no armistice with Rughoojee Bhonslay, and none with Sindia, until he complied with the terms of the agreement. Colonel Stevenson was by this time within a short distance of the confederates, and on the 28th November halted, to enable General Wellesley to co-operate in the expected battle. The confederates decamped from the position they had occupied, when the united British divisions moved towards them on the ensuing day. As

(Nov.
29.)

General Wellesley approached his intended ground of encampment, a few of the enemy's skirmishers appeared in front, and were opposed by the Mysore horse.

General Wellesley, not intending to pursue them, was, after a long march, about to pitch his tents, when the Mahratta cavalry appeared in greater force, and it became necessary to support the Mysore horse with the picquets. General Wellesley, moving out at the head of the latter, descried the army of the confederates drawn up in line on an extensive plain in front of the village of Argaom. Though late in the day, he immediately advanced to the attack, and marched on in column until near the enemy, when he formed his army into two lines, the infantry in the first, and the cavalry in the second. Some confusion ensued in forming the lines, when the Mahratta guns first opened upon them, but when formed, the whole moved on with steadiness and order. A body of about five hundred infantry, supposed to have been Persians, in the service of the confederates, rushed upon the 74th and 78th with desperation, and were destroyed to a man. Sindia's cavalry under Gopaul Rao Bhow charged the 1st battalion, 6th regiment of Madras Sepoys; but they were repulsed, and their commander was wounded; on which the whole army retired in confusion, pursued by the British cavalry and by the Mysore and Moghul horse. In this action, the loss of the British was 346 men in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Mahrattas is nowhere stated, but was very considerable.

(Dec. 5.)—The British army next invested Gowelgurh.¹ The

¹ [Gāwīlgarh is a hill-fort in the Sātpuras, situated in Amraoti District, Berār, and stands 3,595 feet high. It was built by Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī in 1425–8, and was afterwards a stronghold of the

principal operations were carried on by Colonel Stevenson's division on the north face, where the troops went through uncommon labour and fatigue in carrying the guns and stores to the point of attack. The outer fort, having been breached by the 14th, was stormed on the ensuing morning; the inner fort was escalated by the light company of the 94th headed by Captain Campbell, who immediately opened the gate and admitted the rest of the troops.

(Dec.
15.)

In the meanwhile negotiations had been going forward at intervals for upwards of a fortnight. Yeswunt Rao Ramchundur, the wukeel of Rughoojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to prove that his master was not the aggressor in the war; that the Peishwa had concluded a treaty contrary to the usage of the Mahratta state, without consulting the chiefs of the empire; that his master had not quitted his own territory, nor moved towards Sindia's with any hostile design against the British Government, but had gone with his army to mediate between Sindia and Holkar; that Holkar was strong and Sindia was weak, and that the latter would have been overpowered without his master's assistance. General Wellesley represented the fact of his having assembled an army on the frontier of an ally of Britain, and having, in conjunction with Sindia, refused to withdraw; he denied the right of the Mahratta chiefs to be consulted by the Peishwa before he could make a treaty; and in regard to interfering between Sindia and Holkar on account of the weakness of the former, admitting

Imādshāhī dynasty. Repaired in 1577 by Murtaza Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar, it was captured in 1597-8 by the Mughals. In the second Marāthā War it was held by Beni Singh for Raghuji Bhoslē, and was stormed by General Wellesley on December 15, 1803. The fort was dismantled in 1853. Among the loot taken at Gāwīlgarh was a silver image of the god Bālāji (Vithoba) and his two wives, which is said to have belonged to Raghuji Bhōslē. It was eventually purchased by Edward Moor, and is depicted on Plate 12 of the original edition (1810) of his *Hindu Pantheon*. Another prize, seized at the same time, was a silver throne for various gods, which was carried to Poona and purchased by the Pēshwā for 40,000 rupees. (Moor, *ibid.*, p. 33.) The Delhi gate of the fort has two bas-reliefs of a double-headed eagle holding an elephant in its beak and claws. This is the famous *Ganda bherunda*, the emblem of the Vijayanagar Empire, and is evidence that the gate was built by Fath-ullah Imād-ul-Mulk, who, according to Firishṭa, was a Vijayanagar Brahman captured in his youth and brought up as a Muhammadan. Imād-ul-Mulk was viceroy of the province under Mahmūd Shāh Bahmani, and became independent in 1490. He repaired the fort in 1488. (*I.G.*, xii. 193-4.)

the fact to have been so, it was, General Wellesley observed, an extraordinary mode of strengthening Sindia and weakening Holkar, to transfer to the latter all the territories of the Holkar family. In short, after a long argument as to the merits of the war, and a still longer discussion respecting the terms of the pacification, it was finally agreed on the 17th Dec.

(Dec.
17.)

that Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, should cede to the British Government and its allies the province of Kuttack, including Ballasore; and the whole of his territory and shares of revenue to the westward of the river Wurda, and south of the hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh. The forts of Nurnalla and Gawelgurh remained in Rughoojee Bhonslay's possession, together with districts lying south of those forts, valued at four lacks of rupees. All claims on the Nizam, including of course Chouth, Ghasdana, &c. were renounced; all differences between the Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Sena Sahib Soobeh were to be arbitrated by the British Government; and no European or American of a nation at war with the English, or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British Government. Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Deogaom. Accredited ministers, from each of the contracting parties, were to reside at the court of the other; and the Honourable M. Elphinstone, at that time Persian interpreter on the staff of General Wellesley's army, was appointed to act as Resident at Nagpoor.

The negotiations with Sindia were not so promptly terminated. Doulut Rao endeavoured by every means to avoid making the cessions, which the British Government demanded as the basis of a pacification; and it was not until assured that his compliance

(Dec.
30.)

was the only means of averting the entire conquest of his territories, that he at length assented. The treaty was concluded at Surjee Anjengaom on the 30th December, and Sindia ceded to the British Government and its allies his territory between the Jumna and Ganges, and all situated to the northward of the Rajpoot principalities of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud; but the territory lying between Jeypoor and Joudpoor and to the southward of the former place was reserved. The forts of Ahmednugur and Baroach, with their districts; his possessions between the Ajunta Ghaut and the Godavery, and all claims on the Emperor of the Moghuls, the

British Government or its allies, the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Gaekwar, were renounced by Sindia: he also gave up all claims upon such Rajas or Jagheerdars as might have become allies of the British Government during the war, and declared them independent of his authority. Sindia entered into the same agreement in regard to Europeans and Americans, and to Residents at the courts, as had been admitted by Rughoojee Bhonslay: Major Malcolm was appointed to act as Resident in his camp. The city of Burhanpoor, the forts of Asseergurh, Pawungurh and Dohud, with their dependent districts, conquered by the British Government during the war, were restored to Sindia. The enams granted to Mahadajee Sindia by the Emperor, namely, the districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-kerrah, situated to the northward of the prescribed limits, and certain Jagheers belonging to the family or to immediate dependants of Sindia were restored; and the British Government likewise promised Jagheers, or pensions in lieu of them, amounting to fifteen lacks of rupees annually, to some other persons in Sindia's service. All enam villages, lands, or *Wutun*, obtained by Sindia and his predecessors within the territories ceded, were to be restored to him and to the respective owners; but no troops were permitted to be kept in such places, either to the north or south of Sindia's own territory. Finally the British Government left it in the option of Sindia to become a party to the defensive alliance, offering him a subsidiary force, payable from the revenues of the territories already ceded, whether furnished or not. In conformity with this article in the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom, a new treaty was afterwards concluded with Sindia at Burhanpoor on the 27th February, 1804, by Major Malcolm, empowered for that purpose by General Wellesley. Sindia then agreed to become a party to the defensive alliance, and a subsidiary force of six thousand infantry, with their artillery, was to be stationed near his boundary, but within the British territory.

Of the conquests thus gained from the confederates, by subsequent partition treaties between the British Government and its allies the Nizam and the Peishwa, the province of Kuttack including Balasore, the pergunna and fort of Baroach, the districts conquered from Sindia north of the Rajpoot states, the territory along the bank of the Jumna, and between that river and the Ganges, were assigned to the British Government. The whole

tract west of the Wurda, eastward of the Peishwa's frontier, and southward of the range of hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh, down as far as the Godavery, was made over to the Nizam. The Peishwa having failed to afford the aid which was in his power, and having in other respects profited largely by the war, the fort and district of Ahmednugur was the only portion reserved as his share of the conquests.

The princes and chiefs who, by treaties with General Lake, had become the allies of the British Government, were the Rajas of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Boondee, and Macherry; the Jhat Raja of Bhurtpoor, the Rana of Gohud, and the Mahratta officer Ambajee Ingliã. The agreements with the Rajpoots and the Raja of Bhurtpoor specify the guarantee of their territory against external enemies, an exemption from tribute, and the aid of their forces in the event of any invasion of the country lately conquered by the British; Europeans not to be received into their service without the consent of the British Government. With respect to the Rana of Gohud and Ambajee Ingliã, with whom treaties were also made, it will be recollected that Mahadajee Sindia conquered the Gohud territory in 1784, and since that period it had been held by that chieftain and his successor. Ambajee Ingliã, whom we have seen appointed successor to Perron, was Mamlitdar of the province of Gohud, and after seeing the rapid conquest of Hindoostan, revolted, or pretended to revolt, against his master, and joined the English, from whom he obtained by treaty a share of the province of Gohud, which was divided between him and the Rana, with the exception of the fort of Gwalior, ceded by the Rana to the English. The treaties with the Rana of Gohud and Ambajee Ingliã were similar to those concluded with the Rajpoots; excepting that the Rana of Gohud agreed to subsidize three battalions of Sepoys, paying for them at the rate of 75,000 rupees a month. But these two treaties last mentioned afterwards became null and void, for reasons which the progress of our narrative will explain.¹

¹ The above chapter is on the authority of English Records. The Marquis Wellesley's Narrative. Oral information. Mahratta Letters and MSS.; and Major Thorn's Memoir.

CHAPTER XLIV.

A.D. 1804.

A.D. 1804.—THE rapidity of the conquests and the speedy termination of the war surprised all India, and it was naturally supposed that the astonishing success of the British arms would have deterred any power, however inimically disposed, from evincing a spirit of hostility at such a moment ; but the conduct of Asiatics is frequently so capricious that it cannot be foreseen by any reasonable estimate of their real interests.

Family rivalry, next to disputes concerning hereditary rights, is always uppermost in the mind of a Mahratta. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, notwithstanding the great sacrifices made by Sindia to induce him to join the confederacy, could not believe that his rival could forget the defeat and disgrace he had so lately suffered ; and he concluded that, in the event of success against the British power, Sindia's first object, after re-establishing his influence at Poona, would be a war of extermination against himself. On the other hand, if the tide should turn against the confederates, he imagined, after the power of Sindia had been reduced to the level of his own, he might not only interpose with safety, but attain a consequence so much the greater, as it would be manifest in the event of ultimate success that it had mainly depended on his exertions. Like all the Holkar family, he was a great advocate for the predatory system of warfare, and conceived that it would have been better for the confederates, if they had carefully reserved their infantry and guns under the protection of forts, avoided an action, devastated the Company's provinces, and acted with vigour upon General Wellesley's supplies.

Holkar, during the progress of hostilities, remained in Malwa, levying enormous contributions¹ from friend and foe, and could

¹ Sir John Malcolm mentions his having exacted a crore of rupees from the city of Mundissore alone. [Mandasōr in Mālwa is now in Sindia's dominions. (*I.G.*, xvii. 150.)]

scarcely credit the accounts he received of the rapid victories of the English. When too late, he began to carry his designs into execution, and moved up towards the Jeypoor territory, for the purpose of negotiating for aid from the Rajpoots, the Raja of Bhurtpoor, the Rohillas, and the Seiks. He likewise dispatched an envoy to Sindia, recommending him to break the treaty and renew the war; but that chieftain was, or pretended to be at the moment, so exasperated against him, that he immediately communicated the fact to the British authority. Some of his ministers, especially his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, had more confidence in Holkar, and advised Sindia, notwithstanding the communication to the British Resident, to dispatch a wukeel to the camp of Jeswunt Rao, for the purpose, as they gave out, of ascertaining his designs; but in reality to leave open the door of reconciliation, in case the project of Holkar, in whose wisdom and fortune all the Mahrattas began to have great confidence, should prove worthy of regard.

The principal part of the British armies in the Deccan, after the termination of hostilities, retired to the southward, and two considerable divisions were stationed, the one at Jaffeirabad to ensure the tranquillity of the country and its occupation by the Nizam, and the other at Poona with the Peishwa, whose territory was a good deal molested by plundering insurgents and freebooters, which is usually the case in India after the close of a war.

The army in Hindoostan under General Lake was still in the field to watch the motions of Holkar, whose menacing position, as well as the tone of his language, the general report of his hostile intentions, and his having put to death three officers,¹ British subjects, who wished, in consequence of these reports, to take advantage of the Governor-General's proclamation and retire from his service, afforded strong indications of an approaching rupture. Superadded to these were the machinations already mentioned, which were ascertained from his intercepted correspondence; but it was scarcely credible that he could intend risking a war; and General Lake believed to the last that affairs with Holkar would be amicably adjusted. In Holkar's letters to General Lake, as is frequently the case when insolence is designed on the part of a Mahratta, it is difficult to discover whether

¹ [They were Vickers, Dodd and Ryan. (See footnote on page 316, *ante.*)]

friendly profession, arrogance or humility predominates. In his first letter, professing that he had no intention of saying anything improper, he requested General Lake to retire towards Agra, 'as his near approach to his victorious army appeared likely to produce unpleasant circumstances.' In his next, he declares that from him the general shall never have any other language than that of friendship; 'but if anything contrary to friendship shall appear from you, then I am helpless.' At length it became absolutely necessary to ascertain the designs of Holkar, and the Governor-General directed General Lake to intimate to him the necessity of withdrawing his troops from the frontier of the allies of the British Government. Whatever claims might be urged by the Holkar family against the Rajpoots and others, such claims, he was told, could not be considered to rest in him; but the British Government was willing, with the consent of the Peishwa, to arbitrate the existing difference between him and his brother Khassee Rao, on principles of equity and justice: Jeswunt Rao was also invited to send wukeels to the British camp. To these proposals Holkar replied by promising to withdraw his troops; and in the middle of March sent wukeels to General Lake's camp at Ramgurh. These persons produced a letter from Holkar, in which, after many friendly professions, he recommends the general to consent to the propositions they would offer, otherwise, 'his country and his property were on the saddle of his horse; to whatever side the reins of his brave warriors should be turned, the whole of the country in that direction should come into his possession.' The wukeels

(March 18.) submitted the following propositions: 1st. 'That Holkar should be permitted to collect Chouth, agreeably to the custom of his ancestors. 2d. That the ancient possessions formerly held by the family, such as Etawah, &c.; twelve districts between the Ganges and Jumna, and a district in Bundelcund should be ceded to him. 3d. That the country of Hurriana, which was formerly in the possession of the family, should be given to him. 4th. That the country then in his possession should be guaranteed, and a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that with Sindia.' These demands were altogether extravagant, and were treated as such by General Lake. Most of these countries mentioned in the second and third propositions had been conquered from Sindia; Etawah had not

been in the possession of the Mahrattas since their garrisons were driven out by Shujah-ud-doulah, after the recall of the Peishwa's general, Visajee Kishen, in 1773, and had been ceded in 1801 by the Nabob of Oude to the East India Company. The wukeels proceeded, in a high strain of menace, to exaggerate the power of Holkar and the value of the connexions, hostile to the British Government, which he had formed. General Lake replied, 'that it was not customary with the English to boast of their power, but that Holkar would find, in the event of a rupture, that he had much overvalued his own.' General Lake also took occasion to mention to the wukeels that their propositions and their language were so much at variance with the tenor of Holkar's letters, that no judgement could be formed of his real wishes and intentions. On the ensuing day the wukeels attended to receive a reply to the letter they had brought from Holkar, when they solicited a grant of some country, or an annual sum in lieu of an increase of country, and asked whether or not Holkar was to be allowed to collect the customary tribute from the states of Oudepoor and Kotah. To all which General Lake merely replied that Holkar must first evince his friendly intentions by returning into his own country, before the British Government could be enabled to enter upon a discussion of any claims.

Five or six weeks before the dispatch of these wukeels to General Lake, Jeswunt Rao Holkar had addressed a letter to General Wellesley, in which he demanded from him certain districts claimed by his family in the Deccan, as the condition of peace, and concluded in a strain of the most vaunting menace, in case, by non-compliance, it should be rendered necessary to resort to war.

In the beginning of April Holkar repaired on pretence of devotion to Ajimere, belonging to Sindia, where he levied contributions, and made an unsuccessful attempt to possess himself of the fort; but he justified these acts to Sindia's wukeel as necessary to enable him to prosecute a war involving the independence of the Mahrattas. A great portion of his army remained on the frontier of the Jeypoor territory, where they commenced plundering.

In the meanwhile the Governor-General having been made acquainted with Holkar's demands, and apprehending many evils from continuing to temporize, issued orders to General Lake

and General Wellesley to attack Holkar's troops and possessions in every direction, declaring at the same time that it was not his intention to retain Holkar's territories for the British Government, but to divide them amongst its allies.

(April 16.)

General Wellesley was at this period at Bombay,¹ and in consequence of a famine in the Deccan,² from a deficiency of rain, superadded to the devastations occasioned by the moving armies and plundering bands, by which that country had been for years infested, it was apprehended that it would be impracticable to act against Holkar's possessions in that quarter until the fall of the rains; but General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray to assail them from Guzerat, and to advance upon his capital in Malwa. Sindia, who was informed of these particulars, professed

¹ [General Wellesley was in Bombay from March to May 1804, and lived in a house called Surrey Cottage, about half-way up the now non-existent eastern brow of Malabar Hill. This portion of the hill was cut away to provide filling for the Back Bay reclamation (1860-6). The hall of the house commanded a fine view of Back Bay, a portion of Girgaum and the Esplanade. The stables of the house stood close to the modern Siri Road. (*B.C.G.*, ii. 132-3 n.)]

² [Holkar's army on its march to Poona had laid waste the whole countryside. The Pindāris followed in its wake and reduced the Deccan and Carnatic to such depths of misery and want that cows, buffaloes and even human beings are said to have been devoured by the starving peasantry. The price of grain stood at 1½ lb. per rupee, and notwithstanding the activity of private charity, and importations of grain and liberal remissions of revenue by the Peshwā's government, continuous hordes of starving emigrants poured into the Konkan and Gujarāt, leaving a trail of dead and dying behind them. The failure of the late rains of 1803 accentuated the calamity wrought by human agency; the river at Poona was black with putrescent corpses, and hunger, hand in hand with cholera, left numerous villages permanently desolate. Among those who endeavoured with some success to mitigate the prevailing misery were Lady Mackintosh in Bombay, who collected £4,000 for relief, and General Wellesley, who improvised relief works and free doles for the people of Ahmadnagar. The part played by the Bombay Government during this crisis is described by Forbes (*Oriental Memoirs*, iv. 291-5), who quotes the fine address delivered by Sir James Mackintosh, Recorder of Bombay, to the Grand Jury in 1804. 'I am sure,' he said, 'that I considerably understate the facts in saying that the British Government in this island has saved the lives of 100,000 persons, and, what is more important, that it has prevented the greater part of the misery through which they must have passed before they found refuge in death, besides the misery of all those who loved them or who depended on their care.' (*B.C.G.*, ii. 133-5.)]

his readiness to act in cordial co-operation for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao.

(April 18.)—On the 18th April General Lake sent forward a detachment of three native battalions under Colonel Monson to

(April 23.) Jeypoor, on which Holkar began to retire rapidly to the southward. Parties of irregular horse under European officers followed his march to watch his motions and harass his troops. Holkar having halted for two days, General Lake advanced upon him preceded by Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment, but Holkar renewed his flight and continued his route until he had gained his own frontier, and crossed the Chumbul. During his retreat he made an attempt to renew the negotiation which was declared inadmissible. He was followed by the irregular horse and Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, covered by General Lake's army, from which a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Don gallantly stormed and took the fort of Tonk-Rampoorah by blowing open the gate.

(May 16.) The news of this first success in the war against Holkar was shortly afterwards followed by intelligence of a different description from the province of Bundelcund, where the refractory chiefs in that strong country occupied the troops for a considerable period after its transfer to the British Government. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, the officer in command, had detached seven companies of Sepoys, with some artillery, for the purpose of reducing a small fort. Whilst operations against it were in progress, the Killidar sent out an offer to surrender on the ensuing morning on condition that the firing should cease. The proposal being accepted, the Killidar apprised Holkar's general, Umeer Khan, of the circumstances, and invited him to send a detachment and fall by surprise on the British troops. In this scheme they were partially successful; the horse approached the battery before they were discovered, and two companies of Sepoys with fifty artillery-men, their officers and guns were completely cut off. The remaining five companies, under Captain Smith, supported by their only remaining gun, effected their retreat to the headquarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett. Umeer Khan, encouraged by this success, made an attack on Kalpee and attempted to pass the Jumna, for the purpose of plundering the Dooab, but he was checked by two companies of

Sepoys stationed on the bank, and was shortly afterwards attacked and routed by a party of horse, and a battalion of infantry which had been received into the British pay from the service of Ambajee Inglia. Umeer Khan, however, continued to act for some time on the side of Bundelcund, where the numerous refractory Zumeendars facilitated the means of predatory warfare.

In the meantime, as the rains approached, and the troops in Guzerat, in concert with those of Sindia, were supposed best capable of acting with advantage against Holkar's possessions during that season, General Lake, after the capture of Tonk-Rampoorah, returned with the main army into cantonment, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to keep Holkar in check, with five battalions of Sepoys and about three thousand irregular horse; the latter divided into two bodies, the one under Bappoojee Sindia in the service of Doulut Rao, and the other under Lieutenant Lucan. After the return of General Lake, Monson, intending to co-operate with Colonel Murray from Guzerat, entered Holkar's territory by the Mokundra pass,¹ and a detachment from his division took the hill-fort of Hinglaisgurh by esca-lade. Without efficient means of supply, he continued his route towards the Chumbul until the 7th July, when he received information that Holkar was crossing that river to attack him with the whole of his army, including his infantry and guns. Monson, who shortly after his appointment to his present command was nominated to the temporary rank of brigadier-general by the British commander-in-chief, at first advanced with the intention of meeting the enemy, and of taking advantage of their probable confusion in crossing the river. But staggered by a report that Colonel Murray intended to fall back on Guzerat, he began to reflect that he had only two days' grain for the supply of his camp, and that several detachments might be expected to join him; he therefore determined to retire to the Mokundra pass. A prompt and spirited attack on Mahrattas has always succeeded: indecision on the part of their enemy encourages them to fight when they would otherwise only think of escape, and a prolonged

¹ [This is the Mukūnd Dāra Pass in Rājputāna, thirty miles to the south of Kotah. The name signifies 'the pass' (Persian 'dara') of 'the deliverer' (Mukūnda, i.e. Vishnu-Krishna). Tod (*Annals of Rajasthan*) describes it in great detail.]

retreat before them, except in the single instance of the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Camac, has invariably ended in disaster.

Having adopted the unfortunate alternative¹ we have mentioned,

Brigadier-General Monson, on the 8th July, began his (July 8.) retreat by sending off his baggage and stores at four o'clock in the morning. No enemy having appeared, the line of infantry followed at nine, and the irregular horse were left on the ground, with orders to follow in half an hour and to send the earliest intelligence of Holkar's motions. The division had retired about six *kos*, when intelligence was brought that the irregular horse had been attacked and defeated, and that Lieutenant Lucan² was taken prisoner. This information, it may be here observed, was brought by Doulut Rao's officer, Bappoojee

Sindia,³ who a few days afterwards deserted to Holkar. (July 9.) On the ensuing morning, however, Monson took post (July 10.) in front of the Mokundra pass. On the 10th the Mahratta cavalry appeared, and next morning, their numbers having greatly increased, Holkar sent a letter requiring the surrender of the arms of the British detachment. The

demand was of course rejected; when Holkar, (July 11.) dividing his cavalry into three bodies, attacked the division in front and flanks, but after various unsuccessful attempts, he withdrew his troops in the evening, and encamped at the distance of two *kos*, where, being joined by his infantry

¹ [General Wellesley's caustic comment was that Monson had 'advanced without reason and retreated in the same manner.' Though Monson advanced too far from his base and committed many military errors, his instructions from Lake were not precise; and it is right to add that Monson was an extremely gallant officer, who had led the storming party at Aligarh, and did good service even after his disaster. (*O.H.I.*, p. 602.) For an account of the campaign from the Rājput side, see Tod's *Annals of Rajasthan*.]

² Lieut. Lucan's fate was never positively known. He was supposed to have been poisoned, but this I have heard contradicted on tolerably good native authority, which stated that he died of a bowel complaint. The authority alluded to was Mohummud Khan Bungush, one of Holkar's officers, taken in rebellion by Colonel Wallace, in 1808.

³ [Bāpūjī (Bappoojee) Sindia was described by Colonel Broughton, who met him in Sindia's camp in August 1809, as 'a large, fat, vulgar-looking man, who talks and laughs a great deal, and has the reputation of being the least scrupulous of all the chiefs of this unprincipled Durbar.']

and guns, he intended, as was supposed, to renew the attack on the following morning. Monson not deeming his post tenable, and being apprehensive of having his retreat cut off, quitted his position, and in two marches, though harassed by the enemy

and exposed to very heavy rain, reached Kotah.¹ The
 (July 12.) Raja-Rana of Kotah, when the British troops appeared as fugitives, would neither admit them into the town nor supply them with food²; Brigadier-General Monson was therefore obliged to continue his route towards the Gaumuch ford on the Chumbul. Although its distance from Kotah was only seven

miles, the obstructions occasioned by the incessant
 (July 13.) rain, and the deep nature of the soil, prevented his reaching the expected ford until next morning, when it

was found impassable until the ensuing day. On the
 (July 14.) 14th Monson was obliged to halt to enable the troops to procure some grain: heavy rain continued throughout the night. On the 15th he resumed his march, but the guns sank so deep in the mud that they could not be extricated. The grain in the adjoining villages was exhausted—retreat was now necessary to procure subsistence; the ammunition was therefore destroyed, and the guns were spiked and abandoned; but they were recommended to the care of the Raja of Boondee,³ who,

¹ [The chiefs of Kotah in Rājputāna belong, like the chiefs of Bundī, to the Hara sept of Chauhān Rājput̄s, and up till 1600 their history is identical with that of the Bundī rulers. About 1342 Jet Singh, son of a chief of Bundī, took Kotah from the Bhils. His descendants were ousted about 1530 by Rāo Suraj Mal of Bundī. Kotah commenced its existence as a separate and independent State about 1625, and was ruled by a long line of chiefs until 1761 when the Jaipur ruler attacked it. The Jaipur forces were, however, defeated by the famous Zālim Singh, who afterwards ruled Kotah as regent for more than fifty years. In 1817 the State came under British protection; and in 1838 it was dismembered in order to allow of the formation of the separate Jhalāwār State for the benefit of Zālim Singh's descendants. (*I.G.*, xv. 412–15). See note on page 463, *post.*]

² Monson's narrative as published by government. The Raj-Rana, Zalim Sing, afterwards denied his having refused them food, and said he had offered them an asylum outside the walls; but allowing this last to have been true, Colonel Monson, by accepting such an equivocal support, might have exposed his detachment to certain destruction between two fires. It is however certain that Zalim Sing was fined ten lacks of rupees by Holkar, whilst the latter lay in the neighbourhood of Kotah.

³ [The Bundī State lies in the south-east of Rājputāna, and is bounded on the north by the Jaipur and Tonk States, on the west by Udaipur

although he could not save the guns, had the courage to maintain his engagements with the English, in the face of the host of Holkar.

(July 17.) On the 17th the troops reached the Chumbelee rivulet which was not fordable, but Monson, on the ensuing day, sent his artillery-men across on elephants, with orders to proceed to the fort of Rampoorah. Nearly ten days

elapsed before the whole of the troops, some on elephants, some on rafts, and some by being sent to a ford farther down, could cross this rivulet, so greatly was it swollen. During that time they sustained much privation ; in different situations, they repulsed several persevering attacks which were made upon them by Holkar's cavalry, and a detachment of flank companies

(July 21.) under Captain O'Donnell beat up the camp of a large body of the enemy on the evening of the 21st July with great spirit and success. Many of the men were

drowned in crossing the Chumbulee ; but the most trying to the poor Sepoys of all that they endured was the loss of many of their wives and children, who being in some instances necessarily left on the opposite bank till the last, were, in this helpless and unprotected state, in view and within hearing of their husbands, barbarously massacred by Bheels from the neighbouring hills, who were in the interests of Holkar.

By the 29th July the whole of the corps of the division reached Rampoorah, and here Brigadier-General Monson was joined by two battalions of Sepoys with four field-pieces, two howitzers, and a body of irregular horse, bringing with them a supply of

State, and on the south by Kotah State. Bundī was captured about 1342 from the Mīnas by one Deorāj, who founded the State. Between 1457, when the Sultan of Māndū took Bundī, and 1534, when Rāo Surjan ascended the throne, Bundī was engaged in intermittent warfare with Jaipur and other principalities. Rāo Surjan allied himself with the Mughal Emperor of Delhi, and was granted the title of Rāo Rājā, a *mansab* of 2,000, and the possession of fifty-two districts, including Benares. In 1707 during the struggle for Aurangzeb's vacant throne, the chief of Bundī aided Shāh Ālam and was created Mahārāo Rājā. Between 1804 and 1817 the Marāthās constantly ravaged the State in revenge for Bishen Singh's assistance to Colonel Monson. In 1818 Bundī concluded a treaty with the British Government, whereby the tribute hitherto paid to Holkar was remitted and the lands in Bundī held by Holkar were restored to Bishen Singh in return for an annual payment to the British of 40,000 rupees a year. In 1847 Sindia relinquished certain lands in the Pātan District, which the Mahārāo of Bundī now holds as a perpetual fief from the British Government. (*I.G.*, ix. 79-82.)]

grain. This reinforcement had been ordered forward by General Lake as soon as he was apprised of the situation of the detachment at the Mokundra pass; but Brigadier-General Monson, not judging his supplies sufficient, after a long and apparently unnecessary halt, determined to continue his retreat to Kooshalghurh, where he expected to find supplies and to be joined by six of Sindia's battalions with twenty-one guns; under Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur, the officer defeated by Holkar at Poona in October, 1802. After throwing a strong garrison with his field-pieces into Rampoorah, the division, consisting of five battalions and six companies of Bengal Sepoys,¹ with two howitzers, on the morning of the 22d August reached the Bunass, which was so much swollen as to be scarcely fordable for the largest elephants. Three boats were found with which the treasure of the detachment, protected by the six companies of the 21st regiment under

Captain Nicholl, were sent across and forwarded to (Aug. 23.) Kooshalghurh. On the 23d August Holkar's cavalry again made their appearance in force, and on the 24th

(Aug. 24.) the river being fordable, Brigadier-General Monson began to send over his baggage and one battalion.

Holkar, at the same time, took possession of a village on Monson's right, but was promptly dislodged from it. The river having decreased considerably, the Mahrattas were enabled to pass it to the right and left, and most of Monson's baggage having got across, his main body, consisting of three battalions with one of the howitzers, followed. Major James Sinclair was left with one battalion, the 2d battalion 2d regiment, and the picquets of the four corps which had crossed, to protect the passage of the remaining baggage and camp followers. At 4 p.m., however, Holkar's infantry and guns came up, and opened a heavy cannonade. Major Sinclair desperately charged the guns with the small party that remained, took several of them, and for a moment was victorious; but the enemy, rallied by Jeswunt Rao Holkar in person, charged in turn with overpowering numbers, and the gallant handful of Sepoys was nearly annihilated. Of the brave European officers who led them on, twelve fell with their commander, and the wreck of the party escaped under cover of the fire of their comrades, who lined the opposite

¹ 2-2d, 1-9th, 1-14th, both battalions of the 12th, and six companies of the 21st Bengal Native infantry.

bank. The Mahrattas, as usual in success, were now active and energetic; they prosecuted the advantage which they had obtained, and compelled Monson to abandon his baggage, which, with their usual avidity, they seized as trophies of a decisive victory. But the British detachment could yet show they were far from being subdued; every attack was repulsed, and Colonel

Monson reached Kooshalgurh on the night of the 25th (Aug. 25.) August. Here a most unexpected state of affairs presented itself;—instead of finding an ally in Sewdasheo Bhow, that officer had attacked Captain Nicholl, who had with much judgement and spirit maintained his post and protected Kooshalgurh, a town belonging to the Raja of Jeypoor. On the 26th August, the Mahratta cavalry encamped in separate bodies, surrounding the British detachment; and two companies of Sepoys, belonging to the 1st battalion 14th regiment, with a large proportion of the irregular horse, seduced by Holkar, deserted. Of the cause of this partial disaffection there is no account afforded, but for the treachery of the few, the general fidelity and steadiness of the detachment most amply made amends.¹ Unfortunately Brigadier-General Monson did not know the Sepoys, they had no confidence in him, nor he in them. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 26th August, having previously spiked his remaining howitzer, the other having been taken by the enemy on the bank of the Bunass, Brigadier-General Monson moved out of Kooshalgurh, and prosecuted his retreat towards Agra in an oblong square. During that night and the ensuing day, the Mahratta horse, supported by guns, repeatedly attempted to penetrate, but could make no impression.

(Aug. 27.) On the night of the 27th, under the protection of the ruined fort of Hindoun, Monson halted a few hours to refresh his weary men, but one hour after midnight his retreat was resumed. As soon as he had cleared the ravines near Hindoun, the horse, in three different bodies, made a desperate charge; but the Sepoys, reserving their fire until they were almost within reach of their bayonets, then gave it with such signal effect that the enemy retired in every direction. The troops almost exhausted with

¹ During the most harassing days, many of the old Sepoys and Native officers were often heard encouraging the younger European officers, when sinking under their fatigues, telling them 'to cheer up, for that they would carry them safely to Agra.'

fatigue and hunger, reached the Biana pass about sunset ; here Brigadier-General Monson intended to halt during the night ; but the ardent and persevering enemy once more brought up their guns, and opened so heavy and severe a fire on the exhausted troops as to oblige them to go on as they best could. But weary and harassed beyond endurance, the baggage having become entangled with the line of march, and the night being excessively dark, no order could be restored, and the whole were thrown into inextricable confusion. In this state, the troops fairly broke and fled towards Agra. The enemy, though they attacked in straggling parties, fortunately were not in sufficient

(Aug. 31.) force to reap the full advantage they might have done, and by the 31st August the greater part of the fugitives, who escaped the enemy, found an asylum at Agra.

Holkar, at the head of sixty thousand horse,¹ fifteen thousand infantry and artillery, with 192 guns, advanced triumphantly to Muttra, which, at his approach, was abandoned by the British troops ; and parties of the Mahratta horse pushed across the Jumna. But General Lake, with his accustomed energy, had already taken measures for repairing these disasters. The Mahrattas who crossed the Jumna were driven back, troops were ordered on to Agra with all expedition, and the British army, in the course of a month, again advanced on the Mahrattas. In a few days, the Mahratta horse began in their usual manner to show themselves in small parties, gradually increasing in numbers, flying before the British cavalry when sent to pursue them, evading every attempt to bring them to action, turning as their pursuers turned, firing their matchlocks, and brandishing their spears ; whilst others stole in upon the flanks and rear, where they at first cut off stragglers and baggage with considerable success. The cruelties committed by Holkar on all who fell into his hands were barbarous in the extreme.² It is probable

¹ So stated by Sir John Malcolm, who, in regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, is our best authority. To account for this vast body, it must be recollected that he was recruited by the wreck of the armies of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay ; and a part, no doubt, were Pindharees.

² [Sleeman records an example of Jasvant Rāo's cruelty. On October 14 he gave a great entertainment at Kosī, twenty-five miles north-west of Mathurā, while his troops were besieging Delhi. 'In the midst of the festivity he had a European soldier of the King's 76th Regiment, who had been taken prisoner, strangled behind the

that General Lake, instead of making fruitless attempts from a standing camp to bring Holkar's cavalry to action, would have pushed at his infantry and guns, but he seems to have remained at Muttra for the purpose of collecting supplies, which afforded Holkar an opportunity of attempting an important enterprise, being no less than that of endeavouring to possess himself of the Emperor's person. The plan was well conceived, but it was completely frustrated by the precaution and gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, the commandant. The whole of the enemy's infantry and artillery attacked Delhi on the 8th, and continued the siege until the 14th, during which, though deserted by a party of irregulars attached to the garrison, a small body of British Sepoys, ably commanded,¹ made a successful sortie, repelled an assault, and under incessant fatigue defended a city ten miles in circumference.

(Oct. 18.)—General Lake, on hearing of this attack, marched to the relief of the capital, and arrived there on the 18th October ; but it was Holkar's plan to keep his infantry out of reach, and they were already five days on their march towards the territory of his ally the Raja of Bhurtpoor ; who, in favour of his old friends the Mahrattas, particularly the family of Holkar, had seceded from his engagements with the English, notwithstanding the great advantage which he derived from their alliance. Holkar's cavalry, except a few thousands who accompanied the march of his infantry, continued to hover round Delhi for some days ; but on the 29th of October suddenly crossed the Jumna below Panniput, for the purpose of cutting off a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, who, after being called in for the defence

curtain, and his head stuck upon a spear and placed in the midst of the assembly, where the 'nach' girls were made to dance round it.' (*Rambles, &c.*, ed. V: A. Smith, 1915, p. 421.)]

¹ In regard to Sepoys, it cannot be too well understood that much depends on their European officers ; no officers in the British service can be placed in situations where more address, suavity, and firmness, are necessary ; consequently, none are more deserving of consideration from their country ; but officers must also remember that it is generally their own fault when confidence is not mutual. To encourage the Sepoys on this occasion, Colonel Ochterlony served out sweetmeats, and promised them half a month's pay, as soon as the enemy was repulsed. He knew them.

of Delhi, was on his return to his station at Sehraunpoor, with one battalion of Sepoys and some matchlockmen, when he was overtaken by Holkar at Shamlee. He formed his camp into a square which towards evening the enemy surrounded; but drew off in the night to the high road leading to Sehraunpoor, which enabled Colonel Burn to throw his party into a small gurhee near the town, where he resolved to defend himself if he could procure supplies, and if not, to fight his way back to Delhi. In consequence of the hostility evinced towards him by the inhabitants of Shamlee, who joined Holkar in attacking him, he had determined to adopt the latter alternative, when he heard that General Lake with three regiments of dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of infantry under Colonel Don, was marching to his relief. General Lake arrived at Shamlee 3d November; Holkar retired on his approach, and now prepared to execute his long meditated threat of wasting the Company's provinces with fire and sword. To leave him no time for the purpose was now the object of the British general; and on the 5th November the pursuit of Holkar commenced; his route lay in a southerly direction, straight down the Dooab, in which he pillaged and burned the defenceless villages as he passed along.

The British infantry, excepting the Brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, was sent with two regiments of cavalry by General Lake, when he crossed the Jumna, to follow Holkar's infantry and guns, which had taken post near Deeg, a fort belonging to the Raja of Bhurtpoor. Major-General Frazer, who commanded,

(Nov. 12.) arrived in the neighbourhood of Deeg on the 12th November. Holkar's infantry was encamped behind an extensive morass and a deep tank; with their left on a fortified village, and their right on the fort of Deeg supported by ranges of batteries, which they deemed impregnable.

(Nov. 13.) On the morning of the 13th the British troops, in two lines, moved on to the attack; the gallant 76th first carried the fortified village with their bayonets, and finding a range of guns immediately under it, charged on through a tremendous fire of round, grape, and chain shot: the 1st Bengal European regiment rushed on to support the 76th, followed by the Sepoys. Holkar's infantry abandoned the first range of guns, and retired to the next; but this was as instantly charged by General Frazer, who fell mortally wounded in the operation,

deeply regretted by his troops. The command devolved on Colonel Monson, under whom the victory was completed; the enemy being compelled to abandon battery after battery, until they were forced into the fort of Deeg, the garrison of which immediately fired upon the British troops. During the battle the Mahratta horse retook the first range, and for a short time turned the guns on the rear of the British line, but they were again retaken by twenty-eight men of the 76th regiment, headed by Captain Norford, who lost his life in the performance of this remarkable exploit. The loss of the British was severe; no less than six hundred and forty-three were killed and wounded, and of these twenty-two were European officers. The loss of the enemy was estimated at about two thousand. Eighty-seven pieces of ordnance were taken, and among them Colonel Monson had the satisfaction of finding fourteen of those lost during his retreat.

(Nov. 17.)—Four days after the victory at Deeg, on the morning of the 17th November, General Lake, after a most persevering pursuit, came up with Holkar's cavalry at Furruckabad, and falling upon them by surprise, put three thousand of them to the sword.¹ General Lake from the 31st October estimated that he had marched at the rate of twenty-three miles daily, and that during the night and day preceding the attack, including the space gone over in the pursuit, his cavalry went upwards of seventy miles in less than twenty-four hours.

The explosion of a tumbril, as the British troops approached the Mahratta camp, gave the alarm to Holkar, and, on the first discharge from the gallopers, Jeswunt Rao fled with such of his followers as were ready on the instant, taking the direction of Deeg to join the remains of his army, of whose defeat he received intelligence the night before he was surprised. General Lake, continuing the pursuit, arrived at Deeg on the 1st December, when the siege of that fortress having been determined upon, the battering train was brought from Agra, and the trenches opened on the thirteenth. In ten days a breach was made in an outwork, strongly fortified, at one of the angles of the city, which was stormed and taken at midnight, with the loss

¹ [The English loss on this occasion amounted to only two men killed and about twenty wounded.]

of 227 men killed and wounded. On the ensuing day and night the town and citadel of Deeg were evacuated, the
 (Dec. 23.) garrison, including the remains of Holkar's infantry, betaking themselves to Bhurtpoor.

The capture of Deeg, involving the loss of the greater part of the territory of the Raja of Bhurtpoor, was a severe blow to Holkar. His territory in the Deccan was already reduced by the capture of all his forts, including Chandore and Galna, which after a slight resistance surrendered to a division under Colonel Wallace by the end of October. His principal forts in Malwa were also occupied by British troops, and in the month of August, Indore, his capital, had been taken possession of without resistance by the detachment of the Bombay army from Guzerat. That division had been ordered to advance into Hindoostan for the purpose of endeavouring to intercept Holkar in his expected flight to Malwa, and it had reached Kotah by the end of December. The reduction of Bhurtpoor, however, was deemed necessary in order to cut off Holkar's only asylum, after which he might, it was supposed, be followed up as a fugitive, and either taken prisoner or rendered insignificant.

But the fortunes of Jeswunt Rao, though in a few weeks they had undergone a signal reverse, were not yet destined to close. The situation of his ally, the Raja of Bhurtpoor, was still more desperate than his own, for as a Mahratta freebooter 'he had still his country and his property on the saddle of his horse,' but the Jhat Raja, as he himself declared from the first, 'must stand or fall with his fort.'¹

¹ The above chapter, where the authority is not expressly mentioned, is from English Records. Major Thorn's memoir and Oral information

CHAPTER XLV.

FROM A.D. 1805 TO A.D. 1806.

A.D. 1805.—THE Bengal army arrived before Bhurtpoor¹ on the second day of the new year. General Lake being accustomed only to success, without properly reconnoitring the (Jan. 4.) place, and with a very inefficient battering train, commenced the siege by taking possession of a grove which afforded a partial cover to his operations.² Bhurtpoor is a fortified town, six or eight miles in circumference, everywhere surrounded by a high strong mud wall and bastions planted with a numerous artillery, having a wide and deep ditch, capable of being rendered unfordable. It was strongly garrisoned by the whole of the Raja's troops and the remainder of Holkar's infantry. The Raja pressed a great proportion of the neighbouring villagers, many of whom were of his own cast, to assist in repairing the works; and having a very large treasury, nothing to obstruct his supplies on three sides of the town and Holkar's cavalry to act upon those of the besiegers, his means of defence were proportionate to his resolution to use them. In addition to Holkar's cavalry, Umeer Khan was summoned from Bundelcund, and during the progress of the siege, after making on one occasion a considerable but unsuccessful effort on an important convoy, where (Feb. 7.) a number of his men were killed, he went off to effect a diversion, crossed the Jumna and the Ganges, and invaded the Company's districts in Rohilcund. He was, however,

¹ [Bharatpur (Bhurtpoor), in the Jāt State of the same name, is thirty-four miles west of Agra. The fortress was stormed by Lord Combermere on January 18, 1826. The fortifications were then dismantled. A large portion of the walls is now standing and presents an imposing appearance. They seem to have been repaired. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, pp. 116 and 355 n.)]

² [At this date and for many years afterwards the Indian Government did not attach sufficient importance to the engineering branch of the service. (*O.H.I.*, p. 602 n.)]

so closely pursued by the British cavalry, detached by General Lake, under General Smith, that he had not time to effect extensive mischief. He was at last overtaken on the 1st March, and after a sharp skirmish routed with considerable loss. This defeat encouraged the people of the country to resist him, and his followers began to desert. Tired at length by a campaign

less profitable and more hazardous than he expected,
(March 20.) Umeer Khan, about the 20th March, returned to Bhurt-

poor, which still defied every effort of the British general, who had by that time come to the resolution of suspending operations until the arrival of stores, and the junction of a more powerful artillery. The army had been repulsed in four assaults; the first, led by Colonel Maitland, who lost his life on the occasion, was made on the night of the 9th of January. Several causes were assigned for its failure;—owing to the irregularity of the ground, and the extreme darkness, a confusion took place at the outset, from which many of the men lost their way; the ditch was very deep, and the breach was not only imperfect, but defended with determined courage. A better breach induced General Lake to try the second assault on the 21st of the same month: it failed from the depth of water in the ditch. Means had been taken to ascertain the extent of this impediment by a stratagem of three of the Bengal native cavalry, who, pretending to go over to the enemy, and being fired upon with blank cartridges from the trenches, had thus an opportunity of making their observations, and returned with a favourable report. The enemy, however, dammed up the ditch in front of the breach, which, on the part

of the besiegers, rendered valour unavailing, and perseverance destruction. On the 10th February, the
(Feb. 10.) Bombay division under Major-General Jones joined

the Bengal army, to assist in the siege, which was now going on

by regular approaches. On the 20th of that month,
(Feb. 20.) another assault was made with no better success than the former. Two European regiments, one of them

the hitherto brave 76th, refused to follow their officers, and thus gave the 12th regiment of Bengal Sepoys an opportunity of immortalizing themselves. Following the gallant remains of the flank companies of the 22d regiment of foot, the Sepoys advanced with the greatest alacrity, planted their colours on the top of a bastion, and it was supposed that an equal degree of ardour on

the part of the 75th and 76th regiments would have made them masters of the place. Next day, the men of these regiments, when addressed by General Lake, were overpowered by shame

(Feb. 21.) and remorse ; they volunteered to a man ; and a fourth and last attempt was made on the 21st February. The men, marching over the dead bodies of their companions, which crowded the ditch and glacis, rushed on with a desperate resolution, which would have overcome any practicable obstacles. On this, as on every former occasion, none of the troops relaxed in their efforts ; and for two hours, until ordered to desist, they persevered at the breach, or in climbing up a high bastion, which adjoined it. But as fast as the leaders got up, they were knocked down with logs of wood, or speared by rows of pike-men who crowded the tops of the parapets. The besieged took every precaution, and used every effort of prudence and resolution ; the damage done to the mud wall by the shot was generally repaired during the night, their guns were drawn within the embrasures, to prevent their being dismounted, and during the assaults, particularly in the last, pots filled with combustibles, burning cotton bales steeped in oil, with incessant discharges of grape from the cannon, and a destructive fire of small-arms were poured upon the British troops, whose casualties were very great, and in the four assaults 3,203 men were killed and wounded, of whom 103 were European officers. The most affliction circumstance attending these failures was the necessity of leaving many of the wounded behind, who were almost invariably put to death by a sally of the garrison.

The Mahratta horse made their appearance daily, endeavouring to obstruct the operations of the siege, and during the assaults afforded considerable assistance, particularly when the British cavalry was in pursuit of Umeer Khan. They occasionally cut off cattle, foragers and stragglers, and the foraging parties of the besiegers were necessarily so strong, and obliged to march to such a distance, that very considerable impediment was the consequence. Besides the attempt made by Umeer Khan, already adverted to, there was another serious but unavailing attack upon a convoy, which was made by both Holkar and Umeer Khan, assisted by some of the Jhat horse. On both occasions the convoys were saved by seasonable reinforcements from the British camp. Upon the return of the cavalry from the pursuit of Umeer Khan

in Rohilcund, General Lake made two attempts to surprise Holkar, in the second of which he was particularly successful¹; a thousand of the Mahrattas were killed; and great numbers of the horsemen, their spirit being now completely broken, quitted their leader after this chastisement. To such a pitch of alarm had they now arrived, and so completely disheartened were these active tormentors of Monson's detachment, that they had not courage to fight for their lives; not one of the British cavalry was killed on the occasion. A few days after this event, three thousand of the remains of Holkar's regular infantry were intercepted by a detachment of British troops under Captain Royal, and defeated with severe loss.

To complete Holkar's misfortunes, his ally, the Raja of Bhurtpoor, hoping to save himself, took advantage of the intermission of the siege, to testify his desire of reconciliation; offering terms, which, even after everything was prepared to renew the

(April 10.) attack, many concurring reasons induced the British authorities to accept, although at the prodigious sacrifice of leaving a lasting impression of their failure. The Raja of Bhurtpoor paid twenty lacks of rupees, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British Government, and his claims to advantages secured by the former treaty with the General, now Lord Lake.² The fortress of Deeg was to be restored, when the British Government had reason to be assured of his fidelity.

The principal cause which actuated the British authorities, in accommodating matters with the Raja of Bhurtpoor, was an apprehended rupture with Sindia. Doulut Rao, several days even before he signed the treaty of defensive alliance, had made

¹ In the first attempt the clattering of the steel scabbards worn by the cavalry gave the Mahrattas intimation of his approach; in the second, by leaving them behind he got nearer to their camp before being discovered.

² [The unsuccessful siege of Bharatpur was General Lake's one personal failure. He was born on July 27, 1744, and entered the army before he was fourteen. He served in the Seven Years' War in Germany, in the American War, in the French campaign of 1793, and against the Irish rebels in 1798. In 1801 he became Commander-in-Chief in India, and proceeded to Cawnpore, then a British frontier station. After his final defeat of Holkar, he sailed for England in February 1807, and on his arrival at home was created a Viscount. He died on February 21, 1808. (Note on p. 566, Sleeman's *Rambles*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915.)]

strong objections to the restorations granted by the British Government to the Rana of Gohud, whom, as being long dispossessed of all territory, he affected to consider as a private individual, possessing neither rights nor independence, and therefore incapable of engaging in any treaty; consequently, it was unjust, he argued, to set up his antiquated claims as one of the independent Rajas or Jagheerdars, and absurd to pretend that this elected Rana could cede Gwalior to the Company. These arguments, though easily combated, were sufficiently ingenious for the immediate purpose of Sindia's ministers, whose chief aim was to seek cause of present dispute, trusting to events for widening or repairing the breach, as they saw occasion.

Ambajee Inglija, who was insincere from the first in his treaty with the English, and who claimed and obtained merit with his master for what he had done by retaining possession of some of the districts in Jagheer, is said to have been the deviser of this scheme in regard to Gohud,¹ and to have been the active abettor of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay in endeavouring to excite Doulut Rao to a union with Holkar. No Mahratta doubts, and the Governor-General must have known, that Bappoojee Sindia and Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur joined Holkar with Doulut Rao's consent. Whilst disavowed, it was not expedient to charge him with such an act of treacherous hostility, and therefore, in the event of their being apprehended by General Lake, he had instructions to try them by a court-martial for their treason and desertion, and to carry into execution whatever sentence might be passed. Sindia, in a long letter of frivolous and unjust complaint, which he addressed to the Governor-General on the 18th October, 1804, had the assurance to adduce the desertion of those officers as one of his grievances, originating in his not having received pecuniary aid from the English, to enable him to co-operate against Holkar; and that they had only feigned to join the enemy for the purpose of obtaining subsistence for their troops.

At the period of the date of this letter, Sindia was on his march from Burhanpoor towards Malwa, professing an intention of proceeding to his own capital, Oojein, agreeably to frequent recommendations from the British Government. But under the

¹ Oral information from Ambajee's son-in-law and others,

influence of Shirzee Rao, who from the first earnestly promoted the union with Holkar, Sindia was fully bent on joining that chief, and in addition to various acts of a hostile nature against the allies of the British Government, committed a gross outrage by attacking, plundering, and detaining Mr. Jenkins, the acting Resident, in his camp.

A division of the British army under Colonel Martindell in Bundelcund had been directed to reinforce the army at Bhurtpoor, and had advanced for that purpose as far as Gwalior ; but on receiving intelligence of this outrage, Colonel Martindell fell back on Jhansee to frustrate any scheme which Sindia might have formed of invading the Company's provinces, which from Kalpee to Calcutta were completely exposed ; but Sindia moved on gradually to the northward, until his approach to the Chumbul produced a strong remonstrance from the British Resident, to whom Sindia declared that he was unable to proceed to settle his own country from the state of his finances, and that he was only marching towards Bhurtpoor to mediate a peace. He agreed, however, if assisted by the British Government in the removal of his pecuniary embarrassments, to return to the southward and act as they might desire ; he also promised to make reparation for the plunder of the British Resident. At the interview where these assurances were given, the demeanour of Sindia and his ministers was much more conciliatory than it had been for some time before, and it being of great importance to prevent Sindia from joining the confederacy at Bhurtpoor, the Governor-General accepted this promise as an atonement for the outrage on his representative, and agreed to advance some pecuniary aid, provided Sindia would return and employ himself in taking possession of Holkar's unoccupied districts in Malwa. Sindia pretended to acquiesce, and retired eight miles towards Subbulgurh ; but still, on pretence of mediating, sent on a part of his cavalry and all his Pindharees towards Bhurtpoor. The treaty, however, was concluded previous to their arrival ; the Raja declined an interview with Sindia's wukeel, and the troops, joined by Holkar with the remains of his cavalry, returned to Sindia's camp, where Holkar met with a cordial reception, as did Bappoojee Sindia and Umeer Khan. Sindia, in regard to Holkar, endeavoured to justify himself to the British Government, by telling the Resident that Holkar, who had intended to plunder the British territories, had,

at his request, abandoned that design, and consented to his mediation for the attainment of peace.¹

Lord Lake, in consequence of this junction, moved from Bhurt-poor with his whole army towards the camp of Sindia and Holkar, desiring the Resident to quit Sindia's camp. The Resident, however, was still detained on various pretexts, whilst the two chieftains, on Lord Lake's approach, retreated in a south-westerly direction towards Kotah with great precipitation. Their whole force consisted of five thousand infantry with one hundred and forty guns, twelve thousand Sillidar horse, and twelve thousand Pindharees. From the advanced state of the season, Lord Lake did not deem it advisable to pursue them, and therefore directed the army to take up positions during the monsoon. The Bombay troops under General Jones occupied a central situation at Tonk-Rampoorah. Colonel Martindell's division returned to Bundelcund; a detachment was placed at Gohud; and the main body of the Bengal army was stationed at Agra and Muttra.

Sindia and Holkar repaired to Kotah, and afterwards moved towards Ajimere. Holkar was a decided advocate for continuing the war; Shirzee Rao was strenuous in support of this proposal, and whilst he continued to sway the councils of his son-in-law, Holkar had entire influence in Sindia's administration. But the violence of Shirzee Rao defeated his own purposes, and Holkar was instrumental in removing him from power and placing Ambajee Inglia at the head of Sindia's administration. Holkar, with Sindia's connivance, had at first confined Ambajee, and after exacting from him a large sum of money, on which the troops subsisted for some time, he was released and appointed as has been just mentioned. Holkar expected to find in him a willing coadjutor, and from the reputation of his wisdom much more was hoped than from the rash violence of Shirzee Rao; but the temporizing policy of Ambajee, the rekindling rivalry of the two chieftains, the separation of their camps, and above all, Sindia's conviction of their impotency to contend with the British Government, paved the way to a pacification which had by that time, owing to a change in the government, become the primary object of the British Cabinet.

¹ Mill's History of British India.

Peace was no doubt of the greatest importance to British India at this period, but the power of the Mahratta chiefs was completely broken: the Peishwa, however inimically disposed, had as yet acquired no authority, and the Marquis Wellesley, without renouncing any advantages, would have soon been enabled to effect every arrangement for securing a long if not a permanent tranquillity; but the protracted warfare and the popular clamour in England against his administration, arising chiefly from temporary embarrassments and a sudden accumulation of debt, began to influence the opinions, not only of the proprietors and Directors of the East India Company, but of the British Ministry.¹ The return of the venerable Marquis Cornwallis² to India was solicited by the highest authorities, as if the salvation of that country depended on his presence. He arrived in Calcutta on the 30th July, and on the same day assumed charge of the government. He showed, almost from the first act of his administration, that he disapproved of the system of defensive alliance conjoined with a subsidiary force, and evinced so great an eagerness to put an end to the war with Holkar, and to accommodate the differences with Sindia, that, had the power of these chiefs and of Rughoojee not been completely broken, it would probably have ensured a prolongation of hostilities, conducted with all the energy and activity of Mahrattas in success. Lord Cornwallis was willing to overlook the outrage committed by Sindia on the British Resident, to give up Gwalior and its dependencies, and to make some provision for the Rana of Gohud from the disposable territories on the Jumna. To Holkar he proposed to restore the whole of the territories conquered from him during the war. He greatly disapproved of the treaties of defence and guarantee entered into with the petty Rajas of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, Bhurtpoor, Macherry and Boondee. As to the first, the Raja of Joudpoor having refused

¹ [Attempts were made to impeach the Marquess Wellesley, but were not pressed. His merits were recognized by a later generation of Directors, and a year before his death they erected his statue as a mark of their esteem, and presented him with £20,000.]

² [Cornwallis was a complete wreck when he accepted the appointment of Governor-General for the second time. 'He was no longer the man,' writes Dr. Smith, 'who fifteen years earlier had sprung to arms in order to defend distant Travancore. He had come to regard almost the worst peace as better than the best war, and was willing to list n to the pleasant words of admirers who hailed him as the saviour of India.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 608.)]

to ratify the treaty which his wukeel had made with General Lake, of course no agreement with that state existed. With regard to the second, the Raja of Jeypoor had not fulfilled the conditions of his agreement, and the Marquis Cornwallis at an early period had directed him to be informed that it was considered as dissolved ; but the Raja's subsequent conduct had in a great degree retrieved his previous neglect. With respect to the other three, the Governor-General proposed, as an inducement to their renouncing the alliance, to make over portions of the territory conquered from Sindia south of Delhi, and on the west of the Jumna, which river he intended should form the south-western boundary of the Company's possessions in that quarter, and by this means exempt the British Government from all obligation to guarantee or defend the territory so assigned from the attack of Sindia or any other potentate. In conformity with these sentiments, instructions were forwarded to Lord Lake on the 19th September ; but, before their official transmission, Lord Lake, apprised of the pacific course of policy which the new Governor-General had determined to pursue, seized an opportunity, consequent to Ambajee's appointment to the administration and to the dismissal of Shirzee Rao, to draw proposals from Sindia, —an important advantage in most negotiations, but particularly so in the present case. To the overtures made Lord Lake replied that he could listen to no proposition until the Resident was released, a preliminary to which Sindia now readily consented ; and Lord Lake, in anticipation of the wishes of the Governor-General, had submitted, previously to the receipt of his instructions, a plan for the adjustment of differences with Sindia. In consequence of this favourable state of affairs, and the evils he conceived likely to result from abandoning the connexion with the petty states and permitting the Mahrattas to regain a footing in the northern provinces, he delayed acting upon the instructions, and represented the reasons by which he was guided.

Before this representation was received, the mortal illness of the Marquis Cornwallis had rendered him incapable of attending to public business ; and at his death, which happened (Oct. 5.) on the 5th October, the charge of the British Government in India devolved on the senior member of the Bengal council, Sir George Barlow.¹

¹ [Lord Cornwallis died at Ghāzīpur. His successor, Sir George

In the meantime Holkar, perceiving the change of politics on the part of Sindia, and that he had nothing to hope from him whilst his own fortunes were so low, quitted Ajimere early in the month of September, and, with about twelve thousand horse, two or three thousand infantry and thirty guns, took the route of the Punjab, giving out that he expected to be joined by the Seiks and the Afghans. Two divisions of the British army, the one under General Jones from Rampoorah, and the other under Colonel Ball in the Rewaree hills, made ineffectual attempts to intercept him ; on which Lord Lake, having posted divisions to prevent his getting back, set out in pursuit of him with five regiments of cavalry and four battalions of infantry.

These operations did not obstruct the arrangements with Sindia, which, under the immediate direction of Lord Lake, were concluded by a new treaty on the 22d November ; Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm being the agent on the part of the Company, and Moonshee Kavil Nyne on that of Sindia.

The treaty of Surjee Anjengaom was to remain in full force, excepting in such parts as might be altered by the present arrangements. The subsisting engagement between the British Government and the Rana of Gohud being inconvenient, or, as was declared, the Rana being found totally unfit for the exercise of sovereign authority, the agreement was dissolved, and the fortress of Gwalior with the Gohud territory were restored to Sindia. It was, however, stipulated, that an establishment should be provided for the Rana by the British Government ; and in order to remunerate them for the expense of supporting it, Sindia on his part agreed to relinquish the pensions of fifteen lacks of rupees, granted to certain officers in his service, and to resign his enam districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-Kerrah, which were reserved to him by the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom. The river Chumbul, from Kotah on the west to the extremity of the Gohud territory on the east, was declared the boundary of the two states, and in Barlow, has been justly described as ‘ the meanest of the Governors-General.’ ‘ His narrowness of view was made the more dangerous by the extreme personal dislike which he inspired.’ He was more active than Lord Cornwallis in reversing the Marquess Wellesley’s policy in Upper India, in pursuance of which policy he broke faith with Jaipur, and bound the British Government in India not to make any arrangement with the Rājput States for their protection against Marāthā oppression. Lord Lake protested in vain, and finding he could make no impression resigned his political powers and retired to Europe.]

consideration of the benefits derived by the Company from this line of demarcation it was agreed to allow Sindia personally an annual pension of four lacks of rupees, and to assign Jagheers to his wife and daughter ; the former to have two lacks, and the latter one lack of rupees annually, within the territory of the Company. The two small districts of Bhadek and Sooseporarah, on the right bank of the Jumna and south of the Chumbul, being necessary to the greater security of the Company's frontier, were made over to them. Sindia renounced all claim to tribute from the Raja of Boondee, or from any other state north of the Chumbul and to the eastward of Kotah. The British Government engaged to enter into no treaties with the Rana of Oudepoor, the Rajas of Joudpoor, Kotah, and other chiefs, the tributaries of Sindia in Malwa, Marwar, and Mewar ; nor to interfere with the arrangements Sindia might make with them. In the event of peace with Holkar, the British Government engaged that they should not desire the restoration of such of the districts of Holkar, between the Taptee and Chumbul, as Sindia had taken, or interfere in any manner with their arrangements, wars, or disputes. The losses, public and private, sustained by the British Residency, were to be made good ; and as it was notorious that Shirzee Rao Ghatgay was the instigator of this outrage, and that he had always acted with the most virulent hostility to the British Government, Sindia agreed never to admit him into his councils.¹ The negotiation of this treaty did not obstruct the active pursuit of Holkar ; Lord Lake, joined by reinforcements as he advanced, followed him into the Punjab with unremitting perseverance. Jeswunt Rao, if he entered the territory of the Seiks in any expectation of assistance from them, was totally disappointed ; but, whilst they preserved a strict neutrality, they were also anxious to become mediators for Holkar, whose hopes of resisting the British power were now completely crushed. Driven at length to extreme distress, he sent agents to Lord Lake's camp on the banks of the Beah,² to sue for peace ; and as the instructions of the late Governor-

¹ [This exclusion of Sarjī Rāo Ghātḡē was subsequently waived ; and on February 9, 1809, Daulat Rāo Sindia met him on his return to Sindia's camp. Sarjī Rāo completely re-established his influence, and was formally appointed chief Minister on February 23, 1809 which position he enjoyed until his death a few months later (Broughton, *Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, pp. 44, 50.)]

² [The Biās (the Hyphasis of the Greeks) is one of the five rivers of

General remained in force, under the authority of Sir George Barlow, it may be imagined that the negotiation of a treaty which restored conquered territories, to which Holkar had forfeited his right, even had he been the legitimate representative of his family, was very soon concluded. Holkar renounced all right to Tonk-Rampoorah, Boondee and all other places north of the Boondee hills, all claims on the province of Bundelcund, and on the British Government and its allies: he engaged never to entertain Europeans in his service, and never to admit Shirzee Rao Ghatgay into his councils or employment; he also became bound to return to Malwa by a prescribed route. The British Government engaged to have no interference with the possessions of Holkar south of the Chumbul; to restore the forts and districts of the family in the Deccan, excepting Chandore and its dependencies, and the districts of Amber and Sewgaom; but, in case of Holkar's evincing amicable and peaceful intentions towards the British Government, Chandore, Amber, and Sewgaom were to be restored, and the district of Koonch, in Bundelcund, was to be

(Dec. 24.) given in Jagheer to his daughter; the former in eighteen months, and the latter in two years, from the 24th December, 1805, the day on which the treaty was dated.

A.D. 1806.—Sir George Barlow, in whom the power of confirming treaties on the part of the British Government now rested, made an alteration in this treaty, as well as in that concluded with Sindia. Sir George Barlow conceived that the reasons adduced by Lord Lake for continuing the connexions with the petty states north of the Chumbul were outweighed by the political advantage of their dissolution. Lord Lake maintained that the alliance of these petty states interposed a strong barrier against the future encroachments of the Mahrattas; and that, at all events, the honour of the British Government was pledged to respect its engagements, until the treaties were infringed or renounced by the states in question. Sir George Barlow contended that the security of the British Government depended either on its controlling all the states of India, or on leaving them to the wars and disputes which were sure to arise if left to themselves; and that

the Panjāb. Rising on the southern face of the Rohtang pass in Kulu, it traverses Mandi State, flows through the Kangra District, and after a total course of 290 miles joins the Sutlej at the southwestern boundary of Kapurthāla State. (*I.G.*, 1907, vii. 138.)]

if the British Government renounced its claims to the territory in which any petty state was situated, all obligation to protect it was dissolved. It is not clear, in the circumstances then existing, in what manner Sir George Barlow meant to apply this latter argument, excepting to the Raja of Boondee ; but with respect to the former observation, as far as regarded the contentions of those states, Lord Lake had before expressed his opinion that, if left to themselves, they would quarrel with each other, call in the aid of the native powers in their vicinity, and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of the most fertile provinces of the British Government, against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security, but a military force in a constant state of preparation. Had his Lordship's life been extended to the term which might have been reasonably hoped, he would not only have seen his prediction verified, but that a military force, acting on the defensive, afforded no certain security against the incursions of swarms of brigands which were thus nourished.

Agreeably to the system of policy he had determined upon, Sir George Barlow annexed declaratory articles to the treaties concluded with Sindia and Holkar, explaining away any obligation which by the treaty with the former might be inferred, of protecting the petty states north of the Chumbul, from Kotah to the Jumna, and restoring to the latter Tonk-Rampoorah and all the territory north of the Boondee hills ; thus abandoning to his fate the Raja of Boondee, who on his part had maintained the alliance with honour and generosity.

Lord Cornwallis, disapproving of the system of alliances, had, as already mentioned, taken advantage of a failure in his engagement on the part of the Raja of Jeypoor, to direct that alliance to be considered as dissolved ; but Lord Lake had prevailed upon Lord Cornwallis to suspend this dissolution ; because at that period the Raja had it greatly in his power to assist or incommode the British army ; and from that time he had performed such essential service as to render himself obnoxious both to Sindia and Holkar ; to whose vengeance he became exposed, should the British Government withdraw its protection. Notwithstanding these claims, and the earnest recommendation of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow obstinately adhered to his determination, and declared the alliance at an end. This declaration,

it may be observed, did not take place until subsequent to the treaties with Holkar and Sindia; so that without infringing its engagements with them, the British Government was still at liberty to extend its protection to Jeypoor if it should see fit.

The engagements with the Rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry, though their dissolution was much desired by the Governor-General, remained in force.

The treaty of Deogaom concluded with Rughoojee Bhonslay, 17th December, 1803, also continued in force; but by an engagement dated 24th August, 1806, Patwa and Sumbulpore were restored to him.

By the definitive treaty with Sindia, it became necessary to provide for the Rana of Gohud; and the districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-kerrah were assigned for that purpose.

A definitive treaty of general defensive alliance had been concluded with the Gaekwar 21st April, 1805, for the purpose of consolidating the stipulations contained in three preceding agreements, drawn up in March, June, and July, 1802, and making some additions and alterations which were deemed expedient. The Gaekwar had previously received a subsidiary force of two thousand men, and he now engaged to maintain three thousand infantry and a company of artillery, which were to be stationed within his territory, but only employed on occasions of some importance. Districts yielding rupees 11,70,000¹ were assigned for their support. The districts of Chourassy, Chickly, and Kaira,²

¹ Viz. Dholka	R. 4,50,000
Neriad	1,75,000
Beejapoor	1,30,000
Mahtur	1,30,000
Moondah	1,10,000
Tuppa of Kurree	25,000
Kheemkatodra	50,000
Wurat on Kattywar	1,00,000

R. 11,70,000

² [For Chourassy see page 321, *ante*. Chikhli (Chickly) is now the eastern *tāluka* of Surat District, containing an area of 168 square miles. The ceded territory in Kaira consisted of Kaira town and fort, Nadiād, Mātar, and Mahudha. In 1817 the Gaekwār ceded Mehmādābād, Alīna, Thāsra, Antroli and half the town and district of Petlād, while Kapadvanj and Bhālaj were received in exchange for a district in north Gujarāt. Thus the modern Kaira District is composed of lands partly acquired from the Pēshwā in 1802 by the Treaty of Bassein and partly transferred by the Gaekwār of Baroda

together with the Gaekwar's share of the Chouth of Surat, were ceded to the Company. The British Government having advanced or become security on account of the Gaekwar's government to the amount of nearly forty-one and a half lacks of rupees, the revenue of districts yielding nearly fourteen lacks annually was appropriated for liquidating this debt. The Gaekwar agreed to submit the examination and adjustment of the outstanding accounts and debts, between him and the Peishwa, to the British Government; to receive no European into his service, and to commit no act of aggression against any other power without the acquiescence of the British Government.

Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Baroda, concluded by Major Walker on the part of the Company, and intended to render the engagements with the Gaekwar state consonant to those of the treaty of Bassein.¹

in 1803 and 1817. Transfers of villages took place between the Ahmadābād and Kaira Districts prior to 1833, in which year the two districts were finally separated and Kaira assumed its present form. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 270-1.)]

¹ Authorities as in the preceding.

CHAPTER XLVI.

FROM A.D. 1806 TO A.D. 1814.

A.D. 1806.—IN the preceding chapter we have brought to a close the detail of those important events in Mahratta history which immediately followed the treaty of Bassein. It now becomes requisite to survey the condition of the Mahratta states, before and at the conclusion of those arrangements with the British Government, to review briefly the policy which actuated that Government, and to explain the effects resulting from it on the various Mahratta states. It will then only remain to detail the principal causes which led to the last great revolution and entirely subverted the dominion of the Peishwas.

The treaty of Salbye, by which Mahadajee Sindia was acknowledged by the British Government as head of an independent state, and the policy of Warren Hastings, which permitted him to extend his power on the side of Hindoostan, had a great effect in weakening the power of the Peishwa and in hastening the decline of the Mahrattas, by dissolving that community of interests which was the mainspring of their union. Previously, however, to the treaty of Bassein, if we except the engagements entered into by the Gaekwar with the English, the visible changes in the Mahratta government were wrought by domestic feuds, originating in the intrigues of some of its principal members: first, of Nana Furnuwees and Sindia to supplant each other; next, of Bajee Rao to overturn the power of both; and finally, of the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, to obtain by force a control over the Bramin court, similar to that which the Peishwas had established by policy over the head of the empire.

By the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent treaties on the part of Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sindia and Holkar, with the British Government, a still greater and far more obvious change had taken place in the condition of the Mahrattas than that which resulted

from the treaty of Salbye. The Peishwa had ceded a large tract of country ; he was controlled in his foreign relations, and upheld in his musnud by a British force. The territories of the other Mahratta chiefs had been dismembered ; the Moghul Emperor had fallen into the hands of their great rival ; and they sat down exhausted and dismayed, sensible of some of their errors when too late ; but with no plan, or even sentiment of union, except hatred to that nation by which they had been subdued.

The inconsistencies observable in the British policy were produced by the different views entertained by successive Governors-General, each influenced in a greater or less degree by opinions in England. Lord Cornwallis, before the close of his first administration, perceived the necessity of some measures of precaution to secure the territories of the Company, and to preserve the peace of India. He hoped that the native powers would become sensible of the integrity and advantage of the plan he suggested for ensuring a common alliance, and that they would embrace it with the same candour with which it was proposed ; but he failed in completing the treaties of general guarantee, which he had contemplated as a remedy for the evils with which the country was threatened.

The Marquis Wellesley, looking equally to the security of British India from foreign invasion and from wars with the native powers, believed that such security was only attainable by establishing an ascendancy in the councils of the native states, so as to be able to direct their resources to their own advantage and to that of the British nation ; hence, his policy tended to the control of all the native powers, from Cape Comorin to the gulf of Kutch, and from Kutch to the Sewalick mountains. How far and with what success he carried his measures into effect, has been detailed. His extensive plans, the effect which their prosecution had upon the commercial interests of the East India Company, and the obstacles he encountered, alarmed the authorities at home ; some of whom, doubting the justice of the measures pursued and dreading a rapid extension of dominion, were desirous of at least impeding the conquest of all India ; and others, whose views extended little further than the obvious increase of debt and the irregularity of furnishing the Company's investments, sought a change of policy, as essential to prevent or repair these apparent evils. The Marquis Cornwallis was accordingly, as we

have seen, again sent out, and an instant stop was put to the system of defensive alliances. His successor, Sir George Barlow, inflexibly pursued the same line of policy, without regard to various circumstances, which he considered unimportant in attaining a general end; but his measures were as short-sighted and contracted as they were selfish and indiscriminating.

The Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Gaekwar were already bound by the defensive and subsidiary alliances of the Marquis Wellesley; but British protection was withdrawn from the petty states in Hindoostan, excepting the Rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry. Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sindia, and Holkar were each left in possession of considerable tracts of territory; but under their management, the net revenues of each state, after deducting Enams and Jagheers, did not exceed sixty lacks of rupees; that of Rughoojee Bhonslay was considerably less, but his military followers were fewer and of an inferior description. The treaties with these three states were mere instruments of general amity; their intercourse was completely unrestrained, and no control, except in relation to the allies of the British Government, was to be exercised over them. Plausible reasons were not wanting for supposing that the whole pacification was wise and politic. The progress of conquest was at least impeded; a considerable territory, pretty equally balanced, remained to each of the chiefs; and it was expected that their domestic wars, the plunder of their neighbours, and the fear of losing what they possessed, would deter them from hostile proceedings against the British Government. In the armies which they maintained, a portion of the unemployed soldiery, numbers of whom were entertained in the British service during the war and discharged from it immediately afterwards, would still obtain a livelihood; and it was even hoped that these chiefs would find it their interest to establish order in their revenue collections, gradually to reduce their military establishments, and turn their attention to cultivate the arts of peace. Until these desirable reforms could be effected, the vigilance of the British Government and the power of its allies would, it was supposed, be quite sufficient to quell disorders or inroads occasioned by the plundering hordes, which after every war in India disturb the general tranquillity.

It is not the object of this work to enlarge on this subject, it is sufficient to state the policy embraced, and the ends expected by

the British Government ; but the consequences, as they tended to hasten the decline of the Mahrattas, and the leading events antecedent to their fall, it is our province to explain.

When Jeswunt Rao Holkar returned from Hindoostan, he intimated to his army his intention of discharging about twenty thousand of his horse, chiefly Deccannees¹ ; but large arrears being due to them, which Holkar could not immediately pay, they placed him in *Dhurna*, when he gave them his nephew, Khundee Rao, as a pledge that their demands should be satisfied. The advantage of having the admitted head of the Holkar family in their custody was not overlooked by a turbulent soldiery, already disaffected and mutinous ; they immediately hoisted the standard of Khundee Rao, declared him the only legal representative, and refused obedience to Jeswunt Rao. But the overawing power of the infantry, and the payment of their arrears, to defray which Holkar exacted a large sum from the Raja of Jeypoor,² had an immediate effect in quashing the sedition.

But the innocent instrument of the mutineers fell a sacrifice to his enraged uncle, who secretly put him to death ; and the ferocious jealousy of Jeswunt Rao, once roused, could not be allayed until he had also decreed the death of his brother, Khassee Rao, who was in like manner privately murdered.

A.D. 1807.—Those atrocious deeds were the forerunner of a state of insanity, which was further evinced by extraordinary military preparations, carried on with an ardour and violence proportionate to the derangement of his intellect ; until at last, in 1808, his extravagant conduct led to his being put under restraint ; in which state he continued in his camp for the space of three years until the 20th October, 1811, when his miserable existence terminated.

¹ Sir John Malcolm. Bappoo Kanhoo, one of my authorities, who was with Holkar at the time, says, ' there were no words with the Mahrattas,' and that the subsequent mutiny was occasioned entirely by the Patans. Bappoo Kanhoo, to whose authority I have here referred for the second time, is a respectable old Bramin soldier, who was the staunch adherent and devoted friend of Chitoor Sing. He was employed in all his negotiations, and shared in most of the vicissitudes of his remarkable life. Bappoo Kanhoo was found imprisoned in one of the hill-forts, taken by the British troops in 1818, and, on being rescued, joined the Raja of Satara, at whose court he now resides. The history of his own times, written at my request, is lodged with the Literary Society of Bombay.

² Bappoo Kanhoo.

The chief feature of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's character was that hardy spirit of energy and enterprise which, though like that of his countrymen boundless in success, was also not to be discouraged by trying reverses. He was likewise better educated than Mahrattas in general, and could write both the Persian language and his own: his manner was frank and could be courteous, and he was distinguished by a species of coarse wit very attractive to the Indian soldiery. He had few other commendable qualities; for although sometimes capriciously lavish, he was rapacious, unfeeling, and cruel, and his disposition was overbearing, jealous, and violent. In person, his stature was low, but he was of a very active, strong make; though his complexion was dark, and he had lost an eye by the accidental bursting of a matchlock, the expression of his countenance was not disagreeable, and bespoke something of droll humour as well as of manly boldness.

When Holkar returned from the Punjab, after signing the treaty with Lord Lake, the Rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were at war on account of a princess of Oudepoor, for whose hand both were pretenders. Each party solicited aid from Sindia and
A.D. Holkar; Sindia sent them Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and
1808. Bappoo Sindia, with 15,000 horse; and Holkar allowed Umeer Khan to join the Raja of Jeypoor with his Patans. This Raja was for a time successful, until Umeer Khan left him, commenced plundering the Jeypoor and Joudpoor districts indiscriminately; then changing sides, reversed the probable issue of the contest by joining the Raja of Joudpoor. At last, interposing between them, he put an end to the contest by horrible deeds of treacherous assassination.¹

When Holkar's state of mind rendered it necessary to place him under restraint, Umeer Khan was just disengaged from his Rajpoot warfare, and proceeded with all speed to Rampoorah. It was there settled that the government should be administered by a regency controlled by Umeer Khan, but under the nominal authority of Toolsee Bye, the favourite mistress of Jeswunt Rao, a woman of profligate habits and of most vindictive disposition, totally unfit for high station or the exercise of the power with which she was vested. On the death of Jeswunt Rao, she adopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, a boy of four years old, the son of Jeswunt

¹ See Malcolm's Central India.

Rao by another concubine, and in his name continued to govern. Umeer Khan was soon recalled to Rajpootana in the prosecution of his own views, which were solely bent upon the extension of predatory power for the interest of himself and his ferocious band of Patans; over whom he maintained an authority by superior art, but in whose hands he was sometimes a mere instrument. When it suited his views of plunder, Umeer Khan sometimes advanced claims in Holkar's name, but those claims were not pressed, where the consequences might involve the state of Holkar with the British Government. At his departure from Rampoorah, he caused a Jagheer to be conferred on his relation Ghuffoor Khan, whom he left as his agent and director with Toolsee Bye.

The conduct of the administration was worthy of such a regency; there was no regular collection of revenue, the government had not the power of reducing its army, and the finances of the state, even under the most skilful management, were inadequate to the support of the establishments. Bodies of troops, under various commanders, were therefore sent to collect or extort subsistence from the provinces, without much regard to the rights of neighbouring states; many of them became disobedient; one body of Holkar's troops under Mohummud Ally Khan Bungush went into rebellion at a very early period, plundered the districts in Candeish, and would have forced their way through the Nizam's territory into Holkar's district of Amber, but the subsidiary forces of Poona and Hyderabad were called out to oppose them, when the rebels were dispersed, and Bungush was sent as a state prisoner to the fort of Bombay.

The government, if such it may be designated, of Holkar was alternately swayed by two factions, the Mahrattas and the Patans, who were constantly intriguing against each other, and nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country.¹ At the court, bribery, executions, and murders; in the provinces, violence, rapine, and bloodshed.

A.D. 1809.—Sindia's territory was nearly as much disturbed

¹ [Broughton records one of these disturbances in May 1809. Amīr Khān seized Malhār Rāo Holkar and his principal ministers, whereupon the *regular* infantry pretended to mutiny and trained their guns on the main army. About July 1809 there was an attempt to assassinate Holkar, and in September a further attempt to poison his wife and child. (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, pp. 104, 204.)]

as that of Holkar. His military establishment far exceeded his financial means, and to rid himself of the clamours of his troops he was obliged to send them out to subsist upon the districts in the manner which was adopted by Holkar ; but some found employment in reducing several refractory Zumeendars and Rajas, who were Sindia's tributaries. Armies accustomed to rapine and violence in extensive regions, were now confined to tracts comparatively small ; the burden of their exactions became in many places intolerable, and districts before cultivated and populous were fast running to waste and wretchedness. For the supply of personal exigencies, Sindia was obliged to have recourse to a banker, who at large rates of interest furnished him with occasional advances of money¹ ; and of all his pecuniary resources the pensions which he and his family derived from the British Government were the security most acceptable. On the death of Ambajee Ingliā,² Sindia proceeded to reduce the territory in Gohud, held by Ambajee's family, and having established his camp at Gwalior

A.D.
1810. in 1810, though he frequently went on pilgrimages and expeditions, he never moved his headquarters from that spot ; hence Sindia's camp, as it is called, has become a great city. His authority was considerably strengthened by the reduction of Ingliā's Jagheer ; and the death of his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having happened during the preceding season, was important both in tranquillizing the domestic feuds and public dissensions which that turbulent man was perpetually exciting. The articles of the treaties with Sindia and Holkar respecting Shirzee Rao were subsequently annulled by the British Government. He afterwards exercised considerable power, and frequently dictated to his son-in-law in the most audacious manner : the circumstances which led to his death originated in a violent altercation respecting a Jagheer, which Shirzee Rao, in opposition to Sindia, wished to confer on some rich Sillidars,³ the Nimbalkurs

¹ [In June 1809, according to Broughton, he borrowed 10,00,000 rupees from a rich banker named Gokul Parakh, 'on rather hard terms.' At this date the distress in Sindia's camp was approaching a climax, and the troops were in a state of mutiny owing to non-receipt of their pay. Details of the conditions prevailing in the camp will be found at pp. 146-8 of Broughton's *Letters, &c.*, Constable, 1892.]

² [Ambājī Ingliā died on May 5, 1809, at Bagēra village, close to Sindia's camp. (Broughton, *Letters, &c.*, 1892, p. 110.)]

³ Poor soldiers are at least as common in Maharashtra as in other parts of the world. The Nimbalkurs of Watar are the only rich

of Watar. Sindia, unable longer to endure his violent and contumacious behaviour, ordered him to be arrested, when Shirzee Rao having refused to obey the mandate, Anund Rao Sindia, the son of Mannajee Phakray, transfixed him with a spear, and thus rid the world of a being than whom few worse have ever disgraced humanity.¹ Doulut Rao, if he did not order, approved of the deed, and it is said that he has all his life been a prey to remorse for the atrocious actions to which he was induced to lend his sanction, when under the influence of the monster Ghatgay.²

The state of affairs at Nagpoor under the government of Rughoojee Bhonslay partook of the weakness and confusion prevalent in the territory of Sindia and Holkar; with this difference, that the troops of Rughoojee were inferior, and the country became, in

Sillidars with whom I am acquainted. Watar is a village between Phultun and the Mahdeo hills, where the different members of this inferior branch of the Nimbalkur family have expended vast sums of money in the erection of palaces, which are more remarkable for their solidity than their elegance. They have at least the merit of being the most substantial dwellings in the west of India.

¹ [Sarjī Rāo Ghātḡē was a notorious drunkard and libertine, and so greatly injured his constitution by excess that 'he had constant recourse to provocatives to excite his appetite and stimulate his failing powers.' One of his whims was to dress himself wholly in European clothes, including even the hat, and thus attired to appear at the head of his troops. The following account of his death is given by Broughton. 'As he was about to depart, Sarjee Rāo repeated his remonstrances, and at length had the temerity to seize the skirt of his (Sindia's) gown and endeavoured to detain him forcibly in his seat. Some of the *Hoozooriyas* (Sardārs) present, incensed at such an insult, thrust him back, and Seendhiya escaped from the tent, giving an order, however, to secure his person. The Minister (Sarjī Rāo) snatched his sword from the hand of an attendant, and resisted those who attempted to execute the order of Muha Rāj (Sindia). A violent scuffle ensued, in which some individuals of both parties were killed and several wounded, and Surjee Rāo at length effected his retreat to his tents, after having killed two men with his own hands. He was followed thither by the enraged party from the *Deooree* (Sindia's tents), headed by Ānund Rāo and a son of Mannajee Fankra, two distant relations of the Muha Rāj's family. In one minute the ropes of the tent, in which the unfortunate Minister had taken refuge, were cut, and he himself dragged from beneath it, and in the next he fell dead in the public street, pierced with a dozen wounds inflicted by his pitiless enemies—Ānund Rāo himself having set the example.' (Broughton, *Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, pp. 167-8.) Ānund Rāo was the son of Tukājī Sindia, and not the son of Mānājī Phākde, as stated by the author.]

² Malcolm. Prinsep. Mahratta MSS., and Oral information.

consequence, more exposed to the attack of freebooters from without. Invited by these circumstances Umeer Khan, in 1809, after establishing himself in Rajpootana, made a pretext of some alleged claim of the Holkar family to carry his ravages into Berar, and to let loose the Pindharees as well as his own followers to plunder the territory of Rughoojee ; but the British Government glad at the moment of an opportunity to employ its troops, gratuitously interposed, and forced these predatory bands, which no state acknowledged, to recross the Nerbuddah.

The Pindharees,¹ a class of the lowest freebooters, whom we have already had frequent occasion to mention, were early known in the Deccan. Great numbers of them followed the army of the first Bajee Rao ; and it probably was an object of that great man's policy to draw them out of the Mahratta country. It is certain that he left his Pindharees in Malwa, with his officers Sindia and Holkar, that they always attended their armies when they invaded the Moghul provinces, and that the Pindharees of each of these leaders distinguished themselves as Sindia Shahee and Holkar Shahee, or the respective followers of Sindia and Holkar.

In 1794, Sindia assigned some lands to the Pindharees near the banks of the Nerbuddah, which they soon extended by conquests from the Grassias, or original independent landholders in their neighbourhood. Their principal leaders at that time were two brothers named Heeroo and Burrun, who are said to have been put to death for their aggressions on the territory of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay. The sons of Heeroo and Burrun became Pindharee chiefs ; but Khureem Khan, a Pindhara, who had acquired great booty in the plunder of the Nizam's troops after the battle of Kurdla, and was distinguished by superior cunning and enterprise, became the principal leader of this refuse of the Mahratta armies.

Khureem got the district of Shujahalpoor from Umeer Khan, which, with some additions, was afterwards confirmed to him by Sindia, through the interest of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. During the war of 1803, and the subsequent disturbed state of the country,

¹ [See notes on pp. 180 and 272, vol. i, *ante*. The *O.H.I.*, pp. 625-6, gives pertinent quotations about these marauders from Malcolm's *A Memoir of Central India*, and other details regarding their organization and raids. Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ch. xlix, also gives a brief account of them. Yule, *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. Crooke, 1903, s.v. Pindarry, should also be consulted.]

Khureem contrived to obtain possession of several districts in Malwa, belonging to Sindia's Jagheerdars ; and his land revenue at one time is said to have amounted to fifteen lacks of rupees a year. He also wrested some territory from the Nabob of Bhopaul, on which he built a fort, as a place of security for his family and of deposit for his plunder. Khureem was originally a Sindia Shahee,¹ but like most of the Pindharees, except about five thousand of the Holkar Shahees who remained faithful, he changed sides or plundered his master whenever it suited his convenience, which was as often as he found an opportunity. Sindia, jealous of his encroachments, on pretence of lending him some guns, inveigled him to an interview, made him prisoner, plundered his camp, recovered the usurped districts, and lodged Khureem in the fort of Gwalior.²

A number of leaders started up after the confinement of Khureem, of whom Cheetoo, Dost Mohummud, Namdar Khan, and Shaikh Dulloo became the most conspicuous. They associated themselves with Umeer Khan in 1809, during his expedition to Berar ; and in 1810, when Khureem Khan purchased his release from Gwalior, they assembled under that leader a body of twenty-five thousand horse and some battalions of newly raised infantry, with which they again proposed to invade Berar ; but Cheetoo, always jealous of Khureem's ascendancy, was detached by Rughoojee Bhonslay from the alliance, and afterwards co-operated with Sindia in attacking him ; Khureem was in consequence driven to seek an asylum with his old patron Umeer Khan, but by the influence of Sindia, Umeer Khan kept him in a state of confinement until the year 1816.³

When the Mahrattas ceased to spread themselves, the Pindharees, who had attended their armies, were obliged to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence, and on being suffered to exist at all, their numbers were very soon augmented. To the unemployed soldiery of India, particularly to the Mahomedans, the life of a Pindharee had many allurements⁴ ;

¹ Sir John Malcolm.

² Prinsep. [See also Broughton, *Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, pp. 203-4.]

³ Public Records. Prinsep. Sir John Malcolm.

⁴ [See Sir A. Lyall's 'The Old Pindaree,' in *Verses Written in India*, London, 1889.]

but the Mahratta horsemen who possessed hereditary rights, or had any pretensions to respectability, did not readily join them.

In every thousand Pindharees, about four hundred were tolerably well mounted and armed; of that number, about every fifteenth man carried a matchlock, but their favourite weapon was the ordinary Mahratta spear, which is from twelve to eighteen feet long. The remaining six hundred were common plunderers and followers, armed like the Bazar retainers of every army in India with all sorts of weapons.

Before the Pindharees set out on an expedition, a leader sent notice to the inferior chiefs and hoisted his standard on a particular day after the cessation of the rains, generally about the Dussera. As soon as the rivers were fordable, and a sufficient number had assembled, they moved off by the most unfrequented routes towards their destination. Commencing with short marches of about ten miles they gradually extended them to thirty or forty miles a day, until they reached some peaceful region against which their expedition was intended. Terror and dismay burst at once on the helpless population: villages were seen in flames, wounded and houseless peasants flying in all directions, fortified places shutting their gates and keeping up a perpetual firing from their walls. The plunderers dispersed in small parties, and spread themselves over the whole face of the country; all acting on a concerted plan, they swept round in a half circle, committing every sort of violence and excess—torturing to extort money, ravishing, murdering, and burning in the defenceless villages; but seldom venturing on danger, unless the prospect of booty was very certain. When they approached a point on the frontier, very distant from where they had entered, they united and went off in a body to their homes. Whilst they continued their excesses, marauders of all descriptions sallied out to join them, or to profit by their presence, and whole districts became a scene of rapine and conflagration.¹

¹ [The havoc wrought by the banditti of all classes in Rājputāna is described by James Tod, *Annals of Mewār*, ch. xvii; while the tortures described by the author are also enumerated in Henry T. Prinsep's *History*, &c., 1825. Malcolm states that 'the women of almost all the Mahomedan Pindaries dressed like Hindus and worshipped Hindu deities. From accompanying their husbands in most of their excursions they became hardy and masculine; they were usually mounted on small horses or camels, and were more dreaded

The ordinary modes of torture, inflicted by these miscreants, were heavy stones placed on the head or chest; red-hot irons applied to the soles of the feet; tying the head of a person into a *tobra* or bag for feeding horses, filled with hot ashes; throwing oil on the clothes and setting fire to them; besides many others equally horrible. The awful consequences of a visitation from the Pindharees can scarcely be imagined by those who have not witnessed them. For some time, until the districts in Malwa, Marwar, Mewar, and the whole of Rajpootana were exhausted, and the Pindharees were encouraged and excited to venture on more fertile fields, their ravages were chiefly confined to those countries and Berar; a few of them, however, ventured almost every year into the dominions of the Nizam and the Peishwa, though little notice was taken of them by the British Government, whilst they refrained from molesting its own subjects¹ and territory. But even had no other causes arisen to excite the

A.D.
1812. Pindharees to extend their depredations, it was impossible, in the state in which India was left by the half measures and selfish policy adopted by the British Government, that any part of it could long remain exempt from predatory inroad. The Rajpoot states were overrun by Umeer Khan, Sindia, Holkar, and the Pindharees; and the territories of Sindia and Holkar, intermixed as they were in Malwa, and in the hands of a powerful and lawless soldiery, soon became, like Rajpootana, common prey. The aggressions of Sindia and Holkar on each other gave rise to disputes and even to battles; but to no political warfare. Had Sindia been able to pay up the arrears due to

by the villagers than the men, whom they exceeded in cruelty and rapacity.' (*O.H.I.*, p. 627.)

¹ For a long time they respected the persons of the British subjects, to which the author can himself bear testimony, having accidentally passed through a body of Pindharees in the middle of a night when they had committed great excesses; and to him, though unarmed and unattended, they offered neither molestation nor insult. [Colonel Broughton records an exception to this general attitude towards British subjects. In 1803 Lieutenant Simpson, who was attached to the escort of the British envoy at Daulat Rāo Sindia's court, was seized and carried off by Pindāris. The envoy remonstrated and demanded his release in vain. Simpson was treated with great indignity and cruelty until after the battle of Assaye, when he was handed over to a French officer in the service of the Bēgam Samrū, who did his best to make him as comfortable as circumstances would permit, (*Letters from a Maharratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, p. 30.)

his troops, and to command the services of those who owed him allegiance, he might, at Jeswunt Rao's death, have made himself complete master of Holkar's dominions; but intrigues were substituted for military force, and these were counteracted. Although the chiefs were not at war, the troops of the Rajpoots and of Umeer Khan, and those of Sindia, Holkar, the Powars of Dhar, and the Pindharees, fought frequent battles amongst each other, when plunder was in dispute; all which had no other effect than that of rendering yet more miserable the already unhappy country, and stirring up materials for predatory power, on which Umeer Khan and Sindia began to found higher hopes, when they foresaw a prospect of support from the head of the empire.

To him, therefore, we now return in order to detail the events preceding that revolution in Maharashtra, with which this history closes.

CHAPTER XLVII.

FROM A.D. 1803 TO A.D. 1817.

A.D. 1803.—BAJEE RAO was scarcely re-established on his musnud, when he evinced the distrust and duplicity of his character towards his new allies ; and openly avowed, in regard to many persons subject to his authority, that in entering on the alliance with the English a principal inducement was a motive of revenge.

He kept up a correspondence with the chiefs confederated against the British power,¹ and ascribed his connexion with that Government, which to them he reprobated and deplored, to necessity occasioned by their absence, and to the treachery of the southern Jagheerdars. He withheld the services of his troops as much as possible, and prevented the Putwurdhuns from accompanying General Wellesley, by secretly inciting the Raja of Kolapoor to invade their Jagheer ; thereby hoping to make a merit with Sindia and afford to himself an opportunity of wreaking his vengeance on the family of Pureshram Bhow, by making it appear that they were enemies to the alliance with the British Government, and had forfeited their Jagheer by disobedience to him.

These indications spoke very unfavourably to his new allies, of what might be expected from the Peishwa in case any reverse should attend the British arms. Bajee Rao, as the reader has had ample occasion to observe, was not deficient in a species of ability, but he had little talent for government ; intrigue was with him a passion ; profound in the arts of deceit, he believed all his plans infallible, and at this period no person shared his entire confidence. He aimed at conducting the administration himself ; but as his chief business for some time lay with the British Resident, with whom it was his plan to avoid all personal discussion where

¹ After Bajee Rao's deposal, it was found that Sindia's villages within the Peishwa's boundary, ceded by the treaty of Surjee Anjengom, were all secretly continued to Sindia by Bajee Rao.

difference of opinion might arise, he found it expedient to entrust the management of that important branch to Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, whom we have already mentioned as the agent of Govind Rao Pingley, the Peishwa's envoy at Hyderabad. Sewdasheo Bhow was subsequently employed, on the part of Sindia and Bajee Rao, to endeavour to engage the Nizam in the proposed confederacy against the British Government during the last war with Tippoo, at the moment when the speedy reduction of Seringapatam and the fall of the Sultan crushed their machinations.

Sewdasheo Mankesir was a Deshist Bramin, one of the family of the Deshpandya of the village of Taimboornee, and at one time gained a livelihood by reciting Kuthas¹ in Poona, before he entered the service of Pingley; but notwithstanding his humble origin, he was dignified in his manner, polite and affable in conversation, and, as a statesman, possessed of considerable ability. His avowed enmity to the alliance with the English was Bajee Rao's chief motive for selecting him as minister for their affairs; and during several months the Peishwa was at pains to show that circumstances alone had forced him to sign the articles of the treaty; but the success of the war, the protection which the presence of the British troops afforded, and the power, the security, and the comforts, to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which he soon experienced in the connexion, not only reconciled him to it, but induced him to declare, and probably for a time with sincerity, that he considered the alliance as the most fortunate of events. The forts hitherto in possession of Amrut Rao or Nana Furnuwees were reduced and given up to the Peishwa; his country, which for a time after his re-establishment was overrun by freebooters and exhausted from the effects of war and famine, even under the disadvantage of a pernicious revenue system, gradually recovered itself in most places; and his authority, at first scarcely acknowledged beyond the environs of Poona, soon became respected throughout his dominions.

¹ Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir was a great musician and composer; all the airs of which he is the author are distinguished by a peculiar plaintiveness, and several of them are well worthy of being preserved. Some of our countrymen at Poona, who have leisure, may be induced to do so, before they are forgotten or corrupted by the general bad taste of the Deccan, which, according to a saying of the natives of Hindoostan, is the grave of music,

The British force, although seldom required to be put in motion, was the chief cause of strengthening his authority by its presence, and gave a power and stability to his government, which he had never known since his first accession to the musnud. Adherents were not long wanting, and a few had been faithful even in his adversity. Khundee Rao Rastia, Sur-soobehdar of the Concan, from the time of Bajee Rao's flight to his restoration, had shown great fidelity to his cause, and his respectable support was at first of much consequence to the Peishwa ; but his influence was undermined by Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, who unjustly represented his being in league with the British Resident in every measure proposed ; and in a few years, on an accusation, never attempted to be proved, of corrupt practices in his government in the Concan,

he was removed from office, and his Jagheer was seques-
A.D. trated. The year after the re-establishment of the
1804.

Peishwa, Khundee Rao Rastia had an opportunity of performing a service of some importance. When Amrut Rao and Moraba Furnuwees joined General Wellesley, Baba Rao Phurkay went off with the Hoojrat Pagah,¹ and acted during the war with Rughoojee Bhonslay against the British Government. After the peace, Baba Rao returned from Nagpoor, gave his followers the slip, and retired to Merich, where he was protected by Appa Sahib Putwurdhun, the son of Pureshram Bhow. His troops, thus left to themselves, plundered the country and erected the standard of insurrection ; Bajee Rao had no disposable force, and the British troops could not at that time be spared to hunt down horse. Khundee Rao Rastia, having formerly served with the men exciting these disturbances, had the address to effect an arrangement with the whole body, and brought them under the Peishwa's authority at a critical time, when they might have committed infinite mischief. But Bajee Rao made no permanent provision for the commanders of the army, the soldiery of the country, nor the civil servants of the government. They had served the state under Nana Furnuwees, which was of itself a strong reason with him for excluding them from employment. His total disregard of their claims and their necessities must inevitably have increased the disorders prevalent on his restoration, and under

¹ The Hoojrats, or household troops, were originally the Raja's, and afterwards the Peishwa's, personal cavalry. Many of them were, to the last, composed of the immediate dependants of the Raja of Satara,

ordinary circumstances, had he persevered in such a line of conduct, it probably would have required the whole power of the British Government to keep him on his musnud ; but the severe famine of 1804 destroyed vast numbers of men and horses ; a provision was thus opened to many of the remaining Sillidars by the quantity of land and *wutun* to which they succeeded by deaths amongst their relations and fellow villagers ; and as Sindia was then exchanging his Rajpoots and Mahomedans for Mahrattas, a great part of those persons who would have joined an insurrection became interested in the tranquillity of the country, or were withdrawn to another scene.

Ballajee Luximon, the Dewan of Wittul Nursing Vinchorkur, who, during his master's minority, managed the affairs of the Jagheer, was a staunch adherent of the family of Rugoba ; and one of the very few respectable men who to the last preserved a large share of Bajee Rao's confidence. He was appointed with the fullest powers Sur-soobehdar of Candeish and Buglana ; and a body of the Peishwa's infantry, under Munohurgeer Gosaeen, was sent to support him. But such was the state of those provinces that they were never restored to order under the Peishwa's government. Holkar's ravages had been followed by various plunderers ; and the Bheels, who until 1802, had lived intermixed with the rest of the population, betook themselves to the mountains, and carried on precisely the same system of plunder as is now practised by the brigands of Italy and Spain.

One of the first acts of Ballajee, instigated by the Gosaeen, has left a stain on his memory which cannot be effaced. Finding it impracticable to reduce the Bheels by force, he inveigled a whole tribe of them, with their wives and families, to an interview at Kopergaom,¹ on pretence of affording them a settlement, when they were treacherously seized and most barbarously precipitated into wells, where the whole perished. This inhuman action had the effect in some degree of checking the Bheels about Chandore

¹ [Kopergaon (Kopergaom) in the Ahmadnagar District, sixty miles north of Ahmadnagar town. It was a favourite residence of the Peshwā Raghunāth Rāo, whose palace is used as a sub-divisional office. Here in 1804 Bālājī Lakshman, the Peshwā's governor of Khāndesh, and one Manohargir Gosain slew 7,000 Bhīls and threw them into wells. In 1818 the place was occupied by Madras troops, and a few European tombs still testify to that occupation. At Hingani, three miles away, is a cenotaph of Raghunāth Rāo, who died and was cremated there. (B.G., xvii. 723 f.)]

and the southern part of Buglana ; but to the northward, and along the Sautpoora mountains, it drove them to desperation, and they continued to molest the country.

A.D. 1805.—During the war between Holkar and the British Government, Futih Sing Manay returned to the Peishwa's territory, and recommenced his ravages to the south of the Neera with an army of ten thousand men. But Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the Mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee, assisted by the troops of Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun, planned a judicious attack on his camp, routed his troops, killed Futih Sing Manay, together with a great number of his followers, and completely dispersed them ; after which he formally addressed a dispatch, stating the particulars to the Peishwa, who approved of the service performed, and was much gratified by this act of courtesy from the Mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee. Bulwunt Rao was at this time chief director of his master's affairs. Pureshram Sree Newass, the son of the deceased Bowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, was a young man of some spirit, but of weak intellect and of dissolute morals. He was born on the day of his father's death, and during his minority had been kept in a state of tutelage by Nana Furnuwees, and reared with hereditary enmity to the house of Rugonath Rao. Bajee Rao, before his connexion with the British Government, had with Sindia's assistance laid a plan for seizing the Pritee Needhee in his own house at Poona ; but it was frustrated by his bravery and the exertions of one of his adherents, named Doulut Rao Ghatgay, by whose assistance he cut down the persons who laid hold of him, and immediately fled from Poona to his own Jagheer at Kurar.

The management of his Jagheer was in the hands of his mother, who was assisted by Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the Mootaliq already mentioned. The Pritee Needhee wished to assume the control himself, and he was assured by his mother that he should be placed in authority ; but being deceived by false hopes for a period of years, he at last determined on asserting his rights by force. Bajee Rao saw their differences with satisfaction, as he

wished for a favourable opportunity of stripping the Pritee Needhee of his possessions ; but this extreme measure he at first would not venture upon, as he apprehended that the Pritee Needhee might be supported by the Putwurdhuns. Pretending, therefore, to be anxious to mediate between

the parties, he decided in favour of Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees ; in which he was supposed to have been influenced by the good conduct of the Mootaliq in suppressing the depredations of Futih Sing Manay. In order to support Bulwunt Rao, he sent a body of his troops under Bappoo Gokla to enforce submission, and the Pritee Needhee was placed in confinement by his mother in the Gurhee of Mussoor.¹ Gokla returned to Poona, the country was tranquillized, the adherents of Pureshram sought safety in concealment, and it was generally supposed that the Pritee Needhee would remain a prisoner for life. But Pureshram Sree Newass had a friend from whom no one expected his succour. His wife, one of the most respectable ladies in the country, perceiving the weakness and violence of her husband's character, had several years before endeavoured to bring him into his mother's views, which so exasperated the Pritee Needhee, that he never afterwards would live with her. He chose as his mistress a Telin, or wife of an oil-seller, with whom he cohabited, and to the great scandal of his cast as a Bramin made no secret of the connexion. The Telin, after the Pritee Needhee was confined, had the address to obtain possession of the fort of Wassota,² situated in a most inaccessible part of the Syhadree mountains, where having collected some followers, she headed the party, attacked Mussoor and rescued the prisoner. As soon as the Pritee Needhee found himself at liberty, he hoisted his standard, declared himself the servant of the Raja of Satara, and bound by no tie to

A.D.
1807.

¹ [This is Mhasvād in the Sātāra District, on the Sātāra-Pandharpur road. The chief feature of the place to-day is the great Mhasvād irrigation lake, which lies six miles south-east of the town, in the territory of the Pratinidhī or Chief of Aundh. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 557 ; *B.G.*, xix. 156 f.)]

² [Vāsota (Wassota) lies in Sātāra District at the head of a small valley which branches west from the Koyna river. The fort stands on the very edge of the Western Ghāts, the defences consisting of a vertical scarp varying in height from 30 to 60 feet, crowned by a wall and parapet from 6 to 8 feet high, and loop-holed at intervals. The cliff to the south of the fort has a sheer drop of 1,500 feet, and was used as a place of execution for criminals, like the Tarpeian rock of ancient Rome. Sivājī, who took the fort in 1655, renamed it Vajragarh, which name it has not retained. Subsequently it was used chiefly as a State prison. The fort was captured by the British in April 1818, Mountstuart Elphinstone being present at the siege, which he has described. The prize property amounted to two lakhs of rupees, in addition to family jewels of the Rājā of Sātāra, worth three lakhs of rupees. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 565.)]

obey the Punt Purdhan. The inhabitants of the tract between the Neera and Warna, in which the Pritee Needhee's districts were situated, being prone to insurrection, the standard of rebellion soon found supporters, and some of the old retainers of the Pritee Needhee's family joined him. The temporary power thus obtained by the assemblage of a body of troops was, however, exceedingly abused. He committed great cruelties on such of the adherents of his mother and of Bulwunt Rao as fell into his hands; and he rendered himself odious to the peasantry by a system of plunder and extortion, worthy of the lowest Pindhara. Had the Pritee Needhee possessed moderation and ability equal to his spirit, there were materials for a rebellion in that quarter, which Bajee Rao, unassisted by British troops, could never have suppressed; but, before he had made adequate preparations for resistance, Gokla once more came against him; the few faithful Sillidars who accompanied him recommended his retiring to the hills and raising the Ramoosees, until like Chitoor Sing he could attack with effect. Regardless, however, of this advice, he waited for Gokla near Wussuntgurh, a few of his men stood by him, but most of them fled at the first charge.

The Pritee Needhee was supposed to have been killed; he was taken up by his enemies for dead; but, although he had lost his hand and was severely wounded in the head, he recovered, and was ever after, during the reign of Bajee Rao, confined in the city of Poona, where a small portion of his late extensive Jagheer was assigned for his support; the remainder, without any separate provision for the opposite party, was sequestered. Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees regretted the opportunity thus afforded to Bajee Rao by their differences, when too late; the country was soon reduced, all the garrisons having surrendered excepting the fort of Wassota, which held out for eight months, when the Telin, after a spirited defence, surrendered in consequence of a fire which destroyed her granary. The jewels and private property of the Pritee Needhee's family were seized by Bappoo Gokla, and never accounted for to the Peishwa. In order to prevent the odium likely to arise from having thus reduced the Pritee Needhee, Bajee Rao allowed Bappoo Gokla to retain possession of the conquered districts, as if they were kept more as a punishment to the Pritee Needhee than as an advantage to himself. During the period Gokla retained possession of the conquered territory, his exactions were

most severe ; and being supported by a large force, they were irresistible. By these means Bappoo Gokla¹ became the wealthiest of the Peishwa's Surdars. He succeeded to the command of his uncle's troops, when the latter was killed by Dhoondia Waug, as already mentioned ; but he owed his elevation chiefly to General Wellesley, whom he accompanied in the war of 1803, and, excepting Appa Dessaye Nepankur, was the only good officer in the immediate service of Bajee Rao.

A.D.
1808.

Appa Dessaye's name is Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur² ; we have already had occasion to mention this person on more than one occasion, but about this period he became more conspicuous from the following circumstances.

About the year 1785, the petty states of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, always jealous of each other, went to war, because Luximee

¹ [Bāpū Gokhale (Bappoo Gokla) was the nephew of Dhondo Pant Gokhale, a Konkanasth Brahman of Chiplūn, Ratnāgiri, who was originally a marine record-keeper at the port of Vijayadrag. When Parasurām Bhāu Patvardhan marched with the Pēshwā's auxiliaries in conjunction with British troops against Tipū Sultān in 1791, Dhondo Pant accompanied the army to Seringapatam. From that date he and his nephews became distinguished as military leaders. All three behaved with gallantry in the operations against Dhondia Wāgh in 1799, Dhondo Pant and his elder nephew Appa both being killed, while Bāpū Gokhale received several wounds, one of which, a sabre cut in the face, left a permanent scar by which he was afterwards distinguished. Bāpū accompanied General Wellesley in the campaigns of 1803, 1804 and 1805, and finally ended his career in a gallant charge against the British cavalry on February 17, 1818. He left a widow, the daughter of Raghu Pant Abhyānkar, but no children. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 678.)]

² [The ancestors of Sīdojī Rāo (Seedojee Rao) had performed military service for the Rājās of Kolhāpur, from whom they obtained the two *inām* villages of Nipāni and Nandi, including the *deshmukhī* and the office of *sar-nāikī* of the *pargana* of Hukēri. During the life of Sīdojī-Rāo the Rājā of Kolhāpur conferred two more villages upon him. Nipāni, Nandi and Hukēri are now included in Belgaum District, the largest of the three places being Nipāni, forty miles north of Belgaum, which with the estate of which it formed part lapsed to the British Government in 1839. Sīdojī was introduced by Sarjī Rāo Ghātḡē to the notice of the Pēshwā, who conferred the title of *Sar-Lashkar* upon him. He accompanied the British army under General Wellesley in 1803-4 ; and subsequently having wrested Chikodi and Manoli (see page 417) from the Rājā of Kolhāpur retained them until 1817, when he was forced to relinquish them. After the defeat of the Pēshwā and the conquest of his territory in 1818, Sīdojī Rāo was confirmed in the rest of his estates by the British Government, to whom they eventually lapsed in the absence of heirs.]

Bye, the wife of Kem Sawunt, Dessaye of Waree, and niece of Mahadajee Sindia, had obtained some privileges of royalty for her husband from the Moghul Emperor, through her uncle's all-powerful influence at the court of Delhi.¹ With a few intermissions and with various success, this warfare had continued for twenty-three years; when at last the troops of Kolapoor gained a victory over those of Sawuntwaree in a pitched battle, fought at the village of Chowkul, and the fort of Waree was immediately besieged; Kem Sawunt had been dead some years²; he had left four widows, the eldest of whom, Luximee Bye, became regent, on account of the minority of Kem Sawunt's only son, by Dawee Bye his third wife. Luximee Bye, when her capital was besieged, called in the aid of Wiswas Rao Ghatgay and Appa Dessaye. Wiswas Rao Ghatgay had been put in possession of two districts called Chickooree and Menowlee,³ belonging to Kolapoor, by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. His pretended right to dispose of them originated in their having been conquered by the first Mahdoo Rao and bestowed on the family of Putwurdhun; and Sindia having authority for possessing himself of the sequestered Jagheer of the Putwurdhuns, Shirzee Rao, who had seized those two districts,

¹ [The title of Rājā Bahādur (lit. 'the valorous King') was conferred upon Khem Sāvant the Great by the Emperor. For an interesting note on the word 'Bahādur,' see Yule's *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. Crooke, 1903, pp. 48 f.]

² [Khem Sāvant died childless in 1803. A contest for the succession continued until 1805, when Lakshmī Bāi (Luximee Bye) adopted a child, Rāmchandra Sāvant, *alias* Bhāu Sāhib. The child lived for three years, and was then strangled in his bed. Phond Sāvant, a minor, was chosen to fill his place (see page 418, *post*). In 1812 Phond Sāvant was forced to yield Vengurla to the British in consequence of the losses sustained by British commerce from the pirates who infested the Sāvantvādi coast. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 496.)]

³ [Chikodi (Chickooree) is now the north-western *tāluka* of Belgaum District, containing 836 square miles, and famous for tobacco, sugarcane, fruit and vegetable gardens. Manoli (Menowlee), now represented by a town in Parasgad *tāluka*, forty-two miles east of Belgaum town, is famous as the spot where General Wellesley overtook the notorious free-booter, Dhondia Wāgh, after a long pursuit from Mysore territory. During the war with the Pēshwā in 1817, the Rājā of Kolhāpur sided with the British. In reward, the tracts of Chikodi and Manoli, wrested from him by Sarjī Rāo Ghātḡē and later by the chief of Nipāni (Sīdojī Rāo Appā Desāi) were restored. In 1829, owing to the serious misconduct of the Rājā, these tracts were resumed by the British Government, in whose possession they have since remained. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 15, 25, 515.)]

made them over to his brother, Wiswas Rao, when he was ordered by his son-in-law to join him in Malwa. Wiswas Rao would have been driven out of them by the Raja of Kolapoor, but he was supported by Appa Dessaye, who afterwards took them for himself. The Peishwa, on the plea of wishing to avoid disputes with Sindia, pretended to take no concern in those districts,¹ but it was on the authority of his secret orders that Appa Dessaye seized them, and Bajee Rao at a subsequent period, in 1812, asserted his own claim to them on grounds which were admitted by the British Government.

On the present occasion, when Luximee Bye applied for aid, Appa Dessaye with the Peishwa's secret concurrence readily afforded it; the siege of Waree was raised, and the territory of the Kolapoor Raja above the Ghauts was invaded; so that the Kolapoor troops were recalled from the Concan to defend their own capital. Application was made to the British Government for its mediation, but Lord Minto, then Governor-General, declined all interference; and the Peishwa who was the principal cause of the disturbance began to hint at his rights of supremacy over all parties; a disposition to encroachment, which, if checked by the British authorities on its very first indication, would have been of essential importance to the stability of Bajee Rao's government.²

Appa Dessaye, however, made himself complete master of Chikoooree and Menowlee, and endeavoured to establish his authority over Sawuntwaree. The son of Kem Sawunt was strangled at the instigation of Appa Dessaye's Carcoon, with the concurrence of Luximee Bye and of Poond Sawunt, the next heir to the principality. But Appa Dessaye did not profit by this atrocious deed. Poond Sawunt, taking advantage of the weak state of Appa Dessaye's troops, the greater part being withdrawn to maintain the war above the Ghauts, drove them from the country, and possessed himself of the government.

**A.D.
1809.**

¹ Colonel Close's dispatches, 5th May, 1808.

² [Lord Minto was so deeply engaged throughout his term of office in planning and executing the overseas expeditions which swept the fleets of France from the Indian seas and left England without a rival in the Eastern hemisphere, that he was practically debarred from interfering in Marāthā politics and from running the risk of causing a Marāthā war, which would have been deeply resented by the authorities at home. The whole available strength of India was absorbed in the capture of the French islands (1809-10), the conquest of the Moluccas (1810), and the conquest of Java (1811). (*O.H.I.*, pp. 611-19.)]

Luximee Bye died soon after, when Poond Sawunt found a rival rather than a coadjutor in the person of Doorga Bye, the second widow of Kem Sawunt and the daughter of a Mahratta officer named Khanwelkur.

In the meantime the utmost apparent cordiality subsisted between the British Resident and the Peishwa's court. Bajee Rao, as often as he could find a pretext, was prosecuting with inflexible perseverance his favourite plan of sequestrating the Jagheers of all whom he considered the political opponents of his family, and appropriating their revenues to his own use. Whilst thus engaged, Bajee Rao was happy. On every occasion he enlarged on the blessings he enjoyed through his alliance with the British Government; he professed the warmest affection and friendship for the Resident, Colonel Close; and it is probable that Bajee Rao, in all he thus expressed, was in a great measure sincere.

Colonel Close was in the habit of receiving all native visitors through an agent, a Parsee named Khoosroojee, familiarly styled the Moodhee¹: a person of comprehensive judgement, and of great address, who soon attained considerable influence with his master. Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir and the Moodhee soon formed a compact, and having united with them Byajee Naik, a Hoojra or personal servant of the Peishwa by whom Byajee was much trusted as a spy, they contrived to persuade Bajee Rao, that by gaining Khoosroojee to his interests he might command the services of the British Residency: a proposal well suited to the mind of Bajee Rao, by whom no means were spared to attain an end so desirable.

The triumvirate in all probability participated in the spoils, and all intercourse, public as well as private, went on so agreeably by the agency of those persons, that there was no cause of dissatisfaction. Any subject likely to occasion unpleasant discussion was either postponed, or so arranged that, before being brought

¹ [His proper name was Kharshedjī Jāmshedjī Modi. He was a native of Cambay. Modi (Moodhee), which is now the surname of certain well-known Parsi families of Surat and Bombay, is a professional name meaning 'agent, broker or contractor.' The Modis of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were government contractors for the supply of provisions and other articles to the troops, and acted also as importers, agents and bankers. They are mentioned in old Bombay records as 'the Moodys.' (*B.G., Materials II; Dosabhai Framji Karaka's History of the Parsis*, London, 1884, ii, 40 ff.)]

forward on either side, it was smoothed of its asperities, so that little difficulty remained in the adjustment.

The services of Colonel Close during this year were called for, on a very important occasion, to Hyderabad, and he never returned to his situation at Poona. Mr. Henry Russell succeeded to the temporary charge of that Residency, until the return of Mr.

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1810. Elphinstone from a mission to Cabul,¹ and the same harmony continued to prevail. Khoosroojee, though a servant of the British Residency, had been permitted to accept the high office of Sursoobehdar of the Carnatic under the Peishwa's government, and he appointed as his deputy a Bramin named Bappoo Sawney.

Mr. Elphinstone had been an assistant to Colonel Close at Poona, before he was attached to General Wellesley's staff in the war of 1803, so that he took charge of his appointment as Resident with considerable local information. Being in the habit of

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1811. communicating with the natives direct, he saw all persons who had business, and discontinued the form of introduction through any one agent. This alteration, superadded to a quarrel which had taken place between Khoosroojee and Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, was a source of secret vexation and discontent to the former, as it so greatly tended to lessen his importance and his gains; but Khoosroojee had much personal influence with the Peishwa, which he unfortunately exercised in prejudicing his mind against the Resident, by representing him as one who entertained the same sentiments as General Wellesley, whom Bajee Rao hated, because he had opposed his schemes of vengeance against Amrut Rao and the family of Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun. Several instances might be adduced of the effect which the Moodhee's insinuations produced on the mind of the Peishwa; but although many subjects hitherto kept back were now brought into discussion in hopes of creating a necessity of again interposing the agency of the Moodhee, Bajee Rao had soon reason to acknow-

¹ [Mountstuart Elphinstone's embassy to Kābul in 1808 never got beyond Peshāwar. 'Shāh Shuj'a, to whom the mission was accredited, soon afterwards was expelled from his kingdom, so that no direct political results were obtained. The envoy devoted much of his time to investigation through agents and by all means at his command of the conditions existing in Afghanistan, then a completely unknown country. He embodied the results of his researches in a book of great value, entitled *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, &c.*, which was published in 1815, and still counts as an authority.' (O.H.I., p. 614.)

ledge the impartiality of the Resident on the subject from which his chief prejudice against him had arisen.

As soon as he had resumed the lands of the inferior Jagheerdars who had ever been disobedient to himself, or who had taken an active part against his father, the Peishwa desired Bappoo Gokla to make over the Pritee Needhee's district to the state, and again brought forward his complaints and claims against other great Jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, Rastia, and the Dessaye of Kittoor.

These persons, presuming on the protection already afforded to them by the British Government, neglected to obey the orders of the Peishwa, and omitted to send their troops, which were now much wanted to defend the country from the Pindharees, whose inroads were every year becoming more powerful and destructive. When Bajee Rao embraced the British alliance, he wrote to the Jagheerdars in question, to assist the British troops. Most of them being personally acquainted with General Wellesley readily obeyed Bajee Rao's orders, co-operated in his re-establishment, and were disposed to forget past injuries, until the rancorous revenge and studied aggressions of Bajee Rao completely alienated their minds. They were only deterred from supporting the Pritee Needhee's rebellion by the fear of the subsidiary force, and had the interposition of the British Government been withheld, they would, when joined to the Pritee Needhee, have probably effected another revolution, as it was estimated they could at that time bring into the field nearly twenty thousand horse. In considering a plan of settlement between these Jagheerdars and the Peishwa, several modes were discussed at a very early period by the British authorities. To have avowedly withheld support from both parties would have involved the country in war and confusion; to have assisted in the destruction of families in whose favour so much might be urged would have been unjust; and it would have been still more so, to raise them into independent principalities under the guarantee of the British Government. It therefore appeared advisable to steer a middle course; and it was determined to enforce the service of their troops as due to the Peishwa, and to cause them to restore all usurped lands; but to guarantee their territory as long as they chose to abide by the tenor of their original engagement to the Poona state.

With this arrangement of the southern Mahratta country

it was resolved to combine the effectual suppression of piracy in the states of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, which, it was foreseen, could never be rooted out, until some harbours and fortresses on the coast of Malwan were placed in the hands of the British Government.

The Putwurdhuns were very averse to acknowledge fealty to Bajee Rao, but they at last submitted and complied with the conditions imposed by the British Government. The Raja of Kolapoor nearly lost his capital by the intrigues of the Peishwa, who secretly encouraged him to resist the demands of the English ; hoping that his general, Appa Dessaye, then besieging Kolapoor as if in his own quarrel, might be able to reduce it before the terms were accepted ; whilst on the other hand, in order to cause delay, he declared to the Resident that the British Government had no right to enter into a treaty with the Raja of Kolapoor, who was his subject : an assertion as bold as it was false. Before any of the objects could be effected, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to assemble an army at Punderpoor, and move it down to the neighbourhood of the Kistna. In regard to the Jagheerdars, besides what has been already stated in the general plan of settlement, Appa Sahib Putwurdhun was obliged to surrender the person of Baba Rao Phurkay ; a concession to the Peishwa on the part of the British Government, which was very unpopular in the Mahratta country ; and although it may have been strictly just, the policy of the measure is questionable. Baba Rao was confined by the Peishwa in the fort of Bassein, where he shortly after died. By the terms tendered and accepted by the Raja of Kolapoor, he renounced all right to Chickooree and Menowlee, which were ceded to the Peishwa ; but all other places taken from the Raja in consequence of the disputed right to these districts were restored. To the British Government the Raja ceded the harbour of Malwan, which included the forts and island of Malwan or Sindidroog and its dependencies ; he also agreed to renounce piracy, to permit no armed vessels to be fitted out, or to enter his ports, on pain of becoming lawful prize to the British Government, and to restore wrecks, as well as to assist vessels in distress. He also became bound for himself and his successors to pursue no manner of hostility against any other state, without the consent of the British Government. The British Government renounced its long existing claims against the Raja, and became bound to guarantee his

possessions against the aggressions of all foreign powers and states.¹

(Oct. 3.)—Poond Sawunt, Dessaye of Sawuntwaree, was at the same time bound down to suppress piracy, to make over the fort of Vingorla and the battery of Gunaramo Tembe, with its port and limits; and in case of being guilty of further piratical acts, the forts of Newtee and Rairee were likewise to be required of him. British merchants were to be allowed free ingress and egress to and from the Dessaye's territory, on paying the customary duties; but all articles of consumption required for the British troops stationed within the territory were to pass duty free.

Soon after the conclusion of the agreement, Poond Sawunt died, and Doorga Bye became regent.² This old lady, regardless of the guarantee of the British Government, attacked the possessions of the Raja of Kolapoor, took the fort of Burratgurh, which had formerly belonged to Sawuntwaree, and refused to evacuate it. A British detachment from the Madras establishment was brought down to protect the Kolapoor territory, when she withdrew the garrison of Burratgurh, but continued to brave the threats and despise the arguments which were offered to deter or induce her to refrain from aggression. No retaliation was permitted against Doorga Bye, till every reasonable proposal had failed; when the British troops were ordered to occupy some of the districts, with a view of forcing her into terms. No opposition was actually made, but the British troops were kept perpetually on the alert

¹ [This agreement was known as the Treaty of Karvir, this being the original name of Kolhāpur. The present capital, Kolhāpur, originally existed as a purely religious settlement, the site being now marked by the great temple of the goddess Mahālakshmi. Karavira, or Karvir, is probably the older and more important capital of the State, and the transfer of the political capital from Karavira to the religious settlement of Kolhāpur was probably necessitated by some convulsion of nature, of which there is much evidence in the neighbourhood. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 523.)]

² [Phond Sāvānt was succeeded by his son Khem Sāvānt IV, a child of eight. He proved himself, when he came of age, quite unable to manage the State, and in 1838, after several revolutions and much disturbance, he agreed to make over the administration to the British Government. Rebellions, which were quickly suppressed, broke out in 1839 and 1844; and in 1861 the State was finally restored to the chief, on his undertaking to defray the cost (5,50,000 rupees) of the last rebellion, to pay a succession fee of one year's revenue, to protect his subjects, and to meet the expense of a British Resident and his establishment. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 495-6.)]

by threatened attacks, and thus was engendered a state of affairs neither of peace nor of war, but which occasioned all the expense and inconvenience of the latter. Doulut Rao Sindia, though unconnected with the Waree state after the death of Luximee Bye, interested himself in behalf of Doorga Bye, and much discussion and correspondence resulted from her contumelious behaviour; nor did she desist from her vexatious opposition until, in consequence of many hostile acts against the British Government, her territory was reduced in the beginning of 1819 by a British force; but after exacting the necessary securities, the principality of Sawuntwaree was left in its original independence.

In the meantime, although Bajee Rao was disappointed in the hope of being able to ruin the southern Jagheerdars, they were compelled to bow before him. He could scarcely refrain from insulting the Putwurdhuns when they came to pay their respects, and his exultation at getting Baba Rao Phurkay into his power knew no bounds. He was profuse in his acknowledgements and expressions of gratitude to the Governor-General and the Resident; but he at the same time declared that he should wish not to have a single Surinjamee horseman¹ in his service, and proposed raising a brigade of infantry, to be disciplined entirely by European officers and paid like the British Sepoys, direct from the treasury. To this proposal the Governor-

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1813. General readily acceded, and Captain John Ford, of the Madras establishment, who had been long attached to the escort of Colonel Close, was, at the recommendation of Khoos-roojee, selected by the Peishwa as commandant of the brigade, and able officers from the line, chosen by Captain Ford, were lent from the Bombay establishment to assist in its formation and discipline. The men, excepting a small proportion of Mahrattas, were chiefly raised in the Company's provinces in Hindoostan, and on entering their battalions swore fidelity to

¹ That is horse furnished by Jagheerdars. [*Saranjām* (Surinjām) is a Persian word signifying 'beginning-ending,' and is used in India to mean 'apparatus,' 'goods and chattels,' and the like. But in the Deccan and Southern Marāthā country it is applied specially to grants of land or assignments of revenue, for special objects, such as the maintenance of a military contingent for service; to civil officers for the maintenance of their state; or for charitable purposes. (Yule's *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. Crooke, 1903, s.v. 'Surrinjaum.')]]

the Peishwa, whilst he continued in alliance with the British Government.¹

The cantonment allotted for this brigade was about four miles to the north-west of Poona.² One brigade of British troops was stationed on a spot originally selected for the protection of the city, in its immediate vicinity; and the rest of the British subsidiary force occupied a position about half-way between Poona and Ahmednugur, near the village of Seroor,³ on the river Ghore.

The Peishwa had soon a fresh instance of the utility of the British force by finding it necessary to call in a part of it against Appa Dessaye, who, although he came to Poona on being ordered, refused to comply with certain claims devolving on the Peishwa by the late settlement, or to give up some territory belonging to the Raja of Kolapoor. The British authorities interposed, but Bajee Rao artfully contrived by his intrigues to induce Appa Dessaye to trust to his lenity and to resist the demands; by which insidious conduct the Dessaye was led on to forfeit one-fourth of his Jagheer to the Peishwa.

We have already alluded to the quarrel between Khoosroojee Moodhee and Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. Their differences likewise originated in the intrigues of the Peishwa, who, having been informed of their collusion, concluded with some justice that such a cabal might as often act against him as for him, and he therefore determined on creating a division between them. It was with this view that he conferred the appointment of Sursoobehdar of the Carnatic on the Moodhee, in preference to Sewdasheo Bhow, who would have been much gratified by it. The

¹ Oral information.

If I am not mistaken, this condition was proposed and insisted upon by the Hindoostan Sepoys themselves, without its being suggested by their officers:

² [That is to say, in or close to Kirkee, which is now the principal artillery station of the Bombay Presidency, and contains a large arms and ammunition factory.]

³ [Sirūr (Seroor), or Gnodadi, is thirty-six miles north-east of Poona, and thirty-four miles south-west of Ahmadnagar. At present the garrison of Sirūr consists of a regiment of Indian cava ry. In the cemetery of Sirūr is the tomb of Colonel W. Wallace (1809), who is still remembered and spoken of by the inhabitants as *Sat Purush*, 'the holy man.' Except Brahmans and Mār wādīs, all the Hindus of Sirūr and neighbouring villages worship at Colonel Wallace's tomb. At harvest-time the villagers bring the first-fruits of grain as *naivedya*, or food for the saintly spirit. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 532.)]

Moodhee was thus secured in Bajee Rao's interests, but the envy of Mankesir was excited, and he in a short time informed the Peishwa of the corrupt practices of the Moodhee in the affairs of his government. These charges Bajee Rao secretly advised his minister to prefer to the Resident, which was accordingly done, and as the Moodhee was a servant of the British Government they would have been immediately investigated, but the Peishwa's object being answered by the accusation from Mankesir,¹ he interfered to prevent the inquiry, and, as it related to an affair connected with his government, the proceedings were quashed at his request.² This intrigue answered its purpose, by incensing Khoosroojee against the minister; and as *friendship*, according to the interpretation of the court of Bajee Rao, was to aid and to conceal the acquisition of corrupt emolument, the Peishwa secured the goodwill of Khoosroojee, but the nature of the Moodhee's confidential situation at the Residency being incompatible with his appointment as governor of a Mahratta province, he was afterwards required by Mr. Elphinstone to resign the one or the other, and he accordingly relinquished the latter.³ Trimbukjee Dainglia was immediately appointed to the vacant office. Trimbukjee was originally a *jasoos* or spy, and brought himself to the Peishwa's notice, when he fled to Mhar from the power of Holkar, by carrying a letter to Poona, and bringing back a reply, in a very short space of time. Being afterwards entertained on the personal establishment of the Peishwa, his activity, intelligence and vigour soon became conspicuous; and by unceasing diligence, and, above all, by being pander to his vices, never hesitating to fulfil his wishes whatever they might be,⁴ he gradually gained the confidence of his master, and was the only man who ever obtained it. When Gunput Rao Phansay, the respectable commandant of the Peishwa's artillery, was deprived of his Jagheer, Trimbukjee was appointed commandant in his stead. He at first courted Mankesir and Khoosroojee; but having discovered their collusion, he

¹ The accusation was not made by Mankesir himself, but by three persons employed by him and the Peishwa.

² The above is from native information of respectability; but I am not certain of the date, or whether Mr. Russell or Mr. Elphinstone was Resident at the time. I think the former.

³ Native information.

⁴ Trimbukjee once told Mr. Elphinstone, in conversation: 'If my master order me, I will kill a cow'—a declaration of servile devotedness, equally strong and impious.

disclosed it to the Peishwa, and though it did not for some time become apparent, he entirely supplanted Mankesir in his master's councils, and retained Khoosroojee in the manner already described.

Bajee Rao's success in bringing his Jagheerdars under his authority encouraged him in more extensive plans for aggrandizing his power. He occasionally mentioned his claims on the Nizam, but as often as the Resident prepared for entering on the investigation, Bajee Rao found some excuse for delay. He likewise spoke, at first distantly, of his claims on Sindia and Holkar, although sensible that they were dissolved by treaties, to which he was himself a party ; and he pressed, with seeming earnestness, an early settlement of the debts due to him by the Gaekwar : a subject which had already for several years occupied attention, and to which we shall presently advert.

Unfortunately for Bajee Rao, the low favourite whom he had chosen, and who had much of the character of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, entertained a strong prejudice against Europeans ; and his arrogant presumption and unprincipled mind were equal to any attempt. Bajee Rao, at first, in wishing to extend his power, entertained no hostile designs against the British Government ; but, elated by his increasing consequence, without reflecting from whence it was derived, and flattered by the suggestions of Trimbukjee, who tried to persuade him that he would recover by the force of his wisdom all that his ancestors had gained by their swords, he became irritated by opposition to his wishes, and was hurried forward, until he was overwhelmed in the intrigues

and crimes which Dainglia led him on to perpetrate. In frequent consultations with the Moodhee and Trimbukjee, they advised him, before entering on the more important discussions with the British Government, to increase his military establishment, which without any design or appearance of hostility would, they represented, tend to render him more respectable in the eyes of all India, and give weight to arguments with his allies. Of the benefit derived by the British Government from the treaty of Bassein the Moodhee, perhaps from conviction, impressed Bajee Rao with the most exaggerated opinion ; and he may have thought, from the evident desire of conciliation which existed in the councils of the British Government, that much would be conceded to avert a war. The annual

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inroads of the Pindharees and a pilgrimage undertaken by Bajee Rao, for the second time, to a celebrated temple in the Carnatic, furnished ample excuse for raising troops, had a pretext been wanting; but the fact was, the Resident had been constantly pressing on the attention of the minister the inadequate force maintained by the Peishwa for the protection of his country. Up to 1812, exclusive of the troops maintained by the Jagheerdars, and the Sebundees, or irregular infantry employed in collecting the revenue, his army amounted to no more than two thousand five hundred horse and three thousand infantry. Four thousand horse were that year added to the establishment, and several hundreds each year subsequently; but instead of continuing to increase the levies of horse so useful to check the Pindharees, a large body of Gosaeen infantry was now entertained at Trimbukjee's suggestion; and Arabs, whose enlistment Bajee Rao had at one time not only prohibited, but had begged of the Bombay Government to arrest on their route from the coast to his dominions, now met with every encouragement. An opportunity for exercising the new levies soon occurred by the refusal of Bappoo Sindia, Killidar of Dharwar, to surrender that fortress. Having come to pay his respects to the Peishwa on his route to the Carnatic, Bajee Rao desired him to give up the fort to Trimbukjee. 'If Your Highness,' replied the Killidar, 'will send a gentleman to relieve me in the command, or if you will send a Carcoon in your own name, to whom I can commit my charge, your servant will present the keys to him, but I will never give over the fort of Dharwar to such a person as Trimbukjee Dainglia.' In consequence of this speech, as soon as he had reached the door of the Peishwa's tent, he was arrested, bound, and tortured by Trimbukjee, until a promise of surrender was extorted. His Carcoon, a Bramin on whom the Killidar could rely, was dispatched with Trimbukjee, who, accompanied by a body of troops, proceeded to take possession; but, on approaching the gate, the Carcoon begged permission to go on a few minutes in advance of the party, that he might speak to the garrison and make some arrangements; when, no sooner had he got inside, than he shut the gate, and on pretence of being detained by the garrison opened a fire on Trimbukjee and his followers, who were obliged to retire with precipitation. This insult could not be resented at the time, nor until the Peishwa's return to Poona, when Dharwar was invested; but the faithful Carcoon did not

surrender until an order was obtained from his imprisoned master, through the interposition of Bappoo Gokla.

About this period the conduct of Khoosroojee Moodhee, which from the first had not escaped the Resident's observation, became such as to render it necessary to remove him from Poona, in order to prevent, as far as possible, the bad effects of the dangerous opinions which he inculcated. His past services entitled him to all due consideration from the British Government; and it would have been both difficult and ill-judged to have proved the circumstances by which he had forfeited his claim to its reward. A liberal provision was therefore made for him in his native province, Guzerat; but, about the eve of his intended departure, he died by poison. Whether it was administered by others, or taken wilfully or accidentally by himself, could never be discovered, although the case underwent a long and strict investigation. If he knew more secrets, with respect to foreign intrigues, than Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee Dainglia thought fit to trust to any third person beyond their own power, his death may be imputed to their machinations; but it was the general opinion of the people at Poona that he had poisoned himself through a fear of the loss of reputation, when, by removal from power and office, his corrupt practices might become public. It is, however, remarkable that in succession to this general report the Peishwa, who had before quashed the proceedings against him, now became his accuser; and Bappoo Sawney, the deputy of the deceased, was called upon by Bajee Rao to account for the defalcation, bribery, and corruption of his master. During the proceedings, Bappoo Sawney died suddenly; of fright it was said, at what he might expect if proved delinquency threw him into the power of Trim-

bukjee Dainglia. This person, who had been for some time the chief director of the Peishwa's councils, was at last appointed his minister in the transaction of affairs with the British Government. He studied his master's humours, and attained entire ascendancy over his mind; his measures were vigorous, though marked by ignorance, violence, and treachery. His punishments were at once lenient and severe; robbery and murder might be compensated by a small fine, but a failure in a revenue contract was an unpardonable offence.

The Peishwa farmed his districts to the highest bidder; and those who failed in their contracts were compelled to surrender

their whole property with that of their securities ; and should all be insufficient, they were thrown into hill-forts and treated with the greatest rigour. On one occasion, Trimbukjee, before his power was completely established, being enraged at some delay on the part of a banker who had become security for a revenue contractor, used him in the harshest manner, and at last ordered the banker to be dragged before him, when he struck him a violent blow on the head, which, owing to a heavy ring on his finger, proved instantly fatal ; but, although the person thus deprived of life was a Bramin of respectability,¹ no notice was taken of the circumstance.

These severities to the contractors did not deter others from adventuring on the same course ; for Bajee Rao, who let the districts himself, was an adept in the art of flattery, and his manner plausible to a degree which few could resist. His court, which was gay and licentious beyond that of any other Peishwa, soon became agreeable to the generality of Bramins in Poona, and a high offer for a district was a sure way to the temporary notice of the prince. All his expenditure was regulated by contract. The net revenue of the state was about one hundred and twenty lacks of rupees, of which Bajee Rao saved annually about fifty lacks, and had, at this period, collected treasure exceeding fifty millions of rupees. Whilst thus intent on amassing wealth, his time was divided in the encouragement of the grossest debauchery, and the practice of the most absurd superstitions. He aspired to a character for sanctity ; was rigid in the observance of every form required by the rules of cast ; and the murder of Narrain Rao, attributed to his parents, was a subject of inquietude and remorse. To atone for their crime, he planted several hundred thousand mango trees about Poona ; gave largesses to Bramins and religious establishments, and was particularly generous to the temple at Punderpoor. As an instance of his superstition may be mentioned a dream of one of his religious attendants, who declared he saw the ghost of Narrain Rao, and that it had ordered a dinner for one hundred thousand Bramins ; an entertainment which was immediately provided.

To the complaints of his subjects he never listened ; and if the villagers endeavoured to approach his presence, they were driven

¹ The banker's name was Sukharam Naik Loondee.

away by the attendants. The farmers of the districts had generally the superintendence of civil and criminal justice, and their powers in this respect enabled them to increase their collections by fines and exactions. There was a nominal court of justice at Poona, under a Shastree, who had a very large establishment. It was supported entirely by the corrupt emoluments which power enabled its members to draw from the public, and was so notoriously corrupt, that the poorer suitor, unless he had interest, or could bribe some great man of whom the Shastree stood in awe, was certain to lose his cause.

Defective as the system was under Mahdoo Rao Bullal, the Shastree who then superintended and directed the Panchayets was a person of strict integrity, and that Peishwa's reign was always referred to as the time when a poor man had justice : even the administration of Nana Furnuwees was spoken of with applause ; but Bajee Rao, the only Peishwa who had full leisure to amend the civil government, had neither ability nor inclination for the task.

He persevered in his plan of sequestrating Jagheers, and Mahdoo Rao Rastia having failed to produce his quota of horse for muster, the Peishwa represented to the British Resident this departure from what was stipulated, as wilful disobedience to his authority. The agreement in question being one of those concluded through the interposition of the British Government, Rastia was called upon by the Resident to fulfil his engagement with the Peishwa ; otherwise he must abide by the consequences. Rastia hesitated, declared his inability to furnish so many horse, owing to the disobedience of the Dufflays, who were Jagheerdars under him, and by the Peishwa's usual artifice was secretly encouraged to believe, that by trusting to his lenity more favourable terms might be obtained. It was in vain that the Resident represented his situation in its true colours, and warned him of his ruin ; he steadfastly refused compliance, and was stripped by the Peishwa of all his possessions.¹

¹ [The capital of the Rāstē (Rastia) family was Wai in Sātāra District, twenty miles from Sātāra and about fifty miles south of Poona, where, in 1798, Parasurām Bhāu Patvardhan was incarcerated. Moor (*The Hindu Pantheon*, 1st ed., p. 349) describes Wai in 1810 as the capital and 'principal residence of the rich and great Brahman family of *Rasta*, one of the five great independent feudal chiefs of the Mahratta Empire, and nearly related to the *Peshwa*.' In 1827 the

Every day made it more evident that the Peishwa's government was now aiming at the revival of the old Mahratta policy, and was running a course equally incompatible with the Peishwa's alliance and his political existence, unless it were expected that he could overturn the British Government. By Trimbukjee's advice, he had sent agents in the preceding year¹ to the courts of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay; he also dispatched an envoy² to Holkar, with whose court Bajee Rao had never before held any friendly communication, but, what was still more extraordinary, he sent an agent³ to reside with the Pindharees, and had a secret interview at Kopergaom with some of their chiefs. The object of his missions to the Mahratta courts above named was to negotiate a secret treaty of general confederacy and support, which was actually concluded. The declared intention seems to have been for the purpose of strengthening themselves, and uniting together in case the British Government should meditate further encroachment on any of the states concerned, or to act offensively against the British should an opportunity arise, either in consequence of their expected failure in the Nepal war,⁴ then going forward, or on any future occasion; but those of his countrymen who know Bajee Rao best are of opinion that notwithstanding these extensive and apparently well-ordered intrigues, he had neither a fixed plan, nor any serious intention of making war upon the English at this period; certain it is

Rāstēs were still resident in Wai, though the personal estates had dwindled in value from 10,00,000 rupees to 60,000 rupees. (Forrest, *Selections (Marāthā Series)*, i. 677.)

¹ Trimbukjee is supposed to have held communication with Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay as far back as 1811, no doubt with his master's approbation.

² The envoy was a Bramin named Gunnesh Punt.

³ This agent was a Mahratta, his name Kistnajee Gaekwar.

⁴ [The Nepāl War (1814-16) was occasioned by the hostile aggressions of the Gūrkhās, who invaded and seized the Būtwal and Sheorāj regions, and in 1814 attacked three police-stations in the former area. The Marquess of Hastings declared war in May 1814; but the earlier operations failed in consequence of very incompetent leadership. The failure was partly compensated for by successes in Kumāon and on the upper Sutlaj, and in 1816 Sir David Ochterlony forced the Nepalese to sign the treaty of Sagauli (Segowlee), whereby Garhwāl and Kumāon were ceded to the British, the Tarāi, or lowland below the hills, was surrendered, Sikkim was evacuated, and the appointment of a British Resident at Kathmāndu, the capital of Nepāl, was accepted by the Nepalese. (*O.H.I.*, pp. 621-3.)]

however, that his measures were such as would have subjected him to the loss of his musnud, had the facts been formally substantiated and strict justice enforced.

His next scheme was to establish his ascendancy in Guzerat. Like his claims on the Nizam, he frequently expressed a wish to have his affairs with the Gaekwar settled ; but as often as the wish was met by the British Government, he contrived to delay the adjustment. There had been no settlement between the Gaekwar and the Peishwa since the accession of Govind Rao. On the suppression of the rebellion of Aba Shelookur, the Baroda government agreed, as already mentioned, to hold Ahmedabad in farm from the Peishwa, including the tribute of Kattywar, with Pitlaud, Nappar, Chura-Ranpoor, Dhundooka, Gogo, and some rights in Cambay, for the annual sum of five lacks of rupees. When the Bombay Government sent the detachment into Guzerat, to support the party of Rowjee Appajee at Baroda, the government was fast approaching to that state of anarchy and confusion, in which the dominions of Sindia and Holkar were afterwards involved. This fine province was in a great degree preserved from similar misery by the active interference of the British Government, under the able arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, the Resident. The revenues of the state amounted to fifty-five lacks of rupees, and its expenditure to eighty-two. The power of the government was, as we have seen, in the hands of a body of Arab mercenaries, and the divisions in the family of Gaekwar afforded a wide field of hope and of profit to military adventurers of all descriptions, who abound in that quarter. The Arabs were driven out: the debts, exclusive of the heavy balance due to the Peishwa, were compromised for a sum less than forty-two lacks ; and money was raised on the security, or advanced from the treasury, of the British Government for its liquidation. Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, whose rebellion brought the English permanently to Baroda, went off from Neriad, as the reader may recollect, about the time when the Arabs were besieged in Baroda. He was afterwards, when nearly famished, taken prisoner by Babajee, commander of the Gaekwar's troops, delivered over to the charge of the British Government, and long kept a prisoner at large in the fort of Bombay, or its environs, where he ended his days. Kanhojee surrendered himself in 1808, and at first was allowed his liberty and an ample pension ; but

his natural turbulence and love of intrigue could ill brook the undisturbed calm of such a life. In a short time he forfeited the advantages he enjoyed, engaged in plots against the existing government, and was finally conveyed to Madras as a state prisoner.

The collection of the tribute in Kattywar¹ required a considerable force every year from Baroda. The Mahrattas give the name of Kattywar to the whole western Peninsula of Guzerat, although

¹ [Kāthiāwār (Kattywar) is the peninsula lying between 20° 41' and 23° 8' N. and 68° 56' and 72° 20' E., and standing out into the Arabian Sea between the smaller projection of Cutch and the straight line of the Gujarāt coast. Kāthiāwār was known to the Greeks and Romans by the name of *Σαυραστρήνη*. The Muhammadans called it Sorāth, and to this day a large division in the south-west retains that title. The large tract to the east, however, has long been known as Kāthiāwār, having been overrun by the Kāthis, who entered the peninsula from Cutch in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. In the fifteenth century the whole tribe was driven out of Cutch, and in that and the following century conquered considerable territory. The Marāthās, who came into contact with them in their forays and were sometimes successfully repelled by them, extended the name of Kāthiāwār to the whole province, and from them has been borrowed the name in this wider sense. Brahmans and Indians generally still speak of the province as Surāshtra.

Between the middle of the eighth and the close of the thirteenth centuries various petty kingdoms arose. The Jethwas became a powerful tribe in the west of the peninsula; the Jhālas were settled in northern Kāthiāwār by the Anhilvāda kings; the Gohels (now in eastern Kāthiāwār) came from the north in the thirteenth century, retreating before the tide of Muhammadan conquest and founding new seats for themselves on the ruins of Anhilvāda (Pātan, circa 770-1298); the Jādejas and the Kāthis came from the west through Cutch. The sack of Somnāth in 1026 by Mahmud of Ghazni, and the capture of Anhilvāda (or Pātan) in 1197, were the prelude to Muhammadan invasions of Kāthiāwār. In 1572 the country came under the rule of Akbar, and was administered by viceroys from the court of Delhi until the Marāthās supplanted the imperial power. Entering Gujarāt in 1705, the Marāthās had firmly established their rule in 1760. During the latter part of the eighteenth century the Gaekwār, partly for himself and partly for his overlord, the Pēshwā, sent yearly a revenue-collecting army (*mulk-giri*) to obtain contributions from the chiefs of western and northern Gujarāt. As this armed expedition caused much waste and confusion, the British Government agreed to associate itself with the Gaekwār in recovering the Marāthā tribute from the Kāthiāwār States. Internal warfare and resistance to authority were ended in 1807-8 by the settlement effected by Colonel Walker, the chief feature of which was that tributes were fixed and the work of collection was undertaken by the British Government, which also acquired the Pēshwā's rights in Kāthiāwār

strictly applicable to one district only of that extensive tract, which derives its name from the Kattees, a very peculiar race, who worship the sun. The whole region is inhabited by a warlike people, chiefly Jarejah Rajpoots, who are under separate chiefs, and whose internal divisions had early made them an easy prey to the plundering bands of Kantajee Kudum Banday and Dumajee Gaekwar. The Resident, attended by a British force, repeatedly accompanied the Gaekwar's army, and contributed much to tranquillize the province, and to improve its revenues. He also humanely exerted himself, though in the end with little success, to suppress the barbarous practice of female infanticide,¹ to which the Jarejah Rajpoots are prone. From all these circumstances, the Baroda government fell much under the control of the British Resident; but as Lieutenant-Colonel Walker was

after the proclamation of Sātāra in 1818. In 1820 the Gaekwār agreed to have his share collected and paid through the British Government. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 340 ff.; Captain Wilberforce-Bell, *The History of Kathiawad*, Heinemann, London, 1916.)

¹ [The Jādejas (Jarejah), or 'children of Jāda,' were the ruling family in Cutch from the fourteenth century, the Samma tribe of Rājput̄s to which they belonged having ousted the Chāvada Rājput̄s about A.D. 1320. When the rest of the Samma tribe in lower Sind embraced Islam, the Jādejas adopted as their religion a mixture of Hinduism and Muhammadanism. This fact has avowedly influenced their history. Isolated from the rest of their tribesmen and unable to obtain suitable husbands for their daughters, they were led to practise wholesale female infanticide, and enjoyed an evil reputation for this habit up to quite a recent date. The practice was formerly in vogue also among the Kunbis of Gujarāt, owing to the ruinous expenses attached to the marriage of girls, while among the Rājput̄s it arose from the difficulty of securing bridegrooms from the sections of these castes with whom custom prescribed that intermarriage should take place. In 1812 the Jādeja chiefs entered into engagements to abandon this custom, and under the constant watchfulness of British officers, it is believed to be now practically extinct. Mr. Willoughby, in the years preceding 1849, made great progress in stamping it out in Kāthiāwār. It is possible that the crime still prevails in other parts of India, though the general opinion is that it is now comparatively rare (*Census Report*, India, 1911, p. 217). Dr. Vincent Smith mentions the severely inquisitorial measures adopted in the Agra Province in 1870, which did much to break the custom there, and states that a clear case came before him in the Rai Bareli District in 1889. Sleeman deals with infanticide as practised in Oudh in many passages of his *Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh*. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 28, 29 n.) Risley discusses the connexion between female infanticide and the rules of exogamy and hypergamy in *The People of India*, pp. 164-71.]

enabled to direct its principal acts, without paralyzing its internal authority, much benefit resulted to the country from his superintendency.

The ministry was chiefly composed of a set of Purvoes,¹ a cast frequently remarkable for great fidelity and bravery, and when poor, they are often frugal to parsimony ; but it may be observed of the Purvoes, that wherever they attain power and can command wealth, they are lavish and improvident. The head of this ministry was Rowjee Appajee who died in July, 1803, but having previously adopted his nephew Seetaram Rowjee as his son, he was, with the consent of the Resident, appointed his successor. After a patient trial of his ability and resources, Seetaram was found incompetent to the duty, and his uncle Babajee, hitherto at the head of the army, was invited to assist him. Futih Sing, the brother of the Gaekwar, and the heir apparent, whose liberty had been purchased from one of Holkar's commanders who carried him off from Poona in 1803, was also at the same time brought into the administration. Futih Sing chose as his secretary Gungadhur Shastree,² originally in the service of the Phurkay family at Poona, and a man of considerable activity and address, who had been very useful to the Resident in the important measures he had effected. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker placed the highest confidence in the integrity and fidelity of the Shastree, and upon the death of Babajee, and great misconduct on the part of Seetaram, Gungadhur Shastree supported as he was, both by

¹ [i.e. Prabhūs. See note on pp 108-9, vol. i, *ante*. Rāoji Appājī (Rowjee Appajee) was descended from Prayāgī Anant, who defended the fort of Sātāra against Aurangzeb in 1700. (See vol. i, p. 394, *ante*.)]

² [In a letter to his friend Strachey, Mountstuart Elphinstone described Gangādhar Shāstri (Gungadhur Shastree) as 'a person of great shrewdness and talent, who keeps the whole state of Baroda in the highest order, and here lavishes his money and marshals his suwary (i.e. *savāri* or retinue) in such style as to draw the attention of the whole place. Though a very learned Shastree, he affects to be quite an Englishman, walks fast, talks fast, interrupts and contradicts, and calls the Peshwa and his ministers "old fools" and "damned rascals," or rather "dam rascal." He mixes English words with everything he says, and will say of someone (Holkar for instance) : "Bhot *tricks* walla tha, laikun burra akul mund, Kukhye (cock-eye) tha (He was a very tricky person, but very intelligent. He was cock-eyed.).'" Holkar had lost an eye. (See Colebrooke, *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884), i. 275.)]

Futih Sing and the Resident, soon became prime minister in all but the name.

The first arrangement of any importance which took place between the government of Poona and that of Baroda, after the treaty of Bassein, was the settlement of the farm of Ahmedabad and its dependencies.

The former agreement was made in October, 1800, and the term of its duration was to have been five years, but as Ranpoor, Gogo, Dhundooka, and the Peishwa's rights in Cambay were ceded to the British Government by the treaty of Bassein, the Gaekwar was anxious to obtain a perpetual lease of the remainder ; as the evils of divided authority would be avoided, and his own districts become more valuable in consequence. The British Government was equally desirous of having the farm continued, both for the reasons mentioned, and because much confusion and oppression were likely to be averted by the arrangement. The Peishwa, on these representations, and upon condition of receiving five and a half lacks of rupees for the remaining districts, consented without difficulty to allow the Gaekwar to retain them for ten years from June, 1804, and a new agreement was concluded accordingly. But at the expiration of the period, the Peishwa's views were entirely altered, and five times the amount of the sum realized from the districts could not compensate, in his estimation, for the advantages of an increased political influence on the side of Guzerat ; nothing could induce him to renew the lease. Long, however, before the period of renewal, the question of his claims upon the Gaekwar had become a subject of attention with the British authorities.

The Governor-General deemed it advisable to allow the two states to settle their affairs by direct negotiation, and to desire that the arbitration of the British Government should not be resorted to, except in the event of a failure on their part to effect an accommodation. At an early stage of the discussion, an agent of the Gaekwar government, named Bappoo Myraul, was sent to Poona. The debts of the Gaekwar to the Peishwa, according to the statements of the latter, which appear to have been correct, amounted to nearly a crore of rupees ; but, as the chief cause of the embarrassments of the Baroda government originated in the attachment of the family to the cause of his father, Bajee Rao generously acceded to the relinquishment of sixty lacks of

rupees of this demand. The Baroda government, without claiming exemption as matter of favour, advanced counter-claims on the following grounds.

When Dummajee gave up half of Guzerat to Ballajee Bajee Rao in 1751, he retained his rights in Baroach undivided, and the Peishwa got Jumbooseer and some other districts, as an equivalent for his share. By the treaty of Baroda, in 1775, Rugonath Rao obtained from Futih Sing Gaekwar the cession of his rights in Baroach for the East India Company; and by the treaty of Poorundhur, although the Poona ministry had no power to alienate Baroach from the Gaekwar, it was wholly ceded to the British Government. It was in vain that Futih Sing demanded his rights in Baroach, from the English who kept them, or from the Peishwa who had given them away; and although, when the war was renewed, General Goddard put Futih Sing in possession of several of the Peishwa's districts, he was compelled to relinquish them by the treaty of Salbye. Mahadajee Sindia, on the conclusion of that pacification, obtained Baroach from the British Government: with Sindia's successor it remained until it fell, by right of conquest, to the English in 1803; and the Gaekwar now advanced a demand on the Peishwa for the amount of his share of its revenue since the treaty of Poorundhur.

His other counter-claims were on account of expenses incurred in reducing the rebellion of Aba Shelookur, and in maintaining an extraordinary number of troops for the defence of the Peishwa's, as well as of his own, possessions in Guzerat. These intricate claims occasioned infinite discussion; and when Bajee Rao adopted the plans of Trimbukjee, he threw every obstacle in the way of a settlement, because the outstanding demands on Baroda and Hyderabad were reserved as a means of communicating with these courts; from which, owing to the nature of their engagements with the British Government, his intrigues might otherwise have been excluded. Bappoo Myraul, the Gaekwar's agent at Poona, a sensible, upright man, and of a cautious observant disposition, was soon found unfit for the Peishwa's purpose. Some other agent must be sent, with whom the settlement could be conducted. The Gaekwar's government, therefore, resolved on sending Gungadhur Shastree, both for the adjustment of the accounts and for obtaining a renewal of the lease of the Peishwa's share of Guzerat.

(A.D. 1814.)—Accordingly, the Shastree proceeded to Poona ; but such was the general dread of the violent and unprincipled conduct of the powerful Trimbukjee towards all who opposed his wishes, that the Gaekwar asked and obtained the formal guarantee of his minister's safety from the British Government. As early as September, 1811, it had been proposed to send Gungadhur Shastree to Poona : the proposal was at that time readily and distinctly acceded to by the Peishwa ; but on the Shastree's arrival, in 1814, Bajee Rao objected to him, and even refused to see him, on the plea of his having been insolent to him when a Carcoon in the service of Phurkay. The fact was, the Baroda minister, Seetaram Rowjee, jealous of the Shastree, and already seduced by the Peishwa, represented the Shastree as a person wholly in the interests of the English.

It must be explained that Bajee Rao, on the decline of Seetaram Rowjee's influence at Baroda, attempted with success to gain him to his views ; and on the Resident's discovering the intrigue and protesting against it, the Peishwa first denied and afterwards justified the correspondence, by endeavouring to prove his right to appoint the Dewan at Baroda, according to the ancient practice in the plenitude of the Peishwa's power. Such a right, in regard to the Senaputtee or his Mootaliq, Gaekwar, never did exist on the part of the Peishwa ; but, without reference to the alleged right, or the object of the intrigue, the reasons urged did not appear sufficient, in Mr. Elphinstone's opinion, for the Peishwa's refusing to transact business with the accredited agent of a government in alliance with the nation which he represented, especially after having once assented to his mission : the Peishwa's objections were therefore overruled.

The proposed renewal of the lease of Ahmedabad, for reasons already explained, was positively rejected by the Peishwa ; and Trimbukjee, having obtained the appointment of Sur-soobehdar, prepared his troops and agents, who, in the Peishwa's name, took possession of the districts in Guzerat, and very soon commenced a systematic plan of insurrection and intrigue, which threatened to throw the whole country into confusion and disorder.¹ No better success attended the other objects of the

¹ In the rains of 1815, the British troops in the cantonment at Kaira, their usual strength being much reduced at the time, were for several nights in expectation of being attacked in their lines by the Koolees,

mission to Poona ; and the Shastree, at last, with the concurrence of the Resident, determined to return to Baroda, and leave the questions to the arbitration of the British Government.

A.D. 1815.—This determination produced a marked change towards the Shastree in the conduct and demeanour of the Peishwa and Trimbukjee, who, foreseeing that they should thus be shut out from Baroda, resolved to spare no pains in gaining the Shastree to their interests. It was just at this period that Trimbukjee was appointed to carry on the communications between his master and the British Government.

The Shastree was induced to postpone his departure, and every means was employed to conciliate his regard and confidence. Trimbukjee assailed him on the side of his vanity, which was the weak point of the Shastree's character, and persuaded him that the Peishwa, in admiration of his talents both throughout the negotiation in which he was then opposed to his government, and in regard to what he had effected at Baroda, had resolved to appoint him his own minister. As a proof of the sincerity of this proposal, the Peishwa offered his sister-in-law in marriage to the Shastree's son, and acceded to an adjustment of the Gaekwar's affairs for a territorial cession, on a plan suggested by the Shastree, though without consulting his own court or obtaining the sanction of the British authority. Every arrangement was made for the intended nuptials ; when the Shastree, having received no reply from the Gaekwar respecting the territorial cession, became apprehensive that it might be supposed he was neglecting his master's interests in forwarding his own, hesitated and suspended the solemnization of the marriage, after great expense had been incurred by preparations. This conduct was deeply resented ; and the refusal of the Shastree to permit his wife to visit the Peishwa's palace, or to witness the scenes of gross debauchery to which every lady who entered it was subjected, was an offence which Bajee Rao never forgave, in him or in any other person. Trimbukjee, however, affected to treat the Shastree with more cordiality and friendship than ever.

The Peishwa proceeded on a pilgrimage to Punderpoor, and the Shastree accompanied him, although his colleague Bappoo Myraul

who are very numerous in that quarter, and were excited against the British Government by Trimbukjee's agents.

warned him of his danger, and begged that he might at least be permitted to attend him; but the infatuated man would neither listen to his advice nor allow him to be of the party. At Punderpoor, on the night of the 14th July, Gungadhur Shastree, who had that day dined with the Peishwa, was invited by Trimbukjee to repair to the temple for the purpose of paying his devotions on an occasion of particular solemnity. The Shastree, being a little indisposed, excused himself, but upon earnest and reiterated entreaties, he at last complied. With a few unarmed attendants, he proceeded to the temple, where he performed his devotions, conversed with Trimbukjee, and paid his respects to the Peishwa, who was seated in the upper verandah of the temple, and on that occasion treated him with particular condescension.

The unfortunate Shastree, who like many others could never resist the agreeable manners of Bajee Rao, quitted his presence in the highest spirits, and set out on his return; but he had scarcely proceeded three hundred yards, when he was attacked in the street, and almost literally cut in pieces. Trimbukjee Dainglia hired the assassins, two agents of Seetaram Rowjee from Baroda assisted in pointing out the Shastree, and the Peishwa, if he did not instigate, approved of the murder, which was rendered peculiarly atrocious in a Hindoo, by being not only perpetrated on a Bramin, but upon the consecrated ground of Punderpoor, a place of extraordinary sanctity. As Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee denied all knowledge or participation in the deed, the Resident, who at the Peishwa's request had not accompanied him to Punderpoor, called for an immediate inquiry into the circumstances, for the satisfaction of the British Government: but no investigation took place. The general voice of the country pronounced Trimbukjee the perpetrator of the murder; Bappoo Myraul openly accused him of it, and the Resident instituted a very minute and strict inquiry, which clearly established his guilt. The Peishwa was called upon to place him under restraint, and afterwards to deliver him up to the British Government; but he refused compliance, evaded the demand, and for a time seemed resolved to stand or fall with his favourite. Being, however, unprepared for extremities, and the British troops being assembled at Poona, his natural timidity prevailed over every other sentiment, and on the 25th September he delivered

up Trimbukjee, whom he had previously sent into confinement in the fort of Wussuntgurh. The two agents of Seetaram, being deeply implicated, were seized at the same time and delivered to the Gaekwar, by whom they were confined in hill-forts. Seetaram, who in conjunction with the agents of Trimbukjee had been levying troops, whilst the Peishwa hesitated to deliver up his favourite, was removed from the administration at Baroda, and taken into custody by the British Government. This measure was much against the inclination of the regent Futih Sing, who on this occasion betrayed symptoms of being himself swayed by the intrigues of the court of Poona.

A.D. 1816.—Trimbukjee was confined by the British Government in the fort of Tannah, on Salsette, whence he effected his escape over the wall between seven and eight o'clock of the evening of the 12th September.¹ The guard over Trimbukjee, owing probably to excessive precaution, had no mixture of Sepoys upon it, but was composed entirely of Europeans. From this circumstance, the Peishwa was able to communicate with Trimbukjee, and for some days previous to his making the attempt several of his friends and servants were waiting in the neighbourhood with full expectation of his joining them. The principal agent of communication was a Mahratta horsekeeper, in the service of one of the officers in the garrison, who passing and repassing the window of Trimbukjee's place of confinement, when in the act of airing his master's horse, sang the information he wished to convey, in an apparently careless manner, which the Europeans, for want of sufficient knowledge of the language, could not detect. The difficulties of this escape were exaggerated into an exploit worthy of Sivajee, and greatly contributed to raise the fame of Trimbukjee amongst his countrymen, with whom it gained him a degree of popularity which he had never enjoyed while in power. He confided his safety to the Bheels, Ramoosees and Mangs, and resided chiefly in the hills about Nassuck and Sungumnere, sometimes in Candeish and Buglana, and frequently amongst the Mahdeo hills towards Satara, but never in the original haunts of Sivajee, where he would not have been safe. This circumstance is to be accounted for, in his having treacherously

¹ Trimbukjee, in conversation with different officers on his guard at Tannah, before he had any hopes of escape, admitted the murder, but said he had merely obeyed his master's orders.

seized Chittoor Sing, who was extremely popular in that part of the Mahratta country.

Chittoor Sing, since we had last occasion to mention him, after the battle of Poona in 1802, had served in most parts of India. He was conspicuous in the charge made upon the 74th regiment at the battle of Assaye,¹ and was afterwards in the armies of Holkar, Umeer Khan, and the Rajpoots. In 1812 he was returning home through Candeish, when Trimbukjee seduced him to a conference, took him prisoner, loaded him with irons, and threw him into the fort of Kangooree² in the Concan. Many vain attempts were made by his partisans to effect his rescue; till at last, a Gosaeen of the same name, aided by some of the Ramoosee chiefs, taking advantage of the interest felt for him in the country, gave out that Chittoor Sing had escaped, and obtained possession of the fort of Pruchheetgurh³ by a daring and well-planned enterprise, suggested, it is said, by a traditionary account of one of Sivajee's exploits.⁴ They afterwards took many other forts, and raised a formidable insurrection, which, though generally kept in check by the troops of Bappoo Gokla, was never reduced by the Peishwa's government. Their real object was plunder, but their avowed purpose was the re-establishment of the Mahratta sovereignty, and the release of the Raja of Satara; and had Trimbukjee Dainglia fallen into their hands, they would have put him to death; Chittoor Sing lingered in prison at Kangooree, where he died in the end of April, 1818. His brother Shao

¹ I know this circumstance from Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who was himself in that charge, and with Chittoor Sing.

² [In Mānkar's translation of the life of Sivājī, 2nd ed., 1886, p. 106, this fort appears under the name Kongārī or Mangalgad. It is in Kolāba District, eleven miles south-east of Mahād town, and stands 2,457 feet high. It was one of seven forts captured by Sivājī in 1648, and was the place of confinement of Chhatr Sing, brother of the Rājā of Sātāra, from 1812 to 1818. (*B.G.*, xi. 323.)]

³ [Prachītgarh (Pruchheetgurh) fort lies in Vālva tāluka, Sātāra District, in an inaccessible position on the edge of the Sahyādris at the junction of Rūndhiv village, Sātāra District, with Nairi and Shringārpur villages in Ratnāgiri District. The character of some of the masonry indicates considerable age, and the fort may have been built prior to the era of Muhammadan rule in the Deccan. The fort was captured by Colonel Cunningham on June 10, 1818. (*B.G.*, xix. 543-5.)]

⁴ The manner of it has already been explained in a note on Sivajee's life. See footnote on p. 111, vol. i.

died at Satara, 3rd May, 1808, and was succeeded by his son, Pertab Siew, or Sing,¹ the present Raja, then in his sixteenth year.

However strong the suspicion of the Peishwa's connivance at the escape and concealment of Trimbukjee, there was no proof of the fact; and as it was thought he would rest satisfied in having effected his freedom, little notice was taken of the circumstance. Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir was again called into the Peishwa's councils; Moro Dixit, a student of Bassein, and Chimnaje Narrain, both Concanist Bramins, who, like most of Bajee Rao's courtiers, had gained the favour of their prince by the dishonour of their families, were likewise employed in the administration; and Captain Ford, the commandant of the regular brigade, in whom the Peishwa placed considerable confidence because his prosperity depended on the stability of his government, was frequently the channel of communication between the British Residency and the Peishwa's ministers. The utmost cordiality seemed to prevail between the court and the Residency at Poona; but nothing could be more deceitful on the part of Bajee Rao. He was now engaged in the most active negotiations with Sindia, Holkar, the Raja of Nagpoor, Umeer Khan, and the Pindharees, against the British Government; he made great additions to his army, and supplied Trimbukjee with large sums of money, directing him to raise troops at different places in his

¹ [After the defeat of the Pēshwā and the annexation of his territory, the British Government assigned the principality of Sātāra to Pratāp Sing (Pertab Sing), as titular Marāthā Rājā. He was placed on the *gādi* (throne) in April 1818, and a treaty of alliance and friendship was concluded between him and the British Government in September 1819. Captain Grant Duff was appointed Resident, with full power to conduct the administration under instructions from Mr. Elphinstone, and remained at Sātāra until 1822, when the Sātāra territory was formally handed over to the Rājā, and thenceforward was under his sole management. After a time he became impatient of the control exercised by the British Government; and as he persisted in intriguing and holding communications with other princes, in contravention of his engagements, he was deposed in 1839 and sent as state prisoner to Benares, his brother Shāhjī being placed on the throne. This chief, who did much for the improvement of his people, died in 1848 without male heirs; and after long deliberation it was decided that the State should be resumed by the British Government. Liberal pensions were granted to the Rājā's three widows, and they were allowed to live in the palace at Sātāra. The survivor of these ladies died in 1874. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 538.)]

own territory, which, even if discovered by the British Government, might appear to be plundering Pindharees or insurgents.

A.D.
1817. The Resident, who had early and exact information of Trimbukjee's secret proceedings, applied to the minister to ascertain whether the assembly of such troops was authorized or not by the Peishwa ; and he was assured, not only that it was not authorized, but that no such assembly existed. Mr. Elphinstone was therefore bound to consider it an insurrection ; he told the minister that such levies were going forward ; that the principal body was assembling near Nattapoota, a village south of the Neera, within fifty miles of Poona ; and he begged that immediate steps might be taken for its dispersion. Although the minister continued to deny the existence of any assembly of troops, a part of Bappoo Gokla's horse was sent down, as was pretended, for the Resident's satisfaction. They quietly occupied a position in the very district where the insurgents were collecting, but declared they could hear nothing of them. The Peishwa also persisted in denying all knowledge of Trimbukjee, or of an insurrection, and called on the Resident, if he really did believe such an absurd report, to take his own measures for suppressing it. It was by this time known to the Resident that the Peishwa, during a visit to the country, had invited and positively given Trimbukjee an audience at Phoolshuhur, within seventeen miles of Poona ; but what made this meeting the more remarkable is the fact, afterwards ascertained, that Trimbukjee came there attended by a large body of horse, who surrounded the village during the interview. The subsidiary force was then in an advanced position near Jaffeirabad, for the purpose of protecting the country from the ravages of the Pindharees, and of assisting in giving effect to political measures to the northward ; but it was now with the consent of the Governor-General ordered to act against the insurgents. Whilst two detachments of the Madras army advanced to the frontiers of the Nizam's territory, the one to Tooljapoor, the other to Beder, Colonel Lionel Smith, who commanded the Poona subsidiary, marched to the Neera with a light division, leaving his reserve to follow at leisure. The insurgents had moved from Nattapoota to Jhutt ; but, on Colonel Smith's approach, they countermarched, and passed, by a rugged and unfrequented route, through the Mahdeo hills ; Colonel Smith followed them, but they

had gained many hours march before the division got into their track ; the pursuit, however, was taken up by a party of infantry from the reserve, under Major Smith of the Madras native infantry, who, after a persevering march, surprised and killed several of them ; but they had previously marked their course by several acts of atrocity, particularly by the murder of Lieutenant Warre of the Madras artillery. The object of this body in moving to the northward was to join another party, assembled in Candeish under Trimbukjee's relation, Godajee Dainglia ; but before their arrival, Lieutenant Evan Davies of the Bombay establishment, at the head of a body of the Nizam's horse, had attacked and dispersed the troops of Godajee.

The existence of the insurrection could be no longer denied by the Peishwa ; orders were therefore issued to the Jagheerदार of Vinchoor to act against them, and some time after, a letter from the Vinchoorkur, with a fictitious account of their attack and dispersion, was sent for the perusal of the Resident and the officer commanding the subsidiary force.

In the meantime the Peishwa continued to levy troops, both cavalry and infantry ; every endeavour was used to induce him to desist—he was warned of the consequences of such proceedings, and of the dangerous course he had followed in abetting the insurgents, and thus evincing intentions decidedly hostile to the British Government. But he still persevered ; the language of his ministers assumed a peremptory tone, and they demanded from the Resident whether he intended war or peace. Mr. Elphinstone, in order that nothing might be wanting to bring the Peishwa to a sense of his situation, had suspended the intercourse between the Residency and the Poona court about the time when Colonel Smith proceeded against the insurgents ; he now in expectation of receiving instructions from the Governor-General, directed Colonel Smith to move towards Poona with the light division, acquainting the Peishwa with his having done so ; the plan he pursued was to proceed gradually, giving the Peishwa time to correct his errors, if so disposed, at the same time relaxing nothing of the steadiness and dignity which became the representative of the British nation. Many reasons, however, combined to render it advisable to bring matters to an issue. The insurgents gained ground in Candeish : a fort fell into their hands ; the Peishwa's levies, and the repairs of his forts, which had been

going on for some time, proceeded with great activity, and as the rainy season approached, it was apprehended the Peishwa might betake himself to a hill-fort, inaccessible at that season, and commence a war which must be protracted, and would probably encourage all the Mahratta powers to unite in his cause. At this important crisis the communication between Calcutta and Poona was interrupted by disturbances in Kuttack ; but in the absence of the expected instructions, Mr. Elphinstone had fortunately received a private letter from the secretary to the Governor-General, which mentioned the surrender of Trimbukjee Dainglia as an indispensable preliminary to any new settlement whatever. On this information he determined to act without delay. Having intimated a desire to communicate with the minister, the Peishwa requested to see him, and throughout a long conference displayed an unusual degree of coolness and self-possession. He entered into a warm and most eloquent defence of himself ; reverted as usual to his obligations to the British Government, and spoke with so much apparent reason and candour of his own situation, and of the consequences of the conduct and views imputed to him, that any person who had not considered the weight of the evidence and fully understood the character of Bajee Rao, must have felt disposed to give credit to the soundness of his arguments, even if he had been inclined to doubt the sincerity of his protestations. But whilst his actions contradicted his words, Mr. Elphinstone was not to be deceived ; he tried, however, by every means, both during the conference and subsequently, to induce the Peishwa to prove the sincerity of his professions and avert the danger by which he was threatened ; he distinctly told him that Trimbukjee Dainglia must be delivered up, or not suffered to remain in his territory, and that the consequences of a refusal must involve the states in immediate hostilities. At last, after several days had passed in this manner, the Resident formally demanded the seizure of Trimbukjee in the space of one month, and the immediate delivery of three principal forts, Singurh, Poorundhur, and Raigurh, as a pledge for the fulfilment of the demand. Bajee Rao, still under an impression of the high importance of his alliance to the British Government, believed that the Resident would not proceed to extremities ; and he hoped that without making such a humiliating concession, or surrendering pledges so important, he should be able to tem-

porize until the season was advanced, and should find time to call into operation, with full effect, the extensive confederacy planned by himself and his favourite. Even when Mr. Elphinstone, on the 7th of May, intimated his determination to surround the city of Poona, Bajee Rao still refused compliance with the terms required. At last, at one o'clock in the morning, the Peishwa sent a messenger in hopes that the Resident might be induced to postpone or to relinquish his intention; (**May 8.**) and it was only on finding him steady to his purpose, that the messenger told him he was instructed to comply with his demands. During the discussion the day had dawned; the troops were moving round the city, and had completely surrounded it before the Resident could reach the head of the line. They were withdrawn as soon as the order for the surrender of the forts was sent out; and the Peishwa, as if at length sensible of his situation, and resolved to give up his favourite, issued a proclamation, offering rewards for the seizure of some of Trimbukjee's adherents, and a sum of two lacks of rupees and an enam village of 1,000 rupees a year to any person who should bring in Trimbukjee Dainglia dead or alive. He likewise seized some of Trimbukjee's adherents, sequestered the property of others concerned in the insurrection, and manifested an apparently strong desire to comply with the recommendation of his allies. Although these proceedings did not deceive his own subjects, and the proclamation, without the Peishwa's cordial concurrence, was of little importance to the apprehension of Trimbukjee, still it seemed reasonable to admit these acts as a concession of that preliminary, without which no proposals for present satisfaction or future security would have been received by the British authorities.

The instructions of the Governor-General, which reached Poona on the 10th May, were framed for the purpose of circumscribing the Peishwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as should prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the court of Poona for several years, and of obviating inconveniences found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein.

A new treaty was therefore drawn up by which, in order to mark the foundation of the whole proceedings, the Peishwa was compelled to admit the guilt of Trimbukjee Dainglia, as the

murderer of Gungadhur Shastree, the accredited agent of the Gaekwar state residing under the guarantee of the British Government within the Peishwa's territory, and his consequent obligation to seize and deliver him up to the British Government; until the accomplishment of which, the family of Trimbukjee Dainglia were to be given over as hostages.

The Peishwa engaged to have no communication with any foreign power whatever, neither to send nor to receive wukeels, and as head of the Mahratta empire renounced all rights beyond the boundary of his own dominions between the Toongbuddra and Nerbuddah; he relinquished all future demands on the Gaekwar, and agreed to compromise all past claims on him for the annual sum of four lacks of rupees. He also agreed to let the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gaekwar for four and a half lacks of rupees a year, exclusive of the tribute of Kattywar and his other rights in Guzerat which were dismembered by another article. Instead of furnishing the contingent of five thousand horse and three thousand infantry required by the treaty of Bassein, he agreed to cede territory yielding thirty-four lacks of rupees for that purpose. This cession included Dharwar and Kooshgul with some undefined districts in the Carnatic, the Concan north of Bombay, and the Peishwa's revenue in Guzerat except Ahmedabad and Oolpar; but Ahmedabad was subsequently included. The Peishwa also ceded the fort of Ahmednugur, together with all his rights north of the Nerbuddah; he recognized the settlement with the Jagheerders concluded in 1812; and at the recommendation of the British Government, restored the Jagheer of the unfortunate Mahdoo Rao Rastia; finally he renounced Mailghaut, a possession on the Nizam's frontier which the Peishwa's troops had occupied in 1811.

In consequence of this treaty, by which important advantages were secured to the Gaekwar's government, a new arrangement was concluded with him, which had for its object the consolidation of the territories of the respective governments, and also to impose on the Gaekwar a more adequate proportion of the military charges of the province of Guzerat, than he had been hitherto called upon to bear; for although his irregular troops were maintained at a great expense, they were found wanting in efficiency, and the duty, as well as extra charges of field service, fell upon the British Government. It was therefore proposed that

a part of the irregulars should be discharged, that the subsidiary force maintained by the Gaekwar should receive an addition of one thousand regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry; and that districts lying conveniently for the meditated consolidation should be assigned to the British Government for defraying the additional expense. To this plan the Baroda government acceded, and a treaty to that effect was concluded on the 6th November.¹

¹ The above chapter is on the authority of English Records and Oral information, Mahratta MSS. and personal observation.

CHAPTER XLVIII.

FROM A.D. 1814 TO A.D. 1817.

IN October, 1813, the Marquis of Hastings,¹ then Earl of Moira, assumed charge of the government of British India, as the successor to Lord Minto.

(A.D. 1814.)—In addition to affairs immediately pressed upon his notice, the new Governor-General instituted inquiries into every department of the state; extending his interrogatories to the public character and services of individuals; by which he not only collected a mass of information, but awakened a lively attention in the minds of the officers throughout the vast army of British India, and inspired them, by this obvious desire to ascertain real merit, with the hope of honour and reward both for past and future exertions.

The defective nature of the political arrangements concluded by the British authorities in 1805-6 had become very evident from the state of anarchy existing in Malwa and Rajpootana; and the necessity of suppressing the spreading hordes of Patans and Pindharees was universally acknowledged. The numbers of these marauders had augmented to about fifty thousand men, of

¹ [He was created Marquess of Hastings in the peerage of Great Britain early in 1817, as a reward for his conduct of the Nepalese war. As Lord Moira he had spent nearly eight years in America as an officer during the War of Independence, and later saw some military service in Europe. He owed his appointment as Governor-General to the fact that in 1812 he had rendered special political services to the Prince Regent, afterwards George IV, with whom he was on terms of the closest intimacy. His term of office lasted until January 1, 1823, and was characterised by unremitting labour and by the successful prosecution of the Pindāri and third Marāthā wars, and by the occupation of Singapore. In 1824 Lord Hastings became Governor of Malta, and on November 28, 1826, died at sea off Naples. (*O.H.I.*, pp. 620-46.)]

whom about one half were Pindharee horse.¹ Both the one and the other were systematic plunderers; but the Patans were associated, under Umeer Khan, for the purpose of invading and plundering such states as they could overpower or intimidate; whilst the object of the Pindharees was universal rapine.

The Patans, therefore, required infantry and guns, and in this respect no native army in India was more efficient: their artillery was excellent; and they had some of the oldest of Holkar's battalions as the foundation of their infantry, which was estimated at about ten thousand, and their cavalry at fifteen thousand men. They were also distinguished from Pindharees by having a fixed rate of monthly pay, though it was seldom punctually received.

These plunderers, especially the Pindharees, were always gaining an accession of strength as the countries around them became exhausted; for not only did every lawless man who could command a horse and a spear join them, but the more peaceable part of the community were driven for subsistence into the same course of life; so that additional wants and accumulating strength tended of themselves to enlarge the sphere of Pindharee operations, without other less apparent sources of augmentation, derived from the secret support and encouragement of various principal chiefs of the Mahratta empire.

Representations of the growth and formidable nature of this predatory power were early made to the Court of Directors, but as the question seemed to involve a revision of their political relations with several of the native states, years had elapsed before any latitude was granted for departing from the defensive system of policy pursued since the settlement of 1805-6.

The authorities at home, however, regretting the manner in which some of the Rajpoot states had been thrown off, were desirous of repairing what was still in their power, by taking the Raja of Jeypoor under British protection, and orders to that effect were received at Bengal in 1814; but as the measure was

¹ [‘Calculation of the numerical strength of the Pindārī hordes is fallacious, and as Munro pointed out, contemporary reports show a strong tendency to exaggerate their numbers. They were “so amalgamated with the whole of the loose part of the military population of India, that it had become a system, not a particular force, that was to be subdued.”’ (O.H.I., p. 625.)]

part of a plan which the Marquis of Hastings had in view for effecting a complete arrangement, he postponed attempting it until a more favourable season.

As a prelude to the great object contemplated, it being supposed that Rughoojee Bhonslay, from his dread of the Pindharees, and from a sense of the gratuitous aid which had been more than once afforded when Nagpoor was threatened, might now be induced to enter on a defensive alliance with the British Government; proposals to that effect were made to him; but a long negotiation through the Resident, Mr. Jenkins, ended in a positive rejection of the terms.

The chief end of these overtures, in the present instance, was with a view of connecting the chain of military posts between the frontier of the British possessions in Bundelcund and the territory of their ally the Nizam. The same object was attainable, by taking Govind Rao Nana, the chief of Sagur,¹ and Wuzeer Mohummud, Nabob of Bhopaul, under British protection; but being by this time involved in hostility with the Goorkhas of Nepal, Lord Hastings intended to postpone the offer of protection to the principalities in question, when he obtained information that a negotiation for a treaty, offensive and defensive, was in progress betwixt Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay, and also between Sindia and the ministers of Toolsee Bye Holkar²: he further learnt that Sindia, who had made great efforts against Bhopaul the preceding year, was determined to renew the

¹ [Sāgar (Sagur), or Saugor, is now the headquarters of the District of that name in the Central Provinces. The town lies 109 miles north-west of Jabalpur (Jubbulpore). Sāgar and the districts of Jubbulpore, Hoshangābād, Seonī, Damoh, Narsinghpur and Baitūl, were ceded by the Marāthās to the British in 1818, the cession being confirmed by the treaty of 1826. Pensions amounting yearly to two and a half lakhs of rupees were allotted by Government to the various officers of the Marāthā Government, dispossessed by the cession. The districts mentioned above were at first administered by a semi-political agency; in 1852 they were placed under the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces (now the Agra Province in the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh); and in 1861 passed under the control of the Local Administration of the Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces, established in that year. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 57, 161 n.)]

² These negotiations, of which the Governor-General had obtained intelligence, were the prelude to the treaty of confederacy, of which the first article expressed the determination of these princes to serve and obey the Peishwa.

siege; that in its exhausted state even the heroism of Wuzeer Mohummud¹ must prove unavailing; and finally, that this chief earnestly solicited to be taken under British protection.²

From these circumstances, Lord Hastings determined on adopting the proposed measure, and directed certain terms to be offered, which comprehended the free ingress, egress, and residence of British troops within the Nabob's territory; and the surrender from Bhopaul of a fort as a present depot. To support the negotiations, the troops in Bundelcund were reinforced, the Hyderabad subsidiary moved from Jaulna to Elichpoor, the Poona subsidiary from Seroor to Jaffairabad, a large reserve was formed in the Deccan, and the army of Guzerat occupied a position at Soneepoor, on the right bank of the Myhie.

Wuzeer Mohummud appeared most ready to embrace the terms, and it was in consequence intimated to Sindia by the Resident in his camp, that the principality of Bhopaul was under British protection. Sindia protested most vehemently against the measure; declared the Nabob to be his dependant, and in defiance of the assembled armies threatened an immediate attack upon him. His battalions advanced, and although under a certain assurance that an attack on Bhopaul would occasion an immediate rupture with the English, Sindia for a time seemed quite determined to risk the event; but his actions fell short of his words; and ultimately his army was withdrawn. His conduct was to be accounted for in the unfavourable commencement and brilliant termination of the Nepal war; but the first impressions throughout India respecting that warfare inspired hopes in all who wished the overthrow of the British power. Of that number, the Peishwa, from the time he was guided by the councils of Trimbukjee Dainglia, and especially after having instigated and participated in his crimes, may be considered the chief; it was, however, at one time supposed that the plan of the general confederacy already men-

¹ See Sir John Malcolm's Central India for an interesting and animated account of the defence of Bhopaul.

² [The principality of Bhopāl (Bhopaul) was formed by Dōst Muhammad Khān, an Afghan officer of Aurangzeb, who became independent a few years after that sovereign's death in 1707. Since 1844 the State has usually been ruled by ladies; one of whom, Sikandar Bēgam, rendered signal services to the Government of India during the Mutiny in 1857.]

tioned, did not originate with the Mahrattas, but was suggested through Sindia by the Nepaulese.

The Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay assented, with seeming cordiality, to the proposed connexion of the British Government with Bhopaul, but no agreement ever took place with Wuzeer Mohummud. As long as he was threatened by Sindia, he not only appeared to accede to the terms, but gave out that he was under the protection of the British; but when the danger subsided, he objected to the surrender of a fort, and the negotiation terminated. The descendant, however, of the Nabob of Bhopaul, who in 1779 dared, in defiance of Mahratta hostility, to befriend the English detachment under General Goddard, could be forgiven for an evasion, by which, if he refused protection, he also preserved independence. The failure of this arrangement prevented the prosecution of any plan of settlement with Govind Rao Nana at this period.

(A.D. 1816.)—In the ensuing year, after the termination of the war in Nepal, the Raja of Jeypoor, being much pressed by Umeer Khan, applied for protection from the British Government, which Lord Hastings, with a view to the general plan of settlement, was willing to afford; but the Raja broke off the negotiation as soon as he had induced Umeer Khan to withdraw, and like Wuzeer Mohummud, showed that necessity alone prompted his application.

(March 17.)—The Nabob of Bhopaul, however, died on the 17th March, 1816, and Rughoojee Bhonslay on the 22d (22d.) of the same month. Wuzeer Mohummud was succeeded as Nabob of Bhopaul by his son Wuzeer Mohummud; and Rughoojee Bhonslay was succeeded by his only son Pursajee. But Pursajee, whose intellect was always weak, fell into a state of idiotism immediately afterwards, and his cousin Moodajee, usually styled Appa Sahib, the son of Venkajee Munnya Bappoo, who commanded at the battle of Argaom, was chosen regent, although not without considerable opposition. To secure an ascendancy by no means fully established, Appa Sahib applied to the British Resident to be admitted to the defensive alliance, before proposed to Rughoojee, which was promptly acceded to, and a treaty was signed 27th May, 1816. A stipulated money payment,¹ calculated to defray the additional

¹ Of seven and a half lacks of rupees annually.

expense of field charges for one regiment of cavalry and six thousand infantry, was to be paid by the Nagpoor government, and a contingent of three thousand horse and two thousand foot was to be maintained by the terms of the alliance. A subsidiary force was immediately formed, and until Appa Sahib was secured in the government, the whole continued in the neighbourhood of the capital; it being agreed, that when the troops were required in advance, or even on ordinary occasions, two battalions only should remain at Nagpoor. By the end of October, 1816, Appa Sahib had completely established his authority, but being immediately assailed by the intrigues of the Peishwa, he very soon came into the views of the Poona court; being,

A.D. however, apprehensive that if he threw off the support
1817. of the British Government during the lifetime of Pursajee, a party might endanger his power, he one night caused Pursajee to be secretly strangled, and on the following (**Feb. 1.**) morning it was announced and believed that he had been found dead in his bed.

In the meantime the aggressions of the Pindharees increased, nor could the British Government defend its territory from their ravages, although large armies at a vast expense were annually called into the field.¹ During the season of 1815-16, or from October till May inclusive of those years, the Pindharees pushed their depredations to a great extent, and were very successful in eluding the parties sent in pursuit of them. In the ensuing seasons they were less fortunate in their escapes: the British detachments, performing extraordinary marches, frequently came up with them, sometimes fell upon them accidentally, and cut off many of their parties. The Pindharees never fought, and seldom defended themselves against British troops; but these successes, though in many instances highly creditable to the zeal and perseverance of the army, were but a mere palliative to this growing and deep-seated evil. It was observable that for several years the territory of the Mahrattas was in general

¹ [Pindārī (Pindharee) raids into the Company's territory commenced in 1812, when Mirzāpur and South Bihār were attacked. Early in 1816 there was a fierce incursion into the northern Sarkārs (Circars); the brigands in the course of twelve days plundered 339 villages, killed 182 persons, severely wounded 505, and subjected 3,603 to various forms of torture. Many women destroyed themselves in order to escape dishonour. (*O.H.I.*, p. 627.)]

respected, and their ravages directed principally against that of the Nizam and the British Government.

To prevent suspicion from this circumstance, the Peishwa sent a party of horse to plunder in his own country, who gave themselves out as Pindharees,¹ and Sindia professed the greatest desire to suppress them; but his commanders openly countenanced them, and it was manifest that both Sindia and Holkar were not only unwilling but unable to restrain their dependants.

The subsidiary treaty with Nagpoor, and the acquisition of the Peishwa's rights, by the treaty of 1817, over his remaining tributaries in Bundelcund, greatly improved the defensive means hitherto adopted by the British Government; but the Governor-General, before receiving authority from England, had come to the resolution, as early as December, 1816, of effectually suppressing the Pindharees; various reasons, however, induced him to defer carrying his plan into effect until the close of the ensuing rains; and in the meantime the Court of Directors had sanctioned offensive operations to the extent of driving the Pindharees from their haunts on the banks of the Nerbuddah and from Malwa.

The views of the Marquis of Hastings were more enlarged; he aimed at their complete suppression by eradicating the predatory system from Central India, so as to carry peace to those desolated provinces, and security to the rest of the country. Berar was supposed to be settled by the late subsidiary alliance; and the Peishwa, crippled by the treaty of Poona, might, it was hoped, see the necessity of refraining from hostilities, secret or avowed, if he wished to retain the territory still left to him. The plan, therefore, of the Governor-General embraced principally the possessions of Sindia, Holkar, the Rajpoots, the Nabob of Bhopaul, and the principalities of Bundelcund. The former treaties with Sindia and Holkar became virtually annulled, from the period when their dependants began to ravage the territory of the British Government. Many proofs of secret hostilities,

¹ The fact here recorded is stated on good authority, but it was not suspected or known till after the war; the party was sent by Trimbukjee in the end of 1816, or very early in 1817, into the southern Concan, where they plundered and committed very great excesses. Having dispersed, they afterwards reassembled in the neighbourhood of Nattapoota. They halted one night in Satara, on their way down of which place some of them I believe were natives; at all events they were afterwards well known there.

particularly on the part of Sindia, had come to the knowledge of the Governor-General, besides the treaty of confederacy, by which all the Mahrattas engaged to serve and obey the Peishwa; he therefore determined on submitting a plan of a treaty of concert and alliance to those two states—to declare the treaties of 1805 annulled, so that he might be at liberty to admit the claims of every state, tributary or otherwise, that had any pretensions to independence; and to guarantee rights and possessions in all instances where the state or principality agreed to make common cause against the predatory system; but he resolved to admit of no neutrality. He adopted as a principle, not to disturb occupancy; but to treat with the existing government, or chiefs, who might be in possession of the country at the time. Thus Umeer Khan, though an undeserving instance of the operation of this general benefit, if he agreed to the proposals and dismissed his Patans, was to be guaranteed in the Jagheer which he held from Holkar. On these principles, and to the above effect, as soon as the military preparations were in sufficient progress, orders were dispatched to the various Political Agents.

The military plan was equally simple and comprehensive.¹ Armies were to be assembled around the territories described, to close in by simultaneous movements to a common centre, so as to hem in the Pindharees and their abettors at all points; taking care to provide efficient means for resisting or following up any bodies of the enemy, who might pass through the advancing divisions. For this purpose, five divisions were prepared in the Deccan, and placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras army. One division was held

¹ [The plan of operations was a vast encircling movement. 'The Pindārīs were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Mālṡā, somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbadā, and between Bhopāl and the dominions of Sindia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarāt—and to keep the native states in check. An extended movement, therefore, was about to be made inwards from the circumference of a great circle, whose centre was somewhere near Handīa (in the Allahābād District), and whose diameter was nearly 700 miles in length; the enormous distances which separated the different bases of operations, the absence of rapid means of inter-communication, and the necessity of simultaneous action, all contributed to render the task which had been undertaken an exceedingly difficult one.' (O.H.I., p. 628.)]

ready in Guzerat, and four divisions, with two in reserve, were to co-operate from Bengal under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, who took the field that he might be on the scene of operations, and superintend the execution of his arrangements. Sir John Malcolm was appointed Political Agent of the Governor-General with the army of the Deccan, and had also command of one of the divisions destined for active operations in the field. The preparations in the south, as the troops had so far to march, were necessarily public ; but those to the northward of Bundelcund were managed with secrecy, so as not to give the alarm to Sindia, until he should find himself compelled to submit to the intended propositions, or obliged to commence war under great disadvantage.

The forces of the Deccan, including a sixth or reserve division formed at Adonee under Brigadier-General Pritzler, the Guzerat division under Brigadier-General Grant Keir, and the troops left for the protection of Poona, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor, amounted to upwards of 57,000 regulars, of which number 5,255 were cavalry. The army which took the field in Bengal consisted of about 34,000 regulars, of which the cavalry amounted to nearly 5,000. Besides these, there were 13,000 irregular horse on the strength of the Deccan army, and nearly 10,000 with the army of Bengal, many of them good troops.¹

The 1st division of the army of the Deccan, under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, preceded by the 3d division under Sir John Malcolm, was destined to advance into Malwa, and cross the Nerbuddah at Hindia. The 5th division, consisting of the Nagpoor subsidiary force under Colonel Adams, was to advance by Hoo-shingabad. The 2d division under Brigadier-General Doveton, and the 4th division under Brigadier-General Smith were to occupy positions, the former in Berar, and the latter in Candesh, and to act according to circumstances. The army of Guzerat was to advance by Dohud into Malwa.

The four principal Bengal divisions were to be assembled at Rewaree, Agra, Sikundra near Kalpee, and at Kalinjer in Bundelcund. The two divisions in reserve were intended as detachments

¹ [The total army mobilized, including both the Northern or Army of Hindustān and the Southern or Deccan Army, numbered 120,000 men with 300 guns. Of this total, about 13,000 were European troops, namely 8,500 infantry, more than 2,000 cavalry, and the rest gunners. (*O.H.I.*, p. 628.)]

of observation ; the one was stationed under Brigadier-General Toone on the upper Saone, the other, under Brigadier-General Hardyman, in Rewah on the upper Nerbuddah. The division from Bundelcund, under the command of General Marshall, was to advance with the Deccan army against the Pindharees. The division from Rewaree, the most northern point, was under the command of Major-General Ochterlony, and was intended to expedite the arrangements with the Rajpoots, and to co-operate in overawing the Patans or attacking the Pindharees. The main body, to be assembled at Sikundra, was under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, and was prepared with considerable celerity and secrecy by the middle of October. It was destined to cross the Jumna by a bridge of boats a little above Kalpee, to march due west, and to occupy, in the first instance, a position south of Gwalior, whilst the division from Agra, under Major-General Donkin, took up its station at Dholpoor, immediately to the northward. This judicious manœuvre, which gave the command of Sindia's camp with the best part of his artillery, was executed with great success ; it disarmed one important member of a hostile confederacy formed against the British Government, and compelled Sindia to sign a treaty, which, however unpalatable at the moment, was really ensuring his safety.

In September it was intimated to Sindia through Captain Close, the Resident in his camp, that the army of the Deccan was about to advance for the extirpation of the Pindharees, and as a matter of form passports were requested for the free ingress and egress of the British troops through his territory. At this period Sindia's army at Gwalior was more than usually turbulent, a circumstance principally attributable to a strong excitement, caused by reports of the Peishwa's determination to break with the English, and a general hope that their master was about to join him. Sindia, in reply to the applications for passports, stated that he had not given up his intention of punishing the Pindharees, and requested that the troops might be stopped ; but this being declared impossible after what had happened in the last two years, the passports were granted. Before the middle of October, the views of the Governor-General were completely unfolded to Sindia, by a paper prepared and sent from the camp at Sikundra. It contained remonstrances on his evasive conduct, for having harboured freebooters, who had plundered the British territory at the very

time when he was pledging himself to punish their depredations, and it combated the plea he had advanced of inability to suppress them ; if, however, that plea were admitted as personal exoneration, it constituted a virtual dissolution of the treaty, and more especially annulled those stipulations in regard to his dependants in Rajpootana ; because, if unable to restrain such dependants, when they committed aggressions on the British Government, the treaties which bound that Government to regard them as the subjects of Sindia, could no longer be considered in force. The paper in question further declared that the British Government had no other view than the effectual extinction of all predatory associations ; and Captain Close was authorized to communicate the mode in which Sindia's aid was solicited for that purpose. He was required to place his troops at the disposal of the British Government, to be stationary or employed at its option, with a British officer superintending each of the principal divisions ; and any of Sindia's officers, supporting or harbouring freebooters, were to be dealt with as rebels. A contingent of five thousand horse to be employed under the direction of British officers against the Pindharees, and funds allotted for its expenses for three years from the pension payable by the British Government and the tribute demandable from Boondee and Joudpoor. The lands recovered from the Pindharees, belonging to Sindia, to be restored to him ; and to the rightful owners, in all cases where they co-operated for their suppression ; where they did not, the whole to be given up to Sindia. As a security for the fulfilment of the proposed terms, the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh were demanded, but Sindia's flag was to be allowed to fly, and a few of his troops permitted to remain in each of them. The tribute due to Sindia by the Rajpoot principalities was not to be affected by any agreements which the British Government might make with them ; on the contrary, its due receipt was to be guaranteed to him. A treaty to this effect was signed by Sindia on the 5th November, and ratified by the Governor-General on the following day. Hindia was given up according to the terms of the treaty ; but Jeswunt Rao Lar, the Killidar of Asseergurh, refused to obey the order of surrender. The three principal divisions of Sindia's army were thus stationed : the first at Ajimere under Bappoojee Sindia, the same person who treacherously deserted on Monson's retreat ; the second at Jawud

under Jeswunt Rao Bhow; and the third, at Bhadurgurh under Colonel Jean Baptiste.¹ The British officers chosen to superintend those divisions, were, in their respective order, Major Ludlow, Captain Caulfield, and Major Bunce.

Soon after Sindia had signed the treaty, General Donkin's division proceeded to the westward, for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan, but the Marquis of Hastings continued to move about to the southward of Gwalior, to observe the motions of Sindia, who, though compelled to accept the terms imposed, was watching the progress of events in the Deccan, intriguing with the Peishwa, and endeavouring to stir up the Goorkhas of Nepaul to make common cause with the Mahrattas.

In the meantime the Political Agents of the British Government were actively engaged in negotiations with the petty states. The Raja of Kerowlee,² a dependant of the Peishwa, to whom the Raja had paid a small tribute of 25,000 rupees a year, was the first to accept the proffered protection. He acknowledged the supremacy

¹ [This was Jean Baptiste de la Fontaine Filose, the younger son of Michael Filose. When his father fled, Jean Baptiste was at Delhi, where his brother Fidèle divided with him the battalions they had inherited. He fought against George Thomas with this force in 1801. Four of his battalions were beaten at Assaye, and he himself left Sindia's service after this defeat; but he subsequently rejoined Sindia, and was the only military adventurer who survived the disasters of 1803. His descendants are to-day employed in the service of Sindia; one of them, Sir Michael Filose, being an architect at Gwālior. Jean Baptiste was eventually removed from the service of the Gwālior State after the war of 1843, between Sindia and the British, and the battles of Mahārājpur and Panniar. He was at that time Commander-in-Chief of the Gwālior State army. (Compton, *Military Adventurers*, &c., pp. 352-4.) For an account of his 'kingdom-taking' expedition, see Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 293-4. All the territories which he took on this occasion were subsequently confirmed to Sindia by the British Government.]

² [Karauli (Kerowlee) is a small principality, about seventy miles equidistant from Agra, Gwālior, Mathurā, Alwar, Jaipur, and Tonk. It was one of the places attacked by Jean Baptiste Filose on his 'kingdom-taking' (*mulk-giri*) expedition in 1813, and the chief was forced to yield to Sindia the Sabalgarh District, yielding annually four lakhs of rupees (i.e. Rs. 4,00,000). (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, p. 293.) Broughton described the chief of Karauli (Kiruolee) in 1809 as a timid youth of limited capacity, belonging to the Jādav tribe of Rājput, which formerly reigned at Biāna. The revenue of his state did not exceed 1,25,000 rupees, out of which he paid 20,000 rupees as tribute to the Peshwā. (*Letters from a Mahratta Camp*, Constable, 1892, pp. 9, 10.)]

of the British Government, was guaranteed in his possessions, and in his particular case the tribute was remitted. He agreed to furnish troops to the extent of his means. This agreement was signed on the 9th November, and on the same day Umeer Khan's agent at Delhi accepted the terms offered for his master. His Jagheer was guaranteed and taken under British protection, on condition of disbanding his followers, except a small number for the internal management of his Jagheer, which were to attend on the requisition of the British Government; he was also to relinquish all connexion with freebooters, and to give up his artillery for an equitable pecuniary compensation.¹ After the conclusion of the treaty with Sindia, Captain Tod, Assistant to the Resident in Sindia's camp, was sent on a political mission to the Rajpoot states. The Raj Rana, Zalim Sing of Kotah, who governed the principality in the name of his imprisoned sovereign, with all the prudence and vigour of the ablest of the Mahratta Peishwas, immediately acceded to the terms proposed; blocked up the passes in his country, and furnished a contingent to act with the British troops. A treaty was afterwards concluded with him on the 26th December.²

In Bundelcund, Govind Rao Nana had signed a treaty on the 1st November, by which his tribute and military service, transferred from the Peishwa to the British Government by the treaty of Poona, were commuted for the cession of a part of the

¹ [This was the origin of the Tonk principality. The present Nawab of Tonk is a descendant of Amīr Khān. See note on p. 307, *ante*.]

² [Zālim Singh, the blind Regent, ruled Kotah from 1771 for more than fifty years, and though the territory which he governed was not extensive, he made himself feared and respected by all his neighbours. In 1758 he had succeeded to the *Faujdāri* of Kotah, and in 1761 secured a victory for the Kotah troops over the army of Jaipur at Bhatwāra. About 1809 Sindia nominated Zālim Singh to the office of governor (*Subha*) of Mēwār, for which the latter paid about 1,50,000 rupees; but Sindia subsequently changed his mind and confirmed Ambājī Ingliā instead. He, however, did not return the money to Zālim Singh. (Broughton, *Letters, &c.*, 1892 ed., p. 28.) A supplementary article, added in 1818 to the treaty of 1817 with the British Government, vested the entire administration of Kotah in the Rāj Rāna Zālim Singh and his heirs in perpetuity. Zālim Singh, styled by Tod the Machiavelli of Rājputāna, died in 1824, and was succeeded by his son, Mādho Singh, who proved unfit for office. In 1834 it was resolved, with the consent of the Mahārāo of Kotah, to dismember the State and create the new principality of Jhalāwār as a separate provision for the descendants of Zālim Singh. (*I.G.*, 1907, xiv. 115-16, and xv. 412.)]

district of Mahabuk, which lay within the British frontier in Bundelcund. Winaek Rao, the chief who had possession of Sagur, refused the proffered terms. The Raja of Simpthur¹ and the Soobehdar of Jhansee² readily accepted the terms of protection and guarantee, and the Nabob of Bhopaul not only accepted them, but entered most heartily into the cause. The political arrangements in Bundelcund were conducted by Mr. Wauchope; those already mentioned as concluded with the Rajas of Kerowlee, Kotah and Umeer Khan, were framed by Mr. Metcalfe,³ the Resident at Delhi; but that of Umeer Khan,

¹ [Samthar (Simpthur) is a small state lying between the Betwa and Pahūj rivers, to the south-west of the Jālaun District. It was separated from the Datiyā State only one generation previous to the British occupation of Bundēlkhand. A treaty was concluded with the Rājā in 1812. (*N.W.P. Gazetteer* (1st ed.), vol. i, p. 578.) (Sleeman's *Rambles*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, p. 191.)]

² [The Brahman chief of Jhānsī (Jhansee) was originally a governor under the Pēshwā, who acquired the territory from the Bundēlkhand chiefs. In 1770 Raghunāth Rāo I ruled the State, and when he drowned himself at Benares in 1794 or 1795, was succeeded by Shivrām Bhāu, who ruled till 1814. The treaty of November 18, 1817, recognized the then chief, Rāmchand Rāo, his heirs and successors, as hereditary rulers of Jhānsī. Rāmchand Rāo was granted the title of Rājā by the British Government in 1832, and died without issue on August 20, 1835. The succession was then contested by four claimants; but ultimately Gangādhar Rāo was appointed Rājā, and after a period of disorder, during which British officers conducted the administration, he obtained full powers in 1842. In 1853 he died without heirs, and Lord Dalhousie, applying the doctrine of lapse, annexed the State in 1854, granting a pension of about £500 monthly to Lakshmī Bāī, Gangādhar Rāo's widow. She resented the refusal of permission to adopt a son, and the consequent annexation of the state, and was further deeply offended by several acts of the English Administration, above all by the permission of cow-slaughter. Accordingly, when the Mutiny broke out, she joined the rebels. On June 7 and 8, 1857, all the Europeans in Jhānsī, men, women and children, to the number of about seventy persons, were cruelly murdered by her orders, or with her sanction. On June 9 her authority was proclaimed. In the prolonged fighting which ensued, she placed herself at the head of her troops, whom she led with great gallantry. In June 1858, after a year's blood-stained reign, she was killed in battle. By November 1858, the country was pacified. (Sleeman's *Rambles*, &c., ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 219-20 n.) Jhānsī is now the headquarters of the British District of the same name and also of the Indian Midland Railway. Since the opening of this railway and the restoration of the Gwālior fort to Sindia in 1886, the importance of Jhānsī, both civil and military, has much increased. The native town was given up by Sindia in exchange for the Gwālior stronghold. (*Ibid.*, p. 209.)]

³ [Charles Theophilus Metcalfe was born in 1785, and commenced

though signed by his agent on the 9th November, was not ratified by himself for some time, as the crafty Patan was then engaged in other negotiations with the Peishwa's agent in his camp, and, like Sindia, was watching the important events which were passing at Poona and Nagpoor.¹

his Indian career in 1801. At the age of twenty-four he was dispatched by Lord Minto as envoy to the Sikh court, and arranged the Amritsar Treaty of April 25, 1809. After filling various high appointments, including that of Resident at Delhi (1824-27), he succeeded Lord William Bentinck as 'Provisional Governor-General' in 1835, just after he had taken charge as Lieutenant-Governor of the North-Western Provinces. He remained at the head of the Government for nearly twelve months, and would have been confirmed had he not offended the Directors of the Company by abolishing the restrictions on the press. Smarting under the censure of the India House, he resigned the service and returned to England in 1838. Subsequently he was appointed Governor of Jamaica, and then Governor-General of Canada. He died in 1846. (*O.H.I.*, p. 671. See also Sleeman's *Rambles, &c.*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, p. 461 n. ; and Kaye, *Life and Correspondence of Lord Metcalfe*, 1854.)]

¹ In addition to the authorities quoted for the preceding chapter, I have to acknowledge my obligations to Mr. Prinseps' narrative.

CHAPTER XLIX.

FROM A.D. 1817 TO A.D. 1818.

A.D. 1817.—IN the month of July, as soon as the arrangements resulting from the treaty of Poona were put in a train of adjustment, the Peishwa left his capital, and proceeded on his annual pilgrimage to the temples of Punderpoor, unaccompanied by the Resident ; which promised to have a good effect, in marking the restoration of confidence on the part of the British Government. He immediately reduced his military establishment, chiefly his cavalry ; but it was subsequently discovered that he had given every Sillardar seven months' pay, with orders to remain at his village and to hold himself in readiness to return when called upon, with as many of his friends as he could collect.

The regular battalions raised by the Peishwa were transferred as part of the contingent which was placed under the direction of the British Government, and now termed the Poona auxiliary force ; but at Bajee Rao's particular request, that he might be able to confer the command on Captain Ford, one of the battalions was to be retained in his own pay, and in lieu of it a new corps was to be recruited. Every exertion was made to raise the stipulated number of horse ; but the Peishwa's emissaries opposed the recruiting by every means they could devise. From Punderpoor the Peishwa, instead of returning to Poona, proceeded to Maholy, a village near Satara, and a sacred place at the junction of the Yena and Kistna. During his stay there, Sir John Malcolm arrived at Poona, having, on his appointment as Political Agent to the Governor-General, with his usual great activity, visited all the native courts in the Deccan, for the purpose of consulting with the Residents, previously to entering on the scene of operations in Malwa ; and the Peishwa, on hearing of his arrival, invited him to a conference at Maholy.

In the course of conversation, the Peishwa complained much

of the degraded state in which he was left by the late treaty, lamented the loss of that friendship which had hitherto been only productive of benefit ; but enlarged on the gratitude which he felt, and must ever feel, for the protection and support he had experienced from the British Government. Sir John Malcolm endeavoured to soothe him, explained in a general manner the plans of the Marquis of Hastings for the suppression of the Pindharees, and strongly recommended him to adopt a line of policy calculated to assure the British Government of his sincere desire to promote the alliance, and secure its friendship :—that the restoration of what was already forfeited he must not expect, but by pursuing the course now recommended, and aiding the operations with his utmost means, he might rely on the justice and liberality of the Governor-General for obtaining considerable acquisitions as a recompense for the fidelity of which he boasted, and which he might now display. The Peishwa's professions were most cordial, and communicated, as usual, with so great an appearance of candour and good sense, that Sir John Malcolm was completely deceived, and returned to Poona, in the full conviction that Bajee Rao would now heartily engage in the British cause ; and that by encouraging him to raise troops, and treating him with perfect confidence, he would prove a faithful ally. Mr. Elphinstone, though he expressed his opinions, would not oppose the liberal system recommended by Sir John Malcolm ; but he contemplated and foretold a different result, especially on considering the tempting opportunity which would be afforded by the advance of General Smith's division to the frontier, and the exposed state of the handful of troops at Poona.

The forts of Singurh, Raigurh, and Poorundhur, were restored to the Peishwa during the month of August. The excessive heavy rains of this season, prolonged to an unusually late date, delayed the advance of the whole Deccan army. Brigadier-General Smith had transported his division across the Ghore by the 9th October, and by the 20th, occupied convenient positions close to the Chandore range of hills, with a view of advancing into Candeish, as soon as it should appear requisite. A battalion of light infantry, with some auxiliary horse, was left between Seroor and Ahmednugur ; one auxiliary battalion was stationed for the protection of the Seroor cantonment, and the Peishwa's own corps, consisting of from four to five hundred men, remained at

Dhapooree¹ in its first cantonment, a few miles to the north-west of Poona. The Company's European regiment from Bombay was to be held in readiness to join the brigade at Poona about the end of October.

The Peishwa did not return to his capital until the end of September. During his stay at Maholy, he was most actively engaged in those schemes he had long meditated against the British Government; but by the advice of Bappoo Gokla, he had determined on changing his plans of covert hostility to an open attack, as soon as he should be prepared. The recommendation of Sir John Malcolm to recruit his army, for the purpose of aiding in the Pindharee war, afforded an excellent cloak to his designs. Gokla was now the leader of all his measures, and Bajee Rao was induced to give him a formal writing under his own seal, which he confirmed on oath, binding himself to be implicitly directed by his counsel, and investing him with the full powers of his government. This measure seems to have been adopted, not merely as a security to Gokla, but as a means of allaying the mistrust which the Sillidars entertained towards Bajee Rao, and was the condition on which several of the Jagheerdars pledged themselves to stand by him. This circumstance, though reported in the country, was not fully ascertained until after the commencement of hostilities. Bappoo Gokla received ten millions of rupees, nearly a million sterling, to assist in the expense of preparation. From the time of his first determination to break with the English, Bajee Rao restored the lands of many of his Jagheerdars, and for several years had been endeavouring to render himself more popular with all classes of his subjects. He unfolded his intention of going to war with the English to the Raja of Satara; and, whilst he exacted from

¹ [Dapūrī (Dhapooree) is a village in Havēli *tāluka*, Poona District, six miles north of Poona City. It contains several old bungalows and gardens, of which the earliest was built about 1820 by Captain Ford, C.B., who was for some time assistant to Sir Barry Close, Resident at Poona, and subsequently raised and commanded a brigade for the Pēshwā. In his house at Dapūrī he entertained in grand style. In 1828 Sir John Malcolm purchased his residence for Government, and it was used as the Governor's residence until 1865, when the present Government House at Ganeshkhind was completed. Sir John Malcolm established a fine botanical garden on the estate, which was eventually sold by auction, together with the house, during the American Civil War (1863-5). During the closing years of the nineteenth century the house was occupied by a brewery. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii. 127 f.)]

him and his mother an oath of secrecy and support, he sent them and all their family into strict confinement in Wassota. His recruiting went forward with remarkable activity; his forts also were garrisoned, stored, and repaired; and orders were issued to prepare his fleet. Many Bheels and Ramoosees were engaged in his interest by Trimbukjee Dainglia; and special missions were dispatched to Nagpoor, and the camps of Sindia, Holkar, and Umeer Khan; but the schemes which he personally directed were the seduction of the native troops, and the assassination of the Resident. His plan of corrupting the troops extended even to the European officers; and the agent employed for the latter purpose was Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who, for many years, had resided at Poona, was intimately acquainted with many of the officers, and since the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom had received a pension of 1,000 rupees a month from the British Government.¹ Jeswunt Rao had experienced much kindness from Mr. Elphinstone; but at this period, in consequence of some petty intrigues, in which he had made an improper use of his name, the Resident was obliged to treat him with unusual reserve. Bajee Rao, therefore, judging the opportunity favourable, sent for Jeswunt Rao, and after many promises exacted an oath of secrecy, and communicated the plan for corrupting the European officers; a commission which Jeswunt Rao, although he well knew its futility, like a true Mahratta, readily undertook, upon receiving an advance of 50,000 rupees. So far he kept his oath, as to say nothing of these circumstances²; but Jeswunt Rao had a great personal regard for Mr. Elphinstone, and throughout the rise and progress of the Peishwa's preparations, gave early and constant warning of what might be expected. Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray

¹ It may be here mentioned that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray had a just claim to the fort and valley of Sondoor, held by his brother Khundee Rao Ghorepuray, but which Jeswunt Rao had made over to the Peishwa, in exchange for other villages. The British Government approved of the transaction, and promised, at the time the transfer was made, to put the Peishwa in possession of Sondoor, but various causes prevented the fulfilment of this promise, until the end of October of this year, when Sondoor surrendered to a part of the reserve under Colonel Thomas Munro, detached from the force of Brigadier-General Pritzler for the express purpose.

² Independently of its having been found in the Peishwa's accounts, I became acquainted with the circumstances from an individual then high in Bajee Rao's confidence, whose name it would be improper to publish.

was the only man of family, who, at the rupture, openly espoused the British cause ; but of all its adherents, none was of so much importance, or rendered himself so eminently useful, as a Bramin named Ballajee Punt Nathoo,¹ whose vigilance, judgement, fidelity, and firmness, at that trying period, entitle him to be mentioned in this place.

The reports of corrupting the troops were brought from all quarters ; some of the Sepoys indignantly refused what to them were splendid offers ; and others, pretending to acquiesce, communicated the circumstances to their officers ; but the extent of the intrigues could not be ascertained, and they at last became alarming, even to those who knew the fidelity of the Bombay Sepoys, from the circumstance of the Peishwa's having many of their families and relations in his power, against whom he commenced a system of persecution, which he threatened to perpetuate if the Sepoys refused to desert the British service.

It was the Peishwa's wish, previous to the commencement of hostilities, to invite Mr. Elphinstone to a conference, and murder him ; but this plan was opposed by Gokla, who, though he concurred in that of corrupting the Sepoys, and was most sanguine in his belief of its complete success, disdained to perpetrate so base a crime, especially as Mr. Elphinstone had more than once proved himself his friend. But Bajee Rao was unwilling to relinquish a favourite scheme of personal revenge, and proposed to assassinate the Resident as he rode out ; or, should that fail, to get Trimbukjee with a body of Bheels to endeavour to surprize the Residency by night, whilst a simultaneous attack should be made on the cantonment.

The last interview which took place between Mr. Elphinstone and

¹ At my particular request, he wrote a very correct and voluminous history of his own times, in which he quotes his authorities. It was translated for me by my friend Mr. William Richard Morris, of the Bombay Civil Service, whose valuable assistance I have already acknowledged, but the original MS. is in possession of its author, who, for various prudential reasons, was desirous of retaining it. Ballajee Punt Nathoo was the Carcoon of the ill-requited Khundee Rao Rastia, who at his death appointed him guardian to his children. He endeavoured to interest Colonel Close in their behalf, was in the habit of coming much to the Residency, and at last attached himself to Mr. Elphinstone, openly embraced the British cause, and proved himself well entitled to the munificent reward which was conferred upon him, before Mr. Elphinstone assumed the government of Bombay,

the Peishwa was on the 14th of October, when, although the latter adverted to the loss of territory and reputation he had suffered

(Oct.
14.)

by the late treaty, he continued to express grateful acknowledgements for the former friendship of the British Government. On Mr. Elphinstone's mentioning how anxiously the advance of the troops was desired, Bajee Rao repeated the assurances which he had of late frequently made through his ministers, that his troops should be sent to the frontier, to co-operate against the Pindharees immediately after the Dussera.

(Oct. 19.)—The festival of the Dussera took place on the 19th October, and was the most splendid military spectacle ever witnessed since the accession of Bajee Rao. Two circumstances were particularly observable on this occasion; a marked degree of slight towards the Resident, and, at the moment of the Peishwa's quitting the ground, a large compact mass of horse, under an officer named Naroo Punt Aptey, galloped down, as if they had intended to charge the flank of the British troops, but wheeled off as they came close up. The intention of this manœuvre was to show the Sepoys their insignificance, when compared to this host of Mahratta spears, and might be supposed to have its effect in aiding the Peishwa's intrigues. It would have been difficult to convince the Mahrattas, in that vaunting moment, that of the three weak battalions, then peaceably and unsuspectingly standing before them, one should, in less than three months, repulse their whole army.

(Oct. 25.)—After the Dussera every day became more interesting, and by the 25th parties of troops were coming into Poona from all quarters, by day and by night. General Smith's force was now at a distance, and the European regiment from Bombay could hardly be expected in less than ten days. The position occupied by the brigade almost joined the northern environs of Poona: it had been originally taken up by Sir Arthur Wellesley for the protection of the city, but circumstances were now reversed. Gardens and enclosures, with high prickly pear hedges, ran in many places within half musket shot of the lines, affording not only every advantage for the attack of the Arabs and irregulars, but, in case of disaffection amongst the Sepoys, every facility to desert. Small parties of horse came out, and encamped round the British cantonment, and in a few days were augmented to large bodies, whilst a strong corps of Gosaeen infantry occupied a

position on one of the flanks. The Sungum being at some distance from the cantonment, the Vinchoorkur's horse, with some infantry and guns, encamped between the Residency and the village of Bambooree : but, besides these preparations, all reports concurred in representing that an immediate attack was meditated.

For several nights the Peishwa and his advisers had deliberated on the advantage of surprising the troops before the arrival of the European regiment ; and for this purpose, on the 28th October, their guns were yoked, their horses saddled, and their infantry in readiness. This intelligence was brought to Mr. Elphinstone a little before midnight of the 28th, and for a moment it became a question, whether self-defence, under all circumstances, did not require that the attack should be anticipated. It was an hour of anxiety :—the British cantonment and the Residency were perfectly still, and the inhabitants slept in the complete repose inspired by confidence in that profound peace to which they had been long accustomed ; but in the Peishwa's camp, south of the town, all was noise and uproar. Mr. Elphinstone had as yet betrayed no suspicion of the Peishwa's treachery, and, as he now stood listening on the terrace,¹ he probably thought that, in thus exposing the troops to be cut off without even the satisfaction of dying with their arms in their hands, he had followed the system of confidence, so strongly recommended, to a culpable extremity : but other motives influenced his conduct at this important moment. He was aware how little faith the other Mahratta princes placed in Bajee Rao, and that Sindia, who knew him well, would hesitate to engage in hostilities, until the Peishwa had fairly committed himself. Apprised of the Governor-General's secret plans and his intended movements on Gwalior, which many circumstances might have concurred to postpone, Mr. Elphinstone had studiously avoided every appearance which might affect the negotiations in Hindoostan, or by any preparation and apparent alarm on his part, give Sindia's secret emissaries at Poona reason to believe that war was inevitable. To have sent to the cantonment at that hour would have occasioned considerable stir ;

¹ As I was the only person with Mr. Elphinstone during that night, though I here narrate simply what I saw and heard, some apology to him may be necessary, for publishing without his sanction what relates to him personally, but I trust that the occasion is sufficiently interesting to the public, and honourable to him, to authorize my having done so.

and in the meantime, by the reports of the spies, the Peishwa was evidently deliberating ; the din in the city was dying away ; the night was passing ; and the motives which had hitherto prevented preparation determined Mr. Elphinstone to defer it some hours longer. Major J. A. Wilson, the officer in command of the European regiment on its march from Bombay, had already been made acquainted with the critical state of affairs, and was hastening forward.

(Oct. 29.)—Next morning, however, the officer in command of the brigade at Poona was requested to keep the men ready in their lines, but with as little appearance of bustle as possible. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the Peishwa, mentioning that His Highness's horsemen were crowding in upon the position of the brigade ; that such a mode of encamping had never been practised or permitted by British troops, and therefore the commanding officer confined his men to their cantonment until those of His Highness should be withdrawn, lest, by their contiguity, disputes might arise between them. This message was delivered by Captain Ford, and created a great sensation. Gokla recommended that the attack should not be delayed ; the Peishwa hesitated, stating that he wished a little more time to make sure of corrupting the Sepoys ; the European regiment was still, as he believed, at a great distance, and every hour was adding to his army ; another night was thus wasted in consultation, and at four o'clock of the following afternoon, the

(Oct. 30.) European regiment, by great exertions, marched into the cantonment.¹ Mr. Elphinstone now determined on removing the troops from their present very bad position to another in many respects more eligible, at the village of Kherkee,² four miles distant, which had been early pointed out by General

¹ [The troops under Major Wilson covered the whole distance from Panvel in the Konkan (Kolāba District) to Poona with only one halt. The regiment was the 2nd Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, the 'Old Toughs.']

² [i.e. Kirkee (Khadkī). At the date of the battle, Kirkee was a small village. There were two battalions of native infantry (6th and 7th) and two guns, under the command of Colonel Burr at Garpīr, on the right bank of the Muthā, close to the present site of the Collector's office. These troops, with the Bombay European regiment, quitted Garpīr for Kirkee, leaving one company to guard the cantonment and 250 men to reinforce the Residency escort. (Acworth, *Maratha Ballads*, p. 127.)]

Smith as the proper one to be occupied in case of an apprehended rupture. The troops accordingly took up their ground at Khirkee on the 1st November, and the Residency being close to (Nov. 1.) the town, two hundred and fifty men were sent for its protection. The Peishwa was apprised of the intended movement ; but his army supposed that the British troops had withdrawn from fear, and was much encouraged in consequence. The cantonment was plundered ; an officer,¹ on his route to Bombay, was attacked, wounded, and robbed in open day ; the language of the Peishwa's ministers was that of perfect slight ; his troops everywhere began to insult individuals as they passed ; and they continued to push forward their parties as if in defiance. They proposed forming a camp betwixt the old cantonment and the new position, and a party of horse moved down for the purpose. A second message was therefore sent to the Peishwa, begging that the motives of the movement might not be misconstrued ; for, if the British troops were pressed upon, as in the old position, those of His Highness must be treated as enemies. The Peishwa now believed, from the reports of his emissaries, that the (Nov. 4.) Sepoys were completely seduced.² On the 4th November Moro Dixit, the minister, who had formed an attachment to Captain Ford and was anxious to save him, communicated this circumstance, and that his master was determined to cut off the British detachment without sparing a man.³ He advised him to stand neuter, when his property should be spared and his family protected ; but on Captain Ford's telling him he would immedi-

¹ Lieutenant Shaw. Veeram Sing, a horseman of Bajee Rao's personal retinue, was the individual who speared him.

² Many of the Sepoys behaved with admirable fidelity ; one native officer, Jemadar Shaik Hoossein, of the 2d battalion 6th regiment, on being tampered with, encouraged the overtures, by the advice of his Adjutant, Lieut. Robert Billamore, who was instructed on the subject. The Peishwa sent for the Jemadar, made him great promises, and desired a Carcoon to give him 10,000 rupees, but the latter gave the Jemadar one-half and kept the other himself. The Jemadar brought the money to his officer in a bag of rice, just before hostilities commenced.

³ Dr. Coats and Captain Ford, the latter only if he stood neutral, were to be the sole exceptions. Dr. Coats had attended the Peishwa in an illness, had gratuitously performed many cures amongst the people of the country, and had spread vaccination for many miles around ; the anecdote proves that Bajee Rao was not wholly devoid of gratitude.

ately join his countrymen, he took an affectionate leave of him, promising, at all events, that he would do his best to befriend his family ; but as there was, he observed, no saying what turn the war might ultimately take, he exacted a like promise from Captain Ford, which was readily granted. Until this communication was made, Captain Ford, though in daily intercourse with the city, and made acquainted with the circumstances by Mr. Elphinstone, was perfectly confident that the Peishwa had no intention of going to war, and his astonishment and alarm were proportionally great. The Peishwa's reason for still wishing to procrastinate was the expected arrival of the Putwurdhuns and Appa Dessaye Nepankur ; matters, however, were brought to a crisis before they could join his army. General Smith, who continued in the position already described, on hearing what had taken place, was prepared to expect a rupture ; and therefore, without waiting for orders from Sir Thomas Hislop, concentrated his force at Phooltamba on the Godavery, and ordered the light battalion to fall back to Seroor ; it was also settled between him and the Resident, that in case the communication were interrupted, the General might conclude that the troops at Poona were attacked. On the

3d November, Mr. Elphinstone directed the light battalion (**Nov. 3.**) and a party of auxiliary horse, stationed at Seroor, to move to Poona. As soon as the news of these arrangements reached the Peishwa, he determined to delay the attack no longer.

His preparations began about seven o'clock on the morning (**Nov. 5.**) of the 5th ; but in the early part of the day, he sent out several messages calculated to lull the Resident's suspicions ; such as, that his troops were alarmed by hearing that those at Khirkee were under arms ; that he was about to perform a religious ceremony at the temple of Parbuttee,¹ and

¹ [The lake and temple-crowned peak of Pārvatī (Parbuttee) lie about one mile to the south of the city of Poona. Moor describes the ceremony of *Dakshina*, or almsgiving, to Brahmans at the temple in 1797 during Bāji Rāo's reign, he and a Captain Gardner having been admitted to one of the enclosures. The four gates of this enclosure were superintended respectively by the Pēshwā himself, Amrat Rāo, his elder brother, Chimnāji Appā, his younger brother, and Nānā Farnavis. The total sum distributed on this occasion by the Pēshwā was 5,00,000 rupees (about £62,000 at the rate of exchange then current). (Edward Moor, *The Hindu Pantheon*, 1st ed., London, 1810, pp. 376-8.) Half-way up the Pārvatī hill is a small altar marking the spot where the last *Satī* in Poona is said to have taken place in 1832.

that the troops were drawn out, in honour of the occasion, to form a street as he passed. In the afternoon, when all was in readiness, the whole of his principal officers having assembled at his palace, Wittoojee Gaekwar, a personal servant of the Peishwa, was dispatched to Mr. Elphinstone, by Gokla's advice, to inform him that the assembly of troops at Poona was very offensive to the Peishwa ; to desire him to send away the European regiment, to reduce the native brigade to its usual strength, when it must occupy a position which the Peishwa would point out, and that if these demands were not complied with, he would withdraw from Poona and never return. Mr. Elphinstone denied the Peishwa's right to require the removal of the European regiment, explained the reason of his having called in the light battalion, and recommended that the Peishwa should send his troops to the frontier as he had promised, in which case all cause of complaint would be removed :—there was a good deal more passed, as the conversation, on the part of the messenger, was intended to engage as much attention as possible ; but he at last withdrew, warning the Resident of the bad consequence of his refusal. In the meantime the Peishwa's officers at the palace were dispatched to their troops ; Bajee Rao, in person, proceeded to Parbuttee,¹ and Wittoojee Gaekwar had scarcely quitted the Residency, when intelligence was brought that the army was moving out on the west side of the city. There was a momentary consultation about defending the Residency, but it was instantly abandoned as impracticable, and it was determined to retire to Khirkee, for which purpose the nature of the ground afforded great facility. The river Moola betwixt the Sungum and the village of Khirkee forms two curves like the letter S inverted. The Residency and the village were both on the same side of the river, but at the former there was a ford, and near the latter a bridge ; so that the party, by crossing at the ford, had the river between them and the Peishwa's troops the greater part of the way. From the Residency no part of the Mahratta army was visible, excepting bodies of infantry which were assembling along the tops of the adjoining heights, with the intention of cutting off the Residency from the camp, and having

The southern crest of the hill contains the ruins of an incomplete palace, commenced by Bājī Rāo (1796–1817), the completed portion of which was destroyed by lightning in 1816. (*B.G.* xviii, pt. iii. 386–9.)]

¹ Situated on a hill on the south side of Poona, and already mentioned.

this object in view, they did not molest individuals. On ascending one of the eminences on which they were forming, the plain beneath presented at that moment a most imposing spectacle. This plain, then covered with grain, terminates on the west by a range of small hills, while on the east it is bounded by the city of Poona and the small hills already partially occupied by the infantry. A mass of cavalry covered nearly the whole extent of it, and towards the city endless streams of horsemen were pouring from every avenue.¹

Mr. Elphinstone had personally reconnoitred the ground in front of the village of Khirkee, and ascertained that there was a ford between that village and Dhapooree, which, although difficult, was practicable for six pounders, three of which, manned by native artillery-men, belonged to the auxiliary force, and were attached to Captain Ford's corps. It had been arranged, in case of an attack, that Captain Ford was to join the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Burr; and Mr. Elphinstone had been at pains to explain to all concerned the advantage of always acting on the offensive against Mahrattas. When the party was fording at the Residency, a messenger was dispatched to warn the troops of the approach of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, the officer in command, wished to have acted on the defensive, but as the message required him to move down and attack the Peishwa's army, he immediately sent the battalion companies of the 2d battalion 6th regiment to protect the stores, ammunition, and followers in the village of Khirkee, left his camp standing, and instantly marched down by the high road for about a mile;—then wheeling to the right, he moved in the direction of Dhapooree, to facilitate the junction of Captain Ford's corps, and bring his front parallel to that of the enemy. In a few minutes the expected

¹ Those only who have witnessed the Bore in the Gulf of Cambay, and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at sight of the Peishwa's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day; there was a dead calm, and no sound was heard, except the rushing, the trampling and neighing of the horses, and the rumbling of the gun wheels. The effect was heightened, by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes startled from sleep, bounding off, and then turning for a moment to gaze on this tremendous inundation, which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn, and completely overwhelmed every ordinary barrier as it moved.

corps was seen approaching ; the Resident's party had joined, and Colonel Burr advanced to the attack. The Mahrattas, who had sent on their skirmishers, some of whom had already suffered from the fire of the light infantry, were surprised by this forward movement in troops who they had been encouraged to believe were already spiritless ; and a damp, which had been spreading over the whole army by the accidental breaking of the staff of the Juree Putka before they left the city, was now much increased. Gokla, with the true spirit of a soldier, was riding from rank to rank animating, encouraging, and taunting as he thought most effectual, but the Peishwa's heart failed him ; and after the troops had advanced he sent a message to Gokla desiring him ' to be sure not to fire the first gun.' At this moment the British troops were halted, their guns were unlimbering—it was the pause of preparation, and of anxiety on both sides ; but Gokla, observing the messenger from the Peishwa, and suspecting the nature of his errand, instantly commenced the attack by opening a battery of nine guns, detaching a strong corps of rocket-camels to the right, and pushing forward his cavalry to the right and left. The British troops were soon nearly surrounded by horse ; but the Mahratta infantry, owing to this rapid advance, were left considerably in the rear, except a regular battalion under a Portuguese, named De Pentó, which had marched by a shorter route concealed for a time under cover of the enclosures, and were now forming with apparent steadiness, immediately in front of the 1st battalion 7th regiment and the grenadiers of the 2d battalion 6th :—no sooner, however, were their red coats and colours exposed to view of the English Sepoys, than the latter with one accord pushed forward to close, and in their eagerness got detached from the rest of the line. Gokla, hoping that they might either be disposed to come over, or that he might be able to take advantage of their impetuosity, prepared a select body of 6,000 horse, which, accompanied by the Juree Putka, and headed by several persons of distinction, had been held in reserve near his left, and were now ordered to charge.¹ The Mahratta guns ceased firing to let them pass ; and they came down at speed, in a diagonal direction across the British front.

¹ Naroo Punt Apty, Mahdoo Rao Rastia, and Aba Poorundhuree were all in this charge. Gokla advanced a considerable distance with them, until his horse was wounded : he told Naroo Punt that most of the Sepoys were friendly, and would fire over his head.

Giving their fire, and receiving that of the line, they rode right at the 7th. Colonel Burr took his post with the colours of that corps ; it had long been his own battalion, he had 'formed and led' it for many years, he was then suffering under a severe and incurable malady,¹ but he showed his wonted coolness and firmness in this moment of peril. He was the first to perceive the moving mass : he had just time to stop the pursuit of De Pento's battalion, already routed, and to call to the men, who could not be dressed in line, to reserve their fire, and prove themselves worthy of all his care. Fortunately there was a deep slough, of which neither party was aware, immediately in front of the British left. The foremost of the horses rolled over, and many, before they could be pulled up, tumbled over those in front ; the fire, hitherto reserved, was now given with great effect, numbers fell, the confusion became extreme, and the force of the charge was completely checked : a very small proportion came in contact with the bayonets, a few continued the attack in the rear, but many turned back ; some galloped round the left as if to plunder the camp, but they were driven off by a few shots from two iron guns at Khirkee, and the Sepoys had nearly repulsed the attack before a company of Europeans could arrive to their support. This failure completely disconcerted the Mahrattas ; they began to drive off their guns ; their infantry retired from the distant position they occupied, and upon the advance of the British line, the whole field was cleared. The brigade returned to its position at Khirkee after nightfall, and the light battalion and auxiliary horse joined it next morning. The report of their arrival, and the effect of the forward movement, deterred Gokla from renewing the attack. The Mahrattas in Captain Ford's battalion deserted, and a part of the newly raised auxiliary horse were, at their own desire, permitted to quit the British camp ; but not one Sepoy of the regular service left his colours. The number of the British troops engaged at the affair of Khirkee, including Captain Ford's battalion, was 2,800 rank and file, of whom about 800 were Europeans. Their loss was comparatively trifling, amounting only to eighty-six men in killed

¹ Colonel Burr had lost the use of his side from a paralytic stroke, and both mind and body were impaired, but he was foremost in the post of honour. On this occasion, two of his attendants were shot by his side, his horse's head was grazed by a ball, and another went through his hat.

and wounded, fifty of whom were of the Sepoys on the left. The Mahratta army consisted of 18,000 horse and 8,000 foot, with 14 guns.¹ They suffered considerably, having lost five hundred men in killed and wounded ; and though the proportion of horses killed on the spot was inconsiderable, a very great number were disabled. Amongst the sufferers was the minister Moro Dixit, who, by rather a strange fatality, was mortally wounded by a grape-shot from one of the guns attached to the battalion of his friend Captain Ford.

Hostilities were no sooner commenced, than the ferocious and vindictive character of Bajee Rao's previous orders became apparent from the proceedings in every direction ; probably before he had time to stop them. The Residency was plundered and burnt, and of the Resident's library and private apartment, not one stone was left upon another ; the families and followers of the troops, who fell into the hands of the Mahrattas, were robbed, beaten, and frequently mutilated ; the gardens were destroyed, the trees were torn from the roots, and the graves were dug up. An engineer officer, on survey, was attacked and killed ; two brothers, of the name of Vaughan, one of them a Captain in the Madras army, were taken while travelling between Bombay and Poona, near the village of Tullygaom, and though they made no resistance, were most barbarously hanged under the superintendence of a Bramin named Babjee Punt Gokla.² These atrocities, excepting the plunder of the adherents and servants of the British Government, were not perpetrated under Bappoo Gokla's sanction ; but as he had been entrusted with the entire powers of the state, Mr. Elphinstone took the first opportunity of intimating to him, that any individual, however exalted his rank, who might order the death of a British prisoner, should answer for it in his own person.

¹ This number is given from the actual returns, and does not include 5,000 horse and 2,000 foot stationed with the Peishwa at Parbuttee, so that Bajee Rao had already collected thirty-three thousand men at Poona.

² This person is now a prisoner, in a wooden cage, in the fort of Singurh. Bajee Rao disavowed the murder of the Vaughans, but acknowledged that the Residency was destroyed by his orders. [The graves of the brothers Vaughan are still to be seen at Talegāon (Tullygaom), twenty yards off the road. One brother was a Major in the 15th Madras N.I., the other was in the Marine service. The brothers were actually captured at Karli and dragged almost naked to Talegāon, where one brother was made to hang the other. The tragedy took place on November 10, 1817. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii.)]

Two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison of the Madras establishment, on the route from Hyderabad to Poona with a small escort, were attacked when they approached the latter place, and after a manful resistance, being compelled to surrender, they were confined in a hill-fort¹; some small parties who stood on the defensive in various situations, and surrendered on terms, were permitted to join the British camp. Amongst this number was the Resident's moonshee, who, having a party of Arabs in his pay, defended his house in the city for several days, until Gokla interposed and sent for him. During their interview, at which several persons were present, Gokla showed him the Peishwa's paper investing him with the full powers of his government, and after some conversation observed, 'I have given you protection because your master was an old friend of mine; we are now enemies; the trial we have already had' (alluding to the action of the 5th), 'has not turned out as I expected, but tell him we shall persevere: we may have taken our shrouds about our heads, but we are determined to die with our swords in our hands.'

As soon as General Smith found the communication cut off, he advanced on Poona. From the time his division quitted Seroor, he was followed by flying parties of Mahrattas, who, owing to his want of cavalry, harassed his march. He arrived on the evening of the 13th, and preparations were made to attack the Peishwa before daylight of the 15th. His army, having obtained a considerable addition by the junction of most of the southern Jagheerdars, had come out a few days before, and encamped with its left on the late cantonment of the British troops, and its right stretching along the Hyderabad road for several miles. The intended attack, however, on the morning of the 15th, was

¹ [They were captured at Urulī, about fifteen miles east of Poona, and were sent first to Kangorī fort in Kolāba, where they were harshly treated, and thence to Vāsota. The British force advancing from Medha by Bamnoli and Tambi, drove in outposts at Vāsota and met the Pēshwā's forces at Indoli. Negotiations were opened with the commandant, Bhāskar Pant, but he refused to surrender. The British forces then advanced a detachment and dug shelters for themselves in the hillside. A battery was set up on the old fort, and the bombardment lasted for twenty hours. The commandant finally surrendered on April 6, 1818, and the two British officers were recovered uninjured (see pages 517-8, *post*). See also Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone*, vol. ii, p. 34. Elphinstone was himself present at the capture of Vāsota.]

postponed by General Smith, in consequence of unforeseen difficulties at the ford. About sunset on the evening of the 16th, an advanced brigade was ordered to cross the ford, and take up a position to the east of the Peishwa's army, at the village of Ghorepuray,¹ for the purpose of co-operating in an intended attack on the ensuing morning: it was opposed by a body of the Peishwa's infantry, supported by parties of horse and two guns, but having succeeded in getting to its station, though with the loss of eighty-four men in killed and wounded, it was no longer molested during the night. In the morning, when General Smith moved towards the camp, he found it abandoned, and that the Peishwa had fled towards Satara. During the day the city was surrendered, and the greatest care being taken on this, as on every occasion, by General Smith for the protection of the peaceable part of the community, order and tranquillity were soon re-established.² General Smith remained at Poona for five days, during which time the communication with Bombay was opened, and a party, being detached for the purpose, succeeded in capturing several guns in the neighbourhood of the fort of Singurh. Some of the inhabitants of Poona, who fled as usual with their property towards the hill-forts, were sufferers on this occasion, as a great quantity of baggage was taken at the same time with the guns, and became the booty of the army.

On the 22d November, General Smith, having been joined by a regiment of native cavalry, commenced pursuing the Peishwa, who remained at Maholy, and during his stay there, sent a party to Wassota, for the purpose of bringing the Raja of Satara, his mother and brothers to his camp, but he had quitted Maholy prior to the Raja's arrival, owing to the approach of General Smith, before whom he fled to Punderpoor, and thence, turning up the bank of the Beema, he continued his flight until he ascended the Lag Ghaut, north of Joonere, where he occupied a position at Bamunwaree. This part of the country is exceedingly strong,

¹ [This is Ghorpadi, which lies to the north-east of the central belt of the modern Poona cantonment, and contains military lines and three sets of barracks, the oldest of which were built in 1842. (*B.G.*, xviii. pt. iii.) The engagement here described is known as the battle of Yerāoda, and took place near where the present Fitzgerald Bridge stands, the British guns on 'Picket Hill' commanding the position.]

² [As regards the measures taken to preserve Poona and the forbearance of the troops, in the face of great provocation, see extract from M. Elphinstone's dispatch to the Marquess of Hastings on pp. 3, 4, vol. ii, of Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone*, 1884.]

with mountains on all sides, and the passes were stockaded by Trimbukjee Dainglia, who here joined the Peishwa with a reinforcement. The Raja and his family were brought into his camp whilst on the route from Punderpoor. General Smith followed the Peishwa until he was past Poona, when he proceeded to Seroor : he there deposited his battering train and heavy baggage, and left a battalion of native infantry, and a body of auxiliary horse, to reinforce the station ; he then proceeded by Ahmednugur down the Nimbadewra Ghaut, and up the bank of the Paira to Sungumnere. Finding he had got to the northward of the Peishwa, he ascended the Wursura Ghaut, and here he divided his force, sending back a part by Ahmednugur, and, with a light division, continuing the pursuit of the Peishwa, who fled to the southward as soon as he heard of General Smith's arrival at Sungumnere, giving out that he intended to attack Poona. Great exertions were therefore made to come up with him ; but, in the meantime, the most remarkable event of the war took place from the following circumstances. General Pritzler, it must be premised, was at this time advancing with the reserve division of the Deccan army from Adonee towards Punderpoor for the purpose of co-operating in the pursuit of the Peishwa ; and Smith, deeming it probable that he should get to the northward of the Peishwa, as in fact he did, and that the Mahratta army, afraid of being driven back upon Pritzler, might descend into the Concan, where there was a small force fitted out by the Bombay Government, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, employed in reducing the country, and which might thus be exposed to be cut off, it became necessary to provide against such an event. Accordingly, Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, who was stationed at Poona, was directed, in case he should have positive information that the Peishwa had descended into the Concan, to detach the 2d battalion 6th regiment from his own immediate command, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Prother ; and in that case, he was authorized to call in to Poona the 2d battalion 1st regiment, lately left by General Smith to reinforce the cantonment at Seroor. But when the Peishwa commenced

(Dec. 31.) his flight to the southward, Colonel Burr, hearing that he meditated an attack on Poona, sent off an express for the 2d battalion 1st regiment, to reinforce himself. The battalion, on receipt of this application, commenced its march from Seroor on the last day of the year, at eight o'clock in the evening.

It consisted of little more than 500 rank and file, and was supported by two six pounders, well manned by twenty-four Europeans of the Madras artillery, under a serjeant and a lieutenant. It was also accompanied by 300 of the newly raised irregular horse, and the whole was under the command of Captain Francis Staunton. Having marched all night, by ten o'clock on the morning of New Year's Day, Captain Staunton reached (A.D. 1818. Jan. 1.) the high ground above the village of Korygaom¹ on the Beema, where he beheld the whole of the Mahratta horse, consisting of about 25,000, on the opposite side of the river. He continued his march towards the bank, and the Peishwa's troops believed that he intended to ford, but as soon as he had gained the neighbourhood of the village, he immediately took post in it. Korygaom is a moderate-sized village, immediately overhanging the steep bank of the Beema, but owing to the immense beds of the Indian rivers, which are never filled except during the rains, the channel occupied but a small part of the space between the banks, so that the village was fifty or sixty yards from the water. There is a mud wall, which at one time probably surrounded the village, but is now full of large breaches on the side next the river, and on the east it is completely open.² Most of the Peishwa's infantry, in number about 5,000, had gone on in advance towards the Bhore Ghaut, east of Poona ; but on first descrying the battalion, immediate orders were sent to recall them. As soon as they arrived, three bodies, of six hundred choice men in each, consisting of Arabs, Gosaeens, and regular infantry mixed together, advanced on three different points, under cover of the bank of the river, and supported by two guns, to storm the village. A continued shower of rockets was at the same time poured into it, and many of the houses were set on fire. Captain Staunton had selected a commanding position for the guns ; but unfortunately the interior of the village was not sufficiently reconnoitred, as

¹ [The famous battle of Koregāon (Korygaom) was fought two miles distant from Lōni, on the right bank of the Bhīma, and sixteen miles north-east of Poona. Koregāon is now in the Sirūr *tāluka*, Poona District. Tod styles Captain Staunton's heroic defence the 'Indian Thermopylae.' (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 519 f. ; *O.H.I.*, p. 631.)]

² I write this description of the village from recollection ; I have not seen it for seven or eight years : not indeed since the morning after Captain Staunton evacuated it, when, though I carefully examined that scene of recent and desperate conflict, I at that time had no intention of publishing an account of it.

there was a strong square enclosure commanding most of the streets, of which the enemy obtained possession, and whence they could not be dislodged. The village was immediately surrounded by horse and foot, and the storming party was supported by fresh troops. All access to the river was speedily cut off, Captain Staunton was destitute of provisions, and this detachment, already fatigued from want of rest and a long night march, now, under a burning sun, without food or water, began a struggle as trying as ever was maintained by the British in India. Every foot of ground was disputed, several streets were taken and retaken, but more than half the European officers being wounded, the Arabs made themselves masters of a small temple, towards the east side of the village, generally used as a choultry, where three of the officers were lying wounded. Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, one of their number, got up and went out, but was immediately stabbed by the Arabs, and his body cruelly mangled. Lieutenant Swanston, who had two severe wounds, had the presence of mind to advise his remaining companion to suffer the Arabs to rifle them unresistingly, which they did, but committed no further violence ; and in the meantime, a party of the battalion under Lieutenant Jones and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie, arrived to their rescue, retook the choultry, avenged the death of Mr. Wingate, and carried their companions to a place of greater safety. The sufferings of the wounded became extreme from thirst ; and the men who continued the conflict were fainting, or nearly frantic, from the dreadful privation of water. Some of the artillery-men, all of whom bore a very conspicuous part in this glorious defence, proposed to Captain Staunton that they should surrender if terms could be obtained. His determined refusal did not satisfy them, but Lieutenant Chisholm their officer being killed, the enemy encouraged by this circumstance, rushed upon one of the guns and took it. Lieutenant Thomas Pattinson adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was taken, than getting up he called to the grenadiers 'once more to follow him,' and seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs striking them down right and left,¹ until a second ball

¹ Lieut. Pattinson was a very powerful man, being 6 feet 7 inches in height ; nothing could exceed his heroic conduct on the memorable occasion where he received his wounds ; he did not expire until the

through his body completely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded ; the Sepoys, thus led, were irresistible, the gun was retaken, and the dead Arabs, literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended. The body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found by his gun with the head cut off ; Captain Staunton judiciously took advantage of the circumstance, by pointing it out to the men, and telling them ‘ such was the way all would be served, who fell dead or alive into the hands of the Mahrattas,’ on which they declared ‘ they would die to a man,’ and the conflict was resumed by all with the most determined valour. Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Jones, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie were the only officers who remained fit for duty, and manfully persevered in continuing the defence. Their situation towards evening was very hopeless ; Captain Staunton had apprised Colonel Burr of the difficulties he laboured under, and an unavailing attempt from Poona had been made for his relief. As the night fell, however, the vigour of the attack relaxed, and the men were able to procure a supply of water. By nine o’clock at night the firing ceased, and the village was evacuated by the Peishwa’s troops.¹ Next morning the

Mahratta army was still hovering round the village, and (Jan. 2.) Captain Staunton opened his guns upon them as soon as he could see. They appeared to draw off in the direction of Poona ; but they had heard of General Smith’s approach, who was hastening forward with a very small force in hopes that the Peishwa might be encouraged to make a stand ; but Captain Staunton, not knowing of General Smith’s advance, and having reason to believe the enemy was in wait for him on the route to Poona, gave out that it was his intention to proceed thither. As soon as it was dark, however, taking as many of the wounded with him as he could carry, he moved out of the village

regiment reached Seroor, but unfortunately, in his last moments, he laboured under an impression that his corps had been defeated, which caused him great distress.

¹ To commemorate this glorious defence, a monument was erected by Government, recording the names of those who fell ; the corps was made grenadiers, as their 1st battalion had been, for the defence of Mangalore, and ‘ *Mangalore and Korygaom* ’ became the animating motto of the regiment. [The 2nd Battalion, 1st N.I. Regiment, which fought this action, is now the 102nd King Edward’s Own Grenadiers. The monument erected by Government consists of a stone obelisk, which still stands at Koregāon. (*B.C.G.*, ii. 269.)]

at first in the direction of Poona ; then changing his route, he retreated to Seroor, where he arrived next morning, with the loss of one hundred and seventy-five men in killed and wounded, of whom twenty were of the small detachment of artillery. Besides these, about one third of the auxiliary horse were killed, wounded, and missing.¹ The Mahrattas lost five or six hundred men, and have the generosity, on all occasions, to do justice to the heroic defenders of Korygaom. During the conflict, the Peishwa sat on a rising ground on the opposite side of the river, about two miles distant. Gokla, Appa Dessaye, and Trimbukjee directed the attacks, and at one time Trimbukjee entered the village. Bajee Rao frequently expressed his impatience, and asked his commanders 'where were now their boasts of defeating the English when they could not overcome one battalion.' The Raja of Satara was with the Peishwa, and having put up an *aftabgeer*,² or screen from the sun, the latter begged he would put it down, 'otherwise the English would send a cannon ball through it.'

After leaving Korygaom the Peishwa fled towards the Carnatic, followed by General Pritzler, who took up the pursuit near the Salpee Ghaut. On Bajee Rao's arrival on the Gutpurba he was

¹ There were eight European officers in this memorable defence.

2D BATTALION 1ST REGIMENT

Captain Staunton.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Pattinson, died of his wounds.

Lieutenant Conellan, wounded.

Lieutenant Jones.

Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, killed.

ARTILLERY.

Lieut. Chisholm, killed.

Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie.

AUXILIARY HORSE.

Lieutenant Swanston, wounded.

² [The *āftābgīr* is described under the name of *afthaadah* as 'a sun embroidered on crimson velvet, both sides the same, and fixed on a circular framework, about two yards in circumference ; this is attached to a silver or gold staff, the circle deeply and fully flounced with gold brocade, or rich silk bound with silver ribands. The person riding is sheltered from the rays of the sun by the *afthaadah* being carried in an elevated position.' (Mrs. Meer Hassan Ali's *Observations on the Mussulmans of India*, ed. W. Croke, 1917, pp. 38 and 47.)]

surprised to find a part of the country already in possession of the British Government. It appeared that Brigadier-General Munro, who had been originally sent up by the Madras Government as Commissioner to receive charge of the districts in the Carnatic, ceded by the treaty of Poona in June, 1817, had collected a few regulars in addition to his own escort, and by his personal influence and experience had raised the native population, who were averse to the Mahrattas, as they had been to Tippoo, and eagerly desired a change of government.

The Peishwa, in pursuing the southern route, was supposed to have some hope of being joined by the Raja of Mysore ; but disappointed in this respect, and alarmed at the progress of General Munro, he turned suddenly round, passed General Pritzler, and re-crossed the Kistna, where General Smith, having arrived with the light division, pressed him very hard, until he got down the Salpee Ghaut and went off in the direction of Sholapoor. General
 (Jan. 29.) Smith's division was then halted, for the purpose of allowing General Pritzler to join, in order to form a new distribution of the force, according to a plan proposed by Mr. Elphinstone, who now took upon him the direction of affairs, by authority received from the Governor-General.

When the Marquis of Hastings heard of the Peishwa's treachery, superadded to the numerous proofs of his insidious and persevering intrigues against the British Government, he determined to put an end to the dynasty of his family, and to annex his dominions to the Company's territory ; merely reserving a small tract, sufficient for the comfort and dignity of the imprisoned Raja of Satara, which might serve as a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the Bramins, conciliate the Mahratta nation, and leave an opening for the employment of many persons, in their own way, whom it would have been expensive to subsist, and who could not obtain a livelihood under the English administration. Instructions to this effect were transmitted to Mr. Elphinstone, vesting him with full powers as sole Commissioner for the settlement of the territory to be conquered. The 4th and 6th divisions of the Deccan army, under Generals Smith and Pritzler, were withdrawn from Sir Thomas Hislop's control, and placed at the disposal of the Commissioner. These instructions were received by Mr. Elphinstone early in January, but various reasons induced him to reserve their promulgation for a short period, until it could be done under

impressions more favourable to the British cause than existed at the moment ; and be then followed up, in a manner which should convince the Mahratta nation of the advantages of submission, and the hopelessness of resistance. Hitherto, the pursuit of the Peishwa had been productive of nothing important, excepting the political effect of holding him up as a fugitive. Whenever Bajee Rao was pressed, Gokla, with all the light troops, hovered round the pursuing divisions, firing long shots with their matchlocks, throwing rockets in favourable situations, and cutting off cattle and baggage. Some skirmishes took place in consequence, and the Mahrattas frequently suffered from the shrapnel shells of the horse artillery ; but these affairs were attended with no advantageous result to either party.

(Feb. 7.)—The two divisions having united at Rehmutoor, the whole force, under the command of General Smith, proceeded to Satara, which it was thought advisable to reduce, on account of the importance attached to the possession of that fortress in the minds of the Mahratta people. It scarcely made any resistance,

(Feb. 10.) and was surrendered in the evening of the 10th February, when the British colours were hoisted ; but next day they were hauled down, and the Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of Sivajee and his descendants, was with due forms hoisted in its place. A manifesto was at the same time published by the Commissioner, in the name of the British Government, succinctly representing the whole conduct of Bajee Rao, and stating the reasons of its being deemed incumbent on the British to deprive him of public authority ; to exclude him and his family from all concern in Deccan affairs ; to take possession of his territory, and to govern the whole under the authority of the Company, excepting a small tract to be reserved for the Raja of Satara. It was declared, that there should be no interference with the tenets of any religious sect ; that all wutun, enam lands, established pensions, and annual allowances should be respected and continued, provided the owners withdrew from the service of Bajee Rao, and retired to their habitations in two months from that date. Farming of revenue was to be abolished, and the hereditary district and village officers were called upon to reserve the revenue, otherwise they would be compelled to make good the payments ; and should they or any other wutundars afford aid or pay money to the deposed Peishwa, their wutuns were declared liable to

confiscation. No notice was taken of Jagheers, as it was soon understood they would be kept or restored, according to the readiness with which the holders under the Peishwa should tender their allegiance to the new government, and whilst retained, they became a powerful security for the fidelity of the claimants.

The reader, who has perused the foregoing pages with attention, will be able to judge of the merits of this proclamation, and how well it was calculated to the end in view ; especially when seconded by strenuous and persevering exertions on the part of the military.

A new distribution of the two divisions of the army was immediately formed, one for the purpose of pursuing Bajee Rao, the other for besieging his forts. General Smith chose the former, as promising the most active service, and marched with two regiments of cavalry, a squadron of the 22d dragoons, 1,200 auxiliary horse, and 2,500 infantry, in quest of the Peishwa. General Pritzler, in the meantime, attacked the strong hill-forts immediately south of Poona, whilst a small force, originally sent back by Sir Thomas Hislop, under Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon, to occupy the intended position of the 4th division in Candeish, had moved down at Mr. Elphinstone's request, and laid siege to Chakun.¹ Other divisions were likewise occupying the country ; General Munro, in the Carnatic, was eminently successful ; the small force of Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, already mentioned, had taken many forts in the Concan, and another small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, likewise fitted out by the exertions of Sir Evan Nepean, Governor of Bombay, had commenced operations in the Concan, south of Bancoote.²

¹ [Chākan (Chakun) lies eighteen miles north of Poona. The fort is nearly square with bastioned fronts and corner towers. A portion of the outworks is said to be the remains of a fortification made in 1295 by an Abyssinian chief. In 1443 Chākan was the headquarters of Malik-ul-Tujar, the leading Bahmanī noble, who was ordered by Alā-ud-dīn II (1435-58) to reduce the Konkan forts. In 1486 Malik Ahmad, founder of the Ahmadnagar dynasty, seized the fort. In 1595 the fort was granted by the tenth Ahmadshāhī king to Māloji Bholṣē, Sivājī's grandfather. Shāyista Khān, the Mughal general, captured it in 1660, but Aurangzeb restored it to Sivājī in 1667, from which date until 1818 it remained in Marāthā possession. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii. 121 ; Sarkar, *Shivaji and His Times*, pp. 92-5.)]

² [Among the fortified places captured by General Munro were Sholāpur, Belgaum, Bādāmi, and Bāgalkot (in Bijāpur District), and Dhārwar, Gadag, Hubli, Nargund, Navalgund, and Rānībennur (in Dhārwar District). The chief fort taken by Colonel Prother was

Whilst the new arrangement of the divisions, and the reduction of Satara were in progress, Bajee Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Sholapoor, where he exacted large sums of money from the Carcoon of the late Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. That minister died at Poona a short time before the breaking out of the war, and with the general respect of all parties. During the short time he was employed after the surrender of Trimbukjee, he honourably endeavoured to convince Bajee Rao of the futility and wickedness of the course he meditated; and that there now was neither honour nor safety to the Mahratta nation, excepting by a faithful adherence to that alliance which, when contracted, might in his opinion have been avoided. The Peishwa deceived him respecting the secret insurrection; and though so well acquainted with Bajee Rao's character, when the facts were forced upon his conviction, he gave vent to expressions of indignation and disgust at the unparalleled deceit and treachery of his master.

At Sholapoor, Bajee Rao was joined by a body of horse from Nagpoor under Gunput Rao, to whom we shall hereafter revert. In the meantime General Smith was marching towards the Mahratta army; the Peishwa decamped and moved to the westward, as Gokla conceived he should have no difficulty in passing the British detachment, and avoiding them or not as he thought

(Feb. 19.) proper. On the 19th General Smith arrived at Yellapoor; he heard that the Peishwa was on the route from Sholapoor towards Punderpoor. He therefore marched all that night in hopes of coming upon him; but before morning he learnt that he had gone to the northward and was encamped at Ashtah.¹ Taking, therefore, the cavalry and horse artillery, desiring the

Raigarh, Sivājī's former capital; while Colonel Kennedy seized Suvarnadrug and Jaigarh in Ratnāgiri District, with the assistance of the Bombay Marine.

Sir Evan Nepean, Bart., assumed charge of the office of Governor of Bombay on August 12, 1812, and was succeeded by Mountstuart Elphinstone on November 1, 1819.]

¹ [Ashta (Ashtah) is now a village in the Mādha tāluka, Sholāpur District. The battle was entirely a cavalry action, Gokhale having 8,000 to 10,000 horse, and General Lionel Smith two regiments of cavalry, a squadron of the 22nd Dragoons, 1,200 auxiliary horse, and 2,500 infantry. Ashta is chiefly remarkable to-day for a large lake, over four square miles in area, formed by damming the Ashta stream, a feeder of the Bhīma. Two irrigation canals lead from the dam, which together serve to water 18,000 acres. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 579-80; *B.G.*, xx. 223 f.)]

remainder to follow as expeditiously as they could, General Smith pushed forward, and came in sight of the Mahrattas about half-past eight, just as they were moving off the ground. The Peishwa sent Gokla a taunting message for having thus allowed the army to be surprised, to which the latter replied, that he might rest assured his rear should be guarded. Gokla, having desired Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was at the head of about four thousand men, to support him, waited with five hundred horse for the approach of the cavalry, who were then advancing in three columns, the dragoons being in the centre, the 7th on the right, and the 2d regiment on the left. Gokla's friends advised him to retire for support, and return better prepared to meet them, but to this he objected and merely replied 'whatever is to be done, must be done here.' As the British troops came near, the Mahrattas fired a volley with little effect; and three hundred of them, with Gokla at their head, came galloping down diagonally across the front, wheeled suddenly round on the flank of the 7th regiment of cavalry, as they were forming after crossing a ravine, and driving upon them with their spears, occasioned considerable confusion; but Captain Dawes of the 22d dragoons, instantly throwing back a troop of his men, charged along the rear of the 7th and dashing into the middle of the Mahrattas, in a few minutes dispersed them in flight. Gokla fell on this occasion by the hand of a dragoon; and, though supposed to have been wounded before he came in contact with his antagonist, fought bravely to the last, literally dying, as he had pledged himself, with his sword in his hand. Govind Rao Ghorepuray and Anund Rao Babur, both persons of distinction, were killed with him. The Mahrattas were pursued for some miles; several elephants, a quantity of baggage, and a few horses were taken; but the most important result was the capture of the Raja of Satara, with his mother and brothers, who on this occasion, to their great joy, were rescued from the power of Bajee Rao and the thralldom of the Concanee Bramins. Prior to this event the Mahrattas had resolved to stand a general action, as soon as Ramdeen, a partisan of Holkar, should arrive. For this purpose, the Peishwa's infantry and guns, before left at Nepanee,¹ had arrived at Kurar,

¹ [Nipāni (Nepanee) is now a market-town in the Belgaum District, on the road from Belgaum to Kolhāpur, forty miles north of the former town. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, ii. 26.)]

but the unexpected attack of General Smith and the death of Gokla completely disconcerted their arrangements. The affair of Ashtah, trifling as it was, had a very material effect in hastening the termination of the war, and these advantages were purchased with the loss of only one man killed, and eighteen or twenty wounded ; amongst the latter was General Smith. The Mahrattas, in the charge and during the pursuit, lost about one hundred men. The Raja of Satara having been made over to the care of Mr. Elphinstone, General Smith proceeded to Seroor, and thence resumed the pursuit. Bajee Rao remained for a time at Kopergaom,¹ where he was joined by the expected Ramdeen, and deserted by his luke-warm friends the Putwurdhuns. He next continued his route towards Chandore,² intending ultimately to proceed to Nagpoor, where events, as interesting as those already detailed, had taken place before this period.

We left Appa Sahib in February, 1817, established in the regency. It was not discovered, at the time, that he had been accessory to the death of the Raja Pursajee ; and he was therefore proclaimed his successor by the name of Moodajee Bhonslay. The emissaries of the Peishwa were so successful at Nagpoor, that until the feigned insurrection, set up by Bajee Rao under Trimbukjee, was checked, Appa Sahib had pledged himself to take part in the warfare begun in that insidious manner ; but on hearing of the Peishwa's submission he completely changed his conduct, and, although he continued in constant correspondence with Poona, the Resident did not anticipate any more serious departure from the terms of his alliance, until it was known that the Peishwa had attacked the British troops. Upon this intelligence Appa Sahib secretly determined to make common cause with him, and immediately exerted himself, by every means in his power, to augment his military establishment. Mr. Jenkins, on perceiving these preparations, sent to Colonel Adams, requesting that a brigade of his division might be left to the southward

¹ [See note on p. 412, *ante*.]

² [Chāndor (Chāndvad) is the headquarters of the *tāluka* of the same name in the Nāsik District, forty miles north-east of Nāsik town and fourteen miles north of the Lasalgāon station of the G.I.P. Railway. In 1804 it was captured by Colonel Wallace, but was restored to Holkar until 1818, when it passed finally into British possession. (*I.G. Bom.*, 1909, i. 474.)]

of the Nerbuddah, and that a part of it should be held ready to march on Nagpoor. This application, however, was merely precautionary ; Appa Sahib betrayed no other indication of hostile designs ; on the contrary, he was profuse in his professions of friendship, and inveighed bitterly against the conduct of Bajee Rao, in treacherously attacking the English : but on the night of

(Nov.
24.)

the 24th November he sent to inform Mr. Jenkins that a *khillut* had arrived for him from the Peishwa, who had also sent him a Juree Putka, and conferred on him the title of Senaputtee ; that he intended to go in state to his camp to receive these honours next day, and invited the Resident to be present at the ceremony. Mr. Jenkins's remonstrances against such a proceeding were, of course, of no avail ; the insignia were received, and Appa Sahib's troops immediately took up positions in the vicinity of the Residency, so threatening, that Mr. Jenkins was induced to call in the brigade from its cantonment, about

(Nov.
26.)

three miles westward of the city. Next day appearances were so hostile that preparations for defending the Residency became necessary, and an express was dispatched to call in the 2d division of the Deccan army, under General Doveton. The whole force at Nagpoor consisted of a brigade of two battalions of Madras native infantry, the 1st battalion 20th regiment, and 1st battalion 24th regiment, both considerably reduced by sickness ; the Resident's escort of two companies of native infantry, three troops of the 6th regiment of Bengal native cavalry, and four six-pounders, manned by Europeans of the Madras artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Hopeton Scott was the senior officer.

The Residency lies to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and is separated from it by a rocky hill, running north and south, called Seetabuldee. At each extremity of this hill, and distant about thirty yards from each other, are two eminences ; that to the north, which is close to the Residency, is considerably larger and a little higher than that to the south ; but the base of the latter, being close to the huts of a village communicating with the suburbs, and affording facility to the approach of irregulars, was a most important point, and was occupied by 300 men of the 24th regiment, under Captain Sadler, supported by a six-pounder. The three troops of cavalry, under Captain Fitzgerald, occupied the enclosures surrounding the Residency, being behind and partly

to the right of the larger hill, upon which the remainder of the force was posted. In the evening, as the British picquets were about to be placed, a party was fired upon from the village at the bottom of the lower hill ; but, under the possibility of a mistake, they forebore returning it, until, upon a continuance of the aggression, they gave their fire, and retired upon the smaller hill, under a heavy discharge of matchlocks, which became the general signal for an attack on the British position. A smart fire was maintained on both sides till two o'clock in the morning, when it slackened on the part of the Mahrattas, but was renewed with great fury with cannon and musketry at daylight. The heaviest loss which the British had hitherto sustained was at the smaller hill. Frequent attempts had been made by the Arabs to carry it, and that post had been, in consequence of the slaughter, repeatedly reinforced. At last, by the accidental explosion of a tumbril, some confusion was created, of which the Arabs took immediate advantage, charged up the hill sword in hand, carried it, and immediately turned the gun against the larger hill, where the casualties became distressingly severe. Emboldened by their success, the enemy's horse and foot closed in from every direction, and prepared for a general assault. To add to this appalling crisis, the Arabs got into the huts of the British troops, and the shrieks of the women and children reached the ears of the Sepoys. The Residency grounds, where Captain Fitzgerald was posted, were also attacked ; guns were brought up, and bodies of horse threatened to break in. Captain Fitzgerald had repeatedly applied for permission to charge, and was as often prevented by orders from the commanding officer ; but seeing the impending destruction, he made a last attempt to obtain leave. Colonel Scott's reply was, ' Tell him to charge at his peril.' ' At my peril be it,' said the gallant Fitzgerald on receiving this answer, and immediately gave the word to advance. As soon as he could form clear of the enclosures, he charged the principal body of horse, drove them from two guns by which they were supported, pursued them to some distance, cut a body of infantry accompanying them to pieces, and brought back with him the captured guns. The infantry posted on the hill witnessed this exploit with loud huzzas ; the greatest animation was kindled amongst them ; it was proposed to storm the smaller hill as soon as the cavalry returned, but another explosion of ammunition having taken

place amongst the Arabs on the south hill, the same accident by which it had been lost, men and officers mingling together rushed forward. Irresistible under such an impulse, they carried everything before them, pursued the Arabs down the hill, took two of their guns, spiked them, and returned to their posts. The Arabs again assembled, and evinced a determination to recover their ground; but as they were preparing to advance, a troop of cavalry, under Cornet Smith, charged round the base of the hill, took them in flank, and dispersed them. The British troops now advanced from the hills, drove the infantry from the adjoining huts, and by noon this trying conflict, only equalled during the war by the defence of Korygaom, had wholly ceased. Instances of heroism equal to that of Pattinson are adducible, particularly that of Lieutenant John Grant, adjutant of the 24th regiment, who, though impeded by two severe wounds, was foremost in the storm of the smaller hill, and received a third and mortal wound as the post was carried.

The British had not fourteen hundred men fit for duty in the defence of Seetabuldee, whereas the army of Appa Sahib amounted to eighteen thousand men, half of whom were infantry, and of these three or four thousand were Arabs, who fought with much resolution. The British lost three hundred and thirty-three in killed and wounded; amongst whom twelve were European officers.¹ The Mahrattas lost about an equal number. The disproportion at Nagpoor was not much greater than at Poona; but the presence of a European regiment, and the advantage of acting offensively, gave a very different character to the contest.

Appa Sahib, being foiled in his treacherous attempt, sent wukeels to express his sorrow, and to disavow his having authorized the attack; but Mr. Jenkins refused to treat with him under present circumstances, until he disbanded his troops, though he agreed to a suspension of hostilities. Reinforcements poured into

Nagpoor from all quarters. Lieutenant-Colonel Gahan with a brigade from Colonel Adams's division appeared (Nov. 29.) on the 29th, Major Pitman arrived with a detachment on (Dec. 5.) the 5th December, and General Doveton, with the whole second division, had reached Nagpoor before the middle of that month. On the morning of the 15th, Mr. Jenkins

¹ Including Mr. Sotheby of the Civil Service, 1st Assistant to the Resident, who was killed.

demanded the absolute submission of Appa Sahib, requiring (Dec. 14 of him to disband his troops, to place his territory at the disposal of the British Government, and to surrender -15.) himself as a hostage for the performance of these conditions; but he was at the same time given to understand that upon compliance, no harder terms should be enforced than a cession of territory equal to meet the expenses of the subsidiary force, and as much control in his internal government as should prevent similar treachery in future. Till four o'clock on the following morning was the time allowed for his acceptance of the terms. At six o'clock it was intimated that the troops would not permit Appa Sahib to come to the Residency as he wished; a respite of three days was requested, but three hours only were granted. When the time expired the troops advanced; Appa Sahib then came in, and the army was halted, in hopes that his force would be disbanded, and his guns given up. Such of the latter as were in the arsenal were surrendered, but on advancing to take possession of the others, a cannonade was opened upon the British troops. The line was in consequence immediately formed, and the guns were stormed and taken, but with the loss of one hundred and forty-one men in killed and wounded. Two of Appa Sahib's officers, Gunput Rao and Mun Bhut, were the persons who maintained this resistance; and it was supposed, without their master's orders. Gunput Rao afterwards went off towards the Peishwa's territory, and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned, near Sholapoor; but Mun Bhut, with the Arabs,

(Dec. 24.) retired to the fort of Nagpoor, where an attempt was made to storm one of the gates on the 24th December, and repulsed with the loss of two hundred and sixty-nine men in killed and wounded. The Arabs afterwards offered to surrender, on being permitted to march out with their property, families, and arms; terms which were admitted, because time was of importance, and there was no efficient battering train on the spot.

The reserve division of the Bengal army stationed at Rewah, under Brigadier-General Hardyman, was ordered down to Nagpoor, when the Marquis of Hastings was first apprised of the defection of Appa Sahib; but the order was not received until the 6th December, so that General Hardyman did not reach the neighbourhood until the whole was settled by General Doveton; but

on the 19th December, he routed a body of the enemy assembled at Jubbulpoor, reduced that place and co-operated with Lieutenant-Colonel M'Morine in occupying the whole of Appa Sahib's northern territory, excepting Choureeagurh and Mundelah.

Hostilities at the capital were brought to a conclusion by the capitulation of the Arabs and the surrender of Mun Bhut; Mr. Jenkins, owing to the interruption of the communication, had received no instructions relative to Appa Sahib in case of submission; and therefore in consequence of what had been already proposed, although the terms had not been complied with, Mr. Jenkins, on a consideration of all circumstances, conceived it incumbent on the British Government to reinstate Appa Sahib, but deemed it necessary that his government should be most effectually controlled. For this purpose, to secure the subordination of the capital, the Seetabuldee hill was to be fortified; the British troops to have complete military occupation of the whole country; and a territorial cession, amounting to about twenty-four lacks of rupees, equal to the full charge of the subsidiary force, was demanded. A treaty to this effect was drawn out and about to be submitted for the Raja's acceptance, when, on the 2d January, Mr. Jenkins received instructions from the Marquis of Hastings, issued on first hearing of the Raja's defection, before being informed of what had passed subsequent to the arrival of General Doveton. These instructions forbade any reconciliation with Appa Sahib himself, and directed that the son of the daughter of the late Pursajee, a minor, should be placed on the musnud, and affairs confided to a regency, selected by the British Government. Afterwards, however, upon considering the motives which swayed the Resident, respect for the moral obligation implied by the terms of his personal surrender, induced the Governor-General to confirm the treaty¹ on the terms proposed by Mr. Jenkins.

At this point, therefore, we shall for the present leave the detail of Deccan affairs, and return to the operations which were about to be commenced by the British armies in Central India, when their Mahratta allies at Poona and Nagpoor, taking advantage of the removal of the British troops, treacherously attempted, as we have seen, to annihilate the detachments at their capitals.²

¹ The treaty was dated 6th January.

² Authorities as for the preceding Chapter.

CHAPTER L.

FROM A.D. 1817 TO A.D. 1818.

A.D. 1817.—DURING the rains of 1817, the Pindharees, in three separate bodies, or *durras*, under their leaders Cheetoo, Khureem Khan, and Wasil Mohummud, occupied positions between Indore and Sagur. Khureem Khan was particularly active in recruiting his *durra*, and was anxious to concert some general plan for eluding the coming storm; but the enmity between him and Cheetoo was too rancorous to admit of cordial co-operation, even in self-defence. They were promised assistance by all the native princes, according to their hopes or fears, but none stood forth openly in their favour. The left division of the Bengal army assembled on the 10th October at Kalinjer in Bundelcund, under Major-General Marshall, and reached Sagur by the 28th. Whilst on its march, a party of Pindharees from the *durra* of Wasil Mohummud got in its rear and began to ravage the territory in Bundelcund; but their progress was arrested by a detachment from the Governor-General's division, which obliged them to return to Malwa; and this was the only enterprise attempted by the Pindharees. General Marshall, without noticing this attempted diversion, marched on according to his instructions, and arrived at Rylee on the 10th November, where he opened a communication with Colonel Adams, whose division was already in its prescribed position at Hooshingabad. Sir Thomas Hislop by the same time had reached Hurda, and assumed command of the first division of the Deccan army. Sir John Malcolm, with the third division, composed of the Nizam's battalions and the Mysore irregular horse, had arrived in that neighbourhood some time before; and the Guzerat division, having advanced from Baroda, was in its position at Dohud. Everything was now ready for the combined movement, when news of the breaking-out of hostilities at Poona

(Nov.
10.)

reached Sir Thomas Hislop. Conceiving from this intelligence, and from recent accounts of apprehended treachery in the court of Nagpoor, that it would be necessary to support Brigadier-Generals Smith and Doveton, General Hislop, departing from his instructions, immediately reinforced General Malcolm's division with a brigade of the regular troops, and sent him forward to

(Nov.
19.)

co-operate against the Pindharees, whilst he himself, with the first division, began to retrace his steps towards Burhanpoor. Sir John Malcolm crossed the Nerbuddah on the 16th November, and Colonel Adams on the 14th. By a

(Nov.
22.)

concerted movement with General Marshall, the three divisions respectively reached Ashtah, Rassein, and Ratgurh on the 22d, and thence, in the same manner,

(Nov.
26.)

reached Tullain, Bairsea, and Gunj Basouda by the 26th. They thus drove the Pindharees from their accustomed haunts, and their lands were either taken possession of, or restored to the agents of Sindia and the Nabob of Bhopaul. The *durras* of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem Khan united about Seronje, and thence, invited by Sindia, took the route of Gwalior; but Cheetoo went off to the north-west, in hopes of support from Holkar, and from Jeswunt Rao Bhow, one of Sindia's officers stationed as already noticed at Jawud. Lord Hastings's camp, at this period, was at Erich; and he had placed detachments connecting his own with General Marshall's division. Upon ascertaining that Khureem and Wasil Mohummud had come to the northward, one of the detachments moved from Burwa Sagur through Duttea, across the Sindh, so as to cut them off from Gwalior; and Lord Hastings brought his division within thirty miles of Sindia's camp, which had the effect of completely overawing that chieftain. The Pindharees, unable to advance to Gwalior or to return to the southward, whence General Marshall and Colonel Adams were closing in upon them, remained at Shahabad until General Marshall, though he advanced tardily, was close upon them. They then forced the Lodwana Ghaut, leading into Huraotee, which they were enabled to effect, owing to the misconduct of a party of Zalim Sing's troops posted there; but General Marshall succeeded in destroying a few of them. They then intended to cross the Chumbul by the Loharee ford; but they were intercepted by General Donkin; and Khureem, with Wasil Mohummud, after having burnt their baggage, went off to the

southward, at the head of four thousand of the best mounted of their followers, with whom they succeeded in passing Colonel Adams's division, and directed their flight westward into Meywar. Of those who were left behind, some were cut off by the troops, and some by the exasperated villagers; one considerable body, however, got clear off to the southward, and after traversing the whole Deccan, entered the Company's provinces in the Carnatic, where they were annihilated or completely dispersed before the end of the ensuing January.

The scene of operations was now changed; General Marshall was posted at Seronje, Colonel Adams moved down upon Gungraur, and General Browne, detached with a part of the Marquis of Hastings's division, also proceeded westward, in a parallel direction to the northward of Colonel Adams; General Donkin, recrossing the Chumbul, took post at Shapoora, west of the Bunass. But whilst such was the progress of the Pindharee warfare in the east of Malwa, more important events were passing to the westward.

When Cheetoo went off towards Holkar's camp, he was pursued by General Malcolm with the 3d division, but there being reason to apprehend that hostility was meditated by Holkar's army, Colonel Adams for a time inclined his march to the west, in order to be able to support Sir John Malcolm; on its being understood, however, that the Governor-General disapproved of Sir Thomas Hislop's retrograde movement, and had ordered him on as first directed, Colonel Adams co-operated as before against Khureem and Wasil Mohummud. Sir John Malcolm continued to pursue Cheetoo, until the latter found refuge in Holkar's camp, in the vicinity of Mehidpoor, when the 3d division halted at Agur on the 4th December.

(Dec.
4.)

It has hitherto been quite unnecessary to refer to the everlasting turmoil of Holkar's durbar. The Mahratta faction, which Toolsee Bye the regent joined, had, in a moment of superiority over their Patan rivals, put the minister Ballaram Seit to death, which threw the principal power into the hands of Tattya Jogh and Holkar's hereditary Dewan, Gunput Rao, a man of weak intellect, under the guidance of Tattya Jogh; he was also the paramour of Toolsee Bye, over whom her passion gave him entire ascendancy. When the Peishwa's emissaries were negotiating the confederacy against the British Government, one of their objects was to reconcile the Patan and Mahratta factions; but at

the crisis when the British army crossed the Nerbuddah, there was a division amongst all parties and factions in Holkar's camp. Gunput Rao had been for a time gained over to the Peishwa's cause, and Toolsee Bye¹ had no will but his : Tattya Jogh, suspected of being favourable to a negotiation opened by Mr. Metcalfe on the part of the British Government, was placed under restraint, and the war faction or, in other words, Bajee Rao's influence predominated. The negotiation alluded to, as opened by Mr. Metcalfe, was part of the Governor-General's plan, who, as will be recollected, intended to form a treaty with Holkar, nearly similar to that which was concluded with Sindia. The proposals were made to Holkar at the same time that the terms were offered to Umeer Khan ; but no reply was received until the middle of November, when a secret communication from Toolsee Bye, offering to place the young Mulhar Rao and herself under the protection of the British Government, was, by the advice of Tattya Jogh, transmitted to Mr. Metcalfe. The regency, however, being under the control of their own soldiery, were obliged to yield to the popular cry in the camp, and to move towards the Deccan, trusting to some favourable opportunity of effecting their purpose, though now obliged to join in the general demonstrations of loyalty in favour of the sovereign Peishwa. But Gunput Rao having, as already mentioned, been gained over, Toolsee Bye likewise seceded from the plan of seeking protection from the British ; and Tattya Jogh, the original proposer of that measure, was placed in confinement. The soldiery were averse to the admission of terms from the British Government, because the chiefs knew they must lose the power and consequence which the existing state of anarchy conferred, and the troops apprehended the loss of their bread. Before Holkar's army quitted Rampoorah, some advances were made by the Peishwa's agent, and larger sums were promised as soon as they should cross the Nerbuddah. They were joined by Roshun Beg, one of Holkar's commanders, with fourteen battalions before they reached Mehidpoor, and all were apparently enthusiastic in the Peishwa's cause. The arrival

¹ [Tulsī Bāī (Toolsee Bye), who had been Jasvant Rāo's concubine, and was a woman of remarkable beauty and superior education, had adopted Malhār Rāo, who was an illegitimate son of Jasvant Rāo. The latter left no legitimate heirs. On Malhār Rāo being placed on the throne, Zālim Singh of Kotah came at once to pay him homage. *I.G.*, viii. 337.)]

of General Malcolm's division in their neighbourhood caused some alteration in the minds of the regency ; but the general indications of hostility were so strong, that Sir John Malcolm retired upon the 1st division advancing to Oojein. The division from Guzerat ought to have been by that time about the same point, but Sir William Grant Keir had fallen back a considerable distance, at the requisition of the Bombay Government, as in consequence of the Peishwa's defection, disturbances were apprehended in Guzerat ; but of this movement the Governor-General disapproved, and the division was ordered to return, for the purpose of co-operating as at first directed.

(Dec. 14.)—In the meantime, the first and third divisions having united, advanced towards Holkar's camp. Terms agreeably to Lord Hastings's instructions were offered, and a show of negotiation was kept up by Ghuffoor Khan and the Patan commanders, in the name of Mulhar Rao Holkar ; but their horse committed hostilities, molested the foragers, carried off cattle,

(Dec. 20.) and at last made a direct attack on a body of the Mysore horse. So determined were the Patans to cut off all chance of pacification, that, suspecting the regency of an

(Dec. 21.) intention to accept the terms, they confined Gunput Rao and put Toolsee Bye to death. When Sir Thomas Hislop

found his parties attacked, he immediately determined on bringing affairs to a crisis. Holkar's troops, estimated at nearly twenty thousand men, of whom about one-half were infantry, were posted on the left bank of the Seeprah,¹ and on the opposite side from that on which the British army was advancing. Sir Thomas Hislop had four regiments of native cavalry, two squadrons of dragoons, a battalion of Europeans, and, including the Nizam's corps, seven battalions of native infantry, besides a considerable body of irregular horse. The position of Holkar's troops, at the point attacked, was exceedingly strong. The ford, by which it was determined to cross, was about eight hundred yards from the enemy's line of infantry ; which was drawn up at an angle of the Seeprah, with its left flank protected by the steep bank of that

¹ [The Sīprā (Seeprah) river lies to the north of Ujjain. The battle is known as the battle of Mahīdpur, and is the only action in the third Marāthā War in which there was any considerable European element in the British forces engaged. Other battles, such as Kirkee, Sītābaldī and Koregāon, were won almost entirely by native troops under the command of trusted British officers. (*O.H.I.*, p. 631.)]

river, and its right covered by a deep ravine ; its front was lined with a formidable artillery, consisting of about seventy pieces, many of them heavy guns, which, being well served, overpowered the light English field-pieces, and occasioned a heavy loss before the British troops, after crossing the ford, had time to form and advance, which they did with all their characteristic bravery. The first and second brigades, gallantly led on by Sir John Malcolm, had the principal duty to perform ; the Madras rifle corps bore a very conspicuous part in the battle, but earned the honour at a high price, having suffered most severely. Holkar's artillerymen stood bravely to their guns, even after their battalions had retired ; but all the cannon were taken, excepting five or six of the lighter pieces, which were carried off by the flying troops. Holkar's horse showed considerable spirit in skirmishing, before the British army crossed the river, but fled as soon as the action became general. This victory cost the British troops a loss of seven hundred and seventy-eight men, in killed and wounded, of whom thirty-eight were European officers. Holkar's army lost three thousand men, principally in the pursuit ; but it is creditable to his battalions, that two bodies of the infantry effected their retreat, when the British general was so strong in cavalry. One

of these bodies, under Roshun Beg, reached Rampoorah, where it was attacked and dispersed on the 10th January 1818. by the division under General Browne, detached, as (Jan.10.) already mentioned, from the force under the personal command of Lord Hastings. The other body was under Ramdeen, a person notorious in the intrigues and anarchy of the period, who made good his way to the Deccan and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned, at Kopergaom. After the battle, Sir John Malcolm, with a light force, followed up the main body of the fugitives, on the route towards Mundisore ; whilst Sir Thomas Hislop, joined by the Guzerat division, followed in the same direction a few days afterwards. At Mundisore the submission of the young Holkar was tendered, and a treaty was concluded on the 6th of January. By this treaty (Jan. 6.) Holkar confirmed the agreement with Umeer Khan ; ceded several districts in perpetuity to the Rana of Kotah, which Zalim Sing had before only rented ; transferred his tribute on the Rajpoots to the British Government ; and also ceded to it his territory north of the Boondee hills, and south of the

Sautpoora mountains. He agreed to commit no hostilities, to have no communication with other states, and to entertain in his service no native of Europe or America, without the sanction of the British Government; to discharge his superfluous troops, but to maintain a contingent of three thousand horse, which were to co-operate with the English troops when required. The Jagheer of Ghuffoor Khan was to be continued under the guarantee of the British Government. A wukeel from Holkar was to reside at Calcutta, and a resident envoy was to be appointed to Holkar's court. The British Government became bound to protect the territories of Holkar, and to maintain a field force for that purpose.

Sindia's durbar, after the conclusion of the treaty with Holkar, became perfectly tractable; but some of his officers still showed a determination to support the Pindharees. After the battle of Mehidpoor, Cheetoo proceeded to Jawud, and was admitted into the camp of Jeswunt Rao Bhow, who at first refused to receive Captain Caulfield, the superintending officer appointed to his division. But afterwards, pretending to comply with whatever was required, he desired Cheetoo to withdraw, and allowed Captain Caulfield to join him. It was found, however, that he harboured and protected the Pindharees, whom he would neither arrest nor expel from his camp; and the Marquis of Hastings at last gave orders that he should be treated as a public enemy. The division under General Browne was sent against him; and here, as at Rampoorah, this division was distinguished by the prompt and efficient manner it performed the required service; the camp of Jeswunt Rao was beat in, his guns were captured, one of the gates

of Jawud¹ was blown open and the town taken, on the (Jan. 28.) 28th January. The districts occupied by Jeswunt Rao Bhow had been usurped from the Rana of Oudepoor, with whom an agreement, similar in principle to those with the other Rajpoot states, had been concluded by the British Government on the 13th January. Kumulnere, Rypoor, and Ramnagar,

¹ [Jāwad (Jawud) is a town in the Mandasōr (Mundisore) District of Gwālīor State, which originally belonged to the Chiefs of Mēwār. Some little time after its capture by General Browne in 1819 it was restored to Sindia. In 1844 it was included in the districts assigned for the maintenance of the Gwālīor contingent, but was once more handed over to Sindia in 1860. Jāwad is now a commercial centre of some importance. (*I.G.*, xiv. 85, 86.)]

three forts of some consequence, particularly Kumulnere, being situated in the usurped districts, General Donkin was ordered to reduce them, which was effected with little trouble by the middle of February. When General Donkin's division was broken up, the service in this quarter being by that time completed, a part of it joined Sir David Ochterlony, then engaged in negotiating with the Patans, and aiding in the settlement with the Rajpoots.

In the meantime Cheetoo, with his *durra* of Pindharees, had gone off in a north-westerly direction, when the pursuit was taken up by the Guzerat division with considerable effect. A part of the *durra* was destroyed, and several of their parties were overtaken in villages. Cheetoo, finding himself harassed, turned suddenly to the southward, and by passing through a very difficult country, where Sir William Grant Keir found it impossible to follow him, he effected his escape; he reappeared near Dhar, whither he was followed by the Guzerat division by another route. The broken remains of the *durras* of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem, at a time when they thought themselves secure from pursuit, were completely surprised in the middle of January by a detachment from Colonel Adams's division, which destroyed a great number of them. Khureem was not with his followers at the time, having been left in a jungle as they were flying through Huraotee; but he was in Jawud when the town was stormed by General Browne, and escaped on foot with great difficulty. After a variety of adventures, Khureem surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on the 15th February¹; Namdar Khan came in on the 3d February, with such of his followers as remained, and many of the principal chiefs followed his example. The only terms required by Namdar Khan were an assurance that he should not be sent to Europe or Calcutta. Many persons belonging to the *durras* of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem gave themselves up to Zalim Sing of Kotah, and the small parties dispersed. Wasil Mohummud, in person, took refuge in Sindia's camp at Gwalior, where the British authorities would not seize him, but caused Sindia to do so, that it might be manifest to all India that an enemy of the British Government could nowhere find an asylum. He was not imprisoned, but kept at Ghazeepoor under a strict watch; and at

¹ [Karīm Khān, after his surrender, was granted the estate of Ganēshpur, then in the Gorakhpur and now in the Bastī District, where his descendants still reside. (*O.H.I.*, p. 629)]

last, being intercepted in an attempt to escape, he destroyed himself by poison.

(Jan. 25.)—Of the Pindharees, Cheetoo's *durra* alone remains to be accounted for. The main body had hitherto escaped ; but on the 25th January it was completely surprised and dispersed by a detachment from the garrison of Hindia ; and the Bheels and Grassias in the neighbourhood, from whom it may be recollected the Pindharees took several districts, being encouraged to attack the fugitives, spared none who fell into their hands. Cheetoo with two hundred followers escaped : he endeavoured to make terms for himself through the Nabob of Bhopaul, but his demands were extravagant, and being again pursued, his followers dropped off daily. He afterwards went through a variety of adventures, and we shall again have occasion to mention him ; but at length, hunted from his last asylum, and still bearing up with a spirit and perseverance worthy of the leader of a better band, Cheetoo, when singly pursuing his flight, was devoured by a tiger in the jungles adjoining the fortress of Asseergurh. The Pindharees thus dispersed, without leaders, and without a home or a rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of, though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peishwa : they mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindharees still retain their name, though some of them have become active improving farmers.¹

With regard to the Patans, Umeer Khan, after he had made the agreement with Mr. Metcalfe for himself, did not ratify it until he heard of the defence at Seetabuldee, when, considering the Mah-ratta game as completely lost, he immediately dismissed the Peishwa's agents, ratified the engagement with the British Government, and endeavoured by every means in his power to fulfil its stipulations.

The advance of Sir David Ochterlony, who judiciously interposed his division between the two principal Patan camps, would

¹ I know personally some of this description settled in the Deccan, and, I dare say, many may be found cultivating the fields in Malwa. [See note on Pindārīs, p. 272, vol. i, *ante*. In the Bombay Presidency the Pindārīs of to-day are petty traders and day-labourers. They deal in grass, rice, cattle, sheep, &c., and some work as masons. They are found chiefly in the Khāndesh, Nāsik and the Southern Marāthā districts, the Musalman Pindārīs being resident almost entirely in the last-named area.]

soon have compelled Umeer Khan to submission, had coercion become necessary ; but his presence in that situation was afterwards very important, in enabling Umeer Khan to obtain the promised guns, and to satisfy the turbulent soldiery. The Patans were prevented from trying their strength, by the fate of Holkar's troops at Mehidpoor, by the influence and cunning of Umeer Khan, and by the address and firmness of Sir David Ochterlony. Some of them were dismissed with a part of their arrears, some of them were taken into the service, and the whole were overawed or conciliated without bloodshed.

The presence of Sir David Ochterlony likewise facilitated the negotiations with the Rajpoots, and enabled the Marquis of Hastings to complete his plans, or put the whole into a train of adjustment by the middle of February. A treaty with Joudpoor was signed on the 6th January, but the negotiations with Jeypoor did not terminate until the 2d April, when a treaty was concluded. All the other states and principalities, excepting Sagur, of which the British Government took possession, accepted the terms offered by the Governor-General ; and Sindia, having given up the district of Ajimere, and relinquished his tribute on the Raja of Boondee, in exchange for part of the lands of the Jagheerदार of Vinchoor, situated in Malwa and forfeited by his adherence to the cause of Bajee Rao, the British Government was thus enabled to recompense the hitherto ill-requited Raja of Boondee, who behaved so well to the English when retreating under Colonel Monson. Not only was the tribute thus obtained from Sindia relinquished by the British Government, but all the possessions usurped from the Raja by Holkar were restored, and Sindia's encroachments within his frontier were also recovered for him by negotiation. The record of this instance of national gratitude will be read by every Briton with satisfaction, and the Marquis of Hastings also had it in his power to confer on the Nabob of Bhopaul a reward equally suitable ; not only for the friendship of his ancestor towards General Goddard's army, but for the zeal he had himself displayed in the British cause ¹ during the present war, since he acceded to the proffered terms in the month of November. A treaty was concluded with him on the 26th February, by which a small contingent of six hundred horse, and four hundred infantry, was all that was

¹ He sold his jewels to support troops.

required to be furnished for the service of the British Government, and five districts¹ were ceded to him in perpetuity for their support. Some forfeited lands of the Vinchoorkur, and a part of the district of Shujawulpoor were afterwards added; the fort of Islamnugur, a much valued possession, was likewise obtained for him from Sindia by negotiation. These cessions placed the principality of Bhopal on a very respectable footing, and amongst the natives of India, where the recollections of benefits and injuries are treasured up for generations, nothing in the whole administration of the Marquis of Hastings conveyed so deep an impression of the value of British friendship, as the conduct of its Government to Boondee and Bhopal.²

The military operations in Central India being completed, Sir John Malcolm remained there as Agent for the Governor-General; and by the active exertions and conciliatory methods, which during a long career have characterized his services, and which, on the whole, have been surpassed by those of no living servant of the East India Company, that officer introduced order and peace in an extensive tract, where those blessings had been long unknown.³

The division under General Marshall was ordered from Seronje into Bundelcund; and after reducing Sagur, took Dhamounce and Mundelah belonging to the territory of Nagpoor, the Killidars of which had refused to surrender, in consequence of secret orders from Appa Sahib. At the same time that General Marshall was sent into Bundelcund, the greater part of the first, third, and fifth divisions were placed at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, to

¹ Ashtah, Ichawur, Sehar, Dowaha, and Dewpanaa.

² [For Bundī (Boondee) see footnote on pp. 372-3, *ante*. The Bhopāl State was originally founded by an Afghan from Tirāh in 1709. He had been in the service of Auranzgeb. On his death in 1740 his son, aged eight, was placed on the throne, but was shortly afterwards ousted by an illegitimate son of the late ruler. The latter, though never formally installed as Nawāb, ruled until his death in 1754. His successor was a religious recluse who left the administration in the hands of a very able Hindu minister, Bāji Rām. In 1779 Māmullah Bēgam, a woman of great capacity, controlled the State, which since 1844 has usually been ruled by ladies. One of these, Sikandar Bēgam, rendered signal services to the Government of India in 1857. (*I.G.*, xiii. 128.)]

³ [See the remarks on the political settlement, the quotations from Prinsep (1825), and the list of authorities for the wars of the Marquess of Hastings at pp. 631-6 of *O.H.I.* (1919).]

assist in the more important revolution going forward in the Deccan.

Sir Thomas Hislop, as Commander-in-Chief at Madras, proceeded to Fort St. George; but on his way to the southward, he took possession of those places in his immediate route which were ceded to the British Government by Holkar. The Killidar of Talneir,¹ from a pertinacity common to governors of forts in India, resisted the order of surrender; and although warned from the first that he should be treated as a rebel, if he refused to obey the orders of his government, he continued to fire upon the British troops. A storming party was therefore sent to force the entrance of the fort, which is by five successive gates; of these the first and second were passed without difficulty, and at the third, the Killidar came out and surrendered himself. He also returned with the party through the third and fourth gates which were opened, but at the fifth gate there was some demur made by the Arabs, when told they must surrender at discretion; the wicket, however, was at last opened, and a few officers and men had entered, when the Arabs, from some misapprehension, rushed upon them, cut most of them down, and amongst the number killed Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor. Their companions behind, hearing of what had been perpetrated, with the exasperated feelings of British troops where they suspect treachery, rushed in as fast as they could gain admittance, and of a garrison of about three hundred men, one only, by leaping the wall, escaped with life. Sir Thomas Hislop, under the same impulse by which the troops were actuated, ordered the Killidar to be hanged as the cause of all the bloodshed, without reflecting on the probability of his not being, even in the first instance, wholly to blame for this lamentable catastrophe, and that his subsequent conduct entitled him to clemency.

In taking possession of the forts in the territory ceded by Holkar,

¹ [Thālnēr (Talneir) lies on the Tāpti, twenty-eight miles north-east of Dhūlia, West Khāndesh District. Inscriptions show that it belonged in 1128 to the Gāulis or Ahīrs. Late in the fourteenth century (1370-99) Malik Rājā Fārūki chose it as his headquarters; in 1498 it was invested by Mahmūd Begada of Gujarāt; and in 1600 it passed into Mughal possession. The Pēshwā received the fort in 1750, and at the date of its capture by Sir Thomas Hislop, it was held by Holkar. Thālnēr contains the tombs of Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor of the Royal Scots, and also the tombs of four kings of the Fārūki dynasty of Khāndesh. (*I.G.*, xxiii. 287.)

Sir Thomas Hislop was aided by the second division under General Doveton, who, shortly after the surrender of Nagpoor, had proceeded to the westward, believing that everything in the quarter he had just quitted was finally arranged ; but no sooner was Appa Sahib reinstated on his musnud, than he renewed his intrigues, encouraged the savage Goands to revolt, sent secret orders to his Killidars to resist the orders of surrender, which he had granted in favour of the British Government, and applied to Bajee Rao for assistance. An application to this effect had arrived at the time Gunput Rao joined the Peishwa near Sholapoor, and frequent messengers followed, subsequent to the affair of Ashtah, imploring succour.

We left Bajee Rao on the route to Chandore. Before he reached that place, hearing of the approach of the divisions under Sir Thomas Hislop and General Doveton, he returned to Kopergaom ; but there having learnt that General Smith was advancing, he pursued his route to Bheer, and thence, turning off to the eastward, hastened towards Chandah in the territory of Nagpoor, sending Gunput Rao forward to the assistance of his master by a different route.

Sir Thomas Hislop endeavoured to intercept or overtake the Peishwa's army, but finding they were beyond the reach of pursuit, he continued his march to Poona, and left the conduct of operations to Generals Doveton and Smith. The former took the route by Basum and Kurinja, the latter moved eastward along the line of the Godavery.

(Mar. 15.)—In the meantime Mr. Jenkins having discovered Appa Sahib's extraordinary treachery, arrested him ; and preparations being made to oppose the advancing succour, Gunput Rao's party was met on the banks of the Wurda, and driven back

(April 3.) by a detachment under Colonel Scott. Colonel Adams with his division also arrived on the banks of the Wurda

(April 6.) in a few days ; and Bajee Rao, uncertain how to proceed,

halted at Pander Koura to the west of the Wurda. There he was hemmed in by the divisions of Doveton and Adams, and, in endeavouring to avoid the former, was driven upon the

(April 18.) latter near Sewnee, where a considerable number of his followers were killed. Many of his Jagheerdars had quitted his standard before this event, and most of them took advantage of the opportunity to disperse to their homes. The

Peishwa's brother Chimnaje Appa fled to the southward with Appa Dessaye Nepankur and Naroo Punt Apty, and surrendered himself to a party, detached to intercept him by General Smith. Colonel Adams, as soon as the pursuit ceased, proceeded against Chandah, which was held by the partisans of Appa Sahib, and after a short siege carried the place by assault. Bajee Rao, followed by General Doveton, fled in great consternation to the northward, and for six days his army suffered severely from fatigue and privation. He had faint hopes of aid from Sindia ; but all he now desired was a good opportunity of throwing himself in the way of the British general. He had made many overtures to Mr. Elphinstone, but as they always implied an ability to treat, he was distinctly told his submission only could be accepted. He again dispatched agents to Mr. Elphinstone and to the Resident at Nagpoor, but continued his route, forded the Taptee on the 5th May, and advanced towards Sindwa, where he intended to cross the Nerbuddah ; but finding that point guarded, and that Sir John Malcolm had made every preparation to intercept him, he sent forward an agent, Anund Rao Chundawurkur, with a letter to that officer, and retired to wait the result at Dholkote, in the neighbourhood of Asseergurh. That fortress, though stipulated to be given up by Sindia in the treaty of the 5th November, was still held by his Killidar, Jeswunt Rao Lar, who had always refused to surrender. Here Bajee Rao, with about eight thousand men, remained in a state of the utmost disquietude and alarm ; he was unacquainted with the country, and excepting the Vinchoorkur and Aba Poorundhuree, abandoned by almost every person of consequence in the Mahratta country ; the fords and passes to the northward were guarded, and troops were closing in upon him on every side. His agent reached General Malcolm's camp at Mhow, near Indore, on the 16th May. On receiving the Peishwa's overtures, Sir John Malcolm, who had been furnished with a copy of the Governor-General's instructions to the Commissioner in the Deccan, resolved to make the Peishwa's letter the basis of a negotiation for his surrender. Accordingly, two of his political assistants, Lieutenants Low and M'Donald, were dispatched towards the camp of Bajee Rao, instructed to open a negotiation, requiring him to renounce all sovereignty for himself and family for ever in the Deccan, to which he was never to return ; and to surrender Trimbukjee and the murderers of the

Vaughans. After these preliminaries, Lieutenant Low was to insist upon his immediately separating himself from Ramdeen and all proscribed rebels and Pindharees, and advance to meet Sir John Malcolm, who in such case promised to become the medium of an adjustment with the British Government, and obtain for him a liberal maintenance at such holy city as he might select for his future residence. The Governor-General did not approve of any deputation to Bajee Rao, both because it had a tendency to cramp the military operations against him, and conveyed an impression of the Peishwa's being in a condition to treat, when he was, in fact, eager to submit. Some circumstances proved the justness of these opinions; and, in several respects, there was an inconsiderate zeal evinced in the proceedings on this occasion, which has not escaped censure. The Marquis of Hastings, although he had given the outline of the conduct to be observed towards the Peishwa, reserved to himself the particular terms to be granted to him, after obtaining his submission to a justly offended nation; but before his sentiments, in regard to the first steps taken by Sir John Malcolm, could be received, Bajee Rao, on the 3d June, after a protracted negotiation, surrendered himself,¹ on condition that the stipulated maintenance should not be less than eight lacks of rupees a year; which was promised to him by Sir John Malcolm, from an idea that it should not be less than the pension of his brother Amrut Rao. The Marquis of Hastings deemed the amount too great, and seeing that his deposal was declared, and his country almost entirely reduced, knowing also the intriguing disposition of Bajee Rao, and the amassed treasure which he and his adherents might secrete for purposes hostile to the British Government, it was generally considered the extreme of liberality. But there was a conditional promise to Bajee Rao, in favour of Jagheerdars who had adhered to his cause, and of Bramins and religious establishments supported by his family, which was quite unnecessary, and certainly should have been avoided; because it implied that Bajee Rao was in a condition to treat, not only for himself, but for others; it detracted

¹ Before surrendering himself, he had an interview with Sir J. Malcolm; and in a private conference displayed his usual address and eloquence; appealing to Sir John as the last of his three earliest and best friends. Colonel Close being dead, and General Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington) in a distant land.

in some degree from the liberality of the British Government in the settlement of the conquered territories ; and it obtained for Bajee Rao, amongst such of the Mahrattas as were disposed to advocate his cause, praise which he did not merit, and honour which it never could have been the intention of Sir John Malcolm to confer. Whilst commenting, however, in this instance on the supposed failings of the politician, justice is due to the generous feelings of the man : Sir John Malcolm saw the prince whom he had visited nine months before in the midst of a gay court, and in a newly erected palace on the banks of the Kistna, now a harassed and houseless fugitive ; he forgot the manner in which he had been so grossly deceived ; he thought only of the contrast in the Peishwa's situation, and of the benefits which the British Government had derived from its connexion with that misguided and unfortunate individual ; and he pitied those faithful adherents, who still followed their sovereign in hopeless adversity, and forfeited their all, when, by personal submission, they might have secured their possessions. The Marquis of Hastings ratified the terms ; and Beithoor,¹ a place of sanctity near Cawnpore, was appointed for Bajee Rao's future residence, to which he was immediately conducted.

Ramdeen surrendered on being promised pardon, but Bajee Rao evaded compliance with that part of the stipulated terms which required the surrender of Trimbukjee ; he escaped to the southward, and for a time attempted to collect adherents and conceal himself as before ; but Captain Briggs,² Mr. Elphinstone's

¹ [Bithūr (Beithoor) is in the Cawnpore District, and during the early years of the nineteenth century was for a time the civil headquarters of the district. Bājī Rāo owned extensive palaces in the town, which were occupied at the time of the Mutiny by his adopted son, Dhondo Pant, *alias* Nānā Sāheb. The town was captured by Havelock on July 19, 1857, when the palaces were utterly destroyed. (*I.G.*, viii. 250-51 (1907).)]

A masterly estimate of Bājī Rāo's character was drawn by Mountstuart Elphinstone in a report on the resources and character of the Pēshwā's government prepared in November 1815. It is reproduced in full on pp. 287-9, vol. i, of Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884).]

² [Captain John Briggs (afterwards General Briggs) succeeded the author as Resident at Sātāra in 1823, and held the office until December 1826, during which period he interested himself in literary pursuits and in opening up, with the help of the Rājā of Sātāra, the hill-station of Mahābaleshvar. He is best known as the translator of Ferishta's

agent in Candeish, discovered the place of his retreat, and by a well-concerted plan, sent a party of irregular horse under Lieutenant Swanston,¹ who seized him in the village of Aheergaom. He was afterwards conveyed to the fort of Chunargurh in Bengal, where he remains a prisoner. The surrender of Bajee Rao was an important event, and was rendered more so by the escape of Appa Sahib, a circumstance which partly actuated Sir John Malcolm during the negotiation.

After the arrest of Appa Sahib by Mr. Jenkins, the Governor-General directed that he should be sent to Allahabad, and there confined. He was accordingly sent off from Nagpoor for that purpose, but having corrupted some of the Sepoys of a Bengal corps on his guard, and being furnished with a suit of their regimentals, he got off in that disguise on the morning of the 13th May, and fled to the Mahdeo hills between Nagpoor and the Nerbuddah, whence it was impossible to dislodge him during the monsoon. Here he was joined by Cheetoo Pindharee; and the person of Appa Sahib became a rallying point for all the disbanded and broken troops of the country. The unfortunate negligence which occasioned his escape was productive of much harassing service owing to insurrections in various quarters.

The grandson of the late Rughoojee Bhonslay, a minor named Goozur, was, in the meantime, adopted by the widow of the late Rughoojee, and, assuming the name of his grandfather, was seated on the musnud. The widow was considered regent; but for the present, and during the minority, the whole administration was committed to the charge of the Resident, who, in the Raja's name, directed every department under the immediate superintendence of officers appointed by himself.

The season was considerably advanced before troops could be spared to co-operate in a combined attack upon the position of Appa Sahib; it was hoped he might be taken; but being assisted by the skill and intelligence of Cheetoo, he passed one of the parties which was hemming him in, and though subsequently exposed to

Rise of Muhammadan Power, and the Siyarul Mutâkhirîn. In the Transactions of the R.A.S. he published in 1827 a memoir of Nānā Farnavīs and the 'Secret Correspondence of the Court of the Peishwa Madhoo Rao from 1761 to 1772.' (See *J.B.B.R.A.S.*, xxii. 172.)

¹ The same officer who assisted in the defence, and was severely wounded at Korygaom.

imminent danger from a guard of British troops, he succeeded in gaining the fort or neighbourhood of Asseergurh.

That celebrated fortress was besieged by General Doveton; Sir John Malcolm co-operating with a force from Malwa. After a respectable defence during about twenty days, it surrendered on the 9th of April, 1819. Appa Sahib, if he ever had been in the fort, made his escape. He afterwards sought refuge amongst the Seiks, where he still is; and no desire being evinced by the British Government to receive his submission, he has sunk into the insignificance to be expected from a person of his weak and treacherous character. The dreadful fate of Cheetoo, as he attempted to fly from Asseergurh, has been already told.¹

¹ Authorities as in the preceding.

CHAPTER LI.

FROM A.D. 1818 TO A.D. 1819.

A.D. 1818.—IN the preceding chapter we were drawn forward to mention the last event of the war, whilst the reduction and settlement of the Peishwa's territory remains to be briefly explained. By the 10th of April, the strong forts of Singurh,¹ Poorundhur and Wassota, with many others, had been taken by the besieging force, under General Pritzler. Though places of that remarkable strength, which has been already described, none of them made a good defence, none stood the assault, and as their previous history was scarcely known, their capture excited less interest, even among the besiegers, than it otherwise was calculated to produce. An exception must be made in regard to Wassota; the wild country, through which the troops advanced for about twenty miles, far exceeded in sublimity and grandeur any pre-conceived ideas the British officers might have formed of those vast mountains, dells, and forests, which they were told existed in the Ghaut-Mahta. The necessary artillery was transported with extraordinary labour through thick jungles and deep valleys, where natural barriers presented themselves in every succeeding hill, at which a handful of men might have arrested a host; and when at last brought to the point of bombardment, intense interest was excited for the two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, who, the reader may recollect, were taken prisoners

¹ [Mountstuart Elphinstone mentions the capture of Singarh (Singurh) in his diary for February 13, 1818. The garrison contained no Marāthās, but consisted of 'a hundred Arabs, six hundred Gosains, and four hundred Concanees (Konkanis). The Killadar was a boy of eleven; the real Governor, Appajee Punt Sewra, a mean-looking Carcoon. The garrison was treated with great liberality; and, though there was much property and money in the place, the Killadar was allowed to have whatever he claimed as his own.' (Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1884), vol. ii, pp. 27, 28.)]

at the commencement of the war, and were now in confinement in this fortress. The wives and families of the Raja of Satara and his brothers were also in Wassota, and these princes were present in the British camp. The obstinacy of the Killidar, who at first would listen to no terms of surrender, was, in this instance, a cause of general regret. At length the mortars opened; and though the peal of every salvo as it reverberated from the surrounding rocks, carried with it an anxiety for the fate of the prisoners, the bombardment was kept up for about twenty hours, with such effect that the Killidar capitulated, and fortunately none of the captives suffered. The two British officers were found in a dress of coarse unbleached cotton, made into a form neither European nor Indian, but partaking of the nature of both; their beards had grown, and their appearance was, as may be imagined, extraordinary; but their health was perfectly good. They had been kept in ignorance of the advance of their countrymen, or the state of the war; the firing, in driving in the outposts, was represented by their guard as the attack of some insurgents in the neighbourhood; the bursting of the shells over their heads was the first intimation of approaching deliverance, and the most joyful sound that had reached their ears for five weary months. They had been at first used very harshly in the fort of Kangooree; but they were removed to Wassota by Gokla's orders, and a letter, in his own handwriting to the Killidar, desiring him to treat the two poor Europeans well, was one of several instances of a like generous character, tending to prove that Gokla had no participation in the cruelties of his master; and at that moment excited some feeling of pity for his fate. On most occasions the captive officers had been humanely treated by the native soldiery; and they met with some remarkable acts of disinterested kindness and sympathy.

(April 11.)—Shortly after the reduction of Wassota, the Raja of Satara was, with great pomp, seated on his throne by the Commissioner, when he published two proclamations, the one announcing his connexion with the British Government, the other making over entire powers for the arrangement and government of his country to the author of this work, who was the agent selected by Mr. Elphinstone for that purpose.¹ In the first procla-

¹ [Grant Duff, at that time Captain Grant, was Resident at Sātāra from 1818 to 1822. Before finally relinquishing the post he invested

mation, the Raja dwelt on the injuries received from Bajee Rao ; amongst these was an order, the existence of which was confirmed by the Killidar of Wassota, to put the whole family to death, rather than suffer them to fall into the hands of the British Government. The Raja Pertab Siew (or Sing) was in his 27th year, naturally intelligent, and well disposed¹; but bred amongst intrigues, surrounded by men of profligate character, and ignorant of everything except the etiquette and parade of a court. His whole family entertained the most extravagant ideas of their own consequence, and their expectations were proportionate, so that for a time the bounty which they experienced was not duly appreciated.

As it was inconvenient to reduce the whole of that strong country at this period, a battalion of Sepoys and five hundred auxiliary horse were left for the protection of the Raja and the defence of the fort. After these arrangements, a part of the besieging division was detached to assist in the capture of the forts to the northward of Poona, and General Pritzler proceeded to the Carnatic, to place himself under the orders of General Munro. That gallant officer, with a mere handful of men, had taken a number of very strong forts, amongst others, Badamee, which he carried by assault. Having added to his limited means by raising a great body of irregulars, he had already possessed himself of the country in that quarter. On being reinforced, he immediately marched to the northward against the remainder of Bajee Rao's infantry, which, in number about four thousand five hundred, with thirteen

the Rājā with full powers and also secured for him the Pratāpgarh fort, containing the temple of Sivāji's family goddess, Bhavāni.

The territory reserved to the Rājā comprised the compact and fertile tract lying on the western border of the Deccan, between the Nira and the Bhīma rivers on the north and the Warna and the Krishna on the south, and extending from the Western Ghāts eastward to the districts of Bijāpur and Pandharpur. The annual revenue of this territory was estimated at about 15,00,000 rupees.]

¹ [According to General Briggs, who succeeded Grant Duff as Resident, the Rājā was twenty-four years of age at the time of his installation. Mountstuart Elphinstone described him in 1826 as 'the most civilized Maratha I ever met with, has his country in excellent order, and everything to his roads and aqueducts in a style that would do credit to a European. . . . I do not know what his ancestor would think of so peaceful a descendant.' (*Life of M. Elphinstone*, vol. ii, p. 188, quoted in D. B. Parasnis' *Mahableshwar*, Bombay, 1916, pp. 37, 39.)]

guns, was levying contributions, under Gunput Rao Phansay, in the Nizam's districts near Beejapoor. On hearing of General Munro's approach, they retreated under the walls of the strong fort of Sholapoor, where they were followed up, attacked, routed, and pursued with great slaughter. The pettah of Sholapoor had been previously carried by escalade; and the fort, after a short siege, surrendered. As General Munro advanced from the Carnatic, he sent his irregulars to the right and left of his column of march, who occupied the villages, fought with spirit on several occasions, stormed fortified places, and took possession in name of 'Thomas Munro Buhadur.'

The Bombay Government having conquered the Concan by its own exertions, Mr. Elphinstone did not interfere in its settlement, especially as few of the difficulties to be apprehended above the Ghauts existed in the low country. Mr. Pelly and Mr. Marriott were appointed to the charge of the civil duties; the former in the southern, the latter in the northern Concan, or to the territory south and north of the river Penn. Raigarh, famous as the capital of Sivajee, and a place as impregnable as Gibraltar, surrendered to Colonel Prother on the 7th May: it contained the Peishwa's elder wife, Waranussee Bye; a fortunate shell having set fire to her habitation and destroyed it, she prevailed on the Arab Killidar to capitulate.¹ Waranussee Bye was allowed to retire to Waee, near Satara, where she resided for nine or ten months, until it was discovered that her being there facilitated Bajee Rao's persevering intrigues, when with a suitable escort she was dispatched to join her husband at Beithoor.

In regard to the settlement above the Ghauts, General Munro, as we have seen, took possession of the Carnatic, which he subsequently made over to Mr. Chaplin, an experienced civil servant of the Madras establishment, who was appointed, under Mr. Elphinstone, principal Collector of the Mahratta country south of the Kistna, and Political Agent with the Raja of Kolapoor and the southern Jagheerdars.

To the management of the provinces extending from the Kistna to the Nerbuddah, Mr. Elphinstone, at different periods, during the progress of the conquests, appointed four subordinate agents.

¹ [The bombardment of Raigarh (Raigurh) took place from a hill-spur called Kalkai, and lasted fourteen days. A treasure of 5,00,000 rupees in coin was found in the fort. (*I.G. Bom.*, ii. 141-2.)]

The territory reserved for the Raja of Satara was the tract between the Warna and the Neera, extending from the base of the Syhadree mountains on the west to Punderpoor on the east, or nearly to the Nizam's boundary. Until reduced, and some progress made in its settlement, the Satara country was managed entirely as a British province. Captain Henry Dundas Robertson had charge of the city and district of Poona, of which he was Collector of the revenue, Judge, and Magistrate. His district lay between the Neera and Beema. From the Beema to the Chandore hills was entrusted to Captain Henry Pottinger, with the same authority as was delegated to Captain Robertson; and Captain John Briggs, in the province of Candeish, in addition to the duties of those officers, was Agent for effecting a settlement with the Bheels.¹

With each of those officers, whose authority nearly resembled that of the great Sur-soobehdars under the Peishwa's government, experienced natives were appointed to conduct the numerous subordinate situations, with permanent salaries, on a scale of liberality which rendered their offices both in regard to power and emolument exceedingly respectable.

To get possession of the country; to prevent the revenue of the current year, or the treasures of the Peishwa from being made applicable to purposes of hostility; to protect and conciliate the inhabitants; to attempt no innovations, and to endeavour to show the people that they were to expect no change but the better administration of their own laws, were the primary objects to which the Commissioner directed the attention of his agents. As the country was drained of British troops, the greater part of which had proceeded in pursuit of the flying Peishwa, the means

¹ [Anarchy was at its zenith in Khāndesh (Candeish) in 1818—the roads were impassable, the villages were plundered and murders committed daily, the only protection obtainable by the inhabitants of the plains being through regular payments of blackmail. For many years after annexation the Bhil (Bheel) tribes gave trouble by outbreaks of lawlessness, but eventually submitted to the pacificatory methods of Lieutenant (afterwards Sir James) Outram, who entering the district under Elphinstone's orders in 1825 conciliated the wild jungle-men by feasts and by his prowess in tiger-shooting, and eventually succeeded (1825–30) in forming a Bhil corps, the original nucleus of which consisted of nine men who had accompanied him on shooting expeditions. In 1827 this Bhil corps numbered 600 men, who fought boldly for Government and suppressed plundering. Riots occurred among the Bhils in 1852 and 1857, but were easily suppressed. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 419, 442; ii. 482.)]

of those agents were, at first, limited ; but by raising irregulars, taking such places as they could reduce, destroying or executing straggling plunderers, especially when they were found torturing or murdering the villagers, opening negotiations with the Killidars of the stronger forts, and representing the hopelessness of resistance, the country with the assistance of such regulars as could be spared, fell almost as fast as men could be collected to keep possession. It not unfrequently happened that irregulars who had left Bajee Rao's service a few days or hours before, entered that of the British Government ; and instances are adducible, where, having quitted the Peishwa, they were enlisted, subsisted, supplied with ammunition, and fighting for the new Government, within little more than twenty-four hours ; so readily do the irregular troops of India transfer their allegiance to the prevailing power. To these men the new conquests were frequently of necessity entrusted, and they proved, in no instance, treacherous or disobedient.

By the month of May a small detachment of regulars from Poona, under Major Eldridge, had obtained possession of the numerous hill-forts between that city and the Ahmednugur hills, some of which are as strong as any in the world. The defences are entirely composed of solid rock, in which caves are hewn that render the garrison safe from the effect of shells, and a very few resolute men could maintain an assault against any numbers.

Another small detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowell, was equally successful in reducing the forts in the Chandore range ; and by the end of May the Arabs in Candeish, and the insurgents under the pretended Chitoor Sing in the Satara territory, were the only opponents of the British Government within the dominions of the late Peishwa. On the 13th June the
 (June
 13.) Arab garrison of the strong fort of Mallygaom¹ surrendered to Colonel M'Dowell after a very obstinate defence ; during which they repulsed an assault and occasioned a loss to the besiegers of upwards of two hundred men in killed or wounded. In the opposite quarter of the country, and on the ensuing day, the fort of Pruchheetgurh and the pretended Chitoor Sing were taken by a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham.²

¹ [See note on Mālegāon, p. 469, vol. i, *ante*.]

² Pruchheetgurh, in a most inaccessible situation, was taken by an enterprise, successful from its apparent impracticability. The fort

These events, except a few detached expeditions in the ensuing season, and the siege of Asseergurh already mentioned, put an end to military operations in the Mahratta territory.

A.D. 1819.—The progress of the settlement went forward as rapidly as the conquest. After the first instructions were in train, the next object was to obtain full information respecting individuals, that their claims to consideration might be fully understood. Inquiries were also circulated by the Commissioner to his agents and by them to their subordinate agents, on the usages and laws of the country, in which all the intelligent part of the community were called upon for their opinions. A mass of valuable information was thus speedily collected, and from the judicious nature of the queries, so far from alarming the inhabitants, an inconvenience to which such interrogatories are particularly liable in India, these, on the contrary, being committed to men who knew the natives, tended to gain their confidence, and were in this respect useful to the new Government. To keep down insurrection; to settle claims and rewards consequent upon such a revolution; to make some provision for all who suffered, and to better the condition of those whom the voice of the community pointed out as fit objects of bounty, were a part of the duties which devolved upon the Commissioner.

In regard to insurrection, vigilance was enjoined and strictly maintained by a system of private intelligence which the Mahrattas consider necessary to good government, and which the state of the country as well as the usage of the people rendered necessary; armed men travelling without passports were required to deposit their weapons; and the hoarded resources of the late government were seized wherever found; but as it was commanded by an adjoining hill, from which a brisk fire soon drove the besieged from the gate, to seek shelter behind some stone houses in the fort; upon which Captain Spiller suggested the possibility of blowing a hole in the gate with musquetry. This strange breach was effected under a heavy fire from his companions, which prevented the besieged from suspecting what was going forward at the gate. Captain Spiller went in first, but a grenadier Sepoy who attempted to follow could not get through owing to his cartridge box; Captain Spiller was therefore obliged to return until he had made the entrance sufficiently large, by which time he was joined by Colonel Cunningham and Assistant-Surgeon Radford, when they got in, one by one, concealing themselves in the gateway until their party had entered. They then rushed upon the garrison, completely surprised them, and carried the place without the loss of a man.

not intended to disarm the Mahrattas, still less to create a vexatious search, which might in the slightest degree interfere with private property, or even to exact from inoffensive individuals all that they were known to possess belonging to Bajee Rao, great relaxations in these respects soon took place. After the first year, no passport was required from any body of armed men, not exceeding twenty-five, and no search for treasure was authorized without previously obtaining satisfactory testimony in regard to the information concerning it. A strong military force occupied positions at Belgaom, Kuladgee, Kurar, Satara, Sholapoor, Poona, Seroor, Joonere, Ahmednugur and Mallygaom; and numbers of the enemy's irregular infantry were employed in the British service. The ranks of the auxiliary horse were already filled by men enlisted beyond the borders of the Mahratta country, but more than half the horses which returned from Bajee Rao's army died in the course of six months from the fatigue they had undergone.

The Bheels in the mountains adjoining Candeish continued to disturb the country for some time after the new Government was established. The plan adopted for settling them was to appropriate waste lands for such as chose to cultivate them; and to grant to every chief an allowance for a certain number of men, for which they became bound to restrain the excesses of the rest. To force them to accept these terms, their supplies which were drawn from the plains were stopped, parties issuing out to plunder were cut off, and vigorous attacks were made on the points in the hills occupied by the refractory chiefs. These measures at length reduced them to submission, but it must be the work of many years to reform their habits.¹

There were few attempts at insurrection; one conspiracy was detected, which had for its object the release of the pretended Chitoor Sing, the murder of all the Europeans at Poona and Satara, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the person of the Raja of Satara. The persons concerned were men of desperate fortunes among the unemployed

¹ [See note on p. 521, *ante*. The condition of the Bhil country is very different now. Crime is rare among them. The few offences that occur are chiefly cases of illicit distillation, and the roads are as safe as in settled British districts. In the Dāngs, which consists of fourteen petty estates ruled by Bhil chieftains, the only police force now maintained consists of seven constables.]

soldiery ; many of them were apprehended and tried ; and the ringleaders, some of whom were Bramins, were blown from guns ; an example which, though severe, had a great effect in restraining that intriguing race, and preventing similar attempts in the country.

As to claims, the most important upon the British Government were those which regarded the settlement with its ally the Nizam ; but no arrangement of their mutual affairs could be made, until it had been fully ascertained what surplus revenue the British Government should derive from the conquest. The advantages immediately gained by the Nizam were exemption from debts amounting to about sixty millions of rupees ; and which, on the most moderate estimate, he could not have settled with the Peishwa without making a cession of territory equal to ten lacks of rupees a year. The shares of revenue, within the boundary of the Soobehdar of the Deccan, which the Peishwa or his subjects had enjoyed up to the breaking out of the war, and of which the Nizam now retained the collections, were more than equal to twelve lacks of rupees a year, and the cessions which fell to him from the governments of Holkar and the Raja of Nagpoor amounted to nearly six more ; so that the Nizam obtained an addition of at least twenty-eight lacks of rupees of annual revenue.

Though the British Government gained much by additional strength and security, it was doubtful how far its income was benefited by the conquest. The provision for the Raja of Satara was completed by a treaty dated 25th September, 1819, by which he agreed to hold his territory in subordinate co-operation to the British Government ; neither to increase nor diminish his military force without its sanction ; and as a fundamental condition, he was positively prohibited from holding any intercourse with persons not his own subjects, except through the Resident at his court. The Company charged itself with the defence of his territory, which, for a time, was to be governed under an agent of that Government, until the Raja and his people were made acquainted with business.¹

¹ The plan followed in the Raja's country was simply to amend the native system, and to place the routine of business in that train, which it was possible might be preserved after the interference of the British Government was withdrawn. The Raja himself was taught

Next to the provision for the Raja of Satara was a reward to the Raja of Kolapoor, who, on the first declaration of hostilities, espoused the British cause. The much desired districts of Chikcooree and Menowlee, with the history of which the reader is already acquainted, were therefore restored to him ; a recompense equal to his highest expectation.

The next claims were those of the Jagheerdars ; but it may be first proper to mention that every species of hereditary right not Jagheer, all other rent-free lands, all established pensions, charitable and religious assignments and endowments were restored ; and that every promise held out by the proclamation of Satara was fulfilled without reserve or modification, excepting with respect to the Dukshina which will be subsequently explained. In regard to Jagheers, there were various points for consideration. In the first instance, unless specially exempted, every Jagheer was taken possession of like the territory in the immediate occupation of the Peishwa's agents ; and all Jagheers falling within the Nizam's boundary were declared to be irrecoverably lost to their late owners. Jagheers also, which had been sequestered by the former government, were not restored. Certain Jagheerdars, whom we shall designate of the first class, were the old Mankurees or native chiefs of the country, whom the reader has it in his power to trace from the earliest history of Maharashtra ; such as the Nimbalkurs of Phultun, the Duflays of Jhutt ; the Ghorepurays of Mudhole, &c. &c. Others, in the second

to expect power according to his ability to exercise it, and in a short time laboured as assiduously as any Carcoon under his government. The entire powers of the state were formally delivered over to him on the 5th April, 1822, at which period the boon thus conferred by the British nation on the descendant of Sivajee was certainly appreciated by the country generally, as well as by his relations and himself ; but time must prove whether this liberal experiment on the part of the authorities of the East India Company will be attended with any lasting good effect, to the governors or the governed. [The experiment in the end was not a success. The chief had to be deposed in 1839 and sent as a state prisoner to Benares for persistently intriguing and holding communications with other princes in contravention of his engagements. His brother Shāhji, who was placed on the throne, died without male heirs in 1848, and the Sātāra state was then resumed by the British Government and formed into a district of the Bombay Presidency. During the Mutiny a widespread conspiracy was discovered at Sātāra to restore the Marāthā power with assistance from northern India. The movement was suppressed with only trifling disturbances. (*I.G. Bom.*, i. 538.)]

class, were the old aristocracy of Sivajee and his descendants, such as the Purdhans, the Pritee Needhee, Angria, and the Raja of Akulkote. A third class was that which was raised by the Peishwas; some of whom had established claims by their early submission or former services to the British Government; but even of those dependants of the Peishwa, who had adhered to him to the last, it was, as remarked, 'politic and humane to allow them a liberal maintenance, but it was neither required by humanity nor policy to give such persons the command of troops, paid from the revenue which had fallen into the hands of their conquerors'.¹

The various claims of each of these classes being considered, the first, or old hereditary Jagheerdars, had the whole of their lands restored. Of the second class, the Punt Suchew² was the only one of the Purdhans to whom the Peishwa had left a vestige of power: he was one of the first who joined the British cause after the proclamation of Satara, and his territory, valued at three lacks of rupees of annual revenue, and which includes the spot where Sivajee first established himself, was immediately placed in his own hands. The Pritee Needhee³ took the first opportunity of escaping from the Peishwa's camp, and the lands held in his name, which were assigned for his maintenance, but never committed to his own management, were given up. The Raja of Akulkote⁴ was one of those Jagheerdars who, from the first, would have resisted Bajee Rao's authority, had he not been overawed by the subsidiary force; he joined in the war with reluctance, quitted the Peishwa early, and his Jagheer was immediately relinquished. Of the third class of the Jagheerdars,

¹ Elphinstone's dispatches.

² [The Bhor State, near Poona, represents the *jāgīr* of the Pant Sachiv (Punt Suchew). The State entered into alliance with the British Government by a treaty of 1820, and on the lapse of the Sātāra State in 1849 was placed under the political control of the Collector of Sātāra until 1887, when it was transferred to Poona. The present chief, who has the title of Pandit of Bhor and Pant Sachiv, has enjoyed a personal salute of nine guns since the Delhi Durbar of 1903, in recognition of his loyalty and efficient administration.]

³ [The modern Aundh State, under the political control of the Collector of Sātāra, represents the Pratinīdhī's estate. The chief still holds the title of Pant Pratinīdhī (Pritee Needhee).]

⁴ [See note on p. 447, vol. i, *ante*. The modern State of Akalkot (Akulkote) is under the political control of the Collector of Sholāpur.]

the Putwurdhuns were the most conspicuous. Gunput Rao Putwurdhun of Tasgaom,¹ one of the surviving sons of Pureshram Bhow, never joined the Peishwa, and took an early opportunity, before the Satara proclamation, of assuring Mr. Elphinstone of his determination not to do so; his lands were confirmed to him. The other members of this powerful family left Bajee Rao about the end of February: a like favourable consideration was shown to them. Appa Dessaye Nepankur did not join the Peishwa till late; he never acted with vigour against the British troops, and on one occasion behaved remarkably well to some prisoners. He, as well as the Putwurdhuns and Rastia, maintained a communication with Mr. Elphinstone throughout the war; but as he did not quit the Peishwa's standard until a late period, he lost a part of his Jagheer by the restoration of Chikkooree and Menowlee to Kolapoor; and he likewise lost considerably by revenues within the territory of the Nizam; but for these last he was at a subsequent period partly compensated, and the rest of his Jagheer was restored.² Mahdoo Rao Rastia had less reason than any other Jagheerdar for those ideas of honour which induced many of them to adhere to the falling fortunes of him whom they considered the chief of the Hindoos. He quitted Bajee Rao after the affair of Sewnee, and thus lost the claim of fidelity to the Peishwa, or of gratitude to the British Government. All Jagheers granted under the Mahratta governments are for personal support or the maintenance of troops; and each chief has a certain portion of his Jagheer allotted for the former purpose. To such persons as had forfeited all claim, like Rastia, and even to those who rather feared persecution than expected favour, their personal estates were, in every instance, restored. The Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the Raja of Akulkote, the Duflays, and the Nimbalkurs, were, at their own request, placed under the Raja's government, and their lands guaranteed to them. To

¹ [Tasgaon subsequently lapsed to the British Government, and is now the headquarters of the *tāluka* of the same name in Sātāra District. The other branches of the Patvardhan family are represented by the Chiefs of the Sangli and Miraj States in the Southern Marāthā country. (See note on p. 197, vol. ii, *ante*.)]

² [The Nipāni estate lapsed to the British Government in 1839 on the demise of the last *jāgīrdār*, and is now represented by the market town of Nipāni and neighbouring villages in the Chikodi (Chikkooree) *tāluka* of the Belgaum District.]

all the great Jagheerdars the same powers were permitted, within their own territory, as had always existed; and even towards those chiefs who had lost their lands, great delicacy, and as little interference as possible, were enjoined. The equitable and enlightened law, which levels all distinctions, would have been intolerable to men's minds in the existing state of the Maharratta country, and would have been as little relished by the lower as by the higher classes of society.

The Punchayet was the ordinary tribunal for the decision of civil suits, and it is that which gives, and, if judiciously administered, probably always will give, more satisfaction, and be, in their own opinion, of greater benefit to the natives of Maharashtra than any other mode of trial. The English officers of Government, who had been accustomed to the courts of Udalut,¹ could not reconcile themselves to the corruption, delay, and apparent injustice of some of their decisions; but in commenting on the evils

¹ [Adālut (Udalat), from *adl*, 'doing justice,' is an Arabic word signifying 'a Court of Justice.' Under the Mughal Government there had been three such courts, viz. Nizāmat Adālat, or chief criminal court; Dīwānī Adālat, or civil court, and Faujdārī Adālat, or police court. In 1793 regular courts were established in the East India Company's territories, under the title of Sadr Adālat, which became the chief court of appeal in each Presidency. This Court had a criminal side, which in Bombay and Madras was termed Sadr Faujdārī Adālat, and a civil side which was similarly styled Sadr Dīwānī Adālat. These Courts were originally located at Surat, but were transferred to Bombay in 1827, and all cases decided by inferior tribunals outside the limits of Bombay Town and Island were referred to them. The Sadr Dīwānī Adālat had no original jurisdiction, but its decisions were final except in suits regarding property worth more than Rs. 10,000, when an appeal lay to His Majesty in Council. The Sadr Faujdārī Adālat was vested with the superintendence of criminal and police matters in all parts of the Presidency, excepting the Town of Bombay, and with power to revise all trials held by lower courts outside Bombay Island. In 1823 a Supreme Court was established in Bombay, and was vested with civil, criminal, equity, admiralty and ecclesiastical jurisdiction over the Island of Bombay and the factories subordinate to it; but it had no jurisdiction over the ordinary administration of justice in the rest of the Presidency, which continued to be performed by the Sadr Adālat on its civil and criminal sides. Hence arose constant and sometimes acute friction, which continued until August 6, 1861, when an Act of Parliament was passed abolishing the Supreme Court and the Sadr Adālat and establishing in their place the High Court, vested with the entire jurisdiction hitherto wielded by the two former. Letters Patent were issued on June 26, 1862, and in August of that year the High Court of Bombay was formally opened. (*B.C.G.*, ii. 223-6; Yule's *Hobson-Jobson*, ed. Crooke, 1903.)]

of the Mahratta system, it is to be feared they forgot the many defects of their own. Although Panchayets are continued under the provisional government which is still maintained in the conquered territory, it is to be apprehended they can neither exist, nor have a fair trial, where, whilst some are prejudiced, others, overwhelmed by business of various kinds, are discouraged by the difficulties they find in the system ; and a few (though I do believe such selfishness, in the present state of feeling, to be rare), considering it at variance with the interests of the civil service, only strive to discover objections, which in some shape may be found in every form of administration, but which time and vigilance would, in this instance, in a great measure remove. On the temper, zeal, and perseverance of the government officers, much must depend : Panchayets, where neglected or merely tolerated, cannot prosper ; they require a pure and steady superintendence, with all the weight and authority to correct and amend the faults of the people which are confounded with the defects of the system. A very active able agency would at first be necessary, after a plan of reform had been digested ; but once instituted, carefully watched and encouraged at the outset, and carried on for a time, much less interference would become requisite on the part of government, and not only would the natives be called upon to administer justice in the form most popular among them, but, leaving advantages to policy out of the question, the Panchayèt might be made a powerful instrument for improving the minds and amending the morals of the natives of India. At present, even in the Mahratta country, those who have a suit will frequently solicit the decision of an English judge ; but the same persons, if intelligent men, when exempt from the impulse which influences their opinions under such circumstances, will invariably declare that the Panchayet, in civil cases, is far better suited to the country at large than any mode of decision by individuals.¹

¹ [The *Panchāyat*, or village council of five (or more) persons, has completely disappeared as a tribunal of civil justice ; and the term is now applicable only to the caste-councils which deal with matters of dispute arising within the caste or with those caste-offences of which the law of British India takes no cognizance. The author's views of the value of the *Panchāyat* system are doubtless to be attributed in some degree to the opinion of Mountstuart Elphinstone, who considered it 'an excellent institution for dispensing justice and in keeping up the principles of justice, which are less likely to be observed among a people to whom the administration of it is not at all entrusted.'

The criminal law in the conquered territory was administered, as it usually had been, by the decision of individual judges, assisted by Hindoo authority in regulating the measure of punishment; but the evidence and sentences in all important cases were subject to the approval of the Commissioner before being carried into execution. Panchayets, in criminal cases, had been known in the Satara country, constituted of the servants of government. The same mode was revived in that territory, but Panchayets in criminal cases might be chosen from the body of the people, although the advantages of a trial by jury¹ would not be at first appreciated, and would require to be introduced by persons thoroughly acquainted with the natives.

The revenue system,² of settling with the people through the

Elphinstone, however, was not blind to its obvious shortcomings. (*Life of Mountstuart Elphinstone* by Colebrooke (1884), ii. 53-4, 89, 124.) In Madras a determined attempt was made to revive the *panchāyat* system, but produced little result owing to the unwillingness of the people to serve. (*O.H.I.*, p. 643.)

¹ [The system of trial by jury was eventually introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure, the first edition of which was promulgated in 1861, in which year the old Supreme Courts and *Adālat*s of the Company were replaced by Chartered High Courts. The Indian Penal Code had been enacted in 1860. In the country districts it is not always possible, even now, to empanel an efficient jury; and trials before Sessions Courts are therefore conducted with the aid of assessors—who merely assist but do not bind the judge by their opinions—or of jurors. Where juries are used, the Code directs the Sessions Judge, if he considers that a jury has returned a manifestly wrong verdict, to submit the case to the High Court, which is empowered to set aside or modify the finding. An Indian jury consists of nine persons in High Court trials, and in other trials of such uneven number up to nine as may be prescribed by the Local Government. (*I.G.*, iv. 148-9.) A case has occurred in recent years in which the system of trial by jury has had to be temporarily suspended in a District, in consequence of an obstinate series of flagrantly wrong verdicts.]

² [The Bombay land revenue system is, with few exceptions, *Ryotwāri*, i.e. a system of settlements with the *ryots* or cultivators of small-holdings, whose revenue payments are fixed after careful measurement and classification of the land in their possession. The settlement, once made, is in force for a period of thirty years, during which the *ryot* is at liberty to alienate his occupancy right; but he cannot be dispossessed by Government so long as he pays the several instalments of land revenue. At the conclusion of the period of settlement, the revenue payment is liable to revision; but the tenant has a continued right of occupancy provided that he agrees to accept the new terms. The original settlement was based on the investiga-

agents of government, instead of renting the districts, was the means of abolishing many grievances; but in the Peishwa's country, especially in the villages, where a portion of the inhabitants were composed of the soldiery, there was not so much oppression as might have been expected.

The mode of settlement for the Jagheerdars has led to a brief notice of the revenue and judicial system, and in regard to the latter, has called forth reflections which have been seldom intruded on the reader in the plain narrative now about to be concluded.

Mr. Elphinstone took charge of the Government of Bombay on the 1st November, 1819, and Mr. Chaplin succeeded him as Commissioner for the conquered territory; but liberal pensions in land or money were previously granted to those adherents of the British Government whose services, during the revolution, had merited such rewards. The ministers of the late government, wholly unprovided for, and those of the times of Nana Furnuwees, who were pining in want, had also pecuniary assignments for their maintenance during life. Chiefs, not Jagheerdars, who were reduced to absolute indigence, had also a provision according to circumstances.

The Dukshina, as the reader may remember, was a charitable institution, originally established by Dhabary Senaputtee, and perpetuated by the first Bajee Rao and his successors. The great Mahdoo Rao confined the donations principally to poor Bramins, whose proficiency in science and mythology entitled them to distinction; and the rewards were conferred in proportion to their acquirements, moral conduct, and sanctity. During the reign of the second Bajee Rao, though a portion was always reserved as the reward of learning, it degenerated into an indiscriminate distribution, dictated by the superstitious idea of

tions of a Survey Department, specially organized for this work, which measured and mapped every holding, classified each field according to depth and quality of soil, situation and natural defects, and finally fixed maximum rates for blocks of villages grouped with regard to propinquity of markets, means of communication and economic conditions. The early assessments in Bombay were fixed too high, and led to considerable distress; but the rates were at once reduced, and after twelve years' inquiry the principles which are still the basis of the Bombay land-revenue system were formulated in 1847. (For further details of the advantages and disadvantages of the system, see *I.G. Bom.*, i. 96-8.)]

feeding and bestowing on Bramins, as an atonement for sin.¹ Many poor Bramins, however, had become greatly dependent on this charity, and therefore to have stopped it at once would have been inconsistent with the humane munificence which pervaded every act of the British Government in the conquered territory ; but to have continued that promiscuous alms to all Bramins, who chose to collect at Poona for the purpose, would have been a wasteful, and in many respects a useless and pernicious expenditure. It was at first, therefore, bestowed under certain limitations ; the portion assigned to men of learning was duly distributed ; and, that the benefit to the country might be rendered more essentially important, as the donations at the *Dakshina* were circumscribed, a Hindoo college² was instituted at Poona, where the minds of the youth might acquire such instruction in their own way, as they are disposed to receive in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, &c. ; and pains were taken to erase from their elementary books of ethics such principles of morality as have a dangerous or a doubtful tendency. Though the institution of the college, which was committed to Mr. Chaplin, was at first regarded with some signs of distrust, before the end of 1822 there were one hundred and forty three Bramins, students or candidates for admission, even before fit teachers for all the branches had been found.

The saving to the British Government from the revenues of the Peishwa's territory, after all these arrangements were completed,

¹ [See note on page 475, *ante*. Moor records that as many as 40,000 Brahmans used to assemble at the Pārvatī temple for the *Dakshina*, and that the cash dole to each Brahman varied from three to ten rupees.]

² [This Sanskrit College, established with a portion of the *Dakshina*, subsequently developed into the existing Deccan College which teaches up to the B.A. and first LL.B. degrees. In 1837 some branches of Hindu learning were relinquished in favour of the study of English and the vernacular languages ; in 1851 the institution was amalgamated with an existing English school ; and finally in 1857 appeared in its present form by the separation of the college and school divisions. *Dakshina* fellowships were founded from a portion of the *Dakshina* Fund, and in 1863 Sir Jamsetji Jijibhai offered £10,000 to provide suitable buildings for the College, which were completed and occupied in 1868. The institution was then named the Deccan College. It is endowed with scholarships by Government ; and other scholarships have been founded in memory of Major Candy, a former Principal (1851), of Mr. W. H. Havelock of the Civil Service (1877), and of past Indian students and fellows. (*B.G.*, xviii, pt. iii.)]

became very inconsiderable ; but by lapses of lives of the pensioners, effectual protection to the country, fortunate seasons, and progressive improvement of agriculture, the revenue in three years increased upwards of seventeen lacks of rupees.

Thus was completed, under the direction of the Honourable Mountstuart Elphinstone, this important change in the government of the Mahratta country. The liberality of the settlement authorized by the Marquis of Hastings far exceeded the expectations of the people, and more was in consequence done for the tranquillity of the Deccan in eighteen months than had ever followed a revolution in that disturbed country, after a period of many years. The name of Elphinstone was deservedly associated with the acts of the British Government, and the memory of benefits conferred by him on the inhabitants of Maharashtra will probably survive future revolutions ; and will do much, in the meantime, to preserve the existence of British India.¹

¹ Authorities as in the preceding. [The author's eulogy of Mountstuart Elphinstone is confirmed by Bishop Heber in his *Journey in India from Calcutta to Bombay, &c.*, 1824-5 (2nd ed., 3 vols., 8vo, London, 1828). Besides improving the land communications between Bombay and the Deccan, Elphinstone made in 1823 the first official proposal for the establishment of steam-communication between Bombay and England, via the Red Sea, and renewed the suggestion in 1826. His services to the cause of Indian education were recognized after his retirement in 1827, when the Princes and chiefs of the Deccan and Konkan and the general public subscribed a large sum to found the well-known Elphinstone College in Bombay. He lived for more than thirty years after his retirement, and twice declined the appointment of Governor-General of India, and also that of permanent Under-Secretary of the Board of Control. A fine statue of him by Chantrey, erected in 1833, stands in the Town Hall, Bombay, and his bust adorns the Victoria and Albert Museum in the same city. The Indian view of his character and administration is set forth in the opening paragraph of an address presented to him on his final departure from Bombay, by Indians of all classes in the Bombay Presidency. It will be found at p. 199, vol. ii, of Colebrooke's *Life of M. Elphinstone* (1844).]



SOUTHERN, WESTERN AND PART OF CENTRAL INDIA



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