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H I S T O li Y

OF THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND,

I-ONDON :

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'^HISTORY

or THE

PHILOSOPHY OF MIND :

KMBRACI.Vt; THK

OPINIONS OF ALL WRITERS ON ]\IENTAL SCIENCE

FROM THE

EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME.

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By Robert! BLAKE y, a.m.

AUTHOR OF HISTORY OF MORAL SCIENCE, ESSAY OX MORAL GOOD AND EVIL, ESSAY' ON LOGIC, &C.

A'OLUME 1

LONDON: LONGMAN, BROWN, GREEN, AND LONGMANS,

PATEKNOSTER ROW.

1850.

TO y. I

HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS PE.INCE ALBEET,

CHANCELLOR OF THE UNIVERSITV OF CAMBRIDGE, &C. &C. &.C.

THESE VOLUMES

A RE

(s'y permission)

MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED,

BY

II IS ROYAL HIGH NESS'S

VERY OBEDIENT,

HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

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PREFACE,

It is upAvards of twenty years since I first formed the intention of writing' a work of this description. Having been an ardent cultivator of metaphysical literature from early youth, I often experienced the want of some guide to a knowledge of authors, and their several publications on this species of philo- sophy ; and it occurred to me that a work, which simply brought into one focus the multifarious and scattered elements of speculation Avhich every civi- lized country possessed, could not fail to prove highly useful, not only to the mere scholar like myself, but even to those more advanced in philo- sophical knowledge and acquirements. To form a plan, however, is one thing ; but to execute it, another. I soon found the great difficulties which lay in my path. In England it is more arduous to write a history of philosophy, than in any other country in Europe ; chiefly from the deficiency of works on the literature of tlie Middle Ages. Nearly all Continental lil;raries, even those of

Vi PREFACE.

small towns and villages, have more or less of this species of literature; but in England the best libraries in our provincial cities are almost entirely without works of this description. The time required for reading was another obstacle in my way ; for more urgent and pressing pursuits engrossed almost every hour I had to spare. In consequence of these and other impediments which it is not necessary to particularize, I have some- times been compelled to suspend the work for three or four years together ; and many a time and oft have I altogether despaired of ever being able to complete it. Circumstances however have at length enabled me to do so ; and after a good deal of anxiety, I now present it to the philosophical world, with a firm persuasion that they will act justly towards it, and award me that portion of com- mendation to which I may be entitled, however small it may be ; and to more I have no right to aspire.

There are two modes of writing a history of philosophy. The one is to classify authors under general heads, in conformity with a prin- ciple of resemblance or affinity subsisting among their respective speculative opinions. This is called philosophical history. The other is, to follow the order of time, and give a distinct and personal outline of every philosopher's views, in

PREPACE. Vll

the precise order in which chronoloi^y develops them. Both plans have their respective advan- tages and disadvantages ; and it is a nice point to determine which to prefer. To me, in all tlie purely historical works of a classified kind that I have seen, there has appeared no small degree of confusion ; and this I helieve is commonly felt as a great inconvenience by young students, when they enter upon tlie study of mental science. Generalization on the philosophy of mind ought not to precede observation and instruction, but to follow them. For these and other reasons, I have adopted the order of time, as nearly as the nature of the subject would admit; leaving the reader, except in some few special cases, to select and classify wa-iters according to his own opinions and judgment. The historical or classified arrange- ment is certainly more dignified and imposing ; but I conceive the chronological is better fitted to im- part elementary and correct information, and to preserve the mind from many false notions which an arbitrary or imperfect classification is apt to create, in reference to particular authors and their respective systems.

This work is arranged upon a plan somewhat particular. It is almost exclusively confined to mental science. I am not acquainted with any publication precisely of the same kind, with the

Vlll PREFACE,

exception of Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to the Encyclopedia Britannica. Every reader knows that, on the Continent, religion, morals, and po- litics, as well as metaphysics, are comprehended under the general term Philosophy. In England, however, we have commonly kept these topics apart from each other ; allowing each to rest upon its own basis ; and this I consider a better plan upon the whole. It is obvious, notwith- standing, that by adopting it, I have, in a corresponding degree, contracted the sphere of discussion and observation ; and, therefore, there must necessarily be less variety in my statements and reasonings than if I had launched freely, on every occasion that presented itself, into mat- ters intimately connected with the fundamental principles of religion, morals, and politics. Not that I have altogether refrained from touching upon these respective branches of knowledge ; this it would have been impossible for me to do, had I wished ; but on those occasions where a direct reference is made to any of them, it is only in order to illustrate more clearly and pointedly the precise nature and bearing of some particular me- taphysical principle or system. My aim has con- stantly been to furnish a history of Iletaphysical Philosophy^ and nothing more.

I ha AC been desirous of combining some portion

PREFACE. IX

of elementary instruction on the science of mind, in conjunction with the historical sketches and details I have given. This will account for some short chapters or dissertations in several parts of the work, apparently unconnected with the course of simple chronological narration. I trust that, though this method may be considered in some measure novel, it will not be without corresponding benefit, particularly to young students and general readers. I once purposed to make these elemen- tary essays more numerous ; but the increasing pressure of purely historical matter did not allow me to follow this course to a greater extent than I have done. A considerable portion of the benefit and pleasure to be derived from a historical sketch of any branch of knowledge, arises from our know- ing something of its leading and fundamental principles ; and this applies to the science of mind more, perhaps, than to any other.

The same cause which limited those elementary statements and reflexions, operated in curtailing the development and discussion of several systems of metaphysical speculation treated of in the work. It has often been to me a matter of deep regret, that my limits did not allow me to illustrate many inte- resting and important principles to the extent I de- sired, in order that they might be comprehensively and accurately understood. This will account, in

X PREFACE.

many instances, for the imperfect and circum- scribed notice of several theories, and their col- lateral branches; and for the abrupt discontinu- ance of my remarks, when perhaps a discussion had just reached that precise point at which it be- came most interesting to the inquirer. Consider- ing the extent of the ground over which I had to travel, and the numerous historical notices required, these imperfections, however much to be lamented, were unavoidable. I^ifty, instead of four volumes, would scarcely have sufficed to give any thing approaching to a full view of the different systems enumerated, and to point out all their bearings on each other, and on other departments of human knowledge.

One of the chief designs of this work has been to impart to it a universal character and interest; to make it, in some measure, as interesting to the philosopher of Paris as of London. With this vievf, a copious account of English and Foreign philo- sophical publications is given ; in order that those who feel an interest in mental pursuits may have as accurate and comprehensive a view of all that has been written on the philosophy of mind, as it was practicable in such a limited publication to afford. To remedy in some degree the imperfection of more extended elucidations and comments, on many foreign authors in particular, lists of their

PREFACE. XI

names and respective various publications will be found in the Notes appended to the work.

I feel myself under great obligations to many philosophical historians, both in my own country and abroad. I cannot, however, enumerate all from w^hom I have received assistance. Among English treatises, I have consulted Stanley, Cud- worth, and Enfield, with some slight advantages. To Dugald Stewart's Dissertation, prefixed to the last edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, I lie under considerable obligations. I am also much indebted to Mr. Ilallam ; and in perusing his " Literature of the Middle Ages," I have often experienced regret that he has not treated some mental speculations of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries at greater length. Every thing he says is so excellent, both in matter and in stvle, that on many occasions his brevity has been felt as a painful infliction. I tender my acknowledgments to Mr. Lewes for his recent able and useful "Biographi- cal History of Philosophy," though I must add that I cannot concur with the general aim and spirit of his speculative opinions. In examining the systems of philosophy of the present age, Mr. Morell's historical work, which is well entitled to the patronage and commendations it has received, has often been of service to me; and I have felt a peculiar pleasure in the perusal of his writings,

Xll PREFACE.

from the circumstance that his opinions and my own have so many points of resemhlance. To the Erench historians I owe much ; especially to De Gerando, Cousin, and Damiron ; and likewise to the lahours of Brucker, Emitter, Michelet, and other distinguished German authors.

Erom the wide range of inquiry I have taken, the varied topics on which I have commented, their innate complexity and diversified aspects, and, ahove all, from my own imperfections and shortcomings for such an important task, it is probable I may have fallen into errors, both as to matters of fact and of opinion. To candid and dispassionate criticism I cheerfully commit my labours with all their faults ; having every reason to believe, that, as the love of truth has ever been my polar star in their prosecution, the same feeling animates the spirit of criticism of modern times ; and that if correction be needed, it will only pro- ceed from generous and honourable motives ; and prove as beneficial to the receiver, as commendable to the giver.

London, Oc/. 1818.

CONTENTS.

P A O K .

Introduction xvii

CHAPTER T. On the Histories of Philosophy, Ancient and Modern 1

CHAPTER II. Mental Philosophy of Grefce. — The Ionic School: Thales — Anaximandcr — Anaxinieues — Ilermotinius of Cla- zoniene — Diogenes of Apollonia — Anaxagoras 5

CHAPTER III. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Italian School of Metaphysics : Pythagoras 1 7

CHAPTER IV. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Eleatic School of Metaphysics : Xenophanes — Parmenides — Melissus — Zeno of Elea — Ileraclitus 21

CHAPTER V. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Second Eleatic School of Philosophy : Empedocles — Leucippus — Democritus .... 35

CHAPTER VI. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Greek Sophists: Protagoras — Gorgias 42

CHAPTER VII.

Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Socrates Jl

CHAPTER VIII. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Cyrenic and Cy- nical Schools 5y

CHAPTER IX. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Schools of Megara, Elis, and Eretria : Euchd -V

XIV CONTENTS.

PAOK.

CHAPTER X. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Plato 59

CHAPTER XI. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Aristotle 72

CHAPTER XII. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy, considered in relation to Greek Philosophy . . 100

CHAPTER XIII. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Sceptical School of Metaphysics : Pyrrho 121

CHAPTER XIV. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — Epicurus 126

CHAPTER XV. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Stoical School of Metaphysics : Zeno — Chrysippus 130

CHAPTER XVI. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — On the Notions com- monly adopted by the Ancients, up to the Period of the Stoics, on the Origin of our Knowledge and the Nature of Truth 136

CHAPTER XVII. Mental Philosophy of Greece. — The Second Academy : Arcesilaus — Carneades — Philo — Antiochus — Clitomachus — Posidonius — Panoetius 143

CHAPTER XVIII. The Alexandrian School of Metaphysics ' 153

CHAPTER XIX. On the Notions entertained by the different Schools of Philo- sophy on the Nature of General Principles and Propositions, up to the time of the Foundation of the Alexandrian School 158

CHAPTER XX. The Roman School of Mental Philosophy. — Lucre- tius— Cicero — Alcinous — Maximus of Tyre — Alexander of A])hrodisias — Galen 166

CONTENTS. XV

CHAPTER XXI. TriE Latkr School of Metaphysical Scepticism. — .I'Enesiclemus — Agrippa — Phavorinus — Se.xtas Empiricus . . 182

CHAPTER XXII.

On the Opinions of Ancient Philosophers, up to this period of History, on a Deity and the Human Soul 1 1) I

CHAPTER XXIII. Mental Philosophy of India. — Sankhva and Yo2;a — . Bhagavad-Gliita — Nyaya and Vaisechika — Vedanta 207

CHAPTER XXIV. The Union of Eastern Doctrines with those or Greece and Rome. — Aristobulus — Philo — ApoUonius of Tyana — Plutarch — Lucius Apuleius — Xumenius 219

CHAPTER XXV, The Gnostic Metaphysicians 228

CHAPTER XXVI. The Metaphysical Principles of the New Plato- NiSTS. — Ammonius Saccas — Longinns — Plotinus — Por- phyry— Jamblicus — Proclus — Marinus — Isidore of Gaza . . 229

CHAPTER XXVII. On the Metaphysical DisQi;isrrioNS of the Ancient Fathers of the Church. — Justin Martyr — Tatian — St. Athenagoras — St. Theophilus — St. Pantsenus — Origen — St. Clement — Herm#s — TertuUian — Arnobius — Irenseus — Lactantius — Anatolius — St. Augustine — Nemesius — St, Gregory — Synesius — Claudianus ^lamertus — Boethius — ^lartin Capella — Cassiodorus — St. John Damascenus .... 244

CHAPTER XXVIII. Observations and Reflections, from Ascetic Wri- ters, on Matters connected with Reasoning and General Knowledge, — St. Peter the Anchorite — St.

Alonzo de Vega — Pelagius 2/7

CHAPTER XXIX. On the Principle of Authority, in Matters of Philosophy and Theology, maintained by the Fathers of the Church 300

/

/

/

xvi CONTENTS.

PAOK.

CHAPTER XXX. On Moral Evidence, after the Full Establishment of Christianity 3 1 1

CHAPTER XXXI. On the Opinions of the Fathers of the Church, on THE Liberty and Necessity of Human Actions. —

Isnatius — Justin Martyr — Tatian — Ireneeus — Clement of Alexandria — Tertullian — Origen — Cyprian — Eusebius — Athanasius — Cyril of Jerusalem — Hilary — Epiphanius — Basil — Gregory Nazianzen — Gregory of Nyssa — -Ambrose — Jerome — Augustine — Chrysostom — Theodoret 317

CHAPTER XXXII. On the Metaphysical Notions of the Arabians. —

Alkendi — Alfarabi — Avicenna — Algazeli — Avicebron — Averroes — Theophilus 340

CHAPTER XXXIII. The Persian Sophists. — Avenpace 3(i4

CHAPTER XXXIV. The Cabalistic Metaphysics 364

CHAPTER XXXV. On the Philosophy of the Jews. — Eben Ezra — Moses Maimonides 3G9

CHAPTER XXXVI. On Distinct Faculties of the Mind, as recognised by Philo- sophers up to the Ninth Century . . • 3/5

CHAPTER XXXVII. General Remarks on Faculties of the Mind, and of what may be urged against their individual Existence, Nature, and Operation 383

CHAPTER XXXVIII. On Saxon Metaphysics. — Alfred the Great — Alcuinus, or Albinus Flaccus — Bede ,411

Concluding Remarks 433

Notes and Illustrations 439

INTRODUCTION

Phi'losopiiy is a conipreliensivo term, and, in its fullest extent, embraces evorv tliinj? which a man can know and feel. Philosopliers are however, like otlier humbler workmen, obliged to divide their labours in order to ensure more successful and efTicient execution ; and accord- ingly we find that, from the first dawn ol' any thing like science and literature, all knowledge has been classified under three leading divisions ; namely, a knowledge of external bodies, of mental faculties or powers, and of moral duties or obliga- tions. In no possible state of human existence can • these three branches of thousrht be conceived in a state of complete isolation or independent opera- tion. There is a bond, an indissoluble union, con- necting them ; and the precise limits where one ends and another commences, it is impossible to point out Avith any thing like fractional nicety. But still this consideration does not prevent men from making useful and practical divisions, or from designating them by general terms. It has accordingly been almost universally proclaimed in all ages, that pliilosopliy may be substan- * b

Xviii INTHODUCTION.

tially divided into three leading parts ;— what can be known of nature, of God, and of man.

It has commonly been affirmed, that the consi- deration of visible nature is prior to every other inquiry. Whether this be correct or not, is of little moment to our present purpose. Man is evidently placed in an immense arena, and sees himself surrounded by a universe of infinite extent and variety. He feels the influence of external objects, and in turn exercises his power over them. What is the order and result of this reciprocity of action, is a matter of vital moment to him ; and he therefore institutes inquiries into the laws which regulate the movements and properties of external thm2:s. To these he ffives the name of Natural or JPhysical FMlosojjhy. This science has matter, and its various modifications, for its basis.

This inquiry into material bodies can scarcely be conceived in operation apart from some considera- tion of the thinking and active principle which conducts and guides it. Here the origin of mental science is placed. It has often been defined, but it is one of those branches of knowledge not suscep - tible of a formal and concise definition. Speaking generally, it has mind, both human and Divine, for its object. Aristotle terms it the first philo- sophy, not only on account of its superiority to all other branches of human w isdom, but also as being prior, in the order of time, to the whole of the arts and sciences. We cannot, however, lay much stress on the theories which attempt to account for the origin of speculative philosophy ; because

INTRODUCTION. XIX

it is quite obvious that speculations as to tlie beginning of things, their nature, and the laws which govern and regulate their existence, must have been coeval with the very first rudiments of human thought. Man is never able to refer to any- period in the liistory of his species, in which there was not some system of philosophy recognised. Every child, and every savage, is a philosopher in his way ; and the only difference between tlie scholar and the boor is, as to the relative degree in which each is able to investigate and arrang<^ the phenomena of existence. Both are, in their respective spheres, placed under the same govern- ment, and influenced by the same circumstances and events. But whatever opinion may be adopted on this point, certain it is, that mental science forms one of the three great divisions of human inquiry.

Another division of human thought, containing many important subdivisions, and which is clearly defined, arises from the very first wants and duties of human life. This department of knowledge relates to morals, or the conduct of mankind. In no situation of life can we conceive a total suspen- sion of the principles of morality. The obligations and bonds of connection which subsist between man and those around him, must form the first elements of his knowledge. These, like the physi- cal laws of the universe, are of a fixed, determined, and eternal character. They form the ground- work of Moral Philosophij .

The philosophy which springs out of and com- prehends a knowledge of mental systems, may be

62

XX INTRODUCTION.

viewed under several aspects. If we look at it merely through its naked or abstract principles, it is one thing ; if exclusively through its practical influence on the condition of human thought in a state of society, it is another thing ; and if both these be amalgamated with other branches of physical knowledge, it presents again altogether different features. Yet all possess a solid sub- stratum of truth ; and the propriety or obligation of taking any particular view of the philosophy of mind, can only be defended upon comprehensive considerations of what is in accordance with the general interest, judgment, and happiness of man- kind.

That it is a condition of human existence that some system of mental speculation should be cul- tivated, and be made to serve as a ground-work for other necessary and interesting studies, is a position as irrefragably true as important. It is a law of human thought that every thing shall centre in mind ; in a knowledge of its faculties or powers ; and in a thorough acquaintance with all those ge- neral conceptions which are incorporated in every intellectual manifestation or state of being. We cannot exile ourselves beyond the sphere of this influence ; for if we could, impenetrable darkness and ignorance would be our portion. It is not a matter of choice whether a man shall be ignorant of mental philosophy or not ; it is imperative that lie should cultivate it, if he is ever to attain a complete knowledge of other sciences. It is tlie portal through which he must pass to the inner

INTRODUCTION. XXI

temple of intellectual treasures. Mental pliilo- sopliy is not itself the sum of all knowledge, but the necessary instrument in the successful pro- secution of all other branches of human wisdom. Without it, every man is a child, an intellectual imbecile, and can have nothing valuable or abiding in him. To illustrate this point a little more fully, we shall make a fe^ observations on the indis- soluble and dependent connection between certain kinds of knowledge and the philosophy of mind.

We shall not dwell upon the obligations which even physical science lies under to metaphysical pursuits. We may, however, barely remark, in reply to the enthusiastic admirers of the positive philosophy, that they are not in a position to mould their own facts, nor to illustrate or me- thodise their views, even in reference to the sim- plest phenomena of the external world, nor can tlieir opinions and conclusions be enforced upon the attention of others, without the virtual recog- nition of principles which have an exclusive re- lationship with mental science. It is only by stepping beyond the strict limits of their own sphere, as mere .collectors of facts and observations, that they can be understood, either by themselves or by others. A system professing to be founded ou facts, and facts alone, is an inconceivable thing to the mind of man. The truth of this may be readily tested by the most superficial consideration of the subject.

Leaving, however, for the present, this part of the subject, we shall direct especial attention to three great divisions of human knowledge ; namely, mo-

XXll INTRODUCTION.

rality, religion, and politics. A profound acquaint- ance with all or any of these, must be obtained through the channels of mental science.

The science of morals is of a comprehensive character, and of universal interest. It affects all classes of mankind, from the king to the beggar. All its principles and facts, however, relate to mind ; they belong tb man's internal con- stitution ; they proceed from certain a priori sug- gestions or conditions of the human conscious- ness, and are not matters which come under the cognizance of the senses, or can be measured or weighed. What is involved in the terms moral freedom, morcd duty, moral ^responsibility , moral obligation, moral feelings, moral princip)les, emo- tions, passions, desires, reioards, and punishments ? Something, undoubtedly, of a purely mental cha- racter ; which, in order to be effectively analyzed, and brought to open day for the satisfaction of man's reason and interest, requires an intellectual process of the most subtile and refined kind. Here nature cannot be interrogated by material instruments ; we must deal with her solely through the means of our internal consciousness, and those liabits of inward analysis and deduction which can only be detected and efiiciently wielded by the mental philosopher. Eor a man to write pro- foundly and correctly on the principles of morals, without a respectable portion of metaphysical learning, would be as impossible as for a man born blind to write intelligibly and philosophically on light and colours.

Theology stands in nearlv the same relation as

INTRODUCTION. XXUl

morality to mental philosophy. The former has to deal with those principles of the mind which constitute the foundation of natural and revealed religion. Here cause and effect, existence, intel- ligence, wisdom, final causes, and an immense variety of other abstract conceptions of the human understanding, form the ground-work of theolo- gical science, and create and support its entire principle of vitality. We have the existence of the Supreme Being, His moral government, the naind's immateriality and immortality, the whole science of morality as contrasted and compared with the morality of the Scriptures, the doctrines of revealed religion considered in relation to the course of nature and the inward suggestions of the human soul ; and a thousand other matters, any one of which is sufficient to occupy the active mind of man during a whole life time, in order to fully illus- trate and enforce it in all its bearings and rami- fications. But in this extensive field of speculation and interest, nothing can be done without a know- ledge of mental subjects. Divines may, and in fact do, regulate their acquirements in metaphysical lore according to their individual circumstances, tastes, and mental capabilities ; but the theologian is not to be envied who can enter a pulpit, or commit his theological thoughts to the public through the press, totally unacquainted with the general out- lines of mental speculations. Indeed this fact is so well understood, that among nearly every class of Christian teachers, it is now an established part of theological tuition, that the candidates for

XXiv INTRODUCTION.

the office of the ministry shall possess a competent knowledge of metaphysical science, before they can be qualified for holy orders.

Politics as a science, not viewed through the medium of party, are essentially founded on men- tal knowledge, and their general principles are of a spmtual or abstract cast. They have also an in- timate and necessary relationship with morality and theology. All declarations of personal rights and freedom, allegiance, civil and criminal codes of laws and jurisprudence, or the law of nations, are severally founded on abstract principles of thought, and have their seat in the deep and inward recesses of the soul. We have only to look at the constitu- tional charters of any state or kingdom, to be con- vinced of the refined and mental abstractions of which they are composed. The science of juris- prudence, for example, is chiefly constituted of a multitude of recondite maxims, of which, unless a man has some knowledge of metaphysical subjects, and is well acquainted with the rules and principles of abstract reasoning, he can never be able fully to comprehend the justice and soundness, nor their applicability to the state of human affairs.

If such, then, be the intimate connection between these three most important departments of human knowledge, and the philosophy of mind, how ne- cessary and obligatory is it that we should assi- duously cultivate it, and should form to ourselves comprehensive views of its nature, limits, purposes, and ends. It ought to constitute an important branch of every young man's education, particularly

INTRODUCTION. XXV

if he be destined to pursue any professional occupa- tion. Unless habits of inward reflection are formed and cultivated in earlv life, and the rules of mental analysis and deduction are familiarised to the mind, it is impossible to rear any great or respectable superstructure of philosophical expertness upon the best and most enlightened systems of public or private tuition. Such systems may make ^full, but not a clever man.

Of late years a lively interest has been awakened in regard to the history of speculative opinions. The European mind has been aroused from a state of comparative apathy, and is now bent on testing every principle and every fact, both by historical evidence and by logical deduction. We are called upon to trace opinions from the most remote pe- riods of time, and to view them in conjunction with institutions and modes of thinking of the pre- sent day. This extensive inquiry is considered by various classes of men in different lights, and with different feelings; some mth aversion, and some with approval; some with an anxious desire to effect social improvements, and promote know- ledge ; and some, unhappily, to throw impediments and doubts in the path of human progress. Still, however, powerful sympathies have been awakened ; and we may rationally hope that it only requires time, and suitable seasons of calm and dispas- sionate reflection, to realize important benefits from their exercise.

In Germany the spirit of speculative inquiry

XXVI INTRODUCTION.

has, for nearly a century, displayed remarkable activity. It lias formed one of the leading branches of public education, and conducted its cultiva- tors to distinction and renown. It has been made subservient to the elucidation of every other de- partment of the philosophy of human nature, and thrown a steady light on many problems which had previously been enshrouded in almost impene- trable darkness. In Prance the same activity has prevailed for nearly the same period. Here, too, speculative philosophy has imparted a higher tone to the general current of literature and scientific investigations, and has been eminently successful in adding to the general stock of rational and en- lightened inquiry. Italy has likewise partaken in some measure of the prevailing enthusiasm, and has relaxed the hitherto inflexible severity of aus- tere injunctions against novel doctrines and opi- nions ; and has, consequently, extended the bless- ings of intellectual liberty among her people. And the same may be remarked of several other conti- nental nations. In proportion as mental philo- sophy has broken in upon the dull and stupifying routine of antiquated and worn-out systems of edu- cation and academical instruction, in the same pro- portion do we trace a favourable change in the general current of the public mind. The spirit of man feels the salutary influences of unrestricted freedom, and enters upon that state which is most conducive to the full and cfi'ective exercise of all its loftier and more ennobling powers and energies. True it is, that these advantages from the

INTRODUCTION. XXVll

ardent cultivation of speculative topics, are not invariably obtained without some serious draw- backs and inconveniences. In Germany and Erance, in particular, there has unquestionably been manifested at intervals a philosophical spirit but little in harmony with the progress of rational knowledge, and the best and most sacred interests of man. The unfettered liberty of thought has in these countries occasionally run into licentiousness. The philosophic mind has degraded itself, and out- raged common sense and common feeling. But still Ave must hold the balance with a steady and even hand. It seems to be one of the necessary conditions of human progress, that no great ad- vances shall be made in the intellectual acquire- ments of nations, nor in the firm and complete consolidation of those important abstract principles which lie at the root of their civilization, pros- perity, and freedom, without some corresponding disadvantages, though of an evanescent or tran- sitory nature. The public mind, long pent up within a narrow sphere, often rebounds beyond its wholesome and natural limits, when its fetters are taken off and all forcible restrictions removed. It revels in the wild and frantic enjoyment of its liberty, and feels but little inclination for the moment to listen to the dictates of soberness and truth. But this feverish state passes over, and seasons of solid thought and reflection succeed, bearing the fruits of real wisdom and matured experience. And an appeal can safely be made to all who have any thing like a competent know^ledge

XXVlll INTRODUCTION.

of the general literature of Germany and Prance, that, amid much speculative inquiry of a question- able kind, and not a little positively unsound and injurious, there is still a very striking improvement manifested in every branch of general informa- sion in these countries within the last century, in which abstract reasoning is especially required, and where the human mind is called forth to ex- ercise all its higher powers of rationalistic dex- terity. And this advancement in the loftier walks of literature and science, may be fairly attributed to the impetus given to the general intellect, by the ardent study of the principles of mental phi- losophy.

Mental studies have not been much cultivated in Great Britain for the last three quarters of a century. In Scotland, however, they have main- tained a respectable footing ; and almost all per- sons intended for the church, the bar, or public offices of any description, make it a point to go through a regular course of study in metaphysical science. In England it is otherwise. Here it can be scarcely said to form any portion of acade- mical instruction. This may be attributed to many causes. The preponderance of mechanical and commercial pursuits among ns, naturally in- disposes the great masses of even intelligent and reflecting people to view speculative or purely in- tellectual investigations with a friendly and en- couraging eye. What is material, palpable, and immediately profitable, becomes the grand and engrossing object of interest. The external sources

INTRODUCTION. XXIX

of enjoyment and happiness prevail over the men- tal or spiritual ; and this sentiment pervades the whole mass of the people, impartini^; to the national mind a strong material tendency. Again, those who, from inclination and their position in society, were fitted to take a leading part in the discussion and propagation of the prin- ciples of mental philosophy, have for more than half a century entertained doubts as to its benefits, chiefly from the circumstance that the mystical and idealistic notions so rankly prevalent in some parts of the continent, might be possibly trans- planted into England, and corrupt the mind of the nation, and withdraw it from those important ob- jects on which it ought invariably to rest. That there is something plausible in these apprehensions, must be conceded. But a little further inquiry into the nature of all speculative doctrines, and into the modes and degrees in which they influence the current thought of a people, would cer- tainly have the effect of greatly mitigating, if it did not entirely remove, any such anticipated sources of danger. For how stands the real position of the question ? There is no stopping, successfully, the progress of inquiry of a whole na- tion ; if you close any particular avenue of thought, another must be opened in its stead. It becomes, therefore, purely a question as to the choice of evils. If we have eschewed the dangers from mystical and idealistic theories, we have un- questionably encouraged the growth of a cold and lifeless materialism, which operates, in a thousand

XXX INTRODUCTION.

unperceived modes, to banish all lofty moral and religious feelings from the minds of men. By an undue encouragement of physical science, with a view to make it supply the whole of the mental wants of the nation, we insensibly, though power- fully, and from the very nature of things, throw the mind of man entirely upon a species of know- ledge calculated, when it fully and exclusively engrosses his affections and energies, to limit the powers of his intellect, and to strip them of their most ennobling and glorious attril^utes. By con- sequently dwelling on material phenomena, and making mere secondary causes objects of the mind's attention, we gradually descend from the lofty and improving regions of thought, and consider the Supreme Being, and all the wonders of intellec- tual nature, as only results and modifications of tlie visible things around us. This is neither a natural nor advantageous mode of procedure. The practical and the theoretical should invariably bo conjoined in the intellectual culture of all men ; inasmuch as this is the only mode which nature has appointed for steadily preserving a hold on their affections, and preventing them from lapsing into any irremediable state of apathetic indifference, or sordid, unqualified selfishness.

When we come to look narrowly at the influence of physical science on tlie minds of the masses of the people, we are struck with its limited range, and its cold and evanescent impressions. The laws of the material world seldom occupy more than a

INTRODUCTION. XXxi

passing moment's reflection; and the improve- ments which mechanical science may bring to tl\e workman's fire-side, he accepts and uses as a mere matter of course, but never makes them anxious objects of his thoughts or contemplations. He is under an almost instinctive conviction, that it is an affair which does not particularly concern him. And the same thing is true of every other class of society. The elements of thought and reflection are of another cast. They relate to other objects apart from the laws and qualities of mate- rial bodies. Does the intelligent mechanic dwell any length of time upon the principles of his art ; upon the formulas of the screw, the lever, or the inclined plane ? Docs he make them the con- stant objects of his thought and solicitude ? By no means. His mind is elsewhere. He lives with his wife, his family, his relations, his countrymen ; and, it is hoped, with his God. It is the l)onds, the connections, the sympathies, the feelings, the hopes, the fears, the cares, and anxieties, which arise out of the relationship he stands in as a son, a parent, a member of society, and an immor- tal spirit, which fill the measure of his thoughts, and give life and interest to his existence. What a slender hold have all material agents upon him ? What to him the number or nature of the laws which regulate their movements ; the great law of gravitation, or the atomic theory of chemical affinities ? Scarcely any thing. They touch but very lightly indeed the vital and stirring principles

XXXU INTRODUCTION.

of his being. They are not the staple articles of his intellectual sustenance and strength. The social, the moral, the political, the domestic ties of life, are the objects of his constant interest and unceasing solicitude. He rests upon intellectual and moral manifestations ; and always allows the phenomena of the material world, numerous and wonderful though they be, to hang loosely about him, and never for a moment suffers them to be placed in competition with the claims, obligations, and duties of humanity.

It is not the natural philosopher ; it is not the Newtons, the Laplaces, the Davys, however vene- rable their names may in the abstract be, who most excite the sympathies of mankind, and engross their undivided attention. These are not the house- hold gods which universal humanity sympathe- tically worships. It is men who develop the prin- ciples of mind ; who make human nature their study ; who unfold the latent thoughts, purposes, and principles of human feeling and action ; who distinguish themselves as lawgivers, statesmen, historians, theologians, poets, painters, and writers on the every-day movements and phases of human life. These find kindred spirits in all ages and countries ; and enjoy a reputation and fame, founded on infinitely more noble and interesting objects, than those on which rest the cold and formal approbations conferred on the physical philosopher, or the zealous disciple of positive science.

INTRODUCTION. XXXlll

"VVe contend, therefore, that the decided pre- dilection for physical science manifested in Eng- land, and for the rules and principles of reasoning necessarily involved in and derived from it, is not grounded upon an enlarged conception of the na- ture and purposes of human knowledge, nor of the advantages to be realised by the national mind from its extended cultivation. We readily admit, as a true and general maxim, that all knowledge is more or less improving ; but it by no means follows that when we unduly confine the public mind within certain prescribed limits, and only call into exercise one set or class of its faculties or powers, we are doing our best to advance the cause of popular instruction, and to elevate the sentiments of the nation to their loftiest point of general improvement. On the contrary, we liumbly conceive that we are, by sketching out and ado[)t- ing such a narrow and contracted system, milita- ting against one of the plainest and most impera- tive dictates or laws of our nature ; and if we ol)- stinately persist in pursuing such a course, we must fully expect to reap those bitter fruits which are the inevitable result of violating one of the estabKshed canons of nature's decrees. To effect the intellectual refinement of a people, there must be a judicious combination of all the different elements of knowledge and thought ; and among the chief and most influential of these, is the sci- ence of human nature.

It must not, however, be inferred from these remarks, that, in order to comprehend other

c

XXxiv INTRODUCTION.

branches of knowledge and science, it is absolutely requisite that we should be intimately acquainted with mental philosophy, and be able to trace its his- tory with accuracyand minuteness. In the pursuitof information we are frequently obliged to take many principles for granted, without being able to prove their truth. All that we contend for is, that the science of mind is more or less a necessary ingre- dient in all human investigations, and that we cannot hope to take a conspicuous part in any department of general knowledge, without either tacitly or experimentally adopting many of the most essential axioms on which the fundamental movements of the intellect depend. The active principles of intelligence must be either theore- tically or practically recognised and understood, before we can successfully apply them to any purpose whatever.

Nosystem of education can be considered more mea- gre and imperfect, than that which entirely excludes the philosophy of mind from its range of inquiry. One of the chief benefits of instruction is entirely lost ; that which enables us to cultivate both the active and reasoning powers of the mind, and to strengthen and mature them to that degree of excellence which is indispensably requisite to secure us against adopting the most erroneous opinions, and the most glaring and palpal)le absurdities.

One of the most powerful causes, perhaps, which have operated to clieck the general cultivation of speculative philosophy among a certain class of in-

INTRODUCTION. XXXV

telligent people, not only in England but in other countries, is the conception that its history pre- sents nothing but a wild chaos of abstruse systems, of conflicting opinions, and unshapely chimeras ; the natural tendency of which is to lead men into error, to fill their minds with shadows and de- lusions, and to excite false hopes and expectations, l^his is the popular accusation brought against the philosophy of mind, and on which rest the apathy and scepticism commonly felt and expressed as to its nature and benefits. But a moment's calm reflection will immediately dissipate this rash conclusion and vulgar prejudice. That there are various and con- flicting opinions relative to some of the funda- mental principles of the science, and to their in- fluence upon, and applicability to, other branches of human investigation, is an indisputable truth ; but this admission does not compromise the va- lidity and importance of mind, considered as an independent and legitimate branch of philosophical inquiry. We find the same spirit of disputation and contention prevailing among those who culti- vate every kind of knowledge. The abstract prin- ciples on which they all rest, are more or less matters of discussion, and are subjected to a va riety of judgments and opinions. But this state of things proves nothing. It is the very nature, essence, and province of knowledge, to separate the true from the false, the hypothetical and con- jectural from the certain and conclusive, the good from the bad, and the expedient from the inexpe-

c2

XXXvi TNTRODUCTIOX.

dient. How great is the importance of morality both to individuals and to whole nations ; it is the very life blood of their social and confederated existence. But where shall we find a theory of morality Avhich is not open to a difference of opi- nion, or which is fully adequate to account for all the moral manifestations, rules, principles, obliga- tions, and ideas of merit and demerit, which dis- play themselves in the wide arena of the moral universe ? Again, the science of politics is of the highest possible interest to man ; but to what con- tentions, varieties of sentiment and opinion, and bitter conflicts, does it not give rise ? Where is the writer who has ever penned a political system or theory which has been universally, or even ge- nerally, received ? Why the very abstract maxims or principles on which all societies of men rest, are at the present moment, in spite of all the learning and scientific investigations of three thousand years, speculative objects of the most opposite and conflicting nature, among the able and intelligent legislative philosophers and politicians of all coun- tries. If, again, we cast an eye to religion, we find the primary principles of both natural and re- vealed theology matters of every-day and eager discussion, and susceptible of being viewed through various mediums ; and the same is applicable to legal science. Where shall we find a greater dis- similarity of judgment than that to which the laws and customs of various people give rise ? Nay, we shall advance a step further, and maintain that even physical science, which prides itself on

INTRODUCTION. XXXVll

its 2)osUive results, is not removed beyond the pale of differences of opinion, and conflicting judgments, relative to many of its theories, principles, and conclusions. Now, taking all these matters into consideration, would a man act wisely or con- sistently, were he to conclude, that, because in morals, politics, religion, law, and physical science, we find opposite theories and conflicting judg- ments supported by those who cultivate these respective departments of knowledge, he is war- ranted in afiirming that they are all delusions, and that there is not the slightest substratum of truth or logical validity for them to rest upon ? Certainly not. A man who should entertain an opinion of this sort, and endeavour to act upon it, would be deemed unfit to be reasoned with on any subject whatever.

What we claim therefore from ordinary candour and consistency is, that mental science be placed upon the same footing as other branches of know- ledge. That there are differences of opinion about its fundamental truths, we readily admit ; but they are neither greater in number, nor more discordant in their nature, than what appertain to almost every other topic of philosophical investigation. And it certainly appears the height of incon- sistency for us to assume that there is no truth whatever in that particular science the principles of which are absolutely necessary to ascertain and to adjudge the amount and nature of truth to be found in every other subject. Of all perverse modes of reasoning, this must appear to be the

XXXVlll INTllODUCTION.

most self-contradictory and unsatisfactory to every well-regulated and candid mind.

As it is with mental science alone that we have immediately to do, we shall just briefly notice some of those general maxims or elementary principles, which seem to have been either logically demon- strated or tacitly assumed, in almost every system of speculation alluded to in this history of philo- sophy. A voluminous record of this kind, extend- ing over more than two thousand years, offers, at first sight, a somewhat perplexing aspect to even scientific minds ; but a little examination into the matter, and an ordinary degree of exercise of the power of generalization, will soon enable the intel- ligent and attentive reader to detect, amid the crowd of objects which present themselves, some distinctive land-marks which will serve to lead him out of the apparent labyrinth of endless specula- tion, and impart to his mind some steadiness of jiurpose. The diversity of systems and theories is, strictly speaking, more in appearance than in reality ; for we often find, that though their ex- ternal dress be very diversified, yet when we look narrowly at them, we soon recognise an affinity or sameness among the principles which form the nucleus of a great variety of speculative fabrics. The importance of these varied illustrations of the same fundamental positions, cannot, on many occasions, be too highly estimated ; but still it is always valuable to observe the philosophic rule of looking at the elementary propositions on which different views of the human mind profess to rest.

INTRODUCTION. XXXIX

It is this susceptibility of the principles of mental science to be viewed throug-h various mediums, and to be Illustrated by materials drawn even from opposite quarters, that imparts so much real interest to tliis branch of knowledge, and makes it such a necessary and useful instrument for the testing of truths in other departments of human inquiry.

And here it may be remarked, that the illustra- tions of principles connected with the human mind in all its grand aspects and divisions, stand so prominently distinct, — possess such an indivi- duality of character, in their susceptil)ility of being varied, to an almost infinite extent, in every thing belonging to the mere physical investigations of the universe, — that we perceive at a glance the ra- dical distinction between the truths of natural phi- losophy and those of human nature. A treatise on Astronomv, Ilvdrostatics, or Chemistrv, is always the same, with the exception of recent dis- coveries, which are simply stated as matters of fact, and are linked to the general mass already accumulated. Writers in any of these depart- ments of knowledge, follow each other in a beaten track, and have no latitude whatever for invention. There is no want of inclination to impart novelty and interest to physical science ; but its cultivators have no room to effect any such thing. They travel in a path bounded by a lofty wall on each side, which shut out nine-tenths of nature from their view ; and, consequently, they have liberty neither to turn to the right hand nor to the left. But

xl INTRODUCTION.

wliat different circumstances accompany the illus- trations of truths springing' out of the deep re- cesses of the human lieart and understanding. How susceptible are they of infinite variation, and of becoming inexhaustible sources of interest. Conviction and mental pleasure rush at once into the soul from a thousand channels ; and yet the perfect identity between the leading principles of human thought and action is never weakened or destroyed. The grand outlines of humanity are always visible. The truths of mind, of religion, of morals, of politics, of matters of intellectual taste, of the every- day movements of life, passion, and desire, are each of them the never-failing fountains from which the streams of human wis- dom and genius perennially flow, to gladden and cheer the heart of man, and to impart to him that necessary mental sustenance, the ceaseless cravings for which constitute one of the striking character- istics of his being. The scientific classifications of the natural philosopher die almost the moment they are born ; but not so the speculations of the mental philosopher, the moralist, the divine, the dramatic writer, or the poet ; these enjoy a per- petual youth, and time itself stamps upon their respective eflPusions the seal of immortality.

We may now observe, in the first place, that one of the leading positions which seem to be esta- blished by the historical statements and details of philosophy in all countries and ages, is, that mind and matter are two separate and distinct things. The whole current of speculation scarcely fur-

INTRODUCTION. xli

nishes us Avitli any thiug approaching to a single comjilete theory, which in all its aspects, and in all its logical deductions, points to an opposite principle. The mind of man, in every state of ex- istence of which we have any authentic record, has always been struggling to give utterance to this fundamental truth, or manifestation of its inward consciousness. It assumes, it is true, a variety of appearances, but it constantly retains the unity of its character intact. Erom the banks of the Thames to the banks of the Ganges ; from the first mutterino's of science in the East, to the finished philosophical productions of the present hour ; this truth has never ceased its influence over the minds of countless millions of our race, who have passed through life under external circum- stances and with speculative theories infinitely varied. Here there is a solemn unity of universal assent, which no hardihood of assertion can deny, nor captious sophistry gainsay.

In the second place, it may be observed, that we clearly perceive, from the whole range of ancient philosophy, that the religious spirit was more or less incorporated Avith it ; that man was considered as of a heavenly origin, and as possessing a more refined and elevated nature than the mere animals around him. It was also clearly taught, from the same authority, that all investigations into the structure of his intellect, could only be successfidly pro- secuted by constantly keeping in view this double relationship or dependence. Whenever, therefore, we set out in our philosophical inquiries into the

Xlii INTRODUCTION.

nature of mental phenomena upon an opposite tack, and contemplate man with the sole view of referring them to the same laws, and subjecting them to the same logical ordeal, which govern and influence other creatures around us, we do, in fact, not only run counter to the universal experience and testimony of mankind, most indisputably and unequivocally expressed ; but we also find that all doctrines, founded on such a mode of investigation, are not only lamentably defective in point of logical merit, but, when reduced to practice, bear fruits inimical to the moral and intellectual im- provement and well-being of man.

And do we not witness the verification of this truth in every stage of the history of speculative principles ? The whole course of human progress, since the first dawn of letters, bears testimony to the fact, that mankind have received incalcuable be- nefits from the belief in the existence of the theolo- gical principle. Man is thus viewed as fitted for a higher destiny than other terrestrial and animated beings ; and we feel assured also, that in proportion as he keeps this opinion steadily before him in all his philosophical researches, the universe around him and the general course of events inspire him with a firm persuasion that he is endowed with faculties and powers expressly fitted for exercise, and to be eminently productive of benefit to mankind, and glory to the Creator of his existence. This con- clusion does not rest upon a mere theoretical con- jecture ; it is susceptible of incontrovertible de- monstration, from the records of history, as well as

iNTiiODUCTioN. xliii

from the overpowering feelings and convictions of the human heart.

Every form which the great theological principle assumes in the history of philosophy, rests upon the position of mind, connected with a creative and y over ning power. The notions of mental operations, and those of a Deity, are purely elemental, and seem to be co-existent in the inward consciousness of man. Whether this primary truth can be fully demonstrated, either psychologically or ontologi- cally, we need not stop here to determine ; but certain it is, that the history of men's opinions strikingly proves that it lies at the root of every form of speculation, and seems to be one of those necessary and fundamental axioms, without which all reasoning is nugatory, all mental conviction impossible, and human life a dream.

And we further feel confident, that a candid and accurate consideration of theories of philosophy will lead the mind to perceive, that there is nothing in the general constitution of them hostile to the leading features and doctrines of the Christian sys- tem. In fact, there exists a surprising harmony between all speculative theories which have any degree of truth or solidity in them, and the ele- mentary principles of revealed theology ; and phi- losophic truth and theological truth will be found, in almost all cases, to act and re-act on each other, to the mutual elucidation and advantage of both. What may be termed the metaphysics of the Bible, if such an expression may be allowed, are in strict keeping with every thing which has been ob-

Xliv INTRODUCTION.

served and recorded, by the universal assent of mankind, relative to intellectual plienomena. There is no radical or constitutional discrepancy between them. The authoritative declarations of Scripture are intelligible only because they rest on the general perceptions and judgments of men; and the high purposes and hopes with which Reve- lation is conversant, are, in every case, powerfully and universally responded to by the most charac- teristic feelings and impulses of human nature.

The religious principle is, therefore, a necessary and wholesome ingredient in every system of speculative thought or inquiry. Nothing is in- telligible without it. It speaks with a thousand tongues ; and like the universal ether, to which it has often been made to claim affinity, pervades all nature, and is ever present to the mind of man. Its manifestations are sometimes faintly traceable in his mental physiology, and even oftimes they become the sport of the wildest vagaries and most fantastical caprice ; but we think not, we act not, without their co-operation, or beyond the pale of their influence.

In the third place, the existence and certainty of a number of a priori mental principles or conceptions, are decidedly recognised in every system of philoso- phy of which there are any full or regularly classified details. These original ideas become the life-spring of thought, and the steady guides of the under- standmg. They depend upon nothing capricious, variable, evanescent, or transitory ; they form the primitive foundations of all human observation,

INTRODUCTION. xlv

experience, and reasoning. From whence they are derived, and how regulated and guided, it is not our province here to inquire ; it is sufficient to state that there will not be found, in all the historical sketches of systems of which we have any account, a single instance where their existence is not tacitly or expressly acknowledged.

In the fourth place, we shall find, from an accurate study of history, that philosopliy is of a progressive character. Though its principles are abstract, and of ana piHori description, yet their full and complete development rests with time. We find this depicted on the lineaments of philosophi- cal speculation, from the remotest ages to the present hour. Unquestionably there have been very great vicissitudes in the progress of mental knowledge. Sometimes it would seem to have been almost sta- tionary ; then to have made a sudden bound in a forward direction ; and again to lia^e relapsed into a state of quietude and apatliy. But still, on the whole, a decided and permanent progress was in- variably secured. This onward course was not, however, characterised by the discovery and de- velopment of neto truths or principles of human nature, but in illustrating the individual operations of those already known, and in more accurately tracing out their respective bearings on other important and collateral branches of human investigation. There is not, in fact, a principle of the human mind in our most approved modern treatises on its nature and faculties, which may not be found among the speculations of the Grecian philosophers : but still we have greatly the ad-

Xlvi INTRODUCTION.

vantage over the ancients, in the copiousness of illustrations ; the nicer processes of analytical and deductive reasoning ; in displaying the power and influence ofmental science over other subjects; and, above all, in those refined yet solid distinctions, which we can now make on almost every topic connected with man, as a thinking, moral, religious, and social being. It is this expansiveness or am- plification of the primary elements of mind, which constitutes the progressive character of philoso- phical speculations on its powers or faculties ; inasmuch as it more completely opens out to our view the whole arcana of thought, in many of those sudden and rapid operations which were inade- quately comprehended by antiquity, and ap- peared in the eyes of some of the ancient sages as partaking of the character of individual and instinctive imj)ulses.

Besides this, there is a progressive character stamped upon every thing we behold. The Avhole economy of human nature proclaims it. We instinctively follow it from the cradle to the grave. There is no human being without a regularly formed system of speculative or theoretical know- ledge, relative to his own nature and to that of the beings around him, however crude or limited it may be ; and when we come to analyse this theory, we find it made up of varied materials, some illustrative of this principle, and some of that. Order, method, selection, revisal, are conspicuous everywhere; and the sum total of an ordinary man's views of himself, and of human life generally, is a perfect epitome of the more elaborate and sja-

INTRODUCTION. xlvii

tematic treatises of the philosopher. We recognise in both the progressive character of the mind ; one truth is made predominant here, and another there ; one subject is considered in this light, and another in that ; weeding out the errors of yester- day by the fuller experience of to-day ; and, in fact, invariably labouring towards a state of ideal har- mony and perfection, and always making a decided step towards its attainment. This is the condition of humanity, and the whole body of human know- ledge, and particularly mental philosophy, is marvellously confirmatory of the fact.

Indeed, to plead for the eclectic, or progressive, philosophy, is but a very trite and common-place affair; since it is nothing more nor less than to argue for that wholesome equilibrium among the leading branches of man's knowledge and springs of action, which all ages of the world, and all sects of philosophers, have more or less recog- nised as one of the indispensable conditions of human thought, power, and happiness. To be convinced of the utility of this, we have only to conceive for a moment, man, as now constituted, under the exclusive control of any one of the three grand divisions of human investigation, nature, mind, and God. Were he merely incessantly look- ing at the material changes and operations of things around him, he would be nothing more than a mere statue or vegetable excrescence ; he might be said to exist, but not to live. Again, were men entirely engrossed by the feelings and movements of their minds, and to take no heed of external things,

Xlviii INTRODUCTION.

they could liot exist a single day. And, finally, were we continually making the nature, attril)utes, and mode of government of the Deity, exclusive objects of our perpetual contemplation, we should only he attempting to do what is impossible. So that every thing depends upon a due and propor- tional sul3ordination of one thing to another ; and this is the reason why the progressive character is imposed upon human knowledge, in order that it might be reared up into an immense and splendid temple, by the aggregate and universal thought of mankind.

Let us just cast a glance over the speculative opinions of mankind, and we shall instantly perceive the progressive character of mental philosophy. In Greece there was a system of great intellectual excellence, embracing within its range nearly all the primary principles of a comprehensive and matured body of thought. These were discussed by the Greeks in a manner and with a tact peculiarly their own ; but towards the latter years of their political glory and inde- pendence, their speculations seemed to have been nearly worn out, and to have become decidedly tame and insipid. The Christian dispensation gave new life to human speculation. The Greek philosophybecame amalgamated with it ; and novel and highly interesting philosophical combinations were the result. New light was thrown on a thou- sand important questions connected with the na- ture of man, with which the Greek mind was unable to grapple alone. The philosophy of the Chris-

INTRODUCTION. xllX

tian Fatliers was followed by that of the School- men ; and, as far as the science of human nature was concerned, there was another step gained in a forward direction, Por though we are apt to talk glibly, and with no small degree of self-compla- cency, of the dark ages ; yet no one who is even tolerably acquainted with the nature and history of the philosophy of this period, can be ignorant that, independently of mere abstract investigations on mind, and of the principles of doctrinal theo- logy, all the most important laws and institutions of European society were dug out of the mines of this ponderous and inexhaustible mass of human speculation. And we need scarcely add, that since the days of the Scholastic inquiries, we have made considerable progress, particularly in all our phi- losophical methods of investigation and reasoning, in shewing the mental dependencies, bearings, and relationships which subsist among all branches of knowledge ; and in what way, and to what degree, they can be advantageously cultivated and applied. It must be interesting to all cultivators of the science of intellect to have some general idea of the present state of speculation, both at home and abroad ; and to observe those philosophical ten- dencies which the mental investigations of parti- cular countries decidedly manifest. There never was, however, a period in the history of mankind, when it was more difficult to predict, with any thing approaching to certainty or probability, the turn which the speculative ideas of nations may

d

1 INTRODUCTION.

take, than at the present moment.* We see men's minds in every direction moved and agitated in a remarkable manner. The first principles of all human knowledge are called in question, and sub- jected to the most rigid logical ordeal. What was mere theory, thrown with off-hand indifference upon the surface of intellectual society but a few years ago, is now brought upon the arena of prac- tical life, and is attempted to be made the ground- work of sweeping legislative enactments and social innovations. The horizon of thought seems dark, overcharged, and threatening; and the prophetic power of the most comprehensive and penetrating sagacity is almost entirely paralyzed. At such a moment we instinctively fall back upon the eternal law of progressive improvement, and dwell upon the anticipations derived from a species of opti- mism, more or less vigorous in every human breast, that '* all things are for the best." Hopeless despair is never a justifiable sentiment either in nations or individuals. On the contrary, we are called upon to look at the cheering side of things, from many weighty considerations. We therefore place un- limited confidence in the imperishable nature of mind. All its movements have for their grand aim, the ultimate increase of man's real know- ledge, and the promotion of his happiness. There may be seasons of mental aberration ; of reckless and discontented movements of the inner man ; but these are but transitory, and last only for

* September, 1848.

INTRODUCTION. U

a season. The intellectual apparatus of a nation soon rights itself. The influence of error is commonly prompt in its manifestations, and the progress of truth slow. Pifty or a hundred years are but as a hand's-breadth in the life of a whole people ; and on this account we are called upon to check impatience and cherish hope. In the men- tal commotion of kingdoms, " the darkest hour is nearest to the dawn;" and after a few convulsive throes and struggles, a brighter era arises ; and more refined, spiritual, and rational views occupy the mind of the nation.

As we have already noticed, the philosophy of mind has been assiduously cultivated in many continental countries, within the last century. In Germany this has been particularly the case. But Germany is just one of those places where it is extremely difficult to draw general conclusions from the intellectual movements of its philo- sophers. Though speculation has there a decidedly national character, yet its details are so multifa- ftr

rious and incongruous, that anything like accurate generalization becomes almost impossible; and anticipations of its future progress and prospects are difficult to realize. Philosophical inquirers have there taken unusual directions; have penetrated into every arcanum of the material and spiritual world ; have by turns doubted all things and de- fended all things; have moulded and theorised every aspect or phase of human thought and life into a thousand forms ; so that we have but a very feeble guarantee indeed for the fulfilment of any

d2

Hi INTRODUCTION.

prediction wliich may be hazarded ou the move- ments of spirits so bold, ambitious, and versatile.

Looking, however, at the general features of German speculation within the last thirty years, we perceive a manifest change for the better. We see common sense and reason more generally re- cognised ; and a growing desire among all the leading minds of the country to weed out of the national philosophy whatever is wild, incompre- hensible, unsound, and irrational. The nation has become sick of speculation for the mere sake of speculating, and of doubt for the mere sake of doubting. Sober and thinking men sigh for something solid and satisfying; something more valuable than the fantastical absurdities of by-gone times. Every year we witness a decided move- ment towards a healthier state of things. The waters are subsiding to their natural level, leaving in every direction large portions of speculative debris behind them. Spiritualism is gradually becoming more material, and materialism more spiritual ; so that the absurdities from the ex- tremes of both sources of inquiry mil soon lie obliterated l3y doctrines of a more intermediate and reconcileable complexion. Idealism will be made subservient to lofty and interesting purposes, and will ultimately coerce empirical facts and principles into wholesome and fruitful channels of thought and action. On the other hand, the natural tendency of pure spiritualism to degenerate into rhapsodical and incomprehensible vagaries, will receive a wholesome check by the power of deduc-

INTRODUCTION. liii

tive reasoning and accurate observation. And thus do we hope, that ere many years pass away, sound and enlightened systems of mental philo- sophy will be everywhere prevalent in the high seats of intelligence throughout the whole of the Germanic empire.

Perhaps we may take upon us to add, before closing our observations on Germany, that the con- flict in this country, at the present moment, lies between a rational spiritualism and an absolute and uncompromising materialism. The latter is the last enemy which the spirit of reform has to vanquish. The venerable and learned Baron Hum- boldt leads the way in the empirical philosophy of his country ; and we cannot but feel deep regret in witnessing a long and arduous life spent in the promotion of physical science, having nothing better to cheer it, or to leave as a legacy to man- kind, even at the grave's mouth, than a material and primordial necessity, and a deep *' sense of insecurity" in every philosophical system which professes to maintain that there is any thing in the universe save mere objective existences.* Splendid and influential, however, as the Baron's acquirements and reputation unquestionably are, we have no apprehension of anything like a general adoption of his opinions. They may cap- tivate or dazzle the unreflecting and superficial for a season, but they carry within themselves the seeds of a mortal dissolution. No man, be his spirit ever so " deeply mersed in matter," can

* !?ee lluniboklt's Cosmos, Londou, 1845.

liv INTRODUCTION.

impress upon the minds of men, for any length of time, the idea that the universe is a Godless uni- verse. The bare attempt is a violent outrage on one of the most powerful and overwhelming con- victions of the human soul.

Looking now at Erance, we clearly perceive that since the commencement of the present century, a great change for the better has been effected in the speculative philosophy of the country. Por some years in the latter part of the last, and the beginning of the present century, we find ultra- materialism everywhere prevalent, and the philo- sophical intellect of the nation sunk to a low ebb. But in due course of time, the principles and spirit of the Scotch philosophy began to gain ground, and to shake and supplant tlie low and grovelling views of the mechanical philosophers. This was one important step gained in a right direction. By slow degrees the idealism of Ger- many came to the rescue, and greatly aided, under the peculiar circumstances in which Prance was placed, the good work of mental spirituality and regeneration. Nor ought we to pass over, without special notice, the great benefits derived from the Paris translations of the Greek metaphysicians, which have had a direct and powerful tendency to induce the young and rising thinkers of Prance to consult authorities on matters of abstract specu- lation admirably calculated to elevate and imjirove the general tone of academical studies, and guide them into more refined, rational, and wholesome channels.

INTRODUCTION. Iv

In casting a retrospective eye on France for the last forty years, to the time when the speculations of Destutt-Tracy, Cahanis, and Volney constituted the staple elements of the national thought, what surprising strides she has made in mental inquiries. How varied and discursive, intelligent and able, have been the numerous publications which have issued from her press. The philosophical disquisitions of her able thinkers undoubtedly possess, like those of Germanv, a distinctive and national character, and have frequently been directed into questionable channels ; yet the Ereuchman has never wandered so far from real life, nor thrown around his lucu- brations such a halo of mysticism, as his German brethren. The Gaulic i)hilosopher has always been the more rational and unpretending of the two. And there is scarcely a modern French publication, of any note whatever, on the human mind, and on its various faculties and powers, which does not dis- play great ability, and a sincere and anxious desire to arrive at truth. The whole tenor of philosophical investigation and criticism has been changed for the better within these few years. Great truths on religion, morals, mind, politics, and human knowledge generally, have been discussed in a truly enlightened spirit ; and many valuable additions made to the common stock of sober and rational discussion. Numerous verifications of this truth might be adduced from her literature, and from her social and religious institutions. And though she be now under a cloud, there is no ground for dejection or despair as to the future advance- ment of the nation in mental philosophy, or the

Ivi INTKODUCTION.

soundness of many of its leading j)i'i^^ipl^^* Every thing betokens that she will steadily and firmly retain the great truths she has so ably and enthusiastically laboured to illustrate and pro- mulgate; and gradually leave behind that old leaven of materialism and folly, which the last century bequeathed, and which has been prolific of so many evils, both speculative and practical, to her character and institutions as a great nation.

In Italy there is a bright and cheering prospect that this first regenerator of speculative philosophy in Europe will speedily occupy a conspicuous and honorable position in mental science among other continental countries. Within the last quarter of a century the numerous publications which have appeared in different states of the kingdom, are characterised by an enlightened spirit, and by great good sense and pliilosophical acumen. The predominance of a state and influential theology has, doubtless, given a formal and limited range to her philosophy ; but still there is so much real heart and pith in it, that it would betray a narrow spirit indeed to refuse our hearty commendations of its general merits. Speaking with some reser- vations, the ordinary bent of ItaKan metaphysics at the present moment is decidedly of an eclectic and common- sense complexion. Ontology and psychology go hand in hand ; and though a priori truths of the mind are highly valued and uni- versally recognised as necessary and important elements of all reasoning, yet they are not placed in opposition, to the actual exclusion of external and sensational sources of knowledge. The leading

INTllODUCTION. Ivii

Italian philosophers of the present day, among whom we place Gioberti, Mamiani, and Tomaseo, — now severally and actively engaged in achieving the social reformation and political independence of their country — are all influenced by lofty views of the nature of philosophic truth, and deeply convinced of its immense importance in regene- rating the institutions and improving the intel- lectual faculties of a nation, and in preserving it from error and mischievous delusions. In no part of the Euroj)ean continent do we find mental speculations impressed with a more subdued, sober, candid, and discriminating tone, and more in accordance with the highest purposes and best interests of man, than in the writings of the modern cultivators of philosophy in this interesting and intelligent country.

The progress of mental philosophy in Belgium and Holland is at the present moment highly satisfactory and encouraging. The deep thinkers of these countries, especially the Belgian writers, have more or less looked up to France as a monitor and guide, without, however, making the least compromise of their own intellectual independence. Thesre has always been less philosophy of a mate- rialistic tendency in the Netherlands than in Prance ; and the present treatises on the human mind are seldom tinged, in any deep degree, with unsound or irreligious opinions in this part of the continent. Although great liberty of discussion is allowed and enjoyed, yet everything from the philosophic press of the two kingdoms is charac- terised by a sober and rational spii-it, becoming

Iviii INTHODUCTION.

reflective and intelligent communities. At no former period in the history of these European states, was mental philosophy more assiduously and profoundly cultivated than it is at the present time ; and by philosophers too, such as Van Meenen, Van Heusde, Van De Weyer, Gruyer, Ubaghs, E/ciffenberg, Tiberghien, Quetelet, and others, of vast literary attainments, and possessing a most accurate and comprehensive acquaintance with the whole speculative thinldng of Europe. Everything from their pens bespeaks the innate power to grapple with questions of the greatest magnitude and complexity ; and they have all besides manifested a strong desire to support and defend the cause of truth generally, by a course of discussion at once candid, enlightened, and for- bearing.

In other northern nations, and in some of the southern, with whose respective literature we are in Great Britain but partially and imperfectly ac- quainted, we see much to encourage hope as to the future progress of the philosophy of mind. Every year affords some additional proof of its more general improvement and diffusion. In Sweden and Denmark, works are regularly issuing fiM)m the press which display an intimate knowledge of speculative systems, and great powers of abstract reasoning on topics connected with human nature. Even Russia is gradually extending encourage- ment and protection to subjects of speculation, which a very few years since were not admitted within the pale of her Universities. And the same may be remarked of Spain and Portugal ;

INTRODUCTION. lix

in both of which we perceive one bulwark after another against enlightened philosophical discus- sion slowly giving way, and the avenues to scien- tific and reflective investigations becoming daily less obstructed by narrow prejudices, intolerance, and bigotry.

In the Western hemisphere, we find the active spirits of the United States cultivating a know- ledge of mental science in every direction. Their continent has become a vast emporium for the speculations of all the European kingdoms ; and there is scarcely a work of any note published in the Old World, on the science of human nature, which does not speedily find its way here, and which does not go tlirough a regular critical ordeal in the chief periodicals of the country. AVhere there is such a regular influx of novel opinions, it becomes hazardous to venture on general con- clusions as to the preponderance of particular me- taphysical views and systems ; but we may afiirm, without speaking dogmatically on the subject, that within the last twenty years, there has been more or less a visible increase in the spiritual notions of mind throughout all the more enlightened and in- tellectual portions of the States. In the Reviews and Magazines of the country we see this change daily verified ; and still more striking manifesta- tions of it may be found in the general tone of the lectures delivered on mental studies, in the several chief places of academical instruction throughout the whole Union. The theological spirit of the nation is actively roused to a deep sense of the utility and importance of metaphysical studies ;

Ix INTllODUCTION, ,

and seems resolutely bent on clearing them from all the dross and mischievous elements which may be more or less incorporated with them when newly imported from every quarter of the world.

It has become almost a common remark, that in Great Britain mental philosophy has been en- tirely stationary for nearly the last half century. There is unquestionably much truth in this ; but there have been latent signs of life in the study, of late years, which promise better things at no very distant day. Several publications have made their appearance which bespeak great ability and knowledge ; and though they do not treat us Avith elaborated systems, yet their general tendency is on the side of improvement ; and in many instances they are calculated to throw new and interesting- light on several individual sections of the science of universal mmd. The recent movements in theological literature and speculation have had no small degree of influence in imparting more spiritual views to some English treatises on meta- physical subjects.

It is therefore cheering to those who feel a lively interest in such studies, and are deeply im- pressed Avith their absolute utility and importance, to witness so many indications of their progress and extension, in every direction to which Ave can direct the intellectual eye. We know that great ideas are never lost ; and Ave consequently feel an inward and firm conviction, that the advances Avhich Ave are, in this age, effecting in the first of aU branches of human knowledge, Avill never be efi'aced by any future retrograde movements Avhat-

INTRODUCTION. Ixi

ever, in the minds of individuals or of nations. The whole progress of human society speaks loudly against any such catastrophe.

But whatever the unreflecting and superficial may think of mental philosophy, or of its future destination, we are firmly impressed with the belief that to those who are acquainted with its prin- ciples, and imbued with its spirit, it cannot fail to recommend itself, from the comprehensiveness of its range, the lofty aim of its disquisitions, and the firm and decided tone which it imparts to tlie intellect. It greatly quickens the reflective powers of man, and enables him to wield them with ease and energy. It gives an ever-living freshness to old truths, and reduces, by subtile and mysterious agencies, the most discordant thoughts and materials into a state of logical harmony, beauty, and order. It has the universe for its object — aU matter and all mind ; and its spirit is a universal presence. It is as sublime, boundless, and inexhaustible as the ocean. We can traverse by its means the whole region of human knowledge ; and no soil and no age is exempt from its pene- trating glance. The science of mind is, from its very nature and essence, universal and difi'usive. Its ramifications and connections are infinite; and these reveal to us the hidden and interesting analogies subsisting among all topics of investiga- tion, and shed a lustre over our path as we travel from one great truth of human nature to another. It exacts an intellectual tribute from every pro- vince of inquiry ; and expends its treasures in

Iviii INTRODUCTION.

rearing a splendid temple, more colossal and du- rable than tlie material universe itself.

The philosophy of man is the sublimest of stu- dies, and its spirit is the most elevating and transcendental of all the gifts of God. The over- whelming grandeur of its themes — themes which have "thoughts that wander through eternity" for their object — fills the mind with holy and im- proving contemplations, and removes it from all that is tame, earthly, formal, and material. Its speculations are the sacred vehicles of the most important and vital truths ; and its reasonings relate to "things which speak not of earth." It deals with mighty passions, affections, and thoughts which stretch into futurity ; which have all mind and creative energy for their object ; and which give expression and thrilling interest to those lofty and refined aspirations which seek after something more pure and consoling than the ordi- nary movements and concerns of life aflTord. These aspirations are the germs of the inward man, which are bound up in the soul just as the living and fructifying principle is incrusted in the seed. They constitute the vivifying energy which makes all things new; which moulds the combinations of matter and mind into an endless variety of forms ; and develops them, by virtue of new afiinities and the immutable laws of intellect, into those splendid and beautiful creations of philosophical thought, which the mere matter-of-fact man can neither grasp nor comprehend, and without which the universe itself would be a chaos, and human life an incomprehensible enigma.

PllOM THE EARLIEST PEKIOD OP

MENTAL SPECULATION

TO THE COMMENCEMENT OP THE

SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY,

ETC. ETC.

CHAPTER I.

ON THE HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY, ANCIENT AND

MODERN.

It is not intended to give in this chapter any thing lilve a lengtliened account of the numerous Histories of Philosophy, hut only to bring before the reader's attention a few of the principal of them, with a view of fixing in his mind some of the lead- ing periods of history when certain works were published. It must also be premised, that what is generally meant by Histories of Philosophy, is not limited to liistories of mental philosophy alone, but embraces morals, poUtics, rehgion, and even phy- sical science. Metaphysics are, m all histories of philosophy wliich have yet appeared, mixed up and blended with other subjects. On this account, if a person wishes to trace out for himself the history of opinions relative to the human mind, he will have to select them from amonj^st a vast varietv of other topics, with which they are historically classed.

* B

2 HISTOKIES OF PHILOSOPHY,

Three of the most distingiiished ancient histo- rians of philosophy are Plato, Aristotle, and Cicero. Though not professed chroniclers of previons opi- nions, yet their treasures are uncommonly valuable, as frequent allusion is made, in unfolding their in- di^ddual opinions, to the \dews and systems of other speculative men who had preceded them, but of whose labours we have little or no account direct from themselves. Plato, in his dialogues, brings contemporary writers on the stage, and paints their characters and systems in his otmi way. Aristotle, again, in lajdng down his own systems, furnishes us with the individual systems of other metaphysi- cians and philosophers. And Cicero, in his specu- lative traditions, has handed down many opinions exceedingly interesting to all speculative minds.*

Hippocrates was an eminent Greek physician. He alludes to the great advantage of an accurate knowledge of the human faculties, relative to the history of opinions. Xenophon is well known as a A'aluable historian of philosophic opinions ; and Lucretius gives us an account of the metaphysical ideas of Democritus and Epiciuais. "We have the system of the Stoics expoimded by Seneca, and the Sceptical Philosophy by Sextus Empiricus. If Plutarch be the author of the book entitled De Tlacitis Fhilosopliorimi, he has added to the useful documents of ancient philosophy ; and to the book of Galen, TJie Philosophical History^ we are equally indebted.

* Gedike has collected together all the passages of Cicero relative to Philosophy. Berhn, 17B2.

ANCIENT AND MODERN. 3

Diofjenes Laertius is an historian of ffreat merit. In his work, "^ Lives of the Philosophers," we have many valuable extracts from the writings of the ancients, and many interesting facts respecting their lives and opinions. We find in several of the early Pathers of the Church, some valua1)le sketches of philosophical opinions and systems, par- ticularly in Eusehius, St. Clement of Alexandria, and Ejiiphanius.

In the fourth century, we have the " Lives of the Philosophers and Sophists," by Eunapius, a general writer and a physician. He is zealously attached to the Eclectic philosophy, and displays great virulence against the Christians of his day. A little after liim we find John Stoba^us, who made large extracts from the philosophy of the ancients. Both these works are of great value to the historian.*

In the middle of the sixth century, Hesychius, a grammarian of Alexandiia, composed an " Abridg- ment of the lAves of Fhllosophers,'" arranged in alphabetical order, f The work is cliiefly taken from Diogenes Laertius. A long intellectual niglit, of several centuries' duration, here intervenes, in which nothing was accomplished in philosophical history worthy of any especial notice.

An Englishman, of the name of Burley, in the fifteenth century, published ^'Lices of the Philo- sophers,'" and the book is amongst the early speci- mens of printing in this country. In Italy, Pici- nus, under the patronage of Cosmo de Medicis, and

* See an edition of Stobseus, by Ileeren. Gottingen, 1792.

t Ilesych. Milet. interpvete Iladriano Juno. Anvers, 1572. 8vo.

B 2

4 HISTORIES OF PHILOSOPHY.

Pouiponius, otherwise styled Peter Calabria, re- vived a knowledge of the works of Plato and Aris- totle with great eclat. After the partial revival of learning in Europe, we have John Louis Yives, a Spaniard by birth, but educated at Paris and Lou- vain, who wrote a work " On the Origin of Sects, and the Merits of Philosophers. ^^ Daniel Chry- trius published his treatise, " A List of Philoso- phers, and their princijml Sects, from Thales to Cicero:'' nearly at the same time we have William Morel's " Table of the order of Succession, Doc- trines, and date of the Ancient Philosophers ;'' and also, the " Chronological Library of Classical Phi- losophers,'' by J. J. Pries.

It would prove tedious, as well as unprofitable, to give an individual and detailed account, from this period, of all the writings which contain an account of philosophical opinions, down to our own day. It will sutficiently answer all the ends we have in view to furnish the reader with a bare enumeration of works, of such a character and ex- tent, as will prove amply useful for all ordinary purposes of reference or consultation, both as to the history of philosophy in general, and metaphy- sics in particular. This we shall do in a note at the end of this volume.*

* See Note A. at the end of this Volume.

THE IONIC SCHOOL.

CHAPTER II. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE TOXIC SCHOOL.

The philosophy of Greece is full of interest to every iiiquiring mind. It has peculiar claims upon our attention ; for it exhibits the innate power of the mind of man to grapple with those interesting and abstruse questions which spring out of his existence, and which force themselves upon his notice by the powerful and irresistible law of his nature. Among the Grecian sages we perceive what has been accomplished by the speculative faculties, unaided and undirected by the genius of revelation ; and how far, and in what degree, the errors and shortcomings of these philosophers may be profitable to our 'instruction in more in- telligent and enlightened times. Mutilated and circumscribed as the Grecian philosophy has come down to us, still we perceive that, take it as a whole, it is a noble monument of thought ; and that its powerful influence has been felt and acknowledged in every stage of literature and civilization. Amidst a vast deal that is crude and

6 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

fantastical, we can still recognise truths of great moment, and universal application ; and the man- ner in which they are often developed and illus- trated, affords the most indisputable evidence of the superior powers of the Grecian understanding. Many speculations might be hazarded on what some modern writers have considered the origin of the Greek philosophic spirit. But these would inevitably lead us into too wide a field of discussion and controversy for our present purpose. Suffice it to remark, that there seem to have been three leading influences operating on the general mass of their speculative notions of mind, and which communicated to them that peculiar feature by which they are distinguished ; namely, a religious feeKng or sentiment, a love of poetry, and those habits and customs which arose out of their popular civil and political institutions.

The religious feeKng or sentiment has an in- separable affinity to the true philosophic spmt. Wliatever attempts are made to form conceptions of creative power, wisdom, and intelligence, dii'ectly lead to the formation and exercise of all those habits of mental culture and accurate analysis, on wliich true philosophy rests. In every department of Grecian speculation we find that mental in- quiries were viewed through the medium of theolo- gical principles ; and we also find that, in projoor- tiou as rational notions of natural religion were recognised, a corresponding degree of clearness and rationality pervaded the popular stream of philoso- phical discussion. This fact is illustrated in everv

THE IONIC SCHOOL. 7

age of Grecian literature. "Wlienever low and grovelling ideas prevailed on the nature of deity and a presiding mind over the affairs of the Avorld, in an exact proportion do we find the system of mental speculation, fantastical, irrational, and untenahle. And this arises from the established laws of human thought. It is impossible to con- ceive an opposite state of things. The same powers which enable us to investigate the laws of human intelligence, and develop their mutual rela- tions and dependencies, are precisely those which, when judiciously used, direct to all those primary truths on which the religious feeHngs and senti- ments of mankind rest.

The same thing may be remarked of the ima- ginative or poetic feeling. Tliis is closely allied to relii]^ion. There can be no true or sublime poetry apart from theological sentiment, though that sentiment may, occasionally, be grossly per- verted. Poetry has also the human mind for its domain and object. It treats of the ideal ; it lives in the reahns of thought. AYhatever, there- fore, is favourable to its successful cultivation, must necessarily prove conducive to the exercise of all those refined powers of analysis and inward reflection, which have the mind for their common centre of operation. The creative energies of the poet directly lead to those abstract and sublime topics, which belong exclusively to the province of the metaphysician.

Social and political institutions have human nature for their basis, and they likewise greatly

8 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

influence mental disquisitions. Where freedom is the ground-work of a commonwealth, and the people have elevated conceptions of their rights and duties, a sound mental philosophy will in- variably be found to flourish. The whole history of Greece is a striking confirmation of this position.

Thales. 64i0 b. c.

Thales was one of the most early sages of Greece who turned their attention to mental pur- suits. None of his discourses or writings have been transmitted du-ectly from himself, but only through the medium of Aristotle, Plutarch, and Strabo. Thales, even in his early day, soon seized upon a mental proposition which has subsequently, in divers shapes and forms, filled the world of phi- losophy with discussion; namely, the spontaneity of the mind of man. Aristotle tells us that Thales maintained that "the essence of the soul, or thinl^- ing principle of man, was motion ; a spontaneous motion, a self -moving power." Plutarch says that Thales' definition of mind was "that it was a thing possessing self-contained or perpetual motion." Strabo mentions the same thing ; " that mind, ac- cording to Thales, was that which contained self- will or motion."*

This early fragment of metapyhsical philosophy is extremely valual)le, inasmuch as it indicates, that this distinguished man had deeply studied the

* Arist. De Anima. 1. Plut. De PI. Ph. 4. 2.

THALES. 9

nature of liis own inincl ; and that the same dif- ficulties presented themselves to him wliich have in all subsequent ages been so perplexing to spe- culators on the abstract natui'e of mind, and of its various powers and faculties. .

Thales is considered one of what are called the Seven Sages of Greece; philosophers who wandered about from place to place, promulgating their doc- trines and opinions. All accounts of him agree that he was passionately fond of speculating into the origin of all things, and that he founded the theory, that loater was the primary principle of the world. Plutarch states the philosopher's reasons for tliis belief. Pirst, because natural seed, the principle of all Kving things, is humid ; whence it is highly probable that humidity or moistiu*e is also the principle of all other things. Secondly, because all kinds of plants are nourished by mois- ture, T\^thout which they wither and decay. And, thii'dlv, because fii'e, even the sun itself and the stars, are nourished and supported by vapours pro- ceeding from water, and consequently the Avhole world consists of the same.*

There has been considerable dispute among the learned, whether this principle of water was a purely passive principle or agent, or an active and creative one. It must ever be a doubtful point to determine what Thales' real opinion was ; but it does seem probable that the philosopher only con- sidered his machinery of watery vapours to be the

* Arist. Met. 1. 1 . Diog. Laert. 1. 1. Plut. PI. Ph. 1. 1. c. 7.

10 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

instrmnents in the liand of a living and active power. Erom liis definition of what he considers the nature or essence of the mind of man, akeady staf ed, tliis probability is considerably strengthened. The same reasons, and the same trains of thoua^it, which brought him to the general conclusion, that mind, and creative or active power, were identical, would naturally force the conclusion on liis under- standing that the world and every thing he beheld in it were the result of an active and efficient agent. This process of reasoning seems natural and consistent.

Anaximander. 610 b. c.

This philosopher was a disciple and friend of Thales, and embraced and extended the general principles of his system. Anaximander cultivated physical inqumes to a considerable extent, as well as topics connected with human nature. It is said, that he was the first philosopher of antiquity who announced the famous axiom that " Out of notliing, nothing can be made." It is impossible, however, to ascertain in what sense he understood this gene- ral proposition ; whether as a sunple physical fact, or as a principle on which a comprehensive theory of philosophical speculation could be established. There can be no doubt but such an acute reasoner as x^naximander would readily perceive that this famous axiom of his cut, like a two-edged sword, both wavs ; that it had necessarilv two distinct meanings attached to it ; and that it might serve

ANAXIMANDER. 11

both for rational and irrational speculations on the nature and constitution of all mental and physical phenomena.

Anaximander considered the infinite as the first principle of things. All things are produced by, and immerge into it. Of course there have been many different notions of what is here meant by infinite. Aristotle and Plutarch materiahze the term, and make it stand for mcdter in general; and the learned Cudworth coincides with this in- terpretation. Others again think it highly pro- bable that a guiding and intelligent principle was still recognised by Anaximander, and that by infi- nite was merely meant that seemingly endless and concatenated series of phenomena, which a contem- plation of the world every way naturally suggests to most inquiring minds.*

The historian Hitter observes, that Anaximander " is represented as arguing, that the primary sub- stance must have been infinite to be all-sufficient for the limitless variety of produced things with which we are encompassed. Now, although Aris- totle expressly characterises this infinite as a mix- ture, we must not think of it as a mere multiplicity of primary material elements ; for to the mind of Anaximander it was Unity immortal and imperish- able ; an ever-producing energy. This production of individual thins^s he derived from an eternal motion of the infinite y \

* Pint. 1. 1. Arist. Plivs 1 1. Cudworth, c. ."5. t Ritter, Hist. Phil. Oxford, 183!).

12 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

This interpretation is very fanciful, but it is natural in E/itter. Such a term as infinite^ is too good a tiling for a German to let pass, without at- tempting to make something grand and mysterious out of it. The word enables him to revel in luxu- rious profundity.*

Anaximenes. 556 b.c.

Anaximenes was a companion and disciple of Anaximander, and a promulgator of his system of philosophy. The former indulged in speculations as to the origin of the world, and maintained the doctrine, that air is the vivifying principle of the universe, of which all things are engendered, and into which all things are resolved. Our soul or spirit is air ; for spirit and air are two names signi- fying the same tiling.

Air he considers as the living Deity, because it is ever in motion. Some authors consider that air should not be taken in its common signification, but as a subtile ether, penetrating all material bodies, and communicating to them that motion and life necessary for their production and reproduction.!

Hermotimus, op Clazomene. 520 b.c.

Hermotimus of Clazomene was a distinguished early metaphysician. He entered deeply into all

* See Note B. at the end of this Volume.

t Simplicius ad Phy. lib. 1. Lactantius, lib. 1.

HEKMOTIMUS — DIOGENES. 13

the mental speculations known in his day. He dis- played great original powers of thinking ; and if we are to believe Aristotle, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, ApoUonius, and several others, he was the original propounder of the system of Anaxagoras. Her- motimus clearly perceived the important distinction between mental subjects and physical inquiries ; and he seems to have kept this essential distinction per- petually before his eyes, in all liis abstract specu- lations.

Pliny, in his Natural History, mentions, that Hermotimus entertained the idea that the soul often quits the l)ody, and wanders to a great distance from it, in order to obtain that knowledge which is denied to it whilst residing in its earthly tenement. It was from this singular notion that his enemies as- sassinated him, that his own soul might wing its way to that situation destined for its reception in a future state of existence.

Diogenes, of Apollonia. 500 e.g.

Diogenes was a follower and disciple of Anaxi- menes ; but gave a more spiritual interpretation to his master's doctrines on the origin of the universe. The subtile ether which Anaximenes employed to create and sustain the world, became, in the hands of his pupil, endowed with a species of wisdom and intelligence. It was not blindness and fatality; it operated by a settled plan or method. The wisdom and order displayed in every part of nature, seem to have made a deep impression upon the

14 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

mind of Diogenes ; for he affirms tliey give evident testimonies for the existence of a ruling principle

of REASON.

Anaxagoras. 500 b. c.

Anaxagoras was one of the most renowned phi- losophers of his day, and succeeded in unfolding more just and comprehensive principles of theism, and of the general government of the world, than any preceding speculator. His opinions on mental suhjects are hut few, and limited in their range, and are handed do^^Ti to us hy Aristotle and Sextus Empiricus. Anaxagoras clearly pointed out how the judgment may occasionally he led astray from the truth, hy the delusive appearances furnished hy the external senses. The judgment, or reasoning power, is the governing principle in man, and is in- tended to correct the errors which first impressions may create in his mind. In pointing out the im- perfections of our sensations as infallihle guides to truth, he has heen accused hy some ancient philo- sophers with manifesting a decided leaning to scep- ticism; hut this accusation is without any solid foundation. What he says may he conceded hy every right-thinking man. He only shows that, on many occasions, such sensations or notions as relate to colours, the appearances of ohjects seen through various mecUa hy the eye, may undergo a multitude of changes ; and yet the mind may de- duce the truth respecting them from a variety of different considerations suhmitted to the reasoning

ANAXAGOllAS. 15

faculty. On this principle there cannot be two opinions.

Anaxagoras, like his predecessors, had his theory as to the origin of the world. He held that the material principle of all things is one and many, of infinite parts, similar and contrary, continuous to the touch, sustaining themselves, not contained by any other. Every indi^ddual thing in nature is consti- tuted of particles peculiar to itself; and it is just this atomic construction which makes it what it really is. Bone, for example, is made from a certain spe- cific form of its particles ; gold and silver, and, in fact, everything else, from the same principle of individual adaptation. Lucretius describes this process in the following lines :

" With Anaxagoras, great Nature's law Is similarity ; and every compound form Consists of parts minute, each like a whole ; And bone is made of bone, and flesh of flesh ; And blood, and fire, and earth, and massy gold. Are, in their smallest portions, still the same."*

Anaxagoras is more decidedly theistical than any of his predecessors. His distinction between mind and matter, between the Creator and the thing created, is clearly annunciated. Plato affirms that he taught the existence of a regulating mind over all things ; and Aristotle declares that mind is the supreme and ruling element, and possesses within itseK all creative power and thought. Plutarch gives his testimony to the same effect. He says,

* Plut. PL Ph. 1. Arist. Phys. 3, 4.

16 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

" the Ionic philosophers who flourished before the days of Anaxagoras, made a blind fatality or destiny the first elemental principle in nature ; but Anax- agoras maintained that a pure mind, free from all material influences, governs the universe." Cicero says that the Grecian sage afiirmed the existence of an "infinite mind, not inclosed in any body ; " and Lactantius and Saint Augustine declare the same thing.*

There were several distinguished disciples of Anaxagoras ; among the number may be mentioned, l?eriGles, son of Xantippus ; Archelcms, son of Apol- lodorus; Euripides , his biographer; Socrates, son of Sophroniscus ; and Metrodorus, of Lampsacum. Some few metaphysical opinions are ascribed to these persons, but they are not entitled to any par- ticular enumeration.

*** Vide Heuman. Act. Phil. i. 16; iii. 165, 173. Burnet, Arch. 1- 10. Cudworth, Int. Sjst. c. 1. Cyril cont. Julian. 1. 1. Velesii Phil. Sac. c. 31. August. De Civit. Dei, 1. 8. Scaliger, Ep. 306. Themistii Orat.26. MorhofF. Polyh. t. 2. Lipsii Phys. 1. 2. Thomasii Obser. Hal. t. 2. MuUerus, De aqua principio rerum ex mente Thaletis. 1718. Bud- dseus de Phil. Mor. Thalet. § 10. Brucker Hist, de Ideis, sect. 1. Gro- tius de Verit. 1. 1. Dickenson Phy. c. 4. Thomas. Hist. Ath. c. 4. Le Clerc, Bibl. Choisie, t. 2. Schmidius de Vit. Anaximenis, p. 1. Plouc- quet. Diss. De Thalet. et Anaxag. 1.2. Bayle. Thalet. Ritter, Hist. Phil. Oxford, 1839. Tennemann. Hist. Phil. Renouvier, Mon. de la Phil, an- cienne. Cousin, Cours de Phil. Degerando, Hist. Comparee des Sys- t^mes. Enfield's Hist. Philosophy.

* Arist. De Anima. 1. 1. Plut. 1. 1. Cicero de Nat. Deor. 1. 1. Au- gust, de Civ. Dei, 1. 8. Lact. 1. .'5.

rrALIAN SCHOOL OF HklETAPHYSICS. 17

CHAPTER III. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE ITALIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

Among the leading philosophers on the science of the human mind in the Italian school, stands Pythagoras, a man of vast capacity, extensive infor- mation, indefatigable industry, and great original powers of thought. lie was born in the Isle of Samos, and received his early education there.

P}i;hagoras was the founder of a school of specu- lative philosophy, and his principal followers and admirers were Ocellus, Timaeus, Archytas, Philo- laus, Ilipparchus, and Ptolemy.

The Pythagoreans speculated deeply on the origin of the world, and on the principles of natural theism. On the human mind their inquiries seem not to have been directed with much judgment, nor sio^nalised bv much success. This sect of me- taphysicians maintained that man had some affi- nity not only witli the gods, but Tvdth the animal creation; and that the same principle of intelli- gence runs through the whole of living existence,

*

c

18 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GTIEECE.

and unites the different parts into one uniform compound. We are distinguished from the hrute creation by the possession of language. The hu- man soul is di\dded, by these Pythagoreans, into two parts, or rather two leading faculties"; i the one embraces all the physical wants of the body, and all the blind and impetuous passions or im- pulses ; and the other those controlling and modi- fying powers, which guide and propel mankind to wtuous and noble deeds, and which are commonly denominated wisdom, judgment, or reason.

The soul is in an imperfect state. It has three elemental divisions : Heason, Intelligence, and Desire. The inferior creation possess the two last attributes, but are denied the first ; reason. The soul is a monad — one. It may have many aspects, but its essence or unity remains the same. In proportion as the rational, intelligent, or sensual principles predominate, so is the character of man proportionally affected. He may be a profound philosopher, a man of the world, or a low and i3eastly creature. " This soul, which can look be- fore and after, can shrink and shrivel itself into an incapacity of contemplating aught but the present moment. Of what depths of degeneracy it is capable ! What a beast it may become ! And, if something lower than itself, why not something higher ? And if something higher and lower, may there not be a law accurately determining its elevation and de- scent ? Each soul has its peculiar evil tastes, brinffinsT it to the likeness of different creatures be- neath itself; may it not be under the necessity of

PYTHAGORAS. 19

abiding in the condition of that thing to which it has adapted and reduced itself?"*

There has always existed considerable doubt as to what the real opinions of Pythagoras were. He was a public teacher of philosophy, but left no written records of his \dews. Conjecture has, therefore, to supply the place of positive informa- tion. His school was a school of mathematics also; and to his blending the two sciences together no small portion of his obscurity may be attributed. The essence of the universe was Nmnher ; but whether numbers were real things, or merely sym- bolieal representations, has been the great source of contention among the commentators and critics on the Pythagorean system. Some maintain that the philosopher considered numbers as the real 2wlnciples of things, or the cause of all material existences, or the final nature of things. Others again contend that these references to numbers were only a sort of mathematical formula, to be symbolieallij applied. It would be useless to enter into this controversy ; for the reasons and autho- rities on each side seem to be nearly balanced. For myself, I confess I am inclined to join with Emitter, and to think that the numbers of Pvtha- goras were purely s\axLbolical representations. The other hj^othesis appears to me so utterly incom- prehensible and absurd, that for the credit of the human intellect we should throw it aside.

The doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls is invariably connected with the philosophy of the

* Encv. Metrop. Art. Moral and Metaphy. Philos.

c 2

20 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

Pythagoreans. It was tliis notion wMcli induced them to abstain from animal food, and to exckide animal sacrifices from all their religious ceremo- nies. Ovid represents Pythagoras as speaking in the following strain, rendered into our vernacular tongue by the immortal Dryden.

" What then is death^ but ancient matter drest In some new figure, and a varied vest ? Thus all things are but altered, nothing dies ; And here and there th' unbodied spirit flies. By time, or force, or sickness dispossessed. And lodges where it lights, in man or beast ; Or hunts without, till ready limbs it find, And actuates those according to theii- kind ; From tenement to tenement is tost. The soul is still the same, the figure only lost ; And as the softened wax new seals receives. Their face assumes, and that impression leaves ; Now called by one, now by another name. The form is only changed, the wax is still the same : So death, thus call'd, can but the form deface, Th^ immortal soul flies out in empty space. To seek her fortune in some other place."

*** Vide Arist. Met. 1. 1. 6. Sextus Empiricus, folio, Paris, 1621. Meiners, Histoire des Sciences dans la Grece, t. 2. (French Translation). Justin. Hist. 20. 4. Dioge. Laert. 8. Leipsic. 1833. Kitter, Hist. Anc Phil. Oxford. Tenneraann, Manuel de I'Hist. de la Philosophic, by Cousin, Paris, 18.30. Schwartz, Manuel de 1' Histoire de la Philosophic Ancienne. Liege. 1842. Renouvicr, Manuel de Philosophic Ancienne. Paris, 1844. Tissot. Hist. Abregee de la Philosophie. Dijon. 1840. Hist. Abre'gce de la Philosophie, par Bouvier, Eveque de Mans; Paris, 1844.

ELEATIC SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 21

CHAPTEH IV. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

The Eleatic Scliool of metaphysicians took its rise from the Italian and Ionian speculations. It differed, however, essentially from both. It had more boldness, more originality, and more system. The Eleatics affected a more complete severance between mental objects and the rules of reasoning applicable to them, and to the ordinary principles of natural theology and morality, with which they had previously been associated.

The philosophical predecessors of the Eleatics were not so ambitious as the latter. The former con- tented themselves with taking the constitution of things just as they found it, and modestly at- tempted only to ascertain the laws which regulated their action on one another, in all their mutual relationships. The Eleatics, however, took higher ground. They attempted to explain the origin of all things ; and, by arguments a priori, to deduce the whole complicated and multifarious phenomena of matter and mind, from certain abstract principles.

22 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Xenophanes. 456 b.c.

Xenoplianes was tlie most distingidslied pliilo- sopher of this scliool. Considerable difference of opinion has existed, both in ancient and modern times, as to the precise notions he entertained on the mental laws of our constitution. By one class of historians he has been accused of complete scepticism; and by others, as a defender of the infallible certainty of human knowledge. The mass of evidence, and the general current of pro- bability, are in favour of the latter hypothesis.

There is, unquestionably, a great deal of material necessity intermixed with all the mental specula- tions of Xenophanes. He affirms that nothing which exists can possibly change. Every thing is one being, and is not susceptible of diversities of form or essence. Thought, according to him, is the only real substance; permanent and immu- table in its nature and properties.

The spirit of Xenophanes' mental jihilosophy bears a very close affinity to some modern systems, founded upon a particular apj)lication of the prin- ciple of necessary connexion. Those who will cast their eye over both, will instantly recognise the almost complete identity. The principle is the same in both the ancient and modern theories ; only the proofs and illustrations are somewhat chfferent. The reasoning of Xenojihanes was of an a priori description ; whereas the modern adopters of his peculiar views employ both a priori argu-

XENOPHANES. 23

ments, and proof di'awn from every-day expe- rience.

The Patliers of the Church, St. Clement oi Alexandria, and Eusebius, have preserved some verses of Xenophanes, in which he expresses him- self with great freedom on the superstitious notions which the generality of mankind entertain as to the natui'e of the gods. He seems, however, to have had just and elevated conceptions of the Pirst Great Cause, from other verses mentioned by Sextus Empiricus, where he says, " God sees all, hears all, knows all ; and His wisdom governs all things without effort."

The Unity of the Divine nature is, then, de- cidedly affirmed by Xenophanes. Deity is self- existent, and consequently eternal; immoveable, unmoved, and without change.

The peculiar expression that " God is a sphere," used by Xenophanes, is thus explamed by M. Cousin. " The word sphericcd is simply a Greek locution to pomt out the absolute equality and unity of the Deity, and of which the conception of a sphere may be an image. The at^ai^iKoq of the Greeks is the rotundus of the Latins. It is a metaphorical expression similar to that of square, meaning perfect and coniplete ; a mode of speak- ing which though now considered in some measure obsolete, had at the early age of mathematical science, something dignified and noble in it, and is found in most elevated poetical compositions. Simonides speaks of a 'man square to his feet, his hands, and his mind,' meaning a complete.

24 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

perfect, or accomplished man; and the same me- taphorical expression is used by Aristotle. We cannot, therefore, be surprised that Xenophanes, who was a poet as well as a philosopher, writing in verse, and not being successful in fixing upon the metapliysical term which fully expressed liis ideas, should have borrowed from the language of imagination that word which would most fully denote his meanino'."

Professor Pulleborn di-aws the following parallel between Xenophanes and Spinoza. " Though the system of Xenophanes does not display the same ability and profundity as that of Spinoza, yet we cannot fail to perceive that they both moved in the same direction, and adopted the same principles. The only difference which distinguishes them lies in the proofs they respectively employ. Xeno- phanes belonged to a period when philosophical studies were but as it were in their infancy, and the forms of language, as a medium of abstract reasoning, but imperfectly understood. After developing a general principle essential to his system, he clothed it with other attributes, and took a circuitous route. Spinoza, on the con- trary, always went direct to his object. The former dealt exclusively in reasonings a priori, and rejected exj)erience ; whilst the latter used the a priori instrument in conjunction with that of observation and experiment."

" In Sj^inoza's day the ideas of unity, substance, and the like, were determined with some precision, particularly by the writings of Descartes ; and the

XENOPHANES. 25

Jewish philosopher had a more definite idea of necessary connection^ than the ancients possessed. When they embraced a general principle or propo- sition, they pushed it to its utmost limits, without reservation or qualification ; and hence a host of absurd and iiTational deductions was the conse- quence. That mathematical form which Spinoza employed with so much effect in the exposition of his views, was not used by Xenophanes."*

The scepticism wliich has been attributed to Xenophanes, and which certain expressions as- cribed to him apparently countenance, was certainly of a loose and indefinite character. It was not dogmatical. It evidently arose in the philo- sopher's mind from a deep conviction of the circumscribed and imperfect faculties of man to embrace the wide expanse of Creation. He was, as every man ever must be, no matter how sound and orthodox his theological opinions, overawed and confounded by the mere attempt to inquire into the great problem of existence. He essayed it again and again ; but at every fresh eff'ort a new host of insurmountable difficulties and perplexities presented themselves ;

"Alps on Alps arose ;" which compelled him to fall back on his own puny littleness and insufficiency, and exclaim, when smarting under the bitter feelings of defeat, that ^^ error is spread over all things. ^^"X

* Fulleborn, Dissertat. De Xenoplia. Halle, 1/89. t Vide Arist. De Xenopha. chap. I. Metapliy. Diogenes Laert. 9. Sextus Enipiricus, Pynhon. 1.22. Cicero. Academ. Qiisest. 2. 37-

26 mental philosophy of greece.

Parmenedes. 430 b.c.

Parmenides Avas a disciple and follower of Xe- noplianes, and considerably extended the range of his philosophical system. The former consolidated and arranged the thoughts of the latter, and, with great judgment, spii'it, and boldness, gave them a more complete and systematic form. Some recent historians have affirmed that Parmenides was the first pliilosopher who attempted to found a regular theory of human knowledge.

This philosopher composed a Poem " On Nature^'' in the prologue to which he represents the goddess of wisdom directing the philosophical inquirer to truth and happiness. The goddess speaks nearly in these words : "I hail thee, O thou, whom the heralds of the goddess have conducted to my habi- tation. Rejoice, and count it not a misfortune that thou hast been conducted by a path un- known to mortals. Thou slialt discern the immu- table and eternal things which truth teaches ; and thou shall form just conclusions, both as to the phenomena of nature around thee, and the varied and conflicting elements of human opinions. Keep steadily in this path ; and never allow thyseK to become the slave of tliv outward senses ; of thine eye and thine ear. It is by shunning such guides, by the force of reason, that thou shalt be able to comprehend what I shall announce to thee. If we suifer ourselves to be directed bv mere senti- ment or feeling, we shall infallibly be misled from the true path."

PAHMENIDES. 27

In the book " On Nature ,' we find mental speculations treated under tlie head of " The Intelligible,'' or " The Truth;' or the " JJnitij of Existence y The allegorical form is kept up, and the goddess " reveals what reason will discover in its researches. E-eason teaches that ichich exists. The existence of a nonentity. Speech, thought, and existence, are all positive realities. Men, blinded by their senses, confound them by turns ; and separate existence from creation. Eollow then the path, which points out the reality of things. Many reasons prove that that which has never begun, cannot cease to exist. Existence is a whole ; it is one ; it is immutable ; it is infinite. Eor does any one ask me from whence is this existence de- rived? Erom what source does its perpetual stream of creation flow ? Erom whence doth it proceed ? These are questions we cannot answer. Eor no person can conceive or tell why a thing exists, or what power is able to call it into being, or why it has appeared at a particular time, neither sooner nor later. It is necessary, then, that existence should always be, or never be ; for tliis maxim is eternally true, that a thing cannot by itself be created out of nothing. Existence is founded upon itself; it universally reposes on itself, and is in- vested with unmutability ; the chains of necessary power envelop it. Thought, and the object of thought, are one and the same. We cannot have the thought, with the object which is cognizant to the mind."

This Poem ends with the following remark;

28 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

"The unclerstanding is to man, wliat the bodily members are to his frame ; for the thinking prin- ciple possesses the same unity of nature and design, as the organs of the outward man ; all is filled by thought."

The general features of the speculative system of Parmenides, have no small resemblance to those which have been designated, by some modern thinkers, by the term common sense. He was less addicted to paradox than his predecessors ; and seemed to seize those general principles of mind which display themselves in the every-day move- ments of the mass of mankind, and which form the ground-work of that universal sjrmpathy and harmony Avhich subsist throughout the whole region of thought.*

Melissus. 424 B.C.

Melissus of Samos expoimded the doctrines of Parmenides. On the real existence of thinjjs, he remarks, "We cannot determine the quantity of any thing without taking for granted its existence. But that which is real cannot be finite ; it must be infinite ; not in sjmce, but in time. It fills all time, and must always be the same in itself."

Aristotle calls the unity of Parmenides a rational unity, but that of MeKssus a material one.f

* Arist. Met. 1. 1. Sextus Empiricus 1. 9. Diogenes Laert. 1. !). Plato in Parmen. 1. 11. Plat. adv. Colut. 1. 6. Eusebius 1. 1. t Tissot, Ilist. Abre'gee de la Phil. p. 106. Dijon, 1840.

ZENO. 29

The German historian Emitter makes the following remarks on Melissus. " As, however, the develop- ment given hy Melissns to his theory of being strongly resembles the method in which it was carried out by Parmenides, we may here pass over much, and only bring forward what is peculiarly his own, and what is requisite to indicate its re- lation to other philosophical doctrines. This con- sists chiefly in the manner in which, as an Ionian and living among lonians, he necessarily put most prominently forward those points which it was indispensable to establish against the Ionic phi- losophy. Melissus, in common with Parmenides, does not found his argument on the notion of the Deity, but on that of being. On the former point he recedes so far from Xenophanes, that he expressly declares, ' men must not speak of the gods, for of them we have absolutely no knoAvledge.'* Accord- ingly, the central point of the whole system — the notion of the perfect one — was even still more lost sight of by him than by Parmenides ; and the whole argumentation bears the appearance of an empty sophism. On this account he was much less esteemed by the ancients than Parmenides ; and Aristotle is of opinion that his principles present little or no difiiculty."t

Zeno, of Elea. 450 b. c. Zeno was the able, bold, and successful defender

* Diog. Laert. 1. 1. 9. 24. t Ritter, Hist. Phil. p. 481.

30 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

of the Eleatic pliilosopliy. He possessed in a high degree all the mental requisites for an expert and formidable controversialist. He was remarkably acute, knew well how to handle general principles, so as to confound and annoy an adversary, and had, besides, a copious fund of information on all the current topics of the day. He may be con- sidered as the founder of that general system of philosophical discussion, so prevalent for many subsequent ages, in all the countries of the East.

Among his controversial discussions we find the following, tending to invalidate the systems of those who founded all science on pure experience. " Every body constantly occupies a portion of space equal to itself; it is then constantly in repose. Now if it move itself, it should move in every instant ; it would then be both in motion and at rest at the same time."

Zeno attempted to establish the doctrine of perfect and ahsolute unity. On the divisibility of matter, he observes, "When we arrive at the utmost boundaries of divisibility, we shall then only have a mathematical point; which is really nothing."

On the successful cultivation of the art of reasoning, and investigating truth, and communi- cating it to others, he laid down many excellent principles and rules. He divided this art into three distinct branches ; the first, the art of draw- ing consequences or inferences from principles ; secondly, the art of dialectics ; and thirdly, tlie art of speaking.

HERACLITLS. 31

Of the importance of the dialectics of Zeno, we have the testimony of M. Cousin, who says, " The polemical method entirely disconcerted the dis- ciples of the Ionic philosophy, and excited a lively curiosity and interest for the stability of the doctrines of the Italian school ; and thus was sowti in the capital of Greek civilization and refinement, the prolific germ of a more lofty development of philosophy." Hitter also observes, " On account of the readiness and scientific skill with which Zeno indicated the contraries of all things, he has been called bv Plato the Eleatic Palamedes. The dialogistic form of his composition was calculated to give rise to a sophistical tendency, as was shewn in latter times ; but even in his reasonings there is often so close a trenching upon subtile and falla- cious distinctions, that he has frequently been classed among the Sophists ; nevertheless, when we consider the serious end which he pursued, we cannot but suppose that he merely employed those fallacious artifices as a by-play and relief to his dialogue, or in mocking defiance of the want of skill and the helplessness of his opponents."*

Heraclitus. 460 b. c.

Heraclitus belonged to the school of the Eleatics, and signalised himself by his profound study of the general laws of the universe. On mental sub- jects he observes, "The human soul, such as is

* Arist. Met. 1. 1. Pioge. Laert. 1. 3. Sext. Emp. Math. /. Plato, Parm p 127. Strabo 6. I.

32 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

endowed with reason, is an emanation from the universal mind; but it is united to an animal nature, in common with the inferior orders of creation. Man breathes the universal soul or mind, and readily unites with creative intelligence, in a state of watching ; sleep l^eing an immediate and temporary suspension of this communication."

This metaphysician established the maxim which exercised, in subsequent ages, a great influence over speculative minds, "that a thing can only be known by the same thing." " Conception is founded only upon the similitude between the agent and the object." This principle was con- sidered, when viewed in all its bearings and rami- fications, as destructive of the evidence of the senses ; and places the discovery of truth solely in the faculty of reason. But in opposition to this conclusion from his premises, Heraclitus maintained that the senses were the apertures through which we inhaled the divine reason.

" Our sensations," says he, " do not appertain to external objects ; they reside only in ourselves ; for they vary amongst individuals, and even in the same individual, from the varied condition of the organs themselves. These senses cannot, then, communicate any certain knowledge of external things, since their operation is so unsteady and fluctuating. The understanding alone possesses the power of teaching us the absolute nature of objects; it alone can impart truth to us." , He argues however in another place for the testimony of the senses ; for he remarks, " The

HERACLITUS. . 33

judgments wliich mankind in general form, possess the certain testimony of truth ; this common light wliich diffuses itself over all at once, is nothing else but the Divine E-eason, shed over all our under- standings by a direct and immediate effusion."

On the nature of memory he observes, "the mind represents to itself the universe such as it has been preserved by the memory ; we arrive then at truth when we borrow from memory that true and veritable sketch which has been deposited and confided with it. Wisdom is then accessible to all men."

His notions on the origin of the world did not ma- terially differ from those which had been promulgat- ed by many of his predecessors. Fire, or an ethereal exhalation, is the principle of existence and life. This agent consists of two indivisible portions or atoms, which are simple in their natures, and eternal, and indestructible. The particles of which this ethe- real exhalation consists, are in perpetual motion. From the various modes in which these two con- stituent elements are combined, we have the result of all the numerous and diversified forms of ma- terial existences. There is a rational or thinking principle incorporated with this primary fire, and this principle animates the whole, and preserves and changes the face of nature at its will. * This principle, in fact, is God, the maker of all things.

There is a story told about the writings of He- racUtus, that they were deposited in the temple of

* Clem. Alex. Prot. p. 42. Tertull. Contr. Marcion. * D

34 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Diana, at Ephesus, and remained tliere unknown for a considerable period. At length they were discovered and published ; and the poet Euripides made known their contents to a public audience in the same celebrated temple. This circumstance excited a lively feeling amongst the philosophers of the day, some of whom immediately declared themselves Heraclitus's disciples. Among the number was Hippocrates, the famous physician.

We shall close tliis notice of Heraclitus with a few observations of Emitter's upon the system of the Grecian philosopher. " The notion of life implies that of alteration, which by the ancients was gene- rally conceived as motion. The Universal Life is therefore an eternal motion, and consequently tends, as every motion must, towards some end; even though this end, in the course of the evolution of life, presents itself to us a mere transition to some ulterior end. Heraclitus on this ground supposed a certain longing to be inherent in fire, to gratify which it constantly transformed itself into some determinate form of being, without, however, any wish to maintain it, but in the mere desire of trans- muting itself from one form, into another. There- fore to make worlds is Jove's pastime."

EMPEDOCLES. 85

CHAPTEU V. MENTx\L PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SECOND ELEATIC SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY.

This second scliool of Eleatics was distinguished by many important and subtile speculations on mental subjects ; but its general scope and tenor had a decided leaning to the most objectionable forms of materialism. They were devoted and zealous students of philosophy, but they adopted general principles ^\dtliout sufficient discrimination, and supported them by fictions and fallacies dis- creditable to discerning minds.

EMPEDOCLES. 444 B. C.

This philosopher was born at Agrigentmn, in Sicily, about the year 400. Erom his youth he devoted himself to medical pursuits with great zeal and success. He travelled also a great deal, and became, by his skill in medicine, and the boldness and singularity of his character, a well known per- sonage, even beyond the limits of his oami country.

He prosecuted the science of mind with some

D 2

36 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

success. His theory of sensation is worthy of notice, principally from its singularity. He fol- lowed the general maxim of his predecessors, that the same thing could only he perceived by the same thing. He attached to each of the senses a particular element ; thus, the fire could only be perceived by the fire, that is, sight ; the air by the air, which is the ear. To the w^hole of the senses he joined other two — ^namely, discord, wliich is per- ceived by discord, and love, which is perceived by love. He explained the general phenomena of sensation by affirming that there was a complete identity between the object perceived and the sensation itself. The colours of objects, for example, were certain forms, proceeding from things external, and transmitted to us through the medium of the organ of sight.*

Empedocles makes a distinction between divine and human knowledge, and yet he rather inconsis- tently attempts to resolve all kinds of knowledge into the Divine Mind. However, it would appear that, according to his idea, man has some portion of this divine intelKgence given him to balance his sensual knowledge. How it operates, what are its limits, what influences it exerts, or in what degree it counteracts material agents, we can form no conception, neither from the philosopher's own language, nor from any of his commentators.

The system of the universe, as promulgated by Empedocles, is dimly shadowed forth. World-

* Arist. De Sensu, cjip. -1. I'lut. <le Placit. Phil. A.

LEUCIPPUS. 37

making mth him is a very crude and bungling affair. He collects all the elemental principles to- gether, separates them, descants upon them indivi- dually, and then mixes them in such confusion, that it becomes in the end impossible to obtain even a gKmpse of his system.

Letjcippus. 428 b. c.

Leucippus belonged to this school, and struck out a new system of philosophy. He was a subtile observer of the laws of the human mind. His whole theory of human knowledge and the consti- tution of nature, is founded upon an obvious train of thought, when contemplating the world around us. We incessantly see an endless variety of forms, and a perpetual change of motion amongst all bodies, whether animate or inanimate. We see one thing slowly but steadily amalgamating with another thing, and the forms and properties of both changed. These multifarious changes of na- tiu-e almost naturallv excite the mind to suffffes- tions of thought foimded upon the gratuitous assimiption, that a system of motion amongst the inanimate particles of matter, whether organized or imorganized, must be the efficient cause of all the varied forms of creation. There seems to be no other feasible solution of the phenomena we be- hold, save a theory of this description ; the mind rests for the moment upon it, and seems to feel a temporary pleasure and satisfaction that it affords a probable solution of philosophical difficulties of such magnitude. Hence it is that this theory of

38 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Leucippus, and modifications of it, have prevailed since the first daT\Ti of letters amongst men, and will, ill all hnman probability, keep its ground till the end of time.

Leucippus supposes that every atom of matter is invested with a peculiar principle of motion ; and that a number of these atoms produce a kind of vortex. Huet and Bayle have both remarked, that this theory is very similar to that broached by Descartes in modern times.

Leucippus says, " There are then two principles in all things, one primitive, and the other positive : space, and a vacuum." " Thus," he adds, " the whole train of events we see are subjected to a principle of necessity."

These few words embody the whole system of this Eleatic philosopher, as it has been handed down to us through the wi'itings of the ancients. He thought it fully accounted for all the diversified appearances of the universe, both physical, mental, and moral. *

The metaphysical views of Leucippus are, of course, founded upon the same material basis. Life, thought, motion, are all one thing ; respira- tion is the condition, and heat the sign of them. The soul, in which these three properties of life, thought, and motion reside, is itself only an aggre- gation of atoms ; a compound of fiery particles which circulate in all bodies.

We must, notwithstanding tliis system of mate- rialism, award the high honour to Leucii)pus of being the first philosopher Avho clearly detected.

DEMOCRITUS. 39

and fully explained, that important principle in metaphysics, so highly valued in recent times ; namely, the distinction between the primary and secondary qualities of matter.

The whole system of Leucippus is also worthy of remark as being the first regular theory founded ujion materialism in its most absolute sense.

Democritus. 460 b. c.

Democritus followed in the same path of specu- lation as Leucippus ; and more fully developed his system. The ^dews of the latter, relative to the distinction between the 'primary and secondary qualities of matter, were, however, not entertained by Democritus, who stoutly contended that the secondary qualities were nothing but mere modifi- cations of the thinking principle. "Honey," says he, " is in itself neither sweet nor sour, but it pro- duces upon the organ of taste an impression to which we give the name of sweet ; and from hence is derived the varied class of sensations which dif- ferent individuals experience. It is precisely the same with colours, sounds, and odours. ' ' He thought that the sense of touch was the onlv one which really taught us the knowledge of external objects.

He maintained, likewise, that all human intelli- gence was of a passive character. " All our per- ceptions come to us from without, and the ol^jects which produce them emit certain emanations re- sembKng them, and like images are imprinted on the soul." Again, for example, water, which com- poses the principle of life or vitality, furnishes as

40 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

it were by reflection, a copy of its properties to the mind ; the air transmits them through the ear, by an internal movement of particles, precisely similar ; and thus it is with all the other organs of sense.

Democritus aflirmed that there were two kinds of knowledge, the genuine and the abstract. The first has its foundation in the mind ; and the latter from the operation of the external senses. The abstract or obscure species of knowledge is acquired by the influence of external agents on the thinking faculty (vovg), and thus conceptions are generated.* Bodies operate, however, only by contact. There must be an impression on the soul from without, f This is indispensable. An external object is made kno^vn to us by a sense, through the medium of certain eflQ.uxes filled with sensation and impres- sion, which the philosopher calls images (t'/^wXa) ; these drop as it were from the object, and after assimilating themselves with the surrounding air, enter into the organ of sensation through certain channels or pores. This process communicates certain figures corresponding to the external ob- jects from whence they come. But it is only the external covering or surface of these objects which we perceive ; and this is the chief reason of the mass of obscurity which hangs over their real nature or properties. There is always, therefore, a cloudiness and haziness hanging over everything around us ; and it is in vain to think of ever re- mo\dng it from the sensuous organization of man.

* Arist. de Aniiiia. 1. 2. t Arist de Sensu, 2.

DEMOCRITUS. 41

We have only, in fact, a one-sicled glimpse of na- tural objects.*

We must not, however, suppose that all know- ledge was confined to this imperfect sensuous operation. There was a higher principle of intelli- gence ; something which guided and directed us to truth, independent of the impressions from external objects. There were certain internal perceptions or elements of thought which seemed to form part of the construction of the mind itself. This has been considered by some writers as the faculty of reflection (Siavota), which forms such an important element in modern metaphysical science. Whatever opinion may be formed on this point, certain it is, that Democritus seems to have been constrained to admit, though in. rather ambiguous language, the existence of certain primary elements of thought, apart from the mere mechanism of sensation.

Condorcct, in his Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind, has the following remarks relative to the philosophy of Democritus.

" Democritus regarded all the phenomena of the universe as the result of the combinations and movements of simple bodies, possessing a deter- mined and fixed shape, and having received a primary impulsion, from whence was imparted a quantity of motion, which modified itself in every distinct atom, but which, in the entu^e mass, always preserved an aggregate harmony."

* Theophr. dc Sensu, 63.

42 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER VI. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE GREEK SOPHISTS.

We come now to notice that class of speculative persons whom historians have distinguished by the term Sojyhists. They occupied a prominent station among the learned Greeks, although they did not form any distinct school or party, properly so called. The spiiit of their system encouraged an independent tone of thinking, and but little in ac- cordance with the constraint or authority of any federal head whatever.

There were two species of Sophists : the one generally exercised the profession of Rhetorician, and the other confined themselves to the instruc- tion of their pupils in all the branches of mental philosophy.

The philosophy of the Sophists comes down to us under great disadvantages, both for their repu- tation and our own conviction. They left no writ- ings of any moment behind them ; and what re cords there were, have all perished. We have their oj)inions, systems, and characters, only through

THE GKEEK SOPHISTS. 43

somewhat suspicious and prejudiced channels. It is therefore by way of inference alone that we can approximate to the truth.

The philosophical system which the Sophists adopted, if it can be called a system, was the natural result of the peculiar state of speculative science in this age. Men of active habits and inquiring minds, had seen one sect of reasoners after another usurping public attention, by at- tempting to solve the problem of the origin of the world, and the constitution of all things, both physical and mental. Their opinions were marked by great subtility, inconsistency, and extravagance. They seemed to agree only to differ from one another. Nothing had been satisfactorily proved; no one general principle established ; nor was there a single philosophical resting-place for the sole of the foot. This state of things natm^ally created a reaction. Men of bold and stirring habits shook off the cobwebs of speculative subtility, seized hold of the reality of things around them, and made a straightforward appeal to the feelings, opinions, and common sense of mankind. It is easy to see that an enterprise of this kind, under such circumstances, was sure to prove successful. Mankind listened, and they even fancied they obtained instruction. All the recluse and subtile philosophers were deeply shocked by this Gothic irruption into then* territory. The withering jeers of the multitude were keenly felt by the speculative recluse. He had no means

44 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

of repelling the attack. His weapons were too refined for sucli rude and vulgar warfare ; for, under such circumstances, his retaliation would in reality have been " to chop blocks with a razor."

We can readily therefore imagine, that no good feeling would exist between the disciples of the old schools of Greece, and the Sophists. There was no communion of fellowship and sympathy between them. It may readily be conceded — indeed the matter seems quite ob^vdous — that the majority of the Sophists would be shallow and declamatory personages, dealing in generalities, and avoiding every thing like abstruse reasoning and deduction. But still they could not propagate their views without spreading useful truths far and wide. They would doubtless make a liberal use of ridicule and banter in their popular orations ; and would, on many occasions, push their principles to an extravagant length. And there can be no doubt but that many of the expressions and propositions, which Plato and Aristotle have handed down to us, as falling from the lips of the Sophists, were uttered in the heat of extemporary oratory, or when smartmg under some unmerited persecu- tion. Making, however, every allowance, there is reasonable groimd for supposing that their ser- vices in the cause of true knowledge were con- siderable, and that they by no means merit that contempt and derision which many ancient and modern philosophers have heaped upon them.

PROTAaORAS. 45

Protagoras. 475 B.C.

Protagoras was one of the most eminent and early of the Sophists. His metaphysical notions may be gathered from what Sextus Empiricus has told us of them. They are in substance the follow- ing, Man is the standard of the truth of all things. He is the proper criterion of the reality of every thing which exists. This is the funda- mental principle of all human knowledge. Matter is in a perpetual flux and reflux ; it is constantly changing its forms. Our bodily senses, which are affected by and perceive these changes, undergo also a modification from old age, disease, and other circumstances. The foundation of every thing which the senses can perceive, or be affected by, resides in matter. But men at different times, and under different circumstances, derive various impressions from external objects. Those whose organs are in a healthy and \agorous state, perceive objects just in the same manner as other persons do who are in a similar situation, and whose sen- suous faculties are in a snnilarlv ors^anised con- dition. On the other hand, those whose organs are impaired or diseased, recognise external objects in precisely the same way as those who labour under corresponding imperfections and infirmities. Man, then, is the sole criterion of the truth of things. We are perpetually in the habit of making references to our own individual feelings and per-

4G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ceptions as the infallible test of truth and false- hood.*

Plato, in one of his works, gives the most un- equivocal evidence that the above is the sum and substance of the system of Protagoras. In the passages quoted by Plato, he makes the Sophist take his stand upon the common and every-day feelings of himian nature ; and supposes one man to test the truth of his sensations and feelings, by a direct appeal to the consciousness of his neighbour. Tliis is the first great effort which was made to bring the ordinary emotions and opinions of man- kind to bear upon the extreme subtility and ab- stract refinement of the various schools of philo- sophy which had, up to this period, prevailed throughout Greece. Protagoras spoke a language responded to by all mankind. A fine field was open to his rhetorical talents ; and there is little doubt but that the common sense tone of his philo- sophical discussions must have produced a power- ful influence on the inquisitive spirit of his day.f

On the merits of Protagoras and his system, philosophical historians are widely at difference. Degerando observes, " Les autres Sophistes adop- taient indifferemment toutes les opinions ; Prota- goras essayait de prouver que chacune a des fonde- mens legitimes. La plupart des autres Sophistes n'eurent que des audit eurs ; Protagoras exer9a une influence importante sur la marche de I'esprit

* Arist. Met. 3. 5. Diog. Laert. !). 50. Cicero, Acad. Qua^st. 4. Plato. Theat. 2.

GORGIAS. 47

liumaiii. La plupart des autres Sopliistes furent bientot oubliees et meritaient de I'etre ; Protagoras a pose des problemes qui subsistent encore, et qui peut-etre ne sont pas entierement resolus. Enfin, il soumit a des regies I'art que professaient les Sophistes ; il decouvrit plusieurs formes de raison- nement, et on convient que sa methode se rap- prochait a quelques egards de celle de Socrate."*

Emitter observes : " In all these propositions and reasonings of Protagoras we recognize at once the endeavour to resolve conception into sensation, and to deny the universality of pure intellectual thought. It was in this sense that the ancients understood the position, that all is in a continual state of incipiency ; for since every sensation is nothinsr more than the result of the concurrent activities of the percipient and the perceptible, and thought merely sensation, the former must consequently be a production of the constant varia- tion of these changeable activities. All, therefore, according to Protagoras, lives merely in the sensi- ble changeableness, and is in fact this mutability itself. The sensible is indeed true, so far as it is sensibly perceived. But nothing in itself is cold or hot, nor generally has any sensible quality ; but is of such or such qualities, according as it is perceived as such."t

GORGIAS. 452 B. c.

Gorgias was another Sophist of distinction. In addition to the general current of opinions held l)y

* Ilistoire Comparee, vol. 2. p. S3, t Hist. Philosophy, vol 2. p. 5/6.

48 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

his predecessors, he advanced many original propo- sitions of his own, and pushed them to a great length. In a hook entitled " On ichat is not, or on Nature i'^ he attempts to estahlish three distinct principles or axioms, all, however, directed against the stability of human knowledge. They are the following. ' Pirst, — That nothing exists. Second, — That if anything really exists, it cannot be known to man. Third, — That if he could know it he has not the power of communicating that know- ledge to others.

The first proposition, that nothing exists, Gorgias attempts to establish by the following arguments. At first nothing existed. Then reality had no ex- istence. Now everything must have either been eternal, or must have been made ; or must have possessed the characters of being both eternal and created. If matter be eternal it could not have been created, and must be infinite ; but that which is infinite has no parts ; it must also be different from that which contains it ; and nmst also be comprised in space. This space must then be a different and a greater thing than it ; which is a notion not in unison with infinity. If matter has been produced, it must have either been created from that which previously existed, or from no- tliing. On the first supposition it has not been created, it has only been changed in its form ; and on the other hand it is contradictory to say that a thing has been created which never existed.

On the second proposition, that if anything should even have a real existence, we could not know it ;

GORGIAS. 49

he, in substance, argues as follows : We cannot know what things are in themselves ; for it would be necessary, for this purpose, that there should be a perfect relationship established between our con- ceptions and those external realities ; that what they offer to our senses should be the very qualities themselves, under the self-same form that they are perceived ; but all this is absm-d. If we could conceive, for example, that a man could walk upon the winds, or a chariot drive along the siu^face of the sea, we should then be entitled to conclude that a man might fly, and that a chariot might ride upon the surface of the waters. That, there- fore, which really exists escapes our knowledge. Each sense only perceives that which belongs to its own province ; a thing is called visible because it is the object of sight ; but it does not cease to exist because it cannot be seen. Wliat then can be conceived may exist, though it may not affect our senses, because it is beyond the limit of their range.

The third proposition, that if anything really existed^ loe could not communicate its existence to others^ he defined in this manner. The means we have of communicating with others, is through the medium of language. But language is not identi- cal with external things, or real objects. We only transmit to others om- own words. Now that which is visible is not felt by the ear, nor does the ear see external objects ; the province of these two . senses is quite separate and different. We say, indeed, that language is formed from the impres-

* , ' E

50 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

sions we receive from external objects, through the medium of the senses ; as colour, for example, is derived from the act of vision. It does not, however, follow from this that our words really and fully express the qualities or properties of things without us ; hut simply the effect they pro- duce upon our organs of sensation. Even admit- ting that the objects of sense really exist, we are not from hence entitled to say that they are the objects of language. Om' sensations and words are two different things. *

There were several other Sophists distinguished in their day as bold and reckless declaimers. Pro- dicus, Hippias, Euthydemus, Thrasymachus, and Callicles, are the chief names mentioned by Xeno- phon and Plato. Some of these Sophists were charged with blasphemy by the civil authorities, de- nounced as corrupters of youth, and condemned to public execution.

* Arist. de Gorg. Plato, Meno. p. 7^. Sext. Empiricus 1. 1. 85.

SOCRATES. 51

CHAPTER VII. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Socrates. 400 b. c.

The name of Socrates forms a landmark in mental philosophy. Though not strictly a meta- physician, yet his influence as a pubKc teacher produced a marked effect upon all the subsequent speculations on mind. His powers were not of a system-making or speculative cast, but were of the highest order of common sense. In fact, he was a sober-minded, rational sophist, who had as thorough a contempt for pure quibbling, as for shallow and empty declamation. His scholastic acquirements, and his knowledge of the world, were so happUy balanced, that he exercised all the influence and power of a monarch over opposite and conflicting systems and parties.

Besides the mode of reasoning adopted by So- crates, metaphysical science received great indirect assistance from the soundness and consistency of his ideas upon matters connected with natural theology. These were in strict keeping with his lofty ideas of the reasoning faculty, and the various

e 2

52 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

important offices to wliicli it must be applied. His notion of the soul of man, according to Xenoplion, was, that it was allied by its nature to the divine mind, not by essence, but by virtue of its nature. Man was elevated beyond all the ranks of animated beings, and this by the power of his reason.*

The influence of Socrates upon metaphysical science arises from his peculiar method of instruc- tion. This was based upon the general workings and principles of his own mind. " Know thyself," was the key- stone to his philosophy. The first step in the pursuit of useful knowledge was a rigid examination into man's nature. This he ever steadfastly kept in view. He took his stand upon the perfect and absolute certainty of human know- ledge, and never for a moment allowed his thoughts to wander into the regions of doubt and perplexity. He took the world of thought just as he found it ; and all its daily and varied manifestations consti- tuted the materials of his method. Every pupil of Socrates was early initiated into the invaluable habit of looking into his own mind ; of practically operating upon his own consciousness ; and of de- ducing rules and principles for the government and direction of his reasoning powers. This dia- lectic discipline enabled the student to place every idea and thought in a variety of aspects, and to fortify his logical conclusions by numerous and apposite illustrations.

Erom what we learn of Socrates, it is quite ob-

* Xenoph. Memora. 1. I.

SOCRATES. 53

\dous that he was well acquainted with several metaphysical theories, though it does not appear that he ever formally reduced his o^vn thoughts upon the subject to regular order or method. "VThen developing his mode of instruction he always proceeds upon propositions generally received as true or self-evident. Aristotle savs, that Socrates, in studying the moral virtues, was the first who, in giving a definition of them, sought to conform them to reason, and establish them upon the rea- lities of things. Socrates rendered two essential ser\ices to true knowledge, — the introduction of the inductive method of reasoning, and an accurate mode of using general terms. But Socrates did not separate universal ideas from particular facts ; his successors did tliis, and gave them the name of ideas.*

Emitter, in his History of Philosophy, has the follo^\ing observations on Socrates, which I think sound and correct. " It is clear that the ultimate object of the Socratic method was to apprehend in the thought the essence of a thing, and that strongly impressed mth the character which pre- dominates in the Platonic and Aristotelian, it made the explication of terms the centre of its system, and sought to exhibit, in the definition, the real nature of the object. Consequently, although we must hesitate before we assert, with a later writer, t that Socrates was the first to es- tablish the doctrine of ideas, still we cannot deny

* Arist. Metaphysic. 1. 6, chap. 4. t Aristocles, ap. Euseb. 10. 3.

54 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

that the connection which he discovered between the idea and its object, must naturally have awakened investigations calculated to call the ideal theory into existence."*

* See also the following works : Olearius, De Genio Socratis. Vie tie Socrate, Amsterdam 1699. Gilbert Cooper's Life of Socrates, Lon- don, 1749. Wasser, De Vita, Factis, et Philosophia Socratis. Menzius, Dissert, de Socratis methodo docendi, &c. Leipsic, 1740. Lossius, De arte Obstetrica Socratis, Erfurt, 17B5. Simon, Dissert, de Socratis me- ntis in Philosophiam, &c., Wittembergh, 1797. Heller, Socrates. Franckfort, 1789. M. Stapfer, De Philosophia Socratis, Berne, 1786. Dr. Wigger's Life of Socrates.

THE CYRENIC AND CYNICAL SCHOOLS. 55

CHAPTER VIII. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE CYRENIC AND CYNICAL SCHOOLS.

The Cyrenic and Cynical Schools of Philosophy formed a rather singular feature in the history of mental inquiries. The members of them professed to reject all formal rules of abstract reasoning, to study nature A^ath all possible simplicity of design, not to avail themselves of any aid from mathema- tical forms or principles, but to be solely guided by the common and every-day rules and maxims of life.

Their views relative to the nature of the human mind, and all its powers and faculties, approached very nearly to those systems in modern times, de- nominated by the general term " idealism." We cannot in substance, say they, perceive and know anything save our own impressions, — not the ex- ternal causes of them. When we are affected by the image of white, or the taste of siveetness, we can very truly affirm the effect these produce upon ourselves, but not that the object of whiteness or sweetness has any real existence. The words we

56 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

use to designate these sensations do not designate the objects, but simply our feelings at the moment. The intervening links, the motion, the transforma- tions, involved in this act of sensation, form a complete barrier to our knowledge of what external things are in their own nature. Hence it follows that there is really nothing in common amongst men relative to their sensations, except the mere language they use to point them out ; for there is no invariable or unalterable law of sensation for the whole species. We employ the terms white and sweetness, but they stand for different feelings in different persons. Every man judges for himself, and not for his neighbour ; he can only know that which affects himself personally. Though our de- cisions are expressed in the same language, there is still no infallible criterion to judge of other men's feelings, sensations, or emotions.

The three principal pliilosophers of these two schools were Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Dioge- nes ; but the metaphysical gleanings from them are very scanty. Their principal disquisitions re- lated to morals. What we have already mentioned embodies nearly every notion attributed to them on mental inquiries.*

* Ai'ist. Metaph. 1. 8. chap. 29. Cicero, De Nat. Deor. Diog, Laert. 6. Lactantius. Divin. Inst. I. 5. Clemens Ales. Admon. Sect. 46.

EUCLID. 57

CHAPTER IX. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SCHOOLS OF MEGAHA, ELIS, AND ERETRIA.

These schools were branches or offshoots from the Eleatic Philosophy, and always retained the fundamental lineaments of the parent establish- ment.

Euclid. 400 b.c.

Euclid was the most distinguished philosopher of the school of Megara. He was imbued with a subtile spu'it, and enjoyed knotty and puzzling questions. In dialectics he took the opposite principle to Socrates; for he did not attack the premises, but the conclusion. He is charged with having renounced all analogical reasoning; but this is absurd, he could not do so, were he ever so confirmed a sceptic. Analogy constitutes the foundation of nine-tenths of aU hmnan knowledge. The rule which Euchd laid down as to reasoning was a solid and substantial one ; that in any inferences drawn from two cases, or sets of circum- stances, it is necessary that every thing in these

58 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

cases and circumstances should be identical. Any- little variation may make the greatest difference in the deductive reasoning. To every man, there- fore, who wishes to cultivate truth, this maxim of Euclid is invaluable. It is for want of its know- ledge and observance, that such erroneous reason- ings, on every thing connected with human na- ture, are presented to our notice in the ordinary concerns of life.

The other distinguished disciples of the Megarean school were Eubulides, Diodorus, and Alexinus. Their metaphysical opinions are unimportant. E-itter observes, " The majority of the later mem- bers of the Megaric school are famous either for the refutation of opposite doctrines, or for the invention and application of certain fallacies ; on wliich account they were occasionally called Eristici and Dialectici. Still it may be presumed that they did not employ these fallacies for the purpose of delusion, but of instructing rash and hasty thinkers, and exemplifying the superficial vanity of common opinion. At all events it is certain that they were mainly occupied with the forms of thought, more perhaps with a view to the dis- covery of particular rules, than to the foundation of a scientific system or method."

Phsedo of Elis, a scholar of Socrates, was the founder of the Elian school. That of Eretria sprung out of it. The leading doctriae of both was, that what was good, and what was true, were based upon reason and intelligence.*

* Ciceio. Qu. Acad, 2. 42. Diog. Laert. 1. 2. Pint. adv. Colot. 23.

PLATO. 59

CHAPTEE X. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Plato. 430 b.c.

We come to notice, at as full a length as is consistent with the limited plan of this work, one of the most eminent metaphysicians and general philosophers of whom antiquity can boast. Under his auspices the nature and powers of the human mind were fully investigated, and clothed with a clearness and facility of expression, which have served as shining lights to illumine the paths of mental philosophy for more than two thousand years.

The powers of Plato's mind were of the highest order. He possessed a more than ordinary share of that mental energy, so requisite an ingredient for all great enterprises of philosophy. In all the learning of his age he was profoundly skilled, as well as in the lighter departments of polite literature. He was a great writer, orator, and politician ; and possessed, besides, the power of enduring mental labour to a surprising extent.

This distinguished philosopher improved all these

60 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GEEECE.

talents and acquirements by varied and extended travelling. In Italy he devoted ninch of his time to the sages of the Pythagorean School; at Cyrene he studied geometry ; and in Egypt he contracted an acquaintance with the priests, studied astronomy with them, and attempted to penetrate into the sacred mysteries of which they were the sole depositaries. He overran the whole of Greece, re- sided thrice in Sicily, and made himself acquainted, in all the countries he visited, with their forms of government, laws, manners, and social institutions.

The speculations of Plato constitute an impor- tant epoch in the liistory of mental science ; and chiefly for the following reason. He was the first heathen philosopher who possessed enlarged and refined conceptions of a first universal cause, and of a clivme providence. The loftiness and purity of his principles of natural theology, gave a tone and elevation to all his mental investigations, and preserved him also, in a great measure, from all those extravagant conceits and paradoxes which so materially mar the speculations of his prede- cessors. He cultivated the science of mind in conjunction with the dignified investigations of a comparatively pure theism, and niade, in some de- gree, the former co-operate towards the elucidation of the latter.

Plato was the first metaphysician who cleai'ly and forcibly laid doTVTi the general principle that a knowledge of the laws of mind was an indispen- sable qualification for prosecuting, with success, physical inquiries. He says, " Philosophers have

PLATO. 61

laboured for the establishment of science, but have neglected to ask themselves, beforehand, what that science is ; they have speculated upon tilings, and have omitted to examine the nature and offices of that principle of intelligence which alone can exercise itself upon siu'rounding objects. What has been the consequence ? ^^ly, they have transferred their own sensations to objects ; have been entangled in all manner of contradictions ; and have bewildered themselves in clouds of diffi- culties and embarrassments."

There are, in a certain sense, two souls in man ; we give the name of soul to that physical life and spontaneous activity, to that organic power we possess in common with the animal and vegetable creation. But in a rigorous sense we apply the word soul only to designate the principle of sensi- bility and thought ; this principle is one and simple; for the subject which judges is identical with that which conceives and thinks ; therefore, all knowledge, judgment, and science, appear to be involved in this notion of mental identity or union. This soul which thinks, feels, reasons, and judges, exists only in man ; it emanates from the supreme intelligence ; it is immaterial ; it falls upon the organs of sense, and is not subject to change. Body and soul, though different in their nature and essence, are nevertheless linked together by a powerful bond of union, and exercise on each other a reciprocal influence ; and the health and happi- ness of man consists, in a great measure, in pre- serving this constant harmony.

62 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

We can only thorouglily understand the facul- ties of the mind by carefully studying the effects they produce. We ought then to distinguish as many faculties of the mind as there are different and distinct mental operations. I distinguish at first two principal faculties, that of feeling and thinking . To feel is to be affected by an external impression ; to think is to operate upon our ideas. The faculty of thinking divides itself again into two others, the understanding and reason. The understanding is that power which combines sensi- ble images ; reason is that supreme faculty which regulates all others, directs to an end or object, marks the relations of things, and forms conclu- sions from the whole. The understanding and reason exercise themselves both under an active Sind passive form; under the latter form they re- ceive and preserve notions ; and under the former they are united, separated, combined, and placed in logical and methodical order. These two powers are equally exercised on external objects and intel- lectual notions. Wliat is eminently characteristic of the power of thought, is that ability of uniting, judging, and concluding relative to sensations and ideas. Thought is a species of inward self-instruc- tor; it interrogates itself and furnishes the answers. This self-instructor, through the means of language, forms the Judgment, which consists in the uniting of ideas together, in the same manner as discourses are formed through the instrumentality of nouns and verbs.

The understanding is closely linked to sensa-

PLATO. 63

tion ; for every sensation is but a confused judg- ment, which the understanding has afterwards to develop. The latter power unites in one image the detached and apparently unconnected impres- sions to which sensation gives birth; the senses furnish the materials, and the understanding ela- borates them. Though sensibility and reason be two separate powers, opposite in their nature, yet they possess mutual relationships ; they appertain to the same tliinking being, which unites, by an act of mental consciousness, the objects of thought furnished from both sources.

Let us consider more in detail the particular functions attached to each of these faculties, and the fruits of their joint and separate exercise. There are in our minds images^ notions^ and ideas ; the first belong to sensation, the second to the un- derstanding, and the third to reason. Let us com- mence then with sensible images, for they develop themselves in man a considerable time before the faculty of thinking. The infant experiences sen- sations at its birth, but the indications of thought manifest themselves much later, and in some indi- viduals are hardly ever recognized at all. Besides, the soul and reason cannot be conceived without life and thought, nor these again without the influ- ence of external things upon the organs of sense. There are three things involved in every individual external perception; — the object perceived, the subject which perceives it, and the perception itself which bears a mutual relation to both. Co- lours, smells, &c., reside not in the objects, — they

64 MENTAL PHILOvSOPHY OF GREECE.

have their seat only in ourselves. Sensations are then only a certain kind of affections or modifica- tions of the power of sensibility ; the soul is pas- sive in receiving them. An external object acts upon the organs of sense ; certain fibres receive and transmit this impression to the soul. Sensibility is the faculty of being affected, modified, and changed in its condition by this process of sensa- tion. External impressions are remarked and noticed from their diversity and the changes they undergo. In fine, external objects which affect the soul, leave certain traces behind them, the me- mory preserves them, and imagination revives them.

Sensible perceptions are then the effect of the combined action of external objects upon our organs of sense ; and it is necessary also that these percep- tions should be united in a centre or common focus, and the result of this concentration is the power of consciousness. Each sense transmits to us only a particular species of impressions; the sight, co'- lours ; the ear, sounds ; and so on. Now we have the power of comparing these divers classes of im- pressions, and judging of their analogy and distinct- ness. "Wliat is the faculty which makes this com- parison ? It can be neither one sense nor another ; it must have its source in the soul itself. It is the understanding which performs this office. At the moment when our senses are apprised of the ex- istence of an external ol)ject, we appreciate not at first all its divers qualities of greatness, smallness, &c. This operation belongs to the judgment,

PLATO. 65

wliicli is seated, as it were, in the centre of the soul, to take cognizance of these impressions. It is in this that the power of abstraction consists. The understanding forms notions then ; that is to say, perceptions of relations and generic qualities, whether as distinguished from or combined with objects possessing a common resemblance or differ- ence ; it isolates them from the particular incidents belonging to them, and thus produces all those abstract notions, without which there could be no clear perception whatever. These abstract notions are partly the fruits of external sensations, and partly of the internal power of thinking ; and, un- der this second relation, are grounded upon our own mental nature. Sensation furnishes us with what is particular and individual ; the understand- ing with what is common and general. The senses furnish us with confused perceptions in the concrete form, and the understanding clear perceptions in the abstract form.

Such is the general outline of the metaphysical system of Plato. It has many very valuable prin- ciples involved in it ; and it must be considered by aU intelligent and candid judges, as the most important step in the path of speculative inquiry which had, up to his own time, been taken by any philosopher, on the nature and powers of the human mind.

The great dispute about Plato's metaphysical system, has arisen from doubts as to what he means by the word idea. Controversies innumerable fill the annals of philosoj)hy on this point ; and to this

66 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

hour the question remains as unlikely to be solved as when first propounded. To wade through these controversies can be neither pleasant nor profit- able. Were I to hazard an opinion I would say, that, from all I have read upon the subject, I am fully convinced that Plato meant by the word idea, just the same thing — neither more nor less, than what we do in common conversation or dis- course at the present hour. It is conceded on all hands, that he employed the word to designate al- most all things, both particular and general ; and this can only be accounted for upon rational grounds, that he understood it to mean, according to Locke's definition, tvhatever it is that is the object of a man when he thinks. If Plato had been asked to give a definition of this word, this must, from the mere nature of the tiling, have been what he would have said. Idea is the simple sign of thought. It may be general, it may be particular, it may be true, it may be false ; but it is, in all its phases, just that, and no more, which occupies the mind, or is in the mind, at the time Ipeing. How could Plato, or any man else, give a different defi- nition ? The thing is impossible. To define idea is to define what is the essence of thought.*

The scientific method of Plato is essentially the same as that of Socrates, with some additions and improvements. In fact, Plato's method is the best which he could form out of all preceding systems, and that of his great master in particular. His

* See Note B. in the A|)i)entlix to this Volume.

PLATO.

67

object, like that of Socrates, was, ^liich was the best mode of seeking after, as well as of communi- cating:, knowledge ? On this point, the following observations from Mr. John Mill are very judicious. Contrasting Plato with Socrates, he says, "No doubt the disciple pushed his mere inquiries and speculations over a more extended surface, and to a greater depth below the surface, than there is any reason to beheve the master did. But though he continually starts more original and valuable ideas, it is seldom that these, when they relate to the results of inquiry, are stated with any air of con- viction, as if they amounted to fixed opinions. But when the topic under consideration is the pro- per mode of philosophising — either the moral spirit in which truth should be sought, or the intel- lectual processes and methods by which it is to be attained ; or when the subject matter is not any particular scientific principle, but knowledge in the abstract, — the differences between knowledge and ignorance, and between knowledge and mere opi- nion,— then the views inculcated are definite and consistent, are always the same, and are put forth with the appearance of earnest and matured be- lief. Even in treating of other subjects, and even when the opinions advanced have the least sem- blance of being seriously entertained, the discourse itself has generally a very strong tendency to illus- trate the conception which does seem to be really entertained of the nature of some part or other of the process of philosophising. The inference we would draw is, that, on the science of the investi-

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68 MENTAL PniLOSOPHY OP GREECE.

gation of science, the theory of the pursuit of truth, Plato had not only satisfied himself that his prede- cessors were in error, and Jioio, hut had also adopted definite views of his own; while, on all or most other suhjects, he contented himself with confuting the absurdities of others, pointing out the proper course for inquiry, and the spirit in which it should be conducted, and throwing out a variety of ideas of his o^Ti, of the value of which he was not quite certain, and which he left to the appreciation of any subsequent inquirer competent to sit in judgment upon them."

Plato has always been a great favourite with the philosophic poets of all countries. Every thing he said, and every thing about him, strengthened this prepossession. The Platonic orb, though burning in a sepulchre, has been as a sliining light to their path. Milton, Young, Thomson, Akenside, as well as Shakspeare and Pope, are conspicuous in- stances in our own country. The four first poets were unusually proficient in Platonic knowledge. They drank its spirit at its source, the genuine living fountain. Shakspeare' s all-searching genius derived its intelligence and direction from such scattered glimpses as shone, to his acute percep- tions, in the pages of the olden and less learned philosophers of the middle ages. The philosophic light was subdued, but it had much resemblance to those roseate hues that linger on the mountain tops long after sun-set ; and men of upward ten- dencies of soul, like Shakspeare, are the cliff's which catch them.

PLATO. 69

Pope knew little of Platonism himself, and wliat he did know was solely from the Discourses of Bolingbroke, who studied it in the Latin version of the monk Picinus, with all the facility, but le- vity, of his natural temperament ; and who seems to have retailed it, so far as he had mastered it, to his admiring pupil as msdom of his owti. How little Warhurton really knew of the Grecian sage may be guessed at from this, that though the editor of Pope, he did not know that his most brilliant work, " The Essay on Man," was but depraved and corrupted Platonism.

Goethe has the following remarks on Plato, of whom, like all minds of an imaginative kind, he was passionately fond. " Plato was a happy and beneficent spirit, sent into this world to sojourn in it for a season. He did not seek so much to make himself profoundly acquainted with it, as to com- municate with gracefuhiess those treasures of wis- dom of which mankind stood so much in need. He penetrated into the abyss of speculation, mofe from the lofty grandeur of his nature than from any vain desire for abstraction. He took his flight to celestial regions, his soul glo"vving with desire to participate again in its divine nature. Every thing he said had a relation with the good, the beautiful, and the immutably true ; and he ardently desu-ed to inspire all those who heard him with the same lofty and noble sentiments."

The same principle which has so powerfully acted on the philosophical spirit of poetry, from Plato's speculations, has also exercised a great influence on

70 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GHEECE.

the current of theological thought, from the first introduction of Christianity to the present hour. Plato has always been a much greater favourite with divines of all denominations than his pupil Aristotle. There is doubtless spirituality in the sys- tem of the Stagirite ; but it is not the spirituality of Plato. The deity of Aristotle is indeed an active creation, but no more. It exercises no providential care or interest over human affau's. In the eyes of Aristotle the soul is distinct from the body, but without a body it cannot exist. The understanding is connected with the soul, as the soul is with the body, and they must all three perish together. We can readily see, therefore, that Christian phi- losophy could never have any very close alliance with opinions of this description. In Plato, how- ever, we see the creation of the world, and its government, referred directly to the Deity himself; and the immortality of the soul is unqualifiedly maintained. These theological principles consti- tute the great bond between him and all Christian philosophers ; and that bond will remain unsevered till the end of time.

*** It is impossible to enumerate a fiftieth part of the authors who have written on the works of Plato. Patricius counts, among the ancients alone, sixty-five commentators on the Platonic Philosophy, before the time of Ammonius Saccas in the year 220. We shall give the follovting list of publications on the subject, which will, it is hoped, be found ample enough for any rational purpose of consultation or reference. Apu- leius, De Dogmat. Platonis ; Alcinous, De Doctrina Platonis ; Diog. Laertius, Olympiodorus, Ilesychius. Guarini di Verona, Vita Platonis ; Marsilius Ficinus, Vita Platonis; Melancthon, Oratio de Vita Platonis; L'Abbe Fleury, Discours sur Platon ; Dacier, Vie de Platon ; Sam. Par- ker, A Free and Impartial Censure of Platonic Philosophy, London, 16()6 ;

PLATO. 71

Bernardi, ia the second book of his Serainarium Totius Philos. Venice, 1599; Coclenius, Idea Phil. Platonicse, Marbourg, 1612; Patricius, Plato Mysticus et Exotericus, Venice, 1591 ; Keuke, Disser. De Philos. Pla- tonis, Helmstadt, 1776; Weigenmeier, Disser. De Philos. Platonis, Tu- bingen, 1623; The Articles of the Abbes Fraguier, Garnier, Sallier, and Arnaud, in the Memoirs of the Academy of Inscriptions, Paris ; Tenne- mann. System of Platonic Philosophy, in German, Leipsic, 1792, 4 vols.; Remarks on the Life and Writings of Plato, London, 1760. The fol- lowing works are on the Platonic Theory of Ideas : Scipione Agnelli, Venice, 1615, fol. ; Thomasius, LSth Letter; Sibeth, Rostock, 1720 ; Schulz, Wittemberg, 1 755 ; Fachse, Leipsic, 1 795 ; Schants, London, 1795 ; Bartstedt, Erlangen, 1761. M. Cousin has given a translation of Plato's AYorks, in French, in 13 vols.; and the reader will find an English translation by Floyer, Sydenham, and Thomas Taylor, in 5 vols., Lon- don, 1804.

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CHAPTER XI. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Aristotle. 384 b. c.

The successor of Plato was Aristotle, his pupil ; a genius of transcendent powers and boundless re- putation. He stands alone, without a single com- petitor, in the history of the philosophy of the human mind ; and his speculations have been the fruitful source of more extensive and varied discus- sion, explanation, and comment, than the writings of any other human being that ever figured on the stage of life.

The extensive range of his inquiry precludes the possibility of giving here anything approacliing even to an outline of his labours. The extent of his acquired knowledge, the systematic turn of his mind, his indefatigable application to study, his unrivalled power of analysis, liis sagacity in detect- ing general principles from a chaos of particular facts, his ardent love of truth, and his clear and forcible language, have been, ever since his own day, the theme of admiration of all the lovers of learning in every civilized country.

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In the following observations under the head of Aristotle, we shall confine ourselves to four points, namely, liis theory of Sensation, his Categories, the Syllogistic theory, and a few cursory remarks as to the nature and principles of Logic in general. These four divisions will embrace the leading topics which the writings of Aristotle, considered exclu- sively in the light of a metaphysician, usually sug- gest to the minds of philosophical readers.

SENSATION.

Aristotle's theory of sensation may be developed in the folloAving observations. —

Sensation is the feeling or emotion we experience from external objects acting upon our organs of sense. This sensation or feeling is, in the first instance, passive and transitory, and is always to be distinguished from those universal feelings which, when once brought under the influence of the will, have a permanent residence in the mind. Of the five senses, Aristotle considered that of touch to be the most important, inasmuch as it is diffused over the whole body, and cannot be destroyed but mtli life itself. The sense of taste he considers a species of touch, for an especial object, — the nutri- tion and support of the body.* The three other senses reside in particular organs, which may be impaired, andeven destroyed, without the risk of life itseK.

The eye and the ear are appropriated to colours

* De Anima. 1. 2. c. 3.

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and sounds ; and motion and form are conveyed to the mind through more senses than one. A third class of perceptions are communicated to the mind through the united action of all the senses.

The real qualities and properties of external bodies are made known to us through the senses ; but those qualities and properties, such as they appear to us, have no actual existence until they are perceived. Previous to sensation, they exist only in what Aristotle calls their causes ; that is, in their fitnesses or susceptibilities to produce certain effects upon our organs of sense. Were man differently constituted, the world would probably assume a very different aspect ; for then sensation might not only inform us of the nature of external things, considered in themselves, but also consi- dered in relation to the peculiar organization of the individual senses.

The powers of imagination and memory depend upon the senses, and are, in a certain degree, common to man with many other animals. As sensation is created by certain motions excited in the organs ; so imagination and memory, which are copies of sensation, exert their power and energy tlirough the medium of fainter motions, which are representatives of the former.*

Aristotle considers that the perceptions of ima- gination and memory are amenable to a certain law of order and progression, and differ in this respect from mere sensations. The movements and

* Rhetor. 1. 1. c. 11

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influences of the latter seem more capricious and wayward. Reminiscences are in some degree un- der the influence of the human vnll ; and the prin- ciples which seem to govern them are four in num- ber,— proximity in time, continuity in place, re- semblance or similarity, and contrariety or contrast. And to shew, he says, how much the will has to do with the act of remembrance, we are conscious of hunting cihoitt, as it toere, among our thoughts, until we meet with connecting cu'cumstances, which bring the past perceptions sought after present be- fore the mind.*

This faculty of reminiscence, and the poAver the will seems to have over the train of our ideas, is, in Aristotle's conception, a boundary line between man and the other sentient members of creation. The divine principle of reason is recognized in man by the power which he possesses of nioulding the more common sensations and emotions into more elevated and harmonious compounds. Every spe- cific act of remembrance implies comparison ; and every act of comparison, expressed in the simplest manner, indicates a substance diff'erent and separ- able from mere matter. This substance we may not be able fully to detect or describe ; but still we are convinced of its existence, by the mere power of those attributes which we conceive to belong to it, and wliicli manifest their influence by the irre- sistible feeluis^s of consciousness.

Between the nature and properties of mind and

* De Memor. p. 682.

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those of matter, there is a wide and palpahle dis- tinction. It is not sense or fancy wliich has the power to recognize its own heing or existence ; it is the intellectual nature alone. It is this which ennohles man, and confers on him a resemhlance to his Creator. It is this which, when separated from the body, is invested with an immortal and divine nature, and which does not decay mth the bodily tenement it inhabits.*

THE CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE.

The different Categories, according to Aristotle, comprehend all of which we can have the least knowledge. They are ten in number, namely, Quantity, Quality, Relation, Action, Passion, The Where, The When, Position in Space, Possession, and Substance.

Quantity. — Quantity is divided into discrete and continued. Discrete is that whose parts can really be separated, as number, &c. Continued is that whose parts cannot be separated. These are again divided into successive and permanent. Successive quantity is that which comes by succession, as time and motion. The parts of these cannot be divided as those of number, but run onwards in a continued series. Permanent quantity is that wliich remains always the same, as space, which never changes as

* De Anima, 1. 3. c. 6. Yarious interpretations have been put upon Aristotle's expressions in this part of his work. We refer the critic to Dr. Gillies' translation of the " Ethics and Politics," vol. L p. 57, and Note ; and also to Lord Mouboddo's " Ancient Metajjliysics," vol. 2. p. 165.

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time and motion do, but has always a lasting and permanent existence. Its category is long, broad, and deep. And here we may ol) serve, that quantity when considered l)arely as extended, without breadth or depth, is called a line ; when it has both length and breadth, a surface ; and when it has length, breadth, and depth, it is denominated a solid.

Quality. — Tliis is divided into four kinds. Pirst, liahits, which are such endowTnents as are either created or very materially strengthened, by repeated acts of the mind. "V\Tien a man is \irtuous, we say he possesses the habit of virtue. In a similar qua- lified sense we apply the word habit to ivisdom, temj^erance, learning^ &c. Those endoTMnents wliich are acquu*ed by different acts of the mind are also considered as qualities, but they are usu- ally called habits. Secondly, natural poicers, which relate more particularly to our bodies, such as the power of walking, riding, &c. These powers are possessed more or less by all mankind, and can be exercised as occasion requires. Thu-dly, sensible qualities, which are those we acquire by our senses from the operation of external objects, such as co- lours, tastes, smells, sounds, &c. Yovl^lHAj, figure midifoi'm are also ranked under this category ; all external objects must be possessed of these.

Relation. — This indicates the relative con- nexion of one thing with another, as parent and child, master and servant. It also denotes resem- blance, equality, greatness, smallness, &c.

Action. — This is either internal or external. Internal action is when I think of a particular

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thing confined witliin myself, and effect nothing without me. External action regards something without, as when I cut a piece of wood or hew a stone.

Passion. — After action, passion naturally fol- lows ; and is always expressed hy a verb.

The Where. — This answers to the question, "Where was such thing done ? If one ask where such a battle was fought, I tell him it was in such a country, and near such a city.

The When. — This category gives answers to questions relative to tbne. As, How long is it since he died ? One hundred years ago.

Position in Space. — This relates to standing, sitting, before, beliind, right, left, &c.

Possession. — This involves the whole rights of property.

Substance. — Tliis is divided into two kinds, sjn- ritual and temporal. Spiritual is divided into liv- ing creatures, as men, beasts, birds, &c. ; and tem- poral into inanimate tilings, as metals, minerals, earth, air, stone, &c. Both orders may be subdi- vided again into almost endless classes and varieties.

These are the famous categories of Aristotle, and every one must see how defective they really are, as a philosophical classification of things. Tliis list was considered for many centuries as the most perfect and complete arrangement of the phenomena of nature that ever was made. On this point Dr. Gillies observes, " The reduction of things to genera or classes, by applying to them common names, is the foundation of division and

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definition, whicli have been called by a just meta- phor the firm handles of science. Each of the categories, or classes, above mentioned, that of substance for example, may be variously divided according to the intent of the division, which may be undertaken for explaining the works of art or of nature ; for delineating the institutions of civil policy, or describing the structure of plants and animals ; in a word, for examining any object, whether material or intellectual, about which human thought is conversant. But for whatever purpose the division is intended, it can be perspi- cuous and satisfactory only when it descends from the more general classes or terms to those which are less general, until it arrives at the lowest species of all, which rejects all further partition but into individuals only. The intermediate terms between the highest genus and the lowest species, stand each of them in two distinct relations, and therefore receive two diff'erent names, that of genus with respect to the less general terms which they contain, and that of species with respect to the more general terms under which they are con- tained. Such is Aristotle's own doctrine concerning classification and division ; a doctrine continually exemplified in his works throughout, moral as well as physical ; and admirably illustrated by some modern writers, especially on the subjects of na- tural history.

Syllogism. Our observations in this division shall be con-

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fined to three distinct heads ; namely, first, to show what the syllogism is, according to the usual ex- planations given of it hy logicians and metaphy- sicians ; secondly, to inquire into its nature and ohject ; and thirdly, to state, as briefly as possible, what are the general opinions of the learned on its real luerits, as an instriunent for the discovery and communication of truth.

The process of reasoning involved in the syllo- gism, has, by some logicians, been looked upon as simply a process of comparison. When we com- pare two things of dissimilar qualities together, we cannot affirm or do anything respecting them, with- out endeavouring to find some intermediate ideas, to reconcile as it were to the mind these dissimilar or contrary qualities. But, it may be asked, by what process is this efi'ected ? And how do these intermediate ideas come to discover the relations of things of an incongruous and opposite nature ? No rational answer can be given to these questions, except this, that such is the constitution of our nature, that when two ideas are presented to our attention, from which no reasoning conclusion can be adduced, it so happens that when one or more intermediate ideas are presented to our minds, and contemplated by them in conjunction with the other two ideas, we instantaneously, as it were, draw a logical inference from the whole.

It is from this cause that those writers who have argued in favour of the use of syllogisms have founded their doctrine on the principle, that every act of reasoning assumes the form of a syllogism.

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Tliey consider reasoning to be merely an operation of the mind, which deducts some unknown propo- sitions from other propositions which have been rendered familiar by a previous exercise of reason- ing, or are intuitively certain. In every simple process of reasoning, two members or parts are employed; and these members or parts must of themselves be obvious to the understanding, and we assent to their truth immediately upon their enunciation. In a syllogism, the premises are assumed to be self-e\'ident truths ; and if this were not the case, we could never draw any logical in- ference from them. In the major of a syllogism, the connexion between the subject and the predi- cate could not be observed by the mind, by a mere attention to the ideas themselves which compose the major ; for this proposition requires as much proof as the conclusion cbawn from it. In tliis case the mind must find out fresh matter to trace the connexion wanted, and furnish another syllo- gism to establish the first point in the general one. And should it so happen, that this second syllogism is not found sufficient to establish the truth of the first, we must have recourse to a thii'd, and a fourth, and so on, till it be discovered. We go on in this manner, till we arrive at perfect intuitive truths, and here we are compelled to rest satisfied.

Erom these remarks, it is maintained, therefore, that every single process of reasoning is founded upon intuitive propositions ; and if tliis be not the case, syllogisms must be employed to lay the

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foundation. By this view of the matter, every train of reasoning consists of a greater or lesser number of syllogisms. These may not, in many cases, be put into a formal shape ; but it is entirely from the natural connexion which subsists among the propositions, that the force and conclusiveness of general reasoning proceed.

To show the nature of the syllogism more clearly, we shall here give an example. Let us take the proposition, and form it into the shape of a syllogism — that man ought to practise justice. Now, we want to discover the relation which ought to subsist between man and Justice ; for the mind does not perceive tliis relation, as the proposition at present stands. By considering the matter a little, we soon learn, that for man to be under an obligation to do a thing, he must have the sagacity to perceive, and the power to execute it. A creature must have the faculty of distinguishing good from evil, as well as the liberty of choosing either, otherwise he lies under no obligation to perform the one or refrain from the other. Now, these are the middle terms or ideas, wliich must be compared by the mind with the first term in the proposition, namely man ; and when we have made this comparison, we find that it may be affirmed of him, that he is a being who can distinguish good from evil, and that he has the liberty of choice in his actions. We have here, then, two distinct judgments that man can distinguish good from evil, and that he has the poicer of himself to do either ; and a third judgment immediately suggests itself,

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that man ought to practise justice. The argument may now be put into the shape of a syllogism, thus —

" Every creature possessed of reason and liberty ought to practise justice ; Man is a creature possessed of reason and

liberty, Therefore man ought to practise justice."

In this syllogism three distinct parts or proposi- tions are involved ; and they are so arranged as to agree with the mode which our minds naturally follow in the arrangement of our ideas in reason- ing. The first two propositions are denominated the premises, because they go before, or lay the foundation for, the other proposition, which is called the conclusion, in consequence of its naturally groA\TLQg out of the premises. But there is a matter here which the reader will do well to consider thoroughly, and make himself master of. The two terms man and Justice, which express the two ideas whose connexion or relation we wish to find out, are called the extremes ; and the inter- mediate idea, by which this connexion or relation is discovered, namely, a being possessed of reason and liberty, takes the name of the middle term. Now we are to understand that before the premises of a syllogism can be established, the terms called the extremes, and the middle term, must be compared together ; for out of this comparison proceeds the very essence of the syllogism. The conclusion is the proposition which arises from the extremes being considered either in connexion

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with, or separated from, that wliich appears the result of this comparison.

E/easoning in common life has been affirmed to be nothing' more than merely ascribing the general qualities of tilings to their objects in matters with which we are concerned. We refer a particular object to some general head or class, which general head or class possesses some fixed attribute or quality. We then ascribe that attribute or quality to the particular object we have placed under the general assortment of things. Thus, if I scrutinize the character of my friend John, and find it to be virtuous, I then begin to reflect that a virtuous character is worthy of esteem and reward ; and I draw the conclusion, that the conduct of John is worthy of esteem and reward. This is the common process which the mind follows in forming judg- ments of tliis description. If we wish to arrange the process of reasoning in the form of a syllogism, it will stand thus : —

" Every virtuous man is worthy of esteem and reward ; John is a virtuous man. Therefore John is worthy of esteem and reward."

These few remarks apply to syllogisms in ge- neral. But we come now to speak of the diffe- rent kinds or sorts of syllogisms. There are four general assortments, which take tlieu' rise from the particular situation wliich the middle term holds in the syllogism. 1st, That in which the middle term is the subject of the major proposition, and

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the predicate of the minor. 2nd, That in which the middle term becomes the predicate of both premises. 3rd, That in which the middle term becomes the subject of both premises. And, 4th, That in wliich the middle term is the predicate of the major proposition, and the subject of the mmor. These four different classes or assortments become divided again according to what logicians call their anodes, which are determined by the quantity and quality of the propositions framed into syllogisms. By quantity is meant the consideration of propositions as they relate to universals or par- ticulars ; and by qtiallty^ whether these proposi- tions be of an affirmatice or negative description. All the possible modes of syllogisms may be found by ascertaining how many combinations may be made out of these four general kinds. The number will be sixty-four, which, multiplied by four, will give two hundred and fifty-six.

Each of these figures has rules peculiar to itself; but there are some rules which are common to all syllogisms ; and Aristotle enumerates the follow- ing. 1st, Every syllogism must have only three terms or propositions. 2nd, The middle term must be taken universally in one of the premises. 3rd, If one of the extremes be particular in one of the premises, it must also be particular in the conclu- sion. 4th, The conclusion must be particular^ if either of the premises be particular ; and negative ^ if either of the premises be negative. 5tli, No term can be taken universally in the conclusion, if it be not taken universally in the premises.

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Without drawing out these general remarks on the natiu'e of syllogisms to a greater length, we shall now advert to a few only of the different kinds of syllogisms. These will he sufficient for common purposes, as well as to illustrate the leading principles of the syllogistic theory.

There is a kind of syllogism in which the numher of propositions is more than three. This syllogism is technically called a sorites; which means a numher of propositions piled up one upon another, in which the predicate of the first pro- position is made the suhject of the second, and so on, till in the conclusion the predicate is attributed to the first suhject : thus,

" Man is an animal. Every animal is a body. Every body is a substance. Therefore, every man is a substance."

Now this particular combination of propositions, it must appear obvious to the reader, may be con- tinued to almost any length we desire, without weakening the premises or grounds on which the conclusion rests. The reason of this is, that this kind of compound syllogisms may be divided into as many simple ones as there are middle terms in the sorites. When such a division takes place, and the simple syllogisms follow one another, the last in the series becomes the con- clusion of the compound syllogism or sorites. This method, therefore, of constructing syllogisms is nothing more nor less than joinmg together

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several simple syllogisms; and consequently the sorites must stand upon the same ground, in respect to logical stability, as do the individual parts of which it is composed.

There is another kind of syllogisms, called by logicians entliymeme\ where one of the parts is omitted, and is left for the mind to supply upon the spur of the moment. This happens when one or more of the premises is a self-evident truth, and familiar to the mind of every one. Such, for instance, is the foUo^ving :

" Everv man must breathe. Therefore the king must breathe."

This syllogism has the appearance of being imperfect, as having only two propositions; but this is not the case. It is really complete ; for the minor proposition, evenj Idng is a man, is omitted, and the reader is suppossd to supply the ellipsis in liis own mind.

Ealse syllogisms are called paralogisms ; and a false syllogism, the error or fallacy of which is not very readily perceived by the mind, is called a sophism. The following kinds of sophisms are generally treated of by writers on logic.

Iffuoixitio eleuchi, or a mistake of the question, is a term applied to a proposition which has no necessary connexion with the subject in- dispute. If, for example, a man should Tvish to establish the position, that God is infinitely good and merciful, and begin by demonstratmg His om- niscience, this would be a deviation from the

88 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

question under consideration; for God's omni- science may be granted, and yet His goodness and mercy may still remain subjects of discussion. In like manner, a man may argue that all religion is a delusion; for he has seen some persons who have made loud professions of piety and devotion in public, who were, nevertheless, very profligate and wicked in their general conduct. This also is an ignoratio elenchi, or a mistake of the question ; for a hypocritical professor of a system is here made the test or standard by wliich the nature and truth of that system are to be estimated.

Fetitio prmcijni, or begging the question, is a term employed to denote the taking for granted the proposition you wish to prove. If a man were to maintain that a certain act of his was not in the least immoral, because it was not contrary to the acknowledged rules of morality, nor to com- mands of Scripture ; he would here be begging the question, and assuming in the outset the very thing he was desirous to prove — the harmless nature of the act. This mode of reasoning is also sometimes called arguing idem per idem.

Arguing in a circle is when the premises are de- monstrated by the conclusion, and the conclusion by the premises. If, for instance, it be affirmed that the authority of any particular church proves the truth of the sacred Scriptures, and the Scriptures the authority of that church ; this would be arguing in a circle.

Non causa pro causa^ the assigning of a false cause for any effect. Thus when a person ascribes

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certain events to good or ill luck, to the influence of the planets, or the Hke.

Fallacia accidentis, arguing from what is local and incidental to what is general and essential. If, for example, a person were to maintain that a bank-note of any country is of a value as universal and absolute as a piece of gold, this would be a fallacia accidentis; for paper money has only a local, but gold a general value. And further, if a man were to say that any particular amusement is dangerous or immoral because it is liable to be abused, this is arguing from what is particular and accidental, to what is general and essential.

Sophisms of eqiiiuocation, are those which are formed by the employment of ambiguous terms, or terms which are of doubtful meaning. The follow- ing is an old example. —

" He that says you are an animal says true ; He that says you are a goose, says you arc an

animal ; Therefore, he that says you are a goose says true."

We shall add to these remarks on the nature of the syllogistic theory, a few observations from Dr. Ueid, Avho wrote an Analijsis of Aristotle's Logic. The following extract forms a compendium of the precise mode of reasoning exemplified in three forms of the syllogism.

"In the first figure, the conclusion afiirms or denies something of a certain species or individual; and the argument to prove this conclusion is, that the same thing may be affirmed or denied of the

90 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GllEECE.

whole genus to wliicli that species or individual belongs.

" In the second figure, the conclusion is, that some species or individual does not belong to such a genus ; and the argument is, that some attribute common to the whole genus does not belong to that species or individual.

"In the third figure, the conclusion is, that such an attribute belongs to part of a genus ; and the argument is, that the attribute in question belongs to a species or individual which is part of that genus.

"I apprehend that, in this short view, every conclusion that falls within the compass of the three figures, as well as the mean of proof, is comprehended. The rules of all the figures might be easily deduced from it; and it appears that there is only one principle of reasoning in all the three ; so that it is not strange, that a syllogism of one figure should be reduced to one of another figure.

"The general principle in which the whole terminates, and of which every categorical syllo- gism is only a particular application, is this, that what is affirmed or denied of the whole genus may be affirmed or denied of every species and individual belonging to it. This is a principle of undoubted certainty indeed, but of no great depth. Aristotle and all the logicians assume it as an axiom, or first principle, from which the syllogistic system, as it were, takes its departure ; and after a tedious voyage, and great expense of demonstration, it

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lands at last in this principle, as its ultimate conclusion. O ciiras homimim ! O quantum est in rebus inane .'"

That one of the principles on which the syllogism rests is, that the same word is invariably used in the same sense, is quite obvious. Indeed the truth of this position has been attested by a number of enlightened philosophers. Lord Bacon says, "A syllogism consists of propositions, propositions of words, and words are the signs of notions ; there- fore, if our notions, the basis of all, are confined, and over hastily taken from things, notliing that is built on them can be firm."* Professor Stewart remarks, that "the whole theory of the syllogism proceeds on the supposition, that the same word is always to be employed in the same sense ; and that, consequently, it takes for granted, in every rule wliich it furnishes for the guidance of oui* reasoning powers, that the nicest, and by far the most difficult part of the logical process, has been previously brought to a successful termination." f We find M. Turgot making the same remark : — "Tout I'artifice de ce calcul ingenieux, dont Aristote nous a donne les regies, tout I'art du Syllogisme, est fonde sur I'usage des mots dans le meme sens ; I'emploi d'un memo mot dans deux sens difi'erens fait de tout raisonnement un so- pliisme; et ce genre de sophisme, peut-etre le plus commun de tout, est une des sources les plus ordinaires de nos erreurs.":j:

Nov. Org., part 1. f Elements of M. Phil. vol. 1, p. 35fi.

(Euv. de M. Turgot, torn. 3, p. 66.

92 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

The nature as well as the utility of the syllogis- tic theory has heen long and keenly contested. !For many ages it was considered almost sinful to call in question either its truth or usefulness. There was no language too eulogistic to sound its praise. The syllogism was considered the noblest and most useful invention ever produced by man ; the universal organ of science; the eye of the intellect ; and, like the sun, the light of the world. It was called the " ars artium, scientia scientiarum, organum organorum, instrumentum instrumen- torum, ancilla, clavis, testa, murus philosophise, docendi discendique magistra, veri falsique discep- tatrix et judex." Aristotle himself was extolled in the same extravagant terms. Pather Par dies, a Prench writer, says, " Que si, dans sa physique, il a parle en homme, dans sa morale il a parle en Dieu ; qu'il y a sujet de douter si, dans ses morales, il tient plus du jurisconsulte que du pretre ; plus du pretre, que du prophete ; plus du prophete que de Dieu." Averroes, an Arabian phi- losopher, declares that " Nature was not altogether complete till Aristotle was born ;" and that in liim " she received the finishing stroke, and could advance no further !"

The language of modern times is, however, more subdued and modified. We are not all in the same way of tliinking on Aristotle's merits as a logician. There is a diversity of opinion as to the nature and importance of the syllogistic theory. But the dis- pute, though still undecided, is now carried on with more calmness and liberality than in bygone times. And perhaps the day is not far distant

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when an unanimous and settled opinion will be formed by all speculative thinkers, as to the true nature of the logical writings of Aristotle, and of that portion of praise to which they are justly entitled. ,

On the general value of the syllogistic art, I cannot refrain from giving the opinion of the late Professor Stewart. He says : — " The remarks which were long ago made by Lord Bacon on the inutility of the syllogism as an organ of scientific discovery, together Tvith the acute strictures in Locke's Essay on this form of reasoning, are so decisive in point of argument, and, at the same time, so familiarly knoAvn to all who turn ^heir attention to philo- sophical inquires, as to render it perfectly unneces- sary for me, on the present occasion, to add any thing in sujiport of them. I shall, therefore, in the sequel, confine myself to a few general and miscellaneous reflections on one or two points overlooked by these eminent writers ; but to which it is of essential importance to attend, in order to estimate justly the value of the Aristotelian logic, considered as a branch of education.

"It is an observation which has been often re- peated since Bacon's time, and Avhich, it is astonish- ing, was so long in forcing itself on the notice of philosophers, that in all our reasonings about the established order of the universe, experience is our sole guide, and knowledge is to be acquired only by ascending from particulars to generals ; whereas the syllogism leads us invariably from universals to particulars, the truth of which, instead of being

94 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

a consequence of the universal proposition, is im- plied and presupposed in the very terms of its enunciation. The syllogistic art, therefore, it has been justly concluded, can be of no use in extendi/ng qur knoioledge of nature.

" It isj not, however, merely as a useless or inefficient organ for the discovery of truth, that this act is exceptionahle. The importance of the very ohject at wliich it professedly aims, is not a little douhtful. To exercise with correctness the powers of deduction and of argumentation ; or, in other words, to make a legitimate inference from the premises before us, would seem to be an in- tellectual process which requires but little assist- ance from rule. The strongest evidence of this is, the facility with which men of the most moderate capacity learn, in the course of a few months, to comprehend the longest mathematical demonstra- tions ; a facility which, when contrasted with the difficulty of enlightening their minds on questions of morals or politics, affords a sufficient proof that it is not from any inability to conduct a mere logical process that our speculative errors arise. The fact is, that, in most sciences, our reasonings consist of a very few steps ; and yet, how liable are the most cautious and the most sagacious to form erroneous conclusions !

"The fundamental idea on wliich Aristotle evidently proceeded, and in which he has been so implicitly followed by many even of those who have rejected his syllogistic theory, takes for granted, that the discovery of truth chiefly depends on this

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reasoning faculty which constitutes the intellectual superiority of one man ahove another. The simi- larity between the words reason and reasoning, of which I formerly took notice, and the confusion which it has occasioned in their appropriate mean- ings, has contributed powerfully to encourage and to perpetuate this unfortunate mistake."*

Logic. The principle laid do^ii by Aristotle, is, that all reasoning whatever rests on one simple principle : that "what is predicated, either affirmatively or negatively, of a term distributed, may be predicated in like manner of anything contained under that term." This, I conceive, must ever be considered a very inadequate definition of what a process of reasoning is, metapliysically considered. All rea- soning is called 2^ process ; now we want to know what this process is. But we shall look in vain for any thing in the logical works of Aristotle, or of his commentators, ancient or modern, wliich throws light on this curious process. To afiirm, or deny, or predicate anything of one or of many things, is not a process ; it seems, from an appeal to consciousness, to be a simple act of the mind; consequent, however, upon other previous acts or perceptions of the thinking principle. It may be safely afiirmed, that the whole theory of reasoning, considered as invoMng mental pheno- mena, is very imperfectly understood, even from

* Elements of the Pliil. of the Mind, p. 42/. Edit. 183G.

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the WTitings of our ablest and most perspicuous writers. This subject will, however, come under the reader's attention in a subsequent part of this work.

Aristotle dissented from Plato's notion relative to the nature of ideas, and in many parts seems to condemn it rather severely. But it is still a mat- ter of great difficulty to determine the precise character and import of Aristotle's objections to his master's theory. The former agrees with the latter, that the essences of things are expressed in our notions of them, but that this essence is not found in the general ideas which we form. This contro- versy has given rise to considerable discussion in Germany ; and to those who may feel any interest in it, we refer them to the end of the volume.*

To these remarks I would add the foUomng observations from Mr. Stewart, whose opinion on the subject in question, is entitled to great respect. "On most of these points, the i^liilosopliy of Aris- totle seems to have coincided xjery nearly icith that of Flato. The language, however, which these plii- losophers employed on this subject was different, and gave to their doctrines the appearance of a wider diversity than probably existed between their opinions. While Plato was led, by his passion for the marvellous and the mysterious, to insist on the incomprehensible union of the same idea or essence with a number of individuals, without multipli- cation or division; Aristotle, more cautious, and

* See Note C. at the end of this Volume.

ARISTOTLE. 1)7

aiming at greater perspicuity, contented himself with saying, tliat all individuals are composed of matter and form ; and that it is in consequence of possessing a common form, that different indivi- duals belong to the same genus. But they both agreed, that as the matter or individual natures of objects were perceived by sense, so the general idea, or essence, or form, was perceived by the intellect ; and that as the attention of the vulgar was chiefly engrossed with the former, so the latter furnished to the philosopher the materials of his speculations.

"The chief diff'erence between the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the subject of ideas, relates to the mode of their existence. That the matter of which things are made, existed from eternity, was a principle which both admitted; but Plato further taught, that of every species of things, there is an idea of form w^hich also existed from eternity; and that this idea is the exemplar or model according^ to which the individuals of the species were made; whereas Aristotle held, that, although matter may exist without form, yet that form could not exist without matter."*

On the subtile, though important, doctrine of Cause and Effect, Aristotle's opinion is worthy of a passing notice. He divides all causes into four kinds ; the material, the formal, the efficient, and the Jinal. Material causes relate to the substance or matter out of which things were originally

* Philos. of Mind. Vol. 1. p. 88. See also Brucker, Dr. Reid, Harris's Hermes, and the work, " Origin and Progress of Language."

* H

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made ; the formal designate that inward structure or form, on which rest the outward figure and diversified appearances of things ; the efficient cause is the instrument of motion or change ; and the final cause is the end or purpose which certain things were made to accomplish.

"A student passing from the works of Plato," it has heen well said, " to those of Aristotle, is struck first of all with the entire ahsence of that dramatic form and that dramatic feeling with which he has been familiar. The living human beings with whom he has conversed have passed away. Protagoras, and Prodicus, and Hippias are no longer lounging upon their couches in the midst of groups of admiring pupils ; we have no walks along the walls of the city; no readings beside the Ilissus ; no lively symposia, giving occasion to high discourses about love ; no Critias recalling the stories he had heard in the days of his youth, before he l3ecame a tyrant of ancient and glorious republics ; above all no Socrates form- ing a centre to these various groups, while yet he stands out clear and distinct in his individual character, showing that the most subtle of dialec- ticians may be the most thorouglily humorous and humane of men. Some little sorrow for the loss of those clear and beautiful pictures will perhaps be felt by every one; but by far the greater portion of readers will believe that they have an ample compensation, in the precision and philoso- phical dignity of the treatise, for the richness and variety of the dialogue. To hear solemn disquisi-

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tions solemnly treated; to hear opinions calmly discussed without interruptions or personalities ; above all, to have a profound and considerate judge, able and not unwilling to pronounce a positive decision upon the evidence before him ; this they think a great advantage, and this, and far more than this, they expect, not wrongfully, to find in Aristotle."*

*** The Commentators on Aristotle are still more numerous than on

Plato. The following may be consulted with advantage : The ancient

Commentators, Simplicius, Alexander Aphrodisicus, Ammouius son of

Hermeas, Porphyry, and Themistius. Among the moderns : Bernardi,

Seminarium Philos. Peripat., Lyons, 1599; Crassot, Institutiones in

Universam Aristotelis Philosophiam, Paris, 1619; La Ramee, Animad-

versiones Aristot. Paris, 1518; Gassendi, Exercitationes Paradoxicae,

Grenoble, 1624; Delaunay, De vari. Philosoph. Arist. Paris, 1653;

Charpentier, Descriptio universEC artis Disserendi ex Ai'istotelis Logico

Organo, Paris 1564; Mazzoni, Italian translation, Venice, 1547; Back-

mann, German translation, Nordhausen, 1629; French translation by

Charpentier, 1574. The English reader will find Gillies' translation of

several of Aristotle's works useful ; and the translation of all his works

by Taylor, in 9 Volumes, may also be beneficially consulted.

* Ency. Metropoli. Art. Moral and Met. Phil.

h2

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CHAPTER XII. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ON ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, AND ANALOGY, CONSI- DERED IN RELATION TO GREEK PHILOSOPHY.

In almost all the speculations of the ancient philosophers, we find more or less attention given to the powers of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. The degrees of importance assigned to these respective powers were various ; some referring nearly the whole phenomena of thought to them ; while others again confer upon them hut a passing notice. To enter into all the discussions on the nature and limitations of the faculties we find in the writings of the sages of antiquity, is out of our power ; but we shall hazard a few general observa- tions on these constituent principles of thought, which exercise so marked an influence over the mental movements of all mankind.

By analysis we must understand the dividing and separating a general truth or proposition into its elementary or component parts. This is a

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mental process carried on to a great extent by all men, without their being, in ordinary cases, in the least degree conscious of its operation. Wlien a beautiful and extensive landscape bursts suddenly upon our view, the mind is occupied with the con- sideration of the whole taken together ; but after a certain time has elapsed, we begin to examine the different parts of which this landscape is composed; to reflect upon and examine them, and to apportion out to each individual part, ac- cording to our knowledge and taste, its due propor- tion of influence in the general effect produced. We examine the landscape by piece-meal ; begin- ning, in ordinary cases, with the most important parts, and descending in the scale of promi- nency, till our observations have assumed a suffi- cient degree of minuteness to gratify the spmt of inquiry, or to grasp the mental object of which we are in search.

Those who can attend to the operations of their o\\Ti minds, wdll readily perceive the vast use of this power of analysis, and how necessary its culti- vation and exercise are to our making any progress in many important branches of human knowledge. Referring again, by way of illustration, to an in- teresting landscape, we know that the artist who can furnish a representation of it, must be greatly indebted to this power of analysis. He must carefully attend to the effects of the scene as a whole ; and yet he must, at every step of his per- formance, be carrying on a most accurate and minute process of analytical division. He must

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give to every part of the landscape a proper degree of attention. The general aspect is grasped as a whole by his mind ; and then it is parcelled ont among the rocks, and prominences, and waterfalls, and woods, and buildings, &c., in suitable propor- tions, according to the principles of art. Indeed, it is to this habit of analyzing his ideas of the sublime and beautiful in external nature, that he owes his skill ; for if he had no art to separate his general conceptions into theu' component parts, and apportion out to each its suitable situation, as to dimensions, light, shade, distance, colour, &c., his canvass would l3e one miiform representation of shapeless nonentities.

And the case is precisely the same with one who, instead of representing a landscape on can- vass, presents you with a verbal description of it. No general language can possibly convey to you the most distant conception of the landscape, till the describer descends into particulars, and divides the object which occupies his thoughts into its se- veral parts. He must talk to you of the conical- topped mountain ; the rugged and prominent cliff, overhanging the banks of the river ; the weeping willows shading the waters from your view ; and the tremendous roar of the mountain torrent, as it dashes from rock to rock. There must be indivi- duality embodied in every part of his description, that it may be understood and relished by those to whom it is addressed; and when the whole has been analyzed into sufficiently minute portions, these are all summed up, as it were, by the mind,

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and united into one general and uniform represen- tation.

The same power of the mind we are here de- scribing, is called into active exercise in tlie efforts made in the current literature of all ci\dlized na- tions to delineate human character, in its various forms and aspects. But here, as in painting and descriptive writing, general ideas must be resolved into their individual parts, before our descriptions of character can be rendered intelligible, or in unison with nature. In drawing a mental or moral portrait, we must begin with the leading and more conspicuous traits of character, and gradually de- scend to the more hidden and* minute principles of action and passion; filling up the sketch, as we proceed, with the little angular prominences and ' whimsical eccentricities, which diversify the wide and extended range of human nature. In those Avritings descriptive of men's habits of thinking, powers of mind, moral principles, passions and sentiments, we immediately recognise the hand of a master, if the description display a minute and skilful exercise of the power of analyzing. We are never deceived in this matter, but promptly pro- nounce the portrait to be admirably drawn, when all the parts wliich constitute the picture pass in review before our minds, and become invested with an evident unity of design and appearance.

In subjects of an abstract and profound nature, the mind follows the same plan to arrive at truth. The process employed in abstruse sciences has fre- quently been illustrated by a piece of machinery.

104 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Let US take the steaiii-engine for an example. We wish to make ourselves well acquainted with its nature and mode of operation. If we wish to ob- tain this information by the analytic method, we take the engine to pieces, and examine its parts separately. When we have seen the action and use of all the parts of which it is composed, com- pared them together, and seen their mutual de- pendence and relationship, we then discern the nature and use of a steam-engine. We have \m- ravelled the mystery, and can now discover the cause of those phenomena which so often puzzled us.

Before proceeding farther, however, we would call the attention of the reader to a few remarks in reference to the j)ower of analysis. The analytic method is never used alone, but generally conjoin- ed with the synthetic method. They are often alternately employed by the mind ; and these alter- nations are, in the majority of instances, so quick and rapid, that we cannot perceive them, even by the strongest efforts of consciousness. The manner in which we exert these faculties is this. We first take the general proposition as a whole, divide it into its elementary parts; we then sum up all these parts again, to form afresh the original pro- position. Thus we employ both analysis and syn- thesis. These two operations are strictly distin- guishable from each other, from the point at which they set out in the reasoning process. If we begin at the top, and descend, it is analysis; if at the bottom, and ascend, it is synthesis.

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Analysis by itself would never, however, lead us to truth. And here we must notice a peculiarly important principle, arising out of the mechanism of the understanding, in relation to this analyzing process. Were we to go on to analyze every object presented to our minds, we would never get any nearer the truth. There is a limit beyond which our division of objects must cease ; but this limit cannot be specifically pomted out by any precise rules or precepts of logic. This discriminating power is under the control of the superior faculties of the mind ; and commonly goes by the name of judgment^ taste, &c. To be entirely destitute of this power, is to be entirely destitute of intellec- tual acumen ; and on the contrary, to possess this power, and to know how to regulate it properly, constitute the distinguishing properties of a ra- tional being.

Let us suppose that a painter, when he endea- vours to represent a landscape, should direct his attention so minutely to evcrytliing which com- posed the rural scene before him, as to dwell upon every leaf of a tree, every blade of grass, and every minute object which came within the sphere of liis vision, he could never by this means complete a picture at all. The analysis would be too minute, and carried beyond its legitimate boundaries. Agam, should a man, when he wishes to make himself acquainted with a piece of machinery, such, for instance, as the steam-engine already referred to, dwell with fastidious and scrutinizing minute- ness on the nature, configuration, and properties

106 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

of all the fibres of wood which compose the frame- work of the machine, or the grains of metal, or the shape and number of the nails which have been employed in the construction of the boiler ; if, in fact, he were to attempt to analyze every thing re- lating to the object of his inquiries, he might so employ himself for a thousand years, and be no nearer a correct understanding of the nature and power of the engine, than the first day he com- menced his investigations. Thus it appears that an unlimited analysis can lead to nothing. But this power is wisely placed under the control of the judgment ; and, while she occupies her supre- macy, the power of analysis is carried just to that point which is necessary to make us perceive the truth of the general propositions of which the mind is in search.

These two powers of analysis and synthesis enter into every process of reasoning, however limited or unimportant. We are almost every moment of our lives employing them. These operations, how- ever, are frequently so subtle and rapid, that it can only be from long attention to the inward workings of our own minds, that a habit can be permanently formed of readily recognising their existence and influence upon our intellectual movements. Erom the writings of logicians and metaphysicians, the reader might be led to imagine that the analytic and synthetic methods of reasoning are purely matters of art^ and only of very recent invention. But this is a great mistake. The division of our general conceptions or ideas into their component

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 107

parts, and the power of again uniting them into their former state of aggregation, are faculties inti- mately blended with the very earliest movements of the mind of man, however rude or unenlightened it may be. We recognise the application of these intellectual instruments in the savage, as well as in the philosopher, as far as their respective degrees of knowledge require that application.

These remarks will be sufficient to illustrate the analytic method of reasoning ; we come now to the synthetic method, or that of induction. We here reverse the order followed in analysis. In seeking knowledge for ourselves, or in communicating it to others, by the synthetic plan, we begin with the simple and elementary parts of which general truths or propositions are composed. In abstract science, we commence with intuitive or self-evident truths or axioms, and advance by regular steps up- wards, carrying evidence and conviction along with us ; so that, at every interval of our reasoning, we have a clear view of the ground wliicli we have immediately gone over, and the reasons which, at every point, have commanded our assent.

In natural philosophy the synthetic method is generally adopted. In making experiments and observations upon various objects, we notice the result ; and by comparing and judging, we come to the knowledge of those quantities or properties of bodies which are common to many apparently different sul) stances. As we follow up this process we come to generalize still more, until we arrive at

108 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

what we call the ultimate principles of bodies, or general laAVs of nature.

What generally passes under the denomination of method, is simply the exercise of these two powers of analysis and induction. Our all-wise Creator has assigned them a conspicuous place among our intellectual principles. There is in man a love of order and arrangement, which manifests itself at a very early period of life. At the first dawn of reason, ere the mental powers have ac- quu^ed almost any strength, we find the young child begin to make selections of material objects, and to arrange and classify them according to a particular standard fixed in his mind, as to colour, size, &c. Some faint traces of this power are discernible in the inferior creation ; but it is vastly pre-eminent in man. It gradually develops itself as he advances to manliood ; enables him to divide and methodize his thoughts and sentiments ; and becomes of vital importance in the proper discharge of those numerous duties which fall to his lot to perform.

Analysis and induction, however, viewed singly, cannot be regarded as instruments either for the dis- covery or promulgation of truth. Another power is absolutely necessary, — that of analogy ; and to it, therefore, we shall call the attention of the reader.

We have, in the preceding remarks, pointed out at some length the importance of the two opera- tions of the mind, called analysis and synthesis. But we must here observe, that these faculties

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 109

.would be of very little use if we did not pos- sess the power of reasoning from analogy. If we required to analyze every object which came before us, and to resolve it into its general prin- ciples, before we could pronounce with certainty any thing respecting it, our actual knowledge would be exceedingly circumscribed indeed. Here, however, another operation of the mind is brought into ]olay, which relieves us from an inconceivable degree of trouble, enlarges our knowledge, and expands our reasoning powers to an almost indefi- nite extent. This process is analogy. If we ana- lyze a portion of matter into its elementary parts, we firmly believe that another, possessing the same external appearances as the former, is composed of like materials. If Ave see a man following a certain line of conduct, and bringing upon himself and others poverty and disease, we immediately draw the conclusion that the like will happen to others if they tread in the same steps. In these respec- tive instances we do not institute an inquiry into every indi\ddual object upon which we reason and decide ; Ijut we di'aw our conclusions from what we have actually experienced, and apply them to objects of a similar nature, which we may, never- theless, never have submitted to personal examina- tion.

The term analogy is generally used, both in common language and in systems of logic and philosophy, to denote a certain degree of relation, agreement, or resemblance in some points, between two or more objects, which in other respects have

110 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

little in common, or possess altogether different properties or quaKties. It must he ohvious, from the immense variety of the works of creation, that the ohjects which hear a relation or resemhlauce to one another must be numerous beyond the possi- bility of calculation, and we shall tind that analogy or resemblance is of every degree, from nearly complete identity to direct opposition or contra- riety.

A great portion of the reasoning of mankind is founded upon analogy. It is in constant and uni- versal use, and is employed alike by the rustic and the philosopher. It is one of those instruments which the Almighty has placed in our hands to secure our comfort and welfare, and to develop for our information the laws of nature ; but, like all other gifts from the same munificent source, it requu'es to be judiciously applied to the proper and legitimate ]ourposes for which it was given.

In almost every department of human know- ledge analogical reasonings are employed to a great extent, and are found to be of vast utility. In the science of comparative anatomy, for example, it is of singular importance to trace out the resem- blances between the structiu^es of different animals, their organs of sensation, digestion, and motion; and from this analogical inquiry we may draw useful conclusions for the government of our own conduct and constitution, and the promotion of our interests. Por example, we make experiments with certain kinds of food on the digestive organs of dogs, and from these we infer or draio con-

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. Ill

elusions that such and such effects will result to ourselves from taking these same kinds of food; and these experiments have often led to the forma- tion of rules of diet and regimen of considerable importance to our bodily health. Many highly beneficial discoveries in medicine may be traced to experiments and observations made upon the in- ferior animals, founded upon the resemblance be- tween their functions of life and our own.

In chemical science we may perceive the won- derful effects produced by the operation of the principle of analogy. Many of the most splendid and important discoveries in this science were the result of analogical reasonings. It was from this source that Dr. Priestley proved the compound nature of atmospheric air ; and it is related that it was in consequence of hints which he had given, when on a visit to Paris, to Lavoisier, founded entirely upon analogical conjectures, that the latter philosopher was induced to commence experiments, with the View of proving the compound nature of water, and of reducing it to its constituent ele- ments. Indeed the whole history of this impor- tant and useful department of human knowledge exhibits very striking and incontestable proofs, how much of the science owed its existence to mere hints and conjectures, founded, in many cases, upon slight resemblances or analogies.

In the science of astronomy we find that analogy has been the principal instrument in conducting us to important discoveries and improvements. The law of gravitation, as unfolded by Sir Isaac

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Newton, was discovered by a train of analogical reasoning founded on one of the most trifling cir- cumstances which daily present themselves to our notice. While Sir Isaac sat ruminating under a tree in his garden, an apple happened to drop from it, and hit him on the head. He conceived that the same law which determined the fall of the apple might possibly be that which moved the heavenly bodies in their orbits. This led to in- quiry, and inquiry ended in a full and settled con- viction, that the law which regulates the motion of terrestrial bodies is the same which regulates the movements of the sun, moon, and whole plane- tary system. And it is by observing the motions of the planets which belong to our solar system, and by comparing their annual and diurnal motions with the corresponding motions of the earth, that we come to the well-grounded conclusion that these planets are the habitations of various orders of living beings ; for we are confident that the sun imparts both light and heat to the planets as well as to our globe ; and as his inflaence gives birth to the various animated beings with which we are conversant, "analogy," says La Place, "induces us to believe that his influence produces similar effects on the planets ; for it is not natural to sup- pose that matter, of which we see the fecundity develop itself in such various ways, should be sterile upon a planet so large as Jupiter, which like the earth has its days, its nights, and its years, and on which observation discovers changes that indicate very active forces. Man, formed for the

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 113

temperature which he enjoys upon earth, could not, according to all appearance, live upon the other planets; hut may there not he a diver- sity of organization suited to the various tempe- ratures of the glohes of this universe ? If the difference of elements and climates causes such variety in the productions of the earth, hoAV in- finitely diversified must be the productions of the planets and their satellites. The most active imagi- nation cannot form any just idea of them, hut still their existence is extreihely probable."

It would be impossible in this chapter to advert to all the advantas^es which analo£:ical reasonino* has conferred, and is daily conferring, upon science. But these advantages are not exclusively confined to matters of abstract speculation ; they influence us also, to a wonderful extent, even in our common and every-day occupations, opinions, and language. Nearly the whole of oiu' knowledge of human nature is founded upon analogy; though it is commonly, but very erroneously, attributed to experience. We conclude, that any given line of conduct Avill be pleasant or disagreeable to our fellow-men, merely because we conceive them to be of a similar construction with ourselves in body, mind, and moral feelings. "Wlien we confer bene- fits upon our neighbour, we conceive that he will feel grateful, because we presume that his nature is similar to our own; and for the same reason, when we inflict an injury upon him, we conceive that he will feel and express indignation. The

*

114 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

food wliicli is palatable and noimshing to us, or that which is unpleasant and pernicious," we judge will produce like effects upon other people, solely because we ground our conclusions upon the analogical hypothesis that there is a close simi- larity among all men in the organs of digestion and general powers of life.

The whole structure of metaphorical language is grounded on the resemblance or analogy which the imagination conceives to exist among different objects. We say that vii'tue is fair and beautiful, that the mind is strong and robust, active and lively, precisely because we conceive there is some- thing in the moral and mental qualifications angilogous to the material objects which we clothe with these attributes. Metaphorical expressions will always be found most numerous in the writings of those authors who are led, from the habits of theu' minds, into extensive comparisons and a minute examination of the works of nature. The poet is a well known instance of this. It is from metaphors and similes that a great deal of the pleasure which poetry affords us is derived. We clothe the objects of nature, both animate and inanimate, with various properties and attributes ; but all these must in true poetry be founded upon some real or apparent analogy or resemblance, otherwise we derive no pleasure from poetical metaphors ; on the contrary, nothing so readily disgusts and puts us out of humour with our author, as when his similes and metaphors do

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 115

not suggest to our minds some natural or fancied resemblance to the objects which they are designed to represent.

But though analogy is one of the most powerful and general operations to which the mind resorts, and the exercise of it seems indispensable to our comfort, nay, to our very existence, yet it is not placed beyond the reach of misapplication. Ana- logy frequently leads us into gross errors, both in speculation and practice; and we ought at all times, in using it, to exercise a \dgilant circum- spection over all conclusions which seem to rest exclusively on analogical reasonings ; and more especially if these conclusions involve subjects of deep interest to our present or future well-being. Were we able, in the majority of cases, to trace the remote or hidden springs of those actions which hiu'iy the unthinking and profligate part of mankind to a course of life destructive of their virtue, their comfort, and existence, we should find that a great part of their misfortunes might he fairly attributed to erroneous or fanciful analogies, or miscalculations as to the effects of any given line of conduct.

In our abstract and speculative opinions, we are also greatly affected by erroneous or doubtful re- semblances ; and no one can take up a book on controversial topics of any description, without no- ticing that the differences of opinion may, in nine cases out of ten, be attributable to some false ana- logies incidentally introduced, as it were, into the

I 2

116 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF GREECE.

discussion, and made the ground- work of tlie wliole matter of dispute. To give an example of this kind of influence on our speculative conclusions, arising from erroneous analogies, will perhaps prove more strikingly illustrative of the truth of these remarks, than any general observations T^liich could be made upon the subject. The quotation I am about to give relates to the long and keenly contested ques- tion on liberty and necessity ; and the extract is the more valuable as having come from the pen of a very able and accomplished American writer, the Reverend Jonathan Edwards. Of course it would be altogether out of place here to express any opi- nion on the questions under dispute ; it is simply our duty to notice how false analogies may impose upon the strongest minds, and vitiate a long chain of close and argumentative reasoning. •" There is a vast difference," says he, " between the sun's being the cause of the lightsomeness and warmth of the atmosphere and the brightness of gold and diamonds, by its presence and positive influence, and its being the occasion of. darkness and frost in the night by its motion, whereby it descends below the horizon." " If the sun were the proper cause of cold and darkness, it would be the fountain of these things, as it is the fountain of light and heat ; and then something might be argued from the na- ture of cold and darkness to a likeness of nature in the sun ; and it might be justly inferred, that the sun itself is dark and cold, and that his beams are black and frosty. But, from its being the cause, no otherwise than by its departure, no such thing

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 117

can be inierred, but the contrary ; it may justly be argued, that the sun is a bright and hot body, if cold and darkness are found to be the consequence of its withdrawnient ; and the more constantly and necessarily these effects are connected vdila. and confined to its absence, the more strongly does it argue the sun to be the fountain of light and heat. So, inasmuch as sin is not the fruit of any positive agency or influence of the Most High, but, on the contrary, arises from the withholding of his action and energy, and under certain circumstances ne- cessarily follows on the want of his influence ; this is no argiunent that he is sinful, or his operation evil, but, on the contrary, that he and his agency are altogether good and holy, and that he is the fountain of all holiness. It would be strange ar- guing indeed, that because men never commit sin but only when God leaves them to themselves, and necessarily sin when he does so, their sin, therefore, is not from themselves, but from God, and so God must be a sinful being ; as strange as it would be to argue, that because it is always dark when the sun is gone, and never dark when the sun is pre- sent, all darkness, therefore, is from the sun, and his disk and beams must needs be black."

Now the whole of this argument from analogy is foim^ded upon the assumed principle, that there is a reseynhlance of the sun, a created and depen- dent olDJect, to the Almighty Creator of that same object, and of every thing else. But a moment's consideration ^vill convince us, that there can really be no resemblance between the principle on which

118 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

the movements and energies of a dependent crea- ture rest, and the principle on which depends the active power of the Being who made that creature. The two objects have nothing in common ; that is, the sun wants the essential attributes of self-mo- tion, will, and intelligence, which must be consi- dered as inherent qualities in the divine nature.

We cannot fail to view with wonder and admira- tion that subtile power of mind, which, in general cases, balances so nicely, and promptly too, the different degrees of evidence which result from dif- ferent degrees of analogy existing among various objects. Where the analogy or resemblance be- tween two or more objects is almost perfect, the mind readily, and upon the spur of the moment, reasons upon both, and draws similar conclusions from them ; and when this analogy or resemblance becomes fainter and more imperceptible, then we advance in our reasoning with more hesitation, and our conclusions are encompassed with a greater portion of doubt and uncertainty. How surprising is this power of the mind, and how subtile and dexterous are its movements !

Now, looking at the great importance of analogy, both as it influences our abstract and speculative principles and reasonings, and as it bears upon our practical conduct, we ought to be perpetually upon our guard to employ this mighty engine in a pro- per manner. In this consists the greater part of that which generally goes under the denomination of judgment. Let us be cautious in drawing ana- logical inferences and conclusions from certain sets

ANALYSIS, SYNTHESIS, ANALOGY. 119

of facts or circumstances, which are not in all par- ticulars alike. It is from the neglect of this pre- caution that we are so frequently involved in diffi- culties and perplexities in our reasonings, and thus led into error on many important subjects. In all our speculations we shall do well to keep this precaution steadily in our mind's eye, and we shall thereby be prevented from falling into many mistakes of moment, both as it regards our ab- stract principles and our actual comfort and happiness.

Looking over the Grecian metaphysical systems as a whole, we may plainly perceive, that they are varied in character, almost solely from the propor- tion in which Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy, are mingled together. Where the synthetic prin- ciple predominates, we see a more determined love of system, and often a reckless habit of generaliz- ing. In the early philosophers of Greece, this is very observable. On the other hand, when anlaysis unduly prevails, we see the genius of philosophy bolstering up its influence by minute, unimportant, and frivolous particularities. Again, when we see the speculative habit resting principally on Analogy, we find theories and systems full of crudities and inconsistencies. It is when all these three great prmciples of our mind are rightly adjusted and proportioned, that the happiest results may be anticipated. And what is true of individuals, is true in respect of the philosophical spirit of a whole people.

It may be remarked, that aU readers of Grecian

120 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP GREECE.

Philosopliy will readily recognise the great know- ledge wliicli the sages of that country generally dis- play, in their appreciation of the nature and use of these principles of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy. They mix and blend them, so to speak, with con- summate skill. In all the most valuable portions of their "\Tritings we see the right application of these general powers of thought. It is only when very abstruse theories are developed, and fanciful systems advocated, that we perceive any derange- ment in the management of the reasoning faculties. The works of Plato and Aristotle furnish us with innumerable examples of the beautiful application of Analysis, Synthesis, and Analogy ; especially in those sections of their respective treatises, which depend upon a correct observation of nature's operations, and the every-day appearances she presents to our view. In all the various dialec- tical systems of Greece, we see no errors from the application of these rudiments of reasoning ; it is only when ultimate principles of being and of thought are brought into play, that we find room for dissent or censure.*

* See the Author's " Essay on Logic," Second Edit. 1848, publislied by Saunders, 6 Charing Cross.

THE SCEPTICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 121

CHAPTER XIII. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE SCEPTICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

Pyrrho. 340 B. C.

Pyrrho stands at the head ofthe ancient Sceptics. We are not, however, to understand by the term sceptic, as here used in reference to the personal opinions of Pyrrho himself, that he embraced the notions commonly indicated by the generic term Pyrrhonism in modern times. He did not deny the absolute existence of truth; but only showed that in seeking after it we often feel a difficulty in seizing hold of it, from the mass of error which commonly surrounds it.

Pyrrho formed part of the court of Alexander the Great, in his grand expedition to Asia. The personal friend of the philosopher was Anaxarchus, from whom he derived a knowledge of the specula- tive opinions of the Eleatics. Pyrrho also learned the Indian doctrine of the Gymnosophists. He attended the philosophical school of Megara, and studied with great care and zeal the writings of

122 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GEEECE.

Democritus. He was greatly esteemed by all his contemporaries for the piuity and simplicity of liis life and conversation.

The Te}i Tropes^ so often alluded to in the philo- sophical writings of the ancients, and which con- tain the general tenets of what goes nnder the name of Pyrrhonism, are attributed to Pyrrho as their author. The principles of doubt involved in these rules go simply to recommend a suspension of assent, rather then a positive denial of matters submitted to the judgment. His scepticism was more of a passive than an active type. A Prench historian of philosophy, and a Catholic bishop, makes the foUoT^Tno^ observations on Pvrrho. " Que Pyrrhon ait ete amene, par son doute universel, a ne pouvoir agir, a ne croupe a rien dans la pratique, a ne pas se detourner pour eviter un precipice, comme le raconte Diogene Laerce, ces assertions sont sans fondement et tout-a-fait invraisemblables. Ce pliilosophe reconnaissait, au contraire, I'autorite du bons sens, des lois, des usages ; il admettait des regies de morale, et pre- tendait que ces regies avaient leur fondement dans le coeur. II voulait qu'on suivlt les apparences, sans se mettre en peiae de la realite; qu'on agit comme le commun des hommes, qu'on evitat soigneusement les discussions epuieuses qui ne pouvaient enfanter que le doute, et qu'on demeiu^at dans ce repos d'esprit qui seul pent faire le bonheur de I'homme."*

* Bouvier, Hist. Abregce de la Philosophic. Vol. 1. p 184. Paris. 1844.

PYRRHO. 123

The strong hold of the Sceptics was the variahle nature of our ideas of pure sensation. These al- ways afforded them weapons against the attacks of their adversaries. The sceptics carried their analogical reasonings from tliis source into every department of human knowledge, but particularly into our notions of what constituted good and evil. Here too, they received fresh succour, from the apparently discordant opinions and judgments of mankind upon the rules and obligations of mora- lity. People in different countries have different notions of what is proper and beneficial ; and this diversity is strictly analogous to the variable sensa- tions of external things, produced by the operation of the senses. It would be idle to deny, that such analogical reasonings would have a powerful effect upon popular opinion ; but still the nature of all similar logical declamations exercises a per- nicious iniiuence over the progress of sound and rational knowledge.*

The more abstract scepticism among the Greek and Uoman philosophy has a great uniformity of character, because it was grounded upon "vdews and argmnents which lay very open to common remark and observation. The following may be stated as the principal springs, out of which the various

* On the Sceptics, see Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1. Diog. Laert 9. 74. Cicero, De Fini. 2. 13. Epictet. Fragm. ed. Schweigh. Bayle, Diction. Huet, Traite de la faiblesse de I'esprit humain ; Ploucquet, Disser. de Epoche Pyrrhonis, 1758; Beausobre, Le Pyrrhonisme raisonnable, Berlin, 1753; Langheinrich, Disser. De Timon. &c., Leipsic, 1720.

121 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

currents of sceptical opinions flowed, in almost every period of tlie ancient pliilosopliy.

1st. The great diversity in animal nature, as to its origin, organization, &c. ; tlie differences in wliicli external objects are viewed by the inferior creation; all of which go to show what a vast variation there must necessarily be in the concep- tions formed of the qualities and properties of external bodies, through organs of sense so much varied. The question then is, as animals are deprived of reason, what grounds have we to prefer our perceptions to theirs when we are in the search of truth ?

2nd. The diversity of character is very great in human nature; and the differences among men, both in mental and bodily qualifications, are varied beyond all conception. This contrariety, joined to the interminable disputes among philosophers themselves, and the differences in tastes and aflFec- tions particularly noticed by physicians, render all attempts to arrive at the truth of things hopeless.

3rd. There is a great difference m the organs of sense, and every organ has its appropriate ob- jects. Do the qualities of these objects belong to the particular conformation of our senses, or only to the objects themselves ? Have they only as many and such qualities and properties as we perceive, and have they none which we do not perceive ? What are the constituent elements of objects, have they just such and such qualities and no other ?

4th. The various ways in which our physical

PYRUHO. 125

organs are affected, by disease, sleep, old age, sadness, fear, cold, heat, and a thousand other circumstances, must necessarily create a great di- versity of judgment relative to things around us.

5th. The differences from variation in the quan- tities of things, produce often opposite judgments and conclusions. A little more heat, a more rapid motion, or a little more wine or spirit, creates divers changes in our opinions. The general aggregation or di\dsion of homogeneous J)odies greatly modifies sensation.

6th. The various kinds of education among men, and the different laws and conventional rules of society, beget opposite opinions and conclusions on the most important subjects.

7th. Erom the interminable mixtures and com- binations of things, it is next to impossible to form a correct opinion of the mass of objects around us. Colours, density, and forms, are for ever changing; and the eye can only judge of that which is, at tlie moment, an object of vision.

8th. The relations of things one with another are continually changing. We seldom see an object precisely in the same point of \iew tvnce in succes- sion.

9th. All relations, and objects, opinions, notions, and principles, are connected together, and have mutual dependencies one upon another; so that the mind of man can never be certain that the conclusions it forms are the really true ones. All things are not perceived, therefore our judgments are onesided.

12G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

CHAPTEE XIV. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

Epicuuus. 341 B. C.

EpiCURirs was the founder of that school of phi- losophy which has gone nncler his name for many centuries. He was a philosopher of great parts, and cultivated inquiries into the nature of the human mind, in conjunction with speculations on the principal questions of morals.

The foUomng is the suhstance of the metaphy- sical theory of Epicurus. The soul is corporeal; it is composed of the most refined and suhtile matter; it is inherent in the whole of bodies, and forms a constituent element of their nature or essence. We can distinguish three separate or distinct elements in the soul. The senses; the appetites, diflPused over the whole organization of man ; and intelligence or reason, placed in a sort of inter- mediate position between the senses and the ap- petites, sharpening the former, and guiding and regulating the latter. The senses are a kind of soul within a soul. They form the organs or in- struments hy which the soul seizes hold, as it

EPICURUS. 127

were, of external objects. It is thus that objects vastly varied act upon us, and that we are enabled to distinguish the differences amongst them. Porms, colom's, sounds, smells, and tastes, which affect severally the five senses, are composed of cor- puscles, disposed in different orders, endowed with different motions, and these corpuscles are received into the various organs of sensation, by pores or canals proportional)ly suited to their nature. These elementary corpuscles penetrate even into the sen- sorium itself, strike and affect it, and give bii-th, in our sentient being, to images similar to these external things. These images may be compared to the impression of the seal left on wax.

The principle of intelligence or reason exercises supreme authority over the senses. Its province is, whilst the senses are affected by external objects, to think, to perceive, to conceive, to reflect, to meditate, to discuss, and to deliberate. Heason is not passive. But how is this thought excited ? By a phenomenon analogous to that which produces sensation ; by airy or sjnrittml essences, which pre- sent themselves to reason. These spiritual essences are disengaged from bodies, or are formed in the air, and seize hold of the mind, and fix themselves in it. But in the multitude of intelligences, these essences choose those whose attention is excited, and such as direct themselves to particular forms of thought ; to others they remain perfect strangers. Attention is then reason's principal instrument ; by it, judgments and conclusions are formed.

The appetites and passions relate primarily to

128 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE,

pleasure and pain; and from these follow hope and fear. The soul naturally expands itself when under the influence of pleasurable feelings, and, on the contrary, shrinks from what is painful and un- pleasant. This pleasure and pain result also from the subtile and minute corpuscles of bodies, which introduce themselves into our organs of sensation. When there is a natural harmony between these subtile corpuscles and our internal thinking prin- ciple, pleasure is produced ; but, in a contrary state of things, when this harmony does not exist, the delicate organs of sense are wounded, and pain and suffering are the consequence.

Again, it is by an action enth'ely mechanical that the soul puts the divers members of the body in motion. The whole system of mental pheno- mena may be compared to a macliine of wheels and springs, the two ends of which rest upon external objects. But there is, nevertheless, this essential characteristic relative to voluntary motion, that the soul judges beforehand, and wishes the effect which it produces.

Of the absolute certainty of our knowledge from the senses, Epicurus was a strenuous advocate. Sensations are the criterion of truth; the only test of certainty ; they never deceive us. Wlienever there is error, it may be traced to the judgment ; it arises, from our hasty or premature decisions upon objects which act externally on the senses.

The circumstance of the perfect freedom of the human mind to act or not act, just as the will pleases, is a curious, and apparently an incon-

EPICURUS. ^ 129

sistent item in tlic metapliysical system of Epi- curus. All other phenomena seem pretty tightly chained down to the principle of necessity or fate ; but the mind, or intelligent principle, he sets at complete liljerty.

The notions of Epicurus as to the formation of the world, are nearly the same as those of Dcmo- critus, with whose system he was intimately con- versant. His primary elements arc the atoms of Democritus. The atoms of Epicurus harmonize and repel each other, and generate a rebounding and oscillatino; motion. Thev combine and form various systems, which constitute what we deno- minate visible bodies or Avorlds. These primary atoms are infinite in number, and, therefore, an infinite nimiber of worlds may be framed out of them. It is needless to say that such notions arc vague and childish.

*:^* Diog. Laert. 10. Cicero De Nat. Deo. 1. 25. Sextus Empi. Math. 7. See also the works of Gassendi, the modern commentator on the Philosophy of Epicurns : and the following works : — Sorbiere, Lettrcs sur la Vie, &c., Paris 16G0; Jacques Rondel, La Vie d'Epic. Paris IHJO; Pierre de Villemaudy, Manuductio ad Philosophiae Aristotelia;, Epicurese et Cartesianse Parallclismum, Ainsteidam U)S1 ; L'Abbs Batteux, Morale d' Epicure, La Haye, 1686; Temple's Essay on the Gardens of Epicurus, London 1696. TragilU Arnkiel, De Philoso. et Schola Epicuri. 1671 ; Faust. Diss, de Deo Epicuri, Strasburg, 1655.

*

K

130 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

CHAPTER XV. MENTAL rniLOSOPHY OF GREECE.

THE STOICAL SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

As we proceed dovm. the stream of time, we find the discussions and speculations on the nature of the human mind hecoming more diversified, pro- found, and important. The Stoical School of Phi- losophy, especially in reference to the principles and practice of morals, has long maintained a con- sideral)le portion of respect and attention among the learned in all countries ; and the discussions of this school on the laws of mind are also well en- titled to a careful and attentive notice.

Zeno. 362 B. c.

Zeno was one of the most able and distinguished masters of this school. He followed the profession of a merchant for some time, but relinquished it, and attended all the most celebrated seminaries of learning and philosophy.

The idea of this philosopher, as to the abstract nature of the evidence which our senses furnish

ZENO. 131

US, was, that knowledge was certain and immuta- ble. In this respect he vigorously opposed the general doctrines of the Sceptics, in all their shapes and forms. The train of thought which appears to have been in his mind on this occasion, is exceed- ingly curious and interesting ; as it seems, as far as we are able to judge of the matter, to have led him to precisely the same conclusions which several metaphysicians of modern times have propounded with all the pomp and display of new discoveries. I allude here to the doctrine of ultimate truths, or, as some term it, the doctrine of common sense. Zeno maintained that evidence, and evidence alone, was the foundation of his theory of human know- ledge,— the very key-stone of his system ; and he points out a guide to the use of this instrument. He calls it right judgment, or healthy reason. This right judgment, or healthy reason, is partly founded on an accurate knowledge of things, and partly upon the condition and state of the soul, as to its exemption from corruption. Nature has fur- nished us with a kind of model or expression of herself, by which the mind gathers together the divers notions of tilings. These notions furnish the elementary principles of all science. By their assistance an extensive field is opened for the pro- secution and investigation of truth. As nature is the same in all mankind, those primary notions form a sort of common sense, which appertains to the entire mass of humanity.

Zeno distinguished eight faculties of the soul ; the five senses, generation, language, and thought.

K 2

132 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE.

It will be perceived by tlie reader, that lie here classifies generation, a physical power, with the other faculties which essentially constitute our thinking principle. The reason of this is not stated. These eight powers or faculties are, accord- ing to Zeno, a kind of governess to our soul, to lead and guide us in all matters of knowledge and life. We can say, under this point of \iew, that there is in the soul only one faculty, from which all others are derived. Tliis faculty is passive when it receives external impressions, and active when it unites, separates, and combines them, for the pur- pose of forming general notions and judgments from them. Thus the nature and operations of the soul form one perfect whole, like a smaller universe.

The Stoics introduced in their school the famous maxim, " that there is nothing in the understanding which has not been previously in the senses.^' They did not admit of innate ideas. They distinguished natural ideas from artificial notions. The former were obtained without any eff^ort of the mind itself, and were denominated anticipations ; the latter were the work of the remote spontaneity of the mind, and were called notions.

Artificial notions were derived from several sources, namely, from analogy, composition, pro- portion, opposition, transposition, repetition, and privation.

Zeno differed from Plato as to the latter' s theory of ideas. The Stoic coincided with Aristotle, but did not implicitly adopt all his opinions on mental speculations.

CHRYSIPPUS. 133

His notions as to the origin of things were, that there were two principles. The one is primordial matter, which is the passive material of which all thin^rs are formed. The second is the active ele- ment which moulds and forms every thing ; this is Reason, Destiny, God. The laws of matter are imprinted on it by this intelligent and active principle.

Chrtsippus. 250 b. c.

Chrysippns was another distinguished pliiloso- plier of the Stoical school. On many points he entertained correct views as to several important principles of mental philosophy.

He agreed with Zeno as to the difference between sensible perceptions of external objects, and notions of the mind created by its reflecting on its own poAvers, or consciousness. These notions are not propagated immediately from the senses ; they exclusively appertain to thought. They institute, as it were, a comparison between objects of sense ; they seize the common and general features or cha- racteristics which belong to them ; the one opera- tion is founded upon natural causes, and the other upon the reflective faculty of the understanding alone.

Chrysippns attempted to make a catalogue of im.demonstrable or elementary truths. His idea was, that all other truths should be arranged under some one of these. These general truths may be reduced to two kinds ; those which include propositions necessarily involved in propositions

134 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

previously admitted as true; and consequences which result from disjunctive propositions. The minor details of this system of reasoning are com- prehended under the heads of simple and complex maxims; possible and impossible; necessaiy and contingent ; probable, paradoxical, rational, and empirical.

On the doctrine of Causation, Chrysippus divided causes into two descriptions ; those which he con- sidered purely mechanical, which belonged to the aggregate masses of matter ; and those which were organic, and constituted the principles of vegetable and animal life.

Most of the opinions of Zeno and the Stoics of tliis period generally, on the nature of the Deity, are extremely rational. They clothe the Divine nature with noble and sublime attributes. They regard Him as infinitely perfect, and every way worthy of adoration and homage. It must, how- ever, be stated, that there is a great drawback to this species of theism. Though they invest the Deity with these attributes, they nevertheless be- lieve Him to be essentially connected with matter. They say that the Deity constitutes both the visible and the invisible world ; that God is the soul of the world ; that He penetrates all parts of it ; that He is the Kving and vivifying principle of it ; in fact, that the world was composed of God, who was the soul of it, and matter, which was its body.

Zeno and his school were strict and absolute necessitarians. Every thing was linked together by an inexorable fatality. They made some little

CHEYSIPPUS. 135

display of allowing the Pirst Cause a degree of liberty or choice ; hut it was evidently a mere piece of philosophical delusion. Cicero accuses them of this fruitless attempt to reconcile liberty with necessity.* Both Zeno and Chrysippus saw the chfficulty, that if they did not invest man with personal freedom, it was impossible to conceive how actions could be considered either praiseworthy or blameable, or entitled to rewards or punishments. They were, therefore, obliged to cede a form of liberty, to harmonize, in some measure, this moral responsibility with the other parts of their system, f The Stoical doctrines, as a whole, present much that is praiseworthy and valuable. The philo- sophers of this school set themselves against the whole mass of vain and conceited quibbling which too often usurped the name and authority of philosophy and true wisdom. They took human life and human nature as they found them. The whole of their doctrines were grounded on the more obvious and striking principles of men's thoughts and actions. They say, in substance, If your system be against common sense, it must be erroneous ; we may not perhaps be able to rebut all your refined and subtile arguments, but be you assured, that nature has not left the first princi- ples of speculation and action to be trifled with hj the weak and puny sophistry of man. Upon these grounds the whole of their public teaching was based.

* C icero, Noctes Atticse, 4. 2. 15.

t Cicero, De Fato, 10. 12. Nemesius, De uatura Ilominis. c. 2.

136 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF GllEECE.

CHAPTER XVI. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

ON THE NOTIONS COMMONLY ADOPTED BY THE ANCIENTS, UP TO THE PERIOD OF THE STOICS, ON THE ORIGIN OF OTJR KNOWLEDGE, AND THE NATURE OF TRUTH.

We sliall attempt, in tliis chapter, to give a general but concise view of some important and elementary principles discussed by the ancient sages ; simply with a view of fixing the ordinary reader's attention more firmly on the real amount of progress which the philosophy of the mind had made, up to this point of history.

The first question with the philosophers of Greece was, Erom whence is our knowledge de- rived ? Does it proceed from ourselves ? Does it emanate from any physical channel or source we can recognize ? Does it own a di\dne or heavenly origin? Theu' inquiries soon, however, brought them to something which seemed to point out what appeared to indicate, in some measure, a probalde solution of the great problem. This

ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 137

something was Sensation. They saw that an affection of the senses was prior to thought. This conclusion was established not only from every man's hom-ly experience, but from a consideration of the infant years of mankind, when the deve- lopment of sensation was more strikingly and pointedly marked, as an anterior operation to the knowledge of the existence and qualities of ex- ternal objects. No man could be ignorant, much less a philosopher, that a mountain, or lake, or river, must be seen by the eye before a person can possibly have an ideci of it ; that sounds must be heard by the ear, before we can have an idea of them, or be able to feel the exquisite pleasures which are derived from their mechanical combina- tion in the art of music. And the like may be remarked in reference to the other three organs of sensation. This being the precise state of the case, inquiring men took their stand on Sensation. They perceived that it was, in some way or other, indissolubly and invariably conjoined Avith know- ledge ; this they were in no position to deny, either as philosophers or men. Nature decided with peremptory authority. She pointed her finger to the final cause of this great source of knowledge, that this peculiar organization of our senses shall be the medium of that information of the qualities and properties of external bodies and agencies which is absolutely requisite for the support and enjoyment of animal existence.

We find, therefore, no difference worth mention- ing among the various schools of philosophy as to

138 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE.

common and every-day operations of sensation, considered as mere phenomena of existence. Its necessary connection with knowledge coukl not be denied. But a little inquiry below the surface of things suggested another important question, Are there any thoughts, or ideas, or notions, or prin- ciples in our minds, which do not seem to have their origin in this peculiar affection of our senses, either from their separate or collective operations ? We have the colours and confor- mation of bodies by the eye, sounds by the ear, smells by the nose, tastes by the mouth, and feeling by the touch ; but does any one, or do all of these produce those ideas, for example, which I have of myself, of being or existence in general, of space, of time, of number, of infinity, of right, of obliga- tion, of cause and effect, and of a thousand others which are in every man's mind, and which form as it were the pabulum of his mental existence ? This is the point of departure of mental philoso- phy. To solve this problem has been the great object of all metaphysicians from the earliest re- cords of speculation ; and the question is still ask- ed from a thousand different quarters, even at the present hour.

The first step which philosophers took to throw some light on this intricate question was, to divide our sensations into two classes ; the one related to the simple or secondary qualities of material bo- dies, and the other to their primary ones. Our simple ideas or notions of the secondary qualities or properties of things, arc only conditionally or

ORIGIN OF KNOWLEDGE. 139

relatively uniform. Let us, for example, take the sensation of warmth. Take a bason of water heat- ed to a certain degree, and put a cold hand into it, and a warm one. The water will feel quite warm to the cold hand, but cold or chilly to the warm one. Does then this sensation belong, as an inhe- rent quality, to water ? Does it form a constituent portion of its nature ? If this were granted, it would make the water both hot and cold at the same time, which is absurd. Such sensations are called s'miple or secondary ones, because they depend upon and are apparently regulated by the phy- sical state or condition of the organs of sense. But whether water be hot or cold, warm or chilly, it always occupies space, it has a certain volume or bulk, and a certain density or weight. These quali- ties appertain to it, independently of our sensations, or the state of our organs of feeling, taste, smell, or sight. These, therefore, are termed the iwimary qualities of matter, and seem to form the ground- work of a mighty structure of intellectual mechan- ism and contrivance.

We come now to the third step in the progress of inquiry. Was there any inward principle in man which could elaborate or concoct any ideas or notions out of the ordinary sensations which our senses produced ; or did these ordinary sensations merely operate as exciting causes to the mind, forming out of its otvh resources notions or ideas which did not seem to have any immediate or necessary connexion mth the process of sensa- tion ? This was a puzzling question to the inquir-

140 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GPvEECE.

ing philosoplier. It was clear to him that there were certain notions in our minds, and very familiar ones too, which did not seem to owe their exist- ence to the operation of external objects on the senses ; but how to account for them, constituted the difficulty. There were two modes of attempting- to remove the perplexity ; the one supposed that the mind, as by some chemical laboratory, distilled, as it were, these more rarefied notions from the mass of common ones which flowed throu£?h the senses; and the other, that these refined ideas were di'awTi from the internal resources of the mind itself, independent of sensation. These two theories both came under the notice of the ancients, wliose systems we have previously glanced at. The evidence preponderates in favour of the solution that those general abstract notions which we possess, and which seem to be so necessary for the acquirement and cultivation of knowledge, owe Iheir existence to the mind itself; and that the operation which evolves them is called reflection. We find that the most acute and comprehensive reasoners on men- tal subjects, from Thales down to the time of the Stoics, were obliged to admit this inward power of reflection, to be enabled to make any progress in the study of mind themselves, or to convey their information and knowledge to others.

The abstract nature or character of truth, Avas another stumbling block to all the ancient sages of Greece. Are our sensations to be taken as the evidence of truth ? They are variable and imcer- tain. Do our more abstract and refined notions or

NATUHE OF TRUTH. 141

ideas afford more evidence ? We cannot rely upon them either. Is there any criterion by which we can determine a thing to be true or false ? Some lay down one test, and some another. The Aca- demics maintained there was no criterion of truth whatever. The Dogmatists all agree upon a cri- terion of truth, but differ about that in which it consists. Plato would allow no criterion from the testimony of the senses ; for, says he, " from them we have nothing but opinion." He affu'med, how- ever, that we had a criterion from pure intellect, which afforded a test for certain knowledge. Aris- totle differs in some degree from his master. The former allows that the pure mind confers upon us certain conviction, although the evidence from the senses was sometimes very variable and uncertain. Among all the sects of philosophers none contended so zealously and boldly for a criterion of truth as the Epicureans. They established thek test on three principles ; sensation, anticipation, and pas- sion. Subsequently, the most indefatigable hunters after a criterion of certainty were the Stoics. They suggested several modes by which this great desi- deratum might be found.' Some amongst them, in order to conquer what they conceived as prejudices, went so far as to distrust the intimations from their own senses, and to contend that the ordinary principles of action among men ought not to be implicitly relied on. They conjectured that some wicked demon might insinuate falsehood through this channel, and make men the objects of their

142 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

wicked and malicious sport. After laying aside, however, all the usual maxims received among men, they seem to have heen driven into a corner at last, and compelled to admit, that truth might rest upon the evidence of their own minds.

THE SECOND ACADEMY. 143^

CHAPTER XVII. MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

The Second Academy.

The philosophers of the Second Academy dif- fered in several points from Zeno and his followers. The former especially directed their discussions towards those parts of the mental philosophy of the Stoics which related to the foundations of hu- man knowledge, and the nature of truth in general. This conflict of opinions is exceedingly interesting. The truth of important principles was at stake; and the various combatants brouq-ht to the task great natural acuteness, and a perfect knowledge of aU preceding systems.

Arcesilaus. 315 b. c.

According to Sextus Empiricus, Arcesilaus di- rected his logical attacks against Zeno's theory of perception. The liistorian teUs us that *' The Sto- ics maintained three tilings ; science, opinion, and comprehension ; the last of which occupied an in- termediate place between the other two. Upon

144 MENTAL PniLOSOPTIY OF GREECE.

tliis point they were attacked by Arcesilans. As comprehension has to be sustained by science and opinion, it cannot be the arbiter of their nature or essence. Now this comprehension resides either in wisdom or folly. If it resides in wisdom, it is science itself ; if in folly, it is no opinion, but mere empty jargon. This comprehension, by which we pretend to derive the power of giving assent to visi]3le things, exists nowhere. We do not give assent to what we merely see, but to reason alone. Men only affirm formal or implied propositions. Besides, are there not thousands of delusions from visual objects, as well as true representations ? If then wisdom gives its assent upon the strength of this criterion of the Stoics, it only gives an assent to a very illusory opinion."

This philosopher seems, however, to have limited liis observations to the phenomena of external things, and not to have carried his doubts to the existence of the mind itself. But on this point there is a diversity of opinion.

Cahneades. 215 B. c.

This philosopher, according to Sextus Empiricus, not only opposed the Stoics in their general tenets, but seems to have founded upon their own cri- terion a system that went to establish contrary propositions. Lactantius also mentions that Car- neades had an intuitive quickness in perceiving the weak sides of his adversaries' doctrines, and designed their overthrow by the inward consciousness that he would prove successful.

CAENEADES. 145

On the nature of perception Garneades has the following observations. " The criterion which pronounces upon truth can consist only in an ad- hesion to the mind which creates the evidence of the object. The senses begin to indicate the exist- ence of objects only when they are affected by them, whilst the former undergo divers alterations in comino* in contact wdth the latter. It is in these affections, and in these divers modifications of feeling produced by external bodies, that we must seek for the foundations of truth. Vision, for example, shows us two things at once ; a mo- dification of feeling we experience, and the object which exercises itself upon us. It is thus that light shows itself, and manifests the object which strikes our eyes. But the sense of vision does not invariably teach us the real nature of objects, but sometimes deceives us. All \dsual things cannot, then, be taken as an infallible standard of trutli, but those things are only true which are proved to be so in themselves."

Garneades established the proposition, that a chain of probable evidences is connected with the exercise of aU our organs of sensation ; but this is more strikingly indicated from the exercise of the organ of sight. He says, " Perception represents two tilings at once ; the external object perceived, and the subject which perceives it. Vision must then be considered under two distinct relations. First, relatively to the object perceived. This may be either true or false ; true, if in conformity with it ; and false if otherwise. Secondly, relatively to * L

146 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

the subject perceiving. That which is true appears to differ from that which is false. That which bears the appearance of truth is probable. Some- times this indication of truth is faint and weak ; it may be from the smallness of the object, or from the weakness and confused operation of the senses themselves. Sometimes this appearance is very striking and evident ; in such cases this distinct- ness is a sure criterion of truth ; it is sufficiently manifested by itself."

On the doctrine of necessary connection Car- neades seems to have been inclined to the li- berty of human thoughts and actions. He says, "From the proposition, that there is no effect without a cause, it does not follow that every thing which happens arises from external causes. Now our walls are subjected to no antecedent cause. Such is the nature of all voluntary actions, that the cause of them arises from the will itself."

E-itter observes, that " Carneades laboured to prove that all previous attempts of philosophy to establish a criterion of truth had miscarried, and moreover that it was impossible to find such a criterion. Eor, he argued, it must be placed either in sensation, or in conception, or in reason. Now as to the last, he mamtained that it could not be found in reason independently of both sensation and conception, for that which is the object of any judgment of the reason must first appear to the mind in a conception, which is impossible unless it has been first of all presented to it by some irrational sensation ; so that every operation of the

PHILO — ANTIOCHUS. 147

reason is originally dependent upon sensation, which is irrational, and consequently the truth of ra- tional cognition depends upon that of sensation.*

PHILO. 100 B. c.

Philo's metaphysical disquisitions related chiefly to the abstract nature of truth and e\idence. Sextus Empiricus informs us, that this philosopher maintained that the reality of objects could be known from that comprehensive perception on which the Stoics founded their criterion.

Philo remarked that a logical consequence might be true, though it was united to a false sup- position. He distinguishes three species of truths; first, that which is deduced from a self-evident proposition ; secondly, that wliich is deduced from a false proposition, though conditionally true ; and, tliirdly, from a proposition from which the con- clusion presents not only a hypothetical, but a real truth, in spite of any absurdity contained in the proposition itself ; as the earth moves ^ therefore it exists.

Antiochus. 86 B. c.

This philosopher of the Second Academy seemed to be actuated, in all his mental inquiries, with a sincere and ardent love of truth. He set himself to correct the general principles of the school, and

* Hist. Phil. Vol. 3. p. 614. Oxford 1839. L 2

148 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GREECE.

to banish tliat species of loose and imdefined scep- ticism wliich had, ever since the foundation of the academy, hung around it, and engaged it in per- petual quibbling discussions and irrational specula- tions.

"Philosophy," says Antiochus "has two prin- cipal objects in \dew; truth and happiness. He can have no pretensions to true "uasdom, who does not keep this double end in ^iew ; who is ignorant from where he sets out, and whither he is going. A real philosopher ought to establish himself upon sound principles."

Cicero, who enjoyed the personal friendship of this philosopher, tells us, that, on the long con- tested point, the real foundation of human know- ledge, Antiochus makes the following remarks. " The testimony of the senses is worthy of all con- fidence, if they are themselves free to act, are in a healthy state, and no obstacle intervenes to ob- struct the faithful perceptions they furnish. If this were not the case, of what use would be our deductions from them ? What would be the founda- tion of memory ? What distinction would there be between knowledge and ignorance, between the lettered and the unlettered man? What would there be attached to reason ? Of what use would it prove to exercise its powers and faculties ? Scepti- cism is at direct variance with the whole nature of man, his desires, powers, and destination. Desii^es influence the will, and suppose certain judgments in the mind. If men wish to act, they must hold by the truth presented to them. But above all,

ANTIOCHUS. 149

virtue is the best testimony to the certainty of human knowledge. How could men resolve to suifer inconceivable torments rather than desert their duty ? or why should they bring upon them- selves the vengeance of rigorous laws, unless they were imder the control of clear, fixed, and deter- mined principles ?"

The predecessors of Antiochus in the new academy had made a fine and subtile distinction, in theu' metaphysical system, between a clear 'per- ception^ and a real perception. This distinction was combated by Antiochus. He argued. How could we affirm that an object, for example, was white, if we happened to take it for black ? Or how would we know when a perception was a clear perception imprinted on our minds, if we were not certain whether it was a real one or not ? Such a mode of reasoning Avould go to establish that there is neither colour, nor body, nor truth, nor reasoning, nor' sensation, nor any thing truly seen by the mind. We are so constituted that our minds give their assent to testimony, just as the scale of the balance is influenced by greater or lesser weights.

Antiochus exercised great influence in his day ; and w^as certainly a metaphysician of no mean order. He was not, however, successful in fram- ing any peculiar system ; but his aim seemed to be to arrive at a species of eclecticism in reference to all pre\aous speculations on the nature and facul- ties of the human mind.*

* Sextus Empi. Pyrrho. 1. 2'ib. Nemeskis ap. Euseb. 14. 9. Stobaeus Eclec. 2. p. 38. et seq.

150 mental philosophy of greece.

Clitomachus. 125 b. c.

Tills metaphysician was a disciple of Carneades, and wrote four books on tlie reasons which ought to induce us to suspend our assent to the general truth of things. Cicero tells us that he distin- guished vision into two kinds ; the one embraces all things which we perceive, and those which we perceive but indistinctly; the second, those which are probable, and those which are not probable.

POSLDONIUS.

This pliilosopher established a philosophical school at Rhodes, where, it is said, he had Pom- pey and Cicero for his hearers. He was partial to the system of Aristotle, whose general arrange- ment of mental speculation seemed to coincide with his views. He opposed Chrysijipus on the division of the soul. His great anxiety appeared to be to reconcile if possible all the conflicting theories of human nature, and to reduce them to some common-sense level. It was j)robably with this view that he revived the Platonic division of the mental powers or faculties.

The direct influence which the bodily organiza- tion exercises over the mind, engaged the attention of Posidonius. He thought this influence was very considerable, and that previous pliilosophers had not made due allowances for it in their systems of the mind.*

* Galen, 1. 4. pp. 143. 153. Plutarch, Fragio. 1. (^.

PAN^TIUS. 151

Human nature, in the opinion of Posidonius, was a compound material, in wliicli the desires of the creature corresponded to vegetable life ; the violent passions, as anger, &c., to the brutish or animal life ; but reason was the exclusive attribute of man.* The doctrine of physical temperaments is here clearly shadowed forth ; and there can be no doubt that both the Sceptics and Stoics gene- rally, in their public teachings and dissertations, must have dwelt very often on the striking con- nection which subsists between the bodily organiza- tion and the mental habits and acquirements. This was one of those prominent topics which the every- day intercourse of human life must have forced upon their attention.

PAXiETIUS.

Pansetius was a jiopular teacher of mental and general philosophy, and endeavoured to communi- cate his opinions with all possible simplicity and clearness. This spread his fame in every direc- tion; and many of the most celebrated Roman lawyers attended his lectures, and became his phi- losophical disciples and advocates.!

His metaphysical opinions are but little known. His talents and acqukements did not lie in abstract questions and theories. The system of logic he taught had an especial reference to grammar, and did not rest upon a full development of those prm-

* Galen, ibid. p. 170.

t Van. Lynden, De Panactio Khodio, Liigd. 1802. p. 50.

152 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF GUEECE.

ciples of reasoning so commonly incorporated with many other ancient systems of Logic.

Pansetius was passionately fond of Plato, and considered him the greatest philosopher that ever lived.

The notions of Pansetins on the soul differed from those entertained by some of the earlier mas- ters of the Stoical school. He only admitted it to have six parts ; and referred the faculty of speech to voluntary motion, and maintained that gene- ration belongs not to the soul but to vegetable nature.

None of the speculative works of Pansetius have come down to us. Only two physical treatises have survived.*

* Cicero, De Fini. 4. 28. Idem De Divina. 1. 3. Nemesius, De Natur. Horn. 15. p. 96. Clem. Alexand. Strom. 2. p. 416. Stobseus Eclec. 2. p. 114. Diog. Laert. 7- 92.

ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS. 153

CHAPTER XYIII. THE ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICS.

The formation of the Alexandrian School of philosophy forms an important era in the history of mental speculations. A vast number of the most subtile reasoners, and the most renowned men of whom the history of letters can boast, attended, in some part of their lives, at the Alexandrian Seminary. This school of learning claims also peculiar attention from its connexion with the early introduction of the Christian faith, and with the reciprocal influence which philosophy and re- ligion exercised upon each other, at this eventful period of the history of the human race.

The doctrines of the Grecian philosophy were gradually introduced into Alexandria by the inter- course maintained with the most eminent men in Athens. Antiochus corresponded with Heraclitus of Tyre, who taught at that time in Alexandria ; Strabo, the geographer, had amalgamated the doctrines of Zeno with those of Aristotle; and Ammonius attempted to reconcile the doctrines

154 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL

of Plato with those of his distinguished pupil. These learned men soon established a taste for abstract speculation and useful knowledge; and metaphysics formed a very conspicuous portion of their general system of public instruction.

It is impossible to think of the School of Alexandria without emotion. To the di^dne, the philosopher, and the lover of general science, she is, and ever must be, an object of supreme interest and regard. Every movement of her mind, from her earliest establishment, has been fruitful of important results, and has, in every civilized country, left indelible memorials of her influence. She was destined to play an interesting part in the history of speculative opinions. She succoured the exiled sages of Greece, and furnished them with new weapons to combat their enemies, and even to overthrow their own systems. She changed the whole current of men's thoughts. Old theories were renounced, and new ones adopted, which created and fostered whole families of illustrious men. Her name is inseparably connected with the greatest event this world ever witnessed; the rise and progress of that Christian system, which is destined for ever to hold the flambeau to that philosophy which she, in her early years, considered as fixed on a rock of adamant. She is still glorious even in her ruins.

The philosopher Potamon was one of the most distinguished among the early founders of the Alexandrian School, for his cultivation of mental

OF METAPHYSICS. 155

science. He had studied wdtli great care and success the most important writings of Grecian literature, and was highly esteemed among his contemporaries for his skill and judgment on all knotty and dithcult questions. According to Diogenes Laertius, he was the founder of the Eclectic sect of philosophers. The historian ohserves : " But a short time since a new sect called Eclectic had heen introduced hy Potamon of Alexandi'ia, who selected from each school of philosophy that which he considered the most worthy and important. He thought there were two criteria of truth. One resided in the same fa- culty which judges ; that is reason, which presides over the whole system of intellectual laws or move- ments. The second consisted in those perceptions which serve as the measure or instruments hy wliicli knowledge is communicated ; or, in other words, in the certainty and evidence of the received impressions from external ohjects."

The Stoical pliilosophy was zealously studied and cultivated at Alexandria. Aristotle had many disciples and commentators ; and the doctrines of Plato were hoth openly and secretly cherished by many philosophers, of a more enthusiastic and imaginative temperament. Here every thing he- longing to philosophy was to be foiuid ; and the wide interchange of opinions was greatly promoted by the trading and commercial importance of the city. Here were men of all nations collected together for the purposes of traffic ; and the proxi-

156 ALEXANDRIAN SCHOOL

mity to the seat of eastern speculation soon led to the gradual introduction of principles and theories with which the Grecian sages had previously been unacquainted. This famous seminary of philoso- phy and learning soon gave evident proofs of new doctrines and new systems. The spirit of inquiry received a powerful impetus; and those seeds were profusely sown, which were afterwards to yield such a rank and luxurious harvest.

We shall have to enumerate, in subsequent parts of our history, some of the most eminent pliilosophers who flourished at this notable seat of learning.

We may allude generally to one or two doctrines which took their rise at this famous seat of learnins', and which are commonly connected with its history.. The one is what is called the Alexandrian Trmity, and the other the doctrine of Myianations.

It must be observed, in reference to the first doctrine, the Alexandrian Trinity, that many writers have supposed that it arose directly from the Scriptm-e doctrine of the Trinity, and was not an original theory or speculation either from Alex- andria or from any other place. This, on the other hand, has been stoutly denied. It would be contrary to the spirit and object of this work, to enter into any controversy on the question; therefore we shall refer the reader to ecclesias- tical historians for a full statement of arguments on the point in dispute.

The metaphysical doctrine of the Alexandrian

OF METAPHYSICS. 157

Trinity is this. God is of a threefold nature, and at the same time but one. His essence contains three distinct elements, substances, or persons, and these three make, or constitute. One Being. These three distinct persons or substances have also distinct and individual attributes. The first is Unitij ; the second is Intelligence ; and the third, the Universal soul, or the vivifjdng cause of life and motion.

This theory of the Divine Nature produced many heresies in religion, and led to a great mass of idle speculation on the nature of the human mind. We shall have frequent opportunities of alluding to this doctrine, in the com^se of our subsequent inquiries into pliilosophical systems of a later date.

The theory of Emanation arose naturally enough out of the Alexandrian Trinity. Something was wanted to manifest the connexion between divine and earthly natures; and hence the doctrine of Emanation, which was invented to explain the phenomenon. The human soul is identified with the Infinite ; andi the world, and every thing in it, is an Emanation from this Great Eirst Cause. This opinion was a prolific soiu'ce of contention for several centuries, in all the schools of philosophy and theology.

158 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS

CHAPTER XIX.

ON THE NOTIONS ENTERTAINED BY THE DIFFE- RENT SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY ON THE NATURE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND PROPOSITIONS, UP TO THE TIME OF THE FOUNDATION OF THE ALEX- ANDRIAN SCHOOL.

It must appear to the attentive reader, tliat a considerable portion of that controversial matter which formed so essential a part of the philoso- phical disquisitions of the ancient sages of Greece and Rome, consisted in the nature, extent, and application of general principles and propositions. To examine these in all theu^ abstract nakedness ; to estimate then' influence and power over indivi- dual minds, and masses of men ; to see the mode of their operation in detecting truth and falsehood; to point out their relationsliip to the various individual powers of the mind; and, in fine, to view all theu' manifold offices in the general phe- nomena of thought, was the perpetual aim of nearly all the profound speculators on human nature, of whom, in ancient times, we have any record.

ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 159

On a subject so recondite, and far removed from ordinary observation, and tbe common trains of thought, we might fairly expect to find a consider- able diversity of opinion. This anticipation we find realized by unquestionable facts. Some schools of philosophy treated of general principles and propositions in a plain and common sense manner, making them comparatively easy of comprehension; and, at the same time, calculated to promote the cause of sound and rational knowledge. Others, again, sublimated and refined to a great extent, and placed those elementary rules of reasoning and truth at a considerable distance from the grasp of ordinary minds. While no small number of inqui- sitive thinkers were led to form theories and systems, which had the evident tendency to call in question all truth and knowledge, and submerge the human mind in the slough of irredeemable and universal scepticism.

But though these \iews were opposite in their nature and tendency, yet necessity, and the force of nature, kept the generality of philosophers within certain bounds, and gave to all theu' dis- cussions a portion of uniformity and system. They could not labour, nor convey their views to others, without making use of certain formal and recog- nized instruments of thought. This laid them under obligations to arrange and systematize their weapons of reasoning and argumentation. It will, therefore, prove of advantage to the general reader to present him with a bird's-eye view of this in-

160 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS

tellectual armoury, so far as the common opinions, statements, and systems of the ancient sages will afford us materials.

It may he remarked here, in passing, that ge- neral principles and propositions, for the purpose of mental instruction, are not confined to mere metaphysical knowledge. They embrace a wider range. They claim a connexion with the whole circle of the sciences ; and are applicable to the discussion of every topic relating to human nature.

It was a generally received opinion amongst the ancients, that all knowledge was founded upon certam ultimate or first principles, which were supposed, by several men of distinguished renown, to have been imprinted on the mind at its forma- tion, by the hand of the Supreme Being himself. These elementary principles went, at various pe- riods of history, under divers names ; but on the whole they were considered, by a decided majority of speculators on the mind, to be of a really innate character. These principles may be divided into three classes or sorts ; namely. Speculative, Prac- tical, and Theological.

Speculative principles were, in the systems of the ancients, those which related to the nature and constitution of things, and concerning which the mind, or the more elevated part of the intellect, had to exercise its contemplative or thinking powers ; as, for example, when we say that a whole is greater than a part, or that two and three make five. These purely speculative principles are ex-

ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 161

ceeclingly numerous, and must always, from the natiu'e of the mind itself, be the ground- work of a great portion of pliilosophical discussion. Accord- ingly we find that they formed, so to speak, the stock in trade of a considerable number of the ancient schools of philosophy ; and though these principles are in appearance distantly removed from the ordinary \T.ews and affairs of men, yet this cir- cumstance did not prevent them in bygone times, and will not prevent them now, from exciting the most lively and ardent feelings, foLinded on intel- lectual rivalry, superiority, and distinction.

Practical principles were, in the eyes of the an- cients, those which required something to be done ; which led to some immediate action, and which were determined in their nature and influence by the suggestions of nature, or the necessities men foimd themselves under to reduce them to applica- tion. Such, for example, as that parents should be honoured and obeyed; honesty and integrity observed ; and contracts fulfilled. These practical principles were of every-day use, and formed the basis of human society, confederation, and brother- hood. They constituted the materials of that which had, more or less, been incorporated into all systems of philosophy, and must always be invested with paramount interest ; namely, the common- sense feelings and opinions of mankind.

Theological princip^les were such, in the ancient systems of speculation, as related to divine or ce- lestial things ; as the existence, nature, and mode of action of the Great First Cause; and these * M

162 NOTIONS OF THE ANCIENTS

principles also embraced all those rules of conduct and trains of thought, which were grounded upon that sense of duty wliich prompted mankind to feel a desire to worship and obey the Creator and Sustainer of the universe.

There are three attributes, in the opinion of the ancients, belonging to all innate or ultimate prin- ciples or propositions ; namely, that they are self- evident, universal, and the source of many con- clusions.

1st. Self-evident principles are such as the mind readily gives its assent to, as soon as the terms, or any form of words in wliich they are embodied, are expressed and understood. All negative propositions are self-evident ; as a square is not a circle, nor a man a horse. But then these propositions, and all others of a similar nature, wanted one important qualification requisite to all innate principles ; that they are not the source of a number of conclusions. Keither from the proposition that a square is not a circle, nor a man a horse, is there any conclusion necessarily deducible.

2nd. Universal propositions are such as are agreed to by persons of all nations and creeds.

3rd. Principles are said to be the som^ce of a number of conclusions, from which we can deduce a great many truths.

Innate ideas may also be further subdivided, in accordance with the ancient philosophy, into four descriptions, immediate, common, external, and immutahle.

1st. Immediate principles are those, the truth of

ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 163

which we can perceive without the help of any intermediate ideas, such as those which constitute the evidence on which mathematical conclusions are grounded.

2nd. Common principles are such as are agreed upon by all mankind.

3rd. External principles are those which ever have been, and always must be, true. Though, for example, a triangle had never been formed or de- scribed, yet it needs must have been eternally true that its three angles are equal to two right ones.

4th. Immutable principles are those which re- main always the same. We cannot conceive how even Omnipotence Himself could reverse their na- ture. The terms in which such propositions are couched may be reversed ; but their mental nature or essence seems to be unchanged and unchange- able. A square may be called a circle, and a circle a square ; but still to the mind's eye, or to the eye of the understanding, the nature of these two mathematical conceptions remains the same. We conceive it is not in the power of the Almighty Himself to make two contradictory propositions, both true and false at the same time, nor cause the same individual to be at two different places at the same moment. This does not argue any im- perfection in the Supreme Being ; on the contrary, to make Him the author of an absurdity, ought to be considered as a manifest and great imperfection.

Aristotle, and the Peripatetics generally, main- tained the idea that there were two principles, of a seemingly discordant and contradictory nature, on

M 2

164 NOTIONS or THE ANCIENTS

which a great part, if not the whole, of our know- ledge was huilt. The first of these principles was, "Whatever is, is;" and the second, "It is im- possible for the same thing to be and not to be." The first proposition was called a direct one, be- cause it was thought to form the basis of all direct or certain information. The second was termed indirect, and was conceived to be the ground of all indirect demonstrations, or such as led to ab- surd and ridiculous consequences or conclusions. Some of the ancient Sages, who were smitten with a love of system to a great extent, went so far as to declare that the first proposition, that "What- ever is, is," embodied the sum and substance of all human knowledge.

The discussion, in the different schools of philo- sophy, relative to the general doctrine of ultimate or first principles, gave rise to a variety of opinions and systems. One class of reasoners, deeply im- pressed with the importance of truth, were anxious to divest themselves of prejudices and partiali- ties of every kind, in order to guard against error more effectually. They attempted the study of nature with minds like a tabula rasa. This led them formally to renounce all established princi- ples. They supported tliis course of proceeding by urging that, from personal experience, their various organs of sensation deceived them, and conveyed to their minds false impressions of exter- nal objects ; and, in fact, that these faculties of perception were so capricious in their operations, that no positive or legitimate conclusions could be

ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES. 165

drawn from them. These reasoners also main- tained, that they had been induced to place faith in a variety of things from the prejudices of edu- cation; and that they were daily called upon to renounce some favourite principle or other, which a more extended acquaintance with the maxims of philosophy showed to be perfectly absurd or ridi- culous. Even with respect to self-e^ddent maxims and propositions, they felt themselves not fully justified in placing implicit confidence in them. This brought all such reasoners to the verge of complete scepticism. The existence of a material universe seemed almost to vanish from their belief. The reader will readily recognise from the pre- ceding remarks, that the speculative principles greatly predominated in the seats of learning at particular periods. They also gave way at in- tervals to investigations of a practical or common- sense character ; and very often both were blended in the elucidation of theological principles, relative to the existence of nature, and the modes of opex'a- tion of the Divine or Supreme Mind.

166 ROMAN SCHOOL.

CHAPTER XX. THE ROMAN SCHOOL OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

The E-oman School of metaphysics, considered in itself, is but of little moment. In viewing it, however, in conjunction with various Grecian systems, it becomes more interesting, and has a higher claim to our regard.

The Roman people were altogether different from the Grecians. The warlike character, the rude and abrupt manners, and the enterprising restlessness of the former, present a striking con- trast to the mild, refined, and effemmate ci\Tlization of the Greek republics. The Roman was, therefore, a man whom both nature and education had in a great measure unfitted for very abstract specula- tion. His forte lay in activity and martial ardour. Pure speculation hung always loosely about him, because it proved but a drag or incumbrance to his movements. The theatre of his action was confined to the bustle and turmoil of public life ; and his only hope of fame and distinction rested on

OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. 167

tlie active and efficient discharge of duties which society imposed upon him. Not so the Greek. His soul was fashioned in a softer mould. Luxu- rious ease, and contemplative equanimity, were the grand objects of his life. He lay upon his couch, or sauntered in his garden, with his soul buried in sublime speculation ; and to solve a problem or develop a theory, afforded him more intense grati- fication, than the possession of a crown or the subjugation of an empire.

Some philosophical historians have expressed their surprise that the E-omans added so little to the science of mind. Why should tliey be sur- prised at this result ? Do men " gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles ?" It is no easy matter to change the frame-work of a nation's mind. Many ages of discipline and favourable external circumstances, are requisite to effect such a result. AYe may readily imiagine witli what wonder the inhabitants of Rome would first listen to the development of Grecian metaphysics, con- veyed through the medium of a different and unknown tongue ; couched in a dialectic form to which they were entire strangers ; and aiming at nothing short of accoimting for the origin of the universe, and every tiling in it. The seeds of such knowledge must have fallen upon many hard and stony places. Several ages must have been required to cultivate and enrich the soil for their reception and fruition. Our surprise therefore ouc^ht to be that the Romans reallv made so much progress in the knowledge of the philosophy of

168 ROMAN SCHOOL.

Greece, as they actually did, considering the manifold obstacles from political institutions, social habits, difference of language, and consti- tutional temperament.

The Romans first became acquainted with the mental speculations of the Greeks, through the channels of political relationship. The consular and ambassadorial dignities carried the seeds of the new pliilosophy to Rome. Scipio long patronized the Stoic Pangetius, who seems to have been extremely zealous and successful in disseminating his views in the metropolis of the world. It is said that he fully developed both the Platonic and Stoical systems ; and made many converts of rank and influence. A knowledo;e of other schools and sects followed. The doctrines of the Epicureans, and of the New Academy, were promidgated ; and Sylla brought to Rome the works of Aristotle, which became generally accessible, through the means of a translation, eff'ected bv Tyrannion and Andronicus of Rhodes.

Lucretius.

The first fruit of Grecian speculation among the Romans, was that of Lucretius. He was a disciple and admirer of Epicurus. His poem, De Rerum Natiira, contains all the leading views and princi- ples of the Epicurean pliilosophy. We have the religious veneration and fear of the gods ridiculed ; the necessity of emancipating the mind from all notions of a Divine Nature; but, at the same time.

LUCRETIUS. 169

to endow it with that resolute and inflexible deter- mination and self-government, that will enable it to triumph even over destiny itself. Nature is the only Deity which the poet can recognise ; but even here, we find that strildng circumstance occur, which demonstrates tliat poets cannot go on long without some active or creative power ; and hence it is that we find him gi^^ing life, vitality, and in- telligence, to this very principle or abstraction which he calls nature. In fact, he makes a Deity of it, both in its essence and offices. It is only through the instrumentality of this \dvifying or active principle, that he has been able to make any thing like a readable poem out of the Epicu- rean system. He personifies Nature. He repre- sents her as a ruling unity, who makes her power and influence felt in every direction. Even when this power and influence are delegated to inferior agents, as the sun or stars, the same vital principle goes with them, and discharges the active duties of their office. This is not ascribable to any poetic license, but arises from the very nature of things themselves. There is no other course open to the poet, no matter what his notions of fatality may be. Lucretius' notions on the human soul are very perplexed and irrational. His theory of the nature of the primordial atoms of which all things consist, is the only key we have as to what liis opinions really were. He talks of atoms having a principle of self motion* ; and these are the elements out of

* "Prima moventur enim per se primordia rerum." b. 2. 132.

170 ROMAN SCHOOL.

which the voluntary powers are fabricated. The different forms of the atoms, and the direction they take, either straight or oblique, determine the individual character of the soul. These forms are finite, but the seeds of each configuration are innumerable ; and hence, by inference, the immense variety in animated creatures.

Cicero. 106 b. c.

Cicero is the most distinguished civilian in E/Oman history. As an historian, a politician, a statesman, and an orator, he is unrivalled ; as a phi- losopher he holds a respectable station. We esti- mate him in this last character, not so much for what he has left us of his otvti speculations, as for what he has given us of the opinions and systems of others. He was not a profound and subtile genius, who could frame a system, and work it out with the most refined and elaborate illustra- tions ; but he had a powerful and brilliant judgment, and keen intellectual perception, which could pene- trate into matters of the most recondite nature. Still, however, he was no theorist. He knew a great deal of many systems ; felt some partialities for particular ones ; but he never assumed the cha- racter of a philosophical partisan, in the strict sense of the word. He dived a little into this system, and a little into that, but never appeared as a thorough-paced proselyte, determined to defend certain dogmas, whether they were true or not. The structure of his mind, and the habits of his

CICEUO. 171

life, were quite in opposition to a eliaracter of this description. He was in every sense of the ex- pression, a man of the world. Knowledge was to him an instrument for use, not an object of mere curiosity or display. It was to promote his views and fame as a lawyer, an orator, a statesman, and a politician, that lie cultivated an acquaintance with philosophy ; and in every movement of his active mind, of which we have any literary memorial left, we may fairly discern how adi'oitly he turned tliis acquaintanceship to a profitable and honourable use.

We shall consider him chiefly as a metaphysician. His genius embraced every section of Greek philo- sophy. He had studied with considerable care and success both Aristotle and Plato, as well as the Epicurean and the Stoical systems. Por a critical knowledge, he sufficiently mastered the most im- portant theories connected with the nature and faculties of the human miderstanding.*

On the nature of the human soul, this celebrated man observes : " The soul is derived immediately from the Di^dnity. It retains ties of relationship with celestial beings ; and hence it comes to pass that amidst all animated nature, man is the only creature which possesses the knowledge of a Supreme Being. The possession of this knowledge is then sufficient to entitle man to point to Ms upward origin. Nature has placed in us certain necessary and elementary notions, Avliich form the basis of all true wisdom and science. "f

On the nature of the organs of sensation Cicero

* See Note D. at the end of this Volume. t De Legibus 1. 8. 9,

172 ROMAN SCHOOL.

remarks, "Our senses have been conferred upon us, in our present state of being, to act the part of so many satellites or messengers, each of which is invested "with its own proper function, and the per- fection of each sense consists in percei^dng, mth promptness and certainty, those things which nature submits to them."

It is not possible, however, to determine whether Cicero considered our sensations as affording us a standard of truth, or whether they were fallacious, and not to be depended upon. He is wdshful to steer a kind of middle course between conflicting systems. He could not go the whole length of say- ing, that the impressions by the senses were stamped mth infallible certainty; neither, on the other hand, would his movements among men of the world, and an active participation in all its duties, allow him to consider these impressions, in the vast majority of cases, as uncertain and illusory. To solve the difficulty in some measure, he instituted a species fdi iwohahility , which was to serve the common and ordinary purpose of guiding men to safe and rational conclusions, on all matters appertaining to the mere phenomena of sensation. There is, however, great vagueness and uncertainty on every thing the philosopher has advanced on this question. In some places he considers the senses as the mere channels through wliich objects are conveyed to the mind ; and that it is the peculiar province of this intelligent principle, to procure information, to combine, and compare, and to judge.* This position

* Tusc. 1. 20.

CICERO. 173

is, however, laid down with so many qualifications and reservations, that it becomes quite obvious that he had no decided or systematic opinions on the subject of sensation generally.*

On the difficulties which present themselves in all investigations after truth, Cicero thus expresses himself: "All knowledge is encircled with diffi- culties. Such is the natural obscurity of things, and the constitutional weakness of the principle of intelligence, that the most sagacious minds of an- tiquity have doubted whether we ever can arrive at truth at all. The most part of mankind em- brace opinions without having the power of choosing them. They judge of what they do not know ; and attach themselves to some favourite system, as mariners do to a rock in a tempestuous sea. But a philosopher will only give his assent after he has patiently heard both sides, and after a careful re\dew of all the opinions which have previously been advanced on the subject."

Cicero seems to have established his metaphysi- cal creed upon the general principles of Plato's system. Though well grounded in various other doctrines relative to the mind, he decidedly gives the preference to those of this eminent Grecian sage. Cicero almost always had a fondness for Plato. They had many things in common. There were the same elevation of thought, and warmth of feel- ing, displayed in both ; and the same deference paid to the common-sense feelings and sentiments of mankind. This must have proved a powerful

* De Finibns. 2. 12.

174 ROMAN SCHOOL.

bond of union. And there can be no rational doubt but that the predilection which the great orator and statesman manifested for Plato's views of the human understanding, arose from an inward and powerful conviction that they were more in unison with the duties and destinies of man, than those of any other of the Grecian philosophers.*

The immediate followers of Cicero in pliilo- sophical disquisitions, were not signalized by any advancements in the study of mind. Indeed it was in a great measure neglected by all the latter disciples of the Stoical School at Rome. The speculations of the learned men who still adliered to the forms of philosophy, were directed to the principles which regulate the ordinary current of human life, and into the nature of public and private good and evil. The Stoical school, for a long period after the death of Cicero, clearly indi- cates how disinclined the Romans were to abstract studies, and what a faint relish they displayed for all the most sul3lime speculations which formed the intellectual glory of Athens. With the exception of the doctrine of the freedom of the human will, we can scarcely recognize a single speculation of a metaphysical character, brought prominently

* Vide, The Memoirs of Gauthier tie Sibert, on the Philosophy of Cicero, iu the 27th book of the Academy of Inscrijjtions, Paris ; Facci- olati. Vita C iceronis Litteraria, Paris, 1760 ; Middleton's Life of Cicero, London ; Hulsemann, De Indole Philosophica M.TulliiCiceronis, Luxem- burg, 1 700 ; Meniers, Oratio de Phil. Ciceronis, Leipsic ; Adam Bursius, Dialectica Ciceronis, Zamosck, 1604 ; Janson de Nares, Brevis et distincta Quajst. in Ciceronis Philosophia, Pavia, loJ)/ ; Waldin, Oratio de Phil. Ciceronis Platonica, Jena, \753.

ALCINOUS. 175

forward on the stage of public discussion, for a long series of years. To this doctrine, however, the Stoics were enthusiastically attached. Indeed it forms the grand key- stone to then- whole sys- tem of morals. A few scattered thoughts on the philosophy of mind may he found connected with the names of Q. Sextus, Demetrius, Demonax of Cyprus, (Enomaus of Gadara, Athenodorus of Tarsus, Seneca, Musonius Rufus, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius Antoninus.

ALCINOUS.

Amongst the most eminent metaphysicians who adorned the school of the new Platonists at Rome, Alcinous took a distinguished rank. His " Introduction to the Fhllosophj of JBlato^^ is the very best summary of Plato's system which has ever been given.

Alcinous maintains that that w^liich has for its object intelligent things, is science, or scientific reason ; that which embraces sensible things, or sensations, is doxatical reason, or opinion.

It foUow^s then from this, that all which flows from the exercise of this scientific reason, is solid and immutable, because it is itself founded upon a basis which embodies these two qualities. On the other hand, factitious reason or opinion offers only general probabilities, and resemblances, because it is founded only upon uncertain data.

The understanding is the foundation of science, Avhich has for its objects intelligent tilings; and

176 ROMAN SCHOOL.

sensation is the link wMcli connects the under- standing with our senses.

Sensation is an impression which the soul re- ceives from external objects, and which impression indicates its passive nature.

When, then, the soul receives, through the instrumentality of the senses, a sensible impres- sion,— that is to say, a sensation, — instead of its being destroyed, or erased by time, it remains and is treasured up there ; and the continuation of its future existence, is that effect of sensation which produces what we term memory.

When we recognize a sensible object, whilst the presence of that object produces in us a sensation, and this sensation is imprinted on the memory ; when we perceive again tliis identical object, we compare the preceding sensation, which has been preserved by the memory, with the new sensation ; and we thus say to ourselves, for example, Socrates^ horse, fire ; and so of other things.

When, then, we compare a previous sensation with another just experienced, the effect of this act of comparison is termed opinion. When the two objects compared are in unison, the result of the comparison is truth ; on the contrary, when there is want of agreement, the opinion is false and erroneous.*

Maximus of Tyre. This writer on the mind follows nearly the same

* Introrliiction to the Philosophy of Plato.

MAXIMUS OF TYRE. 177

path as Alcinous. The distinction between reason and the mere sentient principle, he points out in ^the following manner.

"Let us inquire what that is in man to which we apply the terms to know, to learn, to app^^eliend, and other phrases of a similar nature which indi- cate that the soul is in a contemplative state of existence. Do we call by the name of science that which the senses assemble as in a contemplative picture-frame, and which we commonly designate by the name of experience ; that, in fact, which is submitted to the eyes of the mind, and which reason, after due examination, stamps with its own seal ? Such a science as this, it must be owned, is common to brutes ; for they receive sensations, acquire ex- perience, and possess a species of wisdom. The superiority of man is derived from his reason, and liis relation to science is nothing but this reason bringing under its power, for a sufficient length of time, the multitudinous objects submitted to its notice ; and in its active powers detecting resem- blances and contrarieties ; separating, uniting, dis- tinguishing, and producing an harmonious whole, out of a mass of incongruous and diversified ma- terials. The soul of man is a compound of mortal and immortal elements. The latter qualities Linite him with the gods. Instinct is the gift of the former ; intelligence that of the latter. Prudence or sagacity holds a situation between them both ; and establishes the supremacy of our immortal nature upon that which we possess in common with the animal creation. Experience has created the

* N

178 HOMAN SCHOOL.

arts ; prudence or sagacity governs the passions and emotions of the soul ; and intelligence represents the laws of tliis external habitation of ours — laws which have been created by God himself. I call true science the harmonious combination of these three faculties or powers."

We find Maximus entertaining the '^most lofty ideas of the nature of the soul. He had evidentlv drunk deep in the Platonic philosophy. It is only the internal and intelligent parts of the man which command liis admiration and respect ; it is these alone which raise him to the dignity of claiming an affinity with Deity itself. There is a genuine spiri- tuality and life in his mental speculations, which are not displayed in the lucubrations of his pre- decessors.*

Maximus did not fail to notice the various sources of error mankind had to contend against in their pursuit of truth. Not only the passions of the soul blind and misdirect the reason, but even philosophy herself, infallible as she is commonly considered, is but a frail and uncertain guide. The rivaby of different and opposing sects, the influence of am- bitious singularity, and the strong prepossessions in favour of particular studies and sciences, distract the judgment of the most sedate and able men, and convert them into instruments of delusion. The phi- losophy of Thales was viewed through the medium of astronomy ; of Pythagoras, through music ; of Heraclitus, through solitude ; of Socrates, througli

* Maximus Tvr. Diss. 12. U. 17

ALEXANDER. GALEN. 179

the moral affections ; and of Epicurus, through vo- luptuousness. Thus mankind are bewildered and tossed from one set of doctrines to another.*

Alexander op Aphrodisias.

This metaphysician was a distinguished com- mentator on Aristotle, to whose ideas he added some notions of his own. He attacks the Platonists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, and seems to have been a stout and resolute defender of the perfect stability of human knowledge.

Alexander was a strenuous advocate for free-will. He maintains that this power was given to man, and is one of the marks which distinguish him from mere animal nature. He points out, with great force, the moral and social evils which follow the doctrines of necessary connexion, when they are once brought into active operation in the con- duct of individuals or whole bodies of men.

Galen.

This distinguished physician did not confine his inquiries to those topics more immediately con- nected with the physical constitution of man ; but with indefatigable labour investigated those hidden springs of mental action, which always exercise a greater or lesser influence over the bodily powers of human nature. He seems to have freed himself

* Diss. 25.

n 2

180 KOMAN SCHOOL.

from the trammels of systems, and to have prose- cuted his inqumes under the influence of a sincere and ardent love of truth.

On the abstract nature of evidence he makes some profound and just remarks. He saw the great error which pervaded many of the systems promulgated by the ancients, which principally consisted in an absurd and ridiculous aj^plication of general terms, without making those perpetual re- ferences to facts, which are indis^Densable for the foundation of comprehensive branches of science and knowledge. In his definition of synthesis and analysis, he points out the nature of both these in- struments, the limits of each, and the most ap- proved rules for the advantageous combination of both.

He distinguished four kinds of demonstration. The first produced all science ; it seized the reality of things, and investigated their nature completely ; the second, that logical process on which dialec- tics were founded ; the third, that which embraced foreign testimony, grounded upon the probability of the statements advanced ; and the fourth rested on commonly received notions or opinions.

Galen remarks, that evidence is the source of all intellectual light ; if there were no evidence, there could be no exercise of the human understanding.- This power is to the soul what the eye is to the body. To perceive, is to comprehend, to know, to be assured of the existence of things. It is necessary, then, to commence all our inquiries with essential and fundamental things, and to take our departure

GALEN. 181

from those things that are easy of comprehensiorij and are immediately around us.

This philosopher considered that the common source of error amongst men, arose from a too hasty generalisation. The successful search after truth essentially consists in an extensive and careful in- vestigation, and an exact comparison as to the differences and resemblances of thinors.

182 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM.

CHAPTER XXI. THE LATEK SCHOOL OF METAPHYSICAL SCEPTICISM.

At stated periods in the history of mental phi- losophy we find that certain men invariably at- tempted to gain distinction and notoriety, by call- ing in question the fundamental maxims of know- ledge, truth, and reasoning. We find all shades and degrees of scepticism; from the humble and simple doubter, to the absolute and dogmatical disbeliever in even his own personal existence. The nature of mental inquiry is favourable to tliis intellectual disease ; chiefly from the abstract na- ture of its principles, the uncertainty and imper- fections of language, the difficulty attending a close and consecutive examination of the phenomena of thought, and the variable motives which may influence the judgments of the metaphysician throughout the whole course of his investigations.

tEnesidemus. ^nesidemus was a reviver of the doctrines of the

^NESIDEMUS. 183

Pyrrlionians. He was a contemporary of Cicero, was a native of Crete, and taught philosophy at Alex- andria. He wrote a work to point out the distinc- tion between the doctrines of the Academicians, and those of the followers of Pyrrho. In the se- cond book of this work ^nesidemus treats of truth, causation, action, chance, motion, production, de- struction, with a view of showing the imperfections of om' knowledge on all these matters. In the third book he treats of our sensations, and endea- vours to show that there is a great want of uniformity amongst them. The fourth book is occupied with the imperfections of signs ; and the fifth points out the uncertainty accompanying all those deductions which we make from sensible tilings, to matters removed from the senses. The sixth attacks the ordinary maxims respecting cause and effect ; and the other three books are confi.ned to questions as to good and evil, and the end and destiny of man.

On the subject of causation, this philosopher makes the following remarks : " Bodies cannot be the cause of other bodies ; for if they act, they must either act by themselves, or by others, as intermediate agents. If by themselves, they can only produce that which ah'eady forms a part of their own nature or essence ; if they act through the instrumentality of others, then these become necessarily one and the same substance. That which is incorporeal cannot, moreover, be the cause of another incorporeal substance; and for this reason, beings cannot produce that which forms no part of their own nature. Besides, that

18i LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM.

which is incorporeal cannot he in contact with, or act upon, or he acted upon hy, that which is material. Bodies cannot he the cause of incorporeal natures, nor can the latter be the cause of the former, for they contain opposite properties or principles. A body at rest cannot be the cause of another body also at rest, nor can a body in motion be the cause of another that moves itself."*

What JGnesidemus meant by being or essence, is difficult to conjecture. His views on the primary causes of things seem at variance with the general scope of his speculations. The essence (ovaia) was the primeval body ; but whether it included a se- condary body, is uncertain, f He also considered air as the principle of all things. There seems, however, to have been great confusion in his mind on every topic of speculation.

Agrippa.

This ancient writer was the successor of ^Ene- sidemus, and cultivated his system with great zeal and success. He made additional maxims to the theory of Pyrrho. These maxims are five in number. The first relates to the differences amongst the various schools of philosophy, on the truth of theu' respective elementary principles. The second arises from the notion of infinity in- volved in every chain of proofs, that one depends upon another ad infinitum. The third maxim, of

* Photius, Bibl. pp. 642. 648. t Sextus Empiri., Pyrrb. 3. 138.

PHAVORINUS — SEXTTJS EMPIRICUS. 185

doubt, refers to the uncertainty we must always labour under as to the real nature of objects ; inas- much as we can only speak or judge of things by our own individual sensations or perceptions. Fourthly, we are led into doubt and error from the hasty adoption of purely gratuitous principles. And the fifth maxim is the common practice of reasoning in a circle. There seems, however, no- thing novel in all these maxims. They have been repeated over and over again by many preceding philosophers.*

Phavomnus.

This philosopher wrote a treatise on Vision, as well as upon the Academical propositions, and the views of Pyrrho. Philostratus informs us that these works were of high merit. It was against this philosopher that Galen directed his metaphy- sical writings. The latter remarks, "That some recent writers, and amongst the number is Pha- vorinus, carry their doubts to such a pitch, as to call in question the existence of the sun."t

Sextus Empimcus.

Sextus was not only a most profound metaphy- sician himself, but he was, on the whole, a most able and candid historian of mental theories and systems generally. He had paid great attention

* Diog. Laert. 9. 88. Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrh. 1. pp. 164 —178. t Diog. Laert. 9. 87.

186 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM.

to this department of knowledge ; and it is chiefly to him that we owe any information at all of the views and writings of several eminent philosophers of ancient times.

His own personal opinions seem to have classed him amongst the Sceptics ; but it has long been a question, since his day, what was his degree of doubt, and how far he carried out his scepticism on the fundamentals of human science and know- ledge. On this point it will be difficult to form a correct opinion. We have only a few scattered observations of his own, and very slender probabi- lities to guide us. It would seem, however, that he did not carry his system, of doubt to such a length as to invalidate the testimony of our senses, or the elementary principles of reason. On this subject he remarks, " We never examine how sen- sible things fall under our senses, nor how intelli- gent perceptions arise in the understanding and are there perceived by it; we receive both in a simple and absolute manner, as a matter unac- countable and undefinable."

Sextus remarks also, that the philosophers who preceded him had maintained three standards of truth, or rather we should say, three instru- ments for the discovery of truth and falsehood. The first is that wliich belongs to man, and which forms his power of judgment ; the second, the means he employs for judging, that is, Ms senses and understanding ; and the third, that action or power by which he applies these objects or instru- ments. The first principle he rejects, on account

SEXTUS EMPimCUS. 187

of the compound nature of man, possessing a body, as well as a soul, wliich must, in his opinion, give rise to many operations we never can know any- thing about. The second criterio7i he also refuses liis assent to, principally on the ground of the conflicting and variable nature of our organs of sense, and the sources of delusion to wliich the un- derstanding is liable from this and other causes. The tliird standard is rejected likewise, from the doubt thrown over our organs of vision.

The notions entertained by Sextus on the human soul, are of a material complexion. He thought we knew little or nothing about it.* All the higher kinds of thought were but the relations to the sensible particles of matter. Our sensations seemed to be the only ground he had for anytliing approaching to truth and certainty. But Sex- tus was not apparently consistent even in this position : for he maintained that man did not know anytliing whatever of himself. We have no sure means of arri\dng at the truth of our own natures, either bodily or mental, f Every thing is tainted with doubt. If the mind can know any thins? of man, it must know him onlv throua^h three channels, the body, the senses, or itself. If the body compels the mind to think, then the body moves without any reason, and consequently our minds must be moved or impelled irrationally. The same objection lies against the position that the senses can be known by the mind, for they are

* Pyrrh. Hyp. 3. 51. t Pyrrh. 2. 29.

188 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM.

themselves irrational in their movements and operations. If we learned what the senses were through the medium of the imderstanding, this would reduce all to the same uniform nature or essence. As to the mind taking notice of its own thoughts, feelings, opinions, and emotions, this is evidently impossihle, for we should have neither a suhject to know, or an ohject to he known. Eor the mind to know itself, it must know what its real suh- stance is, all its laws of action, where its proper lo- cation is ; and, in fact, in what mode it operates on matter, and matter operates on it.

These douhts and objections are reiterated over and over again by this learned Sceptic, but there is little method or ingenuity displayed in the ar- rano;ement of his views.

The ideas of Sextus on cause and efiTect, are clothed in the same mystification as his other notions on the foundations of truth in general. Causation from the contact of material bodies is considered very doubtful. No two bodies can touch each other; it may be conjectured that they may touch each other at theu^ surfaces, but the bodies themselves can never come in contact.* The same thing may be affirmed of all mixtures of material elements, and the various changes they seem to undergo in consequence. There is no real contact of the particles in such cases.

On cause and effect generally, the objections urged by Sextus are very subtile, and fairly stated,

' Pynhoa. Hyp. 3. 12.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. 189

In modem times we have seen them often brought upon the stage of philosophical discussion. If one thing, says Sextus, can be the cause of another thing, one of the following circumstances must take place ; either the quiescent must be the cause of the quiescent, or the moved of the thing in motion; or a moving cause produce a quiescent effect, or a quiescent cause a moved effect. Now this cannot be, because it is maintained, as a general maxim, that like things can only produce like things. Again, it is affirmed that cause and effect must have a co-existent nature. That a cause cannot be posterior to an effect is quite true ; neither can an effect be subsequent to a cause, for this reason, that if the cause be anterior to the effect, there must be a certain time when it was deprived of, or separated from, the effect, therefore making it no cause at all. If again the effect be posterior to the cause, then it must exist when its cause ceases to exist, which would make it, in fact, an effect without a cause, which is a thing impos- sible to be conceived.

Besides these objections, it is urged by the Sceptics, that our ordinary theory of causation involves the position that all causes are active principles, and all effects are passive ones. Now this cannot be proved. Indeed this theory of cause and effect contains many contradictory con- clusions ; and it is from the consideration of these, that Sextus sees it is impossible to extricate him- self from this labyrinth of doubt and perplexity.

On the nature of Deitv, the whole of the doubts

190 LATER SCHOOL OF SCEPTICISM.

and speculations of Sextus are of a material nature and tendency. There is nothing of novelty "in them.* •

* See the three works of Sextus Empiricus ; the PjTi-honistie Hypoty- poses, that against Encyclic Sciences, and that against the Philosophical Sects. The two last are joined in one called Adversus Mathematicos.

i

OPINIONS ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 191

CHAPTER XXII.

ON THE OPINIONS OF THE ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS, UP TO THIS PERIOD OF HISTORY, ON A DEITY, AND THE HUMAN SOUL.

As we have now arrived at what may be strictly called the termination of heathen speculations on the mental nature of man, it will prove of advan- tage to take a retrospective view of the general notions entertained by the sages of antiquity on the nature of a First Great Cause, and of the hu- man soul. These are two branches of knowledge so nearly allied to metaphysics, so closely inter- woven with all the inquisitive powers of men's minds, so vitaUy important to the right application of aU speculations on human nature, and so deeply momentous to the present and future interests of mankind, that no apology can be necessary here for giving these topics the fullest consideration possible. Indeed, unless these important doc- trines were founded in truth, and taken with us as guides throughout life, it is difficult to conceive what could really be the ol)ject in instituting any

192 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

investigations into tlie laws of either matter or mind. The doctrines of a Deity, and the spiri- tuality of the human soul, are the true vivifying principles of intellectual existence; and without them all speculation would only present a melan- choly and dreary wilderness, without a single ob- ject of substantial interest for the eye of man to dwell upon.

Among the various modern writers on the prin- ciples of natural theology, and the evidences of Christianity, there are evidently two classes, cha- racterized by strong marks of difference. One por- tion have always shown a marked jealousy against allowing the heathen philosophers the smallest credit for any knowledge of a Supreme Being ; and the other have been apt to misconceive and over- rate the importance of that heathen knowledge. The former writers have, in substance, maintained that Christianity should have the sole undi\dded honour of revealing to man the existence and attri- butes of a Deity ; that human reason had no just claim to such a magnificent discovery; and that had it not been for the direct and positive declara- tions of Holy Writ, no knowledge would have been found at this day among the human race, on this interesting and all-absorbing topic. Now I con- ceive there can be no good grounds for depreciating ancient knowledge on the nature of a Deity. There is nothing here to detract from the merit of Chris- tianity ; but on the contrary, to strengthen its evidences, and to make them take a firmer hold of the human understanding. It is quite obvious, as

ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 193

a matter of fact, that many of the sages of anti- quity had very clear and elevated notions of a Su- preme Being ; and these notions had heen worked out by the pure force of their natural mental fa- culties, and their accurate modes of interrogating nature. And this is perfectly in accordance with the declarations and spirit of Revelation itself ; for it declares that God did not leave himself without a witness ; inasmuch as he had given to every man a Kght to guide him to a knowledge of Himself.

We find, on the other hand, that some theolo- gical writers have descanted on the nature of the knowledge wliich the heathen possessed of a Su- preme Being, as if that knowledge was every thing that could be desired ; and that the subsequent revelations from heaven on this grand subject, were nothing more than a simple recapitulation of the opinions of Aristotle or Plato. This is errmg on the opposite side. We should, therefore, hold the balance fairly between both parties. The opi- nions of the ancient philosophers are well worthy our special regard ; but we must amalgamate them with the more full and comprehensive develop- ments of the Divine nature and attributes, which the Christian system unfolds.

There is one very obvious difference between the Deity of the heathen philosophers and the Deity of the Christians. The former is invariably repre- sented as a Being very far removed from all hu- man sympathy and regard. He rules and governs the world by general laws, but takes no interest in the petty affau's of man. Now the Christian sys- * o

194 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

tern brings the Deity, so to speak, nearer to man- kind ; institutes a close and mutual sympathy be- tween them; and represents both under the fa- miliar and interesting relationship of Father and children. When this difference of character is duly estimated by the practical consequences wliich must follow from it in our modes of worship, the result must display the great defects in the speculative systems of the ancient world, in reference to the existence and attributes of the Author of the universe.

We find that those ancient philosophers who discussed the nature of the Great Pirst Cause, pur- sued the same line of argumentation which has commonly been employed by all theological writers in modern times. There is a very interesting and striking resemblance on this point. The proofs of a Deity furnished by the ancients, may be classified under three distinct heads ; namely, Immcm testi- mony; the order and constitution of the loorld ; and the 'jjerniciotts consequences of Atheism. Under the first head they showed the almost universal opinion entertained by all mankind on the sub- ject of a Pirst Cause, and that nien of the greatest wisdom and penetration had given their cordial as- sent to it. In the second place, they considered the order and wisdom displayed in the constitution of every department of nature, '^'\1lere intelligence is so strikingly imprinted on every thing around us, it is but reasonable to suppose that an intelli- gent cause must be the creating and sustaining principle of action. Again, nothing is so perni-

ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 195

cious as the doctrine of Atheism. Every noble principle, and every disinterested feeling, become paralyzed under its withering and hateful influ- ence. It destroys all religion, all morality, all wisdom and justice among men.

One of the most early notions respecting the Deity entertained by the ancient philosophers, was that the all-creating Cause was not different in nature or essence from the universe itself. They imagined the Divinity to pervade all space, to be every way present, and that no change or move- ment could be produced but by His direct will or influence. We find traces of this opinion through- out the whole range of heathen philosophy. It does not appear, however, that they deduced any atheistical inferences from it. The reasonable sup- position is that very elevated and transcendental notions of supreme power led inquirers to this train of thought, and by not mshing to mix the actions of the Deity with every petty mundane afiair, they ' talked of this Spirit pervading and forming part of the whole frame of universal creation.

Some philosophers — and the Stoics were of this number — considered that the Deitv consisted of more than one person. Cicero, in his Treatise on the Nature of the Gods, says that all the theology of the Stoics may be divided into four parts ; namely, first, that there are gods ; secondly, that their nature may be defined ; thirdly, that the gods govern the world ; and fourthly, that they especially interest themselves with the affairs of men.

Akin to this last opinion, was the one generally

o 2

196 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

prevalent amongst the Eastern nations, wliicli embraced, in divers sliapes and forms, the two principles of good and evil. This idea was the groundwork of many systems of theology.

There was a notion almost universally enter- tained amongst all classes of the ancient philoso- phers, that the Deity acted under the influence of an irrevocable fate or destiny. The affairs of the world, and the constitution of things in general, could not be otherwise managed than we find them. They were always more or less scrupulous in admitting the application of this doctrine, in all its fulness, to the superior or intellectual part of man, but seem to have tacitly acquiesced in it, in reference to the Deity. There were, however, many qualifications and modifications of the doc- trine of necessity, when thus applied to the influ- ence of the universal Cause.

Another opinion, somewhat curious, was adopted, that the Deity and the Creator of the world were two Separate Beings ; the latter, however, only the agent or instrument in the hands of the former. This notion, it may be observed, was confined to a very small section of the philosophical world of antiquity.

The Deity of the ancients was almost invariably associated with a high degree of intelligence. He was the centre of all thought, truth, and wisdom. The intelligent principle is always the leading and prominent attribute of his nature ; and good- ness and benevolence were made to occupy a sub- ordinate station in the character of the Divinity.

ON A DEITY AND THE SOTJL. 197

This notion gave a great variety of colourings to tlieir theological systems.

There were, as we have already noticed, three leading arguments used by the ancients for the existence of a Deity, namely, testimony, the con- stitution of the world, and the evils of atheism ; yet, in addition to these, there were other powerful influences which seemed to have a great effect upon all their reasonings on this interesting question. Among these, the origin of mcJtion occupied a con- spicuous place. We find that, whenever a reasoner was placed in any real or apparent dilemma on the nature and existence of Deity, he invariably took shelter in the origin of motion. He demanded, how could a body move itself ? There must be a first cause, or you cannot advance a single step in accounting for anything. Yoar philosophy is puerility and nonsense without it. Every reader of the works of the Grecian sages can readily bring to his recollection innumerable instances of the adoption of this line of argumentation.*

The opinions of the ancient philosophers on the nature of the human soul were exceedingly diversi- fied, often contradictory, and sometimes unintelli- gible. We can do little more here, therefore, Avith any hope of profit, than just present the reader with a few general remarks, on some of the leading systems which obtained currency amongst the spe- culators of antiquity.

There were a few of the ancient philosophers

* See Note E. at the end of this Vohime.

198 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHEHS

who maintained that the soul was propagated by parents to their chikben by the ordinary laws of generation. Against this opinion it was contended, that if the soul were created in this manner, it must either be from the body or from the soul of the parents. If it proceeded from the body, the soul wonld then be a material substance ; and the effect, in this case, would be vastly more noble and exalted than the cause. If, on the other hand, our thinking principle proceeded from the soul of our parents, then the difficulty presented itself, that by thus making the soul a simple uncompounded substance, it could not possibly be dissolvable or communicative. Again, it was asked, If the soul be propagated from parents, by the ordinary laws of generation, is it from the soul of one of them, or from both ? There is no reason why it should be from the one parent more than the other ; and if we say it is from both, then vre are immediately betrayed into the absurdity, that the soul is made up of parts. Its unity is hereby destroyed, which is one of the leading attributes attached to the soul or mind of man. The opponents of this theory always insisted, that it was impossible to conceive how the souls of two parents should be so united, as necessarily to produce a new soul. On the other hand the advocates of the theory attempted to illustrate their principles in the followmg manner. The soul exerts a thought ; that thought becomes the germ or seed of another soul. There was no greater difficulty involved in this simple assumption than there is when speak-

ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 199

ing of the (jerm or seed of material things. But here it was objected, that if by a thought one spirit could produce another, then one superior intel- lectual nature could produce its own kind in like manner; which would end in chaotic confusion. Besides, this theory involved the notion, that the soul was capable of an act of creation, which is the especial prerogative of the Divinity itself ; for whatever can produce a substance out of nothing, possesses undoubtedly a power of creation. If the soul of man had the power of creating another soul from a simple thought, and if that thought be main- tained at the same time to have nothing in itself of a substantial form, then the soul would possess that same creative power which we consider as the sole attribute of the Deitv. To avoid this conclusion, it was contended that though the soul had not the absolute power of creation, yet it possessed a power to multiply itself, and so produce other souls, in precisely the same manner as a candle is lighted from another, Avithout diminishing its substance.

There was a very commonly prevailing o])iuion amongst the ancients, that the souls of men were originally made l3y the divinity himself at the creation of all things ; and existed in a prior state, Avhere they were completely happy, and might have continued so for ever, had they not committed some heinous offence against their Creator, and thereby lost their primitive integrity and purity. In consequence of this, they were placed in bodies as punishments for their former crimes. This doctrine was objected to on the general ground.

200 OPINIONS or ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

that if this were the real state of the case, how comes it to pass that men had no remembrance whatever of any former state of existence ? To this it was answered, that eternal oblivion consti- tuted one of the chief elements of the punishment inflicted upon them for then' disobedience.

The doctrine of the Qiietempsycliosis, or transmi- gration of souls, c\MniQi\. a kindred alliance with the above doctrine. It maintained that the souls of men passed after death into the bodies of other living animals, whose habits, modes of life, and dispositions, bore a suitable resemblance to those moral pursuits and intellectual qualities, which defined the characters of individuals on earth. If a man led a debased and sensual life, he was doomed, after death,to be imprisoned in some wretched beast, there to perform a species of penance for several ages. If, on the contrary, he lived a sober, tem- perate, and virtuous life, he was more fortunate in being sent to some happy and peaceful animal. Some of the ancient philosophers pretended to have had visions on this subject. One describes the soul of Orpheus, who was musical, melancholy, and a hater of the fair sex, as entering into a swan ; the soul of Ajax, represented full of anger and ferocity, into a lion; the soul of Agamemnon, who was soaring and ambitious, into an eagle ; and the soul of the scoffer Thersites, into a monkey. This doc- trine of transmigration has often been alluded to by modern writers of great note. How fine is Dry den' s translation of Pythagoras' speech, in the fifteenth book of Ovid's Metamorphoses, touching the im-

ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 201

propriety of eatiiig animal food. And most literary readers must know the famous prologue which Congreve fixed to one of his very best comedies, in which the following lines occur, with respect to the supposed consequences of this grand doctrine of transmigration : —

" Thus Aristotle's soul of old that was. May now be damn'd to animate an ass ; Or, in this very house, for ought we know. Is doing painful penance in some beau."

There were a considerable number of the ancient sages who strenuously maintained that the j)ower or faculty of thinking was an inherent and essential property of the soul, and if this thought were taken away from it, its nature would be entirely destroyed. They affirmed, that the soul was a substance alto- gether distinct and different from matter, the con- stitutional properties of which were solidity and extension. If the soul be neither solid nor ex- tended, then, said they, we cannot conceive how it can exist, when it does not think. It may be true indeed, that a body when put in motion may con- tinue to move in a straight line, until it comes in contact with some other body which may give it another direction ; but this case does not apply to the general argument, for a body when moving is entirely passive, whereas the soul of man is per- petually active in all its creations ; and, therefore, it must be concluded, that constant thinking is an essential attribute of the mental nature of man.

This opinion was qualified, in some degree, l)y asserting that the essential principle of the soul

202 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

was not perpetual cogitation, bnt only a communi- cated power to think. Thought was considered re- latively to the soul, what motion is to the body ; as it is not always necessary that the body should be in motion, neither is it necessary for the soul always to think. To account for the soul's existence when it does not think, we have only to suppose that though the soul is not solid, so as to offer resistance to bodies, yet it is extended ; and it is as easy to conceive how the Divinity might communicate a power of thinking to extended matter, as to ac- commodate an immaterial substance, so as to har- monise with a material one.

We must here notice those persons who adopted the atomic or corpuscular theory of matter, for their notions of the nature of the soul were in a great measure peculiar to themselves. They accounted for the soul's influence over the body upon similar principles with those which in modern times have been ascribed to the doctrine of attraction and gravitation. It was a fundamental pro^iosition with these reasoners that the seat of the soul was in the head, and that the thinking principle is not gene- rally diffused throughout the various parts of the bod}^ The soul is limited to this locality, and it is also maintained that the soul does not act upon the body immediately . There are certain nerves, canals, or channels, distributed through almost every part of the body, even the most remote. All these conduits are much of the same nature as the strings of a musical instrument ; so that Avhen one end of any of them is moved, the others partake of

ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL. 203

the motion. All these canals or channels of sen- sation have a connexion with the head, and con- sequently with the soul itself. Wlien the soul wishes to move any particular part of the hody, there is a motion immediately communicated through these nerves or canals, which in their turn move the soul, and then the sensation of pain or pleasiu-e is produced. This was the ordinary pro- cess by which these mental speculators endeavoured to account for the manner in which the soul moved the hody, and the way in which external things excite sensations in the mind. They would not allow pure spirit to move bodies immediately , nor bodies to act on spirit immediately ; but the action and re-action must be solely through the intervention of a third medium.

There was a small section of philosophers amongst the various schools of learning, who seemed to have adopted that hypothesis respecting the nature of the soul, which is now pretty generally maintained as the most orthodox one. This view is grounded on the notion, that at the organization of the body, Avhen the receptacle is properly furnished, the soul is immediately created by God himself, and infused into the body ; like a person taking pos- session of his new habitation, when all things are in readiness for his reception.

Several metaphysicians of antiquity, of great note, were exceedingly puzzled, by their inability to conceive how the soul could act upon the body, or the body upon the soul ; or in other words, how a spiritual substance could have any influence over

204 OPINIONS OF ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS

a material one, so as to move and act upon it. This difficulty led these reasoners to adopt the notion — a notion which has formed the foundation of several metaphysical systems in modern times — that all our actions were brought about by the direct interference of God himself. This was con- ceived to be effected in two ways. Pirst, whenever there was an impression upon any of our organs of sense from external objects, there was a sensation suitable to this impression excited in the soul by the Deity himself. Second, whenever the soul wishes to move any particular member of the body, immediately upon the existence of this volition, God excites a corresponding motion in that par- ticular member. According to this doctrine, the will of the soul is not the immediate cause of the motion of the body, but only the exciting cause of the Divinity's creating that motion ; and the im- pression made by a body upon any organ of sense, is not the cause of the sensation, but only an inducement for Divine interference to effect that purpose. When, for example, I wish to move my finger, or any other member of the body, it is not my soul which moves my finger, or the member; but the Deity, upon my volition, takes the occasion to move either the one or the other.

A portion of the ancients considered the soul and body to be but of one substance. They main- tained that the particles of which the soul consists, are not different in nature, but are only of a finer and more subtile kind than those of the body.

There was a very influential theory amongst a

ON A DEITY AND THE SOITL. 205

number of the ancients, respecting the nature and operations of the human soul, grounded upon a very subtile and refined principle of concord or harmony between the soul and the body. The soul being a thinking or spiritual substance, could not act upon the body, nor could the body act upon it, but only through the medium of a certain con- stituted asfreement l^etween the volitions of the soul and the motions of the body. This theory may be illustrated in this way. The Divinity has decreed that every soul should have a certain train of thought and desires, and no other ; and that all mental operations should go on according to a regular and circular order or plan. A thought may produce a desire, and a desire a will, and an effort of the will a motion of the body, and so on, in a regular progression. In every body there are cer- tain sprmgs for producing every species of action, and every body must perform certain actions agree- ably to its natui'C, and no other. This is a binding and unerring law; and, consequently, it is impossible for any given body to perform any other kinds of motion than those it was destined to perform from the beginning. Now among so many souls, possess- ing an immense variety of different thoughts and volitions, and so manv bodies with such different springs or principles of action, the Deity chooses one soul Avhose thous^hts and volitions mio'ht cor- respond to the motions of some suitable body. Here is a mutual sympathy created ; which may be compared to two pendulums which do not act upon each other, but when one is down the other

206 OPINIONS ON A DEITY AND THE SOUL.

is clown also, and vice versa. Por example, wlien the soul had a desire to eat, the human hody was so modelled from the beginning of time, as to take victuals at a certain period, and in a certain given way or manner ; and when the soul willed to go in any particular direction, the feet were deter- mined to move in this same direction.

Another prevailing notion was, that the soul of man was a real part of the divine nature; not different in nature or essence, but only in degree. This svstem had varied and extensive ramifications, and formed the nucleus of many doctrines on natural theology.

MENTAL PHILOSOPnY OF INDIA. 207

CHAPTER XXIII.

MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDL\.

The positive knowledge we shall be able to derive from the Indian philosophy, ^vill not be great in amount, nor very satisfactory in its nature. The obscurity which hangs over it is so murky and dense, that even those who have devoted nearly a whole lifetime to its consideration, have not been able to reduce it to anything like system, or to recognise what are its first or elementary prin- ciples.

The few observations we shall make on the sub- ject, are suggested from a perusal of the " Trans- actions of the Royal Asiatic Society." The members of this Society have displayed the most commend- able zeal in all their inquiries on this subject ; and the only regret one feels is, that their labours should have proved so comparatively barren and fruitless.

208 MENTAL PaiLOSOPIIY OF INDIA.

The Sankhya and Yoga.

This is considered the best known of all the systems of Indian speculation on philosophy. There are three kinds of knowledge which are here recognised, namely, perception, mediate know- ledge, arising from the varions forms of the Syllo- gism, and traditional knowledge. The first, percep- tion, appertains to sensible objects; but this faculty is not of itseK sufficient to account for all the various kinds of thought ; therefore, recourse must be had to the second species of knowledge, reason- ing or demonstration, which assumes two forms, either going from cause to effect, or from the effect to the cause. The Sankhya acknowledges no intuitive knowledge whatever ; this is reserved for beings of a higher grade than man.

All objects of scientific knowledge are either creative and not created, or both creative and created, or created and not creative, or neither creative nor created.* Creation is the first prin- ciple of things, without it nothing could exist. This creative energy is supposed to be a subtile fluid or essence, which operates in and through the senses. This fluid or essence possesses, how- ever, perfect unity of nature ; it is one and not many. The evidence for this creative unity arises chiefly from the uniform appearances of nature, from the singleness of design imprinted upon every

* Colebrooke, Isvara- Crishnas, 1. p. 31.

THE SANKHYA AND YOGA. 209

tiling, and from the impossibility of conceiving a creative power acting harmoniously, without being invested with unity of conception and purpose. This creative energy or power is not, however, possessed of intelligence; it is a blind corporeal body, but of a very subtile nature, so as to elude all human perception.

That object which is neither created nor creates, is the soul of man. The evidence for the existence of this soul arises from many considerations. We find a blind corporeal body in existence, whose physical capabilities may be likened to a musical instrument, such as an organ for example. Now this piece of workmanship owes its existence to some designing agent, and is made for some pur2:)ose. This purpose is to aiford a suitable place of residence for the soul. The e^ddence of the existence of a soul is also evinced from the con- sideration of its various feelings and emotions, and its numerous sources of pleasure and pain. We see, too, that the blind incorporeal matter cannot move or direct itself, and, therefore, this argues the necessity for a soul. All the higher feelings of which the soul is susceptible afford likewise con- vincing proofs of its separate nature and superior excellence.

It is almost needless to observe, that there are paljoable contradictions involved in all these opi- nions and statements. Matter or body is consider- ed a blind and immoveable thing, and the soul as a vivifying energy, and possessed of intelligence. Now this creative or living power, which is the

210 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OP INDIA.

first principle of tilings, — the source of all being, — ■ is denied intelligence, which is conferred upon a more humble and subordinate agent, the soul of man. This is obviously very contradictory and inconsistent.

The principle of all corporeal things is simple unity ; but the principle of all thinking creations is multiple. All bodies may assume different forms, still they are but one; a multiplicity of souls have all distinct natures, which is evinced l3y the different parts they are made to act in the drama of existence.

The first emanation which arises from the creative principle of things, is mind. All rational and thinking beings are minor emanations from this great 3I'md. It overrules all. A Deity means this first-created Being, or mental energy. It has divers modes of manifestation. There are five elementary energies which are productive or cre- ative of things above sensible objects, and which energies are not perceptible to man. Those which produce sensible objects are of a subordinate or grosser character. These create the five senses ; and to correspond to these, five other organs of activity are framed, which are, as it were, the material instruments by which these senses act. These active organs are, the tongue, the organ of speech ; the hands, the feet, the alimentary and secretive organs, and the organs of generation. These active instruments are made parallel to other elements of an ethereal and active nature.

EHAGAVAD-GHITA — NYAYA. 211

The Bhagavad-Ghita.

This record of Indian speculation is more of a theological nature than the preceding one we have mentioned. There seems one simple and absorbing principle, which is that God, or the Supreme Mind or Soul, is the Creator of all things. Creation is just a manifestation of the existence and nature of this first great principle. All souls emanate from it; and maintain a perpetual sympathy with it, in all states of their existence. " The great Deity is my womb, in it I lay my fruit, and the origin of all things emanates therefrom. The Deity is the great womb ; and I the seed-giving father." Such are the terms employed to express tliis connection between heavenly and earthly natures.

The Ntata and the Vaisechika.

This branch of specidation is considered by ori- ental scholars as one of the most intellectual systems of Indian philosophy. It attempts to develop more fully the principles and rules of reasoning, than the systems we have just glanced at ; but it must be con- fessed, that after one or two elementary maxims are laid down,we are lost in the wild and irregular super- structure which is built upon these maxims of the Nyaya. European thought has not yet been able to penetrate into the mysterious arcana of their logic. A species of syllogism is used, consisting of five, instead of our three parts. The following is given- by

p 2

212 MENTAL PHILOSOniY OF INDIA.

Colebrooke as an an example. 1. Tlie hill is fieiy. 2. Because it smokes. 3. Whatever smokes is fieiy, e. g. a kitchen hearth. 4. The hill also smokes. 5. Therefore it is fiery.*

According to tliis branch of Indian speculation, the soul is possessed of altogether different pro- perties from the body. Thought is the grand dis- tinctive attribute of the former. This is displayed in knowledge, desire, aversion, and the pleasures and pains of our internal mental structure. Body has none of these qualities or afPections. There is, however, a bond of union between it and the soul, and this bond is manifested by the connections which exist between our external senses and our physical organs. These senses are five in number, and are not mere modifications of consciousness or internal feeling, but they possess a corporeal nature. To correspond with these five senses, there are five elements provided, which sympathise or keep up a constant intercourse with these senses thi'ough the instrumentality of some subtile powers or other, T\ hich are not clearly defined.

The act of perception is considered a compound act, but of homogeneous parts alone. Hetero- geneous or dissimilar agencies cannot act together, or be combined into one whole.

The atomic theory of the Indians bears a strong resemblance to that of Greece. It is afiirmed by the philosophical schools of the former, that an extreme point or limit must be arrived at, otherwise

* Colebrooke, 1. p. 116; and also Windischmann, p. 32. 38.

THE VEDANTA. 213

investiijations would be endless and inconclusive. If all bodies consist of an infinite number of parts, all must be alike infinite, and then we must concede the conclusion that a part is equal to a whole. To avoid so absurd a conclusion, it must be assumed that all compound bodies are the result of a union among corresponding parts ; and when these parts are separated, we must come to some atom whose di\ision ceases.* Certain dimensions are never- theless given to this ultimate atom, for its magni- tude is defined to be the sixth part of a particle floating in the sunbeam.

On matters of theology, the Nyaya is very ob- scure. It maintains that the soul is the highest of created things, but that it is fettered by the body, which is essentiallv the source and active instru- ment of all evil. It is on this ground that the Metempsychosis is advocated. The soul which has committed any sin or fault, is, after death, again united to a body. In this philosophy, the existence of a Eirst Cause is obscurely stated. What notions are entertamed seem to be of a material character. The portion of Divine intelKgence and wisdom is small, and undefined in its operations.

The Vedanta.

The Vedanta claims to be the orthodox expounder of the religion of the Brahmins. A peculiarity in this system of speculation on human knowledge is,

* Wiadischraanu, p. 1924. Colebrooke, b. I. p. 105.

214 MENTAL PHILOSOPKY OF INDIA.

that it is maintained that there are other sources of information besides what is derived from per- ception ; and these sources are revelation and tra- dition. The knowledge conveyed in tliis revelation is eternal ; and the language in wliich it is con- veyed, is also immortal, and not of human invention. All matter by its nature is inert, and cannot move itself, nor eflPect spontaneously any change in its structure. There must, therefore, be a spirit of some kind ; and this spirit must be endowed with self-existence and a creative energy. It exists in itself, and can perceive, reflect upon, and be con- scious of its own powers. The properties of the body are all deficient in these attributes. They cannot feel, or be sentient of their own natiu'es ; they are only the instruments through which the soul feels, and thinks, and understands.

On the natiu'e of matter and mind, which this school of philosophy held, Sir William Jones makes the following remarks : — "The difficulties attending the vulscar notion of material substances, induced many of the wisest among the ancients, as well as the Hindoo philosophers, to believe that the whole creation was rather an energy than a work, by which the Infinite Mind, who is present at all times and in all places, exliibits to his creatures a set of perceptions like a wonderful picture, or piece of music, always varied, yet always uniform."*

"The Vedantis," the same author observes, " unable to form a distinct idea of brute matter,

* Introduction to a Translation of some Hindoo verses.

TIIE VEDANTA. 215

independent of mind, or to conceive that the work of supreme goodness was left a moment to itself, imagine that the Deity is ever present to his work, and constantly supports a series of perceptions, which in one sense they call illusory, though they cannot but admit the reality of all created forms, as far as the happiness of creatures can be affected by them."

" The word Maya, or delusion, has a subtile and recondite sense in the Vedanta philosophy, where it signifies the system of perceptions, whether of secondary or primary qualities, which the Deity was believed, by Epicharmus, Plato, and many truly pious men, to raise, by his omnipresent spirit, in the minds of his creatures ; but which had not, in their opinion, any existence independent of mind."*

On the nature and existence of a Pirst Cause, the Vedanta is very confused ; and Oriental scholars are at variance on the precise doctrines of this branch of the Indian system. It is generally laid down, that where there are decisive marks of de- sign and contrivance in the construction and ar- rangement of external objects, there must be a designing and intelligent cause. But at the same time this principle is clogged with so many quali- fications and restrictions, that at length it becomes difficult to say what is really meant by Indian sa- vants. Mr. Kennedy controverts the opinion of Colebrooke, that, according to the Vedanta, God is not only the efficient but material cause of the

* Dissertation on the Gods of Greece, Italy, and India.

21G MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA.

universe. The former gentleman insists that the Indian philosophy does not acknowledge the idea of matter at all, nay, absolutely denies its very existence.* It is observed by Emitter, that " It vidll at once occur to the reader, that the strongest argument on wliich the Vedanta could have rested, must have been the view which pervades the whole philosophy of India, that the multiplicity of phe- nomena does not destroy the unity of the essence. Thus it was held, that as the essence of the soul may remain intact, notwithstanding that the most diversified phenomena are mirrored upon it ; so the Supreme Mind or Spirit is not altered in its essence by the change of the mundane objects which arise out of itself. In this view the identity of the es- sence is so firmly maintained, as to exclude every possible change that can happen to or in it. Ac- cordingly it is said of God, that although he can transmute liimself into all, and create all things out of liimself, he is nevertheless without shape or form ; not affected by the states of the universe ; without passion or change ; and similar to the clear crystal, which apparently receives into itself dif- ferent colours, but in reality is equally transparent at all times ; or to the light of the sun or moon, which, although it is invariable in itself, neverthe- less appears different according as it shines upon different objects. The Mind or Spirit may be com- pared to pure space, wherein all exists and goes through change after change, but which is not it-

* Royal Asiatic Soc. 3. p. 412.

THE VEDANTA. 217

self changed thereby. In these there is no differ- ence between the recipient, the perceived, and the perception ; it is without multiplicity, and he who believes it must be multiple, dies death upon death."*

We have given a short sketch of the mental spe- culations of an imperfectly civilized portion of our race ; and every candid reader must allow, that in one point of ^dew this Indian philosophy does not flag far behind that of more polished and intellec- tual nations ; that is, in reference to the notions entertained as to a first or creative principle. To the Indian understanding, mind is indispensable to enable even the savage to conceive any active or creative power in nature at all ; and on this ac-* count he is placed on precisely the same footing as the most favoured people among whom the arts and sciences flourish in the highest degree of vi- gour and perfection. The savage and the civilized man are nearly, if not identically, on a level as to tlie first step in philosophy ; but the great discrepancy between then* respective views arises from the dif- ferent ways in which each analyzes and illustrates the principle. Both admit sunply that a mind is indispensable to the solution of the phenomena of existence ; but when each attempts to describe in what way and manner this mind operates and dis- plays itself, then we recognise the great disparity between ignorance and intelligence. The man of civilization and science gives some plausible and

* Hist. Phil., vol. 4. p. \\o%.

218 MENTAL PHILOSOPHY OF INDIA.

rational theory for liis views and opinions ; but the savage, or half civilized, run riot in the wildest ex- cesses of ignorant conjecture and superstitious fears. Both set out from the same starting point ; but they take opposite directions, and, of course, the longer and farther they travel, the greater is the interval of space which separates them from each other.*

* See Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 1. pp. 19.43. 92. 118. 439. 466. 679.; and Vol. 2. pp. 1.39.

UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES. 219

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES WITH THOSE OF GREECE AND ROME.

We come now to a marked and important epoch in the history of mental speculation, namely, the amalgamation of the Greek doctrines with that great and varied mass of refined and attenuated philosophy which prevailed in many of the more intelligent and civilized parts of the Asiatic conti- nent. This alliance caused an obvious change in the mode of conducting investigations into the laws of the human mind ; and made, moreover, these in- vestigations more subservient to other branches of knowledge, than they had liitherto been in the divers schools of pliilosophy at Athens, Rome, and Alexandria. Discussions on the nature of mind took now a more lofty a priori station ; were sub- limated into endless refinements ; were more com- pletely shrouded in mysterious allegories, and en- veloped in the gorgeous pomp of Eastern metaphor and imagery. All this proved a source of inter- minable and unprofitable inquiries and discussions ;

220 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES.

clouded the whole horizon of the philosophy of nimd ; and ushered in a long and dreary night of wrangling, douht, and obscurity.

What were the precise causes of this union, do not very clearly appear from any historical records we possess. Certain it is, that a mixture took place between some of the leading systems of Greece, and the peculiar views of Oriental nations ; and that Alexandria was the principal seat of learning where tliis union manifested itself. The doctrines of Plato and Pythagoras seem to have been great favourites, but there are also evident traces of some of the opinions which exclusively belong to the Stoical school of philosophy.

The chief difference between what is termed Oriental philosophy and Grecian, arises from this ; the Oriental chiefly relates to notions or j)rin- ciples immediately connected Tvith Di\"inity, and endeavours to develop those laws connected with the creation and regulation of mundane afiairs. The'Greek speculation follows a different route. It starts with man, his mind, his feelings, his moral emotions, and social and physical existence. It is obvious that a different result would be effected by these varied modes of inquiry; and as general principles in both cases became more minutely analyzed, the divergency from the respective points of departure, would necessarily become wider and more palpable. Now this is precisely what we find. Both the Oriental and Grecian streams of know- led":e took their rise from nearlv identical locali- ties, from a united desire to know the origin of all

ARISTOBULUS. 221

tilings ; but they flowed through diversified regions of thought, and at their point of junction we see them tinged with the respective intellectual strata over which they had passed. The Oriental was thick and turbid, and the Greek comparatively pellucid and clear.

Amstobulus.

After the Jews returned from their capti^dty at Babylon, they brought with them many of the pecuKar philosophical notions prevalent among the Babylonians, and other neighbouring nations. This importation of speculative novelties, changed and corrupted the simple philosophy of the HebrcAV people; and their learned men made various at- t tempts to unite the foreign with their ovsti peculiar abstract views of human nature.

Aristobulus was one of the first among the learned Babbins who made this attempt at amalga- mation. His views on metaphysical subjects were precisely those of Plato, with a little admixtiu*e of Asiatic hyperbole, and metaphor. He endeavoured to explain the doctrines of the Jewish faith through the means of the abstract principles of the Greek philosophy. There are none of his writings extant; therefore we cannot furnish the reader with any details as to his peculiar ^dews on the nature of the faculties of the human mind.

Philo. Philo was a distinguished Jewish writer. He

222 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES.

had studied with great care and success all the principal Greek systems on the human mind ; and he was, also, partially versed in the mystic philoso- phy of the East.

He maintained that there were two distinct souls in human nature ; the one a reasonable, and the other an irrational or animal soul. To the reason- able soul he attributed three separate faculties, understanding, sensation, and speech ; and to the irrational soul, the sensual passions and affections. Pliilo affirms that the understanding is not only a divine spirit, but an inseparable portion of the divine essence itself. It is also the loord, analogous to the Deity ; it bears his image, and virtually con- tains in it all forms. The soul pre-exists in bodies, and is possessed of complete liberty of action. God has given to man prudence to govern his reason, courage to restrain his passions, and temperance to repress his sensual desires. Sometimes the soul, invested with the senses, only sees sensible objects ; sometimes, by taking a spontaneous flight, it dis- euffasres itself from material influences, and elevates itself to the perception of intelligent things. It is this deliverance from the bondage of the body, that the truly wise always aspire after; this conflict between the senses and the free exercise of the understanding, constitutes wisdom in its loftiest acceptation. It is from this contemplation of the divine essence that man obtains all his true know- ledge, and arrives at virtuous excellence.

Philo dwells upon some of the sceptical argu- ments of the Academic School of Greece, by repre-

PHiLO. 223

sentiiig the great difficulty there is in man's ability to detect the truth in matters of abstract specula- tion. The impressions from the senses are not always to be relied on; and even those more refined thoudits which seem to have their source out of the mind itself, may lead us into error and delusion. Man cannot penetate into the arcana of nature ; and the only kind of knowledge which is calculated to improve and delight, is that which arises from a contemplation of the powers and faculties of the soul.* But even here our desire for knowledge receives a severe check ; for it is as unreasonable for the soul to know itself, as it is for the human eye to direct its powers to its own movements. We know not the nature of the soul; it may be blood, or air, or fire, or it may have no material quality what- ever. How little then can we really know of the matter ! All true science will teach man humility, and will force him to acknowledge that he indeed knows nothincf. God alone is the source of all knowledge.

Considerable difference of opinion exists among philosophical liistorians as to the proportion of heathen notions incorporated with Philo's owai Jewish system. This is a controversy not easily decided. The majority of the German critics refer a great portion of his philosophy to an eastern origin ; but there is really no solid ground for this. The theological principles involved in the Jewish Scrip- tures were sufficient of themselves to give that

* De Ebriet. 40. p. 382.

221 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES, &C

peculiar cast to a speculative system, which we recognise in the writings of this distinguished Rabhi. In every thing he advances there is a great portion of common sense; few thoughts of fanatic absurdity or oriental mysticism are percep- table. His views are just such as an inquisitive mind might be supposed to entertain, who had the revealed system of Moses, and the Grecian philoso- phy to guide him ; without availing himself of any speculations from the Magi, or the Gymnosophists.*

APOLLONIUS OF TYANA.

There is very little known of this philosopher. He was a sort of marvel-monger, and dealt in mi- racles, soothsayings, and omens. On metaphysical questions he seems to have made Pythagoras his model and guide. Apollonius recommends that we should adopt a pure worship of the Supreme God, a sort of personal and inward movement of the soul towards Him, apart from all parade or external ce- remony. He also maintains that the anunal crea- tion bore an affinity to man, and that the doctrine of the Metempsychosis was well founded. He un- dertook long journeys into India and Upper Egypt to consult the Magi ; and he affirms, that the result of his personal inquiries and investigations was, that Pythagoras derived his philosophical opinions from Indian sages.

* See Dahne's Theol. Studien u. Kritiken, Jahrg. 1833. p 984. The same author treats very fully of Philo in his Geschichtliche Darstellung (\. Jiulisch-Alexandrinischen Religiosen Philosophic, Ilalle, 1834.

plutaech — luciits apuleius. 225

Pltjtarch.

Tills philosopher is better knowii for his biogra- phical laboiu's and moral disquisitions, than for his metaphysics. He was not, hoAvever, altogether unacquainted \^ith the science of mind, and its kin- dred doctrines as to the origin of the world and the nature of the human soul. The systems of Plato and Aristotle were great favourites with him, but especially that of Plato, whose views of life, and speculative ideas on the Deity and the human soul, were more in unison with his own. He adopts Plato's division of the soul into five members ; the nutritive, the sensitive, the sensual, the irascible, and the rational.

LiTcius Apuleius.

This philosopher was a public teacher of the doc- trines of Plato and Aristotle, in the time of Anto- ninus, at the city of Madaura, in Numidia. He endeavoured to reconcile the opinions of Plato and the Stagirite, and steered a sort of middle path between them on controversial points. His notions of the Deity are rather singular. He maintains that it would be highly derogatory to the Almighty to guide and regulate the affairs of this world ; and for tliis reason Apuleius thinks that mundane con- cerns are all committed to the superintendence of a host of angelic ministers. These ministers have thek abode in the air, and fill up that great void between heaven and earth. * • Q

226 UNION OF EASTERN DOCTRINES.

All the clivers forms of religion among men, even the most ignoble and degrading rites and ceremo- nies, have their respective representatives among these aerial ministers or agents. They know every- thing, doAvn to the intents and purposes of the human heart. He likewise affirms that the Divine Mind is constituted of a kind of trinity of faculties, and is immutable and eternal. All ideas reside in this divine E-eason.

NUMENIUS.

The metaphysical opinions of this learned man are but very imperfectly known. He was born at Apamea in Syria, and is supposed, on this account, to have entertained a marked predilection for Ori- ental ideas. He was a great favourite with the New Platonists, who considered his system, (if his peculiar views are entitled to that designation), as singularly profound and valual3le. He held the character of Moses in high veneration, and was no doul3t well acquainted mtli his writings. The phi- losophical opinions of the Egyptians, the Magi, and the Brahmins, he studied carefullv, and is even said to have made free with the personal history of our Saviour.*

His opinion on the general constitution of things seems to have been, that there could be no cor- poreal substance, unless there was some incor- poreal agent previously existing. This is nothing

* Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 9. pp. /• 8.

NUMENIUS. 227

more nor less than saying, that mind must have existed prior to matter. Everything, according to Numenius, which is corporeal, is subject to decom- position and decay ; an immaterial soul or princixile is, therefore, requisite to secure immortaKty.

On the nature of the Divine essence, we have a good deal of refined and mysterious speculation. This is a point on which both Numenius and most of his commentators have been sadly puzzled. The philosopher attempted to explain the connection which subsists between a spiritual and creative mind, and the material universe. This was an arduous task, and we cannot wonder that he should fail. Indeed all his conjectures and fancies on this subject are not worth the trouble of exposition or comment.*

* Eusebius, Pr. Ev. 15. 17-

Q 2

228 THE GNOSTIC METAPHYSICIANS.

CHAPTER XXV THE GNOSTIC METAPHYSICIANS.

The mental disquisitions of the Gnostic sect of plii- losopliers are but very imperfectly understood. They were generally incorporated with their peculiar doctrines on the nature of the Supreme Being, the creation of the world, the nature and origin of good and evil, and the future destiny of the human race. These Gnostic speculators were divided into many different sects or parties ; but they all seemed to maintain that man was a being compounded of two distinct souls ; the one intelligent, and the other sensitive. The ordinary division of the mind into various faculties or powers, appears to have obtained their general assent. The practical application of their metaphysical principles was, that man should cultivate his intelligent at the expense of his sensi- tive faculties. " Man," say they, " is only a passive instrument in the hands of the Divinity. Science comes solely from this source ; and reason should detach itself not only from the influence of the senses, but even from itself. The ascetic, or he who elevates himself to God, alone possesses true know- ledge. All is then pure ecstasy.

THE NEW PLATONISTS. 229

CHAPTER XXVI. ;

THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW

PLATONISTS.

The philosopliical scliool of the New Platonists was formed from the m.ixture of the doctrines of Plato, with the traditions and mysteries of the East. This school is sometimes termed by historians, the Alexandrian School of Plulosophy. The opinions which were promulgated by these learned men, exercised a very marked and powerful influence over the whole philosophy of the mind for many sub- sequent centuries, and even over the moral and religious principles of a large portion of the civilized world.

Ammonius Saccas. a. d. 200.

Ammonius Saccas was the founder of this school of philosophy at Alexandria. It is said that he was the son of Christian parents, and had received a Christian education ; but that when he became of riper age, he gave himself up to the study of the Greek phi-

230 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

losopliy, and afterwards to the observance of tlie rites and ceremonies of Paganism.*

The principal aim in his philosophical studies was to reconcile the discrepancies between the Platonic and the Aristotelian systems. How far he was able to accomplish this task, does not very clearly appear, from any historical accounts which we have of him.

There are two philosophical fragments of Am- monius Saccas, preserved by Nemesius, Bishop of Emessa, in which some of his opinions on inte- resting and important questions may be found.

On the immortality of the soul, Ammonius seems to have a fixed and decided opinion. He advocates its spirituality and indestructibility. A corporeal body, according to his notion, must have some principle or essence, by which its individual parts can be held together and sustained ; for it is quite obvious, that this principle or essence must be of a different nature from that wliicli has no life in itself, and which cannot communicate life, activity, and motion. There may be a mode of the two natures, corporeal and spiritual, acting on each other, but their real essences must necessarily be diametrically opposite, t

On the nature of the Deity, Ammonius held that he was eternal and immutable, the cause of all

* See on this point, Essai Historique sur la vie, &c. d' Ammonius Saccas, ])ar M. Dehaut, Bruxelles, \S36.

t See the learned and critical Essai of Dehaut, already mentioned, p. 135.

LONGINUS PLOTINUS. 231

things, the substance of all substances, the being of all beings, the essence of all essences, and the arche- type of all intellectual perception and power. The Deity does not possess relative, but Sihsohite unit i/ ; and He is not pure intelligence, for He is above all intelligence, and had a prior existence to it.

LONGINTJS.

Lono-inus, the author of the treatise " On the Suljlime," cultivated philosophy among the New Platonists. He did not, however, adopt their most extravagant and mystical doctrines. He rejected the theories of Epicurus and Chrysippus, because they had a dii'ect tendency to materialize the human mind. Longinus affirms it is foolish to think that the phenomena of thought and intelli- gence can be the result of simple mechanical action, or of a mere combination of material atoms.

Plotinus. 206 A.D.

Plotinus was one of the ablest and most renowned of the New Platonician Metaphysicians. He was a writer of vast acquired information, and of a vigor- ous and powerful mind. His mental speculations are contained in a treatise, called the " Mieade.'' This is truly considered one of the most interesting books on abstract science of which antiquity can boast. It contains nine parts. The first treats of morals ; the second of physics ; the third, general considerations on the laws of the universe; the

232 PRINCIPLES OP THE NEW PLATONISTS.

fourth, on the human soul; the fifth, on intelK- gence ; and the sixth is a summary of the whole. Some of the chapters or parts are douhle ones.

This speculative work of Plotinus is confessedly one of the most abstruse which antiquity has handed down to us. It is extremely difficult to obtain a right conception of its leading principles, or the end which the author had in view to establish. The theory seems grounded on a peculiar notion of unity ; but the exact meaning to be applied to this word is not easily divined. Plotinus calls it absolute, j^^rfect, and primordial unity. He tells us again that this unity is necessary, immutable, and infinite ; it is not numerical unity ; not the in- divisible point of the arithmetician and geometri- cian. It is universal unity, perfect in its own sim- plicity. It is the highest degree of perfection ; it is the beau ideal, the only true beauty ; it is the supreme good, the highest excellence.

After this subtile and laboured attempt to explain a very remote abstraction of the mind, Plotinus endeavours to point out how this principle of unity operated in the production of the universe. " At first, from its own bosom proceeds the supreme in- telligence ; a secondary, subordinate, but perfect principle. It proceeds from its source without ex- ternal action or internal volition ; without the first principle of unity being either modified or affected ; in fact, it emanates like light from the sun. This intelligence is the image, the reflection of unity ; the luminous crown or glory of it . This intelligence embraces the object conceived, the subject which

PLOTINUS. 233

conceives it, and the action of conception itself; the whole of these three things are embodied in itself. This principle of supreme intelligence con- stantly contemplates itself; this contemplation is its essence."

" The universal soul is the third priaciple, suljor- dinate to the other two. This soul is thought, speech, an image of intelligence, the exercise of its spontaneity ; for intelligence acts only by thought. But this thought is determined only because it is infinite. All chis train of events or cu'cumstances acts not in time, but in eternity ; and the three principles, primordial unity, supreme intelligence, and the universal soul, though forming a hierarchy of separate and independent dignities or orders, are nevertheless co-eternal mth each other."

On the nature of existence generally Plotinus maintained, that natural beings were not the true beings. The real universe admitted neither of al- teration nor transformation ; it is identical with the Deity; it is the Divinity itself, such as he manifests himself, and is eternal and immutable like him.

On the nature of the human mmd in particular, this subtile philosopher observes, " The human mind has two ordinary modes of acting, and knowing ; the one by a participation in intelligence and the other by forms. It enjoys the former when filled and illuminated with intelligence, which enables it to see and feel immediately. It enjoys the second, by means of certain characters, or certain laws which have been engraven on our natures. Eor

234 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

the Supreme Being has imprinted on the himian mind the rational form of things. True knowledge is that, when the object conceived or known is identical with the subject which conceives or knows it."

" The faculties of the soul are of two kinds. The one, derived from above, constitutes reason; the other, descending to the inferior regions, forms sen- sibility and vegetation."

" Reason is placed in an intermediate position between the understanding and the senses. It acts not by the agency of the bodily organs, but solely by the force of intelligence."

Plotinus entertained some curious notions as to the nature of memory. He affirmed this faculty did not consist in preserving impressions received from the senses, but solely in an innate develop- ment of self-power or energy. And the power of memory was in strict proportion with the internal strength of this power. According to this opinion it is not necessary to place confidence in memory, to recal the impressions which externals may have made upon it ; for the mind possesses in itself for the retaining of knowledge, a sufficient power by its intercourse with superior intelligences.

On the nature of sensation, he remarks, " The perceptions we obtain from external objects are always obscure ; while, on the contrary, those we receive from reflection are always clear and lumi- nous."

r

The general outline of the doctrine of Plotinus bears a striking resemblance to some modern specu-

PonrHYUY. 235

lations on the human mind, Avhich we shall have to notice in a subsequent part of this work.

Plotinus seems to have followed in the wake of Ammonius Saccas, and to have moulded his philo- sophical system upon the principles of that learned person. Plotinus was of an ardent and imagina- tive mind; and this led him, in conjunction mth the general tone and character of the philosophy of the times, into mystical and fanatical specula- tions. These shed a cloudv haziness over the more rational and solid portions of his system; for it was not so devoid of valuable disquisitions as some historians have imagined. There is a strong under- current of common sense in his writings ; and his ideas of the philosophy of the mind in particular, show that he had culled from the systems of Plato and Aristotle some of the best and soundest maxims on this branch of kno^^ ledge, and that he fully appreciated their intrinsic worth and impor-' tance.

Porphyry.

Porphyiy was the pupil and personal friend of .Plotinus, and embraced essentially the same prin- ciples, as to the natiu'e of the human mind and its modes of operation.

With the view of reconciling the doctrines of Aristotle with those of Plato, which was one of the grand aims of the new Platonists, Porphyry wrote a work on the Fredicahles of Aristotle, and endea- voured to enter into a minute analysis of the

236 PEINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

notions we commonly attach to particular generic terms of reasoning; such as genus, species, con- trariety, identity, 8fC. This is considered a very ex- cellent work of its kind, and it shows the profound attention with which he had studied the metaphy- sical works of the Stagirite.

The ideas Porphyry entertained on the nature of general terms, may be inferred from the following remarks on this eagerly contested point. " Genus is the principal, which contains the species and the individuals placed under it ; and involves an idea of multitude, or number." ^^ If genus and species possessed each a separate and independent exist- ence, or were two distinct and separate notions of the mind, then, on the first supposition, they would have a corporeal existence; and on the second, they would be of an incorporeal nature, for they would be separated from sensible or external thin2:s."

Porphpy compared the human mind, in re- ference to sensation, to the harmonv elicited from the cords or strings of a musical instrument. The senses are the agitated cords, and the soul is the musician who moves them. The human soul has reasons contained within itself for all things ; and it is on this account, and by this special reason, that it can always operate on the senses, whether there be an external exciting cause, or merely the internal suggestions of its ovm. nature or will. If there be an external exciting cause, then this leads the mind to the cognizance of external objects ; if only an internal suggestion, then we are led to the

JAMBLICUS. 237

contemplation of more intelligent ideas. Sensa- tion never takes place without a modification being experienced by the organs of sense ; and the under- standing in its turn never receives assistance from its own imaginative workings, without these intel- lectual objects receiving an intellectual impres- sion. The human understanding is essentially uniform, of perfect unity of parts, one and indi- vidual in every thing which constitutes it.

Jamblictjs.

This philosopher composed a work, addressed to Porphyry, " Upon tJie Egyptian My steries^'" in which there are a great number of curious and important remarks on divers topics connected with the mind of man. The fundamental system of the new Pla- tonicians is strenuously upheld. Jamblicus main- tains the existence of an intellectual and a sensible world ; but considers the former as containing in itseK the whole of the latter ; or perhaps, to speak more plainly, that the sensible or external world is only the shadow of the intellectual one. " The Gods," says he, " which compose tliis superior re- gion, contemplate their own divine ideas ; the stars, or visible Gods, are only the images created by divine and intellectual realities. A bond of union associates these two orders of existences into one indissoluble whole ; the visible Gods being con- tained within the intellectual ones. The farther we ascend in this chain of existence, the more we de- velop first causes by their genus and essence, — the

238 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

more we shall be directed to the consideration of parts of the stupendous whole, and the better able to detect that sublime and perfect unity of design and purpose, so visibly imprinted upon every thing we behold."

"This knowledge of the Gods is intimately blended with our own individual being. It is an- terior to every mental act of examining, judging, and reasoning. It has been co-existent, from the beginning of time, with a certain predisposition in our souls towards that which is good. It is the same with all those superior intelKgences which fill up the intervening space between the Gods and the human soul ; which form the intermediate link between both, in that immense chain which binds the most elevated things with the most common, and sustains the harmony and order of the whole creation."

Peoclijs. 412. A.D.

Proclus was one of the great shining lights amongst the metaphysical philosophers of the new Platonic School. He was a man of great and varied accomplishments, and gathered around him a lively and intense interest during his scholastic reign. He was born at Constantinople, in 412 of the Christian era, and at an early age was sent to Alexandria to study pliilosophy, oratory, and belles- lettres.

Proclus adopted the system of Plato in all its fulness and in all its bearings. The latter says,

PROCLUS. 239

that " unitv and variety are the essential characters of human thought;" and this principle serves Pro- clus to workout a very extended, subtile, and elevated commentary, in reference to the whole constitution of nature.

According to this philosopher the human mind may he considered under three points of view, the essence of every thing, identity, and diversity. These elementary forms give rise to three other princi]iles of a prolific nature. "The world," he says, " is composed of harmony. Now harmony is unity in variety. Unity and variety exist then primarily in the conceptions of the Grand Architect; or rather the Grand Architect is only the highest unitv, which embraces in its bosom all other divine unities. Similitude is the limit which determines diversity from infinity. Similitude assembles, diver- sity disperses. These three tilings, essence, identity, and diversity, produce by theu' action all the forms or unities which reside in individual tliin<?s."

Proclus distinguished five orders of faculties in the human soul. The first is confined to the exer- cise of the external senses. The second is that which displays the soul's connexion mth the body, and yet preserves her own individuality. The third consists in rectifying and testing our opinions and conclusions, by the aid of superior intelligences and wisdom. The fourth detaches the soul from all in- ferior and grovelling impressions, renders it peace- able and tranquil, looks into its own powers, feel- ings, and emotions, and observes the harmonious action of the whole inward man. And the fifth

240 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

power is that which excites and sustains our sympathies with all our kindred of mankind, and with aU those angeUc forms, in which superior de- grees of intelligences reside.

In accordance with these five powers, there are five branches of knowledge. The first relates to matters of a very humble character ; to material objects and such as influence us by the force of physical destray. The second order of intelligent tilings has for its object all general notions, which form the basis of reasoning. The third embraces absolute unity, or the power of analysing and dis- cus sing general principles, a knowledge of causes, and conclusions and inferences draivn from them. This branch of knowledge also embraces all mathe- matical forms, and numbers. The fourth di\dsion includes all theories, resolutions, compositions of reasoning, definitions and demonstrations, and all systems of speculative truth. The fifth class of things relates to matters of a high and lofty cha- racter; to a divine exaltation, gradually assimi- latiug the human mind to the nature of the divine Being and his attributes.

Proclus sought above all things to give order and logical method to his speculations. Consequential reasoning was, in his opinion, indispensable to all useful human learning. It was one of the great lal)ours of his life to give his master Plato's pliilo- sophy in a logical form, and he has left us a strik- ing memorial of his zeal and industry in this direc- tion. But his great work of method is his " Me- ments of Theology,'' which he has treated of at

MARINUS — ISIDORE. 241

sreat leno-tli, and which embodies the chief ele- ments of the Platonic system, as defined and illus- trated bv Proclus and his immediate successors. It is impossible to look over the methodical propo- sitions of this Treatise, without recognizing it as the prolific parent of many subsequent theories, both in theology and philosophy. It is an exceed- ingly interesting exposition of an ancient system, and treated in a manner the most profound and logical. The whole of the propositions will be found at the end of this volume.*

Marinus.

This philosopher was a disciple and biographer of Proclus. The former filled the chair of Instruction at the death of the latter.

Little is recorded of the mental speculations of this writer. He examined with considerable pro- fundity the nature of our abstract concejitions, and the laws of thought which seem to accompany their development.

Isidore of Gaza.

This member of the new Platonic theory suc- ceeded the preceding philosopher in the chair of Philosophy. He appears to have given to his meta- physical speculations a decidedly rehgious turn. He remarks, "that human knowledge and reasoning are

* See Note F. at the end of this Vohirae. * R

242 PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS.

but feelDle succours for that sublime wisdom whicli is alone agreeable to the Divinity. To enlighten the reason is the privilege of God himself ; man can- not confer it ; but he must receive it as a gift."*

With the name of Proclus the ancient Grecian system of philosophy may be said to terminate. It had run a long and noble course ; was charac- terised by profound thought, patient investigation, comprehensive views, noble aspirations, and inde- fatigable zeal ; and was destined to leave the im- print of its existence upon the minds of all succeed- ina: asres of civilized men. But it was henceforth to shine only with a borrowed light. Its own effulgence was to be obscured by brighter rays of truth ; and it was to be used only as an instrument for the illustration or defence of more sublime doctrines, and more lofty views of the future destiny of man. Another power had been established, which was hourly on the increase, and which should solicit the suffrages of manlvind, and place

* See I'Histoire de I'EclecticIsme, by Beausobre, Avignon, 1/66 ; Ole- arius, Dissert, de Eclecticis ; Cudwortb's Intellectual System ; Mos- heim's Ecclesiastical History ; Tbe Histories of Philosophy by Brucker, Tiedemann, Buhle, and Tennemann; Victor Cousin's Translation of the works of Proclus ; Taylor's Translation of Proclus ; Eeussling, De tribus Hypostasibus Plotini, Wittenberg, 1690; Hebenftreet, Dissert, de Jamblichi Philos. Leipsic, 1764; Fichte, Dissert. De Philos. Novae Platonicse origine, Beroliai, 1818; Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Articles, Proclus, Marinus; Stobaeus b. 1. Articles, De Gradibus, De Anim. Viri- bus, De eo quod est in nostra potestate ; De Gerando, Hist. Comparee, vol. 3 ; Ritter's His. of Philosophy, vol. 4.

PRINCIPLES OF THE NEW PLATONISTS. 243

speculative pliilosopliy upon anotlier and a firmer basis. The great problems which Grecian inge- nuity raised, were to be solved in a manner, and with a clearness and conclusiveness, of which the disciples of Plato and Aristotle had no conception. The lofty hopes which many of the Grecian sages entertained were to be realized to their more for- tunate successors ; and those bright rays of light, which gleamed in the distance, and which they but distantly recognised, were to shine, to all future philosophers, "more and more unto the perfect day."

But though the independence of the Grecian speculation was to be destroyed for ever, it was still to be a useful and often melded instrument in the hands of future cultivators of philosophy. This honour was, however, to be confined to the two great pillars of Grecian thought, Plato and Aristotle. The smaller sects were to be compara- tively forgotten in the new order of things. The Stoics, the Epicureans, the Pythagoreans, the Sophists, the Sceptics, were to pass away, but Plato and Aristotle were to remain ; and for many centuries were to divide the opinions and applause of the learned and contemplative. We shall have frequent occasion, in our historical progress, to record the influence of theii* respective systems, and the favourable or unfavourable judgments of rival partizans. But that undi\dded and despotic power they for many huncbed years exercised over the minds of men, was now to crumble gradually to the dust, without any hope of future resuscitation.

ii2

244 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

CHAPTETl XXVII.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL DISQUISITIONS OF THE ANCIENT FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

It is necessary we should fall back a little upon the regular course of time, and notice at some length the labours of the first promulgators of Christianity in the field of mental philosophy. These labours constitute an important epoch in the history of the human mind.

The establishment of the Christian dispensation must always be considered the most important and interesting event in the history of the philosophy of human nature in all its departments. Science no longer stood alone, upon its own abstract prin- ciples and merits, as an intellectual exercise ; but all its doctrines were, in the future ages of the world, to be discussed in reference to the great truths revealed to mankind in the Holy Scriptures. Heligion and Philosophy, it is true, had to wage many bitter and protracted conflicts; they had both to undergo a most rigid scrutiny before the tribunal of human reason ; they were frequently placed, by the over-heated zeal and mistaken views

DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 245

of tlieir respective advocates, in direct opposition to one another; but still we find, that as time rolled on, their points of difference became gra- dually less, and both seemed calculated to throw additional light upon, and to give natural suj^port to, each other.

And this was nothing but a natural consequence from the constituted order of things. Eevealed religion did not profess to make man an entirely new creature ; to give him a new body and a new mind, endowed with various faculties wliich were never before recognized in the human species. No! it only assumed to direct his ordinary bodily and mental fimctions, to objects and pursuits more sublime and important, and which were but dimly, and in many cases not at all, shadowed forth by the mere Kght of natm-e. The relative position, therefore, in which religion and philosophy stood to- wards each other, was a natural position. Philoso- phy professed to investigate all those powers of body and mind which distinguish our species from the inferior creation ; and to unfold the laws wliich go- vern their mutual dependencies and relationships. The heathen philosophers had to labour in the same vineyard as the professors of Christianity. That both parties should form different opinions as to the value of their own exertions and the merits of theii" respective modes of cultm-e, is quite natural. Revealed religion was not a mere simple fact, or mental conception, or intimation from heaven; but it appealed to human reason, based itself upon prin- ciples, laid do\^Ti abstract propositions, and openly

246 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

clialleno:ecl the liuman race to their discussion. It did not set itself in opposition to human learning, bnt only declared that that was insufficient of itself to produce certain results, and guide to certain ends.

These general remarks will be fully borne out, by a brief summary of the philosophy of the an- cient Pathers of the Church, relative to man's moral and mental natures, and to those opinions and principles connected with the important doc- trines of natural and revealed religion. It cannot fail to prove extremely interesting to all reflective minds, to have laid before them an intellectual chart of the opinions of these distinguished men on points of faith and speculation, which must al- ways, as long as the world lasts, exercise a very powerful influence over the minds of the general mass of manldnd.

Here we may briefly notice, in passing, that many distinguished writers have entertained a very low estimate of the opinions of the Eathers, and have upbraided them with numerous and palpable contradictions. It must be admitted there is some truth for these accusations. But to form a just estimate of the Pathers, we ought always to keep before us their exact position relative to religious doctrines and other opinions connected with sub- jects closely allied to them. We know that many of the Pathers had been either educated in Pagan systems, or were more or less brought into close fellowship with them, in their daily commimications with those around them. This circumstance must have exerted a powerful influence over the every-

DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 247

day current of their thoughts and opinions. They would daily meet ^dth men who had to be converted through a formal refutation of these false systems ; and this could only be done by means of an accurate acquaintance with them, and an effort on the part of religious teachers to accommodate their owti doc- trines to the minds of their pupils. There would always be going on a sort of compromise of prin- ciples and opinions, with a view of obtaining a hold of the minds of men, and subjecting them to a peaceable course of instruction and con^dction. Teachers would occasionally diverge a little to gain a victory over the stubborn and deep-rooted pre- judices of a convert. This would be done with the best intentions, and frequently with the most happy effect. Many of the Pathers went from country to country, from district to district, and from town town to, making converts, and imparting instruc- tion as they well could. And it is quite ob^dous that their public addresses must have varied con- siderably from each other, on account of the diver- sity of heathen notions, rites, and ceremonies, enter- tained and practised by their hearers. If therefore these addresses were afterwards published, it is quite a thing to be expected that considerable dis- crepancies would be apparent upon the face of them ; not springing from any defection of doctrinal purity, or from the lack of soim.d knowledge, but from casual and incidental cu'cumstances. This would naturally, in after times, give rise to observation and comment, and a difference of opinion would

248 DISQUISITIONS or the tathers.

thus be formed. A Pather would appear under the disadvantage of self-contradiction, and inconsistency of statement, and thus his authority and influence would become weakened from no justifiable cause whatever.

Justin Martyk. 99 a. d.

Justin Martyr was one of the early Pathers of the Church who successfully cultivated philosophy with a view of extending and illustrating the Chris- tian system. He had been educated in foreign schools of learning, and, for a considerable period of his life, had followed the heathen modes of wor- ship. He especially studied the doctrines of Aris- totle, Plato, and Pythagoras, and was minutely acquainted with all the various divisions and mo- difications of these different schools of philosophy. After his conversion to Christianity, he still con- tinued to cultivate profane learning ; and his re- marks upon the use of speculative doctrines are admirable. He says, " Philosophy is a very noble thing, and very agreeable to God, since it leads us to Him ; and truly happy are those who avail them- selves of such an aid. Though the doctrines of Plato, and the Stoics, as well as the writings of historians and poets, are not in strict conformity with the Gospel, yet they do, nevertheless, bear a certain relationship to it ; and what good and just things have been here said, are calculated to ad- vance Christianity. The writings which existed

JUSTIN MARTYR — TATIAN. 249

previous to the Gospel gave us a glimpse of those great truths which it has revealed ; and have vastly aided the Divine reason wliicli is implanted in us from our hirth. This reason is the germ or seed which Christianity is to fructify."

Again, he says, " Socrates exhorted men to raise themselves above mythological fables, and to search again for the unknown God, whose existence it was reserved for the Gospel alone fidly to demonstrate." " The true philosopher is neither a Platonist, Pe- ripatetic, nor a Stoic, nor a Pythagorean. If he belongs to any of these sects, he has substituted human authoritv for reason."

It is mentioned by Eusebius that St. Justin had written a work upon the nature of the human soul, in Avhich he had unfolded the various opinions which the Pagans held of this subject ; and that he intended to write another Treatise, to expose the fallacy of these opinions, and also to show what were his own notions on this important doctrine. None of these works, however, have descended down to our times.*

Tatian. 170 A. D.

Tatian, who was St. Justin's disciple, paid great attention to mental philosophy in all its branches. He had travelled a great deal, and visited many eminent seats of learning, and possessed a very ac- curate knowledge of aU the subtile and distinguished

Apologia. Sect. 13. 15. 46. Benedictine Eilition.

250 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

controversies of his clay. He maintains that there are in man two distinct mental principles. " The one is the soul, the other is superior to the soul ; it is the understanding, the image of God. The soul in itself is full of darkness ; alone it is sub- jected to matter, and is confounded with it ; and it is not simple but compound ; the mind or under- standing uniting itself with it, gives light, power, and life to it. It elevates and purifies it. This mind is the di^dne reason, or Logos. It is not communicated to all, hut only to those who live in accordance with the dictates of justice and wisdom. The soul, being an emanation from the Deity, is light ; it only becomes obscured by its connection with matter."

The peculiar philosophical opinions of Tatian are expounded in his Gratia ad Grcecos, the only ge- nuine treatise we have of this waiter. In this apologetical work we find that the author was deeply skilled in Oriental systems ; for the general tone of all his speculations on mind and matter bears a great resemblance to those opinions pro- mulgated in the early days of the Alexandrian

Academv^

Tatian considered that matter was the som-ce of all imperfection and evil. In this respect he fol- lows Plato. This opinion had probably led him to the Gnostic idea that our Saviour had no real body.*

* See the Oxford Edition of the " Oratio." 1700.

ST. ATHENAGORAS. 251

St. Athekagoras. 172 a. d.

The attachment of St. Athenagoras to specula- tive learning is well known. Even after he had been converted from Paganism to Christianity, he still wore the costmne used in the East in his o^vn day by the studious and philosophic. In his Apology, addressed to the Emperor, Marcus Aure- lius, in the year 176, he enters very fully into se- veral speculative theories, and compares them with the general principles of the Christian faith. In the writings of the poets and historians he found the doctrine of the unity of the Deity recognised, and several other important truths, which were more fully and clearly revealed in the Gospel. His grand aim was to reconcile the Christian creed with the doctrines of the founder of the Academy. " Plato," says he, " contemplated, with a lofty stretch of thought, that eternal intelligence and Divinity which reason alone can conceive; that Being who is the only true one, who is unchange- able, full of goodness and truth. He saw in Him infinite power, that glorious Source of all perfec- tion, that celestial Uuler, the universal Cause which is every way present. The Idea is the first crea- tion of the celestial Ruler; it is the type of all creation. This type was necessary to shapeless matter, to that nature which invoked and oflTered itself to it, and which was again plimged into con- fusion and chaos to receive that consolidation of parts, and form and beauty, Avhich we now behold.

252 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

Though this faculty of reason be the same in all men, yet it takes different directions, elevating some to sublime conceptions, to heavenly things, and to the great Author of all ; while on the other hand the same reason produces worldly and gro- velling pursuits, vain imaginations, and the sug- gestions of evil spii'its. AVhile the soul is soft and flexible, and has not embraced sound princij)les, nor contemplated the truth, nor carried its thought up to the great Creator of the universe, it is sus- ceptible of false opinions, and of the influence of malicious spirits, thirsting for the blood of their victims, and filling their imaginations with delu- sions, from which spring all kinds of idolatry and superstitions."*

St. Theophilus. 172 a. d.

St. Theophilus was one of the Alexandrian Fa- thers, and manifested a passionate attachment to the philosophy of Plato. He became bishop of Aiitioch in 170, and governed his diocese for thir- teen years with great zeal and prudence. He was a zealous disputer with heretics, and it is in these controversial writings that we find the philosophical opinions which he seems to have entertained. He had evidently studied deeply both Aristotle and Plato ; for the latter of whom, as just stated, he shows a decided preference. St. Theophilus points out to his opponents the great defects in all liea-

* Legatio pro Lhristianis. Sect. 5. G. 8. 15.

ST. PANTiENUS— ORIGEN. 253

then speculations, and how much superior the phi- losophy of Christianity was, to anything which mortal man had been able to discover.

St. Theophilus has furnished us with an historical chronology from the creation of the world to his own time ; and he endeavours to prove that the history of Moses is the most ancient and authentic account we have of the early days of the hmnan race.*

St. Pant.enijs. 180 a. d.

The first school opened at Alexandria for the in- struction of Christians in philosophy, was by St. Pantsenus. He belonged to the sect of the Stoics, and on account of his great knowledge and talent, was appointed to carry the Gospel into India, and to convert the Brahmins from their idolatry. He was well acquainted with the works of Aristotle and Plato; but manifested a decided preference for the philosophy of the Stoics. He thought the system of the latter, considered in relation to prac- tical life, more in accordance with the important practical precepts of the Christian faith.*

Origen. 185 A. D.

The famous Origen, a disciple of St. Clement's, was a prodigy of learning and science. Prom the

* See Gesner's Edition of the works of St. Theojihilus. Zurich, 1546 ; also Du Pin, Lardner, Mosheim, and Cave.

t See Cave, Lardner, Milner, Du Pin, and Mosheim.

254 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

accounts of Eiisebius, he had studied almost every system of speculation, and made himself completely master of the whole circle of knowledge in his own times. There was nothing too varied or profound for the versatility and grasp of his mind. His wonder- ful activity and zeal showed he possessed an intel- lect susceptible of great mental labour and appli- cation. He was intimately skilled in the doctrines of the Stoics, the Epicureans, the Platonists, and the Pythagoreans ; and also with the traditionary knowledge of the Hebrews as well as all the heathen systems of speculation celebrated in his own day. He divided ail human science into three kinds'; namely, first, profane wisdom, which com- prehended natural philosophy, mathematics, and what came under the denomination at that time of the fine arts, as poetry, rhetoric, grammar, music, and medicine ; secondly, the tvlsdom of the p>rinces of this icorld, which embraced all the mysteries and speculative theories of the Egyptians, the Chal- deans, and the Brahmins ; and thirdly, that wisdom which was especially revealed to man in the Holy Scriptures.

Origen seems to have entertained the opinion of the alisolute reality of all moral distinctions. He remarks that, " if the reality of the Gospel is in accordance with that of the Greeks, it is because the notions of moral rectitude are destined to regu- late human life, and are engraved on the soul of man by the finger of the Deity himself, in the same manner as He has recorded theiu upon the minds of the prophets and of our Lord and Saviour."

ST. CLEMENT. 255

This clistingiiislied Father of the Church believed in the fact, that all the Grecian pliilosophy had been originally derived from the Hebrew nation. His notion of the immortality of the soul, was grounded on the supposition of its pre-existence in a former more elevated sphere ; and that when it took up its abode in a material body, it still had the faculty of recognising a Divine Being, of obeying his laws, and of preparing itself for a life of full en- joyment with him for ever. This notion was com- mon both to the Gnostics and to the new Pla- tonists.*

St. Clement. 218. a. d.

We come now to St. Clement of Alexandria, who was the shining light and glory of his age. His acquisitions and labours were prodigious. He knew all the learning of the Greeks, the Sp'ians, the Egyptians, and the Hebrews ; and had visited every seminary of knowledge wliich was of any note in his own day. He viewed the philosophy of human nature throuo^h a candid and enlis-htened medium ; and he embraced every opportunity of shelving how nearly, on many points, the princijiles enforced by the ancient philosophers were allied to those laid down in the Sacred Scriptures. He contended it was a most mistaken, as well as a mischievous, opinion, that Christianity opposed itseK to the cultivation of himian knowledge. On the contrary, he zealously and eloquently contended

* Seethe Works of Origen by the Benedictines. Paris, 1783.

256 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHEKS.

that it was only by tlie cultivation of science and useful information, that revealed truth could either he promulgated or understood.

St. Clement openly declared himself favourable to the Greek philosophy, even in spite of the opinions of some of his brethren, who were hostile to the speculative system of this country. He says, " The Grecian philosophy forms the man to virtue, and teaches him, also, that it proceeds from God himself. Those, then, who would judge harshly of the philosophy of Greece, ought to be prepared to prove their statements ; and in order to enable them to do this, they must study and examine it. If it does not rest on a perfectly solid foimdation ; if it does not always conduct to satisfactory con- clusions ; it is ornamental at least, and exercises the student in detecting truth from falsehood. As the labourer first waters the bosom of the earth, before he commits the seed to it ; in like manner when we extract out of the writings of the Greeks what we can advantageously borrow from them, we are watering the earth, that the sun may exercise his influence in giving vitality to the intellectual seed. I do not give the name of philo- sophy to the particular doctrines of the Portico nor of Epicurus, nor of Plato, nor of Aristotle, but to what appertains to justice and sound religion in all these diflerent schools. I give the name of philosophy to that which is really excellent in all their doctrines ; and above all to that of Socrates, such as Plato describes him to have been. The opinions of Plato upon ideas, is the true Christian and orthodox philosophy. Those intellectual lights

HERMAS TERTULLIAN, &C. 257

amongst the Greeks have heen communicated by- God himself. But they have not been charmed by their power, but have mingled them with human errors and delusions."*

St. Clement frequently remarks that true wis- dom or philosophy is the right understanding of human and divine things; and severely rebukes those who fall into habits of snarling disputation or captious scepticism. He however strenuously recommended fixed rules of reasoning, and parti- cularly the Greek system of dialectics. On this subject he remarks, that " Dialectics form a sort of rampart for the protection of truth against the assaults of sophistry. The cause of all error and false judgment is, that we cannot detect the reasons on which the accordance or differences of things amongst themselves are founded ; and thus we erroneously classify things together which ought to be separated. It becomes necessary, then, to apply the art of dialectics, as a useful in- strument to conduct us to truth, to enable us to demonstrate it to others, and to protect and defend it from captious argumentations. But we must guard against the abuse of this art."t

Hermas — Tertullian — Arnobius — Iren^us —

LACTANTirS, &C.

We must here make an allusion to several of the

* Stromal . lib. 1. Ed. Paris, 1641.

t See the Oxford Edition of the Works of St. Clement, 1/15; also Du Pin, Blount's Censura, Fabricius, Mosheim, Lardner, &c.

258 DISQTJISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

learned Fathers, who entertained strong prejudices against all kinds of profane philosophy whatever. They were led to form notions of its dangerous ten- dency to revealed religion, from the many examples of eminent and learned individuals forming semi- naries of learning under the auspices of revealed religion, and imparting to numerous classes of per- sons, who afterwards took an active part in ec- clesiastical affairs, those peculiar doctrines which emanated from these different schools of instruction. These philosophical establishments became on many occasions, and from the sheer force of particular circumstances, formidable instruments in the hands of zealous sects and parties ; and hence arose certain feelings of jealousy against both them and theu' principal professors. Hermas, Tertullian, Arno- bius, Irenaeus, and Lactantius, were the leading Fathers of the Church, who, with various modifica- tions, adopted these opinions as to the general tendency of human learning in matters of rehgion. Hermas wrote a treatise to refute the Pagan philosophers, which contains a considerable portion of the Grecian metaphysics. Irenseus waged war most zealously against all the religious heresies of his own times ; and attributed them to the pesti- lential influence of the Gnostic system, Tertullian entertained a determined hostility to the doctrines of Plato, which he regarded as the prolific source of all the heresies which harassed the Christian Church. " Heresies," says he, " are the individual opinions of men and demons. They have their source in that insatiable curiosity for human science

HERMAS — ^Tertullian, &c. 259

which our Lord himself severely reprobated, while he promulgated those views which appeared fool- ishness in the eyes of the world. This modern phi- losophy presumptuously attempts to interpret the Divine nature, to mislead unwary spirits." Of the Academicians, TertuUian says, "Who art thou, im- pudent Academician ? You overturn every con- dition of life; you derange the whole order of nature ; you remove a divine superintending Pro- vidence. It must have given, according to your doctrine, the senses to men as the most fallacious organs for comprehending and admiring His stu- pendous and marvellous works. Is not every thing under the control of the senses ? Is it not through their ministration, that all men receive that subordinate instruction which embraces the sciences, the common affairs of society, the relations of things, the joys, the sorrows, the hopes, the fears, the wants, and every thing which ornaments human life ; since it is only by these same identical senses, that man can be distinguished as a rational crea- ture, capable of knowledge, even to commence Academician himself."*

Arnobius, an African by birth, and, during a part of his life, a zealous advocate for Paganism, expres- sed, after his conversion to the Christian faith, his decided hostility to all kinds of philosophy. The science of Logic fell especially under his displeasure. He maintained that with all its display of metho- dical arrangement and demonstrative conclusions.

* Tertullian, De Prsescript. cap. 7-

s 2

260 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

it was but a very inefficient instrument for guiding us to truth.* Lactantius followed in liis wake with the same class of opinions. This venerable Father entered very fully into all the heathen sys- tems, with a design to collect together, and place in one point of view, the numerous contradictions and discrepancies to be found in these various spe- culative theories. By this plan he made a consi- derable display in favour of liis own peculiar opi- nions. On the nature and use of human knowledge generally, the following quotations will furnish us with his views; and they embody, in point of prin- ciple, the real essence of his writings on this siibject. " Science," says he, " cannot be derived from hu- man intelligence, nor could it be unfolded by the mere effort of thought. It is the prerogative of the Deity himself, and not that of man to possess sci- ence properly so called. Man can only receive that knowled2:e which comes from without. This is the reason why the Di\ine Mind has given him organs of sensation, through which knowledge is conveyed to the soul." " The human soul is shut out in the obscure abode in the body, from the means of ac- quiring knowledge. Thus ignorance is the lot of humanity, as wisdom is the inherent attribute of the Deity. We need, then, a light to dissipate the dark clouds which envelope human thought. The Deity is this light of the human soul ; and he who receives it in his heart, will immediately discover the mysteries of truth ; but on the other hand, he

* TertuUian, De Prfescript. lib. 2. cap. 9.

ANATOLIUS — ST. AUGUSTINE. 261

who is deprived of this celestial light, must always remain full of error."

On the nature and offices of Logic, Lanctantius has the following remarks. " That portion of phi- losophy which we call Logic, is that which contains dialectics, and the rules of reasoning. The Divine reason has no need of any such assistance, it re- sides not in forms of words but in the heart, and it is of little moment what language we employ ; for it is things we seek, and not words."*

■■o'-

Anatolius. 226 a. d.

This Christian writer was a public teacher at Alexandria, and obtained great celebrity from his extensive knowledge in philosophical systems. He studied Aristotle profoundly, and endeavoured to amalgamate his opinions with those of other Gre- cian and heathen speculations. It is however unknown whether he succeeded in this enterprise, as none of his commentaries upon Aristotle have sm-vived to oiu' times. He was a profound mathe- matician, and made an attempt to explain subjects of mental pliilosophy upon mathematical prin- ciples, f

St. Augustine. 354 a. d. St. Augustine comes next in order, as a disciple

* De Ira Dei, cap. 1. ; Divin. Inst. lib. 2. cap. 3. ; lib. 3. cap. 16. t See the fragments of Anatolius' Philosophy in Fabricius, BibK. Grec, Vol. 2. pp. 274—277.

262 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

of Plato. He had at first been attaclied to the Aristotelian theory, but it did not correspond with his wishes, and he exchanged it for the doctrines of Plato; these were more in accordance with the nature of liis mind, being a man of a lively and active imagination, and warm feelings.

We shall only make a few brief remarks on, and quotations from, St. Augustine's work ^'Against the Academicians^^ which is the most important connected with the history of philosophy. He commences the work by urging the most powerful inducements to study philosophy, and to excite in the student's bosom an ardent love of truth. Then follow copious outlines of the heathen notions on speculative topics, showing theu' various changes and modifications during many centuries. These he examines and discusses with great care, and minuteness. The opinion entertained by the Aca- demicians, that happiness consisted in seeking after truth, he attempts to refute ; and endeavours to establish the opposite theory, that happiness arises from the possession of truth itself. In the third book, he attempts to define the indefinable notion which the Academicians entertained about probabi- lity and resemblance ; and he finishes by refusing his assent to the philosophy of the Academy, which maintained that the human mind had not the power of seizing hold of real truth.

This work of Agustine's is written in the form of dialogue, and is exceedingly interesting. The lead- ing idea throughout the whole treatise is, that the Academicians have been obliged, in spite of them-

ST. AUGUSTINE. 263

selves, to admit the existence of sucli a thing as truth; which showed, at once, that their whole reasoning rested upon a sceptical foundation.

In St. Augustine's work " On Order,'' he has developed that -argument for a superintending Providence, which has in recent times been so ad- mirably handled by many learned and able men. He says, "Order is wisdom and perfection; disorder is evil. Order is that law by which the Almighty executes all which he had ordained. The wisdom embodied in this order is united to the Deity, be- cause that he conceives himself every thing of which He is the source."

This venerable Father, in his soliloquies, attempts to furnish us with the distinctive characters of truth and falsehood. "Truth," says he, "is supe- rior to right ; it is eternal and immutable. There is truth in God, and in the human mind. Trutfi is the source of all intelligence or wisdom."

In St. Augustine's book " On the Quantity of the Soul," that is, on its power or nature, he has given us a full discussion of every thing which the light of nature and revelation estabhshes respecting our spiritual frame. He treats of the origin of the soul, of its nature, what are its faculties or powers, why it was placed in the body, what is its condition while it is placed here, and what will be its condi- tion in a future life. The soul is a substance en- dowed with reason, and placed in the body for the purpose of guiding and directing it. " The soul derives its origin from God ; it is simple and im- material; and what proves tliis is, that it can con-

264 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

ceive ideas of abstract quantities and dimensions which are not corporeal ; though it is susceptible of feeling through the agency of the body, it is not extended over the body."

St. Augustine distinguishes the visual perceptions of objects, from the judgments which accompany them. On the subject of sensation generally he has the following remarks — " Sensation is produced from external objects, which act upon the soul. Sensation is not science ; and science itself differs from reason. By reason we seek and develop science, and reasoning is the instrument which con- ducts us to it." Again he remarks, " The exercise of the faculties of the soul may be divided into seven distinct stages. In the first, these powers are manifested in that life or being which belongs to vegetable existence. In the second, these powers give birth to sensation; they move and direct bodies, and form the foundation of animal life. In the third, they rise above the brute creation ; they com- pare material objects with one another ; act upon them ; change their natm'e and appearances : apply them to human wants ; and create all that mul- tiplicity of objects and pursuits, which we deno- minate the arts of life. The fourth stage of these powers of the soul, displays itself in giving birth to a moral world ; enabling us to detach and contem- plate our minds apart from external and sensible things ; and in recognizing the principles of justice and virtue. The fifth period is marked by the soul's reflecting upon its own powers, enjoying it self fully in its own innate liberty and ease. The sixth, or

ST. AUGUSTINE. 265

last stage, is characterised by a kind of sudden bound, by which the soul at once aspires to really superior things ; purified by this long course of j)ro- bation, it steadily dii-ects its eye, with a calm and confident assurance, towards the region of pure and exalted intellect. In fine, intuition, the contem- plation of truth itself, is the last act, the summit of the ladder, the sublime end of all its efforts, and is thus carried to the Great First Cause, to the Supreme Author of all things.

St. Augustine has been accused, in modern times, of a decided leaning to Pantheism ; but this accusation rests upon a very slender fovmdation. The fact is, that the same charge might, with equal justice, be brought against many hundreds of able and orthodox divines, of almost every Christian church, and in every period of ecclesiastical history. Everything depends upon the meaning which is attached to the word Pantheism. It is almost unpos- sible to tie men down to anything likea fixed defi- nition of words of this description ; particularly when employed under the heat and excitement of sectarian controversies.*

There are none of the Fathers of the Church whose lives are so full of interest, relative to spe-

* The following is the passage from St. Augustine, on which this ac- cusation rests. " SubstantiaUter Deus ubique diffusus est. Sed sic est Deus per cuncta diffusus, ut non sit quahtas mundi, sed substantia crea- trix mundi, sine labore regens et sine onere continens mundum. Non tamen per spatia locorum, quasi mole diffusa, ita ut in dimidio mundi corpore sit dimithus, atque ita per totum totus; sed in solo coelo totus, et in sola terra totus, et in ccelo et in terra totus, et nuUo contentus loco, sed in se ipso ubique totus."

266 DISQUISITIONS or the fathers.

dilative opinions, as that of St. Augustine. His mind underwent many changes ; and these changes exercised a powerful influence over his active ener- gies and pursuits.*

Nemesius. 356 a. d.

The writings of Nemesius are well worthy of especial notice at this period of the Christian Church. He was Bishop of Emessa, a city of Phenicia, and wrote a book in the Greek language, in forty-four Chapters, called, " On the Natui^e of Man.^^ This is unquestionably one of the very best productions of Christian pliilosophy of which the early Christian Church can boast. The author combated, with great power and zeal, the doctrine of fatality involved in the system of the Stoics ; and he also showed himself greatly averse to the speculative opinions of the Manicheans. He adopted however the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, which had been revived by Origen, and which was afterwards, in the year 551, condemned at the Council of Constantinople. Nemesius also studied anatomy and physiology; and we find it stated in the Oxford edition of his works, in 1671, that he made important discoveries on the nature and uses of the bile; and that he was well ac-

* See Confessions, lib. 1. 2. 3. 4. 7- 8. 9. The best edition of St. Au- gustine's vvoiks is that published by the BenetUctines at Antwerp, 1703, in 12 vols, folio.

NEMESIUS. 267

quainted with that important fact, the circulation of the blood.

On the nature of the human soul, Nemesius en- tered very fully, and discussed the various opinions which preceding philosophers had expressed on tliis interesting but abstruse subject. He main- tains that the soul is immaterial, and that it is not the result of a peculiar organization of body. " The soul," says he, "is united to the body." Again, " A portion of the faculties of the soul are destined to serve, and another to command. The organs of sense, their movements, and the appetites which belong to them, compose the first class, and reason the second."

Nemesius advances a theory of sensation in which both intellectual and physiological facts are stated with great clearness and effect. He had evidently been a very attentive and discriminating observer of nature. He distinguishes sensations from conclusions of the understanding which ac- company them ; and affirms that all our errors are solely confined to the latter and not to the former. The judgment and the memory are, in his opinion, the two principal faculties which conduct the mind to important abstract truths. He rejected the theory of Porphyry, who maintained that the soul saw every thing through sensation, as through a mir- ror. "The memory," says Nemesius "preserves the perceptions obtained by the senses; and the understanding combines and arranges these mate- rials furnished by the senses and the memory." Again he remarks, " We are conscious of the ex-

268 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

istence of things whicli we have been accustomed to think and judge of; as, for example, reason inti- mates to us the existence of the sea, and the sand on the sea shore ; though we cannot fix or define the limits of the sea, nor number the individual grains of sand. We can conceive the general ideas of the sea and of the sand, but not the individual parts of which they are composed."

To the doctrines of voluntary and involuntary actions, Nemesius had paid considerable attention. He has made many judicious remarks on this ab- struse branch of the philosophy of mind.

St. Gregory. 372 a. d.

St. Gregory, bishop of Nyssa, wrote a work on the immortality of the soul, which has been often highly praised by learned divines since his day. He argued strenuously against the Platonic notion that the soul was composed of many different parts, a sort of little municipality or commonwealth. He allows, however, three distinct parts or principles of the soul, namely, the vegetable life, the sensitive life, and the intellectual life. He also refuted several heretical opinions on tliis subject, which had gained a considerable portion of popularity in the East.

Stnesius. 410 A. D.

The learned Synesius was the ornament and philosopliical light of the age. He was an Afri- can, born at Cyrene of illustrious parents. He

CLAUDIANUS MAMERTUS. 269

studied the sciences with great success ; and hav- ing embraced the doctrines of Aristotle, he gave to that system of philosophy additional charms and interest, by his ingenious illustrations and the fervour of his fancv. His mind was enerrossed with the most lively feelings of philosophical and religious adoration of the works of nature ; and his reflections on the attributes of the Supreme Mind and of the human soul, are at once just and sub- lime.

SjTiesius, after having been for several years an Aristotelian, began to study with great minuteness the pliilosophy of Plato ; and more especially those views of it which were rife in the Alexandrian school. He became, in consequence, more ideal and mystified in his opinions on the nature of a Deity, the human soul, and the intellectual prin- ciple. His orthodoxy in matters of religion was generally questioned. It is certain he entertained doubts on the doctrine of the E/Csurrection.

Clatjdianus MAMEHTrs. 450 a. d.

This Christian writer was a learned Presbvter at Vienna. He was deeply versed in the dialectic system of Aristotle, and displayed great eloquence in his philosophical discourses. His work " On the State of the Soul," is a curious v/ork. It is grounded on the principles of two divisions, the senses and the powers of reflection.*

* Fabricius, Bibli. lat. t. 2, p. 642.

270 DISQUISITIONS OP THE FATHERS.

BOETHIUS. A. D. 470.

Boetliius was famous for his virtues, talents, civil distinctions, and misfortunes. He was born at Home in the year 470 ; and studied philosophy and general learning at Athens. In the year 525 he suffered an icrnominious death, without the forms of law, for an alleged treasonable correspondence.

Boethius studied the doctrines of Aristotle, and made himself completely master of them in all their ramifications. He translated the Categories at Rome, and several other tracts of the Stagirite, and also the Commentaries of Porphyry. But though nominally belonging to the school of Aris- totle, yet in spirit he was a real Platonist. The sublime doctrines of the latter class of philosophers, seemed to have entirely engrossed his mind, and to have led him, in all liis speculations, to give that form and expression to his thoughts, which were widely removed from the dryness and technicality of the AristoteKan theory. He loved to roam amongst the lofty doctrines of the Grecian sages. The stu- pendous operations of nature ; the mysterious union of the soul and body ; the nature and attributes of the Divine Mind ; the immortality of the soul ; and a future state of rewards and punishments ; filled his comprehensive intellect with the most exalted conceptions, calculated to elevate and dignify the human mind, and console and cheer the heart of man. Never was there a genius better fitted, both from its worldly afflictions, and from its own rich

MARTIN CAPELLA — CASSIODORUS. 271

and inexhaustible resources to unfold " Tlie Conso- lations of JPJiilosophfj ; a work which must always remain an imperishable monument to his name, as well as a tender memorial to his virtuous and un- merited suifering.*

Martin Capella. 474 a. d.

Martin Capella, who was an African by bii'th, wrote a book, entitled " Satyricon, or the Me-union of Philosophy loith Mercury.'''' Part relates to my- thology and part to the fine arts. He also wrote on grammar, dialectics, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music. He adopted all the rules and maxims of philosophy taught by Aristotle and the Stoics. His writings are a sort of common gathering of all the opinions and systems which history had handed down, as prevalent at different periods amongst the Greeks and Romans.

Cassiodorus. 480 a. d.

Cassiodorus, who was a contemporary of Boethius, wrote several works on metaphysics and on other kindred branches of knowledge. He was an ardent admirer of Aristotle, and conceived his philosophy to embrace the whole of what mankind could ever know of the laws and principles of the human mind. The works of Cassiodorus formed the text books in the schools in the East, for a considerable period after his death.

* See Fabricius, Bib. Lat.; ami Vies des Saints, Vol. 1. par Baillet.

272 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

Erom the beginning of the fifth to the end of the sixth century, the discussions amongst the learned Eathers were not so detached and independent of each other, as they previously had been. There was more of unity and party, and fewer individual theories struggling for distinction and public favour. Nearly the whole of the writings of the priesthood on philosophy in general, were divided, or rather amalgamated, into two leading divisions ; those which were in favour of the theory of Plato, and those who contended for the supremacy of Aristotle. Under these two banners, the general mass of dis- putants and writers were arrayed, and many were the varied aspects of party success, during this long and conflicting struggle.

There were several distinguished expounders of the leading principles of the Platonic doctrine at this period. In their writings against the Mani- chean heresy, as well as in many other tracts, they showed the harmony which existed between this Grecian system, and the leading principles of na- ture and revealed religion. Their opinions were at once truly enlightened and liberal ; and manifested how carefully they had studied both the philoso- phical tenets of heathenism, and the theological doctrines contained in the Holy Scriptures.

In the 7tli and 8th centuries the two most emi- nent men, in reference to the cultivation of the philo- sophy of human nature, were John the Grammarian and St. John Damascenus. The first composed extensive and erudite commentaries upon the works of Aristotle ; and the second attempted to simplify the Greek philosopher's doctrines, so as to render

ST. JOHN DAMASCENTJS. 273

them more comm.oiily understood. His general re- marks as to the nature of pliilosophy, are very ad- mirable. "Philosophy," says he, "is the science of things which are just what we find them to be. It is divided into two parts, speculative and prac- tical. Speculative philosophy comprehends theo- logy, physiology, and mathematics ; practical phi- losophy comprehends etliics, economics, and poli- tics. Theology has for its object that which is im- material, such as the Deity, angels, and the souls of men. Physiology embraces a knowledge of ma- terial things, as of animals, plants, minerals, &c. Mathematics consist in things which, though not strictly corporeal themselves, have a relation to external bodies, as number, proportions, figures, and the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Dia- lectics, or the art of reasoning, is more an instru- ment of philosophy, than one of its leading divi- sions. It is, from its very nature, a preliminary acquisition. The Sceptics were guilty of self-con- tradiction when they afiirmed that philosophy had no claim to a knowledge of things. There is no- thing more excellent than knoAvledge ; it is the light of an intelligent soul. Seek it, explore for it, by unremitting investigations ; and at the same time consult the works of the ancient heathens, where you will find many important truths, which you must disentangle from the errors with which they are associated."

He has the following observations on method. " There are four dialectic or logical methods. The

274 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

first is the di^dsion wliich separates genus and spe- cies ; the second is the definition which defines the sul)ject by the genus ; the third is analysis, wliich decomposes every part ; and the fourth is demon- stration, which establishes the truth by means of the last term." St. John Damascenus also dis- tinj?uishes analysis into three distinct kinds ; na- tural, logical, and mathematical. The first resolves compound ideas into their simple elements ; the second resolves the syllogism into its different parts ; and the third consists in admitting the cor- rectness of a certain principle, in order to arrive at a knowledge of an important truth.

On the doctrine of Sensation, St. John Damas- cenus maintains that the faculty of sight informs us of the magnitude, position, and distance of objects.

" Imagination," says he, " is a faculty belonging to the irrational di^dsion of the soul, which operates through the organs of sense. TVTien the soul per- ceives external objects by the organs of sense, it forms to itseK an opinion or judgment ; when it knows, by thought, things which appertain to the understanding, it conceives a notion. Such notions cannot proceed from the senses ; they can be ob- tained only by instruction. Memory is the image which has been left by objects offered to the senses, and seized by the action of the soul, or preserved from that which has been perceived through the senses, or the inward process of thought."

DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS. 275

A long darkness in tlie Lower Empire now suc- ceeded to the comparative light which we have just described. Leo, the philosopher, obtained con- siderable reputation in the Byzantine Empire for his various writings. Photius flourished at Con- stantinople, in general philosophy, oratory, and poetry. Leo VI., son of the Emperor Basil, dis- tinguished himself in general literature.

There were a great number of commentators on Aristotle in the latter centuries of theLower Empire. David was an eminent critic and expounder of the pliilosophy of the Stagirite ; Eustratius composed treatises on dialectics and morals. Nicephorus, a learned monk, cultivated general philosophy with divinity. George Pachymera composed an Epitome of the PJdlosophy of Aristotle, and a Compendium of his Logic. Theodoras Metachita stood at the head of the school at Constantinople, for his eloquence and profundity. Magentinus illustrated the doctrines of many of the Pythagorean philosophers. George Cyprius, surnamed Gregory, obtained well merited honours from the patrons of learning in his own day. Michael Psellus cultivated philosophy, me- dicine, and mathematics, and obtained the title of the "Prince of Philosophers." He composed and published an " Exposition of the Chaldean Oracles^'' and a " Treatise on the Faculties of the SoulP

*jt* The following, among many others, are interesting works on the philosophical principles and opinions of the Fathers of the Church. Thomasius, Origin. Hist. Ecclesi. et Phil. Mosheim, De Turbata per Platonicos Recentiores Ecdesia. (This work has occasioned considerable discussion among learned ecclesiastics of modern times ; particularly Baltus and the Benedictines of Saint Maur.) Huet, Origenia. Clerc,

T 2

276 DISQUISITIONS OF THE FATHERS.

Biblioth. Select. Brucker, Hist. Crit. Phil. Carus, L'Etude de I'homme et la Psychologic en particulier. Jean-Baptiste Crispus, De Ethnicis Phi- losophis caute Legendis. Souverain, Le Platonisme Devoile. Baltus, Defense des Saints Peres; Jugemens des Saints Peres sur la Morale de la Philosophic Paiennc, (Strasburg). Barbeyrac, Traite de la Morale des Peres de I'Eglise. StandHn, Progr. de Patrum EcclesifE Doctrina Morali. Eberhard, Spirit of Primitive Christianity, (in German). Roessler, De Originibus Philosophise Ecclcsiasticse. The fourth Volume of the Bibliotheque des Peres de I'Eglise. Tennemann, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophic, the seventh Volume. Cave's Lives of the Fathers, and Ecclesiastical Antiquities. Whiston's Primitive Christianity. Fabricius, Biblioth. Grec. Lardner's Account of the Christian Fathers. Journal des Savans, 1734. Tillemont, Mem. Ecclesi. Gaudentius, Diss, de Compar. Dogm. Orig. cum Dogm. Platonis.

ST. PETER THE ANCHORITE. 277

CHAPTER XXVIII.

■

OBSERVATIONS AND REFLECTIONS, FROM ASCETIC WRITERS, ON MATTERS CONNECTED WITH REA- SONING AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE.

As we are just upon tlie eve of entering into a long night of comparative stillness and unprofit- able discussion, we shall lay before the reader a few scattered fragments, culled from ascetic sources, on matters bearing a. certain relationship to mental studies. These fragments, though very scanty and limited in their range of inquiry, will be found not altogether devoid of interest, considering the pe- riod and the circumstances under which they were written.

St. Peter the Anchorite. 410 a. d. On Simian Wisdom and Learning.

" It has often appeared to me that there are among the learned of this world, and even among some of our ablest divines, many odd and curious notions about the nature of human wisdom and

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learning. I have long come to the conclusion that there is no learning nor wit of men that is not grounded in religion — Kttle that is not decidedly of a religious character ; and my reasons for this opi- nion I shall state to you as briefly as I can.

" Men pride themselves on theii* wisdom in ob- serving the causes of things, and their effects. A physician, for example, is called a learned man in proportion to his knowledge of the cause of human ailments, and the effects that particular drugs have upon them. And, again, a man is called a wise legislator who is acquainted with the causes of so- cial happiness and prosperity, and with the effects which particular measures have upon the welfare of the community. Here causes and effects are the materials of Avisdom. Now I conceive that no man can be intimately conversant about these, make them daily objects of his attention and no- tice, and pride himself on his mode of arranging them in Ms mind, without his thinking often of the First Great Cause, which made and sustains all things. I know well there are thousands of learned men who never directly refer theu" wisdom to the Deity ; but still the thought is in their minds, whether they give formal utterance to it or no. And this is the thing to look at. If there were not indirectly a reference made to this know- ledge of Deity, it is difficult for me to see how there could be anything like wisdom in the world, or why men should pride themselves upon possess- ing it, and demand praise from others for it.

SAINT PETER THE ANCHOUITE. 279

" You have heard me often mention in conversa- tion, that I very much douhted if there were ever such a being as an Atheist; and it is upon the strength of this doubt that I am now offering my opinions. All the philosojjhers I have read of who have been charged with denying the existence of a God, always had a notion of supreme power about them. This notion mav have assumed various forms, but it is always in the mind of man, and influences him without his knowing it. It is never destroyed, and I question much whether it be ever very much weakened. The natural man, it is true, does not know God as we Christians know Him; but he does know Him notwithstanding. We are not in a precise situation to estimate the influence which this primary notion of the Deity may have over the other faculties of the mind, nor over the judgments we form of things. We cannot do this either wiA other people or ourselves. But I hold it evident that the whole frame-work of our nature rests upon it ; and there would be nothing in the miiverse we could call wisdom or learning, unless it were based upon this fundamental principle of theology.

"Learning and wisdom Avould not be placed against each other in the world's estimation, if men would only base their knowledge upon religion. They ought to commence with it, and descend to other branches of information ; and not begin with the latter, with a vicAV of obtaining a know- ledge of the former. This is inverting the natural order of things. Most of the heathens, and even

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some good Patliers of the Church, have maintained that Socrates was the wisest man of ancient times ; and the proof that is adduced for this is, that he connected his knowledge with some definite notions of a God. This has often struck me as a very curi- ous circumstance; hut it is very confirmatory of what I am now contending for. If we couhl make ourselves acquainted with every thing in this world, and yet had no notion of what lay beyond it, what men call wisdom would he hut a poor and miserable thing indeed. And in all the Pagan writers we find that continual references were made to the wisdom, favour, and applause of the gods, when they were intent on doing great things. The Deity must be the fountain of all knowledge and wisdom, and in proportion as men direct their minds to him, they will make real progress in knowledge ; but if they tleglect liim, all they can know is but dross and emptiness."*

St. Alonzo de Vega. 530 a. d.

Nature of Unbelief. " In moving much in the world, in the early part of my life, it has often been my lot to meet with men who refused to give credence to the Gospel ; and the variety of reasons they adduced often at- tracted my notice. But I have almost uniformly found that, at bottom, such men did not approve

* Dies y siete Coloqnios y Discursos Yarios, Salamanca, 1593, Vol. 1. )))). 310 — 314. Flos Sanctorum, Madrid, 1710,

ST. ALONZO DE VEGA. 281

of religion in theii* lives, and this, I conceive, made them averse to its truths. Some exceptions to this rule I have met with ; and when the parties were men of intelligence and learning, I have felt no small degree of interest in discussing points of doctrine with them.

"In all my encounters of this kind, I have noticed that their oT)j actions were much of the same cast as those which the old pliilosophers used to employ in their discussions and wranglings with one another, on the general doctrines of a Deity and a superintending Pro\ddence. The latter, as well as modern douhters, always wanted to know the reasons for things being constituted as they are. Now this is a silly notion, because it is just as pertinent against as for those who use it. It is a two-edged sword. Therefore, whenever I have met with persons who followed this line df argumentation, I have endeavoured to turn their own weapons upon themselves, and this has often made them plead for mercy. I adopted this mode of warfare, from an accident which befel me in one of my travels, and which I shall here relate.

" Going once over one of the most wild and mountainous parts of Spain, I was accompanied by a physician, with whom I had become acquainted in the last town in which I had rested. He was a very intelligent man ; knew Hippocrates and Galen by heart ; was fond of disputation ; but would not listen to my doctrines of religion. We were be- nighted in the midst of one of the mountain passes;

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but, after a good deal of suffering and fatigue, were seen by a shepherd, who took us to his humble dwelling, and succoured us for the night. The badness of the weather prevented us from leaving our quarters the next day. To beguile the hours, my friend, the physician, began to converse with the shepherd, with a view of sounding the depth of his knowledge of sundry matters. The physi- cian found him a keen and witty man by nature. This gave some zest to the conversation. My com- panion attempted to explain several things dis- tinctly connected with his own profession, but the shepherd would not believe his statements, and always met his declarations and reasonings with the inquiry, why such and such a thing was made in this or that particular manner, rather than in some other ? When the physician attempted a solution of any question, the shepherd laughed and shook his head in derision. When the physician affirmed that such and such things were true in phi- losophy, the shepherd denied the truth of the state- ment, and asked, with no small portion of ironical wit, why should the thing be in that way, when another way, apparently much simpler, would have answered the purpose ? I saw my friend was ex- ceedingly annoyed ; but I enjoyed the dispute my- self; for it so happened that when I attempted to unfold any theological principle or doctrine, he dexterously employed the same line of argument against me which the simple and untutored shepherd now used against liimself. The physician was in

ST. ALONZO DE VEGA. 283

the habit of asking me why the Almighty had not made us so as not to have needed the costly sacri- fice of His own Son ? why we could not see the truth of another life in a much clearer light than we do ? why there should l)e any evil at all in the world ? These and many more questions of a simi- lar nature he urged to haflB.e and confute me. Now, I fancied he had thought of this in his conflict with the shepherd, and had felt inward mortification in consequence. Por my part, I felt a secret pleastlre at his discomfiture, and I endeavoured to draw a useful lesson from it. I have found such argu- ments as these used by the shepherd, to question the truth of jDlain prmciples of knowledge, almost universally employed among doubters of the Gospel. When the real nature of these arguments is ex- amined, they will be found a very weak subterfuge for error and delusion."*

On the Immortality of the Soul.

*' All my readuig and reflection have convinced me that man lives after his earthly career ; and my reasons for this opinion are drawn more from human testimony, and the nature of things, than directly from the Scriptures themselves. The opi- nion of another life is universal ; no people are devoid of it. Idolatry of all kinds is a striking manifestation of it. It was the creed of the Egyp- tians, and Chaldeans, and Persians, and Greeks,

* Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 1564. Vol. 1 pp. 200. 202.

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and Romans, and Jews, and is interwoven with all Pagan rites and ceremonies."

" Socrates says, ' I hope there will be something after death, and that the future life will he better for vii'tuous men than for the wicked.' Plato, in his letters, remarks, ' That we ought to assent to the ancient and sacred opinion, that the soul of man is immortal ; and that after this life it will be judged and punished severely.' Aristotle spoke of the happiness of a future state as an opinion of very great antiquity, even in his day. Cicero says ' that the immortality of tlie soul has been adopted and defended by the most distinguished men.' And a like opinion may be found in Homer, Thales, Py- thagoras, and Zeno."*

Pelagius. 768 a. d.

Pelagius was born in some part of Sj^-ia, but the exact place is not known. The events of his life are but briefly related by his Spanish bio- graphers.

It would appear that this recluse was born of rich and influential parents, who gave him a very learned education. He was employed, in the early part of his life, in the service of Prince Abdalrah- man, who, in 750, at the revolution of the Caliphate at Damascus, having fled from the massacre of his family, came into Spain, and fixed liis residence at

* Los Padres del Disierto, Vol. 1. p. 250.

PELAGITJS. 285

Cordova. Here he found an independent kingdom, where the arts and sciences were introduced and cultivated with assiduity, during a period when most other kingdoms of Europe were involved in heathen darkness, barbarity, and ignorance. *

Pelagius, for several years after the establishment of Prince Abdalrahman in Spain, laboured with uncommon zeal and effect in promoting a know- ledge of all kinds of science, and a love of general literature. In this laudable undertaking he met with every degree of encouragement from his mu- nificent and intelligent patron, who kept him about his own person, and consulted him in every under- taking for the welfare of his kingdom.

At the age of fifty-three he was tiredof all public life, and determined to withdraw into solitude to devote himself exclusively to the perusal of the Holy Scriptures, to which he thought he had not paid so much attention as he ought. This resolve gave Prince Abdalrahman great pain. He used every art of persuasion to induce Pelagius to change his mind, but all to no purpose.

He sought out one of the most barren and deso- late places in the country, where to fix his dwelling place, wliich was a cave hewn out of a soKd rock. Here he lived upon the wild fruits of the earth, and drank nothino^ stronsrer than water. In the heat of summer he had a kind of cradle erected upon a lofty tree which over-hung his cell, wherein he slept during the night. His mental occupations were the reading of the Scriptures, and the study of

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some of tlie most distinguished of the Grecian and Roman philosophers, of whose writings he was passionately fond.

It is related that once in every year he paid a -v^sit to the Prince, his kind patron, who was always delighted to see and converse with him. It is not known in what year he died, but his age is stated to he eighty-two. He was buried with great pomp, and many thousands of persons, from aU parts of the country, came to pay their respects to the ashes of this singular and talented man.

His literary remains are under the head of "Prag- ments," from which the following extracts are made. His knowledge of philosophy is singularly great for the time in wliich he lived.

On matters relating to Knowledge in general^ and Reasoning .

The human mind is divided into two faculties, viz. the judgment, and the memory. Philosophy is of use to inform and rectify the mind ; but it will be necessary to give a definition of the word philosophy, and to show whence it had its origin. The ancients who employed their time in the search of knowledge were called Sophoi, l3efore Pythagoras existed, who, out of an air of modesty, refused the name, as being proper to immortal gods only ; in- stead of which, he assumed the name of philosopher, and which, since his time, has been attributed to the former characters, and hence arose this desig- nation.

PELAGIUS. 287

Vulgar knowledge is that by which we know only the bare existence of things, without being able to give reasons why they are so and so. Solid know- ledge is that of which we know the causes and effects ; as that the sun melts snow, and the frost , congeals water.

Aristotle divided his works into two kinds, exo- terica and acroamatica ; the former he wrote for the vulgar, without giving any reason for what he affirmed — as, God was to be worshipped, or the soul was immortal, which men were to believe upon his word. The latter he taught his disciples, to whom he proved every thing he said with the strongest arguments he could advance.

Prom hence may be drawn the following four corollaries : —

First — Vtilgar knowledge is that which we wholly acquire by the senses, and is the foundation of all solid knowledge ; for we must know a thing is so, before we can offer a reason for it. Vulgar know- ledge is the least degree of knowledge we can conceive.

Second — Solid knowledge does not depend so ex- clusively upon our senses, but upon right reason ; that is, by deducing some truths from others by a necessary conclusion. But there are some parts of learning which cannot be called philosophy ; such as mathematical arts ; and even theology, because acquired by revelation. As to mathematical arts, though they be deduced from some principles of philosophy, yet it commonly happens that the arts

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are themselves illustrated by an inquiry into the nature of things, and by practice and experience. It may be said, since right reason is the faculty of deducing some truths from others, how comes it to pass that we embrace false opinions ? We answer, by an unavoidable mistake, or erroneous judgment, from whence many errors proceed. But a philoso- pher ought not to receive any doctrine but what can be deduced from seK-evident truths, principles, and axioms. On the other hand, there are some doctrines which cannot be demonstrated by axioms and definitions ; in that respect they have recourse to probability and analogy.

Philosophy is divided by some writers on meta- physics into subjective and objective.

Pirst — Objective is a system or collection of so many dogmas or opinions.

Second— Subjective is a faculty, or a certain habit of deducing some truths from others. If we understand philosophy in the second sense, viz. subjectively, sceptics may be recorded among phi- losophers, as being always searcliing after truth, but never coming to a resolution on the certainty of any thing. But if we place philosophy in the for- mer, (where we may with more propriety,) they have no claim to be classed with philosophers.

Philosophy by some is divided into true and false.

True philosophy is that which is founded upon right reason. Pliilosophy does not deserve the name of false, because there is no such thing. Phi-

PELAGIUS. 289

losopliy is by others called eclectic ; this name was given to those who, out of doctrines and opinions which they had heard or read, chose what they thought l)est, and most agreeable to truth and reason.

The objects of philosophy are truth and goodness ; and the end of it, the true happiness of mankind.

Philosophy is again divided into instrimie)ital, theoretical, and practical. The first part of philo- sophy is logic, which is instrumental, or, as Aristotle called it, organon, a machine, because it is to the mind what an instrument is to the body. I cannot cleave a piece of wood with my hand, but easily with an axe ; so logic affords proper help and as- sistance to the mind for investigating truth, and distinguishing it from falsehood.

But it is necessary to give the derivation , of the word logic. It comes from the word logos, i. e. sermo, or ratio ; and it is very probable it comes from logos in the last sense, because it is the art of reasoning. Though some who occupy themselves in trifling speculations, call it sermo, because, say they, thoughts are the internal speeches of mind. The object of logic is truth in general ; and the end of it, the investigating of truth, and com- municating it to others.

Logic may be defined the science for discovering and propagating truth. A science is any part of learning which depends upon seK-evident truths or undoubted principles. Hence logic may justly be termed a science, because it is founded upon axioms or self-evident principles. Truth is, as it were, hid- * u

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den in a pit, and logic is the ladder by wliicli we may descend to searcli for it. Truth is Ijlended with falsehood, and therefore logic is rendered more necessary, which teaches the method of in- vestigating truth.

Logic is conversant about three things : —

Pirst — The nature of the human understanding.

Second — The nature of truth.

Third — The method of investigating truth and communicating it to others.

The nature of the human understanding, which is divided into two principal faculties, the under- standing and the will. The understanding is chiefly conversant about truth ; the will, about goodness.

In the understanding mind there are certain ideas which experience tells us are infinite in their num- ber. Plato, and the philosophers of his time, were of opinion, that these ideas were stamped or im- printed iipon the mind of man from its first forma- tion, ])y the Author of nature ; and these were called innate truths or ideas.

The idea we have of immaterial things comes from the inward man; that is, by reflecting on what passes in the human mind. Hence some are to be found fault with in saying we have our ideas of immaterial things from material things, as the passions of hope and fear, joy, anger, &c. These could never be acquired by material objects. Thus, suppose a man void of any of the passions, as for example, anger ; he could never form an idea of it from merely seeing a man in a rage, with his countenance changed, and speaking loudly; but

PELAGIUS. 291

tliat which gives him an idea of it, is by reflecting on what passed in his o\Yn mind when he was affected with this passion ; for, until he feel it himself, he can never have a just idea of it. ^^Tien the mind is furnished with a considerable num- ber of ideas, the first thing which occupies it is, the comparing two of them together, to see whether they be equal or unequal, whether they agree or disagree ; as when we see a child that knows the difference between a book and a leaf of paper, by lifting and comparing them together. But when the objects cannot be removed and applied to one another, as two buildings, we must have recourse to some intermediate measure, as a rope, yard, &c., and measure the one, and then the other, and see whether they agree or disagree.

There are three acts of the mind, which are called perception, judgment, and reasoning. First, Per- ception is that which we barely perceive, without passing any judgment upon it, as the fire, a house, the sun, moon, or stars, &c. This is called percep- tion, and sometimes apprehension. Second, Judg- ment is the comparing of two ideas together, as, I have an idea of Grod, and another of justice, and can judge that God is just, for I see that these ideas agree. Third, E;easoning is the third act of the mind : it takes place when two thmgs cannot be afiirmed to agree or disagree without the help of some intermediate idea, as for example, I want to compare my soul with matter. I cannot do it immediately, but I find out an intermediate idea, a middle term, which is tJiinhing. I first compare

u 2

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tliinldng with matter, and I find it does not agree with it, then I conclude that my soul is not matter. If we were only endued with these three faculties, all our knowledge would be very confined, and would depend upon things present ; for example, if I were shut up in a room tallciug with a man, then all my knowledge would he confined mthin these walls ; but the Author of Nature hath endowed us with an act of the mind called the imagination, whereby we can excite the ideas that were formerly in our mind from the world around us : the imagination is the knowledge of things absent as if they were present. I can form an idea of a horse or an ape, though they do not immediately aff'ect my senses : thus the imagination brings into our mind the ideas we formerly had. By the help of the imagination we can excite the ideas of objects, corporeal things, and exert certain faculties about them. I think there are four such faculties, viz. Compounding, Dis- cerning, 'Recalling, and Retaining.

Pirst — Compounding is the combining or gather- ing our ideas into one collection, as the idea of a unit ; and ]3y joining as many ideas to it as make a dozen, or a score, I have as distinct an idea of these numbers as I have of a unit. Wliat would be our condition if we wanted this faculty ? We should then have no idea, for example, of the college, be- cause it consisted of many houses ; but only of our room ; and so of other things which consist of parts.

Second — Discerning, or distinguishing, is the separating our ideas from one another. I have an idea of two men being intimate friends ; I cannot

PELAGIUS. 293

distill guisli tlie one from the other, in their friend- ship.

Third — Recalling is the bringing back into our minds the ideas we formerly had. By this act we remember our former acts. It is commonly called the memory, which is, as it were, the repository of all our ideas.

Pourth — Retaining is the keeping in our mind the idea of an absent corporeal object excited in our mind bv the imas^ination. I have the idea of a triangle, and can retain it in my mind until I have compared all its parts. But it is almost im- possible for one to keep his thoughts for a month or two fixed upon one object, on account of the vast number of ideas that crowd in upon us : no sooner does one disappear than another appears. Hence, this faculty of retaining is so imperfect in some men, that it renders them very unfit for ac- quiring knowledge, because they cannot keep in their minds any thing so long as to examine and consider its properties and qualities.

Thus, then, that faculty which keeps and retains an idea for some time is exceedingly useful to man ; and without which all our ideas would be jumbled together as a chaos.

There are three / other faculties : Comparing^ Naming, and Ranging of oiu' ideas into different classes.

Pirst — Comparing our ideas together; namely, two triangles together to find the difference.

Second — Naming is an act of the mind, by which we express om* ideas by articulate sounds, called

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words, in order to distinguish one thing from another. Words are nothing else but the marks of our thoughts, by which we keep converse, and communicate our knowledge one with another.

Third — Hanging, or reducing our ideas into pro- per classes. To illustrate these, we observe that many things produced by nature have a certain resemblance one with another; as, when we ob- serve a certain rank of beings of an erect form, with their heads set, so as to make them look towards heaven ; these we commonly comprehend under one general class called men : so also as to horses, birds, and fishes. If we had not this faculty we should be obliged to give a name to every individual, which, in the first place, would be impossible, because no man could be endowed with such a memory as to find a name to every grain of sand, or single hair ; and even if we were, it would be idle and superfluous, because by nam- ing the hairs of our head we could not convey any diff^erent idea to ourselves or others. However, there are some classes that occur in common con- versation, of which we are obliged to call every individual thing by a particular name, for distinc- tion sake, in order to excite the same idea which is in the minds of others. Hence, every man is called by a particular name; and it is even the same with horses sometimes. In like manner sportsmen distinguish dogs ; and we call countries and kingdoms by particular names, for no other reason than because they frequently occur in com- mon conversation ; and we thus communicate a dis-

PELAGIUS. 295

tinct idea of them into the minds of others. The shepherd calls his dog by name ; but he need not use this formality to his sheep. But we may pro- ceed further. All those who have life, and are endued with spontaneous motion, we call by the name animal. Yet some who are more speculative have found out a more general name, under which we may comprehend all things which have life, whether rational, sensitive, vegetative, called by the name vivens. Some have gone further, and have comprehended all things material under one name, called substance. But there is another power of the mind wliereby we make one singular idea universal. Every idea as it enters the mind is single, and we make it complex by making that simple idea represent a whole class of things ; as when I have the idea of a book, by abstraction I can make it represent all books, of different sizes. If we had not this act of the imagination, we could not have a general idea, but only l3e conversant about individuals ; as we could not have the idea of a triangle in general, but only of some certain one. Thus it is by the act of compounding we combine our ideas, excited in the mind by the imagination, into one collection ; then by an act Ave can imagine a pole which reached from our eyes to the stars ; and first having a notion of gold, and then of a mount, we can form the idea of a golden mountain, a sea of milk, &c., which are called creatures in the mind^ but not in the nature of things.

Again, ideas which contradict and destroy one another, which neither exist in the mind nor in the

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nature of things, are called nonentia, as a square circle, since the imagination may compound ideas which cannot exist in nature. To prevent being led into errors and mistakes, there is need of the judgment to distinguish these ideas from real ones ; hence it is that he whose judgment predominates is fit for philosophy, the civil laws, &c. ; and he who excels in the acts of the imasrination is best qualified for poetry and oratory ; and he that ex- cels in memory is fit for acquiring the languages. Since the mind of man is endued Tvdth such acts or faculties, how comes it to pass that we often em- brace falsehood and fall into errors ? It has been a question much agitated among philosophers, what is the source and spring of all errors and mistakes P One of the ancient philosophers im- putes it to the depravity of the will ; but others say that it is the limited natui'e of the human mind, and the understanding being so narrowly confined is the source of all errors and mistakes. The prejudices of autliority and 'precipitancy aj;e the chief leadino' causes of error.

First, the prejudice of authority is defined to be the embracing of or rejecting an opinion without thoroughly examining into it, upon the qualifica- tions or endowments of the persons who maintain it, as children are obliged to obey their superiors, parents,' and nurses, and to believe for truth what- ever they say, since they cannot search into the arguments upon which the doctrine is supposed to rest. So when they come to the years of maturity, and are able to converse with their acquaintances,

PELAGIUS. 297

and the doctrines are never contradicted which were tokl them by their nurses, parents, or others, in their tender years, they make such impression upon their minds, that they think them sacred, and a thing unpardonable to part with them as long as they live. Another instance is this ; many follow the opinion of Zeno, who said there was no vacuum. In this country, we believe the contrary. Besides, there is a prejudice in religion, as we see from experience; for almost whatever doctrines prevail in the country where we are brought up, we adhere to without examining them, chiefly be- cause the minister or people around us maintain them.

There are more prejudices, as those of antiquity, honour, fame, and probability ; and there is a pre- judice which is still more ridiculous, as we see most common people believe what theu' rich superiors say, because they are rich, and for no other reason. Thus far concerning the prejudice of authority.

Second. The next grand prejudice is that of 'precipitancy or rashness. It is defined to be a re- jecting or embracing an opinion without acearately considering it, as we see most people are averse to reasoning or entering into a long series of argu- ments whereby they may prove the principle they embrace, and are content with a superficial know- ledge of them ; and their minds are often changed with the books they read, or by the arguments they hear advanced about any subject. Por ex- ample, when they hear the argument raised to prove the immortality of the soul, they easily as-

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sent to it ; and when tliey hear the argument as- serted, to prove the contrary, they as easily embrace it, and alter their opinions as often as they hear different arguments offered.

Under this class may be comprehended that prejudice which is called a spirit of contradiction. We see a great many show their wit and learning in contradicting whatever arguments they hear advanced either on the right or wrong side of the question; and also a great many debates g^rise about the meaning of words in matters of religion.*

On the Thinking Principle of Animals.

It has been often a keenly agitated question whether the lower orders of creation perceive ideas as we do. Some of the ancient philosophers, who abounded in nice distinctions, particularly those who resided at Alexandria, divided souls into three kinds — rational^ sensitive, and vegetative. The first was given to man, the second to animals, and the third to plants.

There were two philosophers who made no small noise in Arabia, about fifty years ago, that maintained that animals were susceptible of sensa- tions from external objects, and, consequently, that they had a sensitive soul, but were deprived of a perceptive one, whereby they are prevented from reflecting upon their own inward sensations, and from comparing two or more ideas together.

* See Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 15G4. 2 A"ol. Art. St. Pelagiiis.

PELAGirs. 299

I have often perused with amusement the treatise on this subject, composed by the good Nemesius, Bishop of Emessa, who was a decided advocate for giving certain animals credit for a great share of artifice and prudent calculation. He cited a variety of instances which had come under his own per- sonal observations, wherein great msdom and fore- thought were clearly manifested in the animal nature. But it must be allowed on all hands, that there is something pre-eminent about man, over all classes of the living creation.*

* See Los Padres del Disierto. Madrid 1564. 2 Vol. Art. St. Pelagius.

300 PUINCIPLE OP AUTHORITY

CHAPTER XXIX.

ON THE PRINCIPLE .OF AUTHORITY, IN MATTERS OF PPIILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY, MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.

In cultivating an acquaintance witli pliilosopliy, it was natural for the Eatliers of the Church to view all its principles through the medium of the doctrines contained in revelation. A rigid exami- nation of every abstract proposition grounded on human nature, would he instituted with a view of ascertaining all its hearings upon vital questions of faith and duty. This practice, so natural to men placed in their situation, would almost insen- sibly suggest rules and maxims of religious autho- rity. Human nature, in its widest range, was the common arena of disputation, both for philosophers and theologians. It was the source from which both drew all their materials, though they received them through different channels. Philosophers spe- culated in the closet ; theologians in society ; the one illustrated their principles by mental abstrac- tions, the other by the every day scenes of life and character. The theologian would, in consequence.

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be powerfully iuclined to appeal to human autho- rity, in support of his general views and abstract principles of human nature. The ordinary modes of thinking and l^eling among mankind would be constantly referred to, and become invested, in his eyes, with an authority in matters of specula- tion, from which there could be no philosophical appeal.

The every-day discharge of the arduous and important duties of the Clergy, would invariably strengthen this principle of authority. A Divine Revelation is of itself an act of authority of the most comprehensive and decided nature. It is opposed to the doctrine of the infallibility of human reason ; it deiines limits to speculative inquiries ; it directs them into particular channels ; and renders them subordinate to certain ulterior purposes and ends. This revelation, therefore, involved the doctrine of authority, in all its fulness and purity, and could not but prove powerfully influential on the minds of those, whose herculean labours were du'ected towards its extensive promulgation among man- kind.

It must have proved, also, not a little influential on the minds of the Eathers, that many of the ancient heathen philosophers, whose writings were famiKar to them, acknowledge the necessity of some divine authority and communication, to direct men to sound and wholesome conclusions on philoso- phical doctrines and systems. The Pathers were acquainted with the declarations, on this point, of

302 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY

Pythagoras,* Socrates, f Plato, J Aristotle, § Hip- pocrates, 1| Cicero,^ Catullus,** and Seneca.ff

Indeed this question of religious authority has always, since the introduction oi Christianity, heen more or less a suhject of discussion ; and has exer- cised over speculative philosophy a much more ex- tensive influence, hoth directly and indirectly, than is commonly imagined. In our o\^ti day, especially in continental countries, it is quite a popular con- troversy ; and it may be considered as a singular thing, in the history of modern speculation, to find some of the most distinguished of the German me- taphysicians maintaining the necessity of a divine revelation to guide mankind in their philosophical inquiries. To hear this from Pichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Herder, whose speculative systems lead, by a short route, to absolute pantheism, must be considered as something both curious and in- structive.

St. Justin, after having alluded to the disputes among philosophers, and the uncertainty of almost every fundamental principle which they have at- tempted to establish, attributes this unsatisfactory state of affairs, to the opinions they entertained as to the infallibility of human reason, and the vain attempt to dispense with instruction. " Quod a peritis dlscere noluerint, sed esse existimaverint

* Deinoph. Lact. Pythagoras. f Memorab. Socrat. 1. 4.

X Phfcdo.'p. 83. § De Alundo. Cap. 4,

II Book. 3. II De Legg. 1. 7- 2. 14.

** Liber 64. Ver. 385 et seq. ft Lpis. JJO.

MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 303

mentis liumanse solertia claram coelestiuni reriim cognitionem assequi posse, cum ue terrestrium. quiclem potuerint." And he concludes T\-ith refer- ring to the doctrines of the ancients, who had faith- fully transmitted the truth to us, which they had originally received from God himself. " Quocirca, ciim veri nihil de E^eligione a doctorihus vestris (Grsecis) prgecipi posse constet, et idoneum satis documentum vobif ignorationis ipsi suae per dissi- dentes inter se factiones exhibuerint, reliquum esse opinor, ut ad majores nostros revertamur, qui et magistros vestros longe tempore anteverterunt, et nihil de suis ipsorum cogitationibus et placitis docuerunt ; minim e ipsi mutuis dissensionibus in- vicem conflictantes, aut alii aliorum dicta evertere in anunum inducentes ; quippe qui omni conten- tionis studio et factionum dissidio liberi, sicuti a Deo acceperunt, ita nobis doctrinam tradidermit."

Hernias descants upon the errors and contradic- tory systems of philosophers ; and contrasts their pretended knowledge, ^^dth the certainty of that which is transmitted to all mankind by tradition. *' Beatus apostolus Paulus, Corinthiis, qui juxta Laconicam Grseciam habitant, scribens, cluu pro- nunciavit sapientiam mundi hujus apud Deimi stultitiam esse, prseter rei yeritatem locutus non est. Videtur enim mihi ab anc^elorum defec- tione principium repetiisse, cur philosophorum decreta inter se neque consentiant neque appro- bentur."

Clement of Alexandria maintains that the first principles of philosophy are obtained by faith, and

304 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHORITY

not by demonstration. " Ostensmn est principil Tiniversorum esse earn, quae fide liabetur, scientiam, non autem demonstrationem." [Stromat. lib. 2.) He says, besides, that common sense should form the basis of all demonstration, and that the human mind, in all its investigations, ought to set out from an immutable principle, which can only be established by faith. " Si ejus quod est certuni et extra controversiam referatur fides ad id quod omnes confitentur, illud est constituendum doc- trinjB principium. ... Si est demonstratio, omnino necesse est prius esse aliquid ex se credibile quod quidem dicitur primum et indemonstrabile. Ad fidem ergo indemonstrabilem reducitur omnis de- monstratio." {Ibid. lib. 8.)

In opposition to the incredulity, that faith is the foundation of all our knowledge and movements, St. Theophilus of Antioch says, " Quid, obsecro, incredulus es ? Non animadvertis actiones omnes antecedere • fidem ? Quis, cedo, agricola metere potest, nisi prius semen credat sulcis ? Quis mare poterit trajicere, nisi prius semetipsum credat navi et gubernatori ? Quis, morbis implicitus, sanitatem recuperare poterit, nisi semetipsum prius credat medico ? Quam artem, quam scientiam quis dis- cere poterit, nisi prius semetipsum tradiderit et credlderit prseceptori ? Si igitur agricola credit telluri, navigaturus navi, infirmus medico, tune refugis temetipsum credere Deo, a quo tot fidei arrhabones accepisti."

Tertullian calls philosophers the 'patriarchs of heretics.

MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 305

Origen proclaims that all human things depend upon faith. Quomodo Deo credere non sit ration! cousentaneum magis, ciim a fide omnia hummia pendeant? {Cont. Celsus, lib. 1.)

Arnohius says, in his work against the Gentiles, that we can explain nothing without faith, which is the foundation of the social and scientific order of things. " Itaque cum nobis intenditis aversionem a religione priorum, causam convenit ut inspiciatis, non factum ; nee quid reliquerimus opponere, sed secuti quid simus potissunum, contueri. Nam si niutare sententiam culpa est ulla vel crimen, et a veteribus institutis in alias res novas voluntatesque migrare, criminatio ista et vos spectat, qui toties vitam consuetudinemque mutastis ; qui in mores alios atque alios ritus, priorum condemnatione transistis."

St. Augustine wrote a book on the utUitij, or necessity, of faith. He urges that every one ought to commence bv faith ; for without it there can be no soKd foundation for rational religion. He says that the medicine of the soul consists of two ingredients, mithority and reason. Authority acts by faith, and prepares the way for reason, and by this means in- tellectual knowledge is created. [See De ut'ilit. cre- dendi, &c.]

In the works of Theoderet there are long and numerous passages to be found, in favour of the same doctrine.

Vincent of Lerins maintains that faith is in strict conformity Avith human nature. Faith is the basis upon which the natural order of things rests.

306 PRINCIPLE OF AUTHOUITY

It guides US in all our actions ; is common to all men ; and it may safely be concluded, from these facts, that if it be necessary in matters of human knowledge, how much more necessary must it be in matters appertaining to heavenly things.

Lactantius estabhshes the necessity of attending to traditionary and revealed knowledge, as helps to reason and judgment. (See Dwin. Inst. lib. 1. 3. 7.)

St. Hilary says, "Non est de Deo humanis judiciis sentiendum; a Deo dlscendum est, quod de Deo intelligendum sit ; quia non nisi autore cognosci- tur." {De Tr'm. lib. 5.)

We have the principle of authority still more minutely and forcibly stated by St. Peter the Anchorite, who lived about the middle of the fifth century. This pious recluse states his case in the following manner. —

" To the ears of the enemies of our holy faith, and to those latitudinarian people who never care much about any thing serious, the authority of the Church is a matter of ridicule and mockery. But not so to the humble and intelligent Christian. It is his constant theme of exultation, the foundation of all his hopes, and the never-failing stimulant to all his exertions. Without authority, human and Divine, such a thing as a Church could not exist, any more than the human body could exist without a soul."

" But men even of intelligence and piety greatly perplex themselves and others, with abstruse specu- lations upon the nature of ecclesiastical authority, and from whom it derives its life and power;

MAINTAINED RY THE FATHETIS. 307

whereas the matter appears somewhat plain to me. It is quite obvious that the spmtual authority of the Church, (for I am only considering it in this light) must be involved in every revelation from heaven. This revelation must be simply the decla- rations'or commands of the Deity to men. Authority is here implied in the very act of revelation, and arises from the relative situation of the lawgiver, and those who receive his commands or precepts. To argue, therefore, that church authority has no foundation, is in fact to argue that there was no revelation at all. And it has often appeared to me that this is the only consistent result to which a man can arrive, if he doubt at all the obligations and injunctions of ecclesiastical authority. No communication from heaven, no matter for what end, could ever be of ])encfit to any save those who immediately heard it, if the principle of authority be once shaken or denied. Por in order to transmit the revelation from those to whom it was imme- diately given, to the next generation, reliance, the most perfect and unconditional, must be placed upon the words and declarations of men ; otherwise the thinc^ revealed is at an end. There is no channel for its perpetuity to succeeding races of men. Authority, which is simply faith in the declarations of a particular set of men relative to a particular matter, is the verv essence of all revealed truth, and the vital principle by which alone its life can be preserved."

" Now if this be the nature of church authority, when considered in relation to those who imme-

x2

308 PRINCIPLE OP AUTHOEITY

diatelv receive a Divine communication, it must still retain all its leading attributes, when descending the stream of time, among succeeding ages of men. The perfect unity of its nature can never he de- stroyed. There is the same obligation for us to be guided by the authority of St. Athanasius or St. Augustine, as lay upon them to respect the authority of the Church under St. Justin or Irenaeus ; and the latter to respect the authority of the Apostles and their immediate successors. All is suspended as it were by a chain, the first link of which is fixed in the heavens, and +he last touches the earth. But I think I hear a question put to me, ' Pray do you say that every thing which a nmnber of the clergy affirm is to be the unerring rule of my faith and conduct ? Is my judgment or reason to have no part in the matter ?' Now I would answer to this very natural and pertinent question, that you are under no obligation to attend to what they command, if they tender you no proofs of their authority. But then the clergy of the Church always carry the instruments of their power mth them ; that is, the word of God, of which they are the ex- pounders and interpreters. This word, as they now give it to you, they received from their immediate predecessors, who again received it from theirs ; and so on, till they came to the Apostles and Prophets themselves, who were the recipients of the direct wiU of God."

" I can conceive it consistent for a man who im- piously denies the existence of a divine revelation, to deny also religious authority ; but for any one

MAINTAINED BY THE FATHERS. 309

to pretend to believe the divine origin of the Scrip- tures, and yet deny the authority and power of the Church in matters of religious opinion and belief, is to me one of the most contradictory things imaginable. Indeed, it seems to me unreasonable for men to object to Church authority, inasmuch as the same thing is to be found in ordinary life. What is called public opinion, the general voice of the world, common sense, and such like things, are nothing but modes of expression to indicate human authority displaying itself in matters of general and universal interest. Much of the every- day knowledge of the world, which we have all more or less to be acquainted with, and to put in practice, is derived from sheer acts of human au- thority. Men are guided in their conduct by it, and pay a hallowed reverence to its injunctions. If this were not the case, the world would l)e in a most lamentable condition. The analogy is com- plete between hmnan authority in worldly aifairs, and religious authority in matters of theology. In the concerns of life there are certain latitudes al- lowed for a difference of opinion and conduct ; but essential and vital principles are of universal appli- cation, and objects of universal belief. So in mat- ters of theology, a certain sphere is permitted for non-essentials ; but general and vital doctrines are of paramount obligation and necessity for man's salvation."*

* Dies y siete Coloquios y Discursos varios, Salamanca, 1593. Vol. 1 pp. 310. 316. Flos Sanctorum, Madrid, 1710. 2 vols. Origen de lo Frayles Ermitanos, Barcelo. 1628.

310 AUTHORITY OF THE FATHERS.

Every one aequamted with the philosophical doctrines zealoLisly promulgated both on the conti- nent of Europe and in Great Britain within the last century, vnR readily recognise, in these state- ments, the outlines or germs of some favourite theo- ries of metaphysical theology. These will he more fully developed in another part of this Work.

ON MOHAL EVIDENCE. 311

CHAPTER XXX.

ON MORAL EVIDENCE, AFTER THE FULL ESTABLISH- MENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

There was no department of human knowledge which received such a marked accession of improve- ment, after the introduction and establishment of the Christian dispensation, as the principles, rules, and maxims appertaining to moral evidence. Here, in a comparatively short space of time, great altera- tions were effected ; general principles of evidence were more firmly grounded in the minds of men ; their various applications and modifications were more clearly defined ; and the whole framework of reasoning, on subjects connected with human na- ture, was more widely and securely extended over its former foundation. All this had a weighty in- fluence over the moral, religious, intellectual, and social condition of mankind.

The introduction of Christianity threw an im- portant element into the arena of human disputa- tion. Here a great number of new principles were announced ; new doctrines unfolded ; novel motives

312 ON MOHAL EVIDENCE.

to human action enforced ; a fresh catalogue of future rewards and punishments published ; an im- mense variety of mii'acles, facts, supernatural ap- pearances, historical declarations, personal narra- tives, deeds, exploits, sayings, and observations, were made known ; and more full and conclusive illustrations of all those elementary and abstract principles of theology, morals, and civil institutions, which the pure light of nature had previously sug- gested to men's minds, were furnished to the think- ing part of mankind. This immense augmentation of materials for reasoning overwhelmed the narrow framework which heathen philosophy and logic had erected, and compelled the application of a more comprehensive and accurate instrument for the in- vestigation and establishment of truth, than had liitherto been employed.

It is quite obvious to ordinary readers, that the modes of reasoning generally prevalent amongst the heathen sages, were marred and disfigured by a perpetual inclination for sophistical wrangling and ingenious trifling. These were their great lo- gical besetting sins. When, therefore, Christianity took a firm hold of men's minds, these imperfec- tions were gradually removed. Men disputed and argued under the influence of more powerful and lofty motives than hitherto. Truth was not now a mere toy or plaything, but a matter of deep and universal concern ; and on this account it was to be enforced and promulgated with becoming seri- ousness, and under the most weighty and biading obligations. Hence it is, that we perceive the great

ON MORAL EVIDENCE. 313

change wliicli men's minds underwent by reason of the Christian faith, and how firmly and judiciously were important bulwarks erected, to preserve men from falling again into the sea of universal scep- ticism and doubt.

It is a difficult matter to give a full and precise definition of what is meant by moral evidence. It is not confined to matters of mere morals, but em- braces a wider range, and is commonly understood to comprehend all those topics connected Avith the na- ture of man as a moral, an intellectual, a religious, and a sociable being. It is in this acceptation that we emplov the term moral evidence. It must be obvious, that the principles connected mth subjects so important and varied must be very numerous, and would require, for their full development, a space far beyond what can be allotted. Our re- marks must, therefore, be of a very general nature ; but, it is confidently hoped, they will not be alto- gether unsuitable or unprofitable.

The fu'st principle which was firmly established, relative to the nature of moral proof, at the period of the establishment of Christianity, was the de- fining of the nature of moral evidence from other kinds and descriptions of e\ddence. This was a most important matter ; not only to the moral, intellectual, and social interests of mankind, but also to their religious welfare and interests. This distinction lay at the foundation of all theological discussions, and proved of incalculable value to the Ancient Pathers in their disputes with the heathen philosophers, and in their systematic expositions of

311 ON MORAL EVIDENCE,

Gospel truth. It was clearly pointed out that mo- ral evidence differed essentially from demonstrative evidence. That no facts or arguments grounded on human nature, stood in the same relation to abstract truth, as arithmetical numbers or mathematical forms.

Moral evidence, at this period, vras considered to consist of two leading parts or divisions ; namely, observation or experience, and testimony.

Experience was considered as particular and ge- neral ; particular when applied to a man's own ob- servation, and general when derived from the com- mon observation of mankind. These two kinds are mixed and blended together in a variety of propor- tions ; and this amalgamation gives rise to a vast portion of our knowledge, and to the diversified means of applying it to our circumstances in life.

Testimony was considered of two kinds, divine and human. Divine testimony was looked upon as the highest degree of moral evidence ; for nothing could be considered as untrue, if revealed from God himself. This was, in all its leading features, a new species of evidence, arising out of revealed religion, of which mankind had no conception till the intro- duction of the Christian system.

Human testimony is of various kinds ; single and compound, direct and indirect, written and unwrit- ten. But all human testimony must be modified by experience ; and it is only when taken in con- junction with it, that this species of evidence can lead us to safe conclusions.

This mixture of experience with testimony gives

ON MORAL EVIDENCE. 315

rise to a multitude of rules respecting the evidence of things in general. The nature of the matters submitted to our judgment ; the character and num- ber of the observers ; what were their opportunities for careful observations ; are all important elements arising out of this combination.

Besides these there is analogy, which is often mis- taken for experience. It is an im23ortant branch of moral evidence. In addition, we have the ^j^'^- stmiptive, ov internal evidence of things, which forms a considerable portion of what goes under the de- nomination of moral evidence.

Certain rules of application arise out of these general principles. These are very numerous, and of infinite utility for the advancement of truth. There is, 1st. The necessary personal qualifications to discuss any particular question. A man may be wholly incapable of discussing a question, from ig- norance, the force of prejudice, interested views, and manv other causes. 2nd. We must be sruided in all our inquiries by strict rules of evidence ; these must not, on any account, be lost sight of. 3rd. "We should in all discussions endeavour to look out for, and make our observations and illustrations subservient to, some general principle, on which the whole question may rest. This is of singular importance ; as it strengthens the mind, and gives it a just confidence in its own movements.

These were some of the leading principles re- specting moral evidence, which are conspicuously illustrated by the writings of the learned, after the introduction of Christianity. From its first an-

316 ON MORAL EVIDENCE.

nouncement, till its firm establishment in all the seats of learning and science, we find a gradual pro- gress was made towards rational and enlightened principles of discussion. The peculiar nature of the Gospel aided this ; because it contained every variety of fact and doctrine which were calculated to excite profound and interesting disputes amongst the learned men of the day, whether Christian or heathen.

HUMAN ACTION. 317

CHAPTER XXXI.

ON THE OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH, ON THE LIBERTY AND NECESSITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

The doctrine of the necessity or lil^erty of the human will, decidedly belongs to the science of metaphysics. It is not only a very curious and in- teresting question, when considered in reference to the variety and forcible nature of opposing argu- ments involved in it ; hut it is also of the highest importance to our welfare as moral and religious agents. It cannot therefore be considered out of place, in a history of this kind, to give a succinct outline of the sentiments of the Philosophical Eathers of the Church, on this interesting topic ; a topic which it requires no keen prophetic powers to divine, will ever remain a standing subject of dis- cussion amongst mankind. As the question is so intimately blended with theological and moral doc- trines and principles of the utmost moment, it can- not Imt prove of use to students of theology and the kindred science of morals, as well as to the general reader, to have an epitome of the opinions of the

318 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

early sages of the Christian dispensation, on a doc- trine of such importance and interest.

It is a common, but a very superficial notion, that the doctrines of free-will and necessary con- nexion, are purely speculative crotchets, and have little or no legitimate bearing, either directly or indirectly, upon any portion of really useful human knowledge. Now, it so happens, that these doc- trines are vitally interwoven with all natural and revealed religion; and there has not been a single controversy about the principles of either, or their application to human conduct, that has not arisen directly out of these philosophical doctrines. And a moment's consideration must prove sufficient to convince us that this could not be otherwise. E^eligion is a system of duties and obliga- tions, and of rewards and punishments. This must of course relate to a code of laws, and to beings who have to attend to it, and to reap the fruits of their observance or neglect of it. Here the elements of j)Ower in the lawgiver to enact and enforce, and in the agent to obey, are at once appealed to, and our constitutional notions of the nature and limits of both, become the subject of eager discussion and intense interest. This is the prolific germ of all the different systems and views of religious truth ; and a firm foundation is here laid, as long as the human mind is constituted as it now is, for an extensively varied outline of religious doctrine and l)elief.

It woLild necessarily lead us too much into detail, were we to illustrate this position by a reference to all the religious controversies for the last eighteen

ON HUMAN ACTION. 319

liundred years. The bare enumeration of tliem would be scarcely possible within the limits of an ordinary volume. But we may be allowed to glance at some of the more prominent ones, with which every theological student is supposed to be fami- liarly acquainted.

On the very first introduction of Christianity, we find that the doctrines of grace, original sin, and predestination, were eager topics of discussion in the religious community. Dr. Priestley, in his " Cor- ruptions of Christianity," boldly afiirms that these doctrines were scarcely knowai until the fourth cen- tury, but this is evidently a great mistake. Though they might not have at first assumed that j)recise form and character with which they have, in recent times, been invested, yet the ^;rw?ci7;/^ on which these doctrines rest, as on a common centre, were debated by the early Christians with keen perti- nacity. The Gnostic heresy, introduced into the Christian church in the first centurv, did in fact embrace, in point of principle, the whole of these doctrines within itself. Here we distinctly find that the principtle of evil was necessarily confined to, and formed a component part of, all material objects ; that the divine influence upon man's life and conduct, was under the direction of this mechanical association ; and that all diseases, trou- bles, wars, devastations, and \dces, were necessarily under the control of a certain species of malignant demons or spirits. The doctrines of Simon Magus were essentially the same as those of the Gnostics. He held the eternity of matter, and the influence

320 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

of the evil ])rmciple over the minds of men. The systems of philosophical theology advocated by Menander and Cerinthus, who lived a little after Simon Magus, are precisely similar to his in all their leading features. The Gnostic Theory was the parent of this entire and numerous brood of heretical notions.

The famous Pelagian controversy, in the fourth century, related to the powers of the human will. This celebrated dispute branched out into various ramifications, and kept the minds of speculative disputants in full activity for some centuries after- wards. Some took a certain portion of human liberty, and others took a little less, into their respective systems, and this discretionary licence gave rise to numerous distinctions, ^\ hich the lapse of ages has buried in forgetfulness.

Then follow the fierce and long continued con- tests of the Schoolmen. Here we find the doctrines of liberty and necessity fully entered into and dis- cussed in all their bearings and dependences. The learning and genius employed on this occasion, have been the theme of admiration of all the specu- lative theologians of modern times.

The Protestant Reformation brought the doc- trines of free-will and necessity again into the field of controversy, with all the stirring interest which belonged to this singular and important event. The Roman Catholic notions of human merit, and the discipline of the Church founded upon them, were the especial topics of opposition by all the leading Reformers ; and this circumstance naturally

ON HUMAN ACTION. 321

led them to advance principles of an opposite com- plexion. Religious controversies of a very extended nature were the fruits of this conflict.

The writings of Luther, Calvin, Erasmus, Zuin- glius, Melancthon, and others, as well as the proceed- ings of the Council of Trent, go to prove the deep in- terest involved, at the time of the Reformation, in the doctrines of free-will and fate, and the intimate rela- tionship conceived to exist between these doctrines and the principles of natural and revealed religion.

Prom the period of the Reformation to the pre- sent hour, theological controversies have run in the same channel. There may have been a change of names amongst them, and subtle and refined dis- tinctions made in modern times ; but the essentials of discussion are precisely similar to those Avhich have gone the round of the Christian world for tlie last eighteen hundred years. The doctrines of jus- tification, redemption, faith, election, the influence of the Holy Spirit, &c. &c. are to be received on the authority of Holy Scripture. A spirit of true philo- sophy should lead us at once to embrace whatever the Sacred Record teaches; while the disputes which have ever agitated mankind upon these subjects are obviously grounded, to a very great extent, upon peculiar and partial views of the doctrine of human freedom and necessary connexion: and owe tlieir very existence to the deep-rooted hold these philo- sophical speculations have on the primary elements of the human mind.

We shall now give a short account of the opinions * y

322 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

of the Christian Fathers of the Church as to their conceptions of free-wilL These quotations will clearly show that there was but one opinion amongst them as to the intimate connexion which exists between this doctrine, and man's moral and reli- gious obligations to obey the divine commands.

Ignatius. — " I do not s^ ^Iv of two natures of men, but that the one man is sometimes of God. sometimes of the devil. If any one be pious, he is a man of God ; but if any one be impious, he is a man of the devil, being made so, not by nature, but by his own will."

Justin Maiityr. — " God foreknows some who would be saved by repentance, and some, perhaps, who are not yet born. But lest any one should ima- gine that I am asserting that things happen accord- ing to the necessity of fate, because I have said that things are foreknown, I proceed to refute that opinion also. That punishments and chastisements and good rewards are given according to the worth of the actions of every one, having learned it from the prophets, w^e declare it to be true ; since if it were not so, but all things happen according to fate, nothing would be in our own power ; for if it were decreed bv fate that one should be cood and another bad, no praise would be due to the former, or blame to the latter. And again, if mankind had not the power, by free-will, to avoid what is dis- graceful, and to choose what is good, they would not be responsible for their actions. But that man

ON HUMAN ACTION. 323

does what is right, and what is wrong, by his own free choice, we thus prove : we see the same person passing from one thing to that which is contrary to it ; hut if it were fated that we shoukl he either had or good, he would not he capable of doing con- trary things, or so often change ; but neither would some be good and others bad, since we should so declare fate to be the cause of bad things, and to act contrary to itself. Or that which was before mentioned would appear to be true, that neither virtue nor vice is in reality anything, but is only imagined to be good or bad ; which in truth is the highest impiety and injustice. But we say that there is this immutable fate, namely, to those who choose what is good, a worthy reward; to those who choose the contrary, a worthy punishment. For God has not created man like other things, as trees and four-footed beasts, incapable of acting by choice ; for then he could not desu'e reward or praise, not ha\dng chosen good of himself, but being made so ; nor if he were bad, would he deserve punish- ment, not being such of himself, but miable to be anything except that which he was made."

Tatian. — " The Word, before the formation of men, created angels. But each species of these created beings was endowed with power over themselves, not ha\ang natural goodness excejDt only from God, being perfected by men through the freedom of choice ; that he who is wicked may be justly punished, being made wicked by himself;

y2

324 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

and that he who is just may deservedly be iDraised on account of his good actions, not having, through his power over himself, transgressed the will of God. Such is the nature of angels and men. But the power of the Word having in itself the fore- knowledge of what would happen, not according to fate, hut by the determination of free agents, fore- told future events, and guarded against wickedness hy prohibitions, and commended those who should persevere in goodness.

" Free-will destroyed us. Being free we became slaves ; we were sold because of sin. No evil pro- ceeds from God. We have produced wickedness, but those who have produced it have it in their power again to renounce it."

luEN^TJS. — " John the Baptist, speaking of Christ, says, ' He shall baptize you with the Holy Ghost, and with fire : whose fan is in his hand, and he will thoroughly purge his floor, and gather his wheat into the garner ; but he will burn up the chaff with unquenchable fire.' He therefore w^ho made the w^heat, and who made the chaff, are not different persons, but one and the same person, judging, that is, separating them. But the corn and chaff being inanimate and irrational, are made such by nature. But man, being endowed with reason, and in this respect like to God, being made free in his will, and having power over himself, is himself the cause that sometimes he becomes wheat and some- times chaff. Wherefore he will also be justly con-

ON HUMAN ACTION. 325

demned ; because being made rational, he lost true reason, and living irrationally, he opposed the justice of God, -delivering himsell* up to every earthly spi- rit, and serving all lusts."

Clement of Alexandria. — "Neither praise, nor dispraise, nor honours, nor punishments, would be just, if the soul had not the power of desiring and rejecting, and if vice were involuntary.

" As, therefore, he is to be commended who uses his power in leading a virtuous life, so much more is he to be venerated and adored who has given us this free and sovereign power, and has permitted us to live, not ha^dng allowed what we choose or what we avoid to be subject to a slavish necessity.

" That thing is in our own power, of which we are equally masters, as of its opposite ; as, to phi- losophize or not ; to believe or not.

" ' Por therein is the righteousness of God re- vealed from faith to faith.' The Apostle therefore seems to announce two faiths, or rather one which admits of increase and perfection ; for a common faith is laid as a foundation.

" Since some are without faith and others con- tentious, all do not obtain the perfection of good. Nor is it possible to obtain it without our own exertion. The whole, however, does not depend upon our own will, for instance our future destiny ; * for we are saved by grace,' not indeed without good works. But those who are naturally disposed to good, must apply some attention to it.

" Faith, although it be a voluntary consent of

326 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

the soul, is, however, the worker of good things, and the foundation of a right conduct.

" His will is, that we should be saved by our- selves. This then is the nature of the soul, to move by itself. Then we who are rational, philosophy itself being rational, have some relation to it. Wit- ness, indeed, is a tendency to virtue, but it is not virtue. All men then, as I said, are qualified by nature for the acquisition of virtue. But one man makes a greater progress, another less, both in knowledge and practice. Therefore some men have attained even to perfect virtue, but others have gone only a certain length ; and again others, being neglected, though they had otherwise a good na- tural disposition, have turned in an opposite di- rection.

*' Wlierefore, when we hear ' Thy faith hath made thee whole,' we do not understand him to say that men will be saved, however they have believed, unless good works also shall follow."

Tertullian. — " Every one has a right belonging to man, and a natural power, to worship that which he shall think right ; nor is any one injured or be- nefited by the religion of another. Nor is it any part of religion to force religion, which ought to be taken up spontaneously, not by force.

" I find that man was formed by God with free- will, and with power over himself, observing in him no image or likeness to God more than in this respect ; for he was not formed after God, who is uniform, in face and bodilv lines, which are so va-

ON HUMAN ACTION. 327

rioiis in mankind ; but in that substance which he derived from God himself, that is, the soul, answer- ing to the form of God ; and he was stamped Avitli freedom and power of his will. The law also itself, which was then imposed by God, confirmed this condition of man. Por a law would not have been imposed on a person who had not in his power the obedience due to the law ; nor again Avould trans- gression have been threatened mth death, if the contempt also of the law were not placed to the account of man's free-will. The same tinner also you may find in the subsequent laws of the Crea- tor, when he sets before men good and evil, life and death, and likewise the whole order of discipline, arranged by precepts ; God dissuading, and threat- ening, and exhorting, and man being free and at liberty to obey or to despise. Por it was necessary that the image and likeness of God should be form- ed with a free will in his own power, in which this very thing, namely, freedom of will and power, misrht be considered as the imac^e and likeness of God. He who shoidd be found to be good or bad by necessity, and not voluntarily, could not mtli justice receive the retribution of either good or evil. "Therefore, though we have learnt from the commands of God both what he wills and what he forbids, yet we have a will and power to choose either, as it is written, ' Behold I have set before you good and evil ; for you have tasted of the tree of knowledge.' Therefore that which is sul)ject to our own T\ill, we ought not to refer to the will of God ; he who wills no evil, wills that we should

328 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

have a will. Thus it is our own will, when we will evil, contrary to the will of God, who wills that which is good. Moreover, if you ask whence that will conies hy which we will anything contrary to the will of God, I ^vill tell you ; it conies from our- selves. And not without reason; for you must resemble the origin from which you sprang, since Adam, the author both of our race and of sin, willed that in which he sinned. Eor the devil did not communicate to him the will to sin, but sup- plied matter for the will. But the will of God di- rected him to obedience. Wherefore if you do not obey God, who having given you a command, has formed you ^ith a free power, you will voluntarily fall, by the freedom of your Avill, into that which God does not will. And thus you think that you are destroyed by the devil, who although he wills you to will that which God does not will, yet he does not cause you to will : because neither did he compel our first parents to the will of sin ; nor were they unwilling, nor ignorant of what God forbade ; for he forbade it to be done when he made death the consequence of doing it. Therefore the only work of the devil is, to tempt that which is in you, whether you ^vill. But when you have willed, it follows that he turns it to his own purpose (sibi subjungit,) not having caused the will in you, but having taken an opportunity to work upon your will. Therefore, since the will is in ourselves only, and by it our disposition towards God is proved, I say that we must deeply and earnestly consider the will of God." ' -

ON HUMAN ACTION. 329

Origen. — "Moreover, because the soul, having substance and life in itseK, when it departs out of this world, will be disposedof accordingtoitsmerits, either enjoying the inheritance of eternal life and bliss, if its conduct shall have procured this for it, or suffer- ing eternal fire and punishment, if the guilt of its sins shall have thrust it into that condition ; and because there w^ill be a time of the resurrection of the dead, when this body, ' which is sot\ti in cor- ruption, will be raised in incorruption ; and that which is sown in dishonour ^^dll be raised in glory ;' this also is settled in the doctrine of the Church, that every rational soul has free-will, and that it has to contend against the devil and his angels, and the powers which oppose it, because they strive to burden it with sins : but we, if we live rightly and prudently, endeavour to rescue ourselves from this kind of burden. "Whence, consequently, we may understand that we are not subject to necessity, so as to be compelled by aU means to do either bad or good things, although it be against our will. Eor if we be masters of our wiU, some powers, perhaps, may urge us to sin, and others assist us to safety ; yet we are not compelled by necessity to act either rightly or wTongly.

" I assert that man is endoAved with free-will, declaring that this is the greatest gift conferred upon him by God, because all other tilings are by necessity obedient to the command of God. Eor if you speak of the heaven, it stands bearing the Lord,

330 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

not moved from its appointed place. And if you choose to speak of the sun, it performs its appoint- ed motion, not refusing its course, but by necessity serving the Lord. And in like manner you see the earth fixed, and hearing the command of him who ordered. In like manner other things by necessity serve the Creator, not any one of them being able to do any other thing than that for which it was made. Wherefore we do not praise these things which are thus obedient to the Lord ; nor is any hope of better things laid up for them, because they have voluntarily observed what they are command- ed. But it is the will of God that man should obey the understanding, and he has received ]iower to subject himself, not being governed by the necessity of nature, or destitute of power ; which I say is being endowed with free-will, for the sake of better things, that he may receive better things from Him Avho is more excellent (which is the consequence of obedience), and moreover, as it were, a debt from the Creator. Eor I do not say that man was thus made to his injury, but for the sake of better things. For if he had been made like one of the elements, or any thing of that kind, there would have been a necessity that he should serve God; he would no longer receive a suitable reward of his choice, but man would be as an instrument of his Creator, and he who uses it would be the cause of these thinsrs. But neither would man have arrived at suj^erior knowledge, knowing nothing else but that only for which he was formed. I say therefore that God

ON HUMAN ACTION. 331

has thus honoui'ed man ; it being his will that he should know better things, he has given him the power to be able to do what he chooses."

Cypeian. — "That a man has free-will to believe or not to believe, we read in Deuteronomy, ' I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing ; therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live!' Also in Isaiah, 'If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land ; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye shall be devoured with the sword ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.' Also in St. Luke's Gospel, ' The kingdom of God is within you.' "

EusEBius. — "So that it must be altogether ac- knowledged that we have liberty, and the free-will of a rational and intelligent nature.

*' The Creator of all things has impressed a na- tural law upon the soul of every man, as an assist- ant and ally in his conduct, pointing out to him the right way by this law ; but, by the free liberty with which he is endowed, making the choice of what is best worthy of praise and acceptance, and of greater rewards, on account of his good conduct, because he has acted rightly, not by force, but from his own free-will, when he had it in liis power to act otherwise. As again, making him who chooses what is worst, deserving of blame and punishment, as having by his OAvn motion neglected the natural law, and becoming the origin and foundation of wickedness, and misusing himself, not from any

332 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

extraneous necessity, but from free-will and judg- ment. The fault is in him who chooses, not in God. Eor God has not made nature, or the substance of the soul, bad ; for he who is good can make nothing but what is good. Every thing is good which is according to nature. Every rational soul has na- turally a good free-will formed for the choice of what is good. But when a man acts wrongly, nature is not to be l)lamed; for what is wrong takes place not according to nature, but contrary to nature ; it being the work of choice and not of nature. Eor when a person who had the power of choosing what is good, did not choose it, but vo- luntarily turned away from what was worst, what room for escape could be left to him who is become the cause of his own internal disease, having neg- lected the innate law, as it were his Saviour and physician ?'

)'>

Athanasius. — " Eor the knowledge and accurate comprehension of the way of truth, we have need of nothing but ourselves. Not, as God is above ail things, so is the way which leads to these things, remote or extraneous to ourselves ; but it is in our- selves, and it is possible to find its beginning of ourselves."

Cyril of Jerusalem. — " God requires nothing else of us but a good will. Do you say. How are my sins blotted out ? I say to you, by will- ing, by believing. What can be more concise than this ? But if your lips declare a willingness,

ON HUMAN ACTION. 333

and your heart does not, he who judges knows the heart. From this day, therefore, cease from every evil work. Let not your tongue utter irreverent words ; let not your eyes sin ; let not your thoughts Avander about vain things."

Hilary. — "What, therefore, we are, is rather our own gain than His who formed us what we are; because God, not grudging his own eternal goodness, takes us into the perception and use of liis own blessed goodness. But he who is per- fect and good used his goodness towards us, and his blessedness, not without reason and method. Por he permitted to every one of us the liberty of life and sense, not fixing necessity either way, so that the law should compel every one to be by nature good or bad ; but he who had benevolently created us to enjoy his blessedness, appointed us a qualification for it, through the merit of an inno- cent and honest life. Eor Avhat honour and reward could the necessity of goodness deserve, when a certain force, interwoven in our nature, would not sufi'er us to be bad ? Goodness, therefore, is per- mitted to the will ; that the will of goodness might obtain to itself a reward ; and that there might be again and enjojTuent of this eternal blessedness from merit, and not an indiscriminate necessity by law. And though he invited us to the will of goodness, that is, to live well and honestly by the hope of deserving and experiencing his goodness, yet he added a punishment for shunning and de- spising it; so that when he had left us a liberty of

334 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

will to deserve goodness, because a necessity of nature did not admit of desert, the terror of punish- ment threatened on the other hand proved this very liberty. And thus lil3erty was permitted for the deserving of reward, with a due reward to equity and justice ; and the power of liberty is, through the goodness of God, restrained by the fear commmiicated to us ; that the hope of deserv- ing might admonish us to a good will, and the punishment of apj^ointed revenge might dissuade us from a bad will."

Epiphanius. — " How does he seem to retain the freedom of his will in this world ? Eor to believe or not to believe is in oiu' own power. But where it is in our power to believe or not to believe, it is in our power to act rightly or to sin ; to do good good or to do e^dl."

Basil. — " These things are in our own power, as to subdue the passions, or to indulge in plea- sures ; as to restrain anger, or to attack him who provokes us ; to speak truth or falsehood ; to be meek and gentle, or proud and overbearing. Do not then seek the origin of those things, of which you are yourself the master, from any other quarter ; but know that that which is in itself evil, derived its origin from voluntary lapses. For if it had been involuntary, and not m our own power, those who act unjustly would not have had so great fear of the laws hanging over them."

"If the origin of vicious and virtuous actions be

ON HUMAN ACTION. 335

not in ourselves, but there is an innate necessity, there is no need of legislators to prescribe what we are to do and what we are to avoid ; there is no need of judges to honour virtue and to punish wickedness. Eor it is not the injustice of the thief or of the murderer, who could not restrain his hand even if he would, because of the insuperable neces- sity which urges him to the action."

Gregory Nazianzen. — " The good derived from nature has no claim to acceptance ; but that which proceeds from free-will is deserving of praise. Wliat merit has fire in burning ? For the burn- ing comes from nature. What merit has water in descending? Por this it has from the Creator. What merit has snow in being cold ? Or the sun in shining ? Por it shines whether it will or not. Give me a virtuous will. Give me the becom- ing spiritual, from being carnal ; the being raised by reason, from being depressed by the weight of the flesh ; the being found heavenly, from having been low-minded; the appearing superior to the flesh, after havmg been found to the flesh."

Gregory oe Nyssa.— " Since man was made in the likeness of God, and was blessed in being honoured with free-will, (for to have power over himself, and to be subject to no master, is peculiar to the blessedness of God), to be forcibly impelled to anything by necessity, would have deprived him of his dignity. Por if voluntarily, according to the motion of free-will, they directed the human

336 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

nature to anything improper, and were driven from it forcibly and by necessity, such a pro- ceeding would have taken away from them the pre-eminent good, and would have deprived them of the honour of being like to God. Por the free will is likeness to God. Therefore, that both power might remain to human na- ture, and that evil might be done away, the wis- dom of God devised this mode, to suffer man to pursue those things which he wished ; that having tasted the evils which he desired, and learned by experience what exchange he had made, he might voluntarily return by his own desire to his former blessedness, shaking off from his nature every- thing which disturbs the passions or is inconsistent with reason, as a burden."

Ambrose. — "We are not constrained to obedience by a servile necessity, but by free-will, whether we lean to virtue, or are inclined to vice.

" No one is under any ol3ligation to commit a fault, unless he inclines to it from his own will."

Jerome. — "Do not think that there are only good or only bad things in the world, since this world con- sists of different things, contrary to each other, hot and cold, dry and moist,hard and soft, dark and light, bad and good. But God has done this, that wis- dom maybe displayed in choosing good and avoiding evil, and that free-will may be left to man.

'" If ye be willing and obedient, ye shall eat the good of the land ; but if ye refuse and rebel, ye

ON HUMAN ACTION. 337

shall be devoured with the sword ; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.' He preserves free- will, that either way there may he punishment or reward, not from an antecedent decree of God, hut according to the merit of every individual.

" He gave them free-will ; he gave them the liberty of their own mind, and that every one might Kve, not under the absolute command of God, but under his own direction ; that is, not by necessity but by mil, that there might be room for virtue, that we might be distinguished from other animals, while, after the example of God, it was permitted us to do what we will. Whence both the judgment against sinners is equitable, and a just reward is given to the holy or just."

Augustine. — "Pree-will is given to the soul, which they who endeavour to weaken by trifling reasoning, are blind "to such a degree, that they do not even understand that they saw those vain and sacrilegious things with their own vnR.

" Every one is author of his own sin. Whence, if you doubt, attend to what is said above, that sins are avenged by the justice of God ; for they would not be justly avenged, unless they were committed with the will.

" Lastly, if we do not act wrongly with the will, no one is to be reproved at all, or admonished ; and if you take away these things, the Christian law and the whole discipline of religion must necessarily be destroyed. Therefore sin is com- mitted by the will. And because there is no doubt * z

338 OPINIONS OF THE FATHERS

but sin is committed, I perceive that not even this is to be doubted, that souls have free-will. Eor God judged that his servants would be better if they served him freely ; which would be impossible if they served Mm not with the will, but from necessity."

Chrtsostom. — " God, from the first formation of man, implanted in him the law of nature. And what is the law of nature ? He framed it for his conscience, and enabled us to know from ourselves the difference between good and evil.

" Since he has made us masters of the choice of bad and good actions, and wishes us to be volun- tarily good ; therefore if we be not willing, he does not force, he does not compel ; for to be good by force is not to be good at all.

"When you hear these tilings, do not imagine that the calling carries with it necessity, for God does not compel, but leaves men masters of their free-will, even after they are called."

Theodoret. — " God created the whole nature of incorporeal things, making it rational and immortal. Free-will is peculiar to what is rational. But of these some have preserved a good disposition towards the Creator, but others have fallen into wickedness. This we may also find among men. Eor some indeed are lovers of virtue, but others are workers of wickedness. If, therefore, any one complains of the creation of mcked persons, he deprives the champions of virtue of the prizes of victory. Por

ON HUMAN ACTION. 339

if they had not the desire of virtue in the choice of the will, hut were unalterably fixed by nature, those who successfully struggle for piety would be unknown. But since the will has the choice of what is good, and of the contrary, some justly ob- tain the crown of victory, and others suffer punish- ment for their voluntary offences."*

* See the Author's work on "Free Will," second edit., 1848, pubhshed by Saunders, Charing Cross ; and also the writings of Drs. Copple- stone, Hampden, and Whately, who have treated the bearing of the doc- trine of Necessity on Theological doctrines, at considerable length. — See also Note G. at the end of the Volume.

z 2

310 AJIABIAN METAPHYSICS.

CHAPTER XXXII.

ON THE METAPHYSICAL NOTIONS OF THE ARABIANS.

We shaU now take a retrospective view of the state of metaphysical knowledge amongst the Ara- bians, soon after the introduction of Christianity. This does not promise to be a very fruitful field of inquiry ; but still the subject is well worthy of a particular notice. We shall also allude to the notions of the Jews on mental subjects ; at least that portion of this ancient and interesting people, who resided in the East, and mingled with the Arabs and other kindred oriental tribes.

The Arabs, in point of philosophy, must always appear a curiously constituted people. In the early parts of their history, they were the bold, courage- ous, and fierce conquerors of the East ; and it was a considerable time after these successful invasions had been made, that the attention of the people was directed towards the cultivation of letters and philosophy. Wandering in arid deserts, and lead- ing a pastoral life, their minds sQcm to have been

ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 341

insensibly trained to severe habits of inward con- templation ; and the charms of poetry, and the mental mechanism of numbers, appear to have formed the primitive elements of their early learn- ing. This habit of inward reflexion, however, pro- duced other fruits in the due course of time. It led the Arabs to dwell upon the nature and powers of their own understandings ; to scan all the pecu- liarities of thek actions ; to watch all their subtile movements ; and to pourtray the divers important ends and purposes which the inward macliines were so admirably fitted to accomplish. The intellectual history of this people is still buried in comparative obscurity ; although there are, in many of the public libraries throughout Europe, an immense number of Arabian manuscripts, which, if brought to the light of day, would undoubtedly tend materially to dissipate the thick clouds which at present en- velop the philosophical opinions and acquirements of this singular race of mankind.

All the modes of life and intellectual habits of the Arabs peculiarly fitted them for entering into the subtile questions connected with metaphysical disquisitions. This is strikingly conspicuous in all their writings. They invariably manifested a decided preference for abstract forms of disputa- tion, and rigid rules of investigation. Aristotle, on this account, proved their great master, their guide, the object of their most devoted veneration and attachment. His dry and formal rules accorded admirably with the genius of their minds. Plato, and his commentators and disciples, were never,

342 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

consequently, relished, if we except Plotiniis and Proclus. The Platonic system abounded too much with imaginative and lively theories and senti- ments, and breathed moreover too ardently the spirit of liberty and freedom, to suit the taste of the slavish worshippers of the Koran.

It is remarked by a Prench writer of great learn- ing and genius, " That there is, between the philo- sophical productions of the Greeks and Arabs, the same difference, or rather the same contrast, wliich exists between the literary works, the manners, genius, and civil institutions of the two peoples. The philosophy of the Greeks had in it something brilliant, fascinating, and lively, like the beautiful views in Attica and Asia Minor ; that of the Arabs had something grave, monotonous, and arid, like the deserts they inhabit. Pull of charms, even in its errors, the former excited an enthusiasm simi- lar to that which inspired it ; the latter, dull and malancholy, even whilst they seized hold of truth, breathed the habit of resignation, and the influence of fanaticism. The Greeks displayed an easy eleva- tion and spontaneity of thought, though a certain restlessness of spirit; while the Arabs displayed mdomitable patience, and bore upon them the im- print of rigorous formalities. The Athenians prided themselves on harmonious co-ordinations ; the in- habitants of the desert on complicated combina- tions. The genius of poetry seemed to preside in the meditations of the Greeks ; the laws of calcula- tion in those of the Arabs. The Greeks imagined, invented, created matter; the Arabs laboured at

ARABIAN METAPHYSICS. 343

what was placed in their hands, and imprinted form upon it. Intellectual light seemed to spring up among the Greeks as by enchantment ; among the descendants of Ishmael, it was the fruit of painful conquest.

We shall mention here the three famous Arabian Caliphs who exercised such a marked influence over the intellectual progress of their countrymen ; namely, Almanzor, Alraschid, and Almamon. His- torians described the first, Almanzor, as having been a very enlightened and intelligent prince. He was passionately fond of learning and philoso- phy. He studied politics in conjunction with in- tellectual learning and astronomy ; and he trans- lated into the Syriac and Arabic languages several treatises of Grecian literature. Alraschid was equally distinguished for his wisdom and love of knowledge; and in addition to his taste for the abstract doc- trines of philosophy, he had a thorough knowledge of poetry and the belles lettres. Almamon, who flou- rished in the 9th century, was still more reno\^^led then either of his two predecessors. He endea- voured to obtain knowledge from all parts of the then known world. He invited learned men to his Court, without any reference to their religious opinions. He penetrated into all the abstruse doctrines of the Chaldeans, the Persians, and the Greeks. Public schools of philosophy were esta- blished, and those of Bagdad and Bassora obtained especial distinction. The doctrines of Aristotle were taught and expounded within the walls of Tunis, Tripoli, and other African cities.

34<1 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

Alkendi.

Alkendi, who attended the Court of Almamon, was a distinguished philosopher. He inspired the Arabs with an enthusiastic veneration for the doc- trines of Aristotle, and furnished them with trans- lations and commentaries upon several of his works. Alkendi published a " Treatise on the Study ofFhi- losopliy i" containing questions on logic and meta- physics. He also cultivated mathematics and phy- sics with singular success. There is besides a book ascribed to his pen, ^'■ZTpon the Compositions of Medicines.'"

Alfarabi.

AKarabi obtained well merited fame at the school of Bagdad. His mind embraced a wide range of study. He was a mathematician, an astronomer, a physician, and a philosopher ; and devoted his whole life to study and learning. " He penetrates" says Albufarage, " into the most profound points of logic ; but in his endeavours to revive them, he renders them difficult of comprehension. He sug- gested ingenious but subtile speculations ; and completed the investigations of Alkendi upon the arts of analysis and method." Alfarabi added very useful commentaries to Aristotle's art of thinking, and made the Arabs acquainted with his rhetoric.

We must also notice here two tracts of Alfarabi, the first " JJpofi the Sciences'^ and the second " TJp)0}i

ALrARABI. 345

the Understanding.'" The first is a sort of dictionary or methodical classification of various branches of knowledge; embracing the leading and fundamental principles of these sciences, and their relative con- nexion mth one another. At the head of all these departments of knowledge, he places divine wisdom, which he divides mto three parts, the last of which embraces immaterial objects. "This science," says ho, " demonstrates that these objects, in their aggre- gate number, are gradually elevated to the height of perfection. The ascending scale terminates at the first principle anterior to all things ; this is that primordial unity, which confers existence and design upon every thing we see. Truth flows from it as its source."

In Alfarabi'swork, ''On the Understanding," we find, in substance, the following propositions and principles laid down. These form the latent germs of several subsequent abstract systems of mental philosophy, which enjoyed considerable notoriety in the East, This philosopher took Aristotle for his guide. The former maintains that the human understanding is that faculty of the soul by -which men acquire the certainty of universal and neces- sary truths and propositions. These are not, as commonly imagined, obtained by labour or atten- tive meditation, but arise out of the native resources of his own mind, without his knowing from whence they came, or from what derived. The understand- ing is, however, itself composed of three distinct powers or faculties ; namely, the understanding of power, the understanding in action, and the active

346 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

understanding. It is by this macliinery tliat all its important functions are performed. The under- standing of poioer separates the/brms of substances from those tilings in which they reside, and trans- fers them to itself. These forms are distinguished from corporeal forms in this, that the former is imprinted only upon the surface, but the latter penetrates into the very depth of things. "When the understanding has received these/orms, it then becomes the understanding in action^ and the forms are 'perceived in reality^ and become the forms of the understanding itself. In this new state these forms are not what they were when they resided in theu' substances. There they were bound to cer- tain conditions which are now removed. Here they are considered under new relations, and re- ceived into the understanding in action ; they enter into the universality of existing things, which be- come the exclusive province of intelligence. "When then the soul embraces all intelligent tilings, by a glance of the unde^'standhig in action it perceives itself, it perceives its own act, and recognises its own proper essence. It has here acquired noilim^ fi^om loithout, but only from an inward act of reflexion.

The province of the active understa/nding is, to recognise that which is most perfect in itself. It grasps, in an abstract manner, the forms which belong to substances ; not such, however, as resid- ed in them previously to their being detached from these substances, but, penetrating into the nature of all sul)stances, the active understanding im- prints these forms on itself, such as they really are

AVICENNA. 317

in their abstract natures. These forms are indivi- sible. The active understanding^ so to speak, sub- stantializes itself in man ; its essence, action, reality, are identical. There is here no need of the common substances of bodies ; no need of assistance from any corporeal organs ; no need of either senses or imagination ; for its own action embraces all bo- dies, and the powers which manifest themselves in them are simply the materials upon which the ac- tive understanding exercises itself.*

AviCENNA.

Avicenna was another most distinguished Ara- bian metaphysician. A great part of his life was spent in public turmoils and engagements ; but still he was enabled to devote a considerable portion of his time to the cultivation of learning and science. He also studied medicine ; and gained such celebrity in this important branch of know- ledge, as induced some liistorians to call him the Eippocrates of the Arabs.

Avicenna was a zealous disciple of Aristotle, and lost no opportunity of inculcating and expounding his doctrines. Professor Tiedemann makes the fol- lowing remarks upon him. " We find in the views of Avicenna a remarkable clearness and precision ; in all his reasonings a profound acuteness ; and in all his thoughts a natural and pleasing connection."

In Avicenna' s Treatise on Logic, we find he adopts the principles of Aristotle, but does not fol-

* Alfarabi, De Scicntia. Paris, 16:38. pp. 35. 62.

348 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

low him slavishly in every abstract doctrine. The Arabian philosopher maintains that "All know- ledge consists in representation and conviction. We may represent things to ourselves very well, with- out, however, persuading ourselves of their truth. E-epresentation is acquired by definition, or some similar thing ; but conviction is derived from rea- soning."

Avicenna qualified the doctrine of Aristotle re- specting his division of the negative, sensible, and rational soul. The former remarks that those distinctions indicate rather three modes of action, than three distinct things. " The vegetable soul has three faculties ; nutrition, augmentation, and generation ; the sensitive has two faculties, those of apprehension and motives; the latter excites or produces motion, and creates appetites. The fa- culty of apprehension is a compound one. It exer- cises itself both externally and internally. We commonly attach to it five external senses, and five internal ones. The bodily or external senses em- brace hearing, seeing, touching, tasting, and smell- ing ; the five internal ones are, first, \dsion ox fan- tasy, the second, imagination, the third, cogitative, the fourth, estimatwe, and the fifth, memory. The rational soul is divided into two grand parts ; the one embraces the faculty of knowledge, and the other of activity. These two rule and guide the whole inward man.

Avicenna points out, in few words, the process by which children learn to distinguish one object from another. " The first image," says he, " which is traced in the mind of an infant, is the particular

ALGAZELI. 349

form of a man or a woman. But it cannot distin- guish between the man who is its parent, and him who is not ; nor between its mother and a stranger. Nevertheless it soon learns to recognise this differ- ence, and to make proper distinctions amongst par- ticular objects. Eor a short time after its birth it has only very confused notions of single objects."*

Algazeli.

Algazeli, in the eleventh century, obtained great honour as a philosopher at Bagdad and Alexandria. He was a person of great penetration and sagacity, and his powers of imagination were far above the common order. He cultivated theology with unre- mitting ardour ; and his work on the " Religions Sciences " enjoyed unrivalled popularity throughout the whole Eastern republic of letters.

In all his disquisitions on mental subjects, he followed a most independent course, and manifest- ed a becoming anxiety to examine everything for himself, and to take nothing on trust. As might naturally be expected, from this turn of mind, and from the nature of philosophy herself in this age and country, he differed in many respects from his contemporaries. He combatted the new Platonists upon the eternity of the world, a universal ema- nation, absolute identity, perfect unity, the non- existence of matter, and the migration of souls. The general proposition of this school, that " In-

* See Logique d'Avicene, translated by Vattier, Paris ; Metaphj's. Trait. 2. chap. 1. ; and also Note H. at the end of the Volume.

350 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

telligence can only know itself," he argued against with great zeal and effect.

On the intricate question of cause and effect, Algazeli made some remarkably subtile and curious observations. It is quite evident that the theory of Hume is here anticipated.

On the general nature of the human understand- ing we find the following is, in substance, an epi- tome of the system x)f Algazel. The human soul has two faces, the one by which it directs its atten- tion to the wide region of superior things, there extracts the light of knowledge, and, by virtue of its own distinctive character, receives the emana- tions from this superior light. The other face is dii'ccted towards inferior things, under the govern- ment and guidance of proper organs. Sensibility and imagination can only exercise themselves upon material objects ; they can seize only individual things ; they perceive or conceive them under cer- tain conditions, as time, place, figure, &c. The faculty of estimation depends then upon substances or external things, since it derives from this source the perceptions on which it rests. But we have also another faculty which seizes the essential pro- perties of things, and strips them, as it were, of their particular qualities or accidents. This is sum- mary or general abstraction. This faculty differs from the preceding ; it is the understanding ; and it gradually elevates and develops itself, in propor- tion as it is exercised.

The following remarks display the judicious and accurate observer of mental habits and phenomena. "The understanding can perceive itself; it can

AVICEBRON. 351

perceive its own perception ; it can perceive what it produces ; it can pass from the strong to the weak, from the obscure to the luminous, without any essential change of its nature. It is strength- ened, instead of being weakened, by years. The derangement of the organs of sensation may, it is true, act upon the intellectual faculties in two modes ; viz. by causing a distraction of the mind, when accompanied by pain ; and by depriving the mind of the assistance of these organs for the in- vestigation of external objects. But our intellectual power can, by virtue of its own innate energy, emancipate itself from this double dependance."*

AviCEBRON.

This was a very acute and distinguished Arabian philosopher. The only account of his writings is from Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and Wil- liam of Paris. We gather from these three sources, the following short outline of the leading views en- tertained by this writer.

He attempted to penetrate into the original cause of all things. He wished to investigate what was the quality of the jii^st matter, and the first form, which produced all things. The quality of the first matter is to receive, to be the subject, to contain ybrm in itself, to exist by itself; that is to say, not to exist in anything else. The nature of the first form is to be in another thing, to give reality to matter, to determine its power, and to

* Logica et Philos. Cologne. 150().

352 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

form a portion of its essential nature in this com- pound state. Matter is thus maintained to reside in intellectual things, comprised under quantity, combination, and contrast. The author attempts then to prove that this first or primary matter is purely spiritual, as it expresses the highest and most refined abstraction, after being stripped of all its variety of particular forms. The Supreme Being is not, however, included in this spiritualised matter, for He is above all forms or qualities.

The 2)ri7nari/ foi'm is intellectuality. Intelligence occupies the first rank in the order of beings ; it is itself composed of matter smdform ; its form, then, presides in all things. The primary form imposes limits to the modifications of matter. Intellectu- ality is such, that it comprehends all things ; it is that from which all forms proceed, and from which every thing in heaven or in earth takes its rise.

These two elementary principles being laid down, there is an affent to . carry them into operation. This is termed the ^;riwi«rj/ agent. His act con- stitutes the light of intelligence. It resides in per- fect simplicity or absolute unity. It cannot act im- mediately ; because the will is the instrument of action. This will contains within itself the reason or word for everything which exists. It chooses out of the general treasure those figures or types it wishes to act with. It determines the first or primary matter; it imprints upon it the first act of intellectual light. This intellectual light is varied according to the variety of figures or types. It produces, by degrees, matter, under the relations of quantity, combination, and contrariety. It is

AVERROES. 353

thus that the will always proceeds from unity ; for intellectuality penetrates all things by vu'tue of its own simplicity. All form is, at the commencement, the author of its own archetype.

AvERROES,

This was, without doubt, one of the most able and subtile of all the Arabian philoso- phers. He had studied the philosophy of Aristotle with peculiar care and attention, and became en- thusiastically enamoured of his doctrines. By un- wearied zeal, great learning, intense application, and a profound subtility, he imprinted his mind upon his own age; and long after his death, re- tained the distinction of being one of the most able and original commentators on the Aristotelian phi- losophy.

"We find, in his remarks upon Aristotle's meta- physics, that he was an admirer of the doctrine of an intelligent hierarchy and universal emanation. He remarks, " that motion can be imparted only by intelligence; all motion presupposes a motive which appertains to a spiritual or immaterial being. The celestial spheres have their intelligent attributes, derived from the Supreme Power, the first princi- ple of all things. This motion is communicated successively into all regions ; from the highest de- gree of creation, even into our own sublunary world, this nation is conducted and transmitted by a suc- cession of intelligent agents." * 2 a

354 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

On the sj^iritual or immaterial nature of mental perception, this metaphysician entertained some very refined notions. He conceives that our organs of sensation only perceive the sensible qualities of matter, detached from matter itself. This consti- tutes, in his opinion, the act of perception, a spiritual or immaterial act. Some of these qualities of matter are universal, and some particular and individual. But these two kinds of qualities are not perceived in the same manner. The mind seizes hold of ge- neral or universal ideas, without any direct com- munication, so to speak, with matter itself ; there is no intermediate agency requisite to obtain these ideas. On the contrary, to obtain individual or particular qualities, there must be an intermediate agent to communicate with matter, for without this intermediation, the mind would not be able to distinguish these particular, from general or uni- versal, qualities. Nature has provided /orwzs, to act as these agents, which hold a middle station between corporeal and material ; these forms are material relatively to objects, but spiritual rela- tively to the soul. As interposing instruments they are thus of a mixed character. Now these inter- mediate assents are the instruments of the senses ; those things which perception requires, to detect or seize hold of universal or general qualities. The act of perception is so much the more perfect, in exact proportion as the intermediate agent is re- fined and subtile. This mental operation may be illustrated, more particularly, by a reference to the senses of sight, hearing, and smelling. The air, by

AVERROES. 355

the aid of light, receives the forms of objects, and bears thera to the retina of the eye ; from thence they are transmitted to the common sensorlum^ which also receives the forms of the objects. Erom there these forms are again transported to the im- agination, where a new and spiritual character is given to them. Here, then, are three successive orders of i\iQs,Q forms of external objects : the first is corporeal ; the second resides in the organs of sensation ; and the third is the faculty of the ima- gination. The second is spiritual, and the third is still more so ; and this is the reason why the imagination has need of the presence of external objects, in order that this form should be presented to itself. This process is what Aristotle wished to illustrate by the mirror with a double face. If the spectator place this mirror opposite to him, he will see, on one of its faces, his own image ; and if he place the mirror in such a position that this image it retains may be reflected upon the surface of the water, he will perceive a second image similar to the first. Now in the process of sensation i\\Q,form perceived is like the image of the spectator ; the mirror is like the air which transmits the form ; the water is the eve or the organs of sense. One of the faces of the mirror is the sensitive faculty ; and the other face is the imaginative one. If the spectator turn the mirror and consider only the second face, then the reflected part will not be upon the water, and there will, consequently, be no more than one image. Similar phenomena take place in the process of perception in reference to both hearing

2 A 2

356 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

and smelling. Bnt this faculty of perception is not tjie same in all animals ; man alone is able to seize hold of the proper qualities of objects, with all their shades and degrees, resemblance and contra- riety. He can extract the juice from the fruits, whilst the brute creation have to stop and peel off the bark. As a proof of this, man is the only ani- mate creature who can appreciate fully the har- mony of sounds in all their multiplied variety.

The way in which we obtain abstract notions, is described by Averroes in this manner. In our common organs of sense reside the images, the cha- racter of which is precisely the same here as in sen- sible objects ; and the relation of these images to the material understanding is the same as these sensible objects are to the senses themselves. This may be comprehended more distinctly by saying, that this image is to reason, what the sensible ob- ject is to sensation. The soul can then conceive nothing without the assistance of the imagination; nor the material understanding, without the help of sensation. Here we perceive two images asso- ciated together, and our intelligent notions become corrupted through the influence of this contagious contact. As to these intelligent notions, they are the qualities of the/brms of imagination detached from matter ; and must needs have different qualities from the latter.

The material understanding is a notion peculiar to this Arabian philosopher. He explains its na- ture and operation in the following manner. The faculty of imagination retains the forms which have

theophiltjS. 357

been made upon it ; these forms are transmitted to the material understanding, there to become the objects of thought. But an agent is requisite to impress them upon the latter, and that agent ap- pertains to the active understanding. This material understanding conceives abstract notions, so that the abstract understandino; makes one with it. To conceive abstract notions or ideas, is no other thing than simplv to conceive a thinsc subsistmo^ bv itself.*

Theophilus.

This author was a native of Seville, and a physi- cian and philosopher. His work entitled FMloso- 'plius Autodid actus, is a very curious one, and has been translated into Prench, English, German, and Dutch. He obtained great reputation and respect amongst all the leading tribes of the Arabs, and also among the Jews. The learned Leibnitz de- clared he had perused this publication with delight, and found it abounding with elevated and just con- ceptions of human nature in general.

Thisphilosopherremarks, thatman possessesthree relations of similitude or affinity ; namely, one Avith the animal creation, another with celestial beings, and the third with the necessary and divine Being. To these three orders of relationship appertain three modes of action. The first exercises itseKupon our material organs ; the second upon the vital spirit ; and the third upon its own essential essence.

The first mode of action is directed towards sen-

* Commeut. in Aristot. Metaph. lib. 4. cap. 2. See also Note I. at ' the end of the Volume.

358 ARABIAN METAPHYSICS.

sible objects. Far from acquiring instruction here, we often meet with great obstacles; for external things are a kind of veil which envelops true sci- ence and knowledge. The second only obtains an imperfect intuition, or a confused assemblage of objects ; but when directed upon its own essence, it then confers knowledge. By the third action we acquire complete and perfect intuition. Its atten- tion is absorbed in the contemplation of necessary existence. It annihilates itself ; it vanishes like a vapour. Its own essence, and all other essences of things, disappear before that one Being, who at once possesses unity, truth, grandeur, sublimity and power.

Celestial bodies have three attributes ; one by which they throw light, heat, and rarefaction over inferior substances ; the second relates to their own nature, their happiness, holiness, purity, and power of rapid motion ; and the third refers to the Su- preme Being, whose will they execute, whose power they recognise, and whose presence they perpetually enjoy. Man ought to imitate these three kinds of attributes. To conform himself to the first, he ought to extend a benevolent protection to all ani- mal natures, and to all plants, and endeavour to preserve them in a perfect condition. To bring himself under the influence of the second attribute, he should preserve himself from all impurities ; practise ablutions ; pay great attention to the pro- prieties of the body and of dress ; and use suitable exercise, and even circular movements, though he should thereby experience giddiness of the head. In reference to the third attribute, he should

THEOPHILUS. 359

shun all obstacles from sensible objects ; shut his eyes and ears ; repress all flights of imagination ; and reduce all his faculties to a certain state of languor, until he approaches a state of pure intel- lectuality.

Arrived at this high state of perfection, man will learn that his own essence does not differ from the essence of the Supreme Being ; that there is really but one universal essence. The Divine Essence is like the rays of the material sun which expand over opaque bodies, and which appear to proceed from the eye, though they are only reflected from its sur- face. All beings distinct from mere matter, which possess this knowledge, are identified with the di- vine essence; for knowledge is nothing but this essence itself. These beings are, therefore, not dif- ferent, they are only one and the same. Multipli- city, variety, and aggregation appertain only to bodies. The sensible world is only the shadow of the Divine world.

Theophilus further remarks, " In considering the number of his organs, and the variety of their func- tions, man would appear to be a compound being ; but in lookinsc asjain at the secret tie which unites all these organs, and their principle of action, man shows himself to be truly but an individual being. This unity is derived from the unity of the vital principle. ^^

This philosopher led a life of singular abstraction, and enjoyed fits of pure intellectual ecstasy. In one of these he afiirms that he saw the supreme and celestial sphere, in which the essence of im-

360 AKABIAN METAPHYSICS.

materiality resided. All joy and beauty dwelt here, and the sight was the most ravishing imaginable. He perceived a spiritual Being, who was neither the first of beings, nor the sphere itself; without, how- ever, its being different from both. It was like the image of the sun produced in a mirror, which is neither the sun itself, nor the mirror.*

*** See Geor. Elmacinus, Historia Saracen. Lugd. 1625; Assemani, Historia Arabum. Rome 1/19; Bayle — articles, Alchabitius, Alchindus, Averroes, Almacin; Peringer, Historia Linguae et Erudit. Arabum, Al- pini, 1694 ; Ludovicus, De Historia Rationalis Philos. apud Arabos et Turcas ; Nagel, De Studio Philos. Graecse inter Arabos ; Fabricius, Bib. Graec. De Viris quibusdam illustribus apud Arabos ; The Histories of Philosophy by Brucker, Tiedemann, and Tennemann; Bodiiguez de Castro, Bibl. Espagnole, book 1st.

* 'I

Theoph. Philosophus Autodidactus, edition by Pocock.

THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS. 361

CHAPTEE, XXXIII. THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS.

The metaphysical notions of the Persian So- pliists are but very imperfectly kno^^Ti. They are shrouded and enveloped in a mighty maze of ec- static rapture and frantic abstraction. Their phi- losophy is but a jumT)le of most of the opinions of the Oriental nations, -with a few slight peculiarities belonging to the Persian nation.

The Sophists considered the human mind to be under the direct influence of the Divine nature. This influence they designated by the terms ema- nation, call, proclamation, attraction, &c. They declared that the path which conducted to God, was the commencement of that which introduced you to the bosom of the Eternal himself, and which placed you in full possession of the true spiritual absorption.

The doctrine of absolute unitv, maintained and enforced by the New Platonists, was also a fa- vourite pliilosophical dogma of the Persian So- phists. They affirmed that every man whose heart

362 THE PERSIAN SOPHISTS.

was free from doubt, knew, with the most perfect certainty, that there was but one Being in all na- ture. I and the Divinity are the same thing. The Sophists also represented the body as a sort of prison-house for the mind or soul. " Do you wish to enjoy true liberty ?" say they, " then disengage yourself from the vain illusions which obstruct you, and take refuge in the Divine essence, where truth exclusively resides." On the doctrine of Divine emanations they remark that "This universe is only a small meandering rivulet from the ocean of Divine Beauty and Perfection." Pour species of Divine manifestation are distinguished; namely, iirst, the contemplative mind sees the absolute es- sence, under the figure or representation of some corporeal being; secondly, he sees this absohtte unity under one of its attributes of action, as the giving of what is needful ; the third appears under the form of one of the attributes which constitute its own essence, as science or life; and in the fourth, the contemplative spirit loses its conscious- ness in its existence.

The Sophists enveloped their disquisitions on the mind of man with a crowd of fables and allegories. To assist the flights of contemplative ardour and ecstasy, they recommended the practice of ab- stinence, watchings, silence, restraint of the appe- tites ; a renouncement, in fact, of all bodily plea- sures. They urged that men should bring themselves to a state of apathetic insensibility, in order that they might fully realize the delights of celestial beatitude.

AVENPACE. 363

AVENPACE.

Little is now known of the metaphysical specu- lations of this author. He was a physician, cul- tivated mathematical learning, and had studied the works of Aristotle with great zeal and attention.

His peculiar ideas on the mind of man are con- tained in a letter entitled " The Conjunction of the Understanding loith Man." In this fragment he supposes that all intelligent things are produced or created ; and that everything which is produced of this intellectual natiu'e, is possessed of an essential character or quality. The understanding has the power, by virtue of its own peculiar natm-e, to de- tach this essential character from things, and make it an object of abstraction. He concludes that the human understanding is a uniform thing in all mankind ; and that it is a separate and independent thino' from matter in all its forms and modifica- tions. It may be remarked here, that this writer's notions are but very imperfectly expomided, and seem shrouded in a more than usual portion of mvsticism.*

* See IMalcolm's History of Persia; Journal des Savans, 1821 et 1822 ; Sufismus, sive Theosophiee Persarum Pantheistica. Berlin, 1821 ; and Note J. at the end of the Volume.

364 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS.

The origin of those speculative opinions, which sprang from the minds of what are termed the Ca- balistic Philosophers, is enveloped in great obscu- rity. Several learned and lengthened controversies have arisen out of their history, relative to their precise opinions on many important doctrines which they profess to discuss. It seems, however, to be pretty generally considered at the present day, that thek speculative views are a compound of theo- logical, philosophical, and mystical opinions ; and that a great portion of the attention which this sect excited in their own day, as well as that which they have subsequently obtained from modern histo- rians, arose from the allegorical, mysterious, and symbolical language in which they clothed all their thoughts and principles.

The chief divisions of the Cabalistic doctrines are the following.

Out of nothing, nothing can be produced; be- cause the distance between existence and non-exist-

CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 365

ence is infinite. Matter, though achnitted to be something, is an imperfect thing, and cannot he self-existent. The Creator of all things is a Spirit, eternal, uncreated, and of infinite intelligence, hav- ing witlun itself all life and motion, as attributes of its nature. This Creative Spirit fills all space, and is called En-Soph, the Infinite Deity. This spiritual power is the fountain of all created exist- ences, which emanate from it, but are neverthe- less united with it. The universe, and everything we behold in it, is an emanation, which displays the attributes and properties of this Pirst Cause to human intelligence.

Anterior to creation, all space was filled mth the Or Haen-Soph, or Infinite Intellectual Light. When the Divine volition willed the creation of nature, the eternal light hitherto difiiised through infinite space, withdrew to an equal distance, in every direction, from a central point, as a sphere of operations where all things were to be created. There are traces left in this vacated space of the existence of the Divine essence, and these traces or detached portions of Infinite Intelligence are to l)ecome the seeds of future worlds. Erom a cer- tain point in the concave surface of the eternal Kght which envelops the opaque sphere, the crea- tive emanation is first exerted, and the rays of in- telligence or mind emerge in straight Knes into the abyss of darkness or non-entity. This beam of light effected a communication between creative agency and non-entity, through the means of which future worlds can be produced. Through the

'^GQ CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS.

opening caused by this beam of light, various streams of intelligence flow, in clivers distances from the centre, and are separated from each other by dark portions of space. There are ten of these circles of light, which are called Sephir^ or Splendoks.

The first emanation from the Living Eountain, is the rectilineal beam, and this is the source of all other emanations, or creative existences. This rectilineal emanation is designated by the name of Adam Caijmus, the first man, the primary effect of Divine power, the Son of God. These Sephirse are fountains from which flow every created thing subordinate to this Adam Cadmus, and are named in the following order : Intelligence, or the Crown, Knowledge, Wisdom, Strength, Beauty, Greatness, Glory, Stability, Victory, Dominion. These must not, however, be considered in the light of mere agents or instruments of the Divine operations, but simply media though which creative energy manifests its power. They are not detached por- tions of the Divine Essence, but purely attributes, virtues, or powers, possessing an individual but de- pendent existence, through the mediation of Adam Cadmus, the primary emanation.

In the Ensophic world, or world of infinity, there are four inferior worlds or emanations, depending, however, upon the superior one. These have ap- propriate designations. Aziluth, is the world of emanation which produces the Sephirse ; Brish, embraces certain sj)iritual natures or forms which derive their essence from the Sephirae; Jezirah,

CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS. 867

or the world of forms ; and Asiah, or the visible and material world, comprehending every thing susceptible of motion, composition, division, or de- composition.

These derivative or secondary worlds may be considered as evolutions or expansions of the Divine nature, and possess more or less splendour, in pro- portion to their distance from the centre of Eternal Light. The last and most remote emanation is MATTER, which is produced by a species of re-action of the divine light, in receding from the fountain, whereby it becomes so attenuated as to be absorbed in darkness, and nothing but an opaque substance is left as a residue. This matter or residue is only one degree removed from non-entity. It has no separate or independent existence, but is purely a modification of the emanative power of the Eternal Light.

These derivative or secondarv worlds have vari- ous orders of creative beings. Those in Aziluth, are superior to spirits, and are denomiated Persons. The beinsrs of the second world are called Thrones, on account of the authority they exercise over other natures of an Angelic order, which inhabit the third world. The fourth region is that devoted to evil spirits, the refuse of emanation. These are the Authors of evil ; but they are always aspiring towards the Sephirse, and will, in the revolution of ages, return once more into the fountain of Eternal Light.

The human soul, which proceeds by emanation, is of the same order as the Eternal Mind. When

368 CABALISTIC METAPHYSICS.

united with tlie body, it forms a complex creation, endowed with reason, and capable of action. This soul consists of four parts, the principle of vitality, the principle of motion, the power of intelligence, and the divine principle by which it can contem- plate, and hold intercourse with, the Ensophic world.

All souls were created at once, and existed in the first emanation, Adam Cadmus. Every hu- man soul has two guardian angels, created by emanation at the time of the production of souls. The human mind is connected with the Divine nature, lilve the radii of a circle with their centre.

The Divine energy upholds all things. When this energy is exerted, new forms of life and being are produced ; when it is withheld or lies dormant, the streams of life return again to their proper fountain from whence they came.*

* See Enfield's His. Philo. Vol. 2. p. 220 ; Menasseh Ben Israel, De Great, p. 27 ; Reimann, His. Theol. Jud. ; Budd, Introd. Philos. Heb. ; Burgonovo, Select. Cabb. Dogm.; Basnage, Hist. ; Brucker, Hist. Crit. Philos. ; Wolf, Bibliotheca Hsebr. ; Hottinger, Biblioth. Orient. ; Morus, Fundamenta Philos. sive Cabbal. ; Helmont, Dialogi Cabalistici.

ox THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 3G9

CHAPTEH XXXV. ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS.

The metaphysical opinions of the Jews after their complete dispersion over almost every civilized country in the world, are not of very great import- tance. The principal service they rendered to mental philosophy, was their diffusing the knowledge of many of the speculative opinions of the Greeks, among those nations they visited for the purposes of mercantile traffic and gain. This tended in many cases to keep alive an interest in those ancient mental theories and systems, even among a class of but comparatively learned people, and very incompetent to appreciate, to the full extent, their nature and worth.

At what precise time the Jews became acquainted with the speculative philosophy of other eastern nations, it is a difficult matter to determine. But certain it is, that there were learned persons among the Jews who obtained considerable notoriety for their knowledge of foreign speculation, and for their amalgamation of it with their own Hebrew notions. Simon Magus, Dositheus, and Menander,

* 2b

370 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OP THE JEWS.

are instances of this. It is commonly affirmed that they were all three well acquainted with Oriental opinions as to the nature of Deity and the human soul ; and that they zealously laboured to form something approaching to systematical theories, out of the miscellaneous and scattered fragments of philosophy they had collected to- gether, from divers eastern nations.

It is well known that the Jews were, at a later period of their history, divided into several sects, who grounded their differences in rites and ceremo- nies upon certain speculative tenets. The chief of these sects were the Sadducees, the Karseites, the Pharisees, and the Essenes. The Sadducees main- tained the materiality of the human soul. It died with the body. Neither had angels or spirits any separate existence from the corporeal frames or vest- ments in which they were enveloped. They believed in the existence of the true God, the supreme and intelligent Governor of the universe. His perpe- tual and providential care was also a tenet of their creed. The human a\t11 was, however, free from any interference or control from this cause ; and this was the reason for the obligatory nature of all moral and religious institutions. The homogene- ous nature of man was a point they zealously main- tained, without any conditions or compromise what- ever.*

The speculative tenets of the Karseites were some- what different from those of the Sadducees. The for- mer affirmed that all created existences derived tlieir

* Josei)lms. DeBfll. J 1. 2 o V2.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS. 371

Origin from an uncreated and eternal Deity, to whom they bear no resemblance whatever. The Supreme Being rules and governs every thing ; the human mind is under His influence to a certain extent, but at the same time its voluntary powers and ener- gies are maintained to their full extent unimpaired. The human soul is immortal, and, if virtuous, goes after death to dwell with celestial intelligence for ever ; but if unworthy and wicked, is subjected to suffering and disgrace.*

The Pharisees were a powerful and influential sect among the Jews. Their metaphysical opinions were that the universe is the work of one intelligent and eternal God, who governs all things by the word of his power. Man is under the divine in- fluence, but still his will is free to act. The soul is spiritual and immortal, and will be rewarded in a future life accordins^ to merits or demerits in this life. There are other spiritual existences besides man ; as good and bad angels. f

The opinions of the Essenes were that the hu- man soul was immortal, that it was constituted of a very subtile kind of ether ; that it was in a state of exile or imprisonment in this earthly body ; and that when it was released by death, it would, if good, wing its way to celestial and happy regions beyond the ocean, and, if bad, to where there was unceasing lamentation and woe. The Deity, by in- finite wisdom, created all things, and by His provi- dential care maintains and supports them. I

* R. Japhet. Lev. Conf. Wolf. Bill. Heh.

t JosepliTis. Ant. .Tud. 1. \3. c. 9. + Josephus. De Bell. J. 1. 2. c 12.

2 B 2

372 ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS.

After the destruction of Jerusalem, and tlie dis- persion of its inhabitants, little is known of the speculations of the learned among the Jews. Their peculiar philosophical notions seem, for a long pe- riod, to have been buried in oblivion. It is stated, however, that so early as the year one hundred and thirty-eight of our era, a Jewish school was estab- lished by Akibha, at Lydda or Dioscopolis, and that he had as many as twenty-four thousand stu- dents.* The peculiar opinions he held Avere sup- posed to have been a compound of Pythagorean and Cabalistic speculations ; but we have no detailed account of them. After Akibha, Simeon Ben Ja- chai flourished, at the commencement of the third century, and taught the Cabalistic doctrines with great pojoularity among the Jewish people.! After this we hear almost nothing of the public teaching of this peculiar nation, until the beginning of the tenth century, when the Schools of Sora and Pum- beditha were renovated under the auspices of Uabbi Saadias Gaon, a native of Egypt, well skilled in most of the philosophical opinions and systems which had been promulgated for many centuries previous in the Alexandrian Academy. | This Jewish writer composed two works, one called " The Philosopher's Stone," and the other " A Compendium of Jewish Theology ;" the latter illustrated at great length by a series of abstract and logical statements and proofs.

* Zemncli David, ad An. IMiindi. .'57(10. Dayle. Liglitfoot, Hor. Heb. t 2. ]). 4A^). . t Woir.Bib : Hel). Chap. 1. j.. 70:.'. + Gauzii Zemach David, p. 51.

EBEN EZRA. — MOSES MAIMONIDES. 373

Through the influence of the Arabians and Chris- tians, the Jews became acquainted with the Greek philosophy, particularly the works of Aristotle. This gave, in some measure, a new impulse and direc- tion to theu' speculative labours and views. Seve- ral learned men sprang up amongst them, who dis- played great natural aptness for general philoso- phical and mental speculations.

Eben Ezra.

This was a very learned and talented Jew, in Spain, who flourished about the middle of the twelth century, and who cultivated an acquaintance with many branches of philosophy. He was a native of Toledo, and his contemporaries conferred upon him the name of the " admirable," on account of his varied and profound acquirements. In his writ- ings, he treats of philosophy, astronomy, medicine, poetry, grammar, theology, and the interpretation of the sacred books of the Cabalistic Science.

MosES Maimonides.

This philosopher was a native of Cordova, in Spain, and had studied all the Grecian metaphysics, with great attention and success. Among his own sect of the Jews, he excited a spirit of opposition ; and a charge was brought against him of having imbibed some of the doctrines and opinions of Islamism. On this account, he fled from Spain to Egypt. He established a philosophical school at

374^ ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE JEWS.

Caii'o, where his fame soon procured him a large crowd of students and admirers.

A very just remark was made by this learned man, relative to the study of theology, which has called forth imqualiiied approbation from sound thinkers of almost every age since his day. " The- ology," says he, " ought to be preceded by the study of other philosophical branches of knowledge. God can be known only by his works, and the in- vestigation of the laws of nature is the route which will conduct our reason to Him."

Maimonides was the author of a work on Logic, called Miloth Higayon. This treatise was origi- nally written in Arabic, but was afterwards trans- lated into Hebrew, by Moses Eben Tibbon. Mai- monides follows Aristotle's method, though he en- deavours to make it applicable to his own peculiar theological views.

Tliis learned Jew was also the writer of a work On Psychology, in which the various powers and faculties of the mind are examined and commented on. This work presents a curious medley of no- tions ; and is, on the whole, the most unintelligible of all Maimonides' speculations.*

*** See Zeltner, Diss, de Beruria, Altdorf, 1/14 ; Rabbi Moses Mik- kozi ; Zeraach David, Hist. Misha. and the writings of Wolf, Basnage, Rowland, Lightfoot, Hottinger, Buddaeus, and Prideaux.

* See Scheycr's " Psychology of Maimonides," Frankfort, 1H45.

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 375

CHAPTER XXXVI.

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND, AS RECOG- NISED BY PHILOSOPHERS UP TO THE NINTH CENTURY.

At this point of the liistory of mental philosophy, we shall make a few remarks upon the different faculties of the mind, which metaphysicians have noticed, and attempted in their writings to define. The number and names of these faculties have oc- casionally undergone changes, in accordance with divers general theoretical systems ; but still we shall be able to give such an outKne, as will answer the purpose of fixing the reader's attention upon the more obvious divisions of our intellectual structure.

The operation which has generally been recog- nised by almost all previous writers, is that of per- ception. There has been great uniformity in the language employed, to describe the nature and limits of this faculty. There can be no act of per- ception unless the mind receives an impression from external objects. This seems to have been

376 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

unanimously agreed to by all reasoners. This power has sometimes been considered under two aspects ; the one mediate and the other immediate. When, for example, we read a book, the letters are what we perceive mimedlately ; while the ideas which are signified by them are what may be considered as perceived mediately.

It is clear from the speculations of almost every writer on the mind, up to this stage of history, that perception claimed and obtained priority of con- sideration before any other mental power. It is also well known, that whatever opinion there might be entertained by different sects of philosophers, as to the evidence which perception affords us to arrive at truth, or to form a decision as to a knowledge of things, there never was any doubt but that it was really and truly through the influence of our organs of perception, that we owed all the informa- tion we had of external nature.

The next important faculty of the mind noticed and discussed by the ancient philosophers was that of memory. This fills an important office in their ideas of the mental economy. It consists in re- taining those simple and complex ideas or notions, which Ave receive from sensation and reflexion. Aristotle and others paid great attention to this power. Its mode of operation was well observed by nearly all the ancients ; and the various degrees of retention enjoyed among men, were accurately noticed, in the very early periods of intellectual history. Memory was seen under two phases ; the one merely keeping the idea for some time before

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 377

it, dwelling upon it, and turning it, as it were, over on every side. This was called contempla- tion ; and the same term is used now to express this phenomenon of memory. We have again another form of memory, namely, the power of reviving certain past ideas or trains of thought, after they have been for a long period absent from the mind's perception. The Grecian philosophers dwelt often on this exhibition of memory ; and seem to have marked the laws of recurrence with great accuracy. They considered memory as a kind of store-house or repository of ideas or notions. Our language of the present day, is strikingly expressive of the same thing.

TVliat are called the laios of memory were accu- rately and scientifically investigated by the ancient metaphysicians. The modes in which they dis- cussed their philosophical principles led them by a direct route to pay great attention to those laws. Attention and repetition were found powerful as- sistants to remembrance. When attention becomes interestedly and intensely fixed, retention and ac- curacy are the necessary results ; and repetition formed in ancient times, as it does now, an ex- ercise of the highest importance in the divers plans of scientific and ordinarv education.

In all the historical epochs of philosophy, we find certain plans and suggestions for aiding and strengthening the power of memory. The every- day practical importance of the faculty, naturally gave rise to these projects for increasing its power and usefulness. Cicero speaks of artificial means

378 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

of strengtliening the retentive principle, and that he found them of service in his own case, in the delivering of his public orations. Several other distinguished men of antiquity availed themselves of these mechanical aids to remembrance.

Of all the ancients, Aristotle seems to have viewed memory in its widest signification. His rules and definitions of it became quite philosophical canons in succeeding ages ; and we find, throughout all the scholastic writings, his notions of this men- tal power were invariably adopted by the school- men of all parties.

The judgment was an important intellectual power among the ancient pliilosophers. They did not define it very accurately; but it seemed to stand for that prompt internal perception of truth, which results from a calm and dispassionate consi- deration of evidence. Among the sceptical sects of antiquity, we seldom find suspicion thrown upon the judgment itself, but chiefly on the materials which were supposed to be submitted to its notice, through the channel of the external senses. The power itself generally escaped unscathed; and where there was doubt as to the reality of its determina- tions, that doubt was attriljuted, by the Scej^tics, to deceptive elements thrown in the path of the judgment, to warp or distort its decisions.

Judgment was often denominated a perceiving or discerning of truth ; just as we speak, in ordi- nary language, of that power at the present time. The various kinds of judgment, or rather, perhaps, the various topics on which it was exercised, were

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 379

often subjects of remark and observation among- the ancients; and distinctive names or epithets were given to these efforts of the judgment, when directed to particular departments of knowledge.

Abstraction was a power of the mind which the earliest metaphysicians recognised. They consider- ed it much in the same light as we do at present. With them, as wdth us, it was the withdrawal of an idea or general notion from others with which it might be accidentally or necessarily connected, and considering it apart. The mathematical stu- dies of the ancients were highly instrumental in bringing this faculty of the mind perpetually before them, and of impressing them with a lively convic- tion of its great usefulness and importance.

Reasoning, in the general opinion of the ancients, was related more intimately to the dialectic art, than to the judgment. Reasoning was of a more light and artistic character than the latter. Gra- vity and circiunspection were the characteristics of the judgment. Reasoning, on the contrary, seemed not to have much necessary connection with truth, and not by any means to possess a very lively and disinterested affection for her. Mere reasoners were always plentiful, and to be found every where, and ready armed upon all questions ; but men of judg- ment were more rare. E/casoning often coquetted with error, but judgment showed more steadiness and fidelity. The former often brought temporary discredit upon philosophy by attempting to show " the weaker to be the stronger reason ;" but the power of the judgment was a prudent and faithful

380 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

friend, whose opinion was always valuable, and car- ried lasting esteem and respect with it.

Imagination was a well known and universally recognised faculty of the mind among the ancients. It stands prominently out from the other faculties, and enjoys a more striking individuality of charac- ter. It is the source of many pleasures and pains, and exercises a powerful influence on the weal or woe of mankind. This the olden philosophers were not slow to perceive ; but I think we have no very decided evidence to show, that they were so fuUy sensible of the immense power of this faculty, in contributing to our rational pleasures, as more mo- dern speculators on the mind have proved them- selves to be. The cultivation of imaginative excel- lencies in the last two centuries, has far exceeded anything which the ancients ever performed, or had any conception could be achieved.

But perhaps the most common division of the mental faculties which the ancient metaphysicians made, was that which placed them under two classes, — those of the understanding^ and those of the icill. We meet with this classification every way, in the history of philosophy. And we cannot help suspecting that this division must have pre- sented some obvious advantages, or been considered as the most natural arrangement, when we find it so generally adopted. At bottom, the faculties of the understanding and the icill stand for those which we in modern times call the intellectual and actioe powers of man. Our mode of treating and illustrating these does not differ from that adopted

ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 381

by the ancient sages of Greece, nor from that which all the Fathers of the Church recognised.

And it may be observed, in passing, that there is notlimg in nature more distinctly marked than the active and contemplative powers of the mind, There is no mistake about their respective modes of ac- tion ; but there is a great variety of human cha- racter resulting from the irregular manner in which they are distributed among mankind. The active and speculative powers are never found in full per- fection in any single individual. Indeed this is impossible ; for it falls little short of demanding that a man should be moving and still, at one and the same moment. Wherever a mind is naturally inclined to speculation or contemplation, there is a corresponding depression of his active energies ; and, on the other hand, where physical and men- tal activity is the prominent feature, there the spe- culative powers become correspondingly inert. And this is a wise and providential arrangement. It seems impossible to conceive how the affairs of the world could be carried on, were this not the case. The most profound and the most important specu- lative principles or systems would l^e a dead letter, if they were not matm^ed and nourished by the every-day active powers of the mass of mankind. And again, if action Avere not regulated and guided by contemplative minds, no beneficial end could be attained.

In discussing systems of education, the active and speculative powers of individuals should be carefully studied. The active greatly preponderate

382 ON DISTINCT FACULTIES OF THE MIND.

over the passive or contemplative powers. Still they ought both to be provided for in all compre- hensive schemes of instruction, either public or private. If this be neglected, or imperfectly at- tended to, no happy result can possibly follow.

REMARKS ON FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 383

CHAPTER XXXVII.

GENERAL REMARKS ON FACULTIES OF THE MIND, AND OF WHAT MAY BE URGED AGAINST THEIR INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE, NATURE, AND OPERA- TION.

It must be obvious to every reader of the history of mental philosophy, that there were, in almost every age, a small number of persons Avho seemed inclined to adopt the absolute unity, or singleness of the mind of man. It is difficult to emT)ody the general arguments for this opinion, principally from their extreme subtility, and the imperfections of language. But the fact is quite clear, that the usual doctrine of separate faculties, was not very cordially embraced by some, at least, of the emi- nent sages of antiquity.

As this abstract question is interesting to all expounders of metaphysical doctrines, I shall state what I conceive to be the chief arguments against distinct faculties or powers of the mind. This shall be done fully, without confining myself to what may be considered as the exclusive opinions

384 GENERAL REMARKS ON

of the ancients on this point. Allusions to modern writers and modern opinions will be made, in order that the reader may have as full a view of the arguments on each side, as I am able to furnish. I beg to state, however, that I do not wish to have the following observations considered as my own individual sentiments on this subject ; but simply as conveying a few thoughts on a mental hypo- thesis opposite to that which is most commonly adopted by writers on the human mind.

Judging from a cursory glance, there appears to be little foundation for the doctrine of distinct or separate faculties of the mind. Were it composed or made up of parts or principles independent of each other, we should instantly be able to recog- nise them, and point out their specific differences, as readily as we do between an arm or a leg of our own bodies. When we attend carefully, however, to what passes in our own mind, and l)ring the matter in dispute to the test of consciousness, we can perceive no real difference between many men- tal operations which are commonly referred to dis- tinct faculties. Let us take a case for illustration. Almost all metaphysicians agree that judgment and imagination are very different powers from each other. But in what does that difference con- sist ? What is it that constitutes them two dis- tinct faculties ? Can theii* specific differences be clearly pointed out ? I think not. When a person proposes, for example, a question to me, that two and three make five, I readily solve it ; but I can- not do this without bringing to my recollection

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 385

(by an effort similar to that which is called imagi- nation) what the terms two and three stand for. Now what is this effort of the mind which suggests the ideas we have attached to the words tioo and three ? Is it not the same mental power as that which forms other combinations which are usually referred to imag-ination ? Let any one attend to what passes in his own mind, when he goes over again a»y simple proposition in geometry without having the diagram before him. He will perceive that he cannot take a single step in the process of demonstration without employing what is termed the faculty of imagination. At first he will form a conception of the diagram ; and then commence to show the numerous relations which subsist between the divers parts of it. But the same mental power which is here employed, may also be perceived, when a person desires me to furnish him with an account of an accident which befel a mutual friend in America, or any other distant part of the world. The ideas a1)out which the mind is em- ployed in these two cases are very different ; but still that faculty of the mind by which I solve the geometrical problem, and that by whicli I give an account of the accident which befel my friend, seem, as far as the testimony of consciousness goes, to be one and the same. When the request is made to give a faithful account of the accident in question, I immediately form a conception of my friend's person, similar to what I do of the dia- gram; and then begin to relate the various and serious circumstances attending the accident, by the * 2 c

386 GENERAL REMARKS ON

same mental processes, to all appearance, which were used in solving the proposition in geometry.

Shall we say, then, there is no difference be- tween imagination and judgment ; two faculties which have been distinguished by mankind in all ages ? The true answer to this question, I appre- hend, is, that though mankind have always made such a distinction in our mental nomenclature, yet that distinction arises solely from the circumstance that the ideas the mind is employed about, are (if I may be allowed such phraseology) true in the one case, and false in the other; or in other words, that real and fictitious representations con- stitute the onlv difference between these two men- tal powers. Even philosophers themselves point out no palpable distinction, save what arises from the truth or falsehood of the ideas employed in both cases. A writer, for example, who gives an account of any transaction just as it happened, without adding the slightest colourable circum- stance, (if ever such a T^a^iter did exist), would be called, in the language of philosophical criticism, a Avriter without any imagination. Another author, however, w^ho gives a description of the same trans- action, but amplifies and distorts every incident which really took place, would be called a man of a fine and lively imagination. But what is the difference between them ? Only this, that the one gives, or is supposed to give, a real representation of facts ; and the other, a fictitious one, or at least a narrative mixed with a goodly portion of fictitious circumstances.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 387

It appears, then, that the word imagination is employed by mankind to denote what has no foun- dation in truth ; and this is all they mean when they speak about the faculty of imagination. We very frequently find, when we A^dsh to convince individuals of the truth of any proposition in na- tural or moral philosophy, with which they are previously unacquainted, and which seems contrary to their experience, they will immediately charge you with dealing in fiction, and employing the fa- culty of imagination instead of that of reasoning. Why ought the exercise of the imagination to be so strictly guarded against in philosophical disqui- sitions ? Why the philosopher will tell you, be- cause it would lead you from the truth.

The word imagination may also be considered, in many cases, as only another word for invention, mien a man sits do^\Ti to A^Tite a novel or a play, he must be conscious, if he be capable, or in the habit, of reflectmg on what passes in his mind, that he employs no other intellectual faculty than if he were to sit doA\Ti and write a book on metaphysics, or any other branch of philosophy, in which inven- tion is said chiefly to be employed. By way of illus- tration : to say that the one author has invented a novel or a play, and of the other that he has imagined a book on metaphysics, would be a departure from both common and philosophical language, but it would be no very absurd statement of the fact ; and the phrase would enable us to form as correct notions respecting the faculty by which the former author composed his novel or play, or the latter

2c 2

388 GENERAL REMARKS ON

his treatise on the miiicl, as if we were to use the common phraseology that the novelist had been exercising his imagination, and the metaphysician his invention.

It may be objected to these observations, that imagination, and what in some systems of men- tal philosophy is called conception, are here con- founded together. But I would observe, that their difference has not been clearly pointed out, even by those who have so ably and zealously contended they were distinct faculties. Mr. Dugald Stewart, in his chapter on Conception,* says, " The business of conception, according to the account I have given of it, is to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived. But we have, moreover, a power of modifjdng our conceptions, by combining the parts of different ones together so as to form new wholes of our o^vn creation. I I shall employ the word imagination to express this power ; and I apprehend that this is the pro- per sense of the word, if imagination be the power which gives birth to the productions of the poet and the painter. This is not a simple faculty of the mind. It pre-supposes abstraction, to sej)arate from each other qualities and circumstances which have been perceived in conjunction ; and also judg- ment and taste to direct us in forming the combi- nations. If they are made wholly at random, they are proofs of insanity." A little farther on in the chapter he says, " A talent for lively description,

* Philosophy of the lliimnn Mind. Vol. 1. p. VAb.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 389

at least in the case of sensible objects, depends chiefly on the degree in which the describer pos- sesses the power of conception." — " Nor is it merely to the accuracy of our descriptions that this power is subservient ; it contributes more than any thing else to render them striking and expressive to others, by guiding us to a selection of such circum- stances as are most prominent and characteristic ; insomuch that I think it may reasonably be doubted if a person would not write a happier description of an object from the conception, than from the actual perception of it. It has been remarked, that the per- fection of description does not consist in a minute specification of circumstances, but in a judicious selection of them ; and that the best rule for making the selection is, to attend to the particulars that make the deepest impression on our own minds."

Conception, according to the above, is that fa- culty which presents us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived ; and the power of modifying our conceptions is called imagination, which is not a simple faculty, for it pre-supposes abstraction, judgment, and taste. Now, if a talent for lively description arises from possessing the power of conception in a high degree, and this power is said to present us with an exact transcript of what we have felt or perceived, how can we con- sistently say that, in exercising this faculty, we make a ^^ judicious selection'' of our feelings ? Does not ^ ^\judicious selection'"' ^vQ-s\ii\)])0'&Q the exer- cise of abstraction, judgment, and taste ? Surely.

390 GENERAL REMARKS ON

Then wherein does the difference lie between ima- gination and conception ?

It is said that tliese faculties of the mind, sucli as judgment, imagination, memory, and taste, never exert their power separately, but are always more or less combined with one another. There is no reasoning without memory ; and there can be no taste without imagination, judgment, and memory. If this be the case, how can we ascertain the exist- ence of any mental faculties at all ? If these facul- ties are never perceived in a simple form, we can never be certain that there are any independent faculties whatever. Wliat should we think of a chemist who should strenuously maintain that a certain substance was composed of a number of other substances, T^diich he might call primary ones, when the substance in question had resisted all the chemical processes hitherto known to de- compose it ?

Mr. Locke appears to have been fully aware of the impropriety of talking about the faculties of the mind, and of the difficulty of proving their existence. In one place he says,* " But the fault has been that faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct agents ; for it being asked, what it was that digested the meat on our stomachs, it was a ready and very satisfactory an- swer to say, that it was the digestive faculty . What was it that made anything come out of the body ?

* Kssay on the Human Understanding, "^'ol. 1 . book 2. chap. 21 .

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 391

T\iQ expulsive faculty. What moyed ? Hha motive faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual fa- culty, or the understanding understood ; for fa- culty, ability, and power, I think, are hut different names for the same things ; which ways of speak- ing, when put in more intelligihle words, will, I think, amount to thus much ; — that digestion is performed by something that is able to digest; motion, by something able to move ; and under- standing, by something able to understand."

It may be alleged, that though we can form no abstract notion of the faculties of the mind, any more than we can form an abstract notion of the principle of gravitation, or of the screw or the lever, yet the hypothesis, which is founded on the exist- ence of independent mental faculties, may be fa- vourable to a proper classification of intellectual phenomena, and may assist us in our researches of the mind, in the same way as the principle of gra- vitation, of which we have no conception, has been instrumental in aiding us in our physical investiga- tions. To this it may be replied, that it is a very doubtful proposition that gratuitous principles can ever be instrumental in the discovery of truth — the end and object of all pliilosophy. It is an establish- ed maxim with those philosophers who maintain the doctrine of mental faculties, that we ought to be very cautious in reasoning from material pheno- mena to those of the mind, for we may fancy there is an analogy in a case where, for any thing we can tell, there may not be the slightest resemblance. Therefore, if we have taken a principle for granted

392 GENERAL REMARKS ON

in our physical researches, of which we have no idea, we are not fully warranted in doing the same in investigating the human mind ; for such a mode of proceeding would lead to the grossest ahsurdities. Why are Hartley's System of Vibrations and Aris- totle's Ideal System rejected by many modern phi- losophers ? Because in the one case, we cannot perceive any vibrations ; and in the other, are not conscious of any images, or forms, or species of ex- ternal objects being transmitted by the channel of the senses to the immediate seat of thought. Upon the same principle of reasoning, why ought we to say that there are distinct faculties of the mind, when these faculties cannot be perceived.

The fact seems to be, that philosophers in gene- ral have called certain kinds of ideas, and their various combinations, by the name of faculties, with- out ascertaining the existence, or informing us of the nature of those faculties or powers, by which these ideas are generated, and their combination effected. A knowledge of the faculties and powers seems evi- dently above the reach of human sagacity. The great progress the science of natui*al philosophy has made, is chiefly ascribed to that mode of reason- ing which, recommended by Bacon, commences with an examination of facts, and gradually mounts up to the more general laws of nature. But the phi- losophy of the human mind does not seem to be capable of receiving much aid by a similar mode of investigation. We can only view the mind in a naked state. We are beings that are conscious of ideas, or feelings, or perceptions, and this is all

FACULTIES or THE MIND. 393

we know of our minds ; and whatever may be urged in favour of general laws or principles of the mind, the existence of such laws or princijiles must be always problematical at best ; for we can never be conscious of their mode of operation; and what we are not conscious of, we have little grounds to be- lieve can have any existence.

There is a great difference in prosecuting the study of natural or experimental pliilosophy, and the philosophy of the human mind. In the for- mer, a person may be put in possession of the va- rious improvements and discoveries that have been made during many ages, without undergoing a hundredth part of the bodily and mental toil that was found necessaiT before the orio^inal inventors could bring these improvements and discoveries to light. But in the science of the human mind there has no method been yet found to facilitate, in an equal degree, the knowledge of discoveries in this department of human inquiry. As much time and attention are frequently necessary to enable us to form correct notions of intellectual appearances, treated of by metaphysical writers, as would bring these appearances to our view by our own individual and unassisted efforts.

There are many causes of this difference. One of the principal, however, is, that no one can un- derstand what another writes on metaphysics un- less he has pre\dously learned the art of scrutinizing his own thoughts ; or, as some say, of exercising his own consciousness. This art bears, in a great measure, the same relation to the science of the

394 GENERAL REMARKS ON

raind, as experiment does to natural philosophy. To many it is an art hoth difficult in its attainment and difficult in its practice. But it is necessary ; and until a person has learned it, and can practise it with ease and dexterity, he cannot reasonahly hope to reap much pleasure or improvement from perusing treatises on the human mind. Without this preliminary knowledge, such writings must necessarily appear almost unintelligihle, and will speedily disgust the reader with a constant repeti- tion of words and phrases to which he can attach no clear or definite notions ; and which cannot fail to produce disappointment, inasmuch as they pretend to he descriptive of mental operations, whose existence, for want of reflecting on his own mind, he is unahle to perceive.

To those, however, who are in the hahit of exer- cising their consciousness, I suhmit the few fol- lowing observations on abstraction. I know they will differ from the opinions of many eminent phi- losophers of the present day ; but in inquiries of this nature, authority considered merely as such, however great and weighty, must go for nothing, where not supported by the evidence of conscious- ness. It is to this power that all appeals must be made for determinino; the truth or falsehood of propositions in metaphysics ; for without such a tribunal, this science would soon relapse into that state of comparative confusion, from which it has so lately been rescued.

It appears to me that general principles, which are said to be formed by the faculty of abstrac-

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 395

tion, are nothing but certain words representing a number of individual thoughts, perceptions, or, if you will, observations ; and that it requires no other faculty to speak or think of such general principles, than to speak or think of any one of the individual thoughts or perceptions that com- pose them. All projected bodies, for example, have a tendency to fall to earth again. This is a general principle in natural philosophy, and is formed, it is commonly said, by abstraction. But when we come to examine how the mind arrives at this conclusion or general principle, we shall see there is nothing that ought to induce us to attribute its formation to any other operation of the mind than that by which we perceive and speak about individual ob- jects. Let us suppose a being possessed of all the susceptibilities of knowledge which we possess, to make his appearance on this globe. The first time he saw a stone thrown up into the air, he would 2)e)^cewe that after a certain time had elapsed, it would fall again to the ground. A second time he would perceive the same result ; and if similar experiments were made with projected bodies a thousand times with different substances, and "with different velocities, he would perceive the same effect, that all these bodies would ultimately return to the earth from whence they were thrown. Hence he would conclude, that all projected bodies would return to the earth again : which is nothing more than an expression of a number of individual per- ceptions.— The first time he saAV the stone fall, it was, agreeably to the common theory, by the faculty

396 GENERAL ilEMARKS ON

of perception ; and is there not every reason to believe that the last time, as well as the interme- diate ones, were perceived by the same power ?

In like manner, it may also be slio^vn, that general principles in morals and politics are formed in the same way as the preceding. When we say that all men are more or less influenced in their actions by self-love, we only mean that we, as well as others, have always perceived that the greater part of the exertions of mankind tend to the grati- fication of some passion or appetite. Unless the individual observations, on which general principles are founded, have come under our view, we cannot be said to understand them, or give a rational assent to them. On the contrary, in proportion to the number of our indi^ddual observations, the truth of such moral principles will be more uni- versally acknowledged.

The resemblance and disagreement among the objects of nature form the foundation on which all abstract or general reasoning is built. But the mere circumstance of the mind expressing a re- semblance or analogy among a number of indi- vidual objects, cannot warrant us in maintaining there is any other faculty employed for tliis pur- pose, than that which enables us to affirm or deny any thing about any individual object of thought or perception. Here is certainly a difference of effect, but if we attend to our consciousness, no difference of cause is observable. The perception of reseml)lance of colour, for instance, between two or more objects, is perceived as quickly, and is

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 397

as much an individual object of thought, as the figure, density, or any other quality of the objects. That faculty by which we perceive the figure and other qualities, and that by which we perceive the resemblance of colour, must, I think, be considered as one and the same.

The manner in which general terms are said to originate, throws no light upon the faculty of abstraction. The commonly received theory of the origin of these terms is that mentioned by Locke, Condillac, and Adam Smith. The last author, in a Dissertation on Languages, prefixed to his Tlieory of Moral Sentiments, says; "The assignation of particular names to denote particular objects — that is, the institution of nouns substantial, would pro- bably be one of the first steps towards the forma- tion of language. The particular cave, whose cover- ing sheltered the savage from the weather ; the particular tree, whose fruit relieved his hunger ; the particular fountain whose water allayed his thirst, would first be denominated by the words cave, tree, fountain ; or, by whatever other appellations he might think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark them. Afterwards when the more en- larged experience of this savage had led him to observe, and his necessary occasions obliged him to make mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other fountains, he would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects, the same name by which he had been accustomed to express the similar he was first acquainted with. And thus these words, which were originally the proper names of indivi-

398 . GENERAL REMARKS ON

duals, would each of them insensibly become the common name of a multitude. What constitutes a species ^^'' he continues, " is merely a number of objects bearing a certain degree of resemblance to one another ; and, on that account, denominated by a single appellation, which may be applied to express any one of them," Condillac also says,* " A child calls by the name of tree, the first tree which we show him. A second tree which he sees recals to him the same idea, and he designates it by the same name ; he gives the same name to a third, the same to a fourth. Thus we find that the word tree, applied at first to an individual object, becomes the name of a class or genus, an abstract idea,t comprehending all trees in general."

There is nothing in these passages respecting the origin of general names that requires any other fa- culty than that which treats of individual objects. What constitutes a species, says Mr. Smith, is only a single name given to a number of objects bearing a certain degree of similarity to one an- other. But why should we suppose that a different faculty is required to give a name to an individual

* " Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le i^remier arbre que nous lui montrons. — Un second arbre qu'il voit ensuite lui rappelle la meme idee ; il lui donne le meme nom ; de meme a un troisieme, a un quatrieme ; et voilii le mot d'Arbre, donne d'abord a un individu, qui devient pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une idee abstraite qui comprend tons les arbres en general." See also Locke, Essay on the Human Under- standing, Book ii. c. ii. sect. 9 ; and Book iii. c iii. sect. 7.

t Abstract idea, or abstract term, for I am doubtful whether " idee" means, in this passage, precisely what we should understand by idea, when speaking simply of the act of percention.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 399

object from that which gives a name to a multi- tude of objects that bear a certain degree of resem- blance ? The savage and the child, upon the as- sumed theory now stated, give the name of tree to the first tree they perceive, or that is pointed out to them ; and when a number of trees of various kinds are exhibited to their view, thev denominate them by the term tree^ because they resemble, in a variety of particulars, the tree or trees they al- ready know. But I see no reason for creating a fa- culty for the purpose of giving this number of trees a common name, merely because their resemblance is not so complete as to amount to identity. To say that where the resemblance between two or 'more objects is so great as to constitute them of the same kind, we assign names to them by means of one faculty of the mind ; and where that resem- blance is not so evident, we give names to ol)jects by means of another faculty of the mind ; is, in my opinion, neither philosophical nor just. Be- sides, may it not be asked, that as no two objects in nature are precisely the same in all particulars, at what point of resemblance does the one faculty cease to act and the other begin ?

Mr. Locke seems to have employed the word ab- straction in a more limited sense than modern phi- losophers have done. He says, " The acts of the mind, wherein it exerts its power over its simple ideas, are these : — Pirst, combining several simple ideas into one compound one. Secondly, bringino* two ideas together, and setting them by one an- other; bv which we come at all ideas of relation.

400 GENERAL REMARKS ON

Thirdly, separating' our ideas from other ideas that accompany them in their real existence." To this last act of the mind he gives the name of abstrac- tion ; to the other two acts he gives no names whatever.* I believe that most metaphysicians since Mr. Locke's time have referred all these dif- ferent acts of the mind to abstraction. The dis- tinctions, however, this philosopher has here point- ed out, would certainly justify us in referring them to distinct faculties, as much as manv other dis- tinctions that are commonly referred to separate principles. It may be considered as something curious that he should say in his third and fourth books that general ideas are fictitious contrivances of the mind.

Mr. Stewart observes,! "This poAver of consider- ing certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest ; or, as I would rather choose to de- fine it, the power which the understanding has of separating the combinations which are presented to it, is distinguished by logicians by the name of ahstr action.''' Had the celebrated author confined himseK to the fii'st part of this sentence, as con- veying what he meant by the faculty of abstrac- tion, his definition would have been intelligible enough : but being desirous to define it better, he has only rendered it more obscure. Eor what is meant by combinations presented to the mind I am at a loss to conjecture. If Mr. Stewart means that

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book 2. c. 12. sect. 1. t Elements of tlie Philosophy of the Human Mind, Vol. 1. )). 156.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 401

certain thoughts are presented to the mind in a complex or compounded state, and that the mind has the power of analysing them into their elemen- tary parts, then I differ from him. The thoughts of man must be considered as individual objects, apparently incapable of analysis. If they can be analysed, they can be subdivided ; and what is ca- pable of subdivision, may be divided ad infinitum. Then if thoughts are infinitely divisible, they must be infinitely extended; and what is infinitely di- visible and extended, can have no elementary parts ; consequently thoughts must be nothing at all. — What a fine doctrine for the Sceptics !

But if the first part of this sentence be a defini- tion of what Mr. Stewart calls abstraction, viz. the power of considering certain qualities or attributes of an object apart from the rest, then I say that the mind never does anything else but abstract ; — with this qualification, however, that the mind only considers one quality or attribute of an object at the same instant, and not more than one, as Mr. Stewart here affirms. It is a commonly received maxim, that the mind can only be occupied with one idea at the same time. When a tree comes before my view, I do not in the same instant of time contemplate its height, its thickness, its figure, its extension, the colour of its bark and leaves, and the disposition of its branches. If I attend to one of these qualities or attributes, the rest must be excluded from my mind at the moment the other is under contemplation. These attributes must come into my mind in succession, and cannot all * ' 2d

402 GENERAL REMARKS ON

be present to it, so to speak, at the same indiyidual point of time. This is sufficient, I think, to shew, that the human mind is always employed about in- dividual objects, and that what are called complex or general ideas have really no existence, in the sense in which they are commonly considered.

Such phrases as compoimding and decompounding our ideas, seimrating the combinations of sense, and many others of a like description, have absolutely no meaning when applied to the mind. When con- fined to the science of chemistry, they may be very correctly and very usefully employed ; but there is not the slightest analogy to justify their application in mental philosophy. Are we ever conscious of this composition and decomposition among our ideas ? Sulphate of iron and nut-galls are two distinct substances ; but when joined together they make another substance very different from either, and which much resembles, in its properties and appear- ance, the ink I write with. Do we ever see a sim- ple idea. A, for example, entering into combination with another simple idea, B, and forming, by their union, another totally different idea, C ? I think every one who has paid the slightest attention to his own mind, must answer this in the negative. Yet, unless there be appearances of this description ob- servable in our mind, such phrases, making every allowance for metaphorical language, ought to be employed only in a qualified sense ; for instead of enlightening and guiding our judgment, they are apt, in such inquiries, to darken and lead it astray.

If we examine the svstem of mental faculties a

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 403

little more narrowly, we shall find, that instead of its proving conclusive, it is pregnant with dif- ficulties, which are apparently insurmountable. There are very few, if any, of the faculties, accord- ing to the received theory on the subject, which can be considered as acting simply ; for we find by appeals to our consciousness, that they seem to be incapable of being conceived in a single state. What is called the faculty of attention is defined to be that by which we simply think of a particular thing or object. The faculty of reason is also said to be that by which we are able to draw inferences from premises. This is considered a simple faculty, not a compound one. Now, it is utterly incon- ceivable how a man w^ould draw an inference from premises, without paying attention to that inference and those premises ; or, in other words, T\dthout thinking of them. Again, perception is defined to be the faculty by which we perceive things. Now, we cannot draw^ inferences from premises, unless we perceive these inferences and premises. Here, then, we have the faculty of reason, considered a simple faculty, compounded of atten- tion and perception. How many questions arise from these considerations, which it w^ould be very difiicult to solve ? Might we not ask. What is the nature of this faculty of reason, when influenced by these faculties of attention and perception ? What effects would it produce if acting by vii'tue of its own inherent power ? And by what means shall we be able to perceive in what respect it differs from the other powers combined with it ?

2d 2

404 GENEHAL REMARKS ON

Eor the sake of further illustration, we will take another faculty, memory for instance, and we shall find that we cannot look upon it as a simple faculty. It implies perception, attention, and consciousness. When a past idea is present to the mind, we must perceive it, and we must also attend to it, otherwise the words perception and attention have no meaning. And there appears to he so close a connection he- tween consciousness and memory, that we might, without producing an ambiguity, define this latter faculty, that by wliich we are conscious of a past idea. This definition would he in unison with th3 established mode of speaking among the generality of mankind ; for when their memory is taxed to remember any past event, they say, " I am not conscious of having said or done such a thing." A phrase can mean nothing more or less than, " I do not remember having said or done such a thing."*

It must appear evident, upon the slightest con- sideration, that distinct mental faculties can in no way be useful in explaining mental appearances, until the nature of these faculties themselves is well understood, and we are able to furnish a satis- factory explanation of those laws which regulate the simple powers of which they are said to be

* It may be worth while to remark here in passing, that Mr. Stewart, in treating of attention as being a distinct faculty of the mind, says, though several authors have spoken of attention in general terms, he was not aware that any author, ancient or modem, had spoken of it as a separate faculty. But if he will look into Condillac's " Precis des Lemons Prelim inaires, vol. 8 of his works, he will find attention not only enumerated among the mental facidties, but an attempt is made to re- solve several other faculties into it.

PACULTIES OF THE MINJJ. 405

compounded. This is absolutely necessary as a preliminaty step. That wiiich is to serve as an explanation, ought to be clearer and more evident than the thing to be explained, otherwise no ex- planation can be effected. It certainly cannot be considered as an infallible method of arriving at truth, to take a principle for granted, and after- wards prove the truth of the inferences drawn from it. We should demonstrate the truth of the principle first, and the truth of the inferences will consequently be estabKshed. Now, has any meta- physician ever undertaken to show in what manner the faculties of abstraction, judgment, and taste, act upon the faculty of imagination, so as to make it form imaginary appearances ? Or in what way the faculties of consciousness, perception, and atten- jtion act upon memory, by which we are capable of bringing to our recollection past events ? No one, as far as my information goes, has ever undertaken any such thing.

If by mental faculty is simply meant, the power the mind has to do any particular thing, then no one will deny that the mind has faculties who does not deny the active state of the mind. But then the faculties of the understanding must in conse- quence be multiplied to an enormous degree, for every distinct act of the mind. I see a table before me, which I am said to perceive by the faculty of perception ; I look out of my room window and see a man standing in the street ; but can any one pro- duce a single argument to prove that I perceive the man in the street by the same faculty by which

406 GENERAL REMARKS OK

I perceived the table ? Again, when I have medi- tated on the properties of a triangle, and have come to the conclusion, that the three angles are equal to two right ones ; how do I know that I come to this conclusion by the same mental faculty by which I determined that the square of four is six- teen ? It may be said there is a difference in the processes of the mind in the two cases ; but then, I reply, that these processes are not discoverable by consciousness, and consequently the only test of their existence is wanting. The mind can be con- scious only of its ideas ; and therefore it follows clearly, that if we were conscious of any such mental processes, they must necessarily be themselves com- posed of ideas, othermse they could not be objects of our consciousness. Here, then, upon this posi- tion, that we are conscious of these processes, when we are endeavouring to prove that ideas are the result of certain distinct and individual powers or faculties inherent in the mind, we are only all the time striving to prove, that one set of ideas are the cause of the existence of another set : a principle that fact and experience declare we know nothing about.

The system of faculties appears to have been established with a view of satisfying one of the most powerful propensities of the human mind, viz. a desire to know the true cause of every event which falls under its notice. But those who have correct views of mental and material philosophy, know that philosophers do not set out in their in- quiries with a view of ascertaining the causes of

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 407

the phenomena which fall under their ohservation, but to observe those laws which regulate their con- stant conjunction.

We shall here give a quotation from a very acute Avriter on mental subjects, relative to distinct facul- ties of the mind. " If," says he, " the mind pos- sesses powers, it may be asked, upon what they are exercised? The answer must be, upon the objects of mental perception ; which are sensations and ideas. Now, in what manner are we to under- stand the action of the intellect, by means of its powers upon ideas ? Nothing seems more obvious, though nothing be really less so, than the action and reaction of bodies ; but when we argue in this instance analogically from the material to the im- material world, it must be confessed that we are utterly forsaken by the light of reason. To suppose the existence of power at all, may perhaps be nothing else than the hypothesis of men who admit the occult assertion of something, wliich is no object of the understanding, for the purpose of accounting for events. In attributing powers to the mind, it would be well to consider Avhat we mean by the mind; and, before we assert that this acts by its powers upon ideas, how our souls can be shown to be different from our thoughts and feelings. It is yet more embarrassing to con- ceive what is meant by the action of powers upon ideas. Bodies are said to impinge upon and to impel each other, to transmit powers and to communicate motion ; but, when this mode of reasoning is ap- plied to our intellectual nature, a very little reflec-

408 GENERAL REMARKS ON

tion may suffice- to convince us that the analogy is altogether inadmissible."*

To put what may be further urged against the faculty of abstraction in as small a compass and in as clear a light as possible, we shall just state the following. Suppose a certain piece of matter to be possessed only of four qualities, namely, extension, hardness, colour, and figure; and that we desig- nate our ideas corresponding to those qualities by the letters A, B, C, and D. In former times, and particularly among the Schoolmen, it was a pre- vailing opinion, of a numerous party of them at least, that besides the four simple and individual ideas denoted by these four letters, which com- posed all substances, we had another idea (which we call E) made up of, or comprehending, the other four simple ideas ; and this idea E was called substance in general, or an abstract general con- ception. The faculty of abstraction was confined almost exclusively to the producing of these general notions. But it is long since this doctrine of ab- stract general conceptions began to lose ground in England, and at the present day its advocates are few in number. In consequence of this, the pro- vince of abstraction is considerably curtailed ; and is now, I believe, generally understood to be that faculty by which we think of one quality or part of an object, distinct from the rest of the qualities or parts which compose it. Now, when we talk about considering a quality of an object separately

* Academical Questions bv Sir William Drnmmond.

FACULTIES OF THE MIND. 409

from the other qualities which belong to it, we evidently go upon the principle, that we are able to think of all the different qualities of an object at the same moment of time ; a mere gratuitous assumption, unsupported by one single argument from an appeal to mere consciousness. But waving this objection, nay, let us even take it for granted that we can pay attention to many things at a time, still this does not by any means go to prove that the facultv bv which we attend to several thing-s is different from that by which we attend to an indi- vidual thing. If we can perceive and attend to A, B, C, and D at the same moment, there is the highest possible probability that we perceive and attend to them by the same faculty by which we perceive and attend to either A, or B, or C, or D, separately. There is nothing to lessen this proba- bility, unless one thing can be shoA\Ta, and that is, if we are conscious of a difference in the perceiving faculties in the two cases here mentioned. If when we perceive and attend to A, B, C, and D, jointly, we are conscious that the same faculty does not enable us to perceive and attend to any of them separately ; then we ought to come to the conclu- sion, that a number of things are not perceived' and attended to by the same power by which we perceive and attend to an individual thing. This is the only way by which the question can be settled.

These observations will not, I hope, be considered out of place, when we remember, that upon this question of distinct and independent mental facul-

410 GENERAL HEMAEKS.

ties, many important conclusions in philosophy depend. It must ever vary the complexion of metaphysical theories. It forms a point of depar- ture for abstract speculation ; and systems diverge or approximate to each other, in exact proportion as we consider the mind as being constituted of a collection of faculties or powers, or as merely dis- playing a series of states, operations, or phenomena. It is contended by some philosophers, that the dis- pute is only a dispute about words ; but this, I ap- prehend, is an erroneous opinion. The question lies deeper than verbal ambiguities. It rests upon the very nature of things ; and from the first moment of our being able to contemplate, by consciousness, the operations of our own minds, and to draw con- clusions respecting them, we are presented with this knotty controversy in all its complicated difficulties.

ALFRED THE GREAT. 411

CHAPTER XXXVIII. ON SAXON METAPHYSICS.

There are but very few writers on mental phi- losophy, in Saxon literature, of whom we have any authentic accounts. There are only three of whom we shall take any notice ; namely, Alfred , Alcui- mis, and Bede.

Alfred the Great.

On Chance. — " It is nought when men say any thing happens by chance, because every thing comes from some other things or causes, therefore it has not happened from chance ; but if it came not from any thing, then it would have occurred from chance.

"Then said I, Whence first came the name? Then quoth he, My darling Aristotle, mentioned it in the book that is called Phisica. Then said I, How does he explain it ? He answered, Men said formerly, when any tiling happened to them unexpectedly, that this was by chance. As if any one should dig the earth, and find there a treasure

412 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

of gold, and should then say that this happened by chance. But yet, I know that if the digger had not dug into the earth, and no man before had hidden the gold there, he would by no means have found it. Therefore it was not found by chance."

On the Preedom of the Will. — " I would ask thee, whether we have any freedom or any power, what we should do, or what we should not do ? or does the divine pre-ordination or fate compel us to that which we wish ?

" Then said he, We have much power. There is no rational creature wliicli has not freedom. He that hath reason may judge and discriminate what he should will, and what he should shun; and every man hath this freedom, that he knows what he should will and what he should not will. Yet all rational creatures have not a like freedom. Angels have right judgments and good will, and all that they desire they obtain very easily, because they wish nothing wrong. But no creature hath freedom and reason, except angels and men. Men have always freedom, and the more of it as they lead their minds towards divine things. But they have less freedom when they incline their minds near to this world's wealth and honours. They have no freedom, when they themselves subject their own wills to the vices ; but, so soon as they turn away their mind from good, they are blinded with unwiseness."

Why Men have Freedom of AVill. — " I said, I am sometimes very much disturbed ! Quoth he, At what ? I answered :

ALFRED THE GREAT. 413

" It is at this which thou savest, that God g-ives to every one freedom to do e^dl, as well as good, whichsoever he will: and thou savest also, that God knoweth every thing before it happens ; and thou also sayest, that nothing happens, but that God wills, or consents to it ; and thou sayest that it shall all go as he has appointed. Now, I wonder at this : why he should consent that evil men should have freedom that they may do evil, as well as good, whichsoever they will, when he knew before that they would do evil.

"Then quoth he, I may very easily answer thee this remark. How would it now look to you, if there were any powerful king, and he had no freedom in all his kingdom, l)ut that all were slaves ?

" Then said I, It would not be thought Ijy me right, nor also reasonable, if servile men only should attend upon him.

" Then quoth he, It would be more unnatural, if God, in all his kingdom, had no free creature under his power. Therefore he made two rational creatures free; angels and men. He gave them the great gift of freedom. Hence they could do evil as well as good, whichsoever they would. He gave this very fixed gift, and a very fixed law with that gift, to every man unto his end. The freedom is, that man may do what he will ; and the law is, that he will render to every man according to his works, either in tliis world or the future one ; good or evil, whichsoever he doeth. Men mav obtain

414 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

through this freedom whatsoever they will; hut they cannot escape death, though they may by good conduct hinder it, so that it shall come later, indeed, they may defer it to old age, if they do not want good mil for good works.

"Then said I, Thou has well removed that doubt."

On the Divine Pore-appointment. — " But I am yet grieved with much more trouble, even to sadness.

" What is thy grief about ?

" It is about the Divine pre-ordination. Because we heard it, some while since, said, that all shall happen as God, at the beginning, had appointed, and that no man can change it. Now me-thinketh, that he errs, when he honoui'eth the good, and also when he punishes the evil ; if it be true, that it was so shaped by him, that they cannot do otherwise. We laboiu' unnecessarily when we pray, and when we fast, or give alms, if we have no more merit from it, than those that in all things proceed according to their own ^vill, and run after their bodily pleasures.

" I tell thee, if this be true, we ought to say, that it was an unnecessary commandment in the divine books, that God should order man to forsake evil and do good ; and, again, the saying which he expressed, that the more a man laboureth the greater reward he shall receive. I woncler why thou hast forgotten all that we spoke about before. We said before, that the Divine Providence wrought

ALFRED THE GREAT. 415

every good and no evil, nor appointed any to be made, nor ever made any ; but that indeed we are directed to good.

"It is thought evil by common people that He should avenge or punish any one for his evil.

" But did we not also say in this same book, that God had appointed freedom to be given to men, and made them free ; and that if they held this freedom well, he would greatly dignify them with everlasting power ; and if they misused this freedom, that he would then punish them with death ?

" He has appointed that if they sin in any thing through this freedom, they shall, by penitence, com- pensate for it, to recover that freedom ; and if any of them will be so hard-hearted, that he will do no repentance, that he shall then have a just punish- ment. He has appointed all creatures to be ser- vants, except angels and men, and hence they are the servants of these other creatures. They have their ministerial duties till doomsday. But men and angels, they are free. He dispenses with their servitude.

" What ! can men say, that the divine Providence has appointed this, that they should not fulfil their duties, or how ? May they neglect them ; that they may not do good? Now it is written that God will render to every man according to his works. Why then should any man be idle, that he work not ?'

" Then said I, It is obvious enough to me, that

416 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

G-od knew it all before, both good and evil, before it happened. But I know not, whether that shall all happen unchangeably, Avhich he knows and has appointed.

"Then, quoth he. There is no need that all should happen uncliaugeahly : though some of it shall happen unchangeably. This will be that, which will be best for our necessities ; and that will be his will. But there are some so directed that there is no necessity for this ; and though its being done would neither injure, nor benefit, nor be any harm, yet it will not be done.

" Think now, by thyself, whether thou hast ap- pointed anything so firmly, that thou thinkest that it shall never be changed by thy will, nor that thou canst be without it ; or whether thou again art so divided in opinion on any thouglit, whether it shall happen to help thee, or whether it shall not. Many are the things which God knows before they hap- pen, and he knows also whether it vnR hurt his creatures that they should happen. But he knows not this for the purpose of willing that they should happen, but that he may take previous care that they should not happen. Thus a good ship-steerer perceives many a stormy wind before it occurs, and folds his sail, and awhile also lays down his mast, and then abides the beating, if, before the threaten- ing of the adverse wind, he can guard himself against the weather."

On Human Nature and its best interests. — *' Then said I, Thou hast very well helped me hy this

ALFRED THE GREAT. 417

speech. I wonder why so many wise men shoukl have laboured so much on the subject, and have found out so little that was wise.

" Then quoth he, Why wonderest thou so much? Is it so easy to be understood ? How knowest thou not, that many things are not understood so as they exist ; but according to the quality of the un- derstanding of him that inquires after them. Such is wisdom. No man from this world can under- stand it, such as it really is; though every one strives according to the quality of his understand- ing, that he may perceive it if he can. Wisdom may entirely comprehend us, such as we are, though we may not wholly comprehend that, such as it is in itself; because wisdom is God. He seetli all our works, both good and evil, before they are done, or, for this purpose, thought. But he compels us not to tliis, that we must necessarily do the good, nor prevents us from doing evil; because he has given us freedom. I can teach thee also some examples, by which thou mayest the easier under- stand this speech. What ! thou knowest the light, and the hearing, and the taste : they perceive the body of man, and yet they perceive it not alike. The ears perceive so that they hear, but they per- ceive not yet the body entirely as it is ; our sense of feeling must touch it, and feel that it is the body. We cannot feel whether this be black or white, fak or not fau^; but the light at the beginning turns to these points ; and as the eyes look on things, they perceive all the appearance of the body. But I will give thee some further explanation, that * 2 E

418 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

thou mayest know that which thou wonderest at.

" Then said I, What is this ?

" He said, It is that man understands only that which he separately perceives in others. He perceives separately through his eyes ; separately through his ears ; separately through his nostrils ; separately hy his reason ; separately by his wise comprehension. There are many living things that are unmoving, such as shell-fish are ; and these have yet some portion of perception ; or they would not else live, if they had no grain of perception. Some can see, some can hear, some taste, some smell ; but the moving animals are more like man, because they have all that the unmoving creatures have, and also more too. This is, that they obey men. They love what loves them, and hate what hates them ; and they fly from what they hate, and seek what they love. But men have all that we have before mentioned, and also add to them the great gift of reason. Angels have a still wiser under- standing.

" Hence are these creatures thus made, that the unmoving shall not exalt themselves above the moving ones, nor contend with them ; nor the moving ones above men ; nor men above angels ; nor angels strive against God.

" But this is miserable, that the greatest part of men look not to that which is given to them, that is, reason; nor seek that which is above them, which is what angels and wise men have ; this is a wise understanding. But most men now move with cattle, in this, that thev desire the lusts of

ALFRED THE GREAT. 419

tlie world like cattle. If we now had any portion of an unhesitating understanding, such as angels have, then we might perceive that such an under- standing would be much better than our reason. Though we investigate many things, we have little ready knowledge free from doubt. But to angels there is no doubt of any of those things which they know, because theii* ready knowledge is much bet- ter than our reasoning ; as our reasoning is better than the perceptions of animals. Any portion of understanding that is given to them, is either to those that are prone, or to those that are erect. But let us now elevate our minds as supremely as we may towards the high roof of the highest un- derstanding, that thou mayest most swiftly and most easily come to thine own kindred, from whence thou camest before. There mav thv mind and thv reason see openly that which they now doubt about ; — every thing, whether of the Divine pre- science, which we have been discoursing on, or of our freedom, or of all such things.

On THE Divine Nature. — " I would ask thee first one thing, Whether thinkest thou that any thing in this world is so good as that it may give us full happiness ? I ask this of thee ; I do not wish that any false likeness should deceive you and me, instead of the true comfort ; for no man can deny that some good must be the most superior, just as there is some great and deep fountain from which many brooks and rivers run. Hence men say of some advantages, that they are not entirely with-

2 e 2

420 SAXON mi<:tapiiysics.

out. Yet every thing would go to nought, if it had not some good in it.

" Erom this you may understand, that from the greatest good come the less goods ; not the greatest from the less ; no more than the river can be the spring and source, though the spring may flow into a river. As the river may return again to the spring, so every good cometh from God, and re- turns to him; and he is the full and the perfect good ; and there is no deficiency of will in him. Now you may clearly understand that this is God himself.

" Then answered I, and said, Thou hast very rightly and very rationally overcome and convinced me; I cannot deny this, nor indeed think otherwise, but that it is all so as thou sayest.

" Then said Wisdom, Now I would that thou shouldest think carefully till thou understand where true happiness is. How ! knowest thou not, that all mankind are \^dth one mind consenting that God is the beginning of all good things, and the governor of all creatures ? He is the supreme good. No man now doubts this, because he knows nothing better, and indeed nothing equally good. Hence every reasoning tells us, and all men con- fess the same, that God is the highest good. Thus they signify that all good is in him ; for if it were not, then he would not be that which he is called ; but something has existed before him or is more excellent. Then that would be better than he is ; but nothing Avas ever before him, nor more excel-

ALFRED THE GREAT. 421

lent than lie is, nor more precious than hinisell'. Hence he is the beginning, and the fountain, and the roof of all good. Tliis is clear enough. Now it is openly shown, that the true felicities are in no other existing tiling but in God,

" Then said I, I am consenting to this.

"Then he answered, I conjure thee that thou rationally understand this; that God is full of every perfection, and of every good, and of every happiness.

" I then replied, I cannot fully understand it. "Wherefore tell me again, the same that didst men- tion before.

" He saidj Then I will say it again. I would not that thou shouldest think this, that God is the father and the origin of all creatures, and yet that his supreme goodness, of which he is full, comes to him from any where from without. I also would not have thee think that any other can be his good and happiness but liimself ; because, if thou sup- posest that the good which he hath comes to him any where from without, then that thing from which it comes to him would be better than he, if there were such. But it is very silly, and a very great sin, that men should think so of God ; either to suppose again, that anything were before him, or better than he is, or like him. But we should agree that he is the best of all things.

" If thou believest that God exists so as men are, either he is a man that hath soul and body, or his goodness is that which gathereth good else- where, and then holds it together, and rules it. If

422 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

thou then believest that it is so with God, then shalt thou necessarily believe that some power is greater than his, which it so unites as that it mak- eth the course of things. But whatever thing is divided from others is distinct, — is another thing, though they may be placed together. If, then, any thing be divided from the highest good, it will not be that highest good. Yet it would be a great sin to think of God, that there could be any good with- out him, or any separated from him. Hence no- thing is better than He is, or even as good. What thing can be better than its creator ? Hence I say, with juster reason, that He is the supreme good in his own nature, which is the origin of all things.

" Then I said. Now thou hast very rightly con- vinced me. Then quoth he. Did I not before tell thee that the supreme good and the highest hap- piness were one ? I answered. So it is. He re- plied. Shall we then say that this is any thing else but God ? I said, I cannot deny this ; because I assented to it before.

" He is the stem and foundation of all blessings. From him all good cometh, and every thing tends to Him again. He governs them all. Thus He is the beginning and the support of all blessings. They come from Him so as the light and bright- ness of the planets come from the sun ; some are brighter, some are less bright. So also the moon : she enlightens as much as the sun shines on her. When he shineth all over her, then is she all bright.

ALFRED THE GREAT. 423

" When I heard these observations I was then astonished, and much awed, and exclaimed, This is a wonderful, and delightful, and reasonable obser- vation, which thou expressest to me.

" He answered. It is not more pleasant nor wiser than the thing that thy discourse was about. We will now talk about that ; because me-thinketh it good that we connect this with the former. Then replied I, What is that ?

'' What I expressed to thee before was, that God was happiness ; and that from this true felicity come all the other goods that we discoursed about be- fore ; and return to Him. Thus, from the sea the water cometh into the earth, and there freshens itself. It proceedeth then up into a spring ; it goeth then into a brook ; then into a river ; then along the river till it floweth again into the sea. But I would now ask thee how thou hast understood this assertion ? Whether dost thou suppose that the five goods which we have often mentioned before, that is, power, dignities, celebrity, abundance, and bliss : I would know whether you suppose that those goods were limbs of the true felicity, so as a man's limbs are those of one person, and belong all to one body ? Or dost thou think that some one of the five goods makes the true felicity, and after- wards that the four others become its goods ; as now the soul and body compose one man ?

" The one man hath many limbs, and yet to these two, that is, to the soul and the body, belong all this man's comforts, both spiritual and corporeal. It is noAV the good of the body that a man be fair

424 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

and strong', and long and broad, witli many other excellencies besides these. Yet they are not the body itself; because, thongh he should lose any of these good things, he would still be what he was before. Then the excellencies of the soul are, pru- dence, moderation, patience, righteousness, and wisdom, and many such virtues ; and yet, as the soul is one thing, so the wtues are another.

" I then said, I wish that thou wouldest explain to me yet more clearly, about the other goods that belong to the true felicity.

" He answered, Did I not inform thee before, that the true happiness is God? Yes, I replied. Thou hast said he was the supreme good. Then quoth he. Art thou now consenting that power, and dignities, and fame, and plenty, and joy, and happiness, and the supreme good, are all one ; and that this one must be the Deity ?

" I said. How should I now deny this ? Then he answered. Whether dost thou think that those things which are the limbs of the true felicity is that felicity itself ?

" I replied, I know not what thou wouldest say ; but it will please me better that thou should speak to me some while about it than ask me. He then said, How ! couldest thou not reflect that if these goods were limbs of the true felicity, they would be somewhat distinct from it as a man's linibs are from his body ? But the nature of these limbs is, that they make up one body, and yet are not wholly alike.

" I then remarked. Thou needest no more speak about it. TliOLi hast explained it to me clearly

ALFRED THE GREAT. 425

enough that these goods are no whit separated from the true felicity.

" Then quoth he. Thou comprehendest it right enough. Thou now understandest that all good is the same that happiness is, and this happiness is the supreme good, and the supreme good is God, and God is always inseparably one.

" I said, There is no doubt of it. But I wish vou now to discourse to me a little on what is unknown.

" Well ! O men ! Every one of you that be free tend to this good, and to this felicity ; and he that is now in bondage with the fruitless love of this world, let him seek liberty, that he may come to this felicity. Por this is the only rest of all our labours. This is the only port always calm after the storms and billows of our toils. This is the only station of peace ; the only comforter of grief after all the sorrows of the present life. The golden stones and the silvery ones, and jewels of all kinds, and all the riches before us, will not enlighten the eyes of the mind, nor improve their acuteness to perceive the appearance of the true felicity. They rather blind the mind's eyes than make them sharper ; because all things that please here, in this present life, are earthly ; because they are flying. But the admirable brightness that brightens all things and governs all; it will not destroy the soul, but will enlighten it. If, then, any man could perceive the splendour of the heavenly light with the pure eyes of his mind, he would then say

42G SAXON METAPHYSICS.

that the radiance of the shining of the sun is not superior to this; is not to be compared to the everlasting brightness of God."

Description of the Deity. — " Hence we should with all power inquire after God, that we may know what he is. Though it should not be our lot to know wiiat He is, yet we should, from the dignity of the understanding which he has given us, try to explore it.

" Every creature, both rational and irrational, dis- covers this, that God is eternal. Because so many creatures, so great and so fair, could never be sub- ject to less creatures and to less power than they all are, nor indeed to many equal ones.

" Then said I, What is eternity ?

" He answered. Thou hast asked me a great and difficult tiling to comprehend. If thou wilt under- stand it, thou must first have the eyes of thy mind clean and lucid. I may not conceal from thee what I know of this.

" Know thou that there are three things in this world ; one is temporary ; to this there is both a beginning and an end; and I do not know any creature that is temporary, but hath his beginning and his end. Another thing is eternal, which hath a beginning, but hath not an end : I know not when it began, but I know that it will never end : such are angels and the souls of men. The third thing is eternal, both without end, and without beginning ; this is God. Between these three there is a verv great discrimination. If we were to in-

ALFRED THE GREAT. 427

vestigate all this subject, we should come late to the end of this book, or never.

" But one thing thou must necessarily know of this previously, Why is God called the Highest Eternity ?

" Then said I, Why ?

*' Then quoth he. Because we know very little of that which was before us, except by memory and by asking; and yet we know less of that which will be after us. That alone exists rationally to us which is present ; but to Him all is present, as well that which was before as that which now is, and that which after us will be. All of it is pre- sent to Him.

" His riches increase not, nor do they ever dimi- nish. He never remembers anything, because he never forgets aught ; He seeks nothing, nor in- quires, because He knows it all ; He searches for nothing, because He loses nothing; He pursues no creature, because none can fly from Him ; He dreads nothing, because He knows no one more powerful than himself, nor even like him. He is always giving and never wants. He is always Al- mighty, because he always wishes good, and never evil. To Him there is no need of anything. He is always seeing ; He never sleeps ; He is always alike mild and kind ; He will always be eternal. Hence there never was a time that He was not, nor ever will be. He is always free. He is not compelled to any work. From His divine power He is every where present. His greatness no man can measure. He is not to be conceived bodilv,

428 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

but spiritually, so as now wisdom is and reason. But He is wisdom ; He is reason itself."*

Alctjinus, or Albinus Elaccus.

This was an English prelate, and a disciple, some say, of Bede's. He went on an embassy from Offa to the court of Charlemagne, and was the principal agent in the formation of the public schools esta- tablished by the Emperor. Alcuinus was considered one of the most learned men of his time ; though some historians have maintained that he knew little of philosophy in general ; and even in theology it- self he was by no means a proficient. His narrow views have been ascribed as the reason why these schools were limited in their scope, and so unpro- ductive of real knowledge. An Italian historian, Eather Andrea, makes the following remarks upon these early seminaries of learning. " They learn there to read, to sing, and to calculate, and nothing more. The schools have regularly established mas- ters, but it is sufficient if they know grammar. If any of them pretends to a little knowledge of ma- thematics or astronomy, he is considered an oracle. Books are given to consult, but they are all eccle- siastical ones. If in some schools the fine arts are cultivated, it is only with the view of making them subservient to the illustration of the sacred l3ooks."t

The opinions of Alcuinus on the human soul are

* Turner's Anglo-Saxon History, pp. 41 — 51.

t Dcir origiuc, progresso c state att. d'ogni letter, torn. 1. c. 7.

ALCUINUS. 429

well entitled to notice. He divides it into three parts, the appetites, the rational part, and the irascible. Two of these appertain to the inferior creation as well as to ourselves. But reason be- longs alone to men ; and it is by tliis power that he judges, counsels, and excels in wisdom. The faculty of reason is that which directs and governs the whole moral nature of man ; and all our vir- tues, as prudence, justice, temperance, and forti- tude, pre-suppose its active vigilance. Wlien these virtues are sanctified by a holy and pure benevo- lence, they bring the soul nearer to the Divine na- ture,*

Memory, will, and intelligence are all distinct powers, but are, nevertheless, united into one. Unity does not destroy their individuality. " I perceive that I perceive, will, and remember; I will to remember, perceive, and will; and I re- member that I have willed, perceived, and recol- lected, "f

" We may remark the wonderful svsdftness of the soul in forming things which it has perceived by the senses. Prom these, as from certain messen- gers, it forms figures in itself, with inexpressil^le celerity, of whatever it has perceived of sensible things ; and it lays up these forms in the treasury of its memory.

" Thus, he who has seen Rome figures Rome in his mind, and its form ; and when he shall hear the name of Eome, or remember it, immediately the

* Opera, pp. 770.. t Ibid. p. 773.

430 SAXON METAPHYSICS,

animus of it will occur to the menioiy, where its form lies concealed. The soul there recognises it, where it had hidden it.

" It is yet more wonderful, that if unknown things be read or heard of by the ears of the soul, it immediately forms a figure of the unknown thing; as of Jerusalem. When seen it may be very different from the figure of our fancy ; but whatever the soul has been, in other cities that are known to it, it imagines that it may be in Jerusa- lem. Prom known species it imagines the un- known. It does not fancy walls, houses, and streets in a man ; nor the limbs of a man in a city, but buildings, as are usual in cities. So in every thing the mind from the known forms the unknown.

" While I think of Jerusalem, I cannot, at that moment, think of Home ; or when I think of any other single thing, I cannot then think of many ; but that thing only is present to my mind whicli I deliberate upon, till, sooner or later, this departs and another occurs.

" This lively and heavenly faculty, which is called mens, or animus, is of such great mobility that it does not even rest in sleep. In a moment, if it chooses, it surveys heaven ; it flies over the sea, and wanders through regions and cities. It places in its sight, by thinking, all things that it likes, however far removed."

"The mind, or soul, is the intellectual spirit, always in motion, always living, and capable of willing both good and evil. By the benignity of its Creator it is ennobled with free will. Created to

ALCUINUS. 431

rule tlie movements of the flesli, it is invisible, incorporeal, without weight or colour, circum- scribed, yet entire in every member of its flesh. It is now afiiicted Avith the cares, and grieved with the pains of the body ; now it sports with joy ; now thinks of known things ; and now seeks to explore those which are unknown. It wills some things ; it does not will others. Love is natural to it.

" It is called by various names ; the soul, while it vivifies ; the spirit, when it contemplates ; sen- sibility, wliile it feels ; the mind, when it knows ; the intellect, when it understands ; the reason, while it discriminates; the will, when it consents; the memory, when it remembers; but these are not as distinct in substance as in names ; they are but one soul. Virtue is its beauty; vice its de- formity. It is often so affected by some object of knowledge, that, though its eyes be open, it sees not the things before it, nor hears a sounding voice, nor feels a touching body.

"As to what the soul is, nothing better occurs to us to say than that it is the spirit of life ; but not of that kind of life which is in cattle, which is without a rational mind. The beauty and orna- ment of the human soul is the study of wisdom. What is more blessed to the soul than to love the Supreme Good, which is God ? What is happier to it than to prepare itself to be worthy of ever- lasting beatitude, knowing itself most truly to be immortal."

432 SAXON METAPHYSICS.

Bede.

The history of this singular and learned man, is well known to most readers. We shall here transcrihe a few remarks upon some of the meta- physical topics he discusses in his works.

He compares the three inseparable essences of the Trinity to the circularity, light, and heat of the Sun. The globular body of the Sun never leaves the heavens ; but its light, which he compares to the Pilial Personality, and its heat, which he ap- plies to the Spii'itual Essence, descend to earth, and diffuse themselves everywhere, animating the mind, and pervading and softening the heart. Yet, although universally present, light seems never to quit the sun, for there we always behold it ; and heat is its unceasing companion. As circles have neither beginning nor end, such is the Deity. Nothing is above; nothing is below; nothing is bevond him: no term concludes him; no time confines him.

He pui'sues the same analogies in other parts of nature. In water he traces the spring, its flow- ing river, and terminating lake. They differ in form, but are one in substance, and are always inseparable. No river can flow without its spring, and must issue into some collecting locality.

" His \iew of nature is not unpleasing. " Ob- serve how all things are made to suit, and are governed; heat by cold, cold by heat; day by night ; and winter by summer. See how the heavens and the earth are respectively adorned :

BEDE. 433

the heavens by the sun, the moon, and stars ; the earth by its beautiful flowers, and its herbs, trees, and fruits. From these mankind derive all their food; their lovely jewels ; the various pictures so delectably woven in their hangings and valuable cloths ; their variegated colours ; the sweet melody of strings and organs ; the splendour of gold and silver, and the other metals ; the pleasant streams of water, so necessary to bring sliips, and agitate our mills ; the fragrant aroma of myrrh ; and, lastly, the interesting countenance peculiar to the human form."*

*:,:* The preceding pages have been taken chiefly from Mr. Sharon Turner's History, and the Literature of the Middle Ages in Lardner's Cy- clopedia. As the authors of both these works have paid great attention to every thing connected with the Saxon period of our history, what is here stated may be fully relied on ; and contains, in fact, every thing which can be found associated with the names of those ancient worthies, which bears upon the philosophy of mind.

We have now sketched out the history of the philosophy of mind, for nearly fifteen centuries, and traced its ramifications and bearings among the crash of empires and the mouldering remains' of mighty kingdoms. We saw it in Greece as a grain of mustard seed. In the days of Socrates, and Plato, and Aristotle, it was a plant of gigan- tic growth, and its shade long formed a philoso- phical retreat for the ardent and speculative minds of men. The Grecian metaphysics for some ages retained their compactness and system ; but as

* Bede de Subst. vol. ii. p. 308.

* 2f

434 HEMARKS.

time rolled on, tliey were spKt into cletached frag- ments, and gave birth to various and contending sects, who vied with each other in giving new colourings to old truths and antiquated doctrines. The rage for novelty became strong; and men racked their minds to give old theories in a new form. Every philosopher was ambitious of forming a school of his own, which might establish his present fame, and hand down his name with honour and applause to future generations. Still, however, the divergency from the olden system of Grecian speculation, was not so great among the multitude of new sects, as what at first sight might lead one to imasjine. The frame-work of Plato and Aristotle was never essentially broken or disjointed; nor were their leading views and doctrines of mind supplanted by other original systems. The various sects and parties were merely commentators and expounders of the two great champions of Grecian intellect ; and though, on many occasions, they dis- played consummate genius and skill, they never could make any considerable inroad upon the phi- losophical arrangements of these two wonderful ex- pounders of abstract thought.

Through the influence of political changes and vicissitudes, we find the Grecian philosophy of in- tellects transplanted to the Etonian capital, among minds of a bolder and fiercer stamp. Here it en- joyed an exotic existence but for a short period. It then found its wav to Alexandria, where it came in contact with some novel systems, and was gradually subjected to many transformations and changes of

REMARKS. 435

character. It became enveloped in the mysterious cosmogony of the East ; and that regular and con- solidated system of Grecian thought, which had common sense and the every-day feelings of man- kind for its basis, became so corrupted and debased, as scarcely to present a single feature of its original grandeur and simplicity. Everything became crude, unintelKgible, fanatical, and childish.

Christianity, however, came to the rescue ; and gradually, though slowly, stripped off the myste- rious allegories of the East, and took the " divine Plato" and the erudite Stagirite under her guid- ance and protection. There was an active and living sympathy between them that no adverse circumstance could weaken, nor time destroy. They imparted mutual light and strength to each other. And as the Christian system became more firmly rooted in the minds of men, and more widely extended, in the same proportion do we perceive the champions of the Church embrace with cordi- ality all the leading principles of Grecian specula- tion on human nature. The cause of this is obvious ; the great truths involved in both bore a striking affinity or relationship to each other. They both took man as they found him; they analyzed his nature and powers ; they laid down rules for liis government ; and both aimed at the permanent re- finement and ameKoration of his condition. These constituted the secret and powerful bond of union between human and divine knowledge ; between the sages of Greece and the disciples of the Cross.

2 f2

NOTES

AND

ILLUSTRATIONS.

NOTES AND ILLUSTHATIONS.

NOTE A.— Page 4.

We beg to give here a short Catalogue of Works on the History of Philosophy, It might have been considerably extended ; but the list, it is hoped, will be found sufficient for ordinary purposes of reference. —

Adelung, J. C, Geschichte der philosophie fiir Liebhaber. Leipz. 1786, 1787, 1807.

^^?r«5, Cours de Philosophie. Paris, 1838.

Anderson, Wm., The Philosophy of Ancient Greece Investi- gated. London, 1794.

Ast, Frid., Grundriss einer Geschichte der Philosophie. Lands- hut. 1825.

Berchon de Penhoen, (Le Baron), Ilistoire de la Philosophie Allemande. Paris, 1836.

Berchetti, Filosofia dcgli Antichi Popoli. Perugia, 1818.

Blessig, Joh. Law., Diss, de Origine Philosophic apud Romanes. Strasburg, 1770.

Born, Fri. Gloh., Institutiones Histori. Philos. Leipsic, 1798.

Boiivier, Histoire Abregee de la Philosophie. Paris, 1844.

Boioen, Francis, Critical Essays on a few Subjects connected with the History and present Condition of Speculative Philosophy. Boston (U. S.) 1842.

Brandis, Handb. der Gesch. der Griech. und Rom. Philosophie. Berlin, 1835.

Brueker, Joh. Jah., Kurze Fragen aus der Philosophischen Historie. Ulm, 1/31. — Idem, Ilistoria Critica Philosophise a Mundi incunabulis, etc. Lips. 1742.

440 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Buddeus, J. F., Historia Philosophica, Succincta delineatio. Halle, 1712.

Buhle, Joh. Glieb., Geschichte des Philosophirenden Verstandes. Lemgo, 1793. — Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophic und einer Kiit. Literatur derselben. Gotting. 1796, 1804.

Biirigtiy, Histoire de la Philosophic Payenne. La Haye, \724.

Buschiny, Ant. Fr., Vergleichung der Griech. Philos. mit der Neuern. Berlin, 1785.

Ccqjasso, J. B.., Hist. Phil. Synopsis. Neap. 1728.

Capajigue, Histoire Philosophique des Juifs, depuis la Decadence des Machabees jusqu'a nos jours. Bruxelles.

Cai'us, F?'. Aug., Ideen zur Geschichte der Philosophic. Lands- hut, 1808. — Idem, Hauptrnomente der Gesch. der Philos. Mu- nich, 1829,

Cousin, Cours de I'Histoire de la Philosophic. Paris, 1829. — Idem. Fragmens Philosophiques. Paris, 1839.

Cro)iiaziano, Agatojnsto, (Ajunaiio Bnonafede,) Delia istoria e della indole di ogni filosofia. Lucca, 1766, 1771-

Dacier, Bibliotheque des Anciens Philosophcs. Paris, 1796.

Damii'on, Cours de la Philosophic. Paris, 1839.

De Gerando, Histoire Comparee des Systemes de Philosophic. Paris, 1846. 6 vol.

Deslandes, M. D., Andr. Fr. Boiwemi, Histoire Critique de la Philosophic, ou Ton traite de son origine, de ses progres, et des diverses revolutions qui lui sont arrivees jusqu'a notre temps. Paris, 1730, 1756. Leipz. 1770.

Diderot, Histoire Generale des Dogmes et Opinions Philoso- phiques. London, 1769.

Dntens, Recherches sur I'Origine des Decouvertes attribuees aux ISIodcrnes, &c. Paris, 1766.

Eberhard, Joh. Aug., AUgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Halle, 1788. — Idem, Auszug aus der Allgeui. Geschichte. Halle, 1798.

Enfield, Will., History of Philosophy from the earliest Times, &c. Loud. 1791.

Erdmann, Versuch einer Wiss. Darst. der Gesch. der Neuern, Philos. Riga, 1834.

Ernesti, Encyklopiidisclies Handbuch einer Allgem. Geschichte der Philosophie. Lemgo. 1807.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. Ml

Feuerbach, Die Neuern Philos. v. Bacon, Spinoza, &c. Anspach, 1833.

Formey, Abrege de I'histoire de la Philos. Amsterd. 1768.

Fries, Geschichte der Philos. Halle, 1837.

Ftdleborn, Von der Verschiedenheit der Alien und Neuern Phi- iosophie. — Idetn, Kurze Geschichte der Philos.

F^nelon, Be la Motte, Abrege des Vies des Anciens Philosophes. Paris, 1795.

Gaudentius, Paganimis, De Philosophiag apud Romanos Origiue et Progressu. Pisa, 1634. ^

Gaudentius, De la Philosophic Payenne. La Haye, 1724.

Gedike, Frid., Ciceronis Historia Philosophies. Berlin, 1782.

Gentzkenius, F., Hist. Phil, in usum lect. Hamb. 1724, 1734.

Gmeiner, Fr. Xav., Ljiterargesch. des Ursprungs und Fort- gangs der Philosophic, wie audi aller philos. Secten und Sys- teme. Griez. 1789.

Goclenius, Lexicon Philosophicum. Franck. 1613.

Goess, Ge. Frid. Dan., Die Erziehungswissenschaft nach den Grundsiitzen der Griechen und Romer. Anspach, 1808. — Idem, De Variis, quibus usi sunt Grseci et Romani Philosopliise Defini- tionibus Comm. Ulm, 1811.

Gravius, Historica Philosophica. 1674.

Guillon, Histoire Abregee de la Philosophie. Paris, 1835.

Gurlitts, Joh., Abriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Leipsic, 1788.

Hallam, Literature of the Middle Ages. London, 1839.

Hamerskold, L., Grundziige der Geschichte der Philos. Stock- holm, 1828.

Hegel, G. W. F.,Vorlesungen iiber die Geschichte der Philo- sophie.

Hehieccius, Jo. GottL, Elementa Hist. Philosophicze. Berlin, 1743.

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Hilaire, Saint, M. Barth. De I'Ecole d'Alexandrie. Paris, 1845. Hillebrand, Josejih, Geschichte und Methodologie ^der Philos. Heidelberg, 1819.

442 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

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Lapena, Ensayo Sobre la Historia de la Filosofia. Burgos, 1807. 3 vol.

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NOTE B.— Page 12.

" The reason why Anaximander regarded the primary substance as infinite, finds a natural explanation in the infinite variety of the evolutions of the world, which have their ground in it. He is re- presented as arguing that the primary substance must have been infinite, to be all-sufficient for the limitless variety of produced things with which we are encompassed. Now although Aristotle expressly characterises this infinite as a mixture, we must not, nevertheless, think of it as a mere multiplicity of primary material elements ; for to the mind of Anaximander it was a unity, im- mortal and imperishable, an ever-producing energy. This pro- duction of individual things was derived by Anaximander from an eternal motion of the infinite ; from which it would appear that he ascribed to it an inherent vital energy, without, however, employing the terms life and production in any acceptation except the only one allowable byjthe character of his philosophy, — in the sense, i. e. of motion, by which the primary elements of the infinite separate themselves one from another.

•' According]^to Anaximander, it was not by any continuous trans- mutation of the primary substance into a variety of secondary states,

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 445

that the sensible qualities of things begin to be ; but by separation, according to their kind, of opposite elements, which in the infinite are confusedly and separately combined into unity ; which secretion is effected by the eternal motion. According to this, the primary being of Anaximander is undoubtedly a unity ; but it comprises within itself the multiplicity of elements out of which things are composed ; and these need only to be divided, in order to their appearing as separate phenomena of nature. Thus on the decom- position of the infinite, the kindred elements were attracted to- gether ; so that what in the All was gold, without, however, appear- ing to be such, in consequence of being blended with its opposite, now appears gold ; and what was earth, earth ; for nothing new is produced, or assumes other qualities different from those it pre- viously had ; but all was antecedently the same as subsequently it exhibited itself to be. This is evidently founded on the grand principle of the mechanical theory of physics, that nothing alters its qualities, but ever remains identical, and only moves among the other elements, whereby, in the altered mixture, the same element appears different at different times. We shall see these same con- ceptions occurring again in the more detailed explanations of nature given by Anaximander, and thereby his whole theory placed in direct opposition to that of the Ionian dynamicists.

"The issuing of individual things from out of the infinite All was thus explained by Anaximander : The central point in the cosmo- pceia was the earth ; for, being of cylindrical form with a base in the ratio 1 : 3 to its altitude, it was retained in the centre by the air, and by the equality of its distances from all the limits of the world ; the stars, on the other hand, moved round it at equal dis- tances from each other, — the planets and fixed stars lowest, then the moon, and ultimately the sun ; each one of these bodies being borne on wheel-like ring (its sphere). According to this view of the system of the world, the motion of the infinite productive unity, which comprises within itself all opposites, appears to have suggested first of all the opposition the centre and circum- ference, and then again to have referred this to a further oppo- sition between the earth and the heavens, of which the former indicated to his mind the cold, the latter the warm : so that in the first place the cold elements separate themselves from the warm, the former constituting the centre, and the latter the circumference

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of the world. This representation is everywhere paramount with Anaximander ; all formation, either of the universe or individuali- ties, must necessarily evolve itself in the contrariety of the inner and the outer, inasmuch as the outer surrounds and encloses the inner, as the bark does the tree. The earth, therefore, in its first formation, was supposed to be a mixture of cold, watery, and earthy elements, which had been separated out of the infinite from the warm and fiery, by means of the eternal motion. The heaven, on the contrary, he considered as a hollow fiery sphere, which con- tains the atmospheric air. The system of the world, however, after this first formation, proceeded to evolve itself to a further degree ; aud whilst the earth was improved by the force of fire, occasioning the division of the land and the waters, the heavens likewise ex- perienced a further separation. The revolution by which this was brought about, is described by Anaximander as a disruption of the heavenly sphere, by which means several single fiery systems were formed — the present heavenly bodies — which, being thereupon en- closed in aerial spheres, are onlj' visible through certain apertures. Here again we meet with the opposition between the outer and the inner, the enclosing air and the enclosed fire ; only the fire in the compass of the world presents itself differently from what it does in the centre, or rather in the world itself, — for with respect to the latter, the inner core of the world, in its narrow sense, is the cold ; and the water, or the heaven, is the warm ; but contrariwise, in the heavenly bodies the inner is the warm, and the enclosing integu- ment the cold. It is impossible not to see in all this an intentional pursuit of contrariety, which again is further evident from the mode in which, attached to the polytheist conceptions of his country- men, he designates the universe and the heaven — by which latter term he understands the stars — as gods. When, however, he speaks of an infinity of co -existent worlds, he must, consistently with his entire theory, employ the term world in a subordinate acceptation, for the oneliness of the world or universe was a staple point in all his speculations, — since he supposed, on the one hand, an influential action of the heavenly bodies on the formation of the earth, and on the other, that the earth and the heavenly bodies, maintaining certain definite distances, constituted one orderly system ,

" In all these formations the mode of production is evidently me-

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 447

chanical ; thus it is the eternal motion which separates the contra- ries, and collects the warm elements in the circumference, and the cold elements in the centre. Again, the opposition of heavy and light seems to have played its part in the system of Anaximander, and to have been looked upon by him as the cause of motion. And the mathematical laws also, which are so naturally allied to the mechanical physiology, are employed in his theory to deter- mine the ratio of the earth's altitude and base, to calculate the distance of the intervals between the subordinate worlds, and to compare the size of the earth with that of the sun.

" But there is yet another point which displays still more re- markably the close affinity of his whole view with the mechanical tlieory of nature ; which indeed — as we shall see the same point occur in an exactly similar manner with all the mechanical philoso- phers of the Ionian school, and nothing similar being to be found among the dynamicists — affords a test whereby to recognise in the details the historical connexion of the various expositions of this theory, which is, however, otherwise sufficiently manifest from the general view. The greatest difficulty for the mechanical theory of nature must have been to account for the organical construction of living beings, since this view does not recognise an original vital energy really capable of transmuting itself into other changeable states. Hence we invariably find the mechanicists occupied in framing hypotheses which might serve to explain on mechanical laws the phenomena of animal and vegetable life. Those put for- ward by Anaximander for this purpose have been very inaccurately reported to us ; sufficiently, however, for us too see that they com- pletely coincide with his whole notion of a progressive formation of the world by means of the gradually evolved contrarieties of heat and cold ; and also bear the greatest resemblance to a very ancient representation of the origin of men and brutes, which in its general features has been transmitted by Diodorus Siculus." — Ritter, Hist. Phil. Yol. l.pp. 163—172.

NOTE B.— Page 66. ** As, however, in the midst of these logical or dialectical disqui- sitions, we have fallen upon that which from of old, has ever been

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considered at once the centre and the difficulty of the Platonic sys- tem— his theory of ideas, it is indispensable to ascertain precisely the true Platonic sense of the term idea. This is the more neces- sary, the greater the disposition that has been evinced in modern times to take a very partial view of the subject, and to explain the ideas either by the general properties of objects, or by the general notions of genus and species, and even to confine them exclusively to the ideal conceptions of the good, the beautiful, and the just. The expressions of Plato, hov^ever, far transcend all these narrow limitations, and there is no species of being which he does not comprise within his idea. In order, however, to determine from his own writings the extent of the term as employed by him, it is necessary to bear in mind that he speaks in the same sense of his Vc?eff, and of the permanent essence, unity, or absolute being, which, to his mind, indicated the objective of the ideas. Now we find that he comprises therein not merely the highest and most perfect within his own knowledge, the beautiful and the good, justice and science, but even their contraries — every species of vice, evil, and in- justice. Moreover, he speaks of ideas of resemblance and difference, of the one and the manifold, of magnitude, of health, and strength, and even of speed and slowness ; so, too, of the unity of man and of beast, of the sphere, in and by itself, the circle, in and by itself; of a bed and a stable, even of the name or the noun. And lest, perchance, this should be misunderstood to refer merely to the general character of genus and species, the individual soul is represented as an idea ; and what Socrates is, and what Simmias is, is distinguished from what is common to both. What, however, is still more calculated to excite surprise, is the attribution of an essence even to the sen- sible and the inchoate, so that it is requisite to consider as an idea that which to all appearance is the most to its nature. Thus an essence is attributed to a colour and a sound, and prototypes are given to the different species of life, and a permanence of essence is ascribed, not merely to things, but also to their actions and activi- ties. This is, however, perfectly consistent with the comprehensive and searching character of Plato's mind, which would not allow of science being limited to any close and narrow domain, or of aught being excluded from the sphere of right knowledge. This extensive view of science is exhibited in a manner truly philosophical, in the re- proof which tlie young Socrates is made to receive from Parmenides,

NOTES AND ILLUSTKATIONS. 449

for evincing a disinclination to recognise, .-is possible, the reality of the ideas of man, fire, water, nay, even of hair and of clay, and other equally mean and paltry objects ; for Parmenides observes, it is unbecoming a true philosopher to defer to the opinion of the many, and to consider any object as wholly despicable. In another sense, the Platonic acceptation of Idea is still more extensive ; for among the ideas after which the sensible world was formed, he even reckons the tribes of mortal creatures ; which, however, to his mind, indicate nothing more than different grades in the development of one and the same living essence ; since the soul, in its migration, passes from one to the other. Hence we may clearly infer, that the Ideas may indicate certain natural grades of development — and not merely the essence of things, which, in every possible relation, invariably remains identical with itself. "We have, however, from Plato himself, as general a determination of the province of Ideas as could be desired ; for he expressly declares, that an Idea may be attributed to whatever, as a plurality, may be indicated by the same name. It must be manifest to all, whose notions of the theory are tolerably clear and precise, that this expression cannot be under- stood as exclusively referring to species and genera, which, in the individual, appear as the manifold, but also to such individuals as, expressed by one common name, exhibit themselves in many phe- nomena. Furthermore, it could not escape Plato's observation, that every property, every condition, and every relation of things, expressed by a term, can be valid by many ; and finally, that even the variable activities, as also generation or becoming, can be ex- pressed by a noun, and combined with many verbs ; so that, in fact, it must be admitted that according to him there is nothing which does not participate in Ideas, or may not be comprehended in an Idea."

" Now, that the term Idea should have been used by Plato in this wide and general sense, will surprise no one who has con- sidered, however slightly, the basis on which his whole theory rests. This, indeed, is the Idea of science, for the reality of which that of the Ideas is indispensable. If, then, Plato maintained that there must necessarily be Ideas to exhibit the unalterable and eternal truth of the objects of every science, in order that the science itself should be possible, he was constrained to find Ideas wherever there is a true essence, and scientific investigation is possible. But what * 2 G

450 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

was there to which, in Plato's opinion, scientific inquiry might not attach itself, or in which some truth might not yet be found ? For consistently with the comprehensive view he entertained of science, he must have clearly seen that there is a truth to be discovered, even in individuals, even in the qualities and properties of things, and in all that comes into being, and that consequently an idea must be found for them all. We must, therefore, dismiss all nar- row views of the Platonic Idece, and understand by them whatever exhibits an eternal truth, — a persistent something which forms the basis of the mutability of the sensible. As the ideal theory was the conjoint result of the controversy against the sensuous presen- tation interpreted by the Sophists, and against the denial of all dis- tinction to which the Eleatic theory manifestly tended, there were two points principally which it is of importance to it to establish clearly and firmly, — first, that the sensible is not the true, but that science alone, which teaches that there is an unchangeable truth, can adequately express the unchangeable essence of things ; and secondly, that truth, or the real and true being, is not indis- tinguishably one and identical, but that it comprises a multitude of separate notions, every one of which expresses, in a manner pecu- liar to itselfj the eternal essence of things ; and although it consti- tutes in itself a true unity, nevertheless, in reference to others, it appears as a multiplicity.

" But there is yet a third point which is immediately implied in the Ideal theory, viz. that the true and the real are exhibited in general notions as elements of science, which are so related to each other that every higher notion embraces and combines under it several lower ; consequently, that the elements of truth cannot be so separated from each other as not to be nevertheless held together by some higher bond. Now, as Plato maintained this coherency of ideas to be indispensable to science, he naturally proceeded to show that all those theories are subversive of it, which consider any special truth to exist absolutely in and of itself. This connexion of the individual essences he supposed to be similar to that by which individual ideas are comprehended under the more general ; which in his mind is a true and a real connexion, and not merely conceptual. Here, then, we have the reality of the general ex- pressly asserted, which however is not a mere abstract generality, but one in which the special and the individual are comprised.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 451

That this must possess a verity, and consequently reahty, needs not, according to Plato, any other voucher than the truth and reahty of science, of which the general is the constituent." — Ritter, Hist. Philos. Vol. ii. p. 1/0—172.

NOTE C— Page 9Q.

" But, although Aristotle agreed with Plato in thinking that the essences of things are expressed in the notions, he nevertheless impugned the Platonic theory of ideas, in so far as it taught that this essence is to be found in the general ideas. This controversy is carried on by Aristotle in very different ways. At times he attacks the manner in which Plato attempts to gain, by means of ideas, and of the mathematical notion of numbers, a transition from the becoming, to the eternal verity. In this attack Aristotle con- fines himself to bringing forward a variety of doubts, which the vagueness of Plato's views, and those of his disciples, on this sub- ject, naturally give rise to, and which, although they do not enter deeply into the spirit of the doctrine, are nevertheless well fitted to awaken attention to its weakness. This mode of the contro- versy does not, however, concern us in the present place, where our first object is that which relates to the notion of essence. In this respect Aristotle objects to the ideal theory, that it possesses an essence which has no part in motion or change ; for the ideas are said to indicate the eternal alone, and that, consequently, it renders all investigation into nature impossible. This objection was in some measure connected with his conviction, that the ideal theory had its origin in logical, as opposed to physical, researches. Simi- larly, Aristotle urged that ethical investigations also are impossible in the ideal theory, since these investigations are not concerned about the good in itself, but the good which is the end and result of human conduct and actions. From admitting Slich grounds of science Aristotle was prevented, by his doctrine that we must rise from the better known to us, or from that which is more nearly allied to the sensible, to the knowledge of what is better known in and by itself. On this ground he likewise shews, that if the ideas are contained, or ought to be, in us, that they must be moveable, or sensible, since there is in the soul a movement and perception of

2 G 2

452 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

forms. Herein is apparent the endeavour of Aristotle to find such an essence as would facilitate the explanation of experience, and the sensuous phenomenon of becoming ; for he regards it as the great defect of the ideal theory, that it rends the universal from the material, in order to make the sole ground of the special. It did not indeed escape Aristotle, that Plato's doctrine does not alto- gether neglect phenomena, but that, on the contrary, it attempts to reconcile sensation with the ideal; but he considered that it accom- plishes this not only very vaguely, but even very strangely. Thus he says, that what the Platonists call a participation of objects in the ideas, is a mere vague, idle talk ; and he designates as absurd the position of the ideal theory, that even general notions indicate an essence, or entity, since, according to such a view, a single essence might be composed of several diiferent essences ; a consequence which would imperil the legitimacy of the principle of contradiction. At times, indeed, he evidently misinterprets the Platonic doctrine, and is of opinion that Plato considered the ideas to be altogether separate from sensible things, to which he may perhaps have been misled by the fact, that Plato does not assign a place to the ideas, but evidently looks upon them as existing wholly without the rela- tions of space. But the principal defect which he imputes to Plato's theory is, that it confounds the grounds of all things, and, by a necessary consequence, teaches concerning things, doctrines which do not coincide with phenomena. In opposition to this view, Aristotle observes, that it is necessary to assume different grounds of entity, a sensible for the sensible, a perishable for the perishable, and an eternal for what is eternal, and generally to admit for every class of objects a peculiar and correspondent ground. From this confusion of the grounds of Plato it has necessarily resulted, that he could not assume any properly supra-sensible grounds of things, but believed that, by adding to the sensible ground the words "in and by itself," he could elevate it into the supra-sensible. In this respect Aristotle compares the ideal theory to humanizing represen- tations of the Deity ; for, in the same manner that these form at most but eternal men, the Platonic doctrine makes the sensible species of things conceived as eternal, to be the ground of things. The great absurdity of the doctrine is, that it assimilates in species, things, like the perishable and imperishable, which are generically different.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 453

" It cannot be denied that, by following out these consequences, Aristotle did not attack Plato in the true spirit of his theory. This spirit Aristotle misunderstood, in consequence of following a very different notion of essence from that which Plato did. While the latter viewed the essence of things in a very general light, and without any proximate determination, as that which exhibits itself in sensible phenomena as the abiding law, which admits of being apprehended in a scientific notion, Aristotle sought to discover some ground which, as absolutely subsisting, should furnish the ground of all things. The principal object of Plato was to discover and to trace the true and the real in all sensible objects, aud this he considered to be the essence ; Aristotle, on the contrary, sought to explain the origin of sensations by the mutual action and passion of things on their essences. And if Plato looked upon the true not merely as individual, but also as universal, still Aristotle does not deviate from him in this respect ; he only objects to Plato's giving to the universal the term essence. Moreover, he took too narrow a view of the ideal theory, when he believed that Plato did not admit ideas of individual objects as well as of the universal. Here again he was probably deceived by the language of Plato, who, in truth, does consider every particular idea as a universal, but at the same time regards every individual entity as universal or general, since it also comprises under itself a multiplicity of sensuous determinations. That on this point there subsisted nothing more than a verbal misunderstanding between Plato and Aristotle is clear from the fact, that the latter even looked upon the general, although it may be predicated of many things, as something which, not merely in name, but also in being, is one and the same, and as only cognizable by the intellect indeed, but still actually present in the sensible. Aristotle found it necessary to maintain this, because, otherwise, any inference from a universal truth would be impos- sible. He held that science, as Plato had previously shewn, is dependent on the universal, only this universal is not something extrinsical to things. We cannot deny that this account still leaves a difference of view between Aristotle and Plato; which, however, does not consist in this, that while one denied the existence of the general, the other denied that of the individual ; but merely in the different directions they respectively followed in their attempts to explain phenomena. Plato sought to deduce the individual from the uni-

454 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

versal ; but Aristotle, on the contrary, believed tbat the universal has its grounding in the individual. Logically, the tendency of the latter is mainly expressed in his endeavour to find an ultimate subject of the proposition, an " hypostasis " of which all else may be predicated j such are individual objects, for ideas are merely idle words, and the general is not anything subsisting absolutely in and for itself, but it is invariably predicated of something else." — {Ritter, Vol. iii. p. 108.)

NOTE D.— Page 1/1.

*' II fut aussi le prince des philosophes romains, ce citoyen illustre, qui fut le prince des orateurs. Le premier, il cleva sur cette terre nouvelle un monument a la science de la sagesse ; et tjuel monument ! C'est un portique majestueux qui introduit h toutes les branches de la science. Ciceron est historien et peintre tout ensemble ; il fait revivre les ecoles diverses en meme temps qu'il en raconte I'origine, S'emparant ensuite de leur heritage, il eleve la philosophic a la plus haute dignite, lui assigne son veritable but, lui prete le plus noble langage, I'arrache aux subtilites des ecoles pour la transporter sur la scene de la socicte, I'anime d'une vie toute nouvelle. Ce n'est pas a I'intelligence seule qu'il s'adresse, c'est Tame tout enticre qu'il interesse a ses doctes lecons. Comment les anciennes preventions qui repoussaient les etudes philosophiques ne se seraient-elles pas dissipces, lorsque leur cause obtenait un tel apo- logiste, lorsqu'elles recevaient de la bouche de ce grand homme les plus magnifiques eloges, lorsqu'on apprenait de lui qu'elles avaient ete sa lumiere dans les affaires publiques, son delassement dans ses travaux, sa consolation dans I'adversite ; qu'il avait trouve en elles et un guide pour son genie, et une source inalte'rable de bonheur, et le vrai fondement de la vertu ; lorsque Ciceron lui-meme, si justement fier des services qu'il avait rendus a son pays, placait au ^premier rang de ces services le bonheur d' avoir pu introduire ces concitoyens a I'etude de cette science ? II nous apprend qu'avant lui divers ecrivains s'etaient dej^ exerces sur le meme sujet ; mais ils etaient restes dans une obscurite dont I'orateur romain croit in- utile de les tirer. II est cependaut singulier qu'il ne fasse jamais mention du pocme de Lucrece. Ciceron nous confie lui-meme qu'il

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 455

s'est propose quatre vues principales : faire connaitre aux Ro- xnains les doctrines des Grecs, y puiser librement ce qui lui parais- sait digne d'estime, les revetir des ornements du style et de tout I'eclat qu'elles peuvent emprunter k I'art oratoire, et les rapporter aux resultats de I'utilitc la i)lus relevce et la plus etendue ; aussi trouvons-nous dans la philosophie de Ciceron les quatre caracteres essentiels qui distiuguent les travaux des philosophes remains pen- dant le cours de cette periode ; una science empruntee aux sages de la Grece, mais composee d'un choix de matc'riaux fait dans les diflFcrentes ecoles, una science rendue accessible, attrayante, mise a la portce de tons les hommes iustruits, une science cminemment pratique et appliquee aux besoins gcneraux de la socictc, comme a ceux de la morale privee ; en sorte que Ciceron n'a pas ete le vrai fondateur de la philosophie h Rome, mais qu'il est en quelque sorta pour nous comme le representant de tons ceux qui I'ont cultivee apr^s lui. En tracant rapidement ici le resume de ce qu'il a fait pour elle, nous expliquerons done mieux que par une froide nomen- clature bibliographique, le point de vue dans lequel les Romaius se sent places pour I'etude de cette science, et I'esprit dans lequel ils I'ont traitee.

" L'ecole d'Epicure est la seule a laquelle Ciceron n'ait voulu payer aucun tribut, et I'eloignement qu'il montra pour elle est justifie en partie par Tabus qu'on commencait a en faire, par la pressentiment de celui qu'on en ferait par la suite. II lone Pythagore, il rand a Socrate une sorta da culte, il professe pour Platon I'admira- tion la plus constante ; il associe Aristote aux hommages dont il environne le fondateur de I'Academie, il se plait a voir dans ces deux philosophes plutot deux aUie's que deux rivaux ; il s'est pe'netre des austeres maximes de Ze'non, il s'est range a la suite de Carneade et de Philon dans les rangs de la moyenne Acade'mie ; mais ca qu'il y a surtout cherche, c'est I'avantage qu'offre cette ecole de pouvoir comparer, discuter hbrement toutes les doctrines, les opposer entre elles, et faire un choix judicieux. II cherche lui-meme comment on peut composer, de I'enseignement des sages de la Grece depuis Socrate, un systeme unique ou du moins principal, modifie seule- ment par les additions ou les corrections de ses sucesseurs ; il va quelquefois jusqu'a forcer ca rapprochement, et jusqu'a supposer que la doctrine des Stoiciens ne difFere que dans les termes da cel- les da Platon et d' Aristote. On est force de reconnaitre toutefois

456 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

que, dans ses vastes recherches, il n'a pas toujours exactement saisi, fidelement rendu, la veritable pensee des auteurs dont il se rendait

I'interprete.

"En general, Ciceron suit la moyenne Academie dans les ques- tions speculatives, Platon dans la psychologie ; Aristote et Ze'non surtout le guident dans la morale ; il s'attache de pre'ference a Avis- tote dans la politique ; mais c'est Platon qu'il prend constamment pour modele dans sa methode ; il se plait a imiter la forme de ses dialogues : s'il ne I'egale pas dans I'extreme delicatesse de ses ana- lyses, il I'egale souvent en ele'vation, il le surpasse en clarte, et ofFre lui-meme a 1' eloquence philosophique un modele qui n'a jamais ete eo-ale jusqu'a ce jour." — De Gerando, Histoire Conipar^e des Systemes de Philosojihie, Vol.ii. p. 178.)

NOTE E.— Page 197.

We shall here cite a few passages from the writings of some of the Greek and Roman sages, on the nature of a Deity. Plato, on Cause and Effect, reasons thus :^-" Whatever is produced, must be produced by some cause ; for it is impossible that anything should be produced or made without a cause." (Timseus, p. 28). " The Universe received its origin, not from any fortuitous concourse of atoms, but from a prudent potent first cause." (Tim. p. 265.) " We must take it for granted that nothing can make itself." (Thetetetus). " God is the primary and principal mover in nature, (like the soul to the body) who moves himself, and all things that are, were, or shall b^ in the world." (Leg. x. p. 894). Plato states the argument for a Deity, drawn from the order, harmony, and beauty of the world, in the following words : " The admirable order of the universe, and the regular motion of the stars and other celestial bodies, ordered by the Divine mind, demonstrate an intel- ligent cause. For no mortal man who shall look into these things with a diligent, inquisitive eye, can so far be an Atheist, as not to acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being." (Leg. xii. p. 966). Cicero says, " that Nature herself has impressed a notion of a Deity on the minds of all men." (De Nat. Deor. lib. 1). " For God is the first Being and Cause of things." (Simplicius in

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 457

Epict. c. 1, p. 9). Seneca, although he speaks of a pluraUty of gods, asserts the existence of a supreme Deity in language which cannot be mistaken : " The Framer and Former of the universe ; the Governor, Disposer, and Keeper thereof; Him upon whom all things depend ; the Mind and Spirit of the world ; the Artificer and Lord of this whole mundane fabric ; to whom every name be- longeth ; from whom all things spring ; by whose Spirit we live ; who is in all his parts, and sustains himself by his own power ; by whose counsel the world is provided for, and guided in all its movements ; by whose decree all things are done ; the Divine Spirit that is diffused through all things, both great and small ; the God whose power extendeth to all things ; the greatest and most powerful God, who supports himself and maintains all things ; who is present everywhere ; the God of heaven whom we worship and adore." (Nat. 2, lib. 2.)^

NOTE F.— Page 241.

Exposition of Theology by Proclus. Prop. 1. All multitude participates in a certain respect of the

ONE.

Prop. 2. Everything which participates of the one, is both one and not one.

Prop. 3. Everything which becomes one, becomes so through the participation of the one, and is one, so far as it suffers the partici- pation of the one.

Prop. 4. Everything which is united is different from the one itself.

Prop. 5. All multitude is posterior to the 07ie.

Prop. 6. Every multitude consists either of things united, or of unities.

Prop. 7. Everything productive of another is more excellent than the nature of the thing produced.

Prop. 8. That which is primarily good, and which is no other than the good itself, is the leader of all things that in any way whatever participate of good.

Prop. 9. Everything which is sufficient to itself, either according

458 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

to essence, or according to energy, is more excellent than that which is not sufficient to itself, but has the cause of its perfection suspended from another cause.

Prop. 10. Everything which is sufficient to itself is inferior to that which is simply good.

Prop. 11. All beings proceed from one first cause.

Prop. 12. The principle and first cause of all beings is the good.

Prop. 13. Every good has the power of uniting its participants, and every union is good ; and the good is the same with the one.

Prop. 14. Every being is either immoveable or moved. And if moved, it is either moved by itself or by another. And if indeed it is moved by itself, it is self-motive ; but if by another, it is alter- motive. Everything, therefore, is either immoveable, or self-motive, or alter-motive.

Prop. 15. Everything which is converted to itself is incorporeal.

Prop. 16. Everything which is converted to itself, has an essence separate from all body.

Prop. 17. Everything which moves itself primarily, isconvertive to itself.

Prop. 18. Everything which imparts existence to others, is it- self that primarily which it communicates to the natures that are supplied by it with existence.

Prop. 19. Everything which is primarily inherent in a certain nature of beings, is present to all the beings that are arranged ac- cording to that nature, and this conformably to one reason and after the same manner.

Prop. 20. The essence of soul is beyond all bodies, the intel- lectual nature is beyond all souls, and the one is beyond all intel- lectual hypostases.

Prop. 21. Every order beginning from a monad, proceeds into a multitude of every order, and is referred to one monad.

Prop. 22. Everything which subsists primarily and principally in each order is one, and_is neither two, nor more than two, but is only begotten.

Prop. 23. Every imparticipable gives substance from itself to things which are participated. And all participated hypostases are extended to imparticipable hyparxes.

Prop. 24. Every thing which participates is inferior to that

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 459

which is participated ; and that which is participated is inferior to that which is imparticipable.

Prop. 25. Every thing perfect proceeds to the generation of those things which it is able to produce, imitating the one principle of all.

Prop. 26. Every cause which is productive of other things, it- self abiding in itself, produces the natures posterior to itself, and such as are successive.

Prop. 27. Every producing cause, on accouut of its perfection, and abundance of power, is productive of secondary natures.

Prop. 28. Every producing cause gives substance to things simi- lar to itself, prior to such as are dissimilar.

Prop. 29. Every progression is effected through a similitude of secondary to first natures.

Prop. 30. Everything which is produced from a certain thing without a medium, abides in its producing cause, and proceeds from it.

Prop. 31. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing essen- tially, is converted to that from which it proceeds.

Prop. 32. All conversion is effected through the similitude of the things converted to that which they are converted.

Prop. 33. Everything which proceeds from a certain thing and is converted to it, has a circular energy.

Prop. 34. Everything which is converted according to nature, makes its conversion to that, from which also it had the progression of its proper hypostasis.

Prop. 35. Everything caused, abides in, proceeds from, and re- turns or is converted to, its cause.

Prop. 36. Of all things which are multiplied according to pro- gression, the first are more perfect than the second, the second than those posterior to them, and after the same manner successively.

Prop. 37. Of all things which subsist according to conversion, the first are more imperfect than the second, and the second than those that follow ; but the last are the most perfect.

Prop. 38. Everything which proceeds from certain numerous causes, is converted through as many causes as those are through which it proceeds, and all conevrsion is through the same things as those through which progression is effected.

Prop. 39. Every being is either alone essentially converted, or vitally, or also gnostically.

460 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Prop. 40. Of all things which proceed, from another cause, those which exist from themselves, and which are allotted a self-subsis- tent essence, are the leaders.

Prop. 4 1 . Everything which is in another, is alone produced by another ; but everything which is in itself is self-subsistent.

Prop. 42. Everything self-subsistent is convertive to itself.

Prop. 43. Everything convertive to itself is self-subsistent.

Prop. 44. Everything which is convertive to itself according to energy, is also converted to itself essentially.

Prop. 45. Everything self-subsistent is unbegotten.

Prop. 46.

Prop. 47. Everything self-subsistent is incorruptible.

Prop. 48. Everything which is not perpetual, is either a com- posite, or subsists in another.

Prop. 49. Everything self-subsistent is perpetual.

Prop. 50. Everything which is measured by time, either accord- ing to essence, or according to energy, is generation, so far as it is measured, by time.

Prop. 5 1 . Everything self-subsistent is essentially exempt from the natures which are measured by time.

Prop. 52. Everything eternal is a whole which subsists at once. And whether it has its essence alone eternal, it will possess the whole at once present, nor will it have this thing pertaining to itself now subsisting, but that afterwards which as yet is not ; but as much as is possible it now possesses the whole without diminution and. without extension ; or whether it has its energy as well as its essence at once present, it possesses this also collectively, abiding in the same measure of perfection, and, as it were, fixed immoveably and without transition, according to one and the same boundary.

Prop. 53. Eternity subsists prior to all eternal natures, and time exists prior to everything which subsists according to time.

Prop. 54. Every eternity is the measure of eternal natures, and every time is the measure of things in time ; and these are the only two measures of life and motion in beings.

Prop. 55. Everything which subsists according to time, either subsists through the whole of time, or has its hypostasis once in a part of time,

Prop. 56. Everything which is produced by secondary natures.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 461 -

is produced in a great degree by prior and more casual natures, by whom such as are secondary were also produced.

Prop. 57. Every cause both energizes prior to the thing caused, and gives subsistence to a greater number of effects posterior to it.

Prop. 58. Everything that is produced by many, is more com- pounded than that which is produced by fewer causes.

Prop. 59. Everything which is essentially simple, is either better or worse than composite natures.

Prop. 60. Everything which is the cause of a greater number of effects, is better than that which is allotted a power of producing a less number, and which produces the parts of those things to the wholes of which the other gives subsistence.

Prop. 61. Every power which is imparticipable is greater, but when divided is less.

Prop. 62. Every multitude which is nearer to the one, is less in quantity than things more remote from it, but is greater in power.

Prop. 63. Everything which is imparticipable gives subsistence to two-fold orders of participated natures, one indeed in things which sometimes participate, but the other in things which always and connascently participate.

Prop. 64. Every monad which ranks as a principle, gives sub- sistence to a two-fold number ; one indeed of self-perfect hypos- tasis, but the other of illuminations which possess their hypostasis in other things.

Prop. 65. Everything which has any subsistence whatever, either subsists according to cause, so as to have the form of a prin- ciple, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation, after the manner of an image.

Prop. 66. All beings, with reference to each other, are either wholes, or parts, or the same, or different.

Prop. 67. Every wholeness (6\oTr]Q) is either prior to parts, or consists of parts, or is in a part.

Prop. 68. Every whole which is in a part, is a part of that whole which consists of parts.

Prop. 69. Every whole which consists of parts, participates of the wholeness which is prior to parts.

Prop. 70. Everything which is more total among principal, illuminates participants, prior to partial natures, and when these fail, still continues to impart its illuminations.

462 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Prop. 71. All things which, among nrincipal causes, possess a more total and a higher, in their effects, according to the illumina- tions proceeding from them, become in a certain respect subjects to the communications of more partial causes. And the illumina- tions indeed, from higher causes, receive the progressions from se- condary causes ; but the latter are established in the former. And thus some participations precede others, and some representations extend after others, beginning from on high, to the same subject, more total causes having a prior energy, but such as are more par- tial, supplying their participants with their communications poste- rior to the energies of more total causes.

Prop. 72. All things which in their participants have the rela- tion of a subject, proceed from more perfect and total causes.

Prop. 73. Every whole is at the same time a certain being, and participates of being, but not every being is a whole.

Prop. 74. Every form is a certain whole, for it consists of many things, each of which gives completion to the form ; but not every whole is a form.

Prop. 75. Every cause which is properly so called, is exempt from its effect.

Prop. 76. Every thing which is generated from an immoveable cause has an immutable hyparxis ; but every thing which is gene- rated from a moveable cause has a mutable hyparxis.

Prop. 77. Every thing which is in capacity proceeds from that which is in energy. And that which is in capacity proceeds into energy. That also which is in a certain respect in a capacity, so far as it is in capacity, is the offspring of that which is in a certain respect in energy. But that which is all things in capacity, pro- ceeds from that which is all things in energy.

Prop. 78. Every power is either perfect or imperfect. Prop. 79. Every thing which is generated, is generated from a two-fold power.

Prop. 80. Every body is naturally adapted of itself to suflFer ; but every thing incorporeal to act. And the former indeed is es- sentially efficacious, but the latter is impassive. That which is in- corporeal, however, suffers through its communion with body j just as bodies are able to act through the participation of incor- poreals.

Prop. 81. Every thing which is participated in a separable

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 463

manner, is present with its participants by a certain inseparable power which it inserts in it.

Prop. 82. Every thing incorporeal, which is converted to itself, when it is participated by other things, is participated in a sepa- rable manner.

Prop. 83. Every thing which has a knowledge of itself, is en- tirely converted to itself.

Prop. 84. Every thing which always is, possesses an infinite power.

Prop. 85. Every thing which is always becoming to be, or ris- ing into existence, (aei yivofxevov,) possesses an infinite power of becoming to be.

Prop. 86. Every thing which is truly being, (ojtwc ov,) is infi- nite, neither according to multitude nor according to magnitude, but according to power alone.

Prop. 87. Every thing eternal indeed is being, but not every being is eternal.

Prop. 88. Every thing which is truly being, is either prior to eternity, or in eternity, or participates of eternity.

Prop. 89. Every thing which is primarily being consists of bound and infinity.

Prop. 90. The first bound and the first infinity subsist by themselves, prior to every thing which consists of bound and the infinite.

Prop. 91. Every power is either finite or infinite. But every finite power indeed derives its substance from infinite power. And infinite power subsists from the first infinity.

Prop. 92. Every multitude of infinite powers is suspended from one first infinity, which does not subsist as a participated power, nor in things which are endued with power, but subsists by itself, not being the power of a certain participant, but the cause of all beings.

Prop. 93. Every infinite which is in (true) beings, is neither infinite to the natures that are above beings, nor is it infinite to itself.

Prop. 94. Every perpetuity is indeed a certain infinity, but not every infinity is perpetuity.

Prop. 9.5. Every power which is more single, is more infinite than that which is multiplied.

464 NOTES AND ILLrSTRATTONS.

Prop. 96. The power which is infinite of every finite body, is incorporeal.

Prop. 97. In each series of things, every cause which has the relation of a leader, imparts to the whole series the peculiarity of itself ; and that which the cause is primarily, the series is accord- ing to diminution.

Prop. 98. Every separate cause is at one and the same time every where and no where.

Prop. 99. Every imparticipable, so far as it is imparticipable, does not derive its existence from another cause : but it is itself the principle and cause of all its participants. And thus every principle in each series is unbegotten.

Prop. 100. Every series of wholes is extended to an impartici- pable cause and principle. But all imparticipables are suspended from the one principle of all things.

Prop. 101. Imparticipable intellect is the leader of all things that participate of intellect, imparticipable life of all things that participate of life, and imparticipable being of all things that parti- cipate of being. But of these, being is prior to life, but life is prior to intellect.

Prop. 102. All beings which exist in any manner whatever, consist of bound, and the infinite through that which is primarily being. But all living beings are motive of themselves through the first life. And all gnostic beings participate of knowledge, through the first intellect.

Prop. 103. All things are in all, but appropriately in each.

Prop. 104. Every thing which is primarily eternal, has both its essence and its energy eternal.

Prop. 105. Every thing immortal is perpetual; but not every thing perpetual is immortal.

Prop. 106. The medium of every thing which is entirely eter- nal, both in essence and energy, and of every thing which has its essence in time, is that which is partly indeed eternal, and partly is measured by time.

Prop. 107. Every thing which is partly eternal, and partly temporal, is, at one and the same time, being and generation.

Prop. 108. Every thing which is partial in each order, is able to participate in a two-fold respect of the monad which is in the proximately superior order, viz., either through its own wholeness.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. tL65

or through that which is partial in the superior order, and co-ordi- nate with the thing according to an analogy to the whole series.

Prop. 109. Every partial intellect participates of the unity which is above intellect and the first, both through the intellect which ranks as a whole, and through the partial unity which is co-ordinate with this partial intellect. Every partial soul, likewise, participates of the intellect which is a whole, through the soul which ranks as a whole, and through a partial intellect. And every partial nature of body participates of the soul, which is a whole through the wholeness of nature, and a partial soul.

Prop. 110. Of all things that are arranged in each series, such as are first, and are conjoined with their monad, are able to parti- cipate of the natures which are proximately established in the supe- rior series, through analogy. But such as are more imperfect and remote from their proper principle, are not naturally adapted to enjoy these natures.

Prop. 111. Of every intellectual series, some things are divine intellects, receiving the participations of the Gods ; but others are intellects alone. And of every physical series, some things are intellectual souls, suspended from their proper intellects ; but others are souls alone. Of all corporeal natures, likewise, some have souls supernally presiding over them, but others are natures alone, destitute of the presence of souls.

Prop. 112. Of every order, those things that, are first have the form of the natures prior to them.

Prop. 113. Every divine number is unical. Prop. 114. Every God is a self-perfect unity, and every self- perfect unity is a God.

Prop. 115. Every God is super-essential, super-vital, and super-intellectu;)l.

Prop. 116. Every deity except the one is participable. Prop. 117. Every God is the measure of beings. Prop. 118. Everything which is in the Gods pre-exists in them according to their peculiarities. And the peculiarity of the Gods is unical and super-essential. Hence, all things are con- tained in them unically and super-essentially.

Prop. 119. Every God subsists according to super-essential goodness, and is good neither according to participation nor accord- * 2 H

4>GG NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

ing to essence, but super-essentially ; since habits and essences are allotted secondary and manifold orders from the Gods.

Prop. 120. Every God possesses in his own hyparxis a provi- dential inspection of the vrhole of things. And a providential energy is primarily in the Gods.

Prop. 121. Every divine nature has indeed for its hyparxis goodness, but possesses a power which is unsubdued, and at once incomprehensible by all secondary natures.

Prop. 122. Every thing divine provides for secondary natures, and is exempt from the subjects of his providential care, providence neither relaxing the unmingled and unical transcendency of that which is divine, nor a separate union abolishing providence.

Prop. 123. Every thing divine is itself indeed, on account of its super-essential union, ineffable and unknown to all secondary natures ; but it is comprehended and known by its participants. Hence, that which is first is alone perfectly unknown, as being im- participable.

Prop. 1 24. Every God knows participable natures imparticipably, temporal natures without time, things which are not necessary ne- cessarily, mutable natures immutably ; and, in short, all things in a manner more excellent than the order of the things known.

Prop. 125. Every God, from that order from which he began tc unfold himself into light, proceeds through all secondary natures ; always, indeed, multiplying and dividing the communications of himself, but preserving the peculiarity of his own hypostasis.

Prop. 126. Every God who is nearer to the one is more total, but the God who is more remote from it is more partial.

Prop. 127. Everything divine is especially primarily simple, and on this account most sufficient to itself.

Prop. 128. Every God, when participated by natures nearer to himself, is participated without a medium; but when partici- pated by natures more remote from himself, the participation is through a less or greater number of media.

Prop. 123. Every divine body is divine through a deified soul. But every soul is divine through a divine intellect. And every intellect is divine through the participation of a divine unity. And unity indeed is of itself a God ; intellect is most divine ; soul is divine ; but body is deiform.

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 467

Prop, 130. In every divine order, such things as are first are in a greater degree exempt from the natures proximately arranged under them, than these latter are from beings subsequent. And secondary natures in a greater degree adhere to their proximate superiors, than follovs'ing natures to those.

Prop, 131, Every God begins his own energy from himself.

Prop, 132, All the orders of the Gods are bound in union by a medium.

Prop. 133. Every God is a benificent unity, or a unific (kuo- TTOLoc) goodness ; and each, so far as a God possesses this hyparxis. The first God, however, is simply good, and simply one. But each posterior to the first, is a certain goodness, and a certain unity.

Prop. 134. Every divine intellect intellectually perceives in- deed as intellect, but energizes providentially as God.

Prop. 135. Every divine unity is participated by some being immediately, or without a medium ; and every deified nature is extended to one divine unity. As many also as are the partici- pated unities, so many are the participating genera of beings.

Prop. 136. Every God who is more total, and arranged nearer to the first, is participated by a more total genus of beings. But the God who is more partial, and more remote from the first, is participated by a more partial genus of beings. And as being is to being, so is one divine unity to another.

Prop. 137. Every unity in conjunction with the one gives sub- sistence to the being which participates of it.

Prop. 138. Of all the deified natures which participate of the divine peculiarity, the first and highest is beinff itself.

Prop. 139, All things which participate of the divine unities, originate indeed from being, but end in a corporeal nature.

Prop. 140. All the powers of divine natures, having a supernal origin, and proceeding through an appropriate medium, extend as far as to the last of things, and to places about the earth.

Prop. 141. Every providence of the Gods is twofold, one indeed being exempt from the natures for which it provides, but the other being co-arranged with them.

Prop. 142. The Gods are present with all things after the same manner, but all things are not after the same manner present with the Gods. But everything participates of their presence according to its own order and power. And this is accomplished by some

2 11 2

468 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

things uniformly, but by others manifoldly; by some things eter- nally, but by others according to time ; and by some things incor- poreally, but by others corporeally.

Prop. 143. All inferior natures fail before the presence of the Gods, though that which participates of them may be adapted to participation. Everything foreign indeed from divine light becomes far removed from it. But all things are illuminated at once by the Gods.

Prop. 144. All beings, and all the distributions of beings, ex- tend as far in their progressions as the orders of the Gods.

Prop. 145. The peculiarity of every divine order pervades all secondary natures, and imparts itself to all the subordinate ge- nera of beings.

Prop, 146. The ends of all the divine progressions are assimi- lated to their principles, preserving a circle without a beginning and without an end, through conversion to their principles.

Prop. 147. The summits of all the divine orders are assimi- lated to the ends of the natures (proximately) situated above them.

Prop. 148. Every divine order is united to itself in a threefold manner, from the summit which is in it, from its middle, and from its end.

Prop. 149. Every multitude of the divine unities is bounded according to number.

Prop. 150. Everything which proceeds in the divine orders, is not naturally adapted to receive all the powers of its producing cause. Nor, in short, are secondary natures able to receive all the powers of the natures prior to themselves, but the latter have certain powers exempt from things in an inferior order, and incom- prehensible by the beings themselves.

Prop. 151. Everything paternal in the Gods is of a primary nature, and is pre-established in the rank of the good, according to all divine orders.

Prop. 152. Everything which is generative in the Gods, pro- ceeds according to the infinity of divine power, multiplying itself, proceeding through all things, and transcendently exhibiting the never-failing indications in the progressions of secondary natures.

Prop. 153. Everything which is perfect in the Gods, is the cause of divine perfection.

NOTES AND ILLUSTUATIONS. 469

Prop. 154. Everything which is of a guardian nature in the Gods, preserves everything in its proper order, and is uniformly exempt from secondary, and estabhshed in primary nature.

Prop. 155. Everything vivific in the Gods, is a generative cause, but every generative cause is not vivific.

Prop. 156. Every cause of purity is comprehended in the guar- dian order. But, on the contrary, not everything of a guardian order is the same with the purifying genus;

Prop. 157. Every paternal cause is the supplier of being to things, and gives subsistence to the hyparxes of beings. But every thing which is fabricative of the production of form, exists prior to composite natures, and precedes their order and division according to number, and is also of the same co-ordination with the paternal cause, in the more partial genera of things.

Prop. 158, Every elevating cause in the Gods, differs both from a purifying cause, and from the convertive genera.

Prop. 159. Every order of the Gods consists of the first prin- ciples, bound and infinity. But one order is in a greater degree derived from bound, another from infinity.

Prop. 160. Every divine intellect is uniform, or has the form of the one, and is perfect. And the first intellect subsists from it- self, and produces other intellects.

Prop. 161. Everything which is truly being, and is suspended from the Gods, is divine and imparticipable.

Prop. 162. Every multitude of unities which illuminates truly existing being, is occult and intelligible ; occult indeed, as being conjoined with unity ; but intelligible, as participated by being.

Prop. 163. Every multitude of unities which is participated by imparticipable intellect, is intellectual.

Prop. 164. Every multitude of unities which is participated by every imparticipable soul, is supermundane.

Prop. 165. Every multitude of unities which is participated by a certain sensible body is mundane.

Prop. 166. Every intellect is either imparticipable or participable. And if participable, it is either participated by supermundane, or by mundane souls.

Prop. 167. Every intellect intellectually perceives it. But the first intellect indeed perceives itself alone ; and in this, intellect and the intelligible are one in number. But each of the subsequent in-

470 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

tellects perceives itself, and the natures prior to itself. And the intelHgible to each of these is partly that which it is, and partly that from which it is derived.

Prop. 168. Every intellect knows in energy that which it intel- lectually perceives, and it is not the peculiarity of one part of it to perceive^ and of another to perceive that it perceives.

Prop. 169. Every intellect has its essence, power, and energy.

Prop. 170. Every intellect at once intellectually perceives all things. But imparticipable intellect indeed simply perceives all things. And each of the intellects posterior to it perceives all things, according to order.

Prop. 171. Every intellect is an imparticipable essence.

Prop. 1/2. Every intellect is proximately the producing cause, being perpetual and immutable according to essence.

Prop. 173. Every intellect is intellectually both the things which are prior and posterior to itself.

Prop. 174. Every intellect gives subsistence to things posterior to itself, by intellection ; and its fabrication consists in intellection, and its intellection or intelligence in fabrication.

Prop. 175. Every intellect is primarily participated by those natures which are intellectual, both according to essence and ac- cording to energy.

Prop. 176. All intellectual forms are in each other, and each is at the same time separate and distinct from the rest.

Prop. 177. Every intellect being a plenitude of forms, one in- deed is comprehensive of more total, but another of more partial forms. And the superior intellects contain in a more total manner such things as those posterior to them contain more partially. But the inferior intellects contain more partially such things as those that are prior to them contain more totally.

Prop. 178. Every intellectual form gives subsistence to eternal natures.

Prop. 179. Every intellectual number is bounded.

Prop. 180. Every intellect is a whole, so far as each consists of parts and is united to other things, and at the same time separated from them. But imparticipable intellect indeed is simply a whole, as containing all parts in itself totally. But each partial intellect possesses the whole as in a part, and thus in all things partially.

NOTES AND ILLUSTllATIONS. 471

Prop. 181. Every participated intellect is either divine, as be- ing suspended from the Gods, or is intellectual only.

Prop. 182. Every (divine) participated intellect is participated by divine souls.

Prop. 183. Every intellect which is participated indeed, but is intellectual alone, is participated by souls which are neither di- vine nor subsisting in a mutation from intellect into a privation of intellect.

Prop. 184, Every soul is either divine or is changed from in- tellect, or always remains as a medium between these, but is in- ferior to divine souls.

Prop. 185. All (divine) souls are indeed Gods psychically. But all those that participate of an intellectual intellect, are the perpetual attendants of the Gods. And all those that are the recipients of mutation, are sometimes only the attendants of the Gods.

Prop. 186. Every soul is both an incorporeal essence, and se- parate from body.

Prop. 187. Every soul is indestructible, and incorruptible.

Prop. 188. Every soul is both life and vital.

Prop. 189. Every soul is self-vital.

Prop. 190. Every soul is a medium between imparticipable na- tures, and the natures which are divisible about bodies.

Prop. 191. Every participate soul has indeed an eternal essence, but its energy accompanies by time.

Prop. 192. Every participable soul ranks among the number of (truly existing) beings, and is the first of generated natures.

Prop. 193. Every soul subsists proximately from intellect.

Prop. 194. Every soul contains all the forms which intellect primarily possesses.

Prop. 1 95. Every soul is all things, containing indeed sensibles paradigmatically, and after the manner of an exemplar ; but intelli- gibles iconically, or after the manner of an image.

Prop. 196. Every participable soul primarily uses a perpetual body which possesses an unbegotten and incorruptible hypostasis.

Prop. 197. Every soul is an essence vital and gnostic, and a life essential and gnostic, and is knowledge, essence, and life. All things likewise subsist in, at once, the essential, the vital, and the gnostic ; and all things are in all, and each is separate from the rest.

472 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

Prop. 198. Everything which participates of time and is always moved, is measured by periods.

Prop. 199. Every mmidane soul uses periods of its proper life, and restitutions to its former state.

Prop. 200. Every period of soul is measured by time. The period of other souls indeed by a certain time ; but that of the first soul, since it is measured by time, is measured by the whole of time.

Prop. 201. All divine souls have triple energies ; some indeed as souls ; but others as receiving a divine intellect ; and others are suspended from the Gods. And they provide indeed for the whole of things as Gods; but they know all things through an intellectual life, and they move bodies through a self-moved hyparxis.

Prop. 202. All souls attending upon, and always following the Gods, are inferior to divine, but more eminent than particular souls.

Prop. 203. Of every psychical multitude, divine souls indeed being greater in power than other souls, are contracted according to number. But those that always follow divine souls have a middle order among all souls, both in power and quantity. And partial souls indeed are inferior in power to the others, but proceed into a greater number.

Prop. 204. Every divine soul is the leader of many souls that always follow the Gods ; and of a still greater number of such as sometimes receive this order.

Prop, 205. Every partial soul has the same ratio to the soul under which it is essentially arranged, as the vehicle of the one to the vehicle of the other.

Prop. 206. Every partial soul is able to descend infinitely into generation, and to ascend from generation to real being.

Prop^ 207. The vehicle of every partial soul is fabricated by an immoveable cause.

Prop. 208. The vehicle of every partial soul is immaterial, essen- tially indivisible, and impassive.

Prop. 209. The vehicle of every partial soul descends indeed with the addition of more material vestments, but becomes united to the soul by an abolition of everything material, and a recurrence to its proper form, analogous to the soul that uses it.

Prop. 210. Every connascent vehicle to the soul, always pos- sesses both the same figure and magnitude. But it is seen to be

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 473

greater and less, and of dissimilar figure, through the additions and abolitions of other bodies.

Prop, 211. Every partial soul descending into generation, de- scends wholly, nor does one part of it remain on high, and another part descend.

NOTE G.— Page 339.

The controversy between the Calvinists and Arminians, grounded on a particular view of the doctrines of necessary con- nexion and free will, seems, at the present day, to be as far re- moved from a settlement as ever. Indeed, an agreement on the point is almost hopeless. This arises not from sectarian or party feelings, but solely from some leading metaphysical ideas, of oppo- sing character and influence, which lie at the bottom of the dispute. We shall hazard, however, a few general observations on the sub- ject, chiefly with the view of directing the attention of the reader to the leading principles and difficulties involved in this interesting, though perplexing, theological question.

It is common with Calvinistic writers to maintain, that their theory is altogether different from the principle of necessary con- nexion, advocated by many philosophers. Let us see how this is. The Calvinists aflfirm, that the Deity must have foreseen all events, and by virtue of His Omniscience^^ nothing could have happened otherwise than it has done, or will do in future. The doctrine which is called philosophical necessity may be defined to be that which asserts that all the phenomena of the moral world, like that of the physical, are regulated by fixed and immutable laws ; or, in other words, the human mind is first excited to action, and conti- nually influenced by motives ; that these motives originate from, and depend upon, the circumstances in which man is placed, and over which circumstances he has not the least absolute control.

Now then, taking these two doctrines as thus explained, may it not be asked, what diff'erence is there between every thing being done by the immediate agency of the Almighty, and every thing being done by necessary and fixed laws which He has created and ordained ? In both cases the freedom of the human will is com- j)letely excluded ; so that, as far as it is concerned, these two doc-

474 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

trines are one and the same. Yet it does seem somewhat strange that Calvinists should look upon the first doctrine, that every thing is regulated by the immediate interposition of Almighty power, as the very foundation of Christian orthodoxy ; and that the other doctrine, that God governs the world by fixed laws, is to be con- sidered as atheistical and dangerous to the interests of morals and religion. There is a great apparent inconsistency in this. It is not in the power of the most subtile theological disputant to point out any difference between Calvinism and necessity, {so far as both relate to the human will, which is the only point which can render them interesting,) that seems not purely arbitrary and absurd. The only perceptible difference is, that the two doctrines in question are designated by different names.

Calvinists would, we conceive, stand upon firmer ground, if they would take their main principle in all its sweeping fulness and integrity, and not fritter it away, with useless illogical qualifica- tions. They complain that Arminians reason disingenuously with them, by drawing inferences from their doctrines, which they are not warranted to do. But then the Calvinists do the very same thing with their antagonists, the philosophical necessarians ; and even with the Arminians too. The doctrine of predestination is this, that certain individuals will be doomed to everlasting punish- ment, and a certain nvimber to everlasting life. So far there is no ambiguity nor inconsistency in the principle laid down. But when iVrminians or others draw inferences from this maxim of theology, that such a view of the Divine procedure, appears inimical to cor- rect notions of the attributes of the Deity, such as justice and mercy, the Calvinistic complains that the proceedings are un- fair and illogical. Now the only way in which Calvinists have argued against both philosophical necessarians, and Arminians is, by urging the force of inferences against the truth of a principle. This has been the invariable practice followed in every stage of this keenly contested point, for many hundreds of years.

Most Calvinistic writers meet their opponents with such qualifi- cations of Divine decrees as the following : " So far as the Divine government is concerned, the rational mind is in all its delibera- tions and decisions voluntary , and even free, in the more common and less accurate sense of the words. The secret purposes of the Divinity have no influence in determining the human will, and of

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 475

consequence can never destroy a responsibility to the Divine law. " That the soul always chooses that which, all things considered, is the most agreeable, is an identical truth." " The will is ulti- mately governed by the understanding." " The activity of mind implies a general capacity of volition." " The mind is chiefly regulated by its own innate predilections."*

These admissions, which are merely a repetition of what has been over and over again said, show how difficult a matter it is, to get rid of the freedom of the human will ; and how impossible it is for Calvinists to carry out their main principle to all its logical con- sequences.

On the Arminian side of the dispute we again meet with the same difficulty viewed under another aspect. To make the human will independent of the Divine omnipotence and government, is another stumbling-block. The advocates of this theory, like their antagonists, shrink from the inferences of their own principle, and take shelter in qualifications and compromises. The only course, therefore, which is left to both parties, is to agree to differ.

NOTE H.— Page 349

&"•

It has been noticed by some historians, that there are some parts of the writings of Avicenna which would seem to countenance a recent theory, maintained by Drs. Gall and Spurzheim. We shall here quote a few sentences from the fifth volume of Avicenna's works, which may be considered to bear such an interpretation.

" Virium autem apprehendentium, occultarum, vitalium, prima est fantasia, quae est sensus communis, quse est vis ordinata in prima concavitate cerebri, recipiens per seipsam formas omnes, quae imprimmitur quinque sensibus et redduntur ei. Post banc, et imaginatio, vel quae est etiam formans, quae est vis ordinata in ex- tremo anterioris concavitatis cerebri, retinens quod recipit sensus communis a quinque sensibus, et remanet in ea post remotionem illorum sensibilium. Post banc, est vis quae vocatur imaginativa, comparatione animae humanae, quae est vis ordinata in media con- cavitate cerebri, ubi est nervus, et solet componere aliquid de eo quod est in imaginatione cum alio, et deinde aliquid ab alio, secun- dum quod vult. Deinde est vis estimativa, quae est vis ordinata in

* Sermons on Election. London, 1822.

476 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

summa media concavitate cerebri, apprehendens intentiones, non sensatus, quse sunt in singulis sensibilibus, sicut vis quae est in ove dijudicans quod a lupo fugiendum est ; videtur etiam hsec vis op- erari in imaginationis compositionem et divisionem. Deindeestvis memorialis et remiriiscibilis, quae est vis ordinata in posteriore con- cavitate cerebri, retinens quod apprehendit vis sestimationis, de in- tentionibus non sensatis singulorum sensibilium." — De Anima.

NOTE I.— Page 357.

Mr. Hallam observes that the general doctrine held by AveiToes was, " that there is one common intelligence, active, immortal, in- divisible, unconnected with matter, the soul of the human kind ; which is not in any one man, because it has no material form, but which yet assists in the rational operations of each man's personal soul, and from those operations which are all conversant with par- ticulars, derives its own knowledge of universals. Thus, if I un- derstand what is meant, which is rather subtile, it might be said, that as in the common theory particular sensations furnish means to the soul of forming general ideas, so, in that of Averroes, the ideas and judgments of separate human souls furnish collectively the means of that knowledge of universals, which the one great soul of mankind alone can embrace. This was a theory built, as some have said, on the bad Arabic version of Aristotle which Aver- roes used. But, whatever might have first suggested it to the philosopher of Cordova, it seems little else than an expansion of the Realist hypothesis, urged to a degree of apparent paradox. For if the human soul, as an universal, possesses an objective reality, it must surely be intelligent ; and, being such, it may seem no extravagant hypothesis ; though incapable of that demonstra- tion, we now require in philosophy to suppose that it acts upon the subordinate intelligences of the same species, and receives impres- sions from them. By this also they would reconcile the knowledge we were supposed to possess of the reality of universals, with the acknowledged impossibility, at least in many cases, of representing them to the mind." {Lit. Middle Ages, Vol. 1, p. 196.)

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS. 477

NOTE J.— Page 363.

4

Le Livre des Conseils, par Ferideddin Attar, quoique essentielle- ment destine a offrir uii recueil de Preceptes moraux et de Conseils pratiques, renferme aussi quelques vues sur la connaissance de Dieu, suivant le langage des Arabes, sur la vie spirituelle et con- templative. C'est en effet par la contemplation que cette connais- sance s'acquiert. Celui qui connait veritablement Dieu par la contemplation, est convaincu que la veritable existence consiste dans I'aneantissement. Si tu connais bien ton ^me sujette aux passions, tu connaitras le Dieu Trcs-Haut et veritable dans ses dons. Celui-la seul possede la science qui connait Dieu. La contempla- tion consiste a disparaitre et a s'aneantir devant Dieu. La con- templation ne s'occupe ni de ce monde, ni de la vie future ; toutes ses facultes sont absorbees dans le desir de son union avec Dieu. Ce monde est semblable a un fantome que voit un homme durant son sommeil ; lorsqu'il est eveille, il ne lui reste aucun profit de ces douces illusions."

"Quoi que cette theosopbie mystique se soit particulierement, nous la voyons se produire aussi parmi les Maures d'Espagne ; elle trouve, au milieu du douzieme siecle, un sectateur dans Iban Baiiah, que S. Thomas a appele Avenpace, et qui est plus connu sous ce dernier nom. Avenpace, disciple du philosophe et medeciu Avenzoar, avait ecrit des lettres philosophiques et theologiques, au nombre desquelles il en est une sur le detachement des choses hu- tnaines et I'union de V amour avec Dieu. Ses opinions lui attirerent, de la part des docteurs musulraans, une accusation d'here'sie. II avait cultive les sciences mathematiques ; car il avait commente Euclide. 11 avait egalement travaille sur Aristote ; Averrhoes le cite souvent, et c'est par ces citations seules que nous connaissons aujourd'hui ses idees philosophiques, Avenpace, dit Averrhoes, s'occupa beaucoup de I'entendement, et particulierement dans la lettre qu'il intitula : De la Conjonction de V entendenient avec Vhomme, et dans son Traite de I'Ame. Voici le fondemeut qu'il etablit: d'abord il supposa que les intelligibles sont produits ou crees ; que tout ce qui est produit a une quidditi (une qualite essen- tielle ;) que I'entendement est capable par sa nature de de'tacher cette quiddite ; qu'il en abstrait ainsi les formes des intelligibles, en quoi il Concorde avec Alfarabi. II ajouta que les intelligibles ne

478 NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

comportent point la pluralite, si ce n'est a raison de la reunion des formes spirihielles par lesquelles elles subsistent dans chaque in- dividu ; d'ou il suit que I'intelligible depouille de ces formes, est un pour tous les hommes. La quiddite, I'intelligible, et la forme, n'ont point elles-memes de forme spirituelle ; elles ne subsistent dans aucun individu ; elles ne sont point la quiddity d'un individu particulier, d'ovi il conclut encore que I'entendement est unique cbez tous les hommes, et qu'il constitue une substance separee et distincte." — Histoire Compar^e par De Gerando. Tom. 4, p. 286.

PKINTEn BV C. F. HODGSON, 1, UOUOU SQUAIiE, FI.EBT STKKKT, LONIlO.V.

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