



HOME RULE

A CRITICAL CONSIDERATION

BY JOHN J. HORO

“As Ireland is necessary to Great Britain, so is comp and perfect liberty necessary to Ireland, and both islands must be drawn much closer to a free constitution, that they may be drawn closer to one another.”—HENRY GEATTAN.

“If you establish an Irish Parliament, give it plenty of work and plenty of responsibility. Throw the Irish upon themselves. Make them forget England; let their energies be engaged in Irish party warfare; but give no Irish party leader an opportunity of raising an anti-English cry. That is what a good Home Rule Bill ought to do.”—JOHN BRIGHT.

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Α μάταια μοῖμας,
'S α ἔαπα ζαν ἔλαον ζαν ἔλμῃ,
Le τόσων ἱρ ρεαρῖ,
Α λεζαῖμ ἀν λεαβῖ ἀτ' λῖμῃ.

Ὅρ λῖρ τῶμῃ ἀς τεαῖτ
Ζεα-βλῖτ na ροῖρη ἀμῖτ',
Σο πολλῖρ ἰ ρῖ ἀρ μαε
Ὀεῖτ τοραῖ ἀρ ἀν ζερῖμῃ ἀς ρῖρ.

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CONTENTS.

	PAGE
Foreword	
I. What is Home Rule?	1
II. Where Parnell Stood	6
III. Legislative and Executive Authority ..	11
IV. Two Chambers or One	16
V. The Constitution of the Legislature ...	20
VI. Proportional Representation	24
VII. Irish Representation in the Imperial Parliament	30
VIII. The Plundering of Ireland	35
IX. The Financial Scheme in the Bill of 1886...	42
X. The Financial Scheme in the Bill of 1893...	47
XI. Ireland's Present Balance-sheet ...	54
XII. English Administration in Ireland ...	61
XIII. The Present Financial Problem	66
XIV. Justice, Police and Post Office	72
XV. The Problem of the Intolerant Minority ...	76
XVI. Conclusion	83

FOREWORD.

I AM indebted to the Editor of the LEADER for permission to republish in book form the following articles, which first appeared in his paper and were written at his request. They are an attempt to explain in a clear and businesslike way what Nationalist Ireland means by Home Rule. My object in writing them was twofold. First to awaken intelligent discussion in Ireland concerning the details of Home Rule, and secondly to place a clear statement of Ireland's demand before fair-minded Englishmen. It was indeed to compass the second of these objects that this book has been published. I have taken as the standard for discussion the Home Rule Bill of 1893, because I do not believe that Irish public opinion will be satisfied with anything less, and because I hope that English statesmen will have the courage and foresight to give us something more. One specious argument is frequently used against a generous Home Rule Bill by politicians of the Devolution school. Stated shortly it amounts to this, that Home Rule should be granted by instalments because Ireland is not prepared for a measure of full self-government. Nothing could be more absurd. The administrative government of every country is really carried on by the permanent officials. The representatives of the people who form the party government of the day simply direct and influence the permanent officials. Nowhere is this more apparent than in England, where the government of the day always acts on consultation,

FOREWORD.

and generally in agreement with, the permanent heads of the great administrative bodies, such as the Local Government Board. Whatever the nature of the next Home Rule Bill, it cannot, any more than did its predecessors, upset the administrative machinery of Irish government. That machinery must remain, and whatever Irish government holds office must act in consultation with the permanent officials. Changes no doubt will be effected, and alterations made as time goes on, but no Act of Parliament can of itself effect them, they must be the result of experience, consultation, and commonsense operating through the elected representatives of the people upon the permanent administrative machinery. Those who wish to study the question of Irish finance in more detail would do well to read Miss Murray's standard work, "The Commercial Relations between England and Ireland," Professor Kettle's book on "Home Rule Finance," the excellent analysis of Treasury papers entitled "The Financial Relations of Ireland with the Imperial Exchequer" by "An Irishman," and above all the report of the Childer's Commission. To those English readers who wish to understand the genesis and growth of the Home Rule movement, three books are indispensable: "Irish Nationality," by Mrs. J. R. Green; "Contemporary Ireland," by M. L. Paul Dubois; and "The Life of Parnell," by Mr. R. Barry O'Brien.

Lacaduv, Cork,
July, 1911.

HOME RULE.

I.—WHAT IS HOME RULE?

THE Nationalists of Ireland have been so long demanding Home Rule that it is not to be wondered at that the expression "Home Rule" has become a mere party cry, almost devoid of meaning to the man in the street. I purpose, therefore, as an introduction to these articles, on what we may, perhaps, without being too optimistic, call "the coming Home Rule Bill," to consider what exactly these two mystic words, Home Rule, really mean. To put it very briefly, the demand for Home Rule in Ireland is a demand for constitutional government. That great constitutional lawyer, Isaac Butt, speaking at the Home Rule Conference in November 18th, 1883, said: "What is constitutional government? Constitutional government is this—that, whatever be the form of government—take it as ours is, a monarchy—the Sovereign carries on the government of the country by advisers controlled by a representative assembly of the people."

Now, how does this definition fit in with the present government of Ireland? Let us see. Mr. Redmond moved a resolution in the House of Commons on March 30th, 1908, which, whilst it is somewhat long, exhaustively shows the difference between constitutional government and the present government of Ireland. Here it is:—

That the present system of government in Ireland is in opposition to the will of the people, and gives them no voice in the management of their own affairs; that the system is consequently inefficient and extravagantly costly; that it does not enjoy the confidence of any section of the population; that it is productive of universal discontent and unrest, and is incapable of satisfactorily promoting the material and intellectual progress of the people; that the reform of Irish government is a matter vital

to the interests of all Ireland and calculated greatly to promote the well-being of the people of Great Britain, and in the opinion of this House the solution of this problem can be obtained only by giving the Irish people the legislative and executive control of all purely Irish affairs, subject to the supreme authority of the Imperial Parliament.

This resolution, which was passed by 313 votes to 157, embodies the demand of the Irish people, and has since been adopted by the present Prime Minister as the policy of the Government in his famous Albert Hall speech, and re-affirmed during the recent debate on the Home Rule amendment to the Address both by the Government and Mr. Redmond. When all is said and done, the demand for Home Rule is based on the simple and unanswerable fact that the government of Ireland is unconstitutional—namely, it is not answerable to the Irish people, but to an English Government. From this follows all else, its inefficiency, its extravagant cost, its incapacity to promote the welfare of Ireland. Grattan's Parliament, of which we read so much, and about which we often seem to know very little, was not really a constitutional body. If it had been answerable to the people of Ireland, it would never have passed the Act of Union. It was elected on a very restricted franchise, and its ministers went out of office with the English Government of the day. They were dependent, therefore, for office, not on the Irish electors, but on English parties. Moreover, they had no voice whatever in Imperial affairs. O'Connell's original demand was for the Repeal of the Union, and the revival of Grattan's Parliament. That demand he subsequently modified, as will appear from the following letter, which he addressed to the Repeal Association in October, 1844:—

Both parties are agreed that those powers should be sufficiently extensive to enable the Irish Parliament to protect the lives, liberties and property of the people. That is, it should have the power to enact all the laws to be in force in Ireland—in short, that it should be an efficient Parliament for all legislative, financial and judicial purposes within her Majesty's realm of Ireland. The simple Repealers are of opinion that the reconstituted Irish Parliament should have the same power and authority which the former Irish Parliament had. The "Federalists," on the contrary, appear to me to require more for Ireland than

the simple Repealers do; for besides the local Parliament in Ireland having full and perfect local authority, the Federalists require that there should be, for questions of Imperial concern, colonial, military and naval, and of foreign alliance and policy, a Congressional or Federal Parliament, in which Ireland should have a fair share and proportion of representation and power. It is but right and just to confess that in this respect the Federalists would give Ireland more weight and importance in Imperial concerns than she would receive by the plan of the simple Repealers. . . . For my own part, I will own, since I have come to contemplate the specific differences, such as they are, between "simple Repeal" and Federalism, I do at present feel a preference for the Federal plan as tending more to the utility of Ireland.

We, therefore, find O'Connell advocating, in 1844, Home Rule on Federal lines, so that the quack prophets of the Tory Party can scarcely continue to claim that they discovered it in 1910. Let Mr. Garvin, of the "Observer," bellow ever so loudly, the fact remains that the Federal solution has been accepted by every leader of the Irish constitutional movement from O'Connell to Mr. Redmond. The great Home Rule Conference of 1873, which initiated Isaac Butt's movement, formulated the Irish claim in a series of historic resolutions, the fourth of which reads as follows:—

That in claiming these rights and privileges for our country (*i.e.*, an Irish Parliament), we adopt the principle of a Federal arrangement which would secure to the Irish Parliament the right of legislating for and regulating all matters relating to the internal affairs of Ireland, while leaving to the Imperial Parliament the power of dealing with all questions affecting the Imperial Crown and Government, legislation regarding the Colonies and other dependencies of the Crown, the relations of the Empire with foreign States, and all matters appertaining to the defence and stability of the Empire at large, as well as the power of granting and providing the supplies necessary for Imperial purposes.

This resolution illustrates the continuity of the Home Rule demand, inasmuch as, without altering a comma, one might put it forward as the Irish claim to-day. The Home Rule Bill of 1886 departed, it is true, from the Federal principle, as, under it, Irish representation in the House of Commons was to cease, but we know that this departure was due to Mr. Gladstone, and not to the Irish Party. Mr. Parnell had an open mind on the

question, as he admitted to Cecil Rhodes. He did not greatly care whether the Irish members were retained or not. Mr. Gladstone, however, was strongly opposed to their retention. Afterwards, as we know, he changed his mind, and the Bill of 1893 provided for the retention of the Irish representatives in the House of Commons. The following letter from Parnell to Rhodes gives his final views on the subject:—

June 23rd, 1888.

DEAR SIR,—I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 9th inst., which confirms the very interesting account given me at Avondale last January by Mr. MacNeill as to his interviews and conversations with you on the subject of Home Rule for Ireland. I may say at once, and frankly, that you correctly judged the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster to have been a defect in the Home Rule measure of 1886, and, further, that this proposed exclusion may have given some colour to the accusation so freely made against the Bill that it had a separatist tendency. I say this while strongly asserting and believing that the measure itself was accepted by the Irish people without any afterthought of the kind, and with an earnest desire to work it out with the same spirit with which it was offered—a spirit of cordial good-will and trust, a desire to let bygones be bygones, and a determination to accept it as a final and satisfactory settlement of the long-standing dispute between Great Britain and Ireland.

I am very glad that you consider the measure of Home Rule to be granted to Ireland should be thoroughgoing, and should give her complete control over her own affairs without reservation, and I cordially agree with your opinion that there should be effective safeguards for the maintenance of Imperial unity. Your conclusion as to the only alternative for Home Rule is also entirely my own, for I have long felt that the continuance of the present semi-constitutional system is quite impracticable. But to return to the question of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster. My own views upon the points and probabilities of the future, and the bearing of this subject upon the question of Imperial federation—my own feeling upon the measure is that if Mr. Gladstone includes in his next Home Rule measure the provisions of such retention we should cheerfully concur with him, and accept them with good-will and good faith, with the intention of taking our share in the Imperial partnership. I believe also that in the event I state this will be the case, and that the Irish people will cheerfully accept the duties and responsibilities assigned to them, and will justly value the position given to them in the Imperial system. I am convinced that it would be the highest statesmanship on Mr. Gladstone's part to devise a feasible plan for the continued presence of the Irish members here, and from my observation of public events and opinions since 1885, I am sure that

Mr. Gladstone is fully alive to the importance of the matter, and that there can be no doubt that the next measure of autonomy for Ireland will contain the provisions which you rightly deem of such moment.

It does not come so much within my province to express a full opinion upon the larger question of Imperial federation, but I agree with you that the continued Irish representation at Westminster immensely facilitates such a step while the contrary provision in the Bill of 1886 would have been a bar. Undoubtedly this is a matter which should be dealt with in accordance largely with the opinion of the colonies themselves, and if they should desire to share in the cost of Imperial matters, as undoubtedly they now do in the responsibility, and should express a wish for representation at Westminster, I certainly think it should be accorded to them, and that public opinion in these islands would unanimously concur in the necessary constitutional modifications.

I am, dear Sir, yours truly,

CHARLES STEWART PARNELL.

To sum up, in Mr. Redmond's words, when we speak of Home Rule, "we mean an Irish Parliament with an executive responsible to it, created by Act of the Imperial Parliament, and charged with the management of purely Irish affairs, leaving to the Imperial Parliament, in which Ireland would continue to be represented, the management, as at present, of all Imperial affairs." This is the broad principle, but what of the details? "We stand," says Mr. Redmond, "where Parnell stood." In the following articles I will enter into the details of Home Rule, and consider more fully where Parnell stood.

II—WHERE PARNELL STOOD.

SPEAKING in Cork on January 21st, 1885, Parnell made the famous declaration:—"We cannot ask for less than the restitution of Grattan's Parliament, with its important privileges and wide, far-reaching constitution. We cannot, under the British constitution, ask for more than the restitution of Grattan's Parliament. But no man has a right to fix the boundary of the march of a nation. No man has a right to say, 'Thus far shalt thou go, and no further;' and we have never attempted to fix the *ne plus ultra* to the progress of Ireland's nationhood, and we never shall." I have no doubt that when the new Home Rule Bill is introduced, this statement of Parnell's will be quoted by the extreme critics of the Irish Party and we shall be told that Parnell would never accept such a measure of Home Rule. That eminent crank, Mr. Frank Hugh O'Donnell, trotted it out a short time ago with that very object, but unfortunately for the value of his criticism, he himself shortly afterwards wrote a history of the Irish Party, which commends Butt's federal scheme as the only practical solution of the Irish problem, an entirely different thing from Grattan's Parliament. Three things have to be remembered about this declaration of Parnell's. First of all, when he made it both English parties were nibbling at Home Rule, and, able strategist as he was, he knew that he must ask for as much as possible if he was to get anything useful. Secondly, Parnell's ignorance of the details of Irish history was tremendous. We find him in that very month of January, 1885, two days after he had made the declaration about Grattan's Parliament, saying to his friend, Mr. M. J. Horgan, of Cork, just before he was to deliver a lecture on "Ireland and Her Parliament": "I really do not know anything about Irish history. Have you got any books I can

read?''* I therefore doubt very much whether when he made this declaration about Grattan's Parliament he had at all considered the powers of that Parliament or its relations to Irish life and imperial affairs. What confirms me in this opinion is the fact that we have full and complete details of the scheme he was eventually willing to accept as a full measure of Home Rule, and this scheme is entirely different from Grattan's Parliament. Mr. Barry O'Brien, at the suggestion of Mr. Gladstone, wrote a series of articles on Home Rule in the autumn of 1885. Before these articles were written the following interesting discussion took place, and is set out in Mr. O'Brien's life of Parnell.† I make no apology for quoting it in full, as it gives very clearly Parnell's final position with reference to the main details of Home Rule:—

A few days before Mr. Gladstone left Hawarden for Midlothian, I received a letter from the publicist whom I have already mentioned, saying:—"When can we have a talk about your second article? Would to-morrow suit you?" I called on the morrow. "Now," he said, "I think the time has come to have an article on Home Rule. What I should like you to tell me is, not what you think would be the best system, but what Mr. Parnell would accept. We want to get Mr. Parnell's mind on paper." I then stated the points on which I thought Parnell would insist, and the points on which he would be prepared to accept a compromise or give way:—

1. There must be an Irish Parliament and an Irish Executive for the management of Irish affairs. No system of local government would do. It was not local, but national government which the Irish people wanted.

2. Parnell would not stand out upon the question whether there should be one or two chambers. He would be quite willing to follow Gladstone's lead on that point.

3. Neither would he stand out on the question whether the Irish members should remain in the Imperial Parliament or be excluded from it. The Catholic Church would certainly be in favour of their retention in order that Catholic interests might be represented, but the bulk of the Irish Nationalists would not really care one way or the other. The chances are that if they were retained they would rarely attend.

* See Barry O'Brien's "Life of Parnell," p. 318.

† Anyone who takes the slightest interest in modern Irish History should purchase and read this book. It can be now bought for a shilling in the Nelson Library of Notable Books and is more interesting than any novel.

4. What would be Irish and what Imperial affairs? This really was the crux of the whole scheme.

(a) Irish affairs—Irish affairs should include land, education, law and justice, police, customs.

Publicist—"Are you sure about the police?"

"Certainly. Parnell would insist upon the police. If you refused he would make the refusal a *casus belli*. I have no doubt about that."

Publicist—"Well, customs?"

"Parnell would certainly like the customs. He wants protection for Irish industries, for a time, at all events."

Publicist—"Well, he won't get it. That much is perfectly clear. We won't give him the customs. Would he make the refusal a *casus belli*?"

"No; if you give him land, education, law and justice, and police, he would be satisfied; but these things are vital. He would, however, make a fight for the customs, I think."

(b) Imperial affairs—Imperial affairs should include foreign policy (peace or war), the army and navy, the Crown, the currency and the post office.

"The Irish would not trouble themselves much about Imperial affairs. What they want is to have the building up of their own nation in their own hands. Give them an Irish Parliament with full power for the government of Ireland, and they would let the British run the Empire."

This resumé of Mr. Barry O'Brien's gives us practically the position Parnell did take up when the details of the Home Rule Bill came to be discussed. On April 8, 1886, Mr. Gladstone moved the first reading of the Home Rule Bill.

He proposed to establish an Irish Parliament and an Irish executive for the management and control of Irish affairs, reserving to the Imperial Parliament the following subjects: The Crown, peace or war, the army, navy, militia, volunteers, defence, etc., foreign and colonial relations, dignities, titles of honour, treason, trade, post office, coinage. Besides these "exceptions" the Irish Parliament was forbidden to make any laws respecting (*inter alia*) the endowment of religion, or in restraint of educational freedom, or relating to the customs or excise. The Dublin Metropolitan Police were to remain under Imperial control for two years, and the Royal Irish Constabulary for an indefinite period; but eventually all the Irish police were to be handed over to the Irish Parliament. Ireland's contribution to the Imperial Revenue was to be in propor-

tion of one-fifteenth to the whole. All constitutional questions relating to the powers of the Irish Parliament were to be submitted to the Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council. The Irish members were to be excluded from the Imperial Parliament. This, in rough outline, was the Home Rule Bill of 1886. Parnell accepted it. He accepted, moreover, fully and without reserve, the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament. The following passage from one of his speeches on the Bill explains his position:—

We have always known since the introduction of this Bill the difference between a co-ordinate and a subordinate Parliament, and we have recognised that the Legislature which the Prime Minister proposes to constitute is a subordinate Parliament. . . . Undoubtedly I should have preferred the restitution of Grattan's Parliament, . . . but I consider that there are practical advantages connected with the proposed statutory body, limited and subordinate to this Imperial Parliament as it undoubtedly will be, which will render it much more useful and advantageous to the Irish people than was Grattan's Parliament.

I understand the supremacy of the Imperial Parliament to be this—that they can interfere in the event of the powers which are conferred by this Bill being abused under certain circumstances. But the Nationalists, in accepting this Bill, go, as I think, under an honourable understanding not to abuse those powers; and we pledge ourselves in that respect for the Irish people, as far as we can pledge ourselves, not to abuse those powers and to devote our energies and our influences . . . to prevent those powers being abused.

The Imperial Parliament will have at command the force which it reserves to itself, and it will be ready to intervene, but only in the case of grave necessity arising.

I believe that this is by far the best mode in which we can hope to settle this question. We look upon the provisions of this Bill as a final settlement of the question, and I believe that the Irish people have accepted it as such a settlement.

This passage clearly shows that he had entirely abandoned Grattan's Parliament as the standard of the Irish demand, if, indeed, he had ever seriously set it up. The Home Rule Bill of 1886, as we know, never reached the House of Lords. The House of Commons rejected it by a majority of 30. The defection of Mr. Chamberlain and his followers killed it. Parnell did not live to see the introduction of the Home Rule Bill of 1893, but we know that he approved of its main proposals and

that they formed the subject of consultation between himself and Mr. Gladstone.

How far he would have tried to modify the Bill had he lived we cannot say, but I think we can be quite certain that he would have accepted the Bill when it left the House of Commons as a full and satisfactory measure of self-government. Bearing these facts in mind, and comparing Mr. Asquith's policy with the Bill of 1893, I think Mr. Redmond is entirely justified in saying that he stands where Parnell stood. The Bill of 1893, therefore, represents the final result of Parnell's labours. It is the high-water mark of Home Rule legislation. Remembering this, I shall proceed to consider that Bill step by step, applying to it such criticism as the changed condition of things may suggest, and not forgetting "to walk by the light of commonsense in the domain of reality."

III.—LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY.

SPEAKING at the Oxford Union Debating Society a few days after I had written my previous article, Mr. Birrell made the following remarkable statement:—

At the same time if they had full opportunity of reading the Bill of 1893 it would be seen that what was proposed would be *something like that*, subject to the alterations and the changes and the modifications which the times that had gone by since then had taught all wise and rational men. The nature of the Home Rule measure would be a National Parliament with restricted powers, subject to a National Executive.

This proves clearly that the Government intend to make the Bill of 1893 the basis of the pending legislation, and I think fully justifies a serious dissection of that Bill. The first thing we have to consider is the legislative and executive authority of the Irish Parliament—that is, the sort of laws it will be able to make and the manner in which those laws will be enforced. The preamble or preface of the 1893 Bill (which, by the way, was introduced amongst others by Mr. Secretary Asquith) is as follows:—

Whereas it is expedient that without impairing or restricting the supreme authority of Parliament, an Irish legislature should be created for such purposes in Ireland as in this Act mentioned.

The first clause goes on to enact:—

On and after the appointed day there shall be in Ireland a legislature consisting of His Majesty the King and of two houses, the Legislative Council and the Legislative Assembly.

I do not purpose in this article to consider the question of whether the new Irish Parliament ought to consist of two houses or one, but purpose rather to discuss its powers, whether it consist of two chambers or one.

The consideration of the two-chamber question, and, incidentally, of Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington's views thereon, will arise more naturally when I come to discuss how the Irish Parliament is to be constituted. What, then, were the powers given to the Irish Parliament by the Bill of 1893? It enacted that, with the exceptions and subject to the restrictions set out in the Act, there should be granted to the Irish Legislature power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of Ireland in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or some part thereof. The Irish Legislature was not to make laws concerning the following matters:—

1. The Crown, or the succession to the Crown, or a Regency; or the Lord Lieutenant as representative of the Crown.

2. The making of peace or war, or matters arising from a state of war.

3. Naval or military forces, or the defence of the realm.

4. Treaties and other relations with foreign states, or the relations between different parts of Her Majesty's dominions, or offences connected with such treaties or relations.

5. Dignities or titles of honour.

6. Treason, treason-felony, alienage, or naturalization.

7. Trade with any place out of Ireland; or quarantine, or navigation (except as regards inland waters and local health or harbour regulations).

8. Beacons, lighthouses, or sea-marks (except so far as they can consistently with any general Act of Parliament be constructed or maintained by a local harbour authority).

9. Coinage, legal tender; or the standard of weights and measures.

10. Trade marks, merchandise marks, copyright or patent rights.

In addition to these exceptions it was also laid down that the powers of the Irish Legislature should not extend to the making of any law—

1. Respecting the establishment or endowment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

2. Imposing any disability, or conferring any privilege, on account of religious belief.

3. Abrogating or prejudicially affecting the right to establish or maintain any place of denominational education or any denominational institution or charity.

4. Prejudicially affecting the right of any child to attend a school receiving public money, without attending the religious instruction at that school.

5. Whereby any person may be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or may be denied the equal protection of the laws, or whereby private property may be taken without just compensation.

6. Whereby any existing Corporation, incorporated by Royal Charter or by any local or general Act of Parliament (not being a Corporation raising for public purposes taxes, rates, cess, dues, or tolls, or administering funds so raised) may, unless it consents, or the leave of His Majesty is first obtained on address from the two houses of the Irish Legislature, be deprived of its rights, privileges, or property, without due process of law.

7. Whereby any inhabitant of the United Kingdom may be deprived of equal rights as respects public sea fisheries.

There are two points upon which it seems to me that we ought to seek for amendment of these restrictions. First, we should not be prevented from making laws as to the standard of weights and measures. The English standard weights and measures are entirely obsolete, and it would be of enormous importance commercially if an Irish Parliament were left free to introduce the metric system, and so bring Ireland into touch with the rest of Europe. I do not think it would be difficult to get this concession, more particularly as the introduction of the metric system has been seriously mooted already in England, and it could not be called a revolutionary change. It is one that would certainly tend to enormously simplify education and commerce. Secondly, I think that the Irish Party should most strongly insist on the removal of the restriction concerning trade mark, copyright, and patent legislation. England is very tenacious as regards her commercial rights, and I imagine the removal of this restriction would meet with strong opposition. But even supposing that we could not get a full concession on this point, we should certainly insist on getting powers to legislate concerning the Irish National Trade Mark and the trade marks of all Irish manufacturers. There can be little doubt that the creation of a national board to regulate the Irish

Trade Mark and Irish trade, or, rather, the re-creation of the Department as the Irish Department of Agriculture and Trade, with full power to control the Irish National Trade Mark, should be one of the first acts of an Irish Parliament. Such a body, with someone conversant with Irish industrial needs (such as Mr. E. J. Riordan, of the Irish Industrial Association) at the head of its trade department, would soon work wonders for Irish commerce.

What may be called the religious restrictions on the powers of an Irish Parliament are no doubt somewhat ridiculous, and to some extent offensive, but it is not to be wondered at that the raving of the Orange bigots has created such a condition of mind even amongst singularly clear-headed and logical Englishmen that we must accept these restrictions as a necessary part of any Home Rule Bill, and as no Irish Catholic has the slightest ambition to enact such laws it cannot be said that these restrictions greatly matter.

The provisions of the Bill as to executive authority are, shortly, as follows:—The executive power is to continue, as at present, vested in the King and in the Lord Lieutenant as his representative. The Lord Lieutenant as the King's representative will summon, prorogue, and dissolve the Irish Parliament, just as the King does the Parliament of England. An Executive Committee of the Privy Council of Ireland will aid and advise in the government of Ireland, being of such numbers and comprising persons holding such offices as His Majesty may think fit or as may be directed by Irish Act. The Lord Lieutenant will, on the advice of the said Executive Committee, give or withhold the assent of His Majesty to Bills passed by the Irish Legislature, subject, nevertheless, to any instructions given by His Majesty in respect of any such Bill. This means that such an Executive Committee of the Privy Council would advise the King as to the use of his veto on legislation passed by the Irish Parliament. The real meaning of these provisions could only appear in the application thereof. I think that the King would be very slow to exercise such a veto, and that if the Irish Legislature acted with any sort of tact and

moderation it would really be a dead letter. Neither would an Executive Committee of the Privy Council, on which sooner or later a large proportion of representative Irishmen in touch with the people would sit, be anxious to act aggressively towards an Irish Parliament.

The important feature of this section of the Bill is that it gives no power of veto to the Imperial Parliament, which would stand, therefore, in the same relation to the Irish Parliament as it does to that of Canada or South Africa. This is one of the things that differentiate the Home Rule Bill of 1893 from the Devolution proposals beloved of Lord MacDonnell and Lord Dunraven. No one can doubt that a power of veto by the English Parliament would destroy all sense of national responsibility and be a perpetual cause of national irritation. The English Parliament will have the power to take away entirely the Irish Parliament it gives us, but Ireland must see to it that the English Parliament will have no power to veto or alter the acts of the Irish Parliament. Such a power would reduce the Irish Parliament to the legislative level of a Town Council.

IV.--TWO CHAMBERS OR ONE ?

THE Home Rule Bill of 1893 provided, as I have already stated, for the creation of an Irish Parliament, consisting of two chambers—a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly. Before discussing the franchise on which these chambers are to be elected, or the number of members they are to contain, I purpose to consider in this article the first and equally important question, whether the Irish Parliament ought to consist of two chambers or one. Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington, in a recent lecture on the Home Rule legislature, strongly advocated a single chamber, on the grounds that a second chamber would diminish the responsibility of the members of the Lower House, that the number of men qualified for public life is necessarily limited, and that the Executive would be responsible not to one, but to both Houses—a position disastrous to representative government. Let me say at once that I entirely disagree with him. I consider that an Irish Legislative Assembly is much more likely to develop a sense of responsibility when it knows that its legislation is subject to the revision of a Legislative Council. He comments somewhat sarcastically on our habit of passing resolutions unanimously which we do not agree with, and possibly do not understand. I entirely fail to see how the creation of a single Legislative Chamber would in any way act as a preventative of hasty and ill-considered legislation. On the contrary, I should imagine it would encourage it. Here is just where the serious side of the matter comes in. The Irish Assembly will, as we have seen, be subject to the veto of the Crown, a veto exercised, of course, on the advice of the Irish Privy Council. I think it is quite obvious that the temptation to veto the acts of one chamber would be much greater than to veto the acts of two chambers—particularly when the Second

Chamber had within reasonable limits the powers of revision and delay. Perhaps Mr. Skeffington's democratic soul has been biassed by lengthy contemplation of the struggle between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. Now, it is quite obvious that the Irish Legislative Council would not be a hereditary body, and would not possess the same powers as the House of Lords. Nothing could be better or more reasonable to my mind than the clause of the 1893 Bill, which dealt with differences between the two chambers. Here it is:—

“ If a Bill—or any provision of a Bill—adopted by the Legislative Assembly is lost by the disagreement of the Legislative Council and after a dissolution, or the period of two years from such disagreement, such Bill, or a Bill for enacting the said provisions, is again adopted by the Legislative Assembly, and fails within three months afterwards to be adopted by the Legislative Council, the same shall forthwith be submitted to the members of the two Houses deliberating and voting thereon, and shall be adopted or rejected according to the decision of the majority of those members present and voting on the question.”

In other words, the Legislative Council or Second Chamber would have reasonable powers of revision and delay, always remembering that the Irish Second Chamber would be an elected body, and not an hereditary one, and, therefore, subject to that somewhat elusive thing, the will of the people. Mr. Skeffington, on the contrary, desires a Single Chamber, subject to no criticism or delay save the veto of the Crown. Surely the natural result of such a condition of affairs would be that the Crown would exercise its veto in the same manner as a Second Chamber would exercise its powers of revision and delay, and so cause unnecessary irritation and annoyance, if it did not entirely maim and ruin the Irish Parliament. It would create a condition of things as unfair to the Crown as it would be unfair to Ireland. Mr. Skeffington's argument from other countries is entirely beside the point. There is no foreign veto exercised over Bulgaria or Norway, and their national position is entirely different from that of Ireland. Neither are the Canadian provincial legislatures cases in point. As a matter of fact, some of

the provincial legislatures in Canada have second chambers. What we want in Ireland is a National Parliament, and not a Provincial Assembly. Mr. Skeffington's second objection, that there are not a sufficient number of competent public men in Ireland to provide members for two Chambers, is hardly a serious one. I think the complaint is surely the other way round. I think it is quite obvious that many public men, who are quite competent to become first-class legislators, are to be found in Ireland, and that many of them have been deterred from taking part in politics up to the present owing to the abnormal condition of Irish political life. These men, almost entirely conservative, in the non-political sense of that word, would form the backbone of an Irish Parliament. Mr. Skeffington's contention, that a state of things in which the executive is responsible to both houses is a position disastrous to representative government, is, on the face of it, ridiculous. The enormous majority of civilised countries are governed in this way, and without any disaster to representative government.

But the final and disastrous objection to a Single Chamber Irish Parliament is one that Mr. Skeffington does not seem to have seriously considered at all, namely—what other security of an equally satisfactory nature can we offer to the Protestant minority in this country? A Second Chamber, elected on a partially restricted franchise, is, to my mind, the best of all safeguards from their point of view, and, this being so, we may be quite sure that a Second Chamber will form part of the coming Home Rule Bill, as it did of its predecessor. But even if there was no anxious minority in this country, I am still of opinion that a Second Chamber would be both necessary and useful if the Irish Parliament is to be a success.

The point to be emphasised is that a Second Chamber is necessary as a safeguard against a chance majority on some large question, for which there is no mandate from the people.

I believe Mr. Skeffington claims to have inherited the political mantle of the late Michael Davitt. Parnell's biographer records a characteristic conversation between

Davitt and Parnell. Davitt asked Parnell what he would do if he (Davitt) took up a certain attitude towards a Home Rule Government. Parnell's reply, if somewhat laconic, was certainly conclusive. "I should lock you up," he said. Can it be that Mr. Skeffington fears a similar fate at the hands of an Irish Legislative Council?

V.—THE CONSTITUTION OF THE LEGISLATURE.

HAVING accepted the creation of two chambers as an indispensable portion of any Home Rule Parliament, let us now consider the franchise on which these chambers are to be elected, and the number of representatives to sit in each. The Bill of 1893, as I have already mentioned, provided for two chambers—a Legislative Council and a Legislative Assembly. The Legislative Council was to consist of forty-eight councillors elected by the following constituencies:—Antrim, three members; Belfast borough, two; Cork County, three; Down, three; Dublin County, three; Dublin Borough, two; Galway County, two; Limerick County, two; Tipperary County, two; and Cork Borough, one. All the other counties to have one representative each except Leitrim and Sligo, which were to be amalgamated and have one member between them. This scheme of representation was evidently drawn up on the basis of population, and seems to me to be a reasonable one. The right to vote for the election of these councillors was based on a property qualification—namely, the owning or occupying of any land or tenement of a rateable value of more than twenty pounds. Provision was also made by which no elector was entitled to be registered, nor if registered, to vote at an election of councillor in more than one constituency in the same year. In other words, plural voting was abolished, and a person who owned lands or houses of the requisite value in several constituencies could only vote in one. The term of office of every councillor was to be eight years, and was not to be affected by a dissolution; and one-half of the councillors were to retire every four years, their seats to be filled by a new election. The Legislative Council, as I have stated in my last article, was to have powers of revision

and delay within reasonable limits, and subject to a joint sitting of the two Houses as a final court of appeal.

I think it is quite obvious that, once the principle of a second chamber is accepted, it follows, as a matter of course, that such a chamber must be smaller in number than the more popular assembly, and must be elected on a restricted franchise. This being so, I think there can be little doubt that the provisions of the Bill of 1893 are entirely reasonable, and would result in the election of a Legislative Council sufficiently in touch with popular feeling not to be anti-national or retrogressive, and sufficiently conservative (in a non-political sense) to exercise a wise veto and restraining power over the Legislative Assembly. It would certainly offer an absolute guarantee of fair play to the Protestant minority. Although the question of election by proportional representation is undoubtedly an open one, as far as the Legislative Assembly is concerned, and I hope to discuss it fully in a succeeding article. I do not think that it would be a necessary or desirable method for electing a Legislative Council of forty-eight members on a restricted franchise. Let us now consider the Legislative Assembly. The Bill of 1893 provided that the Legislative Assembly should consist of one hundred and three members to be returned by the existing Parliamentary constituencies in Ireland, and elected by the Parliamentary electors for the time being in those constituencies. It was to have continuance for five years from the date on which it was summoned unless sooner dissolved. The Irish Legislature (namely, the two chambers) was to have power, six years after the passing of the Bill, to alter the qualification of the electors, and the constituencies, and the distribution of the members among the constituencies, provided that, in such distribution, due regard was had to the population of the constituencies. A Legislative Assembly of 103 members is certainly not too large—the question that suggests itself is, whether it is not too small. Holland, with a population of nearly the same size as Ireland, has a Legislative Assembly of 100 members, but Greece and Norway, with much smaller populations, have Legislative Assemblies numbering respectively 234 and 114. I

hardly think that a Legislative Assembly of 103 would be sufficiently representative of all shades of opinion in Ireland, and, if a system of proportional representation were in force, it would scarcely give sufficient scope for its working. A chamber of 150 members would probably be a more satisfactory solution; it certainly should not exceed 200. Any number over 200 would be inefficient, incapable of proper deliberation and full debate, and would probably get into very much the same condition as the present House of Commons, where, as we have been somewhat abruptly reminded of late, the independent private member is, to some extent, shut out from debate. In any event, as long - as the Gladstonian standard of 103 members is not decreased, the question of whether it is to be increased or not is hardly likely to be made a *casus belli*. Whatever franchise the Irish Parliament may eventually adopt, it is clear that, for the first couple of years, the members of the Legislative Assembly should be elected on the existing Parliamentary franchise, but plural voting should be made illegal. To suggest, as Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington does in his recent lecture, that they should be elected on the present Local Government register, which includes peers and women, would be the very negation of the whole principle on which the demand for Home Rule is based, because it would extend the principle of female suffrage to Ireland without consulting the country one way or the other as to whether it wanted it or not. It would be somewhat the same thing as if there were a clause in the Bill nominating Mr. Sheehy-Skeffington first Irish Prime Minister. Now, whatever may be one's view about Votes for Women, one is certainly entitled to be consulted before the principle is adopted by an Irish Parliament. Anyone that knows the strong conservative under-current in Irish politics would certainly be surprised if a Female Suffrage Bill passed the Irish Parliament at all. It certainly would not do so on the first journey. "But," says Mr. Skeffington, "if we do not agree to votes for women being embodied in the Home Rule Bill, we shall have processions of ladies marching to College Green, and being kept from assaulting the Irish Cabinet

by the D.M.P." Surely this is not a serious argument. On similar grounds, we might ask to have a clause in the Home Rule Bill preventing the playing of barrel organs within 300 yards of College Green, lest the mental activities of our legislators should be impeded thereby. Mr. Skeffington also suggests that illiterates should not be given votes, but again, this is a question for an Irish Parliament to decide. What a very different welcome compulsory Irish* would have had, had it been imposed upon us by English statute instead of by Irish public opinion. The leaders of the female suffrage movement must put their case before the Irish electorate, and abide by its decision. A demand for its inclusion in a Home Rule Bill only means that they have a weak case, or that they despair of carrying it through an Irish Parliament. In either event, they have no excuse for imposing it on the country without its consent. The present leaders of the women's suffrage movement are only asking for votes for a small and well-to-do section of the female population. Personally, both as a lawyer with some experience of the difficulties which surround the compilation of a register based on a property qualification, and as a democrat who believes in the full voice of the nation being heard, I should hope to see our Irish Parliament adopt adult suffrage before it was many years in existence. This would give every man and woman over 21 a vote, and abolish the endless complications of the present franchise.

* At the request of the Irish County Councils and Irish public opinion the Irish language was made an essential subject in the program of the National University.

VI.—PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION.

THE whole question of proportional representation as part of a Home Rule Bill has been raised in a most dramatic and effective manner by Lord Courtney's letter to Mr. Sexton and by his recent address in Dublin. It is well to remember who Lord Courtney is. He was one of the most determined opponents to the Home Rule Bill of 1893. He is still a Unionist, but he is a Unionist who recognises that Home Rule is inevitable, and recognising that, he is anxious that Ireland should get the best kind of Home Rule possible. "A country," he writes, "is self-governed with a representative Parliament because the country is in Parliament and feels that it acts and speaks through it. The secret of English contentment in the days of a grotesque organization of Parliament lay in the belief that after all a nation governed itself through Parliament."

"Our habitual language expressed and repeated the belief. Grattan's Parliament was absurd enough as a representation of Irishmen, yet even in respect of it something of the same kind was felt, and the echo remains with us. Let us make our national assembly as representative as we can. Let us try to get in it the best men of all kinds in a fair relation to one another. It cannot be free from faults. There will be at Dublin, as at Westminster, intrigues, manœuvres, petty ambitions, mean jealousies, and yet we may hope for an ascendancy of Parliamentary feeling, as sense of a body the members of which must in the end be found working for the common good. Our best assurance for the future must be found in the composition of a Parliament representing all Ireland."

These are wise and weighty words, and no one can doubt that the ideal which Lord Courtney suggests of

an Irish Parliament representing all sections of Irishmen according to their numerical strength, is one well worth striving for.

Lord Courtney suggests it should be achieved by proportional representation. What is proportional representation? It has nothing to say to the qualification which entitles one to vote; it concerns itself entirely with the method in which one votes. It is, in short, a system of voting which aims at reproducing the opinions of the electors in their true proportions and at securing that the majority of electors shall rule and all considerable minorities be heard. The first step towards proportional representation would be to unite the existing constituencies into larger ones returning three or more members each, having regard to natural divisions of the country, such as large towns, counties or parts of counties, and to give each constituency so formed a number of members proportionate to its electorate. Large towns, such as Dublin and Belfast, might be formed into five-member constituencies. Most, if not all, of the other Irish constituencies would be three-member constituencies. It would be quite easy to work out a scheme for Ireland on these lines. Having created the large constituencies, it only remains to decide elections by a proportionate system. The best of these systems, if one may judge by results, is that known as the Single Transferable Vote, and if proportional representation is adopted in Ireland it is certainly the system we ought to follow. The manner in which this system of proportional voting is carried out is as follows:—

1. Each elector has one vote, and one vote only.

2. The elector votes

(a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate he likes best.

He is also invited to place.

(b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his second choice.

(c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his third choice, and so on, numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his preference.

3. A candidate, to ensure election, need not poll a majority, but only a certain proportion of the votes cast. This proportion, which is the least number of votes sufficient to render certain the election of a candidate, is called the *Quota*. Thus, in a single member constituency, a candidate who polls one more than half the votes must be elected; the quota is, therefore, one more than half. So in a two-member constituency, the quota is one more than a third, for not more than two candidates can poll so much; and in a three member constituency one more than a fourth, and so on. Therefore, to ascertain the quota, divide the total of the votes polled by one more than the number of seats to be filled, and add one to the result.

4. The Returning Officer ascertains the result of the election as follows:—

- (a) He counts each ballot paper as one vote to the candidate marked 1 therein; he also counts the total number of votes thereon.
- (b) He ascertains the quota.
- (c) He declares elected the candidates who have received the quota.
- (d) He transfers in strict proportions the surplus votes of those candidates who have received more than the quota, and credits them to the unelected candidates indicated by the figures 2, 3, and so on, as the next preferences of the electors whose votes are transferred. This operation renders all votes effective; votes are used and not wasted.
- (e) He declares elected those candidates who, after the transfer of the surplus votes, have obtained the quota.
- (f) He eliminates the candidates lowest on the poll one after another by transferring their votes in accordance with the wishes of their supporters to the candidates indicated as next preferences. This process is continued until the required number of candidates, having each obtained the quota, have been declared elected, or the number of candidates not eliminated is reduced to the number of seats still vacant, in which event the candidates not eliminated are declared elected.

This, then, is the system of proportional representation known as the Single Transferable Vote. How does it work out in practice? I give below the results of recent elections in three countries where it is in force—Belgium, Finland and Tasmania. (It is also in force in the South African Union, Japan, Switzerland, Denmark and Sweden.)

BELGIAN ELECTIONS, 1909.

Parties.	Votes.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in propor- tion to votes.
Catholics	515,926	37	36
Liberals and Socialists	633,258	43	44*
Christian Democrats	16,095	1	1

FINLAND ELECTIONS, 1909.

Parties.	Votes.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in propor- tion to votes.
Socialists	336,659	84	80
Old Finns	198,635	48	47
Young Finns	121,006	28	29
Swedish Nationalists	104,107	25	25
Agrarians	56,649	13	13
Religious Labourers	23,120	2	6

TASMANIAN ELECTIONS, 1909.

Parties.	Votes.	Seats actually obtained.	Seats in propor- tion to votes.
Labour Party	18,802	12	11.7
Non-Socialist	29,286	18	18.3

These three countries differ in every conceivable way, yet it will be seen that in each case the seats actually obtained by each party were practically equal to the voting strength of that party. This amply justifies the claims put forward by the advocates of proportional representation. But the objection will be raised that this elaborate system of electioneering would take much longer to carry out than the present single member constituency one. I do not think so. A model election of five members was held recently in England. The 21,672 votes recorded were all counted and transferred in six hours by a staff of 40. It must take just as long, if not much longer, to count the vote in five single member constituencies as at present. Take the county of Cork. It consists of seven county divisions returning a single member each, and one city division

* The figures for Liberals and Socialists are given together because in several constituencies these parties presented a common List.

returning two members. This means eight separate elections. What it means in time and trouble during eight contested elections no one save the Sub-Sheriff for Cork County could properly say. It must be prodigious. Under a system of proportional representation Cork County would probably be divided into three constituencies, namely, Cork City (three members), East Cork (three members), West Cork (three members). The whole election could be carried through in one day and the counting of the votes in another, so the work which at present takes nearly three weeks could be carried through in a few days. The position of the illiterate voter would not be different under such a system from what it is at present; in both cases he has to depend on the kind offices of the presiding officer to fill up his paper for him (Ballot Act, Sch. I., Part I., rule 26). One must presume that a voter, even if he cannot read, has some acquaintance with the candidates before he comes to give his judgment at the election, and it is no more difficult for the illiterate to signify which of the candidates he likes best, which second best, and so on, than it is to decide against the two rival policies under the present conditions. I must emphasise the fact that the duty of the voter and that of the returning officer should be considered entirely apart from one another. A vote is valid if a single figure 1 is marked against one name, and I am sure there are very few voters who cannot tell the presiding officer whom they like best. The adoption of proportional representation in electing members to our legislative assembly is, therefore, highly desirable. It certainly merits the fullest consideration and discussion. Lord Courtney's letter has indeed been received most generously. Mr. Redmond has himself declared that—

Lord Courtney's letter suggests proportional representation in the creation of an Irish Legislature. Now let me say this on that matter. With the spirit and with the object that he has in view I entirely sympathise. *What we want is that the Irish Parliament should be representative of every element in the country. We want every class represented. We want every creed represented.* We want represented there the men of learning and letters, the men of commerce, the men of the professions, the working-men, the tradesmen, the farmers,

the labourers and artisans—the Catholic, the Protestant, and the Presbyterian. We want equal justice and toleration for all honest opinions, and even, I would say, for all honest idiosyncrasies. Yes, we want equality, and I say—speaking, as I believe I can speak, for the mass of the Nationalists and Catholics of Ireland—we won't have, and we won't tolerate, an ascendancy of any class or creed. Therefore I say that we are *willing to discuss sympathetically, and that we will give our consideration to any proposal for a system of representation in our Parliament which will carry out our idea of Toleration and Full Representation so long as it is consistent with honest democratic principle.*

These are strong and wise words. It is peculiarly necessary that the new regime in Ireland should start with every possible element of justice to every section of the population. A just system of representation will ensure this. And there is this further point: the division in Ireland between Unionists and Home Rulers is apt to appear to English eyes as a provincial division—North-East Ulster against the rest of Ireland. This apparent division is, as we know, untrue. There are Unionists in Dublin and in Cork, and there are Home Rulers in North-East Ulster. Proportional representation will make it clear that the line of cleavage of political opinion is not a provincial line, and so will produce a greater sense of unity between the different geographical districts. Irish conditions are not unlike Belgian. In Belgium before proportional representation was introduced, the Flemish provinces were apparently solidly Conservative, and opposed as such to the Walloon provinces, which were apparently solidly Socialist or Liberal. Proportional representation destroyed this appearance of uncompromising opposition. It allowed the Liberal minorities in Flanders and the Conservative minorities in Liège to return their own members, and when the representatives of Liège and Flanders met in Brussels, each man could find among the members from the other province a sympathiser in political opinion. So may it be in Ireland.

VII.—IRISH REPRESENTATION IN THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT.

THE question of Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament, or House of Commons, is in some sense more an Imperial problem than a strictly Irish one. It is indeed intimately related to the large and important question of Imperial Federation—a question which is bound to come up for solution in the near future. Parnell, as I have already stated, kept an open mind upon the question. The most important thing from the Irish point of view was then, and is still, that the Irish Parliament should have complete control over purely Irish affairs. That secured, the part Irish representatives were to play in the Imperial Parliament was one for friendly settlement on the most suitable basis for all parties concerned. I think it is obvious that in this matter Mr. Redmond also stands where Parnell stood. He is interested in a Federal solution of the Irish question, and he will not hinder such a solution, but neither will he consent to have the Irish demand for self-government postponed for such a length of time as the whole of Great Britain may require before it makes up its mind as to the best method of centralising the Imperial Government whilst giving to each nationality within the Empire power to manage its own local affairs—a power which, as far as the Colonies are concerned, is already in existence. Such an Imperial Federation is, I think, inevitable. The British Empire, as it at present exists, is really a voluntary league of States terminable upon a breath. Nothing could prevent Australia or South Africa or Canada from severing the Imperial connection in the morning were they so minded. If British policy for the last hundred years had proceeded on the centripetal instead of the centrifugal principle, who can doubt that the British Empire would be a much stronger political fact to-day. But let this be also remembered, that any

scheme of empire which ignores the force of nationalities is predestined to ruin. A recent political philosopher has well said:—

Nationality is a bugbear and a stumbling block to the impatient reformer; to the rhetorical man of feeling it is an end in itself; but to the statesman who has the skill to use it it is possibly a way to the widest and firmest union the world has ever known.*

So, indeed, the statesman who gives Ireland self-government may at the same time lay the first stone of a great Imperial Federation. Bearing these thoughts in mind, let us proceed to consider in detail the question of Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament. Roughly speaking, and for the purposes of practical discussion, there are four methods of dealing with the difficulty. The first method, and to a certain extent the simplest, would be to exclude the Irish members entirely from Westminster. This is what the Home Rule Bill of 1886 proposed to do. It was, perhaps, one of the principal reasons which led to its defeat. The exclusion of Irish members from Westminster would mean an entire alteration in the status of Ireland, which must be either followed by her complete release from all contributions to Imperial expenditure or place her in an unfair position to every other self-governing colony. Now there is not the remotest chance of Ireland being absolved in perpetuity from all contribution to the Imperial Treasury whatever remission of a temporary nature may or may not be made. This method would also mean taxation without representation; it would shut out Ireland from the consideration of grave Imperial questions which might be of vital interest to her future welfare. We may, I think, without any hesitation, dismiss this method of solving the question as impossible, and one which no English Government would now adopt. The second method would be to

* The Life of Alexander Hamilton, by F. S. Oliver. P. 434. All interested in the federal question should read this fascinating book, as also the "Letters of Pacificus," by the same author, which appeared in the *Times* last autumn. They are to be published soon in book form.

retain the Irish members at Westminster in the same number as at present, with liberty to take part in the proceedings by voice and vote on all subjects. This method would involve an obvious hardship and disadvantage to England, Scotland and Wales, inasmuch as it would subject them to continuous Irish interference in their internal affairs without a corresponding right to interfere in the internal affairs of Ireland. Such an arrangement could not last. It would be both unfair to England and unfair to Ireland, and as it would place Great Britain in a situation of inequality as compared with Ireland, it would be reversing the present condition of affairs with a vengeance. The third method, which was the method adopted by the Home Rule Bill of 1893, would be to retain the Irish members at Westminster in reduced numbers proportionate to the population of Ireland and with liberty to take part only in such proceedings as were of an Imperial character. Mr. Gladstone outlined this proposal as follows when introducing the Bill of 1893:—

He declined to regard the question as at all vital to the Bill, but announced that it proposed to retain them (the Irish members), eighty instead of over a hundred strong, with limited powers of voting. First of all they would be excluded from voting upon any motion or Bill expressly confined to Great Britain; secondly, they were not to vote for any tax not levied in Ireland, nor for any appropriation of money otherwise than for Imperial services—the schedule to the Bill naming the services—nor on motions or resolutions exclusively affecting Great Britain or things or persons therein. With reference, however to the first restriction, it seemed to the Government that there should be some way of raising the question whether or not the Bill or motion ought to be extended to Ireland, and, therefore, Irish members would not be excluded from voting for a motion “ incidental to ” such Bill or motion.

This third method of dealing with Irish representation in the House of Commons was accepted by the Irish Party during the debates on the 1893 Bill, even though it involved a reduction of the Irish members at Westminster to 80. There can be no doubt, however, that although this method is superior to either of those already mentioned, it is by no means free from serious

defects. It would mean that the House of Commons would be divided into two different classes of members, one partaking in all debates and divisions, the other only in a limited number of debates and divisions. The difficulties that would arise from this arrangement might possibly be of an extremely serious nature. One can well imagine a situation where a government with a majority of seventy (consisting of Irish votes), in Imperial questions, would be in a minority as far as the domestic affairs of Great Britain are concerned. Of course it may be urged with considerable probability that the Irish votes would be divided and largely neutralise each other, but there can be no guarantee of this. Some arrangement might also be made by which the Irish votes, whilst they could carry or upset a policy or bill, would not put out the English Government of the day. Still it is quite clear that this method would provide a temporary solution of the difficulty until a final and satisfactory arrangement was arrived at. I do not doubt that this final arrangement will be what may be called the fourth method of providing for Irish representation in the Imperial Parliament. This method involves the creation of local Parliaments in Ireland, England, Scotland and Wales for the management of their domestic affairs; it involves the retention of the House of Commons as it at present exists, clothed with supremacy over the domestic Parliaments, but concerning itself solely with Imperial affairs, and finally it involves the abolition of the present House of Lords and the substitution for it of an Imperial Senate representing the entire Empire and elected by the peoples of the Empire. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament would not mean that it could interfere in the domestic legislation of the National Parliaments. Such a power was not contemplated by the Home Rule Bill of 1893. The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament would simply mean that if it granted a Home Rule measure to Ireland in 1912 it could repeal it or qualify it in 1920. But, as I have already said, this great question of Imperial Federation does not take political precedence of Home Rule. Ireland cannot afford to wait until this question matures. Ireland

will not wait. She will, however, agree to any reasonable solution which leaves the way open to a Federal solution later on. As such, the third method I have indicated in this article—the method adopted by Mr. Gladstone in 1893—seems to me most likely to prove acceptable to all parties concerned.

VIII.—THE PLUNDERING OF IRELAND.

THERE can be no sort of doubt that amongst the most important provisions of the next Home Rule Bill will be those dealing with finance. Home Rule will be worse than useless to Ireland if it does not leave her solvent as well as free. This being the case, it is imperative that anyone writing on the subject of Home Rule should enter as exhaustively as possible into the details of Irish finance, and the basic principles upon which a financial settlement between Ireland and England is to be arrived at. In this and the following articles I will endeavour to discuss the subject from the point of view of one who is neither a financier nor an economist, but who possesses the simple qualification of being an ordinary man in the street. A necessary preliminary to any consideration of the present condition of affairs is an historical examination of how it has arisen. I have tried to sum up this historical examination in the one short sentence which stands at the head of this article, namely—The plundering of Ireland. This fact, that Ireland has been plundered and overtaxed since the Union, on unimpeachable historical evidence and on the admission of a representative English Commission, is the first and most important thing to be remembered in discussing the financial relations between England and Ireland. The history of this plundering divides itself naturally into three historical periods, namely:—

1. That between the year 1782, when the Irish Parliament secured complete legislative independence, and the year 1800, when the Act of Union was passed. During this period both the Parliaments and the Exchequers of Great Britain and Ireland were separated.
2. The period from the Act of Union to the consolidation of the Exchequers of Great Britain

and Ireland in the year 1817. During this period the Parliaments were united, but the Exchequers and financial systems were distinct.

3. The period from 1817 to the present. During this period there has been both one Parliament and one Exchequer, although the financial system of the two countries has been only gradually, and is not yet completely, unified.

The first period, that previous to the Union, was, of course, the most satisfactory for Ireland. Ireland was not then bound to contribute anything to objects beyond her own shores. In point of fact, she did not make any such contribution except by way of maintaining some Irish regiments abroad, when troops were serving outside the three kingdoms, and by way of small grants made in some of the years after 1782 towards the support and manning of the navy. The total Irish expenditure during this time was very moderate, so moderate, indeed, as to seem almost ridiculous in these days of bloated Dreadnought estimates. In 1760, for instance, the total Irish expenditure was £597,505, exceeding by a small amount her income, which was £552,282. In the same year the expenditure of Great Britain was £17,993,229, her income £9,207,446. While Ireland contributed very little towards the wars which extended English trade, she was, until the close of the American War, almost entirely excluded from any foreign or colonial trade, and even then only gradually admitted to it. In the year 1793 began the long and expensive Napoleonic wars with France, and in 1798 the Irish rebellion. These disturbances rapidly increased the Irish debt. In 1783 the total amount of the Irish National debt was £1,917,784. At the beginning of 1801 it was £28,541,157. We now come to the second period. In 1800 the Union was carried by "perjury and fraud." A legislative union might have been brought about without any particular arrangement as to financial matters, and, if it were contemplated that after that union Great Britain and Ireland were to be regarded as one country, this is the course that

would manifestly have been taken. But this was not the principle adopted. Mr. Pitt and Lord Castlereagh clearly recognized that even after the Union of the Legislatures, Ireland would have separate rights, and that one of these rights was that, in the matter of taxation, she would contribute only in proportion to her ability and resources. Lord Castlereagh made the point clear. He said:—"As to the future, it is expected that the two countries should move forward and unite with regard to their expenses in the measure to their *relative abilities*." Were it not for the acknowledgment of this principle the seventh article of the Act of Union would have been wholly unnecessary. By that article it is provided that Ireland should contribute to the Imperial expenditure in a proportion of 2 to 15, or 1 to $7\frac{1}{2}$, or, in other words, that of every £100 contributed Ireland should contribute 12 per cent. and Great Britain should contribute about 88 per cent. It was repeatedly urged by Grattan and others, in the debates which preceded the Union, that no information had been laid before the Irish Parliament, justifying the ability of Ireland to pay two-seventeenths of the joint expenditure. Figures were procured by Castlereagh justifying this proportion, derived from a comparison of the value of exports and imports from Ireland for the three years ending March 25th, 1798, with the corresponding values in Great Britain for the same period. It is obvious if any valid conclusion was to be drawn from these figures that they should have been submitted to the most searching scrutiny. The time and the opportunity for such scrutiny were resolutely denied. Had it taken place it would have been found that Castlereagh's figures were utterly untrustworthy. They were statements not of real, but of official values, and the official values bore to the real no fixed relation whatever.* It is by virtue of this Article, founded on false statistics, that the present taxation of the United Kingdom exists. However, bad as it was, it recognised three important provisions which have not been observed or acted upon.

* Dr. Bridges, in "Two Centuries of Irish History," p. 253.

1. That Ireland and Great Britain entered into legislative partnership on the clear understanding that they were still, for purposes of taxation, to be regarded as separate and distinct financial units.

2. That Ireland was to contribute to the Imperial expenditure only in proportion to her resources, so far as the same could be ascertained, and that, even after the imposition of indiscriminate taxation, if circumstances permitted its adoption, she might claim special exemptions and abatements.

3. That the Imperial expenditure to which those respective contributions were to be made included not only the whole civil expenditure of Ireland, but even special grants for Irish purposes, which were to remain in operation for twenty years.

The proportion of taxation imposed on Ireland by this article was, as I have said, severely criticised in the Irish Parliament. The critics were soon justified. Ireland sank deeper and deeper into financial difficulties year by year, and long before the time fixed for a revision of the terms of the contract, her debt had increased even beyond the proportion of two to fifteen to that of Great Britain, and it became evident that a continuance of the financial system carried out after the Act of Union by the Imperial Parliament, would speedily involve her in absolute bankruptcy. The following figures show how rapidly the Irish National Debt mounted up:—

In 1801	£28,000,000
1806	58,000,000
1811	70,000,000
1817	113,000,000

In 1800 the taxation of Ireland was under £3,000,000; in 1817 it amounted to £6,000,000. In 1816 a Bill consolidating the debts and public revenues of the two kingdoms was brought into the House of Commons and rapidly passed into law. Pursuant to that Act all revenues in Great Britain and Ireland were, from and after the 5th January, 1817, to constitute a general fund called the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; and that fund was to be charged with and indis-

criminally applied to—the services of the British and Irish debts; the Civil lists; all other services previously charged on the separate Consolidated Funds of the two kingdoms; and supply services of the United Kingdom generally. The Irish customs system continued in existence up to 1823. The next important landmark in Irish financial history is the decade 1850 to 1860. During that period about two and a quarter millions were added to the permanent taxation of Ireland, or, in other words, her taxation was increased by about 40 *per cent.* In 1853 Mr. Gladstone extended the Income Tax to Ireland and increased the rate of the spirit duty. The income tax, according to his proposal, was to be extended to Ireland only for a limited number of years. It still remains. True, the advance of £4,000,000 made to Ireland at the time of the famine was wholly remitted when Mr. Gladstone imposed the Income Tax, but the total amount of money Ireland has since paid to England for this remission of £4,000,000 is up to the present about £117,000,000, and we are still paying 4½ millions each year for the generosity that remitted £4,000,000 fifty-three years ago. In addition to this imposition of the Income Tax, a great revolution took place in the whole financial policy of the United Kingdom. The general effect of this change in policy has been to abolish nearly all duties on raw material, on manufactures, and on articles of food, and to substitute direct taxation upon income and property, together with duties on an extremely limited number of imported articles and on alcoholic drinks. The articles selected for these duties, namely, tobacco, tea and spirits, are those most largely used by the population of Ireland, whilst the articles freed from duty were so freed mainly for the benefit of the inhabitants of Great Britain. The change was obviously beneficial to the inhabitants of a rich manufacturing country, and detrimental to the inhabitants of a poor agricultural country.* What other

* Ireland had been a prosperous industrial country, but during the 18th century its industries were strangled by repressive English legislation. The cattle trade, the woollen trade, the glass industry, the brewing industry, these and many other trades were in succession barred from competing with English traders at home, and finally even abroad. The linen trade, because it did not interfere with any English interest, was encouraged and survived. Hence the principal reason of Belfast's prosperity.

result could have been expected from the Act of Union? Old Sam Johnson spoke the truth when he said to an Irish friend in 1779, "Do not make an union with us, sir; we should unite with you only to rob you. We should have robbed the Scotch, if they had anything of which we could have robbed them." Between 1852 and 1862 the taxation of Ireland was increased 52 per cent., while that of Great Britain was only increased 17 per cent.; and the proportion of the Irish to the British revenues, which in the first sixteen years of the century was between one-thirteenth and one-fourteenth, rose in the ten years after 1852 to *one-tenth or one-ninth*. To put the matter in another way, between 1817 and 1894 taxation in Ireland *increased* 170 per cent. per head of the population; while in England during the same period taxation *decreased* 11 per cent. per head of the population. The last important landmark in the history of Irish finance is the Financial Relations Commission of 1893. This Commission was composed of the most eminent financial experts in the United Kingdom, and its report is an indispensable guide to Irish financial problems. Ireland was represented on it by The O'Connor Don, Mr. John Redmond, M.P.; The Hon. Edward Blake, M.P.; and Mr. T. Sexton, M.P. The majority report, which was signed by 11 out of its 13 members, stated "that whilst the actual tax revenue of Ireland is about one-eleventh that of Great Britain, the relative taxable capacity of Ireland is very much smaller and is not estimated by any of us as exceeding *one-twentieth*." In other words, an amount ranging between £200,000,000 and £400,000,000 has been extorted from Ireland in overtaxation since the Union. In 1893 this overtaxation was going on at the rate of 2½ millions per annum. It must be now nearly 3½ millions per annum. This is the verdict of impartial English experts. There is no going behind it. It justifies the title of this article.

It is in the highest degree relevant to the consideration of the present financial relations of Ireland and England, because it makes it perfectly clear that Ireland's position is not due to poverty or economic weak-

ness, but to overtaxation and misgovernment. This being the case, we must consider any adjustment in favour of Ireland which may be necessary in the new Home Rule Bill, not as a matter of generosity or charity, but as our absolute right on indisputable grounds of justice and equity. It is only on these grounds that we can negotiate a new treaty with England, based, not upon spoliation and oppression, but upon redress, restitution and freedom.

IX.—THE FINANCIAL SCHEME IN THE BILL OF 1886.

BEFORE coming to close quarters with the present financial position of Ireland and considering how it is to be treated in a new Home Rule Bill, it is, I think, absolutely necessary to see how finance was dealt with in former Bills. In this article, therefore, I propose to outline briefly the financial scheme of the Bill of 1886 and to discuss its details. No attempt was made in this Bill to take into account the so-called "true" revenue actually derived from Ireland, as distinguished from the revenue collected in Ireland. It is evident that Customs and Excise duties may be collected in Great Britain in respect of articles which are consumed in Ireland and *vice versa*. The English Treasury now holds that such duty is to be credited not to the country in which the duty is collected, but to the country in which the duty-paid article is consumed. This was not considered in the Bill of 1886. The Customs and Excise were taken as collected without regard to the domicile of the consumers. Inasmuch as the export of duty-paid goods from Ireland to Great Britain exceeded considerably in 1886 the import of such goods from Great Britain to Ireland, the revenue credited to Ireland under this Bill exceeded the revenue actually derived from consumers in Ireland. The amount of such excess was in 1886 estimated by Mr. Gladstone to be £1,400,000. The contribution of Ireland to National Debt, Army, Navy, and Imperial civil expenditure was fixed on the principle of taking one-fifteenth of that expenditure as it stood in 1886. Mr. Gladstone explained that this ratio was chiefly based upon the relative assessment to death duties in Great Britain and Ireland. Unlike the method adopted at the Act of Union, the Irish contribution was not to be one-fifteenth of the annual expenditure of the United Kingdom, and therefore to

vary from year to year, but it was to be for 30 years one-fifteenth of the expenditure classified as Imperial as it stood in the year 1886. In addition to a contribution on this principle to Imperial expenditure, Ireland was to pay a fixed annual sum to the Imperial Exchequer towards the cost of the Irish Constabulary, which was, while it subsisted, to continue to be a force subject to the control of the Lord Lieutenant. The Bill provided that duties of Customs and Excise should continue to be imposed and levied by and under the direction of the Imperial Parliament only, and gave power to the Irish Parliament to levy other taxes for the public service of Ireland.

Ireland was to make to the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom the following annual contributions, namely:—

(a) For Irish share of National Debt	...	£1,466,000
(b) For Army and Navy Expenditure	...	1,666,000
(c) For Imperial Civil Expenditure	...	110,000
(d) For Royal Irish Constabulary and Dublin Police	1,000,000
		£4,242,000
Total	£4,242,000

These annual contributions were not to be increased for 30 years, but might be reduced in the event of the reduction of the total Imperial expenditure. The Irish share of the National Debt was to be taken at 48 millions, and Ireland was to pay annually £360,000 as a sinking fund. The moneys collected in Ireland by way of Customs and Excise were to be carried to a separate account and applied in the payment of the annual contribution and sinking fund. Any balance of the Customs and Excise revenue was to be paid over to the Irish Government, and the revenue belonging to the Irish Government, on the other hand, was charged with any part of the contributions which the Customs and Excise might be insufficient to meet. The best way to bring the matter clearly before the reader is to reproduce the following balance-sheet of Irish revenue and expenditure which was presented by Mr. Gladstone to illustrate the working of the Bill:—

EXPENDITURE.

REVENUE.

REVENUE.		EXPENDITURE.	
(Collected in Ireland.)			
	£	£	£
1. Taxes ;—			
(1.) Retained by Imperial Government—			
(a) Customs	1,880,000		
(b) Excise	4,300,000		
		6,180,000	
(2.) Transferred to Irish Government—			
(a) Stamps	600,000		
(b) Income Tax at 6d. in the £	550,000		
		1,150,000	
2. Non Tax Revenue ;—			
(a) Post Office	525,000		
(b) Telegraphs	107,000		
(c) Crown Lands	42,000		
(d) Miscellaneous	346,000		
		1,020,000	
			£8,350,000
1. Imperial Charges ;—			
(1.) Contribution to Imperial expenditure on base of one-fifteenth—			
(a) Debt Charges		1,466,000	
(b) Army and Navy Charges		1,666,000	
(c) Civil Government Charges		110,000	
			3,242,000
(2.) Sinking Fund			360,000
(3.) Fixed Constabulary Charges			1,000,000
			4,602,000
Total Imperial Charges			
2. Local Charges ;—			
(1.) Civil Government Charges (<i>less</i> Constabulary)		2,310,000	
(2.) Collection of Revenue		834,000	
			3,344,000
Total Local Charges			7,946,000
Total Expenditure			404,000
Balance			£8,350,000

Mr. Parnell, speaking on the Bill in the House of Commons on April 8th, 1886, made the following very pertinent criticisms. He said:—

“The question of the Customs has been touched upon. In giving up the Customs we should practically give to you the whole control of six-eighths or three-fourths of the Revenues of Ireland. It would be absolutely as much within your power as it is now, both as regards the original assessment of the taxes and the receiving of the money. The right hon. gentleman has explained to us that, instead of our insisting on separate Custom Houses, England, by collecting the duties on whiskey and tobacco in her own Custom Houses, gives £1,400,000 a year. This, of course, is a very serious consideration, and it may be fairly balanced against the surrender of the control of the Customs and Excise. But, at the same time, if the right hon. gentleman the Prime Minister is to take credit for giving us that £1,400,000 as a consequence of the surrender of the Custom Houses and the collection of the Revenues by the Imperial authority, I do not think he is entitled to claim credit for it a second time, and to make us pay, out of the £1,400,000, £1,000,000 for the Irish Constabulary, over whom we are not to have any sort of control whatever, at all events for the present. Then there is the great question of the contribution to the Imperial expenditure. I cannot admit—and I say it with great deference—either the liberality or the justice of the standard of comparison which the right hon. gentleman has taken. It appears to be the amount of property which comes under assessment regarding the payment of legacy and succession duties. That is the most unfavourable standard for us that the right hon. gentleman could have chosen. Of course, I understand that he is anxious to make the best bargain he can for England, and to secure as large a contribution for the Imperial Treasury as possible; but he should also remember that Ireland is a very poor country, and that with such a small balance as he showed on the Budget of £400,000 a year, it will be impossible for Ireland to have any credit for floating loans. Irish landlords now can borrow money at a low rate of interest for the improvement of their estates. Irish tenants can borrow money for improving their farms. Local bodies can borrow money for sanitary purposes within their jurisdiction. All these are very important matters. But we shall have to surrender all of them under the scheme of the right hon. gentleman, and we shall be left with a Budget which only exceeds the annual balance by about £400,000 a year, and a Budget arrived at on an estimate

which necessitates that the consumption of spirits, not only in Ireland, but also in England, should continue at its present high rate, and, of course, that the duty should be kept as it is now. . . . When you are proposing a great settlement, a settlement which admittedly can only succeed if cheerfully accepted by public opinion in Ireland, and all its important provisions are recognised as just and equitable, is it worth while for a rich country like England on the question of £1,000,000 one way or the other to drive too hard a bargain? . . . I am convinced that it is clear that one-twentieth is a far better standard of the relative share of the two countries than that most unfortunate standard of one-fifteenth which the right hon. gentleman has adopted."

Parnell's criticisms were perfectly justified. The Financial Relations Commission of 1893 actually adopted the standard of one-twentieth as the maximum proportion of Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure. It is quite clear now that the financial scheme of the 1886 Bill could only have resulted in a bankrupt Ireland. Parnell with his great foresight saw this, and if the Bill had reached Committee we may be sure that he would have done his best to amend it. The charge for Constabulary was, and is, an Imperial charge, and should be paid for, in part at least, out of the Imperial Exchequer. The charge for collection of revenue, amounting then to £834,000, should be an Imperial charge. Whoever heard of a man who pays rent paying the landlord's agent commission for collecting it? Yet this is fundamentally what Mr. Gladstone proposed. But the really fatal defect in the scheme was the contribution of one-fifteenth to the Imperial expenditure. Ireland could not have paid such a contribution, it was not an equitable contribution, and she should not have been asked to do so. One thing is quite certain, she will never be asked to do so again, or being asked, she will never consent.

X.—THE FINANCIAL SCHEME IN THE BILL OF 1893.

THE Bill of 1893 differed entirely in its financial provisions from the Bill of 1886. When brought into the House of Commons it contained the following provisions as to finance. The Irish contribution to Imperial expenditure was to be the amount of the Customs duties derived from Irish consumers, then estimated to be about £2,400,000, while the rest of the revenue of Ireland, less the amount of excise upon Irish trade articles consumed in Great Britain, was to be treated as Irish revenue. After 15 years from the passing of the Act these financial arrangements might be revised in pursuance of an address to the Sovereign from the House of Commons or the Irish Legislative Assembly. The Bill provided that there should be a separate Irish Exchequer and Consolidated Fund, and that the duties of Customs and Excise and the postage duties should be imposed by the Imperial Parliament, but that the Irish Legislature might impose any other taxes in order to provide for the public service of Ireland. The Customs duties were also to be regulated, collected, managed, and paid, as before, into the Exchequer of the United Kingdom. The Excise duties derived from taxed articles manufactured in Ireland but consumed in Great Britain were to be treated as non-Irish revenue, and were either to be paid in Great Britain or to an officer of the Government of the United Kingdom. With these exceptions all the public revenues of Ireland were to be paid into the Irish Exchequer and form part of the Irish revenue. The Bill provided that the Royal Irish Constabulary and the Dublin Police should, while these forces continued,

be under the control of the Lord Lieutenant, but that they should, when and as local police forces under local authorities were established, be gradually reduced, and ultimately cease to exist. Two-thirds of the annual amount expended out of the Exchequer to the United Kingdom on the constabulary and Dublin police was to be repaid to that Exchequer by the Irish Exchequer.

Mr. Gladstone, in his speech of the 13th February, 1893, explained that the surplus or working balance of £500,000 with which, according to his estimate, the new Irish Government would start, arose from the fact that the Imperial Government would, under these provisions, bear to that extent the cost of the Constabulary. He stated at the same time that, in view of the proposed gradual reduction of that force, this would be a "vanishing" charge upon the Imperial revenue. The whole financial scheme of the Bill as introduced was, however, upset by the discovery of the fact that the amount of duty-paid spirits exported from Ireland to Great Britain had been, by error, considerably understated in the Inland Revenue returns, and that the true revenue of Ireland had, therefore, *pro tanto* been overstated. The difference amounted to about £356,000. The Government then decided to remodel and simplify the financial clauses of the Bill. The principal features of the scheme, as re-modelled and finally embodied in the Bill in Committee, were as follows:—

1. That Ireland's contribution to Imperial expenditure should be a quota of her *true* revenue based on the receipts actually derived from the taxes and Crown lands in Ireland.

2. That this quota should consist of one-third of such revenue.

3. That Ireland should be credited with the other two-thirds, and likewise with her miscellaneous receipts, and with the surplus (if any) arising from her postal services.

4. That out of the revenue with which she would thus be credited, and taxes other than existing taxes which the Irish Legislature had power to impose, Ireland should provide two-thirds of the cost of the existing Constabulary and

Dublin Police forces, which under the Bill remained *pro tempore* Imperial forces, pay all her Civil Government charges, and meet the deficit (if any) on her postal services.

5. That until the transfer hereafter mentioned, the changes in the rates of Inland Revenue duties and Postal Revenue in Ireland, as well as of the Customs Revenue, should continue to rest with the Imperial Parliament, and that the collection should remain in the hands of the Imperial Government.

6. That if any special war tax should be imposed, the whole of the proceeds collected in or contributed by Ireland should go to the Imperial Exchequer.

7. That these financial arrangements should be for six years, at the end of which period (1) they should be revised as regarded the Irish contribution to Imperial charges; (2) the collection of the whole of the Inland Revenue should be transferred to the Irish Government; and (3) the Irish Legislature should impose the stamp duties, income tax, and excise licenses.

8. That for the purpose of determining the *true* annual revenue of Ireland, as distinguished from revenue collected there, an adjustment should be made by a Joint Committee of the Treasury and the Irish Government in the case of Customs and Excise, so as to provide that Ireland should be credited with the Customs and Excise duties, including any collected in Great Britain upon articles consumed in Ireland, but not with the duties, although collected in Ireland, upon articles consumed in Great Britain.

The manner in which this scheme would have operated is shown by the following specimen balance-sheet prepared by the Treasury at the time:—

SPECIMEN IRISH BALANCE SHEET, according to actual

IRISH REVENUE, 1892-3.

	£	Total Estimated Revenue of Ireland.	Amount payable to Irish Exchequer.
	£	£	£
1. <i>Customs</i> .—Revenue collected in Ireland	2,136,000		
<i>Add</i> estimated allowance for duties paid in Great Britain on articles consumed in Ireland	266,000		
	<hr/>	2,402,000	1,601,000
2. <i>Excise</i> .—			
(1.) <i>Spirits</i> .—Revenue collected in Ireland	4,112,000		
<i>Deduct</i> amount of duties ascertained to be paid in Ireland on spirits consumed in Great Britain	1,872,000		
	<hr/>	2,240,900	—
(2.) <i>Beer</i> .—Revenue collected in Ireland	811,000		
<i>Deduct</i> estimated allowance for duties paid in Ireland on beer consumed in Great Britain	187,000		
	<hr/>	624,000	—
(3.) <i>Licence Duties</i> collected in Ireland		194,000	—
Total Excise		<hr/>	2,039,000
3. <i>Stamp Duties</i> collected in Ireland.		707,000	471,000
4. <i>Income Tax</i> collected in Ireland		552,000	368,000
5. <i>Crown Lands</i> .—Amount estimated to be due to Ireland in respect of		65,000	43,000
Total		<hr/>	4,522,000
<i>Miscellaneous Irish Receipts</i>		138,000	138,000
Totals		<hr/>	4,660,000

Figures, of REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE in 1892-3.

IRISH EXPENDITURE, 1892-3.

	£
1. <i>Civil Government Charges</i> (exclusive of Constabulary, &c. charges and salary of Lord Lieutenant; but inclusive of local charges met out of Local Taxation Revenue) . . .	3,123,000
2. <i>Constabulary, &c. Charges</i> (1,459,000 <i>l.</i>), two-thirds of . . .	973,000
<i>Estimated Deficit on Postal Accounts</i>	52,000
	<hr/>
	4,148,000
Surplus	512,000
	<hr/>
	4,660,000

These are very briefly the facts concerning the financial provisions of the 1893 Bill. It is, I think, obvious that just as it would be impossible now to embody in a new Home Rule Bill the financial provisions of the Bill of 1886, so also it would be equally impossible to embody in such a Bill the financial provisions of the Bill of 1893. That the present Government are aware of this is made evident by the fact that they have appointed a special Financial Commission to advise the Cabinet as to the financial provisions of the new Bill. Let us consider how the provisions of the Bill of 1893 would operate at present and we shall see how absurd it would be to try and revive them. The surplus to Ireland's credit in 1893 was, we have seen, £512,000.

The Irish Revenue for 1910 is difficult to arrive at accurately on account of the disturbance created by the rejection of the Budget, but we shall estimate it at its highest figure if we place it at about £11,000,000.* Then apply the principles of the 1893 Bill and we get the following startling results:—

Irish Revenue	£11,000,000
Payment to Imperial Treasury on basis of 1893 Bill	3,666,666
				<hr/>
Balance available for Irish expenditure	£7,333,334
Irish expenditure (1910)	£10,712,000
				<hr/>
Deficit	£3,378,666

These figures are alarming enough to an Irishman, but I commend them particularly to the attention of the English taxpayer. For him they are a peculiarly useful study, and in concluding this article I offer him this sum in proportion as a suitable and refreshing mental exercise. If a financial scheme that eighteen years ago would have left Ireland with a surplus of £512,000 now leaves her with a deficit of £3,378,666,

*This figure is not based on Treasury returns, but on other data which I hope to discuss in a succeeding article.

what deficit will Ireland show under the same scheme (or any conceivable financial scheme) after twenty years more of financial bondage and English government? Having completed this exercise in arithmetic, he might, with further profit to himself, proceed to read the old story about the killing of the goose that laid the golden eggs.

XI.—IRELAND'S PRESENT BALANCE-SHEET.

IN order to arrive at any just conclusion as to what should be the financial provisions of a new Home Rule Bill it is, first of all, necessary to consider the present revenue and expenditure of Ireland: in other words, to construct an Irish balance-sheet. This is a matter of some difficulty. Ireland is in the position of a business man whose books are kept (in a system he objects to) by a firm of accountants appointed by a rival trader, and who is only presented once a year with a summary of his income and expenditure. The whole financial system under which Ireland's taxation is administered is, as we have already pointed out, a direct violation of the terms of the Act of Union. This being so the Treasury White Papers are naturally inaccurate and misleading. Professor Kettle has recently shown that on the Revenue side they abound in mere guesses. The "true revenue" contributed by Ireland under such large heads as tobacco, beer, tea and sugar was actually calculated for 1909-1910 on the basis of auguries or conjectures made for 1903-1904. On the expenditure side they contain many items which are really Imperial charges and which would cease to exist under Home Rule. It is, therefore, almost impossible to form any very accurate idea of how Ireland stands financially at the present moment. One thing seems to me certain—namely, that she is absolutely solvent and in a far better position than anyone gives her credit for. A good example of Treasury accounts is given in the recent White Papers 233 and 234 dealing with Imperial Revenue and Expenditure in Great Britain and Ireland. According to these papers the Irish Expenditure exceeded the Irish Revenue in the year ending 31st March, 1910, by £2,357,500. The exact figures are:—

Irish Expenditure	£10,712,500
Estimated True Revenue	8,355,000
		<hr/>
Deficit	£2,357,500

The first thing to be remembered about these extraordinary documents is that they deal with an extraordinary year—the year that Lloyd-George's Budget was thrown out and the whole financial system of Great Britain disorganised. The accounts of the United Kingdom for the same year show a deficit of £26,248,155, due to this cause. Let us take the matter a step further and compare the Irish Revenue for 1909-1910 with that of the preceding year, which was a normal one:—

		Collected. 1908-1909.	Collected. 1909-1910.
		£	£
Customs	2,611,000	2,742,000
Excise	5,420,000	4,487,000
Estate Duty and Stamps	1,001,000	977,000
Income Tax	1,019,000	388,000
Post Office	1,088,000	1,110,000
Crown Lands	146,500	142,000
		<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	£11,285,500	£9,846,000
		<hr/>	<hr/>
True Revenue	£9,250,000	£8,355,000

Or if the average annual amount of revenue collected in Ireland for the seven years 1902-8 is taken, the result is nearly the same—

Average Revenue collected in Ireland	£11,473,640
Average estimated true revenue	£9,721,300

These figures show that the White Papers for 1909-1910 underestimated the revenue collected in Ireland in a normal year by £1,627,640 and the estimated true revenue by £1,366,000. But the figures for 1909-1910 do not include the increased taxation under the Budget, because it had not then been collected. A

great deal of discussion has taken place as to what this taxation amounts to. The actual annual increase, taking the average figures of taxable revenue for the two years subsequent to the passing of the Budget, and the two years after the passing of the Budget, now available, comes to £538,000. Say in round numbers £600,000. Take this figure and add it to the average annual true revenue for the seven years 1902-1908, £9,721,300, and we get £10,321,300, which is approximately correct, and £1,966,300 more than the Treasury returns show.

But this by no means disposes of the fundamental inaccuracies in these accounts. Mr. R. A. Atkins, of Cork, has recently written two letters to the Press which completely demolished the theories of Mr. Samuels, K.C., and are invaluable reading to any student of Irish financial affairs at the present juncture. I do not agree with all his figures, but they are very helpful, and I have used most of them in this article. Mr. Atkins points out that the "true revenue" of Ireland is considerably under-estimated. The estimated "true" revenue is, we have seen, on the seven years' average, 1902-1908, £1,752,340 less than the actual revenue collected in Ireland. Sir Edward Hamilton (Assistant Secretary to the Treasury), in his evidence to the Financial Relations Commission, pointed out how the so-called "true" revenue was arrived at. He said "that it is evident that Customs and Excise duties may be collected in Great Britain in respect of articles which are consumed in Ireland, and *vice versa*, and that in that case the revenue derived from the duty is properly to be credited, not to the country in which the duty is collected, but to the country in which the duty-paid article is consumed. If, for instance, a pound of tea is landed and pays duty in London, and is subsequently sold and consumed in Ireland, the revenue in respect of that tea is collected in London, but really paid in the retail price of the tea in Ireland. The reverse would be true of spirits manufactured and taxed in Ireland, but sold and consumed in England." Now, up to 1904, when the Department began to publish their invaluable reports on Irish exports and imports, there was no record of cross-Channel trade

except as regards spirits. Any estimate made by the Treasury must, therefore, only be an approximation of the truth, and not a very accurate one, as we shall see. The average for the seven years 1902-1908, according to the Treasury returns, shows a difference of £1,752,300 between the revenue collected in Ireland and the true revenue, which means that after making allowance for duties paid in the United Kingdom on articles consumed in Ireland, the additional sum of £1,752,300 has been deducted from the revenue collected in Ireland, in respect of duties paid in Ireland on articles consumed in the United Kingdom. I submit that this is obviously incredible and ridiculous. Let us contrast this figure with the Department's Report for 1909 on Imports and Exports. This Report shows that the undermentioned articles were imported into Ireland, on which all or portion of the duty was paid in Great Britain:—

	£
Tea, 34,334,832 lbs., about 95 per cent. paid duty in Great Britain ...	679,544
Sugar, 2,857,832 cwts, about 30 per cent. paid duty in Great Britain ...	78,588
Manufactured tobacco, cigars, etc., 2,780,944 lbs., all paid duty in Great Britain	741,598
Cocoa, chocolate, etc., 4,694,696 lbs., all paid duty in Great Britain ...	29,560
Coffee and chicory, 1,330,560 lbs., all paid duty in Great Britain	8,317
Beer and porter, 156,397 barrels, all paid duty in Great Britain	60,604
Confectionery, 150,993 cwts.	13,840
	£1,612,051
Total	

Also 1,305,102 gallons of wine and 912,214 gallons of spirits on which it is impossible to estimate where duty was paid.

I am quite certain the Treasury never consider these figures in preparing their returns of true revenue. They

are in the same position as Mr. Gladstone, who stated, when introducing the 1893 Bill, that the amount of duties paid in Great Britain on articles consumed in Ireland was only £266,000—an underestimate of at least a million pounds in favour of England, as the Irish population was then 300,000 more than it is now, and they certainly did not consume less tea, tobacco, etc., than in 1909, when the duty so paid was, we have seen, £1,612,051. Mr. Atkins also points out in his letter that no allowance is made to Ireland for the enormous amount of income tax deducted from Irish shareholders by English companies when paying dividends or interest, and which must amount to a considerable sum, as Irish investors have, unfortunately, much more money invested in Great Britain than British investors have in Ireland. Bearing all these facts in mind, let us put together our balance-sheet.

APPROXIMATE IRISH BALANCE SHEET, MARCH 31ST, 1910.

REVENUE.

EXPENDITURE.

	Collected in Ireland.	True Revenue.	
	£	£	
Customs	2,611,000		
Collected in Gt. Britain on articles consumed in Ireland	1,552,000		
Excise	5,420,000	4,163,000	
Collected in Great Britain on articles consumed in Ireland.	60,000		
Less Duties paid in Ireland on spirits, &c., consumed in Great Britain	5,480,000		
	2,277,400		
Estate Duty Stamps	1,001,000	3,202,600	
Income Tax	1,019,000	1,001,000	
Add deducted in Great Britain from Irish Investors, at least	200,000		
Post Office	1,088,000	1,219,000	
Crown Lands	146,500	1,088,000	
		146,500	
Add increased Irish Taxation imposed by the Budget 1909-1910		10,820,100	
		600,000	
		11,420,100	
			£
			158,500
			1,442,500
			7,476,500
			270,000
			1,365,000
			707,600
Civil List and Miscellaneous			
Local Taxation Account			
Amounts voted by Parliament			
Collection of Taxes			
Post Office			
Surplus to credit			

11,420,100

The above figures are compiled as follows:—The revenue is that for 1908-9, a normal year, adding £1,000,000, the estimated increase in Irish taxation owing to the Budget. The expenditure is the actual expenditure for 1909-1910. As regards the duties paid in Ireland on spirits, etc., consumed in Great Britain the same percentage is taken as ascertained by Mr. Gladstone from Excise permits in 1893. The amount of Irish whiskey exported may have increased since then, but the increase cannot be very great. The item "Amounts voted by Parliament" on the expenditure side includes £2,321,799 for old-age pensions. In the balance-sheet prepared by Mr. Atkins, on which mine is based, he estimates the increased taxation under the Budget at £1,500,00. I have estimated it at £600,000. He estimates income tax deducted from Irish investors in Great Britain at £100,000. I estimate it at £200,000, and think this is short of the actual figure.

In conclusion I should like to point out that in this balance-sheet no allowance has been made for the present wasteful administration of Ireland or the portion of our expenditure which is really Imperial in its character. These subjects I shall deal with later on.

XII.—ENGLISH ADMINISTRATION IN IRELAND.

THE story is told of the late Judge Adams that he was walking down to the Four Courts during the discussion of the Home Rule Bill in 1893 with one of the big judicial dignitaries. "I suppose," said the judge, "the first thing this Irish Parliament will do is to reduce my salary to £2,000." "Indeed they won't," replied Adams, "they'll reduce it to £300, and you will have to do a good canvass every January to prevent them reducing it to £200." Of course, no Irish Parliament would desire to deal in this summary fashion with Irish officialdom, even if it were given immediate power to do so, but the story is a pointed criticism of English administration in Ireland. The shameless extravagance and wasteful expenditure which characterise Dublin Castle government may be illustrated in a concise fashion by the following figures. In 1841 the population of Ireland was 8,175,124, and its civil government charges were about £1,400,000. In 1910 the population of Ireland was about 4,000,000, the civil government charges were £9,077,500. The following comparison with Scotland, a country whose population is larger than Ireland's by more than half a million, is also eloquent:—

	Scotland.	Ireland.
Number of Government officials having more than £160 a year	944	4,397
Amount of their salaries ...	£319,257	£1,441,131

The figures are taken from the Inland Revenue Report for 1909-1910. Is it any wonder that the cost of Irish Administration offers a fruitful subject for investigation by an Irish Parliament? These are the gross figures. Let us consider the matter in detail. The number of boards, offices and departments connected

with the administration of Ireland is fifty-seven. Sir David Harrel, for many years Under Secretary at Dublin Castle, has stated publicly, and the statement cannot be called a partisan one, that "These departments might, with economy and advantage, be diminished in numbers and placed under fewer heads."* Ireland, which is one of the most crimeless countries in Europe, has a police force costing £1,500,000. Scotland has a police force which costs £600,000. The cost of the police in Ireland is 6s. 8d. per head, in England 2s. 4d., and in Scotland 2s. 2½d.

The report of Lord Farrer, Lord Welby and Mr. Currie, in the proceedings of the Financial Relations Commission, contains one remarkable passage bearing on the cost of Irish administration. Here it is:—

The expenditure of Belgium may be compared not unfairly with that of Ireland. In Belgium, as in Ireland, government is centralised, and the functions of administration are extended. The imports and exports of Belgium, excluding transit trade, are valued at £117,000,000 in 1893; those of Ireland are guessed at £45,000,000. In short, if Ireland is said to be poor, Belgium is beyond question prosperous, wealthy and progressive, yet the charge of Civil Government in Ireland for 1892-93 was £4,544,000, while the charge for like purposes in Belgium in 1893 was £2,600,000. We, therefore, state the case much against Belgium if we reckon in broad figures her expenditure to that of Ireland as 3 to 4½. That is, Civil Administration in Belgium (population 6,300,000 in 1893) cost less than 10s. a head, in Ireland 19s. 7d., or double. Looking to special items, we find that the salaries provided in the Belgian estimates for the fifteen judges of the two courts of justice are barely £6,000 per annum, while Ireland pays her Lord Chancellor £8,000.

The imports and exports of Ireland now amount to £125,000,000 (they were probably more than £45,000,000 in 1893), but the Irish civil government charges have gone up to £9,000,000, or double what they were in 1893. True, we may console ourselves with the fact that the Lord Chancellor's salary has

* Quoted in "Dublin Castle and the Irish People," by R. Barry O'Brien, p. 357. The best book on Irish administration and its history.

been reduced to an equality with that of the entire Belgian judiciary, namely, £6,000!

The most scandalous extravagance in Irish administration is to be found under the head of judicature. The Lord Chancellor has, as we have seen, £6,000 per annum, £1,000 more than the Prime Minister of England. The Lord Chief Justice and the Attorney-General have £5,000 each, the same as the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Four other judges have £4,000 per annum, and the ten remaining have £3,500 each. The President of the Swiss Republic has £720 a year, and no judge in Belgium has more than £400 a year. The Private Secretary of the Irish Lord Chancellor gets £500 per annum. The total law charges for Ireland are £421,384. The total law charges for Scotland are £228,383, yet I have never heard that it is harder to get justice in Scotland than in Ireland. The Lord Lieutenant gets £20,000 a year. He used to get £30,000. The President of the United States gets £20,000 a year. He used to get £10,000. The household of the Lord Lieutenant costs £4,672, and there are miscellaneous charges which amount to £10,402,† so the total cost for the upkeep of the Lord Lieutenancy is £35,074. One naturally asks if this figure-head could not be done without, or at least given a reasonable salary. Is it conceivable that an Irish Executive would pay such salaries? It is not a question of what these distinguished men deserve, but what the country can afford to pay. Irish administration is founded on demoralisation. The money spent on the legal establishment is part of the system of English government in Ireland. It has purchased the intellect and sapped the integrity of a great profession. A national government could have no use for such a system. "In the estimates for the year 1906," says Lord Dunraven, "the sum placed upon 26 Irish votes amounts to about 4½ millions, of which about 3 millions are for salaries and pensions. Head for head, the Irish Government costs more than that of any civilised community in the world." Against this system Ireland has

† Estimates 1906-1907.

no appeal, no remedy, no alternative. Let us return to the salaries. The Chief Secretary gets £4,425, nearly as much as the Prime Minister. The Secretary for Scotland gets £2,000, so does the Irish Under Secretary. The Irish Assistant Under Secretary gets £1,200. The total expenses of the Chief Secretary's Department for the year 1906-1907 were £41,471. The Inspector-General of the Constabulary receives £1,800 a year. The Deputy Inspector-General gets £1,200. The Chief Commissioner of the Dublin Metropolitan Police receives £900 a year. The Head of the Stockholm Police receives £500 a year.

The total vote for prisons in Ireland for the year 1909-1910 amounted to £114,556, for Scotland it amounted to £97,390. Yet there is much less crime in Ireland. Turn from these figures to those concerning education. Professor Kettle, speaking in the House of Commons on 26th March, 1908, dealt with the subject. He showed that the amount spent per head of population for primary education in the three kingdoms was as follows:—

				s.	d.
England	7	10½
Scotland	8	8
Ireland	6	5

Further, for every £1 spent by the State in England on education, 17s. went to education and 3s. to office expenses. In the case of Scotland, 16s. 2d. went to education and 3s. 10d. to office expenses. For every £1 spent in Ireland, only 13s. 6d. went to education and 6s. 6d. was spent in office expenses. The total vote for Irish primary education in the year 1909-10 was £1,621,921; in Scotland for the same year the vote for primary education was £2,147,541. But the story of English mal-administration in Ireland does not end with the appalling figures I have cited. There is the most extraordinary confusion in the powers of all these boards and authorities. The Chief Secretary is supposed to preside over most of them like a sort of Pooh-Bah—a Lord High Everything Else. The Lord Lieutenant

has powers of appointment in certain departments; in others he shares these powers with the Crown; in others with subordinate officers. Then he has power over the judiciary, but not of appointment. All the lowest official positions are obtained by severe competitive examination, the higher positions are the emoluments of political jobbery and corruption, and the preserves of a small privileged caste. The Treasury and other English Boards have control over several of the Irish Boards without reference to Lord Lieutenant or Chief Secretary. Some boards are free from all control, and defy both the executive and the Irish people. The Intermediate Board is a case in point. Education is unco-ordinated, and the teachers, both primary and secondary, are treated scandalously. The Treasury, within limits, is the real master of Ireland. Whether from ignorance or prejudice, it withholds money when it is wanted and pays it out for every fresh form of extravagance. This is the story of English administration in Ireland. It explains the financial condition of Ireland. It is the final and clinching argument for Home Rule.

XIII.—THE PRESENT FINANCIAL PROBLEM.

IN the preceding articles I have tried to show that Ireland since the Union has been systematically and stupendously overtaxed, that the financial schemes embodied in the Home Rule Bill of 1886 and 1893 are now obsolete and impossible, that Ireland is not yet insolvent although rapidly becoming so, and that the English administration of Ireland is extravagant, corrupt, and inefficient. There remains to be considered the most vital question of all, namely, on what basis can a financial settlement be now arrived at between England and Ireland? The question is a difficult one. It would be presumptuous for me to suggest definitely a final solution. I can only summarise and discuss the conclusions of those more competent to do so. In the first place consider the two peoples. In Great Britain you have a rich commercial people living in the cities, the average wealth of whom is £50 per annum. In Ireland you have a poor agricultural people whose average wealth is only £15 per annum. "We have only," says Mr. Birrell, "got to look at the Revenue return from Ireland to see that she is a poor country. In 1906-7 the revenues collected in Ireland amounted to £11,499,000. Well, of that amount £8,000,000 was derived from Customs and Excise—eight millions of money out of eleven millions, because the people have to eat and drink excisable customs-bearing articles. We all know that people who drink large quantities of tea and smoke many ounces of tobacco do so because of the very inadequacy of their sustenance. We find that the income tax in England produces £28,000,000; in Ireland it produces £999,000; therefore you find a country whose taxation is practically almost wholly derived from indirect taxation, and therefore we have to deal with a poor country."*

* House of Commons, May 2nd, 1908.

Mr. Redmond has put the matter in an equally graphic way. Speaking in the House of Commons on May 13th, 1902, he said:—

There are some tables given by the Government Department known as the Congested Districts Board as an appendix to one of their reports and they give twelve examples of the income and expenditure of twelve families in the poorer parts, scattered practically over the whole of Ireland. I will take these at random. Here is one example of the receipts and expenditure of a family in ordinary circumstances—judged by the Irish standpoint, the ordinary circumstances being profits from agriculture and home industries. The total receipts are £23 8s. 7d. The total expenditure included these items: meal, £7 14s., because that is their bread, as my hon. friend who interrupted me rightly pointed out a moment ago. These people cannot afford the luxuries of ordinary bread. They live very largely upon yellow Indian meal, the kind of meal you feed your dogs on in this country. Now, in the family where the budget is £23, meal costs £7 14s.; tea, £5 17s.; sugar, £1 19s.; tobacco, £3 9s. 4d.; total, £18 19s. 4d. out of a total income of £23. The Secretary of the Treasury was right when he stated that in considering this tax it is not fair to consider it alone. It is right we should take a survey of the other taxes, and I say it enormously strengthens my case. There are these poor creatures living in straitened circumstances such as that; and you, from motives and with objects I will not delay now to examine, enter upon a great Imperial policy and a great war to extend the dominions of the Crown, and what is the first thing you do? You come to a poor wretched family whose whole income is £23, and you put a war tax first upon tea, then upon tobacco, then upon sugar, and now you come down and put a war tax upon bread and the poor man's meal*.

These facts and figures illustrate clearly the enormous importance of the taxation derived from Customs and Excise. The revenue from Customs and Excise is more than sixty-one per cent. of the total revenue of Ireland. Control of the Customs and Excise means to a large extent control of Ireland's economic destiny. Is an Irish Parliament to be deprived of this control? This is one of the most serious questions to be decided by the financial provisions of the new Bill. Several writers have assumed that the control of the Customs and Excise is to remain in the hands of the

* The over-taxation of the Poor is the real Irish financial grievance.

Imperial Parliament. Have they considered what would happen to Ireland if we were saddled with a scientific English protective tariff, framed in the interests of England and English manufacturers? The contingency is by no means improbable, certainly not impossible of fulfilment. The same tariff could not suit both countries, and each of the protective tariffs outlined up to the present would mean Ireland's economic ruin. The possibility of such a tariff was not contemplated in Parnell's time, and the necessity for economic independence was not so imperative then. It is different now. I would therefore strongly urge that Ireland be given control of her own Customs and Excise. Reservations might be made, and doubtless would be made, which would prevent an Irish Parliament from raising a tariff barrier against England. Such reservations would be only equitable. The thing to be guarded against is not the Customs and Excise duties as they stand, but probable alterations thereof by England in the direction of Protection. Again, if Customs and Excise duties are not collected by the Irish Exchequer there will be endless difficulties in ascertaining the true revenue of Ireland to the satisfaction of both countries. Mr. Frank MacDermot has put the whole matter very clearly. He writes* :—

Nothing can really be learnt as to Ireland's economic status until she has tried her hand at raising her own revenue. Nor until then can an Irish Parliament make any real beginning with its work. It is not as in Parnell's day. There are no burning questions to be settled, no chains to be broken, no tyranny to be overthrown. To budget for ourselves, that is now the kernel of Home Rule, or very near it. The ideals of public service and public duty, which it is our ambition to disseminate through a country where love of the State has been an unknown emotion, and love of the law has been synonymous with arrogance and rapacity, will be atrophied at the start if we are compelled to look on in heart-breaking impotence while economic advancement is being stunted by financial measures whose authors have not the power, even if they had the will, to ascertain and satisfy our needs*.

* *The Nation*, April 15th, 1911.

The question of what is Ireland's revenue is also of enormous importance. Mr. Gladstone in 1886, for convenience, and also for equitable reasons, treated the revenue collected in Ireland as Ireland's true revenue. The Treasury now deducts close on two millions from Irish revenue on the grounds that this sum is actually paid, not in Ireland, but by the consumers in England. The sum thus deducted is apparently arrived at on absolutely obsolete figures and by methods which Ireland has no opportunity of examining. I submit that the whole arrangement by which "True" revenue is at present arrived at is inequitable and misleading. On the other hand it is equally obvious that some adjustment must be made or Irish trade would be injured. Take the whiskey industry, for instance. If Ireland got the revenue collected in Ireland without adjustment, one of two things would happen. English purchasers of Irish whiskey would take the whiskey in bond to England and pay the duty there, so that Ireland would lose the revenue, or else, and this is more probable, they would not buy Irish whiskey at all because they would be contributing to Irish revenue alone on every bottle of Irish whiskey they sold, and our Scotch rivals would waste no time in pointing this out. The same thing would happen as regards porter. Therefore if Ireland got the Excise revenue as collected there would be soon no revenue to collect. I pass on to another aspect of the financial problem—namely, can Ireland contribute anything to the Imperial Exchequer? She cannot at present. The present administration of Ireland will not be reformed in a day, economies will not be possible for many years, because monopoly and privilege cannot be limited nor extravagance curtailed by Act of Parliament. Careful pruning will do much and intelligent examination disclose many openings for retrenchment, but it will take an Irish Parliament many years to conserve and strengthen the Irish Exchequer to such an extent as will enable Ireland to contribute to the Imperial Treasury. During that time Ireland cannot contribute to Imperial expenditure, during that time England must help to build up

what she has destroyed. On what basis is this restitution to be made? I would suggest as follows. The present cost of the Royal Irish Constabulary is £1,351,500. This force is at present a military organization, maintained to support English government in Ireland. It is, in other words, an Imperial force. It could have no place in a healthy Irish state. As long as it is maintained at its present strength England should pay two-thirds of its cost, namely, £900,332. This contribution would reduce Ireland's expenditure on police to an equality with that spent on a normal police force like the Scotch. Then take old-age pensions. Old-age pensions in Ireland cost at present £2,342,000. At least half of the destitution thus relieved is the aftermath of bad legislation, famine, emigration, and over-taxation. I believe an Irish Parliament could much reduce this sum by remodelling the Old-Age Pensions Act with an eye to Irish social conditions, which are entirely unlike those prevailing in England, or even in Scotland. Time will reduce it also as the survivors of Ireland's larger population disappear. One-third of the old-age pensions would be a small amount for England to pay by way of restitution, but it would suffice. This would mean, adding together the contributions to police and pensions, that England would pay about £1,600,000 per annum into the Irish Exchequer, and this sum would be automatically reduced as the old-age pensions and police expenses became less—a small return for the three hundred millions of over-taxation taken from Ireland since the Union. It is not a question of generosity, but of restitution. It is well for England to remember that in this matter restitution means relief not only to Ireland, but to England. Ireland is at present on the way to national bankruptcy. It is better for England to pay five shillings in the pound to Ireland now than to have to pay twenty shillings in the pound later on. These are the only two alternatives. To continue to prescribe the Union as a cure is, as Professor Kettle has pointed out, rather like prescribing alcohol as a cure for delirium tremens. It is a remarkable thing

that the leading English experts on the Financial Commission of 1893 outlined in their minority report the very course events have since taken.* "Let us suppose," they say, "that no change is made in the existing system, and that Ireland continues to contribute as she does at present, the control of Irish receipts and expenditure remaining where it now is. We have seen that she now contributes, after paying her own expenses, about £2,000,000 to the expenditure of the Empire. But in 1859-60 she contributed £5,400,000. This contribution has diminished steadily under the present system in consequence of the increased cost of administering Ireland, which has grown from £2,300,000 in 1859-60 to £5,600,000 in 1893-94. Is it not more than probable, even supposing the present amount of taxation to be maintained, that the costs of administering Ireland will, under the present system, continue to increase, and that the surplus of £2,000,000 which she now contributes will be more and more reduced till it becomes nil or is turned into a deficit?

. . . . It is, therefore, for the interest of the British as well as the Irish taxpayer, to put an end to the present system, and to give Ireland the control of her own finances."

Since these words were written their truth has been established by incontrovertible facts. But the financial problem they indicate is still unsolved. That problem can only be solved by giving Ireland equitable financial restitution and a full measure of Home Rule.

* Report by Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, and Mr. Currie.

XIV.—JUSTICE, POLICE, AND THE POST OFFICE.

THE provisions concerning the administration of justice embodied in the Home Rule Bill of 1893 were simple, and I think satisfactory. Briefly they were as follows: The existing judges were to hold their offices on the same conditions as before the Bill, and were to be only removable, as formerly, on address from both Houses of the English Parliament. Future judges were to be appointed by the Crown on the recommendation of the Irish Executive, and were to be removable on an address from both Houses of the Irish Legislature. Other provisions protected the pensions and salaries of the present and future judges, whilst not preventing the Irish Executive from reducing those salaries on future appointment if they thought fit. Similar provisions applied to present and future Civil Servants. Two of the judges were to be permanently appointed by the English Executive and called Exchequer judges. Their salaries were to be paid by the English Treasury, and their duties were to be to decide all legal proceedings instituted at the instance of or against the Treasury or Commissioners of Customs or any of their officers, or which related to the election of members to serve in the English Parliament, or which touched any matter affected by a law which the Irish Parliament had no power to repeal or alter, but in order to give them jurisdiction it was necessary that some party to the proceedings should require the case to be heard before them or one of them. Any appeal from their judgments was to lie direct to the English Privy Council. Whilst not engaged in such special work the Exchequer judges were to act as ordinary judges of the Irish High Court. No appeal from any judge or court in Ireland was to be made to the English House of Lords, but to the Judicial Committee of the English

Privy Council, as in the case of the self-governing colonies.

On the hearing of such appeals, at least one member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council was to be an Irish judge, or an ex-Irish judge of the Supreme Court. Power was also given to the Lord Lieutenant to submit any constitutional question that might arise affecting the powers of the Irish Legislature to the Judicial Committee of the English Privy Council. The Lord Lieutenant was to hold office for six years, and any British subject was to be qualified to hold the position without reference to his religious belief; thus abolishing the law against a Catholic holding the office. Let us now consider the question of police. Parnell made it a *sine qua non* that the police should come under the control of the Irish Executive, and from this position no Irish Leader will now recede. The Royal Irish Constabulary is a peculiar body. It is not a police force proper, neither is it an army. Sometimes it is one and sometimes it is the other. A meeting is to be suppressed at Ballymoon, or an eviction to be carried out at Carrigstone, it promptly becomes an army corps with loaded rifles, pistols and swords. A publican is suspected of breaking the licensing laws, and it promptly becomes an ordinary police force, and lies in ambush for hours to catch the thirsty mala-fide traveller. At the present day the force consists of an Inspector-General, a Deputy Inspector-General, three Assistant Inspector-Generals, thirty-seven County Inspectors, 202 District Inspectors, 241 Head-Constables, and 10,195 Sergeants and Constables. This enormous force would be almost sufficient to hold India. It is purely an Imperial force, as no one with any pretence to common-sense or sanity could maintain that under normal conditions such a body would be necessary to preserve law and order in Ireland. In addition to this armed body Dublin has a special force of its own known as the Dublin Metropolitan Police. It numbers 1,282 men, including officers, and it is not a military force. It costs 8s. 2½d. per head of population. The nearest approach to this extravagant figure in the United Kingdom is Liverpool,

but there the police only cost 5s. 7½d. per head of population. Under the Bill of 1893 both these forces were to be gradually reduced and finally cease to exist, their place being taken by local police forces under the control of the local authorities, as in England and elsewhere. In 1893 the Local Government Act did not exist, but it is obvious that under a new Home Rule Bill the County Councils would be charged either by the Bill or by the Irish Parliament with the management of the new local police forces. In any event the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. were to cease to exist within six years after the summoning of the Irish Legislature. After the passing of the Bill no new officers or men were to be recruited, and the two forces were to be under the control of the Lord Lieutenant.

The expenditure on salaries and pensions in connection with these two police forces whilst they existed was to be paid out of the Exchequer of the United Kingdom, but the Irish Exchequer was to repay two-thirds of the amount so paid. In this connection, and with reference to all pensions to judges, police, or other former employees of the Imperial Government in Ireland, it may be pointed out that a pension is simply deferred pay, and why should the future Irish Government be charged with the deferred salaries which, in the natural course of events, should have been paid out of the Imperial Treasury? The creation of the local police forces was to be carried out by Irish Act, the procedure being that the Executive Committee of the Irish Privy Council certified to the Lord Lieutenant that a local police force had been established in a certain district, and **within** six months from such notice the R.I.C. were to be withdrawn from that district, and the force reduced by a proportionate number.

Within six months from the final establishment of such local police forces all over Ireland, the R.I.C. and the D.M.P. were to cease to exist. It is quite obvious that a large body like the R.I.C. could not be disbanded in a few months, nor would it be advisable to do so till a local police force had been created to take their place; therefore I think these provisions are eminently reasonable. In the new Bill we can expect no more, we ought

to be contented with no less. Some at least of the R.I.C. ought, owing to their training and experience, to form the nucleus of the new local forces.

Under the Bill of 1893 the Post Office in Ireland was to be placed under the control of the Irish Parliament and Executive. We should insist that in the new Bill a similar proviso exist. The Post Office in Ireland, like many other Government departments, is entirely out of touch with the Irish people. Most of its responsible and prominent officials are English. Promotion is practically barred to its Irish Catholic officials.

Its methods are adopted to suit English requirements, and it treats with contempt both the Irish language and Irish manufacture. The Irish Post Office is at present supposed to be run at a loss, and whilst we may be more than a little sceptical on this point, the fact remains that under proper Irish administration considerable saving and reform ought to be effected in this department, with results satisfactory not only to the Post Office officials themselves, but to the public. The transfer of the Irish Post Office to an Irish Executive would, of course, mean the transfer of the Irish Post Office Savings Bank. The prosperity of Ireland under Home Rule would re-act favourably on the Irish Post Office and increase its prosperity, whilst the adaptation of the postal service to Irish commercial needs by an Irish Executive would increase the revenue of the Post Office and the prosperity of the country.

XV.—THE PROBLEM OF THE INTOLERANT MINORITY.

NO series of articles on Home Rule would be complete without some consideration of the problem which gives its title to this article. We have heard a good deal lately about the intolerance of Catholics and the policy of Conciliation, so much indeed that one is inclined to wonder whether all sense of humour has departed from this country. No one will dispute that Catholics—particularly highly-placed Catholics—are intolerant—to *their fellow-Catholics*. Nor can this be greatly wondered at. The spirit of the slave is strong within us still, and it has historical reasons for its existence. Out of some 157 persons entrusted with the government of Ireland since the Union, there have been about sixteen only in touch with Irish public opinion. There have been five only professing the religion of the nation.*

If Napoleon had been successful one hundred years ago in his schemes for the conquest of England, England might now be governed by Frenchmen and Catholics in the interests of France. Assume the existence of a French colony, or the descendants of French colonists, in the North of England (receiving all the loaves and fishes which the Frenchmen at home could spare), while the rest of England consisted almost exclusively of Englishmen and Protestants (who were hewers of wood and drawers of water to the privileged classes). That is a rough parallel to the case of English rule in Ireland. It is this foreign influence, this intolerant minority, which is responsible for the Irish question as we know it to-day. "The government of any nation," said Mr. Carlisle, the first Resident Commissioner of the National Schools in

* Dublin Castle. By R. Barry O'Brien. P. 17.

Ireland, "must necessarily partake of the character, particularly of the religious character, of the nation." The administration of England will stand this test. The administration of Ireland will not.*

The reason is not far to seek. The Union was made, not with the Irish nation, but with the Protestant Party in Ireland; not indeed, be it said to their credit, with the whole of that party, but with the corrupt majority of it. There were some Protestants—men like Charles Kendal Bushe—who were incorruptible. The fruits of this alliance and this corruption are still with us. In 1798 Cornwallis wrote to Pitt: "It has always appeared to me a desperate measure for the British Government to make an irrevocable alliance with a small party in Ireland (which party has derived all its consequence from, and is in fact entirely dependent upon, the British Government), and to wage eternal war against the Papists." The warning passed unheeded. Lord Redesdale was sent as Lord Chancellor in 1802. He struck the keynote of the Union policy. "The Catholics," he wrote, "must have no more political power." And again—"I have said that this country must be kept for some time as a garrisoned country. I meant a Protestant garrison." One hundred years has not made this statement less true. We find only the other day a modern, if somewhat more stupid, representative of the same class proclaiming publicly that he and his kind are "England's faithful garrison in Ireland." The Union had been made with a "party," and the "nation" was to be governed through that party in the interests of England alone. The process has continued down to the present day. Catholic Emancipation came, and people thought things would change. But they were soon disillusioned. This is how Mr. Lecky describes the character of the Irish administration four years after the Catholic Relief Act had passed into law:—

In 1853—four years after Catholic Emancipation—there was not in Ireland a single Catholic judge or stipendary magistrate. All the high sheriffs, with one exception; the overwhelming majority

† Dublin Castle. P. 18.

of the unpaid magistrates and of the grand jurors, the five inspectors general, and the thirty-two sub-inspectors of police were Protestants. The chief towns were in the hands of narrow, corrupt, and, for the most part, intensely bigoted corporations. Even in a Whig Government not a single Irishman had a seat in the Cabinet, and the Irish Secretary was Mr. Stanley, whose imperious manners and unbridled temper had made him intensely hated. For many years promotion had been steadily withheld from those who advocated Catholic Emancipation, and the majority of the people thus found their bitterest enemies in the foremost places.

Let us turn now to the present Government of Ireland. In a country of which three-fourths of the population are Catholic there has not been a Catholic Viceroy since 1688. There never was a Catholic Chief Secretary. There have been three Catholic Under-Secretaries. There have been two Catholic Chancellors. In the High Court of Justice there are seventeen judges: *three* of them are Catholics. There are 21 County Court Judges and Recorders; 8 of them are Catholics. There are 37 County Inspectors of Police; 5 of them are Catholics. There are 202 District Inspectors of Police; 62 of them are Catholics. There are over five thousand Justices of the Peace; a little more than one-fifth of them are Catholics. There are 68 Privy Councillors; 8 of them are Catholics.* Let us now consider some of the large Government Departments. Take the Local Government Board. This body consists of two elements—the nominated and highly-paid officials, and those who secure admission through competitive examinations. From the latter class Catholics cannot, of course, be excluded. The permanent Vice-President is to all intents and purposes the Local Government Board. He is a Protestant and a Unionist. Of the three Commissioners two are Protestants, one a Catholic. On the permanent staff we find 47 nominated officials, 34 of whom are Protestants, and the balance of 13 Catholics. The 34 Protestants draw an average yearly salary of £653 13s., while the average yearly salary of the 13 Catholic officials only amounts to £580. On

* Dublin Castle. P. 78.

the permanent staff created by competitive examination the story is very different. Here we find 43 Catholics and 25 Protestants. Brains and ability could not be kept out. But what about their remuneration? The average salary of the 43 Catholics amounts to £207 13s. 6d., while that of the 25 Protestants is £304 8s. Can any sensible man believe there is no favour here? Pass on to the Chief Secretary's Office. Only one out of every six of the officials in this office are Catholics. Take the Board of Works, the three Commissioners and Secretary are all Protestants. The newest Irish Department is the Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction. Surely we shall find Catholics getting fair play there? The facts are the reverse. The five principal officials draw salaries to the tune of £5,000 a year. One is a Catholic. The appointment of this one Catholic created more commotion amongst the intolerant minority than any recent episode of Irish departmental history. The man who made the appointment was driven out of public life. At the head of the Agricultural Branch are three officials drawing salaries of £954, £620, and £365 respectively. All of them are Protestants. All of the officials at the head of the Technical Instruction Branch are Protestants. At the head of the Fisheries Branch is a Protestant clergyman with a handsome salary and expenses, and eight or nine other officials, all Protestants. The Chief Veterinary Inspector, the two Assistant Inspectors, the Curator of the Science and Art Museum, the Head Librarian at the National Library and his three assistants, are all Protestants. Will any sane man suggest that this extraordinary state of things is the result of a mere accident? This policy of "No Catholic Need Apply" does not stop with the Government Departments. It permeates the whole social and commercial life of Ireland. It is within the recollection of us all that it was only within the last few years, and as the result of a fierce struggle, that the railway companies agreed to open their clerical positions to competitive examination and so give Catholic boys a chance of entering their service. At that time, of the forty-

seven highest paid positions in the Great Southern and Western Railway only two were held by Catholics. Out of 59 clerks employed at the Broadstone Terminus of the Midland Railway 50 are Protestants. While in the Great Northern Railway out of every £1 paid to the staff in salaries only three shillings goes to Catholics. In the banks and great commercial houses the same state of things exists. In the Provincial Bank of Ireland only one-seventeenth of the salaries paid goes to Catholics. There are 302 Protestants employed by this bank, with incomes amounting to £58,185, and 29 Catholics with £3,665. Contrast with this the Munster and Leinster Bank, which is a Catholic Bank, with a majority of Catholic directors, where the majority of the managers are Protestants.

The following list shows the principal public positions held by Protestants in two of the leading Southern counties—Cork and Waterford. Many of these positions are in the gift of Catholic public bodies. I should like to see a similar list of positions held by Catholics in Belfast and Derry; where the persecution and intolerance exist would then become apparent:—

County Cork.	County Waterford.*
High Sheriff of County. Sub-Sheriff of County. High Sheriff of City. Clerk of Crown and Peace (East Riding). Registrar of Probate Court. Local Registrar of Title. Two Surveyors of Taxes. Engineer to Harbour Board. Head Master Technical School. Seven Instructors Technical School. Nine Professors University College. Three Lecturers, University Col- lege. One Crown Solicitor.	High Sheriff of County. Sub-Sheriff of County. County Surveyor and two assis- tants. Clerk of the Crown and Peace. Secretary to County Council. Registrar of Probate Court. Local Registrar of Title. Surveyor of Taxes. Collector of Customs. Governor of the Jail. Secretary to Harbour Board. Engineer to Harbour Board. Two Engineers appointed by Joint Bridge Committee. Clerk of Works to New Bridge. Superintendent of Co. Asylum. Crown Solicitor.

County Cork.	County Waterford.*
Chairman Public Works Committee, Cork Corporation.	Two Resident Magistrates.
Chairman Waterworks Committee, Cork Corporation.	Two District Inspectors R.I.C.
Chairman Fitz-Gerald Park Committee.	Senior Poor Rate Collector.
Chairman Technical Instruction Committee.	Actuary of Savings Bank.
Public Librarian.	Postmaster and Assistant.
Secretary Cornmarket Committee.	Female Technical Teacher, Technical School.
Senior Rate Collector.	Assistant Technical Teacher, Technical School.
Head of Fire Brigade	Manual Instructor, Technical School.
Principal Draughtsman, City Engineer's Office.	Commercial Teacher, Technical School.
Solicitor to County Council.	Art Master, Technical School.
One County Court Judge.	Engineering Instructor, Technical School.
All Resident Magistrates.	Assistant Science Teacher, Technical School.
All County Inspectors R.I.C.	Head Nurse, Co. Infirmary.
15 District Inspectors R.I.C. out of 17.	Board of Works Engineer.
Secretary of Savings Bank and all Clerks except one.	Postal Inspector.
Postmaster Cork City.	Veterinary Inspector.
Manager of Labour Exchange.	Secretary to Fishery Board.
Two Veterinary Inspectors.	Manager of Gas Works.
Chief Inspector of Schools.	Chief Inspector of Schools.
Majority of Managers of Munster and Leinster Bank.	All salaried staff of Strangman's Brewery.
General Manager and all chief officials of Cork, Bandon, and South Coast Railway.	Majority of Staff of Graves and Co.
General Manager, Cork, Blackrock and Passage Railway.	Majority of Staff of Steamship Co.
Secretary, Manager, and all chief officials of Cork Electric Tramways Co.	All the Staff of Clyde Shipping Co.
Manager, Secretary, and principal officials City of Cork Steam Packet Co.	Majority of Staff of Great Southern and Western Ely.
	Majority of Staff of Waterford and Tramore Railway.
	Majority of Staff of Hall and Co.
	Majority of Staff of H. Denny and Co.
	Majority of Staff of Matterson and Co.

* "Freeman's Journal," May 18th, 1911.

In considering these lists one must also remember that in the County of Cork there are 365,724 Catholics and 38,887 Protestants. In County Waterford there are 82,556 Catholics and 4,631 Protestants. Comment is needless.

Is it any wonder that the intolerant minority in Ireland are afraid of Home Rule? The reason is not far to seek. They know that Home Rule means equal opportunity for every Irishman. They know that the coming of Home Rule means the end of the ascendancy of any creed or any intolerant minority in the government of Ireland. They cannot fear for themselves, because their positions will be amply safeguarded by any Home Rule Bill that may be introduced. They know, also, that the Irish popular bodies were composed of Irish Catholics have penalised no man on account of his religion. Their real fear is for their party. In the changing stress and storm of a new and healthy political life based upon national needs and national policy there will be no room for a party of selfish placehunters whose whole aim is the maintenance of a corrupt sectarian ascendancy. But someone may ask, "What of Ulster?" I remember asking a prominent Irish politician some time ago whether he thought that Ulster would fight in the event of Home Rule.* "Yes," he said, "Ulster will fight for the leading positions and the legislative plums in a Home Rule Parliament. We fought for the Land Acts; Ulster benefited most by them. We fought for local government; Ulster has not been slow to use it to advance her position. We fought for a University. Belfast has got her University. You here in Cork have got a University College." Who can doubt that this is the truth? Who can doubt that the only real solution of the problem of the intolerant minority in Ireland is the spirit of real toleration and conciliation that will grow and fructify within the walls of an Irish Parliament? The Irish question is not in the ultimate analysis a question of "Catholic" or "Protestant" appointments by a foreign government. Ireland wants *Irish* appointments—Catholic and Protestant—by a National Government.

* At the last General Election the voting of the whole province showed a majority of 1,298 in favour of Home Rule. 16 out of its 33 members are Nationalists. Ulster threatened to fight on two former occasions, namely, when Catholic Emancipation was granted and the Irish Church Disestablished. The threats never materialised.

XVI.—CONCLUSION.

THE late Queen Victoria summed up in a single sentence three hundred years of Irish history. "Really," she wrote, "it is quite immoral, with Ireland quivering in our grasp and ready to throw off her allegiance at any moment, for us to force Austria to give up her lawful possessions.*"

No matter where we begin to discuss the question of Ireland's present condition we shall always come back to the central and dominating fact that Ireland is governed by the public opinion of another country. The Irish people are naturally loyal, but they have no free institutions to be loyal to. Ireland is governed in the ultimate analysis by an English Chief Secretary, who combines as many executive functions as Pooch-Bah, and by an unknown Treasury official. Both of them, when it so pleases them, can snap their fingers at Irish public opinion. Ministries come and go, but the Treasury official remains, and so one may naturally suppose he has the more permanent control.

The secret of England's success as a colonising power is to be sought for in exactly the opposite direction to that which has so far made her government of Ireland a failure. Sir Edward Grey, the present Foreign Secretary, has well stated the foundation of that secret. Speaking at the dinner given to the Colonial Premiers on Friday, April 19th, 1907, he said:—

The history of our relations with our self-governing colonies had been a great chapter in the history of freedom. Freedom gave to self-governing colonies the power to develop their countries, and, what was more important, the special excellences of their race and character, in the environment of the country in which they lived. That was a great gift—the power to develop—which freedom gave. But it had another gift—namely, that of healing. In the history of one of our great colonies we had

* "Letters of Queen Victoria." Vol. II. P. 237.

already seen how it could heal wounds and strife, and bring races together, and we were confident, in our latest self-governing colony, the healing gift of freedom would be equally potent, and we all felt that the tie between the mother country and the colonies was now one which combined the advantages of union with the privileges of independence.

It is this power to develop and heal which has been denied to Ireland both spiritually and materially. Ireland's trade was killed by English laws. Ireland's children were left in ignorance of Ireland's history and Ireland's language. But the seed of development is not dead. The Gaelic League has nourished and revived the national life of our country. The industrial and agricultural interests have been helped by better land laws and the industrial revival. It is, however, certain that Ireland can never develop her national life and national prosperity to full fruition until she controls her own domestic affairs. A prosperous and loyal Ireland is the certain result of a generous measure of Home Rule. A prosperous Ireland will be the best investment England ever made. These articles have been quite useless if they have not shown that the continuance of the present condition of affairs must inevitably mean a growing demand on England's Treasury, and eventually an insolvent Ireland. This is due quite as much to ignorant and extravagant administration as to Ireland's poverty. The Department of Agriculture and Technical Instruction has, of late years, endeavoured, as far as possible, to compile a return of Irish imports and exports. The story these figures disclose is an eminently hopeful one. The total import and export trade at Irish ports in 1909 is estimated at £125,675,847, as compared with £117,017,768 in 1908, an increase of £8,658,079. The imports amounted to a total of £63,947,155, and the exports to a total of £61,728,692. The increase in the estimated value of the trade in 1909, as compared with 1908, has taken place both in imports and exports, the increase in imports amounting to £4,940,278 and in exports to £3,717,801. These figures show that Ireland industrially is on the up grade.* It is true that 1908 was generally an unfavourable year in the annals of trade,

*The improvement is not due to Unionist Policy, but to the policy which the Unionists have consistently opposed, namely, the policy and labours of the Irish Party.

but the figures for 1909 show an increase of £4,281,233 even over 1907, which was the best previous year for which records are available. On the other hand, the emigration statistics shown no sign of decrease. No one can doubt, however, that Ireland's trade is capable of infinite development under an Irish government, and that this development would be bound to re-act favourably on English trade. Before I conclude this series I should like to mention a suggestion made to me by a friend with regard to the Irish Second Chamber, or Legislative Council, which I think is eminently worthy of consideration. He thinks that "high franchise" proposals for the upper house are not likely to work, and that both parties in a lower house would eventually unite in attacking an upper house elected on a restricted franchise.

He suggests as an alternative that the Legislative Council or Upper House should be elected by six constituencies, as follows:—

Dublin	Belfast
Leinster (rest of)	Ulster (rest of)
Munster	Connaught.

The Council to consist of sixty members distributed amongst these six seats, according to population, and elected by a system of proportional representation. The Lower House or Legislative Chamber to be elected on the same franchise as the Upper, but by smaller constituencies. He also suggests that the age limit for the Lower House should be 25, and for the Upper House 40. I think this plan would be preferable in many ways to that of the Bill of 1893. It is obvious that the more discussion we have about the details of Home Rule the more likely are we to get a good workable Bill suited to Irish conditions. With that object in view these articles have been written. They are in no sense of the word an expert or official exposition of the subject. The demand for Home Rule is not a thing of yesterday, and Englishmen need not delude themselves with vain hopes that Ireland is likely to give

it up. It may be that we are about to realise our ambitions, but in any event we will certainly not cease fighting for them. Irish history proves beyond contention the tenacity of the Irish people in sticking to their political ideals. Catholic Emancipation was opposed as vehemently and as bitterly as Home Rule. For twenty-eight years the struggle went on. Ireland won. Then there was the agitation for the removal of the Tithes and the Disestablishment of the Irish Protestant Church. There were more delays, more violent struggles, more makeshifts. The Liberals of that day tried to shirk the question. The Fenians came, and the Established Church was swept away on a sea of revolt. Lord Salisbury once said that it would be safer to give Ireland Home Rule than Local Government. His nephew introduced and carried a sweeping measure of Irish Local Government in 1898. It has been a triumphant success, and is, of course, an overwhelming argument for Home Rule. The agitation for a National University was similarly impeded, similarly shelved, and similarly triumphant. Even the very agitation for Home Rule—the backbone of all Irish agitation—has had its “dark and evil days.” Most of us can remember the dark hours before and after Parnell’s death, when all Ireland was plunged into strife and turmoil, when brother fought with brother, and the Home Rule movement seemed to have sunk for ever in a welter of hopeless anarchy. It is now alive and strong, and the man who counts on killing it, either by kindness or coercion, is living in a fool’s paradise. “*Sin é an ceart, an ceart do déanam,*” says the Irish proverb, “the right way is the just way.” Home Rule is the just solution of Ireland’s difficulties, if England will but read them aright. For the people of Ireland the granting of Home Rule will open up a great future and a great past. It will not in itself save Ireland, but it will give Ireland the means of saving herself. It will teach the Irish people the great principle of national responsibility, that if they are to have the *rights* of a nation they must also undertake the *duties* of a nation. It will open the door

to an enduring and equitable alliance between England and America, and thus do much to preserve the peace of the world. It will, above all, in the words of a great Irishman,* “hasten the day of true union and real reconciliation between the people of Ireland and the people of Great Britain; and with the advent of that true union and reconciliation, there will be dispelled, and dispelled for ever, the cloud, the weighty cloud, that has rested on the history of a noble race, and dimmed the glory of a mighty Empire.”

* Lord Russell of Killowen. Close of speech at Parnell Commission.

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