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**THE HUMAN COSTS  
OF THE WAR**

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THE NIGHT BEFORE CHRISTMAS

Serbian refugees in the stable of an old Turkish inn at Leskowitz, Serbia.

# THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

*By*

**HOMER FOLKS**

ORGANIZER AND DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF  
CIVIL AFFAIRS OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS IN  
FRANCE AND LATER SPECIAL COMMISSIONER  
TO SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE

*Illustrated with Photographs by*

**LEWIS W. HINE**

American Red Cross  
Special Survey Mission



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THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR

**THE HUMAN COST OF THE WAR**  

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E-U



*To the Memory of*

L. F.

1893—1915

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## PREFACE

WHY doesn't Europe function?

This, in substance, is the question which puzzled America has been asking all through the last half of 1919. Why must 1919 go down in history, as M. Brieux says, as "a lost year"? With huge excess stores of food and products, why does trade delay? Why does foreign exchange jump up and down like the temperature of a "flu" patient? When Mr. Hoover returned last July he was quoted as saying that, unless Europe began promptly to produce, there would be starvation in unheard-of proportions this winter. Now we hear that it is at hand. Did they deliberately choose starvation, or did they drift into it, or is there still another and perhaps a more valid reason? Production implies producers. Who and where and in what condition are the producers of Europe? We hear that Belgium and England are making real progress toward production. Has this any relation to the fact that their military losses, especially those of Belgium, were much less in proportion than those of some other countries?

For five and a half years we have scarcely opened a morning paper without reading a head-line telling of the sufferings of some new group of victims of the war. This morning—January 10, 1920—it happens to be Poland, and the Red Cross reports that, of its

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twenty millions, four millions are refugees at this moment. Nevertheless, seeing many things of this kind at first hand from July, 1917, to the end of the war, in the extensive relief work of the American Red Cross in France, the thing which impressed me most painfully as I read the American papers was the infinitesimal fraction of reality which found its way into print. I saw the utter impossibility for the average American reader, from such fragmentary accounts, written by so many different persons, from so many different angles, with so many different purposes, to form any true picture of what the war was meaning to the health and happiness of Europe. It is even more necessary now, if we are to think and act with the slightest realization of our responsibilities in the world that actually exists, to be able to see in a fair degree of perspective and sequence the disasters inflicted by the Great War on the peoples of Europe. These may prove to be the most far-reaching of the war's results.

Just as the war was ending a request came to me to make the best estimate then possible of the needs of southern and southeastern Europe. The trips through Italy, Serbia, Greece, France, and Belgium for this purpose ended in April last, but the collection of data and the effort to set the facts in their true proportions have continued to the date of publication.

Chapter I tells the origin of the survey which resulted in this volume and gives an account of the itinerary of our trips. Chapters II to VII, inclusive, deal respectively with Serbia, Belgium, France, Italy, and Greece. Chapters VIII to X endeavor to sum up the war's results in all these countries, in

## PREFACE

the three vital aspects of childhood, home, and health. Chapter XI tries to fit the whole into a picture of War *vs.* Welfare.

No effort has been made to present a constructive program—this is simply a contribution toward a diagnosis which might make it possible to outline a well-considered course of treatment.





**THE HUMAN COSTS  
OF THE WAR**



# THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

## I

### INTRODUCTORY

Comfort, content, delight,  
The ages' slow-bought gain,  
They shriveled in a night.

—KIPLING.

A unique survey: Europe's woes at the war's end; experience in France; assistants; itinerary; transportation difficulties; with refugees in an Ægean storm; Saloniki, crossroads of the world; through Serbia as freight; Serbians, near-Americans; Belgrade, not dead, but convalescent; in a Serbian hospital; the home-coming of war's exiles in Belgium and France; limitations of present estimates; disasters dimly seen, but terrifying; not an account of American Red Cross work.

**A** *UNIQUE SURVEY*.—On the evening of November 11, 1918, while laughing, singing, shouting, kissing crowds were jostling one another on the boulevards, I left Paris for Italy and the Balkans on a unique mission. It was to find out at the end of a great war how much suffering there was, and of what kinds. During the war I had been in charge of the American Red Cross relief work in France. As the war drew to a close, the calls for relief from

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

eastern and southern Europe became more and more urgent. The American Red Cross felt that it must have a fresh appraisal of the needs, of their relative urgency, and of how they could be met.

Even at first impressions the job did not seem an easy one, and the more one considered it the less easy it seemed. Everybody knew vaguely that the able-bodied men of these countries had been at war for several years; that their usual work of getting food, clothing, and shelter for their families must have been done in a makeshift way or left undone; that widowhood and fatherlessness had been spread broadcast; that millions of men had been made cripples; that millions of people had been driven from their homes, and that these homes had been destroyed; that other millions had lived under the rule of the armies of their enemies; that many thousands had been forcibly deported to labor as slaves; that fatigue, underfeeding, indecent overcrowding, and exposure to cold, rain, and snow had been general; that prices had been fantastically high, many supplies unobtainable, and transportation broken down. All these things were known to be not simply uncomfortable, but dangerous to health and life. They were bad enough, but they were the earlier stages of war disaster. What were the later ones? What would be the full fruits of such conditions lasting through four years? We heard rumors of whole peoples clothed in rags and starving; of outbreaks of typhus and other epidemics; of hordes of famished refugees returning to the bare ruins of non-existent villages. How much was there of all this suffering? Where was it? How could it be helped most quickly and most efficiently?

## INTRODUCTORY

The job was essentially that of estimating, in such parts of Europe as could be reached, the net results of the war upon human welfare. It required study as well as observation. Wretchedness and misery do not thrust themselves forward. Ruined homes and buildings are obvious, but ruined lives, starvation, and illness are unobtrusive and have to be looked for. The weaker people get the less noise they are able to make. The worst possible conditions of human suffering are entirely compatible with complete external calm and with complete confidence on the part of the authorities that all is going quite well, or at least as well as can be expected. This is true in peace as well as in war, and in this fact lies one of the most serious difficulties of relief work. People who need help do not come forward to ask for it. They do not know that it can be had, or they are too proud to ask. Even in the most humane and socially minded countries there is only the slightest general realization of the amount of extreme poverty and of preventable disease. An epidemic is alarming because, being something new, it is "news," and gets the head-lines. The steady, all-the-year-round lists of deaths from ever-present epidemics, such as tuberculosis and children's diseases, get only the small type of the obituary columns and nobody is disturbed. In those countries in which poverty is greatest the least is said, known, and done about it. Short of impending revolt, it is not vocal. This makes a survey of sickness and distress difficult, even in peace-times when all the usual means of getting information are at hand. It is vastly more difficult when the ordinary community life is disrupted by war.



## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

To have definite objectives, I prepared an outline of various ways in which war is likely to cause distress in an invaded country (see Appendix). In framing this I had the great advantage of my experience as organizer and director of the relief work of the American Red Cross in France, since its beginnings in July, 1917. I had seen this work develop from giving first aid to a few straggling refugees returning to the area devastated in the famous Hindenburg retreat of March, 1917, to perhaps the largest relief work ever undertaken. It included a vast relief agency in all parts of France for a million and a half of refugees, later to become two million; for the repatriates arriving a thousand a day through Switzerland from back of the German lines, and for an army of half a million war cripples. It included also planning and getting under way two comprehensive efforts which it was hoped would be continued long after the war had ended and which should help to make up some of the terrible losses inflicted by the war upon the people of France—campaigns against tuberculosis and child mortality.

*Assistants.*—I was given a free hand in the selection of my survey aides. The question of food was paramount, and the United States Food Administrator in Europe detailed one of his staff, Capt. Edwin G. Merrill, to assist in this phase of the inquiry. Captain Merrill had been president of the Union Trust Company in New York City, and was a man of wide experience in business. The American Red Cross Tuberculosis Commission to Italy placed at our disposal Capt. Louis I. Dublin, who was in charge of its research work. Captain Dublin is statistician of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, lecturer on



## INTRODUCTORY

vital statistics at Yale University, and one of the recognized authorities on the bookkeeping of human assets in the United States. As adviser on epidemics and contagious diseases generally, I was fortunate in securing Capt. Edward S. Godfrey, M.D., epidemiologist of the New York State Department of Health, formerly of the Illinois State Board of Health, and at an earlier date Health Officer of Phoenix, Arizona. Captain Godfrey had had a wide experience in tracing epidemics to their origin and in public health activities. Capt. Lawrence Pumpelly, assistant professor of French in Cornell University, and skilled in the art of language, acted as interpreter and transportation manager, as well as unwinder-in-chief of the interminable red tape which hampers travel in foreign countries during war. Capt. Lucien W. Booth, of Wichita, Kansas, was our secretary and ever-present stenographer, and kept a full record of all important interviews and observations. Capt. Lewis W. Hine, who first made the photography of social betterment a career, kept a record of human conditions and needs with his camera which is quite as complete and enlightening as the record of conversations and interviews. By his remarkable photos of various types of persons seen on our travels he helps us to understand that these people are of the same kind as ourselves, and to realize, not only that we are our brothers' keepers, but that the brothers are well worth keeping. Capt. James A. Mills, who had been a member of the original Red Cross Commission to Rumania, accompanied us as far as Saloniki, where he took charge of an important emergency relief expedition to northeast Serbia. If I were starting on a similar trip again, I could not

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

improve my selection of personnel. They helped both in securing data and in judging of its significance. While I alone am responsible for statements of fact and of opinion, I am quite certain that I have expressed the judgments of the group as a whole.

*Itinerary.*—When the survey was proposed, the war was obviously in its later phases, and it happened that the date of our departure fixed some time previously, the evening of November 11th, proved to be armistice evening. It had been a wild day in Paris. The restrained emotions of weary months and years were let loose, and the celebration of victory and peace excluded all else. The breakdown of organization, even in the American Red Cross, was such that some members of our party were unable to secure transportation to the railway station and had to follow us a day later. It was a sobering thought that on the evening of the day of victory for which we had been waiting so long we were setting out to make an estimate of the sufferings, distress, and losses which no armistice could discontinue, and some of which actually increased in volume and in intensity for months to come.

We went first to Italy and were told the essence of what the indefatigable American Red Cross workers in Italy had learned during a year of strenuous activity in every part of the kingdom. Besides the heavy military losses, it was a story of half a million refugees, and of an entire population on the edge of unendurable want. We were made acquainted with the government officials charged with the relief of refugees, food administration, and questions of public health, and interviewed leading

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citizens. We visited Italy's devastated area stretching from the Piave River west and north to what had been Austria, and including some of its most fertile and most prosperous regions. The trip had to be made by auto, as there were only temporary bridges over the Piave, and no railways beyond it. At the pontoon bridge we were held up a few moments to allow a procession of foot-passengers coming this way to cross. Who were this weird-looking lot, ragged, bearded, gaunt, tired, hungry? They were Italian soldiers, prisoners of war returning from Austria. They had walked part of the way through Austria and now had walked all the way through Italy's devastated area. We met them after that all along the road, in twos and threes, in scores and in hundreds. We had our first look at occupied territory and saw bread-lines standing before American Red Cross relief stations in a region which had been impoverished to the last degree during the past year, and from which the retreating Austrians had carried away only two weeks before the little food, clothing, and bedding that had remained. Here and there family groups of refugees were returning, the children, in spite of all their hardships, looking as irresistible as only Italian children can look. They were cold, hungry, and homeless, but they were incomparable.

We traversed the peninsula to Taranto on the south. The *Odessa*, originally a Russian boat on the Black Sea, carried us to Corfu, where we caught glimpses of the Isle of Death, so named since the remnants of Serbia's army found refuge there, and many of those who had survived the Albanian Mountains perished of the later effects of exposure. We

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

noticed with especial interest the summer home of the Kaiser on a hillside in the distance, now serving as an Allied Military Hospital. We sailed along the Adriatic coast, into the Gulf of Corinth, and landed at a tiny port on the north shore, Itea, very near Delphi, and were driven over an excellent road, recently constructed for military purposes, to Bralo, a station on the Athens-Saloniki Railway.

*Transportation Difficulties.*—Our transportation experiences from here on may well be narrated in some detail, for they reflect better than anything else the complete breakdown of the movement, both of persons and of goods, a breakdown which in large measure still exists and is one of the most serious obstacles in preventing wholesale starvation in Europe in this winter of 1919-20. We represented generous America, coming to see what was needed, and the best was placed at our service. For the ordinary traveler, even for the local official of high station, the facilities were still more scanty and uncertain. The express train from Saloniki to Athens which runs three times a week was due to pass Bralo at 7.20 A.M. We noted that it was being planned that we should arrive at 9.30. We called attention to the time-table. "Oh, we shall be in plenty of time; the train is always later than nine-thirty." When we arrived the train had not gone by. We waited and from time to time various numbers of hours were stated as the time yet to elapse before the train would arrive. There had been a rain the day before, and the road-bed was not in good condition. Finally at 7.30 P.M. a train appeared. No one could tell us whether it was the regular express or a special made up a few stations above. After two hours' further



## INTRODUCTORY

wait it pulled out without light or heat. It was some ninety miles to Athens, but it occupied us until six the next morning.

At Athens, as at Rome, the American Red Cross workers gave us the results of their experience, in this case covering a few weeks only. We also saw numerous government officials and private citizens interested in health and relief work. We heard of scores of thousands of destitute Greek refugees on Mytilene and other Greek islands off the Asia Minor coast. We heard of destroyed villages and cities in Macedonian Greece, and of thousands of Greeks who had been deported from this region into Bulgaria and who were returning famished and half clad. We learned that we were in a country in which the entire population at one time had been in sight of starvation. We heard of health conditions which had been very bad before the war, and now were very much worse.

We were looking forward, however, with impatience, to Serbia, the country whose heroic defense in the early days of the war had won the surprised admiration of the world, the country which had had to yield later to overwhelming numbers, which had disappeared behind the lines of the Bulgarians, Austrians, and Germans, until, again to the surprise of the world, the reorganized Serbian army and other Allied troops drove victoriously through the country in a few weeks, in September and October, 1918, writing in large characters the first chapter of the end of the war. We were all so anxious to know what had happened to stout-hearted Serbia during the three years of enemy occupation, and no one as yet knew much about it.

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

At the Serbian Legation in Athens good fortune threw us in with a Serbian army officer, Capt. Radomir Chaponitch, attached to the diplomatic service, who had made the retreat through Albania with the Serbian army in the winter of 1915-16, and had since been in exile in Rome and Athens. He wished to return to Belgrade and offered his services as guide and interpreter through Serbia. He proved to be not only a most efficient aid in these ways, but also a well-educated and most agreeable companion. He was of great assistance to us, and when we parted we all felt that we were leaving a lifetime friend.

*With Refugees in an Ægean Storm.*—Saloniki was the point of departure for Serbia as well as for Grecian Macedonia. On the railway from Athens to Saloniki a "*rapide*" express makes the three-hundred-mile trip every other day at the terrifying speed of thirteen miles an hour, when it arrives on time (which it never does); ordinary trains are much slower. On the best advice, in view of the uncertainties of the railway, we set out from Athens to Saloniki by water, taking the best of the coastwise Greek boats, which was to make the trip in thirty-six hours in special comfort. This was faster, however, than a telegraph message, which usually took two days. At Volo we took on board many refugees returning to Grecian Macedonia; their huge bundles, their crates of live fowls, and their packages of foodstuffs for the next forty days were piled high in all the passageways of the boat. Like other travelers in the Ægean, we met heavy winds and seas. The unhappy refugees were drenched and terrified; their flour became paste, and their chickens became water-



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fowl. Our good ship *Peloponnesus* was forced to turn back and to lay in the shelter of the island of Sciathos a couple of days. The influenza was extremely bad on the island and we were not allowed to land. Finally we reached our destination, six days, instead of thirty-six hours, after leaving the port of Athens.

*Saloniki, Crossroads of the World.*—Saloniki had been headquarters of the Allied armies of the Near East and also of the American Red Cross Commission to Serbia since 1916. Although belonging to Greece since the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913, it is also, by arrangement with Greece, the Ægean port for Serbia. It had now become the crossroads of the world. Some of our impressions of Saloniki as jotted down on the spot may help to recall the most picturesque of the war headquarters of Europe.

Saloniki, which has had a continuous history of two thousand years, mostly of fighting and war, is an island of dirt, surrounded by an ocean of army hospitals. It is unlike anything that ever was before or ever can be again. The native population is composed entirely of foreigners, chiefly Spanish Jews, Turks, and Greeks. No two civilians are dressed alike, and each costume is different from anything any one has ever seen before. They vary from a few primeval rags to such a brilliant collection of fiery colors as is only to be found in an old-fashioned flower garden.

The military element of the population is made up of soldiers from Great Britain, France, Italy, Serbia, Greece, Russia, Senegal, Madagascar, Tunis, Morocco, and India. Huge army hospitals, interminable rows of barracks, wonderfully trim and orderly-looking, stretch away as far as the eye can see, on the Macedonian plains. Tent colonies house Bulgarian prisoners.

The anopheles mosquito, fed up for centuries on Turks, Greeks, and Jews, applied himself diligently to the Allied armies. It was chiefly the mosquito that built these large

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

hospitals. It was the mosquito that filled them with thousands and thousands of Allied soldiers. It was the mosquito that sent thousands upon thousands home to France and to Britain.

Saloniki is dirty, without any sort of qualification; it smells to heaven. A flood would not clean it, and if it did it would dirty itself again within twenty-four hours.

Its narrow sidewalks, paved with rounded stones and concealing deep holes at irregular intervals, make walking a hazardous occupation. If you step from the sidewalk into the street, you are in danger of being run down by the innumerable army automobiles, camions, and trucks rushing in every direction, and splashing everything and everybody with dust or mud. Saloniki is always either dusty or muddy.

Some of the buildings date back to the fourth century, and all of them have that look. A famous Roman structure, quite intact and looking like the Pantheon, was being overhauled and its floors excavated by French soldiers. A wonderfully illuminating plan of the building, showing the date of construction of its various parts, was the work of the Armée Française d'Orient, Service Archéologique (French Army of the Orient, Archeological Service). When before did an army have an archeological service?

In Saloniki, old men, barefooted, dressed in pieces of burlap packing—it is mid-December—are beasts of burden. One sees them stooping over until they could almost walk on all-fours, carrying inconceivably heavy loads, over rough sidewalks and streets. The cargoes of numberless boats that sail the Ægean are unloaded by them.

*Through Serbia as Freight.*—When we reached Saloniki on December 6th with the plan of going through Serbia overland to Belgrade on the Danube the opinion there was unanimous that the trip was practically impossible. No Americans had made the trip from Saloniki to Belgrade overland since the armistice. The local representative of the American Red Cross who had returned from a trip some distance into the interior was certain that it could not

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be done and that the only way to reach Belgrade was either to find some boat going direct to Ragusa or Fiume or to retrace our steps to Corfu, hoping to find there such a boat, and thence go in by rail. We learned later that the boat which had set out three days before from Saloniki for Fiume was *sixteen days en route*. The Serbians themselves had no transportation and were dependent upon the Allied armies. The Italian army had just removed all its transportation facilities. The English were rapidly moving on farther east. Overland transportation in Serbia was under the control of the French military authorities. We sought out their commanding officer. He was most agreeable, but definitely discouraging. He would not say it was actually impossible, but it was practically so; their personnel and the Serbian officials who had returned to Saloniki, expecting to go up to Belgrade, were being sent back the other way; no new parties were being started. The railway terminals were heaped high with freight. Efforts were being made to move it into the interior of Serbia, but little could be accomplished. The railroad line in the interior of Serbia was out of commission, and the roads were as bad as they could possibly be.

But we said we did not wish simply to arrive at Belgrade. Our object in coming was to see the interior of Serbia at first hand. Belgrade would be even more effectively cut off from the interior than Saloniki. A very laudable object, yes, but just short of impossible; if we were to start, we would have no assurance of when we would arrive, if at all. The only vehicles making efforts to get through were heavy trucks for carrying freight; if we insisted on

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trying it, he would certainly place one at our service as soon as he could; but he had not the least idea as to how far or how fast it could go. It was necessary to carry gasolene for the trip both ways. The roads were getting worse every day as winter came on. He was sorry he had no better transport to offer the Americans, but the only possibility was to put our hand-baggage on the floor of one of these trucks and make ourselves as comfortable as possible sitting on the baggage.

We decided to try it.

The railway ended at Skoplie (better known by its Turkish name, Uskub), the metropolis of the portion of Serbia annexed by the treaty of 1913, some 190 miles northeast of Saloniki, 140 miles of which are in Serbian territory. The trip of 360 miles from there to Belgrade was divided into short sections, over each of which the French or English military authorities attempted to start ten or twelve heavy trucks daily. If weather conditions had been favorable for some time all the trucks in the convoy might reach their destination by night-fall. More likely some of them would be left behind, stalled in the mud or out of repair. Not infrequently the whole convoy would spend the night in the middle of the road, between villages. Numerous trucks, injured beyond repair, lay by the roadside.

Our mission of eight members, including our Serbian friend, made the trip in this way in twelve and a half days. Twice the night was spent in villages which were not regular stops, and with difficulty we found shelter on the dirt floor in tiny rooms in peasants' cottages. Once we were stalled



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after dark, miles from any village, and slept in the camion, which was just large enough to accommodate us all packed as closely together as possible on the floor. One day the distance covered was less than six miles. Three and a half days before reaching the Danube we passed at Chupria, where we crossed the wide Morava on a temporary wooden bridge, a half-mile procession of mules, heavily loaded with French military supplies. Within a half-hour after the arrival of our truck at its destination the mules arrived. Mules and auto had made the same average speed for three and a half days. It should be borne in mind that we were proceeding along the main line of travel and that in all other parts of the country conditions were still more difficult or, so to speak, still more impossible, than those which we met.

It was following a trail of destruction for three hundred miles. Windowless buildings and fragments of walls lined the roadsides; skeletons of horses and oxen were everywhere. But what we shall remember longest are the groups of refugees in rags returning southward—Serbians, Albanians, and Greeks, old men, women of all ages, and children, all carrying bundles on their backs as they trudged along the muddy highway or the disrupted railway, and little groups of convalescent Serbian soldiers just out of the hospitals, patiently plodding toward their homes in the north.

*Serbians, Near-Americans.*—Throughout the trip the members of the Survey Mission were practically the guests of the Serbian authorities. At every stopping-place for the night (except the unexpected ones) we were received by the prefect or mayor, or

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both, and assigned to selected families for shelter. We thus saw the interiors of some of the best homes in Serbia, as well as of some of the poorest, and enjoyed the hospitality of some of its humblest peasants and some of its leading citizens.

The thing which impressed me most strongly about the Serbians was their likeness to Americans. They look like Americans, talk like Americans, and seem to think like Americans. An amusing incident emphasized this American-like atmosphere in a little village at which we arrived one evening after dark. A peasant family shared with us their one room and fire for the evening, and we slept on the ground in another house, destitute of floor, furniture, or heat. It was rainy and cold and altogether cheerless. The English officer in charge of our transportation, who was sharing our frugal meal, bethought himself of a bottle of whisky brought along for a rainy day, and decided that no day was likely to be rainier. Those who wished shared the liquid good cheer; American songs were sung; and in turn the Serbian family sang their national songs. It was suggested that our host, an elderly, weather-beaten, and, to say the least, non-professional-looking person, might also like a taste of whisky. Our interpreter was asked to make the offer. After some conversation he explained that our host was extremely sorry not to accept the invitation of his guests, especially so since they were Americans, but that he could not share the whisky because he was the president of the Total Abstinence Society of the village.

The peasants and villagers were most simply and frankly curious about the American visitors. They studied every detail of our behavior, our clothes, and



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our belongings. They sat in our rooms and watched us make our toilets with undisguised interest in every article of our equipment. Even though communications were limited to the sign language, it was impossible to misunderstand their kindly, though embarrassing, interest and their desire to learn.

*Belgrade, Not Dead, but Convalescent.*—As we neared Semendria, below Belgrade on the Danube, we met two French officers who inquired our destination. When we said Semendria, they remarked, "A dead city," and when we explained that we were going on to Belgrade, they said, "Still more dead." We did not find either city dead; rather, just beginning to convalesce after a terrible illness. The following are some of our notes on Belgrade:

Belgrade, the beautiful capital of Serbia, has a superb location at the junction of the Save and Danube Rivers. The central portion of the city lies along a ridge, sloping gradually on one side toward the Save and on the other toward the Danube. As you approach the city it is still beautiful in its general aspects. As you get into it, go about it, and live in it you begin to appreciate the extent to which the capital city of Serbia has been hit by the war.

Before the war there were large factories in the lower districts at the foot of the hill on either side. Some of these are now crumbling heaps of bricks; of others the walls are standing, but the interiors are partially or completely demolished. Not one of them is operating. All over the town you find damage done by shell-fire. Sometimes it is obvious; more often it is hardly to be seen from the outside. It is only when you enter the building or look closely through the windows to discover why the building is unoccupied that you realize that the interior is a mangled mass of partitions, doors, windows, floors, in hopeless confusion. Of the two best hotels in the city, one is a complete wreck, and the other so badly damaged that no

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effort had been made to repair it. The buildings of the University of Belgrade stand abandoned, and a considerable part of them is in ruins.

Before the war Belgrade approached 100,000 in population. When the Austrians took it there were 20,000 inhabitants. Soon 30,000 came back. At the present time its population may be 65,000. Some shops are open, but nobody seems to be buying anything except food. At the moment the food supply seems to be sufficient, but the prices are so high that 25 per cent. of the population is on the list of applicants for free distribution. The only autos going about the streets are those of the military and of a few of the high government officials. These are used very sparingly, for gasolene is almost unobtainable.

Also there is a marked crisis in fuel.

Belgrade was a modern city with interior plumbing. The water-supply comes from wells and is distributed by a pumping-station. On account of the scarcity of fuel the pump is operated only a few hours each day, and in some parts of town does not operate at all for periods of several days. For the same reason tramcars have been discontinued entirely for several weeks. Everybody walks. The electric current is turned on late in the afternoon, and is turned off at ten o'clock.

After arriving at Belgrade we spent a week checking up the information which we had secured on the way through Serbia, by interviews with officials, representatives of the Serbian Red Cross, physicians, and others, and by looking about the city. It was not surprising that we found that in several respects we were better informed as to conditions and needs in the interior of Serbia than were the officials at Belgrade, many of whom had only recently returned from exile.

*In a Serbian Hospital.*—We had hoped to see Rumania and then Palestine, but our trip had already occupied more than twice the time allotted. Several members of the party were ill at Belgrade, which



DR. BOCHKO KONIEVITCH AND THE AUTHOR IN A MILITARY HOSPITAL  
IN BELGRADE

ALEXINATZ, 20 December, 1919.

MY DEAR MR. FOLKS:

It was with greatest pleasure I received last week your cordial letter, and some days later the books from the Health Office—just the thing I needed so much. Then the S. C. A. A. News are welcome to me, the new and so inexperienced President of the County Society for the care of Needy Children.

Sorry, I was for long time not in Belgrade to meet Mr. Doherty and learn something from him; but here is much plenty to do, then our railway is still so bad (the locomotive stops somewhere in open road to take breath and needs sometimes 30 to 40 hours to make 200 km. to Belgrade); and lastly, I am only three months at home and in good health. For there in Belgrade I contracted the amœbic dysentery and was very ill, lying in the same bed and room as you. And the medication was worse than the illness, but not in vain, for now I am feeling quite well and working with such delightfulness that my patients grow cured if only seeing my cheerful countenance. No wonder, for I was at last relieved from the military service, came to my regular occupation, found my family well, and am at last *post tot discrimina rerum* after hazards of things enjoying delights and comfort of my sweet home—well deserved after vicissitudes of the seven years' warfare, 1912-1919.

Perhaps it looks sometimes we Serbians are too much given to this "well-deserved rest," but if you remember that in these seven years we suffered much, and still have, plenty of depressant moments; then—pity I can not sufficiently express my thoughts in writing, and we are not together to pursue our discussions—but to visit America remains only my desire and dream.

Please accept my most cordial regards and thanks for the books you sent me.

Sincerely yours,

DR. BOCHKO KONIEVITCH.





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detained us there ten days after our work was finished. A week as a patient in the chief military hospital in Belgrade gave many interesting sidelights on things Serbian. It gave one a great respect for the diagnostic ability of the best surviving Serbian physicians. We sometimes say of a person with a keen eye that he looks through one. I can only say of the Serbian physicians that their sensitive finger-tips seem to *feel* through one. Having been in contact with many refugees suffering from strange diseases on the way up, it was disquieting to have them inquire so persistently and seriously as to the date of the last successful vaccination, and it was a relief when, after various guesses, they said, "A mild case of the 'flu.'"

With my physician, Dr. Bochko Konievitch, of Alexsinatz, who had gained a modest knowledge of English during the war, I soon found many subjects of common interest. Before the war, in his home town, he was head of the public hospital, active in public health matters, and had given courses of lectures on hygiene to the pupils of the local normal school. His parting request was for publications in English on public health.<sup>1</sup>

Trained nursing would have been lacking had Heaven not sent an English nurse of the Scottish Women's Hospitals for temporary service in the hospital at that particular time. The hospital itself had been stripped of every bit of furniture and equipment by retreating Austrians only two months before, but a fair collection had been found

<sup>1</sup>These publications were sent after the author's return to America and he was rewarded by receiving, some weeks later, a very interesting letter from Doctor Konievitch. See illustration facing this page.

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for the private room which I occupied. The poor Serbian privates in the wards were much less fortunate.

The only route to Bucharest, the capital of Rumania, was by rail through Hungary. Under the most favorable conditions the trip, which should be made in a day, would now occupy five days, traveling in cars without windows and without heat, in midwinter. It was thought that the train service would probably last until we reached Bucharest, but by that time it would undoubtedly be suspended for lack of coal. We regretfully gave up Rumania and Palestine, and accompanied an English admiral and a French general on a special train to Fiume. Here one of our party, who had been taken with pneumonia *en route*, was left in the care of an American military hospital unit. An English cruiser carried us to Venice, and we returned to Rome to write our report on Serbia and to see what changes had occurred in Italy since early November.

*The Home-coming of War's Exiles in Belgium and France.*—Some weeks later we made a trip to Brussels and various other Belgian cities, and through the Belgian and French war-zone, to which large numbers of refugees were already returning. Our special purpose was to see the conditions of housing, food, and employment at this very early stage of reconstruction. Already nearly six months had passed since the signing of the armistice. About one-fifth of the refugees had returned and more were coming every day. If ever courage and a strong heart were necessary, it was here. These people, who, three or four years before, or perhaps only a year before, had been driven from their homes by





**MANY HANDS**

But even so, it is not light work when you are building shelters in the ruins of Lens, France.



**NOT MUCH LEFT**

But even in these ruins this mother and four children, who have been refugees two years and a half, find a shelter.



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the temporary success of the German army, who had lived in communities which did not need them, had no homes for them, and were not very hospitable toward them, who had lived under the worst conditions of overcrowding and bad sanitation, returned now to what had been their homes. But if there were to be homes here, they would have to make them. The heaps of sticks, stones, bricks, and mortar, which showed where buildings had been, were but symbolic of the utter ruin of the economic, social, and political life of the devastated area. Not only buildings, but all the organized activities which make up civilized life, even the family groups, had been disrupted. The final chapters of the story of reconstruction will be written decades hence. We can here record only its very beginnings.

*Limitations of Present Estimates.*—The trips outlined above furnished the original data for our reports, but our study has continued up to the moment of publication. The American Red Cross sent many workers to various parts of Serbia subsequently to our visit. We have seen their reports and interviewed some of them upon their return. We have also seen the later reports of the relief workers in various parts of Greece. Through the courtesy of M. André Tardieu, High Franco-American Commissioner, two of his staff prepared as full a memorandum on all the points covered in our questionnaire as the available data would permit. There were necessarily many gaps, for France has been too busy to give much attention to vital statistics, and when figures are so disturbing as those of France's population during the war who can be blamed if there should be some hesitation

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both in compiling them and in letting them be known? Similar reports were received from the Belgian officials and the Belgian branch of the American Red Cross. No effort has been spared to revise, verify, and complete our data by all possible means. We are well aware, however, that it is both incomplete and imperfect. It is incomplete in that some important matters are not touched upon at all; imperfect in that all present data must be subject to revision by the more exact statistics which may become available when the tasks of government everywhere are less overwhelming and immediate.

No complete measurement of the human disasters and distress caused by the war is now or ever will be possible. No country has made a census. No country has made a complete survey of its devastated area. Vital statistics are non-existent or far in arrears. Starting out, however, with a careful review of the pre-war facts in each country as to prevalent diseases, death-rates, and birth-rates, we were able to form a tolerably good opinion of what would be likely to happen under conditions of food shortage, invasion, and hardship generally. We sought information from every source, always preferring to see things with our own eyes. At every stopping-place the various members of the party took up their special lines of inquiry, on food, health, refugees, clothing, transportation, etc. We compared notes, checked up reports from one source with those received from another, made special search for facts which pre-war conditions indicated as important, and took special pains to get information from those actually concerned, not simply from the high-up officials. We knew only too well what a wide gap



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often separates the plan from the execution. If we began a study of food conditions at the office of the food administrator by examining his regulations and statistics, we always ended by finding out what food was for sale at local stores, and what the poorer people were actually living on, and what it had cost them.

We are satisfied that we gained not only what might be called a "going" knowledge of the situation—one sufficient for planning and executing relief measures, but also one sufficient to show that the magnitude of the disasters brought upon the peoples of the Allied countries by the forces let loose at the end of July, 1914, far exceeds any estimates or descriptions hitherto made; that, though the relief work of societies and of governments has been on an unparalleled scale, nevertheless, it has been able to deal with only a fraction of the need; and that, besides the remediable distresses of the war, there are far deeper, more far-reaching, and fundamental human losses, from which recovery can take place only after decades, if, in fact, they can ever be made good.

*Disasters Dimly Seen, but Terrifying.*—The human costs of the war are indeed beyond understanding and measurement. There is no nook or corner of Europe in which the every-day life of the average person has not been tremendously changed. No such breaking up of the complicated fabric of organized society has ever before occurred, no such wholesale breaking away from former habits of doing and of thinking. We have not undertaken to deal with the biological results of war on the racial stocks of the various countries, though these may prove to be the

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most important and permanent results of all. We have not tried to take into account the effects of the unprecedented employment of women (except so far as it may be reflected in disease and death-rates), nor the great impetus to the extension of the franchise to women, nor the partial or complete suppression of the sale of liquor, nor, of course, most difficult of all to estimate, the war's effects on the people of Russia. For countless errors of omission we ask indulgence in advance. We have not considered the political changes produced or hastened, perhaps unduly hastened, by the war, for who can tell at this time what they will prove to be? Nor have we tried to deal with the changed public opinion in all countries, irrespective of formal political changes. Every country seems certain to be either more or less democratic than before, but as yet it is not clear which it will be. We do not yet know whether compulsory military service is to be restricted or extended. We know that the world is made ripe for changes, for big changes, for doing big things, but we do not yet know in what direction they will lie. We do not yet know whether justice and right, as such, speak more, or less, loudly than before. Our effort, in substance, is to find out what sorts and conditions of men and women are left to take up the new tasks; whether they are stronger or weaker, more numerous or fewer, more fit or less so. There is but one answer—the harm done to the white races by the war is unprecedented, many-sided, deep-seated, incapable of exact measurement, but truly terrifying.

*Not an Account of American Red Cross Work.*—The American Red Cross was already at work in all the countries we visited. We were not charged,



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however, with making an examination of what was being done, but rather with consciously laying aside any presuppositions, and taking a new measurement on a uniform basis of the total effects of the war upon the civilian populations of these countries, of how far their needs could be remedied by relief, and of what kinds of relief were most urgently needed. There will be no effort, therefore, in this volume to give any adequate statement of the varied and effective work of the American Red Cross; that story will be told in detail by those to whom the task has been assigned. It should be said, however, that there was no country in which the efforts of America through the American Red Cross had not softened the blows inflicted by the war, no country in which we did not find Americans hard at work with characteristic American resourcefulness. The two American girls at Skoplie, who had gone to do stenography, and who, not being urgently needed for that, were busy undressing, washing, and "delousing" refugee babies, were typical Americans. The volume and variety of help given by America to these suffering countries was unprecedented in the world's history. It secured funds and accomplished results, which even the most optimistic considered impossible of attainment. Every American should feel a justified pride in the accomplishment of his representatives.

Perhaps it should be said that it is equally important that every American should also recognize that the damage done by the war was so extensive and so varied that not even the huge sums given to the American Red Cross could make more than a faint impression upon it. We could be, as it were,

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a first aid to the injured when war conditions permitted us to be there; we could prevent a few of the worst things from happening, but, in spite of all anybody and everybody could do, the great brutal forces of the war smashed hither and thither, dislocating and disrupting human society, ruining human lives, and piling up a burden for future generations. It is necessary to see these facts in perspective in order to form a just understanding, both of what our part in this phase of the war has been and of our further opportunity and duty in the relief of suffering and the repair of damages which the results of the war still produced and will produce for years to come.

One of Mr. Hoover's most-quoted remarks was that the Allies had a common cause, and therefore must have a common table. He was the great socialized food controller of the world. There are still the same reasons and the same need for community of action in repairing the damages done by the war and in securing the benefits made possible by it as there were in winning it.

This volume is an effort to state wholly dispassionately the facts as to the actual effects of this particular war upon the men, women, and children of Europe. It is not prompted by any desire to influence any pending matter or support any policy or theory. It is in no sense a propaganda for or against anything. Any one who has been in Europe during the past two years, and has seen how what passes for public opinion is cynically manufactured and systematically inflamed, has learned to hate the very word *propaganda*. The obvious facts are, however, that the war has gone much deeper into the fabric of human life than one who has lived

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during the war on this side of the Atlantic can easily understand; that some of its worst effects are only now beginning to be felt; that they will project themselves very far into the future; that it is the most serious strain which western civilization has ever undergone, and it inevitably raises the question whether that civilization could stand another such strain.

If this study presents a terrible picture of the state of the European peoples at the end of the war, this picture should surprise no one. It is of the essence of war to produce such results. That was the intention of the war-makers. Each side was trying to do just these things to the other, and both measurably succeeded. In peace, men are engaged in many and diverse occupations, but they may all be summed up as the doing of those things which they believe will make life healthful, comfortable, and attractive. In war, men's whole effort is just the opposite; it is to destroy life and to make life so uncomfortable, unhealthful, and unendurable that the enemy will cry out, "Enough." This study, in a sense, shows only that both sides waged an effective war. That of the Allies was so effective that the Central Powers could not go on. But the Central Powers also inflicted widespread and terrific suffering and loss. How widespread and how terrible it is the purpose of this volume to indicate.

## II

### SERBIA: THE COST OF ASPIRATION

God of Justice! Thou who saved us  
When in deepest bondage cast,  
Hear Thy Serbian children's voices,  
Be our help as in the past.  
With Thy mighty hand sustain us,  
Still our rugged pathway trace;  
God, our Hope! protect and cherish  
Serbian crown and Serbian race!

*(The first verse of the Serbian National Anthem, as translated by Elizabeth Christich. The music is as inspiring as the words.)*

Paralyzed Serbia; the people and the country; a glorious war history; non-existent transportation; everybody going somewhere; Serbia's boys die on Albanian mountains; displaced peoples; a whole country three years under enemy armies; sent into slavery in enemy territory; from bad to worse after the armistice; short rations of food, fuel, and clothing; "a new kind of poor."

**PARALYZED SERBIA.**—The net impressions of a first-hand survey of Serbia in December, 1918, and January, 1919, can best be summed up in the expression that it is a *paralyzed country*. A description of its activities is essentially a succession of negatives. Passing through the country, one saw numbers of people, but nothing seemed to be happening. This is not to be wondered at, since the enemy had had full charge of the country for three years and



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had recently departed, taking with him not only supplies and materials, but funds and official records.

In Serbia no banks were doing business.

In Serbia no schools were open for the children.

In Serbia the state university was closed and its buildings partly destroyed.

In Serbia there were practically no doctors, no Serbian hospitals, and disease was everywhere.

In Serbia the stores had practically nothing to sell except local food-supplies.

In Serbia some regions would have been starving except for the American Red Cross aid.

In Serbia nobody had sufficient clothing.

In Serbia practically no fuel was to be had, and nearly everywhere no means for lighting.

In Serbia no factories were in operation.

In Serbia no mines were operating.

In Serbia there were no means of transportation, no through railway, no horses, no mules, no automobiles, no gasolene, no trucks, and but few oxen.

In Serbia only a very small fraction of the normal volume of public business was being transacted.

In Serbia there were almost no men between eighteen and fifty.

In Serbia there were almost no children under the age of three.

Serbia had to begin afresh and rebuild step by step the entire organized life of the country. If the Serbians had shown fewer qualities of courage, resourcefulness, and determination, one might have felt that they were headed straight for complete disintegration and anarchy. That thought never occurred to one who met them at first hand. One never doubted that little by little the threads would



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be picked up, the wheels begin to move, and Serbia again be an organized community. Meanwhile she needs all the help her friends can give her. The amount of this help will largely determine the length of her sufferings and the completeness of her recovery.

*The People and the Country.*—To visualize the effects of the war upon Serbia, it is necessary to glance for a moment at her history and at the general aspects of her life at the outbreak of the first Balkan War in 1912.

Most Americans think of Serbia simply as one of the "turbulent" Balkan States, presumably with an undeveloped, backward people, with no glory in its past and little promise in the future. We forget that for five hundred years, up to 1913, the Turkish rule was the best possible justification for turbulence. If, after centuries of freedom, the Mexicans had conquered and held in bondage our Southwestern States, or the Eskimos the New England States, we would have expected some turbulence, and would have regarded it as evidence of progress, not of backwardness. The facts are that long before America was discovered Serbia was an important kingdom with, for those times, a high degree of civilization. The culminating point of earlier Serbian history was the promulgation in 1354 of a code of laws, ordinances, and customs of the Serbian Empire. Then the Turk clapped the lid on Serbia and under Turkish rule it remained an oppressed and depressed people until the early part of the nineteenth century. The last stages of the Napoleonic War Serbia considered a favorable time to make a drive for independence. This she substantially achieved in 1815. She had had

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a national independent existence of almost one hundred years at the outbreak of the Balkan War.

By the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913 Serbia was largely extended toward the south to include regions of Macedonia, with the important cities of Monastir and Skoplie, which had remained under Turkish rule and had a very mixed population.

The Serbia which had existed as a nation for one hundred years had a population of a little under 3,000,000 in 1910. The territory which was added to Serbia in 1913 was without reliable vital statistics. A census, made soon after by the Serbs, showed a population of 1,700,000, making a total Serbian population by 1914 of about 5,000,000.

Belgrade, the metropolis, had a population of 92,000 in 1910; the next largest city, in territory added in 1877, was Nish, with 30,000. There were only a few cities with a population of between 10,000 and 20,000. The great bulk of the population lived in small villages. In the territory added in 1913, Monastir, toward the far southwest, had 60,000 inhabitants, Skoplie, 50,000, and Prizrend, 20,000. About 90 per cent. of the Serbians are peasants, owning their own small farms. This land ownership has had a very important influence on the development of the Serbian character, as well as on the diffusion of a degree of well-being among the people.

The soil of Serbia is very fertile and before the war its peasant farmers easily lived comfortably. They raised large quantities of corn, wheat, barley, oats, and rye. In the western part fruit was grown and plums were exported in large quantities as prunes or preserves. The farms were rich in live-

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stock, especially cattle and hogs, and, in the south, sheep. Little use had been made either of large areas of rich forests or of valuable deposits of copper, silver, and other metals or of widely distributed coal deposits. It was a peaceful, prosperous, well-distributed, rural population.

Austria succeeded Turkey in the exploitation of the Balkans and deliberately hindered the economic development and kept closed the natural transportation outlets of Serbia.

From its capital city on the Danube the main line of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway ran toward the southeast. At Nish, 210 miles distant, it turned more directly east to Pirot and on through Bulgaria. A branch line, which was in fact the main line of the Serbian Railway, ran from Nish southwest 150 miles to Skoplie, whence, bending again toward the southeast, it ran 190 miles to Saloniki, the last 50 being in Greece. Saloniki, by arrangement with the Greek government, was the Serbian outlet to the Ægean Sea. Serbia thus had a continuous line of 550 miles of through railway from Belgrade to Saloniki. There were several short branches and a few short separate lines.

There was also a main highway, paralleling the railway from Skoplie, through Nish, to Belgrade. It had been a fair road with a stone base throughout, but little effort had been made to avoid steep grades. It had always seemed easier to go over a hill than to make a cutting through it.

In the Serbia which had existed for a hundred years there was a fairly complete system of vital statistics, the bookkeeping of human resources. It was, in fact, better than that of the United States,

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in that it covered the entire country, while 20 per cent. of the territory of the United States is in this respect still in the Turkish age. The Serbians are a religious people, adhering to the Greek Orthodox Church, and births and deaths were conscientiously reported to the priests and through them to the public authorities, though the description of the causes of death doubtless contained many inaccuracies. The statistics show that the birth-rate and the death-rate were each about 50 per cent. higher than in the so-called "registration area" of the United States—that is, those parts of our country in which reasonably complete records of births and deaths are kept. The birth-rate was 38 per 1,000 of population in Serbia in 1912 and the death-rate 21. This left a margin of 17 per 1,000 as an annual addition to the population. The actual number of births in 1912 in excess of deaths was just under 51,000. The conditions in the newly acquired territory were probably not very different in these respects from those in old Serbia, and the normal annual increase in the population was about 85,000.

Such was the country which in alliance with Greece and Bulgaria entered upon the first Balkan War early in October, 1912. This war was short and astonishingly successful. Turkey was brought to her knees before the middle of November. The European Powers intervened and refused to Serbia the necessary outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Serbia in turn asked Bulgaria to readjust their earlier understanding as to the new territory. Bulgaria declined, and thus arose the second Balkan War—Serbia and Greece, soon aided by Rumania, against Bulgaria. This also was a short war, lasting only from June 29th



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to July 31st. Serbia extended her boundaries southward, taking in territory which would have gone to Bulgaria under the earlier understanding. This territory was very far from being homogeneous. It had been Serbian long ago and still included many Serbs, but also many Albanians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Greeks. The Serbian army remained mobilized for six months, until early 1914, when conditions seemed stable and the soldiers were returned to their homes.

Serbia had long aspired for union with those on the west and the north related to her by ties of language, of race, and, in most cases, of religion. The people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, forcibly annexed by Austria, also aspired to rejoin their Serbian kinsmen. Although this sentiment found expression in various mild forms of what might be termed "propaganda," it was almost as great a surprise to the Serbs as it was to the world at large when Austria, on July 23d, handed its fateful ultimatum to Serbia, and the Great War began.

*A Glorious War History.*—The general outline of Serbia's fortunes in the war may be stated in very few words. On August 12th an invasion occurred on the northwestern frontier from Bosnia, but twelve days later the invading army had been driven back across the frontier. Early in November a very much more serious invasion was begun. The Serbians retired step by step. Belgrade was evacuated. On December 3d the Serbians, having received ammunition, began a heavy counter-attack. The Austrians were again driven back; by the 12th of December they were at Belgrade. On the morning of the 15th the Serbian artillery destroyed the pontoon bridge,



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the 40,000 Austrians remaining in Belgrade surrendered, and Serbia was once more free. The losses had been heavy and the army which had been 350,000 was now 160,000. From the middle of December, 1914, until October, 1915, Serbia was not molested by the Austrians, but suffered heavily from typhus.

In October, 1915, German gift for organization put a backbone into the Austrian army and the great invasion of Serbia was begun. The Serbian army was now about 200,000. Belgrade was taken in October; simultaneously the Bulgarians attacked in the south, cutting the railway between Nish and Skoplie. The Allies tried to advance from Saloniki, but were not in sufficient numbers to relieve the Serbian army. It was driven toward the south and toward the west. There were only two alternatives: surrender or retreat over the Albanian mountains to the Adriatic. Surrender was not considered. Without hesitation the Serbian army destroyed its transportation facilities and all stores which it could not carry and started for the narrow passes over the mountains, accompanied by the officials of the government and their families. Even when they reached Scutari near the coast in north Albania they were unable to secure food and were obliged again to cross mountains southward to Durazzo and Valona on the Albanian coast, whence about 105,000 were taken by the Allied war-ships farther south to Corfu in Greece.

The country was overrun by Austrians and Germans in the north and west and by the Bulgarians in the east and south. Finally the day of reckoning came. In September, 1918, the Serbian army, re-

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organized and transported to Saloniki, and its allies, began their advance. The Serbs attacked and captured positions which were considered by their allies to be impregnable. The enemy was driven from all of southern Serbia and on September 30th Bulgaria asked for an armistice. The Serbs entered Nish after severe fighting on October 2d, drove the Austrians and Germans rapidly to the north, and, before the armistice with Germany on November 11, 1918, had again cleared their territory of the enemy and had advanced into the portions of Austria-Hungary occupied by their kinsmen.

A month after the signing of the armistice, and three months after the beginning of the Allied offensive on the Saloniki front, the American Red Cross Survey Mission left Saloniki to see for itself the condition in which Serbia and its people had been left after the ravages of two Balkan wars, the typhus epidemic in 1914, two unsuccessful invasions by the Austrians in the last half of 1914, a complete occupation in December, 1915, three and a half years of enemy domination, and the final expulsion of the enemy in September and October, 1918.

*Non-existent Transportation.*—The first question which any one wishing to help Serbia in any way is obliged to consider is transportation. No matter how much food, clothing, medicine, or equipment, nor how many doctors, nurses, or relief agents there might be in Saloniki or in Belgrade, they could be of no help to the people of Serbia unless they could be distributed. Some of our experiences in getting from Saloniki to Belgrade were narrated in the introduction, but further particulars are needed to afford an understanding of the harassing difficulties

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which the absence of transportation placed, and still places, in the way of Serbia's every attempt to get onto her feet.

Trains were running as far as Skoplie. Our train was, in fact, one of the first to make the trip through from Saloniki. A temporary bridge over the Vardar River at Strumitza had been completed only the day before. We left Saloniki in a hospital train without heat or light at eleven o'clock at night and did not reach Skoplie until eight o'clock the following evening, the trip of 190 miles having occupied twenty-one hours, an average of nine miles an hour. It did not altogether surprise us when, asking some families of refugees in a box-car on a siding at Strumitza how far away their starting-point was, we were told, "Two days by horse and cart, or three days by train."

During the first part of our journey in a freight-truck from Skoplie to Nish our chief difficulty was the steep grades. Farther north, when we neared the Danube, there were few grades, but the mud was deeper and more sticky than before, although we had had continuously good weather for a fortnight. When the road was not a river of mud, or a steep grade, or both, it consisted of a succession of holes which had been worn deeper and deeper by the iron-tired German trucks used in the later stages of the war. At numerous points groups of Bulgarian prisoners were supposed to be improving the road, but none of those whom we saw were doing anything which, by any stretch of the imagination, could be called hard work. In fact, having seen thousands of prisoners, Bulgarians, Austrians, and Germans, supposedly at work, in Greece, Serbia, Italy, France, and

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Belgium, I have yet to see a group of prisoners who were really working. I have never been able to understand this phase of leniency, in view of the great demand for labor everywhere. These groups of prisoners helped to push the truck through the mud or up the grades. Sometimes the efforts of the heavy engine of the truck, of three ox-teams, and of as many men as could find places to push were fruitless. During the whole trip we met very few conveyances of any kind.

For nearly the entire distance the main railway ran alongside of the road. As the enemy retreated he put the railway out of commission by blowing up all the bridges, large and small, which were numbered by the hundreds. There were only a few tunnels, but these also were destroyed. The road-bed itself remained intact, though we were told that near Belgrade it was blown up every thousand meters. In the south the bridges were being temporarily repaired, but it was slow work, owing to lack of men and of materials. A fortnight after we passed, trains were running to the first station beyond Skoplie, Kumanovo. By February it had been put in order as far as Vranja, and in April it had been opened to Nish. There still remained a long stretch northwest from Nish toward Belgrade, which could not be operated for at least several months. The main line of the Berlin-Bagdad Railway from Nish eastward to Pirot and on to the Bulgarian border was similarly disrupted.

Not only was the railway destroyed and the main highway in an almost impassable condition, but the former means of transportation over the highway had almost disappeared. We saw practically no





**A BAD SPOT ON SERBIA'S "GOOD ROAD"**

The main highway of Serbia from north to south, and its only means of transport.



**WALKING HOME**

In Serbia, in December, 1918, groups of ragged, convalescent soldiers were to be seen along the main highway trudging bravely along.



1872

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horses or mules in Serbia except mules in the French military service. Skeletons of horses and oxen were scattered by the roadside all the 500 miles through Serbia. As we approached the north they were more abundant, and on some of them the vultures had not yet finished their work. Many of the oxen that were carrying transport for the Serbian army on its last triumphant march through the country had succumbed to fatigue and lack of food. There are still some oxen in Serbia. A little below Grdjlitza we saw a procession of ox-carts stretching along the road for nearly half a mile, carrying sick and wounded soldiers. The number of oxen, however, is only a fraction of what is needed for the agriculture and transport of the country.

Automobiles and trucks were non-existent except for military purposes or for very high civilian officials. Even in Belgrade high officials of the government had but few cars and used them very sparingly because of the great scarcity of gasolene.

There is nothing inherently difficult in the transportation problem in Serbia. There is no reason why express trains should not run from Saloniki to Belgrade in ten hours. The topography of the country presents no difficulties in the way of a system of good roads. It would be easier to build a first-class highway from Skoplie to Belgrade than from New York City to Rochester. The fertility of the farms, the pine forests, and the rich deposits of metals all suggest that, under conditions of peace and with such a population as it would have had attained by this time except for the war, Serbia might readily be one of the richest and most attractive countries of its size in the world. Now, it is barely

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possible to distribute food sufficient to prevent starvation in some regions; its women walk barefoot over miles of country roads to market in winter; such stocks of clothing and shoes as can be sent to its larger cities cannot be distributed to its rural districts and the few doctors and nurses can reach only a small fraction of those needing their care. The whole country is, as it were, bound hand and foot in a rigid and helpless position by the paralysis of transportation.

*Everybody Going Somewhere.*—Passing through Serbia at the close of the war, one was puzzled by the extraordinary number of the groups of men, women, and children going from one place to another. Everybody everywhere seemed to be going somewhere. They all were going home, yet the currents were running crisscross and in every direction. Among them were many Greeks and Albanians. They were coming back from the north, where they had been sent by the enemy. Serbians from the south, who had been sent north, were also slowly finding their way back. Serbians from the north, who had shared the fortunes of the army and had been exiled as far away as Italy, Corsica, continental France, or the northern shores of Africa, had found their way back to Saloniki, hoping to proceed from there to Belgrade, and had been stranded at various stations along the line as transportation had given out. To untangle the story of the origins of these confusing currents and to reconstruct the story of Serbia's civil population as it was thrust hither and thither by the changing fortunes of war seemed an almost impossible task. Little by little, however, the general features became discernible.



#### HARD LUCK

This family of refugees were driven from their home in El Basan in Albania. They were the most distressed of all refugees seen in Serbia.



#### THE OVERFLOW

Several hundred refugees at Grdjlitza, Serbia, unable to find shelter, camped in the open.

TO THE  
ADMINISTRATIVE



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We must distinguish clearly between the civilians and the soldiers. The age of compulsory military service at the outbreak of the war was twenty to forty-five inclusive. Later it included the age of fifty. The mobilization at the opening of the Great War was very inclusive. Only government officials in posts of urgent necessity were exempt. Those found obviously unfit by a hasty medical examination were assigned to military service in the rear. None were released for agricultural work. The civil population, therefore, included males under twenty and over fifty, the obviously medically unfit between those ages, and girls and women of all ages.

*Serbian Boys Die on Albanian Mountains.*—The first large group of civilians whose fate we must follow is the young men of fourteen to eighteen and many younger boys. The Serbians, desiring them as soldiers as they became eligible, and not wishing them to be used by the enemy, hastily collected them into groups which retreated with the Serbian army. With it they attempted the passage over the Albanian mountains, along the Adriatic coast, and to Corfu. They became separated from the army and from one another. Arrangements for feeding them were almost non-existent. They were two weeks on the way, with only such food as they carried when they left. They suffered indescribably from hunger and cold. It is estimated that 35,000 started over the mountains, that only 14,000 actually crossed the Albanian frontier, that 10,000 reached the seacoast, that 1,000 died on the ships *en route* to Corfu, and 100 died per day for a time after their arrival, and that only 5,000 to 6,000 of the original 35,000 survived the hardships of the entire trip, to find their

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way later to Corsica or to France as refugees. This almost complete loss of its younger male population is perhaps the saddest in the many sad pages in the war history of Serbia.

*Displaced Peoples.*—Besides the young men, a number of other civilians, chiefly officials' families, accompanied the Serbian army in its retreat. They fared considerably better as to food and care than either the Serbian army or the young men. There were three routes: the first lay through southwestern Macedonia into Greece or to the extreme southwest coast of Albania through El Basan. A number of civilians escaped by this route. The second was by almost impassable roads, country paths, and trails northwest from Pryzrend over mountains 5,500 to 6,000 feet high to Ipek and to Podgoritza in Montenegro and thence to Scutari in Albania. The group which took this route included the King of Serbia and the Ministers of the Allied Powers. The third route went more directly westward from Pryzrend to Scutari, shorter than the preceding one, but even more difficult and dangerous. Many Serbian officials took this route. The total number of civilians who accompanied the Serbian army in its exile was much smaller than has been often supposed. It was probably much less than 100,000.

Some 20,000 Serbian refugees, sick soldiers, and returned prisoners met a hearty welcome in France. The refugees received the same allowance as the French refugees; the best shelter available was given to the sick and wounded soldiers; the schools and universities were opened to the young men. France, with its own overwhelming refugee problem, could

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provide only the barest necessities. The American Red Cross found no more appealing groups in France than these Serbian refugees. Tuberculosis was astonishingly prevalent, and nearly all showed plainly the evidence of extreme hardships.

When the enemy entered Belgrade late in 1915 there was a tremendous temporary exodus from the city and its population was reduced from 100,000 to 20,000, but in a very short time, the enemy not only remaining in this region, but having taken possession of the entire country, many returned, and the census increased to 50,000. The 30,000 of Nish dwindled to 18,000 when the enemy took possession. Numerous other temporary migrations occurred, but, in the main, people did not go far from their homes. This was not the case, however, along the southern border where the battle-line was formed at the close of 1915. From the immediate rear the civilians were evacuated to north Serbia or to Bulgaria. As in France, this line swung back and forth. A serious effort on the part of the Allies to advance in the late summer of 1916 resulted in the recapture of Monastir, but the enemy was not driven far and the city remained within range of his guns. It was bombarded from time to time, sometimes with gas-shells, until the final Allied advance, and its population fell from 60,000 to 15,000.

After taking into account all of the exiles, driven from their homes into Greece, Italy, or Corsica, to the northern shores of Africa, or to far-away France, or deported into Bulgaria, the great bulk of the civil population remained in Serbia during more than three and one-half years of its occupation. The vital question of the total effect of the war on Serbia,



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therefore, turns largely on what happened to these four and a half million people.

*A Whole Country Three Years Under Enemy Armies.*—From December, 1915, until September and October, 1918, except for a small corner, Serbia was practically annexed to Austria and Bulgaria. What were the conditions of life among the Serbians during this period? It must be borne in mind that the blockade of the Central Powers was becoming more and more effective, and that it finally broke the backbone of the German civil population and helped to end the war. Serbia, being behind enemy lines, suffered from all of the effects of the blockade. It was even more serious than this, for when the Austrians and the Bulgarians began to feel the pinch of hunger, finding food in Serbia and other crops being produced, they took possession of much of the food and sent quantities home regularly to their families. The officers naturally took the lion's share, but even the private soldier was allowed to send a package home every week. Effective means were taken to seize the Serbian food. The peasants living near the larger cities, who had been accustomed to bring live-stock, grain, and vegetables to the city markets daily, were forbidden to do so, except on one or two specified days each week. The quantity they were allowed to take for sale was rigidly restricted. Supplies of raw materials for clothing and of imported food were soon entirely exhausted. As in the Central Empires, cotton became unobtainable. A small spool of thread cost the equivalent of five dollars in Serbia, but it was more usually sold by the yard. Coffee, rice, and all other "dry groceries" (or, as they are ordinarily called in Serbia, "colo-

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nials") were not to be had at any price. Sheets and bedding, like clothing, were seized by the enemy to replenish his vanishing stocks. Coal, kerosene, and candles were practically unobtainable. The lack of food was very serious and undoubtedly caused the prevalence of disease referred to later. In the cities a ration was established. In Nish it was stated that 120 grams of flour per capita per day were allowed, about one-third of an adequate ration. The flour was made chiefly, it was said, of chestnuts with but little wheat. In Belgrade the ration was from 150 to 200 grams. Meat of poor quality could be bought twice a week, 180 grams for adults and 90 for children. All this, together with the inevitable mental depression, made life in Serbia very bare and hard.

We were accompanied on our arrival in Belgrade and in some of our visits about the city by our Serbian friend, Captain Chaponitch, who had come with us from Athens. This was his first visit to Belgrade since he was driven out with the army in the fall of 1915. Repeatedly, after he had stopped to greet affectionately and embrace former friends who had been in the city during the occupation, he remarked as he joined us: "How old they look! They seem to have aged at least ten years during the past three."

But hardships other than deprivations were to be the lot of the Serbs, especially in the region occupied by the Bulgarians. As noted in an earlier chapter, the portion of Macedonia which was awarded to Serbia at the end of the second Balkan War was by no means wholly Serbian, but included many Turks, Bulgarians, and Greeks. In fact, by the original



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agreement between Bulgaria and Serbia, a large part of this territory was to have been recognized as Bulgarian if Serbia had secured its outlet to the Adriatic. Now Bulgaria temporarily came into possession of what she regarded as rightfully hers. She wished to prove that this was really Bulgarian territory, and to extinguish once and for all the Serbian nationalistic aspirations which had been rapidly developing in this region under Serbian rule. To accomplish this purpose she did some very cruel and some very ridiculous things. The cruelties involved the use of a super-German frightfulness to crush out the Serbian spirit and the deportation of large numbers of Serbs into Bulgaria.

We found it difficult in all except the northern part of Serbia to secure the information we were seeking as to present conditions because of the fact that every Serbian was bursting with indignation at the atrocities of the Bulgarians, new facts about which were coming to light every day, and insisted upon telling us all the details. Not to listen would have seemed hardness of heart.

At Leskovatz, having interviewed various groups of refugees all the forenoon, we went into the outskirts of the town in the afternoon with a leading citizen whose hospitality we were enjoying and who had been the owner before the war of one of the few large factories in Serbia. It had made woolen and linen cloths. The factory was as thoroughly out of commission as the railway. The complicated machines imported before the war from Germany had apparently been put up at auction and sold to Bulgarian citizens. Many of them had been removed, and many of those remaining were marked

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with the names of the successful bidders at the auction sale. There had not been opportunity for their removal, but the Bulgarians had taken pains to see that they were rendered useless by carrying away or destroying the more delicate mechanisms. All leather belts had been taken away and leather-covered rollers had been stripped of their covering. It would take three years to restore the factory to operating condition if funds were available, and the owner estimated his losses at \$13,000,000. As we were walking back to town, reflecting upon the scenes of privation, sickness, and hardship of the morning, and on the afternoon view of the ruins of what had been the chief industry of the town, we noticed on a hillside, at some distance, an attractive building and inquired what it was. Our host told us that it was the finest church in the vicinity and added, parenthetically, as if it were a matter of no special significance, that there was a well under the church and that they had found in it a few days before the bodies of some twenty important people, who had been thrown into the well with hands and legs bound. In Nish, the Nisus of the Romans, there is a famous fortress surrounded by a moat, said to have been built by the Romans and having that appearance. In this fortress, a huge stone affair inclosing several acres, are several dungeons, dark, gloomy, and unventilated, such as the Romans of that day were wont to build. We were told that a large number of the citizens of Nish and the surrounding towns were thrown into these dungeons. The gallows on which fifty citizens of Nish and several thousand from the region were hung was still standing in the inclosure. We were taken to

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the corner of the wall in the moat where each evening for a fortnight in March, 1917, thirty unfortunate Serbians taken from the dungeons faced a firing-squad, and the wall certainly showed evidences of many volleys. The victims, we were told, were buried in a shallow trench directly underneath. So anxious, in fact, were our guides to convince us that they called on several soldiers to excavate the trench. Protests that we were already convinced were of no avail; not until several pieces of clothing had been turned up and we turned away were they willing to discontinue their quest. Our concern was with the living, not the dead. An international Allied commission was investigating the subject. Late in July a report signed by British, French, and Serbian representatives was published, not only confirming these charges, but containing many more of an unprintable character. They will be a part of the record of a great war in which atrocities became commonplace.

We remarked a moment ago that Bulgaria did some very cruel and some very ridiculous things in her efforts to exterminate the national spirit in Macedonian Serbia. We have noted some of the cruelties. There were ridiculous things, too. In a printed notice posted in Uskub by the Bulgarian prefect on December 9, 1915, occurred the following:

- (1) Serbians who remain in Skoplie are forbidden to walk in groups. They must not leave their houses except in special instances.
- (2) The Serbian citizens who speak to Bulgarians must speak in the Bulgarian language, and it must be good Bulgarian; otherwise the matters might not be attended to. It is forbidden to speak the Serbian language in the streets, and it is also forbidden to listen to it.



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The tombstones at Nish and elsewhere of Serbian officers who were killed in the second Balkan War frequently recorded the fact that the officers had fallen in battle with the Bulgarian enemy. The Bulgarians actually took time to chisel away all parts of the inscriptions which referred in any way to the Bulgarians as enemies. Also, it is the custom in Serbia to place a small likeness of the deceased in a niche of the tombstone hollowed out so as to protect the picture from the weather. The pictures of these officers naturally showed them in the uniforms of Serbian army officers. These affronts to the national sentiments of Bulgaria were also carefully removed.

*Sent into Slavery in Enemy Territory.*—The process of de-Serbianizing included also sending the population of entire villages, old men, women, boys, and children, far from their homes into Bulgaria where their conditions of life were extremely severe unless they had sufficient money to buy special favors. Many of them lived in the open or with rudimentary shelter. Labor was severe; food scarce; clothing, what they had taken with them; medical care, non-existent; and, according to the universal testimony of those who returned, the utmost severity and cruelty was constantly practised by those in charge. Bulgarians naturally made a special point of deporting those who would be leaders in perpetuating Serbian nationalist sentiment, such as school-teachers, judges, and priests. The Serbian Church is a branch of the Orthodox Greek Church, but it is practically independent and autonomous so far as other ecclesiastical authorities are concerned. It is, however, neither independent nor autonomous so

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far as the Serbian state is concerned. In fact, one is almost tempted to say that in all these countries the church has the aspect of being a camouflaged branch of the government, charged especially with the task of stimulating national spirit.

No one in Serbia seemed able to give anything like a definite and credible statement as to the number of Serbs who had been deported into Bulgaria. From the city of Nish and its immediate vicinity the authorities state that 5,000 were deported into Bulgaria, about half of whom had returned at the end of December. One official estimate of the number of war prisoners and civilians interned in Bulgaria is 80,000, mostly civilians. Another estimate of the number of civilians deported was 50,000. Nor was there any definite knowledge of the number who had returned. At Kumanovo 37 returning prisoners passed through in the forenoon of December 19th, the day of our visit, and 250 the day before. They had been coming through for two months in very irregular numbers, sometimes as many as 300 per day. They poured through the passes from Bulgaria into Serbia and down its main highway, walking on foot on the road-bed of the ruined railway or along the muddy highway. An American Red Cross relief worker states that 40,000 passed through Pirot and that 10,000 others who came from other parts of Serbia settled near Pirot, being unable to go farther or learning that their former homes had been destroyed. We saw many of them clad in rags infested with vermin, and the women especially hungry and emaciated. It must be said, however, that most of the children were in a less serious condition than would have been



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expected. We were told that many had not survived, and this seemed plausible. Children, however, are among the toughest of young animals, and will survive and quickly recover from conditions apparently impossibly bad. It seems likely that in all some 70,000 Serbians may have been deported and that 80 per cent. of them returned.

It also developed that many of those who were thought at first to have been deported into Bulgaria would never return and, in fact, had never reached Bulgaria. Fresh evidence was coming to light from day to day, at the time of our visit, of groups of leading citizens who had been started toward Bulgaria and, upon reaching the mountains along the frontier, had been massacred and buried in large numbers in shallow trenches.

A good many Serbians were deported also into Austria. The Austrians had occupied a relatively small part of Serbia, roughly speaking, that part of northern Serbia which is west of the Morava River. The Austrians apparently deported chiefly those whom they suspected of active aid to the Serbian cause during the war. The former schoolmaster was among those deported from Semendria into Austria. He said that between 200 and 300 had been deported, of whom 50 to 60 died. Again it was impossible to secure anything like a convincing estimate of numbers. The total number of Serbian prisoners of war and civilians interned in Austria and Germany was officially estimated at 160,000, a very great majority of whom were soldiers. One authority, on whose judgments we were disposed to rely, thought that perhaps not more than 10,000 civilians were deported to Austria. Their condition was quite serious as to

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lack of food and shelter, but fewer complaints were heard of brutality and cruelty.

*From Bad to Worse After the Armistice: Short Rations of Food, Fuel, and Clothing.*—Our Survey Mission were practically guests of the Serbian government. We were escorted through Serbia by a thoroughly competent and helpful Serbian official. On arrival at a town we were taken first to the office of the prefect, who is the chief executive officer and highest representative of the central government in the department.

We were likely to be taken to a forlorn-looking building, some portions being unusable and nearly every room showing evidences of shells or bombs. Most of the rooms were apt to be quite bare. The furniture of the prefect's office might include some sort of a table or occasionally a dilapidated desk, a few chairs (no two alike), and a bench or two. The prefect might have one or two aids and a few convalescent soldiers to do errands. The prefects had returned within the preceding two months from their years of exile in Greece or France. They came back to empty buildings, destitute of furniture and records. Even tax records had disappeared. The cities had no budgets, no resources, no credits. The prefect, empty-handed and barehanded, had to set up a new administration. He represented the state. He had hardly collected a few odd pieces of furniture and called upon a relative to act as assistant before lines of people began to form before the building to ask for aid and reparation. If he were able to get in touch with the capital at Belgrade by telegraph, or at intervals by courier, he was not much better off. The central authorities

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likewise were rebuilding a government. One thing they had done—they had formed, with other Serbs, the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. New departments had been created—on paper at least. The problems that seemed most pressing to these high officials were those to be taken up shortly at the Peace Congress. They were thinking in terms of boundaries and reparation. They were far too busy to give much thought to the prefects in the different parts of Serbia. These could get along in some way for a time. They must get along as best they could.

One thing, however, stood out clearly everywhere. However hard conditions had been during the occupation, they became much worse immediately thereafter, because the retreating enemy took with him all he could carry away and destroyed what he could not take. Bulgarians, Austrians, and Germans alike pillaged the country. Train-load after train-load of household furniture, hospital supplies, bedding, clothing, linens, tools, metals, food-supplies, were sent into Bulgaria, Austria, and Germany, leaving behind a country as nearly stripped as can be imagined. Great stocks of enemy military supplies, which could not be removed, were burned. Those who had been leading citizens before the war, people of means or of professional position, who had been too old for military service, were left with only the clothes they were wearing and with only such household goods as were too old or too worn to seem worth removing. The enemy also drove away large quantities of live stock, especially cattle and hogs. Grain was also sent away, though they allowed the peasants to retain a small per capita allowance.



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However, the Serbian peasants had learned something in the seven long years since the beginning of the Balkan wars, and it had become a custom to conceal food-supplies by burying them. We were told everywhere that they had succeeded in secreting, usually in the ground, considerable amounts of grain.

Our personal experiences threw little light on the subject of food, for we were guests of the government and undoubtedly had the best there was. We took a good supply of food with us, but, except when we stopped in some small village, we did not need to draw on it, and hospitality prevented our doing so. We did not have any of the imported kinds of food. We had plenty of meat and bread, though in one town there was only corn bread. Before the war Serbia produced not only all its chief articles of food, but also a good deal for export. In this respect it was better able to meet war than countries that were largely industrial. On the other hand, during the war it could not be reached by friendly allies with such life-saving help as that of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium. It was an occupation ex-Hoover. Considerable grain was produced in Serbia even during the occupation. Serbia, as a whole, was not starving for lack of food-supplies in January, 1919, but there were regions which would have been starving had it not been for the American Red Cross and the Serbian government. All along the southern boundary where the fighting-line ran and where many troops were quartered not much food is produced even in peace, and the armies had consumed what little there was. In Monastir, and especially in the regions west of there, to which food could be sent only by ox-carts, the population





#### PLOWING IN SERBIA

Agriculture in Serbia, if not modern, is not primitive. The scrawny cows evidently resented the double job of giving milk and plowing ground.



#### THE RED CROSS HELPS

Capt. G. H. Edwards and his chief assistant, a citizen of Serbian birth, directing the unloading of supplies in Belgrade.



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was on the very edge of starvation a few weeks after the armistice. Among the reports which came to us at that time from competent Red Cross workers who had come to Saloniki to report and to secure further supplies were such as the following:

In Monastir, now a city of 25,000 instead of its former 60,000, everybody needs clothing. The Serbian authorities are giving a quarter of a pound of bread per day to 20,000 of the 25,000 inhabitants. The American Red Cross is also giving out a little bread, as well as rice and lard, to 5,500 people. In a few days it will begin also to distribute beans. There are two doctors for this population of twenty-five thousand.

From Monastir to Lake Ochrida, a distance of fifty miles, there are 50,000 people and no physician. The "flu" is still very bad. The authorities are not distributing food in that region because there is no way of getting it there. No crop was raised this year because the people had no seed, and the farming implements had been taken away by the Bulgarians, who also drove away the sheep and cattle. Ten thousand people here are in immediate need of food and clothing. In another district not far away, including forty-seven scattered villages with 23,000 inhabitants, 6,000 are in immediate need of food. There are neither physicians nor medicines.

Circumstantial accounts were also received of alarming shortages of food-supplies in the extreme northeast. The only possibility of relief was to send supplies partly by truck and partly by rail by a roundabout route through eastern Macedonia and Bulgaria by way of Dedeagatch and Sofia. A train-load of supplies sent by this route was distributed in Pirot and vicinity, having traveled some 900 miles to reach a point 280 miles distant. At this time and place bread was 60 cents per loaf; sugar, \$5 a pound; kerosene, \$6 a quart. Women's shoes were \$60 a pair and men's, \$70. Underwear was

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\$20 a suit. Milk, coffee, and soap could not be had. A few days after the arrival of relief supplies prices fell 50 per cent.

In most parts of Serbia there was in December, 1919, enough food to meet immediate requirements. The distribution of the food-supply, however, presented very grave and entirely unsolved difficulties. The Serbian government was too recently returned from exile and too busy with foreign questions to deal effectively with the question. The price of bread all the way up through Serbia ranged from 2 to 3 francs per 800 grams, that is to say, from 20 to 30 cents per pound, or about five times the price of bread in France or in Italy. This was not a matter of great seriousness to those who produced their own food, but to the others, the professional, clerical, office-holding, and laboring classes in the cities, it was very serious. In the city of Nish, for instance, food was for sale in bakeries and stores. However, when we visited the part of the city occupied by the working-people they said that though wages had risen somewhat during the war it was now hard to find work, as nobody had any money or was carrying on any business, and that the price of bread had risen very much faster than wages. They said they were selling whatever they possessed in order to get money to buy bread. They took us into their homes and showed us that they were selling furniture, bedding, and even clothing. Within a very few weeks they would have nothing more to sell. We heard of a similar state of affairs in the cities generally, but did not learn of any official distribution of food, even to the needy, except in the cities of Belgrade, Monastir, and Skoplie.



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All European countries took special pains to provide food-supplies for the capital city during and after the war. It was important to make a favorable impression on foreign visitors. Also it would be embarrassing if the civilians, pressed by hunger, were to create disturbances in the centers of government. It was probably, however, owing rather to the personality of the mayor that the city of Belgrade had taken energetic measures to organize food distribution. The mayor of Belgrade had been recently transferred from the position of prefect at Monastir, where he had organized relief. Although at Belgrade but a short time, he had already appointed a local committee of citizens for each of the fifteen wards of the city. Posters had been displayed requesting those who were unable to secure food and clothing to register at the local offices. The families already registered represented 16,000 people in a total population of about 60,000, or 27 per cent. Before the war there were about 3,000 needy persons in Belgrade in a population of 100,000. The local committees were making a house-to-house canvass of all the families registered as needing aid, and suggesting what aid should be given. The mayor was consolidating these lists and was about to call together the relief agencies to invite them to co-operate with one another and with the city. Meanwhile, he had secured stocks of various kinds of food in Hungary and had distributed in December to those who were registered as needy a ration of three hundred grams of flour per day per capita and a pound of sugar to each family and a small amount of cabbage. He had also secured a small stock of potatoes and onions and sufficient wood to

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give a small quantity to each household. He was preparing for a serious situation during the entire winter. Except in these three cities, even though the total amount of food might be sufficient, many people would not be able to buy bread unless the price could be reduced. Some effort had been made to control the price of grain, but we were told that as soon as this had been done no grain came on the market and conditions were worse than before.

It seemed certain that food-supplies would be exhausted in one locality after another in the course of the winter and spring, to say nothing of the need of seed for the next crop. No one knew, and there seemed no way of finding out, how much grain was actually in the possession of the peasants of Serbia. The crop had been less than normal, the enemy had consumed or sent away a good deal, and the Serbian army had "lived on the country" as it passed through in September and October. The persistence of the high price of bread confirmed these indications of a real shortage. We learned in Belgrade from the government officials that there were surpluses of grain in some portions of the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes and that probably, if this could be distributed, it would be sufficient for the needs arising in Serbia itself before the next harvest. The very serious question of transportation still remained. If one after another of the isolated regions reached the end of its supply, would it be possible, after getting the food into Serbia, to distribute it soon enough over these rivers of mud, called highways, and up the narrow paths and trails? Reports from Serbia state that these difficulties were overcome, that the very

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narrow margin did not actually become a deficit. The end is not yet, however, for the 1919 crop is far below normal and the present sowing is also below normal. We must be prepared to hear of further shortages before the harvest of 1920.

The loss of live stock in Serbia is a more serious menace to its prosperity than to its immediate food-supply, except as it affects distribution. There are literally almost no horses left in Serbia. They were taken by the army, and their skeletons are scattered along the roadside from Saloniki to Belgrade. In Nish, in the absence of automobiles, two very antiquated-looking teams were found and two carriages discovered which served to conduct the American visitors about the town and to the military hospital in the outskirts. I do not recall having seen any other horses. The number of cattle is very greatly reduced, but some oxen were seen everywhere and meat was seen in the city markets. Prices were high, but not more so than in other countries. The increase from pre-war prices, however, is great, for before the war meat was exceptionally cheap. The principal local purchaser was the government, which bought for army use and kept the price low (eight cents per pound) to discourage the slaughtering of the herds. The surplus of meat was exported to Austria, and the Austrians managed by a variety of devices, mostly grossly unfair, to keep the prices very low. This, in fact, was one of the reasons why the Serbs were so desirous of an outlet to the Adriatic, giving them access to other markets. In southern Serbia many sheep were raised on the treeless plains and mountainsides, and we saw a considerable number of fine flocks of sheep which, we were told, had



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escaped the Bulgarians. Formerly many hogs were raised in Serbia, but we saw almost none, except a day or two before Christmas, when in the open markets of Semendria and of Belgrade there were many squealing young pigs which were to be the holiday delicacy for those able to buy them. Upon leaving Belgrade, we crossed the Save River to Semlin and started directly west toward Fiume. Almost immediately we saw very large numbers of hogs, greater numbers than I have ever seen in America.

Besides coffee, tea, and rice, the imported articles most missed were soap and candles. Tea and coffee were being quoted at fifteen dollars a pound, but as there was none to be had the price was not significant. Soap was unavailable and its absence led to many unpleasant and unsanitary conditions. Candles were selling at fifty cents each and kerosene was not to be had at any price. Relatively normal trade conditions would soon exist as to the sale of clothing, shoes, soap, candles, kerosene, and supplies generally, if the transportation systems were in working operation, for the Serbians were not without money. But the resumption of normal trade activities is impossible until the railways are restored.

Lack of transportation created also a fuel crisis in the towns. Serbia is bordered by mountain ranges, nowhere far distant, which, except in the south, are well wooded. Coal-mines are quite well distributed and before the war provided considerable fuel for industrial and domestic uses. Coal was also imported. At present the mines are out of commission, and importation is reduced to the narrowest



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minimum by lack of transport. There is neither labor for cutting wood nor transport for getting it into the cities. In Nish, which is not far from the wooded mountains, wood was selling at 200 francs (\$40) per cubic yard, and very little could be had. Before the war the same quantity sold for 5 or 6 francs. Fuel was used only for cooking, and if the weather had not been exceptionally warm there would have been much suffering. Serbian winters, except in the high mountains, are about like those, say, of the Hudson Valley of New York State.

In Belgrade the lack of coal and wood was, in January, 1919, very serious, although it is reached by railways from Fiume on the west and from Hungary on the north. Small amounts of coal were brought by rail and some wood was cut on the shores of the Danube and brought in by barge, but there was not enough for even the most necessary purposes. The municipal water-supply is operated by a pumping-station which was operated only a few hours daily. In some parts of the city no water had been available for several days at a time. It is a modern city, with indoor plumbing, and the lack of water was very serious. The tramway system had already been out of commission for several weeks. The electric-light current was turned off at 10 P.M. The hospitals were without fuel for heating the wards. Only the exceptional weather prevented the plight of Belgrade from becoming very serious. The railways were running at only a small percentage of their capacity for lack of coal. The line from Belgrade to Fiume was running one train a day, although there was said to be sufficient rolling stock for thirteen. The Hungarian railways were about to

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discontinue entirely. As to fuel, as well as food, clothing, supplies of every description, and even medical service, the rebuilding of Serbia had to await the re-establishment of its transportation system.

“*A New Kind of Poor.*”—The most acute lack was that of clothing. At Palanka a well-educated English-speaking Serbian woman said she had paid fifty dollars for a pair of shoes which lasted less than a month and two hundred for a simple baby outfit. In Semendria I had two conferences with a group of three leading citizens: the mayor (three days out of the hospital and looking as though he had left the hospital much too soon); the former head of the school system, a man past middle life who was very interesting and evidently very well informed; and a widow who had successfully carried on the considerable business interests of her former husband and was now organizing a civil hospital at the mayor’s request. She was shabbily dressed, but her manner and attitude recalled to me the best of the women who help to direct the charitable societies of New York and Boston. I asked her who were most in need. Thinking a moment or two, she replied (in French): “The war has created a new kind of poor in Semendria. Those who were best off before the war are now the poorest. Please do not think badly of our mayor and our schoolmaster because of their shabby clothing—they have no other. What little there is to be bought is at such fantastic prices that they cannot afford to buy. I myself have been considered one of the most well-to-do citizens of the town. These rough clothes are all I have. I do not mind that, but if you could bring in some

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clothing and sell it at reasonable prices you would be helping those who need help most." The weather was then unusually warm for January, but in early February the snow was deep in the streets of Semendria, Belgrade, and all northern Serbian cities. Footwear of all sorts was lacking. The Serbian peasant ordinarily wears a very closely knit, thick stocking, and over these a sort of leather sandal fastened by a stout cord. The people in the cities and villages, as well as the soldiers, have learned to wear shoes. The peasants have no disinclination to wear shoes if they can get them, except that they are so impressed with the beautifully finished leather that some of them are disposed to keep them in the home as an ornament and an evidence of prosperity, even at the cost of going barefooted.

Our necessarily rapid examination of Serbian conditions was strikingly confirmed by the reports made after much more detailed inquiry by the American Red Cross relief workers who went to Serbia upon our return. For instance, several American women investigators made a survey of seventy-five towns in northern Serbia with a population of 335,000 and registered 63,000 persons as in dire need of the necessities of life—food, clothing, and shelter.

Milk was almost unobtainable in many districts, and clothing even of the most elementary kind was far beyond the reach of any except the wealthy. A case of second-hand clothing from Buffalo, valued in America at seventy-two dollars, was appraised by a merchant in Nish at fifteen hundred dollars.

In 44 towns of a total of 75 there was an immediate need of food, in 63 of clothing, in 10 of housing, in

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29 of medical supplies, in 25 of medical attention, in 38 of sanitary measures, in 9 of hospitals, in 33 of child-welfare activities, in 32 of employment workrooms, and in 14 of other forms of relief. Between 30 and 35 local relief organizations were found in existence in these towns, but many were quiescent for lack of funds or supplies.

One of these American women reported:

Almost every family has lost in the war father, husband, or brother—frequently all the male members of the family are gone and the women-folk are left without means of support. The number of widows with small children is distressingly large, and the suicide rate among young Serbian women is very high. The children plead tearfully for help, and we found many of them who had gone without food for several days at a time. All the children show the effects of under-nourishment. A majority of them are suffering either from “war dropsy” or from a chronic malnutrition of which the most characteristic feature is an enlarged stomach, spindly legs, pinched face, and sunken eyes.

The most serious aspects of the occupation and post-armistice periods, those which relate to the subject of health, will be considered in the next chapter.



### III

#### SERBIA: THE COST OF ASPIRATION (*Continued*)

Health: *the* Serbian disease, tuberculosis; the slaughter of the innocents; the older children; syphilis; typhus; typhoid; influenza; "Wanted, Babies"; total human losses; pre-war health agencies; organized medicine; the new Public Health Ministry; war orphans and widows; soldiers' families; cripples and prisoners; devastation; impressions of the Serbians.

**H** EALTH.—For a people whose military losses were so overwhelming as those of Serbia the health of its civilians is of first importance. We took special pains to learn as much as possible about sickness and mortality in Serbia during the occupation and at the time of our visit, and also as to future needs. Our informants, though vague and inexact, were clearly trying to describe conditions which had been most serious. We have noted that very fair vital statistics were kept in Old Serbia prior to the war. These were incomplete during the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913. Those for 1914 are still less complete, and before the end of 1915 the Serbian army and its government had been driven wholly out of the country and no records are available for that year. Most of the records kept during the occupation by the Austrians, Germans, and Bulgarians were removed or destroyed. The pre-war records, however, indicate what would be likely to happen under war

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conditions. We were interested in finding in Belgrade a ten-year report on the sanitary conditions and vital statistics of that city. It was a volume quite comparable to such as might be gotten out by an enterprising American city. In fact, I doubt whether many American cities of one hundred thousand would publish as thoughtful and enlightening a review of their health conditions, though they might have more material available.

Also, we were fortunate in securing in Belgrade a copy of a printed report dealing with sanitary conditions in the part of Serbia held by the Austrian army. It was by a member of the Austrian military staff and was entitled, *The Sanitary Watch at the Gate of the Orient*. It was written from the point of view of the danger of importing into Austria, through Belgrade, the epidemic diseases which were always more or less prevalent in the Balkans. Its statistical material was quite complete and showed careful preparation. The comments naturally must be taken with due allowance. We found also a few elderly physicians who had remained in Serbia during the Austrian occupancy. We learned something from the army physicians as to conditions found when the Serbians reoccupied their country in the late fall of 1918. Gathering, bit by bit, the facts in regard to Serbia's birth and death rates before the war, the epidemics of 1915, the hardships during the occupation, the conditions at the time of our visit, the traditions of the country in matters of medicine and sanitation, and the attitude of the people toward new ideas and methods, it became clear to us that the greatest opportunity to aid Serbia is to help to care for her sick, especially her children, to bring

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under control the epidemic diseases which are always prevalent, and to establish a public health organization, state and local. Even moderate success in applying scientific knowledge of disease and its causes would greatly reduce sickness and mortality. This, with the high birth-rate, should go far in a decade or two toward restoring Serbia to that position of numbers and influence to which she is entitled by the very distinguished and heroic part she has taken in the war.

For these reasons some of the interesting facts as to health conditions will be stated in detail.

*The Serbian Disease: Tuberculosis.*—One of the questions we asked wherever we went was, "How about tuberculosis?" Our first contacts were with important officials, prefects of departments, mayors of cities, and leading citizens. To the question, "Have you much tuberculosis?" they uniformly replied in the negative; in fact, they stated emphatically that there was no tuberculosis to speak of in Serbia. They explained that with its wonderful climate and its naturally healthful conditions it could not be otherwise. They pointed to the mountain ranges along the eastern and western frontiers and to the beautiful open rolling country bathed in sunlight as convincing evidence. They believed what they said. It was very like what one hears from local authorities in any American rural district. They are always quite positive that in their districts conditions are too healthful to permit tuberculosis to gain any foothold. They, too, are honest in their beliefs, and have been genuinely surprised when trained nurses everywhere find hundreds of consumptives,

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The vital statistics of Old Serbia showed a tuberculosis death-rate in 1911 of 32.4 per 1,000, more than twice that of America or Great Britain. Tuberculosis, being a lingering disease with easily recognized symptoms, was probably fairly accurately reported as a cause of death. We were certain that our optimistic officials and citizens were mistaken. From experienced Serbian physicians we met an entirely different response: "Oh yes, plenty of it." "Yes, tuberculosis, we call it 'the Serbian disease.'" "Quantities of it, and more than ever since the war." The doctors were right and the well-meaning officials and citizens were wrong. Tuberculosis was very prevalent, but had not been "put on the map" by an organized educational effort such as has made the facts about it common knowledge in America and western Europe.

The cities were worse than the country. The report on Belgrade showed that in 1912 tuberculosis deaths were 72 per 1,000, more than four times the rate of an ordinary American city. It was to be expected that three years of hunger during the enemy occupation would increase tuberculosis. It did. The Austrian report showed a population in Belgrade in 1917 of 45,000. The deaths from tuberculosis in 1917 amounted to 145.3 per 1,000, an absolutely unheard-of figure. All reports agree, even this Austrian volume, that food was very insufficient in Belgrade in 1917. It even expresses a regret that so fine a people as the Serbs should have to suffer so much from lack of food.

Wherever pulmonary tuberculosis is unusually prevalent one is almost certain to find also much tuberculosis of the bones and glands among children.



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Nurses and doctors from Great Britain who had come in contact with Serbian children were aghast at the amount of tuberculosis among them. American relief workers and nurses who have reported since have made the same comment. We saw on the streets of Belgrade and other Serbian towns large numbers of crippled children and many hunchbacks, most of them undoubtedly crippled by tuberculosis.

We learned that the Serbian medical profession was quite awake to the seriousness of tuberculosis in Serbia and that just before the outbreak of the war an anti-tuberculosis movement was being organized. A plan had been agreed upon and lectures had been given in several of the larger cities. This promising plan was wiped off the slate by the war. Money, men, and thought—all were devoted to the destruction of human life, not to its conservation.

An effort for the control of tuberculosis must be built upon a broad educational movement, informing all the people of a few important facts about its prevalence, its curability, and its preventability, and thus creating a public opinion willing to foot the bills. Is it possible to carry on such an educational work in Serbia? I am convinced that it is not only possible, but relatively simple and easy, and that no time could be more favorable than the present. Serbia has had one somewhat similar experience. The epidemic of typhus in 1915 was brought under control by the aid of physicians and sanitarians from France, Great Britain, and America. We were told that this left a permanent impression upon the people. They remember that typhus is carried by the body-louse. Many peasants during the winter of 1918-19 asked aid in freeing themselves from vermin for fear

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of typhus. The Serbians are quick to learn, naturally curious, interested in all public movements, responsive to new methods and ideas, and realize that everything possible must be done to rebuild Serbia's population. As to underlying conditions, Serbia is ripe for an active and comprehensive anti-tuberculosis movement, but it must be begun from the bottom up and Serbia must have a great deal of help in it. How anti-tuberculosis, infant welfare, and other health movements can be made to undo some of the most serious effects of war in the Balkans will be considered in Chapter X, on "War, Best Friend of Disease."

*The Slaughter of the Innocents.*—The infant mortality rate of Serbia before the war was high, but not extraordinarily so. In 1911 the number of deaths of babies under one year of age was 146 per 1,000 of births. This is about 50 per cent. greater than the present rate in the state of New York.

There are no exact figures showing the effects of the war on infant mortality in Serbia, but every one agreed that sickness and mortality among children had very greatly increased. The priest of a large church in Belgrade, who had long taken a special interest in his people, said that before the war there were several times as many births as deaths among the children, but that during the war the figures had been reversed. His statement need not be taken too literally, but it is in line with what we heard on every side. Epidemics of children's diseases were common.

Only a very few years ago 100 deaths under one year of age for each 1,000 births was considered a distant goal toward which we might work. That has already been largely surpassed in numerous

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localities, including New York City, where the 1919 rate reached the unprecedentedly low figure of 82. The report of the Local Government Board of England for 1917, after reviewing the progress made in the reduction in infant mortality during the war, announces its conversion to the belief that a death-rate of 50 per 1,000 births is an entirely practicable goal, to be attained in England in the very near future. In fact a few English cities have already secured a rate below 50. At least one Australian city has even secured a rate below 40. The Serbian infant death-rate had ranged during the previous decade between 135 and 181. There is no reason why it should not be reduced as low in Serbia as in any other country. The practice of breast-feeding is almost universal and the population is largely rural. The significance to the future of Serbia of a reduction of the infant death-rate to one-half or even to one-third its present volume, which should not be in the least impossible and hardly difficult, can easily be appreciated. The disappearing birth-rate in Serbia during the war, which makes baby-saving work especially imperative at present, will be referred to later.

*The Older Children.*—Another striking fact is the high mortality among children from one to five years of age. The infectious diseases of children are widely distributed and some are of unusually serious types. Scarlet fever of a virulent type, one which is rarely found in the United States at present, known as the anginous form, is widespread. Whooping-cough before the war showed a death-rate about ten times that in the United States. All agreed that these diseases, like tuberculosis, were vastly more



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prevalent during the war, especially at the time of the typhus epidemic. There are laws for the reporting and isolation of these diseases, but enforcement was impossible during war because of the lack of physicians, the difficulties of communication and of travel, and the closing of the civil hospitals.

*Syphilis*.—This is a most serious disease in Serbia as elsewhere. The northeastern departments are reported to have had an extraordinary prevalence of syphilis for several decades. This is attributed to the occupation of these provinces for some years by a foreign army some forty years ago. The facts that Serbia has been at war almost continuously for seven years, that the armies of Bulgaria, Austria, and Germany as well as the Allied armies have marched through her territory, and that the entire country was occupied for three years by an enemy army, have been important causes undoubtedly of the present reported prevalence of syphilis. The crowded conditions under which the people live, several people sleeping in the same bed and eating from the same dishes, may also be a factor.

There was a very fair system of general hospitals in Serbia before the war maintained by the public authorities and open to all needing their care. We were told by experienced physicians who had been at the head of some of these hospitals that 25 per cent. of the patients received in them were admitted because of venereal diseases. The Austrian report spoken of above also comments on the prevalence of syphilis, and says that in certain departments of the country, in 1898, 4 per cent. of the population were registered as syphilitic and that this covered presumably only a portion of the cases actually existing.



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*Typhus*.—Typhus fever has been present in the Balkans for many years, breaking out in epidemics from time to time, especially during war. It was a serious problem during the Balkan War, but it became a national menace in the Great War.

The great epidemic appeared in the late autumn of 1914, after the second Austrian offensive. The successful Serbian counter-offensive began early in December. As a captain in the Serbian army remarked: "Our army fought the Austrians and the typhus at the same time. It won the battle with the Austrians but lost that with the typhus."

The crowding together of the civil population during the retreat from the invaded territory, the absence of sanitary precautions, the lack of physicians, nearly all of whom were with the army, the presence of a considerable number of enemy prisoners, and the general shifting back and forth of masses of people—all were favorable to the spread of vermin and hence of typhus. Not only typhus, but also other infections, such as typhoid, dysentery, small-pox, and scarlet fever, spread rapidly, and the Serbian government applied to the Allied countries for medical aid. Medical supplies and physicians arrived under the auspices of the British, French, and Americans, and with this help, and with the coming of summer, which diminished the amount of crowding in sleeping-quarters, and with the establishment for a time of more stable conditions after the Austrians were driven out of the country, the epidemic was brought under control and practically disappeared in the summer of 1915. Various estimates are made of the number of deaths from typhus, but the consensus of opinion places the

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number at about 150,000 civilians and soldiers. According to one Serbian authority over 45,000 deaths from typhus occurred in the valley of Valjavo (near the invaded frontier) alone, including civilians, soldiers, and Austrian prisoners. It is stated that in that province there was not a house in which one or more deaths from typhus did not occur. One hundred and twenty-five Serbian physicians died of typhus of a medical profession stated at from 310 to 400.

When we were in Serbia many conditions were favorable for a renewal of the typhus epidemic, although large numbers of the population must have become immune. In fact, if such a thing be possible, the survivors in Serbia should be almost plague-proof. Large numbers of prisoners and civilians were returning from Austria and Bulgaria vermin-infested. All Serbia presented a confused picture of shifting groups of population, all of them grievously lacking in every essential of cleanliness and sanitation. Added to this, the housing destroyed or made unusable by war, the shortage of fuel, and the lack of bedding, all caused overcrowding of vermin-infested people. The representatives of the American Red Cross were not in Serbia at this time in sufficient numbers to make any large contribution toward warding off typhus. At Skoplie and one or two other points stations were being established for assisting refugees to clean up. Fortunately, however, no extensive epidemic developed in the early winter of 1918-19. In the spring typhus appeared in eight regions. Skoplie, Monastir, Leskovatz, Palanka, and others—they were all familiar names to us and recalled hordes of famished, half-clad,

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compulsorily filthy refugees. The American Red Cross now had thirty physicians, fifty nurses, and several health workers in Serbia. It aided in setting up many "disinsecting" stations which helped to control the outbreaks.

A report of the early spring of 1919 shows how six women of the American Red Cross, one of whom fell ill of the disease, fought typhus in the Serbian town of Palanka, some sixty-five miles inland from Belgrade.

The stronghold of the typhus was in an army barracks where 267 Serbs and Bulgarians lay on filthy straw on the floor, without bedding or medicines, with vermin crawling over them. The barracks, called a hospital, had no modern surgical instruments, no baths, no toilets with running water, no pails, no utensils, no nurses, no medicine. The stench was overpowering. Each day several typhus victims were taken out on two planks nailed together and buried in a trench. The American women installed delousing baths, used hundreds of gallons of lysol on the men, clipped and shaved the patients, bathed them in hot water, put them into freshly set-up beds with white-linen sheets, gave them food fit for convalescents, distributed American pajamas, scrubbed, whitewashed, and disinfected the barracks from cellar to garret, drained near-by cesspools, screened doors and windows—and soon were out with gangs of Serbian soldiers cleaning up the town.

*Typhoid Fever.*—Typhoid fever has been always present for many years. In 1909, 1910, and 1911 the typhoid death-rates were respectively 122, 121, and 87 per 100,000, five to seven times the present rate in the United States, and sixteen times that of the state of New York. There are, doubtless, many errors as to causes of death, but at least these numbers of people died of something which looked like and was called typhoid. Under war conditions the



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contamination of drinking-water was bound to become much more common, and typhoid steadily increased. Sixty-seven cases were reported in the city of Belgrade during the week beginning August 20, 1916, and sixty-one cases during the week beginning November 1, 1917. Belgrade is the most favorably situated of Serbian towns. It is the only one having a system of sewage disposal, and few have a municipal water-supply. Farther south, approaching Turkish rule, the sanitary arrangements become more and more primitive, or are altogether lacking. City streets are generally regarded as the proper places for the deposit of human waste.

One of the striking triumphs of modern sanitation is the reduction of typhoid fever to a mere fraction of its former prevalence. The essentials in its prevention are very simple and present no special difficulties in Serbia.

*Influenza.*—The epidemic of influenza had just passed its maximum when we were in Serbia. We heard everywhere of the "flu" as having been very serious—comparable to typhus in 1915. We heard of whole families being wiped out, of villages in which no household failed to lose one or more of its members. The prefect at Kumanovo, whom we saw on December 19th, was just in receipt of a report from the subdivisions of his department, showing during the preceding two weeks a total of 972 deaths among a population of 125,000, mostly from influenza. This was a high death-rate, especially as it was the second wave of the disease. A Serbian physician of Monastir said that for a time the influenza deaths there were 50 per day. From what we know of the number of deaths from influenza elsewhere, and from the



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pictures presented to us of its ravages in all parts of Serbia, we estimate the losses as about 40 per cent. of those of the typhus epidemic. This would be about one-half the rate in Italy and 50 per cent. greater than that of the United States.

“*Wanted, Babies.*”—A wholly different effect of the war has diminished the population of Serbia probably more than all other causes combined, more certainly than typhus, more than deaths of soldiers from wounds and disease. It is the fall in the birth-rate, apparently more marked than in any other country.

Even while its army was still in Serbia, transportation conditions were primitive and overburdened, and it was not easy for the men to visit their families during the year and a half before the great retreat. Before the end of 1915 the Serbian army and its young men became exiles and remained so until 1918. Even then they marched through the country and on into what had been Austria-Hungary, and were still far from their homes and families.

We have noted that the birth-rate is normally high, 38 per 1,000 in 1912 against 24 in the United States. Young people marry at an early age and babies come along promptly and regularly. Their numbers were greatly reduced by disease, but there remained an annual increment to the population amounting to nearly 2 per cent. Mobilization was followed in due course by a great reduction in the birth-rate, as in every other belligerent country. When, however, the entire army was driven out of the country and remained away for more than three years, this reduction became very much more marked. Statistics on any large scale are not to be

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had, but it is apparent that the birth-rate took on the aspect of a disappearing phenomenon, and that the midwives of Serbia, had there been any system of unemployment insurance, could have qualified as applicants for its benefits. The mayor of one of the cities on the Danube said that he had found records of births and deaths kept by the Austrians during the occupation, that the deaths were many, and the births a negligible number. He said that while there had been more or less of irregular relations between the Austrian soldiers and the Serbian women, such relations were not likely to result in births, and that the practice of abortion had spread most alarmingly. A physician long past middle life with a long practice in Belgrade stated as his opinion that the number of births was less than 20 per cent. of the normal. In Semendria the physician had heard of four or five during the last six weeks, less than one-fifth the normal. A group of twelve hundred poor children in Belgrade were brought together for a Christmas dinner with their mothers. There were only about twenty under three years of age. The absence of small children was apparent to even a casual observer.

The actual number of births in Old Serbia in 1912 was 114,257, indicating a total for the entire country of about 190,000 per year, or during a period of four years a total of 760,000. If the rate of births has averaged one-fifth of the former rate, and this seemed a fair estimate, the number of births during the four years was 152,000 instead of 760,000, a deficit of 608,000. This is certainly the largest item, though it is but one in a melancholy series, in the diminution of the Serbian population by the war,

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*Total Human Losses.*—Can we now form any estimate of the total effects upon the population of Serbia of four years of war? We have seen that the population of Serbia at the outbreak of the war was about 5,000,000, with an annual increase of about 85,000, or 340,000 for a period of four years, which would have given a population in Serbia in 1918 of about 5,340,000. The war factors, which we have discussed, indicate certain losses. These estimates, it must be remembered, are based on the best information now obtainable, but not in any case on an actual census. All the varied information which we have received from Serbia since our visit tends to confirm the substantial soundness of our conclusions, though only a census would give actual figures. Such a census might increase some factors and diminish others, but I am satisfied that it would not materially change the net result. The estimated losses are:

Deaths from Spanish influenza . . . . .	60,000
Deaths from typhus . . . . .	150,000
Deaths of soldiers from wounds and diseases . . . . .	240,000
Deaths of prisoners and civilians interned in Bulgaria, Austria, and Germany . . . . .	100,000
Deaths among boys and young men from the Al- banian retreat . . . . .	30,000
Decrease in the number of births . . . . .	608,000
	<hr/>
Total losses . . . . .	1,188,000

On this estimate the population of Serbia in 1918 would be not 5,340,000, but 4,452,000. We have not taken into account as yet the deaths among the civil population during the period of occupation from the increased prevalence of tuberculosis, infant

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mortality, typhoid fever, and such diseases, other than typhus and influenza. Taking these into consideration, it is probable that the prevalent Serbian estimate that the present population is not over 4,000,000, and that the loss from what the population would otherwise have been is 1,340,000, is a conservative estimate as to net results. The Serbians and others making such estimates seem to me to overestimate the losses from death and to underestimate the factor of birth deficit.

This estimate finds confirmation in the census taken by the Austrians in the part of Serbia which they occupied. This census, taken in the midsummer of 1916, seems to have been carefully made by the military authorities as a basis for rationing food. In the departments under their control they found a total population of 1,218,027. According to the Serbian census of 1910 this same area then contained a population of 1,568,048. This represents, therefore, a net decrease of 22 per cent. during the first two years of war, in addition to the sacrifice of the normal increase. If these figures are approximately correct, and they seem to be as correct as census figures taken under such circumstances can be expected to be, and if a similar loss occurred in the area occupied by the Bulgarians, the total net loss at the middle of 1916 from the census figures of 1910 would be about 1,050,000 in addition to the loss of the normal increase.

The problems of physical reconstruction in Serbia, of rebuilding cities and villages, of the reconstitution of its herds of live stock, and of the rebuilding of its railways and highways are indeed great, but they are



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unimportant except as they contribute to Serbia's underlying, fundamental problem—that of the replenishment of her human resources.

*Pre-War Health Agencies.*—We have passed in review some of the important factors in Serbia's health problem, but have not yet asked what resources she had before the war for dealing with disease, and what have been the effects of war upon these resources.

There had been, unfortunately, only a slight development of agencies for the cure of the sick and the prevention of disease. There is no medical school in Serbia. In the northern portion, especially in the capital, there were physicians who had received their training in some of the best medical schools of the world, those in Vienna, Berlin, or Paris. Having been under their care for ten days in a hospital in Belgrade, I cheerfully testify to what seemed to me quite remarkable thoroughness and skill in diagnosis and treatment. Even these practitioners had thought little of the modern science of preventive medicine. In the south, recently Turkish, physicians were extremely rare and the sick received little treatment. It was a saying among the physicians that the Serbians are in the habit of sending for a priest when they should send for a doctor, and of sending for a doctor when they should send for an undertaker. This, however, is by no means limited to Serbia. Before the Balkan wars the medical profession of Serbia numbered, according to various estimates, from 310 to 400. If the number were 400 and if the physicians had been evenly distributed throughout the country this would mean one physician to each 12,500 inhabitants. As a comparison

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we may recall that in the United States the number is one to 500. Even this small number of physicians was most unevenly distributed. The city of Belgrade, with one-fiftieth of the population of the country, had more than one-fourth of its medical profession.

Trained nursing, that happy by-product of the Crimean War, which has changed the entire aspect of illness in England and in America, and which not only contributes enormously to the comfort of the patient and of his family, but also greatly increases his chances of recovery, did not exist in Serbia. A slight beginning was made in 1908 toward the training of nurses, but it was short-lived.

There were a number of general hospitals in Serbia before the war, which seem to have been as efficiently organized as the very limited medical service and the total absence of trained nursing would permit.

Health administration as a function of government was almost non-existent. Deaths and births were reported through the Church. It does not appear that any one studied the deaths from various causes for the purpose of deriving from them a program of health activities.

Such was the meager equipment for dealing with sickness and epidemics before the war. Even this little quickly became almost non-existent. One hundred and twenty-five of the physicians of Serbia died of typhus, a considerable number of others were lost in military service, and almost all the survivors were attached to the army. Except for a very few aged practitioners and for such slight and altogether incidental attention as the military physicians could

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give, the civil population of Serbia went practically without medical attention during the war. The departmental hospitals left without staff or resources were discontinued. Some were taken by the enemy for military hospitals. When the enemy retired he took with him all movable hospital equipment. We found what had been civilian hospitals occupied as temporary shelters for refugees, or unused. There were a very few hospitals operated by physicians from England or America, but the system of civilian hospitals had ceased to exist. In Semendria an efficient and benevolent woman was establishing a civilian hospital of twenty beds. I heard of it some months after as having attained a capacity of sixty-five and as being crowded with one hundred and thirty patients who were sleeping on the floors and in every other available bit of space.

*Organized Medicine.*—While Serbia had few physicians before the war, several aspects of its medical and hospital organization are of unusual interest and are quite in line with the present trend of medical practice and organization in the most progressive countries. Such medical practice as it had was largely organized as a public function. Each of the eighteen departments into which Serbia was divided had a departmental physician, chosen after a careful examination, who received what was for Serbia a very fair salary regularly increased at five-year intervals and supplemented by a system of pensions after thirty years of service. These state physicians were a majority of the profession and included many of its best representatives. They were allowed to engage in private practice and their state salaries usually constituted from one-fourth to one-half of



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their income. They were required to examine and treat all who came to them and also to call upon those who were too ill to come to their offices. Since the territory of each physician was large, and transportation difficult, it was usually necessary for the patient to go to the physician's office. This was often a great hardship to patients who were perhaps very ill and spent many hours in slow travel in cold weather before reaching the physician. Patients whose income was such that they paid taxes were required to pay a small sum to the state for the services of the physician. Others received treatment free. Each *arrondissement* (ward) of a department also had its public physician and each village or city of more than three thousand was permitted to have a municipal physician. All these were selected and remunerated similarly to the state physicians, and the obligations to the people of their districts were similar. There was, however, very little supervision of their work from the central government. Departmental, *arrondissement*, and municipal physicians were slowly being reappointed in January last as physicians became available. On our visit to Semendria a physician, until recently a resident of Croatia, had just been appointed to all such positions of the department, *arrondissement*, and municipality, there being no other physician available for the service. In Prishtina as late as June, 1919, medical practice was in the hands of one Czech and one Greek doctor.

Also, each department had a departmental general hospital, managed on the same principles as the medical service. They were public institutions to which all persons needing their care were eligible for admission, those being required to pay whose cir-



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cumstances were such that they paid taxes. The hospitals differed greatly in their adequacy to meet the needs of their communities, in their equipment, and in the efficiency of their medical service. The system of public hospitals was also being slowly re-established in the early part of 1919.

These traditions of public medical service to which the Serbian government is committed and to which the people are accustomed afford a valuable foundation upon which to build modern health service, which must of necessity be public, and they afford an excellent opportunity for the close co-ordination, or actual merging, of the hospital and medical service with the health service.

*The New Public Health Ministry.*—The unusual opportunity for medical and health assistance in Serbia is emphasized by the establishment in the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes of a Ministry of Public Health, a recognition of the importance of the subject which has not yet been given in many other countries. The British Parliament has just passed a bill for the establishment of a Ministry of Public Health, with a seat in the Cabinet. A similar proposal, but much less definitely outlined and much less advanced, is under consideration in the United States. The Ministry of Public Health of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes is as yet little more than a beginning, but its establishment is an interesting recognition by the framers of the new government of the timeliness and importance of the subject. The Minister of Public Health had already called about him a council of medical advisers from various parts of the new kingdom. We had the valued privilege of dining

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and having an extended conference with the Minister and his medical advisers, who did not underestimate the seriousness of the problems before them. We were favorably impressed by the evident professional competence of this group and by their attitude toward their responsibilities. At the outset the Minister stated that he was well aware that he had a tremendously difficult problem before him, and that not much could be done in less than ten years. He hoped that the end of the war and the reduction of military expenditures might leave larger sums available for public health. He said that if the American Red Cross could find it possible to help him, its aid would be most gratefully received. He said that he needed help most in dealing with infant welfare, tuberculosis, and venereal disease. It is clear that whatever help the American people, or any other Allied nation, may give Serbia in medical care, nursing, or public health should co-operate closely with this newly established Ministry. How this help should be given is considered in Chapter X, on "War, Best Friend of Disease."

*War Orphans and Widows.*—The war brought another blight upon Serbia's childhood on a scale heretofore unknown—that of fatherlessness. Orphanage occurs in all countries at all times, and everywhere it touches deeply the human heart. Serbia is perhaps the first country in which the loss of the father may almost be said to be the rule instead of the exception. The official statement of the losses of the Serbian army in killed and dead from disease, from August, 1914, to the end of the war, is 238,835. This does not include those who died as prisoners in enemy countries, very likely at least 60,000 to 80,000,

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nor does it cover deaths from wounds or disease during the two Balkan wars. Including these, the military losses of Serbia were somewhere between 300,000 and 350,000. In fact, a responsible Serbian official, independently of the preceding estimate, stated that since the beginning of the Balkan wars Serbia had lost 350,000 soldiers. This official estimates that as early marriages and frequent births in early married life are the rule each deceased soldier left an average of two fatherless children. This would make a total of 700,000 half orphans. This estimate is much higher than that given by a different department of the Serbian government, which, without any definite method of reckoning, roughly estimated the number at 250,000. I am inclined to believe that the larger estimate is more nearly correct; but whether the number be 250,000 or nearer 700,000, it is far beyond the ability of our imagination to form any adequate picture of its realities and its significance.

Fortunately, the mothers of a majority of these children are living. In France the records indicate that only 2 per cent. of the fatherless children are also motherless. The proportion is probably not far different in Serbia. Of this 2 per cent. it is certain that the great majority have brothers or sisters or other close relatives. "War orphans," so called, need help, but happily it has not been proposed thus far that we should deprive them also of their mothers by setting them apart in orphan-asylums. Soldiers' orphans' homes would be a most doubtful benefit to offer the fatherless children of Serbia, and, when this generation had grown up, the orphans' homes would still exist with their coteries of employees and their



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imposing buildings calling almost vocally for inmates. Impersonality, cheerlessness, and the deadening atmosphere of all except the very best institutions, would be a poor preparation for those who were made fatherless by the war to take up the great problems and to live up to the great opportunities which the near future will bring to Serbia.

It is a happy by-product of Serbia's misfortunes that some of her leading officials in their exile went to France and came closely into touch with the agencies and the policies of that country. Knowing at first hand the experiences through which Serbia was passing, France extended to them an unqualified welcome. Among these exiles was the man who, at the time of our visit, held a very responsible position in Belgrade as Minister of Public Instruction. This department was then charged with the care of those made fatherless by the war. We had become thoroughly acquainted with the remarkably well-drafted statute enacted in France in July, 1917 (more fully described in the chapter on France, see p. 144), by which all the children made fatherless by the war became wards of the nation, which accepted final responsibility for their education, guardianship, and support. A similar law drafted by him was enacted by Serbia.

The American friends of the fatherless children of Serbia should adapt their measures of relief to strengthening and supplementing this far-sighted provision of the Serbian nation and, under no circumstances, should set up institutions except as essential parts of the national system. Since the date of our visit the care of the orphan children has been separated from that of public instruction and now





A SHEPHERD GIRL ON THE HILLS NEAR BRALO  
(Not far from Delphi, Greece.)



APPLICANTS FOR RELIEF  
At the American Red Cross Relief Station in Skoplie, Serbia.



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constitutes a ministry of child welfare, remaining, however, under the direction of the same official who is vice-president of the Cabinet of Serbia.

When all has been done which can be done for the benefit of the fatherless in Serbia it is only too certain that nothing can replace the Serbian fathers. American relief workers report in May and June, 1919, that everywhere Serbian women are seen doing men's work, repairing or rebuilding houses, repairing railways and highways, and especially working the land, instead of looking after the children and the homes.

The needs of the orphan children in Serbia are many, among them training in improved methods of agriculture and of homekeeping. These needs are in no respect different from those of all the other children of the community. It would be a misfortune if training in agriculture, in industries or in homekeeping were provided only for war orphans, and it would be nothing short of a calamity if institutions, under whatever seductive name they might be called, were established and these children set apart from others in order to receive a much needed training in such lines. Instruction and support are separate questions and should be dealt with separately. The mother should be helped to meet the question of support, and the public school should be helped to meet the question of training, for all the children of Serbia.

*Soldiers' Families.*—The husband and father is normally the support of the family. When the husband and father and big brother were mobilized, how was the family supported? It obviously was not by any system of allotments and allowances from

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soldiers' wages, for the soldier was expected to serve his country as a matter of obligation, not as a matter of employment. In common with other continental countries Serbia paid her soldiers very little. The soldiers in the fighting force received the equivalent of six and two-thirds cents a day and those in the auxiliary forces of five cents a day. On this pay the soldiers could hardly buy minor necessities for themselves, to say nothing of sending anything home to their families. Nor did the Serbian government, out of the deficit of its almost non-existent treasury, make any allowances for the support of soldiers' families; in fact, it is difficult to see how it could have done so during the greater part of the war, since those families were back of the fighting-lines. Most of the families were soldiers' families, and they subsisted as best they could on products raised upon the farms by the women, the old men, and the older children, or by their earnings if they lived in cities. The sufferings of soldiers' families were part of that great volume of semi-starvation, cold, and bareness of life which filled Serbia during the years of the occupation.

*Cripples and Prisoners.*—We can glance for only a moment at two other groups of war victims. There are those permanently crippled by the war—who will spend the remainder of their days in blindness; who will painfully find their way about on crutches or sitting in a wheeled chair; who have lost one or both arms, or who suffer from some other injury which may spell a maimed and unfruitful life. Such are to be seen in all parts of Serbia, but their numbers, in proportion to population, seem less than in France. The reasons are grim. The Serbian army was short



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of medical service and of hospitals, even at the outset. It was not possible to give to those seriously wounded that immediate surgical attention and skilled nursing which often means the difference between life and death. Also, typhus leaves few cripples; neither does hunger nor cold. Nevertheless, the total number of permanent cripples, officially estimated, is twenty thousand, a serious loss of manpower in a country so desperately short of men. One catches glimpses of what it means to each of that group of twenty thousand, in spite of the courage, determination, resignation, and perhaps fatalism of the Slav, to be set apart from the ordinary activities of life, to be unable again to till the soil of Serbia, or to care for its herds and its flocks, or to be a constructive factor instead of a dead weight in the up-building of a nation.

Then, there are the prisoners of war—those to whom war loses all its glory and to whom it resolves itself into a weary effort to continue to live under the most depressing circumstances imaginable; who chafe under the consciousness of being able no longer to help their former comrades in arms; to whom the thought of working for the benefit of the enemy is abhorrent; and to whom each day and each night bring fresh pangs of hunger and fresh suffering from cold and exposure. Some 50,000 Serbian soldiers are stated to have been carried away as prisoners into Bulgaria and not far from 150,000 to Austria. At the end of December, 1919, about half this number had returned. No one needed to ask them if they had been half starved. No X-ray was needed to diagnose many of them as tuberculous. In one hospital in Belgrade 790 returning prisoners had been

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received, of whom 235 were dead by December. Some of them returned in very fair condition. Obviously those who had returned, including the sick, represented the more vigorous and resistant of the total number who had been captured. These were they who had been able to survive hardships through several years and to make the trip back on foot to their own country.

*Devastation.*—We have purposely left to the last that aspect of war's effects which is the first to catch the eye of the visitor—physical destruction. It is seen everywhere, but to make any general statement about it is difficult. As a whole, it is less than might have been expected in view of the fact that hostile armies conquered every inch of the country and were subsequently driven out.

There is a fringe of destruction across the north border in the cities on the Danube and on the Save. There is a fringe of it along the southern border where the battle-lines were stationary for several years. There are streaks and splashes of it along the central highway, yet there are no cities that I know of which are wholly destroyed, and some villages even along the main highway look quite uninjured.

Belgrade suffered at the time of its original capture in November, 1914, and in the expulsion of the enemy thirteen days later. It was again baptized by fire when the army of Mackensen entered it in November, 1915, and considerable additional injury occurred in connection with the final departure of the Austrians and Germans in November, 1918. The industrial parts of the city along the river-front suffered most. A great tobacco-factory which had employed hundreds of people is now only crumbling

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heaps of brick. On the opposite side of the street stands a mill for grinding grain which seems to be quite intact. All through the best parts of the city, which, on superficial examination, seem to be uninjured, one finds a vast amount of physical destruction. Of the two largest hotels, one is completely destroyed, the other so much so as to require the entire reconstruction of the interior. The buildings of the University of Belgrade were seriously damaged. The royal palace cannot be occupied. One end of the Russian Legation was converted into fragments. In fact, over the entire city one comes across buildings which, appearing to be intact, are a mass of ruins in the interior. After spending a few days in such a region, when one is shown new lodgings he looks about to see in which corner of the room a shell came through the wall or where the hole in the floor or ceiling happens to be. The city of Semendria, some thirty miles east of Belgrade, on the Danube, was damaged rather more than Belgrade. As you look casually at the cathedral you see that one corner of the tower has been injured by a shell, but when you enter it you see that there are great gaps in the roof and that the distinction between indoors and outdoors has largely disappeared. The city of Chabatz, some sixty-five miles west from Belgrade, on the Save, is reported to have suffered still more seriously. Along the southern border the cities and villages which were close to the fighting-line are in ruins. A third of Monastir, the second city of Serbia, was destroyed, and another third seriously damaged.

As the enemy fell back he found time not only to destroy railway and highway bridges, but also to leave a permanent record of the line of retreat. He



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apparently was too busy to do much except along this line. The sight of windowless buildings during the greater part of our trip of five hundred miles through Serbia will remain one of the most vivid impressions of the trip. Glass is now unobtainable in Serbia. Many of the owners of buildings facing the main street have filled the window space with a solid brick wall to within some six inches of the top, or entirely. In the northern part of Serbia we saw hundreds of such buildings in which the interior received only such light as might come through the door when it was left open or from narrow slits six or eight inches wide at the top of the space where the window had been.

It is much too soon to begin to talk of reconstructing the injured buildings of Serbia. Not until its transportation system is fully repaired will building materials become available. The problem of manpower will for a long time be almost hopeless. The financial problem is likely to be very serious in spite of whatever reparation it may be possible to secure from the scattered fragments of Austria-Hungary. So far as houses are concerned, the problem is not always one of immediate urgency. The population has been so greatly reduced by seven years of war and war epidemics that, although a good many of the houses have been destroyed, the remaining population still finds shelter, though with great difficulty in Belgrade. The task of physical reconstruction can wait; the task of human reconstruction is immediate and urgent.

*Impressions of the Serbians.*—This chapter may properly be closed by recording a few personal impressions of the Serbians.



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Everywhere they were extraordinarily hospitable to the American party. There was no evidence anywhere that this was the calculating hospitality of officialdom nor that it was with a view to future favors. It seemed to be a spontaneous expression of a real appreciation on their part of what America had done toward ending the war in the right way, and of the principles of nationality, democracy, and freedom, so brilliantly stated by President Wilson, whose ideas we were given to understand were better understood by everybody in Serbia than those of even the most popular Serbian personage. The Serbians seemed to us a very self-respecting people, wishing to conceal, rather than to display, the sufferings they had undergone. They often turned aside our comment on the seriousness of their losses with some optimistic remark that everything would soon be right, or that nothing else mattered since they had gained freedom from the danger which had threatened them from the north, and were reunited with their brother Serbs. When they learned the purpose of our visit they seemed to wish to help us to secure accurate information. We saw nowhere a disposition to color the facts or to exaggerate them. They appeared to be a very individualistic people, doing their own thinking, owning their own land, and, before the war, having almost no poverty. We asked to be taken, for instance, to the poorest quarter in the city of Nish. It seemed to us quite like other parts of the city, quite superior to living conditions which might be seen in the slums of most European and American cities.

The Serbians seemed to us a very simple people, affectionate, and even sentimental. We happened to

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see a number of reunions of friends who had been separated by the war and the display of a warmth of affection was something quite foreign to our habits, especially as between men.

The impression made upon us by the heads of the various ministries at Belgrade, by the mayors of the various cities, and the prefects of departments, was that, with exceptions, they were curiously like Americans. They were of many different types as to personal appearance—some blond, some brunette, some large, some small, and, in fact, presented as many different types as one would meet in an American city. Our impression as to the intelligence and serious interest of these officials in their work was almost uniformly favorable. How competent they would be in executive duties we could not judge. Subsequently we heard some less favorable comments on the official classes, but high praise for the peasants from every one.

We heard from numerous sources that the returning Serbian soldiers, after seven years of war, were not especially anxious to work. In this they are not altogether different from soldiers of other countries. The officers, trained more or less in Austrian and German methods, were reported, in a few instances, to have absorbed some of the undesirable features of the military caste, as shown in their attitude toward privates and civilians. We did not see this, but we heard it referred to several times.

The Serbian peasant, as a rule, has had little education. A fair proportion of those in the northern part read. The public-school system was being developed rapidly before the war. The peasants, however, seem to be generally alert, active-minded,

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interested in things, and responsive to new ideas and methods, with a whole range of new interests and curiosities awakened by their contact with other peoples during the war.

The Serbians seem like the Japanese in their desire to learn the best quickly from other peoples; like the French in scrupulous politeness and deference; like the Italians in the warmth of their welcome and the frank expression of their sentiments; like the English in their dogged resistance; and like the Yankees in their rugged individualism, born of a long period of individual proprietorship in land.

## IV

### BELGIUM: THE COST OF DECISION

Belgium's material losses; military losses relatively small; four waves of devastation; results of rationing; tuberculosis doubled; birth-rate halved; infant mortality; unemployment; exiles in Holland, France, and England; reconstruction beginnings.

*BELGIUM'S MATERIAL LOSSES.*—The story of Belgium's suffering is better understood in America than is that of any other Allied country. No war victims have made a more insistent appeal to American hearts than those who were in no sense a party to the issues of the war, but, happening to be across the easy way from Germany into France, did not hesitate an instant to choose the path of honor and of resistance, which was also that of sufferings and disaster at the time unparalleled. Now that the long period of oppression is over, now that all Belgium is again free and we can look about and attempt to measure the results of the war, it should be a very real satisfaction to America to find that, heavy as were the sorrows of Belgium, urgently as she needed every ounce of help that could be given her, and little as all this help could do to diminish her losses, it is, nevertheless, the final fact that in permanent injury, in depletion of her people, in irremediable losses, Belgium suffered less proportionately than most of the



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Allied countries. A larger proportion of Belgians are now at home and living fairly comfortable lives, with families intact and firesides in order, than of most of the other invaded Allies. This is due to the fact that the invasion was so unexpected and so rapid that she had no time to mobilize a large army in proportion to her population. Her army being relatively small, her military losses were relatively low. The greater part of her men remained to carry on local administration and activities in such fragmentary ways as a brutal enemy occupation would permit. This made possible the handling of a large part of the detailed work of the Commission for Relief in Belgium by the Belgians themselves through local organizations amounting almost to a system of local government. When the German army swept over the country the vast majority of the population remained in their homes. Of those who fled into Holland, many soon returned. The Belgian Relief Commission was able to send both food and clothing for the entire population during the whole period of the occupation. There certainly was never what could be called an ample supply, but there was always enough to go around after a fashion. The Belgians early recognized the importance of saving the lives of the babies, with the result that, in some localities at least, as in England, infant mortality was actually lower during the war than it had been formerly, a sharp contrast to conditions in other invaded countries.

If the permanent war losses of Belgium may be said to be comparatively low, they are, nevertheless, so serious that standing by themselves they would cause the whole world to hold up its hands in horror.

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Among the major losses are the following: the complete destruction of the industries which occupied a majority of her population, so that, as late as April, 1919, no less than nine hundred thousand men, representing more than one third of the population, were drawing an unemployment allowance; the undermining of habits of industry of very large numbers of people; the devastation of cities, villages, and agricultural areas to an appalling total; the driving from their homes of perhaps a million refugees; a very marked increase in tuberculosis and a 50-per-cent. reduction in the birth-rate.

*Military Losses Relatively Small.*—Belgium is a country of 7,500,000 people. The rapidity of the German invasion was such that the number of men whom it was possible to mobilize in the Belgian army of 1914 is estimated at 180,000. This is a much smaller number in proportion to the population than the mobilized army of France, or Italy, or Serbia. Subsequently, a goodly number of those who had been left behind found ways, hazardous though they were, of getting out of the country and of reaching France, where they joined the Belgian army. At the end of the war the army was considerably larger than at the beginning, and is stated to have been 250,000. The deaths of soldiers from wounds and disease are placed at 41,000. The number of missing is 20,000, of whom at least one-half must be reckoned as killed, making a total of soldiers' deaths of about 51,000. Under ordinary circumstances the loss of 51,000 men would be an appalling disaster. It is not less so now, but it seems less when dealing with deaths by the millions. Compared with this rate of loss of men, that of France is about seven times as great; that

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of the United States, about one-seventh as great. The number of widows and orphans is correspondingly less than in France or Serbia. The number of war orphans is put at 5,800. It is startling to learn that to these 5,800 orphans of soldiers there must be added a larger number, 6,200, orphans of civilians who were shot during the demonstration of the "value" of frightfulness, or killed by shells or bombs, or died in exile, making a total of 12,000 children made fatherless by the war. Forty thousand Belgian soldiers were taken prisoners or interned in Holland, and 10,000 civilians were deported as prisoners. Many thousand civilians, one German estimate says 56,000, were deported as laborers. There are about 15,000 permanent cripples. All these direct military losses of the Belgian people should lose none of their significance because of the fact that other countries, having had more time in which to complete their mobilization, suffered accordingly.

*Four Waves of Devastation.*—Belgium is spotted from the German border to the sea with areas of devastation. It happened at four different periods.

First, when the German tide became strong enough to sweep over the frontier forts and spread through the country. The amount of devastation by fighting at this time was very much less than might have been expected. There are areas of destruction in eastern Belgium, but they are chiefly due not to fighting, but to deliberate arson. The German troops claimed that civilians fired on them and as a punishment and deterrent they burned cities and towns. The names of Visé, Termonde, Dinant, and Louvain are identified for all time with this phase of the spread of



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*Kultur.* Nearly five years afterward the burned areas of Louvain stand almost as they were left in August, 1914. The walls of the great university library stand, but there are nothing but walls. The major part of the cathedral, that in which the Germans built fires in one chapel after another, stands as they left it. A very few small permanent buildings have been put up. Scattered through the burned area are a variety of one-story buildings, mostly of wood. Not all of Louvain was burned, of course—perhaps not more than one-eighth or one-tenth. Except for this wanton destruction, relatively little harm was done; even Antwerp, in spite of the serious fighting and heavy bombardment, was relatively little injured. Here and there, however, all through Belgium, are found marks of the original invasion.

The second belt of destruction is that along the trench line, as it stood after the race between the Allies and the Germans to the sea had stabilized the positions for the time being. The trench line extended for about twenty-three miles in Belgium from the sea to the French frontier. Close to this line everything was destroyed. A little farther away the destruction varied from 5 to 100 per cent. For example, Furnes, a city of six thousand people, four and a half miles this side of the trenches, which was bombarded so heavily that at one time the entire population except four people fled, finds itself at the end of the war with one-fourth of the houses entirely destroyed, one-fourth badly damaged, one-fourth slightly damaged, and one-fourth intact. These twenty-three miles of front saw much of the heaviest fighting of the war, for it was here that the English



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and the Germans tried to see which could endure the most. Nieuport, Dixmude, the Forest of Huthulst, Meerkein, Bixchoote, the Passchendaele Ridge, Ypres, Hooge, Dickibush, Messines Ridge, Kemmel, and Neuve-Église are a few of the names which recall to the world the titanic struggles which took place along these short twenty-three miles that separated "free" Belgium from that vastly greater Belgian area which never lost confidence that it would some day again be free. Nowhere in Europe, perhaps, are to be seen more obviously the results of high tide of battle in the Great War than on the western half of the ten-mile road from Menin to Ypres, and on Messines Ridge, a slight and gradual ascent, from which one looks in every direction and sees only utter, complete, unqualified destruction. Very possibly such areas as these cannot be made again suitable for agriculture until another forest growth has created another soil. Nevertheless, the owners are back and are beginning to pick over the soil of the former fields by hand, bit by bit. The flooded area extending some miles inland from the sea has the look of an unreclaimable marsh. The ruins of Ypres, to which the British, with Germans on three sides of them, held on throughout the entire war, have been made familiar to the entire world.

A third period of serious destruction occurred when the Germans pushed the southern end of this twenty-three-mile line toward the west and shortened it to a line of about fifteen miles. The regions of Messines, Wulverghem, Locre, Kemmel, Dranoutre, names which the world read with a sinking heart in the spring of 1918, represent regions of complete destruction.

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Then, finally, the fourth and last period of destruction took place in September and October, 1918, when the German line farther to the south was shattered, the coast line was abandoned, the Belgian, French, and British armies moved forward and a new trench line was established along the Lys, as formerly it had been along the Yser. Along the area of this retreat there are spots of destruction, but it is chiefly along the line of the Lys that the fourth zone of devastation is to be found. Here the Germans remained until the armistice.

An official estimate of the total number of buildings wholly or practically destroyed in Belgium is 86,348, of which 48,498 were in West Flanders. In the province of Antwerp the number is 6,000; in that of Namur, 5,000; in Brabant, including Louvain, 5,800. The total is about one-fifth of the official French estimate of the number of buildings destroyed or materially damaged in France. In proportion to its total population, the amount of physical destruction in Belgium is, perhaps, slightly greater than that of any other country on the western or southern fronts.

There is to be added to these successive waves of destruction connected with fighting the dismantling of factories in all parts of Belgium, many miles from any fighting-line. Partly, no doubt, in order to use the materials for munition manufacture, and partly probably also for the deliberate purpose of breaking down competition in the future, the great factory-buildings of industrial Belgium were taken down, piece by piece, the materials shipped to Germany, and the machines either destroyed or shipped with the materials. This is probably Belgium's most



**SAFELY BACK**

This little girl and her parents live in a temporary hut of corrugated iron and boards, near Ypres, Belgium.



**DANGER IN DEBRIS**

Ruins of the buildings in the city of Armentières. The boy had been injured while playing with powder from unexploded munitions.





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serious loss, for she raised only one-third of her food and depended on her manufactured products for the means with which to pay for the imported two-thirds.

*Results of Rationing.*—Turning from the tremendous amount of physical destruction in Belgium to the effects of the war upon its civil population as a whole, we begin to appreciate how very different the reckoning is from what it would have been had it not been for the prompt organization of the Commission for Relief in Belgium. Belgium had formerly produced considerable amounts of food. She raised enough potatoes as well as hogs to met her needs. The production of eggs met nearly the need, and oats and rye fell short by one-seventh. Wheat, on the other hand, was largely imported, local production meeting less than one-fourth of the need. Three-fourths of its importation of four million tons of food per year came from France. The war, of course, immediately stopped this importation, and, as the industrial population faced starvation, Hoover appeared upon the scene. With the aid of a very complete organization of the Belgians themselves the Commission for Relief in Belgium waged a successful fight against starvation for five long years. It provided not only a modest ration of food for the population at all times, but also distributed great quantities of clothing. Except for this greatest relief work of history the human assets of Belgium would have been devastated far more effectively than her homes and other buildings actually were; yet it is both incorrect and inadequate to refer to the work of Mr. Hoover and his aids in Belgium as relief. It was a mobilization of the food-supplies of Allies and neutrals for the benefit of a whole people. It was

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superseding the breakdown of supply and demand, by a conscious and effective control of a vast commercial operation for a tremendous social purpose. It was business elevated into social statesmanship. The vast majority of the Belgians paid for their food as they should do, but nobody went without because he was unable to pay. It was as different in kind as it was in volume from anything which had ever been done before, for it had to meet a situation such as had never existed before.

We have said that the ration of food which it was possible to provide was modest. It became more so as the war progressed and especially after America entered the war. In May, 1918, a report from the sanitary officer of Bruges says:

At the present time the individual per diem ration of our population is composed of 300 grams of bread [two-thirds of a pound], 11 grams of meat [four-tenths of an ounce], 15 grams of lard, 30 grams of rice, 18 grams of corn flour, 18 grams of beans, and 8 grams of sugar. [This makes a total daily ration of nine-tenths of a pound.]

He adds that the very small meat ration is not always given, that milk can be had only in trifling quantities for the sick, that butter, home-made lard, and cheese have practically disappeared, and that there has been no distribution of potatoes since April 15, 1917.

For all of Belgium, the Inspector of the Health Service states that the average adult ration varied from 1,800 to 2,000 calories. An expert of the Commission for Relief in Belgium <sup>1</sup> says that the minimum

<sup>1</sup> Robinson Smith. *Food Values and the Rationing of a Country.*

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amount of utilized calories sufficient for light muscular work is 3,000. "We may reduce this at least 1,000 if we merely wish (because we can only afford) to keep body and soul together." His minimum balanced ration gives a total amount of food of 870 grams per day (one and four-fifths pounds), including 340 of bread and 300 of potatoes, and giving a total of 2,000 utilizable calories—*i.e.*, units of energy-producing force. He adds that this minimum was not maintained for Lille (France) and people began to die, the normal mortality of 16 per 1,000 running up to 26 in October, 1915, and 39 in March, 1916.

For months after the war the food prices remained very high. In reply to questions, a representative of the National Committee on Food said (April, 1919):

Food is no longer rationed. No foodstuffs, strictly speaking, could be said to be absolutely lacking, but food is so dear that it seems to be abundant.

He gave the following prices:

<i>Articles</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Prices</i>	
		<i>Before War</i>	<i>April, 1919</i>
Bread.....	per lb.....	\$.027	\$.08
Meat.....	per lb.....	.27	.90 to 1.09
Lard.....	per lb.....	.18	.45
Ham.....	per lb.....	.44	1.80
Eggs.....	each.....	.02	.045
Milk.....	per pint.....	.023	.09
Potatoes.....	per lb.....	.01	.027
Butter.....	per lb.....	.32	1.60

*Tuberculosis Doubled.*—It is beyond question that we owe to Hoover the fact that we have no serious

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epidemics to record in the history of occupied Belgium. But even a rationed food-supply was not sufficient to prevent an alarming increase in that disease which seems to be so very closely related to nutrition—tuberculosis. In the summer of 1916 Dr. William P. Lucas, later chief of the Children's Bureau of the American Red Cross in France, made an inquiry on behalf of the Belgian Relief Commission as to the health of the people in occupied Belgium, covering three months. He found the well-to-do and the agricultural classes, together amounting to 35 per cent. of the population, in their usual state of health. The industrial and minor commercial classes, however, already showed a great change as to the amount of tuberculosis. Dispensaries and hospitals reported that many people who had been cured of tuberculosis were reappearing with the disease in a serious form. The attendance at some tuberculosis dispensaries increased 100 per cent. Every tuberculosis sanatorium and hospital was crowded and there were long waiting-lists. The number of children having tuberculosis of the glands or joints increased tremendously. In Antwerp the number of deaths due to tuberculosis increased 94 per cent. from 1913 to 1917, and in Liège 102 per cent. In Brussels the increase from 1914 to 1916 was from 17.7 to 22.3. In one of the schools in Brussels 63 per cent. of the boys between four and sixteen years old had infected glands of the neck, and in another 70 per cent.

These conditions became worse and worse to and through 1918. At the end of the war the tuberculosis death-rate of Brussels looked like this:



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<i>Year</i>	<i>Tuberculosis Deaths per 10,000 Inhabitants</i>
1914	17.7
1915	17.9
1916	22.3
1917	35.0
1918	39.0

There is a well-organized society for the prevention of tuberculosis in Belgium, and it is its opinion that these figures reflect the actual facts throughout Belgium. It is commonly reported that the tuberculosis death-rate increased threefold during the war. Whether it be slightly over twofold, as the Brussels figures indicate, or threefold, it is an increase of ominous significance for Belgium's future. She will have rebuilt her factories and her war zone long before she has succeeded in reconstructing her diseased multitudes.

*Birth-rate Halved.*—In view of the fact that the mobilization in Belgium was very incomplete and that a large proportion of the men remained throughout the occupation, a reduction of 50 per cent. in the number of births is astonishing. It is also disturbing as indicating that some of the factors which produced it may continue long after the end of the war. Doctor Lucas noted, in the summer of 1916, that in the larger cities the birth-rate had already fallen 40 per cent. He commented on the fact that the number of men absent from the country was unimportant as compared with the proportion of the men absent from other Allied countries, and suggested the lowered vitality of women, due to poor nutrition and their anxiety and fear of being unable to care for their children, as probably large factors in the situa-

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tion. This reduction became still more serious as the war continued. The actual figures for certain cities during the entire war period are as follows:

	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Brussels and vicinity	12,093	9,317	6,846	6,051	5,709
Province of Liège...	13,669	11,069	8,637	7,902	Not known
Province of Namur .	4,316	3,633	3,027	2,704	Not known
Province of Hainaut.	16,763	12,233	9,131	8,499	Not known
City of Ghent.....	3,058	2,145	1,654	1,370	1,407
City of Eecloo.....	284	225	183	151	113
City of Alost.....	808	620	478	381	361
City of Lookeren...	648	501	401	311	318
City of Courtrai....	863	679	548	414	359
City of Hamme....	440	346	283	232	187
City of Grammont..	298	211	164	113	133

These are widely separated regions, most of them far removed from the fighting-area, yet almost uniformly they show a reduction in births of about 50 per cent. The total reduction for the war period is sufficiently serious. The fact that it occurred notwithstanding that a great majority of the men were still in Belgium, and the further fact that hard conditions of living, a restricted food-supply, overcrowding on account of lack of buildings, uncertainty of income until factories and machines can be rebuilt and industries re-established, are continuing and will continue long after the war, suggest that some reduction in births is likely to continue. Before the war, in 1912, Belgium had a high birth-rate, twenty-two, and a low death-rate, fifteen. A reduction of even 35 per cent. in births with no increase in deaths, would mean a stationary population for Belgium. A larger reduction than that means a diminishing population. Belgium has started on the

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road along which France had traveled a considerable distance toward depopulation.

*Infant Mortality.*—Observing the great fall in the birth-rate and fearing a high mortality among children, the National Committee on Food made a special effort to reduce infant mortality by the establishment of infant welfare stations. These met with marked success among the limited number of children and of mothers able to avail themselves of their advantages, and great efforts were made to extend this baby-saving work as widely as possible. Numerous instances are given of striking reduction in the death-rate among babies as a result. It is impossible as yet to secure figures as to the death-rate among babies in the whole of Belgium, and it is uncertain as to what extent the number of infant welfare stations which it was possible to establish were able to overcome the great combination of adverse circumstances under which the children of Belgium were trying to live. The most inclusive figure available is that for regions including about one-fourth of the population. In this region there were 44,000 deaths of children under two years of age in 1914. In 1915 it had been reduced to 38,000, and in 1916 it was 40,000. On the other hand, in 1917 it reached 49,000. Having in mind the great reduction of births during this period the figures as a whole are not encouraging. As against these, however, there are isolated instances which show that an efficient method was worked out which under the more tranquil circumstances of the present it should be possible to apply on a wide scale throughout Belgium. The National Committee reports such encouraging instances as the following: that in one re-



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gion in which the deaths of children under three years of age, from 1890 to 1894, was 22 per cent., in 1915 it had been reduced to 15.3 per cent., and in the month of July, 1916, to 7.5 per cent.; in another region a rate of 12 per cent. in 1914 was reduced to 3.2 per cent. in 1916. In the city of Brussels, where the deaths of children under three had averaged 436 per year from 1911 to 1914, in 1915 it was 284, a diminution of nearly one-third, although the number of births had fallen off about one-fifth. The number of deaths per thousand births in Brussels, 1911-14, inclusive, was 154; in 1915 it was 121. In various cities in Flanders, in all of which infant welfare stations had been established, the average death-rate under two years of age varied from cities having as low as  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., 3.8 per cent., 4.8 per cent., to others in which it was as high as 10.8 per cent., 12 per cent., 14 per cent., or even 15.9 per cent.

From the point of view of total results the picture is somewhat confusing, but it suggests that, although in certain localities by special effort the infant death-rate was actually reduced, as it always can be by a special effort, yet that for Belgium as a whole the actual rate of death among the new-born was high, probably higher than before the war.

*Unemployment.*—Belgium is a predominantly industrial country. It is estimated that its industrial and minor commercial populations include nearly 65 per cent. of its entire population. The completeness of the industrial breakdown can hardly be overstated. There were not only the financial difficulties and the difficulty of securing raw materials, but the buildings were very largely destroyed and the machinery either destroyed or removed to Germany.



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One of the vivid recollections of my trip is that of a visit to what had been a very important iron- and steel-factory employing several thousand workmen some fifty miles south of Brussels. Some of the buildings were still standing and some were in ruins. High furnaces had been taken down and taken apart and the iron and fire-brick shipped to Germany. Most of the machinery had also been shipped. The little that remained had deliberately been made unusable. On a siding of the railway track there were still standing railway cars loaded with machinery which apparently there had not been time to send away. Their destination had been plainly marked upon them. It was Essen!

If money were plenty and credit ample, it was estimated that it would take about three years to replace the machinery to enable the factory to resume its work. The other side of this picture was presented to us in the government offices at Brussels. Here we were told that of about 1,200,000 laborers in Belgium, 900,000 were unemployed and receiving unemployment benefits—three-fourths of all the workmen in the country; that each of these men represented an average of several dependents, and that this meant that something like 3,000,000 people in a total of 7,500,000 were being supported by the government—a government which had been in exile for over four years and whose only resources were loans. It is evident that even with the most rapid recovery possible large numbers of Belgians must be carried for a long time before they can again be supported by the highly developed industry which made Belgium so prosperous a country up to 1914.

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*Exiles in Holland, France, and England.*—When the German army overran Belgium in 1914 about one-sixth of the population fled. A great majority of the refugees went into Holland, probably at least a million. Many of these soon returned. Travel between Belgium and Holland was not very difficult until 1915. Others, perhaps 200,000, went to France. A good many went to England. Something like 600,000 Belgians remained exiles during practically the whole war—in England, France, Holland, or Switzerland. There were some 70,000 in Paris alone, perhaps as many in London, and about 30,000 in Havre. The French government treated the 200,000 Belgian refugees exactly as it did French refugees. It made an allowance to them of the same amount and in every way it made no distinction between refugees in its territory. The English also tried to make the Belgian refugees, some 20,000 in number, as comfortable as circumstances permitted.

But when Dutch, French, and English hospitality had done the best it could, that best left much to be desired. The Belgian refugees in France, as well as the million and a half French refugees, were obliged to live at standards far below those to which they had been accustomed, and considerably below those of the native populations of the localities to which they went. The natives owned their own homes and many of them small farms, so that they were not completely at the mercy of the high cost of living either as to rent or as to the important parts of the food-supply. The refugees, on the other hand, were absolutely at the mercy of the landlords and of the ever-rising cost of living, and in late 1917 and to a greater degree in 1918 the prob-

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lem of subsistence became very acute. Invariably the refugees were obliged to take the poorest living-quarters available. The dark, gloomy, damp, unsanitary quarters fell to their lot and often from four to eight persons occupied a single room. The opportunities for cleanliness and sanitary living (and the standards of many of them were fairly high in these regards) were almost nil. It must always be remembered that refugees were not the unsuccessful class, but included all classes of people driven from their homes. It was inevitable that a great deterioration in their health, as well as in their moral standards, should occur, and especially that the development of the children should be greatly delayed and their vitality undermined.

In the remnant of "free" Belgium, a strip of land nowhere more than ten miles wide and about twenty-three miles long, some seventy-five thousand persons remained at all times within the range of the enemy's guns, though, as a matter of fact, a great deal of the territory was not actually subjected to fire. They were also at all times within easy reach of bombardment by airplanes at night. This bit of Belgium was even more densely inhabited until the spring of 1918 than before the war because employment in the manifold forms needed by the armies was plentiful. Nearly half of this whole number were obliged to flee into France during the advance in the spring of 1918, when the Germans captured a large number of additional villages near the French frontier. Colonies of Belgian child refugees were established in Switzerland and in France. The refugee problem of Belgium throughout the war in proportion to its population was a very serious one, and but for the



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friendly aid of France, England, Holland, and Switzerland the lot of these groups, which together formed about one-eleventh of the total population of Belgium, would have been still more painful and harmful to their future well-being than it was.

Behind the lines there was also great shifting of population from time to time. In 1917 the city of Roulers, with thirty thousand population, ten miles from the line, was wholly evacuated toward the interior, as were many other localities similarly placed. Also, Belgium was the temporary stopping-place of many thousands of French evacuated by the Germans from St.-Quentin, Lens, Lille, and elsewhere. Refugee migrations were, in fact, a more or less continuous factor in Belgian life from August, 1914, to midsummer, 1919.

The great amount of unemployment was seized upon as an excuse for deporting thousands of Belgians into Germany for compulsory labor. The editor of the *Tageblatt* is quoted as saying that fifty-six thousand were so deported, that they were treated as slaves, and that fifteen hundred perished in the first two months. Definite information from Belgian sources as to these deportations is not at hand.

*Reconstruction Beginnings.*—The condition of the returning Belgian refugee is quite like that of his French brother. The Belgian war zone presents every variety of partial and complete destruction. Probably a greater proportion of the Belgian war zone is completely destroyed than of that of any other country. The government endeavored to delay the return of the refugees until it could provide temporary housing for them in barracks and could extend assistance for agricultural rehabilitation and



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for the beginnings of industries. It was not surprising, in view of the superhuman difficulties under which the government of Belgium labored after the armistice, that these forms of organized relief developed far more slowly than did the determination of the refugees to return, a determination before which the resistance of the authorities inevitably soon began to break down. All through the Belgian war zone are found people housed in every conceivable kind of improvised shelter. Many of them are in temporarily repaired buildings in which windows have been replaced by solid brick walls; others are living in many varieties of temporary shelters or huts made of boards, corrugated iron, building-paper, and every other sort of material salvaged from the battle-field. Many others are living in basements and even cellars over which they have been able to arrange some sort of a roof. These surroundings are undoubtedly far more unhealthful and far less attractive than the gloomy quarters in which most of them had lived as refugees during the preceding four years, but it is all that remains to them of home. It is the locality to which they had been accustomed. It is the land they own. There may be nothing left but a few stumps of trees, but ownership and attachment to locality exercise an irresistible attraction for the refugee. Until the harmful results of living for weeks, months, and years in these primitive huts and shelters are known, the harmful effects of the war to Belgium cannot be fully reckoned. These are the kinds of surroundings which have always been associated with lowered vitality and increased death-rates. They are incomparably worse than the types of tenements which have been

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forbidden by law in progressive cities for many years; vastly more healthful quarters than these have been torn down by municipal authorities because of their unsanitary nature and injurious effects. It is as certain as that the sun will rise upon the Flanders plains that the effect upon this large element of the Belgian population of living in these areas of destruction under these circumstances of hardship, privation, overcrowding, and insanitation will be seriously and permanently harmful, that it will further undermine their strength and their moral standards, that it will impair their ability to undertake the reconstruction problems which are formidable for their country, and that it will project into Belgium's history for a long time to come a vast amount of lowered vitality, of sickness, of dependence, and of premature death.

Economically, the reconstruction of her factories is first in order of importance. A higher order of statesmanship would put first of all the rebuilding of the houses in the devastated areas. The health and efficiency of the returning population depend largely on their housing, and the prosperity of the future must be built upon a healthy and efficient people.

## V

### FRANCE: HER SUPREME SACRIFICE

The French; the exoduses of 1914 and 1918; repatriation; under the enemy army; how devastation came about; how much is there of it?; her soldier dead; cripples; widows' veils; fatherless wards of the nation; soldiers' families; general conditions; huge excess of deaths over births; intensive survey of a typical French community after four years of war by Mr. and Mrs. Basil de Selincourt; population; prices; wages; labor—some family groups; refugees; health; government.

**T**HE FRENCH.—France helped us to be free and is our friend by a long tradition. It is a land of clear thinking, a home of ideas and of idealism, of universal thrift, and of luxury as a fine art. The names of her scientists and philosophers are household words among us. It was France toward which two million American homes turned when their boys crossed the water. We think more frequently of France probably than of any other ally, and when we think of her we see a picture of ruined cities, dismantled factories, and destroyed dwellings. That is a terrible picture, but it does not show France's supreme sacrifice. It is not the destroyed houses in the war zone, but the lonely homes all over France which are her chief claim to our sympathies. She can rebuild her cities, with help, but can she rebuild her people?

A glance at the perspective of her recent history

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will help us to understand the greatest injury which she suffered from the war. France is often cited as a proof of the speed with which a country recovers from war; she recovered unexpectedly quickly from the Napoleonic wars and from that of 1870. Did she? Financially, yes; but from another and more fundamental point of view, no. In 1801 France had more than one-quarter of the population of the five great countries of Europe. In 1910 she had less than one-eighth. May not the necessity of paying an enormous indemnity have contributed to that thrift which reduced her numbers in order to recover her prosperity? Certain it is that the excess of births over deaths in France fell off very rapidly during the early period of the last century and that during the five years 1871-75 it almost disappeared. From then on the birth-rate and the death-rate ran a neck-to-neck race. In 1871 France had 37,000,000 inhabitants, Austria 36,000,000, and Germany 35,000,000; in 1914 France had 39,500,000, Austria 50,000,000, and Germany 65,000,000. Even before the war no problem of France called for higher statesmanship than that of her population. The hardest blow of the war struck France at her most vulnerable point. No previous losses which she has ever suffered can compare for a moment with the loss of her men in the Great War and the tremendous decline in her birth-rate. Each of these causes has diminished her population by about 1,500,000, and some of the factors which have produced this extraordinary decline in the birth-rate seem likely to continue for several years to come. The evidences of France's supreme sacrifice are the millions of fatherless or childless homes.



## FRANCE: HER SUPREME SACRIFICE

*The Exoduses of 1914 and 1918.*—One phase of the story of the French refugee is familiar to Americans. We know that as the gray German flood rolled over northern France a million and a half of people fled before it as before a tidal wave. When we think of them we think chiefly of their dramatic leave-taking, of the hurried good-bys to all the things to which they were accustomed and which they held dear; of the hardships to people of all ages of walking long distances, of being crowded into trains, and of making long journeys to strange places; of families being separated; of hunger and cold; of anxiety and distress—but the real tragedy of the refugee came later. These things were serious enough, but they could be endured. All traveling is more or less unpleasant and, for a few days, most people can endure even what the refugees passed through without any serious permanent harm. The really serious task of the refugee family was how to establish itself, how to care for the children, not for a few days, but for a few years. Hunger, cold, exposure, overcrowding, discouragement—all these can be put up with for a short time, but their effects are cumulative. Surroundings and deprivations which may have no bad result for a few days or even a few weeks become serious in a few months and very serious in a few years. We must follow this homeless population of a million and a half, later to be two millions, scattered throughout every part of France so that every community had its refugee group. In fact, the cities and towns were all told by the government that they must receive up to 5 per cent. of their normal population. The average quota exceeded this. The refugees brought nothing with them ex-

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cept what they could carry. They were of all the types and classes that make up the industrial cities and the rural districts of northern France, but, as would be the case everywhere, the great majority of them were people living close to the margin of subsistence and with little money or articles of value which they could take with them. They found themselves in communities already thrown into the utmost confusion, from which the men had been mobilized, whose normal activities had thus been suddenly interrupted, in which little work was to be had. There were no homes for them to go to, no schools to accommodate all these additional children, no doctors to look after the sick, no extra supplies of food to meet these unusual demands. The kinds of work to which they were accustomed were not carried on in these regions. The native people were different, talked a different kind of French, had different habits of life, and did not like the newcomers. After the first period of extreme distress there came a time in many districts when munition-factories and other war industries had been developed, when wages had risen, and food was fairly plentiful, when the governmental allowance to refugees was in operation, when such of the refugees as could be useful in the new lines of work were reasonably able to make both ends meet, though the housing conditions of the great majority of them were at all times extremely bad, very much worse than they had been accustomed to, and very much worse than those of the natives.

Then in the spring of 1918 came the last great German effort and another half-million people were driven from their homes. This time the departure

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and the trip to the interior were a shade less distressing. There were more people to help. The American Red Cross and its various allied organizations carried away a good many of the sick, the crippled, and the aged in their ambulances and trucks. It met the refugees when they arrived in Paris, helped to care for them overnight, gave clothing to those in need, helped the mothers to look after their babies, and provided care for the sick. When this new half-million refugees reached their destinations the American Red Cross was there, too, and did what it could to help to make the best of a bad situation. Everybody else had to crowd up still closer; buildings that had been abandoned as being too bad for human use were again put into service. The American Red Cross was now represented in every department in France. Its coming toward the end of 1917 and in the early part of 1918 had put new life into the wearied officials and impoverished French relief committees. Many things which they had recognized should be done for the refugees, but which they had decided they could not undertake, they thought might be possible with the aid of the Americans. A little coal could be gotten for each family, a few rudimentary articles for housekeeping, some bedding. With such things as the Red Cross could import from America, buy in France, or Spain, or England, or Scotland, or have made in France, it was possible to put the families into as good quarters as were unoccupied. Otherwise, having no furniture and no credit, they would have been obliged to go into the worst of the available so-called "furnished rooms." So far as first adjustment was concerned, the last group of refu-



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gees, with American help, did better than the earlier ones.

The entire group of two millions, however, now began to face new difficulties, in common with the entire working population of France. Prices soared skyward and there began to be actual shortages of available food here and there. The allowance which the government had made the refugees and the wages of those who could work, which at first looked large, now proved to be hardly sufficient to provide the barest living. The winter of 1918-19 looked indeed dark to these two million people until peace came almost unexpectedly, and even then there was no immediate improvement. The relief and rejoicings were so great, however, as almost to make up for a time for the lack of other things.

*Repatriation.*—Meantime, something new in the history of war had been happening. Three millions of French people had remained back of the German lines. Those who lived nearest the line, in a region which began to be under the Allied artillery fire or subject to air bombardments, were sent back by the Germans into the extreme north of France or into Belgium. A good many of them were a dead load to be carried—the aged, the sick, and the young children. As food began to be more and more scarce in Germany, the Germans in December, 1916, hit on the plan of sending these people back into France. Each day they selected a thousand or twelve hundred of those least able to work and sent them by special train all the way along the frontier into Switzerland. They passed through Switzerland and entered France on the south shore of Lake Geneva, near the city of Evian. Here there occurred



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from December, 1916, with few intermissions, until September, 1918, such a sight as only war can produce. Daily there were welcomed back into France a thousand people who had been under enemy rule for some three years, who had been carefully kept in ignorance as to the progress of the war, most of whom had had no information in regard to relatives who were on this side of the line, who did not know whether their brothers or fathers in the French army were still living. It was a royal welcome they received, with plenty of music, a speech, and a good dinner at the casino. Then they passed into a large hall in which a remarkable system of records had been arranged with wonderful card indexes and filing arrangements. Each family received whatever letters or communications their relatives on this side of the line had sent to them in the hope that they might be among the repatriated. Wives who had supposed that their husbands had long since been killed in battle found that they were still living, and their joy made almost as great demands upon their powers of self-control as did the bad news which many other wives and mothers received. Children were restored to their parents, sisters to their brothers, wives to their husbands. French people were restored to France. They all passed before a doctor and those who were obviously sick were placed in hospitals. After the early fall of 1917 the children were examined by the physicians of the American Red Cross and those having contagious diseases were cared for by it in a hospital opened for that purpose. A group of American Red Cross ambulances carried the aged and sick and facilitated the physicians' work. Clothing was given to those

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who needed it, a certain amount of the local money which they had been using back of the lines, if they had any, was exchanged for French currency, and the following day, those who had friends or relatives who could provide for them went on their way. The others, from six hundred to eight hundred, were placed on a special train and sent to the prefect of some department who had to provide for their shelter and care, as he had done for the refugees. The American Red Cross helped him after it had secured its staff by the end of 1917.

Sometimes there was an intermission for a few day or a fortnight, but several hundred thousand people were welcomed back to their country in this unique way and added that much more to the impossible load which their country was already carrying.

*Under the Enemy Army.*—The condition of those remaining in the occupied territory can best be realized, perhaps, from a description by Professor Calmette, a physician and sanitarian of international reputation, who remained at Lille throughout the occupation. Lille, the fifth city in size in France, had a population at the beginning of the war of 220,000. About 60,000 people were mobilized in the French army or left in advance of the arrival of the German troops. About 25,000 were sent back into Belgium to be out of danger, or to France by way of Switzerland. Another 25,000, Doctor Calmette says, were sent away to enforced work in the workshops or military establishments of the Germans. When Lille was liberated there remained only 110,000 of its former 220,000.

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The death-rate before the war had been from 19 to 21 per 1,000. It steadily increased as follows:

1915.....	27.73	per 1,000
1916.....	29.26	per 1,000
1917.....	30.41	per 1,000
1918.....	41.55	per 1,000

This was due particularly, in Doctor Calmette's opinion, to diseases due directly or indirectly to lack of food, such as tuberculosis, dysentery, scurvy, and others. During the last three years of the occupation the food rations distributed to the population were much below the normal needs of young people. Bread was scarce and of bad quality. There was little rice, beans, or corn, and very small amounts of sugar, lard, and canned beef. For more than a year before the end of the war there were no potatoes and no fresh meats. Butter and eggs were to be had only by the very rich. One of the most serious effects, in Doctor Calmette's opinion, was the arrest of growth of the juvenile population. Children of fourteen appeared to be not more than ten. A large majority of girls of eighteen were no further developed than girls of thirteen should be. They attained their development as women tardily, if at all.

*How Devastation Came.*—When France's losses are mentioned most of us have come to think of ruined cities, bridges, railways, and highways. While these things are not France's greatest loss, they are a gigantic problem which complicates and greatly increases all her other problems. Buildings, like the Sabbath, were made for man, and their destruction means homelessness, exposure, and suffering, and



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stoppage of income for men, women, and children. In trying to gain an impression of what the war means to France we must form some notion of the extent of the destruction of the shelters which men had built for their habitations, and the factories, railways, and bridges which they had built to serve human needs. It will help, perhaps, to see how it came about. It is possible for armies to do a great deal of marching back and forth and considerable fighting without causing any considerable destruction. In fact this is the rule; destruction is the exception.

It is related that when the war of 1870 was unloosed the high German command was awakened from his sleep and that he sleepily said something like, "Third drawer on the right, folder number sixteen seventy-five." Here were found complete detailed instructions concerning every step of the march to Paris. We may be sure that in 1914 the plans had been worked out even more carefully, and that no detail for which human research and foresight could provide was left unattended to for facilitating the one grand push which should again make Germany master of France and thereby make her master of Europe and of the world. The Belgians made them stop to take breath and modify the schedule a bit. Then they rushed on and did not stop until they reached the Marne and had spread over northeastern France. At this high tide of invasion they had taken possession of fifteen thousand square miles of French territory, or one-twentieth of France. But as this is its foremost industrial, as well as the best agricultural region, it had, not one-twentieth, but over one-tenth of the population of France,



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about four million people. Thus far little destruction of buildings had occurred, but now the German army ran against something. The French stopped at the Marne, and the Germans stopped there, too. The Crown Prince, who, we are told, had selected his restaurant and arranged for his dinner at Paris that night, changed his plans again. Fighting and destruction raged all along the line. When the Germans fell back no other permanent memorial of the battle of the Marne was needed. On the customary route from Paris to the front, when one arrives at Senlis, about fifteen miles out, one discovers considerable areas of the city in ruins. From here a belt eastward across France marks high tide at the Marne. This belt of devastation is one hundred and fifty miles long and from five to ten miles wide. A few temporary repairs have been made here and there, but in the main the ruins stand as they were left in September, 1914.

The Germans fell back a long way. In fact, they gave up almost one-half of the territory they had taken, say, about seven thousand square miles. Then both sides dug in, and trench life began, and with it a second belt of destruction, all the way from the North Sea to Switzerland. It varies in width, it varies in completeness. It is nowhere very wide. Although modern artillery carries long distances, there is not enough of it and it does not last long enough to destroy anything like all the territory within its range, but the main trench line of 1914 to 1916 will always be an easy line to trace along its hundreds of miles.

Then came the terrific fighting of 1916 in the British offensive along the valley of the Somme and

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in its vicinity. It was of unprecedented intensity, and in the many square miles over which the Germans were pushed back nothing was left standing. The Germans boasted that the British offensive had been stopped in a sea of blood and mud, but they were sufficiently impressed by it to make a grand strategic retreat in March, 1917—the famous Hindenburg retreat. This time they voluntarily gave up fifteen hundred square miles of territory and, in doing so, gave their first example on a large scale of voluntary, deliberate, wanton devastation. This zone, stretching through the departments of the Aisne, the Oise, and the Somme, was marked by substantially complete devastation except in a few cities, such as Noyon, to which the unfortunate inhabitants were gathered while their villages and country homes were destroyed. Back of this line the Germans held from March, 1917, to March, 1918, roughly speaking, 5,750 square miles. Then the Russians pulled out. The German lines on the west were reinforced and they made their great efforts of March and May, 1918. These were so formidable as to carry them over 2,300 square miles of territory, recapturing the devastated area and much more. Considerable destruction occurred all the way wherever anything was standing, for the going was bad, but still some cities survived in part even this trial by fire. At high tide, in the German advance of May and June, 1918, they held 8,000 square miles of territory. Then, the Americans helping, they were pushed back step by step, fighting every inch of the way, and the greatest amount of devastation in all the war occurred in driving them out of their holes.

*How Much Is There of It?*—There have been



**HOME FOR A FAMILY OF SIX**

A shelter to house a miner, his wife, and four children at St. Nicholas, a suburb of Arras, France.



**TEMPORARY SHELTER AT MERCATEL**

A destroyed village on the road between Arras and Bapaume. The German advance of March and April, 1918, was stopped at this point.

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various official accounts of the number of buildings destroyed, and they are interesting. In May, 1916, before the battle of the Somme, there was a survey which indicated 46,000 buildings partially or completely destroyed. In July, 1917, after the Somme battle and the Hindenburg retreat, another census showed 102,000 buildings damaged, of which almost exactly one-half were completely destroyed. When the smoke of the fighting preceding the armistice cleared away and it was possible to take account it appeared that in the fighting of 1918 the amount of physical destruction had been multiplied by four, so much more destructive had become the agencies of warfare during the progress of the war. This account, which is embodied in a report to the Chamber of Deputies on December 18, 1918, and which was revised a month later, indicated that the number of damaged buildings is 410,000, of which 240,000 are totally destroyed and 170,000 partially so. Totally destroyed, in this sense, undoubtedly means so far destroyed that it will be cheaper to tear down and build anew rather than to attempt to repair. The net result of all these orgies of destruction is that about 6,000 square miles of France, the equivalent, roughly, of a strip two miles wide stretching from New York to San Francisco, has become for all practical purposes a wilderness. This area had housed about 2,000,000 people, or 5 per cent. of France's population.

The value of these buildings is placed, in the report referred to above, at 19,000,000,000 francs, or nearly \$4,000,000,000, an average of \$2,000 per inhabitant. This might seem a high average, but it must be remembered that it not only includes houses, barns,

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and outbuildings, but also public buildings of all sorts and descriptions — school-houses, churches, hospitals, city halls, hotels, etc. Also, that in France buildings were of a permanent character and represented a large outlay of capital; also, that the cost of materials and of labor has been greatly increased by the war. Taking these facts into consideration, the estimate of an average of \$2,000 per inhabitant for the destruction of buildings is perhaps not greatly excessive. The value of the furniture, supplies, etc., in these buildings is estimated at \$2,000,000,000, one-half the value of the buildings. This again seems high and it may be found excessive. The total amount of damage inflicted by the war on the invaded regions is estimated in the same report, including the damages to agriculture, to mines, to factories of all sorts, machinery, railways, bridges, etc., at 122,301,000,000 francs, or a total of \$24,000,000,000.

When one comes to dealing with figures of this size they have long since lost any definite meaning. It might as well be \$5,000,000,000 or \$100,000,000,000 as \$40,000,000,000. No one can form any rational estimate of what it means in human terms. The one sure thing is that these physical properties have gone; that all these products of human labor put up by human hands through several centuries, all built to serve some useful human purpose—to keep out the rain and the cold in winter, to shelter children while they were being educated, or the sick while they were being cared for—have been wiped out, and this vast amount of human effort has been undone.

It is not simply a question of so many millions

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or billions of francs or dollars. Human hands must relay these bricks and stone. The cement, the lumber, and the glass must be brought from elsewhere. Somebody must get them ready. Long before the process of destruction was completed and its full magnitude known it was estimated that if all the men engaged in building operations before the war did nothing but build in the devastated area continuously they would be so occupied for fifteen years. If that were a correct estimate when made, the period of time must now be multiplied by three or four, since the fighting in 1918. Never before has the world faced at one time such a tremendous job of building, and never before was it in so bad a shape to begin it, so short of materials, so few means of getting them where they are needed, so short of men to do the work. But we must not think too much of the value of these buildings nor of the labor which must go into their reconstruction. We must bear in mind that until the job is finished, years from now, the purposes for which they were built will not be fulfilled. The people who were living in these houses will be living in cellars, shanties, corrugated-iron houses, dugouts, wooden barracks, that until just lately would not have been thought good enough stables for cows; that makeshifts will have to be used for schools, hospitals, churches, and for all community uses in so far as these are met. Because of the lack of suitable buildings life will remain for hundreds of thousands of people for indefinite periods, in many cases for years, a bare, hard existence without most of the aids which civilization has gradually evolved to make life cheerful, interesting, and worth while. In some such way as



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this the real devastation of France must be recorded. It is a devastation not simply of buildings, but of life, of thought, of feeling, of affections, of religion, of brotherhood, of hope, of courage. If we could *see* this devastated area of life, as we can that of the devastated city and country, we would have a clearer conception of what devastation means to France.

*Her Soldier Dead.*—The deaths among the soldiers of France caused by wounds are estimated by the American army authorities at 1,385,000. Besides these, there remain some 250,000 accounted “missing,” but most of whom must be added to the list of the dead. Then there are the deaths from sickness in the army and among the war prisoners. For the 550,000 war prisoners the deaths notified by German authorities amounted to 25,000. The deaths from sickness we may estimate at 80,000, or a total of 1,740,000, reckoning deaths from disease in the army and among prisoners very conservatively. Compared with any of the other great countries engaged in the war France’s loss of about one-fifth of her effective adult male population was far the highest. This unhesitating sacrifice of her sons entitles France to the gratitude and sympathetic friendship of every ally for all time to come.

It is quite impossible for us to arrive at the slightest conception of what the loss of 1,750,000 men means to a country the size of France. Consider it first simply from the human point of view, of grief, of mourning for lost sons, husbands, fathers, brothers. One or two slight comparisons may help. The United States’ loss from influenza amounted to about 600,000. It created everywhere in this



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country a sense of imminent danger. Undertakers could not bury the dead. Every one lost one or more from his immediate circle of relatives, friends, or acquaintances. Gloom, apprehension, grief, and distress were broadcast in the land. It was truly an appalling disaster and every bit of apprehension and distress was fully justifiable. If, however, we wish to picture France, all of France, her cities and villages and her countrysides, in their true condition, we must think of them as having lost, not only probably as heavily as we from the grippe, but also as having lost by deaths in the army eight times as many in proportion to population as we lost from influenza. If we had lost as many soldiers in proportion to our population as France did, we should have lost some 4,780,000 men, or eight times our estimated loss from influenza and ninety-three times our deaths from battle.

Shortly after my return from Europe I happened to meet a neighbor who was living a few doors away. We chatted a moment. I remarked, casually and thoughtlessly, "I suppose your boys are back from France." "Yes," he said, and his face quivered as he turned away, "that is, all who are coming back. We lost one." I reproached myself for not having remembered that this might be the case. I knew another neighbor whose son was killed in the war. There was a third friend in the same town, a city of 100,000, whose son I knew was killed in France. My first impression was that this was a large number, since only 51,000 Americans gave up their lives in France. May God forgive the "only"! When one is dealing with totals of millions, 51,000 seems but few. I happened to pick up the *Annual* of the

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graduating class of the high-school and found that of the class of 1919 no less than 17 were among those who had died in the service. I began to sense the extent to which the shadow of war sorrow had come to our own city. In the evening paper, in the proceedings of a memorial meeting was given a list of the boys from Yonkers who had died in France. It filled nearly a column. I was astounded at its length. I made a calculation then for the first time as to what would be, so to speak, Yonkers' quota of 51,000 deaths and realized that it would be 50. It was appalling to think that in these few square miles of territory and in every other group of population of the same size, on an average, from Florida to Washington and from southern California to Maine, there were fifty households which, however they might rejoice at the successful outcome of the war, would feel that the price to them had been terribly, terribly high. The loss of 51,000 men had brought a shade of gloom to every community in the entire land.

Then I tried to think for a moment what it would be like if we had lost our men in the same proportion as France. If we were mourning, not 51,000, but 4,780,000, this city would have lost, not a quota of 50, but a quota of 4,640. The average loss in every city, community, and town would be 93 times as great. The shade of gloom, so to speak, would be 93 times as heavy, the cloud 93 times as black. The question is whether it was worth while 93 times as frequent, the missing places in the ranks of industry, education, agriculture, and the professions and all along the line 93 times as numerous. France lost about one-fifth of all her men between eighteen and

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fifty. If there were no additional work to do, four men would have to do what was previously done by five, and from these four-fifths there are still to be deducted an army of cripples, and a much larger army than France had before, keeping the watch on the Rhine, on the Danube, and in Asia. And France not only has the work which she had before, but has a problem of reconstruction so big that nothing like an adequate survey has been made.

One should stop a moment in passing, too, to think of the sufferings of these poor men who died. Otherwise our picture would be hopelessly incomplete. Some of them were hardly conscious that they were wounded, death came so instantaneously. For huge numbers of others, who knows how many hundreds of thousands, there were hours or days or weeks of mental anguish and of physical torture. In all the earlier period, and all through the war, for that matter, only a small proportion in any of the armies could receive that immediate attention upon the battle-field which would have relieved their sufferings and increased their chances of recovery. They had to lie in the open field, perhaps under the hot sun, without drink or food, or walk or crawl or wriggle over fields or through woods or swamps, often for long distances, to find help, and then possibly could find none, for in such battles the individual counts for naught. Everything is disorganized, everything is insufficient, and he is lucky indeed who receives prompt and adequate attention. We must think, too, of their mental sufferings as they thought of the dear ones at home—of their wives, their children, their fathers, and mothers. They were dying gloriously for France, but they



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were human. They loved their homes, their children, and all the places to which they were accustomed. They loved life, believed in its promises, looked to its future. Not unwillingly they risked all and lost, but that did not diminish the bitterness of their grief when they realized that they were among those who were to pay the full price.

One must think, too, of the five hundred and fifty thousand French soldiers taken prisoners by the German armies and living in prison camps. As we saw German prisoners in France evidently not suffering from any serious lack of food nor from overwork and having a considerable degree of liberty, one gained the impression that they did not greatly mind being prisoners. The lot of the French prisoner was different. He was in a blockaded and a losing country whose resources and strength were hour by hour less adequate for the strain. The French prisoners, we may be sure, would not be the last to feel the pinch. There were not enough doctors to go around. The influenza was severe in the prison camps. Tuberculosis made great headway. Thousands of French families denied themselves needed food to send a package regularly to the father in the German prison camp, hoping it would reach him undiminished. Perhaps it did, perhaps not. The full story of the French prisoners is for the future.

*Cripples.*—It might naturally be expected that having so large an army, and having been in the thickest of the fighting from the outset to the last day of the war (France held 55 per cent. of the line and had 40 per cent. of all the soldiers on the western front on Armistice Day), and having a very skilful medical service, France would have a large number



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of cripples at the end of the war, probably larger both in numbers and in proportion than in any other Allied country. Such is, in fact, the case. The total number of cripples who had been awarded pensions or similar grants up to April 1, 1919, was just short of three hundred thousand. There were still three large categories to be added—those who had not yet established their rights, those still in hospitals, and those suffering lesser injuries who were still mobilized. All those having lost 10 per cent. of their effectiveness are entitled to pensions and the Pension Service estimates that the number will amount to two million. Even should this be an overestimate, the total will be formidable. Of those already pensioned 41 per cent. are farmers, 16 per cent. industrial workers, 12 per cent. in the building trades, and 9 per cent. in commerce.

The pensions to be paid these victims of the war will amount to a huge sum, but it is not so much of this that we should think, as of the crippling of the lives of these men, of losses for which no pension can make up. Their injuries range from minor ones which hardly interfere with normal enjoyment and usefulness, to those manglings which stopped just short of causing death, which make the victim helpless to enjoy life and useless in its tasks, perhaps an object of involuntary aversion on the part of his fellows who can hardly bear the sight of a man so distorted and deformed. For years they will endure an existence which has largely lost its meaning, however they may be cherished by their families and supported by a grateful people. They constitute not only a great financial burden, one of the elements in the reparation which Germany must pay if she

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can, but both subtract from the man-power available for reconstruction and add to the load, for they must be fed, clothed, sheltered, and tended.

The great bulk of those able to work will naturally return to their former occupations unless their injuries make this wholly impossible. Special courses of training go a surprisingly long way toward enabling a crippled man to earn a livelihood in some line of work. Schools for the "re-education" of cripples sprang up in various parts of France, some under private initiative and some under municipalities. Subsequently there was established a National Service for Cripples to co-ordinate and supplement these schools. The number of schools was considerable and their training very ingenious and very useful to the pupils, but the number of cripples seeking re-education remained quite small. This was due largely to a lack of understanding of what re-education could accomplish, partly to a fear of impairing their prospects of securing an adequate pension, and partly to an inclination to feel that they had done their duty once and for all and that some minor governmental post without excessive duties was the least reward which the government should offer. The number of pupils completing their re-education per year was as follows:

1915.....	1,288
1916.....	8,161
1917.....	17,935
1918 <sup>1</sup> .....	18,339

This rapid increase is encouraging, but the total is pitifully small compared with the number whose

<sup>1</sup>To September 1st.

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usefulness would be greatly increased by such training.

*Widows' Veils.*—We have spoken of the loss of a million and three-quarters of men to the future of France, but let us return for a moment to the present generation. We do not know how many of these men were married. The Pension Office had formal knowledge on the day of the armistice of 585,000 widows. The number must have been much larger than this. The black veil was to be seen on every street of every city of France. To the American it was, perhaps, the most frequent reminder of the war. But what the bystander felt for a few passing moments was the widows' lot all day, and every day—theirs and their children's.

We all have observed the effect of the changes wrought by the slowly passing months in homes from which the father has gone. We know how the acute grief, or even bitterness, is slowly and kindly dulled as time passes, but also how the added responsibilities sprinkle the mother's hair with gray and write lines in her face. Governments and peoples intend to be grateful and the generous would always recognize instantly the widow's paramount claim to aid. The trouble is that generosity is apt to be soon weary or to be fickle in its attachment, while the widow's need remains constant three hundred and sixty-five days in the year. It is hard, too, to devise any plan which is sufficiently elastic to fit the varying family circumstances and economic situations. Thus it has happened that the lot of the widow has usually been a much harder one than the complacent community has supposed. She has tried to carry a double load—support, as well as care for, her family.



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She has fallen short, inevitably, in three directions—insufficient support, insufficient care, and overdrafts on her own strength. Being unable to leave her home for domestic service, she falls into the hardest and least well paid of unskilled employments for women, with long hours, low pay, and excessive strain. That this will happen to a proportion of the widows of the Great War is inevitable. They will pay more than their share of its cost.

*Fatherless Wards of the Nation.*—The alarming state of the human resources of France is further indicated by the small number of fatherless children left by this million and three-quarters of dead soldiers. The official estimate as of the armistice date is 887,500 who have lost fathers only, and 12,000 who have lost both fathers and mothers. These figures probably approach quite closely the final totals. Shall we be glad or sorry that the number of fatherless children is so few; that of a million and three-quarters of the men of France only 585,000 were married, and that the average number of children left by these was but one and a half? Yet the real significance of 899,500 fatherless children is altogether beyond our comprehension. We may enter in some slight degree into the misfortunes of one fatherless child. It is to a slight degree only, for no one of us really knows the child's soul. But it is absolutely beyond the range of our powers of imagination and sympathy to form any notion whatever of what fatherlessness means to 899,500 children. Long before we had comprehended more than a minute fraction we should cry out in distress and beg for any other fate rather than that of wholly understanding what such figures mean,



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The fatherless children of France rightfully appealed to the sympathies of America. The American Red Cross, through the Children's Bureau, ministered especially to medical needs and to saving the lives of the babies. The organization known as the Fatherless Children of France distributed monthly grants to many thousands of these half-orphans. Other American agencies established institutions for them or for children driven from their homes near the front. The war orphans, as they were popularly called, were also a first charge upon French benevolence. But all these agencies combined could diminish their hardships by only pitiful fractions and could in no appreciable degree diminish their sorrow.

The children must prematurely assume responsibilities and must be without the guidance, companionship, inspiration, and education which can come only from daily contact with both parents. Such losses are not all of to-day or to-morrow. They project themselves through many years of the future. Not until well after the twenty-first century has begun to write its record will there be none in France to look back and say, "How different my life might have been had I not lost my father in the Great War!"

The government of France was conscious of its peculiar obligations to these children and after suitable deliberation it expressed its sense of that obligation by the enactment of a law making the nation their guardian. This statute, remarkably well drafted, as well as based on the soundest of principles, became a law on July 27, 1917. Its opening sentences read as follows:

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France adopts those orphans whose father, mother, or family support perished, in the course of the war of 1914, a military or civil victim of the enemy.

There are entitled to the same privileges as orphans those children, born or conceived before the end of the war, whose father, mother, or family support are incapable of gaining a livelihood by their labor by reason of wounds received or illnesses contracted or aggravated by the war.

Children thus adopted have a right to the protection and to the material and moral support of the state for their education, within the conditions and limits set forth in this law, until they have attained their majorities.

This does not mean that the nation deprived the mother or close relatives of the actual care of the children nor of the duty of providing for their support in as far as she could. The war had robbed these children of their fathers, but the state did not make the mistake of taking away their mothers also. It meant in substance that the nation, recognizing that the father's life had been given for it, acknowledged its obligation, and underwrote the making good of his loss in so far as such a loss can be made good. The plan is to give the mother any assistance she may need to maintain and educate the children. If, unfortunately, the mother also is dead or if she is unable to actually care for the children herself from sickness or serious disqualification the children are to be supported by the state and placed with near relatives or with other carefully chosen families, keeping so far as possible their former status and identity in the community, and not being set aside as a separate class of children. Only those needing some special treatment or needing protection by reason of mental defect are to be placed in institutions. Such institutions are to be especially de-

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signed to provide for the particular needs of their inmates, whether physically or mentally.

The machinery created to administer the law is imposing, but such as to justify confidence in its impartiality. The whole administration is in a sense auxiliary to the Ministry of Education, but it is in a very large degree autonomous. There is created as the highest authority and ultimate responsibility for proper administration a National Board with ninety-nine members. These are selected in an interesting way. They include among others: three Senators elected by the Senate; four Deputies elected by the Chamber of Deputies; the presidents of the Municipal Council of Paris and of the Council-General of the Department of the Seine; the mayors of the five largest cities of France; the presidents of the Councils-General of the five most populous departments; various government officials; the president of the Chamber of Commerce of Paris; six delegates from the agricultural syndicates, elected by the Superior Council of Agriculture; six from the syndicates of employers and workers, selected by the Superior Council of Labor; two delegates from workmen's co-operative societies; four delegates from friendly societies; twelve delegates, of either sex, from philanthropic or professional associations having to do with war orphans; five persons chosen by the President of the Republic for special qualifications or achievements; a delegate from the Institute; one from the Academy of Medicine, etc.

There is also to be in each department a board made up in a somewhat similar manner, and finally there is in each canton a board with at least one member for each commune.



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An effort has obviously been made to create an organization broadly representative of French opinion and separated from the network of bureaucracy. The national body is the law- and policy-making organ; the departmental body is the executive agent; and the local sections are to exercise a friendly oversight, to give the mother advice and moral assistance, and to see to it that she is given such material aid as she may need.

The principles and general plan of this statute are admirable. Its operations must inevitably depend upon the wisdom and the efficiency of those chosen to administer it.

*Soldiers' Families.*—The ordinary soldier of France served his country as a matter of duty, not of employment. During the first fourteen months of the war he received 1 cent per day; from October 1, 1915, to October 1, 1918, 5 cents per day; since October 1, 1918, 15 cents per day. His living was, of course, provided by the army. Obviously his family could not receive any aid from his pay. To meet their needs an allowance was made to soldiers' wives of 30 cents per day, and of 30 cents per day for each child over sixteen unable to work and 25 cents per day for children under sixteen. In view of increased cost of living the allowances for children were raised to 35 and 30 cents per day on November 1, 1918. The allowance to refugee families was the same for the mother, but was 20 cents per day per child. The soldier's family also profited by the fact that if living in the same place since the opening of the war it could not be evicted or prosecuted for non-payment of rent. Since mobilization was very complete, the great majority of families were



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included in the term "soldiers' families" and were supported by a government allowance. In case of families having large gardens or owning farms which could be worked by the women, the aged, and the children a fair degree of well-being was not difficult. For refugees, and for those depending wholly upon wages, and in which there was no able-bodied worker, the full force of rising prices was felt, and living became a serious problem. This applied to all classes of families alike, whether widows with orphans, soldiers' families, refugees, or the relatively few families not included in any of these categories.

*General Conditions.*—We have considered the refugees, the widows and orphans, and the various groups which suffered directly from the war. How about the French population as a whole? What were the general conditions produced by the war? We have heard many conflicting opinions on this subject, from that which saw France on the verge of revolution from privation, to that which saw her becoming swollen with riches spent by the Allied armies; from that which saw her on the edge of starvation, to that which saw her eating plenty of the best of everything while her allies went on short rations. The facts were complicated and far from any of these extremes. France is a great food-producer. Before the war, an average of 1909-13, she consumed annually 19,000,000 tons of food, of which she herself produced 17,000,000 tons. Her imports were chiefly wheat, dried peas and beans, olive-oil, and cocoa. The French lived well; cooking was a fine art; they knew good food, and knew how to enjoy it.

During the war, in spite of the mobilization of the

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men and of the use of transport so largely for war purposes and of countless obstacles to agriculture, production held up remarkably well. There was, of course, some falling off. The estimated production of grain for the year beginning September 1, 1918, was 13 per cent. below that of pre-war days, that of meats 33 per cent., that of sugar 83 per cent.

Meanwhile, it had become necessary to impose various restrictions upon the consumption of food by the civilians. The evil day was postponed as long as possible, but it came. The composition of the bread was fixed some time before it was rationed. Later, a previous average consumption of 600 grams per person per day was cut to a ration of 300 grams per day and a system of bread-cards instituted. For those engaged in hard manual labor an increase to 500 grams was allowed. Sugar was rationed at first at 750 grams per capita per month, and this was subsequently cut to 500. The selling of confectionery, cakes, etc., at first limited to certain days, was discontinued altogether. The use of milk was sharply controlled, children and the sick having first claim. Its service in hotels and restaurants was discontinued. Meatless days were established, but as other food became even more scarce, they were subsequently discontinued. The total consumption of food contemplated for the year beginning September 1, 1918, was 10,000,000 tons, not including the occupied area, as against a total pre-war consumption, noted above, of 16,000,000; 3,000,000 tons of dairy products are not taken into account in either estimate.

Food prices rose in the course of the war, but not remarkably until toward the end of 1917. During

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1918 the rise was very sharp and all families which were obliged to buy their entire food-supply and were living on an allowance or a fixed income found themselves obliged to curtail sharply their purchases.

Fuel was also very scarce during the last two winters of the war and, in fact, also in that of 1918-19. Some of the mines were in German hands, the supply of labor was sharply limited, and transport was very difficult. Everybody suffered from the cold. Heat could not be turned on in steam-heated premises until November 1st and was cut off on April 1st. People sat in the library of the university in their overcoats. Even the well-to-do were lucky to have one warm room in the house. Hot water was available in hotels only on Saturdays and Sundays. The use of electric current was reduced by substituting bulbs of lower voltage and cutting out many lights altogether. Street lighting was cut to a minimum. Cities and villages were in a semi-darkness during evenings and in many rural districts there were no lights at all. There were a few cities in which the enforcement of all these measures for saving food and fuel was notably inadequate, but these were minor exceptions. France as a whole, from 1916 on, went cold, gloomy, and, if not hungry, at least in sight of hunger.

All these conditions, together with interesting sidelights on some of the economic changes which took place in France, will appear more clearly in an interesting study of actual conditions in a typical French community in 1918, a summary of which is the closing portion of this chapter.

*Huge Excess of Deaths Over Births.*—What were



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the effects upon the population of France of wholesale mobilization and of lowered standards of living? It is too soon to give a final answer to questions except as to one extremely important phase—the declining birth-rate.

Here the effect of the war was very prompt and very striking. In the seventy-seven uninvaded departments (of a total of eighty-six) the number of births for the six years beginning 1913 was as follows:

1913.....	604,811
1914.....	594,222
1915.....	387,806
1916.....	315,087
1917.....	343,310
1918.....	399,041

This is cutting it perilously nearly in half. In reality, the facts for France as a whole are considerably more serious even than these figures indicate. In the nine invaded departments, where the births in 1913 numbered 141,203, there were very few after 1914. Two million refugees from this zone were in the interior, and their births are already included in the figures above. The three million people back of the lines included so few men that we may be sure that the birth-rate was very low. In Lille, for instance, the population was reduced to one-half, but the number of births was reduced to one-eighth.

The same situation may be expressed a little differently, as follows: Beginning with 1914 the number of deaths (not including the deaths of soldiers) exceeded the number of births in the seventy-seven uninvaded departments of France. The excess of deaths was as follows:



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1914.....	53,327
1915.....	267,340
1916.....	292,655
1917.....	269,838
1918.....	389,575
<hr/>	
Total.....	1,272,735

This makes a total of 1,272,735 excess of deaths over births during these five years. The birth deficit will undoubtedly continue through the greater part of 1919. If it continued at the same rate in 1919 as in 1918 this would mean a further 205,771 excess of deaths, or a total for the six years 1914 to 1919, inclusive, of 1,478,506 more deaths than births. The American army's estimate of the number of French soldiers who died on the battle-field or from the effects of wounds is 1,385,000. To this must be added the proportion of deaths among those reckoned as missing. It is evident that, so far as reducing France's population is concerned, Germany's terrific war-machine was not more successful upon the field of battle than was the indirect effect of the war in the homes of France.

This great fall in the birth-rate would ordinarily be accompanied by a fall in the infant death-rate. On the contrary, the death-rate rose. In 1914 one in every nine of the babies of France died, in 1915 one in seven, in 1916 and 1917 one in eight, in 1918 one in seven.

The death-rate of the population as a whole also rose considerably. Not counting soldiers' deaths, the death-rate per 1,000 on the estimated population in the seventy-seven uninvaded departments was as follows:

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1913.....	17.7
1914.....	19.6
1915.....	19.1
1916.....	18.1
1917.....	18.6
1918.....	23.8

Except as to infants under one year, we have no classification of deaths by causes after the beginning of the war. We cannot, therefore, trace the war's effects upon tuberculosis, for example, with any degree of certainty. Numerous partial statistics from various localities show conflicting results. Two broad general facts, however, stand out clearly—first, that France lost about 1,750,000 soldiers, and, second, that the excess of deaths over births during the war period (including 1919) will be about 1,480,000, a total loss of population of 3,230,000. France started the war with 39,500,000 people. She ends it with about 36,280,000, with every prospect of a death-rate exceeding its birth-rate for some years to come. She could not stand many such wars, even if always victorious.

*Intensive Survey of a Typical French Community After Four Years of War.*—In the summer of 1918, primarily for the purpose of getting a fresh estimate of the actual serious needs of the French population at that time, the American Red Cross in France detailed two of its experienced workers, Mr. and Mrs. Basil de Selincourt (the latter, Anne Douglas Sedgwick), to take up their residence in a typical French community for the purpose of making as complete a picture as possible of the actual conditions of human life in that locality. Both these workers spoke French with facility, one of them

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was half French, both of them had lived a great deal in France and were extremely devoted to her interests. They were told to forget all previous plans, estimates, and activities, and ask, simply, "Who are suffering here and what help do they most need?" They had taken part in several important pieces of American relief work in France and were exceptionally qualified to describe accurately what they saw. A summary of a few of their actual observations in this community will give a better picture of the effects of the war upon the people of France than could be secured in any other way. The locality was selected as being typical, so far as that is possible, of French communities. It was sufficiently far from the war zone not to be affected except as most other parts of France had been. It had no munition-factories. It was a village with a population of 2,600, in which there was one large factory established a hundred years ago. Before the war it employed 1,540 people, of whom 125 were men, 630 were girls living at the factory, 410 were women living at home, and 375 both lived and worked at home. Not all these employees, however, were residents of the town; in fact, about two-thirds were from elsewhere. The girls who lived at the factory and were over thirteen years of age worked from six to six and lived under the immediate supervision of a religious sisterhood. There was another small factory which closed immediately after mobilization. The other large element in the community was the peasant farmer, 450 in number, typical, presumably, of that vast number of farmers who we are accustomed to say constitute the backbone of France. At any rate they are the largest

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factor in France as a whole, for the official figures state that agriculture occupied 8,500,000 French men and women in 1911; industry, 7,500,000; commercial pursuits, 2,000,000; domestic service, 700,000; army and marine, 600,000, and liberal professions, 550,000. The *cultivateur* is the most numerous, and probably the most characteristic, element of the French population. A quarter of the land of this village is tilled, a quarter is forest, a sixth each is vineyards, pasture, and waste land or lawns and gardens, the proportion of forest and waste land being unusually large.

*Population.*—This little town, like many others in France, was already losing ground before the war. In the three years ending 1913 its deaths numbered 110, while its births numbered only 80. This serious menace was greatly intensified by the war, for in the three years 1915, 1916, and 1917 the deaths, not including soldiers, increased to 144 and the births fell to 42. It had, therefore, lost 100 people in those three years, a rate which, if continued, must result in the disappearance of the community in the early future. The soldiers' deaths numbered 42, making a total of deaths of 186 during the years 1915, 1916, and 1917, as against 42 births. In 1918, up to October 1st, there were 8 births and 36 deaths of civilians, as well as 14 of soldiers, the worst record of all. Sixteen of its men were taken as prisoners of war and 14 were discharged from the army as unfit for service from injuries or illness. There were 666 households in the town; among these were 124 childless couples, 202 with one child, 132 with two children, and only 98 with three or more. But, alas, of these latter a goodly proportion were



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not French people, but had come from a far more fertile country to the southeast for the employment offered in the factory.

*Prices.*—The cost of living in this town, in the opinion of our inquirers, had increased 200 per cent. during the war. The actual figures of some of the items were:

<i>Article</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>1914 Price</i>	<i>1918 Price</i>
Potatoes.....	per 100 lbs.....	\$.64	\$5.45
Rice.....	per lb.....	.07	.32
Milk.....	per pint.....	.017	.06
Butter.....	per lb.....	.22	1.00
Veal or pork.....	per lb.....	.20	.545
Eggs.....	each.....	.009	.045
Dried beans.....	per lb.....	.036	.20
Dried peas.....	per lb.....	.045	.27

Bread doubled in price and still sold at a loss.

The article most frequently substituted for bread—potatoes—had increased eight and a half times in price. Clothing and other necessities had increased in price even more than food. Some details as to clothing materials are given later.

*Wages.*—Before the war the women earned from 60 to 80 cents per day in the mill. Wages had increased during the war by slow stages to a total of 35 per cent., or rather the wage had remained stationary, but there had been added a temporary allowance amounting to 35 per cent., in recognition of the high cost of living, making the average earnings from 80 cents to \$1. Thirty-five per cent. had been added to the wages, 200 per cent. had been added to the cost of living.

*Labor.*—The war brought many changes to the

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economic life of this village. The men mobilized numbered 247 at the outset and over a hundred more were called out later. The smaller factory closed at once. The larger factory lost many of its men, and many of its women left to work in the fields in place of their mobilized husbands. After much difficulty some of the women in the factory were induced to take up the essential jobs which had heretofore been reserved for the men. The hesitation was overcome in some cases only by taking the women to a large city some distance away and showing them how the women were successfully doing men's work. About one hundred workers from Italy left for home when Italy entered the war. The number of "hands" in the mill was reduced from 1,540 in 1914 to 967 in 1916. In 1918, even with 126 refugees, its employees numbered 1,010.

The farms had to be operated, for they were the source of living for 338 of the 666 households. Omitting forests, building sites, and waste land the average size of the farms was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  hectares, or about 7 acres. Each farmer needs four sorts of land—forest, pasture, tilled field, and vineyard—and each man has a number of different strips of each kind of land, often from 25 to 50, to make up the small total of 7 acres. The work before the war was done largely by oxen. There were only 52 horses in the commune in 1912 and more than half of these were requisitioned for the army. Most of the others were owned by tradesmen. There were very few sheep, almost no hogs, and very few goats. The farmer was reasonably independent of the price of food, but was very dependent upon the surplus farm produce for the income with which to buy other necessities. Practi-

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cally all the men went to the war. The women, old men, and boys carried on the farms as best they could with a diminished number of cattle and hardly any horses. They could not secure proper fertilizer for the land and they planted crops for immediate results without regard to future fertility. Also, they could work only part of the land. The rest grew up to weeds. They managed to raise food sufficient for their actual necessities and also to make their outside purchases, but it was done at the cost of a serious impairment of the value and future fertility of their land.

The smaller mill, above referred to as closing upon mobilization, was subsequently reopened under government control. Its roster of 78 employees included 17 Portuguese, 10 Russians, 5 Italians, 27 French mobilized men, 3 refugees, and only 16 local residents.

The village is much more isolated than formerly. Formerly there were seven trains each way on its railway, but now there were only two.

*Some Family Groups.*—Here is an account, condensed from the de Selincourt report, of one family of war orphans in this little village. The widow has four children. She is a farmer's wife, but there is something in her perfect candor, in her manner, in the courteous reception, in the sober and care-worn beauty of her features, which produces a singularly sympathetic effect upon the visitors and gives them a sense of the virtues and values of the solid foundation of the farmer's life, the underlying strength of France. Her husband was lost from tuberculosis. He came back from the army with it, and died after a disabling illness of

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three months. One girl was without the use of one arm and hand which had remained weak and undeveloped. She was ill, and they feared tuberculosis. There were two little boys aged ten and thirteen and another boy, a stalwart youth with red cheeks and frank eyes, who was just old enough to join the military class of 1920 the next month. The mother remarked, thoughtfully, but without bitterness, that this was one of "the little annoyances of the war." What are they to do when the boy goes? The mother is already working for her children as hard as possible. They own the small farm and have two cows. They have already been obliged to let a good part of their land go to weeds. "Work in the fields is hard for a woman," the widow remarks, "but when she has an invalid child upon her hands and two others it is impossible for her to look after them and also do the farm-work, which alone takes an able-bodied man, for the hours of work are long for the French farmer."

In this little town 247 men were called to arms at the opening of the war. This number has since been increased to about 360. Of these men, 56 have been killed, 16 are prisoners in Germany, and 14 are out of the service on account of injuries. Most of the cripples are still able to go on with their former occupations. One, who had lost his left arm, had learned bookkeeping. Among the cripples, however, was one very pitiful case. He undoubtedly represents what in the total is a large number in France. He has lost both arms, one at the shoulder. He had been married just before he left for the war, and they were now, as he said, enjoying their first housekeeping. They were shortly expecting their



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first baby. He had learned the trade of rope-making in a hospital for the re-education of cripples, but much of that work requires the help of the wife. She has not only to do her housekeeping, to wash, dress, and feed a husband who is helpless to care for himself, but also to do the greater part of the rope-making and to carry their wares to the market at some distance. The best the two are able to earn is 30 cents per day. They have an allowance from the government which amounts to 60 cents, so that they have a total income of 90 cents per day. They reckon that it will be impossible for them to keep the baby at home and go on with their work and are planning to put the baby out to nurse, as is common in France. This will greatly diminish the baby's chances of surviving infancy, a fact which they did not at all understand. They were charming and courageous, and the responsibility for the future seemed to rest more heavily upon the woman than upon the helpless cripple, who had the sunniest expression and even a gay smile.

*Refugees.*—Some refugees came to this little town as early as the spring of 1916, others came in 1917, but up to January, 1918, the total number was only 60. Then came the deluge, and by July there were 283 refugees from the front, or repatriates who arrived by way of Switzerland. This equaled 11 per cent. of the original population. Most of those who could, worked in the factory; some of them received a small allowance from the government; none of them, of course, had farms. It was plainly to be seen that life for these people was more bare and difficult than for the natives. The refugees and repatriates had been of a rather better economic status than the natives

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of the town, and it was difficult for them to live in the worst of the dilapidated houses, or even in the barracks and outbuildings, and to match scanty earnings and a slender allowance against a cost of living which rapidly increased to three times its normal figure.

Here, for instance, is a family consisting of a Madame X., her married daughter, Madame W., an unmarried daughter, and a little granddaughter aged four. They live in a tiny, dilapidated, unsanitary house, crowded in behind the other houses on the street. The married daughter, aged twenty-six, is soon to have another baby. She works in the factory when she can, and earns about 75 cents a day. The unmarried daughter seems to be mentally lacking and usually works only about two days a week. The mother is a curious, tidy woman who seems bewildered and extremely disheartened by the extraordinary changes which the war had brought to them. The son-in-law, having been mobilized and assigned to work in the vicinity, receives no wages, but, on the other hand, is an additional expense when he comes to spend week-ends with them. The purchase of clothes or shoes is out of the question, and the little girl's feet are almost without covering. Equally impossible is it to buy any of the necessary utensils for the household. There are no toilet conveniences, either inside the house or outside. Old Madame X. spoke with tears in her eyes of the comfortable house they had near Lille and seemed to miss most of all the tidy privy. Her husband had been accidentally killed some years before. At home they had four well-furnished rooms with plenty of good beds and immaculate sheets. They had a neat

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garden and kept chickens and rabbits and a goat. She and her daughter, whose mental abilities were sufficient for working in the field, earned 50 cents a day each in the field. The married daughter and her husband each earned \$1 a day in the factory, so that altogether they earned \$3 a day, and living only cost one-half of what it does now. There also was a son at the front to whom packages of food had to be sent from time to time. The picture, altogether, was that of a former life of comparative prosperity, of assured comfort, while now the only certainties were a most uncomfortable home, an income barely sufficient to buy food and wholly insufficient to provide clothing and fuel.

Here is another refugee household consisting of Madame C. and Madame D., sisters-in-law, living in two bare, miserable rooms. Madame C., with a baby of six months, cannot go out to work. Her husband is at the front, and her son of sixteen was killed by a bomb before they left their home. A boy of thirteen works in the factory, but, as he does some sort of apprenticeship work, he receives no wages. Before the war her husband and she had been market-gardeners with a comfortable house, stable, horse, chickens, and had lived very comfortably. Madame D. is not well enough to work in the factory, but goes out to housework for three or four hours a day and earns from 20 to 30 cents. She has a little girl of eight who, obviously, needs shoes and many things besides. Madame D.'s husband before the war was a factory worker, earning \$1.10 a day. Madame C., with the baby in her arms, still maintained an air of patient philosophy, but Madame D., sunken together on a chair, with



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dull eyes, wan cheeks, pinched red nose, and an expression of utter fatigue, helplessness, and hunger, could only bewail with dull regret the lack of their comfortable house with its pleasant and well-furnished rooms.

A man who was thoroughly familiar with the life of the town before and during the war, who held an important position in the factory and assisted in much of the buying of groceries for the village, worked out a very interesting budget of family expenses as they were before the war and now, with characteristic French detail. He had in mind a family of a workman, wife, and three children under ten years of age. Such a man, he assumed, would earn \$1.20 a day for six days, a total of \$7.20 a week, before the war. To this there will now be added about one-third increase in wages, or a total of \$9.60. His weekly expenses were worked out in great detail, but we may summarize them as follows:

<i>Article</i>	<i>Pre-war</i>	<i>Present</i>
Food.....	\$3.98	\$16.29
Laundry.....	.25	1.76
Light.....	.19	.30
Heat.....	.33	.80
Clothing.....	1.17	4.66
Shoes.....	.39	.78
Medical care and medicine..	.07	.07
Rent.....	.61	.61
Miscellaneous.....	.19	.37
	\$7.17	\$25.63
Totals.....		

If we omit from the \$25.63 the estimated cost of the wine, \$4, which the French certainly consider necessary, there still remains a living cost of \$21.63



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to be met from an income of \$9.60. Under these circumstances the only thing to be done is to tighten the belt, buy no clothing, and shiver in cold weather for lack of fuel.

In support of his estimate on clothing he gives the following prices of materials:

<i>Article</i>	<i>1914</i>	<i>1918</i>
Material for woolen dress (per yard) . .	\$ .90	\$8.24
Material for cotton dress (per yard) . . .	.25	.90
Woolen stockings . . . . .	.40 to .60	2.00
Straw hats . . . . .	.40	1.40
Men's shirts . . . . .	.70	3.00
Men's boots . . . . .	4.00	11.00
Children's shoes . . . . .	1.60 to 2.00	5.00 to 8.00
Material for linen shirts . . . . .	.38	2.40

*Health.*—We can readily imagine that in such a town as this under these conditions there will be many sick people. There were two physicians, but one of them was so old as to be unable to practise. The other, besides being responsible for all the medical practice within a radius of twenty miles, occupied also the most important public position in the community, one which might naturally have occupied all his time. It goes without saying, therefore, that only the most necessary medical attention could be given to those who were obviously most seriously in need of it. Nursing as we know it is an unknown factor. Before the war there were two small hospitals, but at present two military hospitals with sixty beds each are the only hospital facilities. The epidemic of influenza was just beginning and one heard of whole families prostrated with it. No one felt any responsibility for the medical care of the refugees and repatriates.

## THE HUMAN COSTS OF THE WAR

*Government.*—The point of contact with all the great world at Paris is the secretary to the mayor. Before the war he was a whole-time employee and received a salary of \$345 a year, plus rent and heat for the family of himself, wife, and two children. The high cost of living has been recognized for him by the municipal authorities granting him a total increase in salary of 30 cents per day. His wife also has been recognized as an assistant and given a salary of 40 cents a day. The two children have grown up and earn small wages in the factory. With this total income of a little over \$600 the family barely manages to live. The amount of work piled upon this municipal official has increased fully in proportion to the cost of living, if his income has not. He it is who must look out for all the bewildering variety of governmental allowances given under widely varying conditions to the families of soldiers; to widows and orphans; to the families of those who have been dismissed from the army for sickness or disease, if they are fortunate enough to receive any; to the heads of large families. He also must distribute a complexity of allowances to refugees and repatriates, with wide variations under special circumstances. This population of refugees and repatriates differs from day to day. Arrivals and departures are almost daily matters, and the lists must be changed constantly. Any one leaving town must have a safe-conduct from the mayor. He must give out all the food-cards for each man, woman, and child. He must make the delicate decisions as to who are entitled to 500 grams of bread, who to 400, who to 300, and who only to 200. All military requisitions must pass through the City Hall. Here

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come all the farmers to make known the size of their crops of wheat, of corn, and of wine, and to tell how many horses, cattle, sheep, and pigs they have and in what condition. He must reply to the innumerable requests from the government of every conceivable sort. His office hours are from daylight until dark, and he has to deal with an endless procession of people, all of whom have very justifiable grievances. He knows that they can get only a fraction of what they want and actually need, and his principal job comes to be that of finding excuses and of presenting reasons as to why things cannot be done. He must throw all possible obstacles in the way of those who want relief because there is not enough to go around. The infinite perplexities which red tape will yield must be availed of to the utmost.

Aside from the funds coming from the government, there is little to be expected from private resources. The mind of the French people does not run in that channel. Every man is to have his fair chance in life—that is what democracy means; but if he does not succeed in providing for himself and family, whose fault is it but his own? The margin is so slight that who can expect those who succeed to divide with those who have failed? The people are sharply divided, too, into those who adhere strongly to the Church and those who do not. If you receive any private relief, it is most scanty.

As a check against the conditions of this particular town, similar inquiries were made by other investigators in another town only two and a half hours from Paris. This was a city of 5,000 people which had run a fairly normal course during the war until after the misfortunes of early 1918, when it was over-



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run both by refugees and by military establishments which had been driven back from nearer the front. It tells almost exactly the same story of increase in the cost of necessities in 1918 as compared with 1914. It adds some interesting comparisons of wages in different establishments. In one which made toilet articles, the largest factory in town before the war, for a work-day of eleven and a half hours men made from 80 to 90 cents. Now they received from \$1.10 to \$1.40. It also now employed women, which it did not do before, and they received from 8 to 9 cents per hour. Both men and women also received an allowance on account of the high cost of living which amounted to 20 cents per day additional. This indicates a total increase in wages of from 60 to 80 per cent. In another establishment, dealing with wines, wages have increased from 80 cents to \$1.20 for a day's work of eleven hours. In another, men's wages for a work-day of eleven hours have increased from a dollar to \$1.30 and \$1.50 and women's wages from 50 cents to from 65 to 75 cents. Also, the men received 20 cents additional and the women 15 cents additional as an allowance on account of the high cost of living. Carpenters' wages have risen from 10 cents an hour to 16 cents an hour; laundresses who formerly received 50 cents a day now receive 75 cents a day. Women doing general housework have increased from a range of \$6 to \$8.50 a month to that from \$10 to \$12 a month. The increased cost of food, light, heat, and clothes follows very closely that for other cities—namely, an increase of about 200 per cent. as compared with an increase of wages of 50 per cent.

This concrete account of the details of life in two



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typical communities, just before the close of the war, shows that to everybody life had become a serious and, to many, almost an insoluble, problem. Long hours of hard work, instead of yielding a comfortable living as formerly, with sufficient food, clothing, and fuel and with reasonably comfortable surroundings, brought now only the barest of necessities, scanty food, no new clothes, and not enough wood or coal to keep comfortable in winter. The doctors were mostly away with the army, and those remaining could give only the slightest of attention to a few of the very sick, to those most able to command medical services. Scattered through this population were refugees and repatriates, notably worse off than the natives. It is a picture of bareness which could not but diminish still further the already very low birth-rate and the effects of which upon the health, vigor, and spirit of the people must continue to be felt for many years to come. It is not surprising that the people who before the war accepted the existing situation as very satisfactory are now, almost to a man, bitterly discontented and anxious for some sort of change.

## VI

### ITALY: WAR WIPES OUT TWO MARGINS

Pre-war Italy; exiles after Caporetto; the occupied Veneto; devastated Italy; a hungry nation; from deprivation to disease—slipping back into the plagues; tuberculosis; the return of malaria; child mortality; typhoid; “flu”; military losses; total human losses; war orphans; cripples; the return of the prisoners; soldiers’ families.

**P**RE-WAR ITALY.—Before the war Italy presented the contradictory picture of an infertile country lacking the necessities of life and a fertile and rapidly increasing population. She imported coal to keep her people warm and run her transportation and factories, raw materials for making clothes, and great quantities of food, but she exported men by the hundreds of thousands annually. She had a narrow margin of economic well-being and a wide margin of population growth. War wiped out both.

Her population by actual count in 1911 was 34,671,377. Her birth-rate was over 30 per 1,000 as compared with 18 for France and 24 for the United States. Her death-rate also was high—20 per 1,000, as against 14 in the United States and 17.7 in France.

She entered the war in May, 1915. Already she had been feeling the effects of the war in the increasing difficulty of securing her supplies of food and fuel. Mobilization immediately stopped her export

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of men and diminished her production of food. The submarine increased the difficulties of getting supplies from overseas, and high prices quickly placed a sufficiency of these articles beyond the reach of a large part of the population. At best, they had led so precarious a living, on so narrow a margin, that huge numbers annually turned their faces toward America.

Austria, against whom her effort was directed, was already busy fighting Russia, and only the difficulties of a mountainous frontier prevented Italy from carrying the war far into the enemy's country. As it was, she made slight progress geographically, but succeeded for over two years in keeping the war just over the border into Austrian territory. The earlier effects of the war on Italy were those common to her entire population—absence of men at the front, scarcity of food, high prices. Two years later, however, in October, 1917, she was to know fully, as Belgium, France, and Serbia had done, what it meant to have war waged on her own soil.

*Exiles after Caporetto.*—When the war had gone on for nearly two and a half years, and Italy, though fully mobilized and making extraordinary efforts, had made but little headway in carrying the war into Austria, and as food became more and more scarce, and prices higher and higher, the voice of the pacifist began to be heard in the land. Teuton propaganda saw the opening and soon converted this break in the line of the national will into a break through the line at the front. She accomplished by the aid of propaganda what she had not been able to accomplish with the bayonet and artillery alone, and, in October, 1917, the Germans and Austrians

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came through the Italian line at Caporetto in the far northeast. The whole front had to be withdrawn, enormous quantities of stores had to be destroyed or left behind, great military hospitals had to be abandoned at the moment of their greatest need. With some aid from their British and French allies, but chiefly by the reorganization of their own forces, they stopped the enemy along the Piave River, which empties into the Adriatic some twenty miles east of Venice. The new line ran from this point some forty-five miles northwest along the Piave, then turned west another forty-five miles to the Austrian frontier. From this point on, the remaining ninety miles of the line were still in Austrian territory.

As the Italian army retreated in confusion and the Austrian and German armies came on rapidly the people of the invaded region, known as the Veneto, one of the richest agricultural districts of Italy, with only a few cities, had to make the choice which so many of their allies in France and Serbia had faced—to flee or to hide. They were equally unprepared. The war had been on for over two years, but every one had expected the Italian line to move forward, not backward. There were about a million and a half people in the portion of Italy east of the Piave River and about one-third chose to flee, the same proportion as in invaded France. When the line was re-established at the Piave the villages and countrysides near the line had to be evacuated. Venice and some other near-by cities were also evacuated by reason of danger of capture and the imminence of air bombardments. About a half-million people hastily gathered a few articles in their



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hands, streamed along the roadside, walking day and night, and later were crowded into freight-trains and sent somewhere, anywhere, into the interior of Italy. Their physical sufferings *en route*, while serious and sufficiently dramatic to attract the attention of the world, were far less serious than the utter confusion, helplessness, and mental distress into which they were plunged by this sudden and complete break with their hopes of a lifetime, the surroundings to which they were almost as completely and intimately adjusted as are the trees to the soil, the means by which they had been able to live in comfort and happiness. It was one of the most progressive, efficient sections of Italy, free from the grinding poverty of the infertile south, free also from the narrow margin which a rapidly growing and unsympathetic industry had imposed upon the industrial populations of the cities of the north.

Where could they go? Naturally everybody's first thought was of the vacant summer homes and tourist hotels with which Italy was well provided. Long train-loads after train-loads found their way to the Adriatic coast, to the Riviera district, and to Sicily. Other scores of thousands went to the industrial cities of the north—Milan, Genoa, and Florence. Not many were sent to Rome—it is not a good thing to have too much evidence of the distress of war and too many dissatisfied voices heard at the seat of government. Not many went to the southern end of the peninsula or to Messina. People here were already living in temporary barracks which were on the verge of being uninhabitable. They had been extemporized at the time of the earthquake in 1908 as temporary refuges and

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had developed an unexpected and obstinate inclination to become permanent. Almost nothing had been done by the people of this region in the ten years since the earthquake to build new houses—hardly enough even to keep the temporary barracks in repair.

But the empty hotels could take in only a small fraction of the great streams of refugees. School-buildings, factories, churches, were pressed into service, and even public parks and gardens, where refugees lived in the open. Winter was coming on. Fuel was so scarce that they could hardly expect to be kept warm, but it was impossible for the women and children and the aged to live in the open, unprotected from wind and rain. Any kind of an out-building was pressed into service. The live stock of Italy had been seriously depleted in order to feed the army fresh meat, a luxury to which the soldiers had not been accustomed in peace, but which helped to keep them in fighting mood. The refugee families crowded into these barns, sheds, and outbuildings, which had sheltered domestic animals. Even these were not enough, and the native families, already packed pretty closely into a minimum of house space, crowded up still closer and two families lived where one lived before.

Getting there and finding some kind of shelter was only the first, and was, perhaps, the simplest of the refugee's problems. He still had to live; food had to be bought. He looked about to earn something. The old men, beyond military age, were accustomed to work in the fields of the Veneto; the women also knew well the art of husbandry, and the older children were almost as useful as men in much

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of the work. They looked about for a chance to do the work they knew how to do. Alas! they were to all intents and purposes in a strange land. These were Italians all about them, but of an almost different race, with very different ways of living. They raised crops which were unknown in the north and did not raise the crops to which the people of the Veneto were accustomed. Even if they tried to raise the same crops, the conditions were very different and the methods had to be very different. The experienced farmer of the north was almost as much at a loss in the farming of the south as though he had always worked in a factory. A few of the refugees had lived in cities, but the few industries in the south were of a different character from those in the north. Some were given work in making uniforms for government contractors, but a large part of the refugee population of one-half million remained unadjusted. The kinds of work to which it had been accustomed were lacking, and it was too old to be taught new tricks. The time was too short and the people too pressed to bother with awkward hands. The government created a division for aiding the refugees which considered the possibility of redistributing the refugee population so as to place them where they could work in ways to which they were accustomed, thus providing a certain amount of much-needed labor where it was most needed and enabling more of the refugees to earn a living. The redistribution of a half-million people was a transportation problem of some magnitude. The transportation service was already hard pressed, and became more so with every month of the war. Then came the influenza, and instead of encouraging



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travel the government forbade it except in special necessity. The refugees stayed where they were and made the best of it. The government made an allowance toward the support of those unable to work or to obtain work. Only about 10 per cent. of the refugees were physically fit to work. In the resort towns the refugees had shelter and scenic beauty, but little else. Tourists had been the sufficient if not the only industry, and in their absence there was no work. In a number of these localities the American Red Cross established workshops in which the refugees manufactured articles, subsequently sold to them or to other war victims.

In general, from this time on, the lot of the refugees did not differ very greatly from that of the bulk of the population of Italy, not because they were well provided for, but because nearly everybody else was also in serious trouble. Most of the men were at the front. The soldiers' families also received a governmental allowance. Food and fuel were equally scarce for all, and prices becoming more and more impossible.

*The Occupied Veneto.*—Meantime, about twice as many people had remained beyond the Piave as fled across it. We visited this region within a week after the German armistice and within two weeks after that with Austria. It was the same story as that of Serbia, of Grecian Macedonia, of northern France, and of Belgium; more like France and Belgium than Serbia and Greece. It was a much shorter occupation. The Austrians came in October, 1917, and went in November, 1918. A million people had suffered enemy rule for a year, as against three years in Serbia and four years in France and Belgium, but



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it was the last year of the war and it was a territory adjoining Austria which felt the pinch sooner and more severely than did Germany. All the railway and highway bridges had been blown up and it was very difficult to get food to the region after the Austrians left.

As in Serbia, conditions near the fighting-line were considerably worse than those farther back. The conditions which we saw in a few of these towns will give a fair idea of what had happened. Conegliano is about three miles beyond the Piave. Before the war it was a city of 13,000. Two weeks after the armistice it was a city of about 3,000. The people had not received a ration of bread or flour during the occupation. They had lived on such vegetables as they were able to raise, on plants gathered in the pastures and untilled areas, and on a little corn or wheat, if they were able to hide any or to keep a small part of what they raised. Just before the Austrians left they requisitioned and shipped all blankets, bedding, clothing, shoes, and even underwear, not always excepting even some of the clothing which the people were actually wearing. They also took out car-loads of windows and shipped them to Austria. Many of the buildings were completely destroyed by shell-fire, but some were standing in various degrees of destruction. Even the best were without windows. We saw a long line of people getting food from the American Red Cross relief-station. About one in five of them was emaciated and obviously had suffered extremely from lack of food. Yet those who were able to come for food were the healthiest members of the families; those at home were less well off. We noticed particularly

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one woman who was extremely emaciated. She said she had three small children at home who had been living for a long time on roots and greens which she collected from the fields. They had not been allowed to have any garden. A fourth child had died.

There had been practically no medical attention for the civilian population during the occupation. There had been a good deal of illness in the town, including especially pneumonia, "bronchitis," and influenza. The American Red Cross since the Austrian retreat had been distributing beans, peas, rice, bacon, condensed milk, salted beef, and a little sugar, and the Italian authorities were now issuing bread rations.

Vittorio was ten miles beyond the Piave. It had been a place of twenty-one thousand people. In a considerable part of the town the buildings were uninjured. Here the Austrians had issued a very small ration, thirty grams of foodstuffs per person per day, about one-tenth of the bread ration in France. It had been as completely stripped as Conegliano. It was evacuated on October 30th and a camion-load of food was brought to the town by the American Red Cross the next day. At the end of the first week the mayor of the town said, "Thanks to God and to the American Red Cross, we have been able to live through this week." A little later the authorities began to distribute food. In Vittorio we saw a most curious form of relief. A newspaper of Rome had collected funds for the people of the invaded district and was making a distribution of clothing by throwing the articles from the second-story window of the City Hall. A large crowd below scrambled for the articles as they were thrown out.



#### THE BREAD-LINE

There were many such lines as this before the American Red Cross relief-stations in devastated Italy in the few weeks after the armistice.



#### THE CHILDREN MAY RIDE

This woman is returning with her mother and three children through devastated Italy. For some days their only food had been yellow corn.





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One person would get hold of one leg of a pair of trousers and another person of the other, and the legs parted company. It was a curiously futile and inconsiderate method. On the other hand, at a town farther on we saw an admirable example of neighborliness. The people of the city of Como had collected and sent two large camion-loads of clothing, bedding, household utensils, etc., to the people of the town of Oderzo, and six more camion-loads were on the way. The clothing was of excellent quality, suitable for winter, and was most urgently needed, for the weather was getting bitterly cold. There were also blankets, towels, hardware, etc. The articles were carefully sorted and the representatives of Como were selecting a list of beneficiaries after a conference with the mayor of the city and others who had remained during the occupation. We heard that a number of other towns adopted in similar fashion particular cities or villages in the occupied area.

As we went farther east, although the entire region had been occupied by the Austrians and Germans, conditions were not quite so bad. There had usually been a food ration for the civilian population, and it was a little larger, of better quality, and given more regularly.

Everywhere, however, we heard of a vast amount of sickness, and that conditions had been much worse during the occupation. There were no figures, for all governmental functions had been in the hands of the Austrians and they had taken away with them such few records as they had. Most people thought that about 20 per cent. of the population had died. This would be more than ten times the normal mortality for the district.

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In the town of Oderzo, seven miles beyond the Piave, with a pre-war population of 9,000, there were now about 3,000 persons, of whom 600 were reported to be ill. There was a good deal of typhoid fever in the smaller places near Oderzo. Altogether, it was a picture of hunger, of cold, of every phase of misery, such as we had not seen before, such a life as only the toughest could survive for long. Its relief would at best be slow, incomplete, and very difficult. The Italian army was busy in occupied Austria. The armistice had come so suddenly that no one thought about this relief job, and all the rest of Italy was also suffering from lack of food and fuel.

*Devastated Italy.*—Italy, like every country adjacent to the Central Empires, has a devastated area, but the amount of destruction is somewhat less than one might expect. A great part of the fighting between the Austrian and Italian armies was just over the line on Austrian territory. This territory was peopled by those of Italian ancestry and is now to be a part of Italy, so that its reconstruction will be an Italian problem. Within the boundary of what was Italy, however, the destruction is largely limited to a belt on the two sides of the Piave. From the Austrian boundary to the Piave, the Italian army retreated too rapidly and in too great confusion to make very great resistance, and consequently there was little destruction. The same was true when the Austrian army retreated over the same region in October. After it was once driven away from the Piave it made only a few efforts to withstand the attacks of the Italians, and hence there were few areas of destruction by actual fighting.

Although modern artillery carries for long dis-

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tances, the area in which anything approaching the total destruction of buildings occurs is usually limited to a very few miles. There may be a concentration of big guns upon some particular point farther in the rear, but, as a rule, the cities, villages, and countryside escape physical destruction up to a few miles of No Man's Land. Many buildings are intact or but slightly injured up to within, say, three miles of the Piave. Within this distance a great majority of the buildings are destroyed or seriously damaged. Farther away, destruction is the exception, not the rule. Here, as elsewhere, serious injury to buildings occurred from quartering large numbers of enemy troops in them, tearing out wood for fuel, or using the buildings as stables, tearing out stairways and partitions. In a few places, such as Sacile, which is eighteen miles from the Piave, the Austrians made some effort to stand, and here nearly every house was injured and a great many wholly destroyed. It had been enemy headquarters during the occupation, and there had been many air raids by the Allies.

We made an effort to estimate the number of people whose homes had been destroyed along the Piave. No census of this kind had been made. Taking into account the average density of the population of this part of the Veneto, it seemed to us that the homes of about two hundred thousand persons had been entirely destroyed or so injured as to be uninhabitable. There were vastly larger numbers whose homes were looted by the removal of furnishings, equipment, etc., but whose buildings remained intact or but slightly injured.

It was a relief to see that the greater part of this



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fertile and prosperous region had been only slightly injured by shell-fire and trench operations. Even along the Piave, where we crossed it, a great majority of the shade trees on the roadside were uninjured. There is very little territory in Italy like the valley of the Somme, where not only have all vestiges of construction disappeared, but the soil itself has been so plowed by shells as to be useless for agriculture for a long time to come.

In comparing this phase of Italy's problem with other emergencies it is interesting to recall that in the earthquake of 1908 the cities of Messina and Reggio, which were destroyed, had a population of 170,000. Numerous villages were also destroyed. It is likely, therefore, that the reconstruction problem which Italy faces in 1919 (not including that in the annexed territory) is not far different from that which she encountered in 1908. The housing then destroyed has not yet been made good, though ten years have elapsed, six of them a period of relative peace and prosperity, notwithstanding the Tripolitan War; the present destruction has to be faced by a country stripped of resources, with disrupted transportation, and staggering under a tremendous load of debt.

We were struck by the fact, when we visited Italy in November and again in January, that no plans seemed to have been made for the return of refugees and the reconstruction of the invaded region. In France the plan, on paper, was excellent for providing temporary housing for all the returning refugees. In Italy, on the other hand, the entire problem of either temporary or permanent reconstruction seemed to be pushed ahead into the indefinite future. After its experience with the



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temporary housing of earthquake victims of 1908, seeing that temporary housing, no matter how unsatisfactory it may be, almost inevitably becomes more and more permanent, the Italian authorities were strongly disposed to avoid any form of temporary housing by barracks, if possible. On the other hand, as to what form of housing would be provided, and how it would be provided, and who would pay for it—these problems were all too difficult to be dealt with in a country in which so many more pressing subjects demanded instant attention.

*A Hungry Nation.*—The serious war problems of Italy are to be found among the 35,000,000 in the uninvaded region, rather than among the 1,500,000 in the invaded Veneto. In normal times Italy had a rather meager menu, and of this a large amount was imported. A great deal of corn was eaten in the north and of macaroni in the south. The consumption of meat was not large. Much olive-oil was used. About 2,200,000 tons of wheat and corn were imported annually.

One of the first changes produced by the war was the establishment of a meat ration for soldiers. A large proportion of the live stock of Italy was slaughtered before a sufficient amount of meat could be imported to keep up this ration. The food situation very soon became acute, and Italy established a food administration and rationed and bought and distributed through government channels a number of staple articles, including bread, macaroni, rice, fats, and oil. The ordinary bread ration for civilians was 200 grams (7 ounces). Working-people were allowed 9 ounces and people doing especially heavy work 14 ounces a day. Different cities established

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different rations according to the supplies on hand. Florence and Genoa, for instance, had a ration of 20 grams (7-10ths of an ounce) of rice, while Milan had 66, and in Rome rice was not to be had at all. The bread ration for workmen was 250 grams daily in Reggio; 300 in Florence, Milan, and Genoa; 400 in Turin, Rome, and Naples; and 500 in Bologna. All kinds of fats, including oil, butter, lard, and fat pork, were rationed at the extremely low rate of  $\frac{1}{2}$  ounce per day per capita for the entire group. Olive-oil, which had been a common article of diet before the war and large amounts of which came from Greece, was almost unobtainable. The sugar ration varied from 10 to 14 ounces per person per month. The official ration of meat was an ounce per day, four days per week. The other three days were meatless. The total food ration was considerably short of a pound a day and, in many localities, for long periods it did not exceed 12 ounces per day. The slaughter of the herds greatly reduced the milk supply. Even favored Rome secured only two-thirds its former amount. Eggs were hardly to be had. The making and sale of confectionery were forbidden.

Another serious factor was the impossibility of making the best distribution of what they had because of the lack of transportation. Military needs took 60 per cent. of the available train service of peace-time. During the influenza epidemic, which lasted for a considerable length of time in Italy, on account of illness of railway employees the 40 per cent. available to civilians was reduced to 15 per cent. Shortages of food in particular localities from time to time, some of which were serious, were not always

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due to a lack of supplies in Italy as a whole, but to a failure of distribution. It was generally admitted, unofficially by officials and frankly by citizens of important position, that there had been much hoarding of food-supplies and speculative profiteering. The government had made some efforts to prevent this. The public authorities had opened municipal stores in Rome, but the number of stores and the amount of supplies available were not sufficient to affect prices to a great extent. There was an official list of established prices, but these did not hold outside of the government stores. Some of the official prices in Rome in English equivalents just after the close of the war, as compared with the price of the corresponding article in peace-time, follow:

<i>Article</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Official Prices</i>	
		<i>Peace-time</i>	<i>War-time</i>
Bread.....	pound.....	\$.03½	\$.05½ to \$.07
Rice.....	pound.....	.05½	.09
Oil.....	pint.....	.22	.57
Macaroni.....	pound.....	.03 to .04	.05½ to .07
Sugar.....	pound.....	.16 to .20	.42 to .60
Milk.....	pint.....	.04½	.11½
Beef.....	pound.....	.32	.73
Potatoes.....	pound.....	.01¾	.06½
Eggs.....	each.....	.....	.08½

The cities fared better than the country districts, chiefly, probably, because of the greater ease of distribution, partly, also, because of political considerations in view of the greater danger of organized disorder in the cities, in which there was much socialistic sentiment and a marked tendency toward pacifism.

Two things stand out clearly: first, there was a real and serious shortage of food-supplies in Italy;

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second, the prices were so high that persons of limited means found great difficulty in buying even the small quantities allowed. What was the effect of all this on the health and mortality of the people? The official position is that while Italy was always close to the edge and at times facing a crisis, nevertheless there was always a sufficient ration to prevent serious impairment of health and working capacity. It would be too much, perhaps, to expect the officials, who were in charge of food distribution, to take any other attitude. This position, however, is far too optimistic, as we shall see from our consideration of the distressing subject of sickness and mortality in Italy during the war. If any confirmation were needed of the fact that Italy was going hungry, or had been going hungry, one glance at the children standing by the railway line at any station in southern Italy would remove any doubt. Their faces were pinched and thin. They looked old, gloomy, and grandfatherly, instead of like those radiant children of Italy whom her painters have immortalized for all the world.

The food shortage was not relieved by the armistice. In fact, about five million additional people, many of whom had suffered even more than the people of uninvaded Italy, were left upon Italian hands. There were the million people in the occupied regions, the four or five hundred thousand famished returning Italian prisoners of war, the Austrian prisoners taken just before the armistice and numbering perhaps a million, the occupied regions of Austria, to say nothing of Albania. In fact, eight months after the armistice leading head-lines in the daily press told of food riots in Italy extending



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in at least one city to the setting up of a new municipal authority.

*From Deprivation to Disease: Slipping Back into the Plagues.*—A glance at the condition of Italy before the war, at the outset of this chapter, showed a death-rate 40 per cent. higher than that of the United States. It was made still higher by the war. Italy had been making some headway toward health. In fact, in 1914 the death-rate was lower than it had ever been before, 17.9 per 1,000 of population. In 1915, the first year of the war (omitting deaths caused by earthquakes), it had risen to 19.6, an increase of over 9 per cent. In 1916 it had risen to 20. Complete figures for 1917 and 1918 are not available. A change of one figure in the death-rate per thousand may not look very large to the casual reader, but apply this to Italy's population of 36,000,000. The increase in 1915 meant that there were 68,000 more deaths than in 1914. The further increase to 20, in 1916, meant 79,000 more deaths than in 1914. The effect of proximity to military operations on the death-rate is strikingly shown in the province of Veneto before it was invaded. Not including deaths of soldiers, the civilian death-rate in the Veneto rose from 16.4 to 20.2 in 1916. The full significance of the lost ground in Italy in dealing with disease on account of the war will be better appreciated by considering certain diseases which are known to be preventable and in the control of which encouraging progress was being made when the war broke out.

*Tuberculosis.*—Italy's pre-war tuberculosis death-rate was not excessively high. It had been decreasing for twenty-five years up to 1914 and had fallen

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40 per cent. In 1914, the lowest in Italy's history, it was 145 per 100,000. The disturbances caused by the war and especially the shortage of food were immediately and startlingly reflected in the tuberculosis rate. From a steady decrease during a quarter of a century, it changed to an abrupt increase. From 145 in 1914, it rose to 159 in 1915 and to 169 in 1916, an increase in the country as a whole of 17 per cent. in only two years. Even these figures do not include tuberculosis deaths among the soldiers. But worse things were to come. We have no complete figures for 1917 and 1918, but we have the facts for the cities. In the 130 cities the pulmonary tuberculosis death-rate rose from 143 in 1916 to 160 in 1917, an increase of 12 per cent. in that one year alone and a total increase of 22 per cent. over the 1914 figure. As the increase from 1914 to 1916 had been greater in the country than in the cities, it seems likely that the complete figures for 1917 will be more serious even than the alarming increase in the cities alone.

For 1918 we have also the figures of deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis in certain of the cities. In nearly every case these show an increase from 1917, and in some an increase that is extraordinary. In several cities 1918 tuberculosis deaths are double those of 1914. This is due in part, no doubt, to influenza, but the steady increase from year to year in a group of these cities is very striking. We give a few of them in the following table:

<i>Cities</i>	<i>Tuberculosis Deaths</i>				
	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Genoa.....	221	227	216	325	275
Milan.....	131	129	145	188	268

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<i>Cities</i>	<i>Tuberculosis Deaths</i>				
	1914	1915	1916	1917	1918
Bergamo.....	198	254	267	262	408
Bologna.....	114	128	127	148	172
Florence.....	238	244	254	306	403
Pesaro.....	106	125	125	166	271
Perugia.....	87	114	97	124	190
Rome.....	170	179	195	217	310
Naples.....	83	105	116	111	122

We must take into account, too, the large number of cases of tuberculosis developed among the soldiers. Careful examinations by experts of returned Italian soldiers have shown positively diagnosed cases of tuberculosis to a number over eight thousand. The distressing thing about this increase in tuberculosis is the great number of new cases all through the country who are likely to be centers of infection. Tuberculosis yields to control only very gradually at best. With this great increase in the number of persons in a condition to convey the disease to those with whom they come into close contact, the task of recovering the ground gained in the twenty-five years preceding the war will be long and difficult.

For these statistics as to tuberculosis, as, in fact, for the greater part of our information on sickness in Italy during the war, we are indebted to the American Red Cross Tuberculosis Commission, which not only gave us its statistician, Doctor Dublin, as a member of our mission, but also turned over to us the information it had collected and made special inquiries on lines on which we expressed a wish for additional data.

*The Return of Malaria.*—Malaria affords an even more striking illustration of the disruption of an

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effort approaching complete success for the prevention of sickness and the saving of life. The progress made over a term of years is lost in one or two. It is generally known that some parts of Italy have long been infested with malaria. We have all read of malaria in the Roman Campagna and of the danger of visiting some of the Italian cities on the southern Adriatic coast containing some of the most interesting monuments of the fourth and fifth centuries. Perhaps it is malaria—who knows?—which accounts for the fact that these localities are now known chiefly for the monuments which they contain. It is not generally known that Italy some years ago recognized malaria as a national menace and began an organized governmental effort for its control. It drained swamps, screened houses, and popularized the use of quinine. It bought quinine in enormous quantities, carried on a widespread educational campaign for its use, and made it available to every one by selling it through the postal authorities. The movement was successful. The malarial mortality was reduced by 1914 to one-tenth of that twenty years before.

Then came the war. The expense of drainage operations and such enterprises was considered impossible, in view of the tremendous expenditures for the war and the general poverty of the country. Quinine became scarcer and scarcer and then practically impossible to secure. The result was astounding. The death-rate from malaria rose from 5.7 in 1914 to 10.5 in 1915 and to 14 in 1916, increasing from 1914 to 1916 246 per cent. But malaria is not evenly distributed over the country. Its increase in one of the most infected provinces was from 22



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in 1914 to 128 in 1916, an increase of nearly 600 per cent. It also began to spread to regions adjoining those previously infected. In Rome no malaria deaths were reported in 1916, but there were 56 in 1917.

Numbers of deaths give only a slight indication of the damage which malaria does to the people of any locality. It is directly fatal in only a very small proportion of cases. It produces an enormous amount of sickness, and consequent poverty, which may not lead to death or may be only a contributing cause through weakening resistance. The number of cases reported, each one of which means a very definite and serious impairment of vigor and efficiency, is more suggestive. The number of cases reported during the four years before 1914 and the four years then beginning were as follows:

### *Malaria*

1910.....	Cases reported,	201,000
1911.....	“ “	186,000
1912.....	“ “	167,000
1913.....	“ “	157,000
1914.....	“ “	129,482
1915.....	“ “	214,000
1916.....	“ “	224,000
1917.....	“ “	304,216

It thus appears that during 1917 no less than 174,734 more persons were reported infected by malaria than would have been the case if there had been no further reduction from 1914; but the number of cases had been diminishing at an average of 17,750 per year for some years. If this reduction had continued at the same rate, as it seems possible would have been the case had there been no war, the re-

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ported cases would have been 76,232, whereas they actually were 304,216, a war excess of 227,984 cases in 1917 alone. In the island of Sardinia, with a population of 880,000, the number of cases reported in 1917 was 100,000, or more than one-ninth of the entire population of the island. Italy will suffer in every aspect of her national welfare as the result of these hundreds of thousands of increased infections from malaria. Her children will be less fit for education, her laborers less productive, her peasants less successful in the cultivation of their land.

*Child Mortality.*—The largest single factor in Italy's mortality is "diarrhea and enteritis," which is a disease of infants. In 1914, when its rate was 201 per 100,000, it caused almost twice as many deaths as tuberculosis. It responded at once to the evil conditions of war. In 1915 its rate was 244 and in 1916 it was 248. We have noted the steady increase in mortality from tuberculosis in some of the cities of Italy. The mortality of children under one year of age per 1,000 births shows a similar increase. Here are the figures:

<i>Cities</i>	<i>Infant Death-rates</i>				
	<i>1914</i>	<i>1915</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>1918</i>
Genoa.....	120	150	126	149	134
Milan.....	107	132	123	138	167
Bergamo.....	186	223	259	243	246
Bologna.....	92	121	136	134	195
Florence.....	120	131	186	188	232
Pistoia.....	127	138	230	208	334
Pesaro.....	161	199	199	317	638
Perugia.....	115	142	155	217	....
Rome.....	124	122	131	122	144
Naples.....	154	155	169	186	230
Fano.....	183	172	258	424	675

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This increase in mortality among infants is the more striking by reason of the fact that the number of children born during the war was very greatly reduced. Ordinarily, when the birth-rate goes down the death-rate among babies goes down also. The food-supply for a small number of children is more ample than for a larger one. Mothers can give more individual attention to a few children than to many. Overcrowding is less, and the chances of spreading communicable diseases are correspondingly less. The war upset this, however, as it upset many other things. While the infant death-rate went up, the birth-rate went down even faster. The Italian birth-rate before the war was 31.1 for the five years ending 1914 against 24 in the United States and 18 in France. In 1915 it was very little affected, as Italy did not enter the war until May. In 1916 there was an abrupt drop from 30.5 in 1915 to 24.4. In 1917 (figures from a few provinces being incomplete) there was a further drop to 19.5 or a loss of more than one-third from the figures of 1915. These figures translated from rates into actual figures afford a better picture of their significance to the future of Italy. They mean that during 1916, 1917, and 1918 there was a deficit of births in Italy of considerably more than one million. Furthermore, the loss will continue during a large part of 1919. The total deficit in births in Italy, therefore, due to the war will be in the neighborhood of a million and a half, a sum far in excess of her losses from any other single cause and about equal to the losses from all other causes due to the war.

*Typhoid.*—In previous wars typhoid fever has caused enormous mortality among soldiers. Even

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in our own Spanish-American War the losses from typhoid were far in excess of those from all other causes put together. In this war anti-typhoid vaccination was very generally enforced among the armies, and typhoid fever caused only a small number of deaths of soldiers. This was not true of the civil population in Italy. Italy's typhoid-fever death-rate had fallen from 27.5 in 1911 to 22.1 in 1912, 22.5 in 1913, and 19.4 in 1914. During the first year of the war it rose to 26 and in the second year, 1916, to 27.9, considerably above the figure which had prevailed as long ago as 1911. Here, again, entirely apart from deaths of soldiers, the increase was greatest in the area adjacent to the fighting. In the Veneto the typhoid rate of 21 per 100,000 in 1914 increased to 64 in 1916, and in the city of Udine, in the Veneto, typhoid became an epidemic, with a rate of 410 per 100,000, a rate equal to one-fifth of the entire death-rate in Italy as a whole during that year, and thirteen times the death-rate from typhoid in the country as a whole.

“*Flu.*”—Italy suffered extraordinarily from the influenza. Definite returns as to its mortality in a number of large cities have been received. In Genoa, Milan, and Bergamo the mortality was 7 per 1,000; in Modena, Florence, and Rome it was 10 per 1,000, or 1 per cent. of the entire population. In Padua and Naples it was 12 to 13 per 1,000, and in Foggia it was 20, or 2 per cent., and in Fano it was nearly  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. In the rural districts medical help was almost entirely lacking, the one available physician in many cases dying at the beginning of the epidemic. It seems likely that the mortality was even higher in the country than in



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the cities. A study of the distribution of the influenza deaths in Rome by wards shows that it ranges from 4 per 1,000 in a well-to-do section to four times that amount in the poorer districts. The total number of deaths from influenza in Italy is probably not far from  $1\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., which would be 540,000.

*Military Losses.*—In considering the effects of war upon the population of Italy we must add to the deaths due to war diseases the number of soldiers killed in battle or dying of wounds or of disease in excess of the normal death-rate of men of that age. The Statistical Division of the United States army estimates the Italian losses of men killed in battle or dying of wounds as 462,000. No official statement has been made of the losses from disease. We know, however, that the losses among the prisoners of war was large. There were, perhaps, 500,000 Italian prisoners of war. The condition of those who returned, to say nothing of their account of the suffering they had endured, was such as to leave no doubt that very large numbers of them died. We shall, perhaps, not be far from the truth if we estimate the number of deaths among the prisoners of war at 50,000.

*Total Human Losses.*—We are now in a position to form some estimate of the extent to which the population of Italy was diminished during the war in comparison with what it would have been had pre-war conditions continued. It can be only an approximation, but it is intended to be conservative and it is confidently believed that in its general outlines it indicates the true situation. The main items are:

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Civilian deaths, 1915 to 1918, inclusive, in excess of 1914 (excluding influenza and the occupied region).....	310,000
Deaths from influenza, 1918.....	540,000
Deaths of soldiers in action and from wounds.....	462,000
Deaths in excess of normal rate among prisoners of war.....	50,000
Deaths in excess of normal rate among civilians in occupied area.....	80,000
Total deficit in births.....	1,435,000
	2,877,000
Total.....	2,877,000

It seems to us a very conservative estimate to place the population of Italy at the end of the war, or, rather, at the end of 1918, at least 2,877,000 less than it would have been with no war. The normal excess of births over deaths in the few years preceding the war was about 450,000 per year, or 1,800,000 for a four-year period. If our estimate is correct, the population of Italy at the end of 1919 is something more than 1,000,000 less than it was at the beginning of the war.

This estimate does not take into account migration, in regard to which the facts are not now obtainable.

*War Orphans.*—We have noted the official estimate of men killed in action or dying from wounds as 462,000. Adding deaths among prisoners of war in excess of the normal death-rate among men of that age, which we estimate as at least 50,000, the total loss of soldiers was some 512,000. We were unable to secure any estimate of the number of these men who were married or of the number of children left by them. We know that in France the number of war orphans is placed at a little more than half the number of deceased soldiers, but Italy is dif-

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ferent. The marriage age is earlier and the number of children born in the early years of marriage much greater. The birth-rate in Italy is 50 per cent. greater than in France. While some of the fallen Italian soldiers were unmarried and some of the married soldiers were childless, it is probable that these men left behind them an average of one child each, or an army of fatherless children of 512,000. The great majority of them are living with their mothers and will continue to do so. The problem is that of widows' pensions. Widows are given a pension of approximately \$8 per month, with an additional allowance of \$2 per month for one or two children, and if there are more than two an additional allowance of 80 cents per month for each child up to the age of eighteen years. This was tolerable when the law was enacted, but with the high cost of living at the end of the war, and, in fact, to the present, it is barely sufficient to provide food, and leaves nothing for clothing or other necessities. The widows and children, of course, will not be allowed to starve. A law was enacted in June, 1918, creating a committee in each province under the direction of the prefect to take general charge of war orphans, to arrange for them to be suitably cared for in their own homes if possible, or, if this is impossible, to place them in suitable institutions. While war orphans of Italy will not be allowed, visibly and obviously, to starve, nevertheless the conditions of life, bare and hard for the people of Italy generally, will fall with especial severity upon these unfortunate children, and we must expect that deaths related to malnutrition and lack of adequate care because of the absence of the mother at work will be distinctly



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more numerous among them than among other children. Also, it is obvious that no committee whatever and only one mother in a hundred can fully take the place of a missing father, and that the chances of moral disaster among these children, or at least of failure to acquire that education, training, and development which would fit them for self-support and leadership, are very greatly increased. The absence of this half-million men will be felt in many ways in Italy, but perhaps in none will it be more serious than in the lack of leadership and guidance which they would have given to their families.

*Cripples.*—We were told that 450,000 soldiers had been made unfit for further service by injuries received in the war. Probably 80 per cent. of these were farmers. The government was too deeply engrossed with the bare task of keeping the nation intact to be able to give very serious attention to the question of their re-education or special training for farming by methods not inconsistent with their crippled condition.

*The Return of the Prisoners.*—At the time of the disaster at Caporetto in October, 1917, it was reported that over three hundred thousand Italian soldiers had been taken prisoners. In the severe fighting of the earlier portion of the war large numbers of prisoners had been taken on both sides. The total number of Italian prisoners approached a half-million. Most of these were kept in Austria, but a few were taken into Serbia as laborers. Upon the conclusion of the armistice with Austria these men were released from prison-camps. Some of them were brought by train to points near the Austrian



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frontier and there released to walk into Italy; others walked all the way. They arrived at the frontier in a distressing condition, clothed in rags, without sufficient food for months, many of them seriously ill, and all without adequate medical attention since their imprisonment. When they reached the frontier they had two choices before them. To go south to Trieste, now occupied by the Italians, or to push westward through devastated Italy and across the Piave. If they chose the latter, they had to find their way through a region seventy-five miles wide which had been stripped by the enemy, where railroads were not operating, in which even the barest necessities of food were lacking. We met thousands of these. One man said he had been walking fifteen days, another eleven, and another eight. All said they had been without food for three days. Many thousands went to Trieste, where they were taken under control. They were placed in a large, open area, exposed to the bitter cold of winter in that region. It was, perhaps, too much to expect the Italian government to be able to provide immediately for this unexpected addition to its responsibilities. At any rate, these men, after all the bitterness of their prison life, went without food for some days except such as the American Red Cross with very depleted transportation resources was able to get through the devastated regions to them. Perhaps the fact that among these prisoners were those who had opened the way to the enemy at Caporetto, though they were only a fraction of the whole, was not without its influence upon the nature of their welcome. After some days the government set up disinfecting-stations, an important step in prevent-

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ing the possible introduction of typhus. It also distributed food rations; but to any one who has seen the condition of those very large numbers of prisoners as they returned on foot and in rags to the part of their beloved Italy which had been laid waste by the enemy, the sight will remain one of the tragic aspects of the war.

*Soldiers' Families.*—If there were times when the war was not enthusiastically supported either by the Italian people or by a considerable portion of its army, the explanation is not difficult. The Italian soldier received practically no pay (ten cents per day in the war zone and two cents per day in the rear), and the allowance to soldiers' families was even less than to the refugee. The soldier who constantly hears from home of hunger, cold, and increasing distress is not in a mood for fighting. The very efficient branch of the American Red Cross in Italy very wisely devoted its first efforts to the relief of the families of Italy's soldiers from the immediate dangers of utter destitution. When one realizes how serious the economic plight of Italy actually became or, in other words, how near the whole country was to starvation and how far it did actually suffer from hunger, cold, and every sort of privation, one has complete sympathy with the feeling that Italy has made great sacrifices for the war and that they should not be in vain. One also hopes that she may not be led astray by any will-o'-the-wisp, that her internal problems may now receive the same degree of attention she gave to winning the war, that she may think in terms of welfare rather than of glory.

## VII

### GREECE: THE COST OF INDECISION

Pre-war Greece; the futility of a glorious past; Greece's war history; fleeing from the Turk and the Bulgar; refugees from earlier wars and fires; under Bulgar rule; sentenced to slavery; destroyed villages; the fire in Saloniki; nation-wide hunger; a virgin field for sanitation; tuberculosis; typhoid; Greece's malaria menaces Allied success; infant mortality.

**P**RE-WAR GREECE.—Like Serbia, Greece had a population before the Balkan wars of about 3,000,000 (2,643,109 by actual census in 1907), to which was added in 1913 a population of about 2,000,000, making a total of about 5,000,000. Athens, the metropolis, had a population of 200,000, and its seaport, Piræus, only six miles distant, the second city in Greece before the Balkan wars, had another 100,000. In the new area, Saloniki had 170,000 in 1914. Greece lived chiefly by agriculture, though only one-fifth of its soil is tillable. It also had considerable commercial and maritime interests, with about 1,000,000 tons of shipping.

*The Futility of a Glorious Past.*—If classical Greece taught the world for all time the beauty of the human body, modern Greece is as conspicuously lacking in any appreciation of the value of its human resources. It has no general statistics of births and deaths, except for a few of its larger cities. Opinions

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as to the trend of human welfare in Greece, both before and during the war, cannot be based on numbers and causes of deaths, but must be drawn from various indications. These are not lacking, and indicate as unpleasant a picture of human conditions as we have seen. It is doubtful whether any country in Europe has been so neglectful of its people as modern Greece. The birth-rate appears to have been high. It must have been; otherwise, in view of the prevalence of disease, the country would have been depopulated. The death-rate in the twelve cities up to 1909 was about 23 per 1,000; in Athens in 1907 it was 26.5, about double that of New York City. Volo, a city of 25,000, had a death-rate in 1907 of 34, two and a half times that of New York. Malaria, typhoid, tuberculosis, and infant mortality all were very prevalent.

*Greece's War History.*—Unlike Serbia and Belgium, Greece did not readily find herself in relation to the war. The sympathies of the Greek people were undoubtedly with the Allies. Those of the king and of the well-to-do and royalist element were undoubtedly with the Central Powers. But Greece was not moved in this matter by sympathy. She had much at stake, both her gains of 1913 and others hoped for, and naturally she wished to be on the winning side, or at least to be neutral in order to hold her earlier gains and profit as much as possible commercially. But she was too intimately bound up with the Balkan situation to be able to remain neutral. When Bulgaria entered the war in October of 1915 Greece's interest was obviously with the Allies, and, presumably on invitation of Venizelos, when the Allies left Gallipoli, they landed at Saloniki on October 1,



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1915. They were too late to help Serbia, and the Germans, Austrians, and Bulgarians overran all Serbia and stopped only at the Greek border. All through 1916 there was uncertainty and anxiety on the part of the Allies as to whether they might not be attacked by the Greeks in the rear as well as by the Bulgarians and Austrians at the front. Eastern Macedonia, which Greece had received at the end of the second Balkan War in 1913, was treacherously surrendered by King Constantine to the Bulgarians in May without a fight. Two divisions of Greek troops marched into Bulgaria and surrendered and were sent as "guests" to Germany. Bulgaria, which had expected to receive this region in 1913 and which claimed that it was really Bulgarian and not Greek, took substantially peaceful occupation of the region, including the cities of Kavala, Seres, and Drama. A new Allied front was established along the Struma River and the Bay of Takinos, the line leaving the Ægean Sea near Orfani, about half-way between Saloniki and the eastern boundary of Greece, as fixed in 1913, and running northwest nearly to the Bulgarian boundary, where it turned west and followed closely the boundary between Greece and Serbia. In October Venizelos set up an independent government at Saloniki. From an Allied point of view the uncertainty had to be ended, and a blockade of Greece was established in December, 1916. King Constantine endeavored in vain to withstand its effects. In February, 1917, he established a Food Ministry, but no Ministry could make an adequate ration from a food deficit. By common consent the government was turned over to Venizelos in June, 1917, and Greece, after

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nearly three years of vacillation, became one of the Allies. With the lifting of the blockade food conditions began to improve, but the food situation in Europe was by this time too difficult to permit much relief to Greece. She took part in the fighting in the autumn of 1918.

The outstanding facts of Greece's relation to the war were: the effects on the Greek population of the shortage of food from the blockade of December, 1916, until some months after the armistice; the flight of refugees from the Turks in Asia Minor and from the Bulgarians in Macedonia; the devastation of Macedonia and the deportation of Greeks into Bulgaria after Greece had placed herself on the Allied side; and the disruption of some feeble beginnings to deal with the terrible incidence of disease throughout Greece.

*Fleeing from the Turk and the Bulgar.*—All the world knows how the Turks set out to exterminate the Armenians on the pretext of deporting them into the interior. Few are aware, however, that a similar fate was planned in 1914 for some hundreds of thousands of Greeks who lived along the western coast of Asia Minor. Fortunately some of the Greeks had another alternative: they fled from Asia Minor to the islands along the coast, to Mitylene, Samos, Chios, and others, all of which had been awarded to Greece in 1913. About 180,000 succeeded in reaching the Greek islands; 100,000 went to Mitylene, 40,000 to Samos, 20,000 to Chios, and perhaps 20,000 to smaller islands. From here the able-bodied men found their way across the Ægean to ancient Greece or to Saloniki.

They were housed partly in old fortresses, burlap

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packing hung over wires or poles, giving a slight degree of privacy to each family, or in houses which the Turks had left after the islands were awarded to Greece in 1913. In the city of Mitylene each family was limited to one room, often so small that there was scarcely room for all to lie down at night. In Chios some of them were housed in wooden barracks, one hundred and fifty feet long by twenty wide, and subdivided by only one partition lengthwise. The refugees hung old carpets of coarse burlap on strings to set apart a few square feet of space for each family. Under these conditions they lived for four years, an allowance of six cents per day from the government barely purchasing food necessities, and the scanty clothing and bedding they brought with them soon being in rags. No wonder that typhus appeared among them. The French sent a physician to assist in its control. Influenza also made heavy inroads. When the American Red Cross came upon the scene in December, 1918, the number of refugees had been reduced by about one-half, partly by the departure of the able-bodied men, but also by typhus, influenza, and other diseases. Even at this time the needs of those returning to Greece's devastated area in eastern Macedonia were so much more pressing that little could be done for these refugees except some distribution of clothing.

The population of eastern Macedonia beyond the Struma River, occupied by the Bulgarians, was something like 400,000. Most of these remained, but some 25,000 to 30,000, including most of the well-to-do, did not fancy Bulgarian control and fled to the island of Thasos, along the coast, then found their way to Saloniki, or to Volo, or as far south as



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Athens. These did not fare especially badly. The Greek men had not been fully mobilized when Macedonia was overrun, and the refugees included many able-bodied men who found employment without great difficulty. In fact, wages increased rapidly. In Volo, as high as \$3.20 per day was paid for the manipulation of tobacco. The Greek government also made a small allowance to refugees, distributing to them \$2,500,000 in 1917 and \$3,000,000 in 1918. It also spent \$500,000 for soup-kitchens for refugees and others whose lot was made especially difficult by the war.

*Refugees from Earlier Wars and Fires.*—It was interesting to find in various parts of Greece groups of refugees from earlier wars still occupying "temporary" shelter and expecting to "go home," some in very poor condition and some fairly prosperous. It seemed as though Greece never caught up with any housing job before another came along. Everywhere in northern Greece one found groups in makeshift housing who had been war or fire refugees, some of them for forty years. For example, in Volo we found some 3,000 refugees who came from Thrace and Macedonia in 1912 and 1913, and 5,000 from eastern Macedonia in 1916. Three hundred families lived in congregate buildings, an ancient Turkish barracks, a former harbor master's office, and an unused mill. These buildings were without windows, chimneys, or partitions. Coarse cloth was tacked up over the windows and burlap, hung over wire, subdivided the space into small sections for each family. The families averaged five members each. Under these conditions they had been living six or seven years.



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Some twelve miles from Volo, at Nea Ahnilos, was a refugee stratum from a still earlier period. Here were three hundred families occupying houses which the Greek government had built for them. The first story of each house was a stable for animals; the family lived in the two or three rooms above. These people came from eastern Roumelia in 1908 when that region became a part of Bulgaria. The Bulgarians wished the Greeks to give up their schools, religion, and language and become Bulgarians. Their ancestors had lived in the region since before the Christian era, but they promptly left rather than become Bulgarian. They are self-supporting, look well nourished, and are fairly well clothed. They all had had malaria, of which they showed marked signs, and regarded it as a matter of course. Fifty persons had died of influenza during a period of seven weeks in three hundred families, a population of about fifteen hundred, a rate of over 3 per cent. Although they had been here eleven years and had no special complaint to make, they fully expected to return; in fact they did not regard it as an open question. Some swing of the political pendulum would make it possible for them to remain Greeks in their ancient home region, and of course they would return thither. This attitude after eleven years of good adjustment to their new economic situation seemed to us to throw much light on a question which many had been asking in Belgium, France, Italy, Greece, and Serbia—will the refugees go back? It had never seemed to us open to doubt. Whether it be one or four or a dozen years, they will go back, with some exceptions of course. Attachment to locality, love of the home site, is like the law of gravitation—universal and

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unchanging. It is the great, original, conservative force.

The colony had, in fact, nine hundred houses, though only three hundred were occupied. It seemed that after the Greek government had been informed as to the number expected, and had built accordingly, many found work elsewhere or found transportation too difficult. This is one of seventeen similar colonies in Greece for refugees from the Balkan wars and from other earlier migrations. All were built on what was then unoccupied and waste land. This colony seems to be successful in tobacco culture on such land. While six hundred houses here were unoccupied, many hundreds of war and fire refugee families were living under conditions of a very much worse type at Volo, only twelve miles away, as well as at Saloniki.

*Under Bulgar Rule.*—The saddest chapters of the war in Greece are those of the three hundred and sixty thousand who remained in eastern Macedonia when the Bulgarian army took charge in 1916. It must be remembered that Bulgaria considered this territory as properly belonging to her, and that the population was very mixed. In fact, if Austria had not intervened in 1913 and if Serbia and Greece had received the territory which they had expected toward the west, this territory would undoubtedly have gone to Bulgaria and there would have been no second Balkan War. Bulgaria undertook, after Greece had definitely declared herself on the side of the Allies, to make this into a Bulgarian region, just as she had done in parts of Serbia. Something like a third of the entire three hundred and sixty thousand were forcibly deported into Bulgaria, many of them

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into the northern part, and those who remained were in the position of a persecuted minority.

Noting in advance that any Greek description, written under the circumstances, would not be likely to fall short in making the picture lurid, it is, nevertheless, interesting to read a report of the *sous-prefect* of Pravi to the prefect of Drama, on October 26th, about a month after the evacuation of the region by the Bulgarians. In the opening portion of his report he says:

Authoritative testimony as well as the concurring testimony of the unfortunate victims cannot but convince even the most skeptical and prove conclusively that the line of conduct followed by the Bulgarians, as soon as their invasion of Oriental Macedonia was begun, was intended to exterminate scientifically and with premeditation, brutally and pitilessly, all that which was Greek, all that which could be said to bear a Greek character.

Acts of oppression, outrages, mockeries, and insults against national honor, thefts, pillages, and profanations of churches and homes, rape and abduction of young girls, the lowest outrages against women, deportation of young girls and children, torture and death following ill treatment, imprisonment and beatings without the least pretext, murders, assassinations, acts of brigandage, of pillage and of arson, robberies and violence, complete demolition of houses, appropriation of fortunes, total destruction of entire villages (Tsiousti, Fteri, Nidia, Orfano, Elefthere, Karayanni), the carrying off of furniture and all that belonged to Greeks, the deportation of about twelve thousand hostages and their condemnation to forced work and to certain death by starvation and privations, such is the result, in short, of the actions of the 10th Division of the Bulgarian army, called "Bella-Morska (Mer Egee)," and of the Turkish army (58th Division), which carried out worthily this work of destruction.

But as if all that was not enough, the entire population was destined to die of starvation, for not only were no measures



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taken to insure its food-supply, but all that was at hand was requisitioned for the needs of the army.

Thus wheat reached the price of \$3.27 per pound, salt \$2.18 per pound, sugar \$5.81 per pound, so that the population was forced to feed itself during entire months upon wild plants and turtles. . . . For a time flour was distributed at the ration of  $1\frac{3}{8}$  pounds for fifteen days.

The Bulgarians have, besides, outrageously taken advantage of this frightful condition, for from April and May, 1917, they advised the population by poster to emigrate to Bulgaria.

This vivid characterization seems to be borne out by detailed accounts of what happened in each locality, from which we quote a few.

### *Pravi:*

The population before the war had grown to 3,500.

With the entrance of the Bulgars in the valley of Simvolo, about 4,500 Greeks took refuge at Pravi. Of this number, 8,000, natives and refugees, 2,200 died of starvation.

Three hundred and fifteen inhabitants were taken away as hostages and 150 families emigrated. Thirty-five of the hostages died in exile and 121 have so far returned to their homes.

One hundred houses were completely demolished, even the materials being taken away.

A large number of the houses are partly destroyed—doors, windows, and window-panes and other materials having been taken away.

A large number of stores and homes were pillaged. Cattle, crops, and various other products were taken away.

### *Podogariani:*

A village of 100 houses before the invasion, of which 77 have been destroyed.

One hundred and fifty inhabitants were deported as hostages. Two hundred and forty died of starvation.

There were taken away:

Mules and donkeys . . . . .	300
Oxen and cows . . . . .	600
Other cattle . . . . .	8,000



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Wheat (pounds)	.....	110,000
Barley	“ .....	110,000
Corn	“ .....	178,750

Numerous houses and stores were pillaged.

Thirty-seven people were put to death (names given).

Twenty-seven women were violated (names given).

### *Marianni:*

This was a wholly Greek village.

After the Bulgarian invasion the inhabitants received notice on August 30th to leave the village, as it was on the sea and therefore likely to harbor spies. After the inhabitants were scattered, having abandoned the village, the houses were pillaged and destroyed by the Bulgarians and Turks, pretending to discover hidden corn. It should be stated that this village was particularly flourishing because of the cultivation of corn, cotton, etc. Its 120 houses were entirely demolished. At present its site is a desert.

### *Dresna:*

One hundred houses before the invasion.

Thirty-two inhabitants deported as hostages, of which only 13 have as yet returned.

Twenty-seven died of starvation.

Thirty-four were put to death (names given).

Nineteen women and young girls died after having undergone the worst outrages and tortures (names given).

Ten young girls were violated (names given).

Of 500 inhabitants there remain but 212.

There were numerous acts of plunder, violence, and thefts of cattle. Houses were destroyed. A library estimated at about 800 books was destroyed. Churches were robbed.

There were carried away: 120 mules and donkeys, 500 oxen and cows, 6,000 other cattle, quantities of tobacco and cereals.

The reference to Orfani is brief but complete:

### *Orfani:*

A village of 45 houses pillaged and wholly destroyed. Now absolutely a desert.

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Also that to Fteri.

### *Fteri:*

Thirty-five houses before the invasion. Ninety-four inhabitants, of whom 25 were deported as hostages, 3 dying in prison; died of hunger, 50 (names given); houses in ruins, 34; carried away, 860 domestic animals and 1,100 hives of bees. The village is now a ruins without inhabitants.

The fate of a refugee village is thus set forth:

### *Nea Midia (New Midia):*

Comprising formerly 300 houses built by the government for the refugees from Midia (Turkey). This village was destroyed utterly, after the property of the refugees had been given over to pillage. The refugees have been sent to various places in Bulgaria.

An American official report of a visit to Seres within twenty-four hours after its evacuation says:

Seres, before the Bulgar occupation, was a flourishing town of 24,000 inhabitants. It now consists of 6,000, a large number of whom are parentless children, mostly of ten and twelve years of age and less. Of the original population, according to the Mussulman mayor and the city records, 5,000 have died of starvation during the Bulgarian occupation; 2,000 men between the ages of 18 and 60 were deported into Bulgaria or some enemy country to work. That accounts for 13,000. The remaining 11,000, consisting of women, children, old men, and invalids, have dispersed, driven away by hunger. Their condition is pitiable; the rest are at various railway stations, utterly abandoned.

The Bulgarians have cleaned out the town, taking away cattle, horses, sheep, goats, poultry, furniture, bedding, silverware and dishes, food, everything, in fact, portable. They have taken the glass panes out of nearly all the houses in the town and carted them away.

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A Y. M. C. A. worker, reporting on the same city, says:

It is beyond my power to describe the pitiful condition in which I found that city. Most of the houses are utterly destroyed, and not one, I am sure, was left undamaged. Practically all furnishings of every kind have been carried away. I was in the homes (if such a name can be given to the miserable places where most of the inhabitants were compelled to live) and I talked with the inhabitants and am convinced that at least one-third of the 24,000 original inhabitants perished inside of two years from privation and hunger, while another third has been carried or driven away; many of the last third escaped and are to-day returning to their ruined homes. Certainly a beautiful city has been laid desolate.

There are also evidences of women and even girls of tender age having been ravaged, and the stories of brutality are too horrible to relate.

Kavala, on the *Ægean*, was the largest and most prosperous city of this region. An American report of a study of conditions there just a month after the armistice says:

This flourishing city, just prior to its occupation by the Bulgars, had a population, according to official figures, of 50,000 to 55,000. To-day it bears the appearance of a deserted town, the vast majority on the streets being Greek, British, and French soldiers of the liberating armies. Only 8,000 to 10,000 people are left, women, children, and men over fifty-five years of age, all bearing marks of hunger and privation. Twelve to fifteen thousand are dead from hunger and attendant disease, according to the municipal records kept by three Greek doctors, among them Mr. Trifiliandides, municipal physician. The balance of the population has been deported, or has dispersed over the country to seek food. When we were in Kavala the food situation was still critical and the bakeries were besieged by weeping crowds, fighting for the scanty stocks. We were obliged to depend on the military authorities for food while there.

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Two ship-loads of grain and flour had arrived from Piræus, but such was the lack of labor that the cargoes could not be discharged until soldiers were detailed for the work.

No system of rationing seems to have been put into effect by the Bulgars. Every one had to shift for himself. Those with money had to pay ruinous prices, those without money ate grass, weeds, and leaves and died in the streets.

About 40 per cent. of the buildings in Kavala have been wholly or partially destroyed. On the only occasion when the city was bombarded by the Allied fleet no damage was done except by half a dozen stray shots, as the target was the customs-house on the water-front. Many of these buildings were razed to the foundations, the rest having been stripped of all wood-work, floors, roofs, beams, partitions, window and door frames. Ninety per cent. of the buildings in Kavala, including public institutions, outside of the Turkish quarter, have been systematically pillaged.

The absence of men in civil life was startling. The Bulgar initiated a system of deportation of Greek civilians in Macedonia as early as June, 1917. The original orders seem to have been to deport all Greeks, regardless of age or sex, but later were applied only to males between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five, including all priests. From Kavala these deportations seem to have been commenced in September, 1917.

Drama, the third city of some size in eastern Macedonia, evidently suffered somewhat less:

Drama appeared in better condition than either Kavala or Seres. It is a town of normally from 30,000 to 35,000 inhabitants, of which about 4,000 are Turks, a mere handful of Jews, and the rest Greeks. The Turkish population did not suffer much during the first three months of the occupation, as there were two Turkish divisions camped near by, and these aided their compatriots. Later, however, they suffered with the rest.

For the first two months of the occupation the Bulgars rationed the population. Later, they gave the people the mockery of a ration amounting to 2 kilograms ( $4\frac{1}{2}$  pounds) of grain per head per month. Those who were able were obliged to pay for grain



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at the rate of 1 kilogram of copper or cotton for 2 kilograms of grain, or in default of either material, at the rate of 5 cents per pound. On account of the starvation ration issued, a contraband trade at once sprang up in grain, so that the real price was \$1.66 per pound.

A few houses were torn down partially by their owners to sell the wood to buy food. This was especially the case in the Turkish quarter. As to deaths during the occupation from hunger and attendant disease, all municipal records have been destroyed or carried off by the invaders. The municipal doctor and various inhabitants testified to a probable total mortality from these causes of 7,000 to 8,000. This is corroborated by the municipal gravedigger, who stated that he buried an average of 15 to 20 a day during the last year and a half of the occupation.

We visited one large warehouse, full of stolen furniture and household utensils collected from other places, which the spoilers had no time to remove. These goods comprised articles from china and glassware to expensive furniture, some of which was, doubtless, from public buildings. Much of it was ready packed with addresses written on it in Bulgarian, ready for transportation.

The same system of deportations practised in other parts of Macedonia was applied in Drama, about 3,000 being taken from the town. This began in July, 1917. The Greek priests were either killed or expelled. The five in Drama were replaced by two Bulgar priests, who performed all ceremonies.

It is obvious that starvation conditions existed in this entire region during the latter part of the three-year occupation, and that both property and personal rights received scanty consideration at the hands of the enemy army. It is not surprising that a commission with British, Belgian, French, and Serbian, as well as Greek members, found that some thirty-two thousand deaths occurred among the three hundred and sixty thousand persons who remained under the Bulgar occupation. We have noted that through deportation, starvation, and emi-

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gration to avoid these hardships the population of the leading cities was reduced as below:

Seres, formerly 20,000, now 6,000

Drama, formerly 30,000, now 20,000

Kavala, formerly 50,000, now 10,000

*Sentenced to Slavery.*—Although King Constantine allowed the Bulgarians to enter Greek Macedonia without resistance, the Greek inhabitants of that region paid a terrible price for his weakness. Soon after Greece actually entered the war in June, 1917, the Bulgarians began the systematic deportation of Greeks from this region into Bulgaria, often to the northern regions bordering on Rumania. There is a Bulgarian military order, dated July 10, 1917, giving directions as to how this is to be done. Until further notice two hundred persons are to be sent daily from Drama, one hundred from Pravi, and one hundred from another region. Those deported are to be allowed to take with them only two suits of underwear, a pair of boots, a winter overcoat, and food for three or four days. If they have additional food or cattle or beasts of burden they are to deliver them to the Bulgar Commission of Requisitioning. The deportations are to begin in the districts at the frontier and to be extended to the districts in the rear of the armies. That it was prompted by political, not military, reasons is shown by the fact that it began in the region farthest from the military zone. Including at first only men, it later included also women and children.

It is not easy to exaggerate the sufferings of those deported. One can only account for what happened

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on the theory that the Bulgarians were quite unconcerned as to how many of these people lived to return to Greece. Families were broken up. Women and children as well as men were obliged to work at very heavy labor, such as breaking stones and mending roads, often without shelter at night, with very little clothing and with an extremely low food ration. Many circumstantial accounts are given of extreme hardships, such as being made to work when very ill, being driven to work under these conditions by beating and by the withholding of the meager food allowance. There are also many circumstantial accounts of still more revolting things, as to which it is difficult to separate established fact from statements made in good faith, but unconsciously exaggerated. There is unanimity, however, that a large number of these unfortunate Greeks died from lack of food, exposure, and disease. No one knows how many. It may be as high as thirty thousand of the one hundred and twenty thousand deported, and some estimates are even higher. When the war closed, the survivors, or most of them, were released wherever they happened to be. Many of them were left to walk back; others were sent part way by train. Whatever funds they might have were taken from them to pay for their transportation. There was a line of railway running west from Constantinople through Turkey and through Bulgaria along the north shore of the Ægean. In one way or another many of the Greeks found their way south to this line. They collected about the railway stations in great numbers and streamed on to every passing train, whether it were passenger, freight, or military, squeezing into every inch of space, and packing as closely as possible on



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top of the cars. They had very little clothing, and the temperature was approaching the freezing-point.

Three very trustworthy Americans who arrived in Saloniki Friday evening, December 7th, having come over this route from Constantinople by rail in six days, gave this account of their observations of Greek refugees along the road:

From the Turkish frontier through all Bulgaria and as far as Seres in Grecian Macedonia there were large numbers of these refugees at every station, and many encampments were seen along the railway. Most of the refugees had no personal or household effects, only their clothes and small bundles. They were poorly clad. The British authorities in charge of the railway system had made it known that these refugees would be provided with transportation in so far as the British could furnish it.

These refugees had no money, of course, with which to buy food. At Xanthi, Drama, and Seres we found American Red Cross feeding-stations where bread was being given out. An attempt was being made to supply the people with one meal a day.

Every train carried from three to twenty freight-cars which were filled with these refugees. They were riding on the trucks, on the bumpers, on the roofs, and, in fact, wherever they could get foothold. The military trains carrying war material were also packed with these people. They were under the guns, under the field kitchens and artillery wagons. At practically every station some passengers were taken off dead. We saw several instances of this. At Xanthi we were told that six people had died on the cars the night before. At the Drama station eight to ten were taken out of the train dead, although the train stood there only a few hours. They died on the train *en route* or on the train at night. The weather was very severe. They had no food, and were made ill by being packed in so tight.

At Drama there is a dispensary, and efforts were being made by the Red Cross there to supply food. I counted forty-five fresh graves at Kavala. The deaths were due to the bad condition in which the people arrived at the station, lack of food, and being worn out.



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At Drama I saw a child, barefoot, standing in icy water up to the ankles, waiting for food to be brought from the Red Cross camp, with ice all around the edges of the pools, and no other place to stand.

Just outside of Drama, perhaps for a quarter of a mile, the railway track was lined on either side with thousands of bundles of clothing, trunks, and all kinds of cooking-utensils, etc., which the more fortunate had been able to bring. The people were in tents or grass huts alongside the railroad. The railroad puts them off at the village nearest their former homes where they can be taken care of.

As we came on from Drama we saw twenty car-loads of these refugees. At every station little groups would get off and go across the plains or over the mountains to their home villages. One very sad thing I saw at Drama—two women sitting beside grass huts, each holding a dead child in her arms. These grass huts are just a few sticks put up and thatched on the roof and sides with grass or straw.

It was very much the same in Bulgarian territory. We saw many at the stations. At every station on arrival the trains would be besieged for transport; many traveled on the roofs of the cars. We suffered from cold inside the cars, and the suffering of those on top must have been terrible.

The physical condition of most of them is very bad. Some of the men were husky, but all were in rags, and it looked as though it would not take much to break them down. At Xanthi two young fellows were coming back with their families; one said four children had died of starvation. A mother and two children of twelve years had been working on the roads under the Bulgarians nearly two years. They spoke of the very severe treatment they had received; no effort was made by the Bulgarians to furnish shelter. They were paid for their work on the roads, but only sufficient to buy a little food, and unless they worked they got no food.

As to numbers, the facts were hard to get. The number deported was estimated at the time of our visit by various officials, Red Cross workers and others, at from 50,000 to 150,000, and the number who had returned at from 5,000 to 40,000. Subse-

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quently, in July, 1919, the mixed commission above referred to reported that 42,000 were deported, and another 12,000 went voluntarily, in search of food; that of this 54,000 about 12,000 died in Bulgaria.

*Destroyed Villages.*—Notwithstanding her tardy entry into the war, Greece paid what was for her a heavy price in physical destruction. The line of battle all along her northern boundary and down through Grecian Macedonia is marked by an area of villages destroyed by shell-fire. Fortunately this is not a region of cities, Seres, with its 20,000, being the largest. An official survey completed in February last shows 161 villages totally destroyed and 61 partly so. East of this, through to the Bulgarian frontier, 13 villages were completely destroyed and 13 others partly so, for no military purpose whatever. Others were greatly injured by the use of the timber of the houses for fuel. The total number of people made homeless may be from 70,000 to 80,000. There was also looting of all movables, furniture, bedding, and supplies of every description, including doors and windows, such as characterized the enemy's departure from Serbia and Italy.

*The Fire in Saloniki.*—The destruction by military operations, and that for no obvious reason, was almost matched by another disaster which befell the city of Saloniki during the war. In August, 1917, a fire of unknown origin swept over one-third of the city, destroyed most of the business portion, and made seventy-three thousand persons homeless. The walls of many of the stone buildings remain standing, and the appearance of this part of Saloniki is strikingly like that of the devastated cities of northern France. Saloniki had not caught up with her housing problem

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created by an earlier fire in 1871, and there was still a colony of fire refugees in the suburbs. The various Allied armies helped to meet the emergency. The British and French armies erected colonies for the fire refugees. The Serbs erected a colony for their refugees who had fled from Monastir, Istip, and elsewhere. The refugees from the former fire moved up closer and took in some of the new generation of refugees. Mosques and synagogues were pressed into service all over the city, and many hundreds of families lived in tiny cubicles separated from one another, if at all, by pieces of burlap hung over wires. After all sorts of temporary devices had been fully availed of, there still remained a large number of families unprovided for. Digging among the ruins where their houses had been, they often found brick arches of cellars, basements, or sub-basements which had withstood the falling of the timbers and walls above. By clearing away a small entrance to these they could find temporary shelter. Ofttimes two or three families would crowd into a single small cellar. Naturally these cellars were almost without light. When it rained, the water settled in them and stood several inches deep on the floor until bailed out. The families expected these to be temporary quarters, but in December, 1918, sixteen months after the fire, more than a thousand families (one authority estimated it as high as five thousand) were occupying such quarters, and apparently would do so through another winter.

A splendid plan for the rebuilding of these ruined parts of Saloniki has been adopted by the Greek government. New streets are to be laid out. Open squares and parks are to be provided, and, in general,



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the plan is that of a thoroughly modern city. Unfortunately, though the statute had been considered for a long time and finally enacted, it still remained simply a project. Everybody had been too busy with the war, and the government was too poor to actually carry it into effect.

*Nation-wide Hunger.*—Turning now from Greece's war zone to its population in general, the great war-time problem was that of food. Before the war Greece, like Italy, consumed more food than it produced. It had a high per-capita consumption of bread and a low one of meat. About two hundred and fifty thousand head of live stock were imported annually, mostly from Turkey and Bulgaria; large quantities of wheat were imported. For the first two years of the war food conditions in Greece remained almost normal. Then came the blockade in December, 1916; food-supplies began to fail and prices to rise. This happened first as to wheat, the great staple, then as to rice and all other imported articles. In February, 1917, a Food Ministry was established and a ration system put into effect for bread, rice, potatoes, and other supplies. No meat could be imported from the former sources of supply, and the slaughtering of live stock took place on a large scale. Some districts went without bread for periods of several weeks, and some indefinitely. This had happened even before the war in isolated currant-growing regions. The cities fared better than the country, and Athens best of all, but toward the end of the blockade the conditions which existed everywhere can only be described as starvation. When the blockade was ended in June, 1917, things began to improve somewhat. The Allies supplied






**A SHEPHERD BOY**

Tending his cattle and sheep on the slopes of the foothills on Mt. Parnassus at Bralo, Greece.



**A DOUGHBOY ON THE ACROPOLIS**

An American soldier of Greek birth, returning to visit his birthplace after twenty years in America, views the sunset from the Acropolis.



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some wheat, rice, and sugar. Stocks everywhere in Europe were getting low, and transportation was difficult; Greece remained on scanty rations. Her situation was laid before the Allied Powers in December, 1917, and an import program agreed upon. If this could have been carried out it would have been sufficient, but, because of the shortage of shipping, food remained scarce for a long time after the armistice.

The price of bread was kept fairly low, but the government cannily made sufficient profit on the other articles to cover the loss. Government monopolies and a ration system were established for coffee, sugar, rice, and dried vegetables, and efforts were made to fix prices for other articles. The bread ration was usually a little over 300 grams (two-thirds of a pound). Manual laborers received 25 per cent. more. The bread was three-fourths wheat and one-fourth either corn or rice. It was sold at the equivalent of about 8 cents a pound. White bread could be had by the fastidious at twice the price and with a reduction of 25 per cent. in the ration.

The allowance of sugar in the import schedule was slightly over a pound per month per person, but little more than one-half of this was actually brought in by the available ships. There was practically no meat for the civil population. Available meat was assigned in the following order of precedence: (1) the army; (2) the hospitals; (3) the officials; (4) the sick (on doctor's orders); (5) the general public. Olive-oil was plentiful and was much used for food, as also for lubricating and lighting purposes. Olive-oil could not be exported, nor mineral-

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oil imported, on account of the lack of ships. While Italy's population was starving for lack of its accustomed olive-oil, Greece had so much to spare that it used it lavishly for all sorts of purposes. Butter had never been available except for the rich. A little butter made from sheep's milk could be bought at four times its earlier price. After the slaughter of many of the cattle for food it became very difficult to secure milk. Confectionery was to be seen in shop-windows, made chiefly from syrup extracted from currants and mixed with glucose. Matches became very scarce and were given out on bread-cards, two boxes per month, if available, in the larger cities; the smaller cities and country districts did without. The expensive hotels and restaurants were provided with food materials, and their prices rose from 300 to 400 per cent.; aside from this for some months after the armistice the quantities of food were very limited, even among the well-to-do, and among the poor living was reduced to the barest necessities. A very intelligent citizen of one city of 20,000 inhabitants gave the following prices as of December 6, 1918, as compared with pre-war prices:

<i>Article</i>	<i>Quantity</i>	<i>Prices</i>	
		<i>Pre-war</i>	<i>Present</i>
Bread.....	per lb. ....	\$.07	\$.10 to \$.14
Oil.....	per lb. ....	.28 to .36	1.08
Cheese.....	per lb. ....	.09	.90 to 1.01
Olives.....	per lb. ....	.04	.16
Butter.....	per lb. ....	.58	2.18
		(best quality)	(poor quality)
Eggs.....	each .....	.01	.20
Milk.....	.....		Not obtainable
Sugar.....	.....		Not obtainable



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The first four articles are the principal articles of diet.

The absence of bookkeeping of human assets in Greece makes it impossible to give any statistical evidence of the effect of semi-starvation upon her people. It was the consensus of opinion, however, that here, as elsewhere, scarcity of food registered immediately in much higher rates of sickness and death.

*A Virgin Field for Sanitation.*—Lacking everywhere in sharp outlines, the picture of health conditions in Greece is seen vaguely as one of vast volumes of sickness patiently borne because considered inevitable. The seriousness of the situation is fully realized by a few leaders, but, on the whole, is not felt either by the medical profession or by the governmental authorities. Here is almost a virgin field for the prevention of tuberculosis, malaria, typhoid fever, and the diseases of childhood. These alone produce a high mortality in every one of the twelve cities for which figures were available, and the same undoubtedly holds true for the entire country.

*Tuberculosis.*—This disease seems to have been more prevalent in Greece than in any other European country which keeps vital statistics except Serbia. In Athens the death-rate from pulmonary tuberculosis was 294 per 100,000 during the three-year period 1906–08. Other forms of tuberculosis were also very prevalent, making a total tuberculosis death-rate of 365, or one death in every six. There was a beginning of an anti-tuberculosis movement in Athens, with a dispensary and a small sanatorium with about twenty beds for early cases. A few

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tuberculous patients might be received in the small general hospitals in a few of the larger cities, but as to any general program for the control of tuberculosis, by either private or public initiative, there was none.

*Typhoid.*—Typhoid fever is continually prevalent throughout Greece, and from time to time becomes epidemic. In the three-year period 1906–08 the typhoid death-rate in Athens was 59 per 100,000, about four times the present rate in the United States. In the city of Larissa the rate was 96 per 100,000. An obvious explanation of these high typhoid rates is the absence of sewers and of any safe and sufficient water-supplies, even in the large cities. In Athens the water-supply is still brought in through an aqueduct constructed by the Emperor Hadrian. In summer months it is insufficient to flush the water-closets. No Greek city has anything except cesspools for sewage disposal. In the country districts and smaller towns the rudimentary privies, where there are any, afford no protection against surface or underground contamination of water-supplies and no safeguards from infection by flies. Plans were drawn to provide Athens with an adequate water-supply and a modern system of sewage disposal, but the execution of these plans was put off by the war.

*Greece's Malaria Menaces Allied Success.*—Malaria also is prevalent throughout Greece, probably more so than anywhere else in Europe. In some areas, especially in Thessaly and in the west, nearly everybody is infected. The disease is often of a malignant type, resulting in chronic disability and in many deaths. The malarial death-rate in the larger cities in 1906–08 per 100,000 was as follows:

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In Volo malaria caused more deaths than pulmonary tuberculosis. Besides this, other diseases showed a high death-rate, indicating that malarial infection reduces resistance to other diseases.

Malaria in Greece became a distinct menace to Allied success in the Balkan campaign. Many thousands of troops near Saloniki were invalidated at critical periods. Thousands were returned to France and England unfit for further service. One of the first requests made to the American Red Cross in France in the summer of 1917 was to establish a large hospital in Paris for malaria patients returned from Saloniki. The actual money cost to the Allies for the building of hospitals in and about Saloniki for the maintenance of patients, for the return of invalidated soldiers, and for their subsequent support was enormous. Diminished efficiency of the Balkan armies was still more serious. It would have been money in pocket and an insurance against some possibilities of failure if the Allies had recognized years ago that the evils arising from malaria in the Balkans cannot be limited to those countries and had joined hands to assist the poorer Balkan countries in eliminating it.

The Greek government in 1911, on the recommendation of a voluntary anti-malaria society, undertook to control malaria by promoting the widespread use of quinine. As a result of three years' work, 1911-14, the amount of malaria was reduced one-



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half, according to a well-informed government official. During the war the purchase and distribution of quinine became impossible and, in his opinion, malaria returned to its former level. It is the policy of the government to re-establish this method and also to undertake a national system of drainage. The government has already surveyed Thessaly and other regions for this purpose. In Athens and perhaps other larger cities it is proposed that the work shall be done by the national government directly, and in the smaller communities it is hoped that it will be done by local authorities on plans laid down by the government and aided by government subsidy. At any rate, these plans await recovery from the exhaustion and impoverishment caused by the war.

*Infant Mortality.*—The infant death-rate is high in the Greek cities, notwithstanding the almost universal practice of breast-feeding of babies. According to the latest figures and on the best estimate of births it was nearly twice as high as in American cities. It is due largely to ignorance of what are suitable foods for babies during and after the time of weaning. Much of the food given small babies would test the digestion of even a healthy adult. In Athens the rudiments of medical inspection of school-children exist, but there is no home visiting, and consequently no effort to control communicable diseases discovered in the schools except smallpox. There is no reporting of contagious diseases nor isolation of patients except in case of smallpox and typhus. Influenza was very prevalent in Greece, and the epidemic, in the opinion of competent foreign observers, lasted longer than elsewhere. In Janina the deaths were



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2.3 per cent. of the population and in another city in Epirus even higher.

Agencies for dealing with sickness in Greece are few, though not quite as rudimentary as in Serbia. There is a medical school in Athens and the number of physicians in proportion to the population is 1 to every 1,300, but a large proportion of the best physicians are located in the city of Athens, which has a population of only 200,000, the total for Greece being 5,000,000. There are large areas of the country in which no medical service is available. The anti-malaria work was done in the Ministry of Communications. There is a division of health in the Ministry of the Interior, with a director and two assistants, all being lawyers, we were told. The work of this division has had to do with the suppression of alarming epidemics. It does not have in hand a general health program. Athens has several good hospitals, but available chiefly for paying-patients. In fact, the impression which one gets in Greece is that the comforts and the expert services of life are to be had by the well-to-do, of whom there are many in Greece, but that as to the condition of the great mass of the poorer people few give much thought, and that very little is done for their well-being. Every one said that there was much more poverty in the cities than before the war. Wages had risen, but prices had risen faster. There were no munition-factories in Greece and no unusual employment of women.

Greece has not a large problem, relatively, as to casualties among soldiers, war orphans, and cripples. She came late into the war and her mobilization was

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far from complete. The American army authorities estimate her losses of men killed in action or died of wounds at 7,000, as compared with an estimated loss in Serbia, which has about the same population, of 125,000. It is a striking commentary on the magnitude of the losses of the war that the killing of 7,000 and the care of the children thus made fatherless should seem a negligible detail to be passed over in a line or two, if it is not to be seen out of proportion in the total picture of human misery drawn on the world's canvas from 1914 to 1918.

## VIII

### WAR AND THE CHILDREN

“The scenes of my childhood” in war; Semendria; the obstinate optimism of childhood; “Dad” and big brother go away; will they return?; no more goodies—malnutrition; the refugee child; disillusionment of home-coming; war as childhood’s background; war deficit of babies.

**B**ISHOP PHILLIPS BROOKS once remarked that he who helps a child helps humanity with a directness and certainty which is possible in no other way. If this be true, then, conversely, whatever harms a child injures humanity with an equal directness and certainty. Its injury to childhood, therefore, affords one measure of the effect of war on human welfare.

“*The Scenes of My Childhood*” in War.—In what had been the city of Lens on a cold, rainy day in April five months after the signing of the armistice our automobile stopped in what had been a street and was now a sort of gigantic furrow plowed through debris. The chauffeur blew his horn and there came up from a cellar steps a mother and a boy of three or four years, pale, thin, and blinking. This cellar had been their home, not only since their return some months ago, but also for many months during the occupation while the Allied artillery made Lens

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a wilderness of kindling-wood, bricks, stones, and mortar. In fact, for the greater part of the boy's life this cellar had been his home. It was like all other cellars, but was wholly below-ground and lighted only by the entrance.

At our farthest point east in devastated Italy on a bitter cold day in November we passed on the roadway an Italian mother leading a tiny donkey which was pulling a cart on which were three small children and all their worldly possessions. The children were crying from cold and hunger. An old grandmother trudged alongside of the cart. They had been left in the rear when the Austrians swept forward in October, 1917, and, their home being too near the lines, had been sent farther back. They were now on their way back "home," to what we knew was an almost completely destroyed village. The only food any of them had had for many days was yellow corn.

A bit nearer the Piave, at Pordenone, four Italian families with quantities of children were living in a wretched building which had been despoiled of doors and windows and left in an unspeakably filthy condition less than a fortnight before. The children still had all the beauty which the children of that part of Italy have had for centuries, but the faces of the mothers left no need of any further statement of the sufferings through which they had passed.

When we reached Skoplie, American women, who had come as stenographers and clerks, were bathing and cleaning up refugee children who were on their way back from Bulgaria, whither they had been deported from southern Serbia. The cleaning up was being done in an old Turkish inn. The only



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utensils which could be found were empty petroleum-tins, and there was no way of heating the water other than by tiny fires made on the stone floor of a gloomy, damp, and unwholesome a building as can be imagined. The children were verminous, ragged, and suffering from skin and eye diseases.

A little farther on we met, walking along the unusable railway track, Albanian refugees—father, mother, and numerous children—all stooping under the weight of heavy bundles, getting such food as they could from the none too hospitable country through which they were passing, and finding shelter as best they might. They had to go about two hundred and thirty miles further.

At the next stop, Leskowatz, passing some low buildings opening on the street, we noticed the most distressed people we had seen. Their faces were thin and pinched. The women were dressed in pieces of coarse burlap and other rough packing-material stitched together with strings. They were bare-foot and sitting about on a damp dirt floor in cold weather (December 23d). Most of them looked as if they could not hold out much longer. El Basan, their home in Albania, was still some two hundred and fifty miles away. A funeral procession came down the street and passed us. A body wrapped in coarse cloth was being borne in an ox-cart, and four or five men in rags were following it. Our interpreter, a local resident, said: "Yes, that is one of them. Every day quite a number of the refugees die." The town seemed full of them. In the outskirts was a building which had been the civil hospital of the department. It had been stripped of all equipment by the retreating enemy and hundreds of pass-

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ing refugees were camped on its stone floors. The smoke from many tiny fires filled the building. An open space in the rear served in place of toilet accommodations. Near the center of the town there was a curious ancient inn built around an open court. The buildings had recently served chiefly as stables, and parts of them were still occupied by cattle. Manure and human filth and standing pools of water made navigation in the courtyard difficult. In places the roof had fallen in. Wherever the space was not occupied by cattle there were refugees. There were few babies among them, most of the children being obviously more than three years old. Everywhere there were the familiar family groups—old men, mothers, grandmothers, and children of all ages except babies. They had little or nothing in the way of bedding and their clothing hung in rags and tatters.

From one of the buildings opening on the street on the outskirts of the village we heard the cries of a child. There was something insistent, penetrating, and peculiarly mournful about the cry. Scattered about the entrance to the room was all manner of filth. Looking in, we saw a child, perhaps three years old, lying on the dirt floor, dressed in rags, crying bitterly. We asked a bystander what was the matter with the child. "Its mother is dead; she is in there." Then we saw on the dirt floor what was apparently the body of a woman, sewn in a rough wrapping. We were told she had been dead two days. We asked if there were any other children. "Yes, there are one or two more. They are in there. They are either asleep or perhaps they may be dead." We then saw another bundle of




**EVERYBODY CARRIES SOMETHING**

This family of Albanian refugees are walking home through Serbia.



**ON THE WAY HOME**

Two hundred and fifty refugees from Macedonia stopping a few days at Leskowatz, Serbia, on their way home. Twelve died here.





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rags, and while we were looking it began to stir and a tiny hand crept out, reaching and feeling about in a weak, uncertain, trembling fashion. The arm was bare to the elbow. It was literally skin and bones, and was covered with the most repulsive sores. We asked who was looking out for the children since the mother died. "No one," was the reply. We suggested that it was not necessary to let the children die because the mother was dead. The bystanders shrugged their shoulders and said something to the effect that that was the way with these people. Just then our epidemiologist came up and we asked him to look at the sick child. He stepped in, pulled the rags back, looked at the bare arm, and said, "Smallpox." We asked him to look more carefully, and he decided that probably it wasn't. Our inquiries had the intended effect, for, returning a little later, we found that the two children had been removed to an adjoining room with another family. The child who had been crying was eagerly devouring a piece of dry bread with every appearance of extreme enjoyment. The scene remains fixed in our memory as the last work in human misery.

*Semendria.*—At Semendria on the Danube we talked with the former schoolmaster. He had been one of those deported into Austria. His shirt was collarless and he had no other. His eye was keen and kindly, and he was exceptionally interesting. He was much troubled over the condition of the boys and girls of his town who had been running wild in the absence of schools and fathers, on streets left unlighted at night for military reasons or simply to save fuel. A good many half-grown girls and boys

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were working in a tobacco-factory where conditions were very bad. After four years of absence from school they had gotten out of the idea of going. Conditions in these respects are even worse now than during the occupation. The high-school building is being used by one of the Allies for a hospital, and even if they were to vacate, there is no school furniture and there are no books. The Austrians burned them all.

These few incidents, among hundreds of like character, prompted me to try to form some estimate of the effects of war on the childhood of this generation. The task is impossible, many times over, but at least a start can be made.

*The Obstinate Optimism of Childhood.*—Normally, childhood is the springtime of life. Always the sun shines, summer is coming with fruit and flowers. Home is the center of the universe, a sure refuge if any danger threatens from the great unknown outside world. Father is the superman, easily able to vanquish any enemy, a marvel of strength, the very incarnation of power and of wisdom. Big brother has many of father's qualities, but is not so busy and perhaps understands a child's plans better and is more ready to join in the serious and venturesome amusements of playtime. Mother is the source and sum of tenderness and understanding, with miraculous powers to heal all hurts and to summon the sun from behind the clouds that occasionally cross the April skies. It does not need riches, palaces, nor college graduates to make up this environment for childhood. Give children ever so slight an opportunity, and their sublime optimism and unconquerable idealism will construct an almost perfect home,

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set in their own world, of the barest, scantiest, and commonest of materials. To them it is perfectly real, and its daily exchange of affection, experience, and ideas constitutes the rich soil out of which the living soul of the child ripens into a human life. Into this land of dream-reality there occasionally comes a rude shock. The superman father in the world outside meets some enemy which for the moment is too much for him, or the wonder-working mother through some inexplicable error in the general scheme of things becomes ill. Perchance the mystery of death comes close by. But this is altogether exceptional. In the vast majority of instances the dream-world of childhood gradually changes into that of reality without any rude shock or violent transition and without wholly losing that atmosphere of promise, of confidence, of good will and good intentions. Into such a world, as well as into the tamer and disillusioned one which we adults believe to be the real world, came an unprecedented shock in 1914. With one rude blow it shattered the picture of springtime joy and substituted for it the gloom and threatening sky and the bitter cold of November.

*“Dad” and Big Brother Go Away.*—Its first blow to childhood throughout Europe was to take away the superman, whose strength had kept the world in order and whose companionship, in the brief intervals when he had time to be companionable, stood out as a succession of almost miraculous events. I do not know the equivalent of “dad” in French or Italian or the tongue of Serbia or Rumania, Greece, or Russia, but I know that every language must have such a word. “Dad’s” place in the home had



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been secure and supreme. In the word "dad" he had felt compressed such volumes of affection, such completeness of confidence, that for him life had taken on new meanings and vast responsibilities. The failure to meet them would be the greatest of all failures; the chance to live up to them drew forth his greatest powers and made long hours of monotonous toil seem a negligible part of the day.

Now, however, for no reason that appealed to the child—because somewhere a bugle sounded, or somebody brought to the door a bit of paper with some typewriting upon it—"dad" had to go away. Life thereupon became very quiet and monotonous. All parts of the day were alike. Mother seemed very still. There was nothing particular to do. Nobody came home to dinner with interesting accounts of what had happened during the day. At night the streets were dark, and it was best to say nothing to mother about what took place in them. There was nothing to do but to look forward to the time which mother said would be soon when "dad" would come back. Life became chiefly a matter of waiting.

Big brother went away, too. The games in which he helped, which were the best games of all, could be played no longer. There remained only the tame ones in which all parts were taken by children. He had gone off on the same kind of an errand as "dad," and he, too, was coming back soon.

The number of children whose world was suddenly darkened in this way is so huge as to be utterly beyond all comprehension. Some 50,000,000 men became soldiers; one authority says 56,000,000. Most of them were fathers or brothers. The devastation of child life was world-wide. It struck not



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only the children of France and England, of Italy and Russia, of Belgium and Serbia, of Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Bulgaria, of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, of Rumania and Greece and Switzerland; it included the children of Japan and the children in hundreds of thousands of homes in China and in the "black continent." We thought we had accomplished something quite remarkable when we arranged a more or less unreal kind of "big brothers" for a few hundred children in our juvenile courts, but in a very short time the war called away more big brothers than we are likely to provide in something like seventy thousand years.

*Will They Return?*—So long as "dad" and big brother were going to come back, the child could call upon his reserves of patience and endurance. He could make the old and worn-out games do after a fashion. But to many of them something happened so very much worse that it was quite useless to make any effort to understand it. It was so inherently improbable that it could not really be true. People began to say that "dad" and big brother would not come back. The child's searching eye, which turned to mother for reassurance, saw that something terrible had happened. It was so impossible to understand how anything could really interfere with such a big, powerful man as "dad" that the child's mind resisted to the last the thought of his having been harmed in any way, and equally the thought that anything in the world could possibly prevent him from returning sometime to his children. But, however long and doggedly the child denied to himself the truth of the terrible statement, there was always the haunting fear that it might be true, and in pro-

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portion as fear got the upper hold the future was dark. Mother was absent-minded and could not heal this hurt as she had done so many before.

Millions of children went through this experience. Do I say *went* through it? They *are going* through it now and will continue in its shadow for many years to come. How many war orphans there are in the world God only knows! There are millions and millions—probably nearer ten millions than five. Nothing can really take the place of the father in normal contact with his family. The lessons of life are passed over from one generation to the next in a multitude of daily events and experiences which occur only in a home in which father and mother both occupy their natural places.

*No More Goodies—Malnutrition.*—Another thing happened to the childhood of the world. The child is always hungry and naturally expects to be fed. The process of relieving hunger is one of his chief occupations. But now, in millions upon millions and in yet other millions of homes, there was not food enough. There were not so many kinds of things to eat; the good things especially were lacking—cakes and candies, meat and gravy. There remained mostly bread, which was even drier and harder than before and there was less and less of it. To the child this meant daily disappointment, a vague, uncomfortable sense that life was no longer satisfying, and that everything interesting which might be done involved so much effort that it was not worth while to begin it. To the understanding eye of the mother this atmosphere of insufficiency, this feeling of never being able to provide enough, was much more serious. It meant a gradual chang-

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ing of the bright flush of unconscious health to the pale, anemic look of one who had been, or was going to be, sick. It meant that the child became thin, weary, downhearted, peevish, always wanting something. To the physician it meant stunted growth; a delay in physical development which could never wholly be regained; a dozen cases of tuberculosis of the glands or of the joints where before there were but one or two; an inability to withstand children's diseases which ordinarily seem at least to come and go, leaving little impairment for the future. Insufficient nourishment was so widespread in the world and affected so very large a proportion of the people—those who buy their daily food and upon whom the full burden of higher prices immediately falls—that it sweeps far beyond any stretch of the imagination. About one-third of the world's population are children under sixteen. There are so many millions upon millions of people in the countries which were at war in Europe and in Asia that it is almost futile to try to think of these under-nourished children in terms of numbers. Europe's population in 1910 is estimated at 447,000,000. One-third of this would be 149,000,000. Add the children in Asia who went more hungry than before. We understand a little bit of what insufficient food means to the individual child. We know that the underfed child is a poor scholar, a weakling, a problem of the future, but who can form any conception of the tremendous sweep of these continental areas of backwardness, invalidism, fertile soil for infection, resulting from a shortage in the world's food-supply because so many men were at war, so many ships were sunk, and so many soldiers were eating more than they had before? It



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is a heritage which will plague the world for scores of years, producing inefficiency, breeding discontent, burdening the public treasury with the support of the sick and the invalids, and reducing everywhere the joy and richness of living.

*The Refugee Child.*—For a proportion of these children the war very quickly changed from something vague and far away which claimed “dad” and big brother, to something terrible, something of explosions, of terrific noise, something so dreadful that they must leave their homes and flee before it. Home had been a fortress, an absolutely sure protection from all danger, but this was something so terrible that a home was of absolutely no account. In one second it would convert a home into a mass of ruins. It spared nothing. The child’s playthings, the furniture in his room, the doors, windows, partitions, ceilings, and walls of his house, all crumbled into bits at the touch of this terrible thing. The child did as he was told. He picked up his kitten or his dog, carried a bundle which was so heavy that it immediately began to make his back ache, and walked off down the road. His feet became so sore that he could hardly take another step, he was desperately sleepy, terribly hungry, and more uncomfortable than he had ever been in all his life, and there was everywhere a vague feeling of still more terrible dangers. The child had to go with his mother, his brothers and sisters, and his grandparents on some long railway ride, or perhaps they had to walk all the way. They were hungry, cold, and crowded. There was no place to sleep. Finally, after what seemed like an endless lifetime of traveling (which was, in fact, several days), they arrived



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“somewhere.” Even then there was no good place to go. Hundreds of them would be crowded in together in some big building with no separate rooms. It had no beds, no stoves, no nice warm blankets. It was all so bare, dreary, and uncomfortable, and everybody was so downhearted that the children wept bitterly. They longed for the comfortable places from which they had come. They feared that nobody would look after all the treasured things which they had left behind. They felt sure that no one would have been so cruel as to harm them if they remained. They could not see why mother should have come to this gloomy and hateful place of all others. But here, or in some such place, they had to stay. They might as well forget all the comforts and attractions of the homes in which they had been brought up. They were exiles, refugees, and here they stayed for so long a time that it seemed as though they had lived here longer than anywhere else, and some of them had. They came to feel that this was where they would have to remain always, that their former home belonged to some sort of a golden age which would never return; that, hateful, wretched, and uncomfortable as it was, their present quarters were all that life held out to them, and that they had to make the best of it. Mother did not seem able to get any new clothes, their shoes were worn through, their stockings had great holes in them, their underwear and outer garments alike grew thin and patched, and patched again. Mother’s clothes were the same way. There was nothing handy with which to do anything. They had hardly any dishes. Many times they had no coal and no wood, not enough to cook, and never enough to keep

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warm. Some 4,000,000 children lived in this way from one to four years.

*Disillusionment of Home-coming.*—Mother had told them from time to time that by and by they would go home, but the waiting was so long they had come to disbelieve it. One day they were told that they would start.

But when they reached home what disappointment! Perhaps they had heard that home had been destroyed, but they had easily reconstructed it in their imagination. They had refused to see a heap of bricks and stones; it was so much more agreeable to think about the wonderful home as it had been, and as they thought about it again and again it seemed to them to be reality. But now the bitter truth was evident. Their home had gone. The strange place in which they had lived for so long a time in exile seemed bare and cold and gloomy, but this which had been home promised even worse. This was unmistakably the place; the road and the fields, the rivers and the hills—all proved beyond question that this was where the golden age had been spent, but now how different! What enemy could thus wreck the most perfect of homes, so solid and permanent and comfortable that the thought that it might be broken to pieces had never occurred to them? Now there was neither up-stairs nor ground floor; nothing but a cellar, and that full of bricks and sticks and stones. The stables were gone as well, and down the street the schoolhouse had gone, and the church and the town hall. As far as one could see in every direction everything had gone. Apparently this was where they were to live, for their elders and superiors began to clean out the

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cellar, to collect bits of iron and sticks and pieces of heavy paper, to prop up some sticks to make some kind of a hut, to look here and there for a broken dish or anything that might be useful. It was most strange. If, for a moment or two, it seemed interesting because it was so different, they soon realized that it was no place to live; it was more uncomfortable, more crowded, more cold, more dreadful even than the place where they had been. And if mothers and brothers and grandparents said that it was to be only for a little while, that very soon they would have a fine new house like the old one, can we doubt that childish minds, grown old so fast, which had experienced in a few years more tragedy than comes to most people in a long lifetime, saw through the thin pretense and knew in their hearts that it could not be done, that there were not the things to make houses of, nor the people to make them, and that it would be a long, long while before they would again have the wonderful homes which they had left away back in the golden age?

Several million children in Europe are living in such places. Unless all that we call civilization has been on a mistaken quest, unless sunlight, fresh air, good food, dryness, cleanliness, and decency do not make for health, vigor, and normal development, these millions of children when they come to carry on the world's work will find themselves weak where they should be strong, lacking in vision, adaptability, resistance, vitality, energy, courage, affection, responsiveness, and resourcefulness.

But even in such places children must play, and what a wonderful field for exploration! Among the ruins were most extraordinarily interesting things.



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There were things made of iron and copper, long and round, flat at one end and shaped like a beehive at the other. Also, there were small, oblong, iron things, with a curious fixture in one end. What were they for? What was inside of them? Could one take out the curious things in the ends? Would a hammer break them open? Would they make a big noise? Thousands of children experimented with shells and hand-grenades. Many will be cripples for life and many have found a world in which there is no war.

*War as Childhood's Background.*—What are the effects of all this upon the child's impressionable soul? What remains to him of that rosy future which had held out its hand so enticingly in the early days? Life had been false to him; it had lied to him; it had promised him warmth, shelter, companionship, love, and comfort. It had brought him noise, exile, hunger, cold, loneliness, and homelessness. It is the impressions of the early years which persist through life, which give a drift to character, which shape the instinctive attitudes and presumptions of life, which create an atmosphere of expectation. To what can this generation of children look forward, in what can they believe, whom can they believe, when life has proved so false in one thing after another; when the whole background is that of violence, of killing, of destruction, of hate; when the earliest recollections include explosions, shells, and bombs? In what temper of mind will they approach the duties of the future, what kind of democrats will they make, how much heart will they have for the creative undertakings of life?

Excepting for the fresh supplies of confidence,



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optimism, and good will which children are continually bringing into the sum total of life, the earth would speedily become too *blasé*, disillusioned, and certain that nothing is worth while, to be a fit place to live in. Childhood's contribution to each generation is a vital element.

*War Deficit of Babies.*—Those who let loose the World War probably realized vaguely that they might decimate Europe's manhood. Probably they did not in the least foresee that, in addition to this, they might reduce Europe's population to an equal extent by causing widespread race suicide. The war deficit of births in Europe probably exceeds the total number of soldiers dead from wounds and disease.

In France, as we have seen, the effect of the war on the birth-rate was very prompt and very striking. The 77 uninvaded departments (of a total of 86) show a deficit of births for the five years beginning 1914 of 984,589. Adding a deficit of some 200,000 in 1919, the loss amounts to some 1,184,589.

In the 9 invaded departments, where the births in 1913 numbered 141,203, there were very few after 1914. Two million refugees from this zone were in the interior and their births are already included in the figures above. The 3,000,000 people back of the lines included so few men that the birth-rate was very low. In Lille the births were reduced by seven-eighths. The war-zone birth deficit is probably at least 100,000 per year, a total of 500,000, including 1919, or for the whole of France a total birth deficit of some 1,684,589.

In Italy, whose population was as fertile as its fields were sterile—which exported men and imported food—the war's devastation of the cradle was equally

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marked. The birth-rate for the five years ending 1914 was 31 per 1,000; in 1916 it was 24. In 1917 (with a few provinces not fully reported) it was 19, a loss of more than one-third from the pre-war figures. Figures from 23 cities show a still farther drop in 1918, in some cases to less than 50 per cent. of the 1914 rate. Obviously, this will continue through at least the larger part of 1919. Expressed in terms of totals, this means a deficit of births in Italy, compared with pre-war conditions, of about 1,500,000, a number three times as great as the number of soldiers killed in battle, which was estimated at 462,000.

In uninvaded England the number of babies born in 1914 was 869,096. In 1917 it was 663,340, a falling off of about 25 per cent. In 1918 it fell still farther to 611,991, a decrease from 1914 of 31 per cent. For the two years 1917 and 1918 the birth deficit was 477,861. The deficit had already begun to operate in the latter part of 1915 and 1916 and will continue through at least the greater part of 1919. In England and Wales alone, for the war period, the birth deficit runs not far from 750,000. If Scotland and Ireland be included the war deficit in the United Kingdom will approach 1,000,000.

In Belgium the annual crop of babies before the war was about 170,000. Reports from localities widely scattered show an average falling off of about 50 per cent. or 85,000 per year, which for four and one-third years amounts to 348,000.

In Serbia, normally a very fertile country with the high birth-rate of 38 per 1,000, the number of births appears to have fallen off to an even more startling extent.

## WAR AND THE CHILDREN

The absence of children under three years of age in Serbia was very obvious to even the casual observer. The number of births in Serbia before the war was about 190,000 per annum, or for a period of five years some 950,000. A reduction to 20 per cent. of its former volume would mean a deficit of 760,000, a number undoubtedly greater than the exceptional losses which Serbia sustained during the Great War from all other causes combined, including the typhus and influenza epidemics, wounds and disease in the army, internment of prisoners and civilians in enemy countries, and the retreat through the Albanian Mountains in midwinter.

It is well known that the birth-rate fell off tremendously in the enemy countries as well, and that this led in Germany to a comprehensive movement to train child-welfare visitors in order to conserve the lives of the few war babies.

Even in America the bookkeeping of human resources began to tell the same story. In New York State the birth-rate of November, 1918, was 2.6 lower than that of the average for November for the preceding five years (19.8 against 22.4 per 1,000). By March, 1919, it was 3.2 lower than the average for March for the preceding five years, a reduction of 13 per cent. This would mean a falling off of about 32,000 in the state of New York alone in one year.

Taking France's deficit of 1,500,000, Italy's of about the same, England's of 1,000,000, Belgium's of 350,000, Serbia's of 760,000, and recalling Russia, Rumania, and Greece, it is evident that the deficit in births among the Allies alone will run into something like 6,000,000 or 7,000,000, and that if we add

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the figures for the Central Empires we shall arrive somewhere in the neighborhood of 10,000,000.

One might almost think that in whatever spiritland the souls of unborn children await their departure, the sounds of war and strife were heard and a whole generation just refused to come. The earth became very unpopular as a future home. Perhaps the population of Mars or some other planet increased proportionately. At least these wise little souls evidently refused to be born into an atmosphere of hatred, violence, and wholesale slaughter. It was no place for babies.



## IX

### WAR EXILES AND HOME-COMINGS

By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea, we wept,  
when we remembered Zion.

—*Psalm CXXXVII:1.*

Homelessness no light matter; continuing tides of refugees; refugees everywhere; leave-taking; refugee "adjustment"; refugee "prosperity" and "morale"; the call of home; war zone after the war; cave-dwellings; repairing the irreparable; other makeshifts; temporary houses; more aid and less pity; immaterial ruins; sub-standard living; Germany's devastated area; community "adoption."

SINCE August, 1914, Europe has been full of migrating people, homeless and heart-sick, weeping as they felt the pinch of hunger or shivered from cold and thought of the comfortable homes from which they had been driven. Their numbers compare with the little band of the Chosen People whose plaintive wail has become part of the sacred literature of the world as the ten million men who fought on the western front compare with the little bands of soldiers who followed the personal fortunes of their kings in Asia Minor twenty-five centuries ago.

*Homelessness No Light Matter.*—In American homes and Red Cross workrooms millions of American women have been making garments for these war

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victims. Now that the war is over, what is happening to them? The women of America are entitled to know, not only that on a certain day a refugee, shivering from cold, was given clothing made in America, but what the whole sad story of being a refugee means. The Great War created homelessness on an unparalleled scale, and homelessness is no light matter. It is not by accident that we have come to live in family groups and in settled habitations. It is because, on the whole, after centuries of trying many ways of living, the home plan works best. It is not only the child for whom the barest of walls that inclose a home are transformed. Under the magic of romance and the great adventure of parenthood, bare walls are covered with brightness; each meal is fit for a king; work is child's play and life is altogether desirable. In the home children acquire poise, serenity, and balance, and take over unconsciously such wisdom and grace as their elders have acquired. Away from home we get homesick because at home we are surrounded by all the things that help to make us and keep us well. The world has seen many voluntary migrations in search of better things, for there is a restless element in human nature. People moved out of crowded regions into newer areas to establish new homes. War migrations, on the contrary, were compulsory and always to worse conditions. The war exiles did not wish to leave; they had to. They did not go out to build themselves new and better homes, but to put up with any temporary makeshifts.

*Continuing Tides of Refugees.*—There were refugees all over Europe. For five years it had seemed that almost everybody was either going somewhere else

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or expected to do so soon, and, meanwhile, was living in a makeshift fashion. In Paris alone there was a constant number of 250,000 French refugees, 70,000 Belgians, 2,000 Serbs, a goodly number of Russians, and a sprinkling of other nationalities. Besides these, other thousands overflowed the railway stations and temporary lodgings of Paris as they passed through from time to time on their way from the occupied regions to "somewhere in France." You could not go anywhere in France without finding refugees, and you could hardly remain at any place without seeing intermittent processions passing by. The production of new groups of refugees was an almost continuous aspect of the war. It was just an ordinary incident of the day to hear that the town of So-and-so with a population of 5,000 or 20,000 had become too dangerous for civilians and would be evacuated on the following Tuesday or Thursday. Toward a million people left Paris during the period of greatest danger in the spring of 1918.

Throughout the war hundreds of thousands remained as near home—that is to say, as near the front—as they were allowed to. From the North Sea to Switzerland from 1914 to 1918, when the enemy changed the direction or range of his heavy artillery at any point, new processions started toward the rear. When the smoke cleared away they started back. There was always a balancing of dangers from bombardment, poison gas, and air bombs, against attachment to home, getting the crops in, and doing profitable work of various kinds for the armies. There was always plenty of work to be had near the armies, though life there was thoroughly demoralizing. The Allied armies did not have the

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brutal attitude toward refugees which would have been shown by the trained militarists of the Central Empires under like conditions. They were sympathetic and as helpful to the refugees as the military situation permitted. The British army especially was always ready to share its food with the refugees coming through the lines, and to help them to get to the rear. It liked to have them sent well to the rear, because freedom of action was essential to it and also there was the ever-present danger of spies being mingled with the refugees. Sometimes the restrictions which it placed upon persons going into the war zone to do relief work seemed unreasonable. But they were fully justified. Its attitude might be summed up as, "Be good to them, but, for Heaven's sake, keep them out of our way."

*Refugees Everywhere.*—When we started on our survey mission on armistice evening the refugees everywhere were just beginning to go back. It was the first trickling of what was to become a returning flood. Along the Piave River in devastated Italy they were coming from both directions—the refugees who had fled in advance of the Austrian army to the interior of Italy and those who had stayed behind and had been evacuated eastward by the Austrian armies. In the bitter cold, through a devastated country, with a few household utensils and a little clothing packed into a donkey-cart, they were finding their way back to a region as thoroughly devastated as northern France.

A week or so later we arrived at Bralo, a tiny station between Athens and Saloniki, the point at which troops going by rail were transferred from the wagon-road going overland from the Gulf of Corinth



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to the railway. On the tiny railway platform bundles and packages of every description were piled high. In the early evening we heard singing. It was the Serbian refugees who had been exiles in Italy, France, or Africa, and were on their way home. They did not know that they were on a blind alley and that after they reached the southern part of Serbia they would have to stay an indefinite time or retrace their steps many hundreds of miles to go from the Adriatic to Belgrade. When we reached Athens we found refugees from Asia Minor and Macedonia. A great boat-load of clothing had just been sent by the American Red Cross to scores of thousands of refugees on the islands off the coast of Asia Minor.

We started by boat for Saloniki, stopping on the way at Volo, the most unhealthful city in unhealthful Greece. As many refugees came on board as some slight regard for the safety of the vessel would permit. Between-decks it was full of refugees. When we met true Ægean weather and took in goodly quantities of water the poor refugees between-decks slid from one side of the boat to the other as it pitched from one side to the other, aided in so doing by some inches of water.

Arrived at Saloniki, the town was one seething mass of unfortunates stopping temporarily somewhere. Turkish mosques and Jewish synagogues received impartially hundreds of families who camped in little groups here and there on the stone floors, fortunate if a bit of burlap hung over a wire afforded a suggestion of privacy.

At Strumitza, just across the Grecian frontier in Serbia, box-cars on the siding were loaded inside and

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on top with unhappy women and children "going home." From then on, through southern and central Serbia, refugees were ever present, trudging along the muddy road, camped on the stone floor of some empty building or in the open. The impressions were of rags and tatters, dirt, eye and skin diseases, bundles, vermin, unavoidable unspeakably unsanitary practices, but also of determination, patience, a spirit of "carry on," and, as to the children, real interest in the passing show and a confidence that somehow, somewhere, life still must have interesting and agreeable experiences.

At Nish the refugees had passed by, but in the cemetery two large groups of newly made graves were pointed out to us as those of refugees who had died on their way home. At Belgrade, too, most of them had passed on, but there remained a few isolated and friendly old women, many of them with faces of extraordinary dignity and serenity.

*Leave-taking.*—The story of their going has caught the world's sympathetic attention. We have all been made to see the family groups—grandparents, mother, children, the sick and the crippled, as they looked longingly at their cherished possessions, their tidy homes, the many things made with their own hands, their animals, their crops, their fields, the church spire in the village. They must have picked up one thing, laid it down; took up another, and then another. "No, it can't be taken; it is too heavy. It must be left. We must walk, and the road is long." Hastily they put together a few necessary or treasured things and started down the road. We have seen them walking footsore, burden-bearing, falling by the wayside. We know of babies

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born on the way, and of mothers carrying new-born babies for miles. We have seen the refugees packed by main force into stifling freight-cars and slowly hauled, with many long interruptions, somewhere into the interior, hungry, filthy, weary, depressed. This happened to 1,250,000 people in Belgium, to 2,000,000 in France, to 500,000 in Italy, to 300,000 in Greece, to, say, 300,000 in Serbia, to 2,000,000 Armenians (except that they walked out into the desert and most of them to death), to 400,000 in East Prussia, to huge but unknown numbers in Rumania, Russia, and Austria—all told, to some 10,000,000 people.

Nobody, unfortunately, has had the imagination to enable us to realize what happened to all these people afterward, although that is the really important thing. Traveling is never very comfortable. We can put up with hunger, weariness, cold, and sleeplessness for a few days, if need be. They may even help us to forget loneliness. The hard thing is to endure all these things, day after day, week after week, and month after month for several years and with no early or certain end in sight. This, a much more real tragedy than their more dramatic departure, is the second and greater claim of the refugees to our continued sympathy and help.

*Refugee "Adjustment."*—When they arrived at their destinations there seemed to have been some mistake. Nobody was expecting them and no comfortable place was ready. All the houses were occupied by people who had been living there a long time. The only places to go to were barns, sheds, abandoned factories, unused convents, abandoned hotels, etc. These became terribly crowded,



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Instead of each family having two or three rooms, often there were two or three families in one room. It was awkward, indecent, noisy, and sickening. There was nothing to cook with, nothing to sleep on, nothing to cover up with, and it was cold. There was not enough fuel to go around. There never had been too much, but now, because some of the mines had been captured and there were not enough men to work the others, and the cars were so busy hauling munitions, it required desperate efforts to get barely enough coal or wood to cook with, let alone keeping warm. Most of the refugees could not do much work. The communities whose involuntary and uninvited guests they were did not like the new-comers who talked so differently, lived differently, and crowded in everywhere. Rents went up and food prices went up, and, as the refugee had no home and no land, he had to buy everything, and his scanty means would not hold out. He had to take the cheapest, dampest, darkest, and most uncomfortable quarters there were—places which people had abandoned because they were so bad. Here, with poor food, with little heat, sometimes no light, underclad and underfed, he did not really live; he simply existed. Homesickness is a real handicap, and the refugee was homesick all the time. He continually contrasted his former comfortable home, steady employment, and relatively good food with his present lot. All the other war distresses—the longing for the men who were away so long at the front, the haunting fear that they would be wounded or killed, the knowledge that they had been—all this cut more deeply into the heart of the refugee because he was already homesick, cold, hungry, and dis-



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couraged. No wonder he looked forward always to the day of home-coming.

*Refugee "Prosperity" and "Morale."*—When the American Red Cross reached France in July, 1917, and, looking about, inquired what most needed to be done, it heard contradictory statements in regard to the 1,500,000 French refugees who had been scattered through France for the last three years. The majority of the Americans resident in Paris thought the refugees had by this time "adjusted themselves." We were told that wages had risen in France, and that munition-factories offered plenty of employment. These advisers, however, added that the morale of the refugees left much to be desired. For some reason the refugees were dissatisfied. They were not enthusiastic about the war. It did not take much first-hand inquiry to clarify the situation. The small proportion of refugees who were of working age and who were located in a factory region had little difficulty in finding employment at wages which at first seemed high in France, but which actually had not kept pace with the rise in prices. The great majority who were too young or too old or too sick to work, and who had to depend on the government allowance, were in a bad way. Those also who had been sent to the resort regions for shelter in the tourist hotels found almost no employment. Except in the resort regions, whether employed or not, almost without exception, the refugees were living in the oldest, poorest, darkest and most unwholesome of quarters. Without sufficient money to buy household utensils or even the barest necessities of housekeeping, they were crowded into the meanest and poorest of the "furnished

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rooms." They had not been, it must always be remembered, poverty-stricken and unsuccessful people. They were the average population of the city and country districts of the north who had earned good wages, owned their homes or farms, lived in comfortable houses, had plenty of food, kept their children in school, and enjoyed the comforts and a fair share of the refinements of life. Now a family which had lived in its own comfortable home of four or five rooms, provided a considerable part of its food from its own fruitful garden, and surrounded itself with attractions and comforts, found itself crowded into one tiny room and lucky, indeed, if another family were not camped with it. In this tiny room it might have a few pieces of broken furniture. More than likely they were sleeping on the floor. There would be a tiny stove, but only by the most watchful and constant economy could the fuel be made to hold out for cooking. There was no one to look after the sick. Worst of all, these misfortunes were constantly getting worse instead of better. Their dissatisfaction and lack of enthusiasm for the war were easily understood. In less than a year after our arrival we were helping refugees by the hundreds of thousands, adding \$2,000,000 a month to the \$12,000,000 a month expended for them by the French government, and wringing our hands because this touched only the fringes of what needed to be done, as the soaring prices of food and fuel and the ever more crowded rooms made the problem of living more and more insoluble. We sent one of our volunteers, a hard-headed man who had left behind a large business enterprise in America, to see whether the thousands

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of refugees crowded into one of the industrial cities in France needed any further aid. He reported that, so far as he could see, many of them could not survive the winter without more help. Crowded into dark and unwholesome corners, huddled around tiny stoves in which a fire could be kept only a few hours each day, living on the scantiest of food, unable to buy clothing and bedding, without medical attendance, he saw additional relief as the only hope of their survival.

Finally victory and peace came. The war was over. It had been won. People threw up their hats and cheered. The fear of domination by a brutal enemy was removed. All would be well!

*The Call of Home.*—It was early winter and the government told them not to go back yet. As well tell a ripe apple not to fall. The pull of the home tie was stronger than everything else and streams of refugees began to trickle slowly back. By the middle of April, 1919, five months after the fighting ceased, about one-fifth of the refugees had returned—to what? Homes? Yes, if latitude and longitude made a home. There was nothing left but locality!

Going home was very much easier than coming away had been. It was easy to choose which things to take, because there were not many from which to choose, and most of them they were glad to leave, anyway. They were such poor excuses and substitutes for the real comforts of home. They had great confidence that now they would be taken care of. They knew that the disaster which had befallen them was in no sense due to any fault of theirs, but that it was somehow connected vaguely with a successful effort to prevent the control of the world by



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a ruthless and brutal people. The war had been won in behalf of justice, and, of course, justice would be done to them. Nothing could make up for the sufferings already endured, but the future would be different. They had heard of wrecked houses and of devastated cities, but they felt that probably it was not so bad as that where they came from.

We all know, and the world knows, only too well to what they returned. Every Sunday illustrated supplement for the past four years has brought us its new pictures of devastated France, devastated Belgium, and devastated this, that, and the other country, until to us in our comfortable homes they have ceased to be terrible or even to be interesting. These refugees, however, were now to see ruins, not from the outside, but from the inside. When they returned to their former homes things were far more out of joint than when they had arrived in the interior. Not only was nobody expecting them; there was nobody there. They had not even the advantage of beginning with a clean slate. Everywhere there were tumble-down houses, broken buildings of every kind, trenches across the fields, rivers of barbed wire running in every direction, and fragments of wreck and ruin. Here and there just under the surface were unexploded shells or grenades, not found by the prisoners of war who were supposed to have removed them. But it was home. Here they owned a bit of land; here they had been born and reared. The hillsides, the roads, the brooks—all spoke to them of childhood and early years. So here they would remain; in fact, they had nowhere else to go. It was hardly a matter of choice.

*War Zone after the War.*—The first and most vivid



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impression of a visit to the war zone is the tremendous amount of it—the sheer volume of destruction. In a fast auto I traveled for ten days from early morning until dark, stopping a few minutes here and there at most interesting spots, chatting with mayors, relief workers, and with refugee pioneers, and during the ten days saw nothing but regions of ruins, and even then had covered only half the distance from the North Sea to the Swiss line. The impression is somewhat like that of riding over our western prairies: one becomes almost terrified by the stretch of it. Will it never come to an end?

The second strongest impression is that of the variety of conditions. It is impossible to make any general statement about the war zone. At one moment you may be passing through a region in which the fields are apparently in perfect condition and, if not ready for the harvest, at least ready for the plow. The next moment you enter a region where the land is one succession of shell-holes. Rocks, stone, and sterile clay of the under-soil to the depth of four to six feet have been scattered over the surface. There are many regions in which one sees nothing but this as far as one can see in every direction. Where the fighting occurred in the early part of the war nature has begun to hide this ugliness and shame by a scanty covering of weeds and grass.

The buildings, too, show every degree of damage in the most haphazard fashion. One city will be nothing but a heap of bricks, sticks, mortar, and stones; the next may be wholly intact. In the same city one section may be completely destroyed and the other partly so. On the same street some of the houses may be in complete ruins, others partially

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destroyed, and still others almost uninjured. We can only describe it in such terms as these; in what we might call the county of Cambrai, there are 74 villages and cities in which the destruction ranges from 5 to 40 per cent.; 14 in which it is from 40 to 90 per cent.; and 21 in which it is from 90 to 100 per cent. A great variety of facts enter in: Did either side make any serious attempt at resistance in this particular locality? How near was it to the line of trenches? Was it an important place from a military point of view? Heavy artillery can completely destroy a city twenty miles back of the lines, but it rarely does so. The number of big guns is limited and their lifetime short. There are villages and towns very close to the trenches which show little destruction.

Nearly always conditions are very much worse than they at first appear to be. Repeatedly as we approached a town we thought, this place seems to have escaped. The buildings appeared to be standing, yet as we entered it and went into the buildings we found that it was only a ghost of a city. The walls, and perhaps even the roofs, might be standing, but the interiors were a mass of tangled wreckage. Any one who has ever undertaken to repair a dilapidated house will appreciate that it always costs a great deal more than was expected. The damage does not need to be very extensive to make it cheaper to tear away and build anew. Whole areas and cities that to the casual observer at a little distance appear almost unharmed can only be dealt with by the radical method of completing the work of demolition and building anew from the bottom up.

To this crazy patchwork these bewildering and

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planless areas of contradictions, this end-result of an orgy of blind destruction, the weary, depressed refugees return. If it is difficult to make any general statement about the devastation, it is equally difficult to make any general statement about how the returned refugees are living. They are living in every possible way except the way of comfort, health, and efficiency.

Surely, they thought, those great Powers conferring at Versailles who were to make Germany pay would now rebuild their homes perhaps better than before. They believed firmly in the early resurrection of the devastated area, and therefore almost anything would do for the present.

*Cave-dwellings.*—The first thing the returned refugee does is to dig. Very likely he buried something under the cellar when he went away, or he thinks something useful may have been left by the armies, or perhaps he is simply curious. With pick and shovel he finds what proves to be an entrance to the cellar. The cellar may not be flooded. In any case, when it is opened up in this way it will be drier. Maybe the cellar would do for a time. It ought not to be for long. A few stones for steps will enable one to get in and out. The heaps of stones and rubbish above have not broken through, and probably won't. They will help to keep out the rain and the snow. It is a bit damp, but one can't have everything in war-time. A few pieces of furniture may be picked up here and there; a stove from somewhere; a few lengths of chimney pipe can be gathered and pieced together; and it will be home.

These cellar homes are the rule in the larger cities



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which have been completely destroyed. In the great coal-mining center of Lens, where the destruction was 100 per cent. complete and where simply to clear away the rubbish from the roads would occupy a large number of men a long time, one might ride through the city on one of the very few roads which had been cleared up and think it still completely deserted. Here and there a tiny wisp of smoke would be seen in the midst of the ruins. Looking closer, the smoke was seen to come from a bit of stovepipe projecting a foot or so above the rubbish. Scanning closely, as one may have done in a country pasture for the hole into which a woodchuck had disappeared, one sees a path and, following it, finds a tiny hole leading down into the blackness. It is the vestibule of a human habitation. Sound the horn of the automobile and here and there amid the ruins women, children, and old men appear as if by magic. It seems uncanny, like the emergence of the beasts of the fields from their holes. But they have no other place to go.

*Repairing the Irreparable.*—Sometimes parts of walls of the house, or perhaps of the stable or outbuilding of some kind, are still standing, for in France they build very solidly for all time. If there are two pieces of wall standing, forming an angle, it is better. There is already one end and one side of a possible shelter. By sheer good luck, once in a hundred times, there may be parts of three walls, making it necessary to build only the fourth. For a roof? Well, there are plenty of pieces of corrugated iron lying about which were used for military huts. These can be laid on a few sticks and, if it is well done, they will almost keep out the rain. A few





#### THEIR HOME-COMING

Near Armentières, France. This family of returned refugees had just arrived to learn the condition of their former home.



#### THEIR HOME

Pioneers in the famous coal-mining city of Lens, held by the Germans until near the end of the war, and destroyed by Allied artillery-fire.



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heavy stones will hold them in place. Window-glass does not exist, but the gaping holes where the windows had been can be filled in in a variety of ways. For a moment we thought we were in Serbia when we saw what had been windows now solid brick walls, though perhaps laid without mortar. We had seen this for three hundred miles along the central highway of Serbia, but no, this was Belgium and France. The windows never were numerous or large, for there had been a tax on windows. In the next building, perhaps, the windows may be partly boarded up and partly covered with corrugated iron salvaged from the battle-field, partly by heavy building-paper, and partly by a thick, opaque oil-cloth, with perhaps one tiny square through which a precious bit of glass found somewhere around the premises admits a few rays of light. Just when a special effort is being made throughout France and Belgium to teach the importance of light and ventilation in the prevention of disease, hundreds of thousands of people are forced to live in shelters which effectually exclude both light and ventilation.

*Other Makeshifts.*—Or perhaps there may be on the premises, or near by, one of those curious semi-circular houses made of corrugated iron, of which the British used so many. There is no chance for windows except in the ends, which are of wood; holes can be cut and some cloth will keep out most of the rain and let in a little light. A heavier covering of some kind can be hung up when it rains. By piling up the dirt around the sides, the wind can be kept out. It does not look like a house, it is not a house, but it will do for a time, and there is room for a good many in it.

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Or the tiles of the roof may be broken to bits and the doors and windows gone, but the walls may be standing. Some kind of a temporary roof can be fixed up underneath the timbers of the former roof. A brick wall can be made without mortar, where the windows were, since there is no glass, or they can be boarded up. A ladder will do in place of a stairway. It is a little dangerous, but people must be careful. Without any windows it is dark, but it is not for long. The air is horribly close at night, but it will not be so hard to keep it warm in winter. There is nothing to make any mortar with, but bricks, if piled up carefully, make a wall that will stand for some little time. Pieces of boards carefully arranged and held down by heavy stones will make a fair roof.

Or scattered here and there are what look like heavy cement half-cellars. The big guns were under here or the soldiers went in here when the shells were numerous hereabouts. It was not intended to be lived in, and it is damp, cold, and dark, but still, until something better can be found, it will do.

A ten-day trip through the northern half of the western front showed only too clearly that these returned exiles were living about the barest, darkest, coldest, unhealthiest sort of existence possible. Thousands and hundreds of thousands of people began to live in every kind of dark, damp, gloomy, unwholesome, temporary quarters which will not really be temporary. Building something better takes a great deal longer than one would think. It is impossible to get nails and hammers and saws. It is impossible to make mortar, and, besides, one has to be thinking about raising things in the gar-





**PICTURESQUE, BUT THINK OF LIVING IN IT**

This British military hut shelters a refugee mother and her family on the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war, not far from Ypres.



**THE BATTLE-FIELD AT HOOGE**

Site of the Belgian village of Hooge on the famous Ypres-Menin road. This is the condition of hundreds of square miles in France and Belgium.



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den and getting chickens and rabbits, otherwise one might starve next winter. It is a long way to go to get bread and mail and whatever one may be able to get. So the temporary shelter becomes more and more permanent.

*Temporary Houses.*—Here and there, amid complete destruction, one sees a wooden barrack. In peace-time it would have been a poor excuse as a stable for animals. Now it represents the acme of comfort for human beings. It may have a window or two, and may have even a partition dividing it into two or three rooms. It is the official plan for the temporary housing of the people of the war zone. These barracks were to have been manufactured by the tens of thousands and set up, that the people might return and begin the tilling of their fields and the rebuilding of their permanent homes. It is not to be wondered at that these barracks are, nevertheless, few and far between. The government of France is tired out. It accomplished marvels during the war. It worked under the highest degree of nerve strain, with feverish haste, to meet one appalling emergency after another. It endured this strain for weeks and months and years, knowing that it must come to an end. When it did come to an end, it was simply impossible for them to go on at such a pace. There had to be a period of rest and a renewal of strength and resolution, no matter how urgent the needs might be.

Such were the conditions, and such the people, of whom a typical all-admiring and wholly undiscriminating appraiser of American relief work wrote for *The Ladies' Home Journal* in May last: "There is going to come an hour when the civilians must

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stand on their own legs or fall. By July [1919] at the latest American benevolence, save for a few rare exceptions, should be out of France." Never was there a more superficial, blindly, blandly, and wilfully complacent view of great masses of one of the most civilized people in the world plunged into utter misery and helplessness in order that civilization might be saved.

*More Aid and Less Pity.*—Well-informed testimony is unanimous as to the slowness, not simply of reconstruction, but of temporary housing of any sort. On Sunday, July 6th, the President of the French Republic visited Rheims, "The Martyr City," to bestow upon it the Cross of the Legion of Honor. *The Evening Post* special correspondent reports that chalked on many of the fragments of walls were the words, "Pity us less and aid us more." The mayor said that one-third of Rheims's population had returned and were living as best they could among ruins and debris. The railway at Rheims had been closed to traffic for a month. The clearing up of the streets even had scarcely begun. The mayor's wife broke in, "Think, there are only two more months of good weather and there are thousands of people living in hovels open to every wind and to the cold." A simple and direct citizen said: "We are proud that the government should think of decorating Rheims. What we are asking for is houses."

Writing from Lille, September 15th, Philip Gibbs says: ". . . and into Lille has crowded a dense population from that outer belt of ruin, the devastated regions. There, apart from a few wooden huts among the ruins, there is no revival of normal life, and there the blessed word 'reconstruction'



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spoken in Paris as a magic word, a word of power, is only a fetich and a will-o'-the-wisp. So the people of Lille have talked to me rather bitterly and rather sadly."

Some day there will be a new Lens, and a new Rheims, and thousands of other new cities and villages, but not at once nor for a long time. The men who might have repaired these railways, prepared the raw materials, cleared away the rubbish, and put up the new buildings are resting in the soil of France, of Belgium, of Italy, of Greece, and of Serbia.

There are not men enough in Europe to go around, no matter how they may be assigned, and we all know in our hearts that one, two, three, yes, a dozen, or twenty years will elapse before those who in this war were refugees will all again occupy real homes. Very weary and very sorrowful, they have returned as pioneers to a wilderness of ruins, to dig in bit by bit, to get some slight foothold and slowly and painfully to bring the first elements of order out of chaos; with their own hands to make shelters in which to live; to endure for an indefinite time the poorest and bleakest of existences; to live in the dark and in the cold, in the unhealthiest and most depressing of surroundings, and to awaken slowly to the fact that their emergence from this humanly created chaos is to be a painful and slow process of an indefinite duration.

This is the refugee's third and greatest claim to our sympathy and help. The outward journey was a matter of a few days, the exile a matter of a few years, but reconstruction will be a matter of a few decades.

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Little by little, the temporary shelters will be made a shade less unbearable. Some of the larger holes will be stopped up, the rain will not come in quite as much, and window-glass will replace boards and iron in the tiny windows; but wretched, unwholesome, insanitary accommodations must be the rule for years to come in the zone of devastation which stretches through Belgium, France, Italy, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, what was Austria, East Prussia, and wanders in irregular fashion through great areas of what was Russia.

*Immaterial Ruins.*—Shelter is only the beginning of living. The thing that was destroyed in these devastated areas was not simply buildings; it was the whole structure of human life. All these wrecked houses, schools, hospitals, factories, city halls, churches, had been put up to serve human needs. They represented the thought, the sentiments, and the labor of many generations who had builded themselves into these structures.

When you go into a patched-up building with the windows stuffed with cloth, the door turning awkwardly on improvised hinges, and into a bare room with two or three bits of broken-down furniture, and find that this is the City Hall and that this man sitting here is the mayor, you begin to realize that it is the whole intangible structure of human life that has been destroyed, a thing which it will be harder to rebuild than buildings. An organized community, which, little by little, took shape through centuries, had been blown to bits. This man sitting here has everything to do and nothing to do it with. He is bare-handed and empty-handed. He has no resources and no helpers. But the entire

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community, bereft of everything, looks to him to make the loss good. Scores of thousands of city fathers in Europe are trying to do this superhuman task.

*Substandard Living.*—The great majority of men, catching glimpses of better things, have crawled slowly, bit by bit, through many hundreds of years, out of and away from dirt and squalor, hunger, cold, and vermin, into some degree of happiness, leisure, and comfort. The standard of living has risen ever so slowly, as slowly and unconsciously, it seems at times, as islands or continents here and there are rising out of the sea. Suddenly the standard of living of a whole continent is again submerged, and millions of men and women and children are thrust back into cold and misery, into darkness and dampness, bareness, ugliness, and squalor, into discouragement and friendlessness, and disbelief that any one cares for them or that there is anything desirable in the world. This is not the misery of the unsuccessful such as is always with us; it is misery spread through the entire population of what had been prosperous cities and towns. They had reached various standards of living and nearly all were well above the stage at which the fear of destitution is ever present. They were not the unfit, if such there are. They had built their homes in a land of plenty. This German Vesuvius, which finally engulfed them, had not always rumbled and smoked and betrayed its volcanic character.

We have seen to what the refugees have returned in France and Belgium, countries of high standards of living. What their conditions must be in countries where the former standards were low, where



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there was always plenty of disease and, from time to time, starvation, we can only imagine.

It is hard to climb up, but easy to slip back, and still easier to stay down. Who can estimate the permanent harm done to civilization by thus putting the ways of living of millions of people back to something which looks extraordinarily like the standards of the cavemen? We know that it cannot be done with impunity, that there are laws not only of economics, but of science, of health, and of morals. Darkness and dirt, vermin and filth, bad air and cold and hunger are not to be thought of lightly. Somebody has to pay. The human race has climbed and fought its way up from these things because they are bad, because they mean suffering, disease, and death. We cannot plunge five or ten million people for several years into every sort of disease-breeding condition without paying the price. Much of it will be a deferred debt, but it will be paid with interest, compounded at short intervals, and calculated at a high rate. That we have many other debts, and are not in a favorable position to pay, will be no excuse. There will be no exemption law, and no moratorium. In sickness, in poverty, in misery, in inefficiency, in unrest, in the dislocation of the complicated thing which we call civilization, the price will have to be paid to the uttermost farthing.

*Germany's Devastated Area.*—It is interesting to note in passing that, although Germany planned with diabolical skill and with a very large degree of success, that war, when it came, should be carried on in the enemy's territory, it was not wholly without its own devastated area. Eastern Prussia was in-



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vaded and occupied by the Russians on two occasions, from the middle of August to the middle of September, 1914, and from November, 1914, to February, 1915. According to a report by the German Minister of the Interior, a copy of which came to the knowledge of French officials, 34,000 buildings were wholly or completely destroyed, 10,000 persons were taken away as hostages, and 1,600 killed. The German authorities estimated the number of refugees from these regions at 400,000. In the different centers to which the refugees were sent public schools were open without charge to the refugee children, agencies organized to assist nursing mothers, and special institutions set up for sick and convalescent children. The great part of the population returned in the spring of 1915. Prompt measures were taken for the establishment of the amount of the losses, all of which the state assumed, recognizing also the increased cost of materials and of labor and the additional requirements demanded by modern hygiene. Supplementary allowances were made to cover these purposes. Thorough steps were taken for the disinfection of all the buildings in which the Russian troops had been quartered, for the purification of the water-supply, and for the medical treatment of the returning refugees. Thirty million marks were set aside by the government for the re-establishment of agriculture in the invaded region.

One of the most interesting phases of this German effort at reconstruction was the establishment of a society of war relief for eastern Prussia, which operated under a system described by the French word *parrainage*, a word which has no precise English equivalent. A *parrain* is a godfather and *parrainage*

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describes that relationship of sympathetic interest and, on occasion, actual material aid, which, in Europe, a godfather is supposed to extend to a god-child. The plan was that various German cities or organizations, or even rich and influential citizens, would select a city or a village in the invaded region and for a period of years would assist in some phase of its re-establishment, financial, agricultural, educational, or sanitary. Similar plans suggested at various times for the adoption of French cities or towns by various American cities, failed of success because they undertook too much. The American cities in "adopting" French cities or villages were expected by the promoters of the plans to provide for their complete reconstruction, just as a parent provides for the needs of an adopted child. The duties of an adopting parent are very far-reaching—he succeeds to all the obligations and responsibilities of the natural parent, including the full support and education of the child. The godfather's duties, on the other hand, are never more than supplementary and, so to speak, occasional. The actual cost of rebuilding any village or town would be far beyond the resources of the private philanthropy of any like city or town, unless the city or town to be rebuilt were very small and the adopting city very large. The German cities and organizations which became "godfathers" to localities in the devastated areas, were wiser and less ambitious. They had a great variety of plans, but none of them contemplated more than some one need. One, for instance, would undertake to replace the public buildings of a given locality; another would undertake to re-establish the various means of transporta-

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tion; a third would rebuild schools; a fourth would devote itself to the restoration of the public-health agencies, hospitals, laboratories, public baths, etc.

*Community "Adoption."*—A sound principle underlay this suggestion that the altruistic sentiments of a given locality should be organized to meet the needs of some other particular locality. It was successfully applied to some extent in the relief of the devastated region of Italy. During the early months of 1918 consideration was being given by some American and French co-workers to the possibility of working out a plan whereby the good elements in this arrangement could be availed of for interesting American towns in the ruined French cities and villages. It was seen that the plan would involve, first, a definition of what "adoption" in any given case might mean—such as the restoration of the public buildings, or the restoration of the buildings for health or educational purposes, or both, or the restoration of a transportation system, or a water-supply; second, the selection and public announcement of some one agency in America through which all such requests might be forwarded to some one agency in Paris; third, the setting up of some machinery by such agency in Paris for securing data by which definite suggestions could be made to any American locality as to a particular French locality which might be, in the above sense, "adopted," together with an estimate of the cost involved, the nature of the work which might be undertaken, and an offer to place the donor in touch with the suitable local authorities and to co-operate with a view to the smoothing out of all the difficulties which might be involved. Unfortunately, in the very early stage of

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consideration, these plans were interrupted by the offensive of March, 1918, and the opportunity did not arise later to definitely formulate such a plan. This is most unfortunate. Were such a plan in effect, the people of many American localities would now have a close and continuing tie with reconstruction as it is actually progressing in various parts of the devastated area. There would now be a fuller understanding of the slowness and tremendous expense of reconstruction, of the sufferings and loss which the unfortunate inhabitants of these areas must continue to undergo for an indefinite period of time, and a larger body of common understanding and good will upon which to build a permanent friendship and co-operation between the two peoples. It would have had an admirable effect if American communities, in the full tide of their prosperity and with all their tendencies to isolation, had in this manner been kept interested in the cities and villages of France, Belgium, Italy, and Serbia and other countries as they creep slowly step by step back toward organized living.

It is not necessarily too late to consider such a plan, preferably, perhaps, in relation to countries which have suffered even more than France, such as Serbia, Poland, and Armenia.



## X

### WAR, BEST FRIEND OF DISEASE

The first wealth is health

—EMERSON.

The millennium that was coming; sickness prevented and death postponed; lost ground among civilians; tuberculosis increases; malaria returns; the "cootie" spreads typhus; drinking typhoid sewage; influenza and war; war, baby-killer; health aspects of cave-dwellings; a postponed millennium; meeting the situation; American tuberculosis work in France; health agencies, America's best gift to the Balkans.

### *THE MILLENNIUM THAT WAS COMING.*

—In 1914 the millennium was on its way. It was not at the door, but it was definitely predictable. The war has postponed it indefinitely.

In what respects does life most fall short of being reasonably satisfactory? Do not its great disappointments arise chiefly from two things—sickness and untimely death? There are many annoyances and disappointments in life, but it is nearly always sickness or the untimely death of those dear to us which cuts across the pathway of our happiness, ruthlessly disrupts our plans, prevents the normal development of our powers to do and to enjoy, wrecks our careers, and wounds our souls so deeply that the scars are seen in our very features. These are the things that silver our hair, round our shoulders, and write lines in our faces.

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In the years just before 1914, however, a new chapter was being written in human welfare. After long ages of helpless resignation, of pitiful efforts to snatch some crumbs of comfort by ascribing these afflictions to a power outside of ourselves, we were just beginning to see that it was in our own hands to apply the remedies; that, to a surprising degree, sickness and death were subject to human control.

*Sickness Prevented and Death Postponed.*—Life was already being made longer, happier, and richer. It is difficult to write truthfully of what had happened without seeming to exaggerate. Tuberculosis was slowly but surely on its way to join smallpox as an almost negligible factor in the bookkeeping with death. The warfare against it was civilization-wide. It was a slow fight and a long one, but it was winning. Diphtheria had been reduced to a fraction of its former proportions by a serum which is both curative and preventive. Those of us in middle life can remember when serious epidemics of yellow fever occurred nearly every summer, when we wondered how far north it would get, when quarantine was by shotgun, and when great heroism was attributed to those who remained in infected cities. Now yellow fever has been reduced almost to the vanishing-point in the United States and Cuba, and General Gorgas, for the Rockefeller Foundation, is trailing it to its ultimate hiding-places with the definite program of actually causing it to disappear from the face of the earth. All this became possible by the discovery that the sole mode of communication is by the *stegomyia* mosquito. The similar discovery that malaria is carried, not by bad air, as its name suggests, but by another type of mosquito, was already

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beginning to rid southern Europe of a disease which caused as many deaths in some localities as tuberculosis, and which injured vastly larger numbers so that their usefulness was greatly reduced and death came at an earlier date. Some scientists and writers have ingeniously suggested that the downfall of the civilizations of Greece and of Rome was due primarily to the work of the *anopheles* mosquito. It is unquestionably true that this little but industrious insect has been a tremendous factor in making the civilization of that part of Europe what we call backward. Every one knows how an aggressive campaign put the hook into the hookworm and pulled him loose from the population of our Southern states whose vitality he was draining, and that this effort is to be carried around the world along the hookworm belt. Typhus fever had largely disappeared as man had learned to rid himself of lice. There was only enough smallpox to enable the health authorities to keep alive an interest in vaccination. Syphilis had been recognized as a deadly enemy and means for its cure and for its prevention had been discovered. Cancer remained largely a mystery, but enough had been learned to make possible the earlier recognition and successful surgical treatment of vast numbers of cases which formerly would have meant sure and painful death. These are only a few of many discoveries and organized movements which had already added ten years to the average lifetime in America and Great Britain, had made life vastly more attractive, and which in the very near future, with increasing momentum, would have lightened the black clouds of sickness and untimely death that for ages had kept the world in gloom.

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*Lost Ground Among Civilians.*—It must forever remain one of the most serious of the many charges against the Great War that it disrupted or delayed a great number of these, the most promising movements in modern life. In some cases progress, made slowly and painfully through decades, was lost in two or three years. Attention and funds were diverted to destroying instead of saving life, and age-old pests and enemies of man took fresh heart and a firmer hold upon the race.

It happened among the civilians. The armies were well cared for. A great majority of physicians, sanitarians, laboratory workers, and nurses were busy in keeping fit as many as possible of the soldiers. The armies had first call on food-supplies. Whoever else might go hungry, they were well fed. Influenza was about the only epidemic disease which was not substantially held in check in the armies of the Great Powers. But the armies are small minorities. Many times as many people remained at home as went to war in the soldier's uniform, but in fact everybody was drawn in and the war resolved itself into an endurance test between peoples. There were few countries in which the pinch of hunger was not felt by almost the entire population. Millions of refugees were driven from their homes to live under the most unwholesome conditions. From these populations under these wretched conditions, even the rudimentary safeguards against disease were removed. The results were immediately registered in increased death-rates, which, in many cases, were startling.

*Tuberculosis Increases.*—Every one knows the plot of the tuberculosis tragedy. In the immediate circle



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of our family, intimate friends, or office associates, we have seen it develop step by step. We can never forget the haunting fear of something wrong, the shock of the diagnosis; the rebound to optimism; the rude interruption of all the ordinary activities; the uncertain income; the specter of poverty; the alternations between hope and despair; the long period of uselessness; the racking cough at shorter intervals; the hectic flush; the shrinking of the body; the inner evidences that the battle is lost; the bitter realization of defeat; the last gurgling gasp. How unlike a glorious death upon the field of battle. Yet hundreds of thousands who make this slowly losing fight in the obscurity of home or hospital are as certainly victims of the war as those who are buried in the war zone.

The anti-tuberculosis movement was local, state, national, and international, voluntary and governmental, medical and lay; the best organized effort to stamp out a widespread disease yet known. Progress was slow. In a period of twenty or thirty years the disease might be reduced by 50 per cent. But everywhere it *was* being reduced. Now comes the war. This decrease in tuberculosis is immediately arrested and in two or three years the hard-won gains of twenty are lost. A review of the conditions disclosed in our study of the several countries shows that increased tuberculosis stands out as one of the great phenomena of the war.

We have seen that in Serbia there had been twice as much tuberculosis as in the United States or Great Britain (324 deaths per 100,000 in 1911 as against 138 in the United States). In Belgrade tuberculosis deaths in 1912 were 720 per 100,000.

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Serbia went hungry during the war. It suffered all the effects of the blockade and then more. There was no Mr. Hoover there. Very likely it was chiefly the shortage of food which caused the tuberculosis death-rate in Belgrade to jump from 720 in 1912 to the absolutely unheard-of rate of 1,453 in 1917. It is easy to understand the figures—Serbia twice as high as America; Belgrade twice as high as Serbia as a whole; Belgrade at war twice as high as Belgrade at peace, or eight times as high as America. Experienced Serbian physicians recognized before the war that tuberculosis was the greatest medical problem of Serbia and were awake to the possibility of doing something about it; in fact, a plan of organization for an anti-tuberculosis society of Serbia had been prepared. Lectures and popular education on the subject had begun. All these, of course, were rudely thrust aside by war. Nothing constructive could be thought of while every ounce of energy was mobilized for war. Now it will be very difficult. There never were many physicians, and half of them have died. The civilian hospitals have been disrupted. The public debt is staggering. Disease has taken a strangle-hold upon thousands who survived the horrors of war. Under favorable conditions, with ample resources, in the most progressive of countries, progress against tuberculosis is slow. The task of helping Serbia, under her conditions of unprecedented difficulty, to overcome the menace of tuberculosis, is almost a first mortgage upon the enlightened generosity of the world.

Greece, too, is a country in which tuberculosis seemed to maintain its position of primacy. We say "seemed to," because there have never been any

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complete figures as to deaths in Greece. In this unenviable position, Greece is on a par with the United States, for we have no vital statistics for our country as a whole. It is a state matter, and some states don't function. In the city of Athens the death-rate from tuberculosis during the last three-year period for which the figures are to be had, 1906-08, was 294 per 100,000, not as high as Belgrade with its 720, but more than twice as high as in the United States for the same period. In Athens one death in six was from tuberculosis. There was a beginning of an anti-tuberculosis society in Athens, which had a dispensary and a small sanatorium with twenty beds. Early in 1917 starvation conditions began to exist throughout Greece, even in Athens. They improved later, but for the civilians food conditions remained very difficult until months after the armistice. Undoubtedly food shortage and war conditions in Greece had the same effects upon tuberculosis that they had in Serbia and elsewhere.

In Italy the figures are more complete and the proof of war's guilt as a promoter of tuberculosis is uncontestable. The tuberculosis death-rate had been steadily decreasing. In the twenty-five years ending 1914 there had been a reduction of 40 per cent. In 1914 it was 145 per 100,000, the lowest in the history of Italy. It responded immediately to war conditions. From 145 in 1914, it increased to 157 in 1915, and to 168 in 1916, an increase of 16 per cent. in two years. Even these figures do not include tuberculosis deaths among soldiers. This immediate and striking increase in tuberculosis in Italy is one of the startling facts in public health history. But worse things were to come. In the



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130 cities in Italy the pulmonary tuberculosis death-rate increased from 143 in 1916 to 160 in 1917.

Still worse things were to come. For 1918 we have the figures for some of the larger cities. In several the 1918 rate, as shown by the table on pages 186-7, was double that of 1914.

We have, therefore, in the cities of Italy, a known increase during the war in tuberculosis ranging from 30 to 50 per cent. and in some cities completely wiping out the progress of the preceding twenty-five years. We have to add tuberculosis deaths among soldiers and among the famished prisoners of war. Truly a depressing picture.

In France we must distinguish between the invaded and uninvaded areas. As to the invaded area, Professor Calette reported to the Academy of Medicine at Paris in 1919: "The total mortality rate [of Lille], which varied before the war from 19 to 21 per 1,000 inhabitants, steadily increased as follows: In 1915 to 27; in 1916 to 29; in 1917 to 30; in 1918 to 41. The causes of this increase were, in the first place, a terrible extension of tuberculosis. . . . Before the war there was an average of 330 deaths from tuberculosis per 100,000. This rate has steadily increased. In 1918 it was 573. Among those under twenty years of age it was almost double that of peace-time." This fairly reflects conditions in all probability in the occupied area.

For unoccupied France detailed statistics are not yet available.

In Belgium the tuberculosis death-rate increased in Brussels from 177 in 1914 to about 390 in 1918, and is believed to have at least doubled throughout the country.



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England did not suffer invasion by the Germans, but the unseen tubercle bacilli were more successful. Pulmonary tuberculosis deaths in England and Wales in the three years before the war and the four fateful years beginning 1914 are as follows:

### DEATHS FROM PULMONARY TUBERCULOSIS IN ENGLAND AND WALES

1911.....	39,232
1912.....	38,083
1913.....	37,055
<i>Enter War</i>	
1914.....	38,637
1915.....	41,676
1916.....	41,545
1917.....	43,113

The deaths from pulmonary tuberculosis in England and Wales in 1917 were 6,058 more than in 1913. Moreover, tuberculosis deaths had been diminishing at the rate of a thousand a year. This reduction would almost certainly have continued, and the number of tuberculosis deaths in 1917, had there been no war, would have been some 33,000 instead of 43,113. There was an actual increase in 1917 of 16 per cent. over 1913 and of 30 per cent. over what probably would have been the rate in 1917 had there been no war.

Isolated reports from a few Austrian and Hungarian cities also show a striking increase in tuberculosis, especially during the last two years.

In Germany the increase of tuberculosis is thus described by such competent inquirers as Dr. Alice Hamilton, now of the Harvard Medical School, and Miss Jane Addams:

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The effects of underfeeding are registered chiefly in the increased tuberculous rate at all ages, and in the increased death-rate among the old as is shown in Germany's statistics. During the third quarter of 1917 the deaths from tuberculosis had increased by 91 per cent. in women, only 40 per cent. in men.

Kaysersling, one of Germany's foremost tuberculosis specialists, told us that the fight of almost forty years against tuberculosis was lost. The Germans date their anti-tuberculosis campaign from about 1882 when Koch discovered the bacillus. Since then their rate had fallen from over 30 per 10,000 of the population to less than 14. In the first half of 1918 it was already over 30 and is still rising and will continue to rise for some years. Nor does the death-rate tell all the story. In Berlin the infection rate among babies—shown by the von Pirquet test—has increased threefold, the rate of tuberculous sickness among little children, fivefold. These children will not all die. Many will live on to puberty and then fall prey to the disease, or if they are able to resist that period of strain, they will succumb during the twenties, under the strain of child-bearing or heavy work. For the whole period of this generation, tuberculosis will claim a greatly increased number of victims, and how far the health of the children of these war children will be affected nobody can say.

Not only is the number of the tuberculous increased, but the form of the disease is changed and German hospitals are now filled with varieties of the disease which used to be regarded as medical curiosities. We saw most pitiful cases among the children, multiple bone tuberculosis with fistulas, multiple joint tuberculosis, the slow, boring ulcers of the face called lupus, great masses of tuberculous glands such as we never saw in America, and that great rarity in civilized countries, caseating pulmonary tuberculosis in little children. Kayserling said that the hunger blockade had shown that tuberculosis is a disease to be combated chiefly by nutrition, not by the prevention of infection, and that by long starvation it is possible to break down racial immunity, if indeed there be such a thing. The forms of tuberculosis now common in Germany were formerly seen almost entirely among primitive peoples, and it was supposed that the acquired resistance of civilized races made such things impossible, but that is now an exploded belief.

There is no space to do more than mention some of the other

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results of the long underfeeding of women, children, and old people. "Galloping consumption," fatal in four to sixteen weeks, used to be very rare; now it is almost the rule in young adults who develop tuberculosis after a decided loss of weight.

Even in America, far removed as we were from the seat of war and late as we entered it, the rate of decrease in the tuberculosis death-rate, which had been fairly continuous for many years, was abruptly reduced. The best that can be said for the last two years is that, if we have made little progress, we at least have not lost much ground.

We are, therefore, confronted by the fact that this arch-enemy of mankind, this ever-present and everywhere-present epidemic, which was slowly yielding before the steady pressure of organized effort, has quite broken loose from control. It is not only Kipling's "comfort, content, delight" which have "shriveled in a night"; it is vigor and health and life itself. Hundreds of thousands, probably millions, of human beings, who would otherwise have escaped, are now seriously infected with tuberculosis. It will be a long, slow road back to where we were in 1914.

*Malaria Returns.*—Malaria is not as well known to us as was the "ague" or "chills and fever" of an earlier generation. It still lingers in our Southern states and in southern Europe. Since the *anopheles* mosquito was definitely convicted of being the bearer of the disease, great progress had been made toward its control. In the Panama Canal Zone, as late as 1906, 878 per 100,000 of the employees died from malaria, but in the last few years there have been almost no deaths from this cause. Every traveler has been warned against going to parts of Italy, on



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account of malaria. Some years ago Italy recognized malaria as a national menace. It drained swamps, screened houses, and popularized the use of quinine. It bought enormous quantities of quinine, sold it through the post-offices, and carried on a propaganda for its use. Success is easy on such lines, and in 1914 the mortality from malaria was only one-tenth of that of twenty years earlier. When the war came it was almost impossible to secure quinine. It seemed impossible to continue the expense of drainage operations, and nobody thought much about malaria, or such unimportant things. The result was even more striking than in the case of tuberculosis. The malarial death-rate increased 246 per cent. in two years. In one province it increased fivefold and in another tenfold.

Malaria is directly fatal to only a very small proportion of cases; for instance, in 1914 deaths were only 2,072, but the number of cases reported was 129,482. In 1917, 304,216 cases were reported. In the island of Sardinia, with a population of 880,000, 100,000 cases were reported in 1917.

Greece presents an even worse picture as to malaria than Italy. Recall that Italy had decreased its malarial death-rate from 81 in 1886 to 5.7 in 1914; Athens, for the three years 1906-08, had a malarial death-rate of 33; Patras, 54; Larissa, 179; and Volo, 248. We do not know the figures as to malaria in Greece during the war, but we know that the Greek government, having adopted, in 1911, certain of the Italian anti-malarial methods abandoned them on account of the war.

*The "Cootie" Spreads Typhus.*—Of all the jokes, slang, and poems made in the trenches, a large per-



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centage relate to the "cooties," which seem always to enlist with the soldiers. If there is any typhus about, the "cooties" spread it. Under modern conditions, typhus is almost wholly a war disease. When large numbers of soldiers carrying typhus-bearing "cooties" travel through a country and are quartered with the population, conditions are ideal for a typhus epidemic. This was just what happened in Serbia late in 1914. A tremendous cleaning-up campaign was carried on and vermin were hunted as vigorously as enemy spies. The epidemic was under control by midsummer of 1915, losses being about 150,000—soldiers, civilians, and prisoners. There were only between 300 and 400 physicians in all of Serbia; 125 of them died of typhus. In an epidemic of the same proportions, the United States would lose 3,300,000 persons, five or six times as many as we lost from influenza.

At the end of the war hundreds of thousands of prisoners were turned loose in Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Weary processions of refugees tramped through the Balkans in every direction. Armies marched hither and thither. An epidemic of typhus was easily predictable. It came—in Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Poland. We know little as to the numbers of cases or deaths, but we hear frantic calls for help and accounts of whole areas stricken. We are now so accustomed to horrors, so emotionally overstrained, so tired of thinking about Europe, that we are little impressed. Only in history will this post-armistice epidemic of typhus be seen in its true proportions.

*Drinking Typhoid Sewage.*—Sewage is not good to drink, but every typhoid patient has drunk or eaten

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the essential, and objectionable, element of sewage. Preventing typhoid means keeping water and milk supplies free from human infection. This is difficult when soldiers and refugees are camping out all over the country. It is not surprising, therefore, that in Italy the typhoid death-rate, which had fallen from 27 per 100,000 in 1911 to 19 in 1914, immediately rose to 26 in 1915 and to 27.9 in 1916.

In Serbia the pre-war typhoid rate was seven and a half times that of the United States from 1910 to 1915. There were epidemics in Belgrade in the summers of 1916 and 1917, with 60 cases reported in a single week. Any such increase in the amount of typhoid leaves a residuum of typhoid-carriers who for years to come will make typhoid control more difficult.

*Influenza and War.*—At the very height of the Great War the world was startled by the appearance of what seemed like a new plague. It originated, according to Doctor Flexner, in that portion of Russia next to Turkestan. It may be no accident that in the atlas the name of this region is put down as Hunger Steppe. The disease traveled across Europe to Spain before it was recognized as an epidemic, and hence it was called "Spanish influenza." Mystery still surrounds its origin and mode of infection. Its being contemporaneous with war may have been accidental, but war has given a new lease of life to other diseases, and, so to speak, wings by which to fly with all speed from one locality to another. It is more than probable that in whatever nests of poverty and uncleanness its germs had lived a quiet, if not a respectable, life for years, its sudden flaring out into an epidemic is not unre-



#### A DISINSECTING PLANT

This Serbian refugee mother was doing her part toward preventing the spread of disease. This is a familiar sight in the Balkans.



#### REFUGEE CHILDREN AT SKOPLIE

These children are receiving milk from the American Red Cross.





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lated to the great hardships through which all those regions of Europe were passing. The constant streams of prisoners, wounded soldiers, new recruits, refugees, and laborers from every part of the world to and from the seats of war easily account for the speed with which influenza traveled east and west around the world. An undefined but substantial amount of the terrible "flu" is therefore to be put down on the debit side of civilization's account with war. As an agency of death, the "flu" leaves fighting far behind. We are told that 6,000,000 deaths occurred from influenza in India alone. Influenza deaths in the United States are estimated at 600,000. The losses in Italy were about a half-million in a population about one-third that of the United States. Serbia suffered heavily from the influenza. Nobody could give figures, but we heard everywhere that it had been very bad, comparable to the typhus.

*War, Baby-killer.*—We have left to the last the effect of war upon the lives of babies. When millions of men were being killed, it was obviously important that babies should be saved. The number of births fell off tremendously. Ordinarily, this would mean an improvement in the death-rate, for if there are few babies the mothers can give them better care than if there are many. But all rules fail in war, and, with the exception of one or possibly two of the Allied countries, even among the few children who were willing to face a world at war and to take their chances in such a crazy bedlam, the baby death-rate was higher than before. Italy's experience is typical. Before the war her baby death-rate was not exceptionally high and in 1914 it was the lowest

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on record—130 per 1,000 births. The very first year of the war, 1915, it rose to 146 $\frac{1}{4}$ , an increase of over 10 per cent. After that we have figures for the cities only. Forgive a repetition of a table of statistics. They are not figures; they are those curly-haired, chubby-cheeked cherubs of Titian and Tintoretto and Raphael:

BABY DEATHS PER 1,000 BIRTHS

<i>Cities</i>	<i>1914</i>	<i>1915</i>	<i>1916</i>	<i>1917</i>	<i>1918</i>
Genoa.....	120	150	126	149	134
Milan.....	107	132	123	138	167
Bergamo.....	186	223	259	243	246
Bologna.....	92	121	136	134	195
Florence.....	120	131	186	188	232
Pistoia.....	127	138	230	208	334
Pesaro.....	161	199	199	317	638
Perugia.....	115	142	155	217	....
Rome.....	124	122	131	122	144
Naples.....	154	155	169	186	230
Fano.....	83	72	258	424	575

Use a little imagination on these figures. The number of children born was from one-third to one-half less than it had been. Even among these the death-rate in some cities was doubled. How much this table looks like the one about tuberculosis! Life was hard in Italy. She paid a heavy price for her new territory. Serbia and Greece tell a like story, but haven't any figures to prove it. Even in France the infant deaths went up and the birth-rate down.

In marked contrast to these countries is the experience of England. The fall in the birth-rate showed that baby-saving, like munition-making,

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should be a national industry. In spite of war expenditures and the necessary absence of a great part of the medical profession with the army, a comprehensive effort to save the lives of the babies was made. Infant-welfare stations were set up in large numbers, trained visitors were sent to visit the babies' mothers, and the other things done which would help to save babies. As a result, the infant death-rate was actually reduced in England and Wales from 105 in 1914 to 91 in 1916 and 97 in 1917 and 1918.

By similar means some localities even in occupied Belgium secured similar results, though in Belgium as a whole there was probably an increase in the infant death-rate.

*Health Aspects of Cave-dwellings.*—There has yet to go on the debit side of the account the effects of the return of some millions of refugees to living-quarters in the war zones which are astonishingly like the habitations of the cavemen. These are not able-bodied men with good food rations and constant medical supervision, but women and children with scanty rations, scanty clothing, and little or no medical attention. We do not know exactly how this wholesale reversion to the standards of a forgotten age will impair the vitality of the next generation, but we do know that the price will have to be paid.

*A Postponed Millennium.*—These deferred obligations are, in fact, the most distressing aspect of this matter of war and disease. Germs cannot be demobilized by any armistice or peace treaty. Once let loose, their recapture and control is a matter of long effort. In a certain district in Serbia syphilis

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is extremely prevalent. It is believed to date from an army occupation many years ago. The great inroads upon the world's health, of which we have seen only a few glimpses, will project themselves far into the future. There will still be living in the year 2000 those who were orphaned by the Great War. Perhaps not even they will see a world in which the war's aid to disease has been overcome. The forces fighting the age-long struggle for comfort and for a normal lifetime have been thoroughly disorganized. The attainable millennium has been postponed indefinitely.

*Meeting the Situation.*—Indefinitely, but not permanently; it is for us to say how long. If we recognize the gravity of the danger and the greatness of the opportunity, we shall regain the lost ground and lost momentum very much more quickly than if we fold our hands and say, "How terrible!" England, with its new Ministry of Public Health and its remarkable housing and town-planning enterprises, is putting health into the very foreground of national activities. America should do likewise. But England and America cannot save themselves alone. The world cannot remain half free and half pest-ridden. We shall not have done our full duty as an Ally unless we help the less fortunate Allies, not simply to recover lost ground, but to bring the health millennium much nearer to their peoples. Fortunately, a clean-cut and very successful plan for doing this has been worked out and has stood the test of experience.

*American Tuberculosis Work in France.*—The Nineteenth Arrondissement (ward) of Paris is, by common consent, one of the poorest, most unsanitary,



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and altogether most helpless quarters of the city. It is here that revolutions have repeatedly arisen. Life here is so bare and hard and grim that those who have taken up health or relief work in Paris, almost without exception, have located elsewhere. In July, 1917, the American Red Cross and the Rockefeller Commission on the Prevention of Tuberculosis went to France to express America's sympathy by constructive work. It was suggested that they establish somewhere in the city model demonstrations of how tuberculosis and child-welfare work are done in America. The suggestion was accepted. "Where shall we place it?" the Americans asked. "In the Nineteenth Arrondissement," the French replied. The Americans learned all the discouraging things about the Nineteenth Arrondissement, but the opportunity to try the most difficult possibility was too good a sporting chance to be lost, and to the Nineteenth Arrondissement they went. A visitor, who was familiar with American public health, going to the Nineteenth Arrondissement a few months later, would have found four combined tuberculosis and child-welfare dispensaries in full operation; rather better, if anything, than he would find in any American city. They were fully equipped for scientific work; they had the best of physicians on full time, paid service; they had as good public-health nurses as there are anywhere, and they had a carefully developed relief work combined with the nursing, so that whatever the doctors prescribed, whether it were medicine, or food, or an additional room, or a country vacation, was to be provided. We were told beforehand that we would not be able to visit the French families; that they would not let

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us in. Our nurses and visitors found their difficulty was not to get in, but to get away. The families were delighted to be visited and wanted to talk on indefinitely. Schools for the training of Frenchwomen as public-health visitors were set up, French physicians came to study the work, and, little by little, as fast as it could be done, without losing efficiency, French personnel in American pay replaced American personnel. From all points of view, and in the opinion of every one, the experiment was an unqualified success. It was repeated with equal success in one of the regions some fifty miles out of Paris, including several smaller cities and towns and a large rural area. Exhibits on child welfare and tuberculosis were prepared with all the artistic directness of the French. They were tremendously popular. The medical diagnosis and the home visiting naturally brought to light a good many patients who needed sanatorium or hospital care. Very well—we proposed to the French that sanatorium and hospital care be provided. The French gave the sites and, in some cases, existing buildings, and the American Red Cross made all necessary repairs, provided equipment, and agreed to operate the hospitals for a certain period of time. Following these two demonstrations, tuberculosis dispensaries and hospitals are being established rapidly in many parts of France, quite as rapidly as is consistent with careful and efficient work.

*Health Agencies, America's Best Gift to the Balkans.*  
—This is exactly the kind of thing that needs to be done all over southeastern Europe. In Serbia it would be necessary to send a larger proportion of American personnel because Serbia has almost no

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doctors, and they will need to stay longer, but the method is perfectly adaptable to the Serbian attitude. They would love exhibits: they would have almost too great confidence in American physicians and nurses. They remember what the French, the British, and ourselves did to the typhus. Dispensaries, public-health nurses, educational exhibits, hospitals, and sanatoria should be put into operation in as many different localities as possible, both to meet an urgent immediate need and to lay a foundation for a comprehensive permanent public-health service.

The American Red Cross during the first half of 1919 sent food and clothing to the Near East to meet the immediate emergency. It is now emphasizing a comprehensive health campaign in eastern Europe. The Serbian Child Welfare Association, under expert direction, has sent skilled personnel and established a program for Serbia very like that outlined above as in effect in France. The American Red Cross had a Tuberculosis Commission in Italy in 1918-19 which gave a great impetus to the anti-tuberculosis and child-welfare movement there. The League of Red Cross Societies, with headquarters in Geneva, has for one of its chief objects the control of epidemic diseases. The way is open for the American people, through its own American Red Cross, through such agencies as the Serbian Child Welfare Association, and also through its participation in the League of Red Cross Societies, to continue to do its bit toward undoing the terrible losses inflicted upon the health, the happiness, and the efficiency of the world by the Great War.

## XI

### CIVILIZATION'S INDICTMENT OF WAR

What civilization is; war its negation; ten million homeless; forty-two million enemy subjects; sent into slavery; nine million soldier dead; fifty million manless homes; ten million empty cradles; war diseases; a submerged continent; a mortgaged future; continental reconstruction and nobody to do it; what America can do.

**WHAT CIVILIZATION IS.**—Civilization is the net result of the efforts of the human race for several hundred thousand years to make life more comfortable, interesting, and satisfying. Many experiments in this direction are fruitless, but occasionally one succeeds and we inherit the sum total of the successes. Up to 1914 this world-wide and history-long effort had met with a fair degree of success. The race had learned how to raise ample amounts of many kinds of food and how to distribute them. The fight against cold had measurably been won. We had learned how to make warm clothes and how to build houses and keep them warm. We had learned how to do these things and still have time left over. Diffused education was helping us to learn how to enjoy leisure. We knew what was going on in the world. Life was getting interesting and promised still better things. In the general opinion of mankind, it was good to live, when the storm broke in the midsummer of 1914.



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*War Its Negation.*—The essence of this war was that it denied the validity of all toward which we had been striving. It set up new standards and declared that darkness, cold, hunger, poverty, disease, crippling, killing, hate, orphanage, widowhood, were proper conditions of life. It enforced these newer ideals, at first in limited areas and then in ever-broadening circles, until in some degree they had permeated the life of a continent. To-day the world is full of strikes. We need not look for subtle explanations. They are the direct legitimate successors of war. They are simply carrying a step farther the newer ideals of life. They are hunger, insufficiency, and bareness of life expressing themselves, along with an implied reliance upon force rather than persuasion and orderly procedure.

It is possible to sum up, imperfectly, a few of the chief offenses of the Great War against civilization. It will be only a few out of many of the crimes of this habitual offender, but from these few we may infer something of others. From events which have already occurred, and of which we are able to make some measurements, we gain impressions as to what is yet before us.

*Ten Million Homeless.*—We put down as the first offense against civilization the breaking down of civilized living among the war exiles, hastily saying good-by to home with its comforts and enjoyments, leading a makeshift life for four or five years, and returning to even more miserable and wretched makeshifts for an indefinite time in the war zones. We have seen that at least 10,000,000 people passed and are passing through this experience. At this moment, January 10, 1920, a Red Cross

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mission reports that 4,000,000 of Poland's 20,000,000 people are still refugees. Unless mankind has been on the wrong trail, unless well-being is undesirable, this volume of subnormal living on the part of about one-twentieth of the Allied peoples of Europe during four or five years of exile and an indefinite period of reconstruction is a very serious matter, from which recovery to normal producing power and ordinary civilized living will be slow and uncertain.

*Forty-two Million Enemy Subjects.*—We frame as the second count of the indictment against war the hardships of those who remained in the areas occupied by enemy armies. When the invading tides rolled into Belgium, France, Italy, Serbia, Greece, Rumania, and Russia, not all the civilians fled before them. In fact, the great majority remained. They went into the cellars while the war tornado crashed past. When the noise died down and they cautiously came to the surface they found themselves in a changed world. Its physical aspect might be little changed, but everything else was absolutely topsyturvy. They were no longer their own masters; they were under the rule of an enemy army. It is bad enough to be a subject people in peace; it is far worse to be the subjects of an enemy army in war. They could no longer be sure of anything. They had to do as they were told. All ordinary business was at a standstill. They were behind the blockade. If they raised food, it would very likely be taken from them. If they labored, it was very likely to result in benefit to those who were trying to destroy their country. They were in a sense slaves, for they had no freedom and no rights. On sus-



**HOME-MAKING UNDER DIFFICULTIES**

Site of the former village of Beauraine, on the road between Arras and Bapaume, on the German front-line trenches, 1914-17.



**IN THE HEART OF THE SOMME BATTLE-FIELD**

No other habitation can be seen in any direction from this spot in the heart of the Somme battle-field.





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picion they were thrown into prison; on little or no evidence they were shot. Their cities were called upon to pay large sums as fines or indemnities, which for Belgium alone are stated by a Carnegie Fund investigator to amount to about \$2,000,000,000. They had to see their factories torn down and the materials shipped away. Anything they had which the enemy wanted he took—especially food and clothing. As the blockade became more and more effective, they suffered even more than the enemy civilians, for many of their supplies were taken and shipped to the enemy countries to eke out their failing stocks. Life was no joy ride in the occupied territory. No wonder its tuberculosis and child death-rates shot up to one and a half or twice what they were before. It is not easy to realize that this kind of life was the lot of 6,000,000 people in Belgium, 3,000,000 in France, 1,000,000 in Italy, nearly 5,000,000 in Serbia, 200,000 in Greece, 5,000,000 in Rumania, and 22,000,000 in Russia. In all, some 42,000,000 people lived this life of exasperation, subjection, and deprivation.

*Sent into Slavery.*—The third count in the indictment is an offense which smacks of ancient rather than of medieval or modern times—wholesale carrying away into captivity.

From among these millions there were selected by the enemy, as he grew short of man-power, some hundreds of thousands, no one knows how many, for a worse fate—deportation into enemy country. They were to be real slaves, or worse. From Belgium, from France, and, above all, from Greece and Serbia, these deportations sentenced men and women to wearying, brutal labor, exposure, hardships like

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those of army prisons. When there was also involved, as in the Near East, a desire to change the dominant national sentiment of some locality, even the children were deported, to share all the hardships of a life pointing directly toward extermination. When the war was over the survivors walked home. We met them everywhere in Serbia—Greeks, Albanians, and Serbs—footsore, ragged, famished, vermin- and disease-infected.

*Nine Million Soldier Dead.*—The fourth count in the case of the people against war is that of wholesale murder.

The hardships of 10,000,000 refugees in their hurried exile, their years of unwelcome sojourn, and their decades of makeshift living during reconstruction, of 42,000,000 in occupied areas, and of hundreds of thousands deported into slavery, are only a beginning in the realization of the newer ideals of human life introduced by war. It has always been considered that the death of a husband and father is one of the most serious of tragedies. The highest type of religion has been declared to consist of visiting widows and the fatherless in their affliction. Now, however, instead of being a rare exception, this was to become almost the rule in wide areas of the world. In France, for instance, we have reckoned that about 1,750,000 men were lost. From the point of view of the emotional strain of sorrow and mourning its volume is beyond our powers of understanding. France is literally soaked, inundated, permeated through and through by grief. Serbia is even more so. The frequent suicides reported among its women and children are easily understood. England, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Greece, Rumania,

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and all the enemy countries are enduring the same kind of strain. Our army authorities estimate the battle deaths alone at 7,582,000. Adding deaths among the missing, among prisoners, and excess of deaths from disease in the armies, it is clear that some 9,000,000 men laid down their lives on account of the war. Each of these came from a home. The number of widows, fatherless children, of parents and of brothers and sisters in mourning, must be counted in scores of millions. There are also the permanent cripples, those who were snatched from death by the miracles of modern surgery, who will live, perhaps for a normal lifetime, a maimed and partial life, shut out from many of the things that make life worth living, and able only in part or not at all to contribute as producers to the welfare of their families, their communities, and their countries. These we may estimate at 2,000,000.

Shall we stop a moment to recapitulate? Europe's population was, roughly, 393,000,000, which during the war was grouped approximately as follows:

Neutral.....	42,000,000	
Central Powers.....	124,000,000	(not including Turkey in Asia)
Allied peoples.....	227,000,000	

Among the Allies the war victims already enumerated may be totaled something as follows:

Homeless refugees.....	10,000,000
In occupied areas.....	42,000,000
Soldiers killed.....	7,600,000
Soldiers' orphans and widows.....	15,200,000
Permanently maimed.....	2,000,000
Total.....	76,800,000

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Of the tremendous mass of Allied population (twice as numerous as the people of the United States and its dependencies in 1910) almost exactly one-third had either been made homeless, subjects of an enemy army, killed, widowed, orphaned, or permanently crippled.

*Fifty Million Manless Homes.*

Indictment count No. 5:

With war as an enemy of home life, we have still other counts to settle. Something like 50,000,000 or 56,000,000 men, most of them, we may be sure, being fathers or big brothers, were for the time being almost as effectively separated from their families as though they were never to return. And for many of them it was a separation for four years, broken by only very brief occasional leaves. Europe was a continent of manless homes. Its home life was thoroughly abnormal. It was a dull, gray, uneventful life for, say, a hundred million children, and an anxious, wearing, emotionally overstrained existence for scores of millions of wives and mothers.

In the middle of Serbia in late December, 1918, I saw a company of German prisoners in a village. They had the use of a fairly comfortable building in a large yard inclosed by barbed wire. I talked with them of the war. They did not seem at all interested in the Peace Conference; they did not care where the Kaiser was or what he was doing, or who was in control in Germany, or what America was going to do. They wanted to get home to their wives and children. They did not complain of their food or shelter or work. They talked and thought of only one thing—home.

For four long years scores of millions of homes in



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Europe, instead of being centers and creators of happiness and affection, of serenity and order, were abodes of loneliness, anxiety, nervous apprehension, and, in about nine million cases, of grief beyond expression. Who can foresee the future effects of such an environment for the children of a continent?

*Ten Million Empty Cradles.*

Indictment count No. 6:

But we have only begun in our survey of war on homes. Ten million refugees, 42,000,000 under enemy army rule, hundreds of thousands deported, and 9,000,000 dead soldiers mourned by God knows how many millions of widows and orphans—all this is only a fair start. About 10,000,000 homes have been deprived of that for which homes primarily exist. Every home is built around a cradle. War has gone very far toward emptying the cradles of Europe. Looking backward some decades hence, this fact and its consequences may appear as among the most serious results of the war. The figures are clear. France, with its pre-war stationary population, shows a war deficit of births of about 1,500,000. Italy, unlike France in that its birth-rate was high, also shows a war deficit in births of about the same number. Uninvaded Britain shows nearly 1,000,000; Belgium, 350,000; Serbia, whose men were in exile for four years, 760,000, and so on. A rough estimate of the Allied countries' shortage in babies due to the war is 6,000,000 or 7,000,000, and if we include the Central Empires we have an estimate for Europe of some 10,000,000.

The consequences of this wholesale race-suicide project themselves far into the future and will have many curious and far-reaching results, most of which

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we probably cannot foresee. We can see that there will be a partial hiatus in the ranks of school-children for an age period of four or five years. There will be a great falling off in the graduating classes of schools and colleges in the years when those born in 1915-20 would graduate, except for the laggards of earlier years who have fallen behind and the precocious ones of later years who have forged ahead. If compulsory military service should exist twenty years from now there will be an alarming dearth of recruits in the classes born in 1915-20. The industries and employments which ordinarily receive each year a certain number of maturing young men and women will find a curious diminution in the labor supply during the period, say, 1934-39. When the children born in 1915-20 would be young men and maidens the parish registers will record an extraordinarily small number of marriages and the future population will be correspondingly diminished.

Those who have reread Rupert Brooke's *Letters from America* with added interest since he became one of England's priceless contributors to the cause of saving civilization will recall his description of the procession of Harvard graduates on Commencement day, arranged by years of graduation, and will remember that he noted that the orderly sequence of the years from the new graduate to the veteran of eighty-five or ninety was unbroken except at one point. Here was a gap, large and arresting. There seemed to be no one in the procession between sixty and sixty-five. A Harvard friend told him the reason—the Civil War. There will be two great gaps in the procession of the men who will march across the campus of the world a few decades from now.

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One will recall the young men who perished in the Great War; the other, the children who were not born in the years 1915-20.

The case of Belgium is exceptionally interesting and equally disturbing. In Belgium the birth-rate had already fallen by the summer of 1916 to 60 per cent. of its former proportions; by 1918 it had fallen uniformly to about 50 per cent. This is about what happened in the other Allied countries, but the striking and very disturbing fact is that it is not so readily accounted for. The gray German flood overflowed Belgium so quickly that there was not time to mobilize a large army. The heroic Belgian army, which, without a moment's hesitation, opposed itself to the thrust of the German battering-ram, happened to be only a small proportion of the men of Belgium. The great majority of the Belgian men remained to carry on their civilian duties as best they could, and the war-tide passed by. In occupied Belgium, therefore, unlike invaded France, there was a large proportion of men left behind to carry on the ordinary life of the community. This 50-per-cent. reduction in the birth-rate in Belgium, then, could not have been due primarily to the absence of men on military service. We must look elsewhere for its causes. The suggestions which naturally offer themselves are the lowered vitality of the women, due to an insufficient food-supply; their constant mental distress; the fear on the part of women workers that absence due to childbirth might reduce income very far below family needs, and the consequent increase of abortions; in other words, the subnormal standards of living which had to be accepted. A very serious aspect of this is



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that these subnormal standards did not disappear from Europe at the end of the war. They continued with little change for months after the armistice, and still continue. With food prices as they still remain, with millions of returned refugees living in huts, basements, cellars, and improvised shelters of every description, Europe is still leading a subnormal life. Will the birth-rate also continue subnormal? It has been rather generally assumed that it would not, and that soon after the armies were demobilized the birth-rate would resume its former proportions. The facts as to Belgium suggest very strongly that this assumption will prove to be unfounded, and that the reduced birth-rate was due, in considerable degree, not only in Belgium, but wherever subnormal conditions of living existed, to such psychological and physiological factors as anxiety, uncertainty, distress, grief, depressing surroundings, insufficient food, and fear of unemployment. We know that these things are continuing and must continue. We do not see any end of them. Their further duration will be measured by years and not by months. Agriculture must be re-established. All the slow processes which entered into the building up of industry must be retraced, and all these things must be done by peoples who have lost, in some cases, as high as one-fourth or one-fifth of their entire efficient male population.

It is more than a conceivable possibility, it is a definite probability, that a marked reduction in births will continue after the war, and that former conditions will return only slowly and over a period of years.

Will they return at all? The question cannot be



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evaded. Even though, after a time, conditions of industry and prosperity return, will the attitude of mind, will the conditions of domestic life, be such as they were before? It is at least doubtful.

Without speculating too far as to conditions a few decades hence, what has already happened, is happening, and must continue for a few years at least, is adequately disturbing. It means a reduction of a great many millions in the population of Europe. A reduced population, arising from a low birth-rate, is not always necessarily undesirable. Generally speaking, a lowering of the birth-rate means also a lowering in the rate of infant mortality. There is a large element of truth suggested by the phrase, Fewer babies and better ones; or, fewer babies and more of them kept alive. There is nothing to be said for the idea of a baby every year and a baby funeral every eighteen months. But one thing may be very disturbing—a low birth-rate in some countries and a high birth-rate in others. If the white man has carried the burden of the world it was because he was better fitted to carry it, not because there were more of him. But the extent to which he can be depleted in numbers and still carry the white man's burden is an unsolved question. There are limits to his carrying powers. We may find a parallel on a smaller scale, but one sufficiently imposing, in the history of France and Germany during the past few decades. It is not so long ago since France and Germany were not very far apart in population. In 1860, in fact, France had about 37,000,000 people, while the country which later became the German Empire had a population of 35,000,000. France had a steadily diminishing

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birth-rate; Germany's birth-rate remained relatively high. In one eighteen-year period, 1895-1913, the tiny Fritzes who were born into the world numbered over 35,000,000, whereas during the same period the cradles of France received only 14,500,000 babies. As a result, at the outset of the war, France's 39,500,000 would obviously have been speedily and completely overwhelmed by Germany's 65,000,000 unless powerful and numerous Allies came to her rescue. Is there not a possibility that history may repeat itself on an even vastly greater scale? Has the white race of Europe, with its birth-rate already cut almost in half for a number of years by conditions some of which will continue for years longer, entered upon the course which France has been following for the past forty years? Will the preponderance of the yellow race become relatively and markedly greater and greater? It seems distinctly possible. How unfortunate that the millions of China are emerging from the Great War a disillusioned people so far as their reliance upon the justice, fairness, and disinterestedness of the white race is concerned! No more cynical or more disturbing document appeared in connection with the Peace Congress than the statement made by the Chinese delegation when the terms of the Peace Treaty became known, which in substance amounted to this: that they had come to realize that the nations represented in the Peace Conference were treated with a consideration directly in proportion to their military power; that China, being peaceful and unarmed, was without influence; that China had now learned its lesson, and at the next conference of peace would be prepared to enforce her claims by a

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demonstration of what her enormous population, put on a military basis, could do.

If the time should come when the white race of Europe faces a hostile yellow race from Asia, perhaps reinforced by a hostile black race from Africa, it will be with numbers greatly depleted, not only by the direct losses of the Great War, but in even greater degree by the indirect effects of that war upon its birth-rate.

It was very interesting in France to find that among some of the most thoughtful and public-spirited families the lessons of this situation were clearly recognized. Here and there, in the more intimate conversation between those who had become well acquainted one heard remarks such as these: "We have only two or three children. Of course we will have more. Several, we hope. As many as we can. We must—for the sake of France." War has taken of the best everywhere. The ranks of those who represent generations of education and of training are fearfully depleted. The University of Serbia reopens with two hundred students; five hundred others will never return. Whether people talk about such things or not, they must think about them. The privilege of contributing serene, balanced, thinking, sympathetic people to that generation which, a few decades from now, will be taking charge of the affairs of a world full of promise and full of danger is an enviable privilege.

### *War Diseases.*

#### Indictment count No. 7:

We have seen how the war has given a new lease of life to many plagues and pests that were well on their way toward extinction. How many additional



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deaths have already been thus caused among civilians, no one can say. We must include typhus and typhoid epidemics, greatly increased tuberculosis and infant death-rates, a great increase in malaria, and other similar factors. We must include influenza as at least contributed to, if not caused by, war. The excess of deaths from such causes as these in Italy and in Serbia may be tentatively estimated at 900,000 and 400,000, respectively. Elsewhere we cannot make even a tentative estimate, except that the totals will run far into the millions.

*A Submerged Continent.*—As the eighth and last count in our incomplete and fragmentary recital of war's offenses we point to its attack upon the entire peoples of the continent of Europe. A great lawyer once said that he did not know how to draw an indictment against a whole people. On the other hand, the language of every indictment recites that the offense was committed against *the people*, in this case the literal truth.

We have spoken thus far of those who were directly affected—refugees, residents of occupied regions, those deported, widows and fatherless, and the families of those mobilized. But this warfare against civilization permeated every community in Europe. With the able-bodied men diverted to war for four years, it needed neither blockade nor submarines to make life bare and hard, to make food, clothing, shoes, coal, wood, shelter, medical care, recreation, education, scarce and high in price. When the bugles sounded the call for mobilization workmen dropped their tools by the unfinished buildings which were to have been comfortable homes, or in which children were to be taught, or



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business carried on, or the Creator worshiped. All over Europe one saw these partly finished buildings going to ruin. Farmers left their fields untilled and their crops ungarnered. Salesmen and clerks left their stores and offices. After tearful leave-takings the women, the old men, and the boys tried to take up the burdens which their able-bodied men had dropped. They did their best, but it was only a fraction of what is needed to keep the wheels of life moving. The entire world went in sight of hunger, and in whole nations its pinch was actually felt. This falling away from the slowly and hardly won condition of having enough food immediately registered itself in the death records everywhere in Europe and enabled disease to take a new hold upon the human family.

We must revise our ideas of starvation. Most of us have assumed that unless food shortage produces actual starvation no serious or permanent harm is done, though it may be uncomfortable to do without the accustomed variety and quantity of food. If there is one lesson, however, written clearly on the face of the vital statistics of all the warring countries it is that food-supply has a very intimate relation to health, that any considerable diminution in the supply to which the peoples have been accustomed produces serious results in sickness and mortality long before any obvious indications of starvation appear. If we can imagine the food-supply of any country being gradually diminished without that fact being known, something like the following would result: There would begin to be almost immediately a slight but definite lessening of resistance to disease. Health at best is a condition of unstable equilibrium,

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a balance between constructive and destructive forces. A slight diminution in the average power of resistance means, therefore, an immediate increase in illness and deaths from diseases which are ever present in every community. Long before there was any conscious hunger or evidence of any unusual malnutrition there would be an increase of illness and of deaths which probably no one would attribute to the slight change in food-supply which had occurred. When the shortage became more marked the volume of sickness and mortality would rise more sharply, especially from tuberculosis. It might at this time become apparent to students of vital statistics, and possibly to practising physicians, that some new factor was at work, but the evil results might readily be attributed to some other cause than a diminution of food. As the supply was further diminished, large increases in the number of deaths from tuberculosis, from diseases of infants, and from diseases of the aged would result, and very likely evidences of under-nutrition would begin to be obvious and conscious hunger would be widely experienced. This excess of deaths appearing in the records as due to tuberculosis and other particular diseases would, in fact, be actually due to under-nutrition—in other words, to partial starvation.

Only when the shortage had become more marked would there appear what we ordinarily call “starvation”—that is, emaciation, constant hunger, weakness, a general breakdown, and death, not attributable to any particular recognized disease. Only the very toughest of the community, however, would have survived to die of starvation; the others would have died of tuberculosis or of other diseases, the

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resistance to which had been diminished by lack of food. Starvation is a relative term. We must think of any appreciable diminution in the supply of vital energy derived from food as sufficient to tip the scales, at best very evenly balanced, the wrong way for considerable numbers of people. We must recognize that in any community the health of large numbers of persons depends upon a very narrow margin, that, so far as they are concerned, the destructive forces are dangerously near at all times to gaining the upper hand; particularly that the ubiquitous tubercle bacillus awaits only a slight diminution of bodily vigor to gain the ascendancy over larger and larger numbers of people, and that, in fact, a moderate diminution of food-supply increases the volume of sickness and death long before the average person would think of using the word "starvation."

After the mobilization nobody had time to devote to building homes, schools, churches, or hospitals, or to making the world a safer and brighter place for children. It was impossible even to carry on such of these things as existed. There are those for whom the simplification of life—doing without servants and automobiles and having fewer courses at dinner—was desirable, but such are numerically a negligible minority. The great mass of mankind have never gained so much that they can afford to lose; they have never passed beyond the simple life. For them diminution means hardship, and hardship means reduced vitality and efficiency. This substandard of living has been enforced over practically the whole of Europe during the later stages of the war, and still continues. How long it will continue



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no one may say. It is easier to tear down than to construct. The complex economic life, growth of generations, must be slowly rebuilt. The world has more work to do than before, and fewer men to do it. There is a shortage in all manufactured articles, a shortage in raw materials, a shortage in housing, and there are enormous ruined areas to be rebuilt. The prospect for a speedy regaining of the standards of living of 1914, of such measure of comfort, well-being, education, and enjoyment as the peoples of Europe had attained to, is not good. All those cheerful head-lines which one will read during the next two years, to the effect that this, that, or the other country has returned to normal conditions, may be disregarded as based on misinformation, lack of information, blind and wilful optimism, or a desire to float a loan or affect the exchange rate.

*A Mortgaged Future.*—Every nation has incurred for future payment a huge debt which, for an indefinite period, will claim all income except that required for the most urgent of current needs. The increasing amounts which were being devoted to education, health, and, in general, to the enrichment and betterment of life, can only be had from now on in dribbles. In a hundred million homes in Europe there will be hopeless drudgery, constant and fruitless struggle against heavy taxation and high prices. Europe will be in the treadmill for decades, slowly and painfully grinding out the liquidation of war's enormous obligations, incurred for destructive purposes. She starts her post-war career with depleted stocks of men and must propagate her future generations from the physically less fit. Intangible and difficult of measurement as this race deterioration



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may be, it may easily prove to have been the most disastrous of all the effects of the war.

War is indeed the great disaster. Earthquakes, floods, tornadoes, explosions, may harm the whole population of a locality; alcohol or vice may injure a percentage of the people of whole countries, but war can be compared only to all these things combined and sown broadcast over a continent. We may select from all these other enemies of human life their worst features, combine them into one quintessence of horror, intensify this to the *n*th degree, scatter it continent-wide, and that is war. War is the negation of all the race has striven for through all the centuries. It denies that life is worth while. It is the enthronement of unreason and coercion. It is the supreme skepticism, both of man and of God.

*Continental Reconstruction and Nobody to Do It.*—Vast political, economic, and social changes caused by the war can be seen only vaguely as in process, but with no clear outcome in sight. The world will be either more democratic or more imperialistic, but as yet it is not clear which. Peoples have seen big things done and are demanding that other big things be done. One can feel the swell of the tides of sweeping changes, but not their direction.

Such matters are for the future. Our concern is that the world faces a sea of difficulties, with depleted and deteriorated men. Of the causes and forms of this deterioration we have caught glimpses. Ten million people driven hurriedly from their homes into exile, living a makeshift life for four years, and returning to a still more primitive existence for an indefinite period among the ruins of their former

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homes; 42,000,000 subject to the rule of enemy armies; hundreds of thousands deported into practical slavery in enemy countries, many of them into conditions of deliberate extermination; 9,000,000 men, selected as among the fittest, killed in battle or dying in army prisons or from army hardships; millions of widows and more millions of fatherless children left to do as best they can in a world pre-occupied with every sort of trouble; 10,000,000 empty cradles that should be guarding the slumbers of those who must take up the world's burden a few decades hence; millions of deaths among civilians due to war hardships and scores of millions of illnesses past, present, and to come; 50,000,000 homes deprived for several years of the support of fathers or brothers and of their companionship, and inundated by loneliness, anxiety, and nervous apprehension; all Europe on short rations of food, coal, clothes, shoes, and the essentials of healthful and efficient life.

*What America Can Do.*—This volume is not an effort to answer the question as to what America should do. It would require vastly more knowledge of politics, industry, and commerce than the writer possesses. Our object is to state certain undeniable facts which should help to determine the state of mind in which we approach the subject as to whether we should help or not and, if so, as to what we can do. Probably all we can do will be painfully little, even though we are by far the strongest of the nations. There are a few things which, for what they are worth, seem clearly in the line of our duties:

1. We can at least look the facts in the face. We can cease to think of these European peoples,

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wearied and weakened by war, as our equals in strength and vigor and readiness for production. We should never forget that destruction is not only material, but is also human; that ruins are as important as symbols as they are as realities. We can be patient with peoples who have carried, and who will have to carry for a long time, burdens far beyond anything which have fallen to our lot. Instead of scolding our European partner in the world's reconstruction for not working faster, we must recognize that he is both sick and injured and is far from being fit to do a full day's work. He is running a temperature daily. He needs treatment and sympathetic understanding rather than nagging. For the time we must carry the heavy end of the load; he carried it before we took hold.

2. We can continue our emergency relief where needed. There is still plenty of war in Europe. Let us hope that Mr. Hoover is right in thinking that only \$150,000,000 more is needed to supply sufficient food to prevent starvation. The situation as to clothing is probably worse than it has been at any previous time. A careful observer just returned from a trip through Serbia, when asked about the Serbian peasant's costume, said he had not seen any. He had seen only rags.

3. We can make larger and more adequate plans for permanent constructive relief in the countries that have been hardest hit. The Serbian Child Welfare Association is planning for something like a five-year campaign with \$5,000,000, to help build up an efficient permanent child-saving and health-preserving organization. The other smaller and newer countries in eastern and southeastern Europe should

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be aided equally comprehensively to conserve what human assets remain to them.

4. We can recognize that European civilization, to which we are so closely bound, has passed through a wholly unprecedented strain; that it is not yet perfectly clear that it will soon recover; and that, in any case, it could hardly stand another such strain in the near future. Recognizing these facts, we can make it plain that we mean to do our part in guaranteeing peace. We can make it clear, not only that we recognize that it is impossible for us to live apart from the remainder of civilization, but that we would not wish to do so if we could; that we have no disposition to be either slackers or quitters in the world's greatest crisis; that we have not even thought of being passive onlookers, or of passing by on the other side, or of considering Europe's misfortunes from the point of view of the degree to which they may contribute to our own prosperity.

5. We can look squarely in the face a question which has been asked very frequently in Europe, but seldom in America—must we or ought we to cancel some of the loans which we have made to foreign countries? Of course, their first duty is to retrench and produce. Granted. But when they have done their best in both directions, suppose there is still a deficit? Suppose that deficit arises from the necessity of paying us interest and principle for the food which we furnished them as an Ally during and just after the war. Just how hard are we willing to see the women and children and old men in Serbia, for instance, work in the fields and deny themselves and their children food and clothing



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to repay us for meeting their war necessities? Have we any continuing moral obligation as an Ally beyond that of selling things to them? I do not forget the wonderful American Red Cross and other relief organizations, but what all of them did, and could do, was but a drop in the bucket, a temporary emergency provision for the moment. Between good friends, gifts are possible. How about a gift to Serbia and to other nations whose need is at all equal to hers?



## APPENDIX

### Outline of Survey of Conditions and Needs of Civilian Populations in Belligerent Countries (October, 1918)

#### I. CONDITIONS BEFORE THE WAR

1. Population.
2. Annual number of births.
3. Classified annual deaths.
4. Chief occupations of population.

#### II. DISPLACED POPULATION

5. Number of refugees.
6. When displaced.
7. Where sent.
8. How housed.
9. How supported.
10. How employed.
11. Present conditions as to employment.
12. Present conditions as to health.
13. Present conditions as to food, and prospects  
for this winter.
14. How many have returned and when?
15. Probable date of return of refugees.

#### III. POPULATION REMAINING IN OCCUPIED TERRITORY

16. Numbers remaining in invaded territory.
17. Number of those who have since been repatriated or left in liberated regions.
18. Condition of those repatriated or left in liberated regions as to health.

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19. Chief immediate needs of those repatriated or liberated.

### IV. DEVASTATED AREAS

20. Area devastated—size, former population, general character.
21. Nature and extent of devastation.
22. Extent to which now liberated.
23. Date on which population will probably return.
24. How temporary housing could best be provided.
25. How agriculture can best be reconstituted.

### V. FOOD CONDITIONS AND NEEDS

26. What articles chiefly constituted the popular diet before the war? Of these, what proportion were locally produced, what proportion were imported, and what food-supplies, if any, were exported? How can local production be quickly stimulated?
27. What foods are rationed, and size of rations? What foods are altogether lacking? What foods plentiful? Present prices to retail consumers of the important articles of the popular diet compared with pre-war prices. Present wages of industrial classes compared with pre-war wages.
28. What groups of population, geographical or economic, are suffering from malnutrition, and to what extent, as indicated by:
  - (a) Number and character of deaths.
  - (b) Notable changes in amount or character of illness.
  - (c) General appearance of population.
  - (d) Actual consumption in typical households on given dates.
29. Additional food-supplies needed until the next harvest other than those now in sight to meet minimum requirements:



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- (a) Kinds and amounts of food required.
- (b) Where this food may be had.
- (c) How it may be transported.
- (d) Its cost.
- (e) Who should pay for it.

### VI. HEALTH CONDITIONS

30. Classified statement of deaths each year during the war, known or estimated for the country as a whole or for selected areas, indicating where greatest changes in death-rate have occurred, and from what causes.
31. Infant welfare: compare number of births each year during the war with pre-war conditions; also death-rate under one year of age, so far as known or estimated in selected areas or entire country; existing agencies, if any, for preventing infant mortality; what preventive measures could be taken quickly; money, personnel, and equipment required therefor.
32. Tuberculosis: compare number of deaths with pre-war conditions in entire country or in selected areas; existing agencies, if any, for preventing tuberculosis; what preventive measures could be taken quickly; money, personnel, and equipment required.
33. Other leading features in national mortality:
  - (a) Causes.
  - (b) Preventive measures, if any, in operation.
  - (c) Preventive measures which could quickly be put in operation.
  - (d) Money, personnel, and equipment required.
34. Number of deaths of soldiers due to wounds or disease.
35. Estimated present population of country.

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### VII. SOLDIERS' FAMILIES

36. Amount paid to soldiers per month per capita.
37. Allowance to soldiers' families, if any; amount and adequacy, present prices considered.
38. Special conditions of need, if any, among soldiers' families.
39. Effect of present conditions of soldiers' families on army morale.

### VIII. WAR ORPHANS

40. Number of war orphans.
41. Special provisions, if any, made for them:
  - (a) By allowance to widows.
  - (b) By special institutions.
42. Existing special needs for care of war orphans.

### IX. CRIPPLES

43. Number of cripples, and their former occupation.
44. Facilities, if any, for re-education.
45. Needed additional facilities, if any.

### X. PRISONERS OF WAR

46. Number of soldiers taken prisoners, and by what countries.
47. Number of prisoners since returned, if any.
48. Condition of those still prisoners, so far as known, as to health.

THE END







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