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HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS PART II

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 17, 1974

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary



WASHINGTON : 1975

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
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Approximate Area of Turkish Military Occupation of Cyprus as of December

HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS IN CYPRUS-PART II

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1974

UNITED STATES SENATE,

Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, of the Committee on the Judiciary,

Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room 4232, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Edward M. Kennedy [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Kennedy [presiding], Fong and Mathias.

Staff present: Dale de Haan, counsel; Jerry Tinker, staff consultant; Marc Ginsberg, staff assistant; and Joanna Reagan, chief clerk.

OPENING STATEMENT

Senator KENNEDY. The subcommittee will come to order.

The subcommittee has closely followed developments on Cyprus, since the outbreak of violence some 5 months ago. Earlier hearings were held in August and September—and an extensive report of a factfinding mission to the area was released just a few weeks ago. Our primary concern has been the humanitarian crisis produced by the Turkish invasion—and what our Nation is doing to help bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

Regrettably, in these past 5 months little has changed on Cyprus. The Turkish occupation of at least 40 percent of the island continues. The economy deteriorates every day. And over 200,000 people, both Turkish and Greek, remain refugees—driven from their lands and homes only a few miles away. For 5 months they have lived in fields, under trees, along the roadsides, in tents, in schools and churches—wherever they could find shelter and help. And today they shiver—idly in the winter cold—still waiting the opportunity to return to their hivelihoods and homes, and to their families and friends.

The tragedy on Cyprus remains the same, but so do the issues in American policy toward ending the crisis. Our Government still persists in viewing the Turkish action on the island as simply a new reality to cope with. We still fail to condemn the invasion and occupation of an independent state. We still fail to acknowledge that the human tragedy on Cyprus was brought about with the illegal use of American supplied weapons. We still relegate to the sidelines a central issue for Cyprus—the return of refugees to their homes. And, as in so many other recent world problems with heavy American involvement, the administration is still asking for a little more time on Cyprus, in order to bring about its repeated assurances of early negotiations to achieve a political settlement. And so, as the human suffering and political tragedy of Cyprus drags on, American policy continues its tacit support for consolidating Turkey's control over northern Cyprus. And in the absence of any new directions or initiatives in our policy, we see our diplomats avoiding testimony before the committees of Congress. We see them withholding information on the issues at stake—and searching around for new explanations for the continuing refugee problem, and the lack of progress in bringing peace to the people of Cyprus.

I believe Congress has acted responsibly in strongly asserting its concern over the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus—and over the deadlock in negotiations that has prevented the return of refugees to their homes. In October, Congress acted to give the President time to break this deadlock, and to secure some progress in negotiations. The President now says he needs more time. And Congress is now working its will, and will vote on this crucial issue within the next few days.

But time is running out—and the condition of the refugees is getting no better.

American goals toward Cyprus are as clear today as they were 2 months ago when this subcommittee last met.

First, our Government must unequivocally affirm American support for the restoration of the full independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus. No other goal will satisfy the demands of justice, or really bring peace and relief to the people of that tortured island.

Second, we must show a more active concern over the rehabilitation needs of the refugees. Moreover, the fate of these people is central to the Cyprus issue, and to any negotiations over the future of the island. We must finally put the problem of Cypriot refugees at the top of our agenda for Cyprus.

And third, given our close political and defense ties with Turkey, and the administration's repeated assurances of productive relations with Ankara, we must express more urgently the need for a Turkish gesture of goodwill—involving the return of refugees to their homes to break the impasse in negotiations. This would not only serve the interests of the Greek Cypriot refugees, but also those of the Turkish Cypriot community, which is also suffering the ill effects of an occupation army.

The purpose of today's hearing is to up date congressional and public understanding of conditions on Cyprus, and of America's ability to assist further in fulfilling the hopes and aspirations of the Cypriot people.

This subcommittee over the period of years has been extremely interested and concerned about humanitarian problems as they have existed in all parts of the world. Its early interest focused on the enormous problems of refugees in Southeast Asia, and it continued with the problems of Biafra, and Bangladesh—the 10 million refugees there, more than 3 million of whom died. We have also focused our attention on the problems of the Sahel and the devastating problems of food and hunger that exist in that part of the world. And we have attempted to play a constructive role in dealing with the problems of hunger that exist in Ethiopia—long before that was even generally understood or made known to the American people. We tried to work with the administration in a constructive way, both across the table in the course of these hearings and in our continued contact with the administration, both Democrats and Republicans, because we recognize that humanitarian concerns have no partisanship and no party banner.

We on this committee have recently focused on what I think is a desperate plight of hundreds of thousands of Cypriot refugees—they number approximately 280,000—living in some of the most desperate conditions on that island. The committee staff report has described the conditions under which they live, separated from their families in many instances, from their homes and employment, and have had to depend upon the response of the international community to help meet their basic needs.

This has been as a result of actions which have been taken by Turkey, which run completely contrary to not only agreements that have been made with the United States in the use of various military equipment, but I believe which violate international law in their military aggression on Cyprus. Their present occupation of Cyprus and, more, their failure and unwillingness to really respond to the legitimate rights of the people who live on that island by their continued occupation, has resulted in tragedy. People have been suffering, old women, old men, children as well, have had their lives interrupted in the most cruel and unreasonable way.

We recognize—I do, and I am sure other members of this subcommittee do—that in order to restore their lives and sense of wellbeing, it is going to take a political settlement I have expressed before my own view on the nature of that which will be dependent upon the withdrawal of foreign forces and the return to their homes of refugees. We recognize that this really is the basis for any long term solution to the problems of refugees. We as individuals of this subcommittee are going to pursue this goal in the way which we feel it can best be done. I have expressed my views on that particular issue.

The question which brings us here this morning is the humanitarian issue—the humanitarian problems of the people of Cyprus. We recognize again that it is carefully intertwined with the overall political problem, but nonetheless, we want to make sure that we as a country and individuals are responding to the humanitarian needs.

WELCOME TO WITNESS

So we are fortunate this morning to have a distinguished church leader for our leadoff witness.

Before recognizing him, I will recognize our ranking member, Senator Fong, who has been an extremely active member of this subcommittee, and ask him if he would like to make a statement.

Senator FoxG. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this meeting. I think it is a very appropriate time for us to have another meeting on the question of Cyprus.

I am very happy to welcome His Eminence.

Senator KENNEDY, Senator Mathias.

Senator MATHIAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I also want to join in welcoming the Archbishop this morning, His Eminence, so he can give us from a human point of view some of the facts that will be helpful to this committee and will be helpful in

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illuminating this preblem for the whole American public, because we have to keep in mind the problems on Cyprus, human problems, problems capable of solution, but problems which will not be resolved unless there is a full understanding by the American public of just the depth and nature of the problem, and I think that is what this morning's hearing will do.

I will only say to His Eminence that we appreciate his presence here, and say that I hope that it will be helpful and worthwhile to the cause that we all want to serve.

Senator Kennedy, as the chairman of this subcommittee, has led the committee into studies of various human problems, and he has said in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh and other areas, and I think the attention that has been brought to the problems of refugees as a result of his leadership and the committee's work have been helpful in those instances. I have confidence and hope and pray that the same will be true in this case.

Thank you for being here.

Senator KENNEDY. Your Eminence, you have, as you can understand, a warm welcome extended to you. You follow other religious leaders who have appeared not only before this subcommittee and before the parent committee, the Judiciary Committee, and other committees, who bring to our Nation's policy a deep seated sense of moral concern to these issues. Too infrequently, perhaps, our legislative efforts are not identified with those moral concerns and those moral needs. But, as you understand as a church leader, this is really the basis for all government and for all society.

We welcome you here and we value very highly the message you bring to this committee and to the Senate this morning. We thank you very much for arranging your program to join us.

STATEMENT OF ARCHBISHOP IAKOVOS, PRIMATE OF THE GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE AMERICAS

Archbishop Iakovos. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to express to you directly and personally my most profound gratitude, which I also address to your distinguished colleagues, Senator Fong and Senator Mathias, for having concerned yourselves with the plight of the almost 300,000 refugees and displaced persons in Cyprus, including the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

I am fully aware, and as a matter of fact, very proud of the humanitarian record of our people in the United States; in presenting myself to you. I feel dutybound to verify what my fellow men and colleagues in Cyprus are suffering these days as a result of Turkey's invasion in July.

I do not have to go into the circumstances which caused this uprooting of innocent people, for the circumstances are very well known, not only to the American public, but to the world as well.

The end result of that invasion, which in my judgment was totally unjustified, caused the uprooting and misery of thousands of people who are now seeking refuge under trees, under tents, and always under the eyes of God in whom they have placed both their faith and their trust. What concerns me more than anything else is not the conditions under which they live, but the absence of hope from their minds and from their hearts that someday they will be helped to rediscover their homes and establish themselves where most of them were born and where they have lived all these years.

For 4 months already these thousands of Cypriots are waiting for a ray of encouragement, why the sky hangs very heavily over their heads. There is a long night of fear and uncertainty, and they would very much like to see a ray of hope. This is what I am soliciting today on their behalf.

The graveness of the situation does not lie simply in the fact of their pride of their basic livelihood, but in the fact that there are very few people in the world who understand their true situation, the tragic conditions which surrond their lives for the past four months.

Many governments, starting with our own here in the States as well as in Western Europe and including the Government of Greece, are doing their best in order to provide them with the necessary nourishment and basic food stuff so they may prolong, so to speak, their endurance until the day comes when they will be helped to go back to their own homes.

FAILURE TO SUPPORT HUMAN RIGHTS

I feel certainly very unhappy when I think of our age, an age during which we have come to recognize human rights, civil rights, equal opportunities, equality among races, and yet it seems that we cannot be effective in our attempts to establish such an equality among men throughout the world.

Ours has been a Nation which has played always a leading role in humanitarian activities. I feel that if we fail the Cypriots in their plight today we may fail all of the people who are suffering because of similar reasons which have caused the creation of so many refugee camps in the Middle East area as well as in Hong Kong.

HELP REFUGEES RETURN HOME

The United States has been always helpful, has been always stretching a helping hand to all suffering, but I think what we need to do for the Cypriots is not simply to help them in their present need, but also in their other expectations so they may be able to go back to their own homes.

The American Red Cross as well as the International Red Cross and many other organizations, the Greek American community in the United States and Canada and South America have done their utmost in order to be of assistance to their brothers, both because we share their suffering and because we feel it is our moral responsibility to assist them in their painful anticipation of a better day.

I understand that you, my respected and honored friend, Senator Kennedy, have presented to your committee an amendment to the pending foreign aid bill, an amendment providing foreign aid up to \$100 million in order that Cypriot refugees, both Greeks and Turks, may be helped and may be rehabilitated. It is true that all American people, including the Greek Americans, are deeply indebted to you and to your distinguished colleagues. I know, not because I have been in Cyprus, but because I have been in constant correspondence with people in Cyprus, that their only hope is that we in the United States, as a matter of fact, the United States may take the initiative in their behalf and bring about a much desired peace which will help them to reacquire their dignity and their self-respect.

I don't need to come into details describing their needs, because a special study group sent to Cyrpus has reported already to you in detail some months ago. I don't need to say that the winter, although brief in Cyprus, becomes very cold at times and very dangerous, especially when people live in continued suffering and misery.

I know that we Americans have been always concerned with people who have been victimized as a result of war, violence, or injustice, and I am more than convinced that we will do our utmost in order, once again, to be helpful to those who need to be helped, who need to be encouraged, who need to be saved.

I don't mean to give you the impression that I may be sermonizing, but in the name of Him who came as a man, to put an end to servitude, in the name of Him who came as a poor boy so that He may bring an end to poverty, in the name of Him who was forced to leave His home town and go into Egypt as a refugee so that He may put an end to human injustice and to inhumane actions, permit me to place my appeal before you so that you take under serious consideration and personal concern the plight of our Cypriot brethren and not allow the issue to be buried under political or diplomatic considerations.

I am most grateful for your inviting me to give this kind of testimony or statement in behalf of my Cypriot coreligionists and allow me to repeat that my hope and my trust is in God and in you.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Your Eminence, for a very moving comment and statement, and one which we value very, very highly.

CHURCH RELIEF EFFORTS

I was wondering if you might share with us the efforts that you have been making personally, and that the Church has been making, to provide some relief for the human suffering in Cyprus. Tell us a bit about that.

Archbishop IAKOVOS. My efforts go back to the month of August, beginning of August, when I invited Greek-American community organizations to come for a special meeting in New York, at which time we decided to address an appeal to our fellow communicants throughout the States so that they may help those who have suffered as a result of the war on Cyprus. Individual organizations and communities have responded most generously in offering blood, medicines, blankets, cots, foodstuff, clothing, money, and I must inform you that I am informed by my 50 regional chairmen that our church communities have generously responded to my appeal. I thank God for them and I am very proud of them. They have directly sent to Cyprus thousands of tons of material aid, and through the Archdiocese have offered as much, as a \$1 million in cash. Already \$500,000 has been given to Archbishop Makarios and his representatives and another \$500,000 will be presented to the Ambassador of Cyprus at the end of this week.

My fellow communicants in South America were also instrumental in sending 150 tons of sugar and coffee and other foodstuff to Cyprus, while the Canadian community has been more than active in helping the refugees in Cyprus.

ADOPTION OF ORPHANS

I must add as a footnote that all we did was in response to the dictates of our conscience and heart. The Church ladies, the youth societies, are doing their utmost in order to provide help for a number of children, orphaned children in Cyprus. We already have adopted in excess of 600 children and we shall continue to do so.

On the other hand, the American institutions both here and in Greece, the college, the American farm school in Salonika, and the Athens College have offered scholarships to young Cypriot students, and we shall never cease doing what we feel is our moral and religious responsibility toward them.

Senator KENNEDY. Well, it appears that the community and the Church have really led the effort in trying to reflect what I think is one of the finest characteristics of the American people, and that is their sense of generosity for those in need. Under your leadership, your Church has, I think, made an extraordinarily important contribution to the relief of the suffering of the refugees.

ATTITUDE OF REFUGEES

I would like to ask you if you would develop for us a bit the attitude of the refugees themselves. You commented, and I thought very movingly, about the real lack of hope that exists, and I think this was something which is terribly important. Besides their physical adversity which they are facing in terms of the winter and in terms of living in tents, I would also be interested in how they look toward the future and what their view about their future lives might be. I think this is terribly important.

Archbiship IAKOVOS. I have working for the Archdiocese in New York two ladies who came from Cyprus. They are rather young. Another secretary of mine left New York for Cyprus some months ago. She went to Cyprus to stay, and all three of them describe with very, very discouraging color the future of the refugees in Cyprus. I cannot comment in detail, because as I said earlier, I think your committee is rather well informed of the existing conditions in Cyprus.

I also receive, almost daily, letters from young people of both sexes who would like to continue their studies in Cyprus or Greece and need help. Since this is impossible under the present circumstances in Cyprus they ask me to provide scholarships for them. They tell me that it seems impossible for them, even to live, unless something is done, and done within a reasonably short time. They also tell me that people in Cyprus have lost faith. They are presently left in a completely chaotic situation. They are demoralized. People who found it necessary to go back to the Turkish zones find their homes either demolished or in complete ruins, and on their way back to their tents are being mugged and tortured by Turkish peasants and soldiers.

I don't like to give you the impression that I color politically my sentiments or the description I am trying to give you, but I feel that there is no man who can describe justifiably the extent of the tragic conditions under which these people live without dramatizing the degree of suffering.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Fong?

RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES?

Senator FONG. Your Eminence, is there any resettlement going on at the present time?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. As far as I know, your Honor, I don't think so. I have no information of any kind of a settlement.

On the other hand, I know that the Cypriot Government does not like that word settlement. They prefer the term rehabilitation. Senator Fong. 1 said resettlement of the people, not settlement;

Senator Fong. 1 said resettlement of the people, not settlement; resettlement of the people back into their homes, is that going on?

Archbishop Iakovos. I don't think so.

NEW REFUGEES?

Senator FONG. Is the number of refugees growing at the present time?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. New refugees are being made, especially under present conditions, because people who remain back in villages, now with the winter around the corner, prefer to leave their homes and join their compatriots so they may suffer together and thus alleviate their own actual suffering.

Senator Fong. Do you believe many are still leaving their homes at the present time?

Archbishop Iakovos. Yes.

Senator Fong. You don't believe that many are returning to their homes?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. As I commented a few minutes ago, very few have tried to go back home, and they were prevented or sent back to their refugee camp by the Turkish authorities.

BRITISH RELIEF EFFORTS

Senator FONG. Do you know of any effort that has been made by England, for example, to ameliorate some to these conditions?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. I think England has done its best in order to alleviate the suffering and also to give some protection to the Turkish refugees who have fled their homes; thousands of Turkish refugees are hosted, so to speak, and protected by the English forces in certain areas, especially at the Dhekelia Base.

TURKISH REFUGEES

Senator Fong. What do you estimate to be the number of Turkish refugees?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. From figures in my possession it is 34,000 refugees or persons who have fled.

Senator Fong. Approximately how many Greek Cypriot refugees are there?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. In excess of 240,000 people.

Altogether displaced persons are reaching the figure of 284,000, including Turks and Greeks.

Senator Fong. Has the effort of the United States been such that everyone has been able to receive some food?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. All the people are receiving at least one substantial, decent meal a day. But I know very little about what our own Government has done in that respect. I know Sweden and West Germany and England are doing their part while Greece is spending between \$5 and \$6 million a month just for food for the refugees, both Turkish and Greek refugees.

Senator Fong. Do you envision this is going to be a long term refugee situation?

Archbishop Iakovos. I am afraid that if we cannot separate the two issues, the political settlement of differences between Greece and Turkey the plight of refugees in Cyprus or accept the Turkish position that the refugee problem will be part of the expected discussion between Turkey and Greece, we may be presented with some more tragic situations.

REFUGEE PROBLEM IS A POLITICAL PROBLEM

Senator Fong. You don't think the refugee problem can be solved until the political problem is solved?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. As a layman in political affairs I can only say that the two issues should be separated before the whole issue of Cyprus is politically resolved. But it seems that this is difficult because, from several discussions I have had here in the United States with people in authority, I formed the impression that the problem of refugees is one of the most important subjects to be discussed on the table of negotiations.

Senator Foxg. You fear that the problem is that we are wrapped up in political negotiations?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. I am very much afraid so.

Senator Fong. Under those circumstances, you believe it will not be resolved until the political issues are worked out?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. I have that impression, and I am terribly upset with the idea.

Senator Fong. Thank you.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Mathias.

REFUGEES ON BRITISH BASES

Senator MATHIAS. Your Eminence, can you tell us the situation with regard to those refugees who were living within the British bases? Are there still numbers of people there?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. My information about the Turkish Cypriots who have sought refuge in British bases comes from England, from official or semiofficial reports as well as from the World Council of Churches. As you have probably read, the Turkish authorities demanded these refugees to be freed, so to speak, by the British, and be transported to the northern part of Cyprus which they like to Turkishize complete.y.

Senator MATHIAS. In other words, this would be an effort at a forced resettlement project?

Archbishop Iakovos. Exactly.

Senator MATHIAS. Rather than an effort at maintaining a subsistence level of life while the political situation is going on?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. I had discussions with Archbishop Makarios the very same day that he left the United States, and he told me that what he thought was important was not simply to recognize full citizenship to Turkish Cypriots, but to form cantons and to those which are inhabited by a majority of Turks, be given complete antonomy. Those on the other hand which are inhabitated by a clear majority of Greek Cypriots be given equal autonomy and be incorporated, together with the Turkish cantons, into a federal government. He doesn't like the idea of dichotomy, which seems to be the demand of Turkish Cypriots or the Turkish Government.

Senator MATHIAS. So, in fact, these Turkish refugees who are living in the British bases are resettled, it would have the effect of increasing segregation rather than decreasing it?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. Yes. I called such a resettlement unjust because it will make things more difficult for a final settlement of differences between Turkey and Greece.

EXTENT OF DESTRUCTION

Senator MATHIAS. Do you have any more information as to the number of houses that have been destroyed and the number of people that were actually without homes either because they were destroyed or driven from the areas in which they lived?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. According to reports received from the Government of Cyprus, at least 30 percent of the houses and the establishments, generally speaking, in the areas occupied by the Turks have been destroyed.

Senator MATHIAS. So that those people are now effectively homeless?

Archbishop Iakovos. They are in fact homeless and even those who have fled and sought refuge in churches were chased out of them after having been brutally tortured—punished—let me use a less impressive word—by Turkish authorities.

Senator MATHIAS. Merely punished for being Greeks? Archbishop IAKOVOS. Yes. The fact that old men and children and women of all ages have been tortured in the churches, where they had sought refuge, or the fact that organs of public order, the police, have been slain—all attest to the statement that their only crime was that of being Greek. But this is beyond the realm of, 1 think, our present discussion.

POLITICAL SOLUTION NECESSARY

Senator MATHIAS. Of course, the Senator from Hawaii has brought out the political aspect as the very key and prime requisite, but do you have any suggestions to the committee as to the type of aid which you feel is most urgent?

Archbishop IAKOVOS. As I stated earlier, I think the most important kind of aid we can give them is that they sustain in their hearts a reasonable amount of hope that they will be rehabilitated in their own homes. I don't call the aid, in the form of food or elothing or tents, as the most important one. It is up to us to give

them something more substantial, something more precious, and that is hope.

I like to repeat that word: "Hope." Because committees which have been sent by the Cyprus Government to the States, and which they came to see me, asked me to round up the efforts, so to speak, so that this hope for Cypriots in despair may be given precedence here in the United States, and especially among people in the Government. The American public should be informed that their Cypriot brothers are not begging for food, but for justice and dignity. Senator MATHIAS. Thank you.

SILENCE OVER HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Senator KENNEDY. Your Eminence, from my point of view, one of the very deep and genuine concerns that I have had about Cyprus, and on human rights issues, generally, has been the failure of those who have information, or knowledge, or understanding about the violation of human rights to raise their voices about these issues. I am just wondering from your position as a church leader what sort of sense of morality exists under these circumstances?

One of the quotes that President Kennedy used to use was Dante's that, in times of moral crisis those who remain silent, there was going to be a special place in hell reserved for them.

I am just wondering, in listening to you this morning, what your views are. There is certainly no other American who has felt this as deeply as you have, someone who has such a deep concern, and yet in listening to your voice it is powerful for not only what it says, but it is powerful for the restraint as well.

Of course, you haven't been restrained in responding to the humanitarian needs in your efforts in trying to provide some relief to people.

But, as a church leader, what do you tell your parishioners about this dilemma of silence on moral issues?

Archbishop Iakovos. I am glad, Senator Kennedy, you mentioned the name of President Kennedy because I was afraid for a moment that I would be considered as paying compliments to the Kennedy name, but I had in mind telling you that it was President Kennedy who raised the issue of morality as a very important issue, and I feel that these last years of our history have given full justification to the great principle established by President Kennedy that we should be capable of even capturing again the morality and the purity of the American mind and the American soul in all we do and all we say.

The last 3 years told us and told the world all over again that morality is much more powerful than any kind of material power or political preeminence. I tell these things to myself because I don't like to give you the impression that I came here to teach morality. I am not the teacher of morality. I prefer to be a doer of moral things.

TARNISHED AMERICAN IMAGE

I have the fear, however, and because of this I will allow my feelings to dictate my response to a certain question by Senator Mathias. I have a feeling that our whole attitude toward Cyprus and toward our Cypriot brethren has not been in the best tradition of American morality. I don't think for instance that by sending through the Red

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Cross or through the United Nations special funds, \$2 to \$4 million to Cyprus, we can be proud of ourselves for having done what we ought to do, and I don't think by discussing the problems of Cyprus extensively in the press or over TV or among high officials that we can say that we have done our part.

I think this Nation has given to the world an image which was unknown before the end of the last war, an image of a Nation concerned, a Nation guided by moral principles, a Nation which could believe in a code of ethics in international politics. I am terribly sad, as a matter of fact, very unhappy whenever I see with my own eyes that we are losing gradually that respect which was centered on the moral tenets of the American Nation and of the American politics.

Therefore, if I am allowed to add one more thing before I conclude what I have already stated, I would say that it is up to us to recapture that fiber which would make us a much stronger Nation in the sense that we can regain once again the confidence and the trust of the rest of the world.

CYPRUS RELIEF: MORE THAN BREAD ALONE

Senator MATHIAS. This very literally, if I interpret what Your Eminence says, is a case where bread alone does not suffice. We have to do what is necessary from a humanitarian standpoint as far as human suffering—but bread alone could prolong this problem if we simply decide, as we have seen in other parts of the world, that we will support the refugees indefinitely without coming to grips with the problem that has made them refugees. We will prolong the difficulties that have been brought upon the people of Cyprus.

Archbishop IAKOVOS. Thank you for expanding my thoughts.

Senator MATHIAS. I hope I have done it accurately.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator KENNEDY. I want to thank you, Your Eminence, very much, for your extremely helpful comments. They have been of great value to me, and 1 know all of us on this committee appreciate your sharing your thoughts and your concerns with us.

We will look forward to working with you in the future, in meeting needs that I think you have challenged us to meet over the coming days and over the long run.

I want to thank you very much.

Archbishop IAKOVOS. I thank you and I hope God gives you the strength to do your best.

Senator KENNEDY. Your Eminence, you are welcome to stay if you care to, or whatever your program is. We will go on until the full Judiciary Committee calls us to a scheduled meeting. Whatever your program is.

We had planned to have the Administration as No. 2, but we have some out-of-town witnesses. So I would like to give them a chance to speak because I don't know how long we will be able to continue.

I will ask that Mr. Tsaffaras, who is from my State of Massachusetts, if you will come and introduce Mr. Chirgotis.

Mr. TSAFFARAS. May I at this time present to you the supreme president of the Order of AHEPA, American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association, Mr. William Chirgotis. The other members are not here, Mr. Chairman, but I think we will cover the subject quite extensively.

Senator KENNEDY. We extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. Chirgotis.

We will start out by noting that you contributed to what I think is an excellent report in reviewing the situation in Cyprus. As one who has followed refugee problems not only in Cyprus but also other parts of the world, I want to commend you and your organization for the work you have done. Your report is just first rate, and it will be of great value and help to us. I am going to include it as a part of the record.

As you know, we had a team in Cyprus in October, and we follow very closely the events and the happenings on that island. So we look forward to hearing from you this morning.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. CHIRGOTIS, SUPREME PRESIDENT, ORDER OF AHEFA AND WILLIAM P. TSAFFARAS, COCHAIRMAN AHEPA JUSTICE FOR CYPRUS COMMITTEE

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity of appearing before you to give a very brief report of our factfinding mission to Cyprus.

I do not appear before you today with a prepared statement. However, I have brought with me several copies of our monthly publication, which includes a 37-page factfinding report as was witnessed by the seven members of our delegation that went to Cyprus on October 1, 2, and 3, 1974.

I would like to refer to a speech that I made in Chicago just the other day in which I gave them my views of our factfinding analysis. These are some of the things that we actually saw and not things that we read in local newspapers.

CYPRUS: MASSIVE HUMAN SUFFERING

In my entire life, I have never imagined or seen suffering like our mission of mercy delegation saw on this Mediterranean island. We saw many small children going to a class which seated 25 youngsters and there were 90 in the class. We saw families living in bamboo huts, living under trees without the facilities of tents or blankets. We saw a 96year-old Cypriot who begged us to return him to his home so that he might die in peace. We also saw a young boy about 14 or 15 years old who handed us a piece of shrapnel and said take this back to America, he said, with our regrets. He also told us in the brief conversation that we had with this young man that his father and mother were both killed by fire bombs during the Turkish invasion.

VISIT TO REFUGEE AREAS

We went to four of the refugee camps, and in one camp there was approximately 11,000 displaced persons. In the second camp I believe there was 8,000 or 9,000. The one plea of pleas seemed to be return us to our homes. It appeared at that time that food was in short supply. Most of them hadn't had a hot meal for days, and they were living on spaghetti and rice. We saw the delivery of many of the supplies that the order of AHEPA had just delivered, and to date we have shipped overseas about 500,000 pounds of supplies, and because the supplies are coming in faster than we can airlift them overseas, we hope that within the next few weeks we will send by ship another million pounds of supplies.

HOPE IS IN SHORT SUPPLY

The actual physical conditions that we saw there were expressions of uncertainty almost on every face. As I mentioned a few moments ago, the one plea of all pleas was please return us to our homes. Of course, the feeling of hope seemed to be in very short supply.

The Order of AHEPA is a nonpolitical organization, a fraternal organization, but we are very much concerned about what has happened in Cyprus and we are doing whatever we can to help our Cypriot brothers.

We very often think of the many sacrifices that our American forefathers went through for the preservation of liberty in this country, and because of the application of these cherished principles may I say that this country has carned first place in the hearts of the people of all free nations, and I personally believe that the violation—that any violation of these principles would certainly endanger the moral foundations of this Nation, perhaps of the entire civilized world. This is my own personal opinion.

Our trip to Cyprus was made possible, may I say, through the courtesy of the State Department; as you well know, gentlemen, there is no transportation between Athens and Cyprus. The only transportation is by means of ship, and that takes about 36 hours to get to the island of Cyprus. So through the courtesy of the State Department they made available to us an Air Force plane which made our trip to Cyprus possible.

REFUGEES ON BRITISH BASE

We landed at a British airbase and we were very happy to see that at one of these camps it was supervised by the British, and they were making every effort to see that the refugees and displaced persons were extended the courtesies, help, and assistance that was possible.

HELPING CYPRUS

In one of these camps water was in very short supply. They were bringing the water in by means of tanks, and many of the people that we saw there in Cyprus hadn't bathed for days.

The situation is indescribable. I have been told recently that the only great effort that is being done to assist our unfortunate brothers in Cyprus is that the Greek Government is sharing the load, and at the present time they are constructing semipermanent homes there to house the refugees through the winter season. They are spending millions of dollars, and it is necessary, I believe, that some effort be made to assist these people.

I don't know what else, Mr. Chairman, I could add to this brief report. As I said, I have come here today without a prepared statement. These are just my extemporancous remains. I have brought several copies of our report here which I would like to leave with you which has a complete factfinding report of the mission to Cyprus.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

We will include that, the relevant parts in the record,¹ and the whole report in the file of the committee.

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. Mr. Tsaffaras is with me today, our past president of the organization, and perhaps he may have some comments.

Mr. TSAFFARAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of this committee.

Let me state that as a member of AHEPA factfinding mission to Cyprus I welcome the opportunity to appear before you and to submit for your consideration the reasons for financial assistance to the people of Cyprus.

I could spend several months relating my experiences and describing the various events during our visit to the island of Cyprus. All the events and the pain, suffering, and misfortune of these 200,000-plus refugees are well described in your excellent report "Crisis on Cyprus, 1974." prepared for your subcommittee, and also this "AHEPA Cyprus Mission of Mercy," published in the AHEPAN magazine, the official publication of the Order of AHEPA.

ECONOMIC DISASTER FOR CYPRUS

Aside from the very important human suffering, let us look at the economic disaster of Cyprus. Although it is difficult to estimate accurately the damage incurred in the area controlled by the Turkish invasion forces; some estimates have been made, however, on the consequences of the invasion on the economy. It is estimated that the country of Cyprus is losing about \$5 million a day in production; a major part of the labor force is unemployed or seriously underemployed compared with a state of full employment before the invasion.

It is estimated that over 40,000 households have been broken up and forcibly expelled from their homes, leaving behind all of their property. These properties are estimated to be in the order of over \$150 million. Goods left in warehouses, shops, and factories under Turkish control amount to many millions of dollars.

Destruction to cultivated lands, pinewood forests by the bombing of some 100 square miles cannot be expressed in pecuniary terms. It will take many years to restore these resources.

Tourist activity which brought into the country more than \$75 million annually is lost, and this loss is expected to continue for a number of years.

Major losses have been suffered in livestock, agricultural products, mineral resources, and many other sectors of the economy. A conservative estimate of the economy that is a total loss is well over \$1 billion during these past 5 months.

REFUGEE SITUATION

With your kind indulgence may I say a word or two about the refugee problem. As we walked through these refugee camps the one thing that stands in my mind were the words expressed by the old and the young when we asked what help we could offer. This one expression was, "help us to go back to our homes."

¹ For the text of the AHEPA report, see app. 1.

These people are a proud people. They do not seek charity. They seek justice, and they look to the United States for assistance to that end. They want the opportunity to rebuild their economic position. This financial assistance that we are seeking today will be a beginning, a new beginning, for these 230,000 refugees, a new hope that someone cares.

With this statement, Mr. Chairman, I would like to bring to mind the traumatic experiences that these refugees are experiencing, and it is most difficult to visualize this experience.

I well remember, and if I may, through an experience of my own, as of yesterday, December 16, some 30 years ago, I was in Germany at the Battle of the Bulge and we were captured as prisoners of war and we witnessed this traumatic experience, this hope, this nightmare that one goes through in wondering what the next day will bring. This is the exact thing that these refugees are experiencing today. They look to you. They look right into your eyes and say, "when will this nightmare be over?"

I think it is incumbent upon us in the United States to provide whatever financial assistance we can to help bring Cyprus back on its feet. They want to work. They want to build. They want to build their own economy as best as they can. They don't want charity; they want to get back to work and build their economy.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

ROLE OF AHEPA

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much, Mr. Tsaffaras, for a helpful comment, as always.

Let me ask you what the Order of AHEPA is doing and what it plans to do over the long term. I would be interested in that.

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. While we were in Cyprus we took a camera crew with us and we took photographs of the existing conditions in Cyprus. Several weeks ago I took the film to Universal Studios in California and we had TV personality Telly Savalis narrate this film for us, and the final print should be available in the next few days. We are making about 50 copies of this film and it is our intention to use it to raise funds for the people of Cyprus.

Senator KENNEDY. You are planning to continue your program of help and assistance?

Mr. Chirgotis. Definitely.

Senator KENNEDY. That is based upon your sense of the need that exists there, gathered from your factfinding group that visited in October?

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. 234,000 refugees, Mr. Chairman, is a lot of people.

Senator KENNEDY. But as I understand, you have ongoing and continuing plans to reach out to your membership and also to other citizens in this country as well, who have the sense of concern about the plight of these people, and you are going to be raising funds for Cyprus?

Mr. Chirgotis. Yes.

WHAT SHOULD THE UNITED STATES DO?

Senator KENNEDY. Do you have some ideas or suggestions about what the United States can be doing to supplement your efforts? As I understand, Cyprus is a rather unique situation where, because of the fact of trained and skilled people that exist in Cyprus, it hasn't been necessary to set up a whole new relief infrastructure. It has been done through groups and churches and the government quite effectively. I wonder if you would like to comment on how the relief effort is going.

But we know that the extent of U.S. assistance has been approximately \$10 million. When you look at the fact that you have raised, and the archbishop has raised, a very substantial amount of resources just through your own efforts, I am interested in what you think we ought to be urging our government to be prepared to undertake, both in the short term and probably in the long term, for Cyprus.

Do you think that funds could be wisely spent now if additional funds were made available by the U.S. Government to provide some relief from the suffering of people there? Are you satisfied that would be the case and it would be justifiable? You obviously believe it, because you are going to your members to raise additional resources. What I am trying to do is to build a case so we can go to the Department of State and say we have a case here—there are additional needs—and let's provide some assistance.

ASSISTANCE FOR CYPRUS

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. Mr. Chairman, there are probably several things that can be done. While we were on Cyprus it seemed that the most important thing was that these people wanted was to return to their homes as soon as possible. As you well know, Turkey at the present time occupies about 40 percent of the island, and the most fertile area of Cyprus as well.

The displaced persons in the southern part of the island is very nonproductive. The one thing that should be looked into very seriously, I think, is the problem of restoring the economy of the country. These people are very desperate in these camps for lack of something to do, and if some method could be found or established whereby the economy of the country can be restored to get these people back on their feet, I think the longer they remain in the situation the more depressed they are going to get.

The Turks at the present time occupy Famagusta, which is one of the main seaports. We have been told if it were possible for the Turkish Army to leave Famagusta, one-third of these people could be accommodated in the homes and the hotels and the buildings that are there, and I think this is one thing that could be looked into as a temporary situation to relieve the requirements and necessities of onethird of the refugees, about 70,000 or \$0,000.

But the most important thing, I think, is to see these people get self-determination.

Senator KENNEDY. Senator Fong?

MILITARY SITUATION STABILIZED?

Senator Fong. Is the military situation stabilized now? Mr. CHIRGOTIS. It appears to be, sir.

Senator FONG. Is it a question of having the political situation resolved before many of these things can be accomplished?

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. It appears that way.

Mr. TSAFFARAS. If I may make a comment on that one. We were over there and visited with Mr. Denktash, the leader of the Turkish group, and we asked if it would be possible to retreat some of these troops from the city of Famagusta, and he indicated to us that nothing would be done until the political problem is resolved and this is where it is stalemated and this is where it is very important, so we seek some form of adjustment so some of these people can go back to their homes.

RETURN OF REFUGEES TO FAMAGUSTA

Senator Fong. What suggestions have you along that line?

Mr. TSAFFARAS. We think we would like to have this country, through our State Department, convince the Turkish people there, and the country of Turkey, to pull some of the troops back and let some of these refugees return to their homes.

Senator Fong. You think if they gave up Famagusta-----

Mr. TSAFFARAS. Famagusta, 50,000 refugees from that one city, and they indicated they could accommodate another 30,000 if they were allowed to go back to their homes.

Senator Fong. As a member of this committee I will try to ascertain if that can be done.

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. That might be a temporary starting point, anyway. Senator KENNEDY. Senator Mathias?

Senator MATHIAS. I think it has been very helpful to have your testimony this morning, particularly as it comes firsthand as a result of a field investigation.

I would join with Senator Fong in his suggestion to the chairman that we do make that recommendation to the State Department.

I would only add further, and I am sure the chairman would be agreeable to this, that you feel you have an open line to this committee, and as you get additional information, that you think will be helpful to us, that you will feel free to supply it to us on a continuing basis; in that way, we can keep in touch with the Cyprus situation and with the immediate and crucial problems that affect the refugees.

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. Thank you for your concern, Senator.

Senator MATHIAS. I would ask the chairman that we arrange to have the staff prepare to accept any communications of any kind that you may wish to give us.

LETTER TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Senator KENNEDY. We have been summoned, which I knew we would be, to attend a full committee meeting, so we will have to adjourn.

But I would like to mention just before we do, that one of the recommendations that the subcommittee study mission made was the need for a Turkish gesture of good will, that would involve, perhaps, the return of the refugees to Famagusta and breaking of the deadlock over Nicosia Airport—that they would serve as a meaningful step to negotiations.

We have sent the recommendations of this report down to the Department of State on October 25, and we still haven't received a response, which is a little perplexing. What I would like to suggest is that, as members of the committee, and we have our own views about the political situation, as I think you have gathered here—but I think what we ought to do is to take our humanitarian recommendations and the ones you have suggested and see if we can't press these again to the Department on the basis of our hearing this morning, and see if we can't keep after this issue. Shall we do that?

Senator Fong. We will get a special communication to the State Department.¹

Mr. CHIRGOTIS. It will be very helpful.

Senator KENNEDY. We will have to stand in recess now.

I will say to Mr. Eagleton, we will try and resume in a short while for your testimony. We have it here. But perhaps what we could do is have that submitted for the record, and then maybe we can submit a series of detailed questions for the Department. We also want an answer to the recommendations sent in our October 25 letter. We want it soon, and we are going to address the letter to the Secretary about these humanitarian concerns and we hope that you will press when you return to the Department our very deep sense of concern about efforts that are being made for Cyprus.

We will submit your statement for the record, Mr. Eagleton, and permit you to make any response on earlier comments that have been made.

[The above referred to statements follow:]

DECEMBER 17, 1974.

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM EAGLETON, JR., BEFORE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES ON EMERGENCY RELIEF EFFORTS ON CYPRUS

The plight of the refugees on Cyprus remains serious, and is a continuing reminder of the need for early progress on a settlement that will enable the people of Cyprus to live together in peace and security. Without minimizing in any way the hardships and suffering of the refugees on the island, it can nevertheless be said that the emergency relief program has been reasonably successful to date in providing the refugees with their immediate needs in food, shelter and medicine. The international community responded to the UNHCR appeal for \$22 million

The international community responded to the UNHCR appeal for \$22 million for September–December relief efforts with contributions in cash and kind totalling \$23.1 million. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has acted as the coordinator for these and most other contributions and has been responsible for arranging the purchase and shipment of food and relief items. The International Red Cross (ICRC), the first major international organization to provide relief on Cyprus following the July events, has concerned itself with POWs, treatment of detainees, protection of civilians, missing persons, and humanitarian matters such as providing food, shelter and medical assistance to displaced persons and returnees. (The U.S. contribution to the ICRC has been \$3.37 million.) UNFICYP (UN Force on Cyprus) has also supported relief activities, delivering on behalf of the UNHCR food and relief goods to the Turkish Cypriot community in the south and to the Greek community in the north, assisting the ICRC and UNHCR in the evacuation of the sick, pregnant, aged, and stranded civilians in both sectors, and providing medical evacuation services. (The U.S. contribution to UNFICYP thus far this fiscal year has been \$4.8 million.)

The bulk of the operational aspects of the relief work, however, has been carried out by local authorities. The Government of Cyprus has established an Office of Special Services for Refugees, which has provided assistance to Greeks and (through UNFICYP) to Turks in the south, overseen the construction of permanent camp facilities, and collected statistics on refugees in order to formulate an effective refugee relief program. According to statistics released by the Government of Cyprus, Greek Cypriots displaced to the south since July number 180,716

 1 For the text of the letter of the subcommittee to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and his reply, see app. II. 46-035-75-4

of which 41,260 are completely self-supporting at this time and 139,456 are considered needy and are now receiving food and/or money for subsistence. In addition the UNHCR and the ICRC are providing food aid for about 18,000 Turkish Cypriots in the north.

Cypriots in the north. The Cyprus Government reports that of the displaced persons (a) 102,572 are satisfactorily housed, (b) 2,269 are living in public buildings, (c) 55,888 are living in permanent structures but in overcrowded conditions, (d) 7,558 are living in garages and unfinished structures, and (c) 12,429 are in tents. There are believed to be few, if any, refugees still living in the open. The housing situation seems to be stabilizing, and thus the emphasis of the Government's relief efforts, which in the early days was on protection and housing, is shifting to food assistance.

FUTURE RELIEF REQUIREMENTS

The relief program for Cyprus in 1975 is still being developed by the Government of Cyprus in collaboration with the UN, the ICRC, and other organizations concerned with Cyprus relief. As noted above, the Government of Cyprus has shifted its emphasis to food assistance, and it has approached the UNHCR for financial assistance to help cover the majority of these expenses. Most of the funds provided under the UNHCR's \$22 million appeal have been expended and thus additional contributions will be necessary. We understand that the UNHCR is considering the implementation of a Food for Work Program through the World Food Program (WFP). The WFP would have the responsibility for purchasing food, shipping it to Cyprus on the UNHCR account, and arranging for the shipment of food pledged on the UNHCR by the EEC and other in-kind donors.

The WFP is now working on a plan to channel all food and humanitarian assistance through a series of food for work projects. The WFP has worked out preliminary understandings with authorities on both sides on compensation for participants in the food for work programs. Details of proposed projects involving reforestation, irrigation, agricultural development, road construction, etc., are now being worked out. Preliminary WFP planning is based on an estimated 210,000 participants for a four-month trail period beginning in January 1975. The cost of such a program to the UNHCR would be about \$8 million.

U.S. Relief Assistance

The United States has contributed \$10.5 million to the Cyprus emergency relief effort through the ICRC and the UNHCR. We began by contributing \$3.2 million in each and relief supplies (tents, food, medical supplies) including a \$725,000 each grant to the ICRC. In September, in response to a UNHCR appeal for \$22 million for relief efforts through December, we agreed to provide one-third of this amount (\$7.3 million). Since August a US disaster relief specialist has been assigned to Nicosia to coordinate US assistance with UN agencies and the Cyprus Government and to help evaluate continuing relief needs.

As for the US role in 1975, specific funding requirements are not yet fully known and we are not yet in a position to state with certainty the exact amount that the US should be prepared to contribute. However, based on current spending patterns, AID believes that additional US assistance of from \$8–10 million will be needed during the first six months of 1975. We appreciate and support action by Congress to provide funding for Cyprus relief efforts in 1975 and wish to continue to work with the Subcommittee on Refugees to ensure that the US carries its full share in meeting the humanitarian needs of the people of Cyprus.

Senator KENNEDY. I regret we have to adjourn, but I think, realistically, we will be in the Judiciary Committee for some period of time. Unless you have objection, that is the way we will proceed. We will stand in recess.

[Whereupon, at 10:55 a.m., the subcommittee was recessed, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

HUMANITARIAN MISSION TO CYPRUS: A SPECIAL REPORT

(By William G. Chirgotis, Supreme President, AHEPA)

November 1974

My fellow AHEPANS and Greek Americans: We have just returned from an eight day fact finding mission to Cyprus—and what we witnessed during this short but productive period was something we never expected to find in the 20th century.

Seeing is believing—and we saw 234,000 refugees living in tents, others under trees, on the beaches, in the city streets. We saw doctors examining children in tents which would make M.A.S.H.'s medical tents look like modern hospital facilities. We witnessed ehildren slowly dying due to a lack of medicine and proper facilities to stop diarrhea and dehydration. We saw a baby left on a blanket unattended, the father captured by the Turks, the mother frantically seeking to find her other two infant children—

These were only a few of the initial tragic sights we saw.

The six man team was headed by the Supreme President of the Order of AHEPA William G. Chirgotis and included John Plumides, Chairman of the AHEPA International Justice for Cyprus Committee; Past Supreme President William Tsaffaras; Past Supreme President Peter Bell; Cyprus Committee Coordinator, George Douris—who said as Boston Supreme Convention Chairman, "We shall go to Cyprus in six weeks," and we did—and James S. Scofield, Past Supreme Governor of the Order of AHEPA and Past Supreme President of the Sons of Pericles. Aides to the committee, Archie Mavromatis and Peter Sideris, also attended with the mission.

To these Brothers I am grateful. They proved their devotion for AHEPA and above all their love for all Hellenes. We were told before we left that we were going into a war zone—we know now they were not joking. We visited both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sections. We passed through a fourblock "no-man's land" zone of empty houses and buildings where not even a bird would dare fly or a rabbit run without being shot at by Greek Cypriot or Turkish guns.

It was common to hear the quiet of the night broken by machine gun tattering; and the beautiful mornings of Cyprus shattered by rifle fire. We heard bombs in the distance and prayed for the safety of the Cypriots and only ten minutes after we met Acting President Glafkos Clerides, an attempt was made on his life.

we met Acting President Glafkos Clerides, an attempt was made on his life. We met with Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece, Foreign Minister of Greece George Mavros, United States Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch, Vice Premier George Rallis, Ambassador George Petrounakos of Hellenism Abroad, Turkish Vice President Rauf Denktash, Acting President Clerides, United States Ambassador to Cyprus William R. Crawford, and of course, a man who we can't thank enough, an AHEPAN of 20 years standing—the third man in the American Embassy, Zachary P. Geaneas. This man did everything possible to make our trip comfortable and safe. We also thank the two pilots of the small U.S. Air Force Dakota airplane that flew your AHEPA delegation to Cyprus and back, and to the British for their hospitality and for quickly expediting the AHEPA delegation in Cyprus and for providing whatever security that might have been needed.

To the press, radio and television in Greece, in Cyprus, and in our own country for fairly reporting the facts of our mission and helping get our message across to the public. To all the concerned individuals who helped in making our "Fact Finding Mission" possible, we say a collective thanks.

We thank the eleven publishers and editors of the Athens newspapers and news media who accepted the invitation of the Order of AHEPA to a luncheon at the Athens Hilton Hotel in which we explained our position and our efforts to help correct the unfortunate course of the foreign policy of the United States Government towards Cyprus—and they did make our story known! To the people of Greece, including the 15,000 who demonstrated past our hotel rooms at the Athens Hilton as they proceeded towards the American Embassy with anti-American government slogans, we are grateful for making us more aware of the problems facing mother Hellas, and we in turn made them understand that the American people are solidly behind the cause of Cyprus as proved by the tremendous favorable vote of the United States Congress. To the Senate and the Congress of the United States, for their action on the Turkish Military Aid cut-off, we are grateful.

As Supreme President, I was proud to lead this non-partisan AIIEPA delegation of dedicated Brothers, all with their own strong opinions; men of different political parties in AHEPA: but Brothers united in one cause—to help the people of Cyprus, in their hour of need, to correct the tragic mistake of the foreign policy of our country towards Cyprus. I am grateful to each and everyone for dedicating eight days of their lives, with very little rest and sleep, and in some instances, with very little food, to accomplish what I believe was so very much for humanity as the following report will show.

It all began with our first meeting on August 23, 1974 during the Boston Supreme Convention with Secretary of State Kissinger. The delegation very strongly told the Secretary of State of our disappointment in regard to the policy of the United States towards Cyprus.

At the second meeting with Dr. Kissinger on September 19th, once again the Supreme President of the Order of AIIEPA told Dr. Kissinger that we were bitterly disappointed that the State Department apparently tolerated Turkish military aggression by continuing its economic and military aid to a country which was in violation of all its NATO commitments, and the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

We saw unexploded bombs that Greek Cypriots recovered and we witnessed American-made arms, American uniforms, American jeeps and other American military equipment on Cyprus in the hands of the Turkish invaders, which indeed is a clear violation of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 which denies the use of such arms for aggressive purposes against a sovereign nation.

When we told Dr. Kissinger we are going to Cyprus, he offered to assist our mission of mercy by facilitating our air transportation from Greece to Cyprus and for this, we say thanks.

Prior to our departure on Thursday, September 26th, Brother George Douris met privately with Archbishop Makarios and explained AHEPA's mission to Cyprus and received the blessings of His Beatitude. On Friday, September 27th, the AHEPA was host to Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Mr. George Mavros, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, at a cocktail reception held at the Plaza Hotel in New York City.

Both these leaders encouraged our "Fact Finding Mission of Mercy" and asked us to strongly urge acting Cypriot President Glafkos Clerides to stand strong and not to be swayed by internal strife.

Following the reception, Mr. Douris, AHEPA International Justice for Cyprus Committee Chairman John Plumides and counsel to the Committee and Former Under Secretary to the U.S. Treasury, Eugene Rossides, met in Plaza Suite 1141 for more than an hour with Foreign Minister Mavros, and Professor Basil Vlavianos, Past President of Hermes Chapter, and discussed Mr. Mavros' appearance on Tuesday, October 1, before the Senate Foreign relations committee.

^{*} The AHEPA delegation advised Mr. Mavros to take a strong stand in condemning Turkish aggression, as well as expressing shock and indignation that the United States would allow the Turkish invaders in Cyprus to use guns, bullets, bombs, tanks, and American invading launches to accomplish their mission of invading and conquering a sovereign nation.

Mr. Mavros informed the committee going to Cyprus, that they should urge the Acting President, Mr. Clerides, to hold out, not to negotiate under duress with the Turks and that AIIEPA will do everything possible for the 234,000 refugees.

What follows is a chronological report of the fact finding mission from the moment we boarded TWA flight #880 (Olympic Airways was on strike) which left Kennedy Airport at 6:45 p.m., Sunday September 29th, for Athens Greece. *Fraternally yours*,

WILLIAM G. CHIRGOTIS, Supreme President.

At 10:00 a.m. Athens time Monday, September 30th, the mission arrived at Athens Airport. It was met at the airport by Greek Government officials, headed by Ambassador George Petrounakos and by Brother Zachary P. Geaneas of the American Embassy. After a brief stop at the Athens Hilton Hotel we met with United States Ambassador Jack B. Kubisch, who himself was a recent arrival in Athens. Following the brief meeting with the Ambassador we were briefed by Embassy officials on the current situations in Greece and Cyprus. Following this meeting we had lunch with Ambassador Kubisch and the Embassy staff, the first social occasion to be hosted by Ambassador Kubisch and his charming wife since their arrival in Athens.

On Tuesday, October 1st, we had our initial press conference with newspaper, radio and television representatives. At 10:30 n.m. we met with Minister of Public Welfare, Athanasios Tsaldaris, who outlined to us the relief needs of the Greek Cypriot refugees.

Minister Tsaldaris indicated that the immediate need in Cyprus is for blankets, tents and camp beds and for money to buy needed relief supplies. He said 100,000 blankets must be supplied immediately and that there is a need for a total of 600,000 blankets. He also said that there are 5,200 students who now are at ending schools in Greece and that \$ million a year will be needed for their education.

At 11:45 a.m. we met briefly with Prime Minister Constantine Caramanlis of Greece, the first of two meetings held with him during the week.

At 1:00 p.m. we met with the Ambassador of Cyprus to Greece, Nieos Kranidiotis, who briefed us with regard to Cyprus relief needs and made final arrangements for our visit to Cyprus. He informed us that all of the relief goods from the United States had already been sent by boat to Cyprus. We checked and found out that this was true, but much more had arrived that day and was still in a warehouse awaiting shipment to Cyprus.

The AHEPA mission brought 10,000 pounds of AHEPA relief supplies for our Cypriot Brothers.

At. 2:00 p.m. we were guests of Ambassador Petrounakos at a luncheon held at the King George Hotel where we also discussed the situation in Greece and Cyprus and the relief needs in Cyprus. Later that evening we witnessed a massive, yet disciplined and perceful demonstration, of students at the American Embassy which was against American Government Foreign Policy and of great emotional intensity. It created tremendous traffic jams and chaos in the streets immediately surrounding our hotel; some 15,000 students participated. This rally made us even more determined in our efforts to explain to Greece and Cyprus what AHEPA has done to correct the tragic mistakes of United States Foreign Policy and that we were disturbed by the anti-American government feeling. We wanted them to know the American public overwhelmingly supported Greece and Cyprus.

On Wednesday, October 2nd, at 9:30 a.m. we departed from Athens Airport aboard a U.S. Air Force C47 Dakota airplane. We landed at 1:30 p.m. at the British Sovereign Base of Akrotir in Cyprus. We were met by Phoebus Zachariades, District Officer of Limassol; Kyprianos Kyprianou, Foreign Office, Acting Chief of Protocol and Jay R. Grahame, of the American Embassy in Nicosia, We were briefed about Cyprus by the U.S. Embassy staff. Immediately thereafter, at 4:30 p.m., we met the Acting President of Cyprus, Mr. Glafkos Clerides, in the first of two meetings which we had with him.

Mr. Clerides, who impressed us very much with his decisive and forthright manner and grasp of the problems of Cyprus, told us that he deceded assurances from Archbishop Makarios that he could negotiate with his Turkish counterpart and make the necessary decisions needed to implement these negotiations. He indicated that without these assurances he would be forced to resign. We asked that in the interests of world peace and the future of a sovereign Cyprus that he stay on as Acting President.

Thereafter, we met with Ambassador William R. Crawford, U.S. Ambassador to Cyprus, and discussed aspects of United States Foreign Policy as promulgated by the State Department in regard to Cyprus and the Mediterranean. Ambassador Crawford assured us that the United States has a deep interest in achieving justice in Cyprus. We informed him of our meeting with Secretary of State Kissinger and of our basic disagreement with the policies thus far followed by the State Department.

Ambassador Crawford said that he would attempt to arrange a special meeting for us with Vice President Rauf Denktash, who represents the Turkish Cypriots. Later that evening at the Skorpios restaurant in Nicosia we were dinner guests of Panikos Sivitanides, Minister of Labor and Social Insurance.

At dinner, we discussed in a most strenuous manner our views of State Department actions in regard to Cyprus with U.S. Embassy officials who were present. They were quite taken aback with the intensity of our emotions and the extent of our knowledge regarding the Cyprus crisis. We also exchanged views with the Cypriot officials present and were advised as to the relief needs of the refugees of Cyprus. Brother Tsaffaras, Scofield and Bell had heated discussions with the American Embassy staff members pertaining to their seemingly pro-Turkish positions.

On Thursday, October 3rd, we departed from Nicosia for Larnaca, the city to which most of the Greek Cypriot refugees have fled. There we met with the Mayor of Larnaca, Dr. H. J. Francis and the Mayor of Famagusta Andreas Pouyouros and other officials of the City and the District of Larnaca. We were accompanied by K. Kyprianou, Acting Chief of Protocol; George Iacovou, Director of Special Services for the care and rehabilitation of displaced persons; Savas Antoniou, Police Commissioner; Jay R. Grahame of the American Embassy and Bruno Kosheloff, U.S. Aid Relief Officer.

We began a tour of Displaced Persons Camps with the above and with other officials and with District Officer of Famagusta Mr. Paralikis; District Officer of Larnaca, Mr. Vryonides; Mayor of Larnaca Dr. H. J. Francis and Police Super-intendant Zindellis.

The first camp we visited was Ormedia with a population of 10,000 Greek Cypriot refugees. During the first few days at this camp there were 20,000 refugees who have since been relocated to other camps. We met with Dr. Vasos Vasilopoulos of the Ministry of Public Health for the Republic of Cyprus. The good Doctor told the AHEPANS that he was grateful for the medical supplies sent by AHEPA during its Supreme Convention in Boston. Furthermore, he disputed reports as "unfounded" that there were any Cypriot women who had their breasts cut off or boys emasculated. He said if there were any such cases behind Turkish lines it was never brought to the attention of his Ministry. The Doctor said that they had several cases of victims who needed artificial limbs and that East German doctors had volunteered medical facilities for such purposes.

Dr. Vasilopoulos further added that because of the Turkish invasion and the crisis that followed there were many young men and women, as well as the elderly, in desperate need of open heart surgery. He said: "If you can bring these victims to the United States to have open heart surgery, you would be doing our nation a great service." He added; "the world community has been of tremendous service during the crisis and what is now needed is additional medical aid."

Dr. Vasilopoulos also told us that there are thirty young Greek Cypriot victims being treated in the Athens Hospitals for extremely serious napalm burns as a result of the illegal Turkish fire bombing of Cyprus by Turkish American-made warplanes.

At the first camp, the AIIEPANS were greeted by thousands who applauded and the following speech was given in Greek by a spokesman of the camp.

As the delegation was walking down the camp area, one young boy, not more than 14, handed the delegation a piece of shrapnel and said:

"Here is a piece of American made shrapnel. Take it back to America—with our regrets". We did not know how to answer this young man. His mother and father were both killed by bombs during the Turkish invasion.

Many young children, both male and female, had necklaces . . . with the compliments of the American Government. The necklace had a pendant which was a bullet manufactured in America, paid for by American taxpayers' money, and picked up by these youngsters while Turkish invaders were advancing unchecked through their country.

In one tent, Elaine Mischel, who lived in Famagusta, was three months pregnant and had lost her husband. She was young—too young to understand—but she knew she was carrying a baby who would never have or know the love of a father. She had no fresh meat for 55 days. She and 60 others lived in a tent, a summer tent, a tent used by American soldiers during World War II. Other refugees came from other parts of Cyprus; some knew each other, while others had not met until the Turkish invasion. But they were "blood brothers and sisters" in tragedy and therefore shared what little they had with each other. All asked for one thing;

"Help us return to our homes."

In another tent, eight families (fifty persons) were living together sleeping on the bare ground with only hay separating them from the coldness of the earth. A small charcoal heater to cook on. Mostly pastas, canned meats, canned vegetables. No fresh tomatoes, no lettuce, although northern Cyprus, now held by Turkey, is so rich in both. No fresh fruit to eat, although Cyprus exported much fresh fruit to Greece and other parts of the world prior to the Turkish invasion.

These were proud middle class people. Many self-employed—Many with cars most of them well dressed. But they left everything behind for survival. They ran from the invaders, seeking a place in Cyprus where they would be safe from the fire bombs, from the bullets, from the tanks, from the American equipped Turkish soldiers in American made uniforms advancing on their homes, their property, their business—looting while constantly pressing forward, constantly disregarding all United Nations resolutions demanding they halt their advance.

Supreme President Chirgotis and Brother Plumides spoke to the tearful refugees, many crying openly; young children tugging on our shirt sleeves seeking help. A 95 year old Cypriot man, Georgious Anastasi from Spatarikou asked Chirgotis:

"I am old. I will be 96 in November. Please help me return to my home so I can die in peace."

Chirgotis choked up because his father is just a few years older. This man was sleeping on a hard bed, if you can call plywood a bed. He had one blanket with the insignia "United States Army". He had no cigarettes. Mr. Mavromatis gave him a package of Marlboros.

In the next camp of Xilotimbou, 12,000 refugees were existing. Mary Iacovidou, a camp spokesman and refugee from Famagusta, and Demetrios Stylianou, Civil Defense Director, also from Famagusta, told the Fact Finding Mission that all these people want one thing—to go home.

They told us that for 52 days these refugees had been living in the camp, under trees, like animals; surviving on spaghetti and rice and losing steadily their hope and will to live. At this point, Supreme President Chirgotis and Cyprus Committee Chairman, Plumides, walked up to a 4-by-6 foot bamboo triangular hut covered with a thin plastic sheet with bare dirt as a floor. Mr. Chirgotis and Mr. Plumides went into the structure. Both willowy men could barely fit in.

Chirgotis called out; "Who lives here?" Nikos Ioannou stepped out of the crowd and said; "This is my makeshift home".

"Do you live here alone?" Chirgotis asked. "No", said the proud Cypriot, "I exist here with my wife and four children, whose ages range from 6 to 16."

"My God!" Chirgotis said, "I can barely fit in here alone, how can a family exist here?"

"We will show you," Ioannou said and his wife and children went into the bamboo hut, shoulder to shoulder—body to body. Sardines in a can have more room than they did. They slept propped up and suffered from backaches while trying to get what little rest they could.

At the next camp, located inside a British military installation, some 10,000 refugees were located. We found conditions here slightly better than at the other camps we had visited.

At least at this camp they were getting two "hot" meals a day and medical assistance was available. Medical assistance was administered under an old tent, which makes M.A.S.H.'s movie and television mythical hospital look like a modern General Hospital medical facility, instead of what it really is. We saw a doctor, just five months out of medical school in England, working under primitive and strained conditions. His work kept him busy from early dawn to the late hours of the night. We saw this doctor perform modern day medical miracles with insufficient lighting, no anesthetics, with no sharp medical instruments, and with a lack of modern medical supplies. But yet the services he rendered to his people were the best under adverse conditions. He would not complain!

cient lighting, no anesthetics, with no sharp medical institutions, and with a lack of modern medical supplies. But yet the services he rendered to his people were the best under adverse conditions. He would not complain! He and "two angels of mercy" dressed in white, both young, both Cypriot, both nurses, went about their work. Eating when they could, what everybody else at camp ate. Rice and spaghetti, without fresh meat. At this camp, we saw the first of many AHEPA supplies, such as clothing, canned foods, and blankets, filling some of their basic needs. Maria Panatopoulos told the AHEPA Fact Finding Committee that clothes were coming in from Greece, Great Britain, Australia, and only recently, supplies were arriving from the United States.

She also told us that emergency medical supplies had come in large quantities during the later part of August. She said in recent weeks clothes and canned food had arrived in Cyprus from the United States. She said there were enough clothes for now, but their most pressing need at the moment was for drugs. There had been many cases of diarrhea and therefore a great need for proper medication. Also, because of the coming cold weather, antibiotics were needed.

At this camp, we saw 1914 cooking facilities. Primitive outdoor boilers looking like the old fashioned pot bellied stoves, but as far as the Cypriots were concerned, they were doing the job. They were supplying two hot meals per day.

they were doing the job. They were supplying two hot meals per day. At still another camp, we saw a "Demotikon" school now bursting at the seams with children attempting diligently to learn their ABC's under the worst possible conditions. The teachers were doing the best they could. Instead of 25 pupils per class there were 90. Giorgos, Yiannis and Maria told Mr. Scofield of their pain; and how they were living, and Maria's glasses slipped low on her nose

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and Jim smiled, lifting the glasses back to their proper place and saying: "This happens to me all the time too."

Maria was a thin girl, no more than 6 years old—much too young to understand war, but already much too old not to understand the suffering that she and her family were being put through.

Other children were crying because they feared all strangers. One of the teachers said to them: "Don't ery. These are American friends", and then he quickly corrected himself, adding, "These are Greek American brothers and not the Government officials of the United States". At this point, we could not help but wonder what effect the tragic episodes of the last few months would have on the minds and growth of our future Greek Cypriot generation.

This camp was well organized politically and it was evident to this committee that the left-wing element of Cyprus was doing their job, because many young and old were spouting the left-wing line.

We spent a little extra time here, and explained to them that the overwhelming majority of Americans support the cause of the Greek Cypriot people.

The principal of the school told us that before the Turkish invasion there were 250 pupils in the school, now more than 2,000 between the ages of 6 to 12 were attending in three shifts, and going to classes running from 7:00 a.m. in the morning to 11:00 p.m. at night.

Here, Past Supreme President Peter Bell, made an outstanding speech in Greek, calling for the unity of all Cypriot people. The Worcester attorney was at his fincst when he said, "Only if you are united—only if you speak with one voice—only if you act as one, can we overcome the odds against us. In unity there is strength. The Greek Americans are united in their strength to help you. Hellenes everywhere are united in joining you in this struggle. We will continue to be united and if we are united we shall be victorious," Bell concluded.

be united and if we are united we shall be victorious," Bell concluded. This the refugees understood. They applauded. They thanked the AHEPANS. In the fourth camp at Ahna Forest, we met with British Major John Long who told us of the conditions in the refugee eamp, what the British were doing and what was yet needed to be done. We met Mr. Pieris Afxentiou, the father of the EOKA hero known as Afxentiou. The old man, already feeling the loss of a son, begged the AHEPANS to use their influence to get all of the refugees back in their homes. He asked for nothing for himself. You could see he was held in great esteem. His son put his life on the line for what he believed was right for the believed was justice for his people. The Justice for Cyprus mission understood.

These are the figures of displaced Greek-Cypriot persons settled in the Southern portion of Cyprus.

Displaced persons situation south: Greek Cypriot

Displaced and registered	194, 000
Self supporting Receiving Government assistance	33,000 161,000
Housing: In adequate housing In adequate tents In public buildings In homes of relatives In semi finished structures Living in open air	$\begin{array}{c} 44,000\\ 7,000\\ 22,000\\ 93,000\\ 13,000\\ 15,000\end{array}$
Total South: Turk Cypriot: In British Sovereign Base Area of Episkopi Living in isolation in the South; not all of whom are necessarily displaced North: Turk Cypriot: In homeless or needy situation North: Greek Cypriot: Living in isolation	194, 000 S, 500 26, 000 S, 500 20, 000
Total persons displaced on island since July (approximate)	257,000

NOTE.—All figures are approximate in that movement of persons from one category to another is not infrequent.

On our way back to Larnaea, Brothers Plumides and Douris met with Colonel Constantine Zargavaras, Regional Commander of the 4th Battalion of the National guard of Cyprus at Famagusta.

He was a proud officer. A professional soldier. Born and raised in Lama, Greece, he had arrived in Cyprus only two days before the Turkish invasion began.

"We fought and fought," he told us. "We used sling shots while the Turkish had modern armament. Our men had guns from World War I, their men had modern military equipment of the atomic age. Our men had no airplanes, their men had the fastest jets. Our men had little tanks, their men had the most modern tanks America produces. Our men were poorly uniformed, their men dressed like the Green Berets of Viet Nam fame. Our men had Cypriot mortars made during World War II, their men had American mortars perfected by Americans during the Viet Nam war.

"We fought back the first invasion force. Then we fought back the second invasion force in hand-to-hand combat. The bodies of Turkish soldiers floated in the sea off Famagusta. Then the tanks came, and the American jets, flown by Turkish pilots, flew low over our lines. Like David fighting Goliath—we fought. We used our rifles and machine guns and knocked down 24 Turkish planes. Then they flew higher . . . much higher. Our bullets could not reach them. Their rockets were not as effective, because of the new higher altitude.

"More tanks came in and 10,000 more Turkish soldiers hit the beach. We fought gallantly but we had nothing to save Famagusta. We were outgunned and outmanned. I gave the order to fall back to Larnaca. We dug in. My men used their hands digging away at the hard dirt to make trenches to surround and protect the city. They were determined to lose their lives so that no Turkish soldiers would pass. We went into the Turkish villages and were surprised to find modern army equipment from the United States of America in Turkish homes. We used these guns, and these military supplies against the Turkish invaders.

Colonel Zargavaras was a seldier who did not know the meaning of defeat. He fought gallantly against overwhelming odds. He was a hero.

Later, he showed us the military equipment he had and then showed us the captured military equipment of the Turks. What a difference. It was amazing that he did as well as he did against overwhelming odds.

The Colonel said to us that notwithstanding the resolutions of the U.N. Security Council and the repeated agreements on cease-fire, Turkey continued its invasion until August 17th, 1974, and now occupied $40 \, \text{C}_{0}$ of the Republic of Cyprus.

They invaded, 40,000 strong, they had 300 tanks, 1,000 motor transports, and were supported by warships and military aircraft which bombed Cyprus for five whole days, a small country without an Air Force or heavy weapons. The good Colonel told us that in its air attacks, the Turkish air force did not spare hotels, tourist establishments, civilian populations, hospitals, the Red Cross building or the Armenian School.

We were told repeatedly that the Turkish soldiers "raped and killed" civilians and systematically looted homes, shops, stores and factories.

After visiting the camps we were invited for lunch by the Mayor of Larnaca, Dr. H. J. Frances at the Four Lanterns Hotel in Larnaca.

After leaving Larnaca, we proceeded back to Nicosia to one of the most frightening moments of the trip.

Slowly our American Embassy vehicles moved onto the road that led from the Greek zone in Nicosia towards the Turkish held sector of Nicosia. Greek Cypriot soldiers challenged us at the checkpoints. Satisfied with who we were, they let us pass. They looked suspiciously at us as we were slowly leaving the Greek Cypriot quarters towards "no-man's land" between the Greek Cypriot sector and the Turkish sector. It was only four blocks. There were buildings but nobody lived there. Our car moved so slowly—ever so slowly—as we passed by the damaged Ledra Palace Hotel, the site where the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot leaders meet and exchange prisoners. There were United Nations vehicles all over the hotel grounds. It is where the U.N. has its headquarters. The old but beautiful hotel was pockmarked by machine gun bullets, rife bullets and rockets. One of its upper floors was in shambles. Off to the right was a small building with a sign on top, "Avis-Rent-A-Car"—but there were no cars for rent.

The silence was deafening and frightening. Not even a rabbit would dare dash through "no-man's land without permission. Not a bird was flying. All of a sudden we were stopped once again. This time by Turkish Cypriot police. Satisfied as to our identity, they permitted us to proceed. Then like a modern miracle, there was life again. Turkish Cypriot children were playing; Turkish Cypriot mothers were pushing their baby carriages; Turkish Cypriot shops were operating. Life in the Turkish Cyprict quarters continued seemingly undisturbed. Our car went through a small park and then we saw our "first" Turkish soldier dressed in a Green Beret uniform similar to the American Army. It was shocking. All of a sudden, a Turkish policeman signaled our vehicles into a parking area. A guard welcomed us and escorted us into the offices of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot Vice President.

Turkish Cypriot Vice President. The meeting with Mr. Rauf Denktash resulted in a lively and informative exchange of different points of view. Mr. Denktash indicated that "everything is negotiable except the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority". He stated that he felt that he could negotiate with Acting President Clerides only if Clerides had full authority to negotiate on behalf of the Greek Cypriots.

He was intelligent, and spoke English fluently. Educated in London, he has a Law Degree. Also at the meeting were Mr. Orek, Minister of Defense; Minister of Labour, Rehabilitation and Social Affairs; I. Kotak, Member of the Social Welfare Services, TCA and H. C. Tilki, Secretary General Social Welfare Services.

We held a frank and open discussion. Denktash told us about the pains of the Cypriot Turkish community. We quickly countered with facts about the sufferings of the Greek Cypriot refugees. We spoke about alleged atrocities against the Greek Cypriots and he spoke about guerrilla warfare and killing of Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriot Vice President said, "We don't want to be small Turkish drops in a Big Greek Ocean." Denktash meant that he didn't want Turkish enclaves in the entire Island of Cyprus but wanted his people located in one area of the island.

Denktash told our Mission of Mercy Committee that a Government Constitution is not made by wizards—but created by political animals. He said that the 1960 constitution of Cyprus was a partnership between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority and it could have worked.

Denktash told us repeatedly that he wanted security for the Turkish Cypriot minority and that once this is obtained the Turkish Army shall withdraw. He said that the Turkish Cypriots did not want the Turkish Army there any more than the Greek Cypriots did. "We want a safety valve and we want that valve protected at all times," he said. "We can't have Turkish ships in the Greek sea because the call of Enosis will create waves which would sink the Turkish ships. We don't want partition. We don't want a Greeo Turkish war. We never thought the day would come that a Junta would be in power in Greece and press the butten of "Enosis" which led to this conflict. We never thought that the Junta would have a plan known as the "three hour lightning plan" to cut up the Turkish quarter and destroy our people.

Denktash proposed a "bi-regional federation" consisting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot "states".

We listened to his commentary and then we countered with our own. We told him of the Greek Cypriot refugees and the conditions under which they were living. We told him that if he was sincere, he would immediately order the withdrawal of all Turkish soldiers from Famagusta and allow the 80,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes and to the modern hotels where they can be housed under a modern roof instead of being left outdoors to the elements of nature. We told him that this would be the first step in achieving a peaceful coexistence which would lead to the security of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. We told him we were dismayed over the reports that the Turkish Army was looting Greek Cypriot homes, raping Greek Cypriot women, destroying Greek Cypriot property, and stealing Greek Cypriot livestock, which he, of course, denied. We showed him documents relative to the above which were hard to disprove. We told Denktash that we felt there could be no peaceful solution until the Greek Cypriot refugees were allowed to return to their own homes. We told him there were 5,000 Greek Cypriots killed, many of them merchants, doctors, lawyers, architects and teachers. We told him of a report brought to our attention by the Maronites that a Maronite Church in the Kyrenia District was loaded with refrigerators, television sets, and other household equipment looted from Greek Cypriot homes by the Turkish Army which were awaiting shipment to Turkey

The Maronites said that this church was scaled by the Turkish soldiers and only opened when the Maronite Bishop threatened to go to the U.N. officials. He said he was shocked with what he saw. Denktash's parting words were:

"Everything is negotiable except the security of the Turkish Cypriot minority."

Prior to a press conference at the Cyprus Ililton Hotel in Nicosia we met with leaders of the Armenian Cypriot community. They told us of their immediate relief needs which included the repair of an Armenian school. They stated that their immediate need was primarily for money. The following were present at the meeting: Reverend Sasken Sandronnin, Dr. Antranig Ashdjian, Mr. Arania Mahdessian, Member of the Armenian Administrative Council; Miss Keghdsin Guebenlian, Mr. Berdge Tibbian, Mr. Sempad Devletian, Advoeate, Mr. Asadour Bedian, Principal of the Melkonian Institute. They told us that the Armenian Orthodox Church in Famagusta was destroyed, that their church in Nicosia was fire bombed, that the upper floors of the Armenian school was destroyed and many olive and carib trees, the only form of income for the monastery and Armenian churches of Cyprus, were destroyed. These consisted of approximately 5,000 aeres.

At the news conference we described the terrible conditions we witnessed in the refugee camps and stated that we would press for more relief from International Agencies and from the United States Government and also stated that we would continue our campaign to gain Justice for Cyprus by crystallizing the situation in the United States Senate and Congress and by convincing the American public of the rightness of the Greek Cypriot cause.

Supreme President Chirgotis, Bell, Plumides and Tsaffaras spoke out at the News Conference which was covered by the international and Cypriot press, radio and television.

Later, we again met with Ambassador Crawford and his staff and repeated our strong thoughts relative to what must be done to achieve justice in Cyprus and to assure its future as a free and independent sovereign nation.

We told Ambassador Crawford, in very strong words, that we felt the young men of his staff should not show any pro-Turkish sympathies, which we felt was so. We further told the Ambassador, who was a schoolmate of Congressman John Brademas of Indiana, that we felt his staff should be more sympathetic to the Greek Cypriot cause and if not openly favoring it, to at least understand it. We further told him we would express this concern through Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Of course, we told him we were grateful for his hospitality and for the assistance given to us in Cyprus, particularly by Jay R. Grahame and Bruno Kosheloff. Other members of the Embassy that we met included Frederick Z. Brown, James A. Williams, David D. Grimland and Daniel Mudrinich.

On our way to the airport, for our departure from Cyprus, we again met with Aeting President Clerides for nearly one hour. We relayed our observations to him and reassured him of our now even more intensified support for the cause of Cyprus. We wished him success now that he had received assurances of "unqualified support" from Archbishop Makarios.

We were extremely impressed by Acting President Clerides, educated in London, and a lawyer by profession. He showed himself to be a man of witty intelligence, articulation and concern over the plight of his people.

He thanked the AHEPANS and the Greek-Americans in general, for their concern and the help they have given the people of Cyprus; "We know how much you all felt for us during this tragic time; we also know that our Greek Brothers throughout the world are united in their concern about the fate of Cyprus. This is the most difficult time in the short but volatile history of Cyprus. It's our struggle for survival. It's an unparalleled struggle for us," he said.

"Our problems are not with the Turkish Cypriots but with the Turkish nation, Cyprus was invaded by a Turkish Army, a Turkish Navy, and a Turkish Air Corps. Some 40% of our Island, the most productive part of the Island, is occupied by the Turkish invaders. More than 200,000 refugees, nearly half of our entire population, are refugees. The rest of the island has financial problems, unemployment problems, productivity problems, etc. Cypriot Greeks had a high standard of living—now we are penniless.

"Livestock, in Turkish areas that were not looted, are dying because of a lack of food and care. Crops are unattended, tourist money and investments are not coming in and the best hotels are now in the areas controlled by the Turkish soldiers.

"I am in complete agreement with what AHEPA is doing to create pressure in Behalf of Greek Cypriots."

Acting President Clerides indicated he has been in constant contact with Archbishop Makarios, Dr. Henry Kissinger and Prime Minister Caramanlis, as well as other international, political and governmental leaders.

Acting President Clerides told us that if Dr. Kissinger wants peace and tranquility on the Island then he has to do something about it. He stood firm in saying that we will sign no agreement and that we will not be part of any talks or discussions that do not guarantee that the Greek Cypriot refugees return to their homes." "This could very well be the seed of new troubles, new problems, new fighting which could very well destroy the peace and tranquility of the entire Mediterranean area. If the American people realize this truth then they will know that there will never be such an agreement—no Greek Cypriot will ever put his signature on a document that doesn't guarantee the refugees a return to their homes." Clerides went on to say, "The United States must restore its image on Cyprus.

Clerides went on to say, "The United States must restore its image on Cyprus. Here the Greek Cypriot people believe that the United States is responsible for their problems." He also said that the Greek Cypriots feel:

"The United States did nothing to stop the invasion of the Turkish Army.

"The Geneva Conference did nothing to stop the Turkish Army from continuing their invasion."

Clerides said that, now that Dr. Kissinger is getting involved we must give him breathing space so that we can see what active role and what solutions he can come up with. He must give us a sign first. He has to do something constructive. He must move in the right direction and then the Secretary of State can visit Cyprus and be welcomed by the Greek Cypriot people, something not possible now.

"Repatriation is the key to the problem. When Dr. Kissinger speaks of a unitary state—two independent states in Cyprus—one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot, does he really mean a federal state?" Clerides asked.

Clerides told us that the Turkish Cypriots are already issuing visas, birth certificates and designating certain areas of Cyprus as Turkish districts.

Clerides told us he was concerned about reports about extensive Turkish looting of Greek Cypriot property in Turkish occupied areas, adding, "Anything that can be taken has been taken."

He said, "the Turkish Government is already moving towards setting up a Turkish state in Cyprus," and stated the following:

They are building a heavy concrete fortification line a little behind the area they are now occupying.

They have set up a tenth Turkish District with letters being mailed in from all over the world marked as Kipris, Mersin 10, Turkey.

They have set up a Turkish Post Office.

The Turkish Government has issued an order to all companies, both Cypriot and foreign that they are not now recognized as doing business in Cyprus unless they sign up with the Turkish Government in the Turkish held zone.

The Turks are issuing passports and visas.

The Turks are using an old air field and have established a commercial airline between Cyprus and Turkey.

The Turks are issuing their own birth certificates.

The Turks are issuing their own death certificates.

The Turks have set up their own Port Authority.

The Turks have taken over Greek Businesses and have turned them over to the Turkish Cypriot businessmen.

The Turks have set up their own Police Department.

Clerides said that as Acting President he has been negotiating with the Cypriot Turkish leaders with "very little power" and this was a hindrance initially, but now that the complete support of the President of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios, and the Greek Government had been received, "I can negotiate with new strength."

"I know all the negatives and now I have the positives on my side as well. He said "the unaligned nations like Algeria, India, Mali and Yugoslavia among others, support our position. International support is meunting daily, but since the Turkish do not respect the United Nations we don't see any other hope but to negotiate here on Cyprus. We have established a trust in each other, Denktash and myself."

It was obvious to us that his worried look of the day before was gone. The concern that he was a leader with no power was eliminated. Arehbishop Makarios had spoken . . . loud and elear.

President Clerides then departed under armed protection and only minutes later Cypriot Police exchanged gan fire with a suspicious vehicle that obviously harbored persons who were attempting to increase this motoreade in an attempt on his life. We were shocked by this action, and were indeed happy that the assassination attempt did not succeed.

The machine gun chatter could be heard over the quiet of Nicosia. It happeued only yards away from where we had dinner the night before. Our car was similar to that of Acting President Clerides. We were scheduled to move out minutes earlier than the Acting President but we were detained because the film we were to take back to the United States with us—to be made into a special documentary "AHEPA in Cyprus"—had not, as yet arrived. We were concerned. We were worried, but we were glad that the attempt on Clerides' life was unsuccessful. We feel that he is the only man who is on the scene, who can negotiate the return of the refugees to their homes. He must be assisted. He must be successful He needs everyone's help. AHEPA pledges that support.

Before departing Cyprus we stopped at Limassol to pick up an aide to our committee, Mr. Mavromatis, the son of a Cypriot who begged for a few minutes to visit his paternal grandparents. He saw his 76 year old grandmother and other members of the family. It was the first time in 17 years that he had seen them. You can imagine the joy of these Cypriots who again embraced their American born grandchild. The tears flowed freely and Mr. Mavromatis' joy was that his family was safe and alive. Only moments earlier, machine gun fire erupted a few yards away from where we were scheduled to pick up Mr. Mavromatis, After we left, bombs exploded near the same area, which destroyed several houses and automobiles. No one knows who committed this crime—but it was committed. This is what the stark reality of life in Cyprus is today.

It is difficult at this juncture to determine the financial loss to the people of Cyprus but it is in the millions of dollars; it is also difficult to predict the future financial choos to the Cyprus economy as a result of the Turkish invasion, but it will be considerable. It is even more difficult to estimate accurately the damage incurred in the areas controlled by the Turkish invading forces in terms of residential buildings, hotels, factories, etc. but the Cypriot Government is now trying to do so.

Since the invasion, the entire economy of this once well to do nation has been completely disrupted. It is estimated that the country is losing about 6 million dollars in production each day. So far more than \$300,000,000 of production has been lost because the economy has ground to a halt. Virtually \$0% of the labor force is unemployed and the refugees have little or no money to keep the economy moving. The Cypriot Government is now preparing to give each refugee stipends of several Cypriot pounds per day which is equivalent to about \$5 in American money, so they can move the economy forward once again. That is why they need money. That is wby they urge Greek-Americans to send money for refugee relief and we urge that each donations should be remitted immediately to the Order of AHEPA and make checks payable to:

THE FUND FOR THE RELIEF OF DISPLACED PERSONS

This fund is under civilian administration. We met and discussed this freely with George Iacovou, Director of Special Service for the Care and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons, 7 Byron Avenue, Nicosia, Cyprus, and the AHEPA Mission is satisfied that these monies will be used exclusively to help the displaced refugees. To date the following help has been given by the United States Government to Cyprus.

Needs and/or commodities delivered, on the way, or pledged, as of Sept. 22, 1974

(\mathbf{B})	Ambassador's fund Cash grant to ICRC Items purchased for or consigned to ICRC:	$\frac{225,000}{725,000}$
	Tents: 5,700 units, 5,600 family tents, 5 persons, 100 large 80-ft marquis-type	793, 290
	blankets. 70,591 units, 10,000 light-weight cotton, 60,591 wool blankets	300, 623
	Cots: 9,998 units Water cans: 10,000 plastic units	$\begin{array}{c} 101,625\ 10,500 \end{array}$
	Red Cross markers: 79 units	4, 000
	400 gal water trailers: 4 units	8,000
	Body bags: 200 units Tent repair kits: 3 units	4,120 218
	Cost above items	1, 222, 366
	Transportation cost above items Total cost associated with above items	$\frac{1}{2}, \frac{244}{466}, \frac{395}{761}$
(D)	Use pledged contribution via UNECR: Obligated for 5,600 tent flies with transportation Cash grant authorized Unfunded balance: (May be cash or goods)	400, 000 1, 000, 000 1, 600, 000
	Total contribution via UNECR Grand total USG assistance to Cyprus to date	3, 000, 000 6, 216, 761

At 12:30 A.M. Friday, October 4, we departed Akrotiri for Athens aboard our United States Air Force plane, arriving in Athens at 4:35 A.M.

A[±] 9:30 A.M. Friday, after only a brief rest, we met with more than 20 reporters and writers, radio and television commentators of the Greek Press and outlined the story of our tour of Cyprus indicating the tragic conditions of the refugees and stressing the need for Greek Cypriot unity. In addition there was television and radio coverage of the news conferences.

Just before noon, we met with Foreign Minister George Mavros who told the AHEPA delegation: "Your work in the Cyprus crisis is marvelous. Your work is remarkable. Your contribution is enormous. We are indebted to you for serving both the interests of Greece and the United States of America. We salute you."

At a second meeting with Prime Minister Caramanlis the AHEPA delegation told him of what we saw in Cyprus and of our meetings with Acting President Clerides, Turkish Cypriot Vice President Denktash and the plight of the refugees and assured him that AHEPA, as always, is ready and willing to take the responsibility to correct the foreign policy of the United States towards Cyprus.

The Prime Minister, who again showed his concern that the Greeks in America be united so that they may better help the cause of Cyprus and Greece, reiterated that he has full confidence in the leadership of the Order of AHEPA and in its goals and aims.

Plumides added that a united Greek force in the United States, as exists now over the Cyprus crisis, can accomplish wonders. He said that every Greek-American organization, from the smallest to the largest, has played a major role in aiding the people of Cyprus and in helping change the direction of the Foreign policy of the United States.

The mission was host of a luncheon for publishers and editors of the Greek Press. This well attended event featured full and free discussion of the Cyprus situation and the important role played by the Order of Ahepa in the United States. These leading opinion makers were informed, many for the first time, as to the significance of Ahepa on the American policial and social scene, of its strength, and of its successful efforts to correct American foreign policy on Cyprus. It appeared that the media leaders of Greece were quite impressed by the past and present endeavors of the Order of Ahepa and left more knowledgeable and very enthusiastic as to its worth and its achievements.

At this point the delegation divided, with Messrs. Plumides, Scofield and Douris remaining at the luncheon with the publishers and editors of the Greek newspapers, radio and TV stations. Supreme President Chirgotis, after making an initial appearance with the publishers and editors, left to go to a luncheon at the Grand Bretagne Hotel with Vice Premier George Rallis and Past Supreme Presidents Tsaffaras and Bell. Several high Greek Government officials were present and all again thanked Ahepa for the leadership provided in the Cyprus erisis.

The delegation was interviewed on Greek National radio and television. The Associated Press, United Press International and Reuters News Agency sent out international dispatches on Ahepa's mission to Cyprus and its findings. Also, the film of Ahepa visiting the refugee camps was shown Saturday, Octtober 5, on Greek National Television.

On Sunday, October 6th, we departed Athens airport at 10:30 A.M. Athens time; changed planes in Rome, and arrived at J.F.K. Airport in New York City at 4:40 P.M. New York Time, grateful that we were once again on American soil.

Our conclusions are:

1. The tragic mistakes of our United States foreign policy toward Cyprus must be corrected if the United States is to retain its prestige and strength in the Mediterranean and among the people of both Greece and Cyprus—and to possess moral integrity in the eyes of the World.

2. The people of Cyprus are rapidly moving toward unity in the face of the adversity of the current Cyprus crisis.

3. All the Greek Cypriot refugees must be returned to their homes and lands immediately.

4. The Turkish armed forces which illegally invaded Cyprus using American arms and equipment must be withdrawn from the sovereign nation of Cyprus immediately.

5. The relief program in Cyprus is being administered efficiently and well despite difficult circumstances; but that the great need for relief must now be in the form of cash to buy blankets, camp beds and tents and to provide pocket money for the refugees—thus allowing them to purchase the necessities of life and to thereby help move the economy forward. (The need for 100,000 blankets is immediate).

6. The rights of both the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot minority be respected in any peace settlement and in the future governmental structure of the Republic of Cyprus.

7. The Order of Ahepa should continue its relief efforts for Cyprus and its public relations campaign to convince the United States government and the American people that justice must be served in Cyprus; it should continue to battle for legislation to immediately halt the illegal military aid from the United States to aggressor Turkey; it should press efforts to obtain millions of dollars in emergency relief funds from the United States government for the Cypriot refuges.

This report has been prepared by Ahepa's Mercy Mission to Cyprus to inform the Ahepans, the Greek-Americans, and the American public on the true picture of what exists now in Cyprus. The report is a true picture—as the members of the mission saw it. The findings are ours. The quotes are as they were told to us. It is Ahepa's attempt to bring to you the true story of the tragic situation on Cyprus—and this we believe we fulfilled.

We again urge that each donations be made to help the people of Cyprus. For the present, there is no longer a need for clothing or food, but a desperate need for money. We urge that your contributions be made through Ahepa to: "The fund for the Relief of Displaced Persons."

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APPENDIX II

TEXT OF SUBCOMMITTEE'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS

I. SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES' CORRESPONDENCE WITH SECRETARY HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECEMBER 19, 1974.

Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER, Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, since the outbreak of violence last July, the Subcommittee on Refugees has closely followed developments on Cyprus. Our primary concern has been the refugee and related humanitarian problems resulting from Turkish military operations, and the kinds of efforts our country is making to help bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

In addition to a series of three public hearings on this issue of concern to Congress and the American people, members of the Subcommittee have exchanged views with officials in the Department of State, and a special Study Mission, representing the Subcommittee, traveled in the field during August and September. A report of their findings and recommendations was submitted to the Department of State for comment on October 25th.

We share the view of many Americans that the plight and fate of the refugees is central to the Cyprus issue, and to any meaningful negotiations over the future of the island. We further believe that a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, much less peace on the island, will not be readily accomplished unless and until a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees are permitted to return safely to their lands and homes in areas currently occupied by Turkish forces. We believe, therefore, that the United States must finally use its vast influence and good offices with Turkey to persuade the Ankara Government of the need for an immediate "gesture of goodwill", which includes a meaningful withdrawal of occupation forces and the return of refugees to their homes. In purely human terms, such a "gesture of goodwill"—involving the orderly return of refugees to the Famagusta and, perhaps, the Morphou areas of the island—would significantly ease the tragic plight and humanitarian needs of many refugee families. Such a development would also offer an immediate opportunity to break the deadlock over the resumption of negotiations among the parties involved, and serve as a meaningful first step toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem and the restoration of the island's full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

As members of the Refugee Subcommittee, we would like to recommend that an immediate withdrawal of Turkish forces from the areas eited, and the orderly return of refugees to their homes and lands in these areas, be a clearly understood and primary objective in current American diplomacy over Cyprus. We share the strong conviction that such development would accomplish important humanitarian and diplomatic ends, which will contribute positively toward a resolution of the Cyprus problem and the renewal of peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

We would also like to express our concern over the absence of any visible progress in efforts to open the Nicosia airport, which has been closed since July. Most observers agree that the opening of this airport, under United Nations auspices, would, among other things, greatly facilitate international relief operations in behalf of the Cypriot refugees and others in distress, both Turkish and Greek. We are extremely hopeful that the problem of the Nicosia airport is high on the diplomatic agenda, and that the United States will lend a greater measure of diplomatic support to the opening of this important facility under appropriate international auspices until the island's future is determined.

Finally, we commend the Administration for its important humanitarian contributions to international emergency relief efforts in behalf of the refugees and other Cypriots in need. We are hopeful that our Government is prepared to continue this tangible expression of America's traditional generosity and compassion overseas, and that efforts to meet growing rehabilitation and reconstruction needs on Cyprus will also receive our Nation's active concern and support.

We would appreciate very much your early consideration and comment on these areas of public policy and concern.

Many thanks for your consideration, and we look forward to hearing from you soon.

Best wishes,

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees. PHILIP A. HART, HIRAM L. FONG, CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Jr.

11. SECRETARY KISSINGER'S LETTER TO SENATOR KENNEDY AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

JANUARY 6, 1975.

Hon. Edward M. KENNEdy, Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees, U.S. Senale,

DEAR TED: Thank you for your letter of December 19 and for your views and those of Senators Fong, Mathias, and Hart on the Cyprus problem and the role the United States should play in it. Happily, it appears that we share many views on this question. In particular, we share your deep concern for the plight of the refugees and believe that resolution of this tragic human problem is central to the Cyprus issue and to any meaningful negotiations on a political settlement. Likewise, we believe that the question of Turkish troop withdrawals will be part of any settlement and that arrangements must be worked out among the parties involved which will preserve Cyprus' sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and enable the people of Cyprus to live together in peace and security.

Our primary objective, from the outset of the crisis, has been to bring about negotiations between the parties concerned which would address these urgent questions. We have worked closely with all the parties to this end, encouraged flexibility and moderation, and supported various United Nations resolutions urging the parties to make early progress on the refugee and troop withdrawal issues.

Fourtunately, some progress has been made in recent weeks toward getting substantive negotiations underway. I had good talks in Brussels on December 11–13 with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers which led in turn to the resumption of discussions between the representatives of the two communities on Cyprus on December 19. They are now working to resolve one final point so that political negotiations can begin. In light of these developments, I believe we have progressed beyond the point where gestures are needed as a means of getting negotiations launched. However, a conciliatory approach by all parties and the creation of a favorable atmosphere remain as important as ever to successful negotiations. We will therefore continue to encourage all parties to make whatever contributions they can to improve the atmosphere and to proceed as rapidly as possible toward a negotiated settlement. At the same time, while we can take and advocate positions on some issues in the negotiations, it is important that we keep the process moving without ourselves getting in the middle prematurely with suggested solutions.

I can assure you that both from a humanitarian and practical point of view, we agree on the importance of the reopening of Nicosia Airport. My talks led to agreement that this will be a priority agenda item once negotiations get underway, and there are good prospects that interim arrangements for operating the airport can be worked out and agreed upon without too much difficulty.

In closing, I would welcome and appreciate your cooperation and support for our efforts to facilitate a negotiated settlement to this troublescme and deeply rooted historical problem. Let me also thank you and your committee for your support of United States contributions to the Cyprus refugee relief effort. These contributions have been, as you aptly put it, a "tangible expression of America's traditional generosity and compassion overseas", and we fully intend to express our continuing concern for the refugees in Cyprus through further contributions, as necessary and appropriate, to the relief effort.

Warm regards,

Hon. HENRY A. KISSINGER, Secretary of State,

Department of State, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: As you know, there is continuing and, I feel, growing Congressional and public concern over the course of American policy towards recent developments on Cyprus. Of special concern to many Americans are the refugee and related humanitarian problems resulting from Turkish military operations on the island.

In this connection, the Subcommittee on Refugees has conducted two days of hearings with Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman, and a three member Study Mission, representing the Subcommittee recently travelled to the island to survey humanitarian needs. I have also introduced a foreign aid amendment, prepared in cooperation with officials in the Executive Branch, which, among other things, would authorize humanitarian assistance to Cyprus.

With the full cooperation of the Department, the Subcommittee's Study Mission travelled to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean in late August and early September, and recently they filed a report of their findings and recommendations. The report has been informally made available to officials in the Executive Branch, and some conversations have followed between members of the Department's Cyprus Task Force and the Study Mission. The findings and recommendations focus on humanitarian issues, but they also include material on the broader aspects of United States policy towards Cyprus. A copy of the recommendations is enclosed, and I would appreciate very much getting the Department's detailed comments on the Study Mission's views and suggestions.* I would also appreciate the Department's comment and views on the enclosed series of questions based on the hearings with Assistant Secretary Hartman and additional inquiry of the Subcommittee.

In light of the urgent humanitarian problems on Cyprus, and the intense congressional and public interest in developments on the island, I am extremely hopeful, Mr. Secretary, that the Subcommittee can anticipate a response to the enclosed inquiries within the next ten days. Many thanks for your consideration, and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Chairman, Subcommittee on Refugees.

NOVEMBER 22, 1974.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: Knowing that you would be anxious to have a reply before he returns from his current trip to the Far East, Secretary Kissinger has asked that I answer the questions contained in your letter of October 25 concerning current US views and policies regarding Cyprus. We had hoped to get a response off to you sconer. However, I hope you will understand that the fluidity of the situation, the comprehensive nature of your questions, and our desire to give as full a response as possible prevented us from doing so.

The Secretary would like you to know that he fully shares your concern over Cyprus—both as a humanitarian and political problem. The Secretary would also like you to know that he is urgently concerned that Congress and the Administration work together and that he stands ready to cooperate as fully as possible with you and your colleagues.

Should you have any further questions, we would be happy to answer them informally with your staff, or more formally through testimony before your Subcommittee on Refugees.

Cordially,

LINWOOD HOLTON, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations.

Enclosure: Detailed Responses to Questions on Cyprus.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD CYPRUS FROM CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY AND THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

(1) Generally define the objectives and content of current United States policy toward Cyprus.

^{*}Formal comment on the Study Mission's list of 8 recommendations has not been received from the Department of State.

Answer. "The United States has four principal objectives in Cyprus: a) to support the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus; b) to relieve the human suffering on the Islan I caused by the tragic outbreak of fighting this summer; c) to achieve a negotiated settlement which will enable all Cyprus to live in peace and security; and d) to remove Cyprus as an irritant in Greek-Turkish relations, and as a source of instability in the Eastern Mediterranean.

⁶Thousands of Cypriots have been displaced from their homes, and this means that we view movement on the Cyprus issue as much from a humanitarian as from a political standpoint. To meet urgent humanitarian needs, the United States has contributed over \$10.5 million to the international relief effort (including \$7.3 million toward the UNHCR's \$22 million appeal), has actively supported the UNHCR appeal by urging other countries to respond generously, and has sent disaster relief specialists to the field to coordinate U.S. assistance, assistance in the conting months.

"Throughout the present crisis we have urged moderation and restraint on the parties, worked to foster a climate for negotiations, and actively supported the intercommunal talks between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash. These talks have achieved agreement on a number of important humanitarian issues and have established an essential framework for broadened discussions on a political settlement. We have also explored in detail with the parties directly involved ways in which these broader discussions might be facilitated.

"The negotiating process has, to be sure, moved more slowly than we had hoped. Nevertheless, our efforts to advance this process continue. The elections in Greece which have given Prime Minister Caramalis a substantial majority and the designation of yet-to-be-confirmed new government in Ankara give promise of moving the parties involved on Cyprus to early negotiations."

(2) Apart from the Cypriot inter-communal talks between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash, generally define the current status of negotiations over Cyprus. (a) Does the United States anticipate a resumption of the Geneva talks? Are alternative formats, involving other governments or NATO or the United Nations, possible or desirable?

Answer. "(a) Our current efforts are aimed at facilitating broadened discussions within the framework of the Clerides-Denktash talks. We anticipate that at some stage Greece and Turkey will participate more directly in the discussions, and this could of course involve a Geneva-type framework. At this time, however, we have no fixed ideas on the type of framework that would be more appropriate, other than our general view that a smaller forum involving only the parties directly involved is likely to be more productive than a larger forum."

(b) In his October 14 message to Congress, the President stated that "the United States is making every effort to play a useful role in assisting the parties to a resolution of the Cyprus dispute." Define and characterize these efforts and the kind of "useful role" the United States is or anticipates undertaking to encourage and facilitate "a resolution of the Cyprus dispute."

Answer. "(b) We believe we have played a useful supporting role in the effort to move the negotiating process forward. The Secretary has met with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus, and with Archbishop Makarios on several occasions in an effort to develop a dialogue, identify areas of possible agreement, and sustain momentum toward negotiations."

(c) In his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Hartman repeatedly spoke of American efforts to find and suggest "common ground", between the parties to the Cyprus dispute, in order to facilitate a resumption of negotiations. What should Congress and the American people understand by "common ground"? What, in the Department's view, are the ingredients of this "common ground" in light of the Turkish occupation and what is the appropriate basis for negotiations? Answer, "(c) The 'common ground' to which Assistant Secretary Hartman

Answer. "(c) The 'common ground' to which Assistant Secretary Hartman referred in his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee is an expandable concept. In the early stages of the crisis, the only 'common ground' was the belief of all parties that the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus should be maintained and that the crisis should be resolved through negotiations. Now the common ground includes agreement by Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on the November 1 UN Resolution which outlines some of the essential subjects that will have to be addressed in any future negotiated agreement." (d) Earlier, at a news conference on August 19, Secretary Kissinger spoke of the need for Turkey "to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities..." What should Congress and the American people understand by the need for Turkey "to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities"? Does this include a "gesture of goodwill" which is often mentioned in public debate over Cyprus, and which Assistant Secretary Hartman spoke of in his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee? And, in practical terms, what kinds of action by Turkey, in the Department's view, would constitute a meaning-ful "gesture of goodwill". And what are the possibilities for such a gesture being made before the end of the year? In the Department's view, does such a gesture require the return of a substantial number of refugees to their homes?

Answer. "(d) The Secretary's August 19 statement about the need for Turkey to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities was meant to include possible steps designed to advance the negotiating process. These steps might be made in areas such as refugee return, troop withdrawals, pullback from present lines, and the reopening of Nicosia Airport. The parties themselves must decide what steps or gestures are necessary and meaningful. In this regard, what we meant here were first steps, indicating an intention to negotiate rather than final positions to be taken in the negotiations. Given the uncertainties in the governmental situation in Turkey, it is difficult to estimate when some kind of initial steps or gestures will be made."

(e) Also on August 19, Secretary Kissinger said that "we will use our influence in any negotiation to take into full account Greek honor and national dignity." In his October 14 message to Congress, the President also refers to "the honor and dignity of Greece" as a factor in our diplomacy toward the Cyprus problem. What actions or developments, in the Department's view, would "take into full account Greek honor and national dignity"—in terms of a resumption of negotiations, the negotiating process, or a final settlement.

Answer. "(e) Only the Greek Government can decide what would satisfy Greek honor and dignity vis-a-vis Cyprus. We would imagine, however, that further indications of Turkey's good faith and progress toward negotiations, are essential prerequisites."

(f) What are the Department's views on what Assistant Secretary Hartman calls "the guarantee for the eventual outcome", or settlement, of the Cyprus problem?

Answer. "f) We believe that some system of guarantees, like those written into the 1956–60 negotiations will probably be required but we have no fixed views on what guarantees will be necessary or who the guarantor powers will or should be."

(g) What are the Department's views on various proposals for the neutralization and demilitarization of Cyprus?

Answer. "g) The nature and size of the armed forces in the Republic of Cyprus are matters to be decided by the parties themselves."

(3) Assess the status of Turkish military forces on Cyprus in terms of their numbers, kinds of units, equipment, maintenance costs, resupply, et cetera.

Answer. "We are in the process of improving our information about the size and status of Turkish military forces on Cyprus. Our best current information is that there are 35–37,000 Turkish troops on the Island."

(4) What is the Department's assessment of reports that Ankara has introduced civilian administrators, laborers, and others from the mainland into the occupied areas of Cyprus?

Answer. "Some civilian administrators, laborers, and others have been sent to Cyprus from the mainland. Our understanding is that most of these people have been assigned to the Island on a temporary basis, and have come without their families."

(5) Assess the stability of the ceasefire line, and the frequency and source of ceasefire violations.

Answer. "The cease-fire line has been stable since mid-August. There have been only a few brief, isolated, and militarily insignificant incidents. According to the UN Forces in Cyprus, which investigate each incident as part of their peace-keeping duties, both sides have at various times provoked minor infractions."

(6) Comment on recent reports that Turkey has systematically and extensively mined the ceasefire line on Cyprus, and has constructed heavy fortifications or other barriers on or behind this line.

Answer. "The Department does not have precise information regarding the extent to which Turkey has fortified its line of control in the northern region of Cyprus. Construction of some defensive fortifications has been reported, however."

(7) In the context of explaining American policy towards Cyprus, officials in the Executive Branch have spoken of the need "to protect American interests" in Turkey. Define these interests and their significance to our immediate and longer term national interest and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

Answer. "The United States and Turkey share a common interest in preventing Soviet aggression and expansion southward into the Mediterranean. We are both NATO allies, and by participating in this common endeavor, we share basic foreign policy and defense goals. Through this mutuality of interest, we have built common defense installations, are granted overflight rights and port facilities. It is also in the U.S. interest to have a friendly ally control access to the Black Sea. We welcome continued Turkish membership in CENTO, and Turkish assistance in our common efforts to combat international narcotics trafficking.

(8) In this regard, define the number, nature and, purposes of American mili-tary/intelligence and related installations in Turkey. What is the number of American personnel maintaining and operating these installations? And how many of these are involved in intelligence operations?

Answer. "Turkey and the US maintain one large, two medium, and several smaller common defense installations in Turkey. There are between seven and eight thousand American military personnel working at these installations. Further questions about the number of US personnel assigned to monitoring or intelligency duties should be addressed to the Director of Central Intelligence."

(9) Define the kinds, categories and levels of economic and military assistance given or projected to the government of Turkey for fiscal years 1973 through 1975. Answer. "The following table shows military and economic assistance to Turkey for FY 1973 through FY 1975:

1973	1974	1 1975
9.0	0	0
2.8	1.8	1.1
	2.8	2.1
5.0	0	0
22.9	4.6	3.2
20.0	75.0	90.0
58.5		80.0
		35.0
10.6	11.4	13.0
133.0	187.4	218.0
	9.0 2.8 6.1 5.0 22.9 20.0 58.5 43.9 10.6	9.0 0 2.8 1.8 6.1 2.8 5.0 0 22.9 4.6 20.0 75.0 58.5 63.7 43.9 37.3 10.6 11.4

In millions of dollars)

1 Fiscal year 1975 military assistance/sales figures are requested amounts and should not be compared with 1973 and 1974 figures which are actual amounts disbursed.

(10) On a monthly basis since January 1974, define the volume and kinds of American military shipments to Turkey, and those scheduled or projected for delivery through the end of the current fiscal year.

Answer. "[Department of State estimates put Military Assistance Program deliveries for CY 1974 at \$46,175,000 through September. Foreign Military Sales deliveries total \$43,409,000 during the same period. The combined total is \$89,584,000.]

(11) Comment on reports that American military equipment is being or has been, transferred, or sold to Turkey through third parties, such as Iran.

Answer. "Except for unconfirmed reports that some quantity of USmanufactured small arms and ammunition have been sent to Turkey by Libya, the Department is unaware of any military equipment of US origin having been sold or otherwise transferred to Turkey by third countries. The Federal Republic of Germany had until mid-1974 a military assistance and sales program. Similarly, we understand that the Turkish and Italian Governments have recently concluded a commercial sales agreement providing for Turkish purchase of Italian-made aircraft of US design. This transaction was arranged by the Governments of Turkey and Italy, and the US Government was informed in advance about the arrangement.'

(12) Given the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, what is the Department's final conclusion on the legality of continuing military assistance to Turkey, under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended?

Answer. "Turkey has maintained that its actions were justified as measures consistent with the UN Charter under the 1960 Treaty of Guaranty to which the Government of Turkey, the United Kingdom, Greece and Cyprus are parties. It was clear that Turkey felt its actions were justified and necessary in light of the events which had transpired on Cyprus prior to the Turkish intervention. After carefully weighing the legal and foreign policy considerations, the Administration decided that it was impossible publicly to express a legal conclusion on the issue of Turkey's cligibility for further assistance and sales without undermining our foreign policy objective of persuading Turkey and Greece to enter into direct negotiations for a solution of the Cyprus problem."

(13) In his September 26 testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee, Assistant Secretary Hartman said:

And when I saw the Deputy [United Nations] High Commissioner [for Refugees], I said to him, I do not think it is realistic at all for you to be talking only about this period from September 1 through December 31, because when you are talking to these governments. you cannot just come around to them sometime in December and say, look, we have a new requirement now for 1975. While, none of us want to give the impression that we think this is a problem that is not going to be solved by negotiation, I think it is only wise and prudent . . . to hope for the best and plan for the worst.

Elaborate on this statement in terms of the Department's views, as of now, on the time frame for contingency planning, the costs involved in providing relief assistance to the refugees, and the level of support the United States is prepared to give to the UNHCR program. Also, in what other ways is the United States prepared to support rehabilitation and recovery efforts on Cyprus?

Answer. "We understand that the UNHCR's current \$22 million appeal has been met, and that some of this money will be available for relief efforts in 1975. Additional assistance, however, will definitely be necessary for at least 6–12 months and perhaps longer. Accordingly, we are keeping a disaster relief specialist in Cyprus to advise us of relief requirements on a continuing basis and AID is asking Congress in its budget request for an additional \$10 million for the Cyprus relief effort." •

APPENDIX III:

SELECTED PRESS REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES ON THE SITUA-TION IN CYPRUS

[From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1975]

CYPRUS TALKS STALL ON AIRPORT QUESTION

ETHNIC GREEKS AND TURKS FAIL TO AGRUE ON HOW TO REOPEN FACILITY

(By Steven V. Roberts)

Nicosia, Cyprus, Jan. 23—After two working sessions, the talks on the political future of Cyprus appear to be off to a rocky start.

When the talks resume tomorrow, Greek and Turkish Cypriotes will again eonsider the international airport at Nicosia, which has been closed since the Turkish invasion last July. The proposals made thus far by the two negotiators— Glafkos Clerides for the Greek Cypriotes and Rauf Denktash for the Turkish Cypriotes—seen quite far apart.

This has been dispiriting to diplomats here, who hoped that rapid progress on the airport question might give some * * feelings of trust between the two sides.

The Americans are particularly disappointed, since continued military aid to Turkey, which they do not want to terminate is linked to progress on a settlement of Cyprus.

In the face of Administration protests, Congress voted last month to cut off aid to Ankara on Feb. 5 unless substantial progress was made in Cyprus. Yesterday, a Defense Department statement that it intends to sell Turkey \$230-million in arms to modernize her tank forces reopened the controversy in Washington.

Because Cyprus is an island, the airport is vital to an economy already shattered by the fighting last summer and Turkish occupation of 40 per cent of the country. Exports such as textiles and fresh produce are strangled. Tourist and business travel is down to a trickle.

Both sides are hoping to open small landing strips of their own next month, but they will only dent the problem.

Before Christmas, United States and United Nations diplomats helped draft a proposal that would provide for United Nations supervision of the airport, with Greek and Turkish Cypriotes working under them. The formula for hiring employes was deliberately left vague, to avoid political questions.

ANKARA VETOES IDEA

Mr. Denktash's response was initially favorable, but when he passed the proposal to Ankara, it was rejected. Well-informed diplomats here generally agree that the Turkish Cypriote leader has little authority. Mr. Denktash concedes that on security matters—such as the airport—Turkey calls the tune in Cyprus.

on security matters—such as the airport—Turkey calls the tune in Cyprus. The Turkish counterproposal, presented last Monday, plunges directly into political questions. It would eliminate the United Nations' role, and have the two communities run the airport on a 50-50 basis. Even though they comprise only 18 per cent of the population, the Turkish Cypriotes will insist on an equal share of power in all major areas, Mr. Denktash said in an interview. The Turks feel that the United Nations would act on behalf of the Government of Cymrus urbins is lorgely. Creater Cymrus.

The Turks feel that the United Nations would act on behalf of the Government of Cyprus which is largely Greek Cypriot. Turkey refuses to recognize the Government as it existed before the war.

Turkish leaders say that the United Nations, which has a peace-keeping force in Cyprus, has generally favored the Greek side, and therefore the Turks want to minimize the organization's role here.

The Turks have suggested that each community maintain its own customs facilities at the airport, with a joint facility for foreigners. The Greek side does not like this idea. Turkish Cypriots want the guaranteeing power—Turkey, Greece and Britain to provide security at the airport. According to Mr. Denktash the mainland Turkish Army must have a right to a contingent at the airport because of its considerable military value.

"We are not willing to take steps that prejudice our political stand," Mr. Denktash said.

Mr. Clerides finds the Turkish attitude "ominous" and many diplomatic analysts agree with him. If anything, one Western envoy said, the Turkish line has stiffened in recent weeks and the talks are actually moving backward.

[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1975]

TURKEY IS ADAMANT ON TWO-ZONE CYPRUS; OIL CLAIM PRESSED

(By Sam Cohen)

Istanbul—The present Turkish government led by caretaker Premier Sadi Irmak does not seem prepared to make any of the concessions on Cyprus that the Greek Cypriots require. It also appears determined to go ahead very soon with its plan to start oil exploration in the Aegean sea, regardless of Greek reaction.

These points were made clear in an interview with Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel, who emphasized that the new realities in Cyprus and in the Aegean have to be taken into consideration if a solution is to be found.

"I am hopeful about the intercommunal talks which have started in Cyprus," Esenbel said, "but these will be difficult talks and will take time. Considering the pressure of the realities, I am optimistic about the prospects."

Esenbel said that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots will insist on a two-zone federation in Cyprus, with a central government having limited powers. He rejected a cantonal system and said that a federation based on geographical separation was now the only realistic solution.

separation was now the only realistic solution. "There are only 17,000 Turkish Cypriots now left in the southern part of the island," he said. "Since the exodus of those Turks continues, and since the question of the Turkish Cypriots in the British bases has been solved, a new reality, a de facto situation, has arisen. When the question of the borders and the status of the federation will be discussed at a later stage, the Greeks will understand that there is no possibility of turning the clock back."

The minister said that once the economic and other practical matters are solved in the intercommunal talks, the basic political issues will be discussed. At that stage the talks will be enlarged to a five-sided conference, including Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two communities in Cyprus, he said.

Escabel expressed the hope that the two communal leaders, Rauf Denktash and Glafkos Clerides, will agree soon on the reopening of the Nicosia airport, based on "an equal participation to its administration. . . . There can be no question of handing over the administration or control of the airport to any foreign organization," he said.

But he said that the Turks cannot accept any participation of the Greek Cypriots in the port administration at Famagusta. "Famagusta is going to remain the major port in the future federated Turkish area in the Cyprus state," he said. "Of course the Greek side will be able to use this port, but a Greek Cypriot participation in the port authority is out of the question. The decision on this is definite."

Esenbel said that the recent British proposal to allow the 10,000 Greek Cypriot refugees in the British bases to return to Famagusta was a political question. "The British have expressed a desire, but I do not think that such a gesture can be made at this time," he said. "The question of resettling Greek Cypriots in the city of Famagusta relates to the issue of the transfer of population, and this can only be discussed at a later stage, within the framework of the status of the federation."

Esenbel pointed out that the question of the borders of the Turkish-held area will be discussed only when the Greek side accepts the two-zone federal system. "Once this is accepted, Turkey will agree to discuss modifications of the recent borders. I must repeat that the borders are negotiable, but first the bi-zonal system must be accepted," he said. According to Escabel, the question of the withdrawal of the Turkish forces on Cyprus is also linked to the progress in the political negotiations. "We do not want to keep these forces on the island forever. I believe a phased reduction of the forces is possible. But first the status of the Cyprus state that will guarantee the security of the Turkish Cypriots must emerge."

Esenbel declared that Turkey considers the treaty recognizing Brit. i... Greece and Turkey as guarantor powers as still valid, and added that the Turks will insist on its continuation, without enlarging it as suggested by Archbishop Makarios.

If the intercommunal talks fail, Esenbel said, "the present defacto situation will continue and the Turkish sector will be consolidated. Therefore the questions now discussed will become facts."

Asked whether Turkey intends to send a surveyship to the Aegean sea for seismic research for future oil exploration, Esenbel said, "Our government is determined to follow a dynamic policy on this matter. Turkey cannot make any concession on this question, which is of vital importance for her. It is desirable to establish a cooperation between Greece and Turkey on this field, again based on existing realities. But if there are people who expect us to sacrifice our national interests in the Aegean, they will be terribly mistaken."

Esenbel emphasized that Greek concessions on Cyprus could not be traded for Turkish concessions on its rights to Turkey's continental shelf in the Aegean. "Those are two separate problems, and we would never consider a package deal for solving them," he said.

Regarding recent Greek warnings that Turkey's move to explore for oil in what Athens considers its continental shelves could lead to clashes, Escabel said, "Our intention is definite and clear. We will go ahead with our plans in the Aegean. Those who do not like it should think twice, in view of the realities,"

[From Time Magazine, Jan. 13, 1975]

CYPRUS-BITTER LEMONS IN A LOST PARADISE

Before last summer's short but savage war between invading Turks and the outgunned Greek Cypriot National Guard, Cyprus was an oasis of sumny prosperity in the turbulent eastern Mediterranean. Nearly six months after the end of the fighting. Cyprus today is a wrecked dream—its airports still closed, its economy shattered, one-third of its people refugees in their own land. Greek Cypriot Leader Glafkos Clerides and his Turkish counterpart, Rauf Denktas, had hoped to resume their interrupted peace talks during Christmas week but were unable to agree on a basis for further negotiations. Time Correspondent Erik Amfitheatrof recently visited the troubled island. His report:

Erik Amfitheatrof recently visited the troubled island. His report: With no settlement of their six-month agony in sight, Cypriots are living through the bleakest, most bitter winter in memory. Though there have been losses and atrocities on both sides, the Greek Cypriots, who make up 80% of the island's population, have suffered the most. Terrified by reports of mass shootings and rapes by Turkish troops advancing in the north last July, some 200,000 Greek Cypriots fled toward the British base area of Dhekelia on Cyprus' southern coast. The more fortunate were able to squeeze into the homes of relatives, but nearly 20,000 are spending the winter in canvas tents pitched in the fields and orchards.

The temperature is near freezing after sundown. On rainy days, the muddy lanes of the refugee camps turn into streams and water seeps into the tents. On cold nights, hundreds wander like ghosts into nearby towns to bed down in cafes or hotel lobbies.

The situation of some 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees in the southern, Greekcontrolled part of the island is no better; they, too, are living under canvas this winter. In two desolate camps at the British base in Akrotiri, many are suffering from bronchial and rheumatic conditions, and there are cases of tuberculosis. But they at least have the consolation of knowing that a few dozen miles to the north of their camps, there is Turkish armor with the capability of overrunning the entire island. For many of the refugees, the ordeal is made more difficult by memories of the paradise that has been lost. Before last summer's upheaval, the island, which is carpeted with eitrus groves and vineyards, exported lemons, oranges, grapes and wines to Europe. It produced automotive parts for Middle Eastern countries, and its beaches lured 250,000 tourists a year. By the early 1970s, Cyprus was one of the eastern Mediterranean's most prosperous nations, with a per capita income of \$1,460, and there was virtually no unemployment. Even the long-festering animosity between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was sweetened by the good life, and an eventual healing seemed possible.

SILENT LEADER

Prospects for a political settlement that might revive the island's economy now appear remote. Archbishop Makarios, the prelate-President of Cyprus, returned from his enforced exile last month, but so far he has accomplished little and said even less. He has consulted with leaders of all the Greek Cypriot political parties about forming a new government, but has yet to give any indication of the composition of his future Cabinet. Meanwhile, negotiations between both sides remain stalemated over the issue of a mass population transfer. On a visit to Cyprus last week, former Turkish Premier Bülent Ecevit insisted that the geographic and administrative separation of ethnic communities be formalized through the establishment of a federal state. But the Greek Cypriots oppose any agreement that would prevent them from returning to their homes; to bolster their bargaining position, they have refused to allow Turkish Cypriots in the Greek-controlled south to move north. For the moment Makarios is silent. But he knows well that unless he remains adamant on this issue, he cannot held the support of the Greek Cypriot community.

[From the New York Times, Saturday, Jan. 18, 1975]

DEATH OF A CYPRIOT MARS OPENING OF POLITICAL TALKS

(By Steven V. Roberts)

Nicosia, Cyprus, Jan. 17—Political talks began today on the future of Cyprus, but a violent protest that resulted in the death of an 18-year-old Greek Cypriot showed that the issues dividing the communities of this island remained intricate and explosive.

After months of uncertainty, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots finally got down to specific issues in a morning meeting at the battle-damaged Ledra Palace Hotel. They discussed the status of the international airport, a vital link in the country's economy that has been closed since the Turkish Army's invasion last July.

Meanwhile, hundreds of Greek Cypriots marched on the British base at Episkopi. They were protesting London's decision to allow Turkey to move about 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees who fled to the base for safety during the war.

According to United Nations sources, the marehers attacked a small United Nations convoy that was approaching the base, broke the windows of the lead vehicle, and tried to set it afire. In the ensuing confusion, one of the other vehicles tried to come to the rescue of the first one and accidentally struck one of the marchers.

VICTIM WAS A REFUGEE

The youth, Panikos Dimitriou, died while being taken to the base hospital. A native of Agios Memnon, a village near Famagusta, he had been forced from his home during the fighting and was living as a refugee in Limassol.

The demonstrators also threw rocks and bricks at British troops, injuring 14. They were eventually dispersed with tear gas and water hoses. More demonstrations are expected tomorrow when the first plane load of ethnic Turkish refugees is expected to leave the base.

London has been hoping that the Turks would make a reciprocal gesture and allow some ethnic Greek refugees to return to their homes. This morning Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, said the British move might "open a new road" towards peace, but he did not elaborate. The political talks are being held between Mr. Denktash and Glafkos Clerides, the ethnic Greek representative who is speaker of the Cypriot Assembly. The two met during the autumn months to discuss humanitarian issues. They agreed to enter substantive negotiations after Secretary of State Kissinger met in Brussels last month with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

The initial session last Tuesday was spent on preliminaries. The first substantive question of the agenda, the airport, demonstrates the complexity of the Cyprus problem.

Now occupied by United Nations troops, the airport is surrounded by Turkish and Greek soldiers. According to diplomatic sources, the Turks have proposed that any administration be divided equally between the two ethnic groups—a reflection of the Turkish assertion that they are equal partners in the Cypriot state. The Greeks say that any division should follow the population distribution four Greeks for every Turk.

The Turks also want separate customs facilities, the diplomats say, because they do not recognize the central Government of Cyprus as it now exists. The Greeks reply that the Government is still valid and functioning.

The United States has proposed that the United Nations administer the airport on a provisional basis, and that all political questions be postponed. But even though the airport is important to the economy of both communities, the feelings run so deep that the negotiators failed to make much headway today, according to a United Nations spokeman.

In their communiqué, the negotiators mentioned that preparatory work was being done by a separate group on the powers of a central government in a federal state. They also formed a subcommittee to deal with humanitarian matters.

The British decision to release the Turkish Cypriots has infuriated many ethnic Greeks, since London had been insisting for months that the refugees were a political question that had to be settled by talks between the two communities.

Then, the Greeks complain the British yielded to Turkish pressure just at the moment when the talks were beginning.

The Greek anger is heightened by an expectation that the Turkish Cypriots will be kept in mainland Turkey only a few weeks. Then Ankara likely will transfer them to northern Cyprus, where Turkish troops are in control. Once there, they will be given homes and businesses abandoned by Greek Cypriots.

The British move thus supports the Turkish plan of dividing Cyprus into two zones.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 21, 1974]

TURKISH CRISIS OF RULE PERSISTS AND CRIPPLES THE CYPRUS TALKS

(By Steven V. Roberts)

ANKARA, TURKEY, Dec. 18.—The Government crisis in Turkey is now three months old, and there are few prospects for improvement.

Since Premier Bulent Ecevit resigned on Sept. 18, the country has been run by caretaker administrations. Meanwhile, various politicians have tried, and failed, to form a stable government.

Mr. Eccvit won wide popularity here for his decision to invade Cyprus last summer following a coup against Archbishop Makarios. But he failed to gain approval for quick elections after his resignation, and now the next feasible date is late spring.

The continuing instability here has hampered efforts to begin peace negotiations on Cyprus, where Turkish troops still control almost 40 percent of the territory. As one Western diplomat put it: "Turkey picked a bad time to have her Government unravel."

The current caretaker government, led by Prof. Sadi Irmak, a 70-year-old Senator, now seems ready to begin preliminary talks. Turkish leaders insist that Cyprus is a "national issue," and that they all agree on a common policy.

Diplomatic analysts note, however, that Professor Irmak would have far less power and flexibility than an elected leader, and they wonder whether he will be able to make the compromises necessary to reach a settlement with the Greeks. The Government crisis has crippled Turkey's ability to deal decisively with such economic problems as inflation and food shortages. Signs of discontent are appearing among the trade unions.

In addition, recent outbreaks of violence between extreme rightist and leftist student groups have sent a chill through the country. Similar clashes led to the civil unrest that plagued Turkey from 1969 to 1971. Calm returned only after the army forced the elected Government to resign, and squashed the dissidents with extra legal methods.

The military has traditionally played a major political role here, but in the last year or two a new generation of commanders has come to power. They are not as eager as their predecessors to intervene in governmental affairs, and so far there is no indication here that they are preparing to make a move. Following the military takeover of 1971. Turkey was ruled for two years by an

Following the military takeover of 1971. Turkey was ruled for two years by an army backed, nonpolitical government. Then, in a rather remarkable display of confidence, the military permitted parliamentary elections last year.

Turkey uses a system of proportional representation, and with eight parties competing for votes, no one emerged with a clear mandate. Confusion reigned for three months. Then Mr. Eccevit, the leader of the Republican People's party, who are social democrats, formed a shaky coalition with the National Salvation party, a right-wing group of Moslem fundamentalists.

MANEUVER BY ECEVIT

The alliance never worked well, and after his triumph in Cyprus, Mr. Ecevit saw the chance to improve his position and resigned. But the other parties, fourful that he would sweep to a sizable victory, refused to vote for early elections and the current crisis ensued.

Mr. Ecevit stayed on as a carctaker Premier. Secretary of State Kissinger scheduled a visit here last month, and Mr. Ecevit was preparing to make several conciliatory gestures to help get Cyprus talks started. But at the last minute, the National Salvation party objected, the Kissinger visit was canceled, and the gestures were never made. Mr. Ecevit then resigned even his carctaker assignment, and the Irmak Government replaced him.

At the moment, the five conservative parties are trying to form a coalition government under Suleyman Demirel, who served as Premier from 1965 to 1971. The parties are torn by bitter personal rivalries, however, and diplomats do not expect the effort to succeed.

"This is the last attempt I am making," Mr. Demirel said in an interview. "We will either have a government or go to elections."

The prospect haunting this capital city is that once elections are held, the results may still be inconclusive. As Mr. Ecevit put it, "If the Government crisis is prolonged indefinitely, no one knows what will happen."

[From The Times (London), Dec. 6, 1974]

EOKA READY TO ACCEPT MAKARIOS RETURN TO RESTRICTED CHURCH ROLE

(From Paul Martin)

NICOSIA, Dec. 5.—The Eoka guerrilla movement has declared that it will accept the return of Archbishop Makarios if he gives up the presidency and restricts himself to church affairs. The Eoka declaration came as thousands of Greek Cypriots began to arrive in the capital to hear the archbishop speak on his return from the exile forced upon him by the July coup.

There is a growing air of excitement among the archbishop's supporters as the hour of his return approaches. Originally he was to have flown in from Athens on Friday. However, at the last minute, it was announced by his supporters that "technical reasons" had caused a delay of 24 hours.

The Eoka movement, which remains bitterly opposed to the archbishop, made its stand clear in a 10-point manifesto circulated in Nicosia overnight. Although it takes a strong line against the archbishop it is the first time it has agreed to his return.

Calling for national unity among Greek Cypriots, the manifesto sets out the conditions under which the Eoka movement would accept his return. It accused the archbishop of deliberately ignoring advice from "friends and foes" about the possible adverse consequences of his decision.

"Makarios has declared that on his return he will succeed in securing a return of Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes", the manifesto said. He also declared that he would lead the struggle to end the Turkish occupation. We believe that both are illusions. However, we shall not block his way in order to prove once more that he conscientiously deceives his people."

The manifesto declared that the task facing the Greek Cypriot people allowed "room for everybody to take part in the national struggle". However, it added: "It is necessary for him to realize that his presence in the political arena will result in division and conflict." This rendered his "speedy withdrawal from politics" a necessity.

It went on to reiterate the Eoka stand that any attempt to reestablish the Makarios order, ousted by the coup, would result in continued conflict in the Greek Cypriot community. "If Makarios does not heed this then his return will constitute an epilogue to the Cyprus tragedy."

Opening the way for the Archbishop's return as head of the Cyprus church, the manifesto said: If he comes to give a solution to the ecclesiastical problem in accordance with the church heirarchy, then we shall contribute. The solution of the church problem is a basic ingredient for national unity among the Greek Cypriots. It is a question of great urgency."

The manifesto then went on to warn the Archbishop that even if he does restrict himself to the church, he must heed the factions inside the church who opposed him. "If Makarios does not take a responsible line he will find us a strong and unyielding opponent."

The Eoka movement, the manifesto added, did not try to prevent Archbishop Makarios's return by using force. "However the national centre must know that if Makarios is to repeat the recent past, Cyprus will inevitably be led to a bloody civil strife."

MARIO MODIANO WRITES FROM ATHENS

One of the vital facts that emerged from the archbishop's talks in Athens, is that so far as post-junta Greece is concerned no lasting settlement on Cyprus is possible without the approval and cooperation of President Makarios.

The Greek Government, therefore, did not discourage him from returning to Cyprus despite Turkish hints of a third military operation to capture the entire island, on the ground that the remaining Turkish Cypriots in the south might be endangered by a renewal of violence within the Greek community.

"Greek diplomatic sources" denied today, vigorously though anonymously, assertions by the Turkish Defence Minister that Greece was despatching troops to Cyprus. "This is grossly inaccurate", the sources said. "Greece has not sent a single mon to Cyprus in recent months other than reliefs for outgoing servicemen."

Next week's scheduled meetings in Brussels, for instance, between Dr Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State, and the Foreign Minister of Greece and Turkey, may set the pace for substantial intercommunal negotiations on the future of the island.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 23, 1974]

TURKEY RULES OUT CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH MAKARIOS

(By Steven V. Roberts)

Ankara, Turkey, Dec. 18—Turkish officials say they are ready to begin serious negotiations over Cyprus, but they have set down two conditions that could hinder progress toward a settlement.

They do not want Archbishop Makarios, the President of Cyprus, to control the negotiating position of the Greek side. They know it is unrealistic to expect the Archbishop to resign, but they hope he will delegate full negotiating authority to Giafkos Clerides, the President of the House of Representatives.

The Turks also want the Greeks to acknowledge the principle that any settlement must be based on a "geographical federation." By that, they mean that Cyprus should be divided into two zones, linked by a federal government but administered separately.

One zone would be controlled by the ethnic Turks, who make up 18 per cent of the population, and the other by the ethnic Greeks, who account for 80 per cent.

AN EXPRESSION OF OPTIMISM

Turkish officials have expressed guarded optimism following the recent meetings in Brussels between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. As a member of the Turkish delegation put it, "We found out that Greece is willing to have negotiations—and vice versa.

The Turks urged Mr. Kissinger and the Greek delegation to put pressure on the Arehbishop to withdraw from the negotiating process. President Makarios has been making conciliatory statements lately, but analysts have long considered him masterful at ambiguity.

If all goes according to the plan sketched out in Brussels, the next step would be for Mr. Cierides and Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriote leader, to start preliminary discussions on political subjects.

The two men, who are old friends, have already been discussing humanitarian issues raised by the Turkish invasion of the island last July. There was wide agreement in Brussels that these talks should now become "much more meaningful," according to a Turkish official. However, he added, any final settlement would have to be negotiated between Athens and Ankara.

The Turks are pleased that Greece now has a strong leader, Constantine Caramanlis, who established good relations with Ankara during his previous tenure as Premier. They realize that only a strong government can make the compromises necessary to reach an agreement, and they worry about the weakness of their Premier, Prof. Sadi Irmak.

All Turkish leaders seem to share a common policy toward Cyprus, however, and they agree that it would be "difficult but not impossible" for the Irmak Government to pursue a settlement. These leaders say that the elimate for a settlement improved when Congress agreed to delay cutting off United States military aid to Turkey, since they do not want to make concessions that would look like "knuekling under" to Washington.

FULL AUTHORITY SOUGHT

In Turkish eyes, the big question mark is Archbishop Makarios. The Turks simply do not trust him and prefer to deal with Mr. Clerides, who was acting President for several months after the Archbishop field Cyprus last July, following a coup organized by the military junta that was then ruling Greece. That coup led to the Turkish invasion, which in turn provoked the collapse of

the Greek junta.

Mr. Clerides has said publicly that the Greek side must accept the principle of geographical federation, a view that is shared privately by the Government in Athens.

The Greek side prefers an arrangement that would give the ethnic Turks control over several areas throughout the island, rather than one large zone. They feel that this would minimize shifts in population and the possibility that the island might be partitioned.

The Turks insist on a "bizonal" federation, which they say would make it easier for them to provide security for Turkish Cypriotes, and to develop a viable economy that is not too reliant on the Greeks.

[From the New York Times, Nov. 30, 1974]

MAKARIOS OFFERS TURKS AN "OLIVE BRANCH"

(By Steven V. Roberts)

Athens, Nov. 29—Archbishop Makarios, the proposed President of Cyprus, said here today that he would offer an "olive branch" to Turkey in negotiations over the island's future. But the conditions he outlined indicate that a settlement is still far away.

The Archbishop came to Athens for talks with Premier Constantine Caramanlis of Greece and Glafkos Clerides, who has been President of Cyprus since last summer. It was the Archbishop's first visit here since July, when he was ousted in

a coup d'etat organized by the military junta then ruling Greece. That coup provoked the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish troops, who still occupy almost 40 per cent of the island. The invasion then led to the collapse of the junta here, which ceded power to a civilian government four days later.

The Archbishop spoke from a hotel balcony to tens of thousands of supporters massed in Constitution Square. Red flags bearing the hammer and siekle flared in the cool sunshine and many of the crowd's signs and slogans carried anti-American themes.

"We are prepared to give the Turkish Cypriotes the right of self-government," the Archbishop asserted. "But we will not consent to the forcible movement of the population or the creation of conditions which will lead to the possible partition of the island."

OPEN TO FEDERATION PLAN '

As he stated in London last week, Archbishop Makarios is ready to discuss a "multi-regional federation" for Cyprus. Under this plan, Turkish Cypriots would have administrative control over their own communities scattered throughout the island.

This puts Archbishop Makarios in sharp conflict with the Turkish side, which favors division of Cyrpus into two separate districts, and the massive shift of population. One district would be controlled by the ethnic Turks and the other by ethnic Greeks.

The Archbishop is also at odds with Mr. Clerides, who insists that the only "realistic" solution would be separate geographical areas linked by a federal government. Like the Archbishop, Mr. Clerides opposes the "forcible movement" of populations. But Mr. Clerides would accept voluntary exchanges that would give the ethnic Turks a majority in their own sector, even though they comprise only 18 percent of the population.

Mr. Clerides has conducted preliminary discussions with Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriote leader. But he is said to be worried that, with the archbishop in the background, he does not have adequate authority to pursue serious negotiations or conclude an agreement.

WHAT CLERIDES SEEKS

For this reason, Mr. Clerides has placed great emphasis on the meetings here this weekend. He wants the Archbishop to commit himself to a clear negotiating position. But as one well-informed diplomat here said: "That kind of commitment is exactly what Clerides is not going to get from Makarios. What Makarios is really ready to accept, no one knows. Not even Makarios."

The main interest of the Caramanlis Government is to avoid spending its hard-earned political capital. In this vein, the Premier has insisted that Cyprus should be a "national issue," outside partisau politics, and that Athens would accept any solution that is agreeable to the Cypriotes.

Mr. Caramanlis wants to get rid of the Cyprus problem, but he prefers no solution to a humiliating one. As one astute Western diplomat put it: "I don't believe the Greeks care very much about the substance of the solution. What they care about is their national honor vis-a-vis Turkey."

The Archbishop reiterated today his determination to return to Cyprus next week. Mr. Clerides has warned that the Archbishop's presence could cause bloodshed within the Greek community, and the Turkish side has insisted that the prelate would impair prospects for peace by returning.

This view is shared by many diplomate, here and in Nicosia, who wish the controversial Archbishop would stay in exile. But these diplomates also concede that Archbishop Makarios remains extremely popular in Cyprus, and that most Greek Cypriotes would reject any solution that lacks his endorsement.

[From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 13, 1974]

KISSINGER SEEKS TO PROMOTE CYPRUS PEACE BUT WITH LITTLE DISCERNIBLE Success So Far

(By Richard J. Levine)

Brussels—Under growing congressional pressure to produce progress, Henry Kissinger has spent much of his time here seeking ways to promote peace on Cyprus—with little discernible success so far.

Officially, the Secretary of State came to this wet and windy capital to attend a routine meeting of North Atlantic Treaty Organization foreign ministers. But while here he has expended considerable effort on the Cyprus problem in a series of private talks with the foreign ministers of Greece and Turkey, the two nations most deeply involved in the affairs of the divided island nation in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Kissinger, who sandwiched this trip between Washington talks on the Mideast and this weekend's coming U.S.-French summit conference in Martinique arrived in Brussels with modest expectations about what could be accomplished in the Cyprus situation. His talks were labeled "exploratory," and that is what they have been.

Mr. Kissinger is convinced that the congressional cutoff of American military aid to Turkey, which went into effect Tuesday, and the presence of a caretaker government in Ankara make major diplomatic progress difficult at this time.

Perhaps even more important in the long run, however, is the return of Archbishop Makarios to Cyprus as president after being ousted in a coup last July. President Makarios is the major unknown in the Cyprus equation, and his return to power complicates enormously the diplomatic problems confronting Mr. Kissinger, U.S. officials say.

UNDERMINE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

Until the archbishop spells out clearly his formula for solution of the Cyprus problem, Mr. Kissinger is unlikely and unwilling to make any bold moves, regardless of congressional pressure.

Indeed, much of Mr. Kissinger's effort here seemed designed to forestall the House vote Wednesday to cut off military aid to Turkey until "substantial progress" has been made toward a Cyprus peace settlement. Mr. Kissinger had hoped that the House would go along with an earlier Senate move to postpone the aid ban until mid-February. Toward this end, he has argued that the congressional action would undermine American diplomatic efforts to get the Turks to make necessary concessions on Cyprus.

As a result of its invasion of the island last July 30 to protect the Turkish Cypriot community following the coup that deposed President Makarios, Turkey currently controls some 40 percent of Cyprus' territory. U.S. officials say that a few months ago Turkey was willing to make concessions that would have enabled negotiations to start.

But this initiative was thwarted by early congressional votes to cut off aid to Turkey. If Turkey had made concessions in the face of congressional action, U.S. officials say, it would have been put in the politically unacceptable position of bowing to pressure from Washington.

Turkish Foreign Minister Milih Esenbel makes the same point. After meeting with Mr. Kissinger, he told reporters: "Turkey and the U.S. decided on a course of action in October on Cyprus. But unfortunately the action taken by the U.S. Congress since then hampered the progress we could make."

Despite the imponderables in the Cyprus situation, U.S. officials are convinced that Glafkos Clerides, former acting president of Cyprus and currently President Makarios' designated negotiator, and Vice President Rauf Denktash, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, could work out a solution to the Cyprus problem in two months—if left to their own devices and backed by Athens and Ankara. While U.S. experts believe the Greek and Turkish governments would go along, it seems clear that President Makarios doen't intend to allow Mr. Clerides much latitude.

WHAT FORM IS UNCERTAIN

With some 40,000 to 45,000 Turkish troops in control of a large part of Cyprus, and solution is likely to involve division of the nation into two communities under some kind of federation arrangement. But exactly what form such a federation might take it uncertain, and President Makarios has indicated he will resist any solution that leads to a distinct partition of the island.

Since Turkish Cypriots comprise only 18 percent of the island's population, Turkey is said to be willing to surrender some of the territory it seized in last summer's fighting. But while Turkey is willing to accept less than the 40 percent of the island it holds, experts say it wants more than 80 percent. Moreover, time would appear to be on Turkey's side. With each passing day, the de facto separation of the island makes the eventual legal partition more likely. Meantime, Cyprus has become still another test of strength between the powerful, prestigious Mr. Kissinger and a Congress increasingly intent on playing a more forceful role in foreign policy. In Mr. Kissinger's view Cyprus has become a major tragedy, not only because of the tremendous suffering among the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, but also because of the adverse effects on American national security interests.

For at a time when Mideast tensions run high, U.S. officials argue, Washington ean ill afford to antagonize a major NATO ally in the castern Mediterranean.

[From Manchester Guardian Weekly, Dec. 14, 1974]

TURKS READY FOR CYPRUS DEADLOCK

(By Eric Silver, Nicosia, December 10)

Turkish Cypriot leaders are working on contingency plans for breaking off negotiations with the Greek community and refusing to admit the United Nations peacekeeping force to the "Autonomous Turkish Region Cyprus."

They are waiting not only for Archbishop Makarios to clarify his bargaining strategy, but also for a new Cyprus resolution which is due to come to a vote by the weekend in the Security Council. The Turks believe that the United Nations formula will have an important influence on the Archbishop's decision.

Makarios repeated at a press conference here today that he believed a solution was possible, though it should not give "excessive privileges to one side at the expense of the other." He hoped that the intercommunal talks would resume in about 10 days. He would be giving the Greek negotiator, Mr. Clerides, detailed guidelines within a few days.

The Archbishop did not, however, approach the Turkish requirement which is that he accepts the present geographical position, with the Turkish Army occupying 40 percent of the island, as the basis for further negotiation. He said, as he did on his return from exile on Saturday, that a settlement must not entail the "removal or exchange of population."

If he holds to this position, the Turks (and possibly Clerides) will find it hard to continue talking. The Turkish negotiator, Mr. Denktash, is also making it a sticking point that Makarios must stop calling himself President and accept that he is only leader of the Greek community.

At his press conference, the Archbishop refused to comply. "I would not like to negotiate," he said, "as representative of the Greek Cypriot community. I am the President of the republic, which includes Greek and Turkish Cypriots."

Makarios suggested that Clerides would be a more appropriate negotiator. The former Acting President would take part as the representative of the Greek Cypriots. Makarios said he did not expect the new talks to last as long as the intercommunal negotiations that preceded the July coup. Since these dragged on for eight years without achieving a solution, the remark drew a rueful smile later from Denktash.

The Archbishop dismissed as "entirely unfounded" reports of a rift between himself and Clerides. Relations he insisted, were "very harmonious" and Clerides had done a "commendable" job during his absence.

It is no secret, however, that contact between the two Greek leaders is as cold as a winter night. Makarios did not mention his stand-in when he addressed 100,000 Greek Cypriots who welcomed him home on Saturday. Clerides was kept waiting until this afternoon for his first working session with the Archbishop.

Makarios, as always, will not tolerate another figure of comparable stature in the Greek community. He is trying to put Clerides back in his place. After his achievements of the past four months, in which he weaned the volatile Greeks to the ugly realities of the Turkish occupation, Clerides is less disposed to accept a subordinate role. He has earned respect and authority.

The chill will become a crisis if it affects policy—if it means that Makarios cannot stomach the kind of concessions Clerides knows are unavoidable, or if it means that Clerides, who has a unique rapport with Denktash, resigns as the Greek negotiator.

Then Cyprus will be back in the world of fait accompli, enforced partition, and guerrilla warfare.

[From The New York Times, Friday, Jan. 17, 1975]

CYPRUS SPLIT SEEMS CLOSER AS TURKS PLAN TO EVACUATE REFUGEES

(By Steven V. Roberts)

Episcopi, Cyprus, Jan. 16—The division of Cyprus into two districts came a bit closer today as about 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees prepared to leave the southern part of the island for Turkey and probably eventual resettlement in areas in Northern Cyprus now controlled by Turkish troops.

Britain announced yesterday that she would allow Turkish Cypriot refugees to leave the British base here, where they have been living since last July, to go to the Turkish mainland.

Today, base officials carried out a census, asking all refugees whether they wanted to leave the base or stay. The next step is uncertain, but it is likely that Turkish aircraft will fly the Cypriots to Turkey. Later they are expected to be transferred to northern Cyprus.

Greek Cypriot leaders denounced the British decision today, saying it would further Turkish plans to partition the island and harm the possibilities for peace. Some leaders also threatened to press for the removal of the two large British bases here, key western outposts in the eastern Mediterranean.

THOUSANDS ALREADY IN NORTH

The Turkish Cypriots came to Episcopi to escape the fighting that followed the Turkish invasion of the island. It has cost the British almost \$2-million to feed and house the refugees, who refused to return to their homes. Sixty Turkish-Cypriot babies have been born in the base hospital and 300 patients have been treated, according to base officials.

Ankara had been insisting that she be allowed to remove the refugees from the base. The British resisted, saying that the matter must be settled within the refugees from the base. The problem.

The British came under growing pressure from Turkey to relent. But in explaining the decision to allow the refugees to go, the British cited humanitarian motives.

Turkish Cypriots have been making their way northward by various methods since the fighting stopped. Thousands have already moved into houses and shops abandoned by the 180,000 Greek Cypriots who fled from the advancing Turkish Army.

Ziya Rizki, the leader of the ethnic Turks here at the base, sat in a crowded tent, his overcoat buttoned against the cold, and explained why almost all his people wanted to go north.

"They have no confidence in going back to their villages and living with the Greeks. They can't live with the people who have been attacking them."

The Turkish Cypriots have suffered a lot and have heard a good deal of propaganda from their own leaders. They clearly want to move somewhere they consider more secure.

They are leaving homes in the south, their jobs, the graves of their parents. "A lot of them have said, enough is enough," a British official said. "But a lot of them are sorry to go, too."

Greek Cypriots have been hoping that Turkey would respond to the British move by allowing some ethnic Greek refugees to return to the eastern port city of Famagusta. But Ankara has been silent.

TURKEY PLANS AIRLIFT

Ankara, Turkey, Jan. 16 (Reuters)—Turkey will organize a huge airlift within the next few days to evacuate thousands of Turkish-Cypriot refugees from a British base in Cyprus.

Foreign Minister Melih Esenbel told a news conference here today that a fleet of Turkish Airlines planes would shuttle the refugees to temporary accommodation—mostly under canvas—in southern Turkey. He said he hoped the operation would start this weekend and last less than two weeks.

Mr. Esenbel said that the British decision had averted damage to Anglo-Turkish relations and would create a more relaxed atmosphere for negotiations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the island's political future.

CYPRUS SETTLEMENT IN SIGHT AS GREEKS AGREE TO FEDERATION

Nicosia, Jan. 8—The Greek and Turkish Cypriot sides agreed today to resume negotiations for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, on the basis of the establishment of a federal state.

The breakthrough came during a 90-minute meeting between Mr. Glafkos Clerides, the president of the House of Representatives, and Mr. Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, in the presence of Señor Weekman-Muñoz, the United Nations special representative on the island.

This was the fourth exploratory meeting between the two Cypriot leaders to find a basis for resuming their talks, since these were interrupted early in December. Their agreement ended weeks of uncertainty and gave rise to hopes that a settlement might be reached within five to six weeks, once the talks get under way.

An official announcement at the end of the meeting said the two leaders had agreed to continue their talks on humanitarian issues (arising from the Turkish invasion) and "to commence talks on the substance of the Cyprus problem."

The statement then added; "They will begin their work by discussing the function of the central Government in a federal state." This was seen as a clear indication that agreement had already been reached that the basis of the peace talks would be a federal settlement.

The substantive negotiations will get under way next Tuesday, at the Ledra Palace Hotel conference centre on the Green Line, which divides the Greek and Turkish sectors of the capital.

The talks were called off early in December by Mr. Denktash, just before Archbishop Makarios returned to the island from his five-month exile. Mr. Denktash stated at the time it would be pointless to continue until the Archbishop made his intentions elear.

Now, a month and a day after the Archbishop's return, the way is open at last for meaningful negotiations.

The Turkish demand for a federal form of government for the island's two communities was rejected as completely unacceptable by the Archbishop before the Turkish invasion.

It is obvious that the Archbishop now has recognized the grim reality brought about by the occupation of nearly 40 percent of the island by the Turkish Army and the establishment of a de facto Turkish Cyprict administration in the occupied region.

Whereas before the invasion the main Greek Cypriot preoccupation was to preserve the format of a unitary state, the return of some 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees to their homes in the Turkish-controlled area is now the primary aim. Observers feel that by accepting the demand for a federal settlement the

Observers feel that by accepting the demand for a federal settlement the Archbishop hopes that the Turks may be more willing to consider the refugee question.

It is noteworthy that the agreement for the resumption of the peace talks came on the same day that President Ford was conferring on Cyprus with Dr. Kissinger and the American ambassadors to Athens, Ankara and Nicosia.

The United States is particularly anxious to see some progress towards a settlement before February 5, the date when all American military aid to Turkey is scheduled to end, if there is no progress.

[From The Times (London), Dec. 31, 1974]

Now the Turks Must Decide What to do With the Part of Cyprus They Won

(By Paul Martin)

Sombre looking Turkish troops stand guard over the forlorn flotilla of pleasure boats moored round the onee picturesque Kyrenia harbour. An austere bust of Ataturk stands in the main square, and Turkish flags flutter from the battlements of Kyrenia Castle. This is the front door of Turkish Cyprus.

Five months after the invasion, the Turks have imposed their desired majority in the north of Cyprus. More than 40,000 Turkish Cypriots have filtered there from the south of the island, and the remaining 20,000 in the Greek areas are arriving at the rate of about 100 a day. With only 13,000 of the former Greek population of 160,000 in this area north of the Attilla Line left, the ethnic and geographic partition of Cyprus is almost complete.

The power that 36,000 troops affords has placed the Turks in control of 40 percent of the island. In this area they have more than 80 percent of tourist accommodation, about 60 percent of agricultural export potential, more than $\pounds 2,000$ m worth of hand and buildings, and more than half of the country's earning potential. Turkish Cypriots are so eager to point out to foreign visitors: "Now all the Greeks have left is their grapes."

Nevertheless, anyone asked to draw a comparison between the two areas at this stage would come to the conclusion that the Greeks were the victors and the Turks the vanquished. Faced with 200,000 displaced persons—about a third of their numbers—on top of their economic losses, the Greeks have been quick to adapt. Refugees have been absorbed into the houses of friends and relatives, into requisitioned hotels, apartment blocks and public buildings. So that today, fewer than 13,000 are refugees living in tents.

In the north, the Turks have been slow to exploit the fruits of their vietory. The bulk of the rich eitrus crop has been lost and the grain producing Messaoria Plain has lain fallow so that no crop can be expected for at least a year. Though the Turks boast that they will resurrect the now dead hotel trade in the north, officially condoned looting of deserted hotels continues. And, so bad has the Turkish record been on this score, Turkish families from the south find themselves inheriting vacated Greek houses stripped bare. This has sparked off another cycle of looting.

Clearly, the problems facing the Turkish administration are great. Whereas the accommodation found for Greek refugees is temporary, the resettlement of the Turks in the north is part of a campaign to ensure permanence. Housing is allocated on the basis of what a Turkish family owned in Limassol, Larnaea, Paphos or any other of the southern towns or villages. "It is only natural that a refugee family will tell you they left behind a mansion when in fact they lived in a shack", said a member of the administration. "Hence the process of sifting is extremely important."

On top of that are the problems that partition (whether disguised in federation or not) impose. Kyrenia is the perfect example. So far the Turkish administration has flooded the town with as many as 3,500 Turkish Cypriots mostly from the Limassol area. All Greek Cypriot businesses have been taken over, and apart from the homes of the 550 Greek Cypriots who remained after the Turkish invasion, the Turks have requisitioned all the houses.

"Kyrenia is not Turkish or Greek but is foreign also," a Turkish Cypriot who shared a business with a Greek before the invasion said. "I like to look at it as a sort of Riviera. I don't know the Riviera, but I think in terms of a tourist town where all can feel at ease. We won the war. But the Kyrenia I see today is not the Kyrenia I wish to see. We must all sit down and decide what must be done for the future—otherwise all is lost."

As any visitor to the Turkish controlled north of Cyprus can see, it is with the Greek Cypriots that the skill in running hotels, restaurants and the like lies. The Turks have done their utmost to encourage the two main restaurants in Kyrenia— the Harbour and the Red Shark—to get back into full swing. However, try as the respective owners may, they lack the trained staff who are now south of the dividing line. The same goes for the hotel trade.

Whatever it is called, partition has imposed its settlement on the island. However, for the Turks more than the Greeks this solution brings difficult social problems. For instance, most of the Limassol Turks who now populate Kyrenia earned their living from the docks. Short of a twice-a-week ferry to Turkey there is no dock work in Kyrenia. Few of the immigrants have savings, and live on a meagre dole. And since there is a strong force of dock workers in Famagusta, now in Turkish hands, it is unlikely they could find jobs there.

The fact remains that in the Greek administered south there is every indication that things are returning to normal. Prices are rising and everybody watches the level of Cyprus's foreign reserves—which have remained steady around £100m.

However, the disasters which many felt would have hit the community by now have not come. The unusual spectacle of beggers on the streets near large refugee concentrations has disappeared. The danger of unemployment remains, but initial predictions of as much as 30 per cent have not been fulfilled. Furthermore, private construction and public works projects have begun to regenerate the economy.

"Give us five years", no the promise one has heard from a good many Greek Cypriots, "and Turks or no Turks we will make the north look like the devastated Cyprus.

[From Worldview, December 1974]

CYPRUS: THE DRIFT TO DISASTER

(Lord Caradon)

As Sir Hugh Foote, Lord Caradon was Colonial Secretary in Cyprus from 1943 to 1945 and Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Cyprus from 1957 to 1960.

Auything I write may be quickly overrun by new developments- -in Cyprus, in Greece and Turkey, at the United Nations in New York and Geneva.

I started to write in a plane flying from New York to Geneva to see Prince Sadruddin, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees; 1 went on in hurried interludes during a heetic general election in England: I finished on another plane to New York.

With so many uncertainties and imminent dangers, I am tempted to write nainly about the past. And I shall speak from my own experience. Yet whatever the difficulties of forceasting, one must turn presently to the prospects for the future. To anyone deeply concerned for all the people of Cyprus, the prospects are terrifying.

I first went to Cyprus more than thirty years ago. It was then a British Colony, and I went as Colonial Secretary. I acted as Governor of Cyprus for several months as long ago as 1944, I went back to Cyprus as Governor in 1957 in the middle of the EOKA rebellion, and stayed till I sailed away in 1960 when Cyprus attained independence as a republic. As the last Governor of Cyprus I am tempted, as I say, to speak of the past.

I like to remember that when I was first in Cyprus, during the Second World War, relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots—roughly 80 percent to 20 percent—were peaceful, as they had been for as long as anyone could remember. They participated as officials and judges and police in the same administration, and they served in the same regiments in the war. When I went back as Governor in 1957 the violent EOKA rebellion against British rule and in favor of union with Greece had already sourcd relations. Communal bitterness and bloodshed, which have since reached such a pitch of fear and anger, began less than two decades ago. I take some comfort in reflecting that relations between the two communities were not long ago easy and freindly. I do not for a moment discount the terrible damage that has now been done. Maybe it is irreparable. But I persist in reminding myself that what we see now, all the hatred and all the cruelty, is comparatively recent. The future of all the people of Cyprus is one of utter misery if Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots cannot recover the peace and amity which reigned in their beautiful island for a hundred years.

Before I left Cyprus in August, 1960, I signed on behalf of the British Government the complicated agreements which had been worked out over the previous year and a half. The agreements were signed that same night by the representatives of Greece and Turkey and by Archbishop Makarios and Dr. Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots at the time. The ceremony was conducted in a spirit of achievement and hope. The credit for the agreements went primarily to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, Averoff and Zorlu, who at Zurich had worked out the framework of a settlement for the future. They showed admirable courage in doing so. The framework was filled in by a Constitutional Commission which sat for many months in Nicosia and to which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots and representatives of Greece and Turkey worked together in confident compromise. For more than a year I worked in the Executive Council with seven Greek Cypriot Ministers and three Turkish Cypriot Ministers, and cordial cooperation and trust prevailed.

On the initiative of Archbishop Makarios they agreed, I remember, on the the distribution of portfolios between the Ministers—a distribution which allotted the important Ministries of Agriculture and Defense to Turkish Cypriots.

It was a good start in freedom.

I have no firsthand knowledge of the subsequent tensions and frictions leading to the crises of 1964 and 1967. I shall not attempt to go over the wretched story of the breakdown of the 1960 agreements.

It is generally accepted that the constitutional plan agreed at Zurich was too set, too rigid, to work smoothly. After a few years of uneasy trial, proposals were made for changes. They were rejected and the opportunity for a new negotiation lost. So from 1964 onward the Zurich constitution was no longer in effect. Archbishop Makarios and his Greek Cypriot Ministers ruled. The Turkish Cypriots, sustained from Turkey and based in separate and isolated enclaves, no longer shared in the administration of the island.

Economically, however, the island prospered, the United Nations Force helped to keep the peace, and it is said that the long drawn-out constitutional discussions between Clerides and Denktash made some progress. It is even claimed that earlier this year there was rough agreement on the structure of a new constitutional plan giving the Turkish Cypriots a reasonable prospect of partnership and security. For several years there had been no communal bloodshed. There was some hope that, with Greek and Turkish encouragement, a peaceful and acceptable settlement would be found.

Then, suddenly, in July this year there was the coup. Early that Monday morning the National Guard, led by officers from Greece, drove their tanks into the grounds of the Presidential Palace, destroying the building with cannon fire. They believed they had killed President Makarios in the rubble. There is evidence that the attack was authorized by and planned from Athens.

It seems almost incredible that the Greek Junta, in spite of long, sustained American support in the past, could have dreamed that the coup would succeed, that the way could be opened to union of all Cyprus with Greece, that the Turkish Government would not react violently.

It is also difficult to understand, to say the least, why the American and British Governments decided to take no action in the Sec.rity Council till after the Turkish invasion had begun.

I cannot think of any single act which has caused more suffering and more prospect of continuing misery than the erazy assault that Monday morning. True, one result was the end of the Junta in Greece, and that is certainly cause for rejoicing. But every other consequence has been utterly disastrous.

The human suffering in Cyprus has only just begun. As the winter approaches it will get rapidly worse. A third of the whole population of Cyprus has been uprooted from homes and livelihood. The immediate outlook is very bad. The further future is dreadful to contemplate.

The Turks have no intention of withdrawing their army, except perhaps for a limited withdrawal in Famagusta and Morphou. Nor are they allowing the Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes and lands. The Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government, on the other hand, can never accept what amounts to the partition of the island, leaving so many Greek Cypriots without shelter or income. No Turkish Government and no Greek Government could survive if it gave way.

So what hope is there now for peace, for conciliation and cooperation? Precious little. If the present drift continues, the disaster will be deep and permanent. A situation not dissimilar in some respects to that in Northern Ireland or the Middle East will persist. Tensions may well lead to conflict—conflict into which larger powers, having failed to prevent or deal with the tragedy, may well be drawn. What conceivable escape can there be from drift into despair and bloodshed?

How bitter it is to reflect that only a few months ago a fruitful settlement was for the grasping. How tragically was the prospect of a lasting cooperation in peace shattered by the gunfire on that fateful Monday morning.

A partition weakly accepted is a bleak prospect. One envisions cruel transfers of population, economic ruin, and the certainty of continuing friction and conflict, with Greece and Turkey constantly on the brink of war and the great powers dragged ever nearer to the explosive dispute. Surely there must be another way.

It seems to me that hope must lie in two factors. First, the good sense of the Cypriot people themselves and their able leaders. And second, in the capacity of the international community, acting through the United Nations, to insulate the island from outside pressures and to encourage, facilitate, and guarantee a fair settlement.

I do not doubt the capacity of the Cypriot leaders. On the Greek Cypriot side there is an array of able and experienced politicians, officials, lawyers, industrialists. Glavkos Clerides, the Acting President, is specially qualified by experience and temperament to conduct the negotiations on behalf of his people. Archbishop Makarios has a prestige and skill and courage which may in the future rally his people to repair the damage and overcome the emnities of the past.

On the Turkish Cypriot side too there are experienced and able leaders, Raouf Denktash outstanding among them.

The weakness on the Greek Cypriot side arises from their factional disputes and violence amongst themselves. On the Turkish Cypriot side there is subservience to the negative reaction of Ankara. These difficulties were great enough before recent events created new suspicions and mistrusts. They are much greater now. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost consequence that Cyprus has the advantage of a people of shrewdness, adaptability, and exceptional ability. Left to themselves they would, I am sure, come to a sensible solution of their formidable problems.

There is, however, no prospect of their being enabled or allowed to work out their own salvation without urgent and decisive international action. Effective international leadership means there must be a clear reaffirmation by the United Nations Security Council of the aim to ensure an independent, sovereign Cyprus. The fundamental provision of the Zurich agreement was the elimination of both *caosis* and partition. That must be the key to settlement. Then the Security Council must call on the Cypriot leaders to work out a new constitution giving the Turkish Cypriots communal security and regional autonomy, including their rights to administer their own autenomous municipalities and local government councils.

Meanwhile it must be stipulated that all Cypriots must be allowed to return safely to their homes, with protection where necessary from the United Nations Force. A new mandate for the U.N. Force must consequently be given, and the Force considerably expanded in numbers. Finally, the United Nations must reaffirm the call for a phased withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops. The United Nations Security Council passed a number of resolutions during the Turkish invasion. They did more harm than good, for they were in pursuit of events, not in control of them. They were disregarded, and the authority of the United Nations was consequently diminished.

Now, the United Nations faces a challenge more important, it seems clear, than anything the Organizaticn has had to tackle before. Cyprus is a comparatively small island, but here is an issue of which the United Nations has been seized for more than a decade, where a U.N. force still operates, where the Security Council's decisions have been flouted, where the accepted U.N. principle of the "unacceptability of acquisition of territory by war" is at stake.

Now there is an opporturnity to save the situation: to bring relief to the refugees and let them go safely home, to revive the agriculture and industry of the island, to start a new era of trust and coeperation between the two communities; and at the same time to save the Cypriot people from further bloodshed, to prevent conflict between Greece and Turkey—and to revive faith in international justice and in the authority of the United Nations.

We may pray that the clumsy and costly blunders of bilateral diplomacy will not be repeated, that this great opportunity to make amends by international action will not be thrown away.

"That is what we mean by conscientious objection," I said, feeling I had made an important point. "These young men are recruited by a country which maintains conscription but no provision for conscientious objection and alternative service. As you know, they can only follow their conscience by becoming exiles. Many of them have deserted the army."

"Could you then support in principle a resolution on conscientious objection, since it covers cases like this?" I asked.

"No," he replied. "We could not support it in the abstract. The Portuguese soldiers should stop fighting. Portugal should stop that colonial war. That case does not refer to us. Our constitution obliges everyone to perform military service. Van Boven's resolution is too abstract."

"Under what conditions could you support a resolution on conscientious objection?" I wanted to know.

Evdokayev pondered several seconds.

"The resolution would have to define the type of war that the person objects to. War objection that could be understood, against unjust wars—like the war in Vietnam—also wars of aggression, colonial wars, against serving in occupation ferces in foreign territory. The resolution would have to be more specific."

"But is it possible to be specific in a resolution that is to be applied generally?" I asked.

"It would be sufficient to specify the type of unjust wars, without naming places like Angola or Mozambique." Evdokayev focused his narrow blue eyes on me as if I were a slow-witted student. "But it must be understood that when the war is just, then everyone must obey the order to fight. A just war," he intoned, "is a war in defense of one's territory if it is invaded and for the independence of one's country."

He continued impatiently, "When we fought Hitler, everybody in the whole country fought. That is why we won—and maybe why the Netherlands did not win. What would you want us to do when the Germans came into Russia? Let them come and do what they wanted? We had to resist." "I agree with you," I said, and he nodded with satisfaction, as though at last be had to resist.

"I agree with you," I said, and he nodded with satisfaction, as though at last he had penetrated a slow mentality. "But suppose," I went on, "a few people wanted to resist nonviolently. I myself

"But suppose," I went on, "a few people wanted to resist nonviolently. I myself belong to the Gandhian tradition of resisting evils, including violence, by means of nonviolence, by means that do not kill or injure another human being."

I suddenly thought back to my first intervention at the United Nations, and I continued: "Even Krupskaya and the Christian Socialists, believed in resistance that did not involve killing. Wouldn't it be possible to permit conscientious objectors to killing to fight disease or epidemics instead of people? Couldn't they serve the country that way?" "No, we do not allow nonviolence," said Evdokayev.

"Everybody must obey the call of the country. To allow a different type of service would not be possible."

His companion interjected; "If there was another type of service, some clever people would find a way not to fight. Everybody must obey and fight together."

"But I still look at it from the other side," I insisted, though I could see that both men were restive. "I still see the plight of Franz Jägerstätter, who refused to kill Russians and Poles for Hitler, though Hitler said that everybody must fight together.

"I repeat," said Evdokayev, "a just war in the defense of the integrity, the sovereignty, and the independence of one's country is something that no one can refuse to take part in for any reason whatsoever." He considered the conversation closed.

I took a deep breath. I had to strike one more nonviolent blow for the principle of conscientious objection. "If the resolution would state that one can only be a conscientious objector to unjust wars, and every country says that every war it is fighting is just, where does that leave the conscientious objector?"

There was an uncomfortable silence, which Evdokayev did not break. His face was red, perhaps with anger, perhaps with impatience at having a peaceful air crossing interrupted by such arguments. Humanly speaking, I could hardly blame him. Yet I waited. The other Russian finally remarked: "It is a very complicated matter." And we left it at that.

I realized as I went over our exchange in my mind that Evdokayev had never once used the word "conscience" or "conscientious." War objection he could accept, as long as it was political and as long as the political stripe was that of the USSR. It was the word "conscientious," a word implying that a person has choices, free choices that may not jibe with those of his own nation, that eaused the gulf across which communication could hardly be maintained. It is exactly on that word and on what it implies that the collision of worldviews is likely to continue.

I have no firsthand knowledge of the subsequent tensions and frictions leading to the crises of 1964 and 1967. I shall not attempt to go over the wretched story of the breakdown of the 1960 agreements.

It is generally accepted that the constitutional plan agreed at Zurich was too set, too rigid, to work smoothly. After a few years of uneasy trial, proposals were made for changes. They were rejected and the opportunity for a new negotiation lost. So from 1964 onward the Zurich constitution was no longer in effect. Archbishop Makarios and his Greek Cypriot Ministers ruled. The Turkish Cypriots, sustained from Turkey and based in separate and isolated enclaves, no longer shared in the administration of the island.

Economically, however, the island prospered, the United Nations Force helped to keep the peace, and it is said that the long drawn-out constitutional discussions between Clerides and Denktash made some progress. It is even claimed that earlier this year there was rough agreement on the structure of a new constitutional plan giving the Turkish Cypriots a reasonable prospect of partnership and security. For several years there had been no communal bloodshed. There was some hope that, with Greek and Turkish encouragement, a peaceful and acceptable settlement would be found.

Then, suddenly, in July this year there was the coup. Early that Monday morning the National Guard, led by officers from Greece, drove their tanks into the grounds of the Presidential Palace, destroying the building with cannon fire. They believed they had killed President Makarios in the rubble. There is evidence that the attack was authorized by and planned from Athens.

It seems almost incredible that the Greek Junta, in spite of long, sustained American support in the past, could have dreamed that the coup would succeed, that the way could be opened to union of all Cyprus with Greece, that the Turkish Government would not react violently.

It is also difficult to understand, to say the least, why the American and British Governments decided to take no action in the Security Council till after the Turkish invasion had begun.

I cannot think of any single act which has caused more suffering and more prospect of continuing misery than the crazy assault that Monday morning. True, one result was the end of the Junta in Greece, and that is certainly cause for rejoicing. But every other consequence has been utterly disastrons.

The human suffering in Cyprus has only just begun. As the winter approaches it will get rapidly worse. A third of the whole population of Cyprus has been uprooted from homes and livelihood. The immediate outlook is very bad. The further future is dreadful to contemplate. The Turks have no intention of withdrawing their army, except perhaps for a limited withdrawal in Famagusta and Morphou. Nor are they allowing the Greek Cypriot refugees to return to their homes and lands. The Greek Cypriots and the Greek Government, on the other hand, can never accept what amounts to the partition of the island, leaving so many Greek Cypriots without shelter or income. No Turkish Government and no Greek Government could survive if it gave way.

So what hope is there now for peace, for conciliation and cooperation? Precious little. If the present drift continues, the disaster will be deep and permanent. A situation not dissimilar in some respects to that in Northern Ireland or the Middle East will persist. Tensions may well lead to conflict—conflict into which larger powers, having failed to prevent or deal with the tragedy, may well be drawn. What conceivable escape can there be from drift into despair and bloodshed?

How bitter it is to reflect that only a few months ago a fruitful settlement was for the grasping. How tragically was the prospect of a lasting cooperation in peace shattered by the gunfire on that fateful Monday morning.

A partition weakly accepted is a bleak prospect. One envisions cruel transfers of population, economic ruin, and the certainty of continuing friction and conflict, with Greece and Turkey constantly on the brink of war and the great powers dragged ever nearer to the explosive dispute. Surely there must be another way.

It seems to me that hope must lie in two factors. First, the good sense of the Cypriot people themselves and their able leaders. And second, in the capacity of the international community, acting through the United Nations, to insulate the island from outside pressures and to encourage, facilitate, and guarantee a fair settlement.

I do not doubt the capacity of the Cypriot leaders. On the Greek Cypriot side there is an array of able and experienced politicians, officials, lawyers, industrialists. Glavkos Clerides, the Acting President, is specially qualified by experience and temperament to conduct the negotiations on behalf of his people. Archbishop Makarios has a prestige and skill and courage which may in the future rally his people to repair the damage and overcome the emitties of the past.

On the Turkish Cypriot side too there are experienced and able leaders, Raouf Denktash outstanding among them.

The weakness on the Greek Cypriot side arises from their factional disputes and violence amongst themselves. On the Turkish Cypriot side there is subservience to the negative reaction of Ankara. These difficulties were great enough before recent events ereated new suspicions and mistrusts. They are much greater now. Nevertheless, it is of the utmost consequence that Cyprus has the advantage of a people of shrewdness, adaptability, and exceptional ability. Left to themselves they would, I am sure, come to a sensible solution of their formidable problems.

There is, however, no prospect of their being enabled or allowed to work out their own salvation without urgent and decisive international action. Effective international leadership means there must be a clear reaffirmation by the United Nations Security Council of the aim to ensure an independent, sovereign Cyprus. The fundamental provision of the Zurich agreement was the elimination of both *enosis* and partition. That must be the key to settlement. Then the Security Council must call on the Cypriot leaders to work out a new constitution giving the Turkish Cypriots communal security and regional autonomy, including their rights to administer their own autonomous municipalities and local government councils.

Meanwhile it must be stipulated that all Cypriots must be allowed to return safely to their homes, with protection where necessary from the United Nations Force. A new mandate for the U.N. Force must consequently be given, and the Force considerably expanded in numbers. Finally, the United Nations must reaffirm the call for a phased withdrawal of all Greek and Turkish troops.

The United Nations Security Council passed a number of resolutions during the Turkish invasion. They did more harm than good, for they were in pursuit of events, not in control of them. They were disregarded, and the authority of the United Nations was consequently diminished.

Now the United Nations faces a challenge more important, it seems clear, than anything the Organization has had to tackle before. Cyprus is a comparatively small island, but here is an issue of which the United Nations has been seized for more than a decade, where a U.N. force still operates, where the Security Council's decisions have been flouted, where the accepted U.N. principle of the "unacceptability of acquisition of territory by war" is at stake. We may pray that the clumsy and costly blunders of bilateral diplomacy will not be repeated, that this great opportunity to make amends by international action will not be thrown away.

[From New Outlook, October 1974]

THE CYPRUS TRAGEDY

(By Robert Weltsch)

Robert Weltsch, prominent leader of the German Zionist movement, former editor of "Die Jüdische Rundschau" and London correspondent for "Ha'aretz", gained fame through a series of articles written after llitler came to power and published in a special volume, "Ja-Sagen Zum Judentum".

The author draws on the Cyprus experience to reflect on the concept of bi-nationalism as a solution to national conflicts. Bi-nationalism was conceptualized by Martin Buber and supported by large sections of the Zionist movement before 1948.

In 1453 the Turks conquered the capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, Constantinople, on the banks of the Bosphorus —the straits that separate Europe from Africa. They first occupied the entire area west of the eity which, being surrounded, could no longer resist. When I read the recent newspaper accounts of the Turkish Army's battle for Nicosia, I imagined the tactics to be the same—if on a smaller seale—as those used by the Turks 500 years earlier.

Byzantium was a cosmopolitan Greek city and, though Sultan Muhamad was tolerant of minority cultures and religious practices, the occupation was a source of hostility and hatred between Greek and Turk—a hatred that would reappear in various forms on the stage of history. We have just witnessed one such tragic reappearance: the recent flare-up that followed the Greek National Guard putsch which broke the 1960 Graeco-Turkish Constitution Treaty, deposed Makarios and brought devastation to this beautific island.

STRATEGIC INTERESTS

It still isn't clear what brought the Greeks in Cyprus to this act of insanity. Greek Cypriots in London believe that the C.I.A. had a hand in it, because they thought Makarios was leaning too far left, and endangering the global interests of the U.S. and NATO. If there is any truth in this version, then their calculation was an error and the results are tragic. At any rate, belief in the power of the C.I.A. and its nefarious machinations is widespread. West German playwright Hochhut's drama "Lysistrata" is one example of this; the action takes place against a backdrop of fears that the C.I.A. is planning an Aegean Sea fortress supported by the "Greek Colonels" against the Russians.

Whether all the guesses are justified or not, many people believe the Central Intelligence Agency to be America's worldwide terrorist arm. As an ally, Greece is essential to NATO because the Eastern Mediterranean Basin is vital for the defence of the West. A Greek move into the communist eamp would be a hard blow to American strategy. And the West already faces a serious potential threat when the S2-year-old Tito will no longer rule Yugoslavia.

when the S2-year-old Tito will no longer rule Yugoslavia. There are five ethnic groups in Yugoslavia, and they have always lived in tension, if not outright hostility. The deepest rift is between the Serbs and the Croats—two very different races historically, culturally and by religion. Over the past 50 years, they have found a few occasions to massacre each other. The fear is that, in the event of Tito's demise, the Russians will exploit the delicate situation to regain influence over Yugoslavia—which would give them a powerful status in the Adriatic, and create an intolerable state of affairs for the West.

This is one of the complications arising from recognition of nationalism as the only factor in the maintenance of monolithic political states. Yugoslavia was created in 1918, out of a myth of apparent common language and nationality, while ignoring other vital interests, because national self-determination was then thought to be as holy as the Ten Commandments. But the idyll of the multinational or bi-national state lost ground. Czechoslovakia—the most liberal of the new states—was unable to build a multi-national state based on true equality even though it had strong minorities; it could be a model democracy, but had to give preference to the Czeehs, thereby alienating the Slovaks and earning the hostility of the Sudeten Germans. Henlein, the Nazi leader of the Sudeten minority, declared in 1938: "We want to go home, to the Reich." What was the meaning of "home"? The Sudeten Germans had never been citizens of the German Reich since it was founded in 1871.

BUBER ON BI-NATIONALISM

Cyprus was part of the Ottoman Empire until 1878, when Turkey eeded the island to Great Britain. But the Greek population, the majority on the island, demanded "Enosis"—union with Greece—even though the bi-national settlement held the seeds of prosperity for the entire population of the island. And this obstinate demand resulted in tragedy for all.

Among the Jews of mandatory Palestine, there was a faction that, in the light of geographic and demographic realities, argued in favor of a bi-national state, based on cooperation between the ethnic groups for the benefit of the country as a whole. One of the faction's most energetic supporters was Martin Buber. In "Dividing Line",* an interesting booklet published recently, A.F. Simon records a conversation with Buber—the year he died—on the bi-national problem, among other things.

Simon doubted the endurance of the bi-nationalism principle, after the experiences of places where it had failed in the 40 years since Buber and his colleagues had prescribed it for Palestine. The geo-political situation and other concepts had changed (apparently a hint at the exaggerated view of self-determination). Simon went on to mention the examples of Canada, Ireland and Cyprus—but there are other places like Belgium, Czechoslovakia and South Africa—where there were prior conditions for successful bi-nationalism, but they gave way to hostile rift and zealous nationalism. The fact that, in most cases, tragedy afflicted all parties, did not influence stubborn opinions. And, after three wars, the circumstances of Palestine were more difficult.

Buber replied: "For me, bi-nationalism is only a stage of a more comprehensive objective: a Jewish-Arab federation in the region, or a part of it. We may now have to start with a pact based on a relative separation between the national areas of residence." He seems to have been referring to separate states.

The answer didn't satisfy Simon. After all, Buber always "supported the myth of a nation's link with its kind, and what is the place of the link under these conditions?

From direct examination, Simon concludes that Buber "left too many questions for which he had no satisfactory answers. And it was these that are likely to put an end to our complacency, and reawaken our conscience from its tendency to slumber."

The same thought applies to other nations—like Cyprus—which, because of sterile hate and jealousy, cannot solve their problems.

[From New Outlook, October 1974]

LESSONS FROM CYPRUS

(By Meir Pa'il)

Dr. Meir Pa'il is former Commander-in-Chief of the Central Officers' School in the Israel Defense Forces. Recently he left the IDF, with the rank of Colonel, to become a Member of the Knesset (Moked List). Last month he was awarded the Itzhak Sadeh Prize for Literature on Military Problems.

A confrontation between two nationalist movements cannot be resolved by elinging to chauvinist ideals, nor by submitting to U.S. arbitration, nor yet by establishing territorial facts. As the Cyprus affair indicates, the best solution to such a conflict is territorial compromise.

^{*&}quot;Dividing Line", Nationalism, Zionism and the Jewish-Arab dispute in the philosophy of Martin Baber-by Aniva Ernst Simon, Published by the Arab Studies Center, Givat Haviva, 60 pages, Cit. pp. 47-48, 39,

The violence and drama that recently gripped Cyprus deserve a thorough study, though the affair is not over yet, and it is likely that further unexpected developments will occur on the island and round the Aegean Sea.

So far, there are four lessons to be learned from the Cyprus affair:

A. The recent events, which were largely influenced by the long-standing national friction between the Greeks and Turks on the island and in the periphery of the Aegean Sea, seem to be leading to the partition of Cyprus into a Turkish sector in the north and a Greek sector in the south. Cyprus may remain an independent state—but this time it will be an independent federative state, composed of two separate autonomous national republics, each with considerable political powers. Perhaps the island will actually be divided between Turkey and Greece, or else developments might lead to the establishment of two entirely independent states in Cyprus (though this seems less likely at the moment).

At all events, the idea of "Greater Cyprus" has failed totally: there will be no independent "Greater Cyprus" and certainly no "Greater Cyprus" annexed to Greece. This proves once more, and bitterly, the validity of the notion that the best solution to a prolonged confrontation between two zealous nationalist movements is territorial compromise.

B. Fate seemed to mock the Greek leaders of the Greek-Cypriot National Guard, who staged a coup d'etat in order to remove President Makarios and replace him with a Greek nationalist regime to turn Cyprus into an independent Greek State or annex it to Greece under the slogan of "Enosis".

Blinded by their nationalist ideal and their profound faith in its importance, they did not see the obvious: that Turkey, near-by and relatively strong, could not accept Cyprus being turned into a Greek State.

Thus they themselves, the Greek nationalists, supported by the Colonels' regime in Greece, caused the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This, in turn, brought about the partition of Cyprus and the shattering of the Greek nationalist ideal of "Enosis"; it also caused the defeat of the Greek National Guard officers in Cyprus as well as the collapse of the Colonels' regime in Greece, which reached the verge of an open and disastrous war with Turkey.

C. Does the Turks' behavior in Cyprus prove that, in the final analysis, the use of force and the establishment of territorial facts are the decisive factors?

There is no doubt that Turkey's decision and ability to use troops in Cyprus helped to advance her interests on the island and strengthen the political status of the Cypriot-Turkish minority.

For all that, we should bear in mind Turkey's relative restraint in the use of force in Cyprus. After all, from the military point of view, the Turkish troops (land, sea and air) could gain control over all of Cyprus. And surely there are Turkish nationalist zealots who advocate taking control of the whole island, as in the 16th century Turkish conquest of Cyprus.

To be sure, Turkey's restraint is not due to pure humanitarian considerations, but rather to the limitations imposed by the super-powers that support Turkey's present actions in Cyprus: the U.S. was interested in Makarios' removal and ready to risk Turkish involvement in Cyprus so long as Greece was not pushed out of NATO and out of the system of alliances with the U.S. The USSR, which suffered politically and strategically from Makarios' ouster, is prepared to come to terms with the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, hoping to disrupt and split NATO. This situation created a favorable international background for Turkey to establish territorial facts, so long as Turkey has the wisdom to limit her aspirations from the start, without illusions of a "Greater Turkish Cyprus".

Clearly, the establishment of territorial facts is restricted by the dictates of the international balance of power in the region. This, too, is a lesson worth remembering.

D. All the evidence suggests that the Greek National Guard officers' coup in Cyprus was supported by Nixon's administration, in order to get rid of President Makarios who had recently strengthened his political ties with the USSR to develop a neutral Cypriot policy—a "Third-World" type of foreign policy.

Indeed, all the signs indicate that the U.S. Government suspected that Makarios' removal by the Greek officers would lead to a Turkish invasion, that it would bring about partition of the island and a political solution out of line with the expectations of the nationalistic Greek officers in Cyprus and Greece.

But it seems that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and the danger of a wider war between Turkey and Greece in the Thrace region, led to upheavals in the Greek government beyond the expectations of the American policy-makers.

The fall of the Greek junta was not in the interest of the U.S.; the junta was toppled by strong pressures of elements in the Greek army who wished to avoid a full-scale war with Turkey. The U.S. backed, perhaps even suggested, the resrotation of Karamanlis to the Greek Premiership as an alternative to the junta, hoping to retain Greece within NATO and the American sphere of influence.

But the relative success of the Turks in Cyprus and the rage in Greece caused and still cause deep political shocks: the return of political exiles (Mikis Theodorakis), the release of political prisoners, and the public return of Andreas Papandreou to Greece and perhaps even to power. These events may prompt Greece to sail beyond the exclusive spheres of influence of NATO and the U.S., in the manner of De Gaulle's France.

Of course, such a development is not inevitable. But it is possible, which proves that human history is hard to plan or predict, even for the leaders of the Great Powers.

[From the Washington Star-News, Dec. 17, 1974]

CYPRIOT IMPASSE

On the surface, the prospects for a negotiated settlement on Cyprus declined in the first few days after the return of Archbishop Makarios. This was because the president of the shattered island republic, was anything but conciliatory in his initial crowd-pleasing appearances before his Greek Cypriot supporters.

He seemed to rule out the kind of agreement that might be acceptable to Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots when he rejected "any solution involving transfer of populations and amounting to partition of Cyprus." His only conelliatory gestures were toward Greek Cypriot opponents—presumably those who backed the July coup against him, which led to the Turkish invasion and the present Greek Cypriot plight. For good measure, Makarios snubbed Glafkos Clerides, the former acting president who has played an outstanding role in negotiating communal issues with the Turks.

Makarios perhaps was carried away by the emotion of his return to Nicosia, or was using rhetorical overkill to solidify support among Greek Cypriots. If now says Clerides will be given written instructions for conducting further negotiations with the Turks. The archbishop turned down a request by Vice President Denktash, leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, for face-to-face talks, on grounds of Makarios's legal status as president of the whole island. That is just as well, since Clerides with a sufficient mandate can be expected to function as a more realistic negotiator. Makarous apparently must provide such a mandate under terms of a secret agreement reached in Athens among Greek and Greek Cypriot leaders.

The post-invasion facts on Cyprus, with the Turkish army in control of 40 percent of the island, put the Turkis in a seemingly insuperable bargaining position. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority want a federated Cyprus divided geographically into autonomous zones. The separation of the warring communities and much movement of population already have taken place and are unlikely to be reversed except for territorial adjustments. The alternative to a negotiated federation of autonomous cantons would appear to be a continuance of the present de facto partition. Ultimately, a settlement on Cyprus must be sanctioned by Ankara, currently without a government, and Athens, where parliamentary government has just been restored.

Makarios can keep stirring up his adherents for a return to the Greek-dominated Cyprus that evolved from the 1959 constitution, but that is a dream. The sooner he settles for realistic negotiations and political conciliation the better it will be for uprooted Cypriots of both ethnic communities, as well as for their sponsors in Greece and Turkey.

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