The Humanizing of the Brute

OR

The Essential Difference between the Human and

Animal Sowl proved from their

Specific Activities

BY
H. MUCKERMANN, S. T.

WITH FIVE PLATES

St. Louis, Mo., and Freiburg, (Baden)

Published by B. HERDER
1906

NIHIL OBSTAT.
S. Ludovici, die 4. Sept. 1906.

IMPRIMATUR.
S. Ludovici, die 6. Sept. 1906.

JOANNES J. GLENNON,
Archiepiscopus Sti. Ludovici.

To

THE REV. ERIC W ASM ANN, S.J.,
this little volume

is
gratefully dedicated.

"Und was man tst,
das blitb man andern schuldig."
Goethe.

CONTENTS.

Chapter i. The Humanizing of the Brute

PART I.

Instinct and Intelligence differ essentially.

Chapter n. Instinct and Final Tendency .

Chapter in. Instinct and Consciousness of
Finality ....

Chapter iv. Instinct and Sensuous Cogni-
tion

Chapter v. Instinct and Sense-Experience

Chapter vi. Instinct and Intelligence .

PART II.
Animals have no Intelligence.

Chapter vn. The "Intelligence" of "The

Lower Animals"
Chapter vni. The "Intelligence" of "The

Higher Animals"
CONCLUSION

NOTE: — The author is indebted to the Rev. Fr. John J. Wynne, S. J.,
Editor of the Messenger, and to the Editor of the Scientific American
for their kind permission to make use of several papers which origi-
nally appeared in their periodicals.

CHAPTER I.
The Humanizing of the Brute.

T T is a well-known fact that in the homes of the
"upper ten thousand" special servants in charge
of animal pets play an important part. It is the in-
teresting duty of these favored mortals to rouse the
lovely poodles, pugs, and pussies from pleasant slum-
bers, to attend to their toilet and attire, to take them
out for a drive on bright and sunny days, or lead them
a-promenading down a cool and shady avenue, and,
last not least, to dance humble attendance upon their
charges when feasting at a lordly and luxurious table.
Houses of refuge and asylums for orphaned cats have
been erected at Berlin, and it was reported from Paris
that at the time of the last exposition a cemetery for
dogs, cats, birds, and other domestic animals had been
opened. This city of the dead, with its resplendent
monuments in honor of the noble departed, is said to
rival a fairy-palace in beauty. Indeed, as J. G. Hol-
land expresses his sentiments in very pathetic terms to
his "dear dog Blanco:"

"I look into your great, brown eyes,
Where love and loyal homage shine,

And wonder where the difference lies
Between your soul and mine

(7)

8 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

I clasp your head upon my breast —

The while you whine and lick my hand —
And thus our friendship is confessed

And thus we understand.
Ah, Blanco! Did I worship God

As truly as you worship me,
Or follow where my Master trod

With your humility:
Did I sit fondly at his feet

As you dear Blanco sit at mine,
And watch him with a love as sweet,

My life would grow divine."

These few but telling facts furnish a striking illus-
tration of the senseless mania of regarding the animal
as a brother of man, his equal in nature aud essence.
Indeed, the intelligence of animals is almost universally
defended by modern naturalists. Some of them, as
Buechner, Eimer, Marshall, and a host of others,
whom Prof. W. M. Wheeler justly styles "popular-
izers," ascribe even to animals as low as ants a high
degree of mental activity, in some respects superior to
that of man. Others, as A. Bethe and Uexkuell,
maintain that only the higher animals, such as dogs,
are endowed with intelligence, whilst the lower ones,
as for instance insects, are mere reflex machines, desti-
tute of all psychic qualities. Others, finally, as Em-
ery, Forel, Morgan, Romanes, Peckham and so forth,
attribute intelligence to all animals without exception,
but add that this intelligence, though not differing in
quality from that of man, is infinitely inferior to it in de~
gree. Only a few, such as Wasmann and Wundt, are
convinced that there is no trace of true intelligence,
either in the lower or in the higher animals. Prof.
Wheeler seems to hold that there is no evidence of

THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 9

ratiocination in animals. It is true, he ascribes what
he calls "simple intelligence" to animals, and main-
tains that this term implies "choice on the part of the
individual organism." *) But his term "choice"
can hardly mean choice in as far as it supposes the
abstract comparison of two objects. For he declares
with reference to ants ' 'that there are no evidences of
anything resembling abstract thought, cognition or
ratiocination as manifested in man." 2) Prof. Ed-
ward L,. Thorndike of Columbia University is a de-
cided adversary of animal intelligence. After a most
careful examination of the question, he "failed to find
any act that even seemed due to reasoning, " 3 ) and
that "even after leaving reason out of account, there
are tremendous differences between man and the higher
animals." 4)

But abstracting from such few authors the late zoo-
logist Prof. A. S. Packard is correct when he states:
"Those naturalists who observe most closely (?) and
patiently the habits of animals do not hesitate to state
their belief that animals, and some more than others,
possess reasoning powers which differ in degree rather

l~) "The Compound and Mixed Nests of American Ants,"
The American Naturalist, Vol. XXXV. (1901), p. 809.

2) I.e., p. 813.

3) "Animal Intelligence; an Experimental Study of the
Associative Processes in Animals." Series of Monograph
Supplements to Psychological Review Vol. II., No. 4, June,
1898, p. 46.

4) 1. c., p. 87. Thorndike, at times, speaks of animals as
if he ascribed intelligence to them. But, in reality, he means
nothing else than what we would call "plastic instinct."

10 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

than in kind from the purely intellectual acts of
man." J)

Now upon investigation into the cause underlying
this erroneous principle we might, as far as the more
popular circles are concerned, discover one reason in
the nervous sentimentalism of our days. At the be-
ginning of the twentieth century, no less than towards
the end of the eighteenth, people have become ex-
tremely sensitive to any sort of pain. Pain like a
haunting spectre is dreaded with the utmost anxiety
and avoided even to a nicety; and since the human
heart is inclined to find some correspondence between
external circumstances and its own apprehensions and
emotions, it kindles in sympathy wherever pain is no-
ticed, whether real or imaginary. This inclina-
tion will grow stronger as soon as there is question of
animated beings that are attached to man and afford
him sensuous pleasure, and leave upon him the im-
pression of a certain helplessness. Of course, as is
attested by daily experience, one of the first and fore-
most places among such cherished creatures must be
assigned to the animals known as our "domestic com-
panions." Besides there exists a certain analogy be-
tween the manifestations of pain in man and in the
brute, between the expression of man's spiritual affec-
tions and the corresponding merely sensuous feelings
indicated in the features of animals. Thus it hap-
pens that from the expression visible in the eye of a
faithful dog the inference is drawn, not to an empty
stomach, but rather to a heart oppressed by sorrow

•)A. S. Packard, M. D. Ph. D., Zoology (10th ed.) p.
680.

THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 11

and even weariness of life. In other words, it is from
sheer sentimentality that the spiritual affections prop-
er to man alone are under similar circumstances
attributed to animals; hence it follows that a genuine
consciousness of pain, presupposing reason and intel-
lect, is ascribed to them.

"Human folk," says Thorndike in his admirable
monograph on animal intelligence, "are as a matter of
fact eager to find intelligence in animals. They like
to. And when the animal observed is a pet belonging
to them or their friends, or when the story is one that
has been told as a story to entertain, further implica-
tions are introduced. " l )

A second reason for this universal anthropomor-
phism is touched upon by Peckham when he speaks
"of the futility of any attempt to understand the
meaning of the actions of animals until one has be-
come well acquainted with their life habits. " 2) Many
animal actions, to all appearances, bear such traces of
intelligence that they are almost involuntarily attri-
buted to an intellectual principle. A more careful
examination and comparison with other actions
of the same animal will soon convince us of our
error.

"Thousands of cats on thousands of occasions, sit
helplessly yowling, and no one takes thought of it;
but let one cat claw at the knob of a door, supposedly as
asignal to be let out, and straightway this cat becomes
the representative of the cat-mind in all the books.

') Thorndike, 1. c., p. 4.

2) G. W. Peckham and E. G. Peckham. Oil the Instincts
and Habits of the Solitary Wasps, Madison, 1898, p. 230.

12 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

The unconscious distortion of the facts is almost harm-
less compared to the unconcious neglect of an animal's
mental life until it verges on the unusual and marvel-
lous."1)

The defective philosophical training and superficial
education, so prevalent in our times, suggest a third
reason for this mania of ascribing intelligence to ani-
mals. Ever since the destructive attempts of Kant
and his disciples to shake and shatter the realms of
ideas, the true object of philosophy is ignored and
lost. The noble queen, the exalted offspring of etern-
al wisdom, has been stripped of her royal dignity; and
while ruthless hands have snatched the crown from
off her head, she has "been degraded to be the
cringing handmaid of experimental science. And
what was the unavoidable result? That very soon the
principles of the old and sound philosophy fell into
contempt, whilst in their stead there rose a confus-
ion and obscurity of ideas which oftentimes led to the
defense of most obvious errors permeating certain
branches of science. Thus our modern psychology, as
upheld by many of its advocates, is a veritable monstro-
sity. Wundt can not refrain from blaming mod-
ern psychology for its "premature application of no-
tions insufficiently determined" and for its "ignor-
ance of systematic psychological methods. ' ' Thus he
explains the fact "that the psychic processes of
brutes are not taken for what they appear in imme-
diate and unprejudiced observation, but that the ob-
server's reflections are transferred to the animal. If
any vital action has the appearance of possibly

1 ) Thorndike, 1. c. p. 4.

THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 13

being the result of a number of reasonings and
conclusions, this is taken as a cogent proof that such
reasoning and conclusion actually occurred. And
thus all the psychic activity is resolved into logical
reflections. " x )

The above mentioned reasons, however, do not
offer us the final and fundamental explanation for the
persistent tendency of assigning a difference between
man and animal, not of kind but of degree.

The assumption of animal intelligence, as every
other error, is essentially rooted in the will. It does
not require much depth or breadth of intellect to see
that the humanizing of the brute is a mere corollary
of materialistic evolution. Materialism denies the
existence of a vital principle apart from matter, and
maintains that life is merely the resultant of attracting
and repelling forces. Everything, therefore, is pure
matter, and there can be no essential difference be-
tween the animal soul and that of man, since neither
can exist independently of matter. But if there is no
essential difference between the animating principles
of man and brute, why assume any between the facul-
ties and manifestations of these principles? In other
words, if human actions are guided by intelligence,
the same holds true for those of animals.

It follows that the theory of animal intel-
ligence is the natural outcome of materialism, and as
such must be traced back to the same source from
which materialism ultimately springs. To speak
plainly, the first promulgators of "animal intelligence"

1 ) W. Wundt, Vorlesungen ueber die Menschen=und
Tierseele, 3. ed, 1897, p. 387.

14 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

and those "popularizers," as Wheeler justly calls
them, who now uphold it with such tendentious tenac-
ity often seem to have no other purpose in view
than to establish a theoretical justification for des-
cending practically to a level with the brute.

These reasons we believe clearly prove the deplor-
able character of this modern tendency which aims at
leveling the difference between animal and man, a
tendency which, because of its universality and the
warm support it receives, calls for most strenuous
opposition.

It is our intention to contribute in some small
share to the controversy, and to prove in a simple and
clear manner the essential difference which has ever
been upheld by Catholic philosophy with reference to
the souls of man and brute. Man and brute belong to
two different realms of life, separated by a spanless
chasm. This is the thesis we propose to the consid-
eration of the reader, and in order to demonstrate it,
we shall confine ourselves to the specific activities of
man and brute, basing our entire argumentation on
the following simple syllogism:

True instinct and intelligence * ) differ essentially.
Now the brute possesses merely instinct and no trace of
intelligence. Therefore man and brute differ essentially.

In the first part of the essay we shall develop
the concept of instinct, then explain the true

*) That is "rational intelligence." To avoid misunder-
standings we may note here that by the term intelligence, we
always mean intelligence in its proper signification, that is
rational intelligence.

THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE. 15

criterion which invariably separates instinct and in-
telligence, and prove that this criterion involves an
essential difference. In the second part -we shall
make use of the criterion established and prove that
there is no trace of intelligence in animals.

PART I.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE DIFFER ESSEN.
TIALLY.

CHAPTER II.
Instinct and Final Tendency.

'THE views of scientific men on the nature of instinct
and instinctive activity are so widely divergent that
any endeavor of securing general acceptance for a pre-
cise definition of the terms seems to be a hopeless task.
Still it is necessary to make the attempt; for without
clear definitions and premises it is impossible to treat a
question fairly or to arrive at clear conclusions. The
clear sky lies beyond the clouds and the haze of the
atmosphere. What, then, do we understand by in-
stinct? Sense experience or well observed facts, and
not preconceived ideas, are to furnish the necessary
data from which we determine the characteristics act-
ually common to all instinctive activity. But in
appealing to facts and common sense it is well to re-
main on neutral ground; we shall restrict our present
investigation to actions that are not and cannot be
modified by any experience and are acknowledged
alike by friend and foe to belong to the category ot
instinctive activity. In this supposition we shall
show first of all that all actions proceeding from in-
stinct necessarily involve a final tendency.

(16)

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 17

It is obvious that the influence of "purpose," or a
final tendency, is met with everywhere in the universe.
The recognition of this truth is forcibly brought home
to us by the study of the laws of inorganic matter
in the wonderful cycle of carbon in the realm of nature,
the numeric proportions according to which atoms com-
bine and separate, the peculiar quality of water in
reaching its maximum density at 4° C. It is clearly
demonstrated by the laws of organic life in general,
and especially by the study of the human body, its
organs and functions, the eye, the heart, the circulation
of the blood, the activity of brain and nerves. But
nowhere is the recognition of final tendency demanded
more emphatically than in the explanation of the act-
ivity of animals which originates in their instinctive
faculties. Indeed, we meet with so many actions ap-
propriate to specific ends that, if anywhere in nature,
then surely in the domain of instinct, "final tendency' '
holds the sceptre of sovereignty.

Countless illustrations offered by natural history
show that the tendency, which is characteristic of all
instinctive activity, refers to the preservation of the
individual animal and of its distinctive species. Con-
sequently, there are three principal groups of instinc-
tive actions: those which refer to the nutrition of the
individual, those which tend to its defence, and
those which are directed toward the propagation
of the species. As it is impossible to investigate
every instinctive action in detail, we shall con-
fine our study to these three groups, and we shall
find abundant evidence to prove that "final tendency"
is an essential constituent of every activity that is
acknowledged to belong to the realm of instinct.

18 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

In studying the first group of instinctive actions,
those by which animals nourish themselves and their
progeny, we are struck by two main facts: the peculiar
fitness of the nourishment for the digestive organs of
the animal and the appropriate manner in which it is
procured. I^et us take as an example the develop-
ment of the beetle Sitaris humeralis (muralis), which
has been so admirably described by the French natur-
alist Fabre. x) In its first larval stage this interesting
blister-beetle of the family of the Meloidae cannot live
except on the egg of a bee, whereas the indispensable
food of the second stage is honey , which would have
been virulent poison to the beetle in its earliest exist-
ence. The following organs are at the disposal of our
beetle to secure possession of the egg: six strong legs,
well adapted for climbing and clinging to other objects,
fully developed mandibles and feelers, and finally good
eyes. But after the transformation of the first larval
stage into the second, the wormlike grub is blind
and has almost lost its legs and feelers, but is endowed
with a large mouth admirably adapted for sipping the
honey which is necessary for its subsistence in this
second stage of development. The spot where Sitaris
first beholds the light of day is near the entrance of
the bee's habitation. The larva is hatched toward the
end of September or early in October, and remains
quietly on the same spot throughout the winter with-
out any food until the bee leaves its home in early
spring. Then the moment for action has arrived, and
it is highly interesting to observe how our beetle pro-
cures its suitable nourishment in the most appropriate
manner.

') J. H. Fabre, Nouveaux Souvenirs Entomologiqnes,
Paris, 1882, Vol. II., p. 262.

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 19

When the male-bees are about to leave the nest
they must necessarily pass the spot where our little
larva has patiently lurked, as it were, for six months.
It seems to have anticipated this fact, and when the bee
unsuspectingly approaches the entrance of the nest,
the larva vaults with the greatest ease on the bee's
back, and off it goes on an interesting journey through
the beautiful realm of new-born spring. But at
once it is confronted by a new difficulty; for it will
never succeed in finding an egg on the back of the
male-bee, especially as the latter never returns to the
nest. Yet our little rider knows very well what to do.
At the moment when the male-bee on his journey
meets the female, the larva swaps horses, and having
returned to the nest on the back of the female, slides
along the drawn out abdomen directly onto the first
egg she deposits in the carefully prepared cell. With
the usual signs of satisfaction, the bee then closes the
cell, in which the embryo bee and the bold intruder
have been immured, and the larva can now consume
the egg without fear of disturbance. Resting on the
floating island of "eggshells," it passes into the sec-
ond stage and then enjoys the sweet honey in per-
fect security from all danger for the following stages
of its extraordinary metamorphosis.

Not less remarkable are those instinctive actions of
animals by which they provide for their defence and
propagation. But these actions must not be separated
from the circumstances which influence their perfor-
mance. Indeed, if these circumstances were always
taken into consideration, no one would dare affirm
that instinctive actions of animals are inappropriate in

20 THK HUMANIZING OF THB BRUTE.

their nature, though sometimes for the sake of a high-
er end they may fall short of their immediate purpose.

A classical example admirably adapted to illustrate
the point at issue is the life-history of the famous
leaf-roller Rhynchites betulse L. ; for in constructing
the cradle for its young this tiny black snout-beetle
has for ages been carrying out a problem which, at
least in its entirety, was not known to man before the
year 1673, when the great mathematical genius, Huy-
gens, published his celebrated "Horologium Oscilla-
torium. ' '

L,et us give a brief account of the famous beetle
and its problem, basing our remarks on the investiga-
tions and writings of Debay l ) and of Wasmann a )
and upon observations made by ourselves many years
ago in Holland.

In early spring, as soon as the Rh, betula 3) has
emerged from the ground, it climbs up a birch-tree,
where, after mating, the female at once proceeds to con-
struct from the pliant young birch leaves a little house
for her offspring. Carefully examining the edge of a
leaf, the beetle suddenly stops and begins to cut the out-
lines of what is to be the cradle for its little ones. It
starts at the upper margin of one side of the leaf.
Directing its head toward the upper part of the central
rib, it cuts with its admirably adapted mandibles an
S-shaped curve, whose terminal touches the leaf's

1 ) Dr. Debay, Beitraege zur Entwicklungsgeschichte der
Ruesselkaefer aus der Familie der Attelabiden, Bonn, 1846.

J) Erich Wasmann, S. J., Der Trichterwickler, Muenster,
1884. The following account was first published in the
Scientific American, April, 1901.

3) From betula, birch-tree.

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 21

central rib. Then, after having made a slight incision
into the main nerve of the leaf, in order to impair the
flow of the sap, it cuts across the other half of the
leaf a corresponding but more horizontal curve which
terminates a little higher on the central rib. After
repassing the line of the entire cut to trim the
edges and to cut through some nerves still connected,
it once more stations itself at the starting-point of the
whole operation. With the claws of its legs, whose
femurs are powerful levers, it next grasps the edge of
the leaf, and walking now downward, now to the
middle, it rolls up in less than two minutes one-
half of the leaf into a sort of funnel, opening down-
ward. After a short repast, which very prudently is
taken from parts close to the main ribs, our little
worker hastens to roll up the other side of the leaf
around the funnel just formed, in which operation it
uses its legs in a manner just the reverse of the former.

Now, after 30 minutes' work, the main prepara-
tions have been completed for depositing the eggs. The
beetle crawls into the funnel's interior, cuts out three
or four little pockets and introduces an egg into each.
After this has been done, nothing remains but to close
the precious chamber as firmly as possible. To ac-
complish this, it walks first to the upper end of the
funnel and pierces the different layers of the leaf in
such a way as to make them adhere to each other.
Then it returns to the lower end of the leaf, and grasp-
ing its apex, forms a second funnel, with its opening
directed upward and fitting exactly into the larger one
(Plate I., fig. 1).

In doing all this our little architect, otherwise of so

22 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

timid a nature, exhibits such an interest and fervor
that, as I myself more than once have observed, it
does not desist from its ingenious work once begun,
even though taken into the observer's hand.

Now in what does the real problem of the beetle
consist, and what has it to do with the conservation of
its species?

Unrolling the leaf and spreading it on a plain sur-
face (Fig 2), we shall find that the exterior margin
of the leaf and the S-curve cut by the beetle are in
the same relation to each other as the two curves of
higher mathematics, the involute and evolute, i. e.,
v w, t u, r s, p g, I m are almost perpendicular to
the exterior margin w u s q m, and are equal to
the corresponding curves v y g, t y g, r y g, p y g,
lyg, respectively. In other words, our little mathe-
matician cuts its S-curve so that the length of the cut
made and the distance from the exterior margin always
remain the same. This problem coincides with the task
of higher mathematics, from a given involute to con-
struct the corresponding evolute, and consequently in-
volves a most complicate combination of differential
calculus and geometry.

But to what kind of curve does the evolute of Rh.
betula belong? As Prof. Heis first discovered, the
evolute in this case is nothing else than an unfinished
circle, which has its terminals in the joints g and
y. According to the same authority, the more
horizontal curve of the second half of the leaf is to
be considered as a very appropiate flattening of the
first curve, which has a more perpendicular position.
For, since the broader exterior windings A, B, C>

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY.

PLATE No. I.

OO
i<j

Fig. 1.— The Scientifically Constructed Nest
of the Rhynchites Betulae. (After Wasmann.)

Fi?. 2. (After Wasmann modified.) Fig. 3. (After Wasmann.)

The curve g w' u' e' q' o' in' k' h' Vepr^ents the mathemalical hivdute belonging 10
the evolute g i 1 n p r t v y.

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 25

correspond to the smaller interior //, G, F, without
being shortened (i. e. a b and cd are equal iolm and
z" k respectively) , the second S-curve must necessarily
lie in a more horizontal position.

This is one part of our little builder's problem.
The other consists in the suitableness of the chosen
curve to the formation of a funnel. Supposing that
the beetle wished to construct from the birch leaf the
largest and strongest funnel possible, and that, too,
in the shortest time and with the expenditure of the
least amount of its limited strength, it could really
not choose a more suitable curve.

The funnel may be considered as a surface coiii-
cally evolvable which, when spread out upon a plane,
coincides with it in all its points. Now such a sur-
face can be rolled up in two ways, so that the lines
of convolution meet either in one point or in a row of
points, lying in a straight or curved line (Fig. 3).
To have them meet in one point is, in our case, alto-
gether out of question. For apart from the fact that
the central rib would most probably tear in the course
of the operation, it would exceed the strength of our
little beetle to handle the whole surface o a at once.
Therefore, the second manner of convolution had to be
chosen. Yet here again it would not do to have the
upper margin in a straight line, for in rolling up the
leaf, the upper and lower openings would have to be-
come either equal in their respective diameters, and
we would have no funnel, but only a useless cylinder;
or they would be unequal, the larger opening being
either above or below. If above, the funnel, be-
cause reversed, evidently would not serve its purpose ;

26 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

if below, the length of the side o a would either not
correspond to that of the outer edge a g or at least
the oblique position of the funnel would make it im-
possible to wind the other half of the leaf around it.
The margin, therefore, must be a curved line. But
this curved line again would be either convex or con-
cave; or partly convex, partly concave. Of these pos-
sible cases, the first two would be impractical; for the
merely convex margin has all the disadvantages of a
straight one, and, besides, would make the poor
beetle do superfluous work in rolling up a part of the
leaf (0 b a c) that is of no use in the formation of the
funnel. A funnel with a merely concave margin
would have too many windings closely packed at the
top, and thus overtax the strength of the builder;
and the funnel, which is subsequently to serve also
as food for the larvae, would perhaps have dwindled
down too much in size.

There remains only the concavo-convex line
of section, in which again either the convex or
the concave part might be longer. And here, as Was-
mann justly remarks, "the technical ingenuity of our
architect shows itself in its brightest light. ' ' For what
would be the result if the convex part were longer?
We need only cut such a funnel from paper and see.
First of all, it is not pointed enough. Besides, the
part h b is not in the spiral of the point, as it should
be, but along the vertical axis, and thereby the curve
o cb d will no longer have the required length. And
the part c a b d would most unsuitably protrude above
the funnel's apex. At any rate, the funnel would be

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 27

lacking in firmness and could not be closed so tightly
as it should be.

But if, as is actually the fact, our architect chooses
to make the concave part of the margin longer in the
above mentioned proportion to the leaf's outer mar-
gin, then all requirements are most admirably met,
and not a trace of the disadvantages of the former
methods can be discovered. Without wishing to main-
tain that no other curve might possibly bring about
the same result, there is certainly none so simple and
yet so wonderfully appropiate.

To understand this still more clearty, we may finally
direct our attention for a moment to the purpose
which the funnel has. What is the real destiny of this
artistic house? To insure the preservation of the
species of Rhynchites betulce, it is absolutely necessary
that in its larval stage the young progeny should be
guarded against all harmful influences resulting from
atmospheric changes. Now it has been experimentally
proved that every larva, in spite of abundant v food,
simply dries up when taken out of the tightly rolled
and well-sealed funnel. Moreover, on account of the
constitution of its stomach , the larva can feed only on
dry leaves, supplied by its habitation. That the birch
leaf might be dry in due time, the mother beetle
wisely provided by making the incision in the
leaf's central rib. Finally, because the number of its
progeny is so exceedingly small, it had to guard them
well against all insectivorous animals. But who can
suggest a hiding-place better adapted to its purposes
than a dry, meaningless leaf, rolled up and closed with
so great care?

28 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

A great many other examples of a less impressive
but similar nature could be enumerated, all
evincing the self same conclusion that the instinct-
ive actions of animals are of themselves highly appro-
piate to their purpose and reveal a true final tendency.

Or, for what other reason but to seek protection
from danger do worms contract the segments of their
body, hedgehogs roll themselves into balls bristling
with spikes, snails retire into their shells, turtles with-
draw their heads and legs and hide themselves in the
sand, young snakes jump into the mouth of their par-
ent, chickens seek protection under the wings of the
hen?

Nor can any other explanation than "purpose" be
given for those actions by which animals preserve
their species. Or, why do they always deposit their
eggs in places which offer the most suitable food for
their offspring? Why do mosquitoes drop their eggs
into water, the only place where the young can devel-
op, cabbage-butterflies deposit them on the under side
of the cabbage leaf, Sitaris in the nest-entrance of An-
tophoras? Why does the fly Gastrus equi paste them
on the breast of a horse, where they are licked up t»y
the horse's tongue and forwarded into its stomach,
the only place where the maggots find their specific and
necessary nourishment? Why do several species of
solitary wasps fasten their eggs on the bodies of living
but paralyzed spiders, caterpillars and grasshoppers?

Why does the great water-scavenger, Hydrophilus
piceus build a little boat for its eggs, and Lomechusa,
Xenodusa, Atemeles . . . bring them into the
nests of ants; why in short does every species find

INSTINCT AND FINAL TENDENCY. 29

those places and conditions, which are best adapted
to secure the welfare of its offspring? There can be
no question of chance where such a universal exper-
ience confronts us with such wonderful facts, and it is
consequently evident that a "purpose" in finding
suitable nourishment, in protecting the individual
and propagating the species is an essential constituent
of all instinctive actions of animals.

CHAPTER III.
Instinct and Consciousness of Finality.

I NSTINCTI VE actions are essentially of a purposeful
and seemingly intelligent character being directed,
as we have shown, toward the welfare of individual
and species. We must now examine what relation
instinctive actions have to the agent's cognition and
appetency? For the answer to this question will de-
termine the specific character of instinctive actions in
contradistinction to all other kinds of actions performed
by man or animal. Hence we ask whether we are
justified to infer that the final tendency which is evi-
dently manifested in the case of the instincts is as such
or in itself an object of cognition and volition on the
part of the agent. Some believe that it is impossible to
answer this question in a satisfactory manner. Ladd
says of instinctive actions that "they seem like the
deeds of intelligent will striving to realize ideas held
up by imagination and thought." But, "how far an
actual examination of the data of consciousness justi-
fies the seeming, is a question which can probably
never be answered satisfactorily. " l )

') George Trumbul Ladd, Psychology, descriptive and
explanatory, 4. ed., New York, 1903, p. 598.

(30)

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 31

We believe that this is not so. It is certainly im-
possible to determine in detail how the single instinc-
tive actions are performed and how they originated.
But the simple fact whether or not they proceed from
an intellectual or a merely sensuous principle or from
no principle of cognition at all can, we believe, be
easily ascertained. I^et us see.

Our first proposition is that, as in the instincts of
man so also in the instincts of animals, the connection
of the action and its final purpose is entirely uncon-
scious; or as James says: "Instinct is usually defined
as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce
certain ends, without foresight of the ends, and with-
out previous education in the performance. " 2)

We are led to this conclusion first of all by the
perfect analogy that exists between the instinctive ac-
tions of animals and of man himself. For there are
many actions of man of an instinctive nature and per-
fectly similar to the corresponding acts of animals.
Consequently, if the instinctive actions of man are un-
conscious, the same must be asserted of the instinctive
actions of animals. The hungry babe endeavors to
suck, or gives expression to its feelings by crying, un-
til its mother has appeased its craving. It is evident
that these actions are appropriate to the purpose; nor
is it less evident that they are the result of instinct and
not of reason. But how? Is the babe conscious of the
final tendency of its actions? Does it cry because it
knows that crying is a means to induce its mother,

2) W.James, The Principles of Psychology, vol. II. 1904,
p. 383. James' definition is incomplete, as we shall point
out below.

32 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

to satisfy its hunger? Evidently not. For our own
experience proves that as children we were not con-
scious of the suitability of such acts. Moreover, the
supposition of consciousness on the part of the child
involves a contradiction. Its knowledge of the
appropriateness of the action would have to be derived
from nature or from experience or from personal re-
flection. The first assumption is inadmissible; for
there are no innate ideas. Nor can there be a question
of experience; for the new-born babe cries previously
to all experience of the result of its wailing. Nor can
we fall back upon reflection; for the child is incapable
of using its mental faculties. Therefore, the cry of
hunger is entirely unconscious. The same must be
said of all our instinctive actions even of those which
are performed after we have attained the use of reason.
Our consciousness offers unmistakable testimony
that we do not reflect in extending our hands or closing
our eyes on the sudden and unexpected approach of a
dangerous object. This fact leads to the inference
that animals, likewise, have not the remotest idea of
the appropriateness of their instinctive activity.

But here we are confronted by some who reject this
conclusion from analogy and entirely disregard the
fact, that it is the only way of gaining insight into the
functions of the animal soul.

It is under the influence of this opinion that Pro-
fessor Ziegler writes in his treatise on the nature of
instinct: "We must leave aside the notion of con-
sciousness, if we wish to acquire a useful concept of
instinct. ' ' For, ' 'who can tell whether a dog, a lizard,
a fish, a beetle, a snail, a worm act consciously or un-

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 33

consciously? In the natural sciences it is a very doubtful
proceeding to admit into a definition any mark which
cannot be judged upon empirically."

On the contrary, we must insist on a principle well
explained by Romanes in his "Animal Intelligence."
"Taking it for granted," he says, "that the external
indications of mental processes which we observe in
animals are trustworthy, so that we are justified in in-
ferring particular mental states from particular bodily
actions, it follows that in consistency we must every-
where apply the same criteria. . . . It is, of course, per-
fectly true that the less the resemblance, the less is the
value of any analogy built upon the resemblance, and
therefore that the inference of an ant or a bee feeling
sympathy or rage is not so valid as is the similar in-
ference in the case of a dog or a monkey. Still it is
an inference, and, so far as it goes, a valid one — being,
in fact, the only inference available. That is to say,
if we observe an ant or a bee apparently exhibiting
sympathy or rage, we must either conclude that some
psychological state resembling that of sympathy or
rage is present, or else refuse to think about the sub-
ject at all; from the observable facts there is no other
inference open. ' ' Romanes adds that the analogy from
human to brute psychology becomes weaker and weak-
er as we recede through the animal kingdom down-
wards from man; but he insists that "it is the only
analogy available" and "that when we get down as
low as the insects I think the most we can confidently
assert is that the known facts of human psychology
furnish the best available pattern of the probable facts
of insect psychology. " * )

') P. 8.

34 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

Romanes is correct in insisting upon this analogy.
For from like effects we may and must conclude to like
causes, and consequently it is sound logic to maintain
that, if two actions have the same manifestation in man
and animal, they must be similar in their nature. He
who denies this principle can make no statement on
animal instinct, since by internal experience he is ac-
quainted only with his own instinctive actions, whilst
he has no knowledge whatever of their nature in other
men, much less in animals.

But we may go still further than Romanes. We
need not compare the instinctive actions of man and
animal in every respect, but may restrict our present
consideration for instance to the manifestation of con-
sciousness of finality. Now human psychology fur-
nishes us with a number of data taken from circum-
stances which clearly demonstrate that the actions in
question cannot possibly involve any cognition of final
tendency as such. Hence, if we can show the pres-
ence of the same identical data in the instinctive ac-
tions of animals, we have a perfect analogy and hence
a reliable conclusion.

Our first argument in support of this statement is
taken from the very performance of instinctive actions
on the parts of animals.

Let us return to the illustration taken from the
larva of Sitaris humeralis. Whence does it know
that in its first larval stage it can live only on the egg of
a bee? Whence is it aware that it may indeed start out
on its trip on the back of the male, but must in the
course of it pass over to the female bee and finally
glide down upon the egg? Whence does it know that

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 35

in its second stage honey and only honey is to be taken
as nourishment, though precisely this same honey
would have caused its death in the first stage? Does
it know it perhaps from experience? But only once
in its life does our larva undertake this journey
through the air, only once does it feed on the bee's
egg, only once on the honey of the cell. Moreover
any attempt at experiments would have resulted in
death. Therefore, Sitaris does not know from its own
experience, how and where it has to provide for its
development. Nor is it less ridiculous to assume that
a very good memory aided our larva in finding its
proper food. That would indeed be a unique memory
which remembers facts that have never been exper-
ienced. But somebody else, perhaps a careful mother,
might have given her darling definite instructions as
to the future before it departed from home. Indeed, an
idyllic idea! It is too bad that professor Sitaris had to
die before even one of her disciples could leave the egg.
Therefore, we must either suspect with the elder Ag-
assiz that instinct is a faculty of a much higher kind
that the intellect of man, or take refuge in the ridicu-
lous caricatures of Brehm's intelligent dolls, which pre-
vious to any experience excogitate by aprioristic reason-
ing the actions most appropiate for their future life.
But as these suppositions are evidently absurd, we must
necessarily assume that Sitaris performs these instinct-
ive actions without any knowledge or consciousness
of their purpose; for a purpose which cannot be appre-
hended is not apprehended de facto. The same con-
clusion is forced upon us by the action of the Rhyn-
chites betulae in cutting a curve into the leaf of a

36 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTK.

birch-tree, whose construction, if performed by man,
implies the application of geometry and calculus.
The same explanation is demanded by the action ot
the male-larva of the stag-beetle (Lucanus elaphas),
which spins a cocoon for its future antlers twice as
large as does the female larva; the same of the so-
called silk-worms which when constructing their
double-walled cocoon for the winter season leave a
true but well closed door for escape in early spring.
(Plate II. Fig. 1.)

Nor can any other reasonable interpretation be
given of the actions of birds which after their very
first mating begin to gather blades of grass and like
material for their future nest, deposit their eggs in it
and hatch out their offspring. Nor does the apparent
sagacity of domestic animals in distinguishing so well
and at once between hundreds of poisonous and nutri-
tious herbs warrant any other conclusion. In fine, all
instinctive actions of animals at least at their first oc-
currence and previous to experience cannot be ex-
plained otherwise than by the conclusion that under
the mere impulse of instinct animals are entirely un-
conscious of the final tendency, so brilliantly mani-
fested in their highly appropriate activity.

A second proof that animals cannot know the pur-
pose of their instinctive actions has often been derived
from their peculiar and constant regularity. "A still
more important reason," says Wundt, "which op-
poses the derivation of merely instinctive actions from
conscious reasoning, may be found in the fact that
they are repeated by all individuals of the same spec-
ies with great regularity, though there is no possibility

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINAIJTY. 3T

PLATE II.

Fig. 1. The silk-worm Attacus Cecropia and Its cocoon. (Original.)

Fig 2. A Solitary Wasp "using stone to pound down earth over nest."

(Peckham.)

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 39

of proving that between the single individuals there
exists any connection which might explain the per-
fect agreement in their behavior. ' ' And the zoologist
Schneider adds in still clearer terms, "that in the
habits of insects a regularity and predetermination
should be observed which cannot be detected in the
conscious actions of man. In opposition to merely
instinctive habits precisely those associations which
are formed by ratiocination are characterized by a con-
stant variation, whilst the instincts of the individuals
of the same species remain constant. " 1 )

Here is an illustration of this well known fact,
mentioned by Peckham. The solitary wasp Sphex-
ichneumonea leaves her grass-hopper (which is to
serve as food for the young) just at the entrance to
the excavation (of her nest) and first enters to see
that all is right within. In experimenting with a
French Sphex, which has the same habit, Fabre (the
famous French naturalist mentioned above) moved
the creature a little way off; the wasp came out,
brought it to the opening as before, and went in a
second time. This was repeated again and again un-
til the patience of the naturalist was exhausted, and
the persistent wasp took her booty in after her appro-
piate fashion. She must place the grass-hopper just
so close to the doorway, she must then descend and
examine the nest and after that must come out and
drag it down. Nothing less than the performance
of these acts in a certain order satisfies her impulse.

') Cf. T. Pesch.S. J., Die grossen Weltraetsel, 1883, vol.
I., p. 426.

40 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

There must be no disturbance of the regular method
or she refuses to proceed. 1 )

This argument is rendered still more efficacious,
if we consider how often this very regularity of the
action destroys its appropriate character, although in
common circumstances every instinctive action is
adapted to its purpose. It may happen that these cir-
cumstances are disturbed by man or some other cause.
Now if the animal were conscious of its instinctive
actions, it evidently would either desist from acting or
adapt its action to the changed conditions. But as
many facts have proved, animals prefer to exhibit the
most stupid performances rather than change their
usual course of procedure. A goose deprived of its
embryo goslings continues with great zest to hatch on
the dunghill, and hens will do the same on pseudo-eggs
and iron chains. Birds, that have seen their offspring
killed before their eyes, continue to gather food for
their fledglings. Altum vouches for the fact, that
some northern birds when deprived of their eggs go so
far in phenomenal stupidity as to collect food and dis-
gorge it in the nest when the time has arrived for the
appearance of their brood, as if it were actually present;
or they offer food to the eggs which have become add-
led by excessive hatching. 2 ) Chickens have the in-
stinct of scratching which ordinarily serves to expose
their food or prepare their nest. But they also scratch
on a stone floor or on the top of a heap of grain, and do
not pickup a single morsel without dashing a dozen or
more against the opposite wall. Insects which in case of

1) I.e., p. 212.

2) Dr. B. Altum, Der Vogel und sein L,eben, 6. ed., p. 200.

INSTINCT AND CONSCIOUSNESS OF FINALITY. 41

danger simulate death and drop on the ground do ex-
actly the same if instead of firm ground there is a pool
of water below them. Even ants, in spite of their high-
ly developed faculty of adaptation, do not act less
stupidly. Generally speaking they adopt in observa-
tion nests the same line of instinctive actions which
were useful to them in their natural state, although in
the changed conditions those actions are often useless
and even harmful.

Instances such as these could be multiplied indefi-
nitely. At present let us add but two striking illus-
trations which Peckham enumerates as "errors of in-
stinct. ' ' Cerceris ornata is the name of a solitary wasp,
which is known to kill certain bees of the genus Haly-
ctus by means of its sting, to carry them into its nest
of sand and place an egg upon the ventral side of
the bee. One day "while Cerceris was away hunting,
some dry sand was thrown into the nest, and the en-
trance was then stopped with damp sand. She returned
laden with prey, and seeing herself forced to resume
the profession of a miner, abandoned her victim, cleared
the entrance, penetrated within, came out again and
flew off in search of new prey. After two successive
trips she penetrated a third time into her dwelling and
began to reject the dry sand which had been thrown in.
In the midst of this sand was a bee (which she had drop-
ped before). Presently the wasp flew away. The hours
passed on and she returned without a bee, entered and
threw out the other one which she now considered an
encumbering object. Thus of two victims which were
procured with great trouble, one was abandoned on
the thresh-hold, and the other was dropped halfway

42 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE.

in — neither served as food for larvae. What of that?
Cerceris had given the sting — that was enough. At
another time a nest, one of the cells of which was not
entirely provisioned, was destroyed at evening. On
the next morning Cerceris brought a newly stung bee
and placed it in the hole. On the following day she
came agaia charged with prey and dropped her bee
which rolled to the bottom of the excavation. She had
not brought the full number for provisioning the nest.
Instinct commanded her to bring them, and she obey-
ed but not knowing where to put them, let them fall. " l )

From such instances we must conclude that instinc-
tive actions as such are never connected with con-
sciousness of final tendency. For these cases of in-
appropriateness do not occur only now and then, but
may be occasioned in any kind of instinctive actions.
They cannot be the result of a misleading reflection
or of an erroneous judgment influenced by will power,
or by the appearance of truth; for of this there can be
no question in actions so stupid, useless, and often in-
jurious.

') I.e., p. 219-220.

CHAPTER IV.
Instinct and Sensuous Cognition.

IN the preceding chapter we have proved that, in
spite of their eminent appropriate ness, the instinct-
ive actions of animals do not betray the slightest trace
of consciousness of finality. But we are not allowed
to infer that all unconscious actions which manifest a
final purpose have to be classified as instinctive. If this
conclusion were legitimate, many vegetative processes
and vital actions which are merely automatic would
have to be referred to the domain of instinct. In
fact, some scientists admit a so-called organic instinct.
But at the very first glance it is evident that the term
is not used in its proper meaning. Or is the action of
plants instinctive, when they take in sap by their roots
or carbon-dioxide by their leaves? This would be as
incorrect as to maintain that the beat of the heart and
the respiration of the lungs are guided by instinct.
For, neither vegetative processes nor reflexive activit-
ies can be termed instinctive actions, but only such as
are connected with sensuous cognition and appetency.
Now, first of all, there can be no doubt of the fact that
instinctive actions are at least in some way determined
by sensitive cognition. For as experience shows, ani-
mals distinguish very well in their instinctive actions
between the different objects that surround them and
administer to their wants. Birds never take the insects
which supply their food for the material out of which

(43)

44 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

they build their nests. Who ever saw a swallow con-
structing its nest of flies or mosquitoes and feeding its
young with mud? What else, than some kind of
sensuous cognition guides the hawk when it swoops
down from on high and grasps its prey with unfailing
certainty? What else always impels the hen to gather
its chicks under its protecting wing on the first ap-
proach of such a dangerous visitor? Indeed, Descartes,
misled by the regularity of instinctive actions, spoke
of animals as of automatic beings and thought that he
could explain animal activity by his ' 'spiritus vitales, ' '
certain liquids of a merely mechanical nature. But in
doing so he disregarded the fact that animals have real
organs that produce effects similar to those which are
brought forth by the sensitive cognition of man and he
forgot how variable within the limits of a certain reg-
ularity instinctive actions may be. Therefore, the fact
that some kind of sensitive cognition determines the
animal, when acting instinctively, is beyond all doubt.
Nevertheless, there are some modern scientists of
no small reputation who follow the example of Des-
cartes and maintain that instinctive actions are in no
wise influenced by sensitive cognition, but are of a
merely mechanical nature. One of these scientists is
Prof. Jacques L,oeb *) of the University of California,
well known on account of his experiments regarding
artificial parthenogenesis. 2) L,oeb boldly asserts:

1) Studies in General Physiology, Chicago, 1905, vol. I.
pp. 1—114.

2) We may note here that these experiments have nothing
to do with the great question of primo-genesis. For, all ex-
periments of I/oeb suppose life, and there is none among them

INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 45

"What has been taken for the effect of 'will' or 'in-
stinct' is in reality the effect of light, of gravity, of fric-
tion, of chemical forces, etc." And so he speaks of
heliotropism, when the direction of the rays of light
determines the direction of the movements of an ani-
mal or its orientation; of geotropism, when gravity, or
of stereotropism, when contact with solid bodies deter-
mines the orientation, and so forth.

Heliotropism, geotropisni, and stereotropism may
be positive or negative. They are positive, if the ani-
mal's motion is towards the light, the earth, or a solid;
negative, if in the opposite direction. In further de-
scription of his purely mechanical theory, Prof. I^oeb
uses the following altogether "unequivocal" phrases:
"By the help of light the botanist controls the orienta-
tion of a plant at will. Why should he maintain that the
'will' or 'instinct' of a plant [ ! ] cooperates with the rays
of light when the orientation is determined solely and
unequivocally by the latter? The movements of an ani-
mal toward the light are, however, .... identical
point for point with the movement of a plant toward
the light. Wherever the orientation of plants has been
satisfactorily controlled experimentally, light has in-
deed been considered the sole determining factor; but
in the case of animals, in which in similar experiments
light is without doubt also the sole determining factor,
'instinct' and 'freewill' [sic!] have still been considered
to play a role. ' '

that could be interpreted as having any connection whatever
with spontaneous generation. Cf. our paper on "Modern
Science and the Origin of Life"in the New York Messenger,
April, 1906.

46 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

Loeb grants that life-phenomena are ' ' not dependent
solely upon the external causes acting upon the organ-
ism at a given moment, but upon these and upon the
conditions present within the organism taken together;
and the latter conditions are in themselves variable."

But this does not affect in any way the mechanical
character of his theory. The manifestation of helio-
tropism changes, but it remains pure and unequivocal
heliotropism. Thus "a large number of animals be-
come positively heliotropic, when they are left in the
dark for a long time. If they are brought into light
of sufficient intensity, they become negatively helio-
tropic after a time and this the more quickly the more
intense the light." "We do not therefore always
meet with simple conditions in analyzing the causes
which determine the voluntary movements of an ani-
mal; but however complicated they may be, the vol-
untary movements of animals are nevertheless, as our
experience indicates, always unequivocally determined
only by such circumstances as determine also the
movements of bodies of inanimate nature. ' '

On what facts does L,oeb base his theory? L,et us
give at least one characteristic example.

The caterpillars of Porthesia chrysorrhoea pass the
winter in their nests in fruit trees and bushes, which
they leave as soon as it becomes warm. Then they
creep up to the tips of branches to the small buds
which serve as their food. Now, as Loeb expressly
states, it is merely positive heliotropism and negative
geotropism which compels the caterpillars to creep
upward, where they are held fast on the small buds
by contact-irritability. For you can make the cater-

INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 47

pillars starve by trie aid of light in close proximity of
food. "The animals move to the window-side or to
the top of a test-tube in which they are kept. If,
then, a branch, covered with buds, is pushed into the
test-tube on the room side, the animals nevertheless
remain where light and gravity have compelled them
to go and are holding them. If, however, they once
are on the buds, the latter act as a stimulus which
may be even stronger than light. It is in such a case
impossible to draw the animals away from the food by
means of light. ' ' Besides these animals retain their
positive heliotropism only as long as they have not
yet eaten anything. ' 'As soon as they have eaten and
are about to moult, their irritability decreases and at
the time of moulting it is almost impossible to show
any effect of light or gravity upon them. ' '

We believe that Prof. Loeb's explanation contains
his refutation. For, if his theory were correct, all
caterpillars would be doomed in consequence of posit-
ive heliotropism. Caterpillars usually commence eat-
ing the buds of the highest twigs, and having devoured
all in their reach above them, they rest for some time,
until all is more or less digested. Now in order to
get new food, they must necessarily creep down to
another twig or tree. But this is impossible. For,
their "stomachs" being empty, the caterpillars are
positively heliotropic, and consequently they will all
die on the spot. This, however, is directly opposed
to the facts. There are no caterpillars in nature that
die in consequence of heliotropism or geotropism.
As long as they are hungry, they creep from one
branch to another and in all possible directions, until

48 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

they find the desired food. That they did not do so
in case of L,oeb's test-tubes is merely due to the fact
that they were not aware of the food, since this was
at an altogether unusual and dark place. Hunger,
and nothing else than hunger, is the cause which im-
pels the animal to follow the guidance of its senses in
order to appease that craving. This is the sole rea-
son why, as soon as the caterpillars have eaten, and
at the time of moulting, "it is almost impossible to
show any effect of light or gravity upon them. ' ' It
is not heliotropism, but hungertropism, or, to speak
still more scientifically limotropism, that accounts for
the caterpillars creeping upward.

Prof. I,oeb takes the liberty of sneering at the use of
words like "instinct" to designate causes of move-
ment, and says that such causes stand upon the same
plane "as the supernatural powers of theologians,
which are also said to determine motions, but upon
which an engineer could not well rely. " He more-
over declares the method of Scholastic thinking a
"handicap" which, by phrases like "instinct" serves
to ignore or conceal the true problem involved.

Prof. Loeb forgets that there are two kinds of prob-
lems to be solved: the one referring to the more re-
mote and ultimate causes of phenomena; the other
pertaining to their proximate causes and relations.
Both are objects worthy of the intellect of man, and
neither is opposed to the other. But while the second
is of interest to the specialist only, and has no bearing
on the great questions of human life, the other is of
interest to every man who is anxious to study the
foundations upon which his relations to his fellow-

INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 49

creatures are based and on which his final des-
tinies depend. Indeed, if Prof. Loeb would take the
trouble to study the definition which St. Thomas
gives of the vis aesti mativa in animals, he would find
more wisdom in that one definition than his previous
unacquaintance with that author had ever permitted
him to suspect. This unacquaintance with the
Scholastic method of thinking is the very handicap
which makes him "conceal the problem' ' beneath the
veil of a few Greek phrases.

Loeb as well as Bethe, Uexkuell and others men-
tion a great many facts 1 ) of a nature similar to the
one explained. But it is unnecessary to enter upon
tljem. For far from demonstrating that the move-
ments of animals are merely due to mechanical causes,
they show rather the evident fact that some kind ol
sensitive cognition guides the animal in the perfor-
mance of its instinctive activity.

But we may ask, does sensitive cognition suffice to
explain the phenomena of instinct? The exterior sen-
ses as such certainly do not. For the mere preception
of something green will not induce the cow to eat; for
in that case the cow would eat any kind of green mat-
ter, poisonous herbs or only colored paper. But
this does not agree with facts. On the contrary, just
as hens when threatened by a bird of prey are at once
aware of their danger, but never call their young when

l) Cf. E. Wastnann, S. J., Instinkt und Intelligenz im
Tierreich, Third edition, (Herder 1905), p. 136-168.

This edition of Wasmann's work is practically a new book.

Morever, Wasmann, Die psychischen Faehigkeiten der
Ameisen; Zoologica, Heft 26 (1899).

50 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

the bird soaring over them is not inimical, thus also do
cows on entering a meadow for the first time distinguish
most exactly between nutritious and poisonous herbs.
Experiments begun by Linne have brought out
the fact, that of all herbs within their reach cows se-
lect about 276, whilst about 218 are passed by; and
precisely those 276 correspond to the cow's organism,
whilst as experience proved many of the other 218 are
of a poisonous character. If, therefore , the exterior sen-
ses alone are not sufficient to explain the facts, will the
interior sense give us a satisfactory answer to the
question, how animals are enabled with such unfail-
ing certainty to distinguish between the beneficial and
harmful? Will an interior sense (sensus communis)
suffice to explain that wonderful sagacity of animals,
by which they choose their proper nourishment, by
which they adopt the most appropriate means of de-
fence and propagation? If the animal's interior sense
is exactly the same as that of man, then, indeed, we
must confess that the phenomena put before us are al-
together inexplicable; for the interior sense of man
as such, without the guidance of reason, is not suffi-
cient even to preserve us from the greatest dangers.
The child in the forest smiles, when it takes the
poisonous berry; and its tender life is preserved only
by the care of a loving mother, who is endowed with
reason, until its own dormant intellect is active and
begins to be its guide. Must we then fall back on an in-
tellect to explain facts otherwise inexplicable in the
instinctive actions of animals! Must we defend
Brehm's ridiculous dolls? If so, we must go farther
than Brehm went, and ascribe to animals an intelli-

INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS CONGITIOX. 53

gence far superior to our own; we must bow down be-
fore the animal, which manifests from the very first
day of its existence a degree of wisdom that men
acquire only after years of experience and labor-
ious study. Let us not forget the example of the
Rhynchites betulae, but remember how this tinj^
beetle "without any study solves mathematical
and technical problems, which the mind of man has
brooded over for centuries; how at the very first trial
it performs its work with the greatest perfection,
though no parents, no brothers or sisters were its
teachers, though no experience extending over years
developed the use of its faculties; how with mar-
vellous anticipation it provides for future circumstan-
ces, of which it could have no notion whatsoever
either by its own experience or by human ratioci-
nation; how in fine under ordinary circumstances it
communicates to its work such manifold perfection and
such appropriateness for the desired purpose that the
thousands of specimens of man's art and industry seem
to be the unfinished work of an apprentice." l)
Undoubtedly an intelligence is manifest in the instinc-
tive actions of animals which evidently surpasses that
of man. And yet the elder Agassiz and his followers
err in attributing this intelligence to the animal itself
and in maintaining that in the question of spiritual
faculties man should not arrogate to himself a privi-
leged position in the animal creation. This sup-
position not only destroys the dignity of man and
elevates the animal to a sort of God-like being, but
brings us into collision with indisputable facts. In-
') E. Wasmann, S. J., Der Trichterwickler, 1884, p. 56.

52 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

deed, as we have proved, there is no greater error
imaginable, than to attribute to animals, when acting
instinctively, an intellect similar to that of man. If
then the animal acting under the laws of instinct can-
not boast even of a human intelligence, then all in-
telligence of a higher kind is a fortiori excluded.
No, the superhuman intelligence, radiating, as it were,
from all instinctive activity, does not abide in the ani-
mal itself. On the contrary, we are impelled with
logical necessity by most evident facts to acknowledge
a being which many nowadays are so surprisingly loath
to admit, namely, a divine Intelligence, distinct from
the animal and from the whole creation, a personal
God, infinitely wise and powerful. But since it is re-
pugnant that this God personally governs the animal's
instinctive activity by endless miracles, we have to as-
sume that the Infinite has inscribed in the animal as
in every living being an immanent law according to
which the animal by its own activity performs its in-
stinctive actions. And wherein does this law consist?
As we have seen the facts do not allow us to assign to the
animal when acting instinctively a higher faculty than
sensitive cognition and appetency. Consequently, we
have to infer that the law imprinted in the animal-soul
consists in this very sensitive cognition and appetency,
qualified in such a way that, as St. Thomas says,
"what is the specific object of pleasure to the animal"
is at the same time "the best and most appropriate ob-
ject of its well being. ' '

What, therefore, is our definition of instinct? L,add
says: "The simple fact is that we find men and the
lower animals generally, using the structure with

INSTINCT AND SENSUOUS COGNITION. 53

which they are gifted by nature, in ways significant of
feelings of craving, of anticipations of ends, and of
adaptation of means which considered in themselves
imply far higher degrees of conscious ideation than, so
far as we can judge, really exists. To such complex
conditions of consciousness with their motor accom-
paniments we give the term instincts. " x ) In other
words: Instinct consists in the sensuous cognition
and appetency of the agent, which . enables it to per-
form purposeful actions without becoming conscious
of the purpose as such. The satisfaction of the ani-
mal's cravings guided by sense-experience normally
coincides with its general welfare. How instinctive
actions are actually performed by the agent, which
nerves and which parts of the spinal cord and brain
come into play, how external stimuli affect the end-
organs of sense and set up a nerve-commotion that is
propagated to the brain and finally acts upon the ani-
mal soul to elicit a purposeful action, all this is "sec-
ondary and of no moment for our present dissertation.
For our purpose it is sufficient to have brought out the
principal characteristics of instinct and instinctive ac-
tivities which are (1) final tendency without con-
sciousness of final tendency; (2) sensuous cognition
and appetency normally combining "the specific object
of pleasure to the animal" "with the best and most
appropriate object of its well-being. ' '

l) I.e., p. 600.

CHAPTER V.
Instinct and Sense-Experience.

J NSTINCTIVE actions are not absolutely uniform
and infallible. On the contrary, they may be mod-
ified by experience. Ants kept in artificial nests
generally fall with fury upon any strange object intro-
duced into their midst. But this behavior may be
modified. If a piece of ice is thrown among them,
they first attack it violently. Soon, however, they
experience the fatal cold and retreat, taking sooner or
later a "lesson" for the future. The question is
whether this element of experience changes the nature
of an instinctive action and elevates it to the rank of
such as proceed from intelligence.

As we have indicated, it is the general opinion of
modern naturalists, that only those actions of animals
are instinctive which immediately arise from heredi-
tary disposition, whilst all those which pre -suppose
individual experience are due to intelligence.

Mr. George W. Peckham of Milwaukee, who has
written some interesting papers on spiders and a splen-
did monograph on the instincts and habits of wasps,
explains this general opinion as follows: "Under the
term instinct we place all complex acts that are per-
formed previous to experience and in a similar manner
by all members of the same sex and race, leaving out
as non-essential, at this time, the question of whether

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INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 55

they are or are not accompanied by consciousness.
Under intelligence we place those conscious actions
which are more or less modifiable by experience. " * )

Therefore, whenever an animal makes use of a for-
mer experience or adapts its manner of acting to the
changed conditions of its surroundings, its actions are
manifestations of intellect; and vice versa, whenever
the animal is determined by inherited impulses its ac-
tions are merely instinctive. In other words, if we
have to decide in a given case whether an animal acts
instinctively or intellectually, we must answer the
question: "Did any previous or actual experience
modify the action or not?" If the answer is affirm-
ative, that is to say, if the animal was influenced by
experience to adopt an appropriate deviation from its
general way of acting, the action is said to be the re-
sult of intelligence; if the answer is negative, the ac-
tion must be ascribed to instinct.

What are we to think of this criterion?

Let us see: A criterion is a sign or characteristic
mark which enables us to discriminate with certainty
and under all circumstances between two or more ob-
jects or actions. Consequently, its first and most es-
sential quality consists in this, that the mark or sign
of distinction is not common to the objects or actions
between which we have to discriminate. Hence, if it
can be proved, that there are actions which in spite of
modification by experience are undoubtedly of instinc-
tive nature, the generally accepted criterion of distinc-
tion between instinctive and intellectual activity is

!) 1. c., p. 231.

56 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

evidently false, because the characteristic sign of dis-
crimination is common to both species of actions. Is
this the case?

Speaking of the so-called Pelopaei (Mud- Daubers),
Mr. Peckham says, that "originally they built under
overhanging rocks and in hollow trees. " And now,
"when near human habitations these wasps make use
of the more convenient positions which they offer. ' '
' 'The spot chosen for the nest may be in a barn up
among the rafters, in an outhouse, under the roof of a
porch, or, indeed, in any sheltered place where it will
be protected." x) According to Mr. Peckham's
criterion, the former mode of building in hollow trees
is instinctive, whereas the latter mode of building in
house -chimneys is an intelligent act. For the former
does not depend on any experience whatsoever, whilst
the latter is a modification of the former, due to actual
experience. And in reality Mr. Peckham enumerates
this example among the instances which he advances
for the intelligence of wasps.

But does the experience which influenced the for-
mer mode of action change its instinctive nature?

Every wasp is endowed with instinct. Hence it pos-
sesses the inherited faculty of forming associations of
sense perceptions and feelings necessary for the preser-
vation of its species. But the single associations as
such are not inherited. For, if this were the case, we
would have to assume special innate forms of cognition
representing the exterior objects of every one of
the thousands and thousands of instinctive actions of
animals. But this assumption is as extravagant as it

>) I.e., p. 177.

INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 57

is uncalled for. If, then, our wasp is wont to build
its -house of loam in a hollow tree, this act is not de-
termined by an innate representation of this or that
tree, but by an instinctive faculty which enables the
wasp, unconsciously, to combine with its impulse to
build a nest the representation of any hollow tree.
Otherwise we would have to assume that an immense
"picture-gallery" of all possible kinds of hollow trees
pre-existed in the soul and ganglion centres of the
wasp. For these wasps do not restrict their nest-build-
ing to trees of a special shape and form, but select
any trees that seem fit for the purpose. It is
evident that the wasp's action in selecting chimneys,
where they are to be found, must be explained by the
very same psychological laws which influence the se-
lection of a hollow tree where no more convenient
object is to be met with. For, if the wasp has the instinc-
tive faculty of combining the sensuous perception of any
appropriate object with the corresponding sensitive im-
pulse, why should this faculty not suffice for selecting
any other appropriate place instead of a tree? Indeed,
the only difference between the two actions lies in
this, that the perception of a chimney is more readily
combined with the respective instinctive impulse than
the perception of a hollow tree.

Consequently, the wasp's second action, which is
modified by sensuous experience, belongs equally to
the domain of instinct, and the above-mentioned cri-
terion does not express the real difference between in-
stinctive and intelligent activity. 1)

*) The following examples illustrate the same conclusion:
Everybody admits that children instinctively shrink from a

58 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

We may affirm this conclusion with still greater
confidence, as almost all the examples brought for-
ward by Mr. Peckham are similar to the one we have

chosen Even when there is question of a whole

series of sense perceptions which are associated with
each other and modify the action of the animal, the
criterion of the defenders of animal intelligence cannot
be admitted, as instinct always implies the faculty of
combining any sensuous perception unconsciously with
its corresponding impulse. Hence it is an arbitrary
assertion to maintain that this faculty does not suffice
or that it loses its character, when there is question. of
many sensitive perceptions or of those which arise in
the sensitive memory of the animal. As long as we
remain within the realm of merely sensuous cognition,
there is no reason for calling upon a higher faculty.
But, there is one example in Mr. Peckham's book
which seems to be of a different nature from the one
explained above. Let us shortly consider the inter-
esting case. Peckham's description is as follows:

red hot iron. But this manner of acting is due to experience.
For, as we all know, children shrink from a glowing piece of
iron only after having experienced the painful consequence
of touching it on a former occasion. "A burnt child shuns
the fire." Hence an action, though modified by experience,
does not necessarily lose its instinctive character. Moreover,
the above mentioned criterion eliminates from the realm of
instinctive activity every action, from which the element of
experience cannot be dissociated. As soon as a new-born pup
begins to suck, ^.experiences the pleasant taste of its mother's
milk, and its experience enters into and influences the con-
tinuation of the action. Consequently, an instinctive action
would cease to be instinctive, as soon as it commences.

INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 59

"Just here must be told the story of one Httle wasp
whose individuality stands out in our mind more dis-
tinctly than that of any of the others. We remember
her as the most fastidious and perfect little worker of
the whole season, so nice was she in her adaptation of
means to ends, so busy and contented in her labor of
love, and so pretty in her pride over her completed
work. In filling up her nest she put her head down
into it and bit away the loose earth from the sides,
letting it fall to the bottom of the burrow, and then,
after a quantity had accumulated jammed it down
with her head. Earth was then brought from the out-
side and pressed in, and then more was bitten from
the sides. When, at last, the filling was level with
the ground, she brought a quantity of fine grains of
dirt to the spot and picking up a small pebble in her
mandibles, used it as a hammer in pounding them
down with rapid strokes, thus making this spot as
hard and firm as the surrounding surfaces (Plate II,
Fig. 2) . Before we could recover from our astonish-
ment at this performance she had dropped her stone
and was bringing more earth. We then threw our-
selves down on the ground that not a motion might
be lost, and in a moment we saw her pick up the peb-
ble and again pound the earth into place with it,
hammering now here and now there until all was
level. Once more the whole process was repeated,
and then the little creature, all unconscious of the
commotion that she had aroused in our minds, uncon-
scious indeed of our very existence and intent only on
doing her work and doing it well, gave one final,

60 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

comprehensive glance around and flew away." *)
We do not believe that Mr. Peckham's interpreta-
tion of the facts is warranted by what he actually saw.
The simple fact seems to be as follows: The pebble
happened to be somewhat larger than the other ma-
terial used in closing the nest. Anxious to fill up the
burrow as perfectly as possible the wasp made a num-
ber of attempts to press the pebble into the ground.
But all was in vain. The wasp did not succeed in
forcing the pebble into the ground, so that all would
be perfectly level. Hence after repeated trials she
abandoned the pebble altogether. The fact that the
wasp took up a pebble somewhat larger than usual is
not wonderful at all, since it often makes use of a
pebble of considerable size to deposit it into the lower
part of the newly made nest. Hence we are not dis-
posed to accept Peckham's claim that the wasp "im-
provised a tool and made intelligent use of it".

We distinguish therefore two kinds of instinctive
actions, both proceeding from the self-same sensuous
cognition and appetency. But while the first group
springs directly from the inherited dispositions of the
agent's sensitive faculties, the second group implies a
modification of the actions through sense-experience.
We do not insist upon mere names; and if any one
prefers to introduce another phrase for designating in-
stinctive action modified by sense-experience, he may
do so. But no matter what term he may choose, the
word "intelligence" (that is rational intelligence) is
out of place, unless of course the word is taken in a

*) 1. c., p. 22-23. There is a second fact recorded by Mr.
Williston, which is of a similar nature.

INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 61

merely analogous sense. For that word conveys the
idea that all actions modified by sense-experience nec-
essarily imply consciousness of finality, which is posi-
tively false. Prof. Wheeler says against Wasmann
"that he has overshot the mark and attempted to in-
clude too much in his conception of instinct." "I
should continue, therefore," he adds, "to emphasize
the difference between activities which are compelled
by inherited mechanism and those which imply choice
on the part of the individual organism. For the latter
the term "intelligence" has been so very generally
used that it seems both hopeless and idle to restrict it,
as Wasmann so emphatically desires, to the ratiocina-
tive process in its clearest manifestations. " x ) We do
not deny that true choice supposes intelligence. But
we do deny that instinctive actions modified by sense-
experience necessarily imply choice. What is
"choice?" The Standard dictionary answers "that
power of the will by which one freely prefers and se-
lects as an end of action some one good out of those
presented to the mind. ' ' This definition is clear and
to the point. It evidently supposes that the one who
chooses compares two or more objects with each other
and having understood the relation of them to himself
freely selects the one and rejects the rest. Here is an
illustration w7ell adapted for our purpose: On May
5th, 1905 we arranged an ant nest for I^asius interjectus
consisting of two compartments connected by a small
opening. Compartment No. 1 was dark, dry and with-
out earth ; compartment No. 2 was light and contained
earth. About 100 ants with some 40 young larvae
l) 1. c., p. 809.

62 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

were introduced into compartment No. 2. Within 15
minutes all had withdrawn into the dark compartment
No. 1. On the following day the earth in compart-
ment No. 2 was moistened. Soon the ants moved
over from No. 1 into No. 2. But after some six hours
the ants commenced with carrying over the moist earth
from No. 2 into No. 1 which now was moist, dark and
contained earth and thus was most comfortable. The
action of the ants implies "choice" in as far as the
one compartment is preferred to the other. But this is
not "choice" in its proper meaning. The ants simply
do and must do what they experience to be more
agreeable to their senses. The concrete moist and
dark compartment affects them more pleasantly than
the other, and this concrete perception awakens the
concrete desire to be in the more comfortable com-
partment, which again is followed by the appropriate
locomotion of certain organs. But there is no indica-
tion of the ants becoming conscious of the abstract
relation between the various conditiona of the two
compartments to each other and to their own welfare.
Nor is there any trace of a free determination upon
some alternative.

Choice implies logical thought and the power
of abstraction. For without becoming conscious of
the purpose of the action as such, without knowing
and understanding why the one object is to be pre-
ferred to another, a true and free choice is impossible.
It is clear, therefore, that instinctive actions modified
by sense-experience do not necessarily imply
choice. Otherwise we would have to admit that the
wasp mentioned above compares hollow trees and

INSTINCT AND SENSE-EXPERIENCE. 63

chimneys and, having studied and understood at least
some advantages afforded by either, freely decides to
depart from the traditions of its race and select chimneys
for its future nest. We need not repeat that such an
assumption is unwarranted. The ' ' choice ' ' of the wasp
is no real "choice." In fact, it implies no more
"choice" than many an action preceeding from in-
herited dispositions, such as distinguishing true food
from poison and all indifferent material. The wasp
"selects" a chimney, simply because it has the in-
herited faculty at a suitable time to react appropriately
upon a concrete sensitive impression made upon it by
a concrete suitable object without becoming conscious
of the appropriateness of the action. It is anything
but sensitive cognition and appetency, and there is no
reason for attributing it to a higher faculty of abstrac-
tion and logical thought.

We agree, therefore, with Prof. Wheeler when
he calls choice a characteristic mark of intelligence, but
we differ from him when he asserts that modification
by sense-experience necessarily implies choice. Be-
sides we believe Prof. Wheeler does not lay sufficient
stress on the fact above demonstrated that instinctive
activities even in as far as they proceed from an inherit-
ed mechanism are directed by sensuous cognition and
appetency and hence that they differ from merely re-
flex actions which include no sensuous consciousness
whatever. For Wheeler simply speaks of "actions
compelled by inherited mechanism, ' ' a definition which
is certainly incomplete and characteristic of reflex
actions.

We conclude, therefore, that Prof. Wheeler,

64 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE.

as well as most modern naturalists, defend a con-
cept of instinct which does not apply to instinct
at all, but to intelligence and to reflex actions. Let
us now proceed to define more accurately the true dis-
tinction and criterion of discrimination between in-
stinct and intelligence.

CHAPTER VI.
Instinct and Intelligence.

"VW" HAT is the true criterion of distinction between
instinct and intelligence?

A brief exposition of the nature of an intelligent
act will furnish an answer to this question. We may
define intelligent, in opposition to instinctive, activity
as one that is performed with perfect consciousness of
its tendency, and is consequently guided by a purely
spiritual faculty of cognition and appetite.

The first part of this definition is self-evident,
and sufficiently characterizes intelligent activity.
Moreover, it is generally admitted. Thus Emery
describes intelligence as the faculty of abstracting
general ideas from the multiplex phantasms which
have been acquired by experience, and of utilizing
them in connection with sensuous images to perform
actions which imply a conscious final tendency. And,
strange as it may sound, all our opponents without
exception, notwithstanding their own false criterion,
endeavor to prove the intelligence of animals by
ascribing to them a consciousness of final tendency.
They do not commit the absurdity of denying the ne-
cessity of this tendency for such actions as the plan-
ning of houses, the framing of laws, the solution of
mathematical problems and all purely intelligent act-
ivity, but readily admit that this very consciousness

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66 THK HUMANIZING OK THE BRUTE.

of finality raises these actions to the level of intelli-
gence. It would, therefore, be a quixotic fight
against wind-mills to prove that the essence of an in-
telligent action demands the consciousness of its final-
ity. No, the question at issue reaches much further.
Wasmann lodges the complaint against Romanes,
that he claims intelligence for all actions of animals
that are based on sensuous experience, although he
simultaneously acknowledges that intelligence con-
sists in the power of drawing logical conclusions.

Wheeler, too, as we have seen, makes "intelli-
gence" dependent on manifestations of ''choice" and
Peckham declares that intelligence is the power which
"enables an insect to seek, accept, refuse, choose, —
to decline to make use of this or to turn to account
some other thing. " l ) But both Wheeler and Peckham
maintain at the same time that modification in con-
sequence of sense-experience renders instinctive ac-
tions intelligent. It is this deplorable contradiction
which touches the vital point in the argumentation of
eve n the most moderate defenders of animal intelli-
gence.

They consider consciousness of purpose as inseparable
from ///e utilization of experience; wherever there is
sensuous]experience there is consciousness of purpose,
and vice -versa. Their criterion states that every ac-
tion is intelligent that is appropriately modified by any
kind of experience; and still they insist on the con-
sciousness of final tendency as the real essence of in-
telligent activity. Hence in their view the appropriate
modification of an action by experience and conscious-

'; 1. c., p. 231.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 67

ness of its finality are so intimately connected that
the one necessarily presupposes the other. But this
is the fundamental tenet of materialism and destroys
the true nature of an intelligent act. Consciousness of
piirpose is impossible without spiritual cognition. They
are identical, and therefore our definition adds that an
intelligent act is guided by a purely spiritual faculty
of cognition and appetite. The whole question de-
pends on the proof of this last inference.

Let us open the argument with an illustration.
We select that of the babe in the cradle. Its reason-
ing faculty is still dormant. It is hungry and cries.
Its mother puts a milk bottle into its hands. For a
moment its desires are appeased. But soon the same
scene has to be repeated, until finally the child finds
the bottle of itself, when it feels the pangs of hunger.
No one will dare to affirm that it has attained the use
of reason, and yet no one can deny, that in conse-
quence of repeated experience in some way or other
the feeling of hunger and the milk-bottle are connect-
ed in the child's perception. Otherwise it is impossi-
ble to explain why the child constantly grasps the bot-
tle when it is hungry. But who will maintain that
the babe acts with consciousness of the finality of its
action?

Here is another example. When Rhynchites be-
tulse feels the natural impulse to lay eggs, it in-
variably prepares a funnel-shaped depository and
lays its eggs in the folds of this artistic bed. It evi-
dently perceives in some way a connection between
the funnel and its impulse to lay eggs. Otherwise
this beetle would neither prepare the funnel nor al-

68 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE.

ways place its egg precisely in the requisite folds, but
would at least, once in a while, deposit them else-
where, on a more convenient spot. But, does this
perception warrant the conclusion that R. betulae acts
with consciousness of finality? Undoubtedly not.
For an action that is guided by "purpose" and per-
formed with "consciousness" demands far more than
a me re combination of the phantasms of things which
are related to each other as means and end. This very
relation of end and -means must be clearly recognized
as such. Or, as St. Thomas puts it: "The perfect
knowledge of an end demands not only the perception
of the object which constitutes that end, but its recog-
nition as an end and its relation to the means used to
attain it." But this evidently implies the formal
cognition of finality, the clear perception of the ab-
stract relation between means and end. When a man
wants to enjoy his breakfast with consciousness of final-
ity, it is not sufficient to combine in his imagination
the concrete things before him and his concrete im-
pulse to eat them, a combination which naturally pro-
duces an agreeable feeling and calls forth an appro-
piate exercise of the limbs towards the breakfast
table, but he must understand the abstract relation
between the savory beef-steak as the means and the
satisfaction of his hunger as the end, and guided by
this cognition he must eat his breakfast.

Therefore, every action that is guided by "purpose' '
and directed by "consciousness of purpose" presup-
poses as least requisite the cognition of means and end as
such, of relations as such, and consequently implies
universal ideas. Thus far few of our opponents will find

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 69

any difficulty in admitting our argument. But our
way s separate , when we put the question : Is a sensitive
power of cognition able to form general notions or not?

To answer this question we must first of all inquire
into the nature of a universal idea and investigate its
main difference from a so-called common phantasm.
When Clarke 1) calls the distinction between the
abstract idea and the common phantasm of the imag-
ination "the very touchstone of a philosophical sys-
tem", he enunciates a truth that is of paramount im-
portance in our present investigation. Everywhere in
the writings of those who defend animal intelligence,
abstract ideas and common phantasms are essentially
alike or, at the most, described as different degrees of one
and the same faculty of abstraction. Dr. Forel even
calls a universal idea "a general sensory idea" "like
the idea 'ant enemy"2); and L,add, who is one of
the least offenders in most of his philosophical views,
deplores the fact that "much confusion has always
arisen in psychological discussion on account of the
very natural use of the word 'idea' for both the con-
crete sensuous image and the concept or product oi
thought" 3).

What, then, is a common phantasm?

When, before sunrise, a fisherman unmoors his
boat in the pleasant anticipation of a rich haul, his
imagination is naturally enough occupied with the
picture of a fine fish. In spite of the general resem-

*) Richard F. Clarke, S.J., Logic, ed. 3., p. 123.

2) Ants and Some other Insects, (Religion of Science
Library) No. 56, p. 22.

3) 1. c., p. 378.

70 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

blance to the fishy tribe this imaginary fish is alto-
gether void of any universality, and represents merely
an individual fish. Let us try to eliminate the quali-
ties in which it differs from other fish and bring out
those which it has in common with them. Can this
image now be called universal? Or must we not con-
cede, that in spite of a great similarity with fish in
general the image is still concrete and individual? It
may be that the discriminating marks are less promi-
nent, but the common marks of all fish, as form, color,
fins, are still, as it were, in the foreground of our
imagination. The image is and remains the represen-
tation of an individual fish. We may make as many
efforts as we like, as long as the fish remains a product
of our imagination we can never deprive it of all definite
shape and color, and of definite extension. "I can con-
sider," says Berkeley, "the hand, the eye, the nose,
each by itself abstracted and separated from the rest
of the body. But, then, whatever hand or eye I -im-
agine, it must have some particular shape and color' ' x ) .
As long as the representation of an object possesses
color and extension it is not universal. What infer-
ence have we to make from this conclusion? It is
this, that there are no real universal phantasms,
and that the abstractive faculty of the imagination
consists merely in the weaker or stronger representation
of sensitive perceptions.

The common phantasm, either as an act or the rep-
resentation of an object, is and remains individual.
Or, as Clarke has it: "The common phantasm is not
really common at all. It is simply an individual

l) Michael Maher, S.J., Psychology ed. 4., p. 236.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 71

phantasm, rendered so vague and indistinct by the
separation from it of its distinguishing characteristics
that it will stand just as well, or just as badly, for one
individual as another". x)

The case is -very different with universal ideas. It
is true, that they are so closely connected with com-
mon phantasms that we are unable to form a universal
idea without beginning with the perception of the
senses and without being accompanied in our mental
activity by phantasms of the imagination. Nor do we
deny that the common phantasm by a kind of analog-
ous universality bears some resemblance to the corres-
ponding universal idea. Nevertheless, they are very
different in their real nature.

In what does this difference consist?

As every one concedes, the propositions: "the
angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, the
cow belongs to the vertebrates, man is mortal," in-
volve universal ideas. For when pronouncing these
truths we do not restrict them to any particular trian-
gle or cow or man, but to all triangles, cows and men
without exception and in the very same sense. Now,
what must and what must not be attributed to these
universal ideas, in as far as they are opposed to the
corresponding common phantasms? To say nothing
of less important distinctions, as the sharp and precise
clearness of the idea and the vague obscurity of the
common phantasm, the -main difference lies in the
fact, that the universal idea is really and essentially
universal and free from, any definite extension^ whilst
the common phantasm, even when it is so "universal"

») Clarke, 1. c., p. 137.

72 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

as almost to vanish from our imagination, still retains
a definite extension , and remains essentially individual.
The universal concept of a man or a triangle can be
applied not only to a redskin or a negro, not only to
this or that triangle, obtuse or equilateral, but to all
men and all triangles without any exception,
whilst the phantasm of a triangle even in the most
extreme case can never be identified with any other
triangle. It even disappears from our imagination, if
we eliminate its sides of a definite length, its obtuse
or acute angles. But the universal idea of a triangle
is independent of all this. It can be identified with
any existing or possible triangle, even if the latter be
so large that its three vertices rest on three different
fixed stars, or so small that we can perceive it only by
means of a microscope, if its sides be green or blue,
its angles obtuse or acute. These are merely casual
differences, and do not affect its nature as a triangle.
The universal idea expresses that which constitutes a
being, denotes its essence, its nature, whilst the pic-
ture in the imagination merely represents a being,
colored in such and such a way, of this or that exten-
sion. The color and extension of things, even of one
and the same class, may be different; but the nature of
things must be the same in all. A man deprived of his
essence, of that which makes him what he is, would
no longer be a man, and a triangle no longer a trian-
gle. Still, we do not wish to say that the universal
idea of human nature exists in the same way, that is, as
universal, in every individual human being. That is
the error of the ultra-realists. Every finite being that
exists, or can be called into existence, is necessarily

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 73

individual and realizes the universal idea of that being
in its own way. Every human being is a man, but
never the same man. My own individual human na-
ture is not identical with the individual human nature
of anybody else. But we do want to say that every
finite essence can be deprived of its individuality by ab-
straction; that by this process we attain a universal idea,
the so-called metaphysical essence of the Scholastics,
which is one and the same, and can be predi-
cated of every individual being belonging to that
class. l<The physical is not the same, but perfectly
alike in all; the metaphysical essence is nothing else
than the physical essence inadequately conceived by
us. ' ' Nor is this universal idea a mere fiction of the
mind. It is based on the perfect likeness of individ-
uals of the same essence. In forming it, our mind
does not produce but presupposes this perfect likeness
as something entirely independent of all intellectual
activity.

For all men, no matter what their stature, color,
and so forth may be, are true men and have what we
call a "human nature"; and all triangles possess, as a
matter of fact and independently of the mind that
which makes them triangles. The only thing that
the intellect produces is the iiniversality as such. For
the intellect has the power of perfect abstraction. It
is capable of omitting all differences between the objects
under consideration, including that property which
makes every object individual, and of conceiving or
retaining merely what is truly common to all of them.

What, therefore, is the true nature of the univer-
sal idea and the common phantasm?

74 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

Both are acts of the mind and as such they are in-
dividual, just as any other existing object or property.
But, in as far as their objective contents are concerned,
that is, in as far as they are representations of objects,
the common phantasm is and remains individual and
extended, while the universal idea is universal and
inextended, even though the object in its actual state
of existence possesses the quality of extension. For,
as long as we do not eliminate any and every vestige
of extension, the representation of the object is devoid
of the character of universality. True universality
absolutely demands that even the last trace of individual-
ity disappears.

What, therefore, is our answer to the question : Is a
sensitive faculty able to form general notions?

It must be negative. For as one of our best psych-
ologists puts the argument: "We are capable of ap-
prehending and representing to ourselves abstract and
universal ideas. But such operations could not be
states of a faculty exerted through, or intrinsically de-
pendent on, a bodily organ. A power of this kind
can only react in response to physical impressions,
and can only form representations of a concrete charac-
ter, depicting contingent individual facts. But, uni-
versality, possibility, logical sequence, general rela-
tions, do not constitute such a physical stimulus, and
consequently could not be apprehended by an organic
faculty. Consequently these higher mental functions
must be admitted to be of a spiritual character; they
thus transcend the sphere of all actions depending in-
trinsically or essentially by their nature on a natural
instrument." x)

x) Maher, 1. c., p. 471.

INSTINCT AND INTELLIGENCE. 75

In other words: A sensuous faculty is by its very
nature extended, and can represent only extended ob-
jects. But universal ideas as such are completely inde-
pendent of every vestige of definite extension. There-
fore^ a sensuous faculty is imable to form general ideas.

What is the necessary conclusion?

Perhaps that there are no universal ideas? But the
foregoing explanations prove that this is absurd.
With logical necessity, therefore, and not because
"some peculiar bias has influenced our philosophical
views", we have to assert that any one who is able to
form universal ideas by abstraction must be endowed
with a faculty which trancends the power of the senses,
with a faculty capable of representing inextended ob-
jects, and extended ones in an inextended manner. In
other words, the cognition of universal ideas is insep
arably connected with a supersensuous •, immaterial,
spiritual intellect.

Perhaps many an adversary will reject this conclu-
sion, because it leads with inevitable necessity to the
acknowledgment of a spiritual soul in man, which,
even in the eyes of so eminent a scientist as Emery, is
a mysterious being, whose existence man may recog-
nize or deny, according to his views of the universe
and of the nature of man.

But, if a spiritual faculty is necessary to form uni-
versal ideas, it is equally necessary to act with con-
sciousness of finality; for, as we have proved, this con-
sciousness implies universal ideas. Again, as "piir-
pose," supposes consciousness of finality, there can be
no action directed by ' 'purpose' ' without a spiritual

76 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

faculty. Herewith we have proved our definition
that intelligent activity involves essentially a perfect con-
sciousness of final tendency, and is guided by a purely
spiritual cognition arid appetite,

What, therefore, is the essential criterion of distinc-
tion between instinctive and intelligent activity? An
intelligent action implies necessarily consciousness of fina-
lity, whilst an instinctive one does not. Does this criter-
ion postulate an essential difference? Yes, an instinc-
tive action is of a sensuous, an intelligent act of a spiri-
tual character.

PART II. .
ANIMALS HAVE NO INTELLIGENCE.

CHAPTER VII.
The "Intelligence" of "The Lower Animals".

I Tis true, that most modern naturalists, as was men-
tioned before, deny the difference in quality
between the human mind and the animal soul which
is strenuously upheld by Catholic philosophy. They
consider themselves and their ideas as a "product and
a subject of universal evolution". "Surely," as Pro-
fessor W. M. Wheeler says, when commenting on
Wasmann's views, "the sciences of comparative phy-
siology, anatomy and embryology, not to mention
paleontology, distribution and taxonomy must have
been cultivated to little purpose during the nineteenth
century, if we are to rest satisfied with the scholastic
definition of ratiocination as an adequate and final
verity. And surely no one who is conversant with
modern biological science will accept the views that
the power of abstract ratiocinative thought, which is
absent in infants and young children, scarcely deve-
loped in savages, and highly developed and generally
manifested only in the minority of civilized men, has
miraculously ( ! ) sprung into existence in full panoply
like the daughter of Jove. " 1 )

l) The American Naturalist, vol. XXXV (1901), p. 873.
(77)

78 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

We fail to see how the results of the sciences en-
umerated by Prof. Wheeler could ever change the def-
inition of intelligence developed in the preceding
pages, since that definition rests on totally different
grounds and belongs to a sphere which even a science
like physiology can only approach, but never reach.
The fact that intelligent actions can only proceed from
an inextended spiritual faculty is indeed a final verity,
which, it is true, may find a much deeper and more
adequate explanation as true human psychology ad-
vances, but which will never be changed in the point
it emphasizes.

We have seen in the first part of this essay that the
essential criterion for discriminating instinctive and
intelligent actions from each other lies in the fact
whether or not the animal evinces consciousness of the
finality guiding its actions. This criterion we shall
apply in our present investigation, which proposes to
show that neither the lower nor the higher animals
betray the slightest vestige of intelligence. "High
animals" are distinguished from "low animals" by
the fact that the bodies of the latter are less different-
iated than those of the former. Practically the dis-
tinction will coincide with the division of the animal
kingdom into invertebrates and vertebrates.

In order to establish the proposition that the lower
animals are void of intelligence we propose to enter
upon a most remarkable psychic contrast observed in
the life-history of two ant-species, Polyergus and For-
mica sanguinea. The latter easily holds the first place
among all ants and, in general, among all lower ani-
mals. This fact is freely granted by the best observ-

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 79

ers of ants. Some even, as Sir John Lubbock, main-
tain that in a certain sense the Formica sanguinea
stands next to man. Hence, to substantiate the prop-
osition that the lower animals are void of intelligence,
it is but necessary to prove that this famous ant does
not possess any higher faculty than mere animal in-
stinct. Another reason, why we give preference to
ants as subjects of our inquiry, is because the actions
of no other animal have been so much misinterpreted
for upholding the doctrine of animal intelligence.

This is especially true of the ant-species Polyergus,
which we have selected as first example. x )

It is a warm sunny day in June. In a colony of
the Polyergus rufescens (Plate III., Fig. 1) feverish
activity is displayed. The Amazons (this is their
popular name in Europe), having spent well nigh the
whole morning in preening their legs and feelers, rally
upon their battlements, that is on the top of their nest,
and with great haste and evident excitement descend
for a warlike expedition. Within about 50 paces of
their castle there is in a meadow a settlement of the
Formica rufibarbis. Already some time before some
roving members of the Polyergus household have ac-
cidentally hit upon this formicary, and now under
their guidance a goodly array of about 1000 "slave-
hunters" may be seen marching in an almost straight
line upon their destined prey. Having arrived with-
in 10 cm. of the enemy's stronghold, the vanguard
comes to a stop, giving a violent signal with their feel-
ers to the ranks immediately behind them. With in-

J) The following description was originally published in
the Scientific American Supplement.

30 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

credible rapidity a number of emissaries hurry through
the main body of the army, and in less than 30 seconds
the forces are ready for the attack. In a twinkling
they scale the walls of the F. rufibarbis bulwark. With
indescribable celerity the Amazons fall upon their en-
emy. And there we may behold a twofold spectacle.
While one part of the Polyergus warriors is murdering
the defenders of the hostile nest, the other and greater
part is rushing through every opening into the interior
of the enemy's citadel. Some minutes have passed.
A double stream of ants is issuing from the interior of
the nest. Both are loaded down with cocoons, the
"papooses" of ants, one consisting of F. rufibarbis en-
deavoring to save what may be saved, the other of the
Polyergus troops hastily returning with their booty.
There is no useless shedding of blood. The crania of
the F. rufibarbis are trepanned only in so far as they
refuse to yield up their progeny. Suddenly the scene
is changed. The F. rufibarbis, noticing the hasty
flight of the ravishers, at once pursue them to make
them give up their precious burden. There is a fierce
pulling and struggling hither and thither. The F.
rufibarbis plunge their mandibles into the legs and
feelers of the Amazons and cover them with venomous
ejections from their abdomens. But only some of the
Amazons' rearguard are constrained by superior num-
bers to deliver up the ravished cocoons, while one or
the other of their warriors remains a corpse upon the
field. In about ten minutes everything is over. The
scattered F. rufibarbis forces return to their dwelling
to restore everything, if possible, to its pristine state.
The stolen cocoons, however, are handed over by the
Polyergus to their slaves, already present in the nest,

THE INTELLIGENCE OF "THE LOWER ANIMALS". 81

for further care and development, or for consumption.
They themselves again squat on their four hindlegs,
to renew their comical cleaning operations, which
they interrupt only to extort food from some pass-
ing slave. The young ants, which are fortunate
enough to come safely out of their cocoons, are
in reality not treated by the colony as slaves (which
in this case is a wrong appellation) , but as full-fledged
citizens. However, it is their lot, at least in the nests
of the Polyergus, which are unfit for any work, to take
upon themselves the construction of the nest, the rear-
ing of the brood, and the victualizing of the whole
community. And this task they undertake with mas-
terly skill and rare devotion. Entirely forgetful, as it
were, of their home and kindred, they are absorbed
in caring for strangers. They are unconcerned even
about the propagation of their own species, they sac-
rifice that for which animals strive to the utmost mere-
ly in order to preserve the race of their oppressors,
which would otherwise be doomed to certain destruc-
tion.

This is the exterior appearance of one of the most
splendid expeditions ever observed by Huber, Forel or
Wasmann, and certainly the fact narrated seems to
betray a high degree of intelligence. For, first of all ,
by their warlike expeditions the Amazons seem to
intend to supply their household with new auxiliaries.
Moreover, the means applied for the purpose are most
appropriate. "Scouts" have explored the hostile nest
and seem to lead the whole army. At the right mo-
ment the signal for the attack is given. The attack
itself takes place on a sudden, with great celerity and
by all at once. Thus the enemy will be surprised and

82 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE.

the number of cocoons captured will be more consid-
erable. No blood is shed without purpose. More-
over, the Polyergus seem to distinguish very well be-
tween the useful cocoons of workers and the useless
and harmful ones of the females and males. Finally,
the ants apparently succeed in determining their
slaves to desist from the care of the preservation
of their own species, and to devote all their strength,
yea, even their very life, for the benefit of the colony
and the progeny of their ravishers.

These few facts, indeed, seem to throw a brilliant
light upon the psychic faculties of the ants; and though
some of them may be explained by very simple proc-
esses, there are scarcely any others in the life-history
of animals which present to us a more intellectual
appearance. The question now arises: Must these
facts in reality be attributed to true intelligence; do
they really involve true consciousness of finality?
A short consideration of the dark side in the life-his-
tory of these very same ants will convince us that this
question cannot be answered in the affirmative with-
out evident contradiction.

As will be known to many of our readers, the
mandibles of the Amazons are of a peculiar construc-
tion. They are not like those of other ants adapted
for many functions necessary to sustain the life of the
individuals and commonly exercised by those organs
(Plate III., Figs. 2 and 3). Hence the Amazons
essentially depend on the assistance of their help-
mates in many of their actions. This essential depen-
dence goes so far that throughout life the Polyergus
are even nourishedby their slaves. This fact is

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS' ' . 83

PLATE III

Fig 1.— A Polyergus (Polyergus bicolor Wasm.) (Original.)

Fig. 2. — Head and Mandibles of a
Formica seen from Below.
(Original.)

Fig. 3. — Head and Mandibles of a
Polyergus seen from Below.
(Original.)

Fig 4. — Lower Lip of a Formica
(labium). (Wasemann.) (a =
labial palpi ; b = ligula; c =
paraglossze.)

Pig. 5.— Lower Lip of a Polyergus-

(Wasmann.) a == labia 1 palpi I
= ligula; c = paraglossse.)

THE INTELLIGENCE OF " THE LOWER ANIMALS " . 85

sufficiently established by the observations of Huber,
I^espeo, Forel, Adlerz, Wasmann, etc.

The writer, too, had, occasion to verify the same
with regard to Polyergus bicolor Wasm. , a newly dis-
covered American Amazon. The process of feeding
takes place in the following manner. The hungry
Polyergus first violently buffets and strokes with feel-
ers and forelegs the head of a passing slave. If the
slave has sufficient food in its little crop, it causes a
drop of the prepared liquid to appear on its lower lip,
where it is licked off by the Amazon. Now it is cer-
tainly a very rare case that an animal so much de-
pends on others that it must even be fed by them dur-
ing its whole existence. And thus the two interesting
questions present themselves: First, what will happen
to the Polyergus if deprived of their slaves? And
secondly, are they at all able to obtain food independ-
ently of any exterior aid? As to the second question,
Wasmann sums up the results of a minute examina-
tion of the Amazon's mouth -parts in the following
statements: 1. By the construction of their mouth-
parts, and especially by the shortness of their palpi,
the Amazons show, indeed, that they are less adapted
for independent feeding than other ants related to
them (Figs. 4 and 5). 2. There is, however, no or-
ganic impossibility in the way of their independent
nutrition. For other ants with organs not less imper-
fect feed themselves without being assisted by others.
3. The structure of the so-called paraglossae seems
even to indicate that the Polyergus are able to obtain
food in an extraordinary manner (Figs. 4 and 5). Yet
these inferences from the construction of the mouth-

86 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

parts of the Polyergus would in themselves not be
sufficiently warranted, unless actual experiment had
corroborated them. Examining the mandibles of the
Polyergus, we find that on the interior side they have
a slight excavation widening toward the head (Fig.
1). But as the Amazons are endowed with great pred-
atory instinct, they take delight in exercising their
mandibles upon their foes; and if then these organs
happen to be inserted into the body of ants or their
cocoons, the channels contained in them convey the
liquid to the lower parts of the mouth. Now Was-
mann with sufficient frequency observed the following
fact: While the mandibles of a Polyergus, having
pierced the body of an enemy, were resting quietly in
the same position, their palpi and lower lips were
moving in regular intervals toward the inside, this
movement lasting from three to five minutes But
precisely this motion of the palpi and lip constitute
the eating operation of ants. Moreover, Adlerz, Was-
mann and the writer himself have noticed how in ob-
servation nests Polyergus accidentally coming into
contact with the glass panes of the walls licked off the
drops of precipitation found upon them. From this it
follows that the Polyergus are actually capable of in-
dependent nutrition. What should we, therefore, na-
turally expect of them, if they are robbed of their
slaves? Most assuredly that impelled by hunger they
would make use of their power of eating and would
make an independent effort to partake of the food
placed before them. But what are the actual facts?
The result of numberless experiments is the following:
Although the Polyergus are able to eat and accident-

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 87

ally do eat now and then, they must absolutely be fed
by their slaves, if they are to remain alive. You may
prepare for them the most pleasant dwelling and the
most exquisite nourishment; if you neglect to provide
them with slaves, they are doomed. Their desire for
nourishment impels them only to seek it from their
slaves, but never to make an attempt at independent
nutrition. Therefore, this ant apparently so intelli-
gent in its warlike operations, is so abnormally stupid
and helpless in private life, as not to be able to estab-
lish the simple relation between the promptings of ap-
petite and independent nutrition, and prefers death to
making use of its faculty of eating. But a being that
is capable of eating and from experience knows how
to eat, yet even in the greatest necessities with unex-
ceptional regularity, prefers to die than to eat
independently, is a rather poor specimen of ant
intelligence. There can be no question here of
some error of judgment, as may occur in man en-
dowed with intelligence. Real error cannot be a nor-
mal occurence; it is never found in all individuals of
the same species; it cannot be committed, unless there
is at least some appearance of truth and some influence
of passion or prejudice. Regarding the actions in
question, however, all the circumstances point not to
an accidental error, but to an entire absence of intelli-
gence. For in the first place, these actions are entire-
ly useless for the individuals performing them. Sec-
ondly, they occur with all the individuals so far
observed both in Europe and in America. Finally,
there can be no question of the influence of their will
under the stress of some passion or predilection. For

88 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

every natural desire would prompt them to do the op-
posite. Thus we are forced by inexorable facts to
deny to the great warrior ant, the much lauded Ama-
zon, the faculty of acting with the consciousness of
final purpose and to assign her a place in the realms
of mere animal instinct.

The second psychic contrast, which strongly con-
roborates the conclusion suggested by the first, is taken
from the life-history of Formica sanguinea. This ant,
it is true, does not exhibit the brilliant intrepidity char-
acterizing the warlike expeditions of the Polyergus.
According to Forel sixty amazons can put to flight
thousands of the Formica sanguinea. Again their
warlike tactics do not present the same certainty and
unity, at least not if there is question of more popu-
lous slave-nests. Finally the number of expeditions,
in the case of the Polyergus about 44 in 33 days with
a result of 40,000 cocoons, is in the case of the Formica
sanguinea comparatively insignificant. But in spite of
these facts, which are partially due to the independence
of the Fornica sanguinea from its auxiliaries, some
features in the expedition of this ant exteriorly seem
to indicate a superiority in psychic endowments. We
mention only a single instance. Whilst Polyergus
makes its attack in serried ranks and with all the forces
actually engaged in the expedition, Formica sanguinea
uses only a part of its troops for purposes of assault.
The rest, as if intending to blockade the hostile formi-
cary, distribute themselves in squadrons around it.
If, then, the inhabitants of the nest try to save their
young by flight, they are at once pursued and cap-
tured by the outlying posts. It is evident that this

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 89

procedure is admirably adapted to secure the desired
cocoons. For the nest of Formica fusca, the princi-
pal auxiliary of Formica sanguinea, is in most cases
not very large, and its inhabitants are cowards, at
least if alone. Thus it happens that a few of the
Formica sanguinea are sufficient to bring about a
universal flight. If, consequently, Formica sanguinea
would not divide its army, but make its attack with
all the forces, this kind of action would not only
waste the strength of the aggressive power, but also
most probably result in little success. For, ere the
Formica sanguinea could have succeeded in reaching
the interior of the hostile nest, the majority of the
fleet-footed Formica fusca would most probably have
left it.

But, however imposing the wonderful array of the
apparently intelligent actions of the Formica sanguinea
may be, it can be easily shown that there is no more
intelligence in them than in Polyergus. For the pur-
pose of proving this statement we intend to refer to
the relation existing between the Formica sanguinea
and one of its lavorites, tJie beetle "Lomechusa strum-
osa." This most interesting relation was discovered
and described by Eric Wasmann, S.J. , x) and has of
late been verified with reference to the respective rep-

*) Of the numerous publications of E. Wasmann, S.J., on
this subject, we mention especially "Vergleichende Studien
ueber das Seelenleben der Ameisen und der hoeheren Tiere"
(Herder), 2d ed., 1900. Moreover, "Die Ergatogynen Formen
bei den Ameisen und ihre Erklaerung," Biologisches Cen-
tralbl., XV., pp. 606-646, and "Neue Bestaetigungen der Lome-
chusa-Pseudogynentheorie," Verhandlungen der Deutschen
Zoologischen Gesellschaft, 1902, pp. 98-108, etc.

90 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

resentatives of the two European species in America.
L,et us see in what this relation consists. It is the
custom of the Formica sanguinea not only to adopt
related species of ants as their auxiliaries, but also to
receive a number of other insects, notably the L,ome-
chusa strumosa, as genuine guests into their house-
hold. This hospitable relation between ant and beetle
is based on various reasons. Unable to raise its own
brood, the Lomechusa has the instinctive desire to
have itself and its young fed by the Formica san-
guiaea. On the part of the Formica sanguinea the
relation to its guest is based in part on the circum-
stance that its maternal instinct is aroused by the
sight of the helpless beings before it. Then, by ac-
tive and passive mimicry, the L,omechusae imitate the
attitudes and behavior of their hosts and furnish them
some pleasurable sensations for their gustatory and
olfactory organs. Besides, in order to understand the
facts to be explained presently, we must remember
that there are four distinct periods in the life-history
of beetles and ants. Not unlike our birds, the young
offspring passes the first days of its short-lived existence
in the dark and narrow enclosure of the egg. Scarcely
has the baby-beetle escaped from its precious en-
closure, when it starts upon the second most precarious
period of its life. A tiny mass of pulp, the helpless
creature, now called larva, lies in the nest of the ants.
Totally dependent on their "loving care", it ever and
again opens its mouth, to be fed by its "kind" host.
After its bodily size has assumed the proper propor-
tions, the larva is carried by the ants to a suitable
place and covered with earth. In its temporary

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 91

grave, however, it does not return to dust, but having
spun a dense web or cocoon around itself, it soon
changes its bulky form into the so-called pupa, indi-
cating in more or less distinct outlines the form and
structure of the future beetle. Finally, the periods of
development come to an end. The pupa tries to ex-
tricate itself from the narrow confinement of its little
house and makes its appearance as a lively beetle,
somewhat smaller than represented in the accompany-
ing illustration (Plate IV, Fig. 1).

Now, in supporting its guest, the Formica san-
guinea, as a rule, commits two blunders betraying such
a profound stupidity as to furnish us very clear
proof that in those ants not a trace of consciousness
of final tendency can be found.

For, in the first place, through the hospitality ac-
corded to the I,omechusa, the Formica sanguinea
bring about the ruin of their colony and the gradual ex-
tinction of their species. This is done in a twofold
way.

(1) There is perhaps no animal which cares so
much for its young as does the ant. For no sooner
is the nest attacked than its inhabitants before all else
hurry off with their tender young to a place of secur-
ity. And not unfrequently they suffer themselves to
be deprived of head and limb rather than deliver up
the larvae to the enemy. Even if placed in a vial
filled with alcohol, they may often be found still hold-
ing the dead larvae between their mandibles. And
yet, what a strange spectacle do we behold! The
ants which were wont to defend their young with so
much enthusiasm and bravery have undergone a com-

92 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

plete change. Ever since that strange guest entered
the nest and deposited its eggs, all the care of the
ants is lavished upon the brood of the intruder, which
manifests an almost fabulous appetite and grows with
great rapidity. To satisfy the hunger of their "be-
loved" guests, the ants even allow them freely to de-
vour their own eggs and larvae, otherwise so precious
to them; yea to hasten the work of destruction, they
themselves carry the larvae of the L,omechusae to the
places where the eggs and the larvae of the ants are
stored up.

Whence this strange phenomenon? Year after
year passes by. The conditions of the flourishing
colony become more and more threatening. But the
"most intellectual" ant is unable to see that its action
must necessarily result in the final ruin of the ant-
colony and species, and this the more so since the
beetles are quite numerous and their appetite most
voracious.

(2) Nor is this all. To the rearing of the L,ome-
chusa by the Formica sanguinea it is also due that in
the colonies of the latter an abnormal form of ants is
produced, which in the course of time must neces-
sarily do additional damage to the colonies and species
of the Formica sanguinea. These abnormal forms are
called "ergatogynes," a word which according to its
Greek origin ( tpyAfriuu =to work, yvirf= female; part-
ly worker; partly female) fitly characterizes them.
Wasmann distinguishes six different forms, the most
important of which are the so-called pseudogynes
(t^evSijs = false) (Figs. 2-4). These animals are evi-
dently ruined existences. Unable, either to lay eggs

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS" . 93

PLATE IV

Fig.

EXPLANATION OF PLATE IV.

Fig. I.— Xenodusa cava Lee. (original). Fig. 2.— Formica sanguined
subsp. rubicunda, Em. a — female ; b — pseudogyne ; c — normal worker
(original) . Fig. 3.— Thorax of a normal worker of F. rubicunda (original) .
Fig, 4 .--Thorax of a treudogyne of F rubicunda (original) .

THE INTELLIGENCE OF ' 'THE LOWER ANIMALS". 95

or to discharge the functions of workers, they are use-
less members of the ant community and must finally
effect a degeneration of the entire species of the Formica
sanguinea. Now Wasmann has shown by a great num-
ber of facts, that the existence of these pseudogynes
must be ascribed to the rearing of the guest Lome-
chusa. l ) As regards the explanation of this pheno-
menon nothing certain has as yet been ascertained.
Wasmann is of the opinion, as we have stated else-
where, that the repeated rearing of the beetle causes
a gradual change in the brooding instincts of the ants,
so that the pseudogynes are but a developmental stage
of such larvae as were originally destined to become
females, but were in the course of their later develop-
ment transformed into workers. Be this as it may, the
fact that these encumbrances on the commonwealth
come into existence and multiply with such rapidity,
is the fault of the Formica sanguinea itself. We should
expect, therefore, that at least this circumstance would
rouse the attention of the ants and make them realize
the deplorable condition of their colony. But no!
Instead of murdering their hostile guests one by one,
they continue to give them their best attention, to
sacrifice for their sake hundreds of their own offspring
and to make out of the rest degenerated creatures, —
good for nothing. And not one of the numerous in-
habitants of the various colonies becomes aware of these

1 ) How far the very same may be proved for the corres-
ponding American species we have shortly explained in our
paper on "Formica sanguinea, subsp. rubicunda, Em. and
Xenodusa cava Lee, etc.," Entomological News, December,
1904.

98 THE HUMANIZING OP THE BRUTE.

most senseless and self-ruining actions. Is not this a
clear indication, that there cannot be any trace of true
consciousness of finality in them? Or, could we im-
agine an entire class of beings endowed with intellect
taking delight in overcoming the strongest impulse of
nature in spite of innumerable and most disastrous
losses? But this is only the first stupid action of the
Formica sanguinea. The second is no less flagrant,
and when combined with the first leaves no doubt
whatever as to the total absence of an intellectual faculty
in ants.

The second blunder committed by the Formica san-
guinea in the rearing of their guests consists in this
that, notwithstanding their excessive tenderness to-
wards the I^omechusa , the Formica sanguinea are con-
tinually active in exterminating not only their own
brood, but also the brood of their guests. For, the
larvae of beetles require a treatment totally different
from that needed by the ant larvae. Scarcely have the
latter, toward the close of their larval stage, been em-
bedded in the earth, when they envelop themselves in
a close and firm cocoon. There is, consequently, no
difficulty in their being soon after extracted again
from the earth and carried about at will by their fel-
lows. But this stereotype procedure is entirely unsuit •
able for the young L,omechusa. For these spin only
a thin silken cocoon, requiring exceedingly gentle
handling and sure to tear whilst being extracted from
the earth. Hence, to drag the cocoons to the surface
before the pupae are completely formed, is evidently
out of place. And yet, despite their strong affection for
their guests, and despite all possible experience, the For-

THE INTELLIGENCE OF " THE LOWER ANIMALS " . 97

mica sanguinea year after year fall into the same sense-
less "error" and can neither see nor learn , that their
guests require a different breeding from that of their
own offspring. True, after having torn the cocoons
of their darlings, they carefully replace them in the
earth. But is it perhaps to grant them now the neces-
sary rest for transformation? On the contrary! The
same process is repeated, until the larvae wither and
die. But if through the carelessness of their hosts
some larvae succeed in reaching their pupal stage,
even then they are often brought to the surface, to be
eaten up by their anxious nurses in an excess of affec-
tion!

In the first place, then, the Formica sanguinea
are so foolish as to lavish their care upon the I/ome-
chusa with the result that their own brood is dis-
troyed and their species degenerated. Secondly , they
refuse to give to their darlings the necessary time and
rest for their development, exterminate them by an
inappropriate treatment and finally devour them in
their pupal stage.

But these two facts present many and insoluble diffi-
culties in the way of ascribing to the ants the faculty
of recognizing the appropriateness or inappropriate-
ness of their actions. For, no matter from what point
of view we consider the case, we cannot help but find
an unfailing and evident contradiction. If one should
say that the Formica sanguinea lavish such tender-
ness upon their guests, because the latter afford them
some sense-gratification, we ask: If this be the case,
why do they exterminate and devour the young Lome-
ohusae and thus frustrate the accomplishment of such

98 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

a purpose? But if it be rejoined that the Formica
sanguinea exterminate the I^omechusa because of the
damage inflicted, we ask: Why then do the Formicae
sanguineae bestow such care upon their guests, as to
neglect and sacrifice their own colony, their offspring
and their species?

Thus the life-history of the Formica sanguinea,
"the most intellectual ant", affords an example of how
from a more universal contemplation of ant-life, we are
necessarily led to adopt conclusions quite different
from those reached by certain "pseudo-psychologists"
of our day. Of course, it is still a mystery, in what
manner the single actions proceed from instinct. For
on this point the analogy between animal and man,
from which we must always proceed, becomes more
remote the further we "recede through the animal-
kingdom downwards from man. ' ' Still the fact re-
mains, that the faculty by which the activity of ants
is to be explained is not intelligence, but instinct, and
on this very point analogy retains its full force. But
if evident contradictions are to be avoided, this in-
stinct is not to be conceived as the power of mere
automatic reaction, but rather as a faculty guided by
sensuous cognition and modifiable within the limits of
this cognition by external experience.
I The high degree of objective finality which is
manifest in innumerable actions of the Formica san-
guinea does not proceed as such from the ant itself,
but from God's eternal Wisdom. That Wisdom, too,
can alone account for the double play of stupidity
which we have explained above. For, as Wasmann
profoundly remarks: "That supreme Wisdom which

THE INTELLIGENCE OF "THE LOWER ANIMALS". 99

has made use of the senseless 'love' of the Formica
sanguinea towards the Lomechusae and their larvae
to keep the propagation of the ants within due limits,
has made use of the same senseless 'love' of the ants
to prevent the excessive multiplication of the beetle.
Such are the mild and yet powerful measures, by
which a divine Wisdom is able to preserve the
equilibrium in nature, animal intelligence and ani-
mal-morality standing before such phenomena in
impotent perplexity. ' '

CHAPTER VIII.
The "Intelligence" of "The Higher Animals".

We now pass over to some striking proofs in sup-
port of the fact that the proposition which we have
defended with reference to the "most intellectual" of
the lower animals applies equally well to the "most
intellectual" individuals of the so-called higher ani-
mals. Our observations are based principally on some
of the clever experiments which Prof. Thorndike and
others made with dogs, cats, and monkeys under the
most favorable circumstances. We could, of course,
adduce similar instances against the intelligence of
the higher animals, as we have explained in the
proceeding chapter. We could remind our readers of
that wonderful dog which, being deprived 'of her
young, lavished her maternal ministrations on a pair
of old slippers; or of those loving apes which adopt
other animals, defend and caress them and clean them
of their fleas, but let them die the death of starvation.
Our proof against the intelligence of animals would
be even more cogent than the one furnished by Mr.
Martin, the able editor of a voluminous work on
"Natural History", in favor of animal intelligence.
Says the worthy Darwinist: "When visiting the
zoological garden in Berlin I perceived how the
beginnings of a human smile really played on the
(100)

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS. ' ' 101

almost humanlike visage of the Chimpanzee." *)
But we prefer to make use of the strictly scientific
experi ments of Prof . Thorndike, firstly, because they are
very simple and entirely free from any subjective ele-
ment; secondly, because they admit of no doubt what-
ever as to the reality of the facts as well us to their
interpretation.

For many reasons Prof. Thorndike finds fault with
most of the modern books on animal intelligence.
These books, he says, do not give us a psychology •, but
rather a eulogy of animals. They have all been about
animal intelligence, never about animal stupidity.
Moreover, according to him, the facts have generally
been derived from anecdotes which give really the ab-
normal or supernormal psychology of animals. Fin-
ally, even with good observers often only a single case
is studied, the conditions of the case are not perfectly
regulated, and the previous history of the animal in
question is not known. Hence there is no sufficient
reason for generalization, nor can the influence of
previous experiences be estimated. All these various
faults Thorndike wishes to avoid, and in our opinion
he has succeeded admirably.

») "Illustrierte Naturgeschichte der Tiere," Leipzig, 1882,
p. 11. It is, of course, evident at what Mr. Chimpanzee really
smiled! Many authors like Martin maintain that monkeys
use sticks and stones as weapons and give similar evidence of
intelligence. This is not so. No less an authority than the
editor of the third edition of Brehm's "Tierleben," Mr. Pech-
nel-Iyoesche, who has made most careful observation to this
effect in the southwestern part of Africa assures us that, as a
matter of fact, monkeys "never do such a thing". Animals
do not understand the use of tools.

102 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

us see. The following is the ingenious method
of experimentation he adopted. He took a good num-
ber of dogs, cats, and chicks, and having deprived
them of food for some time, put them in enclosures
from which they could escape by some simple act,
such as pulling at the loop of a cord, pressing a lever,
or stepping on a platform. A model of a box used in
the experiments is given in the accompanying draw-
ing (Plate V). Food was left outside in sight of the
animal. The animal \ then, had to form in each case
some few simple associations between the representation
of the interior of the box and the various movements
which would enable it to satisfy its hunger. The ob-
server made sure that the animal was free from his
influence and had never been subjected to the same or
a similar experiment. Moreover, the animals were
healthy, the main data of their life-history were known,
and they all were in the same state of absolute hunger
when subjected to the experiment.

Now, what are the results of Thorndike's experi-
ments? As far as they pertain to the present subject,
they prove, in the first place, that dogs and cats are un-
able of themselves to form associations which imply the
understanding of the finality of actions. For if they
succeeded in opening the door of their cage, they suc-
ceeded BY ACCIDENT, not by intellectual inference.

L,et us give one typical example. The successes
and failures of two cats, No. 1 and No. 6, are ex-
pressed in the following table: i)

.') 1. c., p. 45.

THE INTELLIGENCE OFT HE "HIGHER ANIMALS'

PLATE V.

103

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS' ' . 105

13.00 Failed.

9.30 Succeeded.

1.40

.50

15.00

6.00 Failed.

14.00 Succeeded.
20.00 Failed.
4.30 Succeeded.
20.00 Failed.
20.00
15.00

60.00

No. 1. 13.00 Failed. No. 6. 17.50 Succeeded.

3.30
9.00
2.10
1.45
1.55
13.00

5.00

2.30
15.00
10.00 Failed.

5.00 Succeeded.
15.00 Failed.

10.00
10.00 "

The figures in the columns represent the time (in
minutes and seconds) the animal was in the box be-
fore being taken out if it failed to escape. Double
lines represent an interval of 24 hours.

"Surely", Mr. Thorndike says, "if one and six
had possessed any power of inference they would not
have failed to get out after having done so several
times. Yet they did. If they had even once, much
less if they had six or eight times, inferred what was
to be done, they would have made the inference the
seventh or ninth time. And if there were in these
animals any power of inference, however rudimentary,
however sporadic, however dim, there should have
appeared among the multitude some cases where an
animal seeing through the situation , knows the proper
act, does it and from then on does it immediately upon
being confronted with the situation . . . Now the

106 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

scores of cases recorded show no such phenomenon. The
cat does not look over the situation, much less think
it over, and then decide what to do. It bursts out at
once into the activities which instinct and experience have
settled on as suitable reactions to the situation, 'confine-
ment when hungry with food outside. ' " 1 )

The second fact which is brought to undeniable
evidence by Mr. Thorndike's experiments is the fol-
lowing: Animals are incapable of learning by imita-
tion such associations as would imply on their part the
understanding of the finality of actions. Of the many
experiments which Prof. Thorndike describes we
mention only one or the other.

Eight chicks were successively put in a box, where
they were left alone from sixty to eighty seconds.
Then another chick which knew how to get out was
introduced with each of them into the box, and upon
its performing the act both were allowed to escape.
No cases, as Thorndike expressly states, were counted
unless the imitator clearly saw the other do the thing.
Besides, it was evident, that the imitators wanted to
get out when left alone. The result of the numerous
experiments is as follows: Chick No. 84 saw its com-
panion escape 129 times, but failed completely to imi-
tate it. Similarly chick No. 85 failed after 30 trials,
chick No. 86 after 44 trials, No. 87 after 26, No. 80
after 54 trials, etc.

Only one, No. 82, performed the act: but this was
accidental. Thorndike says: "I have no hesitation
in declaring 82's act in stepping on the platform the

!) I.e., p. 45.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE " HIGHER ANIMALS " . 107

result of mere accident and am sure that anyone who
had watched the experiments would agree. " l )

In the case of cats the experiment was so arranged
that through a screen the cat which was to imitate
another one could see its guide pull the string, go out
through the door thus opened and eat the food out-
side. The result was the same, as in the case of the
chicks. There was not the slightest difference be-
tween their behavior and that of those who were put
into the same position without ever having seen an-
other one escape from it. "No one, I am sure, who
had seen them, would have claimed that their con-
duct was influenced by what they had seen. When
they did hit the string, the act looked just like the
accidental success of the ordinary association experi-
ments." 2)

Dogs, too, completely failed to comprehend the
simple idea "that what gives another food will give it
to them also. ' '

No. 3, for instance, had been found to be unable
to escape from a box of himself. A chance was given
him to learn it from No. 1. No. 3 could see and
study every move of No. t. And yet what was the
result. Here is the record: 8)

') 1. c., p. 54.

2) I.e., p. 57.

3) 1. c.,p. 60.

108

THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

Times
No. 1 did the
action.

Times No. 3
surely saw
the action of
No. 1.

Times No. 3
probably saw
the action of
No. 1.

Times No. 3
in box
alone.

Result.

30

7

14

3 minutes.

Failed.

After i hour:
35

9

14

3 minutes.

Failed.

After i hour:
10

3

3

5 minutes.

Failed.

After 24 hours:
20, 30

6, 8

8, 13

6 minutes.

Failed.

After 48 hours:
25, 25, 25

8, 6, 9

11, 12, 7

8, 6,10min

Failed.

After 24 hours:
30

10

11

40 minutes

Failed.

Though No. 3 saw No. i surely 66 times, it failed
in all cases. Prof. Thorndike explains many similar
experiments most minutely. All lead to the same
conclusion that even the highest animals are absolutely
incapable of understanding the finality of actions. But
Thorndike's experiments do not refer only to cats,
dogs and chicks. In a special monograph 1 ) on the
"mental life" of three South American monkeys of
the genus Cebus, published in 1901, he shows clearly
that "a negative answer to the question 'do the
monkeys reason?' seems to be inevitable." Very-
many simple acts similar to those enumerated above
were not learned by the monkeys in spite of again
and again having seen them performed by Thorndike
and by their own kind. Similarly, "after having
abundant opportunity to realize that one signal meant

') "The Mental Life of the Monkeys." The Psycholo-
gical Review. Monograph Supplement No. 15.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE "HIGHER ANIMALS". 109

food at the bottom of the cage and another none, a
monkey would not act from the obvious inference and
consistantly stay up or go down as the case might be,
but would make errors such as would be natural if he
acted under the growing influence of an association
between sense impression and idea, but quite incom-
prehensible if he had compared the two signals and
made a definite inference. V Finally "after experience
with several pairs of signals, the monkeys yet failed
when a new pair was used, to do the obvious thing
to a rational mind; viz, to compare the two, think
which meant food, and act on the knowledge directly. ' '
Certainly animals can learn to perform new and even
complicated actions, but only if one succeeds in asso-
ciating in the soul of each individual a definite im-
pulse with the representation of a definite motion.
Thus, as Wasmann narrates in his book "Instinct and
Intelligence in the Animal Kingdom," x) "L,ub-
bock's poodle Van finally learnt to 'read,' by being
trained to fetch the card with the word when it was
hungry. ' ' But ' ' in spite of its long course of training
Van often brought the wrong card, when it
was hungry. This fact shows that it never un-
derstood the relation between the graphic symbols and
their meaning. Nor did it occur to Van to give 'read-
ing lessons' to Patience, the lap-dog. Nor did Pa-
tience hit upon the idea of profiting by Van's experi-
ence, although she had often witnessed the reward
which Van received for fetching the proper card. ' '
Besides, Mr. A. J. Kinnman 2) has applied Mr.

») 2 ed. (Herder, St. Louis), p. 165.

2) "Mental Life of two Macacus Rhesus Monkeys in cap-
tivity," Amer Journal of Psychology, XIII., 1902.

110 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

Thorndike's method to monkeys, and with the same
result. There was not even the semblance of thought
to be noticed; less adapted methods were not replaced
by more improved ones; the monkeys did not experi-
ment, did not know how to make use of favorable cir-
cumstances to obtain a definite end; the female utterly
failed to learn by imitating the male. All was wild
and restless activity without reflection.

The same conclusion is reached by Mr. Hob-
house, who after numerous experiments declares that
the highest animals grasp events merely in concrete
series, so far as they are relevant to immediate practi-
cal interests. "Caution, cunning and sagacity of the
kind which 'animal stories' are so full do not as a
rule imply anything more or less than the "concrete
experience,' that we have described." Hobhouse
explicitly states that the "world of ideas" or of uni-
versals is "the distinctive property of humanity." x)

Nor can examples like that- of "Clever Hans" be
accepted as proofs of animal intelligence. It is true
that von Osten's famous stallion performed actions
that seemed to manifest a degree of intelligence per-
haps never recorded of any other animal. But a
scientific test of the performances of Clever Hans has
shown that they must be explained without appealing
to any reasoning faculty. Dr. Stumpf, president of the
Psychological Institute of Berlin, writes as follows: 2)

Clever Hans was examined experimentally by Dr.
E. von Hornbostel, O. Pfungst, and myself. The
horse was at our disposal even in the case of his own-

') Mind in Evolution, p. 281, p. 298.

2) E. Wasmann, Instinkt und Intelligenz, 3. ed., p. 220.

THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE "HIGHER ANIMALS". Ill

er's absence. The result of our inquiry is as follows:
If the solution of a problem is not known to anyone
present, Hans is unable to find it. Hence Hans is un-
able to count, figure, and read himself. Moreover, Hans
is unable to solve a problem, if he cannot see the persons
who know the solution of the problem. l ) Hence, Hans
depends on optical assistance. But this assistance is,
in the present case, of a merely instinctive character.
In the course of a long training the horse has become
acquainted with the slightest changes of bodily posi-
tion, accompanying the thoughts and reasoning of his
master. Mr. Pfungst, whose observing powers con-
cerning very short impressions of sight have been es-
pecially well developed on account of a long laboratory
1 ) The following facts originally published in the weekly
edition of the Koelnische Volkszeitung are suggestive:

1. A watch was presented to "clever Hans." Without
conedscending to look at it, he immediately gave the correct
answer by stamping eleven times — it happened to be 11
o'clock. I repeat, the animal did not even glance at the
watch.

2. Mr. X, who was among the spectators, wrote an example
of arithmetic on a slip of paper in such a way that no one
present, not ever the owner of the horse, knew the figures of
the problem. The paper was then presented to the horse
with the request to paw the solution. The animal started
pawing ad infinitum.

3. On a certain wall near by fourteen boys were sitting in
two rows. Hans was asked by Mr. Schillings how many
boys were sitting on the wall. Without really looking in the
direction of the wall and counting, Hans pawed fourteen
times.

4. Another time, a captain of the army gave Hans a very
simple problem in addition, but made sure that his owner
could not influence the horse. Hans failed completely.
Then the owner got hold of him, and lo! Hans solved the
problem correctly. (Koeln. Volksz. No. 36, p. S.)J

112 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

training, succeeded in analyzing the motions which
actually caused the clever answers of Hans. In fact,
he was able by mere motions and without putting any
question to make Hans perform anyone of his former ex-
hibitions. Prof. Stumpf concludes his criticism by
stating that the case of Hans is so far from proving the
intelligence of animals that it rather proves the con-
trary. For if not even the training powers and pati-
ence of a man like von Osten are capable of eliciting
the expression of a single concept from a horse like
clever Hans, then, indeed, we are confronted by a first
class proof in favor of the old and general opinion that
animals are devoid of intelligence.

"The animal's self," as Thorndike himself states,
"is not a being 'looking after and before', but a direct
practical association of feelings and impulses. So far
as experiences come continuously, they may be said to
form a continuous mental life, but there is no contin-
uity imposed from within. " l )

This is the reason why animals have never invent-

') At one place (p, 73) Mr. Thorndike has the following
very interesting sentence: "Perhaps the entire fact of asso-
ciation in animals is the presence of sense impressions with
which are associated by resultant pleasure certain impulses,
and that therefore, and therefore only, a certain situation
brings forth a certain act." If Mr. Thorndike would take
the trouble to study Wasmann's works, he would find that
this sentence, correctly understood, has ever been the doc-
trine of scholastic philosophy. Of course, he will blame that
philosophy for not being able to support its statements by
experimental facts just as he has furnished them. But is it
not strange that the old scholastic philosophers arrived at
the same conclusions as Mr. Thorndike, though they merely
relied on the simple facts of daily experience?

THE INTELLIGENCE OP THE ' ' HIGHER ANIMALS' ' . 113

ed even so simple a tool as the ancestors of the human
race employed during the so-called stone-age of the
Paleolithic epoch, this the reason why they are incap-
able of rational language. Parrots may be trained to
utter articulate sounds and even entire phrases. In
general, there is perhaps no class of animals that could
not furnish a great many external signs as a foundation
for intellectual intercommunication. But the invention
of tools as well as of language implies the knowledge
of the universal, which is the "distinctive property of
humanity. "

CONCLUSION.

Animals, then, do not possess intelligence in its gen-
uine meaning. They are mere sense-beings. But this
inevitably leads to ' 'the admission of a qualitive differ-
ence between the human and animal psyche. ' ' For,
as we have proved before, the specific actions of man
and animal are essentially different from each other.
Even "plastic instinct" or "simple intelligence," as
others call it, is but a material faculty, intrinsically de-
pendent on the nervous system, whereas the intellect
with its true intelligent actions is of an immaterial, a
spiritual nature. Consequently, there is an essential, a
qualitative difference between the human and the animal
soul. For, as a being acts, so it is.

Moreover, it is equally plain that we must reject the
supposition of Wundt and of almost all modern scient-
ists, that the psychic faculties of man have been evolved
from the psychic faculties of the animal. Such an evolu-
tion of "mere association" to "conscious intellectual
activity," x) of "nature" to "culture," x) would be

1 ) Wilhelm Wundt, "Vorlesungen ueber die Menschen

114 THE HUMANIZING OF THE BRUTE.

an absolute impossibility, since matter and sense are es-
sentially inferior to spirit and intellect. For the origin
of our "intellectual and moral faculties" we can only
find "an adequate cause in the unseen universe of
Spirit." 2)

und Tierseele." Hamburg und Leipzig, 1897, 3d ed., p. 419.
It is remarkable that Wundt has arrived at the same conclusions
concerning the "intelligence of animals" as Thorndike.
Wundt even considers it as very improbable that some species
or individuals of the present animal kingdom will ever pass
the limit separating sense and intelligence; on the other hand,
he assumes, as we have stated, that the human species in the
course of its evolution has actually taken that important step!
2) Alfred Russell Wallace, "Darwinism," Humboldt ed.
Part IT., p. 322.

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