Human Nature and

Enduring Peace

HUMAN NATURE

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AND ENDURING PEACE

THIRD YEARBOOK OF THE SOCIETY FOR THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF SOCIAL ISSUES

Edited by

GARDNER MURPHY

PREFACE

THOUGHTFUL MEN and women are demanding that use be made of every human resource in the passionate endeavor to prevent the recurrence of war. Though it is generally recognized that human nature — in particular the human nature which develops under modern industrial societies — needs to be as fully understood as possible if the control of war is to prove feasible, there have been, up to the present, only the most fragmentary efforts towards mobilizing our psychological information in reference to this problem. No single approach will ever prove adequate. Neither the historian, the economist, the sociologist, the political scientist, the psychiatrist, nor the psychologist has all the answers. The need is so great that it is felt there is a rightful place for a book stressing the many facets of the problem of human nature as it relates to war. The contributions represent many viewpoints, but all are founded upon genuine expertness and competence with reference to the specific problem treated. The editor found in fact that the field was so great, and its problems so complex, that some fifty different specialists had to be called in if the area was to be properly surveyed. His own energies have gone almost entirely into the effort to unify and integrate the contributions of these specialists. It is hoped that the resulting contribution will be simply the first of a mounting series of psychological studies which will do their share to lay sound foundations for a solid and wholesome world order.

G. M.

FOREWORD

THE SOCIETY for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, an affiliate of the American Psychological Association, includes among its purposes the directing of psychological research towards contemporary problems, making available to citizens outside the psychological profession conclusions drawn from the scientific study of human behavior.

The following set of principles governing the publication of its Yearbooks has been officially adopted by the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues:

The Yearbooks of the Society are co-operative attempts to assemble psychological research and thought on specially designated social problems. They report new researches, summarize existing knowledge on the given topics, and, so far as justified, submit conclusions and recommendations in the form of plans of action. An important aim of the Yearbooks is to show that scientific methods can be helpfully applied in areas of social controversy. Since the Yearbooks aim to contribute to the solution of pressing problems and to stimulate further research upon them, available information will seldom be conclusive.

The Society sponsors these projects in the conviction that it is important to attempt psychological investigations on the issues represented. The Society makes every reasonable effort to secure as adequate and unbiased treatment of the problems as possible. However, the Society does not officially sponsor any findings, conclusions, or implications which the authors of the particular chapters or the editors report.

In presenting material of this type, it is especially important that every effort be made to adhere to the usual standards of scientific inquiry and discussion. Several more specific principles follow:

1. On any controversial issue, effort should be made to report all relevant evidence so far as this can be done. Where there is a dearth of evidence on certain phases of the problem, or where certain types of evidence are omitted, this fact should be pointed

out. Likewise, indication should be given of the extent to which conclusions go beyond the available evidence.

2. All evidence which is presented should conform as far as feasible to accustomed canons of scientific procedure. This refers to such matters as valid sampling, adequate statistical practices, statements of assumptions, and description of the sources and conditions under which data were obtained. Insofar as evidence falls short in these respects, appropriate note should be made of the fact.

3. In the interpretation of evidence concerning which competent analysts arrive at different conclusions, it is essential that the major differences be made explicit. The attempt should be made to state the alternative views in a way that will be acceptable to the adherents of the several views, although the space allotted to such statements must, of practical necessity, be determined by the judgment of the editors.

The following were appointed to serve as the Committee of Editorial Review: Eugene L. Hartley, Edwin B. Newman, and Ralph K. White. This Committee has read the manuscript and certified that it meets the requirements of the Society.

ERNEST R. HILGARD, *Chairman*
Society for the Psychological
Study of Social Issues

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A TABLET in Winchester Cathedral tells us how portions of that vast and beautiful building had begun to sink alarmingly into the mud of an insecure foundation. The walls sank visibly, and would in time threaten to tumble upon the worshipers. Who, thought the architect, is an expert in mud? Who might be able to rescue the cathedral from catastrophe by prying into the soil and outwitting it? The deep-sea diver, he thought, might be able to cope with mud. Water and darkness have no terrors for him; to work without his eyes in the gloom is of the essence of his work. So the diver was found. For five years he worked in mire and in blackness such that in all that time he never saw what his hands did. But the mud, the stones, the rotting wood yielded to his patient groping, until at last the stones lay solid and secure again and the cathedral was saved.

This image of the restoration at Winchester is perhaps an augury for our task as civilization threatens to sink into the mire of recurring blood and hate; as the shafts and the vaulting tremble, crack. Though many strive with patience, devotion, and zeal to rebuild the walls, to realign the arches, there may lie hidden, far beneath, a threat to their success. They work most earnestly with the direct and obvious faults and flaws of the structure of the world; they strive magnificently to save, through diplomacy and legislation, the disordered relations in the affairs of states. Often, however, their training leads them to regard these benign or malignant aspects of political organization as the sole basis of human welfare or human catastrophe. A fundamental overhauling of our international politics is assuredly imperative; but the weakness of human nature needs study, too — bitterness, jealousy, hate, sense of inferiority, overweening pride, lust for power over the lives of others, together with the economic and social weaknesses which underlie the political. Into the mud of

pathological human relationships the lofty edifice of international understanding has dangerously sunk. Like the architect at Winchester, we shall seek in this volume to find divers, experts in mud, trained in the process of making clean and sound the psychological foundations of the relations of men. No claim, of course, can or should be made for the final adequacy of any one approach. There is a need to look at war and peace as a problem in human relationships, illuminated by many studies of human nature. But the historical, the cultural, the economic contributions are also vital; only in an ultimate synthesis will an answer be found.

Some of those upon whom we have called are specialists in political and racial psychology, some in education; some of them deal directly with the specific psychology of the radio audience or of the respondent to a public-opinion poll; some of them are the takers of the daily public pulse through the indirect but vital techniques of journalism; some are men of affairs whose public duties throw them into contact with all sorts of people, inarticulate as well as articulate. Some of them deal expressly with international relations.

From all of these there is, I believe, something to learn regarding those human dispositions upon which either peace or war can be built, according to our wisdom. From each, according to his own special experience, his own world of competence, I have sought an answer to a specific critical question which confronts us Americans as we plan for lasting peace. The responsibility for applying this psychological approach devolves upon workers in psychology; but we recognize our limited competence in relation to so vast a scheme, and have so set the stage as to be able to introduce upon it all sorts of men and women who have something vital to say about the human-nature aspect of peace-planning and peace-maintaining.

The scheme, then, is to proceed, chapter by chapter, in terms of a psychological orientation. I shall attempt an introductory sketch, through six chapters, from my own viewpoint.   Then in Part II I shall attempt to look systematically at the dangers, the trouble-spots of the world. As I come to each snag, each difficulty, I will pose a *critical question* from which I hope an expert can make his own departure, both answering my question and carrying forward the thought. In this way we may see more clearly the context

within which the next question must be posed. In Part III the same method of question and answer will be used, looking to the *constructive suggestions* which experts have to offer. It will, then, be my task again at the conclusion of the book to integrate what these many experts have offered.

Is Psychology Already in Use?

A legitimate question arises: Are not the planners of peace already wide awake to the reality of the psychological problems of the post-war world? In all the present flood of post-war literature, are there not assumptions about human nature, assumptions about the "rôle of psychology" in war and in peace? Indeed there are. But these assumptions are often made, tragically enough, without awareness of their ready-made, untested character. Many of their proponents are unaware that such a thing as psychological research exists, or that there are psychological findings which go beyond the casual inspections made by the humane but untrained observer. There is much "plugging" for psychology, but often with the unfortunate implication that psychology is simply a matter of keeping one's eyes open in a watchful readiness to note the everyday rhythms of human conduct. There is, in short, a demand for psychology without clear understanding of the deeper contribution of psychology.

On the other hand, there is an equally striking demand among other writers for a type of psychological knowledge which has not yet been achieved. This second group of writers assumes that psychology has an almost magical capacity to press buttons, release springs, and engineer the human family into the millennium. The actual degree of development of psychology is not understood by this latter group much better than by the former. We might compare the first group with those who think of modern chemistry as primarily a device for making plastics, with no grasp of the rich theoretical development upon which all such practical techniques depend; and we might compare the latter group with those who expect the chemist to produce in a year or two a type of medication which will constitute a fountain of youth and put an end to old age.

Now neither the overappraisal nor the underappraisal of psychology helps us in doing our job. We have, in fifty years of experi-

mental study, clinical observation, and association with medicine and with sociology, learned some substantial things about human nature — things about human nature which are relatively fixed and things which are very flexible. We do know something about the social and international education of young children and something about the early·manifestations of character which appear in future despots and war-makers. We do know something about the sort of interaction of persons which makes the basis for what we call democratic living. We strive in this book to tell what we know; and where we do not know enough to give answers, we shall try to define *methods* which will in time give us answers. For the demand for psychology which we encounter in so many of the post-war books ought somewhere, somehow to be met. There ought to be a book which will tell what the psychological approach can mean, what it is that the study of human nature can do to make possible the maintenance of peace. It is the aim of the present volume to take a first step in supplying this lack.

The Danger of Psychological Mistakes

And here we face a huge danger of misunderstanding. Is not psychology too effete and technical, too abstruse and involved, to make any positive difference when vast economic and political forces are at work? No, *a psychology worthy of the name is closely integrated with economics and politics.* Indeed, our primary task is *to view the economic and political forces as human behavior forces, and to describe them in psychological terms applicable to fundamental human conduct.* No niceties of technique, no fine points or academic trivialities are involved. It is the massive issues, the great landmarks of human behavior to which attention will be given.

We may illustrate by referring to what happened during the years from 1918-21 and again in the opening years of the decade of the thirties. The mistakes which were made were psychological mistakes; they were mistakes made in the grand style, epic in their dimensions, catastrophic in their consequences. To be specific, Woodrow Wilson had by the autumn of 1918 captured the imagination of Western Europe with his Fourteen Points and with his plea for a pattern of world democracy. Quite aside from all questions

regarding the merits of the Fourteen Points, the psychological situation was at that critical hour altogether favorable. He did, however, two things (among others) which, regardless of their other consequences, made the continuation of his psychological success impossible. He failed to study the temper of Congress and of the public opinion which lay behind it; and when the congressional elections of November, 1918, went against him, he refused to see the writing on the wall and courted a test of strength with a resentful opposition. Secondly, he agreed to the insertion in the Versailles Treaty of a series of propositions concerning the origins of the war which, regardless of the complex problem of their historical justification, added, in fact, to German resistance to compliance even with neutral phases of the Treaty. Several other psychological errors of that era stand out with appalling vividness. Though Germany was physically disarmed, the professional army of one hundred thousand men kept the psychological armament of militarism alive; indeed the officer class achieved in many ways the strength of a martyr group, remaining the symbol of the old-time military prestige which in the thirties more than made up for the loss of conscript armies.

But we must come nearer home. It was not only with regard to Germany that we made psychological mistakes. Just as the Maginot Line became in France an ostrich-like method of ignoring the development of German aviation, just as the preservation of a blue-water Navy acted in Britain to keep men's eyes averted from the dangers on land and in the air, so in this country we allowed an illusion of normalcy, a sigh of "never again," to take the place of hard and realistic study of the consequences of our participation in the European war followed by our complete irresponsibility as to the aftermath. The process by which we made short-term loans to Germany, at the same time that we erected such tariff barriers as to cripple international trade, was by no means simply an "economic mistake." It was a characteristic of our national thinking to pat ourselves self-righteously on the back regarding our security, while contributing to the wretchedness of much of Europe's population; a little hard realism would have shown us that while we wanted one kind of world order in order to maintain our own prosperity, we were giving aid and encouragement to the de-

velopment of a fundamentally different type of world order. At the heart of the difficulty lay not only a bungling economics but also a failure to look at ourselves, to ask about our own motives — a complete psychological naïveté.

During the rise of the Nazi system, and especially after Munich, what happened in France and in Britain as a response to the "strategy of terror" included a failure to ask and answer very simple psychological questions: "What do we *want;* and how can we achieve what we want?" Frenchmen and Britons did not really want peace "more than anything"; they really wanted the maintenance and extension of their traditional place in the world, their way of living; *but* they had not the clarity of vision to look at themselves and face the issue. *Men were afraid to ask those questions, including psychological questions, upon which resolute decisions depend.*

All the same considerations held again for our own conduct during the thirties. With a colossal capacity for self-deception, we managed to persuade ourselves of our own immunity from world dangers, managed to forget that the wish is father to the thought, managed to overlook the patent threat which the fascist and Japanese plans for conquest presented, and managed, by resorting to various theories about the Japanese and the Nazis, to persuade ourselves that they would stop before they had done their worst.

It was *not* because of ignorance of erudite psychological experiments that the catastrophe came. It was largely because the psychological point of view had not taken hold, either with people or with their governments. It was because neither in looking at other men nor in looking at ourselves had we learned to ask, in basic terms, about thinking and feeling, motives and goals, means and ends, which make up the heart of a psychological approach. With the vastly more complicated technical problems which the present world war will produce, a renewed psychological failure, a renewed insistence on resorting to abstract economics and politics without the study of people, will have even more catastrophic consequences.

American Goals

The goals toward which this book is aimed are goals which, I believe, Americans are fully determined to achieve, and to the

attainment of which "blood, sweat, and tears," and also years of patient study, will need to be devoted. Three interdependent goals, centered in the conception of life formulated by Thomas Jefferson, are defined for us in the immediate post-war years.

The first of these objectives is the *maintenance of peace,* by which is meant no sheer continuation of armed neutrality such as characterized the long period of the twenties and thirties, but a world order based upon the acceptance of cultural, economic, and political diversity within the framework of a concern for our common human future.

The second objective is *freedom,* by which is meant that generic quality of unconstrained self-fulfillment in which individuality and cultural diversity can develop, and from which the Four Freedoms stem.

The third objective is the expansion of democratic processes. By this is meant no mere continuation of ballot-box privileges and formal representation in legislatures or in congressional halls, but rather the development, on the basis of universal education, of habits of active participation in all the processes of self-government, a participation based upon mutual respect, and developing through the years in terms of a more and more adequate political and social self-expression, whether shown in informal community affairs or in the complex processes of federal and state government.

One reason why these three objectives are defined as *interdependent* is the fact that we have seen all too clearly in recent years that frustration in the effort toward one of these goals makes the achievement of the other two more difficult. The threat of war makes freedom less real; and though at the surface people seem to be cemented by their fear of an outside foe, the tensions which are aroused produce new aggressions, group against group, person against person. Or, proceeding from the third objective back to the other two, we may properly say that it is only through the extension of the democratic powers of the common man that freedom can take on the warmth and color of full community support, and that it is only in a democratically organized world order that peace can become not a politician's, but a people's peace.

There seem, then, to be three things which can rightly be demanded of psychologists at this juncture, corresponding to the three

objectives defined. They ought to be able to show ways and means of studying human nature which will make the control of warlike tendencies possible and make the human basis of peace more certain. Second, because war and peace are related to individual freedom, they ought to be able to define factors which fetter the mind and heart and so point the way to a fuller self-liberation within free communities. Third, because democracy is related to world order, they should be able, through studies of community leadership and of the parliamentary processes, to show concretely how democracy expands, and with what consequences and in what ways the process can be further extended.

If psychologists cannot say something definite on these three heads at a time of such world crisis, they should go back to their exclusive concern with technical laboratory problems. If, on the other hand, their ways of dealing with people can help concretely, they should speak up with clarity and with energy. To tell one another what they know, to throw light on the conduct of men and of nations within the narrow channels of their own technical journals, is only half their task. Governments, practical administrators, men of affairs have a right to be told in clear and direct language useful things which psychologists can formulate for their guidance, exactly as a chemist explains to a farmer the effects of crop rotation, or as a geologist explains to a civil engineer the difficulties which will arise in building a highway through the Tennessee Valley. The engineer of national and international affairs should have at his disposal the most definite facts available about the changing pattern of human nature from which war has stemmed, but from which, with proper engineering, peace may be made to spring. For the most part, men of action have no time for detailed research, while men of research do not know the mechanics of statecraft. The task of the present volume is as much one of reaching governments as it is of defining facts. The two purposes may be joined when the facts are so stated that governments will gladly use them.

But this problem of making the message intelligible to governments is, in a democracy, likewise a problem of making the message intelligible to the rank and file of common men and women, wherever literate and thoughtful readers and listeners are to be found.

The kind of peace we win will depend upon demands arising from public opinion. Psychological findings regarding the "cause and cure" of war are of value only in so far as something definite is formulated which can be grasped with confidence and energy by a public which awakens to the need for more facts, and of the desperate urgency of putting these facts to use.

THE "RAW MATERIAL" OF
WHICH WAR IS MADE

ONE OF THE MOST colossal obstructions across the road to peace lies in defeatism, the belief that war cannot really be eliminated because of the hate and aggression in the heart of man. Wars as expressions of hate are accepted as necessary evils — like "death and taxes." This chapter must examine this belief in the psychological inevitability of war.

THE AGGRESSIVENESS OF NATIONAL GROUPS

When William James was studying in Germany in the eighteen-sixties, he remarked, as did so many thoughtful Americans, on the romantic dreaminess, the sentimental graciousness of German living. Despite the military tradition since Frederick the Great, there was clearly to be seen the massive force of another great cultural tradition which had come down from the medieval period and which had been enriched and intensified during the decades of the romantic movement. There was much of the impractical in the German, as contrasted with the realism of the French and the British. One might attempt to explain away the newly developing militarism by making a contrast between the Prussians and the Southwest Germans; but one encountered so much sentiment and romance in Central and Eastern Germany, and so much enthusiasm for the art of war in the Southwest, that the distinction became blurred into unintelligibility. The German-speaking world as a whole was in fact undergoing a profound change, not in the sense that something old was dying or that something new was being born, but in the sense that the old balance was being upset.

But the balance is always being upset. If one takes any cultural area for a long period, one finds great vacillations of the same type. This type of long-range analysis of national character has been undertaken by Sorokin (164) for all the greater European nations. There are indeed enduring elements in national character; but

superimposed upon them are vast fluctuations which make the difference between militaristic, pacifistic, martial, or peaceful.

And even when one turns to the abiding aspects of national character, in the hope of finding warlike or peaceful nations, one finds that such character is gradually achieved largely through the guidance of a set of geographical and economic conditions, and of modes of contact and communication with other peoples; and that these factors operate upon all the human material within that area regardless of the biological stocks or strains within it. French character under the "grand monarch," Anglo-Saxon character during the reign of Alfred, Chinese character under the Manchus, can be defined with broad strokes. In the instances just given, the national character which can properly be defined is a characteristic of a *period* and of an *area*, many races and stocks being involved; the character is defined not by stocks but by social areas within which specific cultural forces were born. Thus the characteristic differences between Northern and Southern Chinese have proved to be of trifling significance as contrasted with the differences between traditional and modernized Chinese which, when sufficient time is allowed, appear to be a question of cultural contact and not of biological type.

Society is made warlike or passive, inventive or traditionalistic, worldly or other-worldly, excitable or placid, in accordance with the tempo of life as geography, the soil, and commerce with other peoples affect it. There are indeed always striking individual differences between localities within cultural areas; and there are hereditary variations within families. But these differences cut across all cultural categories, and it is the cultural categories rather than the biological which make men ready or unready to fight, eager or reluctant to respond to the appeal of conquest and aggrandizement.

The massive force of the cultural approach is just as striking in the case of modern Europe and Asia as in the case of the ancient world or the primitive world. The historical argument indicates, then, that the prevention of war is more a matter of inventing a *new institutional pattern* (involving economic, social, educational, and political arrangements) than of discovering a technique for keeping trouble-making races or stocks in permanent isolation or subjection.

We must conclude that the "human nature" which we all experience, which we know well enough to build our lives upon, is a human nature which is developed as a result of living in human society. To the Dobu Islander (58) it is "human nature," it is axiomatic, that one seeks by sorcery to slay or maim those who do not belong to the narrow kinship group. To the mountain Arapesh of New Guinea (120) it is "human nature" to share one's possessions and one's life, marking out only vaguely where one's own rights and privileges stop and those of others begin. When Aesop's Fables were rewritten in the seventeenth century for English children, many of them assumed much about human nature which the Greek slave Aesop never dreamed; and written for children of our twentieth century, they have had to be rewritten again.

The "Human Nature" of the Newborn

There is indeed a human nature which is deeper than all this, a raw material of universal human nature which all men share. This differs, however, in two ways from what the man in the street means when he says "you can't change human nature." In the first place, this raw material out of which we are made is a mass of untutored tendencies, movements, impulses, more complicated than those which we see in kittens, puppies, or young apes, but as blind and naïve and, moreover, as plastic and modifiable; indeed it is vastly *more* plastic and modifiable than is the nature of any other living thing, as development brings response to the faces and voices of others, and as language enriches the tools of understanding.

"Little kids are the same everywhere." This comment applies fairly well to infants up to ten or twelve months old, if one has in mind chiefly the impulses which they must satisfy, and the types of struggle they make to get what they want and to make contact with the adult world around them. Even at this age, however, they have begun to show differences depending partly on the social code and the rules of the game. Children in all societies begin to stand, to walk, and to co-ordinate the movements of eyes and hands. But in some societies they are encouraged to explore, to run about, to get into things; in others they are systematically "scared off" if they stray into ways other than the narrow prescribed path in which they may toddle. In some societies they are sternly disciplined, taught to

obey; in others they are encouraged, gratified, rewarded, never punished. In some societies they model their conduct almost exclusively on that of their parents; in others the parents are simply two among the number of friendly adults with any or all of whom they may spend their time as they will.

By the time children are three years old, no traveler, no student of the varieties of man could possibly say "kids are the same everywhere." The little Eskimo, the little Chinese, the little East African living under their own cultural conditions are profoundly dissimilar. In a few more years they have acquired ways of looking at the world, points of view, philosophies of life which set them off in vivid contrast to all those who have grown up differently; they have become aware that there are outside people, foreigners whose ways are not their ways, toward whom indeed they are frequently hostile if hostility is part of the group viewpoint to which they have been subjected. When one says that human nature is "everywhere the same," one is profoundly right if one refers to the *raw potentialities* for human living, profoundly wrong if one means that the concrete motives, wants, interests in the mature individual are the same the world over. In some societies prestige is everything, wealth nothing; in others wealth and prestige are so wedded that it means nothing to strive for the one and ignore the other; in other societies wealth and prestige are among the minor rather than the major values of living.

It may be felt by some readers that all men did originally start "equal" in this broad sense, but that through the ages they have become differentiated in sharply contrasting groups because each child *inherits* the accumulated traits of the group. But one here encounters the fact of biology that the traits *acquired by individuals in their lifetime* are not (at least, to any large degree) transmitted to children by heredity. Both parents may become expert pianists; the little child begins life with only that raw capacity to learn the piano which he would have had if the parents had gone without training. The children of those who have learned to speak English or to paint landscapes do not appear to begin life with any trace of advantage due to the parental training. Regardless of the civilization of their parents, infants begin life simply as "raw" human beings. The chief, and very likely the only transmission of ac-

quired habits to our children is through training, example, imitation, not through the mechanism of heredity. The massive differences in human societies are developed chiefly or exclusively through the gradual accumulation of *ways of living* transmitted from parents to children by social, not biological, means.

Yet so flexible is the immature human being and so great is the urge to learn to make the most of the rules and ways which dominate his environment that he can within a few years implicitly believe that it is simply "natural," simply human nature to do and to think as he does. Children transplanted in early infancy from one environment to another are not even distinguishable in behavior from those who are "native born."

This does not mean that all newborn children are psychologically identical, like so many peas in a pod. Within every family there are individual differences; and with endless intermarriage and the consequent fusion of the delicate material upon which the heredity of mankind depends, every human stock contains a wide diversity of raw material. But in many fundamental respects all those who are subjected to a common environment take on certain *unities of behavior* — ways of talking, points of view, attitudes toward life. When one finds all Norwegians differing in a basic respect from all Brazilians, one is dealing *not* with the expression of hereditary make-up, but with the impact of Norwegian and Brazilian ways, manners, customs, viewpoints upon all those who, in the plastic years of childhood, are exposed to them.

Universal Human Nature

We turn back, then, from the "developed" human nature of those living in a community to the untrained human nature of the newborn. Our problem is this: What impulses of the newborn underlie the institution of war; what innate tendencies must be appraised by the architect of peace?

Among the universal impulses which characterize human nature in infancy are the tendencies to love when befriended and to grow angry when frustrated. We shall, then, begin with these impulses and try to show what human society does to them and with them.

All infants smile, gurgle, show delight in contact, become fond of parents, brothers and sisters, pet animals, if not obstructed in

the process. They differ in the intensity of their loves, but they all are capable of love. Most of this love may be focused upon the mother if she is the one vital object they know who cares for their every want. If she is a stern disciplinarian and rebuffs their outgoing affection, love may pass to little brother or sister. If all of the immediate human environment rejects this outgoing response, it may pass to pet animals or to imaginary playmates. If the rebuff is so administered that it does not prove satisfying to the child to give himself at all to the outer world, he may find most of his satisfaction in himself, becoming withdrawn or self-absorbed. What he will love and in what way he will express his love will then be determined very largely by the encouragement or the frustration which meets the process of loving. As he understands more and more, and as the process of give and take is more thoroughly assimilated, he may develop deep friendships, or he may basically trust only himself.

His attitude toward the opposite sex, too, will be very profoundly colored by his early experience. He may develop a sense of tenderness and idealization, a wealth of sentiment. Later he may develop a matter-of-fact conception of marriage in terms of work and children, or he may develop a basic fear and resentment of the opposite sex as a symbol that the free and happy days of childhood have been taken away and an unwanted adult responsibility imposed by a forced marriage.

Love, then, is a very fluid and variable thing. It is not uniform for all human societies. In its developed form it may be a tremendous force for community or world brotherhood. However, it is not in its *raw* form but only in its *developed* form that it can be trusted as a force for world peace.

Much the same may be said about the relation of the raw to the developed forms of "anger" or "aggression." Just as the infant smiles and gurgles and makes contact, so, when interfered with, it kicks, pushes, bites, and screams, and as it gradually comes to understand the nature of the things which interfere with it, it concentrates its kicking or biting more and more on these offending objects. In time, the techniques of attack are learned; punching, biting, kicking become organized, with other skills needed in any world in which big brother (or neighborhood boys, or anyone else) teases or cramps the style of the youngster.

Anger is in the meantime being organized within the individual, just as its expression is being organized in his outward behavior. He remembers slights and injuries and on later occasion pays back for what he received. If subjected to very little frustration, he will go only a little way in the development of fighting skills; and — what is especially important for us — he will go only a very little way in the development of aggressive feeling.

Beyond all these factors which differentiate the aggressive tendencies in young children are the standards of manhood and womanhood upon which the child tries to model himself. He may learn, as does the little Chinese child, that real men do not show their anger, indeed allow themselves relatively little outer expression; or he may learn, like the Sicilian child, that family honor calls for sharp, definite, open rage when indignities are encountered.

There is, then, no universal aggressiveness in humankind except in the form of a primitive impulse to writhe, kick, scream, etc. — perhaps a useful form of self-protection. These infantile expressions are developed in some communities into fighting techniques, but in others take chiefly the form of grumbling and grousing, in still others are overlaid by quiet self-control, counting ten before the voice is allowed to rise.

We referred before to the fact that love may be directed chiefly to oneself; so too may aggressiveness. Self-punishment, "kicking oneself," self-accusation, and a morbid sense of guilt are widely found examples. Love then may be focused primarily outward or primarily inward, and the same is true of rage.

It is within this framework that the notion of human "competitiveness" must be studied. Men compete because they want the same things, let us say the same markets, the same natural resources; and wherever they are likely to stand in each other's way, their "competitive instincts" are alleged to be aroused. Closer study of human nature in the making does not reveal any competitive instinct. What it does reveal is that the organization of society may be such as to set men in opposition to one another in achieving goals, while other groups of men wanting the same goals are so organized as to work together instead of against one another.

It is perfectly true that if there is only one tricycle on the nursery school playground, ten two-year olds may fight for it. It is equally

true that nursery schools can be so organized that children spontaneously develop group activities in which they use the equipment together, with little thought of fighting. There is no attempt to deny that men will become aggressive whenever the things that they want can be had only by pushing others out of the way. But it is just as psychological, just as natural, to organize men to struggle as a team against the basic frustrations to their living which occur in the form of natural obstacles, disease, want; and frustrations to their receiving a return from their labor. Unfortunately, frustrations encountered in the relations of individuals, and frustrations engendered in class conflict, have often been contributory to the growth of resentment against an outside group, e.g., a minority group or a foreign country, which is conceived to be the source of the trouble; but by the same token men may, even when enraged at their enemies, discover close comradeship with those who share their struggle. The comradeship is as "natural" as the struggle; the problem is to achieve a type of understanding of humanity from which wise leadership can organize comradeship on a world basis.

It is not to be inferred that men will immediately follow such a plan as fast as it is worked out for them. People are not as rational as that. Another series of psychological steps must be described if we are to understand how change from one system of institutions to another is to be achieved.

Inborn Aggressiveness

Our analysis means, then, that the question whether aggressiveness is inborn, intrinsic, must be restated, remembering that the term "inborn" can mean either one of two very different things. Some human motives are inborn in the sense that they *will recur no matter what one does about them.* No matter when or how we feed the child or adult, the time comes when he grows hungry again. Or cut off the supply of air, and the struggle for air becomes violent. The hungers for food and air are such that they spontaneously, of their own accord, become intense and demanding when interfered with. But there are many motives which arise not spontaneously in this way, but only when *specific outside pressures* are brought to bear on the individual. We tend to be startled by a thunderclap or to draw back when a sharp object is thrust into the skin. These

are innate universal tendencies, easily seen in the newborn. It is quite possible, however, that one may go on year after year without ever exhibiting any such tendency, if no such loud noise or injury is ever experienced. The individual is, so to speak, always *ready* to jump if hurt, but there is no *intrinsic need* that he ever should be hurt.

I suspect that those who have argued as to the innate character of human aggression have often been confused as between these two types of "inborn behavior." Aggression appears to belong squarely in the second group of responses. There is, I think, a universal tendency to fight back when blocked, thwarted, interfered with; but if the individual is not blocked or thwarted or interfered with, he has no intrinsic tendency to aggression.

He may, to be sure, encroach upon the coveted possessions of others (or, under other conditions, co-operate with them). Everything will depend on the people, the property, and the situation. But he has no necessary tendency to attack or to injure except when he himself is blocked or thwarted. He may be just "spoiling for a fight," but when one looks more closely, one finds that he has been insulted or humiliated (or sometimes that to fight is just a good outlet for animal spirits, i.e., it is not true aggression, but a game). A man does not cultivate *rage* out of nothing. *If, then, man can live in a society which does not block and thwart him, he does not tend to be aggressive; and if a society of men can live in a world order in which the members of the society are not blocked or thwarted by the world arrangement as a whole, they have no intrinsic tendency to be aggressive.*

A tendency to energetic activity, to exuberant disposal of their powers to create, to expand, to accomplish, sometimes butting into the preserves of their neighbors — all these things may indeed call for regulation, and order will indeed be necessary; but the desire to *hurt* or to *attack*, or even the primitive slashing out against one's neighbor, appears to be due to frustration, interference, thwarting.

It would not be correct, I think, to say that all frustration produces aggression; it may at times produce apathy or despair. The critical point discussed here is whether there is always an element of frustration in the aggressive pattern. And in this the study of the child and of mentally sick adults as well as the panorama of history seem to give a consistently affirmative answer.

3

FRUSTRATION AS THE CAUSE OF WAR

FIGHTING IN ALL ITS FORMS, from the most simple to the most complex, appears to derive from the frustration of wants.[1] This is stated simply as a first proposition, and not intended as a dogma; the reason for accepting it will emerge as we proceed. Satisfied people or satisfied nations are not likely to seek war. Dissatisfied ones constitute a perennial danger.

It is true that some blind and impetuous fighting comes from a sudden jolt rather than from a prolonged thwarting, as when one strikes back blindly when insulted; and it is likewise true that fighting may appear to be a rather cold and unemotional means of extending one's power and prestige, i.e., motivated by positive goals and not by restriction of one's satisfactions. But in the former instance, it is because one *demands* a certain amount of respect, and because this demand cannot be refused without our frustration, that we strike out in defense against an insult; and in the latter instance it is because we set for ourselves a very definite series of goals regarding our future achievements that we are willing to fight if we cannot have them without fighting, i.e., we fight because of frustration. Thus nations bent upon expansion need not be frustrated in the sense that they are being positively encroached upon, but in the sense that if the timetable of their expansion cannot be realized without force, force is used. Frustration, in other words, is the failure to achieve goals, and if the timetable indicates that the goal is not being achieved otherwise, aggression follows.

The vast majority of wars since the era of colonization have arisen not from these two extremes — blind impulse on the one hand, cold calculation on the other — but from a situation lying inter-mediate between them. A few, but not many, wars have arisen (as did the Franco-Prussian War) largely from dramatic rebuffs to

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[1] This proposition has been the subject of much recent research; cf. especially Dollard *et al.*, *Frustration and Aggression*, 1936.

national leaders and to the sense of national self-respect, and a few have arisen quite coldly (as did the Russo-Japanese war) from failure to achieve expansion called for by the timetable. In most instances, however, the occasion has offered very full justification for the use of the term frustration, in the sense that dominant personalities or classes, frequently supported by the general public, have *strongly felt that their aspirations were being blocked*, that diplomacy and economic pressure were insufficient to achieve their goals, and that there was a good chance that military methods would succeed better. With this feeling, outraged pride and a sense of the rightness of such national self-assertion has regularly appeared. In a number of instances aggressive leadership has in fact suffered from a loss of prestige or power, has been humiliated and embittered, and has consequently conceived war partly in the guise of revenge and rehabilitation of prestige and power. In general, then, the frustration conception of war, in a world in which there are distinct national sovereignties equipped with the means to war, can be expected to lead to this eventuality whenever the leaders judge that war is likely to remove frustration.

And although the masses everywhere, apparently with especially deep feeling in industrialized countries, resist and dread war, responding less and less to martial glory and the fanfare of drums, requiring more and more to be pushed willy-nilly into the hateful struggle, it still remains possible to make real to them this sense of national frustration; and individuals frustrated in their economic or social wants may come to feel that war will somehow offer an escape. Some of them avidly identify with the symbols of national unity and expansion, confident that in victory their personal distress will come to an end, while many others, torn between uncertainty and duty, respond as a matter of conscience through the "slow dead heave of the will," leaving a rather mute and unhappy civilian population behind who grimly support the front because there is nothing else to do.

Thus even when most men abominate war, it can still be true that wars between nations arise from frustration. This does not mean that most people feel personally frustrated, or that most people personally seize their weapons gladly. Frustration must exist at the critical point, the point where decisions are made; and

it must be somehow sensed and made real to some portion of the public. A war-weary population may require years to become ready again; but if the frustration, in the sense defined, exists, it will happen.

Frustration, however, always appears in a context. It is never an explanatory principle upon which one can bear down with one's whole weight. To say that frustration leads to aggression, or in particular to war, is true in the same sense in which it is true that objects move toward the center of the earth. They will do so if free of obstacles and restraining forces, but it is necessary to know about these obstacles and restraining forces if the path of their movement is to be predicted. To be of any concrete value, then, our frustration hypothesis must be tried out concretely.

Let us take as a test of the frustration hypothesis the trend toward war in Germany between 1918 and 1939. To begin with, there was very acute frustration on the part of the industrial leadership, in the loss of colonies and of a large share of control in the European economy. There was a struggle over the financing of reparations, the rebuilding of the merchant marine and of the lost foreign market. There was widespread frustration of small business and of labor, owing to the shortage of capital, restrictions in the movement of goods and, in general, the loss of purchasing power. There was frustration of the farmer through the bureaucratic control of agricultural commodities which was deemed essential to the maintenance of social stability. Beyond all these class frustrations, there was a general sense of national humiliation from the loss of colonies, of Alsace-Lorraine, and of Polish areas in the East, a sense of mutilation and dismemberment in the separation of Danzig and Memel from the Reich, a sense of impotence from the reduction of the army to one hundred thousand men, and a sense of wanton and meaningless moralism in the imputation of sole war guilt to the German nation.

The frustration during the twenties, with the inflationary collapse of savings, and the progressive loss of power by the middle classes was tremendously accelerated by the economic chaos set going by the 1929 depression and the impossibility of maintaining the flow of capital into Germany in the form of loans for industrial expansion.

Here are frustrations enough. Let us ask whether they, by themselves, caused war. First, let us notice that if these frustrations were to eventuate in war, a political régime had first to be built, and built by straightforward psychological techniques. Nothing in the economic-political situation provided a means for war. With both military and economic disarmament advanced as far as it had been, there was no economic or military way out. There had to be a public readiness to respond to such resentments and frustrations through a self-vindicating renewal of effort. Apathy had to be broken down, determination vitalized. Scapegoats, especially Jews and Communists, had to be provided, blame for economic distress placed upon them and hatred constantly nourished; and in time outside powers had to be conceived as absolute obstacles to the possibility of German life worth the living. The system of parties which seemed unable to give Germany prosperity and power in the twenties and thirties had to be discredited. A completely new party had to be built upon a German struggle for "renewal of youth." The fact that there existed a proud nationalist tradition and a firm faith in the prowess of German arms, augmented by the conviction that Germany had lost the war partly through a stab in the back on the home front, made it possible for a clear-eyed, non-moral, and determined leadership to fan the feeling of frustration to a white heat, and at the same time to point out practical means for outwitting and overpowering the frustrators in the West. The first steps were taken by oratory and shrewd political maneuvering, and the National Socialist Party gained in numbers and prestige. Within the party system, there was a magnificent opportunity for the frustrated and the restless to achieve glamour and status as leaders; and for all members there was the opportunity for ego-fulfillment through the sense of serving in the vanguard of a group dedicated to the rebirth of the Fatherland.

Still, however, we have no formula for war. Even with frustration and with a public ready to be fanned into a warlike temper, there were not as yet the essential tools. The next step that had to be taken was to finance this National Socialist spearhead and to extend its status and strength, so as to reach powerful leaders everywhere and a fairly large proportion of the population. It must be remembered that even in 1930 the party was small and unrepresentative,

and that there were many signs of its decadence shortly after that. The organizing and financing steps were taken with the aid of those interested in international operations, and in particular, by Thyssen, the steel magnate. The economic and social misery of the early thirties, steadily growing worse with some nine million adult males unemployed, and with doles insufficient to maintain even a very humble existence, was now canalized into a progressively rigid party structure. This financial rehabilitation of the National So-·cialist Party and the vast enhancement of its prestige led to a numerical increase, to comprise about a third of the population.

But *still* this was not enough. Counter-measures were taken by the center and left parties, and Hitler was blocked. Another factor had therefore to be added. President Hindenburg finally threw his weight to Hitler; and the army and the nationalist-minded judges and prosecutors, carrying on from the old order, made it possible for National Socialist storm troops, together with spies, ex-soldiers, and desperadoes, to apply thumbscrews in many doubting quarters, so that finally forty-three per cent of the counted votes were National Socialist. In other words, force was applied at a critical moment on a public not skilled in the application of parliamentary techniques, and not organized with vigor in defense of civil liberties. To this forty-three per cent were added about nine per cent from the Stahlhelm Party (ex-soldiers, rightists, and reactionaries) and the trick was done. Parliamentary machinery was in the hands of the new chancellor. First the Communist Party, then, as part of one broad tactic, the Social Democratic, the Stahlhelm, and the Center, were liquidated. It will be evident that almost none of the tactical progress was due to sheer economic forces *as such*, and that nothing was accomplished by frustration *as such*. There was a formidable combination of factors at work, together and serially, under astute political leadership.

And even yet, we had not come to a clear war situation. It was now necessary to proceed through a series of steps, each one of which was gauged to be a little less than would lead to war. Active rearmament, the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the threats against the Sudetenland leading to the Godesberg and Munich victories, with invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia — these all follow as a sinister doctor might watch a weak patient's pulse, becoming more and more sure that he can easily be victimized.

There was, in other words, an international psychological pattern appraised by a non-moral and daring politician very much more accurately than it was appraised by the frightened and confused politicians of the Western world, who wanted two things: first, to keep all that their nations held; and second, to avoid war in keeping them. Again the bare economic interpretation is insufficient, and the political interpretation fails likewise to give a fully rounded picture. It was only because this nexus of economic, political, and psychological conditions obtained in Germany that a National Socialist Party was possible; it was only because of the uncertainty, demoralization, and inner confusion of the Western democracies that such easy prey was offered. Frustration, humiliation, nationalistic revenge fantasies, economic support, soft opponents, these are the context within which the ultimate attack on Poland in 1939 occurred.

Frustration alone has existed from time immemorial in many parts of the world. Apparently Chinese peasants have always been desperately poor, and the peasants of India poorer still. The beating down of the human ego has gone much further in the case of the untouchables of India than in the case of any European group. Wars have not resulted in consequence.

It helps but little to say that not absolute but relative frustration is the cause of war; as in the case of the powerful and wealthy who, losing their power and wealth, hanker for renewed glory. For through the last few hundreds of years, both within Europe and within European colonial expansion, the proud have been humiliated and despoiled and have been swept from the historic scene with hardly a murmur; the ruling class in each dominated country constituted typically a case of such relative frustration. People may feel that life has lost its meaning; but from such people war does not inevitably spring.

To make war there must be a technique for controlling the machinery of government, of building armies, of successfully evaluating the claims and powers of adjacent states. There must, in particular, be a system of psychological relationships which enables the mass to respond to the leadership of the frustrated leaders. The people must identify with the leaders and be ready to follow them gladly; or they must trust them, believe that the welfare of leaders

and followers is ultimately one; or they must fear them, in the sense that they feel insecure in disobedience to their leadership. Unless the psychological structure of a national group is right for the purpose, the frustration of leaders or dominant classes will not in itself produce war.

Our failure to prevent the present war — I say "our," for the failure of the American, British, and French publics was similar in the incapacity to foresee the nature of the coming hurricane — was owing largely to a naïve belief in the purely economic origins of war, in particular, to the belief that German business would not find the effort toward war worth while; to wishful thinking in reference to the possibility of staying out; and to the naïve overvaluation of the preparedness of the Western peoples for war, which went hand in hand with naïve overvaluation of the ships and Maginot lines with which a resurgent Germany was to be stopped. Much of the misjudgment of the situation was, in other words, a misjudgment of rather elementary psychological forces both in Germany and, paradoxically, in our own lands.

We found, as the threat approached, that we were fascinated yet apathetic, frightened yet restrained from action, just as, in a dream, one runs with leaden feet from the terrible pursuer. It was this psychological response of our own that "caused" the war, as much as it was the chicanery or brutality of the German régime. Had we seen clearly, American war production could have reached full blast by 1939. We made the colossal mistake during the nineteen-thirties of looking only at Germany, and not looking at ourselves to see whether we would be ready. We talked of the danger of war as if it were a unilateral danger; we talked as if war could spring from a single aggressor rather than from an aggressor in a psychological context. Just as a current flows not from one pole but between two, war depends upon the psychological structure of a situation which is always bi-polar. The threat of war in years to come will depend as much upon non-aggressive as upon aggressive nations, as much upon those totally unready for it as upon those armed to the teeth, above all as much from a psychology of apathy, uncertainty, and confusion as from a psychology of aggression arising from frustration.

We shall have to conclude, then, that although the frustration-

aggression approach has its great value, the frustration factor appears in a very complex economic, political, psychological setting, all the factors needing to be seen in their interrelation before a clear view of the origins of war can be sketched. The hazards that face us in the coming decades will not be hazards made up by the frustrated peoples of the world, no matter how gross their frustration may be. The hazards will lie in the creation of hard, organized, frustrated populations with a psychologically rich tradition as regards war, aggressive leadership, and with economic support for aggressive aims, surrounded by soft, unready, unclear national groups, not organized into a tight, unified, clear machinery for the maintenance of peace. If independent national sovereignties are to continue, the danger of war will continue as long as this pattern of hard and soft national groups continues, perhaps as much as if all national groups were hard.

From this analysis the absolute need for a tight world organization follows; the absolute necessity that hard, resistant national groups, if they exist, be integrated within a still harder international organization. But an even more pressing point from a long-range viewpoint is that the hardness must be thawed out by the progressive reduction of frustrations, and that as world order emerges, the frustrations which occur in daily living must be directed into the overcoming of immediate personal obstacles, through our offering opportunities for self-enhancement and advancement, so that the collective sharing of frustrations in the form of military action will become psychologically unnecessary, meaningless, to the frustrated individual.

For our further consideration, then, two great problems arise; first, the problem of a psychological world structure; second, the problem of the release of the individual from the frustrations of his daily life in such fashion as to reduce the types of tension and aggression which are likely to lead, through one channel or another, to organized group conflict.

For the study of both healthy and sick personalities, in childhood or in the adult, shows the myriad devices by which an aggression once aroused may find an *outlet* in some object other than the immediate source of the frustration. A man reprimanded by the boss may take it out on his wife or the cat; servants may be fired, children

punished, because the stock market slumped. The overdisciplined, frustrated German masses were easily led to blame, or to attack, helpless minorities. It is unsound to try to dam up a torrential stream of aggression by threatening or punishing it; it will find another channel. The only sound procedure is to work consistently for the elimination of the major frustrations.

Frustrations can lead to aggression; in a society without major frustration there is little impulse to aggression. Even though the resulting aggression may take the form of personal fighting rather than of war, the risk of war is so great that the over-all strategy of peace calls for the reduction of severe frustrations rather than the futile effort to extirpate aggression by fiat, discipline, or punishment.

THE STRUGGLE FOR GAIN, POWER, AND PRESTIGE

4.

IN BROAD STROKES it may be suggested that while men have waged many wars to defend their liberties, the major driving force toward war today is the impulse to possess material things, power, and prestige, three forms of motivation that are interwoven in much of civil life as well. The motive of material gain may be more obvious than the others, may appear to predominate in many forms of conduct — buying a business, or swapping horses, or demanding a raise. There may, however, be much else besides. The Yankee may swap horses for the sheer delight of outwitting an oversmart competitor. A business may be bought to make an impression. A raise may be asked because the family must keep up appearances. It is often *prestige*, not material goods, that we chiefly crave. In the great game of business, moreover, *power* is often more important than gain. The history of our economic life since the Civil War has witnessed many instances in which the wealth of a group has declined while its power increased. In many cases, indeed, wealth has been used directly to buy power, power being the chief value with which some types of personality are concerned.

It is, I think, in the light of this distinction between the *gain motive*, the *power motive*, and the *prestige motive*, that we must place the issue of international struggle of dominant personalities, whether of business men or of diplomats, to write their names upon the record of history. There are many other facets of human motivation that appear in war, but these are the ones that appear salient. To overlook any one of these three — for example, to treat the desire for new territory as solely a desire for a material thing — could be fatal. There is no doubt that in the vast crisis of the peace settlement which will soon confront us, they of the Kremlin and of Downing Street, and of the White House and Capitol Hill, will to a large degree gauge themselves, will think of themselves as successful or as failures, in terms of their skill in the great power pattern, and

in terms of the historical vindication which they hope to achieve by way of abetting the power and prestige of their national groups. Moreover, American, or British, or Soviet public opinion may ostensibly be concerned with tangible possessions to be won at the peace talks, but actually be motivated largely by the sense of power or prestige.

In all discussions of war, the question of gain is interwoven with power and prestige considerations, and most questions need consequently to be recast. If, for example, we hear it asked whether "private property" makes war inevitable, we may find it more appropriate to put the question *whether property — no matter what its form — necessarily involves an aggressive use of social power* in the hands of those who control it. From this point of view it is quite possible that American, British, and Soviet statesmen might struggle for power exactly as if personal gain might redound to them, just as a managerial class living upon rather small, fixed salaries, might become as ruthless as a medieval baron in the struggle for control over other managers.

Differing here from the Marxist approach, which we think oversimplifies the conception of economic motivation, we might ask whether a world constituted of states controlling all capital goods within their borders, so as to eliminate personal profit, might not nevertheless exhibit the power-and-prestige struggle in the same morbid form in which the world of capitalism exhibited it in the last century. We do not say dogmatically that this is so. Rather, we are concerned that the matter be carefully explored. For if it is true that power is as important as the motive of gain, or even more so, the issue between the nations may prove ultimately to be the question whether they can curb the power drives of their representative servants — whether those who achieve power in domestic control can by any conceivable method be re-educated, redirected, or controlled when they carry over the power habits to the international sphere.

Origins of the Prestige and Power Motives

Prestige seems to arise from a context in which the little child's affections are at first freely outgoing, diffusely given to any object which is satisfying and which he is encouraged to love. He may

love his parents, his brothers and sisters, his playmates, his pets. He gives some of his affection to himself. Indeed, if his affections cannot consistently and satisfyingly be given to any object but himself, they may be fixed or anchored in such a way that he becomes a "self-centered" person. He seeks to view himself favorably on all occasions; status and prestige satisfy this need.

It is normal and healthy for children to develop *some* love of themselves, along with their love of others. But this self-love and the related need for admiration need not be competitive. Indeed, in some societies (120), every normal child is accepted, and loved, made much of, by all adults in the community; no child feels rejected, and no child needs to develop morbid self-love or thirst for admiration. If, however, society officially limits that commodity which we call prestige, gives rewards to a few because they can run the fastest or bring home the best report cards, the few derive pleasure and the rest are hurt. Whether in business, or in the university, or in the women's club, or wherever we turn, prestige is meted out in greater measure to some than to others, and competition for prestige — status which gives the right to admire oneself — becomes an intense need. Economic competition is a prominent factor in the development of all other types of competition, including competition for prestige; but it is *also* true that a society which, since the dawn of history, has been prestige-centered, tends to use the economic system as a device for manipulating and controlling the prestige struggle of individuals. Prestige can be a competitive commodity and continents can be bathed in blood for the sake of the pitiful prestige-need of a sick personality or his entourage.

Regarding the origins of the *power motive,* it is of course true to say that they who achieve power can manipulate the world so as to be proud of their achievements; in other words, power is a means to prestige. But over and above this principle, there is a satisfaction in vigorously using the body in contests with others, or even in pushing a door open or smashing through an obstacle — the same sort of satisfaction which the healthy child has in running, jumping, swinging, or asserting himself in any other primitive way. Through exercise this tendency is fed and enriched, and more and more one obtains delight in getting results, in being the cause of things happening. There appears to be a satisfaction in pushing things around.

and for exactly the same reason, in pushing people around. Moreover, since the exercise of power *does* lead to satisfying end-results, we should expect to find that it would, through association, come to be satisfying.

Just as in the case of prestige, there is nothing abnormal about the tendency. The only thing that is abnormal or dangerous is the possession of too much of this motivation. *Gain, power, and prestige are all good things and they all need democratic control.*

THE MENACE OF UNBRIDLED DRIVES TO POWER

Let us try briefly looking at the economic scene in the light of the power motive, and see where we come out in relation to the international economic outlook.

It seems to be agreed among the students of our recent business history that a rapid separation has occurred between those who own and those who control business. A half-century ago it was still common practice for the man with capital to operate the business in which his capital was invested. With the development of large-scale industry, entailing vast concentrations of capital, there has been a growth of administrative personnel (from full-time salaried executives down to supervisors and foremen) who constitute a large, stable core in each large business enterprise, and who, as stocks are bought and sold, as profits swell or shrink, maintain their lifetime professional relation to their managerial task.

At this point in the argument, however, the river of thought divides. In the mass of post-war books issuing from the presses, one finds many authors who contend that capitalism in the old sense is rapidly declining, that the new class of managers and administrators makes decisions not in terms of profits but in terms of professional standards of business policy, often concerning themselves more to keep an enterprise going or expanding than to return dollars in the form of dividends. This school of writers believes that the profit motive is, in fact, of minor importance today, and that in both domestic and international affairs professional standards of competence, such as those of physicians and engineers, will be more and more influential in contrast to the old-time speculative interest.

The other school of writers, while agreeing that the managerial group is different from the owning group, insists that the basic

problem of capitalism remains; there must be return on invest-
ment, and the general economic trends inevitably associated with
capitalism will continue. For example, they emphasize that com-
petition is becoming less and less feasible, monopoly more and more
inevitable, and that the new managerial group, despite all their
professional standards, have to accept not only monopoly but also
the resulting restriction of output, so that to all intents and pur-
poses they act exactly as if they were owners.

This issue is too complicated for a mere psychologist to settle,
and indeed it seems too complicated for the economists and the
administrators to settle. But there is a psychological question that
seems to press for an answer, regardless of the ultimate economic
situation.

This is the question as to the motives that underlie the business
enterprise. Is there really so much difference in the ultimate com-
petitive consequences, whether one works in terms of dollars or in
terms of professional standards? We may well wonder whether
business men do not in fact work much more for power than for
material gain. Surely, the history of railroads and of holding com-
panies, and the stock-market struggle of recent years have given us
countless instances of men who shy away from great opportunities
for big killings in the way of money, in order to jockey themselves
into positions of power over their competitors. When as a child I
played *Pit*, or when more recently I have watched the children
play *Monopoly*, or have looked out of the window at the youngsters
who are staking out a claim to a part of the playground, I have been
impressed with the fact that to be able to dominate other people is
far more intensely satisfying than to pile up material goods. In
fact, material goods seem to be piled up chiefly as a way of getting
power. Does it necessarily make such a lot of difference in relation
to international economic tensions whether capitalism is dying or
dead, or being reborn, if the unbridled drive for power, for itself or
for the resulting prestige, remains? Will there not continue to be
people who will with avidity grasp the opportunities for power? And
is not the power struggle the key both to domestic and to international
politics? Will not international economic events turn out to be
supreme examples of playing for supremely great stakes with regard
to power over markets, financial pools, or indeed power over the

ultimate power sources, the state and military sources as well as the economic?

We shall find in Part II many references to the power patterns which flourish in the world's trouble-spots. And we shall attempt in Part III, dealing with education, to say something practical and constructive regarding this mania for power. In particular, we shall try to show how democracy, in many of its forms, can do something definite to mitigate, redirect, equalize, and humanize the power structure. Without such democratization, even a system of socialist states, even a system of propertyless communities, might well vie for power over one another, and our present world system, even with a strong central authority, would suffer from a cancer through all its vitals.

The struggle for power and the struggle for prestige are well mixed. Since the days of Veblen it has been recognized that economic life is dominated by the struggle for prestige, or status, the "complacency" with which one may legitimately be regarded by oneself or by others. A suburban house needs three bathrooms, not because the three members of the family must all take their baths at the same time Saturday night, but because the realtor can blandly, and quite honestly, tell his client, "The house is judged by its baths," and because, ultimately, the Joneses have three baths and we must keep up with them. The $980 spent for an automobile may constitute $480 for engine, chassis, and body, and $500 for competitive prestige, the true differential in value of this car over another perfectly workable one which could be produced but which would not look like $980. During the scarcity economy of the early thirties, Kodaks were made in the colors of the rainbow; it was in style to have a purple and pink one to supplement one's earlier black one. The busy enterpriser can always find an unsaturated market for prestige, for status. First, the buyer must catch up with those whom he emulates; then he must get ahead of them and start emulating a new group.

This appears to be just as true of the world scene as of the personal scene. Many a half-forgotten rural people is a potential nation where new ruling classes would like to be born, not chiefly for money, but for the emoluments and prerogatives of positions as rulers, diplomats, men of affairs. Is not this prestige motive just as

destructive, just as terrible in its implications for democracy, on the one hand, peace on the other, as is the struggle for power? Is it not, moreover, just as probable that domestic conflict and international strife will flow from the struggle of those thirsty for prestige as from those clamoring for material profit? It is not enough to create even a world state with ruthless control of all anti-social forms of profit motivation, so long as leaders may spring up everywhere who discern opportunities for the inflation of the hearts of their immediate followers through the hope of autonomy, independence, or statehood.

Or, to come nearer home, our own behavior in the international sphere is ridden with a childish demand for that prestige to which we may lay claim, rather than a demand for realistic study of what we actually need and want. It has been universally experienced, since World War I, that those who sought in a sober, practical way to give Americans what they wanted above all, namely, security and peace, came up against the simple question regarding each new proposal, "Will it limit our sovereignty?" Exactly what our sovereignty is in a world of international dependence and commitments no one exactly knows, but it would be very terrible if any of it should be infringed. Exactly what any specific American man, woman, or child would lose by a system securing world peace is not evident. But if "American sovereignty" is jeopardized, the whole scheme is judged preposterous and outrageous. This is the temper of our national thinking; this is the prestige-laden tone of our American idiom, as we talk in the councils of the world. Prestige we must have to the bitter end, regardless of the consequences, regardless even of the basis and meaning of the symbols to which prestige is attached. We must, then, regardless of the meaning of the term sovereignty, *have* sovereignty, because the precious prestige which the word spells out to us is beyond all price.

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF POWER AND PRESTIGE MOTIVES

If we differentiate between the gain motive, the prestige motive, and the power motive, we may properly say that it will be insufficient to control the gain motive, even with some sort of democratization at home and abroad to take the place of the swashbuckling exploitation which was legitimized during the Gilded Age. We

must, with the same determination, so organize our domestic and international affairs, both economic and political, that power itself is more evenly distributed and prestige itself more equably dispensed.

This is far from being a philosophical pipe-dream. Any type of social planning involves redistribution of the satisfactions of living. Many human civilizations distribute the commodity which we call prestige much more evenly than we do. To many peoples, both primitive and advanced, power is more fantastically concentrated in a few hands than it is with us, and with many others it is distributed more evenly, with the resulting democratization of social control. It is probably more important, in terms of long-range democratic fulfillment, that the prestige and power needs of men be equably distributed and equably satisfied than that material goods should be spread evenly throughout the community or throughout the world.

If so, what are the practical techniques by which the individual American community can take the first step? By what concrete community procedures can the gross disparities in prestige be ironed out? By what devices can people learn to dispense and distribute power? What can be done in the school, in the neighborhood, to give all members of the group the satisfactions of shared prestige and of shared power through the allocation of varying types of leadership to all, or through the temporary opportunities given to all for leadership in specific activities? How can all members of each American community possess prestige and power to a degree sufficient to enable them to understand their basis and meaning, and to enable them to understand the dire consequences to their own community if any one individual gets drunk with an excess either of power or of prestige? How can such types of training in the distribution of power and prestige be transferred to the scene of national politics and business, and ultimately to the international arena, so that power hunger and prestige hunger will be recognized by the mass of citizens whenever they appear, and so that their dangers in terms of the threat to peace can be controlled? These are questions in the *education of human motives*. Their answers will be sought in the discussion of education in Part III.

For if war is ultimately a power struggle, we must conceive it

more and more as a psychological problem rather than as simply a problem in markets, manufacturing processes, and the distribution of goods. It will be necessary to control, for the social good, not only the economic processes as vehicles of power, but also the development of the power motive itself. And the same for the prestige motive, as it relates to positions of domestic and international leadership.

THE LOADED WORLD-VIEW

5

We have inquired into some of the motives that lead to war — hatred, aggression, gain, power, and prestige — and have found that these are all socially controllable. But without any contradiction, war may properly be thought of as arising also from *points of view*, ways of looking at the world; for all deep-seated motives express themselves indirectly in biasing, or loading, the personal outlook. This chapter, then, inquires into the threat to peace from the common human ways in which peoples regard one another.

Identification with the Group Viewpoint

We referred above to the tendency of the little child to model himself upon his parents or upon other grown-ups. This shows itself in his taking over of the father's and mother's ways, the little boy's mimicking of his father's activities, pretending to work as his father does, the little girl's preoccupation with doll-house activities and the world of the mother. As this goes on, the child builds up a definite picture of himself.

Within this picture of the self are included definite ideas of what is the normal, reasonable, proper way to think and feel. Of course the little child misunderstands a good deal, but he is unceasingly reminded of the things that are right, good, worthy from the parents' viewpoint, things that are wrong, bad, abominable. He takes over these beliefs partly because he knows no others; the world begins to make sense in terms of a systematic parental viewpoint. He takes them over partly because he loves his parents, and to share their world makes him closer to them; and he does so partly because this is a mark that he is ceasing to be a baby, is growing up, is really understanding the world.

Now if one aspect of this parental viewpoint is hatred for another group of human beings, it will be a normal part of his picture of

himself to be one who hates. As the boy Hannibal swore hatred to Rome, the child of today may swear hatred to the Japanese, as a part of being a normal and right-minded American to whom any dilution of his hatred would be a dilution of his Americanism. And what of the present-day Japanese child? When a generation has grown up with so deep a conviction regarding the naturalness and rightness of hating a national enemy, it is not sufficient to show mankind a practical escape from the predicament of returning wars. People are not so rational. At the termination of our Civil War, a swift and hateless reconstruction was at first attempted, which would have saved American history thirty years of tragic anguish. The attempt was successful for a couple of years. But hate and revenge soon won the upper hand; a punitive peace was enforced, and today's debates on the floor of the Senate show that all the venom has not yet been drawn from the wound.

There is the further problem of changing people's feelings regarding themselves, enabling them to understand first the relativity of aggressiveness, the fact that friendship is biologically as normal as hate, and second, enabling them to understand that it is their tendency to maintain their pictures of themselves unchanged which really keeps them from an open-minded consideration of a practical organization of peace.

Wishful Thinking

Another reason why we are likely to resist a restructuring of the world is that we do not really believe it to be necessary. Nothing is more extraordinary than the way in which we Americans perennially underestimate our danger, find ourselves on the brink of war before we properly assess the threat. Why are we so childishly optimistic?

The answer lies partly in a broad principle relating to the way in which people learn to perceive the social order of which they are a part. The process of perceiving is not a simple matter of letting the eyes, the ears, and the other sense organs record what the outer world impresses upon them. We color what we see, we give character to what we hear in terms of our wants, our fears, and our prejudices. The wish is not only father to the thought, it is father to the way in which we see and understand. When two men are

involved in a controversy such as a lawsuit, each usually thinks he has better than a fifty-fifty chance to win. The strategists of baseball and football calculate to win a larger proportion of games than they actually can win. Far more businesses are started than ever succeed. The gambling tendency overshoots the mark.

Now take the process of war-making. Each side expects to win. Each general staff with its technical experts, organized for the task for months or years, carefully calculates the outcome; each side, loading the dice in the manner described, sees victory ahead. The Japanese general staff saw victory ahead; the resources of the United States were not adequately appraised nor was the time perspective properly worked out. Those who plan grandiose achievements, however, do not see objectively; they see with a tremendous loading of bias in terms of the prestige and other goals which they hope to achieve.

Such "loading" of perception is involved in our own national planning. We are very powerful; therefore we have, over and over, expected to do the near impossible. As the cartoon of Uncle Sam represented the situation in 1916, when the threat of war with Germany began to face us, "I don't keep in condition but I can lick the whole of creation." This firm self-satisfaction, this loading of our world view in terms of what we would wish it to be, remains a major factor of risk today, as it has been in all of our past. Public opinion data show clearly that the magnitude of the actual danger was never clearly seen because our own wishful perception of the situation emphasized safety instead.

The other aspect of this tendency which stands out as of equal importance is the tendency to attribute to ourselves a likelihood of success in accordance with our sense of moral rightness. It is almost universally true of human societies that they assume themselves to be in the right, and on this basis not only fight with greater energy but assign to themselves powers greater than facts justify. The moral indignation of the Southern Confederacy in response to the attitudes of the Northern states was countered by the moral condemnation of the South by the North. But the aspect of the issue that we would stress is the universal conviction of the Southern states that they would speedily win because they were right. It was not only that the wish was father to the thought, but that the sense of

moral right seemed clearly to its possessor to guarantee victory.

Now all these tendencies are plainly involved again as we look for our place in the world order to terminate our vacillating foreign policy of the past. Since our statesmen are human beings, not in the habit of making exact allowances for their errors of execution due to these loading factors, and our public opinion is loaded with wish fulfillment and moral self-appraisal, we shall almost certainly do the same thing that the diplomats and peacemakers did twenty-five years ago. The strength of the obstacles will be minimized; in particular the long-range dangers will be put to one side. Thus our ties with our present allies will be assumed to be stronger than they are, instead of objectively studied to make them as strong as possible. Overoptimism is not only a human trait for which a terrible price is paid; it is (because of our isolated, protected past when we were hard to attack) a peculiarly American trait that all too often bars the door to our own intelligent planning.

But there is still another way in which this matter of loaded perception will make trouble. We want to think of ourselves as free and independent agents, almost in the same way that the two-year-old wants "to do it himself," wants to walk without the supporting hand you offer. We bristle and get our backs up whenever sovereignty is mentioned. However far the statesman may go in enlightened long-range planning, he knows that the use of phrases involving "loss of sovereignty" or anything which threatens "free decision" will arouse not only the primitive self-defending aggressions that we described earlier, but the firm belief that "we can do it ourselves."

WAYS OF SEEING OTHER GROUPS

The tendency to see one's own group, one's own ways, as right, carries with it, moreover, the sinister habit of tension and suspicion toward others. It is a well-nigh universal characteristic of communities to regard their own ways, their own feelings and viewpoints as normal, necessary, and right, and to regard alien viewpoints and practices as strange, inferior, or bad. Primitive peoples tend in general to distrust one another. They may come together for trade or in military alliances, but the "out-group" is not as normal, as right, as good as one's own. This tendency is called by the

anthropologist "ethnocentrism." The larger cultural groups show the same tendency, and the greater the cultural diversity, the greater the suspicion. Ethnocentrism — suspicion, fear, scorn, sense of superiority — characterizes the national attitudes of Frenchmen, of Germans, of Englishmen, of Americans, with respect to one another. Some of these feelings are mitigated under the conditions of military necessity, but ready to crop out again in rumors, in hostile gibes, in remarks on the floor of the Senate, or in the columns of newspapers. The point which we would here stress is that it is not just a question of "economic jealousy"; it is not just a question of fear for the loss of overseas power or wealth. It has its primitive emotional roots; the roots have been there throughout history, and the tree has grown as a consequence of the inevitable frustrations of war. There must be people to blame, and the blame goes partly to our leaders, partly to other social, racial, and religious groups at home, partly to foreigners in general.

STEREOTYPES

But this ethnocentric tendency has a further psychological effect. It reduces all the members of an out-group to one common level; outsiders are treated alike. Walter Lippmann brilliantly characterized this tendency to lump people together as the tendency to think in "stereotypes." I have a stereotype of a British Tory, a Welsh coal miner, a Chinese coolie, a Norwegian fisherman. Indeed, if I did not know my Maine coast or my Nebraska farm well enough, I should have a stereotype of a Maine lobsterman or a Nebraska farmer. Those who are to us simply members of out-groups are all pictured in our heads in some simple fashion. It is too complicated and too fatiguing to stop at every moment to remember that there are all kinds of personalities who set lobster pots on the Maine coast, all kinds of personalities who do the work of the Nebraska farmer. To their wives and children, to their neighbors, they are individuals. To those at a distance they are stereotypes. Ethnocentrism leads directly into stereotyping. The hope of peace is, then, threatened not only by blind suspicion and distrust directed to out-groups, even when economic conflict does not exist (and with enormous reinforcement when it does exist), but also by the fact that instead of thinking of the individual wellsprings of

good will and understanding which develop when human beings have a chance to know one another face to face, we think in terms of abstract, generalized stereotypes.

Despite its sinister implications, the development of stereotypes has its comic aspect. Some years ago in studying the social attitudes of college students, it was found that students had highly generalized attitudes about groups to which they did not belong. So a list of national groups was made — Armenians, Belgians, Canadians, Danes, Englishmen, etc.; and it was found that if you knew the total amount of prejudice existing against those ten groups designated by the first few letters of the alphabet, you knew almost exactly the total amount of prejudice about those ten groups which came later in the list, such as Portuguese, Spaniards, Swedes, Swiss, Turks. Whatever holds for a large diversified sample of those "foreigners" holds for the rest. The stereotyping was laid on thick, with a careless brush; there were no fine strokes. This was thoroughly confirmed with other groups in a later study; indeed it was found that *non-existent* groups whose names were slipped into the list, such groups as the Danerians, Pyrenians, and Wallonians, came in, on the average, for the same general level of rejection, the same total amount of dislike, as the out-groups whose names were *bona-fide* names of existing groups.

The tendency to reject outsiders and the tendency to stereotype them are, then, twin indicators of danger, which, though not actually "causing war," can definitely predispose to war, and which, even when a peace institution is invented and implemented, will threaten peace until they are consistently, patiently, thoroughly analyzed down to the last structural components and scientifically removed.

STRATEGY AGAINST WAR:
A PRELIMINARY VIEW

6

As WE LOOK BACK on the sketch of the situation from which wars arise, it is clear that psychological impulses in their primitive, innate form may lead in many different directions. But they have become molded and institutionalized in such a way that many types of fighting, including civil and international war, are the expected response to frustrating situations.

Indeed, the argument developed so far may be enough to convince the reader that World War III will not inevitably arise from forces within the heart of man, yet leave the reader nevertheless convinced that the political institutions of the future are hardly less likely than those of the past to prepare him for a world of enduring peace. For the Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta Agreements, magnificent as they are in defining the unified determination of the Allied powers — and, it is to be hoped, of all the United Nations — still leaves sovereign states in their sovereign control of their own economic and political futures. And such sovereignty clearly leaves the old forces of evil a door through which to return. Surely no one but the light-headed can believe that the competition of American and British commerce will never contribute to international tension, and surely no one in his senses can believe that the Anglo-American system will come into no conflict with the Soviet system when such issues as the industrialization of China are presented. What is meant indeed is not that such dangers can easily be avoided, but that a *determination* to handle them amicably has been engendered, and that superior machinery for implementing this determination will be built.

The question then is this: What right have we to hope that the machinery which is about to be forged *will* be sufficient for the task, and what can we do to strengthen the hands of those leaders of the United Nations who work with energy and good will to stabilize the politics and economics of international relations?

There is great cogency in the arguments so skillfully developed of late to the effect that war is an institutional device which has developed historically, as have other institutions, serving certain specific functional purposes, and that as such it may be superseded by the invention of other institutions, built up in such fashion as to replace it and recanalize the energies which have gone into it. War, instead of being inevitable, constitutes a technological problem, just as famines or pestilences do. We need to learn how to drain swamps and inoculate against yellow fever; we also need to learn how to drain the sources of war and inoculate against its poisons.

This historical-psychological argument, however, seems not to go to the center of the difficulty. War is one of those vast institutional webs which has caught nearly all of humanity for nearly all of the centuries of its existence. The only reign of peace over large areas of which we have any record is that which has appeared occasionally under vast despotisms such as those of the khans in China, or that of the Roman imperial system. Civil wars punctuate even these "peaceful" periods. I remember how, when I felt that I ought to know a little something about the history of China and was told of the peacefulness of that vast national development, I was shocked and disheartened to find the same violence and bloodshed, the same plotting and intrigue, the same torture, espionage, and retribution directed against political enemies, which has saddened our Western world. As for Europe and the New World, the periods of "international peace" have been all too frequently periods of recuperation from war and of preparation for the renewal. War has been the "normal," the standard, the established method of adjudicating struggles between those who wanted more wealth, or prestige, or power. Men cannot cut themselves free by the sole expedient of writing books on the desirability of peace, by pointing out its purely institutional character, or even by working at the institutional superstructure without study of the raw, non-institutionalized human material at the bottom.

There are, indeed, two vast undertakings, the completion of which is necessary before anything much can be said to have been accomplished. First, a world structure must be invented, down to the working details, which will not only take care of the techniques of adjudicating international tensions, but also (as I suspect is even

more important) take care of the constant threat of *civil* war within each large unit, arising from those whose power-need is frustrated by the international situation, and who, within their own domestic spheres, are determined to obtain what they believe to be their rights. The most peaceful nations are, tragically enough, fully as subject to civil wars as are others. And civil wars threaten to disturb even a stable international system. For there are strong impulses to take sides; there are economic as well as political temptations to intervene; and civil war on a large scale, where military power is seized by those who have been kept under the thumb of another power bloc, can introduce all the evils and dangers of international war.

Indeed, one might go one step further and say that if we actually achieve a single world sovereignty, any local civil war can tend to become a spreading civil war within the world structure, one area under its own political, economic, and military system striking out against the rest, with repercussions of rebellion on other parts of the earth. A peace structure is no sheer matter of a central sovereignty. It is a new institutional pattern, not only covering the face of the earth but reaching into the lives of all of humanity; and such an institutional reconstruction is not easily to be achieved in a generation or two, or by any amount of shrewd thinking on the part of statesmen and students of society.

This leads us to our second difficulty with the institutional argument. No institution can be rebuilt without transformation of the human materials involved. We are dealing partly with education in the formal sense, partly with the system of attitudes and beliefs which we call folklore, tradition, or public opinion, partly with unconscious assumptions and dispositions upon which we have as yet focused but little light. The peace-planners must show that they understand institutions not only retrospectively after they have been built, but prospectively as well; they must show that they know, step by step, how to build a new institution. And of this there is meager evidence.

It appears to follow that a many-sided attack must be made if war as a social institution is to be removed. We shall sketch four types of approach here, giving the remainder of our book to a concrete discussion of the ways in which the obstacles to peace present

themselves, and to the concrete ways in which we may hope to re-
move them. Our present summary is intended only as a summary
of the position we have now reached and as an introduction to the
raising of these specific and concrete questions in Parts II and III.

(1) Of the four approaches that must be used, the first is clearly
the redirection of human loyalties. There is no need whatever for
a *reduction* of loyalties to national ideals or cultural standards. The
Swiss live under three language and cultural environments, and
loyalty to one of these involves no conflict with the others. The
Welsh, who still retain their Celtic language, have been loyal and
effective members of the British Commonwealth. The Bretons of
northwestern France are good Frenchmen. Within our own country,
members of many cultural and national groups have preserved the
richness of their tradition from other parts of the world, often for
several generations, while being completely loyal to American
ideals. More recently, cultural autonomy within the various parts
of the Soviet Union has offered another example. It can even be
effectively argued that loyalty to one's own tradition can become
richer when not tied up with belligerency toward other cultural
groups. The danger of nationalism lies not in cultural diversity, but
in the institutional connection between nationality as such and the
use of force against other nationalities, as expressed in the poten-
tiality or the fact of belligerency. What statesmen must do is to
transform the institution in such a way that a common humanity
developing diverse cultures may express its unity through a world
organization, to which in time deep and genuine loyalty, as to a
precious human achievement, may be given. It must again be re-
peated that this infringes only the legal shibboleth, now half mean-
ingless, of the ancient concept of sovereignty; far from destroying
the social, economic, or political independence of nations, it should
well enrich all cultural expressions of autonomy. The first job, then,
is the redefinition of sovereignty in such fashion that war will be-
come as meaningless between states as it is between American
villages.

(2) This first step, profound as it is, must be accompanied by
a second more intimately psychological step, providing that the
motives toward gain, power, prestige be adequately satisfied with-
out recourse to war. In many ways the institution of war is the

most direct opportunity which the modern world provides for the insatiable demand for gain, power, and prestige. While working toward world order, psychological studies must be prosecuted and implemented which will show how to make it possible for the mass of individuals to satisfy ordinary personal wants with respect to gain, power, and prestige, held under control by the democratic guarantee that similar opportunities to satisfy these wants will exist for others. Even if the institution of war be politically crushed by a world federation, the new order might, like a hydra, generate new pestilential heads in the form of demands for excessive gain, power, or prestige, such demands getting out of hand and leading to an impulse to shatter the new institutional structure. In the long run the new institutions *must* provide the ordinary person with a share of material goods, of power, and of prestige.

(3) From this follows directly a statement which is almost the converse of the foregoing. Whenever the impulse toward material goods or toward power and prestige is ruthlessly denied, wherever these wants of men are first cultivated and intensified by a competitive system and then frustrated through extreme concentration of these goods in the hands of a few, the danger of war, both civil and international, will recur. It is only through a system of "checks and balances," restraining those who overreach themselves, as provided by democratic control, that such frustrations can be eliminated or minimized. There must at the same time be deeper and deeper satisfactions in non-competitive group living, more and more immediate happiness in the daily round of events, more satisfactions in job, home, and community if the individual man is to be counted upon to want peace. If the strain upon him through frustration is a major everyday social experience, there is proof that democracy has not been human enough to be satisfying. Only when life is positively good for the common man will peace be safe.

(4) Fourth and last, the changes which we describe will take time because they involve a molding of human attitudes. No matter how swiftly some of the institutional changes may be made at the top, the building of peace will consist largely of a rebuilding of psychological fundamentals. We hope that there is time before another world war to make an important beginning. But the path will be terribly precarious for many years ahead. The task is noth-

ing less than the remolding or re-education of human wants, hopes, and fears, to a point where democratic attitudes within the community prevail everywhere, and where a sense of a common human purpose, based on the integrative activity of all cultural and national groups, is achieved. Only when this vast re-educational project is well under way, comprising not only a bettering of our understanding of our fellows, but a redirecting of our attitudes toward them, can we safely say that the rebuilding of world order is within sight. Very concrete world-wide educational steps toward intercultural understanding are imperative. The political invention of a warless society is *conceivable* even today. But to hold, maintain, and stabilize such a world order will require getting at human nature, working with energy and determination to give the will-to-peace a vitality which will withstand the misunderstandings, the hostilities, or the despotisms which may arise to threaten it.

So much for our preliminary survey of the danger of recurring war. We now turn in Parts II and III of this volume to a study of the *specific dangers* all over the world which will continue to threaten peace the day after the last shot of the present war is fired, and to the *specific methods available by which we may cope with and vanquish these dangers.* Clearly, such a broad summary of the dangers, the trouble-spots, which face us, goes beyond the competence of a single editor. So he has decided upon a question-and-answer method, a panel-of-experts procedure, making himself responsible for the unity of outlook and for a final integration in Part IV, but not for the specific substance of the recommendations which immediately follow.

THE OBSTACLES TO PEACE

THE POST-WAR SICKNESS

A QUESTION; AND AN ANSWER BY

Curt Bondy

7

WHEN AN ARMISTICE IS SIGNED, and "peace" is in sight, the military man will see defeated enemies; the economist will see depleted resources, crippled transportation; the statesman will see unstable governments; but the psychologist will see mentally sick people. Most of the people of Europe, most of the people of Asia will have been racked and tortured through years of misery, terror, uprooting, bereavement, and black chaos. We Americans read our newspapers by the friendly hearth; our planners of peace can aspire to think rationally, in an atmosphere of poise, sanity. Europeans and Asiatics, gnawed by deep anguish of the soul as well as hunger of the body, live in an utterly different atmosphere; the day-by-day struggle to exist will continue, with a new accent, to be sure, but with a pathological intensity to which cool thought, balanced planning, will be a stranger. The deep stains of these years will not wash out at the peace table. The world will consist of the scarred and the whole; almost literally, the bombed and the non-bombed.

The first job of the psychologist, then, is to confront this situation. The medical effects of Vienna's starvation in 1919 have been traced in the bodies of men and women of today; the psychological effects of the events of the same era appeared in the Arditi, then the Fascisti, of Italy, and in the Nazis of Germany. The economic and political seeds of these rank growths have been described countless times; the psychological soil needs also, however, to be remembered. And Europe will be far sicker now than then.

We have not the data to present the whole situation; but we can suggest it by asking one who has gone through the anguish of some of the earlier horrors of the Nazi system, and who has been following the psychological problems of the Nazi-held areas, Dr. Curt Bondy, of the Richmond Professional Institute of the College of William and Mary. We turn to him with the question:

> How far will the mental illness of much of Europe's population pre-
> vent the ordinary social and political processes from re-establishing
> order in Europe?

Dr. Bondy's Reply

The problem of establishing order in Europe after the war will be one of the most urgent and difficult tasks, and a prerequisite to all effective reconstruction work. No lasting peace can be built up without order. The re-establishment of order will be difficult amidst the aftermath of war, evacuation, revolution. Disorder will differ in different countries, and its extent will depend on various factors: whether the war lasts months or years or longer, whether the country was on the side of the Allies or not, whether the country was a battleground, whether there was a complete change in the political and economic order, whether the Russians or the other Allies first entered it, etc.

We shall consider here only one among these factors, the human element, and of it only a part: namely, how far the re-establishment of order will be influenced by a large group of mentally ill people. The problems to be discussed here are:

1. Do mentally ill people exert great influence upon the estab-
   lishment of social order, and if so, how?
2. Will there be more mentally ill people in Europe after the war
   than before?
3. Which groups of mentally ill people are likely to exert most
   influence?

1. The term "mental illness" is taken here in a broad sense, imply-ing any disturbance of normal mental organization. The teacher knows "problem" children, "nervous" children, "psychopathic" children. They are difficult to discipline, and in every school or in-stitution they disturb class or group order. The same pattern is found in adults, e.g., in camps for war prisoners, for refugees, etc. The armed forces know about their disturbing influence on order and discipline, and do all they can to prevent their induction or to hasten their discharge. Thus the first question must be answered clearly in the affirmative. Mentally ill people *are* a severe threat to order; and it is obvious that the more of these people there are

in a nation and the more severe the illness is, the greater the threat.

2. Every country, every normal community has a certain number of these mentally ill people, and the better a community is cared for, the better it can defend itself against this threat by educational, therapeutic, and protective methods. A normal nation can stand a "normal" amount of mental illness in its midst. We have already said that order in European countries will be severely impaired by many factors besides the influence of mentally ill people. Even in their normal number, the mentally ill are more dangerous in war and revolutionary times, because, more than others, they suffer from the absence of a well-ordered environment. The question which arises now is whether, after the war, there will be a greater number of mentally ill persons, and whether they will be more gravely ill than in normal times. This question must be answered in the affirmative, as I shall try to prove.

Modern psychiatry does not regard mental illness as a condition differing in an absolute sense from mental health. The differences are generally not qualitative but quantitative. If we draw a line, and put at the left the completely healthy (H) persons, and at the right the completely insane (psychotic) persons (I), we can — very roughly, of course — portray the whole population of a nation.

FIGURE 1

The figure is not intended to show the actual distribution of the population, but simply to suggest the relationship between two lines, indicating two conditions; they are *relative* only.

Left and right from the mid-point (M), we have those whom we commonly call "borderline" cases (B-B). Let us suppose that the solid line represents the distribution of a normal population at a normal time. Now during times of war and revolution most people are influenced by frustration, bereavement, danger, air raids, overwork, hunger or starvation, imprisonment, and other factors. The

result is that all become more "nervous," unbalanced, inhibited, neurotic, "psychopathic." The number of those who become wiser, more quiet, and more mature is probably negligible; however, they are those who should be sought out in all countries to help in reconstruction.

Thus it appears that almost all people move to the right, and that after the war the whole curve, without much change in its general shape, will have shifted. The dotted line represents the position of the population of the same nation after the war. There will be more borderline — not quite normal — cases, and more insane persons who, though they are still at large, should be in institutions.

As we know that the mentally ill endanger social order, it follows logically that the more ill they are and the larger their number the more the "mental illness" of the European population will "prevent the ordinary social and political processes from re-establishing order in Europe." We can also answer to a certain degree the question "how far." We can say that the greater the suffering of the population and the greater the influence of defeat and of other deteriorating influences, the greater will be the trend of the whole population to mental sickness. Or, as shown in our figure, the more the dotted line moves to the right, the more difficult it will be to re-establish order.

3. What type of mental illness will cause most trouble and disorder? As far as I can see, there are three main groups to be considered:

    (1) The psychopaths.
    (2) The psychoneurotics.
    (3) The wayward.

(1) If we understand as psychopaths those who are predisposed to pathological instability but who have no clear-cut mental disorder, we have the group of persons already mentioned as those who are the vexation of teachers and group workers whenever order and discipline are involved. Their pathological instability will be increased by all abnormal situations caused by war or revolution. Among them will be those who are capable of heroic deeds, as well as those capable of causing the greatest disturbance. Some of them

are always found among ardent revolutionists and among those with the highest and often most unrealistic ideals. They will offer new ideas, aims, beliefs, and will form sects, secret societies, etc. Among them are real leaders, but as instability is one of their most typical traits they will be those who deliberately or unconsciously make themselves difficult to discipline and form a threat to social order.

(2) The second group, which partly overlaps the first, consists of those suffering from psychoneurosis, more or less, i.e., psychological disturbance arising as a reaction to stress. Those in contact with former prisoners of war, people coming from concentration camps, from prisons, from refugee camps have noted that all are more or less neurotic, and will have some understanding of the mental disorder from which an important part of the European population will be found to be suffering after the war. All sorts of symptoms are observed, from the minor anxieties to the more severe compulsions. These people are a great hindrance to real order. If we try to imagine what starvation, bombardment, Nazi domination will create by way of psychoneurosis, we shall have part of the horrible picture which will confront those who have to do the reconstruction. But these psychoneurotics are only part of those who will constitute a threat to order.

(3) The wayward probably form the largest group of all. They suffer from no major mental disorder but, through environmental factors they have become asocial or antisocial; they use all their energies to satisfy their basic drives, and their actions are not consciously or unconsciously directed by higher ideas. "Bread and circuses," eating and drinking, sexual satisfaction, and entertainment are the only essentials. There are all degrees of waywardness. In a normal society the juvenile court judges and the judges of the criminal courts deal with them. We find the wayward among the prostitutes, in industrial schools and in prisons. If their waywardness is not caused or aggravated by mental disorder, there are good hopes of resocializing them when put under good influence in a favorable environment.

Two special groups among the wayward must be mentioned: the sadistic and the cynical. Under the sadistic type must be placed a special type found above all in the fascist countries. Nazi educa-

tion of the Hitler youth, the "leader schools," the storm-trooper training, and army life are apt to develop certain traits of ruthlessness which are believed to be necessary to get tough men to run the concentration camps, kill civilians, and carry out certain special army duties. These boys are not only taught to kill within themselves all human feelings of pity and compassion, but are brought to enjoy the exercise of brutal power. Here the sadistic impulse, kept down by civilization, is allowed satisfaction. It is in large part through this permission to satisfy the sadistic, as well as the sexual impulses, that Hitler's power and influence may be understood. These men are dangerous to an extreme degree, and the question is whether they will submit to any kind of order which will ask them to renounce the unlimited satisfaction of their sadism. We know very little about ways of influencing them (cf. 22).

Not only among the Nazis, unfortunately, but also among the soldiers and among the members of various underground movements, there will be a considerable number who must be put in this category. They will constitute a disintegrating force among the civilian population when the war is over. It should not be forgotten that Hitler and his co-workers belong to this group of men who after the first World War could not find their way back to civilian life.

The second group of the wayward is a special group still more difficult to picture, which has not been studied at all. We may expect that many of the fascist and national-socialist youth will belong to this group, which I will name the "wayward cynics." Many of the best German boys and girls earlier saw in National Socialism all the idealistic aims which seemed related to the movement. Shrewd propaganda has probably maintained this idealistic attitude; and all the energy of youth, all faith and idealism have been invested in this one movement. The awakening must and will come. *They will be precipitated from the heights of their idealism into a deep, desperate nothing.* When Germany is beaten, both the ideals and the dreams of world domination and race superiority will be shattered. The awakening will be terrific. It is to be predicted that many of the best of those young men and women who have blindly followed National Socialism to the last will lose all faith, all enthusiasm, all community feeling. They will try to make good for

themselves only by getting out of life as much as possible. They will become wayward and utterly cynical; they will have no interest whatever in the social processes going on about them.

This will not be true of others, who will try to find a new aim which will perhaps be still more radical. Some will form new secret groups of underground resistance. They will be resolutely opposed to all that could be regarded as a new order. They will constitute another source of danger.

This picture which I have drawn about how mental illness will become apparent in Europe is a very sinister one, and the reader will probably consider it exaggerated. I do not believe it is, and I believe that we shall face in Europe after the war a character destruction hitherto unknown in all history.

Is there any way to bring real peace and order to Europe? I firmly believe that there is a way, but I also feel that a collossal effort must be made to achieve this aim. A sensible peace, or better, an integrated political, economic, and social order, combined with a monumental reconstruction plan, could help us to reach this aim. Among the methods of reconstruction, re-education must play a definite and important rôle. We not only know the symptoms of mental illness but we understand also how to fight them. Or at least we are beginning to understand. There are ways of influencing individuals, groups, masses. What has to be done is to counteract the influence of the war.

War has pushed the whole population of Europe in the direction of mental illness. Reconstruction work, but especially re-education, must push in the opposite direction. We have to admit that not much has been done so far. But it is not too late to begin now with scientific research, with experiments, and with methodical training of reconstruction workers (23).

THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Rudolf Arnheim   *Clarence H. Leuba*
Fritz Schreier   *Hans Margolius*
Charlotte Bühler

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AFTER THE WAR, trouble spots will exist all over the world which represent future danger, even with the most favorable reorganization of world affairs; and with the most intelligent and co-operative centralized institutions for the maintenance of peace. Though the fire can be kept under control, it is not likely to be extinguished for a very long time, even with the use of all of our newest fire-fighting equipment.

In particular, we cannot gloss over the patent fact that in dealing with one great trouble spot of the present era, Germany, no permanently practical, internationally acceptable plan is likely to be devised. For even if Germany be subjected to military and economic disarmament for a generation or two, she cannot be deculturized in respect to her scientific and technological skills; and she cannot be made to forget her long history, her cultural unification in recent centuries, her military achievements, and her tremendous rôle in world science, music, and philosophy. *This phoenix is going to come to life again, no matter how long the ashes are drenched in water and blood.* The devotion to one's own cultural group is a sufficiently profound force, the sense of humiliation is a sufficiently galling anguish to any human being, to make the permanent reconciliation of the Germans to a relatively minor rôle in a world dominated by the present great Allied powers wholly unthinkable. And if the architect of future peace thinks of the German cultural unit as one of the great units out of which the world order is to be constructed, does this really leave us much better off? Is not a specific antidote, a special medicament of some sort, imperative, when so deep a nationalism, so profound a cultural pride threatens world peace?

Americans were dazed in 1914 when the Kaiser's armies, deaf to

the pleas of Grey and Wilson, plunged west and east with ruthlessness, ignoring both the amenities of international law and the elementary humanity which Europeans show to helpless civilians. These, we thought, are not the Germans we know, the earnest, steady, friendly Germans who have added so much to our American life. Oversimplifying, of course, most of us came to accept an essentially demonic interpretation; we placed the blame on the Kaiser or a few bad Germans. After we entered the war, more and more of us came to a more generalized moralistic view: the Germans as Germans were bad. We swung back during the twenties to a view not so different from that held prior to 1914. When the Nazis gained strength, we were sure that they were cranks, not typical Germans; and when by propaganda, chicanery, and force they seized power, most of us fell again into our two old mental habits: some of us held that there are bad Nazis and good non-Nazi Germans, others that all Germans are bad.

Now probably any mental habit persisting in our group thinking has *some* validity. But if one goes back to the Napoleonic era one does not find the moralism of the Whigs and Tories, the emigrés and the Russian court very useful; moral categories mean less and less as we move away from the specific focus of individual conduct to the mass movements of peoples. Our first problem as regards Germany is to try to understand; and not so much to unravel the past as to understand the Germany *of today,* in order to try to help the Germany of tomorrow to find a place in a humane world order.

We shall aim our questions at a group of observers who have known Germany well, and some of whom, during Hitler's terror, made their way to our country to share in the struggle for the destruction of his European system. We shall not pretend that they, or anyone, can outlive or unlearn the horrors of their own personal experience; but as individuals deeply devoted to the best in German culture and eager to do what can be done toward the ultimate restoration of Germany to a place in the society of nations, we believe they should be heard along with those who have known Germany as American observers.

We wish to begin with issues which are exceedingly specific and concrete. So we turn first to Dr. Rudolf Arnheim, formerly with the League of Nations, then with the British Broadcasting Corpora-

tion, now with Sarah Lawrence College, putting to him the question:

> How are the German people likely to react to such measures as the demand for the reconstruction of destroyed territories and the trial of war criminals?

Dr. Arnheim's Reply

Expiation, reconstruction, and bulwarks against further war will be necessary. But must they interfere with new, positive tasks? This is a question which faces the psychologist whenever he ponders over the meaning and value of punishment. Punishment lies between two heterogeneous situations and belongs to both. It is supposed to re-equilibrate, through expiation, a social situation which was disturbed by a misdeed and, at the same time, to create the basis for a better start. Are the two rôles compatible? In dealing with delinquents the progressive method is to convey a constructive function to punishment. Instead of a period of purely negative suffering, merely retrospective in its meaning, measures are inflicted which hurt, but at the same time create — through separation from the previous environment by imprisonment, the subjection to discipline, the compulsion to do useful work — a new and better pattern of life. Thus the task arises of controlling the psychological meaning of punishment in such a fashion that it is not only experienced as a *compensation for a previous deed* but is at the same time a *means for mobilizing positive social energies*.

Let us consider the situation in which reconstruction and punishment will take place. There was a pre-war world: a conglomeration of nations each of which represented a separate, egocentrically motivated force. Each of these forces was directed against all the rest. But through the need to get along with each other, these national forces were adapted, as to magnitude and direction, in such a way that some sort of a balance existed, which permitted some international give and take — the kind of a whole which in Freudian theory is considered the only possible one. Actually there was nothing but a pseudo-whole, though somehow functioning. Yet the political and economic crisis was creating increasing tension everywhere, differing only in degree at different points in the world

system. Then, after minor outbreaks elsewhere, there was the demonic eruption in Germany. This event transformed the total world system rapidly: a split resulted, two opposing parties formed; the battle was on.

One day the focus of the trouble will be crushed; the struggle will be over. But this does not mean that the forces which it aroused will be equilibrated. The offended will demand expiation; destruction will require reconstruction; solid dams will be needed against any recurrence of so catastrophic a flood. While the drive for a new and better balance is under way, unsettled energies on both sides will have to be taken into account. And the problem will be *how to make these energies helpful in the construction of a new world*, rather than allowing them to prolong the old chaos and create fresh tension. Will not any discharge on the one side produce a discharge on the other? Can we avoid the fatal *perpetuum mobile* of the vendetta?

Post-war reconstruction can be introduced in two ways. One approach would be to say: "You Germans are responsible for the destruction of most of Europe's territory; you will now be punished by having to rebuild what you destroyed!" Introduced in this way, the measure, though outwardly constructive, may create the purely negative psychology of the chain gang. Physically the first act of a new era, it would psychologically belong entirely to the past. Meaning nothing but a consequence of defeat, it would prolong the war situation, maintain the split between two hostile parties, represent the enslavement of the weak by their powerful victors. This would only produce new resentment. After the last war, the German people hated the Allies more than they had done during the war. The vanquished, in the very loss of physical power, acquires an ethical trump, for when the war situation is prolonged beyond the armistice it changes its meaning; hurting the weak is objectionable. This creates the basis for new and stronger hatred.

Is it a dangerously "soft" attitude to care about whether or not the Germans will put up mentally with post-war measures? Does it matter that they will hate as long as they are prevented from turning their hatred into action? In our opinion it is the psychologist's duty to point out that mental forces have just as tangible effects as physical forces. It is in the common interest that the disarming of

the Germans should not lead to a rearming of their souls in such a way that ten thousands of men of the United Nations would be required to spend decades of their lives in playing the unpleasant rôle of the lid on the pressure cooker.

But let the same measures be introduced in the following way: *"Much of our world has been destroyed. We have to rebuild it. This is an opportunity for economic, technological, social progress. You Germans, being largely responsible for this destruction, will have to carry a great share of the burden. We trust that you will employ all your skill and inventiveness in this task. Here is a chance for you to make a contribution to the new world!"* Introduced in this way and carried through in this spirit, the task will have remained the same, it will be an equally severe punishment, but its meaning will have changed. Now the emphasis is on the task, a common task, a challenge to productive capacities. Damage done to the whole will be repaired as a service to the whole, and through this hard trial Germans will acquire the right to citizenship in the new world. Laboring in foreign territory may mean slavery. But it may also mean overcoming the old selfishness of national boundaries. It may mean lending a hand where help is needed, regardless of whether it be in your land or mine. Is there a better way to introduce a person to a new spirit than by making him work according to this new spirit? If the proper psychological attitude is created, work abroad may mean the development of sympathy for other peoples, a widening of the horizon, membership in a larger whole, a new sense of responsibility. This would be reconstruction not only of homes and factories and fields, but of the minds of the people. Forced labor would have become true occupational therapy. Although necessarily carried out by way of conscription, the measure should be presented as a constructive task. In harmony with this approach, it should not be entrusted to criminals but rather to the least guilty classes of the German people as an instrument of their rehabilitation. It is an ugly thought that the new Europe should be built by the bloody hands of storm troopers.

Just as in all other matters of education, the aim should be not simply to push passive individuals into what the teacher believes to be the right direction, but to create the conviction that the right thing is being done and to evoke as much as possible of the spontaneous co-operation which may spring from such conviction.

Is it possible in a similar way to give a positive function to the trials of the war criminals? At a first glance there seems to be little constructive value in investigating and punishing the Nazi murders, tortures, robberies, particularly as the record of most of the delinquents will be such that there will be no way of permitting them ever again to assume a part in the human community. We believe that while all eyes will naturally turn to the doomed, the trials will derive their constructive value from being consciously planned for their influence upon those who will not actually appear in court, namely the German people, and indeed the peoples of the whole world. We do not know how the Germans will feel about Hitler and his helpers after the war. But the value of the trials will depend largely upon whether the Germans will identify themselves with the accused individuals to just the right extent. They must be prevented from detaching themselves psychologically so fully as to feel that the trial of a number of criminals, who happen to be Germans, is no concern of theirs. Nor must they be led to believe that there is no difference between the guilt of the actual delinquents and their own. If there were no such difference it would be injustice indeed to give the Germans the opportunity for a new start.

To determine the adequate measure of identification will be part of the procedure itself. Were the Germans forced into what they did by the sheer power of their leaders? Or, as Ilya Ehrenburg expressed it recently, do the crimes "lie at the door of millions"? Whatever the truth may be, the psychological situation during the trials will have to allow for a measure of detachment, just sufficient to let the German people relive in a more objective attitude a historic spectacle which, at the original performance, they had observed through the distorting lenses of Nazi propaganda — as in the revival and straightening out of a past episode of life during psychoanalytic treatment. The reference to psychoanalysis will be sufficient to demonstrate that such conjuring up of the past is not by necessity only retrospective but, if undertaken with a view to clearing the road for a more reasonable future, strongly constructive. The analogy also shows that the part of the "patient" is in no way that of a mere spectator.

If the trials are to be of value for the re-education of the German people, they must not be focused in a narrow way upon the personal

shortcomings of individuals. Rather, they will have to show to what extent Nazism and its crimes were made possible by, and grew out of, the political and economic situation of the German nation. Nay, the *juridical exposition of the facts* can be expected to convince, and thus to re-educate, the Germans *only* if the German situation is presented in its proper *world context,* somewhat as we tried to sketch this context in this paper. As a matter of fact, it would seem that only under this condition can the trials become genuinely of value to the rest of the world. For the people of the victorious nations also will have something to learn from such a re-enactment of the tragedy on the basis of a more objective viewpoint. *They will have to see fascism as a world disease before they can hope to cure the world.* They will have to realize that "the German form of Fascism is merely the worst," as the London *New Statesman and Nation* put it recently. There will be little point in converting the Germans to the "reality principle" unless at the same time the world strives toward the creation of a general framework in which it makes sense to live realistically.

In short, if the trials do not, at least in their general attitude, offer a universal housecleaning, they will not even purge the defendants. Do we have to emphasize that this is not an attempt to exculpate the Germans? A trial must not be inspired by the desire to prove the preconceived conviction that the defendant is guilty or innocent; it must merely aim at justice. And the argument is that justice cannot be established if individual acts are arbitrarily isolated from their context. In the words of Kahlil Gibran, the Arab poet: "And when the black thread breaks, the weaver shall look into the whole cloth, and he shall examine the loom also." [1]

By such impartiality and breadth of view the trials could obtain a constructive psychological value in spite of their essentially negative task. They could give an example of how to settle an international matter not on the basis of antagonistic national interests but "from above," as Max Wertheimer used to say, namely, by view-

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[1] Obviously so vast an enterprise cannot be the business of court trials only. We are thinking of an educational campaign, based on all the media of mass communication which would precede, accompany and follow the trials, present the issue in its broad political framework and divulge and interpret the findings in an impressive way without attempting to interfere with the course of justice.

ing the world situation and its shortcomings as a whole with the conviction that the political and economic isolation of continents or states is becoming more and more impossible, so that the solution of a single people's problems can be sought only by defining this people's function in the larger context. Just because the subject of the trials is connected with war, that is, with an institution which is the exact opposite of the handling of affairs integrally, from above, its settlement by the new method would be all the more impressive. A court set up with the intention to guarantee impartiality, the calm severity of justice, a broadminded, objective procedure, democratic courtesy and human understanding springing from strength, not from weakness — if there is any method of re-educating the Germans, it will consist in giving them this taste of a new spirit on an occasion where they would least expect to meet it.[2]

The trials must be given a constructive psychological function also because of the remarkable tendency of evil to drop out of people's memory. It was amazing to see how Mussolini became nonexistent practically the day after the collapse of his régime, which had held a country, a world, in terror for twenty years. The Kaiser vegetated in Holland as an anarchronistic shadow. Similarly, Hitler and his gang are likely to lapse into unreality as soon as they are driven out of power. This psychological phenomenon is not simply explained by escapism, by the desire to suppress the unpleasant. Rather it seems to derive from the negative character of all evil. Evil is psychologically unreal because it is unnatural. It needs to be physically present in order to convince people of its existence. As it is unconstructive, it offers no basis to the future to build on. Thus having no positive part in the ensuing situation it drops into oblivion. If the post-war trials are not to share the tragicomic fate

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[2] This suggestion is made in deliberate opposition to Emil Ludwig's weird post-war vision of Prussianized Americans, in riding boots, bullying the Germans into obedience. (*How to Treat the Germans*, New York, 1943, pp. 75-89.) As far as practical safeguards against future German aggression are concerned, we certainly do not plead for a half-hearted procedure. Whoever, during the years of the German republic, witnessed the passivity of Allied control while teachers were preaching revenge, and courageous publicists went to jail for divulging information about the more or less secret rearmament of the Reichswehr, can only hope that preventive measures will be carried through as energetically as they are presently advocated in print. What we are concerned with is the psychological climate, which will determine the meaning of such measures.

of the Leipzig trials of 1921, which seem to have succumbed to their own unreality,[3] they will have to give a constructive function to the settling of an account with the past.

What we propose may strike many a reader as utopian. Is there any chance that after the years of murder, torture, robbery, treachery, and incendiarism the victors will possess such angelic serenity? Is not the striving for revenge and for the utmost destruction of the offender, is not an egoistic rush toward new national prosperity, likely to be the dominating motive of all post-war policy? It is not the purpose of this paper to foretell future history. Nor does it undertake to establish the exact proportion which will be obtainable between the possible and the desirable. It attempts to trace an ideal line of conduct derived from theoretical considerations: it does so not for the abstract benefit of ethical principles, but because psychology has shown that coercion fails to create safety, harmony, and progress. Frustration breeds aggression. (*End of Dr. Arnheim's reply.*)

Doctor Arnheim's emphasis is upon using justice as a psychological instrument of German reconstruction. Another problem looms immediately. Justice will be but one constituent in the vast agony and chaos of post-war Germany. What will be the psychological atmosphere of this Germany? What kinds of Germans will there be? Which of them will be able to understand peace? So I put to Dr. Fritz Schreier, formerly of Vienna, now of New York, the question:

> **What psychological characteristics of the post-war German population will help or hinder in planning a democratic world order, and what are the implications for our own behavior toward Germany?**

Dr. Schreier's Reply

The first problem is the nature of the German reaction to the experience of defeat. Will they learn from this experience? If so, what will they learn? The first reply is that there will be no general, no uniform reaction. There may be some truth in the conception of a national character, resting on the fact that co-nationals are ex-

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[3] Compare Elmer Luehr: *The New German Republic*, 1929, pp. 194-198.

posed to certain common influences; but this fact does not result in uniformity of reactions. We must try to find those sections of a given population which react similarly. Marxist theory will tell us that social classes constitute such sections. But though it must be admitted that the class situation is one condition in the motivational process, it is not the only one, since members of the same class frequently act differently and members of different classes act in the same way.

There are Germans who have adopted the "new psychological order," the re-evaluation of given values by rejecting or dropping the values of civilization and replacing them by the values of aggressiveness, brutality, and force. There are other Germans who have made a personal sacrifice in maintaining civilized attitudes and fighting against the new order. Between these two extreme groups stands the group of the lukewarm, who have not assimilated the credo of aggressiveness, yet have yielded to pressure and "gone along." It would be idle to speculate about the number in each group; careful analysis of this problem will be necessary after the war.

Defeat Will Not Change Most Nazi Types

There is no such thing as a uniform Nazi mind. I have made an attempt elsewhere (157) to distinguish eleven different types of aggressiveness, according to the rôle which aggressiveness plays in the personality concerned. Three of those types may be expected to change under the impact of defeat, and to abandon their aggressiveness: (a) the "believers in success" will turn aside when they learn that aggression fails; (b) those "aggressive out of despair" will use other means for their aims when other means are offered; (c) the "insecure" will follow new leaders as they followed the old.

Some of those whose adherence to Nazism is based on the conviction of their own strength, the "ex-soldier" type, may come to understand that their belief is wrong. But that the type of "inhibited aggressors" who need a legal and moral cover for the aggressive actions which they desire to commit will return to their former habit of repressing aggressiveness may be doubted. It makes a great difference whether the aggressive desires were never allowed to come into the open or whether they were realized in

action, such behavior being stopped suddenly by a re-enforcement of the former moral and legal code. It cannot be expected, however, that the direct aggressors, the sadistic, most of the "ex-soldiers," who prefer aggression to other means for their ends, the cynics, the defensive aggressors, the fanatics, and the anti-progressives will be so profoundly affected by the defeat as to abandon aggressiveness.

It is necessary also to distinguish between central and peripheral personality traits; the nearer a trait to the center of the personality, the less the probability of its being abandoned under changed conditions. A person may prefer to sacrifice his life rather than his aims. There are ways of determining whether and to what degree a trait is central; e.g., we know that certain acts if repeated offer less and less pleasure and may, finally, become unpleasant. But there are others which can be repeated again and again, always with the same pleasure. The poet, the composer, the painter, the workman who is a workman at heart, all take new pleasure in each repetition of their creative acts. Their art, their craftsmanship are at the center of their personality. Aggressiveness, however, is at the very center of true Nazi character. Many in the concentration camps have asked in astonishment: How is it possible that these men never tire of abusing prisoners with the same words, maltreating them in the same ways, always with sparkling eyes, always with the same delight? [4] To abandon their aggressiveness would mean for these people an abandonment of the center of their personalities. Such "psychic suicide" can hardly be expected.[5]

Several other arguments support this view. We have a "comparable historical situation," to use Professor MacIver's term: the behavior of Germans after the first World War. At that time there were, of course, also "Nazis" who enjoyed war and brutality, and committed atrocities. How did these pre-Nazis react to defeat? Did they abandon aggressiveness? On the contrary, they formed the

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[4] It is not implied that the prisoners are always the same individuals; the guards may daily maltreat a group of new arrivals.

[5] The Nazi ideology, particularly the master-race idea, seems to me of secondary importance. It is a rationalization for all Nazi types except the fanatic and the inhibited aggressor, for whom it serves as a release from inhibition. The Nazis may or may not, therefore, change their ideology; but they will not give up aggression.

notorious "free-corps" and waged war on their own account. The story of the "black Reichswehr" and the "vehme" murders should not be forgotten. The election statistics speak clearly in evidence of the magnitude of this group: they were numbered by the millions.

The lessons to be drawn from history are usually not unambiguous; either one may consider one's failures as a "precedent" and conclude that the end cannot be reached, or one may regard one's failures as the outcome of a unique historical situation which will not repeat itself. "Wind and weather were against us" was the explanation given by a socialist leader for the defeat of his party. And the third reaction may be: "I used the wrong means; next time I will do better." Resignation, repetition, and application of other means are the three possible rational reactions to failure — apart from irrational reactions such as sublimation or regression.

If the Nazis choose, as may be expected, one of the two latter reactions, they may be supported by a phenomenon which was described best by Nietzsche, anticipating psychoanalysis: "It was like that, says my memory; it cannot have been like that, says my pride. At last, my memory yields. . . . " It was not my fault, it was the fault of others. In this way the legend of the "stab in the back" was born. The first attempts toward a new legend of the same sort are visible in the latest Hitler speeches and his threats against the home-front.

Another analogy: How did those who lost by the Nazis' advent to power react to the political catastrophe? Allport, Bruner, and Jandorf in their analysis of ninety German refugee life histories (6) found that a "variety of protective mechanisms operate to prevent the individual in a catastrophic situation from realizing the gravity of the occasion and thus from making appropriate forms of adjustment." Moreover, "personalities show themselves to be markedly consistent through a crisis. Each takes the catastrophe in a characteristic way, and the personality displays much less disorganization than the social structure in which it moves." These findings will be confirmed by anyone who has had the opportunity to observe such reactions. It is precisely the magnitude and the complete strangeness of the catastrophe which makes for these reactions. Frequently the protective mechanism, "it can't happen here," continues in the puzzled question, "that is impossible, I refuse to believe in it."

The victim does not feel the impact of the force which destroys his life as something human, but as a catastrophe of nature like an earthquake. Precisely because the forces are felt not to be human, they cannot penetrate the personality and change it. *Stubbornness arises in the face of such meaningless and stupid interference in one's life.*

The Nazis will be hit by a similar catastrophe and may be expected to react in a similar way. They, too, *will not be able to understand* that their world has perished. The same "protective mechanisms" may come into play. They, too, will withdraw to stubbornness and cling all the more tenaciously to their aims. They may find comfort in the slogan: "We were the pioneers; someone will come to finish the great aim of making a Nazi world." Defeat, therefore, is not likely to change Nazi minds. It would not be correct to speak of all this as a desire for "revenge." The idea of revenge is finite and, as it were, measurable by the wrong suffered. The French may have had this sentiment after 1871. But the Nazi's desire for aggression is infinite and continuous; it existed before the defeat and will continue afterward.

No Other Measures Will Change the Majority of the Nazis

If, therefore, defeat will not change the Nazis, what can be done? Several possibilities seem to exist. In the first place, leniency may be shown by the victors. Will the Nazis understand generosity and forgiveness? No; these conceptions have no place in the mental framework of the Nazis. They would be interpreted as signs of weakness and ridiculous sentimental quackery, and would arouse new hopes for success. This is particularly true for the cynic type, but also for the others. Moreover, such a development would fit in very well with the expectations of the Nazis: if history repeats itself in a German defeat, it may repeat itself also in post-war history; the weakness of the victors may offer a new opportunity.

But can Nazi types not be led back to *adjustment to civil life* and satisfaction in peacetime occupations? Unfortunately, no. We must not overlook the fact that it was not at the beginning the unemployed who joined Nazism, but the restless, the unstable, the outcasts, the dregs of society. Elements which were never able to get adjusted to normal life formed the advance-guard of Nazism,

among them the "leader" himself. Other Nazi types were successful in civil life, but not satisfied with it, and longed for adventure and aggression. Can people who could not adjust themselves before the realization of their dreams be expected to return to "normalcy" after they have seen their dreams come true? No more than the poor man in the fable, who was made a millionaire for a day, could find his way back to his former life.

Are there any other "substitutes" which could be provided? Certainly no sublimation, daydreaming, identification with the heroes of history or fiction, can be used as substitutes by individuals as active as the Nazis. A functioning democracy cannot offer them the positions of heroes in glittering armor who have power over life and death. Not even the owners of factories can be the "masters" of their workers. Democracy means co-operation and compromise, and has no room for the qualities — even the virtues — of such persons. Democracy also means progress, so that the "anti-progressive" aggressive type cannot be calmed by an offer of a fixed, static rôle.

Will *punishment* reform the Nazis? Punishment, of course, is a necessary demand of retributive justice and may be a deterrent to future aggressors, but it will hardly reform the Nazis, because acts committed with the approval of the dominating group *will not be re-interpreted retrospectively as crimes.* The Nazis will interpret punishment as the natural behavior of the victor, who completely crushes the defeated enemy, who in his turn must wait for another opportunity to arrive.

[Another suggestion offered today (29) is that German militarism is like a mental disorder, and calls for psychiatry. This leads into the theory of re-education; cf. p. 239. — Ed.]

REACTIONS OF THE OTHER GROUPS

Let us turn now to the other groups. What has happened to the former opponents of Nazism? Concentration camps are a means of breaking bodies, but not spirits. Though it is well known that he who is taken to a concentration camp a second time never comes out, there are a number in the camps who wear a bar above their badge as a sign that they are relapsers. Thus the question arises

as to why they were not converted to Nazism by propaganda. This problem of the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda is by no means settled, and after the war careful studies will have to be carried out. I suspect that a certain amount of "debunking" of propaganda will take place, and that the myth of the effectiveness of fascist propaganda will explode as did the myth of its military efficiency. Reports about Italy seem to show that even twenty years of Fascism did not alter political convictions. Perhaps the greatest success of fascist propaganda was to make people believe in its effectiveness; it seems that propaganda can be successful only if it competes with other propaganda and that monopolistic propaganda is inefficient precisely because it is monopolistic.

But what may be the attitudes of these people after more than ten years of Nazi power, and the experience of war and defeat? Two possible reactions are important: some may come to understand the mistakes committed by the Weimar Republic; the Social-Democrats, in particular, may understand the mistakes of the political tactics of their party, aptly characterized (169) as "pressure group action" instead of "political activity"; many may turn Communist. Another group may react in another way: in the endeavor to defend their anti-Nazi creed against the assault of Nazism, they may feel compelled to maintain all the aspects of their original creed, admitting no mistakes, in order not to open a breach in the wall of their convictions; they may also be motivated by their pride and the slogan "wind and weather were against us." We do not know how many will simply continue where they were stopped by Hitler's advent to power. When the Bourbons were re-instituted in France, it was said that they had learned nothing and forgotten nothing, and the same may be true for all similar situations.

Between these two politically active groups, there is the group of the lukewarm. This group, in all probability, will be dominated by just one feeling; the utmost weariness and fatigue. Undernourishment, prolonged working hours, the burden of the daily struggle for food, grief for the loss of relatives, friends, and property, fear of the enemy and fear of the Gestapo, fear of defeat and its consequences will produce one desire: the desire for rest, relaxation, escape. This group will go where they are ordered to go. Heinrich Mann in his novel *Der Untertan* (The Subject), published in 1915,

pictured the Nazis in unsurpassed fashion long before the Nazi movement began. He described the feelings of a German who attends a performance of *Lohengrin* and how natural he finds it to see the people in this opera swear allegiance to three successive leaders in the course of a few days — always with the same enthusiasm.

IF GERMANY WERE LEFT TO HERSELF, CIVIL WAR WOULD RESULT

Given these aspects of the situation, what would be likely to happen were Germany left to herself? If the Weimar groups came to power again, the danger would be they might commit mistakes similar to their earlier ones. These groups would probably be repudiated by the majority, the memory of the last years of the Weimar Republic being too much associated with misery, quarreling, and a piteous end.

Then where can new leaders be found? There may be some among the refugees, but this is too small a group, since too few of the Germans emigrated. New leaders, however, who command the real respect of the population, could come up only in a revolution, and I can see no great prospect of a German revolution. The memory of four lost revolutions — the Peasants' War in the sixteenth century; the unsuccessful attempts after the war of liberation against Napoleon; 1848; and 1918 may haunt Germany and tend to prevent another one.

If there were a revolution, there would be yet another difficulty. The qualities which make successful revolutionary leaders appear to be inconsistent with the qualities required to consolidate the results of revolution and to govern and administer. Administration must be learned; and where could trained administrators be found in Germany? Those who participated in administration under the Nazis are excluded. A slow process of training and growth is necessary, and there will be a vacuum between the moment of collapse of Nazism and a new beginning.

Let us assume, however, that all these difficulties are removed, and genuine new leaders found who are respected by a majority. Would there be a majority big enough to support democracy? (This does not mean a bare fifty-one percent of the population.) There is one important fact which should not be overlooked: Nazism was

stronger proportionately among the rural than among the urban population (6). The urban population, however, will have decreased more than the rural becauses of losses by air raids and the fact that the food situation is worse in cities than in the country. The democratic elements will, therefore, have decreased more than the nationalistic and undemocratic. Though the peasants were protected under the Weimar Republic by high agricultural import duties, this policy with all its disastrous consequences cannot be repeated, and dissatisfaction among the peasants will be stronger. To overcome all this conservative resistance and to maintain democracy, a strong government is necessary. But this government will be at the mercy of the victorious nations. Reconstruction of Germany is impossible without constant and abundant aid by the United Nations. A government which has to ask for outside support at every step cannot at the same time be strong within its borders.

Another fact will influence the whole situation. There should be no illusions that the subjugated and looted European nations will allow Germany to evade her obligation to make amends. Whether or not the name "reparations" is applied, Germany will this time be forced to reconstruct the destroyed areas. After the last war one of the chief arguments which prevented German reconstruction of the devastated areas of Northern France was that the population did not wish to come into contact with Germans. This time this argument will not be repeated because the damage is too great and because the Germans themselves have shown a way to prevent the contact of foreign workers with the domestic population: "labor battalions" are marched back to their barracks after work. A new German government will have to lend its hand to all these measures and necessarily will have to be an instrument of the victorious nations in many respects. Disarmament must be supervised, not in the superficial manner of the Conference of Ambassadors, but by careful and constant inspection of German factories.

Can the majority of the population be expected to support, or even to tolerate, a government which it must regard as the source of the burdens imposed upon it, and which co-operates with the former enemy and carries out its orders? We have seen that hatred against the Quisling who betrays his own nation is stronger than that against the enemy. Here is a real opportunity for "displace-

ment," for making the government the scapegoat, when there is complete impotence against the enemy.

If a community finds itself in an emergency, two reactions are possible: either disintegration, with quarreling among the members, or unity against the common enemy. If war against the enemy is hopeless, only the former is left. The conclusion must be drawn, therefore, that chaos, instability, civil war (latent or open), hatred and despair will govern Germany if she is left to herself. *A new democratic government would have to carry out three tasks:* remove the disastrous consequences of the last war, build up democracy and execute the order given by the victors. This is impossible, the tasks being incompatible, particularly when we inspect more closely the enormous task of building up democracy in Germany.

THE TASK OF BUILDING DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY

Now we have come to that part of the question which relates to positive recommendations.

It has become clear by now that democracy is not only a system of government, but a way of living that must be built up from the bottom, and not by superimposing the roof of an unfinished structure. Transition from autocracy of any kind to democracy affects the whole pattern of community life. We must be well aware of the implications. There must be a break with the past — complete, definite, and irrevocable.

In the first place, the existing government machinery must be torn down. Whoever participated in the brutal and corrupt Nazi government cannot be trusted to work for a democratic government. The mentality which says, "I am a faithful servant of government, whatever it is," cannot be tolerated. This spirit of subservience is a constant threat, for modern dictatorship is made possible by such instruments. It is characteristic of the German official that he feels himself to be, not the adviser of his co-citizens, but the representative of sovereign authority. The difference between the attitude of the official in Central Europe and in the western democracies is striking for anyone who had the opportunity to observe both. The old officialdom can be broken *only* by appointing new men who have acquired other habits in other fields — labor leaders for instance. Wholesale replacement of personnel will, of course, impair

efficiency for some time. But efficiency is not the supreme value and must step aside when the highest values are at stake. It will be particularly important to change completely the personnel of the criminal courts and public prosecutors who contributed to the downfall of the Weimar Republic by partiality in administering justice.

The second large problem is re-education of the German youth. The necessity of a complete change in the school system is obvious. Some turbulence may be expected as soon as the iron grip of Nazi discipline is relaxed, but this will pass. There is, however, another factor in re-education which has not yet received the attention it deserves: the home. Where the parents have preserved or are willing to return to democratic views, there will be no difficulty. But where the parents maintain autocratic views, conflicts within the family must necessarily arise. The child will have to learn to reject and to despise the creed of the parents and to defend himself against the influences of the home. Conflict in the family and between the generations is the unavoidable outcome of radical changes in creeds. It was not the Nazis who said, "The children shall rise up against their parents and cause them to be put to death." The child will be exposed in this way to severe conflict and must find protection against the overwhelming influence of his parents. In exceptional cases the child will have to be removed from home, though this is certainly an extreme measure.

A somewhat similar situation will arise among the millions of cases of war orphans. The situation in the victorious nations will be easy: children will learn that their fathers died the death of heroes in defense of their country and world civilization. But what will German orphans have to learn? They must be taught to understand that their father's death was senseless, and that he was sent to his death by the cruel and unscrupulous Nazi leaders. This is a crucial point: the German orphan must know who is responsible for the insecurity of his being without a father. Psychoanalysis may be wrong in detail in its description of the father image, but is certainly right in stressing the rôle of the father in the mental evolution of the child. There must be some father substitute in the case of orphans, as well as in the case where the father remains devoted to hated and despised beliefs.

There is a legal institution which can be used and expanded: tutelage. The child without a father and the child who stands in opposition to his father must find persons to whom he can turn for help, persons who are in constant contact with him. The teacher may frequently not be the right person because the teacher-pupil relation has its own peculiar aspects. Relatives, also, will frequently not be satisfactory. There should be arrangements by which professional social workers may take over the task. After the first World War Austria created the institution of "general tutelage" — public agencies or associations for the protection of youth which could be entrusted with tutelage. France declared the war orphans to be *pupilles de la nation* and enacted carefully elaborated laws which created special care for these children. There will be few foreigners who will want to be godfathers to German children. But social organizations outside Germany may be able to help by sending qualified persons to aid German democrats.

Another measure could easily be taken: there may be reasons for not trying to teach German prisoners during the war, but they should not be sent back to Germany before they have been taught at least to know what democracy means and how it works. Some time will pass before transportation of prisoners back to their country will be possible. This period should be utilized and preparations made in time. However, the *idea* of a democracy should be stressed, rather than simply holding up American democracy as a shining example.

Much could be learned from a careful investigation of the mental state of these young men, particularly what methods of re-education will be successful and which ones should not be applied. Conversion of convinced Nazis cannot be expected; but many in the critical age-groups who were taught only Nazism and do not know anything else may not be lost, and may well be won over to the cause of democracy if Nazism has not penetrated too deeply into their souls.

No choice is left, therefore, to the United Nations but to take over the difficult and unpleasant task of governing Germany for a period whose length cannot be determined at present — in the interest of the civilized world and in the interest of a future genuine German democracy. They must control disarmament: this implies

the control of production, of imports, and of the budget. They must control the police, penal justice, and education. All these branches of administration are interconnected, and when one of them is taken over for certain purposes, the others must follow. The difficulties on the part of the United Nations are obvious. But the task should not be overrated; neither a large army nor a host of foreign officials will be necessary if the key positions are held.

The danger of the Germans' hating foreign rulers is less than the danger of their hating their co-nationals, who function as instruments of foreign rulers in the name of democracy. It must be freely admitted that the choice is painful. But much will depend on the way in which the administrative problem is handled.

Post-War Propaganda

There is one partial remedy of great importance: post-war propaganda. After the last war no attempts were made by the victors to influence the Germans and to show them the reasons of the provisions of the Versailles Treaty. The field was left to the Germans themselves. The pre-Nazis seized this opportunity immediately, and no serious attempts to check it were made by the government, which was always most sensitive when reproached with being insufficiently nationalistic. It was the reparations, in particular, which were used as the instrument for the most successful propaganda the world ever has seen. Whatever calamity happened in Germany, it was the fault of the reparations — which never were paid because the foreign credits invested in Germany were much higher than the actual payment of reparations and these credits were not repaid.

A telling example is that of the milch cows. According to the Versailles Treaty, Germany had to deliver immediately a number of milch cows to replace those which she had taken away in the occupied countries. Instead of making clear to the German people that this was a simple demand of justice and no more than compensation for a clear breach of international law, this was presented to the Germans as extreme cruelty committed against German children. And in this way it went on and on until not only Germany, but the world, was convinced by propaganda of the injustice and economic impossibility of reparations. The propaganda did not have a true monopoly, but it was not *counteracted*. Nobody took the

trouble to tell the Germans of the wanton destructions in Northern France ordered by the German generals after they knew that the war was lost, despite the fact that the French high command had expressly stated that Germany would be held responsible for these acts. A German soldier returning home is not likely to tell of the atrocities which he has committed, partly on his own account, partly on the orders of his commanders. The picture of the effects of the German occupation presented to the Germans at home in the last as well as in this war is a picture of the blessings of the efficient German administration. The actions of patriots are presented as criminal actions of desperadoes. *Unless those stereotypes are destroyed, the Germans will again be astonished to see furious hatred directed against them.*

The Germans must learn the truth about the period when they were excluded from free communication. No attempts should be made in this "propaganda of truth" to convert Nazis, since this would be hopeless; but there are others whose creeds are based on false beliefs, and these should be corrected. No more, but also no less, is required than to tell what really happened. *Whoever wants to learn the truth should be given the opportunity.* This is the reason why we may speak of Germany collectively in this context. It would be unnecessary to try to pick out those Germans who are interested in learning the truth; if truth is easily accessible to all Germans, those who want to learn it will learn it. It will be especially important to publish widely the German war documents themselves; it will be necessary to get hold of the files and archives of the Gestapo, which will yield instructive materials the authenticity of which cannot be doubted.

Some psychoanalysts may object to these suggestions. There is a theory to the effect that feelings of shame and guilt become intolerable, and set into motion the mechanism of projection which leads to new aggression against the persons upon whom hatred is projected (8). To be sure, there are many phenomena which can be explained only by the operation of this mechanism. However, we should be careful not to overgeneralize it. Catholic and other theology, on the other hand, has always maintained that repentance is a necessary condition of reform and purification. Probably both theories, the psychoanalytic and the theological, are right for dif-

ferent types of personalities. Much may depend on the way the facts are presented. Obtrusive and high-handed sermons will hardly have any effect; but to show simply that the Germans must bear the natural consequences of their acts is quite another thing. If, however, projection is unavoidable, then it is all the more important to direct the hatred against those who are responsible for the catastrophe and make the real evil-doers the "scapegoats." [6] (*End of Dr. Schreier's reply.*)

Dr. Schreier's analysis supplements Dr. Arnheim's, especially in the more detailed study of varying character types with which we shall have to deal; but the cardinal emphasis upon the need for firm authority in dealing with the authoritarian is shared by the two.

Dr. Schreier's answer is largely focused on characteristics associated with Nazism, and with the experience of war and defeat. I felt the need to supplement this picture with a broader approach to the question of German characteristics over a long period of time; an approach in which the views of many individuals who have known both Germany and the United States should be compared, and in which German national characteristics *as a whole,* not necessarily those most directly related to war, should be presented in their interrelations. We shall be dealing with German character, not merely with Germany as a war-making State. This task, like most of the tasks attempted here in such limited compass, could well occupy volumes; but some sort of bird's-eye view of the problem of German national characteristics was clearly necessary.

First, knowing that he had been closely studying the problem, I put to Dr. Clarence H. Leuba, of Antioch College, the question:

Is there any consensus of opinion as to psychological differences between Germans and Americans?

Dr. Leuba's Reply

Attempts to describe the ways in which foreigners are different from one's fellow countrymen are beset with pitfalls. It is alluring to establish a permanently advantageous position for one's group, and thereby indirectly for oneself, by considering the ways of the

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[6] For bibliography cf. nos. 6, 53, 63, 101, 148, 149, 157, 169.

foreigner as inferior. Frequently, moreover, the alleged characteristics of foreigners are vague generalizations based on an inadequate sampling.

For these and other reasons, the internationally minded liberal is justly suspicious of descriptions of racial or national differences. Realizing that the people of the world can be brought together peaceably only on a basis of equality and mutual respect, he rightly emphasizes the universals in human nature which make all men kin. It may be unwise, however, to dismiss all attempts at descriptions of national or other group differences just because of the usually prejudiced association of inferiority with the foreigner. Descriptions of group differences need not necessarily be freighted with evaluative or genetic implications (cf. 64).

In addition to being frequently prejudiced and subjective, descriptions of alleged psychological differences among nations are sometimes said to be really unimportant as compared with an understanding of the large individual differences found everywhere. Since there are fools, rascals, wise men, and good people throughout the world — so the argument runs — we must treat foreigners on their own merits, and without preconceptions. But it is naïve to assume that in practice an American, or anyone else, can meet people without preconceptions. A person familiar only with American customs will expect others to behave as Americans do; the behavior of the foreigner will be surprising and probably shocking. In so far as the latter frustrates expectations, he will be more annoying or irritating than curious or interesting. The normal behavior of the foreigner may, at times, be actually considered wrong or bad.

It is important, therefore, to substitute a different set of expectations when meeting foreigners. If the American is not to be annoyed by the German, he must be prepared for somewhat different values, outlooks, and actions. Though it is unwise to stress national and racial psychological differences unduly, it is equally unwise to ignore them. Those who ascribe racial and national antagonisms mainly to economic and military competition, or to prejudices acquired from economically interested parties, would do well to ponder these psychological factors. The totally unprepared person, even when not economically or militarily involved, is likely to be somewhat irritated and annoyed by a foreigner.

To be sure, correct expectations regarding the probable attitudes and behavior of the foreigner do not by themselves insure friendly relations. The foreign ways may still be considered a threat to one's security and one may feel inclined to boost oneself by belittling them. Correct expectations are but the first step; in limiting myself in this paper to that initial step, I do not wish to underestimate the tremendous importance of understanding the causes for the foreigner's characteristics and of developing tolerance and respect for them.

Probably no one familiar with both Germans and Americans would deny that they are significantly different in many ways. There would also be substantial agreement that existing differences do not differentiate all Germans from all Americans; rather, they are ways in which most Germans differ from most Americans. But there are no standardized and accepted methods for determining the "on the whole" type of differences. There is likely to be uncertainty and disagreement as soon as one attempts to give them explicit formulation. People who have sought to describe such differences have often been influenced by subjective factors, such as sentimental attachments to various aspects of pre-war Germany or by hatreds of the Nazi régime. Furthermore, though familiar only with certain parts of Germany or with certain classes of the population, they have sometimes made generalizations about Germany as a whole.[7]

Generalizations will be more valid, of course, if they represent agreement among several reasonably impartial observers. The observations provided by the latter, however, usually need to be organized and integrated. Unless they have been precisely formulated in a uniform terminology, there may be considerable leeway for the personal attitudes of the integrator to exercise a directive influence. Hence, the merit of a check list or questionnaire in which allegedly important psychological differences between Germans and Americans are described briefly and clearly for the scrutiny of people familiar with both countries. Once these judges have indicated

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[7] Chapter 13 in Brickner's *Is Germany Curable?* (29) and Chapter 6 in Duggan's *A Professor at Large* (52) contain examples of descriptions of German psychological characteristics on the basis of one person's experience. Many of the recent books on Germany, like Ziemer's *Education for Death,* (186) deal mainly with the Nazi period.

agreement or disagreement with such statements, there is less room for misunderstanding or interpretation by the integrator.

The check-list technique yields quantitative results and has, at least superficially, a gratifying aura of statistical objectivity and accuracy. It is difficult, if not impossible, however, to word the important ways in which Americans and Germans may differ psychologically so briefly that the judges will have the time and inclination to ponder them all, and yet so adequately that a definite affirmative or negative answer is possible without endless reservations. Since the ways in which Germans and Americans differ are not ways in which all Germans differ from all Americans, but are ways of behaving in which Germans on the whole are different from Americans on the whole, any generalizations necessarily involve many exceptions. It requires a nice judgment to determine when the exceptions are sufficiently minor or infrequent to warrant the generalization.

The more careful and scientific judges are not likely to commit themselves to a generalization without detailed descriptions of the exact circumstances under which the generalizations do or do not hold. Such judges may overlook the practical necessities confronting the soldier, statesman, or traveler in a foreign country. What may be most helpful to him is a knowledge of the specific ways in which the foreigners, on the whole, are likely to be different from the people with whom he is already familiar.

In this study of German psychological characteristics several methods were used in the hope that each might compensate in a measure for the weaknesses of the others. From my own experiences in Germany, my reading about Germany, and talks with acquaintances who had traveled there, I first drew up a tentative list of ways in which Americans and Germans might differ in their personality traits, values, and general ways of life.[8] I also listed

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[8] My own experiences included living almost a year as a boy in a German-Austrian family in Zürich while attending school there; almost a year as representative of the American Friends Service Committee in Germany shortly after World War I, during which I had opportunity to travel through most of Germany, meeting and talking with people of all classes; a semester at the University of Leipzig; and a short pleasure trip through the Rhineland in 1932. Studies of German art and literature and the general atmosphere radiating from the Friends Service Committee promoted appreciative and friendly feel-

some alleged differences in home, school, and other situations which might be expected to exert powerful influences on development. The frame of reference was always the American scene; German traits and situations were to be compared as far as possible with their American counterparts and with the expectations which the average American has regarding how people will behave. No assumptions were made regarding the origin or cause of whatever differences might exist. Most social scientists, to be sure, would probably be inclined to feel that educational and other cultural differences between the two countries adequately accounted for psychological differences. This weight of opinion should not close our eyes, however, to the possibility that migrations to and from these countries, wars, and other factors may have had differentiating genetic influences.

The questionnaire or check list on the following pages is the result of several revisions on the basis of the answers and comments given by some fifteen people familiar with both Germany and America. A few of these were refugees from the Nazi régime; some had emigrated to America before the Nazi era; others were Americans who had lived and traveled extensively in Germany. With one exception, all the persons to whom I sent the questionnaire either returned it answered or sent suggestions which were helpful methodologically. With some of the respondents I was able to hold interviews after the questionnaire had been answered. Two or three respondents refused to commit themselves with regard to most of the alleged differences without copious reservations; others, however, felt that many of the statements expressed not only ways in which Americans on the whole were definitely different from Germans but also from Europeans in general. The questionnaire, as here reproduced, contains chiefly the statements and answers on which I found unanimous, or nearly unanimous, agreement among those who were willing to commit themselves; x means such agreement, ? means the absence of such agreement.

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ings toward Germany. On the other hand, my family provided me with an aversion to "Prussian arrogance and militarism" and with strong pro-French leanings wherever Germany and France clashed. — C. L.

CHECK LIST OF WAYS IN WHICH GERMANS ARE SAID TO BE DIFFERENT ON THE WHOLE FROM AMERICANS

Column 1, pre-Republican Germany; column 2, Republican Germany; column 3, Nazi Germany.

1	2	3	
			Stronger and more universal conviction that —
x	?	x	National security depends on the nation's military force.
x	?	x	Might makes right; the weak are crushed and the strong survive; to get the upper hand Germany must be militarily powerful.
x	?	x	Relatively higher standing accorded to the military, especially to officers, even in time of peace.
x	?	x	Semi-military societies in the universities.
x	?	x	Students more likely to feel that "honor" should be upheld by dueling.
			Greater respect for, and greater observance of —
x	x	x	Laws.
x	x	x	Orders.
x	x	x	Regulations.
x	x	x	Official decrees.
x	x	x	Authority in general.
x	x	x	More numerous titles in civilian life (Herr Geheimrat Dr., etc.).
x	x	x	Greater prestige attached to title.
x	?	x	Greater emphasis on the importance of men as contrasted with women.
x	?	x	More glorification of masculine traits.
x	x	x	Men more dominant even in home and school.
x	?	x	Women considered important chiefly in so far as they make men comfortable and as they are producers of man power.
x	?	x	Women are associated with "Kinder, Kirche, Küche."
			More authoritarian atmosphere in —
x	?	x	School.
x	x	x	Home.
?	?	x	Labor organizations.
x	x	x	More men teachers in elementary schools (male teachers for boys; male and female teachers for girls).
x	x	x	School teaching much more likely to be a lifetime profession.
x	x	x	Stricter discipline imposed on children.
x	x	x	Greater obedience demanded from children.
x	x	x	Greater control exercised by the central government over schools, universities and education in general.
x	x	x	More respect for adults inculcated in children.
x	?	x	More training in the home, school, and community in authoritarian leadership and followership.
x	?	x	Less training in the give and take of democratic practices.
?	?	x	Less respect, and in many cases outright disdain, for democratic practices.
x	?	x	More devotion and loyalty to a leader (leader worship).
x	x	x	Greater need felt for a leader to resolve controversies, to make decisions and carry them out.

x	?	x	Greater attachment to the nation.
x	?	x	Greater willingness to sacrifice personal desires for the alleged "good of the state."
x	x	x	More accustomed to governmental control and supervision of business life (more state socialism).
x	x	x	Look to government for more control, guidance, protection, and service. Government control of railroads and radio; state and municipal theaters; advanced social security legislation.
x	?	x	More respect for government.
			Greater interest in, and appreciation for —
x	x	x	Classical music.
?	?	?	Art.
x	x	?	Literature.
?	?	?	The aesthetic in general.
x	x	?	Non-materialistic, cultural values.
?	?	x	Belief that the German "race" is superior to all others.
x	?	x	Belief that German culture is superior to all others.
			Special pride in German —
x	x	x	Music.
?	?	x	Art.
?	?	x	Literature.
x	x	x	Capacity for organization and thorough careful work.
?	?	x	Belief that Germans have a mission to spread German culture throughout the world.
			Higher status accorded —
x	x	x	Officials.
x	x	?	Teachers.
x	x	x	Greater fondness for group excursions and other group activities, especially group singing and beer drinking (Gemütlichkeit).
?	?	x	More emphasis on physical fitness and ability to endure physical hardships.
x	x	x	More emphasis on the body-building aspects of exercise.
x	x	x	Less emphasis on its recreational and sport value.
x	x	x	More emphasis on gymnastics, calisthenics, soccer, and hiking.
x	x	x	Less interest in professional sports.
x	x	x	More accustomed to walking.
x	x	x	More inclined to repair something than to replace it.
x	x	x	Less wasteful of materials, especially food.
x	x	?	More diverse in opinions and philosophies (multi-party, rather than two-party system).
x	x	?	More individualistic in that respect.
x	x	?	More inclined to express their opinions and to discuss them.
x	x	?	Less inclined to compromise.
?	?	x	Disdain for intellectualism as effete.
?	?	x	More officially sponsored belittling of the Christian religion.
x	?	?	More rigid class distinctions.
x	?	?	Greater class stability and security in the upper classes.
?	?	?	During later adolescence, German boys frequently show greater idealism, sentimentalism, romanticism, mysticism, and idealization of feminine values; and a greater tendency toward day-dreaming,

art, literature, and music. Possibly, this is an attempted revolt against paternal authoritarianism and represents an identification with the mother and her feminine interests, before the boy has finally to assume the stern, disciplined, realistic masculine rôle. Some traces of these adolescent traits and attitudes remain sometimes in the male adult as sources of conflict, uncertainty, and instability. The German would like to retain the idealistic adolescent traits; he frequently yearns for them but he has to give them up because a "grasping, vicious world" would enslave his Germany, if he let sentiment and idealism distract him from attaining disciplined power. (Adapted from Erickson, E. H., "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, 1942, 5, 475-493.)

Typical German Attitudes Toward Other Nations and Races

?	?	x	More officially sponsored anti-Semitism.
x	x	x	More distrust and dislike for the English as egotistical and self-seeking.
x	x	x	Some respect for the English, especially as empire-builders; some envy of the English.
x	x	?	Some appreciation of "French" qualities and culture (literary achievements, gaiety, enjoyment of life, wit, etc.).
x	x	x	Disdain for the French nation as decadent.
x	x	x	Some appreciation of America as the land of opportunity.
x	x	x	Disdain for Americans as crude, naïve, and relatively uneducated from the point of view of German culture.
x	x	x	Americans are considered to be very materialistic and governed mainly by commercial motives.

From the questionnaire results, the written comments accompanying them, the interviews, and my own experiences in Germany it was apparent that the characteristics shown by the people living in Germany today show considerable stability and continuity with the past; and yet also reveal conflict and flux presumably because of the numerous and far-reaching environmental changes to which Germans have been subjected during recent decades. Their characteristics are the result of three somewhat different atmospheres: that prevailing (1) until the close of World War I; (2) during the brief interim of the Republic; and (3) in the Nazi period. To a marked extent, the third period represented a reversal of trends existing under the Republic, and a return to trends well-established under the Kaisers. Persons whose formative years were spent under the Kaisers — and these included the majority of Germans at the time Hitler came into power — found much that was congenial in

the Nazi ideology. It would apparently be a mistake to believe that the latter was imposed entirely by immediate and temporary circumstances on an otherwise unreceptive people. Only certain Nazi extremes, such as outrages against the Jews and an entirely utilitarian and non-intellectualistic education, were out of line with German traditions of long standing. In the main, Hitler's propaganda — like all successful propaganda — encouraged (and exaggerated) tendencies which were already present.

An inspection of the check list results indicates specifically what differences between Germans and Americans have persisted through all three of the recent periods in German history. In this category are the German's greater respect for laws, orders, regulations, and authority in general. He has been more inclined to obey a law just because it was the law. He has been more accustomed to various aspects of paternalistic state socialism and to look to government for guidance, help, and service. His central government has had more control over education, recreation, and the means of communication; it has run the railroads, provided theaters and operas, and controlled radio broadcasting. The government has long provided him with greater social security, as through sickness, accident, and unemployment insurance. He has had more respect for officials of all sorts and has been accustomed to a great many prestige-bearing titles. Titles in civilian life have had almost as much incentive value as money has had in America. Paternalism, benevolent but nevertheless authoritarian, has held sway in the home. The children have been more obedient and disciplined and have had more regard for the rights, interests, and comforts of adults. Masculine influence has been more evident in the schools, in that teachers were predominantly men. In both home and school children have been taught to be more careful of material things and to be less wasteful, especially of food. Walking, discussing, singing, and beer-drinking have been favorite forms of recreation. In athletics, more emphasis has been placed on calisthenics, gymnastics, and body-building exercises and less on purely recreational and sport values.

Germans have long regarded America as the land of opportunity. But they have tended to regard Americans as relatively crude, uncultured, naïve, and materialistic. They have always disdained

what they considered as the American's "prostration before the almighty dollar." They thought of him as moved almost exclusively by commercial motives. They have had considerable respect and envy for the English as successful colonizers and empire-builders. But, especially since World War I, this has been tinged increasingly with a mistrust and hatred of the English as egotistical self-seekers who held Germany down.

The following characteristics, differentiating Germans from Americans, were lessened during the brief interim of the Republic, but were revived by the Nazis. Germans have had a stronger conviction that national security and prestige depended upon a powerful military establishment. Even in peacetimes they accorded greater prestige to the military, especially to officers. These took precedence over almost all civilians. There were semi-military duelling societies in the universities and the ruling classes felt, on the whole, that a man should always be ready to defend his honor with sword or pistol. In relations between the sexes, men had a more favored position; their importance, needs, comforts, and interests were more emphasized. They played a more dominant rôle, even in the home and school. Children were given training largely in authoritarian followership and leadership rather than in democratic procedures.

Until the Nazi régime, Germans were more diverse and individualistic than Americans, at least as far as their opinions, ideas, and philosophies were concerned. There was a multi-party, instead of a two-party, political system. Men aired their opinions more freely, disagreed more violently, and were less inclined to compromise. In order to get effective action they felt a greater need for a decisive and authoritarian leader.

The Nazi régime with its one-party system and standardized ideology was an extreme reaction against this almost chaotic ideological situation. Violent anti-intellectualism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Christianity, and the glorification of racial superiority and the physical man were largely Nazi innovations and are, therefore, of much more recent origin than the other characteristics differentiating Germans from Americans.

For a person unfamiliar with Germany, the results of a questionnaire study might be, by themselves, of only limited value in creat-

ing correct expectations of how Germans would behave as compared with Americans. The specific types of behavior covered by each statement need to be described in detail with numerous illustrations. For instance, the statements referring to the position of men in Germany as more favored than in the United States might gain in meaning by adding illustrations from typical German family life, such as that women in Germany are more likely to start up the furnace in the morning, help the man off with his coat when he returns from work, put on his slippers, and so on. The representativeness of such examples, however, might at once be questioned. Their only claim to being typical is that they are in line with a generalization to which people familiar with Germany have subscribed. (*End of Dr. Leuba's reply.*)

The data gathered by Dr. Leuba indicate a clear consensus of opinion as to the docility of Germans in the face of status and of authority, a docility which has made prestige-laden military authority peculiarly dangerous. Despite the individualism and outspokenness of many Germans, recourse in times of crisis is to a central authority upon whom all may depend; and in the hierarchy of status and authority the military has, even in the quietest periods, had a position which constricts and stifles the German will to world order. The Nazi system seized upon this psychological situation, and wrought of it and of economic chaos (cf. Chapter 3) the instruments of aggression.

With the *docility* which Dr. Leuba's study indicates goes a *political naïveté* and an intense, though misplaced, *idealism* which are well-summarized in a letter from Dr. Hans Margolius:

"Germans are interested in gardening, in bee-keeping, in music, in *Weltanschauung*, in soldiers, in uniforms, in poetry. They are not interested in politics, and they have no understanding of politics. This makes them an easy prey for a demagogue. First of all, it seems to me necessary that the German people acquire a political education.

"Before this war Germans had a great fear of Communism. They feared Communism not primarily because they feared loss of their liberty or their personal property, but because they saw in Communism something like the Anti-Christ, a life without idealism and

romance, a life of pure materialism. For somewhat similar reasons they feared and abhorred the western democracies. And for the same reasons they were opposed to a democracy of their own. If we want to establish a powerful democracy in Germany, as a stronghold of peace, we must show that democracy can be something highly idealistic. We must build a German democracy as appealing, as glamorous as is American democracy. Thomas Mann earnestly sought to give the Weimar Republic such glamour and *élan vital*. The effort failed. But the struggle must be resumed.

"Quite aside from the physical suffering involved, a lost war will be terribly hard for the German people to bear. They will feel like men who have lost all honor. This feeling of honor — as Schopenhauer observed — has its ridiculous side. But it is a feeling bound up with longing for an ideal task and a mission for the nation. We shall have to give the German people such an ideal task in harmony with the peaceful organization of the world. Maybe it will in time be possible to use Germany in just such a capacity. It is important that the German people get a definite idealistic and patriotic mission which they can fulfill without becoming a danger to the peace of the world."

Our contributors have described German character in terms of the *adult*. In view of her studies of children among several different national groups, I turned to Dr. Charlotte Bühler with the more specific question:

On the basis of your studies, can one say that German youth are more ready for war than are the youth of other lands?

Dr. Bühler's Reply
My answer comes from the findings of a research study. The problem of this study was: Is German war-mindedness due to personality maladjustment in the clinical sense? The study was carried out with material that seemed to lend itself well to a comparison of personality adjustment in different national groups. An investigation of this kind seemed desirable, since a number of psychologists had argued that German national aggressiveness was in essence identical with aggressiveness in the clinical sense, being the out-

growth of individual or group resentment. If national aggressiveness is identical with aggressiveness in the clinical sense, we should find more resentment in German lives than in those of other less aggressive nations. A number of authors have shown that in Germany authority and discipline play a dominant rôle in education. German schools generally carry on as the parents have begun. Awe, abasement and fear, mixed with resentment, are much more frequent attitudes among German than among most other children.

However, while all this seemed clear, I was struck by certain contradictory observations of two kinds. First, I saw in several other countries groups which raised their children with similar strictness, in an authoritarian spirit. In peace-loving Holland, we find much authoritarian home and school education; in England and France we often find in military circles a spirit which is not at all dissimilar to the educational spirit of corresponding groups in Germany; in America, the Catholic, the Lutheran, and the Puritan groups would offer many parallels to German discipline in education. Yet if for the moment we leave aside France and England, whose devotion to peace is more recent and needs more scrutiny, we see no war-mindedness resulting from Dutch, or American Puritan, or Catholic education.

Objection could be made that in rich countries the compensations of wealth and success are available to frustrated individuals, while in a poorer country continuous frustrations pile up. This economic argument, however, is certainly inconclusive. We need only to think of countries like Norway or Belgium, in which we find groups with stern educational principles, and less wealth than in Germany, and yet with no war-minded groups. The first conclusion of my general observations was then that authoritarian upbringing as such does not necessarily produce that type of aggressiveness which makes a group war-minded; nor does the additional frustration of economic hardships necessarily lead to this result.

This argument was strengthened by a second observation. I had, especially during the pre-World War I years in Berlin, made the intimate acquaintance of a number of highly militaristic Prussian families. I knew some of these families during, and many years after, World War I, and in the earlier period of Hitler's domination. When I collected evidence from my clinical cases and from well

known acquaintances in regard to aggressiveness, I was struck by the fact that *some of the best adjusted individuals that I could muster were members of some of the most militaristic families.* In fact, a few individuals, among 159 fathers and mothers and among 141 children of the 84 families which I studied, had the best-rounded personalities of all; they came from some of those families whose war-mindedness, whose militaristic and authoritarian spirit, ranked at the top. This seemed to be odd in view of the malad-justment-aggression theory.

One example may be worth analyzing: a German family consisting of parents, a girl, and a boy. They were Prussian aristocrats, belonging on both sides to big Junker family clans, with the "right ancestors" for an impressive number of generations. The clans were wealthy and influential, and had their men in key positions in government and army. Their habits and principles were representative of the best of their group. They lived in a comfortable but simple style; they had one maidservant, the wife working with her. They were all for "God, Kaiser, and Fatherland." They went to church regularly and believed in a strong church; they served the Kaiser with fervor; they stood for a strong fatherland with a strong army and navy. They believed in Germany's mission in the world; from the German spirit the world was to be healed. ("Am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen.") They felt that a war was inevitable (1912), to obtain for Germany her proper place in the world.

They wanted people to be simple and nice, abiding in that station in life in which they were born; they were against social climbers, against Social Democrats, against Jews, in other words against anything new or revolutionary that could upset God's, the Kaiser's, and their own régime. Women should be housewives, men soldiers. They expected the children's unquestioning obedience; the father's word was law.

This described all of them. In this family there were, beyond this common pattern, a few distinctive characteristics. There was marital disharmony between the parents, which eventually led, during the children's adolescence, to a divorce. There was, furthermore, a higher level of intelligence than was usually to be found in families of this class and group; this fact led to the unusual consequence that both son and daughter went into academic careers, not into government or army services. The girl is the one we wish to describe. There would be no doubt in any psychiatrist's mind that she should

be called an unusually well-adjusted, all-around, well-developed personality. This was true of her childhood as well as of her adulthood, including those years of her very successful and happy marriage during which I knew her. This is the more surprising since her mother's nervousness and marital dissatisfaction should have affected her unfavorably from the beginning. Christine, however, did not seem to suffer noticeably from this. She had apparently sided with her father from an early age and found in him all the support she needed. She was warm-hearted without sentimentality; tactful and complying without losing her personality; unusually understanding, in fact, intelligent and humorous. There was no child, no teacher who did not like her. She was a good student, though never overambitious. She was frank and unabashed without being unduly aggressive. She went through school and college with ease, with a keen interest in many things. Toward the end of her study period, she met and married a man who loved her and whom she loved — a man just enough above her in the aristocratic order to make the match interesting for her without its disparaging her in his eyes. She succeeded in establishing a home which bore the mark of her unusual talent, thoughtfulness, and realism.

This highly educated, civilized, well-adjusted person stood on the side of power policy, war policy, anti-Semitism, strict discipline, and all the other prejudices of her class and group. These ideas belonged to her as much as did her skin. They were quite "impersonal"; they never prevented her from having a Jewish friend, nor from being personally understanding. She was an exceptional person; yet her example shows the possible combination of strongly aggressive political and other opinions with an unaggressive, well-adjusted personality. This and some similar cases made me doubtful as to the theory that aggressor policies are an outgrowth of frustrations and maladjustments. For further clarification of this and related questions, I undertook the following research study.

Case Studies from Seven Subcultural Groups

Through my child-guidance work and through the circumstance that I lived for rather long periods in various countries, I have several hundred cases from a variety of places. I chose seven sets of twelve families each, representing Germany, Austria, Norway, Holland, England; and two sets of twelve families each from the United States, one group of exclusively Puritan tradition and one a mixed

group from various parts of the United States. Eight or nine in each dozen families were representative cases which had come to one of my private guidance bureaus for educational advice. Three or four of each set of families were my personal acquaintances.

The families were selected exclusively from the point of view of close acquaintanceship, allowing detailed analysis of personality characteristics. They were so arranged that each list of twelve began with that family which I knew best (in some cases, for years) and ended with that family which I knew least, though still well enough for analysis. No Jewish families were included, so as to avoid the special issue of "racial" problems. They were all middle-class, with children; the children's ages ranged from "very young" to "adult." The eighty-four families had in all 141 children with whom the author was well enough acquainted to permit rating. The following classification of observed parental attitudes was used:

First Group:

D H (Demands too high)	A. Inordinate demands, intolerant principles, frequent punishment, or harsh criticism.
D L (Demands too low)	B. Lack of adequate demands, no principles at all, too much tolerance, or no punishment at all.

Second Group:

P Do (Parents Domineering)	A. One or two domineering parents, whose word is law, using their authority extensively; and/or powerful personalities who determine the pattern of family life.
P I (Parents Insecure)	B. "Problem personalities" of parents, either or both of whom is nervous, unhappy, preoccupied with problems, or insecure regarding himself or his handling of the children.
P A (Parents Argue)	C. Parents of whom one or both argue, frequently disagree over the children's education or over other issues; or parents who do not really love one another.

Third Group:

P U (Parents Unsatisfied)	A. Parents who are definitely disappointed in a child, disapprove of it or find it a burden.

P O
(Parents
Overvalue)

B. Parents who dote on one or on all of their children, live exclusively in them; children compensate for what marriage or life failed to give.

P R
(Parents
Remote)

C. Parents who are remote from their children or from one child, in that they have other more vital or competing interests, in that they leave the children completely to nurses, schools, or other educators, or in that they refrain from too intimate contacts with the children because of principles or because of educational tradition.

In addition to definitions of the negative parent's attitudes, two positive traits were also defined and rated:

Fourth Group:

P U   A. Unusually good understanding and adequate handling of children.

P W   B. Unusually well-adjusted parent personalities, able to cope with life and with adversities in a secure, adequate, and happy way.

Scores on the first three groups of traits were added to give a total of negative characteristics; scores on the fourth to give a total of positive characteristics. Fathers and mothers singly, as well as both parents together, were rated.

The first problem was to correlate the degree of maladjustment among the children of each group with parents' personalities and with certain characteristics of their handling of the children. The defined characteristics of the parents were as listed above. Since in each group there were children of the late adolescent years, it was frequently possible to follow up the adjustment to adult life, including marital adjustment and the beginnings of a career. In each set of twelve families there were about seventeen to eighteen children about whose present or past school experience detailed knowledge was available.

"Adjustment" meant total adjustment, including contacts outside of the family. Only the non-emotional learning problems in school were excluded from this evaluation. In this present exploratory study, only three scores were used, namely, a plus score for unquestionably good adjustment, a minus score for poor adjustment, and

a medium score for a slightly impaired or doubtful degree of adjustment.

The seven groups will be designated A (Austria), E (England), G (Germany), H (Holland), N (Norway), P (Puritan America), U (Mixed United States). The ratings of 156 individual parents were correlated with the good and poor adjustment of their 141 children, considered in terms of their total negative and total positive characteristics, as well as in terms of certain groups of characteristics.

Our most outstanding quantitative result leads us to the core of our problem. From clinical experience, we should expect to find the greatest maladjustment in that group in which the parents make an excessive use of their authority. But we find that another cluster of parents' attitudes is still more unfavorable, namely the combination of rigid discipline with insecurity in handling the children. The correlation of children's maladjustment with demanding but insecure parents is higher than that of maladjustment with demanding and authoritarian parents. We even find a slightly positive correlation between *demanding and authoritarian* parents on the one hand and *well-adjusted* children on the other hand.

An analysis of our individual cases helps us to the interpretation of these findings. Those children who react favorably to an authoritarian régime with high demands are the ones who believe in this régime and who admire or at least respect the person in authority. Adverse effects of this régime can be seen at once where doubts have arisen in regard to these principles or to the person in authority.

These observations are well corroborated by other studies. Experiments on autocratic and democratic leadership in boys' groups, conducted in this country by Lewin, White, and Lippitt (cf. pp. 306 ff., this volume), led to results very similar to those of Winkler Hermaden some fifteen years ago in Austria: namely, that under certain conditions, and with certain age groups, autocratic leadership is preferred to democratic leadership. At certain levels of development, strong authority is easier than leadership which leaves it to the boys to work out their own decisions. In the German family group, as compared with the other national groups, we find the largest number of well-adjusted children under conditions of authoritarian upbringing. In fact, there were as many well-adjusted

as maladjusted cases. This "obedient" type of good adjustment is, however, of a very specific structure. It is conditional; it requires a certain definite surrounding of stable circumstances which the leader successfully controls.

So far as personal adjustment goes, we found the largest amount of maladjustment under conditions of rigid but insecure upbringing, as is characteristic of the American Puritan group. Such maladjustment most frequently takes the form of excessive shyness, withdrawing tendencies, inferiority feelings, sex repressions, concealed resentment. Though any concealed resentment can at any moment turn into open aggressiveness, it has evidently never produced war-mindedness in these groups; they are far indeed from militarism, or glorification of war.

The best adjusted of our family groups, the Norwegian, is the most outspokenly peace-loving. But after the foregoing observations, the relationship between war-mindedness and individual adjustment cannot be simple and direct. We must look for other factors besides the individual adjustment as decisive.

THE RÔLE OF TRADITION

German children's upbringing emphasizes the virtue of obedience particularly strongly, and German children seem to respond to this urge particularly whole-heartedly. Most Germans, even when living in other countries among people with different ideals, have a passion for the virtue of obedience. German parents consider it a matter of personal prestige that their children's obedience is complete.

This, then, is the conclusion to which I came: the German tradition in bringing up children has extraordinary *strength*; the basis of its strength calls for study. I say German, not Prussian, though the Prussians represent this spirit in the most aggressive form. But in my material, I found to my surprise that some of my strictest parents came from Southern Germany. I think the description of one of these families is particularly enlightening, because this family represents a model that you may find all over Germany.

> The father was an elementary-school teacher in a middle-sized South German city. He came from a farmer's family. (To provide intellectual careers for their sons was typical of German peasant families; their ambition was to have their sons become ministers or

schoolteachers.) This man was following the trend of the beginning of this century in Germany, when most of the elementary-school teachers turned Social Democrat, being inclined to revolutionary ideas. They fought for political recognition and for the rights of the underprivileged.

This man was modern and free in thought so far as theoretical politics went. He also proved an unusually independent spirit when discussing human rights and class distinctions. But this did not prevent him from being an autocrat before whom the family trembled. He happened to have a wife who was an unusually superior person, full of humor and of high intelligence, and of that wisdom with which German wives not infrequently cope with their husband's superiority complexes. She thought he was too rough with her, as well as with the children. But she accepted "father's temper" and his views about his wife's and his children's duties toward him as something that could not be helped. That was how men were.

Americans who have met Social Democrats or Communists in Germany frequently make the mistake of thinking that these people will eventually produce a freer spirit because their political ideas are freer. But these Americans, who during their trips have little opportunity to penetrate into the spirit of these families' lives, forget that life and politics are two different things for their German friends.

The family just described is one in which a disciplinarian spirit and personal maladjustment of at least two members go together with an anti-war attitude because of modern views on political matters. But it is evident why this anti-war attitude is much weaker in time of crisis than the war-mindedness of those who have a total philosophy of life in which their political views are rooted. The politically enlightened anti-war groups of Germans have never gotten hold of a philosophy of life that permeated their whole lives as the Marxist philosophy permeates Russia. There has never been a real revolution of spirit in modern Germany — unless we assume that Nazism has definitely broken up the old ways of family living.

The strength of the reigning classes in Germany has come from the inner consistency of their whole system of thinking and of living. This system had its historical foundations in the State philosophy of Frederick the Great, and in Kant's philosophy of life, with its

emphasis on the "categorical imperative," the principle of duty; these two can indeed be called Prussian in their essence. Frederick the Great built the Prussian state on fundamental principles which have remained a Prussian creed. This Prussian state was poor. Its center was the "Brandenburg Sandbox" which failed to provide for its inhabitants. So Prussia could not afford luxuries, and her officers of state had to be Spartan in their ways of living. Their services were repaid more often in privileges than in money. They had to make material sacrifices for the sake of high prestige, and to sacrifice their lives in those repeated wars which served to make Prussia a large and self-sufficient unit. The inner consolidation of this realm through a Spartan spirit of self-denial, compensation being given in honors and privileges, was a unique pattern in the Europe of that time.

But Frederick the Great was an unusual spirit. While devoting his active life to the consolidation of Prussia, he despised his Prussian contemporaries, and kept himself apart, spiritually, from his environment, dwelling in the French philosophy and literature of his time. What kept the Prussian Junkers from developing intellectual interests is hard to say, but amidst all the philosophy and literature that began to flourish around them in the awakened Germany of the eighteenth century, the Prussian military and bureaucratic classes assimilated to their needs only three things: (1) the Kantian moral philosophy, or, rather, special aspects of it, (2) the state philosophy of Fichte and the patriotic songs and literature that went with it, and (3) Lutheran religious ideas. This was the spiritual recipe that suited the taste of the group, helping to provide a unit of unusual consistency and inner strength. Many present-day writers who make sweeping statements about German maladjustments have never actually met the impressive and convincing personalities who represent this Prussian style. It would be a serious mistake to underestimate their strength of character and the inner strength of their position.

AN INTEGRATED CHARACTER

Perhaps a description of a person as an actual concrete example will again help to impress this point more on the reader's mind. This is a high-school teacher, a personality representative of the

prevalent spirit in the Germany of pre-World War I. Miss von H. was the last unmarried descendant of an East Prussian family of the lower aristocracy. Her ancestors had all been state servants in military or civil service positions. She was particularly proud of that ancestor who had been a general under Frederick the Great. Her family was one of those which had not succeeded in — or condescended to — marrying into rich industrial circles, or getting Jewish money through intermarriage. So this last proud and unyielding scion of the family had to earn her living. Being unusually intelligent, she went to the University and became a high-school teacher at one of the modern reformed girl schools which prepared for the University. She became an outstanding teacher. Not only was her technique of teaching highly efficient, her presentation of material brilliant; beyond that, her personality had an unusual fascination for her pupils. Though friendly and interested in the girls, she seemed at the same time remote, reserved, and inaccessible. This combination made her a mystery, as did her combination of charm with occasional sarcasm. Nobody understood her, but everybody was fascinated by her. Behind this contradictory surface was a personality of unusual depth and strength.

Her genuine kindness sprang from a deep religious feeling about human life. In these depths she was real, human, and full of understanding of human suffering and imperfection. Her religion, the most living thing in her, was integrated with a rigid moral code derived from Kant. Kant's "categorical imperative" was her rigorous ethical guide. As a duty in which she found little satisfaction, she gave herself to her teaching and to her social contacts with girls and teachers for whom she personally did not care in the least. In this way she did the will of God. However, on certain rare occasions, her personal feelings showed through. For instance, she told one of her pupils bluntly how shocking it was that she, a descendant of Frederick the Great's general, had to teach in a high school half of whose girls were Jewish. After she had made this cruel remark to a girl who herself was Jewish, she added her observations on the general lack of good manners in Jewish families.

This gives us the first glimpse into a deeper layer of motivations. In this deeper layer political and social views were as definitely crystallized as were her religion and ethics. Politically, she stood by the military and patriotic ideals of the Kaiser's clique, although she was not connected with this clique in any other way than through the "von" in her name. But this "von" separated her forever from

the crowd among whom she actually lived. If a girl entered her class whose name contained the magic "von," she at once felt at home with her.

Her prejudices were in keeping with her established world order. God was on top; then the Kaiser, then the nobility, then the middle classes, and last, the laboring classes. Religious and moral duties made you live with and feel kindly toward everyone so long as these relationships remained entirely impersonal. She was not particularly interested in world politics. But when the Kaiser's generals felt that a war was impending, she did not doubt that they knew what they were talking about. She would repeat with conviction the phrases formulated by a patriotic press. Not because of war-mindedness, but because the Kaiser and his generals knew what had to be done. In the same way, later, Hitler knew best. People like Miss von H. agreed, without personal reservation, to the war policy of their government. She applied her own judgment and her unusually high intelligence not to any of those things which belonged to an established world order, but only to her professional and personal life.

But the question how honest and intelligent Prussians could keep from acknowledging the justified complaints and convictions of less favored groups in a moving modern world requires a further explanation. This problem leads us to an important issue.

The Rôle of the Unconscious in the German Character

Freud's discovery of and theory regarding the rôle of the unconscious in human motivation have exerted wide influence. According to Freud, human beings are motivated by drives of which they are unaware, the rôle of which can only be understood by a special process, psychoanalysis, through which these motives are brought into consciousness. In recent years, various psychologists have demonstrated a process of self-analysis which, they claim, can, with preparation and training, lead to essentially the same results. Be this as it may, I think it true that in psychoanalysis or self-analysis individual adolescents and adults can, at certain moments, achieve greater or lesser insight into phases of their motivation. Such insight may be only a glimpse which frightens one so that one quickly turns away, or it may take one a good distance on the road which a systematic analysis would travel.

Anyone with clinical experience knows the difference between patients who are able and willing to see things in their true light and others who are so far away from understanding their motives that it seems hopeless to explain anything to them in terms of psychological reality. This is particularly evident if one deals with family education. One mother, though never explicitly admitting it, may quite easily see the truth in disagreeable interpretations of her own motivation in dealing with her child, while another mother may consider such an interpretation an outrage.

In our material of 84 families, with 156 individual parents, I tried to test in an exploratory way my impression that Germans are particularly unconscious of their motivation, to a greater degree than is true of comparable people in other countries. I rated individual parents' co-operativeness in interviews, noting whether they were capable of listening to psychological interpretations, or whether they refused off-hand, or proved incapable of seeing the inner structure of their own case. The result was that in the German, as well as in the American Puritan group, significantly more individual parents were incapable of listening to a psychological analysis than was true of the parents in other groups. The Norwegian and Austrian groups contained significantly fewer of this "incapable" type than did the experimental group as a whole. The remaining United States groups, the British and the Dutch groups, represented the average.

With this observation, we touch on an essential point. The more relentlessly moralistic a person is in his view of himself and others, the less is he capable of facing the exposure of the inner self. This applies to the German as well as to the Puritan principles of upbringing. They lack that tolerance which the human and humorous acceptance of human imperfection produces. Austria and Norway are at the other end of this psychological scale. It may be of interest to note which hero the Norwegians consider most representative of themselves: it is Paul Lange, who had the highest ideals for a political career, but when it came to carrying them out, was too weak to give up happiness, love, success for those stern principles which he had planned to follow.

"Unconscious" people can of course never see things objectively. They may honestly disapprove of other people's views and acts

simply because they are incapable of seeing that what they defend is very convenient for themselves. The more closed the system of moral, religious, social views, the less vulnerable. Neither the French Revolution, nor Goethe's humanitarianism, nor the attack of the Social Democrats, nor modern psychology, nor a lost war could shake the Prussian character. And we may be certain that neither a second lost war, nor more humiliation of the German nation, nor well-meant lecturing about how nice democracy is, will shake it. Changing it calls for psychologically better-grounded measures. Germany, *because she does not know herself*, is holding the world back.

THE PRACTICAL OUTLOOK

The practical conclusions from this analysis are that measures for re-education of the German people must be of a much deeper type than most of the propositions so far advanced have recognized. There are spiritual mountains between Germany and the culturally progressing world. It needs more than knowledge of the German language, experience in organizing, and the desire to spread democratic ideals, to help to redirect this distorted cultural growth.

I do not see how one can hope to change things in the long run by the sheer use of force. No strong people unless actually extirpated has ever for any length of time been kept from rising again. All through history proud nations have managed to rise from humiliation after a few generations, when the victors had become less intent on watching them and on keeping them down. The next generation of Americans will have forgotten all about this war and will prefer to live in America instead of being stationed as guards in Germany. Any plan based on permanent foreign control seems to me unrealistic in view of what is bound to happen within some ten or twenty years. Only the Germans' own attitude will offer a promising scheme for the future.

The following points seem to me essential for any program with a chance of being successful in bringing about a change in Germany.

1. Nursery schools should be established in which from the earliest possible age young children are educated in a democratic spirit of co-operation, in habits of free and independent action and thought, and in constructiveness. Teams of allied and German

teachers ought to be trained already *here and now* for this task. The rest of the continental European countries would in no way be harmed by being included in such an educational project. In fact, I think that this would be the most effective project to unite the States of Europe in the next generation. Such teams of teachers might be composed of many nationalities and distributed over Europe. Attendance at nursery schools could be made compulsory, especially if it were made a general institution in many countries. It could be made attractive through offering free meals and free child guidance and pediatric services. This would gradually give the educators a chance to influence the mothers and to work their way into the families. Widespread child-guidance clinics should use psychiatric techniques to carry that influence further.

2. Political education, that is to say, education in understanding, evaluating, and freely debating political events, should be instituted as a major subject in high schools, vocational schools, and universities, and teachers ought to be trained *here and now* to be able to hold such courses.

3. A team of experts ought to be formed *here and now* to devote their full time to working out a modern human philosophy of life which does justice to democratic ideals, as well as to the realities of economic and social factors in life. "Our way of life" was a happy phrase for the time being, and in the emergency of the situation. But "our way of life" cannot be simply transferred to the Germans. Their more theoretical and systematic approach to things makes them totally unresponsive to the casual and empirical ideology that the Anglo-Saxons handle so successfully in their own living. Moreover, the urgency of working out in theory as well as in practice a philosophy that can be lived in international, in social, and in individual life is felt by everyone. The attempts that so far have been made in this direction are sketchy, unconvincing, and lacking in that background of information which such an attempt requires today. (*End of Dr. Bühler's reply.*)

In these four contributions which deal with Germany we have found much to suggest that the elimination of the Nazi leadership will not put an end to the sources of aggressiveness within Germany. Dr. Bühler's reply in particular shows how the cultural pressures

of authoritarianism reach the child through the family. From her answer, as well as from the preceding contributions, we must conclude that authoritarianism in general, and militarism in particular, have constituted a danger both to the Germans and to the world for a long time. Some writers have carried this theme considerably further, emphasizing the Germans' chronic belief in their own superiority and their sense of an historical mission, while many have indicated in general an unhealthiness, a defensiveness and compulsive aggressiveness as characteristic of most types and classes of Germans. To the social psychologist, these latter generalizations appear rather broad; in particular, they appear to overlook well-known economic factors associating the great land owners, and more recently the great industrialists, with national expansion. Labor has repeatedly — notably in 1914 and in the latter days of the Weimar Republic — been so bitterly discontented that the dominant classes have feared revolution, and have taken every possible step to prevent it. Germany has been neither economically nor psychologically homogeneous. Two generalizations appear to be true which on the surface appear contradictory.

On the one hand, as became tragically clear in 1933, the martial note will call forth a blind response even from the children of workers, a fact which has made the cult of aggression a natural growth, parallel to many other nationalist aggressive trends which have arisen in other cultures and in other eras. These aggressive trends, once deeply entrenched in national life, cannot be trusted to die out of their own account. Nor, on the other hand, can anything constructive be achieved by saying that if we had been through the same mill as the Germans, we should have come out a similar product; for it is not what might have been but what *is* today that constitutes our problem. Perhaps the best we can do is to summarize the situation this way. Not all Germans, but many Germans, partly through nationalist aggressiveness, partly through docility and the blind acceptance of authority, partly through fear of secret agents and concentration camps, have become the tools of destruction. There is no escape from the problem of slow, patient, sustained study, patient reorientation and redirection of these vast psychological forces of German culture.

On the other hand, it is equally clear that liberal and labor forces

have over many decades struggled to modernize and to democratize Germany, often with very limited understanding and help from democratic forces in other lands. Our own conduct, e.g., our trade and tariff policies, and our attitude toward German labor, are as integral an aspect of post-war German development as is our plan for her.

Though the transformation is a task for the Germans themselves, it is evident from Dr. Schreier's analysis that we cannot shirk our own major responsibility to help provide a social climate in which the Germans can complete the task. It is at the same time evident from Dr. Arnheim's analysis that it is only through a constructive rather than a punitive spirit on our part that the Germans can experience the reconstitution of destroyed areas and the trials of Nazis as positive steps toward the ultimate recovery of an enviable place among the nations.

THE PROBLEM OF JAPAN

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Owen Lattimore
Audrey Menefee
Pryns Hopkins

9

GRANTING THE OBVIOUS IMPORTANCE of the German problem, many will feel that the dynamite in the Far East is more dangerous; that the rest of this century and most of the next will be a period of industrialization of the Far East, where far more than half of the people of the world live; that the world center of gravity will shift; and that the greatest danger will arise from the attempt of the leaders of industry in the Far East to cope with and to dominate Western controls. From this point of view, it was not the swords and breastplates of the Japanese warrior of 1854 that threatened world peace, but the vast arsenal of industrial equipment which the Japanese were to build up in a few decades. It was not the Japanese temperament as such, but the Japanese temperament in control of a vast industrial plant turned to the purposes of war, that began the world conflagration in Manchuria in 1931. Now whatever destruction is meted out to Japan and whatever industrialization occurs in China and India, the population of Japan remains the first great industrialized population of the Far East; and regardless of the extent of military catastrophe which Tokyo now faces, the critical question is what this industrialized population may in time become. As the process of industrialization through the East proceeds, will it not inevitably become the vanguard of a vast industrial population resenting and hating what it conceives to be Western interference; and, in a very deep psychocultural sense, unable to work within a framework controlled by the white man's ideas and political institutions? Whether these be Marxists, or whether they be the leaders of parliamentary institutions in the Anglo-American world, will Japan not then be a center of danger for a long time to come?

The answer to this question depends on the values and emphases in Japanese character which will direct the development of the

industrial trends. If a case could be found to prove militarism an intrinsic aspect of "national character," I suppose it would be the case of Japan. But national character can change with amazing rapidity. Owen Lattimore, whom we asked whether militarism is really basic in the Japanese, writes:

"I doubt if militarism has been a basic ingredient in the Japanese character. It very definitely has been a basic ingredient which the ascendant groups in Japan have tried to instil into the Japanese character. The crux of the matter is that after the Meiji Restoration, when universal conscription was introduced, an effort was made to transfer a suitably modified samurai tradition into the minds of classes which had previously been excluded, by the samurai, from the privileges of thinking like soldiers. The indoctrination appears to have worked well, because those who fostered it had things pretty much their own way. This is no guarantee that the indoctrination would have survival vitality under an anti-militarist régime."

The historians of Japanese life appear to agree on a general picture which can be drawn roughly as follows: At the dawn of history Japan was characterized by a clear-cut and powerful family system of control. As is true in other such family systems, the individual has only such freedom as the "public opinion" of the family group allows him. Individuals within the group do indeed vary in power and prestige, but the group is so large, so tightly structured, so conscious of its past, so concerned for its present and future, so proud of its status and power, that the individual is able to lead only in so far as he expresses the articulate or inarticulate trends of the family. Families struggle for land and for power, family groups joining forces or separating again as military and other fortunes dictate. During a long feudal period, the warlike families as families combined into a class structure which excluded non-warrior families.

The military ascendancy persisted on into the new era inaugurated by Perry's forcing the gates of Japan in 1854, the development of the modern army and navy allowing the warrior families large control over foreign policy and therefore over the form of economic expansion to the west which developed at the end of the century. Partly through the struggles of families for power, partly through

the struggle of the military against the bureaucratic or political, Japan has evolved into a world power based upon a dictatorship or autocracy, in which the Emperor is, to be sure, a divine symbol, but in which actual power is the power of family groups which enjoy a military, and in some cases likewise a political and bureaucratic expression.

The direction of public policy has changed somewhat year by year as the fortunes of different families and of different components cutting across the family structure have waxed and waned, but with two fixed and perfectly clear principles: first, orientation in terms of world power, concerned as much with military prestige as with economic gain; and second, an impersonal nationalism lacking in what we of the western world should call the "rights of the common man." Industrialization, which has gone on at a rapid pace, has meant the recruitment of boys and girls from all over Japan to work the factories of the expanding imperial system, and the development of a large but rather inarticulate industrial labor class, while the small farmer has gone on with his devotion to his land, his implicit acceptance of his relation to the family and national system and to the Emperor, with almost complete passivity as far as problems of statecraft are concerned.

To talk, then, about re-education or democratization of Japan, in the western sense of the term, would be much like talking of re-educating Americans in terms of the Japanese type of rigid family loyalty or the subordinating of self to the destiny of the clan. By "family" the American means father and mother, brother and sister, with a little warmth and nearness left over for grandparents, uncles, aunts, cousins. Most Americans do not even keep in contact with the larger family, do not even know where the less immediate relatives live. They come and go as "free individuals," and indeed even within the more immediate family structure, the children rebel against parental domination, mapping out their lives as individuals. Upon marriage, husband and wife frequently break the bonds connecting them to the families of their origin. How vast would be the problem of building the Japanese type of family system into America if one should desire it! By the same token, how vast would be the problem, if one should so desire, of building an individual sense of responsibility, an individual pattern of property, power,

prestige, or our conceptions of economic and political democracy, into the complex culture of Japan.

Regarding these remoter developments we can only be uncertain, apprehensive; but regarding the immediate post-war probabilities we have, fortunately, a fair amount of knowledge. Various government agencies are specifically charged with keeping abreast of the psychological situation in areas which are militarily and economically important. I turned to Audrey Menefee, of the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, with the question:

> What danger to post-war world order will be offered by the social and psychological characteristics of the Japanese; in particular, by Japanese attitudes, beliefs, and opinions?

Mrs. Menefee's Reply

The features of Japanese culture which are most unfavorable to a lasting peace are the remnants of feudalism which still dominate a large part of Japan's social attitudes and determine many of her goals. These cultural patterns are learned, but they are so thoroughly learned that they will probably re-emerge from time to time even after a change has been effected in the political and economic climate of Japan.

Japan is a highly developed military and industrial state, but it is also still an isolated group of islands whose cultural progress has been thwarted by an outmoded Shinto mythology and a social hierarchy inherited from a primitive clan society. While successful industrial techniques have been freely borrowed from the West since the Restoration, all trends toward liberal or democratic thought have been ruthlessly suppressed (150). This combination of powerful modern industry and a public largely as docile, superstitious, and obedient as were its ancestors long ago forms a society full of menace to its own people and the world.

Because the Japanese have been so systematically trained over a period of centuries to many of their most militant traditions and beliefs, and because of their isolation from the democratic tradition, the achievement of a new culture will probably be a harder task and one requiring more sensitive guidance than will be necessary for the rehabilitation of Germany or Italy.

Aspects of the Japanese "mentality" which may change least readily include the following:

Emperor Worship. The average uneducated Japanese is convinced that his Emperor is a living god whose genealogy can be traced in an unbroken line for twenty-six centuries to Amaterasu-O-Mikami, the sun goddess. This belief is a powerful force for national unity and homogeneity. Because of his divinity the Emperor can do no wrong, and the acts of the ministers who serve in his name cannot be seriously challenged. The course of Japanese history can be understood in terms of the special interests of the particular group of men who control the Emperor at any given time.

The controversy presently raging about whether Emperor worship shall be "permitted" to remain as a political force in post-war Japan probably does not take sufficiently into account the wishes of the Japanese people themselves. Some authorities — of whom former Ambassador Grew is a distinguished member — have argued that if the United Nations act in the Emperor's name, and with his support, a political climate can be attained in which the Japanese will work willingly to reshape their own society. Others feel that peace with Japan cannot be a peace with the Japanese Emperor. Sun Fo, president of China's legislative Yuan, maintains that dethronement of the Emperor would be the only sure death-blow to the idea of his divinity. This in turn would destroy the meaning of Japan's militarist, nationalist mythology.

There is some evidence that Emperor worship, like Nazism in Germany, is not actually as deep-rooted as is usually assumed. The Imperial myth has lain dormant for long periods in Japan's history, and the public criticism which attended its revival in the eighteenth century indicates that the Emperor's divinity was not conceded by all scholars and administrators (5).

As late as 1912 one Far East authority wrote:

> Mikado-worship and Japan-worship — for that is the new Japanese religion — is, of course, no spontaneously generated phenomenon. . . . The twentieth century Japanese religion of loyalty and patriotism is quite new, for in it pre-existing ideas have been sifted, altered, freshly compounded, turned to new uses. . . . Not only is it new, it is not yet completed; it is still in the process of being consciously, or semi-consciously, put together by the official class, in order to

serve the interests of that class, and incidentally the interests of the country at large (146).

Emperor worship has been greatly strengthened since this was written in 1912, but it would be unrealistic to suppose that it is so thoroughly ingrained as to be an eternal part of the Japanese way of life. It is possible that belief in the divine character of the Emperor will receive an important setback by the shock of military defeat in this war. Official Japanese propagandists have done their best to associate the Emperor with the war, in order to give it prestige and to keep popular morale high. The Emperor has assumed full responsibility (according to these spokesmen) for the war and for the actions of the wartime Governments.

Nobody knows, of course, whether the majority of the Japanese people really believe that this is the Emperor's war. Still less can we predict the extent to which defeat will cause them to lose faith in him and be ready to accept a more rational political ideology. The important thing is that any basic change in attitudes toward the Emperor must come from within Japan itself. No real change can come about by foreign imposition or by formal agreement. If the skeptics and the scholars among progressive Japanese are encouraged, Emperor worship — which has always operated for reaction and against democracy — will lose some of its hold on the people in the years to come. The myth of divine descent will hardly remain inviolate in a land where freedom of speech is guaranteed, where "dangerous thoughts" are not banned, and where an untrammeled press, schoolroom, and pulpit can freely discuss controversial issues.

Shinto. It has been said of Shinto that it is more an organ of Japanese government than a religion. Popular Shinto covers a large body of fairly harmless polytheistic beliefs in household gods, woodland spirits, and primitive deities. These beliefs are passed on from parents to children and have their origins in a simple preliterate age.

State Shinto is another matter. It does not have official status as a religion, a state of affairs that permits the Government to require adherence to its doctrines from all Japanese, without violating the Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom. If in the post-war period the Emperor continues to command the deep emotional

loyalty of the people, Shinto will probably also remain a powerful force against democratic trends in Japan. It is a "political religion" which sanctifies all the special beliefs of a highly nationalist state, including deification of the Emperor and the whole mythology of a Chosen People. The two major shrines of State Shinto — the Grand Shrine of Ise and the Yasukuni Shrine where souls of soldiers are deified — exert a profound influence on Japanese thought. Japan's sixteen thousand Shinto priests are strongly nationalistic, more so than the Buddhist priests who minister now mainly to old people, women, and children.

State Shinto is important to the maintenance of Japan's military tradition, her racism, and her belief in the Imperial myth. Like Emperor worship, it has been stimulated in modern times to a genuine renaissance through systematic nurturing by the Government. One outstanding Japanese scholar has said:

> Going out of the Court, Shinto has come nearer to the people. It has become an emotional extension of the Imperial authority, a powerful arm to attach the people to the Crown, reaching where law and force could not (136).

State Shinto, if it keeps its present place in the post-war period, will operate more than any other single factor to interfere with Japan's evolution to full partnership in a peaceful family of nations. Its recent arrival as a national force and its relative lack of importance to the rural population will probably mean that if its main prop — government sponsorship — is removed, its strength will deteriorate.

Nationalism. The Chosen People myth is another part of the complex of Emperor worship and Shinto beliefs. Nationalist sentiment in Japan is very likely to be a stumbling-block in the way of international understanding, as there is no reason to suppose that it will disappear at the peace table. The myth of Yamato (Japanese) racial superiority is old, and it has been deliberately reinforced by the Government during this war, in an effort to give the Japanese more confidence in victory.

The extent of aggressive nationalist sentiment among the people of Japan is subject to debate, however. One writer asserts,

> Let us remember that here is no decent reasonable populace, ex-
> ploited by a pack of militaristic gangsters, but 75,000,000 madmen,
> all prepared to commit any crime at the behest of the State (75).

Others argue that nationalism and its accompanying beliefs are
primarily dependent on social, economic, and political conditions
(151). The Japanese people have, of course, rarely been consulted
as to the course of their national history. If the majority of them
have acquiesced in the aggressions of their military leaders, it may
be in part because there was no other course open to them. The
virulent contemporary form of Japanese nationalism is a fairly re-
cent development. Some of its most extreme chauvinistic notions
have been stressed in the schools only since 1932, under pressure
from the militarists (80). If these "militarist tumors" were forcibly
cut out of the Japanese body politic, and if the nation were given
generous economic treatment conditioned upon adoption of major
industrial and agrarian reforms, the destructive nationalism fostered
by the military might swiftly drop out as a major force in Japanese
life.

Anti-Foreign Sentiment. This is an offshoot of Japan's nation-
alism and Chosen People mythology. Again, the extent to which
concentrated wartime propaganda has infected the common people
with the virus of xenophobia is not known. Many Japanese, of
course, have never seen a "foreigner." The behavior of occupying
forces and United Nations advisers after this war will largely de-
termine or reshape their attitudes.

Sentiment toward two specific peoples will be of particular im-
portance. Nearly a million Koreans in Japan will be vitally con-
cerned that anti-Korean hysteria does not break out in mob action
against them, as it did after the 1923 earthquake. Koreans consti-
tute Japan's only large minority group, and the Japanese feeling
toward them has always been tinged with guilt, fear, and distrust.

There may be even more difficulty in the Japanese attitude
toward the Chinese. For all the fact that Japan's common people
were never wildly enthusiastic over the "China Incident," most
Japanese probably believed, what their military leaders almost
certainly believed, that the undeclared war would end in a quick
Japanese victory. China was weak, disunited, torn by civil war,
traditionally at the mercy of white imperialism. As a result of the

war which Japan brought on, that "corrupt young brother" may eventually emerge as a world power — strong, united, free of her humiliating treaty obligations to both Japan and the West, and the leading nation of Asia. Unhappily, it is easy to see how a victorious China could inspire among the Japanese a more ambivalent hatred than they would feel toward America or Britain, attitudes toward which would not be so strongly colored by convictions of "betrayal" and by loss of face. Wise Chinese statesmen may avert or minimize such a development by building upon the sentiments of familiarity and racial affinity which the Japanese already feel toward the Chinese.

POLITICAL-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

More urgent than the social and psychological barriers to a peaceful Japan will be the political and economic problems which will have to be tackled as soon as possible after the guns are laid down. Politically, there are hundreds of laws which operate against the common good, and which will have to be abolished either by the occupying forces or by the Japanese themselves: the conscription laws, the "special criminal codes," the "peace and order" acts, the restrictions against freedom of speech, publication, assembly, demonstration. Under the present Constitution, the War Ministry can force any liberal Cabinet out of existence — and often has. The election laws operate to prevent popular participation in government, and should eventually be replaced by universal suffrage through direct and secret ballots. After the great rice riots of the first World War, the people were given a form of "universal suffrage" (in which women remained completely disfranchised), and the poll tax was reduced from ten yen to three, which raised the voting population to two and a half million out of a total population of sixty million. In 1940, suffrage was again narrowed by limiting the vote to heads of families over twenty-five. Such limitations can be remedied fairly easily; but suffrage, however broad its scope, can accomplish little after the war if the present undemocratic Constitution is not altered.

In the economic field, also, there are innumerable outmoded and restrictive laws and customs. Japanese workers and farmers have never had a real opportunity to exert a direct influence on Japanese

national policy; when they did begin to make themselves heard, they were effectively silenced by legislation and police action.

The Farmers. The age-old problems of Japan's farmers would not be solved by a Japanese victory in this war; so there is little reason to suppose that a Japanese defeat will help this downtrodden part of the population. Farm problems in Japan are quite distinct from those in most countries, and they need special consideration. Very primitive methods will probably continue to be employed for a long time to come, not only because of the farmers' poverty, but because the narrow farmlands do not lend themselves to mechanized forms of cultivation. The pre-war farmer could often add a little to his income by raising cocoons for silk, but nylon and other wartime substitutes have probably permanently cut off the export market for Japanese silk, at least from some of Japan's largest pre-war buyers. For three decades, high interest charges and farm debts have caused dissension and trouble among the farmers. One essential first step in the post-war period would be a cancellation of all farm debts. (In 1937 there was a total farm debt of six billion yen.)

In a sense, the problem of Japan's rural population begins and ends with rice. Since more than half of the entire arable lands in Japan are in rice and more than half of the value of farm products is represented by rice, fluctuations of rice prices have an important bearing on the purchasing power and living conditions of the farming community — and of the city population as well, since rice is the nation's major food.

In the years before the "China Incident," there was a real distress among the farmers, and the bulk of the Japanese army was recruited from among farmers' sons. They were easy prey to the army's vicious nationalism, just as underprivileged, poorly educated youngsters are likely to be in any country. The farmers had debts which they could never hope to meet, and they were frequently on the edge of famine. During these times, while their sons went into the army, their daughters were "sold" into prostitution or to the great silk mills of the cities, where they undercut the wages of older city workers. Meantime, the farmers' debts rose, and only war could bring them any kind of prosperity.

It is obviously impossible to change a nation's basic economy

overnight, even if it is desirable to make a basic change. But unless Japan's rice economy is drastically overhauled and modified in the interests of the great mass of tenant farmers rather than the large landowners, economic depressions will again give nascent militarists the excuse to precipitate new wars, and Japan's farmers will again become soldiers. That many of the farmers are opposed to fascism and war is shown by the fact that they dared to join the workers in protesting Japan's incursions into Shantung and Siberia after the last war, and that in 1922 the All-Japan Peasant Union included among its demands the recognition of Soviet Russia — and that as late as 1944 there were reported to be rice riots in Japan. Because of rebellious activities, the Government dissolved the Japanese Farmers' Union in the spring of 1944, abolished its newspaper, and confiscated its treasury.

The Workers. Except for the harmful racism and superstitions engendered by generations of sedulous propaganda, the workers of Japan are not fundamentally different from workers in any other country. Their aspirations include security, freedom of opportunity, decent living conditions for themselves and their families, the right to organize into groups of their own choosing, and the right to bargain collectively with their employers. In the Japan of today they have none of these basic economic privileges. Because of the modern influences that inevitably impinge on the workers of a country undergoing an industrial revolution, Japan's proletariat may react more favorably and more rapidly to a free Japan than will the less enlightened farm population. Its small core of underground leaders, who have for years fought against repression, may be invaluable assets in the remaking of Japan.

There will probably be great chaos in Japan's industrial plant for a period after the war, since for fifteen years it has been a war economy, geared first and always to the making of the weapons of war. But far-sighted economists armed with real authority could presumably convert the remaining factories and workshops to the manufacture of peacetime consumers' goods, just as our munitions factories will be converted to making refrigerators, automobiles, and vacuum cleaners. And even if air raids do not turn Japan's inflammable houses to ashes, there would still be a great need for housing projects for the millions of city slum-dwellers. The average

wage standards will have to be revised upward if this converted economy is to operate to the advantage of the common people, since one reason for Japan's military aggression has been the seeking of new markets for the manufactured goods which her own poorly paid workers could not afford to buy. In one way, drastic revisions in the country's industrial economy may be easier of achievement than in a democratic country, since the Japanese have had a strictly regimented "planned" economy since the Meiji Era, and capitalists have never enjoyed the complete laissez-faire that they did in this country.

Japan's trade-union movement has had a tragic history, but if it is nourished and encouraged after the war, it can play an important part in the reconstruction. Its roots were planted as long ago as 1912, when Bunji Suzuki and fourteen workers organized the *Yuai Kai* (Friendly-Love Society). The last world war years saw a great growth in the labor movement, with dozen of new unions organized each year. Labor disputes also multiplied: there were 108 in 1916, 398 in 1917, 417 in 1918, and 497 in 1919. In 1921 the *Rodo Sodemei* (General Federation of Labor) met, at a time when the industrial and financial crisis was acute, and the left wing obtained a majority vote on a resolution favoring a general strike. The first conference of 130 Tenant Farmers' Unions met and voted for common action with the workers. As a result, the right-wing labor leaders left the Federation and formed their own federation in Osaka.

By 1923, the Japanese reactionaries had gone to work, using the time-honored weapons of prison cell, torture, bludgeon, and gun to suppress the threatening vitality of the workers and peasants. The great earthquake was used to kindle destructive hatreds, and the police systematically rounded up revolutionaries while the people were busy lynching Koreans. Thereafter intimidation increased, and another split occurred in the labor movement, but between 1923 and 1927 strikes (and lockouts) actually rose in number and seriousness. From 1928 to 1930, great strikes broke out in Japan's richest and most tightly controlled industries — its ironworks, printing plants, and textile factories. In the election of February, 1928, the revolutionary *Rodo Nomin To* (Workers' and Peasants' Party) polled 193,000 votes. Popular sympathy for the revolutionary movement in China and Korea was reflected in much of the literature of this period and in the activities of university students.

During the depression, working days were lengthened and wages cut forty per cent. Mass arrests occurred on a scale unprecedented in history. Fascist organizations sprang up with official sanction, and terrorized working-class districts. Labor radicals went underground, but they managed to penetrate the expeditionary force sent to China in 1932, where demonstrations occurred among the soldiers at Shanghai. After 1933, May Day parades were outlawed. Official tolerance was reserved for the *Shakai Taishu To* (Social Mass Party), which was a curious mixture of liberals, reformers, and ultra-nationalists. In 1937 even this emasculated body, soon to be dissolved, polled thirty-eight seats in the House of Representatives. Despite the threat of prison and assassination, the figures for labor disputes in the early months of 1937 (2126, involving 213,622 workers) were the highest in Japanese history.

In the spring and summer of 1944, newspapers smuggled out of Japan revealed that a new *Shakai* Party had been formed — and banned — but that before dissolution it had held demonstrations attended by forty thousand workers, which were broken up by the police. Chinese sources report that Japanese Communists have recently committed acts of sabotage at war plants and shipyards.

It was the complete smashing of Japan's struggling labor movement that ensured the success of the militarists' ambitions. The converse of this fact may be that if in the post-war period the workers are given freedom of organization, if they can no longer be conscripted into the army, if they are guaranteed employment and wage standards high enough to purchase a minimum of the things which they produce, the recrudescence of Fascism in Japan will be made extremely difficult.

Attitudes toward women may interfere with social progress in Japan for a long time to come. Given no education beyond secondary school, trained to obey first their parents and then their husbands, kept in hopeless cultural and economic bondage, the Japanese women will be in no position to accept democratic leadership, even if Japanese men would permit it. The process of freeing the democratic potential of this submerged half of the population may begin in the rural areas, strangely enough, where economic and social interdependence have prevented female subjugation on the scale that has occurred elsewhere. It has already been mentioned

that female labor has traditionally been used to keep the wage levels down, since a large part of female workers were young girls working out a contract for a few years until they left the factories to marry. And although eighty per cent of the textile workers were women before the war, only one and a half per cent of them ever joined labor unions.

The exigencies of war have already planted the first seeds of disintegration in Japan's traditional patterns of behavior. Urbanization, military conscription, labor mobilization, extra-familial patriotic and civic activities, have operated in Japan — as they have in other countries — to awaken class and occupational loyalties in place of exclusively family, sex, or state loyalties. In wartime, family ties are visibly breaking down; in 1944, mothers were ordered not to cry for their evacuated children, and were admonished that too-tight family ties were the cause of China's downfall.

Faced with military and political disorganization after total defeat, it is not impossible that some of the "advanced" ideas of the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties will again come to the surface in Japan. Not all of the tens of thousands of men and women arrested for "dangerous thoughts" have been killed, or even reformed. (Between 1920 and 1925 approximately thirty thousand Japanese were arrested for "communist" activities alone.) A defeat situation will make fertile soil for social change, and it is entirely possible that ever-increasing wartime privations will result in the emergence of a body of anti-war, anti-fascist opinion stronger than the world has suspected.

While the strength of Western democratic thought among even the most advanced of Japanese should not be exaggerated, the existence of popular criticism of the Government and of internal rebellion in the midst of war is evidence enough that the seventy million people of Japan are not all unregenerate fascists. The progressive potential is there, but whether the Allied occupation forces will call it forth is another matter entirely. Some of our past policies in Europe and Africa suggest that in Japan also our military and civil officials may not be the kind of men who will be able to make full use of the best human elements available. Japan will need administrators with creative social imagination, men capable of organizing the nation for progressive social change, who can

sense and translate into practical economics and politics the almost buried aspirations of a people who have been smothered under tyranny for centuries. (*End of Mrs. Menefee's reply.*)

In the case of Germany, we found ourselves needing not only a view of immediate post-war probabilities, but also of long-range general characteristics. In the same way, we now need, in relation to Japan, not only the picture of attitudes related to militarism as given by Menefee, but the general view of the salient and ingrained national characteristics. In view of his long interest in the question and his special study of the literature dealing with it, I put to Dr. Pryns Hopkins, of Claremont Colleges, the question:

What is known about Japanese character that may serve to indicate whether Japan may be expected in the future to remain a "psychological trouble-spot"?

Dr. Hopkins' Reply

I shall try to catalogue some character traits which responsible writers have alleged to be typical of the Japanese people. A few comments are added by the present compiler, drawing upon his observations during three short visits in the island empire. Since the traits follow the descriptive names in common use, they will hardly represent true psychological entities and are bound to overlap.

DISCIPLINE

Probably everyone who has observed the Japanese has been struck by their *cleanliness*. As early as 1889, Nose (137), writing on "Japanese character," listed it as a principal trait. In the following year, Deming (46) listing the "mental characteristics of the Japanese," called them "the cleanest people on earth." Embree (55) traces the origin of this feature to the rigid training of Japanese infants, itself doubtless influenced by the construction of Japanese houses and by the ritual requirements of Shinto; and Gorer (69, 70) even more specifically points to such traits having their origin in peculiarities in the said toilet-training. Here *fastidiousness* and *neatness* are particularly emphasized, as also *control* of the body and of the environment.

In the latter connection, Embree (55) remarks that "the school itself is anything but comfortable and warm, a feature that fits in with . . . training in the virtues of *frugality* and *self-discipline*." The present writer can recall his visit to a large reform school, where all the boys were sitting silently on their heels in the Zen sect's attitude of meditation before commencing the morning's work; he was told that throughout the winter they started each day by breaking the ice in the river for a swim. Young men all over Japan, and some older ones, too, "offer up to Buddha" the merit gained by walking from shrine to shrine throughout the country when snow is on the ground, clad only in a thin kimono.

AMBITION

With Deming's 1890 opinion that the Japanese were *impractical* is to be contrasted E. M. Boddy's (21) 1921 characterization of their representatives in America as extremely ambitious and *desirous to succeed in an economic way.* Japanese political *corruptibility* is insisted on by J. F. Steiner (165); I have heard this corruptibility (which is helped on by Japan's terrible poverty) charged against the ordinary Tokyo policeman, but not against the military police (who correspond to the German Gestapo).

IMPERTURBABILITY

So, too, whereas of old all Orientals were spoken of as *placid,* Gulick (71a), in 1903, had discovered the Japanese to be emotional, and more recent writers have suggested that the mask of *imperturbability*, with which the upper classes hide their feelings, is by way of being an overcompensation. The trait itself is sometimes explained as an inheritance from the feudal past.

PRIDE

Casting doubt on Japanese imperturbability, a trend toward *eccentricity* is mentioned by Alexander (4, p. 8), and this is generally indicative of a need to draw attention to self. Self can be exalted also by deprecating others; and *disdain* of wives and mothers is spoken of by Gorer. This trait seems presupposed by the Nipponese pointing of woman's whole education toward making her obedient and patient. But, as Embree (55, pp. 20-21) points out, the condi-

tion of life of the poorer workers and farmers forces them to admit
their women to a greater degree of equality, and the contemporary
organization of women into civic and patriotic societies "will do
more to change the traditional family pattern in Japan than either
urbanism or industrialism." A perhaps self-defensive expression of
conceit is the exclusiveness of those recent government leaders who
have wished to keep foreigners and alien ideologies out of the
country, somewhat as the Tokugawa Shogunate did for so long a time.
This, as Embree (55, p. 17) tells us, has "been spurred by the re-
buffs Japan has met from Western nations whenever she has at-
tempted to expand, especially our own 'Exclusion Act of 1924' with
its implications of racial inferiority."

Thus, the trait is related to that well-known characteristic of all
peoples influenced by Chinese culture, *face-saving*. The presence
of this last in the Japanese is remarked by Wolfe (181), and Lederer
(97, p. 49); and Embree traces this peculiarity to the fact that
"motherly affection, coupled with severe toilet-training and cul-
minating in the sudden loss of attention when the next child is
born, creates an early sense of insecurity." A statement prepared
by the United Nations Committee of Southern California on "What
treatment should be given Japan by the United Nations after the
war?" suggests that "The Emperor might serve as a compromise
mediator for the people of Japan," and by leading them "in a co-
operative effort toward becoming an acceptable member of the
family in the United Nations" might function to "save the face of
the nation."

Pride as an outstanding characteristic of the Japanese is dis-
cussed by Boddy (21); Peffer (145), too, tells how their national
pride has suffered from the failure to beat China. Embree explains
that besides the "national spirit taught in the school system, State
Shinto is an important factor in producing the characteristic Jap-
anese personality with its strong pride in Nippon's race and cul-
ture." An attribute which is an aspect of it, namely, this people's
well-known *sensitivity* to ridicule, is spoken of by Gorer, Steiner,
and Alexander; also by Boddy, who describes them as "appalled at
the discourtesy they have received in America." Alexander con-
siders that many objectionable Japanese traits are forms of self-
expressive impulses aroused by the imposition of such extreme self-

effacing loyalty as theirs. Somewhat similarly, their absence of servility is criticized by Deming (46) as being carried so far as to give the Japanese difficulty in cooperating. Superiority-feeling is not necessarily a veneer of overcompensation against an unconscious inferiority complex. Children "catch" this sentiment as applied to their nation from their school-teacher, who, as says Embree (55, p. 36), is usually "a firm believer in the superiority of the Japanese race and culture." Although "the merchant, more worldly, frequently smiles at the naïve earnestness of the teacher . . . on the other hand, young officers, frequently recruited from the old *samurai* families, are deeply imbued with the concept of Japanese superiority and the divine mission of Japan to conquer the world."

Standards of Honor

The related tradition of *honor* is emphasized by Deming (46). If the lack, rather than the presence, of this quality has been an impression often made in more recent times, especially upon those whose relations with the Japanese were chiefly commercial, their apologists reply that the quality was not expected anciently of the middle or trading class and that unfortunately the members of this class rather than the *samurai* are those with whom Westerners have mostly dealt.

In 1889, Nose listed *straightforwardness* among the chief Japanese virtues! But Newman (134) accuses the Japanese of shameless duplicity by pretending interest in a "new order for securing the lasting peace of the world" to mask their aggressive intentions.

Initiative

Alexander, indeed, finds their attitude full of paradoxical features. Bornstein and Milton (25) declare that "whereas once we thought that the Nipponese were *imitative* . . . the fighting tactics of the Far East have shown them to be highly *imaginative* in numerous unorthodox ways." Embree discounts the popular view that the Japanese are only imitative and not *original*, for (55, p. 35) "in the ideological field Japan borrowed very little, preferring instead her own cultural line . . . the cultural borrowing of the past has been selective and controlled" and (p. 26) they have constructed "first-class battleships and planes. The perfect co-ordination of the attack

on December 7 demonstrated an ability to plan": in sum (p. 37), "to underrate Japan as an imitator is just as fallacious as to underrate her as quaint." Finally, *fatalism*, says Peffer (145), is "their strength and their weakness" and causes the Japanese to accept war as one does an earthquake — although, to be sure, the failure to humble China has been rather a blow.

GROUP FEELING

The next group of traits is comprised of those characterized by positive relationships to other persons. It was Nose who found the Japanese *benevolent* as well as filially pious, *dutiful* in their feelings toward their parents, and *loyal* to their superiors. Deming noted among them an old tradition of *championing the weak,* while many find them cruel. Gorer insists that this people has *no understanding of democratic* appeals; S. C. Menefee (123), also, warns us "not to make democratic appeals, because they have no meaning." *Fickleness*, which is quite the opposite of the loyalty which is so often mentioned, is one of the qualities Steiner names. This shows how very unsatisfactory all these undefined and sweeping epithets are. *Home ties must be weak,* according to Gulick, arguing from the early age at which children leave the parental home and the paucity of letters which parents write them; this runs counter to the usual generalization regarding *family loyalty.* Herd-minded as these people are, Alexander mentions their secret *admiration of individualism.* Gulick finds, in the mode by which Buddhism and Christianity both were adopted initially via the upper classes, proof that the Japanese require that an initiative action must always be taken *by a superior.*

The positive relationships of the Japanese would appear to favor particularly symbols of the parents. Nose had long ago observed Japanese *loyalty to superiors.* The appeal of *nationalism* is stressed by Peffer and Menefee. Gorer is particularly at pains to emphasize that all the qualities belonging to this group grow out of paternal relationships. National spirit is something the Japanese child draws in with its mother's milk. The present writer elsewhere (81), in dealing with the play of geographic factors on the Japanese outlook, has stressed the symbolism of an island. Embree tells of the part which retired military men play in the life of every village.

The quality of the nation mentioned more frequently than any other is *filial piety.* Gorer speaks of the respect for father and Emperor. Nitobe (136) deems piety to be his people's response to their monarch's conception of his vocation as spiritual. Nose had noted "filial piety" and "dutiful feeling toward parents" in 1889. *Political complaisance,* remarked by Bornstein and Milton (25), may well be a by-product of this piety. Alexander deems that the repression of rebellious tendencies, although it yields personal *self-effacement,* becomes an ingredient of national aggressiveness.

VIOLENCE

The final group of traits is comprised of the negatively other-regarding ones. Alexander considers that the aggressive impulses owe much of their force to the self-effacement of the individual which Japanese convention demands. Lory (110) holds the popular support of the aggressive policy of the militarists to be an expression of revolt against the power which the big family corporations exercise over the financial and industrial life of the nation. In this he is supported by the fact that the peasantry (from whom mostly the troops are enlisted) are particularly hostile to these families, a hostility which, as Embree points out, has been effectively exploited by the army. Timperley (172) fears that military defeat will aggravate, rather than kill, the psychological roots of aggressiveness. Japanese *proneness to commit atrocities* is attested reliably by Timperley (172). *Brutality* is described by Alcott (3) out of thirteen years' experience as crime reporter in the Orient (therefore seeing, to be sure, the darkest side of the picture) and by Dew (49) who is avowedly motivated by a wish to see their treatment of white people avenged. *Cruelty* is another quality Alexander traces to conventionally enforced self-effacement. Steiner shows the related quality of *hate* growing up in the form of *bitterness against all that is Western;* and Menefee (124) tells of Nippon's attempts to foment hatred of the white peoples and their imperialisms throughout Asia. How the military clique, the policy of assassination, and this present war have all been backed up by public opinion is told by Byas (35). Abend (2) lays it down as axiomatic that Japan's military case must be wholly discredited. But psychologists will less readily follow him in his further suggestion that this could be done best by de-

posing the imperial house. Timperley derives the militarism of today from centuries of medieval Japanese piracy in the China Sea. *Ruthlessness* is a quality of the Japanese as fighters remarked by Bornstein and Milton. *Savagery to the enemy* is traced by Gorer to features of their early training; and I have already quoted Embree as to resentments stored up by the way that each baby is spoiled by its mother *until* the next one comes along and is then abruptly turned over by her to be cared for by an older sister or other person. *Tendencies toward terrorism and rape* by Japanese troops, confirmed by Steiner, are thought by Embree (55, p. 38) to be "in part a reflection of Japanese male character structure by which . . . if a foreign country refuses to surrender . . . first reaction of the Japanese soldier is *anger* at being thus frustrated." All of this latter group of characteristics appear in contrast to the ancient Japanese tradition of *generosity* (the writer has often been a recipient of this), while the emphasis on ruthlessness and on mercenary qualities is at least hard to reconcile with the impracticability of youths and the contempt for money-making which Deming had noted in Japan in 1890.

In conclusion, let me say that as I review the preceding pages, I am chiefly impressed by the large number of the traits of Japanese character — some sixty in all, although there is much overlapping — which thirty-three writers mention. There has been a development from *complimentary* views expressed by the earlier writers to more *hostile* opinion in the case of later ones and many of the above-cited contradictions appear to be related to this trend; yet upon the whole there is less contradiction than I think one might have expected. Notwithstanding, therefore, the obvious need of a better-defined vocabulary of terms, to say nothing of more precise methods of observation, the perusal of this literature does leave in one's mind a picture having some consistency: *Family loyalty, patriotism,* and *self-discipline* are perhaps the most consistently reported characteristics. (*End of Dr. Hopkins' reply.*)

Dr. Hopkins' analysis clearly leads us to the same general conclusion that Mrs. Menefee's underscored: we are dealing with a deeply ingrained cultural tradition which has been effectively exploited by the dominant military elements. While not inborn or un-

modifiable, three characteristics emphasized by Dr. Hopkins, namely, family loyalty, patriotism, and self-discipline, will probably prove very refractory to any pressures which we of the Anglo-American tradition may wish to apply. Rigid family loyalty as it is today makes independent thought and cultural change difficult; the combination of this with patriotism and self-discipline makes the people an easy tool for the militarists. The educational plans will indeed be most difficult to make effective unless strong economic pressures — e.g., working through a lively workers' and peasants' movement, with some professional and middle-class support and leadership — can help education to recast these traditionally rigid patterns so that they will constitute less danger to the rest of the world.

SOME OTHER TROUBLE-SPOTS
OF TOMORROW

10

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Seth Arsenian	John Gardner
Leo Gershoy	Sidney L. Harcave
Sir Norman Angell	Edgar Snow
	Alice Thorner

THE FACT that the long-range psychological problems presented by Germany and Japan appear exceedingly serious is no reason for concluding that the problems of other groups are less so. We have begun with two national groups which became open aggressors in the present war, and they remain sources of danger. But a fire need not start in the driest part of the barn. We cannot, of course, survey *all* the world's trouble-spots. But before we come to ourselves as a trouble-spot — which is, of course, part of our total job — it seems wise to treat specifically the trouble-spots provided by the Near East, by France, by Britain, by the U.S.S.R., and by that vast component of the British Empire, India, which appear as probable centers of immediate post-war tension and frustration. We shall also turn to some psychological problems of Latin-America, not because Latin-America is likely to explode and ignite the world tomorrow, but because its problems are so intimately interwoven with our own. As in all our studies, we aim to emphasize psychological factors which are likely to be forgotten. Frequently vast forces ordinarily called economic and political are of overwhelming importance as compared with the more subtle of "personal" factors; we have indicated in Part I why we regard them as psychological forces, just as are the more "personal" events of daily life. But we cannot weary the reader by stopping at each page to remind him that these forces play through all the trouble-areas of the world, providing a context, a background, upon which are superposed the specific, local sources of likely trouble to be described now.

In view of the fact that the Near East is a traditional bridge of sighs between East and West, whose sorrows belong to the twentieth century as much as to the seventh or the fifteenth, I turned to Dr. Seth Arsenian, of Springfield College, with the problem:

What psychological dangers to world order are presented by the Near East?

Dr. Arsenian's Reply

In speaking about the Near East (or, as the British prefer to call it, the Middle East), we are speaking of a territory of some two and a half million square miles, with a population of nearly seventy millions. Countries involved in this discussion are: Egypt, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, Cyprus, Palestine, Transjordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and so-called "other Arabia." With the exception of Iran, all of these countries have at one time or another been parts of the now defunct Ottoman Empire.

Attitudes common to all these countries are common only to the extent that the historical experiences, including the physical environment, the cultural milieu, the social, economic, and political conditions in these countries, have been, if not the same, at least similar. It becomes apparent at once to the person acquainted with the history of the peoples of the Near East that any generalization covering all of these countries is a hazardous task, and that variations in historical experience and therefore of attitudes in and within the populations of these different countries exist; our generalizations cannot apply to each of them in equal measure. Furthermore, attitudes formed by the total past experience of an individual or nation continue to be modified by on-going experiences or developing events. What these developing events in the Near East will be between now and the signing of the peace is hard to foretell, and there is no safe method of prognosticating the modifications that they will bring to the already existing attitudes. However, attitudes formed over a long period of time are persistent, and modifications that may occur between now and the end of the war will probably not be drastic unless the intervening events are of a traumatic character.

Our task will then be limited to an attempt to answer these three questions:

What attitudes are prevalent in the countries of the Near East?
How may these attitudes help or hinder peace in the Near East?
How best may they be dealt with from the point of view of enduring peace?

What Attitudes Are Prevalent in the Countries of the Near East?

Attitude of Fatalism. Mohammedanism predominates throughout the Near East. Political power in the Moslem countries has been closely associated and indeed identified (as in the person of the Caliph until 1924) with religious leadership. This theocratic régime has found it to its advantage to subscribe to and to enhance the belief that Fate (Kismet) plays a tremendous rôle in human life and that the effort of the individual counts but little, if anything. "For the good things we thank the Padishah; the evil things — well, it is fate." The many wars fought in the land, the diseases, the poverty, the barrenness of the physical environment (eighty-five per cent of the land is desert, fen, or barren mountain), the ignorance of modern machinery and irrigation methods, and the general oppression of government have increased the belief of the common man in fatalism, and thus made a difficult life somewhat bearable for him. This attitude of fatalism has manifested itself in action-patterns of subservience, long endurance of difficult conditions, lack of confidence in self, indolence, passivity, and an inclination to philosophizing, which is for the most part a rationalization of the attitude of "what is the use of it after all?"

Fear of the State. Against a government (the Ottoman) which was both pervasive and oppressive, the common man had little protection or recourse to redress. The concept of government for and by the people is foreign to the land. Consequently an attitude of co-operative effort for the common good is a new phenomenon that has weakly shown itself here and there in countries liberated from the oppression of the defunct Ottoman Empire. Generally, the pattern of political life in these countries is for strong individuals to lead and demand followership. Another common pattern is for

individuals with any political power or even connection to demand, and usually get, special privileges outside of the common law and practice.

Pattern of Violence. With no extensive experience of democratic institutions and with ample experience of constant frustration, the pattern of action against things irritating — provided not very threatening — is violence and threat of violence. It is significant that the Koran has no commandment saying "Thou shalt not kill," and for the nomad in his desert land or on barren mountain initial violence may be a good method for self-protection.

Feeling of Insecurity. With insecurity of life and property in a political setup in which the worth of the individual is practically naught, helpless against the ravages of an inclement and uncontrolled physical environment, the common man in the Near East is fearful and suspicious of the designs — actual or imagined — of others. It is not unusual for him to suspect and whenever possible to avoid, by means fair or foul, obligations or demands of the ruling régime. Unfortunately, the enterprises of the European nations in the Near East for the past century or more, with few exceptions, have not assisted in mitigating suspicion, but have rather strengthened an already existing individual action-pattern and turned it into a group-pattern. In addition to this pattern of suspicion, the insecurity feeling is also responsible to a large degree for a heightened sensitivity to prestige and status. These two patterns — suspicion and high sensitivity — combine into an action-pattern of non-cooperation, which, however, is most carefully trimmed with polite protocol and formality.

Racial and Religious Attitudes. The Near East is and has been a meeting-place of races and religions, but no melting-pot. Semites (Arabs and Jews), Persians, Armenians, Kurds, Greeks, Slavs, Teutons, and Anglo-Saxons have elbowed each other at this crossroad of history, but have not mixed, have not lost their identities. Christians of every sect, Moslems of every schism, Jews, Druses, and Yezidis have lived here together, but have not assimilated one another.

Prior to the nineteenth century and the importation of nationalism from Europe, and before the European nations found it convenient to play the racial and national groups against each other in order to

carve from the decadent Ottoman Empire their zones of political influence and economic exploitation, the populations of the Near East — subject to common oppression — lived nevertheless side by side without shedding each other's blood. The spirit of nationalism (foreign to Islam), when introduced, assumed a particularly noxious form under the influence of the existing attitudinal patterns, and particularly that of violence. Much blood of innocent and helpless people was shed. Turks (since they were the defenders of the Ottoman Empire) fought against Bulgarians, Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, and Arabs. Moslems became suspicious of Christians, and vice versa. Out of the carnage and destruction there finally emerged the present political states of the Near East.

This unfortunate heritage of racial and religious intolerance and violence has not yet spent itself. In the countries now liberated from the Ottoman Empire, and notably in Turkey, Palestine, Iraq, and even Egypt, xenophobia and discriminatory policies against racial and religious minorities prevail. In addition to this, the still active panist (Pan-Islam, Pan-Arab, Pan-Turk) interests, because of their expansionist and exclusive nature, present no good guarantee for racial and religious tolerance or peace in the Near East.

Lack of an Objective Attitude. The facilities for transportation and communication in the Near East are limited; consequently the mobility and the acquaintance of the average Turk, Persian, or Arab with the outside world are much circumscribed. Illiteracy is eighty per cent or over. The religious schools have emphasized the reading of the Koran to the exclusion of almost everything else. The educational program of the secular schools (not sufficient for all children) and of the few high schools has been, with some notable exceptions, under the influence of romantic literature and uncompromising nationalism, and never sufficiently mindful of or effective in teaching the useful arts and sciences applied to human living. There are but a handful of modern schools for higher education. It is apparent that with this kind of educational opportunity or rather the lack of it, superstitions thrive, mental horizons are limited, critical reasoning cannot develop very far, and an objective attitude toward events and phenomena is lacking.

In painting this somber and negative picture of the attitudes in the Near East, we do not for a moment forget the potentialities for

good that exist. From the point of view of native capacity, the population of the Near East is probably second to none. The contributions of the Near East to human civilization have been tremendous. Near Eastern individuals and groups who have liberated themselves from the hampering attitudes and conditions described above have achieved distinction, and have contributed in no small measure to the culture of today. There is in this population a willingness to sacrifice, an uncompromising devotion to accepted ideals, a tradition of frugality and endurance, a spirit of chivalry, and a sense of unhurried enjoyment of life which is admirable. There is also the ability and the great desire to learn when once an interest is aroused and suspicions and fears eliminated.

How May These Attitudes Help or Hinder Peace in the Near East?

Despotic governments, ambitious and ruthless individuals angling for political power and personal profit, concentration of land and capital in a few families in each country, and the marriage of the Islamic Church to political power are bound to create frustrations, keep illiteracy high, and suppress large masses of the population. Politically, economically, and socially frustrated groups will express their aggression in ways that will contribute neither to peaceful living nor to social and economic progress so badly needed in these countries. These factors are more than likely to make use of the existing negative attitude and action patterns which are potential dangers to peace in the Near East.

How Best May They Be Dealt with from the Point of View of Enduring Peace?

Wide educational facilities for the general population with a curriculum, formal and informal, directed toward the formation of objective attitude toward life in general, knowledge and habits of hygiene and healthful living, enterprises and experiences for the youth in shared thinking, deciding, and acting, irrespective of racial and religious differences, will be necessary. Widespread introduction of modern techniques for irrigation, communication and transportation, use of electricity for household living, general improvement in the economic conditions of the poverty-stricken masses, ex-

perience in democratic government to the degree of readiness of the people, cancellation of any unfair foreign designs on the land and wealth of this region, and security for their respective national existences will all add to the feeling of safety, to the belief in the ability of man to improve his own condition, and to the common effort for social progress. An enlightened selfishness on the part of the Great Powers, lending a brotherly and helpful hand to the peoples of the Near East, will eventually stabilize that troublesome area and win it for peace. Any selfish motive with an eye for immediate profit will help to continue the Near East as a trouble-spot which can easily involve the rest of the world.

There must be no doubt that the region is to be assured to its present peoples, and that assistance — financial and educational — from outside will be necessary. Who can provide it?

Britain, unless its policies and practices in colonial administration are drastically changed, stands little chance of being successful. Its record in India, even in the Near East, is against it, quite aside from Italian and German propaganda among the rank and file of the Near Easterners, acrimoniously directed against England.

France has been too rigid in its colonial policy. Its record in Syria during the twenties and thirties and its collapse in 1940 are not factors which will contribute to its political prestige or power in the Near East.

The Soviet Union, because of its successful experience in dealing within its boundaries with many small cultural and national communities — some of them not unlike those in the Near East — and because of its proximity and knowledge of the Near Eastern peoples, stands a good chance of success, even despite the strong fear of Communism in the Near East.

The United States, because of its great reservoir of good will in the Near East built up for a century by American educational institutions, by the record of its medical missionaries, and by a few who have helped in the modernization of the agriculture of these countries, and also because of its non-imperialistic record and dealings in the Near East to date, appears to be the one Great Power most acceptable to the Near Easterners. But it will have to be an America ready to shoulder the full responsibilities despite many unavoidable headaches, providing a trained personnel for the job,

and with its whole heart in the attempt. (*End of Dr. Arsenian's reply.*)

Dr. Arsenian's analysis makes clear that American understanding, both of the economic and of the psychological problem of the Near Eastern peoples, is imperative if their efforts at self-realization, their capacity to function as a force for peace, are to be realized. This we find to be true also of Germany and Japan. It begins to appear that our responsibility is vastly more than the sheer responsibility to cultivate an ideal of peace for ourselves.

Most Americans seem to have forgotten about France, except as a place conquered, bombed, reconquered by Allied arms. Through much of history the greatest European power, France will again be an arena of history-making to which all eyes will turn, or a crucible within which will be tested the real will of modern man for freedom. Dr. Leo Gershoy, of Sarah Lawrence College, undertakes now to answer the question (as of the spring of 1944):

What is the immediate psychological future of France?

The prospects for France in the future must of necessity be estimated in terms of historic France. French aspirations dating from the 1918-1919 period are far less relevant than those dating from 1815 and 1871. Nor can we ignore the demands, or yet the spirit, of 1789. In fact, today's atmosphere, including some of the phraseology, is startlingly similar to that of pre-revolutionary France. Hence, we may expect the new France to ask for guarantees and compensations (though not restoration) as did the France of 1815. In the spirit of the men who were humbled by defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871, Frenchmen tomorrow will also emphasize scientific and technological training, long-term military service and preparedness, and governmental stability.

It is not likely that they will echo the conservatism of 1871, the panicky fears displayed by the middle classes still quivering from the experience of the Paris Commune. Such panic is not likely — despite collaborationist propaganda — for several reasons, not the least of which is the extreme care with which the Algiers Govern-

ment observes legal formalities concerning persons and property. The year of liberation, be it 1944 or some other, will add its accents: revenge against Vichyite collaborationists and fifth-columnists and traitors of all hues; an overwhelming demand for the renovation of French institutions; symptoms of the wounded feelings of men who were bitterly hurt, tempered by the pride of men who found themselves again; a burning feeling that national liberation is synonymous with what the French Committee of National Liberation calls "Social Insurrection"; and above all a magnificent release of fresh energy — the liquidation of many old passions, the opening of careers to the talents of men — and women too — for the first time, and a new deal in colonial and imperial relations. In short, this spirit of tomorrow will be the contemporary equivalent of all that was generous, humane, and progressive in the ideals and aspirations of the two great apocalyptic years of 1789 and 1848.

This is not to say that the France of tomorrow will be wanting in rancor. The new France will for long remain weak. Years will elapse, almost incalculable energy will be expended, before France will recover from the losses in population, the ravages of disease, the willful destruction wrought by the Germans in order permanently to cripple its Gallic neighbor. The zones of friction will be many: old parliamentarians, accustomed to the emoluments and prestige of a political career, will vie with the new men, the men brought into prominence out of the Resistance; Frenchmen who remained in France, whether to suffer or sabotage, will be resentful of those who somehow got out, to London, New York, or Algiers; the men of the radical, militant, and industrialized northern zone will compete with the inhabitants of the predominantly rural southern zone, the peasants with the city dwellers, and the military with the civil; and the war prisoners in Germany will be bitter against all. (Friction caused by the Church or the Communists *qua* Communists will probably be far less than many people anticipate.)

Most assuredly, the humbled and humiliated France of today will yearn again tomorrow for recognition as a *grande nation*. As such she will gladly take her place in that form of world organization which the wisdom, the good will, and the mutual forbearance of men must devise. This re-created *grande nation* will demand freedom above all other things, freedom within organization. For

organization is as essential as freedom. What Frenchmen tomorrow will not face with equanimity is the prospect of further struggle, more furtive living, and continued underground, improvised existence. With equal ardor they will seek happiness, to compensate them for their agony and the cruel years of suffering and privation. There is little doubt that even the French peasantry, not to mention industrialized France, will turn against the contemptible National Revolution spawned by the Vichyites. The A.M.G., as such or in any concealed or modified form, will never, not for a moment, be tolerated. France has had too much of native benevolence to suffer the benefits of foreign protection.

While the overwhelming desire for renovation will probably manifest itself in large-scale and nationally sponsored health, housing, and educational projects, France will also seek to carry through a great social transformation. Many signs point to a vast program of social reforms, to "the last stage of the people's liberation, initiated by the French Revolution." The long-belated emancipation of women is at hand. Even as revolutionary France in the eighteenth century stood in the van of the movement for colonial independence, so the France of tomorrow will seek to serve as model for humanitarian and equitable colonial relations.

There is not too much ground for supposing that the French attitude toward Russia will be identical with its stand toward Great Britain and the United States. There is every reason to believe that the U.S.S.R., immensely admired, will become a polar star round which more nations than the new France will revolve. On the other hand, toward Britain and America, partly in resentful acknowledgment of the fact that they did help, but more because they gave their help cautiously, in the beginning with niggardly reserve, and perhaps calculatingly, French resentment may long prevail. Marshal Smuts' speech will not soon be forgotten by a people better fitted than any other to realize how much of it was true.

The new France will stand far to the left of the bourgeois-minded parliamentary republic of 1939. Of this there is no question. The Fourth Republic will still remain parliamentary, but with a far stronger executive branch than before. Much more pronounced, too, will be public control, if not ownership, of industrial and commercial enterprises.

Not that France is likely to go Communist in the sense that the term was employed to terrify respectable people during and after the days of the Popular Front. France will probably be much more Jacobin than Communist; but it will be a tempered and regulated Jacobinism, with adequate legal safeguards even for the very betrayers whom the new administration will bring to justice. While purging the land of those who brought about the *débâcle*, the reinvigorated France will seek guarantees abroad. It will exact from defeated Germany compensations for its own terrific losses in manpower, goods, and resources. And from its allies in the United Nations it will expect territorial and economic security sufficient to protect it against the continuing menace of its powerful eastern neighbor. (*End of Dr. Gershoy's reply.*)

Surely there can be no doubt that one of the absolute essentials of world order, in a form attainable in this country, is a working understanding between the people of the United States and Britain — the term "understanding" having vastly richer content than any diplomatic *rapprochement*, however subtle. Each national group must have a genuine and substantial grasp of the problem of survival as the other group sees it. By virtue of his lifelong study of such mutual efforts at understanding, I knew of no one so competent in this matter as Sir Norman Angell, as I formulated the problem:

> What will be the prevalent psychology of the British in the post-war world, as it relates particularly to the maintenance of an enduring peace?

Sir Norman Angell's Reply

The rôle of Britain in the post-war world will be very largely conditioned by her relationship with the United States; and that in its turn will be very largely conditioned by factors which are largely or mainly psychological — "ideological," related to nationalism, conflicting conceptions of imperialism — all complicated by old suspicions born of past history, making part of national folklore.

Note, first of all, the importance of the Anglo-American rôle in any post-war organization, but making at the outset at least one

very clear distinction. Any plan by which exclusively Anglo-Saxon power should impose peace upon the world by a sort of condominium, would almost certainly fail, if only because it would be bitterly resented by other peoples — Russian, Chinese, Indian, French, Italian, to mention only the outstanding opponents or objectors.

But while it is true that no post-war international organization can be confined to the English-speaking peoples, it is also true that if British and American policies seriously diverge in the post-war world, there cannot possibly be any such organization at all. Anglo-American agreement is in this context quite insufficient. But it is also indispensable.

The unhappy history of a quarter of a century, to say nothing of that of two centuries, is proof enough that divergences of policy and temper as between America and Britain cannot be ruled out. Suspicion of British policy was perhaps the hard core of that distrust of foreign entanglement which entered so largely into the motives which led to the repudiation of the League by the United States, although it was, after all, of American invention and initiative, a proposal which had been brought from America to Europe. Even a cursory survey of the anti-League agitation shows the enemies of the League, or of any form of international co-operation, using suspicion of Britain as a convenient and powerful instrument.

It would be strange, indeed, in view of past history, if nationalist feeling in America had not taken a somewhat anti-British twist. This fact in its turn influences British attitude toward American policy, giving rise to the fear that it has an unpredictable quality.

The foundation of these attitudes, on both sides, is largely psychological. Material interests could usually be reconciled if views of the facts were more objectively based, were less colored by memories of old disputes, by nationalist preconceptions.

Anglo-American Relations

On the threshold of new international co-operations in which America is almost certainly destined to play a leading part, it is perhaps useful to take stock afresh of the part played by British power

in the past, in the defense of certain values which America is now so fully engaged in defending. American school histories properly enough emphasize such facts as that the Pilgrim Fathers came to America to escape from English authority. (Not British, since the Union with Scotland had not yet been consummated.) But what is almost invariably omitted from that story is the fact that but for the English power which defeated the Spanish Armada, the Western Hemisphere could not perhaps have been opened to the Pilgrim Fathers at all. Spain and Portugal were claiming — on the basis of allegedly divine sanction — monopoly of the settlement of the Western Hemisphere. That claim — which would certainly have included the claim to forbid the establishment of a highly heretical theocracy — would have been made good if the purpose of the Armada had been achieved. The defeat of the Armada made possible the opening of the North Atlantic to those emigrants, refugees, adventurers, who were ultimately to create the United States. (Incidentally, it is interesting to note that the Admiral whose victory over the Armada made possible the Protestant theocracy of New England was a Roman Catholic.) In fact, as so many historians have abundantly shown, the two peoples have again and again been pushed, against their inclinations, to co-operation in international affairs, a co-operation which now stretches over three centuries.

But if it was English resistance to the power of Spain which made possible, a few decades later, the settlement of New England, it was Anglo-American resistance to French power in North America which made possible the extension of the states of the eastern seaboard to the Pacific coast. The forces which resisted the establishment of a French empire on the St. Lawrence, in the Ohio Valley, and on the Mississippi were Anglo-American forces. The American colonists fought side by side with British troops. But co-operation did not end there. The resistance to the Holy Alliance embodied in the Monroe Doctrine at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the operation of that doctrine during the larger part of the century, were, as so many historians have shown, only made possible by the support of American policy by the British Fleet. This co-operation has more recently been expressed by a common participation of the whole English-speaking world in two world wars.

Nevertheless, all that period was marked by psychological frictions, and obstacles to a co-operation which cannot be taken for granted. The comradeship in arms in a second world war will not necessarily lessen those frictions. The presence of some millions of American soldiers in the crowded island of Britain is likely to create as many problems as it solves. Indeed, many of the generalizations concerning the psychology of Anglo-American relationship are on their face unsound. The "blood thicker than water" generalization defies fact: the blood of America is not mainly Anglo-Saxon. Common speech can divide as readily as unite. (It enables each to understand the most unpleasant things which the other says.) Frequency of contact is no guarantee of understanding: the bitterest quarrels in life are often between those who live in the same street or the same house.

The real psychological basis of close co-operation is, of course, a common perception of interdependence, the feeling of each for the need of the other's help. At this present writing, the British public has a warm regard for Russia, a warmth of feeling which one may find among Conservatives quite as much as among members of the Communist Party. It is certainly not due to a community of culture, common language, and similar considerations. It is mainly due to the recognition, on the part of the British people, that Britain's very survival would be in jeopardy but for the courage and fighting qualities of the Russians.

The best hope for a close co-operation between the English-speaking nations as the necessary core or nucleus of a wider internationalism will be found not in community of speech or culture, but in a vivid realization of mutual need for the deepest, the most vital of all national purposes: national survival. National survival is, on the face of it, the national purpose which must in the end take precedence over all others. Yet it seldom comes first in the discussion of Anglo-American relations, a truth strikingly illustrated in the discussion of "Empire" as part of the problem of those relations.

THE PRESENT-DAY MEANING OF "EMPIRE"

"Empire" immediately conveys to the minds of perhaps ninety-nine Americans out of a hundred a connotation of oppression, the

government of one people by another. Americans cannot easily forget that they owe their existence as an independent nation to resistance to the idea of empire. To fight the assumption that any people is entitled to rule another is the very condition of that freedom for which it is presumed the Allies are now struggling. When, therefore, Mr. Churchill declared bluntly that he had not become the First Minister of the Crown to preside at the liquidation of the Empire, a great many in America were genuinely shocked and saw a deep divergence of policy arising out of that simple declaration. Many felt that there could be no permanent co-operation between the United States and Great Britain until Britain had "repented" of imperialism, had abandoned the whole conception of empire, and liberated all the peoples now living within it.

Now the outstanding lesson of this war for the British people, which will be bound to affect their national psychology when they come to consider post-war problems, is that they owe their national survival to the fact that in June, 1940, they were part of an "Empire" — defended at such strong points as Gibraltar, Malta, Aden; and supported by such overseas communities as the South African Union, Australia, Canada. If there had been no such "Empire" in July, 1940, it is quite certain that Great Britain would have had to follow France into defeat and surrender. But Britain was able to hold out for the year in which she stood up alone against the German power just because she was able to count upon the co-operation of the Dominions — Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa — and was able, through such strong points as Gibraltar, Malta, Aden, Port Saïd, and the bases of India, to prevent the conquest of Africa by Hitler and of India by the Japanese. If, for instance, North Africa had fallen to German arms, then Germany, pushing down through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, would have joined up with Japanese power coming out to meet it. The surrender of Britain would not merely have added enormously to Hitler's resources, but would have meant the surrender of the Near East and of Africa, putting him in an immeasurably more favorable strategic position when he launched his attack upon Russia. Unable to count upon the aid of the British Fleet, or upon any form of British aid, India would have suffered a degree of invasion similar to that which China has suffered; and the

totalitarian states would have been in a position to ensure the sub-jugation of China and India, and possibly of Russia, a world situation which would have meant an appalling menace to the security of the United States.

It is not within the scope of this chapter to explore further that strategic contingency. But it has enormously reenforced, in the minds of the British people, a firm conviction that their survival as a nation has been due to the world-wide co-operation of British nations scattered over the earth; to a system which has made possible the rallying and mobilization of the power of those scattered units.

That mobilization has been largely voluntary, but, like the mobilization of any power within a state, it has also in some part been enforced. India, alone among the major belligerents, has escaped conscription. Her army of more than two million is voluntary. The fact that Britain held Gibraltar, which some purists have insisted belongs to Spain, held also Malta (regarded by some as Italian), together with the Suez Canal, and had exacted the right to retain troops of occupation in Egypt, ensured the co-operation of South Africa on the side of the Allies, made it possible for Marshal Smuts to bring the independent South African Union into the war. Although the Indian army is a volunteer army, that army could never have been created at all under an independent Indian government, dominated by a Gandhi, favoring "nonviolent nonco-operation" as the best means of defending India from the Japanese invader. Suppose such an independent, Gandhi-dominated Indian state had been created at, say, the same time that the Irish Free State was founded. If the head of such an Indian state had taken the line which the head of the Irish Free State has actually taken, the line of neutrality, and of denying to the United Nations naval or other bases, then India could never have become the vital American base it has become in the war against Japan.

The reader is reminded of these facts in order to suggest that the impulse behind British imperialism is not, as so many in America seem to assume, a mere function of monopoly capitalism. Its roots lie much more in a deep impulse to national survival. The British community, unlike the American community, does not occupy a single undivided land mass, but is scattered over the world. It

stretches from Great Britain itself, across the Atlantic, on through Canada, across the Pacific to Australia and New Zealand, back through South Africa, the uplands of East Africa, throughout the Mediterranean back to Britain. Already today a third of the British community lives thus outside Britain, and tomorrow that third may represent a half, or much more than the half, of a community which cannot possibly defend itself unless it does so as a unit — that is, unless it is linked by dependable lines of communication. It is obvious that an Australia of seven millions could not defend itself against a Japan of seventy millions. Its only hope of secure survival, survival in its preferred way of life, is by association with the world-wide system just described.

The unity which has ensured common defensive action in two world wars is an extremely loose union and certainly cannot properly be described as an Empire. The Dominions are already completely independent, so independent as to possess in the Statute of Westminster the right of secession and the right of neutrality in any war in which the other Dominions may be engaged. It is this "Dominion Status" which has been offered to India, and of which India could quite certainly avail herself from the moment that she could agree upon the form of constitution which she desires.

The economic element of imperialism, despite the frequency with which it is invoked, has in actual fact virtually disappeared. The Dominions have fiscal independence. Britain cannot, that is, use her political power to exact monopoly or favored treatment. (The impulse of the Ottawa arrangements came from the Dominions, not Britain; were a matter of bargaining in which Britain commonly got the worst of it.) All the Dominions make their own tariff and use it at times to the great disadvantage of British trade. The Indian tariffs against Britain have enormously reduced British exports to India. India, which used to be a debtor country, has become a creditor one. A debt of something over three billion dollars has been transformed by the purchases made by Britain for the purposes of war into a debt of about three billions owed by Britain to India.

All this means that there has gone on a process of *de-imperialization*. It is this trend which has been the strong and dominant one for about a century. It certainly will not suddenly come to an end.

But neither is that form of "gentlemen's agreement" for co-opera-
tion for common defense which we call "the Empire," likely to come
to an end, to be liquidated. The motives of association have become
political and military, a sense of defensive interdependence, no
longer (if they ever were) an expression of the pressure of capitalist
groups obtaining a monopoly position by means of the political
power of their government. If the British people have a strong im-
pulse to support Mr. Churchill when he declares that there will be
no dissolution of the Empire, that impulse has its roots in an urge
toward political and national defense more strongly than in any
economic consideration.

British Unity

The psychology of British resistance in 1940, after the fall of
France, seems to have been very little explored. If Britain stood
out alone against surrender, it was not merely a matter of the
physical courage of her people. The French are equally courageous,
and one cannot explain their defeat and surrender and the subse-
quent creation of a Vichy collaborationist government as mere
cowardice. Britain stood up because the nation was united. That
unity prevented the formation of a "Vichy" government, or any
government corresponding to that which established itself in
France and initiated, first, surrender, and then collaboration with
the enemy. But why did Britain thus attain a unity which France,
with her long tradition of democracy, had somehow failed to at-
tain? What special feature of national psychology in Britain made
possible the collaboration of Ernest Bevin, the truck-driver, with
Churchill, the grandson of a duke; the kind of co-operation of rival
political parties which somehow France had not managed to
achieve? Or, to put it in another way, if we are to ascribe the kind
of quasi-fascism which expressed itself in a Vichy collaborationist
government to the power of the two hundred families, why is it
that the corresponding social class in Britain, where the social struc-
ture is supposed to be much more on class lines, did not have sim-
ilar power? What is the psychology which explains the political
unity that enabled Britain to stand up and to continue resistance?
It was certainly not a special military aptitude — a kind of aptitude
which the French possess in probably greater degree than do the

British. Britain could not have continued at all if her people had been deeply divided by fanatical rivalries. Their political divisions were real enough: the differences of political and economic doctrine in the British parties are vital and visible. The British Labor Party is a socialist party, pledged to "the ending of the capitalist system." The Conservative Party is very definitely hostile to Socialism. Yet the parties in the House of Commons, directly elected by the people as a whole, and dependent upon popular vote, could co-operate across the gulf of party division to form a government of Conservatives, Socialists, Trade Unionists, captains of industry, the sons of policemen, farm laborers. All this implies a certain psychology governing the relationship of rival parties, rival doctrines and of men of different social background. Without that psychological and political fact, the military power of the nation could never have been rallied or assembled for the purpose of resistance.

Nationalist Economics and Nationalist Psychology

The economic situation will, however, enter into the post-war policies of Britain. Britain will, after this war, for a time at least, be exceedingly poor. She is one of the most densely populated areas of the earth and cannot feed her population from her national soil. In the past she has fed it, as someone said, by that alchemy which turns coal into bread, by exchanging manufactures and services (like shipping), largely based on that coal, for foreign food and raw materials.

Britain has met the economic strain of the war by a highly developed communism, using that word in the strict dictionary sense. She has survived, that is to say, by sharing the nation's available goods. The people have possessed those goods in common. If the eggs available could provide only one egg a month per person, one egg a month is all that the King or Princess Elizabeth could get. But the war communism has meant a good deal more than mere equal sharing of the goods available. Mr. Ernest Bevin, the trade union leader, has powers which permit him not merely to take any property which he deems necessary to the national effort, but to determine the occupation of every man and woman in the nation. To the degree that the conditions after the war are severe, will this form of managed economy continue. "We are all socialists now"

to a degree of which the author of that phrase forty years ago could never have dreamed.

Attention just now seems to be concentrated upon such details as cartels. The problem of cartelization cannot be separated from the problem of tariff barriers, or from such devices as subsidies to a merchant marine, currency restrictions, and similar interferences with unrestricted competition. The policy of Great Britain for the greater part of a century was free trade. She maintained a free-trade system long after every other country in the world had become protectionist. Cartelization, Ottawa agreements, imperial preferences are in part at least the means by which high tariffs, competitive currency devaluation and similar devices can be countered. Cartels are the means by which a high tariff, say, is rendered largely irrelevant. They are often, it is true, devices which favor the producer at the cost of the consumer. But that is an accurate description of tariffs also. Cartels, in so far as they exist at all, must be, like tariffs, subject to government control.

The importance of the psychological factor cannot, however, be overlooked even in devices at first sight so purely economic as tariffs. The psychology of nationalism enters into nearly all forms of protectionism. The manufacturer in Illinois or Minnesota is quite ready to meet the competition of low-paid Negro labor in Alabama or Louisiana, but can readily obtain protection against much more highly paid labor in Canada. The feeling that Minnesota can rightly receive protection against the Canadian worker, but must accept the competition of the Negro worker in Alabama, can only be explained on grounds of national psychology.

How far this injection of national feeling can enter into economic matters was illustrated during the campaign carried on in Great Britain by the Canadian, Lord Beaverbrook, on behalf of imperial preference. The general idea of imperial preference was that products of imperial origin — Canadian foodstuffs, for instance — should enter Britain free, while foreign products should be taxed. Lord Beaverbrook carried on "a tearing and raging" campaign among British farmers in an attempt to prove that the competition of United States or Argentine beef did grievous damage to the British farmer, while Canadian beef and wheat could be admitted without hurt. A question, however, arose about the position of the Irish

Free State. Was the Irish Free State a member of the Common-wealth (or Empire), or not? If it was, the Irish butter and bacon should be admitted free and British farmers could be assured that such free admission would not damage their industry. If Irish but-ter or bacon were foreign, its admission would be economically injurious. But the question of whether the Irish Free State was within the Empire or not seemed to depend on whether Mr. De Valera would take the Òath of Allegiance. One critic thereupon pointed out that we had evidently now abandoned the region of economics and had entered that of magic, or of witchcraft. Here was a cargo of Irish bacon awaiting unloading in Liverpool. Was that bacon destined to damage British farmers or not? If it were foreign bacon it would damage them; if it were Commonwealth bacon it would not. But whether it were Commonwealth bacon would depend upon whether Mr. De Valera would pronounce the formula of the Oath. By pronouncing that formula he would con-vert a mischievous foreign cargo of bacon, damaging to British agriculture, into a good and harmless cargo, not damaging to Brit-ish agriculture. Thus, we were obviously dealing with magic in-cantations, not economics.

The relation of nationalist psychology to economic nationalism has been inadequately explored. It is a field of inquiry which might contribute most usefully to a better understanding and con-trol of those passions likely to flare up when we come to the peace-making and to the settlement of international economic arrange-ments; and it is of the very core of clear and realistic thinking in matters related to international arrangements for security, for mutual and collective defense, still so largely dominated by the nonrational. We have yet to learn that only reason will enable us to manage the unreasonable and irrational within us. (*End of Sir Norman Angell's reply.*)

The impression which Sir Norman's words leave upon an Amer-ican reader may well be an impression of the constraint imposed on modern British policy by an inexorable situation; the gradual loss of relative power, the sense of economic threat, the breath-catching attitude of men who have twice nearly gone down to destruction. It will seem to many American readers that Britain could, by do-

mestic economic reform and by profound modification of imperial policy, make her international position both stronger and more just, and her risk of war relatively less. But these are the thoughts of men standing *outside* the threat; they are quasi-moral judgments that have no greater immediate likelihood of changing the actual situation than British or Chinese or Latin-American judgments would have in changing the course of American economic and political development. The peacemaker has his right to moral judgments; but he also has the obligation to work with the psychological materials that actually exist in the world of today and of the immediate tomorrow. And the steps to be taken depend on our full understanding of the glasses through which Britons themselves look, and their understanding of the glasses through which we in turn see ourselves and the world.

We cannot consider here all the dominions, colonies, and dependencies within the world's system of empires. But in many ways they all share common problems. So it is fair to choose for discussion the largest and most important of them all, British India. India presents a case which shows the vast difference between a warlike nation, an "imminent peril to peace," and an abiding thorn in the flesh of a healthy world. For India is a threat to *no one;* yet for all she has suffered and for all her problems of today, she is a threat to *every one.* I addressed to Alice Thorner the problem:

What will be the dominant attitudes in India after the war?

Mrs. Thorner's Reply

What the Indian people will think and feel about internal and international questions in the post-war years will probably be in large degree a function of the strength, scope and direction of the nationalist movement. The two great drives for independence of the nineteen-twenties and the nineteen-thirties served to quicken the tempo of Indian activities in all spheres, to awaken interest in political, economic and cultural problems of a national scale, to draw India into the orbit of world affairs, and to intensify national pride.

But the years of the present war have brought one frustration

after another for the Indian people. Ineffectiveness and failure have characterized all nationalist attempts to meet the crises in British-Indian relations brought on by the war. Although British spokesmen insist that India's independence after the war is certain, Indians simply do not have faith in British promises. The jailing of nationalist leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru at a critical time deprived the country of widely respected molders of public opinion and left the field free for men of narrower outlook. Sharp inflation and desperate shortage of consumer goods have dealt hard blows to the morale of peasants and industrial workers. Famine and epidemics have literally reduced the population both in numbers and in physical strength. Tension between the Hindu and Moslem communities has been rising.

Despite these dampening influences many Indians have been caught up in the surge of post-war planning that arose throughout the Allied world as the prospect of a United Nations victory became more certain. Programs for economic, social, and educational advance have provided a new focus for constructive thinking and a new basis for a hopeful outlook toward the future. Implicit in all these schemes, however, is the assumption that by or soon after the end of the war India will have gained a substantial degree of independence.

Breaking the political stalemate will require a reorientation of nationalistic leadership as well as a change in the policy of the Government. National Congress members, upon their release from prison, will find, as Gandhi has already found, that their concept of India's future in terms of an indivisible nation has been seriously challenged. No practicable solution can be achieved which does not in some way satisfy the considerable number of Moslems who have pledged their devotion to the principle of a separate Moslem state. And a place in the nationalist councils must be made for the organized industrial workers and peasants who have become increasingly articulate about their economic and political demands. The alternative prospect is one of protracted futile bickering among Indians of differing persuasions, of profound discouragement for those who have pinned their hopes on post-war planning, and of still further embitterment of the racially dangerous Indians-versus-Britons struggle.

The extent of Indian interest in the outside world will also depend very largely upon the ability of nationalists to reassert their leadership. Jawaharrlal Nehru did more than any other man to break through India's traditional isolationism and to tie up India's struggle for nationhood with the fight against fascist aggression throughout the world. Since 1930, there have been many evidences of Indian admiration for Chinese resistance. At the same time, however, some Indians have been attracted by Japan's success as an Asiatic power owing homage to no Western nation. By the spring of 1944 Japanese stock had sunk so low that their military penetration into northeastern India, accompanied by promises of "liberation" from puppet Subhas Chandra Bose, former National Congress president, aroused no Indian response. The Soviet Union has held high prestige in Indian nationalist eyes because of its success in meeting problems of agriculture, industrialization and national minorities. The United States has lost much good will because of what Indians have considered a failure to pursue a policy independent from the British. However, American soldiers personally have been very popular and will probably be remembered kindly. Wide circles in India look to the United States for help in industrialization, but at the same time view with suspicion any signs of American business ambitions to become heir to a declining British Empire. (*End of Mrs. Thorner's reply.*)

From India we reach out to the more general problems confronted almost everywhere in the world of colonies and dependencies: the double problem presented by the sense of defeat and frustration through loss of self-determination and on the other hand the linkage to a remote economic control — which often tends to drive local wages down and impose abnormal restraints upon the local system of trade. The whole colonial system is further embittered by the juxtaposition of white-skinned empire-builders and darker-skinned subject-peoples. We are concerned in the present volume with both problems in so far as they are psychological and in so far as they bear upon war or peace. We may from this viewpoint say that these sources of frustration, though they do not at the moment seem important from a military viewpoint, are so widespread as to color much of the thinking of the peoples of Asia and

the Near East, and of Africa; that they may constitute a fertile soil in which seeds of widespread hate may grow, eventuating possibly in a system of alliances which see in war the only escape from an intolerable situation.

Latin America, like India, constitutes a cultural and economic area which we scarcely think of as an immediate threat to peace. It still presents, however, a semicolonial economy which we have found to offer dangers, and it also serves well as a general barometer of democratic and of fascist world-forces. For these reasons it would be foolhardy to omit it. We addressed to Dr. John Gardner, of Mount Holyoke College, this question:

> What are the probable post-war public opinion trends in Latin America?

Dr. Gardner's Reply

Each Latin-American republic is a complex problem in itself, and it is mildly presumptuous to lump all of these problems in a brief memorandum on post-war trends in public opinion. There are some general propositions, however, which deserve statement, and none but the pedantic should be offended if they are stated with brevity.

Latin America will emerge from the present war with precisely the same basic problems with which it has struggled for years — a backward (semicolonial) economy, intense nationalisms, and the cultural debasement of large segments of the population. The broader aspects of Latin-American politics can never be understood in terms of the bizarre or drastic or confused political events of the moment; continuity and meaning emerge only if one views these events as incidents in the never-ending push-and-pull over Latin America's basic problems. Political trends in post-war Latin America, however eccentric and unpredictable, will simply represent further efforts to solve these very old problems.

Assuming this to be true, the question remains as to what form the new solutions will take. A variety of plausible and glib predictions are available, but the question is essentially unanswerable — unanswerable because the form of the new political solutions will

be determined by world events the outcome of which is still very much in doubt. To be specific:

POST-WAR WORLD ECONOMY

Basic to Latin America's post-war mood will be the economic agreements developed after the war. If these add up to an equitable international economy with due attention to the needs of backward nations, Latin-American republics can address themselves hopefully to the arduous but healthy task of putting their national economics on a sound basis. If the old catch-as-catch-can system is revived, the old evils will revive too — rival imperialisms in Latin America, the unhealthy economic enslavement of the weaker countries, and embittered international wire-pulling by the stronger countries such as Argentina — to mention only a few consequences.

INTERNATIONAL MORALITY AND THE FATE OF SMALL NATIONS

The attitude of Latin-American nations toward one another and toward *el coloso del norte* will be very much determined by the world order (or lack of such) outlined at the peace table. If international morality gets lost in a dog-eat-dog scramble for post-war advantages, Latin America's ancient internecine struggles will blossom anew and the old dread of Yankee imperialism will again stalk the land. If, on the other hand, international justice receives something more than a nod of recognition, and if principles of international morality are enunciated and established with some vigor, it will do much both to discourage aggressive struggles for power within Latin America and to assuage fears of domination from without.

FASCIST VERSUS DEMOCRATIC IDEOLOGIES

Post-war Latin America will be considerably influenced by the extent to which fascist ideologies are stamped out by the present war. If fascist political patterns survive in various parts of the world (in Spain, for example), it may be expected that they will survive to a considerable extent in Latin America too. If the destruction of Fascism is relatively thorough, the effects will be correspondingly felt in Latin America. Unfortunately, however, this will represent only a partial solution as long as basic economic and

political inequities remain; the symbols and trappings of Fascism may be driven out of fashion, but similarly unhealthy political solutions will continue to flower behind a screen of democratic symbols.

Events in the Leading Latin-American Nations

Finally, political trends in Latin America will be very much influenced by the outcome of current and future political developments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Most crucial, of course, will be the success or failure of Argentina's desperate gamble. If Argentina comes through unscathed, there will be many to applaud the wisdom of her methods, her internal authoritarianism, her international opportunism, and her intransigent attitude toward the United States. If Argentina finds the tough game profitable, she will almost inevitably become the rallying point for likeminded elements in Latin America.

Less crucial, but still very important for post-war Latin America, will be the turn of events in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, whether or not Brazil's new awareness of her tremendous economic future will meet with frustration or realization, whether or not Chile finds her salvation in politico-economic collaboration with Argentina, whether or not the *Sinarquistas* succeed in spearheading a reactionary turn in Mexico.

This paper began as a discussion of public opinion trends, and yet it has consisted chiefly of analysis of political trends. The reason may not be immediately apparent. We are all aware of the interaction between public opinion and political events — the events affect public opinion, and public opinion contributes to the shaping of future events. But we do not all realize that this interaction is somewhat one-sided for Latin America today. As citizens of a powerful democracy, we are used to regarding present trends in public opinion as of great importance, not only for our own future but for the future of the world. But public opinion in Latin America, at this moment, is not in a position to influence the great world events which will shape her future political mood. For the most part, Latin America is a spectator, awaiting the turn of events beyond her control.

One important consideration in evaluating the effect of these events is the fact that Latin America is not awaiting them apathet-

ically. Effective public opinion in Latin America is thoroughly aware of the major forces operating to determine the future. Latin America's eyes are wide open. She will apprehend very clearly the implications of whatever international economic arrangements prevail after the war. She will observe closely the rise or decline of imperialistic practices. If our rather crude and ill-mannered economic imperialism of earlier days is simply replaced by a more gentlemanly and urbane exploitation under the aegis of Good Neighborliness, Latin America will not be fooled.

Since we have dealt hurriedly and briefly with a variety of important and complex problems, it may be worthwhile to draw out explicitly the central thesis of this discussion: *Post-war public opinion trends in Latin America cannot be predicted or even understood within the scope of a curiously specialized realm of discussion labeled "inter-American relations," but only in terms of the entire world scene.* Latin America is very much a part of the living, struggling, bargaining world, and the fate of Latin America is inextricably tied to the great events which accompany and follow the present conflict.

The future of Latin America is being played out on a world-wide stage. The outcome of world events will shape public opinion among the politically effective segments of Latin America's populations. And this in turn will determine the political events which unravel as Latin America turns to the solutions of its ancient domestic problems. (*End of Dr. Gardner's reply.*)

In all the trouble-spots so far considered, one essentially uniform economy prevails, an economy appearing at many stages and levels of complexity, but everywhere depending upon the same fundamentals: private ownership of capital and the need for a return upon capital investment, the monetary reward for business enterprise depending upon the skill and the aggressiveness with which capital is handled. There has been a widespread tendency to identify war with the problem of capitalism, a view which, in view of the age and near-universality of the war pattern, we cannot adopt (cf. Duvall, p. 192). Emphasizing, as we have, the problem of power and of prestige as well as of gain (Chapter 4), we feel it necessary to look for war-threats wherever the struggle for power

appears. This means concretely that we cannot limit the threat of war to the problem of capitalist states. The one great non-capitalist state, the Soviet Union, must be studied with the same objectivity with which we would look at Britain, Germany, or ourselves.

Despite the difficulties of predicting trends in the Soviet Union, this vast problem cannot be shirked. In some ways it is the toughest assignment of all; for psychological forces are almost completely screened by official declarations and by military and political events which spring from imperfectly understood contexts. Nevertheless, Dr. Sidney S. Harcave of Washington, D.C., has been willing to answer the question:

What post-war attitudes can we expect from the U.S.S.R.?

Dr. Harcave's Reply

A study of the history of the U.S.S.R. and an intensive inquiry into Soviet propaganda and information during the present war permits certain inferences in respect to basic trends and probable developments in the Soviet Union. Surmises on future attitudes in the Soviet Union depend in this case in part on the assumption that the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States and Great Britain will follow current lines. But without considering what turn world events will take, one can find important clues to internal developments in the Soviet Union and to Soviet reactions to current and future events. These constants merit priority in discussion.

BASIC FACTORS

Above all the war has confirmed the Soviet Union in the belief in its own way of life. Consequently, it does not seem probable that the war will be followed by a period of anxiety, soul-searching or self-doubt on the part of Soviet leaders. The war, in their minds, is a not unanticipated interruption in the Soviet way of life. The prevailing mode of thought is that once the conflict is over the Soviet Union will take up its work where it was left off. Nor do there appear to be any objective conditions which would argue for the possibility of any important modifications in the Soviet system.

At the same time it is important to know that the Soviet Union

will be in straitened circumstances at the conclusion of the war. Manpower and material losses have been enormous. Perhaps even more telling on Soviet economy than the direct impact of fighting within its own borders is the ever-increasing pressure resulting from the effort sustaining the magnificent performance of the Red Army. Even before 1941, the "socialist offensive" was accompanied by quasi-war conditions, the people enduring many deprivations against the promise of future rewards. The war has postponed the delivery of these rewards even further.

It will be recalled that in February, 1941, the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. was instructed to set up a fifteen-year plan intended "to surpass the most advanced capitalist countries in the per capita production of iron, steel, fuel, electric machines and consumer goods." The attainment of this program will in all likelihood be the chief domestic aim of the Soviet Union in the post-war period. The problem of satisfying the demand for consumer goods, while at the same time restoring the losses in capital goods sustained during the war, will be a problem of the first magnitude.

It should be borne in mind that balancing in some measure the destruction of capital goods in the German-occupied areas is the large wartime construction and exploitation of resources in the area from the Volga to Sakhalin. The eastward shift of the economic center of gravity is a pre-war phenomenon which has been accelerated by the war. The eastward movement will continue.

From official Soviet statements it is evident that the Russian authorities will welcome any aid which they can secure in the process of restoration and rehabilitation, and that they will participate in international bodies dealing with such problems. Current Soviet utterances indicate that the Russian leaders will not approve of any international economic body which will require mitigation of Soviet sovereignty. In view of the increasing Soviet realization of the need for international co-operation, it is, however, possible that their views concerning the limitation of authority to be imposed on international bodies may be relaxed.

Another basic drive in Soviet life is the search for security. The Soviet Union will continue to strive first of all to secure conditions permitting the peaceful development of its own way of life. The Russians have increasingly come to realize that international co-

operation is a prerequisite for a stable world order. They do not, however, show any sign of basing their hopes for security exclusively on the possibility of successful international co-operation. The Soviets are pursuing a policy of insuring security by combined military and diplomatic strength. Whether or not this is the counsel of wisdom, it is a condition which must be taken into account.

ATTITUDES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The emergence of the Soviet Union as a great and recognized power, taken together with the dissolution of the Comintern, has had and will have important consequences. In the first place, much of the suspicion which has served as a constant irritant in the relations between the U.S.S.R. and the outside world is passing, albeit slowly. As the nations of the world cease to look upon Russia as a menace and as the Russians cease to feel themselves outcasts in world society, the ease and facility of relations will be perceptibly improved. At the same time, Soviet self-assertion in world councils is on the increase. The Soviet Union will insist on its right to a voice in decisions affecting the Eurasian continent, with the exception of India and southeast Asia. Above all, the Russians are determined that Munich, at which momentous questions were decided without Russia, shall have no successor.

With the decline of the Comintern, a process long antedating the present war, the chief determinant in forming Soviet attitudes in foreign affairs is the welfare of the Soviet Union. While the U.S.S.R. displays great sensitivity on matters relating to itself, it has since the war reacted feebly or not at all to more remote problems, for example, the status of India.

Soviet attitudes toward the United States and Great Britain will be determined in part by the success or failure of international cooperation. True, other questions, such as possible friction between Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. in the Near East, may develop; but these appear of far less consequence in enhancing or prejudicing relations than the unity or lack of unity in maintaining a stable world order which will be manifested.

What of China and Japan? (If and when the U.S.S.R. enters the war against Japan, the answer will appear swiftly enough.) Because of the nature of Soviet-Japanese relations the information on

the Soviet Union in the Far East is slight. The U.S.S.R. considers China's struggle against Japan part of the same world conflict in which it finds itself. It seems further that China and the Soviet Union are one in desiring the disappearance of Japan as a power. At this point it is not possible to go further in stating what Soviet attitudes concerning Far Eastern problems will be.

The war has witnessed an extension of Soviet cultural, scientific, and trade union contacts with the outside world. With increasing political co-operation, the extent and facility of such contacts will increase substantially.

Among the factors which influence relations with the Soviet Union, two peculiarities should be borne in mind. Soviet suspicion of the world, a condition of twenty-seven years' standing, is decreasing, but still exists. The well-known hypersensitivity of Soviet leaders in their relations with other countries should never be left out of account.

Another peculiarity arises from the difference between Soviet media and ours. While privately owned periodicals in this country can air their opinions of the Soviet Union, the reverse is not true of the Soviet State-controlled media. Any controversial statement in Soviet organs is received as official in origin, as it must be, resulting in irritation among wide circles in the United States and Great Britain. We have safety valves for the release of tension with less prejudicial results; the Soviets have none.

INTERNAL TRENDS

If, as has been stated, little fundamental change in the Soviet political and economic structure is on the horizon, one can, nonetheless, look forward to developments, which, if not basic, are at least important. These changes antedate the war in their origin. Speaking broadly and schematically the following trends seem to be indicated: The Soviet State seems to be taking on more of the features of the state as we know it. The shift of emphasis from Stalin as the leader of the Communist Party to Stalin as the leader of the Soviet State is symbolic of this trend. The rôle of the Communist Party appears to be declining. Entrance into the party is easier but less meaningful than heretofore. The bases of discipline are also shifting. Restrictions on coeducation, greater emphasis on

discipline in the schools, increased attention to the development of an officers' corps, are among the indices which give reason to infer that the post-war Soviet State will emphasize discipline more, discipline based on new foundations. There is no indication that the Church will become a basis of authority in the State, but the current relaxation of restriction on the Church will continue after the war.

The development of an indigenous Soviet nationalism, which is organically related to other trends in Soviet life, such as the shift in the forms of the State and changes in Soviet foreign policy, will continue. In this nationalism the value of Russia as a symbol will increase. There is, however, no reason to believe that the Soviet practice of equality of races, nationalities and sexes will change.

Will there be any relaxation of control over public opinion or any extension of those activities which we associate with representative government? There is no information which would support one view or the other. It is, however, not improbable that, given an extended period of security and stability, the provisions of the 1936 Constitution, such as those concerning the freedom of the press, will be made more meaningful than they are now.

What of the rôle of the Red Army? Much will depend on the degree of stability attained on the eastern and western borders of the U.S.S.R. In any event, the peacetime strength of the Red Army in any discernible future will be at least as great as it was before 1941. Predictions that the Red Army will play an increasing political rôle in Soviet life are not supported by available information. On the contrary, civilian control over the Red Army appears to be as firm as ever. (*End of Dr. Harcave's reply.*)

In this summary of danger-spots over the face of the earth — in which, as later chapters will show, we are ourselves by no means the least — no account has been given of the Chinese Republic. I have encountered no one who appears willing to think of China in these terms. Vast though she is, and terrible though her threat to peace may in time become if industrialization augments the fascist tendencies which war inflation and chaos have fomented, the *immediate* problem is generally conceived to be not China's threat to the world, but the danger that the rest of us will squabble for

her wealth. Whether China will emerge twenty years hence as a great stabilizing factor or a great disturbing factor will, in the minds of many, depend not primarily on the balance of forces *within* China but upon outside pressures upon her, forcing her into typical patterns of industrialism, and perhaps ultimately of expansionism and empire. She has great potentialities for democracy; but unfortunately also for autocracy.

Emerging nationalism in China can unfortunately mean either participation in a democratic world order or fascist nationalism of the European type. In response to a question from us regarding *conflict of the Far East* with the western colonial and imperial system, Edgar Snow of the *Saturday Evening Post* writes:

"Once Japan is shorn of Korea and Manchuria and Formosa, she will lose the basic resources necessary for a great industrial empire. Manchuria and China are destined to become industrially more powerful than Japan, and that within a very short period. Siberia and Mongolia may become, in combination with Central Asia, the strongest industrial center in all this part of the world. The Dutch Indies are also bound to develop considerable industrial strength. The question for the future is whether the European master-states will be able to stifle the fires of nationalism now burning strongly all over colonial Asia, and which the withdrawal of Japan will by no means in itself put out."

Peace, then, will depend largely upon the understanding which the Western world shows toward the new nationalism, and in the honesty with which the *democratic* forces underlying such nationalism are supported.

Looking back on the contributions in this chapter, tension in Latin America, the Soviet determination to achieve greater security and influence, India's need for independence, the Near Eastern desire for independence of small cultural groups, British insecurity in a period of relative decline, the French struggle for rebirth, provide typical focal points of tension or of pressure to aggressive activity as the case may be. We must distinguish indeed between the struggle for *autonomy* and the struggle for *power* as a trouble-source; in this sense we may say that though the dangers are manifold, the dangers implicit in a power struggle between the greater states is by far the chief hazard. But the power struggle

pervading and coloring all the local sources of hazard is itself de-
rived not from an inexorable Fate but from a complex of psycho-
logical forces of which we have taken brief account (chapters 1-6).
And it does its damage not automatically, but by virtue of various
kinds of psychological blindness and inertia which we shall now
try to sketch more specifically, as they exist in ourselves, and in
some degree everywhere. For as one of the great powers, with an
increasingly huge stake in the world pattern, we exemplify just
those psychological weaknesses shared more or less by all, a fact
which makes tension likely to develop to the danger point and
stands in the way of organizing a rational and effective international
machinery for a stable peace. We turn then in the next four chap-
ters to a study of our own psychological shortcomings as they bear
upon the recurring threat of war.

EDUCATIONAL FAILURE

A QUESTION; AND AN ANSWER BY

James L. Graham

11

IN THE NEXT FOUR CHAPTERS we shall turn the spotlight upon ourselves. There would be no value here in rehashing the question as to the rôle which our policies during the twenties played in preparing for World War II. Our questions relate to the America not of the twenties but of the forties; the America which still has a chance to play a major rôle in stabilizing world order upon an equitable basis if only we are wise and generous enough.

There are four problems of American psychology which seem specially pressing, and at this juncture specially threatening:

(1) The failure of our education to prepare citizens to see more clearly where they were going, so that almost up to Pearl Harbor they lived the life of sheltered children, not of world citizens;

(2) Our failure to recognize the general earmarks of Fascism, and to see its scattered expressions appearing here and there in our confused economy, and promising to appear in much uglier form in the post-war period of rapid, and of frequently frustrating change;

(3) Our amazing capacity to go on blindly but hopefully repeating the old "peace rituals" which we have found ineffective — measures which are all right in themselves but which in the acid test have failed most dismally;

(4) Our tendency, when the fire is put out, to lapse back again into the same general habits from which fires are sure to come, rather than to examine our own habits and find how we ourselves, as well as the other man, may repattern our ways to achieve the goals we really want.

Of these four problems, the one dealing with education is the one which, I think, comes first. Our educational system has not given us a mature conception of the world we live in. The trouble goes so deep that a systematic diagnosis of its origins is called for.

American education once served rather well the pioneer need to read, write, and cipher; and for the very few (mostly the clergy) who went forward to higher education it provided a fairly good classical equipment. The development of universal compulsory education in the last half-century, the rapid growth of high schools, and the great increase in the number who have gone to college have appeared in an era in which increasing understanding of world leadership can rightly be demanded. But great bodies move slowly, and education, like the press, has for the most part moved forward very timidly. Courses in civics and other social studies have "meant well." But the real test is the situation in which we have actually found ourselves.

Though *all* education has been myopic in relation to the world scene, I think it is fair to say that *higher* education, because of the maturity of its students and the leadership rôle which they play, bears a specially serious responsibility; moreover, that its inadequacies are in many ways representative of educational inadequacies as a whole.

It is not asserted that every aspect of higher education is ineffective; we are dealing here with trouble-spots, and our emphasis is upon frankness in description of danger; there will be a search for the basis of hope at a later point. In Part III of this volume we shall try to suggest ways of strengthening education to meet the crisis it confronts.

To James L. Graham, of Lehigh University, the question was put:

How has our system of higher education failed to prepare us for the world situation which we confront?

Dr. Graham's Reply

From the standpoint of productive efficiency, we appraise our colleges as the best the world has ever produced and as providing the highest and widest education ever given. Yet they failed in helping the nation avoid the worst crisis in centuries or in preventing our present gross maladjustment, a failure that only the most withdrawn educator can ignore. Now we are confronted with an imperative need to build a secure and satisfying post-war world order, a task and responsibility that education should not evade.

With this failure and need confronting us, we should deliberate on the motives that have brought and sustained internal weakness, developed strong external resistances, and today hamper future successes, lest we fail to develop the internal fortitude and morale needed to finish the task that lies before us.

DIAGNOSIS

First, do our colleges have the mental health needed to assume the responsibility and complete the rebuilding task? If they do not possess it now, do they have the will and the residual health to regain sufficient strength?

Institutions, like individuals, may adopt abnormal ways when confronted by obstacles blocking goal achievements, if they judge the barriers too impenetrable for their capacities or requiring too much effort for their circumvention. As in the case of individuals, mental ill-health may be only a passing condition. Their capacities may not be impaired. They may only be misdirected. In extending the analogy of a personality liability formula to consider weaknesses in our higher schools, we do not ascribe to them a collective personality or brand them as incurable. Rather, we direct attention to attitudes and habits that should aid our understanding of their basic inadequacies, provide their leaders with insights into underlying motives for their accustomed solutions, and suggest to them important directions for their improvement. Apt institutional parallels to the attitudes and ways of the individual schizophrenic suggest that a similar explanation of dominating motives may account for familiar, widespread, and consistent habits of our higher schools.

The label of dementia praecox over a pigeonhole designed to collect the case-history folders of this personality type brings together a diverse and puzzling variety of inadequate habits. The most distinguishing characteristic common to all is withdrawal from responsibilities customarily expected of successful citizens. Since emotional apathy and surrender of the struggle to achieve civilized desires cannot be easily accepted, the schizophrenic adopts a variety of ways and attitudes that will save his face, excuse his withdrawal, and reduce strains accompanying his frustrations. Confronted by barriers to goal achievements too impenetrable for his capacities or too effortful for his inclinations, the schizophrenic supports his

quitting in characteristic non-adaptive ways. The schizophrenic frequently withdraws by reducing the number and range of his desires and simplifying his environment to an almost primitive level. He may refuse to grow up and assume adult responsibilities. He may even regress and adopt the language, clothes, and ways of a small child. He may occupy himself with relatively indirect and useless busywork or daydreaming and thus be able to shut out the stimulating events about him. He may develop rationalizations, delusions, hallucinations, or compulsive rituals that provide acceptable excuses for quitting. He may adopt a generalized solution applicable to all circumstances and thus avoid making any specific decision because the answer is always "no" or always "yes." He may cultivate poses to support the rejection of responsibilities, such as silliness, playfulness, childishness, or incapacity.

As the neurologist by differential tissue-staining makes certain aspects of his material clear and vivid, let us use this analogy of the socially ineffective personality type and the withdrawing habits of certain educators and institutions to aid our higher schools in analyzing more objectively their mental health. Correct diagnosis is the first step in reducing or eliminating bad habits.

Evasive Administrative Habits

Habits of administrative functioning illustrate the withdrawing pattern. The following questions point to the withdrawing pattern: Why are agenda of faculty meetings often filled with trivial details and matters only indirectly related to instruction of students and to community welfare? Why is open discussion of general policies avoided, as stirring controversy or emotion? Why are broad policies presented as specific cases and directed for resolution to administrative officers or executive committees? Why are former unsatisfactory compromises regarded as precedents for present action, or readjustments avoided from fear of establishing future precedents? Why are traditional habits and course offerings modified with such difficulty and slowness through the employment of red tape? Why are committees and parliamentary procedures so often employed to thwart and delay the making of majority decisions until need for action passes or interest is so dulled that inaction is tolerable? Why are reasonable merit policies for recruiting staffs and establishing a

salary scale so often evaded, and family, personal friendships, alumni, and institutional ties so definitely cultivated in placing students and helping professional friends? Why are admittedly desirable services frequently rejected by references to fixed budgets, or dismissed as ahead of the times? Why is teachers' advancement related so frequently to proficiencies that have little to do with good teaching, e.g., personal usefulness to administrators, committee services, and number of publications? Many specific cases in such categories are seen to fit logically into a pattern of timidity, resistance, and conservatism that supports withdrawal from responsibilities.

WITHDRAWING THROUGH SIMPLIFYING THE TASK

The analogy may find greater support in the similarities between the ways in which schizophrenics support their withdrawals and their institutional counterparts. *First, our educational institutions reduce their desires by simplifying their problems and tasks.* In the transition from a frontier culture and the homestead productive unit to the factory and urban apartment life, our colleges were forced to expand beyond preparing teachers and preachers to disseminate our culture into the preparation of technicians and leaders for many professions, for military and economic positions, for production, for distribution, for basic services, and to supplement the declining effect of out-of-school agencies. The extension required assuming responsibility to provide technical competence for many vocations, job levels, and ever-broadening community horizons, and for advancing knowledge, techniques, and proficiency standards in each added branch. The race to meet these responsibilities soon imposed high barriers to specific job preparation. *In simplifying the task to readjust on a less direct reality level, the colleges substituted a preparation designed to meet the common needs of many vocations and to serve a mythical average individual.*

These salvage goals were met by adopting three indirect aims and establishing a cluster of course requirements associated with each. Since qualifications for any top-ranking post implied a cultured leadership, the baccalaureate degree became the external symbol of a gentleman class. Therefore, courses were required, designed to implant an adequate sampling of our cultural background and to make gentlemen. Since colleges had assumed preparation

for some vocational career, the degree became a recommendation to membership in some professional fraternity, either for immediate employment or admission to specialized schools leading to full membership. A cluster of courses then was required to develop the specialized knowledge, skills, techniques, attitudes, and foundations prescribed for such specializations. When this formula failed to assure either recognition of a leadership status or membership and security in a chosen profession, a third aim was included with an array of courses, designed to remove every serious handicap to such acceptance. These were termed essential courses, cultural courses, honor courses, comprehensive examinations, and extra-curricular and activity requirements. In fact, anything was included that employing managers might accept as substitutes for leadership ability, gentleman status, technical skills, job experience, or which might predict future competence. In a society with a poorly organized merit system for selection purposes, this side line has achieved almost supreme importance. These are the simplified and indirect objectives and programs which are used to provide men and women with adult proficiency standards for highly specialized vocational posts.

This simplification diverts students from meeting proficiency standards to attaining distinctive awards; it thwarts individualization by limiting range of choice in preparing for a specific post; it gears high schools to preparing for admission to an undifferentiated college education; it defers specialization to the graduate school level; it prevents effective student guidance programs or any adequate bridge between preparation for jobs and placement in jobs commensurate with training and ability; it fails to define the essential function of formal schools and the development of professional out-of-school training; it fosters apathy toward the removal of cultural handicaps in terms of racial or class prejudices; and it works toward the employment of technically unqualified persons for highly technical posts, and toward a naïve idea of transfer, to the effect that years of formal schooling rather than specialized knowledge and techniques qualify for such positions. Each of these results menaces the vital interests of our schools. Such emotional apathy and disinterest, such indirectness in aims, such simplification of civilized desires and absence of social sentiment and responsibility are characteristic failures of the schizophrenic type.

INFANTILISM

Second, let us consider ways analogous to the fixation and regression habits of the schizophrenic. Though among the oldest and strongest and most important institutions, colleges have not grown up to assume adult responsibilities. For example, they do not control their own policies and funds. As infants, they accepted control boards to supply teachers and preachers for specific churches, to provide leadership for specific expanding interests, or for effective resistance to conflicting economic or cultural interests. Although they no longer prepare workmen for the service of any single interest or institution or cultural pattern, they still accept this dependent status. Whether the infantile attachment is to church boards, special interests represented by self-perpetuating boards of trust, or to political party organizations, a mature institution must develop abnormal ways and attitudes to tolerate the continuance of paternal controls that are responsible for major and final decisions. The problem suggested here is most complicated, involving charters which long ago fixed the organization pattern, permanently binding grants for designated purposes, and restricted values pursued by minority groups, classes, and interests. These are as definite evidence of psychopathological habits in groups as in individuals. *Responsibility for growing up institutionally* is just as necessary for institutions as for individuals if they are to weather the storms and stresses of maturing, adjusting effectively, and keeping social sanity.

Another evidence of failure to grow up lies in a fixation on preparing for individual leadership and defending relatively futile individualistic freedoms and leadership. In our frontier culture, individual leadership was effective in achieving satisfactions for local enterprises and individually owned and operated businesses. Under the changing conditions of an industrial capitalism, a tightly co-ordinated world economy, and the development of myriads of institutions, effective leadership has passed from the individual to the institution. The leader works *in* and *through* the institution. In failing to train for the newer leadership pattern, contribute to the development of social codes of responsibility for institutions, or to lead institutionally as distinct from individually, adult responsibilities are not assumed.

FLIGHT FROM REALITY

Third, let us consider the schizophrenic's habit of supporting his flight from realities with his daydreams and catatonic rituals. Our educational institutions have developed preoccupations with relatively indirect aims and verbal and ceremonial activities that enable them to shut out the stimulating events occurring about them and avoid real adjustments almost as completely as does the hospitalized schizophrenic. Devotion to broad preparation, scholarly habits, pure research, to raising individual leadership ability, to implanting a culture, or teaching ability to think straight, while sustained with thoughts of attaining artificial rewards in terms of grades, dean's lists, degrees, and individual recognition for scholarly articles for restricted publics, are only remotely related to security in a regular meal-ticket job. Similarly, devotion to narrowly intellectual and highly specialized aspects of history, of science, or of technology, and to manipulating the specialized techniques of an uncritically accepted methodology may advance knowledge and develop professional status, but may *ignore the task of building a harmoniously adjusted social order* without which scholarship and efficiency are hopelessly fettered.

The more science advances, the more risk there is that through unimaginative teaching it may be concerned with quantitative measurement, objective description, and methodological techniques, ignoring problems involving emotions, social adjustment, and broad evaluations. It is true that emotions warp decisions, biases enter evaluations, and broad verifications are elusive, but most important contemporary problems must include them. Preoccupations which ignore them may be our institutional counterpart of the schizophrenic's flight from reality. Deductive teaching techniques may conserve statuses, methods, laws, habits, and attitudes and support withdrawal from the important task of developing skill to devise better ways or to adapt successfully to changing cultural demands. Though science has advanced largely through the use of inductive methods, no large classes in the sciences utilize such techniques. Students may pass entirely through our high schools and colleges without being assigned a single task designed to develop such inductive skills as: picking out important and influential factors from

irrelevant and inconsequential ones, abstracting common similarities from observed or recorded data and designating them with common names, discerning how such similarities belong together or are interrelated, and formulating such relationships into procedures useful in obtaining answers for specific purposes.

The personality liabilities of these indirections and preoccupations, as in the case of the schizophrenics, lie not so much in their nature as in the use made of them to evade making important adjustments. They need not be classifiable as bizarre, formal, ritualistic, or as daydreams, hallucinations, or rationalizations. They may merely provide an occupation to escape from responsibilities.

POSING

Lastly, let us consider the poses that support schizophrenic irresponsibility. We will only comment upon the playful pose. While this pose is more apt to be found as the evasion mechanism of immature and non-vocationally directed students, its adoption is made more likely by such stresses as the following: the importance of spectacular sports, the stress on fraternity, sorority, and social life, the stress on making courses interesting, easy, and entertaining; some of the stresses on activity, and some of the devices of the free schools to achieve interest, and the development of the expectation that colleges provide four years destined to be the most free, happy, entertaining, and unrestrained of any period of life.

THERAPY

The aim of typing an illness is to cure it. Since accumulated knowledge of causes and remedies is assembled under such types, correct diagnosis is extremely important. In this case, we have diagnosed the illness of educational institutions as resembling that of the individual schizophrenic. Let us carry the analogy on to relate it to the remedial purpose. Those seeking refuge in a generalized withdrawal from meeting expected responsibilities often present stubborn cases because they find the solution too satisfying. Most cures result from decreasing a contented complacency by using shock therapies. However, no artificially produced crisis is needed now, for the war has provided a cataclysm no institution can ignore. The very real fear of inability to cope with whatever

may come and the imperative desire for security from ever-recurring and worsening dangers should supply adequate incentive to throw off bad habits and attitudes and to learn more adjusted ones. Herein lies hope of achieving the internal hardihood needed to succeed; for their capacities and abilities, if wisely directed, are great.

Prognosis

What are the probabilities for changing weakness into strength and of educating for a satisfying world order? Suppose the colleges accept the evaluation of weakness and support it with the prevailing withdrawing attitudes and habits. We may expect in the early days of the peace that the colleges will be gorged with students, that college incomes will rise, that their complacency with the old formula will return, and they themselves be excited by the more favored circumstances. A fair guess as to what then will happen is found in the catatonic excitement-pattern of the individual schizoid. In analogous situations, some schizophrenics support their withdrawals with spells of excitement and marked activity, with preoccupations with stereotyped busywork, indirectly or remotely related to adaptive efforts, and an overevaluation of their activities. It will be difficult to predict whether the institutional preoccupations and overevaluations will be concerned with the teaching of some cultural subject matter such as history, with short-cuts to practical skills and instruction in narrow techniques for quick prevocational preparation of individuals, or with financial saving which may result in recruiting partially trained and unqualified staffs. However, it will be fairly certain that the dominant motive will support the failure to assume complete and full responsibility for re-educating for a harmonious, enduring and satisfying peace. If this happens, may we not expect history to judge as criminally negligent those leaders who fail to prevent it?

Probably no one can foretell how much the war will weaken the American system of caste stratification or how much the war will have broken long established and deeply entrenched habits that have bound us to low performance and adjustive levels. The habits and the system may be weakened, but, on the other hand, those who profit by employing these habits may effect advantageous alli-

ances, capture military and political control, and maintain their rule. These uncertainties and probabilities should be a stimulus to act in time — probably a limited time — while freedom of choice is still open. Education, too, may effect mergers with democratic organizations and follower groups, capture controls through educative techniques and democratic processes that will strengthen its power, and free reason from bondage to outmoded, non-adaptive habits and systems.

Institutions and men interested in education for man's future must choose either to build a structure in which mankind may live a satisfying, healthy mental life, free from service to non-adaptive habits and systems, or to withdraw from the responsibility, salvage whatever is possible while accepting the domination of the currently strongest. Institutions and men choosing the greater satisfactions must have visions, draft them into blueprints, and execute the plans which will build an educational system, sound and strong. They will not find the task easy or the way smooth. They cannot spare strength or costs or effort. They must build in faith and gain heights of morale, stamina, and persistence. They must build with strength, for today the forces of resistance are strong. To plan and finish the building, institutions and men must release resources and knowledge, labors and products for man's welfare. They must unite for mutual advantage, ceding acquired privilege and honored status, and assuming full leader and follower responsibilities in joint co-operative enterprises.

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THE FASCIST PERIL
WILL CONTINUE

A QUESTION; AND AN ANSWER BY

Daniel Katz

IN THE FOREGOING CHAPTER Dr. Graham found that the habit of alertly coping with new threats to our American life is hardly characteristic of our higher education. If there is to be no fire, we may be permitted to sleep a while. Yet in the series of chapters on trouble-spots we seemed to discover fertile soils for Fascism to grow again; indeed, we might summarize the group of papers on world trouble-spots by saying that Fascism, absolutism, and morbid aggressiveness will outlive this war in many quarters no matter how good a peace we make. The pressure to personal and group aggrandizement, the domination of one man by another, the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of potential or actual rivals, the existence of the wretched and the desperate — these things which have always fed the roots of war will continue to do so. And above all, man has relearned in these last years the art of despotism, which he had perhaps partially forgotten; he knows the fascist way. Even in Britain Fascism has been aggressively demanding a hearing, and in America all sorts of native fascisms remind us, with a new threat, of the Know-Nothings and the Klan. There are numerous fascist groups among us already, and a frustrated, power-seeking group ready to organize and lead them; there is among the middle classes a fear of organized labor, a fertile soil for rapid growth of fascist ideas; somehow there is money for them. Whether large business interests will be hesitant, or will support them, will depend necessarily both upon the economic advantages and dangers which they see in a rigidly controlled system (business and government being tightly integrated together) and upon public understanding of the issues and readiness to put up vigorous resistance.

Indeed, many of the dangers of fascist thinking and feeling can

unfortunately be found well-defined here at home. The danger can be stated in a few words; but its importance justifies giving it a chapter all to itself. In a period of stress and difficult adjustment, many will turn to simple authoritarian solutions, especially those whose uncertainty or insecurity is of the sort which led to Fascism abroad. So we addressed to Dr. Daniel Katz, of Brooklyn College, this question:

> **What factors may lead to the development of fascist attitudes in post-war America?**

Dr. Katz's Reply

(1) The most important single factor will be the discrepancy between the static values and attitudes of the great middle classes and the dynamic economic and objective world in which they may find themselves. The oversimplified interpretation of fascism as the last refuge of a capitalist class neglects the many important social psychological processes at work. The truth in the simple economic theory is that in economic depression the masses want social change, and a fascist movement receives support from entrenched interests as a counter-revolutionary movement. But the real dynamic in the fascist movement comes from the middle classes, the small businessmen, shopkeepers, white-collar workers, farmers, foremen, engineers, etc. Their psychology gives the best source of prediction for fascist tendencies.

This group feels most intensely the aspirations and ambitions of the American success story. Its members have a rigid temporal economic frame of reference. They expect to better themselves economically and socially as they grow older. They count on salary increases as they work themselves up in their concerns, or if independent operators, they count on building up their small businesses with the passage of the years. The white-collar employee thinks in terms of steady increments and steady savings. The small businessman thinks in terms of slowly building up his business as the years go by. Many of this group start payments on a home expecting to pay off their mortgages when they are middle-aged. The manual worker soon reaches the limit of his earning capacity. In fact, he can expect only a declining income as he grows older. Partly for

this reason, his psychology has a different time perspective. He is more likely to be happy-go-lucky, to regard each day as a new day. The typical middle-class member, however, has a definite time perspective, and this pegs his values and attitudes. The world in which he is secure is the world in which he improves his economic lot slowly as he goes along. He has an investment in the future, his life has been ordered to give rewards as he grows older. Anything that threatens his mortgage payments, his economic increments, threatens his old way of life.

Hence the members of the middle class are upset not only by actual economic depression but by an uncertain and changing economic structure. Uncertainty and change terrify them. All their values and attitudes are fixed in a conservative pattern in which the future repeats the present with minor modifications. Because of the stability of things they can make slow but steady progress. Their position does not remain fixed but the rules of the game do. They are in a slightly privileged position because of the rules. The one thing that differentiates them from workers is the assurance that life for them and their children becomes progressively easier with the passage of time. The homes they live in may not be necessarily so much better than workers' homes, but they own them and some day will have clear title to them. Life has a meaning for them since they have a good chance of getting somewhere, of improving themselves.

Hence the middle classes are the real supporters of authoritarian measures; they want law, order and stability *more* than they want the uncertainty that goes with progress.

It is not only depression itself which drives these people toward a fascist movement; it is also the contradictory and confusing policies of government. Our going off the gold standard upset these people more than it did other groups in society. They are the fundamentally insecure people in our society because they have such a small margin of security, and that small margin depends upon a dependable future unfolding according to plan. The real proletariat is so insecure all the time that it has adjusted somewhat better to insecurity; trade unions build reserve funds for hard times; the worker is often uncertain whether he will have a job next month. The wealthy have more margin and hence are not so timid.

The middle classes, therefore, will be very sensitive to any group which constitutes a threat to their need for stability. They bitterly resent the high wages paid to workers. The high wages may not always mean that the middle classes will be worse off absolutely, but all the surface indications of their slow rise in the social scale are threatened by workers able to match these surface indications by suddenly attained wealth. Hence their scorn for the silk shirts and luxuries attributed to the war worker. They will oppose minority groups of outsiders, such as the Jews, because these minority groups also undermine their social scale of values. What does their steady progress in life mean if it can be attained by other groups of lower social status?

Moreover, anything which is associated with change will be feared by these groups. Since the post-war period will be one of adjustment, of flux, of uncertainty, we can expect to find middle-class groups embracing potential fascist doctrines in many fields: neo-Thomism in education; old economic shibboleths in politics; anti-Semitism in social affairs; and nationalism in world affairs.

Another source of post-war fascism is the strong military hierarchy which will have the prestige and power of a victorious army. After the war this officer group will in part return to civilian life, but in part will still be needed by the huge navy and huge air force we will maintain. Whether they still stay in military life or whether they return to civilian pursuits, they will play a large rôle in the future of this country. In the first place, they will be a more numerous group of military chiefs than we have had since the Civil War. In the second place, they will enjoy all the prestige of victorious military heroes. In a country which has traditionally given its returning military leaders the highest positions of honor, of power, and of office, the returning military caste will have a disproportionate voice in the country's affairs.

The influence of this officer caste will of course not be pro-fascist in intention, but in its implications it may work, broadly speaking, in the fascist direction. For one thing, it will constitute a non-representative group of the population, a group selected originally on the basis of military values. It will comprise men committed to authoritarian beliefs, men from the more conservative or reactionary upper-income groups, men drawn largely from so-called old

American stock, men drawn from West Point and other military training institutions, where little emphasis is placed upon social science or upon the humanities. For another thing, this group will have been welded to a common way of thinking and of feeling by their authoritarian rôle in the conduct of the war. It is too often forgotten that Nazi values and doctrines are primarily militaristic in nature. This officer group returning from the war will feel that the solution of our troubles will lie in more vigorous measures of military action and control. Many of these men will have been thoroughly frustrated during the war by the inevitable inefficiency of a large democratic bureaucracy trying to conduct a totalitarian war. Their chief remedy for the problems they find in the post-war period, with all its uncertainties, will be an escape to the methods of an authoritarian military structure.

If we go through periods of severe depression, the returning soldiers themselves will be a prey for one hundred per cent nationalist groups which will play upon their nationalism and their sacrifices. This happened among the Arditi, ex-soldiers unable to settle down, in Italy in 1919-21, and in the returning soldiers of Germany, who turned eagerly to Ludendorff's and to Hitler's standards. This has indeed often happened here in the wake of war, as in the Klan-like behavior of many ex-soldiers in conflicts with organized labor after World War I, with the blessing of reactionary elements in the American Legion. Frustrated and confused, finding civilians "doing well" (from the soldier's standpoint) and in possession of most of the jobs that are visible to the naked eye, ready to be swayed by a vindictively biting, anti-labor press, and by many anti-labor community organizations, these returning soldiers may easily see things through the eyes of the "stable" elements in their communities. What the returning men will want, above all, is not a great venturesome world of change, but stability, to settle down and *live,* to be free of the fear that goes with the threat of change and fundamental progress. Moreover, as fighters, ready to use force, they may very likely be used (as the National Guard has often been used) to support local business as against local labor. And while *organized* labor is less than half our population, *labor* (exclusive of farm labor) is considerably over half of it; so that the systematic attitude of lining up against labor — a rather large component in the fascist attitude — will be easy to instill.

HALF-WAY MEASURES

A QUESTION; AND AN ANSWER BY
Sylvanus M. Duvall

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IN VIEW OF THE SCOPE and magnitude of all these threats to future peace, it seems fair to ask whether we are actually, genuinely, mobilizing for world peace at all; whether we really wholeheartedly *care*. To go further, one might wonder whether in our present planning of future peace, we are sufficiently concerned with those forces of conflict in individual living which have, psychologically, so much in common with group conflict.

In *The Way of All Flesh,* Samuel Butler tells how a bee, wandering in through the window on a summer afternoon, attacked the flowers which appeared there so appealingly on the wallpaper. Extracting no honey, it proceeded up to the next bunch. Failing again, it proceeded, like Robert Bruce's spider, from bunch to bunch, all the way to the ceiling; and finding this tier of bunches lacking in fragrance, came down to the floor again and worked up the next tier. Hope springs eternal; there still might be honey in the *next* bunch.

This, I think, is the spirit in which much of the post-war and peace-planning literature is being written. Many authors, taking note of the failures of 1919, seem to propose that we do over again what we then did. They propose that the old economic and political formulas relating to internationalism be sought again in the context of the post-war world now to come. The collaboration of the United Nations, the setting up of a central authority to integrate and partially control the separate sovereign states, the development of international machinery for many good causes, all this indeed is worth doing so far as the first educational phases of the work are concerned, yet failure in such matters has played a part in generating cynicism regarding the hope of world order. If peace is to be made at the end of the present war in terms of political and economic realities only, without regard to the flesh and blood of human feeling and attitude and desire, without a consideration of the

fundamentals of human motivation and conduct, we shall go through another period of disillusionment; we shall be like the bees following patiently from one paper bunch of flowers to another, instead of like those happy souls which fly out of the window to a more fullbodied reality. The bees who persist in following the wall-paper designs "know no better." It is possible that we "know" better, but that our desire for real world order is clogged with apathy.

So we put to Dr. Sylvanus M. Duvall of George Williams College, the question:

Does humanity whole-heartedly want to abolish war?

Dr. Duvall's Reply

Most of us Americans have tended naturally to assume that war is an evil to be abolished. Therefore we sometimes forget that others have regarded it quite otherwise. "Hang yourself, brave Crillon," cried Henry of Navarre, "we fought at Arques and you were not there." Vittorio Mussolini more recently expressed the same sentiment: "War is a sport — the most glorious sport in existence" (127). The sport is dangerous; as are auto racing and the steeplechase. But its devotees would no more seek to abolish it because of its perils and tragedies than we would for similar reasons wish to abolish automobile riding. This sport *motif* is by no means limited to ages past, or to the more depraved of our generation. The lure which war has historically held is still widespread even among those who abhor it. Who among us do not avidly read accounts of the present conflict? This almost universal exhilarating response should help us to understand those who go to the extreme of regarding the thrill of war as worth its costs. For these the problem of war is not to abolish it. It is, rather, the securing of a maximum of personal security while wallowing in its excitations.

Not all advocates of war have rooted their justifications in such animal satisfactions. Some, regarding such crassness with disdain, have emphasized rather the importance of war for biological and social needs. Some, having imbibed a few sips of Darwinism, began to say with Bernhardi (18): "War is a biological necessity of first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with." Others have avowed less heroic pur-

poses. They have sought, not to save "civilization" or the human race from decadence, but to achieve such specific objectives as the attainment of national independence, or unity, which our Revolutionary ancestors, or Bismarck, or the Unionists in 1861, regarded as important. Many supported Hitler during the earlier phases of his aggressions because they believed that only war could abolish the crazy quilt of rival nationalisms and restrictions upon the economic development of Europe. A few pacifists may decry war as evil under *all* circumstances. But most of us, even those who decry war most earnestly and sincerely, regard it as at present an unavoidable means of defending essential social and personal values. The vital function of war as a means of bringing about social results regarded as essential is a concept which most of those concerned with abolishing war have not really faced (cf. 141).

The tendency to see good in war has seldom, if ever, been part of a *mass* psychology. The masses of the people have few social purposes which war promotes. On the whole they have enjoyed few of its thrills. For them it has meant suffering, heartache and death. Not understanding wars, nor being in a position to prevent them, these masses have tended to regard wars as they did disastrous floods, droughts, famine, or plagues; as unavoidable evils to be endured with hopeless resignation. One might find shelter from some of the ravages of war, as from blizzard and cold. But the abolition of war was as inconceivable as the abolition of winter.

There have been exceptions; not everyone has regarded war as at least inevitable or essential if not good. Occasional Isaiahs have prophesied a coming reign of peace; usually achieved by divine intervention. A few pacifist groups, such as the early Christians, the Albigensians, Waldensians, and Quakers have renounced and denounced war as not merely an evil, but a sin. Particularly devastating conflicts — the Peloponnesian Wars, the wars which ended the Roman Republic, the barbarian and Norse invasions, the Crusades, the Napoleonic Wars and the first World War — might be followed by an especially strong revulsion. But on the whole until recently — certainly for a large proportion of the world of 1939 — the elimination of war was regarded either as undesirable (particularly in the Axis countries) or as a hopeless chimera.

Within recent years the English-speaking peoples have generally

become vitally concerned with the abolition of war. We feel so partly because, with the exception of obvious self-defense, we have so largely attained the social results which others depend upon war to secure. We have our national independence, and sufficient power to make it relatively secure. We have settled the issue of national unity. We have expanded our territories to about the limits of our aspirations. Further expansion seems best accomplished by economic penetration and control, rather than by military and political domination. This lack of pressure to wage war has had powerful support in certain major emphases of our Hebrew-Christian tradition. From this combination has resulted a strong humanitarian feeling which regards war with deep aversion. Finally, the total nature and terrific cost of modern war in both treasure and life have provided an increasing imperative for eliminating war. This point is becoming increasingly obvious, even to the most flippant and belligerent. As for us, even in the midst of our greatest national effort, we must concern ourselves, not merely with victory in war, but with the elimination of war itself.

Fallacious and Inadequate Approaches to Peace

Stung to active concern, the efforts of the Americans and British especially on behalf of peace have been comparatively prodigious. Never before have so much money, time and effort been devoted to the abolition of war. Never before have peace groups shown such sheer power to achieve specific results, such as the organization of the League of Nations to which every great power belonged except one, the passage of the Neutrality Act, the sharp curtailment of both American and British arms.

The tragedy of the peace movement has been, not its failures, but the futility of its victories. These in turn rest upon the fallacy and inadequacies of the past and current approaches to world peace, some of the more prominent of which are:

(1) *The Moral and Religious Approach, especially prominent among church groups.*[1] The basic assumption of this approach is

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[1] Research Bulletin no. 16 of the International Council of Religious Education (Chicago, 1939) contains a summary of nearly 300 pronouncements in the field of war and international relations made by affiliated religious groups between 1930 and 1939.

that wars are the result of sin. Therefore the only way to cure war is to persuade people to renounce their sins. Two corollary assumptions are involved; one regarding the spiritual capacities of man, and a second regarding method. Those responsible for war are capable of responding to moral and religious appeals, and verbal statements regarding the ethics of war are effective means, if made with sufficient clarity and vigor, to evoke such responses. Inadequate response calls for more frequency and effort.

The first task of those who hold to these assumptions is to convince people of the enormity of the spiritual losses of war. The first casualty is truth. Then follows the spiritual demoralization which must come when killing and destruction have become virtues in which we rejoice. Research projects are set up designed to show the ineradicable effects of a war situation upon growing children; always adverse. Statistics showing an increase of juvenile delinquency in wartime are pounced upon almost with glee, as more ammunition to shoot at the "warmongers." The second task is to awaken people to their own moral responsibilities; to say that Christians must choose between Christ and Mars is a method commonly used to achieve this result. Only as people renounce their sins and live righteously can war be abolished.

Since World War I the conception of the nature of the sins thus to be renounced has grown considerably. These sins include, not merely aggressive attacks upon others but indifference to, or exploitation of economic and social conditions which provoke others to wage war. Great stress is laid upon our collective responsibility. Not only Germany, but our country and our people share in the guilt for World War I. The iniquities of Versailles and its aftermath resulted in Nazism. If Hitler caused this war we (the Allies) caused Hitler (140). Those who want peace must first admit and repent of their own sins,[2] share the resources of the world with the "have-nots" and finally prove their own faith by disarmament.

In evaluating the moral and religious approach we are properly respectful, not only of the earnestness of its advocates, but of the vital truths which it embodies. Certainly social and economic pressures are prominent in international conflict, but these result in war

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[2] A communication sent to clergy members of an "anti-war" group immediately after Pearl Harbor made this as one of its major emphases.

only because possibilities for less destructive adjustments are deliberately rejected. Obviously there can be no peace until men exercise considerable restraint over vicious antisocial proclivities. The limitation of the approach lies, not in the facts emphasized, but in the failure to appreciate the social and personality complexities involved in moral behavior, which make restraint far more than a matter of the exercise of the "will." In consequence the programs suggested under this approach, even when adopted, have proved futile.

The ineffectiveness of pious generalities that war is "un-Christian" is obvious. But the confession of sins and a considerable sharing with the "have-nots" has proved even less effective. After the last war the British and Americans increasingly admitted and bewailed their share in the war guilt; far more readily than did the Germans. Through loans they and the French shared their wealth so generously that their former foes were able to "borrow" a billion dollars more than they paid in reparations, wipe out their own national debt and for years carry a tax burden lighter than that of the victors. The main result was to strengthen the German military and economic situation which enabled the Nazis, when they took over, to fight with resources supplied in part by their victims. The very power of the peace movement in Britain so weakened the British fleet that it dared not challenge fascist aggression in Italy, and thus paved the way for another world war.

Some will bitterly complain that these measures failed because they were "too little and too late." But the "too little" objection, regardless of its theoretical validity, involves such a combination of spartan virtues and sainthood as few can attain. It has been said that if only the British had been willing to give up their Empire, the Americans their economic advantages and standards of living, and others the security of their armaments, we should have had peace. Others might argue that we should have, instead, a Nazi-enslaved world punctuated by bitter warfare between contending factions of the dominant group to decide who would have what. But quite aside from this other possibility, no nation and few individuals can meet such demands. Granted that the concessions made to Germany came too late. Granted that privileged groups must give up much more than they have given up and that they will do so under pressure. But if peace depends upon

economic and territorial equalitarianism among the nations it is a hopeless chimera. Forced seizure will involve a shift in the beneficiaries and victims of exploitation which will result in no gain for either justice or peace. A solution which depends upon conditions which do not, and at present cannot exist, is no solution at all, but an escapist delusion.

The most conclusive evidence of the futility of these demands for sainthood might well be a greater awareness of our own short-comings. The inability of Christian leaders to eliminate "selfish denominationalism," over which they have some degree of control, should help them understand why it is so hard to overcome the "selfish nationalism" which they denounce. One peace leader complains that his friends "will join committees, go to and support meetings and make bitter and sarcastic remarks about 'warmongers,' but will not do serious intellectual work!" It is interesting to note that the collective sins of which we should repent are such conduct as selling oil to Japan, or appeasing the Franco régime, for which our religious leaders could have had no personal responsibility. The sins about which they could do something, such as maintaining a huge music budget in their churches but no comparable budget for peace education, and their complete failure to become familiar with the scientific and technical studies about war, are conspicuously not included.

The basic defect of the moral and religious approach, whether it appears as faith in the efficacy of verbal statements or in demands for spiritual miracles, is a naïve optimism regarding the concern of people for spiritual considerations. Whatever may be their sincerely avowed convictions, most people simply do not care whether a given economic or international policy is Christian or not, moral or immoral. Certainly they are quite incapable of such heroic renunciations as the more extreme advocates of international morality call upon them to make. A recognition of this fact has, in part, helped give rise to a second approach; namely, that

(2) *War Does Not Pay.* This approach minimizes and sometimes frankly abandons spiritual appeals and places the emphasis avowedly upon hardheaded self-interest, especially economic. As early as 1776 Adam Smith contended that "great fleets and armies . . . in time of peace produce nothing, and in time of war acquire

nothing which can compensate the expence of maintaining them" (162, bk. 2, ch. 3). Friendly trade is far more profitable. Therefore the American colonies should be allowed to secede (162, bk. 5, ch. 3). Economists who have looked to him as their source of inspiration have commonly followed him in their belief that war is economic folly. This thesis was elaborated, developed and popularized by Norman Angell in his *The Great Illusion* (8) (that war profits the victors). Following World War I, Will Irwin emphasized the same point in its negative aspects by attempting to show that modern war has become so devastatingly destructive that it can mean only complete disaster for all concerned (83).

Our first observation must be that a really widespread belief that another war would mean the end of civilization did not prevent the outbreak of World War II, or even ensure vigorous measures for its prevention. The supposition that most men are motivated to fight or not to fight, primarily by personal self-interest, is also a great illusion. Even a little reflection should serve to correct such a misconception. How rarely have those who have suffered the risks and losses of combat been motivated by the belief that war would pay them! It is said in reply that those who are really responsible for wars, and who force or persuade others to do the actual fighting are motivated primarily by the hope of economic advantage. Impressive studies are presented to show that those who profit from war — especially, but not exclusively, the munitions-makers — are the real culprits. But if those responsible for wars actually *do* make great profits, then war *does* pay and the thesis is unsound. If war does not pay them then they, also, are motivated primarily by considerations other than economic advantage.

Actually the appeal to economic self-interest has proved as ineffective in preventing war as the appeal to ideals, and for essentially the same reason. For although both altruistic and economic considerations play a prominent part in war and peace, the real causes for war lie far deeper in the forces of half-conscious or unconscious motivation. A partial and distorted recognition of this fact has resulted in a third approach which we may designate as

(3) *The "Debunking" Approach.* The assumption here is that whatever may be the basic economic or other reasons behind war, those who do the actual fighting are lured into it by its glamor.

Some of this is the thrill and excitement inevitably found in so colossal and dangerous an activity. Much is to be found in the false trappings with which the Devil of Death robeth himself like an Angel of Light. Trumpets, flags, and uniforms on parade; these are the sirens which lure so many millions to their doom. The greatest menace to mankind is the military band. If we would stop war we must strip these alluring garments off the daughter of Mars and reveal her to people for what she is, in all her filthy and ghastly nakedness. Debunk war; No Profit; No Glory; No Need. Cry Havoc.

This has been accomplished with a completeness which leaves little to be desired,[3] and with considerable results. Eyes which once saw the glory now see the gory. National honor and flag-waving patriotism as causes for war have become anachronisms. The sinking of the *Maine* caused a tidal wave of sentiment which engulfed a nation. The *Panay,* deliberately destroyed under much more bellicose circumstances, caused hardly a ripple. Repeated violations of the Russian border by Japan resulted in minor military campaigns, but no all-out war. It would hardly occur to anyone to go to war because the flag or the nation had been "insulted." With this fading glory has gone a self-righteousness which formerly prompted men to spring to arms. We have developed a combination historian and newshound. These, departing from the well-kept streets of conventional appearance have burrowed in the filthy alleys of intrigue. Plottings of merchants of death and their moneyed colleagues;[4] powerful vested interests controlling nations and, with their propaganda puppets, fomenting wars; what a smelly mess they dug up for all to see. But it did not prevent war. A knowledge of "all the dirt" may goad us from our complacency and prompt us to search further. But no nation and no civilization can

[3] Some examples are: Barber, Frederick A., *"Halt!" Cry the Dead,* 1935; Englebrecht, Helmuth, *Revolt Against War,* 1937; Nichols, Beverly, *Cry Havoc,* 1933; Shapiro, Harold, *What Every Young Man Should Know About War,* 1937; Thomas, Norman, *War; No Glory; No Profit; No Need,* 1935; Tomlinson, Henry M., *Mars His Idiot,* 1935.

[4] Some of the better-known of these exposés have been Brailsford, Henry M., *Property or Peace,* 1934; Butler, Smedley, *War is a Racket,* 1935; Englebrecht, Helmuth, and Hanighen, F. C., *Merchants of Death,* 1934; Seldes, George, *Iron, Blood and Profits,* 1934; Willison, George F., *Why Wars Are Declared,* 1935.

be saved by dirt alone. Recognizing this fact, many of those who have been most vigorous in their exposés have gone further to propose a negative program which consists essentially in the abolition of capitalism.

(4) *The "Abolish Capitalism" Approach.*[5] This approach rests upon a somewhat modified view of the position made classic by Rousseau, that man is naturally good, but has been corrupted by evil institutions. Abolish these institutions (the Church, tyrannical monarchy, capitalism, etc.) and the natural goodness of man will solve all problems. All the belligerent tendencies of mankind will become gentle Ferdinands, desiring only to smell the sweet flowers of peace forever.

Obviously wars will be integrally related to the specific cultures in which they occur and will center about the values of those cultures. The close connections between wars and capitalism during the past two centuries can hardly be denied. But since warfare is thousands of years old and capitalism hardly three hundred, most wars could not have been caused by this particular form of economic organization.

Proponents of this theory, faced with this fact, commonly fall back upon the broader and more defensible "economic interpretation" of war. In so doing they weaken their position at another point. The abolition of capitalism would not abolish economic activities. Even more serious, this economic interpretation fails to explain the very real warfare in families organized on essentially a communist, rather than a capitalist basis, nor the bitter combats among church groups organized on quite another basis. If the economic interpretation in its bald bare form is sound, why do national groups demand boundary lines which are economically suicidal? Why the almost universal conflicts and struggles for position and power which bear no essential relationship to economic advantage? The economic interpretation, then, displays a complete unawareness of the significance of a growing knowledge of frustrations, repressions and hostile attitudes growing out of basic ego needs which are as

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[5] A complete bibliography of this position would include almost all Marxist literature dealing with war, written before Hitler's attack upon Russia. A relatively recent sober, scholarly statement of this position is Ralph H. Gundlach's *The Psychological Bases for Permanent Peace* (72).

independent of any particular form of economic organization as are hunger and sex. Economic adjustments will contribute to peace to the extent to which, and only to the extent to which they give opportunity for basic personality needs to find satisfactory fulfillment.

(5) *The "World Government," "Union Now," Approach.* This approach differs from the preceding four in that it is not based upon a particular theology of human nature. It neither requires nor implies any radical transformation of people. It affirms only what centuries of experience have amply demonstrated: that well-organized and supported government can regulate existing human conflicts. Even with people as they now are, we can thereby secure not a perfect, but a reasonable degree of social stability and personal security. We may properly expect the regulation of government to be more effective with nations than with individuals. For individuals can often conceal their crimes, thereby weakening the effectiveness of law enforcement. Nations cannot.[6] Thus a major problem of government, the detection of crime, would hardly exist.

The basic problem which the advocates of "world government" have never really faced, however, centers about the matter of *honest support.* As regards Ethiopia, Spain and Czecho-Slovakia world government failed, not because the facts were unknown, but because it lacked honest support. No institution can of itself be more than a superstructure. Only as it represents and gives opportunity for the expression of wishes and aspirations will it be strong enough to meet really crucial tests. The League of Nations was unable to prevent World War II because the egos and personalities of the peoples of the world were not tied in with its authority. No matter how noble its purpose, sane its organization, and vital its function, an agency can succeed only to the extent to which it is rooted in the emotional responses of people. International law and order cannot be achieved through institutions until they have first been established in the motivations of men.

A second problem inescapably involved in "world government" is *safety for the liberties of the people.* No constitutional guarantees,

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[6] Minor and indirect attacks might, of course, be concealed for a time as the activities of private agencies. Yet who was really deceived by the "volunteers" from Italy and Germany who overthrew the government of Spain?

no written "bill of rights" can provide real protection against those who have seized the instrumentalities of propaganda and power. Always there has so far been some possibility of opposing tyranny. At least men could set one tyranny against another. But if there were one all-powerful world government, the only escape from its possible dictatorship would be world revolution resulting from total collapse. The fear of creating what might become inescapable tyranny is the basis for the only sound reluctance to establish world government. Organizational forms, no matter how democratic, written guarantees, no matter how iron-clad, can never be sufficient to assuage this suspicion or to justify its abandonment. As our political machines in America have amply demonstrated, even the most democratic forms can be controlled and perverted to unbridled corruption and unrestrained tyranny. Democracy and liberty can be secure under world government only when and as they have been built into the emotional attitudes and psychological drives of people.

The basic limitations of all these approaches lies in their superficiality. World organization is imperative; but the organization must be not only politically, but psychologically sound. The plain fact is that people act in international, as in other relationships, not on the basis of either spiritual values or personal self-interest, but as motivated by basic drives which in turn have been given direction by conditioning influences. The nature and sometimes even the existence of these impulses is rarely well-understood by those whose conduct they determine. Such desires are by no means always "selfish" or anti-social. On the contrary they often involve a high degree of social sensitivity and concern. But such ethical content lies primarily in what are still largely unofficial or uncodified personal motivations, not in the official ideals which people, however sincerely, profess. Really great religious leaders have always seen that "spirituality" lies in what people really want in their "innermost hearts," and that any truly effective program must center in the transformation of this, not in external moral codes, appeals to duty or ideals, however sincerely affirmed. The latter do not release the really dynamic recreative forces. Their lesser followers have usually missed this point.

We need not here enter into the controversy as to whether all the basic drives that lead to war or peace are inborn or a product

of the culture. Certainly in the forms which they assume and the directions which they take, they are malleable and fluid. The same urge for a feeling of personal significance which prompts one man to "heil Hitler" impels another to resist tyranny to the death. A sense of loyalty to values greater than the state may make one man a "traitor"; it may make another an internationalist vitally concerned for the liberties of all men. Within certain limits human nature is not only changeable, but is among the most changeable things which we experience.

This task of changing human nature is not, however, a matter for well-intentioned amateurs. Definite and sharply delimited behavior may be motivated, it is true, by a few tricks and devices learned with relative ease; direct and simple emotional appeals may persuade men to vote for this or that candidate, or to give a limited amount of support to the church or some similar institution. But the elimination of war is quite another matter. It involves, not a superficial arousal of emotions, but the intelligent redirection of the whole emotional pattern. Such a program calls for far more basic and extensive technical knowledge and skills than medicine or engineering. Warped racial and nationalistic attitudes involve far more complexities than do warped bodies. The one can no more be exhorted, denounced, debunked or willed into straightness than can the other. It is essential that would-be peacemakers really know the fundamental motivations with which they must deal, or at least work under the supervision and direction of those who do. Otherwise their efforts may prove not only futile but damaging.

For example, a campaign against anti-Semitism which merely refutes the usual calumnies made against the Jews may on the surface appear to be highly successful. But if it leaves untouched the frustrations, fears and resentments which gave rise to the condition in the first place, it may merely mean that instead of hating one minority group people now hate another. Only by really basic understanding can we avoid the deception of a "success" which has resulted only in the transfer of prejudice from one group to another. Likewise, leadership in "post-war planning" may serve mainly to help people to escape facing problems about which they could actually do something. And one of the most important things to do is to arrive at a much more adequate understanding of the psychological basis for international war.

No program yet tried has touched the basic psychological pressures which drag the peoples of all nations, disillusioned and reluctant, into wars which they do not want. And yet the real forces which drag them in are their own wants. It was in hope of satisfying these that people in the aggressor states gave their rulers irresponsible power to make war or peace. In the non-aggressor states a psychological wish-thinking made people insist that what they did not want to believe could not be true. It was this which prevented the taking of steps necessary to check aggression before it had gone too far. Similar attitudes prevented the effective functioning of the "world government" which had been established to prevent just such catastrophes. Until these attitudes are revised, they will inevitably vitiate any world governments which may be established in the future.

Wars, then, are far more than moral problems, institutions or social conditions. They are volcanic vents through which the fears, hatreds and insecurities of individual people are pressured into fervid resentments and explosive demands. An understanding of the dynamics of human behavior is not a substitute for noble ideals, economic and other institutional adjustments and sound social and political policies. But it is a pre-requisite and a foundation for them all. War is not a psychological problem *only*. But it is a psychological problem *basically*. I believe that only as psychological factors are recognized and understood, as their implications are incorporated into treaties and political and institutional adjustments, can we make significant progress in the elimination of war.

From the psychological viewpoint it is important not only to understand the surface vents — the volcanoes — but the almost universal *impulse to fight* lying at a deeper level. If we wish to abolish war, we must study the impulse to fight. We must directly face the question: *Is international conflict essentially the same as fighting among individuals and groups in ordinary living, so that a knowledge of one throws light upon the other, or is it so basically different that attempts at comparison became misleading?*

Upon this question there are two divergent points of view. Professor Malinowski holds to the second. War he defines as "an armed conflict between two independent political units, by means of organized military forces, in the pursuit of tribal or national policy"

(118). As such it is decidedly not the same as other types of fighting. "The chaotic brawls, the internecine fighting of the lowest savages, have nothing in common with the institution of war." Durbin and Bowlby, on the contrary, maintain that war is but "one species of a larger genus, the genus of fighting" (53). Their whole treatment assumes that all forms of human and animal combat furnish important insights into the motivations which impel men to international conflict. It is certainly true, as we shall later indicate more at length, that men and animals fight for a variety of divergent motives. But these lie with the individual, not with the type of combat. Thus the motivations of a modern soldier on a field of battle might have far more in common with those of a head-hunting savage than with those of his own comrade in arms. The designation of certain types of aerial combat as "dog-fights" is an often true, if accidental suggestion of relatedness to animal combat. It is difficult to study expressions of belligerency, including those which do not involve physical combat, without recognizing unmistakable similarities, not only in motives, but in techniques and strategies as well. We may go farther and say that the motives which impel men to fight are often, if not essentially, the same as those which impel them to other activities which do not involve fighting at all, but may, on the contrary, involve a high degree of peaceful co-operation. To suggest that fighting is not war because its objectives are heads instead of markets, or because the participants seek to demonstrate that they are super-dogs rather than *Herrenvolk,* is like saying that war is not war because fought with tanks, planes and guns instead of with swords, spears, bows and arrows. Our position, then, is that conflict in other aspects of life not only throws much light on international conflict, but constitutes the most fruitful and promising possibility for research.

Warfare in Human Society

To most thinkers and writers war has meant large-scale military combat; occasionally between groups, as in civil war or rebellion, but usually between nations. We search their writings in vain to find any real recognition of the relationship between the colossal and dramatic clash of arms and the ordinary conflicts which pervade every-day life. Likewise the ordinary person thinks of war in terms

of churning battleships, roaring tanks, and screaming bombs, and of men and women in factories and on farms who produce the means for war. Naturally, therefore, the programs of peace groups, while recognizing implications of economic conflict, have largely overlooked the less conspicuous types of warfare among men, and centered their efforts almost exclusively upon such matters as economic adjustments, treaties, political reorganization. This attempt to start with the upper stories of the building, rather than with the foundations, largely accounts for the futility of their efforts. Any peace movement which is effective must start with a recognition that war, bitter and ruthless, is common in normal human relationships, and that an understanding of war in simpler situations throws much light upon the causes and the cures for international conflict.

First, all the occasions of conflict between nations are present in personal relationships. "Have-not" individuals as well as "have-not" countries resent their situation, and with individuals as well as with nations, "have-not" may mean lack of status and prestige as well as of material resources. There are Hitlers in families as well as in government. The issue of a dictated *versus* a negotiated peace has long been crucial in family conflicts, politics and labor disputes. Aggressive attacks upon the territories of others is a normal phase of ordinary business competition. We do not assume that all, or even most competition is war. But whenever in any competitive struggle, whether for business, boy-friends, jobs, or election to the presidency of the Ladies' Auxiliary, people resort to every means within their power to get what they want (and this happens more frequently than most of us recognize), that is war; often vicious and ruthless.

Our failure to recognize warfare in ordinary human relationships is due partly to the fact that violence is seldom used. But this does not mean that it is any the less war. No effective military machine uses weapons or methods which it knows will result in defeat. So it is with private warfare. Certain criminal classes who believe that they can avoid detection, or who are protected by political connections, may use direct physical assault. For most citizens their own lack of skills, plus the power of government and of public opinion, make violence too dangerous. Therefore they resort to such

weapons and methods as they know will prove more effective.

For example, two junior officials both aspired to a promotion which only one could get. Had each merely done his best at his own job, trusting to intrinsic merit to win, it would have been competition, not war. They were not so content, but fought each other ruthlessly, with everything they had. Sound strategy eliminated physical violence or even verbal assaults as suicidal, and impelled each to appear unusually cordial toward the other. But within the range of effective possibilities no holds were barred. In this struggle they were wholeheartedly joined by their wives, who engineered the final and decisive battle. One wife was streamlined and svelte. She played golf with the boss and allowed him to beat her and to give her pointers. The other was a superb cook. She invited the boss and his wife to dinner. During the evening she praised the stunning beauty of her opponent to the boss's wife, and suggested subtly how attractive older men found her. The fact that the weapons used were beauty, charm and flattery *versus* chicken, biscuits and the seeds of suspicion, rather than guns and grenades, did not make it any less war.

Similar in nature was the struggle between two actresses for a certain rôle in a new play. Here again, sound strategy precluded hair-pulling and eye-scratching-out. Instead, on the night when the backers of the new show were out in force, one actress left a filled glass of water balanced precariously on the arm of a chair, just before the main scene of her opponent. The effect upon the attention of the audience was deadly.

In these last instances the basis for the warfare is relatively easy to recognize. The two men knew that they were fighting, and for the spoils of war. Their wives knew also what they were doing and why. The actress understood what she wanted and what she did. If all warfare were, as in these instances, essentially a more ruthless form of the competitive struggle, the problem of solving it, while enormously difficult, would still be relatively simple. Much, if not most warfare, however, is not of this nature. Its roots lie deep in the unconscious motivations of people; in basic insecurities, fears, hostilities and resentments of which the individual himself is only vaguely aware. Recent studies in such fields as psychiatry and child-development have uncovered labyrinths of

imperatively active hostilities, previously unrecognized partly because they did not take violent forms and partly because they remained largely concealed from those who cherished them.

Many who fight most viciously do not know what they are fighting for, whom, or what they are fighting against, and in some instances, even that they are fighting. For example, how many of those who spread malicious or even belittling gossip recognize their conduct as a type of warfare? Much delinquency is really a form of war. The child who humiliates his parents by public misbehavior may really be striking back at them because they no longer give him the attention which he enjoyed before baby sister arrived. A relapse into bed-wetting, baby talk, or excessive fears may likewise be weapons of warfare; often used with great skill and effectiveness. Much undesirable parental behavior, likewise, expresses serious hostilities toward their children; resentments often carefully concealed. That mother who is always hovering over her child may be trying to dominate him as compensation for his rejection of her. Similar warfare is to be found in the efforts of some parents permanently to prevent the marriage of their children. The basic motive for this may be exploitation, the desire to retain the attention and support of the child, or it may be a way to injure the other parent; in either case, shameless warfare is often waged. In other ages or countries parents could often secure their ends merely by forbidding the marriage. In our culture they usually must employ other means. They may seek to drive off friends who might become matrimonial prospects. The strategy of "getting sick" and "needing" the children "just a little while longer" every time matrimony threatens is fairly common. In extreme instances, parents may even damage the reputation of their children.

Children of the same family compete with each other for family resources, favors and parental attention as they do not with other children. Therefore it is not surprising that warfare among them is so acute. In early years this often breaks out in actual physical combat. Later it is more likely to take the form of teasing, disparaging remarks and vigorous verbal clashes. The warfare between the sexes is clearly evidenced, not only in disparaging remarks (about the male ego or about women as drivers) but in the

multitude of restrictions which men and women seek to place upon each other. Vocational restrictions, and demands for support, are among the more obvious expressions of this conflict. This warfare naturally tends to be most acute among those with whom contact is most intimate and prolonged. Husbands insist that "woman's place is in the home" and wives in resentment make excessive demands upon their husbands, nag, complain, and otherwise seek to undermine their self-confidence. With adults as with children, delinquent behavior, such as adultery, may actually be primarily a weapon of war; especially in those cases in which the guilty party takes great care to be detected.

These statements do not aim, of course, to present a balanced picture of family life. Within most families there is much love and affection as well as hostilities and conflict. Parents and children support and help each other. It is important to recognize, however, that intermingled with even the most loving and beautiful relationships are deep-rooted and powerful hostilities which frequently break out in bitter and ruthless war.

A sound understanding of the prevalence, nature and bases of war in these simpler situations contributes immeasurably to an understanding of war among nations. It contributes first of all to sound interpretation. Our very recognition of the economic factors in international strife has sometimes made it more difficult to see the more basic unconscious motivations which impel and compel men to fight, often against their own economic self-interest. We noted also the superficiality of the "deceived by propaganda" explanation, since in vital matters people can be deceived only by appeals which are in harmony with their own unconscious wishes.

Since programs depend largely upon interpretation, a recognition that international strife is merely human strife on a more disastrous scale seems essential to any effective peace program. Those who see no deeper than "justice" or "economic and social conditions" will inevitably center their efforts around institutional adjustments, usually political and economic. Even if successful they will almost certainly do the wrong thing, not because institutional changes are unnecessary, but because *only a knowledge of the psychological needs of people makes it possible to know what institutional changes need to be made.* If any treaty, reallocation of economic resources,

or other institutional change is to make for peace, it must be based
upon a real knowledge of the hopes, aspirations, mores, fears, in-
hibitions, dreads, points of humiliation and satisfaction of those
affected by it.

We must understand conflict in simpler situations, not only to
know what to do, but how to do it. Until we can recognize and
gain experience in handling successfully war situations in our own
homes, communities, colleges, churches, offices and other more in-
timate relationships, we shall hardly be able to act with full effec-
tiveness in more complex international situations.

LEADERSHIP

Success in any movement is dependent more upon personnel
than upon program. As no army would expect success in battle with-
out trained officers, so no peace movement can expect success without
technically trained and experienced leadership. In addition to the ex-
tensive program of research so far-sightedly suggested by Glover
(56), we must also establish training centers where such knowledge
as we now have can be taught. The first essential for an effective
program is the establishment of "West Points" for peace leadership.

Finally, the insights resulting from a knowledge of simpler situa-
tions are essential in order that peace advocates can understand
their own motivations. Almost all who seek human betterment are
motivated in part by ulterior considerations. These are legitimate
and should cause no sense of shame. But unless recognized and
identified they may interfere seriously with the individual's effec-
tiveness in a cause which he sincerely desires to promote. Peace
leaders, like others, are hampered in their effectiveness by their
own unconscious wishes. These make it difficult both to see what
needs to be done and to act effectively upon the basis of existing
knowledge. The ability the better to articulate ulterior concerns
with social interests would be the first, and perhaps the most im-
portant result of an understanding of the psychological bases for
human conflict.[7]

[7] For bibliography cf. nos. 11, 28, 34, 53, 56, 57, 67, 72, 83, 127, 135, 140,
152, 158, 170, 173, 179, 186.

RELAPSE INTO OLD HABITS

A QUESTION; AND AN ANSWER BY

R. N. Sanford

14

AFTER WORLD WAR I, we moved away from the world. The world had not taken over the political ideals which we wanted to spread, and we tended to regret that we had stepped in. Maybe history will repeat itself. We may unlearn the zeal for internationalism. In one word, our great danger may be in *apathy*. In the preceding chapter Dr. Duvall has shown how fond we are of "going through motions," how hard it is to get beyond well-meaning ceremonials. Even if we can conclude that a large enough proportion of people deeply want to avoid war, old habits of apathy or laissez-faire passivity toward the issues that create war may prevent a stable peace.

So in view of his close study of the psychology of our American public after World War I, I asked Dr. R. N. Sanford of the University of California:

> When peace is achieved, shall we not again lapse back into the same old mixture of guilt, apathy, and regret, which followed World War I?

Dr. Sanford's Reply

If a man should answer this question with an unqualified "yes" he could be suspected of wanting it to be so. It tends to arouse either pessimistic foreboding or optimistic expectation, and of these two emotional attitudes, pessimism is the more dangerous, for the pessimist can derive satisfaction from failure, may unconsciously work to bring it about. Striving to avoid both overoptimism and pessimism, one might rephrase our question: "What are the forces we shall have to overcome in order to prevent our 'again lapsing back . . . '?"

It should be clear that the forces with which we shall have to contend are not, in the main, forces which are ordinarily looked

upon as psychological. When we ask, "Will America become isolationist, or will she be able to co-operate with other nations to prevent aggression?" numerous more specific political and economic questions leap to mind: "Will we support popular or reactionary groups in Europe? Will we launch upon an imperialism of our own? Will anti-British sentiment increase or decrease? What about sentiment toward Russia? Will fascism, or reactionism, triumph at home?" In seeking answers to these questions, we find ourselves thinking first not in psychological but in ideological terms: "Will the trend be toward nationalism, imperialism, collectivism or pacifism? If we are not to become isolationist, will our internationalism be that of Wallace, that of Luce, or that of Hull?"

Yet all of these problems have a psychological aspect, and in some instances psychological factors seem to play the determining rôle. Phenomena like nationalism or an anti-British attitude depend very largely upon economic motives; it should be equally plain that these sentiments depend also upon such factors as an inclination to take the side of the underdog or a determination not to be "played for a sucker." Motives such as these do not always serve economic self-interest, but may even work against it. According to a common mode of interpretation, anti-British activities would be initiated by a group who stood to gain economically thereby, and then "the people" would be brought into line by shrewd appeals to various dependable sentiments. If this view is correct — and it may be, in large part — then one would say that the outcome still depends on what sentiments exist in such a state of readiness that they can be appealed to. It were better, however, if the psychologist did not consider "the powers" so calculating and shrewd, nor the people so stupid, but viewed both as products of their culture — a culture which emphasizes economic gain but gives place to many other motives. To understand the forces which make for isolationism, or other kinds of unwise attitudes in international affairs, it is necessary to examine the American tradition in its moral and psychological as well as in its economic aspects.

The question before us clearly invites our attention to purely psychological matters — guilt, apathy, regret. It leads us to recall that in 1917 a nation with a tradition against war judged it necessary for its own preservation to enter one. Intentional aggression

had been so long and so successfully inhibited (except in the brief war with Spain) that its use could now be justified only by believing that it was in the name of the highest ideals. When these ideals proved impossible of fulfillment, or too extravagantly conceived in the first place, there was left a heavy burden of guilt for having been aggressive — as it seemed — to no purpose. Attempts to dispel these guilt feelings generated two different but related attitudes, both of which became extremely widespread and worked to prevent collaboration for peace; on the one hand, moral disarmament, and on the other, moral isolationism. Under the sway of the first attitude, people asked: "How can we hope to reform the world when *we* are so bad ourselves?" Under the sway of the second, they asked: "How can we hope to reform the world when *they* are hopeless?" In the first instance a sense of moral superiority was replaced by self-depreciation, debunking, and cries for total disarmament. In the second instance moral superiority was preserved — even enhanced — by putting all the evil outside — "never again will we meddle in Europe's mess."

To say that these attitudes will again express themselves in the same way and with the same intensity is to suppose not only that the world situation will be about the same as before, but also that the fundamentals of American character have not essentially changed. Neither of these assumptions can be maintained. To indicate the magnitude of the difference between the present alignment of economic and political forces and those of 1918, one has only to recall that on the latter date the Russian revolution was far from being considered in America a *fait accompli*. To say that Americans will repeat the same pattern of mistakes for the same emotional and sentimental reasons as before is to say that our knowledge of world affairs has not increased since 1918 — which is patently not so — and to say that American writers, historians, educators and ministers are incapable of self-awareness and have learned nothing from experience — a belief which has all the earmarks of the pessimism we have decried.

But that irrational psychological trends will again constitute a grave danger to America's effective collaboration for peace there can be little doubt. If, instead of taking as our point of departure the trend of 1918-1929, we examine the situation in America at the

time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, we can see more clearly the forces to be taken into account. The forces in motion at that time, expressing themselves in various forms of interventionism and isolationism, are still in motion, though often below the surface. With the end of the war they will reappear with increased intensity: nationalism, pacifism, collectivism; Hull internationalism, Luce internationalism, Wallace internationalism; idealism, reformism, realism, positivism. In all these overlapping ideas can be found, in addition to their rational aspects, emotional trends expressive of something in American character.

The concept of "American character" is, of course, somewhat dubious; the nation is divided into economic, social, political, religious, and regional groups, which often differ among themselves as much as one of them differs from a similar group in another nation. Yet when America is viewed from a distance, as from Europe, or over a long period, say the past one hundred and fifty years, there emerge certain currents of thought and opinion which are repeatedly and vividly exemplified in the majority of the people and which color to some extent the thinking of almost all.

Without excluding other trends, one may suggest that "virtuous materialism" is one of the main features of the American tradition. This phenomenon, first observed and analyzed by de Tocqueville (48) a hundred years ago, seems to have gained the dominance that this insightful Frenchman foresaw. To grasp the fundamental importance of virtuous materialism in America one may note, on the one hand, the enormous value that we place upon material well-being, and on the other hand the firm allegiance which we pay to something vaguely conceived as Christianity — and then see how the two are fused.

What impresses the European observer today, for instance, de Sales (47), is our great love of physical comfort and our almost miraculous production of the means for its enjoyment. To a more or less detached observer it appears that one of the main preoccupations of Americans is to go on raising the standard of living, the highest in the world, and to have fun. Post-war planning, individual and collective, tends to center around technological advance: plastics, television, housing, an autogiro in every garage — and this in spite of Archibald MacLeish (117), spokesman for a sterner brand of Christianity.

But MacLeish hits a sore spot; we do need to justify our materialism. As much as we want to be comfortable we want to be good. Most of us were brought up in Christian families and the values there implanted have stayed with us better than seems commonly realized. For this reason most Americans have to deal with the problem of enjoying the pleasures and comforts of life without offending Christian conscience.

Virtuous materialism provides an answer to this problem. According to this pattern, sex and aggression are repressed or sharply restricted, and satisfaction is had from activities that are allowed. We keep our children out of trouble by showing them a good time; instead of having two mistresses we have two cars. From here it is but a step to the view that it is not only allowed but downright virtuous to make money, to save, to go up in the world, to reshingle the roof and get another car. If this approach is challenged, or if it sometimes seems wrong to be so materialistic, then comfort is found in the group conscience. If everybody does it, it is right; everybody *should* do it, so that we might have less guilt feelings.

THE BLINDNESS OF AMERICAN ETHNOCENTRISM

This is the basis of what we may call American ethnocentrism — the "American Way." It is the pattern which underlies and gives strength to our ideological patterns of conservatism, reactionism and imperialism. Psychologically, the crucial fact is that these ideologies have *conscience* to support them. Left-wing writers, and even some social scientists, often seem to think of our businessmen, large and small, as people motivated solely by selfish drives of the narrowest sort. Obviously, it is possible to abstract the economic aims of different groups and to deal with them as variable forces; this the economist, with good reason, has tried to do. But for the psychologist to equate these economic abstractions regarding *group functions and goals* with *selfish motives in the individual*, sacrifices his reason for existing, committing the gravest error of interpretation.

It is not blind self-interest but group conscience, based on a most time-tempered American tradition, that makes it impossible for the little businessman to see that it is not to his "class interests" to side with big business against labor. And anyone who has tried to

organize white-collar workers has been amazed and frustrated by their stubborn insistence on putting what they conceive to be respectability ahead of economic advancement and security. Finally, it is not the absence of conscience but the presence of an unusually strong and rigid one that enables the reactionary so aggressively to oppose forces from outside or from below. Most of the truly enormous aggressions of the Christian Era, from the Spanish Inquisition to the massacres of the Warsaw ghetto have been done in the name of Group Conscience. A man does not kill his own brother unless it be with his father's consent.

This ethnocentrism is the source of the most widespread and deeply ingrained American isolationism. How can you move a man who is enjoying full satisfaction and has no guilt feelings? The fact is, he was not moved in 1941 until he had to be; and there can be no denying that he will revert to his old pattern as quickly and for as long as he can. A normal man engrossed in something satisfying, puts off recognizing an unpleasant reality as long as he can, but when the reality is finally recognized he acts upon it in a realistic way, as those mid-western isolationists did in 1941. These people want to be isolationists. It is no use telling them they *should* not be; the thing is to convince them that they *cannot* be.

And when the ethnocentric American finds that he cannot be isolationist, he becomes internationalist in a characteristic way. Naturally American conservatives tend to support the *status quo,* to stand for the re-establishment of "law and order" in Europe. This much is true of conservatives everywhere. But American ethnocentrism has a distinctive quality of its own; when it becomes internationalist it carries with it a missionary spirit. From this point of view the aim is to Americanize the world. Here is a pattern that is believed in as right; if we cannot be left alone to enjoy life according to this pattern, we will get the world to accept it and life will go on as before.

It should be emphasized that this brand of ethnocentrism is distinctly different from German Fascism or Japanese nationalism. Whereas American ethnocentrism states that people by and large can become like us and that we will accept them when they do, the latter ideologies state that other peoples cannot take over the pattern of the in-group because they are inferior or basically different,

and hence it is proper to dominate them. The difference is funda-
mental; those who have argued that one imperialism is as bad as
another are showing that failure of moral judgment which has
proved the gravest threat to Western civilization. True, there is an
American fascism, of which more later, and an American exploitive
imperialism; but imperialism in its pure form is not in the American
conscience, and *by itself* it can hardly become a potent force.

It has been a common interpretation that the imperialist — British
or American — rationalizes his economic motives by speaking of his
missionary intent. But if his real motives are purely economic he
must rationalize them publicly, and the American conscience being
what it is, such rationalizations must take in some degree the form
of benevolence and "freedom." We were brutal enough to the
Filipino rebels fifty years ago; but in a few years they were being
slowly won to the acceptance of American ways. Since over a
period of time the only way to keep up the appearance of benev-
olence is by being benevolent in some degree, the total effect is
something different from, say, that of Japanese imperialism. But
enough of this myth of the "economic man." A psychologically
richer and truer conception would picture the typical American im-
perialist not as a clever disguiser of sinister motives but as an
ordinary American businessman who is extending his territory and
making another more or less honest dollar. And, American business-
man that he is, he feels that he is selling not merely goods, but the
good life; what he wants is not to exploit somebody but to gain
another satisfied customer with whom — anywhere in the world —
he can play baseball in the twilight and gin rummy in the evening.

This is the fellow who after the last World War came in for the
most severe debunking. One might hope that it does not happen
again, for — and this is the nearest I shall come to making a
prediction — if America becomes internationalist at all, the main
impetus will be provided by the benevolent imperialists. Interna-
tionalism will be carried farther by the prospect of making a dollar
plus selling a way of life than by benevolence alone. The idea of
pure benevolence has the very great disadvantage of being in oppo-
sition to one of the deepest American anxieties; that is, that we may
be played for suckers. Moreover, much of our pure benevolence will
not go far under its own steam after the war is over; it was conjured

up by people who could think of no more potent reason why we should fight to survive the Nazi tyranny, and once the necessity for fighting is removed, this benevolence will easily turn into disillusionment.

If we assume, in the light of experience, that any kind of internationalism is better than none at all, it would seem the better part of wisdom for American liberals to try to see — and to develop and enlarge — the good in an expanding American rôle in world commerce — "American imperialism." To this end it may be wise to remember that the world seems to want many of the aspects of American imperialism. It seems safe to predict that the nations of the world will want to do business with us after the war and not be merely the embarrassed recipients of largess. Moreover, it would not be surprising if Russia and China came in time to imitate our virtuous materialism. Our materialism at least; perhaps they can protect themselves against our morality. But if a little rubs off on them no great harm will be done. And if our carpet-baggers, in their journeys about the world, cannot get everybody to wash properly, they may discover in time that a little dirt never hurt anybody.

The danger in American ethnocentrism is the danger in ethnocentrism everywhere: it is too narrow; it is not sufficiently tolerant of cultural diversity; it exists at the expense of important personality needs which are repressed. When these unconscious needs are disturbed and threaten to become conscious, anxiety is produced; this leads to a counteractive narrowing of the field of the consciously acceptable, the "me," and a projection of the "evil" forces onto others. Thus to understand American ethnocentrism and to cope with it in our post-war years, we must know not only its articulate aims and values, but also the inhibited needs, the deeper sources of anxiety.

Some indications of dangers below the surface were obtained from a study of anti-Semitism (156). It was found that in a college population anti-Semitism was associated with anti-Labor, anti-Communist Party, anti-race equality, with pro-American Legion, pro-Father Coughlin sentiments generally, and with higher family incomes, fraternity (sorority) and church membership, and absence of ideological conflict with parents. In other words, anti-Semitism

was associated with a particularly narrow brand of American ethnocentrism. The intensive study of individual cases showed that a variety of primitive needs was projected onto Jews. In the typical anti-Semitic woman there was a surface picture of untroubled conventionality and social ambition, with underlying hostility toward men, and preoccupation with the darkly sexual. In anti-Semitic men, there was outward masculine aggressiveness and striving, with underlying weakness and submissiveness. This is the kind of pattern which in a larger social context may give rise to a belligerent insistence on "sovereignty," a determination not to have anything put over on us by the clever British or sophisticated South Americans, and in some cases a secret admiration for the strong Germans.

American ethnocentrism is sometimes fascistic and there is danger of a wholesale trend toward Fascism. But there is a very broad gap between American fascism and the main current of American ethnocentrism. The distinction involves both quantitative and qualitative considerations. The major American pattern is a product of much interaction of diverse cultures, and consequently of acculturation; and, as in all acculturation, it has been necessary to prohibit the expression of certain primitive drives and to insist upon the value of what is allowed. From a quantitative viewpoint, one has to inquire, first, how strong, how active, how primitive and unmodified, and how near the surface, the prohibited drives are; second, how narrow and rigid the pattern of positive values is; and how much aggression is mobilized in its support. On this basis one can define a difference between Lindbergh and Luce, or, for that matter between Goebbels and Lindbergh. A qualitative distinction can be seen in the fact that, so far, American fascism is rather strictly crackpot while ordinary American conservatism is not. Socially, this is a matter of the intensity of economic conflicts, but psychologically it is a matter of the mechanisms employed for defense against anxiety. Whereas the conservative uses more or less rational arguments and points to the virtues which he obviously possesses, the true fascist prefers projection to reason, paranoia to the admission of his own weaknesses (45). Thus an argument could be made for the view that what has so far saved us from fascism has been not so much our fortunate economic circumstances as the fact that we have had over one hundred and fifty years of education in a democracy.

This is not to say that American ethnocentrism cannot be turned into fascism. War and economic depression, circumstances that tend to release more vital forces from below, lead naturally to a tightening of the barriers. And whenever the pattern comes under direct attack by those who would suddenly "release the creative forces" in our society, reaction is encountered. Fortunately hardly anyone nowadays, outside of the enemy camp, wants to destroy American capitalism anytime soon, but anyone who has understood the supporting ethnocentric ideology knows that it must be matured, broadened, tempered, and that these processes cannot proceed very rapidly.

Pacifism Can Blind Us, Too

But by no means have all Americans fallen in with the "American Way." Pacifism is another strong historical trend in America, as in other countries where Christianity has been traditional. I believe that of the two attitudes, nationalism and pacifism, the latter has posed the graver threat to Western civilization. The surrender at Munich, the abject defeatism of Pétain, the "cutting off the nose" activities of Gandhi in relation to the threat from Japan seem to me to have brought us nearer to defeat than did any vigorous nationalism in the Allied camp. And in America, it was pacifism that made it necessary for us to wait to be attacked.

Some evidence of the operation of the pacifist spirit in America was obtained from a study of optimistic and pessimistic attitudes toward the war and the peace (45). In predicting the future after the war, college students varied widely, from gloomy forebodings concerning various aspects of national and international affairs to an apparent belief that we are on the threshold of a new era of human brotherhood. What seemed to make the most difference was the fact of religious interest or affiliation. Church members were markedly more pessimistic about the future than were non-members. Since there was no reason to believe that the religious students were more realistic or better informed, some explanation in dynamic terms was called for. The hypothesis suggested itself that the church-minded students were exaggerating the amount of evil in the world and using one or the other of two devices for coming to terms with it. One device was to maintain a sense of self-

righteousness by projecting the evil onto the world: I am good and will be saved, but the world is bad and will land in perdition. This would seem to be the source of a particularly narrow brand of that moral isolation discussed above. The other device was to say we are *all* bad and deserve only the worst from fate. Expressions of the latter attitude could frequently be heard before the war: "If the Treaty of Versailles had not been so unfair to them, the Nazis would not have attacked — who are we to pass judgment upon them? . . . let us first remove the beam in our own eye." This argument has, to be sure, a certain validity. The present aim is not to denounce all criticism of the Treaty of Versailles nor to hamper those who would make a just peace after this war; the aim, rather, is to expose that moral sickness that made it impossible for many people to distinguish between the evils of Fascism and the evils of our own statesmen who, with good intentions, still could not make a peace that would end war.

When peace is achieved, similar expressions may be expected to increase in pitch and volume. And unless this attitude is understood and modified, it will once again hamper our effective collaboration for peace. For one thing, it seems not unlikely that in order to prevent outbreaks of aggression in the future the use of force will be necessary. In such a case the pacifist, perhaps after winning to his side many who are merely lazy, will stand in the way, killing the criminal with kindness, while undermining the moral position of the police. More especially, pacifism will work to separate us from our Allies. It can be mobilized against Russia, whose real solutions for real problems do not always appear exactly delicate, against China, whose rising and expanding nationalism may express itself with a vigor that looks like aggressiveness, and most of all it will operate, as it does now, to weaken Britain's position. Without attempting to whitewash British imperialism, one may point to the remarkable fact that Britain, whose name has long been associated all over the world with "justice through law," is singled out for moral condemnation by pacifist groups. This does not arise from a conception of the British as ruthless colonizers, but for an opposite reason. If the British were indeed brutal aggressors, pacifists would find ways to condone their behavior. The true source of the anti-British attitude lies in the fact that in pacifist eyes, the British are

much like ourselves, members of the family. Their behavior should be morally perfect.

Though the evidence seems to show that pacifism is a product of Christian teaching, and is still linked up with the Church, it must not be concluded that all pacifists are people with firmly established moral standards. A distinction should be drawn between pacifists of strong and of weak character. A man of the first type is unable to defend himself because he fears his conscience more than any external enemy. But conscience is well integrated within the total personality, and makes other demands upon the individual; not only that he refrain from aggression but that he live according to other Christian ideals, chiefly those of humanity and brotherhood. This he does, with the result that he accomplishes much that is necessary for the preservation of democracy. But he has an overdose of conscience. (It is here assumed that the highest morality allows expression of all personality needs, restricting only the conditions of manifestation — the time, the place, the manner and the object.) It is unfortunate that his moral strength cannot be made to serve democracy at times when it is in the gravest danger, and when only the smallest compromise with principle is necessary. Such compromises are, of course, sometimes made, for this type of pacifism exists in different degrees in different individuals. Some can justify fighting when the enemy is made to appear sufficiently low, others when the positive ideals are sufficiently high (45). But both of these circumstances get away from reality; and when the fighting is over, there is in the first instance guilt, and in the second, disillusionment.

Since pacifism of this type is largely a product of religious teaching, one might hope that churchmen will find it in their hearts to help modify it. The Scriptures offer considerable latitude of interpretation, and these have always varied according to changing social conditions. Let us have less emphasis upon personal salvation and more emphasis upon the brotherhood of man.

In the pacifist of weak character — the "passive character" — we often find the same kinds of explicit ideals, but there is a lack of moral courage to back them up. The passive character often seems to pity the weak, but actually does not so much pity them as identify himself with them. He asks, for the weak, the things that he

wants but is afraid to ask for. He can do nothing to protect the weak from the strong; often being unable to defend his friends, he makes friends with the friends' enemy. This is not because he sees good in the enemy; it is because self-sacrifice is the only means he has for dealing with aggression from without.

It is not by accident that fascists and pacifists of this second type may sometimes consort together. It is not entirely because both can be "used" by powerful economic groups. There seems to be some psychological affinity between them, something that calls up imagery of the bullied and the bully, the "Black Lamb and the Grey Falcon" (177) — as if both conceived of life as an uneven struggle between the strong and the weak, a recurring tragedy in which someone is humiliated, assaulted, or mutilated; and given only the two alternatives the fascist takes the side of the victor, the passive character that of the victim.

When we look for sources of pacifist ideology in the personality of the individual, several patterns of development can be found. In the case of the pacifist of strong character, the picture is fairly clear: it is based upon identification with a parent against whom there was a good measure of hostility. Aggression against the parent is turned against the self, and the open attiude toward the parent becomes one of devotion. It is the need to keep aggression from becoming conscious that creates the rigidity of conscience, its failure to adapt to reality, its insistence upon absolute non-violence when the outward situation calls for some aggression.

How the passive character develops is a more complex problem, one that requires much study. A boy may fail to achieve a satisfactory identification with his father, either because the father is too strong or because he is too weak. In either case the mother becomes the central figure, being both exemplar and object of love. That the subject fails to identify with the father does not mean that aggression is thereby left out; indeed, it is the necessity for inhibiting aggression that contributes most to preventing the father identification. The underlying aggression remains, to make passivity necessary, and to give rise to various kinds of self-destructive and self-defeating forces in the personality — cynicism, doubt, hopeless idealism, destructive pessimism. Whether or not this basic pattern comes to express itself in pacifistic ideology would seem to depend upon

how much the mother has insisted upon Christian teachings and upon the degree to which economic and social problems have been brought to the subject's attention. The same basic pattern may express itself in delinquency, in irresponsible romanticism and in creative productivity.

Whereas passivity seems to become initiated as a means of defense against one's aggression, it comes in time to be highly rewarding in itself. The greatest benefit seems to be that it frees the individual from guilt feelings and permits him to enjoy life on an emotionally immature level. The passive character is able in one moment to predict the triumph of evil and the downfall of civilization and in the next to throw himself with abandon into having a good time — in a harmless way. It should be emphasized that such individuals, though they contribute nothing to the *preservation* of democratic society, actually do a great deal to *enrich* it. They help to broaden the conservative ethnocentrism discussed above; and though they yield to fascists, they stand as cultural products in opposition to the fascist personality. The passive character is afraid that he will grow up to be a strong aggressive man, just as the most bitter and impatient criticism of the passive character will come from men who are afraid of their own weaknesses.

But clinical studies of individual pacifists cannot tell us what we now want most to know; that is, *how the pacifist spirit may come to dominate a nation.* To approach this problem one needs concepts that permit him to go from history and sociology to the individual personality — and then back again. Two orienting notions that may be helpful are (1) that pacifism is not a unitary personality response but rather a personality pattern or syndrome and (2) that the family must be in the focus of attention as carrier of culture and determiner of personality. Pacifism, like ethnocentrism, is not a category according to which individuals may be classified; it is, rather, a pattern of dynamically related factors which exists, along with other patterns, in individuals; it may vary with respect to the strength of the component factors and with respect to the degree of their coherence, but it is usually subject to modification under the influence of forces arising from within and from without. It is within this framework that we may understand how historical and social changes may determine in large degree which

of the patterns existing in the individual will express themselves most forcibly at a given time.

To explain how pacifism comes to be one of those patterns commonly developed in Americans after World War I is a difficult problem. The starting point seems to be that in both kinds of pacifism described above it was the inhibition of aggression, and the turning of aggression against the self, that was crucial. In various Protestant forms of Christianity aggression was inhibited because it was totally bad. In families where this doctrine is implicitly believed, every effort is made, from the very beginning, to bring about the inhibition of all childhood aggression. This leads to blanket repression, a circumstance that prevents any modification or rational control; it leaves the individual with the conviction that if he is not to be a brute he must be a pacifist.

Most fascists, authoritarians, and pacifists seem to me to have much in common, that is, a lack of faith in mankind. Some pacifists, like the Friends, base their belief on the educability of all men; but many overestimate the evil in man and underestimate his ability to behave himself and yet be happy; accordingly, they believe that man must be subjected to firm control, from without, from above, or from within. The American imperialist, on the other hand, believes that he is good and entitled to happiness in this world and that other people, within limits, can be just like him. The limits he sets have gradually been extended since the founding of the Republic, but they do not go nearly far enough. There is blindness, and consequently grave danger, in every one of these trends.

MATURITY

If these, then, are the major forces with which we shall have to contend, what, one may ask, is there to oppose them? The first answer is that we have democracy. Have we *enough* democracy to turn the trick? Perhaps so and perhaps not; but in either case democracy is something that we cannot have too much of.

And if democracy is something we cannot have too much of, it is something the meaning of which cannot be stated too often. Every democrat will want to extend economic and social benefits without limit; and every democrat will strive for justice, order, security and tolerance; but these aims and these values are not the distinguish-

ing marks of democracy. What distinguishes democracy is the idea of individual freedom and the idea of government by the consent of the governed. And these ideas rest upon certain assumptions about man: the dignity of all men, the perfectibility of mankind, the capacity of man to better his lot by rational means. All authoritarian patterns are in varying degree undemocratic; they violate one or another of these basic assumptions, and in so doing favor the concentration of political or economic power. How is it possible, psychologically, for individuals of good will and high intelligence to violate the basic assumptions of democracy? It is because they have not achieved what is at once the goal and the salvation of democracy, that is, *psychological maturity.*

Psychological maturity means self-awareness, self-determination, self-control. Self-awareness is the surest guarantee against those unrecognized emotional factors which give the strength to ethnocentrism and to pacifism. Self-determination is the only guarantee against determination by a group conscience or by an overstrict inner conscience; and self-control is the only means by which the individual can find satisfaction for his needs.

It becomes apparent that the democrat need not build an ideology around any particular scheme for social or economic organization. How to achieve the widest distribution of economic and social benefits without crucial sacrifice of individual freedom is a matter for scientific study, not dogma. Americans characteristically reject schemes for economic and social salvation, not entirely out of ignorance, but more often for the reason that American psychologists characteristically refuse membership in schools of psychology: they want to be free to choose, to use such ideas from different schools as seem appropriate to the situation. Thus, too, it is not a misfortune that American values often seem contradictory: co-operation and competition, brotherhood and independence, idealism and practicality. It is when they are regarded as absolutes, or when the attempt is made to organize them into self-consistent, emotionally determined ideologies, that these values appear contradictory. Actually, we expect to find all of them co-existing in the same democratic citizen, because we expect that citizen to behave like a mature individual; that is, one who with individual conscience makes decisions about what to do in concrete situations.

There is a mistaken notion that maturity means something conservative, inflexible, lifeless. This is to confuse maturity with senility. Youth, unfortunately, is rarely free and too often does not want to be; it prefers to have fun within the limits set by benevolent authority, or to abandon itself religiously to an emotionally appealing idea, or to go in for a compulsive irresponsibility. It is precisely because it accepts responsibility that maturity is able to give satisfaction to all needs; to accept responsibility is to accept reality, and this means that the mature man will act to counter destructive forces wherever they arise.

To characterize the mature individual and to discover what promotes and what hampers his development is a primary task of psychology, and to discover what kind of social organization is most favorable to maturity is a major task of social science. So far, it appears, psychologists have in their attempt to "predict," concerned themselves mainly with non-rational determinants of behavior — conditioned responses, suggestions, emotional appeals, unconscious mechanisms. This is all to the good so long as it is clearly understood that the object of studying irrational factors is to enable men to understand, to modify and control their behavior. Psychologists have too often acted as if they had command of all the major determinants of behavior and, given controls of the "stimuli," could propel people along the paths they ought to tread. This is revolt against reason and, hence, revolt against democracy. It is not enough for the psychologist to refuse to participate in this revolt; he must take his stand squarely on the side of reason.

The answer to the original question is that the prevailing American dispositions can easily lead back again to the old guilt, apathy, and regret, if, in moralistic terms, we heap upon ourselves the blame for participation in international aggression, or if we become disillusioned because our brand of democracy does not instantly take root all over the world. The only possible means of avoiding these dangers lies in cultivating a democracy mature enough to recognize the naturalness of aggression, the need of social control in coping with it, and the natural difficulties to be encountered as we strive to spread American ideas among other cultural groups. If we become disgusted or moralistic *either toward ourselves* or *toward the rest of the world,* we have begun to lose the psycho-

logical perspective upon which the world order depends. (*End of Dr. Sanford's reply.*)

We have now come to the end of Part II, in which we have traced both the regional trouble-spots and the evidences of psychological unreadiness in others and in ourselves which serves as a threat to the rational and orderly reconstruction of the world. It is gravely to be feared that as the last gun is fired, we shall turn gratefully and gladly to old ways; we shall attempt by power, and by power alone, to make ourselves safe. Some of us will fall into the old peace slogans, and be content to expatiate upon the horrors of future wars; many will not even care enough to do that. Most of us will probably be content with a dignified pattern of education as a preparation for immediate everyday tasks and, when we can afford to, as an emolument to a gentleman's living. As economic threats to old ways grow ominous, the fascist appeal, as a way of saving what one has, will appeal to many. There is no blinking the fact that the issue is drawn in the most threatening terms, for both regionally and psychologically the forces for war will remain deep and intense long after the present conflagration ceases. There is no likelihood that by purely negative means we could ever persuade ourselves to take the steps necessary to extirpate these sources of danger. When, however, the problem is viewed positively in terms of a program which can today be instituted, there may be some hope. It is in Part III that an attempt will be made to define such a positive program.

A POSITIVE PROGRAM

15

WORLD ORDER WITHIN OUR GRASP

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Horace B. English
R. M. MacIver
Quincy Wright

Sheldon Korchin and
Gordon W. Allport
Alfred W. Jones

THE OBSTACLES and the dangers that have loomed in the chapters of Part II present a dismal and distressing picture. The way is very, very dark; the avenues to world order are cluttered with widespread time-bombs of hate, confusion, and despair, and fear in some quarters vies with apathy in others.

But we are reminded of Foch's classic report: "My right is shattered, my left is crumpled up; I am attacking with my center." I propose that we attack with our center; that we boldly define a plan for world order and drive forward upon it just as hard as we can go. The first issue is no vague ideal to be cautiously approached, but a courageous step that can practically be taken today. The greatest danger of all is that we be guided, at armistice time, by narrow, opportunistic considerations that seem safe from the short-range point of view; that we settle for a half-way peace, hoping that in time somehow things will automatically grow a little better. The only possible escape from the opportunism which will settle down upon us, if we allow it to get started as a habit, is to define our immediate policy in terms of its relation to our ultimate goal, making certain that the first step is in the right direction.

Now there is practically no remaining doubt in the minds of thinking people that world federation, a pooling of that aspect of sovereignty which relates to the use of force in the maintenance of international order, is the practical objective toward which the first step must be aimed. There are of course dozens of counter-proposals, alternative plans for world order, coming, one might say, a dime a dozen in the fretful thought of recent months; and

it is indeed quite possible that some of these proposals are of high merit. The fact remains that the time is late, that reasonable men everywhere are in fair accord as to the need for a world federation growing out of, but extending beyond, the present United Nations. It would be a disservice to the spirit which now prevails and the goal which begins to take shape if we, as psychologists, were to lose ourselves in the fine-spun advantages of some other scheme or in attempting to evaluate the relative technical merits of these various proposals. The important thing for us rather is to support and implement in every practical way the present manifest desire for world federation.

One thing which we *can* practically do is to point out the psychological procedures required for attainment of the goal. Suppose, for example, it be argued that world federation requires a sense of world unity which goes down to the rock bottom of human thinking and that we are not yet "ready for" such a step. But in answer, it has been repeatedly shown that loyalties of this sort normally develop *after*, not *before*, the setting up of the institution to which loyalty is invoked. Indeed, the normal human procedure is to take such steps when one has to, and to develop the loyalty in terms of the value of an existing, rather than hypothetical, institution. Similarly, we have from Horace B. English, of Ohio State University, this excellent summary of the supposed psychological objections and the mode of meeting them:

"It is meaningless to hold that a spirit of unity is an indispensable *prior* condition of institutional organization. The ease with which men yield loyalty even to temporary aggregations (as when grown men in a pickup volley-ball game get excited about 'their side') shows that *institutions* may breed something of a spirit of unity. (Herein they are psychologically quite different from *laws* and *mores*.) While we cannot go too far beyond a present public will, I think we can *develop* loyalties to supernational organizations. The competitive-aggressive character of our culture suggests that regional associations would more quickly develop loyalties but might also lead us into trouble through 'taking sides' with a local unit. We *can* develop loyalties to a world system if it *exists;* it would be absurd to *wait* for such a loyalty to develop, for the loyalty is a function of the *real*, not the imaginary. Obstacles in

terms of psychological unpreparedness are petty and trivial in the face of such considerations as these. The problem is not to *wait upon* loyalty but to *create* it."

A second difficulty, however, must be met: the argument that we cannot think straight in the midst of war and that we must sit down for a cooling-off period until the shape of our thought is like that of justices in high positions who supposedly detach their thought from their immediate wants. The cooling-off period is soundly conceived in so far as it relates to the gradual diminution of wartime bitterness; but it involves the gravest possible difficulties in view of what has historically happened in every one of the world's great cooling-off periods. It is only under the anguish and despair of war that resolution for its abolition can be achieved. The problem is to devise something that can be done *now*, and carry it forward with determination while the iron is hot and the mold ready.

Knowing that he had put his energies into hard thinking about this practical step, I addressed to Dr. R. M. MacIver, of Columbia University, the question:

> Would not a cooling-off period crystallize a world order based on power politics rather than the hopes of the peoples, exactly as happened in 1919?

Dr. MacIver's Reply

Let us suppose that the final terms of peace remain in suspension for, say, two or three years beyond the end of the war. This would mean, among other things, that interim control would be exercised by the victorious powers. Enemy countries would continue to be occupied by them during the period, and this extension of the period and possibly of the scale of occupation might well have unfortunate consequences for the coming peace. Some other countries, among those invaded by the enemy, might not achieve during the "cooling-off period" their final status or frontiers, and these too would be subject to control by the victors.

In such an interregnum many untoward things would be likely to happen. Policy disagreements might well arise between the controlling powers themselves, since their interests would now conflict

and the imperative need for unity imposed by war would no longer exist. There would be grave danger of a disintegrating competition between them for respective spheres of influence within the controlled areas. Each would encourage its own partisans in these areas. Within the areas themselves there would be bitter strife between the various interests and groups ambitious for future domination. Since these groups, during the period of external control, could not proceed along constitutional lines, they would be factions, not political parties. The struggles between them would be conducted by underground methods, by stratagems and plots, and by sporadic violence.

No worse preparation for a future democratic régime could be conceived. There would be partisans of Communism, of Fascism, and of liberalism, all seeking to strengthen their following by dubious and perilous devices. The unrest that follows war would be accentuated by uncertainty concerning the final settlement yet to come. The victorious powers would be engaged on every side with the task of curbing troubles and settling disputes — not only in the controlled areas but also, and in consequence, among themselves.

Moreover, the governments of the interregnum would be in form or in effect military governments, and this fact would have repercussions on the domestic governments of the victorious powers. During the "cooling-off period" policies would still be dictated by military considerations. The prolongation of these policies into the peace would lessen the prospects of a genuine international order in which law reigned and force was the servant of law. The hopes that the people everywhere still cherish of a better world would grow dim. These hopes face many obstacles at the best. This new obstacle might well be fatal to them.

The advocates of a "cooling-off period" are addressing themselves to a very real problem. They are aware that a peace settlement made under the influence of wartime mentality is likely to be unstable and that the passions and hatreds generated in war are inimical to the construction of a lasting peace. They know how fatally these emotions operated in the making of the Versailles Treaty. But their solution is ill-conceived and does not reckon with the socio-psychological realities. The overwhelming cost and suffer-

ing of modern war stimulate in all peoples a great yearning for an international order that will prevent wars. This constructive emotion is strongest at the end of the war and it too is most likely to cool off in the reaction of the post-war exhaustion. The strife that would arise amid the uncertainties and the perils of the "cooling-off period" would stimulate other emotions, the competitive egoisms and ethnocentrisms of all the groups struggling for future place and power. There would be a period of dissolution and not of integration. Hence it is essential that from the first a program for a world order should be explicitly proclaimed by the victors. Such a program could not be carried into effect all at once. A constructive design of such magnitude would require for its implementation a period of years. But it could be announced and initiated at the same time that the more immediate terms of peace are delivered. Its association with the other peace conditions might well help to make the latter more rational and forward-looking. In the final implementation of the larger constructive program, after the world had returned to peacetime ways and peacetime thoughts, all countries, including ex-enemy countries, should be called upon to participate. This might be regarded as a second stage in the making of the peace. In this way there would have been in effect a cooling-off period. (*End of Dr. MacIver's reply.*)

Knowing that Sheldon J. Korchin and Gordon W. Allport, of Harvard University, had been studying the structure of the post-war world with special reference to the problem of the "cooling-off period," I asked them, as a supplement to Professor MacIver's statement, to discuss the problem:

> **What psychological advantages attach to an immediate, as contrasted with a delayed commitment to a plan for world order?**

After the last war a world peace organization, the League of Nations, conceived in haste by the victor nations, attached to an unpopular peace treaty, and presented to the people of Europe as a *fait accompli*, failed within a generation. Many have seen the likelihood of a similar error after this war and urge, therefore, that there be a *transition period* between the signing of the peace treaty

and the establishment of a permanent peace organization. It would be a time for cooling-off; when attitudes of war and destruction are changed to those of peace and construction. With the routine tasks of reconstruction completed, and the inevitable mistakes of food and clothing distribution made, the nations of the world, no longer divided into "friendly" and "enemy," would be ready for drafting the new organization. The common peoples, so long suppressed and subjugated, will find their voices. With their assent, and not from above, a more successful new world order could be formed. During the same period, we, of the democracies, can become reacquainted with peoples long separated from us by the military forces of the Axis. We can learn of their needs and desires; they can learn of our intentions and plans.

Although these and other arguments can be offered in defense of a postponement period, there is much to be said for an organization formed during or *immediately* after the war. Desire for peace and revulsion from war are created in the heat of battle. These feelings grow in intensity and reach their culmination at the time of the armistice. In view of this fact the best time to crystallize public opinion for the world order is during the war; the crucial moment for establishing it is immediately after the war. Not only will the desire for peace fade in time, but so too will the bonds between the allies. Cooling of the emotions toward the enemy will be paralleled by a tendency for the allies to become less friendly once the common danger is past. Cooling-off can thus have its undesirable results. Furthermore, the immediate exigencies will call for some sort of organization: people must be fed and lands restored. If these tasks are left to individual nations, the living ideal of a truly international organization will quickly fade. Immediately after the war Europe will be in a very plastic state, but in time it will again harden in its old mold. Spheres of influence will be re-created and new nationalism and vested interests formed. Psychologically and politically the world will be ready for a peace organization at the close of hostilities. It can best be forged at the anvil left hot by war.

One possible solution would be the establishment of a temporary world organization which would give way at the end of the transition period to a permanent organization. This transition organization would have as its major explicit functions those concerned with

rehabilitation, distribution of food, housing, maintenance of order, and so on, and as its chief implicit function the preparing of the way for the permanent organization. It would draw its personnel from the United Nations at the start, but as time went on it would recruit from the native populations for its local officers. Because of this it may serve as a goal for aspiring leaders, taking the place of a new nationalism.

The transition organization would be pictured to all the world as a symbol of co-operative effort, first of the United Nations and then of all nations working to make the world a better place to live in. This organization would at the proper time make way for the permanent peace organization. Therefore the antagonism and hatred that might arise against it in the early chaotic days of reconstruction, when mistakes are inevitable, would, we hope, die with it. The permanent organization would start with a clean slate; but it would not seem to originate, as the opponents of the postponement proposal fear, out of nothing in a relatively stabilized post-war world. The transition organization would serve to pave the way for the permanent one by being at one time a proving ground for future policies and a scapegoat for the errors made.

Since a world organization of some sort will be in existence, there will be less probability of the development of nationalistic commitments and vested interests. Around this nuclear organization can be laid the basis of a "world patriotism" which can, in turn, be transferred and enlarged in the world organization.

Two functions of the transition organization that are of crucial importance are the punishment of Axis leaders and the social and economic aspects of rehabilitation. In the former lies the possibility of public demonstration of the inestimable damage done to the Axis as well as to the Allied peoples by fascism (cf. Arnheim, pp. 62-68); in the latter there is the opportunity to lay the institutional and structural groundwork of a peaceful society.

This analysis suggests that some form of world organization must be taken immediately and become operative even before hostilities cease; but the form the organization takes can and perhaps should be deliberately *transitional*. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, which seem so defective when measured by the psychologists' yardstick, could be viewed as serving a transitional purpose. Added to the

Proposals might be appended a statement signifying the intention of member nations to build further international bridges when conditions become auspicious. (*End of Allport and Korchin's reply.*)

These answers suggest clearly that political steps toward world organization *must be taken at once.* But other problems loom, even if the political machinery for the maintenance of peace can be indefinitely strengthened. Is it not of the very essence of *economic* forces to break through the constraints within which they are held? Will it not be an inevitable consequence of the later stages of business development in Britain and America, and of the later stages of publicly owned economic enterprise in the Soviet Union, to lead to two types of strife; Anglo-American conflict on the one hand, and the conflict of the Anglo-American system with the Soviet system on the other? Even if Germany and France remain militarily weak for a long time, is the war danger removed merely by providing ironclad protection as regarded from the political standpoint? Are we not, with a political defense alone, like the knight who made his armor ever heavier, only to discover that gunpowder finally destroyed both his armor and his castle? Or are we not like the naval architects who made ships thicker to withstand shells, only to discover that shells could always be made to penetrate any armor plate? If the economic structure of the modern world is such as to lead to another major conflagration, is it not somewhat childlike to talk about the supreme *political* guarantees defending a new political order?

I wanted to see whether this *economic argument regarding the inevitability of war* could be met. So I addressed to Dr. Quincy Wright, of the University of Chicago, author of *A Study of War* (182), this question:

> Can any political force be organized which could ever have the psychological strength of economic forces when organized for the supreme stakes of world economic control?

Dr. Wright's Reply

This question is difficult to interpret and appears to be based on

some false assumptions. Perhaps the best answer would be that political forces can be organized in the world community which would prevent an excessive centralization of economic forces.

The problem of peace is to prevent too great a centralization of economic forces, and to organize political forces so that local, functional, national and international centers of initiative will check one another.

Political forces have been much more important in world politics than have economic forces. People have, in the modern period, been willing to sacrifice national and individual welfare for national security and power. If world politics were really influenced mainly by economic objectives, i.e., by the effort to increase the economic welfare of the people, adjustments would be made by peaceful means. This is because on matters of economic welfare countries are not basically rivals but co-operators. Each country gains in welfare by the prosperity of others. On the other hand, if countries depend for security on their own power alone, they are basically rivals. This is because the relative power of one country decreases with increases in the relative powers of the others, and security, under the conditions stated, depends not on absolute power but on relative power. War, therefore, springs fundamentally out of rivalries for power, not out of economic rivalries. The latter, it is true, develop as subsidiary to political rivalries because government control of economic resources, especially with the present totalitarian character of war, is a valuable instrument of power. Countries become rivals for sources of raw materials and markets because exclusive control of such sources will be of value in time of war. In so far, however, as their objective is the economic welfare of the people the tendency is for nations to co-operate through geographic division of labor and trade. It should be noted that this objective is warped not only by considerations of national power but also by the political pressure of groups to get special protection for themselves at the public expense. Such pressures, however, usually fail unless buttressed by arguments referring to national defense.

The problem, therefore, is to reduce the powerful psychological drives behind national power and to increase the psychological drive behind welfare. This can be done by creating an international

organization able to give security to nations through organizing the superior power of the international community as a whole, so that it will be immediately available against any possible aggressor. With security thus established, the desire of peoples for welfare would have an opportunity to influence policy, and this influence would tend toward co-operative arrangements in exploiting the world's resources in the interest of all.

It is, of course, true that sometimes particular groups in a country can gain an economic advantage through national monopolistic arrangements, but such arrangements are usually so hostile to the economic interest of most people, even in that country, that unless supported by arguments based upon national power, they will not prevail. It should be emphasized that in an anarchic world the popular instinct which places group power ahead of individual welfare is reasonable because conquest will destroy welfare and devotion of resources primarily to welfare may reduce power and encourage conquest. It is, however, unreasonable to believe that under present conditions security is possible in an anarchic world.

The elimination of international anarchy requires wider general understanding of the causes of war and the conditions of peace. The popular idea that war springs mainly from economic rivalries has been a most unfortunate factor in preventing effective action for peace. Peoples have been led to believe that their economic welfare depends directly upon the political power of their government, overlooking the fact that in general the standard of welfare of the population in countries that have not played an important rôle in power politics, such as Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, has been higher than that of the population in the "great powers." Peoples must learn the point which Adam Smith and his successors have been preaching for over a century, that trade does not take place under conditions of economic freedom unless it is mutually beneficial, and that increase in trade and division of labor is favorable to the prosperity of all. Economic urges are dangerous when linked with political ambitions and insecurities or with false economic doctrines. That a segregation of economic from political activity will make for peace is suggested by the relative tranquillity of the nineteenth century, when that segregation was pushed farther than in any other century of Western history.

A program aimed at international organization for security and at freeing trade, both domestic and international, from excessive government control, is practical and will tend to direct psychological drives into channels making for peaceful progress. (*End of Dr. Wright's reply.*)

Dr. Wright's answer seemed convincing provided that strong long-term leadership could be made available. So I put to him this further question:

> **Is there any method by which a political leader can plan for peace in long-range terms, though required to get popular support every two or four years?**

Yes, this is possible. Such a leader may institute policies, principles and procedures, either national or international, which acquire a momentum through general acceptance, custom and institutional inertia, causing them to persist in spite of the fluctuations of party or even national opinion.

National policies, such as avoidance of entangling alliances, the Monroe Doctrine, Pan-Americanism, the open door in China, have been initiated by presidents of the United States, have been subsequently endorsed by Congress and public opinion and have acquired prestige above party and the fluctuations of popular opinion. There is, however, some danger in relying upon the inertia of such national policies as a basis for peace, because in the present dynamic world, conditions change rapidly and policies of this kind may prove unadaptable in changed circumstances. They may continue to influence action under circumstances when their tendency is to produce war rather than peace.

Principles may be established in national law through the efforts of an administration and such laws may prevail for many years. The enactment of the United States Neutrality Law in 1794 and of many other laws designed to prevent the violation of the rights or interests of other countries have had an influence on American action long after the administration that originally urged them has ceased to govern. Such laws, however, may be unadapted to new

circumstances and consequently their influence may come to be adverse to peace.

Procedures set up by the national Constitution or by national laws providing for the exercise of powers by different agencies of government, especially by the President, the Senate and the House, have a persistent influence upon policies affecting war and peace. Probably the Constitutional provision for a two-thirds vote in the Senate on treaties, creating as it does a strong temptation of the minority party to withhold consent from treaty commitments for peace made by the President, has been the most important single influence preventing constructive peace action by the United States. It has been increasingly accepted that the Constitution does not make this procedure obligatory but that international agreements can be made, if the subject matter is within the delegated powers of Congress, by the President with the support of a majority of both Houses of Congress. While the latter procedure has frequently been used, undoubtedly its firm establishment in national law would contribute a great deal toward long-range action by the United States favorable to peace.

National institutionalization of policies, principles and procedures initiated by a single administration is as likely in the present interdependent world to be hostile to peace as to be favorable to it. International institutionalization may establish policies, principles and procedures likely to be observed by all nations, and has far more promise of contributing to peace. Bilateral treaties sometimes have an important influence in this direction, but under present conditions, effective planning for peace must embrace a large number of nations. This was indeed recognized by the Moscow Declaration.

President Wilson, in pressing for the League of Nations, projected a long-range plan for peace which would have had more success than it did if the United States had become a member. *It is mainly through establishing world-wide organizations within which policies can be accepted by all nations, principles of international law can be continually adapted to changing conditions, and procedures of international adjustment can be carried out in an orderly manner that a political leader can effectively plan for peace in long-range terms.* Such procedures, if generally accepted, may become reliable in the sense that national constitutions have sometimes be-

come reliable, and may establish the balance of stability and change in the relations of nations with one another, with individuals, and with the world community which is necessary if the present dynamic and interdependent world is to progress in an orderly and non-violent manner. (*End of Dr. Wright's reply.*)

Though Dr. Wright's answers seemed comprehensive, I wanted some direct discussion of the question whether the concrete situation presented by the potential conflict of the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union in the coming era, could be met. So to Dr. A. W. Jones, of *Fortune*, I addressed the question:

> Are there any psychological considerations that make the great sovereign states of tomorrow inevitable competitors and potential foes?

Dr. Jones's Reply

Perhaps the question should read, inevitable competitors *or* potential foes. In any case the problem is so basic as to call for a word on the early development of the nation-states.

Whether or not the state had its origin in conquest and the subsequent mechanics of exploiting the conquered (anthropologists have long disputed the point), there was a considerable period in the history of the West when the state could hardly be thought of except in terms of its functions, (*a*) of offense or defense, and (*b*) of ruling and exploiting the conquered. Wars were a large part of the reason for existence of the nation-states and wars were conducted by them alone. But this condition need not persist.

Once a nation has come into existence for any reason, it tends to make of its citizens or subjects a new ethnic group distinct from its various original components. The new national character derives from many sources: from the personality traits handed down in the old groups; from the amalgam that they form, which is something new; from the new environment; and from the new economic relationships. Certainly the new national character need not inevitably carry any primordial curse in the form of a tendency toward war-making; if it has the tendency, it will be for specific reasons.

But an answer to a broader question is called for: is the new people (both ethnic group and nation), with its common language, customs, or political procedures, and an awareness of its own distinction, inevitably a *rival* of its neighbors? And the answer seems to be that it is. First, the individuals of the in-group tend to identify themselves with the group itself, or its top leadership. Second, except in the most moribund of groups, those in all the leading layers, both at and below the very top, have pushed themselves into positions of influence and leadership. Third, the policy makers will want their group to excel (in one way or another, depending upon cultural circumstances); this inevitably follows from the fact that they themselves want to excel within their group. But it follows further from this reasoning that the international or inter-group competition need not, and normally will not, take any forms except those derived from competition within the nation or group. Such projected competition may be (*a*) cultural, (*b*) commercial, (*c*) military, or some combination of these.

Cultural it will inevitably be, just to the extent that there is international contact of any kind, and just as long as human beings compete in their own communities for status and prestige. Its overt forms may be Olympic games, or the peaceful rivalry and emulation of primitive peoples, or, say, of the countries of Scandinavia. If contact is intensive enough it can, and probably should, soon go beyond mere invidious verbal comparisons.

International competition will be commercial if commercial competition takes place at home, if there is international trade, and if the commercial interests of the several countries run afoul of each other in foreign markets. Of course there will be international commercial competition of a simple sort even in reaching barter agreements between nations, since a shift in the agreements would benefit one side or the other. Any kind of commercial competition — from the simplest clash of bargaining interests to rivalry for markets, monopolistic trading rights, and the exploitation of cheap labor — can lead to war if violence is the traditional way that one or more of the groups settles its disputes. But it need not lead to war, any more than the clash of interests at home need lead to civil upheaval. In the light of recent experience, it is fairly clear that internal economic stagnation and suffering and the need for im-

perialist outlets can be very great indeed without war following as a consequence.

In a conquest society, the subjugated group (or groups) is put down and kept down by violence or threat of violence. The projection of any such civil violence, or the active memory of it, beyond the country where it prevails, is war. To the degree that we can abstract from the other forms of international competition, war is comparable to physical combat between gangs of adolescents, which exists as the logical projection, beyond the gang, of individual fighting within it for leadership. Of course a nation, at the moment that it is torn by class conflict, is in no condition to wage war and is more likely to be a victim of others than to be an aggressor. The optimum time for a war of aggression is undoubtedly the period far enough removed from active class conflict so that national unity is possible, but not so far removed that the frustrations and hostilities engendered by the class struggle will have disappeared without need of sublimation in foreign wars. The Napoleonic Wars took place in such a period. But as Germany and Japan attest, the hostilities and frustrations can long smolder in a society with feudal, castified traits, and with certain types of ultra-rigorous early training for children.

What part of this discussion is psychological is not of the first importance. All of the considerations that make for war or peace, or any type of international rivalry, have their psychological dimension. There seem clearly to be psychological reasons making for inevitable competition between sovereign states. But the *form* that the competition takes is military only under certain *specific and limited conditions.*

The most profoundly satisfactory outcome of this war would be a prolonged period of peaceful *social and cultural competition* between the great national systems of the world. Of the three most advanced and powerful — the American, British, and Russian — none need make predatory demands upon the others, or anywhere else in the world. Each has moved far enough toward internal ideological homogeneity, and far enough away from internal control by violence or threat of it so that projection of internal competition need not take the form of war.[1] India or China *may* eventually alter the prospects; but in the meantime the only apparent cause of

war involving the three advanced systems would be the most idiotic defensive anxiety and a mounting spiral of armaments, mutual suspicion, and fear. On the other hand, if the proper insights and coolness mark the policies of the United States, Britain, and Russia, there will surely be no other power center in the world for many decades to come capable of starting another world war. (*End of Dr. Jones's reply.*)

Our contributors seem to have drawn a picture justifying relative optimism, which may perhaps be phrased in these words: From the point of view of economics and politics, the construction of a pattern of world order is an immediately feasible task. The concrete forces with which we must deal do permit articulation and orchestration. It will be necessary to follow from these economic and political premises, to a psychological analysis of the human forces which must sustain and buttress any political unification of mankind.

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[1] The exceptions that should be noted are the control in the South of the United States of Negroes by whites (note further that the South is the most bellicose section of the country when it comes to foreign wars); British control in certain colonial areas; and the Russian control of certain formerly powerful but now quite impotent classes such as rich peasants. These exceptions to the rule of ideological, non-violent control of internal competition do not in my opinion directly affect the immediate international projections.

WORLD-MINDED EDUCATION

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

16

Lawrence K. Frank
Harry Overstreet
Ross Stagner
William J. Carr and
    Jane Likert
Ralph Gundlach

Edgar Snow
Eugene Lerner
Goodwin B. Watson
Margaret Mead
Paul M. Limbert

WE HAVE BEEN THINKING, in the foregoing chapter, of a type of political wisdom as an expression of adult mentality, which may be able to take the first great step toward world order — to *achieve*, as it were, world peace at a single bound through a strong international organization. The question arises: Can such a peace be maintained despite the failure of education (cf. Chapter 11) here and all over the world, to *prepare* for world citizenship? We must therefore look closely at the early formative years, in which both information and attitude grow along the lines determined by the adult world, the few years during which internationalism or chauvinism, tolerance or suspicion, can be inculcated. Do we not find that our American education is still profoundly ethnocentric, that our children learn that we are fundamentally right, the noblest of the world's peoples? Indeed, do not the organs of American respectability insist that such bias be continued? Is it not still very much the style in England to teach the child to be proud (as we are reminded in *Pinafore*), simply by virtue of being English? Regardless of fond hopes regarding German and other re-education, is not educational nationalism a foregone conclusion in the post-war era, all the more so because children will inevitably grow up to revere their fathers who fought in the present conflict? Is it really conceivable that German or Japanese children will grow up repudiating their fathers, fundamentally accepting with emotional resilience a world scheme in which Germany and Japan are regarded as the enemies of humanity? Yet, if we do not face these obstacles, if we do not consider the nature of nationalism, isolationism, and chauvin-

ism, is there any reasonable hope that political and economic arrangements alone can safeguard the peace?

Even bolder, perhaps, from a practical point of view is the problem of the influence of education in one nation upon the affairs of other nations, and the problem of international co-operation in the development of education for world peace and world order. I say bolder because we are never more jealous of our rights, more suspicious of our neighbor than when the molding of the mind of the young is involved. We can trade or talk politics with those on the other side of the globe more easily than we can harbor the thought that perhaps our own children will be guided in their development by what men in other lands believe. The issue may indeed be a frightening one. But it need not be. Will it not be to the advantage both of ourselves and of our children to understand fully and deeply what the people of other lands are like, and to find what we have in common with them as well as where we differ? And will it not similarly be to their advantage if their children learn the same with reference to us? If these two points be granted, is it not in the interest of all to see that we work together in our educational plans, neither weakening our own values because we have studied the values of others, nor demanding of them that they replace their values by ours? Is there not a vast realm of international co-operation in the educational process?

After the first World War, many educators, working through the National Education Association, made a desperate attempt to institute through the League of Nations or otherwise a scheme for world education. They were most explicit in their prediction that the failure of education to free itself from bitter nationalism would pave the road to World War II. Even the most pitiful, meager appropriations to study international education were refused. Education and diplomacy moved in two different orbits and the statesmen of the world, under pressure from no mature public opinion in the matter, ignored the pleadings and the tears. Indeed, the internationalist efforts of German education under the early Weimar Republic were for the most part ignored outside of Germany, and the desecration of the German educational system which came later, though considered regrettable, was not fully grasped till too late. That German youth was to be militarized was, of course, un-

derstood, but the brutal ferocity of the process was so alien to anything earlier achieved by European education that American educators gaped or gasped in amazement or horror without the will to study the phenomenon fully, or the courage to report boldly to our own public on what was happening. The story of this "school for barbarians" was, of course, ultimately sketched — though not by an American. All of this arose naturally from the fact that education was not internationally organized, as well as from the fact that education and government seemed to us but vaguely related.

It is not, of course, insisted here that education is the only factor in the reconstitution of world order, but that it is one factor of major weight capable of doing its job only when articulately related to the organs of public opinion and to the process of statecraft. We have here two questions which may, however, be jointly handled: (1) For the attainment of world peace what are the primary requirements for education in the United States? (2) How far would it be possible to apply these same principles to worldwide re-education?

Our contributors, viewing the problem in the light of history and political science, have told us, *World order can be achieved.* War can be prevented by means of the existing instrumentalities and by means of new ones to be cultivated, *provided* that our alertness to such dangers as we have reviewed does not flag; that our energies are maintained at a high level of watchfulness, especially as to our failures, throughout a long period of stress and danger, and that our vision of concrete ways of buttressing peace constantly broadens. But this throws the problem straight at the *educator* for a further answer; for we can hardly say that the educator has yet told us how apathy can be prevented, and how such a continuing alertness and broadening vision, this *desire to relearn our world outlook and our world habit,* can be achieved. Consequently we must appraise what a world-minded education and the world forces of public opinion can do to guarantee such continuing alertness, and to instill, deep in the hearts of mankind everywhere, an increasing passion for world order, pressing constantly toward a more humane and understanding basis for international collaboration.

We shall have to be explicit about what we mean by world-

minded education. We mean education for intelligent world citizenship; education revitalized in such fashion as to implement world citizenship by building democracy at home.

The first task, I think, is education of our citizens to understand the economic-social-political world order of which they are a part, that they may the more wisely share in its intelligent guidance as a sub-system within a world system, steering it so that it will not collide with, but function smoothly in relation to, other sub-systems. This is a problem for schools, colleges, and adult education. For the vast economic development of the twentieth century, with all its intricacy and all its glorious and terrible significance for our social progress and our peace, goes on in a world of such complexity that the common man knows almost nothing of it; even in his grange, even in his labor union, he deals indirectly with a remote reality; he deals with commission men, retailers, foremen, not with those who shape policy. He cannot see the machinery which is day by day weaving the pattern of life in which he and his children live.

My first question then relates to the devices for making evident to common people in the years to come the general course of economic-political development. Take, for example, the issue between our learned friends as to whether capitalism is dead (with the "managerial revolution" its legitimate successor), or is still very much alive under another name (cf. p. 33). This issue will be settled by the emergence of more and more brute consequences of the existing trend; the question is whether we shall have sufficient social education to recognize them when we confront them. If there is a lag of twenty or thirty years between fulfillment of a trend and the first awakening of the common man to the fact that there is such a trend, he can hardly be said to have any democratic control whatever over his destiny.

We shall, therefore, have to put to our educators a very general question. Since the material given out in college and high-school classes, and the material dispensed through the press and radio, constitutes a series of tiny snippets rather than a unified view of social trends, *how can we reasonably expect an intelligent social philosophy, a broad conception of where we are going, to develop in the common man's mind?*

And in preparation for world citizenship, it is clear that no mere

"training" in world geography or world commerce can suffice. Even if war is not inevitable from a psychological, political, or economic viewpoint, it may arise as a natural result of provincialism, of shallowness in our understanding of the diversities of mankind and from cultural conflicts. As we saw in Chapter 2, infants are born very much alike all over the world, but as adults they have been profoundly indoctrinated in the ways of their group, profoundly resentful and suspicious of others whose ways are different. And they may well be all the more resentful and touchy as world travel and world commerce force ever more cultural contact where it is not wanted, and where it hurts the most.

It is all very well to travel abroad for pleasure; one may love the Florentines, the Viennese, or the Parisians for their colorful ways; but he who travels to extend a commercial control among a people alien to his own seldom comes simply as a messenger of peace. And the last twenty-five years have yielded many a brew from the seething caldron of cultural conflict. Relations of Moslems and Hindus, only vaguely and indirectly economic in origin, relations of Jews and Arabs at the eastern end of the Mediterranean, relations of American and British commercial representatives in Argentina, the whole vast tragedy of extra-territoriality in China — these are small tokens of what may be expected to continue, even in a world dominated by a tight, centralized structure of world peace. Such conflict cannot be extirpated by fiat from headquarters.

Nor does the conception of regional tribunals work much better. New Delhi and Calcutta have as much trouble controlling the Hindu-Moslem strife as does London. Cultural conflict may well become worse, if, like a running sore, it is officially closed over and the sources of difficulty supposedly legislated out of existence. It has been characteristic of such cultural conflict to lead to some of the most terrible and sanguinary battles. The cultural conflict may at times simply take the form of a religious conflict, as the Moslem-Hindu conflict does, or as did the Thirty Years' War, or, as we see it in the tensions between "Anglo-Saxons" and the Irish and the French-Canadian residents of New England. Religious conflict is not just religious, but rather an aspect of deep cultural tension. And from the point of view of the present argument, it is immaterial whether the cultural conflict takes a religious form of expression or

some other, as long as it plays a part in leading men to war.

So, before coming to the content and form of world-minded education, I felt the need for some straight talk on intercultural understanding. I wanted this to be considered as a fundamental human problem, yet to be stated concretely in terms of what we of the English-speaking tradition can achieve. So, noting his work with the Institute of Intercultural Studies, I called upon Lawrence K. Frank to answer this question:

> **How can those of one great tradition — the Anglo-American — contribute to orchestration of a world system comprising cultural traditions unlike our own?**

Lawrence K. Frank's Reply

The crucial question to be faced is how far any proposal for world order accepts the *cultural diversity of mankind as the fundamental basis of such order*. Western European culture, which stems from the Egyptian, Greek, Roman, Judaic, and Christian traditions, has ignored or rejected the values of other cultures. Toward the peoples of other lands — China, India, Japan, Africa — many of whom have cultural traditions, religions, philosophies, and ways of life far more ancient than ours, Western Europeans have been indifferent, or indeed often contemptuous. Toward other peoples, especially those of a different color, we have posed as the "master race," possessing all wisdom and virtue, and therefore obligated to impose our ideas, religious institutions, and social organization through political and economic control of their lands and their peoples.

Hitler, by proclaiming the German "master race," has made us realize what the Western European culture has long used as the basis of its international relations. The history of our contacts with other peoples, especially with so-called "backward" peoples — chiefly non-Caucasians — is revealed by most of our diplomacy and economics, many of our missionaries, and most other international activities.

What kind of world order do we want: the supremacy of Western European peoples and culture, or a world in which each group of peoples will live according to their cultural traditions, their own

ideas and beliefs, and their sensibilities? The Four Freedoms are not compatible with an insistence upon Western European beliefs and practices and refusal to accept those of others.

If we are to be prepared for a world order, we should reflect on the following: All over the earth, man as a mammalian organism exists in the geographical space of nature, adjusting to the impact of physical, chemical, and biological events, to gravity and weather, and the hazards from other organisms. While there are differences in size, shape, color, and in some physiological functions, the human species is alike everywhere. Also, despite differences in climate and local variations in flora and fauna, the environing world of nature is basically uniform and similar.

But everywhere man is found living in a cultural and social world, a world which he has constructed for governing himself and his own functional activities and behavior. Each group of men has developed a culture, a way of living in accordance with its historical traditions. Each cultural group, confronted with the same life tasks and compelled to make some assumptions about the world and man, has utilized the same process, but has created different products; they have developed their beliefs and sanctions, their religion, their philosophy, their art, and their patterns of social life, as so many different answers to the same problems and needs. Their differences are the variations upon similar or equivalent patterns. The same fundamental process of cultural building has produced different organizations, functions, and activities, which are analogous products or expressions of the same process and same human needs and aspirations.

When we view these diverse cultures as so many different answers proposed by man to the same problems, so many different approaches to the same vital tasks, then world order may be considered not in terms of a dominating imposition of one culture upon all others, but in terms of orchestrating these cultural diversities. Our Western European culture appears then only as one of the many historically developed cultures, essentially a parochial version of what all other cultures have provided for their people as a way of life.

The peoples of Western Europe and America cannot make their political state, the economy of business practices, the relatively

new Western creeds and religious rituals, and all the other peculiar features of Western European culture, the basis for world order. Each culture is an aspiration, a search for values; every culture is unbalanced, biased, and incomplete, making a virtue of its deficiencies and its anesthesias. Each culture, in meeting the same life task, has created patterns of action, speech, and belief, of human relationships and values that have developed certain human potentialities and have rejected or repressed others. Each culture likes to represent itself by its aspirations, its lofty ethical goals, and usually ignores its failures and its inadequacies.

Now that the world is being linked up through ever more rapid transportation and communication, and is engaging in commerce and other contacts, we must develop some more *inclusive* concepts and broader understanding. World order will *not* be attained by forcing all peoples to accept the same pattern of thinking, acting, and believing, in a colorless internationalism. No one culture is the final or the best; we must recognize the unhappiness, the degradation, the cruelty and human wastage in all cultures, and must also recognize how each culture has developed certain patterns of living and human relationships and has formulated certain ideas which are outstanding achievements, giving their society a peculiar meaning and beauty and personal security. If we will view cultures as we approach the *arts* of different peoples, we will see each culture as significant and meaningful, each in its own context or traditional setting.

World order will arise, therefore, as we realize that all men, everywhere, face the same life tasks, and seek the same goals: to make their life more fruitful and significant, to achieve social order and to regulate their living by values which lift life above mere organic existence. When we realize this similar endeavor of all cultures, we may begin to understand and evaluate all cultures, some of which offer more humanly desirable ideas and more orderly patterns than our own.

We can accept all other cultures and their idiomatic way of life if they affirm the basic value of the individual, of freedom, and of human welfare; we can co-operate with such cultures to establish and maintain world order, as a joint endeavor to those goals. With agreement upon these basic criteria and values, we can co-operate in

regulations for human conservation, for economic and technological activities and all other joint actions among nations involving a sharing of knowledge and techniques and mutually agreed upon goals and purposes. These various standards in these different fields can be put into practice within the framework of the diverse cultures, just as we translate agreements into different languages and symbols (15).

By giving children and youth this orientation toward other peoples and other cultures, we can learn truly to be international, retaining our own basic national and cultural traditions, the things we live by and for, but also respecting the basic national and cultural traditions of others. To do this, educators must critically scrutinize our whole scheme of education and training, to reveal the many ways, both overt and disguised, in which we are inculcating ideas, beliefs and feelings as directly opposed to this larger understanding.

A really serious and systematic revision of education, especially of the arts and letters or humanities, will reveal much that is subtly but effectively poisoning the thinking and feeling of youth toward other peoples, giving them a belief in our supremacy and monopoly of truth. All the courses in international relations and post-war planning for a world state will be futile so long as we continue to indoctrinate the contrary ideas and feelings through the other courses in our curricula. We have rich stores of materials for this re-orientation in the arts — novels, plays, poetry, the visual, graphic and plastic arts, moving pictures, etc., and museum exhibits, all of which could be utilized to develop a world-wide awareness and a sympathetic understanding of other cultures, which would in time increase our understanding of our own culture. Without this change in attitude and orientation, the elaborate plans for political and economic organization are not likely to be very influential. (*End of Lawrence K. Frank's reply.*)

The answer, as a first approximation, seemed to me convincing as to the *direction* in which the world must move. But I wanted more as to *techniques: How* can such inter-cultural respect be developed? I addressed to Dr. Harry Overstreet the question:

For the attainment of world peace what are the primary require-
ments for education in the United States?

Dr. Overstreet's Reply

The basic activity of education is to build images, expectations
and habits. The chief problem of making education serve world
peace is to discover the images that must now be built in young
and old — images that will develop those expectations and habits
that will strongly support a warless world.

Probably the central image will be that of the peoples of the
world needing one another.

Such an image was not created for our present adult generation.
The study of history built for us the image of interminable con-
flicts between the peoples of the world; the study of literature the
image of various writers here and there putting down their stray
thoughts; the study of science the image of scattered experiments
and observations that eventually got into the textbooks. Even
religion — the worship of the One God — failed to build for us the
image of one family of the world; it built for us rather the image
of our Christian people as the genuine believers among other
peoples dangerously astray.

The schools and churches, in short, made no conscious and de-
termined effort to create in us a warm feeling for a world of peoples
all somehow belonging together, needing one another, and con-
tributing to one another.

There was an obvious reason for this: the schools and churches
could not do this, because such a world actually did not exist. The
world was literally an anarchy — with no overspanning world-law;
no common purpose; little mutual aid; and above all, little mutual
respect. Instead of mutual respect, there was a huge amount of
mutual contempt; instead of mutual aid, there was the oppression
of the weaker nations by the stronger; instead of a common will for
human welfare, there was a perverse spirit of each nation for itself;
instead of world-law, there was the right of each separate nation to
be a law to itself to the extent that it could get away with its
sovereign lawlessness.

The hope is that in the post-war world there will be substituted
world law for world anarchy; some common human purpose for

the traditional conflict of nationalistic purposes; mutual aid for past oppressions; and mutual respect for past contempts.

If this hope should be realized, education will have its new chance. It can then build the image of a world working together. Should the United Nations happily turn into a United World, there will be countless ways in which the schools, churches and homes can make vivid this unitedness.

The flags of the peoples can be seen and saluted in cluster. Representatives of nations throughout the world can be visualized sitting down and conferring together. They can be heard over a world radio talking together. Newspapers, magazines and books will report their conferences.

The schools will have the chance to show in a thousand ways how the peoples of the world depend upon one another. The increased speed of travel, the consequent shrinkage of the world, the interdependence of all the peoples of the world in the manufacture and interchange of the goods of life will give the schools a chance to substitute for the traditional image of isolation the image of world association and co-operation.

Above all, education and religion will have the long coveted chance to build an alternative image to that of war. The several conferences of the four leaders in this war — flying in planes from far quarters of the globe — have already had a powerful effect in building a new image of how a world can be united by conferring. While at present the conferring is for war, it is nevertheless for a war that aims to prevent such future wars; and so it is, in effect, a world-wide conferring for peace. In the post-war world, there will, we hope, be a continuing activity of world-conferring for the preservation of peace. As this world-wide activity gets under way, the schools and churches will at last be able to offset the old war-making image by the new peace-making image.

World peace must be thought of, however, not merely extensively, as the logicians would say, but intensively; not merely as a matter of planetary geography, but of individual psychology. World peace will depend upon how the individual American thinks of his neighbor — whether as a "foreigner" to be feared, a "nigger" to be kept in his place, a "Jew" to be despised, a "radical" to be tarred and feathered, or as a human being with all the basic human rights.

War, as we know, is only the overt, last-minute outcome of all the prejudices, animosities, hatreds, competitions that have gone into its making.

Americans have not been free of these. We like to call ourselves a "peace-loving" people. But our peace-loving has meant chiefly a repugnance to the overt activity of war. It has not meant a passionate repudiation of attitudes and behaviors that are fertile soil for war. Nor has it meant the determined building of attitudes and behaviors that make peace something more than the temporary absence of military war.

Education for world peace will, therefore, have to build the images of deep-rooted, constructive peace activity. If world co-operation is necessary for world peace, co-operation among men in their daily activities will be the essential prerequisite for such world co-operation. If mutual respect of the peoples of the world is necessary, such respect must have its beginnings in the neighborhood, business, school, church. If mutual aid among the nations of the world is necessary for world peace, such mutual aid must be the ruling passion of our community, neighborhood and business life.

As surely as one cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear, so we cannot build a world peace out of the war-fostering activities and attitudes of individuals too uncivilized as yet to live happily and helpfully together.

Here, then, will be the primary task of education for world peace: to build new images — images of the peoples of the world needing one another, aiding one another, defending one another against criminal aggression; images of the individuals of the world acting toward one another with generous good will.

If and when the schools, churches and homes build such images, they will create the resultant expectations of peaceful settlements between nations and of continuing mutual respect for the constructive activities of peace. And they will build in individuals those habits of mind and behavior that support the dignity of human life.

The foregoing assumes, of course, that our peace-makers will create at last the beginnings of a united world. If they make no such beginnings, education will continue to be under the old handicaps and will have greatly limited power to forward world peace. But if the beginnings are made, education — in school, church and

home — can be a powerful help in creating among young and old those supporting attitudes and behaviors without which any attempted social order must go to the ground.

It will be noted that Dr. Overstreet was asked to address himself to education in the United States. But still another question was put to him:

> How far would it be possible to apply these same principles to world-wide re-education?

The same principle holds: basic to the re-education of the world is the creation among the peoples of the world of new images, expectations and habits.

It is too obvious to need arguing that what has been chiefly at fault among the peoples of the world has been the picture they have been led to draw of their expected relationships to one another. The picture — particularly European and Asiatic — has been one of a precarious balancing of powers. In the picture, each nation has watched suspiciously the actions of other nations: making alliances when alliances seemed called for; breaking alliances when breaking them seemed the safer course to take. International relations have not been visualized as created for the good of all, but as created for the good of special groups. Along with this picture of wary, alliance-making powers, has gone the expectation that at any moment the balance might be unbalanced and peace be changed to war. The expectation has been about as fixed among the citizens of European and Asiatic nations as the expectation of winter storms.

Accompanying this fixed expectation of war has been the necessity for forming habits for safety. Each nation has had to be a drill ground; every citizen a soldier. In some nations — notably Germany and Japan — the onerous necessity for being everlastingly ready for war has been made less burdensome by being rationalized into a virtue. Soldiering has not seemed so hard, when soldiering has been lauded as the most manly way of life.

All this we know. The question is how these images, expectations and habits are to be changed.

The first essential, of course, is to change the relationships of

nations within the world. If and when some form of world-wide association of nations for mutual defense is established, it will be possible to begin to change attitudes that have hitherto prevailed among individuals and nations. If no such form of association is established, there will be little that can be done to alter the essentially suspicious and militaristic bent of men's minds.

But even if a world-wide association of nations is created, men's minds will not immediately change, since these will have been conditioned by countless cultural factors. There will be a mental and emotional lag between the creation of a United Nations of the world and the redrawing of the picture of themselves and of the world in the minds of men. The function of education must be to shorten the lag.

The most important function to be undertaken will be the rewriting of history for use in the schools. Throughout the militaristic period, the history books in each nation's schools have been the chief support of that nation's claim to power and the strongest means of molding the minds of young and old in support of that power. It is notorious that history has served each nation chiefly as a means of self-congratulation and enhancement of pride. Practically nowhere has history in the school textbooks been written from a global point of view. It may be contended that it cannot be done. If so, we shall have small chance to shorten the lag.

The rewriting of history will require, first of all, the establishment of an international body of scholars commissioned to write world history from the point of view of the interrelationship of nations. Such an international board of historians will be an essential instrumentality of an international council. How the writings of such a board are to be introduced into the schools of the various countries is a matter of grave concern. In countries democratically inclined, they will, we hope, move in time toward acceptance and incorporation into the going schemes of education. In the autocratically inclined countries, persuasion emanating from the peace table or the world council might avail. In any event, history must now be written in the new manner — under the sponsorship of the world and with the collaboration of the best minds of the world.

History, however, while it is the chief, is only one of the educational influences that have shaped the minds of Europeans and

Asiatics into the pattern of suspicious militarism. In Germany, science has been prostituted to the service of false race theories; political science and philosophy have served as propaganda for the Nazi state. Similar distortions of science and philosophy have occurred in Japan and in fascistic Italy. Science and philosophy must be restored to their place of free objectivity.

Very powerful has been the conditioning through youth associations. False habits of obedience and command have been established; an unhealthy relation of suspicion and antagonism between children and parents, and a fanatic relation to the *Leader*. Youth associations of the Nazi pattern will have to be completely removed.

In the Axis countries, the entire spirit as well as the letter of the curriculum must be overhauled. This, obviously, cannot be undertaken by any one of the victorious nations. Like the rewriting of history, it must be undertaken by an international board of educators. The chief objective of such a board must be to reorganize both the studies and activities of students so that the old images and expectations will be removed and new ones put in their place.

It will be of immeasurable help to such a board if the United Nations are wise enough to formulate a Bill of Rights applicable to all the peoples of the world. The gravest lack among the Axis nations has been a Bill of Rights. In those countries individuals have had no chance to think of themselves except as the subjects of their countries. To bring to them the new image of themselves as self-governing citizens, and of Law as shaped for their protection rather than for their regimentation, will go far toward creating attitudes unfavorable to the traditional militaristic régimes.

Finally, there is an instrumentality at hand that can be of far greater use than it ever has been once we become serious about establishing a united world. I refer to international voluntary associations. In a world seething with suspicions and torn by conflicting interests, they have been about the finest influence we have had for developing generous and intelligent relationships among the peoples of the world. International organizations of science, letters, education — even international organizations of businessmen — have served to bind men together along lines of common interest. After the war, such voluntary organizations should be strengthened and made to function in such ways as to build stronger habits of functional co-operation.

It would be folly for Americans alone — or for Americans and British alone — to try to reshape the educational pattern of the peoples of the world, particularly of the enemy peoples. Yet such reshaping will have to be done if the traditional patterns of thinking are not to be continued. It can be done, if we ourselves will get the picture of the new world — the picture of world-wide collaboration — and will join with the best minds of the world in the effort to salvage peoples victimized by the militaristic ideals and expectations of the past. (*End of Dr. Overstreet's reply.*)

Dr. Overstreet's answers seemed to be all to the good; but still greater detail, more concrete application, seemed warranted. In view of his wide contact with the current thinking of social psychologists about practical steps which the individual can take to attain world peace, I addressed to Dr. Ross Stagner, of Dartmouth College, the question:

> What can be done to formulate educational peace plans at the individual level?

Dr. Stagner's Reply

A nation cannot manifest aggressive behavior until a certain number of its dominant citizens become aggressive. The individual human being, for all his seeming helplessness in the scope of world politics, is still the ultimate unit. Before armies ravage and devastate neighboring territory, men must have conceived these acts, and must have been willing to initiate this slaughter and destruction.

From a long-range point of view, therefore, it would seem that peace plans must be organized around a basic conception of why human beings become aggressive, especially in the form known as war; and that psychologists have a unique rôle in defining those policies which will (*a*) forestall aggressions or (*b*) sublimate them in ways less harmful than war.

This belief prompted me, in December, 1942, to submit to eighty-four leading American social psychologists an extensive questionnaire on the subject of peace planning, with special ref-

erence to the rôle of the individual. This article summarizes one section of that study.

Answers were received from fifty-two psychologists, all of them well-known, and most of them having done special research on war problems. The policies submitted to them for judgment were the following:

(1) Give workers more self-expression through increasing trend toward industrial democracy.

(2) Guarantee a minimum standard of living to every family (in relation to economic resources of nation, etc.).

(3) Educate for scientific thinking in human relations, trying to achieve insight into animistic "scapegoat" reactions.

(4) Increase opportunities for higher education for youth in lower economic strata.

(5) Decrease concentration of wealth through government-financed co-operatives, consumer and producer.

(6) Reduce emphasis on competition and getting ahead in our culture.

(7) Provide widespread mental hygiene clinics for adults and especially for children.

(8) Give increased opportunities for individual prestige and recognition through hobbies, contests, etc., not connected with the economic system.

(9) Foster measures leading toward a *decentralization* of both political and economic power in this and other nations.

(10) Encourage sublimation through aggressive sports, etc.

(11) Require compulsory labor service for all able-bodied youth for one year (conservation, forestry, etc.).

(12) Require all candidates for high public office to file a certificate of mental health signed by three licensed psychiatrists.

The proposals are arranged in order of approval. The first three received virtually unanimous endorsements as markedly valuable; the next five were agreed to be of considerable value; and the last four were considered to have little, if any merit. Of the four which stand highest, two have to do with education.

Political scientists have long held that one cause of war is the attempt of a ruling class to protect its privileged position against revolutionary discontent at home. The foreigner provides a substitute enemy upon whom the disgruntled masses can vent their hatred, otherwise potential dynamite for social upheaval. The

foreign aggression functions as a "lightning rod" for danger at home. Psychologists recognize this possibility. Isolationism, in this view, is no more feasible with respect to domestic economy than with respect to foreign trade or foreign political policy. Unemployment on the Danube or the Ruhr is our business. The aggressions set off by frustrations abroad may shortly be roaring about our doorsteps at home. Planning for durable peace must try to minimize these frustrations all around the world.

But what we do with our aggressions is also of great importance. Even in peacetime, most of us release a great deal of tension through hatred of foreigners, minority groups and other scapegoats. *The schools must teach young people to recognize this tendency; to acknowledge hostile feeling instead of repressing it; to deflect such emotion into constructive action rather than into attacks on foreigners, Jews, Negroes and similar groups.*

It is obvious that an educational program oriented to such a goal will differ to a revolutionary extent from our established school system. The achievement of such an educational outcome will call for an individual-centered school, one in which emotional insight and self-control receive higher marks than accuracy in placing decimals or commas. The school must indoctrinate an appreciation of the inherent worth of every individual: his right to freedom for the gratification of his desires, in so far as these do not unfairly affect other people; his right to self-development and self-expression. The only way we can insure ourselves against the catastrophes of war is to insure, as far as possible, against the catastrophes of peace — the day-by-day hatred and conflict between individuals and between communities. This is the view held by leading American psychologists regarding the ultimate basis of durable peace. To me it does not seem strange. It looks like the application of a philosophy of life to which we commonly attach the name "Christianity."

Political isolationism is now generally discredited. Economic isolationism still has great strength, but is under frontal attack. *Educational isolationism,* by contrast, is generally unchallenged in the United States and England. It even receives support from such established propagators of internationalism as the *New York Times.*

Educational isolationism proposes that the educational problems

of Germany, or Russia, or the United States, or Japan, can be approached as segregated issues to be considered and solved separately. Realism denies this. Educating Germans against the vicious doctrine of the *Herrenvolk,* the master-race, is part and parcel of problems in England, America and Japan. Our southern states are only slightly less tragically infected with this poison than the Axis peoples; among our northern citizens and our British allies, we find the germ well-established if not virulent. Delusions of grandeur are part of the mythology of every organized social group of any size. Ruthless selfishness is far more prevalent than we care to admit. Historians know only too well how patriotism has distorted facts. A given incident is often treated so differently by the participants that a person familiar with one version could not recognize the other. If we face this situation honestly, we realize that post-war education — education for durable peace — can only be approached on a world-wide basis. We cannot, without abandoning psychological realism, deflate the collective representations with which German, Italian and Japanese egos are identified, while continuing to inflate Anglo-American symbols.

Disarmament cannot be unilateral, for military disarmament of a single nation may invite attack, or may provoke such profound resentment as to be a real menace to peace. Similarly, complete restructuring of a nation's educational system, without parallel action by its neighbors, could have equally disastrous results.

The Scandinavian countries have shown us that co-operation in the field of education is possible. Joint commissions have edited textbooks and advised on the treatment of controversial issues. This approach must be applied on a global scale if we are to have peace.

Are United Nations history texts to give only our side of this war, with no attention to the (real and fancied) grievances of the Axis peoples? Is Fascism to be treated as a phenomenon unique to the enemy, or shall we frankly assay its potential strength everywhere? Shall we identify group aggressiveness with particular peoples and ignore the frequent aggressions of ourselves and our allies? If we do these things in our schools, we shall indeed be "educating for death."

We need an International Commission on Education, which should be convened now, while hostilities continue and the horrors

of war lend emotional urgency to the need for a durable peace. This Commission should include representatives of the Underground from the Axis and Occupied Countries; exiled democrats from these nations; Japanese liberals such as the Kagawa group; representatives of advanced groups in India, China and the Middle East; and educators from the United Nations.

This Commission should be instructed to canvass the whole task of education in the light of what experts agree must be done (cf. pp. 255-256). The objectives should be formulated in terms of dynamic personal attitudes, rather than purely intellectual concepts. It is much more important, for example, that the Germans acquire some sympathy for the Poles, based on their hardships of 1939-1944, than that principles of sovereignty be introduced into high-school textbooks. And this rule cuts both ways. Poles and Russians must learn that a great many Germans suffered during that period under the domination of their Nazi masters.

The preparation of a specific list of objectives, to say nothing of the detailed content and teaching devices by which these objectives would be achieved, will require patient work by educators of all nations. Space permits me here to list only the general goals which should become criteria for specific approaches:

(1) sympathy which extends across national borders; development of "tolerance for difference";

(2) recognition that national groups are more similar than different; that differences are matters of degree; that black-white thinking is unrealistic;

(3) decreasing identification with national symbols; strengthening identification with international or supra-national symbols;

(4) self-understanding and insight into aggressive impulses, with special reference to scapegoat reactions and animistic thinking;

    (a) recognition of the wide distribution of individual and group egotism, ruthlessness, and other traits brought to high focus in the Nazi-Samurai mentality;

    (b) awareness of the rôle of frustrations and the universal tendency toward displacement;

    (c) sensitivity to the ease with which rationalizations are advanced; applications of statistical and experimental checks to wishful thinking.

Education organized around such objectives would still deal with the concrete facts of history, politics and economics — but with a difference. Textbooks must be revised to correct misstatements, omissions and distortions, of course. But the major purpose should be to establish certain attitudes and interpretations. Facts as such can solve no international problems — although a fact-minded approach to problems would be a great help. The necessity for this change in orientation suggests that educational inertia may be as serious an obstacle as the flag-waving jingoes of our country or the surviving Nazis in Germany. Nevertheless, if men of good will from the nations of the world can get together and establish such plans, there may yet be a chance of establishing a durable peace. (*End of Dr. Stagner's reply.*)

From the foregoing suggestions we seem to have an articulate and psychologically workable conception of world education oriented toward mutual understanding as a basis for world co-operation; this is in fact thoroughly consonant with the broad plans formulated by a half-dozen educational committees and reported in the press in the last three years. But there is a need for concrete ways and means of implementing these proposals. Knowing that the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators had formulated some practical recommendations, I addressed their Executive Secretary, Dr. William G. Carr, and his associate, Jane Gibson Likert, with the broad problem:

Is there any practical way to implement the idea of world-wide education for peace?

Dr. Carr's and Mrs. Likert's Reply

The teaching of international good will has characterized the schools of the United States for many years. A sincere and rather successful effort has been made to develop the attitudes and to provide the information by which our young people could learn to feel a kinship with the people of other nations. The fact that the approach has often been slightly sentimental and idealistic does not

mean that such efforts have been bad, but only that they have been incomplete. We need to add to our past attempts a somewhat tougher realism that has often been lacking. Education for international understanding has sometimes suffered from an unwillingness to admit that there can be evil men and evil forces in the world and that these forces must be faced, and checked, if possible, before they become dangerous, and crushed if they do.

Education for international good will in the past has rather effectively glorified peace and friendship among nations; but it has not been equally concerned with finding practical ways and means whereby the forces making for war might be controlled and the obstacles to peace removed.

One step along the road to international understanding is the effective preparation of teachers. Those who guide and instruct the young must have not only a strong sense of responsibility for world order, but also a thorough understanding of international issues. Greater emphasis on the problems and possibilities of world co-operation is needed in many teacher-education institutions. For teachers already on the job, a wisely administered system of teacher exchange and travel is required. Except in the colleges and universities, this very effective way of promoting a world viewpoint and broad knowledge has been almost entirely neglected.

A broad understanding of international issues on the part of the teaching profession is only a small beginning. We Americans must all learn our way around among the various types of international organization that have been tried or suggested. We should consider the limits to which we are prepared to go in joint international commitments. We should achieve mutual confidence with the peoples of the other United Nations. We should emerge from this war a stronger and more purposeful democracy than we were when it began. We should develop an understanding of international issues too strong to be shaken by specious slogans.

For adult education and educational leadership generally in this country now face the supreme task of their history. No plans for international organization, however perfect, can succeed without the support of the people. Only education can strengthen in our adult population this sense of civic responsibility and help it to reach intelligent decisions; only education can prepare the on-

coming generation of youth to approve and carry out these decisions.

Achieving peaceful and just international relations is a complicated task. Economic questions of colonies and raw materials are part of the problem; so also are political questions of minorities and boundaries, legal questions of treaties and international jurisdiction, educational questions which touch on the way people think and behave. It is a good thing to strengthen international economic, political and legal organizations; to help provide a growing measure of economic security and prosperity for all men and all nations is also decent and wise. But economic fair play, systems of law, and political organization together, however essential, are insufficient. War will not be brought under control merely by providing men with nicely drawn boundaries, legal codes and enough to eat. Men act upon impulses that reach deeper than politics and higher than appetites. Knowledge and attitudes conducive to peace are developed by education. In certain aspects, therefore, education is a matter of international concern — just as much so as foreign trade, or munitions factories, or diplomatic negotiations.

Effective prosecution of the war, as well as intelligent planning for the peace, would be greatly aided by the prompt formulation of a *constructive educational policy by and for the United Nations.* Some preliminary conferences and investigations looking to this end have already been inaugurated by both public and private agencies. Action by the governments concerned ought to follow *now.* A democratically organized and administered United Nations Council on education would facilitate such action. This council could help to increase the wartime usefulness of education in the several nations. Information could be exchanged on the plans found most effective for training for the war industries and the armed forces. School programs and curriculum changes, adopted by the various nations to meet wartime needs, could be explained, studied and applied wherever appropriate. Governmental policies relating to such matters as the support of education in wartime, the means of maintaining an adequate staff of teachers, and the use of older students to meet wartime emergencies could also be analyzed, with significant mutual benefits to all the participating nations. It could assist in planning for educational reconstruction in the countries

that the enemy has invaded, in lands where teachers have been killed, libraries burned, schoolhouses destroyed, and cultural activities bled white. Post-war reconstruction is not limited to measures of sanitation and nutrition. Food and medical supplies may well be the most urgent need, but the most difficult and lasting reconstruction is the rebuilding of faith and purpose. That, in large part, is an educational process.

The occupation of enemy territory by United Nations military forces requires that these forces assume some degree of control in those areas over the normal functions of civil government, including that of education. The proposed council should be prepared to advise the forces of occupation regarding the encouragement of liberal tendencies in educational matters.

After the end of hostilities, the operating functions of the United Nations Council on educational policy should be taken over by a *permanent international agency for education*. This permanent agency should, as its first function, give assistance in the field of intellectual co-operation. It should stimulate and encourage the fraternal contact of scholars, librarians, and teachers in various fields of specialization. These functions compose a great expansion of the work of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation of the League of Nations.

Second, the agency should be a great center and clearinghouse for studies on educational subjects. It should have authority to request educational data from all participating nations. It should maintain a library of educational literature, including files of educational tests and measurements, school building plans, textbooks, teaching materials, recordings, and visual aids to education.

The agency should have a clear-cut appraisal function. It should be solemnly charged with the duty of studying the instructional programs in all countries, in order to determine whether their effect would be aggressive, militaristic, or otherwise dangerous to the peace of the world. In the event that the international education agency should conclude that, in its opinion, instruction dangerous to the peace of the world is occurring, the agency should file a notice to that effect with the government of the country concerned, citing the objectionable practices as concretely as possible. Full opportunity for discussion and conference should be provided. If

no adjustments are made in a reasonable period of time, a full report on the matter should be submitted, together with documents and evidence, to whatever over-all agency may be established to deal with international affairs in general. The international agency for education should be required to make this report public.

The specific responsibilities of the international agency for education should not extend beyond study, discussion, public report, and referral. Police functions in the international realm cannot be successfully mixed with those of education. It is to be hoped that it would never be necessary to apply this power of the international agency for education. Perhaps it would not be needed. But we would be foolish to neglect the possibility. Never again must educational measures, like those of the Axis, brutalize an entire generation. If something like that starts again, anywhere in this world, we ought to know about it at once. The international agency for education would be on the lookout and sound the alarm.

A more constructive and continuous activity of the agency should be the formulation and progressive improvement of educational standards, particularly for the elementary education of the common people. Just as the International Labour Office has encouraged the adoption of standards regarding working conditions, so the international agency for education could propose educational standards to the governments of the participating nations.

The agency might well administer, with the co-operation of the participating governments, far-flung systems of student travel, student exchange, and teacher exchange. Attention should be given to improving the kind and distribution as well as to increasing the amounts of student travel and foreign study.

Among all the possible duties of an international agency for education, none should rank above that of deliberate leadership and encouragement for the teaching of international understanding. The emphasis in this part of the agency's leadership should be positive. To think of education for international understanding merely as a means of preventing war is to commit the same fallacy as to think of training in national citizenship merely as a means of preventing crimes of violence. The international office of education should take the lead in formulating a program for development of attitudes toward world affairs, not fundamentally unlike that which our

schools now attempt to develop toward national affairs — attitudes of responsibility, tolerance, respect for principle, desire for justice.

Such a program will not mean the end of patriotic education. It would tend to discourage the aggressive, self-centered caricature of patriotism, which actually harms, morally and materially, the country and the people which are the supposed objects of its devotion.

Organized education has a significant and hitherto unused contribution to make to the cause of peace. The effectiveness of the educators' contribution will be in proportion to his knowledge and understanding of international issues and his ability and willingness to act as a responsible citizen in helping to find the solution of those issues. (*End of Dr. Carr's and Mrs. Likert's reply.*)

This statement certainly indicates a sweeping yet specific plan. Supposing now that this type of plan for world re-education can be achieved, with Germany and Japan ultimately integrated into the picture, what shall we say about the readiness of youth to participate whole-heartedly; what shall we say about that *eagerness to learn* which is the very heart of education? We have had current events and social studies in our high schools, indeed in our elementary schools, for many years. Does the experiment suggest that young people are ready for international thinking? Does it suggest that they have become more so in recent years? Has the picture changed since the *Middletown* high-school boys and girls said in 1924 that the United States is unquestionably the best country in the world, and also, in an overwhelming majority, that the Allies fought in a wholly righteous cause in 1914-1918? Is American nationalism changing in such a way as to influence the thought and the feeling of children and adolescents? Has not the war experience intensified their nationalism even to the point of jingoism? And will not the inevitable tensions of the armistice period relax the warmth and friendliness for our Allies, and prepare young people gladly for a return to their sense of American independence and superiority? I do not offer any opinion upon this issue by itself, though my chief work is with youth and it is a privilege to be in touch with children and young people from many parts of the United States.

Rather, I will put to Dr. Ralph Gundlach, of the University of Washington, the question:

> Can college students be gotten to think seriously about the prevention of World War III?

Dr. Gundlach's Reply

This question calls for an analysis of the factors which discourage or inhibit serious thinking about social events and those that encourage such thinking in college. My own bias may be unwarrantedly optimistic in the face of the difficulties.

Our schools are not designed or operated so that students consider or act upon current or future social events. During the war crisis some courses are offered that do have an immediate and practical bearing upon the details of war and production, but these are few and temporary. Courses in the professions, in engineering, sciences, arts and literature do not get around to the topic of the prevention of war. The social sciences including history, political science, anthropology, sociology, and social psychology may devote some time to a mention of wars, but usually their emphasis is not upon the control of the future social order and the possibility of eliminating such phenomena as wars. The texts may contain a few paragraphs in the back of the books which are hurried over in the last days of the term's work.

It would be possible to orient many courses toward the consideration of problems bearing on the future course of the world. This might take more, however, than a change in the direction of thinking of college teachers, or even of teaching personnel.

The teachers and administrators of many schools seem to have a policy of discouraging serious thinking and acting, even on the part of a small body of their students. It is permissible for students to feel that wars are horrid, and to wish that we might achieve peace, but policy has been opposed to action or discussion by the students. During the last decade many student groups at various colleges attempted to start discussion groups concerning the depression and peace. Many of these were harassed by the administration; their attempts to get various speakers were denied, and

in a number of places "outside speakers" were banned by the college administration. Students who attempted to organize some sort of action on current issues were sometimes threatened with dismissal. Students were counseled that the proper attitude for them was one of silent contemplation of the social scene, of humble inquiry, or suspended, inanimate judgment. Even now student groups that attempt to organize discussion and action on such problems as price control, housing, racial discrimination, wages and living standards, are discouraged in the same ways by many professors and by many academic administrations. We "stub the toe" of an inquiring mind.

The policy of such administrations is usually a reflection of the attitudes of the dominant social group of the community, who express their attitudes formally through boards or regents. There is considerable public pressure to pattern the college boy and girl according to certain harmless, gay stereotypes. This standardization of the ideals of the college student into sweet conformity with the thinking, ideals, and goals of the important families, and the most vociferous utterances of the press, may encourage endowments and grants, and may keep up a selected enrollment, and it avoids certain "unfavorable publicity" in the more yellowish press, but it does not encourage the practice of clear teaching with regard to the structure and the dynamics of society.

In fact, various "patriotic" groups and certain newspaper publishers have even recently been responsible for campaigns designed to discredit the whole school system and many of our distinguished teachers. These pressure groups have been successful in causing the removal from school use of many textbooks such as those of Professor Rugg, and the dismissal of many instructors whose teaching or inquiries they find distasteful. The approach is called "anti-radical." On a national scale there has been a consistent effort to keep scholars and scientists out of positions of public policy formation and administration since the early days of the depression. In those days the experts were attacked mercilessly as "brain trusters," and more recently Congress has thrown out professors from most important positions in the Office of Price Administration and some other war agencies. Faculty and students alike are attacked as ivory-towered, impractical, foolish idealists, and at the same time they are discouraged from getting out of the ivory tower and par-

ticipating in the vital problems of policy-making, or taking significant political action.

The consequences of these pressure-patterns of home, school and community upon the college student to conform is reflected in the values and attitudes of our typical college students, and in the nature of the deviates from that typical, stereotyped pattern. The general attitude of students is a vague general feeling that war is wrong, that "politics" are futile and bad, and that they as persons would, if asked, like to do "good." But their approach to problems is entirely individual. They feel futile, or cynical, because they consider themselves as isolated individuals, small little persons who can have no possible influence on the course of history. Even those old enough to vote do not find it worth while to discover the issues and to decide how to ballot in most elections. They set their goal in the direction of personal pleasure, personal economic gain and security, individually achieved. Many students actually find the war a personal benefit. They get paid, now, to go to school, and they have no worries about food, clothing, shelter. They look forward to job security, and to government health and accident insurance and other benefits for the rest of their lives.

Most students, then, accept persons who become interested in local or national political affairs, or international problems, as being legitimate opportunists, seeking a career in our competitive individualistic tradition. They look perhaps with tolerance upon those persons whom they consider missionary-minded, and unselfishly trying to "do good," who devote time to the discussion of world peace and the fellowship of man. And they fear and reject as "crackpot communistic radicals," those individuals or groups that, out of the classroom, dare criticize the conventional political and economic folkways.

These items that have been mentioned are some of the major factors that stand in the way of getting college students to think seriously about the prevention of World War III. The difficulties do not lie primarily with the nature of the student. Our young people are the most vigorous and enthusiastic creatures, and will do plenty of serious thinking, talking and acting about any problem that they see as significant that provides them an opportunity for participation, and for productive contribution. One could not

seriously ask such a question about Chinese students, or Soviet students, or even about thousands of the youngsters in our own country who have been provided with some encouragement and guidance, and are even now doing so much for the world.

Our problem is not with the students, but with more deep-lying factors in the school system and in the social community which determines the pattern of the schools. The schools are not an isolated part of society, but are an integral member of the interlocking institutions which constitute the social order. Our society has been sick, torn by internal dissension and conflict, divided in goals and tactics, distorted by expansive and repressive group pressures. The local community and national factors which were responsible for the slow-down of our national equipment to fit an economic system of scarcity and curtailed production were also responsible for distorting the quality and direction of thinking of our faculty, and their students; and the outcome of these pressures, as we have seen by our own experience, was an era of narrow nationalistic isolationism, of professional red-baiting, of the aggressive acceptance of commercial ethics as Christian.

But participation in the world war is destroying many cramping delusions and undermining many of the myths that restrained our culture and education in the past decade. The most important thing the war has done for the colleges is to remove some pressures that confine and distort the educational program. The demands of the war are destroying many of these restraints, and have resulted in the integration of our economy and of much of our educational system, so that student life is more a preparation for adult responsibilities. A premium is placed upon significance and competence rather than upon conformity to artificial and decaying stereotypes. Thus the more effectively organized we become to identify and defeat Fascism abroad, the greater become the resources and strength of democracy at home, and the greater the opportunities for maintaining peace in the world.

As we pass from the war into the period of reconstruction, the new patterns of our social order and of our new ways of thinking will begin to jell. The most promising factor is that the world, including our own country and our schools, cannot settle back into the frames of the nineteen-thirties. How the schools in our society

shape up is in large part a function of the shape of society, and more immediately a function of the participation of both new and ex-soldier students, of faculty, and of interested members of the community, including not only parents and business, but also labor.

There are three levels within which the students (and faculty) can move toward the integration of the schools with the post-war world: political, economic and social. Extending the vote to soldiers will aid in the enfranchisement of persons of eighteen years or older. The extension of the suffrage can serve to focalize the thinking and acting of college students about the political and economic alternatives which will shape the world. The extension of the suffrage will be vigorously opposed, and will be won only through a hard fight. The economic interrelations of school and society have already taken a new turn, with the great emphasis upon practical skills and technical ability. The end of the war will see a tremendous interest in specific vocational training. There will probably be many arrangements to dovetail schooling with practical work experience in industry and government.

However, here as always, we face a fundamental conflict found in our contemporary society. An effort may be made to exclude or limit the liberal, social education of such technically trained students, and to seek to throw them into a pool of cheap labor, scrambling against organized labor on a "free" market. Such disastrous consequences can be avoided if the technically trained student grows up in a democratic world and has his rôle in it interpreted through competent courses in social sciences and through participation with political and social groups. The social integration of students with the community may well come through the extension and expansion of the programs of state and national organizations concerned with welfare, co-operation, fellowship, interfaith and international brotherhood.

Generally speaking, if we wish to get the students — or the faculty or the community — to think seriously about the prevention of the next war, we must apply some of our democratic morale-building techniques. We must make clear to all what our common goals are; and show that we can share and identify with groups that have goals which we accept as good, and can significantly participate in

their achievement. We must make it both actually true and intellectually clear that the students' own personal security, prosperity, and future comfort depends upon the prevention of wars. We must make the elimination of wars and the causes of wars a personally significant, valuable thing.

Secondly, we must point out that wars are not inevitable; and that the structure of our institutions is organic, flexible, subject to change with pressure; we can shape society toward our ideals. There is now available a great deal of pertinent material both about the causes of wars and depressions, about the nature of Fascism and democracy, and about how to change society.

The third step consists in making clear that although a single individual is not effective in determining the course of society against the weight of convention and the pressure of vested interests, one can nevertheless be effective if he can co-operate, participate as a member of some group. This sums up to the slogan: democracy in education; education for democracy. (*End of Dr. Gundlach's reply.*)

The conception of world-minded education, internationally organized in close interrelation with a close federation of sovereign states, prompts a serious, often cynically phrased question: "Can the Germans and Japanese be included?" My own answer is that if they cannot, it is not a world plan at all. As Edgar Snow, of the *Saturday Evening Post*, tersely answers it: "We cannot convince the Germans and the Japanese that the divine right of the superior race, and aggression, conquest of colonies, and the subjection of one people by another, are wicked and unprofitable practices, unless we can persuade ourselves and Europe of the same thing — and act upon the persuasion by organizing a brotherhood with all nations on a basis of equality and mutual respect."

But I should prefer to rephrase the question, and address it to Dr. Eugene Lerner, of Sarah Lawrence College, in these words:

Does the re-education of Germany and Japan constitute a separate problem, as distinguished from world re-education in general?

Dr. Lerner's Reply

It constitutes a *special* problem; but this problem is inseparably tied up with re-education everywhere. Doing that job fairly adequately is well-nigh impossible without a sufficiently enlightened leadership and public opinion in this country, England and Russia — as well as in the other United Nations. The aim of psychological reconstruction ought to be the production of more and more democratic personalities and cultures everywhere. The various nations of the world show differential *lags* in this direction. While being unique in many respects, Switzerland and Sweden (a republic with heterogeneous population and a monarchy with homogeneous composition) may be assumed to rank toward the optimal end of the continuum. This suggests that it should be possible to raise the level of personal and public mental hygiene the world over — without doing away with cultural diversity. Cultural diversity or local self-determination is, a necessary but not sufficient condition of the mental hygiene tasks ahead of us in Germany, Japan and elsewhere. A certain minimum of accelerated cultural diffusion in terms of re-education is indispensable. In so far as outmoded social norms or outright unsanitary forms of provincialism block the demonstrably sound aims of world-wide reconstruction, the principle of cultural diversity and local self-determination must be subordinated to the requirements of world mental health. First things ought to come first, as in other phases of international public health.

Specifically, the re-education of Germany and Japan can be neither left to the arbitrary discretion of these countries, with the mental-hygienically more advanced cultures passively standing by in an informal advisory capacity, nor "enforced" from without, as if one dealt with almost completely deteriorated "patients." Questions of "severity" *versus* "leniency" should be resolved in terms of alternating sequences and proportions of "active" and "passive," "direct" and "indirect" techniques of preventive mental hygiene and psychotherapy. The problem involves the requirements of social psychiatry and constructive human engineering applied to whole nations: in the field of child education and adult education (including parent education), in recreational, religious and leadership work, vocational guidance, personnel work, and in the whole realm of management-labor relations.

Specialists in individual and group mental hygiene do not moralize about their clients; they are not interested in "punishing" or "rewarding" as such. They act now leniently, now firmly or even "severely," now directly, now indirectly: all this in order to produce more self-reliant, more flexible and objective, more friendly and co-operative personalities and "group atmospheres." These criteria of increased emotional maturity and stability, requiring constant training and retraining in the management of love and hate needs in everyday human relations, roughly indicate minimal standards for the production of more democratic personalities and cultures everywhere. "Freedom" in political and economic matters, as envisaged by various contemporary practitioners and planners in government and in business, is simply not feasible without a certain minimal emotional readiness for wanting and using such benefits in a constructive and democratic way.

To understand the implications of such mental hygiene perspectives and to be ready to act on them in an experimentally humane spirit cannot preclude compromises and superficial *ad hoc* solutions of immediately pressing problems, starting from where we are, even in the more democratic countries. But we ought to try to make sure that such "Realpolitik" does not postpone facing the more basic psychological realities too long.

This calls for sharply accelerated enlightenment of leaders of government, business and labor and of public opinion in general. Non-partisan "political" education of this mental hygiene sort would be especially important to provide for members of the armed forces here and in England — lest they unwittingly provide more than their share to post-war lethargy, and a regressive note in public thinking. This would seem to be an urgent task for co-operating teams of specialists and professional workers, including psychiatrists, social workers, educators, psychologists, anthropologists and other social scientists. "Committees of correspondence" could begin part of the task. Carefully planned letters to the editor (cf. the plan of the Council of Democracy), systematic statements to congressmen and other leaders of government, business and labor, more deliberately and effectively planned radio broadcasts, pamphlets and popularized articles would be needed. There is surely no *a priori* reason for the best-informed members of the community to remain con-

spicuously silent and absent in public discussions of acute issues properly involving basic principles and methods of mental hygiene. This special inarticulateness of professional groups is perhaps the most dangerous form of the "let George do it" attitude — unwittingly weighting the influence of more ignorant, irresponsible and vociferous individuals and pressure groups. At best, it can seriously reenforce the well-meaning, if frequently regressive, apathy of the general public. It is especially in this sense that the difficult tasks of re-education in Germany and Japan are inescapably tied up with the corresponding job in the United States, England and similar countries.

It is fairly clearly established that in both Germany and Japan we are up against widespread trends of unsanitary provincialism and strongly embedded norms of very immature emotional conduct. Gorer's suggestive analysis of the dominant themes in Japanese character structure and culture (69), though incomplete, tentatively indicates possible approaches to reconditioning. At certain key points, there is a strikingly corresponding picture to be had about personality formation related to militarism in Nazi Germany, along with obvious differences. The rigidly repressive early training in cleanliness and orderliness, the one-sided displacement of aggressive impulses in the male's treatment of females (and, subsequently, of other "weak" persons or social "inferiors") and the extreme submissiveness to male seniors or other similar persons of authority are especially noteworthy. Obviously, we can find varieties and more or less marked residues of such ego-development even in the more democratic cultures as well — though on closer examination there would appear to be considerable differences in degree *and* kind here. It has been shown clinically and experimentally that an increase in authoritarian relationships in "group atmospheres" is inversely correlated with optimal socio-emotional growth in self-reliance, constructiveness, objectivity, friendly mutual aid and team spirit, even in more democratic cultures (99, 99a). Hence, in keeping with the principles and methods of child guidance, general mental hygiene and free inquiry in science, the aim should be the fostering of more and more liberal and equitable "atmospheres" in family life, in school life, in industry and in governmental procedures. Realistic re-education should thus encompass the whole

life-span of the individual and all the key patterns of given societies.
Re-conditioning *only* in terms of formal education or school-life
would seem doomed to failure, just as purely economic or political
reforms as such would probably be insufficient in this connection.
Here again the tasks of "domestic" and "foreign" reconstruction
overlap.

There is a great variety of fairly well-tested techniques in in-
dividual and group therapy; in face-to-face as well as in more im-
personal modification of social attitudes; in the diagnosis and pre-
diction of attitudes and opinions; in gauging the effectiveness of
given educational and treatment procedures. Some of these can be
further improved or adapted to particular needs on the spot, as we
go along, and additional techniques can be developed. The
matter of selection and training of personnel, both in the more
democratic countries and within Germany and Japan proper, is
crucial.

In the field of military aviation, we have at long last recognized
that trained air-force personnel had to be expanded to well over
two million, in the army alone. The fact that in psychiatry, social
work, psychology, pedagogy, anthropology and related fields train-
ing is somewhat longer, simply calls for getting started with a
vastly expanded training program at the earliest possible moment.
Since it is already very late, it should be evident that there is no
more time to waste in purely theoretical planning of re-education
in general. Without an adequate number of adequately selected
and adequately trained psychiatrists, educators, social workers,
psychologists and anthropologists, i.e., without basic tooling-up, the
job simply cannot be done. Planning here must take into account
probable domestic needs as well as "export" needs. Certainly there
is no unavoidable shortage in college-trained women. Exiles and
refugees, Americans of German and Japanese extraction, nay, se-
lected prisoners of war (cf. certain Russian precedents here) ought
to be likewise considered in this connection. The more of them we
can provide with professional training in social work, social psy-
chiatry, progressive education, psychology and anthropology, the
better.

A great number of such trained personnel will be needed not only
for instituting and supervising the kind of re-conditioning pro-

cedures we have in mind — but also for selecting and training native German and Japanese personnel on the spot, shortly after the cessation of hostilities. Probably only a fraction of such native personnel will have a chance for getting their training, or even a part of their training, in the United States or England and similar countries. Since the major job in psychological reconstruction will have to be done by adequately contra-indoctrinated Germans and Japanese, this problem would seem most urgent to prepare for. Too many of the most suitable professional men and liberal educators will have perished to count too much on "underground" resources. At any rate, caution and common sense would seem to suggest that it is better to gamble on playing safe: to train a greater number of professional specialists than might be needed, rather than *vice versa*. For one thing, it should be possible to use the "surplus," if any, for domestic reconstruction and for reconstruction in countries like Poland — where there will be a dearth of personnel needed for professional training programs as well as for direct application of professional skills.

To insure realistically balanced reconstruction, at given points supervisory and advisory teams of different specialists would have to work on problems — in a somewhat interdepartmental or even de-departmentalized fashion. In this country, we already have the device of psychiatrist, psychologist and social worker or teacher working *as a unit*. From even cursory experience in a relocation camp for Japanese, I am impressed with the possibilities of teamwork by psychiatrist, anthropologist, psychologist and practical administrator. A good many costly mistakes might be avoided in both domestic and foreign re-educational programs if systematic provisions could be made for such teamwork, all along the line. The very complexity of problems, with hardly any direct precedent, calls for multiprofessional perspectives from the start. (*End of Dr. Lerner's reply.*)

In view of the agreement of our contributors as to orientation of post-war education and as to the nature of the objectives which might be pursued in the interests of peace, it was felt urgently necessary to ask a professional student of education to tell us con-

cretely what post-war education in the United States will be like; this concrete account might serve as background for the reconstruction task already defined. So I framed for Dr. Goodwin B. Watson of Teachers College, Columbia University, the question:

What trends affecting post-war American education are already clear, and how do they bear upon the maintenance of peace?

Dr. Watson's Reply

The most pressing task of educational leadership in the next year or two must be to think through the tasks of reconversion from military training to post-war education. Industries have products already developed, with the advertising ready to go out. Many states, counties, and cities have blueprints for their post-war public works. A score of agencies in Washington have been concerned with post-war planning. Education will not be up with the procession unless its leaders make rapid progress envisioning the adjustments which will follow demobilization.

One of the most discussed public questions in England today is the new educational reform bill. Every war in recent centuries has been followed in England by a big step forward in education; this war will be no exception. I hope that in the United States our very necessary concern with providing jobs and working out plans of world co-operation will not keep us from planning also for a better educational program than the world has ever known before. As I see it, the success of international organization as well as of economic reconstruction depends upon more vital education. Our first premise is that the educational objective of sound and healthy personality growth the world over is not a "fad" nor a "frill," but a cardinal principle in making peaceful living possible.

The first step may well be to look over the changes which the war has brought to our schools, asking which of them represent developments we would want to carry over into the post-war period. Eight will be briefly reviewed: (1) nursery schools; (2) vocational training; (3) youth's national service; (4) acceleration; (5) intensive concentration; (6) area organization; (7) visual aids and other teaching devices; and (8) quality education at public expense.

(1) *Nursery Schools.* With aid from the Lanham Act funds,

many communities have organized nursery schools to care for the children of working mothers. In others, mothers have organized co-operative nursery schools. Many school boards will soon face the question whether the education of young children is to be included at public expense. Speech, motor adjustments, social relationships, and artistic aptitudes develop better in children at nursery school than they do in any but the most exceptional homes. If we really believe that rich personalities love peace more than do frustrated ones, we cannot afford to overlook such an obvious aid in taking the first step in the right direction.

(2) *Vocational Training.* Our schools went vocational in a big way to help train workers for war production. The vocational training needed for peace will be very different. Before the war there were about ten million American workers in factories. The war has doubled this number. Allowing for a vigorous program of post-war manufacturing, it is unlikely that more than fifteen million factory workers will be needed. There will be little need for schools to train mechanics and machine-operators for post-war jobs. Our vocational program in the schools should look more to the fields which are likely to expand rapidly after the war, involving work which cannot be done by machines, notably the *service industries.*

(3) *National Service for Youth.* The contribution of the Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Youth Administration residential centers before the war had already raised the question of extending such opportunities to all youth. When war found so many young men below their physical par, the pressure for compulsory physical training increased. Those who have gone through basic military training are likely to come back with a feeling that it would be good for the younger boys and girls to go through some more or less similar experience. A further contributing force will come from the need to provide full employment, and the feeling that youth in training will be withdrawn for a time from competition for jobs.

With many considerations pointing toward some period of national service, the choice for education is likely to be not whether or no, but when, how, for how long, and under what auspices, military or educational.

I would like to propose that the senior high school plan a twelve-month program, involving as many as possible of the values of the

CCC, NYA and army-navy training programs, in addition to the usual endeavors of the secondary school. This means using the summer vacations during the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth years. Some of the time, in fall, winter and spring, as well as in summer, would be spent in camps and at various types of physical labor which render needed services to community, state and nation. One unit of about two months would be under direct military or naval control, assuring that this country has a reservoir of manpower ready if it should be demanded. A further service to army and navy would be a vocational training program giving every boy or girl, in addition to a major breadwinning peacetime occupation, a secondary training for possible military needs.

For many reasons it would be desirable to keep the major responsibility for this post-war youth program in the schools. The alternative is two unrelated programs for youth, under different auspices, sometimes duplicating, sometimes competing, each part failing to utilize some of the opportunities for integration. We have talked a good deal about "integration," "the whole child," and the unity of all aspects of personality. Here is a situation in which school men can, with sufficient foresight, preserve an opportunity to keep education integral.

(4) One of the wartime changes which has most impressed the public is *acceleration*. Young people are speeding up; giving up the long vacations; finishing high school and college more quickly. Do we want to return to the more leisurely schedule? I am sure that many weary teachers and harassed administrators would like nothing better. The public, however, may prefer acceleration, and may seek out those schools and colleges which will continue to drive ahead on a twelve-month working year.

(5) *Intensive Concentration*. Military units have introduced in education the idea that an enormous increase in speed of learning can be achieved by concentration on a particular subject. Giving several hours a day to one learning job, students have accomplished in a few weeks what would normally be spread over many months. The tests by which the efficiency of this kind of education must be judged are not yet completed. Perhaps we shall find that it is relatively inefficient, and that distributing the practice over longer time intervals lets new ideas and new skills soak in more thoroughly.

Right now, however, there are many who believe that the pre-war educational program was lax, attenuated, and needlessly drawn out.

It would be my own prediction that future curricula will not follow either the old-fashioned four or five subjects at once, or the conceivable new division into a series of intensive units, each occupying almost full time until mastered. Rather, each will be found particularly satisfactory for some forms of learning. A whole new series of educational researches seems to me to be called for: What subjects or skills are best mastered by assigning them a period of weeks or months, during which students work on them, with little distraction or interruption? What subjects or skills, on the other hand, are better spread over longer periods, with time for digestion and assimilation? If the inclusion of some blocs of time for intensive concentration on particular areas or techniques is the better way to give education, educational administrators will be ingenious enough to work out the procedure.

(6) *Area Organization.* Americans must be prepared for more participation in world affairs. We shall be one of the three great powers shaping the international scene. Many of the decisions that must be made will call for consent, and therefore for understanding, by the voters. American education, while not isolationist in intent, has often been provincial in content. Limited as may have been our understanding of American history, we still taught more of that than of the history of all the rest of the world. Today, with the U.S.S.R. and China likely to dominate across the Pacific as our good and powerful neighbors, there are very few pupils graduating from high schools with any detailed knowledge of the geography, history, economic life, racial composition, languages, literature, art or music of those nations. We have made excellent progress during the last few years in recognizing our neighbors to the south; a global curriculum still lies in the future.

One of the techniques for preparing men under army and navy auspices to operate in foreign countries has been the organization of training on the area principle. Those to work in a particular land study the language, the maps, the crops, the factories, the customs, the history, the political structure, economic problems, agencies of communication, and other important features, during a period of concentration on that area. The unit is not physical geography or

economics or art, skipping about from period to period and land to land, but a particular country. The facts from geography are interwoven with those from ethnology, public health, economics, and subjects too new to have academic names. What is really being studied is North Africa, or China, or Germany. The principle is not new to elementary and secondary education — we, too, have had our units on Switzerland or Mexico. These have usually been very elementary, however. The suggestion that pupils should not, in the future, study French but France; not Spanish but Chile; not Russian or Chinese, but the Soviet Union or China — this takes us into a new type of unit for our secondary and college curricula. The language will be learned along with all the other facts that are important in coming to understand the rôle that a nation will play in the years ahead. I hope that one of the first big post-war developments will be the selection of teachers for assignment to each chosen area, and their in-service training, including a period of travel in the country they are to teach. Internationalism will be taught, as far as possible, by beginning with international experience.

(7) *Devices and Aids.* Out of the military necessity were born numerous devices for speeding up learning. I hope that some of our educators who have been working on these training programs will, before they are demobilized, prepare reports on those which have worked out most effectively. We are told that some films have been developed which save hours of explaining in certain complicated mechanical operations. We are told that by standardizing instructions, pilots can be trained with less confusion. Careful analysis has discovered what the choice-points are, where the inexperienced are apt to take the wrong turning. In the attempt to speed up the learning of languages and the acquisition of physical toughness, new techniques have been invented. Every field of knowledge which has played a part in the military program has enjoyed some contributions. A careful effort should be made, immediately after the war, to bring together the various technical advances and to criticize their suitability for peacetime schooling, especially as it relates to international understanding.

(8) *Quality Education at Public Expense.* The most striking fact about wartime education is no particular device or principle of organization, but the fact that it was given to all with ability to

learn and to serve, regardless of expense. Those who went to college were not those whose parents had money to finance higher education; they were those who had the intellectual level to make efficient use of advanced courses. When it was decided that their services were needed, the young men and women sent to institutions for war-training were not asked to pay tuition, or board and room, or to take on odd jobs to earn their way. Every possible provision was made to keep their minds free for their college work. Diet was prescribed, and medical care provided for any emergency. Allotments were sent to help the folks back home get along. No expense was spared for the instruction. A three-month technical course might cost two hundred and fifty dollars per capita, in addition to all the living costs for students, but the cost was gladly paid.

How much of this attitude will carry over into a post-war period of education for world citizenship when people are likely to be worrying over the national debt? When the question is put, the conclusion seems foregone that it would be hopeless to think of continuing such lavish provisions. Yet before the war, the trend represented by NYA was already in the direction of making higher education available to those with brains but short on money. Although some regression from wartime subsidies is inevitable, educators may reasonably hope to preserve some of the gains. The public, for example, should be told the story of how education was given in the army, and asked whether that does not make sense; whether it is not worth as much to educate for winning the peace as to educate for winning the war. It is possible that the public is ready to go farther toward a genuinely free education for young people of ability than educational leaders have supposed. Almost the first provision to be made for returning veterans was the provision for more education at public expense. The considerations which have led gradually from the free elementary school to the free high school are today bearing upon the colleges. We should be remiss in our leadership were we not to seek to conserve some of the enormous steps toward free higher education taken during the war emergency, and to direct these steps toward the building of a citizenry which understands the world it lives in. Steps taken here will not be without influence in other countries.

In addition to the eight wartime changes which may carry on in

some way into our peacetime program, the peace itself will bring
new problems and new assignments for education. Four may be
singled out for special comment: (1) new demands for guidance;
(2) new demands for adult education; (3) new demands for
teachers; and (4) new demands for world organization of educators.

(1) *New Demands for Guidance.* Returning students from the
armed forces will need help in achieving reintegration into civilian
life. They will want to think through their place as civilians — a
rôle they may never have established.

The guidance task of the schools in the transition to peace will
include more than employment. Problems of educational guidance
will be intensified by experiences during the war which have
shattered the old accepted hierarchies of values. It is hard to know
what in life will seem most worth while to men who have lived
through the hells of this war; they themselves will have trouble in
knowing what they want out of life; what kind of world they will
want for their children.

(2) *New Demands for Adult Education.* It is estimated that a
million men and women may take advantage of the offer to provide
a year or more of schooling after return from military service.
Hundreds of thousands of these young men and women will not be
ready for college, as colleges have been organized in the past. They
will, on the other hand, be too mature in years, and in toughening
experience, to go into high schools alongside those in their early
teen ages. Either the colleges must broaden their scope to include
something like the General College of the University of Minnesota
(where adults can study whatever they find helpful, regardless of
prerequisites and diplomas), or the public school systems must set
up a new type of folk high school adapted to adult interests and
attitudes. Probably both should be attempted.

Four recommendations can be made regarding the program of
these new adult schools, whether on the university campuses or in
the home-town setting. One is that they should be admitted to
courses on the basis of their present fitness, not on the basis of
previous courses. Heavy reliance will have to be placed on guidance
and counseling; the staff-student ratio will have to be high; mass-
production methods will be detrimental. Second, the vocational
emphasis will be central. Vocation may be made into a very broad

concept, broad enough to include the organization of life about a calling; but the job will be a major concern for these students. Third, young adults will be returning to take up their part in a domestic scene which has been changing during their absence. As citizens, they will be expected to vote for candidates and on issues which are not familiar to them. It is easy to believe that there will be plenty of excited controversy in the attempt to make our post-war economy work better than our pre-war economy did. The folk high schools or general colleges should make a major contribution to helping students understand what is involved in the economic, political, and international issues of their generation. There will indeed be a crying need for adult education on international affairs. We shall have become a part of international agreements long before a new generation of children can be educated to understand world problems and to think in global terms. The returning men and women will have something of a start in this direction. A good adult-education program will further their growth and use their contribution of experience. Forums on both domestic and international issues may be set up, particularly for the young adults who are spending full time at school; but they can be utilized also as agencies to help the whole community toward better grasp of difficult problems.

(3) *New Demands for Teachers.* Enrollment in the teachers' colleges is now lower than it has been for years. The teaching profession in many cities has now aged, so that a large proportion are approaching or have passed the normal retirement date. The return of millions from lucrative war jobs to longer schooling and of other millions from military service to take up interrupted studies, the expansion of services to include nursery schools, all-year-round programs, youth training for national service, and more adult education, may make the present shortage of teachers even more acute. One good result of such a situation may be a further increase in the economic rewards of teaching, which would stimulate improvement in the caliber of teaching. The period following the last world war was one of rapid rise in the real income of teachers, and it is not unlikely that this will be repeated this time. Another good result may be the modification of requirements so as to permit some of the men and women who have demonstrated ability and leader-

ship in other areas of civilian or military life to become teachers. There may not be again for a long time a period so favorable for attempts to reconstruct what we teach and the way we teach, in order to cut out dead wood, to get hold of the most vital and useful processes, and to make use of men and women with experience in world problems.

(4) *New Demands for World Organization.* Education must not only teach about an interrelated world; the profession of education itself should be one of the first to organize on an international basis. The best proposal seems to be a kind of International Education Office, on something like the basis of the International Labour Office, semi-autonomous and yet closely related to any League of Nations or other machinery of international government which may be devised. One representative from each nation might be official; chosen by the Minister of Education or his equivalent in government. Another might be elected from among the teachers. Some of the duties of such an educational body would be: (1) to set minimum standards of literacy and nutrition which are capable of application in backward lands; (2) to bar some of the most offensive educational practices, such as those which advocate national military aggression or the superiority of some master-group; (3) to provide for the exchange of students, teachers and educational experiences. Certainly teachers might be expected to be among the first to honor, in institution as well as in theory, a human tie which transcends nationalism. (Cf. p. 255 and p. 261.)

There may be some danger of relaxation — of waiting until war's end — to face the next set of tasks. In my judgment, to wait so long will mean to lose a great deal. My apology for taking up so many challenges — from nursery schools to adult education; from twelve-month school years to guidance personnel; from camp periods to international blueprints — is that these seem to be all upon us at once, none of them capable of being safely or wisely postponed to any more convenient season. Social change, like individual growth, is not a straight-line affair. There come spurts, and we are certainly caught in one now. The general trends already certain to characterize American post-war education are highly dynamic, providing a large place for new content and new methods. It is a peculiarly favorable time to give education a less provincial character,

and to permit it to prepare children and youth to understand the world scene, and to prepare to live in it. (*End of Dr. Watson's reply.*)

Dr. Watson has offered a challenging picture of desirable changes in education. Whether these changes are made or not depends largely on the understanding being created now during wartime. Hence the study of teachers' daily activities *now,* in the midst of war, as they relate to the tasks and needs of later years is important. The next question in this chapter, addressed to Dr. Margaret Mead of the American Museum of Natural History, is thus phrased:

What is the immediate action rôle of American educators?

Dr. Mead's Reply

The most immediate task for educators is to become vividly informed of what is happening now in education, rather than to concentrate upon the losses which have been sustained under war conditions or the gains which may be anticipated when and if peacetime conditions are restored. At this very moment teachers all over the country, in defense towns, in ghost towns from which the population has been drained by the war, in special courses for army and navy personnel, in accelerated courses in the colleges and pre-induction training in the high schools, are forming new habits, learning to work at a different pace, with a more definite goal, or against a more demanding time schedule, or against the background of homes in which mothers as well as fathers are too busy to play their traditional rôles. They are forming new habits, habits of looking at their pupils, at themselves, at their material. Meanwhile, they are talking and thinking of the past and of the future, ignoring this present which holds the future in its grip.

An immediate attempt to increase conscious and responsible evaluation of these new habits and their significance in any developing educational program is essential. *Whatever post-war plan is set afoot will have to be implemented by individuals whose habits have been formed in this war period.* Will they have become so impressed with the advantages of highly routinized instruction as prac-

ticed in some types of military training, that they will embody this type of procedure in their peacetime practice? Will others have been equally impressed with the freedom from traditional methods of instruction which has been used in other types of military training, for example in the new methods of teaching languages? Many of the current new trends are mutually contradictory and discrepant, and may set up contradictions in the future which will be difficult to reconcile.

Research in any of the applied sciences which are directed toward the betterment of the individual, either as a student, a patient, or a client (of the social worker) all present a common research problem: the resistance which is aroused in the practitioner whose skill should be exercised on behalf of the individuals who have been committed to this charge, when he is asked to reduce these skills, or hold one or more of them in abeyance, for purposes of research. This serious obstacle to all research on educational methods, and especially upon any research which lays stress on interpersonal aspects of education, rather than upon materials, or curriculum, must be taken into account. If we are to set out to find out what is happening now to the habits of educators, the research will have to be planned so as to leave the educator free from the burden of altering his already overstrained skills to meet the needs of research. This means, in practice, that if we are to set up any research to find out what is happening, it must be based upon observation, by experts, of the behavior of teachers in the great variety of new situations in which their habits are being formed, not upon records made by the teachers themselves.

Furthermore, it will have to be a sort of natural history of contemporary educational practice in which the experiments are provided by the ongoing situation rather than constructed for the purpose. Search should be made throughout the country for as many different types of new significant educational situations as possible and arrangements made for experts to observe and to analyze them. The teacher would continue to function as he or she is functioning now and asked to act rather than to observe. In order to guard against the teacher's having a passive rôle, however, preliminary conferences to identify the situations worth studying and later conferences to analyze the results should be held, in which the

teachers, whose behavior is to form the body of materials, could be the most active participants.

If the relevant type situations — experienced teachers using entirely new pace, inexperienced teachers thrust into context in which long experience has always been the most essential ingredient, teachers who have used democratic methods fitted into authoritarian systems, teachers who have been accustomed to deal with a low level of student motivation suddenly confronted with a high level of motivation, teachers who have relied on cut and dried methods of instruction asked to improvise and develop new flexible methods — are well selected, observed, analyzed and evaluated, they should provide a sort of handbook to the available educational habits with which we shall have to build our post-war educational system. I have merely mentioned here some of the types, and such a series should be developed for differences in age, sex, status, nationality composition of pupil groups, for types of teaching which have developed in war plants as compared with military training, in bureaus working with insufficiently trained personnel, etc.

Finally when we have a picture of the specific developing educational skills, these should be re-analyzed in their implications for democratic behavior in the schools and colleges after the war. If we find that certain types of co-operation with army and navy programs have retarded democratic practice, we may also find that other types have advanced it. The closer together we can find and identify positive, negative and neutral habits which need to be organized as a basis for effective democratic behavior, the better. It will be more useful to find the potential new democratic elements to be fostered and the potential authoritarian elements to be discouraged or counterbalanced within each new situation, so that an immediate synthesis can be made. The alternative, holding up to disapproval a set of tendencies which have developed in one context, and to approval a set of tendencies which have developed in an entirely different context, will have far less usefulness because the two sets of habits, one to be encouraged and one to be discouraged, will be embodied in different human beings, e.g., teachers of simple military practice and teachers of Oriental languages, or teachers in pre-induction courses, and teachers in industry.

It will furthermore be necessary to record and consider the im-

plications of the places where educational changes are taking place most intensively, at the upper age levels, and the consequences which will result from this in a new dynamic relationship between elementary and high-school practice and college and vocational training procedures. For the last twenty-five years or so there has been intensified experimentation for younger children, with the colleges presenting a less flexible program. Will the altered ratio between change in the elementary level and change at the college level have implications for the way in which the new generation can be educated?

All of these questions may seem too technical. It may be argued that we should be concerned with What the educator is to teach, rather than with How, with his views on global matters, race relations, methods of arriving at group decisions, etc. But the stuff of democracy lies in the habits of the people who administer it and a child can learn more from the way in which a geography lesson is taught than he will ever learn from a map designed on the very newest methods to show that the world is one. Democracy depends upon a finely balanced system of interpersonal relations; the educational system of this country comprises the interpersonal experience of every child, many hours a day, during the formative years of its life. Only as we know what habits are being formed, now, by those who administer this system of interpersonal learning, can we hope to make the necessary alterations, strengthen the weak spots, erase the untenable contradictions, and so build an educational system which will produce individuals capable of administering an enduring peace. Within the school the child will learn, not only his lesson, but many deutero points also, and chiefly what kind of a world he lives in and may expect to live in. (*End of Dr. Mead's reply.*)

It follows from these analyses by Drs. Watson and Mead that one of the greatest — and one of the most neglected — tasks of the post-war planner is the social and psychological study of teachers and of children and youth as they are today. For though a new world architecture may be expertly set up within a year or two, it will crumble unless we add to our educational planning a continuing study of the attitudes, the readiness for war or peace, Fascism or

democracy that are engendered in the experience of school and community.

This cycle of contributions on education as a tool for the forging of peace would be incomplete if we allowed ourselves to come to rest at a point involving only the verbal methods of conveying ideas to children or young adults. Education has become more and more a matter of learning by *doing*, a matter of putting into practice what one learns as fast as one learns it, or better, learning it by the very process of living it. This applies not only to narrowly practical courses like shopwork and salesmanship; it applies to the fine arts, music, and the drama; it applies to creative writing; it applies to the laboratory and the social sciences. Field work in the social sciences has been steadily crowding out purely verbal presentations which once pre-empted the whole field. In the same way, it is very improbable that democracy, either at home or abroad, can be learned by the mere injection of new content into courses on domestic policy or international relations. The newer vision for which we struggle as lovers of democracy will come largely by learning to live democratically in the classroom, by learning to advance week by week from the democracy of the classroom situation to the democracy of the community and of the world. Instead of limiting oneself to syllabi, textbooks, and lectures, one may teach democracy by practicing democracy in the school and college. In concluding this chapter, therefore, I asked Dr. Paul M. Limbert, of Springfield College and of the National Council of the YMCA,

> **What can be said about education as experience in democratic living?**

Dr. Limbert's Reply

Not so long ago I heard an address on "The Prepositions of Democracy." The speaker of course was referring to Abraham Lincoln's classic statement about government *of*, *by* and *for* the people. But there is another preposition that is commonly slighted in treatments of education and democracy: we hear enough about education *for* democracy or *for* world citizenship, but too little about education *in* democracy. This is more than a play on words. The "in"-concept involves the thesis that *content and method in the*

educational process ought to be inseparably wedded, that education *about* democracy is exceedingly limited in effect unless in the process the learner has experience *in* democratic living.

Many high schools have courses called "Problems of Democracy." Most of these are merely discussions about democracy, following an outline predetermined by the writer of the textbook. A well-conducted discussion on a controversial issue may, of course, be in itself a revealing experience in democracy. But consider how much more such a course must mean when developed in relation to school experience, as was the case in an Oregon high school: As the outgrowth of a student council meeting where school government was under discussion, the Problems of Democracy class undertook a "Survey on School Democracy." A questionnaire was given to a representative sampling of students and the results were studied. As a result, the Problems of Democracy classes were themselves reorganized to provide for more initiative and self-direction on the part of the students.

Examples of this kind showing democracy in action in the school are not rare. Scores of illustrations are given in *Learning the Ways of Democracy*, "a case book in civic education" growing out of a firsthand study of ninety American secondary schools.[1] These instances include experiences in the classroom, in out-of-class activities, and in school and community relations. A few additional illustrations from this study may help to give substance to our central thesis:

In New England, where local government culminates in an annual town meeting, the social studies class in a certain high school decided to hold a model "town meeting." In preparation the students had to survey the needs of their town and formulate "warrants" for appropriations on desired improvements. In the model meeting the "citizens" argued for and against each article. When the adult town meeting was held, students were there in large numbers to check on their own procedures.

Many high schools conduct forums on public affairs, either during school hours as a part of their assembly program or in the evening

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[1] Published by the Educational Policies Commission of the National Education Association and the American Association of School Administrators, 1201 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 1940. 486 pp.

in co-operation with other young people. A variation of this plan is the "World Hour" of a large high school in Los Angeles, a weekly assembly program in which the play production class presents topics of world interest through drama. One technique frequently employed is that of the Living Newspaper, performed against a background of a huge map of the world. A second assembly program each week in the same school is directed toward relieving racial and cultural tensions and "tries to help adolescents solve problems arising in their personal, social, and civic relations." The point is that these students themselves represent varying cultural backgrounds, that they are encouraged to deal with specific problems arising from their own experience, and that classes in speech, drama, music, and art join in preparing original scripts.

In the midst of a study of democracy and dictatorship by a social-studies class in an Eastern private school, several students expressed dissatisfaction with democracy because of its inefficiency. They wanted more direction by the teacher in their own class. The teacher countered with the proposal that the classroom be used as an experimental center to compare the two methods and that for two weeks the class be operated as a dictatorship. Upon their approval he prescribed all classroom activities, decided all controversial questions, and had secret police reporting to him daily on the private actions of their classmates. The vote of the class at the end of the two weeks can easily be guessed; most of them wanted to end the experiment at the end of the first week, but the dictator would not yield.

Illustrations abound of high-school students taking responsibility for various aspects of procedure in classroom, industrial arts workshop, gymnasium, and elsewhere. School papers are printed with a minimum of adult direction. Clubs are run according to responsible democratic procedures. Even the commencement program in some high schools is used as an occasion for expressions of thought on aspects of good citizenship planned largely by student committees.

The editors of *Learning the Ways of Democracy* state clearly the significance of such experiences:

> The collective life of the secondary school exhibits many of the basic processes and problems of adult political societies — the establishment of authority and social control, the safeguarding of personal

liberties, the formation of effective public opinion, and the selection of leaders and representatives, to mention only a few. The student who learns to be a good citizen of a democratic secondary school, and who comes to understand the ways in which the school community operates, will thereby progress far on the road to good adult citizenship. The life of the school itself is therefore a proper subject of study in the school, and is a potential source of insight into the nature and procedures of democracy.[2]

Truisms? But to what extent is this school-laboratory in democratic education being *utilized* in the communities of America? Look also at the wide-open opportunities for experience in democratic living in our leisure time, non-school agencies. What proportion of Scout troops actually provide a training-ground in a mild form of dictatorship? Ask the same of boys' clubs, Hi-Y Clubs, and the like. Here, too, however, one could recount an encouraging series of experiments in responsible democracy. It is to be hoped that someone will study the youth programs of these voluntary agencies with as critical insight as has been applied to secondary schools, and will cite chapter and verse of good practice.

One of the more dramatic large-scale examples of education *in* democracy is found in the Youth-and-Government program that has been carried on for some years under the sponsorship of the Hi-Y movement in New York and New Jersey.[3] Briefly, this project involves an annual assembly of a delegated group of high-school boys and girls at the state capitol. Here they convene as a model legislature and for two days debate "bills" and pass "legislation," following closely the procedures of the adult bodies in whose chambers they assemble. Preceding this state-wide gathering there have been prelegislative coaching conferences and earnest local discussions about bills to be presented. Following the state assembly, local groups often carry on similar projects in municipal or county government, with legislative action appropriate to the more limited setting. Although most of the "bills" naturally relate to education and other problems close to the experience of high-school youth,

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[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 260.

[3] This program is now being extended to other states. It is similar in many respects to the Boy-State program of the American Legion.

some items of legislation invariably arise that reflect a wider setting; for example, a proposal for compulsory military training or a resolution on participation by the United States in some form of world organization.

We have purposely limited this account to illustrations on the youth level, because more tangible records are available in this realm. But the same principles apply to adult organizations and forums and to the thousand and one groups that exist to strengthen democracy at home or extend it abroad. The point is that these proponents of world citizenship are *far too prone to concentrate on goals and materials at the expense of processes.* Most of us have known of organizations with beautifully phrased objectives that were dominated by a few individuals, evaded basic controversial issues, and withered away quickly because there was no responsible, grass-roots participation. When will we learn to match our zeal *for* "a world family of democratic nations" with skill *in* the experience of democratic living?

One final caution is imperative: we dare not count too much on a carry-over of experience in democracy from one social situation to another. Much as we value the participation by high-school students in planning assemblies and carrying through projects that are very real at their stage of development, there is no guarantee of transfer of these attitudes and skills to civic government or the deliberation of corporation stockholders. Even the experience of taking part in a model legislature at the age of seventeen does not warrant a sure prediction that these young men at twenty-seven will be constructive leaders in the political affairs of their communities. An appreciation of other races and peoples, gained through discussion and travel, does not automatically result in wise decisions on specific national policies transcending economic interest and party affiliation.

What we can say with assurance is that experience *in* democracy in the more limited relationships of club, school, church and community (*a*) gives content to the concept of democracy, (*b*) establishes a conviction of the reality of democratic living under certain conditions, and (*c*) makes it more likely that these democratic predispositions will function in a variety of wider relationships, provided:

(1) That the basic characteristics of democracy are made articulate and occasionally made the basis of reflection;

(2) That the varying forms of democracy are not confused with its substance, and that the "feel" of democracy is communicated as well as its ideology;

(3) That from the beginning young people are led to recognize the difficulties to be faced in seeking to establish democracy on a wider scale;

(4) That individuals are encouraged to carry responsibilities commensurate with their capacities;

(5) That provision be made for a continuing experience of responsible democracy in changing relationships — in business or industry, in political organization, in voluntary adult associations, even under wartime exigencies. (*End of Dr. Limbert's reply.*)

Education, then, has appeared through these contributions as a device for supplying both the *content* and the *spirit* in which new attitudes regarding world citizenship may be instilled. One great question looms, however: the question whether a *democratic context* can be found in our society for the kind of education which we need. Only in the social context of democracy can democratic education flourish. We turn then to the larger question of the social context, in particular to the question of making democracy so immediate and practical that education, and all other institutions, will perforce reflect it.

THE PRACTICALITY OF DEMOCRACY

17

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Kurt Lewin   *John R. P. French, Jr.*
Ronald Lippitt and   *David Kuselewitz*
Charles Hendry   *Lee Emerson Deets*
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EDUCATION is absolutely fundamental, but it is still not enough. It is an aspect of the problem, but it is still not the final key. The foregoing contributions have indeed greatly clarified the educational and international issues which face us. But education is not a free institution which can go off in its own chosen direction, independent of the rest of society. It is still hobbled and shackled by powerful constraining forces, many of which are war-tending forces. Let us look at this difficulty more closely.

Though thinking people everywhere vibrated sympathetically to H. G. Wells's statement (176) in 1920 that civilization faced the choice "between education and catastrophe," it has nevertheless become appallingly clear that education faces a huge dilemma. In so far as it is directed to the élite, it prepares people for favored positions, cultural and technical, in society, and does not prepare the mass for the protection of its vital needs — in particular, the need for peace. If, on the other hand, education is geared to mass production, it cannot possibly present to the student the actual complexity of the modern world in such a way as to be understood. Many boys and girls still "drop out and go to work" before the more serious social studies are undertaken. No true presentation of modern political and economic complexities can be made at the maturity level of the elementary school or junior high; and a good many difficulties are likely to appear even at senior high, judging by the copious information and attitude studies which have been made of children and adolescents at these developmental levels. Training in intelligent citizenship necessarily includes training for

adults. Adult education, however, is a hope rather than an actuality in most parts of the world, and such developments, if they are to be sound, can only grow slowly.

Facing this difficult issue, we attempt to give the necessary economic and political education chiefly through newspapers and magazines, and increasingly through the radio, with incidental use of newsreels. Judging by information tests printed in such magazines as *Newsweek*, there is no reason to be pessimistic about the possibility of ultimately achieving some citizenship education through these channels; but these methods are likely to give narrow, detailed "facts," rather than significant principles, and the level of knowledge about the "news," i.e., what has happened in the last week or two, is vastly higher than the level of retention regarding the *course of events* over a period of years. When it comes to seeing the social trends which lead people into war or other commitments for which they are not ready, the whole educational scheme of the civilized world has revealed its inadequacy. How little did the schools, colleges, newspapers, broadcasts of the Harding-Coolidge era teach the *understanding* of the events which were in the making!

Especially disturbing, I think, as one seeks answers to these questions, is the fact that education is organized, paid for, administered as a service to the community, and hence has to submit to political control; in the case of private institutions, education is dispensed as a commodity to be paid for. In either event, can education possibly be anything more than a technique for bringing up the young to see the world *as it has been seen in the past,* vindicating the viewpoint of the elder statesmen, and applying the same colored glasses, or even the same blinders, which have previously been worn? Or to put the matter less invidiously and more abstractly, *is it not of the very essence of education to indoctrinate the individual into the ways of the group?* Is it not a contradiction in terms to expect education to *change* the society which supports it? As we have seen, we have the problem of inventing and using new social institutions; and this is surely not the educator's task as he himself has been taught to see it, and as school boards, regents, and taxpayers see it. If they invent too much, or even discuss too much as it relates to national and international politics, they are sure to step on many toes.

If, now, one retreats to a broader definition of education, and expresses the saving power of education in terms of the intelligent use of newspapers, the radio, the cinema, by the common mass of men and women, is not Wells's race between education and catastrophe a straightforward question of the *rate* at which these organs of communication can advance public knowledge and insight? That these organs are *not* as yet adequate I think we might consider proven by our failure to understand the factors which were bound to produce the Nazi régime, the Japanese attempt at the conquest of China, with the inevitable world fury which resulted, and the fact that we tremble today as we recognize the insecurity of our long-range plans for an abiding peace.

Anyone defending the saving rôle of education in this sense will have to discover a way in which the news (in the deepest and broadest sense of the term) can be presented not only factually but in its broad implications as regards the meanings and consequences of events; secondly, he will have to show how the news can avoid being class-colored, i.e., not the property or the puppet of any one class, race, or interest. But suppose I am "from Missouri" on this issue and deny that news *can* be either philosophically complete or socially unbiased; so far as I can see, economic and political news *cannot* be so complete and reliable as to enable the common man to find his way toward a decent peace. News is colored by those who own the means of communication, notably by the advertisers who frequently tend to dominate the press; moreover, to a tired, busy, and disoriented public, news must be exciting at the moment, rather than philosophical. A millionaire murder in the Bahamas is worth ten post-war reconstruction items. What right has anyone to be optimistic regarding economic and political education in the face of such facts as this? In summary, then, my difficulty comes to this: *How can economic and political issues of the day be made clear to the common man? If neither schools and colleges nor press and radio can adequately reach him, where are we?*

Perhaps, in terms of this question, we are in the soup. Perhaps the whole attempt to reach him convincingly by *verbal means* is ill-conceived. But let us approach the problem in a different way. We might broaden our question and ask ourselves whether the focus of action of large groups of people is necessarily determined by

verbal symbols. Is it not determined frequently by the sheer *social context of their individual lives,* the question whether they have jobs, whether they have roofs over their heads, whether they have money for their children's education? Surely, the history of the New Deal includes a history of conflict between a Republican press and a leadership relying upon a job-conscious mass of a quarter or a third of the American public who felt that the New Deal gave them a livelihood; and nearly all the political acrimony on both sides was due to the simple fact that the New Deal was conceived to be a dispenser of jobs. If so, is it not rather silly to keep harping upon the sole importance of the means of communication? Is it not obvious that education is, for most people, largely a matter of becoming aware of the immediate social realities in which one is immersed? Does it not follow that verbal education, however great its importance, will play its part in a context of forces consisting of the *impact upon oneself of world events* — military, political, and especially economic?

DEMOCRACY AT THE GRASS ROOTS

When the problem is conceived in this way, a solution springs forward for consideration. Perhaps the international realization of democratic ways of thought and conduct will follow naturally if democracy as a way of thinking and acting becomes the natural expression of *person-to-person feeling in grass-roots community living.* Our problem of world order may be a problem not only of *understanding* other cultures, but of *emotional preparation* everywhere for tolerant and generous living.

Accordingly, we turn, in this chapter, to a study of the processes of democratic living. We reject a current "pure economic" interpretation of world trends, to the effect that attitudes regarding war, peace, and international relations must automatically follow the course of present international economic trends. Taking a very different slant, we ask a very different kind of question, namely, "How can the common man's passionate *desire* for democracy at home and between nations, and his practical understanding of his own immediate personal predicament in the face of the institution of war, be used as weapons to give him more realization of the *means* of achieving *local* and *general* democracy?

In a period of war we clutch desperately at the hope held out by our political and military leaders — and respond with surging faith to the addresses of Mr. Churchill and of the President. The epochal speeches of the Vice-President and Mr. Willkie's vivid picture of *One World* have added legitimate sources of renewed aspiration. Much indeed can be expected from these indications that the world has a new kind of political leadership — if only the remaking of the breed can come quickly enough.

There remains, however, the perennial question whether the political leader will be able to guide a world dominated by the vast, concentrated power of economic leadership, a leadership so impersonal as to follow the lure of power even when the individual captain of industry would otherwise desire.

Our problem of economic leadership involves, I think, all the same difficulties of "responsibility to a constituency" which we encounter in the case of political leadership. In addition, the huge burden of "election" not by ballot but by impersonal economic pressure, may mean that if one does what is bold, humane, and wise (in long-range terms), one may immediately be unsaddled from the leadership position. It appears that the economic machine is so constructed that it throws from its steering wheel whoever will not follow its own course; though the hero goes down gloriously to defeat, he achieves nothing except that infinitesimal and momentary control which he can exercise as he holds the wheel in a foreordained direction. Nothing is gained by blinking the austerity of this challenge to the business leader.

I think there is, however, one possible escape from this grim compulsion: the possibility that the economic leader may understand the democratic process as well as the economic reality, the possibility that he may take hold of his corporation, his board of directors, his stockholders, his workers, his consumers, his public, as a wise political leader would take hold, revolutionizing the guidance of his enterprise from within and from without. Many of those who talk of the partnership of business and government vaguely grope toward some such conception. But it needs much clarification. The issue can perhaps best be stated in the following way: Can a type of economic leadership be found which is genuinely grounded upon the democratic modes of thought, the democratic processes of control?

But the problem of leadership in a period of such grave threat from monopoly and cartel control cannot be solved by looking only at the *apex* of the economic structure. For neither the political nor the economic type of leadership can be imposed upon unwilling material. Democratic leadership cannot be mechanically taught to unwilling aspirants; such leaders will have to arise from the people. At the same time, the people will have to become sensitive to the need of such leaders, will have to push the leaders forward and carry them upon their shoulders. In a democracy the people determine, even when they deny they do so, the type of leader which steps forward, and though they may complain that those elected are too often unrepresentative, it is their own apathy or ignorance from which such failure of representation stems. If their school boards give their children unsatisfactory education, it is they, after all, who control school boards. Democracy may be weak, but the critical question is whether there is a will to strengthen it.

Ultimately, the question comes down to the willingness of the public to learn those things which it needs to understand if it is to be capable of living in the modern world. To discover how far our public opinion is ready to outgrow the old obstacles, we must have a rather exact appraisal of the willingness of the public to learn, and of the means of reaching the public through press, radio, books, schools, colleges, community organization; and finally, an explicit statement of the conditions under which the common man can reach his own solution, achieve his own purposes.

The groups already considered hold key positions in reference to our problem, but as we speak of democracy we turn inevitably to mass problems, and well over three-quarters of our American population belongs not to these leadership groups but to labor and agriculture. These are the true middle class, the true American public which, however much they may follow the lead of business and technical people, ultimately hold within their hands the power to remake the world for better or for worse and, in particular, the power to create a non-competitive world order. For the most part, they remain rather inarticulate. Though the level of their literacy in political and economic affairs has risen along with the general level of their schooling during these last two generations, they still are, for the most part, content to follow. Neither labor nor agriculture

has a foreign policy except for immediate issues which line up the farm bloc or, less frequently, certain blocs of organized labor, in support of one or another line of political action. It cannot be said that either labor or agriculture has explicitly recognized the fact that its own membership could easily, through solidarity and determination, make war impossible, or make impossible any of the grosser brutalities from which war arises.

It is a commonplace that when life is substantial, satisfying, and good, one's need to impose one's way of life upon others is of a gentle and brotherly type; when its goodness is more apparent than real, concealing a basic frustration, one is more likely to expand, dominate one's neighbor, "walk softly but carry a big stick," rationalizing one's need to dominate in terms of the superiority of one's own culture whatever the historical complications may be. It is true of the world's great democracies, such as modern Switzerland, Denmark, and Norway, that internal arrangements have moved toward making life's personal relations satisfying and that in so far as this has succeeded the impulse to assimilate other peoples has tended to become rather silly and unreal.

Expanding the problem so as to state it in terms of the present-day world dimensions, may we not properly assume that any country which is busy in the cultivation of its own democracy, the extension of its own civil liberties, its own franchise, its own economic opportunities, feeling the thrill of watching its humbler and more helpless children achieving social maturity and full group membership, will automatically find itself working for the extension of similar expressions of democracy elsewhere? Indeed, when the problem of rival imperialisms is raised, when it is asked whether British, American, and Soviet interests will not struggle for control of the world, would it not be better to ask first, within what *domestic context* American, British, and Soviet ideas of expansion will develop? American business, for example, is not an independent entity, living in a vacuum; it is an expression of American culture. If our American life undergoes a progressive deepening and enrichment through domestic expansion of opportunities — educational, economic, and political — will not American life impress this trend profoundly upon its business structure, and will not American business as an overseas venture concern itself less and less with

exploitation and more and more with the spread of those aspects of American life which are the most practical ways of dealing with human beings everywhere, deriving their vitality and giving their satisfactions in terms of liberating people from poverty and ignorance? In other words, is it not rather futile to put our sole emphasis upon the public control of American overseas business enterprise? Would not such control inevitably be fumbling and inept? Should we not, on the other hand, be vastly more effective as components in a world democracy if our primary effort were devoted toward the democratization of our own culture?

If there be agreement upon this point, the burning question which now intrudes itself is this: How can the democratic processes within our own national life, within our own face-to-face community relationships, be strengthened; how can our own ways of living become so democratized that the international rôle of America and of individual Americans will convey and implement the democratic process everywhere?

Though democracy is close to American hearts, Americans seem uncertain what it is, apologetic for its supposed inefficiency, inclined to assume that in practice it will prove equivalent to its unwelcome twin brother "politics." They lack clarity as to its essential dynamic and its essential contribution. And in an age of *centralization* and *unification* of both economic and political controls, they are inclined to wonder if democracy is *practical*, after all.

In the midst of these questionings, I turned to a leader in experimental studies of democracy, Dr. Kurt Lewin, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, with this assignment:

> Give me a working definition of democracy, and a demonstration that democracy is practical. [1]

Democracy — like forms of group living — cannot be defined adequately by isolated elements of conduct, rules or institutions; it is the larger *pattern* of group life and the group *atmosphere* which determines how a society is to be classified. The pattern includes such

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[1] The reply includes some sections reprinted from K. Lewin, The Dynamics of Group Action, *Educational Leadership*, *1*, no. 4, 1944, with the permission of the editor.

diversified aspects as the form of leadership, the degree and type of interdependence of sub-groups, the way in which the policy of the group depends on the will of its various sections or members; it includes how children talk to parents, workers to foremen, or how the crippled are treated. However, though social *techniques* must be considered, it is the actual *group dynamics* that counts. This holds for a small group of children as well as for the life of a whole community or state, or for the organization of the world.

The war has made it abundantly clear that the ever-increasing functional dependence of the different sections of the world is leading to some form of closer political, cultural and economic organization among nations and within nations. The fateful question is whether this higher degree of organization will be expressed in stronger forms of autocracy or in stronger forms of democracy.

Autocracy, Democracy and Laissez-Faire

In our present state of knowledge, the scientifically superior method of defining a special form of group life is probably the determination of its position within a totality of other forms of group life. One of the outstanding facts which has been known but is not sufficiently recognized concerns the relation between autocracy, democracy and individualistic freedom (laissez-faire). The average Sunday-school teacher, foreman or university professor is accustomed to perceive problems of discipline or leadership as lying on a single continuum, in which lack of discipline and maximum individual freedom represent the one end and strict authoritarian discipline the other. This conception, however, is basically incorrect. Autocracy, democracy and laissez-faire should be perceived as a triangle (Fig. 2). In many respects autocracy and democracy are similar: they both mean leadership as against the lack of leadership which appears in laissez-faire; they both mean discipline and organization as against chaos. They both mean a stress upon the group rather than upon the individual. Among other lines of comparison, democracy and laissez-faire are similar: they both give freedom to the group members in so far as they create a situation where the members are acting on their own motivation, rather than being moved by forces induced by an authority in which they have no part.

FIGURE 2. *The relations of similarity and difference between Autocracy (A), Democracy (D), and Laissez-Faire (LF) cannot be represented by one continuum.*

The person who thinks in terms of one continuum has no choice but to consider democracy as something *between* autocratic discipline and lawlessness; he sees it as a soft type of autocracy, or frequently as a kind of sugar-coated or refined method to induce the group member to accept the leader's will. It is a prerequisite to democratic living and democratic education that this concept be destroyed. The democratic leader is no less a leader and, in a way, has no less power than the autocratic leader. There are soft and tough democracies as well as soft and tough autocracies; and a tough democracy is likely to be more, rather than less, democratic. Like autocracy, democracy is fully aware of the rôle of power in group life and considers power a necessary and legitimate element of group organization. But the democratic use of power is as far from a superiority aloof from the ruled — so characteristic, for instance, of the treatment of "natives" by the British colonial office — as from the religious zeal for one's own power so typical of the "sacred egoism" of totalitarian Fascism.

The difference between autocracy and democracy is an honest, deep difference, and an autocracy with a democratic front is still an autocracy. In democracy the use of power must recognize the "equal right" of each member of the group to live a good life. Sometimes democracy merely "tolerates" differences among individuals or among groups. An outspoken democracy does not merely

recognize the "right to be different" as the basis for "individual freedom" and the treatment of "minorities"; it will encourage that richness of group life and group productivity which can grow only from a diversity of sub-groups and personalities. It will, however, be equally determined to enforce the principle of "intolerance against the intolerant," a principle without which no democracy seems to be able to live in the long run.

As to the form or organization, two differences between democracy and autocracy may be mentioned: (*a*) The unity of an autocratic group is based on its relation to the top leader of the hierarchy to a greater degree than is true of a democratic group. Goal-setting or policy determination in an autocracy is, to a high degree, in the hands of the leader, rather than in the hands of the group as a whole. It is typical of a democracy that the leader is responsible to the group; in an autocratic system the follower is responsible to the leader. This principle of "no responsibility to people below oneself and all responsibility to the leader above" was one of the first steps to be acclaimed again and again by Hitler after his ascent to power.

(*b*) Interdependence within the group and the interactions essential for group life in an autocracy follow, in general, "vertical" lines, i.e., relations between higher and lower in the hierarchy of organization. In a democracy the "horizontal" type of interdependence among people of equal status is more emphasized. That is one of the reasons why, for instance, discussion and group decision — which have their full meaning only among equals — play greater rôles in democracy.

As to the problem of the practicality of democracy, one may consider (1) the effect of democracy on the character and capacity of the individual, (2) its effect on efficiency as regards production in industry, and in other fields, and finally (3) the problem of how to learn democracy and its correct application. This includes the problem of the learning of democratic ideology and the training of democratic leaders.

At present, statements about these topics have to be based on rather scant scientific data, and one must always keep in mind that there are many forms of autocracy and democracy. Only recently has the step been taken from descriptions of attitudes to "action

research" on groups. Scientific insight about the causal relations in group life will have to be established by experiments in group dynamics. The last decade has seen an increasing development in this field although research is still in its initial stages.

The experiments help in many ways to substantiate the triangular relation of autocracy, democracy and laissez-faire, and to clarify the rather disturbing complexity of problems by showing where the differences lie; why differences in group procedures which might look important are actually unimportant; and why others which look unimportant are important. It is particularly interesting to consider what might be called an efficient "tough democracy."

Effect of Democracy on the Character and Capacity of the Individual

The best controlled study in this field is probably that of Lippitt and White (109). In this study the same groups of children went through an autocratic, a democratic, and a laissez-faire atmosphere. They show that the character of the individual, at least as it expresses itself in conduct, is deeply and very quickly affected by a change in social atmosphere. The degree of friendliness, for instance, was greatest in democracy. With an exchange of two children (107) between the autocratic and democratic groups their friendliness and aggressiveness changed within one meeting. Aggressive reactions (109) were greatest in a form of autocracy and led to discontent not only with the leader but with the fellow members as well. It sometimes led to scapegoating.

The sociability of the individual children and the amount of constructive help they offered to other children was greatly affected by the change in social climate. Under autocracy conversation kept much more to the immediate topics; the children under democracy showed a broader outlook in many respects. In autocracy they lost some of their individuality as measured by the degree of individual differences. They became more dependent and more ready to drop work when not under immediate pressure. In other words, initiative and "laziness" are traits which depend much on the social atmosphere.

This is not the place to go into the many and not always simple relations between group life and the character and productivity of

the individual. However, two conclusions seem to be quite well-established by the experiments on groups, by the experience in industry ("Training in Industry" Program), by studies of family living and by what we know about child development in terms of psychology and cultural anthropology (120): (a) The effect of social atmospheres on character and on character development is very profound. (b) A democratic organization with long-range planning seems to be definitely superior to autocracy and to laissez-faire atmospheres in creating initiative and positive sociability.

DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY OF GROUP LIFE

The superiority of democracy in regard to bringing up fair-minded and more richly developed individuals is not likely to be questioned, at least in this country. More frequently, doubts are expressed in regard to democratic efficiency. We are accustomed to the idea that democracy has to "pay" in efficiency for the greater freedom the individual has. For many, efficient group organization is more or less identified with autocratic organization. The problem itself is fundamental because practically every group has to "produce" some kind of "goods," whether it is health in a hospital or automobiles in a factory, fun in a recreation center, or knowledge and education in a school.

In school as well as in industry certain standards exist concerning the rate of learning or production. These standards are set up by the teacher or the management and are upheld by these authorities with a certain amount of pressure. It is assumed that relaxing the standards will slow down the work of group members. This assumption is probably sound, but has *little to do with the problem of democracy.* Lowering the standards or relaxing the pressure to keep up the standards in an autocratic atmosphere means shifting to a softer form of autocracy. It means a shift from autocracy (A) toward laissez-faire (LF) in Fig. 2. It does *not* mean a shift in the direction of democracy (D). Such a shift would involve a positive change of the type of *motivation* behind the action, a shift from imposed goals to goals which the group has set for itself.

It is by no means certain that production goals set for themselves by work teams, or learning goals set by groups of students, would be higher than those ordered by an authority. However, it is by no

means certain that they would be lower. Whether the standards will be set higher or lower depends on the specific social atmosphere and the type of democracy created. Experiments in industry under controlled conditions show a substantial permanent increase of production created in a short time by certain methods of "team de-

FIGURE 3. *The Effect of Team Decision on Production in a Sewing Factory. An experiment by Alex Bavelas shows a marked permanent rise in production after decision. As comparison, the production level of experienced workers is given during the same months.*

cision," an increase in production which was not accomplished by many months of the usual factory pressure (Fig. 3). (The money incentive remained unchanged.) This demonstrates that democratic procedures may raise group efficiency.

Only a few details of the problems, which are by no means simple, can be discussed here. (1) One should be careful to distinguish between discussion and decision. A discussion might be better than a lecture for clarifying issues and bringing about motivation. However, it is one thing to be motivated, another to transform motivation into concrete goals, stabilizing these goals in a way which would carry the individual through to the actual completion of the work. Controlled experiments under comparable conditions show that discussion without decision does not lead to a parallel increase in production. There are indications that *even* if the discussion leads to the *general* decision of raising production without setting *definite* production goals to be reached in a definite time, the effect is much less marked. Experiments with groups of housewives (102) and students' eating-co-operatives (178) show that "lectures" as well as "requests" are less efficient in bringing about changes in food habits than *group decision*. Discussions without decisions do not make for efficient democracy. On the other hand, democratic methods, properly handled, are superior to requests in bringing about changes.

(2) One of the reasons why democratic methods are superior is illustrated in the study of students' co-operatives. Students were to change from white to whole-wheat bread. From each student was obtained a rating of his eagerness to reach the goal and of his like or dislike of whole-wheat as compared with white bread. After "request," the eagerness to succeed was lowest in the individuals who disliked whole-wheat bread and increased with the degree of liking. *After group decision,* however, the eagerness to reach the group goal was largely independent of personal like or dislike. In other words, group decision provides a background of motivation, where the individual is ready to co-operate as a member of the group, more or less independent of his personal inclinations.

How to Learn Democracy

It is one of the basic facts about group standards that they are

not an expression of a common biological entity called "human nature" but are somehow acquired. This fundamental fact seems to be very difficult to realize. To the individual who follows a certain cultural pattern, most of what is essential to this culture seems as "natural" and unquestionable as the air he breathes. It is a prerequisite of international peace that the fallacy of this position be understood. For permanent co-operation we must understand better both our own and other cultures, their similarities and their differences. That is one of the reasons why a large program of research on our own standards and those of other countries is vital.

Two of the important aspects of learning democracy are *changes of ideology* and *leadership training*. The scientific knowledge, finally — based upon experimental cultural anthropology and experiments in leadership training — is as yet very limited. There are definite indications, however, that the education of leaders and the means of changing the forms of leadership can be brought about sometimes in an astonishingly short time.

In all the experiments mentioned, the problem of leadership plays an important rôle. As the earlier experiments show (107, 108), a group atmosphere can be changed radically in a relatively short time by introducing new leadership techniques. The paradoxes of democratic leadership are by no means solved; however, the studies of leadership, and particularly of leadership training (13, 14), give some information.

(1) Autocratic as well as democratic leadership consists in the leader's playing a certain rôle. These leader rôles cannot be carried through without the followers playing certain complementary rôles, namely, those of "autocratic" or "democratic" followers. Educating people in democracy or re-educating them from either autocracy or laissez-faire cannot be accomplished by the passive behavior of the democratic leader. It is a fallacy to assume that individuals if left alone will form themselves naturally into democratic groups; it is much more likely that chaos or a primitive pattern of organization through autocratic dominance will result. Establishing democracy in a group implies an active education: the democratic follower must learn to play a rôle which implies, among other things, a fair share of responsibility toward the group and a sensitivity to other people's feelings. Sometimes, particularly in the beginning of the

process of re-education, individuals may have to be made aware, in a rather forceful manner, of the two-way interdependence which exists between themselves and others within the democratic group. To create such a change, the leader must be in power, and able to hold his power. As the followers learn democracy, other aspects of the democratic leader's power and function prevail. What holds for the education of democratic followers holds also for the education of democratic leaders. In fact, it seems to be the same process through which persons learn to play these two rôles and it seems that both rôles have to be learned if either one is to be played well.

(2) It is important to realize that democratic behavior cannot be learned by autocratic methods. This does not mean that democratic education or democratic leadership must reduce the power aspect of a group organization in a way which would place the group life on the laissez-faire point of the triangle (Fig. 2). Efficient democracy means organization, but it means organization and leadership on principles different from those of autocracy. These principles might be *clarified* by lectures but they can be *learned*, finally, only by democratic living. The "training on the job" of democratic leaders (13, 14) is but one example of the fact that teaching democracy presupposes establishment of a democratic atmosphere.

One should be slow in generalizing experimental findings. Any type of organization like a factory, a business enterprise, a community center, a school system, or the army has characteristics of its own. What democracy means technically has to be determined in each organization in line with its particular objective. The objective of our educational system is customarily defined as twofold. It is to give knowledge and skills to the coming generation and to build the character of the citizens-to-be. The experiments indicate that democratic education does not need to impede efficiency in regard to the first objective, but can be used as a powerful instrument toward this end. The experiment also indicates that, for educating future citizens, no mere talk about democratic ideals can substitute for a democratic atmosphere in the school. The character and the cultural habits of the growing citizen are not so much determined by what he *says* as by what he *lives*.

(3) It is important to realize that the methods of changing group ideology or group goals and obtaining group efficiency are not based

on dealing with the individual as an individual but as a group member. The goals were set for the group as a whole or for individuals in a group setting. The experimental studies indicate that it is easier to change ideology or cultural habits by dealing with groups, rather than with individuals. In addition, the anchorage of the motivation of the individual in a group decision goes far in achieving the execution of the decision and in establishing certain self-regulatory processes of the group life on the new level of ideology and action (102).

SUMMARY

On the whole, then, research in democratic living indicates the deep interdependence of the various aspects of group life, such as ideology, leadership form, power distribution, productivity and efficiency of the individual and the group. It shows that the ideology of a group, the character of its members and the distribution of power are so closely interwoven that no one of them can be changed without altering the others. This should be a lesson to the hard-boiled politician who thinks only in terms of power and to the sympathetic believer in the "goodness of human nature" who forgets too easily that *ideology cannot be changed without changing the actual distribution of power within a group.* There are definite indications that democracy is not only practicable but *superior in regard to character development, social relations and efficiency if it is handled as a true democracy.*

Finally, there are good indications that "self-understanding" and "self-education" within democratic groups is possible. The chances for the success of such a program will be much enhanced by making full use of the instruments of research in social science which, after all, means merely using an old democratic standby: the rational approach.[2] (*End of Dr. Lewin's reply.*)

From Dr. Lewin's reply, and from the earlier statement of Dr. Limbert, it is clear that in a task like learning to find a democratic place in a world order which is today being born, immediate community experience through social participation can often teach more than books can teach.

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[2] For bibliography, cf. nos. 13, 14, 102, 107, 108, 109, 120, 178.

The problem of education for democracy has become a problem in democratic leadership and democratic group *participation;* if children do not learn this, they cannot fully understand democracy as a way of living. Because of their extraordinary success achieved in new ways of extending democratic experience among youth, I turned to Drs. Ronald Lippitt and Charles E. Hendry, of the Research and Statistical Service, Boy Scouts of America, for an answer to the question:

> Since the economic and political problems of today are so complex, have we any right to hope that democratic leadership can enable the common man to formulate his own problems, work through to his own answers?

Reply of Dr. Lippitt and Dr. Hendry

To be assets to our common cause — an ever more effective economic, political, and social democracy — we must all be vitally interested in the cause of the common man, no matter what our particular rôle may be. If the idea of the common man is for any of us the representation of an "average citizen" or a "forgotten man" toward whom we have charitable obligations, the important battle is already lost. Only to the extent that each of us feels a personal belongingness to the joint cause of all of us will democracy succeed.

But how many have this sense of common belongingness which must serve as the motive power for co-operative formulation and solution of today's gigantic problems? All the great developments of community life have conspired to give us participants an increasingly insignificant picture of ourselves and our potentialities, to make us feel increasingly alone and on our own. Not only have the problems grown, but we have individually shrunk, by losing our intimate membership in groups of fellow men. The mirror we hold up before ourselves reflects largely individual aloneness — social impotence.

Looking out of the window on a rainy Election Day, one of us said, "Why should I go out? It's only one vote. It wouldn't make any difference." A third of us in this country have come to believe that even in peacetime no newspaper should be allowed to criticize our form of government. Then there is the group of business and

professional men who met together in a "discussion round-table" to do a better job of volunteer youth leadership. How they turned on their "discussion leader" at the end of the first session when he made so bold as to start a discussion! "We didn't come here to sit around and talk," said they. "You are the expert. You should tell us. Somebody always knows best." The parents of a neighborhood all individually asked that their children be permitted to participate in a community recreation program — but all failed to appear at meeting after meeting when they were invited to *share* in the guidance of the program to keep it functioning in the best interests of their children. A citizen's group came together to hear a panel discussion on the question of delinquency, and went away congratulating one another that it had been a fine meeting — with no thoughts turning to action. "It was a fine discussion." The majority of the youths in three different studies submitted without rebellion, indeed with a show of satisfaction, to initiative-destroying leadership of adult dictators; and the older the age-group the greater the willingness to be personally insignificant in policy-making and execution.

Similar pictures could be snapped in every corner of our culture, in the business office, on the factory floor, in the classroom and in the nursery. But there is ample proof that these are pictures of neglect, not of incapacity! Our curriculum of living has become so crowded with individually required specialization courses that we have forgotten the major subject for all of us — to achieve skill in belonging to the common cause of community welfare. As Saint-Exupéry (153) puts it, " . . . the significance of Man, in whom my civilization is summed up, is not self-evident: *it is a thing to be taught.* There is in mankind no natural predisposition to acknowledge the existence of Man, for Man is not made evident by the mere existence of men."

What evidence do we have that we can be taught? And that there are those among us with the skill and inclination to teach? In an increasing number of classrooms, neighborhoods, and communities, we are beginning to see the evidences of the dynamos of constructive social energy that are released when groups of us — children, youth, families, factories, communities — are helped to become conscious of ourselves as groups in which as individuals we can find a

meaningful membership and emotionally secure belongingness. Child psychologists have shown that children go through a process of discovering themselves as "selves." The evidence is that groups must be helped to look into the mirror to discover themselves, their potentialities, and the satisfactions of united planning, acting, and evaluating, as contrasted with a passive relationship to the welfare efforts of the "community machinery."

Groups of elementary school children spontaneously come to life in a program of "action forums" (79), described as "a series of spontaneous discussions and planned investigations among an *organized* group of students, so conducted by the teacher that the discussion and investigation will result in concerted pro-democratic *action* by the students in the school and community." They have done even more than tackling war salvage problems. They have taken suggestions to the mayor, written the school board, tackled the problem of their own attitudes on racial matters, and put an end to several street gang wars. They are realistically taking the measure of some group-size jobs in their communities, not just playing with "classroom projects."

A group of older youth in a summer camp project (10) makes appointments to visit near-by communities in groups of five and six, to live in the homes of each community for three or four days, exploring collectively and individually the problems of life in the community and testing what they can contribute. They do not come just to observe but to explore channels and techniques of action. Then they return to home base for three days of intensive evaluation of their experience and of their teamwork as a group — helped in their discussions by skilled teachers who have not gone along to guide the adventure. Then they set out for another community. Several communities are visited during the course of the summer.

A group of "ordinary adults" meet in a training course for volunteer youth leaders (13). They come demanding to "be told what to do," become fascinated with the experience of expressing themselves freely with a skilled discussion leader, become aware of themselves by observing their own group process as a laboratory in leadership, begin to visit each other as voluntary teachers of one another on the job, dramatically change their "style of leadership" with their youth groups, and refuse to stop meeting when the "course" is over.

An adult education class starts out with an idea of having some lectures on solving their personal problems (185). They rebel when the expert does not "expert," then discover themselves in the mirror held up by observation and analysis of their own process of rebellion. They begin to share themselves and their experiences with each other. The group life becomes rich in the sum of these gifts to one another. Other groups in the community begin to be influenced by these new action skills and by recognition of responsibility and potentiality.

An incredulous group of workers finds that its management really is willing to think and act in terms of equality of co-operation rather than in terms of balance of power.[3] Creative powers come vigorously to life. An unused "suggestion system" is crowded with thoughtful ideas. Floor supervisors change their relations to the workers; worker teams feel and take responsibility for new areas of planning.

A midwestern community discovers itself (184) with the help of a skilled adviser. They develop a scorecard to keep a record of their progress as a community. Teams of volunteers do the annual checking-up job and a "scoring bee" pulls the citizens together for a social time and to take a look at themselves.

Farmers scattered through the counties of the nation discover that they have a meaningful opportunity to effect policies in which they have a vested interest which have always been made "off there in Washington." Belongingness through representation takes on new and concrete meaning.

What can we say in this brief space about *this process of becoming active sharers in such common causes*? From present evidence these ideas seem to emerge:

(1) People must come together in small groups, in face-to-face relationships. A lot of persons being related indirectly through a centralized agency or office is not enough.

(2) Just because these people come together, to be educated or for some other purpose, does not mean they are ready to learn the necessary skills of group membership.

(3) Leadership must help first to get these persons aware of them-

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[3] French, John R. P. Unpublished data.

selves as a group, to drop their masks of caution and suspicion, to learn to expect friendliness and sympathetic listening and support from one another.

(4) Leadership must also help the group to become sensitive to "needs for action." This is a process of discovery by the group members, but often some "training" in perception is necessary before spontaneous discovery can take place.

(5) There must be free atmosphere of thinking and investigation; tools for discovery; and an orderly pattern for *goal-setting* rather than futile dissipation of energies without clear objectives.

(6) The group must be helped to sense and evaluate their progress in relation to their course of action. Feelings of progress will not come just because a group is actually moving forward. Members must be sensitized to criteria by which they can *recognize* forward movement.

(7) And the group unity that comes with action toward goals, against, through, and around barriers, must lead to new recognition of belongingness to the larger community, rather than to insulation and feelings of self-sufficiency and "local loyalty." The intensive feeling of membership in action-oriented face-to-face groups must be interpreted dramatically by good leadership as a larger belongingness in a concrete Common Man.

What evidence is there that leadership with such skills is ready and willing to function? Probably most heartening is the evidence of a "feeling for new directions" in so many varied quarters.

Higher education shows signs of recognizing the need for "reality-practice" in its educational methods (76).

Youth are getting a sense of national membership as never before through local war service efforts (27).

Labor leadership is beginning to be able to divert some of its energies from the struggle for recognition to the search for belongingness in the larger community efforts (19).

Labor sponsors a self-study of democratic and undemocratic practices (44).

A state university establishes a school for labor leadership (133).

A national social agency sponsors the interpretation to the public of the scientific truths about race and the dynamics of scapegoating (36, 130).

Labor-management committees increase in number and effectiveness on a voluntary basis (37).

Research in social science receives increasing recognition and shows signs of tackling some of the frontiers of man's relations with man that have been so studiously neglected (113).

Groups of scientific workers begin to show a feeling of responsibility for communication of their knowledge for the use of the Common Man (43, 132).

One federal agency develops techniques for sharing policy formation with the "grass-roots citizen."

Another one organizes civilians for national war service by using the block and neighborhood as the social unit (138).

Youth serving agencies critically examine and modify their procedures for training leaders (27, 66).

Teachers' colleges show increasing recognition that the training of educational leaders is a responsibility that cannot be handled with institutionalized complacency (85).

A forthcoming issue of an educational journal gives all its space to a consideration of the question of democratic leadership in the various groupings of our culture (85), etc.

The list could be continued on many other frontiers of our efforts to arouse ourselves to the responsibilities and challenges which our membership in the Common Man requires of us. The list of evidences of a gathering storm of reaction and protest against the "threatened" release of energies of the Common Man could perhaps be almost as long.

This is no excuse for inactivity. To paraphrase Saint-Exupéry somewhat: A civilization is a thing that kneads and molds men. If the civilization to which we belong was brought low by the failure of individuals, then our question must be, why did our civilization not create a different type of individual? . . . We must begin by recovering the animating power of our civilization which has become lost. . . . We have been taking advantage of democracy's tranquillity, its tolerance, its warmth. We have become parasites upon it. It has meant to many of us no more than a place where we were snug and secure, like a passenger on a ship. The passenger makes use of the ship and gives it nothing in return. If the members of our civilization have degenerated, against whom can we lodge a complaint?

The evidence is clear. "We-groups" and leadership are both pos-

sible. They represent the imperative frontier for the social scientist.[4] (*End of reply from Drs. Lippitt and Hendry.*)

The last two contributions have dealt largely with groups gathered together to perform a task; we need also a study of communities, i.e., groups defined in terms of their sheer closeness and immediate response to one another. So I asked Dr. Alvin Zander, now on duty with the United States Public Health Service:

What about putting democracy to work on community functions?

Dr. Zander's Reply

Most communities will feel more *responsibility* for the effective functioning of their governmental and private institutions after the war. This seems a safe prediction because:

(1) The increasing centralization of federal activities demands that communities must strengthen their hands if they are to make effective use of government services.

(2) Government (and private national) agencies are realizing the importance of encouraging every type of grass-roots organization that is sufficiently effective to work with them nationally — witness NYA, WPA, Selective Service, OPA, OCD, USO.

(3) There are continuing signs of reaction against the impersonality of big-city life — witness the growth of luncheon clubs, community councils, women's clubs, adult education classes, etc.

An acceptance of community responsibility is no guarantee, however, that there is a parallel growth in democratic functioning. An autocratic spirit may prevail in any community or institution, no matter how rich the democratic environment surrounding it. How can we make democratic methods of community operation so practical that they will be chosen for use in place of the authoritarian procedures? There are symptoms of democratic pathology in the ordinary community. Let us look at these symptoms; and then at several suggested procedures for widening the understanding and operation of community democracy.

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[4] For bibliography, cf. nos. 10, 13, 19, 27, 36, 37, 43, 44, 66, 76, 79, 85, 113, 130, 132, 133, 138, 153, 184, 185.

THE PATHOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY

There are some practical reasons why democracy wheezes in the average community. Democracy demands attitudes, knowledges, and skills that are little known and are difficult to teach by the usual academic methods. For example:

> *Attitudes.* Comprehension of tolerance, patience in discussion, the constructive value of argument, "use of" *versus* "dependence on" experts. These are subtle, difficult to understand and to practice.

> *Knowledges.* The reason for many-person participation in policy formation, the necessity for the formulation of practices that are consistent with purposes, the need for the frequent evaluation of these practices. These are examples of democratic knowledges that are often absent from the idea-content of the ordinary citizen.

> *Skills.* The ability to make a point, to lead a group discussion, to bring a group to a decision, to compromise one's own favorite position when necessary for the greatest good. These are examples of skills that must be learned by citizens if they are to be effective operators in a democracy.

To look at the situation in more specific terms, suppose you were asked into a community to advise as to ways of improving local institutions — clubs, agencies, governmental groups, etc. — so that these institutions might more effectively meet the local community needs. What *might* you find?

You might find the community in the hands of the "respectable" people, but the government run by the "non-respectables." The *respectable* people are those who make the most money. Great deference would be paid you, and there would be dependence upon you as an expert who is there to provide the community with a simple formula to be followed step by step. They will have difficulty in objectively defining their community problem (as much difficulty as the neurotic in seeing himself as he is); thus most community "projects" will be tree plantings, statues, speeches, and other superficialities. Larger problems will not be seen. Most members of the community will be inflexible in the habit of drawing generalizations from the experiences of other communities, and in making specific applications from the generalizations given to them. They will fear "conflicts of ideas" as signs of poor morale, as de-

structive. The business man will dislike to take a stand on any issue because he cannot afford to insult customers who may think differently from himself. Leadership is a matter of "strength"; the man who gets there first with the loudest talk and the most dominating methods is the "leader" because others do what he wants them to do.

This is a typical example of a community pattern. This community, like many others, appears to have little conception of democracy as a philosophy which insists on the right and the capacity of people to control their institutions for their own best ends. The purest functioning democracy would appear a radical procedure to an ordinary American community. In many cases it compares unfavorably with autocratic methods because its democratic processes are performed so poorly. *What might be done to make democracy more practically effective?*

What can be done may be summarized in four steps:

(1) A definition of democracy must be clearly conceived in operational terms, in terms of concrete steps by which a democratic procedure can be differentiated from any other kind of procedure; it must be sharp and clear. Authoritarian procedures have been widely publicized in recent years. They are more direct than the operations of democracy and therefore easier to identify and to learn. Group leaders in a training course at first mistook the *effective* authoritarian procedures for democratic methods. After the distinguishing characteristics had been explained they no longer had trouble in identifying Fascism in action. Democracy, however, continued to be vague, tricky, difficult to identify. Lots of Americans do know democracy when they see it; but the definition given to them must be given in concrete operational terms. It must be made clear to any individual. It must be applicable to the small group and community. Too long has the concept been a description of what goes on in remote beautiful buildings in Washington.

(2) Communities must have advisers to help them carry on and improve the functioning of their institutions. The adviser would be a person who comes to town at the request of the community. His presence would lend objectivity and yield an accurate analysis of community life and its problems. He would range over a state-wide or regional area, being attached to some politically neutral organization with prestige — such as the state university.

Such a program would not be *explicitly* defined in terms of enriching the democratic activities of the community; that would be too great a threat to its "patriotic" reputation. Instead, the adviser would be called into the community to help them meet whatever kind of community problem they might have. In approaching these problems and enabling his counsel and the community to solve them, his leadership would be concerned with clarifying and strengthening the type of behavior that fulfills the definition of democracy. Individual personalities have troubles in this complex civilization and are learning to turn to the psychiatrist or counselor for guidance and treatment. A comparable situation often exists at the group and community level; communities are beginning to seek guidance and treatment. The Adult Education Program at the University of Michigan under the direction of Drs. Howard McClusky and William Morse comes the closest to the kind of program described here.

(3) The advisor must use educational methods that will provide insights into the interpersonal relations of the democratic process at a level deeper than that of the ordinary teaching methods. He should use workshops (a problem-solving project-method of teaching), institutes, and conferences in attempting to help a community to understand its own shortcomings. A recent laboratory course, at the New School in New York, on Effective Community Citizenship is suggestive of a possible method, as is Henry Otto's book *Community Workshops for Teachers*. Besides the problem of improving democratic dynamics, there is the very real and touchy problem of getting one socio-economic level actually to work with other levels. And democratic Parent-Teacher Associations and luncheon clubs are of little use if they are set against a background of reactionary government.

Too often the adviser will be brought to town by a clique of "middle-class" "do-gooders" who will seize every opportunity to extend their influence (usually in the direction set by the uppers). A clinical relationship should make it possible to find a solution for this problem and others like it.

(4) The trend toward co-ordination of administrative agencies should be encouraged. In recent years there has been a splurge of co-ordination groups. Community councils have been formed to

prevent the waste of energy and effort such as occurs when separate groups try to tackle a problem that is of equal concern to all. On the state and regional level there have also been such co-operative bodies. The number of such groups will undoubtedly continue to increase. However, they need to become objective about two of their greatest failures to date: (*a*) The failure to get true community-wide representation; (*b*) The failure to comprehend their objectives clearly and to function effectively in their rôle as a co-operative and co-ordinative body.

While applying these four principles, every effort must be made to train fresh democratic leadership within the community, for the number available is pitifully small, and the task is vast. (*End of Dr. Zander's reply.*)

In an industrial society the supreme test of the democratic method is its practical effectiveness in *industrial processes*. Indeed, we may well ask whether democracy can really function in society unless it can function in industry. Is there, parallel to constantly improving engineering techniques, an aggressively developing technique for improving the industrial arts through effective democratization of production?

Democracy has, of course, been in a broad sense a feature of a number of industrial movements for some years; there have been many attempts to study intimately and sympathetically the psychology of the individual worker and the nature of his sense of identification with other workers and with the whole task of the plant. One thinks, for example, of the Likert (104) studies of morale in the life insurance industry; of the industrial democracy of the Columbia Conserve Company under William Hapgood; of the psychiatric insights of Elton Mayo (119a); of the experimental industrial studies of Roethlisberger and Dickson (149a); of Douglas McGregor's clinical studies of management-labor relations (116a), and of many similar progressive movements. But something quite new and very important has come to us from the Lewin approach, and in particular, from the work of Bavelas and French in the development of experimental group techniques for the expansion and vitalization of democracy in industry. I turned to Dr. John R. P. French of the Harwood Manufacturing Company with the question:

> How can the democratic method be practically instituted in the day-by-day functioning of an industrial plant?

Dr. French's Reply

The achievement of peace and harmony for any social group depends on the successful solution of *conflict situations*. It is a common belief in our culture that democratic methods are the most successful means of dissolving conflicts among groups. The high value placed on democratic methods is based on a wealth of experience with groups ranging in size from families of individuals to families of nations. There is nevertheless no area of our social life where democracy has been universally and adequately achieved.

In spite of the strengthening of cohesive forces by the war, *industrial conflict* remains a major problem. Labor-Management committees have made remarkable progress toward increased harmony and greater production through the introduction of more democratic methods; yet there remain large areas of armed truce, and some areas of open conflict.

Psychologists and other social scientists have devoted considerable attention to the problem of industrial conflict, but our scientific knowledge is meagre. I will report here a preliminary investigation of some techniques for achieving industrial harmony through more democratic behavior in the higher management of a factory.

The writer is employed as a consulting and research psychologist at a Southern sewing factory employing about five hundred women and seventy-five men. Previous controlled experiments at the factory had demonstrated the effectiveness of democratic methods of leadership (by a psychologist) in increasing the production of experimental groups of workers by as much as twenty percent.[5] A part of the writer's job was to attempt to introduce these methods of leadership throughout the whole factory. Because of complete backing and understanding by the absentee owner, there was an unusual opportunity to try out various techniques of changing the factory as a whole. The problem was not so much how to run the factory democratically, but rather how to get others to run it demo-

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[5] Unpublished experiments by Alex Bavelas.

cratically when they were free to run it in any way they saw fit. In its widest significance it is the problem of how to change a sub-culture. But the present report deals only with the central core of *leadership training of higher management.*

First it is necessary to characterize more fully what we have loosely called "democratic methods." Preliminary observation showed that the policies, as in many other factories, were determined almost exclusively by the top management with little influence by the supervisors and none by the workers. A more democratic functioning would require more influence on factory policies by those below the level of higher management. Factory policies and regulations were generally liberal, but the techniques of enforcement relied primarily on higher authority, rather than upon the more democratic basis of general understanding and consent. The management did little to clarify for the workers their future relations with the company. There was a minimum of personal contact between management and labor and a tendency for management to think of the worker primarily as a necessary adjunct to the machine.

Any attempt to change these conditions through the use of psychological techniques must be based on a correct diagnosis of the psychological forces acting on the management. Before proceeding to a description of techniques, therefore, some of these forces should be mentioned. Of course there is a host of various forces acting on particular managers in particular situations, but the following goals probably represent fairly universal forces: (1) to get high production from the plant, (2) to reduce costs, (3) to avoid trouble both with labor and with owners, (4) to conform to the ideology of industry in general, of their own particular industry, or of their own specific company: usually this means playing the accepted rôle of "The Manager," (5) to maintain their own status and position of authority. With the possible exception of the last, none of these five goals produces forces which are *necessarily* in the direction of undemocratic behavior.

The most important method — it is almost a principle — is that the psychologist must work explicitly within the framework of the major goals of the management. He has neither the position nor the authority to impose more democratic forms of managing. Nor

would imposition from above be successful; enduring democracy can best be taught by democratic methods, for people learn more from what they *experience* than from what they hear. If new forms of leadership behavior are not fully accepted, there can be no guarantee against regression as soon as the initiating forces are withdrawn (60). More specifically, this principle requires that the psychologist be able to show that democratic methods are more effective means of achieving one or more of the goals of management. For example, there is frequently some resistance on the part of higher management to the delegation of more responsibility to supervisors, yet management can be motivated to introduce such a change if they can be convinced that it will result in higher production and lower costs.

A related technique is to start with the immediate problems and felt needs of the management. These may be problems which are not of the greatest importance, either in relation to the major goals of the management or in relation to the nurturing of democracy. However, there are a number of advantages in beginning with experienced needs. In the first place it is easier to get a manager to change his behavior in an area where he does not feel successful and self-satisfied. Secondly, he will feel more satisfied with the results of the changed behavior; and this in turn will help to establish the position of the psychologist. It must be remembered that the ordinary psychologist does not have — and this is as it should be — the established position of an expert such as is readily granted to the consulting engineer. Third, it should be noted that there are few psychological problems in managing a factory which do not readily permit successful solutions by more democratic methods.

The dubious position of the psychologist in industry is not without its compensations. He may be sure that whatever success he achieves will spring from democratic methods which do not rely on any kind of authority. The atmosphere with which he works will be congenial, for there must be a relationship of confidence, understanding, and mutual aid between the management and the psychologist; on no other basis is the game worth the candle. Ordinarily such a relationship cannot be established without the education of the psychologist in the task of management, and of the management in the task of the psychologist. A psychologist can do

little with psychological problems in a factory without a rather detailed knowledge of the factory situation. But the importance of teaching psychological knowledge and viewpoints to management requires further explanation.

What management needs first of all from the psychologist is to acquire what might be called "the psychological point of view." Successful democratic leadership requires the constant recognition of psychological forces, and an awareness of the psychological environment as well as of the physical environment. A manager who cannot think of psychological factors as just as *real* as physical factors will make frequent mistakes in leadership. In handling grievances, for example, it is a mistake to take note only of complaints about tangible things like wages, hours, and physical conditions of work. Yet a manager will frequently take no action in regard to a complaint as soon as he discovers that it is based on misinformation; he is thinking of the physical, not the psychological situation.

Another psychological contribution which can be very useful in the process of changing the behavior of the management is what might be called "research-mindedness." A factory manager, even though very sensitive to psychological problems, is not likely to be impressed with the usefulness of laboratory research or abstract psychological laws. Even the significance of practical research in his own factory needs pointing up. But it is not difficult to convince a manager, faced with a problem, to try some suggested solution in a limited way to see whether it works. This is the first step in using research as a basis for changing his methods of management. It is wise to begin with research where the results are measured in terms of management's own criteria of success, i.e., production, costs, turnover, absenteeism, etc. If such research can show the worth of psychology in helping the management to achieve its goals, then it is a relatively easy step to use morale surveys and other research techniques which are not so directly related to the primary goal of production.

The more the management can be involved in the actual research process, the better the chances of changing the behavior of the management on the basis of the results obtained. An example will help to make clear why this is so. It was the policy of the company

to hire only workers under thirty years of age. The management was completely unaffected by the statement that general psychological knowledge would indicate that many workers over thirty could become high producers. As the labor market became tighter, the management became interested in getting some figures on the productivity of older workers. This research was carried out only after conferences with the management had led to agreement on the methods of collecting the data and on the following criteria of the value of a worker to the company: (1) productivity, (2) absenteeism, (3) turnover, and (4) learning speed. When the results showed the superiority of older workers on all four criteria, there was amazement on the part of management, but no hesitancy to change the company policy; for the research had been designed to answer all the questions they might raise. It must be remembered that research results are never applied in action except on the basis of some *value system*. Thus the psychologist interested in the practical implementation of his research must design it in terms of the value systems of those who are to carry it out in action.

Certainly the most difficult, and probably the most important, procedure in changing leadership behavior is successful demonstration of leadership. The psychologist must be a successful leader if he is to be the most effective trainer of leaders. It is not too difficult, for example, to observe the leadership techniques used by the management in conducting supervisors' meetings and to recommend better techniques; but it is very difficult to get the management to adopt the suggested techniques, and carry through to a successful conclusion. This difficulty is caused partly by the dubious position of the psychologist; the ordinary manager who has conducted such meetings for years is naturally not inclined to accept suggestions of changes without some proof. To be effective, such proof must fall within the range of his own experience; it must be shown that the method works. The psychologist who is a successful group leader not only convinces the management but also wins their confidence in him. Furthermore, the techniques of good democratic leadership in a group meeting are so subtle that they must be observed to be understood. There are a few obvious techniques for stimulating participation — for example, asking questions — which can be described. Yet even here the manner of asking the question

and the general atmosphere of the meeting are so decisive in determining the results that a description of isolated techniques is of little help. One cannot hope, therefore, that a manager will usually experience marked success in his first attempts at using new techniques. Such techniques must be *observed* and *practiced,* with coaching in "pre-planning" and "post-mortem" discussions.

In a social organization, like a factory, a change to more democratic methods of leadership will frequently require a change in the structure of the institution. There must be recognized channels of communication between management and labor; and, if the organization is large, some form of representation for labor. The creation of such organizations is an important method of achieving more democratic management. The dynamics of this method can be illustrated in the creation and functioning of a Labor-Management committee in a factory where there was no union or other group representing labor. Before the organization of this committee under the leadership of the plant psychologist, the management was not aware of some of the needs of the workers, nor inclined to do anything about those needs which were not obviously related to production. The first change suggested by the committee was the introduction, during working hours, of a daily minute of silent prayer for members of the armed forces. Naturally the initial reaction of the management was not favorable to this loss of working time. However, when their official representatives reported that the workers were practically one hundred percent in favor of the suggestion, the management proposed a weekly five-minute service conducted by the local ministers. This compromise was readily agreed upon and carried out. Subsequently the management was highly pleased with the change, even though it never could have been carried out without the organized pressure from below.

It should be emphasized that the top management in a factory fails to use democratic methods not primarily because of opposition to democracy, but rather because of unfamiliarity with democratic methods appropriate to the problems of factory management. Unfortunately, psychologists have neither the knowledge nor the skill to place all these tools in the hands of management. Thus the psychologist is faced both with the problem of teaching the democratic skills which he knows and with the problem of discovering new

democratic methods that will successfully accomplish the purposes of management. Once successful techniques are devised, and proved successful in preliminary experiments, the expansion of their use is sometimes very easy. For example, the inauguration of a few experimental group meetings of departments and smaller functional work groups with members of management was difficult; six months later, however, the management was suggesting that such meetings should be held *daily*.

It is not yet known how fast it is possible to change, on a voluntary basis, the basic method of functioning of an institution like a factory. However, it can be said that there are certain advantages in a gradual "step-by-step" method. Behavioral changes must usually be preceded by ideological changes. Management must be convinced of the *desirability* of more democratic procedures before any concrete steps are taken. Once this conviction is reached, action should be taken only in those areas where it will receive the heartiest support of management. Eventually, by such a process, large changes can be achieved without conflict or even opposition. For example, the Labor-Management committee mentioned above started to function in areas of minor importance to management, such as grievances about physical conditions of work, the selling of war bonds, the selection of the musical programs, etc. Eventually the committee was consulted about wage raises, overtime hours, vacation dates, and other matters which would have been considered in the beginning an exclusive prerogative of the higher management.

An understanding of the rôle of *policy* is essential in the attempt to nurture democracy in industry. The policy of a factory is a statement of those forms of leadership and human relationships which have attained the status of law. Usually they have been formulated by the management without the consent of the governed. Thus the company policies hold a key position from the point of view of democratic procedures. At the same time, any attempt to change an accepted policy is likely to arouse the same reaction on the part of management as an attempt to change the Constitution. Nevertheless, functionally useless policies rapidly die out as far as action is concerned. Thus it is possible to use policy as an effective means of promoting democratic procedures. In most cases it is unwise to try to change directly the existing undemocratic policies; instead

there are two procedures which can be used successfully. In the first place, it is important to institute more democratic procedures in the formation of all *new* policies. Secondly, it is frequently possible to introduce, in a limited area, certain specific democratic actions; if these actions prove successful it is then possible to formulate them into public policy. The policy then becomes a reinforcer of the democratic behavior. What was first an isolated action becomes a permanent procedure because it is supported both by the needs of the workers and by the force of company policy.

These observations on the process of nurturing democracy in industry would be incomplete without some statement of the effectiveness of the techniques used. Unfortunately no precise measures are available; it can only be said that in the opinion of the writer and other psychologists, they have produced a marked change toward more democratic management. This change appears to have been accompanied by higher morale and production in the factory. There is all the more need, therefore, for further research in this vitally important field. From this preliminary approach to the problem of changing the culture of a factory it is certain that psychology is woefully lacking in the necessary understanding, knowledge of techniques, and especially in the research techniques for studying such problems; but that even these small beginnings offer much, both for increasing the effectiveness of human effort and for the enrichment of the social experience of management and workers. (*End of Dr. French's reply.*)

It is hard to read Dr. French's survey without feeling that the experience of managers and workers constitutes more than growth into a specific democratic opportunity; such experience in industry should certainly be expected to modify general habits of personal and community living. We may expect, then, from Dr. French's research outlook, an early concern with the problem of devising research methods to discover *how democratic experience in industry can be made to lead to the most definite and effective democratization of community life.*

These studies of industrial and educational democracy just reported deal with segments of the individual life; their importance lies in their practicality and in the promise that democratization

may *spread* through all the aspects of the life process, leavening the society in which the individual lives.

Another approach, however, remains to us: we may scan a group of *democratic communities,* embedded within others less democratic, which have carried the concept of group living much further; these we may study as examples full of implications for our own culture, but not, of course, as models to copy. We shall limit ourselves to two kinds of groups, held together by the volition of individual members, not by coercion. (In such a book as ours, a synoptic discussion of the rôle of the State in democratization of the community would be futile, and a ten-page account of "life under the Soviet Union" absurd; but there are communities embedded within the economic-political system with which we are familiar, which can in a few pages teach us a great deal.) I refer to the Palestinian co-operative communities and to the Hutterites of the United States and Canada. I first asked David Kuselewitz to answer, in terms of his own experience, the question:

> What can Americans learn about democracy from the Palestinian co-operative communities?

David Kuselewitz's Reply

The world has heard comparatively little about the intensely significant experiment in human living which has been going on for over a generation in Palestine. The Jewish communal settlements, known in Hebrew as *kibutzim* (singular: *kibutz*), could easily serve the student of society and human nature as living laboratories for the study of the natural laws of social development, as a means of determining their relation to universal human hopes and ideals. It is hoped that this brief account of *kibutz* life will stimulate more intensive study of this novel and highly significant form of living.

COMMUNISM, UTOPIANISM, OR LIVING DEMOCRACY

The *kibutz* can truly be called the classical socialist unit of living, for it strives to embody in its daily life the socialist principle: "From everyone according to his ability; to everyone according to his need." Though it is often compared to the utopian societies of

the last century, and the collective farms of Soviet Russia, and though it has undoubtedly been influenced by both, the analogy must not be too far pressed. Unlike the old Utopias, the *kibutz* is not an attempt to escape reality, but an heroic and pioneering effort to face the vicissitudes of the very harsh reality of a persecuted people's return to its ancient and strife-torn homeland. And unlike the Soviet collectives, the *kibutzim* are voluntary associations, free of all coercives, embodying an extreme measure of collectivism in their daily life activities.

The *kibutz* is not built primarily upon empirical norms of living. Its cultural base is made up largely of ideological precepts. In this respect it may be looked upon as a social experiment to test the validity of the socialist philosophy of life, for it is the only known attempt to put the principles of orthodox socialist doctrine into practice on such a large scale, in such trying circumstances, with such scanty means, and — most significantly — on a purely voluntary basis.

The *kibutz* has attained a very high degree of direct, primary contact between the individual and the group, and has done away with most agencies and mechanisms which prevent the individual-social balance from achieving free play. All interests, the trivial as well as the essential, may be the vital concern of the whole group and of every individual in it. Perhaps this may be accounted for by the simple, pioneering life, or by the freshness and novelty of this form of living. As these groups develop economically, their size tends to increase and they tend to join together in country-wide federations, and to resort to a much greater degree of institutionalization in their day-by-day life. But the *kibutzim* strive, almost to the point of fanaticism, to preserve those democratic principles which animated the thought of their founders.

Since the individual becomes a member of the *kibutz* by his own free choice, he is himself the most potent agent of social control. The group has no way of making the individual conform to its norms, except through a direct appeal to his sense of duty. The very existence of the *kibutz* is based upon the assumption that its members have a clear realization of what is demanded of them, and a firm determination to achieve it. Life is therefore constantly and self-consciously scrutinized and evaluated, lest it fall short of

the ethical and ideological norms which called it into existence. The only means of social control are therefore public opinion and the force of the group's philosophy of life upon the psychology of the people who live in it.

Public Opinion as Social Control

Public opinion has a number of very effective means of expression. The most important of these is the General Assembly of the *kibutz*, a formal meeting of its membership. This assembly is the highest authority in the group. Its decisions have the power of law yet without the permanence and rigidity which are characteristic of legal systems. The assembly is also the only tribunal. It strives to become a true "community of spirit," in which the members of a large family come together for frank discussions of their needs, demands, complaints and even their inner motives and aspirations. They try to arrive at conclusions about the abstract principles which underlie their form of life, and to make practical decisions about the particulars of the business of living. They also issue judgments in all cases of violation and nonconformity on the part of any person, or of the group as a whole. The assembly often serves as an informal social gathering, and as a clearing-house for thought and knowledge. In times of stress it may become a public confessional, an excellent means of releasing pent-up grievances, frustrations and doubts. In times of contentment and relaxation it may assume the form of a communal artistic event, giving expression to creativity, talent and a general sense of well-being.

The assembly is usually planned in advance by the executive committee of the *kibutz*, or by the particular committee which has charge of the business on the agenda, in conjunction with the chairman of the meeting. The more informal meetings are generally not planned in advance, but simply called to order and opened immediately to general discussion. In the business meetings, in particular, it is mostly the influential members, or those whose special competence in the matter under discussion entitles them to a leading rôle, who dominate the deliberations and decisions of the group. But there is very little opportunity for demagogy or log-rolling. All know each other so well, and are so thoroughly informed about everything which is being discussed,

that it becomes impossible to deflect the course of the assembly from its inherently honest and serious purpose.

WORKING FOR A COMMON LIVING

The work of a whole year is generally planned in advance, especially in those *kibutzim* which have been in existence for a number of years and in the course of which they have managed to acquire substantial estates, industrial projects, working experience and trained, specialized personnel. Nevertheless, even in the most settled of *kibutzim*, this annual plan is so broad that it becomes necessary to assign specific tasks to people every week, and even from day to day, in accordance with the seasonal needs of group enterprises, and the fluctuations of the outside labor market. This division of labor is administered by a small, elected committee, which takes into consideration the factors of income and productivity, as well as the capabilities and desires of each person. Their assignment, in the form of a daily employment chart, is placed on the bulletin board each evening so that members may learn what they are to do the next day. This chart is rarely consulted by those who are fortunate enough to have a steady job within the estate or in some farming or industrial establishment outside. To those who are not yet adjusted, this chart often becomes a daily source of heartbreak and worry.

Every member is expected to comply with the assignment of the labor committee, unless he suddenly becomes ill, in which case it is his duty to inform a member of the committee, so that a substitution may be made. A member may ask for a change of assignment, and if possible, his request is usually granted. When differences arise they are brought before the assembly for final disposition. Although there is no machinery of enforcement in this, as well as in all other areas of living, the degree of individual compliance with committee rulings is very high, and the number of complaints and grievances is negligible. In the case of illness, for instance, the individual himself is left to decide whether he is physically incapable of working. There are some who are suspected as malingerers. They do not remain members for long, after such suspicion falls upon them, unless they be very thick-skinned, in which case gossip or overt ostracism by the rest of the membership usually

forces them to leave. There is very little desire to simulate illness when the watchful eye of social conscience is upon one. Rather, there is a tendency to excessive zeal, to justify the group's faith in the sheer goodness and honesty of human nature as the chief measure of truth and the only basis for action.

Enjoying the Fruits of Labor

There is no private property in the *kibutz*, except for small items which are left to the individual for sentimental reasons. When a member joins the group he is expected to turn into the communal chest clothing, furniture, books, money, and all other property. All income, from work, as well as from other sources, is turned into the common treasury. In fact, in most cases the *kibutz* treasurer collects wages directly from the employers of the various members, and in the case of *kibutz* merchandise or produce which is sold on the outside, the group receives payment directly. Thus the average member seldom has any money, except for small change. Food is bought and prepared by the kitchen staff. Clothing is bought, mended, laundered and distributed by the people in charge of the clothing department. Living quarters are assigned by the committee in charge of housing. In short, the very concept of "mine" is condemned to oblivion, and the new concept "ours" is rapidly expected to replace it.

Nevertheless, the distribution of income and property is not mechanically standardized or equalized; it varies and fluctuates, within reasonable limits, as a function of changing individual needs and the group's capacity to fulfill them. This is particularly true of secondary needs, such as luxuries, medical aid, vacations, sick leaves, leaves of absence, pleasure trips, visits to friends and relatives, receiving of guests, expenditures for special purposes, gifts, payment of individual debts, financial aid to parents abroad, entertainment, and all other needs of civilized living. The administration of all those trivia of daily living is vested in elected officials, who serve at the discretion of the general assembly, and with a few notable exceptions, on their own free time. Individual requests are often denied, chiefly because of the limited means which the general budget allows each official or committee. A serious psychological problem is the sense of dependence which is thus created in

each individual, and which often produces a feeling of social immaturity, of helplessness, and in extreme cases, of downright infantilism. The strong, self-confident individual either manages to assume a position of leadership which enables him to live with much less control than the average member, or he may eventually leave the group, to seek independence on the outside. The weaker and less aggressive individuals tend to accept, and ultimately even to take a great satisfaction in this rigid but honest system of social security.

There is, nevertheless, in every *kibutz*, a number of truly maladjusted individuals, who either openly voice their disillusionment with the system, or secretly harbor feelings of grievance and bitterness, but who nevertheless do not have the courage or the opportunity to make the final break with the group. The latter type is the symptom of an ailing morale in the group. There comes a time in almost every *kibutz*, particularly if it does not enjoy economic prosperity, when it must clean its own house of such members or disintegrate.

Family Life and Education

Family life, stripped of the institutions of property and education, tends to lose the chief responsibilities which ordinary society places upon it. It ceases to be a legal institution and becomes instead a biological, psychological, and social relationship, the nature of which depends entirely upon the personalities of the individuals involved. The social conscience of the group does not permit two individuals to isolate themselves within the confines of their emotional communion, away from the group as a whole. Family life, aside from the degree of personal happiness which it affords — a matter which is entirely personal — is looked upon as a necessary factor in the stabilization of the group. Next to adjustment to a job, or to physical labor in general, to satisfaction with the system of production and distribution, and to an enduring faith in Zionism and Socialism, a successful family life is considered the most vital factor in the ultimate adjustment of any individual.

The communal upbringing of children deprives education of some of its sentimental concomitants with which exclusive parental care of children has endowed it. But the process, on the whole,

benefits from the expert scientific work of people especially selected
and trained for this task. Parents, of course, see their children as
often as possible, particularly on holidays. Thus they have all of
the joys and none of the drudgery of child-rearing. Even in the
poorest of *kibutzim*, mothers receive very excellent care, before
and after confinement. Infant care is up to the highest standards
known to science. Nothing is considered too good, once the people
in charge decide that it is necessary for the welfare of the younger
generation. Indeed, the care of the children and the sick are the
only items in the budgets of most *kibutzim* which are literally
unlimited, in relation to all other items, including the barest neces-
sities of life for everybody else.

Education at the school-age level is usually carried on in a cen-
tral school which is supported co-operatively by the *kibutzim* of
each region. Most of those schools are ultra-progressive, based
upon the principles of self-activity, self-discipline, social conscious-
ness, and provision for individual differences. These schools have
carried out the principles of the progressive education movement
of the United States and pre-Hitler Europe to a much greater de-
gree than is practically possible in larger school systems. In a
colonial country like Palestine, where there is no compulsory edu-
cation law, and where the standards of living and the standards of
public education are low, these progressive schools are real oases
of cultural achievement, and in them alone the existence of the
kibutzim would be more than justified.

CULTURE AND RECREATION

Most *kibutzim* do not look with favor upon those forms of recre-
ation which are generally known as "social life." Even a good time
must be endowed with some "higher earnestness"; it must have some
significant relationship to the general purpose of living. Sports, for
example, are very popular, but chiefly as a form of physical educa-
tion, as a stimulant and corrective to general health, and not as
mere recreation. That species of sports activity which stars a few
outstanding athletes and relegates everybody else to the rôle of
spectators is discouraged. Card playing, drinking, gambling and
other vices are not tolerated. Smoking is discouraged but not actu-
ally restricted. Love-making in public is considered in bad taste.

The facilities for cultural-educational activity are of course limited to the group's resources in leadership, talent and materials. Yet most *kibutzim* lead a very rich cultural life, in spite of the limitations. Almost every *kibutz* possesses a fine, carefully selected library of books in Hebrew, Yiddish, and European languages, on subjects covering a wide range of interests. In this library are usually found a score of periodicals, and even technical journals which some member may receive from friends abroad, or to which the group has subscribed on the recommendation of one or more of its members who are especially interested in its subject matter. Many *kibutzim* own very fine radio-phonographs, collections of classical and popular recordings, one or more pianos, and any number of smaller musical instruments. Choral groups, dramatic groups and study circles are very popular. Visiting artists and lecturers make appearances and draw capacity audiences. The group itself, out of its own store of talent and resourcefulness, usually arranges debates, lectures, concerts, theatrical productions, exhibitions of arts and crafts work, and other educational and artistic events of high standard and caliber.

A Social Prophecy or an Exotic Dream?

Both the leadership and to a lesser degree the membership at large is very active in political and trade-union activities. The *kibutzim* look upon themselves as pioneers not merely in the task of reconstructing the country and in rebuilding the economic, social and psychological structure of the Jewish people. They have proclaimed themselves as the vanguard of progressive humanity, the harbingers and progenitors of the socialist society of the future. For this reason they consider their trade union and political affiliations and activities as of the highest importance. This is particularly true of the *kibutzim* affiliated with the world Jewish youth movement Hashomer Hatzair, who are united not merely on the basis of principles of *kibutz* living, but in accordance with a carefully formulated system of political doctrine, and an ever-increasing list of decisions and resolutions which are binding to every member of every one of its *kibutzim* as guides in taking his stand as workingman, or leader of workers. This faith, which is truly a complete "Weltanschauung," if not a religion, is one of the most potent

of cohesive forces in the *kibutz*. Whether the intellectual grandeur and the emotional intensity of the *kibutz* idea will prove, like the visions of a few other sects which were born in Palestine, a vision which is prophetic of the future of humanity, or merely the delusion of a quaint and esoteric sect, is a question upon which many of the hopes of humanity may well depend in this century of the People's Revolution.[6] (*End of David Kuselewitz's reply.*)

Before drawing general conclusions from this study, I believe we shall want parallel data from another human society; if possible, from one functioning in a totally different setting. This presentation of the struggle for democracy in the Palestinian communities may, indeed, raise in the reader's mind the question: "Why go so far afield? Are not the problems of Palestine peculiarly complicated by problems of oppression, which have made the return to the homeland a result of a paroxysm of suffering over a long era, sustained in the democratic spirit when others less bitterly persecuted might lack the motivation?" At any rate, it seemed important to get another, culturally distinct sample of the practicality of democratic living and devotion to peace. I turned here to the materials collected over several years by Dr. Lee Emerson Deets, of Hunter College, who has analyzed the extraordinary co-operative communities of the Hutterites in the American Midwest. From his earlier accounts, I felt convinced that here, if anywhere within the Christian tradition, brotherhood was practiced with literalism and faith. Not that our industrial society can, in the manner of Tolstoy, try to simplify itself; and not that the Hutterites, in their passive, and rather primitive, agricultural mode of life, can teach us, any more than the Palestinian co-operatives do, how we of an industrial age can remake our society in a democratic direction. We have, however, learned from the picture of Palestinian co-operatives that modern men and women can, with faith and energy, make democracy and brotherhood supreme as a value, despite all sorts of economic and personal costs; and in the same way, the deep potential of human nature for achieving a satisfactory way of living, without competition for gain, power and prestige, seemed to be an

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[6] For bibliography, cf. nos. 12, 16, 82a, 105, 147, 154, 168.

essential part of any picture of the potential of human nature for enduring peace. I therefore asked Dr. Deets to answer this question:

> What can we learn from the Hutterites regarding the potentialities of human nature for lasting peace?

Dr. Deets's Reply

It is natural that we who live in a warring culture should think of peace primarily as absence of war. The Hutterites, who have a culture very different from our own, think of peace as more than escape from war. To them it is a permanent way of living. How permanent is indicated by the fact that their social order was fully established more than four centuries ago when the dominant institutions of our western society were still in embryonic form. The Hutterite way preceded ours. And unless we give more positive and empirical thought to the relations of human nature to peaceful and democratic living, their way may outlive ours.

To the Hutterite, peace and harmony are ultimate values around which the whole culture is consistently integrated. Since the culture is integrated, their own individual natures are integrated; for they are a product of the culture which they have created. Moreover, the order-producing central core of values is individually held, and support of these values is individually willed. The structure rests firmly on democratic common will. Hutterite experience would seem to demonstrate that human nature is adapted to peaceful living and that the human organism is more normal with it than without it. They are healthier physically and mentally than dwellers in the culture around them. It may also demonstrate that a people who would have peace must not only be willing to make the supreme sacrifice of dying for it when heroic occasion demands, as the Hutterites have; they must also be willing to live for it. Democracy is more than a political device or economic mechanism, and peace is more than a vest-pocket scheme to finesse war.

The Hutterites are a religious, communal society. Over six thousand Hutterites live in the approximately fifty-five communities in North America, six of the communities being in South Dakota, one in Montana, and the remainder in Alberta and Manitoba. A community of sixty-eight is to be found in Shropshire, England, and

an additional two hundred and sixty have a community in the interior of Paraguay at Isla Margarita. The latter two groups are not descendants of the original Hutterites; they are products of a movement started in 1920 by Dr. Eberhart Arnold, a leader in the German Youth Movement and an earnest student of Hutterite history. He organized his group around the sixteenth-century Hutterite patterns described in European archives, not knowing at the time that the original movement was still in existence. The Arnold group was investigated by the Hutterites of the United States and Canada, and was officially recognized. This discussion is limited to the historic Hutterite group now in North America.

The first communal society was established in 1528 in Moravia as an outcome of the Protestant Reformation. The founders were a group of Anabaptist refugees from southern Germany and the Tyrol who, after being severed from the medieval life pattern, found their lot worse than before. With an ascetic attitude which still survives, they repudiated the world of their persecutors, and formed a social order of their own, based upon the doctrine of brotherhood derived from the New Testatment, which had recently been translated into German. The system was an extension of ideal family relationships to the community. Communal sharing of all property and a policy of non-resistance were made central values in a theocentric order. Leaders, Jakob Huter being one, were of paramount importance in the formative stage. After the institutions were firmly established, the system became self-perpetuating. Persecution did much to bind them together.

Hutterite chronicles record many migrations to new frontiers. Some of them were mass flights, and some were treks to secure the isolation necessary for a small, deviant culture to survive. During their two and one half centuries in Europe, the Hutterites passed through three periods of expansion, alternating with two of decline. At various periods they fled or migrated to Austria, Hungary, across the Carpathians in midwinter to Romania, through Bessarabia to north Ukraine and again south to Melitopol near the Crimea. During the years 1874 and 1879 they migrated to Dakota Territory, and in 1918 they began migrating to Canada.

The average community in South Dakota and Manitoba has about one hundred and thirty members living on four thousand acres of

land, valued, with buildings and equipment, at about one hundred thousand dollars.[7] The communities now subsist almost entirely on agriculture. The central nucleus of buildings includes dormitory-like residence, kitchen and common dining rooms, bakery, laundry, "kindergarten," and school, which also serves as church. A few communities have flour and feed mills.

Residence buildings usually house six to eight families. The average population per household is 6.3, and the number of rooms varies from one to three depending upon family size. The family is strictly monogamous and the sex mores of a monogamous society are strictly observed. Less than one per cent (.7) of the Hutterites never marry, as compared with ten per cent in the United States. The birth rate is about forty-four per thousand and the death rate about eight. The model mother gives birth to ten or eleven children. As a result of the great natural increase in population, surplus wealth is used to buy land and establish new colonies. They have long had a peasant level of living and are satisfied with it.

Many Hutterite men look like the "Christus" of Oberammergau. Their faces are placid, and after marriage they grow beards. The clothing worn by the men is quite similar to that of the conservative Mennonites. Hutterite girls look like the familiar, bulging-skirted peasant dolls. The women are larger-proportioned models of the same but with faces weathered by wind and sun.

Hutterite religion is both theocentric and community-centered. They regard their way of living as supernaturally sanctioned and thus as absolutely right. This gives them a profound and abiding certainty about their beliefs and the wisdom of their way of living. The religion emphasizes social relationships and is not mystical. Deity is viewed as benign Absolute Authority, not as companion for communion. Normality of personal relationships and sense of security makes the latter unnecessary. The Hutterites say, "God is so bright and holy we can't look at Him." Heaven is not conceived as a place of economic wish-fulfilment; it has no pearly gates or streets of gold. It is simply an ideal type Hutterische place with no outside world threatening to corrupt the youth or persecute the faithful. Since the Hutterites have a harmonious way of living which satisfies

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[7] For a fuller description of the Hutterites see the writer's doctoral dissertation, *The Hutterites: A Study in Social Cohesion*, 1939, privately printed.

their needs, they do not need our kind of Heaven. There is no conflict between Sunday precept and Monday practise in the Hutterite community. All sanctioned community activity is part of the sacred; only disruptive influences from outside are secular.

Doctrinally, the Hutterites describe their principles of faith as belief in community of goods and non-resistance. Their religion also has a strong ascetic emphasis. The essence of their way of living is better described by the Shaker epigram, "We are organizing harmony." What the Hutterite most enjoys is peace and harmony, and the social effects of it. This is the most difficult aspect of the Hutterite way of life to make clear, and failure to understand it causes most of the failure to see the Hutterites with understanding. We in our culture who verbalize endlessly about peace and unity seem to find it impossible to sense the simple, earthy idea of esthetic appreciation and enjoyment of social harmony as ultimate end in itself. Material goods, acquisition of personal power, the ego satisfaction of "getting ahead" of the other fellow, are not end-values in the Hutterite culture. The Hutterite does not need them. No psychic compulsions drive him to seek them. Since his culture is free from most conflicts, he is not forced into rivalry to escape anxiety or feeling of insecurity and helplessness. He does not feel compelled to try to build an economic wall of security around himself in the form of material wealth. He is so mentally healthy that he does not require status gained by having others of lower class status under him — and no one has higher status than he, since the society is practically classless. He is not neurotic; he has few conflicts and little to fear. These are qualities in the matrix of social harmony which the Hutterite enjoys and which provide the organizing principles of the culture and give meaning to life.

Casual visitors to the community sometimes describe the government as a dictatorship, or at least think it very authoritarian, with dominant leaders and followers. The opposite is true. The Hutterites depend primarily upon inner controls within the individual, developed by habituation and indoctrination. The common will of the group does the dictating. Strong leadership is conspicuously absent. Few, if any, wish to be leader. When a questionnaire was given the children, asking them what occupations they would most prefer, they rated the position of minister (highest in authority) as

last. The Hutterite men showed little more desire for positions of authority than did the children. Authority is viewed as pure responsibility, not as opportunity for dominance, and the Hutterites do not ask for responsibility although they will not shirk it. The authority which administrators have is *delegated to them.* The Hutterites think that the best administrator is the one who most conscientiously follows the traditional way. If he ceases being a follower, as a few have in the past, he is removed from office. The Hutterites have an intricate hierarchy of work organization but their democracy is not superimposed from the top down. The controls which count come from the bottom up. Perhaps this is because they have a highly developed social or group consciousness.

The Hutterites put much emphasis upon the will. The common will, sovereign in their society, is a democratic institution. It is of course nothing more than an aggregate of their individual wills unified around the over-all beliefs which are internally consistent and give meaning to their lives. Self-discipline is the chief controlling force. The personal aspect of it is conscience. The Hutterite fails to experience social harmony and feels abnormal when his conscience pricks him. He loses what he most lives for.

The community is managed by the minister, assisted by a group of from four to seven elders. They call this directing group "headquarters." The minister is supposed to be highest in authority because he symbolizes the traditional values. When he is weak, another person takes over. All who must make the day-by-day, major decisions are included in "headquarters." The person second to the minister in authority is the business manager or *haushalter,* who handles the community money, administers the detailed hierarchy of work "bosses" and, in consultation with the minister, transacts business with the world outside. All other Hutterites, including the minister, are not allowed to receive more than a few dollars a year — spending money. The "farm boss," who operates under the business manager, holds a responsible position. All of these higher positions, including elderships, are elective. The minister and elders have life tenure on good behavior. Other work assignments are rotated to avoid monotony and insure equity. Men with special skills are likely, with general approval, to hold their positions longer than others.

Since the controls are based primarily upon self-discipline maintained through operation of the individual conscience, education for self-discipline is a primary objective. They also have a superimposed, external educational system required by the state or province.

In cases where self-discipline fails, a control device based upon withholding of group approval is used. The anti-social are treated as a status-devalued class, a temporarily "lower class." Only in this seemingly constructive way do the Hutterites use this powerful force of status-giving and withholding. Unlike the treatment of the criminal in our society is the Hutterites' unwillingness to give social status to one anti-social group as a reward for "successful" anti-sociality while at the same time punishing another for its demoralizing work. No special forms of anti-social behavior are regarded as clever, sophisticated, or smart. In their peasant way they recognize that "crime control" depends upon public sanctions. They have a consistent, equitable penal code for all and it works as well as can be expected of external controls.

When a brother errs, he is first spoken to in private by the one who observes his misconduct. If he persists, the minister reprimands him. Successive steps are admonition in the presence of the elders, the congregation in night session, and the congregation in broad daylight. The final, drastic step, very rarely needed, is the "ban" whereupon all members of the miscreant's world are forbidden to speak to him or recognize him. He responds to this by repenting or deserting. Most Hutterite "crime control" is preventive and not retaliatory. Hutterite "criminal law," unlike ours, is not a conflicting confusion of retributive and rehabilitative objectives. There are Hutterite communities and individuals who are disorganized but they cannot be discussed within these confines.

Democratic institutions, which are of the people and compatible with human nature, spring from such long processions of human experience as that of the Hutterites. Hutterite experience suggests that peace and democracy are qualities of a way of living; that their sanctions come from the grass roots; that the individual adjustment involved is a reflection of adjustment in the social order; that the individual can acquire a sense of satisfying identity with security-producing groups; and that security is not captured from others but

derived from relations with others. Their experience demonstrates that it is possible for a human being to enjoy being liked by his fellow man even more than he enjoys the ego inflation of feeling superior to him; and that the permanent condition of harmonious social relationships called peace is intrinsically harmonious with human nature. Our culture may not be senescent. Perhaps it is only immature. (End of Dr. Deets's reply.)

From these last two presentations it seems fair to draw at least three general conclusions: (1) the gain motive (cf. Chapter 4) need not be central or dominant in social organization; (2) even the competitive drives for prestige and power can be so organized as to keep the individual functioning in tasks which are integrative, not disruptive; (3) beyond the various self-assertive tendencies, the sense of identification with a long-range group goal can be drawn upon to provide a powerful dynamic for living. We may conclude from the Palestinian experience that even in men and women who have been reared in competitive or individualistic traditions, the response to such group goals may be overwhelming, and from the Hutterite experience that a non-competitive community goal can be so satisfying as to withstand great temptations and adversities. The implications for an industrial society are indirect and complex; but in conjunction with the studies by Lewin, Lippitt, Hendry, Zander, and French, reported earlier in this chapter, they merit close scrutiny as we endeavor to discover a practical base for democratic living. This base will not suddenly appear in finished form; it will have to be worked through, experimented, developed, over a long period. But world order will not be really safe till democratic control of industrial and social life is itself a world-wide reality.

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THE MATERIALS of Chapter 17 give extensive evidence that social satisfaction and social ideals are highly practical and realistic ingredients in personal living. Setting the satisfactions of democratic participation over against the satisfactions of competitive struggle for gain, power, and prestige, there is good reason to doubt whether the latter need have the coercive force so often assigned them. But reference to social ideals leads not only to the consideration of those ideals of liberty and democracy which reached their great expression in the French and American revolutions. To be realistic, we must take into account the great reservoir of social ideals which belong to the mass of common people everywhere, many of which are associated with religious faith and religious organization. Indeed, both the instances of co-operative living which we found useful as case materials, the Palestinian and the Hutterite, have a profound religious coloring.

Moreover, I wanted a concrete account of the rôle of the churches in the quest for world order. So, in view of the fact that religious bodies are directly concerned, as are many secular bodies, with the slow remolding of human attitudes, I turned to Drs. Seward Hiltner and Luman Shafer, of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, with the question:

What can the churches do to implement the struggle for peace?

Reply of Dr. Hiltner and Dr. Shafer

Even from the most pragmatic point of view which might be adopted, the action rôle of the churches is actually large and potentially still larger. So important is this that no discussion of the rôle of specific groups can exclude the churches, even though the difficulties in the way of discussing the church rôle may be greater than in the case of other groups. The matter is simplified if we

consider mainly the psychological side of the church's function in relation to the peace. Our main question can then become: What are the peculiar opportunities and handicaps, psychologically speaking, which the churches face in relation to influencing the peace constructively?

For the sake of brevity, we shall use categories, one set relating to distinctive opportunities and resources of the churches; the other, to handicaps and disadvantages.

OPPORTUNITIES AND RESOURCES

The church has a long tradition behind it in its concern for peace. While it may readily be conceded that at least various parts of the church (or churches; we speak of the "church" for the sake of simplicity, thinking of all organized religious bodies in this country) have at times been anything but peaceful, that the concern for peace has at times been quite unrelated to the factors which could actually bring peace, and many similar points, it is nevertheless of great positive significance that the concern for peace is so deep-rooted. Where there is tradition to turn to, the task is always easier and more natural, even though the tradition may frequently have been warped.

When the church is able to reach general agreement on an issue, it brings a moral sanction to it which is often of the greatest psychological significance. With reference to at least a few basic principles concerning the peace, such a result seems likely now. It is of course true that this agreement is reached in very different ways among the churches (e.g., compare methods of Roman Catholics with those of Quakers), and that the sanction may be more or less authoritative, or even authoritarian. But the sanction is of great importance nevertheless.

The size of the churches should not be underestimated, nor the variety of their constituency. Sixty-eight and one-half million people is a large group, even if only a small proportion of them can be said to be significantly influenced by the church's thinking on questions of peace. The variety of people who belong to the churches is also very wide, much more varied than is generally recognized by others than students of sociology. Even though the influence of the church upon its constituency may in many, or even

the majority, of cases be peripheral, the number remaining is still large enough to make its influence of the first order. One might add that its influence on the community in general, while usually not so unquestioned as in days past, is nevertheless much stronger than is ordinarily supposed.

Through the nature of its contacts, the church is often the most significant, or one of the most significant, molders of opinion. People who have been influenced through the church then become leaders in other kinds of community organizations. Educators, businessmen, farmers, and other groups are often very strongly influenced, through their leaders, by the basic convictions of the churches. This influence is not invariably constructive; but in issues like these around the peace, it has a good chance of being so. So far as influence on leaders by the church is concerned, it is probably weakest in relation to intellectual groups, who may well be at particular pains not to underestimate its influence generally.

In general, the thought and conviction of the church in reference to the peace is above question on political grounds in the public mind. That is, the interest of the church is assumed to be for broadly religious and humanitarian motives, not for selfish advantage to it as an institution. This is not necessarily true in reference to all issues with which the church is confronted, and it is certainly not true in equal degree with all the various problems posed by peace efforts. But there is sufficient truth in the general statement to make it of importance.

The church is prepared to back the necessity of some sacrifice to insure the peace. Whether or not it backs the right kind of sacrifice will depend on how well its constituency is educated on peace questions. Whether the main motivation for the sacrifice is encouraged as for a greater good, or merely for the sake of expiation, will depend largely on the insight and wisdom of church leaders. But since some sacrifice will be needed, the church can have a very powerful influence at this point.

The church can be counted on to combat any attitude or line of action predicated upon mere vengeance. This point will be supremely important. It is true that the church may (*a*) identify vengeance incorrectly with punishment or other rational attempts to eliminate centers of infection, or (*b*) underestimate the depth

and strength of the "demonic" forces at work in the various brands of Fascism and hence counsel complete and mistaken tolerance toward the wholly intolerant, or (c) contribute to the conscience reaction against even the necessary exercise of force after the war. Though these are distinct possibilities, proper education can aid the church's uncompromising attitude against hatred to get into the right channels. And without the elimination of deep-seated hatred and vengeance, no peace has a chance.

HANDICAPS AND DISADVANTAGES

The church is not united. While the statement that there are two or three hundred denominations in the United States is misleading, since over ninety-five per cent of church members belong to the fifty large bodies, it is nevertheless true that the democratic pattern of American church life has multiplied sectarian divisions. But the will to work together on questions of common interest, such as the peace, has grown greatly; and increasingly co-operative machinery is developing spontaneously to implement the common will. But there is no doubt that the present lack of unity does hold back the church's work for peace.

The leadership of the churches is held too much by the clergy. With most other community groups it is generally expected that the professionals will be the leaders. At least with the Protestant and Jewish churches, the laity are theoretically supposed to be of equal importance as far as establishment of practical policy is concerned. Too often this is not true in practice. In so far as the laity do not feel themselves holding some responsibility for the policy and program of the church in reference to such questions as peace, they vitiate the solidarity of the church's conviction; for they tend then to think of the church's position as "they" instead of "we."

There are some sections of the population not well reached by the church. Protestants are well aware, for example, of their failure at many points to win the laboring groups. While the spread of church membership and participation is much more widely diversified across the class structure than is usually supposed, the testimony and action of the church is limited in so far as any significant class groups are not affiliated with it.

Narrowly self-interested aims are possible within the church on

the question of peace. When and if this occurs, it is far more dangerous than if it were found among other institutions because of the sanction of acceptable motivation which church action carries with it. One may see the possibilities of this factor operating at different levels. Just as an individual may deceive himself into believing that the interests of a group are best served by what benefits him personally, so a group may become convinced that what benefits the group will benefit a larger group. While the church is usually more immune to this than other groups, it can never count on its own perfection at this point.

The church may fail to implement its convictions. It is possible to think of five areas (or steps) between conception of an idea in relation to peace and its execution:

   (*a*) Hammering out agreement on basic principles;
   (*b*) Reaching agreement on so-called "middle axioms" — which are more specific than basic principles, but less specific than steps in strategy;
   (*c*) Widening the base from which agreement on principles and middle axioms comes, through educational and interpretative effort;
   (*d*) Action by the (governmental) policy-making groups on the policy and strategy;
   (*e*) Action by the governmental groups involving administrative decision as to method, and execution of tactics.

The church as church is not involved in (*d*) and (*e*). But it often uses only (*a*) and (*c*). In some measure it should certainly be as much concerned with (*b*) as with (*a*) and (*c*). Part of its wariness, and consequent failure to implement its convictions, may be due to our tradition and heritage of separation of church and state, and part to underestimation of the church's strength. But part is the fear of being drawn into (*d*) in undesirable ways if they go into (*b*). This would not seem to be a justified fear.

There is the dangerous possibility of moralism and perfectionism in the church. One whose eyes are fixed solely on the ideal he wants to realize may too easily fail to see the progressive steps possible in the current situation which have the best chance of leading toward that ideal. Thus the attitude, "We won't co-operate in any way if such and such is done," may defeat the very purpose which

appeared to give rise to the attitude. This is particularly likely to
be true in relation to (*a*) punishment of so-called "war-criminals,"
(*b*) territorial readjustments, and (*c*) irrational (from our point of
view) actions by the people and governments of occupied nations.
Large sections within the church are predisposed to perfectionism.
In the form stated above, this may be a definite handicap to the
church's constructive influence on the peace.

The church may misplace its scruples. There is a segment of the
church which is perfectionistic at certain points, as suggested above.
There is another segment which, if it agrees to some particular step
in connection with the peace, is likely to erect that step into an
absolute principle. This is particularly true if the step involves some
compromise with basic ethical principles. The attitude is, "If we
are to justify this, we must believe it everlastingly." A "holy peace"
can be as dangerous as a "holy war." A psychiatrist knows that one
of his patients may have to throw a few chairs around before he
begins to recover. He does not need to generalize on the value of
throwing chairs around in order to judge that in this instance the
symptom is basically constructive rather than the reverse. The
American churchman does well to recognize in advance the inten-
sity of the revenge-fantasy that has developed through all the con-
quered and bombed territories, and in many other places, too. This
is by no means a positive value. But it is a fact that one must not
permit his scruples to overlook, if he is to have any chance of help-
ing to get it under control.

This is a brief and schematic analysis of the resources and handi-
caps of perhaps the most complex institution in our society, that of
religion. As a church, it is not equipped to handle technical ques-
tions concerning peace. But it is pre-eminently capable of emo-
tional education on questions of peace, that is, education which
contains not only information but also the sanctions of ethical and
religious conviction. As a church, it is equipped to proceed to the
area of middle axioms, where principles by which policy and
strategy must be guided are set forth. Though it has handicaps and
disadvantages and dangers, we shall be hard put to get a peace if
the churches do not both support, and reveal the inadequacies of,
each progressive step within the peace.

The church too has a special concern for the psychological ques-

tions in relation to the peace. It sees, for example, the psychological dangers if relief should be used as a mere weapon of political policy; of vengeance cloaking itself as necessary punishment; of the "instinctual aggression" approach of convinced cynicism; of the loss of spiritual values and constructive interests which have accompanied widespread starvation and exploitation, etc. At these and many other points the church itself has psychological interests.

The church has, as is suggested above, certain handicaps to effective action in the psychological field, but at the same time it has great strengths. And it is noteworthy that several of the actual or potential handicaps carry with them the possibility of being reduced if proper psychological understanding can be made available. Thus the need by the church for every bit of light which can be thrown on the problem by psychologists, psychiatrists and other psychological workers is very great.

Post-war Planning

The activities of the churches in post-war planning have been principally in two areas: first, in the formulation of principles; and second, in education on the basis of those principles.

In the early stages a good deal of time was spent in formulating the general moral principles applicable to post-war problems which would appear to be derived from religious faith. At the Delaware (Ohio) conference held in the spring of 1942 by the Protestant churches on a national basis, somewhat more detailed principles and proposals were worked out. The essential principles enunciated there on a scale which drew national attention have since been generally regarded as acceptable by the churches. Much of the work of formulation, not only on a national level, but in state and local church groups, has been devoted in the main to basic and general principles. On these there would appear to be a large degree of unity among the churches.

In the spring of 1943, there were formulated by the Protestant churches six political principles, that is, six principles upon which political action for peace should be based. These went a step further than general principles, in that they came closer to specific action. They did not, however, outline detailed strategy. While they have behind them the general moral principles, they are not,

in themselves, in the nature of moral imperatives. But they do indicate the deep concern of the churches that moral principles not be vitiated by remaining wholly apart from action, or by being prematurely identified with specific courses of action.

The educational process has been carried on largely through study groups in the churches, especially devoted to consideration of the peace. But sermons, the church school, and many other aspects of the church program have devoted part of their attention to matters of peace.

The Delaware conference findings were very widely used as a basis of study by the churches. In some cases this has been done by the local church itself; in some, on a denominational basis; and in others, on a community-wide basis. In addition, there have been special efforts on a national basis, especially the Christian Mission on World Order (fall of 1943) which reached one hundred cities and the Methodist Bishops' Crusade (fall of 1943) which reached seventy. Through literature and other means it is fair to say that some educational program has gone into every Methodist home; and some other denominations are not far behind.

It is fair to say that there is a rather wide understanding of the bases of peace as the church sees them, and a rather general agreement on the part of church people. This opinion has made itself felt at various points in the discussions in Congress and elsewhere.

What is said above refers to the distinctly Protestant activity. There have been similar programs in the Catholic churches and Jewish synagogues. In the autumn of 1943 these three faiths issued a common statement on the principles to govern the peace. On the main lines, there proved to be general agreement among the faiths. Their educational programs will be carried out separately, but the recognition of the common principles helps the educational program of each.

It is to be expected that the agreement on basic principles will be more widespread than that on middle axioms, and that on middle axioms wider than that on specific actions. On the first there is almost universal agreement among the churches and church people. On the second, there has been a surprisingly wide agreement, and the educational process is rapidly extending the number who agree. By and large, the churches as churches do not intend to take a

stand on specific actions. The hope therefore is that increasingly those areas of importance so far given little attention by the churches may find their way not only into the realm of a statement of basic principles, but also of the middle axioms. (*End of reply by Drs. Hiltner and Shafer.*)

The conception which has just been sketched offers us at least three bases for hope that religious motives, working through religious organizations, will play their part in the effort to implement world understanding: (1) they supply powerful drives toward the overcoming of obstacles for the sake of an ethical goal; (2) they have led in recent years to a widespread practical effort through conference, group study, and education to understand the causes of war and to eradicate them; (3) because of the international nature of religion (and of most of its organized expression), they serve to provide a practical meeting ground and arena for understanding and discussion which helps the nationals of each sovereign state in some measure to understand and to participate emotionally in the problems of other nationals. There is good evidence that the vague and unrealistic idealism which has sometimes been sheltered in the churches (cf. Duvall, Chapter 13) is today being steadily replaced by a religious impulse which not only means well, but is focussing more and more clearly upon the co-operative venture upon which a stable and democratic world depends.

RACE, SEX, AND
DEMOCRATIC LIVING

TWO QUESTIONS, WITH ANSWERS BY

Kenneth B. Clark and *Georgene H. Seward*

THE DISCUSSION of education and of democracy in Chapters 16 and 17 has emphasized primarily problems which are common to the human family, regardless of those biological cleavages of race and sex which must be fully considered if the ultimate orchestration of humanity is to be achieved; and Chapter 18, on the rôle of the churches, took for granted the common problems of all races and of all men and women sharing a religious outlook. It has nevertheless been characteristic of autocracy in general, and of Fascism in particular, to weaken the will to democracy by emphasizing differences rather than uniformities, and in particular, by emphasizing inequalities and prestige categories, rather than the common human attributes which are characteristically precious to one of democratic faith. Whenever *inborn differences* between groups are emphasized, it is easy to believe one's own group superior, the other inferior. Historically, all sorts of human exploitation, including slavery, have arisen in this context; even a morally sophisticated society can rationalize its "inborn differences" into justification to oppress. It is necessary, therefore, before completing our survey of the practical opportunities for democracy, to consider just how the inequality of opportunity between races and the social inequality of the sexes play their part to impede the development of the democratic spirit, as well as to emphasize in a positive way the psychological findings as to race and sex which serve as the basis for a positive faith in an equalitarian and humanistic peace.

Turning first to the problem of race, I asked Dr. Kenneth B. Clark, of the College of the City of New York:

What are those fundamental principles the recognition of which is essential to a wise handling of interracial problems?

Dr. Clark's Reply

Far more than half of the people in the world have "colored" skins. If we seriously mean that we want world order based on human co-operation, there is no more immediate nor pressing need than the removal of Caucasian prejudice against non-Caucasians. There is abundant scientific evidence that the dominant popular ideas about race are outmoded; the demand for their rectification is not simply moral or theoretical; there is an imperative practical need for a swift scientific and educational attack upon the problem.

Our strategy must be determined on the basis of the following premises:

(1) The popular concept of the inherent superiority of certain races and inferiority of others has no proven scientific validity. Indeed, in the most exhaustive survey of the experimental evidence, Klineberg (91) concludes that all generalizations about inherent racial differences lack a scientific basis.

(2) Racial prejudice is not an inherent or "instinctive" human trait, but is developed and crystallized in individuals according to basic principles of the psychology of learning. Thus, for example, Lasker's study of race attitudes in children (93) shows the increasing structuring of the prevailing attitude with increase in age. E. L. Horowitz (82) summarizes his experimental findings in the words "children's attitudes toward Negroes are determined . . . by contact with the prevalent attitude toward Negroes." K. B. Clark and M. P. Clark obtained experimental evidence (41) which shows not only that white children learn their racial attitudes from their social environment, but also — as even more definite evidence that racial attitudes are learned rather than innate — that Negro children also learn and accept to a large extent the prevalent unfavorable attitudes toward the Negro.

(3) Racial attitudes can be changed. Since these attitudes are acquired and are not native, other more favorable and socially desirable attitudes may be acquired with the same ease. An experiment by F. T. Smith (163) demonstrated that racial attitudes could be significantly changed, even in adults, through information about the minority group supplemented by selected favorable contacts with members of that minority group. L. L. Thurstone (171), W. K. C. Chen (38), and many others have shown that education

and propaganda can rapidly change the racial attitudes of children and of adults.

(4) Racial prejudice, and its manifestations in the forms of differential status of racial groups, segregation, discrimination, political and economic exploitation, are integral parts of a larger context of societal maladjustment.

(5) The various forms of racial prejudice are destructive to the aims of a world society predicated upon democratic principles.

(6) Rigid and mechanical concepts and antagonistic attitudes of one race for another result in exploitation and persecution. This gives rise to conflicts and guilt feelings in the oppressors and is reacted to by frustration, resentment, and bitterness in the oppressed. Thus the perpetuation of these relations becomes more likely as they become ingrained in the emotional patterns of each group. Inherent in this pattern, therefore, are the germs of future conflict, if not of wars.

If these statements are taken as basic premises, it follows that no peace-planning worthy of the name can dispense with a change in the relations of the races of the world, in a direction away from the present rigid pattern of prejudice determined by the white man's conception of himself as a "master race" and other non-white groups as belonging in different categories of subservience. Patterns of behavior related to this conception must give way to other forms which arise from new values which are in opposition to the traditional prejudices and are more compatible with socially stabilizing democratic principles.

The basic problem, therefore, would be *how* to change racial attitudes and related social values, and how to eliminate prejudice. Verbal appeals and abstract promises to the oppressed races do not appear to be an adequate approach. Rather, it appears that the non-white races of the world must be shown concrete evidences of democracy — the removal of institutional contradictions of democratic principles — in their relation with whites, e.g., the waiving of extraterritorial rights in China by the British and American governments.

It seems clear, however, that if this is to be done, the dominant white public must *first understand that it must be done,* that prejudice and rigid racial attitudes must not be permitted to interfere

with their understanding, and that they should want these steps taken in spite of the possible economic or psychological gains which might appear to accrue to them through their maintenance. The problem resolves itself as follows: How can the present traditional and culturally determined prejudice of whites be eliminated and attitudes which are more conducive to a world-wide extension of democracy and peace be substituted?

It is clear that in attempting to solve this problem one cannot rely upon public opinion as it now exists — since this is merely a reflection of already existing and admittedly detrimental prejudices. The public opinion poll or the plebiscite are not useful instruments for this aspect of post-war planning.

The problem is essentially one of creating an enlightened public, who, on the basis of this enlightenment, will be willing and eager to extend to all of the peoples of the world the elemental rights of a democratic society of human beings; the right of each individual to develop to the maximum of his capacity, the right of the individual to contribute to the maintenance of a stable and dynamic society, unrestrained by irrelevant factors such as race, religion, or sex, and the right of the individual who so contributes to be free from economic or psychological insecurity, to be free from frustrations and humiliations which result from his identification with a particular racial group.

To bring this about, the victorious allied nations will need to embark on a vast *moral and educational program*. It will be necessary for these nations to mobilize their vast resources of education, science, and the media of propaganda for the purpose of bringing about a wholesale reorganization of the basic social values and attitudes of the peoples of the world, including their own people. These forces must concentrate on the program of substituting valid scientific facts and socially desirable attitudes for social superstition and detrimental attitudes. Specifically it would be necessary for such a program to attack and eradicate these four interrelated ideas prevalent among the peoples of the world: (1) that certain superficial physical differences among groups of human beings indicate inherent superiority or inferiority; (2) that those who work with their hands and give service are inferior to those who plan or are served; (3) that technological skill is the sole criterion of human

civilization and cultural advancement; (4) that a basic character-
istic of human nature is the law of the "survival of the strong," "dog
eat dog," "might is right."

Such a program, to be truly successful, must not be content with
merely changing the surface expression of public opinion, but must
concern itself with the more basic problem of changing people,
changing their basic values, attitudes, ways of satisfying their basic
motives. This, while admittedly more difficult than changing mere
opinion, can be done. The bulk of relevant psychological data
demonstrates that the essential characteristic of the normal human
being is that he is initially plastic, modifiable, and not rigid. The
values and attitudes of a given human being are a consequence of
the stimuli, experiences and culture to which he has been subjected.

An enlightened approach to society, an understanding of the fact
that human society can exist with stability only in terms of the
dominance of a basic humanism in the attitude of people, should
no longer be the personal philosophy of a few advanced social
philosophers or sensitive academicians, but should become, and
can become, the basic determining attitude of the peoples of the
world.

We have already cited concrete evidence that racial attitudes can
and have been changed in specific situations. But the magnitude of
the task calls for the organization of a completely different ap-
proach, viewed in a much larger context. These studies may be
considered representative of the bulk of acceptable psychological
investigations relevant to the discussion. They must be considered
merely suggestive, however, and evaluated as necessarily segmental,
limited in scope, and essentially artificial when seen in the light of
the overwhelming configuration of social dynamic reality. These
studies do not and cannot tap the basic dimensions in which social
and racial attitudes are determined and formed. The positive pres-
sures used to bring about the observed changes must be realistically
seen in opposition to the more powerful and extensive counterforces
continuously existing in the total normative, social environmental
field. That they offer positive results strongly suggests, and may
even be considered as evidence, that were the thoughtful elements
in society to gear themselves for the problem of changing un-
favorable racial attitudes to more socially stabilizing ones, the suc-

cessful accomplishment of the task would be embarrassingly easy.[1] (*End of Dr. Clark's reply.*)

Just as racism has constantly been used throughout history as pseudo-justification for oppression, so the cult of masculinity as a mark of intrinsic superiority has been characteristic, as Veblen well put it, of the "predatory" institutions of mankind. Just as the belief in the intrinsic inferiority of the Negro, for example, is a major basis for rationalizations justifying the withholding of privileges on the basis of race, so the belief in the intrinsic inferiority of women has served, as Veblen pointed out, as basis for the special *prerogatives* of males. The question of "sex differences" as a scientific problem is not involved; for between the sexes, as between any two specifiable groups, there are bio-social differences which may well be studied, measured, used, orchestrated, for the purpose of democratic living. It is not the question of sex differences, but the question of an essentially mystical belief in the inherent *superiority* of masculine traits over feminine traits which constitutes the threat to democratic living. This has been better and better understood in the English-speaking world during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, emphasized by the revolutionary proletarian group in the Soviet Union, and with equal clarity used for opposite purposes by fascist leaders, who recognize that the disbarment of women from self-fulfilling rôles in society is a normal and necessary part of a militarist and fascist movement.

Emphasizing the need for exact research on sex differences, both biological and social, as an approach to our problem, I put to Dr. Georgene H. Seward of Connecticut College the question:

> What are the essential factors to be blueprinted in a democratic definition of sex rôles?

Dr. Seward's Reply

Sex Rôles and the Economic Order. Sex, in company with age and class, is one of the foci around which societies are structured, and elaborate systems of status and right are rooted in these basic cate-

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[1] For bibliography, cf. nos. 15, 30, 36, 41, 82, 91, 93, 163, 171.

gories. Social rôles are differentiated in accordance with them, and "appropriate" patterns of conduct assigned (106). Striking cultural contrasts in the meaning of "masculine" and "feminine" bear testimony to the importance of social factors in molding individuals around a selected stereotype (158a).

It would be an oversimplification, however, to assume that biology played no part in determining sex rôles. Throughout the vertebrates, superiority in size and strength consistently characterizes the male. This physical prowess is highly correlated with social dominance up to the primate level, where less tangible "personality" factors complicate the picture and may even outweigh sheer brute force in determining status. Among humans, muscular superiority has given men an advantage over the "weaker sex" in coping with primitive conditions, and has resulted in the patriarchal structure of most societies. Even where the struggle for existence is no longer on a subsistence basis and physical sex differences actually play a lesser part, male social dominance has persisted as a "vestigial function" (122).

The steepness of the male-female gradient depends upon the prevailing socio-economic pattern. An adequate understanding of sex rôles in the past, and, more importantly, an adequate charting of sex rôles for the future, demand a careful evaluation in terms of the social context as a whole (174). Karl Marx wrote that "Social progress can be measured with precision by the social position of the female sex" (167). Unless we see the problem of women's rights in relation to the larger problem of human rights, we shall repeat some serious mistakes in social planning.

Before the industrial revolution, the home was the center of a co-operative industry in which neither man nor wife could prosper without the other's help. Although the wife was technically subject to her husband, she was his lieutenant rather than his slave, and was trained in some skill that served as an economic asset. In turn, the tradesman considered it his duty to be well-informed on domestic affairs (166). In this social climate, marriage took on the air of partnership, and women were allowed to display qualities of courage, resourcefulness and wit which had previously been denied expression.

With the rise of capitalism, patriarchism took a new lease on

life. Many functions were removed from the home without allowing the women to follow them. The new order even failed to recognize women's age-long rôles as teachers and healers. Increased professional standards, depending on a higher education from which women were excluded, put these occupations beyond their reach. Among the poor, they were shamefully exploited as cheap labor for profit-making purposes, thus indirectly contributing to the unearned leisure of the wealthy (166).

Under Fascism, the exploitation of women as workers has reached a further extreme. In Italy and Nazi Germany a new social philosophy of women's status and function was built up during the industrial depression to remove women from competition with men for the insufficient jobs available. They were exhorted to recognize wifehood and motherhood as their great contribution to society and to remain at home except when needed for the most badly paid work. They have been increasingly excluded from the professions and the higher government posts (88) (174). In Germany, when war labor shortages demanded their services, they were accepted on a lower wage-scale and with the understanding that they were not "naturally" adapted to such employment (1). Women's primary rôle in the New Order is to breed potential soldiers (78) (90), while the ideal male is a warrior, fanatically devoted to his leader and bound in *Bruderschaft* to his brave comrades (20) (160). The subordination of women to men and of men to their leaders is the stuff of which the authoritarian character is made, and through the patriarchal family structure is transmitted from generation to generation.

Perhaps the most extreme example of male dominance is found in the third member of the Axis triumvirate, Japan. Male aggression toward women is rewarded irrespective of age or status. The small boy is permitted to strike, kick, and bite his mother, to destroy her elaborate hair-do and to break her lovely ornaments. In fact, the only limit to the violence he is permitted to express is his own limited strength. Even after school age, when tantrums are no longer allowed, the boy continues to control and command the opposite sex. Women, on the other hand, may threaten and plead but can always be forced to yield. Male dominance is regarded as a high virtue by both Japan and Germany, and nations that display

such characteristics are admired, while those that negotiate are regarded as "feminine" and accordingly despised (29) (70).

In striking contrast to the fascist sex differentiation is the situation in the Soviet Union, where women and men are comrades in the great struggle for a new way of life (77). Both sexes enjoy the same education, compensation and rest. The genuine equality in responsibility and privilege was made possible by extensive economic reforms centering around increased living standards for all workers. Women shared with minority groups their advantages in an expanding collectivist economy (166) (174) (180). These advantages have penetrated into the farthest corners of the Soviet East, where women are gradually throwing off their Oriental yoke of subservience to men (74).

The same trend is apparent in the democracies, but progress is necessarily slower and less certain. Sweden has set an unusually good example. In the interests of married women workers, collective housing projects have been set up which provide co-operative nurseries, restaurants, and other services. These physical facilities are supplemented by a proposed plan to provide training in home economics and family relations for boys, in order to effect a more mutually helpful division of labor within the home (128).

Sex Rôles in Contemporary American Society. Sex typing in our culture is impossible to categorize because "our culture" is as misleading a construct as the "average man." Our culture is not one, but many cultures. Within this vast congeries, age, race, "class," locale, etc., represent areas of subcultural patterning. When we speak of American society, reference is usually made to a middle-class, white adult cross-section of some representative city like *Middletown*. Within this setting we find a pre-war patriarchal family pattern, in which the male is trained for dominance and intellectual leadership, while the female is oriented toward the domestic and service rôles (114) (115). Growing up according to these models is far from the smooth process one might assume it to be. Rather, it proceeds in saltatory fashion, owing to sudden changes in acceptable masculine-feminine behavior at different levels. A child with characteristics carrying sex prestige at one stage may lose status merely by continuing them to another (116). Meanwhile, approaching maturity offers no blueprint of sex rôles

to the groping adolescent, because the models he has tried to copy are themselves in continuous flux, shifting under the impact of every new social change — a great economic depression, a "New Deal," or a major war.

In the marriage relationship alone, three separate female rôles have been distinguished in the traditional *wife-and-mother*, the *good companion*, and the *partner* (89). The balance of privileges and obligations involved in the rôles of the married couple contributes importantly to domestic happiness. Discrepancies between husband and wife in regard to feminist issues, especially the persistence of patriarchal attitudes on the part of the husband, have been reported in association with marital maladjustment (87). The current trend seems to be to endorse equal status within the family, combined with an outside career for wives provided that the family is not "harmed" (17).

Even though American women may be permitted occasional excursions outside the home, the serious business of family support still devolves upon men. A study of the factors in marital disruption places non-support in the leading position even among women with independent incomes! (39). So heavily does the burden of success weigh upon our men that it too often precludes the cultivation of affectional relationships and the sharing of family experiences (142). Rarely does the career-woman feel this burden, because she is subtly aware that in the last analysis she will not be judged by her achievement but according to the standards set for her sex. Success is largely a private satisfaction, while her social measure is taken in terms of her personal attractiveness and the behavior of her children. As long as the social burden of success is so unequally divided, the career-woman is a serious threat to men, and it is no accident that her path is beset by obstacles at every turn.

To compensate for vocational frustrations, the women in our society have assumed an aggressive dominance within "their" domestic sphere. The patriarchal tradition, however, actually denies her even this authority as a "right." Legally the man is still dominant, and the *de facto* female dominance is supported by no institutional safeguards. It is exercised as a license with the tyranny of insecurity, and is proving destructive of healthy emotional development in the children (51) (121).

Re-defining Rôles of Men and Women in Post-war Democracy.
Victory for the democratic way of living means living democracy in all human relationships. It cannot be achieved in a society where half the people dominate the other half, even though their dominance may be exercised in accordance with the most proper of parliamentary procedures (33). Male dominance, arising from biological superiority of size and strength, however appropriate under primitive conditions, has no place around a peace table. Dominance of any group over others must be replaced by sharing. If men and women are to pool their resources in the tremendous task of rebuilding their world, they must co-operate both within the home and outside it. Biological sex differences have yet to be discovered either in domestic proclivities or in the abilities needed for statecraft. Whatever differences may be attributed to sex membership should be regarded as lending overtones to the personalities of men and women, but do not justify casting them in different social rôles.

The realization of the goal of co-operation between the sexes in the world's work demands economic readjustments which will make women *producers* as well as *consumers*, thus making them self-paying members of the social group. Under these circumstances, their sharing of the social burden will become real and their contributions necessary to the life of the whole. By relinquishing the doubtful privileges of a madonna, woman will have attained the dignity of a human being.

We may look to women for special development along certain lines. Given powerful social motivation, we should expect their verbal ability to find expression at long last in the creative scholarship so vitally needed in any program of post-war education. We may also expect women to exert strong pressure against militaristic ideology. In view of the subordinate part they necessarily play in physical combat, war fails to bring them the social rewards which compensate men for the risks involved. What better guarantee of permanent peace could there be than an overwhelming majority of an articulate people?

On the home front, women's illegal usurpation of power must give way to a sharing of responsibility with men, just as male dominance must yield to sharing with women the larger responsibilities

outside it. Home-making in our society has suffered too long from the stigma of "women's work," and the father's rôle is badly in need of revision from that of a figurehead patriarch to an actively participating member of a democratic family group. With adequate training and release from status-anxiety concerning his success as sole provider, the father will be free to take his place beside the mother in molding his children's personalities around democratic values.

A post-war picture of men and women working, playing and building homes together in no way implies an undervaluation of the sex relationship. Under a permissive economic system where satisfactions outweigh frustrations, biological functions can hardly fail to flow more smoothly, and personality overtones associated with sex membership find fuller expression. The result will be a richer development of both men and women, involving among other things a more complete psychosexual appreciation of each other. (*End of Dr. Seward's reply.*)

These studies of race and of sex have shown that prevalent attitudes and beliefs regarding human differences are far off center. More seriously, they have suggested that such conceptions are far from harmless adolescent superstitions; they lead to misunderstanding, to exploitation, and to tension. German and Japanese militarism (cf. pp. 87-90, pp. 122-123, and pp. 125-126) have, not at all accidentally, emphasized both racism and the cult of masculinity as against femininity; such emphases are akin to the aggressive spirit and are powerful aids in national patterns of exploitative expansion. No matter how sane and strong an international political system is to be set up, there will be grave danger as long as race and sex cleavages are irrationally cultivated, while the systematic cultivation of racial and sex equality within each nationality is an essential component in the development of a genuine democratic spirit.

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PUBLIC OPINION
AND WORLD ORDER

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Jerome Bruner   *Harold Lasswell*
Gerhart Saenger   *Ernst Kris*
H. H. Remmers

In studying the contributions on world-minded education, we were forced to the conclusion that in addition to verbal instruction, there is imperative need to learn the ways of democracy by actual participation in democratic processes. In the last chapter we found that such education must emphasize sounder ideas about race and sex differences and the related attitudes.

We have, then, traced the promise of a new type of democratic experience and its relations to problems of industry, of race, and of sex; it remains for us to get the picture of what can be done to bring government into closer touch with people. There is a co-ordinate need for government to develop a sound and sensitive means of keeping in touch with the thinking and feeling of ordinary citizens. Wise choice by the people of its representatives is no longer a guarantee of democratic government, for economic and social changes occur so rapidly that during a four-year period of office major issues arise which were completely unforeseen and unplanned for at the time of the election. Under such circumstances it is necessary for the people to have more opportunity to voice opinions and for elected officers to hear them. Responsible representatives and administrators may under some circumstances decide to ignore them; but it is essential that the public be *heard*. The question was formulated:

How can public-opinion analysis guide toward a democratic formulation of American foreign policy and the implementation of international understanding?

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This was put to Dr. Jerome S. Bruner of the Office of Public Opinion Research at Princeton, who gave us this answer: [1]

In an elective democracy, the community has always faced the problem of safeguarding itself against the unjust usurpation of power either by elected leaders or by groups bent upon "controlling" the course of events through undemocratic means. The traditional safeguard has been the election. Through elections, the will of the people has been expressed.

But in a world which moves with the speed of today, elections are often an insufficient safeguard. With crucial issues to be settled daily, it is not enough that people be allowed to express their will once every two, four, or six years. If electors are deemed worthy of choosing the men who will lead them, they must also be deemed capable of judging the issues of policy whose solution is even more important for their welfare than the leaders who make policy.

It is with this problem — the relation of the public to policy — that the present section is concerned. The problem, essentially, has three aspects. There is, first, the question of social objectives. Put bluntly, the question is this: Toward what social *goals* shall a nation strive? Obviously, no state which disregards the will of the people on this question is worthy of being classed a democracy. A second aspect of the problem, less amenable to easy solution, can be put this way: Through what *means* shall a nation seek to attain its agreed-upon social objectives? Assuming, for example, that a people has decided to effect what it considers a just distribution of wealth, shall this be accomplished by means of progressive taxation, through the Townsend Plan, through comprehensive social security, through public ownership? With whom lies the choice, people or leaders? Finally, there is the matter of *implementing the means* through which objectives are to be attained. Does progressive taxation work? Is a new social security program adequate to cover the needs of the poor? Does public ownership work more hardships than expected? These are the questions which must be asked after means and ends have been devised. They must be asked of "the experts." But they must also be asked of the people.

[1] Dr. Bruner wishes to acknowledge the collaboration and assistance of Dr. Hadley Cantril.

Those are the three levels of policy. They are not mutually exclusive, to be sure, but few things in real life are. For convenience, each will be treated separately in the pages which follow.

PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL OBJECTIVES

Rarely before 1933 did the American electorate have a chance to express their views on social objectives through the ballot box at a presidential election. The real planks of major-party candidates, by and large, were far more alike than different. The occasions when a choice of candidate meant a choice of social objective were dramatic, but few. The great depression brought an end to this happy truce on social objectives. The choice between a Roosevelt or a Hoover meant more than simple allegiance to party labels or disagreement on means. Ideology and social goals were at stake.

But the important problem is not whether candidates for office stand for truly different social ideals. An election featuring a contest between Norman Thomas and Alf Landon could be considered a tilt of ideologies only if one were sure that votes cast for each candidate represented support for what the two men stood for rather than something else. That is the crucial point.

Alfred E. Smith was defeated partly because he was a Catholic. Herbert Lehman, if he should ever run for president, might be defeated because he is a Jew. But these things have nothing to do with what a candidate might espouse. These examples are, to be sure, quite extreme. But they are not misleading. Consider less dramatic evidence of the point.

In Massachusetts, in 1942, the electorate voted on a public-policy question as to whether the Massachusetts legislature should petition the President to call a meeting of nations to establish a world organization. The ayes exceeded the nays by some three to one. In the same election, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., stood against Joseph Casey for the office of United States Senator. Lodge's stand on foreign policy was dubious at best. Let it be said at least that he was anything but an outspoken supporter of American participation in world affairs. Casey, on the other hand, had a record as a strong supporter of Administration foreign policy in the House of Representatives. In spite of the strong endorsement of the referendum question, the voters sent Lodge to the Senate by a large majority.

Some will say, and quite rightly, that elections are not the only means whereby public pressure can exert an influence on the choice of social objectives. There are, to be sure, spokesmen of various segments of the population. There is the press. Yet experience has shown that a composite picture of the demands of special groups in the population rarely reflects accurately the wishes of the public as a whole. One need not dwell at any length here on the problem of the press and pressure groups. That subject will be treated in more detail later. It suffices to say, however, that if one is to heed the voice of the people on questions of broad national policy, it is necessary to discount the strident voices of special groups.

What is the alternative? How bring the public to the point where it may have its rightful voice in the choice of social objectives? Two techniques are available, each of them subject to grave dangers. One is the use of public-policy questions on the ballot and the other is the use of non-partisan public-opinion polling. Consider each in turn.

Public Policy Questions in the Voting Booth. The point has already been labored that one's choice of a candidate at an election is not necessarily predetermined by the platform upon which a man stands for office. Even if the public were highly sensitive to the platform of their candidate, it would still be impossible for the voter to express through his choice of a candidate how he felt about the myriad of contemporary political issues. It would seem, therefore, that the wisest course would be to allow the public to vote both for candidates and on issues.

Voting for a social objective does not necessarily mean that the voter would be given an abstract choice between, let us say, business *versus* government, isolationism *versus* internationalism, or full employment *versus* unemployment. Symbols such as these are either too shopworn or too fraught with emotion to provide a wise set of alternatives. A better system might be to formulate in general terms a specific policy for or against which an individual could cast his vote. Thus, for example, there is no reason why, in a presidential election, the public should not be allowed to vote for or against American entry into a League of Nations.

The result of such balloting need not be considered binding on the future policy of the State Department, the Senate, and the Presi-

dent. But it would at least have the virtue of advising the legislative and executive branches of government on the public's wishes. Certainly Senate committees call before them witnesses who claim to be spokesmen for vast segments of the population. The President and the Secretary of State consult with their political advisers, who are said to be experts on the will of the people. Would it not be more sensible to let the nation testify for itself? Four or five important issues of policy are present in virtually every election. Let the public speak its mind on these.

Traditionalists will raise the objection that a system of advisory referenda would have the effect of curtailing the freedom of action of those elected to represent the people. Some will point to Edmund Burke's classic rebuke: "I represent England, not my constituency." There are several answers to this point.

In the first place, state-wide or nation-wide advisory referenda are in no sense tantamount to pork-barreling by the constituency. An elected official would know not only how his constituents felt on an issue but also how his State felt, and the nation at large. He still has the choice of bowing to his constituents, bowing to the nation, disagreeing with either or both, or carrying on a campaign to show the people back home why his decision is better. One thing is clear: it would be more difficult for a man in a public office to sidestep embarrassing issues when the public had made its own wishes clear on the same issues.

A second point which might be raised against advisory referenda is that they may have the psychological effect of making leaders follow instead of leading. Personally, we doubt this, and for several reasons. At the present time, there is tremendous pressure brought to bear by various groups on any man who holds public office. If an elected official wants to buck this pressure, he does so at the risk of alienating powerful interests. To a great extent our leaders *are* followers. What is important is that in following what they regard as the legitimate claims of various groups, they should also be fully apprized of the claims of the people at large. One might truly say that the use of advisory referenda would serve to free leaders from certain types of *illegitimate* pressure and make them more susceptible to *legitimate* pressure, democratically refined.

Use of Non-Partisan Public-Opinion Polls. Even though there be

constituted a system of advisory referenda on each election day, it is still true that elections are too few and far between to permit the public to register its view on day-to-day issues. To fill in this gap, an authoritative and non-partisan public-opinion poll (or polls) must be instituted. Such an organization would have to fulfill various requirements.

First, it would be necessary that all major political parties and groups be represented on its Board of Directors — Republicans, Democrats, Organized Labor, Organized Farming, Business, Government, the Press, etc. Only in this way could the polling organization be above attack.

A second requirement would be the establishment of and adherence to a Fair Polling Act, passed by Congress and perhaps administered by the Division of Statistical Standards of the Bureau of the Budget, or by the Bureau of Standards, or by the Census Bureau, or by the National Academy of Sciences. Such an Act would free the public-opinion field from the peril of the "phony" poll.

A final condition which would have to be imposed upon such an organization would be the appointment of a director and staff, chosen for their recognized competence, who would have final say on such matters as the settling of issues, the wording of questions, and so on.

With such a poll it would be easy at any crucial moment to feel the pulse of the public on the issue of the day. Again, it must be said that the opinion of the public would in no sense be *binding* on the executive or legislative branches of government or upon any private interests. The effectiveness of such polling can only be guessed. If, however, we look to the social results already achieved by polling, it is not difficult to imagine that an improved polling operation would be a tremendous force for good in the United States.

The history of public-opinion polling is too short to permit a good assessment of the poll's effectiveness. But certain it is that the presence of public-opinion polling was a great aid to policy-makers during the crucial years of 1940-41 before America entered the war. The war — culmination of an era of isolationism — found the American people unready to take their place in the struggle. The

leadership of the President during those years was brilliant not only because he saw the issues clearly but also because he sensed the will of the people — and his "sense" was based on more than intuition — and knew how far he could go in aiding the Allies without creating a reaction against the war. This last point, however, relates to the problem of "means" and not "ends." The most important point is the fact that the President had at all times a picture of the social *objectives* of the country. The strident voices of the isolationist press could not confuse his knowledge that the American people favored as their ultimate goal the destruction of Nazism, and the perpetuation of democracy.[2]

PUBLIC OPINION AND SOCIAL MEANS

As soon as one goes from the realm of social ideals to a discussion of implementing these ideals with suitable means, one comes face to face with the problem of public information. The ideals by which a people live are, by and large, distillations and revisions of pioneer practices which have now come to be taken for granted. Twenty years ago and more, only a few enlightened souls espoused as a serious political objective the principle of the Guaranteed Right to Work. Unemployment has always been regarded as a bad thing, but not until we had experienced a disastrous depression did we come to accept the idea that a nation and a community owed to each of its citizens a job and decent wages and working hours. Had there been adequate public information in the twenties we would have come sooner to the acceptance of this new social objective. But whether there was public information or not, events forced us to accept this new ideal.

But although the impact of events on a people's traditions very soon brings a new social *ideal* to the attention of the vast majority of the public, the same cannot be said of the influence of events on social *means*. It requires a far higher level of information to make an intelligent choice of means than it does to make a wise choice of ends. That statement may sound bizarre; it is nevertheless true.

As a people, we have known for a long time that we want a more

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[2] For a discussion of pre-war policy and public opinion, see Hadley Cantril, *Public Opinion in Flux*, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March 1942, 136-152.

effective democracy, greater prosperity, an end to war. The bases
for these choices are deep in our collective tradition. Yet we have
systematically failed to achieve them because the people have not
known how to check the unwise leadership of the men they chose
to achieve their objectives.

When are leaders wiser, when less wise, than the people? It is
reasonably clear that, at any one time, a nation's leaders know
better how to achieve social objectives than do the people. The
conclusion might be that once a nation has spoken on the matter of
social objectives it should keep silent and let its leaders do the rest.
In cases where complex legislation involving close financial figuring
is at stake, there is much truth in that conclusion. But there are
other cases when the means chosen by leaders are clearly at vari-
ance with agreed-upon objectives. The soldier-vote debate in
Congress during 1943-44 was a case in point. Where such contradic-
tions are present there is every reason why the public should register
its voice. In the case cited, the agreed-upon social objective is uni-
versal franchise. Any legislation which violates that ideal should be
subject to public censure.

Doubtless, we have a long way to go before the public is well
enough informed to make wise judgments on policies for imple-
menting social goals. Take at random some questions of informa-
tion concerning recent "social means" and see how poorly informed
the public is in many cases.

In 1943 . . . .

    10 per cent were able to define correctly "reciprocal trade
       treaties"
    16 per cent were able to give a correct definition of a farm
       subsidy
    33 per cent understood the cause of inflation
    44 per cent could give a correct definition of an international
       police force
    56 per cent could give a correct definition of "tariff"
    63 per cent thought we were *not* receiving anything in return
       for Lend-Lease to Britain
    84 per cent thought there was *no* manpower shortage
    72 per cent did *not* know the correct method through which
       treaties are ratified

30 per cent did *not* know that the Philippines are occupied by Japan

66 per cent did *not* know what the Connally resolution was

30 per cent did *not* know about the Moscow Conference

34 per cent did *not* know of the Russian-Polish Border dispute

72 per cent did *not* know about Chinese Exclusion

We may leave behind for the moment the problem of education, since that is not rightly in the province of this discussion. It suffices to say that before the public's advice on "means" can be taken very seriously, much remains to be done.

Yet there is much good that can be done now by public-opinion polling on "means" questions. Consider several aspects of the problem.

Counteracting Pressure Groups. In 1939 the Townsendites bade fair to push their program through Congress by virtue of the sound and fury their spokesmen were creating. The Townsend legislation was patently one-sided. It had become such a national issue that ninety-five per cent of the country had heard of it and knew something about it. Many people who knew the political scene thought that the Townsend Plan would soon have a victorious day on Capitol Hill. What finally dealt the deathblow to it was the public-opinion poll in January, 1939, showing that only thirty-five per cent of the country was in favor of such legislation. Here was a case in which the nation stopped a pressure group.

There are other instances in which pressure-group leaders have brought pressure to bear on Congress and the President in the name of their followers, when in reality their followers were not with them. In this area, too, public-opinion polling can serve a good purpose. Take the situation in 1943, when farm bloc leaders were opposing farm subsidies. At that time, two-thirds of the nation's farmers with opinions said they were in favor of the subsidy program. And then there is the case of union leaders demanding in 1943-44 that the Little Steel Wage Formula be scrapped. While that demand was being made, the majority of union workers throughout the country was opposed to increasing wages and prices, preferring instead that wages and price levels remain at current levels. And so polls can be used to weed out those pressure-group leaders who are all too eager to speak, not for the people they represent,

but for some small clique. Needless to say, this will be an important problem in post-war years. One need only think of the professional veterans' organizations to realize how important it might be.

The Tactics of Government. Still another function which polls can serve in the formulation of policy is what is best called timing. Any given social objective is achieved in a step-by-step fashion. It is still true that the best way to reach Olympus is to proceed in that direction. The timing of legislative steps toward the achievement of a social objective depends on two sets of factors. One of them has to do with factors not related to public opinion — the economic condition of the country, the exigencies of a national defense problem, the need for amassing the natural reserves in carrying out a program, etc. It is obviously vain to suggest, for example, a comprehensive program of liberalized consumer credit at a time when an inflationary gap is widening, even though in the long run a wise system of credit would be very helpful to the national economy. Nor would it be wise to advocate the unification of the nation's rail trunk lines at a time when a half-dozen of the major carriers are in process of complicated litigation.

But the second set of factors determining legislative timing has to do directly with public opinion. Take, for example, the matter of social security. When the National Resources Planning Board Report was issued in early 1943, the great majority of the country was in favor of its principles. Yet a majority was also opposed to immediate legislative action on it. Other legislation was felt to be more urgent. For the executive to have pressed petulantly for immediate action, if such action were not absolutely essential, would have been unwise in the extreme. In the long run, it might have jeopardized rather than facilitated the successful attainment of the goal of freedom from want.

Speaking in general terms, there are three conditions of public opinion important for the timing of legislation.

(1) The state of public information
(2) The factor of public resistance
(3) The slanting of the appeal

Concerning public information, it is obvious that a bid for public approval of a piece of legislation cannot be made until the public has a clear understanding of the nature of that legislation. If

Congress and the President know that the public is uninformed, they would do well to educate the people before engaging in a showdown fight over the merits of a particular bill. The President's demand for a National Service Act in his 1944 State of the Union message is an excellent case in point. The country was not prepared: only sixteen per cent of the people thought there was a shortage of labor in war industries. If, instead of suddenly asking for a National Service Act, the President had tried first to bring the facts of the case to the people, his chances of achieving his legislative program would have been far better.

On the question of public resistance or public readiness for a certain type of legislation, several things can be said. First, it is unwise for a leader to hold back when his followers are eager for action. This does not mean that the action need take the form of submission to the public will. It does mean that a leader must take cognizance of the fact that the people he is leading want some explanation of why action has not been taken. During 1943-44, for example, the country was eager to see us enter into some sort of international organization after the war.[3] Although steps were taken in that direction, no final agreements were made about an organization of nations. The people were never told clearly why the goal had not been reached. Nor had they been told how far along the road toward achieving the goal we had come. If America's leaders had given proper attention to the state of public opinion, they would have realized the importance of making a clear statement to the nation. Failure to do this may mean a lessening of enthusiasm for a policy of all-out international co-operation. Put in general terms, the moral is probably this: If a leader hopes to capitalize on public enthusiasm, he must act while enthusiasm is at the peak. Yet failure to follow this obvious principle has been the rule rather than the exception in high policy-making quarters. By and large, public opinion has been ahead of, not behind, policy.

A corollary to this principle: It is foolish to fly in the face of public resistance. Given an agreed-upon social objective, the President, for example, is often called upon to implement this objective in accordance with the best advice of his experts. The total program

[3] See J. S. Bruner, *Public Opinion and America's Foreign Policy, American Sociological Review*, February, 1944.

for the attainment of the objective may be so sweeping as to make the public react against it. Yet in the President's way of thinking, the total program is best for the country. He has two courses to follow. He can either try to ram it down the people's throats, or introduce the program bit by bit. The judicious use of public-opinion polling can guide him in the choice between these alternatives.

Consider some examples. President Wilson tried to push his whole post-war international program through Congress in one unit. He refused to adopt the step-by-step method. Looking back at the League fight with our present historical perspective, no sane historian is likely to deny that it would have been better to ratify the League Covenant marred with reservations than to have lost the fight completely. Compare Roosevelt's procedure from 1939 to 1941 on the matter of United States' entrance into the war. Whether through polls or otherwise, he knew the nation was not ready for a declaration of war. It is equally clear from his speeches that he knew we would inevitably one day be drawn into a shooting war. He adopted a step-by-step method — first the sale of war goods, then the exchange of war goods for other commodities, then the establishment of Lend-Lease, then the use of our warships in convoying. At every step the people supported him. Witness the steadiness of opinion on the question: "So far as you personally are concerned, do you think President Roosevelt has gone too far in his policies of helping Britain, or not far enough?"

	Not far enough	About right	Too far	No opinion
May 1941	17 %	54 %	19 %	10 %
Dec. 1941	21	52	20	7

Just before Pearl Harbor, the overwhelming majority (70 percent) of the nation believed that it was more important to help our allies than stay out of war. In the end, the goal of aiding the democracies against dictatorship was achieved.

In overcoming public resistance, it is necessary to know what types of bias are at stake and what kind of objections people are raising to a program. Few advertisers would be foolish enough to launch a new product without finding out first what kind of appeals to make. Similarly, the President would be foolish to launch a legis-

lative program in such a state of ignorance. It is essential in an effective democracy for both sides in any controversy to know as much as possible about the nature of public resistance if they are to make their appeals wisely. If, for example, the nation thinks that social security is a form of charity (in point of fact, the nation does *not* feel that) it is plain lunacy for the President to make speeches about social security as the ultimate attainment of the Christian ideal of brotherhood. All that such a speech would do would be to confirm popular misunderstanding. The President's cue would obviously be to emphasize the rôle of the individual in paying for his own social security.

The Question of Leadership. At the risk of being repetitious, we should like to mention again that what we have said about public opinion and the policies for implementing social objectives means in no sense the death of strong leadership. An informed leader, as judicious about the way people feel as he is about the state of the national pocketbook, is, we think, in a position of far greater strength than one not informed about public opinion. One might even say that such a leader might be so strong as to be a menace. To those who raise that cry only one thing need be said: So long as access to knowledge about public opinion is not monopolized by any one person or any one party, there is no danger of converting such knowledge to diabolical ends. Everything we have said thus far assumes *free access of all to public-opinion data.* It is for this reason that the authoritative Public Opinion Institutes of the future must be controlled by multi-partisan directorates.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

After means and ends have been agreed upon, there still remains the job of administration. It is in this field — the streamlining of public administration — that polling has been used most extensively by government. A few diverse examples of this use of polling:

War bond sales. Starting with the Second War Loan, the Treasury has made a systematic use of public-opinion studies of how best to sell more bonds. The work has been done jointly by the Treasury and the Department of Agriculture. These surveys have covered such diverse topics as the following: In what segments of the population is there most loose cash? What is the best approach to

a prospective war-bond buyer? What kind of posters are most effective? Is house-to-house canvassing a good idea?

Implementing civilian war programs. The OWI has from the beginning used public-opinion surveys to check on the effectiveness of such drives as waste-paper collection, metal salvage, the saving of kitchen fats and grease, etc.

Predicting Post-war Demand. All of the major polling organizations have attempted to find out what types of goods the public will be demanding after the war. The United States Chamber of Commerce now issues regular reports of prospective demand. Such knowledge is of inestimable value to government experts who are now planning the reconversion to peacetime production.

The determination of civilian requirements during wartime. The War Production Board now has a unit whose task it is to find out what types of vital civilian goods are growing dangerously scarce. Such determination is made by the use of public-opinion sampling.

Implementing farm programs. For many years the Department of Agriculture has been using public-opinion sampling both to find out what farmers are going to grow and what difficulties they are having.

Predicting Future Social Problems. Surveys have been made of the extent to which we may expect heavy post-war migration. Such studies have been used by the Department of Labor, and as this is being written, that Department is planning to do similar studies of its own.

Price-control and rationing. The OPA, like the Treasury, has used the Department of Agriculture and OWI polling facilities to find out how best to sell its price control and rationing programs to the public.

Military government. The AMG conducted a public-opinion survey in several Sicilian cities during the late fall of 1943 to determine the nature of food shortages, opinion on information, etc. This type of work will doubtless be extended to other areas occupied by Anglo-American forces.

These are only a few ways in which polling can be used in public-opinion research in this field. If there is a limit, it will be imposed, not by the nature of opportunities presented for expansion, but by the lack of trained personnel to effect such an expansion.

As we see it, public-opinion studies *can* be helpful in the formulation of policy. The next step is up to the social sciences. The public-opinion expert who knows all about statistical method — chi-squares and Shepard's correction and leptokurtic distributions — but does not know a social issue when he encounters one in broad daylight, can do more harm in this new field than he can do good. The real art of public-opinion analysis is that of slicing the issues in the most realistic way. Public-opinion research needs men who know about the nature of public policy — how it is made, by whom, under what pressures, with what intent. The relation of public opinion to policy is no longer a question for academic discussion. It is a challenge to action.

Public-Opinion Methods in Making the Peace

We have given our attention to the general development of public-opinion research tools and their present and future usefulness to society. The question arises, how can such methods help us in relation to making the peace; how can they guide the policy-makers, especially in the task of integrating technical economic information with articulate or inarticulate trends of thought or feeling?

To construe the question narrowly would violate the spirit of the whole intended approach. Peace is not made in one sitting, not even around a green table. Even the five months of the Versailles Conference did not make peace, even such a peace as it was. Peace, like war, is a continuing process. To make war requires preparation, mounting tension, an explosion, and a series of pressures and blows which gradually become one-sided as "victory" nears, but which continue in the use of force and attempted counter-force years or decades beyond the cessation of hostilities. It is likely that there will be a very gradual process of shift from war to peace and then, we may hope, of the consolidation of peace in ever more definite terms. Through all this long, year-by-year process, public-opinion techniques will become more and more useful, more and more consistently relied upon. They will serve in ever fuller detail *as a part of the structure of world order*.

Already, indeed, there has been a great deal of opinion-analysis in relation to American expectations and hopes for the post-war world — many such studies have been done under the Division of

Program Surveys of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, and many others have been reported by Gallup and by other private agencies. It has become clear from these studies that most Americans, in response to most questions, are already thinking in terms of a period in which there will be no more shooting, and that most of them are well aware that the process of achieving peace will be slow and uncertain.

Yet when we get down to cases there are some specific applications of public-opinion research which can be used *in the treaty-making phase of peace-making*. The advisory referendum is one technique that can be used. Another technique we will call "the application of public-opinion pressure." It consists simply of getting the people to put themselves so unequivocally on record that even a Wheeler would feel unable to counter their wishes. There are other methods, too: mobilizing public opinion on the community level, getting the man in the street to tell his Congressman what he thinks, etc., etc. But any of these quick methods will be useless unless the effect of public opinion continues to be felt.

I like something that Lincoln once said: "What I want is to get done what the people desire to have done, and the question for me is how to find that out exactly." (*End of Dr. Bruner's reply.*)

Dr. Bruner has laid the foundation principles for the use of public-opinion analysis in our American democracy. The new methods will prove fundamental in making a lasting peace — not just as a guide to the peace conference, but year by year as peace is slowly built. And what we can do in the United States may in time prove helpful in other parts of the world.

As an immediate sequel to this survey of fundamentals, we need, I think, to have a brief picture of specific current findings regarding the actual post-war attitudes and hopes of Americans of all economic levels. To this end, I found myself able to make use of data gathered by Dr. Gerhart Saenger, of the Sociology Department of the College of the City of New York, and by Dr. Richard S. Crutchfield, of Swarthmore College, who had made a study of the post-war attitudes and expectations of a number of American groups.[4] For-

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[4] A study was undertaken by Dr. Crutchfield in eight cities during the spring of 1943, and another during the summer of 1943 in New York City by Dr.

tunately it had been demonstrated by an independent comparison that the data obtained were typical of the United States as a whole.[5] So I asked Dr. Saenger to report on these findings, incorporating them in a broader study of public-opinion trends, from before Pearl Harbor to the present, putting to him the question:

How much readiness for international collaboration is actually found in the American public?

Dr. Saenger's Reply

While the general constellation of attitudes on domestic policies has changed rather little for the last decade, there has been a complete reversal on attitudes toward international co-operation during the last five years. The overwhelming majority of the population thinks that steps toward international co-operation should be taken now, and that we should either keep up the present form of co-operation embodied in the United Nations (15 per cent) or join some sort of a League of Nations (23 per cent) if not a World Federation or State (23 per cent). Few remain avowed isolationists (15 per cent).

There is, however, evidence that the majority of those desiring international co-operation have only a limited understanding of its implications. International understanding is viewed on the basis of self-interest rather than as a mutual proposition. The desire for international co-operation on the basis of self-interest is due to an increased awareness of the fact that what happens in other countries affects us either from a military point of view (70 per cent) or economically (51 per cent). Ideological aspects of the war and post-war situation are rarely mentioned.

These limitations determine the extent and type of American participation desired. A large majority favors our policing the world either alone or together with others. People feel that we should have a dominant influence in European affairs, but not try to run

Saenger, using the Social Research Laboratory of the College of the City of New York, with the co-operation of all the city colleges. In both these studies representative samples of the population were interviewed in their homes with the aid of open-ended interview schedules.

[5] The data were compared with the findings of the Gallup poll (American Institute of Public Opinion), the *Fortune* surveys, and the National Opinion Research Center surveys.

the world. Extreme imperialism is frowned upon. We should extend our foreign trade (84 per cent) but should put more or less heavy restrictions on foreign trade (68 per cent) in the United States to protect ourselves. Self-interest, the need for protection, is also behind the opposition to post-war immigration to the United States, which was found even among persons advocating a World State. On the other hand, we are willing to aid devastated countries even if we have to go on with rationing for some time after the war.

Self-interest, self-defense, is also considered the main reason for England's and Russia's fight. Ideological reasons, the need to defeat Fascism or totalitarianism, as the basis for their fight, are seen only by a very small minority (19 per cent and 13 per cent).

We are opposed to territorial gains both for Britain and for Russia, and favor the continued independence of small nations after the war. All countries should have the right to choose their own form of government.

Our doubt as to successful international co-operation after the war and the establishment of a permanent peace is partially the result of the motives we attribute to our allies. Many are convinced that each nation is moved only by self-interest, and therefore do not believe that we can fully trust Britain (35 per cent) and Russia (55 per cent) after the war. Most of those who believe that the United States will have to face further wars (45 per cent believe so, 25 per cent say it depends on circumstances) think that Russia is most likely to be our next enemy.

Attitudes toward Germany differ decisively from those toward Japan. While most persons demand stern treatment for Germany, including occupation and disarmament, people do not feel revengeful toward the German people; but they are bitter against the Japanese. The Japanese are considered essentially warlike, and no differentiation is made between leaders and people. Although the sentiment against the Germans is rising, most Americans are still inclined to differentiate between leaders and led. Thus they are concerned about what to do with Germany, but they are at a complete loss to formulate any positive suggestions concerning Japan.

This analysis would be incomplete without further inquiry into the meaning of present public-opinion trends in terms of future

international co-operation, as well as study of the strength of the desire to co-operate, as it varies among different parts of the American population.[6]

The sudden change from isolationism to an attitude favoring international co-operation in the two years preceding Pearl Harbor was closely related to the growing awareness that America would have to co-operate with the Allies lest it face a victorious Germany alone. In the month preceding our entry into the war, seven out of ten Americans felt, according to the American Institute of Public Opinion, that "we should do everything we can to help defeat Germany even if this means getting into war ourselves." More and more Americans favored entry into the League of Nations. This trend toward internationalism reached a high point after Pearl Harbor, and has remained at a relatively stable level ever since. Throughout the last three years, seven out of every ten Americans have favored participation in an international organization. However, prior to Pearl Harbor the Republican Party included a much larger proportion of "isolationists" than did the Democratic Party, while at present both parties include an equal proportion of persons favoring participation in an international organization of nations.

Immediately after the last war, public sentiment favored our

TABLE 1

Persons Favoring Participation in a League of Nations or International Organization

Poll	Year	Type of Organization	Per cent Favoring Participation
AIPO	1937	League of Nations	33
AIPO	1941	League of Nations	50
NORC	1942	Union of Nations	68
NORC	1943	Union of Nations	70
NORC	1944	Union of Nations	71

[6] The writer is indebted to the Social Research Laboratory, City College, New York, Fortune Surveys, Inc., the National Opinion Research Center, and the American Institute of Public Opinion for the data used in this section.

entry into the League of Nations. The failure of the Senate to reach the necessary two-thirds majority for ratification kept us out of the League. There is some possibility that a similar situation may arise again. For example, in December, 1943, three-fourths of all respondents (75 per cent, NORC) were willing "to keep part of the American army overseas for police purposes." Yet, according to an Associated Press poll (spring, 1943) only 43 per cent of the fifty-six senators venturing an opinion were willing to commit the Senate and the country now to an international police force. Public awareness of the possibility that a minority in the Senate may again prevent effective international co-operation, and the desire to avoid a similar blocking, finds its expression in two Gallup survey reports. In October, 1943, 61 per cent of the nation favored a treaty ratification, either by the President alone (7 per cent) or by a simple majority of Congress (54 per cent). By May, 1944, this figure had risen to 67 per cent, with 14 per cent undecided and only 19 per cent in favor of the status quo.

Soldiers favor American participation in an international organization after the war even more than civilians do. While 76.6 per cent of all civilians thought we "should play a larger part in world affairs than before," 86.5 per cent of the servicemen thought likewise.

This optimistic picture is somewhat darkened if one asks the people how far the United States of America should *make commitments* in the interest of international co-operation. Slightly less than one-half (46.3 per cent, *Fortune*, August, 1944) wish us to take "all necessary steps" to make international co-operation a success. One-tenth is undecided, and one-tenth for a return to isolationism. Thirty-three per cent want either to wait and see what happens or to be sure that "we don't commit ourselves too far" (cf. Table 2).

Many who favor international co-operation in principle are not willing to go very far in sacrificing part of our "sovereignty" in its interest. Most persons favoring an international organization grant it the right to decide "what military strength each member nation can have" (69.0 per cent, *Fortune*, January, 1944); 54.0 per cent came out in favor of a "permanent military force of its own stronger than any single nation." Only 44.8 per cent thought the organization should "decide what tariff rates should be charged by member

nations." Still fewer, 32.8 per cent, believed the organization should "decide minimum working conditions in member nations."

There is some indication that people do not fully understand the implications of international co-operation, and would be less idealis-

TABLE 2

PARTICIPATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, BY ECONOMIC STATUS AND EDUCATION

| Course Chosen | Total | Economic Group | | | | | Education | | | |
		A	B	C	D	N	None	Grade	High	College
Take active part in establishing some sort of international co-operation and do whatever is necessary to make it a success.	46.3	61.5	55.6	46.5	31.3	38.2	25.9	32.6	49.6	66.5
Become a member of an international organization after it is formed, but make sure we don't commit ourselves too far.	15.0	20.0	16.4	14.6	12.9	12.2	14.8	12.5	15.9	17.6
Keep friendly relations with any other countries that try to form an international organization but wait to see how it turns out before we join.	18.0	11.5	14.3	19.7	20.4	20.3	11.1	22.8	18.5	8.8
Stay out of all international organizations of any kind.	10.6	4.3	8.3	10.4	14.8	20.3	17.6	14.9	9.3	4.9
Don't know or undecided.	10.1	2.7	5.4	8.8	20.6	9.0	30.6	17.2	6.7	2.2

Fortune surveys, August, 1944. A denotes the highest economic level, D the lowest level, N stands for Negro respondents.

tic, less willing to co-operate, if they grasped its implications in terms of concrete, personal sacrifice. Eighty-two per cent (NORC, January, 1943) expressed their willingness to feed the starving people of Europe even at the cost of a continuation of rationing after the war. During the same year Gallup asked the same question in a way which brought a clearer formulation of the concrete situation: "For a year or two after the war, should people in the United States continue to put up with shortages of butter, sugar, meat, and other rationed food products, in order to give food to people who need it in Europe?" In these terms 67 per cent (AIPO, December, 1943) were willing to help feed Europe. Once the war is over and we are actually confronted with a continuation of rationing rather than with the expression of opinions on somewhat remote issues, demonstrating our idealism and sympathy, a further lowering of this figure would not be surprising, but it may well remain a majority.

From a practical point of view it is important also to know which groups in the population favor international co-operation, which oppose it. While it is true that farmers still tend to be slightly more isolationist than city dwellers, the most important factors are economic status and educational level. The proportion of persons favoring our joining an international organization, an international police force, assistance in the rehabilitation of Europe, and co-operation with Russia after the war, is greatest among the highest-income groups and the better-educated ones, and declines consistently with declining socio-economic status (cf. Table 2). These preferences result from the fact that persons in the higher-income groups, as well as those with a superior education (the two factors are interrelated) are better informed about the importance of international relations than the less favored groups of the population.[7]

In a *Fortune* survey in January, 1944, all respondents were rated on a three-point scale concerning their level of information on foreign issues. The results indicated that persons rated as "uninformed" included four times as many isolationists as those rated as "well-informed." Conversely, the largest proportion of persons

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[7] The lower socio-economic groups include the largest proportion of the readers of tabloid papers, as well as isolationist papers, which factor contributes to their lack of information concerning international affairs.

TABLE 3

ATTITUDE TOWARD POST-WAR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION BY
EXTENT OF INFORMATION ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS *

Respondent's Choice	Extent of Information		
	Well Informed	Poorly Informed	Un-informed
Take an active part in world organization with court and police strong enough to enforce its decisions	77.7	61.4	33.3
Try to keep world at peace, but make no definite agreements with other nations	15.5	26.0	33.5
Stay on our side of ocean	5.4	10.7	22.0

* *Fortune*, January, 1944.

favoring "active participation" of the United States in an "organization with court and police strong enough to enforce its decision" was found among the well-informed (cf. Table 3).

Future co-operation depends on the extent to which unity among the Allies can be preserved after the war. One of the greatest problems here is the problem of Russo-American relations. An overwhelming majority of the civilian population (80.7 per cent) and almost all servicemen (88.6 per cent) believe that we "should try to work with Russia as equal partners" (*Fortune*, April, 1943), and that Russia should have as much to say about peace with Germany as the United States of America (75 per cent, NORC, October, 1943). On the other hand, there is still considerable, although steadily diminishing, distrust of Russia. In March, 1942, only 39 per cent (AIPO) of the population believed that we could trust Russia to co-operate with us after the war. This proportion increased to 47 per cent by February, 1944, with 26 per cent still undecided and 27 per cent distrusting Russia. Here, too, knowledge of the actual relations is important. The majority of those (57 per cent) who had heard about the Moscow conference trusted Russia. *Supplementary Note, January, 1945:* As the war with Germany nears its end, Americans are becoming more concerned with the actual composition of a

world organization. In a recent survey of the NORC about one half of the population thought that all nations *should* have equal weight in the coming organization, yet the great majority *expects* it to be dominated by the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union.

Finally, there is considerable doubt whether we shall be able to prevent another war. While 36 per cent believe that wars are inevitable, 33 per cent think that wars can be prevented, but that the present war will not be the last war. Only 26 per cent hold it "likely that we will prevent future wars after this" (NORC, October, 1943). Many Americans (54%, NORC) believe that we shall have to fight another war within fifty years. (*End of Dr. Saenger's reply.*)

While a good deal of confusion is evident in the Saenger-Crutchfield group of respondents, and a good deal of pessimism regarding the immediate economic situation is expressed, it is equally clear that in international affairs the great bulk of the respondents have moved a long way in the internationalist direction, and that *they are willing to make great sacrifices for the maintenance of peace.* This has, as a matter of fact, been evident in all of the polls, both private and public, with which I have been in contact in the last three years.

One more question arose, however, namely the attitudes of youth as compared with the attitudes of adults. Partly as a supplement to the earlier educational material and partly as a supplement to Dr. Saenger's report, I felt it worth while to note the degree of internationalism characteristic of American high school students. Dr. H. H. Remmers, of Purdue University, has been gathering exactly such material in large quantities, from all over the Midwest; many types of schools and all four high-school years are included. From Dr. Remmers' data, as of various periods in 1943 and 1944, a few typical selections are presented.

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

The peace after this war can be a lasting peace.

Agree	36 %
Uncertain	14 %
Disagree	50 %

German and Japanese delegates should be included in the post-war conferences which make the peace treaties.

Agree	46 %
Uncertain	17 %
Disagree	37 %

If a post-war union of nations is formed, Germany and Japan should be excluded from it.

Agree	31 %
Uncertain	16 %
Disagree	53 %

A kindly post-war policy toward the German people will help the chances of world peace in the future.

Agree	50 %
Uncertain	21 %
Disagree	29 %

The peace treaty at the close of this war should disarm all nations and create a government of the world which is stronger than the United States or any other nation.

Agree	31 %
Uncertain	24 %
Disagree	45 %

A few years at most after the war, every human being in the world should be guaranteed minimum economic security, even if it means lowered living standards in some countries.

Agree	42 %
Uncertain	26 %
Disagree	32 %

The United States should try to develop its industries to the point where it does not have to buy any products from foreign countries.

Agree	30 %
Uncertain	10 %
Disagree	60 %

If the United States is to supply food to the needy nations after the war, we should treat freed and Axis nations alike.

Agree	61 %
Uncertain	17 %
Disagree	22 %

Supposing there is a food shortage in other countries after the war, the United States should supply them food even if it means continuing rationing.

Agree	54 %
Uncertain	18 %
Disagree	28 %

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Should or should not all races in the United States enjoy equal educational, vocational, and political opportunities?

Should	84 %
Uncertain	6 %
Should not	10 %

Can or cannot a group of mixed races live together peaceably?

Can	61 %
Uncertain	9 %
Cannot	30 %

Discrimination against Jews is contrary to the teachings of Jesus.

Agree	65 %
Uncertain	22 %
Disagree	13 %

Negroes should be allowed to enter trained occupations on the same basis as white people.

Agree	62 %
Uncertain	15 %
Disagree	23 %

Our federal government should guarantee jobs after the war for all men now in the armed forces.

Agree	82 %
Uncertain	9 %
Disagree	9 %

After the war, labor unions should have equal voice with management in operating industrial plants.

Agree	36 %
Uncertain	28 %
Disagree	36 %

The picture of youth opinions, as portrayed by the foregoing responses, is, on the whole, encouraging.

The racial and national views which the young people express

indicate that the larger proportion of them are progressive and cosmopolitan. Nearly three times as many youth agree as disagree with the proposition that "Negroes should be allowed to enter trained occupations on the same basis as white people." A definite plurality of the youth feel that "A kindly post-war policy toward the German people will help the chances of world peace in the future," while a lesser, though real, plurality agree that "German and Japanese delegates should be included in the post-war conferences which make the peace treaties."

While the persons interested in promoting international amity can justifiably feel these attitudes are promising, it should not be forgotten that the negative responses, though in the minority, are large. Furthermore, it may be that the factors of undesirable propaganda and the tension of the war will increase the negative attitudes in the near future. In any event, the efforts of the champions of good will should not be relaxed, but rather intensified.

This is far from the naïve nationalism and the naïve conservatism which are so often said to characterize American youth.

Up to this point we have considered public opinion analysis as a domestic problem. Upon our next contributor falls the task of describing the methods of research which are applicable to certain specially difficult problems of *world communication*, problems of the repercussion of thought and feeling in one land upon thought and feeling in another. Broadly phrased, how may we study *international* aspects of public opinion, the interpretation of which means so much in the relationship of nations? I would phrase my question:

> Through what methods can the currents of international public opinion be analyzed and evaluated in such fashion as to reduce tensions, fertilize constructive thinking, organize for a stable world society?

This question was addressed to Dr. Harold D. Lasswell of the Library of Congress and Yale University.

Dr. Lasswell's Reply

Modern methods of measuring "public opinion," or, to use a richer and more adequate expression, of "collective attitudes," provide us with hitherto-lacking *means* of making moral judgments on ques-

tions of public policy. A moral judgment takes into account the thoughts and feelings of others, not for the purpose of benefiting the few and exploiting the many, but in order to move toward a world commonwealth of mutual deference, a social order in which power and respect are shared. Information about the state of general opinion and sentiment is a *survival* necessity of despotism and democracy; it is the *moral* imperative of democracy. This is the policy significance of the new means of measuring attitude that modern science is slowly perfecting.

There is no need of an exhaustive inventory of the procedures now at hand for finding out what people feel and think. I find it convenient to catalog these methods according to a scheme that emphasizes the relation between the observer and the person whose attitude he is seeking to describe. Common sense suggests that whenever anybody tells us that his attitude or that of anyone else is thus-and-so, we must evaluate his statement carefully. What opportunity has he had to observe the persons talked about? How, if at all, has he influenced the attitude that he purports to describe? What method does he use to scrutinize, record, process, and report his data?

With these questions in mind, we may begin by noting that the observer is sometimes remote from the people he describes. The historian who tells us that the German middle classes in Bavaria were gradually won over to "Prussianism" after 1870 may have been in no direct contact with Bavarians. He may rely wholly on diaries, publications and official documents. He is a *collector;* and we must rely upon careful collectors to provide us with what we need to know about how present predispositions have come to be. Concerned with the ever-unfolding present, we are, of course, compelled to set special store by what qualified persons tell us about those whom they directly observe. Some observers are *spectators* who, like historians, do not modify what they see. The unobtrusive occupant of a crowded gallery may have no appreciable effect upon debate. With *participant*-observers the facts differ. Here the participant's own personality acts upon the phenomena of which he makes a record. The impact is even greater when persons are fully aware of being studied, as when the observer becomes an *interviewer.*

Collectors, spectators, participants, and interviewers may be classified according to the simplicity or complexity of the techniques used by them in manipulating, recording, processing, and reporting what they see. In general, we may speak of an observational standpoint as *intensive* when the subject is most aware of what is being done and when the procedures are complex. Other standpoints are *extensive* (little control, simple procedures).

If we are to provide for a continuous world survey of communication, we must examine every phase of the process. We need *control data;* that is, information about the owners, regulators, and contributors to radio, press, film, and other media of communication. We need *media data,* information about the technical set-up and operating details of the channels. We need *content data.* That is, we need to know what is said in these different media; how, for example, the various nations and functional groups of the world are presented to one another. Moreover, we need *effect data,* by which is meant information about the response of audiences to what is brought to their notice. We need many different sorts of effect data. Some of them are concerned with attention, some with comprehension, enjoyment, evaluation, action.

Much more than data about the process of communication is essential if we are to act wisely in forestalling and reducing levels of insecurity. We must relate information about the "worry level" to the changing pattern of values — to shifting distributions of income, democracy, and cultural participation. In short, if we are to arrive at intelligent decisions, our incoming stream of communication must include information about group attitudes plus information about diplomatic, strategic, and economic relations. Policy decisions concern all four spheres of action: communication, diplomacy, strategy, economics. If our judgments are to be moral and efficient, they must be based upon an adequate supply of pertinent fact and comment. Manifestly one of the tasks before us in moving toward a more ideal commonwealth is to perfect an *intelligence function* capable of providing a foundation for policy judgments consistent and compatible with this goal; intelligence is here used as in the phrase "military intelligence," and refers to the gathering of information needed for a specific purpose.

What are some of the factors that determine our success in de-

veloping an adequate world intelligence function? How can we bring into the network of communication through the channels of radio, press, and film, what is required? First of all, we must take into account possible limitations arising from the expectation and practice of violence. Whether we like it or not, future wars, we must admit, are regarded as probable. We know, of course, that those professionally connected with the armed forces have a manifest interest in preserving a lively expectation of future wars. At the other extreme are middle-class housewife "pacifists" who keep their minds off the probability of war and resent even so much as an intimation that wars will probably recur. So long as violence is expected, preparations will be made for attack and defense. Social change will be evaluated in terms of its significance for fighting effectiveness. If our peaceful investments move toward the boundaries of Soviet Russia, they cannot fail to enter into the power processes of global politics. Quite apart from the conscious aim of any investor, the machine tools that move as a result of investing will modify the "threat value" of the environment of Russia to Russians. In the same way, a group of Russian foreign-trade officials in Mexico City will be appraised from the strategic point of view as possible instruments in espionage. The threat value of our own environment will be modified in this way regardless of the conscious purpose of a Soviet trade delegation.

Just so long as the expectation of violence remains a significant variable in world relations, serious obstacles will be put in the path of free communications. In the troubled years before the present global war, veils of censorship were dropped before the eyes of the public that looked toward Russia, Japan, or Germany. There is a delicate reciprocal relation between open access to information and the prevailing state of optimism or pessimism touching upon the probability of war. If secrecy is begotten by pessimism, it breeds pessimism in return. We must do what we can in the future to provide access to all parts of the world for correspondents of radio, press, film, and other media. Not only must we open up sources of current intelligence; we need to clear the channels and to provide what Chairman Fly, of the Federal Communications Commission, once called "freedom to listen." In every possible way it will be necessary for us to encourage governments in all parts of

the world to permit listening to foreign-originated broadcasts, reading of foreign newspapers and magazines, and viewing foreign film. In this way we may gradually undermine the expectation of violence.

The expectation of violence not only operates in the estimates made by diplomats and soldiers of the fighting strength of the powers. The same considerations apply in evaluating internal affairs. Ruling élites are always alert for the first faint breath of disaffection. Rulers and revolutionaries alike continually calculate the probability of successful revolt and revolution. When the tides of insecurity run deep, loyalties are undermined, pessimism about the future of peaceful adjustment spreads, and demands multiply for changes that are revolutionary by methods that are radical.

Besides the expectation of violence, we must evaluate the influence of the expectation of profit upon the intelligence function. Often profit considerations stand in the way of adequate communication. Whenever the mass media depend upon a large amount of highly fixed and specialized capital, they tend to gravitate under the control of private monopoly or of government. Dominated by private or public monopolists sensitive to direct criticism, the content of channels of permissible public communication may be modified to fit the sensibilities of the controlling few. In our own society we are familiar with the insistent allegation that owners and advertisers protect one another and the social order from which they benefit from what they conceive to be adverse news and hostile interpretation. No doubt this is less the result of deliberate "pressuring" than of the sharing of attitudes appropriate to those occupying elevated positions in the social structure.

Besides the expectations of violence and profit, personality factors often curtail the proper performance of the intelligence function. What manner of man specializes in the manipulation of symbols? There is some basis for asserting that the symbol specialists often enjoy the manipulation of symbols as an end in itself. Or, to put it somewhat differently, they are concerned with excitement, enjoyment, or aesthetic symmetry as ends in themselves. Hence they sacrifice veracity for "story value" and operate with no responsible understanding of the crucial influence of communication on the vital processes of society.

It is evident from the foregoing considerations that an adequate stream of communication will not come by default. We cannot wisely think of "freedom of communication" in wholly negative terms. In the arena of public life, we cannot calmly rely upon competition. We do not propose to interfere with free competition; rather we prefer to insist upon the importance of maintaining competition and utilizing it for positive ends. Our aim is to increase the competitive position of the positive conception of freedom, rather than to impose any particular conception upon the media.

Let us examine in somewhat greater detail the functions of communication in a free society. We must depend upon the media to supply the following:

(1) Statements and justifications of the goal values of a free world.
(2) Information on trends in the degree to which these goal values are achieved in practice.
(3) Estimates of the strength of factors affecting the trends just referred to.
(4) Underlining of problems revealed by the relationships found between goal and trend, trend and factor.
(5) The valuation of alternatives of policy, together with recommendations.
(6) Disclosure of source of statements, providing the audience with indications of bias and competence.
(7) Utilization of the most reliable sources for factual statements.
(8) Balance of conflicting statements.
(9) Respect for a zone of personal privacy.
(10) Respect for a zone of official secrecy.
(11) Presentation of a balanced picture of the component groups of society.
(12) Acts to reduce tension when it is probable that further presentations of given subject-matter will precipitate immediate disorder.

The foregoing list of performance standards is set forth in no dogmatic spirit. Many of these standards are already commonplace in the professional codes and personal practice of responsible owners, regulators, and contributors to the media of communication. The problem of applying these general standards to concrete situations is a most exacting task, calling for high qualities of sincerity and skill.

It is apparent in what we have said that the world toward which we move is a dynamic interrelationship rather than a rigid, static Utopia. Through the years to follow we may become better aware of the nature of an adequate intelligence function and more competent in developing a world division of labor adequate to its proper exercise. (*End of Dr. Lasswell's reply.*)

Dr. Lasswell's conception of the rôle of public-opinion analysis appears to extend even further than that of Dr. Bruner, for we are confronted with the problem of conceiving our "intelligence function" in terms of the world community as a community.

There is, however, one further step to be taken. We need to see the relations between public opinion and the *international system of mass communication* through which opinions travel, and by which they are checked, intensified, or molded. Public policy must be considered not only with a view to *acting* upon public opinion, but also with a view to official or unofficial communications which may give facts and viewpoints *to make public opinion better oriented, more intelligent* in relation to group needs. In Chapters 16 and 17, we studied factors in education and group experience which may make for peace; here we are concerned especially with public utterances and publicly shared communications, especially via press and radio. Research upon the uses of communications for the sake of democracy is as crucial as is research on opinion. The two problems are interwoven. Here, if ever, there is an opportunity for the broadest vision, reaching out in all directions; and for courage and imagination. The significance of the public-opinion techniques has been colossal; yet even so we are likely to fail to grasp how far our society may be remade by research on the communication system which keeps the opinions forever changing. Only in a society indifferent to the movement of opinion can any of the modern devices for making contact with the thought of the common man be ignored. It seemed, therefore, appropriate to look further, allowing ourselves a frankly utopian approach, and asking what the joint use of public opinion analysis and of communications research might come to mean as a bulwark of enduring peace. I found Dr. Ernst Kris, of the New School for Social Research, willing to sketch for me an approach in these terms. To him I put the question:

What can the analysis of international mass communication contribute
toward a more stable world organization?

Dr. Kris's Reply

Whatever assumptions one cares to make as to the shape of
things in the post-war world, there can be little doubt that the study
of mass communication and public opinion on an international scale
will play its part. Even if we allow ourselves to be carried away
by the daydream of social engineering in a world of universal good
will; even if we visualize the future in terms of global government
whose policy is based upon insight into the interdependence of all
relevant social processes, wherever they occur; even if we assume
that clashes of interests will be decided by impartial experts — even
if we thus dream of Utopia, we cannot as social engineers omit the
study of public opinion. The verdicts of the experts, we assume,
will reflect justice based on scientific insight; and where wisdom is
no longer controversial, where there is true and false, as in science,
propaganda can be replaced by education, and communication be-
come teaching.

Yet even in the bravest of worlds there would remain one prob-
lem: Whom to teach what at what given time. The *World Opinion
Survey* is in a position to report what people on any given spot of
the globe think in regard to any specific question. If their required
agreement to a measure seems doubtful, they are obviously mis-
informed. The Opinion Survey in such cases turns to the *Com-
munication Survey* in order to see what information reaches the
particular population in the matter under consideration, and to
establish in what respect this information is insufficient. Where it
does not succeed in modifying the views of the people in question
— views which in Utopia at this stage are clearly prejudices — a
new set of data and detailed evidence is made available.

The function of the study of public opinion in the reality of the
post-war world will in one respect resemble this dream: it will
undoubtedly play the part of an essential method of intelligence.
The similarity stops at this point. Whatever organizations have
charge of the international surveys, they will have considerable
difficulties in assembling satisfactory evidence. It might, in fact, be

possible to survey, in reasonable samples, the content of mass communication on a global scale — in press, radio and moving pictures — but we can hardly hope to obtain satisfactory data on the response of people to what they are being told. Only the democracies will tolerate impartial opinion polls without the assistance of specialists in violence.

The contribution of scientific method to this field of intelligence is based on firm grounds. In both fields, in the survey of *communication* (including analysis of its contents) and in the survey of *public opinion* in response to it, many skills have been developed. We are aware of the intricacies of sampling communication, and we have developed methods which permit us to present in quantitative terms the frequency of reference to any given subject and the emphasis upon it. We have learned to appreciate the interrelations of various media and to differentiate between their potential influences. We have perhaps paid too little attention to media other than mass communication, e.g., private conversation, which repeats and varies it, and the rumors which arise under strain; but even in these areas steady progress is being made. Our tools for communication surveys are in good shape.

However, when called upon to estimate the influence of communication upon opinion formation, we frequently fail; we still are prone to overestimate this influence. There is still a tendency to overlook the difference between commercial advertising and political information or propaganda. Though in advertising the response is correlated with the frequency of exposure, this does not apply where controversial interests or values are at stake (92).

We tend also to forget that opinion reflects to some extent what we have been brought up to believe, that opinions formed early in life influence those formed later, that in order to assess the flexibility of opinion we must take into account what nursery and school have implanted; current mass communication and education cannot be treated independently (94).

A third source of error stems from our failure to appreciate the importance of immediate experience. If we want to predict what opinion will be at any given time at any given place in reaction to information, we must look at the specific people whose responses we study; not only at their interests according to income, their

ideas according to tradition, but the vividness which the question has in terms of their experience (96). "War" is a *word* for those who have no children in the foxholes, but a grim *reality* for those who wait for the mail; and even grimmer for those whose homes are being bombed. This factor of immediacy is all-important when forecasting public opinion.

Progress in the study of public opinion itself has been as great as in communication research. Sampling methods become ever more accurate; questionnaires are drawn up with ever greater skill; interview procedures are being constantly refined; spectators and participant observers develop ever more subtle methods of presentation. From the impressionistic procedure of Mass Observation (England) to the quantitative results of public-opinion polls there extends a continuum of skills which reflect the sum of experience in various fields of social techniques and the basic current assumptions of social psychologists.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND OPINION RESEARCH

But to what use are these skills to be put if applied in an international sphere? Intelligence (the term is used as an equivalent for "information"; cf. p. 397), we suggest, may have a double function: if submitted to policy-makers in an international organization, some types of limited action may be based upon it; *but intelligence may also reach the international public itself and act as communication.*

International institutions are bound to be looked upon by different nations from the point of view of their different interests and different value structures. Everything will therefore depend on the agreements within which international institutions will operate. Even if a group of nations — democracies we assume — can reach an agreement, the question will arise whether the agreement goes far enough; whether it permits a detailed definition of social, economic, and moral goals upon which successful operation can be based.

No communication survey can collect *all* the data; no polling system can ask *all* the questions. Any selection of content categories, any formulation of questions to be put before the people, is related not only to the immediate interests of the moment, but also to the concrete goals one has in mind in speaking of a "stable world

order." They may be predominantly negative, and limited to the avoidance of violence at almost any price, or they may comprehend positive goals to be reached in the near or in the distance future; goals which seem worth pursuing at any or almost any price — even that of violence.

However incomplete or complete the power of international or regional authorities may be, this power might well be exercised in various directions; in relation to international communication certain types of content could be excluded from communication and others agreed upon. Analysis of communication permits us to establish with fair approximation when and where certain codes of communication have been violated; where, in dealing with controversial issues, the alternatives were not clearly presented, and where fairness in this sense was violated. This applies more to news than to opinion. It is, we believe, conceivable that an international agency might apply censorship in reverse and attempt to guarantee that information available in mass communication of a certain country be "complete" and include alternatives. It is furthermore conceivable that the influences of communication control might be extended even further and that open incitement and open agitation could be made punishable.

Such procedures clearly presuppose the extension to the international field of what is or should be practiced on a national scale. There are precedents for international agreements not wholly dissimilar to this. The first World War left, as a valuable heritage, international drug control, exercised by the League of Nations, and still partly functioning. That the second World War should bequeath an international control of, say, incitement to violence in mass communication, should not be an exaggerated expectation.

The extension of a practice from national to international communication might also guide the second use here suggested for intelligence data in relation to international public opinion. Within the democracies the publication of public-opinion polls exercises an influence upon public opinion. This influence is by some considered so great that it has given rise to objections to an unregulated handling of public-opinion polls. They are likely, it is said, to invalidate representative government. This is not the place to discuss these objections. Some of them rest upon the idea that where de-

cisions have to be based on detailed information the people are less likely to judge correctly than their elected representatives, whom the poll may unduly influence. We here touch upon the problem whether or not polls should in certain cases be limited to certain groups of the better-informed, to opinion leaders; in others, to those who have an immediate stake in the controversy. But whatever the objection — and whatever the limitations of polling which they suggest — there remains the fact that all objections are valid only in so far as the educational level of the population is limited. But it appears that the *publication of public-opinion polls has become to some degree, and is bound to become to an ever greater degree, an instrument of public education in the democracies.*

The publication of public-opinion polls tells us how people of other economic, educational or regional strata feel about any given question. Interdependence becomes more clearly focused, interests more sharply crystallized; and the information on existing opinion is likely to *engender demand for information* as to the reasons underlying it.

Though this procedure has not yet been fully developed even in the national sphere, it may gain some importance in international affairs. We imagine that it might at first be applied to three areas: to common interests, to parallel problems, and to the relation of peoples to each other. Let us take as examples Britain and the United States. "Common interests" may concern the organization of international world trade; "parallel problems" may concern the controversy between labor and management in each of the two countries; and "interrelations" might concern the basic views Americans hold about the British, and the British about the Americans.

In each of these cases it would clearly be of value for both peoples to realize how far the majority of the people in the other country feel as they themselves do; and in each case the data on the distribution of opinion in the other country will create a demand for more detailed information about the reasons for each opinion. Up to the present time the exchange of trained observers, of newspaper correspondents and experts has served the purpose of mutual information. In the future we might well supplement such indirect information by means of a well-timed and systematic interaction of public-opinion polls, the results being communicated by

each to the other. Understanding of this kind cannot be based haphazardly on figures only; it must be supplemented by insight into the complexity of the social scene. To be familiar with public-opinion polls in another country will help only if implemented by an ever wider context of information.

Whatever the political limits of this kind of policy in the post-war world, there are some limits of a *psychological* nature. The effect of any type of information depends largely on the confidence of the audience in the communication. Distrust in communication has been rapidly growing since the last war. It was born of the propaganda phobia of 1920, gained new strength when the economic crisis created a general distrust "of them" and there is little or no conclusive evidence that the war has dispelled this distrust. An undercurrent of disbelief continues to color the reactions of many to mass communications in the democracies and in enemy countries.[8] How education for international understanding might succeed in overcoming this distrust, how confidence in the reliability of one or various central organizations might be created, cannot be discussed here. But since confidence in communication is related to confidence in the institution from which it emerges, the political effectiveness of the international organization which might be called upon to collect the data on global mass communication and public opinion will determine the trust which people are likely to put in its findings.

We have started in the direction to Utopia, and views which to some seem utopian are inherent in our discussion. Those who believe in the basic rigidity of human nature will hardly be tempted to follow us. The discussion is meaningful only to those who assume that in spite of determining biological factors changes occur over long periods of time which affect even basic human reactions.[9] These changes may then be evaluated as progress. If the "belief in

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[8] On conditions in Russia, China and Japan no conclusive evidence is available.

[9] This is what Freud had in mind when proposing the concept of "organic repression." See *Civilization and its Discontents*, 1929, and "Why War?", League of Nations International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, *Open Letters*, Series 11, 1933; unpublished correspondence between Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud (reprinted in *Psychoanalytic Epitomes*, ed. John Rickman, vol. IV., London, 1939).

Utopia" strays from this point, it is worth while to study in detail what the analysis of mass communication and public opinion can contribute to a stable world order. (*End of Dr. Kris's reply.*)

Looking back over Chapters 15 to 20, there is evidence that the political institutions are far from being the only ones that need fundamental revamping if humanity is to have enduring peace; indeed, we have found that education, industrial and community relations, race and sex attitudes, are all near the core of our problem. Finally, we have seen that the wants of a democracy are not automatically reflected in public decisions; public opinion must be constantly scrutinized. And when public opinion proves to be based on narrow, ignorant, or confused sources of information, it is not the business of democracy to proceed in confusion; public policy must be based on research into the factors responsible for such confusion. How far we may supplement a democratic education by *democratic control of the opinion-making forces* is a controversial problem; for immediately behind it looms the problem of the type and extent of public control over press and radio. Solid psychological facts as to the immediate and remote effects of such control (e.g., the very limited control exercised by the Federal Communications Commission) are not yet at hand. But there are psychological facts in abundance indicating that research into mass communication is imperative in a democracy, both in relation to domestic and in relation to international issues; and that the citizens of a democracy wishing peace will not ignore the problem of the nature and influence of such communication, nor the problem of *who is to control it.*

THE MORAL EQUIVALENT
OF WAR

21

A GROUP OF QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY

Houston Peterson
Alvin Johnson
Lawrence K. Frank

IF THERE IS one principle upon which psychologists can agree with full conviction, it is that peace cannot be achieved as a negative goal, the *absence* of something at which we shudder. As Dr. Duvall earlier pointed out (Chapter 13) the horror approach and the debunking approach resulted in profound aversion, but not in a clear definition of objectives; and as Dr. Sanford's contribution pointed out (Chapter 14) the resulting apathy and ostrich-like avoidance of the war threat did nothing to make men resolute in their demand for peace. In one of the most cogent of his essays, William James showed the necessity for a definition of life in terms of the strenuous, the vivid, the intense; life was to be conceived in such heroic terms that in comparison with it the heroism of war would offer no charms. It is doubtful, indeed, whether a peaceful way of living will be achieved for modern men in terms of the traditional hymn-writer's conception of peace as a region of lilies and asphodels in the green pastures beside a murmuring brook. The old, the sick, and the tired can be charmed by such visions; the young, the tough, and the resolute cannot. They *will* have their danger; they will have their struggle against obstacles. We are thinking here not of "average" people, but of the more active and alert, of them who set the pace, make the decisions. Their energies will be effectively canalized only if life offers so vast an adventure that the living of it far transcends in value any of the satisfactions which the excitement or glory of war can bring.

This series of chapters on the reconstruction of the psychological basis for world living may, therefore, be brought to a conclusion by asking for a definition of the "moral equivalent of war" in modern terms.

Concretely, how can strenuousness of life be achieved?

This question was put to Dr. Houston Peterson, of Rutgers University and of Cooper Union.

Dr. Peterson's Reply

"We are prepared to fight infantile paralysis with the planned strategy of a military campaign," said President Roosevelt to the nation on his birthday, January 30, 1943. "The tireless men and women working day and night over test tubes and microscopes — searching for drugs and serums, for methods that will prevent and cure — these are the workers on the production line in the war against disease. The gallant chapter workers, the doctors and nurses in our hospitals, the public-health officials, the volunteers who go into epidemic areas to help the physicians — these are the front-line fighters."

Will such constructive battle ever replace organized bloodshed? Will men ever march together against non-human foes with the zest with which they march against one another? Will peace, for the mass of mankind, ever have the tingling excitement of war? These are the questions that William James put to himself a generation ago as he considered the eager propaganda of the pacifists. One of the most generous of men, he was too warm-hearted and adventurous to envisage a dull, placid Utopia. After a week of lecturing at the Chautauqua summer school, he once wrote to his wife:

> I long to escape from tepidity. Even an Armenian massacre, whether to be killed or kill, would seem an agreeable change from the blamelessness of Chautauqua as she lies soaking year after year in her lakeside sun and showers. Man wants to be *stretched* to his utmost, if not in one way, then in another.

Allowing for the gay exaggeration of an intimate letter, we find that James (84) developed this point in his famous essay, "The Moral Equivalent of War." That essay was not an attack, as often assumed, on the ideal of peace, but on the naïve psychology of pacifists. It is futile to slander man's heroic though bloody past and promise him a monotonous lukewarm future. "No scorn, no

hardness, no valor any more! Fie upon such a cattleyard of a planet!" The problem is to find a "substitute for war's disciplinary function," to preserve as far as possible the martial virtues such as courage, self-sacrifice, duty and endurance, without the awful cruelty and wastefulness of war. James thought that this could be done in the collective enterprises of the future, in youthful armies "enlisted against Nature," in required periods of work in factory and field. "Great indeed is Fear, but it is not the only stimulus known for awakening the higher ranges of men's spiritual energy."

James died in 1910. How would this thesis look to him today in the light, or rather the shadow, of two world wars — one far from finished? Would recent psychology help him? Would any recent social developments support his views? Psychologists now tell us that there is no "pugnacious instinct," that man is not "naturally" a war-making animal, but that frustrations, especially in early life, make him resentful, hostile and aggressive. "New energies and hardihoods" have developed in all phases of the vast Russian experiment, in the world-wide wonders of aviation, in our own Civilian Conservation Corps.

Now, leaving James, let us consider a little further the *attractions* of war. Economic and political forces undoubtedly prepare the ground, but men have often gone willingly, eagerly, to war — and often they have found it more stimulating than peace. Here are three types of testimony.

In Shakespeare's much neglected play, *Coriolanus,* we find two servants talking about the likelihood of a new war:

2. *Servant.* Why, then we shall have a stirring world again. This peace is nothing, but to rust iron, increase tailors, and breed ballad-makers.

1. *Servant.* Let me have war, say I; it exceeds peace as far as day does night; it's spritely, waking, audible, and full of vent. Peace is a very apoplexy, lethargy; mull'd, deaf, sleepy, insensible. . . .

2. *Servant.* 'Tis so; and as wars, in some sort, may be said to be a ravisher, so it cannot be denied but peace is a great maker of cuckolds.

1. *Servant.* Ay, and it makes men hate one another.

3. *Servant.* Reason; because they then less need one another. The
        wars for my money! . . .

The late Eric Knight, author of *This Above All* and *The Flying
Yorkshireman,* often maintained that the average man does not
consider war a greater evil than peace. A native of Yorkshire,
Knight fought through the first World War in the Princess Pat regi-
ment and died in this one while flying to North Africa in an army
transport. Speaking at the Cooper Union on November 11, 1938,
he said: "When the leaders of the world can make of ordinary
peacetime life a flow that is ridden of most of its present inequalities
and horrors, and more fitting to the dignity of being a human, then
war will seem worse. Until such a time we shall continue to have
wars and men will go to them."

Yet closer to our subject was many a news item from the Ameri-
can coal mines during the strike of 1942. "Most miners and their
families dream of escape, envy the people of the cities; ex-miners
whom I saw on furlough regarded the army as a great refuge from
the routine of living." Life in the army is not much more precarious
than life in the mine — or the gutter; and food, clothing, and shelter
are supplied at government expense. The humblest uniform de-
mands at least some degree of respect, and may strengthen con-
siderably the victim of discrimination.

In a word, men have found many values in war. They have
found excitement and glory after the drabness and dullness of
peace. They have found relative comfort and security after years of
abject poverty and misery. They have found some degree of dig-
nity and deference, when they had chiefly known servility and
humiliation. These are the reasons why peoples and individuals
have looked back nostalgically on war and why they will welcome
it in the future — unless peace is made richer and worthier.

Of course, the problem is vast — vaster and more complicated
than James imagined — but it is *the problem of mankind* and the
sciences of man are beginning to find the solution. There is no
human instinct that requires satisfaction in the horrors of the
battlefield; but men grow ferocious because of the accumulated
resentments and hostilities that cannot be overtly expressed in
organized society. Those who lead full, interesting lives need no

outlet in war; but there are many who are warped, frustrated, embittered, or, failing to find themselves, are bored; and these often best realize themselves in it. A Hitler cries for blood, but not an Einstein. The over-all problem, then, is the democratic one of making life far more interesting, varied, dignified for far more people. We know enough. Can we develop the "civic courage" to put our knowledge into practice?

"Man wants to be *stretched* to his utmost," said James. Well, there will be ample opportunity in the immense tasks of post-war reconstruction. The Arctic and the Antarctic, the desert and the jungle, are waiting to be conquered, as well as the ocean, the air, and the world of science. It may be felt that these are for the more gifted and active of youth; but it is precisely with them that we are chiefly concerned. And each may participate in accordance with his ability and his will, once the leadership is given. With such fields for heroism, discipine and self-sacrifice opened up, further organized killing may well seem anti-climactic and superfluous.

And there remains that universal and ceaseless war against disease of which the President spoke. Infantile paralysis, tuberculosis, cancer, syphilis and all their cohorts surpass in deadliness and ruthlessness any human enemy. When will the masters of psychological warfare begin to dramatize the greatest of all conflicts? "One would think," said Tom Paine, "that there are evils enough in the world without studying to increase them, and that life is sufficiently short without shaking the sand that measures it." (*End of Dr. Peterson's reply.*)

The fact that so many wars in modern times have been "boys' wars," and the fact that inculcation of military virtues in childhood and adolescence have played so large a part in German, Italian, and Japanese war preparations in recent decades, seem to make it specially important to emphasize the youth problem in relation to this matter of the moral equivalent of war; and in particular, to stress the economic predicament of youth as a factor reinforcing the claims made upon youth by the military. "Honor to you if you make war in company with us; economic adversity to you if you do not"; this has been the pull and push of the war-makers' tactic. It was

therefore to an economist, Dr. Alvin Johnson, Director of the New School for Social Research, that the next problem was posed:

> What is the economic predicament of youth in its relation to the moral equivalent of war?

Dr. Johnson's Reply

A striking contrast appears in the two main movements of international public opinion in the last decade before the first World War. On the one hand peace congresses and committees were springing up everywhere. Anti-war books and pamphlets circulated by the million. Statesmen, even the German Kaiser, had to present themselves as true friends of peace. On the other hand the period was one of pervading restlessness among the young. We may recall the account in *Jean Christophe* of the dangerous spirit evinced by the youth on both sides of the French border. They were not definitely demanding war, but their psychological attitudes were such as made the author fear the worst.

Our own youth were not at that time gravely affected by this menacing restlessness. But we had experienced something of it in the time of the Spanish War. Lovers of simple explanations have credited that war to the propaganda of Hearst and the fire-eating of Theodore Roosevelt. At the outbreak of that war I was a student in the University of Nebraska. We were not readers of Hearst, and we paid scant attention to the utterances of Roosevelt. A local paper, *The Call,* alleged that we students were against making war on Spain. Immediately we formed a procession including about every male student and paraded the streets chanting:

> To Hell with Spain,
> To Hell with Spain.
> Damn *The Call,*
> *The Call* be damned.
> Hurrah for McKinley.

That excellent gentleman was doing everything he could to keep us out of war. So were most of our elder statesmen. The Spanish War was certainly not "an old man's quarrel and a young man's fight." Most American men of wealth were against fighting Spain.

The war was certainly not "a rich man's quarrel and a poor man's fight." The young men were spoiling for it.

It was this spirit of the youth that set our wisest philosopher, William James, at work to find a moral equivalent of war. Economic interpreters of history have dismissed this quest as futile. The real cause of war, they allege, is to be found in the economic motives of the ruling class. The Greeks stormed Troy not to recover the somewhat weathered Helen, but to corner the trade issuing from the Dardanelles. Titus stormed Jerusalem, not because the Jews would not place a statue of the emperor in the Holy of Holies, but because he wanted to widen the gate for Roman trade to Mesopotamia and India. We are fighting Germany now to protect our position in world trade. And so on. One must take this sort of explanation for what it is worth.

There have been all kinds of wars since the dawn of history and all kinds of causes of war. We are interested here in one kind of war, the war that springs from the restlessness of youth. Such were the Greek wars in Asia from Xenophon to Alexander. Such were the Roman wars that culminated in the triumphs of Julius Caesar. Cicero's innuendoes on the relation of Caesar to the Cataline insurrection were not wholly groundless, for Caesar capitalized the same restlessness of the youth. Shakespeare has Henry IV plan a crusade, to draw off the restless youth festering in the body politic like bad blood. The Hitler and the Japanese aggressions illustrate the same point. These are all wars made not by the old men, the capitalists, but by the youth.

What is it that gets into the youth from time to time, causing them to buzz angrily like bees about to swarm? It is a social displacement having its origins, as a rule, in economic changes.

In a static society the greater part of the young are tethered to a foreordained place in life. The artisan's son has an artisan's job awaiting him, with a fairly secure living and wife and home within his reach. The merchant's son is being trained to take over his father's business; the son of a professional man has a narrow choice among professions of status equivalent to his father's. *There are no warlike impulses in the youth thus provided for.* The prevailing pacific character of the Chinese may be easily accounted for by the fact that since time immemorial the family or the clan has seen to it that youth has had its traditional security.

The chances of sudden wealth in the eastern Mediterranean after the breaking of the Athenian monopoly by the Peloponnesian War, and in the western Mediterranean after the fall of Carthage, created in Greece and Rome classes of *nouveaux riches* who could flash about their jewelry and fine raiment, to the envy of the less fortunate youth, who lost interest in the imperceptible advances possible under the traditional economy. Straining at their tether, they saw rosy hope in war and foreign adventure. In Shakespeare's time the vast increase in trade, in which England was participating in ever greater measure, made the traditional modes of earning a living seem meager and humdrum. The tremendous technological advances in Western Europe in the last decade of the nineteenth and first decade of the twentieth century, the expansion of the export trade, the fortunes made in stock speculation and real estate, made the old Germany of Schiller and Goethe, the old France of Hugo and Balzac look ludicrous to the rising generation. They demanded their chance. No doubt they preferred an honest chance, so it proved lucrative. But they developed a high degree of tolerance of the dishonest chance. They would have preferred to take their fortune peaceably, but take it they would, by violence if necessary.

In none of these cases, it may be said, could the discontented youth have represented more than a fraction of the total youth. The great majority pursued their routine as of old. This may be true, but in social psychology there is no such thing as majority rule. A restless youth will count more than ten quiet ones in giving tone to the time.

I may appear to have dwelt too exclusively upon the influence of new opportunities invidiously distributed among the youth. Do we not find a more fundamental influence, in a population multiplying beyond the means of subsistence? Overpopulation is frequently advanced as a cause of the bellicosity of Germany, Japan and Fascist Italy.

Undoubtedly if overpopulation results in extensive and long-continued unemployment, a body of embittered youth will develop, a ready instrument for domestic revolution or foreign war. Youth displaced is a menace to peace, domestic or international. But unemployment in modern times is seldom a consequence of overpopulation. In the late depression there was much unemployment in a

sparsely populated territory like Australia, and very little in a densely populated territory like Java. Moreover, the masses of the unemployed are of the unprivileged and uninfluential classes. They become a factor only when leadership is offered by the more privileged discontented.

In the early years after the first World War, Germany was filled with young men and women for whom there appeared to be no place. They had no leadership that could offer them a future. They drifted hither and yon, now blaming the militarists who had ruined Germany, now the Peace of Versailles. Among them there were numerous pacifist movements, based rather on the hopelessness of war than on the hopefulness of peace. Hitler and his corps of propagandists, with a program of European conquest and brilliant opportunities for the conquering youth, won them in shoals away from their pacifism.

Our own youth, after depression set in, suffered under the same social malady of a bitter present and dark future. As with the German youth of the preceding decade, pacifism was rife among them. It was a pacifism not of faith but unfaith. They had no leaders to promise a brilliant future through war and conquest. The cry that Hitler menaced civilization left them cold. What was civilization offering them? They detested grandiose ideals with no apparent footing in reality.

How footless their own pacifism really was became clear upon the events of Pearl Harbor. A negligible few became conscientious objectors. For the rest, they lined up with the national necessity, not, however, with the burning enthusiasm of youth summoned to a great future.

We can hope for lasting tranquillity when we shall have succeeded in providing fair normal chances for the successive contingents of youth. Not brilliant prizes for the few, to fill the many with discontent, but fair chances for all, chances not only of economic abundance and security, but of variety and richness of life. Modern technology is quite competent to supply the abundance. Modern administration is competent to see that abundance is properly distributed. The opening up of the whole world that will follow upon victory wisely used, and peace securely established, may reasonably be expected to lay the basis for an intensive interpenetration of cul-

tures, a diversion of the ambitious youth from a too exclusive pre-occupation with material prosperity. The good things of the spirit are to be had by anyone who is worthy, provided that the fundamental requirements of living are met.

In the development of the arts lies the ultimate hope for true peace. (*End of Dr. Johnson's reply.*)

We can well agree with Dr. Johnson that it is exactly *in the arts* that our hope lies, provided that the term *the arts* can be broadly and deeply defined.

Here I turn again to Lawrence K. Frank (cf. p. 244) for an answer, with this question:

What can the arts do to lay a sounder foundation for world peace?

Lawrence K. Frank's Reply

When the fighting stops in Europe and Asia, there will be enormous numbers of people filled with hate, crushed by despair, torn with anxiety over their immediate fate. The war has brought down to ruin not only cities and towns, and the innumerable artifacts of man, but also the traditional beliefs, sanctions, and faiths by which men have endeavored to make their lives orderly and meaningful.

This hate, despair, and anxiety will, if let loose, lead to violence and destruction, to apathy and to all manner of panicky acts, through which these intense feelings will be expressed. Now there is only one instrument for channeling the intense emotions of a people: the arts, especially drama, which, both as a sacred and as a profane art, has historically provided the catharsis of strong emotions. Today, the dramatists have a world-wide audience waiting for their creations, to redirect these feelings from sheer explosive outlets or the surrender of utter self-defeat, into more constructive endeavors, to take up again the tasks of life and try to build anew a social order and world peace.

Relief, rehabilitation, medical services, social services, economic restoration, are all needed; but more important and more urgently needed is something that will help men and women and youth to transform their otherwise destructive and self-defeating feelings

into constructive activities and to rebuild beliefs and hopes to live by.

Dramas can be made available in the form of talking moving pictures, speaking the language of each group of people, which would reach them as no other form of communication could do. Radio dramas likewise can be prepared on discs and broadcast at the appropriate moment, to bring to people the first humanly constructive words they have heard in many years, not as didactic sermons or commands or regulations, but as artistically valid communications that would reach to the personality and feelings of the audience. How else can we rebuild a society, how else approach the immense task of human and cultural reconstruction that must be undertaken wherever war has directly touched people, both the victor and the vanquished?

Probably no more baffling question faces the United Nations than that of how to treat the Germans after the war. After they have been conquered, made to surrender unconditionally, made to give up their military power, make reparations, and suffer punishment for their treatment of others, we must, after all this, still face the question of how to change German culture and the German character structure.

If we are to help Germany to revise her image of herself, to modify her traditional culture, and to develop personalities which will not be impelled to war, conquest and power-seeking as the national ideal, we must invoke something more than military and naval instruments or other forms of coercion and punishment. Again it seems clear that only the arts offer the means for the subtle, complex and emotionally involved task of reconstructing the German culture and people. What else can offer effective instruments for reaching people who are sullen, resentful and suspicious, many of whom have lost all faith and believe no longer in anything or anyone? Yet to them we must contrive to speak, if for no other reason than that we must persuade them to resume living, face the consequences of their national acts, and prepare as soon as may be to join the rest of us in maintaining world order.

It has been the historic rôle of the arts, especially the drama (now reinforced by the radio and tomorrow by television) to present the major cultural values, transforming feelings and redirecting them

into new channels. Today, as never before, we must turn to the arts for the reconstruction that lies ahead, not only in the immediate days after the fighting ceases, but in the long-term tasks we face.

The basic assumptions and beliefs of Western European culture have become incredible and intolerable. We are now seeing the emergence of the new concepts, the new beliefs and assumptions, that will give rise to the new climate of opinion in which our children and their children will live. These ideas and conceptions are largely scientific, but to become meaningful and really influential in our lives, they must be translated into the arts, whereby we can assimilate them into our thinking, acting, and feeling. Upon the novelists, the dramatists, the poets, the painters and sculptors, the architects and the musicians, rests the major responsibility for creating this new climate of opinion.

Most social scientists tend to think of social life as something given, a part of nature, a mysterious organization or mechanism, existing somewhere between earth and sky, operating by large-scale social forces, acting at a distance. This conception is a survival of the seventeenth-century Newtonian idea of a system in equilibrium through interplay of forces. It is no longer credible, at least as a view of human relations, nor is it useful except for verbalizations and arguments. In its place we may conceive of social order as that which is sought by a group of people who pattern their conduct, their beliefs and their feelings in accordance with their cultural traditions. Social order is not given; it must be achieved; and what people try to achieve is what they have experienced, especially through esthetic experiences, which give them awareness, feelings, hopes and beliefs. If we wish to achieve a social order dedicated to human values which will fulfill our aspirations and needs, we must first have those ideas and values formulated by the artists and then presented esthetically so they can be incorporated into our personalities, especially our feelings.

No one who remembers what happened to the artist under dictatorships will want to tell the artist what he should think, believe, and do. We can, however, express the hope that the artists will rise to this opportunity and do for our age what the artists have always done for their culture. (*End of Lawrence K. Frank's reply.*)

The three contributions to this chapter have something very positive to say about peace: It is not the absence of war. The sheer absence of war is a dull thing; it demands no resonant response. The enemies of all of humanity must be specified: ignorance, disease, exploitation, the fettering of science and technology for temporary local or national aggrandizement. The task of a universal human attack upon them must be dramatized, made vast and heroic through the message of all the arts; portrayed as one of the greatest of pioneering efforts, for such it is. And as pioneers in crisis cling to and support their comrades, so those who through the arts envision a truly heroic human society, must respond to one another across national boundaries, sharing the universal struggle to make this appeal so profound that the glamor of war will grow pale beside it.

This chapter can best be summarized in the words of Walter Nash, New Zealand Ambassador to the United States:

> We who have known the pioneer life in countries like America and New Zealand, know how fully the natural instincts of combat, excitement and comradeship can be satisfied in a struggle against the elements. We know that there is as much satisfaction to be found in such a contest as in any struggle against a human foe. Any man who has worked on — shall we say a great electric power scheme? — fighting nature under hard conditions, side by side with other men, and then one day has been able to look down on a mighty dam holding back the waters of a huge, new lake, with a great new Power House down below turning out current which will light homes and cities, drive the machines of factories and bring light and energy to countless parts of the country — any such man knows full well that peace, no less than war, can be crowded with exciting effort — with heroic achievement — effort and achievement, moreover, which bring no suffering and destruction in their train but a happier and better life for all mankind.[1]

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[1] Nash, Walter, *The People's Peace*, by Representatives of the United Nations, George W. Stewart, Inc., publisher, New York, 1943, pp. 157-158.

Part Four

WORLD ORDER
IS ATTAINABLE

22 | THE COSTS OF PEACE

TOWARD THE END of his autobiography, Lincoln Steffens tells of a morning meeting at the Versailles Peace Table, a meeting which was rumored among the inner circle of newspapermen gathered to witness the building of a treaty. Whether the story is authentic, he points out, is unimportant; the essence of the story rings completely true to the situation. The old Tiger had asked Wilson and Lloyd George if they really wished permanent peace. They assured him profoundly that they really did. He said in reply that permanent peace was definitely within reach. It would merely mean giving up a lot of things; and he proceeded to describe just what, by way of overseas investments of wealth, power and prestige, would have to be given up. The final outcome we know.

It has been commonly assumed that we have failed in the building of peace because of our ignorance or our blindness. Though this is partly true, we failed also because while we want this precious commodity, we shudder at the price. However terrible the human and material costs of war, we forget, as peace returns, that our day-by-day conduct may shape the conditions from which the inevitable return of war will come. The costs, the strains, the wear and tear which would have to be voluntarily assumed by the common run of Americans, if they were to buttress themselves securely against returning war, would be formidable; in comparable situations in world history I know of no generation of men that has ever had the resolution to go through with it. It may be worth while to sketch, as clearly as we may, the price that would have to be paid upon the conclusion of an armistice in order to give some fair guarantee that the conditions of peace could be solidly established.

Merely because they are most obvious, some of the economic costs should be listed first. Overseas investments will have to be chosen in terms of their tendency to cultivate good will and frictionless co-operation, not in terms of profits alone; and this means that

tariffs, long-term credit arrangements, and, above all, the steps to be taken if the overseas investment is threatened, will have to be adjusted as much in terms of the regional problems of the area in which the investment is made as in terms of the financial returns to the investor. If the investor balks at such a proposal on the ground that he is entitled to protection, the only possible answer is that his fellows are entitled to peaceful living. Fortunately public opinion has moved steadily in this direction, notably in the case of the interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine during the last forty years.

But it should be emphasized that it is not just the investor, the exporter, the holder of overseas patents, who is involved. All of those with whom he deals, and therefore ultimately the whole community, are involved in the insecurities and losses which will come if we cease to support the traditional slogan, "Trade follows the flag." The only guarantee that we would have that such investments would pay off would be the sort of guarantee which an Italian or a Swiss has that his investment in the United States will pay off; and if it be replied that our country is more stable than others, it can only be said that stability *may* come in consequence of the gradual, patient expansion of an American commercial empire, interwoven with the commercial empires of all other great states. There have been in the past many instances of business competition of this sort which have sustained, rather than interfered with international order. The competition with the nationals of other states need be no more bitter than competition with one's own co-nationals; and one *may*, under certain conditions, definitely progress toward world order through the expansion of markets, the division of labor, and the competitive stimulus which all these conditions entail. Nevertheless the *willingness to forego such opportunities for gain* is a measure of our determination upon peace, and through the education of public opinion and the implementation of political safeguards to see that trade *is* an instrument of peace, we shall be saying, eloquently enough, whether we are willing to pay the cost.

Except for this crudest and most obvious economic cost, all the major costs are psychological; and they are much more severe, much more difficult to bear, than the economic cost just described. First of

all comes the jolt to our habits as we confront the sharp shifts that have to be confronted in the way in which national decisions are made. One can notice in recent months the strain upon us in recognizing that Downing Street and the Kremlin must concur in, or must indeed in some cases over-ride purely national decisions. The strain on American morale in discovering that Cassino was not so easy to take, and that the conquest of the Japanese Pacific empire involved terrible losses, involved a shock, a strain, a mounting anxiety which will surely increase as we face the fact in the coming months and years that every step into internationalism involves similar costs. The old self-contained system of thinking, the conception of blue-ocean navies to protect us, the conception of national autonomy, brings the need to stop and remind ourselves that that was a world which has gone. We shall be like a man driving a new car with unaccustomed gadgets who does everything wrongly, who bumps and bruises himself, until he slowly and painfully learns where hands and feet should be. Even in 1919-20 we saw some of this wear and tear in trying to think out a new way, and we saw that the strain of the thing could not be supported by many, nor for long; it was easier to retreat.

The point which has just been made could be phrased in terms of the comforting value of inertia as compared with the strident violence of vigorous action along unaccustomed lines — the constant application of effort as the novel and difficult confronts us, where no safe precedents mark the way, as contrasted with the friendly familiarity of the old paths whose every turn we know. If only we could remember that these friendly turnings lead, a mile away, to the misunderstandings and the hostilities from which war arises.

The second psychological cost, greater than the first, is involved in the blow to our ego involved in ceasing to bask complacently in the sunshine of our magnificent independence and our supreme leadership rôle in the world. American egos have been nurtured for one hundred and fifty years upon the conception of rugged and resolute courage, pioneer vigor, unflinching fortitude in conquering the soil and the Indians, heroic dealing with British, Mexicans, and Spaniards, and with the Germans in the first World War — all of this profoundly reinforced by the vast national wealth and strength

which has come to us from our natural resources and our colossal industrial development. Americans are a proud people, not only by tradition but by nature of present material strength. It has been manifestly hard for us to face the fact in the last few years that the Russians are as hard, as tough, and as proud as we. They are considerably more numerous, and through a highly centralized economic and political control much more unified than we; they command a very large part of the Eurasian continent, and are in the process of developing an ever more dominating position in Central Europe, and perhaps also in the Near East and the Far East. This situation can be faced egocentrically, with a chip on one's shoulder; it can be faced timidly in the manner of pre-war isolationists; or it can be faced in terms of recognition of the fact that peace and order, a chance to develop our own cultural resources and our own way of living, is, from a point of view of patriotism, far more important than winning diplomatic and economic victories over the Soviet Union.

At the very time that such a psychologically difficult resolution is being achieved, we shall simultaneously have to reconcile ourselves to a comradeship with the British which runs very much against the American grain. From the time of the Revolution, every generation of American children has gloried in our independence of, and our superiority to, the British. The first World War left us with a sense of injured righteousness in that we had saved the British Empire but could not, without considerable fuss and compromise, collect our debt payments; and the post-war strife, in terms of trading and shipping, is manifestly starting again already. As we argued above, even the economic costs are considerable; but the psychological costs of accepting the challenged, insecure, back-to-the-wall British Empire as an equal comrade in our own proud plans for our economic empire involves a terrific sacrifice of personal and national pride.

But unfortunately this story also fails to round out the picture. Though Americans have complained for decades of the British rule in India, our own American domination of China has been going on in very much the same way in which British control of India developed during the eighteenth century, and that in spite of the fact that the moral climate of the nineteenth and twentieth cen-

turies has made such gradual inroads upon Chinese integrity harder and harder to justify at home. With a population three times that of our own country, the Chinese Republic is destined in very short order to become industrialized and modernized, and China simply will not accept much longer the little-brother rôle in which she has long been cast. The thing is aggravated by our smug assumption that people with skin color other than our own are basically incapable of industrialization and modernization. We have seen in Japan the furious bitterness of a people capable of learning from the West, but regarded by the West, in the days of Commodore Perry, as incapable of coming out of its dreary and dreamy Orientalism. We are in for an awakening as regards China. If we have not already hopelessly loaded the dice in favor of Fascism in China through our consistent unconcern for her common people and their terrible problems during these years, and our consistent playing into the hands of the wealthy, we may find in China the most powerful ally for democracy and for our own type of economic and political living — but not an ally willing to play second fiddle. Whether China develops as a democratic or a fascist state, to deal realistically with her will constitute perhaps the biggest ego jolt of all.

This leads on into a consideration of the types of strain imposed upon the individual American as he begins to realize, ever more deeply, that his superiority to people in other parts of the world derives in large measure from the fact that North America offered vast open country and incredible resources to those who came and took it. Most Americans still believe that there was something of magical and providential value in their own social institutions, their own Founding Fathers, their own written Constitution. They are bound ultimately to learn (as they began to learn during the first great depression) that English institutions were only moderately well adapted to North American conditions; that an enormous share of the natural resources of North America has been wasted in the process of westward expansion to the Pacific; that they have not yet even begun to solve the problem of grass-roots democratic control of a very highly centralized economic life and an equally highly centralized political life. They will have to rethink at the school and community level what it is that American greatness really

means, and upon what basis its continuation and expansion is possible.

It was the frontier spirit above all that provided such greatness; and unless new cultural, scientific, and political *frontiers* in the sense of new and better adapted institutions can be contrived, the pioneer spirit will give up the ghost in favor of more and more conservative and centralized economic and political leadership. A great deal of humility will be required to think through the first steps in recognition of the impossibility of winning further laurels by the ways of the past, and to struggle through to a discovery of the rôles which the American character might fulfill both in science and in the arts, which would win the just gratitude and applause of other nations. Other nations have generally ceased to applaud us for our outstanding political institutions, for they know that several nations, notably New Zealand, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, have more personal freedom and better organized political institutions than we; and while they admire our industrial production, they have learned in recent years how to copy and expand such industrial techniques. America must make the most of her pioneer spirit through her really astounding scientific potentialities, and must make the most of her literary and artistic renascence, if there is to be any compensation for the loss of her earlier basis for self-evaluation.

This shift in self-evaluation is as tough for a nation as for an individual. The musician who has lost a hand but who discovers that he can write great plays requires a long time to overcome his feeling of frustration and to realize that the writing of plays may be as worthy as the rendering of great music. Only by a re-evaluation of herself through forgetting her wealth, emphasizing her powers of creation, can America hope to fit into the new world order.

Accompanying this process of re-evaluation of the ego comes, of course, the problem of re-evaluation of one's individual self as being a white American of a particular State, town, social position, etc. As we have earlier pointed out, the problem of world tensions and the problem of race, religious, and class tensions at home are intimately interrelated. The tendency to find satisfaction in living by being "superior" to members of other races and classes is itself a habit which will gradually have to be given up if a dangerous

way of thinking and feeling in international matters is to be eliminated.

This is particularly important when the scapegoating issue comes up. For the frustrations and difficulties of life are characteristically handled by placing the blame, and if such placing the blame becomes gradually eliminated as a threat to peace and as a threat to the effectiveness of social living at home, one must discover completely *new and much more difficult ways* of handling one's frustrations. It is at this point that the absolutely imperative need of richer social satisfactions comes in. A less competitive and more richly satisfying form of community give-and-take, as it exists for example in the Swiss or Scandinavian community, cannot be won all at once; it will involve a series of very painful, difficult steps. For as one makes the transition one will cease to have the old comforts which the old safety-valve provided and will have to learn how to enjoy the new.

Another huge cost which we face is indicated by the loss of the old "safety" which we have had in *being led* in relation to foreign policy. The vast majority of Americans have been willing to be led for a few years at a time, because they were sure that the trend could always be changed. They have never done much thinking about *long-range* foreign policy. It has now become clear that a policy of very long range indeed is involved, and that the man in the White House is likely to make commitments which may affect one's children's children.[1] Giving up the sense of short-term safety is a hard thing; yet we shall have to give it up if we are to commit ourselves to a long-range plan. One may be reminded here of those young people who, not having *learned* the democratic satisfactions, preferred autocracy to democracy — they "wanted to be told" (cf. p. 314) — and of citizens who, in recent studies, have so often preferred a vigorous despotic type of leadership to which they could commit themselves and about which they did not have to think (p. 313 ff.). One of the great costs we face is that involved in giving up this easily achieved safety through strong and distant leadership.

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[1] Walter Lippmann strikes out petulantly for a continuity in foreign policy which can in fact come only when the political education of the American public is so far advanced that the President, the Senate, and foreign powers will know what it is that we are going to support (109a).

With this giving up of safety goes also the giving up of a certain easy confidence, or even apathy, which characterizes most American political living. Less than half of us even take the trouble to vote for President or for members of Congress, and in most states most of the time only about ten or fifteen per cent of us vote in the primaries. In how many primaries have you, gentle reader, voted since you have been of voting age? There has been a major split within every major and most minor parties — Republican, Democratic, Socialist, and American Labor Party — in recent years. Have you made your voice felt within the party structure?

But it is not just a question of voting. American political institutions are largely operated at the community and state level. Very few thoughtful Americans who want peace have paid any attention to the actual political machinery. It takes trouble, it is a nuisance to do so. Earlier in this book (p. 371) a case was reported in which most of the people of Massachusetts wanted a certain type of foreign policy, but working passively through the existing political machinery elected a person who had failed to identify himself with such a policy.

Over and above such obvious political costs — the time, the trouble and effort involved in revamping political machinery so that it will express our will in foreign as well as domestic matters — comes the initiative involved in writing to the newspapers, sending wires to congressmen, the President, and so on. A few such missives carry tremendous weight in Washington. A few hundred out of many tens of thousands of voters make their wishes explicit. The pressure groups who have a vested interest will always do so. The question is whether others will also pay the cost, take the trouble to counteract the vested interests in favor of a broader vision. Along with this vast task goes the job of political education, forums, discussion groups, broadcasts, the thousand and one aspects of political education which go on in the community.

All of these last points are really ways of saying that it is a great strain to grow up politically. Maturity is harder than childhood. Responsibility and realism involve terrific costs. They mean taking up a burden which one could easily avoid, thinking when one could easily follow, taking the chance of being wrong when one might so easily appear always right, incurring the opprobrium of being a

busybody. Indeed, the cost of being socially and politically mature is so great that few have been willing to pay it.

Unfortunately a summary of this chapter would say that the cost of peace lies in revamping pretty fundamentally most of one's ways of looking at oneself and one's community membership in the world, taking a great many ego wounds in the process, and coming out with no clear-cut alternative satisfactions except those which lie in the rather remote future. It is fair to say that we do not know whether these vast costs will be cheerfully borne.

23 | STEPS TOWARD WORLD WAR III

It will be easy to have our World War III, and the planning stages are already rather well along. It will, I think, only be necessary to implement the plans by seizing week-by-week opportunities to give semblance and body to the war-trend.

We can have our war if we only continue to make our abode upon the high moral plateau from which judgments are uttered in terms of blame; blaming is easier than understanding, anyway. We need only blame the American or British Tories for their imperialistic ambitions; we need only blame labor for its ever-present finger in the managerial pie; we need only blame the Kremlin for its brutal nationalism and grandiose plans for world domination; the German masses for following Hitler; the French for being disunited. If there is still more blame to go round, one could easily blame the bigotries of the Near East, and the lack of realism of the peoples of India and the Dutch East Indies, for their petty and obstinate pursuit of unrealistic goals. The atmosphere of righteous indignation is very satisfying; and there are such cogent and convincing grounds for being frustrated in the first place, and for turning one's frustration into moralistic channels in the second place, that we can surely make the foundations for world tension much more adequate during the next few years, especially while the internationalists are displaying their own pique in response to those who blame them.

If only education could be handled in a traditional way, war could also be assured; if only a safe and sane cultivation of the ancient glories of other years could be so expanded as to crowd out all troublesome modern discussions, all social science wranglings, the insipidities and vaguenesses of progressive education, the petty scientific standards which replace the great philosophical ideas upon which western civilization is based. Just as the child-centered school is being swept away through budget cuts, so high school

and college education may shortly be redeemed by offering to a relatively small number of academically brilliant individuals a serene and symmetrical pattern for looking upon the world through the eyes of Saint Thomas or indeed of Adam Smith. This would lead to a convenient ignoring of parallel educational trends in Germany, Japan and elsewhere, so that a proper respect for the state and for the great national traditions could be well integrated with a renewal of military drill, not merely of the body but of the mind.

Another perhaps easier way to war lies at hand if only the futility of killing gets deep enough under our skins. If once again people achieve the mood of 1919-20, the "never again" mood, declaring that they will never again fight for any cause, and, with a sense of personal righteousness, take oaths that they will never support their governments in *any* war which these governments may undertake, the soil will again be adequately prepared and fertilized for a countermovement in other lands, in the form of renewed aggression, a nationalistic break-through which, snowballing and juggernauting along, will give us a new Nazi movement in a new suit of clothes. If only the never-again ideology can get a grip on us or upon any large state which finds peace more precious than the other values which at times compete with it, peace will again be hugged to death, so that in fact we shall find that it is war that we embrace.

If only we can cultivate the moralistic manner of handling capital and labor disputes; if only we can put business men on the spot as personally guilty of the new, budding imperialisms; if only we can put individual workers or labor leaders on the spot as sowing the seeds of discontent, so as to confuse, as far as possible, the impersonal problems involved in the expansion of world trade in the postwar years; if only we can succeed in causing each new step in such expansion to be judged by the public in the heat of political intensity; if only we can carry the feverish temper of an election year into the post-war decisions as to foreign policy, the form of business arrangements with Britain and with the Soviet Union, we could be pretty sure of our World War III.

One thing we could, for example, easily do is to use the row over the Arabian oil pipelines as a sort of standard by which other economic and military proposals are to be gauged. A still better model

to follow would be the squabble over international airways. It would be helpful also to make it appear self-evident to the public, as it already has been to business, that cartels are a *British* idea, free enterprise an *American* idea, so that every step *toward* cartelization becomes, in our newspapers, a knuckling under to British Tories, while every step *away from* cartelization could be publicized in Britain as a surrender to the American big stick. The norms and patterns which need to be followed to produce Anglo-American tension are already clarified. There will, of course, be a good press for the further cheapening and wider distribution of the commodity. It would be helpful in the further dissemination of such ideas if there could be enough frustration at home during the immediate post-armistice days to make us believe the worst of our allies and to *put the blame* wherever it dissolves the sense of personal frustration. Most useful of all, we can put the blame far enough away from home, in Europe and in Asia. But we shall be able to put blame also upon political leaders in Washington, who take the side of these foreigners as against our own citizens — we have learned this art very well from the isolationist press over a long period. Having thus solved the blame problem, it would be possible for us to find comfort in the "so what?" attitude toward the rapid centralization of impersonal big business forces in our own country and, in particular, toward the fascist implications of such economic centralization.

In such a recipe the economic situation will provide such ingredients as these: A steady and rapid growth in great capital concentrations in Britain and America, leading to strangulation of small business and the frustration of labor and simultaneously to the growth of large farms and the frustration of the one-family farm. American and British corporations would work *together* as far as their impersonal drive for economic control is concerned, as against the schemes of small competitive businesses, but would work *apart* in so far as the great American enterprises would prefer for a while to get along with limited use of cartels, while the British, being up against the wall in their attempt to hold their economic position, would inevitably favor cartels at almost every juncture. Synchronously with this economic situation, provide that the newspapers play up the tensions between Britain and the United States

which appear at the political level in consequence of the economic background, thus weakening the Anglo-American front; at the same time, day in, day out, personalize and moralize the economic difficulties that are occurring, in such a way as to make it appear that certain individuals are at fault, notably agitators, labor leaders, malcontents; make it appear that the great capital concentrations represent free enterprise, and that labor, the small farm and the small business, who are protesting against their increasingly difficult positions, are un-American in their attacks upon free enterprise. In this way, create a sense that patriotism and national unity depend upon economic concentration and that only radicals and subversives are complaining. In the meantime the wedge driven between British and American policy will help to foment chaos in western Europe, Latin America, and China.

At the same time, the unity maintained by British and American policy as against the Soviet economic system can easily be played up as the normal, free expression of democracy as against autocracy. It can easily be made to appear that free enterprise and the Bill of Rights, all that we love in terms of initiative and independence, are threatened by the autocratic and bureaucratic system dominated by the Kremlin, and there can be just enough Anglo-American business unity against the Soviet Union to make for continuous conflict in developing the Chinese market, in the further industrialization of India and in our bids for trade in western Europe and in Latin America. In every land — for example, in France, in Italy, in Brazil — there will be those who side with the Anglo-American economic political system, those who side with the Soviet system. Fine discord, spread with a generous hand all over the earth, may in this way lead to three threats to the peace: first, a natural growth of Fascism wherever class conflict is more marked than is the means for its political resolution; second, the growth of pro-Ally and pro-Soviet factions, serving as local representatives of the great opposed forces of the world, so as to embroil the Anglo-American and the Soviet leaders in every local conflict; third, most important of all, an undiscriminating blanket suspicion of everything Russian, driving home constantly to the common man's mind the notion that our economic system is a natural and indissoluble aspect of our democratic institutions, and that any steps taken to combat monopoly constitute the Bolshevizing of American life.

In short, see to it that the nature of tension between Britain and the United States is misunderstood; see to it that the relation of the Anglo-American bloc to the Soviet system is misunderstood; take up as much newspaper space as possible in featuring tension, frustration, and the threat of belligerency; strengthen the NAM steps for the control of American education, to the end that it may be as nationalistic as possible; sabotage educational budgets and continue the attack upon the Federal Communications Commission, to the end that disquieting voices be heard less and less frequently on the radio. Germany, too, can easily be kept a trouble-spot if we wish. It would be relatively easy, in view of the historical background and the present trends, to make sure that Germany goes through approximately the same evolution which marked the years after the first World War, the confusions, the frustrations, the misery. The presence, on the other hand, of a large and well-trained group of warriors and of bureaucrats would make it relatively easy, while shaking off the Nazi swastika, to by-pass the intentions of the democracies, or even to connive with those Allied authorities of a more reactionary cast, to set up a nucleus in Germany for the rebuilding of the military framework.

No matter what steps are taken the next few years, these psychological seeds will sprout in from ten to twenty years, unless a continuous process of weeding them out goes on. Whether the tradition of Frederick the Great is particularly important in the matter seems to be a matter of difference of opinion. It could well be argued that *any* people going through what the German population will go through in this war would be so profoundly, so frantically miserable and frustrated that it will go through a fascist evolution unless the strongest possible steps are taken against it, both in the East and in the West. At this writing, the East, that is the Kremlin, seems more determined to prevent the renewal of fascism than does the West in the form of Downing Street and Capitol Hill.

As has been suggested at many points, particularly by Sir Norman Angell's contribution, there are some reasons to believe that Britain is the sorest spot of all. If instead of hurling threats at British Tories, one looks at the economic situation of Britain and of the Empire, one sees a clear, straight issue defined by history, economics, and logic; the Empire will have an extremely tough time hold-

ing its own against American competition on the one hand, limited purchasing power, notably in India, on the other, with terrific war and rehabilitation rebuilding costs to be met, and with no areas on the earth's surface ready for new colonization. With the relative or absolute loss of her mastery of shipping on the one hand, credit control on the other, the British Empire will be like a man of sixty trying to run a sprint against a man of twenty. The competition against America in our own hemisphere and against the Soviet system in Chinese, Indian, and other markets, will involve constant frustration and very possibly constant step-by-step regression. Without meaning any evil, things could very easily come to a pass in which renewed war with renewed American help would be literally the only step open to the British, if they are to survive economically.

The British public cannot of course see this objectively. It is too close to the core of life itself. They cannot, for example, see it any more clearly than our own public can see that there is now a complete divorce between its democratically intended political institutions and its actual and factual concentration of power through economic means in a few hands. The only possible escape is through the growth of understanding on the part of the plain man, understanding expressed through the educational work of the Labor Party and the Trades Union Council and the parallel development of the co-operative bonds with labor and liberal forces in small countries, notably in Europe, the gradual abandonment of an imperial, favored position, and the acceptance of a position of democratic leadership among Old World democratic states.

One of the most dependable of the war steps available to us today consists in cracking down upon people whose frustration makes them troublesome. If only in achieving the good old traditional free enterprise system (properly spiced with vast monopolies), enough economic chaos can be created all over the world, with enough free slugging and with enough broken teeth and bloody noses, the frustrated elements in one or more great cultural areas will go through exactly the same cycle that Germany went through during the twenties. It will then be a very fine moral question as to who constituted the aggressor. But any frustration anywhere will serve as well in getting things started. Enough unemployment

at home, enough short cuts in the way of upward tariff revision, and so on, enough interferences with the flow of world trade and of world-minded ideas, can rather easily provide the same general result.

A great deal for the war purpose could also be accomplished by a fine debate as to whether the peace which follows this war should be a "hard" or a "soft" peace. Cogent arguments have indicated that Germany should have been squashed flat after the first World War, so flat that she could never recover; let us do it now. At the same time, the upholders of the negative pointed out that the misery and suffering imposed on most Germans were such as to breed war, and consequently, that there should be a soft peace; let's go easy now. In this discussion it would be wise to ignore very systematically the question, "Soft — for whom? Hard — for whom?" Let us ignore the question of the German military tradition and of the Junker family system, also the question of the German general staff, the organization of the Gestapo, and the existing attitudes of these gentlemen as regards World War III. Germany must be thought of as a whole, as a single entity, good or bad, treated too soft or too hard, if World War III is to be successfully engineered.

This global method of thinking could of course be effectively applied to the same end in relation to other countries, notably Britain and China. Moreover the term "red" should be used interchangeably for an American Communist, an American liberal, a Soviet Union leader, and a rank and file Russian, regardless of his political ideas or interests, just as the headlines of today are so conveniently teaching us to do. The essence of the art is to teach people to think in terms of simple labor-saving clichés. Frustration at home, clichés for people abroad, these two items together will go quite far toward achieving the result.

If, of course, more systematic planning is desired, it would be possible to take up, step by step, the whole theory of war causation, to show what might be done to make the local trouble-spots more troublesome still, how to withdraw money from the education and public-opinion studies which are now tending toward internationalism, how to organize business more "efficiently" in the authoritarian sense of the term, so as to make workers into interchangeable parts and to squeeze the human element out of the entire

economic process. Perhaps these things, however, should be left to the imagination.

The recipe for World War III is actually not a difficult one to write. Most of it is indeed already written. We faithfully followed most of what was written twenty-five years ago and got our World War II, and we have learned in the process how to write the recipe more accurately and more fatally still. We have said nothing at all here about the ways in which the great statesmen or diplomats should conduct their high affairs in their secret conclaves. Indeed, it is hardly necessary to say anything about them or to them. If the few elementary steps described here are taken, the tensions, anxieties, and sufferings of mankind can lead, through fury and desperation, to an upheaval which their political sagacity can do little or nothing to quell.

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STEPS IN A CONTINUING PROGRAM TOWARD WORLD ORDER

WHEN WAR AS A THREAT, and peace as an objective, are envisaged in human behavior terms, a research program is directly suggested, and an action program based upon it. This program can be seen taking shape today; in this program many groups of citizens have a part.

First and most obviously, social psychology will become the study not only of local conflicts and adjustments, but of national and international strains and dangers; techniques of organization; forms of co-operation. Social and political psychology will become a psychology of social order and social control, as these relate to the larger as well as to the smaller social units. We have swallowed our bitter pill in attempting to interpret the large from the small, in attempting to see world problems as expressions of the miniature problems of person-to-person conflict, isolated from a larger context. Through the agony of these years we have learned something about the problems which confront an *international social psychology*.

This last phrase is advisedly used with a double meaning. For the time has come (with all our talk of frames of reference and cultural relativity) to grasp that social psychology cannot safely be approached from the sole vantage-point of any one group; it cannot be the property or nostrum of any clique, group, or nation. Social psychology will have to become as international as physics. This means immediately getting books and journals to China and the Soviet Union and Germany, getting exchange fellowships and teachers, getting funds for laboratory, statistical, or field surveys, wherever they can be used; these become top items on any sane priority list. The internationalization of social psychology means the internationalization of the research task of war prevention.

DEMOCRACY IN ACTION

But, as we have seen at many points in the book, these things cannot be effectively shared if we remain at the verbal level. The social psychology of child and youth groups and of the educational process must include a sharing of experiences in group living, of democratic leadership, and of the tools from the workshop in which grass-roots democracy has been learned. Social psychology must be fused with the work of those who administer such functions. Many an individual man or woman in the army, navy, Red Cross, UNRRA, or in business or government service, may do a better job in such democratization than we psychologists can. There will be no place for stuffy provincialism, nor for the enhancement of our vested interests. The program of social psychology works in and through the hands of all who work toward a dissemination of a sound, living understanding of the meanings of democracy. In the next few years effective contact with group workers, and with educators at all levels, will have to be worked out, to the end that Americans, whether at home or abroad, will learn to take notes and make interpretations of the democratic successes or failures which they confront here and abroad. Instead of learning from the newspapers that "Fascism threatens us" from one European trouble-spot, we shall learn to watch fascist implications in the daily living patterns of peoples all over the world, shall learn to observe the techniques of social control by which despots prepare to crush budding democracies, shall learn to report, through every organ that will carry the story, the nature of psychological trends as they exist in the people with whom rehabilitation, on the one hand, commerce on the other, is being carried on.

In every government and business enterprise, there will be some in the field who understand these matters and are eager to watch for deeper meanings. Indeed if we teach our social psychology well enough, functionally enough, there will be in every working crew — in government, business, education, public health — those who began to understand this lesson when as college students they first encountered social psychology. But it will not be enough to think of social psychology at the level of *college* education only; the social studies in the high schools must be leavened, and adult education

must be imbued with the same spirit. Whether it is called social psychology is of small moment, and whether there are jobs for social psychologists in the process is of slight importance. The way of thinking is what counts, and it is our responsibility to start that way of thinking on its way.

But fortunately the task is going to be made much easier for us through the fact that our public-opinion techniques have won vast prestige and are everywhere accepted by government and business as sound and important clues to public and private policy. Social psychology, in the modern sense, includes basic and thorough training in public opinion, its origins, its forms, its measurement. There will be public-opinion analysts capable of working with everything from the free interview to the Hollerith coding procedure, and with everything from conversation-sampling to exact counts of responses to specific propaganda appeals. These public-opinion-trained people will find themselves in the world's affairs, in China, in Arabia, in South Africa, in the East Indies. As they carry on the professional business of public-opinion study, or, as amateurs, carry on such studies as an avocation parallel to their main business or government tasks, they will help to funnel in to all the research centers of the world a stream of definite knowledge as to the opinion trends from which world order or world chaos may stem. If there be trouble-spots, the new generation of public-opinion analysts will know how to spot them, and to describe them so that they will be meaningful to those with an over-all view of the world picture.

The same groups who serve to democratize can serve to analyze democratic or authoritarian drifts in the tide of opinion. The same people who work passionately for the democratization of education and of community living can be those who most sensitively respond to the opinion trends about them and to the hopes and the threats which daily events bring. Again, as the basis of world loyalties slowly shifts, so that a passion for the richness of one's own national culture is integrated with a passion for a world order which will preserve that culture in peaceful unity with other cultures, it will be the local opinion analyst and educator — frequently the same person — who will be sensitized to understand the shift and to work constructively with it.

RESEARCH CENTERS

We have referred to great *research centers* which will funnel and interpret local trends. Clearly an institute or a group of institutes of intercultural studies needs to be set up in each of the great cultural units. Even without foundation or government support, a headquarters or a clearinghouse of this sort could serve to pattern and give vitality to current local studies all over the world. The directors of each such institute would expressly agree on the ultimate scientific objectives of such an organization, and when threatened by political or other forces, would make it clear that they are in the first instance scientists, and stand ready to resign rather than suppress or dilute what they have to say as scientists regarding threats to world understanding.

Any scheme such as we have devised is of course utopian. It requires a certain amount of kicking around and licking into shape, free-for-all criticism, and tentative application in practice. If the trend toward international co-operation in science continues — and without it peace is profoundly threatened — there is every reason why it should continue in the social sciences as well as in the physical sciences, and every reason why it should continue in psychology as well as sociology, economics, political science, or history. The American Association for the Advancement of Science is at this writing planning a discussion of world collaboration in science. It has been known for some time that British scientists are thinking in the same direction, and through the war the scientists of the various United Nations have learned to work together in a way which may augur well for an ultimate solidarity of scientific objectives. When once psychology is organized in this fashion, through the development of more frequent international congresses, through the exchange of journals and research fellows and professors, through the dissemination of research skills, and through dissemination of funds where needed to found laboratories or libraries in lands not as favorably situated as our own, there will be an abundant opportunity to correct local biases and errors in the light of broader social experience. Each national group of psychologists may note important problems which are being studied in other lands, and each group may in its own characteristic genius define

problems which as yet are not clearly seen in other cultural areas.

Especially important for the health of such a scientific enterprise is the technique of making *specific predictions* as to the trends likely to follow in each area, just as the opinion analyst puts himself on his mettle by making long-range predictions as to the attitude trends of the area in which he specializes. The acid test of prediction announced in published articles can lead to the discovery of the constant errors of the individual psychologist or of the university group which stands behind the prediction, and the constant errors of the whole cultural group from which the research studies spring. Constant errors of American psychologists in predicting American public opinion, as well as in predicting British public opinion, have been clear enough to justify the belief that we can, through patient study, discover the basis of our own inaccuracies and, like the marksman who always fires to the right of the bull's-eye, learn through analysis of our mistakes the *nature of those psychological principles which we have overlooked* and of those autistic biases which have unduly governed our perception.

A continuing program of this sort, year by year, can undoubtedly integrate in some respects with Federal scientific enterprises, such as those administered by the National Research Council.

But the task is not primarily a government task. The government has never had a *research program.* It has used research which lay at hand, or it has at times ordered specific pieces done; but it has never felt that it could set up, as the Dupont or General Electric organizations do, a permanent and vigorous research department. Here and there the voter is willing to see government funds spent on doing research. One might mention, for example, the animal-breeding experiments in the Bureau of Animal Husbandry, or experiments in nutrition, in agriculture, and in forestry. Indeed, for very good economic reasons the Department of Agriculture is by far the largest such research center. The State Department does not, in any serious sense, do research on the prevention of war. Nevertheless, it is to be hoped that some of the war-time activities of the State Department, of the various international economic bureaus, and of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs may possibly establish in Washington — or in the public mind — the notion that serious large-scale research on international affairs is the gov-

ernment's *obligation*. A framework of research started now within the academic institutions could achieve much in its own right and would, in time, stand a reasonable chance of enlisting more government support and co-operation.

In the meantime, psychological research will be guided chiefly by university psychologists and by clinical and field workers, collaborating with government whenever possible, and seeking foundation support for certain of the more ambitious projects. There is a very large rôle for private and for university research and thought; and where the group-work and public-opinion phases of the task reach down into community living, it is very important that the enterprise be freed of bureaucratic control and become a distinctive expression of a need recognized by common men and women. This is one enterprise, indeed, in which collaboration will be required all the way from the technically specialized to the plainest people.

An analogy here with the organization of education is worth while. Educational research is fostered by the graduate faculties of Teachers' Colleges, and by various societies for educational research, but valuable research is also done by both graduate and undergraduate students in education and, when wisely supervised, is also feasible in the hands of elementary school teachers, and through parent-teacher associations. Several instances have been noted in the last couple of years in which teachers in the elementary schools or in nursery schools have gathered vital, important data which have a direct relation to our understanding of the educational process. The first steps usually have to be taken at the top, since time is so short and the need so great. But in a continuing program which is to succeed, one of the most important provisions is to make clear that there will be not only a horizontal extension of the program to include every cultural and political unit in the world, but also a vertical extension so as to provide collaboration of all who are really interested in world democracy, and who believe that trying to *understand* democracy, and to make clear how it works, is an essential step in vitalizing and in communicating the democratic way.

APPLICATION OF THE FINDINGS

Suppose now that all the various types of research mentioned throughout this volume which throw light on human nature and enduring peace become established, with increasing personnel and with more and more solid and substantial results, *by what specific means* will the new methods and results be made available to Government and people; by what devices will the results be turned over to the opinion-makers, the writers of books, the news analysts, the political and economic leaders; by what devices will the public ultimately become research conscious, aware that there are more and more pertinent materials which bear on international conduct, which measure the temper of world opinion, which indicate the course of educational policy here and elsewhere, which show the individual citizen more and more clearly the prospects of world order for himself and for his children?

As answers to such questions as these are formulated, an *action program* demands to be born. As these facts are reached we are pushed into *implementation,* driven to redefine our course as citizens and to see more clearly the necessary rôle of our Federal Government. The research, if solidly and clearly reported, should go far toward indicating the *direction* which we as citizens should strive to take.

There remains, however, a peculiar difficulty. As shown by data earlier reported by Dr. Bruner, the choice of leaders, and of critical policies to be defended by national parties, depends inevitably upon domestic issues. Foreign policy, except under the threat of war, cannot be the chief determiner of the political line established by parties or their leaders. A man may be elected as senator by seventy-five per cent of the voters of his state, though his foreign policy be repudiated by eighty-five per cent of them. Even in the choice of a Chief Executive, the same sort of disparity may exist. Is there anything which can be done to give foreign policy a more and more important place in American politics as American thinking moves more and more away from isolationist trends, and as Americans become citizens of the world in a more and more realistic sense? Can anything be done to accelerate the process by which our more enlightened understanding of the basis of peace, our

more enlightened ideas on foreign policy, influence the conduct of our national affairs?

To be very specific, suppose that we stand some danger in 1948 of enacting a Smoot-Hawley tariff ("hog-the-earth" tariff) which, through our sheer lack of public intelligence, did as much as any other single factor to precipitate the chaos, the violence, and the rise of the war-makers which marked the early thirties. There will be reasons in *domestic* policy why many might favor such a tariff; but many citizens have moved permanently into a position recognizing that world peace is more important than immediate profit. The critical question arises whether our concern for world order is matched by any *practical device for* getting foreign policy *into a more central place in our political life.* It should be stressed that this will not happen automatically as a result of sheer internationalist thinking; it will happen only if the citizen discovers a device by which the new internationalism of our thought can be turned into action in Washington. Reader, we pass this question to you: *Psychology and the social sciences can do what we have described in the preceding chapter; but the problem of implementing the findings, developing national policy, is yours.*

A NOTE ON INSECURITY

A QUESTION ANSWERED BY

Ralph K. White

As THE EDITOR looked back over the assembled materials which have now been presented to the reader, he felt that there were certain recurring themes which constantly reappeared in the discussion of widely varying topics — certain motifs which showed a common psychological quality presented by almost all who think about the psychological problem of enduring peace. These recurring motifs point consistently toward the rôle of fear, especially fear among one group of nationals of what another group of nationals may do; fear appearing also at the level of statecraft, the rationalized and "reasonable" fears of those who guide the ships of state. It was felt imperative to cull together the many observations dealing with this theme of insecurity. Because of his great help in guiding my thought along these lines, I turned here to Dr. Ralph K. White, of Cornell University, with the problem,

In what way does the insecurity of modern man make him a victim of war?

Dr. White's Reply

A number of the contributions to this book have brought out the factor of insecurity (fear, anxiety, "expectation of violence," struggle for national power to ensure national survival, etc.). For instance, Quincy Wright says (p. 231), "War springs fundamentally out of rivalries for power," and, as a deeper explanation of the present intensity of the international struggle for power, "*Security*, under the conditions stated (i.e., international anarchy) depends . . . on relative power." Norman Angell (p. 147) interprets British imperialism (which many persons believe to be a factor in the background of the present war, and a potential factor in further wars) in similar terms: "The impulse behind British imperialism is not, as so many in America seem to assume, a mere function of monopoly

capitalism. Its roots lie much more in *a deep impulse to national survival.*" Leuba (p. 87) presents evidence indicating that the Germans' power policy is related to a deeply rooted belief that they live in a world where *"the weak are crushed and the strong survive."* (Italics ours, in all three cases.)

This emphasis on anxiety or insecurity as even more fundamental than "the struggle for gain, power, and prestige," and as a chief basis for that struggle, could be buttressed by an extensive array of specifically psychological evidence. For instance, there is the testimony of Freud, Horney and others as to the central rôle of anxiety in the neuroses of our culture and our time. This is not the place for even a summary of that evidence, but it may be worth while to suggest two of the implications which might follow *if* our primary emphasis is on the fear motive in international relations:

(1) *The element of realism in the fear of aggression, and in the nationalist's reliance upon military power to achieve security, should be fully taken into account in any organization for peace or education for peace.*

As Quincy Wright put it, security "under the conditions stated" (i.e., the present international anarchy) *does* depend on relative national power. If the struggle for national power is to be mitigated, then, is it not essential to change "the conditions stated" and provide an alternative basis for security? And is it not psychologically as well as militarily essential that this alternative basis should include preponderant military power that is safely in "one's own" hands — i.e., in the hands of a world organization with which the individual is identified, or, failing that, in the hands of a group of firmly allied "peace-loving nations" — in order to allay the deep and primitive anxieties which now exist? Even if it were wholly unrealistic (which it is not), is not this anxiety a thing which imperatively calls for tangible reassurance?

Angell suggests a similar constructive value of realistic fear when he says (p. 145) that "the best hope for a close co-operation between the English-speaking nations . . . will be found . . . in a vivid realization of mutual need for the deepest, the most vital of all national purposes: national survival." It is suggested by Saenger's evidence (p. 385) that in the United States there has been a "complete reversal on attitudes toward international co-operation during the

last five years" — attributable, apparently, to the emotional shock and the increase of realistic fear resulting from the fall of France, the Battle of Britain, and the attack on Pearl Harbor. Lewin has often spoken of the need for realistic fear as a factor in fighting-morale; he has pointed, for instance, to the fact that British war morale (defined as strength of motivation) went up, not down, after Dunkirk. Might not the same thing be true of the motivation of those who are working for a hard-headed internationalism; and might not a psychologically oriented program of education for peace, in America, deliberately try to keep alive this sort of realistic fear?

(2) *At the same time, the element of unrealistic, undiscriminating fear and suspicion of foreigners as such, which is characteristic of nationalist psychology everywhere today, is the central obstacle which a psychiatrically oriented education for peace must overcome if "peace-loving nations" are to remain firmly allied, or give up some aspects of sovereignty to a world organization.*

If, for instance, an Anglo-American bloc fails to work harmoniously with a Soviet bloc throughout the coming decades, the chief disruptive factor seems likely to be an unrealistic, exaggerated fear and suspicion on one side or on both. As Harcave puts it (p. 161): "The Soviet Union will continue to strive first of all to secure conditions permitting the peaceful development of its own way of life," but (p. 163) "Soviet suspicion of the world, a condition of twenty-six years' standing, is decreasing, but still exists." Thus the Soviet Union, like Britain, France, and America, is actuated in its foreign policy primarily by a need for security, which is tied up, rightly or wrongly, with fear and suspicion of all of the capitalist world, and which may therefore (although Harcave does not say this) result in a desire to increase its own military power relative to that of the capitalist world. The possibilities of a conflict for power, possibly in central Europe or in China, are obvious. This is not the place for an assessment of the relative amount of realism in Soviet fear of the capitalist world and in capitalist fear of the Soviet Union. What does seem appropriate and necessary here is to re-emphasize the central importance of unrealistic, undiscriminating anxiety as an educational, a psychiatric, and perhaps ultimately an economic and a cultural problem.

This raises, but does not answer, the extremely complex question of how to make our fears more realistic. The contributors to this book are apparently unanimous in favoring a type of education designed to eliminate unrealistic nationalistic fear and suspicion. How this is to be done without the sentimentality which is mentioned by Carr and Likert (p. 259) — and at the same time without arousing the opposition of a nationalistic public or of powerful groups which (let us say) have an exaggerated suspicion of the Soviet Union or of the capitalist world — is not so clearly answered in these pages. There is little discussion, for instance, of the complex unconscious factors which may be involved, and which a merely intellectual educational approach might fail to overcome. Nor is there much discussion of groups (here or in the Soviet Union) whose self-interest might consciously or unconsciously lead them to exaggerate the foreign danger.

It is here, in my opinion, that discussion and research ought to be concentrated if we are really to come to grips with the most stubborn obstacles to peace.

THIS BOOK is one expression of the conviction that psychologists can contribute to world order by pooling their training and experience in the formulation of principles which must be reckoned with if peace is to be won.

But there are other such expressions. During the summer of 1944, a group of psychologists addressed to their colleagues — nearly four thousand psychologists scattered throughout the United States — a statement and an appeal in the following form:

July 31, 1944

To American Psychologists:

We have been told by competent advisers that the enclosed "Statement," if signed by a large number of psychologists and if released at the proper time, might have considerable influence on public (and even official) opinion. At the very least it would serve an educational purpose in leading people to think about the conditions essential for a sound peace.

Our plan is to release the Statement at the AAAS and APA meetings in September. Under no circumstances should it be circulated or published prior to that time.

It is not intended as an official statement by any psychological organization, but rather as an expression of the views of a large number of individual American psychologists.

If you are willing to endorse the Statement, please sign and mail the enclosed postal card *at once*.

We recognize that this Statement may not exactly reflect your views on every point; probably there are some items included that you would like to modify or omit, and some omitted that you would like to include. We hope, however, that you will waive minor differences and endorse the Statement as one with which, in general, you agree.

Although it will not be practicable to make any significant alterations in the Statement, your comments on it will be welcomed, whether or not you are willing to lend your name to it as it stands.

G. W. Allport   M. A. May
R. S. Crutchfield   O. H. Mowrer
H. B. English   G. Murphy
E. Heidbreder   C. C. Pratt
E. R. Hilgard   W. S. Taylor
O. Klineberg   E. C. Tolman
R. Likert

HUMAN NATURE AND THE PEACE

A STATEMENT BY PSYCHOLOGISTS

Humanity's demand for lasting peace leads us as students of human nature to assert ten pertinent and basic principles which should be considered in planning the peace. Neglect of them may breed new wars, no matter how well-intentioned our political leaders may be.

1. *War can be avoided: War is not born in men; it is built into men.*

   No race, nation, or social group is inevitably warlike. The frustrations and conflicting interests which lie at the root of aggressive wars can be reduced and redirected by social engineering. Men can realize their ambitions within the framework of human co-operation and can direct their aggressions against those natural obstacles that thwart them in the attainment of their goals.

2. *In planning for permanent peace, the coming generation should be the primary focus of attention.*

   Children are plastic; they will readily accept symbols of unity and an international way of thinking in which imperialism, prejudice, insecurity, and ignorance are minimized. In appealing to older people, chief stress should be laid upon economic, political, and educational plans that are appropriate to a *new* generation, for older people, as a rule, desire above all else, better conditions and opportunities for their children.

3. *Racial, national, and group hatreds can, to a considerable degree, be controlled.*

   Through education and experience people can learn that their prejudiced ideas about the English, the Russians, the Japanese, Catholics, Jews, Negroes, are misleading or altogether false. They can learn that members of one racial, national, or cultural group are basically similar to those of other groups, and have similar problems,

hopes, aspirations, and needs. Prejudice is a matter of attitudes, and attitudes are to a considerable extent a matter of training and information.

4. *Condescension toward "inferior" groups destroys our chances for a lasting peace.*

The white man must be freed of his concept of the "white man's burden." The English-speaking peoples are only a tenth of the world's population; those of white skin only a third. The great dark-skinned populations of Asia and Africa, which are already moving toward a greater independence in their own affairs, hold the ultimate key to a stable peace. The time has come for a more equal participation of all branches of the human family in a plan for collective security.

5. *Liberated and enemy peoples must participate in planning their own destiny.*

Complete outside authority imposed on liberated and enemy peoples without any participation by them will not be accepted and will lead only to further disruptions of the peace. The common people of all countries must not only feel that their political and economic future holds genuine hope for themselves and for their children, but must also feel that they themselves have the responsibility for its achievement.

6. *The confusion of defeated people will call for clarity and consistency in the application of rewards and punishments.*

Reconstruction will not be possible so long as the German and Japanese people are confused as to their status. A clear-cut and easily understood definition of war-guilt is essential. Consistent severity toward those who are judged guilty, and consistent official friendliness toward democratic elements, is a necessary policy.

7. *If properly administered, relief and rehabilitation can lead to self-reliance and co-operation; if improperly, to resentment and hatred.*

Unless liberated people (and enemy people) are given an opportunity to work in a self-respecting manner for the food and relief they receive, they are likely to harbor bitterness and resentment, since our bounty will be regarded by them as unearned charity, dollar imperialism, or bribery. No people can long tolerate such injuries to self-respect.

8. *The root-desires of the common people of all lands are the safest guide to framing a peace.*

Disrespect for the common man is characteristic of fascism and of all forms of tyranny. The man in the street does not claim to under-

stand the complexities of economics and politics, but he is clear as to the general directions in which he wishes to progress. His will can be studied (by adaptations of the public-opinion poll). His expressed aspirations should even now be a major guide to policy.

9. *The trend of human relationships is toward ever wider units of collective security.*

From the caveman to the twentieth century, human beings have formed larger and larger working and living groups. Families merged into clans, clans into states, and states into nations. The United States are not forty-eight threats to each other's safety; they work together. At the present moment the majority of our people regard the time as ripe for regional and world organization, and believe that the initiative should be taken by the United States of America.

10. *Commitments* now *may prevent post-war apathy and reaction.*

Unless binding commitments are made and initial steps taken now, people may have a tendency after the war to turn away from international problems and to become preoccupied once again with narrower interests. This regression to a new post-war provincialism would breed the conditions for a new world war. Now is the time to prevent this backward step, and to assert through binding action that increased unity among the people of the world is the goal we intend to attain.

The response of the psychologists was altogether overwhelming. Of those replying, ninety-nine per cent concurred in and signed the statement. And while in peacetime no questionnaire distributed through the mails can expect to receive replies from fifty per cent of those addressed, replies were received from about sixty per cent of the psychologists addressed. Minor comments and suggestions were received from ninety-two individuals. The text of the manifesto certainly being short of the ideal, the document represents nevertheless the most definite consensus of opinion on a psychological problem which has ever been achieved in relation to any issue at any time.

A number of those who sent out the original call were among those who have labored with me upon this volume, so it is to be expected that the contents of the volume and the contents of the manifesto should have much in common. It will then, I think, be profitable to show how the various paragraphs of the manifesto serve as summaries of materials presented by our contributors.

Statement number 1 in the manifesto recapitulates the findings about human nature, aggression, and war sketched by the editor in the first five chapters, and the facts about the inculcation of the war spirit in children defined in Chapters 8, 9, and 13. In particular, the discussion of aggressiveness presented by Dr. Duvall in Chapter 13, and the discussion of the rôle of democracy in obliterating the drive to war, as contained in Chapter 17, support the statement that war is not the outcome of a simple biological disposition, but a very complex institutional response; it is frequently a response to mutual suspicions and to the general sense of *insecurity* (p. 450).

Statement number 2 follows in some degree from the discussion of the extreme modifiability of childhood given in Chapters 1 to 3; it follows likewise from the studies of youthful plasticity in Chapters 16, 17, and 21. The effort at a completely new type of world-minded education must be implemented, as shown in Chapter 21, by positive rather than negative definitions of educational goals; not the absence of war, but a positive world plan attacking the colossal problems of the century is the only thing which can make genuine contact with the temperament of youth.

As regards statements 3 and 4, much material in Chapters 3 and 8 above has shown the flexibility and modifiability of group hatreds, and Chapters 16 and 17 have documented in detail the modifications, through education and community experience, of the tendencies to the formation of racial, national, and group hatreds. Education cannot really do its job unless mutual suspicions are dispelled through understanding. Education for peace must include education designed to eliminate unrealistic fear and suspicion of foreigners.

In reference to statement number 5, Chapters 8, 9, and 10 are replete with instances of the frustrations and animosities which come from the failure to treat national groups as mature participants in their own destiny, just as the experience of our armed forces in Italy, and then in France, has shown how much more can be achieved by allowing indigenous democratic forces to fight for freedom than by attempting to control their expression. The re-education of Germany must include convincing demonstration of how Hitler lied *to Germans*, harmed *Germany* (p. 66); Germans must understand what fascism did to *them* (p. 229) and must will

to break its force forever; must be given a chance to build a Germany which will realize the best that Germany can contribute. And the same for the Japanese.

Statement number 6 is almost literally identical with Dr. Arnheim's statement on pp. 65-68 in Chapter 8.

Statement number 7 has come to us largely by observation of what has been happening in liberated areas in recent months; it is not extensively considered by any of our contributors, except in so far as the principle is suggested by the studies of the nature of democracy in Chapter 17.

In support of statement number 8, the introductory chapters, as well as Chapter 17, have sought to show that the elementary human wants can be satisfied not only as well as at present, but much better, if world security becomes a reality; that no root desires of humanity are effectively satisfied by war. Moreover, Chapter 20 has undertaken to document in detail the conception of a peace based upon a systematic and thorough study of public opinion — articulate and inarticulate — over the face of the globe. For a long time control of incendiary communications, through press and radio especially, may be a prerequisite; we cannot afford to drift in a philosophy of laissez-faire with respect to communications. Here, however, the case can be documented as in Chapter 17, and in Chapter 3, to show that inflammatory intergroup communications tend to die out under conditions of democratic living.

Statement number 9 is based in the first instance upon historical evidence; its support lies in the trend throughout the modern period toward the formation of larger and larger, more and more homogeneous political, economic, educational, scientific, and technological units. "The world is contracting" in so far as such organization proceeds; and there can be no doubt that present steps toward world order will support and be supported by the cultural and scientific integration which has marked the last few centuries. But there is also abundant *psychological evidence*, especially in Chapters 3, 4, and 5; in those chapters the evidence is sketched to show that small units do not feel safe, that isolation breeds suspicion and fear; and that "the struggle for power derives much of its intensity (in a chaotic and dangerous world) from the tie-up of power with security." The trend toward world integration may take the

form of efforts at world *conquest*; or, with a broader view of human democratic potentialities, the form of a world society accepting cultural diversity (pp. 244-247).

Statement number 10 follows from Dr. Sanford's discussion, in Chapter 14, of the grave danger of renewed apathy and reaction if we allow ourselves to drift; and from Dr. MacIver's and Dr. Wright's pleas for world order now, in Chapter 15; also from Dr. Saenger's data in Chapter 20, showing our present readiness for world commitments. *Dumbarton Oaks* is not enough. The psychological foundations of enduring peace are perilously insecure. *The time for their rebuilding is now.*

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