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
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
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## Hungary and Roumania.

When considering the conditions of Hungary with regard to the nationalities, we must not take as guide the conditions of other states with regard to the same, not even those of the late Monarchy. In Austria the development of the whole historical life of the nationalities, and consequently also their constitutional and political position, was quite different. The Czechs, before they had been defeated at the White Mountain, possessed a totally independent and autonomous state existence, the effect of which could be felt in the autonomy of the Czech state even in the days of their greatest denationalisation. The position of the Poles was a similar one. And the Italians, Dalmatians and Slovenes, in consequence of their autonomy developed on a historical basis, lived under quite different political conditions from the nationalities of Hungary.

The constant attitude of the Hungarian nation and government towards the nationalities of Hungary since 1867 can only be rightly judged if we examine its whole previous historical development.

This examination makes it clear that in Hungary the nationalities — the Roumanians, Servians, Ruthenians, etc. — have, till the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, lived a quite simple life without any pronounced political tendencies, having in fact no policy but that of the Hungarians. It proves further also that the nationalistic movements and political tendencies, developed since the second decade of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, however violent and

clamorous they may have been, have never shown any irredentist features — until quite recently; not even during revolutionary periods when, especially in 1849, the Habsburg's power was much shaken.

Lastly we may refer also to the fact that the Hungarian nation and Government have never declined to satisfy the political demands of the nationalities so far as they could be made to harmonise with the integrity of the Hungarian State and its independence to Austria.

That an agreement between the Hungarian government and the nationalities, and a mutual understanding could not be effected to such an extent as it would have been desirable for both parties, was caused in each instance by external influences, or was the result of that influence which the peculiar internal political condition of the Habsburg Monarchy had, at certain periods, on the attitude of the nationalities of Hungary.

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The standpoint taken by the Hungarian nation in face of the political demands of the nationalities of Hungary on occasion of their first being formulated as a political program, was first of all elucidated by Louis Kossuth in his speech delivered held on Aug. 26<sup>th</sup> 1848, with the aim of considering the demands of the nationalities.

Kossuth was inclined to grant everything readily that secures the free nationalistic, linguistic, and cultural development of the single nationalities equally in the sphere of their ecclesiastical and educational as well as in that of their communal and municipal life, not admitting however that the nationalities should organize themselves and form political units in the Monarchy according to territories, because this would lead to the dismemberment of the Hungarian State.

This was the spirit in which article XXI of the bill "on the guarantees of the rights

of the Roumanian nation on the basis of civil equality", was prepared. This bill however on account of subsequent stormy events could not be made law. But the majority of the political leaders of Roumania at that time adhered to the demand that Transylvania should in the future remain a separate autonomous province on the basis of an equality of rights enjoyed by the Roumanian nation together with the Hungarian, Székely and Saxon nations.

Later, when the conflict between the Hungarian nation and the dynasty entered on its final stage, they again tried to enforce their own separate demands not, this time, within the frame of the Hungarian State, but in that of the whole Monarchy.

Some of the Roumanian nationalist leaders did not approve the above mentioned standpoint of the politicians directed by Siaguna, but intended to attain the satisfaction of the Roumanian nationalist demands within the frame of the Hungarian State, and therefore in the interest of the agreement, they continued the negotiations with Louis Kossuth even during the War of Independence in the years of 1848/49.

Thus the Roumanian nationalist party broke into two parts as early as 1848/49, and in the relation of the Hungarian government and the Roumanian nationalist parties to each other, this dualism of the Roumanian nationalist party deserves a more careful consideration for the reason that the possibility or impossibility of an understanding and a peaceful agreement between the Hungarians and Roumanians was pending on the question *which of the two directions should become the leading one?*

After the downfall of Austrian absolutism (1861), inaugurated when the Hungarian War of Independence had tragically failed, the Hungarian Parliament of 1861 sent out a Commission of 27 members, to prepare a law for "distinctly regulating the na-



tional rights of the non-Magyar population of the country with regard to their language, their national development, and their public administration."

The proposition was prepared and together with a proposal of the national minority, having a decidedly radical tendency, it was placed before the House on the 1<sup>st</sup> of August in the same year. The opinion of the national minority was the same as in 1848, namely, that the nationalities should have separate autonomy on the territory of their language and thus the country should be transformed into a national confederation.

After this the Emperor dissolved Parliament and from this fact the nationalities formulated the conclusion that they need not make friends with the Magyars, since they would get more from Vienna than the Magyars could give.

The dissolution of Parliament was the first step towards the realisation of the plans of Schmerling, Austrian State-minister, who desired to reorganise the Austrian Empire on a federal basis, excluding all idea of the historical unity of the countries subject to the Hungarian Crown, dismembering these countries in order to break the resistance of the Hungarian nation — refusing to renounce their political independence — against all efforts of centralisation carried on by Vienna and having for final aim the germanisation of Hungary.

This attempt was, as regards Hungary proper, nothing but a theoretical one, but in Transylvania it came within a certain distance of realisation. The Emperor convoked to Nagyszeben the Provincial Diet for the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1863. The Magyars adopting an attitude of passive resistance, did not take part in this Diet whose convocation was anti-constitutional, but the Saxon and Roumanian deputies began their work. The first law contained the regulation of the equality of the Roumanian nation with the other (Magyar and German) nations, the second regulated the use of the official lan-



guages (Hungarian, German and Roumanian). The Diet began also to prepare the reorganisation of the juridical and municipal administration of the provinces on the basis of the equality of the nations. Political equality was not the real aim, however; the object for which they strove was to secure illegal advantages for the Roumanians and Saxons. Briefly, the autonomical and federative organisation of the Transylvanian nations became almost an accomplished fact.

However, this federistic organisation of Schmerling failed and consequently the Emperor dissolved the Nagyszeben Diet, but the question of nationalities remained an equally important one in the Transylvanian Diet of 1865 as in the common Parliament of 1865—68 in Pest. The latter accepted the standpoint of 1861 and was ready to give the nationalities everything required by their own interest and by the common interest of the country, in consequence of which the Nationality Act of 1868 (LXIV) was passed.

The proposition of the Radical-Nationalist minority, true to their traditions, made a stand for territorial autonomy. They wished to organise the Hungarian State on a system of nationalist cantons, copied from Switzerland. The difference between the law of 1868 (LXIV) and the proposition of the national minorities was that this law secured for each individual citizen the right to make use of his mother tongue, whilst the proposition of the minorities relied on the natural rights of the individual belonging to a political nation living on an independent and separately administered territory.

A year after this law was made on the 8<sup>th</sup> of May 1869, the Roumanians of Transylvania held a meeting at Szerdahely and declared their intention of remaining passive, and not taking part in the work of the Hungarian Parliament. This decision of the Roumanians had two motives. The first

was of a political character and originated from Roumania.

Bismarck was already laying his plans for a war against France, and as it might be expected that the Monarchy had not yet given up a "revanche pour Sadowa", turned towards the young Hohenzollern, who was on the throne of Roumania, in order to keep the Monarchy engaged, and gave the Roumanian statesmen the council to look to St. Petersburg for political information.

The Bucarest politicians came to the conclusion that Bismarck had in view a veritable alliance with Russia against the Monarchy, and began a most furious agitation in the newspapers, as well as in public meetings, against the Monarchy and especially against Dualism. It was this agitation that gave the impulse to the Transylvanians for the Szerdahely declaration.

The second motive of the Roumanians was based on the political movements then going on in Austria.

The Emperor entrusted Count Hohenwarth on 4<sup>th</sup> of Feb. to form a ministry with the object of satisfying the nationalities by reorganising the Austrian State on a federal basis, expecting a similar transformation to take place in Hungary. Inasmuch as this federation in the Transleithan part of the Monarchy would have been followed by the downfall of the dualistic system, Count Andrassy and Beust defeated Hohenwarth's policy. But by showing that even in the highest circles Dualism between the two states was not considered to be permanent, and consequently the transformation of the Monarchy on a federative system was not quite excluded, the attempt at federation gave a new impulse to the Hungarian nationalities.

The occupation of Bosnia after the 1876—78 Russo-Serb-Roumanian and Turkish war created a new situation in foreign politics, and had a great effect on the behaviour of the Nationalities of Hungary towards the Hungarian State.

The court and military circles of Vienna found it desirable to possess the two provinces for constituting, within the limits of the Monarchy, a united Catholic and Southslav State of a Croatian character, so as to have a starting point on the road downwards to Salonika. The Hungarians opposed this program of establishing a Southslav State, which strengthened all federalistic tendencies within the monarchy and had an effect upon the nationalist movement in Hungary itself. What Hohenwarth did not succeed in establishing in the year 1871 on a Czech basis they now hoped to attain on a Southslav basis.

Roumania having taken part in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877—78 received its independence as reward, by decision of the Berlin congress, and the idea of independence filled the Roumanian politicians with daring thoughts and far-reaching aspirations. This effect became noticeable among the Roumanians of Hungary, too. On the 12<sup>th</sup> of May 1881 a meeting was held at Nagyszeben and the leaders of this meeting formulated a program for the "Roumanian National Party." In the first point they demanded the autonomy of Transylvania in accordance with the Act of Nagyszeben 1863, signed by His Majesty. Concerning Dualism they announced that the question, not being on the order of the day, would be treated on some other occasion when the federal transformation of the Monarchy became an acute question.

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It is evident that in the history of the national aspirations of the Roumanian nationality a considerable part was played by Roumania entering the Triple Alliance. The Liberal leader at that time, Demeter Sturdza, tried to use this circumstance as a legal basis for interfering in Vienna as intermediary on behalf of the Roumanians of Hungary, demanding the fulfilment of some of their wishes. To be enabled to make use of the Transyl-



vanian question as conveniently as possible for their own interest, the Roumanian Liberal Party established the Liga Culturala, and by doing so safeguarded themselves against being compromised in foreign affairs. By noisy and tactless behaviour and by constant endeavours to interfere, the Liga Culturala prevented the Roumanians and Hungarians coming to an understanding, for which several efforts were being made by the leading Hungarian politicians.

The most important step in the Roumanian national struggles and in the history of the development of internal politics was undoubtedly taken in 1884 by establishing the daily paper, the *Tribuna*. This newspaper represented the idea that among the Roumanians and Hungarians direct understanding was impossible, and that the Roumanians, being an independent element of the united Habsburg empire, had to ask the fulfilment of their wishes not from the Hungarian Government but from the Austrian emperor. It was due to the agitation of the *Tribuna* that the Roumanian National Party in 1887 held a meeting and passed by vote the resolution of summing up their demands and grievances in a memorandum and sending it, unknown to the Hungarian Government, to the Emperor of Austria. From that moment onwards the *Memorandum* affair was for ten years the centre of the Roumanian nationalist struggles.

There was a large party, however, composed chiefly of Roumanians living in Hungary proper, who, under the leadership of Alexander Mocsonyi, declared that the Roumanians could not expect the fulfilment of their just demands either from the intervention of Roumania, or by means of an energetic step on the part of the dynasty, but only by means of a settlement with the Hungarian nation. This he declared to be only possible if the Roumanians acknowledged Dualism and the independence of the Hungarian State. According



to the ideas of this party the Hungarians would be ready to fulfil Roumanian demands as soon as it was proved that the Roumanians truly acknowledge the independence of Hungary from Austria.

The fight between these two Roumanian parties concerning the *Memorandum* lasted ten years and finished with the fall of Mocsonyi and his party. Nevertheless, even later on, frequent attempts were made to arrive at the understanding so much desired.

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Since the hostile attitude of the Roumanian nationalistic party continued even after the nationality law was enacted and loyally executed, serious misgivings arose in Hungarian public opinion and gradually more energetic means of defence were called for and severer measures, not intended however as retaliation, except in serious cases bordering on sedition.

The general opinion was that it would be possible to stop, or at least neutralise, the destructive forces at work by developing the political, administrative, economic and cultural institutions of the country, but it was only in the eighties of last century that this action began to be carried out in a systematic manner owing to a change in the attitude of the nationalities caused by the interior and exterior political situation of the Monarchy after the war of 1876/78 between Russia, Servia, Roumania and Turkey.

The Roumanian nationalistic politicians and especially the Roumanian nationalist press always accused these purely defensive measures of being attempts to magyarize all nationalities, especially the Roumanians, and to crush the existence of these nationalities and their language. It was especially their habit to accompany with commentaries all laws and ordinances concerning public instruction and to emphasize the allegation that these were most cruel and brutal attempts at magyarization.

In reality these laws and regulations never contained less, and frequently more, than what is conceded to the nationalities in the fifth Section of the Austrian Treaty of Peace (*Protection des Minorités*) in article 68 where we find the words „*Cette stipulation n'empêchera pas le gouvernement autrichien de rendre obligatoire l'enseignement de la langue allemande dans les dites écoles*“.

According to the Hungarian laws the teaching of the Hungarian language was only required besides others, and measures were taken that this should be accomplished as far as possible.

That the Hungarian school-laws, against which so many accusations were brought forward and such a noise was made in the international press, did not deprive the Roumanian school-children of the possibility of learning in their own language (conformable to the Austrian Treaty of Peace § 1.) is clearly shown by the statistical figures for 1912, according to which there existed then in Hungary 2301 elementary schools in which Roumanian was the language of instruction.

Comparing this number with that of the elementary schools in Roumania, we find that the seven million Roumanians of the kingdom possessed at that time but 4453 elementary schools, whereas, to keep up the ratio existing between elementary schools and the total Roumanian population of Transylvania, there ought then to have existed in Roumania 5369 schools. This single fact shows that the Roumanians of Transylvania were better provided with elementary schools than the Roumanians living in the Kingdom.

Besides this the paragraph quoted from the Austrian Treaty of Peace assures the teaching of the minorities' languages only in the elementary schools, while the Hungarian school laws, in accordance with the Nationality Act of 1868, declare that not only the churches, but even private persons have the right to maintain schools and that

those who maintain them have the right to decide what shall be the general language of instruction in that school. Apart from all this, the Hungarian Government helped the churches and the schools of the different nationalities with subsidies amounting annually to several millions, without being obliged to do so by any international agreement. An American, Professor Dorsey, wrote in December 1910, in a letter to the Chicago Tribune treating of the Slovak nationalist movements, that in the eyes of Slovak political leaders nothing the Hungarians did was right. They liked to represent the progress of the Slovak people as due solely to their own efforts, carried on in the face of Hungarian persecution and oppression. "They are afraid of losing this feeling of being persecuted, knowing they would then have no cause to continue their nationalist policy".

The Hungarian election laws were exposed to still more vehement attacks on the part of the nationalities than the school laws. According to these accusations it was impossible to remedy the causes of the Roumanian complaints within the limits drawn by the constitution, for the Nationality Act was just made to protect the political supremacy of the feeble Hungarian majority, and conventional methods used at elections prevented the different nationalities from coming into the House of Commons in such force as would have answered to their number, their economic strength and their national and political importance.

If, however, we analyse this law and consider at the same time the political economic and cultural importance of the nationalities, we find that it was not the nature of the law but their own political weakness that prevented the nationalities from exercising such political influence as their leaders wished.

Among the million of electors 57% were Magyars, only 3% more than their relative num-



ber (54%) in the total population. This small percentage was surely never capable of assuring for the Magyars the supremacy over the nationalities. The nationalist leaders say this result was obtained by an artificial grouping of the constituencies, but the truth is that only in 229 of the 413 constituencies, that is to say in 55%, were the Magyars in majority. So the percentage of Magyar constituencies is 20% smaller than the proportion of electors.

It was also a grievance and the source of many accusations on the part of the nationalities, that the electoral laws were partly based on the taxes paid. Here the truth is that this was in most cases a decided disadvantage for the Magyars, for the absolute size of the property that served as basis for these calculations was not everywhere identical.

Some examples will illustrate this. In the Slovak territory, in the counties Árva and Liptó, anyone could be elector who paid K 0.68 income tax, while in the purely Hungarian county of Csanád the right of suffrage depended on the payment of more than K 0.68. In the mountainous districts of county Bihar, inhabited by Roumanians, suffrage depended on an income tax of K 0.92, whereas on the flat and mostly Magyar parts of this territory the minimum of tax required was K 30.

The dualistic form of government established in 1867 did not satisfy the majority of the Magyar element, as for instance the smaller landowners of the middle class, the peasantry and the poorer town citizens, who thus formed a Hungarian democratic element, that adhered to the program of Louis Kossuth. They found Dualism to be a very meagre counterweight for renouncing personal union between the two states, that seeming more apt to ensure their national freedom and the independence of their country.



If, on whatever map showing the outcome of a parliamentary election, we cover those parts where deputies belonging to the Hungarian Independent Party were elected with the same colour we use for marking the Hungarians on an ethnographic map, we shall find that the two maps are as like as two peas. On the other hand, the members of the Government party = adherents of Dualism — were elected, with few exceptions, in the nationality districts. So these maps are a good illustration of the fact that the Hungarian element from 1867 till our days was, within the limits made possible by the constitution, artificially kept down to the profit of Austria and the ruling family, by help of the constituencies inhabited by non-Magyar nationalities. The Government was forced to recur to such measures, for, if the majority in Parliament had demanded the personal union of Austria and Hungary it would have met with a decided refusal on the part of Austria and the ruling family and it would have been impossible to settle this conflict in a constitutional manner. Such a situation did actually come about in 1904. It was in consequence of this awkward situation<sup>1</sup> that the realisation of the political desires of the Magyar part of the population had to be prevented as far as possible and this circumstance, and not the desire of magyarization was the reason why powerful influences were sometimes brought to bear on the elections. Sometimes the Government had even to resort to illegal means to assure a strong governmental party that would make a stand for the dual monarchy and thus avoid further complications.

On account of these reasons abuses on a much

<sup>1</sup> We have said «awkward situation». It is proved such by the fact that it excluded certain political tendencies, supported by the majority of Hungarians, being realised in a *constitutional* manner.

greater scale occurred during elections on the Magyar than on the non-Magyar territory, for it was on the former that the tendencies which might lead to a personal union made themselves strongly felt. In face of the veto of Austria and the dynasty the electoral abuses were a sort of safety valve, for without these the nation would again have been brought to the verge of revolution. We must establish the fact that the electoral abuses in question were not committed unilaterally against the nationalist party.

Parallel with the development of the Roumanian nationalistic movement as sketched above, efforts were continued on the part of the Roumanians to effect a reconciliation with the Magyars.

A condition of this reconciliation from the point of view of the Magyars was, that the Roumanian national party should give up its passive attitude and participate in political life, for this only would lead to an effective reconciliation. After a proposal made to this effect by M. Aurelius Vlád, one of the political leaders of the Roumanians, at a sitting of the Roumanian National committee, when, however, the measure was not carried, in 1905 the Roumanian National party declared that it would try to attain its political aims by constitutional means and that it would again take up activity. Nationalist candidates were nominated in the different constituencies but at the following elections only eight gained a seat in the House of Commons.

Previous to the elections in May 1906 some Roumanian nationalist leaders had a confidential *pour-parler* with the head of the cabinet, M. Wekerle about, the Roumanian and Magyar reconciliation, and on this occasion the Roumanians expressed the wish that, anterior to the election, Government should agree with them and formulate a contract concerning those constituencies which it was ready to pass over to them without electoral contest.

Governmental circles considered the Roumanians ought to conclude this contract not with the central governmental authorities but with those of the counties. The latter were, however, not willing to give up the field without a struggle and in the ensuing electoral campaign the Roumanians gained but 14 seats.

This result is a good illustration of the fact that the electors of Roumanian nationality were in general not disposed to accept the program of the Roumanian National party.

After Wekerle and the Coalition Cabinet retired in 1910 and Count Khuen-Héderváry had been nominated Prime Minister, the Roumanian leaders again took up the connection. This time there was talk not only of an understanding regarding the elections but of the Roumanians and Hungarians finally coming to terms.

The Roumanians again demanded the handing over of a certain number of electoral districts where their candidates should be elected without opposition and they went as far as to name the districts, but since it happened that not one of them was of such a nature that the election of an Opposition candidate had to be feared, but on the contrary all were constituencies where the election of a Governmental candidate seemed pretty certain, Khuen-Héderváry, who was in this election preparing for a strong fight for the upholding of Dualism, refused the request.

Negotiations of this sort continued after the elections, first through the mediation of Basil Mangra, the late Greek Catholic metropolitan, with Count Tisza, the leader of the National Labour party then in office, but these also were unsuccessful, for differences arose between the older, moderate, and younger, more radical, faction of the Roumanian Nationalist party. The radical faction, which, at the past elections, had not gained a single seat in the House, accused the moderate one of



not working for national but for party purposes, and these, again, accused the former that the negotiations passing through Mangra's hands were not likely to safeguard Roumanian political interest, but those of Tisza's nationalist policy.

In reality the agreement was frustrated by the intrigues of the Liberals of Roumania who feared that if an agreement were formed, the "Transylvanian question" would cease to exist, and so one of the means of coming into power would be lost. The dissolution of the Roumanian national party would not have suited them for other reasons either, therefore M. Constantine Stere was despatched to Nagyszeben in the quality of intermediary and succeeded in restoring peace between the two factions.

Roumania's participation in the Balkan war and her diplomatic success at the Peace of Bucarest raised her self-confidence to a great degree and made general the conviction that the time was near when the Austro-Hungarian problem would have to be solved.

It was under such circumstances that in 1913 Count Tisza began again to gather up the threads of negotiation with the Roumanian politicians, dropped since 1910. At the beginning the Roumanian committee was in favour of making peace on the grounds of his propositions but later, in consequence of the agitation of Octavian Goga, it turned against his project. In this, however, the Crown Prince Francis Ferdinand and the Christian Socialist Party of Austria — supporters of the Crown Prince's policy — had a part, for a compromise was considered dangerous to federalism.

Another reason for the rejection of a peaceful settlement was the influence of Bucarest which, after the Balkan War, gained an ascendancy over the minds of the Roumanian nationalists who were more and more inclined to take directions from



Roumania. These instructions were, in the essential, as follows:

1. The Roumanian-party in Hungary keeps its eyes on the interests of the whole Roumanian race conjointly with those of Roumania.

2. It results from this that every endeavour to come to a political understanding with the Hungarians is perfectly useless.

3. It may be presupposed with certainty that if in the imminent European war Roumania takes part on the Russian side against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy she will be victorious and be enabled to attain the fulfilment of her national desires namely: Greater Roumania.

Of the members of the committee, Octavian Goga, who prevented the understanding with the Hungarians, had excellent connections in Bucarest, and so was quite well informed that a European war was on the point of breaking out and of the probable part that would to be taken by Roumania.

All this shows that in reality there never existed insuperable differences between the main ideas of Hungarian national and constitutional policy and the points of the Roumanian nationalist program, it further shows that from time to time efforts were made to come to an understanding and that even ample good-will was evinced on both sides, but at the same time it becomes evident that every reconciliation was frustrated first by Vienna, later — just before the war — by Bucarest influence. It is not true that, without these influences, a reconciliation would have been impossible.

The relations between the Hungarian Government and the nationalities, especially the Roumanians, can only be judged with justice if we consider that in the Habsburg monarchy the Hungarians could not dispose of absolute political freedom. They were constantly prevented from acting in a manner that would have best suited their desires or their political interests.

In the strife which Hungary has been involved in since the middle of the last century for maintaining her independence, or for being at least an equal factor in the Dual Monarchy, the Roumanians were always on the Austrian side. This alone was enough for the government and public opinion to distrust their claims. If that minority of Roumanians had come to power, which did not want to attain the fulfilment of Roumanian desires by the creation of a federal Monarchy but in accordance with the Hungarian element, the distrust on part of the Hungarians would have ceased. However, on the contrary, the Roumanian leaders always emphasized the fact that they did not reckon with the realisation of their desires by the King of Hungary but by the Austrian Emperor.

Besides this, in the last thirty years, the Bucarest influence led the Hungarians to distrust the Roumanians all the more. This influence arose in consequence of a literary and sentimental tendency declaring the homogeneous civilisation of all Roumanians between the Dnjester and the Tisza and the creation of a Greater Roumania to be the political ideal and desire of every educated Roumanian. Books were written, new daily papers were started and societies were founded in support of this ideal, so that the movement was not without effect on the official circles of Roumania. The uncertainty of the position greatly increased from the day when Roumania entered the Triple Alliance and when every party, on going into opposition, demanded that the Roumanian Government should appeal to the friendly bonds existing and to intercede in Vienna and Berlin in favour of the Roumanians, so that a pressure might be brought to bear on the Hungarians regarding the political wishes of the Roumanians.

These repeated, continuous and more and more energetic steps of the Roumanian government of course confirmed the suspicions of the Hungarians

that behind the so called national desires irridentism lay hidden and that the fulfilment of every nationalist desire would be but a step on the way to a complete separation from Hungary.

Everybody who wants to have a clear idea of the process going on between the Hungarians and Roumanians since 1867 must consider the important facts here enumerated.

We must, on the other hand, for truth's sake point out that irridentism was in Roumania only a literary movement, a sentiment of the educated classes and never a real political program, till the declaration of war in 1916.

By all responsible statesmen and politicians, on every occasion and all the time, irridentism was disapproved in the most decided manner and so it will prehaps always remain an unsolved problem how it happened that Roumania's declaration of war in the year 1916 was based on irredentism and the desire of new conquest.

### **Glances at declarations of loyalty made by the Roumanians of Hungary.**

All memoranda, political programs, manifestos, proclamations and so on which from time to time fixed the position of the Roumanian national party in Hungary, or contained some explanation of their point of view, always emphasized the loyalty of the Roumanians towards the dynasty and to the State in which they were living. They even went so far as to declare that they desired the accomplishment of their political wishes just to be able to work with all the greater enthusiasm for the prosperity of this country.

These declarations give ample proof that the nationalist leaders of the Roumanians in Hungary never thought of seceding from this State. They were the less inclined to do so as they were quite



capable of seeing the advantage of having their nationality recognised within the Hungarian State which provided its Roumanian subjects with institutions more democratic, an economic existence better and surer, and culture much higher than those of Roumania, inferior in all these respects to Hungary. The nationalist leaders never aspired to more than a certain autonomy within the state. We are justified in declaring that in spite of Roumania's military intervention, in spite of the Hungarian revolution, Bolshevism and the resolutions of the Peace Conference so advantageous to Roumania, it is a national autonomy and not annexation by Roumania that is desired by the masses of Roumanians of Hungary and even by the majority of the better classes, and they will never be able to tolerate the interference of Roumania in their affairs.

We will prove this by declarations made by themselves in regard to Roumania during the last half century and even during the war.

The *Memorandum* of the Roumanian Nationalists already mentioned, presented to the Sovereign in May 1892, emphasizes that: "The interest of the Monarchy, the interest of our country and the well-fare of the Hungarians demands that more cordial relations should be initiated between the different nationalities, so that they, trusting one another, might unite in common endeavour at the foot of the throne so as to strengthen the common fatherland and make it flourish."

"As the complaints of the Roumanians are not directed against the Hungarian state" says the pamphlet "Replica" published in 1892 by the Roumanian university students, "so the *Memorandum* itself was not directed against the state either. The Roumanian population of Transylvania and Hungary is well known for its loyalty and might be held up as a model for a law-abiding people. History contains not a single event in which the



Roumanians show lack of fidelity towards the throne or the state, whose supporters the Roumanians flatter themselves always to have been, just as the state has always granted them rights.

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At a congress held in August 1895 by different nationalities in Budapest the first point of the resolution passed was, that the allied Roumanians, Serbs, Slovaks etc. desire to maintain in every respect the territorial integrity of Hungary. When debating about the address to be delivered as answer to the address from the King at the opening of Parliament in 1906 the Roumanian nationalistic deputies, headed by Theodore Mihali, formulated their wishes in a special address and here, too, they emphasized, in accordance with their declaration of 1895, their adherence to the principle of territorial integrity and their desire to obtain the accomplishment of their national demands within the limits granted by the law and in accordance to the constitution of the country.

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The Roumanians of Hungary still adhered to this point of view when in 1914 the war broke out. On the day of mobilisation their youths thronged under the banner with the same enthusiasm as the Hungarians. In the different classes of society Roumanians were, from the beginning to the end of the war, just as ready for any sacrifice and bore the heavy trials with the same endurance as the Magyar population. Their leaders roused the enthusiasm of their compatriots in exactly the same manner as those of the Magyars. The admonitions delivered by the heads of the clergy of both Roumanian denominations were filled with the same fighting spirit as those of the Magyar bishops. In consequence of this the Roumanians of Hungary as, in general, all other nationalities

living in Hungary must, with few exceptions, bear the responsibilities concerning this war to the same extent as the Magyars.

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The following quotations will provide an interesting illustration of the above.

Mgr. Demetrius Radu, Greek Catholic bishop of Nagyvárad issued, at the outbreak of the war, an episcopal charge in which the following sentences are to be met with.

"Our apostolic King relies upon his people and we can answer this mark of confidence in no other manner than by being ready to obey his commands and to shed our blood at his bidding. This is the tradition we inherited from our forefathers, and with God's help we will hand it down unsullied to our children. This is the supreme command of the throne of our dear country and of the radiant crown of Saint Stephen. The sense of duty inspires our men who, when hearing the command, rush to arms and die fighting for their country. No danger whatever will be able to prevent us from defending this land where our forefathers rest. The example of our ancestors and the glorious past of many a century will induce the Roumanians to fight with their well known valour in response to the summons of their sovereign."

The Orthodox Greek bishop, Mgr. John Pap, requests his priests on August 7. 1914 "to read the proclamation of the King addressed to his people at the outbreak of the war in all the churches, to explain its contents and to show their flock that the war was inevitable and was undertaken for a rightful cause." The bishop is happy to remark that his whole flock obeyed the summons with promptitude and enthusiasm, and considers it the duty of the clergy to explain to the population that they must prove with deeds and not with words only

that the Roumanians of Hungary have always been loyal to the throne, so that their Lord and King Francis Joseph should be satisfied with them.

Mgr. Miron Christea, Orthodox Greek bishop of Karánsebes (since metropolitan of Nagy-Szeben), in his charge of August 8. 1914, declares the war against Serbia to be rightful and just and exhorts his flock to remain steady in their loyalty towards their country and their king. "We know — he continues — that the frontier of Serbia extends from Orsova to Pancsova along the Danube and that it therefore touches the bishopric of Karánsebes, and although the enemy does not even dream of putting his foot into our territory nevertheless we must be watchful. Our soldiery passing through the bishopric must be received with the utmost enthusiasm, for it is everybody's duty to help those in whose hands lies at present the fate of the country".

The Greek Catholic bishop of Szamosújvár, Mgr. Basil Hosszu, not only emitted an episcopal charge of similar contents but when, on August 14. 1914, the *hussar* regiment stationed in his residential town marched out to war he delivered a speech in which he said: "It is with a benediction I speed you on your way, a benediction which will, I hope, follow you on the road beset with danger, but filled also with glory. The war requires sacrifices for the country. Death for our country must be received with joy. With love we embrace you in this solemn moment, but remember that although we love you and wish you to return yet we are more ready to support the pain of eternal separation than to see you returning beaten and with shame. Go forward and ascend the steep path which leads to glory."

Not only Mgr. Hosszu but all the other Roumanian high priests seized every available occasion in those fateful days to raise the warlike spirit of their people and to induce them to give proofs of their patriotism and loyalty.



On Aug. 18, the birthday of the king, Bishop Miron Cristea gave a banquet, during which the Roumanian M. P. Constance Burdia (Government party) pointed out, in a toast, the necessity of the Roumanians and Magyars holding fast to each other. Upon this the Bishop replied that in this critical moment the Roumanian was standig by the Magyar like a brother and that this behaviour was not only in accordance with the sentiments, but also with the interests of the Roumanians. The downfall of the Monarchy would not only mean the downfall of the Roumanians of Hungary but of the whole Roumanian nation. Bishop Cristea asks his priests and the leading government officials to do their best to propagate and to augment patriotism and to encourage the friendship with the Hungarians and the loyalty towards the state, so that a better future might arise out of the present situation even as regards the nationalist question and the mutual sympathy between the different races inhabiting the country.

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Besides the chief Roumanian clergy the leaders of the Roumanian Nationalist Party also made similar declarations, and by so doing they proved that they also were ready to partake in the sacrifices and the responsibility of the war, which followed their solidarity with the Magyars.

On August 2, 1914, Theodore Mihali, the president of the Roumanian nationalist party issued, on behalf of his party, the following declaration.

"The youth of our country are called to the field of glory. As in the past, so surely also in the present, the Roumanian soldier will fulfil his duty to the glory of his race and in a manner worthy his fame. His Majesty, our aged Sovereign, and our fatherland will again receive proofs of the ancient loyalty of the Roumanians that live under the Habsburg rule and of their readiness for sacrifices. It is with enthusiasm that the Roumanian youth

have joined the colours to shed their blood on the battlefield. Those who have stayed at home are prepared for any endurance. It is with keenest interest and with the longing for a glorious and victorious result that we await the end of those historical events that are developing before our eyes and those which are yet to come“.

“Exceptional measures having been taken by Government and all public meetings having thus become impossible, the Roumanian nationalist party was prevented from holding a great meeting as was planned, and thus lacking the opportunity to deliver several speeches containing loyal declarations, the party addresses all Roumanians living on Hungarian territory by means of the newspaper press, and requests them to be even more ready in these dark days to fulfil their duty and perform any sacrifice, and exhorts them to be calm and put their trust in God.

“The Roumanian population — so runs this semi-official proclamation — has always shown its good commonsense, it is orderly, loyal, and steadfast. These are the traits of character that we inherited from our forefathers and these we must now show. We hope that our splendid and patriotic conduct, worthy of our nation and our Roumanian name, and the courage of our sons on the field of battle, will both enhance the value put upon the services hitherto rendered, so that the Roumanian nation will finally be enabled to come into possession of all those rights for which it struggled till now, and for which it will continue to struggle in a lawful manner and with all measures available within the constitution“.

Another leading member of the Roumanian nationalist party, M. Alexander Vajda, M. P. made at the same time the following declaration before a correspondent of the Bucarest paper, the *Adverul*.

“The Roumanians living in Hungary have joined the colours with the greatest enthusiasm, giving a proof of

their loyalty towards the ruling family and of their patriotism. In these fateful moments the population adheres to its old traditions. It is true that this is partly due to the behaviour of the nationalist party. The strife that was going on between Roumanians and Hungarians must be put aside till the common foe is vanquished and till the better future is assured. All nationalities must unite in love in face of the exterior foe for the sake of their country and their throne. The Roumanian people and their leaders are well aware of the danger that threatens, not only the dual Monarchy and the whole Roumanian nation, but even the whole civilisation of Europe, in case Russia were to win. In face of this danger the difference of political opinion between Roumanians and Hungarians dwindles to a harmless domestic quarrel. It would be tragic if, on account of the attitude of the Roumanian Kingdom, the Roumanians living under the Habsburg rule and those of the Kingdom should be forced in this decisive moment to face each other as enemies. Since we, Roumanians who are fighting for the dual Monarchy, represent half of the Roumanian nation, it becomes inadmissible that at this moment the Roumanian Kingdom should remain neutral or — worse than that — should attack the Monarchy and help Russia. If Roumania would act in conformity with the interest of all Roumanians, it will first of all help the Roumanians living in Bessarabia. The Roumanians inhabiting the Monarchy are strong enough to help themselves and to uphold their nationality. It is to be hoped that Roumania will consider the well known ingratitude of Russia and understand what are the measures required by the political interests of all Roumanians“.

At the same time M. Alexander Vajda published in the “Budapester Tageblatt“ the following lines:

“The line of conduct of the Roumanians of Hungary has proved that towards this most loyal



people a policy of confidence is the best. Our soldiers are joining the ranks with the greatest fervour and the *brave Roumanians*, as the Crown Prince, of sacred memory, once called them, will again fulfil their duty honourably and loyally.

The Roumanians are proving once again that they are a perennial source of energy for the dual Monarchy, upon which the Monarchy can always count. There never was a traitor among them and never will be“.

M. Basil Goldis, formerly M. P. and a leader of the nationalist party, at present head of religious affairs and education in the *Consiliul Dirigent* at Nagyszeben, made the following declaration on Nov. 14, 1914 in the daily paper *Romanul* appearing at Arad:

“We must declare that, even when fighting in lawful manner and with lawful weapons for the safeguarding of our nationality and for the possibility of unimpeded political and economic development, we nevertheless always keep in mind that there exist common interests between the Magyar and Roumanian people and we are fully aware of the great importance of the Roumanian people in the dual Monarchy. This is why the Roumanian nationalist party is convinced that it will not be difficult to lay open to the leading factors of the Monarchy the rightful and patriotic tendency of its nationalist program and so to settle the conflict existing ever since 1867, the commencement of the Constitutional Era, between the point of view of the Hungarian Government and the necessities of life of the Roumanians“.

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These patriotic proclamations of the leaders of the Roumanians are backed by the whole educated class. Every opportunity is seized for solemn declarations of loyalty, of patriotic feeling and of readiness to help.

Headed by the lawyer, Justinian Pop, the Roumanians of Déva appeared before the deputy-prefect of the county August 2, 1914, and on the part of the Roumanians of county Hunyad presented a declaration of loyalty, begging him to forward it to Government. This declaration contains a statement of eternal loyalty and patriotism. Stress is laid on the fact that now, in this most critical moment, all disputes arising from the constitutional struggle are put aside. All causes of disagreement are declared to have dissolved in the flame of patriotic enthusiasm. They all declare solemnly their readinness for the utmost sacrifices so as to promote by all means a victorious result, and to prove once more the fidelity of the Roumanian people towards the crown and the country. It is further on declared that the Roumanians of Hungary simply fulfil their duty when rising to defend Hungary's King and their common country. They desire to prove that they love their country just as much as the Hungarians. If anyone attempts to violate the territory of the country they will find themselves face to face with the Roumanians, ready to shed the last drop of their blood in her defence.

Basil Osvada, the director of a bank at Vajdahunyad, declared at the same time in a public speech that "the Roumanians conduct themselves with the greatest possible patriotism and loyalty in this war and are ready to shed their very last drop of blood for the common country".

The lawyer Victor Popu delivered a declaration bearing 42 signatures of the Roumanians living in that district to the chief magistrate of the hundred of Puj on the second of August, and the chief magistrate of the hundred was requested to "inform his superiors that the Roumanian educated classes in the district are absolutely decided to help the Roumanian population in fulfilling their duty towards their mother country and their King. Joyfully the Roumanians put their lives and their fortunes at the disposal of

their country, for at this moment but one wish fills the heart of every Roumanian, this being that the crown of St. Stephen should triumph over its foes<sup>•</sup>“.

In the county of Zilah, on the very same day, a deputation led by Alexander Sotie, Greek Catholic vicar, waited upon the Prefect of the county and brought to his knowledge that “in these days of supreme need the Roumanians of the county consider it their duty to declare their sympathy with the Hungarians and ask that the Government be solemnly informed of the fidelity of the Roumanians towards their ruler and of their readiness to sacrifice everything on the altar of their country. This is already proved by the readiness to take up arms.”

At the meeting of the General Assembly of county Temes of Oct. 14, 1914, the Prefect moved the proposition that the council should inform the Sovereign that its members not only adhere loyally to the Throne but are, without difference of nationality or denomination, ready to make the utmost moral and material sacrifices so as to insure a victorious ending of the war. After this proposal Aurelius Comsa, a leading member in the county of the Roumanian nationalist party, rose to speak and declared that when the common country was in danger, the unity existing between the different nationalities always increased. The enthusiasm with which the Roumanian youths in the hour of danger answered the summon to arms, rivalling in this with the other nationalities of the country, shows best their patriotism and readiness for all sacrifice. This occasion has again proved the Roumanians to be the very truest sons of the country and most loyal subjects of the dynasty.

On August 5, 1914 a deputation of Orthodox Greek priests and teachers led by Dean Daian (Greek Catholic) appeared before the royal commissioner at Kolozsvár and asked him to notify to the Government their declaration of loyalty. The speaker of the



deputation declared that the leaders of the Roumanian people of the county are not only doing their utmost to uphold the loyalty and the patriotism of their fellow countrymen but are all ready to sacrifice their lives for their country and their King.

At Gyulafehérvár also a deputation appeared before the prefect of the county and the leader Teculescu, a Greek Oriental dean of Roumanian nationality, asked that the prefect should inform the Government of their loyal feelings.

But not only the larger towns and the centres of counties or hundreds were scenes of patriotic demonstrations; such occurred in many out-of-the-way places where the Roumanians rivalled even the Hungarians in love of their country.

The Magyar, Roumanian and Saxon inhabitants of the village Teke (county Kolozs) arranged on July 31 a demonstration, in which the priests of all denominations represented read the Manifesto of the King to his people on the occasion of the war breaking out and, rousing by speeches the enthusiasm of the hearers, they declared it to be the duty of every one, without difference of nationality, to unite and to defend the throne and their common county. The same scene repeated itself a few days after at the meeting of the Roumanian Cultural League in the village Mócs.

Thus patriotism showed itself in an imposing manner all over the country where the Roumanians lived, thus proving that at the outbreak of the war enthusiasm seized the Roumanians just in the same manner as it did all the other nationalities living in Hungary.

The patriotic Roumanian press, especially the official gazette of the Roumanian national party, the *Romanul*, wrote in a similarly enthusiastic manner.

The Roumanian papers busied themselves with particular pleasure with recording the heroism of the troops of Roumanian nationality, aiming not

only to make it clear before the Roumanian people, that their sons fought with a heroism deserving every recognition, but also that their attitude was by far superior to that of the Hungarian soldiers fighting together with them and therefore, if the Monarchy's Army should come victoriously out of the war, the Roumanian soldier would have a much greater merit in it than the Hungarian soldier.

"Look — writes the *Romanul* in an article on the 28-th July 1914, entitled "Soldatul român" — how they rushed to their garrisons on the very day, when at dawn the drums brought the marching order of the Emperor. With what strong determination did they tear themselves from their wives, who clasped their arms around their necks. How gaily did they, by singing and dancing, shorten the road leading from their native villages, the road which led them into a foreign country poisoned by hate, where only cartridges awaited them. Who fears death? Nobody in the Roumanian villages knows of a single deserter".

The same paper on August 7<sup>th</sup>, in an article entitled "Ostasul Roman" gives a vivid account of the enthusiasm of Roumanian youths joining their colours. The article was inspired by a speech of Mgr. Radu, Greek Catholic bishop of Nagyvárad, delivered to the soldiers starting for the field of battle from that town.

In an article: "Vitejia românească" the *Romanul* mentions with pride the great appreciation of the Austrian-German and Hungarian papers show for the heroism of the troops of Roumanian nationality on the Galician front. In its number of the 26<sup>th</sup> of September it refers to the declaration of Roda Roda, the war correspondent of the "Neue Freie Presse", about the bravery of the Roumanian soldiers in the actions at Grodek and about the brotherly feelings existing between them and their Hungarian comrades. On the 8<sup>th</sup> October in an article entitled "Ostesul roman", it reproduces an

article of the "Pester Lloyd" which mentions the bravery of the soldiers of Roumanian nationality during the fight in Galicia.

The same *Romanul* repeats on the 14<sup>th</sup> September 1914 the following utterance of the regimental surgeon Czako (a Hungarian) who served in the Bruderman Army, about the behaviour of the soldiers of Roumanian nationality: "I saw the wonderful attacks of our Hussars and the rush of the Hungarian infantry, but what the Honvéd regiment of Déva, composed purely of men of Roumanian nationality, accomplished surpasses all efforts of imagination. I cannot describe it, for nobody would believe it. The officers could not keep them back. The *mócz* (mountaineers) rushed like tigers upon the enemy and destroyed them with their bayonets, with the butt end of their rifles or even with their bare hands. I could never have imagined men fighting with such enthusiasm and such valour."

In its issue of the 14<sup>th</sup> December, 1914 the *Romanul* publishes a letter from Major *George Flesariu* of the Austro-Hungarian Army, himself of Roumanian nationality, saying the following about the heroism of the Roumanians: „The well-known heroism of the Roumanians is insurpassable, I too am proud of it." In its issue of December 22 Major Barbini writes with great acknowledgement of the courage of the 33. Inf.-Rgmt. of Arad, composed of men of Roumanian nationality. In its number of the 31<sup>th</sup> December it publishes a declaration of the Archduke Frederick, Commander in Chief of the Austro-Hungarian Army, about the behaviour of the Inf.-Rgmt of Nagyszeben, whose men were nearly all Roumanians, at the battle of Prizdborg. "It was wonderful what the men of the 31. Rgmt. accomplished. According to the reports presented to me a single batallion of this Regiment, under the leadership of a lieutenant, took Prizdborg by storm."



In its issue of January 5, 1915, the *Romanul* reproduces a letter from a lawyer and officer of the reserve, published in the *Nagyváradi*, who writes, that the commanding general, an old Austrian soldier, had tears of joy in his eyes, when he saw the men of Roumanian nationality of the Militia-Rgmt. of Lugos attacking in Servia. An Austrian Lieutenant-Colonel said the following: "These militiamen are ideal soldiers. They have now been three days in service without grumbling, and make astounding marches."

Basil Goldis, at present head of the office for religious and educational affairs of the *Consiliul Dirigent* at Nagyszeben writes in the *Romanul* in its issue of January 7, 1915, under the heading of "Prin moarte la viata" (Through death to life) the following: "The hour of suffering has returned Roumanian youth, at the call of the Emperor, fling itself into the murderous fire. The blood, lost by traditional heroism, will save the Throne and the Country. The sacrifice graciously received by Heaven will save our Roumanian race also."

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But not only on the front did the Roumanians of Hungary take a great share in supporting their country; at home they did their best and, according to their pecuniary abilities, made every sacrifice in economic matters. The Roumanian press urged them to this financial sacrifice just as well as it urged them to fulfil their duty in the line of fire. At the time of the issue of the first War-loan the *Romanul* in its issue of November 7, 1914 under the heading "Bancile si imprumutul de răsboi" (The Banks and the War-loan) says: "The result of the subscription ought to be the thermometer of the public enthusiasm. We do not doubt, that they will soon perceive abroad the solidarity which unites every subject of this country in these hard times . . . We Roumanians

shall, according to our economic forces, fulfil our duty to such an extent as will astonish our compatriots“.

The same paper writes from Karánsebes that the readiness to subscribe the War-loan is great. The former “Bánsági vagyonszövetség” (Co-proprietors of the Banat), the bench of bishops of the Orthodox Greek Church, and private people subscribed fair amounts. The gymnasium at Karánsebes — mostly Roumanian youths, all children of poor labourers, collected 2000 crowns for the war-loan, those of the VIII class bought a share of the 100 Crowns Bonds, which they offered as a patriotic donation to their school. The Directors of the school bought war-loans for 8000 crowns out of the school-funds. The teachers subscribed separately.

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The Roumanians therefore behaved in everything just as the Hungarians or, with few exceptions, like every true son of his country. True, there were some exceptions who, contrary to the totality of the Roumanians, took a different view of the war. There were some amongst the leading men of the Roumanian national party, who fled to Roumania to take part in the agitations against the Monarchy. *Ladislas Lucaciu* and *Octavian Goga* belonged to these. But what the Roumanians themselves thought about these exceptions may be illustrated by the following quotation.

The *Liga Culturala* of Bukarest held an assembly on Dec. 29. 1914, where it was decided to change its name and the purposes it followed till that date. Up till now it fought only for the cultural union of the Roumanian race, henceforth it will fight for its political union. By this the *Liga Culturala* took its stand on the basis of irredentism, until then, repudiated, and subsequently it ranged itself among those social organisations which, since the outbreak of the World-war,

endeavoured to gain the public of Roumania for the idea of war against Austria-Hungary, and thus induce the Government of Roumania to declare war, and all this is in the interest of Greater Roumania, whose boundaries should extend to the river Tisza. To show that the Roumanians of Hungary were in accordance with them, they elected Ladislav Lucaciu and Octavian Goga as members of the Directing Committee on Jan 3. 1915. The official paper of the Roumanian national party, the "*Romanul*" informed the *Liga Culturala* as well as Lucaciu and Goga, of its view of the case, writing as follows:

"It was always the principle of the Roumanians of Hungary never to interfere in the affairs of Roumania, but they also expected that Roumania should not interfere with those of the Roumanians of Hungary. Whenever they tried to do this, they always brought trouble upon the aspirations of Hungary's Roumanians. Roumania may follow the foreign policy that suits her, she will be responsible for it, but it is our duty to inform our brothers of Roumania of our thoughts and feelings regarding the European conflagration, so that they may not be mistaken in their calculations about this matter. Regarding events in the *Liga culturala* we consider it our duty most earnestly to affirm that the Roumanians of Hungary will under all circumstances be faithful to their country and to the glorious dynasty of the Habsburgs".

"Faithful to the throne and country, hundreds of thousands of Roumanian soldiers have shed their blood with acknowledged heroism. This heroism and patriotic attitude is the only lode-star of the Roumanians of Hungary that can guide them and their leaders in their actions and principles. These bloody sacrifices show that it is their firm conviction, born of the national instinct of self-preservation, that the only real danger menacing their national existence is Slavism. If our



brothers of Roumania think otherwise, it is their affair. But it is not Lucaciu's or Goga's business to make politics for the Roumanians of Hungary. If they are desirous to take part in political actions and propaganda in Roumania they ought first to expatriate themselves and to declare that they will no more take official part in the politics of the Roumanians of Hungary. These must make their own politics, by themselves and at home, and if anyone wishes to direct them in whatever way, he must stand at the head of this people and be responsible for it and before them. The Committee of the Roumanian national party cannot represent any other policy than the totality of the Roumanians of Hungary are making, having profusely shed their blood for the throne and country. We are convinced that Messrs. Lucaciu and Goga have already found time to send in their resignations to the President of the Committee“.

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This stand-point was held by the Roumanians even when Roumania, to accomplish her national ideal, Greater Roumania, on the 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1916 declared war on the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, who had been her ally for 35 years.

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of September 1916 the Roumanian Orthodox Greek bishops, by name: *John Pap* of Arad, *Michael Christea* of Karánsebes and *Basil Mangra*, vicar of the bishopric of Nagyvárad, sent the following pastoral epistle to their respective congregations:

“To our great sorrow Roumania has not kept her promise of loyalty, has treacherously broken the seals of the Alliance and has seized arms against her brothers who have been fighting for two years with incredible heroism a fight for life and death against the enemies of the Monarchy. Those who cross our frontiers with cunning words on their lips and with the intention to rob in their hearts,

are not our brothers, but our most insidious enemies, who, to satisfy their savage greed, kill their children and parents. Yes, our brothers of yesterday are, because of their godless greed, to-day our greatest and most abominable enemies. The voice of blood and nature's law constrain us to mercilessly oppose them“.

*Demetrius Radu*, Greek Catholic Bishop of Nagyvárad, having received his invitation to the sitting of the Upper House too late to attend, sent on the 3<sup>rd</sup> of September 1916 the following telegram to the President of that assembly :

“I very much regret that having been absent from my residence it was only to-night I received the invitation to the session of the Upper House to-morrow, and the shortness of time makes my presence there impossible and prevents me from expressing, in the face of recent events causing us such deep sorrow, in my own name, in the name of my priests and the whole of my diocese in accordance to our patriotic feelings, our unalterable faith and devotion to the high Throne, the glorious Dynasty and the Holy Crown of Hungary“.

Two days later, on September 5. one of the leading men of the Roumanian national party in Hungary, Stephen C. Pop — at present Minister for Transylvania in the Government of Bucarest — made, in the name of the above mentioned party, and empowered by it, the following declaration of loyalty :

“It is with profound surprise we have heard that our neighbour Roumania has joined the ranks of our enemies. We are astonished, for we should never have thought it possible that Roumania should turn against the Monarchy, in which several millions of Roumanians live as loyal subjects enjoying the greatest prosperity under the rule of the glorious Habsburg Dynasty. We conceived it impossible that Roumania should ally herself with that Russian

Empire, which menaces mostly the existence of the Roumanian race, for just Roumania's history gives proof of Russia's ingratitude and perfidy for a thousand years.

"The Roumanian population of Hungary has for a thousand years worked in a brotherly manner together with the Magyars, to defend the country against every external enemy, and as everybody acknowledges in the present war also, the Roumanian soldiers by their bravery have given proof of their fidelity to the country and the throne.

"Those who stayed at home united with the Magyars in making every necessary sacrifice, so as to ensure the victory of the army. The loyalty of Hungary's Roumanian-speaking population and the love of its country never can be vanquished. Even the unexpected declaration of war on the part of the Roumanian Kingdom cannot alter this. Hungary's Roumanians will continue to defend their country and the apostolic throne against every attack, wherever it may come from.

"This I considered it my duty to declare, not as if it were possible for anyone within the Monarchy to doubt the fidelity of the Roumanians, but because I consider it necessary to make this fact clear to the minds of those in authority in foreign countries who seem to have supposed that in this new phase of the Great War, the loyalty of Hungary's Roumanians might waver for a moment. I beg the Honourable House to take due notice of this declaration".

In a Note presented to the President of the United States at the beginning of 1917, the Entente Powers declared the liberation of various nationalities living under a foreign yoke to be the aim of the war. This, however, the Roumanians living in Hungary interpreted as an interference in their own affairs and, far from agreeing, they presented to the Prime Minister a solemn



declaration, which they desired should be submitted to the Sovereign.

This declaration bears the signature of all the Roumanian bishops of both Greek denominations, dignitaries of the Greek Churches, archdeacons, canons and deans, professors, the most esteemed leaders of the Roumanian educated classes, etc. and besides these there figures also the name of Theodore Mihali, vice-president of the Roumanian nationalist party. Altogether a hundred and eighty of the most notable Roumanians signed this declaration.

"Since the Note addressed by the Allied States to the President of the United States — so runs this protest — mentions among the objects of the war the deliverance of some nationalities, the Roumanians among others, from a foreign rule, the Entente is working against the integrity of our country.

"We, the leaders and representatives of all Roumanians living in Hungary, in the name of our people, raise a solemn protest against being considered by anyone as living under a foreign yoke. We Roumanians are free citizens of Hungary and citizens endowed with perfectly equal rights. There exists in Hungary not a single law that recognises any difference between the rights and the duties of the Magyar and non-Magyar populations.

"For centuries the Roumanian population has clung with love and fidelity to this country, hallowed by the blood of their ancestors. The loyalty towards the anointed monarch and the fidelity towards the royal family are old Roumanian virtues. Imbued with such feelings, we have fought for a thousand years together with the Magyars for the defence of the Holy Crown, and the fact that our youth is doing the same and that its blood is shed in torrents today, proves that we remain unchanged and our enthusiasm makes us ready for every sacrifice. The empire of the Crown of Saint Stephen is not a foreign yoke to us. We do not need to be delivered, we

adhere to the integrity of our Hungarian Fatherland.

"This decided point of view of ours is not the outcome of a time-serving policy, but is a deeply rooted conviction, based on the experiences of many centuries and historical traditions. We well know that in future the splendour and influence of Saint Stephen's Crown will assure the cultural, economic and political development of Hungary's Roumanians.

"We Roumanians of Hungary hold fast to our desire to remain as heretofore under the rule of the Holy Hungarian Crown, and it is for this that thousands of our hopeful youth are bleeding. The Roumanian people will fight to ensure the fulfilment of this end with all the moral and material weapons at their disposal."

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Even all these declarations however fail to exhaust the data proving that the Roumanians of Hungary took part in the Great War with the same enthusiasm and unselfishness as the Magyars and Hungary's other nationalities, and this was not even changed by Roumania's entering on the scene in 1916. Just to complete the picture, we annex further statements made by Roumanian nationalist M. P.-s in Parliament.

Mgr. Miron Christea in a sitting of the Upper House July 22 1917 gave a detailed account of the courage shown by the soldiers of Roumanian nationality on the different theatres of war and quoted this courage as a proof that the Roumanians had always and under all circumstances been faithful to Hungary.

M. Nicolas Serbán pointed out in the House of Commons on July 22. 1917, that the common interest of Hungarians and Roumanians compel them at present and in the future to rely one upon the other. The war was welcomed by the Roumanians as an effective means of dispersing by

their conduct therein all mistrust, with which up till that time all the political and cultural efforts of the Roumanians were regarded by the Magyars. The declaration of war on the part of the Roumanian Kingdom in no way affected the behaviour of the Roumanians of Hungary, for even during the occupation of some parts of the country by Roumanian troops very few traitors were to be found. Even those cannot be found absolutely disloyal who left the country together with the beaten troops of Roumania, for they did not leave of their own will, but were dragged away by force.

Stephen C. Pop at a meeting of the House of Commons on July 27<sup>th</sup> testified to the fact that he and his party had always lived on good and friendly terms with the Magyars, and that they desired to live so in future too. Their complaints were never against the Magyar nation, but only against the Government. He and his party, when the Roumanian troops broke in, made a voluntary declaration of loyalty. Count Tisza accused him of not having signed the protest against the Note of the Entente, addressed to the U. S. A., wherein the deliverance of different nationalities from a foreign yoke is put down as being one of the aims of the war, but this accusation is utterly without foundation, for such a signature seemed perfectly unnecessary after his declaration made in September 1916 in the House of Commons.

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Until November 1918 not a single party of the Roumanians in Hungary, none, at least of any importance, viewed the war or Hungary's integrity in any other manner than shown in the declarations and statements quoted. All of them adhered to the program that had been drawn up at a meeting of the Roumanians of Hungary in 1881 as follows:

1. Transylvania's autonomy is demanded in accordance to the regulations accepted by the Pro-



vincial Diet of Nagyszeben in 1863 and sanctioned by the Sovereign.

2. Roumanian shall be the official language in the courts of law and in the administration on all territories inhabited by Roumanians.

3. In the public offices of the counties and autonomous towns inhabited by Roumanians, should be employed, Roumanian officials or only such Magyars as speak Roumanian perfectly.

4. The Nationality Act shall be revised and brought into line with Roumanian aspirations.

5. All laws preventing the Roumanians' national development must be abolished.

6. The autonomy of schools and churches is to be maintained.

7. Roumanian schools and cultural societies shall be subsidised by the State, and the amount of this help must be in proportion to the taxes paid by the Roumanians.

8. Elections must be regulated according to a new law permitting everyone to participate in the elections or extending this right at least to all those who pay some sort of direct tax.

This program differed from the Nationality Act only in so far as it derived all these rights not from the personal rights of any citizen, but from the natural rights of a nation living on an autonomous territory, the demand of this latter being the program of the Roumanian politicians from the beginning.

In opposition to the Roumanian Kingdom, the Roumanian population of Hungary adheres even to-day to Transylvanian autonomy, but the latter as the result of the historical and political development of some few centuries can only be effected within the boundaries of Hungary. The unity with Roumania excludes the autonomy of Transylvania and, without such, not only the development of the non-Roumanian nationalities will be imperilled, but even the Roumanians living in Hungary will lose

those moral, cultural and economical qualities of the race that are due to its separate development, going on for centuries, which have thus become characteristic traits and to which a whole world of tradition and sentiment is attached.

It was only after the military collapse of the Central Powers and the occupation of Transylvania by the Royal Roumanian troops in the autumn of 1918 that the leaders of the Roumanians of Hungary altered their views, and came to a point of view diametrically opposed as well to their historical past as to their political evolution. *Either they are wrong now, or they were wrong then. The latter we cannot believe, for we consider it a moral impossibility that a nation should exist that bases its national and political program merely upon lies and that was capable of sustaining such lies for centuries with a perfect want of faith, reliability and appearance of truth.*

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*Grecul Isopescu*, Roumanian member of the Austrian parliament, made the following declaration in the name of all the Roumanians of the Monarchy;

"The four million Roumanians of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy claim the right to form a separate state within the Monarchy. This they may the better demand, since the newly formed state will attract the Roumanian Kingdom and may influence her to join the Monarchy. This mode of working will be in harmony with our former attitude, for we never endeavoured to separate from the Monarchy, but to adhere to the Monarchy, though maintaining our state independence."

It is characteristic of the political attitude of the Roumanian leaders that Theodor *Mihali*, president of the Roumanian National Party, conjointly with John *Hock*, president of the revolutionary Hungarian National Council and William *Melezer*, member of the parliamentary Saxon National Party,

published a common appeal to all the Transylvanian Hungarians, Saxons and Roumanians on Nov. 1. 1918, requesting them to renew intercourse with one another, and to try with mutual trust and understanding to maintain order and the security of property and person.

The Károlyi Government communicated this appeal to all the political and other authorities as a proof of the mutual understanding between the different nationalities, on the basis of which the Wilsonian principles could be realised in the most satisfactory way.

It is a conspicuous phenomenon, that in several county councils — in Máramaros and Ugocsa — the Roumanian members of the council protested (in the second half of November) against any attempt to separate Transylvania from the Hungarian State.

The same tendency is observable in an open letter published on November 24. 1916, by a well known Roumanian advocate of Nagyvárad, John *Pelle*, addressed to the president of the Nagyvárad National Council, Aurelius *Lázár*, declaring that "he would join the council and remain true to them as long as they fought for the Roumanians of Hungary and not for those beyond the mountains". Mr. Pelle says that it may be a fine idea to join Roumania but it is not correct since it is not founded on the well considered decision of serious minds, but only on the wish of dreamers. He is not afraid to say that if the union were to be carried out "the Roumanians would be ruined and it would be a very poor consolation that it would inflict an incurable wound on the Hungarians also".

A very significant part, we may say the majority of the Roumanian working men, were against the union with Roumania. Trajan *Novac*, a leading member of the Roumanian National Party, two weeks after the Gyulafehérvár resolution for joining Roumania, published an open protest at Kolozsvár.



— "It is not true — he says — that they made their decision with the consent of the whole proletariat. Those who spoke there in the name of the proletarians had no mandate from them to declare for separation from Hungary in their name. The simple fact is that union was not carried by vote, it was simply declared from the chair. The Roumanian proletariat will not hear of a union with the Roumanian Kingdom until there exists a democracy similar at least to that declared in Hungary by the Revolution of 31. October".

The feelings of the Roumanian-speaking villagers of Transylvania can be best illustrated by the following two cases:

Theodor *Mihali*, being a landowner in Nagyilonda, called the people of that place together (on Nov. 14. 1918) in order to inform them of the altered situation. When he began to speak about the necessity of joining Roumania the people stopped him, began to throw stones at him, and even threatened him in his house where he took refuge. He was obliged to appeal to the Roumanian military guard for help, and in consequence of their intervention several of the offenders were wounded. The same thing happened also to Alexander *Vajda*, another important member of the Roumanian national party.

The Roumanian national political endeavours had their strongest and almost only supporters among the priests of the Orthodox Greek and Greek Catholic Churches. But the idea of union caused grave anxiety even in the souls of the majority of the priesthood. The Greek Catholic priests who were better informed of church-life in Roumania, knew that there the Orthodox Religion is a State Religion, therefore they felt anxious lest the Catholic character of their Church should be lost. The priests of the Orthodox confession — on the other hand — were afraid of losing the autonomy of their Church, for they were aware that the Roumanian Greek Church, although boasting of being a State

Church, has no autonomy whatever, consequently they knew that they too would have to give up the autonomy they enjoyed hitherto and become the tool of political power, similarly to the Orthodox Church of Roumania in which, according to canon law, they would simply be absorbed.

The natural motives for a union with Roumania if not wholly absent from the minds of the Roumanian politicians at the time of the collapse of the Central European military forces were still so faint that they could not have brought about a decision of so much importance. Outside influences must have been brought to bear upon them to give force to this idea, and these outside influences came from two quarters.

One was the declaration of King Charles IV. issued on 16<sup>th</sup> October 1918, in which he consented to the transformation of Austria into a federation of different independent states created on their respective territories by each people, who should take part in the organisation of the state by means of their representative national councils.

The other was a contract, drawn up in 1916 by Roumania and the Allied Powers, which was secretly sent to the Hungarian leaders of the Roumanian National Party by Jonel Bratianu, prime minister of the Government. It was noticed that Lansing, state-secretary of the United States, consented to it in President Wilson's name.

Two days after the publication of King Charles's declaration, Alexander Vajda read a resolution of the Roumanian National Party in the Hungarian parliament, which declared that Hungary's Roumanian people wish, when deciding upon their position in the State, to exercise their right independently of any foreign influence. In this declaration, while mention was made of a Roumanian National Assembly which should have the sole right of deciding upon the manner in which the new state

formation should be effected, there was not the faintest allusion to a separation from the Hungarian State or to a union with Roumania.

On the 31. October 1918 the rabble of the streets overthrew the government with the assistance of the so-called Hungarian National Council formed a few days previously, and started Hungary on the road to a ruin such as was never witnessed before in the whole history of the Hungarian Nation, leading, after a short period of four and a half months, to Bolshevism.

Soon after this several National Councils were formed, to the detriment of the central power of executive and lawful administration. During this evolution the parliamentary Roumanian National Party transformed itself into a Roumanian National Council at Arad under the presidency of Stephen C. Pop. On the fourth of November a Central Roumanian National Council was formed for the territory of the ancient (political) Transylvania. In connection with these national councils military councils were formed throughout Transylvania.

Hungarian public opinion evinced no mistrust towards these new formations because, although the Roumanians gave expression to their position to act independently in the matter of sacred right they were to hold in the State, not a word was heard respecting a union with Roumania, or separation from Hungary.

The Roumanian national councils openly manifested their intention to cooperate on brotherly terms with the Hungarian and Saxon councils for the maintenance of public order. No objection therefore was raised when the Roumanian national councils formed armed bodies, called Roumanian National Guards, under Roumanian flags and officers who took the oath before the Roumanian national councils.

The Roumanian National Council at Kolozsvár, conjointly with the Kolozsvár Hungarian Natio-



nal Council, had undertaken, in the beginning of November, to keep order in the whole of Transylvania. They agreed that the auxiliary forces should be under the command of General Siegler, who was appointed by the Hungarian Military Command. The men of the Roumanian national army were supplied with equipment and pay just as the Hungarians by the Hungarian military authorities.

It happened that in some places an oath was required from our soldiers of Roumanian birth in the name of the Hungarian National Council by the Hungarian military authorities. The Budapest Roumanian National Council lodged a protest against this with the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who accepted the protest with the greatest courtesy and gave orders that the Roumanian soldiers should take the oath of fidelity to the Roumanian National Councils. At the same time the minister ordered that the Roumanian soldiers should get the same pay as those Hungarians who swore fidelity to the Hungarian National Council.

During the first ten days of the Hungarian revolution, it was the universally accepted opinion of the whole country, and of the Government in particular, that the Hungarian national question should be solved according to the Wilsonian principles and Hungary should be built up as a sort of confederation similar to Switzerland, but without any serious change regarding territorial extension. The attitude of the nationalities, that of the Roumanians especially, seemed to support this belief. External influences were again responsible for the failure of the plan.

On November 7, 1918 Wilson's message to the Roumanian representative at Washington was made public at Jassy, according to which "the President sympathises with the idea of the union of the Roumanians wherever they live, and according to which the government of the United States will not miss the opportunity of exercising its influence

for the Roumanian people to attain their national and territorial rights, and to be saved from all foreign interference“.

This message was followed at Jassy and in other towns by many noisy political demonstrations. On such an occasion General Avarescu, Generalissimo in the campaign of 1916—17, declared that the realisation of the Roumanian national ideal for which so much blood has been recently spilt, was approaching its fruition.

It was public talk in Roumania that the King would soon issue an order to the army to occupy Transylvania and the eastern part of Hungary up to the line determined in the treaty with the Allied Powers in 1916 as the boundary line of Greater Roumania.

The armistice concluded between Count Károlyi and Franchet D'Esperey in Belgrade set down as a demarcation line the left bank of the river Maros and declared in the 1<sup>st</sup> paragraph that even on the territory to be occupied by the Entente troops civil administration should remain in the hands of the Hungarian authorities and that they should have the right to maintain public order by means of the gendarmerie and police force.

These provisions of the armistice made the impression, both on the Hungarian and the Roumanian public, that the Entente powers would not deprive Hungary of those parts of the country which are marked in the treaty of 1916. This conviction led the Bucarest statesmen as well as the Roumanians of Hungary to the most daring irredentism, carefully avoided previously.

The Roumanian National Council in an address to the Hungarian Government (Nov. 9.) demanded that on the basis of the popular right of self-determination the *imperium* should be given over to the Roumanian National Council in those 26 counties in which the majority of the population are Roumanians, right up to the line marked in the treaty of 1916 as the boundary of Greater Roumania, because

on this territory, they only could maintain order, safety of persons and property. Should the Hungarian Government not comply with this desire, they would be obliged to declare before the world that the rights laid down in Wilson's 14 points were for them unattainable and, consequently, if public order could not be maintained on that territory, all responsibility therefor would fall upon the Hungarian Government.

This declaration, which might reasonably be taken for a threat, seems to refer to the 17<sup>th</sup> § of the Belgrade treaty, in which it is stated that, in case of disturbances occurring, the Entente troops may occupy territories beyond the lines of demarcation. It was to be read between the lines that the Roumanian National Council was sure that such disturbances and even bloodshed would take place at a moment's notice and thus the Roumanian royal troops as an ally of the Entente Powers would have a good pretext to occupy those territories.

Nothing can serve for a better proof of the utter lack of irredentism or dreams of a Greater Roumanian Kingdom among the Roumanian people, than the fact that when almost every Roumanian had arms in his hands and the Hungarian State was in utter confusion, no disturbance, nor any bloody revolution actually took place, in spite of the newspaper rumours spread by irredentist agitators in foreign lands. These disturbances did not occur because the people simply never felt any of that oppression with which the different English, French and German pamphlets — written by Roumanians — made the world resound.

The Károlyi Government, instead of refusing the demand of the Roumanian National Council of Arad already alluded to, was ready to take it into consideration. It accepted the offer, and consequently Oscar Jászi, Minister of the Nationalities in the Károlyi cabinet, went to Arad, where he declared that the Roumanian National Council might exercise dominion



in all those districts and towns in which the Roumanians were in the majority. Jászi consented further, that in those places where the Roumanians were in minority their defence should be secured provisionally according to the rules laid down in Act XLIV. of 1868 (Nationality Act). He declared also that this decision should be available only until the Peace treaty be made, and that the situation created by this agreement should not influence the position to be taken by either of the parties at the Peace Conference.

The Roumanians refused the offer, and tried to explain their decision in a proclamation addressed to the peoples of the World.

They said that since the Hungarian Government was not inclined to permit the Roumanian nation to exercise dominion on the territories where the Magyars live in majority, it was impossible for the Roumanians to exercise the natural right of disposal on the territories inhabited by them. Thus the Hungarian Government recurred to might against right.

They argued that the ethnical situation on the territories claimed by them, was not the original or the natural one for the class of oppressors, of course Hungarians, had during the long run of centuries purposely wedged in masses of Hungarian population to divide the body of Roumanians. It was the acknowledged aim of the Hungarian Government since 1867 — they said — to destroy the existence of the Roumanian nation. They created settlements without having any right to do so in order to magyarise the Roumanians, they sent hundreds of thousands of Hungarian officials to Roumanian territories, they prevented the Roumanians from having their own industry, and compelled the population of the towns to become Hungarian and thus created a polyglot population for Roumanian territories, in order to annihilate the Roumanian people.

Considering that since 1867 only one insignificant settlement of 41,000 souls was established in Transylvania, which was not sufficient to alter the character of a territory with six and a half million inhabitants, further that, as all historic data proves, Roumanians had never lived in the towns said to have been violently magyarised, the Hungarians considered these declarations only as such falsifications as they were accustomed to and as were used by the Roumanians from time to time to mislead foreign public opinion.

The fact, however, that the Roumanians by means of armed force succeeded — without any right — in extending their power over the parts inhabited by Hungarians, and Roumanian administration began the expulsion of Hungarian functionaries and Hungarian citizens, and that under any shallow pretext, settling Roumanians in their place, shows that the open declaration of the Roumanian National Council was nothing but an introduction meant to be a justification of the acts of violence and injustice to follow, made specially inhuman by the manner in which they were carried out. Their treatment of officials and their families is unequalled and unknown in the history of civilised peoples.

It is, however, worth noticing that in the Roumanian proclamation no mention is made of the intention of the Hungarian Roumanians to separate from Hungary and join Roumania, they simply emphasize their intention of creating an independent and free state on the territory in which they live. The only allusion to Roumania is that the Roumanian nation of Hungary hopes and expects help in this struggle for freedom from the whole Roumanian race, with which it hopes to be one in soul for ever.

In spite of this proclamation filled with such a determined fighting spirit the Roumanian National Council was not above asking the tyrannical

Hungarian Government, (not even acknowledged by them) to provide for the use of the Roumanian National Guard 160,000 rifles, 5,000 machine guns and 10,000,000 crowns in cash.

On the day of the issue of the Roumanian proclamation Ferdinand I. King of Roumania, ordered the whole army to be mobilised and issued a command to his Army saying: "I call you to arms, in order to realise our old dream, the unification of all the Roumanians, for which you shed so much blood in 1916/17, and fought so bravely. Your Bukovinian and Transylvanian brethren are calling you to the last fight to gain their freedom and with your valour to throw off the foreign yoke".

Three days after this royal proclamation was issued the Roumanian troops, under the leadership of General Presan crossed the eastern and southern frontiers of Hungary. "We have crossed the Carpathians according to the command of King Ferdinand I. and at the request of the Roumanian National Committee" — says General Presan in his order of the day.

We are not in a position to fix with certainty whether it was the National Committee that called in the Roumanian Army — as is said in the above — but that it was not a surprise to the Roumanian National Council may be gathered from the fact that ten days previously small detachments of soldiers had already crossed the Uzok and Ojtoz passes and three days later the Hungarian Minister of War announced officially that the Roumanians were advancing in the county of Csík in a westerly direction.

The Hungarian troops stationed on the frontiers attempted no resistance, since the Government was convinced that in accordance with the measures of the Belgrade Armistice Treaty the Roumanian troops were advancing only as far as the Maros — the line of demarcation.



The Károlyi government and the public, even after King Ferdinand's and General Presan's proclamation had become known to them, believed the Roumanian troops to be coming in accordance with the armistice to keep order, and not to occupy the country. This is conspicuously demonstrated by the fact that the Hungarian Government fulfilled all the wishes brought forward by the Roumanian National Council regarding the Roumanian National Guard and the Roumanian national gathering at Gyulafehérvár as well. A separate railway train was placed at the disposal of the Roumanian representatives going to Gyulafehérvár on December 1.

This Roumanian national gathering was an exact counterpart of others held previously, and was anything but a legal representation of all the Roumanians of Hungary. This gathering accepted certain resolutions with general acclamation. The following are the most important:

"The National Assembly declares the union of all the territories of Hungary inhabited by Roumanians with Roumania, and guarantees autonomy to all of them till matters shall be definitely settled by a constitutional meeting.

It declares further

a) that all the national minorities shall enjoy full national freedom, that they may use their own language for instruction, and be represented in all legal bodies;

b) all peoples of the Roumanian State shall enjoy religious freedom;

c) all shall have an entirely democratic government on the basis of a universal suffrage, by ballot. Every man and woman of 21 years of age shall have right to vote;

d) they shall have perfect freedom concerning societies, meetings and the newspaper press;

e) an agrarian reform shall be carried through according to which the large estates shall be distri-

buted so that every agricultural labourer shall have as much land as he is able to cultivate;

f) the industrial labourers shall enjoy the same rights as those of any western state."

These resolutions being carried, a Roumanian National Council of 120 members was elected to exercise State power until the Constitutional Meeting of Greater Roumania be formed. Next a Governing Council, with a provisional seat in Nagyszeben, was nominated. This Council was to manage the government of those territories which had, in theory, been separated from Hungary.

On the same day the Roumanian Royal Army reached the demarcation line as fixed in the Belgrade Armistice Treaty and entered Marosvásárhely under the command of General Mosiu, who issued a proclamation to the Roumanians delivered by them from what he chose to call their thousand years serfdom. He referred to Woywode Mihály, who had first attempted centuries ago to liberate Transylvania, and then declared with pride that now indeed the Roumanians' chains were broken and all Roumanians had become one and indivisible.

Thus, parallel with the onward move of the Roumanian army and with the military downfall of the central powers, the Roumanian irredentist movement gained in force.

But at the same time, amidst the joy of the Roumanian political leaders and of the majority of the educated classes, the voices of doubt and anxiety might also be heard.

Very soon after the Gyulafehérvár Meeting the question arose whether it had been prudent to declare, in that moment of enthusiasm, an unconditional union with Roumania? What would become of the rights and privileges enjoyed thus far in church and school?

What would guarantee the autonomy of local administration enjoyed under the Hungarian reign but unknown in the public law of the Roumanian

Kingdom? Would it not have been more expedient to make union subject to conditions, thus securing a broad autonomy for the territories in question?

Those who had moved the proposition of union gave some explanations to quiet the anxiety of the Hungarians and the doubts of the Roumanians. Aurelius Lázár, president of the Nagyvárad Council, declared that the Resolution of Gyulafehérvár was misunderstood by many. He declared that the *imperium* would be applied only to territories wholly inhabited by Roumanians. They had no desire to seize power by force, meaning to acquire it in harmony with the Hungarians. They desired to prove that they wished to introduce a really democratic administration which would be a blessing and happiness not only to the Roumanians but to the Hungarian minority too. The Roumanians were aware that great difficulties would have to be overcome until the Hungarian administration were replaced by the Roumanian, but they counted upon the assistance of the Hungarian officials. At the beginning Hungarian should be retained as the language of administration, because this cannot be altered from one day to the other.

These semi-official announcements did not much interest the Hungarian public, they were more anxious to see whether the Roumanian army would cross the demarcation line fixed by the Belgrade Armistice, namely, the River Maros.

The Hungarians considered the occupation up to the Maros river as a task imposed on the Royal Roumanian Army by the decision of the Entente powers, therefore, not to break the Belgrade Treaty, they offered no resistance. They would consider it a similarly grave transgression of the Belgrade Treaty were the Roumanians to cross the Maros. In such a case they wished to obtain a resolution for armed resistance from the government who had crossed from the left of the Maros. At the same time the Székely soldiers, who saw



how their country, this pure Hungarian district, was being occupied by the Roumanians, could hardly be kept from attacking the advancing Roumanian Army.

The Hungarian Government, desirous of preventing any conflict, withdrew the Székely troops to Kolozsvár, where their number was augmented by soldiers returning from the western front, so that soon they would have been strong enough to drive the proportionately small and deficiently equipped Royal Roumanian Army out of Transylvania.

The Roumanian army did not hesitate, but crossing the line of demarcation it followed the Székely soldiers retiring towards Kolozsvár. Not being sure whether the Roumanian action was a private enterprise or was ordered by the Entente powers, the Hungarian Government tried to get an explanation from the representatives of the Entente staying then at Budapest. The answer came late, and even then it was evasive.

Now we know that the Roumanian Government had not been satisfied with the demarcation line fixed in the Belgrade Treaty, the same not agreeing with the western boundary assigned to Greater Roumania in the Agreement of 1916, and had asked the permission of the Entente powers to occupy the whole territory. This permission was not yet in the hands of the Roumanian Government when the army crossed the Maros line.

At this period of desperate uncertainty, the desire for resistance grew apace among the Székely troops. When the Hungarian Government was informed by Lieutenant-Colonel Vix, representative of the Entente at Budapest, that the Roumanian army had been authorised to cross the Maros, the Székely troops, having now attained the strength of a whole division, decided to resist and to hold Kolozsvár. The Roumanians were only some 8000 men, poorly armed and miserably equipped, so

that the Székelys were convinced of their ability to drive them out of the country.

The plans of the Székely Army were most warmly favoured by the people, but the Hungarian Government tried, by means of the Kolozsvár Governing Committee, to avoid their execution at all costs. The Government sent out a special delegate to the troops to persuade them to rescind their decision and to refrain from resistance. After long and weighty discussions the troops left Kolozsvár and about 5000 men of the Roumanian Royal Army under General Gherescu's command, entered Kolozsvár on the 24<sup>th</sup> December 1918.

The Székely troupes then settled on the western boundary of historic Transylvania, the line of Máramarossziget, Zilah, Csucsá, Zám, to defend it against the Roumanians. In consequence of this retreat of the Székelys the whole of Transylvania fell into the hands of the Roumanians.

It was under such circumstances that the Nagyszeben Governing Council seized the *imperium* in ancient Transylvania under the most effective protection of the Roumanian Royal Army.

The Roumanian Royal Army considered Transylvania as a country occupied by right of conquest. It laid hands upon the post and railway, placing them under military supervision. They compelled the Hungarian staff of both services to continue their work under penalty. They disarmed the Hungarian gendarmerie and entrusted their military gendarmerie with the maintenance of order. They introduced the most severe press and correspondence censure, forbade every kind of public gathering, closed all the clubs, and no one was allowed to move without a passport, not even to the nearest village. They seized every kind of military equipment and the food supply found in the state depots, and began a most cruel requisitioning of foodstuff in private houses. The slightest resistance or default was severely punished. Flog-

ging, — a punishment unknown to citizens of the Hungarian State — was an everyday occurrence. So on the whole territory of Roumanian occupation personal freedom and safety as well as security of property became simply illusory.

Simultaneously the Nagyszeben Council began the transformation — called nationalisation — of civil administration. This began in the territories purely Roumanian or Roumanian in majority. They simply dismissed the Hungarian officials and put Roumanians into their places, paying no heed to qualification.

Since the Roumanian troops were small in number and no reinforcements were to be expected from the Roumanian kingdom, recruiting was ordered on the whole territory occupied. But it hardly seemed wise to arm the disarmed Hungarian inhabitants, even within the corps of the Roumanian army and these therefore were omitted. At the same time the national guards, equipped by the help of the Hungarian Government, were incorporated into the Royal Roumanian Army, the latter thus gaining considerable increase of force.

The transformation of civil administration on the Hungarian territories of Transylvania was commenced a month after Kolozsvár had been occupied. It was carried out in the following manner:

Roumanian prefects were put at the head of the counties. These called upon the officials of the administration to take the oath of allegiance to Ferdinand I, King of Greater Roumania if they wished to retain their offices, for the Entente Powers had announced that Transylvania should be given to Roumania, and the Roumanian nation had declared the union with Roumania at the meeting of Gyulafehérvár. Since the Peace Conference had not yet decided in the matter of these territories occupied by Roumania the Hungarian officials considered themselves Hungarian citizens and refused the oath, to take which they considered equal to high treason.



The prefects made the chief officials responsible for the refusal of the oath; they put them into prison, flogged them most cruelly and threatened them with death. They stopped the salaries of these officials, requisitioned their food supply and forbade the banks to lend them money. In many places they even prevented their earning their living by heavy labour in industrial, farming or commercial work.

As the occupation of the territories lying west and northwest of the Maros had taken place by order of the Entente, the Hungarian Government argued that the treaty of Belgrade must be observed by the Roumanian Royal Army and also the Governing Council of Nagyszeben, and repeatedly protested against the treatment received. It emphasized that the administration must remain in the hands of the Hungarians, but the protest oft repeated was of no avail. With the assistance of the Roumanian army the Roumanian Governing Council of Nagyszeben carried out the installation of the Roumanian *imperium* in the most heedless manner without regard for the outraged feelings of the Hungarians.

Day by day the Hungarians of Transylvania saw more distinctly that the declarations of the Gyulafehérvár Meeting regarding the autonomy, the free use of language, and the political and national rights were nothing but promises and they were soon convinced that under the Roumanian rule civil, national or cultural life would be perfectly impossible for the Hungarians.

This was the course of events from the seizure of power by the Roumanians on the territory occupied by Roumanian troops up to the day when on March 20, 1919 Lieutenant-Colonel Vix handed over to the Károlyi Cabinet the note referring to the new line of demarcation and the neutral zone as fixed by the Entente powers which were to separate the Roumanian and Hungarian troops.

On the next day Károlyi, under pressure of the wretched condition of affairs brought about by the bad policy of his Government in the interior of the country, resigned power in favour of the Proletariat and this most lamentable event was followed by the relations between Hungarians and Roumanians becoming more strained day by day. Hungarian troops, whose discipline had already slackened, turned into Bolshevik bands. It was only the Székely soldiers, facing the Roumanians, who kept up military order and a patriotic spirit, but their situation soon became critical.

To avoid a catastrophe the Székely officers and men sent a deputation to the Nagyszeben Roumanian Council, and another to Arad to the French General Gondrecourt, with the following message: The Székely Division is not Bolshevik, and is not inclined to serve the Budapest Bolshevik Government. On the contrary it is ready to march against Budapest to abolish the Dictatorship of the Proletariat in case the Entente powers are disposed to assure them that the Roumanian troops will not cross the neutral zone nor attack the Székely troops in the rear during their operations against Budapest.

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of March the deputation brought answer from Nagyszeben that the Roumanian troops would undertake no offensive without the authorisation of the Entente powers. General Gondrecourt received an authorisation from the chief Command of the Eastern Entente Army (dated Apr. 7) to fulfil the desire of the Székely division. The messenger of the Hungarian captain on the staff, who had been sent to Arad, left that town on the 16<sup>th</sup> April with a written document from General Gondrecourt, which categorically stated that if the Székely Division would march against Budapest to overthrow Bolshevism, the Roumanians would not pass the neutral zone fixed in

Lieutenant-Colonel Vix's Note and would not attack the Székely Division.

Contrary to this double assurance, the Roumanian troops attacked the Székely Division, which had considered itself as secure from all attack, quite unexpectedly early in the morning of April 16. We must, however, suppose that by doing so they did not act upon any authorisation of the Entente, but undertook this just in order to make the plan of the Székely Division impossible, for they hoped by an easy victory over Bolshevism in Hungary to gain a better title to the territories assigned to Roumania in the Agreement of 1916.

Since the commanders of the Red Army were also informed of the intention of the Székelys' to march against Budapest these ordered their gangs likewise to attack the Székelys when retreating.

So the Székely division was between two enemies and thus it was forced to surrender. After the surrender of the Székelys the Roumanian army came in touch with the Red Army which had resolved itself into undisciplined bands of soldiers, who however very soon fled towards the capital.

Three months later the Red Army starting new operations provoked an offensive of the Roumanian army in which the Red Army was perfectly routed and the Royal Roumanian Army marched into Budapest.

During the time of this occupation the work of roumanising all institutions east of the river Tisza was continued systematically, more quickly and rigorously than before. This work was conducted with the greatest disregard of all international laws and accompanied by excesses, of which we sent several reports to the Supreme Council by means of the Budapest Entente Missions.

Taking into consideration all the events occurring since the downfall of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the Hungarian portion of that empire it becomes in truth apparent that the joining of the territories



under discussion to Roumania did not form part of the aspirations of Roumanian national policy which indeed knew no further goal than that of the Roumanian people of Hungary forming a confederation within the boundaries of Hungary, or of the Habsburg monarchy, with the Hungarian Nation on the basis of perfect equality of rights.

It is equally certain that the great change in the political aspirations of the Roumanians of Hungary, resulting in the union with Roumania, was not a spontaneous expression of the state of mind of the people, but simply an outcome of the imperialistic tendencies of Roumania, and consequently it seems but an ephemeral impulse which cannot be looked upon as a constant force strong enough not only to insure the permanence of the new state-formation but also to counteract the many differences of history, culture and sentiment so noticeable as between the Roumanians of Hungary and of the Roumanian Kingdom, and resulting from the twofold development going on through centuries in a direction often diametrically opposed one to the other. We venture to predict that if the Roumanian and non-Roumanian inhabitants of the territory, on the basis of the experience regarding Roumanian methods of government and administration gained during the one year of Roumanian occupation, were allowed to vote, free from Roumanian oppression, under a full international control, they would vote as follows:

"We do not wish to be incorporated into Greater Roumania and live under Roumanian rule, but to remain on the territory in which we have lived through many centuries of good and evil times Magyars, Roumanians and Saxons together as nations enjoying equal rights on the grounds of the Wilsonian principles as truly interpreted, keeping the peoples' right of self-determination in full respect, in close alliance with the mother-country, but as

an autonomous Transylvania. We have had enough of the Roumanian *imperium*, of Macedonian and Albanian style, in the course of one single year. We are not accustomed to continual extortion by unqualified administrators. We are not accustomed to 25 to 50 lashes being given, or being flogged till half dead. We have never before been bound and gagged and thrown into foul prisons. We have never before been kicked by the rough high boots of uncouth pickpockets miscalled political agents.

We wish to remain and live as before in cultural and economic communion with the people of the West and under the protection of right and justice. This is claimed by us by right of our past, our civilisation and our geographical situation. All our rivers, slopes and roads lead towards Hungary, and a rampart of high mountains separates us from Roumania and from its Balkanic ideas and morals. What God has joined together cannot be permanently put asunder by human power, however great, or by man's mind, however wise it be."



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