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THE
IDEAL THEORY OF BERKELEY,
AND THE
REAL WORLD.

FREE THOUGHTS ON BERKELEY, IDEALISM, AND
METAPHYSICS.

BY
THOMAS HUGHES.

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PREFACE.

ABOUT one-fourth of this volume was published some months since, in a small spirited Irish periodical. It is now given to the public not only enlarged in matter, but also altered in form. I am not so contracted in view, and vain in expectation, as to think that it will settle the vexed question between the realist and the idealist. If it will in any way advance knowledge, and cast a ray of light on any dark spot on the canvass of human vision, it will satisfy my expectation and wish.

The book is not intended for the advanced and the erudite; but for those who aspire after advancement and knowledge, and receive with gratitude any light and assistance, from whatever quarter they may come. The intent is, to give within a narrow compass, some acquaintance with Berkeley's theory, to those who have not studied his works for themselves: it aims also to help and encourage the student of metaphysical science, in his lonely and persevering efforts.

There is one ambitious thought running

through the volume,—the universal unity of all truth and knowledge. Though the book is on metaphysics, metaphysical phrases and formularies are avoided; it is intended for the unsophisticated and unmetaphysical reader, as well as to assist those humble students who wish to travel forward in the path of truth and science. The notes are added to give more variety and interest to the ordinary reader.

As people value things by their character and inherent qualities, and not by their appearance and what may be said of them, so books, by the discreet and intelligent, will be thus estimated, and not by what may be said of them in their prefaces; and a different verdict I cannot reasonably wish for this volume. A book becomes a member of a large family, the moment it is given to the public, and an object of blame or praise, as its character is, or as the views and taste of its critics may be; and, in some degree or other, without a doubt, this unpretending volume will share the same common lot. And, in common with all natural feeling, I cannot but wish well to my own: yet, if it happens to have praise, it will not elate; but, if otherwise, it will not distress.

T. H.

February 8th, 1865.

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PART I.

LIFE.

SECTION I.

THE hand of Supreme Providence is impartial in the distribution of its rich and suitable benefits. The chief blessings of that liberal and welcome hand are given unto all people and countries alike. All countries have their beautiful spots and splendid sceneries, elevated hills and magnificent mountains, rich fields and charming valleys, transparent rills and gigantic rivers. They have their Fauna and Flora, their bright summers and fruitful harvests; they have their sun, moon, stars, and comets. There are, however, spots where its blessings appear to have been lavished more copiously than they are in other parts; yet, when all things are considered and compared, there are found palpable evidences of suitability, impartiality, and equality in the whole. What appears to be deficient in one place to compete with another in beauty, value, and grandeur, is made up of other elements equally important, and

much more suitable and needful to answer the wise end of both place and circumstances.

The physical arrangement of things, presents a presumptive proof of the impartial intention and blessings of God in the moral and spiritual. The natural is both an emblem and a proof of the Divine purpose in the spiritual. As the blessings of the natural world are distributed with an approximate equality and unfailing suitability over all the face of the material, so is the intention of God relative to the moral and the spiritual. There is this difference. The moral views man on a higher ground than the natural does; he is viewed on this higher ground of his relation as a rational and accountable being, capable of refusing, receiving, using, or mis-using, the blessings given. Moral blessings are equally contingent and conditional in their character to the natural. According to the exact degree these contingencies and conditions are observed or neglected, moral blessings increase or diminish in their value and usefulness to us. In the spread and distribution of moral blessings there are two parties to be consulted; the agent, as the parent, the minister, or the tutor, and the child, the disciple, and the scholar. If one of these miscarry in the discharge of his duties, the conditions are violated, and the results will most assuredly follow.

SECTION II.

History informs us that hitherto most nations and peoples have had their epochs and cycles in intellectual and moral excellencies. Nations, no more than the physical world, have not flourished all at once. When the light and glory of one country grew dim, the other country rose from obscurity to a higher and a nobler elevation; as if by some mysterious power, the glories of one were transmitted to the other. This we attribute in part to the wrong and temporizing policies of nations, and not to any fate or necessity. Whilst Greece*

* The ancient Græcia, a maritime country in the south-east of Europe. It is in the shape of a triangle, with its base extending from the top of the Adriatic to the mouths of the river Danube, and having its two sides washed by the sea. It is bounded on the north by European Turkey, west by the Ionian Sea and Islands, south by the Mediterranean, and east by the Egean Sea. In extent it is 210 miles long, by 160 broad; and contains an area of 15,000 square miles, inclusive of its islands. It was called by its inhabitants Hellas, and the people were called Hellenes. The name Greece comes to us through the Romans; though why the Romans gave it this name, is not known. It is a familiar fact, that foreigners often call people by a different appellation to what they call themselves. Thus, for instance, the nation called Germans by us, bear the appellation of Deutschen among themselves: and the people whom the Romans called Etruscans, or Tuscans, were known in their own tongue by that of Rasena. Greece, as a small portion of earth, has a history without a parallel, except the hilly land of Judea; and, except the Jews, no people ever have made for themselves such a prominent and illustrious place in the everlasting pages of history; whilst in philosophy and science they are far superior to the Jews. Schlegel calls them the second people of the world, chosen of

flourished in arts, science, and philosophy, other parts of Europe* were uncivilized and dark. Now the land of science and philosophy is deserted, and nothing left but sacred and splendid monuments; as mementoes to testify to the passer-by of her past greatness and glory; other parts of Europe flourish in science and philosophy. Whilst the hills and lakes of Judea † were favoured with the

God to be the medium of further diffusion of revelation in the cause of the development of humanity.

* That part of the globe which is now considered as one of the five divisions of the earth, and in material size the least of them. It is bounded by the sea in all directions except the east, where it is separated from Asia by a boundary-line, formed by the river Kava, the Ural mountains and river, and the Caspian Sea. It has the Baltic on the north, the Mediterranean, the Sea of Marmora, and the Black Sea, on the south, and a large extent of coast, bordered on the west by the Atlantic. Its extent is about 3,400 miles long, by about 2,300 broad; population, 265,000,000. Religiously, the population is divided between the Catholics, the Protestants, the Greek Church, a small portion of Jews, and a smaller portion still of Mohammedans. The appellation Europe, applied to this part of the globe, has a little uncertainty about it. Bochart supposes this word to be composed of אֶרֶץ הַיָּבֵנִית, *hor opha*, "white face," the land of white people, as distinguished from the Ethiopians, black-faced people, or tawny inhabitants of Asia and Africa.

† Judea lies between Phœnicia on the north, and Idumæa on the south, separated from each by a chain of lofty mountains. On the east it was bounded by the Dead Sea, the river Jordan, and the Sea of Galilee, on the west, it extended to the Mediterranean. Its length, from north to south, was about one hundred and eighty miles; and from east to west, measuring from Jordan, about fifty miles. The most extraordinary country in the world, both as to its religious and political history, no wonder that nothing can efface an affection for it from the memory of its original inhabitants. At first it was inhabited by idolatrous peoples; it was then conquered by

saving philosophy * of God in the teaching of the Divine Saviour, † and the noble band of Apostles, ‡ other parts of the world were feeding upon vanity, and enveloped in deep darkness. Now, whilst Judea with her sacred associations has nothing to boast of except her beautiful sceneries, the graves and dust of Prophets and Apostles, and the spots where the Son of God wept, § prayed, || and the Israelites, and divided by them by lot among the twelve tribes. After the death of Solomon, it was divided into two kingdoms; and finally into small provinces, by its several conquerors. It was conquered and governed in turn by the Persians, the Egyptians, the Macedonians, the Romans, the Saracens, the Christians, the Turks; and now is governed by the Mohammedan rule.

* *Φιλεω*, "to love," and *σοφια*, "wisdom," "the love of wisdom." As a system, religion is the revelation of Divine things in love: and, as an element of government in the human will and feeling, it is a love and a desire after Divine wisdom.

† John iii. 16; Heb. vii. 25.

‡ *Αποστέλλω*, "to send away;" *απο* and *στελλω*, "to send." An apostle is a person deputed to execute some important business; but, appropriately, a disciple of Christ, commissioned to preach the Gospel. Twelve persons were selected by Christ for this end; and Judas, one of the number, proving himself an apostate, his place was supplied by Matthias. The title Apostle is applied to Christ Himself. (Heb. iii. 1.) In the primitive ages of the church, other ministers were called Apostles, as were also persons sent to carry alms from one church to another. (Rom. xvi. 7; Phil. ii. 25.) This title was given also to those who first planted the Christian faith; thus Dionysius of Corinth is called the Apostle of France; hence the Jesuit Missiouaries are called Apostles. Among the Jews, the appellation was given to officers who were sent into distant provinces, to see the laws observed. Apostle, in the Greek Liturgy, is a book containing the Epistles of St. Paul, printed in the order in which they are to be read in churches through the year.

§ John xi. 35.

|| Luke xxii. 41, 42; John xvii.

taught,* and wrought His numerous miracles,† other parts of the globe possess, enjoy, and flourish under the influence of the religion established there.

SECTION III.

Every country and people have some monumental relics, either in fossils, architecture, traditions, books, or illustrious names and characters, which make the past sacred and immortal in their remembrance. On this ground all people, in some way and degree or other, cleave to the past with sacred reverence and great tenacity. This is a natural and right affection in its place and prudential use. It is a conservative power, to preserve from sudden innovations and frequent revolutions in bodies, politic and religious. When this affection settles down in narrow superstition, and opposes every improvement and progress because they differ from the past, then it is abused, and becomes injurious to the interest of universal man. In common with all countries, Ireland ‡ has her relics and

* Matt. v. 2; John iii. 2.

† *Miraculum*, from *miror*, "to wonder;" literally, a wonderful occurrence. Theologically, an act above the ordinary laws and order of things, yet subject to the law of Infinite Wisdom, as to its source and end. We have a record, in the Gospels, of thirty-three miracles being wrought by Christ.

‡ An island in the Atlantic Ocean, separated from Great Britain by the Irish Sea, or St. George's Channel, varying in breadth from 12 to 130 miles. It is fertile, and capable of great and various de-

monuments, which make the past dear and great to her feeling and conception ; and, most assuredly,

velopment. It varies in length from 235 to 290 miles, and in breadth from 110 to 182 miles. The whole comprises an area of 32,513 square miles.

The Irish, doubtless, are of Celtic origin. This is seen in the names of their rivers, towns, mountains, and other objects of common and historical interest. This is proved, equally clearly and indelibly, in the remaining relics of antiquity, the tumuli, the cairns, the cromlechs, and the druidical circles. The name of the island confirms the same thing. Eri, or Erin, its most ancient appellation, to which the natives still cling with the fondness of veneration, is derived from the Celtic Ior, or Eir, which signifies "western." Most of its more recent names may be traced to this source. By the Grecians it was called Ierne, being honoured by them as the third island of the ocean ; yielding precedence only to Taprobane and Britain. It is named by Ptolemy, Iouerna ; by Juvenal and Mela, Juverna. Diodorus Siculus calls it Iris. By the Britons it was called Iverdon ; and the Saxons, attaching to the original name an epithet from their own language, called it Ierland, or Ireland. Its later name, Hibernia, has caused much diversity of opinion, but possibly may be traced to the same original source. Some derive it from an adjective of climate, *hibernus*, on account of its wintry temperature ; others from Iberus, a Spaniard, or a river in Spain. Another writer goes still further. Postellus, in his strictures on Mela, deduces it from the Hebrew, *Irin quasi Jurin*, "the land of the Hebrews," who, believing that the empire of the world would be established in a strong place in the north-west, made themselves masters, as soon as possible, of those parts, and of Ireland. Bochart traces it again to the Phenician : Hibernia, according to him, or Ierne, being nothing more than Ibernæ, or the furthest habitation ; because, beyond Ireland, westward, all was ocean, according to the ancients.

All this may have a dim trace in it, that the Celtic Irish and the Phenician proceed originally from the same common eastern stem. Other appellations, of later date, as Scotia, and Ogygia, mean, according to their several adopters, different things. It was not considered by the Greeks and Romans as the country inhabited by any one nation ; on the contrary, its coasts are described by Ptolemy as

the history of Ireland is rich with great events and most illustrious and worthy characters. According to the magnitude of her area, and the political advantages she has had, perhaps no country is richer in events, traditions, and illustrious names and characters, which will ever render her past history, to her own children, very dear and sacred. If much of her history is stained with cruelty, injustice, and oppression, these make the impression all the more deep and lasting. Whether the history of Ireland be viewed religiously, politically, philosophically, or scholastically, it is very attractive and instructive, and mixed with melancholy and pleasurable interest. In all these classes, Ireland has given birth to some of the most memorable and illustrious men and things that chronicles can record. Even in this day she is behind none in proportion to her means, advantages, and magnitude. In abstract and intellectual science she is behind none.* Her sons

inhabited by a number of tribes, of various names. In common with all people delighting in the antiquity of their land and race, the bards and historians of Ireland trace the origin of its population to the family of Noah. Much of its history, in common with all histories of the long past, is buried in the tangled mystery of years and romance.

* The sciences of pure thought are those of metaphysics, pure mathematics, ontology, and that of mind generally. 1. It is an abstraction from sense and objective nature; or a kind of an effort to separate from them in thought and consciousness. 2. An abstract science is so named, because it is the highest and purest exercise of

are found useful and illustrious in every department of intellect and religion, and that in every part of the globe.

SECTION IV.

The famous George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne,* was born on the soil of Ireland. I shall only give an epitome of his life within a small compass. My business chiefly at present is to examine and, so far as I can, within a limited compass, give an impartial view of his ideal philosophy. The editor of his Works † gives us only a short sketch of his life, just extending it over some fifteen pages. Whether this arose from want of materials, or the monotony and dearth of his life, in those incidents and circumstances which make a memoir palatable to the many, or that Berkeley failed to form a numerous and influential school, either in theology, politics, or philosophy, and for these reasons his life was not written more extensively, we cannot tell. It is possible that an analytical biography of his life, containing the developments of his mind in connexion with his different philosophical theo-

thought, a science of pure thought. 3. As contrasted with and different from the complex. 4. It aims at the knowledge of beings and things in their real nature, condition, and relations.

* Cloyne is a town of Ireland, in the county of Cork, twelve miles from Cork. Its population is under 2,000.

† Berkeley's Life and Works, by the Rev. G. N. Wright, M.A., in two volumes.

ries, would have been both interesting and instructive. But it has been the portion of only few good and great men, to leave behind them faithful and able biographers. An Agricola* had an efficient and lucid biographer in his son-in-law, Tacitus.† Not many Newtons‡ leave behind

* Cneius Julius Agricola was a Roman commander, whose father, Julius Græcinius, was an orator, and put to death by Caligula, for refusing to plead against Silanus. He was carefully brought up by his mother, Julia Procilla, and sent to Massilia, (Marseilles,) the chief seat of learning in Gaul, to pursue his studies. He was sent to Britain, where he was at the time of the insurrection of Boadicea, in A.D. 61. After holding various positions, and performing many great and active services in Britain, Gaul, Asia, and Rome, it is asserted that he fell a sacrifice by poison to the cruel jealousy of Domitian. He was born at Forum Julii, now called Frejus, in Provence, A.D. 37, and died at Rome, A.D. 93.

† Caius Cornelius Tacitus, a celebrated Roman historian, of whose family and early life hardly anything is known. Pliny the Younger declares him to be the first orator of his day. He is known chiefly by posterity through his histories, many of which are lost. His Annals were the most important of his works; but of these we have lost a part. His Treatise on the Manners of the Germans, and his Life of Agricola, his father-in-law, are both pure in style, and lofty in sentiment; but his History of the Reign of Tiberius is considered as his master-piece. It is supposed that this great and noble character was born about A.D. 54, and died about A.D. 130.

‡ Sir Isaac Newton, one of the greatest mathematical geniuses and natural philosophers that ever existed. No name so familiar and more respected in all civilized lands than his. He was born at Woolsthorpe, near Grantham, in Lincolnshire, 1642, and died at Kensington, 1727. On the mantelpiece in the room where Newton was born at Woolsthorpe, is placed a marble tablet, commemorative of the past, beneath which are the well-known lines of Pope:—

“ Nature, and nature’s laws, lay hid in night :
God said, ‘ Let Newton be ! ’ and all was light.”

them a Brewster,* able and faithful, and full of sympathy with his great subject; and so giving unto us a philosophical detail of the inward and outward life of the great philosopher. No one but Johnson † left behind him a Boswell,‡ to write

* A living experimental philosopher, and the author of *Sir Isaac Newton's Life*, with several other works on material science. His discoveries relative to the properties of light have led to great improvements in the illumination of lighthouses. In 1815, he received the Copley medal for his paper on the polarization of light by reflection; and in the following year, for his discoveries in physics, received from the Institute of France 1,500 francs, which was the half of the prize. In 1816, he invented the kaleidoseope; in 1818, received the Rumford medal of the Royal Society; and, in 1830, was presented with the medal of the Royal Society, for his further researches on the properties of light. In the same year, with Davy, Herschel, and Babbage, he originated the British Association, the first meeting of which was held at York, in 1831. He was knighted by William IV., and decorated with the Hanoverian Guelphic Order. In 1841, he became Principal of St. Leonard's College, at St. Andrews. In 1849, he was elected President of the British Association; and, the same year, had the honour of being chosen in the place of Berzelius one of the eight foreign associates of the French Academy of Sciences. For twenty-two years he edited the *Edinburgh Encyclopædia*: he was also one of the editors of the *Edinburgh Philosophical Journal*, as well as of the *Edinburgh Journal of Science*. He was born at Jedburgh, Scotland, in 1781.

† Johnson has left a fame in criticism, lexicography, and miscellaneous writing, that few can hope to acquire; which will last as long as the literature of the English language. He was born at Liehfield, 1709, and died in London, 1784.

‡ James Boswell, the author of the *Life of Dr. Johnson*, has secured himself immortality, in connexion with his great subject. Though not possessing vigorous intellectual powers, he has written one of the most attractive and instructive memoirs in English or any other language. Macaulay says of it, as to its accurate detail:—
“His coat, his wig, his figure, his face, his scrotula, his St. Vitus’

adoringly the life of his friend and master; coming to his work after many years of perpetually studying his unwieldy subject in all his capable bearings, and diligently collecting materials for it from all resources about the living man, both whilst his subject was awake, and whilst he was asleep. Few theologians, if any at all, have, or ever will leave behind a Hanna,* to hand faithfully down their lives to generations to come, as was the fortune of Chalmers.† The loss is that of future humanity, and not to themselves; for the

dance, his rolling walk, his blinking eye, the outward signs which too clearly marked the approbation of his dinner; his insatiable appetite for fish-sauce and veal-pie, with plums; his inextinguishable thirst for tea; his trick of touching the posts as he walked; his mysterious practice of treasuring up scraps of orange-peel; his morning slumbers; his midnight disputations; his contortions; his mutterings; his gruntings; his pullings; his vigorous, acute, and ready eloquence; his sarcastic wit; his vehemence; his insolence; his fits of tempestuous rage; his queer inmates, old Mr. Levett and blind Mrs. Williams, the eat Hodge, and the Negro Frank, all are as familiar to us as the objects by which we have been surrounded from childhood." During more than twenty years of friendship and familiar intercourse between Boswell and Johnson, they did not spend more than two hundred and seventy-six days together. He was born at Edinburgh, 1740, and died, 1790.

* Hanna is a living minister of the Free Presbyterian Church, an able preacher, a discriminative theologian, and an elegant writer. He is a son-in-law of the late Dr. Chalmers, and has been for many years a colleague, in pastoral charge, with Dr. Guthrie. He has written a most able but somewhat too voluminous memoir of Dr. Chalmers, with some other theological works.

† Dr. Chalmers was one of the most powerful preachers and writers that Scotland, or any other land, ever produced. He has done more towards the unity and harmony of theology and science,

life of the great and good is written above ; it has done its service below, and is in an indestructible keeping, and on imperishable records.

The 12th of March, 1684, at Killcarn, near Thomastown,* were the time and place that witnessed and recorded the birth of a little child, afterwards called the “ philosophical Doctor Berkeley,” and the “ metaphysical Bishop.” He received the first rudiments of his education at Kilkenny School,† under Dr. Hinton, and was received a pensioner of Trinity College, Dublin, at the age of fifteen, under the instruction of Dr. Hall ; but was received a fellow of that college in the year 1707.

SECTION V.

In 1713 he came to London, and, at the close of the same year, went, in the capacity of a chaplain, in the train of the Earl of Peterborough into

than any other theologian. He was born at Anstruther, Fifeshire, 1780, and died at Edinburgh, 1847.

* Thomastown is a borough town of Ireland, in the county of Kilkenny, on the river Nore ; with population about 2,200. It was formerly enclosed with walls.

† Kilkenny is the capital of the county called under that name. It contains many elegant buildings, and its streets are paved with black marble. The venerable ruins of its churches, monasteries, and abbeys, still remain to prove its former importance. Its college, or free school, is still one of its celebrated buildings and establishments. Its population is about 20,000.

Italy.* The editor relates a very ludicrous incident that transpired at Leghorn;† we shall transcribe it for the reader, in the words of the learned editor. “It may not be amiss,” says the biographer, “to record a little incident that befel Mr. Berkeley in this city, with the relation of which he used sometimes to make himself merry among his friends. Basil Kennett, the author of the ‘Roman Antiquities,’ was the chaplain to the English factory at Leghorn, the only place in Italy where the English Service is tolerated by the Government; which favour had been lately obtained from the Grand Duke, at the particular instance of Queen Anne.‡ This gentleman re-

* Charles Mordaunt, Earl of Peterborough, a great English general who entered the navy, and distinguished himself at Tangiers, when it was besieged by the Moors. He was created the Earl of Monmouth; and, on the death of his uncle, succeeded to the title—the Earl of Peterborough. Some of his letters are printed in the works of Pope, with whom he was intimate. It was said of him, that he had seen more Kings and more postillions than any man in Europe. He was born in 1658, and died 1735.

† Leghorn is a celebrated seaport-town of Italy, the Italian Livorno. In the sixteenth century, it was made a free port by Cosmo de Medici; and to this its advancement and prosperity may be greatly attributed. Among other things, its lighthouse is noted. Its population is about 85,000.

‡ Queen Anne was the second daughter of James II., by Lady Anne Hyde, daughter of the great Earl of Clarendon. In 1668, she married Prince George of Denmark, by whom she had several children, but all of whom died young. In 1702, on the death of William III., she succeeded to the crown. One of the greatest events of this reign was the union of Scotland with England. On account

quested Mr. Berkeley to preach for him one Sunday. The day following, as Berkeley was sitting in his chamber, a procession of priests, in surplices, and with all other formalities, entered the room ; and, without taking the least notice of the wondering inhabitant, marched quite round, muttering certain prayers. His fears immediately suggested to him that this could be no other than a visit from the Inquisition, who had heard of his officiating before heretics without licence the day before. As soon as they were gone, he ventured, with much caution, to inquire into the cause of this extraordinary appearance ; and was happy to be informed, that this was the season appointed by the Romish Calendar for solemnly blessing the houses of all good Catholics, from rats and other vermin ; a piece of intelligence which changed his terror into mirth.”

In August, 1714, he returned from the Continent. The fall of Queen Anne’s ministry having put an end to his hope of preferment, he accepted an offer from Dr. Ashe, the Bishop of Clogher,* to accompany his son on a tour through Europe.

of the number of eminent literary characters who flourished in her reign, it has been called the Augustan age of Britain. Though too much the dupe of her ministers and favourites, she will ever be respected for the general excellency of her private character. She was born, 1664, and died, 1714.

* Clogher is an ancient, small, episcopal city of Ireland, 82 miles from Dublin.

He travelled, in addition to places more common, over Apulia, Calabria, and the Island of Sicily. He was on the Continent in this tour about four years. When at Paris he paid a visit to Père Malebranche,* the author of an ingenious system of philosophical idealism, which teaches that we perceive all ideas in God, which is known under the name of *occasional causes*. This theory has points of resemblance and sympathy with that of Berkeley; yet they are widely different in their

* Père Nicholas Malebranche was the ablest disciple of the philosophy of Descartes. He has been derided by the superficial, and neglected almost by all Protestant thinkers: partly on account of his ideal theory, and partly from the notion that he was a Jesuit. It is true that his theory is considered as exploded among almost all thinkers, yet the thinker himself is worthy of the highest regard both as to his character and as a profound thinker. It is a mistake to think him a Jesuit; he was a priest of the Oratory. Sir W. Hamilton, in speaking of him, says:—"As a thinker he is, perhaps, the most profound that France has ever produced; and as a writer on philosophical subjects, there is not another European author who can be placed before him. His style is a model at once of dignity and of natural ease; and no metaphysician has been able to express himself so clearly and precisely without resorting to doctrinal and scholastic terms. That he was the author of a celebrated but exploded hypothesis, is, perhaps, the reason why he is far less studied than he otherwise deserves. His works are of principal value for the admirable observations on human nature which they embody; and were everything to be expunged from them connected with the *vision of all things in the Deity*, and even with the Cartesian hypotheses in general, they would still remain an inestimable treasury of the ablest analysis, expressed in the most appropriate and, therefore, the most admirable eloquence. In the last respect, he is only approached, certainly not surpassed, by Hume and Mendelssohn." He was born at Paris in 1638, and died at Paris in 1715.

teaching and conclusion. Berkeley found this philosophical father in his cell, preparing a medicine in a pipkin for a disorder he was suffering under,—an inflammation on the lungs. The conversation was naturally led to their peculiar philosophical sympathies and theories. It grew so earnest and warm that the ingenious father raised his voice so high, and became subject at the time to so intense and deep emotions, that his disorder increased and carried him off in a few days. So great and grave a reality the idealism of Berkeley proved to poor Malebranche. Whatever edification and interest this visit gave to the visitor, according to report, it proved a dear and a mortal one to the visited.

SECTION VI.

In July, 1717, he was elected a Senior Fellow of his college; and on the 14th of November, 1721, he took degrees of Bachelor and Doctor in Divinity. The year following increased his fortune considerably; a lady that was no relation left the sum of £8,000 between himself and another gentleman. In the year 1724, he was presented, by the Duke of Grafton, to the deanery of Derry,* worth £1,100 per annum. At this time

* Derry, a city and a county of Ireland, now called Londonderry, because given to twelve London companies by James I.,

he conceived a scheme for the conversion of the aborigines of America to Christianity, and the building of a college in the Somers Islands;* and in 1725 published his purpose, and offered to resign his opulent preferment, and dedicate himself the remainder of his days to this noble and Christian enterprise, for the paltry sum of £100 per annum. In August, 1728, the enterprising philosopher entered the marriage condition; and in the following month of the same year, after much delay and trouble, he set sail, for his very sanguine mission, to America. He took up his residence at Newport, and laboured indefatigably in the discharge of the duties of his clerical functions. After being there two years, he returned home, grieved and disappointed that his sanguine wishes and confident expectations were not met and fulfilled by the Government and men in power. He trusted too much in political schemes and worldly men; so his darling project fell unrealized. In this scheme Berkeley's confidence was on a wrong basis, as were his motives not the

after the rebellion of its chiefs; and now almost the whole county is owned by their successors.

* Somers Islands, or the Bermudas, a cluster of small islands belonging to Great Britain, in the Atlantic Ocean, in number about three hundred. These Islands were discovered in 1522 by Juan Bermudas, a Spaniard; and in 1609, George Somers, an Englishman, was wrecked there, and soon after the English formed a settlement there.

loftiest and divinest. He trusted in the efficiency and faithfulness of worldly patronage and enactments, instead of confiding his cause to the sympathy and feeling of the good and the religious, and the immutable power of truth. This ground failed him, as he might well have expected. His motive, in a great measure, was to make religion subservient to the State. We cannot but look on this as one of the great failures of his life. We are ready to believe that this was the natural result of a system that depends upon worldly patronage for preferments, rather than of want of principle and high view in the amiable philosopher.

SECTION VII.

Queen Caroline* was peculiarly fond of philosophical conversation between learned and ingenious men, and had one day in the week set apart for that purpose whilst she was the Princess of Wales. Among those who attended, and took an active part in the conversation in this illustrious and select company, were Drs. Sherlock,† Hoad-

* Princess Caroline, the wife of George II., and daughter of Brandenburg-Anspach, who died in 1737.

† Sherlock, Thomas, an eminent prelate of the Anglican Church, and a son of Richard Sherlock, an able divine and a chaplain of the army of Charles I.; he was born in London, 1678, and died near London, 1761.

ley,* Clarke,† and Berkeley. Drs. Clarke and Berkeley were the two leading antagonists; Hoadley sided with Clarke, and Sherlock with Berkeley. In this select intelligent company, Berkeley's idealism, and other philosophical theories, were made the chief subjects of conversation. In Dr. Clarke it met a gigantic opponent, and, we should think, in point of mental strength and severe logic, superior to Berkeley: but Berkeley, in expertness of movements, clever and skilful handling of his tools, and amiable temper, was equal to him. We should think that Berkeley's idealism tottered, and was blown down to the ground, before the heavy calibre and gigantic reasoning of the author of the *à priori evidence*. But Berkeley, doubtless, was so enamoured with his darling theory, and at the same time so expert in building up his fortification after it fell, that he was blind and indifferent to his own condition. It is said that Addison‡ made it his

* Hoadley, Benjamin, a bishop of the Anglican Church. His controversy with Atterbury is familiar to most readers; and by reason of his doctrine of non-resistance, he was noticed by the House of Commons, who pressed the Queen to confer preferment upon him. He was born at Westerham, Kent, 1676; died, 1761.

† Clarke, Dr. Samuel, was one of the profoundest men that the Anglican Church or any other Church ever produced. He was at once a scholar, a mathematician, a metaphysician, and a theologian. He was born in Norwich, 1675; died in London, 1729.

‡ Joseph Addison was the son of the Rev. Launcelot Addison, a divine and an author of some eminence. Joseph Addison was the

purpose and work to have the two philosophers together; and that Berkeley complained of the unfairness of Clarke. We should think that Clarke's artillery would be awfully heavy upon his antagonist; and his opponent would feel that he met with a giant, however matters would ultimately end. But, so far as we know, neither of the parties were convinced, which is mostly the result. A man must be met sideways generally to be convinced. If he is conscious that he meets an antagonist, he prepares his instruments, fortifies his ground, searches for arguments, and so confirms and roots himself in his own views more and more.

After the return of Berkeley from Rhode Island, the Queen often commanded his attendance to communicate unto her what he witnessed on the other side of the water. Apart from all he saw in America, his conversation must have been exquisitely instructive and interesting. In

most elegant writer of his age; so much so, as to secure the admiration and imitation of Macaulay. Johnson speaks of his style,—“Whoever wishes to attain an English style, familiar but not coarse and elegant but unostentatious, must give his days and nights to Addison.” It may be said, however, that his style is wanting in masculine energy, and forceful expression. When he found that the hand of death was upon him, he sent for Lord Warwick, and, affectionately pressing his hands, whispered, “See in what peace a Christian can die.” He was born at Milston, Wilts, 1672, and died at Holland House, 1719.

him met all the qualifications to charm and instruct:—his classical taste; his knowledge of the modern languages and manners of Europe; his philosophical insight, analysis, and quick apprehension; and his rich variety of mental treasures;—for his range of study covered theology, politics, and philosophy, in their widest acceptation. His sweet temperament, polished manners, and his religious views and feelings, mellowed and sweetened the whole. It is the portion of but few, to be adorned with so numerous mental and moral qualifications, and that in so high a proportion, as met in the Bishop of Cloyne. Religion and philosophy, refined and adorned, by their combined teaching and influence, the soil that was naturally rich and fertile.

After the deanery of Down became vacant, Dr. Berkeley, at the request of Queen Caroline, was named to it; and the letter of the King went over to Ireland to that effect. But through the neglect of Lord Burlington to notify the royal intention to the Duke of Dorset, who was then Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, his excellency was offended that the richest deanery in Ireland was thus disposed of without his concurrence, and the matter was not pressed further; so Berkeley lost the rich deanery of Down. Her Majesty now declared, that since they would not allow Berkeley to be

Dean in Ireland, he should be a Bishop ; so in this case, as in thousands more, one misfortune leads to a higher honour and advantage. According to the determination of the Queen, he was, on the 19th of May, consecrated the Bishop of Cloyne, in the splendid edifice of St. Paul, Dublin. Fond of study and retirement, susceptible to the beauties and charms of nature and romantic sceneries, this secluded spot would be most agreeable to his taste. He formed such an attachment to it, that when Lord Chesterfield* offered him the vacant bishopric of Clogher, the value of which was double that of Cloyne, he modestly refused it.

SECTION VIII.

It was his habit to rise between three and four in the morning during the whole of the time he was at Cloyne. In 1752 he removed to Oxford, in order to superintend the education of his son. Being convinced of the evil of non-residence, he tried to exchange his high preferment for some

* Chesterfield, Philip Dormer Stanhope, the fourth Earl of, was considered the greatest wit and most accomplished in manners of his day. He associated much with literary men; and partly from that, and partly from some productions of his own, he enjoys still a degree of literary reputation. In 1742, he received the appointment of Lord Lieutenant of Ireland: in this capacity he greatly distinguished himself by reducing the country into a state of tranquillity, such as it did not enjoy before. He was born in London, 1694; and died, 1773.

canonry or headship at Oxford. Failing in this, he wrote to the Secretary of State, to request that he might have permission to resign his bishopric, worth at the time £1,400 per annum. Such an uncommon petition excited His Majesty's curiosity to inquire who was the extraordinary man that sent it: being informed that he was his old friend Dr. Berkeley, the King declared that he should die a Bishop in spite of himself, but gave him liberty to live where he pleased. On Sunday evening, 14th of January, 1753, as he was sitting surrounded with his family, listening to a sermon of Dr. Sherlock's read by his lady, he was seized with palsy in the heart; and so instantaneously expired, that his body was quite stiff and cold before his death was discovered.

SECTION IX.

I differ greatly from Berkeley in theology, politics, and philosophy; yet I wish to do him full justice. My difference from him does not hide from my view his high qualities and excellencies, and my admiration of his character and powers. No one, therefore, it is to be hoped, can accuse me of partiality on the one hand, or ignorant prejudice on the other. His character was made up of varied, rich, and high qualities. He was an accomplished scholar, all his days a devoted stu-

dent; his powers of philosophical analysis were very acute; his powers of conversation were graphic and various; and his rich store of knowledge, both ancient and modern, was almost boundless. His moral character was very rich in clusters of the highest excellencies; his charity to others who differed from him in religious views, was witnessed and testified of by the many Roman Catholics who lived around him; his beneficence was experienced by the poor, not only in the *tar-water** system, but in his care for them and gifts unto them. His zeal for the spread of Christianity was seen in his sanguine and self-denying mission to Bermuda; and his disinterest-

* Berkeley published a large treatise, called *Siris*, on the efficacy of *Tar water*. He thus speaks of it himself: "Every step that I advanced in discovering the virtues of tar water, my own wonder and surprise increased as much as theirs to whom I mentioned them: nor could I, without great variety and evidence of facts, ever have been induced to suspect, that, in all sorts of ailments whatsoever, it might relieve or cure, which at first sight may seem incredible and unaccountable; but, on maturer thought, will perhaps appear to agree with, and follow from, the nature of things. For it is to be noted that the general notion of a disease seems to consist in this, that what is taken in, is not duly assimilated by the force of the animal economy; therefore, it should seem, whatever assists the *vis vite* may be of general use in all diseases, enabling Nature either to assimilate or discharge all unsubdued humours and particles whatsoever. But the light or ether detained on the volatile oil which impregnates tar water being of the same nature with the animal spirit, is an accession of so much strength to the constitution, which it assists to assimilate or expel whatever is alien or noxious." —Works, vol. ii., p. 432. Edit., 1843.

edness was evinced repeatedly, as in the giving up of the deanery of Derry, refusing the bishopric of Clogher, and his wish to resign his preferment when he removed to Oxford. After allowing much to the friendship and warmth of Pope, there is enough still in his poetical praise of Berkeley to sustain him on the ground of virtue:—

“To Berkeley every virtue under heaven.”

We do not take and recommend him as an absolute pattern in all things, because no finite dependent nature can be an absolute model in all matters; and in common with the best in this life, he had some things which it would have been better to be without, and other things which it would have been better to have possessed.

SECTION X.

The life of Berkeley will be estimated differently by different minds. By a small class in the different departments of science he will be always honoured and estimated to his full worth, but the larger class by far will refuse him the meed of honour and praise he is worthy of. His sympathies and application of his powers were universal. He viewed man in all the capability and susceptibility of his nature; he viewed him as having

mind and heart; as susceptible to misery and happiness; as a creature of time and eternity: so he directed his skill and energy to these varied forms of his relations and wants. By some he will be treated as an enthusiastic ignoramus in physics, by others as a dangerous empiric in politics; by many, as a delusive, soft-brained philosopher, and not a few will consider him an unsafe and an unsound theologian. The wider the ramification any man takes, and in proportion to his genius and originality, the more he comes in collision with other theories and views; and in proportion to these things will be the diversity of views concerning him; and for a time, at least, the number of his opponents. Whilst the tame and the commonplace man passes through this life in quietude and happiness without almost any opposing forces; the superior man who tries to benefit his fellows has difficulties and opposing powers without number. Such is the reward of genius and greatness in this life.

SECTION XI.

One accusation against Berkeley is, that he went so much beyond the boundary of his own profession. In the premiss itself there is much truth, but we cannot grant the conclusion which is drawn from it. We cannot allow all this to be

wrong. We see no reason that a man should never give advice and exert his influence in other matters besides what directly belongs to his profession. This would be tantamount to a prohibition not to think of other things ; for to know is of little use, if it is never put in practice when that is convenient and needful. According to this narrow theory, ignorance in all matters except the direct profession of a man is an advantage. According to this, no one but a surgeon must try to save life ; no one but an attorney must give any advice in legal matters ; no one but a statesman must talk about the state of the country ; and no one but the theologian must say anything of the Bible.

SECTION XII.

There is nothing in the economy of Christianity which prohibits a minister of religion from doing all the good he can in all ways, and exerting his influence and powers in every direction, against every form of evil and error. He cannot do all his work in the pulpit and by the sick bed ; for all wrong, misery, and darkness are not around them ; moreover, wisdom and discretion would teach not to bring all there. Christianity leaves all the legitimate relations, duties, and liberties of man intact in this respect, only it

enforces upon him motives and conditions. Every body, every day of his life, goes beyond the direct sphere of his calling. There is not an individual to be found who never thinks, speaks, or acts about anything but what belongs to his actual sphere of action. It cannot be; for it would be contrary to the intuition of man's nature, and at war in numberless instances with the best and noblest feelings of his being. It would at once erase from existence genius, and every superior talent and profundity. A man of high genius must not be confined to a commonplace route, or his nature will be degraded, his spirit imprisoned, his heart broken, and the world robbed. Whilst the narrow common-place path will satisfy and be wide enough to the common-place spirit, not so with one of the superior class of spirits. He must have his meandering turns in all directions, and have full liberty of turning in and out, according to the eccentricities of his nature; to observe and reflect; to make new discoveries and experiments; and, perhaps, he will find a new, nearer, and better path; at least the world will be benefitted in having new facts and experiments.

SECTION XIII.

Let us not be misinterpreted. We do not recommend a neglect of one's profession, to

attend to other matters which do not belong immediately to one's chosen sphere of action. On the contrary, we think that the duties which belong directly to every one's call, should have the preponderate weight and influence with all. No one should neglect the functions of his own profession to attend to others of less importance. All should aim at raising their own profession in effectiveness and usefulness, by aiming to excel themselves in it. Every man, on moral and rational ground, is responsible to do this. What we maintain is, that there is no righteous reason to prohibit from man of any profession to do all he can to benefit man in all ways, provided he does it on enlightened ground and sincere motive, according to the conditions of truth. We cannot, therefore, condemn Berkeley in the abstract, for his varied ramifications into the different paths of science, in politics, in mathematics. At one time he writes about the laws of nature; at another time, about the theory of vision; now on mental philosophy, and not the least in political and philosophical theology. In all this he benefitted man; and, so far as human reason can see, he violated no law of religion or reason. But viewing things relatively, it is possible, nevertheless, that many of his friends may say that the bishop was not entirely faultless so far as his labours and

works are known. It must be confessed that the taste for science, philosophy, and politics, apparently, preponderated in influence over the direct important duties of his profession. It must be confessed, also, that the purely theological portion of his works, compared with other departments, is both meagre and small. The absence of theological literature we do not commend and admire; but this is not an argument against his other writings.* It may be that he had sufficient reasons in his own mind, not to write more extensively in theology. We should not like to say to a bishop or a minister, "Now you must not study science and philosophy; neither politics nor classics must be thought of by you; and surely you must write nothing upon any of these things." This we should rebel against; but on

* All the works of Berkeley, if not what is called directly religious, were written for the good of men, and from religious sympathy and motive. If he did not always treat of the human heart and conscience and the first great duties of religion, he fed the minds and tried to cure the bodies and ameliorate the conditions of men; and unless these are done, religion itself cannot be enjoyed, practised, nor be developed. He who does these things from a religious motive, is a Divine messenger to men, and a great benefactor to his race. He went further than the strait theologian and nervous religionist, but was as religious in aim and conviction as any of them; and far grander in conception and feeling of human want and duty, consecrating himself and all his powers to the honour of his God, the advancement of His truth and goodness, and the happiness of mankind.

the other hand, it may be said, for a bishop to write more on every thing than on the subject-matter of his own profession, is, perhaps, both unwise and out of place. It must be mentioned as a palliation of Berkeley's case, that he wrote most of his philosophical works during the time that he had no responsible ministerial charge; and neither after, nor before he was made a bishop, has it ever been brought to his charge that he neglected any of the duties of his high vocation.

PART II.

BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY:

SECTION XIV.

BISHOP Berkeley is best known by the system of idealism developed by him. This theory is unfolded in two works, called "The Principles of Human Knowledge,"* and "Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous."† If it were not for this system, the name and works of Berkeley, like many more good and great men, would have fallen into a state of entire obscurity. But so long as the various systems of mental science will be studied, the name of Berkeley will be mentioned and his works studied. As yet his theory of idealism, and works in general, have not been so generally read and digested, as they have been

* The book called, *The Principles of Human Knowledge*, was published in 1710, by Aaron Rhonies, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner Row, Dublin; and was the only edition published in Dr. Berkeley's life.

† His *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous* was published in London in 1713. It shows much acuteness, great precision and elegance of expression, but considerable repetition, and often appears as one turning in a circle.

ignorantly referred to and flippantly treated with a smile. The demonstration of the great lexicographer, Dr. Johnson, against the idealism of Berkeley, *kicking a stone*, is as faithfully and generally copied as it is familiarly known.* His system of idealism is considered, generally, so absurd, and contrary to common sense and universal experience, that the best answer it is worthy of is to treat it lightly and indifferently, as the production of one whose brain was not sound at the time in all its organs and powers.† On this ground the philosopher has just reason to complain, and appeal against his critics and judges. We think that the views and sincere convictions of all men should be treated respectfully and cha-

* "After we came out of the church," says Boswell, "we stood talking for some time together of Bishop Berkeley's ingenious sophistry to prove the non-existence of matter, and that everything in the universe is merely ideal. I observed, that though we are satisfied his doctrine is not true, it is impossible to refute it. I never shall forget the alacrity with which Johnson answered, striking his foot with mighty force against a large stone till he rebounded from it,—*I refute it thus.*"—*Boswell's Life of Johnson*, vol. i., pp. 303, 304.

† There is another instance in the *Life of Johnson* by Boswell, where the great critic treats Berkeley's idealism lightly. Being in company with a gentleman who thought fit to maintain Dr. Berkeley's ingenious philosophy,—that nothing exists but as perceived by some mind: when the gentleman was going away, Johnson said to him, "Pray, Sir, don't leave us; for we may, perhaps, forget to think of you, and then you will cease to exist!"—*Boswell's Life of Johnson*, vol. iv., p. 26.

ritably, and that however novel and peculiar they may be, provided they are believed and stated uprightly and fairly. And this is peculiarly rational and righteous on the ground of philosophy. This concession should be made to Berkeley; and we are prepared to give him a full, fair, and just hearing. This we state, not from any partiality to the idealism of Berkeley, but on the ground of rational, impartial justice.

SECTION XV.

On every side it is confessed that he has propounded his system without a method, and often is very ambiguous; so much so sometimes, that his views and theory are so obscure, that both the Realist and the Idealist may refer to it for support and proof.* He appears as one under a sudden

* The Realists and the Idealists are the two great common classes of believers and unbelievers in material substance, which may be subdivided according to the various grades of their belief. The Realists are called sometimes the Substantialists: they are commonly divided into natural Realists, and hypothetical Realists. They are again divided into Dualists, and Unitarians or Monists, according as they view the testimony of consciousness as to subject and object to our ultimate perception. The Idealists are classed into two great and common classes; the cosmothetic and the absolute Idealists. The Cosmothetic are divided into two: those who view the ideal or representative object to be a *tertium quid* different from the percipient mind as from the represented object; and others who regard the ethereal world as only a modification of the mind itself. And the former of these views, again, is divided into various subdivisions;—as theories may differ as to the nature and origin of the vicarious

impulse of discovery and conviction; he runs hastily to make his philosophical *panacea* known to the world, and that without studying method or perspicuity. He opened his bag, and threw his varied materials down at the foot of men, without any form or classification. He appears frequently as one anxious to make some concession, especially to the "vulgar," as if he were afraid of launching too far, or being thought of doing so at least, or that he might gain for his theory more disciples and favour. He walks as one without a track. He had only two points before him,—the starting ground and the concluding spot; but he had no straight line between these extreme points,—he must make that himself. His starting-point

object, as, Is it material or immaterial? Does it come from without, or rise from within? Does it emanate from external reality, or from a higher source? Is it produced by God, or by some higher intelligence, or a representation in the Deity Himself? Is it innate, or produced by the mind on the occasion of the presence of matter? Such are some of these subtle and puzzling theories. Absolute Idealism is again divided into two principal species;—the theistic, and the egoistic. The first supposes that the Deity represents to the mind what we mistake for an external world; the second supposes that these appearances are manifested to consciousness, in conformity with some unknown laws, by the mind itself. The Theistic is again subdivided into three theories: according as God is supposed to exhibit the phenomena in question in His own nature, or to infuse into the percipient mind representative entities different from its own modification, or to determine the *ego* itself to an allusive representation of the *non-ego*. See Sir W. Hamilton's *Discourses on Philosophy and Literature*, pp. 54–60, 193–200. Also his *Lectures on Metaphysics*, vol. i., pp. 294–297.

was a conviction of the non-existence of matter without the perceiving being ; his ultimate object was the making of this theory known unto others, and convincing them of its truth and advantage. In both he was earnest and sincere. All his skill, learning, and acuteness, are summoned simultaneously to prepare their varied logical arrows against a material world, and completely annihilate it from existence, or to prove that it never did exist, which, to the common sense of shortsighted mortals, would be the same thing. Everything exists in the mind that perceives it ; and apart from the perceiving mind nothing exists. The real place and form of existence is in the idea. The desk I write upon, the paper I feel—they exist in my ideas, and nowhere else ; and they may exist in the ideas of all others, if they only saw and felt them, at the same time. If the perceiving *ego* did not exist, the desk and the paper before me could not have existed. Ideas are objects of perception, and their existence is in the fact that they are perceived. Ideas are different from the mind, and yet they exist in the mind. He tells us that all the material things around us, and all the objects of our senses, are nothing more than ideas ; and all these exist in the mind, and nowhere else. Hence, using the thought of Dr. Brown, this system rather materi-

alizes mind, than spiritualizes matter.* Though it denies the material outside, yet it creates something that is not purely mental inside; it denies the old world, that has been always intuitively believed in, yet it calls into being another world of ideas. This may be small or large, just as it is perceived; if it is not perceived by anybody, it does not exist; for its real existence is in the fact that it is perceived by some intelligent mind. It may exist to one without existing to the other; for one may perceive it whilst the other does not perceive it. A thing existing and not existing at the same time, according to the logic of common reasoning, is a contradiction.†

* Dr. Thomas Brown, an elegant philosopher. Never any works on metaphysics have been so popular and captivating as his Lectures were, when they were first published. It may be said, however, notwithstanding his great philosophical genius, that it is very doubtful whether his style is not too flowery to suit serious and deep metaphysical thought. The philosopher was born at Kirkmabreck, Kirkeadbrightshire, in 1778; and, after an illustrious career as a medical practitioner, lecturer on metaphysics, and an author, died at Brompton, London, whither he had gone for his health, in 1826.

† The logical "law of identity or contradiction" is the general expression and criterion of all necessary truth. The law is that a thing must be what it is. A is A. This law vindicates itself; and shows at least one necessary truth or law of reason. In itself it is of little value; but as an abbreviated expression for the criterion of truth, it is of high importance and of great value. The primary laws of thought, or the conditions of the thinkable, are four:—1. The law of identity. 2. The law of contradiction. 3. The law of exclusion; or excluded middle. 4. The law of sufficient reason.

SECTION XVI.

Now, according to this idealism, ideas are not part of the thinking *ego*, neither are they material substance; therefore, they must be something different from both, or possess the qualities of both. According to this, this theory calls into existence a new class of entities, or ideas must be either spiritual or material. If ideas are material, Berkeley will be no further on his way, than he was before the thought of his theory; the name is the only difference,—matter still exists under the name idea. If ideas are spiritual, this would be directly against his theory. If ideas were made up of mind and matter, this would be against him; for then matter and mind would be the synthesis. If different from both, this would not help him; but involve him and all in greater perplexity. We cannot see how Berkeley can avoid the dilemma of the preceding conclusions, without giving up his theory of idealism. Let the ingenious philosopher be heard in his own words: “This perceiving, active being is what I call *mind*, *spirit*, *soul*, or myself: by which words I do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing, whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists in

being perceived.”* He unfolds his views further in the following words: “The table I write on, I say exists, that is, I see and feel it; and if I were out of my study I should say it existed, meaning thereby that if I was in my study I might perceive it, or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was an odour, that is, it was smelled; there was a sound, that is to say, it was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or touch. This is all I can understand by these and the like expressions; for as to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.” “*The vulgar opinion involves a contradiction.* It is, indeed, an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects, have an existence natural or real distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find it in his heart to call it in question, may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction; for what are

* *Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 87, sect. ii.

the forementioned objects but the things we *perceive* by sense? and is it not plainly repugnant that^o any one of them, or any combination of them, exist unperceived?"

To make it more clear and explicit, we shall quote once more: "From what has been said," says the author, "it follows there is *not any other substance than spirit*, or that which perceives. But for the fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like; that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for any idea to exist in an unperceiving thing, is a manifest contradiction; for, *to have an idea is all one as to perceive*; that, therefore, wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist, must perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no *unthinking* substance or substratum of those ideas." *

SECTION XVII.

It is clear, from the quotations made, that Berkeley denies, virtually and actually, the existence of the external world. The external world is nothing but subjective ideas. Whatever his disciples and apologizers ingeniously say to screen or modify his theory, his language is clear, and his meaning cannot be mistaken. In fact, he is

* *Principles of Human Knowledge*, pp. 88, 89, sects. 3, 4, 7.

clearer, and not so disingenuous, as his apologizers and expounders. It makes no difference as to the way he proceeds, and the ingenuity he displays; the end aimed at is, the total denial of matter. This is the only interpretation which the letter and spirit of his philosophy will furnish us with. To put another construction upon his philosophy would be to do injustice to the author, and violation to his system. The material universe, in its ten thousand classes of beings, and numberless tangible objects, is reduced to ideas or sensations. If such a theory could be proved true, we should think it a most marvellous thing, that universal humanity has been deceived so long. It would have been the most amazing discovery that human reason ever made; and the genius which made it would be the most extraordinary. The external world, according to this amazing discovery, has no true existence but in the compass of man's ideas. Not only the catalogue of material objects are ideal in conception, but the real things themselves; he carries them all with him in his ideas. The sun he sees is not above him, but in his idea; the moon he beholds by night is not many miles distant, but in his sensation; the ten thousand stars he sees through his magnifying telescope, are not actually in the different constellations of heaven, but in

him, in his ideas ; for the real existence of things is in perceiving them ; the mind perceives nothing but ideas, and ideas exist in the mind. He maintains that the rivers, the trees, the fields, the houses, beasts, and men, have no real existence, but in the mere sensations of man. And, sure enough, if they existed within man, they could not be real ; for no finite space and power could find place for them all.

SECTION XVIII.

It is true, that he does not deny external phenomena, as presenting themselves to the senses. Mr. Lewes tells us, in his "Biographical History of Philosophy," * that this is an unfortunate affair for his critics. Berkeley could not deny the cognizance of certain objects by the senses, without being considered a maniac ; yet, he denies the external reality of all material substance, inde-

* "Unfortunately for the critics," writes Mr. Lewes, "Berkeley did *not* contradict the evidence of the senses ; did *not* propound a theory at variance in this point with the ordinary belief of mankind. His peculiarity is, that he confined himself exclusively to the evidence of the senses. What the senses informed him of, that, and *that only*, would he accept. He held fast to the facts of consciousness ; he placed himself resolutely in the centre of the instinctive belief of mankind ; there he took up his stand, leaving to philosophers the region of supposition, inference, and of occult substances." —*Lewes's Biographical History of Philosophy*, vol. iv., p. 9. Knight's Edition.

pendent of the perceiving being ; and this leads to the same conclusion as the denial of the phenomena of matter, and less consistent. He denies the final and simple credence to the testimony of his senses. His senses informed him of certain material objects, external and independent of himself ; but he comes forward and corrects their testimony, and says, "O dear ! you misinform me ; all those things which you inform me to be without me, material in nature and independent of me in existence and relation, are within me ; they are as essential parts of me as my ideas ; they are as spiritual as my ideas ; they are nothing but my ideas or sensations."

SECTION XIX.

I see an external object, a tree, a field, or some other material thing, and in these as qualities there are extension and figure. My sense would intuitively inform me that these objects are external and different from myself ; but Berkeley says, No ; they are in my mind ; they are nothing but inward sensations. There is bread on the table ; I feel, see, and taste it. Here we have the testimony of three senses that this bread is something external and independent of the eyes that see it, the mouths that eat it, and the hands

which handle it; it is clear that it has extension, figure, colour, weight, and certain taste. But according to this ideal philosophy, this bread is nothing but an idea in the mind. Pity that such ideas cannot be produced in the mind of many hungry ones; it would be a convenient and cheap way to supply their wants. I carry a heavy burden; my feelings inform me of the time I took it up and put it down; but here, as well as in other matters of which the senses inform us, the good bishop steps forward and stoutly maintains that feeling is inherent in the mind, and that all is nothing but an inward sensation. We believe that in such circumstances very few would believe the good Doctor. This is the plain logic of his philosophy. It is amazing if ever he himself was a satisfied convert to its reasoning and conclusion.

SECTION XX.

My senses inform me of something tangible; they inform me also that this tangible thing is without me and quite independent of me. They inform me, moreover, that this tangible thing, external and independent of me, has certain qualities, as length and breadth, colour, and caloric. But this philosophy will not accept of such evidence, but at once refuses it wholesale, and says,

all is a mistake; all these are nothing but perceptions of the mind, and the mind perceives nothing but ideas, and these ideas are in the mind. This idealism accuses the senses of deceiving us; it disbelieves and denies their primordial and final testimony. The very root of the theory must be traced to the want of confidence in the simple testimony of the senses. It would have been, therefore, more candid and unambiguous, as well as better for the theory itself, to have declared an open war against the testimony of the senses. That Berkeley thus accepts in the first instance the testimony of the senses, and yet denies them final credence, we think it an unfortunate thing for him and his philosophy; and not, as Mr. Lewes thinks, for his critics. If the testimony of the senses is to be accepted as to the phenomenon of matter, what consistency is there in denying their testimony that matter is what it appears to be, a real external substance independent of ideas? If this evidence is to be accepted in one, why refuse it in the other? This is accepting and refusing the testimony of the same witness, and that relative to the same thing. It appears to us that this involves both inconsistency and contradiction.

SECTION XXI.

And yet this philosophy claims a sympathy and coincidence with the view of the vulgar. Mr. Lewes, in the work we have already mentioned, says, "He thought with the vulgar that matter was that of which his senses informed him, not an occult something of which he could have no information." In our humble opinion Mr. Lewes did not rightly inform himself of the view of the vulgar, or has mistaken Berkeley, or was not sincere in this assertion. We are ready to ask in reference to him, as he did in reference to Reid's* and Beattie's,† "Where was Mr. Lewes' usual acuteness?" If we were to ask Mr. Lewes in a straightforward manner, Did Dr. Berkeley deny the external existence of matter, as it is conceived and believed in by the generality of men, or did he not? we must have a straightforward answer to

* Dr. Thomas Reid was a divine, and one of the greatest philosophers that Scotland ever produced. His chief works are, "An Inquiry into the Human Mind," and "Essays on the Intellectual and Active Powers of Man." He was born at Strachan, Kincardineshire, in the year 1710; and died in 1790.

† Dr. James Beattie was both a poet and a philosopher. He was the author of many works of considerable popularity in his day; but his "Minstrel," and "Essay on Truth," are the works by which he is most generally and lastingly known. He was the Professor of Moral Philosophy for many years in the Marischal College of Aberdeen, an office which he retained till nearly the close of life. He was born at Lawrencekirk, Scotland, in 1735; and died, 1803.

this simple and plain question. We shall accept of no metaphysical quibbling. Mr. Lewes will not object to this, being such a faithful disciple and advocate of Comte's positive philosophy.*

* Auguste Comte, a late French philosopher. He commenced his public life as a follower of Saint Simon, and, in 1820, prepared a work explanatory of the system of that extraordinary man. He subsequently became a Mathematical Professor at the Polytechnic School; but on the accession of Louis Napoleon to the Empire, he was deprived of that position. Between 1830 and 1842, he published, in six large volumes, his "Course of Positive Philosophy," the purpose of which is to prove that the human mind passes through three different stages in its meditations upon all subjects. The first is the theological; the second, the metaphysical; and the third, the positive; in which, it is supposed, the mind has acquired a positive knowledge of things, according to their comprehension, relation, and harmony with the laws of the universe. In 1843, he published a mathematical work; and, in the following year, a "Discourse" intended to enforce and make clearer his larger work. His theories attracted a large number of ardent disciples and admirers; especially among the disciples of Saint Simon and Fourier. Not only he found many followers in France, but in England and Europe he has many disciples and admirers; and Mr. Lewes appears to be one of them. At Paris, an Institution was established, of which Comte himself was a kind of high priest; and all its members used all means and the greatest activity to promulgate the views of their admired and great master. There are several causes which have greatly enhanced the influence and popularity of his system. The "Course of Positive Philosophy" is undeniably a very great work; and no one but the very first intellect and genius could have produced it; and every great work by a master spirit is sure to make many disciples. But there are other reasons, which are to be found in the state of men's views and sympathies, which helped greatly its popularity.

The author had a high name and position; the work has an amazing amount of science in it; there is a tendency in the European mind to materialism, especially in the English mind; and, above all,

We think that Mr. Lewes must answer in the positive. Let us quote a few sentences from Berkeley himself. "It will be urged," says the author, "that this much at least is true; to wit, that we take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if the word *substance* be taken in the vulgar sense for a conviction of sensible qualities, such as extension, solidity, weight, and the like; this we cannot be advised of taking away. But if it be taken in a philosophical sense for the support of accidents or *qualities without the mind*, then indeed I acknowledge that we take it away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any existence, not even in the imagination."* This passage might mislead any one who is not familiar with his system. He does not deny "sensible qualities, as

in the matter-of-fact students of material science. There is a common dislike among many formal scientific men to metaphysics; and, above all, it is very acceptable to the wish and feeling of men, to believe themselves in possession of positive and infallible knowledge about all objects of anxious inquiry. It is the dogma of infallibility introduced into philosophy; and the lofty questions of metaphysics reduced to the limit of human mechanism, and positive knowledge. It limits human thought, and paralyses intellectual energy; and no doubt its tendency is material and sceptical. Comte's "Positive Philosophy" has been translated into English by Miss Martineau. He was born at Montpellier, 1795, and, after an illustrious, active, and earnest life, died in Paris, in the year 1857, loved and regretted by a large number in France, Europe, and America.

* *Principles of Human Knowledge*, p. 100.

extension, solidity," and so on. But what does he mean by these qualities? Nothing more than qualities in the form of ideas existing in the mind. Let this be known once more in the words of Berkeley himself, on the same page as the above: — "*The hardness or softness, the colour, taste, warmth, figure, or such like qualities, which, combined together, constitute the several sorts of victuals and apparel, have been known to exist only in the mind that perceives them; and this is all that is meant by calling them ideas, which word, if it was ordinarily used as thing, would sound no harsher nor more ridiculous than it. I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the expression.*" If the reader will compare these quotations with those we have made in former pages from Berkeley, it will show that we interpret him fairly.

SECTION XXII.

But this theory does not coincide with the view of the vulgar, relative to material substance. Berkeley appears to contradict himself on this ground. In one of the quotations we have given, he asserts that the vulgar view of matter is wrong; in another place he states that he coincided with the vulgar. We cannot account for this as well as

for other things in his idealism ; except the author was in a dilemma, and knew not how to extricate himself. *Prima facie*, it might be thought that Berkeley coincides with the vulgar ; but a short consideration and few interrogations will soon convince that he does not. His *material substance*, &c., resolves itself into ideas ; these ideas are in the mind, and in the perception of them consists their existence. This is all Berkeley understands to be matter. Berkeley and the vulgar would go only a short distance together. They would agree as to the phenomena which present themselves to the senses ; but the moment he would say, “ These material objects which present themselves to our senses, are nothing but ideas perceived by the mind,” they would part company with him immediately. The vulgar would ask him, “ Do you see that splendid field covered with beautiful daisies, fine horses, sheep, and cattle ? We think them to be real things without us, independent of us, and if we never saw them, they would exist just the same ; what do you mean by this ? ” He would answer, “ They are ideas in my mind.” Ideas of daisies, horses, sheep, and cattle ! This view is diametrically opposed to the common sense of the vulgar. Such is our confidence in this, that we should willingly venture it upon the examination of the view of the vulgar. Such idealism never

entered the view of ordinary men. They take material substance to be what it presents itself to the senses, intuition, and consciousness; and never dream of solving it to a mere inward idealism. It never has been, nor can it be, the conclusion of common sense; and the vulgar are governed by common sense and intuition. It is the theory of aberrant genius, tired with the common route, and anxious for a more novel path, more congenial with their predisposed feelings, desires, and purposes. Only a few restless spirits have landed on this naked shore of ideal philosophy. The intuition and consciousness of men have preserved them from it, and ever will.

SECTION XXIII.

Neither is there that difference between the vulgar and philosophers, as to the nature and laws of matter. Philosophers, and the vulgar, believe cordially that matter has certain properties; as, extension, impenetrability, divisibility, porosity, compressibility, elasticity, mobility, and inertia. They both believe in other properties, which are not found invariably in universal matter; as hardness, softness, heavy, light, rough, smooth, bitter, sweet, red, brown, green, large, small, and many more of such kinds. They both believe that

matter is found in different forms, as solid, liquid, or gaseous. They both believe that matter is a tangible substance, apprehended by its contact with the senses. Their belief in all the properties and laws of matter, in the main, is the same; only the vulgar are not capable of going so far, and of defining so accurately, its laws and qualities, scholastically and precisely, as philosophers. The vulgar did believe that the *sun*, *moon*, and all the solar planets, turned around this globe; but now they believe with philosophers. The vulgar at length follow and adopt the tested views of philosophers: as one advances, the other follows. In many points of natural science, the vulgar are now higher than philosophers were in times past.

SECTION XXIV.

If it were granted to the idealist, that the vulgar have no conception of a *substratum* in which the qualities of matter inhere, it would not follow that they disbelieve in the existence of an external world on that account. Whether the first is rightly understood or not, the latter will be always believed in, because it is a matter of conscious intuition. Neither does it follow, as a necessary conclusion, if such a thing as a *substratum*, as a metaphenomenal underlying matter, cannot be

clearly defined and proved, that the non-existence of matter is demonstrable, and to believe in its reality inconsistent. The denial of universal material substances would be a very rash and unwarrantable conclusion to arrive at, because such a thing as a substratum of matter cannot be defined and proved. The want of proof and denial of one, can never destroy the other. In this we think Berkeley very inaccurate in his reasoning and conclusion. He denies the existence of matter, which presents itself as an indubitable phenomenon to his senses, because the substratum of it cannot be clearly defined and proved. He sacrifices a thing that has clear evidence, because another thing cannot be clearly pointed out; and the proof of the existence of matter does not depend upon and require the proof of that thing. He is guilty of drawing a positive conclusion from an uncertain premiss, and from a postulate that the conclusion does not necessarily depend upon.

SECTION XXV.

The idealist is not able to prove that a *substratum* does not exist, and yet draws a conclusion of affirmation, that matter cannot be what it appears to be to all the minds of men. Would it be safe and right to use this logic in all departments

of knowledge? Is it needful to be able to define all things about the objects of our credence, before we believe in their existence? Does it not happen frequently, that there is something pertaining to the most simple objects of faith, beyond our definition? Do not the idealists themselves believe in innumerable things that they cannot explain all about? This is a highway to universal scepticism: man is conscious of a spiritual influence, and yet, according to this, he must not believe in it, because he cannot define the course and the agent of it. There are evidences of intelligence in men, and yet, because mind cannot infallibly be defined, we must not believe in it. Many think that they have evidence of the Divinity of the Messiah; yet, because the hypostatic union cannot be defined, we must deny His Divinity! If this is the rule of certitude and credence, we have not sufficient evidence to believe anything; stubborn unbelief must universally reign; and, the more ignorant man is, the more rational his unbelief. These conclusions would have been deprecated by Berkeley, yet we think that they follow naturally from his position.

SECTION XXVI.

Though we may not be able to define a *substratum*, or material substance, in which inhere

sensible qualities, yet one involves the other. Material substance must have some qualities ; so cognizable sensible qualities must inhere in the same substance. A clear proof, therefore, against the existence of one, would end in the negation of the other. If Berkeley could have proved the non-existence of material substance, or of the *substratum* of matter, which is the same thing, then, as a matter of simple sequence, nothing would remain but airy and empty ideas ; but, as he could not prove either of these, his reasoning, in our opinion, is illogical and most inconclusive. It follows that whoever has a perception of one, must have a belief in the other, for one is a correlative of the other ; and the mind, by natural logical order, and intuitive conviction, leads us from one to the other.

SECTION XXVII.

That it cannot be defined, is not the least evidence against its existence, must be clear, from the fact that an exact knowledge of things is never in this world of imperfection to be either the test of truth, the evidence of conviction, the ground of belief, the rule of action, or the final test of things. If this is conclusive, the vulgar, as well as the philosopher, believes in the sub-

stratum of matter. Would any one believe in colour, figure, weight, extension, caloric, sweet, bitter, and all other sensible qualities, without a substance in which they inhere? Can a motion exist without some moving body? One is the accident or the property of the other. It could not have existed without. We could not, orderly and logically, conceive of one without the other. Here is a book. This book has figure, extension, weight, and colour. These qualities are not the book, and yet we cannot conceive of a book without them. The book is not figure, nor is it extension, nor weight, neither is it colour, nor all these put together; it is something that has all these as its properties, yet in itself it is none of them.

SECTION XXVIII.

The legitimate force of this is applicable to the mind as well as matter. Mind is a unity; so matter is a unity; yet both have their powers or properties. If the *substratum* of one is denied, is it consistent to believe in that of the other? We cannot think it is. If it will be said that we are conscious of one, so are we of the other. Perception, conception, reflection, remembrance, abstraction, and calculation; love, hate, fear, grief, joy, confidence, and hope, and many more, are powers

and acts of the mind. Though the mind cannot be what it is without these, yet the mind itself is not one or several of these; it is something in which these exist, and are the expressive powers of it. On the same ground, as this ideal philosophy denies the substratum of matter, it does away with that of the mind, too. In this, also, we consider the theory inconsistent and self-contradictory.

SECTION XXIX.

The immediate question at issue is,—Are the things which come in contact with our senses, material qualities? This is the gist of the whole question. If this were settled, as a matter of sure consequence, the whole matter would rest. If they are material properties, matter must exist, and they inhere in that material reality; but, if they are not material properties, so far as we know, matter does not exist. This is the goal where both sides must unite or separate; in this place must the first premiss of negation or affirmation be proclaimed; without this understanding all will be fighting without arms and order, and completely in the dark. In this, we think that Berkeley and the idealists appear as if they wished to evade the question. Instead of declaring at once that extension, hardness, softness, and other pro-

perities presenting themselves to the senses, are nothing but ideality, they say,—“We believe our senses, that all these are really what they appear to be.” Yet, according to the system of Berkeley, they are nothing but ideas in the brain. This appears like quibbling and evading, rather than fairly defining and reasoning. Truth fares always best when it is stated fairly and fully; and, if idealism is true, it needs fear nothing as to its aim and consequences. The misfortune of truth is, that it is concealed, misunderstood, and denied; whilst it is the fortune of error to be misconstrued, and clothed and mixed with truth.

SECTION XXX.

Berkeley rests his idealism upon the ground of consciousness, and Mr. Lewes says that he is incontrovertibly safe here. On this ground Hume used to say of his philosophy, that it is uncontroverted, but convinces nobody.* The original datum, and primordial truth and testimony of consciousness, are the same everywhere, and in everybody. It cannot be a predicate of the negative and of the affirmative, relative to the same thing, and in the same sense; therefore, it cannot

* Hume, David, a historian, and a philosopher of great power and acuteness. Born at Edinburgh, 1711; died in the same city, 1776.

deny and affirm the existence of matter. The testimony of consciousness is not contradictory and changeable. It is the same in every age and breast. The only difficulty is to solve and understand it rightly. Both the realist and the idealist appeal for proof to the ground of consciousness. The two it cannot support, or its evidence is contradictory; if so, its worth and veracity are gone. The veracity and the efficiency of the fact of consciousness must be preserved in their integrity. If the veracity and uniformity of its evidence are not accepted, it cannot be the court of final appeal; but this must always be the final and absolute court relative to all that belong to the individual *ego*, because it is the only power of test in the possession of all. It is an instinct in the nature of man to fall back upon his own consciousness; and whatever contradicts its testimony is not believed. Here, where lauded Descartes,* after all his doubts and anxieties, *Cogito, ergo sum*, was his resting-place; and here where all philosophers finally seek a safe landing. Whatever is not im-

* Descartes, a celebrated French mathematician and philosopher. He was the first to reduce the science of optics to the command of mathematics. He was an extensive author. The following are some of the principal works which perpetuate the philosophical power of the eminent philosopher:—*Principia Philosophiæ*; *Dissertatio de Methodo recte regendæ Rationis*; *Dioptricæ*; *Meditationes*; *Geometry*; *Letters*. He was born at La Haye, in Touraine, 1596, and died at Stockholm, 1650.

mediately the fact of consciousness, must be a matter of revelation or testimony ; but the cognition of the senses, the emotions, and the state and acts of the mind, are directly under the jurisprudence of consciousness, which Berkeley falls back upon as a testing-ground of his theory.

SECTION XXXI.

To a certain point the idealist and the realist agree, and walk together in unity. The two acknowledge the testimony of consciousness, paramount as to the *ego*, or the mind itself ; so far goes the idealism of Fichte,* which resolves all the external objectives into pure thought ; so far goes the idealism of Berkeley, which resolves all into ideas ; and so far goes the belief in the external world together. At this point Berkeley, and his friend the realist, (not Hylas,) differ, and finally separate company. Berkeley asserts the fact of consciousness further than this : he says that he is conscious of certain ideas as objects of perception, but these were not external and inde-

* Johann Gottlieb Fichte, a subtle metaphysician, and a lofty pure character. One of the ablest expounders of Kant's philosophy ; and father of J. Hermann Fichte, who has caught the metaphysical tendency, views, and ability of his father. The story of his life and death is most touching ; and, whether his system of philosophy is received or not, all will admire the felicitous purity of his life. He was born at Rammenon, in Upper Lusatia, 1762 ; and died, 1814.

pendent objects. Fichte asserted that he was conscious of nothing but of his own thoughts; Berkeley says that he was conscious of his own perception, or the perceiving being, and also the idea perceived, but this idea is nothing. The idealism of Fichte is more simple and consistent than that of Berkeley.* The realist differs from the two as to the cognition of the *non ego*, and its real identical existence, apart from the perceiving *ego*. This philosophy is both more simple and more consistent than that of idealism.

SECTION XXXII.

The fact of consciousness in its present view and relation, resolves itself into different inquiries. First, how far does consciousness take cognizance of things? Does it include something external with the perceiving *ego*? This we answer in the

* Fichte's was a more spiritual and pure idealism than Berkeley's; though they possess much in common, yet they have their features of difference. Berkeley claims identity of belief with the vulgar; Fichte boldly declares that the vulgar are deluded. Berkeley says that he perceives ideas and nothing else; Fichte knows nothing beyond his immediate and absolute consciousness. Berkeley would say, "The world is as if it were real to me, it presents itself to my senses;" Fichte would say, "I know nothing about it, I know of nothing but of my own consciousness." Berkeley quibbles more than Fichte; but both end in the same conclusion,—a complete negation of our external world.

affirmative. It takes cognition of the subjective and of the objective; consciousness testifies to the *ego* and the *non ego*, as a natural and necessary synthesis. It is impossible to think of *self*, without thinking of something that is *not self*. The *ego* is conscious of the perceiving being; it is also at the same time conscious of the external reality perceived; and, in the concept, these are contrasted and separated from each other. This almost all philosophers believe to be the incontestable deliverance of consciousness. Many of the ancient philosophers believed in certain images or representations made to the mind. Reid was the first, in this country at least, to exalt consciousness to its proper place and function; and yet Reid is not very explicit and comprehensive in all his statements; but Sir William Hamilton, with consummate learning, and lavish criticism, and most acute and exact definitions and analysis, has established the fact beyond the power at present of an attack, or perhaps improvement.*

* Sir William Hamilton was one of the greatest philosophers, if not the very greatest, of his age; and the first even Scotland ever produced. He was educated at Balliol College, Oxford, and was brought up to the bar; but, his philosophical tendency being too strong, he never courted much practice. In 1836, he became the Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh, which he retained till his death. He greatly advanced the literature of philosophy, logic, and metaphysics. His powers, both of generalization and analysis, were extraordinarily great. There have been as great

That the *non ego* is different and external to the *ego* that perceives it, is, and has been, the con-

thinkers, and perhaps greater than he; but few, if any, ever united such extensive and various learning, wondrous reading, and wonderful intellectual resources, with great thinking, as the late Sir W. Hamilton. M. Cousin calls him, "*le plus grand critique de notre siècle*;" and M. Brandis, "*le grand maître du Péripatétisme.*" His chief works are, his "Discussion on Philosophy," &c., first chiefly published in the "Edinburgh Review," afterwards collected into a large volume; his edition of Reid's Works, with many notes, and long supplementary dissertations; and he was engaged upon the Works of Dugald Stewart, when the message of death came. His Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, which he delivered to his University class, have been published in four volumes, edited, and given to the public, and at once are worthy of the illustrious Professor, and of the distinguished editors, so that his most tenacious disciple cannot wish anything more.

Without a doubt, Sir W. Hamilton was a disciple of Kant, and the fundamental principles of his philosophy are of the Kantian school; and his acceptance and defence of the common-sense philosophy accorded fully with these principles. It has been said of him, that he was destructive and not constructive. Philosophy in its very nature is controversial, testing, and destructive; its business and aim is, to correct the inadvertencies of thought, belief, and life. Before a philosopher can become constructive, he must destroy the systems of dogmas, and mountains of opinions and prejudices, which stand in his way. After this is done, and a clear way opened, the work of construction begins; and he who can destroy right well, has also the power to construct right well. Sir W. Hamilton was not only a powerful destructive critic, he was also a discoverer both in logic and metaphysics; though he has done more than any one man for a long period, it is possible, but for the lamentable stroke of death, that he would have done more, in constructing a system of philosophy, which he was not permitted to do. He devoted all his powers and resources to teach, elucidate, and establish the fundamental principles in the common-sense philosophy of Reid; and has put it on a ground not easily attacked. These just and high eulogiums do not necessitate our acceptance

consciousness of universal man. This cannot be doubted, without coming into collision with the universal conduct and actions of men. 1. The emotions of the mind are different to these entities: love, hatred, hope, joy, with others of the same nature. These emotions have their real subjectives and objectives, and all are conscious of their different modifications towards their different objects. 2. The actual habits and actions of all men show this universal consciousness; all men avoid falling into the water, going into the fire, precipitating over a rock, taking poison; all men fear the lion, the mad dog, fire instruments, the terrific thunderbolt, and numberless things beside. The fact of consciousness alone accounts for these universal conducts. Berkeley himself, in perpetual and numberless instances, obeyed this law of his nature, whilst he tried to reason it away in his theory of idealism. This is not the production of all in his views; for there are some matters as to which we cannot agree all in all with Sir W. Hamilton.

In purging and establishing the philosophy of common sense, he lays down the following canons as his touch-stone, which regulated all his philosophical inquiries:—"1. That we admit nothing, not either an original datum of consciousness, or the legitimate consequence of such a datum. 2. That we embrace all the original data of consciousness, and all their legitimate consequences: and, 3. That we exhibit each of these in its individual integrity, neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordination."—Hamilton's Reid, Note A., p. 747. Sir W. Hamilton was born at Glasgow, 1788; and, after a laborious, illustrious, and glorious life, died at Edinburgh, 1856.

of a mere phenomenal phantom, but of the real consciousness of the mind, of an external reality. This is seen in children in every class and condition, and that without distinction of time and place, which shows it to be original and uniform.

SECTION XXXIII.

The veracity of consciousness cannot be doubted. If this were doubted, and called in question on one ground, it must be doubted on every ground, and in every form. This would be suicidal and destructive, for the same consciousness testifies everywhere. And if its testimony is not believed relative to the external, what ground have we to believe its evidence relative to the existence of the *ego* himself? If the veracity of the testimony of consciousness were denied, universal scepticism, as a matter of necessity, would follow. The *fact* of consciousness cannot be doubted, without doubting doubt itself; which would be a contradiction and annihilation. Every man must be conscious of his own doubt; and yet, if the fact of consciousness is denied, it is a simple impossibility. The fact of consciousness must ever stand as firm as the existence of man.

SECTION XXXIV.

Secondly, Does consciousness become familiar with external reality mediately, or immediately?

These two theories have been held, and yet are held, by many. They who hold that the mind becomes familiar with the external world, through the medium of an ideal medium, are called representationists; and the believers in the theory that the mind becomes familiar with the external reality, without any *tertium quid*, or immediately, are called presentationists. Ancient philosophers, down to Locke,* and, indeed, Locke himself, be-

* John Locke is a familiar name to the veriest tyro in mental science, and excites feelings of love and admiration in the profoundest thinkers of every land, nationality, and age. He is one of the first that taught me to think, and lead my boyish sympathies and reflections into the lofty and delightful regions of higher thought. I revere him as a master; I respect him as an independent and unaffected thinker; and never will cease to admire his lofty, upright, and noble demeanour as a man; and I love him as a father of the noblest heritage, which a man can leave to his race. It would be one of the most gloomy and distressing thoughts and feelings of my soul, if such characters were gone for ever, without a hope to meet and hold communion with them in a happier and brighter world. Hence, it is a part of the brightest thoughts, and happiest hopes and feelings my mind is capable of, that such lights are not extinguished from the universe of God; and that it will be in my power and privilege to hold intercourse and associate with them in another life.

Thinkers differ as to the quality of his philosophy, but all agree in acknowledging both his greatness and power. No one has wielded, since the time of Aristotle, such great and universal sway over the thinking portion of Europe, as John Locke. He produced an epoch in the intellectualism of England and Europe. Never a more unaffected and natural thinker; never a more homely and familiar thinker; but never a more honest and earnest thinker.

It is the portion of a great man often to be opposed and persecuted, because he removes venerable and fashionable landmarks in thought and habits, and settles the future destiny of men and nations. No

lieved that the mind perceived the external *mediately*.* They believed that the mind was too

man was more persecuted in his time and person, than John Locke; and no one has been more opposed, and more severely handled and tested in his philosophy, than he. But it is the portion of the great and good, to be greatly loved and admired as men. No one has had a larger meed of praise and admiration than John Locke; and at this very time he has readers and admirers throughout Europe and America, and all parts of the globe where philosophy is loved and studied. He was born at Wrington, Somersetshire, on the 29th of August, 1632, and died in the arms of his friend, Lady Masham, on the 28th of October, 1704.

* This is a matter of great debate and disagreement among the critics of Locke. Reid brought upon himself the severe criticism of Dr. Priestley, Dr. Brown, and others, for his criticism upon Locke, that he held *ideas* as *media* between the external world and the perceiving mind. Sir W. Hamilton decides in favour of Dr. Reid, and severely handles the opponents of Reid. See Hamilton's "Discussions," p. 77, &c.; "Lectures," vol. ii., p. 53, &c.; Dr. Brown's "Lectures," p. 170, &c.; "Dr. Reid," by Hamilton, p. 256, &c.

From the want of greater preciseness and unity in diction, and his extensive, familiar, and lively pictorial figures, there is a difficulty to get at the real view of Locke on this controversial point. Yet, any one in studying the works of Locke unprejudiced, without the knowledge of the comments and criticism of his admirers and deprecators, will arrive like myself at the conclusion, that he holds ideas as representations to the mind, of external objects. The mind, according to him, perceives ideas; the external meets the mind in its ideas; ideas are the place of meeting and unity between the mind and all its perceiving objects. "To ask, at what time a man has first any ideas?" says Locke, "is to ask when he begins to perceive? having ideas, and perceptions, being the same thing. I know it is an opinion that the soul always thinks, and that it has the actual perception of ideas in itself constantly, as long as it exists; and that actual thinking is as inseparable from the soul, as actual extension is from the body; which, if true, to inquire after the beginning of man's ideas is the same, as to inquire after the beginning of his soul. For, by this account, soul and its ideas, as body and its extension, will begin to

refined to come *immediately* into contact with matter. According to this theory of representation, the material reality was something beyond the thing perceived ; and so, nothing but a matter of inference. This view throws the material reality, from the ground of absolute certainty, to the ground of logical probability. On this ground material and external substance cannot be proved, directly by the fact and veracity of consciousness ; for the simple reason, that the mind is not conscious of anything directly but the *ego*, and the representation made to it. It would be a hard matter, on this ground, to prove external reality. But the common-sense philosophy of Scotland has delivered the fact of consciousness in this

exist both at the same time.”—*Human Understanding*, Tegg's Edition, sect. 9, p. 53. In another place he says :—“ Fire may burn our bodies with no other effect than it does a billet, unless the motion be continued to the brain ; and then the sense of heat, or idea of pain, be produced in the mind, wherein consists actual perception.”—*Ibid.*, sect. iii., p. 51.

I shall quote once more :—“ *Idea is the object of thinking.* Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks, and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking, being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, how he comes by them ? ”—*Ibid.*, sect. i., p. 50.

These quotations might be easily increased to a great extent ; from these and others it appears, that Locke considered a knowledge of external objects possible through the medium of ideas.

respect. This philosophy of representationism was the *ignis fatuus* that first misled, and at last confirmed, Berkeley in his ideal materialism. Idealism is a direct and natural conclusion of the representation philosophy.

SECTION XXXV.

The wonder is not that any have fallen into idealism, but that any who have believed in this *tertium quid*, have been preserved from it. If it were not that the intuitive conviction of men is stronger than the teaching and tendency of this theory and its deductions, all would have landed in idealism that believed the representative philosophy. It required only a simple conclusion, and a bold spirit to have made it, and this representation would land in idealism. This step Berkeley was bold enough to make. Reality is converted into representation; he is conscious of this, and of nothing beyond this. If all this were true, the simple conclusion would be, so far as consciousness goes, nothing but a mere representation exists. This Berkeley called ideas; and he maintained he was conscious of this, and nothing more. This conclusion was natural and right, but his premiss was a wrong assumption. His radical error was that the mind perceives *mediately*, and

not *immediately*. If he could have established the *tertium quid* of the representation made to the mind, then, so far as consciousness goes, his ground would have been invulnerable. But this he never could; in fact he never tried, for the reason, it could not be done. Indeed, Berkeley appears as if the thought never struck him, that the mind was capable of conversing with the external reality without a medium.

SECTION XXXVI.

This is the only ground upon which dualism and idealism must fight out their quarrel about the reality or non-reality of an external world. The victory must be gained here. If the mind perceives immediately external reality, then we are conscious of it, consequently must believe that materiality exists. Once this is allowed, the external world cannot be denied more than the fact of consciousness. On the other hand, if the mind perceives, through images or representations, the material world cannot be proved from consciousness to exist, it is thrown to the ground of inferential conclusion. Berkeley thought he answered this triumphantly when he said, "An idea can be like nothing but an idea." This is to say,—blue cannot be green, red cannot be scarlet, white can-

not be black, round cannot be square, small cannot be large, extension cannot be like solidity, mountains cannot be like rivers, trees are not like flowers, horses are not like cattle and sheep. In this every tyro will agree with the philosopher. The idea of an effect is like nothing but effect. Is there no likeness of the cause in the effect? Is the idea not like its archetype? Is the idea self-created? Is there no preceding cause to it, and that according to the representationists themselves? For aught this contains, it is an argument on the side of the reality of matter, and the immediate perception of it by the mind, as much as it serves the idealist. My hand which I hold before my eyes is like nothing but my hand; the book upon the table before me is like nothing but a book. These objects, I am conscious, are external to the perceiving being, and at the same time am not conscious of any mediate representation between me and the *non ego*. The mind sees things as they are immediately, and, in appearance and reality, they are not like other things. It would be impossible to persuade and convince the consciousness of men contrary to the way things are perceived; for man is not conscious of any *tertium quid* that might deceive him. No power could persuade the mind that red is blue, or a flower is a stone; and the same with all other

objects, because the mind is infallibly confident and conscious of the immediate objects of its perception.

SECTION XXXVII.

We think, therefore, that the ground of consciousness not only fails Berkeley, but, so far as its evidence can be canvassed, is completely against his position. Any one can test it if he will but fall back upon his own consciousness, and examine its simple and decided testimony. I have a stone in my hand; I am conscious that this stone is cold, round, of certain weight, and of a brownish colour. Some of these deductions are facts of intuitive consciousness relative to this stone. As to its mineral qualities, they are as yet, perhaps, not determined to my understanding, consequently my belief is suspended relative to them; therefore they are not within the reach of the fact of consciousness. Now, am I conscious of any representation made to my mind of this stone? is it by something between it and my mind I know it? is it an image of a stone, or is it the stone itself, my mind perceives? My own consciousness informs me that I perceive the stone immediately, and nothing else. Another question rises,—Is it possible for my consciousness to inform me of other qualities belonging to this stone besides those I actually per-

ceive, and so deceive me in the matter? Is it possible for me to be conscious of a square whilst I perceive a round object? and so with all the rest. If this were possible, it would make the testimony of consciousness a medley of contradictions. This would be the same as to be conscious and not to be conscious at the same time, relative to the same thing; the same as *to be* and *not to be*, which would be self-destructive: consciousness, therefore, informs me of the immediate perceiving of the object, and indubitably testifies of the thing as it is perceived.

SECTION XXXVIII.

The editor of the present edition of Berkeley's Works says, in his prefatory remarks, "It will not, however, be misplaced to observe that Dr. Reid, the only adversary who has assailed 'The Principles of Human Knowledge' with any degree of plausibility, has not gone deep enough in the investigation. He imagined that when he should have overthrown the philosophic scheme of ideas, Berkeley's theory would necessarily become involved in the general ruin. But Berkeley's theory does not depend on the truth or falsehood of that ancient hypothesis, but on this fact, that 'there is no necessary connexion in reason and language

between our perceptions and the existence of external objects, since we know it not unfrequently happens that objects *appear to be present* to the senses when disordered, although we know they are not present.' Reid has not refuted Berkeley," continues the editor, "not even struck at the leading root of his system. No other antagonist has assailed his doctrines with equal ability or success. Berkeley, therefore, remains unanswered."

SECTION XXXIX.

We think that there is an absolute relation between external objects and perception. As for things appearing to disordered senses, this is begging the question. The things which so appear to the imagination of such persons are faint recollections or deductions from something in the memory or in their former knowledge. It is possible to imagine of things that have no real existence; but even that has a reference to something in existence which we saw, heard of, or are familiar with in some way or other. All our imaginations are relative, not to the mind only, but to something without it. All dreams, spectres, and imaginations are nothing but modifications or reproductions in a meaner or in a nobler form of the things which have been made known unto us,

either through our senses, reflections, or revelation. According to this hypothesis the mind could perceive things as they are, if they never existed, nor were heard of, nor made known in any way. So the objects themselves are of no use ; equally useless are the senses, for one is made for the other. Thus it is possible to perceive in cold that we get warm without fire, quench our thirst without liquid, satisfy our hunger without bread, clothe our nakedness without garments : our common experience, and that of all men, show most incontestably the utter impossibility of perceiving things without their existence.

SECTION XL.

We have shown that the mind perceives material objects *immediately* and not *mediately*. This view of the case is an absolute destruction to the idealism of Berkeley. If Dr. Reid lost it anywhere, it was here. His attack upon the hypothesis of ideas was the opening of the gate to this route and conclusion. He should have established his battery of attack firmly on this ground, that the mind perceives things immediately. This ground shuts idealism up ; it is left without power and argument. The preceding quotations of the editor and Berkeley assume the ground, that the mind perceives things *mediately* : destroy this assumption—

they are left groundless ; or it must be shown that our position is wrong, which cannot be done upon the ground of consciousness ; and this is the only direct witness in the matter.

SECTION XLII.

If external objects are not necessary to the perception of them, how are ideas produced ? what produces them ? If ideas are representations, the real things must exist. Thus reasoned the representationists and dualists. But Berkeley says these representations are the real things themselves. If it will be answered, "The mind produces or creates them," we are none the more enlightened. The mind cannot create ideas out of nothing. The mind creates nothing ; it only perceives things as they are, and moulds them into classification and order. This appears to us as effect without a cause—a something without anything. The mind, according to this, creates and destroys all, and that without any real elements without itself. There is a phenomenon to the sense, but it is nothing but an idea perceived by the mind.*

* We are robbed of the material universe without a compensation. Our faith is disturbed without another element of satisfaction. We are unsettled without a reason and a promise. It is hard to choose between this hypothesis and that of Père Malebranche. The hypo-

SECTION XLII.

This idealism is only a natural and maturer development of other systems which preceded it. Berkeley made only one step of advancement. Everything has its natural tendency, and reaches its ultimatum sooner or later. Berkeley

thesis of Malebranche holds that we see all in God. It is called the philosophy of *occasional causes*. Both Berkeley and Malebranche treat the testimony of the senses as false: the two declare the experience and testimony of mankind as false: the two end in the same conclusion, namely, the denial of the material world; both are supported by pious motives, and expected their systems to result greatly to the advantage of religion. The authors had much in common, as to their superior religious character and motives. Their philosophical character, cleverness, and style, have a likeness. The chief differences in their hypotheses are more of accidents and circumstances, than real and fundamental. Most likely, if Malebranche were a Protestant, his idealism would be that of Berkeley; and if Berkeley were a Catholic, his system would be like that of Malebranche. The system of Malebranche needed but to be purged of its Catholic external excrescences, to become an absolute idealism; and almost all the reasons for such a system are found in his "Inquiry after Truth." Whether Berkeley availed himself of this system and the reasons used by Malebranche in its support, or not, this is certain,—he had everything for his idealism made ready to his hand. The conversation which they had before Malebranche's death, makes it probable that Berkeley was indebted to him for his system. The system of Malebranche, in its peculiar features, was a triumph of Catholic dogma to philosophy, in accounting how disembodied saints can be acquainted with human invocation, and the affairs of earth generally. *They perceive, they say, all things in God*; and Malebranche transferred this Catholic theology, relative to saints in heaven, to men in the flesh on earth; and Berkeley stripped it of its Catholic features, and gave it a Protestant colour, and thus gained for himself the fame of being the author of a profound original system.

accepted certain premises, and drew certain natural conclusions from them ; and he was landed on the quicksands of idealism. The first thing he accepted was, that ideas were representations of things. On this ground one of these conclusions was left him,—either there are three kinds of real entities, the mind, ideas, and external objects ; or the mind perceives things immediately, or all external phenomena are ideas. He chose the last. He made all things ideas ; these are the absolute objects of perception ; and after persuading himself of this, it was easy to throw himself back upon the ground of consciousness for a kind of defence and shelter. We have shown that this was a delusive premiss. The second thing he accepted was the primary and secondary qualities, and that the secondary qualities of things are sensibilities in the mind rather than real qualities in the objects themselves. This he accepted from the hand of Locke, though he was not the first to advance this creed.* When once

* “These I call original or primary qualities of body,” says Locke ; “which, I think, we may observe to produce simple ideas in us ; namely, solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number.” Speaking again of secondary qualities,—“Secondly, such qualities, which, in truth, are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, *i. e.*, by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, &c.,—these I call secondary qualities.”—“Human Understanding,” book ii., chap. viii., p. 75. The classification was in Descartes’ philosophy and others before Locke ; but the nomenclature into primary and secondary qualities belongs to Locke.

he believed that colour, heat, and other secondary qualities, were nothing but sensations in the mind; it was only a small step further to conclude that the primary qualities were only sensations too. This was a direct natural and easy deduction. Upon these two pillars Berkeley built his hypothesis of idealism. If the foundation were right, there would be a chance for the upper structure. He should have examined the premises well before drawing his conclusions, and not accepted them as safe *postulata*.

SECTION XLIII.

Berkeley considered the theory of abstraction detrimental to his hypothesis of idealism; so he directed all his energy against it. Locke maintained that abstraction was the chief difference between man and the inferior brute creation; also, to this source he attributed general ideas, and most of our present knowledge. Hume took up the side of Berkeley, and applauded him highly, and made good use of this theory to support his universal scepticism. We think that the doctrine of abstraction has been overstated, as to its importance and utility, by both the dualists and the idealists. Our limits will not allow us to state our analysis and view of this theory of abstraction; and this we think the less needful, 1. Because we

cannot see that it determines the existence or non-existence of matter at all. If Berkeley could have established his position, he would have been none the nearer to prove the non-existence of matter. If he could not abstract motion from a body moving,—a square body from a round one,—this was no reason that matter did not possess an independent reality, and these qualities inhered in it. 2. Berkeley confesses himself almost all that is wanting to establish the doctrine of abstraction. He brings all his powers to bear against the doctrine, and yet it appears to us that he abstracted himself all along. “I own myself able to abstract *in one sense*,” says he, “as when I consider some particular parts or qualities separated from others, with which, though they are united in some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them.” We shall give in his own words an instance more: “And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider a figure merely as triangular, without attending to the particular qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may abstract: but this will never prove that he can frame an abstract general inconsistent idea of a triangle.” If any one will take the trouble to analyse the quotations just made, it will be seen that Berkeley has granted the possibility of abstraction. (Vol. i., pp. 77, 81.)

SECTION XLIV.

Berkeley, like other kind, indulgent parents, loved and thought highly of this child of idealism, which he had begotten. He thought that it was a kind of universal panacea to purify philosophy and theology from all possible error and unbelief. It would put an end to Deism, Atheism, Materialism, and finally settle the immortality of the soul, and put an end to all doubtful theories about matter for ever, for it is taken out of the way.* So near a relation as a parent is not always the best and most impartial judge relative to his own child. Sometimes, also, a parent is much disappointed in the future history and results of his own darling child. We think that something like this was the condition of Berkeley. After so much promise and anticipation, he was much disappointed that his philosophy was so much neglected and despised, and brought so little of that fruit which he so abundantly promised to himself and his disciples.

SECTION XLV.

Yet, Berkeley was a great genius, and a noble character. He has made an impression of his

* "What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry, seemed to me evidently true, and not unuseful to be known, particularly to those who are tainted with scepticism, or want a demonstration of the existence and immateriality of God, or the natural immortality of the soul."—Preface to the "Principles of Human Knowledge."

name, in the universal field of philosophy, throughout the world of enlightened letters. Since his system made its appearance, he has been thought of, spoken of, written of; and, in his turn, praised, scolded, and puzzled many a smatterer in mental science. Such a character must have been, in power and genius, above the ordinary class of his fellows. But even this is no argument for the truth of his theory. Truth and genius are not always synonymous things: they are not convertible terms. Many wrong theories often have much genius and greatness, as to their authors and defenders; and truth may frequently have only feeble and dull advocates. This is not the ground for testing either truth or falsehood. This ideal philosophy has failed to establish its claims on our credence for any good results for mankind: a desideratum so much wished and wanted. It has failed, not for want of genius and power in the propounder of it, but from its own radical incongruity with the fundamental laws of man's nature. The mass of human beings who follow the intuitive and primordial laws of their nature, will for ever refuse allegiance to this ideal philosophy. Its chief place will be on the shelves, and in the select society of philosophers. It will be used by the clever and the sceptic, more to puzzle and confuse, than to convince and edify.

SECTION XLVI.

Berkeley anticipated and answered many of the most common objections which would be made to his system. Most of these answers are not equal to his other departments in thought, power, or genius. Most of them are meagre and unsatisfactory. We think also, that to test any controversial thing in a conversational way, as he did in his "Hylas and Philonous," is not the best and fairest way. In this mode there are several advantages, which are generally greatly abused. It puts the opponent in a very insignificant light; whilst the writer himself is in a wrong position, for he himself is the opponent.—It is radically a false representation. The author puts the objections of his antagonist in the form he pleases, in order to shoot him dead, and then smile at his own cleverness: no one can play the two sides fairly. Every one should establish his own views as well as he can, but should leave the test of them to others; and not make their bullets and direct their hands to shoot as they please. We think that Berkeley was as fair and candid as anybody would be; but we cannot think the mode unobjectionable. This is a Platonic and Ciceronian mode, and Berkeley excelled much in it. This mode of treatment is so

susceptible of abuse, that it is a difficult matter to avoid it, and hardly any body who adopts that style runs clear of it.

SECTION XLVII.

Now, we must say a few words categorically upon those points, in our view, in which Berkeley's system fails. We have shown that it is a development of an antecedent philosophy. It is not independent and complete in itself; it is a part of another philosophy, which preceded it. It is a natural conclusion, from premises which he accepted from the hands of others. We view this system as too short to solve the problem of human nature; it goes too far in other directions,—in its attack upon innocent matter; so it is not true and suitable in either.

I. It fails to account for the correspondence with, and application of, the powers of the human mind. There is an exact correspondence between the objective and the subjective throughout the universe. Both are the workmanship of infinite and infallible Wisdom; and all in the work of infinite Wisdom are equal. The one is made for the other. The philosophy that does not correspond with this, cannot be true and faithful. This is the chief end of all philosophy. Matter itself is not the ultimate point,—it is the human mind.

The material world is a phenomenon to test, develop, and explain the problems of the human mind. We consider this ideal system of Berkeley to have failed completely on this ground. Instead of giving full play to the human mind, it contracts it; instead of extricating from difficulties, it creates more; instead of clearing and simplifying the problems of the mind, it mystifies the whole.

SECTION XLVIII.

II. It is contrary to the general conviction of mankind. Human depravity has nothing to do with the question. It is a question of sense and consciousness. It is within the jurisdiction of all men; yet, the common verdict is against Berkeley. It cannot be that falsehood is the root of our nature. It cannot be that our senses and consciousness are unfit to judge in matters of common and direct cognition; it cannot be that our Creator has a design to deceive us, by playing some mysterious sleight-of-hand with us. There must be some primordial principles of truth in the nature of man somewhere. The Author of our nature has not left us without some criteria of truth. It matters not whether this is called "intuition," "natural reason," "common sense," or "pure reason,"—this does exist. Sir William Hamilton, with his

usual learning and penetration, has shown, in one hundred and six examples from every age and country, that all acknowledge this principle of *common sense*, and ultimately fall back upon it for proof and refuge. Such is the case now in Germany; after a wide and long tossing by the billows of speculation, they return to this rock,—the primordial conviction of humanity. These principles must not be violated; they must be the basis of all true philosophy. No philosophy which violates these things at its very base can be accepted, without falsifying this general condition. And this, we believe, is another of the deficiencies of Berkeley's philosophy.

SECTION XLIX.

III. Berkeley's philosophy is sceptical in its tendency. It begins on the ground of discrediting the testimony of sense, mankind, and consciousness. Hume, with his usual subtlety and aptness, took hold on this hypothesis, and made good use of it to support his consummate system of scepticism, and wound his antagonists. If consciousness is discredited on one side, what reason have we for trusting it on the other? Men must be as conscious of material substance without themselves, as they are of the thinking being in

themselves. If one is believed, the other must be accepted too ; if one is rejected, the other is discredited. If a man could be persuaded that objects of sense are not external and real, as they appear to be, he might believe that his body is not what he is conscious of it to be what it is ; and when once a man reaches this ground, he discredits consciousness, and will ultimately refuse its testimony altogether. This would be universal scepticism. Men generally think they have clearer evidences of the reality of things material and external, than of things mental and spiritual ; and, if they were persuaded to discredit the reality of these, would they believe the reality of any thing that would be to them less clear ? If they believed that fields, trees, rivers, and all beasts, clouds, stars, though apparently so many real objects, yet are nothing but ideas in the mind ; they would easily believe that the first cause, and themselves, are ideas too. In this, Berkeley sacrificed certainty, to establish an uncertain hypothesis. There was but a small step from the primary and secondary qualities of Locke to idealism : this idealism has the same relation to universal scepticism. It is only a step further to discredit the whole evidence of consciousness, and that very easily made. It will be seen that this idealism is responsible for opening the door to much scepticism.

SECTION L.

IV. Another deficiency in this ideal philosophy is, it fails to correspond with the evidence of consciousness. This philosophy does not rightly canvass the natural and the simple testimony of consciousness. It is violated, and made to utter a language that is not natural. Whilst the language of my natural consciousness would assure me that the thing I feel and see is tangible, material, and outside me ; this idealism says, No, they are nothing but ideas perceived by the mind, and you are conscious of nothing but of ideas. The natural consciousness of man, in the first place, does not say they are ideas ; the philosopher must come forward with his theory of idealism, to change things into ideas, before consciousness recognises them as ideas : so the evidence of consciousness is bribed or deceived into the matter. It is not the unadulterated language of consciousness : the ground of consciousness is the same ; but the objects are converted from real things into ideal things. It is a deception, and a violation of consciousness. In this, it violates the first truth in philosophy ; for if the fact and evidence of consciousness are violated, there remaineth no longer a test and a foundation for philosophy.

SECTION LI.

V. It violates universal language, both natural and conventional. According to this philosophy, the words matter, external substance, body, tangible, and many similar terms, which are found in every language known, must be expunged. Terms for matter and mind are found in every language, and more for the first than for the last. These are not mere conventional words, but most of them natural. It shows that the belief in matter is as natural as it is universal. Idealism obliterates all these words; it has no meaning for them; it cannot receive them to her vocabulary; they are in her way. It comes in collision, also, with the terms and facts of the Scriptures. The fact of creation, the deluge, the fire of the plains, and the conversion of Lot's wife into a pillar of salt,—creation of ideas,—deluge of ideas,—ideal burning of Sodom and Gomorrah,—and ideal pillar of salt. Harmless things enough! The miraculous generation of Christ's human nature, and His body, were ideas in the mind. This is the ground, the Bishop thought, of annihilating Socinianism. We think it would be also a mortal blow to Christianity. *Gnosticism* itself would be grateful for this idealism.* If this philosophy could be proved to

* Gnosticism was that system of philosophy taught by the Gnostics; *γνωστικος*, from *γνωσκα*, "to know." The Gnostics were a sect of

be true, it would be a good argument against Transubstantiation. Does it not equally deny us the fact and possibility of the resurrection of the material body? If body is matter, and matter a mere idea in the mind, a resurrection is impossible in the sense in which it is scripturally understood. There is nothing left but ideas; it cannot be a resurrection of ideas. Such, very briefly, is our examination of the result of this idealism.

philosophers which arose a short time before the Christian era, and in the first ages of Christianity accepted some of the truths of Christianity, explained them by the spirit and light of their philosophy, and made them subservient to the support and aid of their system. Their system of theology was agreeable to the Pythagorean and the Platonic philosophy, to which they accommodated very much the interpretation of Scripture. They held that all nature, intelligible, intellectual, and material, is derived by successive emanations from the infinite fountain of Deity. These emanations they called æons, *αιῶνες*. They held matter to be intrinsically evil, of which the Supreme God could not be the Author. Hence arose their fundamental tenet, that the Creator of the world, or the Demiurgus, was not the same with the Supreme God, the Source and Author of all good, and the Father of Christ. It was a kind of an eclectic system of absolute mystery, whose purpose and aim was to purify mankind from the corruption and death of the evil of matter.

PART III.

METAPHYSICS.

CHAPTER I.

MISTAKEN VIEWS CONCERNING METAPHYSICS.

DIFFERENT minds view the same things widely at variance from one another. They stand on different stand-points of spectation, they view things through different mediums, they bring with them different sympathies, predilections, motives, and desires :—with all these things, it would be a marvel if all thought the same. The different states and relations of the mind to the objects presented to it, change their colour, form, and value. Thus, often the true is made false, and the false true, in human opinion and practice ; the inferior is put in the place of the superior, and the superior reduced to the worthless and the mean.

The common fortune of other objects of thought, is that of metaphysics ; only, perhaps it is judged more hardly and unfairly than most things. Metaphysics are further from the common thoughts of men, than most objects of thought ; hence, men judge of them in ignorance, which, upon the

whole, is false, and can never be fair, safe, and virtuous. To judge of things ignorantly, is unsafe and bemeaning to the judge himself, and wrong and capricious relative to the object of judgment. And yet this is the case with those who judge and condemn metaphysics generally; they speak in the dark, they have never made them their study; they follow the common custom, or some acquired and superficial feelings and views in their minds. The student of metaphysics, the more he studies them, the more interested he becomes in them; and scarcely, if ever, is there found among her disciples a recreant. The science has a bewitching tendency; it draws to itself, it strengthens and aspires the soul of her disciples to follow after her deep and lofty objects, with increasing avidity and pleasure. Hence, in most cases, it is the stranger, the superficial, and the would-be-infallible, that speak disparagingly of her; and not her disciple, the profound and the earnest inquirer.

Metaphysics are misconceived and judged of wrongly and harshly, by certain classes and temperaments of mind. It is easy to tell, from the common pursuit, sympathies, and associations of men, whether they are favourable or unfavourable to metaphysics. It is too broad and liberal in its inquiries for the narrow and illiberal; it is too profound in its spirit and problems for the light

and superficial; it is too careful in its analysis, and uncertain in its conclusions, for the matter-of-fact men; it is too free, catholic, and antagonistic to simple human opinion, for the narrow dogmatist; it is too elastic and universal in its reasonings and aims, for the stiff and the formal. A science that refuses to be governed and tested by common opinion, and opposes the common views and feelings of mankind, will be always misjudged and opposed.

For obvious reasons, the science of metaphysics will always be misrepresented by different tastes and classes of mind. Some will affect to despise it, because they have no courage and perseverance to understand it, or no powers and means to do so. Others misunderstand and misinterpret it, because their habits of thought, and sympathies, are in different directions; hence, they have contracted a deep antipathy to its teaching, and even to its high aim and object matter. The spirituality of its sympathies and objects, makes it unpalatable to the materialist; because its results are in the spiritual and the mental, it is misunderstood and condemned by the physieist and the worldlying as useless, and considered even pretentious and dangerous. It demands the greatest efforts and perseverance of the human mind, and the superficial and those who expect to have all in the old

and easy common-beaten path, dislike it and turn aside from it. So varied and different are the reasons and feelings against metaphysics, that it is not easy to find and mention them all. There are many who object to and oppose metaphysics, yet never put their opposition in tangible forms, because the real cause of it is beyond their understanding; and the reason is as much a matter of indifference to them, as it is beyond their conception. It is not unfrequently the case, many think, that by opposing a superior thing, they become clever and great; and that, however ignorant the opposition, and blind the cause. Whilst it is easy to find faults and oppose, it is not always so easy to find reasons to justify an opposition, and defend the same before the bar of truth, and enlightened witnesses.

Even misconception and wrong accusation have the effect of leading to a higher court of justice, and more tested examination; and often the wrongly-condemned comes out brighter and more attractive. As gold comes out of every furnace of test brighter, so truth comes out of every court of impartial justice with advantage and triumph. This is a kind of balance compensation, for the treatment which truth and right have frequently at the hands of men in this world. The true carries an incomparable advantage over the false in

the superiority of its nature; and the Divine order is such, that it always sides with and defends the true, that it has always a fair chance, even in a world of wrong, to get the true verdict, and prove victorious, if rightly presented and defended.

The study of metaphysics is viewed by some as labour lost, because it cannot count upon any real results. Perhaps nothing is less understood, than the relation between causes and results; and about which so much of ignorant talk and cant is heard, and especially relative to metaphysics and religion. Nothing is more common than the misapprehension of the character and degree of results. Many expect to have different results from the character of the causes, and different in degree from the forces or powers which cause them.

It is an universal law, running through the whole constitution of the universe, that results bear an exact proportion in quality and degree to the causes which produce them. It is a contradiction to the universal order of nature, to say that things have no results: and if metaphysics bore no results, they would be an anomaly in the universe. Metaphysics, in common with other things, bear results, and that in proportion with the power they exert, and the same in quality with their nature.

Nothing is less understood by the mass of

unmetaphysical minds, than the results of metaphysics. The mechanist, the artist, and the labourer in the field of science, have the pleasure of beholding the results of their toil, presented to their outward senses. But he who labours in the field of mind must labour on by faith, encouraged by the importance and superiority of his work, and confiding in the faithfulness and immutableness of law and order. And he is as sure of results as those who labour on the other side of the field, and far superior in need and importance.

The results of metaphysics are subtle and deep in their platform and influence; they are slow and unobtrusive in their appearance. The results are felt on the minds of those who become true students, and, through them, on society in its ramified forms and features. The results are various and important, which might be shown at a far greater length than I can do here. Metaphysics impart vigour to the mind, superior to any other educational influence; they give point and acuteness peculiar to themselves; they revive the sympathies, by raising them from the material to the mental, and lead them from the sensational to the spiritual. They liberalize the thoughts and views, by raising the sympathies of the soul above the limited to the illimitable; and open infinite resources before the mind in every direction.

There is not a department in the economy of knowledge but what is under obligation to metaphysics. Ethics, politics, painting, poetry, sculpture, and theology, are under peculiar obligation to mental science; and no one can be a master in these without being educated in the school of metaphysics. If those who affect to despise and cry down metaphysics, were required to point out theologians or politicians who greatly excelled, who were not brought up under their dialectics, they would find it a hard task to fill their list with illustrious names. Often the metaphysical sways much power, when denied in word, and frowned at in external expression. Its fruits are seen often when no confessions are made; and its results are palpable where condemned and prohibited.

Metaphysics are viewed by many as made up of useless theories, and inimical to the practical in life. It is difficult to know the precise meaning of the word "practical," as used in the common parley of the present generation. It is a favourite word with orators in the pulpit, on the platform, and on the rostrum; with commercial men in all transactions of business; with utilitarians in all their talk of useful doings, and beneficial results; and with all pursuers of material science in all the ramification of their walks, and boasted emptiness of their advancement and discoveries. It is one

of those unfortunate words which almost everybody uses; and on that account is in danger of being despised by the thoughtful, and in the long run worn out by its too frequent use, even with those who carry on with it such an extensive business. It is one of those delusive words which everybody who uses it thinks he understands the meaning of; yet, when it comes to the test, it is seen that with those who use it most frequently it has no meaning beyond a vague delusive fancy. It is a cant word, carrying with it to the minds of those who use it an infallible evidence, of the wrong of the thing which is supposed to be impracticable, and the absolute right of the thing which is thought to be practicable. Its meaning is never examined; its truth is never suspected. It is an old favourite word, and taken for granted to be understood, and infallible in its truth and test.

The term practical is almost always partial and one-sided in meaning and application. The thing that is practicable to the one, is impracticable to the other. Walking, running, climbing, leaping, swimming, are practicable to many, but not to all. Speaking, reading, ciphering, writing, painting, are easy things with a large portion of mankind, but there are many who know nothing about them. To make poetry is practicable to the poet, but quite

impracticable to the dull prose soul. The musician can play, or sing; but to a large number both these exercises are impracticable. One can read the classics, and delight himself in the wealth of the poet. One can solve difficult mathematical problems; to the other it is a dark mystery. The arts of life, science in its various developments, philosophy in its deep truths and lessons, are practical both in themselves, and to many minds, yet not to all. It is practicable for the rich to live in mansions, buy estates, enjoy the luxuries of life, ride in first-class carriages, and do many other things which the poor cannot. Are things to be despised, because all cannot do, possess, or enjoy them? Are things wrong, or to be blamed, because I cannot do them? There may be a thousand things good and practical in themselves, which are not known nor appreciated by the one nor the many. It may often be for want of powers, or perseverance, they are not practicable. It would be a common loss and calamity to society if they were neglected, and allowed to go into disuse. When men speak of the practical and the impractical, relative to superior forms of reasoning and knowledge, these expressions are used from mistaken notions, or often as excuses for weakness, slothfulness, and want of taste and perseverance.

Doubtless, there are some things not practicable

for all men alike : there are also things not practicable for any human beings. The luxuries of life are only practicable for the affluent ; but it is impracticable for all alike to live without eating and drinking those things which are essential for the sustenance of life. The idiot cannot reason consecutively, the child cannot analyse and generalize extensively, whilst the strong-minded philosopher can do both : but to fly is equally impracticable for the philosopher, as it is for the idiot and the child. The tall may do some things which the short in stature cannot ; the strong can accomplish many feats which are impracticable for the weak ; the wealthy, the learned, the successful, the happy, and the true, can do things which the poor, the ignorant, the unsuccessful, the miserable, and the false, cannot do : but it is equally impracticable to all alike to transcend their powers and resources, and successfully oppose and destroy the laws of their being.

If it is objected to the science of abstruse reasoning, on the ground that certain grades of intellect cannot master and understand it ; the same objection may be raised against poetry, painting, sculpture, politics, and many of the arts of common life. What is impracticable to one, is quite easy to the other ; what is not possible to one condition, is natural to others. Every thing

possible to one finite being, is possible to another finite being, though not in the same degree of facility and perfection, because men differ greatly in power, means, conditions, and perseverance. Everybody of intelligence, with perseverance, could make some kind of poetry, though only few, of the highest powers and other conditional qualities, can carry it to the greatest possible excellency. So in philosophy and other branches of lofty acquisition, all may philosophize to the degree of their powers and means, though only few of the first spirits can rise and live in the highest regions of thought as their natural and true element.

There are two classes of things impracticable for finite beings as men. 1. Those things which are in themselves beyond the limits of finite capacities, which all alike cannot do or know. 2. Those things which in themselves are within the reach of human knowledge, but, for certain known or unknown reasons, only some can accomplish or know. The first of these is absolute, the other is conditional; the first is impossible from the law and nature of things, the other from some conditions and circumstances in the relations and influences of human life, as it is in its accidental or circumstantial relations.

Every product of intelligence must have a plan or a theory in thought, at least; and thought

expressed is a theory revealed to the notice and thinking of others. Hence, all thoughts in themselves and first expression are kinds of theories.

When thought is found to be possible in action, then it loses its theoretical class and character, and becomes a practical reality. Every true theory is practical; it is nothing but a correct conception of things in plan as they are, or ought to be. It may indeed be that the thought as well as the practice is above the power of the mass: but, if true, practicable withal. As the thought of a thing is possible and true, the practice cannot be otherwise than possible within its legitimate laws and conditions. If our right thoughts were impracticable, we should always be deceived even by our true thoughts, which would be a contradiction. Our true thoughts would be the means to delude and mislead us: our true conceptions would lead us astray in conception. All true things are equal; and if any plan or theory in thought is impracticable in action, there is something wrong or unequal in it to the laws and conditions of things. Truth is consistent in all its steps; what is true in action is first true in thought; and what is true in thought, is practical in action.

To admit that there are metaphysical false theories, is only saying that man is liable to err in this field of pursuit as well as in others. There is

no defence made of the false theories in metaphysics, but of the true; and to separate the primal principles and ends from those of human errors and mistakes. The false and the fanciful in metaphysics are impracticable as well as everywhere else; but all true in thought are practicable in action there as well as elsewhere.

I defend not the fanciful theories of many metaphysical writers, though many of these are innocent and even of advantage to the human mind. My aim is higher and on a safer foundation: it is to defend metaphysics in their natural and primal purpose, and shield them from the charge of foolish and useless theories; and to show that they accord with the law of thought, of reason, and of practice. Metaphysical science is not responsible for the wild theories of some of her disciples, more than many good parents are to be blamed for the prodigality of their children. The argument of abuse is no legitimate argument at all against right use; but rather supposes some practical good use, before there could be any abuse. In order to judge correctly of any thing, its true principles and character must be judged of apart from the opinions and the use men make of it; the same common law of judgment is claimed for metaphysics.

The end and aim of metaphysics, as I under-

stand them, may be stated in few sentences. 1. It is to trace things to the nature and laws of their final causes. 2. To inquire into the laws, conditions, and relations of mind. 3. To test the limit of the human thought. 4. The strengthening and cultivation of the mental powers to their highest capability. 5. The removal of every human, fanciful, and prejudicial obstruction from the way of human advancement. 6. The restoration of thought, hence of human life, into independent, solid, and true condition. 7. Philosophy aims also at the correction of the inadvertencies of ordinary thinking. 8. In a word the aim is, truth all in all, so far as it is the possible possession of man in this world. All human opinions and testimonies in the high pursuit after truth are discarded, and viewed rather as an impediment, than help to find the great object. Nothing is to be taken for granted ; nothing to be refused without a sufficient reason. Every step in advance must be scrutinized ; every thing must be accompanied with a reason and a cause. The metaphysician, from the necessity of his high aim and aspiration, and the way in which these are to reach their objects, will be controversial ; he accepts truth directly at the hand of no one ; it must pass through the crucible of hard thought and reasoning before he can accept of it. On this account,

he is often in danger of being considered by the superficial, the feeble polite, and all the credulous ones, as unpleasant, and to be avoided rather than courted. Yet he is the true friend of society; he aims at truth more than pleasing others, and self-gratification; he is severe with the views of others, because he is earnest in his pursuit, and a master over himself.

Metaphysics are often suspected and charged of being adverse to religious spirit and advancement, in their character and results. It is as hard to define what many people mean by religion, as it is to explain their conception of metaphysics. It happens often that the things which are most common to men are worst understood, and spoken of most loosely and unmeaningly. Familiar and common things are not examined and tested so severely as the novel and the uncommon; their age and familiarity give them an easy reception and a willing place in the mind without doubt or suspicion. All take for granted they understand all about them; but when it comes to a close test, their thoughts and expressions are alike loose, meaningless, and undefined. The fact of the universality of religion, makes it necessarily, in some degree a loose object of thought and reflection. All claim its blessings, all talk about it; but will not, and, perhaps, cannot, think calmly and intel-

ligently about it, so as to give them power to define and express it rationally and intelligently. Men generally accept of religion from the religious tendency of their conviction, thinking it either too great a task, or a needless work, or a presumption, to examine its claims and requirements. All feel its need and reason in some way or other; only few accept of it on the ground of light, and can present it as a reasonable thing.

Religion is an infinite mystery in its source, object, influences, processes, and blessings; which may be another reason why it is a thing so vague and undefined in the minds of men. Though presented to human reason for test and acceptance, yet in all points it leads to the infinite and the mysterious. It is a circle which is touched in all points by awful mystery: but it is a mystery which never contradicts the true and the real in the finite. We test the infinite, not by the infinite, that we have no means and power of doing; we test it by the laws and means of the finite; and if we use and read these aright, our conclusion is always right, because the infinite, and the finite always agree. Men should be able to examine and read rightly themselves and their condition and relations: this is what is required and demanded at their hands; this done

rightly will land them safely and happily into full harmony with the thoughts and laws of God.

Some view religion as a chain of infallible dogmas, holding its empire chiefly over passive human belief; others look at it as a matter of feeling more than belief, holding its power over the sentimental nature of man; others consider it as a formal law governing, directing, and polishing the actions and relations of men's outward life. There is something true in all these views; their great wrong is in their exclusiveness and the extreme into which they are carried.

The dogmatist is opposed to calm inquiry and advancement; the sentimentalist has an aversion to intellectual analysis and searching logic; and the formal is an antagonist to any elasticity and the least deviation from conventional custom and rule. Hence metaphysical science is often considered as an enemy to religion. If the views of parties, conventional life and habits of men, and customs of times and places, are taken for religion, doubtless the tendencies and the results of metaphysics will be found to be against them. But the religion of truth, of harmony with right order, and of God, is a different, and incomparably loftier and happier thing, to that of parties and opinions; and it is possible that metaphysics harmonize with that. Men take party views, sectarian narrow-

ness, and conventional customs for religion ; and make every body and means impious and infidel that oppose them ; and all the while religion is neither opposed nor defended, but human opinions and groundless hypotheses. No wonder that the narrow, the partisan, and the sectarian cry down metaphysics as dangerous, because their theories are sandy and human in their foundation, and they are brought to a test, their nakedness revealed, and their principles examined, found wanting, and condemned.

But what has this to do with religion ? and in what way is the science of causes, of forces, and of mind, in any way prejudicial to religion, that is based in truth and reason ? How the science which aims at the investigation of truth, and throws aside prejudice, human opinion, and all superficial and fallible guides in its search, can oppose the religion that is rooted in truth, is hard to say. Philosophy opposes nothing without sufficient reason ; it accepts of nothing without evidence. If religion is based on reason, and supported by sufficient evidence, it cannot be injured by metaphysics. To deny religion, is neither the work nor the condition of metaphysics ; it is neither its starting point, nor its culminating task ; the business of philosophy is to trace things to their final causes, test and examine them on the

ground of the clearest and most impartial evidence, and things are refused or accepted according as they are found on these high grounds of test. There are questions so deep and subtle, at the root and in the surroundings of religion, that no one but the keen metaphysician can feel and unravel. Hence the greatest metaphysicians in every age and country, have been its greatest expounders and defenders. Metaphysics have been the friend of religion, and metaphysicians her defenders. Her rich and lasting literature is that of theological metaphysicians; and it would have gone badly with her often, but for metaphysics. Her chief battles will be of necessity on metaphysical ground; and if her friends cannot handle their tools rightly, it will suffer for want of skill and power in her professed friends. It will be found in times of darkness and distress, that out of the Galilee of metaphysics, light, support, and deliverance will come.

Metaphysical pursuits are viewed by some as adverse to truth. The name of truth is very convenient, and much abused; it is often substituted for false dogmas, party and one-sided views, and superficial fanciful opinions. It is the common motto on all party banners; in the hand of parties it is often a sign which leads to delusion, ends in darkness and error, and settles down

in blindness and hopeless hardness. Truth is broader than human dogmas, loftier than party motives, purer than human designs, freer than human custom, and more catholic than the creeds and sectarianism of men. He who uses the best means within his reach, in seeking the truest views and convictions, and faithfully carries them out, is true both to himself and all higher demands. To be true, are required the harmony and unity of various elements in the conscious conviction of the soul; hence it is possible that he who is less correct in judgment concerning objects, may be incomparably more true than his more infallible brother. To be true is not to be infallible; it is not one dull monotonous uniformity. Nonconformity with human views and customs is generally truth in consciousness and practice; and what men often call heretical and heterodox, in the sight of a higher tribunal are true and orthodox. Truth is harmony with the laws and conditions of being; and he who fulfils these most genuinely and universally, is most true. Truth in its real character is very different from what it is in human opinions; it is quite another thing in the presence of a higher light and juster balance than it appears to be to human fancy and custom. Truth is a thing which concerns the judgment, the feelings, the motives, the consist-

ence, and the outward expressions of human life. It is the highest development and exercise of these individually and unitedly.

If truth be viewed in itself, and in its true relations, apart from human opinion and custom, it is difficult to make out a case, how metaphysical study is adverse to its apprehension and progress. The chief business of metaphysic in its final aim and results is the possession of truth. It discards human creeds and opinions, human customs and habits, unsupported by indubitable evidence; and if these are meant instead of truth, then most assuredly in this sense it is an adverse power; but in most cases these contain more falsehood than truth. But it refuses not even human opinion, only so far as it cannot be substantiated by clear and substantial evidence. Its aim and effort is, to separate the real from the conventional, the fanciful from the solid, the right from the wrong, the primordial from the customary. There is a distinction to be kept in view, which must not be forgotten,—the metaphysical power in its true aim and end, and metaphysical theories. There are sects and parties among metaphysicians as well as in Christianity; there are false and narrow theories in her ranks, as well as in religion. Christianity is not blamed and refused on account of sects and parties; neither is religion considered

worthless and dangerous, because of false theories, by theologians and her disciples; why, then, should metaphysics be blamed and refused on this ground? It is impossible to conceive an intelligent ground to condemn and exclude it. Metaphysics in itself has no human theory to propound, no party to support, no personal and selfish aim to seek. It is based upon no fallible maxim, it is governed by no customary prejudice. It aims to please and satisfy no party nor earthly power. In itself it is a power, given and cultivated; and no one of her disciples cultivates such a power to oppose truth, but rather to seek and support it; and no one can do it effectually but the metaphysician.

Metaphysics is conceived by many as being inimical to the ordinary duties of life. This is an old charge, which, in its turn, has been used against religion, education, art, and science in general. The metaphysician enjoys the innocent pleasure, and can perform the relative duties of life as other men, when he pleases to throw aside his metaphysical cap; and he is all the more accomplished by his deeper and larger power and knowledge.

The business of life will take care of itself; it fits the ordinary capacities of men; it brings its immediate and palpable results; men are driven to it both by want, pleasure, and interest.

There is never a reason to fear that the vast majority will become so metaphysical as to neglect the common relations of life. What for want of aptitude, and the sacrifice demanded, most men will always be prevented from becoming profound metaphysicians.

Directly, metaphysics has nothing to do with the ordinary duties, transactions, and pleasures of common life. The metaphysician is often both blind and indifferent to the small things of common life, because absorbed in higher and more important things; things of vaster interest and claim, in the higher relations of men. But let any important crisis or question arise, and the man who is careless to the small things of life, can grapple with, solve, conquer, and settle. And when needful, he can act his part, or give counsel in the common things of life, and that in a way that no one but a superior spirit can. It is easy to descend at pleasure, but not so easy to ascend at will. The difficult being conquered, the easy can be done without doubt and uneasiness.

Rather than interfering with the duties of common life, it tends to facilitate them, and arrest their foibles and follies, by correcting, directing, and strengthening the thoughts of men, and pointing out common errors and dangers. It aims to make life safe, by pointing out its errors; make it

easy, by removing all obstructions from the way of its advancement; make it strong and complete, by strengthening its powers; make it noble and true, by purifying and restoring it; and make it happy and harmonious, by destroying its evils: it restores the good, and unites human affections, thoughts, motives, conscience, and life, with God and the universe.

It is not possible that a science whose aim and business is to purify, strengthen, and rightly guide the human mind, and find out the laws and right relations of beings and things, should be without results, indulge in foolish theories, be irreligious in tendency, adverse to truth, and inimical to common life. If it were, either these were wrong, or our conceptions and convictions of metaphysics are incorrect. It wields an unseen power, inasmuch as it has to do directly with the main spring of action. Its influence is universal, though unacknowledged; and destined to be greater and mightier still, and to be acknowledged as a friend, and not a foe.

CHAPTER II.

THE ADVANTAGES OF METAPHYSICAL STUDY.

It is not correct to say that every thing has some advantages; neither is it true that every thing has disadvantages. If it can be proved that there is an absolute wrong, there can be no real good in that. It is possible that in the government of Infinite Goodness, there is nothing so bad as to have no trace of truth and goodness in it at all, and nothing—in this world, at least—so good as to have nothing bad in it. Hence, in that sense, there is nothing without its advantages and disadvantages. But if we can conceive of perfect goodness, and also of perfect evil, there can be no disadvantage in the one, nor advantage in the other.

Advantage and disadvantage are terms loosely used, and variously applied. They are not used on the high ground of truth and real goodness; but in their application to the conventional and selfish views and feelings of those who use them. In the loose sense the words are used, the best things have their disadvantage, and the worst

their advantages. Right is a disadvantage to wrong, truth is an impediment in the way of falsehood, and may prevent the false from advancing. In this sense it may be a disadvantage, according to the selfish and earthly opinion and feeling of men. It may occur circumstantially under certain conditions that the unjust may enrich himself, and the false advance the superficial interest of men in this world. But the thing advanced by injustice, and defended by the false, is not a solid and a real advantage; neither is any impediment or result of truth a real disadvantage. The superficial and the transient are not advantageous; such are the results of the wrong and the false. The solid, the lasting, the safe, and the happy, are no disadvantage; these are followers of the just and the true. In this superficial state of partial knowledge and justice, truth is at a discount, and the untrue at a premium. But there is no real advantage in the premium of one, nor disadvantage in the discount of the other.

The same thing often is considered an advantage to one, but a disadvantage to the other; and frequently things are thus viewed, in the life of the same person, under different conditions and periods of life. In the relation of things to the superficial things of this world, they are tested and solved from different stand-points, as they agree

with different sympathies, and involve their interests. So long as men will be governed by different motives, influenced by different powers, and view their interests as adverse to one another, such will be the case.

If the order of God is based in equity, truth and right can be of no disadvantage to any thing in His order. If goodness is the end of His order, evil and wrong can be of no real advantage to any one. The statement that the wrong, either in itself or in experience, is advantageous, leads to a monstrous pantheism, destroys the distinction between the nature and end of things, or implies that the great sovereign Mind has failed in His design and government. Either of these conclusions would be dishonourable to God, perplexing to reason, and destructive of religion. Such a conclusion would be adverse both to reason and revelation; for both declare the disadvantage of the wrong, and the advantage of the right; both recommend and reward the seeker after the good and the avoider of the wrong.

The tests by which people weigh and conclude the advantage and disadvantage of things, are both partial and imperfect; the elemental premises being incorrect, and it is but natural the final findings should be wrong.

1. One wrong test, is, to estimate things intel-

lectual and religious, according to the degree of earthly and individual selfish advantage or disadvantage, they confer upon their possessors. The views and feelings of men are so low and contradictory, relative to material advantages and disadvantages, that this ground is unequal as a faithful test, and the law of equity demands that all should be tried by equals.

2. The advantage and disadvantage of things are often tested by the partiality and prejudice of human view and desire; so often the really useful is refused, and the useless accepted and applauded.

3. The tests are often as numerous as the opinions and tastes of people; hence there is no higher ground of judgment relative to the advantage or disadvantage of many things, than human dogmas and opinions. In such conditions the test is as varied as parties and one-sided interests; as changeable as accidental circumstances. In fact, according to this, there is no real true test at all. If things have a reality in themselves and relations, there must be somewhere a test of their truth and utility apart from human opinion, prejudice, and selfishness.

4. In the present state of things, matters are brought to an imperfect court to be judged, and the verdict often goes against the true and advantageous, and in favour of the wrong and the disadvantageous.

It is the fate of all things alike, to be judged according to these imperfect tests; and always will be more or less, in this state of being at least. For the reason of the shortcomings of the human judgment, things are never all in all correctly judged and estimated according to their real intrinsic and relative value. And metaphysics come for a full share in this erroneous judgment of mankind; and all the more, because the objects either transcend the common walk of men, or the mode of procedure demands a toil and attention that all are not willing to give; perhaps, under ordinary conditions of life, all are not able to give.

To judge of the advantages of metaphysics, we must raise the ground of test above the common opinion of mankind. If this cannot be done fully and perfectly, there must be an honest aim and strife to accomplish it. In order to accomplish it justly, all human predilections and opinions must be viewed as insufficient for final decision: human consciousness must be attentively and patiently read. Evidence must be carefully sifted and examined; nothing must be refused or accepted but on the ground of clear and convincing evidence. It is not proposed to do all this in this place, only within a narrow limit; more time and space are demanded, than can be here spared.

There are two reasons which hide the advantages of metaphysical study from the view of ordinary thinkers. 1. As an intellectual science, its influence directly is upon the mind; hence, its advantages are indirect, and not seen and felt at once. This is the case also with religion and education in general, yet many of those who believe and appreciate the advantages of religion and education, deny those of metaphysics; while the same reason in this respect may be used against them alike. 2. The advantages in themselves are not seen; they are like seed in the depths of the mind, giving fruit in the lives of men, of various kinds and of different degrees. Though unseen and indirect, yet, like the seed in the ground, there would have been no such happy and abundant harvest without them. The work is done deep in the mind, but the results are in the very external circles of life, and in the extremity of human activity.

1. Metaphysical study strengthens and expands the human mind. All the gifts of God are capable of being increased and expanded; they are given us for high and common service; the stronger and more expanded they are, the more service they are capable of doing. It is a common and an universal advantage to improve every thing good; and all increase in importance in

the ratio they are valuable in themselves, and capable of high and great service. It is a higher matter to cultivate health and strengthen the body, than to increase riches; but it is of higher importance still to the individual himself and to society at large, to cultivate and strengthen the resources and powers of the human mind.

Those who speak of the fruitlessness of metaphysical study, acknowledge the vigour and expansion it gives to the mind, and their own tacit confession is a sufficient answer to their objection: for whatever renders such service to the mind, does not exist in vain. It cannot do otherwise than expand and strengthen, for it leads the mind to do battle with high and lofty questions; it opens before the mind the gate which leads to the infinite and the unknown. Men become massive and intellectual giants, not by dealing and amusing themselves with small and common thoughts; but by grappling and wrestling with the deeper and greater questions of being.

2. The study of metaphysics imparts quickness and insightful ability to the perceptive powers, and sharpness to the logical faculty of man. The saying of Robert Hall, that the chief use of metaphysics is to make men clever at the art of gladiatorship, has made many disciples; and is taken as a shelter by many to deride metaphysical study.

Robert Hall was not adverse to metaphysical study ; there is a vein of metaphysical sympathies and probings running through the whole of his works : a friend and admirer of John Foster could not be otherwise than fond of metaphysics, though he never studied it as a science from the lips or works of its great masters. Putting the most severe construction on Mr. Hall's sally, it bears out our position that the study gives quickness and edge to the intellectual powers and the logical faculty of the mind. Skill in the use of instruments and elements is an essential necessity for the defence, the development, and the preservation of things. If such skill is abused, it is neither the fault of the instrument, nor the acquired skill by which it is so used ; but that of the agent, and the powers which influence him in such a conduct. Whatever is bad in the abuse, is good in the use ; whatever is capable of doing much harm, is also, if it be differently and rightly used, capable of doing much good.

Metaphysical science brings her students constantly into contact with deep and subtle problems ; hence their tools must be well edged and kept bright, and a skill and quickness to use them above the ordinary walk of life. It is a kind of anatomical science of mind, thought, and existence, in their laws and mystery ; advancement is made by

the most careful and minute dissection; and in order to do it with pleasure and effect, the instrument must be precise, delicate, and sharp.

It fits the mind to expose and attack the sophistries of religion and common life, which often would disturb and baffle ordinary minds. By its aid the wrong, in thought, creed, and practice, is brought to light, weighed, and found wanting. By its assistance often truth and religion have been defended and exalted, when other powers were feeble and helpless, and always in extreme difficulty her aid will be asked, and thankfully acknowledged.

3. Metaphysical study disturbs the stagnation of ordinary thinking, and opens before the mind a new and a loftier region. Common-place men can never advance society; in the hands of such men, in the long run, society would stagnate, recede into feeble mechanism, and mentally, morally, and religiously die. Men of talent, of power, of originality, and genius, are the life and power of society; they deliver it from stagnation and sluggish torpor; they raise the platform of thought and sympathy, and lead it to new fields of rich pasture, and aspiring hope.

As men of genius and power disturb the common torpor, and raise and move society; metaphysics disturbs, moves, and advances the science of com-

mon thought and knowledge. Even if it leads occasionally into a doubtful speculation, that carries with it a kind of compensation; it stimulates thought, and leads men to examine the root and principles of their common belief: it awakes them from their slumber, arouses new powers, and develops resources not known before. Inactive torpor gives neither hope, usefulness, nor happiness: conscious wakefulness and activity, is an attitude of hope and advancement.

Metaphysics has repeatedly disturbed the common torpor of society, raised it to a higher region, and given a new direction to its thought and life. And if it had done no more, its visit has not been in vain, and deserves an immortal memento of gratitude.

4. Metaphysical study tends to free and liberalize human thinking, and make it independent of human custom and opinion. One of the canons of metaphysics is, not to take any thing for granted. No human authority must be considered infallible; no name, nor creed, nor earthly source whatever, must be accepted without being weighed and measured by thought and argument. Every thing must be sifted and tested, before it can be received into the vocabulary of philosophical belief; hence its collisions with common opinion, and its opposition to a test that would be infallible and easy.

No one can advance an inch in philosophy without a full exercise of his higher powers, and a complete freedom from the custom, the prejudice, and all human opinions. Things must be looked at as they are, and followed to their real true source; the mind is obliged to exercise all its powers, and use all resources in its possession to accomplish the task proposed. The philosopher ever has three things in view and aim. 1. Freedom from human opinion and the false. 2. Knowledge of the truth. 3. The invigoration and perfect development of his own powers, and that by independent thinking and action. In every step in philosophy there is a necessity which cannot be evaded, to fall back upon one's own powers, resources, and consciousness.

Every thinker is obliged to feel his own feet and use them; the moment he allows others to carry him to the end of his journey, he is deprived of his name, independency, and power. It is both a dignity and a high pleasure to be able to free ourselves from human opinions and fancies, and pursue the journey of thought with our independent resources and guidance. If philosophy did nothing else, this it promises and fulfils; and this is more than a reward for its acceptance and cultivation.

5. Metaphysical study refines the thoughts and sympathies of the mind. The mind receives the

character of its feelings and moulding, from those objects it communes with. If the character of the objects with which the mind communes is corrupt, mean, or material, the mind in its sympathies, thoughts, and expressions, becomes the same: on the contrary, if the character of those objects is pure, lovely, spiritual, and great, the mind is so moulded accordingly.

The objects presented to the mind in philosophy, are pure, true, great, and spiritual. In the pursuit of them, the mind loses its meanness, and rises above material tendency, and becomes noble, pure, strong, true, conscious of some greater end than the body and matter. In the face of so much material tendency, and corrupt and mean influences, it is comforting that there is one science, at least, whose tendency and education are spiritual, pure, true, and Divine. The thoughts of men govern and mould their subjects: hence, those who are students of philosophy, unless they are treacherous to their profession, cannot be mean, material, false to themselves, and unfaithful to the laws of being. It separates men from the dross of human opinion and party; it gives them a calmer and happier region to reside in; they are beyond the common world of storms and turmoils. It communes through self with greater power and higher things than self: hence the meanness, the

shallowness, and the dross of common self are lost, by communion with this nobler counterpart of being.

6. Metaphysical study increases the store of human knowledge ; and that quality of knowledge that no other form of study could. It makes the mind an object of its examination and researches : and the powers and the laws which govern the mind are thus explored, and made objects of knowledge. The final laws and causes of universal being are perpetually before her attention ; she defines the boundaries between the unknown and the known, the finite and the infinite, the conditioned and the unconditioned. It teaches the limit of our powers ; it searches out the particular and the universal in knowledge. It gives men knowledge of self, and of the laws which are above and outside self. If things are estimated according to the quality and quantity of their producing power, philosophy should be highly estimated ; for the quality is first in character, and the quantity real and true, and that in the degree of its earnestness and aim.

7. The study of metaphysics imparts fortitude and comfort to the mind. It enables the mind to take a correct view of things ; it teaches the mind to accept things as they are, and submit calmly to their laws and conditions. It teaches moderation in expectation, and submission in reverses. The mind is supplied with pure thought,

so as to become absorbed in its object, and oblivious to many of the minor sorrows of earth. The mind takes a large and comprehensive view of things ; so as to be able to compare on a large scale, and reason and conclude more correctly than others, who have not the same advantages ; and is calmer and comforted accordingly.

There is a kind of pleasure in all toil ; but specially so, in pure mental toil, when the mind is lost to all but to its own consciousness and the objects of its thought. In philosophy the objects are always pure and great ; and the soul is lost in an inconceivable infinitude. The soul is also comforted in the consciousness of her lofty aspiration, and her true aim and motive, though the high end is not always realized.

As no one but the pure knows the felicity of purity, and no one but the true knows the comfort and fortitude of truth, so no one but the philosopher knows the comfort of philosophy.

CHAPTER III.

THE NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICS.

THE good, the true, the real, the pure, the safe, the useful, and the happy, are needful as integral parts in the constitution of the universal order of being; and as counterparts, to meet the wants of the created dependents of being. It is the most delightful thought that the opposite of these are not a necessity in the order of being,—namely, the bad, the false, the unreal, the corrupt, the dangerous, the useless, and the miserable. Two opposites cannot be needful; indeed, they cannot consistently exist in one thought and order. If the infinite nature is absolutely good, the opposite of all goodness cannot have a necessity: if the order of being be the government of the absolute good, and if right in itself, the wrong cannot have a necessity in it.

If this reasoning is conclusive, it follows, whatever is wrong must be outside the thoughts of God and His order,—an outside needless intruder. It may be established as an axiom that whatever is needful is good, and whatever is good is needful.

To prove the first is to establish the second, and to demonstrate the second is to show reason for the first.

We estimate things in the degree we need them, or as we think we need them, because necessity is a test of value. Bread is more precious than stones, because more needed; water more prized than mercury, because every day's life is more dependent upon it; labour is more needful than idleness, because the wealth and welfare of society depend upon one and not upon the other; hence, it is held in higher esteem. There are two classes of necessary things;—things which are made so by fancy and superficial thought and feeling, and those which from true want and relation are made so, and the last of these is referred to here.

Necessity in itself is a kind of relational condition, involving the existence of other beings and things, and apart from these can have no existence. In its application to finite existence, it supposes limit and law.

Necessity in its application to common and universal existence comprehends, 1. Quality of nature. 2. Mode of being. 3. The condition on which it exists. 4. The condition of finite beings involves a relation to time, space, higher cause, and the laws of life, and reason. 5. Cause and

effect; while finite being involves a cause above himself, the infinite supposes an effect below himself.

Necessity is either absolute or conditional. In its relation to the Infinite and the All-perfect One, it is absolute; but in its relation to finite beings and things, it is conditional. It is true that among finite beings and things, the existence of one being or condition, necessitates the existence of another as a matter of result or completeness; but viewing things in their relation to their higher causes, they are only conditional necessity. But for higher will and power they could not have existed; these are essential conditions of their very being. Whatever is dependent upon another cannot be an absolute necessity in itself, but a conditional one; it is conditioned by law, dependence, and source of being; a higher will, power, and law, are conditions of its existence.

Inasmuch as existence has different sides, necessity has various forms. As material substance exists, physical necessity is the consequence. There is a necessity for physical laws and conditions to secure harmony and completeness. It is not the work of philosophy to show how things might be different in nature and relations to what they are: her work is to explain existence as it is, and to show true causes, fit laws

and relations. Nature viewed as it is; her physical forces, agencies, elements, means, and ends, are a necessity.

Moral necessity is another kind which arises from the nature and relations of moral creatures. This necessity is not the necessity of force and passiveness, as that of the physical; it is rather the necessity of rational and moral fitness, supposing a willing agent, and a rational object and end. Before man can be happy he must be true and pure; this is a moral necessity arising from the fitness of things; yet, man is made true by the sway of his free volition, and the exercise of his reason and conscience.

In reasoning of moral necessity, we always base the consequences which follow, upon some antecedent conditions, which involve will and intelligence. It supposes the possibility of things being otherwise, because it involves will and fitness: it is a reasoning on the ground of possibility, probability, volition, and moral fitness.

There is also a religious necessity, which, though based upon and including the moral, yet has features different from it. There is a necessity in the relation of beings of rational and moral nature for religion: whether we view this relation as existing between man and himself, his fellow man, universal law and creation, or between him and his lawgiver

and God, it is alike needful. Religious necessity is deep in the nature of creatures with affections, like those of man. Man's nature demands a fit counterpart; without it he would both be miserable and incomplete. It is a necessity of Divine purpose, of fitness, of relation, of need, of nature, and of destiny.

Metaphysical necessity is deep in the nature and relations of rational beings. A being like man surrounded with mystery; being endued as he is with power of thought, and that without prevention or limit in its exercise; having doubts and fears, as he has in every step and condition, cannot be prevented from trying to bridge the mystery of being, and sink into the deep secret and root of law and existence. It is as easy to destroy thought, blot out intelligence, or annihilate existence, as to extinguish metaphysical tendency in rational nature.

I. There is an objective necessity for the existence of philosophy. The objects about which philosophy predicates, are a necessity both in themselves and in their relations. The comprehensive and mysterious objects of metaphysics are existence in itself, with its various laws and relations. Existence is a necessary fact; and to a finite mind a mystery. Universal existence necessitates the existence of the part; and the

particular predicates the necessity of the universal.

1. Existence is a necessity as an object of sense, of reason, of consciousness.
2. It is necessary in its cause.
3. In its governing and regulating laws.
4. In its relational dependence and service.
5. In its relation to man.

(1.) Man needs the complement of being as a creature. If existence in its most complete form did not exist, he could have had no existence as he has in its present form. (2.) It is needful for man in a higher sense as he is an intelligent being. Human intelligence proves an intelligent existence above and outside man; and that there are counter objects for that intelligence to spend its energies of thought, feeling, and action upon. Existence is the counterpart of rational nature; and it could never be complete, nor even exist without it.

It is evident that existence in all its forms is intended to be an object of human thought and reason. It excites man's inquisitive curiosity; it presents itself to his reason, inviting his examination; it comes, in some of its multifarious forms, every moment in contact with his senses. His intellectual advancement and existence depend upon the examination and communion with universal being.

II. There is a subjective necessity in the

human mind for metaphysical science and development. In vain will men speak of the danger and fruitlessness of metaphysics, and discourage and prohibit its pursuit; the sympathy is deep in the nature of man, and it cannot be destroyed without impairing his nature. The pursuit of metaphysical study is nothing but the deep feeling in human nature, rising to the surface of life, the invisible coming to prominence, and the root appearing in the flower and fruit. This exists in the nature of men in the proportion of their mental stamina; hence, it appears in actual thought, proportionately to the intellectual power at the root of man's nature, and in the degree that it is cultivated. Intellectual giants will always, and have always, by the very powerful sympathies of their nature, enter into regions that common minds dare not and cannot go, and try their skill and strength with the deep and mysterious problems of being, and that of the infinite.

We can trace the metaphysical necessity to some of its particular sources known to the common consciousness of men generally.—1. The first to be mentioned is, a love for knowledge, either for its own sake, or as means to some other end. 2. A desire in men universally to remove or rise above the evil of life. The human mind carries with it in every state a dislike for the painful, and

a desire after the easy and the happy ; and those opposed to universal feelings stimulate men in search of the new and the unknown. 3. There is an unaccountable curiosity in the mind, to pry into the mysterious and the unknown, and that in itself and for its own sake. Man dislikes seerecy, from Eden to the present hour ; he must try to solve or annihilate it. He fears the secret, and becomes anxious to search it out ; he has a kind of doubting hope in the unknown, hence he is anxious to ascertain it by clear proof, and realize the substance of it. 4. There is a wish in man to be beforehand in the knowledge of his future condition. From a desire thus to know and govern his own destiny man ever sighs after the unknown and the unknowable. 5. There is a law in the intellectual sympathy of man which leads him to inquire into final causes ; there is also a law in the same nature, which ever seeks after the law of unity and harmony. These laws are comprehensible and powerful, they are the root and impulse of his philosophical nature and destiny. Man has not created his philosophical tendency, he can at best or worst but direct or modify it. If the philosophical tendency is not rightly cultivated and developed, it is to the detriment and injury of human nature. In this, as in other things in philosophy, what is first and deepest in the order

of nature, is lowest and last in the order of human knowledge and practice.

III. Metaphysical study is a high educational power, and as such it is necessary to the advancement of the human mind and society at large. The human mind increases in strength and vigour by exercise ; it is preserved in health and power by constant vigorous activity. Philosophy is a field of intellectual gymnastics, which call into skilful and earnest play all the powers of the mind. If metaphysics was no longer an object of pursuit, society would grow tamer, feebler, more ignorant, and less independent. There is no other form of study that could supply the lack of this. Its objects are profound, numerous, and lofty ; yet it demands such nicety of sifting and analysis, that it imparts refineness to the mind, while at the same time it gives breadth, power, and profundity. It is not an evil, but an advantage to society, to have abundance of educational means and powers ; in this way all are revealed ; all parts and sides are thus touched, developed, and polished. The means of educational development should correspond with the objects of knowledge, the end of life, and the powers and resources of the mind : these are counterparts in life, and go together.

Society might dispense with some subsidiary or

circumstantial powers and means without suffering much loss ; but not so with an essential department at the root of natural existence, as metaphysics is. It may be said that society generally neither study nor care for metaphysics ; and what benefit can it be? All are not growers of corn, but all must have bread ; the majority never plough, and would dislike it, yet there must be the ploughing to keep alive society. Society lives in its various departments by the skill and toil of the few : and if those departments which the few carry on and manage were to stop, all would soon feel the loss. Only few produce mental food to society, and lead her on into intellectual advancement and triumph : if they failed, or gave up that high service, society at large would feel the need, and could not advance in her useful and happy progress.

CHAPTER IV.

METAPHYSICS AND THE BIBLE.

THE Bible among Christians is made the final authoritative criterion of every opinion and action. But there is nothing more common, than to make the Bible speak a language it never meant, and to utter dogmas it never contained. Men are so blinded by their own opinions and party views, when they think and express themselves as defended and supported by the Bible, that it is often nothing more than the reflection of their own opinions, in their interpretation. The book which is intended to rectify human opinions and purify corrupt sentiments and motives, is made the greatest support of false opinions, and scapegoat of groundless fancies, of any other. The loftiness of the book, and the greatness of its authority, make it a desirable thing to affect respect for and prize its testimony.

The Bible is made by some the class-book of natural and general science, and whatever does not literally accord with it scientifically, is not in their

opinion correct. This is taking the Bible beyond its intended and professed boundaries ; it also contracts the path and liberty of science within too narrow a limit. If the Bible could be made the class-book of science simply as such, it would be a great misfortune to its authority ; for it is clear that it is not, by the clearest evidence and demonstrations. The Bible is a book of great moral truth, intended to govern the motives, the thoughts, the feelings, and the actions of men. It is a book of vital food for the spiritual nature of man, and a rule to regulate the relations and lives of men.

It is enough for science to know, that the Bible does not flatly contradict and oppose its discoveries and detail ; and that the motives of its promoters, and its results relative to the common good and advancement of truth, are in accordance with its principles and laws. From the affinity of relation, the Bible stands in closer relation to some branches of knowledge than it does to others. It stands in nearer relation to the science of mind than it can to that of matter, because it is a moral book intended for man as a moral and intelligent being.

A case cannot be made out that metaphysics is adverse to the Bible. It is easy to make a loose statement, that philosophy is contrary to the truth and spirit of the Bible, and that it undermines or opposes its authority, and such things ; but when

it is asked when and where? it cannot be definitely and specifically shown and proved. To say that philosophers have been often against the Bible is nothing to the question; it may be that they would have been so, if they had not been philosophers quite as much in sympathy; only their philosophy gave them more skill and power, hence their opposition more felt and dangerous. And it often happens that the views of philosophers, when considered to be against the Bible, are much more against the conventional views of men and parties relative to the Bible, than they are against the book itself. When human arguments and party views are opposed, it is enough to raise the cry in many quarters, that the Bible is opposed, and religion is in danger; and without much of impartial examination, whether human opinions or the Bible is opposed, philosophy wholesale is anathematized as an execrable dangerous thing. Theologians and commentators often quote Scripture against Scripture, and that to disprove the assertions of one another; and yet all this is in harmony with the Bible, whilst surely one of two contradictions is always against the Bible: but any thing under the name of philosophy daring half so much, would raise the ire of all the religious party scribblers of the land against it. Names sway the majority of mankind much more than principles and truth;

there is much more of fighting for human opinions and conventions, under the sham of defending religion and the Bible, than really there is for real truth and religion, as they are in themselves free from all party views and prejudice.

Metaphysics existed in its germinal form before the Bible in its verbal form; and has never been studied by any one of its true students from *malice prepense* to the Bible. If ever it appears to oppose the Bible, it is incidental and not intentional; it may be an apparent opposition more than real. If ever metaphysics becomes opposed to the truth, it is the fault of metaphysicians more than metaphysics; and if ever it opposes the Bible, it is an opposition to something human about the Bible, and not the true and the Divine in it, or the wrong in the metaphysician himself, and not in the metaphysics.

There is nothing in the Bible from which it can be shown, that it opposes metaphysics in itself, nor yet in its studious cultivation and use. The Bible speaks more about the use of things, than of things in themselves; it lays down limits and conditions for the right use of all things, contrary and beyond which they become wrong and sinful. The Bible approves of beings and things in certain relations and conditions, whilst it disapproves of them in others, and the contrary.

As it is possible to misuse and abuse the best of God's gifts, so the best intellectual instrument and power may be misapplied, and made the production of evil rather than good; and in that sense disapproved of, whilst in its natural and best sense it would be approved of. The Apostle (Col. ii. 8) speaks of philosophy, *φιλοσοφίας*, in a bad sense, as a thing capable of being abused; and, when so misapplied, to be avoided by simple and unsuspecting Christians.

Not only the Bible does not oppose metaphysical science, but the metaphysical element pervades it, and it cannot fully be understood and interpreted without it. 1. Many of the terms used in the Scriptures are metaphysical, and cannot be thought of without metaphysical sympathy and reasoning being produced; and cannot be interpreted without metaphysical power. *God, spirit, creator, governor, creation, cause, effect, truth, thought, conscience, mind, soul, regeneration, influence, power, eternity, everlasting, time, space, infinite, omnipresent, unchangeable, almighty, everlasting*, these, and a large number besides, involve in their simplest meaning the metaphysical element, and cannot be thought of without it. 2. The objects-matter of the Bible are necessarily metaphysical in their character, notions, and surroundings. *The infinite, the invisible world, reve-*

lation, miracles, Divine government, the influence of spirit upon spirit, redemption, the existence and cause of evil, the relation of things and beings, happiness and misery, man's immortality, faith, love, hope, and heaven :—these involve the metaphysical element, and cannot be approached without it.

3. Some books and portions of the Bible are thoroughly metaphysical in their tendency, sympathy, and reasoning. Is it possible to read the books of *Job, Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Isaiah, and the Prophets generally*, without being convinced of this? The *Gospels* are pervaded by the same element; the Epistle to the Romans, and all the Epistles of Paul, especially those to the Ephesians, Philippians, and the Colossians. Never was a more metaphysical writer than the Apostle Paul; take the eighth chapter of Romans, and the fifteenth of 1st Corinthians as an example of this; and the same, more or less, pervades the whole of his writings. It was in the depth of the man, and it came out in every thing he said and wrote; it was worthy his superior grandeur, without it he could not have been the great Apostle and the powerful writer he was.

4. The comprehensive principles and end of metaphysics are everywhere recommended in the Bible, even on the high grounds of need and duty. Reflection on the laws and works of God is recommended everywhere; the search after

knowledge is constantly urged and encouraged; the testing of things, and the seeking of truth, are applauded and shown as needful everywhere through the volume. The inquiry into the relations, the causes, the laws, and the results of beings and things, are involved indirectly in the truths inculcated in the Bible, as well as directly and repeatedly recommended verbally.

It would be easy to quote pages from the Bible, to verify the foregoing remarks; but this is difficult from their number, and partially needless to all the readers that may look into these pages, for such passages will be known to them. Indeed, to enter into minute detail, would require both a longer time and a larger space than I can afford to it; the intention of the chapter is suggestive, and not exhaustive.

CHAPTER V.

THE RELATION OF METAPHYSICS TO OTHER FORMS OF
KNOWLEDGE.

As every atom belongs to and serves the whole atomic universe; as every particle of light is a part, and serves the whole body of light; as every member is a part of a body, and helps to complete the whole, and no body can be complete without all its members; so is one branch of knowledge connected with, and essential to the other. Some parts, on account of their relative position, or the variety or importance of the service they render, are greatly more important than others, hence more essential and needful.

If the science of mind is at all any part of the great system of knowledge, it follows that it has its parts to play, and that the whole would not be complete without it. The degree of its service depends upon its comprehension, its position, and means of usefulness, and the variety and degree of its service. Every form of knowledge has its own special objects-matter, and must be specially adapted

for them ; it has also its universal relation as a part of the whole, which it serves indirectly, in the degree of its relation, means, and power. Every form of knowledge has its more particular and professed business : at the same time, every thing stands related to the whole, and helps to complete it.

There are some particular branches of knowledge to which the science of mind is specially connected. The relation between things is mediate or immediate, near or remote, common or special ; there is a relation between the most extreme things, but it is reacted and dependent upon various mediate links and conditions. While metaphysics stands related to the whole body of knowledge, it stands nearer to some parts than it does to others.

1. Metaphysics stands in intimate relation to theology. Theology reaches its systematic aim either through the objects and laws of nature, or through the truths and light of revelation ; hence it is called natural or revealed.

The object-matter of theology is God, in His nature, and His design, will, and laws, towards men and the universe. Theology is absolutely a science of mind, and that in the loftiest and most sacred sense. It treats of the Divine mind, relative to human interest and destiny ; hence it

comprehends universal intelligence, law, and order. Mental science opens the door and leads on theology; it strengthens the mind for its successful pursuit, and feeds and supports its premises and bulwarks. It is difficult to think, how theology can exist and be defended, without some knowledge of the laws of cause, of being, and of thought.

Philosophy and theology are two sisters, having their origin in one source, their converse about common objects, and their aim and results in the same ultimate conclusions. They are intended to serve each other in their career, to rectify each other in their inadvertencies, and to support each other in their common and truthful conclusions. From the nature and order of things, theology is more dependent as a science upon philosophy, than philosophy is upon theology; because it is wider in its range, freer in its action, richer in its means and resources of illustration and defence. Philosophy existed before systematic theology had any form; it is based upon the fact of mind and some final cause behind its very first premises, and is defended by its skill and instruments. Theology and philosophy go a long way together, having common sympathy and end,—truth, and common happiness. Theology is more of a statement, according to certain formulæ and supposed revealed truths; philosophy is more of a search after

truth, without any assumption or prescription of infallible record whatever. Theology is limited within a written record; hence dogmatic and narrow, as interpreted by human system; philosophy is bounded by no written record, it sinks into the deep, and ascends to the lofty places of the universe, searches out mysteries, and traverses the invisible and the unknown infinitude of mind and space. The Bible is the test of the theologian, consciousness that of the philosopher.

Theology is more conservative in its spirit and tendency than philosophy, because the complement of its truths is revealed; hence the philosopher is more liberal in his views, and universal in his sympathies and researches, than the theologian. The theologian believes himself as having found all; the philosopher believes himself as having found nothing fully. The theologian is satisfied with the light and truths he has; the philosopher ever sighs and searches for more light and truth. The theologian is ever in danger of becoming narrow, illiberal, and despotic in thought and assumption; and the mere acquaintance with theology, and nothing else, will almost surely lead to such undesirable results. The metaphysician is in danger of becoming too speculative, sceptical, and confident in the power and light of reason. Theology may be of good service to the meta-

physician to modify his speculation, and show him that there is something higher than human reason in the universe: it may preserve from scepticism and despair. Philosophy may serve the theologian, by giving him broader and more catholic views of God, men, and truth; it may preserve from assumptious infallibility, the pharisaical boast of orthodoxy, and the loud anathemas against all views and things, except those of the narrow dogma or adopted party.

One thing is certain that the Divine voice in words is not different from that in works; and if they be rightly interpreted, the conclusion will be one. But true philosophy is often a very different thing from the opinions of philosophers; so is true theology, from theologians. It is not a discord between theology and philosophy that causes collision; but a want of harmony of thought and feeling between theologians and philosophers. There is nothing in the nature, tendency, and intention of philosophy and theology antagonistic to each other: both perfectly agree in themselves, in their special functions, and yet in their common service and end. The echo of Divine reason must be the same in consciousness, as it is in true revelation: rightly read, they will harmoniously agree.

2. Philosophy stands also nearly related to

politics. In all walks of knowledge there are some things common and alike to them all; which cannot be acquired without the same qualifications. It is a condition in all alike, that the mind must acquire a certain acuteness and vigour before any of them can be pursued with effective results. These, philosophy imparts to the mind, which is the one common power in the pursuit and discovery of all knowledge. But every form of knowledge has something peculiar to itself in it, which requires special qualification to its right performance. Politics has a common work and object; it has also its special work, and the way of doing it. It views and deals with man as a rational responsible being; it is true that it views man on his material side as well, but always through his higher nature—the mental. In enacting and administering laws, man is viewed as a being of intelligence, will, and conscience. Before laws of reason and equity, suitable to man as a being of reason, of limit, of conditions, and states, can be correctly enacted, and justly administered, it is needful to know something of the nature of such a being; this mental science is the best instrument to impart.

In order to carry out the work of politics rightly and faithfully, the politician is under the necessity to know something of causes and effects;

of laws and relations; of the human intellect, passion, conscience, and will; of mental idiosyncrasies; of differences and likenesses; of human motives and actions; of the nature of truth and falsehood; the cause of happiness and misery; and of human ability in certain conditions, and his inability in others. The want of knowing the human mind better is one reason that so many laws are enacted, so unnatural to the nature of man, and so unreasonable in their requirements and provision, hence opposed often by revolution, and repealed by force, or by higher reason. It will be a happy event for people and countries, when their legislators will study more, and understand better, the laws of mind; then better laws will be enacted, and greater stability established. Before any man aspires to be a maker of laws for his fellow men, he ought at least to have this qualification in a superior degree,—*the knowledge of mental science*. If legislators made it their business to know themselves better, we should have fewer legislators, but far better in quality; juster laws; happier countries; more satisfied people; and more stable institutions. Instead of the circumstantial and conventional qualifications, this would be both real, superior, and of universal advantage.

3. General jurisprudence stands nearly related

and greatly indebted to the science of mind. All things which belong to man, are studied directly or indirectly in reference to him. They are thus studied in themselves, or in man himself; for a knowledge of him is to know the counterparts of his being.

Jurisprudence has men in view, in certain relations, and under special conditions; if those relations and conditions did not exist, there could be no such system as jurisprudence. (1.) It views man as subject of law. (2.) As free and capable of moral and responsible action. (3.) As a being of purposes and motives. (4.) As a being of various relations. (5.) As a being in a condition of doing wrong, and of being wronged. (6.) As a being of merit or demerit, according to the nature of his actions. Not only is mental philosophy an assistance to jurisprudence, but an essential necessity to its right understanding and practice. To study jurisprudence in theories apart from men, is often nothing better than legal dogmas, without either fitness, truth, or reason; but when the higher nature and relations of man are studied, true and righteous jurisprudence is understood; for all are for him, and whatever answers his wants and relations is fit and true. No one can advance or practise jurisprudence on an enlightened ground, without a knowledge of mental science.

4. There is a near relation between the science of mind, and that department of knowledge which treats of disease and remedy—the *healing art*. It is undeniable that there is a very near union between the mind and the body, and many of the diseases of the body proceed from the influence of the mind over the material organism. It is needful for the medical student to understand something of the laws, emotions, and power of the mind, in order to know more accurately what kinds of diseases are more particularly produced by the power of the mind over the body, and the way and the degree they are thus produced. A knowledge of the laws of mind would often simplify and solve many perplexed and complicated cases, and be the means, in many instances, to suggest the true remedy, and, in all cases, of preventing many and injurious prescriptions. For the want of this power, the medical practitioner is deprived of the skill and power he might and ought to have; and not unfrequently he mistakes and fails, where he might be right and successful. Ignorance of the laws of mind and their influence upon the body, misleads the medical practitioner often beyond his legitimate boundaries, to wander amidst strange rocks and bewildering paths; and this is all the more intolerable in a guide who should know something of the way, and that when life is in

question. The importance of the function of the medical practitioner demands at his hands this knowledge, and all others which increase his skill and power : he has to do with health and affliction, with life and death. He owes this knowledge to himself, and to all those who put themselves in his hands.

By the exclusive study of the bodily organs in their anatomical and physiological forms, no wonder that the medical student so often becomes a materialist. A knowledge of mental philosophy, would be a kind of equipoise and a preservative power, from that low and dull materialism so often complained of as prevalent among medical students. For the want of this knowledge, it is not unfrequent that mental diseases are treated as physical ones : hence injury is done, and unhappy results follow. Mental philosophy to the medical student is a common benefit to society ; it increases his resources, skill, and power, and makes him more able to administer his important function to the good and happiness of all patients.

5. Metaphysics stands related to history ; and that in such a degree, that history cannot be successfully studied and fully written without it. If history has to account for phenomena, actions, and revolutions, in their causes and results ; and if mind is involved in these, and is the leading

agent in all, then it is needful, in order to have a full and faithful record, to study the laws and phenomena of mind. Much of history is insipidly and superficially written; and one reason is, the want of profounder knowledge, on the part of the writers, of mental philosophy. History, if faithful, is more a history of thought and motives, than of mechanism and material forms and appearances. The historian has perpetually to trace things to their active and motive source; he has constantly to analyse thoughts and motives, in order to distinguish difference and draw right deductions: before all this can be done effectively, the mind must have acquired metaphysical training and power.

The historian constantly is thrown beyond the boundary of clear and common facts, to the ground of analogy and abstract reasoning; and if historians were more familiar with the laws of mind, history would be both more true and complete. No unphilosophical mind can write an independent, true, and immortal history: there may be a pretty relation of events and external transactions written, which are pleasing to superficial readers; but if unphilosophically written, it is not deep and faithful enough to be immortal. The most philosophic histories of the past live and are admired; the shallow, the light, and the flippant ones, are

neither consulted nor respected. The present numerous superficial histories will become effete ; but the few philosophical ones will withstand the ravage and revolution of time, and will go down with honour and respect to futurity. Philosophy gives to history breadth, faithfulness, and truthfulness, to universal law and being, which are the same in every age, and the sure qualities of immortality.

6. There is a near relation between metaphysical science and logic. Logic is the production of metaphysics, and dependent upon it for being and efficiency. Logic being the formal law of thought, is a natural offshoot of the science which makes mind the object-matter of its study, which is philosophy. Logic again is an essential effective instrument in the pursuit of metaphysical science, and cannot be pursued efficiently without it. There is a partial dependence and service between the two ; metaphysics depends partially upon logic, logic depends entirely upon metaphysics. True metaphysics advances the interest of logic ; true logic protects and guides the interest of metaphysics. When the logic of people is bad, their metaphysics cannot be good ; when their metaphysics is bad, their logic is the same. They go together ; as one fares, it shares with the other ; if one is well off, so is the other ; if one badly off, it

is the case with the other. They are twins possessing one common sympathy, they were born only a little after each other, they live together, and if one dies the other will not long survive. Their source is one—mind; their end is one—the advancement of mind and truth.

7. Though metaphysical and mathematical science differ, yet there is a near alliance and sympathy existing between the two. These two great instrumental powers in the advancement of knowledge, have been perpetually set against each other. The mathematician has ever frowned philosophy down as vague and indefinite in its demonstrations and conclusions, and applauded mathematics as the only method of exact and pure knowledge. The metaphysician, again, has often denounced mathematics as a material, formal, and stiff thing, never able to transcend to the higher and nobler region of thought. Now these two sciences are needful and compatible with each other, so that the metaphysician and the mathematician may live on good terms with each other, and think themselves brothers, and co-workers in the advancement of the work and happiness of the universe.

A difference does not necessitate a contradiction; there are differences between these sciences, but no contradiction. Some of the

points of differences are the following. (1.) They differ in their objects-matter. The objects-matter of mathematics are form and magnitude; those of metaphysics are cause, mind, existence, with their laws and relations. (2.) Mathematics deals with the tangible, the visible, and the material; hence a material science: metaphysics deals with phenomena, the unseen, the supernatural; hence a more spiritual and a superior science. (3.) Mathematics is mechanical in its operation; it has but one path, and all must do precisely as they are bidden, or they surely will get wrong: metaphysics is more free and rational; and allows her disciples greater range and liberty to seek truth and evidence. (4.) The tendency of mathematics is to materialize, formulize, and stereotype thought; the tendency of metaphysics is to spiritualize, liberalize, expand, and diversify thought. (5.) The work of mathematics is more limited; it is to settle the material problems of the material universe; and, if that is ever done, its work will be over: but metaphysics deals in the infinite, it deals with dateless cause and being, and with endless existence. Hence, its work will never end, because its objects are illimitable. (6.) Philosophy existed before mathematics; and gave existence to the latter. Men always philosophized, and their philosophical broodings about the material universe

gave existence to mathematics. Mathematics was created by philosophy as an instrument to be used for her service; but the child since has often raised its heels against its more venerable and worthy parent.

But there are points of resemblance as well as of difference. (1.) The mental processes in the prosecution of both are very much alike;—the analytical, and the synthetical. (2.) Both aim at common ultimate ends,—the education of the mind and the acquirement of truth and knowledge. They reign over different empires, and have their individual function and business: but they may dwell and commune with each other in peace and harmony as mother and child; and as the visible and the invisible do in our persons, and in the universe. (3.) They both require the same qualification of mind in strength and perfection to make any proficiency in their knowledge. The first metaphysician would be also the first mathematician, if he turned fully his attention that way; so would the first mathematician in metaphysics: and no one but the first-class power of mind can be great and first in either. They are linked together and cannot be separated. They are the highest achievements of thought: they are common servants of the one great universe.

8. Painting and sculpture in their theory are

partially dependent and obligated to metaphysics. The end and aim of these in theory and practice in their relation to man is the perfect representation and delineation of the form and expressions of the mind and body naturally, spontaneously, and perfectly. Inasmuch as the expressions and actions of the body are produced and governed by the thoughts, the volitions, and feelings of the mind, they never can be understood and delineated faithfully without some knowledge of the invisible mind which directs and governs the whole. No art that is not faithful to the deeper being and laws of human nature, can stand the test of severe and true criticism, and the ravage and the forces of time, because deficient in truth, naturalness, and comprehensiveness.

9. Poetry owes much to metaphysics. The end of poetry is, to express things in their true nature, relation, and law, according to the harmony of sound and pleasing sensibility. It is the inspiring of true thought, with the fire of feeling, spontaneity of expression, harmony of sound, and unity of design. Mind must always be the chief object-matter of poetry, as well as the mighty and skilful power which produces it. There are four things requisite to constitute real poetry,—true and comprehensive conception, harmony of sound,

purity of expression, and spontaneous, deep, and pure feeling.

No one can express the various powers, resources, susceptibilities, processes, and actions of mind, without some knowledge of its nature, laws, and conditions. No one can please, nor hold a long and a mighty influence over the mind of others, unless he is faithful to its character and laws. Utility, power, and immutability, are in truth and faithfulness, and whatever has not these qualities, must ultimately die, though other things which possess these, may share the same mournful fate; but the true and the faithful have a chance to live, and they have also truth on their side; but the untrue and the unfaithful have law and all against their existence, which make it impossible for them to remain always. The order of God is against the untrue and the unfaithful in knowledge and art, as well as in life, which make it impossible for them to remain in immortal acceptance and reverence. This is proved historically, as well as deductively on the ground of abstract truth, equality, and analogy. The great metaphysical poets have come down to us; at least those which have come down are most abstruse, and they are read and admired partially on that ground. Would Homer have retained his power; would Virgil be fresh and virgin; would Dante still impress us with awful

grandeur, but for their metaphysical element? Abstract the metaphysics of Shakespeare, and all his life, eccentricity, beauty, and power, are for ever gone. Milton would never have written *Paradise Lost*, but for his metaphysical broodings and sympathy; and take away this element, and it will be no longer the splendid production of Milton, neither will it any longer sway universal mind. The chief power and charm of Wordsworth is in his philosophical sympathies and touches: so is it the case in a high degree in Tennyson. Many more, of somewhat less magnitude and grandeur, might be mentioned, both ancient and modern, who have gained and retained their power, because of their truthfulness and faithfulness to the nature and laws of mind. So long as man is faithful to himself and the nearest and deepest laws of his nature, it cannot be otherwise; as he advances in true knowledge of himself, he must accept what is faithful to his nature, and refuse and despise the contrary.

It may appear as a paradox, to say, that true and great poetry grows in the soil of true philosophy, yet it is true both to the law of things and history. The superficial in thought can never be splendid in poetry; the untrue and narrow in conception, can never be great and grand in poetry. Inspire the deep with poetical fire, it will be both

lofty and splendid; give harmony of sound and beauty of form to the metaphysical sympathies and thoughts of the mind, there will flow out of it glorious and immortal poetry.

10. The science of ethics stands in near relation and dependence to metaphysics. Ethics is a science of the mind in certain of its relations and sympathies. Ethics is a science of the human will and motives, in relation with their expressions and actions. The science of ethics all through refers to a rational and accountable nature; yet, its immediate objects are those powers which immediately produce and govern them. These powers,—the will, the motives, and the affections, are powers of the mind under certain conditions and modifications, and are known through the expressions of the mind. Ethics can never be possible, but on the ground of mind; it cannot be understood and enforced, but through the philosophy of mind. Things must be studied and understood through their laws, their relations, and their dependents: so must ethical science be understood through metaphysics, which is the science of mind and universal being.

11. Mental science is nearly related to religion, and capable to render to it the greatest service. Religion is a broader thing than theology: whilst theology views religion theoretically, and as such

presented to the human intellect, religion comprehends both the reason, the heart, and the life of its subjects. Religion does not exclude the theory, but is based upon it; but it goes beyond and deeper, and is more real and powerful than a theory can be.

Both the danger, power, and happiness of religion, is in the fact, that it unites with, and roots in human feeling. The chief danger in religion is, deception and delusion; and this for want of higher and correcter knowledge of the mind, and its laws, and dependents. The dangers and extremes are of two kinds;—fanaticism, depression: one is in aërial delusive region, the other is in the region of fog and doubt. Both of these conditions proceed from a want of higher knowledge of the mind; a more correct knowledge of the philosophy of the mind, would often cure both: it would be the means of comfort to the depressed, and undeceive the fanatic. So long as mental science is divorced from religion, and considered antagonistic to it; so long will religion itself be a danger and in danger, and men deluded and depressed, ignorant of their privileges, relations, and conditions. No one can fully understand the state of his mind, unless he knows something of the laws and phenomena of mind.

CHAPTER VI.

METAPHYSICAL DANGERS.

To say that there are dangers around metaphysics, is the same as may be said of every other good thing. What is there without dangers in some way or other connected with it in this world of darkness, of wrong, and of folly? Every form of knowledge has some particular forms of dangers, to which it may be pushed, or lead unto : even religion itself has its various and great dangers around all its truths, duties, and blessings ; enough to testify the goodness and excellency of anything, if it is not inherently dangerous in itself, and naturally and unavoidably leads to dangers and ruin.

No one can help many dangers that may surround his path : if the path be true in itself, and the motives and means used right ones, the path in itself is right, and no one should discourage the traveller from walking in it. Many good things are in danger from the imperfect relations and associations of this state of things, and the want of

proper qualifications in the use of them, or the tendency to folly and error of the agent.

The path of knowledge in this world is like a stranger in a strange country without either map, finger-posts, or milestones to direct his path, and guard him on the right track. He is left very much to himself; he has to consult stars, and all he meets with; and, after all his inquiries, he is left much to himself. Or it may be compared to a mariner on the sea, in constant danger from rocks, reefs, shoals, fogs, waves and tempests, and that without knowledge of the route, latitude, and charts, and the proper instruments for such a condition. The traveller and the mariner have to use all in their power to reach the end of their journey safely; and if they succeed under such conditions, it is a matter of wonder and gratitude. But if they neglect the few means in their hands, no one blames the journey and the voyage, but their neglect, or the condition in which they were placed. Not only man is in a dangerous condition, but there is a positive tendency in man in his career after truth, to neglect the true means, and go after the vain and the wrong.

In the hand of man, the most innocent thing becomes dangerous; and the most needful and beneficial in itself, the means of misery and of death. Fire is a good thing in itself; but it may

be made, in the hand of human nature and wickedness, a most destructive instrument. Books are useful and needful things in themselves; but often they are the channels of wrong impression and falsehood. A hundred things may be named as good and essentially needful in themselves, yet in the hand of man they become bad and dangerous; and if philosophy were not capable of the same abuse, it would be both unaccountable and incredible. The better anything is, greater is its danger of being abused by man: because the sympathy and motives of men are often below the level of a very pure good thing; and if abused at all, by the extreme contrast it appears all the greater evil, and is really so. A wise thing, if abused, is all the greater foolishness; and a lofty thing, if it falls, has a greater fall and crash, than a lower and a meaner thing. Philosophy, if it is made an instrument of abuse at all, becomes more dangerous because of its superior power; and appears all the more visible and extreme, on account of its inherent excellency and superiority of power.

Philosophy must be viewed in two ways,—as a thing which influences the minds and lives of men, and as a thing acted upon and moulded by men. It is a thing developed and reduced into system by human minds. On the other hand, it is an instrument which develops

and perfects the human mind in skill and power in the search after truth. The danger of philosophy may be either to itself, or to others, as we view and consider it. As an object, it may be misconceived, maltreated, wrongly formed and corrupted; as a power, it may mislead, deform, and injure those whom it thus moulds and governs. These are two different inquiries; yet they bear an intimate necessary relation to each other. If philosophy is corrupted as an object, it cannot but injure as an instrumental power: again, if its influence upon its subjects is naturally and necessarily an evil one, the same influence has a reflex upon itself.

First, What are the dangers philosophy is exposed to as an object, if any? In this respect philosophy does not escape the lot of all things in this life. All good and innocent things are in danger from some source, in one way or other. The happiest prospect may be blighted, the purest flower may be destroyed, the noblest organism may be deformed, and the most useful life may be spoiled and maltreated. For this an object is not responsible itself, others must answer for the misdoing. Perhaps in no department of knowledge is the famous saying of Pope, that a little learning is a dangerous thing, more applicable than in that of philosophy; for the reasons that its powers are so

great ; the resources required to understand and appreciate it so various ; and no one can be a competent judge of its truth and value, unless he grasps the whole, and that from all points in all possible relations.

There are various ways in which it is possible to inflict injury upon the purity and simplicity of all forms of knowledge, so upon philosophy the same.

1. One way is, by mixing with its truths mere human opinion, so that in the long run traditional elements are established, and become more prominent and powerful than the demonstrative and true.
2. It is possible to make it the end of human thought and purpose, rather than the means and condition to advance and cultivate the human mind : making it a kind of an absolute idea, rather than the path to the true altar, and the ladder to the one God and truth.
3. Or making it the shelter of prejudice or sectarianism ; for there may be party and dogmatical theories in philosophy as there are in religion. When party views and dogmatical theories are grafted on pretended philosophy, and sheltered by its name and power, they become invulnerable ; and human advancement an impossibility. Such are a few of the ways mental science is in danger, viewing it objectively, and has even thus suffered at the hand of men repeatedly.

Secondly, Is philosophy in danger as an instrumental power? if it is, in what way, and what is it? Philosophy is a great power wielded by the human intellect; intended to advance the interest of man, but capable of being abused into an instrument of deformity and injury. In order to avoid this danger and to the right use of this splendid instrument, it is needful to know the character of the danger, and where it lies. It is not an unconditional necessity, but a thing that may be avoided and cured by knowledge of the wrong and right; and practise one, and avoid the other.

The danger of philosophy is common to all sub-lunary things. Money is made to facilitate the comfort and advancement of mankind; but often by the use which is made of it, the advancement and happiness of the race are obstructed by it. Light is good, and intended to serve virtue, and in all ways increase the happiness and advance the interests of the whole universe; but in the hand of man it is made to serve his selfish cupidity, and corrupt and mean purposes.

1. One of the dangers of philosophy is, of being made an instrument in the hand of man to spread and support human creeds and opinions, so that by its assistance they become more potent and invulnerable. Often has philosophy been thus degraded into a mean instrument to perpetuate darkness and wrong, instead of carrying out her original

and natural mission, discovering truth, spreading light, knowledge, and liberty, in her train everywhere among men. The moment philosophy is thus degraded to support and spread human creeds and opinions, it is deprived of its liberty, dignity, and high end and position, and is no longer worthy of the name.

2. Philosophy may be also in danger of devoting her energy, or amusing herself on trivial questions which are in themselves of little or of no importance to mankind; or spending her energies over questions which are not within the province of human knowledge to understand in this world; and if known would not promote man's usefulness or happiness. The history of philosophy in the Middle Ages, and of the Alexandrian Schools of Philosophy, shows without a doubt the possibility at least of this result.

3. It may be mentioned as another possible result which philosophy may fall into, the magnifying of human reason above its true level. Philosophy is a system of reason; it begins and ends with reason. There is a tendency in the zeal of men to push opinions and theories to extremes. The objects of our pleasure and ambition are in danger of being magnified at the expense of other things,—such is reason with the philosopher. Some religious systems depreciate human reason, and

make it a worse and a feebler thing than it is. Now, of the two extremes, it is better and more hopeful for mankind to magnify human reason, than always to depreciate its power, and discourage its action. To depreciate human reason is discouraging and enfeebling; to magnify it is both encouraging and strengthening. Reason is the best thing we have; it should be fed and encouraged, directed and cultivated, for the advancement of the universe, the good of man himself, and the honour of God.

It is an unwarrantable conclusion to say, that philosophy, even in her extreme magnifying of human reason, leads to direct and necessary infidelity. The magnifying of reason in man does not logically lead to the conclusion, that there is no higher reason; it rather exalts our view of the infinite reason in the Divine. Unless philosophy deifies human reason and makes it absolute and final, it cannot lead to infidelity, but the contrary. Nothing but unnatural and strained conclusion can assert, that a system of human reason leads necessarily to infidelity. It may lead to rationalism, and rationalism criticize the religious systems of men, and find them wanting; but the rationalist may be as devout and sincere in his attachment to truth, God, and His government, as the most religious zealot, and that, in his own view, on a higher and

more reasonable ground. It may become a system of pure reason, hence of pure criticism: it may criticize the Bible, and even find it, according to its own standard, wanting: it does not follow even then that it is really infidel; it may even under that condition be true in its faith and allegiance to God, the infinite Source of truth and reason. There is an infinite tendency in the religious systems of men of every age and party, to make all men who dare to criticize the common dogmas of hereditary beliefs, infidels; hence philosophers will be always liable to be thus accused, because they dare to think independently, and criticize freely the opinions of men. So long as men will thus narrowly and uncharitably accuse one another of infidelity, because they think and reason above their fellows, it will never go well with human reason, religion, and society.

But the danger in magnifying human reason too highly is, to refuse brighter light, which is higher and beyond the province of reason to discover, which withal may agree with human reason, as the beast agrees with man, only different in the scale of degree. To make human reason the absolute test of belief, is as unphilosophical as it is incorrect in logic and experience: we every day in life meet things which we cannot understand and explain, and philosophy itself ends her journey in enlightened ignorance.

4. From the fact of the sovereign superiority of philosophy, she is in danger of becoming too infallible in tone, and absolute in her conclusions. It is in the nature of all things, as they rise in power and resources, to exercise, unless checked, an absolute sway and indisputable right to dictate and govern. Philosophy requires always to remind herself, that human reason is at best a fallible thing, and the best conclusions in human reasoning may be at fault. She will always need to exercise much patience and pity over the common dulness of mankind generally. She must be humble on one hand, and patient and forbearing on the other.

Philosophy may become dogmatical as well as theology; when that is the case, it forgets its function, and is no longer philosophy; and becomes injurious in its education upon man, instead of beneficial to his powers, happiness, and usefulness. The vocation of philosophy is to strengthen, expand, and correct the human intellect, and that by exercise in true and lofty subjects, and enlightened and faithful guidance. When philosophy makes systems synonymous with truth, definitions as infallible axioms, and conclusions as true beyond doubt and improvement; it shuts up the path of progress, makes reasoning useless, and settles down in ease as if all the work were done. In

such a condition, her influence would be enfeebling and disastrous, upon all her disciples. Such a pass is only possible, not probable, to fall upon the whole to the lot of philosophy ; it is adverse to its very nature and intention, and there will be always some splendid spirits, who will break through human conclusions, and test truth by a higher law and surer criterion. There will be always some Minerva in philosophy to test and lead the human intellect to some olivelike freshness, progress, and victory.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ENCOURAGEMENTS AND DISCOURAGEMENTS WHICH MEET
THE STUDENT OF METAPHYSICS.

THINGS viewed in different relations and aspects, affect us variously and differently; they often present themselves discouragingly and encouragingly to our view at the same time; viewing the spiritual, the heavenly, and the eternal, in the light of the earthly, the material, and present pleasures, they appear in a discouraged light and aspect. Goodness appears discouragingly to the selfish and bad; labour is without attraction, and a trouble, to the idle; culture and knowledge have their discouraging aspects to the sensualist, the materialist, and the slothful; whilst to others, of different views and sympathies, they appear encouraging and attractive.

The true and the right, when viewed through their true mediums and in their natural relations, have no discouraging aspects. When the true appears discouragingly to us, there is something wrong in our views, sentiments, or in our ground

and medium of spectation. The true and the false never correspond; the Divine and the human do not always agree; some things appear encouraging to-day, but in their relation with the future discouraging; others full of encouragements in the light of the future, but discouraging in their present aspects and relations. There are things which appear full of encouragements in relation to earth and time, but otherwise in relation to heaven and eternity; there are others which appear attractive and glorious in the light of heaven and eternity, but not so in time and the world. As men and relations differ, and as the wrong in character and relation exists as well as the right, what is discouraging to some in certain place and relation is encouraging to others, in different place and relation.

There is no form of knowledge without its aspects of discouragement to some, and from certain conditions and relations in life; indeed, the best and brightest thing in the world, is full of discouragement to some. The discouragements which the true and right have, is either sentimental, or conventional, blind, or selfish, which cannot stand the test of light, nor bear to be weighed in an even balance. Things must be tested in their characters and results, and not according to the discouragements which they present to many.

In this world the good as well as the bad has its discouragements to many, and even much more. Discouragement is a test of nothing but of the different sentiments and views which govern individuals. When viewed in reference to metaphysical knowledge, it only shows the different views and feelings of persons relative to it: its character and utility must be tested elsewhere.

In order to understand things correctly, the character and source of the encouragements and discouragements must be understood. If the source is good and the motive right, the encouragement is good in nature, and the object of it cannot be wrong. Truth and reason encourage the same in character as themselves; the false and the blind encourage their kind alike. It is an evidence of goodness that it is encouraged by the good, and that in the degree of the knowledge and perfection of the source of encouragement: so with the bad and the wrong. If the encouragement is rational and true, the thing thus encouraged cannot be unreasonable and false; on the contrary, if the encouragement be groundless and feint, the thing thus encouraged cannot be strong and well grounded.

It is beyond the limit and purpose of this chapter to speak of discouragements particularly, and in detail; the object is to point out simply

some of the leading discouragements and encouragements, connected with mental science ; and this more as matter of suggestion than of detail.

Encouragements and discouragements are either material, intellectual, political, moral, or religious. All are in the object or in the agent ; or in the relations and circumstances which are between the two. In their character they are either absolute or conditional : in relation they are either personal or relative. Every form of encouragement or discouragement, in its intrinsic character is natural or conventional, circumstantial or real, in the nature and relation of things as they appear in themselves, or in the thoughts, habits, prejudices, and superficial conditions of men. These various forms of encouragements and discouragements, though possessing something in common, have withal their own peculiar features and character, which cannot here be fully developed into their legitimate detail.

It is shown in some of the preceding pages, that mental science is a necessity ; hence all the discouragements which may appear against it are conventional, proceeding from habits and prejudices, which men have wrongly acquired. If mental science be a necessity, it also follows, that it must have real encouragement for its prosecution ; for every thing true has encouragements both in itself and results.

Indeed, it is a sufficient encouragement to the true in conviction and motive, to be convinced of the truth of a thing, to pursue it with pleasure and earnestness. His aim is loftier than human pleasing; his conviction is deeper than men's opinion. He does not pursue things because they are approved of by the majority, neither does he relinquish his perseverance because the multitude happen to be against him. He perseveres under a conviction of the need, the truth, and importance of the thing in view; and if he relinquishes the task, it is because he has received more light and different convictions, or his resources and powers have failed him, hence the object unattained and hopeless.

It may be mentioned as one discouragement in the view of many, it requires stronger powers and greater application in its pursuit, than in other branches of knowledge. The easy is pleasing to natural feeling, whilst the hard is irksome and avoided. Men prefer the surface to the depth, the smooth to the hard, the easily attained to the arduous and the difficult. In the pursuit of knowledge, quality is not considered so much as quantity; real value is not desired so much as ease and pleasure in the pursuit; ultimate results are not so much a matter of calculation and motive, as the ease of the means and the sacrifice required in the acquisition.

The details of life in the small biographies of the day are read extensively with avidity; political and commercial daily occurrences are looked for and read by the million; general history, which never requires high powers of intellect to read, has its numerous class of readers and students; the religious, sentimental, and dogmatical literature of every age and country, have had a large place in the minds and hearts of men. Most branches in material science do not require the highest mental powers and application to advance, and in some degree at least to succeed in them. Not so in mental science: in order to succeed in any degree, there are required high power and long and great application. There are required piercing insight, patient concentration, acute analysis, comprehensive grasp, independent thought, and high confidence in the laws of being and human powers. Not so in material science and other forms of knowledge: hence they attract more attention and admirers than this their superior sister. Mental science requires earnest thinking, whilst other forms of knowledge are acquired with moderate and leisurely toiling: hence many give it up in discouragement and despair, and turn to others more easy and congenial with their views and feelings.

The result in metaphysical study is not so visible and immediate as in most other depart-

ments of labour: hence a source of discouragement to the faint and timid student. In physical science, and other paths of literary toil, the results generally are immediate and visible to all; so the reward is sure, and something equal to the effort and sacrifice made. Not so with the student of mental science: he has to toil without being recognised as a common benefactor; he has to spend his efforts without seeing tangible results clear and distinct, as in physical science, to his efforts. The result of metaphysical science operates directly upon the mind itself, and that is not seen and acknowledged by men generally, according to its real value. Metaphysics labours deeper and anterior to other forms of knowledge, so science in general is more indebted to it than it will acknowledge; for men generally concern themselves about tangible results, and are careless and blind to the invisible operative causes behind the scenes. In this world the material and the tangible are ever appreciated above the mental and the invisible; so religion and mental science are estimated lower than those things which directly concern the material of life.

The end and value of metaphysics are in the fact that they are indirect and slow in their result; thus their real usefulness is accomplished: but this demands at the hand of

the student greater patience, fortitude, and perseverance.

There is another discouraging aspect in the path of the metaphysical student ; he has to pursue his work in greater isolation than most other students. Men generally like to work and travel in company, and that specially when the toil is hard and discouraging, and the journey far and difficult. Men require in all the hard and needful toil of life, mutual encouragement and support ; which they are able to give one to another. When toiling and travelling together, they possess the same aim and aspiration, and are conscious of the same doubts and difficulties ; whilst the lonesome traveller and worker are deprived of them. The paths to other sciences are not so difficult, and the work not so hard ; the devotees are found in larger companies ; hence, have more mutual intercourse and encouragement. The metaphysical student has to travel often an unknown path alone ; and pursue a hard work single-handed : he has not many companions to encourage, no multitude of admirers to cheer him on. To pursue his work with diligence and success, he requires no ordinary measure of self-possession, determination, earnestness, and devoted perseverance.

Not only has the student of metaphysics to

travel much alone, but he has perpetually to meet the suspicion and the stream of opposite sympathy. The vulgar generally have neither conception of the end and meaning of the science, nor any sympathy and attachment for it; the leading devotees of material science, and other branches of learning generally, have a kind of suspicion and aversion to it which they do not fail to show when occasion serves. No one needs such independence of conviction, indomitable courage, and single and lofty aim, as the student of metaphysics. The science has fewer patrons and more opposition, because less understood and more neglected than others: for these and other reasons, there are higher qualifications necessary to pursue it successfully.

The science of mind has peculiar encouragements to offer, as well as her discouragements to all her sincere and faithful students. All true objects of pursuit have attractions and encouragements in common; but there are peculiar attractions and inducements offered by some, either in magnitude, quality, or some peculiar advantages and usefulness, which encourage and support the toil of study. Men view different objects from their own standpoint of speculation, and through the medium of their own sympathies and sentiments, so that often what is peculiarly encouraging

and attractive to one is the reverse to the other. So long as men differ in powers, positions, interests, and feelings, and the influences which mould and govern their lives are so widely different, the views and conclusions of men will be widely at variance, relative to certain objects of ambition and pursuit.

As the advantages of metaphysics have been already partly shown in a chapter of this volume, it is all the less needful here to dwell at great length on the encouragements of the study. But it is not intended here, more than just to intimate in a few sentences the encouragements of the subject, more as a matter of consistency and harmony of plan, than of absolute necessity and exhaustive reasoning.

The science of metaphysics has attraction to a class of minds, because it deals with the highest and most difficult objects and laws of thought; which is in the inverse to the discouragements it presents to most minds. There is a class of minds everywhere, that is impatient of the ordinary routine of life; they live in different regions; they seek new paths, and travel in a way peculiar to themselves; and are never satisfied but among the difficult, the lofty, and the unknown; like spirited boys, more venturesome than their comrades, climbing to dizzy places, or carrying their sports

beyond their sympathies and capabilities: or like enterprising men in different departments of the business of life, who extend their lines of operations beyond the daring and even the thought of common-place men. So are certain minds; they rise to dizzy altitudes; they diverge from the ordinary path; they sink deeper than ordinary thinkers; they want to know something that has not been found out and known before. The force of their genius and the majesty of their power push them forward: their restless energy, their dauntless spirit, their indomitable courage, their boundless resources, their lofty aim, piercing thought, and great power, make them unfit companions for the majority in life, and of necessity, because of their great superiority, they are obliged to walk the path of science alone. In vain you tell them it is dangerous, useless, prohibited by mandates and decrees, and waste of strength and resources. You cannot prevent them by all threatening or persuasion; they consult no plan of prudential etiquette; they adhere to no circumstantial influences; they break through all prohibition and associational difficulties. They follow the deep law of their nature; they submit to their own inward mighty power; the current stream of their thoughts breaks over all artificial boundaries.

The inexhaustible character of the study is suitable and an inducement to an immortal aspiration to pursue it. Many other forms of knowledge, either on account of their limit, or because of their character, may be superseded and left behind, as unfit any longer for thought and pursuit: but the science of mind, of cause, of being, and of the infinite, will never be superseded. It is boundless in its object-matter; inherent in the human mind; and the spirituality of its character makes it fit for the higher nature, and the endless condition and relations of man. In this study, man always carries with him a consciousness of the inexhaustible, of the boundless, of the absolute, and of the infinite; which are befitting conditions as counterparts of his need and nature.

The study in its results gives peculiar advantage to the mind of its students. It teaches the limits of human thought; hence it preserves from presumption, checks pride, and teaches humility. As it has already been intimated in a former page; it expands and strengthens the powers of the mind, by communion with pure and lofty thoughts, vigorous activity, and reflex influence. On this ground as well as on others, it offers peculiar attractions to all who aspire after the development of their highest nature.

It is a natural study suitable to the rational

nature of man. There can be nothing more congenial and natural than the study of ourselves, the laws, the relations, and cause of our being; and the laws and causes of universal phenomena of mind. The study does not depend upon the superficial conditions of life; it can be pursued under all the conditions of life, for all carry with them always their consciousness; they have ever around them the phenomena of mind.

Finally, in this study there are peculiar charms and interests, and that within the reach of all devoted students. It produces a deep impression of the individual identity of the mind; of the superiority of our spiritual nature; of the high purpose of our being; and of the power and resources of our nature. It brings the mind into constant communion with the spiritual and the higher condition of being; it impresses the mind with the existence, the wisdom, the goodness, and the designs of the Infinite. It raises the mind to a world above the present; and to a sublimer and a happier condition of being. The transient is lost in the constant; the material forgotten in the spiritual; the soul forgets the mean and small things of common value, in her reflection upon and communion with the glorious, the infinite, and the endless. Who then can depreciate a study so natural, beneficial, lofty, and happy?

Let its records be read correctly, its objects and aim be considered impartially, and its teaching be applied rightly ; and it will advance man in virtue, knowledge, power, truth, usefulness, and happiness.

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
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