


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THE
IDEA OF PERSONALITY

DISSERTATION

*Submitted to the Faculty of Sacred Sciences of the Catholic
University of America in partial fulfilment of the
requirements for the Doctorate in Theology.*

By the

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
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INTRODUCTION

Not since the French Revolution have the masses of men had such a passionate trust in the power of ideas as they have today. Such ideas as society, state, person, are no longer the exclusive concern of the few favored experts in philosophy and political theory. Such other ideas as authority, responsibility, conscience, right, and freedom, have become more than the mere blunted foils of friendly, academic discussion.

This democratization of ideas has been, on the whole, a healthy stimulant. No one who recalls the riotous confusion of thought in the nineteenth century will regret a situation that seems to promise a period of redefinition. One does not have to be an obscurantist to regret the uncontrolled and, often uncritical way, in which the findings of physical science were applied in the fields of ethics, religion, politics, sociology, economics, and history. We should have been warned that speculation was moving too rapidly. The careful scientist rarely makes a sweeping and definite conclusion. More rarely still does he make a universal application of deductions, reached in his own sphere of investigation, to all branches of knowledge.

If the philosophy of life, built upon the recent biological and sociological premises, has been unsatisfactory, this has been due to an apparent unwillingness to take the time required to distinguish what is of permanent value from what is simply the exaggeration of controversy, in the anxiety to establish a theory. It is conceivable that men should wish, under the impulse of fresh evidence, to re-examine their notions of God, the nature of human progress, society, and free-will; but it is not conceivable that conclusions, reached so rapidly and with so little discrimination between fact and hypothesis, should be always accurate and should really reflect life's problems and complexities.

We need to be redeemed from our own overweening confidence. We must have an antidote to the theologian who sees no hope for ethical Christianity unless it be ex-

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plained in harmony with the current social theories; to the sociologist who assures us casually, as he might remark on the state of the weather, that the urging of the moral obligation is "no more than the impulse to eat"; to the popular scientist who explains the world on a basis of a half-developed monistic philosophy. Even the most robust radical must admit that such generalizations are out of place.

Some day we shall witness a sane and impartial movement to consolidate the real gains that have been made during the past half-century of feverish study. So far the task has been left to novelists, as Mr. Wells and Mr. George Bernard Shaw. These writers mean well, no doubt, but the absoluteness with which they put forth their fanciful theories is distasteful to one who knows that there is nothing so absolute as claimed, in the domain of sense-experience, even in such an apparently simple experiment as the decomposition of water. On the other hand, the true worth of a book like Professor Simon Patten's "The Social Basis of Religion" lies not at all in the solutions which it proposes. These are open to mortal criticism. Its value lies in the recognition that the interests of Society and Religion are solidary, not the disconnected things which the mathematical method of Descartes made them in modern thought.

We have had our era of criticism and romanticism. The work of reconstruction must be begun; and for the task, a dictionary will be of more value than a hand-book of experiments.

It is obvious that this reconstruction will bring many changes of attitude. For one thing, personality will be conceded more significance. The spirit that dictated a reaction against the total subjectivism of later Kantians, in philosophy, and the "uncriticized individualism" of Herbert Spencer, in political theory, was justified, but it evidently went too far. There are already signs of readjustment. The certain evidences for this re-awakening cannot, indeed, be seen in the utterances of such prophets as Mr. Gilbert Cannan who, no longer ago than last year, protested against a State that suppressed the individual will, conscience, and responsibility.¹ Personality has always had its prophets.

¹ *Freedom*, London.

There have been in every age men who asserted in bitter, eloquent anger the dignity of the individual spirit against the pretenses of institutions. Such, in ancient times, were the Cynics, the Sophists, and the Stoics. Such, in the Christian era, were Tertullian, Ambrose, and Innocent IV, and all that noble list that the world remembers as the defenders of the weak, the leaders of the oppressed, and the champions of the rights of the minority.

When, however, the President of the Philosophical Association;¹ when Mr. Cole in the interests of economics;² when Professor James Ward as the spokesman of social eugenics³—when these and others of equal authority urge that the center of importance must be referred back to the individual, those of us who care to read the signs of the times know that the winter of discontent is at hand—discontent with the former tendencies that, in all branches of investigation, were destroying the spirit and substance of man, and driving the individual into the exclusive service of his environment.

It is true that we have still many lessons to relearn. We must lose the naive conviction that the idea of personality belongs to a crude and undeveloped mental equipment, and that individualism in social and moral life is a relic of a backward civilization. We must estimate properly the importance which a growing self-consciousness has always had in the world's work. Personality is not a force the influence of which can be demonstrated mathematically, but it should not be set aside in favor of a conception that progress moves in large sections with but little regard to the minds and wills of those composing the section.

Looking back over the civilizations that have stood out prominently, the features that, by almost universal consent of historians, have been actual contributions to progress were all inspired by the dim perception of a worth in each man beyond the aims and purposes of the common life and by the desire to have this worth recognized among ever-

¹ *The Opportunity of Philosophy*, *Philos. Rev.*, Vol. XXVII No. 2, March, 1918.

² *Self-Government in Industry*, London, 1918.

³ *Personality, the Final Aim of Social Eugenics*, *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1917.

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widening spheres of individuals. The philosophy of Plato and Aristotle is now recalled for nothing so much as for the solid efforts to give a more spiritual foundation to the nature of man. The Romans never did anything comparable to the creation of the noble body of private law in which for the first time in ancient thought the individual was rescued from the State. In fact, the administration of the Empire was all along a brilliant attempt at a compromise between the sovereignty of the individual and the sovereignty of the State. With the preaching of Christianity came a profounder revolution in human life. Henceforth, each man, no matter what his condition or circumstances, tried to place his life on a self-sufficient basis, above the contingencies of environment.

The belief that the test of possible achievement, humanly speaking, is one's own mind and will; that the test of actual achievement is one's own conscience, has brought happiness to millions. Even in modern times the great rising of labor has been due quite as much to ideas of right, with reference to personal interests that no system or organization can ethically ignore, as to changes in the economic situation.

As regards the realization in practice, indeed, of what was seen to be good, there was frequently much contradiction. The Greek philosophers seem totally unaware of the ethical possibilities of their philosophy when they discuss political theory. The liberalizing tendency of Roman law is almost entirely checked by the fear of leaving the written word of the statute books. Christianity was in constant danger of being stifled by social beliefs and customs, which took shape in the political expedients of governments and the prejudices of the mass of the population. The workers of our own age are still in the grip of an industrial scheme that makes but little attempt to conciliate their mind and spirit. But each succeeding civilization has taken for granted that the great problems of principle have been solved, and this attitude has prevented a return to conditions where life was on a dead level; where the accepted status was regarded as unalterable and final; where, consequently, further progress would have been impossible.

It will be hard for us to relinquish our habit of setting aside causes that do not admit of analysis in the accepted way. But the past few years have made us less mechanical and more human. At any rate, it is not so much of a challenge now, as it would have been formerly, to affirm that human life and human progress need for their explanation the supposition that man is an independent subject of right, life, and destiny.

An effort will be made here to restate the Scholastic definition of personality in terms of values. Those of us who accept Scholasticism can do so for only one reason—that it reflects more truly, in our view, than any other system, the real conditions of life; that it supplies the best answers to the needs of our questioning minds; and that it contains, in germ at least, the most promising opportunity of finding truth amid changing mental equipment and increasing knowledge. To keep alive this motive it is not enough to have definitions. We must retranslate the definitions into the large tracts of vivid, pulsating experience, of which the definitions originally were but crystallizations. When St. Thomas lectured on liberty, for example, he did so in an atmosphere charged with the struggles of the Papacy and the Empire, and with no end of debate on such notions as conscience, morality, might, expediency, taxation, and representative government. As late as the seventeenth century, those who heard Suarez could remember that his views on the State were formed in such practical situations as urged the theologian to quarrel with an English king. We must receive our intellectual inheritance and put into it the element of vitality that the Scholastics could not transmit.¹

The plan of this study, accordingly, does not call for an extensive discussion of substance, nature, essence, existence, the constituents of the metaphysical definition of personality. It rather demands the treatment of the practical postulates upon which the metaphysical definition is founded. Much misconception has been due to the opinion that the

¹ Some illuminating thought can be found in the section on "The New Scholasticism and Modern Sciences" in M. de Wulf's *Scholasticism, Old and New*, Eng., Tr., N. Y., 1910, p. 200.

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idea of personality has been a mental convention, just as "person" is said to have been a legal fiction with Roman jurists.

William James once wrote: "Why is the being-an-individual in some inaccessible metaphysical way so much prouder an achievement?"¹ That was a good sentence and the professor knew it. He meant it to be a clinching argument against the necessity of admitting a substantial soul in order to preserve the "closed individuality of each personal consciousness." No man could fashion a thoroughly satisfactory answer, with merely metaphysical tools, to Professor James' embarrassing question.

But metaphysical personality was not conceived merely to guarantee man's dignity or to prove that man is the overlord of nature. It is simply the summing up of a number of elements observable in the various spheres of life; in the psychical life, where personality means the unity, permanence, and identity of individual; in the religious life, where it recognizes the need of assimilating the human to the Divine; in the political life, where it is equivalent to freedom and the untransmissible responsibility for all moral decisions; in the social life, where it denotes the incommunicable basis which social forces, psychical and physical, influence and alter but never destroy. Of course, the right to interpret these various characteristics and activities in terms of personality may be disputed, is very much disputed at present. This is not the point. The point is that the idea of personality, far from being a simple logical expedient, is the result of a very definite, and a thoroughly concrete conception of life and progress.

Some mention, however, should be made of the nature of the evidence responsible for the belief in personality. First place must be conceded to religious facts. Personality has been an inevitable idea in the history of religions. "Religious progress," wrote Mr. Jevons, "moves wholly on one line, that of personality." This is verified in the "personal-soul concept" of primitive peoples and in their conception of the deities as eminently living, acting, and thinking like themselves, with whom they could come into con-

¹ *Psychology*, New York, 1890, Vol. I, p. 350.

tact, with whom they could treat even as they did among themselves. It is seen in a higher and purer way in the free-will relation between the Stoics and God. It is observed, highest of all, in the personal God of the Christians and in the explanations of man's nature in harmony with that conception of God.

Several problems present themselves. May we, for instance, give to religious evidence the same significance and importance that we attach to other kinds of evidence? There is no apparent reason why the religious thinker, even among uncultured races, may not trust his intuitions with regard to personality, just as the chemist trusts his intuitions with regard to matter, and the psychologist his intuitions with regard to mind. He is in no worse position than the natural scientist, for fundamentally the chief instrument of both is a knowledge of cause-and-effect relations.

A more serious consideration concerns the value to be placed on religious evidence. Is religion essential to the progress of individuals and societies, or is it, as Professor Giddings catalogues it, a minor side of life that appears and develops only "when there is enough energy in society left over from the main struggle for existence?"¹ The effects of the latter assertion on ideas which, like personality, depend mainly for their stability on the essential nature of religious facts, are only too obvious. But, by what norms do we judge that industrial, legal, and political traditions are primary in the social structure and that religious and aesthetic traditions are secondary? Is the division actually discernible in the order of things and in the successive epochs of history? Or is it not rather a subjective disposition of the data which we ourselves make? This would seem to be the case, especially when we advert to the various kinds of elements that have all been declared fundamental. M. Ribot selects the physiological, Karl Marx and Professor Simon Patten choose the economic, while the bulk of the unenlightened populace prefer the religious. If the matter were capable of so easy a solution, there should not be so large an amount of disagreement. But just as there is no known way of absolutely convincing a man that his interests

¹ *Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1908, p. 307.

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lie in religious, rather than in economic and political paths, so is there no known way of determining—unless we decide beforehand the kind of life and progress, we desire—what elements of life are really essential to progress, and what elements are merely accidental, contributory factors. It is much more sensible to regard all as essential, and none as negligible.

It will be clear from what has just been said that the concern of the theologian in the problem of personality must always be very natural and very deep. There is no aspect of the problem in any field of investigation that he can afford to overlook. And this, not merely because our idea of personality has its roots in the theological thought of the early Christian centuries, but also because the notion of man, his nature, his aims, his destiny, is inseparable from the notion of God. These two notions have always mutually influenced each other. Man needs the conviction of union with God to make and keep himself truly great. He rises to higher than human levels in its operative presence. He sinks to less than human levels in its absence. And of this, all that we are throughout to say is progressive proof.

The plan of the following study needs but little comment. Under the conviction that we do not know any idea until we have watched it in the making, some attempt is made to trace the origin and development of the idea of personality. Here much that is usually found in the historical discussions of technical personality may be omitted. Since the aim in view is application rather than exposition, it is relatively easy to be complete without going into all the by-paths of detail which, however interesting, would not alter the general features of the historical picture. The points of stress are the values of personality. Accordingly the idea of personality is traced out from the side of the individual and from the side of society. It should be borne in mind throughout that no separation of these two aspects is ever for a moment contemplated. In the chapters that treat of man's social activity, emphasis, by the necessity of the case, had to be placed on the individual. If we say that it is a man's duty to contribute what is of worth in his personality to society, we imply that that personality must be recognized and respected. But no isolation, no fanciful with-

drawal of the individual from society is suggested. The chapters on the physical, the psychological, the religious, and the ethical person form one definite group. Religion and ethics are placed within the individual, because in the Christian religion they have always been looked upon as the safeguard and the inspiration of personality. Naturally, their social value is not denied. The chapters on sociological, political, and economic theory form another definite group. Both sets of chapters correct and supplement each other.

CHAPTER ONE.

THE CHRISTIAN ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF PERSONALITY.

A "person" in classical language meant a "mask," then a "character," and later in judicial thought, a "subject of rights." This last meaning was arbitrary, a fiction of the law, and did not connote in the person any real basis for rights. The latter were regarded purely as the creations of the State. Christian speculation originated the definition of person as a "real being." These two chapters explain the origin, development, and application of this idea.

Person, as employed in the thought of the Fathers, was first applied to the nature and activity of God. We must be prepared, therefore, for a considerable amount of metaphysics, but to condemn the Fathers because they were metaphysical is beneath criticism. Despite Comte's so-called "law," there are no such things in the annals of thought as unrelated periods, to be characterized as mythical, metaphysical, and scientific. The savage used in his thinking some of the principles of modern science, though he failed in their proper understanding and application. Anyone who has read Herbert Spencer knows that the inclination to be metaphysical did not perish with the Middle Ages. Besides, the Fathers were not metaphysical in the sense that they loved speculation for speculation's sake. They were, as a rule, bishops, that is, they were men immersed in practical affairs. They all disliked controversy. Some of them, the iron-souled Tatian, the severe Irenaeus, the perplexed Hilary, seem to have looked with considerable disfavor on professional philosophy.¹ This does not mean that the Christian religion was entirely on a plane of emotionalism. Some explicit formulation of the original data of Christian belief is evident from the very start. It is perceived in S. Paul

¹ Cfr. Hilary, *De Trinitate*, 1, 13; IX, 8; XII, 19.

and S. John. It is more pronounced in Barnabas, Theophilus, and Athenagoras, and still more so in Justin and Irenaeus. What we mean to say is that when the great philosophical synthesis began in the third century, it had for its aim the preservation of the vigorous and concrete religious life of the first two centuries.

During the formative era of Christian thought, the attitude of the teachers towards theological and philosophical problems involved in the Gospel narrative was largely negative, owing to the fact that up to the fourth century Our Lord's work, not His Person, was the object of consideration. Moral injunctions were accepted, and doctrines assented to, as if these were to be taken for granted. The problem was to reduce belief to action. Thus, God was a kind and loving Father. Jesus Christ was the Redeemer of the world, and the Brother of men. The Holy Ghost was the sanctifier of men, who dwelt in the souls of the just. Believers were heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ. They were temples of the Holy Ghost.¹ The idea of God comprehended chiefly a plan of personal relations. It was the Personality, rather than the essence or nature of God, that appealed to the intellects of Christians, that warmed their imaginations, that inspired their conduct.

Later on there came men who taught that Jesus Christ was not God, and that the Holy Ghost was not God. These denials did not merely shatter intellectual positions. They undermined the entire Christian life, which had already found expression in the baptismal formulas and the creeds, which had grown strong and fervid through the sacramental system, and which was already seeking social expression in the liturgy and organization of the Church. When the Fathers took up the work of defense, it was with the consciousness that they were struggling for a Faith that had already changed a good part of the world and that was trying to come to as full a rational understanding of itself as

¹ Every page of the New Testament is dotted with such allusions as Roms. VIII. 15; 1 Cor. VIII. 6; 2 Cor. I. 3; VI. 18; Eph. IV. 6; V. 20; 1 Pet. I. 17; Roms. III. 24; 1 Cor. I. 4; Philip. I. 11; 1 Tim. I. 15; Roms. VIII. 17; 1 Cor. VI. 9.

it could, under the existing limitations of thought and language.

It is not necessary here to trace out in detail the doctrinal discussions that bore on the problem of personality. No man, unless he has new evidence to adduce, can hope to improve on the historical analysis made by De Regnon with reference to the Trinitarian controversies.¹ It is enough if we show that the effort to comprehend personality in God was necessitated by the Christian relation of man to God, and was never, even at the moment of greatest speculation, anything more than an endeavor to put on a definite, rational basis a vast amount of concrete, religious knowledge and experience.

The obvious distinction between Latin and Greek theology during the fourth century is too commonplace to demand more than a mere mention. What is important is that both East and West had a common end—the defense of the baptismal formula which characterized the life of the Christian as being in God through the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. After baptism the Christians “walked in the newness of this life.”² Sabellius taught that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were three aspects of the same Person. Arius asserted that the Son was a creature of the Father. Eunomius and Macedonius maintained that the Holy Ghost was a creature of the Son. How little Constantine understood the Christians and the spirit of S. Paul when he suggested that perhaps the misunderstanding was about words. Ideas were at stake, ideas that, so to speak, reeked with the blood of martyrs and with the dust and sweat of everyday life. Ideas never meant so much in any age as they did to the Christians of those centuries.³ The crowds surging through the streets of Paris on the eve of the great Revolution had not half the interest in their ideas, that was possessed by the crowds that fought in the streets of Alexandria. Christians felt that their very life-blood was being sapped from them, for by no other comparison could they estimate teachings that would degrade two Persons of the

¹ *La Sainte Trinité*, Paris, 1892.

² Roms. VI. 3-4.

³ For an example, consult the words of S. Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* XX

Blessed Trinity, and that would make of the intimate union between Christ and the believer, and of the work of the Holy Ghost in their souls, mere fictions, delusions, or at best, exaggerations.

It was to preserve the Christian life, the Christian doctrine of salvation, the Christian inspiration, moral code, sacramental system, liturgy, and organization, that the Fathers entered into controversy. The Christian apologist did not seek intellectual props for a religion that showed signs of decay. He was trying to express the abundance of its life, in all that he thought and wrote. Any neophyte in the catechetical schools could have given a firm mental assent to the truth which the heretics denied. In fact, in the Western Church, at least until the time of Rufinus, the theology of the Three Persons amounts to little more than a constant chain of affirmations. It is a striking phenomenon that Victorinus, the only Latin writer who manifested a positive predilection for philosophy, was the very one whose influence was the most ephemeral, and who was blamed as early as S. Jerome's time for his obscurity, although, in truth, the great Scriptural scholar was not a man to lend any theologian a sympathetic ear.

The system of Victorinus is interesting in view of what has been said regarding the relation of Christian doctrine to philosophy. Victorinus was a converted rhetorician who wrote somewhere between 355 and 360. He starts with the ideas of action, motion, and change. God is action, and consequently motion, but not change.¹ This motion in God is a production which, with reference to contingent beings, is creation, but which, with reference to the Word, is generation.² The Word is eternal and consubstantial with the Father.³ He is the Father's will in action.⁴ He is the

¹ *De Generatione Verbi Divini*, 30 (*P. L.*, VIII, col. 1035A); *Adv. Arium*, 1, 43 (*P. L.*, VIII, col. 1074A).

² *De Generatione*, 29, 30 (col. 1034, 1035A).

³ *Adv. Arium*, 1, 34, (col. 1067C); I, 1 (col. 1039D); IV, 21, (col. 1128); *De Generatione*, I, (col. 1019D).

⁴ *Adv. Arium*, I, 31, (col. 1064A).

image by which the Father knows himself.¹ In fine, he is the realization of the active power which the Father is. The Word is equal to the Father, because the Father has given all his dignity and substance to the Son. But he is inferior to the Father precisely because he holds everything from the Father.² This inferiority is, then, not one of nature, but a result of his Sonship. The Neo-Platonic basis of these explanations made them rather difficult for the Christian contemporaries of Victorinus, and makes them still more difficult for us, to understand. The remaining Western theologians proceeded quite differently. They were not seeking ideas, but a language to express the ideas. They did not wish to supplement the baptismal formula but to elaborate it, so as to meet the new intellectual needs.

The facts in the case were these. From the beginning there had been a steadfast belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, who were thought of as being equal, distinct, and complete in themselves. The Christians accepted this statement and lived and prayed accordingly. As a rule, the Bishops told the people not to ask for more, not "to be more wise than it behooveth to be wise."³ But the heretics threatened to disturb the balance of Christian thought and life. It became necessary, therefore, to put the content of the Christian ideas in a definite, scientific terminology. The latter, for the West, was built up principally on the words *nature, substance, and person*; and, for the East, on the words *ousia* and *hypostasis*. These various terms were not appropriated because they were connected with with any scheme of philosophy—Aristotelianism, Neo-Platonism, or what not—that would have made the Christian explanations easier. They were adopted precisely because they were the best words for the problem to be found in the vocabulary of the people, or at least because they were susceptible of a meaning that could be grasped without much reasoning on the part of the common folk. They had no more special

¹ *Adv. Arium*, I, 31. (col. 1064A). 57 (col. 1083-1084).

² *Adv. Arium*, I, 42, (col. 1073A), 57 (col. 1084A); III, 7, (col. 1103-04); IV, 20, (col. 1128A); *De Generatione*, 2 (col. 1021A); *Adv. Arium*, I, 13, (col. 1047C).

³ See Gregory Nazianzen's Address to his flock (*Orat. XX*).

affinity with any philosophical school than our word *material* has with the materialists, or the word *absolute* with the philosophy of Fichte. With but few exceptions in all Patristic literature, the terms cited have always retained the specific concrete meaning which they were first introduced to express.

The revealed truth of the Trinity had two sides, or aspects, both of which are illustrated in the different attitudes taken by East and West. The Greeks said that we know the Personality of God before we know his nature. The Latins held that we must know God as One, before we can know Him as three Persons. Here we meet with the perennial question as to the distinction between *nature* and *person*. The Greek view was perhaps nearer the primitive fact, for God had actually, in the Christian arrangement, revealed himself as Triune.

The language of the Latin Church was formed very early. Tertullian's well known formula of "One God in Three Persons," remained the practical doctrinal standard of the West. Original Latin speculation was centered on the notion that God is One. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are all equal, all have full Divinity, for all are the same substance.¹ Tertullian first used the word *person*.² This term was perfectly familiar to the common and legal language of the period in the West. It said more than any Father ever wished it to say, but it was convenient, and expressed with sufficient clearness the distinction in the Godhead that the Latin theologians desired to bring out. The Fathers were always careful to restrict the meaning to *distinction*, and to

¹ Tertullian, *Adv. Praxeam*, II, VII, IX. Hilary, *De Trin.*, III, 23; IV, 40, 42; VIII, 41; *De Synodis*, 67-69; 71, 73, 75, 88. The foregoing texts refer to the Son. With regard to the Holy Ghost, Hilary does not expressly call him God, but does so equivalently for the Holy Ghost is of the same substance as the Father and the Son (*De Trin.* I, 36; II, 4; XII, 55). Phebadius, Bishop of Agen, who wrote after 357, is a good witness because he adhered closely to the strict Latin tradition: *De Filii Divinitate*. 6 (*P. L.*, XX, col. 42-43); 7 (col. 44); *Contra Arianos*, 22 (col. 30); *Libellus Fidei* (col. 49). S. Ambrose and S. Jerome offer additional testimony but the former only repeats Hilary, while the latter gives only the conclusions that he wishes to account as of Faith.

² *Adv. Praxeam*, cc. XII-XIII (*P. L.* II, col. 168-170).

exclude *division*.¹ The separate life of the Son was explained as being the result of *generation*, a word which, like *person*, was also taken in an analogous sense.² Latin theology had at the time no such precise word to indicate the distinct life of the Holy Ghost. Tertullian had given the phrase "a Patre per Filium." While the latter was accepted as the normal expression, it was explained with a great deal of reserve. The meaning usually attached by S. Hilary and S. Ambrose is that the Son is a true and active principle who, together with the Father, produces the Holy Spirit.³

The great importance of S. Augustine, so far as we are concerned, is that he insisted more on the moral, than on the metaphysical, aspect of personality in God. This is to be expected from so profound an analyst of self-consciousness. True, he did a great deal towards clearing up the notions that were in common use among theologians to designate the Trinity. But what interests us is that almost at the apex of speculation in the West we find so able an exponent coming back to the point from which all discussion had started. In this connection the seven books of the *De Trinitate* (IX-XV) have a significance which we might not at first be inclined to give them. They consist chiefly of analogies for the Trinity. Thus, in the fourteenth book, the author discovers the image of the Blessed Trinity in the memory, knowledge, and love of God, for it is mainly then that the soul—which is God's natural likeness because of its three faculties of memory, intelligence, and will—becomes still more His likeness by the thought of God who lives in it. Here is the end of all speculation. Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are really and equally God. Each is a Person, not because the term exhausts the mysteries of the Trinity, but because it preserves to the weak understanding of man the primitive, revealed truth that the Father, Son, and Holy

¹ Hilary, *De Synodis*, 64, 69; *De Trin.*, I, 16; IV, 20; VII, 2, 32.

² Hilary, *De Trin.*, VI, 23-27; XII, 23-32. Ambrose, *De Virg.*, III, 1, 3.

³ Hilary, *De Trin.*, VIII, 20, 26; XII, 56. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto*, II, 118; I, 152. The same doctrine is to be found in Pheadius, *De Filii Divinitate*, II, (col. 49), and in Victorinus, *Adv. Arium*, III, 8 (col. 1105A,B).

Ghost can be treated with, can be in some measure known, and should be loved. "Cor ad cor loquitur."

The analysis of divine Personality among the Greeks is especially interesting, because a love of speculation has always been associated with the East. The development of thought is more difficult to follow, but we select only the main currents of ideas in order to show that the final status of Christian reflection in the Eastern Church was, just as in the Latin, based on the facts of the Christian life.

Arius had attacked the divinity of the Son. Eunomius had called the Holy Ghost a creature of the Son. The Nicene Symbol had re-affirmed the faith of the Church in the Divinity of the Son. The Council of Nicaea had not insisted specially on the Divinity of the Holy Ghost, because this part of the heretical teaching of Arius, as well as that of Eunomius, had been kept in the background till 359-60. Athanasius held a council in Alexandria in February, 362, in which those were condemned who said that "the Holy Ghost was a creature and separate from the substance of Christ." Later on the error was formally condemned in the second ecumenical Council of Constantinople.¹ In the West, the decisions of Nicaea were renewed in four councils held at Rome, under the auspices of Pope Damasus. The fourth of these councils, sitting in 380, summarized the condemnations of the Apollinarists, Sabellians, Arians, and Macedonians, and restated the Catholic teaching with regard to the Persons of the Blessed Trinity.² This was the practical situation. But the attempts at rational explanation were much more involved. The doctrinal struggle in the East was carried on principally by two groups of polemics, which followed each other, though remaining distinct. S. Athanasius is the chief champion of the first group. Basil and the two Gregories are the main figures in the second group. The former defined ideas and elaborated doctrine. The latter definitely fixed terminology and concluded discussion.

S. Athanasius starts his theory with the notion of Redemption. For him the Incarnate Word is above all a

¹ Canon 1, Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, N. 85 (ed. 1911). Mgr. Duchesne doubts this: *Eglises séparées*, Paris, 1905, pp. 77-80.

² Canons 1-24, Denzinger, *op. cit.*, Nos. 59-82.

Redeemer, and this Redemption, by which man is deified and becomes the child of God, consists in the union of our nature with the Divine nature in the Person of Jesus Christ. Jesus is truly God, for unless he himself is, really and by nature, God and Son of God, he cannot deify us and raise us even to an adopted divine sonship. This new point of view brings into relief the concept Son and leaves the concept Word in the background; the Divine Personality of the Logos is not accounted for by his demiurgic function. No doubt, Athanasius holds that, in fact, the Son was the organ of creation; but he adds also that, in principle and absolutely, this was not necessary, for if God cannot immediately create, neither can the Word who is of the same nature as the Father and if the Word has been created, God, who has created him, can create immediately and of himself.¹ God is one. He is an indivisible monad, and there is but one supreme principle.² On the other hand, we know that the Son is really distinct from the Father.³ Hence, in order to preserve God's unity, shall we exclude the Son from the Divine substance; or, to preserve the Son's Divinity, shall we place Him in the Divine substance; and if we do so, how account for the continuance of the Divine Unity? This summary is sufficient to let one see the orientation of Athanasian theology. The solutions of the great Doctor are far more clear than they are subtle.

Athanasius readily conceded that there is a chasm between God and creatures. Instead, however, of placing the Son on the creature-side of the chasm, as Arius did, Athanasius placed him on the side of God. The Word is not created. He is begotten. To beget is to produce a perfect likeness of oneself and to communicate all that is in oneself—substance, nature and glory—and this is the way in which the Father produces the Son.⁴

¹ *De Decretis*, 30; *Contra Arianos*, II, 24, 25, 40.

² *Contra Arianos*, III, 15.

³ *Ibid.*, III, 4.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 14, 16, 25, 27, 28; II, 24, 41; III, 6, 62, 66; *De Decretis*, II, 12, 15, 19, 23, 30; *De Synodis*, 41, 48, 53.

The teaching of Athanasius on the subject of the Holy Ghost is no less full than on that of the Son. It is to be found in the First, Third and Fourth Letters to Serapion. Athanasius bases the belief in the Divinity of the Holy Ghost on Scripture, on ecclesiastical preaching and tradition, and on the working of the Holy Ghost in our souls. A sanctifying principle cannot be of the same nature as those whom it sanctifies; the Spirit that vivifies creatures cannot be a creature.¹ Since the Holy Ghost deifies us and, through his indwelling within us, makes us partakers of the Divine nature, He himself is God by his very essence.²

There are, in addition to this main stream of exposition, numerous side currents, devoted to the study of special aspects and problems, but with these we need not concern ourselves. Nothing could be more evident than the fact that Athanasius never departed from the certainties of a healthy Christian life. Perhaps this was one reason why his terminology was incomplete and indefinite. He had no word to designate *person*, and he studiously avoided *prosopon*. To the end of his life he identified the words *ousia* and *hypostasis*.³ Nor did he investigate precisely the constitution and differentiation of the Persons in the Godhead. This latter was the defect that the Cappadocians attempted to remedy.

The East did not settle so easily on words for what the West called *substantia* and *persona*. The meanings of *ousia* and *hypostasis* were in an exceedingly fluid state. The Cappadocians made a direct attack on the problem by asking pointedly: What is an *ousia*? And what a *hypostasis*? S. Basil took up the matter in his thirty-eighth letter, to S. Gregory of Nyssa. *Ousia* is that which is common to the individuals of the same species, that which all equally possess, that on account of which all are specified by the same word. It designates no particular individual.⁴ But the *ousia* cannot really exist unless it is determined and

¹ Letter I, 23.

² *Ibid.*, 24.

³ *Epist. ad Afros*, 4.

⁴ Letter XXXVIII, 2.

completed by some individuating characteristics. If we add these individuating characteristics to *ousia*, we have an *hypostasis*. In other words, a *hypostasis* is a determined individual which exists apart, and which possesses and comprises an *ousia*, although it is opposed to the latter as the proper to the common, the particular to the general.¹

The Cappadocians were, therefore, explicitly in favor of Origen's distinction between *ousia* and *hypostasis*, and they were successful in winning recognition for their view. As to the use of the word *prosopon*, Basil was more reserved. He did not admit that it could be looked upon as being synonymous with *hypostasis*, because as was claimed by the Sabellians, one *hypostasis* could play three parts.² Gregory of Nazianzen, on the contrary, held that *prosopon* could be used in connection with the Trinity, provided the meaning of a mere personage of tragedy or comedy were entirely set aside.³

There are, then, in God three *hypostases*, each one of which is opposed to the other two by its own special characteristics. S. Basil, S. Gregory of Nyssa and S. Gregory Nazianzen differed when it came to settling just what the characteristics should be.⁴ What was agreed upon as certain was merely this: the distinctive features of the Divine Persons are involved in the origins of these Persons and in their mutual opposition.⁵ It is in this sense, S. Basil writes, that we say that the Father is greater than the Son, not because He is so by nature, but because we conceive ideally the principle as superior to what flows from it.⁶ The difference is that which exists between the logical and the real; and, while expressed a little more delicately, is identical with the conclusion to which we saw Victorinus come.

¹ S. Basil, *Letter XXXVIII*, 3; *Letter CCXXXVI*, 6.

² *Letter CCXXXVI*, 6.

³ *Orat. XLII*, 16.

⁴ Basil: *Epistle XXXVIII*, 4-6; *CXXV*, 3; *Homilia*, XV, 2. Gregory of Nyssa: *Quod non sint tres Dii* (*P. G.*, XLV, 133). Gregory of Nazianzen: *Orat. XXV*, 16; *XXIX*, 2; *XXXI*, 8, 12, 29; *XXIII*, 11.

⁵ Basil, *Adv. Eunomium*, I, 4-5; Greg. Naz., *Orat. XXXI*, 9; Gregory of Nyssa. *Quod non sint tres Dii*.

⁶ *Adv. Eunomium*, I, 20.

The definition of *hypostasis*, given by the Cappadocians, was correct, so long as human personality is alone considered. The identification, however, of *hypostasis* with individual substance, and the singling out of individual characteristics as the constituent elements of personality, made the definition a rather unwieldy instrument for unravelling the mystery of the Trinity. The human nature assumed by Christ was individual, but was not a person. Perhaps we should not be too captious. The definition was, for the period, an excellent piece of analysis; and, while the difficulties were not perceived, the meaning was perfectly clear. The orthodoxy of the Cappadocians is beyond peradventure, as is testified by the expression of S. Gregory of Nazianzen: "The *hypostases* are perfect, self-existent, numerically distinct, but not separate in the Godhead."¹ Leontius of Byzantium tried to correct the defective terminology of the Cappadocians by giving more prominence to existence *per se* than to individuality.² This new turn in the investigation finally resulted in the developed concept of personality.

The full truth of personality began to dawn on the Christian teachers from the moment that they made *person* equivalent to *subsistence*. Victorinus had used the word, but its significance seems to have been lost on his contemporaries. Victorinus himself may not have fathomed all its import.³ Rufinus is usually credited with coining the word *subsistentia* in the year 401. "Substantia rei alicuius," he notes, "Naturam rationemque qua constat designet; subsistentia autem uniuscuiusque personae hoc ipsum quod exstat et subsistit ostendat."⁴ Whether this was a happy intuition of Rufinus himself, ruminating on the speculations of Latins and Greeks, or merely a compromise word for an idea concerning which, as indeed the remarks of the historian would lead us to believe, both East and

¹ *Orat.* XXXIII, 16.

² *Contra Nest. et Eutych.* (P. G., LXXXVI, 1280-1289).

³ *Adv. Arium.* I, 41 (P. L., VIII, col. 1072A); II, 4 (col. 1092D); III, 4 (col. 1101D).

⁴ *Hist. Eccles.*, Lib I, cap. 29.

West were in entire accord, must continue a matter of conjecture. S. Augustine was apparently unacquainted with the idea, while S. Jerome makes a declaration that is the direct opposite of what Rufinus affirms.¹

The meaning of *subsistence*, with reference to the Persons in the Trinity, was formed in late Patristic and in Scholastic theology somewhat along the following lines. *Subsistence* is not the same as *substance*. Each of the three Persons in the Trinity is the whole substance. Subsistence does not denote an opposition of nature, for independence in an exclusive sense cannot be predicated of the Trinitarian Persons. Personality must be attributed to the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, only in an analogous derivation. These elements will be recognized as constant and invariable in the entire Patristic tradition. Subsistence offered something new in the way of a basis of distinction. Subsistence must apply only to the properties and activities of the Divine Persons. The absolute properties of God, such as goodness, mercy and wisdom, cannot be opposed to one another. The relative properties that are founded on the Son's having been *generated*, and on the Holy Ghost's having *proceeded* from the Father and the Son, are opposed. The plurality of Persons is deduced from these relative properties. Subsistence, as existence *per se*, is not a positive attribute of each of the three Persons.² In other words, no one of the Divine Persons can exist without the other two. Existence *per se* belongs to God as One. Each of the Persons, however, partakes of such existence; and in view of His distinct, though not separate, life is properly the object of a personal relation both among the Persons themselves, and with reference to men. This personal quality of Father, Son and Holy Ghost is of the utmost importance to the Christian life, and justifies the prayers, sacrifices and adoration offered to the Three as distinct.

For those who say that all religions are equally useless, or even injurious, the account of the Patristic effort to formulate the Christian idea of God will be valueless.

¹ *Epistle XV*, 4. Cfr. De Regnon, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-227.

² S. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 30, art. 1 ad. 2.

Christianity to a folk so minded can be interesting only as a chapter in the history of superstition. Such an uncompromising interpretation of religious data is evidently beyond the possibility of successful treatment, at least in the present connection. Before we close this chapter we shall have occasion to revert indirectly to this aspect of the subject; but for the time being, there is a radical difference of principles which renders discussion idle. Those, on the contrary, who concede that religion is an undeniably real factor in human progress must make some effort to appraise the worth of the Christian doctrinal and moral teaching. It is not necessary, either, that we should be convinced that religion is the chief motive power of progress. We may share the passionate trust that made Lord Acton see in the Catholic Religion an infallible recipe for the ills of mankind. Or we may be as coldly unenthusiastic as Professor Giddings, when he designates religion "a minor side of life." The point is, the recognition that what we are, what our civilization and progress are, cannot be fully explained until we have taken into account the facts of religious history.

Historically, religion may be summarized as the belief that God (or the gods) can both be known and loved; and as the attempt to reproduce this belief in conduct. Religion has never had a value, or at least a value that men could appreciate, except when its concept involved the possibility of communion with the Deity. Thus, in the very bed of religious consciousness we find the idea of personality firmly rooted. It would appear, consequently, that the religious investigator must take personality for granted, just as the scientist takes the law of the conservation of energy. And this undoubtedly holds, if we consider the testimony of spontaneous religious experience. On the other hand, religious consciousness whenever, outside Christianity, it has become reflexive, has tried to eliminate Personality from the Divine. This tendency has been the unvarying feature of cultured, as opposed to popular, religious attitudes. The Greek physicists justly repudiated

anthropomorphism; and then, religious philosophy, after the Eleatics, was strongly in favor of de-personalizing the Divine.¹

The works of the great Greek dramatists are interesting indications of the temper of the elite. Aeschylus, the most pious of them all, cut down the number of the gods, which was a good thing, and began the process of removing the Ultimate Power from the sphere of knowledge, which was not so good.² With Sophocles Zeus becomes a symbol for invisible justice. Euripides divorced completely the cultured from the popular theology. Half the charm of Greek tragedy lay in the appeal for sympathy, created by the sight of human helplessness, of heroes and heroines crushed by remorseless destiny. The last hope is that somewhere, somehow there may be a Power who will one day vindicate the right, but who for the present is not concerned in human affairs. Such is the messianism of these stern old moralists. From the side of philosophy, the cultured tradition comes to the surface in Plato's self-evolving Thought, Aristotle's first Cause, the Anima Mundi of the Stoics, the view of nature as a maintenance of type, which the Epicureans proposed. Immanence, Absolutism, Monism, and the more recent social concept of God, are modern variations of the same tradition.

The Greeks were, no doubt, right in charging that the notion of personality had been the occasion whereby religious belief had been deflected into polytheistic channels. They were wrong in assuming that the idea could never have begotten anything better than a system of plural, man-like gods. If the first races had possessed a keener and more accurate knowledge of the spiritual qualities of personality, a clearer vision of what is implied and disclosed therein, they could have come to monotheism with not more trouble than had led them, for lack of that penetration, into polytheism. When the Greek scholars themselves became imbued later with strong pantheistic inclinations they but

¹ For an assertion of Xenophanes' pantheism see Aristotle, *Met.*, I, 5.

² The latter feature is illustrated in the first choral ode of the *Agamemnon*.

followed, albeit unconsciously, one of two possible issues to polytheism which, on the one hand may degenerate into fetishism or, on the other, rise to pantheism.

The defect of all pantheism and near-pantheism is that many facts of psychical life have to be ignored or distorted. All men are more or less perplexed by the relation between themselves and the cosmic order. But there are deep recesses of thought and strong movements of feeling and volition that protest against any total absorption that would make individual life unintelligible and meaningless. All men suspect in their own way what the French dramatist phrases so passionately: "Toute la nature sans moi est vaine; c'est moi qui lui confere sons sens." It is, as pantheists assert, difficult to understand "how beings can be self-contained persons and at the same time elements of the Divine life".¹ But it will always be a greater puzzle as to how things distinct by every known norm can act one in another.² The craving for single life has never been more insistent than when, as in the days of Cynics, Sophists and Stoics, the whole burden of tradition, training, and environment has been thrown in the other direction. If I ask for a rational explanation of my life, I do not obtain it when I am told that my subjectivity is only a dot whereon rests a portion of the universal Subject; that my mind is merely the awakening of the total Mind; that my will is simply the activity of Absolute Will, functioning at a specific point of resistance. Does not all this create more difficulties than it solves? How does it release us, as Fichte promised "from the fear that has tormented and degraded us?"³ Freedom is assuredly not attained by magnifying the conditions of slavery; and the Cosmos is not less a master because it is given absolute, all-embracing power.

I can imaginatively suppose that I hear, with Nietzsche, the mystic music of some distant era, rejoicing in men superior to ourselves and of stronger fibre. I may be willing, like Fichte, to dash myself in a moment of superlatively

¹ Schurman, *Belief in God*, p. 226.

² The Scholastic doctrine of moderate realism does not pretend to any more erudite foundation than common sense.

³ *Fichte's Works*, edited by W. Smith, London, 1873, p. 304.

heroic emotion against the rock of present circumstances as an immolation to the Absolute. I may even be impressed by Mr. Well's God, struggling upward in humanity in some Manichean fashion, and be content to take my stand manfully beside my neighbors. But these are not creeds for practical men. The necessary mood cannot endure long enough. A philosophy of the imagination may at times act as a mental soothing-syrup, as a soft poem may quiet overwrought nerves; but we require something more stimulating in the presence of the mysteries of life, pain and individuality. The answer, if answer there be, to all the ceaseless questionings of our minds is not likely ever to come from a cult of wise men, who from the beginning, have looked down "from their lonely watch-towers apart" on the abandoned rabble, half in pity and half in contempt. Plato obtaining presumable redemption for the philosophers; Seneca idealizing God, the Father and Creator, past all meaning; Hegel transferring the idea of the Absolute to the idea of the State in general; and more recent writers to the idea of Society—if this is the mess of pottage for which the populace is asked to sell its birthright, who will assure us that the end will not be the same anyway when "enlightenment has captured the machinery of despotism". As if the universe had held a sort of general election and decided to rule by majorities; to override the special case for the general welfare; to see men only as they act in masses; to promulgate a set of collective and compulsory legislation where there are no deeper claims acknowledged in our nature, than are to be found in the appeal to some barren and lifeless abstraction—class, state or race—where the predominant conception by which all is tested is the idea of automatic, unrelenting, fatalistic progress; where no mercy can be shown those members of the human family who lag behind the ironical march of progress.¹

¹This conception of progress is supposed to be proved by Darwin's discovery of variation. The use of physical science in all these questions is very extensive. Even pantheistic philosophy will appeal for its view that matter is the self-unfolding fringes of the divine eternal substance to Fechner's assertion that protoplasm and zoophyte are not inchoate matter of organization, but the cast-off residuum of all previous differentiation.

Popular religion has had its faults of thought and action. We smile at the personal-soul concept expressed in the form that Tylor says was original to lower races.¹ We no longer care for the stiff soul-body-spirit psychology of Irenaeus.² We realize that superstition had brought matters to a poor pass when Cato charged that no two soothsayers could meet each other in the street without laughing. But the cultured reaction has likewise had its faults, and the greatest of these lay in severing itself from the main current of historical religion by striving for religious purity through the depersonalization of the Divine.

Christianity maintains that religious development consists, not in eliminating the idea of personality, but in its progressive understanding and application. The contemptuous attitude of the cultured class of today towards this notion of notions and idea of ideas finds its parallel in pre-Christian Greece and Rome, where no effort was made to give it a place in religion, society, and life, because of the scorn felt for the primitive. This scorn is misplaced. The mental attitudes of primitive peoples were not in themselves wrong. There is no difference in *principle* between the logic of early races and that of modern thinkers. Primitive man enjoyed a spontaneous use of the principle of causality, and he knew also that like is required for the production of like. His error lay not in the principles which he used but in their interpretation. Thus, he did not realize that personality, *as such*, cannot be attributed to God, because of its inherent human associations and limitations. Nothing of this kind is discernible in the history of Christianity.

The deep and searching controversies which we have just reviewed, all go plainly to show that Christian thinkers saw in the idea of personality, not a reversion to the primitive, but a purified deepening of human thought along a line which the philosophers of antiquity had neglected. The controversies of the fourth century revealed one fact distinctly—that the notion of personality is not identically,

¹ *Primitive Culture*, New York, 1889, Vol. 1, p. 428 fol.

² *Adv. Haer.*, Bk. V, c. 6.

but only proportionally, true when predicated of God. In coming to this knowledge, and keeping to this principle of proportionality, the Christian thinkers avoided the error of primitive man, and at the same time atoned for the studied neglect of the idea of personality by the cultured classes of antiquity. He would be an unfair critic indeed who would see in the disputes of the fourth century a mere war of words. They were of a far more worthy nature. A notion so high and so far-reaching had been introduced by Christianity that the pagan terms in currency were unable to express it. We are here, therefore, in the presence of the poverty of pagan language, due to the poverty of pagan philosophy, on this great point. And if the controversies signify anything, it is that Christianity had a new thought, not developed by paganism, which it was trying with mind and heart to explore.

Again, we should remember that Christian philosophy grew out of the greatest fact in history—the Person and work of Jesus Christ. He it was whom the Christians were trying to explain; and the very extraordinary character of the Person to be explained led to all the difficulties of language which they encountered. They were not reviving the primitive when they studied this notion of personality. They were investigating the unprecedented and unique. The wonders of the Person of Christ led men to explore the foundations of their own being, in its light.

CHAPTER TWO.

THE SCHOLASTIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDEA OF PERSONALITY.

The Fathers, in ascribing personality to God, had as a matter of course employed principles deduced from the consideration of human personality. But they did not organize these presuppositions into anything like a coherent and definite theory of human personality itself. The fifth century Patristic view of man was essentially the ethical view of the New Testament. The theologians believed firmly in the personal worth of each individual, but they possessed no well-defined philosophical explanation that expressed this worth. Besides, since personality in the Trinity differed considerably from personality in man, further analysis was obviously necessary. The elements of future philosophical evolution were, however, given in the Patristic speculations. With such a notion as subsistence, for example, it was relatively easy for Boethius to throw the idea of personality into a comprehensive form that would apply, with the required qualifications in either case, to both God and man.¹ The final work of analysis, coordination, and comparison was accomplished by S. Thomas, who embodied his conclusions in the definition: a person is "a distinct being subsisting in an intellectual nature."² It is a burden of the remaining pages of this discussion to set forth simply what the Scholastics meant when they designated the human individual a person.

To appreciate the metaphysical concept of person which the Scholastics constructed, we must bear in mind that they sought to discover the real basis of the personal self as verified in every human individual existing as a reality in itself. As moderate realists, they rejected the extremes of nominalism, but conceded a real distinction be-

¹ "Substantia individua naturae rationalis." *Lib. de Duabus Naturis*, I, V, c. 8 (P. L., LXIV, col. 337seq.)

² "Distinctum subsistens in intellectuali natura," *Summa*, I, Q. 29, art. 3, c.

tween individual and individual. It was not enough for a man to come into the world with the equipment of a species. He possessed a further "intrinsic principle of individuation." The Schoolmen refused steadily to confound conceptual unity with actual identity. The Self to them was more than a mere frame, a structural outline, into which are indiscriminately poured unlimited organic activities, nerve reactions, sensations, images and ideas. Whatever actually exists, they said, must be, with entire definiteness and determinateness, its own self and nothing else. However, to apprehend individual realities, to interpret and read meaning into them, we must abstract and universalize certain aspects of them, and use these aspects as predicates. The result is more than a mere logical expedient. The universal is true of every individual, but it does not include the *whole* of the individual. In the case of person, it expresses the fundamental characteristics through which the reality of the individual is realized. The Schoolmen themselves carefully distinguished between this concrete person and the abstract idea of personality. They seem to ignore the psychological and social data that must accompany any concept of the actual self, only because they believe, as any one must believe when he is not philosophizing, that these phenomena require a fixed center in reality; that they do not in themselves explain the genesis of the person.

It will be the aim of the following chapters to extend the ultimate notion of person to its consequences in the organic, sentient, and intelligent human individual, with his colorful variety and many-sided vitality. One thing seems certain at the start: that no amount of derivation from consciousness or environment will ever confer personality on an individual, who is not in the first instance and in his own right, a person. That which makes a person what he is must be sought in the elementary activities of his own being, not merely in the environmental forces which modify, but do not create personality.

Another observation of much significance is that personality must be predicated of the whole man. Intellect and will, physical organs, body and soul must all be parts of the

person. Everything essential to complete human nature constitutes a person. The Scholastics experienced no particular difficulty in conceiving a man's body, as well as his soul and mind, as part of his person. "Person in any nature," wrote S. Thomas, "signifies what is distinct in that nature; as in human nature it signifies this flesh, these bones, and this soul which, though not belonging to person in general, nevertheless do belong to meaning of a particular human person."¹ While recognizing, however, that the individual human being is really composite, the Schoolmen asserted that he is nevertheless really one. But the source of this unity is not a mysteriously absolute little self, holding court in the darkest chambers of our inner life and issuing decrees and commands to all parts of the man. Such a dualism would have been objectionable even to philosophers who were less devoted to the Aristotelian principle of unity in man than were the Scholastics.²

Those who think that the aim of the Scholastics was to find an eternal, independent entity in the man, resembling an organ or a function, misconceive the entire Scholastic situation. Anyone who reads the Schoolmen carefully can hardly class their concept of person among those "old theories" that pictured a "formless ego, indifferent and unchangeable, on which it threads the psychic states it has set up as independent entities."³ Some of our contemporary philosophers lack all sense of proportion. They are perpetually trying to impale opponents on the horns of an impossible dilemma. Unless we are prepared to admit a self for every manifestation of the man, a self for the church and a self for the voting-booth, a self for the home and a self for the factory, a self for the period of childhood, another for the days of courtship, and still another for the years of discretion; unless we accept, in a word, the whole theory of "potential selves," we must be forced to maintain that

¹ *Summa*, Q. 29, art. 4, c. Cfr. Ward: "The body then first of all gives to the self a certain measure of individuality, permanence, and inwardness." (*Ency. Brit.*, 9th. ed., Vol. XX, p. 84).

² Aristotle, *De Anima*, I, 4, 408b, 11. Cfr. S. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 75, art. 2, ad 2; I, Q. 29, art. 1, ad 5.

³ H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, New York, 1911, pp. 3-4.

the person is a lordly mannikin imbedded in the skull or the cardiac region. The self in Scholastic philosophy is "fixed" only because it is itself a reality, not an accidental phenomenon. It is not the mere "coalition" of M. Ribot,¹ nor simply "a working majority of our multifarious possible selves," as in Professor Todd's account of it,² nor just "the aggregate force resulting from coordination of the elements that make up my body," to which David Starr Jordan reduces it.³ It is the ground of the coalition, the ground of the working majority, the ground of the aggregate force.

To do away with the absurd conceptions that pass current for the Scholastic doctrine of personality is half the task of understanding it. The foundation of this definition is the notion of man as a complete individual nature, or substance. Substantiality is not, of course, confined to man alone. It belongs to all things that exist in themselves. It may be difficult, especially in the inorganic world and among the lower forms of life, to distinguish the real individual from what may be only a colony of real individuals. But in man, as well as in many instances of plant and animal life, there is sufficient evidence for the recognition of an internal directive principle, "whereby all the vital functions of the organized mass of matter in question are coordinated in such a manner as to make for the preservation, growth, and development of the whole throughout a definite life cycle from birth to death."⁴ Some of this experimental evidence in the case of man will be more fittingly introduced in the chapters on the physical and the psychological persons. Just now we are more concerned with substance, as radically expressive of the reality that man is.

The Schoolmen stood unalterably opposed to the view of man as a mere aggregate. They conceived him as a distinct being, operating in and through its manifold activity. They said further that whatever it is that constitutes personality must be ultimately in the nature of a permanent, unifying principle in the order of substantial existence. All later Scholasticism has refused to accept the philosophic

¹ *Diseases of Personality*, Open Court, p. 3.

² *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918, p. 22.

³ *Footnotes to Evolution*, New York, 1898, pp. 271-2.

⁴ P. Coffey, *Ontology or the Theory of Being*, London, 1914, p. 272.

traditions which came down from Locke, Descartes, and Kant, and which would identify, in some form or other, the habitual consciousness of self or the habitual feeling of personal identity with personality itself. Consciousness is only an activity, and all activity is of the accidental mode of being. The best refutation of the theories of personality that assert themselves in terms of conscious activity is that they never go very far without admitting a condition that is practically equivalent to substantial existence. Witness Locke's labored attempt to dissociate *person* from *substance*.¹ Witness also the inconsistencies of Hume, Kant, and T. H. Green.² And what is more to the point now-a-days, phenomenalism has not become more cogent through the use of sociological arguments, than it was when it relied exclusively on psychological introspection. Sociologists profess to complete psychology, to bring additional explanatory data. What they usually do is to incorporate the oldest and crudest form of phenomenalism. This, despite the fact that Hume, Kant, and our own James, all at one time or another have recorded a protest against using the bare existence of the phenomena as the total truth.³

How, then, is the reality of the person verified in his existence as a substantial entity? It is safe to say that most attacks on the idea of substance acquire strength only because the notion of universal substance (*substantia secunda*) has been confused with individual substance (*substantia prima*). This universal is designated a substance because it constitutes, and is identical with, the essence of the individual person. The universal does not, of course, really exist. It is realized only in individuals. Failure to appreciate this distinction has led many to describe substance as a "substratum," as an unknown something lying behind the accidents, as a sort of "bedding." Briefly and according to S. Thomas, substance is "a thing to whose nature it belongs to exist in itself, not in another."⁴ It is

¹ *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. 11, c. 27, sects. 7, 9.

² T. H. Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 47, 59, 90-100.

³ W. James, *Psychology*, New York, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 344.

⁴ "Res cuius naturae debetur esse per se, non in alio," *Summa*, I, Q. 3, art. 5, ad 1; I, Q. 90, art. 2; III, Q. 77, art. 1, 2.

a reality that has a diversified richness according to its concrete nature. It is a most generic notion, not to be transferred to the real order in the abstract condition under which the mind conceives it. The concrete individual substances that exist are not *mere verifications* of this widest of notions. They possess a *further content*, a greater richness of reality, as may be seen in the variety of actual substances, which are material, or living, or sentient, or rational, or spiritual, all throbbing with different embodiments of the real. Substance is not a concrete core on which accidents are superimposed; nor an inert substratum underlying them, as Descartes thought; nor is it to be confounded, Leibnitz-fashion, with "agent"; nor is it the *persistence of an object in time*, as imagined by Kant and Spencer. It is *a reality existing in itself, not in another*.¹

But the idea of substance does not exhaust the whole of the reality that is denoted by person. The latter is a complete composite substance more in the sense of a *substantial unity* than in the sense of one substance. It is a unity resulting from incomplete substances in such a way that all the activities of the individual are coordinated and unified by a substantial principle. We have to recognize, accordingly, that the complete individual nature is structurally incommunicable, entirely independent in the mode of its actual being, and that it is functionally the ultimate principle by which all the activities of the individual are discharged, and also the ultimate principle which exercises these activities. This situation is covered by what is called the "subsistence" of the complete individual nature. The relation of subsistence to substantiality may be shown thus. "A complete individual nature or substance, when it exists in the actual order, really distinct and separate in its own complete entity from every other existing being, exercising its powers and discharging its functions of its own right and according to the laws of its own being, is said to subsist, or to have the perfection of subsistence. In this state it not only *exists in itself*, as every substance does; it is not only *incommu-*

¹ Coffey, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-228.

nicable to any other being as every other individual is. but it is also a complete whole, incommunicable as a *mere integral or essential part* to some other whole, unlike the incomplete substantial constituents or integral parts, members or organs of, say, an individual organic body; and finally it is incommunicable in the sense that it is not capable of being assumed into the subsisting unity of some other superior. 'person'."¹ A person is simply a subsisting being that is intelligent.²

The task of the Scholastics was not finished, however, when they described a person as existing-in-itself, and, furthermore, as complete, incommunicable, and autonomous in its existence and activity. There remained the additional question as to whether "any one of the positive perfections contained in the notion of subsistence, is a positive something over and above, and really distinct from the perfection already implied in the concept of a complete individual nature as such."³ In other words, what constitutes subsistence or personality? The Scholastics have not been unanimous in their solutions of this difficulty. Conclusions have generally been determined by the attitude taken with regard to the controverted distinction between the essence and the existence of a created nature.

Scotus is the most prominent of those who deny the distinction between essence and existence; and in his view subsistence is not a positive perfection, really distinct from the complete individual nature.⁴ Subsistence is a mentally distinct aspect of the nature consisting in the individual nature's completeness, its autonomous character, and consequent incommunicability. The more common view of Catholic philosophers, however, is that personality is something *positive* and really distinct from the nature, but they do not all explain the distinction in the same way. Cardinal Billot

¹ Coffey, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

² The Scholastics reserved the term "subsistence" as being more proper to express the reality of a person, although the term would apply also to at least the more highly organized animals. The reason for the reservation is given in S. Thomas, *Quaest. Disp.*, De Potentia, Q. 9, art. 1, ad 3.

³ Coffey, *op. cit.*, p. 266.

⁴ *In Sentent.* III, Disp. 1. Cfr. Franzelin, *De erbo Incar.*, Th. 29, cor. 3.

identifies the subsistence of the complete individual nature with its actual existence, and accordingly distinguishes between nature and personality.¹ Besides the difficulty of verification in natural experience which faces this theory, other Thomists urge that actual existence confers no real perfection, but only actualizes the real. The most promising opinion seems to be that which defines subsistence as a "perfection of the real, essential, or substantial order, as distinct from the existential order, a perfection presupposed by actual existence, and the proper function of which is to unify all the substantial constituents and accidental determinations of the individual substance or nature, thus making it a really unitary being, proximately capable of being actualized by the simple existential act; which latter is the ultimate actuality of the real being."² Cajetan and Suarez appear to suggest this view, which is now clearly defended by such thinkers as Mercier.³

The chief thought to be carried away is that subsistence or personality is the unifying principle of the concrete individual nature. It is not an absolute reality in the sense that it differs from the substance, as thing differs from thing. It is better described as a substantial mode, to use the term of Suarez, naturally superadded to the substance, as a result of which the latter not only exists in itself but is also incommunicable and the subject of independent right. It is real, however, because, while belonging to the order of substance, it is not a mere mental aspect of the latter. The subsistence of even the most highly organized animals varies not only in degree but in kind from the *subsistence of a complete nature possessing intelligence*, which is precisely what the Schoolmen understood and called by the name of "person." Subsistence is thus a positive perfection of the substance, which, though naturally inseparable from the latter, is not absolutely inseparable.

The problem of the reality of a person is not one of philosophical interest alone. It has a religious, ethical, and

¹ *De Deo Uno et Trino*, 5th ed., 1910, p. 135.

² Coffey, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

³ Cajetan, *Comment in Summam*, III. Q. 4. art. 2; Suarez, *De Incarnat.*, Disp. II, sect. III; Mercier, *Ontologie*, pp. 134-5, 289-302.

political importance as well, and considerable bearing, further away, on all theories of social conduct. It is the deciding point against that seductive pantheistic picture of nature, with a spiritual background, "which may be said to sleep in the stone, dream in the animal, and again wake to life in man." It is the basis of systems of rights. It is the question to be solved before any consistent idea of authority can be evolved. The Scholastics are committed once and for all to the notion that a person is *real*, with all the moral, political, and economic consequences involved. They deny that personality is merely consciousness or any other phenomenal activity; and it becomes our business to understand how they apply their conviction to the different conditions of life.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PHYSICAL PERSON.

After what has just been said, it will not be suspected that this and the following chapters aim at anything more than the explicit presentation of personality in its various aspects. The man is an "unum ens per se." But the many pertinent problems connected with his personality lend themselves to intelligent discussion only by attempting some such tentative analysis of the person as is here set forth. It should not be necessary to insist again on the purpose we have in view.

What, then, is meant by the physical person? In one word, it signifies the physical basis of personality. It includes certainly the physical organism. It includes also conscious life, in so far as the latter can be viewed as the counterpart of physiological activity. It may be extended, if viewed empirically, to cover all those outer expressions of intellect and character which take definite shape in clothes, mannerisms, physical habits, delicate shades of feeling, peculiar mental attitudes, moral decisions that could not be forecast; and similarly that psycho-physical situation which results from the force of such things as home, family, friends, possessions; and, more remotely, social relations of innumerable kinds—all of which, while strictly external to personality, nevertheless constitute its settings, its immediate fringes, and exercise some determining influence over what the man finally becomes mentally and morally.¹ Physical personality can thus connote an apparent resume of the whole person. We should not be surprised to find spiritual elements creeping in. The reason is once more that man is an "unum ens per se." The most spiritualized

¹This assertion is, of course, different from the loose modern view that a man's immediate environment is his personality "extended" or that he is that environment. While keeping the two spheres distinct we admit the close relation.

thought or volition is accompanied by organic modifications. What is not admitted, of course, is that personality can be reduced to merely physical manifestations of the body. The Scholastics would not say that the organism is the only ground of being, as M. Ribot does,¹ but that it is simply the physical basis of personality. The distinction is evident.

Physical personality properly designates, therefore, all that may be perceived by an "outside view of man." But it is more than just that. It furnishes us with the first concrete suggestions for the recognition of that permanent ground of variability in individuals that otherwise show fundamental similarities of structure and functioning.² Remembering that the problem of personality in general is mainly one as to how and why men vary and how far these variations can be studied and reduced to practical principles of conduct that have not only a religious and ethical value, but a political, legal, and economic importance as well, the physical person will repay consideration to the extent that it indicates the solution of the many effective differences among men, that form the commonplaces of experience. Every one knows how, from the time of St. Augustine's great paragraphs on introspection, men have regarded certain activities of other men as evidences for an inward personal life. Some would even accuse the philosophers of having barely wrapped up these popular pieces of evidence in high-sounding language. What is true is that, if there is such a thing at all as personality, we must be able to observe its empirical foundation in the organism.

The data connected with the physical person may be unified as a problem of individuality. What demands our attention first of all is that the physical person is an individual or "that which is undivided in itself, but distinguished from others."³ It will be recalled that the initial step of Scholasticism in deciding what constitutes a person was taken on the presumption that man is a genuine individual. The reason given is the existence of an internal di-

¹ *Diseases of Personality*, p. 85.

² That is, it offers the first indications for the Scholastic "hypostasis," taken in its most general sense. S. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 29, art. 2, ad. 1.

³ "Individuum est illud quod est in se indistinctum, se aliis vero distinctum." S. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 29, art. 4, c.

rective principle. It is our task now to justify that position more in detail by seeking to find out whether the principle of individuation is really internal. The significance of this question can be adequately grasped if we remember that to the thought of our day the causes of variability lie rather in the conditions to which each species, and each member of each species, has been exposed during several generations. According to this ideal, we should study conditions rather than men. Undoubtedly, organism and species, organism and environment cannot be separated or understood apart. In reproduction, heredity, and death, the individual shows itself as belonging to a wider organic whole. But there is danger of exaggerating the connection. Darwin himself admitted that there is a large class of variations, to be provisionally called spontaneous, that depend much more on the *constitution* of the organism than on the nature of the *conditions* to which it has been subjected.¹ Since Darwin's time we have been inclined to attach a great deal of importance to these spontaneous variations, and rightly.² It may well be questioned whether there is, or ever can be, one science of nature.³

Unfortunately, science has worked out the proximate causes of things without sufficient regard to the ultimate causes with which philosophy deals; and, consequently, much has been missed. Thus, with reference to individuality there is an imposing array of data which plainly indicate that the individual has a very pronounced interest in its destiny and a very emphatic way of showing this interest. No system of external causation constitutes a completely sufficient explanation of this fact. Sex, race, inheritance, and environment, which have all been brought forth to account for the phenomena of variation, are not able to bear all the facts. Sex has been frankly overrated. Many traits are not touched by it, and the variations within one

¹ *The Descent of Man*, 2nd ed., Philadelphia, p. 59.

² Cfr. William James' *Essay on Great Men and Their Environment in The Will to Believe*, New York, 1911, pp. 221-224.

³ Professor J. Arthur Thompson has shown the questionableness of this scientific ideal. "*Is There One Nature?*" *Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1911; Jan., 1912.

sex are hardly less than those between the sexes themselves. Remote ancestry tells us much with reference to physical differences. Near ancestry seems to determine somewhat intellectual and moral individuality. Environmental influences supplement both. Yet, in all cases, we have still to allow for an "original individuality" that makes individuals, even in the same race, vary widely; that is due rather to original differences of endowment in the cellular structure from which individuals spring; that restricts and shapes environmental forces, instead of being their mere effect. "Hygiene, medicine, education, and all social forces have to reckon with original differences in men. Their aims, means, and methods must be adapted to fit, not one nature, but many."¹

More positively, there are sufficiently well-known examples of development that will depend on the unique character of the individual. In the sphere of physiological activity, such are the formation of neural pathways through which sensory impulses may flow out over motor channels for the production of effective coordinated muscular movements; the determining by the organism itself whether a stimulus shall be repeated or not; also what pathways shall in the first instance become established. Such are also the inhibition of irrelevant movements in the nervous system and the variations in the mechanism of habit.² Wherever we turn the phenomena are constantly pointing backwards to something further. It is so in the processes of secretion, growth, nervous excitation, muscular contraction, which are not simply mechanisms, but related activities of what may be provisionally called an "organic determination," which seems to account for the marvellous delicacy and interaction of the parts, and which would apparently decide what changes are to be made, what elements will enter into the change, and what will be the final state of the change.

The modifying influence of individuality is even more strikingly exemplified in the organism as a psycho-physical

¹ Professor E. L. Thorndike, *Individuality*, p. 43. This whole work will repay a careful reading.

² James Rowland Angell, *Psychology*, 4th ed., New York, 1918, pp. 66-73.

unit. In fact, it is impossible to study the "synapse" without seeing that consciousness may be changed, and behaviour reversed, by the counter effort of the individual. Man is not merely an effect; he is also a cause. Consciousness is never impartial in its response to the objects presented. It is always primarily concerned with some particular portion of the objective field which has for it a meaning through associations of innumerable sorts, and which is placed, classified, or recognized as vitally related to us through our experience. Thus, perception represents the point in which the past and present come together for the production of a new mental object, "the immediate, organized, mental reaction of the individual upon his environment. In it the world is presented as a system of relations; not merely reflected as a disorganized mass of atoms and molecules, but constructed (better "shaped") by the various activities of attention into definite objects. The perceived thing is not simply the physically present vibrations; it is these vibrations as they are interpreted by a psycho-physical organism which expresses them to a nervous system already affected by past experiences, that enable it to get only certain specific kinds of results from the present synthesis."¹ Like illustrations may be had in the juxtaposition of elements in the phenomenon of imagination; in the individual peculiarities and preferences in the kinds of imagery which we employ; in the wide variation among people as to the materials which they use in their memory processes, and also as to the proficiency which they display in acquiring and retaining information; not to mention the coherent and efficient use of meanings in the conceptual process.

In consequence of the foregoing, each life cycle is complete in itself. All the changes observable in man—changes of form, electrical changes, absorption of oxygen, modifications of thought, volition and feeling—happen with seeming regard to a center of interests. Consciousness, on its mental side, is continually given over to the double process of taking apart the various elements of experience into thoughts,

¹ J. R. Angell, *op. cit.*, pp. 169-170.

sensations, feelings and volitions and putting them together again in such a way that all the conscious processes of an individual enter as factors into the determination of subsequent and consequent activities. So, too, consciousness, on its physiological side, is the counterpart of the total mass of shifting tensions going on all over the cortex at any given moment. It is visual or auditory according as this tension is greatest in the occipital, or the temporal region. Moreover, in the picture of consciousness as the counterpart of a unified series of physiological tensions, we must not forget that the whole nervous system is in a measure involved. These tensions are constantly escaping through motor pathways. Finally, ideational processes are often interjected between the sensation and the movement.¹

The closed individuality of the psycho-physical organism is now recognized as a concrete condition by most physiologists, psychologists, and sociologists of the saner type, despite the fact that the latter are generally more anxious than others to describe the cohesion in man as of an extremely volatile kind. The trouble comes when we try to define this ultimate unity. The majority of non-Scholastic writers have given up all hope of anything like a literal unity in man. The Self is to them an aggregate of "potential selves." The "dominant self" is simply the "algebraic sum" of the various activities making up the mind and body at any given instant.² It is a "coalition" after the fashion that M. Ribot calls the human person a "whole by coalition, the extreme complexity of which veils from us its origin, and the origin of which would remain impenetrable if the existence of elementary forms did not throw some light upon the mechanism of that fusion."³ The "mechanism of that fusion" is precisely the point. Admittedly a region about which for the most part we are poorly informed, it may still be maintained that up to the present no theory of the self as a "product of co-operation" has done more than give a metaphorical account of the actual complex situation. If the view of man as a cohesion

¹ J. R. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 54.

² Arthur James Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918, p. 23.

³ *Diseases of Personality*, p. 3.

of multitudinous selves has any real foundation we might expect that the perspective which it opens up would be verified in the organism. In other words, any consistent scheme of personality would be true in all departments of human being. The only promising possibility for the theory under consideration is that which David Starr Jordan provokes when he designates the ego "a co-ordination of nerve cells."¹ On the assumption that the single cells are conscious, we can pass easily to the idea of a "colonial consciousness," which, even if it does identify the material basis of personality with the whole content of personality, has the merit of being more intelligible than the ordinary descriptions of "potential selves." The difficulty is that the scope and significance of the single cell is largely one of physiology; and the students of psychical life must wait on the findings of the physiologists, who are by no means inclined to go very fast as the following quotation from Robert Tigerstedt will show:

"The more modern physiology progresses, the more clearly it is seen that the cell, or the elementary organism, as it is well named, represents the real ultimate in the body, not only morphologically but physiologically as well. Most elementary processes taking place in the living body show that the remarkable qualities of the living substance depend on more complex circumstances than exact investigation of nature in our time has been able to explain. Where investigation is sufficiently far advanced to admit of some theoretical inferences, it has become clear that the elementary conditions for the activities of organs and tissues lie exactly in the activity of elementary organisms. I need scarcely emphasize here that no real theory, that is, no mechanical explanation of the phenomena in question is given. When we reduce organic actions down to the activities of elementary organisms, we have not done anything more than just hinted at where the solution probably must be sought, without for all that having penetrated more deeply into it."²

In the meantime, even if we should be able to reduce

¹ *Footnotes to Evolution*, New York, 1898, pp. 271-2.

² *Lehrbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, Leipzig, 1909, 5th ed., introd. 1-2.

man physically to a group of cells and, psychically, to a bundle of habits, memories and thoughts, we should still have the fact of *complexity*, which, as Alfred Binet testifies, is as big a problem in the unicellular organism as it is in man.¹ Must not the internal functioning of the individual *as a whole*, making the organism live, feel, and know as a whole, enter into our conception of the basis of selfhood? That is the perplexing situation which made the Scholastics call a person, in the first instance, a substance; a mode of existence by which beings remain numerically and identically the same, the subject of all accidental variations and changes going on within them—entities complete in themselves, and distinguished from all others, and capable of resisting all ordinary forces tending to destroy them. It is a perplexity that is not removed, either, by conceiving the ground of unity as transient instead of permanent, and the person as “a bulge in the organic whole” instead of the organic whole itself.

It is safe to say that the physical self is not only the source of our earliest ideas of self, but that it suffices also as a bond of communication for all the ordinary relations of life. This does not mean that the physical self is adequate to meet all the demands made upon personality, but simply that it is the concrete expression, as well as the concrete basis, of self. A man commonly adverts to his personality chiefly in terms of protection and maintenance for his body. Outside this objective, he is interested in preserving normal and prosperous conditions in his family, in acquiring possessions, in having enjoyable intercourse with friends. Personality will be manifested in the attitudes taken in all these concerns, but not much of the inner worth of personality will be revealed. Even where our mental and moral equipment is derived almost exclusively from the unquestioned authority that resides in parents and teachers, there need be little exercise of the deep inward forces of personality. But no life is without its moments of keen remorse or high aspiration that serve to illuminate all that we are and all that we may be. Where we are thus under the stimulus of

¹ *The Psychic Life of Micro-Organisms*, (Open Court), 1897.

noble purposes and ideals, searching introspection is forced on us; and we do not require dignified scientific evidence telling us how little girls often scold their fingers as if they were things apart, how the infant ascertains only gradually the topography of its physical organism,¹ in order to perceive that the ideas of self deduced from the physical person are defective. Similarly, as sympathy broadens and the bonds of association are strengthened by love, we ask a more serviceable concept than that of mere bodily presence and activity.

The whole history of progressive thought, insofar as it can be stated in terms of personality, may be described as a constant effort to correct the inaccuracies and shortcomings of the "outside view of man," by an ever-increasing recognition of the spiritual elements of personality. Reference has already been made to the havoc created in religious philosophy by carrying this very insufficient notion of the human self over into the Divine existence. Legal theories, expressive of individual interests, were also founded on the concept of the physical self. The consequence was that not only was the integrity of the physical person regarded as nothing more than a group-interest, but no provision was made for a long time for such other imperative protections as the immunity of the mind and the nervous system from direct or indirect injury, and for freedom from any annoyance which interferes with mental poise and comfort.² Likewise, the first statements of economic opinion were formulated without any apparent suspicion that a workman was anything more than a producing machine, so many foot-pounds of energy. In a word, the true understanding of personality is grasped, only when its physical basis is supplemented by the more spiritual facts of psychical life and when these are properly appreciated and estimated.

¹There is no intention of disparaging the work of such investigations as G. Stanley Hall exemplified, for instance, in "Some Aspects of the Early Sense of Self." *Amer. Jour. of Psychol.* 9:351-82.

²Roscoe Pound, *The Interests of Personality*, *Harvard Law Review*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 4, p. 356. Here it is not denied that the concern of the law is strictly "with social interests, since it is the social interest in securing the individual interest that must determine the law to secure it." *Ib.*, p. 344.



CHAPTER FOUR

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSON.

The psychological person is a *provisional name* for that permanent group of conscious facts which all must recognize within themselves. Just as in the case of the physical person, we must beware of isolating the psychical self. The latter is not confined to mental manifestations alone. It is accompanied in our consciousness of it by bodily feelings and images. So far, however, as its operations are mainly, or altogether, mental, it shows itself, according to the Scholastic view, as substantial in the identity remaining throughout all changing states; as simple in the indivisible unity of its activities; and as spiritual in the character and kinds of many of its energies, such energies as thought, which is free and spontaneous. These qualities of unity, identity, and spirituality constitute the problem of the psychological person. It will be noted again that there is no hint that the person is "a persistent core of matter or thought." All that is sought is an inference from mental phenomena that each of us is a complete individual nature subsisting independently and incommunicably, and endowed with rationality, which finally gives to the notion of person the grounds for a specific difference.

Obviously, the intimate knowledge of our own nature, implied in this summary, can be the result only of a long and carefully conducted analysis of our own activities, supplemented by the facts of external observation, and of deductions derived from the character of these activities. The concepts produced by this process afford a technical and highly specialized knowledge of the self, not possessed by the majority of persons and not influencing, as knowledge, though it must, of course, as reality, the ordinary conduct of men. This is what was meant when it was said that individuals, as a rule, apparently live out their existence on the basis of physical personality. At the same time, since

the organism is properly a psycho-physical organism, it is impossible that the human individual should be without some immediate apprehension of his own "abiding unity or sameness throughout incessantly changing states, in the temporal series of his conscious activities."¹ This implicit knowledge of the self in the concrete is direct and intuitive, and requires for its formation nothing but the evidence of common experience. That beings maintain themselves as practically one and identical, is quite beyond cavil. Every one recognizes in his body, despite the changes which time works, the same old organic possibilities and weaknesses, and the same peculiarities of structure and functioning. Every one, too, can detect resemblances and differences in his consciousness of today and his consciousness of five years ago.

Such direct knowledge of the self is, naturally, acquired from within and is subject to gradual development after a fashion described by Father Maher in the following paragraph: "As thoughts of pleasures and pains repeated in the past and expected in the future grow more distinct, the dissimilarity between these and the permanent abiding self comes to be more fully realized. Passing emotions of fear, anger, vanity, pride, or sympathy, accentuate the difference. But most probably it is the dawning sense of the power to resist and overcome rising impulse, and the dim nascent consciousness of responsibility, which lead up to the final revelation, until at last in some reflective act of memory or choice, or in some vague effort to understand the oft-heard "I," the great truth is manifested to him; and the child enters, as it were, into possession of his personality and knows himself as a self-conscious being. The Ego does not *create* but *discovers* itself. In Jouffroy's felicitous phrase, it "breaks its shell," and finds that it is a personal agent with an existence and individuality of its own, standing henceforward alone in opposition to the universe."² The self is then distinguished as the cause or subject of the states, and the states as the modification of the self. All

¹ P. Coffey, *Ontology or the Theory of Being*, London, 1914, p. 274.

² M. Maher, *Psychology*, p. 363.

that would be further required to make this conception of the self a working idea would be the quasi-objective view of our own personality as one of a number of similar personalities around us in the world, a view which would "gather into itself the history of my past life—the actions of my childhood, boyhood, youth, and later years. Interwoven with them all is the image of my bodily organism, and clustering around are a fringe of recollections of my dispositions, habits, and character, of my hopes and regrets, of my resolutions and failures, along with a dim consciousness of my position in the minds of other selves."¹

The picture here presented is undoubtedly an accurate account of the actual situation. But because it is necessary both that men should learn to appreciate the true inner worth of the Ego, and that educators should have fit terms to express its worth, additional data from philosophical introspection should be brought to bear on the problem. Since self-consciousness is the chief instrument of this investigation, the question is: what does self-consciousness reveal? It reveals, say the Scholastics, a single something more incessantly present than anything else, the source and support of all that goes on within us. Non-Scholastic psychologists, generally, affirm that it does no such thing. From Locke to James in English philosophy, for example, we meet with an unbroken line of assertion to the effect that we must "find a place for all the experiential facts, unencumbered by any hypothesis save that of passing states of mind." It is thus easy to see why personality has been made synonymous with consciousness. We do not obtain, it is held, by reflexive consciousness the notion of an identically persistent substance. We are rather all "bundles of habits, tendencies, contradictions, oppositions, of every variety and shade, texture, and capacity of combination. The great blooming, buzzing confusion of the outer world has more or less of a counterpart within us."²

The fundamental tenet of phenomenalism is that mind is only sensations and the possibilities of sensations. It may well be doubted whether, even if this doctrine were

¹ *Ib.*, p. 365.

² Arthur James Todd, *Theories of Progress*, N. Y., 1918, pp. 23-24.

verified, we could still regard ourselves as simply a succession of conscious states. We must remember that a certain unified persistency is as much a prerequisite of sense-knowledge as of any admittedly higher form of cognition. This is shown by the fact that the immediate response in sensation, as well as in perception, is the consciousness of a single object. Despite the great number of sensory nerves that are being stimulated by an object, we perceive it, not as an aggregate of qualities, but as a unit, a whole, which we can, if necessary, analyze into its parts. There is, on our side, a certain unitary interest in the thing which binds its members into a single whole. Moreover, equation between the past and present is an elementary necessity of all conscious life. There must always be the habitual reaction due to the influence of past experience. It is this baffling fact that there would be no phenomena if there were not something more than the phenomena, that forces us to seek a residue which the workings of the phenomena indicate, which no phenomenon, no series of phenomena, explains. We must be prepared, however, for the realization that whatever theory is adopted, it will fail to satisfy everybody. But let us have a more virile explanation than that given by Locke or by Mill, who was more allied to the former than he was to Hume.¹ It is a poor expedient to concede to the objective order what you are ashamed of in the order of thought. Equally certain is it that the conclusions of David Hume and the entire school of strict Associanists are also unsatisfactory.² To speak of conscious states as if they were chemical elements, united by laws of affinity, is to do violence to the psychological conditions. The weakness of this whole traditional philosophy was never more emphatically displayed than in the shifting position which William

¹ John Locke, *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Bk. I, c. 4, sect. 18; Bk. II, c. 13, sect. 19; c. 23, sect. 1, note; Bk. IV, c. 4, sect. 12. J. S. Mill, *System of Logic*, Bk. 1, c. 3, sect. 3, 6, 7, 9; c. 6, sect. 3; *Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy*, 4th ed., pp. 247 seq., 263.

² Hume was the great opponent of mental substances. Berkeley had already done away with bodily substances. Hume's views may be had partially in the *Treatise on Human Nature*, Bk. I, Pt. 4, sects. 2, 3, 5. Also the Chapter on *Personal Identity* in the same work.

James tried to occupy, midway between the Schoolmen and the Associationists. He protested, on the one hand, that a world of "pure experience" needs no such bedding as "substances and selves."¹ On the other hand, in the mental life, he admitted that "the coming of the thought, when the brain processes occur, has some sort of ground in the nature of things."² There is the crux of the problem; and it is not surprising that, if the whole chapter on the Consciousness of Self in James' "Psychology" means anything, it is that Thought and Self, instead of being permanent, are instantaneous substances.

An accurate appreciation of the functioning of self-consciousness makes us aware that what is disclosed is neither just a mass of sensations and feeling, nor yet, at least immediately, the substantial existence of the person. For reasons already indicated, there is no act of reflection that shows the Ego as merely "a feeling or sensibility, modified in innumerable ways, by influences which (it does) not originate."³ There is noticed at the same time a grouping of modifications into a "sentient unity," which itself needs explanation. Thus, it ought to clear that self-consciousness compels the recognition of a permanent something, persisting the same throughout the succession of impressions. This, however, is not a matter of direct sensory observation, but of inference transcending the sphere of sense. The validity of this inference will depend, of course, on the strength of the distinction between intellect and sense, to be discussed presently. But assuming that the phenomena do not constitute the whole of our mental life; that feelings, sensations, and impulses do not hang in a vacuum, we may proceed tentatively with the Scholastic interpretation of self-consciousness, remembering that we only require the verification of a faculty beyond sense to render the interpretation solid.

What is revealed to us first of all in our various opera-

¹ *A World of Pure Experience, Journ. of Phil., Psych. and Sc. Methods*, 1904, p. 533 et seq. Pure experience is defined as the "original flux of life before reflection has categorised it"; *A Pluralistic Universe*, p. 348.

² *Psychology*, New York, 1890, p. 343.

³ Thos. Davidson, *Educ. Rev.* XX; 327.

tions, say the Schoolmen, is mind.¹ Further introspection manifests mind as the abiding principle amid its evanescent states. Additional study of the analyzing and classifying powers of mind makes us aware that mind is the activity of a simple, spiritual substance, termed the soul, which, in Scholastic thought, is the basis of personal identity. Soul and body, though distinct, are one substance. The soul is not the person. It is at once the substantial form of the body and the physical principle of permanence and unity, of life and thought.²

Against the Scholastic position has been brought a group of facts that have come into prominence during recent years and that tend to disprove the absolute unity and identity of personality. Such are the facts of amnesia, disintegration of memory in old age, illusions, hypnotic sleep, alternating selves, mediumships, and possessions. Formerly designated "diseases of personality," they are now considered as no more than exaggerated instances of the normal instability of the person. But as the traditional conception of personality is *real*; the modern, *empirical*, i. e., self-consciousness, the latter may be seriously affected without really changing the former. Thus, the disintegration of memory in old age is very evidently an instance of the relation of the brain to thought, and this is perfectly in accord with a real personality, which, as a substance, is capable of relative growth and decline. On the other hand, abstract ideas, which depend so largely for their existence in our thought upon the words which we use to express them, persist by virtue of the law of habit, and any disintegration of the habit will superinduce a suspension of the power of thought. All the operations of the human ego are solidary, interdependent; and this interdependence, this solidarity is perfectly capable of being interpreted spiritually as indicat-

¹ "Ad primam cognitionem de mente habendam sufficit ipsa mentis praesentia, quae est principium actus, ex quo mens percipit seipsam; et ideo dicitur se cognoscere per suam praesentiam. Sed ad secundam cognitionem de mente habendam non sufficit eius praesentia; sed requiritur diligens et subtilis inquisitio: unde et multi naturam animae ignorant, et multi circa naturam animae erraverunt." St. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 87, art. I.

² "Ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturae et personae." *Ib.* III, Q. 2, art. I, ad 2. Also, *Ib.* I, Q. 75, art. 4, c.

ing the *objective*, not the *subjective*, dependence of the mind upon the organism for the matter of reflection. Other phenomena, like hypnotic sleep, denoting profound disturbances of the empirical personality, leave the real personality untouched, changing only the consciousness had of it. These phenomena are related to such cases as hysteria where fundamental cleavages of the memory-processes take place, by virtue of which one set of experiences becomes entirely severed from the rest of experience and serves for the focus of what is called a new "personality," but is really no more than a changed consciousness of one's self. Illusions, similarly, may be regarded as primarily disturbances of the emotional processes connected with the familiarity feeling. Insanity, which affects the higher levels of personality, and alternating selves, though constituting a serious difficulty, cannot be proved to imply more than the eclipse, total or partial, of the power of self-recognition. To one who holds that the self is identical with the consciousness had of it, all these difficulties are insuperable. But to the acceptor of a real self, behind all the varying states of consciousness, a man does not cease to be himself, or really become another, when his ideas change or grow diseased.

It was pointed out that the ability to detect a substantial existence behind mental phenomena in the consciousness of self demands an intellectual principle in man. In fact, it is the possession of this principle, another name for the rational soul, that makes, in Scholastic philosophy, the subsisting individual a "person" as distinct from a subsisting "thing." Hence, St. Thomas writes: "For the nature of each thing is shown by its operation. Now the proper operation of man, as man, is to understand; because he thereby surpasses all other animals. . . . Man must therefore derive his species from that which is the principle of this operation. But the species of anything is derived from its form. It follows, therefore, that the intellectual principle is the proper form of man." The term "rational" does not apply simply to the reasoning processes of the mind. The Scholastics expressly opposed that restriction when

¹ *Summa*, 1, Q. 76, art. I, c.

Richard of St. Victor attempted to alter Boëthius' definition by substituting "intellectual" for "rational."¹ A man does not lose his personality when he loses the power of normal reasoning, although his personality is markedly affected, as in the case of paranoia, where the intellect of the patient is apparently vigorous, but dominated by delusions. Indeed, the emotions, a man's hates and loves, and the like, are more concretely manifestative of personality than the intellect. Reason must be used, at least in the beginning of explanation, in the sense that it is the full implication and significance of all other conscious processes. It involves perception and memory, imagination and conception, as well as the highly abstract and systematized forms that are usually meant by reasoning in the narrower and more precise use of the word.

The great function of reasoning, then, is "purposive thinking." It is this that really distinguishes man from the brutes. It involves the recognition of problems and plans, whether these be transient and insignificant, or interests covering the length and conduct of a life-time; and the solution of the problems and the realization of the plans through the selection of ideas and the manipulation of these ideas in accordance with the purpose that we have in view. Purposive thinking is properly the work of the intellect; and, in its higher phases—abstraction, generalization, relational judgment, and inference—of the intellect alone. But it also brings together, localizes, and gives a value to all the other mental modes—perception, imagination, memory, and the rest—and so in a measure includes them. It is because we perceive the importance of our past experience in some present perplexity, that memory has worth. So, too, does will cooperate in so far as it transforms an idea into a purpose, keeps the mind fixed on that purpose, and directs all its activities to the fulfilment of that purpose. In a word, reason is intuitive as well as discursive; and it is the intuitive reason that is the primate of all our faculties. That a man should be able to apprehend the relations in a problem, to separate ideas from sensations and perceptions is the

¹ Suarez, *De Trinitate*, Bk. 1, cap. 1, sect. 7.

great mental achievement in the building up of knowledge and the controlling of conduct that makes man to a chief extent the arbiter of his own destiny, or more simply, a person.

Such an effective expression of mind is not duplicated, so far as we can see, among animals. Many of the acts of animals that have elicited the most unbounded admiration are undoubtedly purely instinctive. It seems probable, also, that many of these instincts are unconscious and just as truly reflex as the most uncontrollable human reflexes. Besides, there are any number of animal acts, apparently suggesting mind, but consisting really in associating certain impulses or acts with certain objects or situations.¹ The original associating of the correct elements may have come about more or less accidentally and is certainly often the result of many random trials. In the light of our present knowledge, it is probable that the great mass of seemingly intelligent acts which animals perform, apart from instinctive acts, are of this variety and therefore involve nothing more elaborate than the association of certain types of situation with certain motor impulses. Until it can be shown

¹ Mr. Bigelow, Editor of the *Guide to Nature* (Sound Beach, Conn., Feb., 1918), offers some sensible observations on the supposed geometrical ability of the honey-bee. He writes: "First, the bee does not voluntarily make hexagons. The hexagons are the result of physical laws. They have nothing to do with the intent of the bee, nor has the intent of the bee anything to do with them. Secondly, they are not perfect. Careful measurement of the various cells has shown that there is variation, due to difference in size of the adjoining cells. At one time it was thought that there could be no better standard of measurement than these cells. The honey-bee deserves not one particle of credit for making a beautiful hexagon. All that she does is to make a cylinder of wax, and a mighty crude one at that. Bees in series—that is, one after another—take the little plates of wax secreted from between the body scales and pack them into circles as crude as a child would make when she makes her mud pies. . . . The bee heaps up these pellets one after another, and the action of a physical law, and that action alone, does the rest. She is as little responsible for the hexagonal shape as she is for the movements of a planet. Through unthinkable ages honey-bees have been making crude cylinders of wax, but they have never yet been able to make a hexagon. . . . The edge of the honeycomb, built wholly by bees, is never hexagonal nor angular. The side is a curve and the cells immediately on that curve are spherical at their bottom and circular at their rim. All solitary bees work in circles. He that gives the matter consideration will naturally feel that the hexagons of the honey-bee's comb are associated with something beyond and outside biological law."

that animals grasp relations, form concepts, and employ association of similars, we must deny them the significant and distinctive features of human thinking. Animal consciousness, to all observation, is much more exclusively and continuously monopolised by mere awareness of bodily conditions than the human consciousness; it is much more pre-occupied by recurrent and uncontrolled impulses, and much more rarely invaded in any definite manner by independent images of past experience.¹

To say that the nervous system of the higher animals seems to afford all the necessary basis for the appearance and development of the simpler forms of rational consciousness, and that the only difference in these processes, as compared with those of man, of which we can speak dogmatically, and with entire confidence, is the difference in complexity and elaboration, is to raise a hope that does not afford much opportunity of being realized in psychological science. "The dilemma," writes Professor James, "in regard to the nervous system seems, in short, to be of the following kind. We may construct one that will react infallibly and certainly, but it will then be capable of reacting to very few changes in the environment—it will fail to be adapted to all the rest. We may, on the other hand, construct a nervous system potentially adapted to respond to an infinite variety of minute features in the situation; but its fallibility will then be as great as its elaboration. We can never be sure that its equilibrium will be upset in the appropriate direction. In short, a high brain may do many things, and may do each of them at a very slight hint. But its hair-trigger organization makes of it a happy-go-lucky, hit-or-miss affair. It is as likely to do the crazy as the sane thing at any given moment. A low brain does few things, and in doing them perfectly forfeits all other use. The performances of a high brain are like dice thrown forever on a table. Unless they be loaded, what chance is there that the highest number will turn up oftener than the lowest?"²

¹ For this entire section on animal consciousness, Angell, *Psychology*, pp. 296-300, 341-345.

² *Psychology*, New York, Vol. I. p. 140. Also, Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 263.

The Scholastics were not unaware of the parallelism existing between physiological activity and conscious manifestation from sensation to cognition. It was this connection, insistently perceived, that led more than one Schoolman to adopt the notion of the *forma corporeitatis*.¹ Modern thinkers may not feel inclined, in the present state of psychological research, to imitate the Schools in the nice clean-cut distinctions with reference to the faculties, although to abandon all distinction, with James and Bergson, is to fly to a fallacy no less pernicious than that of separatism. We perceive more clearly now, what the Schoolmen indeed perceived but did not fully develop, that faculties merge into one another with surprising complexity. But after all, it comes to the same thing. If we say that men differ from animals as intellect differs from sense, we affirm under another form the fact that men vary essentially from animals in their ability to do purposive thinking. The radical principle of the latter is the intellect, although it implies more than mere intellectual operation and covers the processes of sensation, perception, imagination, and memory as well. The intellective principle in man is one.

But in whatever language we try to meet the demands of the psychological situation, we may feel certain that there is in human consciousness a sphere of activity which brutes have not reached, and, in the light of all possible methods of investigation, cannot reach. The fashion of levelling down the mental powers of man to the plane of brute consciousness, initiated on the data of comparative anatomy, seems now farther away from realization than ever. Comparative anatomy is sensible and convincing so long as it keeps to bones, blood-vessels, and the nervous system and internal viscera. But it exceeds its limits when it rambles off into explanations of man's nature, origin, and destiny.²

¹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet*. III, 16; Duns Scotus, *De Rerum Principio*, Q. 8, art. 4.

² For the Scholastic distinction between Intellect and Sense, St. Thomas, *De Anima*, Lib. III, 1, 7; *Contra Gentiles*, Lib. II, c. 66; St. George Mivart, *On Truth*, c. XV; Balmez, *Fundamental Philosophy*, Bk. IV. The ordinary materials of this treatment may be found, under various aspects in J. L. Perrier, *The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy*, New York, 1909, pp. 100-121; M. Maher, *Psychology*, pp. 231-354, 443-545; L. J. Walker, *Theories of Knowledge*, N. Y., 1910, pp. 391-418.

Of all the rational operations of the human soul, one of the most significant for a true concept of person is undoubtedly free-will. It cannot be expected that we shall impose upon these few pages the burden of a controversy with which philosophy has been occupied since systematic thinking first began. If we accept our consciousness for what it seems to be, then it appears clearly enough that there are moments of deliberate decision when we choose freely; and this testimony is backed by the further recognition of responsibility and consequent feelings of satisfaction or remorse.¹ But it is precisely on this point, more than on any other, that we are told that we cannot take our consciousness for what it seems, but that we must consider, with Mill, internal determining motives expressed in terms of pleasure or pain; or, with Herbert Spencer, the uniform causation of all things; or, with Dr. Maudsley and G. H. Lewes, the inexorable conditioning of the mind by some definite molecular change in the substance of the organism; or, with Buckle, the changes in the surrounding society.² Certainly the determinists are at no loss for weapons with which they hope to put their opponents to inglorious rout.

It is rather disconcerting to be told that if we could exercise free-will in such an apparently simple matter as walking down the street, we should be throwing the universe out of gear. John Fiske was positively terrified at the prospect, and wrote a glowing chapter revealing free-will as disrupting the world order and pulling down "the cardinal principles of ethics, politics, and jurisprudence."³ One cannot fail to be surprised at the naive devotion of the determinists to the dogma, inherited from the great rationalists of the eighteenth century, that the universe is a mechanical contrivance in which nothing can happen except in absolute accordance with the eternal and unalterable laws of mechanics. Not even the profoundest respect for that "age of reason" can make us shut our eyes to the fact that the ac-

¹ Every one can recognize here the gist of the common argument of indeterminists, Scholastic or not. Cfr. H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, Bk. I, c. 5, sect. 2, 1st ed.

² Mill, *Examination*, 2nd ed., p. 505; Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*, I, 503; Buckle, *History of Civilization, in England*, pp. 24-30.

³ *Cosmic Philosophy*, Pt. II, c. 17.

count which science keeps with the world is far from closed.¹ Meanwhile, determinists must be annoyed by the prospect that, no matter how much science may discover, no matter how much physiology and psychology may evolve, individual biographies, as William James laconically remarks, "will never be written in advance."²

Will as a free power means simply the capability of self-determination. Whatever else may be said against free-will, it is not a self-starting faculty. It has to be acted upon before coming into action itself. In fact, it is nothing else than the capacity of inflecting, specifying, directing, determining, and applying *received motions*. The idea that it implies a "miraculous agency without antecedents" would have been as repugnant to St. Thomas as it was to Mr. Bain.³

General considerations reveal the presence of this power of self-determination. So long as we remain on the physiological level, it is a matter not difficult to prove. What can be verified for perception, imagination, the regulation of movement, is true in a more striking way of attention and the formation of habits. Without some positive guiding principle attention would be distributed evenly all over consciousness—an impossible condition. Of course, attention is sometimes constrained from the outside, as in cases of great sensory disturbances, insistent ideas, or intense experiences of the emotional kind. But we are equally aware of many instances where selection is positive and internal, and this is the selection that really counts. It prevents our being at the perpetual mercy of our sporadic ideas. So too, the formation of habits is an absolutely meaningless process, unless the individual has some directive power; and the breaking off of habits acquired—the overcoming of synaptic resistance—is a fine instance of self-determination.

Here, then, we have a kind of inner activity which nobody denies. What is especially objectionable in the inner activity which we associate with free volition? Determin-

¹ *The Contingency of the Laws of Nature*, Emile Boutroux, written 1876, 6th ed., 1907, Eng. Tr. Chicago, 1916.

² *Psychology*, N. Y., Vol. II, p. 576, note.

³ *Summa*, I, Q. 105, art. 4.

ists do not deny that there is a phenomenon "called free effort which seems to breast the tide"; but they deny that it ever really breasts the tide, it is simply "a portion of the tide." Indeterminists say that volition follows thought; that thought is not simply the chain-like succession of one idea after another; that thinking often involves several possibles which require the effort of further consideration, and later of volition, to settle the matter. Hence the controversy. Inner activity that is determinable meets with no opposition. Inner activity that is independently variable must be denied in the name of physiology, psychology, and the peace of the world. But if we accept, as the Scholastics do, the immateriality of thought, we must not only refuse to identify the thinking process with the material concomitants, but we must also regard thought as accompanied by a power that implies effort

Once we grant the indeterminate character of attention and deliberation, it is an easy matter to concede that consent is also unfixed beforehand. There still remains the possibility, of course, that what seems to be the effort in an act of volition is nothing more than the resultant of previous interests and associations that are lost sight of in our consciousness of the proximate act of volition. Yet, even here, we are conscious at times of acting in direct opposition to the influences of training, the recognized traditions of environment, and to the current of internal impulses, habits, or what not else. The whole trouble in the free-will controversy is the misconception of the will as a self-starting faculty. It is conceived of as something that acts independently—a power capable of coming into action without any antecedent cause. The current objections of the determinists refute this false conception of the will. They do not touch the Scholastic position which regards the will, not as a faculty, but as the property of a faculty. By which the Schoolmen meant that the will has to be moved by interests, motives, the complex activities going on within the self; and that *after being moved* by these it is capable of accepting or rejecting the motions received. The freedom of the will

¹ William James, *Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 574.

comes into play under the influence of these swaying motives and interests, which are the conditions under which its power of self-determination is exercised. Correct the determinist's misconception of the will and freedom, and all his objections to the existence of this faculty become harmless illustrations of its actual manner of working.¹

The worth of those aspects of personality, deduced from psychological introspection, has been associated in the past more with moral and religious conduct than with the other activities of life. This has been due largely to the absorbing belief in immorality and the attempt to place conscience beyond the vicissitudes of economic, political, and legal conditions. It is no fault of philosophers, of course, if men have withdrawn the notions of soul and conscience to the region of frail ideals and dreamy aspirations. But what we need now are presentations that will reestablish conscience in laws, in states, and in the industrialism of modern communities. We are sick of all the expediency and materialism that has come with "wealth, idleness, fat peace, and religious indifference." We are sicker still of all the talk of personality in terms of birth, wages, and voting. Undoubtedly, the full realization of personality will always demand, as a prior condition, a situation where the causes of poverty, disease, and crime are reduced to a minimum. But we must remember that the things which eugenics, hygiene, and democratic government represent are not the whole of the problem of man's happiness, which must consist now, as in the days of Aristotle, in the free and complete expression of his rational nature. We have had some experience with exclusively material aims and methods, and we know that they evolve a self-manifestation that is nothing more than "gross selfishness." Materialism inevitably leads to institutionalism and the dehumanizing of the individual. And so we have today "the bloated empires enclosing and stifling countless nationalities; the vast financial aggregates reaching out into every industrial center and money-capitol of the world; the bloodless and inhuman industrial and commercial trust and combinations on the one hand, the subterranean ramifications of a sinister 'Internationalism' in

¹ S. Thomas, *Summa*, I, Q. 105, art. 4.

unionized labor on the other.” “In some way return must be made to the living units of human scale that made the guilds and communes, the parishes and city-states, the orders of chivalry, the universities of the Middle Ages, living signs of the nearest approach man has yet made, through his many inventions, to a sound, wholesome and righteous organization of society.”¹ To have men once more in a “human scale in human associations” we must translate the spiritual values of personality to the various departments of life. Some attempt is made in this direction in the ensuing chapters.

¹ Ralph Adams Cram, *The Great Thousand Years and Ten Years After*, Boston, 1918, pp. 64-65.

CHAPTER FIVE

RELIGIOUS PERSONALITY.

Religious personality, psychologically considered, is the consciousness of our relation to God as person to person. Its practical expression is conscience. Its effect is the recognition of an inner, inviolable worth in man. Its social value consists in the definite and tangible form that it gives to the idea of liberty; an idea which the religion of Christ especially fostered, through the definite revealed knowledge which it brought of the plans of God in man's regard.

Few will deny that the records of religious progress show that the belief in the possibility of communion between the creature and the Deity has resulted in the conception of religious activity as being not only the foundation, but the one clear example, of true freedom and unhampered personal assertion. An exaggerated sense of the superiority of everything modern has led to our underrating the spiritual attitudes of primitive religions. There is always, of course, the difficulty of verification. What knowledge we possess of such institutions as totemism and ancestor-worship, for instance, indicates that the individual was admitted not in his private capacity and on his own merits, but because of his social status and obligations. Still, no matter how socialized religion ever became, the individual did feel the need of approaching the gods on his own initiative.¹ Besides, it is hard to conceive that community worship went on without any of those internal sentiments that would give significance to individual participation. That the religious spirit was not dominated exclusively by external motives and was not solely a corporate matter, is suggested, perhaps, by certain striking facts of contemporary observation in lower religions. Thus, "among the Kamtchatkans, if a man declares that his personal divinity has in a dream

¹ F. B. Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religions*, London, 1896, p. 12.

commanded him to unite with some woman of the tribe, it is her duty to obey, no matter what her position or relationship."¹ Some years ago a Hindu prophetess was imprisoned by the English civic judge for violation of the local laws and for disturbing the peace. Her only statement in defense was: "Years ago when a girl, I met in the jungle face to face the God Siva. He entered into my bosom. He abides with me now. My blessing is his blessing; my curse, his curse."² The worshipper could sometimes break customs and defy established usage, because there existed between him and his god certain sacred relations, singularly his own and not to be infringed by the social body. Obviously, beliefs of the kind could be neither usual nor widespread; but that they existed at all and, stranger still, that they could be acknowledged, is very significant. As Professor Brinton concludes: "This freedom was doubtless abused, but it secured for the individual a degree of personal liberty that could be attained in no other way."³ It was a very crude, though an apparently real, striving after the great religious principle—a free conscience.

As religious philosophy became more developed and refined, the emphasis on liberty also became more pronounced. The Stoics vaunted with considerable fervor the freedom of the unit, the right to think and act only with the sanction of a convinced, inward approval. Through their doctrines of universal brotherhood and free-will the Stoics rose to an imposing consciousness of the single life. Stoicism was not without its reward. It had a decided influence on the rationalizing and liberalizing tendency in later Roman Law.⁴ The lover of what is best in human thought will never depreciate Stoicism, but at the same time he will miss in the careful perusal of its history that detailed application where theory gives evidence of becoming a practical possibility.

The other ideas in which the belief in personal worth

¹ D. G. Brinton, *Religions of Primitive Peoples*, New York, 1905, p. 244.

² Walthouse, *Jour. of the Anthropol. Soc.*, XIV, p. 189.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

⁴ Arnold in his work on *Roman Stoicism* (Cambridge, 1911, c. 16) says that Stoic principles influenced the common people and that a number of reforms, like those of the Gracchi, are to be attributed to Stoic teaching.

expressed itself in pre-Christian speculation were not so satisfactorily evolved. Chief of these was the notion of survival. Survival, in primitive religions, and even in the popular fancy of the classical period, meant the continued existence of both body and soul. Here, the concept of survival, with its necessary postulate of responsibility, lacked much of its efficiency, because it was connected to a great extent with a state of material happiness. Later, the upper and literary classes did not conceive the fate of the soul as connected with the fate of the body. Survival was then transformed into the meaning of "divinization" and, because it was associated with the cold, conventional formalism of the classical creeds, it received a final impetus in the direction of useless.¹ In the mystery-religions, however, the conviction of immortality whether thought of as personal survival or as an absorption by a gradual purifying process into the divine life, did inspire, especially among slaves and soldiers, much individual initiative. Unfortunately for itself, the immortality of the cults could not stand the test of advancing enlightenment. Just as no theory of life can afford to ignore the imperishable value of the human soul, so a conception of immortality is valueless unless it gives an explanation of the present that is more intelligible than mere emotional antagonism. The mystery-religions, at the very climax of their appeal in the Roman world, viewed corporeal existence as an evil and expected no good from a life in society.²

It would be idle to deny that the Christians also felt a certain contempt for the actual. But this feeling was not aroused by the actual as such, but only because of the reasonable reference of all things to eternity. They did not sacrifice the present to the eternal. They simply

¹ The divinity acquired by all, irrespective of class or condition, depended on the precarious fidelity in worship on the part of the living. Cicero, *De Leg.*, II, 9: III, 2; Plato, *Laws*, IX, 926-7; Horace, *Odes*, II, 23.

² Cumont, *Oriental Religions*, pp. 39, 43. No doubt, the cults provided "social helps and mutual encouragements, the stimulus or the consolation of common interests and enthusiasms" (Dill, *Roman Society*, p. 76) within the corporation which might be expected to equal the social effectiveness of "fraternity" in our modern secret societies, and no more.

explained the present by the eternal.³ They thought to live. It could not be otherwise, for they regarded the present as the stuff out of which to fashion a concrete and attainable future. They sought to inject harmony, justice and charity into social activities, and they urged the realization, as far as possible, in time and in societies, of those principles upon which it was believed eternal justice and happiness rested. The foundations of the "City of God" were placed on the common ground of our world. It was not, and is not today, an ideal to tempt men who identify the practical with the expedient. But the whole plan was an outpouring of the awakened Christian conscience, demanding that its sanctions be recognized for every effective decision in the entire sphere of secular concerns.

The Christians did not constitute a revolutionary party. They did not try to attract to their standards, by a dash of daring, the restless masses hoping for a means of egress from the grinding conditions of the existing regime. Still, it is not true to say that "Christianity did not bring a new philosophy of life nor furnish the starting point for a revolt against oppression." This is the prevalent indictment against the Christian Religion, and the reason urged for the necessity of a new social religion.¹ Christianity was theoretically out of joint with the old social order from the very beginning; but it realized that a reform would have to come then, as always, slowly, and only when individuals had been elevated to a state where they could appreciate the principles of reform. The Christians were convinced that man progresses, whether in the affairs of this life or in the acquisition of another life, only by the exercise of his inherent freedom; and that freedom is fostered and preserved only by religion, the "freedom with which Christ has made us free." Accordingly, they strove, first, to emancipate man from slavery to his environment; and, secondly, to establish firmly this new-found liberty in the universal respect for conscience. Here is the meaning of the seemingly reckless abandon implied in the question: "What doth it profit a man, if he gain the

¹ For example, Simon Patten's *The Social Basis of Religion*, N. Y., 1911.

whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?"

From the very start, the Christians had a very pronounced consciousness of the significance and worth of personality. The doctrine of universal salvation swept away a vast amount of collective and conventional accretion which had obscured the true meaning of man. Men could no longer be regarded in the mass or type. If all men had been purchased by the Blood of Christ; if masters were commanded to respect a spiritual value in slaves; if women and children were raised to a condition where they could justly expect fair treatment, it was evident that there must be some reason for this, apart from the contingencies of birth, sex, station, or culture. What precisely helped the first Christians to find themselves was the conception of the intimate union existing between Christ and the soul of the believer.¹ The new ideas, originating in this view of life, stirred men to their very depths, opened up vast and hitherto unsuspected stretches of the interior life, and disclosed men to themselves. They forced a claim for the individual, since they carried with them the recognition of a correlative reality in man that was more than plain self-consciousness; that meant far more than a new ethical relation, which is unfortunately all that most modern critics see in it; that was rather the indwelling of something new and special in the whole man, through a unique principle not formerly present and operating. How else can we understand the very ground-idea that the Gospel is conditioned by the structure of the recipient and capable of adaptation to the needs of every man?

Was this personalism sufficiently virile? Most modern sociologists say, no. The principle of union with Christ, at the base of the entire Christian theory of individual dignity, would be the victim of much rough treatment when Christians went out into the forum. It was like a hothouse plant that might thrive in the soft, kindly atmosphere of religious meetings, but that was doomed to droop and die

¹ Roms. VIII, 11; Gals. II, 20; Philip. I, 21. *Letter of S. Ignatius to the Ephesians*; Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.*, Bk. IV, c. 37. Cfr. Lebreton, *Les origines du dogme de la Trinité*, Paris, 1910, p. 292 fol.

under the withering heat and harshness and vigor of commonplace life. As a matter of fact, Christians flocked in great numbers to the deserts of Egypt, and later on to the monasteries of the West, as if salvation could only be worked out in solitude. Apparently, the highest expression of Christian life had no real advantages over the theatrical withdrawal of Plato and the Stoics to a fanciful isolation, where men stood aloof in make-believe detachment from all earthly interests; and, convinced that the rest of mankind was full of wickedness, sought solace in a ghastly emotionalism, a weak, semi-devotional, colorless self-loss. It is inevitable that religion, when it attains the heights of mysticism, should be distorted by individuals. Obviously, this is no fault of mysticism. The monks were afterwards to give very solid evidences of their worth to society and to bear witness to the fact that, while not of the world, they were to a considerable and substantial extent in it.¹

The normal notion of Christian personal worth preserved its working power by the recognition of a complement in man, more radical even than the reciprocal, inherent value that followed from being Christ's brother, a son of God, or a temple of the Holy Ghost. In other words, the Christian idea of the single life was not founded on the passive principle of receptivity, but on the active principle that human life is to be assimilated through the aid of grace to the life of God Himself. The full comprehension of this truth is revealed in the Christian concept of responsibility. Here we behold the believer not simply in his moments of spiritual exaltation, but as he lived and acted in the contingencies of his every-day existence, even down to the buying of meats in the market-place.²

It is too late in the history of Christian civilization to begin a defense of mental and moral freedom. Our late uneasiness in the presence of "conscientious objectors" shows how deeply rooted in our common life is the prin-

¹ For what constitutes in our time a novel view of the spiritual value of monasticism to society see Ralph Adams Cram, *The Great Thousand Years*, Boston, 1918, 56-63.

² Cor. VIII.

principle of a free conscience. The central problem of religious personality today arises from a condition of life and society where many types of consciences are expressing themselves. Conscience is not standardized. There are times when we are inclined to think that Mohammedans vary from Christians hardly more than the Christians differ among themselves. The strict Calvinist has very few points of contact with those other Christians who do not consider their religion as an instrument of self-torture. There are men who maintain that war is unqualifiedly necessary. There are men, on the other hand, who regard war as evil on any ground. There are men, finally, who distinguish between wars of offense and wars of defense. And millionaires have been known to have conscientious scruples about paying taxes. Even here, so long as we remain absolutely within the area of individual thought and volition, the matter is speculatively not difficult. With a clear idea of conscience and a fairly accurate conception of the objects about which it may legitimately judge, we can say a priori that every position assumed on sincere conscientious motives may reasonably expect recognition.

At the same time, when we remember that man is social as well as solitary, we cannot fail to be in periodic situations that suggest the query as to where respect of conscience will stop. Shall we suffer an unrestrained conscience up to the point of serious public inconvenience? For most men, of course, this is no real problem. Realizing that society must have ends and purposes above the ends and purposes of individuals, only because they are indetical with the greatest good of the majority, men come by an easy and rational process to the conclusion that if an individual is opposed to the community, the presumption is that the individual is wrong. As a matter of fact, a State will never lack defenders nor the means of obtaining and increasing its resources through the conscientious objections of its members. But the minority must still be reckoned with, and here one thing seems certain: force, ridicule and punishment will be of no avail. A long line of martyrdoms, persecutions, rebellions, and reformations should teach us this piece of common sense. All that can

be advised is that a corporate body adjust its treatment of its recalcitrant consciences according to the need. As for the rest, there can only be inducement after full and free discussion of the beliefs, norms, and sentiments which constitute the definite historical content of religious personality, and from which conscientious assertion draws its motives. Henceforth no theory of the State and no definition of authority can be looked upon as complete, unless they include provisions for the workings of conscience.

We can understand from what has been said that it is no unimportant function of conscience to keep the idea of liberty alive among men. The liberty that secures to every man protection "in what he believes to be his duty against the influence of authority and majorities, custom and opinion" can be guaranteed only by the forces that develop from within—religion, morals, and to an extent, aesthetics. Political, economic and general social forces, the forces that develop from without tend to crystallize in a scheme of objective conditions that are at once static and sacrosanct. Thus, men are afraid to change the sacred law of supply and demand, or any other of the "natural" laws of trade. They are timid about changing political constitutions, of which the world might well be rid. They adhere persistently to legal forms long after these have been found to be evidently unjust. The attained becomes the norm, and even the limit, of the attainable. And yet the vitality of a society is precisely in proportion to its ability to react against apparently established physical and external conditions. This dynamic element comes from the inspiration, initiative, and ideals that are supplied by individuals, who have outgrown their awe of institutions, who rise upward by some stupendous energy that men admire but do not understand; and who draw a race after them.

When Mill wrote the essay on *Liberty* he merely revived, in part, the Christian interpretation of liberty as spiritual. He was keen enough to see that such a liberty

¹ Lord Acton, *History of Freedom and Other Essays*, London, 1909, p. 3.

as that proposed by the Chartists, a liberty that meant chiefly the external freedom of action required by the individual for the pursuit of his material happiness, was a barren affair. What we must have first of all is a power that releases individual capacities in the truest and most permanent manner, and that makes them available for the general happiness; a power that is not solely the reflection of environment, but that reaches down to the very depths of our being. This is becoming more apparent, the more political and economic theories try to satisfy basic human intuitions. If such is the case, religion is still a vital force with a very profitable and concrete relation to the rest of life. Those who insist that the highest type of religious person is marked by a blithesome, if sublime, indifference to the concerns of the secular world will, naturally, smile. They will ask for a policy of statecraft, for a theory of production, short of which they deny any practical value to the religious influence. But the new economic liberty, the new political liberty will be evolved, not so much through forms, codes, policies, and plans as through the proper recognition, the free expression, and the harmonious adjustment of the human nature that each man is. It was more than mere smartness when a former lecturer of Columbia University began his book with the remark that "in order to decide whether a city should own its own gas-plant, it is necessary to have clear ideas as to what nature is".¹ In other words, the spiritual and moral side of life will most likely be given greater prominence in our thinking. And the Christian religion, with its tangible sanctions and spontaneous motives, appealing to the individual as an individual, is a force to be reckoned with in the world's remaking after the war. Whether it shall rise to the full stature of its possibilities depends on its guides and teachers. At least, we can no longer minimize its power and usefulness.

¹ Edmond Kelly, *Government or Human Evolution*, New York, 1900.



CHAPTER SIX.

ETHICAL PERSONALITY.

Those who minimize the influence of religion in men's lives substitute "ethical" where formerly we used to write "religious". "Ethical" has become synonymous in this transfer with the vague, the shadowy, the aspirational, the ideal in a loose sense, or, where some attempt is made to be more definite, with the "social".¹

The notion that religion and morality covered different spheres of human activity was really due to Hobbes. Recent speculation has tended to emphasize the separation under the strong conviction that the older morality is no longer available for modern needs, because it was interpreted too much in terms of individual selfishness and too little in terms of social altruism. Of course, no one must be told that it is not in reality possible to cut off religion from morality. What we do is to give a new content to religion. If we will not have a God in the heavens, we fashion gods from our human and social institutions. But this will be matter for later reference.²

So far as we wish to give ethical personality a structure and functioning of its own, we may describe it, psychologically, as a consciousness of our relations to other persons, to the world, and to God, whence emerges a system of values for the regulation of conduct. These values form the material of moral judgments. The latter are always accompanied by the psychological necessity of assuming an attitude. This is responsibility. As a still further consequence, the ethical person becomes a subject of rights and duties. Before detailing the characteristics of ethical personality, we must be clear about some intro-

¹The latter meaning is now accepted as the "scientific" one. For an illustration of its application see J. K. Folsom, *The Social Psychology of Morality*, in the *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Jan., 1918.

²The latest novelties are put in a popular and entertaining way by Walter Rauschenbusch in his book *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, New York, 1918.

ductory matter.

In the first place, it is tritely obvious that conduct, to be ethically intelligible, must be conduct directed to some end. The immediate ends of action we cannot ignore, without doing violence to common sense. The prevalent custom of viewing ends as "survivals" is distinctly misleading. Of what conceivable educative use is a beneficial survival unless it is perceived to be the term of new activity on the part of some consciousness? And we cannot say that ethical progress goes on without consciousness. Selection is no abstract process; and unless we allow for some sort of conscious selection we might as well give up all hope of moral education. In other words, full recognition must be accorded the fact that the individual himself is a determinant of variations, the results of his own peculiar interest in activity.¹ Now, if instead of considering isolated acts, motives, and judgments, we make the process extend over a whole life-time, the same conclusion holds. Only, we must then avoid supposing that the teleological aspect of conduct implies completed development. "Progress is so manifestly an act, habit or condition of the evolving subject itself that it would be absurd to think that the Scholastics made no provision for a subjective final end; they expressly describe the attainment of the final end as a soul act, as 'aliquid animae.' But that thing which we finally tend to attain, and which serves as the first principle of all human action, is, in Scholastic philosophy, external. Again, Aquinas even qualifies his assertion of an objective end, when he writes that the objective end is not wholly extrinsic to, or divided from the human act. 'The end,' he says, 'is not altogether extrinsic to the act because it is related to the act as principle or as term'. Thus, the objective final end, though external, is still to be regarded as standing in intimate relation to the agent, and even as completing his act, since a cognitive and appetitive act can only be completed by the object known and

¹ Cfr. St. Thomas' description of the ends of actions on the basis of actions "proper to man as man." *Summa*, Q. I., art. I, in corp.

desired".¹ For the present it does not matter whether the scheme of ends lies wholly within, or partly without, the universe.

Granting that experience constantly reveals purposes which exercise a controlling influence over particular forms of ethical expression, the question still remains as to how the connection between ends and conduct comes to be regarded as necessary. Involved in this problem is not only the fact that some acts are good and some bad, according as they realize the end or not; but also the further fact that we are bound to perform the good acts. Naturally, "if life is an object of desire for men, all that tends to maintain and promote life becomes hypothetically necessary. . . . These hypothetical imperatives become assertory the moment one adds: *de facto* man wishes to live and be happy."² But since this hypothetical series of things that tend to promote and maintain life is not closed by the individual, but by the nature of things, we must still explain the relation of the former to the latter and the source of necessity between ends and personal conduct. A few illustrative solutions will help to clarify the situation.

Every one will remember the view, formerly very popular, that because the cosmic order is self-sufficient, man's conduct is to be judged and governed by precisely the same principles that rule all other manifestations of natural energy. This led to the adoption of physical energy as the ideal type of natural manifestation. Conduct works on the same principles as machinery. The best way to describe it is simply to say that it happens. In the physical sciences it is sufficient, if events are interpreted according to their serial conjunctions; but, on this level alone, they are no more ethically intelligible than the interminable wheel of Buddha. It is only as facts are related to some consciousness with a norm of valuation that they reveal those fitnesses from which are deduced the comparative excellences of ethics. We can understand why Herbert Spencer's brave program about determining "from the laws of life and the

¹ M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, New York, 1909, Vol. I, p. 64.

² A Fouillée, *Les Elements Sociologiques De la Morale*, Paris, 1905, 2nd ed., pp. 21-22.

conditions of existence what kinds of action necessarily tend to produce happiness" is so disappointing. Where are we to start? What is existence for? What is happiness? Are all types of fact of equal importance in determining the laws of life and the conditions of existence? Shall we regard the happiness of the millionaire in the pleasures of consumption, or of the artist in the enjoyment of production, or of the philosopher in the satisfaction of contemplation as the ideal type? And if all types are valuable, what norms shall guide accurate generalizations and secure stability? Are moral laws simply compromise conclusions from the ups and downs of history? These are questions which must obviously be decided in advance.

Experience is, indeed, a stern teacher. Moreover, any moral code is effective, only in proportion as it reflects the needs and the constitution of actual human nature. A moral law conceived from above or from the outside, if such were possible, without any relation to the problems and conditions of our life here in the world, could in no sense be a source of obligation to anybody. But how we can inhale or absorb morality from the facts, and assimilate responsibility from the connections of facts, without any previous principles of course and direction, is a difficulty which not even E. B. Holt's dramatic vindication of the ethics of the dust can remove.¹ There is a great deal of attractive talk about dirt and sweat, but one cannot escape the conviction that the perspiration is athletic. Everyone who has really struggled for character, fought to make his conduct realize even proximate and worldly aims, knows that his ideals as frequently as not fly in the teeth of what is concretely useful. For the moment the man seems isolated, out of joint with the whole system.

A similar explanation of the relation of "oughtness" between end and act is that which reduces moral obligation to the category of biological needs. It is open to the same objections. Mr. Folsom concludes a little too hastily that the urging of the moral obligation is no more than the im-

¹ *The Freudian Wish and its Relation to Ethics*, New York, 1915, p. 128.

pulse to eat.¹ This has meaning if duty is a physical, instead of a moral, necessity. It is impossible, with our mental equipment such as it is, to conceive the physical necessity of doing good, since men, as a matter of fact, frequently do evil.² Even in cases where we do avoid wrong, and do it rather habitually, there is more to the process than simply shunning poisonous edibles. Of course, it is supposed that if man had perfect knowledge, he would be in the same condition psychically as an organism fully equipped physically. So, Mr. Folsom says, man "must learn to worry more about his ignorance than about his badness of motives."³ This is a variation of the knowledge theory of ethics, proposed every now and again in the history of morals. Knowledge becomes a substitute for responsibility. Thus, Lord Brougham and Sir Robert Peel, in the middle of the last century, would have made men think and act God through a knowledge of physics, astronomy, and natural history. We have more refined forms of the theory at present. We use now the concepts of ideo-motor action, imitation and suggestion.⁴ There is a certain confidence that an idea will be realized in behaviour, if only we can get it into the mind and keep antithetical ideas out. There is a measure of speculative worth in all this, but we are equally aware from experience, actual and historical, that ideas of good acts do not always create good acts. To think that a knowledge of the universe will inevitably engender a desire to live the purposes of the universe has always been the dream of poets. The men who deal with life as it is, the statesmen, jurists, physicians and priests, have too often been painfully aware of a tendency to the very opposite.

The gist of all such attitudes is that moral propositions simply repeat experience, and that their urgency arises from our being parts of a universe, or a humanity, that is moving to some ideal end. We doubt the power of this

¹ *The Am. Jour. of Soc.*, Jan., 1918, *Ib.*, p. 436.

² For the Scholastic distinction as to the kinds of necessity, see St. Thomas, *Summa*, Q. 82, art. I.

³ *Am. Jour. of Soc.*, *Ib.*, p. 490.

⁴ For a terse application of these ideas see M. W. Keatinge, *Suggestion in Education* New York, 1907, p. 30.

philosophy as a practical rule of life for the individual. It is too vague. It does not satisfy certain ethical situations that any man knows to be essentially internal. It does not give definite shape to the real circumstances of any individual life; for it denies to the individual an end of his own, and establishes the moral law as a contrivance for the benefit of the species. A morality that deals in the worlds, the laws of which are intended for the movements of masses, cannot conveniently be made the basis of obligatory ideals, the practical application of which is binding on us through all the minute circumstances that urge to action.

The Scholastics endeavored to avoid such neglect of the individual. They asserted that the ultimate end of all human action is external, but they did not identify this end with the triumph of the species. The end is related to every agent. To put the matter in the metaphysical language of the Schoolmen: "In order to form the judgment—the good ought to be done—we require to realize mentally a final necessity—i. e., a necessary connection of means with end, such that, without the means, the end cannot be obtained. But is this connection enough? What if the end be not itself necessary? Shall we then be compelled to admit an 'ought'? Study is necessary to science, but is science necessary? If it is not, in what sense can you say that study is necessary? Its necessity is merely hypothetical. But moral necessity is an absolute necessity; a thesis not a hypothesis (that is, a categorical, not a hypothetical necessity). It arises from an end to which every will tends with real necessity. . . . Moral obligation may therefore be defined as an 'ought' resulting from the necessary connection of means with a necessary end." Later on, we may be forced to admit a *personal* element into the source of responsibility and obligation. For the present, it is sufficient if we remember that no *necessity* is valuable from our human standpoint unless it involves the individual in the scheme. We must adjust the moral order to single minds and wills. "For this beginning we can allow no other: no pretended inter-haviour might be deduced; still less that silly and offensive

¹ Taparelli, quoted in M. Cronin, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 212.

pretation of the plan of the world, from which, as if it were possible for us, the obligatory commandments of our behaviour which at present plumes itself with so great aplomb on descending into the entertaining incidents of natural history, and—out of a tendency to ascending development which is imagined to have been discovered in the animal world—construing the summit, which logically ought to form the behaviour of humanity. If we could not find in our own conscience the irrevocable criterion of our moral judgment, we should certainly not get it from the beasts; for what observation of them might teach us that the series of development we suppose we find in them goes upward to the perfect, and not downwards to the bad, we could know, only if it were beforehand completely clear to us, which we should regard as the better and the worse end of this scale.”¹

We should be now in a fairer position for constructing a positive concept of the ethical person. The latter is, first of all, one who possesses within himself rational intuitions and ideals that are surely the results of purely internal forces, that “need no proof but their own evidence.”² The Intuitionist is undoubtedly psychologically correct on this point. The stock of such intuitions is necessarily small, and consists only of those truths of the moral order known as fundamental and primary. But that they are rational in origin, or “inner relations,” as some prefer to call them, is as true as the fact that there are no other pathways along which they could have come, or at least could have come in the final and apodictical form in which they appear in consciousness. These intellectual certitudes persuade as principles known to be true; and it was a crime to carry them

¹ Hermann Lotze, quoted in W. Wallace, *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, Oxford ed., 1898, p. 508.

² “Moral intuition is the percipient act by which the truth of a self-evident moral principle is immediately cognized—The term moral instinct is employed to denote a native disposition towards some class of socially useful acts.” M. Maher, *Psychology*, p. 323, n. 10. Trotter urges that the strong internal appeal of moral propositions is proof of their instinctive origin; but he does not offer convincing proof that the higher ideals can be reduced to this level. (*Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, New York, 1916). Professor James has remarked the obvious truth, that the nobler the ideal, the more revolutionary it is likely to be.

over from the domain of intuitive rational *knowledge* to that of *blind belief* or mere instinctive feeling.

All else is growth. The individual, like the race, rises step by step. Each conquest has brought into clearer view still other heights of moral achievement, and motives for further triumphs are found in past victories. But, while the advocates of real personality attribute the principle of growth to the constructive power of human reason, working on its native intuitions, those who reduce personality to consciousness would conceive the gradual perfecting of conduct-control as due to environmental influence. A favorite method is to build up a scheme of behaviour that embraces simply a system of instinctive reactions, unattended by any concept, however obscure. No one today finds great difficulty in admitting that the instinctive processes are useful for explaining many forms of conduct. Formerly it was considered a fatal defect that instincts could give rise only to isolated acts, each one blind and fortuitous.¹ Keener study has revealed the fact that, even though fundamentally an instinctive tendency may be unaccompanied by any clear conception of the purpose served, instincts are always forming themselves into a network, which shows that the apprehending power of reason is not absent wholly from the process. Instincts, modified by experience, are no longer blind; and, where there is memory, there should also be some expectation of consequences. This would apparently save the process from being merely mechanical and would ultimately permit of conscious development. But it falls far short of being an adequate theory of the origin or nature of morality.

It is not possible here to treat instincts exhaustively. One who believes in the Scholastic doctrine of personality will instantly object to the hasty manner in which rational processes are reduced to instinctive categories by the thinkers of our time. We may, of course, so broaden the logical content of instinct as to include all the actions which a man

¹ For a discussion of instincts from the side of modern science, see William James, *Psychology*, N. Y., 1890, Vol. II, p. 383. For the relation of instincts to reflexes and what are termed "inborn capacities" see E. L. Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, N. Y., 1913, p. 24.

performs, even those carried out in response to an idea; but this is evidently an arbitrary extension of the instinctive operation. When we are told that the elementary constitution of instinctive conduct does not permit of the intrusion of idea forces,¹ and when we remember that the conscious accommodations in instinctive tendencies constitute a region about which we are as yet poorly informed, we may be pardoned for refusing to surrender without a priori justification or conclusive experimental evidence a situation where the facts cohere with tolerable clearness for one in which the only excuse for obscurity is the dim hope that reason may finally be revealed as of the same flesh and blood as instincts. The intuitive reason is practically coextensive with all the workings of sense: an obscure concept is practically simultaneous with our first feelings and sensations. Intuitive reason acts in, through, and with sense, in the acquisition of knowledge, even though the discursive reason acts after sense, in the elaboration of the data acquired by reason and sense together. Here we have the fallacy of purpose and procedure characteristic of this whole reductionist movement: the fallacy of *separating* the work of reason and the work of sense. It is sufficient condemnation to point it out. Furthermore, if, as James says, instincts seem to be implanted for the sake of forming habits, the need for an accompanying authority over the result, more definite than what is provided by the workings of the instincts themselves, becomes all the more imperative.² It is very well to assert that all will come out right in the end, because instincts represent racial habits. But aside from the fact that some reactions are preserved which are useless or positively disadvantageous, "instincts are often carried out in a bungling fashion and in the face of circumstances clearly fatal to the successful issue."³ Where are we to find the inhibitory power so essential to moral growth?⁴

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

² William James, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 402.

³ J. R. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 342.

⁴ Scholastic psychology is not particularly rich in experimental studies of instinct (the *vis aestimativa* of the older Schoolmen). There are, however, some works of real merit among Catholic scholars, such, for example, as St. George Mivart's *The Origin of Human Reason*, London, 1889, and *Lessons from Nature*, London, 1876. The general principles on which the problems of instinct are usually solved from the Scholastic side may be had in the Supplementary Chapter to M. Maher's *Psychology*.

Ethically, then, instinctive action does not contain sufficient directive power, or rather clearly presupposes such power, to respond to right as against wrong. Bullying and cruelty issue just as easily and naturally from the same source that impels the justifiable acquisition of food. Collecting and hoarding, also developed in connection with food-getting tendencies, lead just as readily to miserliness. The kind of moral ideals we want demands more than the "indefinite and unpredictable susceptibility to modification from enviroing conditions, with an equally uncertain submission to conscious guidance."¹ Certainly, those intuitive ideals in our moral consciousness that fly in the face of experience, that are not so much summaries from the past as incentives for the future, could never have risen in that way. Progressive human behaviour requires more than the mere conscious adaptation of means to ends. It demands also the capacity to abstract and generalize over a large number of situations. If self-control is to mean anything, it must imply, besides the activity of memory, reflection and inference, the directive work of intelligence, intervening to transform native reactions in accordance with the thought and volition of the individual. Popular evolution used to picture ethical progress as a passage from almost absolute moral anarchy. That such a chaotic state of affairs ever existed is now denied by most competent students.² J. M. Baldwin's theory of organic selection as opposed to natural selection, whether accepted or not, expresses clearly the necessity for some sort of *intelligent action* during the time when instinctive habits are in the process of formation. Men could never have been entirely without the help of rational interpretation, combining, in no matter how small a degree, deduction with induction, passing from causes to effects, from principles to consequences. Temperament, impulse,

¹ J. R. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 342. W. McDougall, (*Social Psychology*, New York, 1908, p. 217), and C. H. Cooley, (*Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York, 1902, p. 64), hold that there are no specific original roots for supporting approval and disapproval responses. E. L. Thorndike (*op. cit.*, p. 89) maintains that in the natural man approval and disapproval appear as satisfiers and annoyers, wholly different, of course, from cultivated moral approbation and disapprobation.

² For example, P. A. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor in Evolution*, New York, 1902.

training, climate, all need to be brought down, directly or indirectly, to *reason*, with its evidence and intellectual justifications.

Great caution is needed to keep us from excesses. All valuable coordinations, even some commonly regarded as moral, do not have to be intellectual in origin. Parental behaviour, for instance, would appear to be easily explicable on instinctive grounds. However, where we put a value on conduct, the latter should then be considered moral. Professor Sorley's distinction between the facts of human conduct and the worth of conduct is exceedingly helpful.¹ The ethical question regards what conduct should be. This may come, of course, after our experience of certain actions, but experience itself cannot originate the moral value. It does no more than present us with the facts in the case. Our moral judgments may be efficient even when opposed to experience. Probably most men will continue to view sitting by the sick bedside as an utterly worthy act, despite the edict of modern psychologists that so to sit is an irrational relic from an original impulse, once justified as a form of mutual aid advantageous to the group's survival. The big thing about conduct is not what happens, but why it happens. To get at the answer to this query, it is necessary to turn up and down, round and about, the elements of experience. In this sense, surely, reason, and not unthinking habits, is the ground of our inner moral existence.

The reason that thus functions intuitively, constructively, and purposively in moral consciousness does not rely for its superiority on any such artificial distinction as Butler would have made between the lower and higher parts of our nature. Nor is it the far-off recluse of ultra-intellectualists of the type of Cudworth, Wollaston and Clarke. It works side by side with every other manifestation of the self. It is the ever-present accompaniment of all the other faculties. The Scholastic does not conceive reason as occupied with a few shadowy, cognitive wants, or he would not have defined morality as acting up to one's rational nature.² He con-

¹ *Ethics of Naturalism*, p. 310.

² J. Rickaby, *Ethics*, 2nd ed., p. 245.

cedes the interrelation, to some extent, of reason with all human activity. He admits, like everybody else, that "there is normally attached to the ethical intuition an emotional state which may be styled the moral sentiment, provided this term be properly understood. Reverence or awe in the presence of a ruling authority, admiration for the good, natural love of right and dislike of wrong, with a consequent feeling of approval or disapproval of the agent, all blend together in the constitution of the moral emotion. Instinctive impulses of benevolence and sympathy reinforce this feeling in certain directions; and judicious education, association, and the practice of virtue may, when they cooperate, give immense force to the moral sentiment, just as, when unfavorable, they may extinguish moral sensibility even if they cannot completely pervert the moral judgment."¹

Here, then, is the first meaning attaching to ethical person. He is a creature of original action, of initiative, of movement to an end. He is subject also to laws of solidarity. He is not the air-tight individual Leibnitz, nor the wild, unrestrained satyr of Rousseau. He is one in whom all the meaning of selection, environment, and heredity must be taken up and carried on anew. Mere association, mere instinctive points of contact with the race will not suffice. It is the inner cohesions, expressed in our mental processes and recognized as moral principles, that save the ethical situation from being mere slavish submission to law and custom. Moral education might, perhaps, be made easier if we could come to believe that conduct is at bottom a system of non-rational impulses; and that even when reason does appear, it is not essentially a principle of self-determination. But the premises adduced for this belief, namely, the essential sameness of human and animal behaviour and moral judgment as idealized experience, are too slender to make of this hope anything more than crude optimism. External pressure, whether conceived as the Fate of the Greek dramatists, the Absolute of some years back, or the Environment of today, is too remote, too unmeaning, too remorseless, too humanly soulless to be the alpha and omega

¹ M. Maher, *Psychology*, p. 416.

of that inward thing we call the moral life.

What has been done so far is only to show that ethical personality requires some power of discrimination and origination, that is essentially intrinsic. There may be a suspicion that the power was imbedded altogether too deeply in our nature, ever again to permit of outward expression. This is what made Balfour say that rational necessity does not carry us beyond a system of mere solipsism.¹ It is what makes modern psychologists conceive self-control largely in terms of instinct-emotion processes, the formation of neural pathways, and the organization of physiological habits. But the fact is that the intellect does not perceive moral truths as a luxury. It is busy all the while fashioning motives for the will. There is in every rational judgment of ethics the moral necessity of realizing the terms of the judgment in conduct. The volitional process not only supplements the rational, but connects our moral life with the outside world. Ethical life assumes the further aspect of duty.

Passing over for the moment the question as to the ultimate base of obligation, we may pause to point out its inevitable personal character. Without fear of future Mills, Bains and Spencers, it may be confidently asserted that external compulsion is not the original factor in the feeling of duty. Sanction is not an ultimate term but is further restricted "by the conditions in an individual which make it right to punish him."² Social needs will suppose in every case our ability to respond by laying the categorical necessity of duty from within ourselves. Even those who believe that the self is a social creation concede that we might as well have a society of stones or trees as of men, if the latter cannot react from the urging of obligation; "for to have a stable society the idea of co-operation, of social service, of social responsibility, if they have not grown normally into the individual's sense of self, must be incorporated into it through proper social discipline and treatment."³ The

¹ *Foundations of Belief*, London, 1895; see chapter on *Authority and Reason* p. 202, fol.

² W. Wallace, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

³ A. J. Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, New York, 1918, p. 51.

language of Professor Todd is here undoubtedly a reflection of the present social theories; but it is clear that he is reverting to a somewhat older doctrine and that fundamentally he agrees with Lecky that usefulness to society is a criterion that must rest ultimately on the recognition within us of a natural sense of moral obligation.¹

It ought to be clear, then, that no ethical demand has any efficiency unless the self is responsive to that demand. A sphere in which right and wrong, obligation and responsibility have any real meaning cannot be the creation of exclusively external forces. There must be active cooperation of an intellect that assents and of a will capable of making the assent vital. But that there must be such a claim is equally evident, if means are ever to acquire the character of *oughtness*, by which responsibility can be intelligibly interpreted. Metaphysics has already been used to show that every individual is connected with an end, but it was suggested then that metaphysics may fall short if it attempts to probe too deeply into the relation of means to end. It does not help to consider man in the abstract and to imagine that moral laws are simple deductions from this ideal order. Utopias of the sort break down before the expediently practical demands of actual life. They break down as they did in the case of the "natural law" of later Roman Jurisprudence; as they did afterwards in the eighteenth century schemes of "natural rights." The ethical person is no doubt aware of a purposive element in his life; but, as an individual, he could hardly originate this purpose. A man may be a fool for not living up to his rational nature, as he is a fool for not living up to the laws of hygiene or for eating poisonous edibles; but he is not a fool, as Father Cronin points out, for asking why he may not violate his nature and be a fool.²

In other words, it is senseless to say that a man is responsible to himself. In what way could he be? Reason only directs the act. It does not create the laws according to which the act should be directed. This is all the Scholastics meant when they said that the moral order of the hu-

¹ W. E. H. Lecky, *Hist. of Europ. Morals*, N. Y., 1869, Vol. I, p. 4.

² *Op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 213.

man act is set up in the act of human reason. Kant's Categorical Imperative is useless. It orders, because somewhere else there has already been established conviction regarding the things which it orders. The strange inconsistency of all subjectivism, ancient or modern, is that, while professing a profound trust in the separate life of the individual, it substitutes *belief* for rational appraisals of conduct and identifies this belief with the emotional side of life. The assertion of self then becomes the glorification of impulsiveness. Each man adopts a plan of life for which he has a temperamental attraction. Few men will die for the ideal order which reason sets up. Many will accept greedily, and live, a system that makes each one's thoughts and desires the norm of living.

The very fact that there are creatures like ourselves, capable of making demands on our conduct, forever precludes subjectivism. The mere contact of man with man is, however, not entirely sufficient. In the adjustment of neighborly relations, in the clash of right with right, of obligation with obligation, there must be some force capable of dictating "all enveloping demands." Men must be in certain essential accord regarding the general purpose of life, before they can be unanimous on the value of actions as means, or reach any definite conception as to the character of perfect human happiness. It can be granted that Society, or a religion of humanity, insofar as it has possibilities of impressing on men a common purpose, may provide a basis for ethics. That Society is the only supreme principle of moral obligation is another matter. If there is no supra-mundane existence, if there is no God, then life in society is the ultimate term of all our cravings and activity. The question is one of fact.

To the extent, however, that the subject lends itself to a priori discussion, we may designate as an utter assumption the assertion that a world in which the highest consciousness is human offers a more solid foundation for ethics and makes conduct more virile than a world where appeal to a Divine Person is allowed. This would be true only on the supposition that an other-worldly principle so wasted all our energy as to leave us unfit for the obvious duties that

we are called upon to fulfil in this world.¹ But such a supposition is precisely what every theist denies. The assent, for example, which the Christian gives to God is not a mere intellectual approval but what the logicians call a "real" assent, that is, an assent with all a man's seeing, feeling, thinking and acting. Isolation can be regarded as an aim only where many departments of life have been ignored; but this condition is evidently excluded in a plan which demands as a consequence of communion with God a better set of relations among men themselves. Absorption in God means simply, that no complexus of worldly situations can ever be judged exclusively on their own merits apart from God and his law; that religion must operate in and through all activity. And science or no science, the theist in arriving at this conclusion is no worse off and no more violates the laws of thought than the naturalist who supposes the supreme principle of conduct to reside in an enlarged, idealized, and, as far as we can see, mythological humanity.

The importance of God in an ethical scheme is that we have a Person who is capable of making imperative demands in a direct personal way on every consciousness, who introduces harmony and regulation among all the various demands which, in a system of finite necessities, have nearly all an equal value, and which, consequently, perplex thought and render action hesitating. This order has an immeasurable ethical advantage over one dominated entirely by ideas of a perfect society, which can hardly appeal to the ordinary man as anything better than an abstraction. Why must I be altruistic? Because Society has given me all I have? This might be a popular reason with the upper and solid middle classes, but the millions would openly laugh. Or because it is our unavoidable duty to assist in the realization of all those superiorities which are attributed to remote posterity? But how can we love those creatures who seem to us so snobbishly good, who triumph on our agonies, who would probably care less for us than we do about the explorers of America or the Fathers of the Revolution? If we cannot love them, what terrestrial force will ever make

¹ Cfr. Encyclical of Leo XIII, *On the Rosary*.

us work and sweat for them? It will be said, of course, that this is our selfishness which will disappear with the development of the great Eros. But, as James said, "in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short of its maximal stimulating power. Life, to be sure, is even in such a world a genuinely ethical symphony; but it is played in a compass of a couple of poor octaves, and the infinite scale of values fails to open up."¹

Radical evolutionists, be it said to the credit of their common sense, entertain no such delusions on the matter. They are aware that the perfect order of things will not come simply because a Socrates or two wish it. They are not so comfortably sure, either, that "society will ultimately grow into the ethical type, and that the ethical type will demonstrate its superior strength and its fitness to survive."² There is much reason for their scepticism if we can accept such statements as those of F. Boas, minimizing the amount of progress that has taken place from the time of our remote ancestors.³ Hence, they put forth such theories as that of A. Sutherland, who promises general justice and affection through the elimination of the cruel, stupid, and perverse individuals of the species.⁴ They would breed better men by finding out what inheritable variations tend towards greater moral capacities. Results have been attained, with similar methods, among animals and plants. Why not with men? It is a little crude, perhaps, and not easy of verification; but it is far preferable to hoping that society, through the exercise of some magical power over individuals, will educate men to the level where they simply cannot be false to their altruism, where they would no more commit themselves to a life of theft, lying, and adultery than they would think of voluntarily starving themselves.

There is one last aspect of ethical personality against which many writers have perspiringly bent the shafts of their criticism. If it is true that the only actions of any value are those determined by the individual conscience,

¹ William James, *The Will to Believe*, New York, 1911, p. 212.

² F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, N. Y., 1908, p. 354.

³ *The Mind of Primitive Man*, New York, 1911, p. 247.

⁴ *The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct*, New York, 1898, Vol. II, p. 5.

does not this lead to the ridiculous doctrine of the unmeaning character of external things? To a certain extent, yes. But it will help us considerably if we recall the psychological doctrine that the world is not set over against the individual as if the two were in antagonism. A subject-object relation is, of course, impossible without a subject and an object. From the angle of ethics it is often advantageous to the economic, political, religious, and the general social situation, that the individual conscience should recognize itself as out of harmony with existing institutions, if progress is to be kept moral. Naturally, there is no intention of apotheosizing the egotists, or the "social cripples" of whom Sir Charles Waldstein writes.¹ If we are to retain that sensitiveness to the forces of idealism which makes for advancing civilization we must make allowance, in the ethical sphere, for the possibility of diverse loyalties much after the fashion of what the recent school of Federalists would create in the political sphere. Ethical centralization in public opinion would mean the substitution of legislation for conscience and convention for personal responsibility. Morality would rather be the external observance of prescribed acts and the spirit in which the acts were performed would matter hardly at all. We should be on the level of Rome where "superstition" was equivalent to transgressing the bounds of immemorial custom; or of Athens, where it was dangerous, as Aristides had reason to know, for a man to take more than his share of the public virtue.

In other words, we must forego the smug Greek doctrine of collective wisdom. It is too much to say, with Mr. Gilbert Cannan, that minorities are always right; but, in spite of the high authority of Aristotle, majorities are sometimes wrong,² Aristotle did not have enough faith in human nature to make rights a matter of individual recognition and respect.³ A long legal history would seem to bear him out. At the same time, if the multitude have generally sound moral principles, this fact is as firmly established by

¹ *Aristodemocracy*, N. Y., 1917, pp. 228-9.

² For illustrations of Aristotle's teaching on collective wisdom see *Pol.* Book III, c. II, sects. 14-17; c. 13, sect. 10; c. 15, sect. 7.

³ *Pol.* III, c. II, sect. 19.

individual responsibility as by the belief that virtue is a cooperative institution in which each man has a "share." It is not a mathematical problem at all. We are not bound to "throw our ready caps in air" in favor of something that the majority has decided by vote, by custom, or by selection, natural or otherwise, to be right, just and binding on all. Or if we are, there is the danger of a too great devotion to expediency which always confronts any social organization of which the moral purpose is not at every point instinct with the highest motive.

But personal ethics are not selfish ethics or self-less ethics. The Christian Religion which constitutes the highest expression of personal morality yet given to the world is proof positive of this. It is only a one-sided criticism that sees in the sense of personal guilt, the desire of personal reward, the striving after personal holiness, nothing but an attempt to adorn a "perfumed ego." The reckless abandon apparent in the question "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and suffer the loss of his own soul?"—has probably done more real good for the world than the appeal to a merely social altruism will ever be able to do. It is a concrete and real appeal.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PERSONALITY IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY.

Social personality is the consciousness of our relation to other men as person to persons. Briefly, it is a "consciousness of kind." It is an attempt to harmonize the social fact of similarity with the psychological fact of difference. Its significance is succinctly expressed in the modern doctrine of "service," or in the older Christian precept to charity and mutual aid.

Nothing could be clearer than that we are not absolutely discrete individuals. Nor should we establish a false antagonism between the person and society. They are two aspects of one fundamental problem. At the same time, we are under some necessity of defining these aspects, all the more since there is at present an immense ethical, political, and economic importance behind the unit-group relation.

The definition of society given by the Scholastics does not differ essentially from that proposed by the more conservative modern sociologists. Thus, for the former, "society implies fellowship, company and has always been conceived as signifying a human relation, and not a herding of sheep, a hiving of bees, or a mating of wild animals. The accepted definition of a society is a stable union of a plurality of persons co-operating for a common purpose of benefit to all. The fulness of co-operation involved naturally extends to all the activities of the mind, will, and external faculties, commensurate with the common purpose and the bond of union; this alone presents an adequate, human working together."¹ For the latter, "society, in the original meaning of the word, is companionship, converse, association; and all true social facts are psychical in their nature. But mental life in the individual is not more dependent on physical arrangements of brain and nerve cells than social intercourse and mutual effort are dependent on phy-

¹ Charles Macksey, *Cath. Ency.*, XIV, p. 74.

sical groupings of the population. It is therefore in keeping with the nature of things that the word 'society' means also the individuals, collectively considered, who mingle and converse, or who are united or organized for any purpose of common concern."¹ Hence, society is composed objectively of three elements: a physical basis in the "groupings of population"; a psychical consensus brought about by the interaction of many minds, and a resultant "sum of formal relations, in which the associating individuals are bound together," which latter constitutes the abstract notion of society.

There is considerable variation, naturally, in the application of these ideas, and nowhere is the difference more strongly marked than in the attempt to describe the character and functioning of the individual within the association. The Schoolmen have always maintained that the person loses nothing of his title to real and original individuality by being incorporated into a society. They were consistent when they carried their metaphysical and psychological conclusions over into the region of the social sciences. They did not lift man out of his social relations, as Hobbes did in the *Leviathan*, nor picture him as the brooding non-conformist of Herbert Spencer's *Man vs. the State*. They predicated of the ego, as a necessary condition of its perfectibility, the power to socialize itself. They did not deny that we "are strengthened and enriched by assimilating the experiences of others."² On the contrary, they would assert that personality attains its full implication only through contact with others. But they refused to cut off the notion of society from that of the individual, to think society as some superior, transcendent entity which, at a period of history, descended upon individuals, seized them in an all-embracing clasp, and evermore directed their destinies irresistibly. Most contemporary sociologists, however, have lost faith in the categories of Scholasticism. It is not clear, though, what kind of individual they would substitute. Apparently, he will have no real personality, this being re-

¹ F. H. Giddings, *The Principles of Sociology*, New York, 1908, p. 3.

² G. H. Lewes, *Problems of Life and Mind: The Study of Psychology*, New York, p. 165.

garded as the impulse to selfishness and the opponent of that whole-hearted cooperation that is now claimed as our most vital need. But the way in which personality is derived from society is nowhere set forth in a convincing manner. Herbert Spencer's theory of society as an "organism" is regarded as incomplete by even his most ardent admirers. The endeavors to state the influence of the "social consciousness" and the "social mind" seldom result in more than thinking out metaphors. Where expression is not obscure, it is crude; as when we are told that physical individuality is a vase into which the contents are poured from the social medium.¹ And weakest of all is the view of individuality as an accident, a whim of nature alone preventing it from being sociality, like James' "famous pebble on the Rocky Mountain crest."² In fine, one who reads carefully the writings of those who see in all personal life merely the results of social origins will miss anything like a definite and satisfying theory of how this can be the case.

The trouble seems to lie in cutting too clean a distinction between psychology and sociology. Certainly, if we are to have a science of sociology, we must center on the facts of solidarity, meeting, similarity, and association. But we cannot afford to overlook divergence, distinction, difference, and dissociation. A pregnant source of misunderstanding is the logical opposition that has been set up. Person is not opposed to the organization, as the unsocial to the social. Person is opposed to person, and this antithesis is itself a social fact which has its proper significance in the higher social synthesis. We must recognize that "an element of anarchy inheres in the very idea of social organization."³ The most effective way of securing the social altruist that seems to be so ardently desired is to socialize him up to the point where he loses all sense of difference, a

¹ Arthur James Todd, *Theories of Social Progress*, N. Y., 1918, p. 56.

² The idea that nature hesitates between making an individual and making a species is a borrowing from biology. Its worth as an analogy for social phenomena is doubtful since it places causation beyond direct observation. See H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, New York, 1911, pp. 259-261.

³ H. J. Laski, *New Republic*, Dec. 21, 1918, p. 229.

sort of human jellyfish who talks of liberty without conflict and sacrifice; of fraternity as if men are never called upon to adhere to their principles in lonely isolation, even apart from those whom they prize most; of equality as if he had never known that not even herds of animals and shoals of fishes furnish exact types of equality. Complete similarity would doubtless mean perfect equilibrium, which, no matter how valuable in a merely physical world, would be an undesirable social situation. Our social Utopia would then be a social Nirvana, what Mr. Ralph Adams Cram would call the "nemesis of mediocrity," where "society is unable of its own powers, as a whole, to lift itself from the nadir of its own uniformity."¹

While it is a man's business to contribute what is of worth in his personality to the community, only a superficial analysis can see that contribution facilitated by deriving personality from the environment, by making each mind the reflection of the social mind, each will the reflection of the social will. It is not worth while to say that, because society gives everything, the individual must return everything to its generous donor. That bargain-like relation of the individual to the group represents solely a static situation. Our intellectual and moral inheritance remains rich and vital because it is being continually touched, colored, and added to by individual initiative and experience. Nor is this influence of individuals only a vague and indefinite affair. It can be sensed and gauged in such phenomena as the injection of new thought into traditions, and in the formation of public opinion which is more often than not the work of a few leading minds. It is the element of personality in life that prevents society from ever becoming commensurate with its actual institutions. In Athens, in Rome, in the Middle Ages, just as at present, society gave all appearance of finality—conservatism in law, rigidity in government, absolute adherence to custom and convention. "To act," as Cardinal Newman wrote, "you must assume, and that assumption is faith."² Personality is the source,

¹ *The Nemesis of Mediocrity*, p. 22.

² *Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects*, Art. 4.

if not of the ideas themselves, at least of that passionate trust so necessary for making ideas effective; and it is the means of kindling in other men sympathy for the things for which the ideas stand. All this is true, perhaps, in a more special way of those pioneers of thought and conduct who have dared to stand alone. It is the history of heroes, saints, conquerors, statesmen, preachers, reformers, dreamers in science, art, and politics, fanatics, adventurers. But it is also true of the common man; for it is by the appeal of personality that he is enabled to recognize in creeds, policies, standards, tastes, and ideals the answers to the needs of his own individual life. It is reason speaking to reason, heart calling to heart, that breaks "the spell that holds the crowd."

In brief, the value of personality to society may be summed up under the one word, deliberation. In spite of all that has been written against M. Le Bon, the collective individual is inferior to the isolated individual in that it cannot initiate rational discussion.¹ The group possesses deliberative power only in an indirect and derived sense. Its primary bond and method of integration is feeling. It is only by misconceiving the group as something apart, and considering as products of its own functioning what are really due to the intellectual communication of individuals, what are originally the contributions of individual minds, that we can assign deliberative action to it. Reason and discussion belong essentially to single minds. It is the effort, foresight, and constructive force of individuals which make it possible and sure that social evolution will be conscious direction, and that development will be rational. It is the individuals themselves, and not any transcendent energy in society, that produce the regulative action which prevents the dominance of passion and sentiment; that maintain the corporate body a fit medium for evolving the kind of intelligent and responsible personality that alone counts for anything. It is the clashes and adjustments of individual consciousnesses, individual minds, individual wills that give content and importance to the "phenomenon of

¹ G. Le Bon, *Psychologie des foules*, Paris, 1895, pp. 16-17.

many individual minds in interaction," which, for want of a better, goes by the name of social mind.¹ We must assume some power that is able to unsettle and disturb the pall of socialized thought, values, and choices; and this power can only belong to that sphere over which personality exerts its sway. The alternative would be that strange belief of earlier evolutionism in irresistible, fatalistic progress. Herbert Spencer said that humanity must in the long run go right, because it has tried all possible ways of going wrong. This is what Mr. More would term "a faith in drifting; a belief that things of themselves, by a kind of natural gravity of goodness in them, move always on and on in the right direction; a confiding trust in human nature as needing no restraint and compression, but rather full liberty to follow its own impulsive desires to expand."²

It seems convenient to draw up here a few practical conclusions. Personality is assuredly a social, as well as an individual, fact. There can never be any condonement of selfishness in conduct or solipsism in thought, which "would reduce all actuality experienced by the individual mind to phases, or phenomena, or self-manifestations, of the individual mind itself as the one and only actuality."³ But neither can there be any excuse for that "tender-minded" sentimentalism that is now being preached from the rooftops as so much social reform and civic duty, that fancies men better and happier when they are equalized by the ballot or when they are given control of the machinery of production. These are means which the next fifty years may change; means which, no matter how valuable in themselves, depend for their efficiency on the character of the men who employ them. It is the man that counts, not the methods. "Civilization is human progress integrated and intensified. Its most essential and characteristic manifestations are diffusion of culture, a high moral and intellectual level, and respect for law. Hence civilization is above all the result of the domination of man by himself, it is a work of interior culture in which the three civilizing forces par excellence co-

¹ F. H. Giddings, *op. cit.* p. 134.

² P. E. More, *Aristocracy and Justice*, preface, viii-ix.

³ Coffey, *Ontology*, p. 86.

operate: religion, art, science.”¹ The individual is not operate: religion, art, science.”² The individual is not prior in time to society, but he is prior in aim and significance. A society is its individuals, no more and no less. We must understand that every individual is a problem of original, active personality. “Personality is not merely a passive consensus of mental states. It reacts on all its emotional and intellectual factors. In every sensation and perception, in every act of attention and of reasoning, in every phase of feeling, personality, the unified resultant of all past and present feeling, is itself a factor, making every process of thought and feeling something peculiar and incommunicable. This reaction of the co-ordinated whole upon the parts is especially distinctive of the psychology of man; it differentiates his conscious life from the conscious life of lower animals.”² The bane of our life is a political psychology that would make men think in masses; a series of educational nostrums that insist on training by categories; a growing load of legislation that orientates the community with statute morality and considers the matter closed. What we must have for inculcating the ideals we have in mind are human beings, not books, codes, and bills; and the people most available at present are the teachers, the nurses, the doctors, the priests, the small foremen who meet men face to face, and heart to heart, who deal with them as individuals of flesh and blood, and not simply as social units or pieces of a mechanism. If we really desire social reform let us pay less heed to millionaire philanthropists, university theorists, and legislative faddists, and give more consideration, more instruction, more kindly sympathy and more wages to that class of lowly leaders, petty officers in the army of humanity, who exercise more control, for good or bad, over the destinies of the race in one day than our much advertised, many-volumed dreamers do in a life-time.

Another point worth noting is that to make a logical surrender of personality to social origins would pave the way for absolutism in theory. The great strength of the notion of “society,” prevalent today, is its alleged superiority to political organization—the tribe, clan, state, or na-

¹ Delleplane, *Rev. International de Sociologie*, Jan., 1912, p. 19.

² F. H. Giddings, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

tion; its asserted identity with the best ideals, traditions, and aspirations of our common humanity. It is no such thing. Bentham is clearly right in his statement that a natural society is always practically a political society.¹ We may mentally distinguish, as Hegel and Bosanquet did, between State and society. We cannot actually cut them in two, as Spencer attempted. "Society, after all, is within the State, and it has its meaning in the State. It follows that, if we take the State in its fuller sense, not as a political mechanism using force, but as a general organization and synthesis of life, which includes and correlates all other organizations, we shall see it as a group of groups, a community of communities, embracing and sustaining the whole field of social co-operation. In this sense we can view the meaning of the State from two aspects. We can see it again as a driving-wheel, giving motive power to the system—as a "force" invigorating by a constant reminder and suggestion of their duties every member and every institution, and preventing the lethargy and inertia into which, without such reminder and suggestion, they might too readily fall. Nor can the State act in this second aspect, as a force, unless it has present to itself its first aspect of itself as a working conception of life as a whole."² We can see how insensibly the political and the larger social aspects fade into one another. And this is the anomaly of our life, that while States will continually feel it necessary to repress initiative in the interests of the larger social bond, crises in the personal development of individuals will just as continually urge to resistance. Accepting the paradox, we can at least see a result where necessary constraints are minimized, and the largest share of liberty consistent with the general welfare assured. But this introduces matter for still another discussion.

¹ *Fragment on Government*, Oxford, 1891. C. I. X. XI.

² Ernest Barker, *Political Thought from Spencer to Today*, New York, (Home University Library), pp. 71-72.

CHAPTER EIGHT

PERSONALITY IN POLITICAL THEORY.

The goal of social functioning is the development of human personality. Moreover, personality reacts on social structure and cohesion. The two spheres of activity do not go on in separate circles, but rather as a circle within a circle. In this sense, the individual has worth only in the community where alone he has the power of full mental development. Modern social studies should not be denied the credit of having emphasized this truism. At the same time, the elementary principles involved do not constitute an area in which there is much room for dispute. Society here means evidently humanity in all its vast vagueness, the complexus of associational influences. There is a spaciousness about such thinking which will harbor, not uncomfortably, all sorts of theories and system; for what is really meant is that man's physical, psychical, intellectual, and moral nature is not isolated in a vacuum. Even the believer in a real personality need not be suspicious, since the mobile, shifting, dissociating elements, which operate as personal forces in society, must converge somewhere if social environment can continue to be synonymous with the conditions of a higher and more developed life.

But the problem is not so simple as all this. Social forces do not affect the concrete individual through the medium of humanity in its entirety, but through the medium of definite groups. The relations which man enters into with his fellows are specialized. The simplest and most obvious of these groups is the family. The influence of home life, even in extensive groups, is always important. The relationships of the family originate and foster qualities necessary for the maintenance of all true association and, furthermore, serve as the practical channel for continuing the traditions and accomplishments of each generation. But of itself the family does not suffice for drawing out to the

full extent the natural faculties of man. Even granting that single families are provided by nature with capacities and energies for promoting their own welfare, the scope of this welfare is extremely narrow and its character elemental, as may be seen today in the more sparsely settled sections of the country.

At most there would be satisfaction of the mere demands of physical survival, together with the stunted beginnings of intellectual and moral growth, but hardly any perception of aesthetic values.¹ There are not enough interests to create the ideals, aspirations, and enthusiasms which result in all those coordinated forms of activity, industrial, devotional, deliberative, scientific, artistic, educational, and recreational—which we now recognize as the conditions of full personal expression. These wants are partly supplied by minor groups of all sorts, but we do not apparently have a situation of possibilities for the attainment of complete life until society by considerable differentiation and organization has emerged in the State.

Thus, we come back once more to the notion of an All, an Absolute. The passion for ultimate monism has been the distinguishing feature of prevalent political theory. Even now those who deny that a State is unitary and its sovereignty single constitute but a handful of heretics.² Nor is the desire for unity in politics without a certain justification. It certainly exercised a social value in combating the exaggerated individualism of such thinkers as Herbert Spencer.³ On the positive side, its primary principle is one by which all political speculation gets started. This is none other than the Aristotelian teaching that the State must be co-extensive with developed life and that its action can only be measured by human necessities and the inability of man to provide for those necessities.⁴ There is no intention of crushing the individual. On the contrary, every one who has asserted the inclusion of all life's relations within the State

¹ M. Cronin, *The Science of Ethics*, Vol. II, pp. 463-463.

² Generally speaking, the Federalists who favor decentralization and view the state as a system of "groups."

³ *Social Statics*, 1850; *The Man Versus the State*, 1885.

⁴ For a Scholastic application of this principle see Cronin, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 472-477.

has done so because he conceived that full personal expansion is in some way dependent on unrestricted sovereignty. The grounds lie ready-made in certain social, historical, and moral facts. The State carries with it its own impulse to self-sufficiency, of which military organization, economic organization, juridical organization and political differentiation are but the external expression. It has a qualitative character as a social whole which is possessed in virtue of its own constitution, and not simply because individuals are quantitatively present to one another. Fundamentally, the State is a moral society, seeking to realize a moral aim, but the very conditions which assure the realization of this aim postulate the existence of social laws, with the restriction that the laws must not be expressed in the mechanical terms of force but in the organic terms of life. Furthermore, the scanty evidences that history grudgingly brings to the problem show that the state is a spontaneous growth. It could not have been the object of formal thought from the beginning for the reason that men would not strive after "conditions of which they never had experience, more particularly conditions which it would be difficult to conjure up in imagination without experience."¹ In the beginning, thinks Bryce, men were forming institutions under which to live, before they were conscious of what they were doing.² All this is not equivalent to going, with Comte, to the limit of saying that a State is wholly the result of unconscious action.³ What is meant is that the State would be the product not so much of one rationally conceived design as of many converging acts of human reason. The State could never have been entirely beyond the realm of human reason.⁴ The stages that led to its formation would be consequences of conscious effort endeavoring to meet growing

¹ Cronin, *op. cit.*, II, p. 467.

² *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, Oxford, 1901, II, 97. It will be interesting to compare the same author's view of sovereignty as constraining power, *Ib.*, II, 56.

³ *Positive Philosophy*. Accepted in a modified form by J. R. Seeley, *Introduction to Political Science*, New York.

⁴ Under the inspiration of such writers as Leslie Stephen and Walter Bagehot spiritual evolution has tended to usurp the place formerly held by biological evolution and, what Professor Todd pointedly calls, its "belly problems."

wants. It would "glide imperceptibly into existence as men became successively aware of the various needs bound up with their nature."¹ The implication is that the State represents the *de facto* evolution of *de iure* presumptions, and that it is not only ideally but actually commensurate with the relations of human life. Finally, the whole scheme is not without ethical confirmation, since liberty must be confined, not only in the interests of peace and security, but as a means to the acquisition of a truer and deeper liberty of cooperation.

The case of philosophico-political absolutism and legal supremacy seems complete. A State functioning properly up to the measure of its high purposes must have unqualified allegiance, all-embracing sovereignty. Thus, Fabian Socialists will urge the State to take into its hands the control of economic life. Eugenists advocate State control of physical life. Philosophers like Hegel, Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet, and literary men like Carlyle, Ruskin, and Arnold, will have it that men take their moral and mental life from the community. And attaining a new content and vindication as a result of this unifying tendency is the legal conception of sovereignty, which confers "on the ruler of the State a positive right of supreme rule, a right to command and direct the people in everything necessary for the good of the body politic." The extremes to which "uncritized individualism" went, perhaps render us more willing to see the elements of truth in all these extensions of State action. We are not inclined now to preach non-intervention as the supreme duty of the State, or to identify political influence with mere police power. A situation where hygienic laws may or may not be observed, where the aims of education are often shipwrecked on the haphazard methods of private management, where morality is left to a good-will that experience has frequently shown to be hypothetical, where unregulated competition results in the dominance of the strong over the weak, will always cause many sincere minds to doubt the validity of the aphorism, carried over from economics, that a man's interests, generally speaking, are

¹ W. L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Oxford, Introduction, I, 27.

looked after more efficiently by himself than by others. And yet, if our theories are to be true to the facts of life, and not solely mechanical, we must admit that the individual will demand a voice in his own fulfilment, that we must deal not with oneness but with plurality, not with a whole but with parts. The concrete right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" cannot be sacrificed to the Moloch of abstract Monism.

The State of ideal synthesis is very different from the State of historical and juridical study. The latter is a definite geographical area, enclosing a group of individuals, living under a system of law, and possessing an authority capable of enunciating and enforcing that law. Its sovereignty is one, and antecedently above the parts of the community only in the abstract sense that, granting a body politic, there must be a power for discovering and realizing the purposes of the community. Concretely, its supremacy is not absolute and apriori, but a matter of gradual achievement. Authority has its source in the God-given nature of the State; but the authority that we know, that actually rules us, is one that has been artificially created.¹ It is a human institution, and the only kind of sovereignty that will be worth anything is that which is acquired by remaining true to human instincts. A State has what of sovereignty it earns, and it earns only by taking into account the fundamental dictates of human nature, in a word, intelligence and consent. Probing to the very roots of the matter, sovereignty depends on the *authority* that *can* be exercised and this in turn depends on the *obedience* that *will* be rendered.² This should not be mistaken for the charter of a Utopia. Force is undoubtedly an element in the State, and coercion, physical or economic, has its proper place. But here again we have to concede that the sovereign authority that uses

¹ Authority and government are not essentially convertible, as Pope Leo writes in his letter on *The Christian Constitution of States*, reprinted by the Catholic Truth Society, *The Pope and the People*, London, 1903, pp. 67-68.

² This is not carrying over the doctrine of irresponsibility or of private judgment to the sphere of politics. The classic expression of the Catholic doctrine of sovereignty in its relations to allegiance and conscience is reached, perhaps in Cardinal Newman's *Letter to the Duke of Norfolk*.

force "must in the ultimate analysis be reduced to the society itself, or rather to the common consciousness of a common end which constitutes the society."¹

If we are forced to offer a theory of the State that covers the presumptions adduced, we have one available in the views of Suarez. The Spanish theologian urged that from the beginning, and by natural law, political authority vests in the "corpus communitatis." It is primarily an attribute of the whole body, and only secondarily and derivatively an attribute of the position of ruler. Sovereignty, centralized in the legal State, is originally diffused through the whole body politic. It is not a discrete solid adjusted to States. It is, as it were, an evaporation and crystallization. It attains its substantiality, negatively, by the recognition that the interests of the group are better conserved through the use of agents; and, positively, by the determination as to who shall be the agents. This theory is more than the assertion that authority lies somewhere in the State. It is more than a mere political doctrine that the ultimate *de iure* sovereign is the people. It is also the application of the ethical truth that what supports and guarantees sovereignty is a spiritual force represented by the common conscience and the common convictions of the human beings who comprise the State.²

¹ Quoted from Ernest Barker's review of T. H. Green's philosophy in *Political Thought from Spencer to Today*, N. Y., p. 37.

² Suarez, *Defensio Fidei Catholicae*, Bk. III, C. II, sec. 5. Cardinal Bellarmine defended the same theory in *De Laicis*, Bk. III, c. 6. Suarez was not attempting, despite various ideas of which he makes use, to give the historical, but the philosophical, origin of the state. Certainly we do not disprove his theories by quoting Sir Henry Maine against him. He was less interested in the temporal antecedents of the state than in their logical presuppositions. The objection which some rest on the asserted parity between authority in the family and authority in the State does not seem to be valid. In the first place, the relations in a State are not so much like *absolute* dependence, as in the case of parent and child, as mutual dependence, such as exists between husband and wife. Secondly, subordination of children to parents is due primarily to reasons of physical origin and survival. If the latter were typical of the state, we should probably have to find the ideal state in an Assyrian despotism, where, as Rawlinson tells us, the king controlled the sources of economic life. Reasoning on this line we should be compelled to admit that the State finds its explanation in the impact of force with weakness and that political dominance is the result of economic exploitation (Franz Oppenheimer, *The State*, Eng. Tr., Indianapolis, p. 68).

Whether or not this theory satisfies, a sovereignty that implicitly denies the priority of moral postulates on grounds of an assumed unity is unreal. Political monism is conceptual only. Legal monism is mechanical. Both have this in common with philosophical monism, that they accept a purely abstract view of reality as adequate. For that reason they are both insufficient. The reality whereby things agree is also the reality whereby they differ.¹ Nowhere in actual life do we find omnipotence and all-inclusiveness. There are areas of activity over which we find no difficulty in asserting State supremacy. There are other activities that are political, only if we take for granted that all social relations are essentially political relations.² While, if we consider that broad field of conduct over which, for example, States and Churches have quarrelled in the past, we might well wonder if we have not here a practical reduction to absurdity of any Hegelian pretensions. Platonic idealism on which the whole monistic structure rests can be destroyed by one conscientious objector; and while we might kill the rebel, his death, as Royer Collard would perhaps say, would still remain an argument. Had we never any experiences of loyalties higher than those due the State, we might yet come to rebellion, as Buckle did, from the side of physics, or, as Huxley and Benjamin Kidd did, from the side of biological morality. If in the concrete State there is a region of undeniable supremacy, this must be accounted for by the fact that up to this point, at least, human needs and aspirations have been interpreted by the State "with sufficient wisdom to obtain general acceptance, and no further." If, on the other hand, there is a sphere where individuals still resist all encroachments of the State, where men stand by their church or union or other organization against the State, this must be because the latter has not been able to detect and generalize the claims of personality that are at stake. The part represents better than the whole certain

¹ For the value of this contention against philosophical monism see Coffey, *Ontology*, p. 125.

² Mr. Laski writes that "because a group or an individual is related to some other group or individual it is not thereby forced to enter into relations with every other part of the body politic." (*Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty*, Yale Press, 1917, p. 10).

interests of the man, and so he throws his allegiance against the ideal custodian of his rights.

Such consideration will always have an added significance from the caution which most men exercise when it is question of increasing the scope of governmental interference, and of so opening the door for the unconscious transfer of uncontrolled absolutism to a body of officials who are in practical life the repositories of whatever supremacy we predicate of the State.¹ A certain native shrewdness will constantly assert itself to prevent all absorbing ideas from creeping into the philosophy of governments. We shall be less inclined to take our theories from Hobbes, and more disposed to imitate the old Roman sagacity which "knew nothing of a special divine grace granted to a particular family, or of any sort of mystical charm by which a king should be made of different stuff than other men."² There is always the danger that absolutism will become force glorified, that it will ally itself with the automatic and coercive elements of the State. Simultaneous conduct, evoked in the presence of the same conditions, on which the State relies to keep its external form intact, and the sense of dependence that accounts for the possibility of coercion, are necessary factors. But there is, as Edmund Burke observed, a moral State within the geographical State. A State's vitality will be conditioned ultimately by its ability to control the free minds and wills of its citizens and to earn for its regulations the sanctions of conscience. It would be suicidal for a State to base its legislative and executive action solely on the unconscious, unreflecting coordinations of routine life, or to hope that its aims can always be carried out by force. In a word, a developed State should be a voluntary association, and its sovereignty maintained by moral forces chiefly.

¹ For the Catholic doctrine of governmental interference, see Cronin, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 477-491.

² Mommsen, *History of Rome*, Eng. Tr., Vol. I, p. 84. This principle persisted in the political theory of the Roman Empire. (Institutes, 1, 2, 6). Catholics will remember that the mediaeval theologians also opposed any divine right of kings. The defense of this doctrine became the perhaps unwelcome task of lesser men in an age when churchmen had become courtiers. For a striking summary of the mediaeval adherence to the "democratic basis of all human authority," see F. W. Bussell, *Christian Theology and Social Progress* (Bampton Lectures for 1905), London, 1907, p. 59.

Naturally, when we begin to suspect that sovereignty may mean more than what is contained within the narrow dimensions of actual rule or more than the regulation of externals by force, we sacrifice the benefits of legal clearness. But that sacrifice may be necessary to obtain a deeper and more progressive grasp on the fundamental facts of political life.¹ Realistic analysis, interested principally in the concept of the State, emphasizes the power of supremacy which secures, even at the cost of coercion, the moral end of the body politic. Ethical analysis is not more concerned for the vindication of authority than it is for the grounds that justify obedience. And when we read in eminent authorities that the sovereignty of the State extends to every kind of act, that anything that the State desires to do, it has a right to do, it is time to recognize that sovereignty is referable to the same roots as those from which obedience springs, and that there is not one moral law for the State and another for the citizens. It is nothing short of despotism to make legal right equivalent to moral right.²

We shall probably have to distinguish moral (or natural) rights from civil rights, just as we shall constantly have to restrict sovereignty in practical life to legal supremacy. The supreme fallacy would lie in our attributing all rights to civil processes, or in conceding an unreal pre-eminence to sovereignty.³ Laws represent definite moral accomplishments. But there is a vast deal of morality in the State that cannot "be brought to book." "The legal is the moral cooled and stationary; the moral shows us the

¹ "Law defines existing legal rights; Ethics defines moral rights; Politics defines those moral rights which would be legally enforceable, if law were what it ought to be."—Jethro Brown, *Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation*, p. 192.

² There is a difference between the situation here suggested and that other situation in which the State, in virtue of certain acts, creates an obligation in conscience. For an illustration of the latter see: John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, N. Y., 1916, p. 202, and the theologians there referred to.

³ The extent and character of natural rights need to be clearly understood. "Natural rights" is a phrase that the people delight to linger on and that orators seize when they desire "to talk large." For a brief and transparent exposition of the Catholic doctrine, John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, pp. 56-58.


same element still fluid and energetic, shapeless and indefinite, but alive. The total fact is the social life of the world, where the principle of progress is, in a healthy State, always in union with the principle of order, the dynamical always keeping up the statical." Law is but the deposit, the fixed result of the operation of that native power of intuition, which, "while still heaving shapelessly, is called morality. In the actual world they are never wholly separate; one without the other is dangerous to the community."¹ We can be less dramatic and say that the social problem must be solved from within the individual, the region of morality, and not from without, the sphere of law.

But when we thus shift the center of importance once more to the individual, it is not the isolated individual that is considered, not the individual of Hobbes' and Rousseau's hypothetical State of nature, but the individual as solidary with his fellows. With this borne in mind, there is no reason why we cannot say that no allegiance is entire. None is absolute. Even Catholics will restrict the allegiance due the Pope to spiritual matters, and the inability to get this into the heads of statesmen shows how prevalent is the misconception of sovereignty. Everywhere there is the possibility of conflict and resistance. A State-sovereignty that struts on the stilts of omnipotence very properly invites destruction. This does not mean anarchy unless we are willing to include St. Thomas, Innocent IV, and Suarez under the head of anarchists. What is meant is that a man cannot surrender his personality. He cannot forget that it exists. His personality must be won over, not coerced; and it can only be won over by recognizing its rightful claims. There is good ground to believe that we are beginning to appreciate this fundamental necessity. We now put faith in the importance of smaller groups to which the individual spontaneously attaches himself. We believe in the regenerative value of the neighborhood. We crave more vigor and interest in local politics. We are anxious that educational systems should be more locally responsive. We everywhere are seeking aims and methods that are more human, that

¹ William Wallace, *Lectures and Essays*, Oxford Ed., 1898, p. 259.

reflect better human conditions and human needs. One thing further is required—that self-improvement be described as radically the work of the *man*, and not the result of *changed surroundings*. On this point the words of Dr. E. T. Shanahan, of the Catholic University, may be used as a fitting conclusion: “Planning a perfect State is not so much like novel-writing that one may manage the characters at will, and make all the future citizens of Altruria automatically good and moral, merely by the literary expedient of arranging all the circumstances to that end beforehand, and by killing off the marplots and undesirables before the last and crowning chapter is reached. Morality is not transferred to the individual from the external conditions under which he lives. It does not exist ready made in any surroundings. Custom and circumstances may indeed *modify* morality for good or ill, but it is beyond their power to *create* it. Character is something we have to work for in any situation, not a magically bestowed gift. And until the social optimist of the day can show that custom and circumstance may create morality, as well as modify it, he has not advanced a single step in the direction of proving his Utopian thesis.”¹

¹ *The Unconsidered Remainder, The Catholic World* for Feb., 1914, p. 585.



CHAPTER NINE

PERSONALITY IN ECONOMIC THEORY.

No sensible view of human life will minimize the importance of a sound physical basis for personality. It is worse to be a mental slave than an economic slave. But it is better to be neither. Normally, we have no right to expect that personality can mature to fruitful fulness on any other antecedents than health, security, sufficiency, and congenial environment. An East Side slum should regularly turn out individuals with dwarfed minds and a lowered moral vitality that is not altogether unconnected with the causes that have produced a lessening of the physical vitality. If there are occasional roses in the desert of such localities, this merely shows that personality is a force that is hard to kill. Artistic accomplishment, far-reaching ambition, and high moral achievement are sometimes found in strange surroundings. Morbid sentimentalists find a peculiar delight in cataloguing instances that prove an empty stomach and a hectic cheek to be a most efficient inspiration to genius; and that, on the whole, it is better to feed stones instead of bread to our poets, philosophers, and artists. Such statistics are a record of shame. Doubtless, much of this is cynicism. But it is not materialism. At present materialism lies all on the other side, on the side of those who are trying to justify the harsh inequalities of material life, who are interested in maintaining the existing personality-killing situation, who prefer a pork-butcher to a teacher, a machine to a man, a steel rail to an idea; who regard human nature as something outside economic calculation. And no matter how much reformers may differ as to methods, they at least agree that spiritual values are the ultimate aim. A comparatively recent expression of Fabian Socialism may serve to illustrate the kind of thoughts that are actuating the men who are trying to realize the material well-being of mankind. The manifesto of the British Labor Party con-

tains this announcement: "From the same source ('the surplus above the standard of life') must come the greatly increased public provision that the labor party will insist on being made for scientific investigation and original research, in every branch of knowledge, not to say also for the promotion of music, literature, and fine art, which have been under capitalism so greatly neglected, and upon which, so the labor party holds, any real development of civilization fundamentally depends. Society, like the individual, does not live by bread alone—does not live for perpetual wealth production."¹

Technical economics discusses, indeed, a material situation. Its problems have to do "primarily with contemporary conditions and with relations between self-supporting individuals and families and the goods upon which their well-being depends." Briefly, it treats "of that portion of human activity which is concerned with making a living."² But we should miss much that is valuable in recent economic speculation if we did not perceive that economic activity is viewed as solidary with the rest of life, and not regarded as an isolated sphere, the facts and conditions of which are irrevocably beyond human control. This is why most thoughtful and sincere men are disposed to be concerned less with consumption and more with production, less with goods and more with self-developing activities, less with mechanical laws and more with the tastes of individuals. What impresses the lay reader is the readiness with which everybody is recognizing that economic reform is in most essential aspects moral reform. The worker is spoken of as a human being. His personality must not be degraded. He must have easier access to material goods by their more even distribution through society, not alone because this is a canon of justice, but also because he must be put in a position to appreciate higher goods.

A view of the economic situation from the side of the individual will never again, perhaps, include the excesses of that individualism which preceded the period around 1880. To attempt a new edition of Herbert Spencer's "The Man

¹ *The New Republic*, February 16th, 1918.

² Henry Rogers Seager, *Principles of Economics*, New York, 2nd ed., p. 1.

Versus the State" is to invite harsh laughter from reviewers, critics, and the majority of an enlightened reading public.¹ Everybody vies with everybody else in exposing the political, economic, and moral fallacies of a doctrine that was once associated with not a few eminent names.

At least, this is the condition in circles of speculation. In practical life theories move more slowly. Men still cling to many principles of the former individualistic philosophy. Every encroachment of the State is widely discussed, sometimes resisted, and never adopted without considerable adjustment. It is this tardy action that made the older socialists advocate revolution, and that makes their successors crave an entirely new State. It is true that in trying to put a new situation on an old legal system, we are constructing a patchwork product. At the same time, there is something deeper. There is a conflict of two ideals—the individual and society. Both have something of the truth. We cannot insulate the individual from his society, political, economic, or otherwise. That is half the truth. We cannot absorb the individual in society. That is the other half. For the hundredth time, the problem is one of reconciliation.

It is but natural that an era of transition should be also one of reactions; that, in the present case, the language of individualism should give way to social phraseology; that initiative, originality, competition, and private ownership should make a less forcible appeal to thought than dependence, cooperation, and State-control. Whatever else socialism may be, it is not a *mere* offensive intruder. It arose in response to a definite need, however mistaken the direction which it took. In its earlier Utopian and revolutionary phases a protest against patent injustice, it has settled down, under the form designated Fabian, to the level of practical economic and political discussion on collectivist principles. The socialization of all rents and the establishment of a purely democratic State are the main objectives. "The wealth which has been created by the whole society

¹ Any one who remembers a rather recent edition of Spencer's work by Truxton Beale, and the criticisms, will appreciate at once the present drift of thought.

must be owned and administered by the whole society. The private owner of rent, whether it was drawn from land or industry, was able to dictate the conditions of life to his 'hands'; the State, as owner, will equally be able to dictate conditions. Only if the State which dictates conditions to workers is itself the workers, will freedom be attained. Then, and then only, will those who own the means of production be also the users of those means; then, and then only, will the people dictate to itself the conditions of such use."¹ Efficiency will demand that such a State have expert government, and the Fabians have given a good deal of thought to this aspect of the question.²

With the political and economic elements of the Fabian creed, we are not, however, directly concerned. The presumption is that the individual would be better off where the forces of political and economic control are put within his grasp. That is not the whole solution, but it is an important part of the solution. Much controversial material formerly urged against socialism would now show not only bad taste but lack of information. Where we have been sensitive to instruction, for example, we realize that government ownership is not necessarily socialistic; and that, even if it were, it would not necessarily be wasteful and unintelligent. Many men who are as far from socialism as one pole is from another will agree that the socialist is right in much of his analysis and that the "machine" which he proposes as a remedy would eliminate the particular evils of society; and, to repeat Mr. Hilaire Belloc, "would (until it grew rusty) grind out sufficiency and security for all. . . . In every prison, school, workhouse, we can see for ourselves officials working such machines without too much self-seeking, controlled by a system of checks from too much private advantage."³

What any believer in real personality wants to know

¹ E. Barker, *Political Thought from Spencer to Today*, New York, p. 217.

² For instance, James Ramsay Macdonald, *Socialism and Government*, 1909. Other aspects of Fabianism, S. Webb, *History of Trades Unionism*, N. Y., 1916, and *Industrial Democracy*, N. Y., 1902; Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*, New York, 1914.

³ *Socialism and the Servile State*, *The Catholic World*, April, 1917, p. 17.

is the philosophy that is behind socialist economics and politics. What he seeks to discover is how far the man has been brought into the scheme, what elements of human nature have been emphasized; what, if any, have been neglected. He denies that any plan, no matter how superficially attractive, can be permanently effective unless allowance is made for all that the man is. Socialism, under Karl Marx, began to be conceived biologically; and of late years Fabian Socialism has given even greater evidence of loyalty to biological phrases and analogies. Society is a living organism, it declares, though there is much of the thought of Spencer devoted to an opposite purpose. Economically, society is creating values, either by its mere growth or by its manifold activities. Politically, it is a unity with a "general will." The social organism has a life of its own. It changes from *within* according to the laws of its own being. How does the individual fit in? He has a definite part in the division of labor and in the common life. Only there is much more than in the Spencerian metaphor, which lacked ethical possibilities. The individual may be identified with some one or other of particular social activities, but he is affected by the whole round of interests in the social organization. The social division of labor is not only an economic gain, but a mental and moral benefit as well. It gives life an aim. It ensures discipline and thoroughness. It affords enjoyment for more hours of leisure. It equalizes opportunity for all. It is biology mixed with a great deal of Greek paternalism. The individual has no place and function of his own. He has no rights of his own. He has no ability to carve out a fortune of his own. This external entity, the Society, must be continually taking him by the hand, directing his course, managing his affairs, allotting his tasks and duties.

Leaving aside the question of the validity of the organic conception of society, of the difficulty of showing that a parallel between the individual organism and the social organism is necessarily a relation, it may still be urged that State-socialism is forced by its method to ignore many human elements in the problem. There is, perhaps, a tendency to exaggerate the material factors, to believe too much

in mechanical laws. We must suspect that something has gone wrong when, after having set out to give the individual control of day-to-day conditions, we end by having no individual at all. Ethical writers have continually pointed out this defect. "The State is an inner outgrowth of society," writes Dr. E. T. Shanahan, for instance, "not an external imposition upon it. It has no existence apart from individual, human beings. These it was who gave it form and constitution, under the laws of nature and of God. And certainly, if history counts for anything in reaching a conclusion on the matter, it was not to put a premium on mediocrity, or to reduce all men to the dullest, lowest level of their kind, that the State came originally into existence. A protest should be filed against the present levelling-down movement of socialism, which attempts to carry over the personal rights of man to the column of social duties, in a ledger badly in need of balancing. The individual, as an individual, has personal rights and duties, distinct from those which entail upon him as a social being, as a member of society. These personal rights cannot be invaded. Sociality is not the only attribute of man, all Tory thinkers, past and present, to the contrary notwithstanding. The duty of the State is to protect the individual, not to absorb him and his, body and soul, by extending the right of eminent domain to everybody and everything within its borders. The social problem must be viewed and solved from within the individual, not from without. Human conditions can neither lastingly nor effectively be improved by changing the internal problem of reforming the character of individuals, into the external problem of reforming their environment. This is to stand the social problem on its head; to invite us to view and solve it upside down."¹

But moralists are not alone in their attacks on State-socialism. They find many allies among economists and political theorists. We hear a great deal, say the latter, of large and suggestive principles, of the revolution of national finances, of the conscription of surplus wealth, of the democratic control of industry. But all these depend on a politi-

¹ *The Unconsidered Remainder, The Catholic World*, February 1914, p. 587.

cal disposition that must involve a governing class, if anarchy is to be avoided. The fact that that class is elected does not alter the final situation. It is an oligarchy, or it will become one at last, whether we look at it economically or politically. It controls the life of the citizen. It inaugurates what Mr. Belloc calls the "Servile State." No opprobrious meaning necessarily attaches here to "servile." All that is meant is that the individual is *compelled*, that he is not actually in possession of his daily life to anything like the extent that the socialistic program promised. Officials of the State replace the managers of capitalism. The ownership of the means of production is theoretical, as far as the individuals are concerned, while their administration of those means is dictated. The individual can in a round-about political way assert his influence as part of the body politic, but most men entertain no illusions concerning the vote in such circumstances. In a word, the argument used against the old socialism is that the ideal of a political-industrial machinery gives no assurance that the status of the worker will be changed. Moralists and economists come to the same conclusion that a change in the industrial environment will not bring with it, of necessity, a change in the individual.

Most important at present among the theories that would be substituted for State-socialism is the doctrine of Guild-socialism. The latter is making rapid headway and has by now an extensive literature.¹ Guild socialists would avoid the crudities of the old individualism by vesting the actual ownership of the means of production in the State, and the dehumanizing tendencies of State-socialism by making the control of productive processes a matter for the self-government of each trade. "The whole effort is to relate the individual to his work in the capacity of a human being not merely endowed with rights and responsibilities, but actually translating them into the terms of everyday life." It is with groups, however, rather than with indi-

¹ G. D. H. Cole (*Self-Government in Industry*, London, 1918), shares with A. Orage (*National Guilds*, N. Y., 1914), the position of spokesman for the new movement.

viduals that the guild socialist deals.¹ Convinced that a political democracy is vain unless there be a true economic democracy, they leave the economic affairs to guilds, membership in which is determined by occupation or profession. Each guild is an area of separate administration. And it is believed, without here going into reasons which suggest themselves, that the control by the workers themselves of their work becomes more effective. This arrangement will insure political freedom, since "economic power precedes and controls political power." It will also insure spiritual freedom, for the things of the spirit, fine art, education, justice, public conduct, international relations, are left to a State, released from financial anxiety and undominated by the sinister interests that mark a state-control of economic life and that perpetuate a struggle characterized by selfishness and exploitation, in which the many barely survive, the few enjoy nearly everything, and the perception and appreciation of spiritual values is reduced to the vanishing point. Where, on the other hand, men are united in cooperative labor on guild principles, it is asserted that we shall have the basis for a richer personal artistic, and economic life.

The guild idea is, no doubt, beautiful. Read with the help of Mr. Arthur Penty's aesthetic inspiration, it is irresistible.¹ Any one bred on Catholic traditions will feel spontaneously the charm of this mediaeval institution. Naturally, he will realize that conditions have changed; that, as the stock objections show, thought must be somewhat wider than craftsmanship, local industries, and small markets, in order to secure the emancipation of workmen who are thrown into a situation where machinery, the necessity of continued access to raw materials, transportation, and an extensive foreign trade are inevitable elements. But going further, Catholic economists would be more inclined than any others to remember that the guilds were not perfect, that no matter how stringent were the rules to promote fair dealings, fraternal relations among the members, and regard

¹ Guild socialism owes considerable of its power to the doctrine of the "real personality" of the group, for the introduction of which into English thought F. W. Maitland is largely given credit.

¹ "Old Worlds for New."

for the interests of the trade as a whole, selfishness, commercial trickery, unlawful monopoly, and disregard of the rights of those outside the ring were not infrequently manifested. There is no reason for thinking that guilds will be immune from the defects that went with similar institutions in the thirteenth century. So long as we must conceive economic man in some social relation, the guilds have, perhaps, possibilities not possessed by other groups; but the status with which guilds are ideally synonymous is not brought about simply by economic and political processes.

Here we have one reason why the Catholic economist is inclined to insist that a moral regeneration must precede any lasting and effective social regeneration. It is not sufficient that the individual be recognized and appointed the real center of importance, unless we take care that the individual will be equipped with an ethical character adequate to sustain and further the system of social justice at which everybody is aiming. No plan of political or economic adjustment can proceed without reference to morality. It is not enough to hope that the ultimate disposition of things will involve an arrangement that will be equivalent to a moral order. There must be morality at the beginning and middle, before we can expect morality at the end. And social morality has its grounds in individual morality. Such considerations had little weight with the mass of statesmen and reformers a few years back. They shared General Braddock's belief in "manoeuvring large bodies." Socialized action and corporate institutions were supposed to drift by some innate propulsion towards goodness. Let us think always in terms of the community and talk ever about the common welfare or the greatest good of the greatest number, and all things economic and political will be added unto us. The individual is the source of all evil, the community of all virtue. When we have public control of industry, of education, of hygiene, of morality, vice will disappear. Hardly, unless we go deep enough; hardly, unless the individual is actually affected. But he is not affected by white-washing tactics. Character cannot be impressed from without. It must be fought for. To think that by changing the external form of society we inevitably better the *within-*

ness of the society is the dream of hardy optimists who are not too much troubled by what Huxley called "ugly little facts." The mere socialization of individuals, whether by economic, political, or educational methods, may be as effective in aggravating and enlarging the faults that we desire to eradicate. But the social process will drift in any direction, according to the composition of the individuals that constitute the society.

We have had some recent experiences that give practical importance to the foregoing reflections. The war accentuated in most minds the inefficiency and injustice, at a time of great public emergency, of free individual enterprise and of private property in the instruments of production. The apparent remedy was to socialize industry. Once accomplished, the thing had consequences outside the vision of even the executives who planned the change. The latter had merely constructed what they thought was a temporary expedient. What they actually did was to afford to aspirations long dormant in society an opportunity for articulate expression. At least, this is the view of the situation taken by not a few writers. For instance, Mr. R. L. Duffus, on the editorial staff of the San Francisco "Bulletin," will say: "It is as though motives and principles on which civilization had unconsciously been acting for a long time had come to the surface. Necessity alone will not explain this acquiescence (of the masses in social readjustments); it has been too unquestioning, almost too cheerful. Necessity may be a compelling master, but without more preparation than appears upon the records it would not have reconciled England and America to the current restrictions upon individual liberty, the current extension of the powers of government, the current substitution of the mechanical bias for the political and judicial bias, in short, to the current repeal of natural rights, if their civilization had actually rested upon the principles on which it was supposed to rest."¹ And we are further told that "the English are obviously preparing themselves to submit, after the war, to a great deal of government interference, of industrial and

¹ *The New Republic, The Twilight of Natural Rights*, March 2, 1918, p. 139.

commercial regimentation which they would not have tolerated in the epoch that ended with the beginning of hostilities, because their individualism has become national through the war, and they are now willing, if necessary, to cooperate with their former competitors for the purpose of defeating a common competitor in foreign lands."¹

All this is not, of course, necessarily socialism; and it could have defects without compromising the claims of socialists, who do not believe that the present State can be impartial, or that any set of beneficial circumstances can be patched on the old legal system. But the new arrangement is considered a step in the right direction. Mr. Sidney Webb, always interesting and suggestive, advises trade unionism that its chance lies in emphasizing the impossibility of returning to the pre-war status and in seizing those elements in the existing situation which can be used for the furtherance of that industrial control which will ultimately mean the substitution of labor for capital as the source of political power.² What has been effected is, at a minimum, a beginning and a beginning that society has seemingly been craving. Such being the case, we might be led to expect, if not the full fruition of altruism, at least a decided improvement in the ethical background of economic life. All the more so, since the causes which produced industrial reforms during the war were accomplished by an intense communal consciousness and ostensibly under the guidance of the highest kind of motives that could be derived from the general welfare, as that welfare was politically and economically conceived. But even the most sanguine are somewhat disappointed. Selfishness, rivalry, and the tendency to use strength against weakness are not less in evidence. It was but natural, perhaps, that capitalists, of the kind that fashioned the Balfour Report, for example, would seek advantage in the new conditions. But labor has not been above reproach; and there may be as much desire to forestall objection as to round out a readable document, that the

¹ *The Problems of Reconstruction, International and National*, a pamphlet issued by the American Association for International Conciliation, New York, February, 1919, p. 234.

² *The Restoration of Trade Union Conditions*. New York, 1918.

British Labor Party preaches the necessity of a conception "of the corporate duties of one nation to another; of the moral claims upon us of the non-adult races, and of our indebtedness to the world of which we are a part."

Such reflections do not make us opposed to reform, they do not pretend to invalidate the reforms that are being tried. They are cynical enough, however, to prevent our idealism from running riot. They show what must be brought about before reforms become practically feasible. Neither mechanical laws nor biological development nor economic adjustment nor political expedients give any absolute assurance that the individual will measure up to the needs of the contemplated improvements. And unless he does, we have the faults of individualism synthesized and given wider scope for harm. This is the lesson of President Wilson's warning: "Responsible statesmen must now everywhere see, if they never saw before, that no peace can rest upon political or economic restrictions meant to benefit some nations and cripple or embarrass others, upon vindictive action of any sort or any kind of revenge or deliberate injury."¹

While Catholic economists do not trade on a collective reform that supposes an ideal individual, who may or may not exist as the individual himself decides, neither do they go back to the individual for the purpose of resting there. They have no wish to be butts for Carlyle's jibe about "buttoning your pockets and standing still." They aim at reintegrating the ethically revived individual in the socio-economic system in such a way that moral judgments which are "fairly efficacious" may be proposed. "When both have been realized in practice, the next step in the direction of wider distributive justice will be much clearer than it is today."² The most common method is to apply rules of justice to whole categories of economic situations. There is a constant effort to distinguish as accurately as possible the personal, from the social, and still more from the physical, element. Thus, in the question of a living wage, it will be

¹ *Reply to Pope Benedict XV*, August 27, 1917.

² John A. Ryan, *Distributive Justice*, N. Y., 1916, p. 432.

pointed out that there is more than the purely economic relation of work to pay, that there is, in addition, a moral factor, because "the activity of the laborer is not a mere commodity, as money or pork; it is the output of a *person*, and a person who has no other means of realizing his inherent right to a livelihood."¹ We must not expect, naturally, the simplicity of socialistic measures. But neither must we charge indefiniteness and vague idealism. Moral considerations are an invaluable help in fixing the hidden causes of injustice, and in taking that wider view of social justice without which all discussion of higher wages and shorter hours is just a superficial scratching of the problem.

Moreover, speculative enunciation is only a preliminary. There is some attempt to realize in practice the principles which it is believed that justice demands. Here, however, there is no concerted Catholic movement. Thinkers will ally themselves variously with available forces of economic pressure or of political assault upon the State. They may assist in spreading ideas of justice and, where they are powerful enough, in creating public opinion. We can presume that measures of land reform, that agitation for a minimum wage, for more equitable relations between employee and employer, for better working conditions, for increasing regulation of woman and child labor, for social insurance, and the like, will meet with favorable consideration from Catholics.²

There is one Catholic who has, however, a specific and sweeping remedy that has its own interest in the present study. Mr. Hilaire Belloc has earned the profound gratitude of every serious Catholic student by his proposal of peasant proprietorship. This is not said by way of apologetics, but because Mr. Belloc has shown the path to Catholics who would grasp the problems of economic life in some more definite and tangible manner. Even those who disagree with him will admit that he is an inspiration. By Dis-

¹ *Ib.*, p. 371.

² As illustrations of Catholic attitude on some of these questions, see *Methods*

³ As illustrations of Catholic attitude on some of these questions, see *Methods of Reforming Our Land System*, by John A. Ryan, *The Catholic World*, October, 1912, and *Minimum Wage Legislation* by the same author in the same magazine for February, 1913.

tributivism Mr. Belloc means the assignment to every man, as far as possible, of individual private property.¹ While accepting the common Catholic view that private ownership is not *directly* necessary for any individual, he asserts it to be the historical means to human welfare. Private property is not intrinsically good, but neither is it intrinsically bad. "If you could get rid of the human institution of property, of the human instinct from which it arose, and of the human purposes which it serves, then you would as a necessary consequence develop (whether in a primitive or a complex condition of industry matters not at all) the scheme of production which the Socialists advocate."² What is evil is that "the means of production are in very few hands, and are tending, under our system of morals, to get into fewer hands."³ There is but one alternative and that a "society in which the means of production are severally possessed by a determinant number of the units, family and individual, that go to make up the State. 'Severally': that is, with a division between who owns and who does not own, lying between unit and unit, so that this family, that corporation, that individual, own lands and capital in absolute property as against others, and that the great mass of regulations limiting such rights (for the furtherance of co-operation, for the checking of competition, etc.) shall arise spontaneously from below, and shall be the product of men economically free, acting in communion. 'Determinant': that is, a number which is not a bare majority, nor any fixed proportion, but such that it determines the general economic sense and opinion, character and air of society."⁴ Mr. Belloc also offers measures by which a redistribution of property might be brought about.⁵ Finally, while the core of his argument is individual property, he recognizes the need of cooperative association in order that property may be protected, and that the return of the Servile State may be prevented. He would find the means of protection in

¹ An article on *Socialism and the Servile State* and two articles on *The Distributive State* in the *Cath. World*, Apr. and Dec., 1917, and Jan., 1918

² *Socialism and the Servile State*, *Cath. World*, April, 1917, p. 18.

³ *Ib.*, p. 17.


⁴ *The Distributive State*, *Catholic World*, Dec., 1917, p. 305.

⁵ *Ib.*, January, 1918, pp. 472 fol.

some such institution as that of the mediaeval guilds.

To the student of personality Mr. Belloc's theory is suggestive, whether it be deemed wise or feasible in the last analysis. At any rate, it gives to personality a logical sequence, from independence of mind down to unrestricted possibilities for making a living. It is consonant with the dignity of the human person. Doubtless, the means of mental, moral, and spiritual development can be provided by wages. That is not the point. No one who remembers the unlimited potentialities of a person will be content with a minimum. Besides it is not merely a question of the individual, as has been repeatedly urged, but of the society also, which is supposed to be the medium of the person's unfolding. And if the testimony of history and common sense count for anything, the existence of a "well-propriety society" gives greater assurance of creating an atmosphere where the standard of living is better and higher, and where life is more wholesome and elevating. There is one thing else that, so far as is known, only genuine religion can teach and that is "the elementary lesson that the path to achievements worth while leads through the field of hard and honest labor, not of lucky deals or gouging of the neighbor, and that the only life worth living is that in which one's cherished wants are few, simple, and noble."¹

¹ John A. Ryan, *op. cit.*, p. 433.



CONCLUSION.

By way of conclusion it may be worth while to summarize and unify the various steps in the study just ended.

In the first place, the history of the conception of personality, human and Divine, shows a distinctive contribution to the subject by Christian thinkers, which represents a development of thought that cannot be forced out of recognition without landing us anew in the pagan conception of the State, overthrown by Christianity. The long and stormy inquiries into the meaning of personality served to teach mankind the spiritual dignity and moral grandeur of man, made to the image and likeness of God. They helped to keep him from being the mere fraction in the unit of the State, which he was under paganism. They showed that man was definable vertically in relation to God, no less than horizontally in relation to his fellowmen in society. They showed him to be the subject of natural rights not capable of invasion by the State, except at the State's eventual cost. And this exploration of man's individuality, substantiality, and inviolability of person is one of the heirlooms of Christian thinking with which the world cannot afford to part. One has but to study the present tendency to transfer individuality and personality from the individual to the State, to realize that social thought, in its philosophical foundations, is not now advancing but going back. The penalty of forsaking belief in the personality of man and God is an impersonal, dehumanizing Absolute destined to crush, not to conserve and elevate humanity.

The aim of all Scholastics, mediaeval and modern, has been to keep the Christian victory from being exchanged for terms of lesser worth. Substance, nature, essence, subsistence, personality are thus more than simple logical expedients. If we see in Scholastic philosophy nothing but clever distinction, we have not yet begun to understand it. When the Schoolmen rooted personality and personal identity in substance, they had in their mind's eye a perspective of

spiritual, ethical, and political consequences. And beneath a definition of personality given, for example, by Aquinas there are depths of moral implication and the fulness of a rich and varied reality. St. Thomas faced the problem of human personality in society with far more candor and vigor than his modern critics have ever detected in his writings. His chief glory is that he sacrificed no element in that problem. He would have no jejune simplification; no identification of personality with egotism or uncontrolled individualism, which might apparently save the human soul, but at the risk of anarchy; no extension of the social process in order to conceive society as a substitute for individual effort and responsibility, by making it use personal minds and wills for superior purposes of its own. Those who urge that the Scholastic notion of personality is unavoidably unsocial forget that the great Scholastics were disciples of Aristotle, further than which no apology is needed for their social beliefs. Those who say, in addition, that the concept of personality is a defense of selfishness have overlooked the fact that the same Scholastics were Christians, whose creed has always held that individual salvation is worked out in company with one's neighbors, because the second of the great commandments is "like unto the first." Nor should we ignore the historical circumstance that side by side with the ideas that produced the brilliantly developed notion of personality in the Middle Ages there went a spirit of true communism.

The trouble is that modern philosophers, in attacking the traditional concept of personality, have in view some ghost or shadow which, whatever it is, is surely not Scholasticism. Who ever said that society and the individual were antithetical? Who ever denied that human personality is perfected in society? Who ever held that society and the State were impliedly enemies of liberty? We might perhaps find such suggestions in the Reformation doctrine of private judgment, in the dilettante individualism of the Renaissance, in the subjectivist philosophies of Kant and his followers. But the Scholastics contain no such hints. A candidate for the mediaeval universities would probably learn from the lectures on his first day of attendance that

individual and group were cooperators, even if he had not already deduced this principle from the activity of his parish or commune, from the workings of the guilds, from the dreams of spiritual empire with which the contemporary atmosphere was full. The notion of man as a social animal became too obvious to be glorified.

The real problem for the Scholastics was to discover what elements of human nature must be satisfied before personality is provided with the means of its expression. This was a problem which taxed their ingenuity. They had to make allowance for continuous growth, for changing environments, for all the vast complexity in persons. But they furnished some principles of lasting merit. They emphasized the fact that each man lives not a multiple, but a single life, that no good can come of breaking up personality into its component parts. Any influence of religion, business, philosophy, politics, domestic life affects the man as a whole. This coherent unity was designated a *substance*, the very idea of which excluded any description of personality in the mere terms of a "process," a "function," a "series" or a "stream" of functions or processes. Realizing, also, that any effective development of personality must proceed in the direction of greater unfolding of the rational nature, they proposed searching analyses of the mind and the will, both in themselves and in relation to the sensitive, emotional, and organic aspects of life. From this scheme they deduced a definite program of character building and education. Finally, to challenge personal attainment, the Scholastics offered motives from religion and morality. They did not minimize the political, economic, scientific, aesthetic, or other functions of man. But they sought to awaken men's minds and to stimulate their wills. When this had been achieved, progress in other fields would follow. Certainly the work of the monastic orders, the guilds, even with all their shortcomings, the political theories that took liberty for their foundation, the extensive missionary movements, the orders of knighthood, the Crusades, the artistic achievements are proofs that the Schoolmen were in principle correct to an astonishing degree. But what is perhaps most instructive is the necessity—inculcated by the be-

lief in personality—of taking into account the very lowest strata of society. True, much of what was seen to be good had yet to be brought down to practice. The condition of the peasants was deplorable. But the principle of emancipation had been proclaimed, and some measure of its application realized. Monasticism and feudalism, resting on principles of real worth, and demanding only that individuals prove themselves, were agencies by which any man might rise to the level of his ability.

Has the philosophy of such a plan of life anything to teach the present age? Most assuredly. All the more so, since democracy is preached as the panacea for all our ills. Democracy is defined as “the definite rise of the average man as an important factor in civilization.” Evidently democracy is not an affair of votes, or charters, or of reforms by which the masses are presumably swept into happiness and prosperity. It is a spiritual force, intelligible only in terms of individual effort, individual betterment, individual desire, and individual achievement. It is not intended to equalize men but to equalize opportunity. If men are to be in a position to utilize opportunities they must first learn to appreciate themselves and their possibilities. Contrary to the general belief, democracy has not triumphed. It is in the making, for good or bad, as each man himself shall decide. No government regulation, no social organism can bring about a condition that depends essentially for its realization on the responsibility that individuals shall bring to their social activities.

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DEUS LUX MEA

THESES

QUAS,

AD DOCTORATUM

IN

SACRA THEOLOGIA

Apud Universitatem Catholica Americae

CONSEQUENDUM

PUBLICICE PROPUGNABIT

TIMOTHEUS BARTHOLOMAEUS MORONEY, S. T. L.

HORA IX A. M. DIE VI IUNII A. D. MCMXIX.

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T H E S E S

I.

Falsum est "nihil realiter cognosci posse a fluxu experientiae distinctum."

II.

Continuas, licet distinctas, esse relationes inter fidem et rationem, gratiam et naturam vigentes, cum Sancto Thoma affirmamus.

III.

"Ac primum quidem Deum, rerum omnium principium et finem, naturali rationis lumine per ea quae facta sunt, hoc est per visibilia creationis opera, tanquam causam per effectus, certo cognosci, adeoque demonstrari etiam posse, profiteor."¹

IV.

Ea quae nuperrime urgent modernistae contra argumentum Sancti Thomae e motu desumptum procedunt vel ex ignoratione elenchi, vel ex placitis gratuitis evolutionis monisticae quam iidem profitentur.

V.

Negatur theoria progressionis inconsciae, huic adspectabili mundo applicatae.

VI.

Communem conceptum Dei omnium inesse mentibus, paganorum scilicet atque christianorum, non solum Scripturae, sed et etiam Patrum testimonia necnon nuperrima religio-
religionum historia luce clarius ostendunt.

VII.

Hunc historicum Dei conceptum omnium mentibus insitum seposuit Cartesius quum essentiam religionis in idearum historia luce clarius ostendunt.
tionem pro nihilo habuerit.

¹ Acta S. Sedis, 9 Sept., 1910.

VIII.

Recte non sentiunt ii qui in notione personalitatis sensim sine sensu semovenda, profectum religionis historicae reponendum esse putent.

IX.

Non in admittenda personalitate in divinis, sed in hac notione minus recte intelligenda, erraverunt primitivi.

X.

Ob id quod philosophi et dramatistae Graeci veram personalitatis notionem prae oculis non habuerint, non est mirum quod in divinis quidem pantheismus, in humanis vero Status omnipotentia, exinde excreverint.

XI.

Etsi Patres Apostolici vocibus *naturae* et *personae*, ex quibus terminologia trinitaria desumpta fuit, usi non fuerint, minime exinde sequitur sensum hisce verbis postea expressum ipsos latuisse.

XII.

Personae Christi exploratio, personae humane indagacionem uberiolem, ut litteris christianis constat, induxit.

XIII.

Persona obiective sumpta est natura rationalis incommunicabiliter subsistens.

XIV.

Huic non obstant veritati, facta ex hypnotismo aliisque eiusdem generis phaenomenis nuperrime in medium allata.

XV.

Mysterium SS. Trinitatis solius rationis ope, sive seclusa sive supposita revelatione, positive demonstrari nequit; qui vero suppositae per fidem veritatis rationes investigat, multipliciter quidem proficit.

XVI.

Consideratis dogmatum catholicorum origine, natura, atque profectu, ab iis omnino recedimus qui haec dogmata exhibere conantur ac si specimina praeberent quibus applicari possent leges generales evolutionis biologicae.

XVII.

Principium quod asserit naturam esse uniformem, nec in divinis nec in humanis libertatem destruit.

XVIII.

Progressus scientiarum non postulat, ut reformedur conceptus doctrinae christianae de Deo, de homine, et de relatione inter Deum et hominem.

XIX.

Obstat conscientia, ut regula morum, ne potestas status civilis ultra debitos limites protrahatur.

XX.

Ex individualismo tum religioso, tum politico non pauca secuta sunt mala.

XXI.

Doctrina Redemptionis, pulcherrima synthesi a Sancto Doctore expressa, summe spiritualis et moralis est dicenda, ab omni insuper aequivalentia quantitativa inter peccati gravitatem et passionem Domini stabilienda independens.

XXII.

Non in unanimitate explicationum, sed potius in continua attestationum catena, consistit traditio catholica: ac proinde a veritate aberrant ii qui dogmata catholica ab explicationibus theologicis eorumdum non sedulo discreverint.

XXIII.

Theologice, historice, et critice inspecta, ostenditur falsa distinctio illa nuperrime adinventata inter Christum quem exhibet historia et Christum quem accipit fides.

XXIV.

Nequit citari doctrina de Immaculata Conceptione Beatissimae Virginis Mariae ac si exemplum praeberet conclusionis theologicae sensim sine sensu ad dogma revelatum evectae.

XXV.

Ex theoriis quae finem individuorum hominum in utilitate communitatis sive praesenti sive futura reponunt, sequitur personalitatis humanae destructio, necnon iniuriosa illa Status omnipotentia, quam hoderni politici haud quidem pauci adstruere atque inducere nituntur.

XXVI.

Religion, though often imperfectly conceived, is in normal conditions of human existence the inevitable outcome of the use of reason, that is, it is the result of the application of the principle of causality.

XXVII.

The Animist theory for the origin of religion does not seem to be psychologically probable, or historically verifiable.

XXVIII.

In the legitimate cravings of the human heart for communication with God, the theist may find a strong presumptive argument in favor of divine revelation.

XXIX.

The criticism of many contemporary critics, that the moral codes of organized religion cannot satisfy modern needs may be traced to misconceptions both of religion and morality.

XXX.

The Christian idea of immortality cannot be proved to have been borrowed from Mithraism.

XXXI.

The rapid spread of Christianity was due rather to the inherent appeal of Christian doctrine and morality than to any supposed satisfaction of contemporary revolutionary aspirations.

XXXII.

The hierarchical constitution of the Church was not a mere expedient, foreign to the mind of Christ, and evolved to meet social disorders in the Church.

XXXIII.

While historical necessity apparently forces us to conclude that in the beginning "episcopus" and "presbyter" were used synonymously, we do not have to infer that the *offices* which these words have long signified were also regarded as identical.

XXXIV.

The claim of the Bishops of Rome to be the successors of St. Peter, far from being disputed, was recognized by the Church from the earliest times.

XXXV.

Christ intended the Church to be one in space and in time, that is, the Church should have the qualities of catholicity and apostolicity.

XXXVI.

A study of the Prophet Osee does not favor the view that the ethical monotheism of the eighth century was a recent introduction.

XXXVII.

Neither the character of the author, nor the features of style and composition prevent our accepting the Prophecy of Amos as a historical account.

XXXVIII.

The problem of Immanuel in Isaias vii.-viii. cannot be solved by a text-critical study of these chapters alone.

XXXIX.

The critical evidence that we have is not such as to justify the assertion that St. Matthew is not the author of the First Gospel.

XL.

The Neo-Protestant doctrine which admits in Christ's death nothing more than the moral value of an example is opposed to S. Paul's idea of the Atonement as an objectively efficacious Sacrifice.

XLI.

The Catholic doctrine does not conceive natural rights as rights which isolated men possessed in a hypothetical and pre-social state of nature, but as rights innate in the constitution of man, and existing for his welfare.

XLII.

Although natural rights are all equally valid, they differ in regard to their basis, and their urgency and importance.

XLIII.

Private landownership is a natural right because in present conditions the institution is necessary for individual and social welfare.

XLIV.

The modern tendency, observable in much of political and juristic theory, to regard the sovereignty of the State as extending to every kind of act rests on an unwarranted assumption of the moral pre-eminence of the State.

XLV.

The facts of psychology and probable difficulties of administration unite to make the realization of the Socialist scheme of industry undesirable.

XLVI.

Doctrina de Sacramentis in genere nonnisi post multa saecula scientifice per analysim et synthesim expolita est.

XLVII.

Merito damnata fuit a Pio X., in decreto *Lamentabili*¹, propositio xl, qua asseritur quod "Sacramenta ortum habuerunt ex eo, quod Apostoli eorumque successores ideam aliquam et intensionem Christi, suadentibus et moventibus circumstantiis et eventibus, interpretati sunt".

¹ Acta S. Sedis, 3 Iulii, 1907.

XLVIII.

Certum est, tempore quo Novatores prodierunt, dogma de septem sacramentorum existentia, in universa Ecclesia, sive Romana, sive Graeca, per plura saecula iam creditum fuisse; atqui illa fides universalis explicari nequit nisi a traditione apostolica oriatur.

XLIX.

Quod Christus promiserat in capite sexto Ioannis, id fideliter praestitit in ultima coena.

L.

Missa est verum et proprie dictum sacrificium Novae Legis.

LI.

Matrimonii finis primarius est procreatio atque educatio prolis; secundarius mutuum adiutorium et remedium concupiscentiae. (Canon 1013,1.)

LII.

Essentiales matrimonii proprietates sunt unitas ac indissolubilitas, quae in matrimonio christiano peculiarem obtinent firmitatem ratione sacramenti. (Canon 1013,2.)

LIII.

Matrimonii promissio sive unilateralis, sive bilateralis seu sponsalitia, irrita est pro utroque foro, nisi facta fuerit per scripturam subsignatam a partibus et vel a paroco aut loci Ordinario, vel a duobus saltem testibus. (Canon 1017,1.)

LIV.

In mortis periculo validum et licitum est matrimonium contractum coram solis testibus; et etiam extra mortis periculum dummodo prudenter praevideatur eam rerum conditionem esse per mensem duraturam. (Canon 1098,1.)

LV.

Impedimentum affinitatis oritur ex matrimonio valido sive rato tantum sive rato et consummato. (Canon 97,1.)

LVI.

Even though the Christian Religion was primarily preached as a plan of personal salvation, it cannot be said that Christianity has contributed nothing towards social progress.

LVII.

The Church as conceived by Clement of Alexandria is a hierarchical institution.

LVIII.

There is in the writings of St. Cyprian a theory of ecclesiastical unity under the headship of the Bishop of Rome.

LIX.

The view which supposes that prior to the Civil War most of the negroes in the South were Catholic, and that they fell away only through neglect, is erroneous.

LX.




All things considered, the Catholic Church has made during the past twenty years convincing progress among the negroes.



VITA.

Natus sum anno 1889 Philadelphiae. Litterarum elementis in scholis paroecialibus Neo-Eborensis imbutis, in studiis apud scholam Societatis Sancti Ioseph praeparatoriam incubui. Seminarium Baltimoreense, in tutelam Beatae Mariae Virginis commissum, frequentavi ut disciplinis theologicis operam darem; ibidem anno 1915 ad Sacrae Theologiae Baccalaureatum sum proventus. Postremo in civium huius almae Universitatis numerum anno 1915 adscriptus sum, ubi Dr. Shanahan auspiciis theologiae dogmaticae praecipue studiis incubui. Theologiae insuper fundamentalis et sacramentalis disciplinis deditus fui, quarum illam Dr. Aiken hanc Dr. Kennedy me docuit.

His, quos commemoravi, et aliis de me egregie meritis viris doctis, qui summa doctrina atque benevolentia me semper iuverunt, gratias et nunc ago et semper habebo quam possum maximas.



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