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
J. K. Newman, *Editor*

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ILLINOIS
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VOLUME X.1

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J. K. Newman, *Editor*

*Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata;
multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est.
Sen. Epp. 33. 11*

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Contributions should be addressed to:

The Editor,
Illinois Classical Studies,
Department of the Classics,
4072 Foreign Languages Building,
707 South Mathews Avenue,
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Preface

This issue inaugurates the tenth year of our journal, founded in 1976 by Professor Miroslav Marcovich. The Editor and Editorial Committee are grateful to the School of Humanities, and its Director, Professor Nina Baym, for continued interest and support.

Once again, I must thank Mrs. Mary Ellen Fryer for her labors in putting on line our contributors' texts. Mr. Carl Kibler of the Printing Services Office, University of Illinois, supervised the PENTA side of our operations with his usual common sense and perseverance.

Frances Stickney Newman's unceasing toil made the whole thing possible.

J. K. Newman

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1

The Date of Herodotus' Publication

DAVID SANSONE

The *communis opinio* regarding the time at which Herodotus published his researches into the causes and progress of the conflict between the Greeks and the Persians is that the work which we now refer to as *The Histories* was brought before the public between approximately 430 and 425 B.C., the latter date being regarded as a secure *terminus* because of certain alleged references in Aristophanes' *Acharnians*, produced at the Lenaea in that year.¹ This view has recently been challenged by Charles W. Fornara,² who uses arguments both negative and positive to show that Herodotus was still writing his history after 425. On the one hand Fornara argues that the passages in Aristophanes which have been considered to be allusions to Herodotus' work do not in fact presuppose a familiarity with the writings of the historian; on the other he seeks to show that certain passages in Herodotus require the assumption that they were composed late in the decade of the 420s. I should like here to examine Fornara's argument in order to see whether a revision of the traditional view is called for. I will concentrate on one of the passages that Fornara

¹ E.g. F. Jacoby, *RE Suppl.* 2 (1913), col. 232; Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur* I² (Munich 1934), p. 591; J. L. Myres, *Herodotus. Father of History* (Oxford 1953), pp. 15-16; most recently J. Hart, *Herodotus and Greek History* (London 1982), p. 174.

² "Evidence for the date of Herodotus' Publication," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 91 (1971), pp. 25-34 and "Herodotus' Knowledge of the Archidamian War," *Hermes* 109 (1981), pp. 149-56. The latter is in response to criticisms by J. Cobet, *Hermes* 105 (1977), pp. 2-27.

discusses, namely the apparent reference to the first book of Herodotus at *Acharnians* 523 ff., because I believe that it admits of a definitive statement. The lines in question come from Dicaeopolis' great speech in which he justifies his private peace-treaty with the Spartans on the grounds that the Spartans are not wholly responsible for the present hostilities. In giving his version of the origin of the Peloponnesian War Dicaeopolis first recounts the consequences of the Megarian Decree and then continues:

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ σμικρὰ κάπιχώρια
 πόρνην δὲ Σιμαίθην ἰόντες Μεγαράδε
 νειανίαι κλέπτουσι μεθυσκοότταβοι·
 κῆθ' οἱ Μεγαρήs ὀδύνας πεφυσιγγωμένοι
 ἀντεξέκλεψαν Ἀσπασίας πόρνας δύο
 κἀντεῦθεν ἀρχὴ τοῦ πολέμου κατερράγη
 Ἕλλησι πᾶσιν ἐκ τριῶν λαικαστριῶν.

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These lines are regularly regarded as a parody of, or at least an allusion to, the account with which Herodotus opens his history, according to which certain unnamed Persians allegedly attributed the origin of the hostilities between the Greeks and Persians to the series of abductions that involved Io, Europa, Medea and Helen. But those who³ consider the passage in Aristophanes to be a reference to Herodotus tend not to present arguments that would make this assumption convincing, and Fornara deserves credit for insisting⁴ that more is needed than a bald assertion of the comic playwright's dependence upon the historian. Fornara does not commit himself to identifying the reference in Aristophanes' lines—to be fair, Fornara is not concerned to do so, but merely to show that the reference is not to Herodotus—but he does hint at “the obvious possibility that verses 523 ff. allude to the *Telephus* of Euripides.”⁵ Since there are undoubted parodies of the *Telephus* in Dicaeopolis' speech, it is not unreasonable to look to Euripides as the source of these lines in

³ H. Stein *ad Hdt.* I. 4; J. van Leeuwen *ad Ach.* 524 ff.; W. Nestle, *Philologus* 70 (1911), p. 246; W. Rennie *ad Ach.* 528; Jacoby (above, note 1); Schmid-Stählin (above, note 1); J. E. Powell, *The History of Herodotus* (Cambridge 1939), p. 77; Myres (above, note 1); P. Pucci, *Memorie dell' Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei* series 8, vol. 10.5 (1961), p. 283; W. G. Forrest, *Phoenix* 17 (1963), pp. 7–8; P. Rau, *Paratragodia* (Zetemata 45, Munich 1967), p. 40; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1972), p. 240; K. J. Dover, *Aristophanic Comedy* (Berkeley 1972), p. 87; H.-J. Newiger, *Yale Classical Studies* 26 (1980), p. 222; L. Edmunds, *ibid.*, p. 13; Hart (above, note 1), pp. 174–75.

⁴ *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), p. 28 and *Hermes* (above, note 2), pp. 153–55.

⁵ *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), p. 28.

Aristophanes. Indeed, this has been suggested previously but, again, without anything resembling a decisive argument.⁶

How are we to decide, then, whether *Ach.* 523 ff. are a parody of Herodotus or of Euripides' *Telephus*? Let us look first at what we know of the latter, to see whether we can find anything in Euripides' tragedy⁷ that might have prompted these lines. The speech of Dicaeopolis from which the lines come, like the speech of Mnesilochus in *Thesmophoriazusae* (466–519), is obviously based on the speech in Euripides' play in which the disguised hero addresses an audience that is hostile to the argument which he advances. Thus we run the risk of arguing in a circle, since the evidence we must use to reconstruct *Telephus*' speech is precisely the speech of Dicaeopolis, the relationship of which to its original we are seeking to determine. But we are fortunate in possessing the speech of Mnesilochus as well, as it provides us with an independent check on our reconstruction. To begin with, it is safe to assume that those elements which the speeches of Dicaeopolis and Mnesilochus share have a common origin in the speech of Euripides' *Telephus*.⁸ Euripides' hero appeared in disguise, lest the Greeks discover his true identity and recognize his personal motivation in urging the Greeks not to make war. And so Dicaeopolis and (with much greater dramatic relevancy) Mnesilochus deliver their speeches in disguise. Both Aristophanic characters begin their speeches in a similar fashion. Mnesilochus (*Thesm.* 469–70) and Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 509) attempt to ingratiate themselves with their potentially hostile audiences by asserting that they too hate "the enemy," respectively Euripides and the Spartans. Mnesilochus (*Thesm.* 472) and Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 504) further identify themselves with their audience by adopting a confidential tone and saying, in effect, "We are alone. There is no danger that the enemy will find out what we say here. Therefore we can speak frankly." Both Mnesilochus (*Thesm.* 473) and Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 514) do then speak frankly and raise the awkward question of whether "we" are justified in assigning all the blame to "the enemy." The remainder of each speech then consists of the

⁶ E. Schwartz, *Quaestiones Ionicae* (Rostock 1891), p. 10; W. J. M. Starkie *ad Ach.* 524 ff.; A. Rostagni, *Rivista di filologia e di istruzione classica* 5 (1927), pp. 323–27 (although he does not rule out the possibility of Herodotean influence as well).

⁷ For the fragments, see C. Austin, *Nova Fragmenta Euripidea in Papyris Reperta* (Berlin 1968), pp. 66–82. Reconstructions of the play in E. W. Handley and J. Rea, *The Telephus of Euripides* (*Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 5, London 1957); F. Jouan, *Euripide et les légendes des Chants Cypriens* (Paris 1966), pp. 222–44; Rau (above, note 3), pp. 19–50; T. B. L. Webster, *The Tragedies of Euripides* (London 1967), pp. 43–48.

⁸ It does not, of course, follow that elements unique to one speech or the other do not derive from the speech of *Telephus*.

speaker's reasons⁹ for believing that "we" are acting precipitately and for regarding the actions of "the enemy" as justifiable. Mnesilochus ends his speech (*Thesm.* 518–19 = Eur. fr. 711 N) with the rhetorical question, "Why are we angry with Euripides when we have suffered nothing worse than we ourselves have done?" Dicaeopolis ends his (*Ach.* 555–56 = Eur. fr. 710 N) by suggesting that, *mutatis mutandis*, "we" would have acted just as "the enemy" has done.¹⁰

Now, when we attempt to recover the Euripidean original on which Aristophanes' two parodies are modeled, it is essential that we understand who "the enemy" is whose actions Telephus sought to justify. In other words, when Mnesilochus (*Thesm.* 473) asks *τί ταῦτ' ἔχουσαι κείνον αἰτιώμεθα*; and Dicaeopolis (*Ach.* 514) *τί ταῦτα τοὺς Λάκωνας αἰτιώμεθα*; what was the object of the verb in the Euripidean line to which these lines refer? In their reconstruction, based on van de Sande Bakhuyzen, Handley and Rea¹¹ paraphrase this section of Telephus' speech, "Why do we blame Telephus/the Trojans?" But Euripides must have written either the one or the other,¹² and it ought to be possible to decide which. The choice is easy. In the fragments that can be attributed to Telephus' speech, Telephus is named twice (fr. 707 and 710 N), Paris and the Trojans not at all. What Telephus is concerned to do (apart from finding a cure for his wound) is to dissuade the Greeks from attacking his own territory in reprisal for the reverse which they had earlier suffered at his hands. He does this by showing that Telephus was justified in his attack upon the Greeks inasmuch as it was the Greeks who had initiated the hostilities and who had acted wrongly in so doing. Just so Mnesilochus seeks to dissuade the women at the Thesmophoria from attacking Euripides by showing that the women, by their immoral behavior, provoked and deserved Euripides' verbal attacks upon them. And so Dicaeopolis seeks to dissuade the Athenians from prosecuting the war against the Spartans by showing that the Athenians (or, at

⁹ Note γάρ, *Ach.* 515, *Thesm.* 476.

¹⁰ Perhaps Telephus' speech ended:

τὸν δὲ Τήλεφον
οὐκ οἴομεσθα; κῆρα δὴ θυμούμεθα
παθόντες οὐδὲν μείζον ἢ δεδρακότες;

¹¹ Above (note 7), p. 34.

¹² Or, perhaps, "the Mysians" or "Paris." Perhaps merely "the barbarians." Lest anyone suggest, following *Thesm.* 473, that Euripides wrote *τί ταῦτ' ἔχοντες κείνον αἰτιώμεθα*; it should be pointed out that this idiom, which differs from *ἔχω + ptcl.* (W. J. Aerts, *Periphrastica* [Amsterdam 1965], p. 160), does not seem to be tragic and is likely colloquial: *Ar., Av.* 341; *Ecl.* 853; 1151; *Lys.* 945; *Nub.* 131; 509; *Ran.* 202; 512; 524; *Men., Sam.* 719; *Eubul.* 107. 6; *Greek Literary Papyri* 67. 22 Page; *Pl., Euthyd.* 295C; *Gorg.* 490E; 497A; *Phdr.* 236E.

least, some of them) were at fault: first they imposed a boycott upon Megara and then they abducted the Megarian courtesan Simaetha. It is at this point that we are asked to believe that Aristophanes is parodying a passage in Telephus' speech in which "the disguised hero seems to have thrown contempt upon the motives which had induced the Greeks to undertake a campaign against Troy."¹³ That is to say, when Dicaeopolis speaks of the abductions of Athenian and Megarian courtesans, his words are based upon a passage in Euripides' tragedy in which Telephus referred to the abduction of Helen. But this is a specious view for, while Euripidean characters are known to cast discredit upon the causes of wars (and in particular of the Trojan War), there is a fatal objection to the assumption that Telephus included a reference to the rape of Helen. Apart from the fact that, as we saw above, Telephus is concerned to mitigate Greek hostility, not toward the Trojans, but toward himself and the Mysians, mention of Paris' crime can only detract from Telephus' main point, namely that the Greeks were in the wrong.¹⁴ Thus there is no reason to believe that *Ach.* 523 ff. had anything corresponding to it in Euripides' *Telephus*.

But if we can eliminate Euripides, does it follow that *Ach.* 523 ff. are a parody of Herodotus? Obviously it is not a necessary inference and, indeed, other possibilities have been explored. E. Maass¹⁵ implausibly proposed the suggestion that Aristophanes is here parodying Herodotus' source and, more recently, D. M. MacDowell¹⁶ has argued that the lines are not parody at all, but rather represent Aristophanes' comic version of the actual causes of the Peloponnesian War. I am not prepared to argue over the actual causes of the Peloponnesian War, but I do think it worthwhile to quote MacDowell's reasons for denying that Aristophanes is parodying Herodotus:

It is most unlikely that many Athenians were familiar enough with [Herodotus' book] to be able to recognize a parody of one particular part of it unless Aristophanes had given very obvious signals indeed

¹³ Starkie *ad Ach.* 524 ff. Similarly Handley and Rea (above, note 7), p. 35 and Jouan (above, note 7), p. 234.

¹⁴ One could, perhaps, envision Telephus attempting to deflect Greek hostility from the Mysians by convincing the Greeks that the Trojans, not the Mysians, had wronged them. But this is unlikely in view of the fact that Telephus is Priam's son-in-law. Indeed P. Oxy. 2460 fr. 10 seems to preserve part of a scene in which Telephus attempted to avoid acting as the Greeks' guide in their expedition against Troy, presumably on the grounds of his relationship with the Trojan royal family; so Handley and Rea (above, note 7), pp. 7 and 37; Jouan (above, note 7), p. 240; Rau (above, note 3), p. 26.

¹⁵ *Hermes* 22 (1887), pp. 590–91.

¹⁶ *Greece & Rome* 30 (1983), pp. 149–54.

to warn them that a parody of Herodotos was coming. But in fact there are no such signals. Dikaiopolis does not mention the name of Herodotos; nor does he mention the Persians or the Phoenicians or the Trojans or any of the other people who occur in Herodotos' opening pages. He mentions three prostitutes, but that would hardly have made the Athenians think of all those daughters of kings. Above all, Dikaiopolis does not use any Herodotean vocabulary or turns of phrase. Whereas the beginning and end of the speech do quote a few words from Euripides, the middle does not quote any words from Herodotos. There is really nothing in the speech which bears any resemblance to Herodotos at all.¹⁷

MacDowell is right to demand that specific parallels be pointed out, but his final sentence contains a considerable exaggeration. For surely it must be considered a "resemblance" between *Ach.* 523 ff. and *Hdt.* I. 1–4 that both attribute the origin of a great war to the abduction of a woman *and to the subsequent abduction of two further women*.¹⁸ For, according to the Persians whom Herodotos cites, the barbarians first abducted Io and, later, the Greeks abducted Europa and Medea. Aristophanes comically transforms these daughters of kings into three harlots, making the causes of the war even more ludicrous. As far as verbal similarity is concerned, it is not true that "Dikaiopolis does not use any Herodotean vocabulary or turns of phrase." The resemblance between *Hdt.* I. 2. 1 (ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἴσα πρὸς ἴσα σφι γενέσθαι μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα . . .) and *Ach.* 523–24 (καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ σμικρὰ κάπιχώρια πόρνην δὲ . . .) has often been noted, but its real significance has not been recognized. For the particle combination μὲν δὴ is quite rare in Aristophanes.¹⁹ While the word δὴ itself occurs some three hundred times in Aristophanes, I am able to find it following μέν only here and in four other places. And the combination is used in a way that is, if not unparalleled in Aristophanes, at least strikingly unusual. It is here, to quote Starkie's note *ad loc.*, "used in summing up, so as to pass on to another subject." It is not so used at *Thesm.* 805, where its use is characterized by Denniston (above, note 19)

¹⁷ MacDowell (previous note), p. 151. Similarly Fornara, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), p. 28: "there is no trace of verbal similarity. Yet I think that we have a right to expect it in a case such as this."

¹⁸ This point, which also tells decisively against the view that we are here dealing with an Aristophanic reference to Euripides' *Telephus*, was first made by G. Perrotta, on page 108 of an article that is too rarely consulted in this connection: "Erodoto parodiato da Aristofane," *Rendiconti dell' Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere* 59 (1926), pp. 105–14. Cobet (above, note 2), p. 11 note 46 also rightly points out that this motif is attested only in Aristophanes and Herodotos.

¹⁹ *Ach.* 523 is the only example cited from Aristophanes by J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (2nd ed. Oxford 1954), p. 258.

396 as “progressive,” nor at *Plut.* 728–29, where we find *καὶ πρῶτα μὲν δὴ . . . ἔπειτα*. In *νῦν μὲν γὰρ δὴ* (*Lys.* 557) the *δὴ* is not to be taken with *μὲν*; rather it emphasizes *γὰρ*, as in Xenophanes I. 1 West *νῦν γὰρ δὴ*.²⁰ The only real parallel in Aristophanes for the usage at *Ach.* 523 is to be found at *Plut.* 8: *καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ταῦτα. τῷ δὲ Λοξία. . .* On the evidence of [Aesch.] *P. V.* 500, Hdt. I. 94. 1 and III. 108. 4, however, this may represent a common, stereotyped expression.

So the phrasing of *Ach.* 523 stands out as being uncharacteristic of Aristophanes. But, uncommon as the usage is in the comic poet, “*μὲν δὴ* is frequently used by the historians,” according to Denniston (above, note 19), “as a formula of transition, the *μὲν* clause often summing up the preceding section of the narrative.” Denniston cites seven passages from Herodotus, five from Thucydides and one from Xenophon. We are fortunate to possess J. E. Powell’s reliable *Lexicon to Herodotus*, which informs us exactly how frequent the combination is.²¹ Not only is the combination exceedingly common in the historian but, with Powell’s help, it does not take us long to discover that its most common use, as at I. 2. 1, is as a formula of transition.²² That this is a characteristically Herodotean locution is made even clearer by a comparison of the usage of the fifth-century tragedians. The combination *μὲν δὴ* occurs only ten times in the surviving works of each of the three dramatists,²³ and in only a handful of instances (e.g. Aesch. *Pers.* 200, Eur. *Alc.* 156, *Hec.* 603, *Suppl.* 456, *Hel.* 761) is it employed as a formula of transition. Therefore, while we cannot say that, when he uses the combination at *Ach.* 523, Aristophanes is “parodying” Hdt. I. 2. 1, it is fair to say that he is using a characteristically and recognizably Herodotean idiom. And this, combined with the fact that the idiom does occur in the passage concerned with reciprocal abductions and with the fact that the motif of reciprocal abductions is known to occur only in Herodotus and Aristophanes, makes all but inescapable the conclusion that the poet is parodying the historian’s account of the origin of the hostilities between Greeks and barbarians.

But this is not in the least surprising. For there is other (although, I believe, less convincing) evidence in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes’

²⁰ For *γὰρ δὴ* see Denniston (previous note), p. 243.

²¹ Cambridge 1938. Under the heading *δὴ* A.III we find that Herodotus uses the combination *μὲν δὴ* 390 times.

²² In the first 20 pages of Book I alone: 2. 1; 9. 1; 11. 1; 14. 1; 21. 1; 26. 3; 32. 1; 36. 1.

²³ In Aeschylus only *Pers.* 200, *Eum.* 106 and fr. 102 M without a preceding *γε*; in Sophocles only *Ant.* 150, 162, *Phil.* 350 and 1308 without a preceding *ἀλλά*.

knowledge of Herodotus' work.²⁴ And there is also good reason to believe that, in his *Cresphontes*, a tragedy which was produced at about the same time as *Acharnians*, Euripides was influenced by a passage in Herodotus' fifth book.²⁵ Finally, Fornara presents an excellent argument to the effect that Herodotus' influence is to be found in Euripides' *Electra*.²⁶ Now, Fornara believes that this play was produced in 414 B.C., which date gives no more support to his view that Herodotus' history was published at the end of the Archidamian War than it does to the traditional view, that it was published in the first half of the 420s. But in fact, to date *Electra* to 413 or 414 is to ignore the potent arguments of G. Zuntz,²⁷ who shows that the play belongs rather in the period 422–416. Thus we have a fair amount of evidence for the influence of Herodotus on works of literature produced in the decade between 426 and 416 B.C. Fornara dismisses this evidence because, as he believes, Herodotus was still writing his history at the time of the Peace of Nicias. But what Fornara and, in his attack on Fornara, Cobet fail to perceive is that there is no inconsistency between Herodotus' influence on works written around 425 and his continuing to write after 421. The passages in *Acharnians* which are likely to be references to Herodotus are references to Book I. Fornara plausibly explains Euripides' reference to Helen at *El.* 1280–83 as inspired by Herodotus' account of Helen in Book II. Euripides' *Cresphontes* alludes to a Herodotean passage in Book V. It is not necessary to reject this evidence and all that it implies in order to accept Fornara's view that Herodotus refers in his history to events that occurred after 424. According to Fornara, Herodotus included a passage that "was written after the death of Artaxerxes and very probably after 421" in Book VI; he refers to the Athenian occupation of Cythera (424) in Book VII; he implies that the Archidamian War

²⁴ See, in addition to the works cited in note 3 above, Perrotta (above, note 18) and, especially, J. Wells, *Studies in Herodotus* (Oxford 1923), pp. 169–82.

²⁵ Compare Eur. fr. 449 N with Hdt. V. 4. 2. The cogent arguments by R. Browning (*Classical Review* 11 [1961], pp. 201–02) for Euripides' dependence are rejected on insufficient grounds by Fornara, *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), p. 25 note 3. For the date of *Cresphontes*, see Webster (above, note 7), p. 137; V. di Benedetto, *Euripide. Teatro e società* (Turin 1971), pp. 133–35; O. Musso, *Euripide. Cresfonte* (Milan 1974), p. xxvii. All date the play sometime in the period 428–423 B.C.

²⁶ *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), pp. 30–31. His view of the date of Eur., *El.*: p. 30 note 12.

²⁷ *The Political Plays of Euripides* (Manchester 1955), pp. 64–71. Most scholars now share Zuntz's view; see A. Lesky, *Die tragische Dichtung der Hellenen* (3rd ed. Göttingen 1972), pp. 392–93, with bibliography. *Electra* is associated with *Cresphontes* on metrical and thematic grounds: Webster (above, note 7), pp. 4, 136 ff.

had come to an end by the time he wrote Book IX.²⁸ If Fornara is right,²⁹ we need only believe that a portion of Herodotus' history equivalent to what we now know as the first four books and the beginning of the fifth was written and "published" before the mid-420s B.C., and that Herodotus continued to compose and make available to the public the remainder of his history, "in substantially the same order in which we now have it,"³⁰ until some time around the end of the Archidamian War.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

²⁸ See *Journal of Hellenic Studies* (above, note 2), pp. 32–34; *Hermes* (above, note 2), pp. 149–51.

²⁹ I must admit that I find decision difficult. On these three passages, see also J. A. S. Evans, *Athenaeum* 57 (1979), pp. 146–47, who is less convinced than is Fornara of the unambiguousness of the evidence. Recently R. Meridor (*Eranos* 81 [1983], pp. 13–20) has plausibly shown that certain elements of the plot of Euripides' *Hecuba* (produced before 423 B.C.; for the date, see Lesky [above, note 27], p. 330) were suggested to the poet by events that occurred in Sestos after the end of the Persian War, when Xanthippus allowed the people of Elaeus to punish the Persian Artayctes. If she is right to argue that Euripides knew of these events from reading of them in Herodotus (IX. 116–20), then we are forced to admit that the final section (and, therefore, perhaps all) of Herodotus' work was published before the mid-420s. But it is not unlikely that this anecdote concerning Pericles' father circulated in Athens in versions other than that of Herodotus.

³⁰ R. Lattimore, *Classical Philology* 53 (1958), p. 18.

2

How Did Pelasgians Become Hellenes? Herodotus I. 56–58

R. A. McNEAL

These chapters are a nightmare. Anyone who comes unwarned upon Herodotus' first ethnographic digression is bound to share Reiske's despairing judgment: "Haec de vetusta nationum duarum principum Graeciam incolentium origine narratio obscura, intricata et inconstans maleque cohaerens esse videtur."¹ Suddenly the sunlit landscape of the tale of Croesus disappears, and we are plunged into the fog and quicksand of an antiquarian mire. What is wrong? Clearly Herodotus is none too precise about his theories. This much it may be fair to say. But these chapters also bristle with major textual and grammatical problems.

This paper is a discussion of four separate topics: textual emendation, narrative structure, vocabulary and grammar, and Herodotus' own logic. What ties all these topics together is their relevance to internal criticism, that is, the establishment of the text. What, in short, does the text say?

Apart from trying to clarify an important but very difficult passage, I want to emphasize the necessity of recognizing internal and external criticism as separate operations. To establish a text is one thing; to discuss its significance in the light of other sources is something else. The historian can of course be his own textual critic; but the editing of a text has to precede its use as a historical document. Failure to

¹ J. J. Reiske, *Animadversionum ad Graecos Auctores*, Vol. III (Lipsiae 1761), p. 87.

make this distinction has caused unnecessary problems in the interpretation of chapters 56–58.

1. *The Initial Antithesis*

The first problem (56. 2) has been recently treated elsewhere.² We are to read ταῦτα γὰρ ἦν τὰ προκεκριμένα <ἔθνεα> τὸ ἀρχαῖον, τὸ μὲν Πελασγικόν, τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔθνος.

Croesus discovered that the Spartans and the Athenians were the most powerful peoples of Greece, the former Doric and the latter Ionic. “The Spartans and Athenians were of old the pre-eminent nations, the one Pelasgian, the other Hellenic. The former never migrated, but the latter moved a good deal.” This reading involves (1) Porson’s substitution of ἔθνεα for ἔοντα and (2) the use of the medieval punctuation.³

Herodotus gets off to a bad start by insisting on an antithesis which is dubious at best and which even he will shortly confound. The Spartans were Doric, Hellenic, and migratory. The Athenians were Ionian, Pelasgian, and stationary. The repeated τὸ μὲν refers first to the Athenians, then to the Athenians who were once Pelasgians.

Despite some good arguments in favor of this interpretation of τὸ μὲν, the best argument remains to be made. Lines 23–27 of Hude’s Oxford text show a carefully contrived chiasmic structure which immediately explains the seeming difficulties of reference beginning with τὸ μὲν Πελασγικόν.

- A: Lacedaemonians
- B: Athenians
- A: Doric
- B: Ionic
- B: Pelasgian
- A: Hellenic
- B: Stationary
- A: Migratory

Chapters 56–69 constitute a so-called digression embedded within the logos of Croesus. Having mentioned the result of Croesus’ inquiries, that is, the conclusion of the story, Herodotus goes backward to sketch the historical events which will justify his statement that, in Croesus’ time, the Spartans and Athenians were the most powerful

² R. A. McNeal, “Herodotus 1.56: A Trio of Textual Notes,” *American Journal of Philology* 102 (1981), pp. 359–61, where see relevant bibliography.

³ J. W. Blakesley, *Herodotus* (London 1854), p. 37, makes a simple transposition: τὰ προκεκριμένα τὸ ἀρχαῖον, ἔοντα κτλ.

of the Greek peoples. Retrospective narrative, as van Groningen has called it,⁴ begins with the end point and then works forward. By its very nature the narrative assumes a circular form, beginning where it ends. Thus in chapter 69 Croesus, having learned why the Spartans because of their past were more powerful than the Athenians, concludes an alliance with them. The narrative then resumes the statement of events in their proper temporal sequence.

But chapters 56–58 play a special part in this narrative. A. G. Laird deserves credit for having seen this point over fifty years ago.⁵ Chapters 59–64 give us a tale of the establishment of Peisistratos' tyranny at Athens, and 65–68 the early history of Sparta. Chapters 56–58 form an introduction to this larger digression. Having established an initial antithesis in 56. 1–2, Herodotus expands this antithesis twice, once in 56. 3–58 and again in 59–68. The following pattern emerges:

- A: Primitive Dorian movements: 56. 3
- B: Primitive times in Athens: 57–58
- B: Peisistratos' tyranny: 59–64
- A: Early Sparta: 65–68

The early wanderings of the Hellenes who were to become Spartans follow directly on the statement that the Dorians were migratory. Then, abruptly shifting to the second term of his antithesis, Herodotus speculates on the original language of the Pelasgians, some of whom would become Athenians: ἤντινα δὲ γλώσσαν κτλ. All of chapters 57 and 58 refers to the Pelasgians and their relationship with the early Athenians. There is no question of original Hellenes becoming Pelasgian, or of the Dorians as a whole emerging from some barbaric Pelasgian ancestry.

2. *Creston / Croton*

The major difficulty with the start of chapter 57 is the vexed question of Πελασγῶν τῶν ὑπὲρ Τυρσηνῶν Κρηστώννα πόλιν οἰκούντων. Dissatisfaction with the state of the text began at least as early as the sixteenth century, and it is not hard to see why. Herodotus himself always uses Τυρσηνοί to refer to Etruscans in Italy. If we read Κρότωνα, or Κροτώννα, that is Cortona in Etruria, then his Pelasgians are to be thought of as having migrated in the past to Italy, where they

⁴ B. A. van Groningen, *La Composition Littéraire Archaique Grecque* (Amsterdam 1958), esp. pp. 57–58.

⁵ A. G. Laird, "Herodotus on the Pelasgians in Attica," *American Journal of Philology* 54 (1933), pp. 97–119.

maintained their non-Greek language down to the fifth century.⁶ Thus Herodotus' use of "Tyrsenians" can be made consistent.

But the argument from internal consistency cuts two ways. Though there is no mention of a town of Creston in Thrace which must be wholly independent of Herodotus, the historian himself does elsewhere mention a town of Creston in Thrace (V. 3) and says that Xerxes' army twice passed through Thracian Crestonia, which lay east of Mygdonia and the river Echeidorus (VII. 124; VIII. 116). These statements at least are quite compatible with a Thracian Creston in chapter 57. And of course Thucydides, who knew the north Aegean well, says specifically (IV. 109) that the Crestonians living in Thrace were Pelasgian and Tyrrhenian.

The major reason why editors want to change the text of Herodotus is to bring it into conformity with that of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (I. 28 and 29).⁷ Dionysius, in discussing the origins of the Etruscans, quotes Hellanicus, who, in his *Phoronis*, had equated the Pelasgians and Etruscans (fr. 4). Having been expelled from Greece, the Pelasgians captured the city of Croton, from which they began their settlement of the country now called Tyrrhenia. Presumably Herodotus, though he prefers to derive the Etruscans from Lydia (I. 94), had some knowledge of Hellanicus' view that the Pelasgians once lived in Thessaly and migrated to Italy. Hence the text of Herodotus must have read "Croton" and "Crotoniatai."

This line of argument is perverse. Herodotus nowhere else mentions the town of Croton in Etruria and nowhere else says anything about Pelasgians migrating to Etruria. Indeed, the Lydians under Tyrsenus came "to the Umbrians." If Herodotus is going to be made a partner with Hellanicus in the equation of Pelasgians and Etruscans, some rather dubious assumptions have to be made about the relationship of their texts in antiquity. To say that the reading of Herodotus ". . . deriva evidentemente da una correzione forse ancora ignorata o giustamente repudiata da Dionigi, sotto l'influenza del luogo di Thucydide IV, 109 . . ." ⁸ is to resort to purely futile speculation. We simply have no knowledge of the history of either

⁶ H. Stephanus (ed.), *Herodoti Historiarum Libri IX*² (Paris 1592), p. 23. "Crotona" and "Crotoniatai" appear only in the marginal commentary to the Latin translation which accompanies the Greek text.

⁷ Lionel Pearson, *Early Ionian Historians* (Oxford 1959), p. 158; F. de Ruyt, "La citation d'Hérodote, I, 57 par Denys d'Halicarnasse, I, 29, au sujet de Crotona pélasgique et des Étrusques," *L'Antiquité Classique* 7 (1958), pp. 281-90; V. Costanzi, "Cortona non Crestona presso Erodoto I,57," *Athenaeum* N.S. 6 (1928), pp. 205-14. Both articles have full bibliography.

⁸ Costanzi, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-06.

text before the Middle Ages (papyrus fragments do not affect the argument here), and it makes no sense to say that a manuscript of the one author was used at some time in antiquity to "correct" and thereby falsify a manuscript of the other author. The only reasonable course is to leave Herodotus' "Creston" alone unless there is some legitimate palaeographical reason for making a change.

Mere internal consistency will not suffice as a reason since, as I have already indicated, Herodotus will be inconsistent with some other part of his text in either case. Indeed, his carelessness in matters of consistency is so notorious that few readers will be troubled by one more nod.

There is of course no manuscript evidence for anything but "Creston." MS b does read Κρητῶνα. Though perhaps a falsification of "Croton," this is just as likely a mistake for "Creston." Thus there is no help here.

Changing the text to make it refer to Italy is the usual course; but some historians, who accept Thrace, still want to introduce unnecessary emendations. Reiske set the fashion for this alternative by reading ὑπὲρ Γυρτηνῶν, a city in Macedonia.⁹

What this textual crux illustrates very well is one of the more dubious legacies of the Lachmannian school of editing—the tendency, one might almost say the psychological need—to force a text into submission at all costs. Not content to leave a problem unresolved, the radical critic rushes to bend the text into compliance with predetermined views. Readers who are willing in this case at least to tolerate a measure of ambiguity are in the minority.¹⁰

3. Fifth-century Pelasgians

Whatever position one takes on the problem of Creston, this textual crux has no real bearing on the logic of the chapter. Herodotus sets

⁹ Reiske, *loc. cit.* The following are desperately and needlessly elaborate attempts to save the manuscripts' "Creston": H. Riedel, "Ad Locum Herodoti 1.57," *Neue Jahrbücher für Philologie und Paedagogik* 4 (1836), p. 594, who omits ὑπὲρ; E. Schwartz, *Quaestiones Herodoteae* (Rostock 1890), p. 7, who reads ὑπὲρ (Μυγδονίης χώρας); W. Christ, "Griechische Nachrichten über Italien," *Sitz. d. phil. und hist. Klasse bay. Akad. der Wissens. zu München* (1905), pp. 92–95, who omits ὑπὲρ Τυρσηνῶν as a gloss; Erik Wikén, "Τυρσηνοί bei Herodot 1.57," *Hermes* 73 (1938), pp. 129–32, who understands Τυρσηνοί as the inhabitants of Mygdonian Τίρσαι, but does not change the text's Τυρσηνῶν.

¹⁰ A. della Seta, "Erodoto ed Ellanico sull' origine degli Etrusci," *Rendiconti dell' Accademia dei Lincei* 28 (1919), pp. 173–82, gives a number of complex arguments for the retention of the manuscript reading. Also in favor of retention is J. Bérard, "La question des origines étrusques," *Revue des Études Anciennes* 51 (1949), p. 218.

out to make a linguistic judgment on the basis of *two* groups of fifth-century Pelasgians: (1) τῶν . . . Κρηστώννα . . . οἰκούντων: those of Creston, who once were neighbors of the present Dorians when the Dorians still inhabited Thessaliotis (here Herodotus gives the Dorians a name which, by his own admission, they did not have until they had entered the Peloponnesus!); and (2) τῶν Πλακίην τε καὶ Σκυλάκην . . . οἰκησάντων:¹¹ the settlers of Plakie and Skylake on the Hellespont, who were once dwellers with the Athenians and (with) other communities which, though once Pelasgian, changed their name.

A serious grammatical problem is involved with ὄσα ἄλλα Πελασγικὰ . . . μετέβαλε. All modern editors take the first three words as the equivalent of ἄλλων πολισμάτων and make the clause a *third* group of fifth-century Pelasgians. Supposedly Herodotus is also including in his linguistic judgment some other groups of Pelasgian speakers whose position he does not specify. Thus ὄσα ἄλλα . . . πολισμάτα is effectively a third genitive dependent on τοῖσι νῦν ἔτι ἐούσι.

But this reading is wrong. Herodotus is saying that, just as some Pelasgians moved away from the Athenians, who then changed their name, so other Pelasgians lived elsewhere in the southern Aegean in the early days and retreated, allowing their former communities to take on a new character and new names. The Peloponnesus, for example, was once full of Pelasgians. The Arcadians too were once Pelasgian, but changed their name and language (I. 146). Herodotus seems to be consistent in his view that ancient Pelasgia, or what would become the later Greece, had many communities which, like Athens, were to see far-reaching ethnic changes with the appearance of the Hellenes.

The phrase ὄσα ἄλλα . . . πολισμάτα is the equivalent of ἄλλοις πολισμάσι ὄσα and ought to be connected closely with Ἴ�θηναίοισι.

4. *The Mechanism of Cultural Change*

Herodotus' second group of Pelasgians, the settlers of Plakie and Skylake, is the source of much trouble. What relationship had these Pelasgians with the Athenians, with whom they once dwelt?

This second group, originally resident in the south Aegean, was pushed aside by the arriving Hellenes; and some of them went to the north Aegean, where Herodotus found their descendants in his

¹¹ The MSS read τὴν Πλακίην. P. Wesseling, *Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum Libri IX* (Lugdunum Batavorum 1763), p. 26, prefers <τῶν> τὴν Π. P. P. Dobree, *Adversaria*, ed. by G. Wagner, (Berlin 1874), pp. 1-2, suggests τῶν Π. The latter is the modern consensus.

own time. The Pelasgians of Plakie and Skylake had come *from* Athens, where they had resided for some unspecified time.¹² The inhabitants of Athens before this departure were autochthonous, that is, Pelasgian and non-Greek. A body of them went off to the north Aegean, where they and their descendants maintained their aboriginal character and language in foreign surroundings right down to the fifth century. But the inhabitants of Athens, presumably because of the contact which they had with the Hellenes who came to live with them, adopted a Greek character. This change involved language of course, but it must have involved much else. Unfortunately Herodotus does not specify what else the change consisted in.

Over against this idea must be set the words οἱ σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο Ἀθηναίοισι. This clause is totally at variance with the notion of a unified body of autochthonous Pelasgian Athenians. Indeed, Herodotus seems to be thinking of two separate groups of people. The Pelasgians are almost resident aliens. Precisely the same confused interpretation appears in II. 51. 2, where the Pelasgians “dwell with” the Athenians, just as the latter are passing into the Hellenic body: Ἀθηναίοισι γὰρ ἤδη τηνικαῦτα ἐς Ἑλληνας τελέουσι Πελασγοὶ σύνοικοι ἐγένοντο ἐν τῇ χώρῃ, ὅθεν περ καὶ Ἑλληνες ἤρξαντο νομισθῆναι.

Herodotus is inconsistent about the Pelasgian background of the Athenians. He is probably conflating different traditions without reconciling them, something which he does often enough elsewhere. The notion of Pelasgians as a distinctly separate group of resident aliens appears again in greater detail at VI. 137, where there is no question of a unified Athenian population, some part of which departed from the main body for a new home in the northern Aegean. In Book VI Herodotus clearly thinks that the Pelasgians were a separate population of guest workers, however autochthonous, and were then expelled because of their rapacious behavior. That I. 57 and VI. 137 should give different versions of the Athenians' Pelasgian past is no surprise. What is surprising is the confusion which runs through the relatively short account in chapter 57: within the space of four lines appear two separate definitions of “Pelasgian.”

5. *The Meaning of τὸ Ἑλληνικόν*

The next major problem is the subject of the participle ἀποσχισθέν. This participle must refer to τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, since no other subject is introduced after the start of the chapter. But what is meant by τὸ Ἑλληνικόν? Since at least the time of Valla's Latin translation of 1474,

¹² Laird, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

the phrase has been universally understood to mean “the Greek nation,” or “the Greeks.” But it really means “the Greek part,” or “element.” And yet “the Greek part” of what? Surely Herodotus means the Greek-speaking Athenians. The population consisted of an aboriginal part which spoke a Pelasgian language and an intrusive Greek-speaking part. With the departure of at least some of the Pelasgians, the population as a whole came to speak and to be Greek. Thus a Pelasgian town became Hellene. Herodotus refers to the Athenians in their new role as Hellenes. After the departure of the Pelasgians, the Athenians were weak, but later grew in numbers and power. Laird is right to say that we do not have here a digression on the growth of the Hellenic people generally, but we are dealing with an increase in the power of the Athenians prior to the time of internal strife and the foundation of the tyranny.¹³ Thus chapter 58 is concerned with the Athenian half of the introductory antithesis, not with the Spartan half. There is no question here of a discussion of the Dorians or of *their* supposed origin from a Pelasgian people.

Indeed, Herodotus nowhere derives the true (that is, original) Hellenes from a barbarian background. They are remarkably pure in their origins. Except for the Cynurians (VIII. 73), the Dorians do not attach to themselves any barbarian peoples.

That the phrase τὸ Ἑλληνικόν is partitive, that it can include more or fewer Greeks as the context demands, is evident from the difficult and commonly misinterpreted sentence in I. 60. 3: ἐπεὶ γε ἀπεκρίθη ἐκ παλαιτέρου τοῦ βαρβάρου ἔθνος τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἔδν καὶ δεξιώτερον καὶ εὐθήης ἡλιθίου ἀπηλλαγμένον μᾶλλον (“they contrived a device by far the silliest that I can discover since the time when, in the distant past, τὸ Ἑλληνικόν was distinguished from the barbarian nation by being [ἔδν] more clever and more free from idle folly”). The correct interpretation in this sentence is not “the Greek nation” as a whole, but “the Greek part” of the Athenians. The Athenians’ separation from the Pelasgians (βαρβάρου ἔθνος) set them on the road to greater cleverness. One can expect folly from barbarians, but not from Athenians once they transcended their barbarian origins.¹⁴

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁴ I follow the reading of MS b and of Aldus, which is the modern consensus. The Florentine MS A, together with P and c, gives τὸ βάρβαρον ἔθνος τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ, which must be wrong. Whatever credit Herodotus gives the barbarians, he does not believe that they are superior in intelligence to the Greeks. In this regard Paul Shorey, “A Note on Herodotus I.60,” *Classical Philology* 15 (1920), pp. 88–91, rightly refutes Wilamowitz. But Shorey’s interpretation of the final clause of the sentence (αἱ καὶ τότε γε οὗτοι ἐν Ἀθηναίοισι τοῖσι πρώτοισι λεγομένοισι εἶναι Ἑλλήνων σοφίην μηχανῶνται τοιάδε) is strangely labored. Believing, as many do, that ἐπεὶ γε is causal, he makes αἱ

6. *A Case for Editorial Conservatism*

If the issue of τὸ Ἑλληνικόν is satisfactorily resolved, there remains one last major textual problem. I give below the readings of the two important manuscripts A and b, just as the relevant text appears. The Roman family of manuscripts, chiefly D and R, omits this part of the *Histories*.

- A. αὔξηται ἐς πλῆθος τῶν ἐθνέων πολλῶν μάλιστα προσκεχωρηκότων αὐτῷ καὶ ἄλλων ἐθνέων βαρβάρων συχνῶν
 b. αὔξηται ἐς πλῆθος τῶν ἐθνέων πολλῶν μάλιστα προσκεχωρηκότων αὐτῷ· καὶ ἄλλων ἐθνέων βαρβάρων συχνῶν

Aldus has the same text as b, but replaces the first two upper, or full, stops with commas. This text continued to be printed until Gronovius' edition of 1715, when the comma after πλῆθος was placed, for no reason that I can discover in Gronovius' notes, after πολλῶν.¹⁵

Modern attempts to improve the text fall into three main categories: (1) Matthiae's simple deletion of τῶν ἐθνέων πολλῶν as a gloss of ἐθνέων βαρβάρων συχνῶν; (2) Reiske's ἐς πλῆθος ἐθνέων πολλὸν μάλιστα, προσκεχωρηκότων κτλ.; and (3) Sauppe's ἐς πλῆθος ἐθνέων πολλῶν, <Πελασγῶν> μάλ. προσ. κτλ., a course adopted by Stein and Hude. Legrand inserts Πελασγῶν before πολλῶν.¹⁶

Sauppe's option, which is the modern consensus, is the most violent. The fact that it has no manuscript support is perhaps the best argument against it. But the redefined subject of διαχρᾶται, ἀποσχισθῆν, αὔξηται provides further ground for rejecting Πελασγῶν. Is Hero-

καὶ . . . τοιάδε a second and even stronger confirmation of the judgment implied in εὐθρόστατον. The clause αὐ καὶ . . . τοιάδε is supposed to mean "inasmuch as." This clause does mark even stronger surprise or indignation on the part of Herodotus. But *both* clauses are temporal. Reiske at least understood this point, though he unnecessarily wanted to emend ἐπέ γε to ἐπέτε (loc. cit.). How absurd, says Herodotus, if even then [at a time when the Greek element had long been separated], the Peisistratidai could concoct such a scheme in the hope of deceiving the Athenians, said to be foremost in wisdom among the Greeks.

¹⁵ Aldus Manutius (ed.), *Herodotou Logoi Ennea* (Venice 1502); J. Gronovius (ed.), *Herodoti Halicarnassei Historiarum Libri IX* (Lugdunum Batavorum 1715). The notes are more readily accessible in Wesseling, *op. cit.*, p. 62 (Notae Gronovii).

¹⁶ Reiske, *loc. cit.*; Aug. Matthiae & Henr. Apetzius (eds.), *Herodoti Historiarum Libri IX* (Lipsiae 1825–26), Vol. II, p. 286; H. Stein (ed.), *Herodotos*⁵, Vol. I (Berlin 1901 [1869]); C. Hude (ed.), *Herodoti Historia*³, Vol. I (Oxford 1927); Ph.-E. Legrand (ed.), *Hérodote, Histoires*, Vol. I, Clío (Paris 1932). The reading which Stein first attributes to H. Sauppe is, I presume, correct. But herein lies a problem. Despite long effort, I could not verify this attribution in those of Sauppe's works available to me. Given the mass of his writings and their obscure locations, this failure is not surprising. But Stein surely knew whereof he spoke.

dotus telling us that, *after* the initial departure from Athens of the Pelasgians, the Athenians grew powerful because of the adhesion of more Pelasgian tribes? He may imply such an idea because the terms "Pelasgian" and "barbarian" have a habit of being synonymous for him. But he nowhere states specifically that the Athenians themselves later gained Pelasgian adherents after passing into the ranks of the Hellenes.¹⁷ He does say that the Ionians as a whole (I. 146) were a notoriously motley group who had all sorts of diverse origins, but the Hellenized Pelasgians who constituted the population of Athens grew to power precisely in proportion as they gave up their Pelasgian-barbarian character and language. The point which Herodotus seems to want to make is that after the Pelasgians' departure, still other barbarians helped the Athenian people to grow. Who were they? He does not say. But Sauppe's Πελασγῶν is misleading and unnecessary.

The most conservative editorial treatment of this passage (and the best way to deal with it) would do no more than enclose the words τῶν through μάλιστα in daggers to alert the reader to a possible crux. The corruption, if corruption there really is, lies here.¹⁸

But can we do any better? I suggest the following: ἐς πλῆθος τὸ <νῦν ἔτι> πολλόν, μάλιστα κτλ. As a variant of Reiske's solution, this conjecture tries to remove the dubious τῶν ἐθνέων and to change the punctuation to show just how Herodotus understood μάλιστα.

If one keeps the manuscript reading of A and b, then the words τῶν ἐθνέων, the worst problem, must be either dependent on πλῆθος or they must be the first part of a compound subject in a genitive absolute. In either case ἐθνέων has to be explained. What are these many mysterious tribes which have attached themselves to the Hellene-Athenians? Herodotus nowhere mentions them, and a search through the tangle of Athenian mythology will not reveal them. Of course precisely the same argument can be applied against ἄλλων ἐθνέων βαρβάρων. These tribes too must remain a mystery, whatever we do with the preceding words. Even Sauppe's conjecture will not solve this latter problem.

¹⁷ Laird, *op. cit.*, *passim*, is correct to dismiss the theory of Myres and Meyer that there was a late Pelasgian migration *into* Attica, after the departure of some of the autochthonous inhabitants. Herodotus at least nowhere says that Pelasgians *came* to Attica. The theory of Myres can be traced at least as far back as H. Riedel, *op. cit.*, p. 592.

¹⁸ I include the adverb only because E. Powell, *Herodotus* (Oxford 1949), Vol. II, p. 688, wants to omit it. I find nothing offensive in its presence.

7. Conclusion

This journey through the wastes of textual criticism may bore the historian, but it is necessary to go back to basics if we are to have any hope of understanding this digression. I have tried to assemble the evidence, and in particular to see how the text has been interpreted over the centuries. Apart from playing the antiquarian, I have set out the possible avenues which alternative explanations might take.

Implicit in this handling of the evidence is a very conservative editorial method: the text should be left alone, even at the expense of ambiguity, unless there are good *palaeographical* reasons for making changes.

What has emerged from an analysis of the textual problems and of Herodotus' own logic are some ethnographical theories which may not suit our own modern taste. Herodotus gets himself into verbal difficulties because on the one hand he wants to establish an antithesis between Spartans and Athenians and carry it into the distant past, and because on the other hand he has to square this contrast with the respective traditions of these two peoples. Autochthonous Pelasgian Athenians must somehow become Greek. They do so by adopting the new language of the intrusive Hellenes. As for the Hellenes themselves, they were always, since the time of their divine and heroic begetters, a recognizable body of people. As flawed as these ideas may be, we should at least accord Herodotus the credit which he deserves for a truly intelligent and honest inquiry, in the best Ionian tradition, into what clearly was for him a very difficult problem. The wonder is that he managed as well as he did.

Northwestern University

3

Particular and General in Thucydides

ALBERT COOK

1

Herodotus disentangled prose sufficiently from myth, setting Thucydides a standard of comprehensiveness and purity that he could better only by a more rigorous purity. If indeed Herodotus is included in the nameless writers whose principles he abjures (I. 20–22), he abjures not all of Herodotus, but rather, among other things, Herodotus' penchant for the exotic and for *faits divers*. Thucydides' pejorative for him, *μυθῶδες*, “story-like” or “mythy,” can certainly be stretched to cover Herodotus' sense. It is because he exercises a somewhat loose control on particulars that with Herodotus, or those like him, the details “prevail into the mythy.”

Thucydides states, as he inserts his statement of principles between the “Archaeology” and the account of the war, that he rests upon inference (*tekmēvion*),¹ and also on inference with a rigorous linear connection to his subject, “all inferential data in order” (*παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ*, literally, “every datum”). “All” points out explicitly that every particular detail is sifted, taken with “inferential data.” Taken

¹ A. W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1959-), I, p. 135, on 20. 1: “It should be remembered that *τεκμηρίον* is not *evidence* but the *inference* drawn from the evidence.” The rigor Thucydides marshalled when sifting evidence for a particular fact shows, for example, in his use of Homer's authority for the relation of the Greeks' early defenses to their later ones in the Trojan War, as Edwin Dolin lucidly and complexly demonstrates (“Thucydides on the Trojan War: a Critique of the Text of 1.11.1,” *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 86 [1982], pp. 119–49).

with “in order” it starts to remind us that Thucydides’ focus will shortly change and that everything he says will bear still more directly on the war.

Writers who do not follow this recommended process may be poets (*ποιηταί*), an activity that engages them in setting up another kind of order: they write not ἐξῆς but *κοσμούντες* (21. 1), an “ordering” that is at the same time an adorning, in a dead spatial metaphor that implies a comprehensive “kosmos” and not a linear sequence. Poets are here coupled with those whom the reader, after Herodotus had written, and in the climate Havelock describes in *Preface to Plato*,² might be tempted to distinguish from poets. These are the *logographoi* or “prose writers,” who also put their material into order. Their procedure of doing so is designated by yet a different locution, *ξυνέθεσαν*, “put together.” The three terms of ordering (ἐξῆς, *κοσμούντες*, *ξυνέθεσαν*) align the three types of writers according to the principle on which they organize their material. Thucydides is a fourth kind, and it may be said that he here emphasizes testing his data rather than ordering them himself because his ordering must evolve in the long presentation he is beginning.

The *λογογράφοι* “put together” their material, Thucydides says, so as to be more attractive to the *hearer*—and the term “hearer” assimilates them back to the more automatic persuasiveness of oral reception. The term *προσαγωγότερον*, “more attractive of access,” also comes close to a notion of *faits divers*. They are “more attractive than true,” and Thucydides then returns in this passage to his single explicit positive criterion, the checking of evidence, datum by datum.

It is, to be sure, by his account, a distance in time, and not in space or in logical ordering, that will make presented data “prevail with incredibility into the mythy” (*ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ μυθῶδες ἐκνευικηκότα*). The compound verb *ἐκνευικηκότα*, which might also be rendered “win over,” indicates a dynamic process. The writer whom Thucydides rejects gradually succumbs to a “mythy” element in his data by failing to scrutinize them. As if in still fuller deference to what he has articulated here, he couples his declaration in the next chapter, that he has constructed or reconstructed the speeches on reliable evidence, with the assertion that in any case they bear directly on the war. Both of these statements may be taken as an implied rejection of Herodotus’ scope. Thucydides’ term *ζήτησις*, inquiry by scrutiny, steps up the rigor of Herodotus’ *historia*, “investigation,” a term Thucydides wholly

² Eric Havelock, *Preface to Plato* (Cambridge, Mass. 1963).

avoids using.³ As for his initial look at events remote in time, Thucydides has already shown them to bear directly on the factors of the war. His opening is similar to Herodotus', except that Herodotus begins almost at once with a narrative as a causal explanation. Herodotus, after setting his theoretical premises briefly, at once begins by sifting stories in the search of a single cause for the enmity between Europe and Asia so as to account for the beginning of the Persian War. He settles on a single particular; Croesus, "pointing out this one man" (τοῦτον σημήνας). It is from that vantage that he gets into his narrative: "pointing out this one man I shall proceed into the further presentation of my account" (ἐς τὸ πρόσω τοῦ λόγου, I. 5).

Thucydides, by contrast, makes no attempt as he sets up his background to make a particular datum carry the burden of his general account. He stays on the plane of factorial semi-abstraction until he reaches the point in time and space that immediately involves his particular war, deferring even the fifty years preceding it, the *Pentēkontaetia*, till somewhat later. In the "Archaeology," though the particular details are subject to the dimming and mythologizing falsification of time, Thucydides has proceeded by what he calls "most explicit signs" (ἐπιφανεστάτων σημείων), "sufficiently" (ἀποχρόντως, 21. 1). This final adverb suggests that in this instance he has contented himself with something like a minimum of data, but after having tested evidence that did prove testable. A sufficient condition has been met for moving from particular to general. The signs were "explicit"—for those who could test them. Again, if this is a revision of Herodotus, it is still very much along Herodotus' lines, except for the adjustment of particular to general, though it could be asserted that Herodotus, even when he doubts, does not usually hint that evidence is at a low state of verifiability. And the possibility here implied by Thucydides, that evidence might somehow be at once scanty and adequate for explicit reading, puts him in a different realm from Herodotus by raising the criterion not just of verifiability but of sufficiency (ἀποχρόντως).

None of this is directly counter-mythological, though it works even harder than Herodotus does the counter-mythological substructure of its organizational principle. This principle tests a relation between particular and general, whereas the myth is always easily both particular (Oedipus or Apollo) and general (man or god). Applying the myth, as the poet does, requires intelligence but not testing. On the contrary, the poet is free to invent within the outlines of his story, as

³ I have discussed the conditions implied by Herodotus' use of *ιστορίη* in Albert Cook, *Myth and Language* (Bloomington, Indiana 1980), pp. 69–106.

well as to emphasize some aspect of a known story. The historian must establish the aspects of a story that has happened but that he must coordinate from scratch. Plato strains his dialectic, as it were, to restore myth's easy congruence between particular and general without recourse to story, except as a supplement or as a movement onto another plane. For Plato, connections between the planes, between dialectic and myth, are left mysterious, and the philosopher's enterprise is neither confined nor fully defined by story-bound pattern types. The ideas are in heaven, but they are history-less, unlike either men or gods.

None of this is exactly counter-mythological either. Thucydides is of course still more negative than Plato on the uses of myth as a factor in the progress of his main narrative. "Having prevailed into the mythy," the abjured practice of others, suggests also for them an intellectual process—one which logically could include Plato's—to mediate that which has been allowed to become "mythy." Such a softening of rigor would work against Thucydides' task-in-hand.⁴

Thucydides leaves Herodotus' ethnographic inquiries almost wholly behind. He does not need those particulars. He differs from Herodotus more notably in that restriction than he does in his attitude towards

⁴ It is startling that Cornford (F. M. Cornford, *Thucydides Mythistoricus* [London 1907]) used this sentence as the epigraph for a work that then goes on effectually to misread its strictures. With the benefit of modern thematic analysis we may make the story of Pausanias (I. 129–35) conform to a mythic pattern, as Cornford does, but Thucydides does not. Still less would he effectually capitalize ἀπατή as the goddess "Deception" in the first events surrounding Alcibiades (V. 35 ff.).

For the overall "mythic" cast of the Peloponnesian War itself, Cornford offers a convenient reference point to deny. This contemporary of Freud, as we may say, saw in Thucydides' *History* a sort of return of the repressed. As everyone realizes, we cannot seek the sense of this work in a crude equation of Athens' downfall through ὕβρις and ἀτη with that in Greek tragedy. Indeed, the formula does not work too well for Greek tragedy either. Thucydides is not *mythistoricus*. For one thing the word ἀτη does not occur once in the whole of his work (A), and the six references to ὕβρις are all limited to a very specific occasion. This is Thucydides'—and for that matter the historian's—normal use of such abstractions, even though there is a slight poetic cast to Thucydides' vocabulary (B). But whatever the dominant substratum we attribute to Thucydides' narrative, the relation he establishes between particular and general in his narrative radically divorces it from the procedures of myth-evocation.

(A) I have tried to deduce the implications of the exclusively poetic use of ἀτη in Albert Cook, *Enactment: Greek Tragedy* (Chicago 1971), pp. 69–76. For further examination of the personal psychological implications of this complex word, see William F. Wyatt, Jr., "Homeric Ate," *American Journal of Philology* 103 (1982), pp. 247–76.

(B) Dionysius of Halicarnassus was the first to notice the poetic cast of Thucydides' vocabulary, which is also touched on by Gomme (*op. cit.*, I, p. 235, note on ἀγαν in I. 75. 1). See also John J. Finley, Jr., *Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1942), p. 265.

the gods.⁵ Thucydides does differ from Herodotus in addressing a collective action that was going to be a failure rather than a success. It was also going to transform the Greek world, for the time being, much more radically than the larger-scale Persian conflicts did. Since he could not have known these two large results when he set himself the task of writing his history, his initial vantage could not have been conditioned by Cornford's sense of a tragic sense in him. Still, it is well to keep Cornford in mind, though at a distance, if we wish to get a sense of how Thucydides, like his younger contemporary Plato, took the tack of rejecting much previous discourse and much of the previous conditions thereof, as an impetus for his own. In the complicated dispute that he reports over the Athenians' drawing water in sacred temple precincts when the Boeotians themselves abstained (IV. 97–98), Thucydides intrudes no doubt about the many factors implicit and explicit.⁶ One factor stated, indeed, is that the Athenians and the Boeotians share the same gods (IV. 97. 4). Nor does Thucydides question the myth of Tereus (II. 29) when he distinguishes a different Tereus in the background of Sitalkes. He actually provides the detail that poets have memorialized the nightingale incident, asserting in the same sentence that the distance between the countries would make a closer origin plausible (εἰκόσ) for the better-known Tereus. As the scholiast says, "It is significant that here alone he introduces a myth in his book, and then in the process of adjudication" (διστάζων, literally "doubting").⁷ The significance would lie not in confirming his rejection of myth,⁸ and still less in his subordination to it, but rather in the austerity of a focus that rarely allows a myth to obtrude. Still, in this one instance, the veracity of a mythical past is used as a tool to sift facts; when he later brings in the myth of Alcmaeon, it serves to define a region. Even a myth will do as a focusing particular.

⁵ Though Herodotus is more explicit in this and other ways, the actual differences between the two historians with respect to the gods are relatively minor. As Syme points out, in Thucydides an appeal to the gods often fails (Ronald Syme, "Thucydides," in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* 48 [1962], pp. 39–56, esp. p. 52). But that is true in Herodotus as well, with the frequent elaborate mismatching of oracle to circumstance.

⁶ Gomme, *ad loc.*

⁷ Quoted in Gomme, II, p. 90, *ad loc.*

⁸ See also II. 15. 1, "in the time of Cecrops." As Gomme says (*ad loc.*, II, p. 48), "Another example to show that Thucydides did not doubt the truth, in outline, of the Greek 'myths,' though he might interpret the story in his own way."

In the reckoning of time and the marking of stages for his *History*, Thucydides abstracts his work at once, demarcating time as related just to his event-series; he numbers the years according to the war, usually by summers and winters. "And the eleventh year ended for the war," he says (V. 39). This particular time there is a tinge of ironic emphasis in the statement, since it marks events after the "Peace of Nicias" in 421. The flat statement works to keep his progression relentlessly even. His movement forward implies a prior reasoning: "If anyone were to doubt that the war continued just because a much-broken treaty of truce was in force, I will use the word war, as I did before, to characterize this particular year too." Such sentences as "And the eleventh year ended for the war" place a purely temporal mark on the event-series, coming as they do regularly but unpredictably in the work, and sometimes with his own name attached to them. Their neutrality reinforces their inexorability.

This writer of prose has left behind him the ambition of Herodotus or of Ion of Chios. He can rest with his method, and with his verbal means. The relation between oral and written is not a problem for him, as it is posed in the *Phaedrus* of Plato and felt all through Plato's work, or as it must have been for Heraclitus. Nor is Thucydides' prose simply a convenient instrument, as for Lysias, Protagoras, and the medical writers. Thoroughly grounded in his principle of testing, Thucydides' written account can then re-include the oral, and spectacularly, in the form of the complexly structured speeches of the work. His principle of testing reassures him to the point where he asserts he can reconstruct these speeches, if necessary, on the basis of reports of what the main arguments would have been ("the way each of them seemed to me to have spoken most likely what was needed [τὰ δέοντα μάλιστ' εἰπέειν] about what the present situation each time was," I. 22). Such a confidence implies that the oral, to be congruent with the written and narrated, need not be poetic. The memorable need not be poetic.

Plato's speeches, of course, are by contrast not remembered. They are fictive reports of conversations imagined to have taken place. Plato's initial fiction corresponds to Thucydides' reality. Thucydides asserts that in their essentials these speeches really did take place. The essentials are points in an argument, which thereby and therewith are put on a par with other historical happenings, the λόγοι with the ἔργα—and in this passage he contrasts the two terms, words and deeds. This pair remains a key duet of terms throughout his work. The speeches show that a sequence of points in an argument is a

sequence of constated particulars. The enchained generalities and abstractions for which the speeches are notable actually attest to their verifiability. The generalities guarantee that the particulars have been tested by sifting.

What was spoken in the past, then, assimilates to, as well as assesses, what was done in the past—so long as it is within the living attention span of the writing historian.

This vision of the public experience arises from a new privacy of the literary act. The philosopher, the poet, the tragedian, and even the medical writer, had an audience defined somewhat by social sub-grouping and personal contact, or else by a ritualized occasion. If Heraclitus was a private writer, he would seem to have taught, and he is said to have laid his book in the temple of Artemis. In carrying out lessons before a band of faithful auditors, Socrates, and Plato himself, conform to the pre-Socratic prototype for the thinker's communication channels. The historian, however, from Hecataeus on, is committed not only to prose but to the written book freed of such social constraints. The exile of Thucydides here offers a literary dimension as well as a vantage for research. He intensifies these conditions. He has no immediate audience for his book, but a long wait. And a certain randomness defines his potential readership; he has no theatre or academy or group of poetry enthusiasts or ritual throng or law court in which it will be taken up.

It is in the act of writing history that the comparatively free audience-expectation of the modern book suddenly comes into existence.

Moreover, while Herodotus undergoes a comparable wait, and compasses a long work in comparable privacy, he can expect some national accolade from the very success of the Panhellenic effort he so fully accounts for. There is a tradition that he read his work aloud to general acclaim. As with Livy, there is an element of patriotism in his history. Thucydides, however, resembles the gloomy Tacitus. Even before the failure of the war, since as he in effect tells us he set himself the task before knowing its outcome, his testing of factors implies a neutrality towards the parties that has a sharper cutting edge than Herodotus'. Thucydides' vision of public events, while highly generalizable, is intensely private and personal, the more so that its generalities are based not on a prior social code, and not even on Herodotus' neutral ethnographic stance, but on the writer's principle of inference as it governs the enunciation of factors. Thucydides proposes no community, as Plato does, and in a sense he does not himself describe a community, though he lets others do so. Brasidas is as noble as Pericles, and there is more in his actions than

the specifically Spartan. Instead, Thucydides provides a basis in action for the principles on which community rests, though unlike Machiavelli he does not turn explicitly to such questions. The high degree of communal energy that characterizes Athens in Pericles' Funeral Oration, on the evidence, is a momentary increment from the prosperity whose evolution is described in the *Archaeology* and the *Pentēkontaetia*. As Schadewaldt says, Thucydides "indicates general horizons for events (*das Geschehen*) and carries within himself a mode of the theory of categories. Both aspects determine the picture Thucydides offers us . . . in tension with each other."⁹

The social implications of the "achievement laid up forever;" the *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*, lodge Thucydides in a lonely universality, even though *κτῆμα* in its regular Homeric and post-Homeric sense suggests personal use in a social context. Looking personally backwards, his events have to have been lived through in order to have validity, and they must be tested in order to have general relevance. Looking ahead, their effectiveness is indifferent with respect to the group that might be imagined as consulting the *History*.

Yet in one sense Thucydides is conservative and by implication community-minded. His narrative concentrates on military history, to as great a degree as the *Iliad* does. In this Thucydides is closer to Homer than Herodotus was. For the military hero that a poet celebrates, too, the poem is a perpetuation of his fame to generations that might otherwise forget, as Pindar reminds us. The poem, too, is a *κτῆμα ἐς αἰεί*. What Thucydides memorializes, however, are events not only unique but also explicitly patterned and exemplary. So are Homer's events, to be sure, but the poet, in his social role at least, seems to be organizing the pattern to enhance the uniqueness, whereas for Thucydides it is the other way around. Homer already took the giant step of transforming the sort of battle frieze to be seen on Mycenaean reliefs, late geometric vases, and later on classical pediments. He transformed this persistent Near Eastern celebratory focus on awesome clashes by setting organizational principles over the clash. Thucydides goes Homer one better by abstracting these, but clashes are still far more particularized in his history than the clashes in Herodotus. Thucydides is a military historian to the degree that the coherence of so striking a cultural tribute as the Funeral Oration becomes a problem for the interpreter.

Thucydides' concentration on military operations also throws them

⁹ Wolfgang Schadewaldt, *Die Anfänge der Geschichtsschreibung bei den Griechen* (Frankfurt 1982), pp. 251-52.

into perspective through the touching in of power motives, the more strikingly that the military is so preponderant.

In depicting military events, Thucydides is linear, but also expansive. The same thorny problem-states—Thebes, Corinth, Corcyra, Potidaea, Plataea, Mytilene, Amphipolis, Syracuse—keep turning their thorns to the event. A complex particular moves in time towards generality. Yet in the imposition of power considerations, Thucydides' view seems to be at once cyclical and general. The same factors keep applying; the course from inception of campaign or attack to resolution keeps taking place. He demonstrates the fact that failure or success may not be clear, and he is consequently careful to point out those occasions when both sides claim victory. In Thucydides the word "circle," *κύκλος*, is always just spatial, though he uses the verb *κυκλοῦμαι* in a way that combines the linear and the cyclical. The verb implies making linear progress in getting past something by using a circling movement.

If we cannot press the buried metaphors in Thucydides so far, the sense he creates of constant ratiocination invites us to look for it in his very diction.

3

The war is involved uninterruptedly, though with unpredictable particular variations, in a forward linear flow. Thucydides shows it at every point gathering up, and pulling against, assumptions and causes—to such a degree that defining his use of terms such as *αἰτία* ("cause") and *πρόφασις* ("pretext") entails intricate comparisons and discriminations.¹⁰ In Herodotus the large, understood forces pause, as it were, for stocktaking. In Thucydides they never rest from their dynamic interaction. The spreading pool of ignorance about the past that Thucydides stresses can be taken to imply some ignorance about the present. And ignorance, signally the Athenian ignorance about the complexity of politics in Sicily, operates itself as a factor, dynamically. The speeches exhibit the tension, and the syntactic intricacy, of trying to construct present-oriented rationales for specific behaviors. This is true even of Pericles' Funeral Oration (II. 35–46). Its high abstractions and graceful definitions are aimed toward the propaganda purpose of boosting morale; Pericles' opening backward look at the past superiority of Athens is adduced as a factor in giving the Athenians an extra edge in the coming conflicts. Pericles ends the speech in a well-nigh Hitlerian injunction to replace the dead

¹⁰ Gomme, I, p. 153; II, pp. 154–55.

soldiers with living children who may grow up to fight for Athens (II. 44. 3).

Still, there remains always such a surplus of factors and emphases that they get out of hand—not counting such natural disasters as the plague, which follows very soon after this oration. It brings about still more deaths, deaths that only most tangentially can be connected to the war. The multiplicity of factors jerks the linear flow ahead, as is shown in pairs or larger groups of speeches—the normal case. A second speaker will show this as against the first speaker, by his reliance on inevitably different emphases and possibly different factors, even when the geopolitical assumptions are the same. The speeches show general and particular in the process of refocusing their relations.

Such is the pressure from many quarters that events tend to outrun Thucydides' linear account of them. Often something has happened which his unavoidable focus at one point has kept out of his narrative in its proper sequence. Occasionally, and revealingly, he violates strict chronological order.¹¹ So, in a specific instance, the very relaxedness that a new peace implies, and the necessity to realign forces once they are not firmly marshalled against one another, leaves participants in a position of overreaching themselves through an inevitable incapacity to cover all the factors. This is the case at the beginning, when Athens incurs the wrath of Sparta by trying to manage forces at the perimeter of her league. It is the case after the peace of Nicias once again, when in 420 many states—Argos and its confederacy, the Athenians and Alcibiades personally, the Boeotians, the Corinthians, the Megarians, and the Spartans—all re-expose themselves by negotiations in more than one direction.

Those Spartans “who most wanted to dissolve the treaty” (V. 36)—thus calling into play the factor of internal factionalism, as Alcibiades will soon effectually do—secretly urge the Boeotians and the Corinthians first to ally themselves with Argos (and its allies), and then subsequently with Sparta. This project, if it were to be actualized, as often in Thucydides, would kill two birds with one stone for these hostile Spartans: it would offend the Athenians by violating the condition of the truce that no new alliances be formed, and by forming them it would strengthen Sparta. However, on their way home the Boeotians (V. 37) encounter, again privately, some Argives who are waiting there for the purpose of urging the very same alliance; persuasion is not necessary. Back home the rulers of Boeotia

¹¹ *Ibid.*, I, p. 209, on I. 57. 6, with examples.

endorse this policy, but the four councils that constitute the decision-making group in Boeotia see it differently:

πρὶν δὲ τοὺς ὄρκους γενέσθαι οἱ Βοιωτάρχαι ἐκοίνωσαν ταῖς τέσσαρσι βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ταῦτα, αἵπερ ἅπαν τὸ κύρος ἔχουσι, καὶ παρήμουν γενέσθαι ὄρκους ταῖς πόλεσιν, ὅσα βούλονται ἐπ' ὠφελίᾳ σφίσι ξυνομνύειν. οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς βουλαῖς τῶν Βοιωτῶν ὄντες οὐ προσδέχονται τὸν λόγον, δεδιότες μὴ ἐναντία Λακεδαιμονίοις ποιήσωσι, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀφιστάσῃ Κορινθίοις ξυνομνύντες· οὐ γὰρ εἶπον αὐτοῖς οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὰ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαιμόνος, ὅτι τῶν τε ἐφόρων Κλεόβουλος καὶ Ξενάρης καὶ οἱ φίλοι παραινοῦσιν Ἄργείων πρῶτον καὶ Κορινθίων γενομένων ξυμμάχους ὕστερον μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων γίγνεσθαι, αἰόμενοι τὴν βουλὴν, κἄν μὴ εἴπωσιν, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι, ἢ ἂν σφίσι προδιαγρόντες παραινοῦσιν. ὡς δὲ ἀντίστη τὸ πρᾶγμα, οἱ μὲν Κορίνθιοι καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ Θράκης πρέσβεις ἄπρακτοι ἀπῆλθον, οἱ δὲ βοιωτάρχαι μέλλοντες πρότερον, εἰ ταῦτα ἔπεισαν, καὶ τὴν ξυμμαχίαν περᾶσθαι πρὸς Ἄργείους ποιεῖν, οὐκέτι ἐσήμεγκαν περὶ Ἄργείων ἐς τὰς βουλάς, οὐδὲ ἐς τὸ Ἄργος τοὺς πρέσβεις οὓς ὑπέσχοντο ἔεμπον, ἀμέλεια δὲ τις ἐνῆν καὶ διατριβὴ τῶν πάντων.

Before these oaths could be carried out with Corinthian, Megarian, and Thracian envoys, the Boeotian rulers publicized these events to the four councils of the Boeotians, who carry the whole authority, and advised them to carry out oaths with those cities who would wish to swear a common oath for defense (*ὠφελία*). But those who were in the Boeotian councils did not accept this rationale (*λόγον*; also “speech”). They feared to act in opposition to the Spartans by swearing a common oath with the Corinthians, who had defected from them. For the Boeotian rulers did not tell the councils the events in Sparta, that among the Ephors Kleoboulos, Xenares, and their friends had advised alliances with the Argives and Corinthians to be carried out first and then alliances with the Spartans. They thought that the councils in deliberation (Lit., singular, *βουλῆ*), even if they did not tell them this, would not vote otherwise than they themselves had determined beforehand and advised. But when the affair took a contrary position, the ambassadors from Corinth and Thebes went off without success, and the Boeotian rulers, who had previously intended, if they had persuaded them of this, to try to make an alliance with the Argives as well, no longer brought anything about the Argives before the councils, nor did they send to Argos the ambassadors they had promised, but there was a certain lack of care (*ἀμέλεια*) and delay in all these matters. (V. 38)

“Lack of care” and “delay” are constant threats in the tension between the forward progress of events and the instability of factors pressing upon them. And shortly, in fact, Alcibiades plays a double game by courting both Sparta and Argos, which is itself playing the double game of courting both Athens and Sparta. Alcibiades is actually playing a triple game, because, by lying himself, he tricks the truthful

Spartan envoys into looking like liars before the Athenian Assembly (V. 44–45). But then another factor, one from the different realm of natural catastrophes, supervenes over this already complicated situation. “But an earthquake occurring before anything had been confirmed, this assembly was adjourned.”

In the war a state is itself a complex factorial entity. The weight or permanence of one such factorial entity—say Corcyra or Sicily—cannot be assessed in its magnitude of importance with relation to that of another entity, until after the fact. Corcyra in the first place could not have been assessed beforehand as incurring the set of events that would place it at the center of the conflict between Athens and Sparta over her handling of Epidamnus (I. 25–56), which drew the Spartans’ protesting attention and helped precipitate the huge war. Four years and a vast complex of events later, this trouble spot, as it turns out, re-erupts, and the same set of dominoes tumbles against one another in a different order—Epidamnus-Corcyra-Corinth-Athens—this time centering on the sort of internal struggle between oligarchy and democracy (III. 69–85) that later develops as a parallel threat to Athens itself. Corcyra is caught as an entity in a linear sequence of power-events, whose unstable timing of recursion in a stable repertoire of factors is guaranteed by the steadiness, and the dynamism, among those factors. A census of the relevant factors would include Corcyra’s (or any other entity’s) geographical distance from a friendly or a hostile power, its relation to colonial ties, both originally (Corcyra is a colony of Corinth) and as it develops (Epidamnus is a colony of Corcyra). Financial status, too, is an important factor, stressed by Thucydides in the “Archaeology”: the ability of a state to translate its resources into an army, a navy, and defensive installations. There are, further, the local political factions, and also a state’s prior relations to such more powerful entities as Athens or Sparta, as well as the history of the state’s prior role in the common effort of the Persian War. A state’s geography comes into play somewhat differently, too, through its relation to war operations in close or distant theatres, and even to holding operations on or near its own terrain.

By adducing all these factors and at the same time often keeping them implicit, Thucydides allows for their permutation, for the subjection of their particular manifestation to the linear progression, and also for their coordination into usually unstated generality. The factors are never quiescent and never isolated, he implies—even though his conception obliges him to be silent about them when, as inevitably on these very grounds, his attention is drawn elsewhere. The naiveté of the Athenians in not seeing, and in not listening to

Nicias about, the inevitable interplay of such factors on the large Sicilian terrain, is implied by what has already been shown to bear on the picture. If this is so with little Corcyra, all the more so with huge Sicily. The roll-call of the Sicilian allegiances as they have shaped up (VII. 57–58) carries with it an implied demonstration of how force, racial ties, prior allegiances, prior colonial ties, and geographical proximity all permute beyond the power of Athens to control them, or even to influence them very much.

As against the interrelations of the political entities in Herodotus, which happen pretty much on a binary or a ternary basis, those in Thucydides permute in the face of a common but relentlessly evolving situation that presses on each state differently but on all alike. The forces are, as it were, centripetal, in spite of the geographically centrifugal relations—often across much water or over rugged mountains—of the Greek states. The relations in Herodotus may be themselves called centrifugal: a state, once it has solved a stress point, is left to itself for a while in a stable condition. There is no general center of common interest or high permutation of factors between Persia and Ionia, or between Persia and Lydia. And for the big conflict mainland Greece has pretty much been left out, except for occasional consultations, until Persia turns by elimination in her direction. State marriage in Herodotus (never except remotely in space or time for Thucydides) may involve a number of state-groups, as that of Astyages involves the Medes, the Persians, the Lydians, the Scythians, the Cilicians, and the Babylonians (Herodotus I. 73–77).¹² But the factors are static, and separable. As these peoples go their separate ways, or take up their places within the Persian Empire, they tend to stay in place.

The speeches, either antithetical or propagandistic in character, serve to externalize the counterpoise of forces in the *History*. Just so the forces drawn up for conquest will meet either prevailing or succumbing counter-forces. But then, whichever the case may be, other forces will be operating against them. And the speeches are oriented to the military action their own situation-orientation and usually their antagonistic stance serve to mirror. The speeches address the war; they are the speeches of those “either about to make war or already in it” (I. 22).

This practical relation of the speeches to force, and their subjection to force as in some ways just another manifestation of it, differentiates Thucydides from debaters in the law courts, from philosophers like Protagoras and tragedians like Euripides, with whom he has been

¹² Albert Cook, *Myth and Language*, pp. 158–62.

compared.¹³ Any lawyer is less involved, any philosopher more theoretical, any speaker in a tragedy more oriented to his own subjective needs, than the speakers in the *History*. Even Alcibiades, the most self-centered of his actors, must try to force a yield of personal gain out of collocating unremittingly public factors. Those are, therefore, the forces to which he addresses himself, like everybody else in Thucydides. In this sense we can almost see the leaders in the *History* bringing to bear upon events the critical view of the historian himself. And, though he may not offer the abstract political science of Machiavelli, he does indeed show a "latent systematization of power."¹⁴ The generalities are always being tested, from the very first sentence of the *History*, by the particulars held in a tension that reveals the force organizing them.

In the *History* a speaker may be said to aim at an equilibrium, a stability among factors. "Stable" (*βέβαιος*) is a favorite term of Thucydides. He has Pericles say that the Spartans, as farmers, will offer their bodies rather than their material resources (*χρήματα*), because the latter "would not be stable against the possibility of being exhausted" (I. 141. 5). The envoys of threatened Mytilene, speaking at the Olympic banquet upon Sparta's urgency, speak of a "stable friendship," while twice invoking *ἀρετή* in international relations. They go on to say that if all states were independent, they themselves would have been "more stable against innovating" (III. 10). In urging death for the men of the rebel city, Cleon declares "the worst thing of all is when nothing remains stable in what we are concerned about" (III. 37. 3). Brasidas' excellence creates a "stable expectation" that others will be like him (IV. 81. 3). In the upheavals and proscriptions caused in 412 by the Four Hundred, a "stable mistrust" is created (VIII. 66. 5).

Moreover, as these quotations illustrate, the term "stable" is applied under the most diverse circumstances. There is no set of general principles that would allow Thucydides to enunciate laws governing stability. In military operations—and they are his subject—he may give specific tactical rationales,¹⁵ but he is not only silent, as Gomme points out, about the relation of tactics to strategy. He must be silent, except about specific factors at a given place and time, on the principles we may deduce from the *History*. Especially is this the case in a Panhellenic conflict taking place in what might be called a weak

¹³ See Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–70.

¹⁴ This is Schadewaldt's phrase, by way of qualifying Reinhardt's and Schwartz's comparisons of Thucydides to Machiavelli.

¹⁵ Gomme, I, p. 19.

macro-system: Corcyra, Corinth, Potidea, Naupactus, Thebes, Samos, Lesbos, Melos—to say nothing of the various Sicilian states—all are subject, taken together, to an idiosyncratic congeries of factors, even if the factors taken singly are the same. It is a stable fact that they will be unstable, and variously unstable. The tension between general and particular operates unpredictably in accordance with predictable laws. The weak macro-system is balanced, by contrast, against what might be called a micro-system that is stable or at least potentially stable, based on the internal organization of a given state by itself, whether small like Melos or large like Athens and Sparta. And the event-moment in space and time—say the siege of Mytilene—is itself a stable micro-system, rendered in turn unstable by the incursion of other systems. This is borne out vividly by what Dover calls “the complexity of classification” in the lineup of combatants before the Sicilian conflict.¹⁶

Buildups have a tendency, as in this impressive one, to work up to a grand slam of alliances. Since the kind of equilibrium which will obtain at a given moment is unpredictable, in the linear progression of the *History* the length and complexity of a buildup may be cut short at any time. So in one among other earlier intrusions of Athens into Sicilian affairs, twenty ships are sent in the summer of 427 to aid Leontini against Syracuse; and then the Athenians establish themselves at Rhegium. Thucydides reports this buildup right after, and implicitly as a consequence of, the petering out of the Corcyrean rebellion. He makes his transition by the lightest of contrasting particles, a δέ. Such a δέ introduces the next transition qualifying and curtailing this buildup; the second plague in Athens; and then earthquakes. Consequently it might be said—this time a μέν marks the transition—that the Athenians turn away from their original purpose when they attack the islands off Sicily (III. 88), and unsuccessfully. Then the following summer they do prevail at Mylae and win Messina, other events intervening to give the buildup and deployment a still further twist. Finally for this campaign they sail from Sicily to Locris, an action they perform in implied concert with a prior Athenian force there (III. 96–98), and become masters (ἐκράτησαν) of Locris. The whole final development is swift enough to be recounted, as though by interrupted aftermath, in a single not lengthy sentence (III. 99).

The balance between predictable factors and their unpredictable development correlates with the principle governing the speeches,

¹⁶ A. W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K. J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (Oxford 1970), IV, pp. 433–36, on VII. 57–59.

which take up a fourth of Thucydides' text. Cornford makes the distinction in the speeches between "infiguration," or fitting in what is already known, and "invention," or adding new matter.¹⁷ As the Corinthians say while pressing their case for war at the beginning, "war least of all proceeds on specified conditions (*ἐπι ῥητοίς*), but manages the many factors (*τὰ πολλά*) of itself according to contingency (*παρατυγχάνον*)" (I. 122).

This stated rule succeeds in a simultaneous declaration and ironic qualification, a contradiction of effects it can embed because the "contingency" can be predictable if seen for its factors or unpredictable if seen for the impossibility of knowing what direction the particular combination of their multiplicity (*τὰ πολλά*) may take. The Corinthians are in fact here revealing their ignorance and overconfidence—traits which elsewhere in Thucydides, as here, accompany bloodthirstiness. Here we have the curious mechanism of whistling in the dark by calling the dark dark. The speeches are, in Schwartz's words, "willed showpieces (*Glanzleistungen*) of his political-rhetorical thinking."¹⁸ In them the intelligence of the historian converges with the intelligence of the participants. He attains his pitch by assuming they can rise to his intelligence on occasion. He envisages an intricacy in their thought comparable to his own by putting it on the same plane as his own. "Intelligence," *ξύσεις*, is a special word for Thucydides, and as he uses it the prefix, *ξύν* ("together") is active.¹⁹ It is an active intelligence, brought to bear on keeping particular events open to the possibility of the sort of general subsumption that the historian brings it to bear on his narrative. Twice Thucydides pairs the term with *ἀρετή* (IV. 81. 2; VI. 54. 5). Intelligence here allows for the "reckoning by probability" (*εἰκάζειν, εἰκός*), and for an attempt to avoid that "irrationality" (*παράλογον*) that characterizes human life generally (VIII. 24. 5) and especially wars (III. 16; VIII. 24; II. 61). Intelligence is the chief safeguard against that which it cannot reach to, the "unapparent" (*τὸ ἀφανές*). The long range is distinguished from the short. It is only after his death, on a long range, that the long range of Pericles' "foresight" becomes apparent. The Spartans expect it to be the short war they have no firm grounds for

¹⁷ Cornford, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

¹⁸ Eduard Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*, (repr. Hildesheim 1960), p. 27.

¹⁹ See Walter Müri, "Beitrag zum Verständnis des Thukydides" (1947), in Hans Herter, ed., *Thukydides* (Darmstadt 1968), pp. 135–69. Syme, *op. cit.*, remarks on Thucydides' predilection for the term. An expansive examination of this and related "psychological" words is given in Pierre Huart, *Le Vocabulaire de l'Analyse Psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide* (Paris 1968).

conjecturing, thus expectation being against “good sense” or “the best opinion” (*παρὰ γνώμην*, V. 14). *Γνώμη* is a term Thucydides uses well over a hundred times, more than twice as many times as Herodotus. In this term intelligence is conceived as an activated natural faculty, often spoken of as “applied” (*προσέχειν*) to the particulars of a situation.

Nicias, in the debate before the Sicilian expedition, declares that his reasoned speech would be weak (*ἀσθενῆς ὁ λόγος*) if he did not try to avoid speaking against his best opinion (VI. 9. 3). Pericles links the possibility of stability to the active use of intelligence:

Overconfidence (*αὔχημα*) can come about through lucky ignorance even for a coward, but disdain is our resource who can rely on good sense (*γνώμη*) to prevail over our enemies. And under equal fortune an intelligence (*ξύνησις*) on which his superiority of feeling depends will provide a more tenacious daring; and it relies less on hope, which is the strength of someone without resources, than it does on good sense from the resources it has, a good sense whose foresight is more stable. (II. 62. 4–5)

This complicated sentence at its conclusion comes down hard on three key words: “good sense’s more stable foresight,” ἧς (= *γνώμης*) *βεβαιότερα ἢ πρόνοια*. Mere Hope, *ἐλπίς*, is often given a pejorative cast in Thucydides.

In the stylistic flow of Thucydides’ own presentation, these definitions of the mind at work on events crop up with special saliency in the speeches. They evidence a high self-consciousness in the speakers. In the narrative they tend to cap a presentation, as Regenbogen²⁰ points out of the moment when the Athenian ships are setting sail and “the foreigners and the rest of the crowd came for the spectacle as to a conception (*διάνοια*) that was sufficient [to draw so large a crowd] and incredible” (VI. 31). The term I have rendered “conception”, *διάνοια*, is hard to translate here. Presumably the unprecedentedly large fleet is visible evidence of a thought process in the leaders of Athens. It is the result of thought, not thought itself, the usual sense of *διάνοια*. Thucydides has been consistently proceeding at a level of factor-collocation that would justify the odd transfer here from thought to what it produces. As for the crowd, the sight is “sufficient” to draw them (*ἀξιόχρεων*), but at the same time “incredible.” The crowd has a somewhat easier thought process than the leaders, that of wonder, and their reaction may be taken as part of a cautionary series with the earlier dissuasions of Nicias and the much earlier warnings of Pericles against such expeditions.

²⁰ Otto Regenbogen, *Kleine Schriften* (Munich 1961).

In his repeated corrections about the overthrow of the Pisistratidae (I. 20; VI. 54–59), Thucydides uses a particular fact, the distinction between Hippias and Hipparchus, as the thread which will provide the proper sequence for an interactive situation. “Factual accuracy,” Edmunds emphasizes, “is not the sufficient condition for history in the Thucydidean sense, but only the necessary condition for τὸ σαφές” (“that which is clear”).²¹ The rebels from Mytilene use the same term during a summary moment of their defense at Olympia: “Possessing such demonstrable grounds (προφάσεις) and motives (αἰτίαι), O Spartans and allies, we revolted; they are clear enough to make our hearers know (γνῶναι) that we have acted in accordance with sound inference (εἰκότως)” (III. 13). Here, actually, the term “clear” is an adjective, σαφείς, applied to two terms themselves intricate, separately and in relation to each other, προφάσεις and αἰτίαι. Further, σαφείς here gathers up and organizes a whole interlocking set of intellections: the lengthy ones of the Mytileneans, the inference of the Spartans and their allies, and the Mytileneans’ thought that what they have thought will make the Spartans and their allies think (γνῶναι) they have carried out their thought on sound inferential grounds (εἰκότως).

Nathan Rotenstreich speaks of “a paradox implicit in historical knowledge. This knowledge is always *causal*, yet it is not based on material *laws*.”²² Thucydides works his way steadily and alertly through this paradox. “Pretext” is a more ordinary sense of πρόφασις in Greek²³ and “cause” of αἰτία. Taking the terms that way, they would provide a ladder of certainty for the principals in the *History*. But they cannot be taken just that way. The ladder is always collapsing because the situation changes so radically and frequently as to suggest at once the inadequacy of these intellections and the presence of some force of the same type beyond the reach of summary, though comprised of the same factors. For all their alertness, the Mytileneans do not extricate themselves. Nor in the whole *History* do the Athenians either. Later, replying to the Athenian claim that the weak go to the wall (V. 89), the Melians enunciate Thucydidean principles, “It is useful for you not to dissolve the common good, but for what is sound (εἰκότα) to be also just for the one who from time to time finds himself in danger; and for one who is persuasive, even when what he says is somewhat short of accuracy (ἀκρίβεια), to be able to have the advantage of them” (V. 90). Still they are massacred.

²¹ Lowell Edmunds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass. 1975), p. 155.

²² Nathan Rotenstreich, *Between Past and Present* (New Haven 1958), p. 296.

²³ See note 12 and Albert Cook, *The Classic Line* (Bloomington, Indiana 1966), pp. 70–71.

“Everything that has to do with war is difficult,” Hermocrates tells the Sicilians (IV. 59). Archidamus says much the same thing to the Spartans, “Things having to do with war are unclear” (ἀδηλα, II. 11. 4). Gomme observes that the reflection is a recurrent one in the *History*,²⁴ and Thucydides, from the beginning, adduces the terms “clear” and “unclear” as alternate characterizations for the dispositions of particular events.

4

The elusive factors bear impersonally on states, but it is men who personally make the decisions that activate them. The contrast between factors and persons, brought to a head in Thucydides' method, carries within it at once a permanent disparity and a perilous resolution. Such a contrast is another aspect of the oscillation between clarity and its opposite. Men are generalizing particulars in a particular situation governed by general factors. Thus is a comparable interaction in Herodotus made dynamic. Resolution into clarity, in a sense, always bears on the situation Thucydides depicts, since the factors can only be activated, and thereby raised as it were to the second degree, by being taken up in the calculations of participants. After the peace of Nicias, and on the heels of a calculated rapprochement with Argos, the Spartan ambassadors who go to Boeotia decide to return the Athenian prisoners they have been given and to announce the razing of Panactum to the Athenians, who had been promised it back (V. 42). The different interpretations put by the Athenians and by the Spartan envoys upon this double announcement, and the different weight given to each event, precipitate a hostility that immediately opens a path for Alcibiades and his rivalry with Nicias (V. 43).

Events, by their very nature as crystallizations of decisions, lead to persons, and to particular kinds of persons. The Spartans may be slow and the Athenians swift, as the Corinthians tell the Spartans (I. 70–71). However, the clarity, the resignation, and even the particular brand of selfishness in Nicias, transcend national boundaries and heavily qualify the notion that he is weak. Thucydides rarely expresses estimates of his persons directly²⁵ and when he does so, he is, as it were, assessing the man as by himself an extraordinary factor, as in the praise of Themistocles (I. 138) or the cautionary words about Alcibiades (VI. 15).

²⁴ Gomme, II, p. 13, *ad loc.*

²⁵ H. D. Westlake, *Individuals in Thucydides* (Cambridge 1968), p. 15.

Leaders, in fact, under whatever form of government, are clearly shown in Thucydides to determine initiatives. They manage the forces to which in turn they cannot help being subject. These forces include other leaders; Nicias loses to Alcibiades the debate over the Sicilian expedition, and he reconciles himself to it, leading the expedition. But then he is subject to another constraint on the lives of statesmen. Unless they have the precocious gifts of an Alcibiades, they will be along in years when at the helm. And war itself increases the risks of mortality. Nicias suffers through the Sicilian expedition and dies there, as Pericles had died and Archidamus, Demosthenes and Brasidas, Phormio and Cleon.

Precocity brings with it another risk, which Alcibiades has come to stand for more than anyone else, the risk of brilliant narcissism. He might trick the Spartan envoys, but over the long run a man's character shows. It was inevitable, whatever his guilt, that he would be accused of the sacrilege against the herms and the Mysteries. Thucydides underscores this inevitability by giving us insufficient evidence to decide his guilt either way, where usually it is accuracy in just this sort of affair that he seeks. The fact that Alcibiades is accused, as he inevitably would have been, impels this rapid and adaptive politician to avoid probable death by fleeing when the Athenians send to have him returned for trial. Other Athenians had fled to avoid prosecution, not always so successfully. And later Alcibiades repeats this success, slipping away from a Spartan death sentence to the entourage of Tissaphernes. He would inevitably be using his talents to intrigue with the Persians and with the Spartans. And through the irony of developments he escapes the disastrous Sicilian campaign he had urged, contriving his way back finally into the good graces of the Athenians.

The forces, at every point, are there to be managed, and the very change of their configuration from present moment to present moment provides a clever man with the opportunity to take them up without necessarily being impaired by the way he had done so before. Finally Alcibiades' selfishness and skill at diplomacy come into their own under the conditions that prevail after the Sicilian disaster, in the eighth book. This, as Westlake reminds us, is "packed with reports of secret negotiations and intrigues."²⁶

The disintegration of the Athenian empire provides a decentralization of forces that permits playing one force against another without effective checks. In this way the person of Alcibiades, at this moment in the war, functions doubly as an agent upon the factors and as a

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 231.

mirror of where they stand. Indeed, the very mode by which agency combines with mirroring will differ. Pericles' particular bearing on the general situation is resumed into the speeches that exhibit him. These speeches exemplify a particular phase of the war and serve as agencies to influence a particular kind of policy—or not to influence, since they are partially unheeded.²⁷ “When he died his foresight about the war was still further recognized” (II. 65). For Nicias, and for the dark events around Syracuse, the man and the time are characterized first by a reasoned speech not forceful enough to prevail, and finally by the relative silence of desperate defensive maneuvers. The individual in this instance would seem to have developed under the pressure of circumstances, since at an earlier moment Thucydides has asserted that Nicias urged the peace “to leave a name to later time” (V. 16).

Thucydides' managed silences too, as Reinhardt and Schadewaldt have emphasized,²⁸ preserve that neutrality. “What [your] nature always willed has been tested to the point of truth” (III. 64. 4: ἀ . . . ἡ φύσις αἰεὶ ἐβούλετο) are in the Greek plural and particular. The literal meaning is “The things which your nature always wished.” The wish is general, and the truth is singular, a generalizing abstraction (τὸ ἀληθές). So the Boeotians say to the Plataeans, but the notion will apply to the whole *History*. Most of Thucydides' uses of φύσις “nature” mean “human nature.” And of the twenty times he uses φύσις, “human” or its equivalent is attached in nine. This quality, however, is not taken for granted, nor does it operate on the surface. It must be “tested to the truth” by the participants, and overridingly by Thucydides himself, whose *History* constitutes such a testing.

Nor is war a special case. “Many difficulties (πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπά) fell upon the cities in the uprising,” he says of the Corcyrean Revolution, “occurring and always bound to occur so long as the nature of man is the same, though more peaceful and changing in their forms according to how the particular transformations of events (ξυντυχιῶν) may impinge (ἐφιστῶνται)” (III. 82. 2). “For all things by their nature (πέφυκε) do indeed diminish” (II. 64. 3), Pericles reminds the Athenians at the moment when he is assuring them that the glory of their empire will survive in memory. Nature, necessity (ἀνάγκη), and customary behavior (τὸ εἰωθός) are linked in his presentation.²⁹

Thucydides' neutrality extends even to the presentation of himself

²⁷ See Peter R. Pouncey, *The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism* (New York 1980), and Gomme, II, p. 195.

²⁸ Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, p. 301, and Gomme, I, pp. 25–29; also Karl Reinhardt, *Das Vermächtnis der Antike* (Göttingen 1960).

²⁹ Walter Müri, *op. cit.*, pp. 155 ff.

in the third person both as a writer and as a participant (IV. 104. 4), and it is significant that in his “second preface” Thucydides adopts for a few sentences the grammatical sleight of an imagined, neutral observer. “If someone does not consider the intervening truce to be accounted war, he will not judge rightly. Let him look to how it is discriminated by the events, and he will find it not a likely thing (*οὐκ εἰκὸς ὄν*) for it to be assessed as peace” (V. 26. 2).

The elaborate negatives here, and the six different verbs for mental sifting, establish, as though through syntactic struggle, the neutrality of viewpoint that Thucydides everywhere aims at. A sense of the severity with which he maintains this steadiness of view impends upon this neutrality, and a sparkling clarity of presentation holds his details in unwavering coordination. The neutrality heightens the relational interaction between general and particular.

Many constraints bear on the historian’s task generally, and some obligation to preserve neutrality is one of them. Neutrality is the attitudinal aspect of the obligation to narrate events “wie sie eigentlich gewesen.” Another constraint obliges him to report only facts he can be reasonably sure were the case. This is Thucydides’ “accuracy” (*ἀκρίβεια*). Still another constraint obliges him to select them for some kind of congruence to his purpose, as Thucydides is a military historian. Another constraint inhibits the historian from avoiding a mediation of his events, inducing him to adjudicate between general and particular in any case. He is obliged to steer somewhat clear of what could be taken for bare reportage. On the one hand he must suspend judgment while suspending his long-range connections. On the other hand mediation requires that he not give just a flat summary of events; he must not simply offer a chronicle. The balance of mediation obliges the historian to steer a constant middle course between tract and chronicle. Thucydides not only understood this requirement, as Herodotus had. The speeches offer him an indirect, “doubled” mode of introducing interpretation while maintaining neutrality.

In this sense he must hold to the narrative, and his skillful management of all these constraints strengthens his narrative, allowing it to take on details for which the necessity cannot be argued on any logical framework. In the case of Thucydides, these details sometimes stun through similarity; particulars worked on by a coordinating intellection evolve into generality. The narrative of the Sicilian campaign would presumably carry a comparable sense of the action if it were divested of half its details, and yet the extra details, what

I have elsewhere called "the visionary filler,"³⁰ do not diffuse the narrative, but rather sharpen it; the particulars function as cumulative demonstration, and in the narrative mode a sense of their necessity does not vanish once a general view is sensed.

In any case, before the investigation of the theoretician, the hard outline of what we would call an "event" disappears.³¹ As Koselleck argues, history "as such" has no object at all, a condition that makes "bare history originally a metahistorical category."³²

Any historian is thus pulled in two directions by the particular and by the general, and the mystery of his task resides in striking a balance between them that will operate along a narrative line. As Paul Ricoeur says, "it is the place of universals in a science of the singular that is at issue,"³³ though even the word "science" is misleading here, since in the historical narrative hypothesis and conclusion are fused together. There is a mix of the two in the ongoing narrative that the historian mediates, and may mediate differently within a given work. Particular and general have a different relationship in the speeches of Thucydides³⁴ and in the more directly narrative portions. The speeches have a double role as explanatory pauses establishing a general case, and as subsumed particulars globally aligned with the details of action, along the lines of Thucydides' constant distinction between *λόγοι* and *ἔργα*, words and deeds.

Thucydides' statements about persons or events are briefer than his narrative presentation of them. This seeming disproportion or sparseness of interpretation actually creates, together with the management of other constraints, a sense that a general view is being gradually furthered. It permits Thucydides sharply to enunciate what all successful historians must, the partial synecdoche that constitutes his *κτῆμα ἐξ αἰεί*. Particular events have to have been selected for some general aim for them not to be a chaotic mass. The selection is partial even of those the historian can know—for Thucydides only those that have not been inescapably lost in the dimness of time. As

³⁰ Albert Cook, *Myth and Language*, pp. 178–83.

³¹ Paul Veyne, *Comment on écrit l'histoire* (Paris 1971), pp. 18–38.

³² Reinhart Koselleck, in *Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft und Praxis des Geschichtsunterrichts*, ed. Werner Conze (Stuttgart 1972), pp. 10–28.

³³ Paul Ricoeur, *The Contribution of French Historiography to a Theory of History* (Oxford 1980), p. 19.

³⁴ N. G. L. Hammond, "The Particular and the Universal in the Speeches of Thucydides," in *The Speeches in Thucydides* (Chapel Hill 1973), pp. 49–59. Aristotle makes too facile a judgment about this relationship by a simple contrast between poetry and history, "poetry tells us rather the universals, history the particulars" (*Poetics* 1451 b 2–3). I have discussed this question in *Myth and Language*, p. 299, note 6.

particulars they suggest a generality to which they relate; they are inescapably synecdochic. But the synecdoche does not operate the way it does in poetry; there is no whole for which the parts can stand. The whole is only adumbrated, and the synecdoche remains only partial, mediating perpetually between general and particular.

This mediation entails a sense of irony, and all or nearly all successful historians are ironic in ways that are also partial. One event is bound to throw another into an ironic light, or the historian offers us just a chronicle. The overlooking of Pericles' advice, the escape of Alcibiades from the war he had urged, the fruitlessness of the articulations of the Melians to save their lives, the failure of the overweening Athenians in Sicily—the ironies of event multiply in Thucydides, who rarely makes an out-and-out ironic remark. Some irony in the historical narrative is unavoidable through the initial chaos of the referent, and yet an overall irony is impossible if the historian retains the order of the referent as a goal. The ironies play over the work as a sort of multiple running check against sliding back to mere particulars or against wholly backing some oversimplifying generality that would undo the tension of the narrative. The interpretative touch of ironic statement in later historians such as Tacitus or Gibbon or Burckhardt will jog the narrative along. Thucydides, we may say, shows his earliness in the intensity by which he stiffly refrains, by and large, from such touches.

The speeches, again, serve to double the ironic possibilities, not only between event and event, but between what is said and what happens, between *λόγος* and *ἔργον*. Any speech, as a complex of ratiocinative recommendations aimed at the future, is bound to be tested by that future, and bound to miss its mark somewhat, generating the implied irony of contrast. And even if the speech hits its mark, there is the irony that still the speech may not be heeded, as Nicias' speech is not. There is generally an impelling onward movement toward conquest through the whole *History*, against which any speech, or any sequence of speeches, protests in vain. So there may be said to obtain a further, deeper irony between momentary if tensely reasoned arguments and silent, overriding motives. The Athenians do not listen to Pericles when he recommends restraint about campaigns, at his point of maximum prestige and maximum social authority. "Your knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*) is better than another force that has good fortune (*εὐτυχούσης*)" (VII. 63. 4). So Nicias says to troops whose morale is low as the Sicilians are pressing them hard. Not only does the disastrous outcome render these words ironic. Thucydides' own principles do, since "knowledge," here meaning military skill, ought to be sufficient to know that it will be a decisive

factor only if other factors are equal. This is what Pericles had insisted long before, weighing up the whole balance of factors, and there is the irony that Nicias, who seems to be imitating Pericles, is inadequate to his model. Of the factors that count, it is precisely strength or force (*βῶμη*) and happenstance (*τύχη*) that figure large.

So particular is the narrative of Thucydides that it often stays close to the maximum point of particularity. In its onward flow, however, it pauses most notably for the speeches, which do not halt the action but poise on the brink of futurity and decision. They themselves, seen not as ruminations over the events but as themselves an event, particularize still further. They are given not word by word as uttered, but word by word to delineate the arguments presented. This makes each clause, and sometimes each word, a microscopic encapsulation of dialectical relations between particular and general. Their reference is to a moment in an idea, and as such the terms in the speeches present a double face. With respect to their referents they are reconstructively concrete, and their character as signs must work more actively just because the individual words are constructive rather than reported. But the actual words are abstract with respect to their lexical origin, and also with respect to their syntactic function.

Because of his onward flow, and his intermittent nervous adduction of qualifying abstraction, Thucydides is not felt to be slipping from particular to general, or from concrete to abstract. He can get back again very fast. For this reason, as well as for those Finley gives,³⁵ he operates, in a sense, midway between the paratactic (*λέξεις εἰρομένη*) and the hypotactic or subordinate (*λέξεις κατεστραμμένη*). Actually, even to describe him so may obscure the fact that the coordinates on which he operates permit of the occasional combination of these two styles, but not for their discrimination. His partial synecdoche makes him always potentially a subordinator, but the stringing of one event onto another in the narrative line pulls against this tendency.

To use Lloyd's terms for persistent tendencies in Greek thought,³⁶ Thucydides implicitly subsumes both the polarity that would make him subordinate his particulars under a general heading and the analogy which would make him coordinate them. Polarity and analogy are readapted to the constantly testing linearity of his presentation. In the sentences, frequent in his work, which seem to derive from, and distort, the *isocola* formalized as stylistic desiderata by Gorgias, the balances between clauses are almost always subverted. The feeling

³⁵ Finley, *op. cit.*, pp. 253–69.

³⁶ G. E. L. Lloyd, *Polarity and Analogy: Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought* (Cambridge 1966).

given by Thucydides' wrenching style is of too much pressing upon the sentence to be distributed out in even clauses. Only in the tendentious argumentation of an advocate uttering a speech will they be pressed into balance, or in the high piety and enthusiasm of Pericles' Funeral Oration. And even in such instances the abstractions brought into balance are themselves terms not usually polarized.

The compression of thinking into these terms individually shows in their somewhat unusual contrast collectively. Dionysius of Halicarnassus takes Thucydides to task for a number of stylistic sleights. All of these could be redescribed as distortions of language into imbalance under pressure: the substitution of noun for verb and of verb for noun; of active for passive and of passive for active; the change of tenses; the frequent use of parentheses and involution; the substitution of person for thing and thing for person. Dionysius speaks, too, of Thucydides' enthymemes. These logical proofs with one term left out will serve well to indicate the onward "slippage" of Thucydides' demonstration.

As Wille says of Thucydides, "Formal analogies can cover actual differences, while actual analogies are concealed in formal variations."³⁷ This happens especially when he is moving from more particular to somewhat less, and from concrete description to abstract reflection, as spectacularly in his transition to general observations after the Corcyrean rebellion:

πάσά τε ἰδέα κατέστηθι θανάτου, καὶ οἶον φιλεῖ ἐν τῷ τοιοῦτῳ γίγνεσθαι, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω. καὶ γὰρ πατὴρ παῖδα ἀπέκτενε καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν ἀπεσπῶντο καὶ πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἐκτείνοντο, οἱ δὲ τινες καὶ περιοικοδομηθέντες ἐν τοῦ Διονύσου τῷ ἱερῷ ἀπέθανον.

Οὕτως ὡμῆ (ῆ) στάσις προχώρησε, καὶ ἔδοξε μᾶλλον, διότι ἐν τοῖς πρώτῃ ἐγένετο, ἐπεὶ ὕστερόν γε καὶ πᾶν ὡς εἰπεῖν τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν ἐκινήθη, διαφορῶν οὐσῶν ἐκασταχοῦ τοῖς τε τῶν δῆμων προστάταις τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπάγεσθαι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίγοις τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ' ἐτόμιον παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, πολεμονύμων δὲ καὶ ξυμμαχίας ἅμα ἐκατέρως τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσι αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥαδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζοντι βουλομένοις ἐπορίζοντο. καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσις ταῖς πόλεσι.

Every form of death occurred, and as is wont to happen in such cases, there was nothing that did not transpire and yet more extremely. Yes, and father slew child, and people were dragged from the temples and killed near them, and some were walled up and died in the temple of Dionysus.

So the raw strife proceeded, and, because this was the first example

³⁷ Günter Wille, "Zu Stil und Methode des Thukydides" (1963) in Hans Herter, ed., *op. cit.*, p. 691.

of it, it seemed even worse than it was; later, practically the whole of the Greek world was stirred up, because in every state quarrels gave occasion to the democratic leaders to ask for aid from Athens, to the oligarchs to ask Sparta. In peace, without the excuse and indeed without the readiness to summon them; but in war and with an alliance at hand for either side, to injury for their enemies and to advantage for themselves, inducements were easily furnished to those wishing to innovate. Many were the calamities that befell the Greek states through this civil strife. (III. 81.5–82.2: Gomme, revised)

Intermediate abstraction has already begun in the sentence about the father killing the son. This is not one instance but a type case of which there could have been more than one instance, though one single salient instance of horror, the walling up of suppliants in the temple of Dionysus, brings the sentence to its climax. The typification of the first instance modifies the horror of the last, while the actuality of the last instance concretizes the whole passage even further. There is also a shift between singular and plural for the verb here, and for “temple” (*ἱερόν*), though the cases are suspended differently between particular and general.

The jump to much higher generalization in “raw strife” (*ὠμή στάσις*) reveals, and incorporates, the horror. Thucydides controls and compresses his diction while his syntax forces into extreme torsions here. He goes on to describe another kind of slippage than the one his mastery is enlisting, a slippage of diction:

ἑστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πίστει τῶν προγενομένων πολλὸν ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινούσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ' ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιμωριῶν ἀτοπία. καὶ τὴν εἰωθίαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαίωσει. τόλμα μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίση, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθῆς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνητὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν.

So as the affairs of the cities kept going into revolt, the later outbreaks, by knowledge of what had gone before were marked by ever-increasing novelty of rationales, shown both in the ingenuity of attack and the enormity of revenge. They changed the customary validation of terms as men claimed the right to use them to suit the deeds: unreasoning daring was termed loyal courage; prudent delay specious cowardice; moderation the cloak of timidity; and understanding of the whole to be in everything inactive. (82. 3: Gomme, revised)

“As men claimed the right to use them” translates the single term *δικαίωσις*, “adjudication,” a term usually applied to court actions, and sometimes to the punishment assigned after judgment. All these senses tinge Thucydides’ use without modifying it. *This* word refuses to refer to that which it describes and unwittingly exemplifies—the

“judgers” are “judged” by Thucydides, and even self-punished by destroying the use of the language to get them out of such later enterprises as the Sicilian Expedition or the rule of the Four Hundred. Under such stress, however, the language must respond by a corresponding compactness and agility, as in this extraordinary case Thucydides is exemplifying when he takes the fairly unimportant Corcyrean rebellion as a typifying instance. When he gets to still bigger and more crucial events, he cannot digress for so long.

The increasing pressure not to digress confines Thucydides' presentational variation simply to relativizing his linear detail. Sometimes he offers a great deal of detail, in campaigns important for the war or for their emblematic force. Less often he scales down the amount of detail he gives. We cannot be sure that his omission of speeches in Book Eight indicates incompleteness and not the writer's decision to foreshorten from this point on. Having been initiated to the argumentative processes of speeches, the informed reader is in a position to make do with summaries so as to move forward more cogently.

The principle of relevance in the *History* operates simply at first; every detail must relate to the one all-embracing war. But the *History* starts out at a higher level of complexity and generality than the one it maintains, since Thucydides delays his prefatory theoretical remarks till after the “Archaeology” and delays the Pentēkontaetia till after the beginnings of conflict. The shifts from one to another of these four initial units might tempt a critic to provide schematizations,³⁸ but the onward pressure of events will undo such large-scale structural deductions. Thucydides cannot be found to have invented a structure more complex than his implied rule of explaining only what time has brought new to the conditions of the war. He could have built the *History*, after all, on a version of Herodotus' more complex pattern, the intertwining of distant with close time-frames and ethnographic monographs with narratives. As it is, his narrative almost mimetically changes course as the war changes course. The Olympian viewpoint of the Archaeology and the Pentēkontaetia cannot be brought in to provide a Herodotus-like expansive disquisition about Persian politics in Book Eight.

By that point Thucydides has established his theoretical control over the factors governing the narrative. Those come as a gradual revelation, and their increasing explicitness reinforces the simple but

³⁸ Schadewaldt, *op. cit.*, pp. 391–94. Schadewaldt diagrams the narrative according to three foci of exposition, “Wesensdeutung,” “Machtmotiv” and “Pathologie Athens.”

elusive near-pattern he is singlemindedly elaborating. The synecdoche can only be partial, but its theoretical force holds.

Plato, and later Aristotle, devised categories that would solve problems about the relation of general and particular. In the *History* Thucydides offers an ongoing instantiation of how one kind of relation evolves between general and particular through a complex temporal sequence.

Brown University

4

Esse Videatur Rhythm in the Greek New Testament *Gospels* and *Acts of the Apostles*

J. K. NEWMAN

A recent book¹ has raised again the important exegetical question of rhetoric and the Christian New Testament. But the topic of prose rhythm is advanced there only to be dismissed on the grounds that "evidence from inscriptions and papyri seems to indicate that long and short syllables were often not accurately and systematically differentiated in the pronunciation of koine Greek." Later, when the Lord's Prayer is found to display identifiable clausula endings, for the author this still does not make extensive analysis of New Testament prose rhythms of more than debatable value.

No doubt these difficulties exist. But evidently it was possible for writers of formal Hellenistic prose to pay attention to prose rhythms. One need look no further than Plutarch.² The difficulty seems to be that the authors of the New Testament, and of the Gospels in particular, are not regarded as capable of that degree of sophistication.³

Already so great a scholar as Eduard Norden presents a classic

¹ George A. Kennedy, *New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism* (Chapel Hill and London 1984). Particular allusion is made here to pages 30 and 59.

² F. H. Sandbach, *Classical Quarterly* 33 (1939), pp. 194–203, with special reference to the work of A. W. de Groot.

³ Understanding is not helped by the blanket use of the term "koine Greek" for the often very subtle and complex language of the New Testament. It has about as much value to the literary historian as "Silver Latin" for anything post-Augustan.

example of this failure to read the evidence. In the first volume of his *Antike Kunstprosa*⁴ Norden supplies an analysis of the long Greek inscription discovered in 1890 and erected in the first century B.C. by King Antiochus of Commagene. He notes that there are 49 occurrences of cretic/trochaic combinations of which 19 are resolved into the *esse videatur* pattern. The inscription as a whole is for him "a dithyramb in prose," a fine illustration of the second Asian style described by Cicero.⁵

Elsewhere,⁶ Norden speaks approvingly of an article proposing that the documents of early Christianity should not be considered part of literary history because they do not make use of the forms of real literature. He supplies another long comparison of the synoptic Gospels with one another in an effort to show that Luke is a more conscious stylist than his peers. But even so he prefaces his remarks with the statement that "Die Evangelien stehen völlig abseits von der kunstmäßigen Literatur."

In fact, the Gospels are most carefully constructed examples of Greek dialogic literature, which is exactly the tradition evoked by Justin when he calls them ἀπομνημονεύματα.⁷ They and the Acts of the Apostles use, in telling contexts, the very rhythm that Norden regards as characteristic of the elaborate Asian style. St. Mark's version⁸, for example, of the Cry from the Cross (a quotation from Psalms 22) is: Ὁ Θεός μου ὁ Θεός μου, εἰς τί ἐγκατέλιπές με; (15:34). A comparison with Matthew 27:46 is instructive. St. John leads into the Last Word with πάντα τετέλεσται, (19:28). The Voice that interrupts St. Paul on the road to Damascus also uses the first paeon and spondee: Σαουλ Σαουλ, τί με διώκεις; (Acts 9:4; cf. 22:7; 26:14).

When Pilate is nettled by Christ's refusal to speak, Matthew makes him ask: Οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνη . . . ; (26:62). Like the Cry from the Cross in Mark, this is an important "dialogic" example. In the very next chapter of the same Gospel, the plan to let the brigand Barabbas go free while Jesus is put to death calls for a spondaic/trochaic admixture that duly culminates in an *esse videatur* clausula: ἵνα αἰτήσωνται τὸν Βαραββᾶν, τὸν δὲ Ἰησοῦν ἀπολέσωσιν (27:20). The contrast between the rhythms of the two long verbs, and the isocolic parallelism linking the proper names, is noteworthy.

⁴ Fifth edition, repr. Stuttgart 1958, pp. 140 ff.

⁵ *Brutus* 325: *verbis volucre atque incitatum, quali nunc est Asia tota, nec flumine solum orationis sed etiam exornato et facto genere verborum.*

⁶ *Op. cit.*, II, pp. 479 ff. The quotation is from p. 480.

⁷ Norden, p. 481.

⁸ The New Testament is cited throughout from the text prepared for the British and Foreign Bible Society by E. Nestle and G. D. Kilpatrick (repr. London 1962).

These initial examples from familiar passages suggest that, for the writers of the New Testament, the stereotyped clausula still had significant life. A list of further examples, which does not of course claim to be complete, repays study.

I. *Matthew*

6:19 and 20 βρῶσις ἀφανίξει, . . .

From the Sermon on the Mount. A nuance of irony and contempt, whose repetitions remind us of similar tricks in Ovid,⁹ for the man who amasses this world's goods? See the following instance.

6:24 τοῦ ἐτέρου καταφρονήσει

(Cf. Luke 16:13.) Also from the same context. "You cannot serve two masters."

6:30 οὐ πολλῶ μάλλον ὑμᾶς, ὀλιγόπιστοι;

(Cf. 8:26; 16:8.) A fourth example from chapter 6. Here certainly there is an ironic and impatient note in this "dialogic" question directed at those who doubt Providence. ὀλιγόπιστοι, of which the Rabbinical *ktn 'mnh* looks like a calque, is first attested in this passage. Compare Luke 12:28, below.

When this rhythm next occurs in Matthew, we are in the middle of a rebuke by Christ to the disbelieving cities:

11:20 ὅτι οὐ μετενόησαν

Cf. 11:21 πάλαι ἂν ἐν σάκκῳ καὶ σποδῶ μετενόησαν.

and Luke 10:13, in the same context, where the insertion of a participle leaves the rhythm intact: πάλαι ἂν ἐν σάκκῳ καὶ σποδῶ καθημένοι μετενόησαν.

Two chapters later, the end of the world and the Last Judgment are in view:

13:47 ἐκ παντὸς γένους συναγαγούσῃ

Another note of ironic disgust and condemnation?

19:20 Ταῦτα πάντα ἐφύλαξα

⁹ E.g. *Metamorphoses* III. 353 (positive) and 355 (negative), exactly the pattern of this passage from the Sermon on the Mount.

If the hiatus is tolerable,¹⁰ the Rich Young Man here confidently (over-confidently?) asserts his own blameless conduct. With the rhythm may be compared οὗτος ὁ τελώνης (Luke 18:11), the prayer of the self-righteous man.

The effect of Pilate's Οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνη . . . ; (26:62), and of Ἰησοῦν ἀπολέσωσι (27:20) was already noted.

A last example from Matthew is furnished by

28:17 καὶ ἰδόντες αὐτὸν προσεκύνησαν, οἱ δὲ ἐδίστασαν.

An emotional profession of faith by those who found themselves able to believe. Yet even this implies a dialogue. "Some were in two minds" (internal debate) and certainly Jesus is himself to speak shortly.

What is striking in all the examples adduced here from Matthew is the element of reproof and even savage satire found in them. At the end, the believers are balanced by the doubters. This pattern of meaning is not maintained by the other Gospels, but I suggest that it gives some indication of the primitive levels on which this rhythm draws.

II. Mark

3:4 ἀγαθὸν ποιῆσαι ἢ κακοποιῆσαι, ψυχὴν σῶσαι ἢ ἀποκτεῖναι; οἱ δὲ ἐσιώπων.

A tense confrontation, again therefore an intended dialogue, but one in which one of the parties refuses to participate. The passage gains in pathos from the realization of this refusal, betrayed by the rhythms. Contrast Pilate's Οὐδὲν ἀποκρίνη . . . ; where however Christ does at long last break his silence.

4:29 παρέστηκεν ὁ θερισμός.

Cf. παρέστηκεν ὁ τρυγητός (LXX Joel 3:13). The end of the world: cf. Matt. 13:47, already quoted.

8:24 ὡς δένδρα ὀρώ περιπατοῦντας.

The blind man begins to recover his sight. A moment of extreme emotional release, perhaps with some metamorphosing comedy in it.

¹⁰ And if it is not, the heroic clausula has its own history!

9:7 Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ Υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός, . . .

The solemn revelation of Christ's divinity. Compare John 1:32 and 33, and 36, below.

10:32 καὶ ἦν προάγων αὐτοὺς ὁ Ἰησοῦς, καὶ ἐθαμβοῦντο, οἱ δὲ ἀκολουθοῦντες ἐφοβοῦντο.

Religious awe (*θάμβος*) and fear, the expression aided by homoeoteleuton and isocolon (10; 5; 11) as well as by the paeonic/trochaic rhythm.¹¹

12:27 οὐκ ἔστιν Θεὸς νεκρῶν ἀλλὰ ζώντων. πολὺ πλανᾶσθε.

Another tense confrontation: see 3:4, above. It is this emotion which perhaps allows us to ride over (or at least to attenuate in some way) the period after *ζώντων*. Contrast Matthew 22:29, where *πλανᾶσθε* is used in the same scene, but no attempt is made to exploit the paeonic rhythm.

12:44 ὅλον τὸν βίον αὐτῆς.

The climax of the pathetic story of the Widow's Mite. Contrast the handling of the same story in Luke 21:4.

13:11 καὶ ὅταν ἄγωσιν ὑμᾶς παραδιδόντες, . . .

The Christians threatened with persecution. Compare *μέλλει παραδίδοσθαι* (Luke 9:44), quoted below.

13:28 ἐγγὺς τὸ θέρος ἐστίν.

Cf. *ἐγγὺς τὸ θέρος ἐστίν* at Luke 21:30. The end of the world. Cf. 4:29 above.

15:34 εἰς τί ἐγκατέλιπές με;

The anguished Cry from the Cross. A supreme example of this rhythm in dialogic question.

¹¹ The effect of the periphrastic *ἦν προάγων*, which throws the stress onto the subject of the first clause, should also be noted: cf. H. B. Rosén, "Die 'zweiten' Tempora des Griechischen: Zum Prädikatsausdruck beim griechischen Verbum," *Museum Helveticum* 14 (1957), pp. 133-54. See the article by Gerald M. Browne, below.

III. *Luke*

1:29 λόγῳ διεταράχθη, καὶ διελογίζετο ποταπὸς εἶη ὁ ἄσπασμὸς οὗτος.

The Annunciation. Evidently another instance of dialogic mental turmoil.

2:35 καρδιῶν διαλογισμοί.

The prophecy of Simeon, and reminiscent of 1:29. With the noun *διαλογισμοί* may be compared the verb *διελογίζετο* there. It looks very much as if the more style-conscious Luke begins his Gospel with what Formalists call a “*dénudation du procédé*,” a “laying bare of the device” by which *esse videatur* rhythm is expressly associated with dialogue, with internal dialogue in particular.

6:9 ἡ κακοποιῆσαι, . . .

Cf. Mark 3:4 above.

6:23 and 26 οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν.

(Cf. Acts 7:52.) Denunciation.

7:6 ἐπορεύετο σὺν αὐτοῖς.

On the way to cure the centurion’s servant. This is perhaps a first example of a type which could be catalogued as “scenery.”¹² The actual phrase may not refer to anything very striking, but its rhythm establishes a certain mood which conditions the reader to expect the marvelous.

7:22 τυφλοὶ ἀναβλέπουσιν, χωλοὶ περιπατοῦσιν, λεπροὶ καθαρίζονται,

Christ’s message to John’s disciples, displaying a double example of the paeonic rhythm, aided by isocolon (7; 7; 7) and homoeoteleuton, of which there is more in the context. Cf. Mark 10:32, above.

8:5 καὶ κατεπατήθη, . . .

The fate of the seed that fell by the wayside.

9:44 μέλλει παραδίδοσθαι . . .

¹² I borrow this term from G. N. Knauer, who uses it in *Die Aeneis und Homer* (Göttingen 1964) to describe those occasions when Virgil evokes a background rather than any particular characterization from Homer for his actors.

We have already met this rhythm in a similar context (Mark 13:11, quoted above). No doubt for the earliest Christians it had a special resonance.

10:13 *καθήμενοι μετενόησαν.*

Cf. exactly the same rhythm in the same context at Matthew 11:21, quoted above.

11:18 *εἰ δὲ καὶ ὁ Σατανᾶς ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν διεμερίσθη, . . .*

Cf. below, 12:51. Here, an impossible suggestion is derided.¹³

11:22 *αὐτοῦ διαδίδωσιν.*

The same context, the same notion of violence.

11:40 *ἔσωθεν ἐποίησεν;*

More tense confrontation.

12:28 *ὕμᾶς, δλιγόπιστοι.*

Cf. Matthew 6:31, quoted above.

12:51 *ἡ διαμερισμόν.*

More violence. "I have not come to bring peace, but division."

15:6 *μου τὸ ἀπολλῶς.*

and

15:7 *ἁμαρτωλῶ μετανοοῦντι . . .*

Pathos and joy over the lost sheep. Compare

15:10 *ἁμαρτωλῶ μετανοοῦντι.*

16:13 *ἑτέρου καταφρονήσει.*

Compare Matthew 6:24, exactly the same rhythm in the same context.

¹³ Not so much perhaps "And if Satan also . . ." ("Equally, if Satan is divided," according to the *New English Bible*) as "Even granted that Satan. . ." For the force of *εἰ* . . . *καί* here, cf. R. Jebb's appendix to his edition of Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus* (3rd ed., Cambridge 1893), p. 224, on v. 305: the usage would come under Jebb's (3): J. D. Denniston, *The Greek Particles* (repr. Oxford 1970), p. 303.

16:26 μηδ(ἐ) ἐκέϊθεν πρὸς ἡμᾶς διαπερῶσιν.

The gulf fixed between heaven and hell. The cretics here leading into the paemonic/trochaic clausula would do credit to Cicero.¹⁴

18:8 πίστιν ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς;

An anguished question about the end of the world.

18:11 οὗτος ὁ τελώνης;

A quiver of contempt in the voice of the self-righteous man, engaged in prayer (= dialogue with God). Compare the Rich Young Man in Matthew 19:20 quoted above.

21:30 ἐγγὺς τὸ θέρος ἐστίν;

The end of the world. Cf. Mark 13:28, the same context and quotation.

24:17 Τίνες οἱ λόγοι οὗτοι οὐς ἀντιβάλλετε πρὸς ἀλλή||λους περιπατοῦντες;

An extraordinary instance of the double occurrence of this rhythm in a dialogic question, here preparing the way for the revelation of the Resurrection.

IV. John

1:22 τί λέγεις περὶ σεαυτοῦ;

Exactly the technique just noted in Luke. John the Baptist is asked to identify himself. His declaration will prepare the way for Christ.

Now four examples follow in quick succession.

1:32 τὸ Πνεῦμα καταβαῖνον . . .

Cf. 1:33 τὸ Πνεῦμα καταβαῖνον || καὶ μένον ἐπ' αὐτόν,

The revelation of divinity calls for the same rhythms as at Mark 9:7 and Luke 24:17, noted above. Cf. fourthly

1:36 τῷ Ἰησοῦ περιπατοῦντι . . .

¹⁴ Cf. τὸν δὲ Ἰησοῦν ἀπολέσωσιν, Matthew 27:20, cited above. Compare Cicero, Verrine V. 16. 40: *infamiam fugerit quam sin(e) ulla voluptate capiebat.*

the recruitment of the first disciples.

4:8 τροφὰς ἀγοράσωσιν.

Jesus is exhausted and thirsty, and is about to make an unexpected revelation of himself to the Samaritan woman at Jacob's well. A "scenic" use, which nevertheless sets the stage for a long dialogue, not without some touches of humor.

4:47 ἤμελλεν γὰρ ἀποθνήσκειν.

The royal official's son saved from death. John is attracted by this rhythm with this verb: cf. ἤμελλεν ἀποθνήσκειν (12:33) and ἤμελλεν ἀποθνήσκειν (18:32). With this may be compared ἐν τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ ὑμῶν ἀποθανείσθε (8:21) and μὴ ὄλον τὸ ἔθνος ἀπόληται (11:50).

11:29 ἤρχετο πρὸς αὐτόν·

Lazarus' sister Mary goes out to meet Jesus. Scenery for a resurrection. Cf. ἐπορεύετο σὺν αὐτοῖς (Luke 7:6), quoted above, and the disputed 8:2, discussed below.

13:7 γνώση δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα.

A promise of future revelation made at the Last Supper, with a telling verb.

19:7-8 . . . Υἱὸν Θεοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐποίησεν. Ὅτε οὖν ἤκουσεν ὁ Πειλᾶτος τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, μᾶλλον ἐφοβήθη.

At the trial, and therefore in a dialogue. Religious foreboding and fear leads to the use of *esse videatur* rhythm in consecutive sentences. Cf. Mark 10:32 and Luke 24:17, quoted above.

19:28 πάντα τετέλεσται, . . .

The end approaches.

20:23 . . . κρατήτε, κεκράτηνται.

The conferring of the Holy Spirit. It is interesting that the rhythm is associated with the negative pole.

The list of examples in John has not included the often questioned opening of chapter 8, where the woman taken in adultery is forgiven. In fact, this passage shows three interesting usages of this rhythm. At the beginning

8:2 ἤρχετο πρὸς αὐτόν. . . .

sets the scene. We expect something extraordinary. Exactly the same phrase introduces the resurrection of Lazarus (11:29), quoted above.

Then two “dialogic” examples follow. Christ asks the sinner if anyone has condemned her:

8:10 οὐδεὶς σε κατέκρινεν;

And when she answers No, he rejoins:

8:11 Οὐδὲ ἐγὼ σε κατακρίνω.

The repetition is reminiscent of the Sermon on the Mount: cf. Matthew 6:19 and 20, quoted above. The question in itself recalls that of Pilate (Matthew 26:62), and its so different sequel.

V. Acts

1:2 ἐξελέξατ(ο) ἀνελήμφθη.

The Ascension.

2:1 ὁμοῦ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό.

2:17 καθ' ἡμέραν ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτό.

The Descent of the Holy Spirit and the first preaching of the Gospel. A striking instance of ring composition, marked both by recurrence of vocabulary and of rhythm, at the beginning and end of chapter 2, suggesting that here the division into chapters owed to Langton (1214) and the medieval Paris Bible corresponded to something in the author's purpose.

7:32 ἔντρομος δὲ γενόμενος Μωϋσῆς οὐκ ἐτόλμα κατανοῆσαι.

From the speech made by Stephen. The revelation at the Burning Bush. A dialogue with God.

7:43 ἐπέκεινα Βαβυλῶνος.

Prophetic denunciation, also from the speech of St. Stephen.

7:51 οἱ πατέρες ὑμῶν;

Yet another use of the paeon in an indignant question. Compare Luke 6:23 and 26, quoted above.

7:57 ὁμοθυμαδὸν ἐπ' αὐτόν, . . .
and

8:2 κοπετὸν μέγαν ἐπ' αὐτῷ.

The beginning and end of Stephen's execution, marked by recurring rhythms as in Acts 2. With the first phrase may be compared 21:32, below, where Paul is rescued from a similar onslaught.

9:5: cf. 22:7; 26:14 Σαουλ Σαουλ, τί με διώκεις;

Although the rhythm is slightly varied (to give a pherecratean), we may note in the same passage:

9:5 Ἰησοῦς ὃν σὺ διώκεις;

(Cf. 26:15, but contrast 22:7.) The question and answer, with their repeated verb, are strongly reminiscent of John 8:10–11, quoted above.

9:24 αὐτὸν ἀνέλωσιν.

A plot to kill St. Paul. St. John's fondness for this rhythm in deadly contexts is comparable.

9:38 πρὸς αὐτὸν παρακαλοῦντες,

The background to a resurrection.

10:6 οἰκία παρὰ θάλασσαν.

Cf. 10:32 βυρσέως παρὰ θάλασσαν.

Scenery at the crucial discovery that even Gentiles may receive the Holy Spirit.

12:10 καὶ εὐθέως ἀπέστη ὁ ἄγγελος ἀπ' αὐτοῦ.

The rhythm here marks the end of the story about Peter's miraculous release from prison. Compare 16:37, quoted below.

12:22 ὁ δὲ δῆμος ἐπεφώνει, Θεοῦ φωνὴ καὶ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου.

The Voice of God has already evoked this rhythm: Mark 9:7 and Acts 9:5. Here of course it is the prelude to a horrible death, described by the agricultural compound, applied with devastating irony to a man, σκωληκόβρωτος.

14:3 ἐπὶ τῷ λόγῳ τῆς χάριτος αὐτοῦ, . . .

The background to the signs and portents mentioned shortly in the context. Λόγῳ is telling. There is still dialogue.

16:26 ἠνέφχθησαν δὲ παραχρῆμα αἱ θύραι πάσαι, . . .

The symbolic opening of the doors.¹⁵

16:37 ἔξαγαγέτωσαν.

Indignant protest. Part of a dialogue concluding the miraculous rescue. The similar rhythm at the end of Peter's rescue (12:10) may be compared.

19:4 βάπτισμα μετανοίας, . . .

This picks up a rhythm often employed by the Gospels with this particular concept: cf. Matthew 11:20 and 21; Luke 10:13 and 15:10.

21:23 εἰσὶν ἡμῖν ἄνδρες τέσσαρες εὐχὴν ἔχοντες ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν·

A religious context, and of course the start of Paul's fateful involvement with the authorities. See 22:29, below.

21:29–30

. . . εἰσήγαγεν ὁ Παῦλος. ἐκινήθη τε ἡ πόλις ὅλη καὶ ἐγένετο συνδρομὴ τοῦ λαοῦ, καὶ ἐπιλαβόμενοι τοῦ Παύλου εἶλκον αὐτὸν ἔξω τοῦ ἱεροῦ, καὶ εὐθέως ἐκλείσθησαν αἱ θύραι.

The background to a riot, with the sentence following the *esse videatur* rhythm marked by isocolon (21; 20; 10) and homoeoteleuton. The closing of the doors is also a symbolic detail. The similar verb helps to link this closing with the earlier scene at Philippi (16:37, quoted above), where however the doors were opened.

21:32 κατέδραμεν¹⁶ ἐπ' αὐτούς·

The same context. A Roman tribune to the rescue. Contrast 7:57, the attack on Stephen, cited above.

¹⁵ Cf. O. Weinreich, "Gebet und Wunder" in *Genethliakon Wilhelm Schmid* (Stuttgart 1929), II Abhandlung (Türöffnung), pp. 280 ff., esp. 320 ff.

¹⁶ Allowing *muta cum liquida* to make position, as it does so often in Hellenistic literary Greek, e.g. in the *Gyges* fragment: see K. Latte, "Ein antikes Gygesdrama," *Eranos* 48 (1950), p. 138. Cf. *ēthnos*, John 11:50, quoted above.

22:29 εὐθέως οὖν ἀπέστησαν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ οἱ μέλλοντες αὐτὸν ἀνετάξειν·

The continuing story of Paul and the Roman authorities.

24:10 ἔμαυτὸν ἀπολογούμαι, . . .

A flourish in the course of the very first sentence of St. Paul's *apologia* before Felix, perhaps an extempore response to the careful rhetoric of the opposition's Tertullus.

25:7 οὐκ ἴσχυον ἀποδείξειν, . . .

An echo of the heated arguments before Festus' tribunal.

25:12 Καίσαρα ἐπικέκλησαι, ἐπὶ Καίσαρα πορεύσῃ.

The solemn judicial (and therefore dialogic) sealing of Paul's fate. All the majesty of the Empire is now to be engaged, with what fateful consequences for the Church!

26:5 ἔζησα Φαρισαίος.

Paul's *apologia* before Agrippa, fraught with memories and emotions.

The New Testament is of course filled with marvels, head-on challenges, reversals. There are many such passages where one might expect *esse videatur* rhythm, and where it does not occur. There are parallel passages, where one Evangelist uses it, and another does not. But these negatives (which of course do not prove that no other rhythms are used) cannot outweigh the positive evidence presented, which all suggests that this rhythm conveys a sense of excitement and agitation: the excitement of the Voice of God; of miracle, even of resurrection from the dead, of the end of the world; of the threat of death; of angry confrontation and denunciation; and then again of pathos and forgiveness.

Time and again in our lists we encountered this rhythm in dialogue, actual or implied, and this, I would like to suggest, is its basic usage. Its occurrence in rhetoric is to be explained by the fact that rhetoric is stereotyped dialogue, sometimes mechanized to the point of absurdity. The advantage of studying *esse videatur* in the New Testament is that it enables us to catch this rhythm in still living interchange, (which is nevertheless "kunstmäßig"). Hence the importance of those instances which occur in questions: Christ confronting his adversaries in debate; with the woman taken in adultery; wondering if at the end there will still be faith left on earth; before Pilate; before God

on the Cross; after the Resurrection teasing his disciples on the road to Emmaus; addressing Paul on the road to Damascus.

But of course in the Gospels and Acts this is also religious interchange, and here there is (*pace* Norden) a link with the Commagene inscription. When we read there τὴν ὁσιότητα (2), ἐν ἀγίωι λόφωι καθοσιωθεῖς (4), δαιμόνων ἐπιφανείαις (7), ἐνιαύσιον ἑορτήν (8), ἐγὼ καθοσιώσας (9), ἀξίως ἐπιτελείτω (11), we find something of the same tension and emotion. The King however expects from his audience only a respectful silence. Study of the New Testament helps us to understand the enormity of his claim.¹⁷

Our investigation has implications therefore for more than the interpretation of the New Testament. Already Norden compares the style of the Commagene inscription with some of Cicero's floridity, and certainly *esse videatur* was laughed at as early as Tacitus' *Dialogus*.¹⁸ There are pages where this rhythm appears to run riot.

But Cicero knows how to control this mannerism too,¹⁹ and rather than join Tacitus' Aper in accusing the great orator of automatism we must explain his fondness for these clausulae partly by studying particular effects, partly by the nature of his audience, and of the dialogic occasions of which he was so fond (including the *altercatio*), and partly by the difference of culture between the Romans and the peoples among whom the Asian style developed. This requires especial attention to the Roman (and Ciceronian) propensity for the comic and satirical, which meant that what emerged as serious and religious elsewhere for them took the stage (still therefore in "dialogic" guise) as farce, parody and wit. Something of this older spirit is still preserved in Aristophanes' use of this particular rhythm,²⁰ and with this may be associated the primitive element of satire and denunciation found notably in St. Matthew. But these large vistas open to another day.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

¹⁷ Cf. στόμα τ' εὐφημον ἄπας ἐξοσιώσθω, Eur. *Bacchae* 69-70. Yet it is precisely this play which illustrates the closeness of the religious and the comic.

¹⁸ C. 23. 1. Cf. Quintilian IX. 4. 73; X. 1. 18, adduced by Norden, pp. 927-28.

¹⁹ Cf. G. Panayiotou, *Consistency and Variation in Cicero's Oratorical Style*, diss. Urbana 1984 (available on microfilm), especially pp. 117-25 and 245-47. Professor Panayiotou compares two pairs of speeches, the *Pro Caecina* and the *De Imperio Cn. Pompei*, the *Pro Caelio* and the *Pro Balbo*, both delivered around the same time, to show how the *esse videatur* clausula is more common in the *De Imperio* and the *Pro Caelio*. The frequency of this clausula in the comic *Pro Caelio* is enlightening.

²⁰ See A. M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama* (2nd ed., Cambridge 1968), pp. 97-103. The rhythms of *Lysistrata* 781 ff. (a negative parable forming part of an *agon*) and 805 ff. (a counter-example) may be compared with the effects registered here.

5

Notes on the Meaning of Κολοκύνθη

J. L. HELLER

[0.01] Dio gives an account (LX. 35) of the hypocrisy of Agrippina and Nero after the death of Claudius—the man whom they had murdered and then pretended to mourn with a state funeral and laudation delivered by Nero but composed by Seneca (Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 3), and later with an official *consecratio* (*Ann.* XIII. 2) or deification—which includes the witty comment of Seneca's brother Gallio on their accomplishment. Tucked parenthetically into this account comes the now famous sentence: "Seneca too was the author of a composition which he called Ἀποκολοκύντῳσις as if it were a kind of immortalization." The formation and meaning of this strange word have been discussed endlessly. Most scholars believe that it was applied as a title to the extant wickedly satirical parody of dramatic narrative in prose and verse (which, however, is titled differently in the manuscripts), and that Seneca coined it as a comic substitute for Ἀποθέωσις, the Greek word which might have been expected from the conversation in the central part of the satire and is actually used in the title of the Sangallensis: *Divi Claudii Ἀποθέωσις per satiram*. But why did he base his comic formation on κολοκύνθη, the Attic form of κολοκύνθη, which *LSJ* defines as the plant called by Duchesne (1786) *Cucurbita maxima*, whose large round fruit we call a pumpkin or squash, the Germans (*Riesen-*) *Kürbis*, the French *courge* or *potiron*, the Italians *zucca* (*commune* or *da mangiare*)? Various answers have been given. What we may call the prevailing view has been restated in a recent article (*Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 82 [1978],

265–70) by H. Eisenberg, “Bedeutung und Zweck des Titels von Senecas ‘Apocolocyntosis’.”

[0.02] Referring to the useful survey of M. Coffey and the fundamental work of O. Weinreich,¹ Eisenberg concludes (270) that Seneca inscribed his newly coined Greek word as a formal title for his composition because he wished to stimulate his readers, to arouse their curiosity and put them in the right frame of mind for the reading of the satire, and to let them understand that what they held in their hands was directed against Claudius, a travesty of his deification. Though the readers might be disappointed on finding that the satire did not contain (265) any transformation into a *kolokyntē*—as the obvious analogy with *apotheōsis* might lead them to expect—and though the single word of the title did not mention Claudius (267), the sophisticated aristocracy of the court, for whose entertainment the work was designed (266), would understand, as they read along, the joke in this title. They would know that the Greek word *kolokyntē* had special prominence only in a few expressions which became proverbial, the *υγιέστερον κολοκύντας* of Epicharmus and Sophron and the *ἡ κρίνον ἢ κολοκύντην* of Diphilus and Menander (269 with footnotes 14 and 15; Eisenberg does not refer to the delightful fragment of Epicrates ridiculing the philosophers who were attempting to define the word, on which see Coffey, *Roman Satire*, 168).² And here the vegetable stands as the embodiment of health or a symbol of life as a lily was of death. But in Latin the equivalent *cucurbita* had the extended meaning *Dummkopf* or “stupid” in popular speech (Apul. *Met.* I. 15. 2 and Petron. 39. 13 are cited [270] from Weinreich),³ and Seneca’s readers, remembering (269) the laughter which had greeted Nero’s laudation (Tac. *Ann.* XIII. 3) of Claudius’ *providentia* and *sapientia*, and finding in the satire itself many references (e.g. 1. 1; 4. 1, v. 2; 7. 3; 8. 3) to Seneca’s real opinion of the opposite

¹ *Lustrum*, 6 (1961), 239–71; Coffey’s views are repeated without much change in chapter 9 of his book, *Roman Satire* (London and New York 1976). See also O. Weinreich, *Senecas Apocolocyntosis, die Satire auf Tod, Himmel- und Höllenfahrt des Kaisers Claudius* . . . (Berlin 1923), especially p. 11 for a list of Greek, Latin, Italian, English, and German expressions in which the word for *Kürbis*, a large globular vegetable, is applied to a person, implying his empty-headedness or stupidity.

² Eisenberg also neglects to mention the Aristophanic taunt (*Nub.* 327, *λημῆς κολοκύνταις* which R. Kilpatrick (in *Class. Journ.* 74 [1979], 193–96) coupled with the separative function of *ἀπο-* in some Greek denominative verbs in order to suggest that Seneca’s title implies that the deified Claudius was being relieved of the pumpkin-like impediments to his vision.

³ Here Eisenberg wisely omits Juvenal’s *ventosa cucurbita* (14. 58; see below, 1.01) which Weinreich had listed on his p. 11.

qualities of the *μῶρος* Claudius, could not fail to grasp the point of the title. In an *ἀποκολοκύντωσις* Claudius would attain “die Gestalt der *cucurbita*” (270), a derisive name (i.e. *Dummkopf* as inferred from Petronius and Apuleius) which already applied to him “wegen seiner Torheit”—an altogether appropriate transformation. Thus the single word of the title is interpreted by Eisenberg, not so much as “transformation into a fool,” for Claudius was already that in his lifetime, as “transformation (by means of deification) of a fool (i.e. Claudius),” or as C. F. Russo put it, not “trasformazione in una zucca” but “deificazione di una zucca” or “zucconeria divinazzata.”⁴ And thus Eisenberg would explain (though he did not mention them) the popular renderings of the title as *Verkürbissung*⁵ or *Pumpkinification*.⁶

[0.03] Before reaching this conclusion, Eisenberg had rejected some other theories about the formation of the title, namely (268, note 11) H. Wagenvoort’s 1934 proposal that it was modelled on the poorly attested *ἀποροφανίδωσις*, and (265) that of J. Gy. Szilágyi, who in 1963 suggested *ἀποβίωσις*, meaning “departure from life” with reference to Nero’s joke (Suet. *Nero* 33) that when Claudius ceased *morari inter homines* he also ceased to be a fool (*mōrari*). As for the ingenious article by A. N. Athanassakis (*Trans. Am. Philol. As.* 104 [1974], 11–22), Eisenberg (266) welcomes his idea that “in satire we must always watch for the double-entendre” (see also Athanassakis’ previous article, *Classical Philology* 68 [1973], 292–94), but remains cool to the suggestion that at the end of this satire, when Claudius is passed around rapidly from one person to another in the infernal court—what Coffey (*Lustrum* 6, 247) called his final degradation—he is very much like the large round ball with which Romans exercised at the baths (see, e.g., Petron. 27), so that he is indeed transformed figuratively into something resembling a pumpkin or *kolokyntē*. In turn Athanassakis had been cool (12) to Russo’s (and thus Eisenberg’s) interpretation of the title.

⁴ Coffey (*Roman Satire*, note 10), pointing out that “deification of a pumpkin” is still open to objection, refers to p. 18 of the 4th edition (Firenze 1964) of Russo’s useful Latin text with Italian commentary. The objection to Weinreich’s 1923 theory (namely that *apokolokyntōsis* could not mean “transformation into a fool” because Claudius was already that in his lifetime) was raised by the Czech scholar, F. Stiebitz, in an essay included (391–99) in a Festschrift (*Μνήμα*) for J. Zubatého (Praze 1926).

⁵ See the Tusculum edition and translation by W. Schöne (München 1957): *Seneca Apokolokyntosis, Die Verkürbissung des Kaisers Claudius*, with a vignette of a round pumpkin on the title page.

⁶ First used by C. Merivale in his *History of the Romans under the Empire* (1850–62); adopted by R. Graves for his translation in an Appendix to his novel, *Claudius the God* (London 1934).

[0.04] And Athanassakis had not neglected considerations of botanical and medicinal science. While here favoring the interpretation of *kolokyntē* as the fruit of *Cucurbita maxima* (see above, 0.01), he had noted (16) that Wagenvoort in 1934 had specified that the implement of the title, which he explained as addressed to Claudius and saying in effect, *me radicasti tu* (you punished me with a radish) *quidem* (when you exiled me), *iam te cucurbitabo* (now I'll pay you back with something more painful), was the pointed tip of the swelling fruit of *Lagenaria vulgaris* (Seringe [1825], elevating Linnaeus' *Cucurbita lagenaria* to a genus), what we call a (bottle-) gourd or calabash, the Germans (*Flaschen-*) *Kürbis*, the French *cougourde* or *calebasse*, the Italians *zucca* (*da vino* or *dal collo*), and the Spaniards *calabaza*. He had referred (*ibid.*, footnote 16) to the important article by F. A. Todd, "Some *Cucurbitaceae* in Latin literature" (*Classical Quarterly* 37 [1943], 101–11), which also looked to the fruit, this time dried and empty, of a small bottle-gourd (see below, 1.02 and Figure 4) in order to explain the title of the satire and certain other passages.⁷ Then at the beginning of his article (12) Athanassakis had noticed the sensational letter to the *Sunday Times* of London for May 18, 1958, "New light on an old murder," by Robert Graves. "Graves assumed that the *kolokyntē* of our title is the purgative colocynth, a dangerous alkaline poison, and that the meaning of the title [no longer to be rendered "Pumpkinification," as he had done 20 years before: see note 6 above] is: deification by means of a colocynth." See Coffey (*Lustrum*, 6, 253) for criticism: such an interpretation is impossible linguistically; the idea had been suggested long ago in the *Animadversiones* of the humanist physician H. Junius (1511–75) and was soon refuted by Heinsius and Fromond. But Athanassakis found it interesting as leading to a cluster of his double-entendres. For the purgative derived from the plant which Pliny called *cucurbita silvestris* or *colocynthis* and we call Bitter Apple, see below, 1.02 and Figure 6.

[0.05] For the nature of the poison, called colocynthine by the pharmacists who isolated it in 1948, classicists can—and by all means should—turn to an article in the (Harvard) *Botanical Museum Leaflets*, No. 5 (1973), 213–44, by F. Deltgen and H. G. Kauer. They were refuting an earlier article (*Leaflets*, No. 3 [1972], 101–28) by the scholarly mycologist, R. G. Wasson, who had examined the circumstances of "The death of Claudius, or Mushrooms for murderers." After a very entertaining discussion of the use of various species of *Amanita* in various fictional or pseudo-historical murders (including

⁷ See Coffey (*Lustrum*, 6, 254) and my article, pp. 181–92 in *Homenaje a Antonio Tovar* (Madrid 1972), esp. p. 191.

acute criticism of the late Dorothy Sayers' *The Documents in the Case*, Wasson had accepted Graves' suggestion that colocythine, administered *per clysteram* (Suet. *Claud.* 44. 3), might have done the trick after the dinner of poisonous mushrooms had failed. In their laborious reply, Deltgen and Kauer take up Wasson's points one by one and demolish them on various grounds, historical, philological, and pharmacological. In particular, an impossibly large amount of raw fruit would have had to be processed to produce a lethal dose, and colocythine is not a rapid poison; in fact there is no record of a person's actually dying from it. They conclude by endorsing Russo's version of the title (*zucconeria divinazzata*) rather than English "Pumpkinification" or German *Verkürbissung*. They have noted the botanical definition (*Cucurbita maxima*) in *LSJ* (see 0.01) and they have accepted the old claim (on grounds indicated in 0.02) that "every educated Roman of the time knew that the Greek word stood for the Latin *cucurbita*, which was a commonly used metaphor for 'fool' or 'madman'."

[0.06] But in so doing Deltgen and Kauer neglected a very important point made by Wasson when objecting to Graves' former "Pumpkinification." "The botanist," he says (125), "is rendered uncomfortable by an anachronism; the pumpkins and squashes were introduced into Europe in the 16th century, being native to America. The Mediterranean shores knew other cucurbits, but not the pumpkins and squashes." If this is really so, all the interpretations of ἀποκοκύντωσις in terms of pumpkins will have to be discarded, and the botanical definition in *LSJ* as *Cucurbita maxima* must be rejected. Actually it has been superseded already in the recent etymological dictionaries of Frisk and Chantraine, who define κοκοκύνθη as *Lagenaria vulgaris*.⁸ The philological evidence which supports this conclusion will be discussed later on (see 2.03). Here we must look briefly at the botanical and archaeological evidence, much of it published in German, which the British scholarly botanist, who drew up the botanical definitions for *LSJ* during or just before the First World War, may perhaps be forgiven for ignoring in favor of French scholarship.⁹

⁸ Hj. Frisk, *Griechisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1954-70), says "Flaschenkürbis," *Lagenaria vulgaris*; P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque; histoire des mots* (t. 2, Paris 1970), had "gourde, calebasse, *Lagenaria vulgaris*, dont le fruit séché servait de bouteille."

⁹ This was Sir William Thiselton-Dyer, F.R.S. See Sir Henry Jones' preface to the 1940 edition of *LSJ*, noting (p. vii) that Dyer had already communicated a number of his identifications to Sir Arthur Hort for use in the Loeb Classical Library edition (1916) of Theophrastus' *Historia Plantarum*. Three installments of Dyer's notes

[0.07] Our purpose is to determine, if possible, the places of origin—whether Old World (Europe, Africa, and Asia) or New World (the Americas, Indonesia, and Australia)—of the family of cultivated plants known as *Cucurbitaceae* or (for short) cucurbits. The pioneering work in the field of plant geography was done by the French botanist, Alphonse de Candolle, whose *Origine des plantes cultivées* (Paris 1883) has become a classic, translated into many languages. His methods stressed first of all the location of wild or semi-cultivated varieties and only secondarily and with caution their classical or vernacular names, because identification of their species was often problematical. Of more importance was the archaeological evidence derived from ancient paintings, mosaics, and sculptured monuments or from pictures in medieval manuscripts and early Renaissance herbals. Since Candolle's time the various kinds of evidence have been greatly enlarged by research in the records kept by early explorers and by the observation of botanists who are now included regularly on the staffs of archaeological expeditions. The resultant conclusions, which differ considerably from Candolle's, were summarized in 1932 by Elisabeth Schieman in her authoritative *Entstehung der Kulturpflanze*, published at Berlin as Bd. III, Teil L of the *Handbuch der Vererbungs-wissenschaft* edited by E. Baur and M. Hartmann; see especially her tremendous bibliography (336–75), her introductory chapter on methods of inquiry, and her pages (237–42) on “Cucurbitaceen.” This is the first section of a chapter (237–50) on “Weitere amerikanische Kulturpflanzen” which also discusses the Tomato and Tobacco. See also p. 64, Tabelle 9, III, for the spread from America to Africa and thence to Europe of the three species of *Cucurbita* (*C. Pepo*, *moschata*, and *maxima*) which have been called, in distinction to Linnaeus' *Cucurbita lagenaria* (and the minor relative which Pliny called *cucurbita silvestris*, see 0.03 above and 1.02 below), the true cucurbits (*echte Kürbisse*), i.e. the pumpkins and squashes mentioned by Wasson. In general, Schieman's conclusions have been accepted with only minor corrections by later handbooks¹⁰ and special studies, and Wasson's claim of anachronism is fully sustained.

[0.08] The case of *Lagenaria vulgaris* Seringe (now known as *Lagenaria*

defending his choices appeared in the *Cambridge Journal of Philology*, beginning on pages 195 of Vol. 33 (1917) and 78 and 290 of Vol. 34 (1918), including one on *sikya* (34, 297–99) which is instructive on his misconceptions, and another on *kolokhytē* (34, 303–05).

¹⁰ E.g., R. Mansfeld, *Vorläufiges Verzeichnis landwirtschaftlich oder gärtnerisch kultivierter Pflanzenarten* (*Die Kulturpflanzen* . . . Beiheft 2, Berlin 1959), “Cucurbitaceae,” 417–32; *Flora Europaea*, ed. T. G. Tutin and others, vol. 2 (Cambridge 1968), 297–99.

siceraria Molina [1782] since the 1930 article by Standley in *Publ. Field Mus.* [Chicago], ser. bot. 3, 435) is peculiar in that it seems to have been cultivated from very early times in both the New and Old Worlds. A recent article by Richardson has collected and reviewed, area by area, the evidence from the earliest archaeological remains of *Lagenaria* in an attempt to evaluate "the hypotheses that have been formulated to explain its world-wide pre-Columbian distribution."¹¹ He concluded (1) that *Lagenaria* is not a monotypic genus but enjoyed an ancient pantropical distribution, (2) that human utilization of *Lagenaria* is at least 15,000 years old in the New World (S. America, Peru) and 12,000 years in the Old World (Africa, Egypt), (3) that these dates are far too early to suggest transoceanic diffusion by man, though drifting from Africa or Asia may have occurred, (4) that the earliest *Lagenaria* used by man was probably a wild plant in the context of a hunt-and-gather society, and (5) that *Lagenaria* was domesticated independently in the Old and New Worlds.

[0.09] Assertions about the homeland of the true cucurbits have been more controversial. In the English translation of his *Origine* (1886), Candolle added a paragraph admitting the cogency of the arguments raised by his American critics, Asa Gray and J. H. Trumbull, and based on the names and descriptions of plants reported by early travelers in America, to the effect that squashes and pumpkins had been known in Mexico long before the arrival of Columbus. He maintained, however, that *Cucurbita maxima* at least was originally at home in Africa, and this opinion was accepted by Dyer (see above, note 9). Dyer also noted some evidence, brought out later than Candolle, which favored an origin in ancient India. This evidence was countered by Schiemann when she noted in her 1932 book (240) that in America the cultivated forms were sharply divided geographically (*C. maxima* in South America, Peru to Bolivia; *C. moschata* in Colombia and Venezuela to Mexico; *C. Pepo* the same as *moschata* but extending as far north as Texas), whereas in Asia their ranges overlap, the absence of geographical separation indicating an imported culture. For the counter to Candolle's claim for Africa see our next paragraph (0.10); here we note that well before Schiemann other German scholars had reached the negative conclusion that the true cucurbits were not among those garden-plants whose existence can be traced in reliable records from Pliny on, right through the Middle Ages (the Capitulary of Charlemagne) to Albertus Magnus and the earliest

¹¹ J. B. Richardson III, *Economic Botany*, 26 (1972), 265-73. See also T. W. Whitaker and G. N. Davis, *Cucurbits: Botany, Cultivation, and Utilization* (London and New York 1962), *passim*.

illustrated herbals. The leader here was R. von Fischer-Benzon in his *Altdeutsche Gartenflora* (Kiel and Leipzig, 1894), discussing the history of the *Cucurbitaceae* on pages 89–92. This was soon taken up by the philologist Otto Schrader in the first edition (Strassburg, 1901) of his *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde* (see p. 483). Then in the fifth edition (1887) of Victor Hehn's deservedly popular *Kulturpflanzen und Haustiere* . . . (first published in 1870, with a third edition in 1877 which Candolle rather enviously disparaged in his preface of 1886), the botanist A. Engler noted that the homeland of the true cucurbits (e.g. *C. Pepo*) was most likely in America, and in the seventh edition (1902) Schrader added (319) the statement "dass die echten Kürbisse den Alten noch fremd waren." These opinions were repeated by Orth in the *R-E*, bd. 7 (1912) on "Gurke" and bd. 11 (1922) on "Kürbis," but Dyer failed to see any of them. So too most recent classicists (except Wagenvoort and Todd), misled by the definition in *LSJ*, have missed this important point. This includes Weinreich, Russo, Coffey, and others, including myself in my former article (see note 7). But with a sure hand, Frisk (above, note 8) pointed to the *Reallexikon* of Schrader and Nehring (1917–23).

[0.10] Candolle's argument for an African homeland had been based on the report of a single traveler on the banks of the river Niger. In a thorough review of all the botanical evidence for and against an "American Origin of the Cultivated Cucurbits," Whitaker¹² has shown how weak this evidence is in the face of the numerous investigations of related species in the Americas, and he has added the negative evidence of the late appearance of these species in European herbals of the sixteenth and even seventeenth century, from which he supplies eight figures in two plates. His argument would be stronger if he had also compared earlier herbals. Candolle had examined one such, a *Herbarius Pataviae Impressus* (1485), which he had reported (in his *English Origin*, 247) as containing a recognizable figure of *Lagenaria vulgaris* but not (256) of *Cucurbita Pepo* or *C. maxima*. But Whitaker's arguments, when added to those of the German authorities, are convincing enough. I know of only one dissenting argument, that of Don and Patricia Bothwell. In their recent book, *Food in Antiquity* (London 1969), they say (127–28): "The genus *Cucurbita* seems to be about as confusing as that of *Lagenaria*, for whilst many species may be counted definitely American in origin, it seems likely that one, the pumpkin (*Cucurbita maxima*) was already wild in Africa before European or American contact was made there, and indeed some of

¹² T. W. Whitaker, *Annals of the Missouri Botanical Garden*, 34 (1947), 101–11. It is noteworthy that he does not refer to Schieman or any of the German authorities.

the Greek and Roman references to *cucurbita* would fit in well with this genus." That is, they are still accepting both Candolle's argument, which I think has been discredited, and the botanical definition of *κολοκύνθη* in *LSJ*, which followed Candolle and was, I believe, a serious mistake on the part of Thiselton-Dyer.

[0.11] Here we should acknowledge that the lexical definition in *LSJ* is simply "round gourd," followed by the botanical name, *Cucurbita maxima*. Previous editions of Liddell and Scott's *Lexicon* had said "the round gourd or pumpkin, Lat. *cucurbita*, the long one being called *σικυα*." This is unobjectionable, going back to a passage in Athenaeus as interpreted in the great *Thesaurus* of Stephanus (see below, 2.02)—except that the implied equivalence of "gourd" and "pumpkin" seems curious to an American reader. But to an Englishman this would be quite natural. Candolle in his English *Origin* headed the section on *Cucurbita maxima* (249) with the word "Gourd," though it was "Potiron" in the original French. And just before this, where the section on *Lagenaria vulgaris* (245) is headed by the words "Gourd or Calabash," he placed a footnote: "The word *gourd* is also used in English for *Cucurbita maxima*. This is one of the examples of the confusion in common names and the greater accuracy of scientific terms." The *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* (New York 1889) notes that formerly *gourd* designated the fruit of various cucurbitaceous genera, including melons, pumpkins, squashes, etc. as well as gourds themselves, but now, in a restricted sense, the fruit of *Lagenaria lagenaria* or the plant itself. There are other examples of this old-fashioned usage. One of the best occurs in the *History* of Merivale (above, note 6). In explaining his novel term "Pumpkinification" for Seneca's skit, he refers (in a footnote on p. 463 of the fifth volume of the New York edition, 1864–79) to "the number of unwieldy and bloated gourds which sun their speckled bellies before the doors" in modern Rome, "to form a favorite condiment to the food of the poorer classes."

[0.12] The history of the word "pumpkin" is also very pertinent here. Dictionaries trace it back to medieval Latin *pepon*, through Old French *pompon* and earlier English *pompion*, applied to any large round fruit, e.g. a melon (compare also English *pippin*). And classical lexicographers (e.g. Steier on "Melone" in the *R-E* 29 [1931], 562–67; Schrader and Nehring [1917–23, above, 0.09]; and of course *LSJ* and Frisk) trace the medieval *pepon* back through Latin sources all the way to the Greek adjective *πέπων*, properly meaning "ripe or mature" but applied metaphorically in Homer and Hesiod to persons in mild or affectionate reproach (*ὦ πέπων*, *Il.* VI. 55, IX. 252; Hes.

Th. 544, 560, etc.). The adjective was frequently attached to the noun *σίκνος*, "cucumber" (*Hp., Morb.* III. 17, *Vict.* II. 55, *Pl. Com.*, fr. 64. 4, etc.) in a phrase indicated the (sweet) melon, which would not be eaten until fully ripe, whereas cucumbers were eaten green, whether raw or cooked. The adjective was also substantivized in Greek and was recognized by Pliny as the name for an unusually large (*Nat.* XIX. 65) and salubrious (XX. 11) variety of *cucumis*, probably the watermelon, which was known in ancient Egypt and was called *Cucurbita Citrullus* by Linnaeus, and *Citrullus lanatus* by Thunberg in 1794. Steier also notes that Pliny's description (XIX. 67) of the golden color and sweet odor of the small quince-like fruits, called *melopepones*, of another variant of *cucumis* (which Pliny thought, mistakenly, had appeared spontaneously in Campania) is strikingly apt for the sweet melon. Later the originally Greek compound (e.g. *μηλοπέπων*, *Galen* VI. 566) was shortened to *melones*, whence come Linnaeus' trivial name (*Cucumis*) *Melo* and the familiar words in the modern vernaculars. But the word *pepo*, which continued to denote the watermelon, was sometimes applied to other fruits of similar shape (compare Fuchs' *Pepones* in my Figure 8, identified by modern botanists as fruits of *Cucumis Melo*), whence come the various words in the modern vernaculars noted above and Linnaeus' somewhat arbitrary (*Cucurbita*) *Pepo*, which even Candolle admitted was probably at home originally in America.

[0.13] In the sections which follow, I propose, first, to examine lexicographically all the contexts in which the word *cucurbita* occurs, especially in the writings of St. Jerome (where I think several expressions need clearing up), in order to determine the range and relative familiarity of its meanings, whether literal, figurative, or transferred, which cluster around its central meaning, i.e. a plant, *Lagenaria vulgaris*, or one of its fruits.¹³ Secondly, since Candolle said

¹³ The woodcut illustrations of plants in my Figures 3–7 are reproduced through the courtesy of the Hunt Botanical Library of Carnegie-Mellon University, from two rare books in their collection. The first (Figure 3) is from Lobelius (*Matthias de l'Obel*). *Plantarum seu Stirpium Icones* (Antverpiae 1581), p. 641 at the right-hand side. Whitaker (see note 12) agrees with Candolle that this is "the first illustration of a plant that is definitely referable to *C. maxima*." The other figures are drawn from the 1549 octavo edition (*Vivae Imagines*) of the *De historia stirpium Commentarii* (Basileae 1542) of Leonhart Fuchs. Secure identifications of its plants were made by T. A. Sprague, *J. Linn. Soc. London, Botany*, 48, 545–642, from which we note the following: my Figures 4 and 5, *Lagenaria vulgaris* Seringe; 6, *Citrullus Colocynthis* (L.) Schrader; 7, *Cucumis Melo* L. But Fuchs' pages 402 and 403 (not shown here) have recognizable figures of *Cucurbita Pepo* L., labeled respectively *Cucumer turcicus* and *C. marinus*, and in both cases said (*Commentarii*, 702) to be recent introductions into

flatly (*Origin*, 246) "Greek authors do not mention the plant," though he recognized *Lagenaria vulgaris* in passages from Columella and Pliny describing *cucurbita* (see below, 1.25 and 26), I propose to examine similarly some (but by no means all) of the Greek contexts—especially those in Athenaeus which preserve fragments of Greek comedy (see above, 0.02)—in which the word *κολοκύντη* (or *-ύνη*) or *κολόκυντα* (or *-νθα*) or one of its derivatives is used. I hope to show that in the range of their meanings the words are not incompatible with Latin *cucurbita* and the nature of *Lagenaria*. Here Alexandrian papyri and at least one painting from Herculaneum will be useful in demonstrating that the plant and its fruits were well known to the Romans of Seneca's time. Then in the third and last section I will return to the problem of *apocolocyntosis*. Directing attention to the end of the satire, where the divine Claudius becomes a very minor civil servant in the underworld, I will suggest (as I did in my former study, see note 7) that here he was being made over into something very much like a living plant, still useful but to the wrong people and in very humble circumstances. This would be a figurative transformation (as Athanassakis suggested) and "a kind of immortalization." But I cannot believe Eisenberg's assertion that Seneca applied his coinage to the satire as a formal title. Everything suggests that it circulated among its first readers anonymously and with no more title than its opening words: *Quid actum sit in caelo*. . . . Perhaps the word was uttered in a private conversation (like the other comments reported by Dio), in answer to a question about the satire and in somewhat rueful acknowledgment of his authorship.

I. St. Jerome on *Cucurbita*

[1.01] In his Commentary (c. 406 A.D.) on Amos (II. 5, p. 289 Vallarsi; Migne 25, col. 1042) St. Jerome was concerned with God's action in raising the salt waters of the seas by means of heavenly heat and then transforming them into the sweet savor of the rains. In this action, he says, God is *instar medicinalis cucurbitae, quae calore superioris gyri humorem et sanguinem sursum trahit*. The fine simile was cited in Mayor's invaluable note (*Thirteen Satires of Juvenal*, vol. 2, 1881) on the phrase *ventosa cucurbita* (14. 58), together with references to ancient medical writers who describe the implement, necessarily made of fire-resistant material (metal, bone, baked clay, or glass) and

Germany; but there is no figure of *Cucurbita maxima*. The first illustration of *C. moschata*, according to Candolle and Whitaker, came in Rheede's *Hortus indicus malabaricus* (1688), more than a century after Fuchs.

prescribe its application by means of fire, which exhausts the air within the instrument and draws blood and the less material agent of disease from the affected parts of the body, including (Celsus, III. 18) the back of the head in cases of mental derangement—which is precisely what Juvenal implies here. In modern practice the hypodermic syringe has replaced the implement and the more dangerous expedient of venesection, but both methods of drawing blood were still popular in eighteenth-century Europe, and for the ancient world archaeology has revealed many examples of the actual metallic implements or their outlines in vase painting or in relief on sculptured stone or stamped coins.¹⁴ The implements are quite small, ranging from three to six inches in overall height and from two to four inches in gross diameter, measured at the base of the swelling top, which is either conical in profile (as in my Figure 1) or more or less perfectly semicircular. Below this diameter the neck or collar of the instrument stretches downward for a couple of inches, ending in a rounded lip where the mouth of the instrument, ranging from a bare inch in diameter to 2½ inches, would fit nicely over the skin of the patient. Jerome's "heat of the upper circle" fits admirably both the sun in the sky and the burning lint or oil in the swelling globe of the instrument—provided that it is visualized hanging empty by a ring on the wall of a surgeon's office. In actual use, of course, the implement was applied horizontally; otherwise whatever burned inside would fall down on the skin of the patient. Compare Paul of Aegina (VI. 41, cited by Milne, p. 102) and the famous riddle (I saw a person gluing bronze to a man with fire) in which *χαλκὸν κολλήσαντα* is explained (Arist. *Rhet.* III. 2, 1405 b 1; cf. Plut. *Conv.* [*Moralia*, 154 b] and Athen. X. 452 b) as *σικύαν προσβαλόντα*.

[1.02] The terms applied in antiquity to this vessel, known in modern times as a cupping-glass (*Schröpfkopf* in German, *ventosa* in Italian and Spanish, and *ventouse* in French), were studied long ago by G. Helmreich (*Archiv f. lat. Lexicogr. u. Gramm.* 1 [1884], 321–23). In Greek it was usually called *σικύα* (as above) and in Latin *cucurbita* because in shape it resembled a small pyriform gourd. Compare my Figure 4, where two little gourds can be seen at the left of and below

¹⁴ See text and illustrations in J. S. Milne, *Surgical Implements in Greek and Roman Times* (Oxford 1907), T. Meyer-Steineg and K. Sudhoff, *Geschichte der Medizin im Überblick mit Abbildung* (Jena 1921), and John Scarborough, *Roman Medicine* (Ithaca 1969). The extensive collection of the modern Greek physician K. P. Lampros (*Peri sikyōn kai sikyaseōs para tois archaiois*, a Festschrift for Ernest Curtius, Athens, 1895) is known to me only through the review by R. Fuchs in *Wochenschr. f. klass. Phil.* 12 (1895), 458–61.

the large gourd labeled by Fuchs (p. 209) *Cucurbita maior* or *Grosz Kürbsz*. Thus Scribonius Largus and (much later) Caelius Aurelianus use the expressions *cucurbitam adfigere*, *apponere*, or *adhibere*, where the Greek expression in Hippocrates and elsewhere was regularly *σικύην προσβαλεῖν*. But since products of the plant *cucurbita* were also utilized in various medicinal preparations (see, e.g., Pliny, *Nat.* XX. 16–17), certain authors tried to distinguish the implement linguistically. In Celsus the plant and its fruit remained *cucurbita*, but the implement of similar shape was called *cucurbitula* regularly (see the *Thesaurus* for references). The diminutive was often used by later writers in this sense, so that it became the regular technical term for the implement in modern medical Latin.¹⁵ But Scribonius Largus (106) and others following him had also used the diminutive to denote the *cucurbita silvestris* or *colocynthis* (Pliny, *Nat.* XX. 14–15; cf. Diosc. IV. 176 [Wellmann] *κολόκυνθα ἀγρία* or *σικύα πικρά* or *κολοκυνθίς*), Coloquinte or Bitter Apple, a plant which is cultivated today in various warm regions (northern Africa, Cyprus, southern India) for its dried fruits, which contain a drastic purge (as noted by both Pliny and Dioscorides), and for its oil-bearing seeds; see my Figure 6 (Fuchs 212). Hence Pliny and Juvenal found it necessary to add an adjective to *cucurbita* in order to designate the implement, Pliny *medicinalis* in a passage (*Nat.* XXXII. 122–23) that compares the use of natural leeches (*hirudines*) and of the instrument for drawing blood, and Juvenal *ventosa*, as we have seen. Pliny's adjective denotes the instrument in a few places among later writers on medicine, including St. Jerome's contemporary, Theodorus Priscianus (once only, IV, p. 110 N. according to Helmreich), but never became a regular designation. Juvenal's *ventosa*, however, which Helmreich thought was drawn from popular speech,¹⁶ was taken up by others. Helmreich cites 12 places in Theodorus Priscianus where the simple *cucurbita* denotes the instrument, six places where *ventosa* is joined to *cucurbita*, and five places where *ventosa* alone is used. But in later Latin translations from the Greek of Alexander of Tralles and Oribasius the trend is reversed: *cucurbita* is rare, *ventosa* more frequent, until it emerges as the technical term in the Romance languages.

[1.03] We can conclude that in using the term *medicinalis cucurbita*

¹⁵ E.g. the physician Leonhart Fuchs added his translation of a libellus of Galen, *De hirudinibus, revulsione, cucurbitula, et scarificatione*, to his translation with commentary on the related work, *De curatione per sanguinis missionem* (Lugduni 1546).

¹⁶ Most children learn, as I did near beaches of the Atlantic Ocean, that if one holds any concave object, an open shell or a cup, or even a cupped hand, over his ear loosely, he will hear a wind or the roar of the surf. Compare Lucan's phrase (IX. 349) *ventosa concha*.

Jerome had been consulting his copy of Pliny, and we shall soon find evidence that he drew from Pliny on earlier occasions, when he was speaking of the plant rather than the instrument whose shape resembled a small fruit of the plant. Mayor, however, concluded his long note by pointing to a cut, printed by Rich, which he said represented an instrument actually "made out of a pumpkin, preserved in the Vatican library," and we must examine this bit of information before going on. The cut, shown in my Figure 2, is taken from the once deservedly popular illustrated *Dictionary of Roman and Greek Antiquities* by Anthony Rich, whose article (in his 3rd edn., London 1873) reads as follows:

CUCURBITA and CUCURBITULA (κολοκύνθη, σικύα). A *pumpkin*, or *gourd*; thence, a *cupping-glass*, which the ancients made out of these fruits (Juv. *Sat.* 14. 58) as well as of horn or bronze (Celsus ii 11). The example represents an ancient original made out of a pumpkin, now preserved in the Vatican Library, and published by Rhodius.

But most of this is misinformation. The object was never in the Vatican Museums, and the woodcut which Rich copied was not published by the learned Danish physician, Johan Rhode, who died at Padua in 1659. After a deal of searching in various libraries I found it in an edition of Celsus' eight books *De medicina* (which also contained Rhode's *Vita Celsi*), published at Amsterdam in 1687. Here on p. 562 the cut, supplied by the editor, Th. J. van Almeloveen, illustrates one of three bronze and seven figuline *cucurbitulae* catalogued (p. 80) in the *Antiquitates Neomagenses* (Nijmegen, 1678) by Johannes Smetius (father and son). Unfortunately, as I am told by the director, A. V. M. Hubrecht, of the present Museum van Romeins Nijmegen, the entire collection was sold in 1703 to the Kurfürst of the Pfalz. Later it was dispersed among various museums in Germany, and, while some of the bronzes have been located at a museum in Mannheim, this distinctive vessel was not one of them. Finally, the object has the shape of a small gourd (see again Figure 4), not a pumpkin. Except that its neck is closed and an open mouth has been made at the opposite bulbous end, it is not unlike the bronze implement of Figure 1, and it would work just as well. The object may still exist and it may be genuinely ancient, but it was probably made of baked clay if not of bronze, and Rich's statement about its manufacture has no foundation. The article in the great *Dictionnaire* of Daremberg and Saglio, which superseded Rich, does not mention him or his cut and explains the semantic shift of *cucurbita* and *cucurbitula* from *courge* or *gourde* to *ventouse* just as we have done

above (1.02), because the instrument was sometimes made “en forme de gourde.”

[1.04] Before going on in Jerome we digress to discuss one of the passages alleged by Eisenberg (above, 0.02) and others to mean *Dummkopf*. This is in Trimalchio’s reading of the horoscope (Petron. 39. 12): *in aquario copones et cucurbitae*. Since only people are mentioned as being born under the various signs, *cucurbitae* cannot have its literal meaning, and since most of the people are obnoxious in one way or another, the meaning “fools” or “blockheads” has been read into *cucurbitae*. But Friedlaender in his translation (1906) had rendered the word as *Schröpfköpfe*, giving the implement a figurative meaning, “persons who bleed or fleece one.” I think this must be right. The metaphor is confirmed by the novel personal name *Σικύας*, applied in jest to a fawning parasite, one of those *ellogimoi kolakes*, who clung to the hand of his indolent patron, according to a story from Clearchus of Soli reported by Athenaeus (VI. 257 a). Gulick in his Loeb translation (1930) quite missed the point when he rendered the name as “Cucumber”! People who cling like leeches are still proverbial. In Jacobean England the older figure was applied to student drudges: “Still at their books, they will not be pull’d off; / They stick like cupping-glasses.”¹⁷

[1.05] Our next set of references in St. Jerome concerns the plant in the Biblical story of Jonah which the Lord appointed to provide shade for Jonah (*Vulg. Ion.* 4:6) as he sat under the bower or booth (*umbraculum*, *ibid.* 4:5) which he had made for himself to the east of the city of Nineveh, watching to see what would happen to it. Jonah was grateful for the shade of the plant (4:6). But at dawn the next day the Lord appointed a worm to attack the plant (4:7) so that it withered away. Then when the sun rose the Lord aroused a hot, burning wind and the sun beat down on the head of Jonah until he was in great distress (*aestuabat*, 4:8) and begged to die. And the Lord said to Jonah, “Do you think you are right to be so distressed (*irasci*, 4:9) over a plant?” And when Jonah replied, “Yes I am right to be distressed even to death,” the Lord answered, “You grieve over a plant (4:10) for which you did not labor, neither did you make it grow, which came into being in one night and perished in one night, and am I not to pity (*non parcam*, 4:11) that great city Nineveh?”

[1.06] In the five places above where the word “plant” occurs in the Revised (American) Standard Version of the Old Testament (1952),

¹⁷ Lines from a play by Fletcher (and others) cited in the *Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia* (1889) under “Cupping-glass.”

the version of the LXX had κολόκυνθα (or -ντα). This had been rendered as *cucurbita* in the Old Latin versions which St. Jerome followed in the translation from the LXX which he prefixed to his Commentary on the relevant verses of Jonah; see the recent (1956) and excellent text edited by P. Antin, pages 108, 113, and 115 (Vallarsi 425–28, Migne, *PL* 25, 1147–50).¹⁸ Thus it was recognized that this rapidly climbing, shade-producing plant was called in Latin *cucurbita* and in Greek *kolokyntha*. Compare also Ambr. *Hex.* V. 11. 35; Aug. *Gen. ad lit.* IX. 14, *Epist.* 102 (4 times in sections 30–36: *CSEL* 34, p. 570. 15, 574. 15 and 19, and 576. 11); and Jerome himself in his dedicatory preface to Chromatius (Antin p. 54: *quod . . . cucurbitae sit delectatus umbraculo*).

[1.07] If the Christian Fathers needed documentation for these two characteristics of the evidently familiar plant *cucurbita*, they could have found it in a passage of Pliny (*Nat.* XIX. 69–70) which is confirmed by another in Columella (X. 378–80). Both authors describe *cucumis* and *cucurbita* together. Pliny asserts that the nature of both growing plants is such that they are eager to reach aloft (*natura sublimitatis avida*) and often do climb (*scandentis*), fastening themselves by means of their creeping, whip-like shoots (*reptantibus flagellis*) to the rough places on walls (*per parietum aspera*), rapidly (*velocitas pernix*)—provided they do have some support (*vires sine adminiculo standi non sunt*)—all the way to the roof (*in tectum usque*), where they cover the vaults (*camaras*) and sheds (*pergulas*) or (in Columella) trellises (*trichilas*) with gentle shade (*levi umbra*). Hence, Pliny adds (70), there are two kinds, a genus *camararium* and a genus *plebeium* in which it (the plant) creeps along the ground (*quo humi reptit*).¹⁹ In the former kind, Pliny continues, a heavy weight (i.e. the fruit) hangs balanced motionless in the breeze (*libratur pondus immobile aurae*), dangling (i.e. from the *camara*) on a surprisingly slender foot-stalk (*mire tenui pediculo*). And he adds that the growth of *cucurbita* too (i.e. the fruit, like the fruit of *cucumis*, whose shape is artificially controlled; see 65, *crescunt qua coguntur forma*) is controlled (*crescit qua cogitur forma*) by wicker-work sheaths placed over the withering flowers so that the figure of a writhing serpent is often produced, but if the fruit is allowed to hang free (*libertate vero pensili concessa*) it has been

¹⁸ *Saint Jérôme sur Jonas*, introduction, texte latin, traduction et notes de Dom Paul Antin, O.S.B., moine de Ligugé (Paris 1956; Sources Chrétiennes, No. 43). Antin (p. 7) dates the Commentary to 396, the translation from the Hebrew to 391–94.

¹⁹ Or, if we adopt Mayhoff's conjecture and translate: in which it (the fruit) grows along the ground (*quo humi crescit*).

known to attain a length of nine feet. With this the lines of Columella (X. 378–80) are to be compared: *Tum modo dependens trichilis, modo more chelydri / sole sub aestivo gelidas per graminis umbras / intortus cucumis praegasque cucurbita serpit*. Here the epithet for *cucurbita* suggests the swelling belly of the cupping-vessel (Figures 1 and 2) and the pyriform shape of Fuchs' *Grosz Kürbsz* (Figure 4). The longer cylindrical form may be seen in Fuchs' *Lang Kürbsz* (Figure 5) and the frail, slender peduncle is apparent in both sixteenth-century figures.

[1.08] But when St. Jerome came to translate from the Hebrew in what has become the Vulgate Version, he substituted the word *hedera* for *cucurbita* in the five places noted above (1.06). This was to involve him in a long controversy—what he later called (*Epist.* 115. 3 = Aug. 81. 3) *ridicula cucurbitae quaestio*—with St. Augustine and others who in general objected to Jerome's use of Hebrew sources which were at variance with the familiar Latin phrases based on the version of the LXX which had served the apostles and the early church so well. This particular problem has been discussed repeatedly and, given the nature of an age-old story, is perhaps insoluble. Hence the Revised Version used the neutral word "plant" (rather than the "goard" of the King James Version or the "ivy" of the Douay translation) with a footnote: Heb. *qiqayon*, probably *the castor-oil plant*. Commentators on the Bible and on the plants of the Bible (e.g. H. W. and A. L. Moldenke, Waltham, Mass. 1952) generally agree, identifying the plant as *Ricinus communis* L.²⁰

[1.09] The conflict with St. Augustine began in 394 when "the younger man, wishing to open relations with the renowned scholar of Bethlehem, made the disastrous mistake of sending Jerome a letter questioning certain aspects of Jerome's scholarship."²¹ The first of these was Jerome's project of translating the OT prophets from the original Hebrew rather than from the LXX. Augustine thought this was both unnecessary and imprudent (see above). The second was Jerome's opinion, expressed in his Commentary on Galatians and due ultimately to Origen, that the scene in which Paul rebuked Peter (Galatians 2:11–21) for his continued observance of the Old Law, was only a rhetorical device. Augustine worried that if this were

²⁰ See also R. Delbrueck, *Probleme der Lipsanothek in Brescia* (Bonn 1932), who on p. 23 collects the evidence for each of the three possibilities for Jonah's *Schattenpflanze*.

²¹ D. Wiessen, *St. Jerome as a Satirist* (Ithaca 1964), p. 235. See also F. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, sa vie et son oeuvre*, première partie (Louvain and Paris 1922), I, 297–306 and II, 47–50. The correspondence of the two saints has often been reviewed; for references see Wiessen, p. 235, note 127.

accepted it would legitimize the use of lies in teaching and would ruin Christian morality. But this letter, entrusted to the priest Profuturus, who died soon afterward, was never delivered. Subsequently (c. 398), Augustine, encouraged by a letter from Jerome reporting on his efforts to separate the bad from the good in Origen, repeated his former query about Galatians and added some new ones, tactfully asking for Jerome's advice. This letter too, carried by a certain monk Paul, went astray; so that rumors from Rome reached Jerome at Bethlehem that Augustine was attacking him. Further correspondence ensued between the arrogant and suspicious Jerome—see Wiessen (note 21 above) for examples of his tone—and the respectful but persistent Augustine, until in 403 Augustine sent copies of his two former letters, including the one which Profuturus had failed to deliver. In his accompanying letter 71 (= Hier. *Epist.* 104) Augustine brought up (§ 5) the now famous incident at the African town of Oea (modern Tripoli), in order to drive home the practical dangers of departing from the familiar versions of the LXX. After the reading of Jerome's new version of Jonah from the Hebrew, a great tumult arose in the congregation, especially from the Greeks who claimed that the reading was false in one respect to what they all knew by heart. The bishop was compelled to submit the question to some Jews. And they, whether out of ignorance or malice (here Augustine indicates his sympathy for Jerome!), reported that the Hebrew rolls were in accord with what the Greek and (Old) Latin texts said. Then the bishop, fearing to lose his hold on the congregation, had announced publicly that the new reading was at fault. Thus, Augustine concluded, even you can sometimes make a mistake. But, he adds, we all appreciate your great efforts in translating the Gospel from the Greek.

[1.10] Towards the end of his letter of the following year (112. 22 = Aug. 75. 22), in which Jerome replied, soberly and at length, to Augustine's criticisms, he reverts to the episode at Oea and acknowledges that the word in question was *hedera*, which he had substituted for *cucurbita*. This point, he says, had come up many years before through a person whom he calls, curiously, both Cornelius and Asinius Pollio. Here he is alluding to the ponderous jesting (which we will examine later, 1.23) with which, in his Commentary on Jonah (dated to 396 by Antin, see note 18) he had introduced his serious explanation of his procedure in translating verse 6 of chapter 4. We can conflate the two passages, following the Commentary but enclosing supplements from the letter within pointed brackets.

In place of *cucurbita* or *hedera* in the Hebrew ⟨roll⟩ we read *ciceion*,

which in Syriac or Punic is called *ciceia*. It is a kind of bush or shrub (*genus virgulti vel arbusculae*) having ⟨broad⟩ leaves like those of the grape vine (*pampinus*) and a very dense shade. Supporting itself by its own trunk,²² it grows very copiously in Palestine, especially in sandy places, and marvelously, if you have cast a seed on the ground, it is warmed quickly to germinate and rises to a tree, and within a few days what you had seen as a blade of grass (*herba*) you now see as a shrub (*arbuscula*). For this reason we too, at the time when we were translating the prophets [i.e. 391–94, see note 18], desired to write this very word of the Hebrew tongue (expressed more clearly in the letter: “When translating word for word, if I had desired to set down *ciceion*, no one would understand it, . . .”), since Latin speech had no word for this kind of tree [but see 1.12 below]. But we feared that the *grammatici* would find an opportunity to comment and would chatter about “Indian beasts” or “Boeotian mountains” or other marvels of that sort, [and so] we followed the old translators who also rendered the word as *hedera*, which in Greek is called *κισσός*,²³ since they had nothing else to say.

Here the parallel explanation in the letter continues the multiple condition which began in the insertion above (ending “no one would understand it”) with:

if I should write *cucurbita*, I would be saying what is not in the Hebrew, [and therefore] I actually wrote *hedera*, so as to agree with the other translators.

The letter then adds a little joke about the Jews’ testimony to the bishop at Oea (see below, 1.14).

[1.11] The Commentary continues:

Let us then examine the story, and before its mystical sense [see below, 1.29] let us study its literal meaning. [The plants] *Cucurbita* and *hedera* are of such a nature that they creep along the ground (*ut per terram*

²² Here Antin notes (p. 111) that the words *suo trunco se* were supplied by Martianus (1704) and Vallarsi (1734–42) from the letter, where the phrase is fitted to *sustinens* less awkwardly than in the Commentary: *cito consurgit in arbusculam absque ullis calamorum et hastilium adminiculis, quibus et cucurbitae et hederæ indigent, suo trunco se sustinens*.

²³ I.e., the old translators of the Hebrew, knowing only that the word *ciceion* represented some kind of shade-producing plant, rendered it as *kissos*, which came over into Latin as *hedera*. The very first sentence of the explanation in the letter actually named Aquila as one of the translators who used the Attic form *kittos*. Delbrueck (see note 20) notes that Field’s edition (1871–75) of the fragments of Origen’s *Hexapla* cites Symmachus for *κισσός* but places Aquila and Theodotion under *Ricinus* as reading *κικέων*. See Jerome’s preface *In Ezram* (as cited by Cavallera [see note 21], II. 108), referring to these three Ebionite translators as collected in Origen’s *Hexapla*.

reptent) and do not seek higher places unless they are supported by poles or props (*furcis vel adminiculis*). How then, when the prophet was unaware of it, did *cucurbita*, springing up in a single night, offer him a shady place (*umbraculum*) when by nature it had no capacity to spring aloft (*in sublime consurgere*) without sheds (*pergulis*) or canes (*calamis*) or upright shafts (*hastilibus*)? Whereas *ciceion*, while it provided a miracle²⁴ in its sudden growth and showed the power of God in the safeguard of the green shady place (*in protectione virentis umbraculi*), [simply] followed its own nature.

A few sentences later (Antin, p. 213), Jerome shows his affection for *ciceion* in the phrase “our modest little tree (*nostra arbuscula modica*), quickly springing up and quickly withering.”

[I.12] Evidently Jerome was proud of his knowledge of the three plants. His reason for rejecting *cucurbita* (= *kolokyntha*) in this context appears to be clear, and he could claim support from Pliny if he needed it. Compare the sentence above (I.07), *vires sine adminiculo standi non sunt*, with the sheds (*pergulae*), the *adminicula* and other props in both the Commentary (I.11) and the letter (note 22). As for *hedera* (= *kissos* or *kittos*), probably the common English ivy, as we call it, or what Linnaeus called *Hedera Helix*, he could rely on general knowledge for its need of external support.²⁵ But on *ciceion*, *suo trunco se sustinens*, he made at least one mistake: the Romans did have a name for it. See Pliny, *Nat.* XV. 25, discussing the oils produced from trees:

Next comes the oil [whose processing and use in lamps he describes subsequently] from *cici*, a tree which is very common in Egypt [cf. *κίκι*, an Egyptian word in *Hdt.* II. 94]—some call it *croton* [cf. *κροτῶν* *Trp.* *HP* I. 10. 1, III. 18. 7, from the resemblance of the oil-bearing seeds to insect ticks, *κροτῶνες* as in *Dsc.* I. 77], others *sili* [attested only here, but cf. *σέσλι Κύπριον*, *Dsc.* IV. 161], others *sesamon silvestre* [only here,

²⁴ The plant (see I.08 above and note 20) is known in Germany as *Wunderbaum* (Stadler in the *RE* under “*Ricinus*”), but there it is only an ornamental shrub, planted annually, whereas in really warm climates, as in the Sudan and Abyssinia but probably not in Palestine, it grows to be a tree 12–15 meters high: see Antin’s long note (p. 111) quoting P. Fournier, who approves Jerome’s account as perfectly just, especially on the point of rapid growth when water is present and equally rapid withering when it is not.

²⁵ This is implied by Pliny when he mentions (XVI. 152) a *rigens hedera* which alone among all the kinds of ivy can stand without support, though he adds, curiously, *ab id vocata cissos*. For *helix* as the name of a prominent species of *hedera*, see Pliny XVI. 145–49. Hence Linnaeus capitalized his specific epithet; it is a noun and not an adjective.

but cf. *s. agreste*, Dsc. lat. IV. 156 = gr. IV. 161]²⁶—and there not long since; also in Spain it comes forth suddenly (*repente provenit*) with the height of an olive-tree, with pithy stalks (*caule ferulaceo*), leaves like those of grape vines, seeds like those of graceful and yellow grapes. Our people call it *ricinus* from the resemblance of the seed (to the insect *ricinus*, as above). The seeds are boiled in water and the floating oil is skimmed off; but in Egypt. . . .”

[1.13] Other Romans, then, were familiar with the nature of the castor-oil plant under its Egyptian name *kiki* or its Latin name *ricinus* (= Greek *κροτών*). And Jerome should not have said that the Greeks had no other word than *kissos* for *ciceion* (i.e. *qiqāyōn* in the modern transcription; see note 23). Of course St. Jerome was genuinely concerned to get at the literal and spiritual meaning of the original Hebrew, but this part of his explanation does not ring true, and it did not convince St. Augustine, as we will see (1.18). I cannot help suspecting that Jerome had some other reason for rejecting *cucurbita* besides its need for external support—an objection which applies also to *hedera*, as he freely admits; that he substituted *hedera* as equivalent to Greek *kissos* in the belief that Aquila or others of the early translators mentioned by Origen had rendered the Hebrew correctly; and that only afterward, when he had learned from his Palestinian informants about the nature of *ciceion*, did he come up with this device, in which he ignored Pliny’s evidence, whether deliberately or through pardonable forgetfulness, and also transferred that artificial *umbraculum* of verse 5 (which Jonah had built for himself, 1.05) to the natural shady place or shade (*umbra*) made by his shrub *ciceion* in verse 6 (above, 1.11). But he underestimated the power of the tradition in which the congregation at Oea and many others (as we will see, 1.19) visualized the rapidly climbing *cucurbita*—and not any *hedera*—as attached to the *umbraculum* of verse 5, a bower or trellis as in Pliny and Columella.

[1.14] Returning to letter 112, we note that where we left off (above, 1.10) Jerome continues:

But if those Jews of yours, whether in malice, as you say [see 1.09], or in ignorance, said that the reading in the Hebrew rolls agrees with what is contained in the Greek and Latin books, it is clear that either they could not read Hebrew writing or told a wilful lie in order to make the *cucurbitarii* seem ridiculous.

²⁶ These references come from J. André’s invaluable *Lexique des termes de botanique en latin* (Paris 1956). I have checked with those in *LSJ*.

The substantivized adjective occurs nowhere else, but Souter²⁷ follows the *TLL* in seeing here the people who grow gourds (i.e. the fruits of the plant *cucurbita*). They would be ridiculous, from Jerome's point of view, because, poor fellows, they had to support their plants on poles or trellises, which his *ciceion* did not require. For the largest and best fruits were those which hang down from the plant as it climbs upward: see Pliny and Columella cited above (1.07), and add Pliny, *Nat.* XIX. 61:

Quaedam iacent crescuntque, ut cucurbitae et cucumis; eadem pendent, quamquam graviora multo iis quae in arbore gignuntur;

and XIX. 73:

Cibus, quo longiores tenuioresque, et gratiores [sunt cucurbitae], et ob id salubriores quae pendendo crevere.

Compare the riddle of Symphosius headed *Cucurbita* (no. 440).

[1.15] Columella tells us (XI. 3. 50) that if we are producing commercial fruit we should choose seeds from the neck of the stored *cucurbita*, *quo proluxior et tenuior fructus eius nascatur, qui scilicet maius ceteris invenerit pretium*. Diocletian's Edict (6. 26, 27)²⁸ lists two grades of *cucurbitae* (both at the same price), the first ten to a bundle, the second twenty to a bundle. They are followed, incidentally, by two grades of *cucumeres* (28, 29) with the same distinction (10 to 20), and two grades of the evidently larger *melopepones* (two to four) and one grade of *pepones* (four to a bundle), all of them at the same maximum price. (For the Latin names of the fruits see above, 0.11, and for their Greek equivalents, below, 2.01.)

[1.16] At this point we may diverge to add the culinary uses of *cucurbita* to the medicinal uses already noted (1.02, citing Pliny, *Nat.* XX. 16–17 as an example which could be extended by other passages on its dietary value: Cels. II. 20, 24, 27; Anthim. 56, and for specific remedies, Scrib. Largus 39; Pliny, *Nat.* XXVIII. 205; Chiron., *Mulomed.* 61. 18 [Oder] and several other late medical and veterinary writers cited by the *TLL*). While the elder Pliny had some doubts about the digestibility of the fresh fruit (compare Celsus, II. 18. 3), he does say (XIX. 71) that as food (*cibus*) it was *saluber ac lenis pluribus modis*. Commenting on this recommendation, André notes²⁹ that

²⁷ A. Souter, *A Glossary of Later Latin to 600 A.D.* (Oxford 1949). Cavallera (above, note 21), p. 304, thinks *cucurbitarii* refers to the Christians, "le terme hébreu ne répondant d'aucune manière à la 'citrouille' [!] des Septante."

²⁸ See now the excellent edition of S. Lauffer, *Diokletians Preisedik* (Berlin 1971).

²⁹ Again (see note 26) J. André, *L'alimentation et la cuisine à Rome* (Paris 1961), 42.

Apicius (III. 4. 1–8, IV. 5. 3) has no fewer than nine recipes involving *cucurbitae*, including one for “gourde farcie.” The younger Pliny (*Epist.* I. 15) includes *cucurbitae* among the plain home-grown foods on his own table, which his friend Septicius had avoided, in spite of the good conversation he would have had there, in order to dine elsewhere on imported delicacies like *ostrea*, *vulvae*, *echini*, and *Gaditanæ (fici)*. We can compare Gellius (XVII. 8. 2) on the philosopher Taurus at Athens whose sober dinners usually consisted entirely of a pot of Egyptian lentils (see André, 39) mixed with a finely chopped *cucurbita*. That Roman aristocrats generally regarded *cucurbita* as cheap food is shown in Martial’s epigram (XI. 31) on a certain Caecilius, mockingly called *Atreus cucurbitarum* because he cut them up into a thousand parts like the sons of Thyestes, so that with the help of his baker and butler he could serve up an entire dinner composed of gourds in various shapes, forms, and disguises, all at the cost of a single penny (*as*). But by the fourth century the fruits were a familiar article of diet for everyone. Compare Arnob. *Nat.* IV. 10 and VII. 16, Diocletian’s Edict above, and Augustine, *Serm.* 247. 2 and *C. Faust. (CSEL 25)* VI. 4, where he twice personifies the fruits *cucurbitae* and even speaks of the person who breaks his fast on a Sabbath and steals into a garden to cut down the fruits from their vines as a murderer, *homicida cucurbitarum*—surely an echo of Martial’s mocking phrase above!

[1.17] Soon after Jerome’s long reply in letter 112 (= Aug. *Epist.* 75), he dispatched another letter (115 = Aug. 81), much shorter and rather apologetic, at the close of which he hoped that if Augustine had read his Commentary on Jonah he would not take up again that ridiculous question of *cucurbita* (see 1.08). Then in a final sentence he adds, “But if the friend who first attacked me with the sword has been repulsed by my pen, your sense of humanity and justice will blame him if he attacks me again, but if he does not reply, you will allow us to joust (*ludamus*) on the field of the Scriptures without mutual injury.” As Cavallera saw (see note 17, I, p. 304), the “friend” must be Rufinus of Aquileia, who had attacked Jerome in his *Apologia* (two books in 401) and had been repulsed after Jerome’s two-book *Apologia* by a vitriolic third book (401 or 402). The quarrel between the two former friends had been deplored by Augustine (*Epist.* 73. 6 = Hier. *Epist.* 110. 6) but continued on Jerome’s part even after the death of Rufinus in 411.³⁰

³⁰ See Wiessen (above, note 21), 225–35, and Cavallera, II, 131–35. See also F. X. Murphy’s scholarly biography, *Rufinus of Aquileia* (Washington 1945), *passim* and esp. p. 155.

[1.18] Then in 405 St. Augustine finally replied in a long letter (*Epist.* 82 = *Hier.* 116) to St. Jerome, reviewing all the points at issue between the two of them and firmly rejecting Jerome's contentions in his letter 112 (see 1.09 above). At the end of the letter (§ 35) the bishop of Hippo informs the solitary scholar at Bethlehem, as politely as possible, that he will not allow Jerome's version of the Hebrew to be read in churches,

lest we introduce something new contrary to the authority of the LXX and thus create a great stumbling-block for the understanding of Christians, whose ears and hearts have been accustomed to hear that version which was approved even by the apostles. Whence that bush (*virgultum*) in Jonah, if in the Hebrew it is neither *hedera* nor *cucurbita* but something else which stands firmly upright on its own trunk and requires no props (*adminicula*) for its support, I should now prefer to be read as *cucurbita* in all Latin versions, for I do not think the LXX would have used this word unless they knew the plant was something like it.

And Augustine closes (*Epist.* 82. 36) by urging Jerome to write back his own opinion of all this, while promising to take good care in the future that his letters to Jerome would reach him before anyone else, who might divulge their contents. Here Augustine apologizes for the misadventure of the letters carried by Profuturus and the monk Paul (see above, 1.09). But if he really expected any admission from St. Jerome, he was disappointed. So far as we know, Jerome did not answer this letter, though some years later he did join forces with St. Augustine "in a common battle against the Pelagian heresy" (Wiessen [above, note 21], 240).

[1.19] Here we should note that Jerome's Commentary on Jonah had also been read by Rufinus, and that he had referred to that *virgultum* in much the same context as St. Augustine and only a few years before him. This was in the course of his *Apologia* of 401, where Rufinus was defending himself against charges brought by Jerome and was raising the counter charge that Jerome's translations from the Hebrew were introducing new elements to the confusion of Christians whose ears, in Jerome's own words, for four hundred years had been filled with versions based on the LXX, but now were being told to set aside familiar things like the story of Susannah as untrue and the song of the three holy children as not worthy to be sung in church. And with cutting sarcasm he adds:

Now after four hundred years the truth of the Law comes forth to us as purchased from the Synagogue. Now that the world has grown old and all things are hastening toward their end, let us write on the

tombs of our ancestors, so that they themselves, who had read otherwise, will know that Jonah did not have the shade of a *cucurbita* but of *hedera*, and again, since that is the wish of the Legislator, not *hedera* either, but of a different shrub (*alterius virgulti*).³¹

As Vallarsi saw, Rufinus was referring to the sculptured scene of Jonah sleeping under gourds (*sub cucurbitis dormientis*, i.e. the fruits hanging down from a leafy vine stretched on supports over his resting body) which was often found in the tombs of early Christians. The sculpture ought to be changed, Rufinus suggests, and the dead ought to be warned by an inscription that Jonah was not resting under the shade of a *cucurbita* but of the *hedera*. Vallarsi refrained from noting the further correction made by Jerome in his Commentary on the shrub, and of course he toned down Rufinus' scornful *Legislator* to the conventional *S. Doctor*, but Vallarsi and Rufinus were quite right in pointing to the numerous scenes of "Jonah resting" in early Christian art, especially as sculptured in relief on sarcophagi of the late third century, and Jerome must have been mortified by this public reminder of his unfortunate neglect of a good Christian custom. Nowhere does he even allude to this charge, but I suspect that it did supply one motive for his continued attacks on Rufinus even after his death.

[1.20] My Figure 8 is reproduced (by permission of the Hirmer Fotoarchiv München) from the Praeger paperback edition (New York 1963) of *Art of the Byzantine Era*, by D. T. Rice, his Figure 8. It is a detail from an ivory diptych, one leaf of which is now in the Ravenna Museum, having come from a monastery at Murano, where it had served as a book cover.³² On the bottom panel of this leaf (see Rice's Figure 7) the story of Jonah is represented in two scenes, Jonah shown being cast overboard from a ship on the right, and on the left, resting with "the whale beside him," according to Rice's caption (actually the snapping mouth resembles rather an Egyptian crocodile). In his text (p. 18) Rice admires the leaf as

illustrative art at its peak. One would associate such competence with a great city, such as Alexandria; the angular poses and the expressive gestures are distinct from what was being done at Constantinople.

³¹ *Apologia contra Hieronymum*, II, 39 in the new (1961) critical edition by M. Simonetti, but chapter 35 in Vallarsi (p. 391) and Migne, *PL* 21, p. 614. The sarcastic comment is not mentioned in Murphy's summary of chapters 32-36, p. 147.

³² See also his *Masterpieces of Byzantine Art* (Edinburgh Festival Society, 1958), no. 6: Ivory Book Cover, early 6th century, Ravenna, Museo Nazionale. Here Rice refers to the places where parts of the other leaf may be found; and he assigns this work either to Palestine or Egypt.

And in the detail, where the hanging gourds certainly resemble those of Fuchs' *Lang Kürbsz* (his p. 211, my Figure 5), my botanical consultants, Dr. Frederick Meyer of the U.S. National Arboretum in Washington and Prof. Charles Heiser of Indiana University, made no difficulty about identifying the plant as the bottle-gourd vine, now called *Lagenaria siceraria* (Molina) Standley (see above, 0.08). They agreed on the shape of the gourds and the general posture of the plant, while Heiser added that the leaves as shown resembled his own drawing of leaves (his Figure 1) in his article, "Variation in the Bottle Gourd."³³

[1.21] But there is difficulty if we regard this scene and the many others of "Jonah resting," mostly without the "whale," which are known in paintings from catacombs or from sculptured sarcophagi,³⁴ as illustrations of the Biblical story. In the first place, Jonah is usually shown lying down on a couch or cushion, either by the sea or in some countryside where he is surrounded by animals or other rustic figures, not sitting down or standing before his shed somewhere east of Nineveh, long after his release from the great fish. In the second place, he is regularly shown naked, without clothing of any kind. These features have been explained in various ways. Anthropologists and historians of religion have compared other versions in classical and oriental folk tales of what most scholars now believe was a very old and widely diffused story³⁵—though Jerome and his Christian contemporaries of course accepted it as a unit, literally the word of God expressed through the historical prophet—and have found traces in Rabbinic and Islamic sources³⁶ of tales in which Jonah lost his

³³ Pp. 121–28 in *Tropical Forest Ecosystems in Africa and South America*, ed. Betty G. Meggers and others (Washington, 1973).

³⁴ See the collections made long ago by J. Wilpert, *Le pitture delle catacombe romane* (2 vols., 1903) and *I sarcofagi cristiani antichi* (3 vols., 1929–36). Antin (see note 18), in his note on "l'iconographie cémétériale" on p. 33, observes that in the paintings Jonah is shown naked and lying down in his shady spot some 33 times, being cast up by the monster about 26 times, and being thrown overboard and swallowed by the monster about 15 times. I thank the director, Miss Rosalie Green, of the Index of Christian Iconography at Princeton University, which of course includes much more than Wilpert's paintings, for giving me (in 1976) the following count of the three leading scenes: Jonah cast overboard, 240 examples; Jonah cast up on land, 330; and Jonah resting under the gourd-vine, 250 examples, mostly before A.D. 700.

³⁵ E.g., H. Schmidt, *Jona, Eine Untersuchung zur vergleichenden Religionsgeschichte* (Göttingen 1907; Uwe Steffen, *Das Mysterium von Tod und Auferstehung: Formen und Wandlungen des Jona-Motifs* (Göttingen 1963).

³⁶ See Delbrueck's 1952 book (above, note 20), pp. 22–24. I add that Delbrueck believed that the richly decorated and so-called *Lipsanothek* (i.e. a reliquary containing *leipsana* or remains of the dead), which he was describing, was originally a kind of

clothing as a result of being roasted inside the whale and needed a period of rest and recreation after that exhausting experience.³⁷ Archaeologists and historians of art, however, have looked for classical themes in literature (metrical epitaphs) and plastic art (sarcophagi and other memorials) which expressed the hope for a happy life after death, so that Jonah's nudity on the sarcophagi is explained by the copying of antique pagan models (in which the heroes of mythology were regularly nude) in ateliers of the third century which catered to the pseudo-rustic tastes of wealthy city-dwellers, Christian and pagan alike. Engemann and others have pointed to a terra cotta plaque in the Louvre which shows a nude Dionysus sleeping in a posture remarkably similar to Jonah's on a sarcophagus in Berlin.³⁸ It was only necessary to change the bunches of grapes in the arbor above Dionysus to gourds, and the sleeping figure becomes Jonah.

[1.22] Possibly it was these scenes on sarcophagi to which Rufinus (1.19) referred, but closer relationship to the canonical story has been seen in catacomb paintings which show Jonah reclining in the usual posture but under a four-posted pergola from whose rafters the gourds dangle.³⁹ On the other hand, the dangling gourds by themselves, without visible reference to Jonah, can be seen in fragments of sculpture found in catacombs and engraved below and to the left of a late third-century inscription commemorating a certain Galatilla.⁴⁰ Can these gourds have been intended as a visual symbol of the "sign of Jonah" promised long before (Mt. 12:40)? I doubt it.

treasure-chest for an aristocratic lady of the first half of the third century. Like the much later ivory at Ravenna, it does not belong to sepulchral art.

³⁷ See A. Stüiber, *Refrigerium interim* (Bonn 1957, no. 11 in the series "Theophaneia," in which Delbrueck's monograph was no. 7), esp. pp. 137-42, stressing the importance of the single scene of "Jonah resting" and referring it to a belief shared by Jews and early Christians alike. Stüiber's views were somewhat clarified in a short article by E. Stommel, "Zum Problem der frühchristlichen Jonasdarstellungen," *Jahrb. f. Antike u. Christentum*, 1 (1958), 112-15. But objections to Stüiber's thesis were raised by clerical scholars in the *Rivista di Archeologia cristiana*, L. De Bruyne, 34 (1958), 87-118, and A. Ferrua, 38 (1962), 7-69.

³⁸ See J. Engemann, *Untersuchungen zur Sepulkralsymbolik der späteren römischen Kaiserzeit* (Münster, 1973; Ergänzungsband 2, *Jahrb. f. Antike u. Christentum*), esp. 70-84 and Taf. 33 c (side of a sarcophagus in Berlin, Staatliche Museen) and 35 a (terra cotta plaque in the Louvre). The central part of the sarcophagus and the whole of the plaque can also be seen in Tafel 8 (c and a respectively) which illustrates Stommel's article (above).

³⁹ See Ferrua's 1962 article (above, note 37), figure 5 (p. 12). Antin's note (above, note 34) also refers to "un Jonas sous pergola" in an earlier article (by Josi) in the same *Rivista* 5 (1928), 198.

⁴⁰ Ferrua, p. 47, figs. 27-29. The inscription (figure 29) is a fragment from the catacomb at Pretestato.

This is only one of the many things we do not know, and I close this unsatisfactory commentary on Rufinus' criticism by saying that I know of no artistic representation at all of Jerome's *ciceion* and only one of his *hedera*, and that one very late. A pair of drawings in a fourteenth-century manuscript *Biblia pauperum* shows Jonas (so labeled) emerging from the mouth of the great fish with a branch of ivy leaves at the right side of the picture. As expected, he is nude, but he is also bald as a baby, though he had a good head of hair in the drawing at the left where he is shown, wrapped in a cloak, being shoved into the mouth of the monster.⁴¹ Here the reading of St. Jerome's Vulgate is preserved, but the long artistic tradition which represented Jonah resting after his ordeal is almost unanimous in preferring the bottle-gourd plant, what Linnaeus called *Cucurbita lagenaria*, as providing him with shade.

[1.23] Returning to Jerome's Commentary, I reproduce Antin's text (which hardly differs from Vallarsi's in Migne, except for the punctuation) of the "ponderous jesting" (above, 1.10) which precedes his serious explanation for his change of *cucurbita* to *hedera* in verse 6 of chapter 4: *In hoc loco*, he says,

quidam Canterius de antiquissimo genere Corneliorum
 sive, ut ipse iactitat, de stirpe Asinii Pollionis,
 dudum Romae dicitur me accusasse sacrilegii
 quod pro cucurbita hederam transtulerim:
 timuit videlicet ne 5
 si pro cucurbitis hederæ nascerentur
 unde occulte et tenebrose biberet non haberet.
 Et revera in ipsis cucurbitis vasculorum
 quas vulgo saucomarias vocant,
 solent apostolorum imagines adumbrari 10
 ex quibus et ille sibi non suum nomen adsumpsit.
 Quod si tam facile vocabula commutantur
 ut pro Corneliis seditiosis tribunis
 Aemilii consules appellentur,
 miror cur mihi non liceat 15
 hederam transferre pro cucurbita.
 Sed veniamus ad seria. . . .

⁴¹ See Abb. 4 in an article by E. M. Vetter and W. A. Bulst, pp. 127-38 in the Heidelberg University magazine, *Ruperto-Carola*, bd. 46 (Juni 1969). Through hints in Schmidt and Steffen (above, note 35), the authors trace the loss of Jonah's hair to a medieval variant in the myth of Heracles' rescue of Hesione. See Tzetzes, *Schol. ad Lycophr.* 34, and Frazer's note in the Loeb *Apollodorus* (I, p. 207): "Tzetzes says that Hercules, in full armour, leaped into the jaws of the sea-monster, and was in its belly for three days hewing and hacking it, and that at the end of the three days he came forth without any hair on his head."

[1.24] *Dudum* in line 3 means “recently” (as Antin notes), i.e. shortly before the composition of the Commentary in 396 but after the publication of the translation from the Hebrew in 391–94 (see above, note 18). This squares with the *ante annos plurimos* of Jerome’s letter (112. 22) of 404, in which he blames a person whom he calls both Cornelius and Asinius Pollio (see 1.10), clearly the same person who is graced here (line 1) with the ridiculous nickname Canterius (line 1, or as in Vallarsi, Cantherius). See Antin’s notes for the degrading connotations of the four names here, also Piganiol in Antin’s note on our line 13, where *seditionis tribuni* is so outrageously applied to the patrician Cornelli that the reader knows that Jerome must be inventing freely. His purpose in creating all this business of names, apart from his usual technique as a satirist (see Wiessen [note 21], esp. 200–12), is revealed in lines 12–16 above: if words can be changed so readily in these names, why shouldn’t I be allowed to change *cucurbita* to *hedera*? In line 11 Jerome implies that his critic on this occasion, which he reports only by hearsay (*dicatur*, line 3), was a cleric who had taken his new name from one of the apostles. One thinks of the monk Paul who carried Augustine’s second critical letter (above, 1.09) to Rome rather than to Jerome in Bethlehem, but his misadventure did not happen until after 398. And it seems likely that Jerome had no specific person in mind. See Cavallera (note 21 above), II, 106–09, who notes Jerome’s expressions in various prefaces for the unnamed people who criticized him for preferring Hebrew texts to the LXX, but also that later on he named Palladius as the chief calumniator.

[1.25] As usual in his attacks on the clergy, Jerome’s first charge (lines 5–8) involves luxurious living. His critic was afraid that if *hederae* were grown instead of *cucurbitae* he would not have anything from which to drink in secret and in some dark corner. Ivy would offer cover for clandestine timpling but not a container for the wine—precisely the function which gave the plant its modern names. In the two sentences which precede Columella’s directions for choosing seeds for the production of the longer cylindrical fruit (see above, 1.07 and 1.15), he tells us (XI. 3. 49) that seed chosen from the middle part of the stored *cucurbita* will produce fruit of larger size (*incrementi vastioris*), and that these fruits are quite suitable for use as containers (*ad usum vasorum*), like the *cucurbitae* from Alexandria, once they have been dried out (*cum exaruerunt*). In the parallel passage in verse (X. 383–88; see above, 1.07 for the preceding lines in which *cucumis* and *cucurbita* are characterized together), Columella had recommended the same choice of seed as above for the production

of larger fruit with swelling belly, and here he mentions more uses for the product (385–88): *sobolem dabit illa capacem / Naryciae picis, aut Actaei mellis Hymetti, / aut habilem lymphis hamulam, Bacchove lagoenam, / tum pueros eadem fluviis innare docebit*. From the woody rind of the dried fruit (see Pliny below) can be made a container for pitch, a vessel for honey, a water-bucket, or a bottle for wine; or even air-tight floats with which boys learn how to swim. Hence Linnaeus (*Species plantarum* [1753], 1010) gave the epithet *lagenaria* in the margin opposite his first species of the genus *Cucurbita*, citing Morison's *Historiae Oxoniensis pars secunda* (1680) for an illustration and the name *Cucurbita lagenaria, flore albo*.⁴² And the common English name for the plant is Bottle-Gourd (no doubt in use long before Morison), the Germans call it *Flaschenkürbis*, and the Italians *Zucca da vino, dal collo*, or (from floats smaller than Columella's) *da pescare*.

[1.26] Pliny's discussion of kitchen-garden plants (*hortensia*, see his § 73, cited below) begins (XIX. 61) by noting the posture of the fruits *cucurbitae* and *cucumis* (plural, cited above, 1.14) and distinguishing their physical composition: *cucumis cartilagine et carne constat, cucurbita cortice et cartilagine; cortex huic uni maturitate transit in lignum*. (Note this as a second unique feature [see note 42] of *Cucurbita lagenaria*.) It continues the characterization of these two important plants in a long discussion (64–74) in which Pliny describes now *cucumis*, now *cucurbita*, but mostly the two together (see 1.07 above), but on the uses of *cucurbita* he is quite clear (XIX. 71): *cucurbitarum numerosior usus [sc. quam cucumerum], et primus caulis in cibo, atque ex eo [sc. partes, i.e. fructus] in totum natura diversa [i.e. the parts (fruits) which come after the stalks, being of a different nature altogether]; nuper in balnearum usum venere urceorum vice [i.e. pitchers or *hamulae* for carrying water in baths], iampridem vero etiam cadorum ad vina condenda [i.e. jars for storing wine]. And a little later (73) he notes how those fruits which were not cut down for eating (compare Aug. *C. Faust.* cited above, 1.16) when green (and the rind was still soft; compare 71: *cortex viridi tener, deraditur nihilominus in cibis*) are prepared to serve as containers: *eas quae semini non serventur ante hiemem praecidi non est mos; postea fumo siccantur condendis hortensiorum seminibus et rusticae suppellectili*. That is, after the onset of cold weather when the fruits have stopped growing and the rinds are becoming hard and woody (61 above), they are cut down; later they (the empty rinds) are dried in smoke in order to form storage jars for the seeds of kitchen-garden plants and homemade utensils. Compare Columella*

⁴² Bauhin in his famous *Pinax* (1623) had also noted the white flower as a distinctive feature of the plant, which he called *Cucurbita oblonga, flore albo, folio molli*.

on *cucurbitae* from Alexandria (above, 1.25). Some of the possibilities latent in that *rustica supellex* and all the steps in the modern process are indicated in the unsigned article on "Gourd" in the *Britannica* (11th edn.):

The remarkable fruit [of *Lagenaria vulgaris*] first begins to grow in the form of an elongated cylinder, but gradually widens toward the extremity, until, when ripe, it resembles a flask with a narrow neck and large round bulb; it sometimes attains a length of 7 ft. When ripe, the pulp is removed from the neck, and the interior cleared by leaving water standing in it; the woody rind that remains is used as a bottle; or the lower part is cut off and cleared out, forming a basin-like vessel applied to the same domestic purposes as the calabash (*Crescentia*) of the West Indies; the smaller varieties, divided lengthwise, form spoons.

[1.27] The drying of the gourds by means of smoking is not mentioned here, nor by Lucian (*Vera Hist.* II. 37) when he describes how the *Kolokynthopeiratai* make their 60-cubit long *πλοῖα κολοκύνθινα* by drying out a gourd (surely not a pumpkin here!), and then hollowing it out and stripping it of its contents, but whether or not the emptied rinds were hung in a smokehouse, they certainly must have been hung up to dry somewhere under cover. The drying rinds of *cucurbitae* would have been a familiar sight in many an ancient household, even in the kitchens of wealthy city-dwellers, and I suggest that this explains the remark of Psyche's envious sister (Apul. *Met.* V. 9) when she complains that her own husband is older than her father, balder than a *cucurbita*, and weaker than any male child. For the surface of *Lagenaria vulgaris*, unlike that of other cultivated cucurbits, is described by botanists as smooth and glabrous. Probably that is also the point of the indignant remark of the porter (*Met.* I. 15), "You may want to die, but I don't have the head of a *cucurbita* so as to die for you." The rind of a drying gourd might look like a head, and its emptiness would certainly suggest thoughtlessness or stupidity, as critics from Weinreich to Eisenberg have insisted.⁴³ I do not deny this, and I can add one other place in which *cucurbita* is coupled with emptiness in a derisory context. This is in the Latin translation of the important work *Contra Haereses* of St. Irenaeus, the probably Syrian-born bishop of Lyons in the late second century, just about 200 years before St. Jerome and almost contemporary with Apuleius. In a paragraph of his first

⁴³ The best modern analogue, I think, is provided by P. Robert, *Dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française* (Paris 1966) when he notes under the word *Carafe*, which means ordinarily "vase destiné à contenir un liquide;" that it is used in popular speech of an "homme sans intelligence": "Quelle carafe!" people say.

book (I. 11. 4 in Massuet's numbering),⁴⁴ Irenaeus undertakes to parody a fundamental tetrad of Valentine's gnostic aeons (series of emanations):

There is a certain royal *Proarchē* (pro-principle) which is *Proanenožtos* (pro-inconceivable), a *Proanypostatos* (pro-unsubstantial) virtue, *Proprocylindomenē* (pro-prostrating itself). With it there is a virtue, which I call *cucurbita*; with this *cucurbita* there is a virtue, which in itself I call *perinane* (absolute void). This *cucurbita* and *perinane*, since they are a unity, have issued (*emisierunt*), without sexual action (*cum non emisissent*), a fruit that is visible on all sides, edible, and tasty, and common speech calls this fruit *cucumis*. With this *cucumis* is a virtue of the same power as itself, which in itself I call *pepo*. These virtues, *cucurbita et perinane, et cucumis, et pepo*, have issued the remaining host of Valentine's ridiculous *pepones*.

The reason why Irenaeus chose these three names from the vegetable world, which he rightly asserts are much more credible than Valentine's, being in everyday use and understood by everyone, is revealed towards the end of the next paragraph, where (p. 107 in Harvey) the last word is used in its Homeric sense in what Harvey saw was probably a parody of *Il. II. 235*: *O pepones, sophistae vituperabiles et non veri*. The fruit *pepo*, then (see above, 0.10), was the melon (*πέπων*), *cucumis* the cucumber (*σίκκος*), and *cucurbita* the bottle-gourd (*κολοκύνθη*). And I can see no reason for his equating *perinane* with *cucurbita* unless he thought that the sight of drying and emptied gourds would be as familiar to people everywhere as they evidently were to his fellow Syrian Lucian.

[1.28] Here we do have a second passage, replacing the one in Petronius which we have removed (above, 1.04) from Eisenberg's note (above, 0.02), in which *cucurbita* might be interpreted as *Dummkopf*. But our object here is to note the frequency and familiarity of the word in all its meanings, and we return now to the discussion of St. Jerome's jesting preface to his serious explanation (above, 1.23). "And in fact," he resumes in lines 8–11, "people are accustomed to engrave the likenesses of the apostle (from whom he drew the name that is not his own), in *ipsis cucurbitis vasculorum quas vulgo saucomarias vocant*." Jerome had just been referring to the *cucurbitae* which could be used as vessels to hold wine (see above, 1.26), but these were made of the woody rinds of bottle-gourds and could not hold the

⁴⁴ Page 106 in the edition by W. Wigan Harvey (Cantabrigiae 1857). For the eastern origin of Irenaeus and the date of his Greek work, see Harvey's preliminary observations, cliii and clxiii, and clxiv for the use by Tertullian of the Latin translation, which must have been made immediately.

elaborate engraving of the beechwood cups pledged by Menalcas in Vergil, *Ecl.* 3. 37–39, much less the chasing or engraving of the well-known metallic vessels here called *vascula*. I think Antin (above, note 18) was right in translating “sur les panses de ces vases,”⁴⁵ though he lets the relative clause, which he renders “nommés communément *saucomariae*,” follow “ces vases” directly. But the antecedent of *quas* is not *vasculorum* but *cucurbitis*, and if the reader will turn back to Pliny’s names for the two kinds of *cucurbita* (and apparently of *cucumis* too, above, 1.07), he will find that the first was the climbing plant, called *genus camararium* because it reached up to the vaults or *camarae*. In place of that strange and hitherto unexplained word *saucomarias*, which Antin said he found in all the MSS he had seen (none of them earlier than the ninth century), we should surely read *camararias*. Then in that case, when Jerome said *quas* (i.e. *cucurbitas*) *vulgo camararias vocant*, his authority for that *vulgo* would have been simply Pliny; compare above, 1.03. But for some reason (see above, 1.13) Jerome refused to admit that the plant which provided shade for Jonah was a *cucurbita*.

[1.29] And there is one more jest which St. Jerome could not resist making as he began his mystical interpretation: *Ad personam vero Domini Salvatoris . . .* (Antin, 112). He quotes his version of Isaiah 1:8 (“And the daughter of Zion will be left like a booth [*tabernaculum*] in a vineyard and like a lodge in a cucumber-field”) and comments on the phrase *velut casula in cucumerario*, “let us say, since we have not found [the word] *cucurbita* in any other place in Scripture, that wherever *cucumis* grows, there usually grows *cucurbita* also.” What is asserted as fact is rather Jerome’s inference from Pliny’s sometimes confusing account (see above, 1.07 and 1.26); here we should add Pliny’s directions for the annual planting of both *cucumis* and *cucurbita* (XIX. 69), which are also named together in the parallel passage of Columella, XI. 3. 48. The inference would be supported by several

⁴⁵ See the article on “burette” in the *Dict. d’archéol. chrét. et de liturgie* (Cabriol-Leclercq-Marrou), t. 2, col. 1354. Fig. 1747 shows a circular bronze bottle shaped much like the water-canteen which hikers suspend over a hip, except that one side is completely flat while the other swells out to a greater extent. The neck is much longer than on a canteen. Antin refers at the end of his note 3 (p. 110) to this vase, found in a tomb at Concevreux; but he does not mention the fact that Leclercq thought that its local designation as “gourde” was scarcely appropriate. But the swelling side, which is what Jerome calls *cucurbita vasculi* is not unlike a vertical half of a pyriform gourd as seen in Fuchs’ p. 209 (my Figure 4). No date is given for this vessel, but others are known from the fourth or fifth century, slender and with long necks, made of terra cotta, with painted surface and various scenes and symbols.

other passages, especially in poetry, where, if the one plant or its fruit is mentioned, the other trails along immediately; see Prop. IV. 2.43; *Priap.* 51. 17; Colum. X. 234 and 380. Thus Jerome makes a jocular concession to his reader. He will not leave *cucurbita* altogether out of consideration, though he has removed it from the text of Jonah, the only place in Scripture where he had found it. But since a derivative of *cucumis* is found in Isaiah, and since *cucurbita* regularly goes along with *cucumis*, the reader is free to suppose that Isaiah was also talking about *cucurbita*. What is really notable here is that in introducing his concession (*Ad personam . . . Salvatoris, ne penitus propter φιλοκολόκυνθον cucurbitam relinquamus. . . . Et dicamus . . .*) Jerome has coined a new Greek word which has not been noticed in *LSJ* and which Antin (above, note 18) thought (112, note 3) was a ridiculous word, echoing the *Apocolocyntosis* of Seneca. It is possible that Jerome had been reading Seneca's skit, but altogether unlikely that he had been reading Roman history in the Greek of Dio Cassius, our only source for the word (see above, 0.01). On the other hand, he was perfectly capable of forming a new Greek word, which on the analogy of *φιλόσοφος* and countless others must mean, simply, "a lover of *κολοκύνθη*," i.e. of the fruits which supply tasty food, not so very different from the *cucurbitarii* or "growers of cucurbits" in *Epist.* 112 (above, 1.14). In other words, it is on account of some reader who may be a cucurbit-lover that Jerome does not abandon *cucurbita* altogether. And actually on other occasions, when he was not discussing the Hebrew text but its spiritual meaning (see above, 1.06 on the preface, Antin 54, and at Antin 107 on 4. 5 and 115 on 4. 9), Jerome himself uses the word *cucurbita* of Jonah's shade-plant, accommodating his vocabulary to his readers' preference.

[1.30] For most of the time in St. Jerome and his contemporaries the word *cucurbita* denotes a commercially grown, edible fruit: compare especially Jerome's *cucurbitarii* in *Epist.* 112, *φιλοκολόκυνθος* at Antin 112 (just above), *cucurbitae camarariae* (no longer *saucotariae*) at Antin 109 (above, 1.28), Diocletian's Edict (above, 1.15), and Augustine's *homicida cucurbitarum* (*C. Faust.* VI. 4, 1.16 above). On one occasion, however (see 1.25 above), Jerome alluded to the wine-bottles which, according to Columella and Pliny, could be made, along with other homemade utensils (*rustica supellex*), from the woody rinds of mature fruits after they had been emptied of their contents and thoroughly dried (see 1.26)—passages from which Linnaeus drew the specific epithet (*Cucurbita lagenaria* and in which Candolle recognized the plant which Seringe called *Lagenaria vulgaris*. And we have suggested that it was the familiar sight of the smooth-skinned bottle-gourds,

hanging dried and empty from the rafters, which lies behind Apuleius' figures (*Met.* I. 15 and V. 9) and Irenaeus' coupling of *cucurbita* and *perinane* (see above, 1.27). Jerome also knew the use of the implement which we call a cupping-glass (see 1.01) and he, following Pliny (1.02), called a *medicinalis cucurbita*—a linguistic transfer owing to the similarity of its shape to that of the gourds when small (1.03). And next we saw (1.04) that *cucurbitae* in Petronius (39. 12) is probably a figurative application of the transferred name of the implement to people whom Trimalchio and his guests considered obnoxious.

[1.31] So far we have been noting the cases in which *cucurbita* refers primarily to a part of the plant, its fruit. But in the sections which follow (1.05–1.22) *cucurbita* refers to the whole plant. According to the Old Latin translations of the book of Jonah, made from the Greek versions by the LXX, this was specifically the bottle-gourd vine, the plant which grew up rapidly and provided grateful shade for Jonah, only to be withered through the agency of a worm at God's bidding. But in his new translation from the Hebrew text, St. Jerome had substituted the word *hedera*, at the same time declaring that the plant was not really the broad-leaved ivy but a different shrub, called *ciceion* in the Hebrew, which grew frequently in Palestine and could rise upward without external support. Various people had protested vigorously against the substitution of something else for *cucurbita*, which they thought was most appropriate to the performance of the plant in the traditional story. St. Augustine had not been convinced (1.18 above) by Jerome's explanation, and Rufinus had ridiculed it (1.19), pointing to the importance of the plant *cucurbita* as a symbol in sepulchral iconography. I have stated reasons (1.12–13) for doubting certain points in Jerome's explanation—not that he was wrong about the reading of the Hebrew text or the nature of the plant *ciceion*—and I have voiced a suspicion that he had some other reason for rejecting the traditional *cucurbita*. This would be, I now think, that the gourd was one of the garden-products which were sought out by luxury-loving clerics who should have been content with ordinary bread (*cibarius panis*) and plain drinking water instead of delicate concoctions like *contrita holera betarumque succus*; see the passage (*Epist.* 52. 12) from the letter to Nepotianus which Wiessen (above, note 21) cites (p. 79) as an example of true satire for a Christian purpose, the reformation of the clergy. Jerome does not mention *cucurbitae* here in his list of delicacies (*caricae, piper, nuces . . . simila, mel, pistatia, tota hortorum cultura*), but they are prominent in Arnobius' lists (*Nat.* IV. 10 and VII. 16) of strange foods favored by pagan superstition. It is also possible that Jerome knew about and

recoiled from the purgative property of Pliny's *cucurbita silvestris* or *colocynthis* (above, 1.02). If so, there is irony in his recommendation of the plant *Ricinus communis*, the oil from whose seeds was used at the time (see Pliny above, 1.12) mainly for burning in lamps but now as a purgative. (And Galen among ancient physicians knew and extolled this cathartic use of the plant called *kiki*; see Kühn [*Galenus Opera*, xii, p. 26], who translates: *Ricini fructus quemadmodum purgat, detergit ac digerit!*). But we cannot know about this, and our object here has been merely to show that all the connotations of the word *cucurbita* in Jerome were known also to Pliny and others in the time of Seneca, and that very few of them were pejorative. It can be said that the plant which Linnaeus called *Cucurbita lagenaria* was regarded then—as it still is—as a provider of goods and services for man.

II. Athenaeus on *κολοκύνθη*

[2.01] Candolle had said (see above, 0.12) that Greek authors do not mention the plant *Lagenaria vulgaris*, though he recognized this plant in Roman descriptions of *cucurbita* which stressed the woody nature of the matured fruits' rinds and their use for homemade utensils. But we have just seen that the word *cucurbita* in the Old Latin versions of the book of Jonah translates *κολόκυνθα* in the LXX, that Jerome himself invented the term *φιλοκολόκυνθος* referring to a lover of *cucurbitae*, that Lucian (*Vera Hist.* II. 37; see above, 1.27) shows how the *Kolokynthopeiratai* made their *κολοκύνθινα πλοῖα* from the dried and emptied rinds of fruits which are evidently identical with the *cucurbitae* described by Pliny and Columella, and that the Latin translation of Irenaeus' work (above, 1.27) uses the successive terms *cucurbita*, *perinane*, *cucumis*, and *pepo*, presumably rendering the terms of the original Greek parody of Valentine's tetrad, which would be *κολοκύνθη*, *διάκενον* (or a new coinage *περιδιάκενον*), *σίκνος* and *πέπων*. And here we can add the Greek names of the fruits whose prices were set by Diocletian's Edict (6. 26–32, see note 28 and above, 1.15): *cucurbitae*: *κολόκυνθοι*; *cucumeres*: *σίκνοι*; *melopepones*: *μηλοπέπωνες*; *pepones*: *πέπωνες*. And the glosses (references in the *TLL*) regularly have *cucurbita* for *κολοκύνθη* or *κολόκυνθα* and, vice versa, *κολοκύνθη* or *κολόκυνθα* for *cucurbita* (or *cucuruita*), except that there are a few traces of the Scholium on Iuven. 14. 58: *cucurbita* *σικύα*—which is quite correct: see 1.01 and note 14.

[2.02] Clearly, then, *κολοκύνθη* and *cucurbita* were lexical equivalents at least from the second century on. But we can trace their equivalence

much farther back through various passages in Athenaeus. He made a critical distinction (II, 59 a), which we have noted (above, 0.11) was the basis for the definition in the *Thesaurus* of Stephanus and thence in the successive editions of Liddell and Scott until it was changed in the new edition (*LSJ*). "The people of the Hellespont," he said, "distinguish long gourds, which they call *σικύαι*, from the round ones, which they call *κολοκύνται*." This is supported by a sentence in Aristotle, who says (*Hist. An.* IX. 14, 616 a 22) that the (supposed) floating nest of the (mythical) halcyon is shaped approximately like the *sikyai* which have long necks. For, although the generic word for gourds in the Attic dialect was *κολοκύντη* (Athen. II, 59 c; compare the heading *κολοκύνται* at 58 f) there were exceptions, as in Aristotle, in various authors quoted by Athenaeus,⁴⁶ and in a third-century papyrus from El Fayûm preserved at the Sorbonne.⁴⁷ Here, in lines 18–21, an agent reports to his superior that the oil-dealer Mares had brought to him a certain person who had two *sikyai* and . . . a *lēkythos*, in which . . . (the rest is illegible). Hombert translated *σικύας β'* as "deux calabasses"; *LSJ* explain the word as "gourd used as a calabash," quite reasonably in view of Pliny's and Columella's containers (*cucurbitae*, above, 1.25; note Columella's Alexandrian *cucurbitae*) for water and wine. Thus we now have documentary evidence from the pre-Christian era that gourds of a certain shape were in fact bottle-gourds, fruits of *Lagenaria vulgaris*. And referring back to the nickname *Σικύας* in Athenaeus VI, 257 a (above 1.04), citing the third-century historian Clearchus and to the discussion of *cucurbita* when applied to the cupping-instrument (1.02–03), we cannot doubt that the word *sikya*, in this application, was also a linguistic transfer or *Übertrag* from its use as applied to a bottle-gourd of a certain shape. If we suppose that the critical shape was similar to that of a cucumber, then it is likely that *σικύα* is an arbitrary feminine variant of the older word *σίκνος* (or *σικνός*) or *σίκνυς* (attested

⁴⁶ Euthydemus of Athens (Athen. II, 58 f) called *kolokyntē* an "Indian *sikya*" because the seed was imported from India; Menodorus, a student of Erasistratus and friend of Hikesius (Athen. II, 59 a), said that among *kolokyntai* there was the Indian kind, also called *sikya*, which was usually boiled, and the *kolokyntē* proper, which was also baked (*καὶ ὀπτᾶται*), and in a significant passage from the poet Nicander of Colophon (to be discussed a little later), Athenaeus (IX, 372 c) assures us that Nicander referred to *kolokyntai* though he called them *sikyai*.

⁴⁷ No. 391, first published in 1925 by M. Hombert, *Rev. belge de Phil. et d'Hist.* 4, 652–60, no. 8, and reprinted by F. Bilabel in the third volume of the *Sammelbuch* (1927), no. 7202, and thus cited by *LSJ*.

for Alcaeus, Athen. III, 73 e); Frisk places the three words side by side in his etymological dictionary.⁴⁸

[2.03] Thanks to a papyrus published in 1931 and not noticed in *LSJ* until its 1968 *Supplement*, we now have documentary evidence that the gourd called *κολοκύνθη* (or *κολόκυνθα*) could also provide a homemade utensil and therefore should be identified as the fruit of *Lagenaria vulgaris*. It comes in a new compound, *κολοκυνθαρύταινα*, defined in the *Supplement* as "scoop or dipper made of a gourd," which stands in line 7 of No. 78 in the *Papyri Iandanae* (in fasc. 5, 1931). The word is clearly anapaestic, like some other words for rare objects in earlier and later lines of the papyrus, and the *Nachträge* of the editors suggest that the versifier was Parthenius rather than Callimachus, in whose works such doubled words are rare. Frisk and Chantraine both give this new compound prominence in their discussion of *kolokyntḗ* as *Lagenaria vulgaris*; see above, 0.05 and note 8.

[2.04] Another passage in Athenaeus, also headed *κολοκύνθη* (IX, 372 b), can be connected with Pliny's *cucurbita*, i.e. *Lagenaria*. Here Athenaeus tells of the party's wonderment when fresh *kolokyntai* were served to them in wintertime. There follows an extended passage from the *Horae* of Aristophanes (Kock I, 536–38) which notes the appearance in midwinter markets of many kinds of comestibles and flowers out of season, including *σικυνοί*, *βότρυς* and, later on, *κολοκύνται* and *γογγυλίδες*, to the amazement—or disapproval—of moralizing gods, one of whom comments sarcastically that Athens has been made over into Egypt. Again the guests wonder (Athenaeus resumes, 372 d) how they could be eating *kolokyntai* in the middle of January, for they were fresh (*χλωραί*) and retained their natural flavor. Then they remembered that cooks knew of tricks to preserve such vegetables, and Ulpian, when pressed by Larensis to recall the practices of the ancients, quotes some lines from the *Georgica* of Nicander of Colophon (frg. 72 Schneider), telling how *sikyai* (he really means *kolokyntai*, Athenaeus makes Ulpian say) should be cut into strips, sewed together on a string, dried in the open air and then hung over smoke, so that in winter the servants may have enough to eat, filling their capacious pot with strings of well-washed *σικύη* and other vegetables.⁴⁹ This

⁴⁸ See note 8 above. In the same way, the *κολοκυνθίς* of Dioscorides (IV. 176, see 1.02 and 0.03 above) is to be considered an arbitrary variant of *κολόκυνθα*.

⁴⁹ My paraphrase owes less to Gulick's translation (see above, 1.04; Gulick was confused also in his notes on the heading *kolokyntē*) than to Gow's (*Nicander*, ed. A. S. F. Gow and A. F. Scholfield; Cambridge 1953), where the fragment is also no. 72. Gow uses "gourds" to translate both *kolokyntai* and *sikyai* and in his first index identifies both words botanically as *Cucurbita maxima*, following (see his Introduction, p. 25)

method of preserving *kolokyntai* for later consumption can be compared with a sentence in Pliny (XIX. 74) which follows directly after his sentence (quoted above, 1.26) about the smoking and drying of the gourds destined for seed-containers and *rustica supellex*. "A means of preserving them (i.e. *cucurbitae*) for food has been discovered," and he goes on to describe two methods, the first of which, in brine (*muria*), can also be applied to *cucumis*; compare the *Geoponica*, XII. 19. 15 on *σίκνοι* and 17 on *κολοκύνται*. For the second method I give Rackham's translation (Loeb Pliny, 5, 1950) of Mayhoff's Teubner text (1892):

but it is reported that gourds also can be kept green in a trench dug in a shady place and floored with dry hay and then with earth.

This is not exactly Nicander's method, but what matters is that the successive authors, Nicander, Pliny, and Athenaeus, were all referring to methods of preserving the young edible gourds in a dry state for eating at a later date: *usque ad alios paene proventus*, says Pliny, and his preceding sentence was one of those by which Candolle recognized the fruit of *Lagenaria vulgaris*. We can add that a contemporary of Athenaeus, the physician Galen of Pergamum, also commended the dried flesh of *kolokyntai*, the seeds having been removed, for pleasurable eating in winter: see his essay, *De alimentorum facultatibus*, in Kühn's edition, vol. 6, p. 559; also in another essay (Kühn 6, p. 785), after the flesh had been cut into small pieces and dried so that it would not rot.

[2.05] In defense of Candolle's failure to recognize *Lagenaria vulgaris* in any Greek source that was available in his time, it can be said that the statements of Theophrastus in his *De historia plantarum* (Loeb edition by Hort, 1916) and *De causis plantarum* (Loeb edition by Einarson and Link in 1976) have been more baffling than illuminating on the botanical identity of his plants, especially those for which he uses the names *sikyos*, *sikya*, and *kolokyntē* (-*nthē* once, at *C.P.* II. 8. 4). *Kolokyntē* is paired frequently with *sikyos* but sometimes with *sikya*, and on two occasions (*H.P.* I. 13. 3 and VII. 2. 9) all three words occur together: *ὁ σίκυος καὶ ἡ κολοκύντη καὶ ἡ σικύα*. Thus there was some reason for Dyer (see note 9) to make a distinction between *kolokyntē* and *sikya* and for Hort to adopt it in his botanical index for the three words, respectively "Cucumber (*Cucumis sativus*), Gourd (*Cucurbita maxima*), and Bottle-gourd (*Lagenaria vulgaris*)." Previous scholars

Thiselton-Dyer in *LSJ*, not without expressing some doubt in general and in the index under *kolokyntē* adding Emmanuel's guess: *Citrullus colocynthis*, i.e. the Bitter Apple!

indeed had diverged widely in their identifications, as may be seen in the index of Wimmer's Didot edition (1866). For the three names above the index gives the interpretations of K. Sprengel (as deduced from his translation of and commentary on the *H.P.*, Altona, 1822) and of C. Fraas (*Synopsis plantarum florum classicarum* . . . München, 1845). In tabular form they read:

	<i>sikyos</i>	<i>kolokyntē</i>	<i>sikya</i>
Spr.	Melone, i.e. <i>Cucumis Melo</i> L.	Gurke, i.e. <i>Cucumis sativus</i> L.	Kürbiss, i.e. <i>Cucurbita Pepo</i> L.
Fr.	<i>Cucumis sativus</i> L.	<i>Cucurbita Pepo</i> L.	<i>Cucumis Melo</i> L.

Here we may note the comment of Sprengel in his Altona edition on *H.P.* VII. 1. 2 (which is echoed, more emphatically, in Hehn's *Kulturpflanze* [7th edn., 1902], p. 310; see above, 0.08) and even by Schiemann (above, 0.06, p. 237):

Indessen ist es sehr schwer, mit Bestimmtheit sich über diese Bedeutungen [i.e. of *sikyos* and *kolokyntē*, also *sikyos pepōn* (see above, 0.10 and 1.27)] zu erklären, da die Alten die Namen häufig verwechseln.

This was in 1822, and Sprengel went on to cite passages from Athenaeus, Dioscorides, Galen, and the *Geoponica*. Then, a century later, even as Schiemann was writing in 1932, the changes of name, apparent in quotations in Athenaeus and Galen from Diocles of Carystus and Speusippus, and in Theophrastus himself, were being exploited by Steier in the article "Melone" in the *RE*, bd. 29 (1931), cols. 562-67, in order to suggest that the *sikya* of Theophrastus might indeed be the Melon, *Cucumis Melo*, as in Fraas above. This is, of course, possible, but Steier nowhere refers to the still earlier and usual meaning of *sikya* as cupping-instrument (see above, 1.02) and in fact at col. 563 he is quite mistaken when he thinks that the phrase *αἱ μεγάλαι σικύαι* in the Hippocratean Corpus (*Art.* 48, Littré 4, p. 214) refers to a plant or the product of a plant (melon). He has failed to notice that the next word in the phrase is *προσβαλλόμεναι*, the regular term (see above, 1.02) for the attachment of a cupping-instrument. The truth seems to be (above 2.02) that the word *sikya* in the sense "cupping-instrument" was transferred from an arbitrary variant of *sikyos* which indicated a bottle-gourd of a certain shape, and that Theophrastus was careless in applying it, apparently, to a plant distinct from *Lagenaria*. For at *C. P.* I. 10. 4 he speaks of the weakness in climbing of "the so-called *sikya*" (*τῆς σικύας καλουμένης*), and here Einarson and Link, who follow Hort and *LSJ* in relating *sikya* to the bottle-gourd, comment on the oddity of the "so-called":

perhaps, they say, it was thought to be named from *sikya*, a cupping iron, although the cupping iron was actually named from the gourd.

[2.06] All this was slippery business, but now that we have documentary evidence from the papyri that the gourds called *sikyai* (see 2.02) and those called *kolokyntai* (2.03) were slightly different products of essentially the same plant (i.e. *Lagenaria*), I think it is safe to say that nothing in the prose writers before Athenaeus indicates that either of these names must refer to something else. With this in mind we can proceed to examine some of the contexts in Athenaeus which draw from the comic poets. We begin with one of the two which became proverbial (see above, 0.02). In his second book, p. 59 c, Athenaeus cites a line from Epicharmus (frg. 154, Kaibel): ὑγιώτερον θῆν ἔστι κολοκύντας πολύ. This is cited as a proverb by Zenobius (VI. 27), and we know from Demetrius *On Style* (*De eloc.* 127 and 162) that Sophron (frg. 34, Kaibel) had also used the expression in a comic exaggeration (*hyperbolē*). Manuscripts vary with respect to the form of the comparative (ὑγιώτ-, ὑγιώστ-, or ὑγιέστ-) but the gender is regularly neuter, and we can probably set aside as too late and somehow confused the masculine form in which the *Suda* (Adler 3, 1945) under *kolokyntē* gives the proverb: κολοκύντης ὑγιέστερος. Lexicographers have attempted explanations based on Epicharmus, usually joining his expression with the other proverb. Thus Liddell and Scott (6th edn., 1869) say, under *kolokynthē* defined as *the round gourd or pumpkin* (see above, 0.10): “proverbially of health, from its fresh juicy nature (citing Epicharmus), as a lily was of death . . . (citing Diphilus).” *LSJ*, however, place the two proverbs under the κολοκύνθα ἀγρία of Dioscorides (IV. 76), which it rightly defines (see above, 1.02) as *colocynth*, *Citrullus Colocynthis*, explaining it as “symbolic of health, from its juicy nature, ὑγιώτερον κολοκύντας Epich. 154, Sophr. 34; as a lily was of death, ἡ κολοκύντην ἢ κρίνον *living* or dead, Diph. 98, cf. Men. 934.” The assignment of both proverbs under *Colocynthis* or *Bitter Apple* seems very strange, and in my next paragraph I will try to show that the second expression (from Diphilus and Menander) belongs under *Lagenaria* as usual, but I think the assignment of the first proverb is correct, though not exactly as a symbol of health. The Sicilian dramatists, especially Sophron who mimed everyday life, may have shown a mother urging a reluctant child to take a purgative or some bitter potion, and saying, “Drink this. It’s good for you, healthier than the plant *kolokyntē*.”⁵⁰ This would be an exaggeration

⁵⁰ This of course would be long before Dioscorides, using the new form in short alpha, separated the species called ἀγρία from κολοκύνθα ἐδώδιμος (II. 134, Wellmann). See again my Figure 6 (Fuchs 212) for the small globular fruits of *Coloquint* or *Bitter Apple*.

indeed, first because it was not the plant but the juice of the fruit of *Citrullus Colocynthis* which was so promotive of health, and secondly because the comparative degree of the adjective ὑγιής "healthy in all respects" is substituted for the comparative degree of ὑγιεινός "healthy for you, wholesome." But this substitution evidently took hold in the speech of comedy, for LSJ cite the expressions ὑγιέστερος ὄμφακος *Com. Adesp.* 910 and ὑγιέστερος κροτώνας, *Men.* 318 (where Strabo, VI. 1. 12, had Κρότωνος). Here ὄμφαξ is the unripe, bitter-tasting grape, and κροτών is the bush or tree, *Ricinus communis*, from whose seeds our castor oil is prepared (see above, 1.12 and 1.31). But then Aelian, *Rust. Epist.* 10, combines the expressions of Menander and Sophron, using the proper adjective: ὑγιεινότερος ἔσται κροτώνας δῆπον καὶ κολοκύντης. Hercher (*Epist. Graeci*, p. 19) renders the first noun correctly as *ricinus* and the second as *cucurbita*, which is correct if we add Pliny's *silvestris* (see 1.02 above); and the reference is clearly to the wholesome purgatives derived from the two plants. But we end this paragraph by noting that Aelian's fictional farmer has been advising a friend to castrate an oversexed boar which has been a nuisance on his farm, and then, after explaining in some detail how he would treat the wounded animal and restore it to health and better behavior in the future, he inserts the comic expressions as above. But in this context ὑγιέστερος would have been the proper word! It would seem that Aelian was more interested in correcting the style of his predecessors than in the consistency of his own style.

[2.07] For the other proverb we have two full lines (Diphilus, frg. 98, Kock) preserved by Zenobius (IV. 18):

ἐν ἡμέραισιν αὐτὸν ἐπτά σοι, γέρον,
θέλω παρασχεῖν ἢ κολοκύντην ἢ κρίνον.

The same contrast, ἦτοι κρίνον ἢ κολοκύντην, is said (*Prov. Coisl.* 253) to have been used by Menander and is counted by Kock as his frg. 934; compare Meineke's frg. 1033. The speaker in Diphilus appears to be a trusted servant or friend who had undertaken to accompany the elderly man's son on some dangerous mission and now promises to bring him back within seven days as (figuratively) either a *kolokyntē* or a *krinon*. Since the paroemiographers (see also Diogenian. V. 10 and Apostol. VIII. 45) all refer to the ancient practice of arranging lilies over the dead (see, e.g., Vergil, *Aen.* VI. 883), so that the usually white lily (Theophr., *H.P.* VI. 6. 8, Theocr. 11. 56) would symbolize death, it is reasonable to suppose that somehow the flower of the plant *kolokyntē* here symbolizes life, and the expression means (see

LSJ above) “living or dead.”⁵¹ I cannot explain how the symbolism arose, but it is pertinent to remember that the flower of the *Lagenaria*, alone among the cucurbits, was white. See above, note 42; and note that Whitaker and Davis (above, note 11), who use the name “White-Flowered Gourd” rather than the traditional “Bottle-Gourd,” describe its flowers (p. 17) as “white, showy, and borne singly on very long peduncles that rise above the foliage.” The long stem, which can be seen clearly in Fuchs’ woodcut (his p. 211, my Figure 5), and the pretty white flower would invite comparison with the lily and make some sort of symbolic contrast almost inevitable.

[2.08] A few other passages in Greek literature make some positive contribution towards our conclusion that *kolokyntē* usually denotes the “White-Flowered Gourd” known in Latin as *cucurbita*. Aristotle (*Hist. animal.* II, 591 a 16) says that among fish only the saupe or salp (*ἡ σάλπη*) is captured with a gourd (*θηρεύεται κολοκύνθη*). D’Arcy Thompson in the Oxford *Aristotle* (4, 1910) suggests in his note that the gourd was not the bait, but a float used to support the line until the fish was exhausted. He refers to a modern authority on fishing, but he might have compared Columella’s line (X. 388, cited above, 1.25) about the floats which help boys learn to swim. Martial’s epigram about *Atreus cucurbitarum* (XI. 31, see above, 1.16) reveals the aristocratic Roman disdain for what they regarded as cheap food. The same attitude is expressed much later in an epigram (*A. P.* XI. 371) by Palladas, the gloomy schoolmaster of Alexandria and pagan contemporary of Jerome, who, I suspected (see above, 1.31), felt otherwise: *cucurbitae* were among the luxury foods which the plain clergy should avoid. But Palladas derides a wealthy host who desires to display his silver plate at a banquet but serves on it only poor fare, for which he uses a novel expression, *βροτὸν τῆν κολοκυνθιάδα*. Patton in the Loeb *Anthology* (1926) translated it “pumpkin pie,” perhaps following Dyer’s guidance in Hort’s *Theophrastus* (1916) but also reflecting a similar disdain, which was affected, formerly at least, by the British in general, for a favorite American dish.

[2.09] Returning to the contexts in Athenaeus, we note some others which can be interpreted in terms of *Lagenaria vulgaris* (for nothing

⁵¹ The ancient tradition (see the paroemiographers) focused primarily on τὸ τῆς κολοκύντης ἄνθος, but rather as symbolizing τὰ ἄθλα, since (they say) it was uncertain whether it would come up as far as a lily or would bear fruit. Only afterward do they continue with the arrangement of lilies over the dead, adding the quite unsupported assertion that the ancients also arranged the flowers of *kolokyntē* over the healthy. This may be an inference from the other proverb, which has certainly influenced modern lexicographers.

prevents us; see above 2.06) rather than *Cucurbita maxima*; and in them we will find nothing very surprising or derogatory about the fruits that are indicated. The first of these is from the comic poet Hermippus (frg. 79, Kock): τὴν κεφαλὴν ὄσσην ἔχει, ὄσσην κολοκύντην. This was the first of several quotations by which Athenaeus showed (II, 59 c) that Attic writers used only the one word (*kolokyntē*) for all the varieties of gourd, some of which others called *sikya* (above 2.02). Many have seen in the notable size of this person's head a reference to the large globular fruit which we call *pumpkin* and the Germans *Kürbis* (see, e.g., Weinreich cited in note 1 above), but of course the large pyriform bottle-gourd (see my Figure 4), viewed upside down, would fit the verbal picture here equally well and even better the famous picture of Pericles sketched by Cratinus (frg. 71, Kock, from Plut. *Pericl.* 13), "the squill-headed Zeus with the Odeum on his head." In neither passage, moreover, is there any hint of ridicule for a large-headed man as being thereby empty-headed or stupid.

[2.10] Next after Hermippus, Athenaeus cites (59 c) a line from the comic poet Phrynichus (frg. 61, Kock): ἡ μαζίου τι μικρὸν ἢ κολοκυντίον, noting that he uses the diminutive hypocoristically. In fact the context shows rather more affection for *kolokyntē*, as being a favorite comestible like *maza*, than any indication of size. Gulick translates "pumpkin," but this could be a small fresh gourd⁵² or, perhaps, a slice of one, dried and smoked as described by Nicander (above, 2.04). The diminutive form *Κολοκύνθιον* was also applied as a nickname (*epiklēsis*) to a certain Theodotus who held high office in the court of Justinian (Procop. *Anecd.* IX. 37). This was cited by Weinreich among the passages in which there was a connotation of stupidity, but the diminutive may well have been affectionate and need mean no more than in Phrynichus—something as good as a barley-cake. There is another possibility, which I pass over quickly, that the long neck of the bottle-gourd (see Aristotle cited above, 2.02, and the smaller dangling gourd seen in the center of my Figure 8) was perceived as phallic in shape and may have led to the colloquial and obscene meaning which the word *colocyntha* evidently has in the sixth line of the Oxford fragment of Juvenal's sixth satire, that is, a *vir memerosus* or *moechus*, according to Todd.⁵³ But if this was the source of

⁵² Compare the smaller grade (20 to a bundle) of *cucurbita* = κολόκυνθα in Diocletian's Edict, 6. 27 (above, 1.15). Lauffer in his notes cites a true diminutive from an account book, *P. Ryl.* IV. 629. 166 (317–24 A.D.): κολοκυνθίων (δρ.) σ'.

⁵³ In the third part of his article on the *Cucurbitaceae*, *Class. Quart.* 37 (1943), 108–11. Todd rejects the evidence on certain ancient medical implements, made from the emptied necks of small dried gourds and certainly phallic in shape, which

Theodotus' nickname, it is not unknown for diminutives to be applied *κατ' ἀντίφρασιν* (compare Robin Hood's Little John) or for subordinates to boast, affectionately and proudly, of their leader's sexual prowess (compare the word of Caesar's soldiers for him, Suet. 51). And in any case, this has nothing to do with pumpkins.

[2.11] Lastly, we may examine the Aristophanic taunt (*Nub.* 327) *λημᾶς κολοκύνταις*, since Kilpatrick (above, note 2) has brought it up, interpreting the noun in the usual way as "pumpkins" and connecting it with Seneca's word *apocolocyntosis*. The phrase is colloquial exaggeration, like our "to weep buckets," since *λήμη* in the Hippocratic Corpus (*Vet. med.* 19, *Progr.* 2) denotes the humor or rheum that gathers in the corner of the eye (so *LSJ*, translating the phrase "to have one's eyes running pumpkins"). But the large pyriform bottle-gourds would fit the exaggeration just as well, and if we think of the *urcei* made from Pliny's *cucurbitae* (above, 1.26) or the *κολοκυνθαρίταινα* of the papyrus (above, 2.03), then they would fit perfectly both with our expression and with a proverb cited by Hesychius (*Λ* 862, *Latte*, 2, p. 593), which combines Lucian's phrase (*C. Indoct.* 23) *χύτραις λημᾶν* (cf. *Genian.* V. 63) with this of Aristophanes.

III. *Apocolocyntosis* Reconsidered

[3.01] The conclusion which we may draw from all these references in Greek literature from the fifth century B.C. through the fourth Christian century (and beyond) is that the fruits of the White-Flowered Gourd, whether called *kolokynthai* or *sikyai*, were very well known both as edible fruits and as the source from which various kinds of utensils could be made. No literary evidence shows that the fruits were what we call pumpkins or squashes,⁵⁴ and only one proverbial expression (see 2.06) suggests that the word *kolokyntē* sometimes referred to the Bitter-Apple, classed by modern systematists as one of the *Cucurbitaceae* and containing in its juice a drastic purgative.

Housman drew from Hippocrates in support of his comment on the passage in his 1905 edition of Juvenal, and works (I think quite rightly, though he need not have rejected the douche-like implements as unfamiliar) to show that the *Quintio* of certain Pompeian inscriptions was not a cognomen but a term of abuse, and further, that it was a shortened form of *colocyntha*, comparing French *coloquinte*.

⁵⁴ The rebuke given to the future emperor Hadrian (Dio, *Epit.* LXIX. 4: ἔπειθε καὶ τὰς κολοκύντας γράφε) has been understood (see Coffey, *Lustrum*, 6, 248) as referring to pumpkins, but nothing shows that it must be so interpreted, and it has been translated as "gourds." The same is to be said of the appearance of *kolokyntai* among other vegetables with swelling body (*δγκος*) whose meaning, when seen in dreams, is discussed by Artemidorus (I. 67).

The Bothwells (0.10 above) were led astray by the botanical definition in *LSJ* and by the equivalence in England of the words *pumpkin* and *gourd*. And Wasson was quite right (0.05) in asserting the view held by botanists of the American origin of the pumpkins and squashes.

[3.02] A few papyri from Egypt will bring the plant called *κολόκυντα* (or *κολοκύντη*) a little closer to Rome and the time of Seneca. In this respect the Zenon papyri, all of the third century B.C., are especially notable. At this time a plant called *kolokynta* was much cultivated in Egypt for its edible fruit, regarded as a vegetable (*λάχανον*): e.g. *κολοκύντας* (*PSI* 6, 553.14), last in a long line of comestibles owned by Zenon in Arsinoë, preceded just above line 14 by a heading, *λάχανα παντοδαπά*. Others of the Zenon papyri are brought to our notice by the article in *LSJ: PCair. Zen.* 292. 132 and 139 (seeds of *kolokyntē* handed out to Zenon's peasants), 300. 3 (I am to report *τὸς πεφυτευκότας σίκκον ἢ κολόκυνταν ἢ κρόμμον*), and especially 33. 14 (*ἀμπέλου . . . κολοκυν[θίνης]* in a list of fruit-trees and vines taken as a gift from the orchard of Lysimachus). While none of these is indicated specifically as *Lagenaria*, as the *sikyai* of the Sorbonne papyrus (above, 2.02) and the *kolokyntharytaina* of the *Pap. Iandanae* certainly are, they are at least significant in that the colocynthis vine would hardly produce a pumpkin (*Cucurbita maxima*), as *LSJ* would have it.

[3.03] And now, thanks to the great kindness of Professor Wilhelmina Jashemski of the University of Maryland, I can report positive evidence from the area of Naples, a region which, like Egypt, was familiar to Seneca, that the plant which botanists now call *Lagenaria siceraria* (Molina) Standley (see above, 0.08) was cultivated there in antiquity and that its fruits, which are still grown there and are popular as food, are depicted in at least two paintings on the walls of houses excavated at Herculaneum. Mrs. Jashemski, whose twenty years of research as historian and archaeologist on *The Gardens of Pompeii, Herculaneum, and the Villas Destroyed by Vesuvius* have recently been crowned by the publication (New Rochelle, N. Y. [Caratsas Bros.], 1980) of a magnificently planned and illustrated book titled as above, has allowed me to see and copy a color photograph taken by her husband Stanley in the summer of 1971. It is not included in the illustrations of her book, and cannot be satisfactorily reproduced here, but I can give a verbal description which has been checked both by Dr. Jashemski and her botanical assistant, Dr. F. G. Meyer of the National Arboretum in Washington, who for some years has been trying to help her identify all of the plants in carbonized material, wall-paintings, mosaics, and sculpture. Before doing this, it will be well to note that an earlier report on the plants seen in the paintings,

published by Dr. Orazio Comes in the 1879 commemorative volume,⁵⁵ had mentioned some other *Cucurbitaceae*, including *Cucurbita Pepo* alongside several of *Cucurbita lagenaria*. Drs. Jashemski and Meyer have not been able to locate any of these paintings either in the Museo Nazionale or in situ on the walls of houses, or in the many published collections of paintings and mosaics from that source. Dr. Meyer believes that all of them, called by Comes *Zucca* and described as yellow or yellowish in color and in varying shapes which nevertheless agree well with those known from modern specimens, were varieties of *Lagenaria*. In other words, none of the pictures listed by Comes can be used as evidence for the pre-Columbian existence in the Old World of *Cucurbita Pepo* or *Cucurbita maxima*.

[3.04] Both of the paintings still visible on walls at Herculaneum show small gourds, brownish or yellowish in color, standing in glass bowls, in company with other objects, as if ready for eating or cooking. The one of which I have a photograph is a panel on the south wall of the portico in the Casa di Cervi (IV. 21).⁵⁶ Inside the glass bowl, vividly portrayed in three curving and high-lighted zones, which seems to stand on the lower shelf of a two-tiered open cabinet seen in illusory perspective as if fixed to the wall, there can be seen an elongated gourd with curved, narrow neck (which extends outside the wide mouth of the bowl) and slightly bulbous lower end, and another vegetable object, fully bulbous in shape, which props up the lower end of the gourd. To the left of the bowl are seen two more gourds apparently resting flat on the shelf, though deterioration of the wall and painting has obscured the lower left corner of the cabinet. Similar deterioration at the lower right corner makes it uncertain whether or not another globular object is to be seen there. A leaf is visible but unidentifiable. Drs. Jashemski and Meyer think that the globular object inside the bowl may be a pear, but they are sure that the two globular fruits shown on the upper shelf are cherries

⁵⁵ See pp. 177–250 in *Pompeii e la regione sotterrata del Vesuvio nell' anno LXXIX* (Napoli 1879). The article was also issued as a separate in 1879 and was noticed (not without some doubts as to the accuracy of its findings) by Candolle, Fischer-Benzon, and others; later a German translation, *Darstellung der Pflanzen in den Malereien von Pompeji*, was published at Stuttgart in 1895 and was summarized by the expert botanist L. Wittmack in an article, pp. 38–66 in a *Beiblatt*, no. 73 (1903), to the *Botanische Jahrbücher*, preceding his own report on the carbonized seeds and other remains of plants found at Pompeii and stored in the Museo Nazionale at Naples. Wittmack did not recognize any seeds of *Cucurbitaceae*.

⁵⁶ Dr. Jashemski locates the other one (in a letter dated Oct. 2, 1977) on a wall of the Samnite house (V 1–2). It “shows two gourds in a glass bowl. The gourds are brownish in color, but Fred agrees that they are *Lagenaria*.”

(because their stems are joined in this and similar paintings elsewhere), despite the fact that they appear to be as large as the (?) pear below them (since cherries are disproportionately large in numerous other paintings). Dr. Meyer assured me in a letter dated March 17, 1976:

The plant [i.e. *Lagenaria siceraria*] is most certainly still cultivated in Italy. In fact, it is a widely eaten vegetable in the Naples area. I saw it grown in the environs of Pompeii, I have photographs of it, and we had it served to us in our restaurant one day. The same plant is cultivated in the U.S.A., but only as a curiosity.

He went on to tell of a snake-gourd six feet long which he was asked to identify and later saw covering the lady's back fence; with this we can compare Pliny's 9-foot *cucurbita* (see above, 1.07). And, he added, "It is the only white-flowered gourd I know of, and on this character alone, it is easily identified."

[3.05] It is well to be reminded here of the varied and sometimes fantastic shapes of the gourds (fruits) of this plant, which must have been familiar to Seneca and the Romans of his time, whether they called it *kolokyntē*, as likely in the Greek-speaking areas of southern Italy and Egypt, or *cucurbita* as elsewhere. According to Heiser in his article, "Variation in the Bottle-Gourd" (see above, 1.20, and note 33), the largest fruit produced in his experimental fields, which used seeds procured from companies located in various parts of the world, was of the pyriform type (from Ghana, but see Fuchs' cut p. 209 and my Figure 4) and weighed 150 pounds (this from a letter to me dated June 7, 1976), but there were snake types ("Variation," p. 123), cylindrical forms (see Fuchs' cut p. 211 and my Figure 5), bottle types and others whose use as containers was known to Columella, Pliny, and St. Jerome (above, 1.25) but is now dwindling ("Variation," p. 121) with the coming of tin cans, glass, and plastic.⁵⁷ The gourds that can be seen in the paintings at Herculaneum resemble in shape the gourds that hang over Jonah's shoulder in my Figure 8, except that there is a more pronounced curve to the neck of the one in the glass jar, but in size they must be considerably smaller,

⁵⁷ Whitaker and Davis (above, note 11) describe (p. 5) the archaeological materials found at Huaca Prieta on the coast of northern Peru and dated to the fourth millennium B.C., as having been "used for containers of various sorts, e.g. work baskets, water bottles, dippers, jars, dishes, etc. Many fragments were found that had evidently been used as scoops or ladles. Some of the forms with long necks were used as fish-net floats. Others were used as rattles for ceremonial purposes, and still others were made into whistles." If one asks how the modern investigators knew what the prehistoric gourds were used for, the answer must be from the uses to which contemporary people put similar objects.

representing edible fruits whose rinds were still soft (see Pliny, *Nat. XIX. 71*, cited above, 1.26). And this shape and size may well have been responsible for the phallic impression which Todd (above, 2.10 and note 53) thought led to the obscenity of *colocyntha* in the Oxford fragment of Juvenal. It would also fit well with Wagenvoort's specification (see above, 0.04) of the implement which in his theory replaced the radish in the traditional punishment of adulterers. And it would not be very different from the critical shape which we supposed (above, 2.02) led to the arbitrary variant of *sikyos* (i.e. cucumber) which was transferred to the implement called *sikya* in Greek; though it was the bulbous end of a small bottle-gourd (see Fuchs p. 209 and my Figure 4) which we compared (1.02) to the bronze cupping-instruments which Pliny and St. Jerome called *medicinales cucurbitae* because of their resemblance to the fruits of the plant (above, 1.03).

[3.06] Returning at last to Seneca's coinage, I think we have shown that the word *kolokyntē* would mean to him and his readers, not the product of any plant, such as a pumpkin or *Riesenkürbis* or *Cucurbita maxima*, but primarily the plant itself, a species of *Lagenaria* which was very well known to them as an annual plant grown from seeds and cultivated in Italy as well as Greece for its food, for the medicinal value of the fruits and other parts of the plant, for the usefulness of the containers and other household goods which could be made from the dried and woody rinds of the fruit, for the aesthetic pleasure, even to the *populus minutus* of the city (see especially the moralizing passage in Pliny, *Nat. XIX. 51-59*), of watching a seed develop rapidly into a trailing or climbing plant with beautiful white flowers, and which, if it reached the top of a fence or trellis, would provide the further service of welcome shade in the summer. It was the manifold utility of this familiar plant, coupled with its very humble and ordinary status, which in my former essay⁵⁸ I thought would apply, metaphorically at least, to the whole of the satire and especially to its end, the final degradation suffered by Claudius. Rejected by decree of the Olympian senate, he is escorted by Mercury back to Rome and then, eventually, to the underworld. At length he is brought to the infernal bar and condemned by Aeacus to play at dice with a perforated

⁵⁸ "Some points of Natural History in Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*," pp. 181-92 in *Homenaje a Antonio Tovar* (Madrid 1972). Reviewing other hypotheses about the title, I had rejected Todd's theory (in the second part of his article [pp. 103-08] in *Class. Quart.* 37, 1943) that Claudius was represented as a dice-box (*fritillus*) incarnate, on the grounds that this figure, though quite possible if we think with Todd of a small husk of *Lagenaria vulgaris*, is forgotten at the very end of the satire.

fritillus—a novel penalty obviously suggested by the myth of the Danaids but peculiarly fitting for Claudius. But Claudius has just begun to serve this sentence when in rapid succession (the point emphasized by Athanassakis, see above, 0.03) he is claimed by Caligula as a former imperial slave but then disowned and donated like a hot potato (as we would say) back to Aeacus, who gives him in turn to his freedman Menander (the Athenian dramatist?) to serve as his secretary for hearing lawsuits. This ending, I suggested, could symbolize the opinion held of Claudius during his lifetime by the senatorial aristocracy. He was industrious, learned (in a dull way) and decorative if somewhat undignified, and though capricious (like the fantastic shape of some of the gourds) still useful—but to the wrong people, the un-Roman rabble in the provinces, the newcomers in the city who were displacing the old aristocrats, and above all to the freedmen who were really his masters. Here Claudius was being made over, not really into a god (*apotheosis*) but into something like a bottle-gourd vine (*apocolocytosis*), immortalized and perennial.

[3.07] This interpretation of the word as a figurative designation (i.e. the deified Claudius is like an immortal gourd-vine) will seem a bit feeble and lacking in satiric bite to those who believe, I think rightly, that Seneca's motive for his merciless exposure of the physical peculiarities, as well as the weaknesses of the deceased emperor's character, was quite personal. No doubt he desired to be avenged for the painful exile which Claudius had inflicted on him. This was well expressed in Wagenvoort's interpretation (above, 0.04) of the title. But once we accept Dio's word *ὀνομάσας* (0.01) as indicating a formal, written title for a work in which there is no actual transformation, it becomes necessary to look for something satiric or derogatory in the underlying *κολοκύντη* = *cucurbita*, as Eisenberg has done (0.02), and to set aside both the normal meanings of these words and the titles which are actually found in the manuscripts. I therefore suggest that *apocolocytosis* was not the formal title, but an off-hand characterization uttered by Seneca somewhat later and in answer to a question (see above, 0.13), at a time when he was beginning to regret his flattery of Nero and to feel, once his old grudge had been satisfied, that Claudius had not been so bad after all. Seneca was soon to extol *clementia* as a moral virtue and he might have been transferring from books to men that quality which the younger Pliny (*Epist.* III. 5. 10) admired in his uncle: *dicere etiam solebat nullum esse librum tam malum ut non aliqua parte prodesset.*

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Editor's Note: The following items should be added to the list of Professor Heller's publications printed in *ICS VIII* (1983), pp. 168-72:

1. *Studies in Linnaean Method and Nomenclature* (Verlag Peter Lang AG, Frankfurt-Bern-New York 1983), ix + 328 pp.
2. "Notes on the Titulature of Linnaean Dissertations," *Taxon* 32 (1983), pp. 218-52.
3. "Conrad Gessner to Leonhart Fuchs October 18, 1556," *Huntia* 5 (1983), pp. 61-75 (with Frederick G. Meyer).
4. "Index to Zoological Sources," in William Stearn and Alwyne Wheeler (edd.), *A Guide to Linnaeus' Zoology* (to be published by the Oxford University Press for the British Museum [Natural History]).




Figure 1. Bronze *cucurbitula* from Pompeii. Milne, *Surgical Implements*, Plate 35.





Figure 2. "Ancient cupping-glass made from a pumpkin." Rich, *Dictionary of Antiquities* under "*Cucurbita* and *Cucurbitula*."

Pepo maximus Indicus comprefus. L. 365. T. 783.



Figure 3. *Cucurbita maxima* Duchesne. Lobelius, *Plantarum seu stirpium Icones*, p. 641, right half.

Poupons Grand d'Inde .



Figures 4 and 5. *Lagenaria vulgaris* Seringe. Fuchs, *Vivae Imagines* (1549), pages 209 and 211.

Colocynthis. *Misc. l. 4. c. 158.*
Coloquint.



Figure 6. *Citrullus Colocynthis* (L.) Schrad. Fuchs, page 212.



Figure 7. *Cucumis Melo* L. Fuchs, page 405.



Figure 8. Jonah resting under the gourd-vine. Detail from an ivory book-cover in Ravenna. Rice, *Art of the Byzantine Era*, Figure 8; by permission of Hirmer Fotoarchiv, München.

6

Longus and the Myth of Chloe

BRUCE D. MacQUEEN

It had been a very difficult night for the Methymnean expedition. True, they were laden with spoils, and they even had a captive: an uncommonly beautiful shepherdess named Chloe. But when they tried to rest for the night, scarcely a mile from the scene of their easy victory over the unarmed and unprepared Mytilenean shepherds, their sleep was disturbed by terrifying prodigies and portents. Day-break brought no relief, and the entire army was on the verge of panic.¹ Then their general-in-chief, Bryaxis, fell suddenly asleep at midday; and when he awoke, his report was strange and unsettling. He had seen a vision of the god Pan, who had upbraided him for his and his soldiers' depredations. To disturb the peace of Pan's favorite pasturelands was bad enough, and worse to desecrate the grotto of the Nymphs; but the worst crime of all was to lay violent hands on Chloe, "παρθένον ἐξ ἧς Ἔρωσ μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει."² Pan's orders to Bryaxis had been peremptory and unambiguous: on pain of instant annihilation, he was to release Chloe and all the livestock his army had seized. Bryaxis, still shaking from the vividness of his dream-vision, ordered that all these things be done as the god had commanded. And so it was that Chloe, accompanied by all the sheep and goats (whose horns had sprouted ivy in honor of the occasion),

¹ Pun intended.

² Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe* II. 27. All quotations from Longus are taken from the Teubner edition of M. D. Reeve (Leipzig 1982); further references will be incorporated into the text.

returned home unscathed, to the limitless delight of her lover, Daphnis, and the happy satisfaction of her family and neighbors.

Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*, unlike the other Greek romances,³ is not replete with vividly dramatic episodes, a fact which makes this scene, the abduction and rescue of Chloe, all the more striking. Nowhere else in all of *Daphnis and Chloe* is the irony with which Longus handles the familiar conventions of the romance more obvious. Any reader of Chariton, or Heliodorus, or Achilles Tatius will at once recognize the familiar motif of the abducted heroine; but no sooner has Longus led us into this familiar territory than he confounds us by introducing a god to rescue Chloe, and by surrounding the narrative with patently Dionysian imagery.⁴ So striking indeed is the Dionysian flavor of this and other passages that some scholars (particularly Kerényi, Merkelbach, and Chalk) have taken the mysteries to be at the very core of *Daphnis and Chloe*; that is, they have argued that the course of the two lovers' erotic education parallels or represents the experiences of an initiate into one or another of the mystery cults. But criticism on Longus has moved, by and large, in other directions, and the "initiation" thesis has found few new adherents in more recent years.⁵

It is certainly not the central purpose of the present study to resuscitate (or, for that matter, to euthanize) the initiation thesis. But it seems to me that, in the process of moving beyond an obsession with mystical symbolism, at least one important clue to Longus'

³ I deliberately beg (or rather postpone) the question of whether or not *Daphnis and Chloe* is a romance, not because I consider the matter unimportant, but rather because the issue transcends the scope of this article. See the discussions of the romance/novel problem by William E. McCulloh, *Longus*, Twayne World Authors Series 96 (New York 1970), p. 22 and pp. 79-90; Arthur Heiserman, *The Novel before the Novel* (Chicago 1977), p. 4 (including note 2 on page 221) and pp. 130-45; the second chapter of Ben Edwin Perry's *The Ancient Romances: A Literary-Historical Account of their Origins*, Sather Classical Lectures 37 (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1967); and J. W. Kestner, "Ekphrasis as Frame in Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*," *Classical World* 67 (1973), p. 168.

⁴ See H. H. O. Chalk, "Eros and the Lesbian Pastorals of Longus," *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 80 (1960), p. 41; McCulloh, pp. 13-15 and p. 93; Heiserman, p. 138; R. Merkelbach, *Roman und Mysterium in der Antike* (Munich 1962); and Karoly Kerényi, *Die griechische-orientalische Romanliteratur in religionsgeschichtlicher Beleuchtung: Ein Versuch* (Tübingen 1927).

⁵ For a detailed refutation of the initiation thesis, see M. Berti, "Sulla interpretazione mistica del romanzo di Longo," *Studi Classici e Orientali* 16 (1967), 343-58; M. Geyer, "Roman und Mysterienritual," *Würzberger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft* n. f. 3 (1977), pp. 179-96; and Heiserman, pp. 140-45. No one denies the presence of religious symbolism in *Daphnis and Chloe*, but most critics now see this as ancillary to Longus' literary methods and goals.

intentions has been, if not left behind, at least excessively demystified. Pan, it will be recalled, tells Bryaxis in Book II that Eros wishes to make a *μῦθος* of Chloe. For Kerényi, Chalk, and the others, to make a *μῦθος* of Chloe is to make her an initiate.⁶ More recent scholarship has either reinterpreted the phrase *παρθένον ἐξ ἧς Ἔρως μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει*, or passed over it. To Heiserman, for example, the *μῦθος* of Chloe is the text of *Daphnis and Chloe* itself, which makes of *μῦθον ποιῆσαι* a fairly sophisticated example of romantic irony.⁷ But I wish to argue here that the phrase means rather more than that; that it is, in fact, fully as programmatic as the initiation theorists supposed. Specifically, I hope to show here that Longus proceeds, in a very specific and traceable way, to make of Chloe, not an initiate, but rather, quite literally, a *μῦθος*.

The first step in the process of discovering what the *μῦθος* of Chloe really means is to make a connection that, to my knowledge, no previous study of *Daphnis and Chloe* has made. Few aspects of Longus' work have generated as much critical comment as the three *αἴτια* that appear at I. 27, II. 34, and III. 23.⁸ In each of the three stories (respectively, those of Phatta, Syrinx, and Echo), a mortal maiden or Nymph is transformed after a confrontation with some sort of male antagonist. Several things seem to be agreed upon by all: first, that these stories, though they appear to be digressive and are homologous to the learned digressions found in the other romances, are in fact closely bound to the development of the plot; that there is an increasing level of violence in the stories; and that Chloe is in some sense to be identified with all three "mythical" heroines. There has also been some recognition that all three *αἴτια* occupy similar structural positions in their respective books.⁹ But no one seems to have

⁶ See Chalk, p. 45.

⁷ See Heiserman, p. 138. "Romantic irony," as used here, means the calling into question, by the text itself, of that "willing suspension of disbelief" necessary to the operation of fiction, usually by a deliberate breaking or manipulation of the point of view. Despite the name, romantic irony (so called from its prevalence in the Romantic novels of early nineteenth-century Europe) is not commonly found in the other Greek romances, but it is definitely a salient feature of Longus' style. For the concept of romantic irony, I am indebted to a public lecture by Professor Lilian R. Furst, entitled "Irony and Romantic Irony," delivered on April 6, 1983, in West Lafayette, Indiana. For further discussion, see Prof. Furst's forthcoming book, *Fictions of Romantic Irony*.

⁸ See Marios Philippides, "The 'Digressive' *Aitia* in Longus," *Classical World* 74 (1980), pp. 193-99; Stavros Deligiorgis, "Longus' Art in Brief Lives," *Philological Quarterly* 53 (1974), pp. 1-9; the article by Kestner cited above; and the discussions of the *αἴτια* by Chalk, p. 40, and McCulloh, pp. 65-66.

⁹ See the articles by Deligiorgis and Kestner.

realized or developed the possibility that the phrase *παρθένον ἐξ ἧς Ἔρωσ μῦθον ποιῆσαι θέλει* is a direct allusion to the three *αἴτια*. The implications of this perception for the interpretation of *Daphnis and Chloe* are, in my opinion, profound. My intention here is to work out those implications; more specifically, to show, by a close examination of the structure of *Daphnis and Chloe*, how Longus uses the replication of framing devices in Books I through III to create the *μῦθος* of Chloe in Book IV.

The analysis of narrative structure is fraught with peril for the incautious critic. A safe course must somehow be steered between the Scylla of imposing an *a priori* structural scheme on the text and the Charybdis of perversely refusing to see what is manifestly there. The present study attempts to find that safe course in an inductive, rather than deductive, approach. My contention is that Longus repeats certain groups of themes and images in essentially chiasmic order, so that a kind of frame is created around each *μῦθος*: that is, ring composition. Certain of the correspondences out of which these rings are built are obvious; others become apparent only when the structure of surrounding rings invites us to look for correspondence. Some readers will certainly refuse to accept one or another of the correspondences I will list, and others will just as certainly find some that I seem to have omitted or overlooked. But the overall scheme is, I believe, sound enough that it does not stand or fall upon one or two correspondences.

Two further *caveats* seem to be in order. In no way do I mean to suggest that Longus' structure is a rigid or perfectly symmetrical one; those who might want geometrical or numerological precision and significance will be disappointed. Nor would I care to argue that the structural scheme I will outline here is anything more than a device. I am not a structuralist. In and of itself, it means nothing that Longus uses ring composition. Rather, the structure points to certain thematic relationships that a strictly linear, diachronic reading of *Daphnis and Chloe* might fail to reveal; and, in so doing, that structure gives us the key to the novel.

My procedure will be as follows: for each of the first three books, I will begin by presenting a schematic diagram of the ring that frames the *μῦθος* of that book.¹⁰ I will then proceed to briefly explain any of the correspondences listed in the diagram that are either especially

¹⁰ Considerations of space and the limits of the subject forbid me to develop here the structural analysis of *Daphnis and Chloe* beyond the framing of the *μῦθοι*. I believe I have detected one other ring in each book, which seem to frame some sort of *ἀγών*. It also seems to me that this whole structure is prefigured in the Prologue. These points I hope to develop in a future article.

difficult or especially interesting. What we will see in Book IV is that the episode of Lampis' abduction of Chloe and her rescue by Gnathon is framed by the narrative in a way that is precisely parallel to the ring pattern established in the first three books. Once the narrative has thus suggested that we juxtapose that particular episode to the *μῦθοι* of Books I–III, the significance of the second abduction and rescue of Chloe, which might easily be overlooked in all the excitement of the recognitions and reconciliations in Book IV, should become clear.

BOOK I

- A. Chloe watches Daphnis bathe (24. 1).¹¹
- B. Daphnis and Chloe play games (24. 2–3).
- C. Daphnis teaches Chloe to play the pipe (24. 4).
- D. The grasshopper is captured and sings (26. 1–2).
- E. The myth of Phatta (27. 1–4).
- D'. Daphnis is captured and cries out (28. 1–2).
- C'. Dorcon teaches Chloe to play the pipe (29. 1–2).
- B'. Daphnis and Chloe bury Dorcon (31. 2–3).
- A'. Daphnis watches Chloe bathe (32. 1–4).

The beginning and ending of this ring are clearly marked by parallel incidents. At 24. 1, Chloe sees Daphnis taking a bath in the stream, and the sight of his naked body, which had earlier caused her to fall into that peculiar affliction of which she does not yet know the name, moves her with its beauty:

*ἡ μὲν γὰρ γυμνὸν ὀρώσα τὸν Δάφνιν ἐπ' ἀθροῦν ἐπέπιπτε τὸ κάλλος, καὶ ἐτήκετο
μηδὲν αὐτοῦ μέρος μέμψασθαι δυναμένη . . .*

At 32. 1, the situation is reversed, and Daphnis, for the first time, sees the perfection of Chloe's undraped form:

*καὶ αὐτὴ τότε πρῶτον Δάφνιδος ὀρώσας ἐλούσατο τὸ σῶμα, λευκὸν καὶ καθαρὸν
ὑπὸ κάλλους καὶ οὐδὲν λουτρῶν ἐς κάλλος δέμενον . . .*

The connection between B and B' is admittedly tenuous; I have included it here because at 31. 3, Daphnis and Chloe place on the grave of Dorcon the garlands they had made at 24. 2.

The correspondence between the grasshopper's intrusion (D) and

¹¹ Arabic numerals in parentheses refer to the relevant passages of the text.

that of the pirates (D') may also seem tenuous, but becomes clearer if both passages are read carefully. Indeed, this correspondence is not original with me: Deligiorgis was the first to point out how the grasshopper and the pirates frame the *αἴτιον* of the wood dove (i.e. Phatta, Greek *φάττα*).¹²

To the exegesis of the *μῦθος* itself I have little to add.¹³ The maiden Phatta is confronted by a male antagonist; she vies with him, is overcome, and is then transformed by divine intervention into a bird, who continues to mourn her loss in her song. That Chloe is to be identified with this hapless girl is made abundantly clear by the way the story is introduced: *ἦν παρθένος, παρθένε, οὕτω καλῆ καὶ ἔνεμε βούς πολλὰς οὕτως ἐν ὕλῃ . . .* (I. 27. 2). As Deligiorgis has noted, the motif of cattle trained to obey musical commands, which is central to the *αἴτιον*, plays a prominent role in the narrative that follows; and the fact that Chloe rescues Daphnis by playing a certain tune upon the shepherd's pipe thus further identifies her with Phatta.¹⁴

BOOK II

- A. Pan keeps his promise (28. 1–3).
- B. Daphnis and Chloe are reunited in the fields (30. 1).
- C. A goat is sacrificed to Pan (31. 2).
- D. Chloe sings and Daphnis plays (31. 3).
- E. The old men brag about their youth (32. 3).
- F. Daphnis and Chloe entreat Philetas to play (33. 1).
- G. Tityrus is sent to fetch the pipe (33. 2).
- H. The myth of Syrinx (34. 1–3).
- G'. Tityrus returns with the pipe (35. 1).
- F'. Philetas plays the pipes (35. 3).
- E'. Dryas dances a Dionysiac dance (36. 1–2).
- D'. Daphnis and Chloe dance the parts of Pan and Syrinx (37. 1–2).
- C'. Philetas offers his pipe to Daphnis (37. 3).
- B'. Daphnis and Chloe are reunited in the fields (38. 3).
- A'. Daphnis and Chloe exchange oaths of fidelity (39. 1–6).

¹² Deligiorgis, pp. 1–2.

¹³ See Philippides, pp. 195–96; Heiserman, p. 136; Chalk, p. 40.

¹⁴ Deligiorgis, p. 4.

The opening and closing of this ring are not so apparent as in Book I. Still, there are important connections between A and A'. Pan's intervention and rescue of Chloe is preceded and announced by the Nymphs, who appear to Daphnis in a dream, and assure him that Pan, despite the fact that Daphnis and Chloe have paid him no attention, will save Chloe.¹⁵ We have already seen how dramatically Pan keeps his promise. At 39. 1, however, Chloe alludes to the fickleness of Pan (*θεὸς ὁ Πᾶν ἐρωτικός ἐστὶ καὶ ἄπιστος*); and since Daphnis had already identified himself with Pan in the mimetic dance at 37. 1, Chloe feels justified in asking him to swear an oath of fidelity. At both A and A', then, the issue of male fidelity is raised. No resolution occurs here, however; indeed, Daphnis will, after a fashion, break his oath, and the consequences of his sexual infidelity, though not at all what one might expect, will prove to be profound.¹⁶

Daphnis is a goatherd, and so the goat offered to Pan at 31. 2 in thanksgiving for Chloe's deliverance is "his" animal in a more or less totemic sense. The offering up of the goat to Pan (C) is answered by the transmission of potency, symbolized in Pan's instrument, the *σύριγξ*, to Daphnis.

The correspondence D–D' is based on the complementary roles played by the two lovers making music together.¹⁷

At 32. 3 (E) and 36. 1 (E'), old men recall their youth. In the first instance, the old men of the vicinity exchange stories of their youthful exploits; in the latter, Dryas, Chloe's presumed father, dances the kind of dance no one expects an old man to do.¹⁸

Others before now have noted that the *αἴτιον* of Syrinx introduces an element of violence—more specifically, the threat of rape—that is, or seems to be, missing from the Phatta story in Book I.¹⁹ The very explicit identification of Daphnis and Chloe with Pan and Syrinx at 37. 1 brings this threat to bear directly on Chloe. Chloe responds by demanding an oath of fidelity from Daphnis; but it is clear that she does not fully understand the nature of the threat that hangs over her. On one level, indeed, Chloe had already faced the threat of rape at the hands of the Methymneans.²⁰ But her subsequent behavior gives no hint that she really knows any more now about

¹⁵ *Daphnis and Chloe* II. 23. 4.

¹⁶ See below.

¹⁷ This depends, of course, on our understanding "music" as broadly as the Greeks understood *μουσική*.

¹⁸ Dryas' dance reminds one of the absurd and almost pathetic behavior of the aged Cadmus and Tiresias in the first episode of Euripides' *Bacchae*.

¹⁹ Philippides, p. 196; McCulloh, pp. 65–66.

²⁰ Philippides, *ibid.*

the sexual nature of male aggression than she knew before. Otherwise, much of what follows in *Daphnis and Chloe* would have little point.

BOOK III

- A. The rams pursue the ewes (13. 1).
- B. Daphnis and Chloe try to consummate their relationship (14. 1).
- C. Lykainion asks Daphnis for help (16. 1-4).
- D. Lykainion propositions Daphnis (17. 1-3).
- E. Lykainion teaches Daphnis a lesson (18. 3).
- F. Lykainion explains why Daphnis should not yet apply the lesson he has learned (19. 2-3).
- G. Daphnis decides not to use his knowledge on Chloe (20. 2).
- H. A ship sails by, carrying fresh fish for the tables of the rich in Mytilene (21. 1-4).
- I. Daphnis knows what an echo is, but Chloe does not (22. 1).
- J. Daphnis tries to learn the tunes (22. 1).
- K. Chloe hears the echoes (22. 2).
- L. Chloe promises ten kisses (22. 4).
- M. The myth of Echo (23. 1-5).
- L'. Chloe pays her debt (23. 5).
- K'. Daphnis' voice echoes (23. 5).
- J'. Daphnis practices piping (24. 2).
- I'. Daphnis knows how to consummate their relationship, but Chloe does not (24. 3).
- H'. Suitors come for Chloe, bearing rich gifts (25. 1).
- G'. Dryas stalls the suitors (25. 3).
- F'. Myrtale explains why Daphnis cannot marry Chloe yet (26. 4).
- E'. The Nymphs appear to Daphnis and give him instructions (27. 2).
- D'. Daphnis asks for Chloe's hand in marriage (29. 2).

C'. Dryas goes to ask Lamon and Myrtale to allow the marriage (30. 2).

B'. Daphnis acts like a husband (33. 1–3).

A'. Daphnis fetches the apple, over Chloe's objections (34. 1).

The correspondence A–A' depends upon our perception of the sexual overtones of the scene at 34. 1, wherein Daphnis fetches an apple from the very top of a tree and brings it down to Chloe—who, it should be noted, would rather he had not. Both the description of the apple (καὶ ἐν μῆλον ἐπέκειτο ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄκροις ἀκρότατον, μέγα καὶ καλὸν καὶ τῶν πολλῶν τὴν εὐωδίαν ἐνίκα μόνον . . . III. 33. 4) and Chloe's attempt to prevent Daphnis from plucking it are reminiscent of a fragment of Sappho's:

οἶον τὸ γλυκύμαλον ἐρεύθεται ἄκρω ἐπ' ὕσδω,
ἄκρον ἐπ' ἀκροτάτῳ, λελάθοντο δὲ μαλοδρόπης·
οὐ μὲν ἐκλελάθοντ', ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰδύναντ' ἐπίκισθαι.²¹

At both A and A', then, males are in pursuit of females.

The correspondence B–B' is suggested by the contrast between the ignorance and ineptness Daphnis displays at 14. 1, and the self-aware confidence of his conduct at 33. 1.

Deligiorgis was the first to point out the correspondence H–H'.²² Twice already men have come from the sea to plunder, pillage, and kidnap; indeed, the sea seems to have no other symbolic function in *Daphnis and Chloe* than to import trouble. This particular ship may seem to pose no threat to the lovers' tranquillity; but it is not long before suitors come to Dryas for Chloe's hand, and the threat of separation adumbrated by the ship at 21. 1 becomes real. This correspondence is further strengthened by the contrast struck in both passages between Daphnis' servile status and the wealth of his real or potential rivals.

Both I and I' develop a theme that dominates the psychological development of *Daphnis and Chloe* after Daphnis' encounter with Lykainion at 18. 3.²³ In both passages, Daphnis knows something that Chloe does not. In fact, the kind of essential equality that existed between them before has been disrupted by Daphnis' initiation, guided

²¹ Fr. 105a (Lobel–Page). The resemblance is noted by McCulloh, pp. 75–76; Philippides, p. 197; and others.

²² Deligiorgis, pp. 3–4.

²³ See D. N. Levin, "The Pivotal Role of Longus' *Daphnis and Chloe*," *Rivista di Studi Classici* 25 (1977), pp. 5–17; Chalk, p. 44, seems to understand Lykainion's function, but not the effect her lessons have on the relationship between Daphnis and Chloe. See also McCulloh, p. 67.

by Lykainion, into the mysteries of sexuality. The superior knowledge that Daphnis displays at I and I' reflects the knowledge of sex he has chosen, temporarily, to conceal.

The immediate frame for the myth of Echo in Book III is very similar to the framing of the Syrinx story in Book II: in both instances, someone makes a promise before the story is told and fulfills it afterward.

The *σπαραγμός* of Echo is the most violent by far of the three *αἵτια*. As Chalk and others have noted, Longus' version of the myth of Echo, which is utterly different from the more familiar Ovidian version, resembles the *σπαραγμοί* of Orpheus or Zagreus.²⁴ That Chloe is to be identified with Echo in some sense is made clear in several ways: first, she has already been identified with the heroines of the first two *αἵτια*, Phatta and Syrinx; secondly, Echo, like Chloe, *τρέφεται ὑπὸ Νυμφῶν . . .* (23.1); and finally, the bloodshed of the *σπαραγμός* recalls Lykainion's admonition that Chloe, being a virgin, will cry out and bleed (19. 2-3). All this could easily lead us into a psychoanalytical jungle from which we might not easily extricate ourselves; and indeed, it is not the purpose of the present study to work all this out. Suffice it to say, that Chloe is admonished by this story (and, implicitly, by its teller) to yield her virginity gracefully when the proper time comes.

And this leads, finally, to Book IV and the *μῦθος* of Chloe:

BOOK IV

- A. Chloe flees to the woods in fear (14. 1).
- B. Daphnis looks like Apollo tending Laomedon's sheep (14. 2).
- C. Daphnis and Chloe feast together (15. 4).
- D. Daphnis is promised to Gnatho (17. 1-19. 2).
 - E. Astylus fetches Daphnis and presents him to his father; he is richly dressed for the first time (20).
 - F. Dionysophanes tells how he came to expose Daphnis (24. 1-4).
 - G. Rumor reports that Dionysophanes had found a son (25. 3).
 - H. Daphnis dedicates his *pastoralia* (26. 2-4).
 - I. The myth of Chloe (27. 1-32. 2).

²⁴ Chalk, p. 42; Deligiorgis, pp. 3-4; McCulloh, p. 66.

H'. Chloe dedicates her *pastoralia* (32. 3-4).

G'. Mytilene rejoices that Dionysophanes has found a son (33. 3).

F'. Megacles tells how he came to expose Chloe (35. 1-5).

E'. Chloe is fetched and presented to Megacles, dressed in fine clothes for the first time (36. 1-3).

D'. Chloe is given to Daphnis in marriage (37. 1-2).

C'. Daphnis and Chloe feast together (38. 1).

B'. A temple is built to Eros the Shepherd (39. 2).

A'. Chloe learns the lesson (40. 1-3).

It was to be expected, and should now be apparent, that the pattern of concentric rings established in Books I through III is carried through here into Book IV. Once again, Longus uses paired motifs and images to convert a linear, diachronic narrative into a synchronic frame.²⁵ The ring begins and ends, as it should, with Chloe. At 14. 1, she flees to the woods in an excess of childish, maidenly fear at the advent of such an important personage as Dionysophanes. At 40. 1-3, however, she learns at last *ὅτι τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης γερόμενα ἦν ποιμένων παίγνια*.

The correspondence B-B' is based on the image of a divinity in an unusual guise. At 14. 2, Longus alludes to the well-known story of Apollo tending Laomedon's sheep; the whole point of the story is the incongruity of the God of Light serving as a shepherd. At 39. 2, we encounter another divinity who is almost as unlikely a shepherd as Apollo: Eros.²⁶

The contrast between the pederastic "marriage" contemplated by Gnathon, which indeed precipitates the *dénouement* of *Daphnis and Chloe*, and the long-awaited marriage of the two young lovers at 37. 1, which is the fulfillment of the plot, is an important one.²⁷ Eros always has two sides, two natures: one fertile and benevolent, the other appetitive and brutish. It may well be that Longus' final statement about Eros is that human happiness depends upon the channeling of the power of Eros into constructive, perhaps

²⁵ For the relationship of the temporal and the spatial in *Daphnis and Chloe*, see the article by Kestner cited above; see also M. C. Mittelstadt, "Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe*, and Roman Narrative Painting," *Latomus* 26 (1967), pp. 752-61.

²⁶ Note also the incongruity of Pan the Soldier.

²⁷ Chalk, pp. 46 and 51; Heiserman, pp. 141-42.

(pro)creative, outlets.²⁸ In this connection, it may be of importance that Gnathon later redeems himself by rescuing Chloe from the clutches of Lampis.

Nothing, to my mind, makes Longus' penchant for the chiasmic arrangement of narrative details more obvious than the sequence EF-F'E'. At 23. 2, Daphnis, now dressed as the young nobleman he has been discovered to be, is presented to his new-found father, Dionysophanes; chapter 24 consists of the latter's account of how he had come to expose his infant son. But the sequence of narrative and presentation is exactly reversed in the case of Chloe: Megacles tells the assembled company (at 35. 1-5) how he, too, had once been compelled to expose a child; only when his story is over, however, is that child, Chloe, presented to her real father (36. 1). Like Daphnis, before, she is now seen resplendent in the rich dress of the class to which she was born.

In Books I through III, the immediate frame of the *μῦθος* has been rather obvious.²⁹ Any reader who has caught on to Longus' methods cannot fail to notice the careful parallelism of the events narrated at H and H': *ἐνταῦθα ὁ Δάφνις συναθροίσας πάντα τὰ ποιμενικὰ κτήματα διένειμεν ἀναθήματα τοῖς θεοῖς . . .* (26. 2); *. . . καὶ ἀνετίθει καὶ Χλόη τὰ ἐαυτῆς . . .* (32. 3). And it is precisely the carefulness of that pairing that isolates and defines the *αἴτιον* of Book IV: the *μῦθος* of Chloe. For if we assume that the correspondence H-H' is the immediate frame, then the portion of the text that intervenes is in the precise structural position in Book IV occupied by the *αἴτια* of Phatta, Syrinx, and Echo in Books I-III. This observation virtually demands that the passage 27. 1 - 32. 2 be set into juxtaposition to those *αἴτια*. Such a juxtaposition produces some remarkable results:

1. In Books I-III, the *αἴτιον* centers on a young unmarried woman; Phatta is a shepherdess, and Syrinx and Echo are nymphs. Chloe is a young unmarried woman, a shepherdess who, as an infant, was found in a grotto sacred to the Nymphs, and who has clearly been under their special protection.
2. In Books I-III, the female protagonist is threatened by a male antagonist. Phatta is confronted by a young boy who sings more sweetly than she does, while the two nymphs are both pursued

²⁸ Chalk, p. 51; Philippides, p. 199; Mittelstadt, "Love, Eros," pp. 320-32. Like Heiserman, p. 131, I do not find Longus' ideas about Eros especially original or profound; unlike him, however, I do not believe that a concern with "ideas" as such informs *Daphnis and Chloe*, for reasons that will become apparent.

²⁹ See Deligiorgis, whose remarks on framing adumbrate much of the present discussion.

by Pan. Chloe is abducted by the brutish Lampis, a disappointed suitor.

3. In Books I–III, there is a moment when all seems lost, and the male aggressor is on the point of victory. The anonymous shepherd boy in Book I enjoys unalloyed victory, but Pan is ultimately disappointed in his hopes; similarly, Lampis seems about to gain his prize when Gnathon, quite unexpectedly, redeems himself by saving Chloe.
4. The female protagonists in Books I–III are all transformed as a result of their various encounters with male aggression. All three become “musical”—they make pleasing sounds. All are common, not to say ubiquitous, natural phenomena.³⁰ The transformation of Chloe is somewhat more complex. Dryas, Chloe’s presumed father, is motivated by her abduction to present the *γνωρίσματα* he had found with her when she was a baby; her true identity remains a mystery, but it is clear that she is no shepherd’s daughter. The last obstacle to her marriage to Daphnis has been removed, and the nature of her “musical” transformation is revealed. She will become a wife.

All this seems to suggest that a *γυνή* is somehow to be compared to a dove, a reed pipe, or an echo. The point of connection, it seems to me, is music, or, more specifically, the delight induced by music. As noted above, all three transformed maidens become sources of sweet sounds, and it is precisely through their confrontations with male aggression that they become so. Chloe, as a result of her particular confrontation with male aggression, becomes a married woman, a wife, whose primary function in life (at that time and place) will be to please her husband.³¹ To Daphnis, then, she is a *κτῆμα τερπνόν*. Put baldly:

wife : husband :: music : hearer

That a Greek wife was her husband’s *κτῆμα*, an asset to be possessed, would be a self-evident truth to any ancient Greek audience. That the marks of her excellence would be the delight she gave her husband is less obvious; indeed, such an assumption might seem to rest on shaky ground. Even a passing reference to Pomeroy’s well-

³⁰ Deligiorgis, p. 6.

³¹ Recent experience has taught me that a disclaimer of sorts may well be necessary here. Whether or not one approves of the view of marriage and the role of wives here ascribed to Longus, such a view is entirely consonant with the prevailing attitudes in antiquity on this matter. Those who are offended by all this have a quarrel with Longus, not with me.

known book on the role of women in ancient Greece will suggest that a wife, even a "good" wife, was not necessarily expected to give erotic pleasure to her husband, who would presumably look elsewhere for that.³² But, as Mittelstadt points out, by the second century of our era new ideas were emerging.³³ The other Greek romances had long since set the pattern of erotic attraction culminating in marriage. So Longus cannot really be credited with any fundamentally new vision of marriage.

But there is still something quite new about the *μῦθος* of Chloe, the building of a narrative around the transformation of a girl from *παρθένος* to *γυνή*. It has already been suggested by others that Longus dwells upon precisely that aspect of erotic development so much taken for granted by the other romances: the flowering of attraction into erotic passion.³⁴ What is prelude in most of the other romances has here become the primary theme. Thus marriage is not (*pace* Chalk *et al.*) a metaphor for initiation, but rather the reverse: initiation is a metaphor for marriage. The evocations of and allusions to the mysteries that pervade *Daphnis and Chloe* are, structurally and thematically, subservient to the theme of marriage.

This is not to say, however, that the final significance of the *μῦθος* of Chloe lies in the transformation that marriage represents. Marriage is not the "privileged layer" of interpretation, but rather points beyond itself to the theme with which, I would contend, *Daphnis and Chloe* is most closely concerned: the theme of literature. For the *κτῆμα* *τερπνόν* that Longus promises in the Prologue and delivers in Book IV is not a wife for Daphnis, but a novel for us, the readers.

. . . τέτταρας βίβλους ἐξεπονησάμην, ἀνάθημα μὲν Ἐρωτι καὶ Νύμφαις καὶ Πανί, κτῆμα δὲ τερπνόν πᾶσι ἀνθρώποις, ὃ καὶ νοσοῦντα ἰάσεται, καὶ λυπούμενον παραμυθήσεται, τὸν ἐρασθέντα ἀναμνήσει, τὸν οὐκ ἐρασθέντα προπαιδεύσει.
(Prologue 3)

Another member, then must be added to the earlier analogy:

music : hearer :: wife : husband :: story : reader

What binds together music, wife, and story is the figure of Chloe: a wife-to-be, who is identified with a series of musical maidens, and becomes a *μῦθος*.

One of the great problems for any writer of narrative in antiquity was the problem of validation. Ancient readers were simply not prepared to accept out-and-out fiction; only in comedy did an author

³² S. Pomeroy, *Goddesses, Whores, Wives, and Slaves* (New York 1975).

³³ Mittelstadt, "Love, Eros," pp. 305 ff.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

enjoy any sort of freedom in contriving a plot. For the Roman comic poets, who clearly felt compelled to follow plot lines borrowed from the Greeks, even that freedom was, if not denied, at least abridged.³⁵ And when prose fiction first began to appear in the Greco-Roman world, it did so rather fearfully and quite tentatively at first. In the "Ninus Fragment," we see traces of a fictional plot, but the story, oddly, is built around well-known mythological characters. The first romance to survive intact, Chariton's *Chaireas and Kallirhoe*, purports to be a "true" story, and the heroine is made out to be the daughter of the Syracusan στρατηγός Hermocrates. Achilles Tatius' *Leukippe and Kleitophon* is a first person narrative, ostensibly told to the authorial persona by Kleitophon. One might argue that Longus, too, feels compelled to find some external point of reference in order to validate his narrative. His work is presented as an extended *ekphrasis*; and there is also the *ἐξηγητής* consulted, the Prologue says, by the author. But the fact remains that Longus, in the Prologue, clearly represents his work as his own creation—*ἐξεπονησάμην*, he says, "finxi." The story derives its validation, not from any mythical or historical (or pseudohistorical) datum, but from itself, from its own construction. In fact, the whole structure I have described above shows that Longus has chosen to make his own myth. Whatever we may think of the result, the fact remains that mythopoesis (or, to be more precise, the separation of mythopoesis from tradition) is the essence of that newness which the term "novel" connotes, and constitutes an essential beginning for the conception of fiction.

What the *μῦθος* of Chloe finally means, then, is the emancipation of fiction. The judgment of McCulloh, that *Daphnis and Chloe* is "the last great creation in pagan Greek literature," takes on a deeper significance perhaps unsuspected by McCulloh.³⁶ The great writers of both Greek and Roman literature derive their power, then and now, from their ability to evoke from their respective cultural traditions a voice that speaks to and from the collective psyche, which is embodied in that tradition. When Longus, in Greek, and Apuleius, in Latin, almost simultaneously develop the project of writing narratives that are not derivative from tradition, we are clearly standing at the threshold of a new era.

It is, then, precisely in the manner of its formation that the significance of the *μῦθος* of Chloe lies. There is conscious irony in Pan's telling Bryaxis that Eros will make a *μῦθος* of Chloe. For it is

³⁵ I leave aside the issue of *contaminatio*, which would not be an issue if the observation just made were not sound.

³⁶ McCulloh, p. 15.

indeed Eros, within the fictive frame of reference, who controls the action, but it is Longus who has made the *μῦθος*. Chloe becomes the wife of Daphnis, but it is we, the readers, who have the *κτῆμα τερπνόν*, which is *Daphnis and Chloe* itself. When we see further how Longus has used three “myths” (in the ordinary sense) to make a fourth of his own creation, we begin to see how and why Longus, far from immersing us in a story, maintains a certain distance from it all. He does not hide his brush strokes, because that would defeat his purpose. What we are really seeing is not a simple tale of incredibly simple children, but the very act of literary creation, and the genesis of fiction.

Purdue University

Chariton and Coptic

GERALD M. BROWNE

Knowledge of Coptic, its linguistic analysis and the literature that survives in it, furthers our understanding of two passages in Chariton, removing the need to tamper with the text of the first, and supporting emendation of the second.

(I) 7. 5. 5 (p. 105. 4 Blake¹) αὕτη δὲ ἦν <ἦ> Καλλιρόη ἀπαντήσασα πρώτη Περσίδων.

Cobet proposed insertion of ἦ, paleographically easy but linguistically unnecessary. The pattern of expression, ἦν . . . ἀπαντήσασα, invites comparison with that studied by H. B. Rosén, "Die 'zweiten' Tempora des Griechischen: Zum Prädikatsausdruck beim griechischen Verbum," *Museum Helveticum* 14 (1957), pp. 133–54. Thanks to the efforts of H. J. Polotsky,² whose work serves as the basis for Rosén's investigation, we know that Coptic employs two special constructions in order to give prominence to an element of a sentence other than its verb; the choice between these constructions depends on whether the emphasis is on an adverbial phrase (resulting in a so-called "second

¹ W. E. Blake, *Charitonis Aphrodisiensis de Chaerea et Callirhoe amatoriarum narrationum libri octo* (Oxford 1938).

² See especially *Études de syntaxe copte* (Cairo 1944), of which pp. 20–96 deal with "les temps seconds" and include a sketch of the cleft sentence (57–65). Polotsky expanded his treatment of the latter in "Nominalsatz und Cleft Sentence im Koptischen," *Orientalia* 31 (1962), 413–30, which appeared after Rosén's article. Both of Polotsky's studies are reprinted in his *Collected Papers* (Jerusalem 1971), pp. 102–207 and 418–35, respectively.

tense”) or on a subject or object (resulting in a cleft sentence). Thus, if in the hypothetical utterance

ΠΡΩΜΕ ΟΥΗΖ ΖΜ ΠΗΙ
The-man stays in-the-house

special prominence is to be given to the adverbial phrase, the following transformation appears:

ΕΡΕ ΠΡΩΜΕ ΟΥΗΖ ΖΜ ΠΗΙ
The-fact-that-(is) in-the-house the-man-stays
I.e. It is in the house that the man stays (Second Tense)

If, in the same utterance, the emphasis falls upon the subject, a different construction is used:

ΠΡΩΜΕ Π(Ε) ΕΤΟΥΗΖ ΖΜ ΠΗΙ → ΠΡΩΜΕ ΠΕΤΟΥΗΖ ΖΜ ΠΗΙ
The-man-is who-stays in-the-house
I.e. It is the man who stays in the house (Cleft Sentence)³

Rosén shows convincingly that Ancient Greek too has a means of shifting emphasis away from the verb (apart from use of particles and modification of word-order), viz. replacement of the verb with a periphrasis involving εἰμί and a participle. E.g. ὁ ἄνθρωπος μένει ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ may be converted into ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ μένων ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ, which can mean either “it is in the house that the man stays” (cf. Herodotus⁴ I. 146. 3 ταῦτα δὲ ἦν γινόμενα ἐν Μιλήτῳ “it was at Miletus that these events took place”⁵) or “it is the man who stays in the house” (cf. III. 63. 4 οἱ μάγοι εἰσὶ τοὶ ἐπανεστεῶτες “ce sont les mages, qui se sont soulevés contre toi”⁶). Regarding this second Herodotean passage, Rosén writes: “der von den Herausgebern gemachte Zusatz von <οἱ> nach τοὶ ist also [i.e. after a list of similar passages] nicht angebracht” (147). The structural similarity between οἱ μάγοι εἰσὶ τοὶ ἐπανεστεῶτες and αὕτη δὲ ἦν Καλλιρόη ἀπαντήσασα in Chariton is striking, and the latter passage no more requires <ἦ> after ἦν than

³ For numerous examples of both second tenses and cleft sentences in Coptic, see the studies of Polotsky cited in the preceding note, and see also notes 4 and 7 below.

⁴ Rosén concentrates on Herodotus, but on pp. 151–53 he suggests that his observations apply to Ancient Greek in general; cf. also Acts 25:10 ἐστὼς ἐπὶ τοῦ βήματος Καίσαρός εἰμι, rendered in Coptic as

ΕΙΛΖΕΡΔΤ ΖΙ ΠΒΗΜΛ ΠΠΡΟ

“it is at the court of Caesar that I stand” (see Polotsky, *Études*, p. 44); for ἐστὼς . . . εἰμι note Rosén’s remark “dass . . . kein Zwang besteht, die beiden Komponenten der zusammengesetzten Form zu juxtaaponieren. Auch die Ordnung der Komponenten ist beliebig” (p. 137). See also note 7 below.

⁵ Rosén, p. 146; the translation is by Rawlinson (Rosén, p. 141).

⁶ Rosén, p. 147; the translation is by Legrand (Rosén, p. 141).

does the former need *τοι* <*οί*>. For Chariton's usage elsewhere, note especially 8. 6. 9 (p. 122. 5) *αὐτὸς γὰρ ἦν πεπιστευμένος τὸν ἄλλον στόλον ἀπὸ Κύπρου*.⁷

(2) 7. 5. 9 (p. 105. 22–23) *καὶ εὐθὺς ἔργον ἐγένετο ὁ λόγος*.

Hercher conjectured *ἐγένετο* for the manuscript reading *ἐγίνετο*. A precise parallel in support of *ἐγένετο* appears in the Coptic Gnostic Treatise *On the Origin of the World* (Nag Hammadi Codex II 116. 3–4):

ἮΤΕΥΗΟΥ ΛΠΕΣΩΔΧΕ ΩΩΠΕ ἸΟΥΕΡΓΟΝ

immediately her word became a deed.

The use of Perfect I in Coptic shows that its *Vorlage* had *ἐγένετο*; *ἐγίνετο* would have resulted in

ἮΤΕΥΗΟΥ ΠΕΡΕΠΕΣΩΔΧΕ ΩΩΠΕ ἸΟΥΕΡΓΟΝ .⁸

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁷ Cf. also St. Athanasius, *Vita Antonii* (Migne, *PG* 26 [1887] 912 A 14–15) ὁ δὲ κύριος ἦν αὐτὸν φυλάττων, which the excellent Coptic translation (for which see my article in *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 12 [1971], pp. 59–64) renders as a cleft sentence:

ΠΧΟΕΙC ΔΕ ΠΕΗΤΑϨϨΔΡΕϨ ΕΡΟϨ

“and it was the Lord who guarded him” (G. Garitte, *S. Antonii vitae versio sahidica*, *CSCO* 117, *Scrip. copt.* 4. 1 [1949], 53. 14–15).

⁸ Cf. Polotsky, “The Coptic Conjugation System,” *Orientalia* 29 (1960), 396 §9 (= *Collected Papers*, p. 242).

The First Sighting Theme in the Old Testament Poetry of Late Antiquity

MICHAEL J. ROBERTS

Until recently the biblical poetry of late antiquity has received little attention from scholars.¹ The major reason for this neglect has been

¹ A number of monographs on individual authors appeared around the turn of the century—mostly on the problems of the biblical text forms used or the imitation of pagan poets—but with one exception—a largely descriptive work on the Genesis paraphrases (Stanislas Gamber, *Le livre de la Genèse dans la poésie latine au V^m siècle* [Paris 1899])—no work of synthesis was produced. Only recently have a number of works begun to supply this need. Two German studies deserve special mention, Klaus Thraede's article on the "Epos" in the *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 5 (Stuttgart 1962), cols. 983–1042, and Reinhart Herzog's *Die Biblepik der lateinischen Spätantike: Formgeschichte einer erbaulichen Gattung*, of which at the time of writing only volume one has appeared (Munich 1975), dealing with Proba, Juvenius, the Heptateuch paraphrase and Paulinus, C. 6. Jacques Fontaine's *Naissance de la poésie dans l'occident chrétien: esquisse d'une histoire de la poésie chrétienne du III^e au VI^e siècle* (Paris 1981) contains a chapter on Juvenius, pp. 67–80, and a survey of the other biblical poets, pp. 241–64. For the Old Testament paraphrases a pair of articles by Kurt Smolak should be mentioned: "Lateinische Umdichtungen des biblischen Schöpfungsberichtes" in *Studia Patristica*, vol. 12, *Papers Presented to the Sixth International Conference on Patristic Studies Held in Oxford 1971*, pt. 1, *Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur* 115 (Berlin 1975), pp. 350–60, and "Die Stellung der Hexamerendichtung des Dracontius (laud. dei 1, 118–426) innerhalb der lateinischen Genesispoesie," in *Antidosis: Festschrift für Walther Kraus zum 70. Geburtstag* (Vienna 1972), pp. 381–97. More summary treatments are contained in J. M. Evans, *Paradise Lost and the Genesis Tradition* (Oxford 1968), pp. 107–42; Charles Witke, *Numen Litterarum: The Old and the New in Latin Poetry from Constantine to Gregory the Great*, *Mittellateinische Studien und Texte* 5 (Leiden 1971), pp. 145–232, and Dieter Kartschoke, *Bibeldichtung: Studien zur Geschichte der epischen Bibelparaphrase von Juvenius bis Otfried von Weissenburg* (Munich 1975), pp. 15–123. In addition, a number of more

aesthetic: the perceived opposition between the form of the poems, derived as it is from pagan epic, and their biblical content; form and content have been felt to be in irreconcilable conflict.² But, in fact, this blend of Christian and classical was very much in accordance with contemporary taste. In this respect the biblical poems are typical of much of the literature of late antiquity. To appreciate the poems properly, therefore, they must be seen against the intellectual background of the time, not in the light of aesthetic preconceptions derived from the study of classical literature or the biblical original.³ Such an open-minded approach is likely to be doubly fruitful. Scholarship, by concentrating on the interplay between Christian and classical in the biblical poems, can hope to learn much about the reception of the classical tradition in the Christian West, and at the same time introduce some light and shade into the almost uniformly dark picture of the biblical epic that has hitherto been presented. The present article draws attention to a group of passages in the Old Testament poems which illustrate their twofold inspiration (classical and Christian).

The passages in question are Claudius Marius Victorius, *Alethia* 2.

specialized studies by German, Dutch, and Italian scholars have contributed to the understanding of individual works.

The present article elaborates on remarks made in my Ph.D. dissertation, *The Hexameter Paraphrase in Late Antiquity: Origins and Applications to Biblical Texts* (Urbana 1978), pp. 322-23. In the present article I have preferred the term "first sighting" theme to "distant views" theme, as being more accurate, if less suggestive. A revised version of the dissertation has recently been published; Roberts, *Biblical Epic and Rhetorical Paraphrase in Late Antiquity*, ARCA Classical and Medieval Texts, Papers and Monographs 16 (Liverpool 1985), but it omits the pages which deal with the "first sighting" theme.

² Cf. the references collected and discussed by Herzog, pp. lx-lxv. Domenico Comparetti, *Vergil in the Middle Ages*, trans. E. F. M. Benecke (2nd ed. 1908; repr. Hamden, Conn. 1966), pp. 158 and 160, expresses with unusual clarity the traditional attitude of scholars to these poems: "Christianity was never at its ease when arrayed in the forms of ancient poetical art, and the ability of its various poets could never do more than slightly diminish the strangeness of its appearance. Not unfrequently indeed the contrast between the matter and the form would have been positively ridiculous to anyone not blinded by the fervour of religious faith," and "To versify the Gospels meant . . . to take away from the simple narrative its own proper poetry by tricking it out in a way repugnant to its nature. . . . Poetry was merely looked upon as versified rhetoric."

³ I am here thinking of criticisms which contrast the fetching simplicity of the biblical narrative with the rhetorical elaboration of the poetic version, interpreted as tasteless mutilation of the original. Cf. the second passage from Comparetti cited in the previous note.

6–26 and 2. 528–39;⁴ Avitus, *De spiritalis historiae gestis* 3. 197–208;⁵ and Dracontius, *Laudes Dei* 1. 417–26.⁶ (The poem of the African poet Dracontius, though primarily non-biblical, contains in the first book a lengthy version of Genesis 1–3, as an illustration of God's mercy towards the human race.) All four passages have in common that they describe reactions to a strange, new environment. *Alethia* 2. 6–26 and Avitus 3. 197–208 describe the first parents' reaction to their expulsion from Paradise; *Alethia* 2. 528–39 Noah's reaction to the new world after the Flood; and *Laudes Dei* 1. 417–26 the first parents' fearful response to the onset of night. Each passage may be described as paraphrastic amplification of the biblical text. In accordance with the principles of the paraphrase the sense of the original is retained; its elaboration is rather a matter of *elocutio* than *inventio*⁷—the poet takes his point of departure from the biblical text and seeks to give more forceful expression to the spiritual content of the text. Since the discussion will initially center on the two passages from the *Alethia*, I quote them here.⁸

⁴ The *Alethia* was most probably written in the third decade of the fifth century; cf. Pieter Frans Hovingh, *Claudius Marius Victorius, Alethia, la prière et les vers 1–170 du livre I*, (diss. Groningen 1955), pp. 22–23 and 45. For the form of the name (Victorius rather than Victor) see Hovingh, pp. 15–16. Hovingh's arguments are accepted by Helge Hanns Homey, *Studien zur Alethia des Claudius Marius Victorius*, (diss., Bonn 1972), p. 7, and Herzog, *Die Biblepik*, p. xxiii.

⁵ The date of composition of the *De spiritalis historiae gestis* is not definitely known. The last decade of the fifth century is the period most commonly given. For the title see Avitus, *Ep.* 51 (80. 21–22 Peiper) "*De spiritalis historiae gestis etiam lege poematis lusi.*"

⁶ Dracontius was a contemporary of Avitus. The *Laudes Dei* is generally thought to have been written in the first half of the last decade of the fifth century (see P. Langlois, "Dracontius," *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum* 4 [Stuttgart 1959], cols. 253–54, who nevertheless believes a later date is possible).

⁷ On the need to retain the sense of the original see Quintilian I. 9. 2 "paraphrasi audacius vertere, qua et brevare quaedam et exornare *salvo modo poetae sensu* permittitur," speaking of a prose paraphrase of verse. Provided that an expansion of the original text introduced no material alteration therein and could be classified as stylistic enhancement rather than fresh invention, no contravention of paraphrastic principles was involved. Stylistic amplification might be broadly interpreted to include, for instance, lengthy digressions, which were viewed as an ornament of style. The *progymnasmata* were largely exercises in such rhetorical amplification. Among them figured the ethopoeia, which, we shall see, influenced the paraphrastic amplifications here discussed. On the theory of the paraphrase see further Roberts, *Biblical Epic*, pp. 5–36.

⁸ The text followed is that of Hovingh, *Claudii Marii Victorii Alethia, Corpus Christianorum Latinorum* 128 (Turnhout 1960), pp. 148 and 165–66, who follows Arie Staat, *De Cultuurbeschouwing van Claudius Marius Victor: Commentaar op Alethia II 1–202* (diss., Amsterdam 1952). Hovingh's *plana* for *plana* (2. 14) is clearly a misprint though adopted without comment by Homey (above, note 4), p. 34.

Alethia 2. 6–26

Postquam sacratis decedere iussus uterque
 sedibus ac regnis genitalia contigit arva
 et propria stetit exul humo, miserabile, quali
 ore rudes stupeant tam barbara rura coloni,
 quae non frugifero distincta stipite vernant. 10
 Nec species iuvat ulla soli, sed bruta coacto
 pondere congeries nec lecta mole locata est.
 Ardua caute rigent, silvis depressa laborant,
 plana latent herbis, horrescunt edita dumis.
 Heu quibus haec spectant oculis, quo pectore cernunt, 15
 quorum animis paradisos inest! Neque causa doloris
 una subest, quod cunctorum iam plena malorum
 se pandit facies, sed, quod meminere bonorum.
 Nunc honor ille sacri nemoris maiore sereno
 inradiat, nunc divitias cumulatus edit 20
 silva beata suas, nunc pomis dulcior usus
 nectareusque sapor, vivis nunc floribus halat
 tellus⁹ et absentis tristis perstringit odore.
 O quam non eadem meritis, paradisi, rependis!
 Te magis extollit conlatio deteriorum 25
 et peiora facis, miseris quae sola supersunt.

Alethia 2. 528–39

At dominus, mundi sortitus regna secundi,
 cuncta Noë gaudens oculis ac mente capaci
 accipit atque animum nequit exsaturare replendo 530
 et cupido raptim perlustrans omnia visu
 ut nova miratur. Noto fulgentior ortu
 et mage sol rutilus, ridet maiore sereno
 laeta poli facies et desperata virescunt
 fetibus arva novis. Sed adhuc versatur imago 535
 ante oculos tantae semper memoranda ruinae,
 inter aquas quid pertulerint, quid munere sacro
 et non pertulerint, fremeret cum verbere saevo
 pontus et inlisis contemneret arca procellas.

Homey,¹⁰ in his dissertation on the *Alethia*, has noted the thematic similarity between these passages. He sees them as inspired by two philosophical *topoi*, later taken over by Christian exegesis. The first is that of man as the *contemplator mundi/caeli*; the notion that by visual contemplation of the universe, and especially the heavens, man

⁹ For the *correptio* of the final syllable of *tellus* see also *Alethia* 3. 561.

¹⁰ Homey, pp. 34–55, where the evidence for these philosophical *topoi* will be found.

may ascend to the spiritual contemplation of God. This idea, as Homey shows, goes back to Hellenistic philosophy, but was adapted by Christian writers to their own concept of the divine. The second philosophical *topos* derives from attempts to explain the existence of evil in the world; evil, it is said, exists so that man may have a yardstick of comparison the better to appreciate what is good. Here Homey quotes *Alethia* 2. 25–26:¹¹

Te magis extollit conlatio deteriorum
et peiora facis, miseris quae sola supersunt.

The influence of such concepts, especially the former, certainly cannot be ruled out. As Homey effectively shows in his dissertation, the influence of philosophical doctrines, as filtered through Christian exegesis, is all-pervasive in the *Alethia*. Indeed, it is clear from elsewhere in the poem that Claudius Marius Victorius was familiar with the notion of man as *contemplator mundi/caeli* (1. 153–58 and 423–31). But neither philosophical *topos* accounts for the feature that the two *Alethia* passages, and the passages in Avitus and Dracontius, have in common: that is, that each describes the reactions of a spectator (or spectators) when confronted for the first time with a strange environment. Nor does the function of the passages correspond to that of the philosophical *topoi*. Claudius Marius Victorius is not concerned to stress the relationship between the contemplation of nature and the contemplation of God; still less does he seek to justify the existence of evil. As Homey recognizes,¹² the passages serve a literary function: to amplify the changes experienced by the first parents and Noah and thereby lend emotional force to the narrative.

The passages serve the purpose of rhetorical amplification. It is in rhetorical rather than philosophical *topoi*, therefore, that their inspiration should be sought. A parallel may be found in a group of ethopoeiae of the form “what would ‘someone’ say on first seeing ‘something’.” Hermogenes¹³ recommends the subject “what would a farmer say on first seeing a ship?” (21. 12–13 Rabe; cf. Priscian’s translation of Hermogenes, 558. 17–18 Halm).¹⁴ Perhaps the closest

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 50, 53, and 55.

¹³ The authenticity of Hermogenes’ *Progymnasmata*, which I here cite, is doubtful; cf. Hugo Rabe, *Hermogenis Opera, Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 6 (Leipzig 1913), pp. iv–vi. There is no reason to deny, however, that the work accurately reflects educational practice of late antiquity.

¹⁴ Accius’ *Medea* (381–96 Warmington = Cicero, *N.D.* II. 35. 89) contained a speech on this subject, which in turn appears to derive from a narrative motif in Apollonius of Rhodes’ *Argonautica* IV. 316–22.

parallel, however, is a subject referred to by Aphthonius (fourth century), "what would an inlander say on first seeing the sea?" (35. 5-6 Rabe); an exercise on this subject is preserved among sample exercises attributed to Nicolaus of Myra (1.389.5-24 Walz).¹⁵ Like the passages in the biblical epic, such ethopoeiae concern the first sight of an unfamiliar object or environment. The speaker of the ethopoeia may be expected to feel a sense of alienation, or psychological distance, from his new environment, just as the first parents and Noah do in the passages under discussion. Such subjects undoubtedly appealed to the student and rhetor because of the imaginative effort required to put oneself in the situation of the speaker and because of the opportunity offered to invent striking new turns of thought in describing the observer's reaction to the strange environment.

It seems probable, then, that the first sighting theme was suggested to the biblical poets by this class of ethopoeiae, with which they would be familiar from the schools. Claudius Marius Victorius was, as we know, a rhetor in Marseilles (Gennadius, *De viris illustribus* 61). The biblical poets' choice of narrative rather than direct speech to convey their characters' reaction to the new environment can be attributed to two factors. The first is a probable reluctance to introduce speeches not sanctioned by the biblical original; Claudius Marius Victorius certainly avoids such non-biblical speeches (only two examples), although Avitus is freer in this respect. More importantly, the use of narrative rather than direct speech permitted greater visual immediacy (*ἐνάργεια*). Ancient theory recognized that such visual immediacy worked particularly strongly on the emotions, and that it could be achieved by the description not only of visual detail, but also of the effect a sight had on an observer.¹⁶ Both Claudius Marius Victorius and Avitus often use such psychological description as an affective technique.¹⁷

¹⁵ For these sample exercises and their relation to Nicolaus (a fifth-century rhetorician) see Joseph Felten, *Nicolai Progymnasmata, Rhetores Graeci*, vol. 11 (Leipzig 1913), p. xxvii, and Willy Stegemann, "Nikolaos," *RE*, 17. 1 (Stuttgart 1936), cols. 451-57, who attributes the exercises to Aphthonius.

¹⁶ For the affective force of *ἐνάργεια*, the vivid description of visual detail, see Quintilian VI. 2. 32: "*ἐνάργεια*, quae a Cicerone inlustratio et evidentia nominatur, quae non tam dicere quam ostendere, et adfectus non aliter quam si rebus ipsis intersimus sequitur"; for the description of a spectator's reaction as achieving the same purpose see Quintilian VIII. 3. 70 "contingit eadem claritas (sc. *ἐνάργεια*) etiam ex accidentibus: 'mihi frigidus horror/membra quatit gelidusque coit formidine sanguis' [*Aen.* III. 29-30] et 'trepidae matres pressere ad pectora natos'" [*Aen.* VII. 518].

¹⁷ For instance *Alethia* 1. 382-84, 2. 93-94, 108-15, 134-35, 3. 173-81, 374-76;

Let us turn now to the procedures used in such “first sighting” themes. The only example available is the exercise attributed to Nicolaus of Myra on the subject “what would an inlander say on first seeing the sea?”, a subject which Aphthonius (35. 4–6 Rabe) classes among ἠθικαὶ ἠθοποιΐαι, that is ethopoeiae designed to reveal the ἦθος (the characteristic frame of mind) of the speaker. Thus, in the exercise of “Nicolaus,” the landlubber reveals his naiveté when confronted with an unfamiliar element, the sea: “I was at a loss to understand the marvel (τὸ θαυμάσιον κρίνειν ἠπόρηκα, 1.389.10 Walz). The biblical poets, on the other hand, employ the “first sighting” theme for purposes of πάθος; to reveal the emotions of the observer in a particular situation. But one technique is common to “Nicolaus” and the poets: the use of comparison. As might be expected, the landlubber, confronted by the sea, compares it to elements that are familiar to him, the air and land: “it does not maintain the character of air, for it is not elevated overhead: it cannot remain motionless like the earth” (ἀέρος φύσιν οὐ διασέσωκεν, οὐ γὰρ ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς φερόμενον αἴρεται· μένειν οὐκ οἶδεν ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ, 1.389.11–13 Walz). In a similar fashion the observers in the biblical poems compare their strange, new environment with the familiar one it has replaced. Such a comparison naturally engenders the “Kontrast von äußerer Wirklichkeit und innerer Vorstellung, die aus der Erinnerung schöpft” noted by Homey.¹⁸ The objective reality of the new situation contrasts with subjective reminiscence of the former state. The biblical poets exploit the emotive possibilities of such a contrast, although, as we shall see, the subjectivity of the observers’ reaction is stressed more by Avitus than by Claudius Marius Victorius. It should be remembered, however, that in instituting this comparison they are conforming to standard rhetorical procedure for the first sighting theme.

As already noted, Homey explains *Alethia* 2. 25–26,

Te magis extollit conlatio deteriorum
et peiora facis, miseris quae sola supersunt,

as a reference to a philosophical argument justifying the existence of evil: by comparison with evil man appreciates the good. I have already suggested that I find this explanation implausible, if only because the

in *De spiritalis historiae gestis* especially to characterize the villains of the narrative, 2. 35–86 (the Devil), 4. 11–85 (the generation before the flood), 5. 75–80, 98–101, 497–500 (the Pharaoh).

¹⁸ Homey (above, note 4), p. 53.

present context shows no concern with the justification of evil.¹⁹ If we are to judge by Avitus 3. 203 "utque hominum mos est, plus, quod cessavit, amatur," the notion that "absence (or rather loss) makes the heart grow fonder" was a proverbial one.²⁰ The phrase *conlatio deteriorum*, which Homey cites in support of his argument, is susceptible of another, and I believe a better, interpretation. *Conlatio* (*collatio*) is a technical term of rhetoric (cf. the passages cited in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 3: 1579. 14–33).²¹ *Collatio* involves the comparison of one thing with another on the basis of similarity (Cicero, *Inv.* I. 30. 49 "collatio est oratio rem cum re ex similitudine conferens") or, in later theory (Quintilian V. 11. 30–31), dissimilarity. Such comparisons may be viewed as argument and thus included in *inventio* or as stylistic adornment and included in *elocutio* (Quintilian VIII. 3. 77). Thus in late antiquity, Cassiodorus, in his Psalm Commentary, commenting on Ps. 11:7, says "quod schema graece syndesmos dicitur, latine collatio, quando sibi aut personae aut causae sive ex contrario sive ex simili comparantur" (CCL 97: 120. 144–146). Comparison was also a recognized means of rhetorical amplification, one of the four *genera amplificationis* (Quintilian VIII. 4. 3 and 9–14). That Claudius Marius Victorius consciously uses comparison in the passage quoted as a means of rhetorical amplification is clear from a second rhetorical *terminus technicus* in *Alethia* 2. 25, the verb *extollit*. The *Thesaurus* quotes ample evidence for this technical usage (*ThLL* 5.2: 2038. 55–75). It is especially common in the context of rhetorical

¹⁹ Homey (p. 53) does not suggest this is the case, but speaks of the literary exploitation of the philosophical *topos*: "Die 'conlatio' macht es technisch möglich, zwei kontrastierende Landschaftsbilder ohne Überleitung dicht nebeneinander zu stellen. . . ." Economy of explanation favors my interpretation of *conlatio deteriorum*; a literary procedure is explained by literary considerations.

²⁰ The closest parallel I have noted is A. Otto, *Die Sprichwörter und sprichwörtlichen Redensarten der Römer* (Leipzig 1890), p. 113, no. 533: Publilius Syrus 103 "Cotidie est deterior posterior dies"; Seneca, *Phaedra* 775–76 "horaque/semper praeterita deterior subit," reminiscences, according to Otto, of the Greek proverb ἀὐτὰ πέρουσι βελτίω (Diogenian. 2. 54; Macarius 1. 31). Cf. also Hans Walther, *Proverbia sententiaeque latinitatis mediæ ævi: lateinische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des Mittelalters in alphabetischer Anordnung, Carmina mediæ ævi posterioris latina*, 2, 6 vols. (Göttingen 1963–69), 3: pp. 114–15, no. 16558b "nescit habens, quod habet, donec desinat habere" and 16565 "nescit homo vere, quid habet, nisi cessat habere." The notion of *conlatio* is, it is true, missing from the Avitus passage (cf. Homey, *Studien zur Alethia*, p. 54, note 17), but note the grammatical comparatives in the proverbs cited by Otto.

²¹ *Alethia* 2. 25 is listed in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 3: 1578. 81–82, as an instance of the non-technical use of *collatio* in the sense of "comparison." I hope my argument will demonstrate that the technical, rhetorical sense of the term was uppermost in Claudius Marius Victorius' mind when he composed the passage in question.

elaboration, and is indeed found twice in Quintilian's discussion just quoted (VIII. 4. 9 and 15). The first passage concerns the use of comparison as a means of amplification:

Quae [amplificatio] fit per comparationem incrementum ex minoribus petit. Augendo enim quod est infra necesse est extollat id quod superpositum est.

Quintilian is here speaking of a comparison based on similarity rather than contrast, as in the *Alethia* passages, but it is clear that a subject can be "elevated" either by comparison with something that is similar, but inferior, to it or with something that is opposite to it. In the latter case the comparison serves not only to amplify the superior but also to diminish the inferior. This is the rhetorical principle that underlies *Alethia* 2. 25–26.

We are now in a position to analyze the function and development of the first sighting theme in Claudius Marius Victorius and his successors in the biblical epic. *Alethia* 2. 6–26 describes the first parents' reaction to their expulsion from Paradise. It proceeds by means of a comparison based on the contrast between their barbarous new environment and the luxuriant vegetation of Paradise, thereby diminishing the former and amplifying the latter (as indicated by the use of the comparatives *maiore*, *cumulatius* and *dulcior*, 19–21). Each description is filled out with ecphrastic detail in accordance with Quintilian's precept (VIII. 4. 14) "quae si quis dilatare velit, plenos singula locos habent"—in Butler's translation "all comparisons afford ample opportunity for further individual expansion, if anyone should desire so to do." But, as we have seen, the comparison is not introduced merely to amplify the description of Paradise. It is here used, in a fashion typical of the first sighting theme, for affective purposes: to indicate the emotional state of the observers. The whole passage is designed as an ἠθοποιία παθητική, albeit narrative in form. The poet frequently refers to the emotions of the first parents (*stupeant*, 9; *iuvat*, 11; *doloris*, 16; *tristes*, 23; *miseris*, 26—cf. *miserabile*, 8, which sets the tone for the passage). The arrangement of the passage follows the sequence of the first parents' emotions: initial shock at their new environment (8–14), which calls to mind the splendor of Paradise (15–18), described in ecphrastic detail (19–23). The final three lines act as a summarizing conclusion (24–26). Homey has rightly noted that the element of subjective remembrance lends particular affective force to the description of Paradise. The ecphrastic detail contained in both descriptions serves a similar purpose (note especially the many words with strong emotive connotations: *bruta*, *rigent*, *laborant*, *horrescunt*, *beata*, *vivis*).

Two sections in this passage deserve further comment. The first is 2. 6–8:

Postquam sacratis decedere iussus uterque
sedibus ac regnis genitalia contigit arva
et propria stetit exul humo . . .

The phrase “genitalia contigit arva” presents some problems. The compilers of the *Thesaurus* (*ThLL* 6.2: 1813. 51–53) hesitate over the correct interpretation: “homo e paradiso pulsus. arva quae ei fruges procreant? an: quibus ipse procreatus erat?” As Staat rightly emphasizes,²² if *genitalia* anticipates the future fertility of the land, it is out of place in a passage that stresses the barrenness of the first parents’ surroundings. The second alternative must be the correct one. Staat further draws attention to the tradition that Adam was created outside Paradise, into which he was introduced by God after his creation (cf. Gen. 2:8 and 15).²³ The phrase is naturally used, then, by Claudius Marius Victorius of the land outside Paradise, into which the first parents are now driven. It is all the more surprising therefore that Staat misunderstands the phrase “propria stetit exul humo.” He translates “van het eigen erf verbannen,” and in the notes specifically takes *propria humo* to refer to Paradise. But the phrase *propria . . . humo* is an evident reference to man’s creation *de humo terrae* (cf. Gen. 2:7, quoted by Isidore, *Etym.* 11. 1. 4, in the form “Et creavit Deus hominem *de humo terrae*”). Claudius Marius Victorius was undoubtedly familiar with the frequently repeated etymology of *homo* from *humo natus*, an etymology already known to pagan antiquity, although dismissed by Quintilian (I. 6. 34) as false.²⁴ By Staat’s own argument, the phrase *propria . . . humo* can only refer to the land outside Paradise. The translation of the phrase in question must be “he was an exile in his own land.” The land is his own (*propria*) because he was born from it. Such a paradox (*propria : exul*) is very much in the manner of Claudius Marius Victorius. The interpretation is further confirmed by the parallelism with the phrase “genitalia

²² Staat (above, note 8), pp. 31–35.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

²⁴ For this etymology see *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 6.3: 2871. 50–63 and 3122. 48–55. F. H. Colson remarks in his note on the Quintilian passage, *M. Fabii Quintiliani Institutionis Oratoriae Liber I* (Cambridge 1924), p. 87, that “this derivation appears to be found (apart from later and Christian sources) only in Hyginus, *Fables* 220, the date of which is very uncertain.” Cf. also Servius *ad G.* 2. 340.

contigit arva." I suspect that the poet intended the phrase *propria . . . humo* to explain the otherwise rather opaque *genitalia . . . arva*.²⁵

The second section worth attention is 2. 13–14.

Ardua caute rigent, silvis depressa laborant,
plana latent herbis, horrescunt edita dumis.

Staat comments on the "artistic construction" of these verses.²⁶ The combination of formal regularity with inconcinnity in detail is very much to the taste of the period. We need only compare a line from another Gallic poet of the early fifth century, the pagan Rutilius Namatianus (*De reditu suo* 1. 38): "plana madent fluviis, *cautibus alta rigent*."²⁷ The two passages are similar in language (the words italicized) and construction (note especially the artfully varied word order in the individual cola). The sentence in the *Alethia* reads like an attempt to imitate and outdo the pagan poet. This is not impossible since the two poets were contemporaries and both probably from Gaul.²⁸ It is more likely, however, in the light of the opposite religious convictions of the poets, that the similarity is attributable to the common literary taste of late antiquity, as it was transmitted to both pagan and Christian by the schools of grammar and rhetoric.²⁹ The description of landscape

²⁵ *Arva*, "fields," is a bold metonymy for the earth from which Adam was created. I suspect the poet was influenced by the desire to incorporate a Virgilian reminiscence (*Geo.* III. 136, *genitali arvo*), a reminiscence that was all the more attractive because it was capable of a specifically Christian interpretation. The incorporation of such pagan poetic locutions into a new context not infrequently occasions some awkwardness of expression. Examples are given by A. Hudson-Williams, "Virgil and the Christian Latin Poets," *Papers of the Virgil Society* 6 (1966–67), pp. 19–20, and Thraede, *Studien zu Sprache und Stil des Prudentius*, Hypomnemata 13 (Göttingen 1965), p. 15, note 34. The phrase *genitali arvo* is used figuratively by Virgil of the mating of horses and by Ausonius (*Ecl.* 7. 11) of childbirth; in Juvenecus (4. 65) *genitalibus arvis* means "native land" (parallels cited by Hovingh *ad loc.*).

²⁶ Staat (above, note 8), p. 40.

²⁷ The parallel has escaped the attention of previous commentators. Hovingh, *ad loc.*, following Heinrich Maurer, *De exemplis quae Claudius Marius Victor in Alethia secutus sit* (diss. Marburg 1896), p. 117, notes only the parallel with Valerius Flaccus 4. 671, *ardua cautes* (to which should be added Seneca, *Ag.* 539, *ardua ut cautes*).

²⁸ The *De reditu suo* is thought to have been written in the second decade of the fifth century. According to Alan Cameron, "Rutilius Namatianus, St. Augustine and the Date of the *De Reditu*," *Journal of Roman Studies* 57 (1967), pp. 31–39, Rutilius set out from Rome on the journey described in his poem in October 417. Vollmer, "Rutilius Claudius Namatianus," *RE*, ser. 2, 1.1 (Stuttgart 1914), col. 1253, remarks of Rutilius' *Nachleben*: "Des R. Gedicht hat keine weite Verbreitung gefunden; nicht einmal bei einem Landsmann wie Venantius Fortunatus findet man seinen Namen oder Spuren seiner Verse."

²⁹ Rhetorical influence on the *De reditu suo* is widespread; cf. Vollmer, cols. 1250–51.

in each case has all the appearance of being stylized and conventional; it is a part of the poetic *lingua franca* of the period.

The second passage in the *Alethia* (2. 528–39) follows a pattern similar to the first.³⁰ Again it exploits a comparison based on contrast; the account begins with a description of the new environment, which calls to mind the old (535–36); the superior environment is described with grammatical comparatives (*fulgentior, mage rutilus, maiore*) and ephrastic detail. Only in one respect does the passage differ. It is now the new environment, the world after the Flood, that is amplified by comparison with the previous state of things. The relationship is the reverse of that in the earlier passage, where it was the first parents' previous existence that was amplified. There is a corresponding change in the emotional tone of the passage. In the description of the first parents' reaction to their expulsion from Paradise the word *miserabile* (2. 8) was the key word; here it is *gaudens* (2. 529, cf. also *cupido . . . visu*, 531; for emotive language *miratur, ridet, laeta, desperata, ruinae, saevo*).

Avitus, like Claudius Marius Victorius, uses the first sighting theme of the first parents' expulsion from Paradise (3. 197–208).³¹

Tum terris cecidere simul mundumque vacantem
 intrant et celeri perlustrant omnia cursu.
 Germinibus quamquam variis et gramine picta
 et virides campos fontesque ac flumina monstrans, 200
 illis foeda tamen species mundana putatur
 post paradise tuam; totum cernentibus horret
 utque hominum mos est, plus, quod cessavit, amatur.
 Angustatur humus strictumque gementibus orbem
 terrarum finis non cernitur et tamen instat. 205
 Squalet et ipse dies, causantur sole sub ipso
 subductam lucem, caelo suspensa remoto
 astra gemunt tactusque prius vix cernitur axis.

The passage was evidently written with the corresponding passages in the *Alethia* in mind. The phrase "celeri perlustrant omnia cursu"

³⁰ In addition to the parallels in construction discussed in this paragraph, note also the verbal reminiscence *maiore sereno* (2. 533 = 2. 19; cf. Homey, [above, note 4], p. 50, note 3).

³¹ I quote from the edition of Rudolf Peiper, *Alcimi Ecdicii Aviti Viennensis episcopi Opera quae supersunt, Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi*, 6. 2 (Berlin 1883).

recalls *Alethia* 2. 531 “cupido raptim perlustrans omnia visu”³² and the apostrophe of Paradise (3. 202) is paralleled by *Alethia* 2. 24–26 in an identical context. But, unlike the earlier poet, Avitus describes the new environment in favorable terms (199–200).³³ It is only by contrast with Paradise that it seems ugly. The comparison Avitus introduces is based on similarity not opposition. In a manner analogous to the *argumentum a minore* the beauty of Paradise is amplified by comparison with an ideal landscape (199–200), which yet seems mean after the first parents’ former existence (201–203).³⁴

The comparison then shifts ground to one based on opposition (204–208). The new and old environments are now compared, not as in the *Alethia*, by means of successive descriptions, but in a single description of the new environment, which yet refers allusively to the former (*angustatur . . . strictum . . . subductam . . . remoto . . . tactusque prius*). We have seen that it is characteristic of first sighting themes in the *Alethia* for an element of subjective reminiscence to be present in the description of the former environment. This subjectivity extends in Avitus to the description of the new world outside Paradise. The reader is already alerted to the fact that the spectators’ impression of their new environment does not correspond to objective reality by the contrast between vv. 199–200 and “*Illis foeda tamen . . . putatur*” (201). This theme is picked up and developed in the second

³² Salvatore Costanza, *Avitiana I: I modelli epici del “De spiritalis historiae gestis”* (Messina 1968), p. 81, compares Silius Italicus 2. 248–49 “*cursum raptim . . . membra/et celeri fugiens perlustrat moenia planta.*” Hovingh on *Alethia* 2. 531 cites Virgil, *Aen.* IV. 607, *omnia lustras*, VI. 887, *omnia lustrant*; Avienus, *Arat.* 27, *omnia lustrans*; Claudian, *VI Cons. Hon.* 412, *omnia lustrat*; *In Rufin.* 2. 496–97, *visu . . . /lustrat*; Ovid, *Met.* VII. 336, *omnia visu*; and Statius, *Theb.* V. 546–47, *omnia visu /lustrat*. Two further passages from the *Achilleis* of Statius may be compared: I. 126, “*lustrat Thetis omnia visu,*” and I. 742, “*interea visu perlustrat Ulixes.*” In the light of these many parallels it may seem rash to suppose a reminiscence of the *Alethia* in the passage of the *De spiritalis historiae gestis*. The thematic similarity between the two passages, however, lends some credibility to this suggestion. I have argued elsewhere (*Biblical Epic*, pp. 102–104, 123 and 218) that Avitus was influenced in the choice and treatment of his subject by the *Alethia*.

³³ The description is perhaps somewhat in conflict with that contained in God’s malediction of Adam (3. 157–66)—in spirit if not in letter. The former passage, however, concerns the earth’s suitability for cultivation, the latter its immediate appearance.

³⁴ For this form of amplification by comparison see Quintilian VIII. 4. 9, quoted above. Quintilian maintains a distinction between this and the *argumentum a minore*, although the distinction seems to lie in function rather than thought (VIII. 4. 12, “*Illic enim probatio petitur, hic amplificatio*”). For the comparison *a minore* used to arouse *pathos* see Macrobius, *Sat.* IV. 6. 1, “*nempe cum aliquid proponitur quod per se magnum sit, deinde minus esse ostenditur quam illud quod volumus augeri, sine dubio infinita miseratio movetur.*”

half of the passage. On the one hand, the limit of the earth is not seen, yet seems to press in on the first parents (204–205); on the other hand, the heavens are hardly visible (206–208), although the world here being described is that of everyday human existence in which, as the reader knows, the heavens are clearly visible. Avitus emphasizes that the picture of the new environment contained in lines 204–208 is not based on visual observation but on the psychological reaction of the first parents. Their mental state is mirrored in their sense of oppression at the shrinking of earth's confines (204–205) and their sense of alienation at the removal of the heavens (206–208). As in the *Alethia*, the narrative ethopoeia reflects the emotions of the first parents (cf. *gementibus . . . causantur . . . gemunt*).³⁵ But Avitus is not simply content to use objective description of the new environment as a counterpoint to the first parents' emotions. Rather the description itself is distorted by and thereby subjectively embodies the emotions. Here, still more than in the *Alethia*, we might invoke the notion of man as the *contemplator mundi/dei*; man's sin has led to his expulsion from Paradise and consequent alienation from the universe. He no longer sees the world correctly. But the theme of man's relationship to nature is an important one throughout the *De spiritalis historiae gestis* and goes beyond the single idea of man as the *contemplator mundi*.³⁶

The last passage to be discussed is Dracontius, *Laudes Dei* 1. 417–26.³⁷

Mirata diem, discedere solem
nec lucem remeare putat terrena propago
solanturque graves lunari luce tenebras,
sidera cuncta notant caelo radiare sereno. 420
Ast ubi purpureo surgentem ex aequore cernunt
luciferum vibrare iubar flammisque ciere
et reducem super astra diem de sole rubente,
mox revocata fovent hesterna in gaudia mentes;

³⁵ Avitus makes little attempt to avoid verbal repetitions of the form *gementibus* (204) . . . *gemunt* (208); cf. in the present passage *cernentibus* (202), *cernitur* (205), *cernitur* (208). The verb *causor* in the sense of *conqueror* is confined to late Latin.

³⁶ Man's relationship to nature is at the center of Books 4 and 5, as it is of 1–3. In each of the last two books human sinfulness precipitates a natural catastrophe, the Flood and the drowning of the Egyptians in the Red Sea.

³⁷ I follow the text of Friedrich Vollmer, *Dracontii De Laudibus Dei . . . , Poetae Latini Minores* 5 (Leipzig 1914), which differs from his earlier text in the *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi*, 14 (Berlin 1905), only in the spelling *luciferum* for *Luciferum*. The edition of Francesco Corsaro, *De laudibus dei libri tres* (Catania 1962), has not been available to me.

temporis esse vices noscentes luce diurna
coeperunt sperare dies, ridere tenebras.

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The episode has no sanction in the biblical text. Dracontius alone of the biblical poets thinks to describe Adam and Eve's reaction to the first nightfall. Here there are not one, but two comparisons involved, both between contrasting environments. The first is between the daylight and night (417–20), the second between night, as described in lines 417–20, and the new dawn (421–23). Dracontius thus introduces temporal progression into the first sighting theme, which had been treated statically by Claudius Marius Victorius and Avitus. The progression is a cyclical one (from light to darkness to light) which is reflected in the emotions of the first parents (424–26).

More detailed analysis will illustrate how Dracontius manipulates a standard rhetorical theme to serve his Christian purpose. By transposing the creation of Eve to the sixth day (360–401), the poet has legitimized the assumption that a day passed between the creation of the first parents and the temptation and Fall. Rather than simply using a formula of time to indicate the passing of the day, Dracontius employs poetic idiom and reminiscence to describe nightfall and the coming of a new dawn. Line 420, as Vollmer notes, is a conflation of two lines of Virgil: *Aen.* III. 515 "sidera cuncta notat tacito labentia caelo" and III. 518 "cuncta videt caelo constare sereno." The description of dawn is a typical poetic periphrasis, with its reference to the morning star (*luciferum*), synonymic amplification (*vibrare iubar flammisque ciere*) and imperfect tricolon (422–23; the construction is varied in the final member).³⁸ The successive verbs of emotion and perception (*putat* [sc. *propago*], 418; *solantur*, 419; *notant*, 420; *cernunt*, 421; *fovent*, 424) emphasize, however, that the sequence of events is seen through the eyes of the first parents. There are, in fact, two parallel sequences described in this passage: in the natural world from light to darkness to light again; and in the emotions of the first parents from wonder to despair (relieved, it is true, by the light of the moon and stars, but note the emotive word *graves*) to confident rejoicing. The interconnection between the two processes is made clear in the final line (426, "sperare dies, ridere tenebras"), which not only ends the passage in epigrammatic form (isocolon with antithesis), but also recalls the beginning of the section ("mirata diem,

³⁸ For references to the rising and setting of stars and other heavenly bodies in such poetic periphrases of time see Quintilian 1. 4. 4, "qui (sc. poetae) . . . totiens ortu occasuque signorum in declarandis temporibus utuntur." The association of *iubar* with the morning star is traditional, going back to Ennius, *Ann.* 559 (Warmington; cf. *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae* 7.2: 571. 80–84 and 572. 18–30).

discedere solem") in rhythm and vocabulary.³⁹ The return of daylight can now be confidently expected when night falls; darkness is no longer an object of dread (*graves . . . tenebras*, 419), but of scorn (*ridere tenebras*, 426). Smolak, in an article on the hexaemeron paraphrase in Dracontius' *Laudes Dei*,⁴⁰ rightly detects Christian light symbolism in this passage. The dispelling of darkness by light always had soteriological connotations for a Christian reader. Dracontius shapes the whole episode round the antithesis between light and darkness. By emphasizing the first parents' reaction to the alternation of light and dark, and the eventual triumph of light, he elaborates the passage into a vignette of Christian edification.

The passages cited from the Old Testament paraphrase illustrate the interplay in the biblical epic between Christian patterns of thought and traditional rhetorical modes of expression. The first sighting theme, derived from the school exercise of ethopoeia, is employed by three Old Testament poets to give expression to Christian emotion. Each passage proceeds by comparison, a technique that, as we have seen, is characteristic of this theme. But, if the procedures are traditional, the passages depend for their unity on characteristically Christian thought and feeling. The contrasts between Paradise and the world outside Paradise, between the world before and after the Flood or between night and day already carry a strong emotional connotation for the reader, which each poet tries to direct and enhance by means of modes of expression derived from the pagan schools. Such a complex relationship between Christianity and the classical tradition is characteristic of much of the biblical poetry of late antiquity. To dismiss the poems on the grounds of the irreconcilable conflict between Christian content and classical form is to dismiss from the very start what the biblical poets have attempted to achieve. As I hope will be clear, an appreciation of the contributions made to these poems by the two cultural traditions is likely to lead to a more nuanced view of the biblical epic as a whole and a readiness to admit the possibility of something other than conflict between the

³⁹ Both lines contain a weak third-foot caesura preceding the word *dies/diem*. In both the penultimate word is an infinitive, though of different metrical pattern.

⁴⁰ Smolak, "Die Stellung" (above, note 1), p. 393. For light symbolism in Christian Latin poetry, see Herzog, *Die allegorische Dichtkunst des Prudentius*, Zetemata 42 (Munich 1966), pp. 52-84, and *Die Biblepik* (above, note 1), pp. 139-40. For the symbolic value of the dispelling of night by the light of day see Tertullian, *Res. Carn.* 12, with the comments of Christian Gnllka, "Die Natursymbolik in den Tagesliedern des Prudentius," in *Pietas: Festschrift für Bernhard Kötling* (Münster Westfalen 1980), pp. 414-15. Lucretius V. 973-81 presupposes a theory that primitive men feared day might not return when night fell (cf. Manilius, 169, Statius, *Theb.* IV. 282-83).

two traditions. No one should expect an aesthetic equivalent of the biblical text; that, given the methods used, would be impossible. But neither should the biblical poems be dismissed simply as rhetorical exercises whose subject happens to be biblical; that would be radically to underestimate the contribution to the poetry of Christian thought and feeling aroused by the biblical text to be paraphrased.

Wesleyan University

APPENDIX

Graduate Studies in Classics Have They a Future?*

This topic is propounded for your consideration *existentially*, as part of a personal puzzlement, and not simply as an abstract thesis suggested by a disinterested love of "truth." This confession may perhaps justify a personal and existential beginning.

My first serious training in Classics was at Exeter College, Oxford. As is well documented, Oxford in the latter half of the nineteenth century was divided by a great debate. The protagonists were Mark Pattison, Rector of Lincoln College, and Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol. Pattison had noted the enormous strides that were being made in contemporary Germany by a university system which set a premium on the seminar, on research papers, on publications, on science. Jowett, the head of a famous and influential College, saw the aim of education as the equipping of soldiers, statesmen, civil servants to run Britain and the Empire. To that task Pattison's German model had, he believed, little relevance. His Oxford contemporaries agreed with him. It took the Great War of 1914-18 with all its traumas, and ultimately the arrival in Oxford of Eduard Fraenkel, to alter old ideas about the place of the Classics in the education of a gentleman.

Old ideas die hard, especially in Oxford. In a recent conversation, the new Kennedy Professor of Latin at Cambridge, formerly Fellow

* This paper was presented by the Editor in his capacity as Chairman of the Midwest Conference of Classics Chairmen to the annual meeting of the Conference at Northwestern University in October 1984. The privately expressed approval of some scholars, and the imminent appearance of a Latin translation by Glareanus in *Hermes Americanus*, suggested that the publication of a revised version of the original might be timely.

of Exeter College, Oxford, reminded me that he was probably the last of the "undoctored" generation of dons who went straight into College fellowships with nothing more than their B. A. degrees, and who acquired any more specific and technical training for their profession "on the job." Let it be freely admitted that many of them acquired it very handsomely!

American education never quite made the mistake that Oxford made, in spite of its often markedly Anglophile nature. Basil Gildersleeve is so clearly the product of German discipline. So is the systematic thoroughness of Goodwin's *Moods and Tenses*, even the old Lewis and Short, all the outgrowth of the best interaction between American energy and German guidance. The protracted seminar, the lengthy, footnoted term paper, the "publish or be damned" mentality: these are among the first shocks administered to the migrant from the British to the American campus. Of course, as one looks at the awful record of British economic incompetence since 1945 and indeed since Pattison's day, this American seriousness is salutary and necessary. Paradoxically, I now want to ask if it is going to destroy the Classics.

Classical studies are in the last resort concerned with the understanding of the literatures of Greece and Rome. I make this anodyne statement because I have heard a colleague murmur in approval of someone that he was "thoroughly acquainted with the literature," when in fact what he meant was that someone had read a lot of articles about a particular aspect of one author. But even this anodyne statement carries with it some revolutionary implications. It means, for example, that Classics is not primarily archeology, or even the study of Greco-Roman civilization, except insofar as both these occupations offer sidelights on the literatures, on the authors. My anodyne statement certainly means that codicology, paleography, textual criticism and all the rest of that invaluable discipline of *ekdosis* are ancillary to the understanding of the texts. It takes a profound awareness of literary possibilities to justify a single conjecture in a major author by this time. The first rule is: leave the transmitted text alone until you understand it!

I want now to advance a second anodyne statement. This one I justify (as I could have justified my first) by reference to the Alexandrian Museum. If we think of the first and even second generations of Alexandrian scholars—Philetas, Callimachus, Apollonius of Rhodes, Eratosthenes—the amazing thing is that so many of them were poets as well as scholars. Callimachus indeed took issue even with Plato, and said that he was incapable of judging poetry. We grasp something of his views on Pindar by studying the opening of the third book of

the *Aetia*. By studying the end of the *Argonautica* we know where Apollonius thought the *Odyssey* ended. For these scholar-poets, learning was the handmaid of literary creativity.

A vastly important corollary follows from the belief evinced by these early Alexandrians that scholarship and creativity are not to be divorced. This is that the evidence of poets about what authors mean is just as important as the evidence of more formal literary history and scholarship. Where poetic genius is transcendent, the evidence is correspondingly superior. The greatest commentator on Virgil is Dante, the greatest commentator on Ovid—Shakespeare. Dante's *Comedy* is a paradoxical work to have emerged from the "searching" of the *Aeneid* to which its author refers. It is paradoxical because, as scholars, we bring certain expectations about epic to high and continued poetry which Dante's oddly named *Comedy* flouts. But Dante quite decidedly rejected conventional expectations when he declined Giovanni del Virgilio's invitation to write a conventional eulogistic epic, and declined it in an *Eclogue*. Poor fellow, he evidently had not read K. Ziegler's *Das hellenistische Epos* might be one rejoinder, for then he would have understood what he was missing. Another rejoinder might be that, when he used an *Eclogue* to reject conventional epic, he was being faithful to the truest essence of the Virgilian tradition by repeating the pattern of Virgil's own sixth *Eclogue*. And when he wrote a *Comedy*, with its metamorphoses, its *communia verba*, its lyricism, its topsy-turvy world, its prophetic time, its vatic indignation, its visionary and alogical glories, perhaps he was telling us something about the understanding of the *Aeneid* which was missing from the handbooks of scholars and officially constituted defenders of tradition such as Vida or J. C. Scaliger, who praise Virgil's poem for its splendid diction and ideal characters, letting enthusiasm blur judgment. There would not have been need for R. Heinze's *Virgils epische Technik* which, elementary though it is, marks an epoch in the return to grasping what Virgil did, if Latinists had read more Dante, more Milton.

It can be seen that I am pleading for a view of classical study which cannot be limited by arbitrary dates like 410 or even 1453. Every new author of merit affects the way in which the existing canon of authors is perceived, since his novelty adds a fresh dimension to understanding. There is a continuous work of criticism of the "Classics" going on therefore, but it is not by professional scholars. Only a classical training which is a humanistic training will open our eyes and ears to this perpetual dialogue.

Professional scholars sometimes behave as if every item of information about the ancient world were of equal importance. The only

thing is to define an area of expertise so far unexplored by the majority, so that one need not fear challenge or anticipation. This is quite mistaken. We are not limiting our view of antiquity when we spend our time on its major authors, for what makes them major is precisely their imaginative range. The energy given over to Corippus or Flavius Merobaudes is only worthwhile if it can be shown how these two poets illustrate and respond to a continuing tradition. Otherwise, the class would be infinitely better employed reading Boccaccio or Ariosto.

It follows that a definition of classical scholarship is needed which does justice to the Alexandrian ideal of the scholar-poet. A large part of our audience comes these days from an educational background which is anti-foreign. At a recent conference on "The International Dimension of the University" a speaker explained how the U. S. Foreign Service washes out any quirky concern with alien cultures which its recruits may have picked up. A Ph. D. in Turkish, we were told, who has the luck to get a job with the Service, soon finds out that, if he is to attract attention and promotion, he must be a regular golf-playing, partying citizen. After a few years his knowledge of Turkish is growing pretty dim. Then he is ready to move up. Eventually, he hardly remembers where Turkey is. Then he is really hot.

Another speaker remarked that big corporations rarely find it worth their while to hire American experts, say, in Arabic. The Corporation is not interested in Arabic *per se*, only in business prospects. If there is any tiresome insistence on the local language, a local hiring will be made. The Corporation is content to be interpreted to the native culture always by foreigners, through foreign eyes.

In that case, I really can't see the point of the kind of scholarship which fixes attention on *minutiae* and refuses any sort of concession to contemporary, English-speaking society. First of all, such an attitude ill equips us for teaching courses to undergraduates who are heading towards jobs that will be anything but academic, and whose eyes are set on professional goals. If we know why we are studying Latin and Greek, we can easily give an account of our stewardship. If we are only interested in settling hoti's business, we shall be tongue-tied on the podium. I have distantly heard of departments that carry professors like this, around whom the rest of the faculty must tiptoe because they are engaged in serious research, and must not be interrupted by the vulgar concerns of students from agriculture or engineering. I am not sure it is fair to the rest of the faculty, and

not sure either how much chance younger academics with similar attitudes have of getting jobs in this day and age.

I'm not even sure that what such people do is "serious research." Does "serious" mean "divorced from the concerns of contemporary men and women"? The anti-foreign bias of which I spoke presumably arises from just such a perception of other cultures, that they and those interested in them are irrelevant to the way we live here. Should we train our students to reinforce that perception? Won't it eventually have dire consequences in State Legislatures?

Such an attitude clearly ill equips our students for jobs outside the traditional academic fields. The former Headmaster of Eton, Dean C. A. Alington, once defended the study of the Classics on the grounds that, without them, we have no adequate knowledge of what men have done and thought and suffered. But how many seminars on Thucydides take the imparting of that kind of moral awareness as their aim? How quickly do we get bogged down in the Tribute Lists and the topography of Syracuse! Surely those things are important, but only as ancillaries to the larger vision, the record of human idealism, folly, ambition, greed, endurance. But a student who has learned not to be afraid of wrestling with Thucydides' contorted Greek, who is not surprised by human behavior either for good or ill, who knows the value of measuring difficulties before an enterprise is under way, and who believes that a good rule is to get there firstest with the mostest, who has suffered in the stone quarries with the Athenian captives and has made up his mind not to add to the sum of human misery by maltreating his colleagues and his clients: such a recruit might be treasured by a Corporation that had not the slightest interest in the Classics in themselves. And a student who thought of the Classics as an introduction to human behavior might not regard himself as leaving his proper sphere if he were to enter the Corporation's service.

I want to follow therefore the Socratic maxim of going where the argument leads. Nobody more than I curled his lip with greater disdain of those old academic fogies who in our day still bleated about the true, the good and the beautiful. What an amazing contrast to their datedness was afforded by the bustling Eduard Fraenkel, who at Corpus began lecturing while still outside in the corridor, who knew all the answers to all the questions, who poured scorn on his adversaries, who once said to a brilliant undergraduate: "Mr. X, you have read books of which most of the dons here have not even heard the names." But in my old age I no longer see the question in such black and white terms!

Fraenkel himself, of course, was much given to quoting Petrarch

or Shakespeare to illustrate a point, and his insomnia was regularly solaced by reading Dante. His dogmatism in the lecture-room was largely inspired by his feeling that it really mattered what a particular passage meant. It would be utterly unfair to align him with the representatives of "pure" scholarship, to whom every last paring of Augustus' fingernails is as valuable as his views on poetry. What he wanted, like his master Wilamowitz, was an *informed* commitment to classical literature, but still a commitment.

It was from another, not German but German-trained professor (and Fellow of Exeter College), Constantine Trypanis, that I first heard the name of Werner Jaeger and his theory of the "Third Humanism." Jaeger wrote at a time when Germany was reeling under the effects of the defeat of 1918 and the disappearance of the monarchy. He believed that classical studies should have an effect on public behavior, even on public policy. Although he went into exile soon after Hitler's accession, he has been criticized as some sort of embryo Nazi. But there is a nucleus of truth in his theory that classical studies cannot be content with being a matter of mere intellectual curiosity. When we read about the fate of Achilles or Oedipus, we will be reading utterly differently from the Greeks themselves if all that happens is that we get an idea for an article. Plato did not expel the poets from his Republic because they inspired notes in *Classical Philology*! I say this of course with all due respect.

Perhaps it is here that we can most fruitfully reconcile the two opposing poles, as they have sometimes seemed, of *Wissenschaft* and *humanitas*. The greatest scholars have certainly been the masters of a learning which puts one to shame. But they have not typically deployed that learning on trivialities. I am thinking of someone like Eduard Norden, or, in a somewhat different area, Leo Spitzer or E. R. Curtius. In his commentary on the sixth book of the *Aeneid*, Norden at times translates bits of Virgil into Greek verse to make his point. Even Fraenkel sent an article to Housman preceded by some quite elegant Greek elegiacs. There is a critical moment at which scholar and poet coalesce. Callimachus described it as an encounter with Apollo. Do our students feel that we have encountered, and been changed by, Apollo? Are they changed in their turn? Do they think of Classics, thanks to our example, not just as *litterae*, but as *litterae humaniores*?

As with most wars, we can in the end see that the issues are not quite so clear-cut as my original account of the debate between Pattison and Jowett may have suggested. Pattison was right to call attention to the superior role of the German system in a world where economic empires would replace those won by the sword. Jowett

however was not wrong when he urged that Classics of all disciplines could never become merely another area of research, along with Home Economics or Veterinary Science. The classicist should be someone who understands where our civilization came from and what it is all about; but what it is all about *now*, not what it was all about in an age long dead. It seems to me that a classicist trained to be alert to this double dimension will both be able to take his place in the classroom in front of students who are fully aware of the modern world (at least in their own estimation), but not of any other, for he will have some allegiance to both: and to find a job in industry or business, because he will be able to relate in a human way to those around him, thanks to his training as a humanist.

I also think that, even in pure scholarship, such a classicist will make more progress in understanding than his blinkered rivals. Here, I would like to cite once again a passage from Machiavelli:

When evening comes, I return home and enter my writing-room. At the door I take off these everyday clothes, full of mud and filth, and dress in royal, courtly garments. Clad fittingly, I enter the ancient courts of the men of old, and there find a kindly welcome. There I feed on that food which alone is mine, and for which I was born. There I am not ashamed to converse with them, and to ask the reasons for their actions. And they, in their humanity, give me answer, and for four hours I do not feel any vexation, I forget every toil, I do not fear poverty, I lose my dread of death, I transform myself entirely into them.

(Letter to F. Vettori, December 1513).

Machiavelli was a philosopher, historian and poet. He has given an adjective to most modern languages, and perhaps part of his fruitful dialogue with the ancients was his familiarity with their language. He asked the right questions because, inspired by *umanità*, he wasn't continually glancing at his watch and the right-hand page of his Loeb. And again, I don't mean to deny that Renaissance authors used translations. But the unerring judgment with which even a genius who was no scholar, William Shakespeare, seized on the essence of the classical experience in order to reflect it back in his ideas and language suggests that these children of a humanistic age meant something different by "reading" a text from the hasty perusal which is too often for the modern scholar the preliminary to getting down to the real meat of the encounter, the interpretative article which tells the rest of us what to think. I don't know what is going to happen to the endless articles poured out in our day about this small point and that. I sometimes wonder what they have to do with humane education.

But what concrete proposals stem from all this? The first is that we should revive a German tradition which has been curiously neglected in the Midwest, and that is the peregrination of students from campus to campus in search of outstanding teachers. A system should be devised which permits the exchange of graduate students between Classics Programs, so that, without losing credit or ultimate allegiance to their home Departments, students who are unencumbered by family ties can know what is being offered in other Universities and take advantage of it in some way that will mean no extra financial burden. It is not a question of encouraging transfers or poaching, simply a matter of broadening horizons.

Secondly, areas of research should always be treated within the larger context of civilization and its traditions. We should take our commitment to modern foreign languages seriously. More basically, we should ask our students to demonstrate fluency with Latin and Greek, not just constipated sluggishness and inaccuracy. I believe I heard that some classical journals refuse to publish articles in Latin. It is outrageous. In the age of the taperecorder there is a golden opportunity to put back the aural/oral dimension of classical literature which is disastrously missing from some of our commentaries. Where are the plays which Renaissance students would have put on in the original? No doubt there were some unintentionally hilarious moments. But at the end of it, the more gifted at least could certainly write very convincing Latin!

Thirdly, collaboration with sister departments on campus should be the norm. Perhaps as a result of this some areas of purely classical research interest will lie neglected. I don't think this is very important in a time when, if we don't do something, all areas of classical research may lie neglected. Many classicists bring very poor critical principles to bear on the texts they read, so that one has to keep re-establishing the point, for example, that a poetic and a real "I" are not necessarily the same, or that consistency is not necessarily as important a virtue as persuasiveness, or that the author's intention is his work of art, and not something which he may or may not have said to his barber. Do we take kindly to the idea that a seminar in the English Department might be a useful introduction to a course in Latin elegy?

One of the sister departments with which communication has been shamefully neglected in traditional views of classical education is Religious Studies. Secular Greek scholarship can facilitate the understanding of the New Testament, for example, in the appreciation of rhythms (what the Formalists call "sound gesture") and subtle tense usages. And awareness of religious vocabulary can do much to illumine what so-called pagan authors are trying to say: for example, when

they use "weight" as a synonym for "glory," or employ the notion, so essential to the Roman way of looking at the world, of metamorphosis, of the present as bigger and better than the past. Lucan makes Caesar test the will of heaven by putting out to sea in Amyclas' boat in the teeth of several gales. He makes him dine at the scene of Pharsalia in view of his defeated foes. These are *religious* ideas. Thucydides says that the bravado of the Athenian fleet about to leave for Sicily filled spectators with *thambos*. This word is also religious. An increasingly secular age like ours is in danger of losing a whole dimension from the picture which the ancient world presents.

Another point of contact between classical study and the most pressing contemporary reality is Arabic. A book like *The Genius of Arab Civilization* (MIT Press, 2nd edn. 1982) opens one's eyes to the zeal with which Arab scholars assimilated and advanced Greek mathematics, astronomy, medicine, philosophy, in spite of the difference of language. When I was standing in the little cathedral square of Syracuse a year or two ago, outside a church which still rests on the pillars of a Greek temple, our guide gestured towards the Archbishop's palace and remarked that the Library was crammed with unread Arabic manuscripts. As late as the eighteenth century the classical languages were Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic. What did the nineteenth century do to us?

Satis superque. My title asked: will graduate studies in Classics survive? I hope not, if we mean by that the continuance of the worst features of the present. Will *litterae humaniores* survive? We must bend our energies to the task of ensuring that they do, for without them nothing is left.

CORRIGENDA

The following list of *errata* has been supplied by Professor Hermann Funke to his article, "Zu Claudians Invektive gegen Rufin," *ICS IX* (1983), pp. 91-109:

- p. 103, line 3: for **vor** read **von**
- p. 103, line 9: for **Goter** read **Goten**
- p. 103, line 16: for **Ludianaffäre** read **Lucianaffäre**
- p. 106, line 12: for **verfasste** read **veranlasste**
- p. 106, line 16: for **diesem** read **dessen**
- p. 106, line 21: for **zur** read **zum**
- p. 107, line 15: for **von** read **vor**





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*Patet omnibus veritas; nondum est occupata;
multum ex illa etiam futuris relictum est.
Sen. Epp. 33. 11*

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Contributions should be addressed to:

The Editor,
Illinois Classical Studies,
Department of the Classics,
4072 Foreign Languages Building,
707 South Mathews Avenue,
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I

Pindar and Callimachus

J. K. NEWMAN

This immensely important topic touches at least three themes: one is Pindar's place in literary history, the second is the real nature of Callimachus' literary ambition, and the third is the literary tradition that reached the Romans from Alexandria.

I

Pindar's Muse has often found herself in uncongenial company. The difficulties of his supposedly sublime language and of a dialect which scholars like to term "Doric," the allusiveness, the apparently casual and inconsequential interjections, the datedness of the athletic ideal—all these features have secured his poems entry to a literary limbo which they have shared with dreary official manifestos or rhapsodic gush. Readers of Lebrun or Tennyson will understand the point.¹

A recent study has argued that a truer appreciation of Pindar's art associates the odes with the spirit of Comus, carnival.² A victory was an occasion for family and civic rejoicing. Pindar's patrons had done something public. Their reward was public recognition. In Greek society, this recognition took predetermined forms. It is on these forms that Pindar built. He spells this out quite clearly by his

¹ The "poetic failure" of other Pindaric experiments by Dorat and Ronsard is noted by R. R. Bolgar, *The Classical Heritage* (repr. New York 1964), pp. 323 ff. The humanist tradition in Germany is discussed by T. Gelzer in "Pindarverständnis und Pindarübersetzung im deutschen Sprachbereich vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert," *Geschichte des Textverständnisses am Beispiel von Pindar und Horaz*, Wolfenbütteler Forschungen 12, ed. Walther Killy (Munich 1981); cf. p. 97 (Lonicer).

² J. K. Newman, F. S. Newman, *Pindar's Art: Its Tradition and Aims* (Hildesheim-Munich-Zürich 1984), pp. 38 ff., 235 ff.

continual use of the $\alpha\omega\mu$ - root. In particular, the programmatic declaration in *Olympian* 3 (vv. 4–9) unites both komic and verbal aspects of the poet's art as the most immediately recoverable parts of the garland that constitutes his song.

Laughter may be uncomfortably close to tears. The art of our age has made us familiar with the melancholy clown (Picasso, Rouault). Franz Dornseiff speaks of Pindar, along with Job, and another "comic" author, Dante, as one of the "great outsiders" of civilization.³ If this is true, it is apparent that it is simply another way of saying that Pindar felt the isolation imposed on any artist with particular sensitivity, and Dornseiff's list is proof that, though prophets may lack honor, they do not lack influence. In Pindar's case however there has been a tendency to associate what has been seen as his outsider status with a belief in his marginal relevance to the mainstream of Greek poetry, and this in turn implies that from the broad current of the European tradition he is hardly visible.⁴

Such a view could be shown to be wrong by a simple enumeration of references to Pindar in later centuries. Callimachus tried to revive precisely the Pindaric epinician. Virgil and Horace imitated him. The Augustan elegists borrowed from his imagery. St. Gregory Nazianzen still remembers a tag.⁵ But the essence of Pindaric influence does not lie in externals. Pindar is important because, with consummate genius, he exploited the personal art of the lyric at the beginning of a period when the person was becoming all-important. He has classical rank because he canonized a class.

This argument is contradicted by the widely held modern notion that Pindar, with Simonides and Bacchylides, represents a style of public, choral lyric in the fifth century which must be sharply distinguished from the older private and personal monody of poets like Sappho and Alcaeus. Horace perhaps lends color to some such distinction. His master is Alcaeus, while Pindar stands at the unattain-

³ *Pindars Stil* (Berlin 1921), p. 73.

⁴ Compare the tone of Wilamowitz' "Abschluss": *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922), pp. 445 ff. The tendency to associate Pindar with the faded poetry of the eighteenth century (the "Theban eagle" and so on) attests the same point. In fact, Pindar never refers to himself as an eagle: *Pindar's Art* (above, note 2), p. 114, note 4. On the general question of Pindaric influence, cf. D. S. Carne-Ross, *Pindar* (New Haven 1985).

⁵ For Pindar and Gregory Nazianzen see *Anth. Pal.* VIII. 220. At *Anth. Pal.* IX. 175 Palladas sells both Pindar and Callimachus. The two are associated again by Tertullian, *de Corona* 7. When the first modern edition of Pindar appeared at Venice in 1513, the two poets were again bound together. Cf. Milton's "Those magnifick Odes and Hymns, wherein Pindarus and Callimachus are in most things worthy . . ." (*The Reason of Church Government urg'd against Prelaty*, 1641).

able limit. But, even in Horace, the distinction is not to be pressed. Horace does in fact pindarize, and Alcaeus cannot be so private if he serves as a model for the Roman freedman's son promoted to vatic dignity. In the context of more general literary history, if it is foolish to ignore the conventions that overlie the supposedly private feelings of Sappho, it is equally foolish to concentrate on the conventions found in Pindar to the exclusion of the private feelings which may be supposed in him also. A man looks at life differently from a woman, but that is hardly the basis for a demarcation between two types of lyric.⁶ All these poets took pre-literary forms and interpreted them in literature.

Pindar has been dismissed as no great thinker, even though his vocabulary at least shows traces of the revolution taking place in his day. Study shows that a number of themes constantly recur in the odes: god and man; achievement and idleness; individual, family, city; light and darkness; fame and obscurity; poet and posterity; time and eternity. This is no token of intellectual poverty. Some of the greatest writers have composed essentially the same work all their lives. But it is the token of polar thinking, and polar thinking is the hallmark of "pathetic" structure.⁷ Here lies the secret of Pindar's classical supremacy. Because he was an observer at the feast, because he clung to a belief in the testing value of action rather than wordy debate, because his art was threatened with extinction by social and other changes, his poetry received an emotional impulse which drove it to the heights, and paradoxically made it the vehicle of the very individualism it sought to combat.

The tendency of the human heart to oscillate between contrasting extremes under emotional stress scarcely needs confirmation. At a

⁶ The "personal" beginning to every kind of poetry is always what F. Schleiermacher calls its *Keimentschluss*: *Pindar's Art* (above, note 2), pp. 13 and 17. Obviously the distinction between monody and chorody, whatever its intrinsic worth, had no influence on the formation of the Alexandrian canon of "Pindarus novemque lyrici." N. S. Greenbaum remarks in *Yazyk drevnegrecheskoy khorovoy liriki (Pindar)* (Kishinev 1973), p. 92, that the language of Pindar's epinicians in particular seems to make more use of Aeolic elements than his other poems, i.e. it latches onto the so-called personal tradition.

⁷ The term is S. M. Eisenstein's: e.g. *Izbrannye Proizvedeniya III* (Moscow 1964), pp. 61–62. Compare Dornseiff's phrase "Die grossen Pathetiker wie Pindar" (*Pindars Stil*, p. 23) and his "polare Ausdrucksweise" (p. 102 and note 1). See further E. Thummer, *Pindar: Die Isthmischen Gedichte I* (Heidelberg 1968), pp. 135–137 and 145 ff., "Der Kontrast"; A. Köhnken, *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar* (Berlin–New York 1971), Index, s. v. "Kontrast und Antithese"; and in general H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich 1969³), Index, p. 603, "Denken und Empfinden in Gegensätzen."

certain stage of oscillation, a phenomenon occurs which has been variously described as a *catharsis*, a *Durchbruch* or "breakthrough," a "leap into another dimension." The characteristic feature of the agitated and antithetical language in which all this finds expression is its desire to communicate feeling rather than the bald information that would satisfy cold curiosity. Such speech is in a hurry (*Semper ad eventum festinat* in Horace's phrase). What it says therefore will be selected as well as polarized; just enough will be expressed to lead up to the breakthrough, which will also be a break-off. The poet will leave his emotionally charged picture before our imagination as he draws out in *gnomai* its religious significance, as he perhaps begins to speak of his own role or that of his patrons.⁸ The explanation is that, once he has established the effect that he sought, he can confidently leave his audience to elaborate its details, indeed he must allow something for them to do in this way if they are to be involved with his poetry. A "bitty," staccato, impressionistic manner, far from being a defect, is absolutely basic to this type of writing.⁹

The leap into another dimension will not however be a simple matter of interrupting the flow of narrative. It is a term that applies to many levels of lyric art. At a very minor level it explains, for example, why Pindar personifies abstractions, or speaks of one sense in language appropriate to another. At a major level, it explains the poet's interest in both myth and music.

Myth is the shaky ladder by which the human climbs into eternity. Pindar's use of this device, shared with Plato, has often been appreciated but perhaps less often understood. Myth is for him not only decoration, and not only amusement. It is the evocation of a universally valid though only partially apprehended order, with which the temporal is briefly and incongruously united. This in itself makes the *Grundgedanke* of burning significance in those odes that contain a myth. Why *this* myth? And why, within the penumbra of incommensurability, *these* details?

Music is the means that raises the spoken word beyond itself into a dimension where emotion can enjoy untrammelled range. Under the pressure of emotion we repeat ourselves, since we are not primarily communicating what happened, but rather the intensity of our feelings about it. It is why repetition is music's most characteristic procedure, and why Pindar writes strophes.

⁸ A technique well described with respect to *Nemean* I by L. Illig, *Zur Form der Pindarischen Erzählung* (Berlin 1932), pp. 12 ff.

⁹ Cf. Theophrastus, quoted by Demetrius, *De Eloc.* 226: Callimachus fr. 57 Pf. (now attributed to the "Victoria Berenices").

An analysis which forgets that in Pindar the word constantly breaks through to more than spoken resonance, and doubly so where it may have been reinforced by some special effect in the music or the dance, can be no analysis at all.¹⁰ The poetry in fact consists basically of these two polarities: masses of words are deployed and articulated by an emotionally loaded traffic baton, the poet's lyre or flute. These words occur in the order of pathetic discourse, and acquire a further pathos from being sung.¹¹

No list of similarities therefore between one ode and another, whether by the same poet or someone else, can really answer the problem posed by each unique poem. The structuralist effort to find an archetypal pattern in the epinicians is legitimate. But, like all this neo-Kantianism, it runs the risk of misunderstanding its founder's doctrine. Kant believed in the epistemological function of the categories, but he also believed that, unfertilized by contact with the schemes, the categories must remain barren shells. In the tension between the universal and the particular is where the poetry lies.¹²

If we had the kind of conductor's score that Pindar prepared, it would have contained his text, plus musical annotation, plus marks of expression, dynamics and rhythm to be a guide to the presenters. Within a given ode, certain words would enjoy a particular prominence. Thematically interlaced, they would in themselves be a many-hued garland for their recipient. But they would by no means exhaust the significance of their poem. That rich context of symbol and music, image and echo, narrative and reflection, sobriety and laughter forever eludes the straining ear.

In the history of any art, tradition is an ambiguous word. Brahms is indebted to Beethoven and Bach. But who could deduce the work of any one of these masters from a study of the other two? Who could expect to find in later literature an exact replica of Pindar? But who would argue from that absence to complete absence?

Commentators both ancient and modern have been impressed by

¹⁰ See W. Mullen, *Choreia: Pindar and Dance* (Princeton 1982). He is following a line of inquiry already sketched by A. Boeckh, *Kleine Schriften* V, ed. P. Eicholtz and E. Bratuscheck (Leipzig 1871), pp. 260 and 263.

¹¹ The musical resonance of the poems, now lost (but not wholly), is especially attested by *O.* 3. 8 and *P.* 1. 2-4.

¹² This is where "topos" criticism is particularly defective. What interests us can never be merely what Pindar shares with others, but rather what makes him a unique poet, and each ode a unique poem. See the article by Yu. Tynianov in *Théorie de la littérature*, ed. T. Todorov (Paris 1965), pp. 120-37, "De l'évolution littéraire."

Pindar's apparent kinship with the epideictic orator.¹³ A far more impressive case might be made out for his resemblance to Plato.¹⁴ His relevance to poetry after his time would be this: at the moment when blandly naive, "objective" narrative technique, whether on mythical or historical themes, was becoming impossible, he offered the pattern for an emotionally charged, pathetic structure, which could support all the weight and balance of the poet's own personality. To a poetry that could no longer expect musical accompaniment, he showed how to find the lyrical overbalance into the transrational, and in particular he showed this extra dimension to the sophisticated epic.

This makes the study of Pindar's myths crucial. They are not ragged specimens of inconsequential tale-telling by a poet whose chief interests lay elsewhere. They are not incidental to literary history. They exhibit on the contrary the classical form of what is so often supposed to be post- or even anti-classical.

This was already forgotten in antiquity. The eleventh *Pythian*, for example, addressed by Pindar to a Theban victor, is a peculiarly interesting case.¹⁵ What can the bloody tale of Agamemnon's murder by his wife, who is in turn murdered by her own son, have to do with a victory in the boys' footrace? "He has elaborated the encomium well enough," remarks an ancient dominie drily, "but after that his digression is quite inappropriate to the occasion."¹⁶

This is a good example of the overlaying of the living response to Pindar's real tradition by rhetorical catchwords, not least in its failure to understand how Pindar uses the word *encomium* himself. What indeed in the first *Olympian* has the sin of Tantalus to do with Hiero's victory? What an unfortunate note to strike in a poem of celebration, and how much the poet appears conscious of his and our embarrassment! The way out of that "embarrassment," which is of course simply a poetic feint, lies in understanding that Pindar's art is essentially one of antithesis. Tantalus and Pelops are juxtaposed

¹³ A. Croiset, *La Poésie de Pindare* (Paris 1895'), pp. 158-59 (Dionysius of Halicarnassus); E. L. Bundy, *Studia Pindarica* I (Berkeley-Los Angeles 1962), p. 33.

¹⁴ E. des Places, *Pindare et Platon* (Paris 1949); E. Dönt, "Pindar und Platon," *Wiener Studien* 83 (1970), pp. 52-65; *Pindar's Art* (above, note 2), index, s. v. "Plato."

¹⁵ Cf. W. J. Slater, "Pindar's Myths: Two pragmatic explanations," in *Arktouras* (Berlin-New York 1979), pp. 63-68; F. S. Newman, "The Relevance of the Myth in Pindar's Eleventh *Pythian*," *Hellenika* 31 (1979), pp. 44-64. The poem both shows Pindar at his most "personal," and indicates in what a modified sense "personal" must be understood.

¹⁶ *Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina*, ed. A. B. Drachmann (repr. Amsterdam 1967), II, p. 257.

because life is a matter of choices, and the Tantalus myth is altered, not because Pindar really cares to censor the current version (which he presupposes), but because the version he substitutes gives him the chance to point his moral more sharply. Is there a similar juxtaposition of opposites in the eleventh *Pythian*?

There is. The murder of Agamemnon and the priestess bride of Apollo whom he has forced to serve his lust is linked with the destruction of Troy by the very periphrasis used for Cassandra, *Δαρδανίδα κόραν Πριάμου* (19). Both city and king are ultimately destroyed by sisters, Clytaemnestra and Helen. Private mischief has public consequences. It is a truth evident in the roughly contemporary second *Pythian* (30 ff.), and of which the civic body needs continual reminding.

But all individual action is not necessarily mischief. As in the first *Olympian*, there is a choice. Clytaemnestra and Helen, the wicked sisters, have brothers, Castor and Polydeuces, models of deferential self-sacrifice, as the ode emphasizes. Their mutual devotion leads them by turns to the shrine on earth where they receive the prayers of their community, and to Olympus. The blind self-seeking of Clytaemnestra led only to the shadowy shore of Acheron.

Once the essentially pathetic structure of Pindar's version of the *strenger Satz* is grasped, this ode no longer assumes a place apart in the poet's achievement. It can be predicted that he is going to use the excuse provided by the need for an exordium, whose actual contents may be quite elastic, to establish a series of motifs, in essence to deploy a number of words, some of which will be taken up again and developed as the poem proceeds. These motifs, recognized by their repetition, are what in essence the poem is about: they form its *Grundgedanke*.

They will depend for their effect on antithesis. At the opening of the eleventh *Pythian*, motifs are presented of daughters of Thebes, fair women rewarded by divine status; of Heracles; of Apollo and his prophets; of Harmony, Law and Justice; of a family proving its worth yet again by a noble deed performed for the general glory.

The myth then shatters all this with rude dissonance. A father's hearth is no longer honored. Instead, a father is butchered (*πατρώαν*, 14; *πατρός*, 17), and only a nurse keeps her upright mind. Daughters of Thebes sang in honor of the god; the daughter of Priam is slain (*κόραι*, 1; *κόραν*, 19). Family quarrels, family misdeeds were at the root of the trouble and, when great families go down in this way, the whole community loses an ideal of behavior. The *heroines* (7) of Thebes are in sharp contrast with the dying *hero* (31) Agamemnon.

The Theban shrine of Apollo and its prophetic priests are offset by the μάντις κόρα (33: cf. κόρα, 1; μαντίων, 6) whose death is directly attributed to Agamemnon and associated with the rape of Troy, fired for Helen and so robbed of its delicacy. Orestes is rescued (we return to the beginning of the story) only to continue its bloody pattern.

Taking back the introduction in this way, negating its values, the mythical narrative ("paramyth") cannot simply be concerned to tell a tale. Far from being ragged, it has an extremely formal structure (φονευομένου, 17; φοναῖς, 37), which makes it all the more surprising that its central section should be occupied, not by narrative at all, but by two rhetorical questions and the poet's reflection on them.¹⁷ What were Clytaemnestra's motives for her denial of all wifely pity to her husband? Was it the slaughter of Iphigenia by the Euripus, far from her homeland, which stung her to rouse her heavy anger? The Euripus was famous in antiquity for flowing two ways, and this story too has a double application. Agamemnon's Trojan foray began with the slaughter of his child. It ended with the slaughter of Priam's child (made into his symbolic last act). Agamemnon's dead daughter led to dead Priam, to dead Agamemnon and to Priam's dead daughter. Iphigenia/Cassandra; Agamemnon/Priam; Helen/Clytaemnestra; Castor/Polydeuces; and, it may be added, Thebes/Troy/Amyclae: the carnival motif of pairs and doubles seems particularly visible in this ode, as indeed it will be in the whole later narrative tradition, and not least in the *Aeneid*.

The second question too has a double relevance. Was it Clytaemnestra's nightly couchings that inspired her, asks the poet. But in this context Clytaemnestra was hardly the only wife to be led astray by an adulterer. Her sister Helen, who will be mentioned shortly, was just as bad, and in his reflections Pindar himself generalizes Clytaemnestra's sin in a way which has puzzled commentators who have not understood either the essential ambiguity of the undifferentiated primitive, or the paradigmatic nature of his story.

What is interesting about both questions is that they provoke a social answer (πολιται, 28) from the poet. When greatness decays, he begins, envious meanness is noisy. The line that says this in the second epode (ὁ δὲ χαμηλὰ πνέων ἄφαντον βρέμει, 30¹⁸) contrasts with τρίτον ἔπι στέφανον πατρῶαν βαλῶν in the first (v. 14), with τὰ μὲν <έν>

¹⁷ They have a parallel of course in Homer's question at the opening of the *Iliad* (v. 8), and in Virgil's at the opening of the *Aeneid* (v. 11), and this is important in the understanding of Pindar's poetic intent.

¹⁸ Contrast μέγα δὲ βρέμει of the man of power in the *Eiresione: Pindar's Art*, p. 62.

ἄρμασι καλλίνικοι πάλαι in the third (v. 46), and with σέ τε, ἄναξ Πολύδευκες, υἱοὶ θεῶν (v. 62) in the fourth. The foul breath of obscuring rumor blasts all these aspirations.

Those who believe that Victorianism was discovered in the age of Victoria will be surprised to note how clearly Pindar links this kind of moral looseness with the decline of a civic ideal. The great chieftain's family troubles, his eye for a pretty girl, are matters which nowadays would call from an "official biographer" for a discreet reticence. Like Apollonius Rhodius, like Homer and Virgil, but not we may suppose like the authors of the cyclic, pseudo-Homeric propaganda epic favored by the Telchines, the poet Pindar boldly thrusts the problem of sex and heroism before the attention of his audience. He is not ill-bred or salacious enough to pry into the bedroom for scandal's sake. But he is concerned to point out that such offenses affect more than the offenders. In stripping the homes of the Trojans of their delicacy, Agamemnon particularizes his deadly act on Cassandra. This is the barest realism. But the Trojans themselves had been fired over Helen.¹⁹ The mutual interplay of personal and public sin, of Eros and Ares, prevents any convenient escape into historians' generalities. It is the lesson of the *Aeneid's* fourth book.

Once the universal relevance of the myth is understood in this way—it teaches that lust is the expense of spirit in a waste of shame—there is no need to look for those detailed allegorical applications which so intrigued older commentators. Immorality upsets public order. Horace will repeat the theme. Both Greek and Roman poet were addressing their own communities. In this sense, both are writing "personal" poetry.²⁰

Aware of the harsh home-truths he has been dispensing, the poet concludes his lesson when he has still almost half his poem to write. Putting into play a comic *ego*, he pretends to have been led astray from the proper path. This is exactly that "Alexandrian," self-conscious aspect of his poetry which showed itself as early as the tenth *Pythian*.²¹ convention which gives notice of being convention, art which knows it is artifice. Has Pindar taken the wrong turning at a crossroads (v. 38)? He is the polar counterpart of Heracles (v. 3), who took the right one.²² Has his skiff been blown off course (vv. 39–40)?

¹⁹ Retaining the transmitted πυρωθέντων at v. 33.

²⁰ Pindar is ἴδιος ἐν κοινῷ σταλείς, *O.* 13. 49.

²¹ Vv. 51 ff.: *Pindar's Art*, pp. 43–44, 81–82.

²² Modern scholarship on the ancient motif of the "two ways" is listed in *Bibliographie zur Antiken Bildersprache*, ed. V. Pöschl and others (Heidelberg 1964), p. 584. The idea of a morally dividing τρίτοδος was, for example, important to the Pythagoreans: E. R.

It is the polar counterpart of all those ships guided aright by Castor and Polydeuces (vv. 61–62).²³ The very phrases in which the poet asserts his predicament cement the two halves of his poem firmly together. Like the Euripus, they flow both back and forth.

As in the first *Olympian*, though at greater length, the last part of the poem draws together and personalizes the themes presented more largely in his introduction and myth. The family of the victor Thrasydaeus is contrasted with the Atreidae: its fire is one of glory (v. 45: cf. 33), its gossip (πολυφάτων, v. 47: cf. κακολόγοι, 28) one of praise. But the admonitory note creeps back again as the poet, using the “preacher’s I” to identify himself with his young patron, prays for contentment with what is possible and devotion to the common weal. Here, he takes up the reflections of the myth on prosperity, jealousy and the city quite openly, and develops his thought with the help of an antithesis between the political concepts of ἡσυχία and ὕβρις (v. 55). In the first *Olympian*, Pelops had to accept his mortality before he could find the only real immortality permissible for a man. In this ode, though both Agamemnon and the victor reach the same dark bound of death (ἀκτὰν παρ’ εὐσκιον, 21; μέλανα δ’ ἀν’ ἐσχατιάν, 56²⁴), one will surely find a fairer fame.

From this challenging reflection Pindar leaps back into the realm of myth, this time not to the cruel bloodiness of the Atreidae, but to the world of gracious loveliness invoked as the ode began. A stronger note is sounded now, as heroes replace heroines, as the self-sacrificial Castor and Polydeuces replace their murderous and lustful sisters. The surly, muttered gossip of the jealous is drowned by the everlasting music of the poet’s song, bestowed upon those who have deserved it.

The nature of the “personal” element in Pindar’s epinicians is now more visible. The poet does not of course keep a diary in verse. What he says is conditioned by traditional forms of social etiquette and expectations. But how he deploys his material is determined by his personal attitudes and responses. We may guess that, in an ode

Dodds, *Plato, Gorgias* (Oxford 1959), p. 375. It may have become associated with Heracles in some early κατάβασις of the type used by Virgil in *Aeneid* VI: cf. *partes ubi se via findit in ambas*, 540. Pindar himself seems already to have developed this theme: Snell–Maehler, *Pindarus, Pars II* (1975), pp. 109–10 on *Threnos* VII. However, J. Alpers, *Hercules in Bivio* (diss. Göttingen 1912), argues that the motif was not known before Prodicus (p. 9).

²³ The Dioscuri appear as saviors of mariners as early as *Hym. Hom.* XXXIII. 7 ff.: cf. Snell–Maehler, *op. cit.*, p. 5 on *Isth.* fr. 6c.

²⁴ A. Turyn’s text (repr. Oxford 1952) has been followed at v. 56.

addressed by a Theban to a Theban victor at a time of national crisis, these feelings were more than usually engaged. The demand for Solonian moderation in civic affairs²⁵ is inherited by the poet, shared by him with other moderates in his city, and at the same time part of his personal outlook. The terms "subjective" and "objective" become, on this analysis, rather inapposite. What is important is the unique amalgam.

If the story that Pindar studied under Lasus of Hermione in late sixth-century Athens is true, he may have picked up his Solonian wisdom in the city of its origin. His teacher seems to have been interested in the kind of literary experiment critics label as "decadent."²⁶ The early twelfth *Pythian*, the only surviving tribute to a non-athletic victor, paid homage to the civilizing influence of art (τέχνη, v. 6) with the aid of vocabulary (λεπτοῦ, v. 25) and ideas (εὔθρον, v. 22)²⁷ which anticipate those of Alexandria, and in it Athene was prominent. Were in fact these two great centers of Greek culture closer than has been thought? Did the Alexandrians set Pindar at the head of their lyric canon not only because of the force of his genius, but because they saw in him the outline of a poetic which they were eager to make their own?

Roman Alexandrianizing poets were fond of claiming to be "first," of using what scholars call "*primus*-language." Pindar uses such language too, of Athene and Terpander, but also of himself. The fourth *Pythian* looks like a virtuoso effort to make lyric outdo epic. At the climax of its myth (vv. 241 ff.), the poet speaks of the difficulties of gaining the golden fleece even after Aetes' challenge had been met:

And at once the wondrous child of the sun told of the shining fleece,
and where the sword blows of Phrixus had stretched it out. He was
hoping that this toil at least would baffle. For it lay in a thicket, and

²⁵ Cf. "Pindar, Solon and Jealousy: Political Vocabulary in the Eleventh *Pythian*," *ICS* VII (1982), pp. 189-95.

²⁶ At least according to Rehm in *RE* 12: 1, col. 888: "Der Hymnus auf Demeter schloss den Buchstaben σ aus, Athen. IX 467a, X 455c, XIV 624e. . . ." We may compare the asigmatic *Odyssey* of Tryphiodorus and other Byzantine *Virtuosenstücke* mentioned by A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (Eng. tr. J. Willis and C. de Heer, London 1966), pp. 815-16.

²⁷ "Invention" is very important to Pindar: cf. *O.* 3. 4: 13. 17: *N.* 8. 20: *Encomia* fr. 125. 1-2. Cf. in general E. R. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur und lateinisches Mittelalter* (Bern 1948), p. 533. The exaltation of Athene in *P.* 12 anticipates the Alexandrian exaltation of Isis, in answer to Euhemerus' rationalism, as the foundress of all human arts: M. Nilsson, *Geschichte der griechischen Religion* II (Munich 1961), pp. 289 and 627 ff.: cf. p. 573, *Minervam*.

clung to the savage jaws of a serpent that in bulk and length outdid a fifty-oared ship finished by blows of iron tools.

The suspense is complete, and the double reference to sword blows and iron blows (vv. 242, 246) guides our imagination towards the expected contest, in which the personified fleece, clinging to the serpent's jaws, seems itself destined to be an adversary.

This is exactly the critical moment chosen by Pindar to frustrate expectation. Instead of giving an account of the heroic struggle, he blandly digresses to talk about his art:

It is long for me to travel along the cart road, for time presses, and I know a²⁸ short path: to many others I am a leader in the poet's craft.

The Alexandrian terms of this remark (μακρά, ἀμαξιτόν,²⁹ βραχύν, πολλοῖσι, σοφίᾳς) would, in Callimachus, provoke irritation. But what we must see is that the breakaway, which is also a breakthrough into another dimension, is itself exactly the short path of which the poet is speaking. While we are impatiently waiting to hear what happened between Jason and the serpent, we reconstruct the story for ourselves. We do the poet's job for him, presumably to our own satisfaction, and so, when he resumes, he can be content with the baldest of remarks, can indeed displace the narrative emphasis from the struggle, which is dismissed in the single word κτεῖνε (v. 249), to its aftermath:

He slew the fierce-eyed, spangle-backed snake with arts, O Arcesilas, and stole Medea with herself, the murderess of Pelias, and they plunged into the waters of Ocean and the Red Sea, into the tribe of Lemnian women, murderers of men.

The climaxing apostrophe to Arcesilas follows the static description of the serpent. Only the emphatic verbs opening their clauses (κτεῖνε, κλέψεν) are provided to trigger our imaginations here. The rest is baffling. Slew it with arts? But whose? Stole Medea with herself? Murderess of Pelias? And how did they get away from Aeetes and his pursuing minions? The central deed of the entire Argonaut adventure is wrapped in obscurity and foreboding (φονόν, 250; ἀνδροφόνων, 252). Is this Red Sea perhaps red with blood?

In a brilliant passage L. Dissen long ago set out the differences

²⁸ The τινα at v. 247 is presumably pregnant rather than diffusive, as in the examples noted in *Pindar's Art*, p. 48.

²⁹ N. 6. 53–54 (where Pindar follows the cart track) is only in apparent contradiction: ἔχων μελέταν is a crucial qualification, used by Pindar to escape from the trite story.

between the narrative technique of the fourth *Pythian* and that of conventional epic.³⁰ Pindar's aim in the myth is to glorify Jason, not to trace the details of a familiar story:

Neque enim res et facta ipsorum causa narrat, sed propter id quod docere vult, et movet non multitudine rerum, sed gravitate.

Dissen is also interested in Pindar's use of antithesis:

Mox in oratione publica Iasonis ne de dignitate admirabili dicam, affectus plenus est locus, ubi iuvenis narrat ut olim eum infantem timore tyranni in fasciis extulerint quasi mortuum e domo paterna inter eiulatum feminarum. Et observa in fine orationis haec poni, ut aculeos relinquat in animis audientium; post quae discedit continuo ad hos ipsos tam diu non visos parentes. Iamque huic tristi praeteritarum rerum memoriae opponitur laetitia paternae domus et cognatorum undique accelerantium, conviviumque per sex dies continuatum; sunt etiam in epica poesi oppositiones plurimae, ut par, sed lyrica in ea re ars est ingeniosior.

Oppositio, what Dornseiff was later to call Pindar's *polare Ausdrucksweise*, is a basic feature of pathetic structure, as defined by Eisenstein.

The selectivity of this allusive style, which has its own interest in *aetia*, permits us to see Pindar as the master of an art already Alexandrian. He lends to Callimachus both images and attitude. It is Pindar who prides himself on his own originality, and who rejects the *schoenus*-length of his predecessors' song (*Dithyramb* II, p. 74, Snell-Maehler):

Πρὶν μὲν ἔρπε σχοινοτένειά τ' αἰοῖδᾶ
διθυράμβων
καὶ τὸ σᾶν κίβδηλον ἀνθρώποισιν ἀπὸ στομάτων, . . .

This public literary argumentation has a long history,³¹ but in particular it anticipates the Preface to Callimachus' *Aetia* (vv. 17–18):³²

ἔλλετε Βασκανίης ὄλοον γένος' αὐθι δὲ τέχνη
κρίνετε, μὴ σχοίνῳ Περσίδι τὴν σοφίην'

³⁰ *Pindari Carmina* (Gothae et Erfordiae 1830), I, pp. LIV ff. The quotations are from pp. LVII and LVII–LVIII.

³¹ It is part of the comic *agon*, developed, for example, in the contest between Aeschylus and Euripides in Aristophanes' *Frogs*. Pindar's older Theban contemporary Corinna wrote a poem about two contending mountains: Page, *PMG* 654. Later it became the troubadours' *tenzone* and was even taken up by Dante into the *Purgatorio* (canto 24); cf. the *Certamen Homeri et Hesiodi*.

³² Pindar's rejection of length is also demonstrated by *O.* 13, 41–42 and 98; *P.* 4, 247 ff.; *P.* 8, 29–30; *N.* 4, 33 and 71; *N.* 10, 19; *I.* 1, 60 ff.; fr. 140b.12.

This anticipation must condition our understanding of *Paean* VIIb, printed by Snell–Maehler as:

κελαδήσαθ' ὕμνους, 10
 Ὅμηρου [δὲ μὴ τρι]πτὸν κατ' ἀμαξιτόν
 ἰόντες, ἀ[λλ' ἀλ]λοτριαῖς ἀν' ἵπποις, . . .

At line 12 here, the restoration ἀλλ' contradicts the sense. Pindar cannot urge the avoidance of Homer's worn cart track, and then go on to recommend his chorus to travel on others' horses, especially if at vv. 13–14 he told them they have their own chariot. The δέ restored in v. 11 is quite superfluous, and the imperative in v. 10 is uncertain. If the syntax of the expression in verse 10 triggered the negative οὐ rather than μή, verses 11–12 may have read:

Ὅμηρου [μὲν οὐ τρι]πτὸν κατ' ἀμαξιτόν
 ἰόντες, οἷδ' ἀ[λλ' ἀλ]λοτριαῖς ἀν' ἵπποις, . . .

With this, the supplement proposed in Snell–Maehler:

ἐπεὶ αὐ[τοῖ ἐς π]τανὸν ἄρμα
 Μοισα[ῖον ἀνέβα]μεν. . . .

coheres very well, and reminds the reader not only of *Aetia*-preface 25 ff. but also of Propertius' great programmatic elegy at the beginning of Book III, written under the auspices of Callimachus and Philetas, but under the patronage of Apollo and Bacchus.³³

II

Callimachus concerned himself directly with the myth on which the fourth *Pythian* is based in his *Iamboi* (fr. 198 Pf.), where he related the victory of Polycles of Aegina in the *Hydrophoria*, founded in memory of the Argonauts who once landed on that island in search of water. In this instance, it seems plausible to say that he was giving an example of what Aristophanes calls "reduction," in a play which shows how much "Alexandrian" vocabulary was current in Athens a century after Pindar had been there.³⁴ In an age suspicious of bombast, in which poet and musician had parted company, Callima-

³³ Cf. *O.* 9. 80–81: εἴην εὐρησιεπιτῆς ἀναγείσθαι / πρόσφορος ἐν Μοισᾶν δίφρῳ At *O.* 6. 85–86 water and weaving images are combined: cf. Prop. III. 1. 5–6. Propertius restores the sense of public pomp and pride to imagery he ultimately inherits from Pindar (water drinking, chariot riding and so on), but significantly without abandoning his claim to be the Roman Callimachus.

³⁴ *Frogs* 941. M. Puelma Piwonka, *Lucilius und Kallimachos* (Frankfurt 1949), pp. 323 ff., gives a sympathetic appreciation of what may have been Callimachus' purpose.

chus still apparently thought that the epinician was relevant. He was perhaps aided by the reflection that the comic spirit of such poetry favored this lightening of its load.

But the epinician also made its appearance in the *Aetia*, perhaps at the start of the third book. The Nemean victory of Queen Berenice was celebrated in an elegy of suitably Pindaric abruptness, adorned with a myth narrating the foundation of the games.³⁵ Since this myth contained a section called by modern scholars "Muscipula," "The Mousetrap," evidently a certain wit was manifest in its treatment. So too was a novelty reminiscent of the first *Olympian*.³⁶

There was also another elegiac epinician, honoring the victory at the Isthmus of Sosibius. Its date is uncertain, but if this Sosibius was already active in the early years of the third century, it could be that Callimachus actually began his poetic career by experimenting with this type of poetry, perhaps as a means of securing the attention of a powerful patron. He certainly shows awareness of the Pindaric manner (fr. 384. 37–39 Pf.):

ἄνδρας ὄτ' οὐ δείσαντες ἐδώκαμεν ἠδὲ βοῆσαι
 νηὸν ἔπι Γλαυκῆς κῶμον ἄγοντι χορῶ
 Ἰαρχιλόχου νικαῖον ἐφύμνιον' . . .

The masterful use of alliteration and assonance, and the emphatic position of Ἰαρχιλόχου, are proof of the poet's genius.³⁷

Pindaric too is the emphasis on witness (*loc. cit.* 48–49):³⁸

καῖνὸ γε μὴν ἴδον αὐτός, ὃ παρ ποδὶ κάτθετο Νείλου
 νειατῖω, Κασίην εἰς ἐπίκωμος ἄλλα . . .

Here the victor evidently proceeded in komic fashion as far as the mouth of the Nile to make an offering in the temple of Zeus Casius.

But, although we can see how carefully Callimachus studied the epinician style, both in its mannerisms and in its origins (e.g. its association with the dead, fr. 384. 30 Pf.³⁹), these imitations are too

³⁵ The text given in Hugh Lloyd-Jones and Peter Parsons, edd., *Supplementum Hellenisticum* (Berlin–New York 1983), nos. 254–69, pp. 100 ff., is also discussed by Parsons in *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 25 (1977), pp. 1 ff.: cf. especially p. 46. Parsons' suggestion that this epinician elegy at the start of Book III stood in some sort of correlation with the *Coma Berenices* at the end of Book IV tallies with the sidereal language of *N.* 2. 11–12. After all, where was the Nemean lion to be seen?

³⁶ See Lloyd-Jones and Parsons, *op. cit.*, p. 134 ad v. 33 on p. 103, οὐχ ὡς ὑδέουσιν: "ex his coniciis, Callimachum fabulam novam miram commemorare, immo novissimam."

³⁷ Cf. *O.* 9. 1, Ἰαρχιλόχου; 4, κομάζοντι.

³⁸ *Pindar's Art*, p. 6, note 11.

³⁹ Cf. O. M. Freudenberg, *Mif i Literatura Drevnosti* (Moscow 1978), pp. 54 ff.

fragmentary to allow any very reliable conclusions about structure. If the poet chose to echo Pindar in his programmatic utterances however, we may perhaps look further in his poetry, following a hint already thrown out by Dornseiff.⁴⁰ The first *Hymn* is particularly instructive. Pindar's imagination was often triggered by a pun, and the second *Olympian* may be inspired by the proper name Rhea, "flowing."⁴¹ But so may this *Hymn*. This might explain, for example, the extraordinary digression at vv. 18 ff., in which the poet's imagination flashes back to some primeval Greek desert landscape, when the great rivers of later days were still hidden in the bowels of the earth. Rhea's Moses-like gesture (vv. 30–31) in bringing forth water from the rock parallels her bringing forth of baby Zeus (τόκοιο, v. 16; τέχε, v. 29). In this celebration of the komic theme of parturition and birth, Zeus' first nurse, Neda, is fittingly commemorated by a stream (vv. 37–41).

The hymn is eventually manipulated more obviously in favor of a *laudandus*, Ptolemy. The king has indeed already been hinted at in v. 3 (δικασπόλον: cf. vv. 82–83). The pre-eminence accorded to the god by his elders (60 ff.), as it were the Diadochoi of Cronus, mirrors that accorded to his earthly counterpart. It was not the chance of the lot, but merit, which determined the excellence of both.

But can Ptolemy only resemble Zeus when Zeus is no longer an infant? Can the myth of Zeus' birth, the token of water and fertility that were to transform a parched Azenis into pastoral Arcadia, be "irrelevant" to the encomium, to use the language of Pindar's ancient critics? It is in fact Pindar's art which teaches us to look further in Callimachus.

The importance of water in Egypt needs no emphasis.⁴² From time immemorial the Pharaohs, whose successors the Ptolemies were, had been lords of the Nile and displayed the symbols of that office. If Rhea's gesture reminds the modern reader of Moses at Meribah, it must be remembered that, according to one tradition, Moses was "learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians."⁴³ The birth of baby Zeus

⁴⁰ *Pindars Stil*, p. 85: cf. *Die archaische Mythenerzählung* (Berlin–Leipzig 1933), pp. 74 ff. and especially p. 77: "Seine (i.e. Callimachus') Hymnen müssen neu behandelt werden auf ihre Beziehungen zur Chorlyrik."

⁴¹ *Pindar's Art*, pp. 166, 176.

⁴² "The River of Egypt is empty, men cross over the water on foot." This is quoted from an Egyptian papyrus by Jack Lindsay, *Men and Gods on the Roman Nile* (London 1968), p. 10. Compare Callimachus, *Hy.* 1, 25–26. In his brilliant reconstruction of life in Alexandria, Wilamowitz notes (*Die hellenistische Dichtung*, repr. Berlin 1962, 1, p. 153): "Quelle und Bach kannte ein Alexandriner nur aus Büchern."

⁴³ NT Acts 7:22. Moses' name is Egyptian. A modern commentary on the Bible tentatively suggests that it could have been Usir-mosis, "Osiris is born": cf. Ra-meses,

signalled abundance of water for Arcadia. Could not the birth of Ptolemy signal the same for Egypt? Could not the divine child foreshadow the grown champion, exactly as in the first *Nemean*?⁴⁴ Thus the first part of Callimachus' Hymn would have a connection both with traditional motifs, and, in this particular instance, with the yearnings of the Greek Alexandrian community, locked in its flat and arid prison.⁴⁵

But, like Pindar before him, Callimachus is not content with even this degree of double-entendre. In the first *Olympian*, a fiction may be observed which calls into question its own status.⁴⁶ Callimachus shares Pindar's self-consciousness. He asks at the start of *Hymn I*: "Which of the two, father, have told lies?" (v. 7). "The Cretans are always liars!" (v. 8): a tag from Epimenides is enough to settle the question. But poetic lies become important again later in the poem. "Ancient bards were not at all truthful" (v. 60). The old story of the division of earth, sky and underworld by lot must be rejected as silly. "May I tell lies that are likely to persuade the ear of my listener!" (v. 65 ψευδοίμην; cf. ἐψεύσαντο, v. 7). The poet is opening himself to the charge that persuasion rather than truth is his aim.⁴⁷ Such sophisticated art does not mind. It is consistent with this legerdemain that, although it is Zeus' deeds which give him superiority (v. 66), the poet refuses, in this hymn to Zeus, to sing of them (v. 92). Evidently they have been sufficiently replaced by what we have heard of the deeds of Ptolemy. Pindar, using δαιδάλλω in the first *Olympian* both of the false stories he ostensibly rejects and of his own art (vv. 29 and 105), had pointed the way to this ambivalence.

"Ra is born": see *La Sagrada Escritura*, I, *Pentateuco*, Director Juan Leal S. J. (Madrid 1967), p. 312. Osiris was eventually identified with the Nile god Hapi: H. Bonnet, *Reallexikon der ägyptischen Religionsgeschichte* (Berlin 1952), p. 528. Moses' striking of the rock to produce water (OT Exodus 17:2 ff., Numbers 20:2 ff.: for the gesture see E. R. Dodds on Euripides, *Bacchae* 704–05, and Apollonius Rhodius, *Argon.* IV. 1446) is on both occasions associated with the Israelites' desire for Egyptian comforts. His response may have been to prove that, like Osiris (see Bonnet's illustration), he too could pour out water from a rocky cave.

⁴⁴ *Pindar's Art*, p. 72.

⁴⁵ The spirit of the Arcadian pastoral and its idealized landscape is already lurking in the background to all this. Ptolemy I's invention of Sarapis (= Osiris / Apis), whose cult image looked like Zeus (H. Idris Bell, *Cults and Creeds in Graeco-Roman Egypt*, Liverpool 1953, p. 19), may also be an influence at work in Callimachus' poem. Pindar had already hinted at the equation Zeus / king: *Pindar's Art*, pp. 128 and 230. He had also described the huge god whose moving feet caused the flooding of the Nile (fr. 282), a passage that looks like a reminiscence of the Egyptian colossal statues of Rameses II at Abu Simbel.

⁴⁶ *Pindar's Art*, p. 160.

⁴⁷ A debate still alive as late as Petrarch's doctrine of poetic *veritas*: *Africa* ix. 90 ff.

The lyrical balance of the first *Hymn* may be seen from this table:

vv. 1-9	Prooimion: Zeus' immortality	9 lines	} 27 lines
vv. 10-27	His birth. Rhea's search for water	18 lines	
vv. 28-36	Water found. Neda receives the child	9 lines	} 27 lines
vv. 37-54	Rhea's thanks. Zeus in Crete	18 lines	
vv. 55-59	Zeus' privileges	5 lines	} 21 lines
vv. 60-64	Poetic fictions	5 lines	
vv. 65-69	Zeus' attributes	5 lines	
vv. 70-75	His choice of kings	6 lines	
vv. 76-90	Privileges of kings, especially of Ptolemy	15 lines	
vv. 91-96	Coda	6 lines	} 21 lines

For Pindar, the exponent of the *αὐστηρὰ ἄρμονία*, the individual words counted. For Callimachus, in this first *Hymn*, it seems that syllables were important:

vv. 1-9	143 scanned syllables
vv. 10-27	285 scanned syllables
vv. 28-36	143 scanned syllables
vv. 37-54	285 scanned syllables
vv. 55-75	339 scanned syllables
vv. 76-96	337 scanned syllables

It is even possible that the poet, like Pindar, set important proper names at significant intervals. Between Ζεῦ (v. 7) and Πείη (v. 10) 53 syllables may be counted, exactly the same number as between Πείη (v. 10) and Πείης (v. 13). This Πείης is then separated by 118 syllables from Πήη (v. 21), and this Πήη is followed 116 syllables later by Πείη (v. 28). Between μν (= Rhea, v. 35) and Ζεῦ (v. 43) stand 117 syllables. Between Ζεῦ (v. 46) and Κρόνος (v. 53) stand another 117 syllables. 119 syllables divide this Κρόνος from Κρονίδησι (v. 61).

We could perhaps already have guessed that in this art, with its word-play, its repetitions, its euphony, in short all the tricks of the Gorgianic, but also carnival, repertoire, numerical balances, whether of line or longer verse paragraph, would make themselves felt to the inner ear, and that this felt responsiveness would evoke, for both Callimachus and his later admirers whether in Greece or Rome, the atmosphere of music. This constitutes one of the most vivid parts of the Pindaric legacy.

To understand the role of the carnival already in Pindar is to see that even Callimachus' sixth *Hymn* is in a similar tradition. Like Tantalus, Erysichthon breaks the rules of social etiquette, and is

appropriately punished by becoming a castout from society, his appetite perpetually unsatisfied. The myth, with its roots in popular folktale, is linked with the main narrative by what at the time of mention looks like a picturesque detail (v. 6)—a typically Pindaric device.⁴⁸ The worshippers paradoxically celebrate the feast of the goddess of earth and grain by fasting, as she herself fasted when in sorrowful search for her daughter. Callimachus ultimately refuses to tell this painful story (v. 17), after he has carefully reminded us of its details, exactly as Pindar refuses to tell the traditional story of Tantalus and Pelops after reminding us of its details (*O.* 1. 52–53). Erysichthon, who thought he could intrude on nature as appetite dictated, becomes the parody of his own lusts, forced to decline the very good cheer he fancied he was going to enjoy. Eventually, a king's son, he sits begging at the crossroads. There is a religious truth underlying all the humor.

Distances between certain references to Demeter bear some relationship, provided we return to Pindar's method of word count and omit μέν, δέ, τε, γε, καί. Whether this more Dorically flavored poem inspired a return to an older technique is uncertain:

Δάματρο (v. 2) + 42 words gives Δαμάτερα (v. 8)
 θεά (v. 29) + 42 words gives Δάματρος (v. 36).

The contrast between piety and impiety is made by the Pindaric means of repeated language, in which distances between words also seem to play a part. The goddess did not eat (ἔδεις, v. 12) and luckless Erysichthon ate more than he wished (ἔδοντι, v. 89). The same point is made with another repeated verb at vv. 16 and 108 (φάγεξ / ἔφαγεν). The following intervals between words of eating are notable:

ἔδεις (v. 12) + 24 words gives φάγεξ (v. 16)
 βόσκει (v. 104) + 24 words gives ἔφαγεν (v. 108).

Compare:

εἰλαπίναν (v. 84) + 24 words gives ἦσθι (v. 88).

In the poet's pious prayer, βόας (v. 136) echoes βῶν (v. 108; cf. βόας, v. 20, βοῦβρωστις, v. 102). Erysichthon, by trespassing onto forbidden territory, is condemned to persist fruitlessly in his offense, like Ugolino in Dante's *Inferno*, also part of an instructive comedy. His original sin of greed (δαίτας . . . αἰὲν . . . θυμαρέας ἄξῳ, vv. 54–55) becomes his essence. The repetition of δαίς from v. 54 at vv. 63

⁴⁸ *Pindar's Art*, p. 157, note 22.

and 69 and at the very end of the myth (v. 115) hammers home the lesson.

Although the text of the poem is damaged, it is possible to discern at least an outline of symmetry as follows:

vv. 1–23 Introduction			
vv. 1–6	Start of procession	6 lines	} 23 lines
vv. 7–9	Hesperus	3 lines	
vv. 10–12	Demeter's hardships	3 lines	
vv. 13–16	Her wanderings	4 lines	
vv. 17–23	Her gifts to men	7 lines	
vv. 24–115 Myth of Erysichthon			
vv. 24–30	Demeter's grove	7 lines	} 16 lines
vv. 31–36	Erysichthon's onset	6 lines	
vv. 37–39	The poplar	3 lines	
vv. 40–45	Demeter's intervention	6 lines	} 16 lines
vv. 46–49	Her speech	4 lines	
vv. 50–55	Erysichthon's reply	6 lines	} 16 lines
vv. 56–58	Demeter's reaction	3 lines	
vv. 59–64	Her sentence	6 lines	
vv. 65–67	Erysichthon's sickness	3 lines	
vv. 68–71	His symptoms	4 lines	} 22 lines
vv. 72–75	His parents' embarrassment	4 lines	
vv. 76–82	His mother's excuses	7 lines	} 22 lines
vv. 83–86	Further excuses	4 lines	
vv. 87–93	Plight of Erysichthon	7 lines	} 22 lines
vv. 94–97	Family grief	4 lines	
vv. 98–110	Prayer of Triopas	13 lines	} 22 lines
vv. 111–115	Final fate of Erysichthon	5 lines	
vv. 116–138 Conclusion			
vv. 116–117	The poet's prayer	2 lines	} 23 lines
vv. 118–127	Instruction and assurance	10 lines	
vv. 128–133	More instructions	6 lines	
vv. 134–138	Final prayer	5 lines	

In this scheme, verses 116–17 have been taken as marking the beginning of the conclusion, and not as the end of the myth (as in Pfeiffer). The analogy with Pindaric mannerisms in these lines, such as the use of the first person pronoun (ἐμὴν . . . ἐμοί), the renewed invocation of the *laudanda*, and the prayer, shows that in reality we have a typically Pindaric "second praise."⁴⁹ This may prove that the

⁴⁹ W. Schadewaldt notes these mannerisms in Pindar: *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion* (Halle 1928), p. 300 and note 6 (use of first person), p. 284 and note 4 (invocation of the *laudandus*), p. 295 and note 2 (prayer).

epinician, as Hermann conjectured, originated in the hymn to the gods, and therefore that Pindar sometimes rather awkwardly adapted it to the praise of human victors. But it may also prove, in an age when the distinction between the human and the divine was becoming all too often blurred, that Callimachus took the tricks of the epinician and adapted them to the hymn, and this is where the novelty and piquancy of his achievement may lie.

III

What the Romans took from Greek Alexandria therefore requires far more careful definition than has been customary. They took in the first place an art that was komic, carnivalized, that dislocated experience and expectation in order to estrange perception. This explains the importance of Laevius' multi-faceted *Erotopaegnia*, and earlier of the extraordinary medley presented by the satires of Lucilius. It also explains the continuing relevance of Pindar, to Virgil, to Horace, to Propertius, but even, in an earlier generation, to Catullus. Statius still advertises his Pindaric studies. Like the author of the eleventh *Pythian*, Ovid still sails a poetic skiff.⁵⁰

But the most powerful impulse given by Pindar was paradoxically towards epic. In the fourth *Pythian* Pindar deployed an ambition consciously epic in its scope. But even the eleventh *Pythian*, its myth ringed, questioning, metamorphosing, could hold a lesson for Virgilian narrative technique. The Alexandrians, so often thought to have been interested only in *Kleinkunst*, in fact communicated a new epic impulse to their Roman disciples, setting it for reasons of their own under the patronage of the Boeotian poet, Hesiod. The Ascræan *Georgics*, which also pay homage to Pindar in precisely one of their most ambitious and yet most Alexandrian passages, the proem to Book III, were the essential preparation for the *Aeneid*. These matters of complex literary inheritance have been discussed more fully elsewhere.⁵¹

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁵⁰ Cf. Curtius, *Europäische Literatur* etc. (above, note 27), pp. 136 ff. The motif is eventually picked up by Dante.

⁵¹ J. K. Newman, *The Classical Epic Tradition* (Madison, Wisconsin and London 1986).

2

Epicurus Vaticanus

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

While preparing a critical edition of Diogenes Laertius for the Bibliotheca Teubneriana, I have collated recently the *Gnomologium Vaticanum Epicureum* as preserved in cod. Vat. gr. 1950, saec. XIV, fol.401^v–404^v. The Vatican collection of the aphorisms of Epicurus was first published by Karl Wotke (in 1888), then by Peter Von der Mühl (Teubner, 1922), followed by Cyril Bailey (Oxford, 1926), Graziano Arrighetti (Turin, 1960; 1973), and finally by Jean Bollack (Paris, 1975).¹

On this occasion, I shall limit myself to trying to solve an old problem—the corrupt text of the last two aphorisms of the collection (Nos. 80 and 81). I think aphorism No. 80 should read as follows (printed here correctly for the first time):

Νέω πρώτη σωτηρίας μοῖρα τῆς ἡλικίας τήρησις καὶ φυλακὴ τῶν πάντα
μολυνόντων κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς οἰστρούδεις.

For a young man the best means of preserving his well-being is to watch over his youth and to guard against whatever defiles (stains or spoils) everything because of “the maddening desires.”

On fol.404^v of V, our aphorism opens with a *v.ω*, which can hardly

¹ Karl Wotke and Hermann Usener, “Epikureische Spruchsammlung,” *Wiener Studien* 10 (1888) 175–201 (Greek text, pp. 191–198); *Epicuri Epistulae tres et Ratae Sententiae*, ed. P. Von der Mühl (Teubner, Leipzig 1922; repr. Teubner, Stuttgart 1966), pp. 60–69; Cyril Bailey, *Epicurus: The Extant Remains* (Oxford 1926; repr. Hildesheim 1970), pp. 106–119 and 375–388; *Epicuro, Opere: Introduzione, testo critico, traduzione e note* di Graziano Arrighetti (Turin 1960; 2nd ed., 1973), pp. 138–157 and 505–520; Jean Bollack, *La pensée du plaisir. Épicure: textes moraux, commentaires* (Paris. Les Éditions de Minuit. 1975), pp. 409–563.

be anything else but νέω, “for a young man.” There are two more instances of an Epicurean ethical aphorism opening with Νέος without the article. Aphorism No. 17 from our collection reads: Οὐ νέος μακαριστός, ἀλλὰ γέρον βεβιωκῶς καλῶς. And a similar aphorism by Metrodorus Epicureus (ap. Stobaeus II. 31. 67 Wachsmuth) reads: Νέος ἐν πολυτελείᾳ βρώμασι καὶ ποτοῖς ἔτι δὲ ἀφροδισίοις ἀναστρεφόμενος λέληθεν ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ θέρει τὴν χλαῖναν κατατρίβων.

Consequently, the reading νέω seems to me to be as safe as it is palaeographically possible. Wotke, however, saw in the manuscript a P..ω (“P..ω soll V[aticanus] geben”), Von der Mühlh, F.:ίω (“prima littera aut Γ aut Π fuisse videtur”), and Bollack, P..ω. They then engaged in improbable conjectures. Wotke and Bailey adopted W. von Hartel’s ἔστιν, while Von der Mühlh printed γενναίω and conjectured γησιώ. But Konstantin Horna (in 1931)² correctly suggested νέω, and Arrighetti adopted it. In brief, the readings of Wotke, Von der Mühlh, Bailey and Bollack are wrong.

The second word of our aphorism is a clear πρώτη. It was printed by Wotke (Bailey and Bollack), but omitted by Von der Mühlh, Horna, and Arrighetti. Probably they relied upon the misleading entry in Wotke’s apparatus criticus, which reads: “Ἔστιν πρώτη] P..ω soll V geben : verb. H[artel]; man könnte auch Παμπρώτη vermuten.” But in fact V has: νίω πρώτη. The expression, ἡ πρώτη μοῖρα, moreover, is of significance. It means, “the *first* role,” “the *best* way,” “the *safest* means.”

Finally, the closing picturesque expression of our aphorism—αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ οἰστρώδεις—is a *deliberate* reminiscence of Plato on the part of Epicurus (*Tim.* 91 b 6; *Laws* V, 734 a 4).³

Now, this vivid Platonic metaphor—“the gadfly-like desires,” which sting man to madness, converting him into an irrational animal—may help us to solve the other textual problem at the end of our collection. Perhaps a similar poetic picturesque expression is hiding in the corruption of aphorism 81. I would like to suggest the following reading of this aphorism.

Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾶ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ’ ἢ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περιβλεψίς οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς οἰζυράς <ἀπλ>έτους αἰτίας.

The disturbance of the soul cannot be dispelled nor the genuine joy be created either by the possession of the greatest wealth, or by the esteem and admiration one may enjoy in the eyes of the populace, or by

² *Wiener Studien* 49 (1931), 34.

³ As, e.g., Bollack (p. 560) had pointed out.

anything else deriving from the wretched unlimited motives (or causes of desires).

For the suggested οἰζυρὰς <ἀπλ>έτους the manuscript seems to offer, ἄζυρ'σ ἔτους. Wotke read ἄζυροῖστος, Von der Mühl, ἄζυρι-σι(έ?)τους, and Bollack, ἄζ.ρ.σιτους. Now, in view of the fact that our scribe wrote in aphorism No. 2, ἀθάνατος, for the correct, ὁ θάνατος, I would think that ἄζυρ'σ could be none other than the poetic expression, οἰζυρὰς, "wretched, toilsome, dreary, or trouble-causing." As for the ἔτους, I think it is lacunose, being the ending of another attribute of the keyword, αἱ αἰτίαι, "the motives or causes of desires." The manuscript abounds in similar—two to three letters long—lacunae. For example, in aphorism No. 14 the word $\bar{\kappa}\sigma$ (= κύριος) is missing (extant in Stobaeus); in aphorism No. 43 φείδε . . . is a sure φείδε<σθαι> (from Demosthenes 24. 172); in aphorism No. 55 our scribe offers τὸ γένος for the correct τὸ γε<γο>νός (Usener); in aphorism No. 63 he writes καθάριος for the correct καθαριό<τη>ς (Von der Mühl); in aphorism No. 67 he omits <μῆ> after the word τὸ πρᾶγμα (Usener), and so on.

Consequently, the suggested supplement, <ἀπλ>έτους for the transmitted ἔτους, seems to be in accord with the scribe's practice. Ἄπλετος is a suitable poetic synonym for Epicurus' key terms ἄπειρος and ἀόριστος, when applied to the motives or causes of desires, as is the case with our aphorism. Its sense is "boundless, unlimited, immense," with the overtone, "excessive, and thus harmful." Consider these similar expressions of Epicurus: Aphorism No. 8 from our collection (= *Ratae sententiae*, No. 15), Ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος καὶ ὠρισται καὶ εὐπόριστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ τῶν κενῶν δοξῶν εἰς ἄπειρον ἐκπίπτει; Aphorism No. 63, ὁ δι' ἀοριστίαν ἐκπίπτων; Aphorism No. 59, Ἄπληστον οὐ γαστήρ, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ φασιν, ἀλλ' ἡ δόξα ψευδῆς ὑπὲρ τοῦ <τῆς> γαστροῦ ἀορίστου πληρώματος; *Ratae Sententiae* No. 10, τὸ πέρασ τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν; No. 20, Ἡ μὲν σὰρξ ἀπέλαβε τὰ πέρατα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἄπειρα. . . . The idea of "unlimited and excessive desires" is also clearly expressed in the word συνεύροντες of Epicurus' *Letter to Menoecus* 132, Οὐ γὰρ πότοι καὶ κῶμοι συνεύροντες οὐδ' ἀπολαύσεις παίδων καὶ γυναικῶν οὐδ' ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα φέρει πολυτελής τράπεζα τὸν ἡδὺν γεννᾶ βίον. . . . The word implies, "continuous pleasures, night after night."

For the suggested reading, παρὰ τὰς οἰζυρὰς <ἀπλ>έτους αἰτίας, scholars usually follow Usener's emendation, παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας. So did Wotke, Bailey, Arrighetti and others. This reading, however, does not find support in the manuscript. Incidentally, ἀδιορίστος would mean, "undefined, indefinite, loose," and not

“unlimited, boundless.” That is why I find Bailey’s commentary on the text, τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας, unconvincing; it reads: “lit. ‘things connected with unlimited causes’, i.e. causes of unlimited desire, such as there is for wealth, honour, power, &c.”⁴

One final note on the sense of παρὰ here. Contrary to Bollack’s recent comment, “il est préférable de faire παρὰ signifier *au delà de, en dehors de . . .*,”⁵ I think that παρὰ with accusative usually means in Epicurus, “owing to, due to, depending on.” Compare, e.g., *Letter to Pythocles* 111, τὴν τε ἀφάνισιν τούτων γίνεσθαι παρὰ τὰς ἀντικειμένας ταύταις αἰτίας; or *Ratae Sententiae* No. 29, αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν γινόμεναι; and especially No. 30, . . . παρὰ κενὴν δόξαν αὐται (αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι) γίνονται, καὶ οὐ παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτῶν φύσιν οὐ διαχέονται ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κενοδοξίαν.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

⁴ *Op. cit.* (above, note 1), pp. 119 and 388.—The conjecture suggested by Emil Thomas, *Hermes* 27 (1892), 35, ἀδιοσχυρίστους, “worauf man sich nicht stützen kann,” “unreliable,” is palaeographically even less likely (in addition to the fact that this word is documented nowhere).

⁵ *Op. cit.* (above, note 1), p. 562 f.

3

Indirect Questions in Old Latin: Syntactic and Pragmatic Factors Conditioning Modal Shift

LAURENCE STEPHENS

1. Introduction

In Old Latin the original indicative of a direct question is not universally shifted into the subjunctive to form an indirect question. Sometimes modal shift occurs, e.g. Pl. *Merc.* 103, *vosmet videte quam mihi valide placuerit*, and sometimes it does not, e.g. Pl. *Pseud.* 18, *face me certum quid tibist.* (cf. Cic. *Fac me certiore quando adfuturus sis*). Can particular conditions be discerned that favor modal shift? Are there rules governing modal shift in Old Latin, or is it in a stage of more or less free variation? Scholars such as Bennett,¹ Lindsay,² and Woodcock³ seem to suggest the latter view when they claim that both the indicative and the subjunctive are found side by side in indirect questions depending on the same main verb. Six or seven cases are commonly cited: Pl. *Amph.* 17; *Cist.* 57; *Most.* 199 and 969; *Pers.* 515; Ter. *Andr.* 650; and *Hecyr.* 873–74. All of these cases have been disputed, notably by Becker⁴ and Gaffiot.⁵ Gaffiot's interpretation of

¹ C. E. Bennett, *Syntax of Early Latin I. The Verb* (Boston 1910), p. 121.

² W. M. Lindsay, *Syntax of Plautus* (Oxford 1907), p. 66.

³ E. C. Woodcock, *A New Latin Syntax* (Cambridge, Mass. 1959), p. 134.

⁴ E. Becker, *De syntaxi interrogationum obliquarum apud priscos scriptores Latinos*, *Studemunds Studien* 1 (1873), pp. 113–314.

⁵ F. Gaffiot, "Quelques cas d'interrogation indirecte," *Revue de Philologie* 28 (1904), 41–55.

the indicatives at Pl. *Amph.* 17, *Most.* 969 and *Pers.* 515 as relative clauses seems rather forced but raises an important methodological point. Interrogative pronouns are distinct from relatives only in some cases. Any preliminary analysis of the use of the indicative must be limited to forms that are clearly interrogative. At Pl. *Cist.* 57 *velis* is most likely not an instance of modal shift, but a potential subjunctive used like *velim*. (*Cist.* 57 belongs to Class 1a discussed below in section 2.) This raises another methodological point: any preliminary analysis of modal shift must be limited to subjunctives that cannot be ascribed to independent uses in direct questions. The remaining cases of indicatives occurring alongside subjunctives have been analyzed as independent exclamations or direct questions. I agree with Bräunlich⁶ that these interpretations seem rather unnatural, and I do not wish to argue that modal shift in Old Latin is governed by absolute and categorical rules and that there is no variation. Rather, we should remember that there are about two thousand potentially dependent interrogative clauses in Old Latin, and these six or seven cases should be assessed in the light of the regularities and tendencies which obtain in that large corpus.⁷

Wackernagel⁸ suggested that Old Latin modal shift was a gradient phenomenon, depending on the degree of dependency of the interrogative clause: "je dezidierter . . . das Abhängigkeitsverhältnis ist, um so eher der Konjunktive gebraucht wird." Wackernagel, however, did not specify how the *Abhängigkeitsverhältnis* is to be assessed: is it syntactic, semantic, or somehow pragmatic and stylistic, or a combination of some or all of such factors? Some twenty years before Wackernagel, Delbrück⁹ reached exactly the opposite conclusion. Pointing to apparently contrasting pairs such as Pl. *Truc.* 499, *vide quis loquitur tam propinque*. (an example belonging to Class 1 discussed in section 2), and Pl. *Amph.* 787, *vide sis signi quid siet*, (an example belonging to Class 2 discussed in section 2), Delbrück asked:

Wie erklärt sich diese Anwendung des Subjunktivs? Aus der Natur des Abhängigkeitsverhältnisses kann sie nicht folgen, denn bei demselben

⁶ A. F. Bräunlich, "The Indicative Indirect Question in Latin" (diss., Chicago 1929), pp. xx, 16–17, 34.

⁷ From data supplied by Bennett (*Syntax of Early Latin*), I calculate that only 19% of the ca. 1064 clearly dependent word questions in Old Latin are unshifted. This proportion is sufficiently small to suggest that it is the retention of the indicative, and not modal shift, that is the more restricted variant.

⁸ J. Wackernagel, *Vorlesungen über Syntax I* (Basel 1926), p. 243.

⁹ B. Delbrück, *Vergleichende Syntax der indogermanischen Sprachen 3* (Strassburg 1900).

Verhältnis zeigen sich ja auch Indikative; auch nicht aus der Natur des Modus, denn sonst würde dieselbe Anwendung sich, wohl auch, in den verwandten Sprachen finden.

Since there was, in his opinion, no synchronic regularity in Old Latin modal shift, Delbrück concluded that scholars should concentrate on the historical linguistic processes through which modal shift arose in Latin. I hope to show in this article that just the reverse research strategy is the productive one: by formulating a more adequate synchronic account we will be able to discover new aspects of the diachronic processes involved in the development of modal shift.¹⁰

The only comprehensive study of Old Latin modal shift is that of Eduard Becker.¹¹ This work is an essential starting point for any study, and my paper is clearly much indebted to it. Becker's work, however, is marred by a tendency to emend away examples that do not fit his arguments, and it is difficult to say to what extent he succeeded in developing an explicit, consistent, and systematic theory. For such a theory we must turn to Haiim Rosén's recent study.¹² Rosén advances the hypothesis that: "it takes a verb of inquiry (or response to an inquiry . . .) to cause modal shift."¹³ The full set of conditions disjunctively sufficient for Old Latin modal shift as proposed by Rosén can be organized into four classes and these arranged to reflect increasing generalization of the domain of modal shift, with clear diachronic implications, which, however, Rosén does not discuss: (1) the verb of the main clause expresses an inquiry, e.g. *rogo* at Pl. *Pers.* 635, *dic* Pl. *Bacch.* 555, *narra* Ter. *Eun.* 562; (2) a response to an inquiry, e.g. *dixi* Pl. *Curc.* 608, *scio* Pl. *Capt.* 1007; (3) reception of a response to an inquiry, e.g. *audivi* Pl. *Amph.* 745, *ex hoc . . . scio* Pl. *Capt.* 295; (4) ignorance or uncertainty, even when no desire to know is expressed, e.g. *nescire* passim, interrogative verbs of knowing, e.g. Pl. *Poen.* 1121, verbs of knowing when dependent on an expression of causation or intent, e.g. Pl. *As.* 140, *memorare* as causative of *meminisse*. However, as will emerge from my presentation of the data in section 2, Rosén's theory is not only incapable of explaining the full range of variability in the philological record, but is also simply contradicted in

¹⁰ Bränlich (above, note 6), xvii–xxviii, provides a useful discussion of scholarship on the question up to 1920.

¹¹ *De syntaxi interrogationum obliquarum* (above, note 4).

¹² Haiim B. Rosén, "On some grammatical and functional values of the subjunctive," in Hannah and Haiim B. Rosén, *On Moods and Tenses of the Latin Verb* (Munich 1980).

¹³ Rosén, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

a large number of cases. For a full discussion of this theory see my review of the Roséns' book.¹⁴

2. Preliminary data analysis

The work of Becker and Rosén has shown that an adequate account of the factors that condition modal shift must consider the utterance involving the question (henceforth Q-clause) and its associated verb in relation to the speech situation portrayed and to its discourse function. Of the various criteria that have been employed for classification, the following appear to be the most useful for a preliminary organization of the data: (1) In what sort of utterance is the Q-clause involved?—inquiry, exclamation, command, etc.; (2) If in an inquiry, is the speaker inquiring about the Q-clause or about its associated verb? (3) If the inquiry is about the Q-clause, does the speaker want an immediate answer? (4) If a command, what is the addressee commanded to do?—find out, inquire about, make a statement about or simply consider the Q-clause; (5) Is the topic of the Q-clause either established in the discourse or present in the speech situation? (6) What is the syntactic status of the verb associated with the Q-clause? In what follows, the major classes of verb plus Q-clause that result from these criteria are given brief labels. These labels are intended not as complete, formal definitions, but as approximate, descriptive mnemonics. Tables 1–4 provide representative examples in addition to those cited in the text. Table 1 provides examples of Q-clauses associated with *verba videndi*, Table 2 *verba sciendi*, Table 3 *verba dicendi*, and Table 4 *verba rogandi*. In any one class only a few examples can be given of often scores of similar cases.

2.1. Class 1a: simple inquiries.

The simplest type of utterance involving a Q-clause and associated verb is the class of inquiries made by the speaker concerning the Q-clause to which he wants an immediate answer and in which the topic of the Q-clause is present or established in the discourse. A good example of this class is Pl. *Truc.* 499, cited by Delbrück and quoted in section 1. It comes from the beginning of Act II, scene vi. Stratophanes has just entered and given a speech. Phronesium asks the question of her maid Astaphium, who answers in the following lines. Here *vide* introduces a simple inquiry to which Phronesium expects an immediate answer. The topic of the question is obviously present

¹⁴ L. D. Stephens, Review of Hannah and Haiim B. Rosén (above, note 12), *Language* 58 (1982), 905–907.

Table 1. *verba videndi*

Class 1:

Pl. *Rud.* 948 GR. eloqueren quid id est? TR. vide num quispiam consequitur prope nos.
 Pl. *Truc.* 499–500 PH. vide quis loquitur tam propinque. AS. miles, mea Phronesium./tibi adest Stratonophanes.
 Pl. *Cas.* 377–78 tene sortem tibi./vide quid scriptumst.
 Pl. *Rud.* 1002–03 vide sis quoniam arbitratu nos vis facere. GR. viduli arbitratu.

Class 4:

Pl. *Miles* 536 vide sitne istaec vostra intus.
 Pl. *Capt.* 292 proinde aliis ut credat vide.
 Ter. *Andr.* 385 ex ea re quid fiat vide.

Class 7:

Ter. *Hec.* 78 audin quid dicam, Scirte?
 Pl. *Pseud.* 1296–97 non vides me/ut madide madeam?
 Ter. *Heaut.* 1013 non vides quantum mali ex ea re excites?

Class 2:

Pl. *Most.* 309 vide tali ubi sint.
 Pl. *Amph.* 787–88 So. vide sis signi quid siet./ne posterius in me cul-pam conferas.
 Ter. *Heaut.* 871 abi intro: vide quid postulet.

Class 3:

Pl. *Most.* 681 videndumst primum utrum eae velintne an non velint.
 Ter. *Heaut.* 557–58 de istoc, quom usu' venerit./videbimus quid opus sit.

Class 5a:

Pl. *Epid.* 81–82 quo in loco haec res sit vides/Epidice:
 Ter. *Heaut.* 555 quae sit ei(u)s aetas vides;
 Pl. *Rud.* 573 at vides me ornatus ut sim vestimentis uvidis:

Class 8a:

Pl. *Most.* 887 vide ut fastidit simia!
 Ter. *Eum.* 919 vide ut otiosus it!
 Ter. *Phorm.* 986–87 os opprime impurum: vide./quantum valet.

Class 8b:

Pl. *Stich.* 410 videte, quaeso, quid potest pecunia:
 Ter. *Phorm.* 358 vide avaritia quid facit!

Class 6:

Pl. *Circ.* 188 viden ut misere moriuntur? nequeunt complecti satis.
 Pl. *Miles* 1045 viden tu ignavom ut sese infert?
 Ter. *Eum.* 1037 audin tu, hic quid ait?

Class 9:

Pl. *Merc.* 103 vosmet videte quam mihi valide placuerit:
 Ter. *Andr.* 825 vide quam iniquo sis prae studio:

Table 2. *verba sciendi*

<p><i>Class 1a:</i> Pl. <i>Carc.</i> 543 scire volo quoi reddi- disti. Pl. <i>Pseud.</i> 696 me quid vis facere, fac sciam.</p>	<p><i>Class 1b:</i> Pl. <i>Cas.</i> 184 amo te, atque istuc ex- peto scire quid sit. Pl. <i>Trin.</i> 88 sed istuc negoti cupio scire quid siet.</p> <p><i>Class 5a:</i> Pl. <i>Carc.</i> 435 iam scis ut convenerit; Pl. <i>Aud.</i> pr. 29 is scit adulescens quae sit quam compresserit, Pl. <i>Men.</i> 764a verum propemodum iam scio quid siet rei. Pl. <i>Pers.</i> 276 scio ego quid sim aeta- tis,</p>	<p><i>Class 2:</i> Pl. <i>Trac.</i> 779 hic nunc volo scire eo- dem pacto sine malo fateamini.</p>
<p><i>Class 3:</i> Pl. <i>Miles</i> 345-46 volo scire utrum egon id quod vidi viderim/an illic faciat, Ter. <i>Ad.</i> 555 scire equidem volo quot mihi sint domini:</p>	<p><i>Class 5b:</i> Pl. <i>Aud.</i> 174 scio quid dictura es; hanc esse pauperem. Pl. <i>Sl.</i> 112 scio ut oportet esse; Pl. <i>Miles</i> 36 scio iam quid vis dicere. Pl. <i>Bacch.</i> 78 et pol ego scio quid metuo. cf. Pl. <i>Epid.</i> 577 scio quid erres; Pl. <i>Capl.</i> 1007 attat, scio quur te patrem adsimules esse et me fi- lium:</p>	
<p><i>Class 6:</i> Pl. <i>Rud.</i> 773 scin quid tecum oro, senex? Pl. <i>Men.</i> 425 sed scin quid te amabo ut facias? Pl. <i>Poen.</i> 1318-19 ANTA, nam te cinae- dum esse arbitror magi quam virum./AG, scin quam cinaedus sum? Pl. <i>Pseud.</i> 538 at enim scin quid mihi in mentem venit?</p>	<p><i>Class 7:</i> Pl. <i>Trin.</i> 373 scin tu illum quo gen- ere natus sit? Ter. <i>Eun.</i> 1035 scis me in quibu' sim gaudiis? Pl. <i>Merc.</i> 732 non tu scis quae sit illa?</p>	

Class Ia:

- Pl. *Trin.* 562-63 dic sodes mihi./
quid hic est locutus tecum?
Ter. *Phorm.* 748 eho dic mihi quid
rei tibi est cum familia hac unde
exis?
Pl. *Aud.* 777 sat habeo. age nunc lo-
quere quid vis.
Ter. *Andr.* 389 cedo quid iurgabit
tecum hic?
Pl. *Pers.* 215-16 hoc mi expedi./quo
agis?

Class Id:

- Ter. *Hec.* 698 redduc uxorem aut
quam ob rem non opu' sit cedo.
Pl. *Rud.* 628 quin tu ergo omitte
genua et quid sit mi expedi
cf. 1d'; Pl. *Pers.* 664 quid id est
ergo? eloquere actutum atque in-
dica.

Class 5a:

- Pl. *Rud.* 478 nam haec litteratati,
eapse cantat quoia sit.
Pl. *Merc.* 940 dico quid eo adven-
erim,
Pl. *Cist.* 549-51 dico ei quo pacto
eam ab hippodromo viderim/erilem
nostram filiam sustollere. extimuit
tum ille.

Class Ib:

- Pl. *Bacch.* 555 dic modo hominem
qui sit:
Pl. *Rud.* 1163 loquere matris no-
men hic quid in securicula siet.
Ter. *Eun.* 562 narra istuc quaeso
quid sit.
Pl. *As.* 27-28 proinde acutum istuc
quid sit quod scire expetis/elo-
quere:

Class Ic:

- Pl. *Rud.* 635-36 at ego te per crura
et talos tergumque optestor tuom./
ut tibi ulmeam uberem esse speres
virgidemiam

Class Io:

- Pl. *Most.* 1150 dicitio is quo pacto
tuu' te servos ludificaverit:
Pl. *Most.* 1136 loquere nunc quid
fecerim:
Ter. *Eun.* 970 tu isti narra om-
ne[m] ordine[m] ut factum siet.

Class 1c:

- Pl. *Men.* 639 quin dicitis quid sit?
Pl. *Pers.* 281 dicitisne mi ubi sit Toxi-
lus?

Class 2:

- Pl. *Rud.* 1148-49 tu, puella, istinc
procul/dicito quid insit et qua facie,
memorato omnia.

Table 4. *verba rogandi*

<p><i>Class 1a:</i> Pl. <i>Amph.</i> 438 quis ego sum saltem, si non sum Sosia? te interrogo. Pl. <i>Pseud.</i> 971 ecquem in angiporto hoc hominem tu novisti? te rogo.</p>	<p><i>Class 1b:</i> Pl. <i>Pers.</i> 635 at ego patriam te rogo quae sit tua. Pl. <i>Trin.</i> 873-74 Lesbonicum hic adulescentem quaero in his regionibus/ ubi habitat,</p>	<p><i>Class 2:</i> Pl. <i>Poen.</i> 1008 roga numquid opus sit. Pl. <i>Circ.</i> 601 rogata unde istunc habeat anulum.</p>
<p><i>Class 3:</i> Pl. <i>Amph.</i> 1015-16 nunc domum ibo atque ex uxore hanc rem pergam exquirere,/quis fuerit Pl. <i>Capt.</i> 951-52 interibi ego ex hac statua verberea volo/erogitare meo minore quid sit factum filio. Pl. <i>Bacch.</i> 189 rogabis me ubi sit: Pl. <i>Truc.</i> 650-51 interrogo/quid eum velit</p>	<p><i>Class 4:</i> Ter. <i>Heaut.</i> 943-44 illum hoc rogato simul,/quam ob rem id faciam. Pl. <i>Poen.</i> 181 rogato servos veterine ad eum tuos. Pl. <i>Cist.</i> 502 abi, quaere ubi iuri iurando tuo sit satias supsidi:</p>	

at hand to the speakers. In all cases of imperative forms of *videre* used in this way, even when the literal meaning of seeing is not involved, as at *Rud.* 1002 in Table 1, modal shift regularly does not occur in the Q-clause. As Tables 2–4 show, imperative verbs of saying, first person present tense verbs of asking, and expressions such as *scire volo* and *fac sciam* are also used to introduce such simple inquiries. This fact proves that the distinction between *verba videndi, sciendi, dicendi, and rogandi* is not relevant to the conditioning of modal shift.

Subclass 1b: simple inquiries with prolepsis.

Subclass 1b is identical to 1a simple inquiries, except that the sentences in 1b all show prolepsis (or *anticipatio*). The subject of the Q-clause has been removed from the Q-clause and turned into an accusative dependent on the associated verb. Modal shift regularly applies in subclass 1b irrespective of the type of associated verb.

Subclass 1c: double inquiries.

In subclass 1c the speaker is still making an inquiry about the Q-clause to which he wants an immediate answer, but he is also asking whether his addressee will answer the question simultaneously being asked. Modal shift regularly occurs in subclass 1c.

Subclass 1d: conjoined inquiries.

In subclass 1d the imperative verb of saying is syntactically connected by a conjunction with another imperative which is not a verb of saying. Modal shift regularly applies in subclass 1d. But for future reference note 1d' in Table 3 where two verbs of saying are coordinated and there is no modal shift in the Q-clause.

Subclass 1e: subordinated inquiries.

In subclass 1e the verb of saying continues to introduce a question the speaker wishes to be answered, but the verb is part of a final clause. Modal shift regularly occurs in subclass 1e.

2.2. Class 2: inquiries about Q-clauses with topics not present.

Class 2 differs from class 1a simple inquiries in that the topic of the Q-clause is not immediately present, so that the person questioned cannot give an immediate response. This is obvious when there are two imperatives “go and see” as at *Ter. Heaut.* 871 in Table 1, but it is also the case when only *vide* occurs, as at *Pl. Most.* 309, where Philematium tells the slave to get dice, which, of course, are not on stage. *Pl. Amph.* 787, cited by Delbrück, belongs to this class. Imperative verbs of asking can also be used this way, and a related usage is found when the speaker intends to turn the attention of the addressee to the question he is about to ask, as at *Rud.* 1148 with the future

imperative, in Table 3. Note that *Daemones* actually calls for an answer from *Palaestra* four lines later at 1153: *loquere nunciam, puella. Volo scire* is used exactly the same way at Pl. *Truc.* 779 in Table 2; *Callicles* only commands a response nine lines later: *loquere tu*. Modal shift regularly applies in class 2.

2.3. Class 3: question descriptions.

In class 3 the speaker is not addressing the Q-clause to a second person in order to obtain an answer; rather he is describing a question he has already asked or one that he will ask or find out about at a later time. With the second person indicative verbs of asking, the speaker is describing or presenting his addressee as asking a question. Class 3 regularly has modal shift.

2.4. Class 4: commands to inquire or find out.

In class 4 the speaker is not asking a question to obtain an answer at all, but is directing a second person to find out or to consider something for the second person's sake. This is particularly clear in the whole interchange between *Periplectomenus* and *Sceledrus* at Pl. *Mil.* 535–37:

PE. vin scire plane? Sc. cupio. PE. abi intro ad vos domum.
continuo, vide sitne istaec vostra intus. Sc. licet,
pulchre admonuisti.

Modal shift regularly occurs in class 4.

2.5. Class 5: statements.

Subclass 5a consists of simple declarative statements: no question is being asked, no command given. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 5a.¹⁵

Subclass 5b consists entirely of the first person singular, present indicative *scio* immediately preceding the Q-clause. In these sentences *scio* is neither syntactically coordinated nor subordinated; it is never qualified or intensified, nor is it used in contrast with *nescio* or other verbs of ignorance and doubting. So far as the discourse function of subclass 5b utterances is concerned, it differs from 5a in that they are all anticipations of a second person's words, sometimes forestalling an objection as at *Aul.* 174. Additional examples with the indicative are: Pl. *Bacch.* 78 and *Mil.* 36. Modal shift usually does not occur in subclass 5b in Plautus, but note *Epid.* 577 in Table 2 with modal shift. In Terence and later authors, however, subclass 5b seems always to have modal shift, and thus is merged with 5a.

¹⁵ See the apparatus criticus at Ter. *Ad.* 996.

2.6. Class 6: exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms.

In class 6 we have the interrogative forms *viden* and *scin*, but here it is not used in an inquiry, i.e. the speaker is not asking whether a second person actually does see or know what the topic of the Q-clause refers to. In fact with *viden* the topic of the Q-clause is present at hand in the action on stage. Furthermore the Q-clause functions as an exclamation. This is particularly clear in Palinurus's exclamation at Pl. *Curc.* 186–88 in Table 1. (He completes his exclamation with the sentence *nequeunt complecti satis*.) Modal shift does *not* occur in class 6.

2.7. Class 7: inquiries about the associated verb.

Class 7 differs from class 6 in that the speaker is actually inquiring whether a second person sees or knows. There are apparently no cases with the form *viden*, but *non vides* is common, as is *scin*. We can compare the similar use of *audin* as at Ter. *Hec.* 78 in Table 1: Scirtus is not on stage, but in the house, and Parmeno is genuinely inquiring if Scirtus has heard what he ordered him to do. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 7.

2.8. Class 8: exclamations about present topics introduced by imperative forms.

In class 8 we have imperative rather than interrogative verb forms. As in class 6 the Q-clause may be an exclamation regarding something on stage (8a) or a topic already described in discourse (8b). A good example of 8b is Pl. *Stich.* 410 in Table 1, where Epignomus had just described how his financial success had got him back in the good graces of his father-in-law Antipho. Modal shift does *not* occur in class 8.

2.9. Class 9: presentations of new topics.

In class 9 the topic of the Q-clause is not already established in discourse. For example, at Ter. *Andr.* 825 in Table 1 Chremes spells out what he means by *quam iniquo' sis* in his following remarks to Simo. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 9.

2.10. Class 10: commands to make statements.

Finally in class 10 the speaker commands a second person to tell something to a third person or persons. Modal shift regularly occurs in class 10.

3. Preliminary Generalizations

To summarize the results of section 2, modal shift regularly does not apply to class 1a simple inquiries, class 5b *scio* anticipations, class 6 exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms.

and class 8 exclamations about present topics introduced by imperative forms. In all the other classes modal shift regularly applies. A number of preliminary generalizations concerning regularities in modal shift emerge from the foregoing classificatory scheme: (1) Modal shift always applies to Q-clauses associated with third person and non-interrogative second person indicative verb forms; (2) When the topic of the Q-clause is not present or already introduced into the discourse, modal shift regularly applies, regardless of the associated verb form; and (3) When the associated verb is involved in certain syntactic relations, for example subordinated in a final clause, coordinated with imperatives of verbs other than *verba dicendi*, or governing a proleptic object, modal shift regularly applies to the Q-clause, regardless of the status of the utterance or other criteria. These generalizations and the very fact that the cases with modal shift could be separated from the cases without it on the bases of externally defined criteria show that there must be some coherent and substantive principles at work. It remains to determine what is directly relevant and what is redundant and how factors of syntactic structure may interact with function in discourse to condition modal shift.

4. Considerations of Speech Act Theory

Since it has been established that Old Latin modal shift is conditioned by speech situation and discourse function (i.e. conditioned by pragmatic factors) as well as by syntactic factors, it is reasonable to investigate the relevance of the theory of speech acts as developed by J. L. Austin and popularized by J. R. Searle.¹⁶ It is obvious that in actual discourse a speaker does far more than merely make statements: he can promise, cajole, advise, warn, introduce new topics, order, request, exclaim, ask questions, and so on. In fact, the sort of acts just indicated are varieties of one of three simultaneous acts involved in speaking. Austin distinguished "locutionary acts," the making of an utterance, from "illocutionary acts," the acts performed simply by making an utterance (asking, promising, exclaiming, etc.), and both of these from "perlocutionary acts," the results intended by

¹⁶ The literature on speech acts has become enormous since J. L. Austin's *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford 1962), and especially since J. R. Searle's *Speech Acts* (Cambridge 1969). An admirable presentation is given by John Lyons (*Semantics 2* [Cambridge 1977], pp. 725–86). See also S. C. Levinson, *Pragmatics* (Cambridge 1983), pp. 226–83. My arguments do not depend on any specific version of speech act theory and will remain valid on an approach which seeks to subsume speech act theory under more general pragmatic theories of utterance function and intent.

making an utterance, such as obtaining an answer. I shall argue that it is the illocutionary status of the verb associated with the Q-clause that is crucially involved in determining whether modal shift takes place.

There is a distinction to be drawn between linguistic form and structure on the one hand and the use of that structure in discourse on the other. As noted in the descriptions of class 6 exclamations introduced by interrogative forms and class 7 inquiries about the associated verb (in which that verb is, of course, also interrogative in form), not every use of an interrogative form such as *scin* or *audin* involves the illocutionary act of questioning. In English, if we say at the dinner table "Could you pass me the salt?" we are making a request, not asking a question. From the perlocutionary point of view, we intend to get the person to pass the salt, not to answer yes or no. The actual illocutionary force is that of a request; the grammatical form determines only the incidental illocutionary force. Such indirect speech acts are, of course, associated with considerations of politeness and the tone that the speaker wishes to adopt.¹⁷ Similarly in an utterance such as *rogo*, *quid est*, *rogo* does not make a statement; it is part of the illocutionary act of asking the question; it is a performative verb. Performative verbs can serve to make the illocutionary force or an utterance explicit. When they do, they are always first person, primary tense (and, interestingly, in English never progressive in aspect). Performative verbs need not be overtly present. *Quid est?* also has the illocutionary force of a question. *Quid est?* is a primary performative; *rogo quid est* an explicit performative. If primary and explicit performatives are not completely identical in meaning, they are nevertheless very similar. In fact performative verbs resemble in a number of ways what are called parenthetical verbs used in making statements. In the utterance "John will be here at eight o'clock, I think" the words "I think" are, as Urmson says, "Used to modify or weaken the claim to truth implied by a simple assertion."¹⁸ They do not serve to describe the speaker's act of cognition. Similarly in the utterance "I ask you, what would you have done?" the performative verb "ask" makes explicit the illocutionary force—perhaps indicating

¹⁷ In general an indirect speech act can be performed by stating or questioning one of the felicity conditions on an explicit speech act; see D. Gordon and G. Lakoff, "Conversational postulates," *Papers from the Seventh Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society* (Chicago 1971), 63–84. This principle seems to be a language (culture) universal; see P. Brown and S. Levinson, "Universals in language usage: politeness phenomena," in E. Goody, *Questions and Politeness: Strategies in Social Interaction* (Cambridge 1978), 56–311.

¹⁸ J. O. Urmson, "Parenthetical verbs," *Mind* 61 (1952), 480.

I am asking a real question, not just posing a rhetorical one. Such performative verbs can be characterized as modulations of the illocutionary force of the utterance in which they appear. The important point is that verbs can be illocutionary modulations only when they partake of at least the same general illocutionary force as the rest of the utterance would in their absence. We can see this very clearly when we contrast an utterance like "I asked you what you would have done." This is a report, a description of the speech act of questioning; it is not itself a question, and "asked" is not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause. For future reference it is interesting to note that Lyons has suggested that "it is . . . possible that the surface structure status of a performative main verb should be accounted for by a grammatical rule which operates on two juxtaposed, or paratactically associated, clauses, neither of which is subordinate to the other."¹⁹

It will be remembered that the failure of modal shift was restricted to just the following classes: 1a (simple inquiries), 5b (*scio* anticipations), 6 (exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms), and 8 (exclamations introduced by imperative forms). All of these classes share a common characteristic. The verb associated with the Q-clause partakes of the same illocutionary force as the Q-clause could have by itself. This status of the associated verb is most obvious for the first person, present tense indicative verbs of asking of class 1a. *Interrogo* at Pl. *Amph.* 438 and *rogo* at *Pseud.* 971 in Table 4 are (in spite of Lindsay's punctuation) typical first person, present tense forms used as direct performative verbs in explicit performative utterances. The relevance of the illocutionary status of the associated verb is established by the minimal contrast provided by the morphologically identical forms *interrogo* and *rogo* as used in class 3 question descriptions, where modal shift occurs. At Pl. *Cap.* 509 and *Truc.* 650 neither *rogo* nor *interrogo* can be performatives, for both are historical presents used to narrate previous acts of questioning. The illocutionary force of these utterances is constative, i.e. they are statements, not questions. Consequently *rogo* and *interrogo* cannot here be illocutionary modulations of the Q-clause (or its unshifted form). Unlike *rogo* and *interrogo*, the verbs of saying, seeing, and knowing of class 1a are not simple, direct performatives. They are all imperative forms (or involving *volo*, *expeto* and the like), but their illocutionary force is not that of a command or request to do anything more than what is implicit already in the act of asking a question. This fact enables us to

¹⁹ Lyons (above, note 16), p. 782.

explain why the questions of class 1a simple inquiries are all restricted to topics that are immediately present. A genuine question cannot be felicitously asked of a person who could not reasonably be assumed to know the answer. If the topic were not present or known to the addressee, this condition of felicity would not be met, and, as a result, the imperatives would not introduce questions, but necessarily be actual commands to see or observe. Such, of course, is precisely the status of the imperatives in class 2 inquiries about topics not present where modal shift regularly applies. Thus class 2 provides another minimal contrast with class 1a that confirms the hypothesis that it is the status of the associated verb as an illocutionary modulation that blocks modal shift.

Class 6 (exclamations about present topics introduced by interrogative forms) and class 8 (similar exclamations introduced by imperative forms) show a parallel relationship between their verbs and the associated Q-clauses. In these utterances, unlike those of class 1a (simple inquiries), the Q-clause does not partake of the illocutionary force of questioning; rather these utterances are exclamations or presentations of discourse topics. We have already seen that the interrogatives in class 6 are used indirectly and that they are equivalent in illocutionary force to the imperatives of class 8. Now the act of making an exclamation or presenting a topic in discourse necessarily involves bringing the topic to the attention of the addressee. There is no additional illocutionary force to *viden* and *vide* in classes 6 and 8; they are not autonomous commands or questions. This fact allows us to explain why, just as in class 1a simple inquiries, the topic of the Q-clauses in classes 6 and 8 concerns matters present on stage or established in discourse. One of the conditions for the felicity of a simple exclamation is that the addressee can reasonably be assumed to know what it is that is being exclaimed about. This condition is not met in class 9, and, consequently, the imperatives in 9 have the illocutionary force of a command to pay attention or consider something new. Thus a minimal contrast parallel to that between class 1a simple inquiries about present topics and class 2 inquiries about absent topics obtains between classes 6 and 8 on the one hand and class 9 on the other.

The status of the associated verb as an actual command and not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause is obvious also in class 10 (commands to make statements). Here the imperatives of the verbs of saying are genuine commands to tell or describe something to a third person. The imperatives of verbs of asking of class 4 (commands to inquire or find out) are exactly parallel.

The relation of the imperatives of verbs of asking in class 2 (inquiries about topics not present) to those same forms in class 4 is instructive. In class 2 the addressee is ordered to ask a question of a third party with the perlocutionary intent that he inform the speaker; in class 4 the speaker has no such perlocutionary object in mind. Since modal shift is obligatory in both classes, it is clear that perlocutionary differences are not relevant to modal shift. This fact permits us to unite the interrogative verbs of saying of class 1c, where the speaker actually wants an answer to the question implicit in the Q-clause, with the interrogative forms of verbs of seeing of class 7, where there is no inquiry implicit in the utterance. The illocutionary force of the associated verb in both classes is interrogative, but in respect to the second person action of the verb, not only that of the Q-clause. Thus these interrogatives cannot be illocutionary modulations.

Of the ten major classes, only class 5 (statements) remains to be discussed. In class 5a the associated verb has constative illocutionary force, i.e. it is making a statement. Consequently, these verbs cannot be modulations, since making a statement cannot be done by asking a question. Furthermore, we can unite class 3 question descriptions with class 5a statements all as constative utterances.

Class 5b (*scio* anticipations) requires some discussion. This class constitutes a special sort of speech act. The illocutionary force of *scio* is not constative as in 5a. The speaker is not really asserting his knowledge; rather, he is anticipating the second person's next remarks or forestalling objections. This distinction emerges in the contrast between Pl. *Men.* 764^a, which is clearly a class 5a constative utterance, and Pl. *Aul.* 174 or *Stich.* 112. The same anticipatory force of *scio* is also found when the verb is not associated with a Q-clause, as at Pl. *Merc.* 164 ff., where Charinus interrupts Acanthio. Note that *scio* is followed by *oratio recta*.

Ac. immo es—Ch. *scio* iam, miserum dices tu. Ac. dixi ego tacens.

Thus in class 5b, *scio* is also a modulation of the utterance's illocutionary force. The relationship between *scio* and its associated Q-clause in class 5b is parallel to that between *scin* and its associated Q-clause in class 6. This parallelism is particularly clear in the case of echo-retorts such as Pl. *Poen.* 1318. Consequently the two classes may be united, at least for Plautus. It is important, however, to point out that class 5b does not exist in Terence as a block to modal shift. At Ter. *Heaut.* 626 ff. Chremes is clearly anticipating what his wife Sostrata is about to say concerning her child, yet the interruption shows modal shift:

So. Meministin me ess(e) gravidam et mihi te maxumo opere edicere, si puellam parerem, nolle tolli? CH. scio quid feceris: sustulisti.

In fact, already in Plautus there is probably variation in modal shift in these anticipatory utterances, since Pl. *Epid.* 577 in Table 2, which has modal shift, seems fairly certainly to belong to class 5b. Thus in class 5b we have evidence for syntactic change in progress in Plautus that is already complete in Terence.

To summarize: in all cases where modal shift fails to apply, the verb associated with the Q-clause is a modulation of the illocutionary force that the Q-clause would have if used independently. This rule allows us to explain why failure of modal shift is found only in association with primary tense verb forms in the first person and the imperative or interrogative form having indirect illocutionary force; it is only in these forms that verbs can be used as illocutionary modulations of a Q-clause.

5. Grammatical Conditioning of Modal Shift

We must now consider whether there is any purely grammatical conditioning of modal shift in addition to the conditioning determined by the illocutionary status of the associated verb. The subclasses 1b (inquiries with prolepsis), 1c (double inquiries), 1d (conjoined inquiries), and 1e (subordinated inquiries) were initially grouped together with 1a (simple inquiries) on the basis of shared perlocutionary force and distinguished in syntactic terms. We have seen, however, that perlocutionary force is irrelevant to modal shift, and further that class 1c modal shift can be explained by the actual illocutionary force of the associated verb. Furthermore, the contrast of Pl. *Pers.* 664 at 1d' in Table 3 (without modal shift) shows that the syntactic structure of coordinated imperatives is not sufficient by itself to entail modal shift. Rather, in 1d' the two imperatives *eloquere actutum atque indica* are pleonastic; both of them have the same illocutionary force and are equally modulations. Thus 1d' can be united with class 1a (simple inquiries). In subclass 1d itself, however, the imperative verb of saying is coordinated with an imperative that expresses a genuine command, for example *redduc uxorem*. Thus these imperative verbs of saying also express actual commands to speak. As a result subclass 1d can be united with class 2 (inquiries about topics not present), where the imperatives also have the illocutionary force of actual commands. We come closer to genuine syntactic conditioning in subclass 1e, but only in the sense that a verb subordinated in a final clause cannot have

the sort of illocutionary force required if it is to be a modulation of the utterance as a whole.

This leaves us with subclass 1b (inquiries with prolepsis of the subject of the Q-clause). The utterances in class 1b do not seem to differ from those of 1a from the point of view of speech act theory: they all involve acts of questioning. This is quite clear when we compare Pistoclus's question to Mnesilochus at Pl. *Bacch.* 555, *dic modo hominem qui sit*, with his question at *Bacch.* 553 also addressed to Mnesilochus, and having exactly the same force, *opseco hercle loquere, quis is est?* The only difference between these sentences is that the one at *Bacch.* 555 shows prolepsis, or *anticipatio*; the subject of the Q-clause, *homo*, has been moved out of the Q-clause and made the object of the associated verb. At *Bacch.* 553, on the other hand, the pronoun *is* remains within the Q-clause as its subject. Prolepsis is described in modern generative grammar as the transformation called Raising to Object. In analyzing the syntactic conditions on modal shift we must be careful to distinguish similar surface syntactic structures which do not result from Raising to Object. For example at Pl. *Pseud.* 261 *nosce saltem hunc quis est* cannot be a case of prolepsis, since *noscere* is not used absolutely by Plautus, and consequently there is no modal shift. It is not entirely certain that modal shift is obligatory with prolepsis in the sense of Raising to Object, cf. Pl. *Pseud.* 1184 *chlamydem hanc commemora quanti conductast. Commemorare*, however, differs from *dicere* in the senses in which it can take a direct object, so that it would be possible to argue that Pl. *Pseud.* 1184 is not a genuine case of prolepsis. A categorical distinction should probably not be insisted on, and variation in modal shift might be expected in cases where either syntactic analysis is possible.

While prolepsis (in the sense of Raising to Object) appears to be a purely syntactic factor that conditions modal shift in Old Latin, the association between these two syntactic processes may have been pragmatic in origin. Prolepsis is typically a topicalizing transformation, i.e. it is typically used to highlight the noun phrase topic of discourse by moving it to an earlier, more exposed position. This function can be seen quite clearly at Pl. *Trin.* 871 ff. The Sycophanta has been knocking on the door of the *senex* Charmides. Charmides steps out and asks him

quid, adulescens, quaeris? quid vis? quid istas pultas?

and the Sycophanta finally answers with the sentence

Lesbonicum hic adulescentem quaero in his regionibus
ubi habitat.

The prolepsis of *Lesbonicum* immediately introduces the topic of the inquiry. The Sycophanta's utterance can be regarded as a complex speech act: a statement in answer to Charmides' question, the introduction of a topic (obviously unknown) to Charmides, and finally a question about that topic. Such an utterance satisfies, on several counts, the conditions we have already established as sufficient to cause modal shift. Since a large number of utterances showing prolepsis would be involved in topic introduction and would, therefore, already require modal shift, the characteristic conditions for analogical extension would be established; modal shift could be readily generalized to other utterances showing prolepsis, probably along a scale of discourse saliency, leading to modal shift in cases such as Pl. *Bacch.* 555. Pl. *Pseud.* 1184, just discussed, could be taken as evidence for this hypothesis of a hierarchy of saliency. At Pl. *Pseud.* 1184 the topic is present in the discourse situation—*chlamydem hanc*—so that this utterance meets the illocutionary criteria sufficient to block modal shift.

Having formulated the hypothesis that modal shift is blocked by the status of the associated verb as an illocutionary modulation, we can see that where modal shift fails to apply we do not have in fact indirect questions in the sense of *oratio obliqua* at all, but rather genuine speech acts of questioning, exclaiming, and so on. On the other hand, where the associated verb is not an illocutionary modulation of the Q-clause, the clause really is an indirect question, exclamation, etc. Accordingly we can formulate a rule that brings Old Latin closer to Classical Latin than has been previously appreciated: in Old Latin modal shift is obligatory in all indirect questions. On this approach Old and Classical Latin differ not in the syntax of indirect questions, but in the definition of what constitutes indirect questions. In Old Latin indirect question status is defined pragmatically in terms of the illocutionary status of the associated verb; in Classical Latin it is generally defined in terms of the surface syntactic structure.

We can see that more was involved in the evolution of the syntax of indirect questions out of paratactic structures than a purely syntactic process of generalization from deliberative questions. The evolution was conditioned by pragmatic, speech act factors, and already by the time of Plautus we see the beginnings of the stage that will lead to the situation in Classical Latin. In Old Latin a substantial number of all Q-clauses associated with verbs were already subject to modal shift, whether for reasons of illocutionary status or for the syntactic reason of prolepsis. A re-analysis of the conditioning factors as syntactic was the next step. We have seen evidence of two areas in which this re-

analysis began. Regular modal shift in subclass 1b inquiries with prolepsis introduced a purely syntactic condition. Modal shift was then generalized proceeding through similar syntactic structures such as those produced by Equi-NP Deletion. The second area is the restricted class of *scio* plus Q-clause anticipations of class 5b. This subclass was open to interpretation as declarative sentences like 5a and the extension of modal shift further encouraged by the overwhelming frequency of modal shift in Q-clauses associated with all other occurrences of forms of *scire*.

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

4

Caesar's Bibracte Narrative and the Aims of Caesarian Style

MARK F. WILLIAMS

The distinctive characteristics of Caesarian prose style are widely if imperfectly known, but Caesar's merits as a stylist are still argued. Paradoxically, much of the debate has as its origin the domination of our standards of good Latinity and good prose style by Cicero, who himself praised the style of Caesar's *commentarii* in a well-known passage from the *Brutus* (§262). Whether Cicero is being disingenuous in this passage is debatable,¹ but the fact remains that Cicero commended the prose style of the political enemy over whose assassination he later gloated unashamedly. The *Brutus* passage does not seem to be ironic;² and the fact that Cicero's praise of Caesarian style does not appear to follow from the dictates he lays down regarding good historical style may be attributed to the generic differences between history and *commentarii*.³

Until recently Caesarian prose style has fared less well at the hands of modern critics than it did at the hands of Caesar's contemporary enemies. For example, Nettleship prefaces his harsh condemnation of

¹ H. C. Gotoff, "Towards a Practical Criticism of Caesar's Prose Style" (*Illinois Classical Studies* IX.1 [Spring, 1984], pp. 1–18), p. 2, note 3, raises the possibility that Cicero may be "grovelling" in the *Brutus* passage.

² But see P. T. Eden, "Caesar's Style: Inheritance versus Intelligence," *Glotta* 40 (1962), pp. 74–117, esp. pp. 74 ff., on the possibility that Cicero is referring ruefully to the reception accorded his own *commentarii*.

³ Not even Livy fulfilled the demands Cicero made upon historical style (in, for example, *De or.* 2.51–64); but most literary manifestos are more honored in the breach. See T. J. Luce, *Livy. The Composition of His History* (Princeton 1977), pp. 181 ff.

Caesar both as an individual and as a stylist with the assertion (impossible to prove) that “while much of Cicero’s writing has come down to us in its most finished shape, nothing of Caesar’s remains but his most carelessly written work.” He continues:

It must be pointed out that Cicero’s success was not due merely to his having mastered the laws of prose rhythm, nor merely to his general power as a stylist. His mind was of the poetical and imaginative order, while Caesar’s, manly, sound, and robust, was without a touch of poetry. Strength of passion Caesar has, but no imagination.⁴

It is a truism that Caesar was not a Ciceronian, but too many critical evaluations of Caesarian style issue from canons of taste that are basically Ciceronian, with predictable results. For example, although he avoids the more extreme Ciceronian prejudices of Nettleship, J. J. Schlicher, in his otherwise excellent analysis of Caesarian style, taxes the first book of the *Bellum Gallicum* with being over-precise and argumentative, with using an old-fashioned mode of expression, and with being not yet adapted to a narrative technique.⁵ Such a view of Caesarian prose style presupposes (although Schlicher does not say so) a sort of stylistic evolution that moved ineluctably from the old annalists to Ciceronian periodicity, with Caesar—at least in *BG*—certainly looking to the past, perhaps ruefully looking forward to a stylistic future he was not yet capable of fitting into. This is an assumption hard to credit in the case of one of the leading orators of the late Republic, but it is the assumption, I think, that lies at the heart of most Tulliocentric analyses of Caesar’s prose style.

Even a fairly strict reliance upon empirical analysis of Caesar’s style does not render one immune from Ciceronian prejudices; even P. T. Eden, despite his attempts to stand upon empirically firm ground in his analysis of Caesar’s stylistic debt to the annalists, falls prey to his own preference for Cicero:

The style and syntax of Caesar, *or at any rate that immense number of stylistic and syntactic practices he shares with Cicero*, have long since been consecrated as paradigms. They have become the standards to which the Latinity of others, Roman jurists no less than modern students, is explicitly or implicitly referred. This canonical status is no doubt entirely justifiable . . . [my italics].⁶

⁴ H. Nettleship, “The Historical Development of Classical Latin Prose,” *Journal of Philology* 15 (1886), p. 47.

⁵ J. J. Schlicher, “The Development of Caesar’s Narrative Style,” *Classical Philology* 21 (1936), pp. 212 ff.

⁶ Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

This is not to say, however, that Eden's critique is without merit. The great strengths of Eden's analysis are, first, his attempt at a sort of "empirical fair-mindedness" and, second, his constant recognition that, in comparing the literary remains of Caesar and Cicero, one is comparing (at least) two very different literary genres. Eden's analysis of Caesar and the meager remains of the old annalists leads him to a conclusion that is probably correct and, interestingly, almost directly opposed to Nettleship's: "[T]he early annalist manner is generally dry and monotonous, but it does carry with it an undeniable impression of passionless objectivity. This suited Caesar's needs exactly: he would be his own most detached judge and expositor."⁷ Eden therefore sees in Caesar's style the result of a conscious choice: the avoidance of obvious *exornatio* and the suppression of extreme rhetorical flourishes were means to an end, as was the text of the work itself. This is a fair conclusion, so far as it goes: it treats Caesar as an artist rather than as a self-serving political hack; but beyond that, Eden does not give Caesar's early prose style much credit when compared to the capabilities of the "comprehensive Livian period." For example, in dealing with Caesar's tendency to repeat key words and phrases (about which I shall have something to say later), Eden says:

Caesar is notoriously guilty of such close repetitions [as *BG* I. 49. 1–3] . . . [T]he repetition is due neither to carelessness nor to a desire for accuracy, but occurs simply because Caesar took no pains to avoid it. In fact here we glimpse the basic substratum of Caesar's annalistic style, running directly from writers like Calpurnius Piso, outcrops of which continue to manifest themselves up to the end of Caesar's work.⁸

The metaphor is instructive (to say nothing of phrases like "notoriously guilty"): by Eden's standards, the *BG* contains boulders of clumsiness that lurk beneath its otherwise almost featureless surface, "outcrops" of uncouth repetition that make it hard for the reader to plough through. While Cicero would no doubt have appreciated the agricultural metaphor, it does not jibe well with Eden's conclusion (quoted above, note 7); moreover, such criticisms, at their worst, tempt the uncritical reader to dismiss Caesar (at least in the early books of the *BG*) as little more than a slavish though effective follower of an outmoded, pre-Ciceronian style; at its best, Eden's view of Caesarian style gives the impression that Caesar either had a tin ear or, worse, was indifferent to the sound of his writing.

What is needed is an analysis of Caesarian style that takes account

⁷ Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁸ Eden, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

both of the appeal of the annalists for Caesar and of the aims Caesar had in bucking the trend in Latinity represented by Cicero. If we take it as given that Caesar was not incapable of something resembling the "comprehensive Livian period" even in the early books of the *BG*, we must answer the question what the effect of Caesar's stylistic choice was—even if we agree with Eden as to its purpose. W. Richter and, more recently, H. C. Gotoff have begun to address this point. Richter observes that Caesar's aim is to make motives, assumptions and consequences understandable as a logical complex which presents Caesar "als kritischen Beobachter eines Kampfverlaufes. . . . [D]ie Kunst des Darstellers spiegelt den Meister der Befehlstechnik."⁹ Correct as this analysis is—and Richter, to his credit, uses *BG* I in this passage—the observation derives not from Caesar's prose style *per se*: Richter does not show how, for example, Cicero (had he been so minded) could not have taken the same material and achieved the same result in his own fashion. Gotoff, on the other hand, treats the nuts and bolts of Caesarian style in much detail, analyzing the complex subtlety and flexibility Caesar achieves even in the early books of the *BG*.¹⁰ But nearly all of Gotoff's examples are drawn from the second and fourth books of the *BG*, and most are comparatively short passages—on the order of one or two sentences. Significantly, the two examples he chooses from *BG* I illustrate the purpose behind a lack of balance between an ablative absolute phrase and the main clause of the sentence (I. 41) and periodicity of a sort not often associated with Caesar (I. 6). In short, Gotoff has shown both what is Caesarian about Caesar and the style's artistic capabilities.

I propose to take the methods of Richter and Gotoff and apply them to a longer, continuous passage of early Caesarian prose: Caesar's account of his fight with the Helvetians at Bibracte (*BG* I. 23 ff.). This engagement, fought in 58 B.C., was Caesar's first major battle as commander in Gaul and, as he saw it, his victory broke the back of a dangerous invasion that could have jeopardized Roman control of the province.¹¹ In this narrative Caesar faced the difficult task of describing a personal triumph and an historically pivotal battle

⁹ Will Richter, *Caesar als Darsteller seiner Taten* (Heidelberg 1977), p. 149.

¹⁰ H. C. Gotoff, *loc. cit.*; the author also remarks (p. 4, note 14) on the "carefully controlled rhetorical ornamentation and *ethopoiia* that makes Book I perhaps the least typical part of the Caesarian corpus."

¹¹ S. Reinach, "Les communiqués de César" (*Revue de philologie* 39, 1915), pp. 29–49, raises the possibility that Caesar's campaign against the Helvetians was a "picked" fight and that the Helvetian migration actually proved no threat to Roman interests. See also Richter, *op. cit.*, ch. 4, §4.a, "Der Ausbruch des Helvetierkrieges," pp. 102–16.

in terms that would enhance his *dignitas* but at the same time give as little offense as possible to those at Rome who already viewed his command with mistrust and apprehension.¹² Thus Caesar was obviously concerned with the impression his account would make at home, and we should probably believe that he was pulled in different directions by aims that would appear, on the surface at least, mutually exclusive. There are also curiosities of style in this passage that seem to be flaws when they are considered in the light of Ciceronian "norms." Perhaps the most immediately obvious example is the repetition of certain verbs and their derivatives: *iacio* (six times), *mitto* (nine times) and *fero* (five times)—and all within the space of about two-and-a-half Oxford pages.¹³ But we must not judge these repetitions and other stylistic "quirks" too harshly, especially if (1) our standard of what constitutes a quirk is based upon Cicero¹⁴ and (2) we fail to look for a possible reason for Caesar's having written as he did. That Caesar was trying in his account of Bibracte to enhance his public image will, I think, be granted without argument. What I seek to prove, and what will provoke argument, is that Caesar's Bibracte narrative succeeds as a work of prose art.

Postridie eius diei, quod omnino biduum supererat cum exercitui frumentum metiri oporteret, et quod a Bibracte, oppido Aeduorum longe maximo et copiosissimo, non amplius milibus passuum xviii aberat, rei frumentariae prospiciendum existimavit: iter ab Helvetiis avertit ac Bibracte ire contendit. Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemili, decurionis equitum Gallorum, hostibus nuntiatur. Helvetii, seu quod timore perterritos Romanos discedere a se existimarent, eo magis quod pridie superioribus locis occupatis proelium non commisissent, sive eo quod re frumentaria intercludi posse confiderent, commutato consilio atque itinere converso nostros a novissimo agmine insequi ac lacessere coeperunt. (23. 1–3)

At the beginning of his Bibracte narrative, Caesar immediately makes a distinction between the Roman strategy and that of the

¹² Caelius reported to Cicero in June, 51, some of the rumors circulating in Rome concerning Caesar's campaign (*Ad fam.* VIII. 1. 4). While commentaries or dispatches by the commander probably would not have won over Caesar's harshest critics in the senate and elsewhere, they would have helped to allay the sort of fears that Caelius mentions.

¹³ All references to the *BG* in this paper are to the Oxford Classical Text of Du Pontet.

¹⁴ Though it is well known that Cicero wrote a *commentarius* about his own actions against the conspiracy of Catiline which he himself thought needed stylistic "touching up."

Helvetians. It was (and is) a none-too-glamorous fact of military life that an army must be provisioned while it is in the field. The first concern Caesar faces as a commander is the insurance of an adequate food supply for his forces. Logically, reasonably, he keeps his logistics in mind (23. 1) and breaks off his pursuit of the enemy before putting himself at a potentially dangerous disadvantage. The construction of 23. 1 reflects the commander's *ratio*: an ablative of time for temporal accuracy and transition from the previous sentence, followed by a balanced pair of *quod* clauses, followed by another balanced pair of main clauses in asyndeton. Such balancing is a conscious effect, of course, and its purpose is to reveal to the reader at once the options that lay open to Caesar as a commander and the logical, most prudent course of action given the circumstances. What the reader is supposed to think is that no other course of action lay open to Caesar which would not have jeopardized the success of the mission.

The logical and likely suppositions of 23. 1 are continued to 23. 2, a short, smoothly-flowing period that shifts the reader's focus from the Roman point of view to that of the Helvetians. Despite the change in perspective, 23. 3 reinforces the idea of Caesar's *providentia* signified in 23. 1. In 23. 3 we have yet another straightforward periodic sentence whose structure is, like that of 23. 1, built around a complex of *quod* clauses. The period begins with an explicit statement of the subject, *Helvetii* (necessary because the sentence begins in asyndeton and the subject of the prior sentence was *ea res*); next comes a pair of explanatory *quod* clauses (the first of which is expanded by an additional *quod* clause¹⁵) which give the most likely possibilities to account for the sudden change in the enemy plan; after the *quod* clauses comes a pair of ablatives absolute, and finally the main clause, for which we have been waiting from the start.

Thus we see that in 23. 1–3 Caesar sets forth in well-balanced sentences the state of affairs just prior to the battle (whose preliminary skirmishes are described in 23. 4). Like any good commander Caesar takes stock of his own situation and tries to account for that of the enemy. We should note, however, that despite the fact that the intelligence controlling the presentation and the activities described in 23. 1–3 is unmistakably Caesar's, Caesar is nowhere named in §23. Significantly, he is not named until 24. 1, where the emphasis shifts from the strategic to the tactical, from planning on a grand, rational (and somewhat impersonal) scale to planning on a smaller scale that

¹⁵ Contrast 23. 1, where the *quod* clauses are more equally balanced.

allows for greater, more detailed analysis of personal motives and actions.

Postquam id animum advertit, copias suas Caesar in proximum collem subducit, equitatumque qui sustineret hostium impetum misit. Ipse interim in colle medio triplicem aciem instruxit legionum quattuor veteranorum [ita uti supra]; sed in summo iugo duas legiones quas in Gallia citeriore proxime conscripserat et omnia auxilia collocari, ac totum montem hominibus compleri, et interea sarcinas in unum locum conferri, et eum ab eis qui in superiore acie constiterant muniri iussit. Helvetii cum omnibus suis carris secuti impedimenta in unum locum contulerunt; ipsi confertissima acie, reiecto nostro equitatu, phalange facta sub primam nostram aciem successerunt. (24. 1–4)

In 23. 1–3 the reader is invited to survey the strategic situation and to make of it what he will; by contrast, in 24. 1–3 we see Caesar's tactical response to a new and perhaps unexpected situation: the Helvetians decide to fight. The Roman commander is here at his most decisive (*subducit/misit/instruxit/iussit*); the impression of his decisiveness is heightened by the (corresponding) tetracolon of passive infinitives in 24. 3 (*collocari/compleri/conferrimuniri*), all depending upon the final *iussit*. Quick action is required; the enemy whom Caesar has earlier (§22) failed to engage is now ready for a fight, and the smoothly flowing syntax of 24. 1–3 reflects the speed with which Caesar prepares to give battle; it also reflects the ease with which Caesar changes his plans to take advantage of an unexpected situation. 24. 1 is short and ultimately periodic (due to the postponement of *misit*); 24. 2 differs from its predecessor in the middle position (!) of its main verb (*instruxit*). The third sentence, 24. 3, is longer by almost a third than the first two taken together, and its periodicity is the more noticeable for the tetracolon of passive infinitives all waiting upon *iussit*, as noted above. The writing is as lucid as Caesar's tactics are conventional: high ground has always been advantageous in battle.¹⁶ But in this part of the *BG* Caesar is concerned with more than a matter of conventional tactics: he is keeping in mind both what the enemy might be thinking about the Roman willingness to fight (see 23. 3), and the tactics the enemy might be expected to use once the

¹⁶ M. Rambaud, *L'art de la déformation historique dans les commentaires de César* (Paris 1953), p. 41, quotes Jullian's observation that Caesar followed monotonously conventional tactics as a matter of habit. Rambaud rightly comments: "L'éminent historien n'avait pas songé que les manoeuvres dont il reproche à César la monotonie sont des nécessités militaires de tous les temps."

battle is joined. Here again we are reminded of Caesar's *providentia*, which is further emphasized when (24. 4) the Helvetians virtually doom their brave effort in advance by forming a phalanx for a difficult uphill charge. 24. 4 is in effect a brief recapitulation of the previous sentences, for the Helvetians carry out what must have been a universal pre-battle maneuver before forming their phalanx; thus, in the first half of 24. 4 Caesar can afford to be brief. His brevity continues in the last half of the sentence, where the preliminary skirmishes of the engagement are rendered with simple compactness in ablatives absolute. 24. 4 is also noteworthy for the occurrence of a verb formed from *iacio*, in the ablative absolute *reiecto nostro equitatu*. As noted above, forms of *iacio* are repeated six more times from 24. 4 to 27. 2; though such repetitions may appear dull or at least bewildering, they are artfully used in this narrative and emphasize in the end the personal nature of Caesar's triumph.

Caesar primum suo, deinde omnium ex conspectu remotis equis, ut aequato omnium periculo spem fugae tolleret, cohortatus suos proelium commisit. Milites e loco superiore pilis missis facile hostium phalangem perfregerunt. Ea disiecta, gladiis destrictis in eos impetum fecerunt. Gallis magno ad pugnam erat impedimento quod pluribus eorum scutis uno ictu pilorum transfixis et colligatis, cum ferrum se inflexisset, neque evellere neque sinistra impedita satis commode pugnare poterant; multi ut diu iactato brachio praeeoptarent scutum manu emittere et nudo corpore pugnare. Tandem vulneribus defessi et pedem referre et, quod mons suberat circiter mille passuum, eo se recipere coeperunt. (25. 1-5)

If our gaze is progressively narrowed from the strategic to the tactical in §§23 and 24, we find that at 25. 1 we are invited to consider Caesar's personal bravery in the face of battle. By sending away his own horse as well as those of his staff, Caesar shows his willingness to undergo the same risks that his legionaries will face. Beginning here at 25. 1, we note several repetitions of verb forms already noted: *commisit* (25. 1), *missis* (25. 2), *disiecta* (*ibid.*). 25. 1 is periodic, though brief; 25. 2 (printed rightly as two separate sentences in modern texts) communicates most of the violence of the battle in ablatives absolute, with the outcome of the engagement given alliteratively in the main clause (*phalangem perfregerunt*). The syntax of these first three sentences (25. 1-2) is simple and, again, smooth-flowing; but when in 25. 3-4 Caesar shifts our gaze to the Helvetians, the syntax suddenly changes: the periodic, easy-going syntax of the prior sentences is abandoned as the main clause of 25. 3 comes first with *magno* in a mild hyperbaton. There follows yet another *quod* clause (the sixth since 23.

1) that is periodic in nature (ablative absolute—*cum* clause—correlated pair of infinitives [the second of which is expanded with its own ablative absolute] depending upon *poterant*); 25. 4 is a result clause with *ut* in hyperbaton. Where the syntax of 25. 1–2 clearly reflects the relative ease with which the Romans beat back the Helvetian phalanx, that of 25. 3–4 reflects the confusion brought upon the enemy by Caesar's tactics. Thus the commander's *ratio* and *providentia* of §24 are vindicated in 25. 5.

Capto monte et succedentibus nostris, Boii et Tulingi, qui hominum milibus circiter xv agmen hostium claudebant et novissimis praesidio erant, ex itinere nostros latere aperto aggressi circumvenere, et id conspicati Helvetii, qui in montem sese receperant, rursus instare et proelium redintegrare coeperunt. Romani conversa signa bipertito intulerunt: prima et secunda acies, ut victis ac summotis resisteret; tertia, ut venientis sustineret.

Ita ancipiti proelio diu atque acriter pugnatum est. Diutius cum sustinere nostrorum impetus non possent, alteri se, ut coeperant, in montem receperunt, alteri ad impedimenta et carros suos se contulerunt. Nam hoc toto proelio, cum ab hora septima ad vesperum pugnatum sit, aversum hostem videre nemo potuit. (25. 6 – 26. 2)

There is, however, an unexpected turn of events when the Boii and Tulingi counterattack and throw the Romans into some confusion. If there is a point in the Bibracte narrative where Caesar tacitly admits to a lapse in his preparations, this is it. In order to preserve his victory Caesar must split his triple battle line, thus weakening his forces. Though Caesar does not say so forthrightly (the battle was merely *anceps*), there was a grave danger that, with his lines weakened thus and split up, the Helvetians could easily have broken through, had it proved possible for them to reform their phalanx (though whether they could in fact have reformed it depends upon how many of them had lost their shields [cf. 25. 1–5]; a phalanx lacking in shields is a decidedly inferior fighting force). The syntax of 25. 6–7 reflects this changed state of affairs: where the actions of the enemy are earlier described in choppy, starting-and-stopping ablatives absolute and subordinate clauses (see especially 25. 3 ff.), now we have the Helvetian action described in smooth, parallel, periodic sentences (depending upon *circumvenere* and *coeperunt*, respectively), and the Roman side is described in abrupt, choppy phrases (25. 7).

Thus Caesar's syntax reflects the ebb and flow of the battle even before 26. 1 sums up in words what the reader intuitively felt to be the case before. In 26. 2 Caesar pays an ungrudging compliment to his gallant enemy; the reader, perhaps, does not see at first that in noting

the enemy's stubborn, almost fanatical bravery Caesar calls attention to that of his own soldiers, and to his ability to change tactics quickly, when the situation demands it.

Ad multam noctem etiam ad impedimenta pugnatum est, propterea quod pro vallo carros obiecerant, et e loco superiore in nostros venientis tela coiciebant, et non nulli inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant. Diu cum esset pugnatum, impedimentis castrisque nostri potiti sunt. Ibi Orgetorigis filia atque unus e filiis captus est. Ex eo proelio circiter hominum milia cxxx superfuerunt, eaque tota nocte continenter ierunt: nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso in finis Lingonum die quarto pervenerunt, cum et propter vulnera militum et propter sepulturam occisorum nostri triduum morati eos sequi non potuissent. Caesar ad Lingonas litteras nuntiosque misit, ne eos frumento neve alia re iuarent: qui si iuissent, se eodem loco quo Helvetios habiturum. Ipse triduo intermisso cum omnibus copiis eos sequi coepit.

Helvetii omnium rerum inopia adducti legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt. (26. 3 – 27. 1)

It is now (26. 3) dark, and the battle rages still around the Helvetian baggage train, but with an ironic reversal of roles. Where before (25. 2–3) the Romans had used high ground to advantage in breaking the initial charge of the Helvetian phalanx, the Helvetians now use high ground to advantage in putting up stiff resistance to an uphill Roman attack. In 26. 3 there are three more repetitions of forms of *iacio*: the Gauls *pro vallo carros obiecerant*; they *tela coiciebant* at the advancing Romans; finally they *inter carros rotasque mataras ac tragulas subiciebant nostrosque vulnerabant*—the first of only two mentions Caesar makes of Roman casualties.¹⁷ Another fierce fight ensues before the Romans finally capture the baggage train and put to flight those of the enemy who are able to escape.

The syntax of 26. 1–4 is simple and straightforward but repetitive in the extreme. Not only do we have the three recurrences of derivatives of *iacio* mentioned above, but we also see several repetitions of other words: *diu/diutius* (26. 1 *bis*, 26. 4), forms of *pugno* (the impersonal passive forms subsuming most of the violence in these paragraphs, 26. 1, 2, 3, 4), and *impedimenta* (26. 1, 3, 4). The repeated vocabulary and the short, abrupt syntax are reflective of the exhaustion on both sides after so many hours of what must have been a nasty fight; thus, the forthright statement in 26. 5b that the Romans were too tired to pursue the Helvetians without several days of rest is anticipated syntactically in 26. 1–4. At the same time, it is indicative of the completeness of the Roman victory that the Helvetians are

¹⁷ The other mention is in 26. 5.

compelled to flee for four days straight, *nullam partem noctis itinere intermisso* (26. 5), while the Romans rest and nurse their wounded. In the description of the aftermath of the battle there is one further repeated verb that is significant: as just noted, the Helvetians flee both day and night; Caesar, on the other hand, *litteras nuntiosque misit* to the Lingones and then *ipse triduo intermisso* follows with his army (26. 6), in stark contrast to the necessary haste of the enemy. Finally, balancing the *litteras nuntiosque misit* of 26. 6, the *Helvetii . . . legatos de deditione ad eum miserunt* (27. 1).

Qui cum eum in itinere convenissent seque ad pedes proiecissent suppliciterque locuti flentes pacem petissent, atque eos in eo loco quatum essent suum adventum exspectare iussisset, paruerunt. (27. 2)

The final surrender of the Helvetians takes place in 27. 2. The sentence is refreshingly periodic after so long a stretch of short, choppy sentences and phrases; it eloquently emphasizes the triumph of Roman arms and, more importantly, of the Roman commander (Caesar is mentioned, directly or indirectly, four times in 27. 2; contrast this with the relative scarcity of Caesar's self-references in the early portions of the narrative). 27. 2 begins with a resumptive relative—a construction that Caesar allows himself at only one other part of the Bibracte narrative¹⁸—and goes immediately into a *cum* clause with yet another tetracolon of verbs. This *cum* clause is worth examining closely, for the first three verbs it controls form a tricolon whose subject is *Helvetii* (*convenissent/proiecissent/petissent*); the fourth verb (*iussisset*) has as its subject Caesar. Immediately after the fourth verb of the *cum* clause the sentence comes to a definitive end, as does the battle itself, with the verb every commander would like to use of his foes: *paruerunt*. Of course this sentence is unbalanced, with the shortest of main clauses weighing in against a ponderous, complicated *cum* clause; but the syntax—and it is straightforward syntax—reflects the discomfiture of the Helvetians, just as choppy, non-periodic syntax reflected the ebb and flow of battle earlier in the narrative. Also, the placement of *paruerunt* makes the sentence ultimately periodic.

The personal nature of Caesar's triumph is emphasized in a subtler way, too, by the seventh and last repetition of a derivative of *iacio* (in the *cum* clause). The enemy who a few days earlier had thrown together wagons as a wall, and thrown volleys of spears and wounded many Roman soldiers (26. 3), now throw themselves at Caesar's feet to beg for peace. Thus Caesar, as noted, emphasizes the personal nature of his victory, but at the same time the precautions he takes to ensure

¹⁸ The other resumptive relative is found in 26. 6 (*qui si iuvissent . . .*). Eden (*op. cit.*, p. 87) complains of a "plethora of resumptive pronouns and adverbs" in Caesar.

that the Helvetian homeland remain free of migrating Germans (28. 4 ff.) emphasize his continued devotion to the constitutional responsibilities of his office.

It cannot be denied that there is personal propaganda in Caesar's account of his battle at Bibracte, but the self-glorification takes the form of irresistibly logical examples of Caesarian *providentia* and *ratio* put at the disposal of the Roman state. This has the effect of making any praise of the commander seem merited but unsought; the reader is led to agreement by the narrative's lucidity and by its author's forthrightness, which are in turn effects (as Eden saw) vouchsafed by the absence of obvious rhetorical *exornatio*.

While it is right to search out Caesar's debts to the old annalists, and to examine his prose style as it developed and was influenced by the changing standards of the day, it is not right to regard the early books of the *BG* merely as dry, rigid experiments undertaken by Caesar on the path to his development of a more serviceable prose style. Instead, these early writings should probably be regarded as the culmination of the old annalistic genre—a style which it behooved Caesar to adopt but which he was not forced into following uncritically. Indeed, one should ask what became of the “comprehensive Livian period” after Livy: the severities and plainness of an Atticist style must have jibed well with the old, purely Roman style of the annalists; the unadorned, choppy, yet subtly effective style of Caesar commended itself to the enemies of Ciceronianism¹⁹ and might well have had as much influence upon apologists for the principate as Cicero had upon adherents of republicanism. But if the style and content *per se* of Caesar's Bibracte narrative tell us anything about Roman prose, it is that descriptive subtlety and the achievement of a difficult rhetorical goal did not always require a Cicero. When we incorrectly and unreasonably exclude the early books of the *BG* from consideration as anything other than examples of narrative primitiveness pure and simple, we fall into a Caesarian trap—no less than the Helvetians did.²⁰

Southwest Missouri State University

¹⁹ See R. Syme, “History and Language at Rome,” *Diogenes* 85 (1974), p. 5; reprinted in *Roman Papers*, vol. iii (Oxford 1984, pp. 953–61), p. 956.

²⁰ An early version of this paper was read before the Missouri Classics Association in Columbia, MO, to which audience I should like to express my appreciation. Thanks are due also to Professor H. C. Gotoff and to Professor Curtis Lawrence, who kindly read through earlier drafts. The appearance of their names here does not necessarily imply that they agree with the contents of my argument; of course, I alone am responsible for any errors that remain.

5

Entellus and Amycus: Vergil, *Aen.* 5. 362–484

MICHAEL B. POLIAKOFF

Commentators have previously noted that Vergil's description of the boxing match between Dares and Entellus (*Aen.* 5. 362–484) frequently echoes the details and language of Apollonius Rhodius' account of Polydeuces' fight with Amycus (*Argonautica* 2. 30–97);¹ already in late antiquity, Servius *ad Aen.* 5. 426 emphasized (not without exaggeration) the extent of Vergil's borrowing from the *Argonautica* in this episode: *est autem hic totus locus de Apollonio translatus*. It has not been noted, however, how remarkably Vergil actualizes Apollonius' description of Amycus as βουτύπος οἶα (2. 91) when he has Entellus slay the bull he had won, nor has anyone considered the implications of Vergil's allusions to his Alexandrian model. Vergil describes the boxing match in rich ethical tones, and in the present argument I aim to demonstrate that he did not use Apollonius in merely a decorative or conventional manner, but for clearly chosen thematic purposes. While one level of the story, supported by references to the Homeric boxing matches in *Il.* 23. 651 ff. and *Od.* 18. 1 ff., consistently makes Entellus a figure of noble restraint, the allusions to Apollonius create an antithetical pattern, linking him with the ogre Amycus. This deliberate paradox stresses a theme which surfaces repeatedly in the *Aeneid*—that the corrupting forces of anger and violence take hold easily and in unexpected places, and that responsible people must constantly labor to subdue them.

¹ R. D. Williams, *P. Vergili Maronis Aeneidos Liber Quintus* (Oxford 1960), provides the most thorough collection of parallels to Apollonius (and Homer as well); most of the parallels discussed in this paper are noted by Williams.

The beginning of the episode tends to raise the expectation that we will have a simple story of an arrogant Dares confronting the noble older competitor, Entellus, and most commentators, in fact, have interpreted the whole of the narrative from this perspective.² Dares rushes into the contest without hesitation and demands that Aeneas give him the prize and not keep him waiting, *quae finis standi? quo me decet usque teneri?* (5. 384).³ Entellus does not rush to the fight, and his initial reluctance is in contrast with his opponent's rude boldness, *improbis iste / exsultat* (5. 397–98). Vergil carefully selects and adapts elements from the match of Epeios and Euryalos in *Il.* 23. 651–99 and that of Odysseus and Iros, *Od.* 18. 1–107, to reinforce the motif of the triumph of reason over rashness. Homer's Epeios had jumped to the contest, grasping the first prize (23. 664–67), threatening to crush any man who dared oppose him, and turned his boast into reality, knocking his opponent senseless. Dares resembles Epeios insofar as he comes boldly to the match and grasps the horn of the bull offered as the prize (5. 368, 382),⁴ but the outcome of Vergil's fight is exactly the opposite of that which Homer's contest leads us to expect. Whereas Epeios' opponent leaves the ring badly injured (23. 696–99), in *Aen.* 5. 468–70, it is not Dares' opponent who exits so ingloriously, but bold Dares himself: *genua aegra trahentem / iactantemque utroque caput crassumque cruorem / ore eiectantem mixtosque in sanguine dentes*. Even in the world of sport, Vergil rejects willful belligerence, and reverses his Iliadic model to articulate this theme. It is appropriate that Entellus gain some of the resonances of Odysseus, for that Homeric hero is also an older man, and is similarly reluctant to fight at first, but once involved proves a formidable pugilist: Vergil's allusion invokes a figure whose initial patience and self-control reflect

² There has been general agreement in Vergilian scholarship that Entellus' victory represents the triumph of a noble character. R. Heinze, *Vergils epische Technik*³ (Leipzig 1914), pp. 154–55, sees Entellus as a character "psychologisch vertieft," sensitive to Eryx' memory and his own former reputation, who fights against a defiant ("trotzig") opponent. Cf. also B. Otis, *Vergil, A Study in Civilized Poetry* (Oxford 1963), pp. 98, 274; W. S. Anderson, *The Art of the Aeneid* (Englewood Cliffs 1969), p. 53; R. A. Hornsby, *Patterns of Action in the Aeneid* (Iowa City 1970), pp. 114–15.

³ Williams, *op. cit.* (above note 1), p. 118, saw in the phrase *effert ora* (5. 368–69) a gesture of "arrogant defiance"; J. Conington, *P. Vergili Maronis Opera*⁴ (London 1884), pp. 365–66, however, claimed that Vergil merely meant *effert caput*, and a similar interpretation appears in W. M. Lindsay, *Classical Quarterly* 25 (1931), 144–45, which discusses Donatus' commentary on Ter. *Hec.* 33, *pugilum gloria*.

⁴ One should also note that in *Il.* 23. 681–82 Diomedes must pressure Euryalos to challenge Dares; similarly Acestes has to persuade Entellus to fight (5. 387). The reluctant Euryalos loses, the reluctant Entellus wins. See the discussion of F. Klingner, *Vergil* (Zurich 1967), p. 474.

upon Entellus in a complementary way. So like Odysseus before his fight with the bullying Iros (*Od.* 18. 1–107), Entellus strips for the contest and reveals his strong limbs: φαίνε δὲ μηρούς / καλοῦς τε μεγάλους τε, φάνεν δέ οἱ εὐρέες ὤμοι / στήθεά τε στιβαροί τε βραχίονες (18. 67–69), *magnos membrorum artus, magna ossa lacertosque / exiit* (5. 422–23).⁵ The selection of boxing gloves, moreover, shows Entellus giving up the personal advantage of using his deadly *caestus*, and in so doing renouncing the wanton destruction these gloves cause. Dares is dumbfounded (5. 406) and frightened (5. 420) when he sees the *caestus* of Eryx, which Entellus throws into the contest area, and shrinks away from these murderously weighted weapons, *terga boum plumbo insuto ferroque rigebant* (5. 405); Entellus, however, readily offers to use equal and less threatening thongs.⁶ Vergil anachronistically makes the *caestus* which Roman pugilists commonly wore in his own day part of an older era, that of Herakles and Eryx, in order to allow the characters, led by Entellus, to demonstrate their enlightenment in abandoning the savage customs they have inherited.⁷

Many other details in the passage, however, suggest that both the characterizations and the ethical issues are more complex. In the extensive allusions to Apollonius' boxing match Vergil refuses to equate Entellus with the valiant demigod Polydeuces and Dares with the hideous aggressor Amycus: instead he subtly but thoroughly clothes Entellus with the trappings of Amycus, and Dares with those of Polydeuces. We learn that Dares once defeated and killed a boxer from Amycus' people, as Polydeuces had done to king Amycus himself (5. 371–74). Coming to their boxing contest, Dares, like Polydeuces, exercises his arms (though not without a great amount of

⁵ Cf. Klingner, *op. cit.* (above note 4), p. 475. Th. Ladewig, C. Schaper, P. Deuticke, *Vergils Gedichte*¹³, II (Berlin 1912), p. 214, also note that *virtus animusque in pectore praesens* echoes *Od.* 18. 61, κραδίη καὶ θυμὸς ἀγῆνωρ.

⁶ On Greek boxing gloves and the Roman *caestus* cf. J. Jüthner, *Über antike Turngeräte*, Abhandlungen des archaeologisch-epigraphischen Seminars der Universität Wien 12 (Vienna 1896), pp. 65–95; E. N. Gardiner, *Greek Athletic Sports and Festivals* (London 1910), pp. 402–11. One realizes at once by looking at the boxers depicted on the mosaics from the Baths of Caracalla (now in the Vatican Museum)—to name one of several archaeological monuments which show the Roman *caestus*—that Vergil is not exaggerating when he speaks of lead and iron in the gloves.

⁷ E. N. Gardiner, *op. cit.* (above, note 6), pp. 431–32, attributes this anachronism to Vergil's "Roman ideas," namely, that "murder and bloodshed are the very essence of a fight. Therefore, as the heroes of the past excelled the men of today in physical strength, they must have excelled them in the bloodiness of their fights and the murderous brutality of their weapons." This seems to be a serious misvaluation of Vergil. For a discussion of the possible thematic purposes of anachronisms in the *Aeneid*, cf. F. H. Sandbach, *Proceedings of the Virgil Society* 77 (1965–66), 26–38.

show), a precaution that neither Entellus nor Amycus takes: πῆλε δὲ χεῖρας / πειράζων . . . / οὐ μὰν αὐτ' Ἄμυκος πειρήσατο (2. 45–48), *ostenditque umeros latos alternaque iactat / brachia protendens et verberat ictibus auras* (5. 376–77). Dares further resembles Polydeuces in testing his opponent's tactics: ἀπηνέα δ' αἴψα νοήσας / πυγμαχίην, ἣ κάρτος ἀάατος ἧ τε χερσίων (2. 76–77), *nunc hos, nunc illos aditus, omnemque pererrat / arte locum et variis adsultibus inritus urget* (5. 441–42), while Amycus and Entellus stand motionless (*Arg.* 2. 78 and *Aen.* 5. 437 ff.). Turning now to Entellus, one notes that, like Amycus, he wears a double cloak: ἐρεμνὴν δίπτυχα λώπην (2. 32), *duplicem . . . amictum* (5. 421). Both figures attempt a knockout blow from above and fail (*Arg.* 2. 90–92; *Aen.* 5. 443–45):

ἐνθα δ' ἔπειτ' Ἄμυκος μὲν ἐπ' ἀκροτάτοιον ἀερθεῖς
βουτύπος οἷα πόδεσσι τανύσσοιο, κὰδ δὲ βαρεῖαν
χεῖρ' ἐπὶ οἱ πελέμιξεν. ὁ δ' ἀίσσοντος ὑπέστη . . .

*ostendit dextram insurgens Entellus et alte
extulit, ille ictum venientem a vertice velox
praevit celerique elapsus corpore cessit; . . .*

Finally, Entellus pursues Dares round the area of competition as the ogre chased Polydeuces: ὧς ὄγε Τυνδαορίδην φοβέων ἔπειτ' οὐδέ μιν εἶα / δηθύνειν . . . (2. 74–75), *praecipitemque Daren ardens agit . . . / nec mora nec requies* (5. 456 ff.). By the end of the fight, Entellus is caught up in the emotions of the match and becomes totally enraged and savage, *saevire animis . . . acerbis* (5. 462), and he leaves the bout an arrogant *victor superans . . . superbus* (5. 473).

A catalogue of places where Vergil's allusion to a literary model substantially affects the reader's appreciation or even understanding of the passage would be very long.⁸ Many of the correspondences between Entellus and Amycus are subtle features of behavior and

⁸ Some few examples and references must suffice here. *Geo.* 1. 429–33 has an acrostic *Ma-Ve-Pu*, spelling the beginnings of Vergil's names, a learned footnote to Aratus and Callimachus, *Ep.* 27 Pf. (cf. David O. Ross, Jr., *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry* [Cambridge 1975], pp. 28–29, with further bibliography). R. S. Scodel and R. F. Thomas, *American Journal of Philology* 105 (1984), 339, discuss a more subtle but thematically important usage: *Geo.* 1. 509, *Geo.* 4. 561, and *Aen.* 8. 726 refer to Callimachus, *Hymn to Apollo* 108, and as in their Callimachean model, their mention of the Euphrates River comes exactly six lines from the close of their respective books, showing a progression from a threatening to a tamed Euphrates River. R.O.A.M. Lyne, "Lavinia's Blush," *Greece & Rome* 30 (1983), 55–64, discusses the significance of the reference to Menelaus' wound (*Il.* 4. 141 ff.) in *Aen.* 12. 64–70. For further examples and discussion, cf. G. Knauer, *Die Aeneis und Homer*, Hypomnemata 7 (Göttingen 1964), esp. pp. 162–63, 339 with n. 1, 5; J. K. Newman, *Augustus and the New Poetry*, Coll. Latomus 88 (Brussels 1967), pp. 242–45; 258–59; G. Williams, *Technique and Ideas in the Aeneid* (New Haven and London 1983), pp. 82–87, 93.

dress, but the pattern is consistent and obviously deliberate, a clear sign that Vergil has a point to make: his paradoxical use of figures from the *Argonautica* highlights the corrupting effects that violence works upon Entellus.

The episode concludes with an emphatic rejection of uncontrolled violence.⁹ The enraged Entellus has begun to show a strong affinity to the figure of Amycus, but when the fight becomes too heated, Aeneas intercedes and stops it, and, restrained by Aeneas, Entellus reverses this process of assimilation to the ogre. Whereas Amycus tried to strike Polydeuces, rising like an ox-slayer (βουτύπος οἶα, 2. 91), now Entellus with a blow of his fist slays the bull given to him as a prize, offering it as a better victim to honor Eryx than the death of his human opponent (5. 483–84):

hanc tibi, Eryx, meliorem animam pro morte Daretis
persolvo

Some commentators have seen sarcasm in Entellus' words,¹⁰ though this seems unsuited to the context. Whether or not they are sarcastic, however, the substitution of an animal for a human victim shows the restoration of balanced and judicious behavior where previously the affinity that Entellus had shown for Amycus demonstrated that the descent to savagery is an ever-present danger.¹¹

Wellesley and Cologne

⁹ We should also note that earlier in this episode the story of Eryx, Entellus' boxing master, changes from a tale of just punishment to one of pathos. In other mythological accounts, Eryx covets Herakles' cattle or abuses strangers (cf. Serv. *ad Aen.* 1. 570; Apollod. 2. 5. 10): here he is honored and acknowledged as the *germanus* of Aeneas (5. 412, cf. 5. 23–24), and his fatal encounter with Herakles is called *tristem* (5. 411).

¹⁰ James Henry, *Aeneidea* III (Dublin 1881), p. 121, argues that Entellus' words are "the brutal scoff of the conqueror", that "the Romans were not so delicate and refined as to say, or to think, it was better to spare the human being and kill the beast." Conington, *op. cit.* (above, note 3), p. 377, concurs, while Williams, *op. cit.* (above, note 1), pp. 135–36, refuses to decide whether Entellus' words show humanity or brutal sarcasm. In my opinion, the context heavily favors a demonstration of humanity—avoiding promiscuous destruction of human life is a serious issue throughout the episode—and certainly Vergil was sufficiently delicate and refined to hold the sentiments that Henry finds unthinkable in Rome.

¹¹ Sadly, the civilized values of this episode do not ultimately triumph. Later the offerings will not be vicarious animals, but human beings: in 11. 81 ff. Aeneas arranges human sacrifices for Pallas' funeral. In 12. 296, moreover, when fighting disturbs the truce, Messapus' words recall the boxer's dedication of the bull, but in a grim and exaggerated reversal, for Messapus describes the Roman whom he slays on the altar as *melior magnis data victima divis*. The restraint of the boxing contest is gone, and instead Messapus observes the fatal wound with the taunt heard in the Roman arena when a gladiator fell, *hoc habet* (cf. *Oxford Latin Dictionary* s.v. *habeo* 16.d, which cites in addition to this passage Ter. *An.* 56, Sen. *Ag.* 901, Pl. *Mos.* 715).

6

The Lover Reflected in the *Exemplum*: A Study of Propertius 1. 3 and 2. 6

FRANCIS M. DUNN

A mythology reflects its region. Here
In Connecticut, we never lived in a time
When mythology was possible—But if we had—
That raises the question of the image's truth.
The image must be of the nature of its creator.
It is the nature of its creator increased,
Heightened. It is he, anew, in a freshened youth
And it is he in the substance of his region,
Wood of his forests and stone out of his fields
Or from under his mountains.

Wallace Stevens¹

Like every other aspect of his poetry, Propertius' use of mythology has been widely debated.² The frequency and variety with which mythological allusions occur in the elegies³ raise a number of ques-

¹ Wallace Stevens, "A Mythology Reflects its Region," in *The Palm at the End of the Mind*, ed. by Holly Stevens (New York 1972), p. 398.

² A useful summary of the bibliography from 1838 to 1965 is given by Godo Lieberg in "Die Mythologie des Propertius in der Forschung und die Idealisierung Cynthias," *Rheinisches Museum* 112 (1969), 311–47 (=Lieberg 1969). The works cited are divided according to their view of Propertius' use of myth: Gruppe (1838), Denne-Baron (1850), Benda (1928), Schanz–Hosius (1935) and Rostagni (1956) are negative; Haupt (1876), Plessis (1884), Rothstein (1898), La Penna (1951), Desideri (1958) and Luck (1961) are mixed; and Hertzberg (1843), Heinze (1918), Schöne (1911), Allen (1939), Alfonsi (1945), Boyancé (1953), Kölmel (1957), Grimal (1963) and Boucher (1965) are favorable. More recent studies include Macleod (1974), Sullivan (1976), La Penna (1977), Lechi (1979), Lyne (1980), Verstraete (1980), Bollo Testa (1981) and Whitaker (1983). Full references will be given below when these works are cited.

³ A catalogue of all the occurrences and the ways in which they are introduced is given by Wilhelm Schöne in *De Propertii ratione fabulas adhibendi* (Leipzig 1911). A

tions: for example, how much does the use of myth owe to the influence of Greek literature,⁴ and how far did it become a vehicle for Augustan propaganda?⁵ But the question most often raised, and to which this paper will give a partial answer, concerns the role which mythology plays within the poems. In general, critics have given three types of answers, namely, (a) that references to mythology provide ornament and coloring; (b) that they bestow authority and a sense of truth; and (c) that they are formal poetic devices. These categories are not mutually exclusive,⁶ nor do critics of Propertius always favor one interpretation over the others.⁷ Yet much of the discussion concerning mythology in Propertius seems to center on the opposition between (a) and (b). Thus Gruppe (1838) regarded myth as "ein fremder Zierath und völlig äusserlicher Schmuck,"⁸ while Hertzberg (1843) opposed such a view⁹ and emphasized the poet's literal acceptance of mythology.¹⁰ More recently, Allen (1962) opposed the view of mythology as decorative¹¹ when he argued for its role in bestowing authority:

In primitive societies it is a function of myth to provide authoritative sanction for custom and belief. In an advanced society it may remain as

catalogue of important occurrences in Greek and Latin poetry is given by H. V. Canter in "The mythological paradigm in Greek and Latin poetry," *American Journal of Philology* 54 (1933), 201–24.

⁴ For an excellent discussion see Pierre Boyancé, "Properce," in *L'influence grecque sur la poésie latine de Catulle à Ovide* (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique 2, Vandoeuvres–Genève: Fondation Hardt, 1956) (= Boyancé 1956).

⁵ See Maria Luisa Angrisani, *Properzio tra politica e mitologia* (Quaderni della Rivista di Cultura Classica e Medioevale 15, Rome 1974).

⁶ Boyancé 1956 (n. 4), for example, regards myth as an ornamental element, "une surcharge d'érudition," which is appropriated by the poet as a formal device and "permet au contraire au poète de mieux exprimer sa personnalité" (p. 193).

⁷ Thus J. P. Sullivan (*Propertius: A critical introduction* [Cambridge 1976]) defines the three functions of mythology in poetry as narrative, symbolic and ornamental. Sullivan suggests that Propertius usually uses myth symbolically, but often lapses into excessive use of myth as ornament (pp. 132–33).

⁸ O. F. Gruppe, *Die römische Elegie*, Leipzig 1838 (the citation is from Lieberg 1969 [n. 2], p. 312).

⁹ "Fabularum autem usus longe diversus in oratione pedestri atque in carmine. Illic enim ornatus saepe gratia adscitae inter figuras rhetoricas referuntur; hic ipsius sunt argumenti pars," Wilhelm Hertzberg, *Sex. Aurelii Propertii Elegiarum Libri Quattuor*, 3 vols. (Halis 1843–45), vol. 1, p. 72.

¹⁰ "[N]on vanae sunt et exsanguis figurae, sed quae sanctorum somniorum et deorum immortalium fide satis roboris atque nervorum accipiant," Hertzberg (n. 9), vol. 1, p. 77.

¹¹ Immediately before the passage quoted below he says "The question which requires consideration is this: Is mythology simply a decorative and ennobling element or is it an essential part of his poetry?"

a body of universally respected truth, establishing the validity of the fundamental assumptions upon which the ordering of society is based. . . . Since Propertius, like Cicero, regarded myth as symbolically true, as providing known and accepted exemplification [sic] of known and accepted principles, he found in myth a means of expressing universal and absolute truth, a standard of validity more real than any single and isolated experience.¹²

Lyne (1980) in his turn reacted against this emphasis on the truth-value of myth¹³ by presenting a new statement of its ornamental function:

It was *untruth* rather than absolute truth: attractive fiction to brighten the tedious truth of house walls and everyday lives. The myths opened on to a fabulous world: a world of *fabulae*, where beings more beautiful, attractive, or terrible than real beings lived lives out of this world; a *romantic* world, in a defined sense.¹⁴

The opposition between these two interpretations¹⁵ is most clearly expressed by the contrast between the "universal truth" of Allen and the "untruth" of Lyne. Yet however much they differ concerning the truth or untruth of the mythical world, both agree in one important respect. Both interpretations regard this mythical world as external to the poem, and as giving to the poem (which is otherwise complete) a greater degree of validity. In one case this is the validity of universal truth, and in the other the validity of romantic fantasy; but in both interpretations this mythical world provides an objective standard shared by the poet and the reader, a common ground to which the poet can appeal to give his poem greater depth and authority.

The third approach to this question follows a different tack altogether. In fact the issue of the truth of the mythical world becomes irrelevant if we regard it as a formal device, as simply a means of poetic expression. Rothstein (1898) argued that in his use of

¹² P. 130 in Archibald W. Allen, "Sunt qui Propertium malint," in *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric*, ed. by J. P. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), pp. 107–48.

¹³ A few lines before the passage quoted below he says "[Classical myths] did not offer a 'means of expressing universal and absolute truth,' as some scholars think," quoting the same passage in Allen.

¹⁴ R. O. A. M. Lyne, *The Latin Love Poets* (Oxford 1980) (=Lyne 1980), p. 86.

¹⁵ Both Hertzberg (note 9 above) and Allen (note 12 above) suggest that our choice must be one or the other. View (a) is represented also by S. Desideri in "Il preziosismo mitologico di Propertio," *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 11 (1958), 327–36. View (b) is argued also by Luck, p. 122 (Georg Luck, *The Latin Love-Elegy*, 2nd ed., London 1969), and Grimal, p. 195: "il finit par découvrir la valeur divine, ontologique, de l'amour" (Pierre Grimal, *L'Amour à Rome*, Paris 1979).

mythology Propertius "zeigt . . . sich gerade darin als der eigentliche Vollender der Dichtungsgattung," and concluded:

es ist ein wichtiger und bezeichnender Unterschied zwischen der modernen Erotik und der des Properz, dass diese vorwiegend durch die als belebt und mitempfindend vorgestellte Natur, die des Properz durch Erinnerung an Schöpfungen der Kunst den Kreis ihrer Darstellung zu erweitern sucht.¹⁶

This view of mythology as an element of poetic technique was developed more fully by Alfonsi (1945)¹⁷ and Boucher (1965),¹⁸ resulting, as Lieberg observes, in "eine radikale Umwertung."¹⁹ Indeed recent studies on mythology in Propertius²⁰ tend to follow the procedure announced by Whitaker: "In general I shall simply take for granted that mythological exempla are an integral part of the elegists' poems. My central concern will be rather the *manner* in which each of the elegists employs myth."²¹ The emphasis of these studies varies considerably, from a rhetorical (Lechi²²) to a statistical approach (Bollo Testa²³), yet all are reacting against the view, implicit in the previous interpretations, that mythology is something external to the poem.²⁴ The result is a shift towards the other extreme:²⁵

¹⁶ Max Rothstein, *Die Elegien des Sextus Propertius* (Berlin 1898), p. xxxvi.

¹⁷ Luigi Alfonsi, *L'elegia di Propertio* (Pubblicazioni dell'Univ. Cattolica del S. Cuore, n.s. 7, Milan 1945) (=Alfonsi 1945).

¹⁸ Jean-Paul Boucher, *Études sur Properce* (Paris 1965).

¹⁹ Lieberg 1969 (n. 2), p. 319.

²⁰ For example Verstraete begins: "As has been better recognized by critics over the last few decades, Propertius uses his images and illustrations from the world of myth as a real and often brilliantly imaginative reflection of the multiple permutations of his experience," p. 259 in B. C. Verstraete, "Propertius' use of myth in Book Two," *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, vol. 2, ed. by Carl Deroux (Collection Latomus 168, Brussels 1980), pp. 259–68.

²¹ Richard Whitaker, *Myth and Personal Experience in Roman Love-Elegy* (Hypomnema 76, Göttingen 1983), p. 14.

²² Francesca Lechi, "Testo mitologico e testo elegiaco. A proposito dell'exemplum in Propertio," *Materiali e Discussioni per l'analisi dei testi classici* 3 (1979), 83–100.

²³ Cristina Bollo Testa, "Funzione e significato del mito in Propertio. Interpretazione di dati statistici," *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura classica* 37 (n.s. 8, 1981), 135–54.

²⁴ Thus Bollo Testa (n. 23): "l'uso del mito in Propertio . . . non è infatti un elemento estraneo, giustapposto, ma nasce e si muove con il mutare dell'ispirazione" (p. 14), and Whitaker (n. 21): "mythology is by no means something extraneous to Roman love-elegy, but is on the contrary very closely bound up with both its main purposes and essential elements of its style" (p. 14). Compare also Kölmel, p. 3 (Bernward Kölmel, *Die Funktion des Mythologischen in der Dichtung des Properz*, Diss. Heidelberg 1957), Macleod, p. 82 (C. W. Macleod, "A use of myth in ancient poetry," *Classical Quarterly* 24 [1974], 82–93), and Verstraete (n. 20), p. 261.

²⁵ This is clearest in Bollo Testa (n. 23) and Whitaker (n. 21), whose discussions center on the various formal relations between myth and context.

mythology is viewed simply as one of many formal devices by which the poet's meaning is expressed. Rather than a source of truth or a source of untruth, it is a neutral medium which the poet may exploit as he pleases. The myth conveys this larger meaning, but has no meaning, no independent function of its own.

As was noted above, these three interpretations are not mutually exclusive. It would be astonishing if they were, and surprising if in using myth as form (that is, in using it as a poetic device) Propertius did not also make full use of its content (namely its power to convey authority and coloring). Although Boucher is primarily interested in mythology as a means of expression,²⁶ he notes that this expression must be indirect, since the world of myth also has a life of its own:

La mythologie constitue un autre monde riche et complexe où se trouvent des êtres connus, caractérisés par leurs aventures, constitués en personnages qui ont une réalité propre: elle fournit à l'élégiaque un moyen d'expression indirecte.²⁷

In reading a given elegy we must take into account all three kinds of interpretation.²⁸

I intend to show in the following sections of this paper that one of the ways in which myth becomes an important means of expression for Propertius is by an original and rather surprising manipulation of its other role as an objective standard of truth. Rather than referring to an independent and external world, and thus providing added color or authority, it refers instead to the subjective experience of the lover. In the first poem we will look at (1. 3), a series of mythical exempla purports to describe the poet's mistress, but instead describes the situation and feelings of the lover. In the second poem (2. 6) a similar series of exempla seems to introduce a condemnation of the poet's mistress, but reveals instead the conflicting feelings of the lover. In both cases mythology is not a neutral poetic device, but achieves its effect by reversing the objective function which it so often performs. That "other world" of absolute truth and of fantasy is seen to be no more than a revelation of the lover's experience, and this lack of an objective standard, this subjective solipsism, contributes to the intensity of Propertius' poetry.

²⁶ He concludes: "La mythologie constitue ainsi un moyen privilégié de composer une réussite artistique et d'exprimer les sentiments," Boucher (n. 18), p. 267.

²⁷ Boucher (n. 18), p. 240.

²⁸ For an interesting historical explanation of this complex quality of myth in Roman poetry, see H. Dörrie, "Sinn und Funktion des Mythos in der griechischen und römischen Dichtung," *Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Geisteswiss.] Vorträge G 230 (Opladen 1978).

This specific subjective use of exempla is quite different from the general function of mythology in portraying personal experience. The latter is "subjective" only in the most general sense of the term—in that the elegy as a whole, and the use of myth within the elegy, are concerned with representing the feelings and experiences of the lover.²⁹ The use of exempla which I will describe is a very specific—and surprising—technique. The mythological comparisons fail or fall short in their basic referential function of alluding to a separate mythological world. By referring instead to the lover's own feelings (1. 3), or by denying the reference they purport to make (2. 6), these exempla are subjective in the specific sense that their reference is to the speaker's own frame of mind, and not to a separate mythical world.³⁰

Finally, it will be noted that the exempla³¹ which begin 2. 6, and are discussed below, are not mythological but historical. However, (1) I will argue that the women in these exempla belong more to legend than to history, and (2) my concern here and in what follows is not with the nature of mythology *per se*, but with the ways in which the poet refers to the mythological world. Exempla which refer to fabled women of the past are therefore equally illustrative of the poet's manner and technique.

One of the ways Propertius uses mythology to portray his own feelings and experiences is by reversing the objective relation it

²⁹ Kölmel (n. 24), for example, is using the more general sense of the term when he concludes that Propertius "bemächtigte sich des Exempels . . . um sie für seine subjektive Dichtung zum stilistischen Gesetz zu erheben" (p. 44). Likewise Fedeli is referring to the general portrayal of emotions when he observes that in Catullus, as in Propertius, "il mito non è sempre trattato in modo 'oggettivo,' alla maniera alessandrina: in lui compare già il nuovo modo di sentirlo che sarà tipico della poesia elegiaca" (Paolo Fedeli, "Properzio 1. 3. Interpretazione e proposte sull'origine dell'elegia latina," *Museum Helveticum* 31 (1974), 23–41 [=Fedeli 1974], p. 39).

³⁰ The *nature* of this mythical world is not important to my argument, only the fact that the reader assumes it to exist. Interpretations (a) and (b), as I have represented them, are two extremes in a spectrum of possible views.

³¹ The exemplum is one of many means by which a poet makes reference to myth. Kölmel (n. 24) identifies three types of reference: paraenesis, auresis and apodeixis (pp. 46–107); and La Penna presents a similar division into paradigm, analogy and antithesis (Antonio La Penna, *L'integrazione difficile. Un profilo di Properzio* [Piccola Biblioteca Einaudi 297, Turin 1977], p. 205). A much more detailed division into ten categories is proposed by Bollo Testa (n. 23), p. 143. The term "exemplum" is used with considerable imprecision, and Lechi (n. 22) proposes to define it more clearly by distinguishing between "exemplum" and "comparison" (pp. 84–85). According to this distinction, the opening passages of 1.3 and 2.6 should both be called comparisons rather than exempla, but I will continue to use the familiar term.

usually establishes. This subjective use of exempla is a highly sophisticated technique, and it creates an almost obsessive concern with the subjective nature of experience; in both these respects mythology in Propertius is indeed the image of its creator.

I

To illustrate Propertius' use of exempla we will turn first to elegy 1. 3,³² which begins with the famous³³ series of mythological comparisons (1.3.1–8):

Qualis Thesea iacuit cedente carina
 languida desertis Cnosia litoribus;
 qualis et accubuit primo Cepheia somno
 libera iam duris cotibus Andromede;
 nec minus assiduis Edonis fessa choreis
 qualis in herboso concidit Apidano:
 talis visa mihi mollem spirare quietem
 Cynthia non certis nixa caput manibus . . .

This is a highly suggestive way to begin a poem. Not only is the setting of the poem left undefined,³⁴ but the reference of the exempla is postponed.³⁵ The three mythical vignettes are introduced as similes (with repeated *qualis*), but the point of connection is not established until afterwards in line 7 (*talis*). The result is that for a brief moment

³² The bibliography on this poem is extensive. In "L'elegia 1.3 di Propertio," *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 14 (1961), 308–26 (= Lieberg 1961), Godo Lieberg gives a useful review and analysis of important discussions up to 1957, namely Birt (1895), E. Reitzenstein (1936), Keyssner (1938), La Penna (1951), Alfonsi (1953) and Kölmel (1957). Hering (Wolfgang Hering, "Properz 1.3," *Wiener Studien* 85 [1972], 45–78) gives a briefer review of the literature of the following decade, namely Lieberg (1961), Allen (1962), Otis (1965), Klingner (1965), Curran (1966) and Wlosok (1967). More recent discussions of this poem include Lyne (1970), Fedeli (1974), Harmon (1974), Giangrande (1974), Cairns (1977), Petersmann (1978) and Baker (1980). Full references will be given when these works are cited.

³³ The elegy was made even more famous in the German world by Goethe's adaptation "Der Besuch," and the two poems are compared by E. Reitzenstein, pp. 43–44 (Erich Reitzenstein, *Wirklichkeitsbild und Gefühlsentwicklung bei Properz* (Philologus Supplementband 29.2, Leipzig 1936), by Fraenkel, p. 55 (Eduard Fraenkel, "Die klassische Dichtung der Römer," in *Das Problem des Klassischen und die Antike*, ed. by Werner Jaeger, 2nd ed., Stuttgart 1961, pp. 47–73), and by Klingner, pp. 442–43 (Friedrich Klingner, "Properzens Elegie Qualis Thesea," in *Römische Geisteswelt*, Munich 1965, pp. 430–43).

³⁴ Thus E. Reitzenstein (n. 33), p. 43. Compare Klingner (n. 33), p. 437.

³⁵ Thus Curran, p. 190 (Leo C. Curran, "Vision and Reality in Propertius 1.3," *Yale Classical Studies* 19 (1966), 189–207).

these vignettes are suspended, free of context, until the comparison is made with the real woman Cynthia. Commentators have aptly noted the "idyllic beauty"³⁶ of this scene, a beauty which is shattered by the following couplet (9–10):

ebria cum multo traherem vestigia Baccho,
et quaterent sera nocte facem pueri.

The speaker drags his drunken footsteps into the narrative as if he were dragging muddy boots across a carpet. This rude awakening³⁷ anticipates a later one when the sleeping Cynthia wakes up: "The idyllic vision wakes, and not only wakes but talks, and not only talks but nags."³⁸ Much of the poem centers on this contrast between the subjective vision of the drunken lover and the objective reality of Cynthia.³⁹ It is important to note that this contrast is enacted rather than described; we view the sleeping Cynthia through the eyes of the drunken lover, and are brought back to our senses just as rudely as he.

This subjective vision is first developed in the opening exempla. We realize (although not until line 9 or 10) that this scene of idyllic beauty is not so much a description of the way Cynthia *is*, as an impression of the way she *seems* to the drunken lover.⁴⁰ The simile is

³⁶ Hubbard, p. 21 (Margaret Hubbard, *Propertius*, London 1974). Compare Allen (n. 12), p. 133: "this scene of calm and of mythic beauty," and Wlosok, p. 333 (Antonie Wlosok, "Die dritte Cynthia-Elegie des Propertius (Prop. 1.3)," *Hermes* 95 [1967], 330–52). Fraenkel (n. 33), however, emphasizes "die Steigerung ins Grossartige" (p. 65).

³⁷ Thus Allen (n. 12), p. 133: "the realistic character who burst in upon the sleeping girl," and compare Lyne, p. 69 (R.O.A.M. Lyne, "Propertius and Cynthia: Elegy 1.3," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 196 [1970], 60–78 [=Lyne 1970]). Curran (n. 35), p. 198, notes the complementary shifts in tone (as the language becomes more natural) and in attitude (as the speaker reflects upon his own situation).

³⁸ Hubbard (n. 36), p. 21.

³⁹ Allen (n. 12), pp. 133–34, reverses this contrast, taking myth as objective and the narrative as subjective (as noted by Curran [n. 35], p. 189, note 1). The contrast is internalized by Lieberg 1961 (in psychological terms as an inner conflict, [n. 32], p. 324) and Harmon (as two aspects of the fantasy of the drunken lover, p. 161 in Daniel P. Harmon, "Myth and Fantasy in Propertius 1.3," *Trans. Am. Phil. Ass.* 104 [1974], 151–65), while it is externalized by Hering (as the different points of view of man and woman [n. 32], p. 77). The contrast between subjective vision and objective reality is more clearly stated by Curran (who regards it as ironic [n. 35], p. 189), Wlosok (who regards it as tragic [n. 36], p. 352) and Hubbard (who emphasizes "the otherness of lover and beloved" [n. 36], p. 22). According to Lyne 1970 this contrast is a romantic one, and is the general purpose of the poem (n. 37), p. 61.

⁴⁰ This is well expressed by E. Reitzenstein (n. 33): "die drei Vergleiche . . . nicht objektiv vom Erzähler her, sondern aus dem Eindruck des Beschauers heraus gegeben werden, dessen Stimmung damit gezeichnet wird" (p. 44). Compare Wlosok

subjective, and its subjective nature is made explicit by the terms of the comparison (*talis visa mihi*),⁴¹ though at first we may not take these terms literally. But the simile is subjective in a much more important manner. As Curran observes, "the identification of Cynthia with the heroines entails a complementary identification of Propertius with the appropriate gods and heroes."⁴² Thus in the first exemplum he "fancies himself Bacchus discovering Ariadne on Naxos after she has been abandoned by Theseus. . . . In the context of the second exemplum, Propertius would play Perseus to Cynthia's Andromeda."⁴³ And in the third⁴⁴ he is Pentheus⁴⁵ spying upon a Maenad.⁴⁶ In other

(n. 36), p. 341. Many details of this subjective impression are colored by the fact that the lover is drunk (see pp. 253–58 in Robert J. Baker, "Beauty and the Beast in Propertius 1.3," *Studies in Latin Literature and Roman History*, vol. 2, ed. by Carl Deroux (Collection Latomus 168, Brussels 1980, pp. 245–58), and Alfonsi suggests that his drunkenness gives the myths a sense of unreality (Luigi Alfonsi, "Una elegia di Propertio. Una forma di arte," *Studi Romani* 1 [1953], 245–54 [=Alfonsi 1953], p. 246). However, compare note 91 below.

⁴¹ Compare Kölmel (n. 24), p. 130, Curran (n. 35), p. 196 and Wlosok (n. 36), p. 341.

⁴² Curran (n. 35), p. 196. This identification is reinforced by the corresponding scenes in the visual arts (see below).

⁴³ Curran, pp. 196–97.

⁴⁴ Curran (p. 197) will not draw the logical conclusion in the case of the third exemplum: "the ferocity and violence usually associated with the Maenads are discreetly suppressed. . . . Indeed, this exemplum at first seems to set the stage for that drama, so often played out in mythology, of a girl or nymph, alone and asleep in the country, who is discovered by a vigorous god or hero." But the first exemplum manages to set just that stage without being so misleading. Curran would separate the lover's fantasy of himself as a hero from his fear of Cynthia's anger, but both are indissolubly present in the third example.

⁴⁵ I call him Pentheus for the sake of discussion. The approaching male figures in the visual arts are anonymous satyrs, divinities or men (see note 55 below). In literature the most famous individual to look upon the sleeping Bacchantes was Pentheus, although the legend of Orpheus was similar in many respects (in Ovid *Met.* 11. 69 the Maenads are given the same epithet *Edonidas*). I am sure that Propertius had in mind both the Pentheus story and the anonymous painted figures.

⁴⁶ Of these three identifications, the first is most generally acknowledged. While Lieberg 1961 (n. 32) argues that the role of the lover is implied in all three exempla (p. 316), Wlosok (n. 36) agrees that "der Dichter sieht sich selbst als erscheinenden Dionysos" (p. 342), but denies him a similar role in the second or third exemplum (pp. 335, 340). Wlosok, followed by Hering (n. 32), p. 51, goes on to conclude that the identities of the mythical figures are secondary: "Das bedeutet, dass die drei nicht als beliebige Heroinnen fungieren, sondern dass die bezeichnete Situation zum Vergleich steht" (p. 334). The reason for beginning the poem with these exempla then becomes quite vague: "Dies alles ist mehr angedeutet als ausgesprochen" (p. 341). Of these three identifications, the first is also most significant later in the poem. Both Lieberg (p. 324) and Wlosok (p. 342) note the tension between the lover's identification with Dionysos in

words, we have to take the point of comparison in an even more literal manner: Cynthia was *talis visa* to the speaker as Ariadne was to Bacchus, as Andromeda was to Perseus, and as the bacchante was to Pentheus. But each woman was not "looked upon" in the same way.⁴⁷ Bacchus looked on Ariadne with desire, aroused by her beauty and vulnerability; Perseus looked on Andromeda with a mixture of desire and chivalrous solicitude; and Pentheus viewed the bacchante with conflicting emotions of prurience and fear. All these emotions are appropriate to Propertius as he comes upon the sleeping Cynthia,⁴⁸ and the mythic exempla create not so much a description of Cynthia's appearance as a specific suggestion of the lover's feelings as he sees her.

My argument so far relies upon the distinction between the idiomatic ("is") and literal ("seems") meaning of the comparison (*talis visa mihi*), and the accompanying distinction between the idyllic descriptions of the sleeping women in the beginning of the poem, and the realistic intrusion of the lover which follows. In both cases we are forced to a reassessment of what has come before. But if the male figure is not mentioned as part of the exemplum (as on this interpretation he must not be), how are we made aware of his relevance? The verbal and thematic allusions within the poem will be discussed below; perhaps even more important are the allusions which the exempla make to the visual arts. Since the seminal articles by Birt⁴⁹ and

the beginning of the poem, and Cynthia's identification of him with Theseus at the end. This complex thematic conflict is much simplified by Grimal (n. 15): "Le sommeil mystique qui sépare Ariane des embrassements de Thésée et lui promet ceux de Dionysos, ravit le poète et l'inquiète à la fois. Lorsque Cynthia s'éveillera, sera-t-elle toujours sienne?" (pp. 194-95).

⁴⁷ Compare the much-quoted observation of Hertzberg (n. 9): "Non *ἀλλάματα* mutatis similibus continent, sed variis visionibus dormientis Cynthiae imaginem ab omni parte illustrant. Solitudinem enim Ariadna significat,—optatam diu quietem Andromeda, profundum somnum Baccha toto corpore resoluta" (vol. 3, p. 13). As the second sentence makes clear, however, he is concerned only with external attributes. Bollo Testa (n. 23) restates this in more subjective terms: "Questi elementi tratti del mito, più di altri, riescono a visualizzare la scena offerta agli occhi di Propertio e a darci un'idea di ciò che egli percepì della *quies* di Cinzia" (p. 140). As we will see, these perceptions can be defined more precisely.

⁴⁸ Curran (n. 35) does not distinguish among them: the exempla describe a woman who "is recumbent, sleeping, abandoned, exhausted, possibly even making love, being rescued, drunk or hysterical, or in some similar state; we are given no inkling which, but are simply invited to contemplate this heroic world" (p. 190).

⁴⁹ Theodor Birt, "Die vaticanische Ariadne und die dritte Elegie des Propertz." *Rheinisches Museum* 50 (1895), 31-65 and 161-90.

Keyssner,⁵⁰ the part played by works of art in the beginning of this poem has been almost universally recognized.⁵¹ As Boucher observes, "les éléments plastiques sont des moyens d'expression et toute la pièce est nourrie de visions artistiques qui s'intègrent à une place précise dans la trame du récit."⁵² Thus the first exemplum recalls scenes in which Dionysus comes upon Ariadne sleeping by the shore,⁵³ the second recalls scenes in which Perseus rescues Andromeda from the cliff,⁵⁴ and the third recalls scenes in which a male figure approaches a Bacchante in a meadow.⁵⁵ Each scene involves both a male and a

⁵⁰ Karl Keyssner, "Die bildende Kunst bei Properz," *Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft* 13 (1938), 169–89.

⁵¹ An exception is Hering (n. 32), who argues that since the exempla do not reproduce these painted scenes exactly (p. 51), their concern is only with the general situation: "Gegenstand der Vergleiche der ersten sechs Verse sind *nicht* die Personen des Mythos bzw. die Situationen" (p. 60).

⁵² Boucher (n. 18), p. 54.

⁵³ An exhaustive catalogue is given by Keyssner (n. 50), pp. 174–75. There are three types of scenes: (A) Theseus leaving the sleeping Ariadne, (B) Dionysus approaching the sleeping Ariadne, and (C) the sleeping Ariadne alone. The third group consists only of statues; thus all painted versions show her with one (sometimes both) of these lovers. As Keyssner notes, the theme of sleep was "mit Theseus wie mit Dionysos in gleicher Weise verknüpft, so dass dem Künstler reiche Abwechslungs- und Entfaltungsmöglichkeit geboten war" (p. 173).

⁵⁴ References are given by Keyssner (n. 50), p. 179; see also Wlosok (n. 36), pp. 334–35. Wall-paintings show either (A) Perseus chivalrously leading Andromeda away by the hand, or (B) the two lovers leaning together and looking at Medusa's reflection in water. The first group is more common, and includes an example in which Perseus admires the beauty of Andromeda. Since Andromeda is not shown sleeping, there is much debate about Propertius' model. Keyssner (p. 179) suggests that he has simply combined the Perseus scene with the common motif of a sleeping woman. Boucher (n. 18) argues that "Properce fait ici allusion à une peinture que nous ne connaissons plus" (p. 54), and is followed by Lieberg 1961 (n. 32), p. 316, and Whitaker (n. 21), p. 91. Curran (n. 35), on the other hand, suggests that the scene is entirely original: "By using this word [*accubuit*] here, he boldly fuses the moment of Perseus' discovery of Andromeda with the consummation of their marriage, ignoring the time Perseus had to spend in dealing with Andromeda's suitors and kinsmen" (p. 197). He is followed in this view by Harmon (n. 39), p. 154. Cairns, on the other hand, argues that the scene is makeshift: "Propertius wanted three myths to make up the standard Alexandrian pattern. So he devised a third *exemplum*, that of Andromeda, which was in strict terms inadequate in comparison with the other two but which he placed between the other two in order to disguise its inadequacy" (p. 352 in Francis Cairns, "Two unidentified *Komoi* of Propertius. 1.3 and 2.29," *Emerita* 45 [1977], 325–53). For my own view see note 56 below.

⁵⁵ References are given by Keyssner (n. 50), pp. 177–78, who cites also Ovid, *Am.* 1. 14. 20–22 (*purpureo iacuit semisubina toro; / tum quoque erat neglecta decens, ut Thracia Bacche, / cum temere in viridi gramine lassa iacet*) and Plutarch 249 E–F. In painting the Bacchante is usually portrayed in lush surroundings, and is always observed by another figure, whose identity, however, often cannot be determined.

female figure; and the fact that Andromeda is typically shown awake rather than sleeping should remind us that the sleeping posture is not the only thing about Cynthia that arouses the lover's interest.⁵⁶ As Whitaker points out, it is the allusion to painting which allows the poet to move from exempla of a sleeping woman to the approach of her lover: "By casting them [his mythological exempla] in a form which would immediately call to his audience's mind certain well-known paintings, he is able to move on to a new theme—his own drunken amorous approach to his mistress—simply by drawing that audience's attention to a further detail of the pictures he has evoked."⁵⁷ What I intend to show is that this introduction of a new theme is very subjective (in that it portrays the lover's emotions, and not just his "drunken amorous approach") and very specific (in that it delineates the varied aspects of these emotions).

In fact, the mythological examples which begin this poem may be described as subjective both in function and in manner. They are subjective in function (or content) in that the point of the comparison is not "is like" but "seems like." Indeed their function is radically subjective in that although the exempla purport to describe an objective fact ("She is like") they do not even describe an appearance ("She seems like"), but simply state a subjective impression ("I feel") which no longer has any formal connection with the other term of the comparison.⁵⁸

The exempla are also subjective in manner (or form) in that they do not state a connection, but imply one. We have noted that the connection which does apply is that between the appearance of the sleeping woman, and the emotions which her appearance arouses. But we cannot know until at least line 9 or 10, when the drunken lover

⁵⁶ As Klingner (n. 33) notes, the point of resemblance between the three episodes is the male figure's "Liebesblick auf die Schöne" (p. 437). The gaze of love is an important theme, and is repeated in the exemplum of Argus and Io (Curran, n. 35, p. 201). However, the primary associations of the Perseus and Andromeda scene are chivalrous deeds rather than gazing or sleep (see also below), and this difference draws attention to the romantic associations of this episode. Although his emphasis is different, Lyne 1970 (n. 37) makes a similar argument: "the discrepancies between Cynthia's and Andromeda's situation, which have worried some commentators, are intentional and significant on a subtle level" (p. 68).

⁵⁷ Whitaker (n. 21), p. 92. Compare the observations of Lyne 1970 (n. 37) that while in the exempla themselves "Propertius is concerned with the sleeping heroines as single figures" (p. 67), the "ominous omissions" of the male figures acquire importance later in the poem (pp. 67–68).

⁵⁸ We could say that the subjective impression (desire) is caused by the objective appearance (beauty), but this would be an assertion of causality, not of similarity (*qualis . . . talis*).

stumbles on the scene, that this is the way in which we should understand the examples.⁵⁹ There is a strong hint in the portrait of the bacchante,⁶⁰ but even here we must wait until the third example. Thus the relevance of the mythic exempla is not given but must be reconstructed subjectively by the reader.

We have so far considered this passage as a unit, and have treated all three exempla as contributing to a single effect. But while their general function is the same, each vignette is different and each corresponds to a different complex of emotions. As a result the opening passage is more profoundly subjective in that it corresponds not to a single vision or fancy of the drunken lover, but to a dynamic series of emotions which he experiences upon seeing his mistress.⁶¹ Rather than an objective description of the lover's (subjective) state of mind, the series of varied emotions provides us with a subjective impression of his response to seeing her. In a paradoxical way this movement is also objective, in that it precisely anticipates the movement of the poem as a whole. The remainder of the poem falls into three sections:⁶² 11–20 where the lover approaches Cynthia impelled

⁵⁹ The proper term for this is *e sequentibus praecedentia*. Williams, p. 73 (Gordon Williams, *Figures of Thought in Roman Poetry*, New Haven 1980), uses the term in connection with this passage, but only to describe thematic anticipation, such as the anticipation of Cynthia's anger by the figure of the bacchante.

⁶⁰ The interest of the bacchante, ever since Euripides' *Bacchae* (especially the first messenger's speech, 677–774), lay not so much in her appearance as in the chance that she might awake and attack her viewer. Propertius makes full use of this in the final section of the poem. Compare Luck (n. 15): "the Maenad suggests the outbreak . . . of which she is capable" (p. 122), and Lyne 1980 (n. 14), pp. 99–100.

⁶¹ Harmon (n. 39) describes as "unfortunate" the observation by Hertzberg that the three exempla do not form a climax (see note 47), and cites the continued acceptance of this view (p. 155 with note 18). He goes on to argue that the exempla form a priamel, with the "Maenad as the climactic member of the list" (p. 157), since her drunk and ecstatic condition is closest to that of the speaker himself. However, I find nothing which identifies the Maenad as his "*altera*" (p. 165), especially given the sense of distance between the lovers (Wlosok, n. 36, p. 352). See below.

⁶² This division is quite close to those of Lyne 1970, n. 37 (1–10, 11–20, 21–30, 31–33, 34–46) and Curran, n. 35, p. 190 (1–10, 11–20, 21–34, 35–46), and also similar to that of E. Reitzenstein, n. 33, p. 46 (1–10, 11–20, 21–30, 31–34, 35–40, 41–46), which is followed by Lieberg 1961 (n. 32), p. 313. The unusual division of Wlosok, n. 36, p. 351 (1–12, 13–20, 21–26, 27–34, 35–46), which is followed by Hering (n. 32), p. 73, is criticized by Fedeli 1974 (n. 29), pp. 23–24. Compare pp. 112–13 in Paolo Fedeli, *Sesto Propertio. Il primo libro delle elegie*, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere "La Columbaria," Studi 53 (Florence 1980) (= Fedeli 1980). Fedeli argues against this strict symmetrical structure on the grounds that it contradicts the neoteric canon of ποικιλία. Petersmann, pp. 954–55 (Gerhard Petersmann, "Properz 1.3," *Latomus* 37 [1978], 953–59), criticizes the undue emphasis Wlosok places on the ring structure of the poem, and proposes a two-part structure (1–30, 35–46) wherein the speaker and Cynthia both

by desire, 21–33 where he gives her gifts and shows his concern, and 34–46 where she wakes up and sharply rebukes him. This movement of the poem from desire to solicitude to fear of assault is exactly paralleled by the opening *exempla*.⁶³

Bacchus and Ariadne / lines 11–20. The principal emotion associated with the mythological scene is desire,⁶⁴—perhaps (given the god's nature) a drunken desire, but certainly desire mixed with admiration for her beauty. In the following scene the speaker is likewise impelled by desire, and in lines 15–16 has every intent of obeying his impulse. The similarities are in fact more specific. In the first case the god of wine and love comes upon a sleeping woman; in the second the drunken lover, compelled by Love and Wine (*hac Amor hac Liber*, 14), comes upon his sleeping mistress. In both cases we may also assume that the desire was heightened by the vulnerability of the sleeping woman. Furthermore, just as Dionysus usually approaches Ariadne with a thronging *thiasos*,⁶⁵ the lover approaches his mistress accompanied by *pueri* (10) shaking torches like a *thiasos*⁶⁶ or a crowd of Cupids.⁶⁷ Finally, as Boucher observes,⁶⁸ the substitution of *Bacchus* for *vinum* in line 9 (*ebria cum multo traherem vestigia Baccho*) emphasizes that the drunken lover is here playing the role of Dionysus discovering Ariadne. However in the myth the god will have his way, while the lover stops short, fearing his mistress' anger, and is frozen, all eyes, like Argus watching Io.⁶⁹

Perseus and Andromeda / lines 21–33. The principal emotion associated with this mythical scene is Perseus' chivalrous concern for

move from distance to closeness (see esp. his diagram on p. 959). His analysis in many respects resembles that of Reitzenstein.

⁶³ Coincidental support for this interpretation is given by Lyne's division of the poem. His divisions closely correspond to my own (see previous note), and his descriptions of them suggest a similar progression of emotions: "A Real Temptation," "Tendresse' and Pathos," "[The Real Cynthia]" (pp. 70, 72, 75).

⁶⁴ Compare Catullus 64. 251–53 (*volitabat Iacchus . . . te quaerens, Ariadna, tuoque incensus amore*) and Ellis' note on the frequent portrayal of Dionysus, Eros and Ariadne in vase painting (p. 280, Robinson Ellis, *A Commentary on Catullus*, Oxford 1889). Wlosok (n. 36) notes: "Wie Dionysos ist Properz vom Anblick der schönen Schläferin hingerissen und in Liebesleidenschaft zu ihr entflammt" (p. 342).

⁶⁵ For examples in art, see Wlosok (n. 36), p. 337, note 4, and in literature compare Catullus 64. 252 f.: *Iacchus / cum thiaso Satyrorum et Nysigenis Sileus*.

⁶⁶ Thus Lieberg 1961 (n. 32), p. 321.

⁶⁷ Thus Lyne 1970 (n. 37), p. 63.

⁶⁸ Boucher (n. 18), p. 243.

⁶⁹ The comparison comes unexpectedly (Lyne 1970, n. 37, pp. 70–71), and Argus' amazement at the strange appearance of Io (*ignotis cornibus*) anticipates the lover's amazement at Cynthia's *sacvitia* (Hering, n. 32, p. 64).

Andromeda, or rather a mixture of concern and love.⁷⁰ The emotions of the speaker in the second section are the same: he straightens her hair, gives her gifts, and fears for her well-being even in her dreams. In particular, the mythological scene in art is typified by romantic gestures, such as Perseus leading Andromeda by the hand, or the two lovers leaning together (see note 54 above), while the scene with Cynthia is filled with romantic gestures and tokens, such as placing the wreath on her forehead and offering her apples.⁷¹ Finally, Propertius' treatment of the Andromeda myth is unusual in portraying the woman asleep,⁷² and this difference is emphasized by *primo . . . somno* (3), the only mention of sleep in the series of exempla. In a similar manner the peculiar atmosphere of "hopeless tenderness"⁷³ in the scene with Cynthia depends on the theme of sleep, both in the rejection of the lover's gifts (*ingrato . . . somno*, 25) and in his concern at her uneasy sleeping (27–30). Once again a chief difference is that Perseus is successful, while the gifts and concern of the lover are ineffectual. As he lingers over her, he is interrupted and upstaged by the concern of the lingering moon (*luna moraturis sedula luminibus*, 32).⁷⁴

Pentheus and Maenad / lines 34–46. The emotions of Pentheus when viewing the Maenads were a combination of prurient desire and fear at their savagery.⁷⁵ The same combination of emotions is felt—

⁷⁰ See especially Maiuri, p. 81 ("Like a knight-errant of the age of chivalry, Perseus saved the fair Andromeda from the jaws of a sea-monster, and a large picture dealing with this incident was found in the House of the Dioscuri"), and the plate on p. 79 (Amedeo Maiuri, *Roman Painting*, trans. by Stuart Gilbert, Geneva 1953). Keyssner (n. 50) comments on the idyllic atmosphere: "Von einem Nachzittern schweren Erlebens ist in diesen Bild nichts zu spüren" (p. 179).

⁷¹ As Lyne 1970 (n. 37) notes, "in lines 21f. and 24ff., Propertius is not just giving presents to Cynthia, which he has brought back from the party, but is performing two conventional gestures of love" (p. 72). On the placing of a wreath, compare Giangrande, pp. 31–32 (G. Giangrande, "Los tópicos helenísticos en la elegía latina," *Emerita* 42 [1974], 1–36), and on the apples compare Enk's note on line 24. Curran (n. 35) notes that "in describing the draping of the garlands and bestowal of other gifts upon an unresponsive recipient, Propertius introduces a subtle variation on the theme of the *exclusus amator*" (p. 203). For an interesting interpretation of the entire elegy as a variation on this theme, see Cairns (n. 54).

⁷² See note 54 above.

⁷³ Lyne 1970 (n. 37), p. 72.

⁷⁴ Baker (n. 40) remarks upon "the attribution to a more or less personified moonlight of an attitude properly belonging to Propertius himself" (p. 246).

⁷⁵ As of course in *Bacchae* (note 60 above). Compare Wlosok (n. 36): "Damit ist darauf hingedeutet, dass ihre Erregung durch den Schlaf nur überdeckt ist und beim

throughout the poem—by the lover viewing Cynthia: he desires her intensely, yet fears her anger when awoken. This conflict is most clearly expressed in lines 17–18 in words that are equally suited to the mythological situation:

non tamen ausus eram dominae turbare quietem,
expertae metuens iurgia saevitiae.

In this case, however, the whole poem corresponds in emotion to the scene of the Maenad, while the final passage depicts that savage outburst which the lover had been fearing.⁷⁶ The fury of the woman when awakened corresponds to the *fear* of that fury in the mythological exemplum. Once more there is also a certain lack of correspondence. While in the mythological version the awakened Maenads destroy Pentheus, Cynthia's violent outburst quickly subsides⁷⁷ and the fierce Maenad becomes instead a Penelope waiting for Odysseus⁷⁸ or an Ariadne abandoned by Theseus.⁷⁹

The opening series of exempla is therefore dynamic in that it portrays a sequence of emotions from desire to solicitude to fear of assault, and it is profoundly subjective in that this anticipates the sequence of emotions experienced by the lover as he views his sleeping mistress. The series of exempla does not form a climax, just as the emotions associated with them are of equal importance. Nevertheless, there is a crescendo of tone, building towards the Maenad in one case, and Cynthia's outburst in the other. Sechi observes "un crescendo di movimento nel succedersi di questi tre quadri, che si articolano su tre verbi: *iacuit, accubuit, concidit*."⁸⁰ But there is more to this progression. Just as the sleep of Ariadne is

Erwachen wieder losbrechen kann. Das ist der entscheidende Aspekt dieses mythologischen Beispiels" (p. 340).

⁷⁶ A comparison of the woken Cynthia with the Maenad is made also by Curran (n. 35), p. 200, Wlosok (n. 36), p. 348 and Williams (n. 59), p. 72. Klingner (n. 33), p. 439, points out that Cynthia is quite unlike a Maenad at the end of her speech, but it is her initial outburst (*tandem . . . improbe . . .*) which reveals the woman he had feared.

⁷⁷ For the change in mood see E. Reitzenstein (n. 33), pp. 45–46 and Wlosok (n. 36), pp. 347–50. Giangrande (n. 71) ascribes this change to Propertius' "Weiberpsychologie" (pp. 34–35). Lyne 1970 (n. 37), however, regards the speech as a sustained attack, with simply "a change of tactics" at the end (p. 76). Klingner (n. 33), on the other hand, regards the whole as a "sanfte Klage" (p. 439).

⁷⁸ Thus E. Reitzenstein (n. 33), p. 44, and Wlosok (n. 36), p. 350.

⁷⁹ Thus Lieberg 1961 (n. 32), pp. 322–24, Curran (n. 35), pp. 205–06 and Wlosok (n. 36), p. 349. Compare note 46 above.

⁸⁰ Margherita Sechi, "Nota a Properzio 1.3," *Maia* 6 (1953), 208–13, p. 209.

contrasted with her earlier lament (*Thesea . . . carina, desertis litoribus*),⁸¹ that of Andromeda is contrasted with her earlier hardships (*libera iam duris cotibus*),⁸² and the sleep of the Bacchante is contrasted with her previous ecstasy (*assiduis . . . fessa choreis*) which at any moment may break forth again.⁸³ This contrast, which is strongest in the third exemplum, is applied also to Cynthia in the following couplet, as she lies posed between sleeping and waking (*non certis . . . manibus*).⁸⁴ The sections which follow likewise build towards the awakening of Cynthia, first in the lover's fear of waking her (17–18),⁸⁵ and then in his concern at her uneasy sleep (27–30).⁸⁶ Her awakening in the final section of the poem both confirms this sequence and reinforces the similarity between Cynthia and the Maenad.

We began by observing that much of this elegy centers on the contrast between the subjective vision of the lover and the objective reality of Cynthia, a contrast which is expressed in part by the difference between the heroines in the exempla and the real Cynthia of the narrative. At the end of the poem, however, these distinctions become blurred. Cynthia seems to enter the mythical world: she resembles a Penelope or Ariadne,⁸⁷ she sings to the lyre of Orpheus (*Orpheae . . . lyrae*, 42), and is described in language which strongly resembles the opening exempla (*fessa*, 42, *deserta*, 43).⁸⁸ In the case of the lover, there is a similar contrast between the heroic role implied in the exempla and the role he actually plays in the following sections of the poem. In the first two, the drunken lover fails where Dionysus and Perseus had succeeded; but in the third, the lover is spared where Pentheus and Orpheus were destroyed. This surprising reversal,⁸⁹ by which the real situation of the lover is superior to that of the mythical figure implied in the exemplum, also blurs the contrast between the

⁸¹ See Wlosok (n. 36), pp. 338–39, who points out the echoes of Ariadne's lament in Catullus 64. On the relation between the two poems, see also Klingner (n. 33), p. 435. Curran (n. 35), pp. 196–97 and Ross, pp. 54–57 (David O. Ross, *Backgrounds to Augustan Poetry: Gallus, Elegy and Rome*, Cambridge 1975).

⁸² Compare Wlosok (n. 36), p. 335.

⁸³ See notes 60 and 75 above.

⁸⁴ Compare Lyne 1970 (n. 37), pp. 68–69, and Williams (n. 59), p. 72. Curran (n. 35), on the other hand, suggests a contrast between this "imminent threat of movement" and "the heroines frozen like works of art" (p. 195).

⁸⁵ Thus E. Reitzenstein (n. 33), p. 46.

⁸⁶ Thus Wlosok (n. 36), p. 347.

⁸⁷ See notes 78 and 79 above.

⁸⁸ Thus Curran (n. 35), pp. 205–06. Compare Allen (n. 12), p. 133.

⁸⁹ Such reversals are among the many hellenistic *topoi* in the poem noted by Giangrande (n. 71). For a broader study of Propertius' models see Fedeli 1974 (n. 29).

two realms, and suggests that vision and reality may have more in common than we expected.⁹⁰

The exempla which begin 1. 3 do not describe an objective situation so much as present the viewer's subjective impressions; they do this in such a way as to anticipate the development of the poem as a whole; and they finally reveal a surprising coincidence between their subjective and objective functions.⁹¹

II

Elegy 2. 6⁹² begins with a series of exempla similar to that which begins 1. 3:

Non ita complebant Ephyraeae Laidos aedis,
 ad cuius iacuit Graecia tota fores;
 turba Menandreae fuerat nec Thaidos olim
 tanta, in qua populus lusit Erichthonius;
 nec quae deletas potuit componere Thebas,
 Phryne tam multis facta beata uiris.
 quin etiam falsos fingis tibi saepe propinquos,
 oscula nec desunt qui tibi iure ferant. (2. 6. 1-8)

⁹⁰ Compare the observation of Bollo Testa (n. 23) that in this poem myth "assume una doppia funzione: spiega e condiziona insieme la realtà, le dà sue sembianze" (p. 140 note 7).

⁹¹ Thus the exempla combine—and blur—"subjective" and "objective" functions. For Kölmel (n. 24), however, the subjectivity of the exempla is absolute: "Nur undeutlich wird die schlafende Gestalt erhellt. . . . da, es ist Ariadne, das wohlbekannte, geliebte Bild! Der Trunkene erschrickt, schliesst die Augen, öffnet sie wieder: es ist Andromeda, nein, eine Bacchantin!" (p. 131). Kölmel is taking to an extreme the observation of Alfonsi 1953 (n. 40) that the unreality of the heroines owes something to the drunkenness of the lover (p. 246). Harmon (n. 39) goes further, and argues that the whole poem is a "drunken reverie" (p. 152). However, the only indication that the narrative is imagined is the absence of a phrase such as "to the couch" in line 9 (p. 152), while there is every indication that it describes an objective situation (compare note 37 above).

⁹² The bibliography for this poem is much smaller than for 1. 3. Apart from the commentators, the fullest discussions are in R. Reitzenstein, pp. 215-220 (R. Reitzenstein, "Properz-Studien," *Hermes* 31 [1896], 185-220), Boyancé 1942, pp. 57-62 (Pierre Boyancé, "Surcharges de rédaction chez Properce," *Revue des Études Latines* 20 [1942], 54-69) and Williams (n. 59), pp. 82-85. See also Copley, who discusses the symbolic use in this poem of the lover's door (pp. 75-76 in Frank O. Copley, *Exclusus Amator. A Study in Latin Love Poetry*, Philological Monographs published by the American Philological Assoc. 17, [Madison] 1956). I will refer to editions and commentators simply by name; for fuller references see Fedeli 1980 (n. 62), pp. 19-26 and Hanslik, p. xxiii (Rudolf Hanslik, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Libri IV*, Leipzig 1979). Citation of commentators is *ad loc.*, unless otherwise indicated.

While the examples here are taken not from mythology but from history,⁹³ it is no exaggeration to describe all three as legendary. Lais was immortalized in the painting of Apelles, Thais in the plays of Menander, and Phryne in the inscription of Alexander.⁹⁴ The use of the Greek forms of their names (*Laidos*, *Thaidos*, *Phryne*) and of allusive geographical epithets (*Ephyraeae*, *Erichthonius*) reinforces the impression that the poet is alluding not to a factual past but to a quasi-mythological realm.⁹⁵ The resemblance to the beginning of 1. 3⁹⁶ goes further than this: both poems begin with a series of three exempla,⁹⁷ each of which describes a legendary woman, and in both poems this opening passage, despite its function of providing a comparison with Cynthia, is somewhat detached from its context.

Let us look at this second feature more closely. In 2. 6 the connection of the examples with their context is severed completely: they form a single sentence, and at line 7 a new sentence begins with nothing to complete the terms of comparison (*non ita . . .*) introduced in the exempla.⁹⁸ But if the examples are left dangling with respect to their context, there is also a lack of connection within them. The first (*non ita complebant*) lacks a definite subject,⁹⁹ and if we supply one from the following line (*Graecia tota*) it does not agree in number. The second comparison is expressed in different terms (*turba . . . fuerat nec . . . tanta*), and is fragmented, postponing the term of comparison

⁹³ A difference Rothstein considers exceptional, p. 179.

⁹⁴ In the cases of Thais (*Menandreae*, 3) and Phryne (*deletas potuit componere Thebas*, 5) the poet makes clear reference to this immortalization. Apelles is not mentioned, but Lais was best known by this portrait; see Enk, pp. 95–99.

⁹⁵ The comparisons should therefore be regarded as mythical exempla rather than historical παραδείγματα. The latter were heavily favored by Latin prose writers; see Alewell (Karl Alewell, *Über das rhetorische παράδειγμα. Theorie, Beispielsammlungen, Verwendung in der römischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit*, Leipzig 1913). On the distinction between mythical and historical comparisons see also Lechi (n. 22), pp. 86–87, whose definition of the latter (“avere lo status della *res vera*”) would not apply to the legendary women of this poem. This is not to deny the considerable difference in tone between these exempla and those of 1. 3, as is noted by Alfonsi 1945 (n. 17), p. 39.

⁹⁶ Noted briefly by Williams (n. 59), p. 82. La Penna (n. 31) compares the beginning of 2. 14, which is similar to 2. 6 rhetorically, but is more “monumental” (p. 230).

⁹⁷ Alfonsi 1945 (n. 17) observes that the use of myth, and especially of such series of two, three or four exempla, is more common in Book 2 (p. 45).

⁹⁸ Verstraete (n. 20), pp. 264–65 (without making mention of this poem), notes that in Book 2 mythic exempla are more often introduced without explicit forms of comparison. Giardina proposes a lacuna after line 6 on the grounds that the comparison is not completed.

⁹⁹ Compare Camps: “the subject is an unspecified “they,” identified by the context as Lais’ admirers.”

(*tanta*) until the second line. In the third example the comparison is expressed in different terms again (*tam multis facta beata viris*), and the change of subject from the lovers to the woman (*nec quae . . .*) further weakens the connection with the preceding example. The effect of hesitancy and confusion is further heightened when the sentence breaks off, and the speaker begins anew with *quin etiam*.

This disconnectedness is not just syntactic. The couplet following the exempla, however paranoid in emphasis (*falsos fingis . . . propinquos*), allows us to infer the point of the comparison: the number of Cynthia's lovers can be compared to that of the great legendary courtesans. The six lines which follow (9–14) elaborate on this paranoid fear, but do so in a manner which contradicts the preceding exempla: if he is jealous of everything (*omnia me laedent*) and asks her forgiveness (*ignosce timori*), then the suspicion implied by these exempla must simply be another of his delusions.¹⁰⁰ The elegy's opening statement ("Cynthia is worse than the greatest of prostitutes") has been repudiated by the speaker himself; and it is because this statement is couched in figurative language (the exemplum), and because of its hesitancy and disconnectedness that this repudiation is possible. The exemplum is therefore subjective in that the statement which it conveys may not be true, but simply a delusion of the speaker. It does not describe the way things are, but the conflicting emotions with which he views them.

By contrast with the exempla in 1. 3, those in 2. 6 are ostensibly objective, and are only seen to be subjective in what follows. The comparison is objective in function (or content) since it asserts the fact of Cynthia's immorality ("Cynthia is more unfaithful than A, B and C"). It remains objective in the following passage; the lover's renunciation is not "Cynthia *appears* more unfaithful than A, B and C" but "It is *not true* that Cynthia is more unfaithful. . . ." It is not the comparison itself which is subjective, but the understanding of it: is it true or a delusion? which should we believe? The renunciation of the original comparison renders its function fundamentally subjective since we are uncertain whether there is any truth to it at all.

The comparison is also objective in manner (or form) since, although the syntax stops short of directly identifying Cynthia with the legendary courtesans, both terms of the comparison are given.

¹⁰⁰ Williams (n. 59) likewise observes: "The apology (9–14) shifts blame away from Cynthia and consequently the women in the comparisons" (p. 83). But the implication of this is not (or not yet) that "man's sexual lust is at fault" (p. 83); *me tener in cunis et sine voce puer* is the voice not of moral rectitude but of self-delusion.

However, after the comparison has been renounced by the speaker, and his contradictory statements have been left unreconciled, the reader must infer the emotional confusion which this represents. The conflict of utterances is an objective correlative to his conflict of emotions, and the latter must be completely supplied by the reader. There is no clear indication why we should understand this confusion in one way rather than another, rendering the manner of comparison also fundamentally subjective.

Elegy 2. 6 falls into four parts: three main sections (1–14, 15–24, 25–36) and a conclusion (37–42).¹⁰¹ Each part follows the pattern of veiled assertion followed by repudiation, replicating the structure of the opening passage. In the second section the veiled assertion is contained in the first couplet (15–16):

his olim, ut fama est, uitiiis ad proelia uentum est,
his Troiana uides funera principiiis;

It is assumed that we know the nature of the speaker's complaint (*his . . . uitiiis, his . . . principiiis*), but these terms are unclear, and our uncertainty is only increased by the impersonal construction (*ad proelia uentum est*; compare the vague construction in line 1, noted above). Since wanton promiscuity is more of a "vice" than fearful jealousy, and since Helen, not Paris, was traditionally blamed for causing the Trojan War, we must infer that the couplet compares the promiscuity of Cynthia (*his . . . uitiiis*) with that of Helen (*his . . . principiiis*). But the following lines, although apparently continuing this theme (*eadem dementia*), directly contradict it.¹⁰² The veiled

¹⁰¹ Hertzberg (n. 9) gives a slightly different scheme: 1–22, 23–24, 25–36, and 37–42, with the first section falling into three parts: 1–8, 9–14 and 15–22 (vol. 3, pp. 103–04).

¹⁰² The contradiction can be removed if we follow Schöne (n. 3), who explains: "Vocibus igitur 'his uitiiis' v.15 (quibus respondent verba 'eadem dementia' v.17) non amicae levitatem, sed virorum immodestiam poeta significat, quam ut explanet fabulas offert Paridis Helenam abducentis, Centaurorum Hippodamiam appetentium, Romanorum Sabinas rapientium. Iam vero hoc perspecto intelleges neque primo exemplo respici propria Cynthiae vitia neque ceteris omnino demonstrari morum perversitatem (sic Rothst. ad v.15 et 17), sed omnes fabulas pariter esse idoneas ad nimiam virorum licentiam confirmandam" (pp. 17–18). However, this interpretation (followed by Enk, Camps and Verstraete [n. 20], p. 264) does not explain how lines 15–16 could possibly suggest male lust when the myth itself, and the poem so far, both deal with female infidelity. The contradiction must therefore remain, although it may be accounted for in slightly different ways. Rothstein regards the movement from female infidelity to male lust as a broadening of the theme: "während man bei *his uitiiis* noch an den Leichtsinns der Helena denken kann, der zu Cynthia's jetzigem Verhalten die mythische Parallele bildet, hat sich hier die Vorstellung erweitert zu der allgemeinen Missachtung

condemnation of female immorality¹⁰³ is superseded by an explicit condemnation of male immorality in the rapes of the Lapiths and the Sabines (17–21). The repudiation is direct (*tu criminis auctor*) but outlandish (*per te nunc Romae quidlibet audet Amor*), as was the repudiation in the preceding section. The final couplet of this section¹⁰⁴ anticipates the poem's conclusion by paradoxically¹⁰⁵ combining these themes (23–24):

felix Admeti coniunx et lectus Vlixis,
et quaecumque uiri femina limen amat!

One could argue either that Admetus and Ulysses were blessed in having faithful wives or that Alcestis and Penelope were blessed in having faithful husbands, but the couplet manages to combine both.¹⁰⁶ Both of the myths in the first line, as well as the moral in the second line, could only support the first of these meanings, and the implication that the woman should be faithful. The couplet is made to bear the second meaning only because of the contradictory change of

der bestehenden Verbindungen, auch auf seiten der Männer, und diese erweiterte Vorstellung leitet allmählich zu den politischen Betrachtungen über" (p. 181). The change from Helen to Paris as the culpable party, however, is a reversal rather than an expansion, and the exaggeration in 19–22 (see below) underlines this reversal. The technique is better explained by Boyancé 1942 (n. 92): "dans une première redaction, qui correspondait à une première humeur du poète, ces baisers suspects étaient des baisers coupables: *his vititis*, de telles fautes ont provoqué les grandes malheurs de la légende. Mais, à une seconde lecture, le poète a surtout songé au manque de certitude qui était le sien. Il n'y a là peut-être, s'est-il dit, qu'une apparence, que l'ombre d'une conduite fautive" (p. 58). "Il s'ensuit peut-être, dans l'expression, une légère incohérence au vers 16 avec le *his vititis* qui nous oblige à nous ressouvenir du vers 6; mais la faute est bien rachetée par ce que le poème gagne de saveur, à mêler aux plaintes et aux accusations les retours sur lui-même" (p. 59). An explanation of this phenomenon as a rhetorical technique is given by Williams (n. 59), pp. 82–83. He calls this figure "arbitrary assertion of similarity," and gives his analysis a sound theoretical basis (see esp. Chapter 2), but does not explain the significance of this device in this poem.

¹⁰³ Butler and Barber thus explain *his vititis* as "Unchastity, not jealousy," but with no discussion.

¹⁰⁴ Enk transposes these lines so that 23–24 follow after 25–26, but has not been followed by other editors. Butler and Barber agree that they "break the argument," while Bailey argues that "some of the transitions [in 23–42] are undeniably abrupt, but none taken singly is beyond defence" (D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Propertiana*, Cambridge 1956, p. 72).

¹⁰⁵ R. Reitzenstein (n. 92) describes it somewhat differently: "Der Ausruf erleichtert dies Durchbrechen eines streng logischen Gedankenbaus" (p. 218), the purpose being to avoid offending his mistress (compare note 116 below).

¹⁰⁶ A further contradiction between this view of the past as a better age, and the opposite view expressed in 15 ff., is noted by Schöne (n. 3), p. 65, and Rothstein (n. 16), p. 181.

subject (*felix . . . quaecumque*); in the first line this change of subject involves a clever, almost outlandish, use of metonymy (*Admeti coniunx et lectus Vlixis*).¹⁰⁷

The third section begins and ends with a veiled reference to the immorality of women (25–26; 35–36):¹⁰⁸

templa Pudicitiae quid opus statuisse puellis,
si cuius nuptae quidlibet esse licet?

...

sed non immerito uelauit aranea fanum
et mala desertos occupat herba deos.

In this section, as in the first, the condemnation of Cynthia and of female infidelity is “veiled” only insofar as it is couched in figural language, namely the rhetorical question and the metonymy of temples for morals. As before, this condemnation is repudiated and the responsibility placed instead¹⁰⁹ on men and male immorality, in particular the painters of *obscenas tabellas* in houses. This shift is once more facilitated by the impersonal construction of the initial assertion (*quid opus, quidlibet esse licet*), and again the reversal is outlandish.¹¹⁰ Not only are neglect of the gods and the decline of morality due to the

¹⁰⁷ Rothstein acknowledges “die Härte des Ausdrucks,” which he regards, however, as the result of a double metonymy by which Alcestis and Penelope are substituted for the morality of a bygone age: “Glücklich sind nicht die Personen, die genannt werden, sondern die ehelichen Verhältnisse, in denen sie leben.”

¹⁰⁸ As will be clear from my discussion, I see no reason to alter the text by punctuating after *immerito*. Rothstein, Barber, Enk and Hanslik add an exclamation mark, while Camps prints the line without punctuation: “The point will then be that the gods’ temples are neglected with good reason because the gods have shown themselves indifferent to the conduct of men by not punishing and checking evil practices such as those indicated in 31–34.” But surely the blame is laid on women, not on the gods: spider-webs and weeds have overrun the temples because piety and chastity have disappeared. Williams (n. 59) also retains the line without punctuation, but without discussion (p. 83). For a further defense of the received text see Boyancé 1942 (n. 92), pp. 59–62, and compare the similar remarks of Alfonsi 1945 (n. 17), p. 30.

¹⁰⁹ Compare Rothstein’s observation that the poet uses this moral discussion to veil his condemnation of Cynthia (note 111 below), and his similar observation that “der Dichter auch schon vorher (v.19) das Bestreben gezeigt hat, nach dem Urheber aller dieser Verirrungen zu suchen und ihn für sein persönliches Schicksal verantwortlich zu machen” (p. 183).

¹¹⁰ Boucher (n. 18) observes that “Properce est le seul élégiaque qui ait appliqué à la peinture le thème de l’εὐθερίας, qui ait formulé des malédictions contre son inventeur” (p. 46), and this original use of the motif, together with “the abruptness with which the subject of erotic pictures is brought in” (Camps, p. 95), gives further emphasis to this reversal. The completeness of the reversal suggests that the poet is not simply embarking on a digression, as is suggested by Boyancé 1942 (n. 92), p. 62.

painting of dirty pictures, but the Golden Age is redefined as the time before they were invented (*tum paries nullo crimine pictus erat*).¹¹¹ This section, like the preceding one, ends with a couplet which combines both implications of the passage. The obvious meaning of 35–36 is that spider-webs and weeds have overrun the temples deservedly—because female fidelity and morality are no longer upheld. But the ambiguity of expression (*sed non immerito*: what precisely is the crime, and who precisely is to blame?), and the absence of a clear connection with the preceding attack on the painters of obscene pictures,¹¹² mean that the attribution of blame is left open; the fault may be Cynthia's—or her lover's—or perhaps even the gods'.¹¹³ It should be noted that in the first and third sections the condemnation is veiled and couched in figurative language, while its repudiation is not. By contrast, the entire second section is couched in figural language and the condemnation there is "veiled" in that it is deliberately ambiguous. We should note further that: (1) the specific condemnation of Cynthia is now more veiled (in the first section the disconnected exemplum helps obscure the reference to her [*etiam . . . tibi*, 7]; in the second and third sections there is no reference to her at all); and (2) the tone of the condemnation is now less veiled (while the first section is largely personal, and the second entirely mythological, the third is overtly moral).

The conclusion of the poem is in two parts (37–42):¹¹⁴

¹¹¹ Rothstein observes that "Unzweifelhaft sind diese moralischen Betrachtungen durch die gleichzeitigen Reformversuche des Augustus angeregt" (p. 179). R. Reitzenstein (n. 92) perhaps takes this too far: "So wenig es mir einfallen kann, das Lied des Properz als reines Tendenzgedicht mit politischen Zweck zu betrachten, so möchte ich doch die Übereinstimmung mit dem officiösen Dichter [Horace] ebensowenig für zufällig erklären" (p. 220). As Rothstein continues: "aber der Dichter spricht doch auch hier nicht als Moralist, sondern als ein Liebender . . . der den Tadel, den er gegen seine Geliebte nicht offen auszusprechen wagt, in die Form einer allgemeinen Erörterung über einen damals viel besprochenen Gegenstand kleidet" (p. 179). Compare Boyancé 1942 (n. 92), p. 61.

¹¹² Compare Boyancé 1942 (n. 92): "Le vers 35 se raccorde mal, lui aussi, avec ce qui le précède immédiatement" (p. 59), who cites the problems it has caused commentators (p. 59, note 1, to which should be added R. Reitzenstein's suggestion of a lacuna [n. 92], pp. 219–20).

¹¹³ Thus Camps (see note 108 above), who is presumably following Boyancé 1942 (n. 92): "puisque'ils [les Dieux] n'ont pas su mieux défendre la vertu des femmes romaines, ils ont mérité leur abandon, en fait l'abandon du sanctuaire de Pudicitia" (pp. 61–62). This third possibility, however, is not clearly expressed, and cannot be insisted upon.

¹¹⁴ The phrase *me ducet* has been suspected, primarily because "the change from *nos* to *me* is needlessly awkward" (Butler and Barber, p. 201). But it is not unlikely that the

quos igitur tibi custodes, quae limina ponam,
 quae numquam supra pes inimicus eat?
 nam nihil inuitae tristic custodia prodest:
 quam peccare pudet, Cynthia, tuta sat est.
 nos uxor numquam, numquam me ducet amica:
 semper amica mihi, semper et uxor eris.

It begins with figural language, a rhetorical question whose implication is that the faithfulness of women cannot be enforced. This veiled assertion is spelled out in the following line, and its restatement in the pentameter incorporates the theme of male immorality: she who is faithful is safe enough (i.e. from unwanted male lovers). The contradictory theme is worked into the assertion without repudiating it, and this first overt expression of criticism is made clearer and more forceful by naming Cynthia for the first time. This conclusion leads us to expect that he will place some demand upon Cynthia's faithfulness, but once more we are surprised by a reversal: in the final couplet the speaker substitutes an exaggerated declaration of his own fidelity.¹¹⁵

Each section of the poem begins with a veiled criticism of Cynthia, an implied condemnation of her unfaithfulness which takes on progressively stronger moral overtones. But each section then continues with an outlandish or exaggerated repudiation of this suggestion,¹¹⁶ whether his paranoid suspicions of the little baby (*me tener in cunis et sine uoce puer*, 10), his blaming Romulus for modern decadence

awkwardness is deliberate. If *me* intrudes, it does so in order to emphasize once more the unnatural way in which the speaker places the burden of fidelity on himself. Hertzberg and Paganelli retain *me ducet*, while most editors read *seducet*. Enk and Richardson transfer the final couplet to the following poem.

¹¹⁵ Rothstein regards the substitution as calculated to secure Cynthia's reform: "Dem leichtfertigen oder mindestens verdächtigen Treiben Cynthias stellt der Dichter als versöhnenden Abschluss, der der Bitte, die dieses ganze Gedicht enthält, grösseren Nachdruck geben soll, die Versicherung seiner eigenen unwandelbaren Treuen gegenüber" (p. 185). Alfonsi 1945 (n. 17) gives a more psychological explanation: "di questa fluttuazione ed incertezza è documento il continuo ondeggiare dell'elegia che si chiude così repentinamente nella attestazione d'affetto che è l'unica certa e da cui ha avuto spunto ed origine il contrasto profondo dei sentimenti" (p. 41).

¹¹⁶ Compare Rothstein, who regards the veiled condemnations as skirted or avoided rather than repudiated: "So sehr das Gefühl der Eifersucht das ganze Gedicht beherrscht, so bemüht sich der Dichter doch, alle verletzenden Vorwürfe und schroffen Forderungen zu vermeiden" (p. 178). Very similar is R. Reitzenstein (n. 92): "Solcher Argwohn muss die Geliebte kränken, und doch kann der Dichter ihn nicht unterdrücken. So sucht er ihn denn in der feinsten Weise zu motivieren, *ohne doch Cynthia dabei zu verletzen. Hierdurch bestimmt sich der ganze Gang des folgenden Gedichtes*" (p. 217).

(*per te nunc Romae quidlibet audet Amor*, 22) or his polemic against the "inventor" of pornography (*quae manus obscenas depinxit prima tabellas*, 27). In each case the attempt to shift blame from Cynthia to himself and other men has a ludicrous effect,¹¹⁷ and in the conclusion the burden of remaining faithful is shifted from Cynthia to himself in a similarly exaggerated manner (*semper amica mihi, semper et uxor eris*, 42).¹¹⁸ We are not given a simple explanation for this self-censure; it may be an aspect of the lover's pathological condition (if so, she is asked to excuse him: *ignosce timori*, 13); it may be the practical consideration that he stands to alienate and lose her by direct criticism (such as he directs against Romulus: *tu criminis auctor*, 19); it may be the observation that society influences our morals (*illa puellarum ingenuos corrumpit ocellos*, 29); and it may be the generous impulse of the lover to undertake whatever obligation will spare hurting or pressuring his mistress (*semper amica mihi, semper et uxor eris*, 42). Within the poem these are simply vague suggestions, and we are not expected to choose between them.

The speaker, for whatever reason,¹¹⁹ repeatedly shifts blame from Cynthia to himself,¹²⁰ and the power of this poem derives from his being too much the victim of his conflicting emotions to know where blame truly belongs. This fundamental subjectivity, the inability to trust his own reactions to Cynthia's conduct,¹²¹ is first clearly expressed in the opening section, in the disconnectedness of the

¹¹⁷ Compare Boucher (n. 18) on lines 7–8: "l'expression ironique—qui voile l'inquiétude fondamentale—dérive du matériel de la comédie" (p. 430).

¹¹⁸ On the earlier anticipation of this theme of marriage, see Williams (n. 59), p. 84.

¹¹⁹ I have suggested several reasons, but all are psychological in the sense that they reveal the speaker's frame of mind. I therefore cannot agree with the conclusion of La Penna (n. 31): "invece che con l'accusa e con l'indignazione l'elegia si chiude con l'espressione patetica della dedizione: il passaggio da un polo all'altro avviene attraverso un lento processo in cui la componente retorico-discorsiva ha questa volta un'importanza maggiore di quello strettamente psicologica" (p. 231). Compare Hertzberg (n. 9): "Lyricum paene totum carmen est" (vol. 3, p. 103).

¹²⁰ A significant difference between this poem and 1. 3 is that here the speaker shifts blame onto himself (or men in general), while in 1. 3 he blames a third party: "It is the Gods, *Amor* and *Liber*, then, who are made to bear responsibility for the idea of the rape" (Lyne 1970 [n. 37], p. 70), and "at the last moment he blames, not Cynthia herself, but *sleep* [v.25] for the unresponsiveness of his loved one" (Lyne 1970, p. 72). This corresponds to the different kind of subjectivity presented in the two poems (see below).

¹²¹ Compare Boucher's expression "l'inquiétude fondamentale," in note 117 above, and the discussion of Alfonsi 1945 (n. 17): "qui si tratta delle incertezze, degli abbandoni, delle riprese di un cuore dibattentesi tra posizioni opposte e discordanti" (p. 41).

exempla and their repudiation in the lines which follow. The subjective use of exempla at the beginning of this poem thus sets the tone and anticipates the structure of the whole elegy.¹²²

Both of these poems begin with a series of mythological or legendary exempla which are used in a subjective manner. In the first poem these examples are used to suggest not an objective situation but the changing emotions and impressions of the drunken lover. The subjective nature of these impressions is emphasized by contrast with the objective presence of Cynthia. In the second poem the examples convey a condemnation which may (or may not) be simply a delusion of the infatuated lover. The subjective nature of this condemnation is emphasized by the contrast of implied assertion with extravagant repudiation. In both cases the subjectivity of the lover's experience is an important part of the poem as a whole. In the first his impressions are subjective in that they are (or seem to be) independent of the objective reality of his mistress. The comparison contained in the exempla is a subjective one. In the second his impressions are more fundamentally subjective in that there is (or seems to be) no way of deciding between contradictory impressions. The objective comparison contained in the exempla is contradicted by the speaker himself. The mythical and legendary exempla do not achieve their effect by alluding to external realms of truth or romance (though they may do these things as well); their effect is in the *manner* in which they are used, the suspension or disconnectedness which make the exempla—and the poem as a whole—a figure for the subjectivity of the lover's experience.¹²³

North Carolina State University

¹²² It is because this self-doubt, the assertion followed by contradiction, comes to structure the whole poem that "the cumulative effect of a series of abrupt transitions is almost overwhelming." But this effect is deliberate; it does not follow that "the sequence of thought is so far from clear that it is hard to resist the conviction that the text has been mutilated" (Butler and Barber, p. 200). Compare the observation by Hertzberg (n. 9): "Aestuantēs huius elegiae affectus et transitus praeruptiores dubitationem criticis moverunt, an hic vel illic saeculorum iniuria mancus esset et turbatus versuum ordo. . . . Nec tamen absonum videatur totius dispositionis figuram proponere, quo rectius nexu sententiarum perspecto interpretari singulos locos liceat" (vol. 3, p. 103).

¹²³ Verstraete (n. 20) notes that "myth comes to assume, in the poet's mind, the emotional dimensions of his own experience. It is in the second book that this continual interpenetration of mythical and present reality may be most clearly felt" (p. 259). Although he does not discuss 2. 6 in any detail, his general observations are consonant with my own findings, and the differences I have noted between 1. 3 and 2. 6.

7

A Reconsideration of Ovid's *Fasti*

CHRISTOPHER MARTIN

We have come a long way from Michael Verinus's fifteenth-century estimate of Ovid's *Fasti* as "illius diuini uatis liber pulcherrimus."¹ Those who now consider the elegy from a literary standpoint generally see it as little more than momentary flashes of genuine poetry against a chaotic, weak background.² Ironically, one of the poem's chief modern exponents, Sir James George Frazer, has through his very approach helped to establish the work as an antiquarian curiosity, and the *Fasti* fades into obscurity among the anthropological oddities it treats.³ But though we may never recover the Florentine humanist's enthusiasm, we cannot so easily walk around a work squarely and stubbornly rooted in the middle of the Ovidian canon.

¹ Cited in Edgar Wind, *Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance*, rev. edn. (New York 1967), p. 114n.

² For example, comparing the *Fasti*'s style with that of the *Metamorphoses*, Brooks Otis comments that the diverse tales of the former were only loosely strung together by the calendar format, and that "Such 'links' were themselves a sign of discontinuity . . ." (*Ovid as an Epic Poet*, 2nd edn. [Cambridge 1970], p. 333). L. P. Wilkinson also complains of the fragment's "haphazard" structure and its shallowness, concluding that "Ovid was interested primarily in rhetorical or literary effect, and only secondarily in truth" (*Ovid Recalled* [Cambridge 1955], pp. 269 and 266). Similarly, Hermann Fränkel condemns the endeavor because "to versify and adorn an almanac was not a sound proposition in the first place." The critic finally decides that one might best read the *Fasti* "as if it were a book for children" (*Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* [Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945], pp. 148 and 149). In his *History in Ovid* (Oxford 1978), Ronald Syme notes this last judgment and suggests that Ovid himself would perhaps concur with the adverse reaction (p. 36).

³ See the massive four-volume commentary appended to his edition and translation of the poem (London 1929).

In the following pages, I wish to suggest an approach which might further an appreciation of the poem, examining it as a reflection upon the contrast between the often arbitrary, obscure conceptualizations by which man orders his existence, and the eternal regularity of the stars. The calendar, itself a human construct based upon the ordered motion of the heavens, provides an appropriate focus for this meditation. Without denying that the state of the text as we have it prevents definitive assertions, I think we can in this way outline a thematic thrust which, once recognized, transforms the fragment from a disjointed, superficial narrative to the first movement of a coherent, perhaps even quietly profound, consideration of order, time, and permanence.

The *Fasti*'s numerous technical inaccuracies prove the poet no astronomer, "being a townsman writing a work of literature for townsmen who had long since regulated their lives by looking at calendars instead of stars."⁴ Yet Ovid defines man in *Metamorphoses* 1. 84–86 as a congenital stargazer,⁵ and never loses sight of the constellations' value as *signa*. Although W. R. Johnson alone strikes me as treating the *Fasti*'s intellectual seriousness fairly, I disagree with his conclusion that the poet can find no focus once the religious motif disintegrates.⁶ Ovid fully recognized, from the very inception of his calendar poem, that he would be writing about "illusions and disenchantments," all grounded in the shifting, arbitrary nature of many human beliefs and practices, whose origins and rationales are seldom clear; but he also saw that this instability is finally balanced by the recurrent stellar cycles. Whatever sacred sites or myths humans may design, these are all secondary to the eternal symbols of genuine constancy circling far above our world. Thus Ovid punctuates his work repeatedly with references to the monthly astronomical motion, a subtle counterpoint to the frequently "entropic" narrative units.⁷ Far from having nothing to do with the thematic progression, these

⁴ Wilkinson, p. 265.

⁵ *Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram, / os homini sublime dedit caelumque uiderel / iussit et erectos ad sidera tollere uultus. . . .* The last line of this passage is itself echoed in *Fasti* 2. 75. Franz Bömer, in the commentary to his two-volume edition of the *Fasti* (Heidelberg 1957–58) notes the parallel, Bd. 2, p. 87.

⁶ W. R. Johnson, "The Desolation of the *Fasti*," *Classical Journal* 74 (1978), 7–18.

⁷ Recent scholarship has demonstrated a certain structural order within individual parts of the overall "blur" Ovid depicts. For the most recent assessment see L. Braun, "Kompositionskunst in Ovids 'Fasti'," in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt* 2. 31. 4 (1981), 2344–83. For a summary of earlier work, consult John Barsby, *Ovid* (Oxford 1978), pp. 28–29 and his notes.

terse, epigrammatic interjections recall to the reader that, however jumbled the antiquarian lore surrounding any given festivity may be, the true indicators of permanence and order remain fixed in their celestial paths; as such, the passages constitute a possible bridge to what Richard Lanham calls the characteristic “hole”—the lack of a central, controlling principle—in the middle of the Ovidian text.⁸

The *Fasti*'s opening couplet, charged with an epic urgency, establishes the program the poet will follow in both the elegy's opening segment and the poem as a whole: “Tempora cum causis Latium digesta per annum / lapsaque sub terras orta que signa canam” (l. 1–2).⁹ Besides *tempora* (the times, the measure) and “causes,” he will treat the ultimate source or cause of all temporal order, the *signa* by which we mark the passage of time itself. But as Ovid sets out to fulfil this plan, he confronts us immediately with an image of the arbitrary, transient nature of humanly-fashioned “order.” Speaking of the original ten-month format of the Roman calendar, the narrator humorously addresses its designer, “scilicet arma magis quam sidera, Romule, noras, / cura que finitimos uincere maior erat” (l. 29–30). Unmindful of stellar motion, the ancients instead founded their *ratio* for allotting this specific amount of time to the year upon human physical and social functions, such as the gestation period for an infant or a widow's prescribed term of mourning (l. 33–36). However reasonable this may have seemed to the planners, the structure of Romulus's calendar proves inadequate, and has to be adjusted by Numa.

Since the year begins with January, we are not surprised when the poet turns to the month proper to find him invoking Janus. It soon becomes clear, however, that this god's primacy in the *Fasti* goes beyond his eponymous status. The twin-faced deity in fact participates in the same kind of duality active at the poem's core: just as the stellar and human orders constitute the calendar, so Janus's visage attests to his position as both a guardian of divine boundaries and a symbol of arbitrary, chaotic form. At his coming, the narrator dismisses the legal wrangling which distinguishes *fasti* from *nefasti*, described at l. 45–62, and directs attention to the sacrificial fires in a

⁸ Richard A. Lanham, *The Motives of Eloquence: Literary Rhetoric in the Renaissance* (New Haven and London 1976), p. 50. On the epigrammatic dimension of the astronomical passages see C. Santini, “Motivi Astronomici e Moduli Didattici nei ‘Fasti’ di Ovidio,” *Giornale Italiano di Filologia* 27 (1975), 1–26.

⁹ All quotations from the *Fasti* refer to Bömer, with minor typographical adjustments.

line which could, curiously, refer to the etherial “fires,” the stars, as well (l. 73–76):

lite uacent aures, insanaque protinus absint
iurgia! differ opus, liuida turba, tuum!
cernis, odoratis ut luceat ignibus aether,
et sonet accensis spica Cilissa focus?

But we learn that if Janus’s birth at the beginning of time corresponds to the establishment of universal order, his two faces serve as a reminder of the degree of disorder in his own being. The god himself indicates this in the description of his origins (l. 111–14):

tunc ego, qui fueram globus et sine imagine moles,
in faciem redii dignaque membra deo.
nunc quoque, confusae quondam nota parua figurae,
ante quod est in me postque, uidetur idem.

More importantly, the chaotic aspect encoded in his appearance carries over to the various *causae* he offers the poet. For example, the variant explications of the god’s shape which effectively answer the questions posed at lines 89–92 also, when taken together, exhibit a certain incongruity. After making the statement just quoted, Janus goes on to say that he assumes the double visage *because* of his position as heaven’s porter (133–40). His 360° vision may make him an appropriate candidate for the job, but the janitorial function is hardly the *cause* of his form. The slight confusion here is perhaps highlighted by the mock-serious stance of the god, who begins with the statement *sum res prisca* (103) and concludes by noting that his two faces prevent him from “losing time” twisting his neck to observe those who come and go (143–44). He again falls to inconsistency later when, after launching into a vituperative harangue against modern greed suggesting that money has become an acceptable sacrifice because it is so highly overvalued by men, he concludes that the gods actually enjoy the gold (223–26). By the end, Janus confuses the details of his own function outright: at lines 279–82, he states that his gates are closed in peacetime in order to hold peace in; at lines 121–24 he had indicated that the closed doors prevent war from bursting forth. Here, as we will see throughout the poem, the *causae* listed are for the most part, whether offered by man or god, multiple and potentially contradictory.

However, as human constructs break down and even the reason of the deities becomes muddled, the poet turns to the stars in the ensuing encomium of the astronomer’s vocation. When Janus takes his leave, the narrator interjects, “Quis uetat et stellas, ut quaeque

oriturque caditque, / dicere? promissi pars sit et ista mei" (l. 295–96). He praises the "happy souls" whose contemplation of the stars has lifted them above the impediments and subjects that hinder and preoccupy mortals (l. 297–306):

felices animae, quibus haec cognoscere primis
 inque domus superas scandere cura fuit!
 credibile est illos pariter utriusque locisque
 altius humanis exseruisse caput.
 non Venus et uinum sublimia pectora fregit
 officiumque fori militiaeque labor,
 nec leuis ambitio perfusaque gloria fuco
 magnarumque fames sollicitauit opum.
 admouere oculis distantia sidera nostris
 aetheraque ingenio supposuere suo.

Through this study men are able to reach the sky: "sic petitur caelum, non ut ferat Ossan Olympus / summaque Peliacus sidera tangat apex" (307–08). Next to their office, all other human activity seems as futile as the giants' attack on the gods. Finally, though the *signa* "wander," the astronomers' understanding of their regular motion permits us to "measure out" or chart the heavens: "nos quoque sub ducibus caelum metabimur illis / ponemusque suos ad uaga signa dies" (309–10). Not accidentally, the encomium directly introduces the first of many constellation notices (311–14):

ergo ubi nox aderit uenturis tertia nonis
 sparsaque caelesti rore madebit humus,
 octipedis frustra quaerentur bracchia Cancri:
 praeceps occiduas ille subibit aquas.

Thus the poem's first movement, capped by the simple surety of this statement, lends the stellar signs a peculiar eminence. The *signa*, which alone sweep out the flow of all *tempora*, preside over the uncertain, makeshift *causae*.

The further the reader proceeds, the more dissatisfied he becomes with the various aetiological quests. On the one hand, the encyclopedic multiplicity of *causae* surrounding certain of the subjects only forces us to realize the arbitrariness of human ingenuity. Any number of reasons might be concocted to explain a particular phenomenon, each one as good as another; as such, the value of explication erodes considerably. An example of this begins at l. 317, where Ovid attempts to discern the rationale behind the term "Agonal," and comes up with no fewer than five possibilities. He opts for the last as the true one without offering any justification for his choice, saying

simply “ueraque iudicio est ultima causa meo” (332). In the discussion of sacrificial traditions that follows, on the other hand, the *causae* he discovers for the animal slaughter seem sufficiently flimsy to excite a comic sympathy for the fates of the sheep and oxen (l. 383–84) and, later, the geese (453–54). Hyperion is propitiated with a horse, for instance, “ne detur celeri uictima tarda deo” (386). The sacrifice of the various animals to their respective deities appears, ultimately, as frivolously random a matter as the source of “Agonal.”¹⁰

Seldom in the *Fasti* can the poet settle on one derivation, and *aut* becomes a presiding word. When tracing the source of the Lupercal ritual at 2. 267–424, he completes one legend only to declare, “adde peregrinis causas, mea Musa, Latinas, / inque suo noster puluere currat equus” (359–60). The Latin explanation will do as well as the Greek, no preference ventured. Similarly, in the description of Anna Perenna’s festival in Book 3, the poet states, “quae tamen haec dea sit, quoniam rumoribus errat / fabula, proposito nulla tegenda meo” (543–44), and proceeds to mention six different identities for the goddess. Discussing the Parilia in Book 4, the narrator actually expresses intimidation at the proliferation of *causae*: “turba facit dubium coeptaque nostra tenet” (784). Ovid’s scholarship, as I think he is well aware and intends to convey, recurrently dissolves into guesswork. Men are capable of fashioning any number of reasons for their ritual behavior; no one can hope to light upon the single “true” aetiology amid the diffusion of mutually coherent legends.

The most salient instances of this multiplicity occur at the beginnings of Books 5 and 6, where the goddesses dispute the derivations of the months’ names. If the poet was intimidated by the number of *causae* surrounding the Parilia, he feels completely abashed at the opening of 5 (1–6):

Quaeritis, unde putem Maio data nomina mensi?
 non satis est liquido cognita causa mihi.
 ut stat et incertus, qua sit sibi, nescit, eundum,
 cum uidet ex omni parte uiator iter,
 sic, quia posse datur diuersas reddere causas,
 qua ferar, ignoro, copiaque ipsa nocet.

Three Muses speak up, each claiming respectively that May takes its name from “Majesty,” “*maiores*,” and “Maia.” In truly politic manner, the poet quietly records each version of the story, refusing to pass

¹⁰ For an extended treatment of this difficult portion of the Ovidian text see Eckhard Lefèvre, “Die Lehre von der Entstehung der Tieropfer in Ovids Fasten I, 335–456,” *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie* 119 n.F. (1976), 39–64.

judgment (108–10). Ovid finds himself in a similar position exactly one book later; and here again, he shifts the burden of decision to the reader: “Hic quoque mensis habet dubias in nomine causas: / quae placeat, positis omnibus ipse lege” (6. 1–2). The contending deities in 6 are Juno, who claims June was named for herself, Iuventas (Hebe), who holds that “Iunius est iuuenum” (88), and Concordia, who attributes the name to the “junction” of Tatius’s and Romulus’s kingdoms. At the end, the poet politely withdraws, noting that “perierunt iudice formae / Pergama; plus laedunt, quam iuuet una, duae” (99–100). In this poem of peace, he eschews all strife. All the proffered *causae* appear sensible, and he would be as foolish as Paris to select among them.

Once we recognize the intentional aspect of the chaos in the poem, we can perhaps see the *Fasti* as participating, after the fashion of the *Metamorphoses*, in what Johnson has called the counter-classical sensibility.¹¹ Augustus’s leadership will supposedly restore the golden age of our origins that the work ostensibly celebrates. The emperor strives to preserve the ancient shrines from decay (2. 57–64), and his efforts have resulted in the *mille Lares* established throughout the city (5. 145–46). But the narrator prefaces this last point with a note that “multa uetustas / destruit: et saxo longa senecta nocet” (5. 131–32), and mentions a few lines later “bina gemellorum quaerebam signa deorum: / uiribus annosae facta caduca morae” (143–44). And, far more important, there is the nature of the poem itself: the praise Ovid offers Augustus as the guardian of the sacred rituals, I think, hardly stands up in context against the flood of confusion and obscurity rushing all about its foundations. In the background seems to lie the implication that Caesar cannot ultimately hope to resuscitate or maintain the abstruse mythic structures in the face of human frailty and time’s eroding power. The obsequious gesture harbors a more subtle skepticism.

But in order to gain a sense of stability in the midst of this chaos, we need only look to the skies, as Ovid makes plain in Book 3 where he again brings up the crafting of the original calendar, which the early Romans’ ignorance of astronomy dooms to fail (99–104):

nec totidem ueteres, quot nunc, habuere kalendas,
 ille minor geminis mensibus annus erat.
 nondum tradiderat uictas uictoribus artes
 Graecia, facundum, sed male forte genus:

¹¹ W. R. Johnson, “The Problem of the Counter-Classical Sensibility and its Critics,” *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 3 (1970), 123–51.

qui bene pugnabat, Romanam nouerat artem,
mittere qui poterat pila, disertus erat.

This is less a snide invective against the effeminate Greeks than a comic indictment of the Roman emphasis on *arma*. (We recall the statement at the *Fasti's* outset, "Caesaris arma canant alii, nos Caesaris aras . . ." [1. 13], and the astronomers' disdain for warfare.) The poet continues (105–12):

quis tunc aut Hyadas aut Pleiadas Atlanteas
senserat aut geminos esse sub axe polos,
esse duas Arctos, quarum Cynosura petatur
Sidoniis, Helicen Graia carina notet,
signaque quae longo frater percenseat anno,
ire per haec uno mense sororis equos?
libera currebant et inobseruata per annum
sidera. . . .

Instead, we have the ironic reduction of lines 113–14, "non illi caelo labentia signa tenebant, / sed sua, quae magnum perdere crimen erat." Romulus's people ground their ten-month calendar in the same kind of arbitrary thought process, delineated in lines 121–134, standing behind most ordering constructs. But only the stars accurately measure the year's length, and Caesar revises the calendar: "ille moras solis, quibus in sua signa rediret, / traditur exactis disposuisse notis" (161–62).

Once the reader grasps the centrality of the stars to the fabric of the work, he begins to realize that, far from being mere clumsy or even distracting junctures, the astronomical references serve as subtle reminders of the eternal certainty and order of stellar motion, contrasting with the often confused aetiological lore. Even the form of these references holds significance: they are (as Carlo Santini observes¹²) mostly brief, epigrammatic statements; as such, they stand in contradistinction to the aetiologies' protracted catalogues or legends. This becomes clear if we reconsider the first book. Ovid prefaces the long passage treating the Agonal rite and animal sacrifice, mentioned above, with the two short references to the constellations of the Crab (311–14) and the Lyre (315–16). Likewise, after the narrative has run its course, the poet suddenly interjects, "interea Delphin clarum super aequora sidus / tollitur et patriis exserit ora uadis" (457–58). Following the problematic section, this terse, simple expression seems to recall the reader to the surety of

¹² Santini (above, note 8), 10–11.

celestial recurrence. And just as this reference, coupled with the subsequent line's "Postera lux hiemem medio discrimine signat" (459), completes the frame begun at 311–16, it also initiates the frame for the next narrative unit, which in turn ultimately lapses into a set of three astronomical notations in lines 651–56. Moreover, in these last passages the Muse herself rebukes the poet for seeking regularity in the wrong places: "utque dies incerta sacri, sic tempora certa . . ." (661).

Moving on to the second book, we see how the stellar references continue to counter the often dubious mythological narrative. February opens with a discussion of the purification rituals from which the month supposedly derives its name, rites which the poet asserts were founded on extremely tenuous preconceptions: "ah! nimium faciles, qui tristia crimina caedis / fluminea tolli posse putatis aqua!" (2. 45–46). But after we learn that the entire placement of the month has shifted, and hear briefly of Caesar's "glory" (which was nevertheless unable to preserve the shrines of Sospita), we appropriately encounter at lines 73–78 the unshifting certainty of the constellations:

Proximus Hesperias Titan abiturus in undas
 gemmea purpureis cum iuga demet equis,
 illa nocte aliquis tollens ad sidera uultum
 dicet "ubi est hodie, quae Lyra fulsit heri?"
 dumque Lyram quaeret, medii quoque terga Leonis
 in liquidas subito mersa notabit aquas.

Naturally, the stars themselves provide bases for mythological imagination; even Romulus's ignorant tribe attributed deity to them (3.111–12). Beginning in 2, Ovid elaborates on the tales behind the constellations. But again, as with the rest of the myths, the stories project an aura of uncertainty. For example, the dolphin wins its place among the stars "seu fuit occultis felix in amoribus index, / Lesbida cum domino seu tulit ille lyram" (2. 81–82). In the fourth book, similarly, the narrator posits variant reasons why only six of the seven Pleiades can be seen (171–78); nor can he definitely settle on the nature of the Hyades at 5. 159–82 or the Bull at 5. 603–20. Ovid's point is precisely that, whatever names are assigned to these guides, or whatever stories or rites grow up around them, the constructs remain secondary to the simple factuality of the stellar cycles. Aetiological study can only go so far; the poet is always left to look to the sky for a picture of true order.

Repeatedly the narrator directs our eyes upward. In Book 3 he seems to pun on the forms of *suspicio*. Trying to work out the

significance of the name “Veious” etymologically, he concludes, “uis ea si uerbi est, cur non ego Veious aedem / aedem non magni suspicer esse Iouis?” (447–48). But he immediately continues: “iamque, ubi caeruleum uariabunt sidera caelum, / suspice” (449–50). *Suspicion* or conjecture gives way to *observation* of the stars. Likewise, the flurry of possibilities surrounding the feast of Anna Perenna, coupled with the assassination of Caesar, fades into a brief reference to the Scorpion at 3. 711–12. Subsequently, the poet turns to the “star of the Kite” (3. 793–94) after running into difficulties determining the reason for the “toga libera” in the Bacchic festival, and to the sun’s entry into the sign of the Ram (3. 851–52) after the confusion over “Minerua Capta” at 835–48.

Read in this light, the *Fasti* becomes a modest celebration of the heavenly perfection standing above all mortal formulation. The poet may wonder at human ingenuity, may be fascinated by mythic or historical lore, may partake in the rites deemed sacred by men; but he remains always acutely aware of human limitation in the presence of eternal order. A particularly stiking demonstration of this occurs at 4. 377–86, where the narrator meets an old soldier at the games honoring the anniversary of Caesar’s victory at Thapsus. Johnson notes that the old man, as “a sudden remnant of the vague, vanished past,”

knows something about this day, this occasion, and, knowing something about the past, perhaps he also knows something about the present and the future that a younger man cannot know. A thunderstorm interrupts the old veteran’s speech, and the conversation that was to have taken place, that might have illumined—what?—is suddenly ended. . . . This moment is a paradigm of all the moments in the poem . . . when we seem on the verge of an illumination only to find that the truth that we thought we had glimpsed has faded back into the incomprehensible welter of days and their vanishing, uncertain rituals and meanings.¹³

I differ from Johnson in that I think this exemplary moment does not signal a point of poetic dissolution in the text, but in fact illustrates Ovid’s theme perfectly. Whatever the old man might say, he can impart nothing more than the same kind of limited information accumulated elsewhere in the poem. The narrator, by the same token, can discover nothing more than what he already knows: namely, that the order governing our lives always was and always will be located solely in the stars. We note that the two speakers are parted when “pendula caelestes Libra mouebat aquas” (386). And appropriately,

¹³ Johnson 1978, 10.

an abrupt reminder of the continuity of stellar motion immediately ensues: "Ante tamen, quam summa dies spectacula sistat, / ensiger Orion aequore mersus erit" (387–88).

Also in Book 4, Ovid has the distraught Ceres, seeking the whereabouts of her abducted daughter, direct her inquiries ultimately not to the nymph Arethusa, as related in the *Metamorphoses* (5. 487 ff.), but to the heavens, turning first to the Hyades and then to the sun (4. 575–84).¹⁴ At the opening of *Fasti* 5, the poet again moves from the confusion obscuring the naming of May to the rising of Capella at lines 111–14. In like manner, after the controversy over the rationale for the name "June" and the discussion of the numerous rites and temples in the first part of Book 6, we come to this reduction: "haec hominum monimenta patent: si quaeritis astra, / tunc oritur magni praepes adunca Iouis" (195–96). Near the conclusion of the same book, Ovid turns from myth and history, and from the quiet reminder of our own mutability at lines 771–72, to a humorous glance at the sky (785–90):

Ecce, suburbana rediens male sobrius aede
ad stellas aliquis talia uerba iacit:
"zona latet tua nunc et cras fortasse latebit:
dehinc erit, Orion, aspiciendi mihi."
at si non esset potus, dixisset eadem
uenturum tempus solstitiale die.

Regardless of the transience of human ritual, the mortality of humans themselves, or even the capacity of the individual inebriated amid his own festivities to recognize their precise implications, the stars shine still.

Thus, these breakages in the narrative flow initiated by the Lyre, the Dolphin, the Bear, and the rest which pass persistently, if furtively, by the reader, are instrumental to the point Ovid wishes to make. As Lanham asserts, this poet "was not bad at transitions";¹⁵ if the junctures seem dissonant, then we must focus on the possible meanings behind these particular points of emphasis. While it is dangerous to speculate on what might have happened in the remainder of an unfinished work, we can reasonably posit, based on further comparison with the *Metamorphoses*, that the role of the stars might have become more explicit as the poem drew on to its close. Reading

¹⁴ Just as the transformation element of the Arethusa story squared better with the *Metamorphoses'* theme, so the more "standard" version of this multiform myth (see, for example, the *Homeric Hymn to Demeter*) accommodated the *Fasti's* celestial focus.

¹⁵ Lanham (above, note 8), p. 60.

the myths of change catalogued in the *Metamorphoses*, one would hardly see the poem as dealing with permanence. Yet when we reach the final book, we realize that immutability is precisely the poet's topic: in spite of all the turmoil, only forms change (so the Pythagorean tells us) while an essence endures, remains constant, a revelation which itself transforms our reading of the verse up to this point (15. 252–58).¹⁶ Perhaps Ovid would have established a similar element in the *Fasti*'s conclusion, pointing out the stars as the central stabilizing factors. We should note that, as the old man in the *Metamorphoses* turns his speech towards the subject of permanence, he states (15. 147–52):

iuuat ire per alta
 astra, iuuat terris et inertī sede relicta
 nube uehi ualidique umeris insistere Atlantis
 palantesque homines passim et rationis egentes
 despectare procul trepidosque obitumque timentes
 sic exhortari seriemque euoluere fati!

Maybe the heavens themselves were the only bridge spanning the “gulf separating primitive, mythical Rome from the Rome of Virgilian propaganda.”¹⁷ The narrative chaos, matched against celestial continuity, sets up this very contrast in the *Fasti* between the transient and the lasting.

Therefore, Fränkel and Otis miss the point when they fault the poet for attempting ostentatiously to exhibit “profound learning,”¹⁸ or subordinating the various story lines to “curious embellishments and learned asides.”¹⁹ “Learning” is precisely the thing Ovid questions throughout his calendar poem. The information which fills out the months, some of it profuse and some spare, some interesting and some tedious, cumulatively counts for little in the grand sweep of time. The *Fasti* shares with the *Metamorphoses* a fascination with uncertainty and confusion counterpointed by a reaching for permanence. Here the permanence is located in the endless recurrence of the years, measured by the eternal regularity of the stars. The

¹⁶ The precise intention behind the Pythagorean passage remains a major critical issue. See Johnson 1970 (above, note 11), 138 ff., and G. Karl Galinsky, *Ovid's "Metamorphoses": An Introduction to the Basic Aspects* (Oxford 1975), pp. 104–107 and n. 37 on p. 109. However, our attitude toward the speaker need not affect the present argument: regardless of the old man's ultimate status, the point he makes does offer the reader one other way to digest the compendium of myth encountered up to the final book.

¹⁷ Lanham, p. 50.

¹⁸ Fränkel, p. 146.

¹⁹ Otis, p. 52.

astrological element diminishes the relevance of any earthly matters. The starry *signa*, themselves the source of our *tempora*, finally stand above the *causae* he lists at such careful, insignificant length.²⁰

This last point leads to a final question, namely, why did Ovid protract this “insignificant” narrative to such a degree? The idea of confusion or impermanence might have been conveyed as effectively in much less space. I would suggest here that, despite the ultimate futility involved, human ingenuity delighted the poet, who took care to record those myths and rituals which man constructs to help him cope with the earthly confusion he finds all around him. Critics have argued that the *Metamorphoses* is “about people telling stories and how telling stories is one of the things that people do in order to get through it all,”²¹ that the “point is not to hierarchize—there are no hierarchies here, and no perspectives either—but just to keep going.”²² I think the narrative dimension of the *Fasti* at root partakes of the same spirit. Ovid never condemns the aetiological quest.²³ He simply wishes to demonstrate its tenuous foundation. That is, men have established rituals by which they live their lives, and the legends behind these rites are shifting and obscure. The poet derives from his investigation not only a degree of amusement, but also a genuine feeling of sympathy and wonder at the sheer diversity of the mind in its attempt to justify human order, an order whose prime feature is its problematic multiplicity rather than any sort of unified truth.

The coherence of the *Fasti*, then, is grounded in the poet’s meditation on and celebration of the element of certainty overshadowing the human constructs occupying the foreground of his work. Though Ovid never finished enough of the poem to enable us to determine the extent to which his project might have succeeded, I

²⁰ We may note how this antithesis between chaotic human explication and stellar certainty distinguishes the *Fasti* from its ostensible model, Callimachus’s *Aetia*. In contrast to Ovid’s skeptical overtones, the Greek poet offers alternative responses to specific aetiological questions on only two occasions of which we are aware (fragments 6 and 79 Pf.), and has the Muse resolve the earlier of these in a presumably definitive manner. As a result, Callimachus’s sole reference to a constellation in fragment 110 presents no discernible tension with his poem’s general sense of “Hesiodic” authoritativeness.

²¹ Gordon Braden, *The Classics and English Renaissance Poetry: Three Case Studies* (New Haven and London 1978), p. 52.

²² Lanham, p. 59.

²³ For a discussion of the narrator’s persona in the poem, see Jean-Marc Frécaut, *L’esprit et l’humour chez Ovide* (Grenoble 1972), chap. 5, and John F. Miller, “Ritual Directions in Ovid’s *Fasti*: Dramatic Hymns and Didactic Poetry,” *Classical Journal* 75 (1980), 204–14.

think we are nonetheless capable of discerning what the chief thematic thrust was to be: as all around us may change, including the names of the gods we worship and the reasons for which we worship them as we do, the stars remain as eternal guides, reminders of the one unambiguous form of order. This realization provided the poet, it seems, with a sense of confidence; there was something above the frequently obtrusive pedantry of this world that made it all tolerable, even enjoyable. If anything killed the *Fasti*, I do not think it was, as Johnson suggests, an internal sadness uncovered in the course of composition, but the sadness of Tomis. In the bitterness of exile, the reflection upon universal order gives way to the more individualized poignancy of the *Tristia*.

I would venture a guess that Ovid could only smile at the fact that, barely fifty years after publication, Frazer's voluminous commentary "is being outdated by advances in anthropological method and in comparative religion. . . ." ²⁴ Perhaps only when the reader lays aside the book late at night, and himself glances out at the same stars which overlooked Romulus and Ovid, Verinus and Frazer, can he fully appreciate what the author of the *Fasti* was trying to say. It is a poem whose incompleteness we may very much regret.

University of Virginia

²⁴ Barsby (above, note 7), p. 29n.

8

Siliana*

W. S. WATT

The following editions are referred to: G. A. Ruperti (Göttingen 1795–98); W. C. Summers (in Postgate's *Corpus Poetarum Latinorum*, vol. 2, London 1905); J. D. Duff (Loeb edition, London 1934).

Heinsius = N. Heinsius, in A. Drakenborch's edition (Utrecht 1717).

S. B. = D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Classical Quarterly* 9 (1959), 173–80.

Delz = J. Delz, *Gnomon* 55 (1983), 211–20.

4. 248: Crixus, ut in tenui spes *exiguumque* salutis,
armat contemptu mentem necis.

With *exiguum* one must presumably supply *est*; so *TLL* 5. 2. 1477. 67. This is not satisfactory for two reasons: (a) one would expect *salutis* to be governed by *spes*, (b) *exiguus* is a natural epithet for *spes*. Both of these considerations still apply if (with Summers and some of the early editors) one believes that a line has been lost after 248. I suggest that *exiguae* (*spes* being plural, as frequently in Silius) would be an improvement, despite the tautology with *in tenui*.

6. 485: exposcunt Libyes, nobisque dedere
haec referenda, pari libeat *si pendere* bellum
foedere et ex aequo geminas conscribere leges.

Regulus addressing the Roman senate.

* I am very grateful to Professor J. Delz for commenting on an earlier version of these notes.

“The Carthaginians demand . . . that you should weigh this war in equal scales” (Duff). I say nothing about this translation of *pari foedere*; what is even more startling, indeed impossible, is that *exposcere* should be construed with *si* instead of with *ut*. I suggest *libeat suspendere*, referring to a truce which would in due course be followed by a treaty of peace (*conscribere leges*). With *exposcunt libeat* compare 16. 601 f., “deturque potestas / orat,” and Livy 2. 35. 5, “exposcentes . . . donarent.” Silius may have had in mind Lucan 4. 531 f., “temptavere prius *suspensio* vincere bello / foederibus.”

7. 515: dividitur miles Fabioque equitumque magistro
 imperia aequantur. *penitus cernebat* et experts
 irarum senior magnas ne penderet alti
 erroris poenas patria inconsulta timebat.

penitus LOV: *gemitus F*

Fabius's reaction to the division of power between himself and his Master of Horse.

“*penitus cernebat*, vor allem ohne Objekt, ist kein Latein,” Delz (p. 220). *gemitus*, although it is not the paradosis, is much more likely to be right: Fabius groaned at the mistake which his country was making and feared its consequences. But he kept his temper and (presumably) suppressed his groans; Summers's *retinebat* or Postgate's *frenabat* would seem to give the sense which is required, but neither is palaeographically probable. Better, I suggest, *clau(d)ebat*; cf. Lucan 8. 634, “claude, dolor, *gemitus*” (with Postgate's note); Silius himself uses *claudere* with *metus* (6. 381) and with *pavor* (10. 377).

8. 502: sed populis nomen posuit metuentior hospes,
 cum fugeret *Phrygios* trans aequora Marsya *frenos*
 Mygdoniam Phoebi superatus pectine loton.

The Marsi in central Italy derive their name from the Phrygian Marsyas, who was forced to flee after being defeated by Apollo in a musical contest; in the usual version of the story he did not flee but was flayed alive by Apollo.

The vulgate is *Phrygias* . . . *Crenas* (= Aulocrene in Phrygia), but this conjecture is (to my mind convincingly) disposed of by L. Håkanson (*Silius Italicus: kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen*, Lund 1976, p. 21), who proposes *Phrygios* . . . *finis*: a possible solution, but not one which commands instant assent. I suggest *Phrygius* (so Ruperti) . . . *poenas*: Marsyas fled from the punishment (presumably flaying) which threatened him as a result of his defeat by Apollo. The

nominative *Phrygius* is an easy change, and is appropriate to the context (an Italian people derives its name from a Phrygian fugitive); and *poenas* assumes the quite common confusion of *p* and *f* (some examples are given by Håkanson, p. 15).

8. 604: nec non cum Venetis Aquileia *superfuit* armis.

From Silius's "gathering of the clans" for the battle of Cannae.

There is no doubt that *superfuit* (FL) is the paradosis and *superfluit* (OV) a further corruption. I think there is equally little doubt that Silius wrote *supervenit*; prosaic though it is, this is the *mot juste* to express the sense (OLD sense 2b); *Venetis* is an adjective with *armis*, as is pointed out by Delz (p. 220). The corruption of *venit* to *fuit* is found in Cicero's Letters (*Att.* 4. 4. 1; 8. 11D. 4; 10. 16. 1) and no doubt elsewhere.

9. 649: abrumperet cuncta
iamdudum cum luce libet, sed comprimit ensem
nescio qui deus et *meme* ad graviora reservat.

From a soliloquy of Varro at the battle of Cannae.

I agree with S. B. (p. 174) in replacing *meme* with a pyrrhic word followed by *me*, and suggest *et ma(la) me*, comparing Seneca, *Oed.* 31, "cui reservamur malo?"

10. 228: squalentem rumpens ingestae torvus harenae
ingreditur nimum ac *ritu iam moris* Hiberi
carmina pulsata fundentem barbara caetra
invadit.

At the battle of Cannae Paulus breaks through a thick cloud of sand and slays a Spaniard called Viriathus.

"*ritu moris* mira dictio. Forte leg. *ritu victoris*," Ruperti. Postgate, followed by Summers and Duff, preferred to replace *ritu iam* by the man's name *Viriathum*. Against both of these readings, apart from palaeographical considerations, it can be objected that *iam* should not be dispensed with (the Spaniard was *already* celebrating victory); *ritu* also appears sound, since Silius is particularly fond of that word with a genitive (or adjective equivalent to a genitive). So it must be *moris* that is corrupt; I suggest *Martis*, "after the fashion of Spanish warfare," i.e. Spanish fighters; cf. 11. 24 *Tyrus Marti* = "Poenis." The corruption of *Martis* to *moris* is easy enough in itself but here it has been helped by a psychological factor: *ritu* has suggested to a scribe its synonym *mos*.

11. 291: namque Iovem et laetos per furta canebat amores

Electraeque toros Atlantidos, unde creatus,
proles digna deum, *tum* Dardanus.

It might be difficult to find a more otiose *tum* than this one. It looks to me as if it had been inserted to fill the gap left by the loss of another monosyllable, perhaps *sit*.

- 11. 356:** hoc iugulo dextram explora; namque haec tibi *ferrum*,
si Poenum invasisse paras, per viscera *ferrum*
nostra est ducendum.

A Capuan father threatens to interpose his own body if his son tries to assassinate Hannibal.

Heinsius found the repetition of *ferrum*, at the end of two consecutive lines, "elegant." In *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 13 (1967), 23 f. A. Ker disagrees, and thinks that one *ferrum* must be corrupt; he tentatively proposes *fili* in 356. Better, I suggest, *saevum*, if change is required; for this epithet of *ferrum* see 13. 284, Lucan 7. 313, Seneca, *Thy.* 573. The two words are not unlike.

- 12. 630:** tandem post clades socium caelique ruinam,
non *hoste* in nimbis viso, non *hoste*, referri
signa iubet castris.

Hannibal is thwarted by a terrible storm in his attack on the city of Rome.

One of the two occurrences of *hoste* must be wrong. It has been usual to replace the second by *ense*, which is an impossibly feeble guess. Much better is Blass's *urbe*, in support of which one could adduce 614 f., "hostique propinquo / Roma latet." Another possibility, I suggest, is *sole* (preferably replacing the first occurrence of *hoste*); cf. 612 f., "caelumque tenebris / clauditur et terras caeco nox condit amictu"; contrast 637 (when the storm ends), "serenato clarum iubar emicat axe."

- 12. 684:** rursus in arma vocat trepidos clipeoque tremendum
increpat atque †uenus† imitatur murmura caeli.

The subject is Hannibal.

The old correction *armis* has usually been accepted, despite *arma* (in a different sense) in the previous line, and despite the fact that it repeats *clipeo*. Other suggestions are *amens*, *tumens*, *fremens*, *sonans*, *minis*. Better than any of these, I think, would be *tonans*; cf. 9. 423 (also of Hannibal), "ingentis clipei tonitru praenuntiat iram," 13. 10 (words of Hannibal), "armorum tonitru" (half metaphorical). Unelid-

ed *atque* is not a serious objection; Silius has 17 instances of this, of which seven are in the second foot.

14. 580: nec mora quin trepidos hac clade inrumpere muros
 signaque ferre deum templis iam iamque *fuisset*,
 ni subito importuna lues inimicaque pestis
 invidia divum pelagique labore parata
 polluto miseris rapuisset gaudia caelo.

After a victory at sea the Romans would have made an immediate assault on the city of Syracuse but for a sudden outbreak of plague.

It makes good sense to take *fuisset* as the equivalent of *licuisset*; so already Ruperti, referring to l. 163, "sistere erat"; this would be an extension of the impersonal use of *est* or *erat* dealt with by Hofmann-Szantyr, *Lat. Synt. u. Stil.*, p. 349. There is therefore no need for Heinsius's emendation *ruisset* (sc. *Marcellus*), which in any case is open to the objection that, although Silius is very fond of *ruo*, he never construes it with an infinitive.

In 583 there is no doubt that S. B. (p. 179) is right in taking *pelagi labore parata* with the following *gaudia*, not with the preceding *pestis*, but it is not clear that *invidia divum* should likewise be taken thus (in what sense was the victory at sea won "through the jealousy of the gods"?). It is much more probable that *invidia divum* goes with what precedes; in that case it would appear that a line has dropped out after 582, e.g. *pestis / (orta graves multis morbos mortesque tulisset) / invidia divum, pelagique* etc.

15. 51: aberunt sitis aspera et haustus
 sub galea pulvis *partique minore labores*.

Pleasure (*Voluptas*) promises Scipio freedom from the hardships of military life.

For the last three words S. B. (p. 180) lists nine conjectures of previous scholars, none of which he likes, and then adds three more of his own. All twelve are, in varying degrees, remote from the paradisis. Yet good sense can be obtained at the cost of little more than the insertion of one letter: *preti(o)que minore labores*, "toils that are poorly rewarded" (Silius is quite fond of *pretium* in this sense). I hesitate to suggest that Silius may have remembered Lucan l. 282 (a disputed line), "par labor atque metus, pretio maiore petuntur."

15. 726: tunc aversi *turgentia* colla
 disicit ense Mosae; percussit pondere terram
 cum galea *ex alto* lapsum caput, at residentem
 turbatus rapuit sonipes in proelia truncum.

Livius slays a tall Gaul in a cavalry engagement.

turgentia colla is appropriate of a snake (2. 546) but not obviously of a human being; Duff's notion that it refers to goitre is quite fantastic. Heinsius's *fugientia* is a poor conjecture, despite 2. 250, *terga fugientia*, and 8. 1, *cedentia terga*.

Read *surgentia*, "towering aloft" on his horse; cf. 715, *procerae . . . cohortes*, and 728, *ex alto*. For this meaning of *surgere* cf. *OLD* sense 7 and Silius 1. 103, "*surgentes . . . flammis*," 5. 133 f., "*vertice surgens / triplex crista*," 6. 598 (of Jupiter), "*Albana surgens (= altus or sublimis) . . . arce*."

16. 170: Massylis regnator erat ditissimus oris
nec nudus virtute Syphax; *quo* iura petebant
innumerae gentes extremaque litore Tethys.

If sound, *quo* must mean *a quo*; so Ruperti, quoting Curtius 5. 7. 8, "*regia totius Orientis, unde tot gentes antea iura petebant*"; but *quo* cannot mean *unde*. Summers adopts Schrader's *quem*, but the use of *peto* with two accusatives is very doubtful; see C. F. W. Müller, *Synt. d. Nom. u. Akk.* (Leipzig and Berlin 1908), 148 f. I can only suggest that *quo* is a stopgap to repair the loss of *hinc*.

Aberdeen, Scotland

9

Leopards, Roman Soldiers, and the *Historia Augusta*

BARRY BALDWIN

Ἄπὸ Συρίας μέχρι Ῥώμης θηριομαχῶ, διὰ γῆς καὶ θαλάσσης, νυκτὸς καὶ ἡμέρας, δεδεμένος δέκα λεοπάροισι, ὃ ἔστιν στρατιωτικὸν τάγμα.

Thus Ignatius, in the opening sentence of his Fifth Letter to the Romans, describing his journey in captivity and expectations of martyrdom. Or, as Jerome, *De Vir. Illustr.* 16 (PL 23. 635A), renders the key words, *ligatus cum decem leopardis, hoc est, militibus qui me custodiunt*, translating (it should be noted) a Greek text whose reference to the soldiers at the end of the sentence is different, reading as it does *τουτέστι στρατιώταις τοῖς φυλάσσουσί με*. As a convenience to readers, I might mention that this point is obscured in the TLL's notice of *leopardus*, where also Jerome's *decem* is misreported as *duobus*.

This passage bothered Kirsopp Lake, the Loeb editor of Ignatius, who felt that "leopards" was the name of a regiment, the following words in the Greek being an explanatory gloss. But, as he admitted, there is no evidence for any such nomenclature, rich though Roman military slang was in such contexts.¹ Ignatius is probably being figurative,² as his opening verb *θηριομαχῶ* implies. He could well have been trying a conscious variant on figurative uses of other animals in Christian literature, e.g., the lion in Paul, II Timothy 4:17.

¹ See the examples collected by R. MacMullen, *Soldier and Civilian in the Later Roman Empire* (Harvard 1963), pp. 166–67.

² Also the view of Arndt & Gingrich, *A Greek–English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (2nd edn., Chicago 1979), p. 471.

Such an explanation does not detract from the linguistic interest of the passage. If we may trust the dictionaries, this is the first occurrence of "leopard" in both Greek and Latin. *LSJ* adduce only Galen 5. 134 (Kühn), *Edict. Dioclet.* 8. 39, and Theognostus, *Canon* 98. Lampe's Patristic Greek Lexicon adds to the present passage only *Acta Philippi* 96 and the seventh century Joannes Climacus, *Scala Paradisi* 7 (PG 88. 812D). All the examples collected by the *TLL* are late, whilst Lewis & Short quote only two passages from the *Historia Augusta*, and the *Oxford Latin Dictionary* merely a couple of inscriptions. Furthermore, the Ignatian passage is the only figurative example in Greek, and there is none in Latin.

The Roman soldiers who provoked Ignatius to this apparent artistic innovation will almost certainly have been the so-called *diogmitae*, a tough crowd of vigilantes or enforcers, hardly deserving *LSJ*'s mild description of them as "mounted policemen."³ *LSJ*, who spell the word διωγμίτης, adduce only *CIG* 3831 a8; this is altered in their Supplement to *OGI* 511. 10, actually the same inscription via Dittenberger's *OGIS*, with the addition of a second inscription from Pisidia, published by Louis Robert, *Bulletin de Correspondance Hellénique* 52 (1928), 407–09. It is striking that all four of the examples in Lampe (who spells it διωγμίτης) come from martyrologies.⁴ To give the best example, Polycarp was arrested by a joint force of *diogmitae* and cavalry (the distinction is to be noted) who were sent out to find him "with the usual arms as though against a brigand."⁵

The Latin equivalent *diogmitae* (which may justify the orthography of Lampe over that of *LSJ*) is not to be found in the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*. Both Lewis & Short and the *TLL* are confined to the same two passages. Ammianus Marcellinus 27. 9. 6 relates how Musonius, the *vicarius* of Asia in 368, tried to combat the brigands of Isauria *adhibitis semermibus paucis, quos Diogmitas appellant*. It may be notable that the historian, who says that Musonius was compelled to use this posse because the regular soldiers were enfeebled by luxury, finds it necessary to explain the term.

The other passage is in the *Historia Augusta*. In his Life of Marcus Aurelius (21. 7), 'Julius Capitolinus', having said that the emperor created bands of Volones (armed slaves), *Obsequentes* (armed gladia-

³ For discussions of their quality and functions, with concomitant bibliography, cf. Fiebigger's notice in *RE* 5, col. 784, Robert, *loc. cit.*, and now B. Shaw, "Bandits in the Roman Empire," *Past & Present* 105 (1984), 18, n. 35.

⁴ *M. Poly.* 7. 1; *M. Pion.* 15. 1, 7; *M. Agap.* 2. 1.

⁵ Text and translation in H. Musurillo, *Acts of the Christian Martyrs* (Oxford 1972), pp. 6–7; the last words in the Greek constitute a quotation from Matthew 26:55.

tors), and reformed bandits from Dalmatia and Dardania, adds the laconic sentence *armavit et Diognitas*. The word is absent from Lessing's Lexicon to the *Historia Augusta* perhaps because he treated it as a proper name.⁶ This account has been accepted at face value by the best modern authority,⁷ and may be authentic, given the undoubted existence of *diognitae* at that time. Yet one has to wonder what the chances are of the *Historia Augusta* independently coming up with the only extant Latin use of the term outside Ammianus, especially when we notice how a crude alliteration (*Dalmatiae . . . Dardaniae . . . Diognitas*) is thereby achieved, also that the biographer's account opens with an ablative absolute, *instante sane adhuc pestilentia*, as does that of Ammianus, *deploratis novissime rebus, luxuque adiumento militari marcente*. Conceivably, then, we have here yet another small link in the chain of details⁸ that betrays the fraudulent nature of the *Historia Augusta*.

University of Calgary

⁶ As does the Loeb text of Magie; in Hohl's Teubner, it is printed with a small "d."

⁷ A. R. Birley, *Marcus Aurelius* (London 1966), p. 218, also in his Penguin translation of the *HA*.

⁸ As put together by many scholars over the years since Dessau. A bibliography is here unnecessary; *HA* fanciers know where to look.

10

Three Notes on *Habeo* and *Ac* in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*

CLIFFORD WEBER

I. *Habeo* = *Habito* (20. 7)

The frequentative *habito* is the usual Latin word for "reside," but in pre-Classical texts this idea is occasionally expressed by the simplex *habeo*. Of the latter usage there is one example in the third-century *Sacra Argeorum* quoted by Varro,¹ but otherwise it is limited to drama: nine times in Plautus,² twice in Naevius, and once each in Accius and Afranius. By 100 B.C., however, this usage would appear to have become obsolete, for not only is it never attested in any Classical text, but subsequently the grammarian pseudo-Placidus states that *habeo* = "reside" "nunc frequentative tantum dicitur."³ In Late Latin, to be sure, isolated examples are to be found: one in Apuleius,⁴ one in Dictys Cretensis, and one in Paulinus of Nola. Nevertheless, two examples drawn from a poet and from an archaizer like Apuleius are not sufficient to establish the survival of *habeo* = *habito* in post-Classical Latin, nor is an isolated instance in Dictys.⁵ A search for additional late examples, moreover, would not appear to hold much promise. In the entry on *habeo* in the *Thesaurus Linguae*

¹ *Ling.* 5. 50.

² Textual conjectures would add three more examples in *Curc.* 44. *Men.* 308, and *Poen.* 1093.

³ Lindsay, *Glossaria Latina*, IV (Paris 1930), H 15 (p. 64).

⁴ Two if *habeo* in *Apol.* 21 (p. 25. 4 van der Vliet) is intransitive.

⁵ The same goes for *CIL*, VI, 38274 from Etruria, which is of unknown date and in any case displays a modicum of literary knowledge.

*Latinae*⁶ the lexicographer unequivocally declares, "Locos dedi omnes."

In *Itinerarium Egeriae* 20. 7, however, this sentence is found:

... mox de nocte petierunt heremum et unusquisque eorum monasteria sua, qui ubi habebat.

As long ago as 1912, in his review of Löfstedt's commentary on the *Itinerarium*,⁷ Schmalz recognized (without, however, expressly drawing attention to the fact) that in this passage *habebat* is best taken to mean "reside." Otherwise, an ellipse of *monasterium suum* must be assumed. Thus, whatever may be the correct analysis of *qui ubi* in the above sentence, there can be little doubt about the equivalence of *habebat* to *habitabat*, so that *qui ubi habebat* means something like "each wherever he happened to be living," as Schmalz took it. This instance in *Itinerarium Egeriae* 20. 7 should be added, then, to the examples of *habeo* = *habito* cited in the *Thesaurus*, "locos dedi omnes" notwithstanding. Another fact, however, is more important. Taken together with Dictys Cretensis 4. 15, this passage demonstrates that *habeo* = "reside" was still in current use as late as the late A.D. 300s. Thus, as it appears in Apuleius and Paulinus of Nola, this usage is not a case of literary affectation but is rather current idiom. It also affords an especially clear illustration of the so-called "classical gap." Amply attested in pre-Classical drama, *habeo* = "reside" then disappears from view for the next two centuries, but not because it became obsolete. On the contrary, though rejected by Classical and Silver purists, the use of *habeo* in this sense lived in the non-literary language of everyday life.⁸ This is the reason why it reappears in Late Latin, after the breakdown of the complex stylistic canon which had earlier distinguished everyday speech from acceptable literary usage.

II. *Ibi Habet* = *Il y a* (4. 4)

It is common knowledge that the impersonal use of *habet* with an accusative, first appearing in Late Latin in the A.D. 300s, is the linguistic ancestor of French *il y a* ("there is," "there are") and the parallel expressions in Spanish (*hay*), Catalan (*hi ha*), and Italian (*vi ha, ci ha*). In the French expression the adverb *y* is optional until the

⁶ Col. 2401. 13.

⁷ *Berliner philologische Wochenschrift* 32 (1912), 549-61.

⁸ Löfstedt implicitly recognized this fact in *Eranos* 7 (1907), 67, where he has this comment on Dictys Cretensis 4. 15: "Dass *habere* = *habitare* bei einem Spätlateiner nicht beanstandet werden darf, braucht kaum hervorgehoben zu werden." How, four years later, did he miss the same usage in *Itinerarium Egeriae* 20. 7?

1700s, but in all the languages preserving impersonal *habet* + acc., examples containing this adverb or one of its cognates are attested from the earliest period on.⁹ Of *ibi habet*, however, the primordial Latin expression, only one example has been identified, and that, found in chapter 19 (p. 145. 19 Geyer) of Theodosius' *De situ terrae sanctae*, is no earlier than the A.D. 500s:

ibi habet dactalum Nicolaum maiorem, *ibi et* Moyses de saeculo transivit, et *ibi* aquas calidas sunt ubi Moyses lavit et in ipsas aquas calidas leprosi curantur.

It is clear, moreover, that even in this passage *ibi habet* is far from being a fixed expression. Impersonal *habet* is here only one of the three verbs which are used with *ibi*, the full semantic value of which is indicated not only by its specific reference to a particular city,¹⁰ but also by its anaphora at the head of three successive cola. Indeed, the occurrence of *ibi* with impersonal *habet* in this passage is largely fortuitous¹¹ and fails in any case to prove that *ibi habet* had solidified even as late as the A.D. 500s.

In the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, however, there is a significant example of *ibi habet* + acc. which, though rendered correctly in more than one translation, otherwise appears to have gone unnoticed (e.g., in the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*¹²). This example, moreover, dates to the late 300s, and thus it establishes that the exact Latin equivalent of *il y a* is in fact coeval with impersonal *habet* without *ibi*, even if, to be sure, the latter is considerably more common. The passage in question is this in *Itinerarium Egeriae* 4. 4:

In eo ergo loco, licet et lectum non sit, tamen petra ingens est per girum habens planitiem supra se, in qua stetisse dicuntur ipsi sancti; nam et in medio *ibi* quasi altarium de lapidibus factum habet.

⁹ Walther von Wartburg, *Französisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* 4 (Basel 1952), 364. Presumably this is true of Portuguese also, even though modern Portuguese *ha* is unique in preserving *habet* + acc. without *ibi*.

¹⁰ Viz. Livia, visited by Egeria in 10. 4–7. The anaphora of *ibi* in Theodosius is reminiscent of the string of five sentences in succession which Egeria introduces with the phrase *Hic est locus ubi* or some variant thereof. The reminiscence can hardly be coincidental.

¹¹ The clause-position of *habet* immediately after *ibi* (cf. *transivit*, *lavit*, and *curantur* in final position) may be due to the tendency of mono- and dissyllabic forms of common verbs to fall into enclitic position. See Jacob Wackernagel, *Indo-Germ. Forsch.* 1 (1892), pp. 95–97 = *Kleine Schriften* 1² (Göttingen, 1969), pp. 427–29; Raphael Kühner and Carl Stegmann, *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache* 2² (Hanover 1912), p. 602; J. B. Hofmann and Anton Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik* (Munich 1965), pp. 404–06.

¹² S.v. *habeo*, col. 2461. 78 – 2462. 11.

To paraphrase: "In that place, even though no passage of Scripture referring to it is read, there is a large round rock which is flat on top. There [i.e., on the flat summit] the holy ones are said to have stood [= resided?], and¹³ in the middle of that space there is a sort of altar made of stones."

What is the subject of *habet* at the end of this passage? To judge from the silence of Löfstedt and others, *petra ingens* is understood as its subject, and hence *habet* is not impersonal. This analysis, however, is mistaken for at least three reasons:

1. The rock *habet planitiem supra se*, and this *planities*, in turn, *in medio altarium habet*. Thus, if *habet* has a subject, that subject is *planities*, not *petra*. Earlier in the clause, however, demonstrative *ibi* is equivalent to *in planitie*, and hence *planities* also is eliminated as subject of *habet*.
2. In the relative clause and all that follows it, Egeria is concerned solely with the *planities*. Even in her nonchalant prose, to return abruptly to the *petra* in the final word in the sentence would require at the very least a pronominal reference to that effect.
3. Egeria has a penchant for losing the syntactical thread established at the beginning of a sentence. Indeed, this is so marked a characteristic of her writing that anacolutha are ubiquitous in the *Itinerarium*. The following examples are both typical and similar in structure to the sentence under discussion:

. . . ita tamen ut lapis cum corpore non moveretur in alio loco sed ibi ubi inventum fuerat corpus positum esset. . . . (16. 6)

Here the insertion of the relative clause *ubi inventum fuerat corpus* is sufficient to cause the authoress to forget *lapis*, which is the grammatical subject of both verbs in the antithesis. She thus writes *positum* instead of *positus*.

Nam ecclesia quam dixi foras civitatem . . . , ubi fuit primitus domus Abrahae, nunc et martyrium ibi positum est. . . . (20. 5)

After two relative clauses *ecclesia* is forgotten and left without any grammatical connection with the rest of the sentence—a so-called "nominativus pendens."

Tunc statim illi sancti dignati sunt singula ostendere. Nam ostenderunt nobis speluncam illam ubi fuit sanctus Moyses cum iterato ascendisset in montem Dei ut acciperet denuo tabulas, posteaquam priores illas

¹³ In the combination of continuative *nam* and *et = etiam*, which occurs occasionally in Cicero and very often (26 times) in Egeria, *et* is otiose.

fregerat peccante populo, et cetera loca, quaecumque desiderabamus vel quae ipsi melius noverant, dignati sunt ostendere nobis. (3. 7)

The grammatical subject of both sentences is *illi sancti*, but the digression on the Sinai cave is of such length and complexity that a return to this subject has to be signaled with *ipsi*, and *ostenderunt nobis* preceding the digression, by now forgotten, is subsequently repeated as *dignati sunt ostendere nobis*.

For these reasons, to return to the passage before us, neither *petra* nor *planities* can be the subject of *habet*. This verb is rather the impersonal *habet* which, occurring twice elsewhere (1. 2 and 23. 2) in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, eventually became firmly established in several Romance languages.¹⁴ In this passage, moreover, is found the *ibi* which, though presupposed by all Romance expressions except Portuguese *ha*, nevertheless occurs in only one of the Latin examples heretofore identified.

Thus, impersonal *ibi habet* + acc., the exact Latin equivalent of French *il y a* etc., is unambiguously attested as early as the late 300s. This *terminus post quem* is more than a century earlier than that previously established, and no later than the earliest examples of the same construction without *ibi*. To judge from its use in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*, moreover, impersonal *ibi habet* + acc. is subject to the same conditions in Late Latin as govern its use in primeval Romance. There the adverb always refers to a specific place, and thus it is not used if such a place is otherwise indicated, or if extent of time is referred to.¹⁵ Correspondingly, in *Itinerarium Egeriae* 4. 4 *ibi* refers specifically to the *planities* atop the *petra ingens*, but in 1. 2 and 23. 2, where *habet* indicates extent of space (the logical and usual antecedent of extent of time), *ibi* is not to be found.

III. *Ac Tertia Die* (6. 1, 23. 1)

It is typical of Egeria's repetitious style of writing that in chapters 1–23 there is a certain sentence-pattern which recurs no fewer than seven times. The pattern in question consists of these elements in this order:

¹⁴ There is no weight in the objection that, so soon after *habens planitiem* earlier in the sentence, *habere* is unlikely to be repeated in a different sense. In 27. 5, for example, *similiter* is used as a sentence-connective = "likewise," only to be followed four words later by the adverb *similiter* = "in the same way." In 21. 1 *locus* recurs three times within two sentences, and each time in a different sense: first "passage of Scripture," then "place," and finally, as the adverb *loco*, "there."

¹⁵ Wartburg, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch* 4:364.

- A. Clause-initial sentence-connective, whether word or phrase (followed once by an enclitic personal pronoun)
- B. Ablative *die* preceded by an ordinal numeral (*alia* = *secunda*)
- C. Participial clause (missing in two cases)
- D. Perfect active indicative of *rogo*, *venio*, or *pervenio* in the first person.

Without exception in chapters 1–23 every sentence that contains an ordinal numeral + *die* conforms to this pattern, viz.,

1. Et alia die, maturius vigilantes, rogavimus (4. 8)
2. Et inde alia die, subiens montem Taurum et faciens iter iam notum per . . . , perveni (23. 7)
3. Inde denuo alia die, facientes aquam et euntes adhuc aliquantum inter montes, pervenimus (6. 1)
4. Ac tertia die, inde maturantes, venimus (6. 1)
5. Ac tertia die perveni (23. 1)
6. Ac sic ergo alia die, transiens mare, perveni (23. 8)
7. Ac sic ergo nos alia die mane rogavimus (16. 7).

It is noteworthy that although they conform to type in all other respects (only the absence of a participial clause in no. 5 is at all anomalous), the two citations containing *tertia die* differ from all others in respect to element A. In all other citations this element is subject to some variation. Indeed, only *ac sic ergo* occurs more than once, and it is common throughout the *Itinerarium*, occurring 31 times in all. In both cases, however, of *tertia die*, far separated though they are in the text, *ac* functions as element A. If this fact *per se* is not particularly remarkable, it surely becomes so when considered together with the general incidence of *ac* in the *Itinerarium*. As part of the fixed expressions *ac sic ergo*, *ac sic*, and *ac si*,¹⁶ this conjunction occurs 53 times. In four other cases it connects syntactically parallel pairs in three-word phrases like *virī ac feminae*.¹⁷ Otherwise *ac* is

¹⁶ That *ac* had no semantic autonomy ("valence") in these expressions is especially clear in the case of *ac si*, the eventual univerbation of which is indicated by its Romance descendants: Old French *eissi*, Provençal *aisi*, Spanish *asi*, and Portuguese *assim*.

¹⁷ To this category, by way of comparison, belong 28 of 36 instances of *ac* in Tertullian's *Apologeticum* and *De anima*. In its other eight occurrences *ac* is part of a formula (*ac per hoc* three times, *rursus ac rursus* twice, and *novus ac novus*, *ac si*, and *semel* [sic] *ac* once each).

Aside from one instance of *simul atque* and four of *alius atque alius*, all the occurrences of *atque* in these texts fall into the same two categories as in the *Itinerarium Egeriae*: three-word phrases like *illuminator atque deductor*, composed of two syntactically parallel (and often morphologically identical) words joined by *atque* (47 examples).

found only four times, not including daggered *atque* in 27. 5. Thus, of the apparently unrestricted use of *aclatque* there are only four examples, and in half of them this rare conjunction is part of the phrase *ac tertia die* falling at the beginning of a sentence.¹⁸ Conversely, these two instances of *ac tertia die* amount to half of all occurrences of *tertia die*.¹⁹

If it is reasonable to ask why an otherwise rare conjunction is found in both of the above citations in which *tertia die* occurs, at least one need not wonder why *ac* is in general not part of Egeria's active vocabulary. Since ample documentation already exists concerning the formal, literary tone of *aclatque* as compared with *et* in particular,²⁰ here a few statistical data will suffice. In Cato's speeches *aclatque* is common, but rare in the *De agricultura*. In Cicero too it is commonest in the speeches. In the pseudo-Caesarian *Bellum Hispaniense* it is limited to a single instance of *ac si*. The same is true of the vernacular passages in Petronius, but in the verse passages, meager by comparison, *aclatque* occurs no fewer than 30 times. It is rare in Vitruvius, the phrase *dextra ac sinistra* (cf. Egeria's *virī ac feminae* etc.) accounting for half of all examples, and rare as well in Comodian and the *Mulomedicina Chironis*. In Phaedrus, with one possible exception, it is limited to *simul ac*, and among the inscriptions found at Pompeii before 1911 there are no examples at all. This statistical evidence of the early obsolescence of *aclatque* appears corroborated, moreover, by the following remark of an admirer of Cato in Fronto *Epistulae* 2. 16:

Uni M. Porcio me dedicavi atque despondi atque delegavi. Hoc etiam ipsum "atque" unde putas?²¹

and formulae composed of *atque* and an adverb or conjunction (*atque adeo* and *atque ita* [cf. Egeria's *ac sic* and *ac sic ergo*] nine times each, *atque exinde* three times, and *atque inde* [cf. Egeria's *et inde* above], *atque illic*, and *atque utinam* once each). It is noteworthy that the phonology of these two categories conforms to entirely different norms. In the formulae constituting the second category, the word following *atque* begins with a vowel in all 24 instances without exception, but among the 47 examples belonging to the first category, this is the case in no more than seven. This striking discrepancy demonstrates that the expressions belonging to the second category are all formulae inherited from the time when *atque* was generally restricted to use before words beginning with a vowel. Finally, *ac* is never used at the beginning of a sentence (cf. Egeria's practice), but *atque* appears 13 times in this position.

¹⁸ In the other half *atque* is found, viz., in 18. 1 and 21. 1.

¹⁹ The other two are in 25. 11 and 49. 3, and only in the latter at the beginning of a sentence (*Item tertia die*).

²⁰ For particulars see Hofmann and Szantyr, *Lateinische Syntax*, pp. 476–78 and the bibliography cited there.

²¹ It is not impossible, however, that the Catonism in question here is not the use of *aclatque* per se, but rather the particular use of *atque* before consonants, for which see

It is clear enough, then, why *aclatque* does not belong to Egeria's active vocabulary. Why, then, in both of its occurrences above, is *tertia die* in particular preceded by this formal, literary, and even vaguely grandiloquent conjunction, which otherwise is used without restriction in only two places in the entire text? The answer follows from the nature of the conjunction itself. If *aclatque* is a word unique to the written language, then *ac tertia die* is likely to be a quotation or a paraphrase, even if unconscious, of some written text with which the authoress is familiar.²² In the vernacular, moreover, as has just been shown, *aclatque* had long been virtually extinct and must therefore, by Egeria's day, have had a distinctly archaic ring. This consideration leads to a liturgical text as the likeliest source of *ac tertia die*, for however unaffected and straightforward the Latin of Christian writers may have been, the language of Christian worship was quite another matter.

... Latin used in the liturgy displays a sacral style. The basis and starting point of Liturgical Latin is the Early Christian idiom, which, however, ... has taken on a strongly hieratic character, widely removed from the Christian colloquial language. ... Liturgical Latin is not Classical Latin, but neither is it, as is so often said, the Latin which was considered decadent by educated people. The earliest liturgical Latin is a strongly stylized, more or less artificial language, of which many elements ... were not easily understood even by the average Christian of the fifth century or later. This language was far removed from that of everyday life.²³

"And on the third day. . . ." Even for a believer less thoroughly steeped in Scripture and liturgy than Egeria, it would have been a natural reflex to express this idea by using the elevated expression with which many a sacred text must have referred to this central event in the life of Christ, and in the belief of Christians everywhere. As far as Egeria in particular is concerned, her propensity for adopting

Bertil Axelson, *Unpoetische Wörter* (Lund 1945), pp. 82–85, and J. A. Richmond, *Glotta* 43 (1965), 78–103, esp. 80, 82, 93–94. *Me dedicavi ac despondi ac delegavi* might have occasioned no comment, at least not concerning the conjunction.

²² In this connection it is significant that in 18. 1, one of the two instances of the free use of *aclatque* just mentioned, *atque* is followed immediately by a Biblicism drawn from Deut. 28:11, for which see below.

²³ Christine Mohrmann, *Liturgical Latin: Its Origins and Character* (London 1959), pp. 53–54.

Scriptural and liturgical modes of expression has been well documented.²⁴ To cite only a few among many examples, the phrases *in nomine Dei*, which she uses five times, *iubente Deo*, occurring eight times, and *gratias agentes Deo*, found once (in 16. 7), are all formulae of prayer which have become part of Egeria's normal pattern of speech. When she mentions Biblical Egypt in 5. 9, she calls it *terra Aegypti*, its designation in the Vulgate and in her own quotation of Gen. 47:6 in 7. 9. Contemporary Egypt, however, she calls simply *Aegyptum* in 3. 8 and 7. 1, for example. In 4. 2, referring to the flight of Elijah from King Ahab, she adopts the Biblicism *fugere a facie* + gen., which, since it occurs at least four times in the Vulgate translation of the Psalms, Ziegler²⁵ has suggested was familiar to Egeria from its frequency in the pages of her psalter. Yet another example has heretofore gone unnoticed. In 18.1, writing of her stopover in Hierapolis in Syria, she characterizes that city as *abundans omnibus* and thus adopts the phraseology of the Vulgate at Deut. 28:11.²⁶

In short, quite apart from explicit references to specific passages of Scripture, Biblical turns of phrase so permeate the *Itinerarium Egeriae* that they have left their stamp on the language of the entire work. In many cases, moreover, Egeria's familiarity with these Biblicisms will have been indirect, due more to their occurrence in her liturgy than to her own Scriptural erudition.²⁷ Nevertheless, whether she is quoting a specific text or, as is more likely, using an expression

²⁴ "Elle fait usage d'un certain langage dévot, caractérisé par des expressions plus ou moins onctueuses, empruntées à la Bible, soit aux textes rebattus de la liturgie"—A. A. R. Bastiaensen, *Observations sur le vocabulaire liturgique dans L'Itinéraire d'Égérie* (Nijmegen 1962), p. 181. See also Joseph Ziegler, *Biblica* 12 (1931), 163–64, 176–77, 184–85, 190 ("Neben den direkten Zitaten des Alten Testaments begegnen uns in der Peregrinatio noch viele freie Anspielungen und biblische Wendungen, die den ganzen Sprachcharakter des Büchleins nachhaltig beeinflusst haben"—p. 176).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 177.

²⁶ "Abundare te faciet Dominus omnibus bonis." With *abundare omnibus* here cf. *abundare in omnibus* (Eccles. 10:30, II Cor. 1:7) and *abundare in omne* (II Cor. 9:8, 9:11). This and other correspondences between Egeria's language and the text of the Vulgate should not, however, be taken to imply that the Vulgate and Egeria's Bible are one and the same. On the contrary, direct quotations from her Bible indicate that the latter, like the Itala in general, was more similar to the Septuagint than to any other extant text. In quotations from the New Testament she comes much closer to the Vulgate, but that is because there Jerome by and large preserved the text of the Itala. See *ibid.* 165, 167, 187, 197.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 177, 184–85, 188, 190.

common to a multitude of texts with reference to the Resurrection of Christ, in neither case can it be known precisely what this text or these texts may have been.²⁸

Kenyon College

²⁸ In the Vulgate New Testament the phrase *et tertia die* (in Luke 24:7, *et die tertia*) occurs in eight places (Matt. 16:21, 17:22, and 20:19, Luke 9:22, 13:32, and 18:33, John 2:1, and Acts 27:19), and in five of these it refers to the Resurrection. There is no instance of *ac* in place of *et*, however, either in the Vulgate or in the Itala. Tertullian and Irenaeus are the only Latin fathers who quote any of the above verses (Luke 9:22 in Tert. *Adv. Marc.* 4. 21. 7 [*et post tertium diem*] and Irenaeus *Adv. haereses* 3. 16. 5 [*et die tertio*], and Matt. 16:21 *ibid.* 3. 18. 4 [*et tertia die*]), and there also only *et* is found.

In the Roman missal *tertia dies* with reference to the Resurrection occurs only in the creed, which has *et resurrexit tertia die*. In all other extant creeds, however, there is no conjunction at all. In the Leonine Sacramentary *tertia dies* does not occur. Finally, in the supplements to the *Corpus Christianorum* entitled "Instrumenta lexicologica Latina," no parallel for Egeria's *ac tertia die* is to be found.

On the Survival of an Archaic Latin Case Form in Italo- and Balkan-Romance

PAUL A. GAENG

Among the *vexatae quaestiones* of historical Romance morphology, the origin and development of Italian and Rumanian third declension plurals in /-i/ from Lat. /-ēs/ (e.g., It. *monti*, Rum. *munți* derived from Lat. MONTĒS) is still high on the list. In his recent *Proto-Romance Morphology* (Amsterdam-Philadelphia 1983), Robert A. Hall, Jr. supports the widely accepted explanation to account for this development when he says that these plurals, which seem to point back to Proto-Romance /-i/,¹ are the result of an *analogical replacement* of earlier /-ēs/ by /-i/ under the influence of the second declension MURI-type plurals rather than a phonetic development, that is, the closing of Lat. [ɛ] to [i] brought about by the following [s]. The implication of this statement is that there are essentially two hypotheses, phonological versus analogical development of /ēs/>/-i/, to account for these plurals. The arguments underlying these theoretical positions may be briefly summarized as follows:²

¹ It should be recalled that Hall's "Proto-Romance" is a theoretical construct, and that he deals with a reconstructed morphology based on the earliest Romance attestations rather than with evidence culled from Vulgar Latin texts and inscriptions.

² The literature dealing with the problem of 3rd decl. plurals in Italian and Rumanian is quite extensive, since all manuals and studies on the historical morphology of these languages make reference to it. Among the essays specifically devoted to the problem at hand, the following should be mentioned: Robert L. Politzer, "On the origin of Italian plurals," *Romanic Review* 43 (1952), 272-81, and "Vulgar Latin *-es* Italian *-i*," *Italica* 28 (1951), 1-5; Paul Aebischer, "La finale *-i* des pluriels italiens et ses origines," *Studi linguistici italiani* 2 (1961), 73-111; Francesco Sabatini, "Sull'origine dei plurali

- (a) The change to It. *cani*, Rum. *cîni* from Lat. CANĒS is the result of an analogical pull exerted by plurals of the *o*-declension nouns (as in It. *il gallo* versus *i galli*) and the need to differentiate singular from plural, since Lat. CANE(M) and CANĒS would have given It. *cane* and Rum. *cîne* in both singular and plural (after the loss of /-s/, a phonological development shared by both Italo- and Balkan-Romance). A contributing factor influencing the change of final /-ē/ to /-i/ may also have been, so the argument goes, the analogical pressure that the definite article (in the guise of a weakened demonstrative) and the adjective must have exerted in a construction of the *illī bonī canēs* type, changing it to *illī bonī canī*. The same desire to differentiate singular from plural would, then, also explain the /-i/ plural ending of 3rd decl. feminine nouns, e.g., CLAVĒS > It. *chiavi*, Rum. *chei*.³
- (b) The change to It. *cani*, Rum. *cîni* from Lat. CANĒS is a purely phonetic development, with /-s/ causing the closing (palatalization) of final /ē/ to /i/: /-ēs/ becoming /-is/ and, finally, /-i/ after the loss of /-s/.⁴ As an alternative to the closing influence of /-s/ on the

italiani: il tipo in -i," *Studi linguistici italiani* 5 (1965), 5–39; Sextil Pușcariu, "Une survivance du latin archaïque dans les langues roumaine et italienne," *Mélanges Antoine Thomas* (Paris 1927), 359–65; I. Șiadbei, "Persistența cazurilor latine în România orientală," *Mélanges Mario Roques* (Paris 1952), 231–40; Maria Iliescu, "Notă cu privire la pluralul -i din română și din italiană," *Analele Universității din Craiova* (Științe filologice) 5 (1977), 15–17.

³ The analogical explanation of Lat. /-ēs/ > It. /-i/ of 3rd decl. plurals is closely associated with the German scholar Gerhardt Rohlfs (*Historische Grammatik der italienischen Sprache und ihrer Mundarten* [Bern 1949], II, pp. 49–52), although he is by no means the first one to propose it. Among his predecessors concerned with the problem one must single out the Italian scholar Francesco D'Ovidio who, after first entertaining the likelihood of a connection between an OLat. FONTĪS nom. pl. and It. *fonti* (*Sull'origine dell'unica forma flessionale del nome* [Pisa 1872], pp. 45–46), changed his mind in favor of an analogical extension of 2nd decl. nominatives to those of the 3rd declension: "è fuor dubbio che *cani* ecc. sono formati analogicamente su MULĪ, BONĪ, ecc." ("Ricerche sui pronomi personali e possessivi neolatini," *Archivio glottologico italiano* 9 [1886], 25–101). So far as Rumanian is concerned, H. Tiktin (*Rumänisches Elementarbuch* [Heidelberg 1905], pp. 80–81) and O. Densusianu (*Histoire de la langue roumaine* [Paris 1901–1938], II, p. 166) must be singled out as early supporters of the analogical theory. More recent advocates of this theory have been Al Rosetti (*Istoria limbii române* [Bucharest 1978²], II, p. 42), I. Șiadbei and M. Iliescu (see above, note 2).

⁴ In essence, this hypothesis rests on W. Meyer-Lübke's phonological "law" according to which Lat. /-ēs/ > It. /-i/ (e.g., Lat. FLORĒS > It. *fiore*) (*Italienische Grammatik* [Leipzig 1890], p. 60). Politzer, in an attempt to refine the hypothesis of a phonetic development to account for this change, suggested that in the final syllable there occurred a neutralization of the front vowels in late Vulgar Latin resulting in a single /e/ phoneme in that position with an [i] allophone developing before /-s/ and that, with the

preceding /ē/, the vocalization of the final consonant, i.e., turning /-s/ into the semivowel /-j/, may also be envisaged, paralleling the /s/ > /j/ evolution in monosyllables (e.g., Lat. TRES > OIt., Rum. *trei*): /-ēs/ > /-ej/ > /-i/, with the reduction of the diphthong in polysyllables, whereas in stressed position (monosyllables) it is preserved.⁵

In a footnote, Hall notes that “Puscariu (1927) ascribed the Italian and Roumanian /-i/ to the OLat. ending /-i-s/ of the pure *i*-stems,”⁶ a hypothesis that the Italian savant D’Ovidio had already entertained over a century ago (see above, note 3) before he changed his mind 15 years later (*ibid.*). Struck by the frequent alternation of orthographic *-es* and *-is* in nominative and accusative functions in *both* consonant and *i*-stems occurring in Latin authors⁷ and inscriptions (e.g., *parentes/parentis*; *sorores/sororis*; *partes/partis*), Sextil Pușcariu, the well-known Rumanian scholar of the first half of our century and the first one, to my knowledge, to deal with the origin and development of 3rd decl. plurals in Italian *and* Rumanian, advanced the hypothesis that the OLat. /-ēs/ of *i*-stems had persisted in the spoken language and that after the fall of /-s/ the /-i/ prevailed as a morphological marker of all masculine nouns under the influence of second decl. masculines where the /-i/ plural morpheme is etymological.⁸ Feminine nouns, under the influence of those of the first decl., preserved the /-e/ ending (>/-ēs/) somewhat longer, as evidenced in medieval literary texts.⁹

eventual fall of this consonant, final [i] was phonemesized as a necessary morphological distinction between singular and plural (cf. his article in *Italica* cited above in note 2).

⁵ Cf. Heinrich Lausberg: “Im Mittel- und Südital., im Vegliot. und im Rum. wird *-s* zu [j] das hinter betontem Vokal (in Einsilbern) erhalten ist, hinter unbetontem Vokal (in Mehrsilben) mit diesem verschmilzt (meist: *a + i̇ > e*, *e + i̇ > i*, *i + i̇ > i*) . . .” (*Romanische Sprachwissenschaft*, II: *Konsonantismus* [Berlin 1967²], p. 82). In his *Beiträge zur romanischen Lautlehre* (Jena–Leipzig 1939), Günther Reichenkron advanced a four-stage development of Lat. /-ēs/ > /-i/, involving vocalization of /-s/, as follows: /-ēs/ > /-is/ > /-ij/ > /-i/ (p. 42).

⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁷ Varro notes that people said *hae puppis, restis* side by side with *hae puppes, restes* and “in accusando *hos montes, fontes*,” as well as *hos montis, fontis* as reported by Aebischer, *art. cit.* (above, note 2), p. 100. Cf. also Ferdinand Sommer, *Handbuch der lateinischen Laut- und Formenlehre* (Heidelberg, 1914^{2&3}), p. 382.

⁸ “. . . le maintien des pluriels en *-i* de la troisième décl. en ital. et en roum., à côté de quelques reliques en *-e*, prouve que l’hésitation entre *-ēs* et *-is*, constatée à l’époque latine archaïque, s’est perpétuée dans le parler populaire de l’Italie et des contrées danubiennes.” (*art. cit.* [above, note 2], p. 362).

⁹ Although Pușcariu is not explicit as to the causes of the eventual change of the

It is worth noting that despite his firm belief in “une continuité entre les pluriels archaïques en -ĪS et les pluriels italiens et roumains en -i” (p. 363),¹⁰ Pușcariu gives the force of analogy its due since, as he admits, “les formes à flexion [sont] soumises à l’influence de l’analogie” (p. 361). He rejects, however, the hypothesis of a phonetic /-ēs/>/-īs/>/-i/ evolution, claiming that “il m’a toujours paru étrange que s final ait pu avoir en tombant une autre influence sur l’e précédent que m final” (p. 361).¹¹

The frequent alternation of orthographic *-es* and *-is* that Pușcariu observed suggests that there must have been a free variation of two expression elements on the *morphological* level, since it has been generally recognized that this alternation occurs only in 3rd decl. plurals.¹² Scholars who have analyzed Late Latin documents and charters from the Italian area have found that the *-is* orthography was widespread in the plurals of 3rd. decl. nouns, regardless of their stem.¹³ Except for a passing reference to inscriptional material in

feminine pl. in /-e/ to /-i/, it must be assumed that it occurred under the influence of masculines, aided by the desire to keep singular and plural apart.

¹⁰ This chronological continuity is also acknowledged by Carlo Tagliavini: “al plurale, specialmente all’acquisitivo, troviamo larghe tracce di *-is* per *-es*, cioè che dimostra la continuazione sviluppatasi nel Latino arcaico” (*Le origini delle lingue neolatine* [Bologna 1969⁵], p. 208).

¹¹ C. H. Grandgent, a staunch supporter of the theory of analogy, has levelled similar criticism against the alleged closing influence of /-s/ on the preceding vowel, calling it “a conjectural phonetic principle at variance with familiar linguistic experience” totally unsupported by direct evidence. The American scholar wonders, as a matter of fact, “why should -s, which was always feeble in Latin, work such a miracle?” (“Unaccented Final Vowels in Italian,” *Mélanges Antoine Thomas* [Paris 1927], pp. 187–93). It may be more than just a coincidence that Pușcariu’s most virulent critics are those who invoke phonetic criteria to explain the Lat. /-ēs/>/-i/ development in Italian and Rumanian. Cf. Bengt Löfstedt, *Studien über die Sprache der langobardischen Gesetze* (Stockholm 1961), pp. 39–47; F. Sabatini, *art. cit.* p. 34, above note 2.

¹² What adherents of the “phonological theory” seem to have failed to recognize, however, is that the orthographic alternation of *-es* and *-is* reflects a morphological phenomenon (formal variation of /-es/ and /-is/) and that the phonetic factor (such as the closing influence of /-s/) is irrelevant.

¹³ In their analysis of the *Codice Diplomatico Lombardo*, the Politzers conclude that “in the nominative plural of the third declension, the distribution of *-es* and *-is* follows no pattern and seems to indicate that the endings were completely interchangeable” (Frieda N. and Robert L. Politzer, *Romance Trends in 7th and 8th Century Latin Documents* [Chapel Hill 1953], p. 28). The same phenomenon is also observed by B. Löfstedt in his study of the language of the *Edictum Rotharii*: “Betreffs der Verwendung von *-is* statt *-ēs* im Edikt ist ferner zu beachten, dass in den ältesten Hss. *-is* ebenso häufig im Nom. wie im Akk. *-es* ersetzt und ebensooft bei Kons. Stämmen eintritt” (*op. cit.*, p. 39). P. Aebischer also finds confirmation of this fact in medieval Latin charters examined by

determining whether the Classical Latin $\bar{I}\bar{S}$ ending survived in the postclassical period or not, a more systematic examination of inscriptional resources to see if they could yield some clue to solving this controversial problem still remained to be done.

The purpose of this paper is an attempt to show, by drawing on evidence culled from inscriptions exclusively, that not only did this Old Latin ending survive, but that in this particular context Lat. /-ēs/ and /-īs/ may be looked upon as variants of the 3rd decl. nominative and accusative plural morpheme, and that they reflect a continuation and extension of the alternation between consonant and *i*-stems in Classical Latin. The inscriptional data are drawn from a corpus of funerary prose inscriptions published in Ernst Diehl's *Inscriptiones Latinae Christianae Veteres* covering the Italian Peninsula, Dalmatia, and the Danubian Provinces.¹⁴ In order to give inscriptional evidence greater weight for the documentation of *-is* spellings in 3rd decl. nominatives and accusatives, I have attempted to give a comparative, quantitative, and chronological presentation of the *-es/-is* orthographic alternation, in the hope that it may yield some interesting results and, thus, contribute to the resolution of a problem that, to date, remains largely unsolved.¹⁵

Here, then, is a numerical summary showing the ratio between *-es* and *-is* spellings in both nominative and accusative cases, based on dated epitaphs:

	century	-es	-is
(a) Danubian Provinces	IV	2	3
	V-VI	0	0
(b) Dalmatia	IV	5	1
	V-VI	2	1
(c) Northern Italy	V	10	11
	VI	5	7
(d) Central Italy	IV	26	2
	V	6	2
	VI	3	6

him: "les formes en *-es* de la troisième déclinaison ont passé dans leur majorité à *-is* . . ." (*art. cit.*, p.104).

¹⁴ Since I am only concerned with developments in Italo- and Balkan Romance, my corpus is limited to 3296 inscriptions, broken down as follows: Danubian Provinces (the inner provinces of Noricum, Pannonia, Dacia, Moesia, Thracia, and Macedonia): 83; Dalmatia: 212; No. Italy: 418; Ce. Italy: 280; So. Italy: 485; and Rome: 1818.

¹⁵ Approximately 40 percent of all inscriptions from the Italian area are dated, but only about 20 percent in the Eastern Provinces. Because of the scanty material from the latter, fifth and sixth cent. inscriptions are lumped together. Note also that in No. Italy there are no dated inscriptions before the fifth cent.

(e) Southern Italy	IV	2	4
	V	7	3
	VI	10	18
(f) Rome	IV	68	42
	V	29	15
	VI	3	12

Many of the orthographic changes in this material involve the form *mensis* (for CLat. MENSĒS)¹⁶ as well as an alternation in the spelling of substantivized adjectives of the *octobris/octobres* type. But there are plenty of other examples of *-is* for *-es* spellings (as well as *-es* for *-is* where we would expect the latter in regular *i*-stems) in both nominative and accusative functions. The same alternation observed in non-dated epitaphs supports the data concerning the alternation of *-es/-is* in dated inscriptions. Here are a few illustrative examples taken at random:

coniuncti amantis se bene dicere debent (1336, 4th cent., Noricum)
parentis dolientis . . . ficierunt (847, No. Italy)¹⁷
fratris se bibi . . . fecerunt (4146F, a. 400, Rome)
de filius [= filios] ipseius qui superstitis sunt (2372, Rome)
de tres fratris cursoris (381B, Rome)
cum . . . sororis suas (808A, Rome)
inter innocentis (2500B, Rome), etc.

An interesting example of the concurrent use of *-es* and *-is* occurs in the following accusative absolute construction: *locum emerunt presentis omnis fossores* (3761, Rome).

The data presented in this summary show a clear trend in the direction of the *-is* spelling, particularly in the Centro-Southern

¹⁶ It has been suggested that in the numerous instances in which *mensis* is preceded by *annis*, as in *vixit annis LII mensis VIII* (Diehl 3252A), the *-is* spelling may be due to an orthographic assimilation to the form *annis*. (Cf. B. Löfstedt, *op. cit.*, p. 41.) This is not the case. A careful count has revealed that in more than half of the instances in which the form *mensis* (also spelled *mesis* and *mensis*) was found it is preceded by *annum* and *annos* (or *annus*). In fact, it is not unusual to find cases where *annis* is followed by *menses*, e.g., *vixit annis L menses sex* (Diehl 1329). Without meaning to deny the likelihood of such an orthographic analogy, I believe the evidence does not seem to suggest it; rather, it would seem that the *-es/-is* alternation is independent of what precedes or what follows. The concurrent use of *menses* and *mensis* in the same inscription (Diehl 3761n)—both times preceded by *annos*, incidentally—only confirms my contention that the apparently interchangeable use of orthographic *-es* and *-is* reflects a variation on the level of form.

¹⁷ The form *parentis* occurs quite frequently in late 4th/early 5th cent. Italian epitaphs in nominative function. It is also found in the Eastern Provinces.

Italian area, with 75 percent of all 3rd. decl. nominatives and accusatives in the area of Rome by the sixth century, suggesting that it may well have been the focal point of the survival of OLat. /-īs/ in the popular language, whence it spread to other Latin-speaking areas. In any event, this kind of evidence is difficult to reconcile with Grandgent's statement that "apparently -ēs crowded out the rarer -īs which left no sure traces,"¹⁸ or the view that the /-īs/ ending of *i*-stems had become "moribund" by the early third century A.D.¹⁹ Quite the contrary would seem to be the case. Inscriptional data suggest that not only did a free variation between /-ēs/ and /īs/ persist throughout the Vulgar Latin period (echoing what must have been a similar alternation between consonant and *i*-stem plurals in Classical Latin) but that /-īs/ also gained considerable ground, taking the upper hand in the Roman area by the sixth century. It is this persistence of OLat. /-īs/ in inscriptions (which, after all, are more faithful and reliable monuments of everyday speech habits than would-be charters or other legal documents²⁰) that led Pușcariu to argue that /-īs/ had lived on in the spoken language and that, after the fall of /-s/, final /i/ prevailed as a morphological marker of all 3rd decl. masculine nouns under the influence of 2nd decl. masculines where /-i/ is etymological. Thus, the hypothesis of a chronological connection between OLat. /-īs/ and 3rd. decl. plurals in /-i/ and the analogical extension of the "masculine declension" come to complement each other, in that what speakers felt to be the plural pattern in /-i/ eventually helped resolve an age-old conflict between Lat. /-ēs/ and /-īs/, a conflict extending well into the Italian and Rumanian phases,²¹ in favor of the /i/ plural marker in modern Italian and Rumanian.

The parallelism between the Italian and Eastern Latin developments becomes evident when we consider that the Eastern Provinces were, in the main, colonized by Italic immigrants from the lower social strata who brought with them their rustic speech habits.²² It is

¹⁸ Cf. C. H. Grandgent, *An Introduction to Vulgar Latin* (Boston 1907), p. 152.

¹⁹ Cf. M. Iliescu, *art. cit.*, p. 15; also B. Löfstedt, *op. cit.*, p. 40.

²⁰ B. Löfstedt, *loc. cit.*

²¹ "Il y avait donc en latin une oscillation entre la désinence -ĪS (à l'origine justifiée seulement pour les accusatifs des radicaux en *i*) et -ĒS. Cette oscillation apparaît chez les écrivains classiques, après même que la grammaire eût déclaré correcte la forme en -ĒS. La même hésitation entre -ĪS et -ĒS s'aperçoit dans les inscriptions et elle continue jusque dans l'italien (*le vite et le viti*) et le roumain (*care, pace* à côté de *cari, păci*)" (Pușcariu, *art. cit.*, p. 363).

²² Cf. Walther von Wartburg, *Die Ausgliederung der romanischen Sprachräume* (Bern 1950), p. 22.

not surprising, therefore, to find early attestations of plural forms in /-is/ on written monuments from the East also.

Unless one refuses to admit, as Pușcariu's critics do,²³ that certain "vulgar" or "rustic" features of speech could well have been transmitted from an archaic Latin period to the Romance languages "im Dunkeln der Volkssprache"—to borrow Karl Meister's expression²⁴—there is solid evidence to support the hypothesis of a chronological continuity between /-īs/ of Old Latin *i*-stems and the modern plural outcome of Italo- and Balkan-Romance languages.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

²³ See above, note 19.

²⁴ "Altes Vulgärlatein," *Indogermanische Forschungen* 26 (1909), p. 89.

Corrigendum

The following *erratum* has been noticed by Professor Gerald M. Browne in his article "Chariton and Coptic," *ICS* X (1985), pp. 135–37:

p. 136, line 8, should read: The-fact-that-the-man-stays (is) in-the-house


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