

UNIVERSITY OF  
ILLINOIS LIBRARY  
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

CLASSICS

The person charging this material is responsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the **Latest Date** stamped below.

**Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University.**

To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

NOV 18 1983



ILLINOIS  
CLASSICAL  
STUDIES

VOLUME V  
1980

Miroslav Marcovich, *Editor*

*SCHOLARS PRESS*

ISSN 0363-1923



## CONTENTS

1. <i>Septem</i> 12-13 and the Athenian <i>Ephebia</i>	1
H.Y. McCULLOCH and H.D. CAMERON	
2. The <i>Iphigeneia</i> at <i>Aulis</i> : the Prologue Anapaests	15
GRACE A. MIZEN	
3. Some Passages in Plato's <i>Laws</i> (IV and V)	44
FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN	
4. Over Troubled Waters: <i>Megara</i> 62-71	49
MIROSLAV MARCOVICH	
5. Greco-Roman Light on Rabbinic Texts	57
HOWARD JACOBSON	
6. <i>Non sua poma</i> : Varro, Virgil, and Grafting	63
DAVID O. ROSS, Jr.	
7. Eight Horatian 'Bridges'	72
MIROSLAV MARCOVICH	
8. Propertius 2.18: "Kein einheitliches Gedicht..."	94
WILLIAM R. NETHERCUT	
9. Simile and Imagery in Ovid <i>Heroides</i> 4 and 5	110
CATHERINE S. PEARSON	
10. Thrasylus in Tacitus ( <i>Ann.</i> 6.21)	130
REVILO P. OLIVER	
11. Mussato's Commentary on Seneca's Tragedies: New Fragments	149
ALEXANDER MacGREGOR	
12. Cicero vs. Ciceronianism in the <i>Ciceronianus</i>	163
H.C. GOTOFF	





## SEPTEM 12-13 AND THE ATHENIAN EPHĒBIA

H. Y. McCULLOCH and H. D. CAMERON

In the prologue of the *Seven Against Thebes* Eteocles urges the people of the city to defend her against the attack from Argos. He first speaks of his own duty as their leader, prays that Zeus the Defender be true to his name, and at line 10 turns to the duty of his hearers: ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ νῦν ...πόλει...ἀρήγειν, "And your duty now is to defend the city." But lines 12 and 13 have caused great bewilderment and confusion for editors and commentators without yielding a thoroughly satisfactory sense. The text in M reads:

- 10 ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ νῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐλλείποντ' ἔτι  
 ἦβης ἀκμαίας, καὶ τὸν ἔξηβον χρόνῳ,  
 βλαστημόν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολύν,  
 ὦραν ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον, †ᾧστι† συμπρεπές,  
 πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων  
 15 βωμοῖσι, τιμᾶς μὴ ἔξαιειφθῆναί ποτε,  
 τέκνοισι τε γῆ τε μητρὶ, φιλιτάτη τροφῶ.

---

13: ὦραν *ferè codd. et M ante correctionem*, ὦραν τ' *nonnulla apographa codicis perditum quem Wilamowitzius Φ appellavit*, ὦραν δ' *Triclinius*, ὦραν QΣ *et M post correctionem a manu recentiore factam, fortasse e memoria codicum aliorum.*

The following is a tentative literal translation which may serve to lead us into the discussion:

And it is now necessary for you, both the one still falling short of ripe *hêbê* and the *exêbos* in age, nurturing much strength of body, each in the prime of life, as is fitting, to defend both the city and the altars of our local gods -- may their honors never be wiped out -- and our children and Mother Earth, dearest nurse.

Editors have traditionally followed the scholiast in interpreting the *hapax legomenon* ἔξηβος to mean an old man beyond the years of military service. Early editors (Schütz, Bothe) assumed that Eteocles is addressing two groups who fall outside military age, *viz.*, boys lacking maturity, and old men; others (e.g., Campbell, Rose), that he is addressing the entire male populace -- boys, old men, and men in their prime. We will argue that he is addressing neither boys nor old men, but exclusively those within the age limits of military service.

Those who argue that he addresses three classes of citizens understand τὸν ἑλλείποντ' ἔτι ἡβης ἀκμαίας to mean one below military age, and understand ἔξηβος to mean one beyond the age of military service, although the grounds for doing so, as we will argue below, are exiguous in the extreme. Since line 12 βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολὺν then seems inappropriately to apply to the old men, editors have followed Campbell in reversing the order of lines 12 and 13, so that the expression then applies to ὄραν ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον, which they understand to mean each man in the prime of life.<sup>1)</sup> In order to make this the third group in the series, it is customary to read the elided τε found in MSS of the Φ group. This gives:

- |    |  |
|----|--|
| 10 | καὶ τὸν ἑλλείποντ' ἔτι                   |
| 11 | ἡβης ἀκμαίας, καὶ τὸν ἔξηβον χρόνον,     |
| 13 | ὄραν τ' ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον, ἵστί+ συμπρεπές, |
| 12 | βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολὺν       |

1) See Campbell's note in *CR* 45 (1931) 5-6. Rose, *CR* 46 (1932) 11, for the most part agreed with Campbell, despite a spirited exchange in that year's volume of *CR*, pp. 155 and 203. It is unnecessary to recapitulate further the various solutions based upon such misinterpretations, but a word must be said about the reading ὄραν in MS Q of the Thoman tradition, which has been imported by a later hand into M as a correction. The meaning would be 'each having concern'. The problem is that ὄρα would be expected to take an objective genitive, and usually occurs with a negative or an expression implying a negative (LSJ s.v.). This would be an unparalleled usage. Secondly, we may ask concern for what? We might like to say 'concern to defend the city', but that would require ὥστε plus the infinitive (*Soph. OC* 386). If we were to read ὥστε in this sense for ὥστι, we would be left with the problem of fitting in συμπρεπές. The mistake arose when an uncial text without breathing marks and accents was transliterated into minuscule.

both the one still falling short of ripe manhood, and the one past full manhood, and each man in the prime of life, as is fitting, nurturing much strength of body...

There are at least three obvious disadvantages to this remedy. First, †ὥστι† συμπερέτες ends up in an odd place, since it ought to apply to the infinitive that follows, i.e., ἀρήγειν. With lines 12 and 13 transposed, it seems that to possess the bloom of youth or to put forth strength of body is what is proper. Second, the three ages -- boys, old men, and young men -- are in a peculiar order. Third, the combination of connectives καὶ...καὶ...τε is nowhere used in Greek tragedy to mark the enumeration of three elements.<sup>2)</sup>

The second interpretation, that Eteocles addresses only the boys and the old men, also rests upon the assumption that ἔξηβος means an old man past military age. Behind this interpretation lies the quite unwarranted presupposition that the city is in such peril that the regular army is already manning the walls, that Eteocles has only the boys and old men before him, and that he must urge this feeble remnant to a last ditch stand.<sup>3)</sup>

But there is no compelling reason elsewhere in the text to assume that these listeners are old men and boys, and indeed there are several logical reasons against it. First, in line 16 they are asked to defend their children. It strains our credulity to imagine that Eteocles is saying

2) Nor does it occur in Aristophanes, Xenophon, Herodotus, or Homer, so far as we can tell by scrutiny of the concordances and indices. *Soph. Phil.* 656f. at first glance appears to be an example, but there, as Ellendt pointed out (*Lex. Soph.*<sup>2</sup> p.353b), the first καὶ means 'even', is bound to ἐγγύθεν, and is not part of the enumeration. Likewise, *Hom. Od.* 11.468f.; 24.16f. prove not to be applicable cases because καὶ does not begin the sequence, but is actually between the first and second elements. In any event, the τ' of *Sept.* 13 has only the most exiguous manuscript authority.

3) Schütz *ad loc.* says: *In summo tamen rerum discrimine et senes, et impuberes pueros armatos fuisse legimus.* And Bothe *ad loc.* takes the pathos one step further, reading an adverbial πολὺ in line 12 and ὄραν 'care' in line 13, and imagines the old men summoning up what strength of body they still have. He translates: *Oportet autem vos, et illum, qui adhuc abest a viro iuventae, et eum, qui iuveniles annos supergressus est omnes corporis vires diligenter reparando, et quae opus sint curando, huic urbi...succurrere.*

this to boys. Second, Eteocles has addressed them (line 1) as πολῖται, but boys before they come of age are not πολῖται (Arist. *Pol.* 1275 a 22). Further, the statement (line 16) that Earth had undertaken the cost of their παιδεία so that they would be her faithful defenders, implies that their childhood is past.

It is equally illogical to assume that he is addressing old men beyond the age of military service. First, in lines 19-21 he says that Earth had nurtured them to be her shield-bearing citizens, which means that they are the men whom Thebes had prepared in advance against the possibility of attack. Who else could this be but the hoplite citizenry, the regular military force? It makes little sense to say that Earth had prepared *the old men* to be her defenders. Eteocles employs what appears to have been a mild cliché of military rhetoric, that just as men owe care to their fathers in return for the cost of their own upbringing, so the soldier pays back the cost of his upbringing to the state by fighting in her defense.<sup>4)</sup> At line 477 Megareus may pay his debt to Earth by dying in her defense: θανὼν τροφεῖα πληρώσει χθονί. χρέος in line 20 (contrary to what the scholiast says) means 'debt', and Eteocles is saying, in effect, "Earth has undertaken the cost of raising you to manhood so that you may be faithful to this debt by fighting in her defense." But this is a sentiment appropriate to young men, or at least men of military age. Indeed, since men past the age of service are to be cared for by their sons, and by Solon's law (Plut. *sol.* 22) have a legal right to γηροτροφία, it would be grotesque to apply this commonplace to them.

Furthermore, the belief that Eteocles is addressing old men and boys rests upon the assumption that the regular army, i.e., all the men of military age, are somewhere else. Moreover, the notion that extreme danger necessitates calling up the old men and boys makes sense only if the regular army

4) Cf. H.D. Cameron, "The Debt to Earth in the *Seven Against Thebes*," *TAPA* 95 (1964) 1.

is unavailable or severely outnumbered.<sup>5)</sup> It is sometimes said that the regular forces are already on the walls, but what sense is there in Eteocles' giving this speech to everybody but the real defenders, who are already on the job? And we must remember that it is dawn or shortly thereafter (line 29): are we to suppose that the regulars were stationed there in the dark expecting a night attack? When at lines 30ff. Eteocles orders *everybody* to man the defenses *in full armor*, we should find it hard to believe that the walls have *already* been manned by the regular army, and we should pause at the notion that boys and old men, otherwise unfit for service, would be expected to manage full armor.

If we consider for a moment the staging of the prologue, we must ask whom the actor playing Eteocles was addressing. Calder has persuasively argued that in the prologue of Soph. *OT* Oedipus directs his speech to the audience, as though they were Theban citizens, rather than to supernumeraries on the stage. It is reasonable to assume, as did Murray and Rose, that Eteocles, too, is speaking to the Athenian audience, who hear themselves addressed as "Citizens of Cadmus," and who for the purposes of the prologue are to imagine themselves the soldiers of Thebes. Can we believe that if they are addressed as "Citizens of Cadmus," they will imagine themselves to be only the old men and boys of Thebes?<sup>6)</sup>

5) The situation in the *Seven* is not analogous with that in Hom. *Il.* 8.517ff., where the very point is that the army is away from the city (λαῶν ἀπεόντων, line 522), and where the women are included with the young and old men; nor is the situation in the *Seven* analogous with that in Tyrtaeus 11 (Bergk, West), where there is no suggestion of an emergency. During the expedition of Myronides in 458 B.C. (Thuc. 1.105), the regular army was engaged in Aegina and Egypt; that is the reason the old men and the young mounted the emergency campaign in the Megarid. Gomme *ad loc.* argues that the old and young mentioned here were *not* outside military age, but rather the youngest and oldest classes within the age of military service.

6) See W.M. Calder, "The Staging of the Prologue of *Oedipus Tyrannus*," *Phoenix* 13 (1959) 121-29. Calder's view still seems tenable despite its dismissal by D. Bain, "Audience Address in Greek Tragedy," *CQ* 25 (1975) 13-25, esp. p. 22, n. 1. The objections which are raised by O. Taplin (*The Stagecraft of Aeschylus* [Cambridge 1977] 129-34) to the possibility that Eteocles addresses the audience do not seem to us very strong, and certainly not decisive.

If there are so many illogicalities, how ever did this interpretation grow current? The sole reason is the meaning given to the *hapax legomenon* ἔξηβος. The Medicean scholiast glossed τὸν ἔξηβον as τὸν ἔξω ἡλικίας, τὸν γέροντα, and from this false gloss all the trouble springs. Whatever authority the Medicean scholiast ought to have is cancelled by the much greater authority, in this case, of Hesychius, who explains the word as: ἔξω τῆς ἡβης. τριδάκοντα πέντε ἐτῶν (s.v. ἔξηβος, Latte Vol. II, p. 125 no. 3827). A 35-year-old man is certainly not beyond military age, and cannot be called γέρον.

Hesychius' authority is to be preferred to that of the scholiastic tradition, since we know that his definitions of Aeschylean words were taken from the Λέξεις Τραγικῆ of Didymus, which itself goes back to the Ἀττικαὶ Λέξεις of Aristophanes of Byzantium.<sup>7)</sup> Furthermore, Hesychius certainly had access to commentaries on Aeschylus from the Alexandrian period (cf. Hesychius s.v. ἐναροκτάντας, Latte Vol. II, p. 88 no. 2679) which were at best known to the medieval scholiasts only in fragmented and corrupted form.<sup>8)</sup> These are excellent *prima facie* reasons for trusting Hesychius in matters of Aeschylean vocabulary. Accordingly, ἔξηβος simply does not mean old man, and we must discount those interpretations which result from the assumption that it does.

What ἔξηβος does mean is any man past the age of adolescence (ἡβη), i.e., an adult, who is consequently liable to regular military service. This is fully in accord with the fact that the classes of the Spartan army were designated by the number of years since adolescence, ἀφ' ἡβης, as we learn from Xenophon. τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἡβης (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.32; 3.4.23; 4.5.14; Xen. *Ages.* 1.31) are those cadres in the first decade after entering upon full manhood, i.e., those between

7) See A. Wartelle, *Histoire du texte d'Eschyle dans l'antiquité* (Paris 1971) 192; H.J. Mette, *Die Fragmente der Tragödien des Aischylos* (Berlin 1959), Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin: Schriften der Sektion für Altertumswissenschaft 15, 277-79.

8) See L. Cohn, s.v. "Didymos," *RE* V.1 (1903) col. 451.

20 and 29.<sup>9)</sup> τὰ πεντεκαίδεκα ἀφ' ἥβης (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.16; 4.6.10) are the first 15 classes, those between 20 and 35. The other expressions attested are τὰ πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.17), and τὰ τεσσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἥβης (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.13; 6.4.17; Plut. *Ages.* 24.3). It is clear that those beyond *hêbê* in this system were precisely those within the age limits of military service.

It is not easy to ascertain unambiguously what the limits of the period of adolescence or ἥβη were, but we may say roughly it began at about 16 and ended at about 20.

At Athens the orphaned children of those who died in war were supported by the state μέχρι ἥβης (Thuc. 2.46; Lys. *Against Theozotides* 2; Aeschines *Against Ctes.* 154). But it is difficult to determine whether this means until the point of puberty or until the end of adolescence, when a boy entered full manhood.<sup>10)</sup> A passage in Plato's *Menexenus* (248 e-249 b) indicates that they were supported until they entered manhood εἰς ἀνδρὸς τέλος, and therefore μέχρι ἥβης means 'to the end of adolescence'.

An expression from legal language, found in the orators and the ancient oratorical lexicons, also indicates that *hêbê* was a period in life during which certain obligations and rights were acquired. Harpocration quotes a passage from Hyperides' oration against Chares on the guardianship (Harp. s.v. ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῆσαι):

ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐνεγράφην ἐγὼ καὶ ὁ νόμος ἀπέδωκε τὴν κομιδὴν τῶν καταλειφθέντων τῇ μητρὶ, ὅς κελεύει κυρίους εἶναι τῆς ἐπικλήρου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἀπάσης τοὺς παῖδας ἐπειδὴν ἐπὶ διετὲς ἡβῶσιν.

When I had been enrolled [in the deme at maturity] and the law had granted [me] the management of the property left to my mother, the law, that is, which says that the children of an *epiclêros* are to be responsible for her and all her property whenever they are two years past adolescence (or have been mature for two years).

9) Cf. F. Ollier, *Xenophon La République des Lacédémoniens* (Paris 1934) 34; and A. Billheimer, "Τὰ δέκα ἀφ' ἥβης," *ΤΑΡΑ* 77 (1946) 216-17. Both conclude that the age of majority at Sparta was 20.

10) See C. Pélékidis, *Histoire de l'éphébie Attique* (Paris 1962) 16ff.

In Bekker's *Anecdota Graeca* s.v. ἐπὶ δειτεῖς ἠβῆσαι we find it explained as τὸ γενέσθαι ἐτῶν ἄλλων δυοῖν μετὰ τὴν ἠβην. This appears to mean that a boy enters the period of *hêbê* two years before he is enrolled in the deme, acquires control of property only when he is enrolled in the deme at age 18 (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 42.1), but reaches complete adulthood only when he has emerged from *hêbê*.

To summarize, the language in our sources appears to mark several stages of life: boyhood, from birth to puberty at age 16, a two-year period of adolescence from 16 to 18 (at the end of which he is enrolled in his deme and may undertake legal obligations and control property), and a second period of adolescence from 18 to 20 (during which he fulfills his preliminary military service, and at the end of which he acquires full and complete adult status).<sup>11)</sup> *Hêbê* then would be the period between 16 and 20, after which he is an ἔξηβος.

This view is consonant with a passage of the *Seven* where Eteocles appears to catalogue the stages of a young man's life. Polyneices has claimed that *Dikê* leads him back from exile, and Eteocles denies that *Dikê* ever looked with favor on Polyneices at any time of his life (664ff.):

ἀλλ' οὔτε νιν φυγόντα μητρόθεν σκότον  
οὔτ' ἐν τροφαῖσιν οὔτ' ἐφηβήσαντά πω  
οὔτ' ἐν γενείου ξυλλογῆ τριχώματος  
Δίκη προσεῖδε καὶ κατηξιώσατο

But *Dikê* never looked on him with favor, not when he fled the darkness of his mother's womb, nor while he was a boy, nor when he had reached adolescence, nor when he had reached the time when the beard's hair thickens.<sup>12)</sup>

While this passage does not distinguish the two periods

11) For a full discussion concerning our sources on the age of majority, see Pélékidis (above, note 10) ch. 4.

12) The strange expression γενείου ξυλλογῆ τριχώματος probably contains a military metaphor "in the mustering of the beard's hair," where ξυλλογή has the sense of mustering of troops, as in Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6. Cf. also Eur. *IA* 514; 1545; Xen. *Cyr.* 6.2.11. Solon 27.5-6 (Bergk, West) characterizes the third seven-year period of a man's life as the time when his beard begins to grow.



of *hêbê*, it clearly marks boyhood, adolescence, and full manhood.

Let us return to the prologue of the *Seven* with the knowledge that ἔξηβος means someone of military age, and that ἦβη is a period of life ending with full manhood. The expression τὸν ἐλλείποντ' ἔτι ἦβης ἀκμαίας can be seen in a new light. The adjective ἀκμαία must not be glossed over. It should be clear that the expression cannot mean those who are lacking ἦβη, i.e., boys who have not yet reached adolescence, but rather those *in* the period of adolescence who are still short of its full ripeness, who are short of the end point of ἦβη but close to it, i.e., just under 20.<sup>13)</sup> Then ἔξηβος quite naturally means those who have emerged from the period of ἦβη, i.e., those over 20. Then βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολὺν applies directly to the ἔξηβος, but its meaning needs to be discussed.

The assumption that ἔξηβος meant 'old man' has led to some very strained interpretations of the expression βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολὺν. For instance, Schütz *ad loc.*, following a suggestion of Hugo Grotius, says it means *vigorem corporis augere*, and he explains further that the old men are

13) The metaphor is of growing grain which is at the end of its period of growth, when it is ἐν ἀκμῇ (Thuc. 4.2). Cf. Eur. *Alc.* 316 ἦβης ἐν ἀκμῇ, at the point when a girl is ready for marriage. In this sense, cf. also Eur. *Hel.* 12. At *Med.* 920 Jason, speaking of his sons, looks forward to the end of their *hêbê*. Cf. the odd usage at *Soph.* *OT* 1034, where ἀκμή means 'extremity'. *Soph.* *OT* 741 presents problems, since there ἦβη seems to refer to middle age. Oedipus, as the possibility dawns upon him that the man he killed may have been Laius, asks Jocasta what Laius looked like and what his age was (τὸν δὲ Λαΐον φύσιν/ τίς' εἶχε φράζε, τίνα δ' ἀκμὴν ἦβης ἔχων;). Jocasta, in answer, does not give his age, but gives a description, including the fact that his hair was grizzled. Because ἦβη is not suitable to Laius, several editors have emended the word away. If we retain it, the passage must be understood to be extremely ironic. Oedipus hopes to learn that Laius was young, and consequently could not be the man he murdered. He loads the question to invite the desired response ("Having what ripeness of youth?"). With Jocasta's answer, μέγας, χυοάζων ἄρτι λευκανθὲς κάρα, the irony is further intensified, because with the word χυοάζων she seems to be saying that Laius was young. Elsewhere this word and its commoner form χυοάω always refer to the bloom of youth, and a compound of ἄνθος also suggests youth. Only with the last word of the line does it become clear that she is not speaking of a young man, but of a man of middle age whose hair is gray.

to refresh their bodies with food and drink so as to be equal to undertaking the exertions of war.

But it is extremely doubtful that βλαστημός can mean *vigor corporis*. It means offspring at Aesch. *Supp.* 314 and its congener βλάστημα means offspring at *Sept.* 533; the verb βλαστῶ is used of plants putting forth new shoots; and βλάστη is used of the birth of children (*Soph. OT* 717; *OC* 972). The basic meaning of this group of words is *budding and sprouting*, and not simple increase of size or strength. The words for that kind of growth are φύειν and αὐξάνειν. In short, the interpretation 'nurturing much strength of body' is no more than an aberration of the scholiasts, and does not stand up to scrutiny.

If line 12 modifies ἔξηβον, meaning of full military age, and if we take βλαστημός in its only supportable meaning, then the thought that these warriors are also fathers, producing scions to populate the state for her future defense, is not only in accord with traditional Greek feeling (cf. *Hdt.* 7.205.2),<sup>14</sup> but is also in accord with the metaphorical language of this play, where the citizens of Thebes literally grew out of the ground, a notion which is brought to our attention again and again (e.g., 412ff.; 474). The phrase means 'nurturing many scions of his body'.

The word χρόνῳ in this passage has traditionally been taken as a dative of respect with ἔξηβον, and the phrase has then been taken to mean 'an old man in age'. This would seem to be parallel with *Soph. OC* 112, χρόνῳ παλαιοί. But given the fact that an ἔξηβος is a man in the prime of life, a better parallel is *Soph. OC* 374, where Eteocles is called ὁ νεάζων καὶ χρόνῳ μείων γεγώς in contrast to his older brother. Accordingly, there is no difficulty in taking χρόνῳ with a word designating a young man.

There is, however, another possibility. If χρόνῳ has its common Aeschylean meaning 'in the course of time' (*Ag.* 126; 463; *Ch.* 650), it should be construed with the participle

14) Headlam, *CR* 14 (1900) 109, had already seen that βλαστημός had to mean offspring, and that this line reflects a commonplace sentiment.

ἀλδαίνοντα. In the three Aeschylean passages cited, χρόνω also appears with the present tense used with future meaning. We may translate: "the one who has passed to full manhood, nurturing many scions of his body in the course of time." With this interpretation, χρόνω is directly parallel with the ἔτι of line 10.

There remains the problem of line 13. It does not connect syntactically with the rest, which has compelled scribes and editors to supply a conjunction. Furthermore, as we will argue, it is clumsily redundant with other elements of the speech. It is no more than a remnant of a prose paraphrase of lines 10-12 which has found its way into the text from an ancient commentary.<sup>15)</sup>

The commentator was explaining that it is necessary for each man of military age, including the cadets, to defend the city. ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ is paraphrased by συμπρεπές,<sup>16)</sup> and the two expressions ἔξηβος and ἐλλείποντ' ἤβης ἀκμαίας are paraphrased by the single comprehensive expression ὄραν ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον. There seems to be no point to ἕκαστον unless it is to make clear that saying ἔξηβον and ἐλλείποντ' ἤβης ἀκμαίας is tantamount to saying each man of military age.

We conclude finally that Eteocles addresses two groups, those just under full military age, and those of military age; that ἔξηβος designates precisely those of military age, not old men; that βλαστημός means offspring; and that line 13 is to be excised as a remnant of an Alexandrian commentary which has made its way into the text and has been adjusted to the meter.<sup>17)</sup> The text should read:

15) For the practice of rendering poetic texts into prose paraphrases, which goes back at least to Aristarchus, see W.G. Rutherford, *A Chapter in the History of Annotation* (London 1905) 336ff. In the preface to his edition of Aeschylus (Leipzig 1873), p.xxiv, Dindorf argued that line 13 was added by an interpolator, who felt the need to supply a third group of citizens.

16) Rose, *CR* 46 (1932) 203, also saw that συμπρεπές (ἔστι) paraphrases ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ. Since ὅστι is puzzling, we may suspect that it represents what is left over from an original ὡς ἔστι συμπρεπές, which would not fit into a trimeter.

17) Cf., for example, Eur. *Supp.* 252 and E. Fraenkel's discussion of *Ag.* 871 (*Aeschylus Agamemnon* Vol. II [Oxford 1962] 393, n. 1).

10 ὤμας δὲ χρὴ νῦν, καὶ τὸν ἐλλείποντ' ἔτι  
 11 ἥβης ἀκμαίας καὶ τὸν ἔξηβον, χρόνῳ  
 12 βλαστημὸν ἀλδαίνοντα σώματος πολύν,  
 14 πόλει τ' ἀρήγειν καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων  
 15 βωμοῖσι...

"And it is now necessary for you, both him who still falls short of the end of adolescence, and him who has passed into full manhood, nurturing many scions of his body in the course of time, to defend his city and the altars of his country's gods..."

The text as we have established and interpreted it has a most interesting implication. The regular military force consists of adult men, presumably within the ages of 20 and 59, and a force of cadets just under full manhood, let us say between the ages of 18 and 20. This obviously suggests the *ephēboi* in the *Constitution of the Athenians*. If the text of the *Seven* reflects the *ephēbia*, it would be the earliest reference to that institution.

Using the date of the first ephebic inscriptions (IG 2<sup>2</sup>. 1156, 1189), Wilamowitz argued that the *ephēbia* became a formal institution in 335/34 on the basis of a law passed the year before.<sup>18)</sup> Moreover, the earliest literary evidence explicitly referring to the *ephēbia* appears in Aristotle *Ath. Pol.* 42.2-5. There surfaced only sporadic dissent from Wilamowitz's view for over half a century. Lofberg<sup>19)</sup> saw a reference to the Athenian *ephēbia* in Thucydides' use of the terms νεώτατοι (1.105.4; 2.13.7) and περίπολοι (4.67.2). Reinmuth<sup>20)</sup> noted that Aeschines' description of his youthful service to the state in 372/71 (*Aeschin.* 2.170) appears to be the same duty which Aristotle tells us was performed by the ephebes φρουροῦσι δὲ τὰ δύο ἔτη (*Ath. Pol.* 42.5). Both Reinmuth and Pélékidis<sup>21)</sup> voiced the expectation that an

18) U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen* Vol. I (Berlin 1893) 193-94.

19) G.O. Lofberg, "The Date of the Athenian Ephebia," *CR* 20 (1925) 330-35, esp. 330-31.

20) O.W. Reinmuth, "The Genesis of the Athenian Ephebia," *TAPA* 83 (1952) 34-50, esp. 36-39.

21) Reinmuth (above, note 20) 50; Pélékidis (above, note 10) 8.

ephebic inscription dated before 336/35 would someday be found, to confirm their position that the *ephêbia* existed as a formal institution at least since the youth of Aeschines. Finally, in 1967, their expectation was fulfilled with the publication of an inscription dated 361/60 (EM 13354, 13354a), in which the tribe Akamantis honors the *kosmêtês* of the *ephêboi*.<sup>22)</sup> Justifiably arguing that this inscription demanded a reassessment of the accepted dating of the institution, Reinmuth restated his earlier position that the *ephêbia* became a formal organization in the early fifth century, sometime shortly after the Persian Wars.<sup>23)</sup>

In support of this view, he cited a story which Aristotle himself tells of this earlier period (*Ath. Pol.* 24.1). After the Athenian treasury, he says, had been augmented by the tribute from the allied states in 478/77, the Athenians took Aristides' advice that they should strive towards the leadership of Greece. Aristides said that some should serve in the army, others *as guards*, and others as administrators of the state. As Reinmuth notes, "the juxtaposition of service in the army and service as guards suggests the contrast between the services of the mature citizen and the preliminary service of the young citizens which we see in the *ephêbia*."<sup>24)</sup>

Both Reinmuth and Pélékidis are led to the conviction that the *ephêbia* was established at Athens just after the Persian Wars. We argue that the text of *Sept.* 10-16, correctly understood, contains a reference to the *ephêbia*. That its

22) The inscription was published by M.Th. Mitsos, 'Αρχ. 'Εφ. 1965 (1967) 131-32. See Reinmuth's discussion of the inscription in *The Ephebic Inscriptions of the Fourth Century B.C.*, *Mnemosyne Supp.* 15 (1971) 1-4.

23) Reinmuth (above, note 22) 123-38. His position was supported by Pélékidis (above, note 10) 79. Recently, P. Vidal-Naquet, "The Black Hunter and the Origin of the Athenian Ephebia," *Proc. Camb. Philol. Soc.* N.S. 14 (1968) 49-64, has stressed that the *ephêbia*, or something like it, was a common inheritance from the period of Greek pre-history.

24) Reinmuth (above, note 22) 137, further identifies the *φρουροὶ νεωρίων πεντακόσιοι* (*Ath. Pol.* 24.3) -- who Aristotle says received subsistence from the state under the policy of Aristides -- with the *φρουροῦντες* at *Ath. Pol.* 24.1. Both, then, refer to the ephebes.

dramatic locale is Thebes need not disturb us. The point of lines 10 and 11 must have been understood by an Athenian audience, and that is sufficient to indicate that this was an institution with which they were familiar. By a circumlocution Aeschylus avoids the jingle of ἔφηβος/ἔξηβος, but still, by using the one explicitly, he suggests the other hidden in the periphrasis. If we now take a look at *Sept.* 665, where Eteocles catalogues the stages of Polyneices' life, the word ἐφηβήσαντα leaps to our attention with enhanced significance. "Justice never looked with favor upon him, neither when he fled the darkness of his mother's womb, nor in childhood, nor when he had become an epebe, nor in full manhood with the muster of beard's hair." We may still hope for the solid confirmation of the long expected inscription, but until then *Sept.* 10-16 and *Sept.* 665 give us good reason to believe that the institution of the *ephêbia* was familiar to the Athenian audience of 467 B.C.<sup>25)</sup>

University of Michigan

[Keep *Septem* 10-16 as transmitted, and read in 13 ὡς τ<ο>ι συμπρεπές (sc. ἐστί), referring to ὑμᾶς δὲ χρῆ νῦν . . . ἀρήγειν. For τοι implying a general sentiment, compare *Prom.* 39; for συμπρεπές, *Suppl.* 458. L. Koenen suggests ὥραν ἔχονθ' ἕκαστον, <ῆ> 'στι συμπρεπές (corrupted to ῆ 'στι because of the preceding ἕκαστον) and interprets this as an allusion to X 71ff. (νέω [as opposed to old Priamos] δέ τε πάντ' [sc. death when defending one's city] ἐπέοικεν . . . πάντα δὲ καλὰ θανόντι) and Tyrnt. 10 West, 27ff. νέοισι δὲ πάντ' ἐπέοικεν. *Editor*].

25) We wish to thank our colleagues at the University of Michigan for their suggestions and critical comments on the several drafts of this paper.

## THE IPHIGENEIA AT AULIS: THE PROLOGUE ANAPAESTS

GRACE A. MIZEN

This paper will examine the anapaests of the prologue of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* more or less in isolation from the iambics. Separating the two sections is a somewhat artificial procedure since it involves not only dissecting an area which is tightly-knit, even if the unity is purely formal, but also, as Page puts it in the last sentence of *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy*,<sup>1)</sup> 'reducing to fragments the structure which Euripides and he [the interpolator] had built'; nevertheless it is manifestly desirable from an academic viewpoint that any new argument for or against the authenticity of the lines should be brought forward.

My approach will be stylistic, in a broad sense. Consequently, neither the arrangement of the prologue, nor such hoary problems as the much-debated lack of consistency between lines 106-7 and 124ff. will be dwelled upon. Secondly, I shall not focus upon the unresolved and apparently unresolvable issues of, for instance, the construction  $\mu\acute{\omicron}\nu\omega\sigma\sigma\upsilon\ \mu\acute{\upsilon}\theta\omicron\nu\ \acute{\epsilon}\varsigma\ \eta\mu\acute{\alpha}\varsigma$  (44) and the exceedingly uncomfortable language at 130ff. In these instances the case for the prosecution is well stated by Page, Bain and Dr. Diggle,<sup>2)</sup> and I shall confine myself to mentioning them briefly before the main discussion.

1) D.L. Page, *Actors' Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford 1934) 216. Referred to throughout this paper by the author's name.

2) D. Bain, "The Prologues of Euripides' *Iphigeneia at Aulis*" *CQ* 27 (1977) 10-26, a very helpful survey, referred to henceforth as Bain. J. Diggle, review of G. Mellert-Hoffmann, *Untersuchungen zur Iphigenie in Aulis des Euripides*, in *CR* 21 (1971) 178-80.

Instead, I should like to concentrate upon the general *ethos* of the anapaests, which will entail studying value terminology; then I shall consider some phrases and imagery which I feel to be both ineffective and inappropriate; and finally I shall discuss the apparent lack of logical or even conceptual progression in both sections of the anapaests.

Firstly then, some introductory remarks about the transmitted order of the prologue. I am not convinced that lines 1ff. can stand at the beginning of a Euripidean play. δόμων τῶνδε παροιθεν is 'technically improper' and 'uninformative', as C.W. Willink<sup>3)</sup> admits, unless the identity of these δόμοι was clearly indicated by the *skene*, an assumption which points more to later than to classical technique.<sup>4)</sup> It is, however, a possible if uninspired opening line, in keeping with the general tone of the anapaests which is atmospheric rather than informative. Certain details suggest that the anapaests were written to open a play, for instance, the well-known ingredients of: speaker identification (πρέσβυ 1, 3 is adequate for a minor character like the Old Man); the mention of the setting quite rapidly (10, 14), and of the time of day, which is not obligatory except when the action starts during the night (e.g. Sophocles' *Electra*, the *Agamemnon* and, of course, the *Rhesus*). Such information fits most comfortably at the play's opening and is not really adequately conveyed in the somewhat irrelevant genealogy and legend in the first lines of the iambics.

I would like to be able to adopt the most favoured current critical viewpoint about the form of the prologue: that is, that two self-contained versions were written by two hands and conflated by a third. Unfortunately, however, this seems more neat than satisfactory, mainly because the information conveyed by both parts appears to be independent. My points

3) C.W. Willink, "The Prologue of the Iphigeneia at Aulis" *CQ* 21 (1971) 343-64. Referred to henceforth as Willink.

4) See P. Arnott, *Greek Scenic Conventions* (Oxford 1962) 93ff., and H.C. Baldry, *The Greek Tragic Theatre* (Chatto and Windus, London 1971) 47.



are these: 1) the anapaests initiate themes of later importance, such as Agamemnon's relationship with his brother (85, 97-8) and, more weightily, his dilemma in harmonising strong family feeling with desire for power (84-98). 2) the anapaests fulfil the indispensable function of introducing the Old Man and conveying in detail the first change of mind in the play. I admit that portions of the complete anapaests and iambics which duplicated information could easily have been excised by an editor. But 3), unless his work was done extremely hurriedly, I do not see why the linking passage at 106-14 should contain the contradiction (which cannot just be brushed under the carpet) with 124ff., nor why Tyn-dareus' oath, which is thematically non-existent later in the play, should follow the Old Man's request for information.

Without doubt, some kind of 'scissors and paste' job was performed upon the iambics and the anapaests. I do not wish to discuss this in detail, but it might be worth considering the possibility that Euripides wrote some of the iambics, which were then incorporated into an avant garde prologue, commissioned by the first producers to supply the missing dramatic links.

This hypothesis is obviously as untestable as any other, but my reasons for putting it forward are as follows. Firstly, I am tempted by the thematic considerations mentioned above, to believe that Euripides wrote from line 80 to approximately line 107; line 107 because I think that the three 'villains' of the piece, Odysseus, Calchas and Menelaus, could well do with an earlier mention, and this need is perhaps not one that an editor, rather than the author, would necessarily have perceived. Furthermore, the glaring textual corruption of 105-7 points rather to confusion over a join than to interpolation; whereas the reminiscence of the *Iphigeneia among the Taurians* at 112-3 and the derivative nature of the rest of the patchwork from the anapaests certainly indicate an interpolator at work. My reasons for making line 80 the commencement of Euripides' own writing

are that the greatest stylistic problems are in lines 49-79; and the 'story' there recounted is irrelevant. Secondly, the existence of the contradiction between 106-7 and 124ff. is more plausibly explained by the possibility that the editor(s) wished to keep as much of Euripides' own script as they could without, however, mutilating their brand-new anapaests. And thirdly, these editors may have felt that although the avant garde anapaests were splendid, they themselves ought to make a token gesture towards traditional Euripidean practice, by incorporating a genealogy (and legend) not *totally* unconnected with the topic in hand, to fill out the scanty remains from Euripides' own pen. I am aware that these last two reasons may be felt by some to be rather too 'psychological', but pure rationality was certainly not the inspiration of any persons involved in this operation.<sup>5)</sup>

So much, briefly, for the disharmony of the prologue's structure. If the play were to be performed with the prologue as we have it, which it obviously was in antiquity, I think that we would have to concede that the existing arrangement would 'work', but it seems unclassical and totally un-Euripidean.

Turning now to the internal problems of the anapaests which are generally well-known, we are faced, in the words of A.M. Dale,<sup>6)</sup> by metrical 'licences elsewhere unparalleled in drama' such as: 1) 119, a dimeter ending in ποός; 2) 123, a paroemiac of the form - - - ∪ ∪ ∪ - -, unique because the sequence - ∪ ∪ ∪ - is normally confined to the opening of a line; 3) 122, γὰρ δὴ is oddly positioned. Considerations (2) and (3) lead Dale to accept Verrall's arrangement: εἶς

5) The brevity of this introduction is mainly due to two papers devoted to the prologue and presented at the Cambridge Greek Seminar 1977-78 before my paper, by Richard Hunter (an overview) and by John Wilkins (a study of the iambs). I am greatly indebted to them, as well as to the Cambridge Greek Seminar for their comments on this paper. - Bain provides a useful summary of critical differences over the prologue.

6) A.M. Dale, *The Lyric Metres of Greek Drama*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1968) 50.

ἄλλας γὰρ δὴ παιδός / δαίσομεν ὄρας ὑμεναίους.<sup>7)</sup> It is difficult, however, to accept that such oddities should be treated as ordinary emendable problems, especially as their existence gains indirect confirmation from the divided anapaestic *metra* at 2, 3, 16, 140, and 149.<sup>8)</sup> I am not impressed by Willink's 'exact parallel' at *Rh* 16 as a confirmation of Euripidean authorship. That argument works both ways; and *Tra* 977-8, while proving that the licence has a classical, formal parallel, is completely dissimilar in its context of hushed, tense expectation. Sophocles seems to have been innovating with a serious dramatic purpose, whereas our writer used the device (if it may be so called) without any significance that I can perceive. For instance, should we argue that the split *metra* connote haste and anxiety, as is possible at 2, 3, 140 and 149, the example at line 16 then appears to be used loosely; for Agamemnon is hardly going to rush into a general reflection after the sense pause following *στείχωμεν ἔσω* with the same haste and anxiety as when summoning the Old Man from the hut, or sending him on his mission. This is a slight criticism perhaps, but one that Euripides would not have incurred.

About individual examples of rare or so-called nontragic words there will never be agreement. For instance, Page points out that *καίνουργεῖν* is very rare, only here (2 and 838) in poetry until Antiphanes. Willink, on the other hand, remarks that it 'seems securely authentic'. Assuming that it is rare, even coined (although this cannot be proved), one might feel that, firstly, it would have been placed more prominently (as indeed at line 838, where Achilles is dumbfounded by Clytemnestra's revelation that he is supposed to be betrothed to Iphigeneia) rather than at the opening of a play, where it could have little meaningful emphasis;

7) Probably attributable rather to Herwerden (Bain, p. 22, note 62). Bain also comments that the licences may be acceptable since they occur in *lyric* anapaests.

8) An even more unusual divided paroemiac. Parallels at Willink, p. 360: *Tra* 977 and *Rh* 561. The latter is doubtful. Compare W. Ritchie, *The Authenticity of the Rhesus of Euripides* (Cambridge 1964) 292.

and secondly, that any instances of such rare diction should bear some thematic weight. It seems to me unlikely that *καὶ-νουργεῖς* at line 2 assists our reception of its recurrence at 838; but this may be a rather subjective opinion.

At line 22 the MSS present us with the unmetrical *καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον*. This is a tricky problem. As with the metrical licences, I feel that simple emendation here is not an adequate answer, although the metrical error here is glaring. Bothe's remedy of deleting the line as a gloss is, as Willink says, 'much the most plausible solution', but plausibility is not a sufficient reason for deletion. Against Nauck's *πρότιμον* there are the problems of its meaning, 'precious', and its apparent absence from the tragic genre. I would choose to keep *τὸ φιλότιμον*, preferring to read with Markland *τό τε φιλότιμον*, which although unparalleled and unpleasant, does form an anapaestic *metron*, while the MSS reading does not. It is possible that a later scribe disliked the proceleusmatic that he found and changed the reading to *καὶ τὸ...* presuming that the iota in *-τιμον* could be short. Another reason why I incline towards retaining *τὸ φιλότιμον* is because I suspect that lines 20-22 are closely related to 385-7, either as their indirect model or their copy. I shall elaborate on this contention later.

*Συννυμφοκόμον* at 48 does not seem problematic in itself, although a *hapax legomenon*. But I do not think that it suits the character of the Old Man to employ original, perhaps recognisably poetic coinages, and I cannot detect the 'irony' that Willink perceives; that is, that the audience can imagine the Old Man accompanying Iphigeneia, as he did her mother, but to a very different wedding ceremony.

Again, the charge of unnecessary employment of unusual diction can be made against *κολπώδη* and *ἀκλύσταν* at 120 and 121. Page informs us that *κολπώδης* appears only here in poetry, as does *ἀλσώδης* (141), which does not recur until Nicander. In isolation, none of these words is objectionable, but we have to ask ourselves if, clustered together in context, they are not rather 'manneristic'. Some more examples

of odd diction, 'poetic' in tone, are τροχαλοῖσιν ὄχοις (146), παραμείβεσθαι (146) and θυμέλας Κυκλώπων (152). These three usages, though obtrusive and uncomfortable, I am prepared to accept. In the first we may allow Agamemnon some licence for his vivid pictorial anticipation of the Old Man's journey. By extension ὄχοι can perhaps denote ἀρμάτων ὄχοι, especially, as Willink argues, in close proximity to ἀπήνη (47); and θυμέλας Κυκλώπων may be, in England's words, 'a picturesque synonym for Mycenae' (see note 25). Similarly we are confronted by σιγαί at 10, which England considers to be of 'poetic beauty', despite (or perhaps because of) the awkwardness of the plural, which can be matched only with Plato *Rep* 425 b 6, where it means 'instances of silence'. Such a meaning is unsuitable here. Willink attempts to support it upon the insecure prop of uncertain emendations by Hermann and Dindorf of a corrupt passage (obelised by Page in the OCT) at *Ag* 412, but this is hardly adequate.

To sum up, the diction here cannot be supported, only accepted as the work of a mannerist writer but probably not the work of Euripides. I shall return to our poet's use of language later.

Grammatically, some passages of the anapaests are highly suspect, such as κείνωσον μῦθον ἐς ἡμᾶς (44) and the text at 130ff. As I mentioned earlier, I am not reconciled to line 44, but it does not seem to be a case for normal emendation. We may perhaps soothe our sensibilities by arguing that the strained construction was not too harsh for Greek ears; but we cannot so easily dispose of the question, 'Would Euripides have used it?' And what reason can we exercise our imaginations to produce, to account for the unique employment of κείνω in a quasi-reflexive sense at 130? There are also problems here with ἐπισημίζεῖν τιναί τιναί which can perhaps be paralleled by Plato *Laws* 771 d 1 in the sense 'to assign to'.<sup>9)</sup>

9) Page's reference. Willink 357 rewrites:

We may also experience discomfort at 151, where the emendation εἰσόρμα would give Euripides a new word, one which, besides, is found intransitively in the active voice only at *Anth. Pal.* 7.707, according to Page. κλήθρων δ' ἔξορμοις at 149 is an awkward emendation of κλήθρων ἔξορμα, raising the question once more of dissociating superficial corruption from an odd original expression.

Another verb used intransitively in the active voice appears to be πορθμεύει at line 6, in opposition to its normal, transitive Euripidean usage. If we wish to smooth out this irregularity we must change τίς to τί, put the question mark after μεσσήρης (8) and take Σείριος to mean, on the authority of Theon of Smyrna,<sup>10</sup> 'any bright star'. If Agamemnon is asking the unlikely question, 'What ferrying is this bright star ferrying, darting near the Pleiades?', he does not receive an answer from the Old Man. Page feels that this is intolerable. England and Willink get around the problem by ascribing all the lines to one speaker only - to Agamemnon and the Old Man respectively - and informing us that these characters are either 'musing' (England of Agamemnon), or 'garrulous' (Willink of the Old Man). This division of speakers, however, is supported neither by the transmitted text nor Ennius' translation, which admittedly is fairly free:

Ag. Quid noctis videtur in altisono  
caeli clipeo?

Sen. Temo superat... etc.<sup>11)</sup>

οὐδέ τι κείνῳ παῖδ' ἐπεφήμισα  
νυμφείους εἰς ἄγκουῶν  
εὐνάς ἐνδώσειν λέκτροις.

This involves keeping ἐνδώσειν (paralleled in Euripides only at *Cyc* 510), which is supposed to imply 'in more crudely sexual terms' Achilles' 'hypothetical disappointment', thus creating a new meaning for ἐπιφημίζειν τινὰ τινί on the analogy of ἐπιβοᾶν τινὰ τινί: 'to him I uttered an intention of giving my daughter (to him)'; and importing another epic word, ἄγκουῶν. As Bain remarks (p. 22, note 63), this rewriting is unconvincing.

10) περὶ ἴστρ. 16 (Martin; Page's ref.) which seems to cite this passage. By this change we also correct the astronomical error.

11) J. Vahlen, *Ennianae Poesis Reliquiae* (Leipzig 1928), *Scaenica* 215 [cf. H.D. Jocelyn ad Enn. trag. fr. XCVI. - *Ed.*]

Willink, reading τί and ignoring the astronomical problem, keeps Σείριος as the Dog Star with some highly subjective and dubious arguments from 'hunted dove imagery' and an imaginative association of Sirius, the hunter's dog, with Orion himself, whose constellation is (of course) near the Pleiades. As usual, Willink's solution, reading 6f. τί ποτ' ἄρ' ἄσπῆρ ὄδε πορθημεύει; / Σείριος ... (that is, ἄρα accent-ed with a circumflex to suit the 'Retainer's quasi-jocular attitude of wonderment and protestation') is too elaborate to carry any conviction. It is also based upon the (as yet unproven) assumption that Euripides was the author of this section of the play.

Further oddities in the anapaests should be mentioned. ἕζου plus accusative (141) may be paralleled at *And* 1265-6 according to Willink, and used on the analogy of θάσσω (Page). ἥως (epic) juxtaposed with Ἀελίου (158) is certainly disturbing and, as Bain points out, cannot be emended to ἰός with the facility that Willink implies at p. 359. ἐς τέλος (161) too is unusual, meaning 'up to the end'; but it may be possible to take it as 'completely/to completion' if we compare *Hec* 817, its only parallel.

None of the difficulties which I have surveyed here are new, and most continue to rest under grave suspicion. If Euripides was innovating, we owe it to his stature as a playwright to explain the dramatic function of the high proportion of curiosities in the anapaests with respect to the rest of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. It is very hard to do this, especially in view of the advances of modern dramatic analysis, which show clearly that the great Attic tragedians do not present audiences with pointless confusion of technical anomaly. Having very briefly mentioned the linguistic problems of the anapaests I shall now turn to their *ethos*.

The first passage I should like to examine is at 45-48. Here the Old Man, in order to convince Agamemnon that he is loyal and trustworthy, says:

πρὸς <δ'> ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν πιστόν τε φράσεις·  
 σῆ γάρ μ' ἀλόχῳ τότε Τυνδάρεως  
 πέμπει φερνήν/ συννυμφοκόμον τε δίκαιον.

This seems very strange, and I can find no parallel instance in tragedy of a slave addressing his master, or any free man, with a self-recommendation couched in these terms. Nowhere does a slave call himself an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός without batting an eyelid: if approbatory value terms are used, they are either traditional or commented upon in typical Euripidean general reflections, which, by their nature, suggest that the author is advancing a controversial opinion. Traditionally acceptable terms for social inferiors are εὖνους, εὖφρων, εὖμενής or πιστός.<sup>12)</sup> Any lack of these qualities makes a slave κακός. Compare *Helēn* 726-7:

κακός γὰρ ὅστις μὴ σέβει τὰ δεσποτῶν  
καὶ ξυγγέγηθε καὶ συνωδίνει κακοῖς.<sup>13)</sup>

When slaves wish to advise or contradict their superiors (something which occurs mainly in Euripides), they need to ask for permission to speak freely, since free speech can only take place among equals.<sup>14)</sup> There is none of the confidentiality between master and servant that we find in New Comedy, even in what would appear to be the most likely relationship, that of the Nurse to Phaedra in *Hippolytus*. It is worth mentioning that here the Nurse eventually prevails upon Phaedra by appealing to her mistress as a suppliant, thereby emphasising her inferiority, rather than addressing her in terms of an equal relationship as is the case in our passage. Of course, it could be argued that the Nurse is pushing Phaedra into a confession that she does not fully wish to make, while the Old Man is responding specifically to Agamemnon's orders; but this is quite unconvincing. It is extremely improbable that social convention (in its strong sense) could be so altered merely because the Old Man feels confident in his request. And how then do we interpret his behaviour at line 866? I shall return to this.

12) εὖνους *Hip* 698, *Hel* 481, *And* 59; εὖφρων *Ag* 263; εὖμενής *Per* 175; πιστός *Hip* 267.

13) Also *Med* 54-55, *Ion* 566, 857-8, *Ba* 1032-3.

14) We have examples of this at *Ba* 668-71, *Hip* 89, *Tra* 52-3 and in the heavily ironical speech of Hecabe to Odysseus at *Hec* 234-7.



Two examples of Euripidean reflections which endow slaves with unusual approbatory value terms are at *Helen* 728-33, which isolates γενναῖοι slaves by implication from all others, using the criterion of 'intelligence' (νοῦς) to make this distinction; and more relevant to our context, *Ion* 854-6:

ἔν γάρ τι τοῖς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει,  
τοῦνομα· τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα τῶν ἐλευθέρων  
οὐδὲν κακίων δοῦλος, ὅστις ἐσθλός ἤ.

This clearly conveys what we expect to hear of fifth century slaves - that they have αἰσχύνη. Euripides, in a characteristic λόγος/ἔργον contrast, is presenting the controversial idea that only their *name* is αἰσχρόν. But our Old Man has no such doubts about his own slavery if he can state that he is an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός rather than, say, a δοῦλος γενναῖος/χρηστός/ἐσθλός.

My objections may be summarised by the following two questions: 1) Can the Old Man refer to himself as ἀγαθός, which has more social overtones of 'nobility' than γενναῖος, χρηστός, or even ἐσθλός, all of which are used occasionally of slaves? And 2) Can he call himself an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός in one breath and in the next (cf. line 866) φερνὴν συννυμφοκόμον, which actually emphasises his lack of freedom, hence his inferiority? I doubt that the social assumption implied by his juxtaposition, that slaves are as much 'men' as free men, could have been passed over without comment by Euripides. δίκαιον at 48 receives the force of criticism (2) even more strongly, accompanying φερνὴν συννυμφοκόμον cheek by jowl, as it does. And is 'justice' relevant here anyway? If the Old Man means that he performed his job as he should have done, is this something for a slave to boast about?

We find δίκαιος used of a servant/mistress relationship at *Tra* 410-2 when the First Messenger is conducting his bizarre cross-examination of Lichas. He snatches up Lichas' δίκαια γάρ (409), meaning approximately 'Of course', which was in answer to the question, 'So you say that this woman is your mistress?', and continues:

τί δῆτα; ποίαν ἀξιοῦς δοῦναι δίκην,  
 ἦν εὐρεθῆς ἐς τήνδε μὴ δίκαιος ὢν;

to which Lichas returns in some surprise, πῶς μὴ δίκαιος; Obviously Lichas is already beginning to side-step the Messenger's anticipated accusation. But the important underlying assumption runs somewhat as follows: 'All servants should/must (χρῆ) be trustworthy, loyal, honest (δίκαιος) to their masters and mistresses.' If they are not, after all, then they lose their greatest claim to be good servants. δίκαιος at 48, we must conclude, is either redundant or making a special point. It is conceivable that this point could be ironical (this would have affinities with Willink's interpretation of συννυμφόκομον), as the Old Man later betrays his master to his mistress; but I believe such irony to be far-fetched.

Let us now consider the scene between the Old Man, Clytemnestra and Achilles with reference to the preceding discussion. When the Old Man introduces himself in answer to the question (basically), 'Who are you?', does he reply: 'I am an ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός/πιστός/δίκαιος'? No, he modestly admits (858):

δοῦλος, οὐχ ἀβρύνομαι τῷδ'. ἡ τύχη γὰρ οὐκ ἐᾷ.

If τύχη means the chance which has made him a captive,<sup>15)</sup> how do we account for his reversion to a traditional estimation of slavery after his earlier, liberated attitude?<sup>16)</sup> In addition to this, he evidently tries to supplicate Clytemnestra by seizing her hand (866) and he assures her of his goodwill in the most acceptable possible terms; he is εὖνους (867 and 871) especially to Clytemnestra, rather than her husband, because of his longer association with her side of the family (868, 870).<sup>17)</sup>

I do not believe that these passages can possibly be

15) Cf. *Aj* 485-6.

16) This passage rules out the objection to my argument, that the Old Man is more intimate with Agamemnon than with Clytemnestra (or Achilles) and hence that his behaviour towards his mistress is more formal.

17) Compare *Ion* 811-2.

written by one author and, as 865ff. are so clearly Euripidean in tone, I do not see how 45-48 can be attributed to him.

The next relevant passage for this discussion is at 16-23. I am extremely dissatisfied with ἀκίνδυνον, ἀγνώως, ἀκλε-  
 ής and the *ethos* which this usage implies, while τὸ καλὸν γ' ἐνταῦθα βίου and τὸ φιλότιμον (if this should be read) enhance my suspicions. To begin with ἀκλεής: Aeschylus and Sophocles do not employ the word but we do have two examples in Euripides: *Her* 623 and *Hip* 1028. In the latter, Hippolytus swears a long, extremely powerful oath, declaring the penalty he would wish to incur for having committed incest, of which he has been accused. The context could hardly be more serious, so we may presume that the usage is representative of standard, not innovatory, fifth century thought. He says:

ἦ τάρ' ὀλοίμην ἀκλεής ἀνώουμος,  
 ἄπολις ἄοικος, φυγὰς ἀλητεύων χθόνα,  
 καὶ μήτε πόντος μήτε γῆ δέξαιτό μου  
 σάρκας θανόντος, εἰ κακὸς πέφυκ' ἀνὴρ.

Can Agamemnon then be using ἀκλεής similarly, and ἀγνώως as a synonym for ἀνώουμος? Surely not, for in Hippolytus' oath it is clear that ἀκλεής ἀνώουμος, 'moral' terms, are equal in weight to ἄπολις ἄοικος; and if you are without a city or a home, it is an unequivocal κακόν. To be without fame or reputation is also, therefore, an unequivocal κακόν.<sup>18)</sup> Is Agamemnon really implying that he envies a man in possession of κακά? This would indeed merit the Old Man's charge of madness at 42! Such extrapolation may, perhaps, be going too far beyond the texts.

If we consider the second Euripidean occurrence of ἀκλεής, at *Her* 623, it comes in the familiar double-negative construction οὐδ' ἀκλεής, and refers to Macaria's heroic sacrifice. It is possible that οὐδ' ἀκλεής here means 'not without fame', but this construction often indicates understatement.

18) Cf. S. *El* 1082-4: οὐδεὶς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ζῶν / κακῶς εὐκλειαν αἰσχῦ-  
 ναι θέλει / νόουμος for a more traditional configuration of the relevant value terms.

ments: 'not without fair-fame'; that is, 'very famous'. A parallel, conveniently using ἀγνώς, the other disquieting term, can be found at Pindar *I.* 1.12, οὐκ ἀγνώς. Further examples of ἀκλεής, in the form of the adverb ἀκλεῶς, are to be found at *Or* 786 (ἄνανδρον ἀκλεῶς κατθανεῖν) and *Rh* 752, 761. The *Orestes* instance clearly matches the moral loading of ἄνανδρον with that of ἀκλεῶς, and I can see no way of escaping the conclusion that ἀκλεής is treated by Euripides not merely as the *privative* of εὐκλεής, but as its *moral opposite*. The same arguments can be extended to ἀγνώς and ἀκίνδυνον βίον. The idea of the dangerous life bringing greatest glory has its literary origins in Achilles' choice and occurs frequently in Pindar,<sup>19)</sup> and although ἀγνώς in tragedy perhaps tends to be morally neutral, meaning 'unknown',<sup>20)</sup> it can hardly fail to attract the moral loading of the other two terms here.

Perhaps it might be said that these lines characterize vividly Agamemnon's disturbed state of mind in the prologue: he is so anxious to save his daughter that he defies moral norms of living καλῶς. Two counter arguments can be adduced: firstly, Agamemnon's character throughout the play which, although indecisive, is consistent in being pulled between family ties and ambition. For example, I see no reason to regard as untruthful Menelaus' account of his brother's rise to leadership at 337-48, which hinges on the family loyalty/power conflict, nor 357. After all, Agamemnon's defence does not deny Menelaus' charges, although it does tell us that his brother's self-righteous stand is as unwholesome as his own position of power. Furthermore, when Agamemnon hears from the First Messenger that Iphigeneia has arrived he reacts, after his initial outburst at 442-5, in the customary style of contradicting an accepted norm. His reflection begins (446):

ἡ δυσγένεια δ' ὥς ἔχει τι χρήσιμον

19) E.g. *O.* 1.81, 5.16-18, 6.9-11.

20) E.g. *Ion* 14, the only other Euripidean instance, *Phil* 1008, *Ant* 1001, *OT* 681, *Cho* 677, *A. Sup* 993.

balancing *δυσγένεια* against *τι χρήσιμον*; in other words, he is not asserting that *δυσγένεια* is *entirely* *χρήσιμος*. He then goes on to elucidate his contention, a common Euripidean pattern.<sup>21)</sup> There is no suggestion that Agamemnon envies his social inferiors in anything more major than the freedom to lament at will.

The second argument follows from the last. When Euripides wishes to question values he does so deliberately and clearly. Compare, for instance, the climax of Iphigeneia's appeal to Agamemnon, *κακῶς ζῆν κρεῖσσον ἢ καλῶς θανεῖν* (1252). This has been prepared for as far back as 1218-9, which is picked up at 1250. In addition, it is worth noting that the traditional values prevail upon Iphigeneia in the end (1375-6).

The *ethos* of lines 16-19 was obviously quite acceptable in later antiquity. Stobaeus quotes them, as does Alexander Aphrodisiensis.<sup>22)</sup> Their approval need not necessarily have stemmed from a Christian bias towards an unworldly, spiritual life; but I am convinced that the lines are totally anomalous in Euripides.

While on the subject of lines 16-19, I should like to comment upon their extraordinary construction. I cannot find another tragic parallel for the expression, 'I envy you more than I envy me', apart from line 677 of this play, much less for the formula that we have here: 'I envy you (that is 'the inglorious') and/but I envy those in honor (that is 'me') less'. Stobaeus' reading, *ἥσσον ἐπαινῶ*, may not merely be a characteristic misquotation therefore, but an effort to make the sentiment more lucid, unless by chance he preserved the correct reading.<sup>23)</sup> But this is doubtful. Turning to 677,

21) Cf. *Med* 579-83, 1089-1104, *Hip* 186-8, 424-5, 664-6, *Sup* 1101-3, *Her* 299-301, etc. On the contradicting of maxims as a rhetorical device, see Arist. *Rhet* 1395 a-b.

22) Stobaeus 4.16.4 (Hense); Alex. Aphr. see Murray's app. crit.

23) Parallels for *ἐπαινεῖν*: *And* 456, 866, *Al* 553-4. None of these is adequate, since only the first can conceivably mean *ζηλοῦν*, and none is a contrast between two individuals. The last two and *Hip* 264 contain contrasts between types of behaviour, rather than between people. *Hip* 264 is the only example which approaches the generality of our passage. None mix generality with particularity as does *IA* 16-19.

See Hense in *RE* 9. 2575ff. for Stobaeus' access to reliable sources.

we find:

ζηλῶ σὲ μᾶλλον ἢ 'μὲ τοῦ μηδὲν φρονεῖν.

Unusual certainly, but not, I think, uncomfortable in *ethos* or formulation. Could the avant garde poet of the anapaests have been inspired to emulate 677 in a misguided attempt to improve upon the idea there?

As I remarked earlier, the suspicions aroused by lines 16-19 are heightened by τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον. τὸ καλόν is purely Euripidean; never found in the other two tragedians. When it occurs it is always in a well defined context, even at *Sup* 300 (its most difficult instance), where it refers to the moral status that Aithra would lose by not protecting the Suppliants. The employment at 300 is prepared for by the more normal εἶπω τι... σοί τε καὶ πόλει καλόν at 293. In general, τὸ καλόν tends to be clarified in antithesis with τὸ μὴ καλόν, or implied equivalent.<sup>24</sup>) It is never used in its full abstract sense of 'all that is good, beautiful and noble' without careful preparation, as at *Hec* 600-2:

ἔχει γε μέντοι καὶ τὸ θρεφθῆναι καλῶς  
 δίδαξιν ἐσθλοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἦν τις εὖ μάθη,  
 οἷδεν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κανόνι τοῦ καλοῦ μαθῶν.

καλῶς and ἐσθλοῦ prepare for τὸ καλόν at 602; and this general sentiment is itself the climax of a long reflection upon φύσις and νόμος which is brimming over with value terms under consideration: ἐσθλός twice, χρηστός twice, κακός, κακή three times, and πονηρός once, all in seven lines (592-8).

In contrast, τὸ καλόν at *IA* 20 is sprung upon us suddenly. As with δίκαιον, we must conclude that it has either a special point or is used carelessly and ineffectively. τοῦτο δὲ γ' ἐστὶν τὸ καλόν σφαλερόν at line 21 immediately tells us that the latter is true, for the passage may be paraphrased as follows: *Old Man*. All that is good, noble and beautiful is there in life (!) *Ag*. But this noble thing at least, is unstable... The two usages of καλόν are dissimilar and no point

24) *Sup* 300 again, *Hec* 602, *Or* 417, *Hip* 382 (pleasure/virtue contrast) and, most interestingly, *IA* 387.

is made by their juxtaposition (unless it could be Agamemnon's lack of moral awareness).

The loose employment of τὸ καλόν at line 20 is underlined by the phrase ἔνταῦθα βίου, which is very awkward. I fail to see how τὸ καλόν can be limited by an idea less abstract, such as βίος (this would be construing τὸ καλόν with βίου); yet presumably the Old Man is not implying that τὸ καλόν can be acquired somewhere *beyond* life (this is taking βίου closely with ἔνταῦθα). The superfluity of the second rendering and the inappropriateness of the first give further indication that the writer of the anapaests was either incompetent, or did not belong to the classical era.

Τὸ φιλότιμον appears to be thematic in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, as it occurs twice (385, 520) and φιλοτιμία once (527), while its only other occurrences in Euripides are at *Pho* 567 and *Sup* 907 (if the latter is genuine). England<sup>25)</sup> remarks that in Euripides it means 'ambitious', 'ambition' and is pejorative; but that it later comes to signify 'distinguished', 'distinction'. It certainly is the simplest solution to *Sup* 907 to regard it as interpolated; and in our passage at 22, it enhances our doubt about the lines' *ethos*.

I shall now examine lines 385-7 with close reference to 20-22. Like Page, I cannot feel that 385-7 are spurious on Wecklein's<sup>26)</sup> grounds that τὸ λελογισμένον is too similar a formulation to τὸ χρῆζον (1017), τὸ κείνου βουλόμενον (1270) and τὸ τῆς θεοῦ φίλον (747), all in suspicious circumstances. Besides Page's point that λελογισμένοι (922), λελογισμένως (1021) and ἐξελογίσω (1409) appear in innocent surroundings and so balance out Wecklein's objections to the article-phrases, the context seems to me to require 385-7 for continuity of thought.<sup>27)</sup> To my mind, however, the most inter-

25) E.B. England, *The Iphigeneia at Aulis of Euripides* (Macmillan, London 1891). Referred to throughout by the author's name.

26) N. Wecklein, *Iphigenie in Aulis* (Leipzig/Berlin 1914). Referred to henceforth by the author's name.

27) Other reasons for supporting the lines: 1) the topical Euripidean pleasure/virtue contrast (cf. *Hip* 380ff.); 2) the lines form a customary gnomic climax, a feature of rhetoric, especially in tragedy; 3) rationality and ambition versus love is an important thematic tension.

esting feature here is the juxtaposition of τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον, which is highly significant, since these two expressions occur only here and at 20-22 in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*, while τὸ φιλότιμον itself is confined to our passages within the entire Euripidean corpus. Both τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον are characteristically elucidated (not left as bare abstractions) by the pleasure/virtue contrast at 386-7 and τοῦμόν at 385. As has been mentioned, however, in the case of τὸ καλόν at 20 - and which can be extended to include τὸ φιλότιμον at 22<sup>28)</sup> - elucidation is lacking. In addition, καὶ τὸ φιλότιμον or τό τε φιλότιμον is superfluous, as Bothe felt.

Drawing a few threads together from this discussion, there appears to be heavy dependence at 16-23 on sound passages later in the play: 1) for the original idea of 'I envy you more than me', compare 677; 2) for Agamemnon's discontent with his social status, compare 446-9; 3) for the juxtaposition of τὸ καλόν and τὸ φιλότιμον, compare 385-7; and it may be worth noting that a later writer need not necessarily have read τὸ φιλότιμον as 'ambition' at 385, but indeed as 'distinction', which is its meaning at 22. Even if the idea seems far-fetched that one man, having read and digested Euripides' unfinished work, should then have composed the anapaests, including lines 16-23, incorporating reminiscences of different passages of the original text, it seems still more implausible that Euripides botched potentially valuable material so badly.

Several larger but equally disturbing questions arise out of the general *ethos* of the anapaests. The first has been touched upon already: can a master (and a great king) hold this type of intimate conversation with a servant or slave? Secondly, how suitable to the tragic genre is Agamemnon's almost neurotic state?<sup>29)</sup> Has he the dignity that is neces-

28) Although we perhaps do not require elucidation, since it doubles for τοῦτο τὸ καλόν.

29) Cf. ἄϊσω 12; his ludicrous behaviour over the writing tablets, as described by the Old Man at 34-42.



sary for us to sympathise with his dilemma; the dignity that all kings in tragedy possess, unless they are unambiguously villainous, like Lycus in the *Heracles* or Polymestor in *Hecuba*?<sup>30)</sup> Furthermore, does he behave with this lack of restraint later in the play? And thirdly, following closely from the last issue raised: how suitable is an anapaestic dialogue, which even incorporates the highly emotional lyric *metra* that we find (for example) in Phaedra's feverish dialogue in the *Hippolytus*, for two *men*, especially when one is a king and the action has yet to commence? Is this possible in fifth century tragedy?

Taking the second question - Agamemnon's lack of dignity - to begin with, I should like to turn to 136-7 which provides a convenient illustration. In response to the Old Man's criticism of his actions, Agamemnon cries:

οἴμοι, γνώμας ἐξέεσταν,  
αἰαῦ, πῖπτω δ' εἰς ἄταν.

Willink seems to think that this reaction is 'characteristic' and compares 1132-6. I fail to see the resemblance, since 1132-6 displays the restraint and hints of disaster that are the hallmark of the highly original and effective scene between the king and his daughter. At 136-7 the οἴμοι, followed a line later by αἰαῦ, the extravagance of the ideas of 'standing out of one's mind' and 'falling into ἄτη', and the cumulative effect of the parallel constructions, seem to me to be more appropriate to an antiphonal dirge (such as at the close of the *Persae*, performed with the Chorus) than to the situation here, which is not completely lost.

There are other objections against these two lines. Consider ἄτη, for example, which does not recur during the *Iphigenia at Aulis* as we have it. This in itself could hardly be called suspicious. Six other Euripidean plays contain only a single instance: *El* 1307, *Hcld* 607, *Al* 91, *Hec* 688, *And* 103 and *Ion* 1240. Of these, *Hec* 688, *Ion* 1240 and *Al* 91 refer to

30) It might be argued that Polymestor gains some stature at the end of the play, but this is totally dissimilar and fully consonant with Euripides' dramatic technique.

especially momentous deaths.<sup>31)</sup> *El* 1307 and *And* 103 are traditional usages: ἄτη πατέρων of the House of Atreus (cf. also *S. El* 215), and the equation of Helen to ἄταν τινά; while *Hcld* 607 meaning 'disaster' refers also to specific deaths, those of all the Heracleidae with Iolaus and Alc-mene (combined with defeat for the Athenians) weighed in the scale against Macaria's own self-sacrifice. It is hardly conceivable that ἄτη at *IA* 137 is used with reference to the curse of the House of Atreus, a theme which seems to have no importance in the play (this is taking ἄτη as a traditional usage), and even less likely that Agamemnon is saying 'I am falling to death' (specific usage).<sup>32)</sup> Once again, the charge of loose writing is inescapable; a strongly suggestive word is employed without sensitivity for its full potential. And Agamemnon is thus presented uttering an almost meaningless lament.

Perhaps despite all this, he retains enough dignity in his reflections at 16ff. and 161ff., and in his orders to the Old Man at 139ff., to convince the audience of his regal status and to be consistent with his character later in the play. Alas, no. In his orders, at least, he is unnecessarily loquacious, a trait totally inconsistent with his later speeches, which are invariably shorter than those of his opponents;<sup>33)</sup> and, in my opinion, his reflections are either

31) *Hec* 688 to Polymestor's; *Ion* 1240 to death by stoning after the attempt on Ion's life; *Al* 91 to Alcestis' voluntary sacrifice.

32) I do not object to the expression πίπτω εἰς ἄταν in other circumstances. *Hip* 241 (e.g.): ἔπεσον δαίμονος ἄτη is perfectly acceptable, contributing to the theme of Phaedra's divinely inspired passion. (Other instances in *Hip* are 276, 1149, 1289.) *Troades* uses ἄτη frequently within a thematic network of the destruction of Troy. But when ἄτη occurs only once in a Euripidean play, it has a traditional or specific reference-point, which is lacking in the *IA*. Note also the ἄτη chain in *Medea* (129, 279, 979, 988), which focusses upon the ruin of the 'royal family', reaching a climax with the metrically prominent 979, 988. From this angle, 129 and 279 may be seen as referring both to Medea and to Creon's household. 279, in particular, gains a tremendously sinister impact from this ambiguity.

33) Note the preferences for brevity and silence which he expresses at 378, 400, 683 and 1144.

anomalous and disturbing, or, as Bain puts it, 'incredibly trite'.<sup>34)</sup>

Proceeding from the idea that the presentation of Agamemnon in the anapaests is inconsistent with his later character, and inappropriate for a king in fifth century tragedy, I come now to my third question, 'How suitable are anapaests, before the action has commenced, for a dialogue between two men, especially when one is a king?' Social values and norms are again of relevance. Agamemnon himself tells us that his birth prevents him from being able *δακρῦσαι ῥαδίως...* / ἅπαντα τ' εἰπεῖν (447-8), and Sophocles' *Electra*, plus the λόγος/ἔργον contrast ubiquitous in tragedy, press the point home that men were supposed to *act*, not talk. If we consider this further, from the angle of form and content - how the significance of any passage is reinforced by its form - the most reasonable conclusion is the most disturbing; that by composing the opening dialogue in anapaests which may even be melic, the poet has actually emphasised Agamemnon's unmanly inability to act, by using a poetic form removed from the iambs of conventional tragic discourse.<sup>35)</sup> Are other dramatists (and Euripides) aware of this nicety? Let us glance at some instances of anapaests and lyrics, in the mouths of male characters.

In Aeschylus, we have Xerxes' lyric lament with the Chorus. He has been destroyed by his rash war, and his dignity is minimal;<sup>36)</sup> he is no longer in a position to act. Prometheus uses anapaests on three occasions (93ff., 136ff., 1040ff.), on the second of which his calmer anapaests contrast with the Chorus' lyrics. Because he is bound, he is prevented from physical action. Physical incapacity is also important in the *Trachiniae*, *Oedipus at Colonus* and *Philoctetes*,

34) 'Anomalous and disturbing', 16-23 (see above); and 24-27, which I shall come to later. 'Incredibly trite', Bain, p. 123, on lines 161-3.

35) This argument assumes that, as the 'words' are 'action', especially in Greek drama, any departure from normal 'words' (i.e. iambic trimeter) towards lyric metre conveys a shift away from 'action'.

36) Compare the tattered clothes symbol.

where Heracles, Oedipus and Philoctetes participate in anapaestic and/or lyric interchanges. In Sophocles' *Electra*, Orestes, the man of action *par excellence*, never departs from iambs even when his sister greets him lyrically at 1232ff. Other examples of men participating in lyrics and anapaests are to be found regularly at moments of despair, when the hero is crushed;<sup>37)</sup> and lyrics of a 'religious' nature are sung by Orestes in the *Choephoroi* and by Ion. None of these examples can adequately support the use of anapaestic dialogue in the opening scene of the *Iphigeneia at Aulis*. And none, in my opinion, raises the question of dramatic and character consistency that arise from the form employed here.

Thus, to recapitulate, the anapaests must be considered highly problematic on the grounds of *ethos*; and they betray themselves in the use of value terms and their underlying social assumptions, and in their dissociation of form from content, as being composed by a lesser, later writer than Euripides.

At several points in the anapaests we come across strained imagery which seems very mannered and akin to the ineffective usages of rare words and odd constructions. The first of these occurs at lines 4-5:

μάλα τοι γῆρας τοῦμόν ἀυπνον  
καὶ ἐπ' ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄξύ πάρεστιν.

Willink comments on lines 1-5 that 'the exchange is already strikingly Euripidean, especially in the characterisation and elegant idiom of 4-5'. He does not, however, explain this viewpoint, and paraphrases the lines: 'My old age is sleepless, and my eyes are keen'. This avoids the difficulty of ὄξύς, which, applied to 'old age', gives an exceptionally curious metaphor: 'My old age is very wakeful and is present sharp (or sharply) upon my eyes'.<sup>38)</sup> All other instances of

37) E.g., Ajax's first appearance, where the Chorus and Tecmessa, interestingly, respond in iambs; compare the end of Euripides' *Electra*.

38) The other rendering of the lines, with ὄξύ as subject of πάρεστιν is even more bizarre. There is an adverbial usage of ὄξύ in Collard's *Supplement* (see note 53), but this is not a parallel.

όξύς in Euripides<sup>39)</sup> mean, as is normal, either 'sharp' or 'shrill', with the possible exception of *Hclld* 290 (μάλα δ' όξύς "Αρης ό Μυκηναίωv), where, however, the notion of sharp blades lies close to the surface.

To make matters worse, old age in tragedy is a theme with stock characteristics: bad temper, intelligence and its lack, weakness, stubbornness; it is almost always considered hard to bear. For some reason or other, the three great tragedians do not depart from these stock traits in the extant plays;<sup>40)</sup> and I very much doubt if they would have introduced the novel idea of keen-sighted old age without a well defined dramatic reason. There is no reason in the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* that can even be imagined, let alone well defined. And, lastly, when γήρας is accompanied by a concrete adjective (such as όξύς) in Euripides, that adjective invariably enunciates a stock characteristic: πικρόν at fr 282, βαρύ at *Al* 672, λυγρόν (and φθονερόν<sup>41)</sup>) at *Her* 649; and δυσπάλαιστον at *Sup* 1108.

The second strained metaphor appears in the reflection at 24-27, which is perhaps alien to Euripidean thought in any case, in its antithesis of 'gods' and 'γνώμαι', both wrecking the prosperity of great men from time to time. διακναίω is not a common word, and we can have no reason to imagine that it was a 'dead' metaphor. It occurs absolutely in the passive voice in both Aeschylus and Euripides (*Al* 109, *Med* 164, *Ag* 65) and with a dative agent at *Prom* 94 and 540.<sup>42)</sup> In the active voice, it is unique to Euripides - at *El* 1307 and *Hclld* 296. The example at *Hclld* 296 is used much as though it were passive: the Chorus, speculating on what report the Herald will bring to Eurystheus, imagine that he

39) *Hclld* 290, *Cyc* 401, *IT* 785 (= *IA* 1566), *Or* 1530.

40) Old age: bad temper, *Ba* 1251-2, *And* 727-8, *Or* 490; intelligence (contradicting the 'norm' of stupidity), *Pho* 528-30, *And* 645-6, *Ant* 280-1, *OC* 930-1; intelligence and weakness, *Ion* 742, *And* 756, *Phil* 96-99, *Ag* 584; weakness and stupidity, *Ag* 75-82, 584, *Eum* 38, *Her* 111-2, 229, *And* 687, 745-6, *Ba* 251-2, *Pho* 1722, *OC* 1235-8.

41) φθονερόν being Wilamowitz's conjecture for φόνιον.

42) αἰκείαις and μυρίοις μόχοις, respectively.

will have been badly treated and παρὰ μικρὸν / ψυχὴν ἤλθεν διακναῖσαι. The expression διακναῖσαι ψυχὴν clearly connotes physical violence, as the Chorus fear the worst that the Herald could relate - the violation of his diplomatic immunity. The instance at *Electra* 1307, however, is more abstract. There, the Dioscuri announce that μία... ἄτη πατέρων has destroyed (διέκναισεν) both Orestes and Electra. The metaphor is aided by the personification latent in ἄτη; there seems to be no awkwardness here.

But what of γνῶμαι πολλὰ / καὶ δυσάρεστοι 'scraping away' or 'shattering into pieces' the lives of great men (*IA* 26-27)? I can find only one example of γνῶμαι as the subject of a concrete verb, within a metaphor, and that is *Philoctetes* 432:

ἀλλὰ χαί σοφαί / γνῶμαι ... ἐμποδίζονται θαμὰ.

Perhaps this is sufficient to parallel our passage; but I feel that the importance in the action of plans failing, and the comparative ease of the idea of complex plans 'tripping themselves up', differentiate the *Philoctetes* instance completely from *IA* 24-27. For here, plans do not merely destroy themselves, but 'scrape away' or 'shatter' someone's life, and their importance in the action is minimal.

I mentioned Agamemnon's flowery letter earlier in connection with rare diction such as κολπώδης and ἀκλύστην (120-1). I shall now adduce other diverse criticisms of its language. To begin with a *caveat*: I do not think that we are in a position to argue that anapaests are an unsuitable vehicle for conveying the contents of a letter (although I personally find this uncomfortable, especially when the anapaests are lyric), since data is lacking. We can, however, argue that some of the wording is unsuitable, in particular ὤ Λήδας ἔρνος (116) and τὰν σάν Ἴνιν (119). Both ἔρνος and Ἴνις are highly poetical words, unlike (e.g.) παῖς. Out of ten usages of ἔρνος in Euripides, six are literal, meaning 'shoots', and one is found in a simile of ivy clinging to laurel shoots, where poetic mileage is made out of the

metaphorical meaning.<sup>43)</sup> Seven out of ten occur in lyrics. When the metaphorical use falls in iambs (twice: *Tro* 766 and *Ba* 1306), there appear to be convincing reasons. At *Tro* 766, Andromache calls Helen ὦ Τυνδάρειον ἔρνος (οὔποτ' εἶ Διός) in an emotional apostrophe, while at *Ba* 1306, Cadmus is referring to his grandson, Pentheus, in dialogue with the newly-sane Agaue: τῆς σῆς τόδ' ἔρνος, ὦ τάλαινα, νηδύος.<sup>44)</sup> As for ἴνις, it has five occurrences in Euripides, all of which have lyric contexts, apart from *Tro* 571 (anapaests).<sup>45)</sup> Its usage suggests that it constitutes a very dignified form of address, since three out of five cases refer to Heracles. Of the other two dramatists, only Aeschylus employs it,<sup>46)</sup> thus reinforcing our belief that it is highly poetical. In Agamemnon's letter, ἔρνος and ἴνιν follow each other within the space of four words; while in the text, even after the Old Man's interruption, they are still remarkably close together. Once more our poet seems to be striving for purely superficial effect.

I should also like to raise a slight objection to the address, Ἀήδας ἔρνος. Of course, this is not an isolated example of an offspring being called its mother's, but it is interesting to note that, among numerous Euripidean examples of the phrase παῖς τινος, only two (in the *Bacchae*, both referring to Pentheus as Agaue's son<sup>47)</sup>) refer to the child by use of the mother's name. In Sophocles this happens three times (*El* 1395, *Tra* 19, 98) for excellent dramatic reasons;<sup>48)</sup> while in Aeschylus the children mentioned spring from elemental personifications, except at *Ag* 1040 and *Sup*

43) At *Med* 1213, describing how Creon is unable to tear himself from his daughter's poisoned robe.

44) In addition to the strength of the context, fertility is an important theme in the play.

45) *And* 797, *Her* 1182, 354, *Ba* 1174, *Tro* 571.

46) *Ag* 717, *Eum* 324, *Sup* 44, 251.

47) *Ba* 517, 1309; and we should add *Ba* 1306 mentioned above. Note also *E. El* 933-5 in this context.

48) The measure of Zeus' involvement is intentionally unstressed.

171, where the father is, as in the Sophoclean instances, Zeus.<sup>49)</sup> My objection, however, cannot be pressed too far, as Leda seems to be a special case in Euripides. She is frequently named in connection with Helen, and three times as the mother of Clytemnestra.<sup>50)</sup> Perhaps this address is another echo of the *Agamemnon* (914, Aeschylus' only mention of Leda - Sophocles has none)? But surely Euripides would not have undercut the actual quotation of *Ag* 914 in the effectively reworked scene of the meeting of husband and wife (686), by using a half-baked recollection here.

While on the subject of addressing people, I should like to sidestep (legitimately, I hope) to the Old Man's irritating habit of tagging 'Αγάμεμνον ἄναξ / βασιλεῦ on to the end of his sentences (lines 3, 13, 43, 140), or at line endings (133), or both (140, 43, and 13 - a whole anapaestic *metron*); something which happens too frequently for comfort also in the first messenger speech.<sup>51)</sup> It is hard to escape the inference that the writer (or writers) of these passages used the device as a convenient line-filler, especially since the *Iphigeneia at Aulis* contains eight cases of the phrase 'Αγάμεμνον ἄναξ<sup>52)</sup> in contrast with its nearest two rivals (*Troades* and *IT*), which have only two; and since the invaluable Concordance<sup>53)</sup> shows that Euripides uses this form of address no more than four times in any other play.

To sum up the discussion so far, it seems clear from these examples that the writer of the anapaests indulges in

49) *Ag* 1040, *Sup* 171, 305, 901, *Prom* 18, *Eum* 16, 1033.

50) Addresses to Helen: *Hel* 616, 1680 and in apostrophe at *Or* 1386; to Clyt.: *IA* 686, 1106, 1344. In *IA* 827, 856 and *IT* 210, Clyt. is referred to, but not addressed as the daughter of Leda. Note that 1106, again in suspicious circumstances, reuses Aeschylus' memorable Ἀΐδας γένεθλον.

51) Lines 414, 431, 436. Note especially 414, which constitutes the highly irregular mid-line entry.

52) Note particularly the instances at 1547, 1573, 1619, extremely dubious passages; and also in the speech of Achilles, which may be interpolated at some points, 950, 961. Other references which seem reasonably secure: 828, 869. Admittedly, Agamemnon appears only in the *IA*.

53) J.T. Allen, G. Italic, *A Concordance to Euripides* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1954) with *Suppl.* by C. Collard (Groningen 1971).



much looser composition than Euripides. This criticism can also be extended from his use of language to his inability to create logical or conceptual progress within the passage.

I have already mentioned the superabundance of inconsequential detail which is not later utilised in the play; for instance, the astronomy at 6ff. and, particularly, the Old Man's projected journey at 141ff., which is crammed with unrealised, vivid pictorial information. At three points this conceptual redundancy is emphasised by lack of logical continuity. The first occasion is at 28ff. England objected to the lack of continuity in  $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  at line 34. This example is symptomatic. I paraphrase as follows: 'You shouldn't complain about your situation like this, Agamemnon. The gods, whether you like it or not, have decreed that you must be happy as well as sad. But you have spread light around, and are writing...' At 'but you', we expect to hear how Agamemnon is contravening the gods' decree of the mutability of joy and sorrow; that is, we should now hear that he is incessantly sorrowful or (less likely in context), constantly joyful.  $\sigma\upsilon\ \delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  is a standard formula for focussing a general reflection upon a particular case, especially when a norm is contradicted,<sup>54)</sup> or for directing attention from one person to another.<sup>55)</sup> At *IA* 34, the pronoun plus  $\delta\epsilon\acute{\iota}$  performs neither of these offices unless, conceivably, we are meant to understand 'But you are constantly sorrowful' from the extraordinary and verbose description of Agamemnon changing his mind over the writing tablets. This is just within the bounds of possibility, but is puzzlingly unclear for a device which is used normally to articulate logical thought progression.

The second passage which I find particularly inconsequential is at 124-37. The Old Man asks Agamemnon how Achilles will react to losing his bride. Agamemnon replies in exceed-

54) Cf. *Hip* 459, *And* 186, *Tra* 4; and H. Friis Johansen's remarks in *General Reflection in Tragic Rhesis* (Copenhagen 1959), p. 110, note 28, and p. 146.

55) E.g., *And* 209, s. *El* 282.

ingly strange language, that Achilles is in the dark about the whole affair. Given the importance of Achilles' offence at his name being used without his permission later in the play, we might reasonably expect the author to drop a hint at this point by making the Old Man respond, 'You were certainly taking a dangerous liberty in using Achilles' name without his consent', or 'in doing this behind Achilles' back'. But no, the Old Man has forgotten Achilles' anger (124) completely, and is now more interested in the deception practised upon Iphigeneia. Again, it is possible to argue these objections away, by expanding the Old Man's words to convey: 'You dared a dreadful deed by using Achilles' name in order to sacrifice your daughter for the Greeks'; but that is not what he says. And what is the ἄτη into which Agamemnon thinks he is falling? Incurring Achilles' wrath? Incurring the wrath of the gods as the slayer of his child? This is not clear either, although I hope that I showed earlier that Euripides does not employ ἄτη without a specific reference point.

The last lines with which I shall take issue are 161ff., which previous scholars have criticised on the grounds of banality. The maxim here is indeed 'trite',<sup>56)</sup> but that in itself is an insufficient objection; some gnomic clichés (such as S. *El* 1171-3) are 'extraordinarily effective. What is more disturbing is that it appears to have no immediate connection with the preceding lines. Agamemnon has not gradually reached a resigned stance, but suddenly he acquires one at line 161; up to 160 he is as agitated as ever. Nor can the thought arise with propriety from σὺλλαβε μόχθων (although these four lines would form an internally consistent quotation), for it is ludicrous if Agamemnon should apply his *gnome* to the Old Man's forthcoming journey. Lines 161-3 dangle insecurely at the end of the anapaests, connected by the tenuous thread of some kind of ring composition (as far as I can see) with the sentiment at 28-32. And if this is, in fact, the case, Agamemnon has been converted

56) Bain, p. 123.

to the Old Man's view at 28-32 without displaying the slightest sign to the audience that he is not as discontented as before. It looks strongly as though the writer was motivated by line 160 to add an impressive-sounding generalisation to round off his work, with only the most superficial regard for consistency.<sup>57)</sup>

Many of the points that I have mentioned in this discussion of the general style, tone and *ethos* of the anapaests only scratch the surface of such problems in this extremely dubious passage. I hope, however, that they validly extend the already weighty and diverse case for the prosecution against the few, idiosyncratic pleas of the defenders. It is to this end that my paper is devoted.

Churchill College,  
Cambridge University

57) It is almost certain that we have a similar case (on a larger scale) at the close of the *OT*. See R.D. Dawe's acute observations in *Studies on the Text of Sophocles I* (Leiden 1973) 268-73.

## SOME PASSAGES IN PLATO'S LAWS (IV AND V)

FRIEDRICH SOLMSEN

(1) In a most solemn address (*Legg.* 4, 715 e 7ff.) the law-giver reminds the citizens that God controls beginning, middle and end; next turning to *Dike*, God's constant companion, he finds in her train those who will achieve εὐδαιμονία because they are in a healthy state of mind. Unlike them, ὁ δέ τις ἐξαρθεὶς ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἅμα νεότῃ καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως... (716 a 4-7) and (relying on himself) σκιρτᾷ ταραττων πάντα ἅμα (b 2) until he meets his punishment. How are we to construe the five datives between μεγαλαυχίας and φλέγεται? ἢ χρήμασι calls for one or several additional causes of the man's arrogance. ἢ τιμαῖς ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ would seem the minimum, but some editors and translators, notably E.B. England, E. des Places and R.G. Bury<sup>1)</sup> (if I understand each of them correctly) add the remaining two datives, without worrying whether the words left, φλέγεται...μεθ' ὕβρεως, suffice to describe the resulting condition of a soul. Actually μεθ' welcomes, even if it does not positively insist on, a partner, and this partner would best appear in the dative case; for, as Wilamowitz à propos φλέγεσθαι observed: "Das Feuer oder das Licht ist immer von dem entzündet, was in dem Dativ dabei

1) Burnet's punctuation, i.e. the commas before ἢ χρήμασιν and before ἢ καὶ σώματος..., puzzles me. E.B. England, *The Laws of Plato* (Manchester 1921) (*ad* 716 a 5) argues for the same construction that R.G. Bury (LCL 1926) and E. des Places (Budé 1951) indicate by their rendering.

steht."<sup>2)</sup> LSJ, s.v. φλέγω, provides this verb in our passage with two datives: νεότητι καὶ ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄμα being left out in the cold. How then are we to adjudicate the conflicting claims of ἐπαιρόμενος and φλέγεται?

My answer would be that three datives: χρήμασιν, τιμαῖς, εὐμορφίᾳ indicate things to be proud of, that νεότης is acceptable as companion of εὐμορφίᾳ but that no one is likely to pride himself on ἀνοία in the same sense as he prides himself on wealth, honors, good looks and youthfulness.<sup>3)</sup> However, as description of a person's state of mind or soul ἀνοία associates readily with ὕβρις. Between two datives a καὶ could easily creep in but the text is better and clearer without it: ἢ χρήμασιν ἐπαιρόμενος ἢ τιμαῖς ἢ καὶ σώματος εὐμορφίᾳ ἄμα νεότητι [καὶ] ἀνοίᾳ φλέγεται τὴν ψυχὴν μεθ' ὕβρεως.

(2) In the new city the first and highest honor is reserved for the gods; yet not many people honor them in the right way. The question τίς...πρᾶξις φίλη καὶ ἀκόλουθος θεῶ; (4.716 c 1) gives rise to an extended regulation not only of worship but also of conduct toward kinsmen, fellow citizens, strangers, etc. When the subject of "honor" is taken up again (5.726ff.) we learn what is second in the hierarchy, ...τὴν αὐτοῦ ψυχὴν μετὰ θεοῦς...τιμᾶν δεῖν λέγων δευτέραν ὀρθῶς παρακελεύομαι (726 a 6). But again τιμᾶ δ' ὡς ἔπος εἶπεῖν ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς ὀρθῶς, δοκεῖ δέ. Self-praise, self-indulgence, concern about one's life in situations where it should not be valued so highly, are some of the mistakes people commit without realizing that each of them inflicts dishonor on the soul. At the end of this disquisition (728 c 9ff.) Plato emphasizes once more the unique importance of soul which, he repeats, δεύτερον ἐτάχθη τιμῇ (d 3), then continues τὸ δὲ τρίτον, πᾶς ἂν τοῦτο γε νοήσειεν, τὴν τοῦ

2) Pindaros (Berlin 1922) 411 n., where he comments on *N.* 10.2 and *I.* 7.23. It can hardly matter that in these passages the datives are not pejorative.

3) Note that of the datives associated with the verb ἐπαίρεισθαι at *Resp.* 434 b 1 and 608 b 5ff. none is comparable to ἀνοίᾳ.

σώματος εἶναι κατὰ φύσιν τιμὴν. The procedure which he at this point suggests, τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν, καὶ τούτων τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι (d 4ff.), parallels what he has done first for the gods, then for the soul. Applied to the body, it shows that neither the beautiful nor the strong nor the swift kind is truly τίμιον (d 7ff.). In view of the parallel procedure for gods, soul and body, I suggest that Plato wrote at 728 d 5 τὰς δ' αὖ τιμὰς δεῖ σκοπεῖν καὶ τούτου (rather than τούτων), τίνες ἀληθεῖς καὶ ὅσαι κίβδηλοι.

(3) In the subject of human motivations the Laws go their own way. Pleasure and pain are recognized as powerful influences on human conduct. A beautiful passage in Book 1 (636 d 7ff.) sets the tone for much that follows: δύο γὰρ αὐται πηγαὶ (scil. ἡδονὴ and λύπη) μεθεῖνται φύσει ρεῖν, ὧν ὁ μὲν ἀρυτόμενος ὄθεν τε δεῖ καὶ ὁπότε καὶ ὁπόσον εὐδαιμονεῖ, ... ὁ δὲ ἀνεπισημόνως ἅμα καὶ ἐκτός τῶν καιρῶν τάναντία ἂν ἐκείνῳ ζῶη. We do well to bear this thought in mind when we read in Book 5 (733 a 9ff.) a sequence of observations concerning human reactions which help Plato to lay the ground for a κρίσις or σύγκρισις βίων. If ἡδοῦναι καὶ λυπᾶναι are the ἀνθρώπειον μάλιστα from which the mortal creature (ἀνάγκη) ἀτεχνῶς οἷον ἐξηρηθῆσθαι τε καὶ ἐκκρεμάμενον εἶναι... (732 e 4ff.), the right manner of "tasting" (γεύεσθαι) these experiences is all important (733 a 4-6).<sup>4)</sup>

In what follows, Plato works his way to the "right manner" (I incorporate the changes which I think are necessary): ἡ δὲ ὀρθότης τίς; τοῦτο ἤδη παρὰ τοῦ λόγου χρὴ λαμβάνοντα σκοπεῖν. εἴτε οὕτως ἡμῖν κατὰ φύσιν πέφυκεν εἴτε ἄλλως [παρὰ φύσιν], βίον χρὴ παρὰ βίον ἡδίω καὶ λυπηρότερον ὧδε σκοπεῖν· ἡδονὴν βουλόμεθα ἡμῖν εἶναι, λύπην δὲ οὐθ' αἰρούμεθα οὕτε βουλόμεθα. τὸ δὲ μηδέτερον ἀντὶ μὲν ἡδονῆς οὐ βουλόμεθα, λύπης δὲ ἀλλάττεσθαι βουλόμεθα. λύπην δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος ἡδονῆς βουλόμεθα, ἡδονὴν δ' ἐλάττω μετὰ μείζονος λύπης

4) See also, e.g., 2.653 a f. I cannot here deal with Plato's attitude to ἡδονὴ and hedonism. Suffice it to say that the argument in Book 5 results in finding greater ἡδονὴ on the side of the excellences (733 e 3 - 734 e 2).

οὐ βουλόμεθα. ἴσα δὲ ἀντὶ ἴσων ἐκάτερα τούτων οὐχ ὡς βουλόμεθα <οὐδ' ὡς οὐ βουλόμεθα> ἔχοιμεν ἄν διασαφεῖν (733 a 6-b 6). This passage, it should be realized, is not yet the actual examination or comparison of human βίοι;<sup>5)</sup> rather it leads us to the threshold of the intended comparison which begins a few lines later (c 2: ἐν ᾧ μὲν βίῳ ἔνεστι πολλά ἐκάτερα...).

I gather from E.B. England's commentary that the expression ἄλλως παρὰ φύσιν (733 a 8) caused misgivings in the 19th century. More recently toleration has prevailed. I do not see how the expression could be justified as a pleonasm; nor can I accept England's own defense of παρὰ φύσιν as an explanation of ἄλλως, a suggestion which would strike me as improbable even if ἄλλως were = ἐναντίως.<sup>6)</sup>

What prompted me to add four words in the last sentence quoted (733 b 5) was a strong feeling that after so much moving back and forth between βουλόμεθα and οὐ βουλόμεθα a mere οὐχ ὡς βουλόμεθα could not be adequate. The content as well as the form of the reasoning (i.e. the λόγος a 6) so far deployed suggest for this situation a statement of our inability to decide between "yes" and "no". Still I would not have trusted my feeling, if the sequel in Plato's text had not provided support. For in the next two sentences—longish sentences which need not be written out—Plato introduces complicating factors. Both pleasure and pain are apt to vary in magnitude, diversity and intensity (σφοδρότης). All such variations must be taken into account, yet the basic point of view remains the same and as soon as

5) For this reason and because it would introduce an unexpected and (in the context) pointless thought it is not possible to understand ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων as comparing one state of equal balance with another. Trevor Saunders (*BICS Suppl.* 28, London 1972, 24ff.) recommends this interpretation because ἀντί is commonly used for exchange. This, I admit, is the meaning in b 2. Still "set over against" is a sufficiently well attested meaning of ἀντί (see *Resp.* 331 b; *Phil.* 63 c; *Legg.* 705 b) to which LSJ is fairer than Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum*. England's reference (*ad c* 7) to b 1 is a mistake. A presence of both emotions in equal strength is not the same as the absence of both.

6) Cf. also the use of κατὰ φύσιν in 734 a 8f. in a sentence which sums up the comparison of opposite βίος.

Plato actually begins to look at and considers the pleasure and pain present in different types of lives, he finds a decisive ὑπερβάλλειν in all instances but one: ἐν ᾧ δ' αὖ βίῃ ἰσορροπεῖ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι· τὸν ἰσορροπον βίον ὡς τῶν μὲν ὑπερβαλλόντων τῷ φίλῳ ἡμῖν βουλόμεθα, τῶν δ' αὖ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς οὐ βουλόμεθα (733 c 6-d 2). ἰσορροπεῖ evidently corresponds to ἴσα ἀντὶ ἴσων of b 5, although now that matters have become more complicated, the simple equality of b 5 is replaced by a subtle balance: in some respects pleasures outweigh the pains; in others the latter are stronger. If in this situation we react by a βουλόμεθα as well as by an οὐ βουλόμεθα, we are evidently just as stymied here (at c 7) as we were in the identical situation at b 5, and the necessity of adding the negative clause in b 5 is proved by its presence in d 1.<sup>7)</sup>

Chapel Hill

7) Despite the invaluable help provided by Saunders' *Bibliography on Plato's Laws* (New York 1976), which covers the period between 1920 and 1970, I do not know whether or not others have suggested my remedy for 732 c 1: γελώπων τε εἴργεσθαι χρὴ τῶν ἐξαισίων καὶ δακρύων...καὶ ὄλωσ (ὅλην Mss.) περιχάρειαν πᾶσαν ἀποκρυπτόμενον καὶ περιωδυνίαν εὐσημονεῖν πειρᾶσθαι... About the two clauses immediately following I feel hopeless even if κατὰ τε εὐπραγίας...καὶ κατ' ἀτυχίας (Badham for κατὰ τύχας) is written. (I do not understand how L.A. Post, *TAPA* 61, 1930, 40, construes the passage.)



OVER TROUBLED WATERS: MEGARA 62-71<sup>1)</sup>

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

"Δαιμονίη παίδων, τί νύ τοι φρεσὶν ἔμπεσε τοῦτο  
 πευκαλίμης; πῶς ἄμμ' ἐθέλεις ὀροθυνέμεν ἄμφω  
 κήδε' ἄλαστα λέγουσα τὰ τ' οὐ νῦν πρῶτα κέκλαυται;  
 65 ἢ οὐχ ἄλις, οἷς ἐχόμεσθα τὸ δεύτατον, αἰὲν ἐπ' ἡμαρ  
 γινομένοις; μάλα μὲν γε φιλοθρηνῆς κέ τις εἶη  
 ὅστις ἀριθμήσειεν ἐφ' ἡμετέροις ἀχέεσσι.  
 θάρσει· οὐκ ἴ<σ>ης γ' ἐκυρήσαμεν ἐκ θεοῦ αἴσης.  
 καὶ δ' αὐτὴν ὀρόω σε, φίλον τέκος, ἀτρύτοισιν  
 70 ἄλγεσι μοχθίζουσαν· ἐπιγνώμων δέ τοί εἰμι  
 70a < - - - - - >  
 71 ἀσχαλάαν, ὅτε δὴ γε καὶ εὐφροσύνης κόρος ἐστί..."

---

63 ἐθέλεις D S : ἐθέλης W Tr 64 τ' Gow (cf. v.18) : δ' codd.  
 κέκλαυται D S : κέκλωνται W Tr, def. Giangrande : κέκλονται Vaughn :  
 κέλονται Aldina altera (1495) 65 αἰὲν Brunck (cf. v.40) : ατεῖ codd. :  
 καὶ κεν Vaughn 66 τις D S : τ' ἄν W Tr 67 ἀριθμήσειεν et 68 θάρσει  
 οὐ codd. : ἀριθμήσειεν ἔν et θαρσοίη G. Hermann, agn. Ahrens : ἀριθμηθεῖ-  
 σιν et θαρσοίη Wilamowitz, agn. Gow 68 οὐκ ἴσης γ' scripsi : οὐ τοι-

---

1) See J.W. Vaughn, *The Megara (Moschus IV): Text, Translation and Commentary* (Noctes Romanae, 14), Bern and Stuttgart 1976. H. Beckby, *Die griechischen Bukoliker* (Beiträge zur klass. Philologie, 49), Meisenheim am Glan 1975, 294-301 and 550-53. G. Giangrande, "On Moschus' *Megara*," C.Q., N.S. 19 (1969) 181-84. Th. Breitenstein, *Recherches sur le poème Mégara*, Copenhagen 1966. A.S.F. Gow, *Bucolici Graeci* (O.C.T.), Oxford 1952. Idem, *The Greek Bucolic Poets*, Cambridge 1953 (reprint, Hamden, Conn. 1972). Idem, C.R. 41 (1927) 169 (on *Megara* 65f.). C. Gallavotti, *Theocritus quique feruntur bucolici Graeci*, Rome 1945. Ph.E. Legrand, *Bucoliques Grecs* (Budé), II, Paris 1927. J. Sitzler, *Wochenschrift f. klass. Philol.* 32 (1915) 454. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Bucolici Graeci* (O.C.T.), Oxford 1905.

ἦσδ' *codd.* : οὐ τοίης δ' Giangrande : γούν τοιῆσδ' Valckenaer : ἐπεὶ  
 τοιῆσδ' Legrand *post v.70 lacunam unius versus suspicor: exspectes*  
 ἀτλήτων ἀνιών· ἀτὰρ οὐκ ἔνι σὺνεχὲς αἰεὶ 71 ἄσχαλάαν *codd.* : ἀγαλάαν  
 Sitzler, *agn.* Gow

[Alcmena:] "My poor child [Megara], what is this that has now come into your mind, usually so full of sense? Why do you want to upset us both with talk of those unforgettable sorrows, for which we have wept long ago? Are not those sorrows enough which have last befallen us, as they keep coming upon us day by day? Fond of bewailing surely would be he who would wish to find the sum of all our griefs! Be of good cheer: two of us do not have equal fate sent from heaven [i.e., my lot is much more ill-fated than yours]. And nevertheless, I see you yourself, dear child, toiling with endless sorrows. Now, believe me, I am well experienced <in unbearable griefs; and yet one cannot always, unremittingly> be grieved, for even of merriment there comes satiety [and much more so of grief]..."

We now have two recent doctoral dissertations on this Alexandrian *epyllion* of 125 lines (Breitenstein, Vaughn), and two fresh editions (Beckby, Vaughn), since Gow's O.C.T. text of 1952. And yet the old *crux* in the middle of the poem (lines 64, 68, 70f.) remains. My solution can be found in the text and translation printed above. Let us now discuss these four lines in the context of the *entire* poem.

(i) *Line* 64. Nobody seems to have pointed out that Alcmena opens her speech with a series of three questions (τί... πῶς... ἢ οὐχ, 62-66) in order to *reciprocate* Megara's own series of five questions at the beginning of her speech (τίφθ'... τί... ἢ ῥ'... τί... τί, 1-7). Such series of opening questions are an old epic device: e.g., Achilles produces five questions in a row while addressing Patroclus (*Iliad* 16.7-19), and Chalciope addresses her half-sister Medea with another series of five questions (A.R. *Arg.* 3.674-78). If that is true, then Gow's τ' (for the transmitted δ') must be correct (*contra* all editors), for δ' would interrupt the series.

What is more important, these series of questions is not the only deliberate parallelism between both speeches. An eight line long simile of Megara (21-28) is matched by a six line long simile of Alcmena (113-18); Megara's oath by Arte-

mis (29-35) finds its counterpart in Alcmena's oath by Demeter and Persephone (75-80); Megara's vivid description of Heracles' dreadful killing of his own sons—a happening τό τ' οὐδ' ὄναρ ἦλυθεν ἄλλῳ (13-20)—is balanced by Alcmena's equally vivid description of her "dreadful dream" about her own sons (91-113). In brief, the poet of *Megara* may rather slavishly borrow from Homeric diction (as Breitenstein, 70-86, and others have shown); and his poetic craftsmanship may be modest (compare, e.g., ἐκπάγλως used three times in ninety lines, 2, 72, 93, as against eight times in both *Iliad* and *Odyssey*). But he *did* have a clear idea about his design: to contrast both pathetic lamentations (Megara's and Alcmena's), to the clear advantage of the latter. More on the poet's design see under (iv).

Back to line 64: κέκλαυται of D and S (which offer better text most of the times) is to be preferred to κέκλωνται of W and Tr. Κέκλαυται is a *perfectum intensivum* (Schwyzer, G.G., II, 263): compare ἔολπα in lines 55 and 80. The point is that Alcmena here is referring to an *old wisdom*: παλαιὰ καινοῖς δακρύοις οὐ χορὴ στένειν (Euripides Fr. 43 N., *Alexandros*). Giangrande, however, defends κέκλωνται (from κλώθω): "these misfortunes (i.e. the misfortunes you are crying over) have not been spun to us just now..." (184). But the sense is weak: throughout Greek tragedy people bewail their *old* fate. In his turn, Vaughn reads κέκλονται (from κέλωμαι) with reference to the scholion in Tr, κέκλωνται· καλοῦνται, ὀνομάζονται. But again, the sense thus obtained is weak ("Surely these are not brought up now for the first time").

(ii) *Line 68.* (a) Hermann, Ahrens, Wilamowitz, and Gow engaged in major surgery (ἀριθμήσειν ἔν or ἀριθμηθεῖσιν plus θαρσοίη for the transmitted ἀριθμήσειεν plus θάρσει· οὐ). Against their procedure it suffices to say that the imperative θάρσει, at the beginning of a line, meaning "be of good courage, fear not," is too firmly rooted in the epic tradition to be taken for a scribal error.

(b) Gallavotti, Breitenstein (51), Giangrande (181f.), Beckby, and Vaughn keep the text as transmitted, θάρσει· οὐ

τοιῆσδ' (or τοίης δ') ἐκυρήσαμεν ἐκ θεοῦ αἴσης, but at the expense of the sense. Breitenstein refers τοιῆσδ' to the two preceding lines only: "God has not allotted us the fate of *counting* all our misfortunes, new and old" ("Alcmène invite Mégara à prendre courage, pour le seul motif qu'elles ne sont pas obligées à compter tous leurs malheurs, tant les anciens que les actuels: Dieu ne leur a pas assigné un tel sort..."). Such an interpretation is *too narrow*: certainly αἴσα must refer to something much more important in human life than simply "counting one's misfortunes." The same goes against Vaughn's interpretation (62): "Alcmena makes a neat comparison between the lot apportioned by Zeus and Megara's self-imposed fate of endless lamentation. So she states: 'Be of good courage! we have not received such a fate as this from Zeus'." In addition, this interpretation contradicts the fact that Alcmena *herself* engages in endless lamentation (lines 1-3; 45f., "you pour yourself out like water with weeping each night and day god sends us;" 82, "though I weep more tears than fair-tressed Niobe"). Now, my point is: Alcmena is entitled to an endless crying, Megara is not. For Alcmena feels that her own lot is much more ill-fated than Megara's: see below, (ii, e).

(c) Giangrande recurs to a rather bizarre solution: "Alcmena says: 'Resign yourself, because we have not obtained an ἀγαθή αἴσα from the god'..." But, first, such a statement coming from Alcmena would serve as *no consolation* to Megara, who is expecting comfort from her beloved mother-in-law (45f.; 50f.). And, as a matter of fact, Alcmena is offering such a comfort to her daughter-in-law -- in lines 71 ("[Stop crying,] for even of merriment there comes satiety [and much more so of grieving]"); 75-80 ("By Demeter and the Maid, I love you in my heart no less than if you had been the fruit of my own womb, and you know it well!"); 81 ("So never tell me, my child, that I care not for you," rebutting Megara's complaint in lines 45-51). Second, if Alcmena in her statement "is pointedly referring to Megara's own words in line 7, τί νύ μ' ὄδε κακῆ γονέες τέκον αἴση;" --

as Giangrande takes it, -- what would be the point for Alcmena to repeat something that Megara already knows? Third, the sense of θάρσει, "resign yourself" (so already Legrand, reading θάρσει· ἐπεὶ τοιῆσδ' ..., "résigne-toi, puisque tel est le lot que le ciel nous a assigné"), can be paralleled nowhere (in late funeral inscriptions *C.I.G.* 4463; 5200b; 9789, the formula, θάρσει ψυχῇ, οὐδεὶς ἀθάνατος, means "Fear not, soul: nobody is immortal"). Finally, the sense of ἀγαθός for τοῖος is not at all likely here.

(d) Beckby tries to solve the problem with a sway of the Gordian sword: by simply printing a question mark. θάρσει. οὐ τοιῆσδ' ἐκυρήσαμεν ἐκ θεοῦ αἴσης; "Füg dich! Haben wir nicht dies Los vom Himmel bekommen?" Again, θάρσει nowhere means "füg dich!" and the sense obtained serves to no solace to Megara, who is crying for help.

(e) If, on the one hand, the epic imperative θάρσει· οὐ is sound (for break and hiatus at this position compare Theocritus 25.275, τυτηή οὐδέ, referred to lately by Gallavotti), and if, on the other hand, τοιῆσδ' does not yield a satisfactory sense, then the latter must be corrupt. Thus read οὐκ ἴ<σ>ης γ' for the transmitted οὐ τοιῆσδ', and compare ἴσην... αἴσαν ar *A.R. Arg.* 3.207f.; ἴση μοῖρα at *Iliad* 9.318. Palaeography. ΟΥΤΟΙΗΣΑ for ΟΥΙCΙ<C>ΗCΓ. The scribal mistake TO for K (and vice versa) need no explanation. And a dropped C may be paralleled by *Megara* 38, Ἡρης D S : ἦρα (i.e., Ἡρας) W Tr. After all, maybe the scribe wanted to write ἴης for ἴσης (compare *Iliad* 9.318f., ἴση μοῖρα... ἴη τιμῆ). Finally, as for the error Γ' > Τ' > Δ', compare *Megara* 81 μή μ' S : μήτ' D : μηδ' W Tr.

The sense thus obtained is: "My dear child, be of good cheer! You and I do not have equal fate from Heaven: *my* lot is much more ill-fated than yours: I should weep forever, not you (cf. 46, said of Alcmena, νύκτας τε κλαίουσα καὶ ἐκ Διὸς ἡμαθ' ὀπίσσω)." Why so? For Megara is still young and may have other children (by Heracles or by another husband); but Alcmena is old and may not: in case something happens to Heracles and Iphicles, if "the dreadful dream" (91-121)

proves true, she would remain childless. Moreover, her father was killed by her own husband; Zeus seduced her as a married woman; and Hera delayed the birth of her son bringing her to the threshold of Hades (83-87). Finally, Eurystheus (5; 123) is a real danger to her family.

This interpretation ("I should cry, not you!") goes well with the context of the poem. First, with the next line 69, "And nevertheless, I see you *too* (καί) toiling with endless sorrows [instead of me alone];" second, with the solace offered to Megara in line 71, "[Stop crying:] for even of merriment there comes satiety, [and much more so of grief]." Finally, the suggested interpretation finds its support in the next lines 72-74:

καί σε μάλ' ἐκπάγλως ὀλοφύρομαι ἠδ' ἐλεαίρω  
οὔνεκεν ἡμετέροιο λυγροῦ μετὰ δαίμονος ἔσχες  
ὃς θ' ἡμῖν ἐφύπερθε κάρης βαρῦς αἰωρεῖται.

"Exceedingly do I grieve for thee and pity thee in that thou sharest the baleful fate which broods heavy over the heads of me and mine" (Gow's pointed translation, my italics). That is it: the fate of *the family of Alcmena* is grave and baleful (compare also the force of "our house" at 124, οἴκου ἄφ' ἡμετέροιο): her daughter-in-law Megara *shares only a small part of that fate*. No wonder then that Alcmena could say, while trying to comfort her daughter-in-law, "You and I do not have equal fate from Heaven: [mine is baleful, not yours]."

(iii) *Lines 70-71.* (a) Once more, as in line 64, Alcmena recurs to a *popular wisdom*: ὅτε δὴ γε καὶ εὐφροσύνης κῆρος ἐστί. This is a clear reference to *Iliad* 13.636-39, πάντων μὲν κῆρος ἐστί (e.g., of sleep, love, singing and dancing). This Homeric wisdom was referred to by many (Gregory of Nazianz, inspired by Euripides Fr. 213.1 N., put it this way, κῆρος δὲ πάντων, καὶ καλῶν καὶ χειρόνων), and it was criticized by Nonnus *Dionys.* 42.178-81 (cf. Breitenstein 52 n. 99).

(b) If the text of this adage is sound, then 71 ἀσχαλάαν, "be grieved," is untenable, and Sitzler may well be right in reading ἀγχαλάαν instead (with a μόχθον understood from

the preceding line), "to ease, relax." But the real problem is that 70 ἐπιγνώμων δέ τοί εἰμι can yield a satisfactory sense *neither* with ἀσχαλάαν nor with ἀγχαλάαν. For it cannot mean, "I counsel thee to rest" (as Gow has it); nor can it be rendered as "je conçois que tu t'en irrites" (Legrand, Breitenstein 51), or as "ich verstehe wirklich, dass deine Seele in Aufruhr geriet" (Beckby), "I can understand your being grieved."

Most scholars, however, take ἐπιγνώμων as being equal in sense to συγγνώμων, "pardoning," with reference to Hesychius, ἐπιγνώμη· συγγνώμη, διάγνωσις. This interpretation may be traced back to the Latin translation of *Megara* in W. Holtzmann's (Xylander's) edition of Theocritus of 1558 ("*ignosco vero tibi quod doles*"); and it may be found in Liddell-Scott-Jones (s.v., ii) too. Sitzler translated, "Ich gebe dir aber die Entscheidung, vom Leide abzulassen, da es ja auch in der Freude eine Sättigung gibt."

(c) But ἐπιγνώμων nowhere means "pardoning." Apart from the rather technical sense of the word ("arbiter, umpire, judge, appraiser, inspector"), its usual meaning is "be well acquainted with; be an expert." In this sense the word is used five times by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. math.* 7.56, τῆς γὰρ ἰδίας τέχνης ἐστὶν ἐπιγνώμων, πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἀλλοτριάν ἰδιώτης καθέστηκεν. 7.348 ἐπιγνώμων τάληθοῦς. 2.67; 7.310; 7.353), and three times by Philo (*De opificio mundi* 124, Ἰπποκράτης ὁ τῆς φύσεως ἐπιγνώμων. *De spec. legg.* 3.52, ἄνθρωποι μὲν τῶν ἐμφανῶν ἐπιγνώμονες, θεὸς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων. 2.24 τῶν δὲ γυναικῶν τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐπιγνώμονας ἀποφήνας).

This is the most natural meaning here as well. Alcmena is saying to *Megara*: "Believe me, I am an expert in suffering. And yet, a mortal cannot endure in mourning forever, for—as the adage goes—'even of merriment there comes satiety,' [and much more so of grief]." Now as ἐπιγνώμων cannot be construed with ἀσχαλάαν, the safest way out seems to be to assume that one line is missing, comprising, for example: <ἀτλήτων ἀνιῶν· ἀτὰρ οὐκ ἔνι σὺνεχὲς αἰεὶ> (cf., e.g., *Odyssey* 9.74; *Arat.* 20; *Theocrit.* 20.12; *Iliad* 12.26). Possibly,

the line was mistakenly dropped because *three* lines in a row opened with an A (70 ἄλγεσι, 70a ἀτμήτων, 71 ἀσχαλάαν). With this line added, Megara's speech takes 55 lines, Alcmena's 65 lines (with two times three lines in the middle serving as a transition passage, 56-61).

(iv) In conclusion, the suggested text of this key passage of the *epyllion* (62-82) enhances the rôle of Alcmena as a caring and loving comforter of her young daughter-in-law. Alcmena displays wisdom (compare her references to "popular wisdom" in lines 64, 66f., 71, and perhaps Hesiod *Scutum* 5, νόον γε μὲν οὐ τις ἔριζε, said of Alcmena); she shows understanding and a warm humane love for Megara -- from the opening sentence, "Be of good cheer: you and I do not have equal fate from Heaven," (68) to the closing mild reproach, "So never tell me, my child, that I care not for you!" (81).

At a point in her hapless life, Megara at once feels desperately abandoned: far from her parents (36-40), far from the wandering husband (41-45), far from any kinsman (47-50); without the attention of her own sister (52-54) and, above all, without Alcmena's care (45f.). And she cries for help: "Nor have I, a hapless woman in my misery, somebody to whom I may look and seek comfort for my heart" (50f., οὐδέ μοί ἐστι πρὸς ὄντινά κε βλέψασα / οἷα γυνή πανάποτος ἀναψύξαιμι φίλον κῆρ).

Megara's effort was *not* in vain. Her love for Alcmena (1-3, Μητερ ἐμή -- τί μοι τόσον ἠνίησαι;) was warmly reciprocated (compare, e.g., Alcmena's diction expressing love, 62, 69 φίλον τέκος, 79 τηλυγέτη... παρθένος, 81 ἐμόν θάλος). Her call for comfort was heard and abundantly answered -- in this passage 62-82.

In brief, this compassionate mutual care and love between Alcmena and Megara, both stricken with grave personal tragedies, is what gives this well designed Alexandrian *epyllion* its unique aesthetic value. But this value had remained hidden from scholars because of a careless scribe.



GRECO-ROMAN LIGHT ON RABBINIC TEXTS<sup>1)</sup>

HOWARD JACOBSON

(1) At *Canticles Rabbah* 1.9.6 the entry of the Egyptians into the Red Sea is described. An Egyptian horseman is addressed by his steed, ראה מה בים. איפחיסים נעשיח לכם בים. "Behold what is in the sea. איפחיסים is prepared for you in the sea." Commentators wrestle with the unknown word. Brüll suggests ὄπτασια (Schauspiel), while noting also ὕψωτος and τάρφος.<sup>2)</sup> Jastrow reads איפוחורוס (= ἰνποθόρος, sc. στόμος) and comments "a satire on Egyptian lasciviousness." Löw (*apud* Krauss) emends the text in two places and argues for ὕψιστος. All these are vain conjectures. Most hold איפחיסים to be ἐπίθετος (e.g., Levy, Krauss, Aruch) in the sense "an attack." This seems possible though the phrase ἐπίθετος נעשיח is a bit strange and neither the sense nor the rhetoric is eminently suitable.

Another option seems better. The noun is ἀποθέωτος. This usually means "deification," but it also occurs in the sense "burial," which is precisely what is desired here (cf. *CIG* 2832.3). It is, however, possible that the noun may retain its fundamental sense here and reflect a touch of humor. Given the Imperial custom of automatic deification upon

1) The following reference works are throughout referred to in abbreviated form (usually by author's name): *Plenus Aruch Targum-Talmudico-Midrasch Verbale et Reale Lexicon*, edit. A. Kohut (4 volumes, Vienna 1878-92); M. Jastrow, *A Dictionary of the Targumim, the Talmud Babli and Yerushalmi, and the Midrashic Literature* (repr. New York 1967); S. Krauss, *Griechische und Lateinische Lehnwörter im Talmud, Midrasch und Targum*, vol. 2 (Berlin 1899); J. Levy, *Wörterbuch über die Talmudim und Midraschim* (Darmstadt 1963; reprint of second edition of 1924).

2) N. Brüll, *Jahrbücher f. jüd. Gesch. und Litt.* 5-6 (1883) 121.

death, the horse's remark may signify, "look; you are about to be deified"; i.e. you are about to die. This would be the sort of humor embodied in Vespasian's observation when on the point of death, *vae, puto deus fio* (Suet. *Vesp.* 23.4). אִפְחֻרְסִים may be the correct spelling. For נן = θεω cf. אִפְחֻרְסִים = θεω-ρῶ. <sup>3)</sup>

(2) At *Esther Rabbah* 3.12 God is said to instruct his angel to inflict punishments on the chamberlains of the king Ahasuerus. The punishments are listed in a series of word-plays based on the names of the chamberlains. Most are fairly clear but the final one is difficult and the text may show some degree of corruption. The earlier section states: "despoil his house, destroy his house, spoil and plunder it... behold the profligacy of that evil man." The text continues with an obscure play on the name of the last chamberlain Carcas. It concludes, "it is Greek. As one says, נְכַרְכַּסִּים." A number of views have been offered as to the Greek involved here and the sense of the final item in the series. Brüll suggests κερκήσια, <sup>4)</sup> Fürst κερκήσιον (Weinfass), <sup>5)</sup> Levy κέρκος, Kohut (s.v. נְכַרְכַּסִּים) κερκίς = κερκίς, while also noting κούρξ. All these are far-fetched and unpersuasive.

Jastrow, however, takes נְכַרְכַּסִּים = ἐκήρυξεν, "proclamation has been made." This is, I think, close to the truth. But the context should lead us to a slightly different understanding of the Greek behind נְכַרְכַּסִּים, one which also better suits the spelling, namely κήρυξον. Thus we have "behold the profligacy of that evil man and proclaim it." κήρυξον is the order to proclaim issued by the figure of authority; cf. ἐκέλευσεν κηρῦσαι. <sup>6)</sup> For the aorist active imperative transliterated we may have rabbinic examples in נְכַרְכַּסִּים = βρέξον and נְכַרְכַּסִּים = ἀπάντησον. <sup>7)</sup>

3) See A. Jellinek, *Bet ha-Midrash*, vol. 2 (repr. Jerusalem 1967<sup>3</sup>) 23.

4) Brüll (supra n. 2) 128.

5) J. Fürst, *Glossarium Graeco-Hebraicum* (Strassbourg 1890).

6) See Preisigke, *Wörterbuch*, s.v. κηρῦσαι.

7) Jer. Tal. *Schebuoth* 34d, *Pesiqta Rabbati* 146a (ed. Friedmann).

(3) The Aruch cites from Yelamdenu Shmini (s.v. קפלארניא), אינו עשוי לקופלארניא, הוי לא איש דברים אנכי. The unknown word is generally taken to be *κουφολογία* = empty talk.<sup>8)</sup> But this simply makes no sense. The context is God's commission of Moses at the burning bush. Moses seeks to turn down the appointment. In the words of the Bible (*Exodus* 3:11), "who am I to go unto Pharaoh and to take the children of Israel out of Egypt" and (4:10) "I am not a good speaker." Within this context what genuine sense could one derive from such a description of Moses, "he is not suited for empty talk."? This is not merely inappropriate but probably inconsistent.

We should rather take קופלארניא to be a slightly corrupted form of *καλοπραγία*. The text would then mean, "he is not suited for noble, heroic acts" and makes perfect sense. The word *καλοπραγία* is only known to us from schol. *ad* Apollonius Rhodius 3.68 where it appears to mean "justice, righteousness." But there is no reason to believe that its range would not have been broader, as is the case for its relatively common counterpart *κακοπραγία*, (failure, misdeeds, evil actions). We know that *καλὰ πράττειν* was used in the sense "to do noble acts" (e.g., Thuc. 6.16). This may also suggest that the exegete was taking דברים = action. We might compare Philo's paraphrase at *Moses* 1.83, τὰ λίαν μεγάλα κρίνων οὐ καθ' αὐτόν, which is virtually "not suited for great deeds," as in our text.

(4) In the Midrash *Aggadat Ester* 5.2 we read that the sons of Haman, believing the queen doomed, proceed to divide up her possessions.<sup>9)</sup> They all seize items at random. But when they come upon her פורפירה (the royal robe of purple), they decide to cast lots: אבל פורפירה שלה שהוא קוהאיוסיס מפילין

8) See N. Brüll, *Jahrbücher f. jüd. Gesch. und Litt.* 8 (1887) 70f. Levy (s.v. קופלא, קופלא) translates the sentence "er ist nicht zur Verbindung, Ordnung der Worte geeignet" which would fit the context. Unfortunately, he gives us no indication as to how he gets this sense from the text.

9) See S. Buber's edition (Cracow 1897); also W. Bacher, *MGWJ* 41 (1897) 356.

לרלל, "but as for her purple robe which is קוחאירסיס, for this they cast lots". Krauss (568) believed the word a corrupted form of κάρησις, and Sperber improved on this with καταίωσις.<sup>10)</sup> The point then is clear. The courtiers can haphazardly divide up the queen's possessions, but when they come to the purple robe "which is the symbol of the royal authority," they pause and decide that so significant an item should be given away by lot.<sup>11)</sup>

Sperber's suggestion is brilliant, but entails two difficulties. First, the word καταίωσις is extremely rare. Second, it does not occur in the sense "majesty, authority." Thus, I should like to offer another possibility, one which is paleographically reasonable (if not as good as Sperber's), is fairly common, and occurs in precisely the sense desired, namely καθοσίωσις. This Greek word was used as the equivalent of Latin *maiestas* (CGL 2.335.36) and was employed in the sense "majesty, authority" with reference to officials (cf. e.g., SIG<sup>3</sup> 905.11). We find it as the Greek equivalent for the Latin (*laesa*) *maiestas* (Suda, s.v. εὐνοῦχος). It is then the appropriate word in the present context.

(5) At *Midrash Haggadol ad Gen.* 24:53 we read that the gifts the servant brings are various fruits, silk, pepper and פרוסינה. Krauss lists the word with a question mark. Kohut (supp. p. 69) offered πύσον and Sperber πύσινος.<sup>12)</sup> The latter is open to objection as it is an adjective and we expect a noun here. But both seem unlikely since the context and the other gifts in the series suggest a luxury item, something exotic. I would propose φασιανός which occurs often in Rabbinic texts, though usually in the form פסיינא (*vel sim.*). The glossator of *Sepher Ha Margalit* evidently under-

10) D. Sperber, *Sinai* 79 (1976) 55.

11) The identification of "the purple" and "royal authority" is evident in various texts from the Empire. Note e.g., Lucan's *purpuram sumere* (7.228) and Claudian's *Tyria maiestas* with reference to "purple" (*Stilicho* 1.79-80).

12) D. Sperber, *Annual of Bar-Ilan University: Studies in Judaica and the Humanities*, vols. 14-15 (1977) 19, n. 38.

stood the word in this way for he explains, "a kind of quail."

(6) At the end of this text we read that the servant also took grain with him. This teaches us, the Midrash elaborates, שׂאם ירצא אדם לדרך ואין אסטרכיא עמו מסחגף, that if a man goes on a journey without אסטרכיא, he will suffer. Two manuscripts read צ in place of ס. The word clearly means "traveling necessities, provision" (Jastrow). It occurs again (in the form איצטרכיא) at *Koh. Rab.* 11.1, where the context also makes it clear that it means "provisions." Indeed, the *Yalkut ad Gen.* 24:53 gives the same exegesis as is found in *Midrash Haggadol* but substitutes מזונותיר for אסטרכיא.

Now it is a well known and fascinating fact that occasionally Greek loan words are assimilated to Semitic roots. Perhaps the best examples are טמירן (= ταμειρον, but "related" to טמך) and מסטוריך (= μιστριχλον, but "related" to סחר). It is generally believed that the word under discussion here is merely an Aramaic noun from the root צרך. Thus, the form אסטרכיא does not even occur in the lexica. I suspect, however, that אסטרכיא is no error, but rather an illuminating clue to the real word here. The noun is the common Greek word for "provisions," namely σιταρχία. It has evidently been "semiticized" into an Aramaic noun as if from the root צרך. In the process it has acquired an א at the beginning. I am not sure whether there is any guaranteed example of such syllabic prosthesis in a loan word preceding a single consonant. אספור from σάπφειρος, אסקרטיר from *secretarius*, אלכסון from λοςξόν are possibilities, but all are disputed. However, the fact that *this* loan word is fashioned so as to seem Aramaic makes such prosthesis more readily understandable and acceptable.

(7) A passage in *Midrash Tanhuma* relates how God bestows His personal apparatus on only a very few select individuals.<sup>13)</sup> Thus, for example, Elijah received His chariot, Solomon His throne. Verses from the Bible are brought as evi-

13) See the edition of S. Buber (Vilna 1913; reprint Jerusalem 1964) p. 51.

dence for the various gifts. Moses, we are told, was the sole recipient of God's crown. As proof, *Exodus* 34:29 is quoted: כִּי קָרַן עַרְר פְּנֵיָו, "Moses' face shone." The difficulty is patent. How can a verse "Moses' face shone" be evidence for his use of God's crown?

We might argue that a mystical doctrine equating light and God's crown functions here. But the answer is simpler. The Rabbis are working with a bilingual pun. קָרַן is associated with Latin *corona*. Such bilingual word play is attested elsewhere in Rabbinic texts. A nice example occurs at *Pesiqta deRav Kahana* 3.1 (Mandelbaum p. 40) where the Biblical אֵלֶיךָ is interpreted as if it were ἄλλον.<sup>14)</sup>

University of Illinois at Urbana

14) For another example see D. Sperber's discussion of *Lekah Tov ad Lam.* 3:65 at *Sinai* 79 (1976) 57-8.

I am indebted to Professor Sperber for helpful comments on these notes.

## NON SUA POMA: VARRO, VIRGIL, AND GRAFTING

DAVID O. ROSS, JR.

In this note I propose an emendation in Varro's *De Re Rustica*, which raises a discussion of Virgil's lines on grafting in the *Georgics*, which in turn leads to a possible confirmation of the dating of Eclogue 8 to 35 B.C.

Varro, introducing grafting (his *quartum genus seminis*), says that attention must be given (*videndum*) to what tree is grafted onto what, when, and how; he then illustrates (RR 1.40. 5):

non enim pirum recipit quercus: neque enim si  
malus pirum.

So Keil's text, with no indication of doubt or difficulty in his *apparatus criticus*. In his commentary, however, he cites Ursinus' punctuation and alteration<sup>1</sup>) and then notes, "de brevitare dicendi *neque enim si malus pirum*, h.e. 'neque enim si malus pirum recipit, pirum recipit quercus', dubitari non debebat." Keil's confidence has since been shared by all -- e.g., the Loeb translators, "You cannot, for instance, graft a pear on an oak, even though you can on an apple."

The words as they stand, however, cannot give the sense so desired by Keil and others: the second negative (*neque*) must either be disregarded entirely or (as in Keil's paraphrase) be made to introduce a remarkably pointless ellipsis;

1) Ursinus: ...*quercus. neque enim si malum pirum, hoc sequendum [secuntur MSS]. multi aruspices audiunt [multum], a quibus...* Cf. Pontedera's revision (reported by G. Pagani, *M. Terenzio Varrone: Dell'Agricoltura* [Venice 1846], 865-6), *Non enim pirum recipit quercus; neque etiam si malus pirum, hoc sequuntur multi qui aruspices audiunt multum, a quibus proditum...*

and the second *enim* is clearly intrusive (the first serves to introduce Varro's illustration, the second serves no purpose at all). Furthermore, the meaning forced upon the words (that an apple will take the graft of a pear) seems to me undesirable: in the discussion immediately following, Varro in fact speaks of the graft of a cultivated pear onto a wild pear and then explicitly says that both scion and stock should be of the same *genus*, as for instance apple (*in quamcumque arborem inseras, si eiusdem generis est, dumtaxat ut sit utraque malus, ita inserere oportet referentem ad fructum...*, 1.40.6).<sup>2)</sup>

I suggest, then, that Varro wrote

non enim pirum recipit quercus, neque etiamsi  
malus pirum.

"For example, an oak does not take the graft of a pear, nor, even if (it is) an apple, does it take the graft of a pear."<sup>3)</sup> Varro illustrates his advice (*videndum qua ex arbore in quam transferatur*) first by the patently absurd (pear and oak), then by what might to the inexperienced seem possible (pear and apple).

The assumption that Varro regarded the graft of pear and apple as possible has undoubtedly been influenced by Virgil, *Geo.* 2.32-4:

et saepe alterius ramos impune videmus  
vertere in alterius, mutataque insita mala  
ferre pirum et prunis lapidosa rubescere corna.

These lines conclude the first didactic section of the Book, concerning propagation (cf. Varro, where grafting is the fourth method of propagation), both natural reproduction

2) The term *genus* is regularly used to denote what we would refer to as "genus" or "species" (thus e.g. *genera oleae, brassicae, violae*), but is also used more generally (thus *genera fructuum, pomorum, arborum*): see *ThLL* 6.1895.70-1896.12 (s.v. *genus*). But in this context it seems clear that Varro refers to apple as a *genus* distinct from pear and oak.

3) *Etiam* in Pontedera's emendation (above, n.1): cf. also C. Gesner, "Quid si ellipsis hic esset ita supplenda, *neque enim* hoc procedit, et si *malus pirum* recipiat? Transposita verba nihil haberent difficultatis. *Neque enim si malus pirum* recipit, *etiam pirum recipit quercus*." Both see the difficulty of the second *enim*.



(9-21) and the methods man's experience has devised (22-34). The second didactic section (47-72) is identical in content though different in disposition (the natural and invented are treated together), but concludes like the first with grafting (69-72):

inseritur vero et fetu nucis arbutus horrida,  
 et steriles platani malos gessere valentis;  
 castaneae fagus<sup>4)</sup> ornusque incanuit albo  
 flore piri glandemque sues fregere sub ulmis.

Grafting, by its position in both sections, had for Virgil exemplary importance.

All of the examples of grafting given in both passages (leaving aside for the moment the one that concerns us most, apple and pear) are impossible according to modern theory and practice and were also unknown in antiquity before Virgil. All of Virgil's examples are of grafts between families and are hence most unlikely.

The amateur has real difficulty in sorting out fact and fiction, theory and practice in this area, for both in antiquity and today accepted theory as to what is possible is surprisingly limited and often vague, while practice is either confined to the practical or is wildly experimental and dubious. The last word on the subject of ancient grafting was written, very fortunately, by A.S. Pease, no botanical amateur.<sup>5)</sup> Modern theory can be stated thus: grafting between families is just about impossible, between genera (intergeneric) possible though difficult and often unsuccessful, and between species (intrageneric) generally success-

4) My punctuation and text differs here from Mynors' OCT (...*valentis*,/ *castaneae fagos*;...). It is simpler to assume metrical lengthening at the caesura than the unusual Greek nominative *fagos* (see Richter *ad loc.*); I wonder too whether an accusative *fagos* is unnatural with the verb *gessere* (as it might be too with the verb *ferre* in 34), because the grafted tree "bears" the fruit of flowers of the graft -- that is, would Virgil say "chestnut trees bear beech trees"?

5) "Notes on Ancient Grafting," *TAPA* 64 (1933), 66-76: I owe this reference, unknown to Virgilian commentators and others, to Prof. Roger Pack.

ful.<sup>6)</sup>

Properly, though, the question is whether Virgil thought such grafts (as apple onto plane) possible -- what was the theory and practice in antiquity? Pliny (*NH* 17.120), for instance, claims to have seen (*vidimus*) a tree at Tivoli bearing every sort of fruit, wallnuts on one branch, "berries" on another, on others grapes, pears, figs, pomegranates, and apples; *sed* (he adds) *huic brevis fuit vita*. Such marvels of ancient grafting, not uncommonly reported,<sup>7)</sup> are misleading or deceptive: Pease reaches two conclusions which need to be underlined.

First, there are various explanations for such marvels, some of which might actually have been observed, and various reasons why they are not in any sense true grafts. Pliny's short-lived tree, I suspect, was perhaps simply decked out for some occasion, perhaps a visit by the local garden club. Others, according to Pease, may have been instances of "space parasitism," which in fact Pliny recognizes as the origin of the art of grafting (17.99), as when a seed happens to be deposited in a fork or crevice in the bark of another tree, "from whence," Pliny says, "we see (*vidimus*) a cherry on a willow, a plane on a laurel, a laurel on a cherry." Others may have been the products of "grafting by ap-

6) Pease, p. 66 n.1, with indications of just how tentative even such a general statement must be. L.P. Wilkinson is one of the few who have inquired into this matter; he quotes Mr. J.S.L. Gilmour, Director of the Cambridge University Botanic Garden, "There is no doubt, I think, that Virgil is mistaken in all the cases he cites. I know of no successful grafts between members of different families, and all his pairs are allegedly grafts of this type. There are, indeed, very few cases of successful grafts even between two different genera of the *same* family, far less between genera of *different* families" (*The Georgics of Virgil* [Cambridge 1969], 244 n.). I would similarly like to thank Prof. Harold Davidson, Dept. of Horticulture, Michigan State University, for his ready help on several occasions.

Much remains doubtful (it seems to me) because (1) the mechanics of compatibility are still not sufficiently understood by botanists, (2) compatibility does not depend entirely on generic relationship, and (3) there can be no agreement as to what constitutes a successful graft in practice (some grafts may be "successful" for only a relatively short time, and in others, Prof. Davidson informs me, there may be a decline after as much as 10 years).

7) See Pease's collection of sources, pp. 67-71.

proach," a method developed probably fairly late and particularly championed by Columella,<sup>8)</sup> by which a branch from one growing tree is joined, without being separated for at least three years, to another, and so in fact continues to grow from its original stock. Finally, to quote Pease, "those [examples] still remaining may well be due to mistaken analogies and enthusiastic exaggerations of amateurs, whether poets or prose writers." (One should note here Pease's designation "amateurs".)

Pease's second conclusion is, for our purposes, even more important: "...[we] should probably consider either the [pseudo-Aristotelian] *de Plantis* or Virgil's *Georgics* as containing the earliest certain reference to intergeneric grafting."<sup>9)</sup> That is, before Virgil there is no mention of grafting between different families, no mention of the wonderful products of intergeneric grafting related enthusiastically from Pliny to Palladius. When one looks at earlier writers on grafting, or for that matter at Columella, one is struck by the sober reality of practical horticulture, not the speculations of amateurs. Virgil may well have been largely responsible for the later claims of grafts now recognized as impossible.

We can be certain, though, that Virgil knew he was presenting the impossible and expected to be convicted of falsehood. After the second set of examples (*Geo.* 2.69-72) Virgil

8) Pliny, *NH* 17.137, *est etiam num nova inserendi ratio...Columellae excogitata, ut adfirmat ipse... : cf. Col. 5.11.12-15*, where there is no such affirmation. See K.D. White, *Roman Farming* (Ithaca 1970), 257, on this passage and on the "absurd instances of incompatible grafting" in Pliny. It does not seem to have been observed that grafting by approach ("Columella's" *nova inserendi ratio*) is in fact described by Varro, 1.40.6.

9) P. 71. The difference between practical horticulture and amateur experimentation needs to be kept in mind. Grafting is in fact a type of propagation, yielding mature fruit of the grafted variety far more easily and quickly than reproduction by seedlings (which may revert from the cultivated variety to the wild type) or cuttings. New varieties too may be produced by grafting. (See K.D. White, *Roman Farming*, 248, with table of varieties p. 262.) The practical fruit-grower would have no reason to graft apple onto pear, much less onto oak, even if it was (or is) theoretically possible or even on rare occasions successful.

has a short passage on the different methods of grafting, concluding this with the tree wondering at fruit not its own (80-2):

nec longum tempus, et ingens  
exiit ad caelum ramis felicibus arbos,  
miratastque novas frondes et non sua poma.

Virgil's language allows us to read this as a less than happy innovation. *Ingens* is an adjective of epic diction, to which Virgil contributed the meaning "native" or "natural."<sup>10</sup>) Certainly *miratast* and *novas* can connote horror, rather than a happy gaze, at its strange and unnatural, rather than novel, foliage. *Non sua poma*: violation of the natural (suggestions of violence, as so often, are clear in the language of these passages) results in distortion. Servius (on line 82) is precise and far more valuable than any modern commentator: "ingens phantasia."

The implications of these observations must await a larger context, but a few conclusions can be outlined in anticipation. Virgil knew full well that his examples of grafts were neither practiced by horticulturalists nor discussed in agricultural literature; he intended all to be recognized as impossibilities. Grafts and grafting are exemplary in the first didactic sections of Book II because they clearly illustrate the farmer's violence and subsequent distortion of the natural,<sup>11</sup>) to the extent that the impossible and unnatural is brought about -- as a poetic fiction, of course. Furthermore, and most important, Virgil's examples are in fact *adynata* of a type somewhat rare in poetry (botanical impossibilities -- to be discussed shortly), and as

10) See the important note by J.W. Mackail, "Virgil's Use of the Word *Ingens*," CR 26 (1912) 251-5; in his category "'Engendered,' sometimes tending to pass into the sense of 'native' or 'natural'," occur this and frequent other examples such as 2.65 *ingens fraxinus*, "the native ash;" 2.131 *ipsa ingens arbos*, which he calls "perplexing" but which clearly means the "native" tree of Media; 4.20 *ingens oleaster*, "a natural wild olive, with implied antithesis to the exotic palm with which it is coupled."

11) Cf., again, in the first section, lines 9-21 (*natura* in 9 and 20) with lines 22-34 (*usus* in 22).

such serve the same purpose as all *adynata*, to show a world inverted and out of joint (and hence the conclusion, the tree with fruit not its own): it is characteristic of Virgil in the *Georgics* to turn an artificial and poetic *topos* into a reality.

Virgil's grafting thus supports the understanding and emendation of Varro presented at the beginning. Though it is not impossible that apple and pear can be grafted with at least temporary success,<sup>12)</sup> Virgil would hardly have included what he considered a possible graft among six others clearly impossible; and since he had the text of Varro at hand, we can feel further confidence as to what that text said.<sup>13)</sup>

One final point remains. In Eclogue 8 Damon, just before announcing his suicide, concludes his song with a series of *adynata*:

nunc et ovis ultro fugiat lupus, aurea durae  
mala ferant quercus, narcisso floreat alnus,  
pinguia corticibus sudent electra myricae... (52-4)

12) R. Billiard, who knew horticulture, dismisses Virgil's other grafts as "imaginaires," but says of apple and pear, "l'alliance des genres *Pyrus* et *Malus*, tous deux de la famille des Rosacées, et si voisins que Linné n'en avait fait qu'un, le genre *Pyrus*, n'est peut-être pas impossible; en tous cas, je ne crois pas qu'on l'ait jamais réalisée" (*L'Agriculture dans l'Antiquité* [Paris 1928], 154). Prof. Davidson (above, n.6) kindly wrote me, "I would suspect that there would be a high possibility of success with apple on pear since this is grafting a pome fruit onto a pome fruit and you are within the Rosaceae family... However, in the family Rosaceae there are quite a few different degrees of graft success between genera." The generic relationship of *Malus* and *Pyrus* has been the subject of constant and continuing revision, so that Pease's statement (p. 66) that grafting is limited in modern practice to trees of the same species or "of the same genus (for example, pear and apple, both species of the genus *Pyrus*)" appears to be questionable. (Pease, I must add, translates (p. 67) Varro's sentence "For the oak does not admit [a graft of] the pear, even though the apple does admit the pear" and gives no indication of hesitation concerning either the botany or Latinity involved.)

13) B. Weiden has called my attention to Prop. 4.2.17-18, *insitor hic soluit pomosa vota corona, / cum pirus invito stipite mala tulit*, a couplet characteristic of Propertius: he is aware of the significance of the apple/pear graft, has called attention to it with the attribute *invito*, but is somewhat late in his reaction.

Oaks bearing apples are an impossibility. These lines are clearly modeled on Daphnis' final words before his suicide in Theocritus (1.132-4), "You brambles and thorns, bear violets; let the beautiful narcissus flower on the juniper, let everything be upside down, let the pine bear pears..."<sup>14)</sup> Virgil retains Theocritus' narcissus, though he transfers it to the alder; but for Theocritus' pines bearing pears, he has substituted oaks (*quercus*, metrically equivalent to the *pinus* he might have used) bearing apples. Gow lists instances of "impossibilities illustrated from the vegetable kingdom as here," giving only three other passages besides Virgil's, none of which are significant.<sup>15)</sup>

Virgil's alteration of his model may have been simply for variation, and oaks and apples may simply have occurred to him for no particular reason, but to me it seems far more likely, because far more characteristic, that he had in mind Varro 1.40.5 (itself, as we have seen, the first instance of the impossible graft of oak and pear).<sup>16)</sup> This suggestion of Varro in Eclogue 8 must remain tentative, but it does present a further consideration. Varro wrote his *De Re Rustica* in 37 B.C. (in his eightieth year, as he says in his introduction, 1.1.1).<sup>17)</sup> If Virgil read it immediately upon pub-

14) νῦν ἴα μὲν φορέοιτε βᾶτοι, φορέοιτε δ' ἄκανθαί, / ἃ δὲ κατὰ νάρκισσος ἐπ' ἀρκεθῶοισι κομάσαι, / πάντα δ' ἄναλλα γένοιτο, καὶ ἃ πίτυς ὄχνας ἐνεΐκαι...

15) *Commentary*, on line 133: the other three passages are Theognis 536 ("for roses and hyacinths do not grow from the squill"), Theocr. 5.125 ("let reeds bear fruit"), Ovid AA 1.747 ("tamarisks bearing fruit").

16) Neither Daphnis nor Damon, of course, are thinking of grafting. Virgil does have a characteristic variation here: Theocritus has pines bearing pears, Varro denies that an oak or an apple will bear pears, Virgil has oaks bearing apples.

17) The actual date of publication, so crucial here, cannot be precisely determined. 37 B.C., generally given in the handbooks and histories, is only the date of 1.1.1 (the dedication to his wife Fundania), in which Varro says he is in his eightieth year. (Varro's birth is given by Jerome as 116.) When he dedicated Book II to Turranius Niger, he mentioned that he had already written a book for Fundania (2 *Praef.* 6). It is possible then that Book I (the *de agricultura librum* of 2 *Praef.* 6) may have been written and may have circulated prior to 37, in which case its introduction as it now stands may have been written for the publica-

lication, would he have then immediately incorporated a suggestion from it into Damon's *adynata*? Or is it not more likely that the incorporation was made between 37 and 35, when he perhaps had begun to consider the possibility of a poem on farming?<sup>18)</sup>

University of Michigan

---

tion of the three books in or after 37; or, if we rely on 1.1.4, *quocirca scribam tibi tres libros...*, with its (though "dramatic"?) future tense, 37 must be the year of the composition of the entire work.

18) For the recent dating of the publication of the *Eclogues* to 35, see G.W. Bowersock, "A Date in the *Eighth Eclogue*," *HSCP* 75 (1971), 73-80; W.V. Clausen, "On the Date of the *First Eclogue*," *HSCP* 76 (1972), 201-5; E.A. Schmidt, *Zur Chronologie der Eklogen Vergils*, Sitzungsber. Heidelberg, Phil.-hist. Kl. 1974, 6.

## EIGHT HORATIAN 'BRIDGES'

MIROSLAV MARCOVICH

When Horace chooses to combine, in a single ode, two blocks of sense equal in length, he sometimes links them by an additional stanza placed in the middle: this central stanza I shall call 'bridge.'<sup>1)</sup> There seem to be eight clear instances of such a 'bridge' in the *Odes*: 1.2; 1.4; 1.16; 1.17; 2.14; 3.8; 3.14, and 4.7. I shall briefly examine here the functional role of 'the bridge' in the thought-structure of these odes.<sup>2)</sup>

## I. TWO POLITICAL ODES: 3.14 AND 1.2

3.14 *Herculis ritu modo dictus, o plebs*. The bipartite structure of the ode (stanzas 1-3 v. 5-7) becomes clear from the following elements. (1) Two different addressees: 1 *o, plebs*, v. 17 *puer* ('O people of Rome,' v. 'You, slave boy'). (2) Two different roles assumed by the poet: a *praeco* ('pub-

1) Eduard Fraenkel (*Horace*, Oxford 1957, 290) and Gordon Williams (*The Third Book of Horace's Odes*, Oxford 1969, 22f.; 93) were aware of the presence of such an 'intervening,' 'central stanza' securing 'a smooth transition,' while N.E. Collinge (*The Structure of Horace's Odes*, Oxford 1961, 99f.; 120) calls it a 'transition-passage,' 'lead-in' or 'overlap.' I think a 'bridge' is much more than that: see the conclusion.

2) Only the scholarship directly related to my topic will be referred to. The text is basically that of Friedrich Klingner (Teubner, 3rd ed., 1959). The knowledge of the standard running commentaries is presupposed, such as: Dionysius Lambinus (Lyons 1561 = Coblenz 1829); Richard Bentley (Cambridge 1711 = Berlin 1869); J.C. Orelli, revised by J.G. Baiter and W. Hirschfelder (4th ed., Berlin 1886); O. Keller and A. Holder (2nd ed., Leipzig 1899); Lucian Müller (2 vols., St. Petersburg and Leipzig 1900); A. Kiessling, revised by R. Heinze (10th ed., with an Appendix by Erich Burck, Berlin 1960); Karl Nummerger (*Horaz lyrische Gedichte*, Münster 1972); and especially R.G.M. Nisbet and Margaret Hubbard (*A Commentary on Horace: Odes, Book I*, Oxford 1970; *Book II*, 1978).



lic announcer') in part I: a private giver of a drinking-party, in part II. Accordingly, two different places of action: *forum Romanum*, in I: the poet's home, in II. (3) Two different sets of persons mentioned in the poem: (a) a god (Hercules), Augustus himself (likened to that god), his wife Livia, and his sister Octavia; (b) then mothers, wives, brothers, and sisters of the homecoming soldiers, in part I: (a) a *hetaera* (Neaera), and her hateful janitor; (b) persons from the turbulent past of Rome (the Marsians, Spartacus, and the consul Plancus), in part II.

Furthermore, (4) Two different poetic dictions. The solemn tone of an official triumph, comprising religious injunctions, in part I (the homecoming of a victorious commander in chief; sacrifices to the just gods; the rejoicing Livia and Octavia process; the suppliant garlands; every participant refrain from ill-omened words), is contrasted by usual symposiac terminology, in part II (ointment, garlands of flowers, a cask of old wine, the clear-voiced Neaera, her janitor, a spirit eager for disputes and quarrel). (5) Finally, and this is the most important point, the present security (24 B.C.), both public and private, as a consequence of the victory of Augustus, the new Hercules, benefactor of mankind (*Herculis ritu... Caesar... victor*), in part I, is clearly opposed to Civil and Slave wars from the recent past, in part II: the *bellum Marsicum* (91-89 B.C.); the War of Spartacus (73-71 B.C.), and especially Philippi (42 B.C.). The ode opens with the winners Hercules and Caesar (24 B.C.): it closes with the defeat at Philippi (28 *consule Planco*).

We may ask now which ones of these antithetic images and ideas are being bridged by the central stanza 4? I think, points (2), (4), and especially (5):

Hic dies vere mihi festus atras  
 eximet curas: ego nec tumultum  
 15        nec mori per vim metuam tenente  
               Caesare terras.

Point (2): 13 *mihi* and 14 *ego* mark the transition from the public 1 *o, plebs*, to the private 27 *ego*, explaining the two

roles played by the poet in the ode. Notice especially two different givers of orders, in 6 *prodeat* ('let Livia take part in the solemn procession') and 12 *parcite verbis* (= εὐφημεῖτε), as against 17 *i pete*; 21 *dic*, and 24 *abito*.

Point (4): 13 *hic dies... festus* bridges an official triumph (in I) with a private celebration (in II). Now point (5): the Adoniac 16 *Caesare terras* serves as a bridge between 3f. *Caesar... victor* and 28 *consule Planco*, stressing the present security from civil wars under the *pax Augusta*: 'I shall fear neither revolution nor death by violence as long as Caesar rules over the world.'

The 'bridge' reveals careful craftsmanship: notice, e.g., the alliteration of the *t* sound at the end of each line (eight of them), and the contrasting juxtaposition, 13 *festus atras*. For the political implication of these *atrae curae* compare 1.14.18 *curaque non levis*.

In conclusion, in addition to achieving structural unity of the poem, the 'bridge' enhances its *political* message: the year 24 B.C. is clearly opposed to the year 42 B.C. Thus, 13 *hic dies vere mihi festus* takes the ode from the genre of symposiac celebrations (such as *Odes* 3.8.9 *hic dies... festus*) to the category of political poems, such as 1.37.1 *Nunc est bibendum*, or Epode 9.<sup>3)</sup>

\*

*Odes* 1.2 *Iam satis terris nivis atque dirae*. Again, the bipartite structure of the ode seems to be clear enough. The grim image of part I (stanzas 1-6) -- ill-omened bad weather, Tiber floods the city, the fear of another Age of Flood, the real possibility of an Italy depopulated through many civil wars (24 *rara iuventus*) -- is being contrasted by the epiphany of a Savior of the state, in part II (stanzas 8-13), such as Apollo, or Venus, or Mars, or even better Mercury disguised as Augustus.

In part I we learn that Rome and Italy have been punished long enough (1 *iam satis*: by January of 27 B.C.?) by Jupiter (*terris... dirae grandinis misit pater et... terruit Urbem, terruit*

3) On *Odes* 3.14 compare Udo W. Scholz, *Wiener Stud.* 84 (1971) 123-137.

*gentis...*; on the agglomeration of the *r* sound see Kiessling-Heinze). 'We already have experienced (13 *vidimus*) the avenging flood of Tiber: we may as well experience depopulation of Italy, and our scarce posterity will blame only us (21 *audiet... audiet pugnas vitio parentum rara iuventus*).

In part II, however, the verbs are invoking the παρουσία of a divine Savior ('O come and stay with us'), as in a κλητικὸς ὕμνος: 30 *tandem venias precamur*; 45ff. *serus in caelum redeas diuque laetus intersis populo... neve te... ocior aura tollat*. This advent is capped by the anaphora in the *peroratio* (stanza 13): *hic... hic* (i.e., 42 *in terris*, as opposed to 45 *in caelum*).<sup>4)</sup>

In brief, the opening phrase, *Iam satis* -- which reveals 'the language of prayer' (Nisbet-Hubbard) -- finds a logical hymnic sequel in part II (*tandem venias* and *serus in caelum redeas*). The Savior Mercury-Augustus will avenge the murder of Julius Caesar (44 *Caesaris ultor*) and the ensuing civil war; he will also take vengeance on the Parthians (51 *neu sinas Medos equitare inultos*): both revenges are required in stanza 6 of part I (*civis... Persae... pugnas vitio parentum*). Finally, the catalogue of part II (Apollo, Venus, Mars, Mercury) contrasts that of part I (Pyrrha, Proteus, Tiber, Ilia, all of them being of a lower rank). So much for the bipartite structure of the ode.

What is now the role of the 'bridge' (25-30)? Formally, it consists of three questions, rhetorically arranged in a *tricolon polyptoton*: *quem vocet... populus? prece qua fatigent... virgines? cui dabit... Iuppiter?*<sup>5)</sup>

25 Quem vocet divum populus ruentis  
imperi rebus? prece qua fatigent  
virgines sanctae minus audientem  
carmina Vestam?

4) Compare *Odes* 3.5.2f. *praesens divus habebitur / Augustus; Serm.* 2.3.68 *praesens Mercurius*, and Karl Keyssner, *Gottesvorstellung und Lebensauffassung im griech. Hymnus* (Würzburger Studien zur Altertumswiss. 2, Stuttgart 1932), 103.

5) For such a series of questions compare *Odes* 1.12.1ff. (inspired by Pindar *Ol.* 2.2), *Quem virum aut heroa?...quem deum?...cuius...nomen? ... quid prius dicam?; 2.7.23ff. quis?...quem?*

cui dabit partis scelus expiandi

30 Iuppiter?

Now question 2 looks back, to part I. *Prece qua fatigent virgines sanctae... Vestam* is a bridge to 15 *ire deiectum... templaque Vestae*, implying: 'The traditional prayers (*carmina*, as opposed to new *preces*) are not able to appease Vesta: so huge was the crime.' I think (*contra* Nisbet-Hubbard) that 29 *scelus* refers to both Caesar's murder and the ensuing civil war ('*et necem Caesaris et bella domestica inde orta*,' Orelli).

Much more functional are, however, questions 1 and 3, which look forward, to part II. They complement each other: *Quem vocet divum populus? ≈ Cui dabit partis... Iuppiter?* Evidently, the prayer of the Roman people (*quem deorum vocet*) coincides with the decision of Jupiter (*cui deorum dabit*). Horace prays for the advent of Mercury, and Jupiter sends down Mercury: the exactor of the *expiatio sceleris* and the Savior of the *ruens imperium* will be the heaven-sent Mercury in the shape of Octavian, as both 44 *Caesaris ultor* and 50 *pater atque princeps*.

At the same time, questions 1 and 3 directly lead to the hymnic πολυωνυμία of a divinity (τίνα σε χρῆ προσεῖπεῖν; πότερον... ἦ... ἦ...;),<sup>6)</sup> which is verbatim expressed in part II: Apollo or Venus or Mars or rather Mercury.

In brief, the key words of the 'bridge' -- *scelus*, *ruens imperium*, and above all a Savior (*cui dabit*) sent by Jupiter -- serve as a strong functional connection between part I (2ff. *pater terruit Urbem, terruit gentis*;<sup>7)</sup> 21ff. *civis* [sc. *contra civis*]... *pugnas vitio parentum*) and part II (44 *Caesaris ultor*; 47 *nostris vitiis*; 50 *pater atque princeps... Caesar*). Jupiter (2 and 30) is the agent of the παρουσία of the Savior Mercury-Octavian on earth (41-52). *Pater* Jupiter in stanza 1 ends with *Caesar pater* in stanza 13, and the 'bridge' plays a pivotal role. (*Aliter* H. Womble, *A.J.P.* 91 [1970] 1-30, esp. 9f.)

6) See Keyssner 46f., and Fraenkel 247 n.1.

7) But the excessive avenging action of the god Tiber could not find the approval of Jupiter: 19 *Iove non probante*.

II. FOUR *CARPE DIEM* ODES:  
2.14 AND 3.8; 1.4 AND 4.7

*Odes* 2.14 *Eheu fugaces, Postume, Postume*. The opening word *Eheu* gives the tone of 'doom' to the entire ode: it is enhanced by the emotional (and rare) anaphora, *Postume, Postume*.<sup>8)</sup> Each stanza is carefully built upon a *tricolon*, but the point is that the gloomy atmosphere of the inevitability of death persists throughout the poem. Here is how it works.

Stanza		<i>Tricolon</i>		<i>Pulvis et umbra sumus</i>
1	fugaces	labuntur	nec...moram	Eheu
	rugae	senecta	mors	indomita mors
2-3	Geryon	Tityos	omnes (mor- tales)	non inlacrimabilis Pluto tristis unda enaviganda
'Bridge' 4	Mars	Hadria	Auster	frustra... frustra
	cruentus	raucus	nocens	
5	Cocytos	Danai	Sisyphus	visendus
		genus		
	ater	infame	damnatus	
6	tellus	domus	uxor	linquenda invisae cupressi brevis dominus
7	Caecuba	merum	(vinum)	absumet... tinguet
	servata	superbum	potius	

The moral of the poem does not become clear until we reach the word 25 *dignior*, in the final stanza: 'Your heir is worthier of the old good wine than you are (*heres... dignior*), for the simple reason that he will *not* keep the wine behind one hundred locks (26 *servata centum clavibus*), as you do, but will enjoy it himself (25 *absumet heres Caecuba dignior*).' That was well put by Lambinus (1561): '*Dignior te, quia utetur, fruetur, cum tu parcas, ut sacris.*' The implication is clear enough:

8) Compare *Odes* 3.3.18; Herodas 10.2, and Nisbet-Hubbard, II, 227.

'Your heir proves to be a 'wise man,' for he knows that he is on earth but a *brevis dominus*, while you yourself prove to be a fool: why don't you adopt the same *Carpe diem* philosophy?' In brief, the appearance of the traditional 'prodigal heir'<sup>9)</sup> in the final stanza puts the ode in the *Carpe diem* genre. Compare *Serm.* 2.3.122f.

Filius aut etiam haec libertus ut ebibat heres,  
dis inimice senex, custodis? ne tibi desit?

and *Odes* 2.3.17-20; 3.24.61f.; 4.7.19.

Now, the central stanza 4 forcefully bridges both halves of the poem:

Frustra cruento Marte carebimus  
Fractisque rauci fluctibus Hadriae,  
15 frustra per autumnos nocentem  
corporibus metuemus Austrum.

(1) It sums up the idea of inevitability of death expressed in part I (*Eheu fugaces... nec... non*) by introducing yet another anaphora, *frustra... frustra*, to match that of line 1, *Postume, Postume*, and by producing an impressive παρήχησις through agglomeration of the *f* and *r* sounds.

(2) Furthermore, the 'bridge' uses the same tenses of 'futility and necessity' as do both parts of the poem: 2 *nec pietas moram... adferet*; 11 *enaviganda*; 13 *frustra... carebimus: frustra... metuemus*; 17 *visendus*; 21 *linquenda*; 22ff. *neque... te... sequetur*; 25ff. *absumet... tinguet*. Notice that most of these words are placed either at the beginning or at the end of a line.

(3) Finally, by stressing the futility of the efforts of an 'unwise man' to take every precaution against death ('one avoids war, avoids sea-voyage, avoids winter: all to no avail'), the 'bridge' directly leads to the *Carpe diem* way of life suggested in part II by 25 *absumet heres... dignior*. The stanza then seems to say much the same as *Odes* 2.3.1 *Aequam memento... servare mentem*; and the reasons adduced there are the same in nature as the reason in our ode: 2.3.4 *moriture Delli,*

9) Compare Nisbet-Hubbard, II, 237f.

seu... seu; 25 *omnes eodem cogimur, omnium...* (where 28 *cumba* matches 8 *tristis unda* and 17 *ater Cocytos* of our ode); finally, 2.3.17ff. *cedes... cedes et... divitiis potiatur heres.*

\*

*Odes* 3.8 *Martiis caelebs quid agam Kalendis*. Part I (stanzas 1-3) explains why a bachelor like Horace is celebrating the *Matronalia*, by giving a feast (6 *dulcis epulas*) and a drinking-party. Part II (stanzas 5-7) exhorts Maecenas to 'put aside political worries about Rome,' to enjoy the gifts of the present drinking-party, and (by implication), to enjoy the gifts of *any* present hour. (For such an interpretation of line 27, *dona praesentis cape laetus horae*, see IV. *Appendix*.)

This is an elliptical poem of 'insinuation.' Accordingly, the functional role of the 'bridge' (stanza 4) is rather elusive:

Sume, Maecenas, cyathos amici  
sospitis centum et vigiles lucernas  
15   perfer in lucem: procul omnis esto  
          clamor et ira.

(1) Maecenas is present at the drinking-party throughout the poem, but the reader is certain about this only when he reaches the 'bridge:' 13 *sume, Maecenas*, links 3ff. *miraris... docte* (of part I) to the verbs in the second person singular of part II.

(2) The explicitly symposiac character and language of the 'bridge' is of importance for the unity of the poem. In part I a puzzle has been asked (*quid agam... quid velint... miraris*) and convincingly answered (*voveram... hic dies anno redeunte festus*). As a consequence, bottle of a very old wine has been opened (in stanza 3). Now, the exhortation expressed in the 'bridge,' *sume, Maecenas*, and *perfer in lucem*, is a logical sequel of the fact that the *amphora* has been opened (in the previous stanza). But, at the same time, this exhortation directly leads to the rest of the imperatives throughout part II: 17 *mitte... curas*; 26 *parce... nimium cavere*; 27 *dona... cape laetus*; 28 *linque severa*.

In addition, the traditional symposiac exaggeration -- 13

*sume... cyathos... centum* and *perfer in lucem* -- emphasizes the importance of the occasion, expressed by another exaggeration, *prope funeratus arboris ictu*, in part I. Hence also the presence of *amici sospitis* in the 'bridge:' it contrasts this *prope funeratus*.

(3) Furthermore, the subject of part I is Horace (*1 quid agam; 6 voveram... prope funeratus; 9 hic dies [sc. mihi] festus*). The subject of part II is Maecenas. The 'bridge' forms a transition from Horace (*amici sospitis*) to *Maecenas*.

(4) Finally, the traditional symposiac injunction against  $\beta\omicron\eta$  and  $\nu\epsilon\iota\kappa\omicron\varsigma$  at a sacred drinking-party dedicated to Bacchus (*procul omnis esto clamor et ira*)<sup>10)</sup> may well play a special part in the poem. 'Let all shouting and anger stay far away!' seems to lead to the peaceful happiness and freedom from anxiety which perspire throughout part II: 17 *mitte... curas; 26 parce... nimium cavere; 27 cape laetus; 28 linque severa*.

\*

*Odes* 1.4 *Solvitur acris hiems* and 4.7 *Diffugere nives* have a common theme (so already Lambinus).<sup>11)</sup> In part I (stanzas 1-2) of the former ode we learn that the life-bringing Spring is back again: a joy for men (sailor, shepherd, ploughman), a joy for gods (Venus, Vulcanus, Graces and Nymphs). As a contrast, in part II (stanzas 4-5) we are suddenly reminded that Death comes to all, and comes sooner than we expect her.

In part I, Venus uses her feet to beat the ground while dancing (*alterno terram quatunt pede*): in part II, Death uses her feet to kick house-doors. This gloomy alliteration, 13f. *pallida Mors aequo pulsat pede pauperum tabernas regumque turris* (reminding us of the inevitable *Odes* 3.2.32 *pede Poena claudo*), contrasts the playful one with which the ode opens: *Solvitur... vice veris et Favoni*.<sup>12)</sup> Finally, Death is described by

10) For the force of such injunctions compare M. Marcovich, 'Xenophanes on Drinking-Parties and Olympic Games,' *Illinois Classical Studies* 3 (1978), 1-26, esp. 11.

11) Compare Fraenkel 419-21, and Nisbet-Hubbard, I, 60f.

12) Compare Jules Marouzeau, 'Horace artiste des sons,' *Mnemosyne*,



another tricolon (16f. *nox, Manes, domus... Plutonia*), contrasting two already mentioned tricolons of part I.

The conclusion of the poem was to expect: 'O prosperous and fortunate Sestius, both (18f. *nec... nec*) enjoy the symposia and admire the young handsome boy Lycidas while you can, i.e., *carpe diem*.' Incidentally, after a display of the *carpe diem* paraphernalia, the ode closes with a rather frivolous detail, about the *tener Lycidas*. So do the odes 1.9; 1.17; 2.12; 3.14. This must have been an Alexandrian device. Apparently, Fraenkel (291) was not happy with such a *specimen doctrinae* in the political ode 3.14, while adding: "A critic who voices such misgivings is sure to be denounced as completely devoid of sense of humour. I am not afraid of that." Evidently, we are not dealing here with 'a sense of humor,' but rather with a Hellenistic refinement, a special sensitivity for picturesque details.

How does the 'bridge' (stanza 3) fit into this antithesis?

Nunc decet aut viridi nitidum caput impedire myrto  
 10           aut flore, terrae quem ferunt solutae;  
 nunc et in umbrosis Fauno decet immolare lucis,  
           seu poscat agna sive malit haedo.

This carefully elaborated and balanced stanza shows a clear binary structure: *nunc decet... caput impedire* (followed by *aut... myrto, aut flore*) is matched by *nunc et... Fauno decet immolare* (followed by *seu poscat agna sive malit haedo*). Such a special attention dedicated to this central stanza may well be explained by its role of bridge. The stanza seems to have a double function.

(1) On the one hand, the anaphora *nunc... nunc* seems to echo the joyful one of the part I: *iam... iam*. (For the use of the anaphora *iam... iam* to announce the coming of something pleasant, compare *Odes* 4.12.1 *Iam veris comites... iam nec prata rigent nec fluvii strepunt...*; or *Carm. saec.* 53, 55, 57.) On the

---

II ser. 4 (1936) 85-94 = *Wege zu Horaz*, ed. Hans Oppermann (Darmstadt 1972) 62-73, esp. 63, and L.P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* (Cambridge 1946) 39f.

other hand, the same anaphora *nunc... nunc* seems to anticipate the *Carpe diem* message expressed in part II: 15 *vitae summa brevis* and 16 *iam te premet nox*, clearly implying 'all too soon.' For the hedonistic force of the *nunc... nunc* compare *Odes* 1.9.18ff., where *nunc... nunc* (i.e., *donec virenti canities abest / morosa*) expresses the same sentiment of *Carpe diem*.

(2) While 10 *terrae quem ferunt solutae* clearly resumes 4 *nec prata canis albicant pruinis*, of part I, the mention of a garland of myrtle or of flowers, and especially of a sacrifice to Faunus (i.e., a feast), seems to anticipate the symposiac atmosphere of part II: the election of a *magister bibendi* at the ensuing symposium (18 *nec regna vini sortiēre talis*), and the presence of a *puer delicatus* (19 *nec tenerum Lycidan*).

In brief, the 'bridge' seems to look forward to the final stanza. Even so, I must admit that the coming of the *pallida Mors*, at the beginning of part II, is rather abrupt. To solve this difficulty, W. Barr tried to explain the presence of the *pallida Mors* by seeing in the sentence of the 'bridge,' *in umbris Fauno decet immolare lucis*, a reference to the annual festival of the dead, the *dies parentales*, culminating in the *Feralia*.<sup>13)</sup> Then the presence of a chthonic Faunus in the 'bridge' would logically lead to the mentioning of Death in the next stanza.

One cannot be certain, however, that there is a reference to death, in the central stanza. If the joyful anaphora *nunc... nunc* really echoes the initial hilarious *iam... iam*, announcing the coming of Spring, then I find it difficult to take it to mean, 'on the one hand, a garland for us, on the other, a sacrifice to the dead.' In view of the evidence, *Odes* 3.18.1ff. *Faune, Nympharum fugientum amator*; 1.17.2; 2.17.28, I would rather think that Horace is offering Faunus a sacrifice of either a lamb or a kid, at the beginning of a new year, as a *fertility* god, a rural deity, the protector of flocks. For the possibility that Faunus here is playing the part of Priapus in Horace's Greek models -- and for other

13) *Class. Review*, N.S. 12 (1962) 5-11, esp. 9.

arguments against Barr's suggestion, -- see Nisbet-Hubbard (I, 60; 67).

\*

Ode 4.7 *Diffugere nives, redeunt iam gramina campis* is more sophisticated than 1.4, for it introduces an effective Hellenistic antithesis: that between *temporary* death in the ever-lasting Nature, and the *final* death of men. Already Lambinus had referred to the *Epitaphium Bionis* 99ff., and to Catullus 5.4ff. (*soles occidere et redire possunt: nobis cum semel occidit brevis lux, nox est perpetua una dormienda*).

Part I (stanzas 1-3): the spring is here again (lines 1-6). But not for long (7 *inmortalia ne speres*): for, the cycle of changes = deaths in Nature is interminable: Winter > Spring > Summer > Fall > Winter again, and so on (lines 7-12). Now comes the 'bridge' (stanza 4): There is, however, a *fundamental difference* between 'death' in Nature and the human death: the former is only a *temporary* one (13 *damna tamen... reparant*), the latter is *final*. Part II (stanzas 5-7): So, then, Torquatus, enjoy the present bliss while you can (stanza 5).

The 'bridge' is the bearer of the mentioned antithesis:

Damna tamen celeres reparant caelestia lunae:  
nos ubi decidimus

15 quo pius Aeneas, quo dives Tullus et Ancus,  
pulvis et umbra sumus.

(1) The Heraclitean and then Stoic equation of change of an element in Nature with its 'death' -- maybe best expressed by Lucretius 1.70f.:

nam quodcumque suis *mutatum* finibus exit  
continue hoc *mors* est illius quod fuit ante<sup>14)</sup>

-- is presupposed in lines 7-12. Compare especially 7 *inmortalia ne speres*; 9f. *ver proterit aestas, interitura simul*. And the eternal cycle of changes-deaths in Nature is succinctly and

14) Compare the testimonia ad Heraclitus Frr. 66 and 33 (36 and 60 Diels-Kranz) in M. Marcovich, *Eraclito: Frammenti* (Florence 1978; *Bibl. di Studi Sup.*, vol. 64), e.g., Philo *De aet. mundi* 109 τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ταῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολαῖς, τὸ παραδοξότατον, θνήσκειν δοκοῦντα ἀθανατίζονται δολιχεύοντα αἰεῖ...



Part II (stanzas 5-7) then logically follows: 'So restrain your temper (22 *conpescere mentem*): vengeful anger has before now ruined heroes and entire cities. I promise to recant you: now promise to give me your affection in return.'

The whole poem is written in a spirit of repentance and reconciliation: it opens with a compliment for the girl (it little matters whether it is Stesichorian in origin or not), and it closes with the hope of the girl's affection (26 *dum mihi / fias... amica / ... animumque reddas*). The reason is simple: the poet is really sorry for his libellous iambics against the girl (2 *criminosi... iambi*; 24 *celeris iambi*), which he promises to recant in a palinode to come (27f. *recantatis... / opprobriis*).

What is now the role of the 'bridge' (stanza 4)?

Fertur Prometheus addere principi

limo coactus particulam undique

15 desectam et insani leonis

vim stomacho adposuisse nostro.

(1) The key-word of the poem is 'anger' (especially 'vengeful anger,' as in the case of the girl, and of 17 Thyestes as well): 9 *tristes ut irae*; 17 *irae*; 24 *fervor*. Now the 'bridge' explains the origin of anger in man (τὸ αἷτιον). On the one hand, anger is a constituent part of our very nature (*vim stomacho adposuisse nostro*), a particle (μόριον) in the original matter (*princeps limus*), added to the body by our creator (*Prometheus*). That explains its presence in the girl (stanza 1), and the fact that the young poet himself was afflicted by the same passion (22ff. *me quoque pectoris / temptavit in dulci iuventa / fervor et in celeres iambos / misit furem*). This piece of physiology of anger, lurking in our stomach (hence *stomachari*) or boiling in our heart (*pectoris... fervor*), functionally looks in both directions: back to stanza 1, and forward to stanza 6.

(2) On the other hand, anger is not a welcome element in our body. Most probably, it was only out of scarcity of raw materials that Prometheus felt compelled to use this particle as well (*coactus*). What is more important, its origin is

not commendable: anger comes from the violent temper of a raving lion (*insani leonis / vis*). That is why the bestial anger drives us headlong into recklessness (9 *irae, quas neque Noricus / deterret ensis nec mare naufragum / nec saevus ignis nec tremendo / Iuppiter ipse ruens tumultu*) and even into total destruction (the picturesque stanza 5). Notice that these examples are placed by the poet around the central stanza.

The 'bridge' then shows understanding for the presence of anger in both the young girl (stanza 1) and the young poet (stanza 6). But, what is much more important, it also shows why the girl should restrain her temper (22 *conpesce mentem*) and put an end to her anger (2 *modum ponere*), no matter how well founded it may be: because (1) anger is only a *vis insani leonis*, unworthy of man; and (2) the poet is ready to recant. The 'bridge' proves to be the pivot of the entire poem.

\*

*Odes* 1.17 *Velox amoenum saepe Lucretilem* is more sophisticated than 1.16. The whole poem is actually a veiled *comparison*, implying: 'As I stand here, on my Sabine farm, under the protection of the gods, enjoying the heaven-sent bliss, so will you too, Tyndaris, should you decide to join me.' *Ut Faunus dique omnes hic me tuentur, sic te quoque hic tuebuntur*. This comparison becomes clear from the fact that Horace uses no less than six verbs in the *present* tense, referring to 'me and mine,' in the first half of the poem (lines 1-14: *mutat; defendit... capellis... meis; quaerunt; nec... metuunt; di me tuentur; dis pietas mea et musa cordi est*), leading to other six verbs, now in the *future* tense, referring to Tyndaris, in the second half of the ode (lines 14-28: *tibi copia manabit; vitabis; dices; duces; nec... confundet; nec metues*). And lest no doubt be left in the minds of the readers about the poet's intention, Horace places 8 *nec... metuunt* at the end of the second stanza, to face 24 *nec metues* at the end of the sixth stanza.<sup>15)</sup> This

15) This was pointed out by Klingner, *Philologus* 90 (1935) 292 = *Studien zu griech. u. röm. Literatur* (Zürich 1964) 317-21. For further analysis of *Odes* 1.17 compare Fraenkel 204ff.; Irene Troxler-Keller, *Die Dichterlandschaft des Horaz* (Heidelberg 1964) 108-18; Nisbet-Hubbard, I, 215ff.

proves that the central stanza ('the bridge') was meant by the poet to be the pivot of the poem.

The thought-structure of the ode seems to consist of five basic elements: 'The gods protect me *here* (i.e., at my Sabinum): so will they you too.' Now here is how these elements are distributed throughout the poem:

Stanza	<i>Di</i>	<i>me</i>	<i>hic</i>	<i>tuentur:</i>	<i>te quoque tuebuntur</i>
1	Faunus	capellis meis	Lucretilis	mutat; de- fendit	
2		olentis ux- ores mariti		impune quae- runt; nec me- tuunt	
3	fistula	haediliae	Usticae saxa	personuere	
4	<i>di... dis</i>	<i>me... mea</i>	<i>hic</i>	<i>tuentur; cordi est</i>	<i>tibi copia manabit benigno opulenta cornu</i>
5			<i>hic</i>		<i>vitabis aestus et fide Teia dices</i>
6			<i>hic</i>		<i>pocula duces; nec confundet proelia; nec metues protervum  Cyrum, ne iniciat manus et scindat coronam et vestem</i>

We see that only the central stanza 4 comprises *all five* basic elements of the poem: an ideal bridge:

*Di me tuentur, dis pietas mea  
et musa cordi est. hic tibi copia  
15 manabit ad plenum benigno  
  ruris honorum opulenta cornu.*

The 'bridge' then stresses three ideas. (1) The poet stands under special protection of the gods (for the anaphora *di... dis* compare *Odes* 3.6.5-7 *dis... di*; 4.2.13; 4.13.1; *Carm. saec.* 45f. *di... di*).<sup>16)</sup> He gives two reasons for that: his *pietas*, and his poetry. The former may be paralleled by *Odes* 2.17.28 (Faunus again), the latter by *Odes* 1.1.29f.; 3.4.

16) Compare Fraenkel 206, and Gebhard Huber, *Wortwiederholung in den Oden des Horaz* (Diss. Zurich 1970) 69.

17-28; 4.6.29f. Elsewhere Horace's *custos maximus* is Mercury (*Odes* 2.7.13f.; 2.17.29f.; *Serm.* 2.6.5 and 15), probably because he was born when Mercury was in the ascendant, hence being a *vir Mercurialis* (*Odes* 2.17.29f.).<sup>17)</sup>

(2) The poet's Sabinum is the only abode of bounty, bliss, security, peace, and happiness. For the anaphora *hic... hic... hic* compare *Odes* 1.2.49f.; 1.19.13; 3.26.6. It is pastoral in origin (compare Theocritus 11.42 and 45ff.; Vergil *Ecl.* 9.40-43; 10.42f.), as is the name of the girl, Tyndaris.<sup>18)</sup>

(3) While the anaphora *hic... hic... hic* (ἐντὶ... ἐντὶ of Theocritus) leads directly to the invitation extended to the girl (in part II), two other elements of the 'bridge' -- *musa* and *copia* -- masterly link both parts of the poem in a cogent unity. *Musa* echoes the divine pipe of Faunus, of part I (10 *utcumque dulci, Tyndari, fistula*), and anticipates the lyre of Anacreon (18 *fide Teia*), in part II. We cannot be certain about Faunus' pipe as having 'a particular appeal for Tyndaris' (in view of the word-order, 10 *dulci, Tyndari, fistula*), as Nisbet-Hubbard wanted it, for Tyndaris seems to be much more sophisticated with her poetry from Teos, dealing with Odysseus between Penelope and Circe (stanza 5). But the fact of musical affinity between Faunus, Horace, and Tyndaris remains.

As for the other element (*copia*), I need only quote Nisbet-Hubbard (I, 222): "here you will see plenty flowing to the full, rich with a horn that lavishes the glories of the fields.' The opulence of the pleonasm suits the scene of abundance that Horace is describing." To be sure, neither in part I nor in part II 'abundance' is literally mentioned. But it is easily implied. So that it seems safe enough to suggest that these pastoral *ruris honores* of the 'überleitende Strophe' (Kiessling) are here to bridge: (a) 1 *amoenus Lucretilis* and 11 *valles et Usticae cubantis / levia... saxa* with 17 *hic in reducta valle*; (b) 5 *impune tutum...*; 8 *nec viridis metuunt*

17) So Franz Boll, *Philologus* 69 (1910) 165f., and Nisbet-Hubbard, I, 127f.; II, 286; differently Kiessling-Heinze ad *Odes* 2.17.29; 1.10.

18) So Nisbet-Hubbard, I, 216; 221.



*colubras / nec Martialis... lupos* with 21 *innocentis pocula Lesbii... nec... confundet... proelia, nec metues protervum / ... Cyrum*, where the *protervus* *Cyrum*, facing *Martialis lupos*, elicits comparison: both behave in the same way (stanza 7). Finally, (c) 2 *igneam / defendit aestatem* with 17 *Caniculae / vitabis aestus* and 22 *sub umbra*. In brief, the pleonasm employed in the 'bridge' serves to sum up the pastoral bliss of the entire poem. What is more important, the 'bridge unites the poet with the girl (*me... mea... hic tibi*).

## IV. APPENDIX:

*DONA PRAESENTIS CAPE LAETUS HORAE (ODES 3.8.27)*

Could Horace -- or could he not -- try to sell his Epicurean *Carpe diem* view of life (compare Epicurus, *Epist.* 3.126 Ὁ δὲ σοφὸς... καὶ χρόνον οὐ τὸν μήκιστον ἀλλὰ τὸν ἥδιστον καρπίζεται) to such an important man as Maecenas? Gordon Williams seems to feel that he could not: "The 'philosophy' of drinking-parties is 'eat, drink, and be merry' and 'take no thought for the morrow;' basically it is a half-centred, self-interested view of life, a weak hedonism that only becomes strong when emphasis is put on death and the uncertainty of life. It simply would not do for Horace to urge this view of life on an important man like Maecenas for it would be to debase and ignore the importance of the great political issues in which he participated."<sup>19)</sup>

I would challenge this interpretation. I think Horace could -- and that indeed he did -- recommend his own view of life to his very close friend Maecenas, to whom he felt especially attached through 'Sternenfreundschaft' (συναστροφία,<sup>20)</sup> *Odes* 2.17.21 *utrumque nostrum incredibili modo / consentit astrum*, and to whom he dedicates *Epodes* 1; *Serm.* 1.1; *Odes* 1.1; *Epist.* 1.1. Let us compare *Odes* 3.8 with the much more complex 3.29.

19) G. Williams (above, note 1), 73.

20) Compare Franz Boll, 'Sternenfreundschaft: ein Horatianum,' *Zeitschrift f. Gymnasialwesen (Sokrates)* 1917, 1-10 = *Kleine Schriften zur Sternkunde des Altertums* (Leipzig 1950) 115-24 = *Wege zu Horaz*, ed. Hans Oppermann (Darmstadt 1972) 1-13.

3.29.25ff.

3.8.17ff.

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| <p>Tu civitatem quis deceat status<br/>curas et Urbi sollicitus times<br/>quid Seres et regnata Cyro<br/>(28) Bactra parent Tanaisque discors:<br/><br/>prudens futuri temporis exitum<br/>caliginosa nocte premit deus<br/>ridetque si mortalis ultra<br/>(32) fas trepidat. quod adest memento<br/><br/>componere aequus: cetera fluminis<br/>ritu feruntur...</p> | <p>Mitte civilis super Urbe curas:<br/>occidit Daci Cotisonis agmen,<br/>Medus infestus sibi luctuosis<br/>(20) dissidet armis,<br/><br/>servit Hispanae vetus hostis orae<br/>Cantaber sera domitus catena,<br/>iam Scythae laxo meditantur arcu<br/>(24) cedere campis.<br/><br/>neglegens ne qua populus laboret,<br/>parce privatus nimium cavere et<br/>dona praesentis cape laetus horae:<br/>(28) linque severa.</p> |
|--|---|
- (41)                            Ille potens sui  
laetusque deget, cui licet in diem  
dixisse 'Vixi:' cras vel atra  
(44) nube polum Pater occupato  
  
vel sole puro; non tamen irritum...

(1) Horace does not find fault with Maecenas' being actively and closely involved in the highest affairs of state; what he does object, however, is Maecenas' excessive political worries about Rome: 'god laughs if a mortal is *unduly anxious*' (3.29.31 *si mortalis ultra fas trepidat*); 'cease to be too anxious' (3.8.26 *parce... nimium cavere*). But the reasons why Maecenas' excessive worries are not justified, are different in each poem. In 3.8 they are: (a) Rome is in good shape now: no immediate danger is at sight (17-24, starting with the perfect tense, 18 *occidit*, 'has fallen,' ending with 22 *iam*). And (b), Maecenas holds no office of state (26 *privatus*): hence the presence of the strong word, 25 *neglegens*. In 3.29, however, there is one good philosophical reason: excessive worries of *any* mortal are unfounded, for the future is inscrutable -- 'god hides it in blackness of night' (30 *caliginosa nocte premit deus*).

(2) Both poems reach the same conclusion: 'Mind to make the best of the *present moment* with equanimity' (32f.); 'That man shall live as his own master and in happiness who can say *each day, I have lived*' (41ff.); 'Seize happily on the gifts of the *present hour*' (3.8.27). Now, when compared to

3.29.32 *quod adest memento componere aequus*; to 42 *laetusque deget, cui licet in diem dixisse 'vixi;* to 2.16.25f. *laetus in praesens animus quod ultra est / oderit curare*; finally, to 1.11.3 *ut melius, quidquid erit, pati,*<sup>21)</sup> our injunction -- *dona praesentis cape laetus horae* -- gains in force, becoming a philosophical precept. I think what Horace is saying to Maecenas is, 'Happily enjoy the gifts of any present hour: this one today, and any other *nunc... nunc* (1.9.18 and 21) of your life,' which is much the same as *Carpe diem, quam minimum credula postero* (1.11.8). I think Lambinus had correctly grasped the force of *dona praesentis cape laetus horae*, when writing (ad *Odes* 2.16.25): '*suaedet enim, ut in diem vivamus, ut Od. VIII. lib. 3. [v. 27]...*'

(3) For *Odes* 2.16.25 *laetus in praesens animus* etc. Kiessling had referred to the Epicurean philosophy in Cicero *De finibus* 1.62 *Sic enim ab Epicuro sapiens semper beatus inducitur... Neque enim tempus est ullum, quo non plus voluptatum habeat quam dolorum. Nam et praeterita grate meminit et praesentibus ita potitur, ut animadvertat, quanta sint ea quamque iucunda, neque pendet ex futuris, sed expectat illa, fruitur praesentibus.* I would like, however, to draw attention to the striking similarity between 3.29.32f. *quod adest memento / componere aequus* and the old Greek precept τὸ παρὸν εὔ θέσθαι. Plato, *Gorgias* 499 c 5, refers to it this way, κατὰ τὸν παλαιὸν λόγον "τὸ παρὸν εὔ ποιεῖν" (and Diogenes Laertius 1.77 attributes it to Pittacus in this form). The adage, 'Make the best of the present moment,' and 'Always be content and satisfied with your present situation' (ἀρέσκεισθαι καὶ ἀγαπᾶν τοῖς παροῦσι, Lucian *Mortuorum dial.* 8 [26]. 2) was very popular among the Cynics (Lucian *Necyom.* 21 τὸ παρὸν εὔ θέμενος).<sup>22)</sup> Marcus Aurelius refers to it (6.2); and Diogenes Laertius 2.66 reports about Aristippus of Cyrene: αἰεὶ τὸ προσπεσὸν εὔ διατιθέμενος. ἀπέλαυε μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς τῶν παρόντων, οὐκ ἐθήρα δὲ πόνω τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν τῶν οὐ παρόντων. I think there is only one small step from here to Epicurus and Horace's *quod adest compone aequus*.

21) On which compare Nisbet-Hubbard, I, 139; 141f.

22) See Rudolf Helm, *Lucian und Menipp* (Leipzig 1906) 37f.; 212.

In view of this evidence, I think Horace meant his categorical precepts for happiness -- *quod adest memento componere aequus; aequam memento... servare mentem* (2.3.1f., a clear example of the ἀταραξία-*aequanimitas*); *laetus in praesens animus; dona praesentis cape laetus horae; carpe diem* -- to be of universal value applying to everybody, Maecenas not being excluded: *contra* Williams' interpretation of *Odes* 3.29.29-34: "but the real point is that the poet's thoughts are moving over an awkward moment to a view of life that he can exemplify in himself, yet cannot really recommend with conviction to Maecenas" (p. 148). I think Horace *could* recommend with conviction the Epicurean way to happiness to his close friend Maecenas, and that he did.

#### V. CONCLUSION

Horatian 'bridge,' linking two blocks of sense equal in length, may be compared to the central section of a horse-shoe: it is the strongest part which keeps the whole structure together. Whatever its origin (ὄμφαλός of a Greek poem composed according to the rules of the Ringcomposition?), the 'bridge' achieves the unity of the thought-structure of the entire ode. It looks in both directions, backwards and forwards. The former it does by summing up the content of the first half of the poem; the latter, by slightly changing the subject. But in both cases the 'bridge' resumes the key-words, ideas or images of both parts.

As for the style and diction, the 'bridge' is elaborated and balanced (1.4) with special care and craftsmanship: an aetiological myth (1.16); a pregnant pleonastic ephrasis (1.17); a tricolon of questions arranged in a polyptoton (1.2); an effective maxim or slogan (4.7 *pulvis et umbra sumus*; 3.14 *tenente / Caesare terras*; 3.8 *procul omnis esto / clamor et ira*); a meaningful anaphora (1.17 *di me... dis mea... hic tibi*; 2.14 *frustra... frustra*; 1.4 *nunc... nunc*); an antithetic juxtaposition (3.14 *festus atras*); an alliteration (3.14; 2.14; 3.8), etc.

In the present paper, only the clearest cases of a

'bridge' have been briefly examined. Possible 'bridges' consisting of more than one stanza; those linking two sense-blocks of unequal length; 'responsive' odes with more than one bridge, etc., will be explored in another paper.

University of Illinois at Urbana

PROPERTIUS 2.18: "KEIN EINHEITLICHES GEDICHT. . ." <sup>1)</sup>

WILLIAM R. NETHERCUT

Elegy 2.18 is one of those poems in Propertius whose abrupt changes of thought have made it a favorite target for division. In fact, it is one of the two elegies in Book Two which have seemed sufficiently incoherent to merit a *triple* severance: Part "A" (verses 1-4), Part "B" (verses 5-22), and Part "C" (verses 23-38). <sup>2)</sup> Hetzel separated the first two couplets in 1876, taking them as a fragment of some other elegy which had wandered to its present position in the text; Rossberg followed him. <sup>3)</sup> Among more recent editors of Propertius, W.A. Camps, acknowledging that the thirty-eight lines of 2.18 do appear in the MSS as a continuous

1) The title is drawn from K. Rossberg, "Zu Kritik des Propertius" *Jahrb. klass. Phil.* 127 (1883), 71.

2) E.g. by H.E. Butler, *Propertius* (Loeb Classical Library, Harvard 1912) 112-117; H.E. Butler and E.A. Barber, *The Elegies of Propertius* (Oxford 1933), 51-52; E.A. Barber, *Sexti Properti Carmina* (Oxford 1957) 55-57; W.A. Camps, *Propertius: Elegies Book II* (Cambridge 1967) 35-36. Among translators, A.E. Watts, *The Poems of Sextus Propertius* (Chichester 1961) 71-72, and C. Carrier, *The Poems of Propertius* (Bloomington 1963) 84-86, follow this division. The "reconditioned text" and translation of S.G. Tremenheere, *The Elegies of Propertius* (London 1931), derives its approach from O.L. Richmond's version and scatters 2.18 in various directions: the first four verses, Part "A", are joined with elegy 2.25 to create a new composition, "Elegy 2.16" -- cf. p. 106; most of 2.18 follows another cutting from 2.25 to make another new piece, "Elegy 2.22", pp. 128-133; then several couplets are assigned elegies where they seem to share subject interest -- 2.18.21-22 and 37-38, on rumor, is given to elegy 2.5 (p. 72); 2.18.35-36, on Cynthia's bed (*lectus*) as *custodia*, belong in elegy 2.6 on the decline of morals in Rome (p. 78); and 2.18.33-34, in which Propertius compares himself to Cynthia's "brother" and "son," is included in elegy 2.7 -- the poem on Propertius' loyal union which Caesar's marriage law had threatened.

3) Rossberg (above, note 1), 71: "Vs. 1-4 sind ein irgend woher stammender Fetzen, der Rest das Bruchstück eines andern Gedichtes."

unit, yet argues that "Lines 1-4 appear . . . to be separate from what follows; and no cogent reason is apparent for attaching them . . . to the preceding elegy xvii."<sup>4)</sup> And the latest edition of the elegist, by L. Richardson, Jr., prints 2.18.1-4 at the conclusion of a new poem comprised of 2.22 "B" and elegy 2.17.<sup>5)</sup>

It has been proposed that we may consider joining 1-4 to the conclusion of 2.17, as "reflections provoked by his misfortunes."<sup>6)</sup> If we leave out of the question 2.22 "B", this reading of Propertius may merit appreciation on grounds of style: the structure of 2.17 (+ 18.1-4) is tight indeed. Propertius is exclaiming that he will only gain Cynthia's hostility if he complains at her; a woman is often "broken" (*frangitur*, 2.18.2) by the man who keeps silent when she does him wrong. The advice is not new: we remember it from 1.18.26, in which the poet asked whether Cynthia was angry at him because he had been complaining too much; the same idea is found in 2.14.19-20, where Propertius tells us that the best plan is to ignore the attractions your woman will feel for other men, and to scorn her unfeeling behavior toward you. If we do take *frangitur* ("she is broken") from the beginning of 2.18 (verse 2) and set it to round off 2.17, this verb will answer, three lines from the ending of our new elegy (= 2.17 + 2.18.1-4), *fractus* in 2.17.4, where it is Propertius who is "broken" by tossing himself from one side of his lonely bed to the other.<sup>7)</sup> There will also be a fram-

4) Camps (above, note 2), 138.

5) L. Richardson, Jr., *Propertius, Elegies I-IV* (Norman 1976) 76, 275-278.

6) Butler and Barber (above, note 2), 221. Cf. G. Luck, *Properz und Tibull, Liebeselegien* (Zürich 1964) 98-99. M. Rothstein, *Propertius Sextus, Elegien* (Berlin 1898) vol. 2, 347, set the first 22 verses of 2.18 together with 2.17 on the grounds that they shared the same argument; this was disputed by M. Ites, *De Properti Elegiis inter se conexas* (Diss. Göttingen 1908) 33-34, who felt that the beginning of 2.18 did not "square with" the end of 2.17 (*sed initium el. 18 non quadrat ad finem 17.*).

7) For additional instances of such "echoing," see P.J. Enk, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Liber Secundus* (Leiden 1962) vol. 2, 420-421, drawing on D.R. Shackleton-Bailey, in *Proc. Cam. Phil. Soc.* (1952-1953) 18.

ing of the elegy by *mentiri*, the first word of 2.17 which announces Cynthia's falsity in leading him on to believe that she would spend the night with him, and *nega!*, with which the new composition will finish: it is Cynthia's denial which occasions the poem, and, in characteristically Propertian fashion, a reversal will have switched negation to the poet's side at the end.

This is all very tidy, but we cannot be sure. Propertius often uses verbal repetitions, not only to frame, but to connect *separate* elegies: for example, *Amor* appears at the beginning of elegies 2.12 and 2.13. This is a typical Propertian device to insure the easy flow of his adventures.<sup>8)</sup>

Instead, I would follow the MSS and see, in 2.18, a single elegy unified by high irony. Propertius has just written (1-4) that if the lover sees his mistress do anything, he must deny having seen this, or if he feels hurt over

---

Also T.A. Suitts' review of Enk in *CP* 60 (1965), 38. Cf. now the dissertation by J.K. King, *Studies in Verbal Repetition in the Monobiblos of Propertius* (Boulder, Colorado, 1969), which is an exhaustive correlation of internal echoes within the individual elegies of Book One. See, too, A.G. Robson, "The Enfolding Couplets: Their Relation to the Problems of Propertius IV, 9, 71-74" *Mn* 26 (1973) 234-238.

8) In Book One, the *duro sidere* beneath which Propertius lives in 1.6 changes to the *dura domina* who rules his life in 1.7; 1.11 ends with *crimen amoris*, and 1.12 opens with a kind of pun at the end of the first two verses, *crimen ... moram* (Propertius' delay in Rome is as much a reproach as Baiae itself); in 1.14 Propertius -- no Odysseus -- bids a long farewell to the riches of any Alcinous, while in 1.15 he suddenly becomes Odysseus to complain that Cynthia will not weep after him as Calypso did for Ulysses! *Desertus* appears at the start of 1.17, picking up the isolation Propertius endures as *exclusus amator* in 1.16, and *desertus* is stated again both at the beginning and end of the next poem, 1.18, while *vacent* at the conclusion of 1.18 is recapitulated by *vacet* close to the beginning of 1.19, and continued by *vacuo* in 1.20.2 (*amor* at the end of 1.19 goes to *amore* in 1.20.1); Gallus in 1.20 is succeeded by another Gallus in 1.21; and so on. Such a brief survey establishes the kind of continuity which is able to be documented fully for Book Two. For one example: at 2.10, where Lachmann thought a new book should begin (see now O.Skutsch, *HSCP* 79, 1975, 229-233; J.P. Sullivan, *Propertius*, Cambridge 1976, 7; M. Hubbard, *Propertius*, London 1974, 40 and 44), *Haemonio equo* in line 2 relates most closely to the *Thebani duces* at the end of 2.9, but can also include allusion to the "Haemonian hero," Achilles, to whom Propertius compares himself in 2.8-9. Moving forward, 2.10 ends by disavowing Propertius' ability *laudis conscendere carmen*, while in 2.11 he also refuses to praise Cynthia, whom he despises (*laudet, qui sterili ...*).



anything, he ought to deny that too. "If you see anything . . .," "If anything hurts . . .," both have the words *si quid* (3-4); now, at verse 5, where editors start a new elegy, -- Part "B" --, Propertius reverses *si quid* ("if anything") to *Quid si* ("But WHAT would you do IF my span of years were whitely evident?!"). The "Preceptor of Love" has no sooner counselled us to bear all in loyal silence, than he begins a long and witty harangue, complaining as loudly as any lover could!<sup>9)</sup> The Dawn, Aurora, married Tithonus: obtaining for him immortal life, she neglected to request, too, immortal youth. And so he shrivelled up, grew incredibly aged, and never could die. Propertius says that Aurora still cradles old Tithonus in her arms; in fact, she is in such a hurry to embrace him that she puts this delight ahead of her horses' comfort, when she returns home in the afternoon.<sup>10)</sup> But Cynthia, while Propertius is vital and good-looking, shuns him even now!

Even those editors who have been inclined to keep 1-4 and 5-22 together mark a division before 23-38.<sup>11)</sup> The final couplet of "B",

9) P.J. Enk (above, note 7), 253-254: "Interpretemur elegiam *psychologicè* rogantes, quo animo fuerit Propertius, cum carmen nostrum scriberet. Ut in elegia 17, poeta iratus tristisque est. Sed ipse se erigit, non iam queri vult, nam assidue querelae odium pariunt, puellisque displicent: 'fortasse si tacebo', inquit, 'miserebitur mei et frangetur. Nonne omnes semper in ore habent illud: si quid vidisti, nega te vidisse; cela dolorem?' Sed dum sibi ea verba repetit, sentit se tacere non posse; indignatio eius nimia fit et erumpit in haec verba irata: 'Quid faceres, si senescerem? Odisti me, quamquam iuvenis sum'."

10) It is perhaps fanciful, but pleasant, to note, in this connection, the inversion of *quam prius* in 2.18.10:

"Illum saepe suis decedens fovit in ulnis  
quam prius abiunctos sedula lavit equos."

*Prius abiunctos*, postponed, shows where her priorities might have lain.

11) C. Lachmann, *Sex. Aurelii Propertii Carmina* (Leipzig 1816) 164-168; C. Hosius, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Libri IV* (Leipzig 1911) 53-55; M. Rothstein, *Propertius, Sextus. Elegien* (Zürich 1966<sup>3</sup>) vol. 1, 326-332; F. Dornseiff and M. Schuster, *Sex. Propertii Elegiarum Libri IV* (Leipzig 1954) 58-60; P.J. Enk (above, note 7) vol. 1, 95-97, and vol. 2, 253-262; E.V. d'Arbela, *Properzio. Elegie* (Milan 1965) vol. 2, 149-155; G. Luck (above, note 6), 100-101. Cf., too, the translation of J. Warden, *The Poems of Propertius* (New York 1972) 89-91.

"Quin ego diminuo curam, quod saepe Cupido  
 huic malus esse solet, cui bonus ante fuit"  
 (2.18.21-22)

has been judged a trite commonplace which ill accords with the apparent passion of the foregoing verses (Scaliger transposed it to follow 1-4) and also seems to have nothing to do with what now ensues. On both accounts -- that it is "weak" where it comes, and that it does not lead into the subsequent part of the elegy -- a new look may be taken.

Lachmann justified 21-22 in position as an appropriate conclusion for 5-20, citing Corydon's final words in Bucolic 2 (*invenies alium, si te hic fastidit, Alexim*), as well as the sentiment of Asclepiades of Samos, Epigram 11 (= *Anth. Pal.* 12. 153):

Πρόσθε μοι Ἀρχεάδης ἐθλίβετο· νῦν δὲ τάλαιναν  
 οὐδ' ὅσον παίζων ἐς ἔμ' ἐπιστρέφεται.  
 Οὐδ' ὁ μελιχρὸς Ἔρως αἰεὶ γλυκὺς· ἀλλ' ἀνιήσας  
 πολλάκις ἡδίων γίνετ' ἔρῳσι θεός.

Lachmann comments: "Nihil erit diversitatis, si . . . scribamus 'Huic **BONUS** esse solet, cui **MALUS** ante fuit.'"<sup>12)</sup>

Not only may it be possible to say that the last couplet of Part "B" ties off this section of the poem in a satisfactory manner (if we envision, in what seems a characteristic distancing by Propertius, the "passionate" lover suddenly lifting himself off out of the welter of his feelings to offer a "philosophic" *sententia*), but Lachmann's formulation serves to point up the way in which "B" proceeds into "C" (2.18.23-38). Lachmann's comment, quoted above, emphasizes for us that Propertius, instead of writing what we find there, in fact placed **MALUS**, not *bonus*, at the beginning of 2.18.22, occupying the present. In line 22, Propertius is thinking about his world as it *now* stands in disarray. Corydon and the Greek girl can look to a better day.<sup>13)</sup> For

12) Lachmann (above, note 11), 165.

13) We may also compare, in a different context, Horace C. 2.10.17-20:

Propertius, there is no future, no look ahead: where he finds himself now, it is implied, is all there is.

That Propertius makes his present misfortunes the end toward which Cupid has been aiming on earlier, happier occasions, smooths the way for *Nunc*, which brings out into the open, at the start of Part "C", what is implicit at the end of "B". Propertius has contrasted what he once was, a happy lover, with what he is *now*, unhappy: this is contained at the end of "B". And NOW (*Nunc*) to *add* to his unhappiness (*etiam* = "also, too, moreover"), Cynthia has laid at his door an additional aggravation, turning herself into a monstrosity!

*"Nunc etiam infectos demens imitare Britannos,  
ludis et externo tincta nitore caput?"*

(2.18.23-24)

The falsity of her contrived appearance is as much a breach of her loyalty to Propertius as her refusal to let him visit her for ten days, in elegy 2.17: the same words which began that poem, *mentiri* and *infectas*, are repeated rather closely together in 2.18 "C", where Cynthia now is eager to imitate the "dyed" or "stained" Britons (*infectos Britannos*, 23) and can consequently look forward to punishment in the afterlife for "falsifying" her hair (*mentita comas*, 28).

In brief: elegy 2.18 is effective as a unified poem:

(1) the interpretation of P.J. Enk, that Propertius' "good advice" at the start of 2.18 is immediately undercut by his lack of will-power to persist in silence, is strengthened by the reversal of *si quid* to *Quid si*; (2) the words *nunc etiam* can be tied, at the beginning of Part "C", to the temporal premise inherent in Propertius' words at the last of "B"; (3) the expostulatory tone which breaks into the elegy at verse 5 (the start of "B") is renewed at the first verse of "C" (line 23) -- in other words, there is a *double rhythm* to

---

"Non, si male nunc, et olim  
sic erit: quondam cithara tacentem  
suscitat Musam neque semper arcum  
tendit Apollo."

Horace resembles the parallels adduced by Lachmann, in looking ahead for happier times to come. Therefore, if he resembles Propertius in assigning *male* to the present, he is quite different.

2.18: advice and outburst, and, after an attempt to dampen the passion of his censure by a semi-philosophical pose, renewed outburst. The experience of 2.18 runs smoothly, and with abundant humor, from Propertius' original instructions about keeping silence even while in pain, through two sections of resounding irritation! It would be witty enough for the poet to have undercut himself as he does in leaping, after 2.18.1-4, into 5-22; the quasi-philosophic distancing in 21-22, just preceding a further immersion in agony, compounds our enjoyment. (4) It is not precise, but perhaps suggestive, to recall that in an elegy close to 2.18, Propertius employs just such a double rhythm: elegy 2.14 opposes Propertius' sense of triumph, upon his return, after a long period of rejection, into Cynthia's arms (2.14.1-10), against his erstwhile misery apart from her (2.14.11-14); he then repeats this movement from triumph, to doubt and insecurity, in lines 19-28 and 29-32, respectively.<sup>14)</sup>

If we grant that elegy 2.14 does repeat its essential contrast, albeit in a more brief form, even as 2.18 does what it wants to do not only once, but a second time, the author's conception of the latter poem may seem less novel. At the same time, however, it is important to admit that, because of its more lengthy development of seemingly unrelated portions, 2.18 needs to be studied in a way quite distinct from 2.14. I shall propose that the surprise we feel when we understand that Propertius has not finished with his philosophic commonplace in 2.18.21-22,<sup>15)</sup> but

14) N. Tadic-Gilloteaux, "À la Recherche de la Personnalité de Propertius" *Latomus* 24 (1965), 238-273, schematizes 2.14 as A - B - A - B. This is accurate as a representation of the shifting mood of the elegy, but for a closer structural analysis, cf. J. Vaio, "The Authenticity and Relevance of Propertius II, 14. 29-32" *CP* 57 (1962) 236-238.

15) If we really think that 2.18.23ff. (= "C") are a new elegy, we shall have to end 1-22 with an erotic commonplace, which, now that we have perceived the extreme originality and interest of the leap from 1-4 into 5-20 (and now that we reflect, also, upon the freshness of Propertius' handling of the Aurora-Tithonus relationship), will indeed be commonplace. One will feel all the greater sympathy for Scaliger's impatience with 21-22 as an ending, though his dissatisfaction was at least partially countered by Lachmann's citation of Corydon at the end

rather intends to carry us on into another development ("C"), is appropriate to the position this elegy maintains within the second book of Propertius.

Elegy 2.18 continues the train of thought -- the lover's despair -- worked into 2.17 and 2.16: it fits, where we find it. Elegies 2.16-18 all have to do with Cynthia's falsehood: the first warns her that Jupiter will destroy the perjured lover who takes another to her arms; the second tells us that she promised to meet Propertius, but has lied; the third, that she has falsified her looks. Then, in 2.19, we suddenly find her all purity and innocence visiting on a farm. The departure from Rome in Book Two is meant to vary the circumstances of 1.11-12: in Book One, Cynthia left Propertius and Rome for Baiae, hotbed of iniquity. In Book Two, Propertius reworks the material of the *Monobiblos* through the first half of his book; then he reverses positions, with Cynthia exemplifying *fides* while Propertius goes out on the town (in 2.22). The start of this new development may be seen to commence with the intriguing recasting, in 2.19, of the situation in 1.11-12. All of this is set in motion by 2.18 "C", which, in its juxtaposition of elegies 1.2 and 1.11, prepares the reader to have fresh in mind the events of Book One and to appreciate with all the more interest just how Propertius is now going on to work out something very new and different.<sup>16)</sup>

---

of Bucolic 2. Instead of thinking that 21-22 are an end to anything, we should view them as a point, within the whole of 2.18, which, like the beginning lines, 1-4, set out a reflection -- perhaps in calmer tone -- that will provide the occasion for a long expostulation.

16) 2.18.23-32 echo elegy 1.2; 2.18.33-34 recapitulate 1.11.23-24. M. Ites (above, note 6), 32-36, is worth re-reading on the development of Book Two in this central portion of the volume. 2.16-19 belong together as a complement to 2.12-15: the first poems celebrate abiding love; this second set shows love's deterioration. "Orditur narratio a praetoris adventu, et Cynthiae discessu finitur in el. 19. Tria carmina quae nihil fere praeter querimonias perfidiae continent, illis includuntur. El.19 autem non hunc modo cyclum concludit, sed totius libri terminum quendam efficit . . ." (p. 34). "*Sic totum amoris cursum his ell. 1-19 conspiciamus ut in libro primo; et hic quoque conficitur concordia quadam et reconciliatione in el. 19, ut el. 19 libri I.*" (p. 36). The words I have italicized underline my own approach to the unity of Book Two, as stated below.

In a general way, Book Two may be read as two "cycles" which reach from 2.2-15, and then from 2.16-28(29?). In the first, Propertius works with the same idea he developed in Book One -- the progressive alienation of Propertius from Cynthia. As in Book One, the lovers start out quite close, then move apart with a more painful and violent tone predominating in 2.8-9, and 11, than anything in Book One. Just as this separation led Propertius to contemplate his death in 1.19, so, near the end of the first "cycle," in 2.13, does he give instructions about his end. But in 2.14-15, poems in which light and darkness play a major role, he is restored to life from death, and in 2.16 he can begin to suffer anew, all over again.

In the second cycle, the roles are reversed for *variatio*. In 2.20.1 Cynthia is compared to Briseis -- she is Propertius' *serva amoris*, by implication. The departure from the climate of the first half of the book is all the more sharply figured, insofar as it was precisely Briseis with whom Propertius' unyielding *domina* was contrasted in 2.8.29-40. Propertius goes out on the town, in 2.22 and 23-24. And in 2.26 ("B") -- perhaps even in the shipwreck scene in "A" -- she is again associated with the imagery of *servitium*.<sup>17)</sup> Elegies 2.27-28 are on death, and just as Propertius suffered from love and came to speak of death in 2.13, so does 2.28 round out the portion of Book Two in which the lovers' roles have been inverted to place Cynthia subordinate to Propertius. Just as 2.14-15 return *Propertius* to vitality and are poems in which light shines in darkness (cf. Cynthia as Propertius' light, *mea lux*, in 2.14.29), so at the end of 2.28 does the phrase *mea lux* reappear -- after a second fourteen poems -- as *Cynthia* returns to life (2.28.59). *Mea lux* appears for the last time in Propertius at the beginning of

17) 2.26.21-22 rejoice that so beautiful a girl does service to Propertius (*tam mihi pulchra puella/ serviat*). If 2.26 "B", which these verses introduce, is in fact a continuation of a single elegy which opened with the dream of Cynthia's shipwreck, we can compare 2.25.23-24, where Propertius characterizes the lover's "voyage" as one all too exposed to disaster. Cynthia's shipwreck would be the metaphor for her overwhelming passion for Propertius.

2.29, in which the poet finds himself back in the familiar role of *servus*.<sup>18)</sup>

Clearly Book Two is a "bigger and better" Book One -- using the formula for the first volume, and then elaborating with interesting new reversals. Book Two was planned as a work which would embrace two "mini-books" -- two broad areas of reversed action -- after each of which several more poems would intervene to re-establish the ironic fact that, whether Cynthia or Propertius should be "restored to life," the result would be the same: Propertius' *labor*. This conception is what is responsible for its much greater length. The double rhythm of elegy 2.18, worked out at the length that we encounter it, not only is in accord with the tenor of the book whose center it approximately occupies, but serves effectively to move us on ahead into the second stage of action in Book Two. Just when we think we have reached a point at which a pause will allow us to regroup our thoughts for what is to happen next, we are caught up and hastened onward. Even the re-statement, in 2.14-15, of Propertius' nighttime adventures, is something of the same kind: we finish 2.14 and think we are done; suddenly, *excitedly* ("O me felicem! o nox mihi candida! et o tu . ."), there is more. The experience is not unlike that of reading 2.18.

We may mention, finally, the central position 2.18 occupies within the first three books of Propertius. These books are balanced and interrelated so harmoniously that it would be difficult to argue that Book Two, which plays an important role vis-à-vis both One and Three, exists in other than a planned order.<sup>19)</sup> Elegy 1.1 and 3.24 are reciprocal in

18) F. Cairns, "Propertius 2.29 A" *CQ* 21 (1971), 455-460, has shown that the Cupids which bind Propertius for Cynthia are *fugitivarii*, "hands" sent out to shackle and return to their quarters runaway slaves!

19) G. Williams, *Tradition and Originality in Roman Poetry* (Oxford 1968), 480-495, argues that Propertius planned I-III at an early stage and left the outline flexible for his personal growth. J.A. Barsby, "The Composition and Publication of the first three books of Propertius" *G & R* 21 (1974), 128-137, stresses that the individual books, if published separately as tradition has it, nevertheless exhibit a great degree of re-shaping into the balanced organization they presently evince. The

their discussion of the family friends who try to call Propertius back from his affair; both mention cutting and burning, medicine, sea-faring. At the start of Book One (1.6) Propertius will not leave Cynthia for "learned Athens" (*doctas Athenas*); the phrase appears only once elsewhere in Propertius, in line 1 of 3.21, which is set in from the end of Three so as roughly to balance 1.6 in its position relative to the start of Book One. At the beginning of his poetry Propertius will not sail from Cynthia; at the end of Book Three he does just this (seen otherwise: in 1.1 Propertius wishes he could escape over the sea from his torment; in 3.24, he has done so).

The lengths of the books make a harmonious form, 22(23?) -34-25. If the much greater length of the center book seems untoward, it should be remarked that Propertius enjoys setting elegies of great length against *short* poems, e.g. 2.1 against 2.2 (78 to 16 lines), or, in Book Four, 4.1 and 4.11, both over 100 verses, against 4.2 and 4.10, the shortest poems in the book. When Ovid revised his *Amores*, he published them in three books of 15-19-15: the longest book of elegies is in the center. That he *revised* his book to this shape is interesting, for it might seem to imply that he had a model in mind (as he did for practically everything); this may confirm the existence of Propertius I-III in the proportions we assign them today.

Within this pattern, Propertius uses, as a leitmotif, his concern for Cynthia's abuse of cosmetics. Extended reference comes three times: in 1.2 and 3.24 -- each the elegy next from the extremities of the set -- and in 2.18 ("C").<sup>20</sup>

---

answer must lie in that period at which Propertius became aware of Horace's three books of *Odes*, to be published ca. 23 B.C. The entire arrangement of Propertius Book Three is most strongly posed as a challenge to Horace's third book. For this relationship, cf. J.P. Sullivan (above, note 8), 12-31, and W.R. Nethercut, "The Ironic Priest. Propertius' Roman Elegies, III, 1-5. Imitations of Horace and Vergil" *AJP* 91 (1970), 385-407, and 385-386 for bibliography.

20) Although 1.15 mentions in passing the way in which Cynthia adorns her hair, listless toward Propertius, eager like a bride going out to meet her new man (verses 5-8), those passages which are intended to recall and echo each other are the three mentioned. Verbal echoes under-



The number of poems on either side of 2.18, taking all three parts of it as a single elegy, is roughly the same: 39, or 40 (if we count 1.8 "A" and "B" as two separate elegies) precede 2.18; 41 follows it.

We can summarize: 2.18 is a single elegy, unified by a humorous undercutting, through two long sections of expositulation (5-20, 23-38), of two attempts (in 1-4 and 21-22) by the poet to affect a posture of competent insouciance. This plan is punctuated by the reversal of *si quid*, in 3-4, to *quid si* in 5, where editors have wanted a new elegy to begin, and by (*Cupido*) *malus esse solet* ("nunc mihi malus est"), at the "conclusion" of Part "B" in 22, preparing the way for *Nunc* at the start of "C" in 23. *Etiam*, which follows *Nunc* in 23, makes the point that now, in addition to her spurning of Propertius who is in the prime of life, Cynthia also is insulting him by making up her hair garishly. *Etiam*, at the start of 23, where the division into "C" has been made (or into "B"), in fact echoes *etiam* toward the end of the preceding section, in line 19: *at tu etiam iuvenem odisti me, perfida* . . . The two subjects of parts "B" and "C" -- Cynthia's scorn for a young lover (Propertius) when Aurora cherished Tithonus even when he was old, and Cynthia's cosmetic taste -- are in this way both joined by the only two occurrences of *etiam* in the elegy.<sup>21)</sup> We can add, to all of the foregoing, that

---

line the interconnection: *natura* (the question of what nature grants, as opposed to what cosmeticians contrive) in 1.2.5, 2.18.25; *forma* in 1.2.8 and 2.18.32, *formosa* 1.2.9 and 2.18.29; *color* (native complexion and coloring vs. artificial dyes and rouges) in 1.2.9 and 22, 2.18.26, 3.24.7; *ornatus* (false adornment) with *ornato capillo* in 1.2.1 and *ornata fronte* in 2.18.36; *candor* (purchased "brilliance" for the face) 1.2.19 and 3.24.8 -- cf. *nitor*, of the same concept, in 1.2.6 (the verb *nitere*) and, for the noun, 2.18.24; *figura* (the natural bodily endowment, vs. falsifying accretions) in 1.2.7, 2.18.25, 3.24.5.

21) *Etiam* has different colors in the two lines: although it may be translated "even" and fit both contexts, it has, in *tu etiam iuvenem odisti me* (2.18.19) rather the force of "even (though)" -- "however much I may be in the prime of my life". *Etiam* = καίπερ. In verse 23, on the other hand, I have argued that it carries the weight of "also, even (more), on top of everything else." In this view *etiam* = καί δὲ καί. Butler and Barber (above, note 2), 222, write that *etiam* can be taken (1) with *nunc* (2) with *infectos Britannos*. They would have the first possibility referring to Cynthia's youth: "even now while you are young

while there are no verbal links between the beginning of 2. 18 (1-4) and its final verses (33-38) -- the presence of which feature would have encouraged commentators to look more closely at the possibility that everything fits together -- we do find, at the beginning, and again at the end, Propertius expecting Cynthia to behave in such a way that what she has done will be known to him, to his regret.

Elegy 2.18 is a poem of double rhythm: Propertius twice stands off from the whole affair with Cynthia and gives "sane advice" to himself and for anyone who may be listening, only to discover this all an empty pretence. The double swing occurs in Propertian elegy: on one occasion, 2.14 twice subverts the lover's triumph over his mistress by referring to her control upon his happiness, his very life. Repetition informs Book Two as a whole: we go through a double story in which, at first, Propertius must suffer while Cynthia entertains his rivals, though later it will be Propertius who enjoys variety and claims Cynthia as a faithful "Briseis", his *serva amoris*. Elegy 2.18 fits harmoniously into this arrangement, at the center of Book Two. The reversal in Cynthia's role begins with her departure from Rome in 2. 19, to lead a life of rustic purity. But that we may be the more astounded when this comes to pass, Propertius has planted in 2.18 an echo from 1.11, where Cynthia had left him in Rome, going "on vacation" to dissipated Baiae: 2.18.33-34

---

and fair." That is, Cynthia, even though young, is pasting herself with a vulgar new face, which -- one assumes -- an older lady might do to conceal the ravages of time. Cynthia's age might be a question at hand, since Propertius is talking about her makeup; however, this elegy does not expressly equate cosmetics with concealment of the years. And, when Propertius does show us an old Cynthia seated despairingly before her mirror, in 3.25, we find no mention of cosmetics. Once more, when 1.2 does address the theme, there is no allusion to old age. Therefore, the imputation of *etiam* to *nunc* as envisioned above introduces what is extraneous to the elegy. Enk (above, note 7), 259, thus elects the second possibility -- that Cynthia is now going so far as to mimic even those (extraordinary) Celts! My own proposal is different: *etiam* expresses the further fact, now to be discussed, because of which Propertius can not keep silent. Camps (above, note 2), 140, agrees with the assumption I make: *etiam* need not go closely with *nunc*, but may be taken with the verb and the whole query -- "What, are you up to *yet another* folly, imitating . . .?" (*italics mine*).

compare Propertius' love for Cynthia to that of a brother for his sister, of a son for his mother; he had written in just such accents to her at Baiae, in 1.11.23-24. Thus, when we move on to 2.19, "*Etsi me invito discedis, Cynthia, Roma . . .*," we think only that her sojourn will continue the poet's misery as we have heard this described in 2.16-18. Suddenly this is all overturned, as the pentameter loves to do: *laetor* (!). Propertius is HAPPY with Cynthia moving . . . to the country.

At the same time that it looks ahead, 2.18 looks back to the elegies that have come before it: 2.18.1-4 resume 2.14. 19-20 (cf. *negare* in both passages), *periuras puellas* in 2.16. 53 is picked up by *mentiri (noctem)* in 2.17.1, and carried on by *mentita . . . comas* in 2.18.28. We also remember how the association of *mentiri* and *infectas (habere manus)* in 2.17.1-2 seems to be echoed in the last "section" of 2.18 (23, 28), while *fractus*-- again close to the opening of 2.17 (verse 4) -- is taken up immediately by *frangitur* at the start of 2.18. Elegies 2.17 and 18 mirror each other: *mentiri - infectas - fractus*, in 2.17, are answered by *frangitur - infectos - mentita* in 2.18.<sup>22)</sup>

22) There are the only two elegies in Propertius in which all three verbal echoes occur, cf. B. Schmeisser, *A Concordance to the Elegies of Propertius* (Hildesheim 1972) 383: *infectus*, meaning "stained," appears only in 2.17.2 and 2.18.23, while but one additional line has *infecto . . . cursu* (2.25.25); here, however, the idiom is different, as *infecto* comes literally from *in + facio* ("un-made, in-completed"). Rothstein (above, note 11), 371, compares Livy 9. 23. 11, *infecta victoria* ("victory not yet fully in our possession"). Propertius' chiasmic reversal of *mentiri - infectus* (a, um) - *frangere* points up the fact that 2.17-18 reverse each other: at the start of 2.17, Propertius speaks of murder (*infectas sanguine habere manus*), or suicide, but he finishes the poem reaffirming his intent to stay by her, without changing; Cynthia will weep (*tum flebit . . .*) when she sees him endure. In 2.18, he begins with the same calmer tone: he will not moan and groan (*querelae*, of what Propertius will not do, picks up *tum flebit*, which Cynthia will do - a small reversal in itself). And then Propertius bursts out in the impassioned reproach we have studied. The circle of his thought begins with a lie, and physical punishment -- either for Cynthia, or inflicted on himself (2.17.13 makes suicide the likely thought behind 2.17.2) -- and returns to punishment (*illi sub terris fiant mala multa puellae*, 2.18.27) inflicted upon the liar (*quae mentita . . . comas*, 2.18.28). This analysis allows us once again to appreciate how very much Propertius aims for each of his elegies to grow out of that poem which

The central position of 2.18 within its own book also grants it a key location within the collection of Propertius' first three volumes, since Books One and Two stand with virtually equal lengths (i.e. by number of elegies) on either side of Book Two. And we have learned that the subject of Cynthia's pretensions, her falsification of beauty, is enunciated at the start, middle, and conclusion of the set of three.

All of this will, I hope, lay to rest discontent with what has seemed to be the static and confusion, the lack of solidity, lying at the heart of Propertius' most controversial book -- but also, interestingly, at the heart of a collection of three volumes whose symmetry and internal connection has lately been increasingly a matter for pleasant surprise. Not only does 2.18 not lack *Einheit* in itself, but it is a kind of model for Propertius' technique in Book Two, as it rounds out what previous elegies have just stated and simultaneously advances us to a new surprise in 2.19. In this way, 2.18 also contributes to the integrity of all three books of Propertius, in which it appears to have been conceived as a central architectural element.<sup>23)</sup>

University of Texas at Austin

---

directly precedes it. This linear unity, as much if not more than the chiasmic paneling set forth by H. Juhnke, "Zum Aufbau des zweiten und dritten Buches des Properz" *H* 99 (1971), 91-125, should begin to convince us that Book Two is well-organized.

23) Two translations which follow 2.18 through without re-arrangement are, in German, W. Binder's edition of F. Jacob, *S. Aurel. Propertius, Elegien* (Stuttgart 1860) 46-47, and -- in English -- J.P. McCulloch's *The Poems of Sextus Propertius* (Berkeley 1972) 96-97. Recently, an argument for the division of 1.8 "A" and "B", similar to that between 1.11-12, and also for 2.29 "A" and "B", as well as one at 2.28.35 into "A" and "B" parts supported by Ovid's adaptation in *Amores* 2.13-14, has been advanced by J.T. Davis, *Dramatic Pairings in the Elegies of Propertius and Ovid* (Berne 1977). The criterion, that a pause between paired poems allows time to elapse, so that something new can occur which will cause Propertius to write differently on the same subject, may seem to apply in 2.18: in "A" (1-22), he writes ironically, hoping to change Cynthia's heart; in "B" (23-38), there is no irony -- only vehement castigation. (The answer Cynthia gave to "A" was to flaunt her

---

makeup, the better to infuriate Propertius when he responds in "B"). I include this possibility for the sake of developing my discussion of 2.18 as completely as possible; however, my own sense of the elegy's continuity (e.g. the fact that its double rhythm is in accord with the movement of Book Two, the speedy progression from 2.18.22 to *Nunc etiam* at the start of verse 23) make me less certain that we have what Professor Davis works to identify. It can be pointed out that -- as I noted above, footnote 8 -- Propertius likes to iterate an idea or word at transitional points in his poetry, pivoting on it and spinning off in a new direction the next instant. Thus, in 2.29 "A", *mānērē* in line 22 may be punned upon by *Mānē*erāt at the start of "B" in 23; and *crimen amoris* at the end of 1.11 appears to be picked up by *crimen . . moram*, a faint echo, at the start of 1.12. But what is difficult is how to interpret such resonances: are they there to bridge what would otherwise be too perceptible a gap between separate poems, or do they rather stand for puns of a kind, the "pivot-points" I mentioned, in a fast-moving repartee? At the most cautious, we can observe that Propertius enjoys this tactic as a means to insure the continuous flow of his elegies. Since, when all is said and done, Prof. Davis has not felt that 2.18 qualifies under the rather precise terms he establishes for identifying dramatically paired elegies, perhaps we may be the more encouraged to read this poem as one.

## SIMILE AND IMAGERY IN OVID HEROIDES 4 AND 5\*

CATHERINE S. PEARSON

Since the publication in 1883 of the thesis by Joannes Washietl, *De Similitudinibus Imaginibusque Ovidianis*, scholars have taken various approaches to Ovid's use of formal imagery in the *Heroides*. Washietl attempted to gauge the indebtedness of Ovid to his predecessors, particularly Homer, Lucretius, Vergil and Propertius, in his selection of imagery.<sup>1)</sup> In the 1930's S.G. Owen<sup>2)</sup> sought to distinguish progressive stages of development in the construction of similes; and a topical outline of Ovidian similes by E.G. Wilkins<sup>3)</sup> provided a useful compilation for a more comprehensive study. Finally in 1964, Emilio Merone assessed the artistic validity of the similes in the *Heroides* through a study of their individual components to determine whether the figures are a simple statement of comparative terms or whether these terms have been fused so as to create a completely new image.<sup>4)</sup>

Of these scholars, only Merone concerned himself exclusively with the *Heroides*. Most discussions of Ovidian imagery

\* I should like to thank my colleagues, A.J. Christopherson and B.C. Fenik, for their encouragement and helpful criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.

1) Washietl's thesis was weakened by the mistaken assertion that Ovid drew few images from the Greek tragic poets (pp. 56-8) and by his failure to indicate Ovid's originality in adapting a borrowed image to his own poetic context.

2) S.G. Owen, "Ovid's Use of the Simile," *CR* 45 (1931) 97-106.

3) E.G. Wilkins, "A Classification of the Similes of Ovid," *CW* 25 (1932) 73-8, 81-6.

4) E. Merone, *Studi sulle Eroidi di Ovidio* (Naples 1964) 108.

either deal solely with the *Metamorphoses* or treat the Ovidian corpus as a whole, thus devoting little if any attention to the epistles of the heroines.<sup>5)</sup> The analysis of Ovid's use of the simile within the poetic context of individual epistles has been largely neglected. Even H. Jacobson's recent study of the *Heroides*, while noting the significance of some images, directs its primary focus elsewhere.<sup>6)</sup>

Many scholars who discussed the use of the simile in the *Metamorphoses* have not differed from Alfred Rohde's judgment that Ovid was rhetorical and "superficial",<sup>7)</sup> the two terms becoming almost synonymous. Owen criticized Ovid's similes as illogical, redundant and the product of nothing more than "riotous fancy".<sup>8)</sup> Even the perceptive study by J. Richardson, the first to demonstrate that Ovid's imagery in the *Metamorphoses* is not purely decorative, concludes that with a single exception, the Ceyx and Alcyone episode, similes have no thematic or symbolic force within the narrative.<sup>9)</sup>

Given the increased attention to and appreciation of Ovid's accomplishment in the *Heroides* in recent years,<sup>10)</sup>

5) See, for example, Alfred Rohde, *De Ovidi Arte Epica Capita Duo* (Berlin 1929) 52-4; J. Richardson, "The Function of Formal Imagery in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *CJ* 59 (1964) 161-69; T.F. Brunner, *Ovid's Use of the Simile in the Metamorphoses* (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Stanford 1965); T.F. Brunner, "The Function of the Simile in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *CJ* 61 (1966) 354-63; T.F. Brunner, "Δεινὸν vs. ἐλλεινόν: Heinze Revisited," *AJP* 92 (1971) 275-84, a comparison of the similes of the *Metamorphoses* and the *Fasti*.

6) H. Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides* (Princeton 1974) *passim*.

7) Rohde, 21, 52-3. Cf. Brunner, *Ovid's Use of the Simile*, 130. A.G. Lee, "Tenerorum Lusor Amorum," in *Critical Essays on Roman Literature: Elegy and Lyric*, J.P. Sullivan, ed. (Cambridge, Mass. 1962) 155, characterizes as "decorative" and "intentionally misleading" the mythological similes with which *Amores* 1.10 begins. But see L.C. Curran, "Ovid *Amores* 1.10," *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 314-19.

8) Owen, 102-106.

9) Richardson, 164, 169. For an analysis of the "simile-metaphor" of the Ceyx and Alcyone episode see B. Otis, *Ovid as an Epic Poet*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1970) 238-46.

10) See especially, Jacobson, *op. cit.* and "Ovid's Briseis. A study of *Heroides* III," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 331-56; W.S. Anderson, "The *Heroides*," in *Ovid*, J.W. Binns, ed. (London and Boston 1973) 49-83; E.J. Kenney, "Love and Legalism: Ovid, *Heroides* 20 and 21," *Arion* 9 (1970) 388-414; H. Dörrie, "Die dichterische Absicht Ovids in den *Epistulae*

his use of formal imagery there and its integration within the total context of each heroine's dramatic monologue ought to be reexamined. This study will treat the interplay of simile and theme in two epistles: the letters of Phaedra and Oenone.

HEROIDES 4: PHAEDRA TO HYPOLYTUS

In her epistle to Hippolytus (*Heroides* 4), Phaedra compares the burden of love upon her heart to the first yokes placed upon tender young bulls or to reins which the newly broken horse can scarce endure (21-4):<sup>11)</sup>

Scilicet ut teneros laedunt iuga prima iuencos,  
frenaque vix patitur de grege captus equus,  
sic male vixque subit primos rude pectus amores  
sarcinaque haec animo non sedet apta meo.

As Jacobson observes, this imagery should not be dismissed as "traditional" in view of Hippolytus' love for nature and the meaning of his own name as "horse-breaker".<sup>12)</sup> It is no accident that Phaedra combines in her simile the two animals which have strong ties to the myths surrounding the families of Theseus and Minos. As Phaedra herself will point out later in her epistle (56-60), the animal bound inextricably to the origin and the fateful passions of her family is the bull. By this combination of images which associates Phaedra and Hippolytus on a metaphorical level in her mind, the simile early in the poem provides a key to the understanding of Phaedra's psychological condition. It reveals her manipulation of reality, that peculiar conflation and ambivalence which is characteristic of her rhetoric and which results in irony and self-delusion.

The immediate points of comparison of her simile are the ideas of inexperience and its resultant difficulties, both

---

*Heroidum*," A & A 13 (1967) 41-55; A.R. Baca, "The Themes of *querela* and *lacrimae* in Ovid's *Heroides*," *Emerita* 39 (1971) 195-201.

11) Unless otherwise stated, textual citations are from the edition of H. Dörrie, *P. Ovidii Nasonis Epistulae Heroidum* (Berlin and New York 1971).

12) *Ovid's Heroides*, 152-3.



for animals and for woman. The images suggest Phaedra's spirited struggle in the grip of strong emotion.<sup>13)</sup> The mute beasts of her comparison are apposite to her presentation of herself as an unwilling and helpless victim of passion who must simply obey what she is bidden. The concept is a variant of a familiar erotic-elegiac motif: the *dominatio Amoris*.

Only Jacobson<sup>14)</sup> seems to have observed the incongruity of this frankly virginal<sup>15)</sup> imagery for Phaedra and her interweaving of motifs which are "incompatible". Phaedra's simile and its immediate context serve as a pointed reminder that she is no longer a virgin. When only five lines later (29-30) she invites Hippolytus in a single couplet "to pluck fruit from full branches and to gather the first rose,"

Est aliquid plenis pomaria carpere ramis  
et tenui primam deligere ungue rosam

she is attempting to reap the advantages both of her actual maturity and of her metaphorical presentation of herself as a *puella*. Again her imagery is ill-chosen. The flower gathered with tender nail is a reminiscence, with strong verbal echoes, of the elaborate metaphor for youthful virginity in Catullus 62.39-47. There the young chanters point out, however, that the flower, once plucked, is no longer desirable

13) Jacobson observes "the absence of any real internal conflict" in Phaedra (*Ovid's Heroides* 157). Ovid implies, particularly through the similes of the poem, that a conflict exists--or has existed, but chooses not to explore the moral complexities involved in her situation. Thus the emphasis in her dilemma and that of Euripides' Phaedra is quite different: hers is simply the struggle to resist being swept away by love. The reasons for her struggle do not enter the picture; therefore her conflict is not internalized. The *pudor* which initially prevents her from speaking (7-14), as Paratore has observed, "Sulla 'Phaedra' di Seneca," *Dioniso* 15 (1952) 224, is purely a device to justify her use of a letter. Thus her conflict may seem trivialized, nevertheless it is suggested.

14) *Ovid's Heroides*, 148. Merone, 120-21, points out that the imagery is that of a virgin, "...di una *puella* che fa le prime esperienze d'amore..."; but he overlooks the fact that this comparison is not suitable for Phaedra.

15) Is it possible that the newly broken horse itself may recall Horace's *equa trima* which is ignorant of marriage and afraid to be touched (*Odes* 3.11.9-12)?

(and for this reason the young women reject the institution of marriage). This Catullan echo from Phaedra's pen is an ironic reminder of her status as a married woman.

This effect is intensified by the image of the yoked bullock. It recalls the metaphor applied to Lalage's youthful disinterest in love at Horace *Odes* 2.5.1-4:

Nondum subacta ferre iugum valet  
cervice, nondum munia comparis  
aequare nec tauri ruentis  
in venerem tolerare pondus.

In due time, however, Horace reassures her lover, Lalage herself will seek a mate *proterva fronte* (15-16). Ovid also uses the image as a metaphor for marriage.<sup>16)</sup> In *Heroides* 9, Deianeira compares her unhappy marriage to Hercules to the yoking of unmatched bullocks at the plow (29-30):

Quam male inaequales veniunt ad aratra iuveni,  
tam premitur magno coniuge nupta minor.

Phaedra's imagery, related primarily to the topos of *servitium amoris*, suggests secondary connotations of marriage which are reinforced subtly by her echo of Catullus 62. Thus the simile and its context juxtapose circumstances Phaedra imagines or hopes for and allusions to her real situation. The result is a simile which is invalid and betrays Phaedra's self-deception.

The simile would be entirely appropriate to Hippolytus if he were to experience love; Phaedra's choice of imagery

16) The association between *iugum* and marriage in the elegists seems to be peculiarly Ovidian. S. Lilja, "The Roman Elegists' Attitude to Women," *Annales Academiae Scientiarum Fennicae* B 135, 1 (1965) 85, cites Propertius 3.25.8: *tu bene conveniens non sinis ire iugum* as an example of the metaphorical use of the yoke to denote marriage. But Pichon, *De Sermone Amatorio apud Latinos Elegiarum Scriptores* (Paris 1902) 177, is correct that the metaphor there is related to the *concordia amantium*. See L. Richardson, Jr., ed., *Propertius Elegies I-IV* (Oklahoma 1977) 412 *ad loc.* and W.A. Camps, ed., *Propertius Elegies Book III* (Cambridge 1966) 170 *ad loc.* Both editors interpret the metaphor as similar to Prop. 1.5.2: *et sine nos cursu quo sumus ire pares*. A. La Penna, "Note sul linguaggio erotico dell'elegia latina," *Maia* 4 (1951) 206, cites the use of the verb ζεύγνυμι by the Greek tragic poets and the Alexandrians as a metaphor for marriage: Sophocles *O.T.* 826, *Trach.* 536; Euripides *Alc.* 994, *Electra* 99. Ovid may have borrowed this metaphor from Greek literature.

is intended to obscure the real disparity between them and place the two on the same emotional level.<sup>17)</sup> In the pastoral images which follow it (29-30) we have noted a metaphor for youthful virginity. Yet these in turn appear in a context of guilt and wrongdoing: *crimen* (25), *nocens* (28), *crimine* (31), *adulterio...adulter* (34).<sup>18)</sup> When Phaedra, in this same context, speaks of her former integrity which must be marked now by an unaccustomed stain (31-2):

Si tamen ille prior, quo me sine crimine gessi,  
candor ab insolita labe notandus erat,

her remark is a telling contrast to her description of Hippolytus later. Here are true *candor*, symbolized by his garment, and the flowers of virginity; modesty produces the blush which is his only stain (71-2):

Candida vestis erat, praecincti flore capilli,  
flava verecundus tinxerat ora rubor.

By its language and context, the first simile reveals Phaedra's vain attempt to become another Hippolytus. By equating her with bullocks and a horse it is also the first prefiguration of her role in his ultimate fate.<sup>19)</sup> Both animals recur prominently and prophetically in the narrative which follows. When Phaedra attributes her adulterous love for Hippolytus to the fate of her family, the common element in the passage, from the disguise assumed by Jupiter (*tauro*

17) Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 147, points out that *Amazonio Cressa* and *puella viro* are an attempt to conceal their kinship so that "...the two, stepmother and stepson, stand together on one level, potential erotic-elegiac lovers."

18) Armando Salvatore, "Motivi Poetici nelle Heroides di Ovidio," *Atti del Conv. intern. Ovidiano* II, 240-41, observes the fine juxtaposition of contrasts throughout this letter. Other critics are less appreciative of Phaedra's rhetoric. F. Arnaldi, "Il Mondo Poetico di Ovidio," *Studi Ovidiani*, 17, characterizes it as "dialettica perversa, ma troppo sofisticata". I cannot agree with Jacobson, 157, who calls it the "rhetoric of a middle-aged woman" and summarizes the epistle as "a joke with Phaedra as the butt."

19) Ovid often suggests the outcome of events beyond the scope of the actual writing of the epistle. A further example is the anachronistic appearance of Patroclus in the epistle of Briseis, cited by Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 41, n. 61 (= "Ovid's Briseis," *Phoenix* 25 [1971] 355, n. 63).

*dissimulante deum*, 56) to the Minotaur conceived in the unnatural union of Pasiphae (*decepto subdita tauro*, 57) and killed by Theseus, is the bull--the animal to be invoked by Theseus in his curse against his son.

The horse reappears in two passages, both repeating the idea of struggle, first suggested by the newly broken horse in Phaedra's initial simile (22). Phaedra suddenly yearns to hunt wild animals on forested ridges, to race a light chariot drawn by a swift steed (37-46):

Iam quoque--vix credes--ignotas mutor in artes;  
est mihi per saevas impetus ire feras.

Iam mihi prima dea est arcu praesignis adunco  
40 Delia; iudicium subsequor ipsa tuum;  
in nemus ire libet pressisque in retia cervis  
hortari celeres per iuga summa canes  
aut tremulum excusso iaculum vibrare lacerto  
aut in graminea ponere corpus humo.

45 Saepe iuvat versare leves in pulvere currus  
torquentem frenis ora fugacis equi.

The language of the passage is revealing. The spondaic *torquentem frenis* (46) conveys the powerful straining of the horse at his reins before he gallops away in the swift dactyls of the final half of the pentameter ...*ora fugacis equi*. There is the implication that Phaedra has lost control, that she is now being carried away by some external force. Note the number of passive or impersonal verbs with which she describes her desires: *mutor* (37), *libet* (41), *iuvat* (45), the explicit *est mihi...impetus* (38), and her admission that her own judgment no longer suffices...*iudicium subsequor ipsa tuum* (40). This utter lack of control is made explicit by the second simile of the poem, and her confession (51-2) that others report her actions when her *furor* is spent (47-50):

Nunc feror, ut Bacchi furiis Eleleides<sup>20)</sup> actae  
quaeque sub Idaeo tympana colle movent  
aut quas semideae Dryades Fauniquae bicornes  
numine contactas attonuere suo.

20) The onomatopoeic patronymic *Eleleides*, meaning literally 'the

Merone observes that the three similes "...descrivono le condizioni spirituali, il travaglio dell'anima de Fedra..." and he continues, "...si sarebbe desiderata una sola similitudine, la quale, con la sua carica espressiva e con la sua intensità, avrebbe giovato certamente all'arte di Ovidio. Tre similitudini, senza apprezzabili e sensibili variazioni...sembrano troppe, stemperano un po' l'immagine di Fedra follemente innamorata."<sup>21)</sup> Rather, the image seems to suggest not that Phaedra suffers internal torment, but that she has given up her initial struggle altogether: she is driven now by violent passion, stunned so that she is not even conscious of her actions. In the words of Jacobson (p. 149), "This is now her character."

The movement of the similes is from possession by divine power--Bacchus, Cybele--to possession by creatures not quite human, not quite divine; from the harsher manifestations of divinity, to the wilder, more violent manifestations of semi-divine creatures of nature. By making Phaedra evoke such a progression of comparisons here, Ovid has juxtaposed to her yearnings for the pastoral allurements of nature the dangerous violence of the wilderness.<sup>22)</sup>

Phaedra's desire to become a devotee of the Delian goddess, to hunt on forested ridges is, on one level, a desire

---

daughters of Bacchus', appears only here in Latin literature. See A. Palmer, ed., *P. Ovidi Nasonis Heroides* (Oxford 1898) 308. It is symptomatic of another motif prominent throughout the epistle: the idea of family relationships. Phaedra is so obsessed with ties of family that she seems to think of everyone in terms of family relationship. Theseus is *Aegides* (59) and *Neptunius heros* (109); she even calls Hippolytus *Thesides* (65). As already indicated, she views her love for Hippolytus as a debt owed the fate of her family (53ff.); her recital of the "crimes" of Theseus shows them to be crimes against family (109-24). Finally, in the impassioned plea with which her epistle ends Phaedra, who is trying to convince Hippolytus to violate ties of family, appeals to him on the basis of family relationships: *genitor* (157), *proavi* (158), *avus* (159), *miserere priorum* (161), *parce meis* (162), *mater* (166). In an epistle of 176 lines, there are forty-one nouns or adjectives denoting family relationships, including four patronymics. See Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 156, for the constant presence of deceit which characterizes Phaedra's view of her ancestors.

21) Merone, 116-17.

22) The motifs are Euripidean; cf. *Hippolytus* 176-242.

to accompany Hippolytus in the pursuits which he enjoys.<sup>23)</sup> Her portrayal of his characteristic *studia* (79-84) is almost a doublet of this earlier wish:

Sive ferocis equi luctantia colla recurvas,  
 80           exiguo flexos miror in orbe pedes;  
               seu lentum valido torques hastile lacerto,  
               ora ferox in se versa lacertus habet;  
               sive tenes lato venabula cornea ferro--  
               denique nostra iuvat lumina quidquid agis.

Again the idea of struggle (*luctantia colla*, 79) accompanies the picture of the horse. But while the horse of Phaedra's first simile struggled to shake free of its new reins and later similes conveyed Phaedra's increasing helplessness, Hippolytus at this point exhibits complete mastery and skillful control as he guides his steed through an equestrian figure. The use of the same adjective (*ferocis*, 79...*ferox*, 82) to describe the horse and the arm of Hippolytus seems to suggest that man and beast are here equally matched, a picture which takes on irony for the reader, who knows the fate of Hippolytus to die in the tangled reins of his

23) On a deeper level, it is a manifestation of her conflict. Diana, goddess of the hunt dear to Hippolytus, is likewise the virgin goddess. Throughout the epistle hunting plays a dual role, with erotic as well as virginal connotations: *figat*, 16; *caecum...vulnus*, 20; the repeated idea of capture which figures in the first simile of the poem, *victas*, 14; *victa*, 153; *captus*, 22; *capit capta*, 64; the analogy of the bow, a very erotic play on the word *mollis*, 91-2. Phaedra's wish becomes the expression of a sexual impulse thwarted by Hippolytus' devotion to virginity. Later she will reject Diana in favor of Venus (87-8). When she repeats her desire to accompany Hippolytus into the forest (101-4), it is so that Venus may be served. She has attempted to allay his doubts by three *exempla* involving hunter-lovers: Cephalus and Aurora (93-6), Venus and Adonis (97-8), Meleager and Atalanta (99-100). Presumably, the first is intended to depict the younger lover who submits to the advances of an older woman; the second, to identify the forest as the scene of erotic union; and the third, to portray lovers as companions in the hunt. The *exempla*, however, bear sinister import--as examples of (1) adultery; (2) incest--*Cinyraque creatum* is contrived to emphasize the manner of Adonis' conception; (3) death--note the telling reference to Meleager by his patronymic. He will meet death at the hands of his own mother after he has murdered his uncles. See Jacobson's observations (*Ovid's Heroides*, 153-4) on the self-defeating nature of Phaedra's rhetoric.

frightened and fleeing steeds.<sup>24)</sup>

The two motifs of horse and bull coalesce prophetically again at the end of Phaedra's epistle (165-6):

Flecte, ferox, animos! Potuit corrumpere taurum  
mater, eris tauro saevior ipse truci?

*Flecte, ferox* echo the description of the horse and Hippolytus' equestrian skill in the passage discussed above (*ferocis*, 79; *flexos...pedes*, 80; *ferox*, 82). Moreover, the alliterative adjective *trux* used to describe the bull subtly reinforces the comparison Phaedra is drawing between the animal and Hippolytus. Earlier in her letter, when Phaedra described the reactions of other women to Hippolytus, she applied the same adjective to him (73-4):

quemque vocant aliae vultum rigidumque trucemque,  
pro rigido Phaedra iudice fortis erat.

This comparison, with its interweaving of verbal echoes, draws Hippolytus inexorably into the fate of Phaedra's family and suggests that he is in a perverse way the logical object of her passion. Through her preference for this man-bull Phaedra becomes in the truest sense her mother's daughter, her brother's sister. And the identification of Hippolytus with the bull suggests that his ultimate destruction will be due to his own nature.

Thus the images introduced in the first simile are related not only to the myth of Hippolytus, but also to themes developed in the course of Phaedra's monologue. The horse is used as a latent foreshadowing of death and a symbol that acquires emotional force--as a sign of Phaedra's struggle against her passion and of Hippolytus' control over his emotions, a control which would result in his steadfast rejec-

24) A form of the same verb, *luctor*, appears at *Metamorphoses* 15.519, when Ovid narrates the death of Hippolytus. There, however, it is used by Hippolytus to describe his own doomed struggle to control his horses. Cf. *Ars Amatoria* 1.338; *Fasti* 3.265-6, 5.309-10, 6.737-45. When Ovid makes Phaedra find the dirt on Hippolytus' face handsome (*Heroides* 4.78), the statement takes on ironic overtones and perhaps a latent allusion to her vengeful joy in his death. See Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 155, esp. n. 31, for a similar play on the use of water at the end of the poem.

tion of her advances and his loss of physical mastery at the fateful moment. The bull links the fate of the pair with an ominous pattern unfolding throughout their personal history. As the second simile signifies Phaedra's surrender to more powerful forces and links them to violence in the wilderness,<sup>25)</sup> the pastoral haunts of Hippolytus--and their virginal connotations--become at once his refuge and his undoing.

#### HEROIDES 5: OENONE TO PARIS

The two similes of *Heroides* 5, the letter of Oenone to Paris, are related to the bucolic landscape which provides both the setting and a dominant theme for the poem.<sup>26)</sup> To the nymph Oenone the woodlands are not only the milieu which she knows and understands best, but a part of her pedigree, the guarantee of her importance. She identifies herself as ...*Pegasis Oenone, Phrygiis celeberrima silvis* (3). As her epistle continues, Oenone's perception of her woodlands gradually reveals her character and creates an antithesis between the old and new loves of Paris,<sup>27)</sup> between the simple life and the luxury of Priam's court.

Haughtily Oenone reminds Paris that *she* is a nymph, daughter of a great river, yet she did not disdain to be his bride when he was a mere slave (9-12). Sound patterns reinforce the tone of bitter, wounded hauteur. The repetitive "t" in lines 9 and 10 makes her seem to spit out her words

25) For Ovid's later use of this motif and its antecedents in tragedy, the pastoral genre and primitive mythology, see Hugh Parry, "Ovid's *Metamorphoses*: Violence in a Pastoral Landscape," *TAPA* 95 (1964) 268-82. Also C.P. Segal, *Landscape in Ovid's Metamorphoses. A Study in the Transformations of a Literary Symbol* (Wiesbaden 1969).

26) L. Haley, "The Feminine Complex in the *Heroides*," *CJ* 20 (1924-25) 17, notes the "wild charm of sea and mountain" which creates a romantic atmosphere in this epistle.

27) The rivalry between the two mistresses which plays a major role in the second part of the monologue is foreshadowed by the sarcastic reference to a *nova coniunx* in the introductory lines. See Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 179-80, for a discussion of the economy of the opening distich, and F.H. Grantz, *Studien zur Darstellungskunst Ovids in den Heroides* (diss. Kiel 1955) 6, 40-2, for a discussion of the way in which the introduction determines the structure of the poem.



scornfully, while the "f" and "ph" sounds in the final half of the pentameter make her claim to semi-divinity proudly emphatic.<sup>28)</sup>

Imagery drawn from nature accompanies the chronological narrative of Oenone's affair with Paris.<sup>29)</sup> She first portrays her love for Paris within the woodland setting (13-16):

Saepe greges inter requievimus arbore tecti  
 mixtaque cum foliis praebuit herba torum.  
 Saepe super stramen faenoque iacentibus alto  
 defensa est humili cana pruina casa.

The scene is reminiscent of a Tibullan reverie in which lover and *puella* drowse, warm and dry as the rain patters overhead (Tibullus 1.1.45-8). But again the setting is intended to magnify the importance of Oenone vis-à-vis Paris. As the yet undiscovered son of Priam, the old Paris had been both literally and figuratively a slave, tending his flocks on Mount Ida and participating in the *servitium amoris* with Oenone as his *domina*.<sup>30)</sup>

Oenone reminds Paris that she had been his instructress in the art of hunting (17-20):

Quis tibi monstrabat saltus venatibus aptos  
 et tegetet catulos qua fera rupe suos?  
 Retia saepe comes maculis distincta tetendi,  
 saepe citos egi per iuga longa canes.

Following immediately upon her description of love within the protective serenity of the forests, these words suggest the erotic theme of hunter-lover. Menalcas and Amyntas, the lovers of *Eclogues* 3, hunt wild boar together (74-5), and Menalcas boasts that Amyntas is better known than Delia to his hunting dogs (66-7). In Tibullus 1.4.49-50, Priapus admonishes the aspirant lover to bear the nets willingly if his beloved is drawn to the hunt. Ovid adapts this metaphor to

28) See Jacobson's discussion of the ostentatiousness of these lines, *Ovid's Heroides*, 181-2.

29) C.J. Bradley, "Ovid Heroides V: Reality and Illusion," *CJ* 64 (1969) 160.

30) F.O. Copley, "*Servitium Amoris* in the Roman Elegists," *TAPA* 78 (1947) 285-300.

heterosexual love: consider Phaedra's longing to hunt with Hippolytus and the elaborate hunting metaphors of the *Ars Amatoria*, which makes love itself merely another type of sport.<sup>31)</sup>

The metaphor admits of two lines of development: the lover who follows along with the hunter-beloved (usually in the servile role of guardian of the nets) in an attempt to win his affections (Tib. 1.4.50; *Eclogues* 3.75; cf. Apollo and Hyacinthus, *Meta.* 10.171-3; Venus and Adonis, *Meta.* 10.533-9; Milanion, *Ars Amatoria* 2.188-9), and the hunter-lover who practices his art in order to ensnare the unwitting beloved and initiate (usually) her in the art of love (*Ars Amatoria* 1.89, 253, 263, 269-70; 2.2).<sup>32)</sup> Oenone's instructions to Paris combine these two aspects of the metaphor: we see her both in the servile role of *comes* stretching out the nets and as the master-hunter teaching her art. Neither is a part usually played by the female member of a love partnership;<sup>33)</sup> since the aggressive hunter-lover usually succeeds in entrapping only himself, both roles result in the position of *servus*, reserved for the male, in the *servitium amoris*. Oenone's instructions to Paris, then, juxtapose the reality of her avocation as huntress and the suggestion of elegiac metaphor in a way which hints at a double meaning and at the irony of her situation. While Oenone had taught Paris the art of hunting, she had been his instructress also in the art of love. In so doing, however, in effect she had passed from *domina* to *servus*, thereby dooming her hopes for her love affair.

The bucolic theme is maintained by Paris' carving on the

31) S. Lilja, 182, notes Ovid's preference, of all the elegists, for imagery drawn from the hunt. Cf. *Ars Amatoria* 1.263-5, 391-4, 763-6. Note also the frequent use of the verb *cipio* in book 1: 61, 83, 159, 234, 265, 270, 348, 351, 358-9, 382, 403, 458. See E.W. Leach, "Georgic Imagery in the *Ars Amatoria*," *TAPA* 95 (1964) 142-54.

32) The case of Phaedra is different. Although she desires to accompany Hippolytus on the hunt (*Heroides* 4. 39-44), she does not become guardian of the nets, but hunts with him as his equal. Thus she acquires elements of both aspects of the metaphor.

33) Sulpicia is the obvious exception (Tibullus 3.9.11-14 = 4.3.11-14); see Copley, 295.

beech trees and by his ἀδύνατον incised on the poplar--both, as Jacobson points out, unique modifications of traditional motifs.<sup>34)</sup> Oenone regards the trees bearing her name as further monuments to her renown.<sup>35)</sup> Paris reverses the usual pattern for such ἀδύνατα, so that the curse under which he has placed himself unwittingly--and the magnitude of his violation of nature--will increase with the growth of the tree. As a fountain nymph who has gained further authority in nature through Paris' blade (21-4), Oenone has the power not only to pray for the fulfillment of that curse, as she does (31-2), but also to command and herself participate in the disordering of nature. The verse carving and the prayer of Oenone reflect the turmoil within her--and consequently within all nature--at the faithlessness of Paris.

Even before the dread pronouncement of *nefas* at line 40, Ovid has depicted the judgment and departure of Paris as acts contrary to the natural order. There is a sudden metaphorical change within Oenone.<sup>36)</sup> The imagery depicting her reaction to the fateful judgment is cold and violent: a sudden terrible storm (*pessima mutati...amoris hiems*, 34), accompanied by thunder (*Attoniti*, 37) and cold (*...gelidusque cucurrit, / ...dura per ossa tremor*, 37-8). Once trees had provided and sheltered leafy couches for love; they had borne Paris' pledges of fidelity, Oenone's claims to enhanced glory. Now with a swiftness<sup>37)</sup> which conveys the ruthlessness of his deed, Paris cuts down trees to prepare his fleet.

Within this context, the first simile infuses the moment of departure with an ironic pathos.<sup>38)</sup> Oenone describes the sorrowful farewell of the lovers (46-8):

34) Ovid's *Heroides*, 182-3.

35) Bradley, 160, misses this distinction when he interprets the trees of this passage as "emblematic of the...glory of the lovers' vows". The glory involved, in Oenone's eyes, is hers alone.

36) *Ibid.*

37) The judgment and Oenone's reaction to it occupy 8 lines (33-40); the preparation and launching of the fleet, only a distich (41-2). Note Cassandra's reference to Paris' ship as *obsceam* (119).

38) Merone, 121-2, judges this "una rappresentazione di rara efficacia".

miscuimus lacrimas maestus uterque suas.  
 Non sic appositis vincitur vitibus ulmus,  
 ut tua sunt collo bracchia nexa meo.

This mingling of tears is to be the last union of mortal and water nymph. But the image is striking for other reasons as well: Oenone's simile reveals a reversal of sexual roles already hinted at by her dominant position as hunter-teacher. Paris is the vine, planted beside and clinging to Oenone, the elm. The vine, in this context, is the feminine image, as in Catullus 62.54: (*vitis*)...*ulmo coniuncta marito*, and in *Amores* 2.16.41-2, where Ovid himself is the *ulmus* and his *domina*, the *vitis*:

ulmus amat vitem, vitis non deserit ulmum:  
 separor a domina cur ego saepe mea?

Oenone's image depicts Paris as an integral, though weaker, part of nature, united with her in her own element, yet dependent on her for support. But the vine can destroy the very support from which it has received its initial nourishment. On one level, Paris is taking the first steps which will destroy his love for Oenone. On another, the felling of the trees has become a symbolic act freeing him from subservience to her. However reluctant his departure, even as he clings tearfully to Oenone, Paris has already destroyed the support for the vine.

As the simple bucolic life has become symbolic of the former union of Paris and Oenone, so now Oenone equates Paris' desire for Helen with his new-found status and luxury at Priam's court. The gleam of royal crimson from his ship affords her, as she waits impatiently on the shore, the first fearful inkling that the old Paris is gone forever (65-6):

Dum moror, in summa fulsit mihi purpura prora.  
 Pertimui: cultus non erat ille tuus.

The return reverses the major elements of the earlier scene of farewell. A gentle breeze (*Aura levis*, 53) had stirred his departing sails and decisive human action, the churning of the sea by the oars, was required to draw him from her.

A swift breeze (*cita...aura*, 67) returns the ship to land, thus ironically fulfilling Oenone's prayer to the Nereids (57). But now it is Helen who clings to Paris, a pose which recalls the simile of the vine twined upon the supporting elm. The significant difference, however, is that here Paris has assumed the dominant role once played by Oenone and nature. With his acquisition of Helen and her *cultus*, Paris has gained masculine independence. While the farewell had begun with the suggestive union of mortal and nature through tears, the scene of return closes with Oenone's solitary tears among the rocks of Ida (73-4).<sup>39)</sup>

The second simile draws both Paris and Helen within the rustic theme. Oenone's image in the first simile (47-8) was an agricultural one: the vines had been planted (*appositis*, 47) beside the tree. At Paris' departure another agricultural image depicted the action of the oars upon the sea (*eruta*, 54).<sup>40)</sup> Now Oenone describes Paris' fickleness (109-12):

Tu levior foliis, tum cum sine pondere suci  
mobilibus ventis arida facta volant.

Et minus est in te quam summa pondus arista,  
quae levis adsiduis solibus usta riget.

Her implications are unmistakable. Once she had lain in love with Paris on a bed of leaves (14; 87-8); her first simile had depicted Paris himself as a living vine. Here Paris is compared to nature which is dry, sterile; to a harvest, ruined. Taken together, the two similes have sexual overtones which reinforce those of the mingled tears and tears among the rocks in the scenes of departure and return. Oenone charges that she gave Paris his manhood--or at least taught him how to use it. But by abandoning her and using his knowledge adulterously, Paris has wasted his sexuality.<sup>41)</sup>

39) See Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 192-3, for the circular construction of this passage.

40) Cf. Palmer, 318 *ad. loc.*

41) Cf. Horace *Odes* 1.25.17-20, where the *aridae frondes* suggest the fate of Lydia, whose haughtiness in bestowing her favors to the poet induces him to depict her as still passionate, but neglected in old age. See references to the theme of withered leaves in R.G.M. Nisbet and

This meaning is intensified by Cassandra's prophecy with its agricultural imagery (115-8):

Quid facis, Oenone? Quid arenae semina mandas?

Non profecturis litora bubus aras!

Graia iuvenca venit, quae te patriamque domumque  
perdat! Io prohibe! Graia iuvenca venit!

Grantz correctly observes that line 115 is an intentional allusion to Oenone's tears upon the sand in the scene of departure (55-6) and that Cassandra's agricultural image has sexual overtones.<sup>42)</sup> His interpretation of the individual components of the image, however, is reversed because he has failed to observe that Oenone plays an essentially dominant masculine role here as within her earlier recollection of life with Paris. It is Oenone who performs the masculine task of sowing although Cassandra predicts that her harvest will fail, a prediction vindicated already for the reader by the ruined crop of the second simile of the poem. There Paris was equated with dry leaves and *arista* burned by constant sun so that harvesting would be useless and the act of sowing itself, a wasted labor.

Jacobson's discussion of line 38 is pertinent. Since *durum os* "elsewhere always refers to men", Jacobson speculates that lines 37-8 may be adapted from a lost tragedy which described Paris' reaction to the sudden apparition of three naked goddesses. The odd phrase here serves "as parody of the grand claims Oenone makes for herself by transferring to her Paris' response."<sup>43)</sup> Neither parody nor adaptation is necessary to explain the masculine phraseology. As Jacobson admits, the language of 37-8 is typically Ovidian for descriptions of fear. Moreover, certain phrases (*micuere, gelidus, cucurrit, tremor*) are particularly suited to Oenone's character as a fountain, and the masculine phrase suits her masculine role throughout much of the epistle.

---

Margaret Hubbard, *A Commentary on Horace: Odes Book 1* (Oxford 1970) 298-300.

42) Grantz, 49-52.

43) Jacobson, 184 and n. 22.

Thus Paris, not Oenone, is represented by the *litora* at 116 and the *saltus* at 124, images usually applied to the female in the plowing metaphor. Cassandra's image places Oenone and Helen in a similar realm, but as plowman and *iuvenca*, and points up the undesirable turn of events: the *iuvenca* has ousted the plowman and ruined his planting.

Bradley is only partially correct in his statement:

Oenone's hope for Paris' return appears sustained by a belief that his cruel desertion and new passion...are impossible, unnatural, and unreal. The letter becomes, therefore, an urgent attempt to return to reality from a hell of destructive illusions.<sup>44)</sup>

It is true that the unique narrative perspective of the *Heroides*, influenced as it is by the fusion of external 'factual' motivation and internal psychological direction, can assume a new reality independent of a purely objective context.<sup>45)</sup> Still, part of the humor of this epistle lies in the fact that Oenone does accept at least some of the realities of Paris' changed circumstances. In fact, it is consistent with Ovid's characterization of Oenone that nature's child recognizes the allurements of *cultus* and aspires to a life among the 'beautiful people' of Priam's court. Although she protests her indifference to wealth and royal palaces (81)--proper sentiments for a fountain nymph--she finally blurts out her real feelings (85-8):

Dignaue sum et cupio fieri matrona potentis;  
sunt mihi quas possint sceptrā decere manus.  
Nec me, faginea quod tecum fronde iacebam,  
despice; purpureo sum magis apta toro.

Jacobson sees this statement as an expression of Oenone's inconsistency of character.<sup>46)</sup> But is this not the real

44) Bradley, 160.

45) See Grantz, *passim*, and B. Latta, *Die Stellung der Doppelbriefe, Heroides 16-21, im Gesamtwerk Ovids* (diss. Marburg 1963) *passim*. H. Fraenkel, *Ovid: A Poet Between Two Worlds* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1945) 43, and Dörrie, *A & A 13* (1967) 46-7, also note the peculiar perspective in the *Heroides*. For a discussion of the different focus of the Oenone epistle, involving both present and past reaction to external circumstances, see Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 187-8.

46) Jacobson, *Ovid's Heroides*, 185.

point to which her whole letter has been leading: her insistence at the outset upon her proper blue-blooded pedigree (3, 10), her insecure suspicions that Paris may now be ashamed of her (44, 79-80, 83-4, 87-8), even her emphasis upon her own importance within nature (23-4) and her witty retort that she is unimpressed by the prospect of becoming one of Priam's many daughters-in-law (82)? These assertions are not, as Grantz suggests,<sup>47)</sup> an *apologia* to prove her guiltlessness in the eyes of the gods, but an attempt to establish her continuing right to be Paris' wife. Yet Oenone does not ask Paris to return with her to their earlier life in the woodlands. Rather Ovid playfully undercuts the bucolic theme to suggest that even nature, beholding the delights of man's worldly accomplishments, would turn her back on rustic glades for the joys of love.

Analysis of the epistles of Phaedra and Oenone has shown that Ovid's similes there are not merely decorative, but are well integrated within each monologue and contribute to the development of a consistent pattern of themes and imagery. The source of the imagery chosen for the similes is significant. In *Heroides* 4 (Phaedra) similes are related to the basic mythological framework within which the dramatic moment of composition is cast and serve to remind the reader of the outcome of the situation which lies outside the heroine's knowledge. The reader gains thereby a double perspective which allows him to view the myth as a whole, while witnessing the heroine's emotional and intellectual reactions at her moment of crisis.

This technique in the construction of similes is not unique to this letter in the *Heroides*. In the epistle of Medea to Jason (*Heroides* 12), for example, the fire image of the simile at 33-6 pervades the myth and her monologue from the fire-breathing bulls (17-8, 44) to the *flammea lumina* of the serpent guarding the fleece (109) and finally to her burning revenge on her rival (183) and her plea to Jason for *fides* (193). The simile equating Cydippe's colorless complex-

47) Grantz, 9-10.



ion with an apple in *Heroides* 21 (217-8) recalls the moment of her unwitting oath in the myth, but has obvious limitations as an image and does not receive the extensive development within the monologue as is the case in some other epistles.

Even in *Heroides* 5, where the bucolic setting of the myth provides the images used in the similes, the development of this imagery suggests the futility of Oenone's aspirations. The agricultural imagery brings about a reversal of roles, not only in the sexual sense as the preceding analysis has attempted to show, but also in those roles which Oenone and Paris play in the universe as a whole. Paris has become a part of the natural world, transplanted to be sure, while Oenone is the plowman who attempts by his labors to make nature more productive. The result conveys the impossibility of combining two basically incompatible worlds: Paris can be no more a part of Oenone's world than she can forsake her rightful nature to share in his. Oenone fails as plowman; Paris destroys nature in his pursuit of *cultus*.

University of Cincinnati

## THRASYLLUS IN TACITUS (ANN. 6.21)

REVILO P. OLIVER

We can only conjecture how many of the decisions and acts of Tiberius during his long principate were influenced or even determined by Thrasyllus, the one adviser in whom he appears to have had implicit and even unlimited confidence. The origin of this extraordinary friendship has been satisfactorily and, I am sure, correctly explained by Frederick H. Cramer.<sup>1)</sup>

When Tiberius, resenting the indignities put upon him by the man who was his stepfather and father-in-law, retired to Rhodes, Thrasyllus, an Alexandrian, perhaps of Greek ancestry, was one of the most eminent of the competing professors in that intellectual capital. According to Cramer, he "must be considered not only one of the most versatile, but also one of the most profound scholars of his era." We may doubt the profundity, which is not necessarily the same as subtlety, but we cannot question the versatility or the learning attested by Cramer's catalogue of his accomplishments, to which I add only the suggestion that the opinions and teaching of Thrasyllus may have changed in the course of a career of which the stages are summarized, I think, by a scholium on Juvenal: *multarum artium scientiam professus postremo se dedit Platonicae sectae ac deinde mathesi.*<sup>2)</sup> A *grammaticus* with so

1) *Astrology in Roman Law and Politics* (Philadelphia 1954), p. 94. For plausible conjectures concerning Thrasyllus's possibly enormous influence on historical events, see pp. 99-108.

2) *Ad Iuv.* 6.576. The scholiast is commonly disregarded because his concise note ends with a statement that when Thrasyllus thought himself in danger from Tiberius, *dolum cum praesensit, fugit*, which is taken to mean that he fled from Rhodes, whereas it is almost certain that he

comprehensive a knowledge of Greek literature that he could be expected to identify a verse quoted from almost any poet,<sup>3)</sup> he turned to philosophy and collected and edited (on the basis of earlier editions) the works of Democritus<sup>4)</sup> and Plato, on both of which he commented extensively and tendentiously, if not disingenuously. Like many literary men, he may have had a tropism toward mystic visions of a "better world" and eloquence about "spiritual values," and thus have felt a need to deny the cool rationalism of the New Academy, which, after a long eclipse, became the basis of modern science. It is also possible that he perceived that learned and cultivated mystery-mongers can always reap a very abundant income from sentimentally gullible members of the upper and wealthier classes who are sufficiently well-bred to disdain unkempt and semi-literate fakirs.

At all events, in his "interpretation" of Plato he began the process of adulterating and distorting the Platonic doctrine with Neo-Pythagorean and Oriental occultism that was to result in the theological dogmas of Neo-Platonism.<sup>5)</sup> And it is likely that he tried to foist similar fantasies on Democritus.<sup>6)</sup> Addiction to occult verbiage, or alternatively a perspicacious perception of what would be profitable in a world that had lost faith in reason while hurrying from one catastrophe to another, naturally led to astrology, which had been conclusively refuted by the New Academy (ex-

---

accompanied Tiberius when the latter returned to Rome. Read <ef>*fugit*, i.e. *dolum effugit* on the analogy of *periculum effugere*, 'he eluded the trap,' doubtless in the way described by Tacitus.

3) Hence Augustus's quizzical jest, Suet. *Aug.* 98.4.

4) The explicit testimony of Diogenes Laërtius is doubted by Cramer (p. 93), who follows scholars who thought Democritus an author most unlikely to engage the attention of a Platonist.

5) Porphyry, *Vita Plotini* 21, lists in chronologically reversed order Numenius, Cronius, Moderatus, and Thrasylus.

6) He ignorantly or knowingly included forgeries in his edition; see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, 2 (Cambridge 1965), p. 388, n. 1, and works there cited. Diogenes Laërtius, 9.7.38, cites Thrasylus as authority for relations between Democritus and Pythagoras that are at least open to grave suspicion, and Thrasylus may be the source of the absurd story (9.7.34) about Persian Magi and *Chaldaei* for which the authority of Herodotus is claimed, perhaps disingenuously.

cept for the one minor detail that Diogenes of Seleucia conceded to it<sup>7)</sup>): one superstition leads to another, *abyssus abyssum invocat*. It was doubtless at this stage of his career that Thrasyllus met Tiberius. His evidently copious writings on astrology may (or may not) have been composed after he reached Rome, the terrestrial paradise of the ambitious.

Tiberius, in a retirement that must have suggested the sulking of Achilles, was at Rhodes *circa scholas et auditoria professorum assiduus*,<sup>8)</sup> and the presence of a man who was at once so prominent and so politically disgraced that he could compromise his acquaintances in the eyes of Rome's boss, must have been acutely embarrassing to the professors. Most of them probably tried to be circumspectly ambiguous in their attitude, but two were bold enough to gamble on their prognostications of the future: one openly snubbed Tiberius, the other, Thrasyllus, recognizing opportunity, attached himself to the fallen dynast with prudent devotion. Cramer is certainly right when he attributes the growth of the friendship to "the friendlessness of Tiberius who 'in the seclusion of Rhodes had habituated himself to shun society.' ... Tiberius must have been particularly attracted to the brilliant Greek whose company helped him while away many hours which might otherwise have been empty."

It is in this context that we must consider the story told by Tacitus (*Ann.* 6.20.2-21.3), who attributes to Tiberius

...scientia Chaldaeorum artis, cuius apiscendae otium apud Rhodum, magistrum Thrasyllum habuit, peritiam eius hoc modo

7) It has always been a matter of common observation that the children of one man by one woman, if not identical twins, always differ greatly from one another in temperament and mentality, although they receive the same nurture and education. Before the genetic processes that ineluctably determine innate qualities were scientifically ascertained, the significant variable seemed to be time of conception and birth, and hence astral influences. (The alternatives were unperceived causes, metempsychosis, and special creation by a god or gods who artistically avoided duplication in their handiwork.) This is what Diogenes meant when he conceded to the astrologers (*Cic. Div.* 2.43.90) *ut praedicere possint dumtaxat qualis quisque natura et ad quam quisque maxime rem aptus futurus sit*.

8) *Suet. Tib.* 11.3.

expertus.

(21.1) Quotiens super tali negotio consultaret, edita domus parte ac liberti unius conscientia utebatur. Is litterarum ignarus, corpore valido, per avia ac derupta (nam saxis domus imminet) praeibat eum, cuius artem experiri Tiberius statuisset, et regredientem, si vanitatis aut fraudum suspicio incesserat, in subiectum mare praecipitabat, ne index arcani existeret. (2) Igitur Thrasyllus iisdem rupibus inductus, postquam percunctantem commoverat, imperium ipsi et futura sollerter patefaciens, interrogatur an suam quoque genitalem horam comperisset, quem tum annum, qualem diem haberet. Ille positus siderum ac spatia dimensus haerere primo, dein pavescere et, quantum introspiceret, magis ac magis trepidus admirationis et metus, postremo exclamat ambiguum sibi ac prope ultimum discrimen instare. (3) Tum complexus eum Tiberius praescium periculorum et incolumem fore gratatur, quaeque dixerat oracli vice accipiens inter intimos amicorum tenet.

This story was denounced by Alexander H. Krappe as "melodramatic claptrap" which could "find credence only among adepts in astrology."<sup>9</sup>) His verdict has been generally accepted. Ernst Kornemann rejects the story as "ein Märchen."<sup>10</sup>) Cramer dismisses it as a mere "fable" that is patently absurd. Erich Koestermann in his commentary *ad loc.* (II, 289) says it is "alles andere als glaubwürdig."

9) *AJP* 48 (1927) 361f. Krappe goes on to derive the story from the tale about Nectanebus in the Pseudo-Callisthenes, which he oddly quotes from a translation from the Syriac, although the story, of course, is found in the Greek text, in the vulgate (longer) version at 1.14.8-21, and, naturally, in Julius Valerius, 1.8.

10) *Tiberius* (Stuttgart 1960), p. 35, n. 3. Modern historians of the period presumably agree, for they scarcely mention Thrasyllus and discuss Tiberius without reference to what Kornemann aptly calls the *Zeitkrankheit*. Barbara Levick, in her elaborate and impressive study, *Tiberius the Politician* (London 1976), although recognizing (p. 224) that "Tiberius became a fatalist, ruled by astrology," makes only passing mention of Thrasyllus and does not consider the possibility that Tiberius was consequently ruled by his astrologer. Morally and historically a ruler must bear the responsibility for his acts, whether or not he was influenced or even manipulated by his advisers, but when we undertake to analyze psychologically the character of Tiberius, we may lament, but cannot ignore, the presence of an indeterminable *x* in our equations. We may, for example, deplore, as does Miss Levick (pp. 178, 186), the "monstrous and illegal" killing of Sejanus's young children, but we can never know whether Thrasyllus had cast their horoscopes and warned Tiberius that he must do more than scotch the young serpents. If Thrasyllus was an *éminence grise*, anyone who will take the trouble can extrapolate from the extant evidence three different, but not implausible, theories why that shrewd and subtle man made the stars serve a specially implacable animosity.

Is this summary rejection of the story warranted? Obviously we cannot hope ever to ascertain what really happened, and no one would contend that the story as it stands is acceptable in all its details, but is it so utterly implausible that we should simply ignore it? In other words, can we elicit from the text of Tacitus an account which *could* be true, which could be the source of the less circumstantial references to the same event in other writers,<sup>11)</sup> and which we have no grounds for impeaching?

One thing is quite certain. Thrasyllus predicted Tiberius's accession to power with some accuracy, for otherwise Tiberius's confidence in him and faith in the art he professed would be inexplicable. Cramer seems strangely to imply that Thrasyllus may have merely expounded what he read in Tiberius's horoscope, and it is remotely possible that the horoscope, according to the rules that Thrasyllus may have followed, did portend supreme power for Tiberius and the hundreds of other men born at the same time, but such a coincidence is extremely improbable.

Thrasyllus had no need to consult the stars to predict that Tiberius, though then in disgrace and apparently a political nonentity, would succeed Augustus. It was obvious to any intelligent man that if two striplings, boys of fourteen and eleven when Tiberius retired to Rhodes, died or gave proof of incompetence, Augustus would have no feasible

11) These will be considered summarily below. Krappe considers the discrepancies between the stories told by Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio proof of a purely mythical origin, and the differences, for which I shall attempt to account, may influence modern historians, who are probably more moved by the obvious folly of all forms of divination to minimize consideration of Thrasyllus. For example, H.H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero*, p. 372, even implies that it is "uncertain" whether astrology entered into the friendship between Tiberius and the astrologer, and I take it that Ramsay MacMullen, *Enemies of the Roman Order* (Cambridge, Mass. 1966), pp. 132, 140, regards the story of the prediction of Tiberius as "invented after the event," as is probably true of many stories of such predictions, e.g., Tiberius's supposed prediction to Galba (unless it was made to ensure Galba's loyalty in the meantime). Only Ronald Syme, who paraphrases Tacitus without criticizing the details (*Tacitus*, p. 525), evidently sees that Tiberius must have in some way tested the power of Thrasyllus.

alternative but to make Tiberius his successor. Neither of the boys appears to have been robust, and the elder, at least, may early have given proof of a weakness of judgment or nerves beyond what could be attributed to his youth and was in the end charitably attributed to mental aberration resulting from a comparatively slight wound. And if death or manifest incompetence did not eliminate the boys? Thrasyllus, we may be sure, was intelligent enough to see that if Augustus, who was nearing sixty, were to die suddenly, Tiberius could take over at once, as he, who held the *tribunicia potestas* and at least a proconsular *imperium*, had the legal right and duty to do, and as he, given his undoubted prestige with the armies, would have the power to do.

And if Augustus did not die? Thrasyllus doubtless had judicious correspondents at Rome who kept him informed of the political situation of which we, given the "singular lack of historical evidence for the nine years... 6 B.C.-A.D.4,"<sup>12)</sup> have only a few glimpses. Augustus pretended to have "restored the Republic," and the aristocracy, for reasons of its own, pretended to believe him. The populace was permitted the amusement of elections, which could become as exciting as gladiatorial shows, although a choice between Tweedledum and Tweedledee could not alter national or domestic policy. It appears, however, that electoral contests, besides providing wholesome exercise for influential men who coveted what was still regarded as the highest civil office and distinction,<sup>13)</sup> could be used to bring pressure on Augustus with regard to the succession, and it is even possible that the premature grooming of Gaius Caesar as his successor, which so offended Tiberius, was forced on him against his wishes.<sup>14)</sup> We need not speculate about obscure

12) Syme, *The Roman Revolution*, pp. 392f.

13) Probably until the accession of Tiberius, election to consular office bestowed *nobilitas*; see Ernst Stein, *Hermes* 52 (1917) 564-571; cf. *Illinois Classical Studies* 3 (1978) 249-254.

14) Barbara Levick's elaborate reconstruction of the politics of this period, *Latomus* 31 (1972) 779-813; 35 (1976) 301-339, is necessarily in large part conjectural, but her argument that a clique around Julia

political intrigues of which we know so little, but it is certain that the elder Julia was the keystone in the political arch of Tiberius's enemies, and it would have required little prescience to foresee that in the struggle between Tiberius's wife and Tiberius's mother, the patient, astute, and prudent woman would eventually ruin her frivolous, reckless, and libidinous younger rival.

Thrasylus, we may be sure, was intelligent enough to see that Tiberius had an excellent chance to become the next *princeps*, and also to see that he had everything to gain, and nothing to lose, by assuring Tiberius that the stars destined him for supreme power. The prediction was necessarily made privately to Tiberius and kept secret. It would probably be known to no one, if Tiberius died or if, fifteen years or more later, he found himself effectually excluded from what the stars had promised. And in that event, Thrasylus had only to catch the first ship out of Rhodes to put himself securely beyond the reach of a man who had no governmental power. And if, by some mischance, the prediction did become known, not even Thrasylus's competence as an astrologer would be seriously compromised: the data with which Tiberius supplied him must have been inaccurate, or Tiberius had misunderstood as categorical a prediction made with the reservation that there would be one or more critical moments when the astral forces would be in balance and the result uncertain, or some other excuse, plausible to the credulous, could be easily devised.<sup>15)</sup>

---

instigated the election of Gaius in 6 B.C. against the wishes of Augustus will commend itself to all who believe that Augustus, however determined to confine the succession to his own blood-line, was too prudent to precipitate a domestic crisis by contriving the election as consul of a boy who was legally an infant, thus making a mockery of his pretense that he had "restored the Republic."

15) According to Cassius Dio, 58.27.1, Thrasylus, shortly before Tiberius died, had the stars predict that the old man would live another ten years, and the ingenious explanation of that prediction (which, since the astromancer died even before his patron, must have been devised by his son and heir to his mantic business, Tib. Claudius Balbillus) could cover up what had been merely a bad guess. The explanation, however, credits Thrasylus with a calculated deception from a preposterously humanitarian motive, and was probably excogitated to



Thrasylus made the prediction. Tiberius, surely, was not so gullible as to accept a simple statement, and must have inquired into details, concerning which Thrasylus was clever enough to cover shrewd guesses with the ambiguities and provisos that successful soothsayers must always have in store. Even so, we should not expect Tiberius to be fully convinced before the prediction proved to be correct.

This brings us to the obvious flaw in Tacitus's narrative.

---

conceal an astrological expedient to further Thrasylus's intrigues to assure the succession to his granddaughter's paramour, Caligula, on which see Cramer, *op. cit.*, pp. 105ff.

We must keep in mind the fact that Thrasylus, like all professionals, practiced *catarchic* astrology. For an outline of the major astrological theories, see Cramer, pp. 14-44, but for our purposes we need note only a fundamental distinction that is sometimes obscured, even in Cramer's later pages, by use of the term 'fatalistic.' The adjective is indeed applicable to all forms of a doctrine that men's lives are governed by astral influences, but for clarity it should be reserved for the theory that a man's destiny is totally and unalterably fixed by the stars presiding over his nativity, and will be fulfilled, *no matter what subsequently happens*, as is maintained by Apollonius in the passage from the romance cited by Cramer, p. 223. This uncompromising view was held by theorists, but obviously could not commend itself to practitioners, who would have to make categorical predictions and could collect only one fee from a customer. *Catarchic* astrology, on the other hand, was very good for business, since, reduced to its essentials, it held that while the stars at nativity portended a man's destiny, the fulfillment of the portent depended on the man's proper response to stellar influences in every decision he made in the course of his life. The dupe was thus obliged continually to ascertain whether the astral forces were favorable or adverse before he embarked on an undertaking, which would end in failure if begun at an unpropitious moment and might even cancel the destiny portended at his nativity. This ingenious theory not only made the sucker dependent on astromancers throughout his life, but provided an ample margin for explaining away unfortunate guesses. Very intricate calculations are obviously necessary, for the constant motion of the heavens makes not only days but hours and even minutes important in determining stellar influences at conception (!) and birth, and on those calculations depends the significance of equally precise observations at the inception of every undertaking, and, of course, the necessary allowances for latitude and longitude must be made for the places involved. The method reaches its logical culmination today in the antics of actor and others who, from superstition or a desire for publicity, sign contracts and have marriages solemnized under the supervision of an astrologer, who, watching the second-hand of his chronometer, signals the precise instant at which the benign influences of the planets are at maximum intensity. This *catarchic* theory, of course, underlies Tiberius's inquiry whether Thrasylus had computed the stellar forces acting on his own destiny at the time of their interview—and it explains why Tiberius, as Cassius Dio reports, 57.15.7, kept Thrasylus constantly at his side *μαντείῳ τινὶ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν χρώμενος*.

Chapter 21 begins naturally enough: whenever Tiberius consulted Thrasyllus (*quotiens... consultaret*<sup>16)</sup>) on so secret a subject, he would, of course, make sure that they could not be overheard or interrupted, and he would have no attendant except an ignorant but powerful slave, who could serve as bodyguard, if necessary.<sup>17)</sup> But after we have been startled by the tense of *incesserat* and had our suspicion confirmed by *praecipitabat*, we have to understand that what is being described is not a testing of Thrasyllus but Tiberius's habitual behavior toward several or many astrologers. At this point, I am sure, every attentive reader looked hopefully at the apparatus for some peculiarity on which he could hang the obvious emendations, and he may even have scrutinized the facsimile of the Medicean manuscript before despairing. Alas! we must suppose that the text is what Tacitus wrote. As Krappe says, we simply cannot believe that Tiberius indulged in a "wholesale slaughter" of the astrologers at Rhodes, and we must agree with Cramer that, if Tiberius had done so, Thrasyllus (or any man intelligent enough to work the astrological business) would not have blithely accepted an invitation to become another corpse on the rocks or in the sea at the base of the cliff. The fox in Aesop had no difficulty in grasping the significance of footprints that went into the lion's cave but did not return.

Let us assume that the preposterous statement is a blunder, conceivably arising from textual corruption but more probably from the author's uncritical acceptance of what he found in his source.<sup>18)</sup> If a single memorable event was distorted and described as customary—if Tiberius, instead of

16) The subjunctive is tolerable in Tacitus and Silver Latin in general.

17) Tiberius would scarcely have neglected so elementary a precaution, even if the interview took place before the sycophants of Gaius openly volunteered to assassinate the lad's unloved stepfather (Suet. *Tib.*13.1). Since a slave would in most circumstances be more reliable than a *libertus*, I assume that the bodyguard was a slave at the time of the incident and later freed in recognition of his services.

18) On the probable source, see below, p. 142f.

acquiring the habit of feeding inept astrologers to the fish, devised a specific and rigorous test of his new friend's skill and sincerity—the story becomes plausible and even probable. Tiberius at Rhodes was an embittered man, but even if he had not recently been embittered by the conduct of Augustus and others in whom he had placed some confidence, he was no longer a youth, and experience must have taught him a prudently cynical estimate of human nature. He cannot have been so naïf as not to wonder whether the author of such roseate predictions, which could have been devised to excite his own secret but divinable hopes, and which, in the nature of things, could not be verified for years to come, was not a flatterer and a fraud; and it must have occurred to him that a man who induced him to make inquiries that could be represented as treason, might be a spy or *agent provocateur*.<sup>19)</sup> If Tiberius was not to remain in suspense and possibly even in danger, he had to devise some means of assuring himself of his new friend's good faith and competence in the mantic art.

Tiberius, furthermore, was an eminently practical and, indeed, a ruthless man. We must not imagine that our contemporary political leaders were the first to discover that when an inferior threatens their peace of mind and it is not expedient to have him murdered, the obvious thing to do is to instruct a reliable technician to arrange a suitable accident or, if more convenient, a convincing suicide. And when the eminently dispensable man must walk along a narrow path on the edge of a cliff, a muscular and obedient slave is the only technician needed. We may reasonably suppose that if Thrasyllus had failed the test, his foot would have slipped on the path, and his acquaintances would have sagely remarked that the poor man never did have a good head for heights or that he was so professorily absent-minded that he

19) Given Tiberius's prestige with the armies, suspicions that he was planning a *coup d'état* must have arisen soon after his retirement and certainly while he still held the tribunician power and an *imperium* that was perhaps *maius*, although Suetonius (*Tib.* 12.3-13.1) implies that the currency of the suspicions alarmed Augustus only later.

sometimes did not look where he was walking. It would have been a model instance of what the professionals now call neatness and dispatch.

The test that Tiberius devised doubtless seemed adequate and decisive to him. No one could possibly know what he meditated in his own mind, and he need not have instructed his slave until just before he and Thrasyllus retired to the secluded spot chosen for the consultation. We may suppose that after Thrasyllus had glibly expounded what the planets foretold and specifically their catarchic bearing on that particular day,<sup>20)</sup> Tiberius inquired in a casual and off-hand manner whether the astromancer had made a similar computation for himself. Tiberius, we may be sure, avoided exhibiting more than a mild interest in the question, but he did not know, as indeed most men today do not know, that while a man can control his features and voice sufficiently to deceive most others, a skilled and subtle observer can deduce his state of mind from minute and unconscious changes in his lineaments, glances, intonation, and breathing. We may be certain that Thrasyllus had mastered the art that modern "mind readers" exhibit on the stage and modern "psychics" use to dazzle their customers.<sup>21)</sup> The technique of

20) Presumably with reference to some real or feigned project in accordance with the catarchic method (note 15 above).

21) In the classification of magic by the celebrated magician of the Nineteenth Century, Robert-Houdin, as reported by H.E. Evans in his introduction to the articles, chiefly from the *Scientific American*, collected by Albert Hopkins, *Magic* (New York 1898; reprinted 1976), the technique in question here falls in the third category: "secret thought read by an ingenious system of diagnosis and sometimes compelled to take a particular direction by certain subtle artifices." It must be distinguished from most exhibitions of "telepathy," such as those by the famous Houdini, which involve the use of an accomplice, electrical devices, or both. The most common form of mind-reading in this third category is called "muscle reading" by magicians, since it involves contact with the person whose thoughts are being read, usually by holding his or her hand, which enables a skilled operator to detect most of the phenomena now commonly detected by a sphygmomanometer ("lie-detector") and to supplement them by visual observation. When there is no physical contact, the mind-reader, who has developed acute visual and auditory senses by diligent training, must minutely observe the subject's unconscious ideomotor reactions to subtly leading questions or to comments and exclamations made by the mind-reader to give direction

making such observations must have been developed when the art of preying on human credulity advanced beyond the telling of mirific tales with rhetorical effectiveness and the use of prestidigitation and mechanical contrivances to perform miracles.<sup>22)</sup>

Thrasylus pretended to make the long and involved calculations necessary to determine the astral influences on him at that particular moment, covertly watching Tiberius and doubtless noting his unconscious reactions to pertinent comments and exclamations until he was certain that Tiberius's interest was more than casual, whence it would necessarily follow that his own science was being tested. He then pretended—or perhaps, knowing Tiberius, he had no need to pretend—that he was terrified by a discovery that his fate hung in balance at that very moment. It was a safe guess,

---

to the subject's thoughts. Such, obviously, was the position of Thrasylus vis-à-vis Tiberius. The most concise catalogue of the methods of diagnosis may be found in D.H. Rawcliffe's *The Psychology of the Occult* (London 1952; reprinted, New York 1976, under the title *Occult and Supernatural Phenomena*), pp. 379-425, 463-478.

22) I know of no ancient reference to the methods of mind-reading. (The *physiognomonic* whose writings are collected in Förster's Teubner edition seem to have been interested only in determining innate character.) Obviously; however, the techniques would have been closely guarded trade-secrets, perhaps transmitted only orally, and we possess astonishingly little ancient information about thaumaturgic technology. A few miracle-making machines are described by Hero, but we must agree with Robert S. Brumbaugh, *Ancient Greek Gadgets and Machines* (New York 1966), pp. 97, 101f., that many other and more elaborate machines were used in temples to show the way of gods to men. Livy (39.13.12) knew the secret of the miraculous torches that were carried by hysterical women during the Bacchanalian craze, but chemically similar miracles are reported by Suetonius (*Tib.* 14.3), Cassius Dio (54.9.6), and Pausanias (5.27.3) with no indication that those authors did not suppose the phenomena to be of supernatural origin. And the secret of the hallucinatory drugs that were doubtless used to produce religious experiences and thus supplement the effects of overheated imaginations and psychopathic tendencies was so closely kept that one finds no reference to them even in the recent and discerning study of E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley 1951). I note in passing that R. Gordon Wasson, who first identified the *soma* of the Hindus and *homa* of the Zoroastrians as the sacred mushroom (*Amanita muscaria*), believes that several different hallucinogens were used at Eleusis; see his contribution to *Flesh of the Gods*, edited by Peter Furst (New York 1972), pp. 194f. The use of drugs in the various mystery-cults was doubtless a priestly secret. The technique of mind-reading, we may believe, was as successfully kept a trade-secret.

for if Tiberius intended to do no more than renounce his friendship if he failed the test, would it not be the astrologer's cruel fate to be heart-broken by the loss of a beautiful friendship?

Like many a dupe of shrewd soothsayers today, Tiberius was convinced: the stars must have told Thrasyllus what would happen to him if Tiberius gave a significant nod to his slave. Here, at last, was a science of the future! And here was a man whose catarchic prognostications Tiberius would continuously need to guide his own conduct from day to day. We may be certain that Tiberius took Thrasyllus with him when, to the astonishment of the politicians who had deemed him a political has-been, he was recalled to Rome by Augustus in A.D. 2, and if he had any faint and lingering doubts, they vanished when he, doubtless guided by Thrasyllus, became the destined successor of Augustus two years later.

The foregoing is, I believe, an entirely plausible account of what could have happened, and it conforms strictly to the narrative in Tacitus except for the reference to consultation of other astrologers. We naturally have no way of determining that this is what actually happened, but the story receives some support from the consideration that Tiberius must have tested the skill of Thrasyllus before reposing great confidence in him. The future princeps was not a sentimental woman to be charmed by a soothsayer's specious verbiage and unverified claims. Given the circumstances, one cannot suggest a more effective test of the astromancer's powers than the one described, or one that would have seemed more cogent to Tiberius. *Se non è vero, è molto ben trovato.*

Tacitus's source could have been some treatise *de divinatione* that discussed the very problem he raises in the following chapter, but the underlying source must have been favorable to the claims of astrology, for that would explain the one false element in the story, the implication that Tiberius had tried and disposed of a number of incompetent astrologers before finding in Thrasyllus a master of the

science. Professionals who exploit human credulity are always in competition with one another, and with all but the most ignorant victims they find it necessary to explain away the ill-repute of soothsayers and the known failures of the kind of divination they are peddling, and each naturally admits that there are many incompetent or fraudulent practitioners of the art that he, a paragon of learning and integrity, is professing. The standard sales technique of all mystery-mongers was, of course, used by ancient astromancers, producing the opinion that Tacitus reports as held by most of his contemporaries, but does not himself endorse (Ann. 6.22.3):

plurimis mortalium non eximitur, quin primo cuiusque ortu  
ventura destinentur, sed quaedam secus quam dicta sint ca-  
dere fallaciis ignara dicentium: ita corrumpi fidem artis,  
cuius clara documenta et antiqua aetas et nostra tulerit.

A story that Tiberius, having found many wanting, found a genuine expert in Thrasyllus was, of course, a perfect *documentum* to show the *fides artis*.<sup>23)</sup>

The story in Tacitus is plausible. The other extant references to this episode are not. Cassius Dio seems to have used a source that discounted the claims of astrology or, at least, could not believe that Thrasyllus had been warned of his danger by the stars. According to this version,<sup>24)</sup>

23) If, as G.B. Townend guesses *obiter* in his article on the sources of Suetonius, *Hermes* 88 (1960) 115-120, Thrasyllus's son, Tib. Claudius Balbillus, was one of Tacitus's sources, he is the obvious source for stories about his father (cf. note 15 above). Balbillus carried on his father's business and would have had an obvious interest in preconizing it in some work that celebrated his father's "science"; that he was capable of writing such a work and did in fact write on various subjects is shown by Seneca's reference (*Nat. quaest.* 4a.2.13) to him as *perfectus in omni litterarum genere rarissime*. He would, of course, have written after the death of Tiberius and would have had no reason not to conform to the almost universal condemnation of his father's dupe; the suggestion of W. Gundel in Pauly-Wissowa, VI A, 581, that the story about Tiberius's test came from a "vielleicht in Tiberius feindlicher Entstellung geschriebenen Tradition," would thus be verified. And Balbillus, writing in an atmosphere of hostility to the memory of Tiberius and concerned to enhance the prestige of his business, could well have added the detail about what Krappe called the "wholesale slaughter" of inept astromancers.

24) 55.11.1-3; the essential part of this passage comes just before

Tiberius decided to eliminate the one man who knew all his plans (ἐπειδὴ μόνος αὐτῷ πάνθ' ὅσα ἐνενόει συνῆδει), it being unexplained what cogitations Tiberius had confided to Thrasyllus, presumably in conversation, so that the reader is at liberty to imagine anything from a scheme to liquidate the young Caesares to projects to be put into effect when Tiberius at last attained power. Tiberius accordingly decided to throw Thrasyllus ἀπὸ τοῦ τείχους, presumably the city wall, unless we imagine that Tiberius's house resembled a Mediaeval castle—a foolishly public spot for an assassination and a very inconvenient one, since a man walking along a broad parapet would not naturally step close to the crenels, and it would be necessary to wrestle with him before throwing him over, and if, as is implied, Tiberius intended to do the work himself, he was so foolhardy as to take the risk that his victim might take the assailant with him. Before attacking Thrasyllus, however, Tiberius noticed that he had a dejected or downcast countenance (συσθρωπώσαντα αὐτὸν ἰδὼν), and, inquiring, was told that his intended victim suspected that he was in some danger (κίνδυνόν τινα ὑποπεύειν), the verb obviously indicating something less than certainty, so that we must suppose Thrasyllus had a presentiment or even guessed that something in Tiberius's manner boded no good to him. Tiberius, marvelling (θαυμάσας) that Thrasyllus foresaw (προεἶδεν) what he was going to do, thenceforth cherished him. At some later time, Thrasyllus, seeing a ship in the offing, predicted that it brought the news of Tiberius's recall to Rome. The basis for the prediction is not stated, but obviously was not an astrological computation, since Thrasyllus had to see the ship before

---

one of the lacunae in the Marcian codex. The corresponding passages in Xiphilinus and Zonaras are given in Boissevain's edition *ad loc.* It must be noted that while Cassius Dio accepted the story in which we are interested as a proof of astromancy (he has just stated that Tiberius and Thrasyllus had learned from the stars when Lucius and Gaius would die), he introduces this story with καὶ λόγον γε ἔχει, which clearly shows that he is turning to another source, which obviously cannot have been the one (Balbillus?) used by Tacitus. Since Dio certainly would not have attenuated a report of the marvels of astromancy, his source for this particular story (a Roman historian?) must have done so.



divining its errand.

In Byzantine excerpts from what appears to have been a compilation of notable feats of astrologers,<sup>25)</sup> we are told that Tiberius, being for some unstated reason vexed with Thrasyllus (ἀγανακτήσας κατ' αὐτοῦ), decided to pitch him from the wall, but saw that the man looked depressed (ἐσιτύγνασε) and inquired. The exact words of Thrasyllus's reply are quoted: "αἰσθάνομαι μέγιστον κλιμακτῆρα ἐγγύς μου ὄντα." The verb is noteworthy. A separate article is devoted to the ship seen in the offing and bearing news of Tiberius's recall to Rome.

Suetonius (*Tib.* 14.4) combines the two incidents. Tiberius, believing Thrasyllus to be a fraud, because his predictions had not been fulfilled, and a spy, who used his professed art to learn Tiberius's secrets, decided to pitch him into the sea—presumably from a cliff—while they were out strolling together: *cum quidem illum durius et contra praedicta cadentibus rebus ut falsum et secretorum temere conscium, ... dum spatiatur una, praecipitare in mare destinasset.* At the very moment (*eo ipso momento*) that Tiberius is about to give his companion the necessary shove, Thrasyllus is saved by asserting *nave provisiva gaudium afferri*. Now since *provisiva* corresponds to πῶρρωθεν κατιδών in Xiphilinus, it must be taken as meaning only that Thrasyllus descried the ship in the distance and with no implication of any kind of mantic foreknowledge. He was therefore saved only by a coincidence and what could have been merely a lucky guess. Nothing is conceded to his astrological skill, and if one interprets the words *contra praedicta cadentibus rebus* strictly, he is credited with forecasts that were found to be wrong and contrary to what actually happened, with the obvious implication that either Thrasyllus was inept or astrology is fallacious. It is most unlikely that Suetonius altered the tenor of his source, which,

25) Edited by Cumont from a Tenth-Century manuscript, *Catalogus codicum astrologorum Graecorum*, 8.4 (Bruxellis 1921), pp. 99ff. Cumont believes the source of the compilation to have been a complete text of Cassius Dio, but would that text have included the words of Thrasyllus that I quote?

therefore, must have been sceptical of, if not hostile to, the pretensions of the astrologers.

Suetonius, like Tacitus, attributes to Tiberius grave doubts of the astromancer's competence and loyalty, and in his version the coincidental appearance of the ship in the nick of time is a test, which, although not planned by Tiberius, does convince him of Thrasyllus's ability and fidelity.<sup>26)</sup> But the two stories as they stand cannot refer to the same incident, for the implication in Tacitus is that the test took place soon after Tiberius became acquainted with Thrasyllus, presumably soon after Tiberius retired to Rhodes in 6 B.C., whereas the ship obviously arrived in A.D. 2. We cannot suppose that Tiberius twice intended to have Thrasyllus kicked into the Carpathian Sea, but the story about the ship could have a basis in fact. It is not unlikely that Thrasyllus, shrewd as he was, predicted that the ruin of Julia (which he could easily have foreseen) would be followed by the recall of Tiberius, and could even have made the stars advise Tiberius to intercede for his disgraced wife (what better way of regaining the favor of her father?), and then, when Augustus proved obdurate for almost four years and Tiberius's tribunician power and *imperium* expired, Tiberius's faith must have been shaken and Thrasyllus needed all his cunning and ingenuity to devise plausible explanations of his miscalculation. Tiberius could understandably have become impatient or despondent during those years and have begun to reconsider his confidence in the "science" of his "friend"; it is not impossible that the arrival of the ship (which probably bore an insigne identifying it as an official despatch-boat, and which did not outrun reliable information that Augustus was going to yield) did save Thrasyllus from being kicked out of the household in which he had so comfortably ensconced himself.

All this is mere speculation, of course, but it does

26) Suetonius (*Tib.* 14.4) introduces the story with the statement *Thrasyllum... mathematicum, quem ut sapientiae professorem contubernio admoverat, tum maxime expertus est...*

permit us, if we want to speculate some more, to imagine that some Roman historian, having Tacitus's source before him but refusing to believe in the "wholesale slaughter," and refusing to believe in the catarchic astrology by which Thrasyllus was said to have become aware of his peril, but attracted by the notion of kicking the magus into the briny deep, tried to make sense of the story by combining it with an account, conceivably in the same source,<sup>27)</sup> of a crisis in the relations between Tiberius and his soothsayer during the time in which it seemed that not even the ruin of Julia would procure the recall of Tiberius. If there was such an historian, neither his work nor Tacitus's source was known to Cassius Dio, who, we may suppose, used a historian who, although perhaps equally sceptical of astromancy, kept the two incidents separate.

With the exception of the brief scholium on Juvenal,<sup>28)</sup> Tacitus alone gives a version of the story that appears to confirm the claims of the pseudo-science, and that version (with one correction) is the only plausible one. It could be the source of the other versions, if these were transmitted through writers who quite reasonably refused to admit the possibility of the astrological calculation by which Thrasyllus was reported as having convinced Tiberius of his scientific skill. And now, if we suppose that the incident described by Tacitus actually took place, we can go on to speculate whether Tiberius and Rome would not have been much happier, had Tiberius made the gesture that would have instructed his slave that Thrasyllus was destined to meet with

27) If the hypothesis that Balbillus wrote about his father (note 23 above) is correct, he could have described Tiberius as impatient at this time and angry with Thrasyllus, thus illustrating the folly of doubting the infallible science of a great astrologer. A sceptic, of course, would have given his own interpretation to the story.

28) The scholium (see note 2 above) says that Tiberius wanted to hurl Thrasyllus *in pelagum quasi conscium promissae dominationis*, which implies, of course, that the astrologer had really ascertained the future. If it is not futile to look for logic in so condensed a statement, it implies a belief in strictly fatalistic astrology (note 15 above), since under the catarchic system Tiberius would not have been so mad as to destroy an expert whose services he would need, as he is reported to have in fact used them, καθ' ἐκδύστην ἡμέραν.

a fatal accident on the way home.

When we try to account for the actions of Tiberius during his principate, we must (alack!) take into account the possible or probable influence of Thrasyllus and estimate, as best we may, his putative character and ambitions, but my only concern here has been to sketch a conjectural and necessarily unverifiable hypothesis (itself based largely on historical reconstructions that are probable rather than certain<sup>29)</sup>) that provides a reasonable explanation of a passage in Tacitus and of the discordant versions of the story in other historical sources. We are dealing with one of the points, so sadly numerous in both ancient and more recent history, at which von Ranke himself would have despaired of ever ascertaining *wie es eigentlich gewesen wäre*.

University of Illinois at Urbana

29) I have cited at each point the scholar whose views I have followed; to rehash debates over disputed points would have served only to multiply pages. Much of the evidence I have used is, of course, open to challenge. To begin with, the commonly accepted identification of the editor of Plato with the astromancer, and of the latter's relationship to Tib. Claudius Balbillus and Ennia Thrasylla, could be disputed. This is a cardinal point, for if Thrasyllus, instead of being a scholar of distinction who could plausibly pretend to a disinterested "scientific" interest, was a professional soothsayer living by his wits, Tiberius's confidence in him becomes less explicable, and a captious critic could doubt that astrology was the real link between them; a nimble imagination could even gratuitously suggest an analogy with the celebrated Dr. Dee of Elizabethan times, who used astrology as an instrument of espionage and is credited with having thus uncovered at least one plot against the Queen's life: see Richard Deacon, *A History of the British Secret Service* (New York 1969), pp. 12f., 16, 30, 41, with the references to his biography of Dee (London 1968). The circumstances of Tiberius's retirement to Rhodes have been endlessly discussed, and even his legal powers may be questioned. It is only probable that he continued to hold until 1 B.C. his tribunician power and the *imperium* that is principally inferred from the exercise of power recorded by Suetonius, *Tib.* 11.3, although Barbara Levick (1972, p. 781) refers to a "wealth of evidence" in a work by C.E. Stevens that I have not located. If Tiberius did hold an *imperium maius*, and if Augustus had died shortly after 6 B.C., his enemies at Rome might or might not have been able to prevent or block his exercise of it. And so on. With so many uncertainties in the evidence or modern interpretations of it, one can only select the views that seem most probable as a basis for more tenuous speculations.

## MUSSATO'S COMMENTARY ON SENECA'S TRAGEDIES:

## NEW FRAGMENTS

ALEXANDER MacGREGOR

In 1969 Anastasios Ch. Megas published from the single MS then known 104 fragments of the Commentary on Seneca's tragedies by Albertino Mussato (d. 1329), along with an edition of his Arguments to each play.<sup>1)</sup> In 1975 I uncovered three new MSS containing 70 different Commentary fragments among them, including 20 hitherto unknown. These last will be published here, along with a fresh recension of the MSS.

Out of some 370 extant MSS of Seneca's tragedies only three contain more than a single fragment of Mussato's Commentary:<sup>2)</sup>

-- British Library Add. 17381 (membr.; written 1475 by Raphael de Marcatellis, abbot of St. Bavon, Ghent.) Illuminated; angular Flemish gothic. The Seneca-text primitive: A- and V- readings abundant.<sup>3)</sup> Arguments of Mussato; 104 fragments of the Commentary,

1) *Albertini Mussati Argumenta Tragoediarum Senecae; Commentarii in L.A. Senecae Tragoedias Fragmenta Nuper Reperta*, ed. Anastasios Ch. Megas (Salonika 1969); rec. A. MacGregor, *CP* 67.1 (1972) 64-69; R. Desmed, *Scriptorium* 25 (1971) 82-84, who prizes Leo's authority on the A-vulgate. Megas' 1969 publication contains the remains of Mussato on the Senecan corpus; Mussato's work on the *Octavia* had been published separately: *O Prooumanistikos Kuklos tes Padouas kai oi Tragodies tou L.A. Seneca* (Salonika 1967), 64-68, 82-87. For a description of MSS used by Megas see *Albertini Mussati Argumenta* etc., 1f. For his recension, 3-25, with a stemma on 22.

2) I have seen 365; adequate reports (by Stuart among others) exist for 12 more. Megas lists 18 MSS containing the Arguments; add Bologna B. Univ. 2405; Br. Libr. Arundel 116 (fragment only); Paris Bibl. Nat. 8261; Paris Bibl. Arsenal 1048.

3) For V(at. Lat. 2829) as the ancestor of the vulgate (A) rec., see MacGregor, *TAPA* 102 (1971) 327-56; contra Tarrant ed. *Agamemnon* (Cambridge 1976), 74-81, who concedes that V is the extant MS closest to that ancestor. See also Philip, *CQ* n.s. 18 (1968) 150-79.

set off with his name; also excerpts from Treveth's Commentary, likewise set off by name. Published by Megas (1969); siglum Lo. there and here.

-- Göteborg B. Univ. 26 (membr.; xiv) Minuscula gothica; Italian. Ff. 172, a rescript (the original text has not been recovered).<sup>4)</sup> Des. *Herc. Oet.* 1802; stray leaves lost earlier: *Theb.* 627 -- *Hipp.* 991-1056; *Med.* 682-746. The Seneca-text is primitive; the A-lacunae (including *Med.* 1009-27) are present 1 m. Arguments of Mussato for seven plays: *Thy.*, 20<sup>v</sup>; *Theb.*, 38<sup>r</sup>; *Oed.*, 67<sup>r</sup>; *Tro.*, 83<sup>r</sup>; *Ag.*, 114<sup>r</sup>; *Oct.*, 129<sup>v</sup>; *H.O.*, 145<sup>r</sup>. There are 67 fragments of Mussato set off by name, 19 of these not in Lo.; as in Lo., there are also extracts from Treveth set off by name. MS not known to Megas; siglum Got.

-- Vat. Lat. 1641 (membr.; xv) A fine (Roman?) humanistica.<sup>5)</sup> Ff. 219. The Seneca-text is virtually identical to that of Lo. Six fragments of the Commentary, all found in Lo. or Got. as well; Megas used Vat. for the Arguments and fr. 1 only. Copious scholia from Treveth, who goes unnamed.<sup>6)</sup> Siglum in Megas, V<sub>1</sub>; here, Vat.

Two MSS contain fr. 1 only:

-- Laur. 37.1 (membr.; xiv). Gothica rotunda; Italian. Ff. 201, Arguments of Mussato ff. 2<sup>r</sup>-6<sup>v</sup>. A heavily interpolated  $\psi$ -text, unlike that of cett. Known to Megas but not used; the MS preserves a longer version of fr. 1 than that printed by Megas. Copious scholia from Treveth, along with the Arguments of "Lutatius" (potted from Treveth).<sup>7)</sup>

4) Cf. Tønnes Kleberg, *Catalogus Codicum Graecorum et Latinorum Bibliothecae Universitatis Gothoburgensis* (Göteborg; ed. 2, 1974), pp. 51f. Kleberg identifies the Arguments but not the scholia as Mussato's; he refers to E. Pellegrin, *Manuscrits d'auteurs latins de l'époque classique conservés dans les bibliothèques publiques de Suède* (Paris 1955), pp. 7-33; and to Ezio Franceschini's edition: *Studi e Note di Filologia Latina Medievale* (Milan 1938); but not to Megas, unfortunately. The Göteborg MS, of unknown provenance, was bought in London in 1920; its features do not square with Stuart's descriptions of MSS in private hands ca. 1908-14 (Trinity College Cambridge MS Add. d 63).

5) Cf. Stuart's evaluation: "But the text is not careful: many words in wrong order, some omissions and a few mistakes. Many readings of *psi*... Its text is rather disappointing, but far from bad... Seems somewhat closely related to Barb. 138" (Trinity College Cambridge MS Add. b57). So, e.g., *Phae.* 718 *nephas* (shared with Barb. 138 alone of 330 MSS); 831 *pariter* Vat., *pari* Barb. (V $\psi$ ). On balance Vat. resembles Lo. more than Barb.

6) I tracked down 28 unattributed lengthy scholia in Vat.; nothing of Mussato, all belonged to Treveth's Commentary. Absent a printed text, I collated Vat. against Vat. Lat. 1650: cf. Marco Palma, *It. Med. e Uman.* 16 (1973) 317-22, for its date. Vat.'s marginalia at *H.F.* 560 = Ussani 88.13 -- 89.9; at *H.F.* 1071 = Ussani 149.4 -- 149.13. Cf. Vincenzo Ussani, Jr., ed., Nicolai Treveti *Expositio Herculis Furentis* (Rome 1959).

7) First edited by Rudolf Peiper, *De Senecae Tragoediarum vulgari Lectione (A) Constituenda* (Breslau 1893), 161-64; then Franceschini, *op. cit.*, 36-39, whose version hews closer to Treveth.

-- Ambros. L 53 sup. (membr.; xv). Gothica rotunda; Italian. A miscellany: the Arguments of Mussato, used by Megas, ff. 4-12<sup>v</sup>; fr. 1, f. 13. No Seneca-text. Siglum in Megas, A4.

The authenticity of the Commentary fragments is easily established.<sup>8)</sup> With two exceptions (fr. 1A and 5A) each fragment in Got., as in Lo., is a separate marginal scholium signed with Mussato's name. This with good reason; Got. also contains scholia derived from the Commentary of Treveth (fl. 1316);<sup>9)</sup> these are signed *Trev.* Someone at the head of the tradition thought to distinguish the competing scholiasts; at times their contradictory views of the same passage are cited. Vat. is slipshod: only two of its Mussato fragments are signed (viz., fr. 7 and fr. 14).

The MSS carrying the fragments are clearly independent of each other. Got. has 19 fragments not in Lo.; Lo. 56 not in Got.; Vat. enjoys one found in Got. but not Lo., one found in Lo. but not Got.; since it gives no sign of conflation, it too is independent. Finally, the new text from Laur. is unique.

Fortunately for recension, many fragments exist in two or three MSS; see *Table I*. The variants therein are collected in *Appendix II*, but, given the dubious integrity of scholia in general, the variants usually demonstrate the willfulness of an individual scribe, not the mutual relationship of the MSS.

8) There is no difference between the contents of the old fragments and the new. Mussato's scholia fall into six categories, roughly: allegorical, metrical, paraphrastic, genealogical, scriptural parallel, and Ovidian parallel. Lo. and Got. both enjoy a fair share of each; there is a high overall correlation between the MSS:  $r = +.94$ . If totals in each category for Got. and Lo. are compared  $\chi^2 = 8.8$ ,  $p. \approx .05$  (possibly significant) with 3 d.f.; understandable: the new fragments do include rather more parallels, from Ovid and from Scripture. Space does not permit full discussion; for  $\chi^2$  and  $r$ , cf. M.J. Moroney, *Facts from Figures* (Baltimore 1968), pp. 258 and 286f.

9) Cf. Palma, *op. cit. supra* (n. 6) for the definitive account of the early history of Treveth's text; he identifies Vat. Lat. 1650 as a presentation codex of 1317. See also his *Nicola Trevet Commento alle Troades di Seneca* (Rome, "Temi e Testi" 22, 1977).

Table I

Number of fragments in:		Total number of fragments in:			
		Lo.	Got.**)	Vat.	Laur.
Lo. solus	54*)	54	-	-	-
Got. solus	18	--	18	-	-
Vat. solus	0	--	-	-	-
Laur. solus	1	--	-	-	1
Lo. Got. ( $N_{\gamma\lambda}$ )	45	45	45	-	-
Lo. Vat.	1	1	-	1	-
Got. Vat.	1	-	1	1	-
Lo. Got. Vat.	3	3	3	3	-
Lo. Got. Laur.	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
Total number of different frags.	124*)	104*)	67 ( $N_{\lambda}$ )	6	Total number of 2 frags.in each MS. ( $N_{\gamma}$ )

\*) includes five fragments after H.O. 1802      \*\*) des. H.O. 1802.

N.B.: Estimated original length of Mussato's Commentary is 138.2 fragments. Disregarding fragments after H.O. 1802, original total  $X = (N_{\lambda} N_{\gamma}) / N_{\lambda\gamma}$ .

Got., Lo., and Vat. are available together in Fragments 7, 19, and 94. Small omissions (or additions) apart, Got. stands alone 5 times (preferable variant at 7.5; indifferent ones at 7.5 and 7.13; variant word order at 19.1 and 94.2); Lo. thrice (indifferent variant at 7.14, corruptions at 7.6 and 7.12); Vat. once (at 7.14). Got. emerges somewhat more correct than is Lo.; Vat. is about on a par with Got., but appears a little closer to Lo. than to Got. (so also in fr. 19 and 94, where Vat. and Lo. agree in lacunae; see below).

To turn to pairings: first Got. and Lo. Got. is slightly better at spelling (e.g., 9.4 *Cadmus*; 86.2 *Niger Pons*; 89.2 et al., *supra*; 90.3 *Pyrrhyn*; the sum offset by such as 80.1 *Calci-one*). Got. usually enjoys the preferable word order (e.g., 62.1; 69.9; 69.10; 77.2), although it ruins a pentameter with a transposition at 84.5. The reading of Got. is right, anticipating Megas, at 37.2 *clamat* and 63.4 *solus*; right also at 43.2; 66.2; 80.3; 84.6 and 99.3 *vestros*; indifferent or



wrong at 12.4 and 71.3; wrong at 5.4; 9.1; 88.9; 92.2; 93.2; and 99.3 *illa* 1 m. At 99.3 its *favores* is a clear interpolation.<sup>10)</sup> In sum, Lo. and Got., quarreling over littles, are of roughly equal worth; Lo. is perhaps a little too dull, Got. a little too correct.

More striking is the lacuna in Lo. and Vat. in fr. 19 (*Med.* 301), a scheme for anapaestic dimeters: ...*tertium daptilum vel spondeum, quartum et ultimum anapesticum spondeum vel iambum et raro troceum*: so Got. (presumably the fourth foot iamb reflects corruption or medieval orthography -- *loco* in 328, say, or *ether* in 310). But Lo. and Vat. give only *tertium daptilum vel spondeum et iambum vel raro troceum*. Here *et* must do the work of the ordinal; even then the scheme is incorrect. Clearly, a *saut du même au même* occurred: *tertium daptilum vel spondeum [quartum ... spondeum] vel iambum et raro troceum*. A subsequent scribe knew that two dimeters make four feet, and interchanged *vel* and *et*.

This lacuna tells us two things: (1) the common ancestor of Vat. and Lo. was capable of willful interpolation; (2) the retention here by Got. of text lost elsewhere helps to establish the *bona fides* of Got. wherever it has the longer text.

Vat. can be paired against Lo. *solus* in Fragments 1 and 14, where it spells *Tros* and *Astianactem* better than Lo. does; but its omission of *et* from *Iulum et Ascanium* smacks of interpolation based on the *Aeneid*. In Fragment 1 Vat. and Lo. are joined by Laur. and Ambros. L 53. Vat. avoids unique blunders of Lo. at 1.1, of Ambros. at 1.8 and 1.17, having one of its own at 1.19. Vat. and Laur. agree at 1.5 and 1.12

10) Whatever Mussato had in mind here, it was not Seneca. Alcmena says that if her son Hercules can die, a *fortiori* the gods should fear death themselves. Mussato instead starts with irrelevancy *nescit quis quid sibi evenire debeat*. He goes on: *Et quare habeatis timere, quia ille, qui faciebat timores nostros, evanuit in modicum cinerem*. This can only be paraphrasing her address to the gods: 'What reason do you have to fear? For he who made ... has shrunk into a bit of ash.' He who what? Who made the gods afraid, I suppose: *faciebat vestros timores*, combining the best in Got. and Lo. Whatever the case, Mussato is a far fetch from Seneca; Got.'s desperation is understandable.

*phy(sici)*.<sup>11)</sup> But Vat. is badly worsted by Got. in their one pairing (fr. 7A); Vat. has six blunders against it.

The various MSS pairings thus yield a "circular triad":<sup>12)</sup> Vat. bests Lo. in *their* pairings; Lo. bests Got. in *theirs*, only Got. bests Vat. in the last. The fact means that the MSS are too erratic to be ranked in order of preference. Both Vat. and Got. interpolate; Lo. itself does not, apparently. Laur. can be dismissed in a word. It is strikingly careless, standing alone 18 times; it is closer to Vat. than to the others. In sum, the four MSS, clearly independent to start with, each appear descended from the archetype at a few removes at most; Got. stands isolated, both because of interpolation on its part and the conjunctive lacunae of Lo. and Vat.<sup>13)</sup>

A little additional light can be shed on the kinship of the MSS by the Arguments. To discuss the *Arg. in Thy.*, available in all the MSS, enough that Got. stands with Lo. and Vat. against Megas' subfamilies  $\alpha$  and  $\chi$  (five MSS in sum) some 60 times, against his  $A_3$  and  $P_1$  22 times. Got. thus belongs in the  $\epsilon$ -subfamily, along with Lo., Vat., and Ambros., the only other Commentary-carrying MSS. The disagreements among the  $\epsilon$ -MSS are instructive:

- 6 *illos filios ad aram* Got. Lo. Ambros.: a. a. i. f. Vat.
- 7 *et Got.:* ac Lo. Vat. Ambros.
- 10 *advertant* Got. Ambros., Lo. p.c.: av- Vat. Lo. a.c.
- 14 *suggestione* Got. Ambros.: subg- Lo. Vat.
- 16 *sene suo* Got.: suo sene Lo. Vat. Ambros.
- 20 *mandet* Got. Lo. Vat.: -at Ambros. a.c.
- 24 *revocet via* Got. Ambros.: r. viam Lo. Vat.
- 37 *suspiciosa* Got. Lo. Ambros.: suspitione Vat.
- 40 *parati* Got. Lo. a.c. Vat. Ambros.: patrati Lo. p.c.
- 43 *consistit* Got. Vat. Ambros.: constitit Lo.
- 56 *ut* Got.: quod Lo. Vat. Ambros.
- 56 *sepe lienda* Got. Lo. Vat.: -o Ambros.
- 58 *illius* Got. Lo. Ambros.: om. Vat.

11) *Phy* could be the abbreviation for *philosophi* or for *physici*: cf. A. Cappelli, *Dizionario de Abbreviature Latine ed Italiane* (Milan 1973) 272.

12) See Moroney, *op. cit.*, (n. 8) 343.

13) Vat. and Lo. are gemelli in their Seneca-texts, as in their Mussa- to Commentary-texts (v. supra, p.153). In both realms Got. is sometimes more primitive; it seems their uncle, not a parent.

Each MS stands alone two or three times: Vat. is interpolated, the others desert the subarchetype  $\epsilon$  for "correct" readings found in other subfamilies. At 10, 14, and 24 Got. and Ambros. stand against Lo. and Vat., as in the Commentary. Lo. and Ambros. were gemelli in Megas' stemma, with Vat. their nephew; Got., Ambros., and Lo. now stand together. Vat. remains inferior, qualitatively if not stemmatically, as before.

Thus the MSS which carry more or less of Mussato's Commentary form the equally cohesive  $\epsilon$ -family on the basis of his Arguments. But Megas has  $\epsilon$  depend on no fewer than five subarchetypes in turn, the ancestors of the remaining extant MSS as well, which possess nothing of the Commentary. Consequently, either the Commentary was deleted from the other Argument-MSS, this many times independently, to survive only in the  $\epsilon$ -family at the very bottom of the stemma; or the Commentary had a tradition separate from that of the Arguments, whence the  $\epsilon$ -family derived it. Neither alternative is very attractive.

(1) It is unlikely in the extreme that the non- $\epsilon$  scribes, trying to weed all Mussato out of their scholia, should severally succeed at that task the while they severally succeeded in *preserving* all ten of his equally conspicuous Arguments. If the Commentary did in fact descend along the same stemma as the Arguments, the largest chunks might perhaps be found in the stemmatically most remote family, but we should expect traces to survive in stemmatically superior families. We do not have traces, we have nothing whatsoever.

(2) Or suppose that the Commentary had a tradition separate from the Arguments; then it is a coincidence that Lo., Got., and Vat. bear the same relationship to each other in the Commentary as in the Arguments. But such a coincidence is highly improbable.<sup>14)</sup>

14) If it is assumed that the Arguments and the Commentary have independent, uncorrelated traditions, then it is a coincidence that the three MSS enjoy the same relationship to each other in their text of the Arguments as they do to each other thanks to the fact that they possess the Commentary. Now, each MS with the Commentary enjoys a 1/12

There is a way over the horns of the dilemma. Granted that Megas' stemma is useful as a way of *classifying* the MSS, as a description of their descent it is highly improbable.<sup>15)</sup> It must be modified so as to allow  $\epsilon$  -- viz., Lo., Got., Vat., and Ambros. -- direct access to  $\epsilon$  for their Arguments and Commentary-fragments both, without going through the subarchetypes of seven alien MSS. So much for recension. It boils down to the fact that the MSS, each in possession of fragments not in the others, are ipso facto independent and indispensable. But none is especially trustworthy.

In presenting the new fragments I have followed Megas' 1969 numeration; his numeration for the *Octavia* fragments of 1967 was superseded in 1969 by one encompassing all ten plays. The new fragments are put into the series of 1969, with A, B, etc. to mark them as coming after the original fragment of that number; I have also counted as new fragments any continuation at least a sentence long. Freshly discovered material can thus be distinguished at a glance. An apparatus for the new fragments is given in *Appendix II*; for those already known, in *Appendix III*.

ALBERTINI MUSSATI COMMENTARII  
FRAGMENTA NUPERRIME REPERTA

*Fr. 1A (Herc. Fur. 1). Sed cum ista teneat allegoriam ideo aliqua de ipsa allegoria sentimus, unde notandum est quod pro ioue debemus assumere hominem uirtuosum qui uirtutes amplectitur in hac uita et eas reinuenit*

---

chance of having a given MS its closest kin with respect to the Arguments, there being 13 MSS in all with the Arguments. So, if Vat. is Lo.'s closest kin with respect to the Commentary, there is only 1/12 chance that we would find that Vat. is also Lo.'s closest kin with respect to the Arguments. Probabilities are multiplicative for simultaneous occurrence: the probability is  $(1/12)^3$  or .00058 that the three MSS would have the same MSS their closest kin in Arguments and Commentary both. This is the likelihood that Arguments and Commentary descend by separate channels, and it is safely below the generally accepted maximum for statistical significance, .001.

15) For the difference between a mere classification and a taxonomy that reflects descent, see Ernst Mayr, *Principles of Systematic Zoology* (New York 1969), 68f.

5 collocatas apud deum in sede stabili et renitenti sicut  
stelle sunt. iunonem uero hic debemus capere pro carna-  
litate fragili et ignara que semper hanc odit uirtutem  
et exertitia uirtuosa. iuxta illud caro semper aduersa-  
tur spiritui et spiritus carni. ideo bene poete finxe-  
10 runt (et in hoc quasi omnes concordant) iunonem rabio-  
sam et quod semper querimoniis conterat uerba sua, ut  
patet apud uirgilium in primo enide, dum conqueritur de  
salute enee, ubi dicit *gens inimica michi thironum nauicat  
equor* [1.67]. est et alia naturalis hystoria suma ratio,  
15 per quam poete illam sic rabiosam fingunt quod iuno pon-  
nitur pro aere. et aer dicitur ab *a*, quod est *sine*, et  
*heris*, quod est *lis*, quasi *sine lite* per contrarium: nam  
aer est semper in aliqua uentorum et tempestatum lite  
quod calida semper expugnant cum frigidis et humida cum  
20 siccis. sic carnis fragilitas numquam quiescit quin ali-  
quo uexetur impetu auaritie uel ambitionis uel superbie  
odiositatis miserie uel tedii et similium. conqueritur  
ergo iuno, id est caro, de ioue, id est de uirtute et  
contemplatione, quod patet per introductionem istarum  
25 concubinarum, et primo de cynosura que interpretatur  
prudentia, cuius remigio nauigant mare tempestatum uite  
parentis. refugiunt incomoda turbinum. per europam que  
uenit de partibus orientalibus intelligas iustitiam que  
depellit omnem sensualitatem, quod homo iustus non de-  
30 clinat a dextris neque sinistris. per athlantides debe-  
mus capere temperantiam que depellit omnem superfluita-  
tem, quod, quando sol transit per eas, producuntur plu-  
uie que irrigant siccitatem. similiter deificauit iupiter  
orionem qui ortus est sine amixtione, quod impetra-  
35 tur fortitudo que aduersitatibus non frangitur nec pros-  
peris elevatur, sed omnia uincit et omnia superat. as-  
sumpsit iupiter damnem, per quam debemus intelligere do-  
num spiritus sancti, qui refulget surgente uirtute fidei  
que pingitur aurata. deificauit etiam tindaridas geminos,  
40 per quod signum significatur caritas, que duo precepit,  
id est, ut diligas dominum deum et proximum tuum sicut

te ipsum. insuper assumpsit iupiter et deificari fecit  
 puellam ygnasiacam, que interpretratur spes. et sic qui-  
 libet uirtuosus assummit omnes istas vii uirtutes, qua-  
 45 tuor cardinales et tres theologas. *Nota de inuentiua*. sci-  
 endum est quod inuentiue sicut inuestigatiue actus sunt  
 ingeniari, experiri, apprehendere, concipere, raciocina-  
 ri. ingenium autem est extensio intellectus ad incogni-  
 torum cognitionem. experientia uero est certitudo rerum  
 50 facta per sensum. apprehensio uero est acceptio complexa  
 intellectus ut quam homo est animal uel homo est animal  
 risibile. raciocinatio uero est acceptio argumentiua in-  
 tellectus ut si homo contra animal est, ut, si homo est  
 animal, homo est sensible et patet numerus. nam inuesti-  
 55 gatio aut extenditur ad cognoscendum et tunc est inge-  
 nium.

*Fr. 5A (Herc. Fur. 592)*. Allegorice: in parte ista Her-  
 cules ab inferis reversus impetrat veniam a Phebo ex eo  
 quia Cerberum extulit qui eius aspectu celum et aerum  
 infecit, et spuma oris eius cicuta exorta est. qui Cer-  
 5 berus dicitur *Creos boros* grece, id est carniū vorator  
 [Isidore *Etym.* 11.3.33] habens tria guttura. ideo autem  
 dicitur Herculem ab inferis extulisse Cerberum quia ipse  
 Hercules uirtuosissimus devicit Cerberum et extrassit  
 ab inferis, qui interpretatur voracissimus et pro vitio  
 10 gule ponitur, quod vitium infernale est et triplex gut-  
 tur habere dicitur propter triplicem conditionem vitii  
 gule: nam gulosi aliqui in quantitate, aliqui in quali-  
 tate, et aliqui in utroque sunt.

*Fr. 7A (Phae. 275)*. *Geminus cupido*: dicitur a gemina fare-  
 tra seu sagipta scilicet plumbea et aurea; faretratus  
 depingitur cum geminis sagiptis: nudus, quia voluptas a  
 nudis peragitur; pharetratus, ut Remigius<sup>16)</sup> ait, quia  
 5 criminis perpetrati conscientiam stimulat tandem; puer,  
 quia magis dominatur in pueris, uel quia sermones aman-  
 tium scimpleni sunt sicut inuolationes infantium.

16) I.e., Remigii Autissiodorensis *Commentum in Martianum Capellam*,  
 ed. Cora Lutz (Leiden 1962), p. 81 (ad 1.8.22).

Fr. 7B (*Phae.* 1123). Chorus Actheniensium metro anapestico querelam fudit.

Fr. 7C (*Phae.* 1156). Hic ponitur flebilis lamentatio phedre circa funus Ypolititi.

Fr. 7D (*Phae.* 1167). *Amore coniugum*: quia Anthiopem uxorem suam et matrem Ypolititi occidisti gladio, Adrianam deseruisti, me nimium dilexisti, qua filium tuum propter me occidi fecisti et semper es nocens.

Fr. 50A (*Oct.* 481). *parentis*: Iulii cesaris quia sibi successit.

Fr. 62A (*Oct.* 706). *Talis emersam*: Tangit fabulam qualiter peleus pater achillis habuit Thetim dum ipsa Thetis mutaretur in uarias figuras. tamen oportuit quod ipsa consentiret. quere xi ovidii metha. ubi dicitur "Tum demum  
5 ingemuit." [*Met.* 11.263]

Fr. 69A (*Oct.* 927). Construe sic. dies est semper metuenda nobis que dies uoluitur per uarios casus.

Fr. 75A (*Herc. Oet.* 173). Metrum anapesticum est supra notatum et est conquestio Ioles dicentis ego dimitto flere omnia communia mala et alia.

Fr. 82A (*Herc. Oet.* 233). Nutrix loquitur in Deianiram intra se clamans sub interiectione (*sic*) exclamantis seu dolentis. quod quando uxor et pellex alicuius ducte sunt in uno domo ut se uicissim uideant seuissime sunt. et  
5 ponit duas comparationes, primo de Silla et Cercidi. que sunt duo maria in Sicilia apud Ethnam que cum iunguntur obuia secum luctantur et semper inquieta sunt. dicit quod nulla fera magis timenda est quam uxor et pellex.

Fr. 82B (*Herc. Oet.* 366). *Archadia*: in Archadia rapuit unam Corebantem de palestra et strupauit eam et illa excidit, id est relicta fuit.

Fr. 84A (*Herc. Oet.* 404). *Facibus* et alia *Heuristeus licet*: Heuristeus hystorialiter fuit rex Magne Grecie et erat tantus et posset imperari (*sic*) Herculi quicquid uellet; et timens eum quasi emulum ne maior eo efficeretur,  
5 iubebat ei ut ad monstra et tyrannos quicumque appare-

bant iret, ut uictus succumberet, quemadmodum Saul imperabat David graua per que eum de mundo tolleret. et fingitur quod Juno ut malus spiritus suadebat Sauli. et tamen succubuit Saul David et Heuristeus Herculi sicut  
 10 habetur intra finem huius tragedie, ubi dicit Hercules deificatus matri, et penas Euristeo dabit.

*Fr. 85A (Herc. Oet. 773). Procedere:* id est, dic michi an sit mortuus; quod si Hercules non est mortuus, bene possum inde precedere (*sic*) et sic si ipsum gladio demum perfodit. unde Ovidius Heroydum in ultimo epistole Deianire "Et tu lux oculis hodierna nouissima nostris Virque sed o possis et puer Ille, uale." [*Her. 8.167-68*]

*Fr. 88A (Herc. Oet. 1139). Ne quis:* de gigantibus etiam concordat diuina Scriptura, quod fuerunt ab initio temporum de quibus Salomon, libro Sapientie, c. 18, "Sed ab initio cum perirent superbi gigantes." [*18.12, ut.vid.*]

*Fr. 89A (Herc. Oet. 1185). Vires Amazon:* similem querelam fecit Ovidius de morte Achillis qui mortuus fuit manu Paridis ut legitur 13 methamorphoseon ubi dicitur "At si femineo fuerat tibi marte cadendum / Thermodonthiaca malles cecidisse securi." [*12.610-11*]

*Fr. 90A (Herc. Oet. 1247). Quid per tonantem:* poterat Hercules dicere verba Ecclesiastes 2 capite "Quid enim proderit homini de universo labore suo et afflictione spiritus qua sub sole cruciatus est? cuncti dies eius doloribus et erumnis pleni sunt, nec per noctem mente quiescit." [*2.22-23*]

*Fr. 92A (Herc. Oet. 1309). Titanas:* fabulam de gigantibus qui voluerunt preliari cum diis habes primo libro methamorphoseon: "Neve foret terris securior ordinis ether Affectasse ferunt regnum celeste gigantes." [*1.151-52*]

*Fr. 95A (Herc. Oet. 1554). Sic habetur in Job.* "homo mortuus nudatus atque consumptus ubi quaeso est?" [*14.10*]

*Fr. 99A (Herc. Oet. 1790). Tracis:* id est, siquis voluerit vindicari pro gregibus adeptis per Herculem a Gerione.



APPENDIX I:  
REGISTER OF FRAGMENTS

Got.: 5 7-10 12 17 19 21 27 37 40 43 44 46 48 57 62-66 68 69 71-73  
76-82 84-86 88-97 99; 5A 7A 7B 7C 7D 50A 62A 69A 75A 82A 82B  
84A 85A 88A 89A 90A 92A 95A 99A

Vat.: 1 7 7A 14 19 94

Laur.: 1 1A

Lo.: 1-104; Lo. solus: 2-4 6 11 13 15 16 18 20 22-26 28-36 38-39 41  
42 45 47 49-56 58-61 67 70 74 75 83 87 98 100-04

APPENDIX II:

APPARATUS FOR NEW FRAGMENTS FROM GOT., VAT., AND LAUR.

Fr. 1A (Laur. solus); 7 *odit scripsi: odio*; 45 *Nota de inventiva ad finem: spurium, ut videtur, eadum manulitteris paullo minoribus exaratum.* - Fr. 5A *sine nomine Mussati*; 9 *voracissimus scripsi: voracis-si*<sup>3</sup>. - Fr. 7A (Got. et Vat.) *continuum e fr. 7 in Got.*; 2 *phare-tratus et alatus Vat.*; 3 *cum om. Vat.*; 4 *ut Remigius ait: ut remugiat Vat.*; 5 *consciam Vat.*; *tandem Got.: mentem Vat.*; 7 *seimpleni Vat.*; 7 *mutilationes Vat.* - Fr. 7D *cont. e fr. 7C.* - Fr. 69A *cont. e fr. 69.*; 2 *uoluit textus tragoediarum.* - Fr. 89A; 5 *securi: bipenni vulg.* - Fr. 92A; 3 *ordinis ether: arduus aether vulg.* - Fr. 99A; 1 *Traces textus tragg.*

APPENDIX III:

APPARATUS FOR KNOWN FRAGMENTS IN GOT., VAT., AND LAUR.

N.B.: the fragments in question stand in Lo. and Got. only unless otherwise noted. - Fr. 1 (Lo. Vat. Gothanus Laur.). 1 *sciendum Laur.* 2 *multifariam Vat. Gothanus Laur.; perfigurat Laur.; nam quandoque Laur.* 4 *planta Laur.; quia ipse codd.* 5 *dicitur: vero accipitur Laur.; autem benignitas: pro benignitate Laur.; pra(c)tica Vat. Gothanus Laur.; poetica Lo., Vat. mg.; vita practica Laur.* 8 *ut enim codd.* 11 *cathe-nis aureis a Jove coniunctam: a J. convinctam c. a. Laur.* 12 *phy Vat. Laur. (= physici, i.e. alchemistae); ethyci Laur.* 13 *etiam: esse Laur.* 14 *nam a iuvando Laur.* 15 *et infra, quia; quod Laur.; sunt Gothanus a.c., Laur.: sint cett.* 16 *semper: divitie Laur.; regenerantur Laur.* 17 *ut codd.* 18 *testuali Laur.* 19 *assumanus Vat.* 21 *de om. Laur.* - Fr. 5 2 *anapestico Got. passim (fr. 19, 40, 88).* 4 *sequitur: loquitur Got.* 5 *dicens, o fortuna Got.* - Fr. 7 (Lo. Got. Vat.). 1 *Diva non miti Vat.* 5 *lacunam Got.* 6 *intelligitur Got.; precelle Lo.: pro- Got. Vat.; corpore humano Lo. Vat.: h. c. Got.* 9 *et om. Got.* 12 *spuma: suma Got.* 13 *veneris: venereo Got.* 14 *igitur: ideo Got.; elicit: eijcit Vat.* 15 *et om. Vat.; nichil om Vat.* - Fr. 8. 3 *non tu om. Got.* - Fr. 9. 1 *etc. om. Got.; quidem Got.* 4 *Cadinum. Cadi. Cadmus. Cadmum Got.; Polidorus om. Got.* - Fr. 10. 7 *planctis: plantis pedum Got.; sibi datum Got.; etc. om. Got.* - Fr. 12. 4 *ut: et Got.* - Fr. 14 (Lo. Vat.) *Ad Tro. 1 Musactus. Quicumque regno &c. sine scholiis Vat. Ad Tro. 17 Fr. 14, inc. Omnis fumat Assaraci domus Vat.* 4 *Tantalum om.*

Vat. 6 Tros Vat. 7 et ante Ascanium om. Vat. 12 Enee item Priamus c. Vat.; genuit om. Vat. 13 Caunum Vat. 15 Astianactem Vat. 16 Athaman-tem et Vat. 18 unde dicit Quicumque regno &c (= Tro. 1) Vat. - Fr. 17. 2 soluit in fine clamoris. eronee soluit Got. - Fr. 19 (Lo. Got. Vat.). 1 audax etc. Vat.; hinnun Lo. Got.: ymn- Vat. (passim). 2 scan-sionem si Got. 3 2<sup>m</sup> anapestum vel spondeum. 3<sup>m</sup> daptilum om. Vat. 4 spondeum, quartum et ultimum anapesticum spondeum vel iambum et raro troceum Got.: spondeum et iambum vel raro troceum Lo. Vat. (iambicum Vat.) - Fr. 21. 3 loquitur. pavet Got. - Fr. 37. 2 id est in qui-buslibet Got.; clama: clamat Got., Megas corr. 4 iuvenes etc. Got. - Fr. 40. 5 obmisimus Got. - Fr. 43. 1 in lamento Got. 2 malum om. Got. 8 etc. om. Got. - Fr. 44 = Oct. 1. 2 suo om. Got. - Fr. 46 = Oct. 3. 2 etc. om. Got. - Fr. 48 = Oct. 5. 1 me om. Got. 7 dicens Quid Got. - Fr. 62 = Oct. 19. 1 nunc om. Got. 2 dicendum est de Popea Got. - Fr. 63 = Oct. 20. 2 formam ... Europam ... formam Got. 4 so-lis Lo.: solus Got. recte. - Fr. 64 = Oct. 21. 3 hic ... haberet om. Got. - Fr. 66 = Oct. 23. 2 relinquerat Got. - Fr. 68 = Oct. 25. 4 et ei om. Got. - Fr. 69 = Oct. 26, continuum e 68 Got. 9 esset sic Got.; esset add. post predestinatum Got. corr. 10 occise essent Got. - Fr. 71. 2 etholorum Got. (passim). 3 et felix et Got. - Fr. 72. 1 nos om. Got.; deflendum Got.; et dolet ... moriendi om. Got. - Fr. 77 2 que ante mutata om. Got.; mutata fuit in saxum in Sicilia Got.; sem-per Got. - Fr. 78. 1 in ante edonas om. Got. 2 plorans semper Got.; progne Got. 3 Methamorphoseos om. Got. - Fr. 79. 1 ciprias lacrimas om. Got. 2 cinere Got. - Fr. 80. 1 sum Got.; calcione Got. 3 ll li-bro Got.; agit: ait Got. - Fr. 82. 1 quid regina om. Got. - Fr. 84. 1 thmoli om. Got. 5 facta lido Got. 6 habuit Got. - Fr. 85. 3 trans-ducta fuit Got. - Fr. 86. 1 tellus om. Got.; scilicet illa Got. 2 Ni-gerpens: niger pons Got. - Fr. 88 1 est: etc. Got. 9 durable: -ilia Got., corr. 2 m. - Fr. 89. 1 time om. Got. 2 supra Got. (passim). 3 Jove, non times vana etc. Got. - Fr. 90. 3 Pirrin: Pyrrhyn Got.; servas? Got. 4 eo, id est in hercule Got. - Fr. 91. 1 supra dictum est Got. 2 declamationibus. dicit chorus, quid. Got. - Fr. 92. 2 ip-sam ut vid. Got. - Fr. 93. 2 interfecit. dixit hei mihi. Got. - Fr. 94 (Lo. Got. Vat.). 1 sed ecce lapsam hab. Lo. Got., om. Vat.; lapsam hiis ita dicentibus hercules excitatus dixit 'ego dormivi et somnus reliquit' Got.; om. Lo. Vat. 2 hic incipit col. herculis Got. - Fr. 95. 4 etc. om. S. - Fr. 96. 3 molestiam etc. quod tenuit purum ferrum, id est faciens justitiam, et non est dignus puniri Got.: om. Lo.; puniri scripsi; puniti Got. - Fr. 97. 4 quenam Got. - Fr. 99. 3 illa Got., corr. 2 m; timores Lo.: favores Got. 4 nostros Lo.: v<est>ros Got., ut vid. Def. Got. post Herc. Oet. 1802.

## CICERO VS. CICERONIANISM IN THE 'CICERONIANUS'\*

H. C. GOTOFF

In 1528 Erasmus published the *Ciceronianus*, the most extensive and important single document in the debate that in some ways dominated intellectual history in the Humanist period. The fact that the controversy had little to do with Cicero's style is acknowledged by some, but needs still to be asserted. The further points, that Erasmus, nevertheless, displays a unique understanding of Cicero's periodic composition, but that his contribution to Ciceronian studies has been all but ignored, remain to be established.

The Ciceronian controversy begins with the ambitious, early Humanist goal of recovering Classical Latin. The notion of limiting oneself exclusively to the model of Cicero was rejected at the outset by Petrarch.<sup>1)</sup> Its later adoption as an ideal reflects the manifestly different intention of using Latin, not as an actively regenerating, living language, but as a formal, traditional medium. The futility of

\* This paper is virtually unchanged from the form of oral presentation it took when delivered at the Fourth International Congress on Neo-Latin Studies, held in Bologna, August 26-September 1, 1979. References to the *Ciceronianus* (Cic.) are from the text of P. Mesnard in *Erasmii Opera Omnia* (Amsterdam 1971), vol. I.2. The comments on Cicero's style and the traditional perception of Cicero's style derive from arguments made at length in my book *Cicero's Elegant Style* (Illinois Press 1979).

1) So Erasmus says of him, *Cic.* p. 661, having in mind, perhaps, what Petrarch says about imitation in *Epp. Fam.* XXII 2. 8-21; esp. 16: "alioquin multo malim meus mihi stilus sit, incultus licet atque horridus, sed in morem togae habilis, ad mensuram ingenii mei factus, quam alienus, cultior ambitioso ornatu sed a maiore ingenio profectus atque undique defluens animi humilis non conveniens staturae." See, too, R. Sabadini, *Storia del Ciceronianismo* (Turin 1885), pp. 7-9 (Petrarch on the poetry of Giovanni da Ravenna).

such an effort was early recognized by Valla and others, while so strong an advocate as Poggio was unable to translate his enthusiasm into the prose of Cicero. Yet, somewhere along the way, the intention and ideal of strict adherence to Ciceronian Latinity (though in reality it came down to no more than limiting oneself to the vocabulary of the extant works of Cicero) were adopted by the religious and cultural establishment of the early Sixteenth century--Catholic and Italian.

Erasmus was too good a Latinist to ignore the stylistic failure of the doctrinaire Ciceronians, too interested in communicating to restrict his style in so slavish and perfunctory a manner. Besides, his independent, inquiring mind could not limit itself to the traditional goals of a conservative, exclusive academic establishment. His treatment of texts both sacred and profane--updating and correcting them for availability to a wider reading public--offended and frightened the conservatives. As early as 1525 a friend suggested that if Erasmus did not appear to be challenging the authority of the Church Fathers and scholastic teaching in areas approaching Divine Law, his style would not have come under criticism.<sup>2)</sup> Here, then, is the basis for Erasmus' own polemics. He saw the formal restrictions of Ciceronianism as the symbol of much more important intellectual limitations put on his work; while his opponents, on the other hand, might with some justification charge him with being a "popularizer". In the controversy, however, the terms were elevated: his opponents accused him of Lutheranism; he charged them with neo-Paganism. They drew a national border to Humanism at the Alps and condemned Erasmus' Latinity

2) P.S. Allen, *Erasmi Opus Epistolarum VI* (Oxford 1926) (no. 1579), pp. 81-2: "si enim a placitis Ambrosii, Hieronymi, Augustini, Gregorii et subsequentium sanctorum doctorum--quae, certo tene, inconcussa sunt secuti Guillelmus Altisiodorensis, Halensis, Thomas, Bonaventura et ceteri probati scholae huius magistri, in illis quae proximius divinum ius attingunt--tuus non dissensisset intellectus, nimirum omnibus stilus placuisset." Natalis Beda, author of these remarks, was the appointed representative of the Faculty of Theology in the University of Paris inquiring into points of heresy detected in Erasmus' works (Allen, *op. cit.* p. 65).

(along with that of every other non-Italian, save Christopher Longeuil); he depicted them as incompetent to succeed at Ciceronian imitation and, besides, of living in a delusory world--for their attempt to cast contemporary Rome in a Republican setting he judged to be futile and grotesque. Thus, while the purported subject of the *Ciceronianus* is described in the sub-title as *de optimo genere dicendi* and alluded to within the dialogue as "imitation", Erasmus vigorously attacks the Paganism of Italian Ciceronianism and its inappropriateness, concluding that the true Ciceronian would be less concerned with the techniques of style than with the vital, contemporary subjects of Christian theology. He scorns what he calls the *lineamenta* of Ciceronian style, insisting that not one of the self-professed Ciceronians can successfully reproduce the model. Further, he expresses admiration for a number of people who deliberately rejected Ciceronian imitation. Ruellius preferred writing about medicine and translating Greek to being a Ciceronian; Wm. Latimer, in his piety, would rather perfect theology than Ciceronian eloquence; Bayfius preferred exposition to Ciceronianism; Gaza wanted to express Aristotle; Valla preferred Quintilian; the list could be extended. The eloquence of Hermolaus Barbarus actually was harmed, to Erasmus' mind, by his philosophical studies. Quite apart, then, from mastering the style, the style itself is not necessarily appropriate or desirable.

In view of the general and pervasive arguments against the aims and principles of the Ciceronians, it is almost incidental that Erasmus offers so much particular stylistic criticism. He makes distinctions one looks for in vain in the writings of most other Humanists--men who contented themselves with the generalities that had gone unexamined and unchallenged in the tradition. The irony is that no one paid the slightest attention to this aspect of the *Ciceronianus*. Not only did the sloganeering continue from the Italian side, but others, offended by the manner of their inclusion or insulted by their omission from the panoramic description

of the styles of contemporary scholars, added a new level of vituperativeness to the by-now hopelessly confused and only perfunctorily literary debate. Erasmus' real contributions to stylistic criticism of Cicero were ignored for four hundred years.

It would be wrong to lay the blame for this unenlightening state of affairs exclusively at the doorstep of the Humanists. Let it be emphasized that the Ciceronian controversy could never have taken the form that it did in the Sixteenth Century, had the critical standards and terminology for describing style not come down from antiquity in a muddle. The confusion began in the last years of Cicero's own life; and he was, himself, to some degree responsible for it. *De Oratore*, after all, was a largely political work--an attempt not to explain oratorical style, but to identify and aggrandize the Roman Orator-Statesman. The elements of an *ars rhetorica* it contains are derivative, often perfunctory. Cicero is defending the serious, practical, peculiarly Roman profession of which he had become the acknowledged master and which, after 55 B.C., was being rendered increasingly redundant by the un-Republican governance of the Triumvirate. The *Orator* was published a decade later, when Cicero's skills and talents had not only been made superfluous by the political upheaval at Rome, but were also under critical attack from a group of purportedly literary detractors who called themselves Atticists. The origins of the Atticist-Asian controversy are unclear and much debated; a vague, literary antithesis seems to have developed between a lush, ornamental, self-consciously artistic, periodic style, on the one hand, and a tense, unadorned style, terse and simple, on the other. Cicero was the target of Atticist criticism; but since his recent oratorical production was at its most restrained, the charge of Asianism, if ever applicable, was surely so no longer. For his part, involved in an unpleasant, personal controversy, Cicero took, in the *Orator*, a polemical stance calculated rather to defeat his opponents' arguments than to explain and defend his own stylistic preferences and

techniques. (The suggestion, here, of a psychological parallel between the controversy of the mid-40's B.C. and that of the early Sixteenth Century is not casual.) Cicero's debating point is that he is more Attic than the Atticists, because true Atticism should incorporate the virtues of a variety of Athenian orators, including the elegance of Isocrates and the power of Demosthenes as well as the simple purity of Lysias. Demosthenes, Cicero's sole Athenian ideal and closest model, was a true political orator and a stylist whose force and *copia* were denied, by definition, to the Atticists. The inclusion of Isocrates was less than wholly sincere. Isocrates was not a forensic orator; and his "sweet style of oratory, smoothly flowing, clever in thought, euphonious in diction" is precisely that epideictic style several times specifically excluded by Cicero from the realm of serious oratory.<sup>3)</sup> Nevertheless, Isocrates was firmly entrenched in the Attic canon of orators and had perfected a style also denied to the Atticists. Hence, he is a convenient and telling weapon in Cicero's polemical armory. Isocrates, after all, had won the approval of Socrates and Plato, however impractical Cicero believed his symmetrical balances, strict concinnity, and involved periodicity to be in addressing the courts or assembly.

In view of such qualified praise, the later, universal identification of Cicero with Isocrates needs explanation. Quintilian is not responsible for it; he compares Cicero quite exclusively with Demosthenes. I may advance some possible reasons. First, as the antithesis between periodic and non-periodic prose became fixed, it would be natural to classify Cicero and Isocrates together. Next, as political oratory lost vitality and relevance in the Imperial age, oratory turned more and more towards declamation: precisely the epideictic prose that Cicero rejected in the practical sphere. In the absence of a pressing, contemporary context, orators devoted more time to those elements of a speech directed at the *captatio audientium benevolentiae*, the parts where

3) Cic. *Orator* 37f., 65.

Cicero, himself, was least at pains to disguise his artistry. Erasmus would later say of Humanist oratory that it was made up largely of *exordia* and perorations; and he observed that what Renaissance Ciceronians endeavored to imitate were the openings of Cicero's speeches. (Erasmus obviously did not have in mind the *Catilinarians* or the *Philippics*, where Cicero generally dispensed with such pleasantries; nor were such *exordia* the models for Ciceronian imitators.) Finally, whatever the strictures upon it, Cicero describes epideictic prose in great technical detail; and later scholars have had a tendency to apply to Cicero the technical vocabulary Cicero himself used to criticize epideictic oratory: concinnity, balance, symmetry.

By the time of the Renaissance, the ability to dispose one's material in a shapely period--that is to say, the ability to write Classical Latin--was a virtue to be attempted and a difficult task to master. Cortesi could criticize Leonardo Bruni's style for lacking *circumscriptio ulla verborum*. George of Trapizonz merely recast three sentences of Guarino into a single period to make it "Ciceronian". No one was suggesting that, while Cicero wrote periodic prose, not all periodic composition was Ciceronian--no one, that is, until Erasmus. With such imprecise criticism and such a vague understanding of what prose composition entails, the description by Cicero of Isocrates' style might be applied equally well to Cicero himself. When, in the *Antike Kunstprosa*, the youthful Norden, in discussing the antithetical style in Renaissance prose, devotes separate sections to imitation of Isocrates and of Cicero, the distinction is illusory. The advocates of each had the same stylistic features, essentially Isocratean, in mind. So Vives, in *De ratione dicendi*, illustrates Isocratean style with citations from the corpus of Cicero; Ascham is pleased with the progress of his royal pupil, Elizabeth, who has learned, by the study of Livy, Cicero, Isocrates, and Sophocles to discern and appreciate apt and felicitous antitheses.<sup>4)</sup> While antithesis certainly

4) E. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa* (Leipzig 1898), Vol. II, pp. 799-802.



has its place in the architecture of Cicero's prose, the careful reader will not have to be persuaded that it has nothing like the same formative value that it does in the composition of Isocrates.

The failure for centuries of admirers and detractors of Cicero alike to attend to the basic elements of stylistic technique, though perhaps surprising, was almost universal. During so much of the Renaissance, after all, one had merely to proclaim oneself Ciceronian or anti-Ciceronian with no discernible effect on one's style. In the midst of controversy, such sloganeering is understandable, even expected. The language of polemics is not the sharp, clear report of a rifle bullet, but the messy, indiscriminate spray of shotgun pellets. The failure of later scholars to make the necessary and by no means obscure distinctions requires a different explanation. I can only surmise that the size and variety of the corpus of material and the conservative force of tradition were inhibiting factors.

It was not until the late Nineteenth Century that Wilamowitz remarked in passing on the comparative reserve of Cicero's late oratorical style.<sup>5)</sup> This was not mere parroting of Cicero's perhaps disingenuous characterization of his early work as *iuvenalis redundantia*. The German scholar was referring to the *Caesarianae* and specifically to the *Philippics*. It was another hundred years before another scholar analysed the structure of Cicero's oratorical prose and demonstrated that the later production is distinguished by shorter, less complex periods. This awareness has still not been incorporated into the tradition. Yet, in the *Ciceronianus*, Erasmus noted, in 1528: "Even if policies were argued today in Latin, who could stand Cicero perorating as he did against Verres, Catiline, Clodius, or Vatinius? What Senate has enough time and patience to endure the speeches he made against Antony, though there he is more mature, less redun-

5) See W. Ralph Johnson, *Luxuriance and Economy: Cicero and the Alien Style* (California 1971), pp. 1ff.

dant, less exuberant in his eloquence".<sup>6)</sup> Erasmus offers no proof or analysis to support his claim; he merely indicates his perception and the sensitivity of his reading. No one appears to have noticed it.

Analytical, rather than judgmental criticism has come late and unevenly to Ciceronian studies. Not until W.R. Johnson's *Luxuriance and Economy: Cicero and the Alien Style* did anyone examine in detail the structure of Cicero's prose. Working independently on sentence structure--the architecture of Ciceronian periodicity--I have been able to demonstrate an apparently little known fact: in his periodic composition, Cicero uses the balanced, symmetrical, antithetical structures employed by Isocrates as a foil. He deliberately and consistently suggests the Gorgianic figures of parallelism, balance, and echo only to disappoint the expectations they raise by equally deliberate inconcinnities. The observation supports the claim, which had to be made as recently as in 1952, that in his periodic composition Cicero far more resembles Demosthenes than Isocrates.<sup>7)</sup> Yet, the similarity of Ciceronian and Isocratean prose styles has been assumed and asserted without discrimination by dispassionate scholars as well as polemicists, throughout the tradition.

Awesome in its indication of Erasmus' independent genius is the fact that the writer of the *Ciceronianus* was aware of and insisted upon a rigorous distinction between the style of composition of the two authors.

I know of no detailed study of Erasmus' literary criticism in the *Ciceronianus*. His main concern was not literary; and, beyond that, his definition of style went far beyond techniques--the *Ciceronis lineamenta*, as he called them--to encompass context and circumstances. Cicero would not have argued with such an approach to oratorical criticism. When Erasmus says, as he did on a number of occasions, that not one of the self-claimed Ciceronians is capable of reproducing

6) *Cic.* p. 654.

7) Eric Laughton "Cicero and the Greek Orators" *AJP* 82 (1961), 27-49.

Cicero, he refers to something that goes far beyond the devices of composition and diction. Yet, even in the limited realm of literary techniques, Erasmus adduces precise and accurate criteria for determining what is, and is not, Ciceronian. In this he is unique.

Essentially, Erasmus derives his critical vocabulary from Cicero and Quintilian--as do practically all other scholars. But while everyone else was content to utter epithets and repeat bland generalities, Erasmus examines and distinguishes. He was, as Douglas Thomson has noticed, perhaps the only scholar before the late Nineteenth Century to analyse *clausulae*--set, rhythmical cadences as sense-pauses.<sup>8)</sup> In identifying two such patterns, he relies on Cicero for one, the double trochee; for the other, his analysis is wholly independent.

In the realm of sentence-structure, or composition, Erasmus again shows a way of criticizing and distinguishing prose styles that, if attended, might have advanced the study of Cicero in particular and Latin prose in general. First, he was not satisfied with the oversimplified division between periodic, i.e., Ciceronian or Asian, and non-periodic, i.e., anti-Ciceronian or Attic. In characterizing the styles of Latinists from late antiquity to contemporary times, he insists that not all periodic prose is Ciceronian. Thus: Ambrose's prose may be rhythmical and modulated, with balanced clauses and phrases, but that makes of him a Roman orator, not a Ciceronian. Augustine is Ciceronian in his use of complex periods, but he does not punctuate that copious flow with clauses and phrases as did Cicero. More recently, Zazius' style flows from a most abundant source; it does not stop, stick, or pause. But to Erasmus, it sounds less like Cicero's style than that of Politian, whose diction is entirely unciceronian. Erasmus frequently applies, as here, a two-tiered standard. The feature that must be present in the ideal Ciceronian does not *ipso facto* produce Ciceronian

8) D.F.S. Thomson "The Latinity of Erasmus", *Erasmus*, ed. T.A. Dorey (London 1970) n. 20.

imitation. Thus, characteristics like the *suavis compositio* of Casselius or the *mollitudo* of Vives would sound in Cicero like descriptions of Isocrates or, worse, of Demetrius of Phaleris. When Erasmus applies the terms to neo-Latin writers he means that their possessors have improved on the *duritia* of scholastic Latin and are eligible to be criticized by a Ciceronian standard. Ultimately, neither succeeds.

The period flow of syntax is essential to Ciceronianism. Lactantius mastered it; though in other respects he falls short. Cantiuncula's *fluxus* is praised as a Ciceronian quality. Gregory I, on the other hand, had a *fluxus lutulentus*, a muddy flow, and a sentence structure in the Isocratean mold. And that, according to Erasmus, is a *Cicerone alienum*.<sup>9)</sup>

This distinction is boldly made and employed elsewhere. Thomas More leaned rather to Isocratean structure and dialectic exactness than to the flowing stream of Ciceronian diction. Rudolph Agricola smacks of the diction of Quintilian, but he is essentially Isocratean in structure. Now, Norden cites this judgment in the section where he fails to distinguish Isocratean from Ciceronian style. In an article on Isocrates and Euphuism, another scholar cites all three passages only to support his argument that Isocrates is not the source of Euphuism.<sup>10)</sup> The larger point, the distinction between Isocrates and Cicero, is ignored. Of all scholars, only George Williamson, in *The Senecan Amble*, seems to have realized the magnitude of the distinction Erasmus makes.<sup>11)</sup> Yet, having understood the distinction, Williamson puts forth a thesis, that Erasmus is essentially an Atticist, which tends once more to lump Cicero and Isocrates together.

The opposition of Ciceronian flow to Isocratean sentence structure suggests that Erasmus was well aware of the stylistic difference. The antiphonal, bi-partite periodicity of Isocrates, with its symmetrical balance and parallel or

9) *Cic.* p. 660.

10) T.K. Whipple "Isocrates and Euphuism", *M.L.R.* XI (1916), pp. 15-27, 130-135.

11) G. Williamson *The Senecan Amble* (Chicago 1951), pp. 29ff.

antithetical restatement does not flow progressively to reach a rhetorical climax, but falls back upon itself with wearing and all-too-predictable redundance. Though, in attributing Isocratean sentence structure to More and Agricola--two men he liked and admired--Erasmus seems to endorse it as an alternative to Ciceronian composition, he is, in fact, harsher elsewhere: *Nec Isocratis laudaretur compositio, nisi perspecuitas dictionis et sententiarum gravitas illi patrocinaretur* ("Isocrates' style would not win praise, were he not favored by the clarity of his diction and the depth of his thought").<sup>12)</sup> It is a pity for Ciceronian studies since the Sixteenth Century that such observations and judgments by Erasmus have gone unheeded.

University of Illinois at Urbana

12) *Cic.* p. 633. Cf. *Cic. Orator* 41 and 42.




















UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA

88016 C001  
ILLINOIS CLASSICAL STUDIES. URBANA  
5 1980



3 0112 023748723