

Shelf No NDED 185 BOSTONES ON PUBLIC LIP GIVEN BY William Eig act. 30, 1896. >





With compliments of J. M. ASHLEY.

THE IMPENDING POLITICAL EPOCH. ADDRESS

HON. J. M. ASHLEY,

BY

BEFORE THE OHIO SOCIETY OF NEW YORK,

MONDAY EVENING,

November 9th, 1891.



"The world advances, and in time outgrows The laws that in our fathers' days were best." James Russell Lowell.

"As the fatal dogma of secession was buried in a common grave with the great rebellion, it is fitting and proper that the National Constitution should be so amended as to conform to the new and broader conditions of our national life."

From page 42 of Address.

H428,275

PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.

EVENING POST JOB PRINTING HOUSE, NEW YORE.



THE IMPENDING POLITICAL EPOCH.

rodder

H421.245

A D D R E S S

HON. J. M. ASHLEY,

BEFORE THE OHIO SOCIETY OF NEW YORK,

MOND'AY EVENING,

November 9th, 1891.

"The world advances, and in time outgrows The laws that in our fathers' days were best." James Russell Lowell.

"As the fatal dogma of secession was buried in a common grave with the great rebellion, it is fitting and proper that the National Constitution should be so amended as to conform to the new and broader conditions of our national life."

From page 42 of Address.

PUBLISHED BY REQUEST.

EVENING POST JOB PRINTING HOUSE, NEW YORK.

Ohio Society of New York, 236 Fifth Avenue.

NEW YORK, Nov. 10, 1891.

Hon. J. M. Ashley, 150 Broadway, N. Y.

My Dear Governor Ashley:

The paper which you read last evening before the Ohio Society of New York touching upon existing defects in the Federal Constitution, the dangers they involve, and the remedies at hand, aroused in these who heard it a strong sense of its interest and value. A resolution thanking you for it and soliciting a copy of it for publication was unanimously passed. Sharing as I do this feeling of the Society, it is a personal pleasure to me to transmit to you their request, and to join personally with them in soliciting compliance.

New Mur . E en W.,

Oct 30.1876.

Very truly yours,

WAGER SWAYNE.

New My Dear Gentl:

NEW YORK, November 11th, 1891.

It gives me pleasure to comply with the request of the Ohio Society of New York.

Herewith I hand you a copy of my address for publication, and thank the Society for its complimentary approval.

My acknowledgments are also due for the very agreeable manner in which you have been pleased to convey their wishes, and for the personal expression of your interest in the address.

Truly yours,

J. M. ASHLEY.

To Genl. WAGER SWAYNE,

President of the "Ohio Society of New York."

Mr. President and Gențlemen of the Ohio Society of New York:

The favor with which this Society received my address at its Annual Banquet last year, and the letters of generous commendation received by me from eminent men, thanking me for that contribution to our anti-slavery history, was so unexpected and gratifying that I am now glad I then acceded to the request of our worthy President and delivered it.

But for his friendly determination that I should make such an address, it would not have been prepared.

I can but hope that what I am to say before you tonight, may receive a like cordial reception.

To you, and through you to the considerate judgment. of all who may read what I shall say, I propose to submit some observations upon impending national questions, in connection with our increase of population, as disclosed by our census reports for one hundred years of progress; questions which, if I forecast aright, are certain at an early day to confront us, and to demand practical solution.

If the appeal I am about to make against our present political system, shall cause you and those whom you can reach, to read and to give a deliberate judgment on the facts which I may present, I shall have accomplished my object.

As there have been in the past, so in the future there are certain to be epochs in our national history, so marked, that he who runs may read. Our transition from a confederation to a nation, including the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War and the War of the Rebellion, and the adoption of the 13th Amendment abolishing slavery, are great and important epochs of the past. In the near future, the impending epoch will mark a more complete recognition than we have yet witnessed, of the democratic idea in government, by amendments to our National Constitution, which will make it conform more fully than it now does to the imperative demands of a great republican commonwealth. James Russell Lowell says, that

> "He who would win the name of truly great Must understand his own age and the next, And make the present ready to fulfill Its prophecy, and with the future merge Gently and peacefully, as wave with wave. The world advances, and in time outgrows The laws that in our fathers' days were best."

The Constitution of our fathers, acceptable as it was a hundred years ago to a majority of the then population of three millions, could not be adopted without material amendment by any National Constitutional Convention which might now be chosen by the votes representing our sixty-three millions of people.

If, then, it be true that with all our veneration for the Constitution of Washington, it would not to-day be accepted as it is and without material change, if submitted as a new Constitution to the people of the United States for their ratification or rejection; its defects must, indeed, be marked and radical.

But it is not at all strange that in a hundred years we should, as a nation, have outgrown our Revolutionary Constitution.

Since the organization of the National Government, the Constitutions of all the original thirteen States have been changed, and some of them two or three times. This is also true of the Constitutions of a majority of all the States admitted into the Union since the adoption of the National Constitution.

So long as slavery dominated the nation, amendments to our National Constitution, such as we are soon to see proposed and adopted, would have been impossible. The abolition of slavery has brought with it new duties and new responsibilities, duties and responsibilities which the nation cannot escape.

With the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments, millions of former slaves became citizens with all the rights and privileges of citizenship.

These former slaves and their posterity must forever remain our countrymen and fellow-citizens, with rights co-equal with our own.

In the year 1940, only fifty years, the Afro-American population of this country (including Indians and all races not properly classed as whites), will, as I estimate it, reach the number of 13,750,000 or more, and out-number the whites in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. That the colored man is certain proportionately to hold his own in North Carolina, Tennessee and Southern Arkansas, is probable, and perhaps he will hold his own in the southeastern half of the Indian Territory and adjoining the Gulf along the eastern portion of Texas and for some distance up the Rio Grande.

The census reports indicate that he will not increase north of $36^{\circ} 30'$ in so great a ratio as the whites, nor in the old border slave States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri and Northern Arkansas. On an accompanying map, I have marked by a black belt the States and parts of States, and the eastern portion of the Indian Territory and Texas, in which the Afro-American will in all probability dominate, before the year 1940 and certainly before the close of the second century of the Republic.

In order that these estimates may be readily examined and verified by students of statistics, I have included in the appendix to my address, a table giving the incompleted census report, as published to date, of our white and colored population for one hundred years, and an estimate for the second hundred years.

As I estimate our total population in 1900, with the

insufficient data before me, it will have reached eightytwo millions or more. In 1940 one hundred and sixty-one millions or more, and in 1990 we shall number some three hundred and ninety millions; at which time there will be not less than twenty-three millions of Afro-Americans.

Confronted with these estimates and with the facts which I shall present, I feel warranted in claiming your attention for an hour or more to-night on impending questions as I see them, and hope by the co-operation of the "Ohio Society of New York" to obtain a more general hearing by thinking men, than might otherwise be given me.

THE LESSON OF OUR CENSUS REPORTS.

Our census reports are invaluable, no less in aiding us to forecast the work of our practical every-day business life, than in the solution of impending political and philosophical problems.

To me, the first hundred years of our census reports teach that the impending questions, National and State, which in the immediate future will confront us and demand solution, are the equitable distribution of political power; the guarantee to every qualified elector of a secret ballot, and an absolute equality of individual power for that ballot; the nomination and election of the President and all public officials, who are to be chosen by popular vote by a direct ballot, without the dictation of conventions or the intervention of an intermediate body such as our present "College of Electors" for electing the President.

Foremost among these, is the question of

THE EQUITABLE OR PROPORTIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL POWER,

National, State and City. It is a question of such transcendent importance, that it must at an early day command the thoughtful attention of the ablest statesmen in this country. In a democratic republic, it is of necessity a fundamental question and underlies all others.

As I view it, it is more important than tariffs, the free coinage of silver, or any question of ordinary legislation connected with the administration of government.

As in the past, the ablest and wisest of men have differed in opinion on questions of finance and on the practicability of current matters of administration; so in the future they are certain to differ. But on the question of an equitable distribution of political power, National, State and Municipal, so that every citizen shall be clothed at the ballot-box with equal political authority and in all legislative assemblies be represented in proportion to the number of votes cast in the nation and in his State, there ought to be no divided opinion among intelligent men who are in favor of democratic government.

In the war for the Union, the people of this country pronounced unmistakably for a national as contradistinguished from a confederated government, for a government which shall be a democratic republic in fact as well as in name, a government which ought to be administered by a concurrent majority of the nation, instead of a mere numerical majority in States, which is often a minority of the whole people.

Under our present happy-go-lucky method of conducting national elections, the *minority* of the whole people have on more than one occasion seized and held the government for years.

You will agree with me that any device, or trick, by which the *minority* seize and hold the government, National, State or City, is an indefensible political crime.

In his "Disquisitions on Government" Mr. Calhoun has, with great clearness and marked ability, pointed out the danger incident to entrusting the numerical majority with absolute political power. Had his argument for the rights of minorities, and for what he terms "the necessity of concurrent majorities" been made on behalf of individual electors and manhood suffrage, instead of claiming it for organized political communities which he called sovereign States, he would have commanded the general approval of all friends of democratic government both in this country and in Europe.

It will be conceded, without argument, that one of the first duties of a representative government is to guard and protect the right of suffrage.

Only when the elector has guaranteed to him a free ballot and an honest count, can the political judgment of a great commonwealth, or of a State or city be collected.

The more perfectly this judgment of the elector is collected the more certain is the end accomplished for which representative government is established.

To collect the opinions of the greatest number in the nation, or in any State or subdivision of a State, is not enough; the opinions of the minority must be collected as well, and as far as possible the sense of the entire community as a whole. To do this practically, special care must be taken that the minority shall always have its proportional representation in every legislative assembly according to the number of votes cast by the minority at any election for representatives, either in Congress or in State legislatures, or city governments, and under no combination of circumstances to permit the minority, through gerrymandering schemes, or other trick or device, to seize control of the government.

The numerical majority must of necessity control and administer all democratic representative governments; but such governments, to be just and equitable, must have checks such as the negative power which an intelligent minority can effectually use before the bar of public opinion, to resist converting the government of a mere numerical majority into one of despotic powers. Obviously enough all representative government becomes better and approximates nearer a perfect government, the nearer it becomes a government of the concurrent majority.

If every interest in the nation, or State or municipality within a State, is represented in the legislative assemblies in proportion to the number of votes cast by each party or association, the combining of this minority interest will greatly increase its power for self-protection and correspondingly decrease the power of the numerical majority to rule with a rod of iron. It is not enough to provide constitutional limitations to the power of the numerical majority for the protection of the minority, unless the minority are clothed with the power of self-protection, so that they can enforce an observance of these rights by personal representation, open discussion and the public use of parliamentary rules. The numerical majority being in possession of the government, will always favor a liberal interpretation of the power granted in any constitution or charter, and on one pretext or another, evade or disregard the restrictions intended to limit them, unless the minority are clothed with the power of self-protection, which can only be had by proportional representation and the power which intelligent debate and publicity always secures.

On the threshold of my remarks, it is proper that I should state the nature of the amendments I would propose to our National Constitution, and to the objectionable features of our national system of elections.

Briefly, these comprise the *nomination* and *election* of the President of the United States, and Senators and Representatives in Congress, by a direct vote of the people, by ballot; the creation of an independent body of officials in every State, to be elected by the voters of each, whose powers and duties shall be to conduct all national elections within their respective States, and fill all vacancies that may from time to time occur for the incompleted terms in the office of President, Senators or Representatives in Congress.

The changes contemplated also include the abolition of the office of Vice-President, and the abolition of all nominating conventions.

THE ABOLITION OF THE CONVENTION SYSTEM.

From the time of its adoption many of the ablest statesmen in this country were opposed to the convention system, although they were compelled to submit to its authority. They opposed it because they comprehended that it was an organized machine, which offered a standing premium on political fraud and corruption. They saw that it would breed a class of self-appointed leaders who would live on office and plunder; that the general tendency would be to nominate men for important positions whom no prudent private citizen would for a moment think of selecting for a public trust. And they opposed it because it is a system unknown to the Constitution and was never contemplated by its framers. Within fifty years it has grown to be a monster political despotism, and in both parties is today the absolute master of the people, in all cities of the first and second class, and in all State and national nominating conventions.

From the birth of the first national convention to the adjournment of the last, not one-tenth of the voters of the country of either of the great political parties have been represented in what are known as the "primaries," that is, in the ward or township caucuses, where each party begins the work of selecting its delegates for all national, State and district conventions.

At all county and city conventions for the appointment of delegates to district and State conventions, the number of voters actually represented is still less than one-tenth.

In national conventions the delegates, thus chosen, by district and State conventions practically represent only cliques and cabals, and even they are often powerless in the hands of the managers of the "machine," and instead of being a deliberative body, every national convention becomes an irresponsible mcb, which, under the manipulation of intriguers, absolutely dictates for whom the people shall vote at every election for President, and from this dictation there is no escape and no appeal except to bolt the "regular nominee" of your party, which practically means political excommunication and often personal ostracism. A national convention made up and organized thus name, the President as certainly as if they alone were the voters, and as if the entire body of the people were disfranchised and voiceless.

This condition of things also obtains largely in all party conventions, State and district, city and county.

If this statement is even approximately true, certainly the first and most desirable reform to be attempted in this country, ought to be the abolition of all such nominating conventions as now enable a small and active minority, of one-tenth or less, to *rule* and dictate to the remaining ninetenths or more.

For securing to every voter an equal voice in the national government, and for a more equitable distribution of political power, the following plan could be made to approximate mathematically to the total voting population of the nation, if it were not for the existence of large and small States, and the inequality of representation of each State in the Senate of the United States.

So long as there are States which contain a population of but a few thousand, or States without sufficient population for co-equal commonwealths; and so long as the present inequality of representation in the Senate of the United States is maintained, the amendments here proposed provide for the fairest and most equitable distribution of political power in the national government, which I have been able to devise.

For State governments, whether large or small, and for all city or municipal governments within States, it is approximately perfect. It provides a system which cannot be successfully manipulated against the people by party bosses or intriguing leaders, whether national, State or city, and is adapted to the wants and growth of our democratic institutions. Let me briefly illustrate the manner of its working in the nomination and election of Representatives in Congress.

"Ohio is entitled to twenty-one members of Congress by the new apportionment for 1891.

Under the plan proposed there would be four Congressional districts in that State, in each of which there would be five Representatives in Congress to be elected on oneballot, and there would also be one member to be elected for the State at large.

It will be observed that this distribution of political power, under the new apportionment, secures to each elector in Ohio the right to vote for six Representatives in Congress, and no more than six, and that under no apportionment which can be made after any census, can the voters in Ohio, or in any State, vote for more than seven Representatives. But if any elector so elects he can run his pen or pencil across the name or names of any one or more of the candidates on his ballot, for whom he does not desire to vote, and cumulate his vote for any one or more of the candidates authorized to be voted for in the State and district in which he resides. Each elector would thus have secured to him absolute freedom of choice from among the candidates placed in nomination by his own party, as provided by law, and also from those nominated by any party with votes enough to select a ticket, and it would be as impossible for any voter, or for the judges of any election, to commit fraud in preparing and depositing such a ballot, or in its being counted, as it would be were the voter filling up a bank check to be paid by a cashier for one or six thousand dollars. And in no event, under this plan, can the minority of the total vote cast in any State secure a majority of its delegation in Congress by the indefensible distribution of political power known as gerrymandering. In fact, this plan renders the trickery and injustice of gerrymandering impossible.

The simplicity and practicability of this plan, which is ap-

plicable alike for national, State and city governments, must commend itself to all students of political reform.

New York, under the new apportionment, is entitled to thirty-four Representatives in Congress. The plan proposed would give the State eight Congressional districts of four members each, and two for the State at large, so that each elector in New York would be entitled to vote for six Representatives in Congress. Thus each voter in Ohio would vote for the same number of Representatives as a voter in New York, or if he so elected he could cumulate his vote, and cast the six votes to which he is entitled for any one or more of the candidates nominated by any party.

Of the manner in which nominations are to be made I shall speak further on.

It will be conceded that political power is unequally and unjustly distributed, wherever in any State the *minority* obtains or elects a larger number of representatives in Congress or in the State Legislature by the trickery of gerrymandering, or by any other dishonest device, nor is there any defense for a system which authorizes an elector in a populous county in the State to vote for a greater number of representatives to the State Legislature than an elector who resides in a less populous county.

An elector in our State, who resides in Hamilton County, is authorized to vote for ten members of the Legislature, and in Cuyahoga for eight or nine, while an elector in Fulton and in a majority of all the counties in the State, can vote but for one member. It must be clear to the average man that the elector who votes for ten members of the State Legislature on one ballot is clothed with much greater political power than an elector who votes for but one. In addition to this injustice, it is well known that these ten members for Hamilton County may, in the future as they have been in the past, be elected by a mere plurality of the votes cast in that county, and not by a majority. When this happens the entire representation from Hamilton County in the State Legislature is secured by a minority of the votes cast in that county, and oftener than otherwise such an election changes the political complexion of the Legislature, and gives to the minority of the voters in the State, control of the legislative department of the State government. So long as the caucus and convention system obtains, and the inequality between electors in the populous and less populous counties of the State is continued, with the present indefensible distribution of political power, to the larger and smaller counties, just so long will desperate political cliques alternately dominate in such counties and in the State; and the government for cities and for State institutions be attempted by "commissions," appointed by the party in power.

It would be difficult to conceive of a more offensive exhibition than that which all last winter was enacted in the State of Connecticut for the want of an honest distribution of political power.

Under this plan, substantially as outlined, I am confident that any man of mature years and fair executive ability, with a small committee of five or seven business men (but never a committee of one hundred) could dislodge and defeat all organized political combinations such as now rule New York and Cincinnati.

Nothing is more certain if the voters can be guaranteed the right to make their own nominations, than that this result can be successfully accomplished with half the labor and less than half the money uselessly thrown away, every year or two, by spasmodic efforts on the part of exasperated and worthy citizens.

It might, and probably would, require two sharply contested battles before the voters could accustom themselves to the new mode of nominating and electing their officials. But the second battle in most cases, and the third battle certainly in a majority of cases, would end in the complete rout of all cliques and self-appointed leaders, who now live at the public crib in both cities and States by the organized power secured to them by the political "machine." If such rings and combines as we have in the cities of New York and in Cincinnati can be successfully dislodged as proposed, it may be safely predicted that they could and would be dislodged and defeated in every State and in all cities.

That the plan proposed will enable the people to accomplish this I am fully persuaded, provided always that a majority of the people vote to elect their own nominations, not otherwise. This plan is for the government of majorities. It is opposed to a government by commission, and to all schemes for clothing the minority with the administration of government, national, State or city.

Let me illustrate briefly the working of the plan if put in operation by the States of Ohio and New York and in the cities of New York and Cincinnati.

In the States and cities named, or indeed in all States and cities where democratic government and home rule is demanded, the State Constitutions and city charters would embody the principles of the proposed amendment of the National Constitution, and provide in like manner for the nomination and election of Governors and Mayors and all officials to be chosen by the people, whether State or city. The plan for the nomination and election of members of the Legislature, or the law-making departments of city government, would thus be uniform for all States and cities. This can be done in every State and in all cities with mathematical accuracy.

Affirming the practicability and necessity of two representative law-making bodies in national, State and city governments, I would provide that in all cases Senators shall be elected by districts in every State, and members of the Board of Aldermen in all cities in districts of not less than three nor more than five members each, and that the number of Senators and members of all Aldermanic Boards should invariably be composed of one-third the number of members to be elected in districts to the lower House in both State and cities.

Thus in Ohio, I would provide, were I a member of a

Constitutional Convention or a member of the Legislature, that the State Constitution should be so amended that there shall be 90 members of the lower House to be elected in districts of five members each, and not less than three nor more than five members of the lower House in addition, for the State at large. To determine the territorial boundaries of the 18 representative districts, I would divide the total vote of the State for Governor by 90, which will give the number of voters to be allotted to each district.

As the Senate, to be elected by districts, would in every case be composed of one-third the number of representatives (that is 30 Senators), there would be six Senatorial districts in each of which five Senators would be elected, and in addition not less than three nor more than five Senators for the State at large. This would make a House of 93 or 95 members and a Senate of 33 or 35, and always secure an odd number in each House.

In New York, I would allot 120 members to the lower House, and have them elected in 24 districts of five members each, and not less than three nor more than five members of the House in addition for the State at large.

In a House of 120 members elected by districts the Senate would be composed of one-third that number, or 40 Senators to be elected in eight Senatorial districts of five Senators each, and three or five Senators in addition to be elected by the State at large. The territorial apportionment for the districts in which members of the House are to be chosen would be determined by dividing the total vote of the State for Governor by 120, and I would provide that in both State and city apportionments three representative districts of the lower House of contiguous territory, should always make a Senatorial or Aldermanic district.

For all State and municipal or city governments this plan secures the absolute equitable distribution of political power, on a mathematical basis, in all apportionments for members of representative bodies, and guarantees to all organized groups of electors, numbering not less than oneeighth or one-tenth and a fraction of the total vote cast at any election, in any State or city, equality of political power, by providing that no elector in State or city shall vote for a greater number of candidates than another elector, but that each elector shall have authority to cumulate his vote, so as to secure to any group of electors numbering one-eighth or one-tenth of the total vote, a representation in all State and city legislative assemblies, that shall correspond approximately with the total number of votes cast at any election for representatives in State legislatures, or in the law-making branch of any city government.

It will be conceded that this plan, even without the provision for selecting all candidates by ballot as provided at nominating elections, would be a vast improvement on the present manner of electing our President, United States Senators and Representatives in Congress and all State and city officials. By embodying in the plan the provision for making such nominations by the people, the system becomes impregnable in the hands of intelligent voters. But the tremendous power which this plan would secure to all able and honestly conducted newspapers cannot at present be estimated. That it would give them a power they have never had will be readily understood by any one now connected with the press who gives this matter proper consideration.

The democratic idea in government demands, and the plan which I here submit recognizes, that in all States and cities each elector shall have secured to him a secret ballot, and the right to vote on one ballot for not less than three nor more than five State Senators for the State at large, and for not less than three nor more than five members of the lower House of the legislative' assembly for the State at large, and in Senatorial districts for five Senators in each, and in representative districts for five members each to the lower House.

This secures an absolutely equitable distribution of political power, and also political equality to every voter in the State, as each elector could only vote for the same number of Senators, and for the same number of representatives in the lower House.

But if he desired he could cumulate his vote and dispose of his votes for Senator and his votes for members of the Legislature as he might elect, by deliberately erasing with pen or pencil the name or names of the persons nominated for Senators or representatives, for whom he did not desire to vote, and designate opposite the name or names of his favorite candidates the number of votes which he wished transferred to them.

In the appendix to my address will be found the form for all ballots, National, State and City.

The plan is so simple, and so free from the possibility of fraud or misinterpretation, that I am confident it will recommend itself to the considerate judgment of all thoughtful men engaged in the work of representative and ballot reform.

That this plan when adopted will prove an invaluable educator will not be questioned.

Those who recognize the capacity of the people for selfgovernment will approve some such plan, while those who doubt or deny that the people are sufficiently intelligent to be intrusted with the power of self-government will oppose and condemn every proposed reform which promises to destroy the political machine, and break the political manacles with which intriguers and conventions now environ the voter in all parties, National and State.

It will be seen that this plan clothes with absolutely independent political power all electors, and that they are thus enabled to vote at every election, free from the arbitrary dictation of political caucuses and conventions, and of all self-appointed political leaders.

Affirming the fundamental proposition, upon which this plan is founded, that a great continental commonwealth can only be permanently maintained in peace and unity, by a government in which the whole people of all the States, the minority no less than the majority, are personally represented in its national legislative assembly, in proportion to the total number of its qualified voters, I gladly avail myself of the opportunity which this Society has given me, to lay before it my contribution to the suggestions, which, in the near future, must be submitted and discussed by the people before any such change as I contemplate can be made.

THE PLAN DEMOCRATIC.

An examination of this plan will disclose that it is equitable, comprehensive and democratic; that it is applicable alike in all governments, whether States, cities or municipalities, in which a democratic representative government is possible.

It recognizes the complete sovereignty of the people, and secures reponsible local self-government. It throws around the ballot-box every safeguard necessary for the security of the voter and the purity of elections, and arms each voter with a weapon which, if he but use it, will on all occasions give him complete protection against secret or open combinations of political intriguers. It makes impossible the successful use of the political machinery of our present caucus and convention system, or machinery such as has long been in use by Tammany Hall in this city, and by like organizations of both parties in other cities.

It destroys absolutely the power of political bossism, and enables the people to defeat all such combinations as now dictate to voters as imperiously as if they were convicts in a State prison, keeping lock-step, while marching to the polls, and obeying the order of the managers of the political "machine." That the present convention system of each party should have so firmly fastened itself upon the people of this country, is an amazing fact in our history. Under this system, the recognized barroom statesmen in this city, or indeed in any city, can, and usually do, select and have appointed to all State, district and city conventions a larger number of delegates than can be secured by any editor of even the ablest party organ. As a rule, and for the express purpose of binding in advance such editors to support the nominees, whoever they may be, they are put on delegations to all important conventions; special care being taken that they shall be sandwiched between a sufficient number of "reliable statesmen" to render them powerless against the "machine," either in such conventions or out of them.

It has long been a recognized common law rule in politics that every delegate taking part in any convention is in honor bound to defend the platform adopted, however objectionable, and support the candidates nominated, even though their nominations were secured by trickery or fraud.

In this way many editors are yearly marched into conventions and practically manacled, and compelled by party usage, and party necessity, to support the nominee, however unworthy, and defend the platform, however offensive, adopted by any convention in which they may have thus appeared as delegates, bound hand and foot.

The plan which I propose will change all this, and practically lodge the power where it ought to be, with the people, represented by the public press. By public discussion secret intriguers can be defeated more certainly than in any other way, and all editors can appeal to their readers to second their efforts to secure desirable candidates at all nominating elections. If a majority of the voters in any party unite with them at such nominating elections, it will be found that almost invariably reputable and worthy men have been selected as candidates. Editors of character and ability will thus always be able, under this plan, to command a favorable hearing with a hundred voters to every ten that can be induced to go to a caucus and vote for the nomination of any candidate presented by the most active and successful among our leading "practical statesmen." Daily in all cities, morning or evening, in the quiet of their homes, every editor under this plan can reach and appeal to his readers and ask them to cut out the ticket printed in his paper, and go to the dolls and vote it, with the statement that in his opinion by a proper effort, the candidate or candidates named can be nominated. I shall not attempt to estimate the power which this plan will secure to an able and independent press.

The usual results in our present national conventions are that the delegates from the so-called "pivotal States" dictate to each party all nominations for President. After a sufficient number of ballots have been taken to weary a majority of the rank and file in any convention, and the weak points of the several contestants have been disclosed, the programmes of the contending chiefs are then determined and the ablest boss manipulator of the "machine" generally wins. As he goes to the convention to win, he does not stand on the order of employing the means necessary to that end.

The moment the lay delegates discover the "situation" they become wild in their zeal to be heard, and the most unblushing and reckless, frantically jump upon seats and desks with yells that always amaze the uninitiated, each of them demanding recognition by the Chairman in order that he may have the honor of leading off and being the first in the mad scramble to have the vote of his State duly recorded for the candidate, who is slated to win, or to declare in a ringing speech that his delegation has instructed him to announce that his State has decided to change its vote from their "favorite son" to the candidate who is to be successful.

This movement, though an old dodge, is often so skillfully played that it stampedes the delegates and gives success to the secretly prearranged programme of the machine managers.

The candidate of the machine is thus oftener than otherwise nominated without the slightest regard to his ability or qualifications for the duties of the Presidential office, and when officially declared the nominee, the entire party is forced to support him, even though it be conceded that his nomination has been secured by trickery and fraud.

In the interval between the hours when the nomination

is made and the final adjournment of the convention, other important matters are being transacted. Papers are duly prepared and signed by delegates for each other, reciting the invaluable party services of delegates from this State and that *who voted right*, and especially the "claims" of delegates from "pivotal States," and before the convention has fairly adjourned, the delegates who made the nomination possible are "booked" for official recognition under the new administration, if the candidate should be elected.

The political demoralization from this condition of things cannot be even approximately estimated. The adoption of my plan for nominating all candidates by a direct vote of all electors by ballot, will, beyond question, secure the early abolition of all national nominating conventions, and eventually of all State, county and city conventions, thus emancipating the voters of all parties from the despotism of party cliques and party conventions.

In thus superseding the present caucus and convention system, each elector will be secured in a right he never had before, the right to vote directly for his first choice for any candidate from President down, without the fear of indirectly aiding in the election of an objectionable candidate, because the first election in every instance is simply a nominating election.

I have provided that at all nominating elections each group of electors, or each party, shall prepare its own ballot, and also that each individual voter may prepare his own ballot, either printed or written, as he may elect and as the law shall prescribe.

After the nominations are made, Congress is specially directed to provide by law that the "College of Deputies" in each State shall cause all the official ballots to be prepared and properly distributed, substantially as in the "Australian system," which has been adopted by several of our States.

Abolish the Office of Vice-President.

To me, there is no provision of our National Constitution so objectionable as that which creates the office of Vice-President, and in case of the resignation, disability or death of the President, clothes that functionary with the Chief Executive office. Objection was made to the creation of the office of Vice-President by some of the clearest thinkers in the convention which framed the Constitution, some of whom declared that "the office was unnecessary and dangerous."

The wisdom of their opposition has been confirmed more than once in our history.

As all know, the Vice-President is a superfluous officer, and as experience has shown, more ornamental than useful. He is simply a figure-head, and since the birth of the convention system not an attractive one at that. But as the "heir apparent" he is always a possibility. Around every Vice President all factions and cranks in his party involuntarily gather. Whether he wishes it or not, all disappointed applicants for office, and all conspirators are drawn towards him as by the law of gravitation. That our revolutionary fathers should have preserved this shadowy relic of monarchy in our Constitution by creating an "heir-apparent" is one of the unexplained facts in our history. And then, our "heir-apparent" is unlike that of any other provided for, in any government on earth, in that he has no ties of affection or consanguinity or gratitude. The President is never the father of the Vice-President nor his benefactor, but often his personal and political rival.

This provision of the Constitution simply invites every Vice-President to be a Richard III. or a conspirator ready and waiting the promotion, which assassins can always secure for him, by creating a vacancy in the office of President, as was done in the "removal" of Lincoln and Garfield.

Night and morning, at banquets and funerals, every-

where and on all occasions, the Constitution perpetually whispers in the ear of every unscrupulous and ambitious Vice-President, "that between him and the highest and most honorable office on earth there is but the life of a single man."

Instead of such an officer as the Vice-President, the provision originally suggested in the first draft made by the Committee in the Convention of 1789 ought to have been made part of the Constitution. That provision simply provided that "The Senate shall choose its own presiding and other officers."

The Speaker of the House of Representatives is always a member of that body, and must be selected by its members. The Speaker appoints all committees of the House, and can, if he so elects, vote on all questions before the House and also take part in debate, while the Vice-President cannot appoint the Senate committees, nor vote, except in case of a tie, nor can he participate in debate on the floor of the Senate. His very existence and presence is a menace and a peril to any man in the office of President.

The peace of our country has been imperiled during our history more than once, because of the existence of the office of Vice-President. We would have escaped the ordeal through which the nation passed in 1801, when Jefferson and Burr were candidates, if there had been no Vice Presidential office. And here I may appropriately quote from a speech which I made in Congress on this subject in 1868, when I said "that had there been no such office as Vice-President, we should have been spared the perfidy of a Tyler, the betrayal of a Filmore, and the baseness and infamy of a Johnson."

After drawing a picture of the conspiracy which ultimated in Mr. Lincoln's assassination, I said in the same speech, that "I present this panoramic view of what is now history to illustrate how weak and indefensible in this particular is the Presidential office, so that I may appeal to the nation to fortify it against this danger by removing the temptation now presented to conspirators and assassins, and thus make the Presidential office a citadel against which they may hurl themselves in vain."

"Adopt this plan and the occupant of the Presidential office will be effectually guarded from all political conspiracies which thrive by assassination. It also precludes the possibility of an interregnum in that office." (Congressional Globe, 2d Session, 40th Congress, Part 3, page 2714.)

In all national conventions, the average candidate for Vice President is practically a "pawn" on the political chessboard in the hands of the managers of the "machine," and is disposed of as absolutely as the skilled chess player moves and disposes of his "pawn" in any sharp game of chess.

More than once, in the history of the Democratic, Whig and Republican parties, has the Vice-Presidential "pawn" been used by the "machine" managers to defeat the nomination of candidates for President, who would have been nominated but for the intriguers, who successfully played the Vice-Presidential "pawn," to defeat the first choice of the party, and to nominate candidates who were not even the second or third choice of the party for President.

From the first National Convention to the last, not one of all the men nominated by either party for Vice-President, could have been nominated for President by the convention which nominated him for Vice-President. Yet the Constitution makes every Vice-President the "heir-apparent."

Had the plan which I propose for filling a vacancy in the Presidential office been part of our National Constitution, when either one or all of our four Presidents passed away, and thus made that office vacant, nothing is more certain than that, not one of the men who was then Vice-President could have been selected to fill out the unexpired term of that President.

Let me ask you to look in upon such a gathering of the national "College of Deputies," as it would appear, on the plan proposed, when in session at Washington for the purpose of selecting a President to fill out the unexpired term of any President. And first, look at the members of such an assembly individually. That such a body of men would be made up of the fairest and most trustworthy citizens of each State, is assured by the requirement which prescribes that the youngest member shall not be less than 30 years of age, and that he shall have been seven years a resident of the State from which he is chosen, and that he shall be nominated and elected by the duly qualified electors of each State. Selected in conformity with this plan, no better guarantee could be given as to their character and fidelity.

Under the apportionment of 1891 for Representatives in Congress, there would be 444 members of such a College of Deputies when convened in session at Washington, representing the majority and minority of the whole people in each State, as equitably as can be secured with the present distribution of political power in our large and small States.

No intelligent man familiar with our history can for a moment believe that such a body of men, when called upon to rise each in his place and vote viva voce for a citizen to fill out the unexpired term of any deceased President, that they would have been guilty of the folly or crime of selecting John Tyler to fill the vacancy caused by the death of General Harrison, or Millard Fillmore to fill the vacancy caused by the death of General Taylor, nor would it have been possible for such a body to have filled the vacancy caused by the assassination of Mr. Lincoln by the selection of Andrew Johnson, or Chester A. Arthur to fill that of General Garfield. If it be true that such a body of men would not have selected any one of the four Vice-Presidents, who as the "heir-apparent" became President on the death of his chief, and if, as I believe, not one of the men named could by any combination have been nominated for President by the convention which nominated him for Vice-President, have I not presented considerations which will justify the people of this country in demanding the early abolition of the office of Vice-President?

THE DECENTRALIZATION OF POLITICAL POWER.

With the adoption of this proposed amendment all conflict of authority between the National and State governments will cease, because the powers and duties of each will have been definitely and clearly defined, so that all States now in the Union, and all States which in the future may be admitted, can have no cause for controversy.

Each State and all municipal governments within any State will be fully protected in its dignity and freedom from intervention on the part of the officials of the National Government, and may regulate its own internal affairs in its own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States.

After the adoption of this amendment, Congress could not clothe the President nor any official of the National Government [as it may now do] with authority to interfere in any national election in any State, nor would it then be possible for Congress to enact such a law, as the so called "Force Bill."

In all elections for President and Senators and Representatives in Congress, the people of each State have, by this plan, direct and absolute control by personal vote free from the intervention of the political machinery of State governments.

Nor does this plan interfere in any way with the electoral or administrative machinery of State governments, or municipal governments in States; nor does it abridge the liberty or the privileges of the citizen of any State; on the contrary, it enlarges his liberty and secures to him rights of which he never before was possessed except in name. It preserves the rights of the States and secures inviolable the sovereignty of the people.

As the Courts of the United States deal directly with the citizens of the several States without serious conflict from the State Courts, so this amendment, and all laws which the Congress may enact by its authority, deal directly with the people and charge the citizens residing in the several States with the selection by ballot of their own officials to conduct all National elections in their respective States.

Under this plan you cannot lodge in the hands of any administration at Washington the control of the National electoral machinery in the States. To the College of Deputies in each State, and to no other officials, is given the authority to secure an honest registration of the electors in each State, and a free and fair election of President and Senators and Representatives in Congress. Instead of an increase of centralized power at Washington, to which I am opposed, this plan secures a marked decentralization of power, by placing it permanently and exclusively in the care and keeping of the citizens of each State.

In all elections for President and Senators and Representatives in Congress, the entire machinery for conducting such elections is lodged in the hands of officials nominated and elected by ballot directly by the qualified voters in each State, and these officials thus elected by the people of the several States can no more be induced to commit fraud or crime or be dictated to or controlled by officials at Washington than a Judge, or a duly impaneled jury in any Circuit or District Court of the United States in any State, nor can they be tampered with and corrupted by any administration at Washington.

Whatever power may originally have been "reserved to the States or to the people" in our present Constitution is by this plan secured to the people direct, without interference on the part either of the National or State governments.

Instead of conferring additional power on the Government at Washington touching National elections, *this plan materially decreases the power conferred on Congress by our present Constitution*, and provides that all power and authority in respect to the conduct of elections in the several States for President and Senators and Representatives in Congress shall be confided to the people direct, and in such manner that neither the officials of the National government nor of a State government can in any way interfere with the authority or the duties of the College of Deputies chosen by the people, in each State.

It takes from a State no power properly belonging to it, but it takes from the State legislatures the power to elect United States Senators as now, and demolishes the power of the machine boss and the cross-roads statesman in every legislature, and makes it impossible for him to wield the power he now uses to compel the members of all State legislatures to go into caucuses for the nomination of United States Senators, where with one-third or less of the members of any State legislature he dictates who shall be the Senator from such State, as is now the case in nearly every State in the Union. It also deprives the legislature of the power of disfranchising the people, and sometimes a majority of the people of a State, of their proportionate representation in Congress by unjust and indefensible acts of gerrymandering the State into Congressional districts.

The power thus taken from Congress and from State legislatures is conferred directly on the people of each State in connection with all National elections, and secures a perfect decentralization of power, and does not permit either the Senate or House of Representatives, as under our present Constitution, to be the judge of the qualifications of its own members; under which rule, either House of Congress can always find a partisan pretext for turning a member out who has been elected, and seat a member who has not been elected, as has often been done, and will be done so long as the present authority is vested in each House.

This constitutional amendment prescribes the qualifications of Senators and members of the House, and confers on the people at the ballot-box the right to determine who the Senators and members from their State shall be, and from this decision there can be no appeal to either House of Congress. All contests must be heard and determined in the District Court of the United States for the State and district in which any contest may arise.

This plan secures full and free scope for the deliberate

expression of the national will, not only in the nomination and election of the President, but in the selection of Senators and Representatives in Congress and members of the College of Deputies.

In States entitled to more than one Representative in Congress, each group of electors, if their number be equal to one-third. or more or less as the case may be, can by cumulating their vote always have a voice in the administration of the Government and thus be able to check and often to defeat schemes which are pernicious or undesirable. By securing to the people of every State proportional representation, the convictions and conscience of the majority and minority in each State, and in the Nation, will always be represented in each State and at Washington, so that ill considered or partisan movements, and sometimes the temporary madness of public opinion, may by prudent criticism and practical discussion be modified or rejected.

The "pivotal States," as they are called, that is, large States like New York, whose vote more than once has decided the election of a President, is one of the most corrupting and dangerous powers in our system. The incentive to illegal voting and ballot-box stuffing, and to the importation of voters from adjoining States into such States as New York, is but one of the dangers inseparable from the election of thirty-six Presidential electors on one ballot for the State at large.

Under the present electoral machinery, a *minority* of the popular vote and a *minority* of the electoral vote secured the President at the time John Quincy Adams was chosen by the House of Representatives in 1825. No plan of national government is defensible which makes it possible for a minority of the voters at the polls and a minority of the Electoral College to succeed in electing the President, as was done in 1825 when Mr. Adams was chosen.

When some such amendment as I here propose shall have been adopted, no third or fourth rate man will thereafter be nominated for President. Certainly no man unknown to the people, nor any man whose political opinions were objectionable could possibly be nominated, after each elector is authorized to vote direct by ballot for his first choice. In order to get votes enough at any nominating election, to be included in the list of the four highest candidates, he must of necessity be a man of national reputation, with a character for political integrity and executive ability.

The average elector has a proper estimate of the dignity and importance which belongs to the Presidential office, and the voters of all parties, when naming their first choice for President, would naturally turn to their ablest representative men. In no event could a mere faction or a minority in any party, by the use of the "machine" form combinations and defeat as they have done, and can now do, the nomination of any man who was the choice of the majority. Schemers and intriguers would be powerless without the "convention machine," and could not by secret combinations hold the "balance of power" in in any large States like New York and Ohio, and dictate the nomination of their candidate on pain of defeating the party. Under my plan, the voice of all electors in each party would be heard, and desperate efforts could not be successfully made, such as we have more than once witnessed in New York, to obtain, no matter by what means, a bare plurality of the vote in the State, so as to secure the entire electoral vote of the State and thus elect the President.

Objections to the Election of a President by a College of Electors and by the House of Representatives under our present Constitution.

Section *One* of Article *Two* of our Constitution prescribes the manner in which electors of President and Vice-President shall be appointed by the several States, as follows:

"Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress."

It will be observed that the Constitution thus confers on the Legislature of each State, without qualification and beyond the possibility of doubt, absolute authority to appoint in such manner as a majority of any Legislature may direct, the number of electors of President and Vice-President to which the State is entitled under any apportionment. The words, "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," are as clear and distinct as the English language can make them. It must therefore be conceded that a majority in the Legislature of any State, even though they represent a *minority* of the total vote of the State, may appoint all the electors, or they may confer the power of appointment on any one or more persons (as the Legislature of South Carolina did at one time confer the power to appoint the electors of President and Vice-President for that State on its Governor), or they may direct that electors for President and Vice-President shall be chosen by the voters of the State, either in Congressional district or by the State at large, or in any subdivision of the State, as they may elect, and from such determination of the Legislature there can be no escape.

The enactment by the last Legislature of Michigan of a law changing the manner of appointing the electors of President and Vice-President for that State ought to be a lesson and a warning.

It is well known that Michigan is a State in which one party, when united, is uniformly in a majority. Factional divisions and incompetent leadership on the part of the majority enabled the minority last year to seize control of the State Government, including the Legislature. Whereupon the Legislature proceeded (as under the clause of the Constitution above quoted they had the legal authority to do) to repeal the law, which from the organization of the State should select, on one ballot for the State at large, all the electors of President and Vice-President; and enacted a law which directs that said electors shall be chosen in districts; districts which said Legislature deliberately gerrymandered, so as to secure to the *minority* of the voters in the State a *majority* of the fourteen Presidential electors to which the State is entitled in the Electoral College of 1892.

If the Legislatures of other States, in which the *minority* of the voters of either party may have secured by any . combination a *majority* of its Legislature, should follow the example of Michigan (which is not improbable), and repeal the law which now authorizes the people to choose Presidential electors in such States, and assume to appoint *all* the electors to which their State is entitled, or a majority of them, such action would disclose one of the weakest and most dangerous defects of our present system for the choice of a President.

The accidental control of the Legislature by a *minority* of the voters of any party of one or more "pivotal States" would thus enable the minority to determine the choice of a President next year. And it is among the possibilities that the act of the Michigan Legislature in dividing the electoral vote of that State, may defeat the will of a large majority of the people of Michigan and of the Nation in their choice of a President in 1892. The new apportionment increases the vote in the Electoral College to 444; of which number 223 are a majority. If the Democratic candidate in 1892 should carry all the States which voted for Mr. Cleveland in 1884, he would have 225 electoral votes and be elected. If he should lose West Virginia, and secure six or eight votes from Michigan, because of the appointment of the electors in that State by districts, he would still be elected.

It will be granted without argument, that if a *minority* party in any State which, by accident or because of the indifference of the *majority*, has secured control of its Legislature, may in its partisan zeal repeal the law providing for the choice of Presidential electors by the people of such State, and by any device secure to its party the appointment of the *entire number* of Presidential electors to which the State is by law entitled, or a *majority* of them,

that our Constitution cannot be too speedily amended in this particular.

Should a *majority* of the voters in Michigan, or in any State, attempt to appoint (as has been suggested) electors of President and Vice-President for 1892, under the law long in use, but which may have been repealed by any State Legislature, such action would probably ultimate in two or more sets of electoral certificates being sent from such States to Washington, and result in a contest in Congress such as we had in 1876–77; and might end in the selection of the President by the House of Representatives.

Another objectionable feature of our electoral system is that which permits each member of a College of Electors to vote a secret ballot for any person he may wish for President; and then, the officers of any pivotal State may corruptly certify to the election of Presidential electors who have *not* been elected by the people of such State; and Congress may refuse to go back of the returns from any State, so certified by its corrupt or partisan officials.

That we have reached a point in our history when the nation must give serious consideration to the impending danger which thus confronts us will not be questioned.

A majority of the American people might refuse to submit to such injustice and wrong.

Another Electoral Commission might inaugurate a partisan conflict that would end in revolution.

The adoption of the proposed constitutional amendment, herewith submitted, will at once put an end to all such dangerous possibilities. When there are no longer "pivotal States," there will be no such desperate efforts as we now witness at each Presidential election to carry such States by improper and dangerous methods.

A whole people cannot be corrupted, and manifestly it would be impossible, when the nation voted as a unit, to secure a majority of the total vote by trickery and fraud.

During the next ten years, if an election of a President should devolve on the House of Representatives, composed of 356 members, as it is under the present apportionment, fifty-five (55) members from twenty-three States can, by uniting, elect the President. It will be seen that under our present Constitution *less* than *one-sixth* of the members of the House, representing *less* than *one-sixth* of the population of the nation, can elect the President.

The following twenty-three States would make a majority of forty-four States:

		1	
	No. of Votes.		No. of Votes.
1. Delaware 2. Idaho 3. Montana 4. Nevada 5. North Dakota 6. W yoming 7. Florida 8. Colorado 9. New Hampshire 10. Oregon 11. Rhode Island	2 2 2 2	14. Washington15. Connecticut16. Maine17. West Virginia18. Arkansas19. Louisiana20. Maryland21. Nebraska22. South Carolina23. Mississippi	$2 \\ 4 \\ 4 \\ 6 \\ 6 \\ 6 \\ 6 \\ 7 \\ 7 \\ 7$
12. South Dakota 13. Vermont	$\frac{2}{2}$	Total Vote	72

Of these seventy-two votes, fifty-five may cast the vote of the above-named twenty-three States (each State having one vote), and thus fifty-five members, in a House of 356, can elect the President.

It will not be questioned that it would be difficult to devise a more anti-democratic provision than that which our present Constitution provides for the election of a President by the House of Representatives.

The slave barons forced this anti-democratic provision in the Constitution, and political progress was thus retarded a century.

That less than *one-sixth* of the members of the House of Representatives can, by uniting, select as President the person having the smallest popular vote and the smallest number of electoral votes of the three candidates returned to the House, is a fact which forms one of the political anomalies in our history.

Why a practical people, such as ours, should for a hun-

dred years have submitted to a system so anti-democratic and repugnant to all fair-minded, intelligent men, is something I am unable to explain.

When an election for President devolves on that body, one-third, and sometimes one-half of its members who vote to make the President, are men who have not been elected to the new Congress.

As their terms expire on the 4th of March immediately after such an election for President, a majority of such retiring members are usually in condition and ready to accept appointments from the man whom they have just voted to make President.

LARGE AND SMALL STATES.

During my early reading of the Constitution, I often regretted that a clause had not been `added to Article V., providing that at some time after its adoption, say in fifty or even in a hundred years, Senators of the United States should be apportioned among the several States as Representatives are allotted to each, in proportion to the population of each.

You will remember that Section 2 of Article I. provides that each State shall have two Senators, and that Article V. contains this extraordinary provision: "And no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." These two provisions and the clause in Article II., which provides that "each State shall have one vote," when the choice of a President devolves on the House of Representatives, are quite as objectionable to me now as when I first began to study the Constitution, for the reason that they are a positive denial of the representative principle and a flagrant violation of the democratic idea in government.

I would not vote to day for the admission of a new State out of any State, or for the admission of a Territory as a State, unless I could be satisfied that its population would, within a reasonable time, entitle it to not less than four (4) Representatives in Congress, under any apportionment which would result by dividing the population of the nation by 356, the number of members of the House fixed by law under the present census.

So long as any State, without regard to population, is clothed with the political power of *two* Senators, a State with less than four members is simply a "rotten borough."

Until the Senate is remodeled, and Senators of the United States are apportioned among the several States on the basis of population, or, better yet, on the basis of the votes cast at each election for President, the admission of rotten borough States ought to be resisted by all who believe in a democratic government and an equitable representation of all the people in the National Congress.

I regret to say that within a year we have witnessed the remarkable spectacle of six new States being dragged into the Union, with unexampled haste, whose combined population is not more than enough to make one commonwealth, and three of them will probably never have a population sufficient to entitle them to more than one Representative in Congress. And this was done with the example of Nevada before us as a warning.

Every student of political science must look with amazement on the reckless distribution of political power which we have witnessed in the recent admission of these six new States.

Nevada contains to-day a territorial area of 109,740 square miles, and is larger by seventy-four square miles in territorial area than all the six New England States with New York added.

When this barren waste of sand and desert was admitted as a State in 1864, the claim was made by its embryo statesmen that it *then* contained a population of *one hundred thousand* or more, and that with its fabulous and inexhaustible mineral and pastoral wealth and its large territorial area, nothing could prevent it becoming the "Empire State" west of the Missouri River and east of California.

Whatever may have been its population in 1864, its population after twenty-seven years of the wonderful development promised by its romancing officials is now reported by the census just taken at the astonishing number 40,019. In round numbers call the population of this marvelous "Empire State" 40,000, and that of New York six millions, and we are face to face with the fact that each voter on this 109,740 square miles of sand and sage brush has more than *four times* the political power of a voter in New York, in the House of Representatives, and one hundred and fifty times the power of a voter in New York in the Senate of the United States, and yet Senators from the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio and Illinois voted not only to perpetuate this inequality of political power, but to increase it, by making precedents for future Congresses to follow.

Instead of creating "rotten borough" States, the statesmen or party which shall devise a popular movement for merging two or more such undesirable States into one State, so that such reorganized State shall contain a population sufficient for a respectable commonwealth, will be entitled to the thanks and gratitude of the nation.

There are now seventeen States in the Union whose combined population is less than that of the State of New York.

These seventeen States, as all know, have *thirty-four* Senators to represent them in the Senate of the United States, New York but *two*.

In case the election of a President devolves on the House of Representatives, these seventeen States have each one vote, while New York has but one vote, provided her Representatives in the House are not equally divided, in which event her vote is lost.

I voted against the admission of West Virginia during the war, for the reason that I was unwilling to increase the political power of any State, in the Senate, by consenting to divide States of the third or fourth class into two or more States.

Before her dismemberment, old Virginia had less than half the population of Pennsylvania, and the population of West Virginia when admitted was but one seventh that of Ohio. I voted against it, for the additional reason that, as I interpreted Section 3 of Article IV. of the Constitution, its dismemberment was a clear violation of that instrument in both its letter and its spirit.

And then I had a sentiment which impelled me to vote against the dismemberment of the old State. However unsparingly I may have condemned, as I did, her indefensible acts of secession and war on the Union, I could not forget that she was the mother of States and statesmen. I could not forget the heroic deeds and great acts of her Revolutionary history, and especially that one which, as time rolls on, rises higher and higher in moral grandeur-I mean her cession to the nation of all that territory which to day comprises the five great States of Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, Illinois and Wisconsin. And then, I remembered with gratitude the fact that she enriched that priceless gift, by uniting with her sister States in passing the ordinance of 1787, which prohibited slavery and involutary servitude forever in all that vast territory. I thought then, and think now, that that one sublime act ought to have saved the old commonwealth of commonwealths from the humiliation of such a spoliation and dismemberment. But this was one of the mad and unstatesmanlike acts of the war, and grievously has the party which did it explated it.

THE NOMINATION OF CANDIDATES.

At all nominating elections for President, or for Senators or Representatives in Congress, and for members of the College of Deputies, the voters in each State are secured in the right to vote direct by ballot for the nomination of candidates for each of the officers to be elected, and from the *four* highest on the list for each office, voted for at such election, each party or group of electors must select its candidates to be voted for at the final election in November.

In voting for the nomination of a President, or for United States Senator or for a Representative in Congress for States entitled to but one member, each elector can give but one vote for each candidate. Only when there are two or more candidates to be nominated for Representatives in Congress and *three* or more members of the College of Deputies for a State, can an elector cumulate his vote at any nominating election.

All electors and each organized party or *group* of electors, must, under this plan, prepare their own ballots and vote directly, as provided by law, to nominate their first choice. That they can do this, free from the dictation of party conventions, party bosses, or "managing statesmen" will be clear enough to any man of ordinary intelligence.

There are certain to be *four* candidates on the list voted for, at each nominating election, who will have received a sufficient number of votes to be included with the four to be nominated; that is, there will always be *four candidates with a plurality over their competitors*, unless there be two or more candidates who may have received an *equal number of votes* at any nominating election (which will seldom happen). In case a tie vote should occur in any State or district, the College of Deputies for the State will be required by law to determine by *lot, or otherwise*, which of the candidates having an equal number of votes shall have his name printed on the official ballot and be eligible to be voted for at the regular election in November.

In Ohio, by the apportionment provided for under the new census, there would be one candidate for Congress to be nominated for the State at large. In order that there shall be, not less than four candidates for each office to represent not less than four parties, or *four* groups of electors, it is provided that from the *four* names highest on the list voted for at each nominating election in August, the electors of each party, shall select their candidates for the regular election in November. By providing that the number of candidates from which the electors may select shall be *four* for each office to be filled at any regular election, each of the great parties will uniformly and without question name its favorite candidates, and smaller groups of electors or new parties can by this plan always secure their own candidates, provided they poll a sufficient number of votes, by cumulating them, to place their candidate among the *four* highest on the list voted for at any nominating election.

Each of the old parties would, after conference and public discussion through its party papers, be certain to concentrate its vote, so as to put its own candidates at the head of the list, at all nominating elections.

The Prohibitionist, the National Alliance, and other party organizations, would, as a rule, be able to unite and cumulate their vote so as to secure one, if not two, of the four candidates. If, however, they failed to do this in any State or district, then and in that event they can select from the list of the four highest which may have been voted for, at each nominating election, and from no others, one or more of such candidates as they may prefer. In this way each minority party, or group of electors, could make up a ticket, as any party would be compelled to do, in order that the "College of Deputies" for each State might prepare and have printed and distributed the official ballots containing the names of all candidates duly nominated as prescribed by law, as only official ballots would be received at any regular election in November.

In the State of Ohio there would be one candidate for Congress to be elected for the State at large, and four candidates from which to select. Each of the great parties would be compelled to make up its ticket from one of the *four* highest candidates on the list voted for, in the State at large, at any nominating election in August. And any group of electors, whether Prohibitionists or National Alliance, or any party with a public organization, could make up a ticket from the list nominated, and require the "College of Deputies" in each State to print the name or names of the candidates designated by such party, or group of electors, on an official ballot to be voted for by them; and, besides, each individual elector would be authorized to erase any name on his official ballot, and use a " paster " or *write* the name of any one of the duly nominated candidates in the place of the name of any candidate whose name he might decide to erase.

In Congressional districts of *five*, there would be *four* candidates nominated for each member of Congress to be elected, or twenty candidates for each district of five members.

The old parties would of course always have their own candidates, that is five candidates each, or one-half the number of the twenty highest on the list. The next highest on the list would probably represent the National Alliance and the Prohibitionists, and perhaps in some States other groups of electors. They could select their ticket from the ten that did not represent the two dominant parties, or if they were a group of "high-kickers" or fighting independents, they could select one from each of the candidates nominated, and thus have one or more candidates from each party, as they might elect.

It will be seen that this plan, while preserving intact the two old parties, provides for securing to the minority, or to any new party, or to individual citizens all the rights that legitimately belong to an independent voter in a democratic republic.

In all States and in all cities this plan can be applied with mathematical accuracy, and with such unquestioned fairness to the *majority* and to the *minority* that one is often amazed that it has not long ago been adopted, and made part of our National Constitution, and also been engrafted in our State Constitutions and put in force in the administration of all cities of the first and second class in every State.

DISUNION IMPOSSIBLE WITH SUCH A CONSTITUTION.

As the fatal dogma of secession was buried in a common grave with the great rebellion, it is fitting and proper that the National Constitution should be so amended as to conform to the new and broader conditions of our national life.

If this proposed amendment, which cannot be misinter-

preted nor misunderstood, had formed part of our National Constitution prior to the War of the Rebellion, that colossal and indefensible crime would have been impossible.

Make this plain democratic provision part of our National Constitution, and we shall thus take security of the future that no such rebellion can happen again.

Adopt this amendment and a crisis, such as that which happily ended in the expedient of the Electoral Commission of 1877, will never confront us thereafter.

Adopt it, and the House of Representatives will never again be the theatre of intrigue for the election of a President.

Adopt it, and the menace of a solid South and of pivotal States in the North will never more be known in our history.

And all citizens of the United States in each State will have the right, which ought to be secured to them in a democratic republic, of nominating and electing their President by a direct vote of the duly qualified electors by ballot without the intervention of national nominating conventions, State Legislatures, a College of Electors or the House of Representatives.

Adopt the amendments providing for the nomination and election of Senators of the United States and Representatives in Congress, and no State or district in a State will have cause to blush for the character or ability of her representatives in either House of the Congress at Washington.

Before the colossal political power which such a constitution will secure, and such a government represent, we may well pause and ask ourselves, "What of the future?" With a population such as I estimate within fifty years of one hundred and sixty-one millions or more, speaking the same language and having a common interest and a common destiny, represented by an indissoluble Union, whose sovereignty resides in the whole people as a unit, and not in territorial subdivisions called "sovereign States," we shall present to the world, as I see it, the freest, the strongest and the best form of democratic representative government on earth.

So thoroughly am I impressed with the maguitude of this subject, and, after years of reflection, so thoroughly does it command the approval of my judgment, that, had I the time, it would be an easy and welcome task to extend this address into a volume. What I now present has been written in odd hours, as time and the cares of an exacting business permitted.

In submitting thus briefly these observations for discussion by the Ohio Society of New York, I feel that I but discharge the duty of a citizen by contributing something to a subject on which many of the most thoughtful men in this country are now thinking, to the end that I may aid in calling public attention to the changes which now confront us—changes which I believe demand the serious consideration of the foremost citizens of all parties and all sections.

To those of my faith and sanguine temperament this impending change represents the life and hope and onward march of the nation, and is the natural outgrowth of that unrest which in the history of mankind always precedes great reforms.

To me, it is the Spirit of Progress born of the aspirations of a great people for an indissoluble Union and a democratic continental commonwealth.

As I watch, this spirit points the way to a higher and broader conception of one's rights and duties as a citizen. In its inspiring presence our prophets and leaders are thrilled with an enthusiasm which glows in face and speech, as they direct the advancing columns of those who are marching in the pathway of progress. And all who march abreast and battle with them, shall feel that

APPENDIX.

Containing the history and text of the proposed constitutional amendment, with suggestions for the form of all official ballots—National, State and City. Together with census statistics for the first one hundred years of the Republic, and estimated population for the second hundred years.

Also map showing the States and parts of States in which the Afro-American will outnumber the whites after the year 1940.

HISTORY OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT.

It may not be uninteresting if I give a brief history of this Constitutional Amendment and the reasons which led me to prepare it nearly a quarter of a century ago.

In 1841, when a boy, I visited Washington to see Gen. Wm. Henry Harrison inaugurated President. Before returning home, President Harrison died and I saw John Tyler, the first Vice-President in our history, inaugurated President, as provided in the Constitution.

In less than three months after Mr. Tyler entered upon the duties of the Presidential office, it began to be quietly whispered about among the Democrats of Kentucky and Southern Ohio, that Tyler (who had been elected Vice-President on the ticket with Gen. Harrison by the Whig party) "had come over to our side."

Within a year it was generally suspected that Tyler had formed some kind of a secret alliance with the Calhoun wing of the Democratic party, and this proved to be true, as is evidenced by the history of his administration.

I was a looker-on in the Democratic National Conven-

tion which met at Baltimore in 1844. By the favor of Col. Richard M. Johnson, of Kentucky, ex-Vice-President, I had a seat on the floor of that Convention with the Kentucky delegation.

More than two-thirds of all the delegates elected to that Convention had been, when appointed, instructed to vote for the renomination of the old ticket, which had been defeated by Harrison and Tyler in 1840.

By intrigue, betrayal of trust, and deliberate violation of instructions on the part of delegates to that Convention, Mr. Van Buren was defeated, and James K. Polk, of Tennessee, was nominated and elected President, defeating Henry Clay.

Afterwards I saw the Electoral College for Ohio meet at Columbus and go through the mummery of voting by ballot for President and Vice-President.

The members of the College then appointed one of their own number to carry one of the three certificates of the result of that election by the electors in Ohio to Washington.

To me, it seemed like a solemn farce, and as if each member of the College was cognizant of the fact.

These events impressed me deeply and so unfavorably that I never thereafter affirmed (as I had been taught to do) "that our National Constitution was the perfection of human wisdom"; on the contrary, the more I studied it, the clearer did its defects and objectionable provisions appear to me.

But the fact must not be forgotten that the fathers of the Constitution were environed on every hand, and that only by yielding as they did, to the slave-holding interests, and also to the selfish demands of some of the States, was the organization of a National Government in 1789 possible.

If, when the National Constitution was under discussion in 1789, its authors had been confronted with the simple proposition of framing a democratic representative government and securing to the people of all the States an equitable distribution of political power, there is no question that more than one of the unphilosophical provisions embodied in our present Constitution would never have found a place in it.

Instead of occupying themselves in discussing practical democratic questions, as many of the members of the Convention of 1789 were pre-eminently qualified to do, the time and skill of the ablest men in that remarkable body were largely taken up in devising plans to defeat the petty schemes of narrow and selfish men, and to secure harmony of views among some of its impracticable members and adjust the supposed conflicting interests of the larger and smaller States.

The practical problem before them was not the best form of an ideal democratic republic, with an equitable distribution of political power, but the organization of a national government that would be accepted and ratified by each of the thirteen States. As all know, the Constitution as finally adopted could only have been formed by concession and compromise, and all compromise is, of necessity, patchwork.

From the day I witnessed the inauguration of Vice-President John Tyler as President, and the defeat of Mr. Van Buren in the nominating convention in Baltimore in 1844, I have been opposed to the caucus and convention system, National, State and City; as also the machinery by which the President is now elected, and in favor of the abolition of the office of Vice-President.

Instead of electing a President as now provided by law and the Constitution, and by the convention system to which custom and usage has given the force of law, I propose that there shall be no Vice-President and that the nomination and election of a President shall be by a direct vote by ballot of the qualified electors in all the States; without the intervention of National Conventions, a College of Electors, or the House of Representatives.

The amendment as now presented (except one or two immaterial changes) was prepared by me during the time the patchwork known as the 14th Amendment was under consideration, as it now appears in the Constitution.

In my original draft, but three members of Congress were apportioned to each Congressional district in States entitled to six members or more. In the draft now submitted, not less than four nor more than five members are allotted to each Congressional district in States entitled to eight members or more.

As a practical solution of the difficulties which environ us, and for securing an equitable distribution of political power, National, State and Municipal, the plan has steadily grown upon me for twenty years or more, and I am confident that substantially as herein outlined it will at no distant day be approved by a majority of all parties in this country.

When first prepared, I submitted it (as was my custom with any important work which I attempted, while in Congress) to my personal friend, Mr. Beaman, of Michigan, for his legal criticism and suggestion. After his approval, it was printed and submitted to Governor Chase and to Sumner, Wade and Howard of the Senate, and to Thaddeus Stevens and Henry Winter Davis of the House.

Their general judgment was, that while the reconstruction measures were before us and the controversy with Andrew Johnson was occupying the attention of Congress, the country was not prepared for changes so farreaching as I proposed, and they advised me to confine my amendment to the nomination and election of the President by a direct vote of the people, and to abolishing the office of Vice-President (to which they all, at that time, heartily assented), and to secure a modification of the veto Instead of a College of Deputies, such as I propower. posed, for the choice of a President in case of a vacancy in that office, they suggested that the power should be conferred on the Senate and House in joint convention, each Senator and Representative having one vote. These members of the Senate and House were representative men and my seniors in years and political experience. After conferring with them, I finally accepted their judgment, and in accordance with their suggestions prepared a modified form of my original plan, omitting the provision for the creation of the National College of Deputies, the election of United States Senators by the people, and for *proportional* or *equitable* representation.

The modified plan as then prepared, and the speech which I made in the House in support of it, may be found in the *Congressional Globe* for the second session of the Fortieth Congress, Vol. 3, page 2713.

Had I been re-elected to Congress in 1868, I should have presented this amendment as originally prepared and as now submitted for your consideration.

Failing to be re-elected, I resolved to present it through some representative member of the Senate or House on the first occasion when I thought public opinion would warrant the probability of a favorable reception of it.

When the Electoral Commission of 1877 declared Mr. Hayes the duly elected President, I believed that the time had come when the statesmen of all parties would be forced by public opinion to give prompt consideration to some such plan as mine for the election of the President, to the end that another such perilous contest as that, adjusted by that extraordinary commission, should never happen again.

Accordingly, I went with it to Senator Chandler of Michigan, and outlined it to him and urged him, as Chairman of the National Republican Committee, and the man who had done more to elect Mr. Hayes than any other, to take the proposed amendment and go to Mr. Hayes with it and see if he could not induce him to adopt it, or some such plan, and have him in his inaugural address present it, and say that he proposed to call an extra session of Congress to act upon it, and state that on its adoption and ratification as part of the National Constitution he would resign the Presidency and submit his title to the office to a vote of the people at the first election under it. I presented the subject to Mr. Chandler with much earnestness, because I felt confident that such a proposition, coming from him at that time, would be acceptable to the Republican party and to the great body of Democrats North and South, and that some such amendment could be passed by Congress and submitted to the States for their ratification, which might then have been done within a year.

I urged that if Mr. Hayes would do this, and the amendment became part of the National Constitution, that his nomination and election would most certainly follow, and that he would thus become a marked and historic figure, and much more of the same import.

But Mr. Chandler was in no frame of mind to entertain my proposition, nor for that matter, any other. He was in fact jubilant and defiant, and in the strongest language expressed his determination to stamp out all opposition.

I have often regretted that I did not, at that time, go personally to Mr. Hayes with my amendment, and urgehim to do as I should have done had I been in his position.

Since that lost opportunity, I have seen no time for its acceptable presentation. The impelling motive which prompted me to accept a nomination for Congress last fall was, that in such a canvass I might have an opportunity to discuss the questions presented in this amendment; and in the event of my election, would hold a position from which I could legitimately command a hearing on it before the country.

For nearly a quarter of a century I have regarded the affirmative settlement of the questions involved in this amendment, as of vastly more importance to our future peace and national unity, than any question growing out of tariff reform, or silver coinage, or any ordinary economic or commercial legislation. But during my ten days' canvass last fall, I found that public opinion was entirely engrossed with tariff discussion and the free coinage of silver, and that the time was not opportune for the public discussion of questions involving important constitutional reforms. So I now come with this amendment, which I have guarded for years with paternal care, and present it for the consideration of the members of the "Ohio-Society of New York," and through them, to the judgment. of all who may do me the honor to read it. The adoption of this proposed amendment will necessitate the omissions and changes indicated below by italics in Articles *One* and *Two* of our present Constitution.

Article One, when amended, will read as follows:

ARTICLE I.

SECTION 1. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

SECTION 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite *under this Constitution to vote for President of the United States.*

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the College of Deputies for such State shall fill such vacancies, until the next regular election for Representatives in Congress.

The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

[See Amendments to Article One when adopted will be inserted here as part of Section 2.]

SECTION 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators for each State, and shall be chosen by ballot by the qualified electors thereof, for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote.

When vacancies happen in the Senate from any State by resignations or otherwise, the College of Deputies for such State shall fill the vacancy until the next regular election for Senator. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not when elected be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Senate shall choose its own presiding and other officers.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose they shall be on oath or affirmation; and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.*

Judgment in case of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.

SECTION 5. A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide.

The fifth section of this article is amended by *omitting* the words "Each House shall be the judge of the election returns, and qualifications of its own members," and thus takes from the Senate and House the power, now often exercised by a partisan majority, of excluding persons who present duly authenticated certificates of election, and admit to seats persons who have not been elected.

The proposed amendment prescribes the "qualifications" of Senators and Representatives; and the Circuit or District Court of the United States in the State or district where any contest may arise is authorized and required to

^{*} The provision for the impeachment of the President is stricken out.

Jefferson properly characterized that provision of the Constitution as a "scarecrow," and as all will remember, the attempt to impeach Andrew Johnson, ended in a national farce.

determine the validity of all election returns where a contest is made, and from such determination there can be no appeal to the Senate or House of Representatives.

All clauses relative to the Vice-President are stricken out, and such parts of Article One not above quoted down to the end of Section Five.

Section One of Article Two is stricken out, except the clauses which provide that "the President shall be a natural born citizen of the United States and shall have attained the age of thirty-five years," and "shall at stated times receive for his services a compensation, which shall not be increased or diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them."

"Before he enter on the execution of his office he shall take the following oath or affirmation:"

"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Sections *Two*, *Three* and *Four* of Article Two remain unchanged, except the word Vice-President is stricken out of Section 4.

Article Twelve of the amendments is entirely eliminated. The Presidential term is made six years.

The paragraphs above quoted will advise the reader of the changes necessary in our present Constitution to make it conform to the amendment as herein proposed.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION.

Providing for the *nomination* and *election*, by a direct vote of the duly qualified electors in the several States, of a President of the United States, and Senators, and Representatives of the several States in Congress, and for the creation and election of a National College of Deputies, in the several States.

Said College of Deputies, when duly chosen and organized in the several States, and at the seat of Government of the United States, shall be charged with the authority and duty of conducting all National elections in their respective States, and with the power and duty of filling such vacancies as may from time to time happen in the office of President of the United States and of Senators and Representatives in Congress and members of the National College of Deputies for any State.

Amendment to Article One.

WHO SHALL BE ELECTORS.

All native-born male citizens of the United States, of the age of twenty-one (21) years and upwards, and each person of like age who shall have been duly naturalized, in pursuance of the laws of the United States, and who shall have been a resident of the State in which he may offer to vote for one year next preceding any election herein provided for, shall be an elector, and qualified to vote in such State for the nomination and election of a President of the United States and for Senators and Representatives in the Congress of the United States, and for the members of a National College of Deputies in such State.

The duly qualified electors in each State shall vote at all National elections, under such rules and regulations as the

54

Congress may by law prescribe; provided that no insane or idiotic person, nor any person duly convicted of a felony, shall be permitted to vote at such elections.

Amendment to Articles Two and Twelve.

THE MANNER OF NOMINATING AND ELECTING A PRESIDENT.

The Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States. The term for which he shall be elected shall be six years. He shall enter upon the duties of his office at 12 o'clock M., on the fourth Monday in the April next succeeding his election in November.

No person nominated and elected President by the voters of the several States, as herein provided, shall be eligible for re-election.

The year in which the first election for the nomination and choice of a President shall take place, after the ratification of this amendment, shall be prescribed by the Congress, and special provision shall be made by law for the appointment of such officers as may be required, to conduct all National elections, in their respective States, until the College of Deputies shall have been duly chosen.

The President shall be nominated and elected as follows:

On the first Tuesday of August, in the year appointed by the Congress for the first election, and on the first Tuesday of August every six years thereafter, the electors qualified as hereinbefore provided shall assemble in their respective States, as the Congress may prescribe by law, and vote by ballot for the nomination of a citizen of the United States for President, eligible under this Constitution. Such election for the nomination, or for the election of a President, shall not be held in any room in which an election is being conducted on the same day for State or local officers, in such State. But no voting district or precinct in any State shall be larger in territorial extent than districts designated by State law for State elections.

The College of Deputies in each State charged by law with

the conduct of such nominating elections for President shall make distinct lists of all candidates voted for at such elections, together with the number of votes cast in their respective States for each candidate, which list they shall officially sign, seal and certify, in triplicate, and within twenty (20) days after such nominating election in each State, they shall transmit, in such form and manner as the Congress may by law prescribe, one copy of such certified returns to the Chairman of the National College of Deputies, at the seat of Government of the United States; one copy to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, and one copy to the Secretary of State for the State in which they, as officials, reside.

The Chairman of the National College of Deputies, and the chief clerk of such College, together with the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, shall meet at the seat of Government of the United States on the first Tuesday in September, at 12 o'clock M, after each nominating election for President, on the preceding first Tuesday in August, and shall, in the presence of such persons as the Congress may by law direct, open all the certificates from each State containing a list of the candidates voted for and the votes cast for each at such nominating election, and they, or any two of them, shall within the time fixed by law, jointly canvass, certify and officially publish the result, stating the number of votes cast for each candidate for President in the several States, and the total vote for each in all the States.

THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

On the first Tuesday of November, after each nominating election for President, the qualified electors shall again assemble in their respective States, and from the list of candidates officially certified as having the highest votes, not exceeding four (4) on the list voted for, at such nominating election, on the first Tuesday of August preceding, the electors shall by ballot choose a President, and the person having the greatest number of votes cast at such election for President, in all the States, shall be the President.

The persons in each State charged by law with the conduct of the election appointed for the first Tuesday of November, for the choice of a President, shall make a dis tinct list of all the candidates voted for at such elections, together with the number of votes cast in their respective States for each, which list they shall sign, seal and officially certify in triplicate, and within thirty days after such election they shall transmit, under such regulations as the Congress may by law prescribe, one copy to the Chairman of the National College of Deputies, at the seat of Government of the United States; one copy to the Secretary of the Interior of the United States, and one copy to the Secretary of State for the State in which they reside.

The Chairman or the acting Chairman of the National College of Deputies, and the chief clerk or acting chief clerk of such College, together with the Secretary or acting Secretary of the Interior of the United States, shall meet at the seat of Government of the United States, at such place as the Congress may by law provide, on the second Tuesday in December, at 12 o'clock M., after each election for President, and shall in the presence of such members of the College of Deputies as may be present, and such other persons as the Congress may by law authorize, open all the certificates containing the official returns of the votes cast for President on the preceding first Tuesday of November, and they or any two of them shall forthwith jointly certify and publish the total number of votes cast for each candidate, and officially declare the person having the highest number of votes to be the duly elected President of the United States for six years from and after the fourth Monday in the April next succeeding such election in November.

But no Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, nor Judge of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, nor Judge of the Supreme Court or highest appellate Court in any State, shall be eligible to be elected President of the United States. The President of the United States may at any time resign his office and appoint a day when his resignation shall take effect, or he may designate that it shall take effect on a given day after his successor shall have been chosen by the College of Deputies. And the Congress shall provide by law for such contingency.

THE NATIONAL COLLEGE OF DEPUTIES.

A College of Deputies, composed of members from each State, equal in number to its Senators and Representatives in the Congress of the United States, shall be chosen every six (6) years by the people of the several States; and the voters in each State authorized to choose members of the College of Deputies shall have the qualifications requisite to vote for President of the United States.

Members of the College of Deputies shall be elected for the term of six years, and their term of office shall begin on the first Tuesday in December after their election in November.

No person shall be a member of the College of Deputies who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and who shall not have been a voter for seven years in the State for which he shall be chosen.

All authority herein granted for the choice of a President of the United States, to fill any vacancy which may happen, by death or otherwise, in the office of President, shall be vested in the National College of Deputies, as herein provided.

The members of the College of Deputies for each State shall be nominated and voted for in States and Congressional districts of each State as herein provided.

The duly qualified electors in each State shall be entitled to nominate and to elect two members of the College of Deputies for the State at large, who shall be designated "the Senatorial Deputies."

The members of the College of Deputies to which each State is entitled shall be elected on the same ballot with the President of the United States and Senators and Representatives in Congress.

In addition to the two Senatorial Deputies, the voters in each State entitled to seven or to less than seven representatives in Congress, shall nominate and elect on a general ticket for the State at large, one member of the College of Deputies for each Representative in Congress allotted to such State.

In States entitled to eight Representatives in Congress, or to any additional number, the members of the College of Deputies shall be nominated and elected in districts corresponding to the Congressional districts in such States of not less than four nor more than five members each.

In States entitled to one and not to exceed two additional members of the College of Deputies, to correspond with the number of Representatives in Congress, not included in any district, such additional member or members shall be voted for and nominated and elected for the State at large, on the same ballot with the two Senatorial Deputies and the members to be elected in districts.

On the first Tuesday in December after each election for . members of the College of Deputies, the persons duly chosen from each State shall be convened at the seat of Government of the United States, and they shall then organize by choosing one of their own number for Chairman. and he shall hold such office for the term of six years.

The College of Deputies shall choose a Chief Clerk and Sergeant-at-Arms, who shall hold their offices for six years, and the Chief Clerk and Sergeant-at-Arms shall appoint such additional clerks and assistants as the Congress may, by law, authorize.

In case of the death, resignation or removal of the Chairman, the Chief Clerk or other officers of the National College of Deputies, such vacancy for the unexpired term shall be filled as may be provided by law.

In national assemblies, a majority of all the members of the National College of Deputies, and in State assemblies, a majority of all the Deputies for such State, shall be requisite to make a quorum for the transaction of business, but a less number than a quorum in each may adjourn from day to day, and they may compel the attendance of absent members in such manner and under such penalties as they shall prescribe in rules for their own government.

A member of the National or of the State Assembly of Deputies, who shall violate such rules, may be suspended or expelled, by an affirmative vote of *two-thirds* of the Deputies present in either body.

A Deputy who may have been suspended or expelled from his office by an Assembly of Deputies for any State, may appeal to the District or Circuit Court of the United States, for such State, and the Court shall grant him a summary hearing, and promptly determine the questions involved, in such appeal.

If a Deputy shall be suspended or expelled from his office by the National College of Deputies, such Deputy may appeal to any Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and the determination of such appeals by the District or Circuit Court of the United States, in any State, or by any Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, shall be final, touching the matters in controversy.

The Congress shall by law provide for the assembling of the members of the College of Deputies for each State at their respective State Capitols within thirty (30) days after their election, and prescribe the manner in which they shall organize by selecting one of their own number for Chairman, together with a Chief Clerk and Sergeantat-Arms, who shall not be members of the College of Deputies, and each of whom, shall hold such office for six years.

The College of Deputies for each State shall be charged with the conduct of all National elections in their respective States for the nomination and election of the President, Senators of the United States, Representatives in Congress and members of the College of Deputies. The Chairman of the College of Deputies in each State shall give public notice of all National elections, as the Congress may by law prescribe, for the nomination and election of the President, Senators and Representatives in Congress and for members of the College of Deputies, and they shall be the custodians of all election returns of such State for President, Senators and Representatives in Congress and members of the College of Deputies.

The members of the National College of Deputies and the Chairman and Chief Clerk and such officers as they shall be authorized by law to appoint, and the Chairman of the College of Deputies for each State, together with the Chief Clerk and such other officers as they may be authorized by law to appoint in each State for the conduct of National elections, shall receive a compensation for their services to be fixed by law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States.

Except for offenses such as the Congress shall prescribe, the members of the College of Deputies shall be privileged from arrest, or from service of legal process of any kind, during attendance at any meeting of their body in any State, or when convened at the seat of Government of the United States, for the choice of a President, or when going to or returning from the same.

In case of the death of the President, or of his resignation, disability, or removal from office, the Secretary of State of the United States, if there be one, and if not, then such member of the Cabinet as the Congress may designate by law, shall act as President until a successor to fill the vacancy shall have been duly chosen and qualiified.

The acting President shall by proclamation convene the members of the College of Deputies from all the States at the seat of Government of the United States within thirty days from the date of any vacancy in the office of President, and the members of the College of Deputies shall assemble in such hall or building as the Congress may by law prescribe, and forthwith proceed to the choice of a citizen of the United States qualified under this Constitution for the office of President to fill out the unexpired term.

On the assembling of the College of Deputies in pursuance of the proclamation of the acting President, the Chairman of the College, if he be present, and if not, then the senior member of the College of Deputies, shall call the members to order, and direct the clerk of the body to call the States alphabetically and the roll of members in alphabetical order. A majority of all the members elected and qualified shall be necessary for a quorum to transact business.

On the assembling of a quorum, in the absence of the Chairman, the College shall select a Chairman *pro tem.*, and at once proceed to the choice of a President to fill the vacancy for the residue of the unexpired term as herein prescribed, and no other business shall be in order, until a President shall have been chosen.

On the call of the roll each member of the College shall rise in his place, name his choice, and vote *viva voce* for President, and each member shall have one vote.

If any person shall receive on any roll-call a majority of all the votes given for President, he shall be declared by the Chairman of the College of Deputies the duly elected President of the United States for the residue of the unexpired term.

The members of the College of Deputies, after organizing, shall vote for President at least once each day until a President is chosen.

No member of the College shall speak more than once on any subject or motion on the same day, nor more than ten minutes except by unanimous consent.

If no person shall receive a majority of the votes given on the first roll-call, the roll shall again be called, and from the persons having the highest vote on the list, not exceeding five of those voted for on the first roll call, the College shall proceed to choose a President.

If no person shall receive a majority of all the votes given on the second roll-call, the College shall again proceed to vote a third time, and from the persons having the highest vote on the list, not exceeding four of those voted for on the second roll-call, the College shall choose a President.

If no person shall have a majority of all the votes given on the third roll-call, the College shall proceed to vote a fourth time, and from the persons having the highest vote, not exceeding three of those voted for on the third rollcall, the College shall choose a President, and the person having the highest vote, on the fourth roll-call, shall be declared by the Chairman to be elected, to fill the vacancy for the residue of the unexpired term.

In the event that no person shall receive a plurality vote on the fourth roll-call, the roll shall at intervals of not exceeding one day again be called, until one of the three candidates highest on the list, shall receive more votes than either of his competitors.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation.

THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF UNITED STATES SENATORS.

Senators of the United States shall be nominated and chosen by the electors of each State qualified to vote under this Constitution for President, as follows:

On the first Tuesday of August next preceding the expiration of the term of any Senator, the electors duly qualified to vote for Senator shall assemble in their respective States and counties, as provided by law for the election of President and Representatives in Congress, and vote by ballot for the nomination of a candidate for Senator of the United States.

All nominating elections for Senator shall be held in each State at the time and places in which Representatives in Congress for such State are nominated and elected, and at no other time.

The Congress shall provide by law the manner in which the members of the College of Deputies and the officials charged in each State with the conduct of such nominating elections for Senators of the United States shall conduct the same, and such officers in each county shall make distinct lists of all the persons voted for at such election for Senator, together with the number of votes cast in the several counties for each candidate, which list they shall sign, seal and officially certify in triplicate, and within ten (10) days after such nominating elections they shall transmit, in such form and manner as the Congress may prescribe by law, one copy of such certified election returns to the Chairman of the College of Deputies for such State, at the Capitel thereof, one copy to the Secretary of State for such State, and one copy to the clerk of the county of which they are residents.

The Chairman and Chief Clerk of the College of Deputies for each State, together with the Secretary of State for each State [if there be such an officer, and if not, then such person as the State may appoint], shall be in session, at the Capitol thereof, on the fourth Tuesday of August, at twelve o'clock M., after each nominating election for Senator of the United States, on the previous first Tuesday of August, and they or any two of them shall, in the presence of such persons as the Congress may by law designate, jointly canvass, certify and officially publish the result, stating the total number of votes cast in the State for each candidate.

On the first Tuesday in November following such nominating election for United States Senator the qualified electors in such State shall again assemble, at the places appointed by law, in their respective counties, and from the candidates officially certified as having the highest vote for Senator, not exceeding four (4) on the list of those voted for, at such nominating election on the preceding first Tuesday of August, shall choose by ballot a Senator, and the person having the greatest number of votes cast for Senator at said election in such State shall be the Senator. The term of office of each Senator shall begin on the fourth Monday in April, at 12 o'clock M., succeeding his election in November. The Chairman and Chief Clerk of the College of Deputies for each State shall canvass and certify the election of Senators and Representatives in Congress and members of the College of Deputies.

The Congress shall have power to enforce this amendment by appropriate legislation.

THE NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN CONGRESS.

Representatives in Congress shall hold their office for the term of two years, and shall be nominated and chosen by the electors in each State qualified by law to vote for President.

On the first Tuesday of August (beginning with the time appointed by Congress for the nomination and election of a President), and every second year thereafter, the electors qualified to vote, as hereinbefore provided, shall assemble in their respective States and counties, at such places as the Congress shall by law direct for the holding of such elections, and vote by ballot for the nomination of such number of candidates for Representatives in Congress as each elector shall be authorized by law to vote for in such State or districts, or both.

In a State entitled under any apportionment to seven Representatives in Congress, or to less than seven, the duly qualified electors thereof shall nominate and elect such Representative or Representatives on one general ticket for the State at large.

If under any apportionment a State shall be entitled to eight Representatives in Congress, or to more than eight, the College of Deputies for that State shall, after each regular election for President, divide it into Congressional districts of contiguous territory, of not less than four nor more than five members each, and in such manner, that no State which may be entitled to two or more such Congressional districts, shall elect for the State at large a greater number than two Representatives in Congress, and such Representatives for the State at large shall be nominated and elected on the same ballot, with the members in each district. And every apportionment shall be made, by dividing the total vote for President in the State by the number of Representatives in Congress to which each State is by law entitled.

No Representative district in any State shall be changed by the College of Deputies thereof until after the next Presidential election, nor until after Congress shall have apportioned the Representatives among the several States; but the Congress may by law, on the application of onefourth of the College of Deputies in any State, change the districts in such State, should such change in the opinion of the Congress be necessary to secure the minority of the electors thereof an equitable representation in Congress in proportion to the total vote cast at the last Presidential election in such State.

The Congress shall by law prescribe the manner and form in which the returns of all elections shall be made for the nomination of Senators and Representatives in Congress in each State or Congressional Districts in any State; and the result of such nominating elections shall be officially published in such manner and form as shall be provided by law.

At such nominating election for Representatives in Congress, each qualified elector may cumulate his vote and cast all the votes to which he is entitled for one candidate, or for more than one, as he may elect.

On the first Tuesday of November following such nominating election, the electors in each State qualified to vote for Representatives in Congress shall again assemble in their respective counties, and from the candidates officially certified as having the highest vote on the list of those voted for at the nominating election on the preceding first Tuesday of August, not exceeding four candidates for each Representative to be chosen, either in Congressional districts or for a State at large, or in both State and districts as the case may be, shall choose the number of Representatives in Congress for such State or districts, or both, as they may be authorized by law to elect; and the person or persons having the highest number of votes cast at said election in such State or district, or both, for Representative in Congress, shall be the Representative.

Each elector shall have the right to cumulate his vote and cast all the votes to which he is entitled in the district of his residence, or for the State at large, or both, as he may elect, for one candidate, or for more than one candidate, under such regulations as the Congress may by law prescribe.

No Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, nor Judge of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, nor Judge of the Supreme Court or highest appellate Court or Court of record in any State, shall be eligible to be chosen a Senator or Representative in Congress or member of the College of Deputies.

MISCELLANEOUS PARAGRAPHS.

All electors and each organized group of electors in the several States shall prepare and print their own ballots for use at all nominating elections, in such form and manner as the Congress may by law prescribe.

After the result of each nominating election for President, and for members of the College of Deputies, or for Senators and Representatives in Congress, shall have been declared, the College of Deputies for each State shall cause to be prepared and printed all official ballots, and shall furnish such ballots to the electors thereof, free of cost to them, as the Congress shall by law direct, and said official ballots shall be the only legal ballot to be used at any final election in November.

Any elector or group of electors in any State or district shall select from the candidates officially declared as hereinbefore provided to be duly nominated for President or Senator or Representatives in Congress, or for members of the College of Deputies, *and from no others*, the names of such person or persons as he or they may desire to vote for at the final election in November, not exceeding the number of Representatives in Congress or members of the College of Deputies authorized by law to be elected by any constituency. And the names of all candidates on any National ticket shall be printed on a plain white paper ballot, as the Congress may by law direct.

In case two or more candidates for nomination to any office shall receive an equal number of votes at such nominating election, the Congress shall provide by law the manner of determining which of the candidates shall have his name printed on the official ballot.

In case of the death, resignation or disability of any Senator of the United States, or Representative in Congress, or member of the College of Deputies, the College of Deputies for the State in which such vacancy may happen shall, on receiving official notification thereof, be convened at the Capitol of such State and vote to fill such vacancy, in the manner prescribed for filling vacancies in the office of President, as the Congress may by law prescribe.

The person so appointed shall be a resident of the State and district in which such vacancy shall have happened, and he shall, when appointed, be a member of the same party to which the Senator or Representative or Deputy belonged, whose vacancy is to be filled.

All appointments made by the College of Deputies, in any State, shall be for the residue of the unexpired term.

The College of Deputies for each State shall once in six years, at least thirty days prior to the time fixed in this Constitution for the nomination of candidates for President, cause a registration to be made of all electors in the several States, duly qualified to vote for President, and shall provide for verifying and correcting such national registration thirty days prior to each election for the nomination of Senators and Representatives in Congress.

Offenses committed against the peaceful conduct of National elections, by the inhabitants of any State, or against the persons of voters when going to or returning from such elections, or against the members of the College of Deputies for such State, or against any official charged by law with the conduct of such elections, shall, on trial and conviction before any District or Circuit Court of the United States for such State, be punished as the Congress may by law prescribe.

The Congress shall by law provide the manner in which elections shall be conducted for President and Senators and Representatives in Congress, and for members of the College of Deputies in each State, and prescribe for the counting and officially declaring and certifying the result of such vote at each election.

If a citizen who has been elected a member of the College of Deputies, for any State, shall refuse or neglect to qualify, or after qualifying, shall refuse or neglect to discharge the duties of his office, as prescribed by law, any one or more electors may file a petition before any Judge of the District or Circuit Court of the United States in such State, asking for an order directing such Deputy to appear forthwith and show cause why he should not be removed from his office, or why the office should not be declared vacant.

In case such Deputy should fail or refuse to obey the process of Court, or its order, he shall be summarily removed from his office by the Court; and may, in addition to such removal from office, be punished, as for contempt, by fine or imprisonment, or both, at the discretion of the Court.

In case of a contest touching the conduct and returns of an election in any State under this Constitution for President or Senator of the United States, or Representatives in Congress, or for members of the College of Deputies, the matter in controversy shall be immediately heard and determined by the Circuit or District Court of the United States for the district and State in which such controversy arose, in such manner as the Congress may provide by law, and from the decision of such Court touching the matters in controversy there shall be no appeal.

The Secretary of the Interior and such officers as the Congress may by law designate shall be authorized and required every six years to determine and officially to announce the number of Representatives in Congress to which each State is entitled under each new apportionment. Such representation to be determined by assigning to each State such proportion of the number of Representatives fixed by law as the number of the votes cast for President, at the election next preceding in such State, bears to the total number of votes so cast in all the States. But each State shall have at least *one* Representative.

The qualified electors in the District of Columbia and in each of the duly organized Territories of the United States, shall have the right to vote at all elections for the nomination and election of President of the United States.

The Congress may provide by law that a delegate elected in any duly organized Territory, which contains a population equal to one-half that required under any apportionment for one Representative in Congress, shall have secured to him all the privileges of a member of the House of Representatives, including the right to vote.

The Congress shall by law define specifically in what the term "inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office" shall consist; and in case of such "inability" happening, may, by a *concurrent vote of two-thirds* of both the Senate and House of Representatives, suspend the President from the function of his office during such inability, or may by a like vote of the Senate and House remove him from office because of such inability.

All amendments which shall be proposed to this Constitution, by the Congress, or by any duly authorized Constitutional Convention, shall be submitted to the qualified voters of the United States residing in the several States, for their ratification or rejection.

Such submission shall be at any national election when Representatives in Congress are chosen, and a majority of all the votes given at such election for and against such amendment or amendments, shall be necessary for its ratification as part of this Constitution.

The Congress shall have power to enforce the several provisions of this amendment by appropriate legislation.

MEMORANDUM.

FIRST.—The stability and safety of democratic government, both National and State, depend so largely on their clearly defined powers, that the Constitutions of each must of necessity limit the power to be exercised, and specifically define the manner in which all branches of the several departments of each shall be administered.

This fact is universally recognized in all our modern State Constitutions. The Constitutions of Ohio and New York contain nearly *two and one-fourth* times the number of words found in the National Constitution, while the Constitution of California will exceed it in length more than three times.

Our fathers, when framing the National Constitution, attempted to settle and define in concise language the principles on which the National Government should be *founded*.

After a hundred years, their descendants are waking up to the necessity of demanding that the principles on which the National Government must be *administered* shall be more clearly and intelligently defined. That which has obtained in all our State Constitutions, has become a necessity in our National Constitution. This is all the answer that needs be given to the objections, which many will doubtless make to the length of my proposed amendment.

As originally drafted, there was in this amendment a clause which provided, that a majority of all the duly qualified voters in any State might abolish their State Governments and, with the consent of Congress, unite the whole or any part of the territory of such State with one or more adjacent States, or, that they might be remanded to a territorial condition, whenever its people determined, for any cause, that they no longer desired to support a State Government. That clause is omitted in the amendment as herewith submitted, for the reason, that during the reconstruction period, immediately after the War of the Rebellion, the practical working of the Constitution taught us that a majority of the electors in any State could, as they in fact did in all the rebel States, abolish Constitutional State Governments, and that Congress had no power, except force, to compel a majority of the people in any State to maintain a State Government and elect Senators and Representatives to Congress, and vote for electors of President and Vice-President.

When such a condition obtains in any State, the sovereignty of the Nation over such people and territory remains unchanged and unquestioned, under the Constitution, as it is—and therefore such an amendment is not now required.

The suggestion made by Mr. Lincoln, during the war, "that whenever one-tenth of the voters in any State which had abolished their Constitutional State Governments, and united with other rebellious States in organizing the so-called Confederate Government should signify their desire to establish Constitutional State Governments, in subordination to the National Constitution, that they should be authorized by Congress to do so," was a proposition so objectionable to the majority that it was, after a brief discussion, abandoned, and the sovereignty of the Nation over all citizens residing in the rebellious States, was fully and distinctly affirmed and recognized, in the plan of reconstruction adopted by Congress.

Of the defects of that plan, I have neither the time nor the disposition to say a single word.

It will be observed,—in case a majority of the voters in any State should determine to alter or abolish their State Governments in the form and manner prescribed in their State Constitutions, and to ask Congress to establish for them a Territorial Government instead,—that, under my proposed amendment, the citizens of such Territory would have secured to them the right to vote for President of the United States and for at least one Representative in Congress.

SECOND.—This plan provides that, at all November elections, the official ballots must contain the names of candidates for every office to be elected, and each party or group of electors sufficiently numerous in any State or district in a State to demand under the law the printing and the distribution of official ballots by the College of Deputies must make up a complete ticket by selecting, from among the *four highest* nominated for any office at the preliminary election in August, a candidate for every office to be elected for his State or district in November.

This provision is important, because it enables every elector when cumulating his vote, or when substituting the name of a duly nominated candidate of any party or group of electors, in place of any name he may desire to erase on his own party ticket, to do so, without trouble, and to indicate intelligently and unmistakably, on the face of his ballot, to the judges of election the change he has made. With such a ticket no voter of ordinary intelligence can make a mistake, when changing his ballot, nor can election judges be in doubt as to the intention of an elector, even if he blur his ticket when making such changes, because the name of a candidate must be erased before another can be substituted.

Congress must provide by law the form of all official ballots and the size of the type in which the names of the several candidates shall be printed, the space which shall appear on such ballot between the names of each candidate, so that the voter shall have room to write or paste in the name of any candidate whom he may desire to vote for, instead of the candidate whose name is printed on the official ballot of his party.

THIRD.—It provides that a plurality of the votes cast at all nominating elections shall designate the persons to be voted for at each final election in November. It provides that a plurality shall, after the fourth ballot, elect, when the National College of Deputies may be called upon to fill vacancies in the office of President, or the College of Deputies for any State, shall vote to fill the office of Senator, or Representative in Congress, so that there can be no deadlock, or failure to nominate or to elect candidates at any election.

FOURTH.—It provides that the Legislatures of the several States shall no longer be charged with the duty of electing Senators of the United States, and confers that power directly on the people of each State, thus enabling the Legislatures of the several States to attend strictly to the local business of their States, and to save time and expense-now recklessly thrown away, as witness the one hundred days lost last winter in electing a Senator from Illinois. This amendment will also relieve the average legislator from the dangerous mental strain which now oppresses him, as he lies awake nights devising gerrymandering schemes, whereby a large part of the people in a majority of States are disfranchised, by a dishonest distribution of political power, in the districting of States into Congressional districts, and *districts* for the choice of electors of President and Vice-President, as was done in Michigan last winter.

FIFTH.—It provides for making ineligible for President or Senator or Representative in Congress, or member of the College of Deputies, any "Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, or Judge of any Circuit or District Court of the United States, or Judge of the Supreme Court or highest appellate Court in any State." This provision was inserted with the hope that, when adopted, it will materially aid in reducing the number of ambitious politicians now on the bench in every State, who are officially pandering to the worst element of our population, and appealing to them for political recognition and promotion.

In my opinion, an able and pure judiciary can best be secured by permanently excluding all Judges from eligibility to political office, National or State. It would be desirable if all elections for Governors and State officers in the several States were held either the *year before* or the *year after* each Presidential election, or in any year other than the one in which the Presidential election must be held under this proposed amendment.

And as the expenses of all National elections must be paid by the National Government, there can be no valid objection to holding all National and State elections as suggested. This would ultimate in a complete divorce of National and State politics, and confine the business of State Legislatures strictly to local matters in their respective States.

If to this suggestion could be added the nominating and election in March and April, of all State Judges made elective by the people, and the officials of all cities, (say that such final election of all such officials should be on the first Monday in April), we should, at a much earlier day than now seems possible, witness *the election of a majority* of nonpartisan Judges and a majority of non-partisan city officials, and thus secure an abler and purer judiciary than we now have, and also a better and more competent class of city officials than is possible under our present system.

It will be observed that this amendment provides that at each National election the names of every candidate for whom any elector is authorized to vote must be printed on one ballot.

In order that the reader may the more readily understand how impossible it will be to commit fraud when voting such a ballot, I have prepared four tickets such as each elector or party in any State must make up in order to have all tickets printed by the College of Deputies, after the nominations are made, as an elector can only vote for candidates whose names appear on official ballots.

Tickets for States and cities are also printed herewith.

NATIONAL PROHIBITION TICKET.	For l'resident of the United States: Paul St. John, of Maine. For United States Senator: Gideon Stewart, of Fulton.	For Representative in Congress for the State at Large: John B. Gough, of Ashtabula.	 For Representatives. in Compress for the First District. 1. Gideon J. Stewart. 2. Benjamin Brown. 3. Philo B. Scott. 4. Samuel C. Hunter. 5. Nathan Owens. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Allen G. Marx. 2. Zebulon Vance.	For Member of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: Isano Rodney.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the First District: 1. Thomas M. Davey. 2. Robinson McCane. 3. Carl Pomeroy. 4. George Kinney. 5. John McDowell.
NATIONAL ALLIANCE FEDERATION TICKET.	For President of the United States: Frank Granger, of Kansas. For United States Senator: Alexander Farmer, of Clinton.	For Representative in Congress for the State at Large: Israel Putnam, of Washington.	 For Representatives in Congress for the First District: 1. Columbus Fairplay. 2. Paul B. Miller. 3. Butler F. Benjamin. 4. Lawrence Ainsworth. 5. Job Leadbetter. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Andrew Jackson. 2. William J. Marvin.	For Member of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: Jacob Cone.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the First District: 1. John P. Turly. 2. Asher J. Flanders. 3. Oliver P. Hall. 4. Kingsley G. Baird. 5. Moses Goodridge.
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TICKET.	For President of the United States: Richard Roe, of Kentucky. For United States Senutor: Norman B. Cook, of Hamilton.	For Representative in Congress for the State at Large: Albert Sydney, of Fulton.	 For Representatives in Congress for the First District. 1, Hugh McBride. 2, Zachariah Holmes. 3, Nimrod Hunter. 4. Milton R. Smith. 5, Noah Jackson. 	For Senatorial Deputies:1. John Newman.2. Prosper W. Clay.	For Member of the College of Deputies for the Stute at Larye: Moses Norton.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the First District: 1. James Lyons. 2. John K. Ledwick. 3. Ralph Lect. 4. Joseph Barber. 5. Aaron Vance.
NATTONAL REPUBLICAN TICKET.	For President of the United States: John Doe, of Pennsylvania. For United States Senator: David Gibbs, of Sciota.	For Representative in Congress for the State at Large: Moses McCoy, of Lucas.	 For litepresentatives in Congress for the First District: 1. Hezekiah Brown. 2. Israel M. Hale. 3. Joseph Wilkins. 4. Peter J. Fairfield. 5. Mathew Zane. 	Far Senatorial Deputies:1. Azartah C. Long.2. Salmon A. Hooper.	For Member of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: Abraham Knull.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the First District: I. Washington Hunter, 2. Martin Simmonds. 3. Sampson Varner, 4. William Houston. 5. Robert Montgomery.

FORM OF OFFICIAL BALLOTS SUGGESTED FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN OHIO FOR 1892.

EW YORK FOR 1892.	NATIONAL PROHIBITION TICKET.	For President of the United States: Paul St. John, of Maine. For Representatives in Concress for the	State at Large: 1. William Gibbs, 2. Galen Morris.	 For Representatives in Congress for the Eighth District: 1. Samuel Carey. 2. Noah Chance. 3. Arthur Coldwater. 4. Calvin Tucker. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Isaac Clearwater. 2. Jacob Clingman.	For Members of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: 1. Wilkins Micauber. 2. Asa B. Downing.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the Eighth District. 1. James Clearwater. 2. John Clearwater. 3. Paul Clearwater. 4. Peter Clearwater.
THE OFFICIAL BALLOTS SUGGESTED FOR NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK FOR 1892.	NATIONAL ALLIANCE FEDERATION TICKET.	For President of the United States: Frank Granger, of Kansas. For Representatives in Courges for the	State at Large: 1. Nathan G. Cole. 2. Allen B. Jones.	For Representatives in Congress for the Eighth District: 1. James Emmerson. 2. Thomas J. Smith. 3. Amos Doolittle. 4. Lyman Cross.	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Eli Z. Hooper. 2. Luke McDay.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: John B. Walker. Weller J. Fuller. 	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the Eighth District: 1. Andrew Kirk. 2. Allen Kirk. 3. Abraham Kirk. 4. Isaac Kirk.
TS SUGGESTED FOR NAT	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TICKET.	For President of the United States: Richard Roe, of Kentucky. For Representatives in Compress for the	State at Large: 1. Langdon Smith, 2. Moses B. Jordan,	 For Representatives in Congress for the Egylth District: I. Abraham Long. 2. Solomon Bliss. 3. Addison St. Clair. 4. Charles S. Brown. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Madison J. Bell. 2. Paul Jones.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: 1. Norton C. Bacon. 2. Wm. Henry Brady. 	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the Eighth District: 1. Able J. Roe. 2. Solomon Roe. 3. Peter Roe. 4. Timothy Roe.
THE OFFICIAL BALI	NATIONAL REPUBLICAN TICKET.	For President of the United States: John Doe, of Pennsylvania. For Representatives in Congress for the	Slate at Larye: 1. Azariah Flagg. 2. Benj. F. Jarvis.	 For Representatives in Compress for the Eighth District: 1. Able M. Cooney. 2. James C. Banks. 3. George W. Davis. 4. David A. Wilder. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Jackson Donaldson. 2. David McPherson.	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the State at Large: 1. Lafayette Jones. 2. Andrew J. King. 	 For Members of the College of Deputies for the Eighth District: 1. Arthur Doe. 2. Melangthon Doe. 3. Hezekiah Doe. 4. Jeremiah Doe.

OFFICIAL BALLOTS SUGGESTED FOR NATIONAL ELECTION IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT FOR 1892.	National Prohibition Ticket.	For President of the United States: Paul St. John, of Maine. For United States Seautor: Nehemiah Perry.	 For Representatives in Congress: 1. Noah Chapman. 2. Bird Chapman. 3. Bond Brooks. 4. Otho Zimmerman. 	For Sendovial Deputies: 1. Asher Jones. 2. Clark J. Center.	 For Members of the College of Deputies: 1. Jasper Winthrop. 2. Azariah Fogg. 3. Peter Collins. 4. Mathew Oldfield.
	NATIONAL ALLIANCE FEDERATION TICKET.	For President of the United States: Frank Granger, of Kansas. For United States Senator: Mark St. John.	 For Representatives in Congress: 1. Jonas McCoy. 2. Dunken Forsythe. 3. Orison J. Platt. 4. Benjamin Carr. 	For Senatorial Deputies: 1. Napoleon Wyman. 2. Benjamin Brown.	 For Members of the College of Deputies: 1. Jason Barleycorn. 2. Moses Barleycorn. 3. Jacob Barleycorn. 4. Isaac Barleycorn.
	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TREET.	For President of the United States: Richard Roe, of Kentucky. For United States Senator: Lucke Roland.	 For Representatives in Congress: 1. Edgar Whaley. 2. John Smith. 3. Jackson Smith. 4. Lazerus Smith. 	 Por Senatorial Deputies: 1. James B. Angle. 2. Thomas M. North. 	 For Menders of the Cottege of Deputies: 1. Jackson Barleycorn, 2. Bronson P. Jones, 3. Winfield Scott. 4. Henry A. Chandler.
OFFICIAL BALLOTS SUGG	NATIONAL REPUBLICAN TICKET.	For President of the United States: John Doe, of Pennsylvania. For United States Senator: Jonathan Edwards.	 For Representatives in Congress: 1. Josephus Hawley. 2. Oliver H. Perry. 3. Ethan Allen. 4. Alexander Bird. 	Rur Senatorial Deputies: 1. Audrew J. Sawyer. 2. Alexander Hamilton.	 For Members of the College of Deputies: 1. John Barleycorn. 2. Increase Barnum. 3. Watter Johnson. 4. Washington Zeigler.

OFFICIAL BALLOIS	OFFICIAL BALLUIS FUR NATIONAL FLECTION IN THE STATE OF PELAWARE FUR 1882.	UN IN THE STATE OF DET	AWAMP FON 1092.
National Republican Ticket. Official Ballot.	NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC TICKET.	NATIONAL ALLIANCE FEDERATION TICKET.	NATIONAL PROHIBITION TICKET
For President of the United States:	For President of the United States:	For President of the United States:	For President of the United States:
John Doe, of Pennsylvania.	Richard Roe, of Kentucky.	Frank, Granger, of Kansas.	Paul St. John, of Maine.
For United States Senator:	Pur United States Senator:	For United States Senator:	For United States Senator:
Nathaniel B. Smithers.	Adam Salsbury.	Parker Farmer.	Jonathan Clay.
For Representative in Congress;	For Representative in Congress;	For Representative in Congress;	For Representative in Congress:
Norman B. Jud.	Arthur Bayard.	John King.	William Brooks.
For Senatorial Deputies:	For Senatorial Deputies:	For Sendorial Deputies:	For Senatorial Deputies:1. Andrew Lang.2. J. Paul Jones.
1. John M. Clayton.	1. George W. Jackson.	1. Elbert W. Gray.	
2. Everet J. Filliot.	2. Sannel Bayard.	2. Norton Salsbury.	
For Member of the College of Deputies:	For Member of the College of Deputies:	For Member of the College of Deputies:	For Member of the College of Deputies:
Newton W. White.	Allen B. Brown.	George Wellington.	Solomon Coldwater,

OFFICIAL BALLONS FOR NATIONAL FLECTION IN THE STATE OF DELAWARE FOR 1899

FOUR OFFICIAL BALLOTS.	PROHIBITION STATE TICKET.	For Governor: John J. Ashenhurst.	 * * * * * * * * * For Senators for the State at Large: 1. Peleg G. Scott. 2. Samuel Ramsey. 3. Barney May. 	 For Senators for the Stath District: 1. Willard Warner. 2. Francis G. Scott. 3. Asa Sherwood. 4. Nathan Jewell. 5. William J. Bell. 	 For Representatives in the Legislature: for the State at Large: 1. Morrison Roach. 2. Dennison Hale. 3. Robinson Holmes. 	For Representatives in Legislature for the Eggleenth District: 1. Mason G. Thorp. 2. Hezekiah Hooper. 3. Waldron Dugan. 4. Joseph Stewart. 5. Abram Benson.
	ALLIANCE FEDERATION STATE TICKET.	For Governor: John Seitz.	 * * * * * * * * * * * For Senutors for the State at Larye: 1. Abner L. Jones. 2. Benjamin Briggs. 3. Allen G. Holmes. 	 For Senators for the Sixth District: 1. Chaney N. Olds. 2. Arthur Cook. 3. Jonathan Wynn. 4. George A. Greene. 5. Michael Sheridan. 	For Representatives in the Legislature for the State at Larye:1. Able Adams.2. Nicholas Adams.3. Philander Adams.	 For Representatives in Legislature for the Eighteenth District: 1. Benjamin Stanton. 2. Oliver Hutchings. 3. Wilbur Ford. 4. Thomas H. Ford. 5. Frederick Beaman.
FORM OF TICKETS FOR NEW YORK OR OHIO STATE ELECTIONS.	Denocratic State Ticket.	For Governor: James E. Campbell.	 * * * * * * * * * * * For Senators for the State at Larye: 1. Patrick Noland. 2. John Marks. 3. Bailey McBride. 	 For Senators for the Sixth District: 1. Mathew C. West. 2. Jackson Oakland. 3. Harding Kellogg. 4. Marshall King. 5. Obediah Mills. 	 For Representatives in the Leyislature for the State at Large; 1. Jason Quinsey, 2. Allen Quinsey. 3. Morris Quinsey. 	 For Representatives in Legislature for the Eighteenth District: 1. John Knowlton. 2. James Knowlton. 3. Henry Knowlton. 4. Charles Knowlton. 5. Abner Knowlton.
FORM OF TICKETS FC	Republican State Ticker.	For Governor: William McKinley, Jr.	 * * * * * * * * * * * For Sendors for the State at Large: 1. Orlando Stevens. 2. Henry J. Howard. 3. Jacob Cable. 	 For Senators for the Sixth District; 1. Andrew J. Knapp, 2. Charles Godfrey. 3. Hamilton Houghton, 4. Horace J. Smith, 5. David Rathbourne. 	For Representatives in the Legislature for the State at Large: 1. James Long. 2. John Wentworth. 3. Jacob Williams.	 For Representatives in Legislature for the Explaeeth District: 1. Stanton Brown. 2. Heber Zimmerman. 3. Anthony Moore. 4. George A. Rhodes. 5. Clayton Brewer.

FOUR OFFICIAL TICKETS FOR CITIES OF THE POPULATION OF CINCINNATI AND NEW YORK.

e

Раоннытиом Стат Тускет.	For Mayor: Arthur Brown. * * * *	 For Board of Aldermen for the Utly at Large: 1. Mellville Frank. 2. Melangthon Fay. 3, Orlando Brown. 	 For Board of Aldermen for the Fourth District; 1. William Aikens. 2. John Aikens. 3. Jason Aikens. 4. Jeptha Aikens. 5. James Aikens. 	 For Members of the Council for the Uty at Large: 1. Alford Gleason. 2. Aaron Gleason. 3. Addison Gleason. 	 For Members of the Council for the Tweeth District. John Coldwater. Jason Coldwater. Moses Coldwater. Noses Coldwater. Paul Coldwater. St. John Coldwater.
Cifizens' Non-partisan City Ticket.	For Mayor: Jacob Zeigler. * * * * * *	 For Board of Aldermen for the City at Large: 1. Otho Blake. 2. Norton Blake. 3. James G. Blake. 	 For Board of Aldermen for the Fourth District: 1. John J. Jones. 2. John Paul Jones. 3. Jackson Jones. 4. James J. Jones. 5. Jephta Jones. 	 For Members of the Council for the City at Large: 1. William Banks. 2. Washington Banks. 3. Walter J. Banks. 	 For Members of the Council for the Twelfth District: 1. Elliot Zane. 2. Elbert Zane. 3. Ellihu Zane. 4. Ezekiel Zane. 5. Elijah Zane.
DEMOCRATIC CITY TICKET.	For Mayor: Marshall P. Hall. * * * * * *	Board of Aldermen for the City at Large:Jacob Brown.I. Isaac Brown.Zachariah Brown.	 For Board of Aldermen for the Fourth District: 1. Milton Brown. 2. Obediah Brown. 3. Paul Brown. 4. Peter Brown. 5. Moses Brown. 	 For Members of the Council for the City at Large: 1. Norman Lang. 2. Henry J. Lang. 3. Allen B. Lang. 	 Fur Members of the Council for the Tweifth District. 1. Washington Brady. 2. Worthington Brady. 3. William Brady. 4. Worden Brady. 5. Walden Brady.
REPUBLICAN CITY TICKET.	For Mayor; John Paul Jones.	 For Board of Aldermen for the City at Larye: 1. Allen G. Mason. 2. Franklin Fuller. 3. Aaron Winfield. 	 For Board of Aldermen for the Fourth District: 1. John Smyth. 2. Jason Smyth. 3. Jackson Smyth. 4. James Smyth. 5. Jonathan Smyth. 	 For Members of the Council for the City at Large: 1. Anthony Salsbury. 2. Arthur Salsbury. 3. Albert Salsbury. 	 For Members of the Council for the Twenth Discrict: John Bingham. Janes Bingham. Jackson Bingham. Jason Bingham. Jason Bingham.

	Popul	ATION.		Рор	ULATION.		
	White. 1790.	Colored. 1790.	White. 1800.	Increase. 1790–1800.	Colored. 1800.	Increase. 1790-1800.	
District of Columbia. Delaware. Pennsylvania. New Jersey. Georgia. Connecticut Massachusetts. Maryland. South Carolina New Hampshire. Virginia. New York. North Carolina. Rhode Island. Vermont. Kentucky. Tennessee. Maine. Ohio. Louisiana. Indiana.	$\begin{array}{c} 46,310\\ 424,099\\ 169,954\\ 52,886\\ 232,581\\ 373,254\\ 208,649\\ 140,178\\ 141,111\\ 442,115\\ 314,142\\ 288,204\\ 64,689\\ 85,144\\ 61,133\\ 32,013\\ 96,002\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 12,786\\ 10,274\\ 14,185\\ 29,662\\ 5,560\\ 5,463\\ 111,079\\ 108,895\\ 788\\ 306,193\\ 25,978\\ 105,547\\ 4,421\\ 272\\ 272\\ 11,944\\ 3,778\\ 538\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 10,066\\ 49,852\\ 586,094\\ 195,125\\ 101,678\\ 244,721\\ 416,793\\ 216,326\\ 196,255\\ 182,898\\ 514,280\\ 556,039\\ 337,764\\ 65,437\\ 153,908\\ 179,871\\ 91,709\\ 150,901\\ 45,028\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{tabular}{c} \begin$	4,027 14,421 16,267 16,824 60,423 6,281 125,222 149,336 864 365,920 Error in Census. 140,339 3,685 557 41,084 13,893 818 337	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} 13 \\ \\ 58 \\ 19 \\ 103 \\ 13 \\ 13 \\ 13 \\ 37 \\ 10 \\ 19 \\ 18 \\ 33 \\ \text{Dec. 17} \\ 105 \\ 244 \\ 268 \\ 52 \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \end{array} \\ \begin{array}{c} \\ \end{array} \\ $	
Mississippi. Illinois Alabama. Missouri Arkansas Michigan Florida.			5,179	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	3,671		
Texas. Iowa. Wisconsin. California. Minnesota. Oregon. Kansas.	• • • • • • • • • • • •			· · · · ·			
West Virginia Nebraska. Colorado North Dakota South Dakota Montana Washington	}	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		· · · · ·			
Washington. Wyoning Idaho. Utah. New Mexico. Arizona. Alaska. (Bet 1)					· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
Total	3,172,464	757,363	4,304,489	26	1,001,406	36	

	POPTI	LATION.		POPULATION.				
White. 1810.	Increase.	Colored. 1910.	Increme	White. 1520.	1 петенке,	Colored. 1820.	Іпетовяо,	
	1-0		0 -		0.		0	
16.079 55.361		7.944 17.313	20	26.014		10,425	 0 9	
756.5.14	34	93 957	43	1,017.904	Dec. 0.1	17.467 30.413	31	
226.561	16		11	257.413	13	20,017		
145.414	43	107.019		159,566	30	151 417	41	
255.279	14	6,763	-	267.161	5	7.941 6,74(147.127	17	
465,303	11	6.737	4	516.419	11	6,740	0.04	
235.117	9	145.419	16	260.123	11	147.127	1	
214.198 213.334	17	201.919	35	237.44	11	265.301	32	
213.3.40 551.534	1 e e	423.155	12 16	143.13 613.157	14	482.041	Dec. 19	
918.692	65	40.350	31	1,332.744	45	462.041 39,367	3 Dec. 2	
376.410	11	179.03	25	419,200	11	219.629	23	
73.314	12	3.717	0.9	7.4.413		3.602	I ec. 3	
211 423	£1	750	35	234.546	5	303	20	
324.237	- 90	52.174	100	434,644	34	129.491	57	
215.875	135	45.852	230	339,927	57	\$2,834	51	
227.738	51	989	1:	297,341	31	929	Dec. 4	
205,861	4.10	1.539	463	576.572	152	4,723	148	
34,311 23,52	422	42,245 630	111	73,353 145.75	113 510	79,540	105	
23.025	345	17.315	372	42.176	-910 92	1.420 33.272	125 ਤਰ	
11.501	010	751	01.	53.755	365	1.374	76	
				55.451		42.450	10	
17,227		3.615		55.988	225	10.569	192	
				12.573		1.070		
4.615		144		1.5.11	80	174	21	
• • • • • • • • • • • •						*******		
*****	• • • •	* * * - * * * * * *	* + -					
		• • • • • • • • • •			*******			
			- 0					
	»-							
•••••			• • •		• • • • • • • • •			
•••••						- • • • • • • • • • • • •		
	• • • •		• • • •	••••••		• • • • • • • • • • •		
			• • •					

					* • • • • • •			
********	• •							

5,562,004	36	1,377.810	35	7.561.907	34	1,776.134	25	

		Popt	ULATION.			Рорт	ULATION.	
	White. 1830.	Increase.	Colored. 1830.	Increase.	White. 1840.	Increase.	Colored. 1840.	Increase.
District of Columbia Delaware Pennsylvania. New Jersey Georgia. Connecticut. Massachusetts. Maryland. South Carolina New Hampshire. Virginia. New York. North Carolina Rhode Island. Vernont. Kentucky. Tennessee. Maine. Ohio. Louisiana. Indiana. Mississippi. Illinois. Alabama. Missicuri. Arkansas.	$\begin{array}{c} 27,563\\ 57,601\\ 1,3(9,900\\ 300,266\\ 296,806\\ 289,693\\ 603,359\\ 291,108\\ 257,863\\ 268,721\\ 694,300\\ 1,873,663\\ 472,843\\ 93,621\\ 279,771\\ 517,787\\ 535,746\\ 398,263\\ 928,329\\ 89,441\\ 339,399\\ 70,443\\ 155,061\\ 190,406\\ 114,795\\ 25,671\\ 91,246\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} & & \\$	$\begin{array}{c} 7,049\\ 155,932\\ 323,322\\ 607\\ 517,105\\ 44,945\\ 265,144\\ 3,578\\ 881\\ 170,130\\ 146,158\\ 1,192\\ 9,574\\ 126,298\\ 3,632\\ 66,178\\ 2,384\\ 119,121\\ 25,660\\ 4,717\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} & & & \\$	$\begin{array}{c} 740,858\\ 2,378,890\\ 484,870\\ 105,587\\ 291,213\\ 590,253\\ 640,627\\ 500,438\\ 1,502,122\\ 158,457\\ 678,698\\ 179,074\\ 472,254\\ 335,185\\ 323,888\\ 77,174\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} & & \\$	$\begin{array}{c} 13,055\\ 19,524\\ 47,918\\ 21,718\\ 283,697\\ 8,122\\ 8,669\\ 151,815\\ 335,314\\ 538\\ 498,939\\ 50,031\\ 268,549\\ 3,243\\ 730\\ 189,575\\ 188,583\\ 1,355\\ 17,345\\ 193,954\\ 7,168\\ 196,577\\ 3,929\\ 255,571\\ 59,814\\ 20,400\\ 20,400\\ 20,400\\ 20,400\\ 20,507\\ 707\\ 707\\ 707\\ 707\\ 707\\ 707\\ 707\\ $	$\begin{array}{c} & & & \\$
Michigan Florida Texas. Iowa Wisconsin. California. Minnesota Oregon. Kansas West Virginia. Nevada. Nebraska Colorado. North Dakota South Dakota. Montana. Washington Wyoming. Idaho. Utah New Mexico. Arizona Alaska.			16,345			52 		
Total	10,537,378	34	2,328,642	31	14,175,695	35	2,873,758	23


	Рор	ULATION.			Рор	ULATION.	
White. 1850.	Increase.	Colored. 1850.	Increase.	White. 1860.	Increase.	Colored. 1860.	Increase.
$\begin{array}{c} 37,941\\71,169\\2,258,160\\465,509\\521,572\\363,099\\985,450\\417,943\\274,563\\317,456\\894,800\\3,048,325\\553,028\\143,875\\313,402\\761,413\\756,836\\581,813\\1,955,050\\255,491\\977,154\\295,718\\846,034\\426,514\\592,004\\162,189\\9395,071\\47,203\\154,034\\194,881\\304,756\\91,632\\6,038\\13,087\\ \end{array}$	% 22 35 32 28 0.3 35 31 6 12 21 28 0.3 35 311 6 201 211 28 0.3 35 3110 87 69 347 891	$\begin{array}{c} 13,726\\ 20,363\\ 53,626\\ 24,046\\ 384,613\\ 7,693\\ 9,064\\ 165,091\\ 393,944\\ 520\\ 526,861\\ 49,069\\ 316,011\\ 3,670\\ 718\\ 220,992\\ 245,881\\ 1,356\\ 225,279\\ 262,271\\ 11,262\\ 310,808\\ 5,436\\ 345,109\\ 90,040\\ 47,708\\ 2,583\\ 333\\ 635\\ 5965\\ 399\\ 207\\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ $	% 4 12 10 36 Dec. 5 9 17 Dec. 3 6 Dec. 2 18 13 Dec. 2 18 30 0.07 46 35 58 51 134 265 52 77 224	$\begin{array}{c} 60,763\\ 90,589\\ 2,849,259\\ 646,699\\ 591,550\\ 451,504\\ 1,221,432\\ 515,918\\ 291,300\\ 325,579\\ 1,047,299\\ 3,831,590\\ 629,942\\ 170,649\\ 314,369\\ 919,484\\ 826,722\\ 626,947\\ 2,302,808\\ 357,456\\ 1,338,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 526,271\\ 1,063,489\\ 357,456\\ 1,338,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 526,271\\ 1,063,489\\ 357,456\\ 1,338,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 526,271\\ 1,063,489\\ 357,456\\ 1,338,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 526,271\\ 1,063,489\\ 357,456\\ 1,338,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 226,947\\ 1,388,710\\ 353,899\\ 1,704,291\\ 228,696\\ 6,812\\ 28,696\\ 34,231\\ 2,576\\ 11,138\\ 1,$	$\begin{array}{c} & & \\$	$\begin{array}{c} 14,316\\ 21,627\\ 56,949\\ 25,336\\ 465,698\\ 8,627\\ 9,602\\ 1771,131\\ 412,320\\ 494\\ 548,907\\ 49,005\\ 361,522\\ 3,952\\ 3,$	% 6 6 5 22 12 6 5 6 Dec. 5 4 Dec. 1 23 15 Dec. 2 45 37 1 41 32 27 54 137 153 211 220 84 32.3 564 Dec. 33
<u></u> 19,553,068	 38	3,638,808	27	25,922,537	 33	4,441,830	283

		Depres		
		POPUI	LATION.	
	White. 1870.	Increase.	Colored. 1870.	Increase.
		0/0		 %
District of Columbia Delaware Pennsylvania	88,278 102,221 3,456,609	13 21	$\begin{array}{c} 43,404 \\ 22,794 \\ 65,294 \\ 20,000 \\ 0,0$	$5 \\ 15$
New Jersey Georgia Connecticut Massachusetts	875,407 638,926 527,549 1,443,156	35 8 17 18	30,658 545,142 9,668 13,947	$20 \\ 17 \\ 12 \\ 48$
Maryland South Carolina New Hampshire	605,497 289,667 317,627	17 Dec6 Dec. 2	$175,391 \\ 415,814 \\ 580$	2 .8 17
Virginia New York North Carolina Rhodo Luland	$712,089 \\ 4,330,210 \\ 678,470 \\ 212,219$	Dec. 32 13 8 24	512,841 52,081 391,650 4,980	Dec. 7 6 8 26
Rhode Island Vermont Kentucky Tennessee	$\begin{array}{r} 212,219\\ 329,613\\ 1,098,692\\ 936,119\end{array}$	$24 \\ 5 \\ 36.5 \\ 12$	$\begin{array}{r} 4,980 \\ 924 \\ 222,210 \\ 322,331 \end{array}$	26 30 Dec. 23 10
Maine Ohio Louisiana	$\begin{array}{r} 624,809\\ 2,601,946\\ 362,065\end{array}$	Dec3 13 1	$1,606 \\ 63,213 \\ 364,210$	$\begin{array}{c} 21 \\ 72 \\ 4 \end{array}$
Indiana Mississippi Illinois Alabama	1,655,837 382,896 2,511,096 521,384	24 8 47 Dec9	$24,560 \\ 444,201 \\ 28,762 \\ 475,510$	$\begin{array}{c}114\\1\\28\\8\end{array}$
Missouri Arkansas Michigan	1,603,146 362,115 1,167,282	$51 \\ 12 \\ 58.5$	$118,071 \\ 122,169 \\ 11,849$	Dec4 10 74
Florida Texas Iowa Wisconsin	96,057 564,700 1,188,207 1,051,351	24 34 76 36	91,689 253,475 5,762 2,113	$76 \\ 38 5 \\ 439 \\ 80$
California Minnesota Oregon	$\begin{array}{r} 499,424\\ 438,257\\ 86,929\end{array}$	54.5 159 67	$4,272 \\ 759 \\ 346$	$\begin{array}{r}2\\192\\170\end{array}$
Kansas West Virginia Nevada Nebraska	$346,377 \\ 424,033 \\ 38,959 \\ 122,117$	225.5 	17,108 17,980 357 789	2628.5 693 887
Colorado North Dakota South Dakota	$ \left. \begin{array}{c} 39,221 \\ 12,887 \end{array} \right\} $	14.5 400	456 94 102	891
Montana Washington Wyoming Idaho	$ \begin{array}{r} 18,306 \\ 22,195 \\ 8,726 \\ 10,618 \end{array} $	99	$183 \\ 207 \\ 183 \\ 60$	590
Utah New Mexico Arizona	86,044 90,393 9,581	114 9	$\begin{array}{c}118\\172\\26\end{array}$	50 5 1
Alaska Oklahoma	• • • • • • • • • •	• • • • • • • • • • •	• . • • • • • •	
Total	33,589,307	30	4,880,009	$14\frac{1}{2}$

	Popu	LATION.		Population.				
White. 1880.	Increase.	Colored. 1880.	Increase.	White. 1890.	Increase.	Colored. 1890.	Increase.	
$\begin{array}{c} 118,006\\ 120,160\\ 120,160\\ 120,160\\ 1,002,017\\ 816,906\\ 610,769\\ 1,763,782\\ 724,693\\ 391,105\\ 346,229\\ 880,858\\ 5,016,022\\ 867,242\\ 269,939\\ 880,858\\ 5,016,022\\ 867,242\\ 269,939\\ 331,218\\ 1,377,179\\ 1,138,851\\ 646,852\\ 3,117,920\\ 454,954\\ 1,938,798\\ 479,398\\ 3,031,151\\ 662,185\\ 2,022,826\\ 591,531\\ 1,614,560\\ 142,605\\ 1,197,237\\ 1,614,560\\ 1,309,618\\ 767,181\\ 776,884\\ 163,075\\ 592,155\\ 592,537\\ 53,556\\ 419,764\\ 191,126\end{array}$	$\frac{9}{100}$ 17 22 25 29 16 20 35 29 24 16 20 35 25 20 26 6 27 3 22 3.5 20 26 6 17 23 22 27 26 6 6 37 87 176 40 37 268	$\begin{array}{c} & 59, 596\\ 26, 442\\ 85, 535\\ 38, 853\\ 725, 133\\ 11, 547\\ 18, 697\\ 210, 230\\ 604, 332\\ 685\\ 631, 616\\ 65, 104\\ 531, 277\\ 6, 488\\ 1, 057\\ 271, 451\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 451\\ 1, 451\\ 1, 453\\ 10, 057\\ 271, 451\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 453\\ 10, 057\\ 271, 451\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 403, 151\\ 1, 531, 277\\ 271, 451\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 551\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 514\\ 403, 151\\ 1, 564\\ 487\\ 43, 107\\ 25, 886\\ 488\\ 2, 385\\ 2, 43$	$\begin{array}{c c} \mathbf{H} \\ \hline & & & \\ & & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & & & \\ & $	$\begin{array}{c} 224,461\\ 139,429\\ 5,152,433\\ 1,394,981\\ 973,462\\ 731,952\\ 2,214,695\\ 824,149\\ 458,454\\ 375,701\\ 1,014,680\\ 5,918,921\\ 1,049,191\\ 337,269\\ 331,351\\ 1,585,526\\ 1,332,971\\ 3580,287\\ 554,712\\ 2,148,621\\ 539,703\\ 3,768,266\\ 830,796\\ 2,524,468\\ 816,517\\ 2,065,244\\ 224,461\\ 1,741,190\\ 1,900,099\\ 1,679,339\\ 1,111,558\\ 1,295,329\\ 202,780\\ 1,374,882\\ 729,362\\ 39,361\\ 1,052,725\\ 405,410\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{H} \\ \hline \\ 0_{0} \\ 91 \\ 16 \\ 22 \\ 271 \\ 19 \\ 24 \\ 25 \\ 14 \\ 17 \\ 8 \\ 15 \\ 18 \\ 21 \\ 25 \\ 17 \\ 14 \\ 25 \\ 22 \\ 101 \\ 14 \\ 25 \\ 24 \\ 36 \\ 27 \\ 57 \\ 45 \\ 24 \\ 36 \\ 27 \\ 57 \\ 45 \\ 17.6 \\ 27 \\ 45 \\ 23 \\ Dec. 36 \\ 134 \\ 112 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} & 75,927 \\ 29,022 \\ 105,002 \\ 49,618 \\ 863,716 \\ 13,835 \\ 23,464 \\ 218,004 \\ 692,503 \\ 741 \\ 640,867 \\ 76,772 \\ 567,170 \\ 8,091 \\ 1,057 \\ 272,981 \\ 434,300 \\ 1,474 \\ 91,734 \\ 562,893 \\ 43,453 \\ 747,720 \\ 57,624 \\ 681,431 \\ 154,131 \\ 311,227 \\ 19,305 \\ 166,678 \\ 492,837 \\ 11,184 \\ 3,458 \\ 11,437 \\ 2,603 \\ 872 \\ 52,251 \\ 33,508 \\ 358 \\ 5,580 \\ 5,164 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} H\\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ & \\ $	
133,147	933	401	327	503,843	. 277	1,514	$277\frac{1}{2}$	
35,385 67,199 19,437 29,013 142,423 108,721 35,160	$205 \\ 123 \\ 174 \\ 65.5 \\ 20$	$346 \\ 325 \\ 298 \\ 53 \\ 232 \\ 1,015 \\ 155 \\ \dots$	$\begin{array}{c} 89 \\ 57 \\ 63 \\ Dec. \ 7 \\ 97 \\ 490 \\ 496 \\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 119,424\\ 312,569\\ 56,759\\ 75,079\\ 205,684\\ 139,666\\ 51,837\\ 61,711\end{array}$	$192 \\ 158 \\ 44 \\ 28 \\ 47$	$\begin{array}{c} 1,166\\ 1,509\\ 869\\ 136\\ 334\\ 1,302\\ 228\\ 123\\ \end{array}$	$237 \\ 364 \\ 191 \\ 156 \\ 44 \\ 28 \\ 47$	
43,402,970	29	6,580,593	35	54,920,145	$\frac{1}{26\frac{1}{2}}$	7,537,173	$\frac{14\frac{1}{2}}{14\frac{1}{2}}$	




.



- 21 - The • • 1







·



